THE GOVERNMENT OF PEACE:

LIBERAL CIVILISATION AND THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE

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CANDIDATE'S DECLARATION

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgment any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

Bruce Buchan
30 September, 1999
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This thesis will explore the proposition central to liberal political thought that liberal civil societies are artefacts of a process of pacification. It will be argued that liberal attitudes to violence have been framed within an overarching discourse of civilisation in which the elimination of some forms of violence appears as the pre-eminent social problem confronting the creation of a civil society composed of autonomous, productive individuals. The aim of the thesis is to explain why particular forms of violence have been identified as problematic while other forms have been tolerated, accepted, or ignored. It will be argued that in liberal thought, this has been achieved by separating certain types of violence from the ends and values of liberal civilisation. These forms of violence are defined as barbaric, uncontrolled, and destructive, and the thesis will explore the opposition within liberal thought between 'barbaric' violence and 'civilised' peace. Throughout the thesis it will be argued that liberal thought has been shaped by the view that violence is corrosive of civil order and that the creation of civil societies requires the maintenance of conceptual and physical boundaries which 'exclude' certain forms of 'barbaric' violence while obscuring or tolerating the persistence of other violence.

In the first chapter it will be argued that this 'exclusion' has been achieved under the auspices of states which claimed a monopoly on the right to use violence within their borders. The next three chapters will examine the way that liberal discourse on violence has been shaped by the fear that the appearance of violence heralds the destruction of the rights and securities upon which civil society rests. The following four chapters of the thesis will discuss the persistent attempts made by liberal thinkers to envisage a civilised, pacified civil realm inhabited by self-governed and self-restrained individuals. In the ninth chapter the assumption that there is a boundary separating an 'inner' realm of peace and security within liberal-democratic states, and an 'outer' realm of violence and warfare will be discussed. In the final and concluding chapter, the focus will shift to the boundaries operating within the apparently already pacified realm of liberal-democratic states and societies. The effect of such boundaries has been to sustain the image of a pacified society despite an intensification of violence alongside the values and institutions which claim its elimination from civil society.
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CHAPTER 1

LIBERAL CIVILISATION,

VIOLENCE, AND PACIFICATION IN CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT

One of the effects of civilisation... is, that the spectacle, and even the very idea of pain, is kept more and more out of the sight of those classes who enjoy in their fulness the benefits of civilisation. The state of perpetual personal conflict, rendered necessary by the circumstances of all former times, and from which it was hardly possible for any person... to be exempt, necessarily habituated everyone to the spectacle of harshness, rudeness, and violence... They [savages], however thought less of the infliction of pain, because they thought less of pain altogether. ... In our own time, the necessity of personal collision between one person and another is, comparatively speaking, almost at an end. All those necessary portions of the business of society which oblige any person to be the immediate agent or ocular witness of the infliction of pain, are delegated by common consent to peculiar and narrow classes: to the judge, the soldier, the surgeon, the butcher, and the executioner. ... for it is in keeping as far as possible out of sight, not only actual pain, but all that can be offensive or disagreeable to the most sensitive person, that refinement consists.

This thesis will explore the proposition central to liberal political thought that liberal civil societies are artefacts of a process of pacification, the elimination of destructive violence. It will be argued that liberal attitudes to violence have been framed, as John Stuart Mill’s (1806-1873) opening quotation illustrates, within an overarching discourse of civilisation in which violence appears as the pre-eminent social problem confronting the creation of a civil society composed of autonomous, productive individuals. The identification of this problem and its resolution have not been uniformly expressed within the liberal tradition, but it will be suggested that continuities can be detected in the approaches taken by a variety of thinkers within this tradition. This thesis will in part be concerned with the identification of those continuities, but will focus most discussion upon the assumptions that inform them, and their implications. The primary object of study throughout the thesis is not ‘violence’ or ‘liberalism’ per se, but the way in which the understanding of each has shaped the evaluation of both. The objective is not to define or redefine violence nor to defend or execrate liberalism, but to understand the way in which violence has been understood within the liberal tradition and how those understandings have shaped both the solution to violence and the interpretation of liberalism, its values, goals and central institutions.

It will be the contention throughout this thesis that liberalism has been shaped by a discourse of civilisation in which the process of pacification was one of the most important tasks confronting the proponents of civil society. This interpretation contrasts with those which represent liberalism as doctrine of non-violence or active pacifism. On the surface, this view may not seem that different to the one to be developed in this thesis, but as the argument of this and following chapters will demonstrate, liberalism is a discourse of pacification rather than a doctrine of pacifism. The crucial distinction lies in the fact that rather than promoting the values of non-violence, liberalism throughout its development has incorporated an implicit, and at times explicit discourse of civilisation in which violence has been defined as alien to the requirements of liberal civil societies. Civilisation has thus been conceived as a process of pacification resting on disciplines of self-control and self-mastery, as Frederick von Hayek makes clear,

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The transition from the small band to the settled community and finally to the open society and with it to civilisation was due to men learning to obey the same abstract rules instead of being guided by innate instincts. And although we still share most of the emotional traits of primitive man, he does not share all ours, or the restraints which made civilisation possible.  

While liberalism is not the only tradition of thought to have been concerned with the idea of civilisation, for liberals such as Hayek civilisation appears as a synonym for progress, the upward movement in the evolution of human society from the ‘primitive’ band to the complexity of modern society. The key feature of this ‘liberal’ view, as Hayek presents it, is that civilisation involves the willingness of individuals to obey rules rather than animal instincts, and importantly, this means self-rule. In other words, a liberal theory of civilisation seeks to demonstrate that progress is accomplished by the extension of disciplines of self-mastery. Conducting oneself in a restrained manner facilitates one’s participation in the great project of creating a productive and peaceful society. Individual freedom within this society is in Hayek’s words, “an artefact of civilisation... made possible by the gradual evolution of the discipline of civilisation... [which] protects [individuals]... by impersonal abstract rules against the arbitrary violence of others and enables each individual to try to build for himself a protected domain...”.

Critics of liberalism have often failed to appreciate the significance of the discourse of civilisation within liberal thought, and thereby have usually failed to understand the connection between the ‘pacification’ of society and the promotion of the defining goals and values of the liberal tradition. Chief among these goals and values was the notion of a civil social order based on the primacy of autonomous, self-governing individuals whose self-sovereignty was founded upon the possession of exclusive rights to protection and the private ownership of property, each ensured by a system of law. Though separate from an older and not always complimentary democratic tradition, the liberal emphasis on individual rights and liberties was conducive to a variety of democracy which incorporated representative legislatures, regular though often

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2 Hayek, F.A., *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, Vol. III, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1979, pg. 160. It should be noted at the outset that I have maintained the original spelling, grammar, and gender-specific language used in the editions from which each quotation referred to in this thesis has been taken.

restricted franchises, and executives with strictly limited powers.\textsuperscript{4} Though tensions have often arisen between liberal and democratic values, the concept of liberal-democracy as it will be discussed in this thesis refers to the combination of a state bound by constitutional constraints, incorporating some form of popular franchise and an executive with limited powers, with a liberal civil society understood as a pacified zone, a realm of interaction between rights-bearing, autonomous individuals free from the taint of violence. Within this tradition, important questions revolved around what sorts of violence, or more particularly, \textit{whose} violence was to be prevented and how this was to be accomplished. It will be argued in this thesis that the liberal discourse of civilisation was thus primarily concerned with the identification and exclusion from civilised society of those types of violence deemed most injurious to the needs and requirements of liberal society. This should not be mistaken for the elimination of violence as such, but the representation of certain varieties of violence and certain individual or collective perpetrators as problematic or dangerous, requiring exclusion from civil society. Within this discourse of civilisation, problematic violence has been overwhelmingly represented as uncivilised and barbaric, while civilised conduct has been seen not only as peaceful but rational and self-governed. This has lead to the mistaken impression that civilised societies are free of violence or at least have controlled or eliminated violence from areas of social life in which civilised individuals conduct themselves non-violently.

According to one recent commentator, liberalism represents the “summit” of “civility” by successfully absorbing antagonism and irreconcilable interests in the form of “cultivated conflicts” mediated by a shared respect for law and mutual participation in the “democratic public sphere”.\textsuperscript{5} Such interpretations rest on a view of civilisation most clearly developed in Norbert Elias’ account of the development in Western Europe of “internally pacified but externally belligerent” states in his \textit{Power and Civility}.\textsuperscript{6} Elias’


account, which will be discussed in the first section of this chapter, linked the pacification of society through the extension of patterns of self-restraint with the increasing monopolisation of violence by the state. In common with liberal theories of civilisation, Elias’ account was based on the assumption that violence was barbarous, an artefact of uncontrolled nature, and therefore underestimated the degree to which civilisation has intensified rather than eliminated or even reduced violence. Critics such as Zygmunt Bauman argue that the patterns of self-restraint Elias associated with civilisation were mechanisms of moral distantiation which enhanced rather than reduced the likelihood of violence. It will be argued in the second section that Bauman’s analysis, despite identifying an intensification of violence attributable to civilisation, fails to provide a suitable explanation of why this intensification should occur. Both Elias and Bauman’s approaches highlight the problem inherent in liberal approaches to violence. In common with the liberal approach, Elias represented violence as a phenomenon of untamed nature, an outburst of unrestrained, barbaric passion while the peace of civilisation was seen as an ‘artificial’ construct separating society from nature. Bauman on the other hand reverses this position and views violence as ‘artificial’ and peace as ‘natural’. In neither case are we given a sense in which violence can be seen as something both natural to human beings and intrinsic to civilised society. This line of criticism will be developed in the third and last section in which Foucault’s analysis of the connection between the intensification of violence and the development of self-governing or self-policing methods of managing conduct will be explored. Following Foucault’s insights, it will be argued in this thesis that liberalism has been shaped by an implicit discourse of civilisation which has aimed to inculcate patterns of self-government from which violence is excluded or circumscribed by carefully constructed boundaries between realms of ‘peaceful’ self-governing conduct and non-self-governing realms in which violence is acceptable. Subsequent chapters will explore the construction of those boundaries and the representation of particular forms of violence as intrusive, barbaric, or merely problems requiring solution, while tacitly accepting the continuation of violence outside those boundaries.
I. LIBERAL CIVILISATION

Elias’ aim in *Power and Civility*, the second of his two-volume study of the “civilising process” was to trace the development of modern Western civilisation. His account of that civilisation and the process by which it emerged and assumed its current dominance was based on an approach he called “historical psychology”, the attempt to explain modern psychological traits in reference to the social, economic and political development of European history from the Medieval to the modern period. Elias’ ‘liberal’ analysis emphasised the elimination of “the coarser habits, the wilder, more uninhibited customs of medieval society with its warrior upper class, the corollaries of an uncertain, constantly threatened life” and were “softened”, “polished” and “civilised” [by the] pressure of court life... [which] enforced a constraint on the affects, a self-discipline and self-control...”. In developing his argument Elias incorporated the central themes of a liberal theory of civilisation, one which tied pacification to the extension of self-control and self-government associated with the rise in instrumental reason and self-interest, placed considerable emphasis on the importance of opinion, and the development of productive, market economies. The achievement of self-control, initially at court though subsequently outside it, and the consequent elimination of violence from most types of social interaction Elias argued, was the distinguishing feature of modern Western civilisation. This achievement however, developed alongside and in conjunction with the increasing development of the state and its successful monopoly of both violence and taxation.

The details of Elias’ account of the transition from pre-modern to modern society and the consequent changes in our psychological constitution are of less importance to the present study than the conception of violence which informs his discussion and the ways

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7 The phrase “civilising process” is used throughout the book to refer to the complex psychological as well socio-political developments in Western Europe; see ibid.
9 Ibid., pg. 7.
10 This conception of civilisation is discussed in Volume 1 of *The Civilising Process, The History of Manners*, translated by E. Jephcott, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1978, pg. 1-9, 35-39, and 51-59. Here he makes it clear that the term ‘civilisation’, national differences in usage notwithstanding, denotes a progression from an “uncivilised” to an ever more “civilised” condition. For present purposes, however, I have chosen to focus on the second volume of *The Civilising Process, Power and Civility* which is concerned less with the precise nature of the attitudinal changes in the Western psyche than with the social and political forces which brought them about.
in which he thinks our attitudes toward it have been altered. Elias' view was that Medieval men, and to a lesser extent women, experienced "free and unfettered play in all the terrors and joys of life" were "wild, cruel, prone to violent outbreaks and abandoned to the joy of the moment." Members of the knightly class in particular were given great liberty to "indulge" their passions for violence, but were consequently more exposed to the fear of becoming a victim to the violence of others. Elias suggests that this unsatisfactory situation was the result of the economic structure of medieval society, in which nobles lived from the labour of their peasants or from proceeds of their violence, and therefore did not need and could not achieve any self-control. Consequently, their lives seemed to "oscillate... between extremes" allowing "savage joys, the uninhibited satisfaction of pleasure from women, or of hatred in destroying and tormenting anything hostile."

The lack of self-control among the upper stratum of medieval society meant that an entire class of society took "delight in plundering and rape" as a livelihood. Elias' view, like those of other liberals before him, was that Medieval societies were caught in a web of violent relationships upheld by economic forces which impelled the feudal nobility to sustain themselves by violence and "constituted a regular form of income for the warriors in the barter economy, and moreover, the only one open to them." Consequently, the nobility were motivated by violence, obtained incomes by violence, and feared the loss of wealth by the violence of others. They exercised no restraint on their passions except when induced by the superior force of more powerful lords or...

11 Elias' account of the nature of medieval society and psychology reflected the work of the scholars of his time, the most notable of whom was the Dutch historian Jan Huizinga. It is worth keeping Huizinga's interpretation of the role of violence in medieval society in mind for later comparison to Elias' work. Thus, in a memorable passage, Huizinga writes, "...the contrast between silence and sound, darkness and light, like that between summer and winter, was more strongly marked than it is in our lives. ... All things presenting themselves to the mind in violent contrasts and impressive forms, lent a tone of excitement and of passion to everyday life and tended to produce that perpetual oscillation between despair and distracted joy, between cruelty and pious tenderness which characterises life in the Middle Ages." Huizinga, J., The Waning of the Middle Ages [1924], Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1955, pg. 10.
12 Elias, N., op. cit., pg. 72.
13 Ibid., pg. 241.
14 Ibid., pg. 236-237.
15 Ibid., pg. 73.
16 Ibid., pg. 69. An obvious comparison here is with Adam Smith's characterisation of the "state of property and manners from which the disorders" of Medieval societies arose because the great lords "continued to make war according to their own discretion, almost continuously upon one another, and very frequently upon the king; and the open country continued to be a scene of violence, rapine, and disorder." Smith A., An Enquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations [1776], edited by E. Cannan, Methuen, London, 1961, Volume I, pg. 437
monarchs. In this environment, the power of the nascent central authorities remained unsophisticated and brutal. The operations of power, the relations of dominance and submission were unconcealed, unmediated by complex legal systems and an autonomous system of courts. If power was to be asserted it had to be backed by a capacity for violence superior to that of the local magnates who constantly opposed the will of centralising authorities. The perpetual “centrifugal” forces of the Medieval societies and economies meant that central authorities were constantly grappling with the problem of decentralised power divided among a nobility possessing their own means of violence. Echoing Adam Smith, Elias argued that the crucial transition from Medieval to modern society was the gradual centralisation of power driven by the development of a market economy requiring greater geographic, social and economic integration. Importantly, the emergence of market structures favoured the development of cities dominated by a bourgeois class in contrast to the dispersed, rural settlements of peasants. It was in this latter development, Elias contends, that the twinning of self-discipline and state monopolisation began to assert itself.

Urbanisation encouraged the development of both royal courts and the growth of cities as centres of manufacture. The proximity of court and city life intensified and spread the need for patterns of civil conduct. Royal courts in particular became the arena in which individuals engaged in a variety of non-violent activities such as administration and entertainment requiring a degree of education, refinement of taste and moderation of violence.

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17 Ibid., pg. 72. See also, Elias, N., The History of Manners, pg. 191-205.
18 On this point see Manchester, W., A World Lit Only by Fire; The Medieval Mind and the Renaissance, Papermac, London, 1992, pg. 47-48; and Weisser, M. R., Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Europe, Harvester Press, Brighton, 1979, pg. 29-67. We shall return to this point in the later discussion of Foucault’s analysis of Medieval and modern modes punishment.
19 Thus, “[e]very baron, every viscount, every seigneur controlled his estate or estates from his castle or castles, like a ruler over his state. The power of the nominal liege lords, the more central authorities, is slight. The compelling mechanisms of supply and demand... make the vassal actually controlling the land generally less dependent on the protection of his liege lord than the latter on his services [in war]...” Elias, N., op. cit., pg. 65.
20 Smith for instance argued that feudal societies were characterised by weak central authority, and it was only through the largely “silent and insensible operation” of commerce that a more effective central government with a regular administration of laws was able to develop. Smith A., op. cit., pg. 435-437; and Elias, N., op. cit., pg. 25-28.
21 Georges Sorel argued in his Illusions of Progress that the process of civilisation became the instrument of bourgeois economic and political domination. See, Sorel, G., The Illusions of Progress [1908], translated by J. and C. Stanley, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1969, pg. 30-71.
conduct.23 Within this sphere of interaction “for the first time in secular society” individuals “lived in constant close contact in a hierarchical structure, under the eyes of... the territorial lord.”24 In this atmosphere of regular contact, interdependence, supervision and surveillance, people who were otherwise unaccustomed to self-control began to learn the need for “moderation of passions, [and] sublimation” of violent urges leading to the regularisation of a more peaceful form of interaction.25 This “polishing of conduct” under the influence of the court became more pronounced at a later point in the progress of political centralisation, but the process itself depended upon the demand for luxury goods at the courts which facilitated increasing trade specialisation and an intensification of interdependence between trades.26 The development of a market economies in which goods were manufactured for sale rather than exchange marked a decisive point in the progress of civilisation, intensifying the chains of interdependence between the increasing number of individuals who now earned a living by manufacturing.27 The geographic and social integration achieved by the extension of market relations was directly related to the successful monopolisation of violence by the nascent medieval state. This internal integration and pacification resulted in external belligerence driven by “continuing integration” which created “stable government and internally pacified” states which turned “their weapons outwards against human aggregates of the same size until, with a further integration, a still greater reduction of distances” they would converge and pacify “world society” as a whole.28 What Elias calls the “monopoly mechanism” was in reality a long and gradual process by which central authorities began to accrue the power both to exercise violence and levy and collect taxes at the expense of local lords.29 These two monopolies - of violence and taxation - were complimentary; the growth of one sustained and fuelled by the growth of the other, and the successful development of both together became the foundation of modern states.30 By means of a monopoly of violence, sustained by the revenues from

23 Elias, op.cit., pg. 75.
24 Ibid., pg. 81.
25 Ibid., pg. 77. It was at this stage, Elias argues, that the status of women at court began to rise.
26 Ibid., pg. 86.
27 Ibid., pg. 55.
28 Ibid., pg. 88.
29 Ibid., pg. 104.
30 Elias’ conception of state-building here has something in common with Michael Mann’s notion of “infrastructural power”, or the ability of states to penetrate and dominate areas of social life through the provision of infrastructural facilities such as roads, bridges, and administration. See for example, Mann, M., “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results” in J. Hall (ed.), States in History, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, pg. 113-119. The relation between the monopolisation of
taxation, the state was able to create a secure domestic environment for the “economic, non-violent” competition of the market. The growing numbers of people brought into contact and mutual dependence upon one another in the development of a market economy, fuelled the need for “more complex and stable control of conduct” driven by the overwhelming need to conform. Self-control of conduct Elias argued, was achievable solely within the confines of modern monopoly states, for only such states possessed the capacity to instil regimes of self-control. “When a monopoly of force is formed...” Elias contended, “pacified social spaces are created which are normally free from acts of violence.” Because the use of physical violence is denied to citizens, other forms of non-physical pressure may be used to induce or to coerce individuals to conform to standards of good conduct.

The reduction of physical violence did not mean that people were subjected to less pressures to conform, nor even that those pressures were benign, but merely that they did not involve the direct infliction of physical harm. The substitution of physical for non-physical forms of pressure Elias argued, was one of the defining characteristics of the civilising process; it also became in Wolin’s view a defining characteristic of liberal discourse,

Liberals proved to be unconcerned about the compulsions arising from a system of property because the pressures seemed to be impersonal and lacking in physical duress. On the other hand, liberals could become agitated over political power because it combined both a personal and a physical element.

It was for this reason that liberalism championed impersonal, economic methods of managing individual conduct, the aim of which was to moderate “spontaneous emotions”, extend “mental space beyond the moment into the past and future”, connect “events in terms of chains of cause and effect”, each of which were,

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31 Elias, N., op.cit., pg. 114. A more controversial claim is that the monopoly mechanism has an inherent tendency toward democratisation. While the initial phases of the monopoly process tends toward the concentration of power in the hands of one or a few rulers who govern in their own interests, the later phases tend toward the involvement of larger numbers of people and the recognition of the general as opposed to the private good. See for example, ibid., pg. 115.

32 Ibid., pg. 233.

33 Ibid., pg. 235.

34 Ibid. One of the more important of these is what he describes as the “monopolisation of the means of production” by an ascendant class, protected by the monopoly of violence held by the state.

...different aspects of the same transformation of conduct which necessarily takes place with the monopolisation of physical violence, and the lengthening of the chains of social action and interdependence.36

Subject to fewer of the terrors of life before state monopolisation, individuals moderated their emotional responses becoming enmeshed within networks of more "depersonalised" pressures intensifying their self-control.37 One of the most important features of subjection to what Elias called the "more permanent compulsions of peaceful functions based on the acquisition of money or prestige" was the familiarity with and tacit acceptance of the monopoly of violence held by the state,

Through the formation of monopolies of force... violence [was]... confined to the barracks... the whole monopoly organisation of force, now [stood]... only in the margin of social life as a control on individual conduct. ... a continuous, uniform pressure is exerted on individual life by the physical violence stored behind the scenes of everyday life, a pressure totally familiar and hardly perceived...38

While this stored violence was rarely used directly to induce the moderation of conduct, its more vital role was to underpin the life-long inculcation of self-controlled conduct.39

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36 Elias, N., op.cit., pg. 236.
37 Ibid., pg. 237.
38 Ibid., pg. 238-239.
39 It should be noted here that Elias' account of the emergence of more rigid forms of self-control underpinned by the state has little to say on the role of religion in this development, although he does concede at one point that the greater attention paid to the inner spiritual life by puritanism and Jesuitism contributed to the civilising process (see the footnote in ibid., pg. 295). Max Weber's views on the relationship between Protestantism and capitalism established the view that religion, and especially the Protestant sects in sixteenth-century Europe played a crucial role in the discipline of conduct. According to Weber, membership of these sects required that individuals actively display valued "qualities" or behaviours that the sect prescribed such as probity and honesty, which were "constantly and continuously bred" in the individual. See Weber, M., "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism" in H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Kegan Paul, London, 1947, pg. 320. According to R.H. Tawney, puritanism was the "schoolmaster of the English middle-classes" shaping and justifying the ideas and values of the rising middle class. See Tawney, R.H., Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1922, pg. 211. Michael Walzer has argued however, that puritanical discipline was more attuned to the need for providing regimes of regular hard work and labour for the wandering poor and unemployed of seventeenth-century England. See Walzer, M., The Revolution of the Saints, Atheneum, New York, 1970, pg. 209. The German historian Otto Hintze suggested that state monopolisation in Germany was advanced by the adoption of Calvinism by the rulers of Brandenburg-Prussia in the sixteenth-century, offering these princes a "powerful organisation" and "church discipline throughout all areas of life." See Hintze, O., "Calvinism and Raison d'État in Early Seventeenth-Century Brandenburg" in F.Gilbert (ed), The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, Oxford University Press, New York, 1975, pg. 97. More recently, it has been argued that both Lutheranism and post-Reformation Catholicism offered similar avenues for the discipline of populations outside Calvinist strongholds and that Calvinism in particular was responsible for the emergence of a doctrine of individualism which became critical in the pacification of society. "With its stress on individual conscience, culpability, and discipline, and with its regime of endless self-examination and ascetic self-abnegation, Calvinism succeeded, over the generations in transforming outward emotional expression to inner severity. One of the key themes in Calvinist sermons after the Reformation was the need to control sudden outbursts of anger: violence was unbecoming of a Christian and subversive of the social order. ... [This] resulted in the redirection of social conflict to inner psychological space." Hsia, R.P.-C., Social Discipline in the Reformation: Central Europe 1550-1750, Routledge, London, 1989, pg. 164. The
It is important to note at this stage the nature of Elias’ opposition between violence and civil conduct. For Elias, violence was wild and uncontrolled while civilised behaviour was restrained, rule-bound, and predictable. The length of chains of interdependence induced individuals to develop a greater capacity for “foresight”, and allowed the development of knowledge of what effect(s) one’s actions were likely to have. This foresight depended on the mutual acceptance of the need for “subordinating momentary inclinations” and for the elimination of “irregularities from behaviour”. This moderation and regulation of conduct constituted the means by which “animalic” behaviours such as violence and sex were “progressively thrust behind the scenes of... social life and invested with feelings of shame...”. The environment in which this regulation of behaviour, the elimination of irrationality and libidinal impulses and with it the elimination of physical violence and refinement of conduct reached its zenith were the royal courts during the period of European Absolutism in which the decisive shift within the nobility of “warriors to courtiers” was accomplished. The court became the arena in which increasing self-control and rational regulation of conduct was driven by the decline in the independent power of the nobility and the corresponding rise in importance of court life as an avenue for favour and patronage. Careers sustained by patronage however, depended upon the success with which prospective clients were able to win favour by displaying their refinement and civility. Success in this quest was increasingly divorced from the threat of violence from rivals, but was accompanied by the perpetual fear of loss of status through committing a faux pas. This anxiety over the loss of position, prestige, and status enforced a constant foresight, a calculation of the greatest advantage, the sacrifice of present gain for greater gains in the future. In other words, the development of instrumental reason and the cool calculations of self-interest promised an end to outward violence, but intensified inner anxieties and fears, Liberal man moved in a world where pain and deprivation threatened him from all sides. His fears were compressed into a single demand: social and political arrangements must ease his anxieties by securing

shaping of political discourse by religious concerns is traced in Conal Condren’s The Language of Politics in Seventeenth-Century England, St Martin’s Press, Houndmills, 1994, pg. 32-36.
40 Elias, N., op.cit., pg. 247.
41 Ibid., pg. 248.
42 Ibid., pg. 230.
43 Ibid., pg. 259. Italics in original. This transition is driven in part by the growth of state monopolisation, but also by the decline of land as a source of wealth and power.
44 All following information is taken from ibid., pg. 264-271.
property and status against all threats... to be secure was to be able to “count on things”, to be able to act with the comforting knowledge that one’s property would not be snatched away, a contract would not go unperformed, a debt would be honoured. Everything hinged on having secure expectations.46

It was in this sense that Locke wrote of freedom requiring training, education and the judicious “government” of parents and tutors, and Adam Smith urged the need for “frugality, industry, and application” as the means to a good and prosperous life.47

The pervasive fear and anxiety over the loss of prestige and status was a sign of the increasing importance attached to opinion, which in turn required the emulation of socially acceptable standards of behaviour, manners, etiquette, and the studious avoidance of shame.48 Opinion operated most forcefully at court where strict rules of conduct were expected, and their abrogation threatened a loss of favour and the good opinion of others. Within the circle of court “mutual observation” of conduct served to highlight the most “minute” and “subtle” deviation from norms arousing embarrassment and shame, tinging the inner life of individuals with greater anxiety.49 This complexity consisted in the internalisation of fears, which in less civilised periods were focussed more on external threats from others or from the environment. In this context, Elias contrasts the medieval conception of nature as fraught with danger from beasts of prey, the extremes of climate, or from the violence of thieves and vagabonds with more modern and romantic conceptions of a softened, benign nature.50

The over-riding fear of loss of status and prestige was intensified not only by the loss of favour from the powerful, but by the rise of the bourgeoisie who sought a share in the power and influence hitherto enjoyed by the nobility.51 The models of conduct which developed within what Elias called the “courtly-aristocratic society” were eventually subsumed by the rise to political dominance of the bourgeoisie necessitating new models of conduct specific to a class who “expected to work for a living”.52 Despite this

46 Wolin, S.S. op.cit., pg. 329.
49 Ibid., pg. 297.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., pg. 305.
52 Ibid., pg. 308, 306.
transition however, fears of overstepping boundaries of acceptable conduct and the consequences of overstepping them remained. Indeed, for Elias, the internalisation of fear was to be understood as one of the crucial achievements of Western civilisation, the most effective means of governing people "through themselves, through the moulding of their super-egos."53 Modern fears were directly related to increased interdependence and did not come to us from dark recesses of our long-repressed primeval memory, but were produced directly by the social structure. In other words,

Shame, fear of war and fear of God, guilt, fear of punishment or of loss of social prestige, man’s fear of himself, of being overcome by his own affective impulses, all these are directly or indirectly induced in him by other people. Their strength, their form and the role they play in the individual’s personality depend on the structure of his society and his fate within it,... the constant production and reproduction of human fears by people is inevitable and indispensable wherever people live together...54

The manipulation or manufacture of fears as a tool of governance has a long history, and has played no inconsiderable role in the growth of the modern state.55 Elias’ argument rests heavily on the notion that what modern people fear most is deliberate, physical violence, a violence which is unquestioningly associated with the past or with uncivilised peoples. For Elias, violence represented an unrestrained, passionate urge, an untamed and uncontrolled eruption of physical destruction. Despite all the civility of our modern restrained conduct, violence retained a link with the primal and primitive past, a dark and threatening force. The potential violence of the state Elias contended, was not feared by citizens of modern, civilised societies but accepted because it was thought to be safely secured by constitutional safeguards.56 This violence however, though it may indeed often be brutal and wild, may also be restrained and controlled, and the modern failure to notice violence may in part be attributed not simply to its successful camouflage, but to the very insinuation of state (and non-state) violence within the civilisation which claims to have eliminated it. To what degree Elias

53 Ibid., pg. 314.  
54 Ibid., pg. 328.  
55 On states and fear see Charles Tilly’s “War-Making and State-Making as Organised Crime”, in T. Skocpol, et.al. (eds.), Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, pg. 169-191. The importance of fear in liberal thought will be discussed more fully in the following chapter.  
56 For instance, the English liberal theorist T.H. Green argued that the gradual disappearance in Europe of states based on arbitrary rule ("dynasteia") and the development of modern constitutional states ("politeia") had involved a gradual, though still incomplete control over the state’s ability to demand military service. As he put it, “Standing armies... though existing on a larger scale now than ever before, are not products of the civilisation of Europe, but of the predominance over that civilisation of the old
celebrated civilisation as an achievement of the modern world has been a matter of considerable debate. At issue in this debate is the question of whether modern ‘civilisation’ has in fact made us intolerant of violence, or simply more passive in the face of the peculiarly modern notion that the state has the sole right to exercise violence.

II. GENOCIDE AND CIVILISATION

According to Hans Joas, Elias’ work on civilisation can be divided into an earlier and more strident celebration of the “linear process” of advancement and a later, more “ambiguous” account of civilisation and its problems.57 Burkitt suggests that Elias’ position may indeed be ambiguous and argues that Elias “did not celebrate” civilisation but rather was deeply aware of what he called its “inherently ambivalent” nature.58 According to Bauman however, Elias’ work is far from ambivalent and is in fact a prime example of the “etiological myth” dominating Western self-understanding - not to mention mainstream sociological discourse - which represents the last four or five hundred years of Western history as a “morally elevating story of humanity emerging from pre-social barbarity.”59 There is debate of course on whether Elias considered violence to have been ‘eliminated’ or simply “hidden behind the scenes” of social life, but he clearly believed that although pacified social spaces may still contain coercive pressures they were largely non-physical in nature.60 The irreducible core of Elias’ position, in common with liberalism, is that civilisation has succeeded in changing our attitudes toward the incidence of violence resulting in a distinct aversion for its barbarity, wildness, and physicality.

It is this claim that Bauman finds so misleading and dangerous, for while he agrees that our attitudes toward violence have changed so too has the nature of modern violence, making it both less noticeable and more dangerous than mere wild cruelty. The very

According to Dunning and Mennell, Elias’ theory of civilisation is more complex than either Bauman or Burkitt suggest, arguing that Elias took account not only of ‘civilising’ but ‘decivilising’ forces such as the trauma of war and the weakening of the state’s monopoly of violence. See, Dunning, E., and Mennell, S., “Elias on Germany, Nazism, and the Holocaust: on the Balance Between ‘Civilising’ and ‘Decivilising’ Trends in the Development of Western Europe”, The British Journal of Sociology, 49 (3), 1998, pg. 339-357.
The idea of civilisation as pacification "...diverts attention from the permanence of the alternative, destructive potential of the civilising process..." which in effect divests "the use and deployment of violence from moral calculus". Bauman argues that far from introducing restraints upon state violence modern civilisation, with its emphasis on technology, bureaucratic efficiency, and rationalising judgement became the "necessary condition" of genocides such as the Holocaust by giving rise to what he dryly terms the "gardening state". The 'gardening state' metaphor is used to convey the modern state's interest in social engineering, the pursuit of a "social order conforming to the design of the perfect society." Social gardening is the raison d'être of modern civilisation which pursues a 'design' for society, determines courses of action on the basis of its own blue-prints, and above all is concerned to weed-out any "pests" or other obstacles. Genocide is therefore the logical accompaniment to modern civilisation. Genocide Bauman tells us, "is a gardener's job" because "...visions of society-as-garden define parts of the social habitat as human weeds. Like all other weeds, they must be segregated contained, prevented from spreading, removed and kept outside... if all these means prove insufficient, they must be killed." The distinguishing feature of Bauman's conception of violence is that it is far from wild, barbarous and cruel, but on the contrary merely forms part of the everyday continuum of routine bureaucratic procedure. The crucial ingredient in the production of genocide for instance is the modern institution of bureaucracy with its procedures of scrupulous "authorisation" of instructions from above and "routinised" operation allowing the effective "dehumanisation" of its victims. The individual bureaucrat is shielded by the

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60 See for example, Burkitt, I., loc.cit., pg. 144-146, and Elias, N., op.cit., pg. 235.
61 Bauman, Z., op.cit., pg. 28. Italics in original.
62 Ibid., pg. 13; see pp. 87-88 on the notion of limits to state power.
63 Ibid., pg. 91.
64 Ibid., pg. 92. The use of gardening metaphors for the state has a long history, and one is reminded here of the discussion between the gardeners in Act III, scene iv, of Shakespeare's Richard II which compares Richard's difficulties in governing England to the ruthless maintenance of a garden: "Oh, what pity is it, That he had not so trimm'd and dress'd his land, As we this garden!" A more direct early use of the metaphor in the context of the discourse of civilisation and the use of violence can be found in Sir John Davies' discussion of the English Crown's difficulties in subduing the Irish, "...the Husbandman must first break the Land, before it be made capable of good feed: and when it is thoroughly broken and manured, if he do not forthwith cast good seed into it, it will grow wide again, and bear nothing but weeds. So a barbarous Country must first be broken by a war, before it will be capable of good Government; and when it is fully subdued and conquered, if it be not well planted and governed after the Conquest, it will eft-soons return to the former Barbarism." Sir John Davies, Historical Relations: Or, a Discovery of the True Causes Why Ireland was Never Entirely Subdued Nor Brought Under Obedience of the Crown of England [1664], second edition, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1983, pg. 4-5.
65 Ibid., pg. 21.
complex interaction between different levels within the bureaucratic structure, preventing her or him from having to acknowledge the effects of their actions. Therefore,

The Holocaust did not just, mysteriously, avoid clash with the social norms and institutions of modernity. It was these norms and institutions that made the Holocaust feasible. Without modern civilisation and its most central essential achievements, there would be no Holocaust.66

To convey his point Bauman contrasts two modes of anti-semitic violence under the Nazis, viz, the largely spontaneous barbarity of the mob on Kristallnacht, and the more thorough, meticulously organised and bureaucratic mass murder of the Endlosung.

The ‘Chrystal Night’ of 9 November 1938 was a dramatic incident in the escalation of the anti-semitic policies of the Nazi regime, but although many Jewish Germans were beaten or had their property destroyed, only about 100 lost their lives. According to Bauman the Chrystal Night was a “pogrom”, a largely spontaneous outpouring of mob violence, quite deadly in particular areas but unsustainable beyond the undisciplined rage of the moment.67 What distinguished the Nazis from centuries of such pogroms was the carefully planned, technologically advanced, purposeful, and sustained killing which took place under the auspices of the bureaucratic plan of the ‘Final Solution’. Now Bauman does not argue that genocide itself was a modern creation, but that the Holocaust was “unique among other historic cases of genocide” because it combined bureaucratic planning and efficiency with technology (especially in transportation and chemistry), under the cover of the modern inability to apply moral reasoning to the state’s claim to exercise violence in the name of the social good.68 Far from eliminating or even suppressing violence, the process of civilisation has resulted in the mere “redeployment” and “re-distribution of access to violence” resulting in its increasing invisibility.69 The monopolisation of violence by the state has rendered it neutral, it has become a tool or “technique” administered through bureaucratic procedures and state functionaries.70 Bauman argues the monopolisation of violence by the state entails that violence is not simply directed at other states, but is also used within states. Furthermore, and in contrast to Elias, Bauman contends that the division of labour has

66 Ibid., pg. 87.
67 Ibid., pg. 89-90.
68 Ibid., pg. 94-95.
69 Ibid., pg. 96-97.
70 Ibid., pg. 98.
created a greater sense of distance between individuals thus increasing the likelihood of violence.

Within bureaucratic structures the division of labour results in an ever more restrictive specialisation of tasks and functions enabling fewer functionaries to know precisely how the entire structure functions and what purposes it fulfils. The only considerations that matter within the bureaucratic structure Bauman contends, are those of efficiency, the measurement of how successfully tasks get completed and these 'technical' considerations are far removed from moral evaluation of the purposes and ends bureaucracies serves. The emphasis on technical knowledge and judgement accompanying the division of labour creates a moral "distantiation" between individuals who can be bureaucratically classified as "a set of quantitative measures." This is what Bauman refers to as dehumanisation, and it not only characterises the way in which bureaucracies operate but in fact enables modern states to pursue genocide. Modern bureaucracy, Bauman contends "has a logic and a momentum of its own" which "like the brooms of the sorcerer's apprentice - easily move beyond all thresholds at which many of those who gave it the push would have stopped, were they still in control of the process they triggered." In other words, modern bureaucracies have evolved all the techniques and procedures for dealing with human beings as if they were no more than a set of numbers, a problem to be solved. The employment of violence against those people can be more efficiently administered by bureaucrats who are structurally and functionally incapable of seeing the violence, or of recognising its 'victims'. Modern bureaucracies are thus "intrinsically capable" of pursuing genocidal purposes; a capability which is awakened by the modern obsession with a planned society.

The Holocaust Bauman contends, was the result of the pursuit of a racially pure society by means of the functional specialisation and routine operation of Germany's bureaucracy. The Jews themselves became a category precisely defined by rigorous legalistic methods which stipulated the criteria of Jewishness (and thereby of

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71 Ibid., pg. 99.
72 Ibid., pg. 101.
73 Ibid., pg. 102.
74 Ibid., pg. 104.
75 Ibid., pg. 106. Italics in original.
Arianism). The ‘Jewish problem’ became a matter of administration; the signification, housing, Ghettoisation and eventually the transportation and extermination of Jews were questions requiring precise, technical knowledge. As the Jews increasingly became the objects of bureaucratic procedure and administration they were also increasingly divorced from the rest of society, both physically in terms of having to wear badges and live in ghettos, and psychologically in terms of being seen as a problem, as carriers of disease or agents of racial degeneration. The more the bureaucracy administered the Jews and the ‘Jewish problem’ the more the Jews themselves were separated from normal society and robbed of their humanity, increasing the probability that they would become the targets of bureaucratically administered violence. According to Bauman therefore, the Holocaust and genocide in general is inherent in modern civilisation, and is not attributable to the particular historical circumstances in Germany at the time.78 Bauman’s approach explicitly diverges from the Sonderweg or ‘special way’ thesis which explains the Holocaust in terms of the special economic and cultural conditions which caused Germany’s modernisation to ‘go wrong’, leading to an “excessive dependence on the state” and eventually to genocide.79

For Bauman genocide can only be attributed to the convergence of the two most central features of modern civilisation, the bureaucratic state and the desire to pursue a planned society.80 The moral distanciation separating perpetrators from victims is not the product of a deficient morality but of the elimination of moral considerations by

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76 Ibid., pg. 125.
77 Ibid., pg. 124-129.
80 Bauman, Z., op.cit., pg. 106. One should note here similar analyses such as Henry Reynolds’ attribution of the genocide of Australian aboriginal peoples by European settlers and colonial authorities to continuous policies of exterminism throughout the colonial period lasting well into the twentieth-century. Reynolds, H., Frontier, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1996, pg. 53-57, 83-130.
instrumental, rational calculation. Bureaucratic procedures are the chief “morality-eroding mechanisms” and are,

...strengthened by the principle of sovereignty of state powers usurping supreme ethical authority on behalf of the societies they rule. Except for diffuse and often ineffective ‘world opinion’, the rulers of states are on the whole unconstrained in their management of norms binding on the territory of their sovereign rule. ... What follows is that under modern order the ancient Sophoclean conflict between moral law and the law of society shows no signs of abating. If anything, it tends to become more frequent and more profound - and the odds are shifted in favour of the morality-suppressing societal pressures.

Genocide is thus literally inseparable from the orderly functions of the bureaucracy, and the violence it entails becomes unrecognisable because we moderns are incapable of morally evaluating the bureaucracy and its functions. For Bauman then, genocidal violence is neither barbarous, untamed, or uncontrolled, and to see it in those terms is to fall victim to the ‘etiological myth’ of civilisation, that genocidal violence is a “manifestation of pre-social or a-social drives bursting out from their socially manufactured cages...” signalling a “return to a pre-social state, or a failure to depart from it.” This myth is unable, in Bauman’s view, to adequately explain why “...the culturally trained revulsion against violence” was unable to prevent genocide and more importantly, why “civilised manners showed an astounding ability to cohabit, peacefully and harmoniously, with mass murder.”

This ‘cohabitation’ was accompanied by the moral and physical distancing achieved through the use of various “distancing technologies” such as modern weapons which remove the proximity, visual and physical contact between combatants. Similarly Bauman argues that engineers and scientists working in offices far from the killing fields perfected designs for gas chambers without taking any responsibility for the use of their ideas. The moral separations accomplished by modern civilisation are vital in overcoming what Bauman clearly believes is a natural inhibition to commit violence on

81 Bauman, Z., op.cit., pg. 194.
82 Ibid., pg. 199.
83 Ibid., pg. 170, 174-175.
84 Ibid., pg. 110.
85 Shapiro, M., Violent Cartographies; Mapping Cultures of War, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1997, pg. 77-80.
86 Bauman, Z., op.cit., pg. 197.
those whom one can see, hear, or feel. Morality he suggests, is “inextricably tied” to “proximity” or the physical and visual connection between subjects,

...morality seems to conform to the law of optical perspective. It looms large and thick close to the eye. With the growth of distance, responsibility for the other shrivels, moral dimensions of the object blur, till both reach the vanishing point and disappear from view.

According to Michael Freeman, Bauman’s analysis isolates genocide from other forms of violence, such as warfare and state-building. The merit of this charge draws attention to Bauman’s celebration of the ‘pre-social’, pre-reflexive moral sense implicit in visual relations which leads him to argue that the desire to commit violence can only be explained by the pervasive influence of “artificial”, un-natural modes of thought.

Yet if such modes of thought were artificial, it is hard to understand why they should ever have become so pervasive. Bauman admits that genocides are comparatively rare, but he fails to address the possibility that genocide is only one of many forms of violence in modern societies. By focusing on the Holocaust Bauman stops short of offering a more developed theory of violence, because the violence of which he speaks is by definition episodic and artificial even though the potential for its appearance is ever-present in the conventions and norms of civilised society. His position rests on a reversal of the liberal view that violence is natural or barbaric and peace artificial and civilised, only to leave us without an adequate understanding of ‘artificial’ violence. According to Bauman the willingness to commit violence is increased when one is unable to ‘see’ it as such, and this involves not only the moral separation of victims from perpetrators but the actual shuttering of violent acts behind closed doors. It was for this reason that a means had to be found to “optically separate the killers from their victims”, resulting in the transition from mass shootings to the gas chambers. But is it the case that violence has been removed from sight, or is it that we simply cannot recognise what we see as violent? What Bauman’s approach is unable to address is the possibility that perhaps violence may reside as much in what we see as how we see it.

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87 Ibid., pg. 155.
88 Ibid., pg. 192.
89 Freeman, M., loc.cit., pg. 209.
90 Bauman, Z., Modernity..., pg. 95.
91 Ibid., pg. 106.
92 Ibid., pg. 26.
III. ADMINISTERING VIOLENCE; GOVERNING THE PEACE

The association of vision and proximity with violence in modern civilised societies was an issue of particular concern to Michel Foucault, whose work uncovers some connections between the intensification of violence and the development of self-policing and self-governing methods of managing conduct. Foucault's analysis provides a possibility of seeing civilisation as a process of inculcating patterns of self-government from which violence is not necessarily eliminated, but excluded by carefully constructed boundaries between the realm of self-governing conduct (civil society) and non-self-governing realms (namely uncivil societies such as the family and prisons). The development of arenas of 'peaceful' self-government is therefore accompanied by the concentration, intensification, or simple acceptance of violence in other areas. Violence which intrudes upon civil society is therefore represented as barbaric, a problem to be solved or an obstacle to be eliminated, while violence outside this realm is overlooked or ignored.

According to Foucault, the rise in population levels and growth of urban centres attendant upon the emergence of a market economy in Western Europe heralded an important transition in crime and criminality consisting in a reduction in cases of overt physical violence, murder, and assault but an increase in cases of property-related crime, such as theft and fraud.93 What was important about this transition however, was the bearing that it had on the emergence of new social structures and relations of power which redefined crime and criminality and its solution. In other words, the decline in violence to which Foucault refers was not simply a consequence of an advancing 'civilisation' or pacification of human relations, rather,

...the shift from a criminality of blood to a criminality of fraud forms part of a whole complex mechanism, embracing the development of production, the increase of wealth, a higher juridical and moral value placed on property relations, stricter methods of surveillance, a tighter partitioning of the population, more efficient techniques of locating and obtaining information: the shift in illegal practices is correlative with an extension and refinement of punitive practices.94

A concern for the population and its wealth was the defining characteristic of this emergent discourse of government. Within established patterns of monarchical

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94 Ibid., pg. 77.
authority centred on the person of the ruler as the source of authoritative commands within a given territory, a new “art of government” emerged in which government came to be seen not simply as the seat of all authority, but a regulator of the health, wealth, and stability of a population over which it cast a keen eye. As a consequence, modern liberalism incorporated the idea that the purpose of government was “the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health... on which government will act either directly... or indirectly through techniques that will make possible, without the full awareness of the people, the stimulation of birth rates, the directing... of population into certain regions or activities...”.96

These concerns were at the heart of the emergence of a new mode or rationale of power, in effect a “bio-power”, which aimed not at the elevation of sovereign authority but the creation of healthy individuals and productive societies, the maximisation of the health and life of a population. Consequently, the aim of government was to understand how to nurture a healthy population, requiring knowledge of its “specific phenomena and its peculiar variables: birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, state of health, frequency of illness, patterns of diet and habitation.” The mechanisms of this new “biopolitics of the population” aimed at understanding, evaluating and measuring the needs of the population, maintaining its health and growth, encouraging productivity, ensuring internal security and stability rather than showing itself in acts of “murderous splendour”. This new art of government required extensive surveillance, observation, and a steady accumulation of detailed knowledge of the identities, beliefs, habits, and customs of the people. Foucault’s analysis aims to reveal how the violent authority of sovereign monarchs gave way to a new form of power based on observation and surveillance. In this new form of power the gaze of an un-seen other was crucial in the substitution of violent authority by discipline and self-mastery.

One version of this new art of government, particularly strong in Continental Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth-centuries centred on the activities of ‘police’ in

96 Ibid., pg. 100.
99 Foucault, M., The History of Sexuality, pg. 139 and 144.
regulating areas of social and economic life representing a "great effort of formation of the social body".100 The rationale of this art of government was that the pursuit of the health, wealth and well-being of society required the efficient regulation of areas of social life by an exhaustive policy of investigation, supervision and control by authorities invested with the power to carry out such functions in order to "produce a well ordered civic or territorial community."101 Another version of the new art of government, which is the focus of this thesis, emerged partly in response to the discourse of police and came to be associated most closely with Anglo-Scottish thought and provided impetus to the development of modern liberalism.102 This 'liberal' discourse was premised on the view that securing the health, wealth and well-being of society could best be achieved by ensuring that individuals would regulate their own conduct.103 Liberalism's characteristic concern has therefore been the maximisation of personal liberty, which was thought to be necessary if society was to become an efficient wealth-producing entity. This liberty however, was underpinned by a variety of disciplinary mechanisms aimed at securing individual self-mastery. Within the discourse of police, government was conceived as an activity of integration and command of the various institutions of regulation. Within liberal discourse by contrast, the chief task of government was to produce a self-regulating society through a variety of disciplinary processes, some of which (such as prisons and armies) operated under direct government control others of which (such as churches, schools, and work places) were relatively autonomous.104 It will be argued in this thesis that a liberal discourse of civilisation emerged in response to the perceived need to create a pacified society, to eradicate the violence which obstructed orderly discipline and the health, wealth and productivity of civil society.

From a Foucauldian point of view, liberal concerns for individual liberty were premised on the effort to arrange social, economic and political institutions in such a way that

103 This is the purpose of Foucault's celebrated discussion of Bentham's Panopticon, discussed below.
104 Ibid., pg. 4.
individuals could be enabled to manage their own conduct. The problems of government thus revolved around the adjustment of "...the mechanisms of power that frame the everyday lives of individuals... [and] assumes responsibility for and places under surveillance their everyday behaviour, their identity, their activity". The development of a liberal art of government had less to do with the exercise of sovereign power within a given territory than it did with the development of a range of interdependent disciplinary processes which focussed on the well-being of a population. It was in this vein that reformers such as Henry Fielding stipulated that "the Strength and Riches of a Society consist in the Numbers of the People..." and that social well-being required, inter alia, the elimination of the burden of the poor. It was in this light that he counselled the need to focus attention on the "Customs, Manners, and Habits of the People" in order to prevent "Disorder", stimulate trade and commerce by which the poor may be disciplined to shake off "their Vassalage" and became independent citizens shunning wasteful habits such as drunkenness and gambling.

The emergence of such disciplines and the recognition that government's role was to ensure that they functioned smoothly represented a fundamental shift from a monarchical notion of power based on the absolute sovereignty of the ruler over the subjects within a clearly defined territory. According to this older view, the power of the sovereign consisted in his or her capacity to prohibit or proscribe certain acts; it was therefore a negative power conveyed above all in the public use of violence by the sovereign. On this view crime and criminality could only be seen as acts of defiance against the sovereignty of the ruler, and the punishment of such defiance had to re-establish the absolute physical superiority of the sovereign over the felon. The severity of the punishments meted out to criminals and the publicity given to the tortuous executions were symbolic representations of the triumph of the sovereign's

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105 Foucault, M., op.cit., pg. 77-78.
109 Foucault, M., loc.cit., pg. 93.
As Foucault put it, the “right to punish” was “an aspect of the sovereign’s right to make war on his enemies”, and “public execution” was “a ceremonial by which a momentarily injured sovereignty... [was] reconstituted” by a publicly displayed “invincible force.” The sovereign’s right to punish was indissolubly linked to the same right to make war; the execution of the criminal was the culmination of a kind of war between the all-powerful sovereign and the criminal in which the complete victory of the sovereign is publicly displayed and celebrated.

The development of a new ‘governmental’ paradigm of crime and punishment was characterised by what Foucault called a “double process” marked by the “disappearance of the spectacle and the elimination of pain.” What this represented was not so much a civilised elimination of violence, as an alteration in the forms of violence. The emergence of a ‘governmental’ conception of crime and punishment can be charted in the work of a host of reformers in a variety of fields, who sought was to replace what was increasingly perceived as the “bad economy of power” and punishment of sovereign power, being both excessive and inefficient, and to replace it with “a new ‘political economy’ of the power to punish” which sought “not to punish less, but to punish better”.

A prime example of this trend can be found in the writings of penal reformers such as Henry Fielding (1707-1754) who argued that execution,

...should be in some degree private. ...A Murder behind the Scenes... [if correctly managed] will affect the Audience with greater Terror than if it was acted before their Eyes. ... If Executions therefore were so contrived, that few could be present at them, they would be much more shocking and terrible to the Crowd without Doors than at present, as well much more dreadful to the Criminals themselves...

The Italian reformer Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794), similarly sought reform of what he called the “useless prodigality of punishment” which merely hardened criminals, and impeded the orderly exercise of the law, concluding that punishment should “never be

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111 Foucault, M., op. cit., pg. 48, 49.
112 Ibid., pg. 50.
113 Ibid., pg. 11.
an act of violence committed by one or many against a private citizen”, used as “little as the circumstances will allow, proportionate to the crime, and established by law.” \(^{116}\)

The rationale of this new form of punishment was the development of new and more efficient mechanisms for the management of conduct.\(^ {117}\) The prominence given to prison reform is one aspect, albeit a crucial one, of a wider attempt to mould societies in such a way that the excessive and inefficient displays of sovereign authority may give way to a more subtle, consistent, and comprehensive means of managing human conduct which increased the efficiency and productivity of society itself.\(^ {118}\) The emergence of a liberal art of government was thus accompanied by the desire to create systems of law which were universally applicable throughout society, regulating individual conduct and limiting state power.\(^ {119}\) While the introduction of more moderate and consistent punishments clearly softened the terrors and tortures of public execution, it was symptomatic of the substitution of the desire to destroy the body of the felon by the need to correct and retrain the mind of the criminal through a whole series of techniques designed to manipulate or train the individual criminal to become a profitable and productive member of society.\(^ {120}\) It is in this context that Foucault speaks of the whole range of techniques or disciplines, not only in the penal system but in the military, in education, in the hospitals and factories which effect a “meticulous control” of the body, aiming to “increase... the mastery of each individual over his own body.”\(^ {121}\) Many of these disciplines incorporated pre-existing forms, but each attempted to enclose, partition, and organise the sphere of individual action, to enforce a framework of interaction in which each individual looks upon themselves as one part of an interlocking social whole. The function of the individual is therefore to independently organise their activities in harmony with the activities of everyone else requiring self-


\(^ {117}\) Rosen argues that Foucault’s analysis of this transition in the mode and rationale of punishment implied that it merely replaced “one system of tyranny and terror with a worse one.” Rosen, F., “Crime, Punishment and Liberty”, History of Political Thought, XX (1), 1999, pg. 173. This criticism however, misses the point, for Foucault did not suggest that the changes effected by the penal reformers amounted to a ‘worse form of tyranny’. Rather, these reforms were designed to extend the mechanisms of discipline to include the ‘correction’ of inmates with the intention of making them capable of freedom and self-government. In other words, Foucault would agree with Rosen that, as the latter expressed it, the penal reformers sought to bring “the idea of liberty to bear on the problem of crime and punishment.” Ibid., pg. 174.

\(^ {118}\) Foucault, M., Discipline and Punish, pg. 85.

\(^ {119}\) Ibid., pg. 90.

\(^ {120}\) Ibid., pg. 136.
control of the minute details of action, timing, gesture, and form. The central aim of these disciplines was to create an ordered society of “docile” individuals who become as it were, well-trained, biddable, and predictable components of the social machine.

The militaristic overtones of this conception of an ordered society often found expression in models of society as a well-drilled military machine. The emergence of modern military science with its emphasis on tactical skill - the ease and reliability of movement - marks for Foucault a decisive point in the rise to dominance of disciplinary power.

It may be that war as strategy is a continuation of politics. But it must not be forgotten that ‘politics’ has been conceived as a continuation, if not exactly and directly of war, at least of the military model as a fundamental means of preventing civil disorder. Politics, as a technique of internal peace and order, sought to implement the mechanism of the perfect army, of the disciplined mass, of the docile, useful troop, of the regiment in camp and in the field, on manoeuvres and on exercises.

The well-drilled, professional armies of Western European states in the Baroque age were guarantors of peace in a double sense. They were instruments of peace-keeping within states not simply by deterrence, but also in that the process by which such armies were created provided a whole series of techniques for disciplining society in general. Thus the rise of modern armies became a mechanism for “maintaining the absence of warfare in society” ensuring the emergence of “meticulous military and political tactics by which the control of bodies and individual forces was exercised within states”.

The model of disciplined armies inspired images of a disciplined society from which uncontrolled violence had been eliminated and the routine operation of manifold disciplines made the use of massive violence to ensure obedience largely unnecessary. Nonetheless as Foucault also noted, the “life-administering power” of modern governments provides them with the knowledge and the means to wage more bloody wars and commit genocide on their own or other populations.

121 Ibid., pg. 137.
122 Indeed, it should be noted that the development of modern military organisation under the auspices and in the service of monarchical regimes indicates how interdependent the old monarchical and the new disciplinary regimes were. For example, see ibid., pg. 141-162.
123 Indeed Foucault provides a pertinent symbol of this interdependence in the minting of a medal to commemorate Louis XIV’s first military review. The medal itself and Foucault’s discussion of it illustrate the point well. See ibid., fig. 1 (opposite pg 166) and pg. 188-189.
124 Ibid., pg. 168.
125 Oesterich, G., op.cit., pg. 182.
126 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pg. 168.
127 Foucault, M., History of Sexuality, pg. 136-137.
Within the disciplinary regime each subject is observed, information is compiled and checked, judgements are made about the subject's responses. This is what Foucault refers to as a "physics of power" operating "according to the laws of optics and mechanics, according to a whole play of spaces, lines, screens, beams, degrees and without recourse, in principle at least, to excess, force or violence."  In other words, the subject's behaviour is measured and evaluated according to norms of appropriate conduct, deviations from which incur penalties administered by authorities within the disciplinary structure. This 'normalising' judgement required constant observation by means of inspection or examination, and its implicit purpose was to implant within the individual the will to display a repertoire of predictable, appropriate behaviours. In reflecting on this intimate 'fabrication' of the individual, Foucault had occasion to offer his now famous redefinition of power,

The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an 'ideological' representation of society; but he is also a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power that I have called 'discipline'. We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 'excludes', it 'represses'... In fact, power produces; it produces reality... The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production.  

For both Elias and Foucault, the disciplinary processes which have shaped the lives of individuals have also wrought a historic shift in attitudes toward violence. The similarity ends here however, for whereas Elias stressed the importance of growing chains of mutual interdependence in the extension of social pacification, for Foucault violence gradually recedes from the social world as it is replaced by institutions which subject potentially violent, undisciplined individuals to the rigours of hierarchical observation and normalising judgement.  

For Elias state monopolisation provided the vital framework within which the civilising (pacifying) process took place. For Foucault, the question of what role the state plays in

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129 Ibid., pg. 194.
130 Among such individuals, Foucault lists the young, the sick, the mentally ill, and delinquents as subjects of the most rigorous discipline. Ibid., pg. 193. The primary example Foucault employs to illustrate the modelling of institutions on principles of observation and normalising judgement was Jeremy Bentham's *Panopticon*, a penal institution which sought to isolate each inmate from all others while subjecting all to the permanent but unnoticeable gaze of the warders. In the Panopticon, "...each actor is alone, perfectly individualised and constantly visible. ... [and thereby] ... the inmates... [are] caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers." Ibid., pg. 200-201.
the extension of disciplinary power is altogether more ambiguous. In his lecture on governmentality, Foucault argues that the shift toward an art of government centred on the management of the conduct of a population reduced the emphasis placed on traditional notions of state sovereignty. Indeed, in contrast to the fixed certainties of older notions of sovereignty Foucault refers to the “governmentalisation of the state” as a process of “continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not...” This process involved the transition from “the traditional, ritual, costly, violent forms of power” to more modern “subtle, calculated technologies... of subjection.” As the older violent operations of the state receded however, new police and penal functions emerged and new accommodations had to be made. Indeed, Foucault argues that modern liberal-democratic notions of popular sovereignty and personal rights were underpinned by the enhanced disciplinary power developed within the institutional and legal framework of states.

The emergence of a liberal art of government can thus be charted by the criticism of arbitrariness, inefficiency and corruption of monarchical authority. As John Milton (1608-1674) asked for example, “[c]an the folly be paralleled, to adore and be the slaves of a single person... and we without him might do more easily, more effectually, more laudably our selves?” was it “such felicitie to wear a yoke? ... knockt on by illegal injurie and violence?” Behind such attacks upon personal sovereign authority was an ambition which became central to the liberal tradition, the creation of a society of self-governing individuals guided solely by reason,

Certainly then that people must needs be madd or strangely infatuated, that build the chief hope of thir common happiness or safetie on a single person... The happiness of a nation must needs be firmest and certainest in a full and free Council of thir own electing, where no sigle person, but reason only swaies. And what madness is it... to devolve all on a single person; and more like boyes under age then men, to commit all to his patronage... [for] we need depend on none but God and our own counsels, our own active vertue and industrie...

133 Ibid., pg. 103.
134 Foucault, M., Discipline and Punish, pg. 221.
135 Ibid., pg. 222.
137 Ibid., pg. 212.
The desire to create a productive society of self-mastered citizens is reflected in Milton’s view that only in a ‘free commonwealth’ could children be thoroughly schooled in the manner of “civilitie” and “verte” ensuring that the nation would become “more industrious”, “ingenuous”, “potent”, and “honourable”, for “...of all governments a Commonwealth aims most to make the people flourishing, vertuous, noble and high spirited. Monarchs will never permitt: whose aim is to make the people... softest, basest, vitiousest, servilest, easiest to be kept under... in minde also sheepishest...”138

For later liberals, these concerns were formulated more explicitly in John Locke’s (1632-1704) image of civil society governed by opinion and consent, Adam Smith’s (1723-1790) ideal of a self-regulating market, or of Jeremy Bentham’s (1748-1832) dream of society as a “gymnasium”,

...in which every man exercises himself before the eyes of every other man. Every gesture, every turn of limb or feature, in those whose motions have a visible influence on the general happiness, will be noticed and marked down.19

The notion central to these conceptions of society was that each envisaged significant spheres of self-regulation built upon the effective self-mastery of each individual citizen. The aim of enhancing this self-mastery was often accompanied by the dream that government and the state could be “reduced to the smallest amount possible, and freedom increased to the greatest amount possible” when,

...human nature will have become so moulded by social discipline into fitness for the social state, that it will need little external restraint, but will be self-restrained... [and] the spontaneous cooperation which has developed our industrial system... will leave the primary governmental agency nothing beyond the function of maintaining those conditions to free action, which make such spontaneous cooperation possible...140

Such an ideal was premised upon disciplinary power which functioned according to its own internal rules and procedures more or less independently of conscious personal control by any single individual, group, government or state. This project was the aim of liberal theories of civilisation, and central to such theories was the image of civil society as a pacified zone. For Foucault however, the operation of the disciplinary institution par excellence - the prison - indicates that this pacification was premised on

138 Ibid., pg. 227.
the exclusion rather than the elimination of violence. Prisons do not eliminate crime or violence but administer them, subjecting them to institutional control. Inmates for example are introduced to careers of petty criminality or “delinquency” in prisons which are “politically or economically less dangerous” to society than vagabondage or banditry.¹⁴¹ Unlike the ‘masterless men’ of former ages, modern ‘delinquents’ are regulated by the prison system which institutionalises its members and prevents their illegality from becoming popular.¹⁴² The following chapters of this thesis will explore this exclusion of violence in liberal thought, accomplished by an implicit and at times explicit theory of civilisation.

IV. THESIS OUTLINE

Foucault’s work on government and on liberalism as a rationality of government in particular, takes us well beyond the limitations of the approaches of Elias’ ‘liberal’ theory of civilisation and Bauman’s critique. For Elias, violence was represented as it has been in liberal thought as an outburst of natural fury to be controlled by carefully crafted manners and rigorous self-control. Bauman's insightful criticism of this approach draws attention to the ways in which these apparent mechanisms of control have been implicated in the intensification of organised, bureaucratic violence. Bauman’s approach however, rests on the assumption that peace is a ‘natural’ inclination obstructed by violence which is a product of artificial modes of conduct and control, and thus can provide few clues as to how forms of ‘violence’ have been used to create ‘peace’. While Foucault’s work is suggestive of a different approach to the relationship between violence and peace, neither Foucault nor any of those who have sought to extend and develop his analyses of liberalism have concerned themselves directly with the question of violence and liberal civilisation.¹⁴³

¹⁴² Ibid., pg. 278-279. Foucault refers to Eric Hobsbawm’s work on social banditry here, but Western political discourse is replete with examples of denunciations of the ‘idleness’, ‘criminality’, and violence of ‘masterless men’. Christopher Hill has recently provided a useful discussion of the origins of this fear of masterless men, vagabonds and pirates within English history in his Liberty Against the Law: Some Seventeenth Century Controversies, Penguin, London, 1996, pg. 49-63 and 115-118. On Locke’s response to the problem of idleness and vagabondage see the last section of Chapter Five in this thesis.
¹⁴³ A possible exception to this rule are some recent papers by Pasquino to which I refer in subsequent chapters.
This omission will in part be addressed in this thesis which will be concerned with the ways in which violence has been defined and attitudes toward it have been shaped within liberal discourse. In writing this thesis the aim has not merely been to assess those definitions but to explore the ways in which particular forms of violence have been identified as problematic while other forms have been tolerated, accepted, or ignored. It will be argued that this has been achieved by conceptually and normatively isolating certain types of violence from the ends and values of liberal civilisation. These forms of violence are seen as barbaric, uncontrolled, and destructive, and subsequent chapters will explore the opposition between 'barbaric' violence and 'civilised' peace within liberal discourse, focussing first on discussion of the conceptual boundaries which have been used to limit the definition of violence before turning in the second half of the thesis to a discussion of the theory of civilisation itself. Throughout the thesis it will be argued that liberal discourse has been shaped by the view that violence is corrosive of civil order and that the image of a liberal civil society has been premised on the view that civil society has been civilised and pacified. This pacification however, is premised upon the existence of conceptual and physical boundaries around and within civil society which 'exclude' certain forms of 'barbaric' violence while obscuring or tolerating the persistence of other violence.

The following chapter (Chapter Two) will examine the fear of both civil and state violence in liberal political thought. The predominant liberal response to those fears it will be argued, has been a quest to imagine liberal society as a pacified space, a zone of personal interaction from which the appearance of violence has been excluded, though the threat of it remains. Within liberal political thought violence has been conceptually and normatively constrained, its definition circumscribed, and claims of its elimination from civil society have provided a basis for legitimacy. The next two chapters will explore some of the implications of the conceptual limitation of violence, beginning with a discussion in Chapter Three of the limitations placed on the definition of violence, political violence, and terrorism. The effect of these limited definitions is in part to quarantine violence from the 'pacified' public sphere, and the implication of this conceptual quarantine, which will be discussed in Chapter Four, is that forms of violence which disrupt the order on which civil society depends denote illegitimacy and a return to barbarism. The implication of this view, illustrated in liberal analyses of civil strife and revolution, is that civil order depends upon the inculcation of orderly,
self-governing conduct, and the following four chapters will explore the ways in which a liberal discourse of civilisation arose and attempted to embody this design.

Chapter Five will examine early-modern conceptions of both ‘civil society’ and ‘political society’ (that is government and the state) as deliberate creations of bodies of men who had the intention of ensuring mutual protection of life, liberty and estate. This view was premised on the exclusion from civil society not merely of troublesome violence, but those deemed incapable or unworthy of inclusion and therefore subject to the harsher disciplines of uncivil society. The boundary between civil and uncivil society thus distinguished the realm of freedom, rights, property, and peace from a wider realm of subjects over whom violent methods of control were deemed not only permissible but necessary. The firm distinction made in early liberal thought between the endemic violence of the state of nature and the non-violence of the civil and political state however, also entailed fears that while ostensibly protecting society against violence the state may threaten a worse violence of its own. The predominant ‘solution’ to this problem lead toward the development of a liberal theory of civilisation focussed on the development of societies based on commerce and trade. Chapter Six will discuss the impact of the transition from a predominantly land-based to a commercial economy in late seventeenth-century Britain and its influence on early formulations of the ‘solution’ to the ‘problem’ of violence.

The following chapters will address subsequent attempts to address this ‘problem’, beginning in Chapter Seven which will be concerned with the relation between the domestic disciplines of civilisation which operated largely within societies, and their effect on the external or international behaviour of the states which shielded and protected them. In Chapter Eight, the emergence of a ‘liberal orthodoxy’ on the connection between commerce and both internal and external pacification will be identified. This pacification was nonetheless accompanied by the defence of violence outside the civilised world, especially in the colonies of the imperial powers. Chapter Nine will assess the influence of such assumptions in contemporary liberal international relations literature, while Chapter Ten will discuss the ‘exclusion’ of violence from recent literature on civil society. It will be argued in conclusion that such ‘exclusions’ obscure the continuation and indeed the intensification of violence within liberal states and civilised societies.
CHAPTER 2

LIONS AND POLE-CATS:

FEARS OF CIVIL AND STATE VIOLENCE IN LIBERAL THOUGHT

...what Security, what Fence is there in such a State, against the Violence and Oppression of this Absolute Ruler? The very Question can scarce be born. They are ready to tell you, that it deserves Death only to ask after Safety. Betwixt Subject and Subject, they will grant, there must be Measures, Laws, and Judges, for their mutual Peace and Security: But as for the Ruler, he ought to be Absolute, and is above all such Circumstances: because he has Power to do more hurt and wrong, 'tis right when he does it. To ask how you may be guarded from harm, or injury on that side where the strongest hand is to do it, is presently the Voice of faction and rebellion. As if Men quitting the State of Nature entered into Society, they agreed that all of them but one, should be under the restraint of Laws, but that he should still retain all the Liberty of the State of Nature, increased with Power, and made licentious by Impunity. This is to think that Men are so foolish that they take care to avoid what Mischiefs may be done them by Pole-cats, or Foxes, but are content, nay think it Safety, to be devoured by Lions.

Western political and social thought has been dominated by 'the problem of order', the attempt to explain how order is possible, how it is to be achieved, and how best to maintain it.\(^1\) Lying behind the problem of order is often a fear of violence as the ultimate negation of order, the chaos which makes order necessary.\(^2\) The question 'how is order possible?' is therefore often accompanied by the implicit question, 'how is violence preventable?' The problem of violence or more particularly, the fear of violence and what it entails has been a persistent (though at times unobtrusive) theme in liberal political thought which, although not the only theory to be worried about the prospect of violence, is nonetheless haunted by a particular fear of the origin, nature and effects of violence.\(^3\) It will be the aim of this chapter to identify those fears and to indicate how they have shaped the liberal response to the problem of violence and order. The argument presented here is that liberalism has been haunted, as John Locke's opening quotation exemplifies, by fears both of civil violence (Locke's pole-cats) and state violence (Locke's lions); the former fear alleviated by means of a peace-keeping state, but the latter fear exacerbated by the suspicion that augmented state power threatens a worse violence. Flowing through liberal discourse then is a tension between the perceived need for states to avert civil violence, and the concern that such states are themselves a danger to the liberal order. Continual attempts to expiate these fears have left liberalism caught, as it were, between Scylla and Charybdis, both needing the state to ensure protection, but fearing the consequences of state power.

Neither this chapter, nor the thesis itself will attempt to resolve this problem; rather, the aim is merely to explore the way in which the problem of violence has been framed within liberal discourse with a particular (though not exclusive) focus on early contract theory. The prominent place given to violence in this early literature contrasts sharply


however, with its near absence from more recent liberal thought. Contemporary liberal thought focuses more attention upon the debates centred around human rights, individual liberty, tolerance and pluralism, constitutional government, the separation of powers and legal equality. In the wake of the liberal-communitarian debate, critics and partisans of modern liberalism were polarised into opposing camps, and liberals tended to concentrate their efforts on a vigorous and at times uncritical defence of its key values and practices. Some responded by envisioning liberalism as a "...fair and stable system of co-operation between free and equal citizens..." regulated and encompassed by a conception of "justice as fairness". Others characterised liberalism as a system which placed ultimate value on individual choice as an end in-itself, or emphasised 'political values' such as liberal neutrality toward conceptions of the good. Other defenders sought to uphold the concept of personal autonomy or "the need for toleration" as central liberal values. Partly in response to communitarian attacks on 'thin' notions of the good in liberalism, other commentators tried to define liberalism in terms of distinct and particular liberal goods or ends, such as Galston's identification of key 'liberal virtues', such as courage, loyalty, and independence.

Within this literature the concept of violence, and especially the fear that it was a continuing problem in liberal societies received comparatively little attention, outside of the acknowledgment that "[v]iolence by the state" and "[p]hysical violence by individuals against others" threatened "individual rights and individual dignity... open-

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minded, reasoned debate” and indeed “the whole basis of a liberal society.”9 In their academic writings, contemporary liberals seem largely to have over-looked the problem of violence. The most important exception to this observation has been John Keane’s recent important study Reflections on Violence which will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter. Keane observes that in contemporary liberal (and other) political thought violence has been “clothed in an aura of strangeness”, shunted into the background and ignored.10 “It is ironic”, suggests another commentator, ...that contemporary liberalism should appear so naive. The fundamental ideas of liberal theory were born in a crucible of violence, or the threat of it, in early modern Europe.11

Keane attributes this curious absence of attention to a variety of factors the most important of which he says is a “simply inexcusable” failure to learn “to think in pain” or the fact that liberalism “has forgotten the experience of pain...”.12 Neither of these explanations seem quite to grasp the nature of the omission which makes it sound rather random, a simple slip of the mind. As John Kekes puts it, it is not “that liberals are unaware of the relevant facts or that they try to ignore them” but that “their attempts to accommodate these facts in their political morality are utterly ineffectual.”13 In other words, the omission of violence from contemporary liberal discourse reflects a fundamental assumption that liberalism has provided a solution to the problem of violence. The result of making such an assumption is a “Panglossian” faith that the arrangements of liberal societies will lead to social harmony.14 Such faith sustains the central plank of liberalism, that the creation of more individual autonomy will lead to greater social harmony and the reduction of violence.15

This thesis will attempt to establish that the lack of attention given to the problem of violence can be attributed to the nature of liberalism itself, for it will be argued that

11 Creppell, I., “Locke on Toleration: The Transformation of Constraint”, Political Theory, 24 (2), 1996, pg. 200. One of the few exceptions to this naivety was Alfred Cobban’s In Search of Humanity; The Role of the Enlightenment in Modern History, George Braziller, New York, 1960, pg. 13-19. Cobban’s focus however, was not on liberalism per se, but the empiricist and utilitarian doctrines of the Enlightenment.
12 Keane, J., op.cit., pg. 7.
15 Kekes, J., op.cit., pg. 24-45.
liberalism is above all a discourse premised on the idea of civilisation understood as a process of pacification. This chapter will focus on the nature of the problem of violence within liberal thought, and the prominence once given to the fear of violence. The chapter will begin with a brief discussion of the fear of violence in recent liberal discourse, and it will be noted that conservative critics of liberalism have tended to understand far better than most liberals that liberalism is based on a pervasive fear of violence. In the second section, attention will turn to the work of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) who though himself not a liberal in the modern sense, nonetheless established the fear of civil violence that was to recur throughout the liberal tradition. The third section will be devoted to a discussion on the fear of state violence in early liberal discourse, and especially in the work of John Locke (1632-1704). Despite the fact that fears of violence no longer occupy a prominent place in liberal thought, it will be argued in conclusion that the dual fears of violence have shaped characteristic features of liberal conceptions of politics. The typical response liberals have made to the problem of violence has been to advance a politics of strict containment, a politics of limits and boundaries against the threat of violence, the implications of which for the understanding and definition of violence (and politics) will be discussed in more detail in the following two chapters.

I. FEARFUL LIBERALISM?

Some of the strongest critics of liberalism have focussed their attacks on the distinctive emphasis placed in earlier liberal thought on the need to exclude violence from the sphere of civil relations. Joseph de Maistre for instance was critical of democracy on the grounds that it weakened sovereignty by obscuring the distinction between ruler and ruled. The basis of any political order, in de Maistre's view was a sovereignty he defined as "...a repressive power that acts on the subject and that is external to him." Such power was manifested in the person of the executioner whom he described as "...the horror and the bond of human association. Remove this incomprehensible agent from the world, and... order gives way to chaos, thrones topple, and society


18 Ibid., pg. 120.
In contrast to this rather gruesome image of social order, liberalism posited a social order held together not through fear but mutual self-interest resulting in a peaceful civil society. The rather surprising recent rehabilitation of the work of Carl Schmitt has focussed attention upon his strident critique of this aspect of liberal thought. According to Schmitt, politics could only be understood in terms of the fundamental dichotomy “between friend and enemy” in which there was “…the real possibility of physical killing”. Schmitt castigated liberals however, for denying this dichotomy and subordinating politics to the primacy of the market and private property confining it thereby “...to securing the conditions for liberty and eliminating infringements on freedom.” Such an approach was anti-political in denying the essentially violent nature of politics. For Schmitt, the “essence” of liberalism lay in “negotiation, a cautious half-measure, in the hope that the definitive dispute, the decisive bloody battle, can be transformed into a parliamentary debate which permits the decision to be postponed forever in an unending discussion.”

According to John McCormick, Schmitt sought to revive fear in politics by pointing to the ever-present possibility of civil war which could be averted only by submitting to a state which would determine and enforce the distinction between friend and foe. Liberalism however, sought to circumvent such fears by emphasising the mutual fraternity of pluralistic society and by failing to entrust sufficient power to the state. Where liberalism went wrong in Schmitt’s view, was in ‘neutralising’ Hobbes’ conception of the sovereign state ruling through fear, and in prioritising the individual

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and their mythical ‘right to protection’. Liberalism thereby denuded the state of true sovereignty by seeing it as a mechanism to fulfil the prior right of individuals to protection, whereas for Schmitt, any right to protection for individuals was solely determined by the “initiative” and “prerogative” of the state itself.

Within contemporary liberal discourse, few now acknowledge that “...the right to protection against public and private violence... [is] among the core values of liberalism.” The reason for this is that contemporary liberalism considers violence alien to liberalism and to liberal polities. Researchers such as R.J. Rummel for instance, have expended considerable effort to prove that liberal-democracies are non-violent and that therefore “...the less democratic a government, the more likely it will kill its own citizens in cold blood.” Rummel’s view is that within liberal-democratic polities violent conflict has been supplanted by “…voting, negotiation, compromise, and mediation... enhanced and supported by the restraints on decision makers... pluralism... rational debate, toleration... conciliation, and conflict resolution.” An arguably more ambitious example of this celebration of the liberal solution of the problem of violence is Francis Fukuyama’s End of History which sees in modern liberal states the institutionalisation of “compassion” and intolerance for “violence, death, and suffering manifested in “popular sovereignty... rights, the rule of law, [and] separation of powers...”

Almost alone among contemporary liberals, Judith Shklar argued that liberalism is or should properly be based upon a pervasive fear of violence. In Ordinary Vices, Shklar reiterated Montaigne’s plea that we should put cruelty or the “…wilful inflicting of physical pain on a weaker being in order to cause anguish and fear...” first on the list of vices. Although putting cruelty first on the list of vices did not lead directly to an

27 Ibid., pg. 273-277.
28 Ibid., pg. 279.
30 Rummel, R.J., “The Politics of Cold Blood”, Society, 27 (1), 1989, pg. 33. He also claims that there is a tendency within recent scholarship to deny or attack the liberal pacification of politics. Ibid., pg. 36.
33 Shklar, J., Ordinary Vices, Belknap Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1984, pg. 8. One should note here the work of other liberals who have approvingly referred to Shklar’s work, such as Rorty, R., Contingency,
endorsement of liberalism, the intolerance of cruelty and suffering she thought remained "...a powerful part of the liberal consciousness."34 Shklar’s fearful or “dystopic” liberalism had its “deepest grounding” in the conviction,

...born in horror, that cruelty is an absolute evil, an offence against God or humanity. It is out of that tradition that the political liberalism of fear arose and continues amid the terror of our time to have relevance.35

The liberalism of fear however, was fearful not simply of state violence per se; even the most liberal polity must make use of coercive measures. Rather, the liberalism of fear was fearful of invasive or arbitrary acts of cruelty by the state which inflicted pain and suffering on individuals, and threatened to corrode the rights and freedoms which were the chief virtues of liberal societies.36 Shklar claimed that the separation of the private realm of individual freedoms entrenched in a system of rights from the public realm of politics and state provided a defensible boundary against the violence and cruelty of the state.37

Shklar’s liberalism of fear however, was far from a generalised, passive fear of despotic government it was also a positive programme, a conception of politics. This politics was based on the mistrust of states and the desire for a “...constant division and subdivision of political power”, matched by a commitment to a society consisting of autonomous voluntary associations which become “...significant units of social power...” capable of checking the power of government.38 Indeed Shklar argued that the liberalism of fear should be understood as foundational, a visceral response to suffering maintained as Harold Laski once put it, “by fear rather than good will.”39 Despite its relative absence from contemporary liberal writings, the conception of a social order built upon a foundation of fear has played an important part in the development of early


Ibid., pg. 43.


Ibid., pg. 29.

Shklar, J., loc. cit., pg. 24. Shklar’s essentially pessimistic liberalism contrasts with April Carter’s rather more optimistic “humanist liberalism” which traces ‘liberal pacifism’ to its respect for individual autonomy, and toleration of diversity of belief and lifestyle. See Carter, A., loc.cit., pg. 149.

Ibid., pg. 30.

liberalism. In the following section it will be argued that what was most feared by these earlier thinkers was not state but civil violence.

II. CIVIL VIOLENCE: "WHERE EVERY MAN IS ENEMY TO EVERY MAN"

The fear of what has here been called ‘civil violence’ is a fear of spontaneous, uncontrolled and chaotic violence between individuals and groups in society. Such fears were characteristic of, but by no means limited to contractarian doctrines of the state of nature in which only a sufficiently strong state could put an end to the endemic civil violence of the state of nature and ensure mutual protection and self-preservation of citizens. This indeed was Thomas Hobbes’ approach, who although not himself a liberal in the modern sense, was chiefly concerned with the problem of how to ensure that social order could be imposed on humans whose natural inclination was to look to their own advantage. His solution was to argue for a Leviathan state capable of preserving social order by denying its citizens the unhindered exercise of their rights, foremost among them the right of individual sovereignty, of private judgement and complete self-determination. Hobbes’ political thought can be interpreted as an attempt to construct a method by which citizens may be persuaded of the virtue of having in the state a supreme, sovereign coercive entity, and to accept that subjection to such an authority is in everyone’s best interest. The means by which he accomplishes this end is to imagine a realm where there is no common power and unchecked civil violence rages; this realm is the state of nature.

According to Hobbes’ all individuals possessed a ‘Natural Right’ to preserve themselves and “may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre” to do so. From this Hobbes derived the natural law imperative that we should “seek Peace” and that,

40 King, P., op.cit., pg. 77, 282.
42 One recent commentator has written that Hobbes may be said to be “...the supreme philosopher of fear, and his political theory the apotheosis of fear.” Indeed, as Hobbes himself put it in speaking of the circumstances of his own birth as England awaited what seemed like immanent invasion from the Spanish Armada in 1588, “For Fame had rumour’d that a Fleet at Sea, Wou’d cause our Nations Catastrophe/ And hereupon it was my Mother Deat/ Did bring forth Twins... both Me, and Fear.” Wood, N., “Sallust’s Theorum: A Comment on ‘Fear’ in Western Political Thought”, History of Political Thought, XVI (2), 1995, pg. 186.
...a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe.44

Natural Laws however, no matter how reasonable were not sufficient in themselves to ensure observance “[f]or the Lawes of Nature... without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions... And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.”45 Consequently, no individual would brook obstruction to action and the Natural Right of self defence became in effect a “right to everything”, the liberty to seek any advantage over others, to protect oneself from attack by pre-emptively attacking, over-awing, or otherwise controlling others. Life in the state of nature was therefore dominated by the fear of violent death at the hands of some other individual, for Hobbes believed that human beings were sufficiently equal that no person could be completely invulnerable to attack46 The search for security in such a state Hobbes assured us, impelled a constant search for power or the means to obtain one’s ends.47

But while Hobbes was clearly worried that the human desire for prestige, power, and wealth made violence inevitable in the absence of authority, he also believed that violence was not the most efficient way of ensuring one’s self-interest. Self-interest could only be partially secured in the state of nature because everything was uncertain. The reason was that violence was an option for all to try; individuals were tempted to use “[v]iolence, to make themselves Masters of other mens person, wives, children, and cattell... [or] to defend them... [or to avenge any] signe of undervalue...”48 Consequently,

...during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and as such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. ...[which] consisteth not in Battell only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known...49

The fear of civil violence then, was a fear that violence stalked every person in his or her dealings with others, and that the potential emergence of violence made all

44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., pg. 223.
47 Ibid., pg. 150, 161.
48 Ibid.
uncoerced association, co-operation, culture, industry or agriculture untenable, resulting in "continuall feare, and danger of violent death" making "the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."  

Hobbes was quite explicit that social union could only be ensured by binding, authoritative laws and that to be effective, laws required a power of enforcement, "[w]here there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice". The ceaseless and chaotic violence of the state of nature was thus contrasted to the benefits of social order, law, and justice which were dependent upon a strong central power. Of course the state of nature was a hypothetical construction which was used as a method of justifying obedience to an all-powerful sovereign state, but as Bobbio points out, Hobbes' model of the state of nature was supplied in the horrors of the English Civil War and served as a pointed reminder of the consequences, discussed in later chapters of the *Leviathan*, of state disintegration. The striking images of antagonism, conflict, and violence Hobbes employed in describing the state of nature had a deeper symbolic importance. The state of nature represented for Hobbes the very opposite of social order; it was as Preston King has put it, "a condition and disposition which exists where government is suspended or destroyed."

For Hobbes therefore, the state of nature was not merely the incarnation of mutual antagonism and hostility. It was intended to represent the prospect of a condition in which violence was within the reach and right of every person. The state of nature was "the negative mirror image of social order... intended to depict disorder as the opposite of order: conflict rather than cooperation...". A well-ordered and peaceful society in Hobbes view, was one in which contracts or "co-operative understandings involving reciprocal obligations" were honoured. Such contracts however, were no more binding than Natural Laws without some force behind them to compel their observance. Consequently, the state had to possess sufficient means of violence to compel, and had

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55 Rule, J.B., *op.cit.*, pg. 22.
the capacity and right to use ‘awesome’ violence, or “so much Power and Strength... that by the terror thereof... [the sovereign] is inabled to forme the wills of them all [the subjects]...”\textsuperscript{56} The renunciation of the natural right to all means of obtaining advantage over others Hobbes argued, could be thought of in terms of a contract between individuals to “give up my Right of Governing my selfe...” to the sovereign and to “Authorise all his [the sovereign's] Actions...”.\textsuperscript{57} In forfeiting this “right to everything” the crucial sacrifices were the individual rights to private judgement, to use violence, and to resist the sovereign’s commands.\textsuperscript{58}

In effect, Hobbes argued that the right to resist was incompatible with the powers and rights of the sovereign. The individual right to private judgement and the supposed right to resistance would threaten to overturn social order.\textsuperscript{59} According to Reinhard Kosselleck, Hobbes recognised that the decline of authoritative standards of ethical conduct and the consequent appeals to the authority of private conscience during the Reformation represented “a downright causa belli civilis.”\textsuperscript{60} The sovereign state was therefore the guarantor of social order, but as such the sovereign had to possess absolute power and be obeyed absolutely. This meant that the state was to possess the capacity for massive violence, but such violence was of a different order and magnitude to that of spontaneous civil conflict. As opposed to petty, private violence for individual advantage state violence was administered, institutionalised and served the overall interests of the state and hence was a benefit to society as a whole.\textsuperscript{61} Nonetheless, Hobbes maintained that the sovereign and the order it maintained was haunted by the fear of the re-emergence of civil violence and consequent disorder. Whenever the sovereign was challenged and overcome by internal revolt or invasion from outside, the state of nature loomed as the inevitable result and in such a case,

...is the Common-wealth DISSOLVED, and every man at liberty to protect himselfe by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto

\textsuperscript{56} Hobbes, T., \emph{op.cit.}, pg. 227.
\textsuperscript{57} \emph{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{58} Hobbes believed nonetheless, that individuals could still legitimately claim a right to self-defence, even in the face of the sovereign's request that the individual kill him or her self, but this did not entitle individuals to rebel against or overthrow the sovereign in the name of self-defence. See for instance Baumgold, D., “Pacifying Politics: Resistance, Violence, and Accountability in Seventeenth-Century Contract Theory”, \emph{Political Theory}, 21 (1), 1993, pg. 13-15. See also Hobbes, T., \emph{op.cit.}, pg. 268-269.
\textsuperscript{59} Hobbes, T., \emph{op.cit.}, pg. 229.
\textsuperscript{61} This is evident in Hobbes' discussion of the rationale of punishment. See for example Baumgold, D., \emph{Hobbes's Political Theory}, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, pg. 109-111.
him. For the Soveraign, is the publique Soule, giving Life and Motion to the Common-wealth; which expiring, the Members are governed by it no more...62

The conclusion to which Hobbes' argument headed was that violence was the ruin of social order, but that social order could only be forged by institutionalising violence. Moreover, the violence of the state of nature could never be securely eradicated; it lurked just beneath the brittle surface of civility, and threatened to return all to a state of hopeless brutality.63

Within the liberal tradition violence has continued to be associated with nature, and its solution was conceived in terms of the fabrication of a civil order to solve the problems of nature. The creation of a civil order was thought essential by Benedict Spinoza (1634-1677) for instance, who was clearly worried that if the supreme law of nature - self-preservation - were not curtailed by an independent but benevolent authority ceaseless violence would result.64 The corollary of such a view was that once the civil state had been created, the reappearance of violence between citizens seeking their own advantage would ensure a return to the state of nature. This fear was a chief concern of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who saw the state of nature in starkly Hobbesian terms, a "lawless state of savagery..." in which the "brutish freedom" of individuals made "calm and security" impossible.65 The terror of the state of nature was not simply the fact of hostilities, but the potential for it to erupt at any given moment,

For even if... [the state of nature] does not involve active hostilities, it involves a constant threat of their breaking out. Thus the state of peace must be formally instituted, for a suspension of hostilities is not in itself a guarantee of peace.66

A state of peace was only guaranteed within the framework of a "lawful state", a constitutional system of government capable of upholding and enforcing legally binding rules.67 Kant was quite explicit that a state must be able to restrict the unlimited freedom of each individual and establish harmony between individual freedoms (which

63 At one point Hobbes implores his readers to reflect on their own insecurities. Why else, he asks, do we travel armed and lock up our possessions at night unless we fear that even those who are close to us might use violence against us to rob or dispossess? *Ibid.*, pg. 186-187.
66 Kant, I., "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch", in *Ibid.*, pg. 98.
Kant referred to as *right*), thereby securing each “against attack from any others.”\(^{68}\) Behind his admission that “man is *an animal who needs a master*”, lay a barely disguised fear of the consequences for society and the civilising influences of society if civil violence were to break out.\(^{69}\)

This fear was most clearly displayed in his criticisms of the right of rebellion, similar in many respects to Hobbes’. For a state to be able to guarantee order and Right it must be unchallengeable, for it alone provided the only bulwark against a return to nature. Kant was worried however, by the pernicious doctrine that the true end of governments was not *right* but the pursuit of individual happiness.\(^{70}\) Given the abundance and variety of human happinesses, no constitution could endure its citizens determining for themselves when and if their happiness was sufficiently satisfied. The just commonwealth by contrast must be “irresistible” and forbid its citizens the right “to resist the will of the legislator by violent means”, because the notion that citizens may have a right to insist on securing their happiness was “a maxim which... would destroy the whole civil constitution and put an end to the only state in which men can possess rights.”\(^ {71}\) Even in the case of tyrannous rule,

...all resistance against the supreme legislative power, all incitement of the subjects to violent expressions of discontent, all defiance which breaks out into rebellion, is the greatest and most punishable crime in a commonwealth, for it destroys its very foundations. This prohibition is *absolute*.\(^ {72}\)

What Kant feared most of all was that if human beings only sought happiness in social union resistance would become a common right, and this could only end in “…a state of complete lawlessness…” a return in other words to the rampant civil conflict of the state of nature.\(^ {73}\)

\(^{68}\) Kant, I., “On the Common Saying: ‘This may be True in Theory, but it Does not Apply in Practice’, in *ibid.*, pg. 73. (Hereafter referred to as “Theory and Practice”)

\(^{69}\) Kant, I., “Idea for a Universal History...” in *ibid.*, pg. 46. It should be noted here that Kant, along with other liberals such as Humboldt, did not argue that the civil state should do away with conflict altogether, only violent conflict. The natural desire to compete with others was the driving force behind the development of all the cultural achievements which “adorn mankind”. *Ibid.*, pg. 45-47.

\(^{70}\) Kant, I., “Theory and Practice” in *ibid.*, pg. 79-80.

\(^{71}\) *Ibid.*, pg. 81.

\(^{72}\) *Ibid*.

\(^{73}\) *Ibid.*, pg. 82.
The creation of the civil state did not completely remove the danger of a return to civil conflict, it merely deferred it. As James Madison (1751-1836) put it, violence was an ever present possibility in society,

So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property.74

Inequalities attendant upon a market economy in conditions of scarcity,75 were also a concern of David Hume (1711-1776) for whom private possessions were "expos'd to the violence of others" due to the insufficient "quantity of them to supply every one’s desires and necessities."76 Hume’s fellow countryman Adam Smith, was also concerned about the appearance of violence which he hoped the impartiality and flexibility of the market would largely resolve.77 Although in favour of a minimal state, Smith clearly saw a need for a sufficiently strong and coercive state with instruments of violence at its disposal. He considered defence from external threats and the maintenance of internal peace the first two duties of the sovereign.78 But Smith was quite clear that so far as civil violence was concerned, the accumulation of substantial property and wealth made the state and the use (or potential use) of state violence necessary. As he put it, for “one very rich man there must be at least five hundred poor” and consequently,

The affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor, who are often driven by want, and prompted by envy, to invade his possessions. It is only under the shelter of the civil magistrate that the owner of ... valuable property... can sleep a single night in security. He is at all times surrounded by unknown enemies... from whose injustice he can be

75 Wolin, S.S., Politics and Vision; Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1961, pg. 322-323. Daniela Gobetti argues that the language of rights employed in Natural Law thought restricts the discussion of conflict to “external goods” or possessions, while excluding conflicts over control of “personal resources” such as labour. Therefore control over the “personal resources” of “women and slaves” was accomplished by the exclusion of women and slaves from the “social contract”. See Gobetti, D., “Goods of the Mind, Goods of the Body and External Goods: Sources of Conflict and Political Regulation in Seventeenth-Century Natural Law Theory", History of Political Thought, XIII (1), 1992, pg. 45-47.
76 Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature [1739, 1740], Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1969, pg. 539. On the necessity of government, see pg. 541. Annette Baier reminds us, however, that Hume was also possessed by the fear of state violence, particularly the tendency for magistrates and officials to be over zealous in their execution of justice, relying too often on excessively cruel punishments. Baier,A.C., “Moralism and Cruelty: Reflections on Hume and Kant”, Ethics, 103, 1993, pg. 440.
protected only by the powerful arm of the civil magistrate continually held up to chastise it.79

Echoes of this fear can sometimes be heard in contemporary libertarian thought. Ludwig von Mises for example, warned that social life "would be quite impossible" if law-abiding individuals could not obtain protection from the "force and compulsion" of the law used against the "enemies of society".80 We have here a return to the original problem posed by Hobbes, that human egoism entails a potential for enduring civil violence. This problem necessitated for Smith as it did for Hobbes, the creation of states with violent instruments of coercion at their disposal, even though those states were differently conceived by each. Although Hobbes was not concerned at the prospect of a Leviathan state, subsequent liberals were desperately concerned at the prospect that the state, having curbed civil violence would proceed to exercise its own worse violence. Caught by fears of these two forms of violence, liberalism has been characterised by a continual search to define and control that most ambiguous of liberal concepts, the state.

III. SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS: FEARS OF STATE VIOLENCE

Notwithstanding the influence of Hobbes' solution to the problem of civil violence, liberalism has come to be associated more closely with a fear of state power and the violence at the disposal of its functionaries. In Montesquieu's (1689-1755) Spirit of the Laws for instance, the concern for the provision of individual security was outweighed by the fear that a government without divisions of power was liable to become despotic and rule by force and fear.81 A model of such a government was presented in the harem depicted in the Persian Letters, a regime based upon solitary rule and discipline, often arbitrarily imposed. Montesquieu was clear that this regime of discipline was held together by the twin means of surveillance and violence, described in a letter from Usbek the master of the harem to his chief eunuch, in which he wrote,

Let fear and terror be your accompaniment. ...inflict punishment and correction. Put everyone into a state of dismay... interrogate everyone... subject them all to your formidable inquiry. ... Expose the most hidden

79 Ibid., pg. 232.
80 von Mises, L., Liberalism: A Socio-Economic Exposition, translated by R.Raico, Sheed Andrews and McMeel, Kansas City, 1962, pg. 35. Similar sentiments are expressed on pages 52, 57, and 58.
secrets. Purify this sordid place and return it to the virtue it once possessed.82

The authors of The Federalist Papers, influenced in part by Montesquieu, were of the opinion that the correct ordering of the state and government would cure the ills of civil and state violence.83 In the ninth letter Alexander Hamilton (1755-1804) considered the chief virtue of the United States’ constitution to rest in the balance it struck between centralised (federal) and decentralised (state) power. This balance avoided both centralised tyranny and “splitting... into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord...”84 Madison however, was resigned to the persistence of faction or collective conflicts and of the inability of any society or government to remove their causes completely.85 Rather, he concluded that such conflicts could only be dissipated within a strong state with representative institutions, encompassing a large territory and population.86

Within fifty years of Hamilton’s and Madison’s advice on how best to avoid discord and violence however, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) expressed his fear of violence from the very same institutions they recommended,

...the main evil of the present democratic institutions of the United States does not arise... from their weakness but from their overpowering strength; and I am not so much alarmed at the excessive liberty which reigns in that country, as at the very inadequate securities which exist against tyranny.87

The dilemma in which liberalism had become ensnared was how to ensure sufficient protection against civil violence without tipping the balance toward the probability of excessive state violence. In formulating the classic statement of this dilemma John Stuart Mill returned to the violent and threatening imagery of nature,

To prevent the weaker members of the community from being preyed upon by innumerable vultures, it was needful that there should be an animal of prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them down. But as the king of vultures would be no less bent upon preying on the

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83 Alexander Hamilton is quite clear that such a government must include a federal division of power, a system of checks and balances, an independent judiciary, and regular election of representatives. Hamilton, A., Madison, J. and Jay, J., The Federalist [1787-1788], The Belknap Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1974, pg. 125.
84 Ibid., pg. 126 and 124.
85 Ibid., pg. 130-131.
86 Ibid., pg. 135.
flock than any of the minor harpies, it was necessary to be in a perpetual attitude of defence against his beak and claws... to set limits to the power which the ruler should be suffered to exercise...

The prominence given to this dilemma within liberal discourse owed much to the work of John Locke whose involvement in the political struggle against the rule of James II forced him into treading the fine line between the need for strong states, and the confinement of their power.

Like Hobbes, Locke's thought was imbued with the spirit of Natural Law and his thought incorporated the familiar distinction between the natural and the civil condition even though his conception of each differed substantially from that of Hobbes. Locke began with the axiom that the use of reason revealed the chief propositions of natural law namely, that each individual should seek above all else their own preservation, but that they should also seek "to preserve the rest of Mankind, and may not... take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the Preservation of the life, the Liberty, Health, Limb or Goods of another." In the state of nature however, the power and supreme right to uphold these natural laws lay in the hands of each individual and there was no superior authority to judge or to prevent violations of Natural Law. Consequently the state of nature, although quite benign and certainly more peaceful than Hobbes or Kant envisaged, was dogged nonetheless by the fear of civil conflict. This problem derived from the fact that without a supreme authority individuals could not be hindered from pursuing their own interest to the detriment of others, and the right to punish such offences lay with each person who suffered such infractions. Locke was quite clear however, that the wilful decision to contravene Natural Laws placed the offender beyond the pale of reasonable treatment, for their actions threatened to replace reason and security with violence,

In transgressing the Law of Nature, the Offender declares himself to live by another Rule, than that of reason and common Equity... [essential for] mutual security: and so he becomes dangerous to Mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass against the whole Species, and the Peace and safety of it... every man... by the Right he hath to preserve

Mankind in general, may... bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that Law, as may make him repent... and thereby deter him...\textsuperscript{91}

Importantly, Locke spoke of violence as a characteristic of the \textit{natural} rather than the \textit{civil} state and those who used violence were denounced for “having renounced reason” and were therefore no better than “a Lyon or a Tyger, one of those wild Savage Beasts, with whom Men can have no Society nor Security...”\textsuperscript{92} The decision to inflict violence upon another placed the perpetrator in a “\textit{State of War... a State of Enmity, Malice, Violence, and Mutual Destruction...}” with the rest of humanity.\textsuperscript{93} In the state of nature individuals had the right to kill those who, by their own actions had placed themselves in a state of war,

...for the same Reason, that he may kill a Wolf or a Lyon; because such Men are not under the ties of the Common Law of Reason, have no other Rule, but that of Force and Violence, and so may be treated as Beasts of Prey, those dangerous and noxious Creatures...\textsuperscript{94}

Locke’s state of nature while more benign than Hobbes’, was far from Kant’s “Arcadian, pastoral existence of perfect concord, self-sufficiency and mutual love.”\textsuperscript{95} The fear of civil violence was fuelled by the suspicion that individuals would judge their own misdemeanours more lightly than those of others, and that no impartial judge would be found.\textsuperscript{96}

Locke’s repeated use of the imagery of nature in describing violence highlighted the fact that the solution to the barbarity of violence lay in the manufacture of a ‘political society’. For Locke as indeed for Hobbes, the state alone was capable of guaranteeing order and security within which individual freedom, within the confines of law was preserved,

To avoid this State of War... is one great reason of Mens putting themselves into Society, and quitting the State of Nature. For where there is an Authority... there the continuance of the State of War is excluded... \textit{Freedom of Men under Government}, is, to have a standing Rule to live

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., pg. 272.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., pg. 274.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., pg. 280.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., pg. 279.
\textsuperscript{95} Kant, I., “Idea for a Universal History...” in H.Reiss (ed.), \textit{op.cit.}, pg. 45.
\textsuperscript{96} Locke, J., \textit{op.cit.}, pg. 276.
by, common to every one... and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of another Man.97

The artifice of government was the bulwark against the state of nature; if government toppled, society would return to a natural condition and become a mere "[m]ultitude, without Order or Connexion."98 Locke was quite certain of the benefits of living under government and a state, but it was not just any sort of state. The state Locke had in mind was a disciplined state with a limited executive, incorporating an elected legislature and a constitution,

...whereby provision is made for the Continuation of their Union, under the Direction of Persons, and Bonds of Laws... by the Consent and Appointment of the People, without which no one Man, or Number of Men... can have Authority of making Laws, that shall be binding to the rest.99

The state of which Locke spoke was a circumscribed and regulated state, bound by constitutional rules and dedicated to the preservation of individual property and freedom. He also argued however, that a state could only guarantee individual life, liberty and estate if it possessed sufficient coercive capacity to deter civil violence.100 Consequently, in the civil state individuals renounced they’re natural sovereignty or the right to be their own judge and ‘executioner’. This right devolved upon the state making it the sovereign entity which could alone judge and determine when to use violence in both international warfare and the punishment of civil offences.101 The limitations imposed on government and the state reflected Locke’s concern to guard against the exercise of excessive violence by the state against the lives, liberty, and estate of property-owning citizens in civil society.102 The fear of state violence however, was enlivened by the prospect of ‘undisciplined’ conduct in its two most important manifestations, tyranny and rebellion.

For Locke, violence was a dangerous force which threatened to destroy the fragile foundations of the artifice of political society, but such threats could originate in the ill-

97 Ibid., pg. 282. For Locke, violence is to be abhorred because it is tantamount to slavery, the denial of a person’s freedom of action (which is the chief virtue of the state of nature - the ability to act freely).
98 Ibid., pg. 411.
99 Ibid., pg. 407-408.
100 Ibid., pg. 350-351.
101 Ibid., pg. 324, 350-353. It is just this sovereignty which was possessed by each individual in the state of nature and is placed into the hands of the state in civil society. See for example ibid., pg. 324 and the First Treatise, in ibid., pg. 238.
discipline of both citizens and rulers. In a remarkable passage which preempted the thrust of Lord Acton’s warning about the corrupting influence of power, Locke expressed his fear of concentrated power,

...he that thinks absolute Power purifies Mens Bloods, and corrects the baseness of Humane Nature, need read but the History of this, or any other Age to be convinced of the contrary. He that would have been insolent and injurious in the Woods of America, would not probably be much better in a Throne; where perhaps Learning and Religion shall be found to justify all, that he shall do to his Subjects, and the Sword presently silence all those that dare question it.103

Absolute power was therefore no protection at all, for "...what Fence is there in such a State against the Violence and Oppression of this Absolute Ruler?"104 Here Locke implied that absolute rule was prone to ill-discipline because it knew no bounds, no limits, no laws or rules to regulate its conduct. To argue as Hobbes did that safety required leaving the state of nature for a civil state in which power is absolute, and where terror and awe the means of rule, is to suggest that a fear of the relatively minor depredations of ‘pole-cats and foxes’ (individuals) should be greater than the fear of ravenous ‘lions’ (states). Once again, violence was associated with the imagery of nature, an imagery which represented violence as uncontrolled and barbaric. For Locke however, the fear of civil violence was at least matched by a corresponding fear that just as the "...unjust use of force... puts a Man into the state of War with another..." so a state which used violence and terror as a means of rule was illegitimate.105 Such a state in his view, was no more worthy of respect than bands of “Robbers and Pyrates...” whose associations lay beyond the reach and control of political society and were thus closer to nature than to civilised society.106 What made the use of force illegitimate was its use by a government against the life, liberty and estate of its citizens, which thereby abrogated the free consent of its members.107

Resistance of such a government Locke argued, was not an offence because by its own actions a tyrannous government placed itself in a state of war with its citizens.108 Nonetheless, Locke reserved some of his strongest invective for those who chose to rebel against just rule,

103 Locke, J., op.cit., pg. 327.
104 Ibid., pg. 328.
105 Ibid., pg. 389.
106 Ibid., pg. 385-386.
107 Ibid., pg. 394.
...whoever, either Ruler or Subject, by force goes about to invade the Rights of either Prince or People, and lays the foundation for overturning the Constitution and Frame of any Just Government, is guilty of the greatest Crime, I think, a man is capable of, being to answer for all those mischiefs of Blood, Rapine, and Desolation, which the breaking to pieces of Governments bring on a Country. And he who does it, is justly to be esteemed the common Enemy and Pest of Mankind...

In other words, the sole end of a just government was to provide for the life, liberty and estate of its citizens. So long as it did this, the necessary conditions for mutual felicity would obtain, maintaining the balance between individual liberties and state power. But this balance was a precarious one; the same forces which impelled individuals into the civil state to protect themselves and their liberty, could also impel rulers to overstep the boundaries of legitimacy. The crucial element in the balance between just and unjust, legitimate and illegitimate was the use of violence. Violence had to be regulated to protect social order, but it was also feared as a perpetual source of threat to revive the state of nature and endanger all civil arrangements by transgressing the careful boundaries securing the liberties and rights of citizens in civil society.

The contrast between Hobbes and Locke masks a shared concern to overcome the fear of civil violence, and their mutual reliance upon the state to overcome this fear. What makes Locke’s thought more familiar and conducive to contemporary liberalism however, was his acute awareness of the dangers in this ‘solution’. In a sense, Locke’s liberalism lay in his awareness not simply of a generalised fear of civil violence, but in his awareness of a dual fear of civil and state violence. Locke moreover, saw that these two fears were connected; the statist solution to the problem of civil violence carried with it the dangers of state violence. State violence in turn was to be feared not simply for its detrimental effects upon individual victims, but because a state which ruled by excessive violence threatened to return society to a state of nature and unchecked civil violence. The tension between these dual fears and the solutions proposed to deal with it have shaped, in part, the distinctive nature of liberal discourse. In particular, it has contributed to the precarious nature of the state in liberal political theory. The state appeared as both salvation and curse, a defence against chaos and barbarism, but a constant potential threat to liberty and personal security. The strength of that defence

108 Ibid., pg. 416, 419.
109 Ibid., pg. 418.
and the control of that threat rested on the carefully constructed boundaries within liberal discourse designed to ensure each citizen of their rights and security, limit violence, and sustain the image of liberal civil society as a pacified realm.

**CONCLUSION**

It is an axiom of modern social and political thought that the modern state can be distinguished from its precursors by the fact that only modern states have successfully claimed "the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" and thus claims to be "the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence." This conception of the state emerged in the wake of continual civil and international warfare in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The monopoly of violence by the state was driven by the need to end internal violence in order that rulers could control and direct violence to serve their own political survival. In the previous chapter however, it was argued that the pacification of society has been interpreted as a crucial element in the civilising process which has made us “more civilised... less rough than... [our] forebears.” Along with this civilisation modern states have as Charles Tilly put it,

...made it criminal, unpopular, and impractical for most of their citizens to bear arms, have outlawed private armies, and have made it seem normal for armed agents of the state to confront unarmed civilians. According to Reinhart Koselleck these historic changes were reflected in the emergence of liberal political theory, and particularly in its concern to establish a legitimate “government of laws” based on uncoerced popular consent.

Within liberal discourse then, the state came to be associated with the elimination of violence from society, and its monopoly of violence has been accepted as legitimate so long as it is held in check by appropriate laws and institutions. The state’s monopoly
of violence is understood as legitimate because it is controlled and institutionalised, while the violence of non-state actors carries a very strong imputation of illegitimacy.

The legal violence of police and soldiers, at least, may represent a successful effort to bank the destructive fires of aggressive violence in socially useful ways, whereas terrorist, revolutionary, and criminal violence is, so to speak, violence on the loose.¹¹⁶

The concept of order such views imply is reliant upon a state which maintains an essentially pacified society.¹¹⁷ Non-state violence (such as terrorism, revolutions and rebellions, gang warfare, or the keeping of private armies) is represented as discontinuous with normal (pacified) social order while a sharp dichotomy is also maintained between violence and politics. In other words, politics is conceived as a process by which violence is eliminated from the life of society. Politics is the preserve of duly elected governments engaging in public debate, subject to public scrutiny and criticism in their negotiations and compromises with interest groups, and hence concerned with “boundary-maintenance” against the “corrosive” nature of violence.¹¹⁸

The task of defining and maintaining those boundaries falls above all to the law which, as Spinoza once put it, is the mechanism by which each person may live “securely beyond the reach of fear” and thereby “live together as securely and well as possible... [and] enjoy as a whole the rights which naturally belong to them as individuals...”¹¹⁹

Legally enforced rights serve as an important boundary between individuals demarcating areas of separate activity, separating the legitimate liberties and properties of one individual from another. The legal protection of individual rights is thus considered an important mechanism for controlling civil violence, circumventing the clash of sovereign individuals. But laws are also vital in the enforcement of other boundaries within which state violence is held in check. Foremost among these is the demarcation of a private realm of individual sovereignty from a public realm of state sovereignty. The line separating private from public has not always been drawn in a


uniform manner, but in the final chapter in particular an evaluation of its role in liberal discourse will be made in reference to recent feminist analyses of violence against women. Other boundaries have been drawn and operate almost exclusively within the public realm alone. Thus the public realm itself is divided by boundaries which mark the areas of competing authority designed to limit the capacity of the state to exercise violence. The most familiar boundaries of this sort divide state power between executives and legislatures each limiting the power of the other while the activities of each are watched (and limited) by the independent power of the judiciary. This sort of boundary-maintenance however, reinforces the fact that within liberal discourse violence has been seen as a problem requiring a political solution or more accurately, requiring a liberal politics as the solution. As Maurice Duverger put it,

The first aim of politics is to eliminate violence, to replace bloodshed by less brutal forms of struggle. Politics begins beyond the boundaries of war, civil or international. It is a form of combat, but it is also a restriction of combat.

This solution has been premised upon the conception of violence as an uncontrolled, chaotic, and barbaric phenomenon of nature. By associating violence with barbarism and nature and opposing it to the settled, law-bound arrangements of civil society, violence is defined instrumentally, as a means of gaining power over others which had to be short-circuited by a set of civil and political arrangements. Not all forms of violence however, are regarded as equally problematic and the relative importance attached to particular forms of violence and the consequent urgency of finding solutions depends largely upon whether that violence threatens the boundaries required by liberal discourse. Violence which threatens the boundaries sustaining liberal civil order, which hem state power, divide the state from civil society, contain the reach of politics, and regulate the interaction of citizens excites most attention and is regarded as most problematic, and is held to consist in the unregulated and undisciplined conduct of selves and states in arenas in which regulation and discipline are essential. Violence which occurs within the boundaries proposed in liberal discourse and does not threaten to transgress those boundaries, is regarded a far less urgent problem. It is in this sense that violence in the private sphere, or violence within the prison system (especially that

between inmates) has received far less attention than violence between citizens on the streets, or the violence of those who resist the commands of legitimate states. The identification and definition of violence within liberal discourse is thus crucial in determining its status and the urgency of the threat it poses to the liberal order. The following chapter will turn to the question of how violence is identified and defined in contemporary liberal discourse. The image of a contained politics, a politics within bounds, and above all of a state limited to the public realm exercises a significant influence over the way in which violence is defined and its ‘solution’ formulated.\textsuperscript{122} The next chapter will turn to the concern within liberal discourse over the supposed fragility of civil order and its maintenance by boundaries limiting the definition of violence, designed in part to protect order and reinforce the precarious position of the state.

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\item\textsuperscript{122} Pateman, C., \textit{The Sexual Contract}, Polity, Cambridge, 1988, pg. 39-41. Elsewhere in my thesis the influence of the public/private dichotomy over the conceptualisation and definition of political violence is analysed.
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CHAPTER 3

DRAWING THE BOUNDARIES:

VIOLENCE, POLITICS, AND TERRORISM

When one individual inflicts bodily injury upon another, such injury that death results, we call the deed manslaughter; when the assailant knew in advance that the injury would be fatal, we call his deed murder. But when society places hundreds of proletarians in such a position that they inevitably meet a too early and unnatural death, one which is quite as much death by violence as that by the sword or bullet; when it deprives thousands of the necessaries of life, places them under conditions in which they cannot live - forces them, through the strong arm of the law, to remain in such conditions until that death ensues which is the inevitable consequence - knows that these thousands of victims must perish, and yet permits these conditions to remain, its deed is murder just as surely as the deed of the single individual; disguised, malicious murder, murder against which none can defend himself, which does not seem what it is, because no man sees the murderer, because the death of the victim seems a natural one, since the offence is more one of omission than of commission. But murder it remains.

In analysing the appearance of violence there has been a tendency as Gramsci once observed to tell stories which "...isolate the protagonist and limit themselves to doing a biography of pathology... [in which] subordinate groups always display something barbaric and pathological."¹ Within liberal discourse, violence - and political violence in particular - is usually interpreted as sensational acts of destruction, beginning and ending with the intentions and effect of the terrorist’s bomb, the assassin’s bullet, or the dictator’s death squads; as if violence were always alien to normal, stable, and orderly democratic polities.² The liberal view enforces a distinction between ‘politics’ and ‘violence’, a distinction that separates liberalism from both conservative and revolutionary thought.³ Consequently, those who do violence are often represented as one-dimensional characters intent upon mayhem or evil, which in another context, Thomas Carlyle once referred to as those "...whom one often hears of under the collective name of ‘the masses’, as if they were not persons at all, but mounds of combustible explosive material, for blowing down Bastilles with!"⁴ The effect of such definitions, as Friedrich Engels’ opening quotation demonstrates, is that within liberal discourse violence is most often defined as a deliberate act of individual malice. While such definitions draw attention to particular types of violence, they also confine or limit the range of what may be considered to constitute ‘violence’.⁵

Narrow definitions focus on particular acts of violence and the cogency of these definitions depends upon maintaining a limited focus, systematically obscuring other


³ Clausewitz’ definition of war as not only “a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means” was adopted by German conservatives such as Treitschke who eagerly anticipated the moment in which "we can once more join hands with Clausewitz in calling war the forceful continuation of politics. All the peacemakers in the world will never never make the political powers all of one mind, and until they are, the sword will be the only arbiter.” See, von Clausewitz, C., On War [1832], (edited by A.Rapoport), Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968, pg. 119; and von Trietschke, H., Politics [1916], Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1963, pg. 244. For a revolutionary such as Sorel however, a similar sentiment motivated his suggestion that violence "not only makes the future [proletarian] revolution certain, but it seems also to be the only means by which the European nations - at present stupefied by humanitarianism - can recover their former energy." See, Sorel, G., Reflections on Violence [1906], translated by T.E.Hulme and J.Roth, Collier Macmillan, 1950, pg. 92.

⁴ Carlyle, T., The French Revolution; A History, [1837], Random House, New York, 1960, pg. 570. Ironically, this seems to have been a trap that Carlyle himself stumbled into on occasions.
acts which may equally deserve the label from inclusion in the range of violent phenomena. It will be argued in this chapter that such limitations are indicative of the concern identified in the previous chapter of maintaining boundaries separating the realm of civil peace from violence. The maintenance of such boundaries requires especial vigilance not for violence as such, but for those forms of violence which threaten to transgress those boundaries. It will be argued in this chapter that the focus of liberal discourse is placed on public acts of violence which threaten the ability of individuals to exercise their rights, or disrupt the legitimate authority supposed to guarantee those rights, namely government, law, and the state. The acceptance of the boundary separating civil peace from violence can be seen in the definition of violence as a problem that "lurks just outside the institutional door."6

In the first section of this chapter it will be argued that contemporary academic literature furnishes examples of the definition of violence premised on the existence of a boundary between civil and uncivil conduct. The realm of the civil is identified with the individual and unhindered enjoyment of rights, liberties, and property in civil society. Violence therefore is identified in acts which obstruct individuals from the enjoyment and pursuit of their rights. Such violence is defined in transparent terms enabling concrete identifications of who is harmed, how they are harmed, and who is responsible for harming them. When violence threatens not only individual rights but the very public political order supposed to guarantee those rights, the question of definition assumes an added significance. In the second section, it will be argued that political violence is defined in such ways as to represent those who resort to it as revolutionaries whose violent activities represent a transgression of the assumed boundary separating politics (understood as the peaceful and legitimate activity of maintaining order) from violence. In the third and last section the implications of assuming there is such a boundary will be discussed in reference to the analysis of terrorism in current academic and policy literature.


I. THE BARBARITY OF VIOLENCE

Sensational acts of violence, assaults, murders, deliberate killings or brutal beatings provoke emotional reactions, a desire to condemn or defend them in the name of some higher ideal. Such reactions, natural though they seem, are conditioned by the cultural milieu of the interpreters, not to mention the prejudices or motivations of those who report the events. The focus on sensational violence is the stock in trade of the media which deals with often one-dimensional representations of human suffering in order to excite a vicarious interest from the public. Such stories often represent those who suffer violence as the innocent victims of a perpetrator’s insane malice. While such representations appeal to an understandable revulsion against cruelty, they do very little to deepen an understanding of why it occurs. This difficulty is largely a product of the willingness to treat violence as if it consisted solely in the deliberate, sensational acts of brutal individuals who are seen as barbaric, uncivilised, unbalanced, or simply evil. Images of violence on television or on front pages associate it with illegality and the underside of society, or with political phenomena such as the collapse of regimes, governments or conflicts between states. In each case an implicit distinction is made between violence and the normal order of society which is defined in terms of a system of legitimate authority, of laws and administration respected by law-abiding citizens whose interactions are normally peaceful.

The relationship between violence and the normal order of society is however, a matter of some dispute within liberal discourse. In a pioneering work on attitudes toward violence within liberal political and social thought Aiken argued that there was a division between what he called “pragmatic” or “corporate” liberalism and “liberalism proper”. According to the latter variety of liberalism violence consists in deliberate and harmful attacks upon one person by another and thus constitutes a direct abrogation of the victim’s rights, whereas pragmatic liberals regard violence only as acts harmful

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9 Kekes argues that liberals tend to view those who do violence as “moral monsters” while Watts argues that the tendency to see violence as an individual phenomenon obscures the far greater collective murder of civilians by their own or other governments. See, Kekes, J., Against Liberalism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1997, pg. 30; and Watts, R., “Sharp on ‘the Autonomous Mass Killer’”, Arena Journal, 7, 1996, pg. 34.
to the proper functioning of society.11 The implications of the two views are quite different; one sees violence in terms of the denial of individual rights or the infliction of harm and suffering, while the other view considers individual harm and suffering as violence only when it interferes with the stability or order of the social whole. The former view leads to the conclusion that violence is always wrong because it involves the deliberate infliction of harm upon individuals, while the second view regards the harm which may be inflicted upon some individuals within society a necessary price which must be paid for social harmony and stability.

Both approaches are premised on two pivotal assumptions; first, that the relevant unit of analysis is the individual perpetrator or victim, and second, that the violence itself represents a regression into a barbarism opposed to the mutual felicity of civil society. This latter assumption implies a fundamental opposition between violence and the “reasonableness” and rationality of liberal regimes which have as their aim the rather more moderate but continual improvement of society based on the universal “right” of “every man... to arrange his life himself so far as this is compatible with the equal rights of others.”12 Such a view is based on the notion that violence not only involves the infliction of “physical pain and suffering” upon people, but that it is “insidious”, “corrupts” those who use it and must therefore be conquered and abolished.13 The influence of an implicit theory of civilisation here expresses itself in the view that violence “on the streets” and in the penal system “recedes with the advance of liberal democracy and industrialisation”.14 From this perspective, violence can be seen as antithetical to the very principles of liberalism which “look[s] towards a world in which individuals neither have to receive nor inflict physical harm upon one another.”15

11 Ibid., pg. 60-61.
The violence spoken of here is the deliberate infliction of physical harm by one individual (or group of individuals) upon another individual or group.\textsuperscript{16} The important feature of this definition is that the relationship between perpetrator and victim is assumed to be transparent - the decision to inflict harm is \textit{deliberate}, the act of inflicting harm is unambiguous, and the harm itself is both obvious and indisputable. Thus Robert Holmes argues that in its "strictest sense" violence refers to "the use of force with the intent to harm, kill or cause destruction; or at the least... that has harm, death, or destruction as a foreseeable outcome."\textsuperscript{17} Similarly, in an edition of the \textit{International Social Science Journal} devoted to "Thinking About Violence", violence is defined in terms of "causing injury through the use of vigorous physical force... [in which] the injury be intended or foreseen", or as action which "leads to the death of human beings... [by] direct, physical attack against persons, whose life, health, physical integrity or individual liberty is at stake".\textsuperscript{18} Violence is thus represented as "a conscious and free act" which is "necessarily... negative" in that it constitutes a "violation" denying the victim freedom of will and action, thereby "objectively harming" them.\textsuperscript{19} The focus of such definitions is placed most heavily upon the perpetrator of the act, and as Torrance puts it, "...we tend to call an act violent if we have no sympathy for the perpetrator, if we regard the act as illegitimate, and if we believe something should be done about it."\textsuperscript{20} Indeed as Kai Nielsen argues, the illegitimacy or illegality of violence implies a normative distinction between illegitimate 'violence' and legitimate 'force'.\textsuperscript{21} Violence is thus defined in such a manner that its appearance can only be interpreted as challenge or threat to the normally peaceful liberal order, and is hence "prima facie incompatible with the civil society rules of solidarity, liberty and equality of citizens...".\textsuperscript{22} Such definitions of violence emphasise the deliberate, wilful malice of the act, its intrusive illegitimacy, and the


\textsuperscript{19} Wierzbicki, A.M., \textit{The Ethics of Struggle for Liberation}, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1992, pg. 57-58.

\textsuperscript{20} Torrance, J., \textit{op.cit.}, pg. 69.


physical harm in which it results. The key components here are the harm suffered by the victim and the intention(s) of the perpetrator.

The harm spoken of in the types of definition which predominate within liberal discourse are assumed to have a physical nature - such as killing, maiming, or otherwise inflicting pain upon the body. What I want to suggest is that this 'physical' conception of violence as a harm done to the body derives its force from the view that whatever else it may do, violence is to be condemned because it denies the free agency of the victim. Within liberal discourse, free agency consists in the individual being the final arbiter of their own choices, and as long as they remain within the boundaries of acceptable behaviour, whatever ends they choose to follow or whatever desires they choose to fulfil is the individual's choice alone. Freedom consists therefore in doing whatever one wishes while refraining from deliberately harming others. Such freedom is grounded in the capacity of individuals to exercise their right reason, enabling them to make choices which will not only be effective in fulfilling their own ends, but will do so in a way that will sustain rather than undermine their autonomy. On this view it is the capacity to choose and the capacity to act on one's choices in the deliberate fulfilment of ends which matters, rather than the deliberative process of making that choice. This means that the key to liberty and human fulfilment lies in the capacity to follow one's ends, and this involves the capacity for unencumbered action. The physical nature of harm therefore amounts to a gross transgression of human dignity because it removes or impedes this capacity for free action.23 Violence is thereby seen in overwhelmingly physical terms, as

...unwanted physical interference by groups and/or individuals with the bodies of others, which are consequently made to suffer a series of effects ranging from shock, bruises, scratches, swelling or headaches to broken bones, heart attacks, loss of limbs or even death.24

Such physical damage is denounced not simply for its own sake, but because it also amounts to a "denial of a subject's freedom to act in and upon the world... [and] obstructs subjects' bodily motion."25 The definitional emphasis placed on the physical nature of violence helps to explain the resistance of many to the extension of the term to

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24 Keane, J., *op.cit.*, pg. 67.
include forms of psychological or emotional abuse. While liberals often recognise the influence of such pressures, they are also often reluctant to describe them as violent because “physical force prevents people from acting freely in a way that psychological pressures, however harmful and subjugating, do not” and thus “people have a formal freedom to develop despite moral and psychological coercion which they do not have when they are the victims of violence or force.”

As a consequence the illegitimacy of violence derives in large part from the other crucial element in the definition of violence, the intention(s) of the perpetrator. Liberalism characteristically represents human beings as rational creatures whose choices will at least be informed by reason, and can hence be described as free in the sense that action will be chosen to obtain certain ends. This in turn entails that action is undertaken with at least a reasonable expectation of what consequences are likely to ensue. It is on this basis that violence is defined not only as physical damage or harm but as physical harm or damage that is deliberately inflicted by one person upon another. As one writer put it, on this view violence consists in,

...injury or suffering... inflicted upon a person or persons by an agent who knows (or ought reasonably to have known), that his actions would result in the harm in question.

As rational creatures however, human beings are held to be responsible for their actions and this means that by choosing to inflict violence the individual can foresee the harm and suffering this choice entails. Therefore, to choose violence carries with it very heavy moral opprobrium, for it amounts to choosing to harm someone else and deny

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26 Hoffman, J., loc.cit., pg. 7 and 9. For another example of the resistance to broadening the definition of violence see Platt, T. “The Concept of Violence as Descriptive and Polemic”, International Social Science Journal, 44 (2), 1992, pg. 185-192. An alternative view can be found in Lee, S., “Poverty and Violence”, Social Theory and Practice, 22 (1), 1996, pg. 67-82. Here Lee argues that there are strong grounds for considering that “a society does violence to those of its members who are in poverty...” even though “the reasonableness of this argument... flies in the face of the way people normally use the term [violence], and there seems little prospect that the recommended change will be adopted.” Ibid., pg. 80.

27 Parekh, B., “Marxism and the Problem of Violence”, Development and Change, 23 (3), 1992, pg. 108. It should be noted that this sort of criticism, that we are responsible for violence where we can reasonably be expected to know the consequences of our action, or inaction has a place in Engels’ celebrated The Working Class in England. His argument is that the living and working conditions of English workers in the nineteenth century were tantamount to murder because they radically shortened the worker’s life-span.


them their freedom.\textsuperscript{30} The choice to commit violence thus amounts to a denial of the 'harm principle' which arguably lies at the heart of liberal conceptions of liberty. As John Stuart Mill formulated it,

\ldots that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. \ldots the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.\textsuperscript{31}

Of course the question such a principle invites is how to define the nature of the harm supposed to be prevented.

The liberal approach tends to focus on a conception of violence as both physical and intentional, as in cases of murder or assault. These are usually unambiguous and sensational acts, they involve actions deliberately undertaken by individuals who can foresee the consequences of their actions. They are also actions in which there is an obvious victim and an identifiable perpetrator. Violence is thus associated with unambiguous relationships between a mugger and their victim, or between a murderer and their victim, each of which is transparent in that the victim suffers verifiable injuries as a result of the deliberate actions of another person whose actions break with 'normal' standards of conduct.\textsuperscript{32} As Bhiku Parekh writes,

\ldots in the liberal discourse violence is invariably associated with passion, rage, anger and suddenness. It 'flares up', 'erupts', 'spreads like fire', 'breaks out'\ldots It is noisy, dramatic, visible, involving guns and daggers and has clearly identifiable agents and victims. \ldots the terrorist, the murderer, the hijacker, the rapist and the mugger become the paradigms of violence. \ldots [It is] physical harm or harm to the body... more than any other type of suffering that dominates the liberal imagination.\textsuperscript{33}

This domination, Parekh argues is based on the individualist underpinnings of liberal thought, and in particular the assumption that individuals possess "a distinct, irreducible and unsharable body which ...marks... [them] off from the rest of the

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\item \textsuperscript{32} As David McCallum has suggested however, liberal discourse has also been characterised by a deep concerned over the "disordered and potentially dangerous individual." See McCallum, D., "Dangerous Individuals: Government and the Concept of Personality" in M. Dean and B. Hindess (eds.), \textit{Governing Australia}, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, pg. 108-124.
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world”. As John Keane put it, violence “bears down on and threatens embodied individuals, who are treated as mere objects, and whose bodies are deemed worthy of a kick and a punch, or a knife, a bullet or a bomb.” Parekh suggests that this limitation of definition is a deliberate liberal strategy allowing a distinction to be made between the actions of a mugger and those who employ less physical means of compulsion, such as “an employer who gives me the choice of facing starvation or accepting the barest subsistence wages”. The difference lies with the perception of freedom and choice available to the ‘victim’; the mugger leaves the victim with no choice, while the employer's actions leaves room for choice, even if only a purely formal choice to resign or look for work elsewhere.

Such freedom of choice receives formal and legal expression in the doctrine of rights which set the boundaries of permissible human action. Within liberal thought, rights mark out a preserve of possible action which no other person or authority is entitled to over-rule, so long as each person refrains from infringing the rights of others. Rights are the entitlements of rational individuals, they are the foundation for human fulfilment, and the expression of human dignity and worth. Consequently, for some liberals violence can be identified in action which “...constitutes a violation of a human right... or which prevents the fulfilment of a basic human need.” The basis of this definition is the ‘liberal’ notion that “...for each fundamental human need, there should be a corresponding human right entitled to legal protection.” The corollary of this view is that any action which denies the fulfilment of such a need is an abrogation of human rights and therefore, a grave attack upon the person whether or not they are physically injured as a result. Thus, sexist and racist attitudes are violent, the tobacco industry which peddles cancer-causing substances, and banks which demand exorbitant loan repayments from poverty-stricken countries are all examples of violence.

34 Ibid., pg. 119.
35 Keane, J., op.cit., pg. 68.
36 Parekh, B., (1990), loc.cit., pg. 125.
37 Ibid., pg. 125-126.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., pg. 60, 66, 112-113.
Now this conception of violence is much broader than the conception of direct physical assault in that it does not focus exclusively on direct physical harm, but on the denial of conditions in which one’s rights can be fully exercised. On this view, one could construe violence to consist in poverty for instance, due to the consequent lack of access to adequate health care, housing, or education, compounded by the failure to alleviate the suffering by redistributing wealth. While proponents of this view would consider that cases of direct physical assault clearly deserve to be labelled violent, they refuse to stop there and argue for the inclusion of a whole series of other conditions. Johan Galtung for example distinguishes between “personal” and “structural” violence arguing that personal violence “shows” in the form of physical damage which the victim “perceives”, whereas structural violence “is silent... does not show” and victims “may be persuaded not to perceive” it as violence. This conception of violence differs from earlier transparent definitions in that violence often occurs not by the actions of an identifiable perpetrator but is the result of “…the summated and concerted action” of many individuals together. Such violence exerts a continual pressure upon its victims in the form of less direct, less sensational but no less damaging effects. This sort of violence is associated with social and economic structures which maintain economic inequalities, or cultural attitudes such as sexism which constrain the aspirations and opportunities of women, or even in linguistic conventions which ‘sanitise’ violence and represent it as something less sinister, reducing the violence of poverty to mere ‘underprivilege’ or the violence of sexism to bland ‘discrimination’. All of these forms of suffering Galtung describes as violence because the central criterion is that violence consists in any action or event which prevents an individual from realising their potentials.

41 There is a heavy emphasis in liberal discourse for example, on the idea that violence is equivalent to deliberate coercion, and thus consists in cases where one person intentionally “takes action against... [another] which has the quality of power or force to induce them to do, or to submit to, something which they would rather not.” If this is the relevant criterion however, almost any form of interaction from making a child take their medicine, to the threat of punishment for non-payment of taxes could be described as acts of violence. The quotations is taken from, Ritchie, J., and Ritchie, J., Violence in New Zealand, Allen and Unwin, Wellington, 1990, pg. 7.
42 Lee, S., loc.cit.
44 Ibid., pg. 178.
Despite a broader scope, such conceptions of violence still rely upon the idea that violence constitutes an abrogation of the victim’s rights. The importance of the notion of rights and the corresponding fear of the infraction of those rights is intimately associated with a liberal individualism which sees violence above all as a threat to individuals, their integrity, liberty, and well being. The conception of liberalism with which such an approach is often associated is one which sees the promotion of a system of laws which protects individual rights as the ultimate purpose of liberal society. Such a form of liberalism, its proponents argue “promotes no collective projects, expresses no group preferences, and privileges no particular individuals or individual interests” other than by upholding “the framework of law” which ensures that each person “can co-exist in peace.”\(^47\) This is an image of an essentially value-neutral liberalism which provides no recognition for the different groups and individuals in society but seeks only “to preserve the order within which such groups and individuals exist.”\(^48\) While it is recognised that even in an ideal liberal society individuals will still be subjected to oppressive “pressure to conform”, such pressures will not be built into the system which remains value-neutral and the degree of submission or resistance to such pressures will be determined by individuals themselves.\(^49\)

If violence is identified with the infraction of individual rights or interference with an individual’s potential it is unlikely that the social and political environment in which individuals exist can fail to commit some violence on the individual. The implication of this view is that violence consists in the manifold restrictions, constraints, benign and malicious interference of social life. Such a view is based on the assumption that if individuals were unencumbered by any such interference from others they would be free to fulfil their potential in ways they currently cannot. This conception of the self raises a series of problems which lie beyond the scope of this present study. What is particularly relevant here is that the assumption of the priority of the individual in the conceptual analysis of violence leads to the conclusion identified in previous chapters, that violence is a problem haunting every individual from cradle to grave. It is an object of fear, and the proper response leads to the promotion of a ‘liberal’ politics


\(^49\) Kukathas, C., loc.cit., 1997, pg. 144.
premised on individual protection and the strict containment of the state by the requirements of a scrupulous neutrality.

According to Kukathas for instance, from an individualist standpoint "domination and oppression" appear to be inescapable facts of the human condition because any form of social or political activity involves the subjection of individuals to group conflict and coercion. The central "presumption" is that,

The human condition is one of conflict. ...and there is no plausible social theory that explains how it might ever be different in the future. ...the task of political institutions is to palliate a condition it cannot cure. And the political theorist concerned about oppression in human society should learn to set his sights a little lower, aiming at a theory not of liberation, but of peace.

The achievement of this peace however, required a politics of strict neutrality in which the state affords not opportunity for resentment or conflict by favouring a particular way of life over others. The question that Kukathas fails to ask is whether the very individualism he sees as a vital component of liberalism colours the way in which the problem of oppression (and violence) is framed. Once rights-bearing individuals are seen as the central components of social order, any infraction of rights can only be interpreted as oppressive and (at least potentially) violent because,

...a person has certain rights which are undeniably, indissolubly, connected with his being a person. One of these is a right to his body, to determine what his body does and what is done to his body... Apart from a body, what is essential to one's being a person is dignity. The dignity of a person... [consists in] his ability to make his own decisions.

The conception of a rights-bearing self is here used as a rule or standard for determining what violence is, where and when it occurs, and who is harmed by it. But such a standard is incapable of distinguishing between minor and major infractions of rights. In seeing person-hood as 'indissolubly' tied to the possession of rights, even minor infractions - witnessed in recent debates over restrictions on gun ownership for instance - are often construed as threats to the person and their liberty. Just as the problem of violence in liberal discourse is framed by its definition as a threat to the self and liberty, so the problem of political violence is framed by its definition as a threat to liberal civil order. Such definitions identify a problem to be solved, phenomena to be guarded

50 Ibid., pg. 149.
51 Ibid., pg. 152.
against, (potential or actual) perpetrators who must be controlled and most importantly, a set of values which must be protected.

II. LIBERALISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

One of the problems with the term ‘political violence’ is that it requires ‘...the prior identification of the specific political nature of action - a task which is itself problematic and about which little consensus exists.’ But there is more to the confusion over political violence than a simple failure to acknowledge and specify one’s own assumptions about politics. What an author describes as ‘political’ may also just as heavily depend upon what he or she is trying to say about a particular act or the participants in that act. That is, by describing an act as ‘political’ an author may be trying to impugn or to defend the motives or the integrity of the actors involved.54 Paul Wilkinson for example, makes a distinction between justifiable political or ‘civil’ violence and unjustifiable violence or ‘terrorism’. Political or civil violence refers to acts such as just war, justifiable rebellion, and tyrannicide which may all be justified because the violence is limited and controlled, and innocents or non-combatants are unmolested.55 Terrorism on the other hand refers to unjustifiable acts of “indiscriminate” violence which aim to produce a state of terror in the target population.56 For Wilkinson then, the appellation ‘political’ is clearly used to identify legitimate or justifiable acts of violence and to differentiate these from criminal acts of barbarism.

‘Political violence’ therefore, may be used to cover a wide range of phenomena. For E. V. Walter violence or the causing of “destructive harm” to others acquires a distinctively political character when the violence is employed in the processes of control of society, resistance to that control, and/or the punishment of those who

56 Ibid. Also note the manner in which Wilkinson constructs his definitions of terror and terrorism in such a way that justification of it (not to mention sympathy for it) is made all but impossible. See pg. 13-17.
resist. Political violence he argues, is employed in “processes of terror” which may take either of two forms those being, a “siege of terror” which aims by the use of violence and fear to overthrow existing power structures, or a “regime of terror” in which the controllers of a society choose to exercise their power through the use of violence and fear.

For others such as Ted Honderich, political violence consists solely in attacks upon the state. For him political violence is, ...

...a considerable or destroying use of force against persons or things, a use of force prohibited by law, directed to a change in the policies, personnel or system of government, and hence also directed to changes in the existence of individuals in the society and perhaps other societies.

Honderich clearly believes however, that simply because political violence is exercised against the state does not mean that such violence is unjustified. The changes which such violence aims to achieve may itself be a powerful justification.

Typically however, liberalism is premised on the view that the appearance of violence in politics denotes a crisis, something to be guarded against. Conservative critics of liberalism such as Carl Schmitt argued that liberalism weakly side-steps the issue of violence in politics by attempting to hide behind the myth of a value-neutral state peacefully enforcing a universal system of laws. Such an approach he argued was incapable of appreciating the use of violence which every healthy state must embrace when confronted by a foe or by the need to confront internal resistance. Liberalism by contrast shrank in the face of violence and tried to circumvent the need to decide by trial of strength. As Schmitt mockingly put it, liberalism can only “answer the question ‘Christ or Barabbas?’ with a proposal to adjourn or appoint a commission of investigation.”

From the liberal perspective violence and politics are intractably opposed, and while politics “marks the realm of rational persuasion through speech”,

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57 Walter, E.V., Terror and Resistance; A Study of Political Violence, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1969, pg. 8 (italics in original), 15. Such destructive harm may involve the use of language and ritual in addition to the infliction of physical harm to create a state of terror or extreme fear. Ibid., pg. 156-162.

58 Ibid., pg. 5-7.


60 See for instance Schmitt, C., Political Theology; Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty [1922], translated by G. Schwab, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1985, pg. 36-52.

61 Schmitt, C., Political Theology, pg. 62.
violence “terminates the exchange of words”. For Hannah Arendt, it was precisely the capacity to talk and negotiate which constituted the essence of politics.

Where violence rules absolutely, as for instance in the concentration camps of totalitarian regimes, not only the laws... but everything and everybody must fall silent. ...violence itself is incapable of speech... Because of this speechlessness political theory has little to say about the phenomenon of violence... [f]or political thought can only follow the articulations of the political phenomena themselves, it remains bound to what appears in the domain of human affairs; and these appearances... need speech and articulation... The glorification of violence for its own sake, she argued is “antipolitical” and indeed, the violence of warfare or revolution occurs “outside the political realm” in the international ‘state of nature’. The appearance of violence thus heralds the decay of politics understood as an arena in which discussion and debate rather than violence reigns. In liberal discourse political violence signals some form of political crisis, corruption, or decay of standards of conduct or respect for law and order and is thus “...not constitutive of political order; rather, it comes to the fore when political order fails. ...[Political] violence involves indifference or even hostility to the common good in that it destroys the political community.”

Such conceptions of violence in politics equate violence with some form of attack upon the institutions and organs of political life. Such an approach can lead to a very wide inclusion of a variety of acts “...related to the body politic and its governance...” including,

...everything from the most narrowly targeted assassination to random killings designed to intimidate opponents, while calling attention to a given cause. It comprises the effect of impersonal bombs, official and unofficial “death squads”, the work of the occasional killer with a private grievance - be he outraged husband, hard-pressed debtor, or irreconcilable family foe - whose act may be political only in the sense that its victim happens to be a public figure. It includes programs of

64 Ibid., pg. 19.
genocide aimed at entire races or ethnic groups, attempts to decimate class enemies, and, in the eyes of some at least, formal warfare itself. 67

On this view, for violence to be deemed ‘political’ it matters not whether the agent is an individual or a participant in mass action; nor does it matter if the agent was moved by expressly ‘political’ aims or by ‘private’ resentments. According to this definition, political violence may be quite incidental to the operation of the political system, as in the case of murder of someone who merely ‘happens to be’ a person in authority. Within liberal discourse a more restrictive definition reduces political violence to “...deliberate and unambiguous attacks against the state, its agents, or specific policies.” 68 This approach echoes Samuel Huntington’s view that political violence can be distinguished “…from international (or, more correctly, inter-state) violence in that at least one participant is not a government and... from criminal violence in that it is designed to affect the make-up or functioning of the political system.” 69 For Huntington then, violence takes on a political character when it influences the political system, and he associates the political system with the administration of society when he argues that in a politically violent situation the protagonists must be a government and its non-government opponent(s). There is a heavy implication here that political violence should be seen in the context of conflict between the state and its internal or domestic opponents, such as rebels and revolutionaries, although it is possible to imagine a government being fought by external non-government forces, as in the case of non-state sponsored international terrorism. In either case, the crucial assumption is that political violence involves conflict between representatives of the state and dissidents within society. 70 This also implies that political violence is to be interpreted

68 Zimmerman, E., Political Violence, Crises, and Revolutions: Theories and Research, G.K.Hall, Boston, 1983, pg. 6, 7.
as some form of attack on the sources of legitimate authority, indicating social disorder or “destabilisation” initiated by dissidents or rebels.71

Ted Gurr’s three-fold classification of types of political violence in his classic study *Why Men Rebel* displays just this sort of assumption. The three types of political violence he analyses - turmoil, conspiracy, and internal war - are each types of domestic, non-state violence.72 Indeed, the relative deprivation model Gurr employed specifically identified societal sources of conflict and violence and equated political violence with domestic, non-state actors.73 Recently relative deprivation models have been superseded by rational actor models of political violence. Rational actor models eschew generalised theories about the causes of discontent in favour of cost/benefit analyses of participation in violence, asking not why people rebel, but under what conditions rational actors consider the benefits to outweigh the cost of participation in violence. Even here however, the focus of explanation for political violence is still placed on non-state actors.74 Such approaches are emblematic of a ‘unilateral’ conception of political violence, according to which, violence is political if it concerns the state and specifically, if it is directed at or against the state by internal dissidents (usually groups or collectives). As Gurr put it, “...political violence refers to all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors - including competing political groups as well as incumbents - or its policies.”75 The significance of such a definition of political violence is that it frames the problem of violence in politics in terms of the threat violence poses not just to the state or the government, but to the entire political framework. The responsibility for such violence is directly attributed to domestic opponents of the political system, those who wish to tear down the edifice of politics in a fury of destruction.76

73 Ibid., pg. 45-56.
75 Gurr, T.R., op.cit., pg. 3-4. {My italics}
76 The illegitimacy of such violence is assumed to be self-evident where the political system in question is ‘democratic’. Miller, D., “The Use and Abuse of Political Violence”, *Political Studies*, XXXII (3), 1984, pg. 406-409.
In facing such a threat (real or imagined) states have relied upon their own violence administered by armies and police forces, and no liberal state has ever been able to survive without making use of such violence at some point in its history. Liberal writers have dealt with this problem in a number of ways, but the most common approach has been to redefine state violence as something other than violence. State violence is thus often represented not as violence but force, and the normative connotations of the two terms are quite distinct. As Macfarlane put it,

Violence is the capacity to impose, or the act of imposing, one's will upon another, where the imposition is held to be illegitimate. Force is the capacity to impose, or the act of imposing, one's will upon another, where the imposition is held to be legitimate.77

The legitimacy of force as opposed to the illegitimacy of violence derives from its use by those invested with the right to use it (such as police or internal security forces). In the Westminster system of government for example, the right to use force is limited to particular, authorised bodies whose activities are (supposedly) under scrutiny, subject to the law, and whose functionaries are linked by well established chains of responsibility to government and the parliament. Consequently, it is expected that the use of force will itself be measured and kept to the barest minimum necessary to carry out police functions, and the victims of such force will have the right to seek redress through the courts for any perceived wrongs.78

Violence by contrast is represented as a phenomenon which occurs outside the law, is spontaneous, unauthorised, unregulated, and excessive. If it is conceded that the state may engage in violence, it is often argued that it does so only in reaction to the violence of revolutionaries, rebels, insurgents, or terrorists; state violence is never pre-emptive.79 This approach to political violence is premised upon a conception of politics built around a simple binary opposition between the state and its domestic opponents. For violence to be called political it must occur in the context of this opposition, must be produced by the struggle between insurgents and the state to determine the nature of

the state and its policies. ‘The political’ is thereby equated with the affairs of state - who governs, who has access to state power, what policies are to be pursued - while political violence is identified only with struggles between the incumbents, representatives, functionaries, or defenders of state power and those who seek to reform, remove or replace them by riot, rebellion, or revolution. 80

In this way, political violence and those who engage in it, are theoretically and morally quarantined. Political violence is characterised as abnormal, an event for which responsibility is often laid at the feet of fanatical idealogues or deviants. 81 Conversely, the state, government and political system they seek to destroy are represented as the repositories of legitimacy. A functional political system is a precondition for the existence of a peaceful liberal civil society, and violence renders the maintenance of this order impossible. 82 The key to this opposition is the belief that liberalism cherishes diversity, while democratic procedures attempt to enshrine tolerance by suppressing violent conflict though public discussion and compromise. 83 This conception of politics relies upon the notion that liberalism upholds the peaceful and public debate over the government of the community. 84 Such a conception of politics has two important implications; first, it implies a dichotomy between the public political realm and a private non-political realm; and second, it implies a dichotomy between normal ‘orderly’ politics and abnormal violence. 85 When violence occurs in politics it denotes a collapse of normal political procedures and processes, which when functioning

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80 Elshtain forcefully argues that the very equation of politics with the state is inscribed with a kind of violence. For her, this conception of politics perpetuates the notion of a citizen’s duty of sacrifice to the nation state which is fully realised in a time of war. Elshtain, J.B., “Sovereignty, Identity, Sacrifice”, Social Research, 58 (3), 1991, pg. 548-9.

81 Ben-Yehuda, N., “Political Assassinations as Rhetorical Devices: Events and Interpretations”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 2 (3), 1990, pg. 325 and 333-335. Taylor, M., The Fanatics: A Behavioural Approach to Political Violence, Brassey’s, London, 1991, pg. 40-41. See also Walt, S.M., “Revolution and War”, World Politics, 44, 1992, pg. 322 and 332. Walt’s argument is that peace is maintained by a delicate “balance-of-threat” between states, but that domestic revolutionaries disrupt the state’s ability to manufacture their own threats or respond to the threats of others thereby causing an increase in the likelihood of more domestic and international conflict.


85 Ibid., pg. 124.
normally, maintain order peacefully through the mechanisms of the law.\textsuperscript{86} Political violence consists in climactic episodes of social breakdown or political instability resulting in violence which can only be seen as illegitimate because liberalism assumes “a harmony of interest between state and society”.\textsuperscript{87} The implications of associating violence with political crisis or collapse will be discussed in the next chapter, but what is important to note here is the way in which the definition of political violence sustains an important boundary around ‘the political’ which is marked-out as a realm in which peaceful negotiation and public debate occur, where laws are promulgated, enacted and obeyed, where peace is maintained through regular and orderly processes. Violence on the other hand denotes the collapse of the political, its appearance within politics signals a crisis and a potential return to a pre-civil, pre-political condition. The inevitable result of such a view is that violence can only be seen as “episodes... [or] isolated and unreconciled ‘mounds’ on the... ‘plains of peace’...”.\textsuperscript{88} In the following section attention will turn to the way in which such assumptions shape the current literature on terrorism.

\textbf{III. TERRORISM: A QUESTION OF INNOCENCE?}

The conceptualisation of violence and political violence is characterised by a limitation of scope, of boundaries drawn around concepts, and one of their effects is to identify and isolate ‘perpetrators’. Such boundaries frame the problem of violence by defining it as a threat to the liberal conception of the rights-bearing individual, the fundamental unit of civil society, and as a threat to the political conditions which make civil society possible. Violence and those who commit violence are thus consigned to a moral nether world of murderers, muggers, revolutionaries, and terrorists.\textsuperscript{89} The terrorist above all other perpetrators of violence is particularly prone to being seen as the deranged enemy of humankind as in Joseph Conrad’s description of “the Professor” in \textit{The Secret Agent}, or in the descriptions of Abimael Guzman and the Peruvian “Shining

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{86} Cobb, S., “Violence Invaginated; The Semiotics of Mass Arrest in Chile”, \textit{Law and Critique}, IV (2), 1993, pg. 133-135.
\item \textsuperscript{88} Evans, R., “Blood Dries Quickly: Conflict Study and Australian Historiography”, \textit{Australian Journal of Politics and History}, 41, 1995, pg. 92.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Crelitsen, R.D., “The Discourse and Practice of Counter-Terrorism in Liberal-Democracies”, \textit{Australian Journal of Politics and History}, 44 (3), 1998, pg. 391-399.
\end{itemize}
Path” movement. 90 If the terrorist is not deranged, he or she is identified as a criminal who by engaging in terrorist activity renounces humanity and endorses criminality and barbarity. 91 There is no doubt that much of this opprobrium arises from the very strategy of terrorism itself which not only renounces formal rules of engagement between identifiable combat forces, but seeks to carry its struggle right to the heart of civilian populations. In its rejection of conventional rules of engagement and desire to target civilian populations as well as military forces, terrorism is seen as a form of struggle to which democratic states and civil societies are particularly vulnerable. 92 In such societies, terrorists are able to benefit from ease of movement and freedom of association while the democratic regimes they target are open to public pressure which terrorists seek to manipulate, and hamstrung in their efforts to suppress terrorism by the scrupulous restrictions of the law. 93 As a consequence, terrorism is interpreted as a grave threat to the civil order, a “nihilistic rejection of all ethical and legal constraints...” 94 The implication of such a position is obviously that terrorism represents an attempt to return society to a “Hobbesian state of nature... [in which] there is no civil order...”. 95 The “fundamentally nihilistic...” nature of terrorism is thus “corrosive of political order ...[and] essentially contra-political” because it rejects the “restraints that divide civil society from the state of nature ...[and] lift[s]... a corner of the curtain screening us from the Hobbesian jungle.” 96

The literature on terrorism thus reveals in stark terms the boundary observed in previous sections between civil and uncivil conditions, between the peace established by politics and the violence which ensues when politics fails. This boundary is

reinforced by the distinction between the terrorist and his or her targets.97 The terrorist deliberately chooses to break the bonds of civility, to throw a bomb toward those individuals who inhabit civil society, gain protection and pursue their rights therein. Terrorists as Ryan curiously puts it, set themselves apart from “ordinary politics” by accepting “no limits” to their “willingness to behave badly”.98 Terrorism thus represents an “unmitigated evil” and terrorists are by definition guilty of heinous moral outrages while their “victims” are automatically declared “innocent”.99 For Walzer, terrorism is characterised simply as “the random murder of innocent people... as a strategy of revolutionary struggle...” which necessarily implies that those ‘innocent people’ bear no responsibility for the violence.100 While it is beyond question that most victims of terrorist violence did nothing to deserve their fate, it is not altogether clear that the innocence established by the boundary between ‘terrorist violence’ and ‘civil peace’ is all that secure. It may be agreed that the victims of the Omagh bombing or the Lockerbie disaster for example, had done nothing to warrant their deaths because they were targeted merely because they were members of a civil union the terrorist’s wished to attack.101 As one terrorism expert put it, victims of terrorism are automatically innocent because as members of a civil union they are “noncombatants”, while terrorists who “do not engage in combat, as soldiers do” attack the “unarmed... [and] the undefended [as]... a deliberate strategy.”102 Similarly, in his comparison of terrorism with tyrannicide David George argues that the “personal identity of the victim is of no consequence to the terrorist” whose only concern is that his or her victims are chosen with the sole aim of communicating their message to others.103 Unlike the victims of terrorism, the victim of tyrannicide is killed because of he or she bears “personal guilt” and has a “unique combatant status” because the tyrant has in effect

declared war on society. Tyrannicide therefore represents a form of limited, carefully targeted violence while terrorism is for all intents and purposes indiscriminate and insensitive to the non-combatant status of its victims.

To be innocent then, is to pose no threat, to be “harmless”, to refrain from active engagement in the causing of direct harm to others. This view of innocence fits neatly into a familiar conventional moral framework which allows distinctions to be made between the unjustified killing of terrorism and the justified killing in war. Although common, this familiar distinction is also untenable for the simple reason that ‘conventional’ warfare and ‘unconventional’ terrorism are often simply indistinguishable in their ends, means, and choice of victims. The deliberate targeting of non-combatants in warfare has a long history, the bombing of Dresden, Coventry, Hiroshima, or the massacre at My Lai are just some of the more recent infamous examples. Almost all commentators agree however, that terrorism is a type of combat which “systematically breaches the internationally accepted rules of war” in rejecting any distinction between combatants and non-combatants or between a civil and an uncivil condition. In an age of total war however, responsibility for the rejection of this distinction cannot simply be blamed on terrorists. This distinction, never a strong one, is surely all the more flimsy in our own time in which administrators, technicians or scientists on defence contracts, and munitions workers outside the armed forces have become a vital part of every nation’s military capacity. In World War Two, the Vietnam and Korean wars air power was heavily used for the explicit purpose of

104 Ibid., pg. 402, 406.
107 Draper, K., “Self-Defence, Collective Obligation, and Noncombatant Liability”, Social Theory and Practice, 24 (1), 1998, pg. 57-81. Draper examines the obliteration of the distinction between combatants and noncombatants exemplified in the United States’ military justification for killing Iraqi citizens during the Gulf War. This justification was premised on the assumption that they had “some control over their government” and should have exercised that control to oust Saddam Hussein or force their army to withdraw from Kuwait. Ibid., pg. 57. Draper contends that the U.S. military justified the death of Iraqi noncombatants on the grounds that their inaction meant that they were “liable” for the “necessary and proportionate” violence directed against the Iraqi regime. Ibid., pg. 74.
crippling a nations’ ability to wage total war, in large part by killing or demoralising non-combatants.108

In contrast to such cases of indiscriminate violence, terrorism can often be highly discriminating in its choice of victims. Between 1969 and June 1989 for instance, terrorism in Northern Ireland claimed 2,761 lives, of whom 31 per cent were members of the security forces, 13% were members of paramilitary organisations and 55% were civilians.109 Further analysis of these figures reveals an even more narrowly targeted pattern of killing. Over the same period, loyalist paramilitaries were responsible for 623 deaths, of whom 73% were Catholic civilians, 18% were Protestants, 5% were members of other loyalist paramilitaries, 3% were members of republican paramilitaries, and 2% members of the security forces. Republican paramilitaries by contrast killed 1,593 people, of whom 53% were members of the security forces, 24% were Protestant civilians, 11% catholic civilians, 9% were members of other republican paramilitaries, and 1% members of loyalist paramilitaries. None of these figures mitigates the killing and murder committed by terrorists, indeed killing is still killing whether discriminate or not. The point however, is that terrorist violence can be as discriminate or indiscriminate as the violence of conventional warfare; and if a lack of discrimination in the targeting of ‘innocent’ victims is the key criterion of the definition of terrorism, then states as well as paramilitary cells can certainly be described as terrorists.110

From the perspective of military theory, Everett Wheeler argues that terrorism is indeed a form of war rather than criminality, albeit a reversion to “primitive war”.111 Primitive warfare is defined as a kind of non-state conflict which takes place without pitched battles or professional military organisation, and thus terrorism is a form of warfare


which threatens the supremacy of the conventional military techniques of modern warfare. The assumption behind such a view is that states, even when resorting to the violence of warfare conduct themselves in a ‘civilised’ manner which seeks at the least to limit or control the violence at their disposal. Similarly, it is assumed that terrorists have no respect for the formal rules of war, are not accountable for their actions, and show little willingness to direct their violence solely at other combatants. The claim that modern warfare can be distinguished from terrorism on the grounds that the former has been ‘civilised’ and the latter remains ‘primitive’ despite the use of modern arms technology belies a strongly normative assumption. That assumption is that the participants in modern warfare - states with disciplined, professional armies - are institutions of civilisation whereas terrorists are little better than savages or barbarians who are insensitive to the careful limitations which civilisation has placed on the use of violence.

CONCLUSION

The original idea with which this thesis began was that liberalism is guided by the assumption that a firm distinction can be made between barbarism and civilisation, and that violence is the preserve of the uncivilised. The very popularity of violence and terrorism in particular however, may have nothing to do with a reversion to a primitive state of warfare, but may be an indication of the very prevalence of modern civilisation. Throughout history violence has played an important role in the life of most (if not all) societies, and as Eric Hobsbawm has noted, in societies in which violence was a regular method of “regulating the everyday relations between peoples and groups” various rules were developed around the use of violence, determining how and against whom it could be used, and which aimed to protect those who had no involvement in the conflict.112 Such violence was used only when other possibilities were not available, had a “specific and identifiable purpose” and was hence “proportionate to that purpose”.113 The incidence of forms of violence which seem to deny any such distinction between combatants and non-combatants (such as terrorism or the massacre of civilians by aggrievedgunmen) Hobsbawm argues is itself a sign that violence has become divorced

113 Ibid., pg. 212.
from any rules governing its use. In the process of civilisation which has rendered modern states overwhelmingly powerful, the violence of non-state actors has been transformed into an impotent protest against modern society.

What Hobsbawm’s analysis tends to ignore however, is that while modern states have sought to control who has access to violence, modern technology has made killing at a distance much easier, and has to some degree obliterated the possibility of distinguishing between combatant and non-combatant, belligerent and innocent. According to Konrad Lorenz, the invention by human beings of “shooting weapons” has increased the distance at which killing takes place, and this increasing distance “screens the killer”, as Bauman also argues, from having to acknowledge the consequences of their actions.114 “The same principle applies to an even greater degree” Lorenz suggests,

...to the use of modern remote-control weapons. The man who presses the releasing button is so completely screened against... realising the consequences of his action, that he can commit it with impunity... Only thus can it be explained that perfectly good-natured men, who would not even smack a naughty child, proved to be perfectly able to release rockets or to lay carpets of incendiary bombs on sleeping cities, thereby committing hundreds and thousands of children to a horrible death in the flames. The fact that it is good, normal men who did this is as eerie as any fiendish atrocity of war.115

If Lorenz and Bauman are correct, the increasing distances over which modern technology can now deliver death makes it unlikely that human beings are going to be able to reduce their violence. If one is to sustain a principled and practical opposition to violence however, the persistence of violence cannot be attributed solely to the ‘screening’ effect of modern technology, but may include other factors such as the highly selective approach taken to the identification of what constitutes violence.

The understanding of violence and of specific phenomena such as terrorism, not to mention the efforts to promote less lethal dialogue between terrorists and their opponents, can not be broadened by the use of definitions which effectively thrust all terrorists into a moral nether world peopled by the insane or by ‘primitive’ savages with

115 Ibid., pg. 208-209.
whom no accommodation is possible. As Conor Cruise O'Brien points out, the development of "sentimental" or "hysterical" interpretations of terrorism may serve to reinforce one's own position, but also confuses the understanding of alternative positions. Perhaps as Martha Crenshaw has suggested we need to consider the conceptually awkward possibility that there are many different types of terrorism which cannot be adequately explained by the use of a single definition employing highly pejorative terms. Above all, perhaps the whole idea of a firm boundary between civil peace and uncivil violence which assigns blame for violence to those who represent a regression into primitive savagery is in need of questioning. In liberal discourse it is the value-neutral state which is thought best able to defend this boundary by upholding a framework of laws which make peaceful co-existence possible. The state is therefore invested with the dual task of maintaining the order necessary for the existence of civil society, and defending this order from the threat of violence. This conception of the relationship between the state and the maintenance of a peaceful civil order implies that the fulfilment of this task requires an effective management of the population because it is their conduct which represents the greatest threat to civil order. In the following chapter, attention will be turned to the implications of this assumption in the literature on collective violence against the state.

116 Tilly, C., "Contentious Conversation", Social Research, 65 (3), 1998, pg. 491-510. Here, Tilly argues for such an accommodation: "If we regard conversation as continuously negotiated communication and contention as mutual claim-making that bears significantly on the parties interests... then the two social phenomena overlap extensively. They overlap in the zone we might call contentious conversation." (495) Contentious conversation includes a whole range of violent and non-violent conflictual exchanges. See also Aho, J. A., This Thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1994, pg. 108-121.


As civil society was instituted in order to maintain public tranquility, the state forthwith acquires over us and our possessions a greater right, to the extent necessary to accomplish the end. The state, therefore, in the interest of public peace and order, can limit... [the] common right of resistance. That such was the purpose of the state we cannot doubt, since it could not in any other way achieve its end. If, in fact, the right of resistance should remain without restraint, there will no longer be a state, only a non-social horde.


Though nothing can be immortall, which mortals make; yet, if men had the use of reason they pretend to, their Common-wealths might be secured, at least, from perishing by internall diseases. For by the nature of their Institution, they are designed to live, as long as Man-kind... Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by externall violence, but intestine disorder, the fault is not in men, as they are the Matter; but as they are the Makers, and orderers of them.

... the Soveraign, is the publique Soule, giving Life and Motion to the Common-wealth; which expiring, the Members are governed by it no more, than the Carcasse of a man, by his departed (though immortall) Soule.

In the last chapter it was argued that contemporary liberal discourse is characterised by a pervasive assumption that there is a boundary between civil peace and uncivil violence. The implication of this assumption is that 'violence' threatens to transgress that boundary, to intrude upon the peace which reigns in civil society and disrupt the order built upon the rights of individuals. Violence is therefore seen as uncivil, savage and barbarous, while those who commit such violence are deemed uncivilised, dangerous individuals who show slight regard for the boundary which protects the civil order from iniquitous savagery. This view of violence and its perpetrators is central to liberal discourse, and in this chapter it will be suggested that the development of liberal theories of revolution was shaped by the concern to protect civil order from the unruly conduct of those who sought to disrupt it. Within liberal discourse the maintenance of a boundary between civil peace and uncivil violence is regarded as essential to the mutual felicity of rational individuals who have agreed to forebear from violence against one another and their state. Such forbearance is seen as rational because rational creatures cannot fail to see that their own self-interest lies in the maintenance of social order. The phenomenon of violence occasioned by civil unrest or revolution therefore represents a problem which has elicited the articulation of complex theories designed to explain why or how revolutionary violence occurs when the dangers of violence to the pursuit of rational self-interest are so evident. The resort to violence is therefore regarded as irrational or at least non-rational, and has been explained in terms of individual and social pathology conveyed by metaphors of disease or structural collapse, or by images of storm and earthquake. Violence is seen as discontinuous, an unusual, calamitous event analogous to a volcanic eruption or tidal wave of brief but epic destruction, and its prevention necessitates a careful management of the conduct of the domestic population.

It has been argued in previous chapters that in liberal discourse reason and rational conduct leads not to violence but to peace. The corollary of this position, which will be discussed in the first section of this chapter, is that revolutionary activity is associated with non-rational behaviour occasioned by the breakdown of the fabric of civil society conveyed in metaphors of disease and storm. The association of revolutionary violence with irrationality however, is not unique to liberalism. What distinguishes liberal theories of revolution is the assumption that the development of market economies leads to the pacification of society. What requires explanation is the 'outbreak' of
revolutionary violence which is traced to the tensions induced by the process of economic development. In the second section attention will be turned to the theory of relative-deprivation which traces revolutions to personal and social strain. Derived from Alexis de Tocqueville’s analysis of the French Revolution, relative-deprivation theory has provided the foundation for liberal analyses of revolution. In the third and final section the discussion will focus on the assumptions implicit in liberal theories of revolution, and specifically on the idea that revolutions indicate an abnormality or disequilibrium symptomatic of crises attendant upon rapid or uneven economic development or modernisation.¹

I. REVOLUTIONARY METAPHORS

Revolutions have often been condemned, recommended, sensationalised, or explained away through the use of “organic metaphors” linking them to events in the biological, geological, or meteorological world.² As John Dunn put it, revolutions are like “facts of nature, analogous to physical processes, the release of enormous forces, moving vast masses through space.”³ As if moved by this very sentiment one recent theorist has argued that,

The causes of revolutions and major rebellions operate in ways that seem remarkably similar to the forces that build up to cause earthquakes. That is, in the years before such a revolution... social pressures for change build. Yet the existing social and political structures... resist change (even though pressures and deformations may be visible). Suddenly, however, some response to the mounting pressure... weakens that resistance (like a block breaking off along the fault). At that point, there is a sudden release of the pent-up forces and a crumbling of the old social structures - a revolution or major rebellion.⁴

The imagery of natural disaster, of storm and disease is deeply embedded within the discourse on revolution.⁵ The use of organic metaphors coloured Thomas Hobbes’ analysis in Leviathan, in which he argued that the “infirmities” of commonwealths could be likened to “diseases of a naturall body” owing in large part to “Defectuous

In the very act of creating a commonwealth human beings were unable to prevent their "...ignorance, and passions..." from sowing "...many seeds of a naturall mortality [of the state], by Intestine Discord." Secure commonwealths could not therefore be built "without the help of a very able Architect...", and thus existing commonwealths come to resemble a ramshackle "crasie building" which needs little pressure exerted against it to fall. Addressing himself therefore to the inhabitants of such perillously fragile commonwealths, Hobbes argued that many of the infirmities to which commonwealths were prone proceeded from allowing insufficient power to the sovereign or too much to the subjects. Such a situation he argued, would merely incline "great numbers of men... to rebell" at the slightest inconvenience occasioned by the state. A weak sovereign power will also invite foreign competition and interference, will promote the development of factions, and will be unable to prevent the circulation of "seditious doctrines", the chief of which according to Hobbes, was that each citizen should be the judge of right and wrong. Among the other problems of commonwealths, Hobbes referred to conflict between political and religious authorities which he compared to "epilepsie... in the Body Naturall"; or the want of money which was likened to an "Ague" inhibiting proper circulation through the arteries of society; the accumulation of too much wealth in private hands was described as "Pleurisie" which lead to "fever"; and the liberty to dispute the sovereign's authority was analogous to the action of "little Wormes" in the body politic which weakened it from within.

Such examples as these indicate the importance Hobbes attached to maintaining the supremacy of the sovereign over the subjects, laws, and other structures of government within the commonwealth. The purpose of Hobbes' argument here was to establish that sovereignty consisted in the ability to make and enforce the laws of the community without restraint or division, "for Powers divided mutually destroy each other." In a revealing passage Hobbes referred to the various branches of government as having specific organic functions which, when divided against each other caused disease,

6 Unless otherwise specified, all following quotes from Hobbes have been taken from: Hobbes, T., Leviathan [1651], Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968, pg. 363-376.
7 Ibid., pg. 272.
8 Hobbes referred to this doctrine as a poisonous "venime" that he compared to "the biting of a mad Dogge, which is a disease the Physicians call Hydrophobia", which in the body-politic resulted in what he sneeringly referred to as "Tyrannophobia", the fear and hatred of rule. Ibid., pg. 370.
Sometimes also in the meerly Civili government, there may be more than one Soule: As when the Power of levying mony, (which is the Nutritive faculty,) has depended on a generall Assembly; the Power of conduct and command, (which is the Motive faculty,) on one man; and the Power of making Lawes, (which is the Rationall faculty,) on the accidental consent, not onely of these two, but also of a third; This endangereth the Commonwealth, sometimes for want of consent to good Lawes; but most often for want of such Nourishment, as is necessary to Life, and Motion.9

Such nourishment came from effective, unitary sovereignty which alone guaranteed order by raising sufficient funds, establishing unambiguous laws, and providing clear leadership. The danger in failing to provide sufficient nourishment was that the sovereign - "the publique Soule, giving Life and Motion to the Common-wealth" - would 'expire' and subjects returned to the state of nature.10 Hobbes' use of organic metaphors suggested that the process of governance was concerned with the health not only of the state, but of the population over which it ruled.

The health of both state and population were held to depend upon scientifically ascertainable qualities such as nourishment and circulation, and the science of government - like that of medicine - consisted in being able to make the right diagnosis of particular problems before they became incurable. The outbreak of revolution like the outbreak of biological epidemics, indicated a failure of those entrusted with the task of making the correct diagnosis. Consequently, the appearance of revolution indicated that a severe problem had afflicted the state, and unless it was treated correctly would destroy the fabric of civil society. Even for those who were prepared to countenance resistance to the state such as John Locke, took great pains to confine and limit their claims. Locke in fact used the term ‘revolution’ in contending that his doctrine of legitimate resistance would not create “a ferment for frequent Rebellion”, and made it clear that his was a doctrine of legitimate but limited resistance solely to governments which had either abused their trust or were in a state of war with their citizens by endangering their lives, liberties, or estates.11 Locke firmly distinguished between legitimate resistance leading to “Dissolution of [a]... Government”, and illegitimate resistance resulting in the “Dissolution of the Society”.12 Governments could be resisted he argued, on the grounds of an abuse of trust, by ruling arbitrarily, or by killing or

9 Ibid., pg. 372.
10 Ibid., pg. 373.
subjecting their citizens to slavery. Such forms of rule he claimed, constituted true rebellion, a rejection of the laws governments existed to maintain, and made resistance to it legitimate even though he feared its effects on the life of society.

Something of Locke's concerns were reflected in the debate between Edmund Burke (1729-1797) and Tom Paine (1737-1809) over the French Revolution. According to John Keane, Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* split the "official political spectrum" into supporters or opponents of the French Revolution or "...what would soon be called the Left and the Right." Ted Gurr also acknowledged Burke's importance as a "precursor" to modern liberal theories of revolution. The French Revolution Burke described as a "present confusion" and "palsy" the leaders of which sought to "pervert the natural order" of society. His antipathy to the 'masses' and their violence was barely disguised, dismissing them as "...cruel ruffians and assassins..." whose vulgarity was unleashed in the "...horrid yells, and shrilling screams, and frantic dances, and infamous contumelies, and all the unutterable abominations of the furies of hell..." He re-iterated this theme with an unwavering conviction culminating in fervent denunciations of the Revolution's claims to justice.

Humanity and compassion are ridiculed as the fruits of superstition and ignorance. Tenderness to individuals is considered as treason to the public. ... Amidst assassination, massacre, and confiscation... [the revolutionaries] are forming plans for the good order of future society. Embracing in their arms the carcases of base criminals... The Assembly, their organ, acts before them the farce of deliberation with as little decency as liberty. ... they act amidst the tumultuous cries of a mixed mob of ferocious men, and of women lost to shame, who, according to their insolent fancies, direct, control, applaud, explode them... with a strange mixture of servile petulance and proud, presumptuous authority.

12 Ibid., pg. 406.
15 Bridge, C., "Burke and the Conservative Tradition" in D.Close and C.Bridge (eds.), *Revolution: A History of the Idea*, Croom Helm, London, 1985, pg. 88. Bridge argues that Burke's analysis was to exert a powerful influence on later theorists in the liberal tradition (such as Brinton, Johnson, Gurr, and Huntington), especially by interpreting revolution as an "aberration" and "disease".
19 Ibid., pg. 164-165.
20 Ibid., pg. 160-161.
Burke insisted that revolutionary politics was premised upon a perversion of the human character designed to “...temper and harden the breast...” to the violence attendant upon the subversion of old institutions, leading to a renunciation of “...all the well-placed sympathies of the human breast.”

For Hobbes the metaphor of disease created an image of the sovereign as a physician who must observe and manage a population as a physician would observe and treat a patient. Signs of disease had to be noted and acted upon promptly in order to maintain the health of the body politic. Burke’s organic metaphors however, conveyed a sense that the problem of revolution was in essence incurable and inexorable. Paine similarly spoke of the American War of Independence, in which he was a committed partisan, as “...the greatest and completest revolution the world ever knew...” which burst forth like a “...long and raging hurricane...” sundering all old institutions and ideas. For Paine, the American and French revolutions were symptomatic of a kind of (hopefully fatal) disease in the old order quite unlike the minor events “formerly called Revolutions, [which] were little more than a change of persons, or an alteration of local circumstances...”, and heralded “a renovation of the natural order of things, a system of principles as universal as truth... combining moral with political happiness and national prosperity.” As John Keane put it, “with astounding prescience...”, Paine realised that modern revolutions can be likened to periods of fever and delirium, during which the body politic suffers convulsions caused by vicious power struggles and attempts by the best-organised, most ruthless revolutionists to crush their opponents and ...other “enemies of the revolution”.

Paine himself in a letter to Burke, described the reluctance the monarchies of Europe had to send their armies against France for fear that they catch “the Contagion” of revolution. Although he did not share Paine’s enthusiasm for the Revolution, Burke’s metaphors and imagery were similarly indicative of inevitable catastrophe, warning of “...a hollow murmuring under ground...” threatening an “...earthquake in the political world.” When the earthquake broke in France he castigated the revolutionaries with

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21 Ibid., pg. 156.
24 Keane, J., op.cit., 122.
25 Paine, T., quoted in ibid., pg. 287.
26 Burke, E., quoted in ibid., pg. 291.
failing to repair the walls or build anew on the foundations of the "...noble and venerable castle" of the French state and constitution.  

While Burke here used the metaphor of earthquake to convey the wanton destructiveness of the French Revolution, Paine used the metaphor of storm and hurricane to communicate the very same destructiveness which he thought was likely to sweep away the last vestiges of feudal monarchy. The metaphor of disease and storm however, conveyed another quality of revolution which liberal writers were clearly concerned about, and that was the capacity of revolution to overwhelm individual reason and volition. Revolutions swept across societies like forces of nature which could not be held at bay and would draw the inhabitants of those societies - the faceless masses - into its swirling vortex with irresistible power. For Burke this was clearly a matter for some alarm because revolutions brought to prominence the very worst, most unruly classes - the mob - whose fury and envy was beyond control. Tom Paine however, was more sympathetic to revolution and gleefully anticipated the prospect of liberation for the down-trodden masses. Nonetheless, he admitted that this liberation would inevitably be accompanied by the uncontrolled violence of those who had been degraded by the system they sought to overthrow. "In the tremendous breaking forth" of revolution Paine argued,

...all degrees, tempers and characters are confounded, and delivering themselves, by a miracle of exertion, from the destruction meditated against them, is it to be expected that nothing will happen? When men are sore with the sense of oppressions, and menaced with the prospect of new ones, is the calmness of philosophy, or the palsy of insensibility to be looked for?  

Outrages committed by "the mob" were therefore to be expected in the heat of revolution, but these 'outrages' were not blamed on the barbarity of the masses but on the inexorable oppressions of the system that degraded them. Those "vast classes of mankind as are distinguished by the appellation of the vulgar, or the ignorant mob" he argued arose "as an unavoidable consequence, out of the ill construction of all old governments in Europe" which exalted "the puppet-show of state and aristocracy" while the masses were "distortedly debased" and "degradedly thrown into the background of the human picture". Mob violence was therefore to be explained as a consequence of

27 Burke, E., op.cit., pg. 121.  
28 Paine, T., Rights of Man, pg. 453.  
29 Ibid., pg. 455.
the desire for revenge of those who had been so degraded rather than a consequence of the desire for liberty which they had not yet been “instructed how to reverence...”.

While Paine and Burke clearly differed in their attitude toward revolution, there was a remarkable consistency in their respective analyses of what constituted revolution. Both regarded revolutions as inexorable forces, both believed revolutions unleashed unprecedented destruction of existing social and political institutions, and both agreed that mob violence was inevitable. Such an image of revolution was immortalised by Charles Dickens in *A Tale of Two Cities*,

> The hour was come when Saint Antoine was to execute his horrible idea of hoisting up men for lamps to show what he could be and do. Saint Antoine’s blood was up, and the blood of tyranny and domination by the iron hand was down - down on the steps of the Hotel de Ville, where the governor’s body lay - down on the sole of the shoe of Madame Defarge, where she had trodden on the body to steady it for mutilation. ... The swinging sentinel was posted, and the sea rushed on. The sea of black and threatening waters, and of destructive upheaving of wave against wave, whose depths were yet unfathomed and whose forces were yet unknown. The remorseless sea of turbulently swaying shapes, voices of vengeance, and faces hardened in the furnaces of suffering until the touch of pity could make no mark on them.

Thomas Carlyle in his *The French Revolution* spoke in similar terms of the “madness” and “Elemental Powers” of revolution, the “inflammable” and “combustible chaos” of pre-revolutionary France. Carlyle also employed the metaphor of storm of a “[c]loud of Erebus blackness; betokening latent electricity without limit.” Such images of revolution focus attention on the suddenness and unexpected nature of the assault, the unruly collective nature of the uprising and the accompanying fear of an unbridled, libertine mass, and of course the savage violence with which ‘the masses’ expressed their hatred and resentment of the old order.

Early liberal sociologists such as Gabriel Tarde for example, expressed this concern in his analysis of the revolutionary crowd. Such a crowd had “something animal about it” in which otherwise rational individuals were “completely taken over, irresistibly drawn

30 Ibid.
33 Ibid., pg. 165. See also his account of the September Massacres which occasion the repetition of the imagery of madness and frenzy. Ibid., pg. 493-495.
along by a force with no counterbalance".34 The actions of such crowds he argued, were characterised by irrational destructiveness,

...can we cite a single house built by a crowd, any land cleared and worked by a crowd, or any industry created by a crowd? For a few trees of liberty that they planted, how many forests have been burned, homes pillaged, chateaux demolished by them... The danger for new democracies is the growing difficulty for thoughtful men to escape the obsession and fascination of turmoil.35

The recent popularity of Elias Canetti's *Crowds and Power* is an indication of the currency of the view that, "[t]o the crowd" in Canetti's words "everything seems a Bastille" to be overwhelmed and torn down.36 More recently, Serge Muscovici has spoken of the deterioration of mental faculties, the sway of passion, and the absence of rational calculation in the minds of individuals who participate in crowd activity.37 The assumption behind much of this literature is that the violence of revolutions is not simply abnormal, but that it is irresistible. Revolutions threaten to engulf whole societies in a frenzy of destruction which unleashes the destructive power of the masses. At such times, the rational control of conduct upon which the order of society normally rests is suspended and the sub-rational impulses of the animal crowd hold sway. The fear that lies behind this view was perhaps best expressed by Tarde,

Individuals can be liberal and tolerant when each is alone; but once assembled together they become authoritarian and tyrannical. This is because beliefs become heightened through mutual contact... Political crowds... are the most impassioned and the most furious... passing from execration to adoration, from excessive anger to excessive joy with extreme facility.38

The crime and delinquency of the revolutionary mob was emphasised by associating it with the barbarity of nature which was sharply discontinuous with the civility of a social order of rational individuals. Among the early attempts to offer a comprehensive social-scientific theory of revolution Pitrim Sorokin's *The Sociology of Revolution* was based on just these assumptions.

35 Ibid., pg. 289, 293.
38 Tarde, G., *op.cit.* , pg. 289.
Written as a response to his own bitter personal experiences during the Russian Revolution, Sorokin’s view was that revolution in general (and the Russian revolution in particular) occurred when “...the conditions of the environment are modified in such a way that they violate the fundamental instincts of the masses...” and drove them to commit violence to redress their grievances.\(^{39}\) Revolutions were thus associated with a degeneration of human behaviour, a devastating “biologization” or “transformation of man-socius into man-animal” in which “the biologic tendencies... manifest themselves in their most extreme and ‘sadistic’ form” in the “feverish, agitated and furious character of behaviour of [the] multitudes”.\(^{40}\) Sorokin’s analysis here relied on a distinction between the civilisation and peace of society, and the violence of nature. Revolutions wound-back the progress achieved by civilisation and destroyed “...all the religious, moral and legal habits which acted as a barrier against acts of murder...”.\(^{41}\) In revolutions individuals become,

...drunk with blood, and with the brutal lust of inflicting pain. The bodies of the killed are torn asunder, their limbs and heads are carried through the town on pikes and thrust before the eyes of those nearest to them... The barbarity and sadistic cruelty of long-passed ages came back to life with its [the Russian revolution’s] refined atrocities of torture.\(^{42}\)

The motor force of revolutionary activity was the supposed ‘deformation’ of human character which released the ‘beast within’ and wiped away all the barriers to the violence of instinct and nature in civil society. Sorokin’s assumption, that violence was an attribute of uncontrolled nature, was here combined with the contention that revolutions transgressed the boundary between uncivil violence and civil peace. The defining characteristic of liberal approaches to revolution, which Sorokin’s approach exemplified, was that the shattering of peace by violence was triggered by personal strain and irrationality of ‘the masses’. While Sorokin spoke of this strain in biological terms, his approach and those of his contemporaries owed much to Alexis de Tocqueville’s socio-economic analysis of the French Revolution.\(^{43}\)

\(^{40}\) *Ibid.*, pg. 35-36.
\(^{41}\) *Ibid.*, pg. 139.
\(^{42}\) *Ibid.*, pg. 140-1.
II. FROM DISEASE TO FRUSTRATION

Unlike Burke and Paine, Alexis de Tocqueville suggested that the Old Regime in France was overthrown not by a sudden storm, nor by the intolerable oppressions and immiseration of ‘the masses’, but by an unprecedented period of economic growth which resulted in the successful democratic challenge to and supplanting of outmoded monarchical government. Increasing social wealth “far from tranquillising the population...” was in fact the catalyst of revolution, promoting “a spirit of unrest...” in which the general population “became more and more hostile to every ancient institution...”, in short “the nation was heading for a revolution.” Tocqueville’s reasoning was that economic development caused ‘rising expectations’ among the lower and middle classes which were unmatched by possibilities for their satisfaction. While economic improvements spurred governmental and administrative changes long overdue these merely heightened dissatisfaction, ...it is not always when things are going from bad to worse that revolutions break out. On the contrary... when a people which has put up with oppressive rule over a long period without protest suddenly finds the government relaxing its pressure, it takes up arms against it. Thus the social order overthrown by a revolution is almost always better than the one immediately preceding it... the most perilous time for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways. ...Patently endured so long as it seemed beyond redress, a grievance comes to appear intolerable once the possibility of removing it crosses men’s minds. ...[Remedying one abuse] draws attention to the others and they now appear more galling; people may suffer less, but their sensibility is exacerbated.

Tocqueville’s analysis became the benchmark for later liberal theories which traced revolution to rapid economic development leading to improvements in the condition of the lower classes thereby sparking increasing, insistent, but unrealisable claims for more power, wealth, status or freedom. Revolutions were thus thought to occur when the sense of ‘relative’ as opposed to ‘objective’ deprivation induced by un-met expectations rose above sustainable levels resulting in widespread personal strain.

46 Ibid., pg. 176-177.
47 Calvert, P., Revolution and Counter-Revolution, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1990, pg. 6-8.
Early applications of this theory such as Lyford Edwards' *The Natural History of Revolution* (1927), George Pettee's *The Process of Revolution* (1938), and Crane Brinton's *The Anatomy of Revolution* (1938), emphasised both the pathology and abnormality of revolutionary violence. Edwards for example explained revolution as the inevitable outcome of repression of one or more of four “elemental” human desires, which caused the downtrodden to feel that their “legitimate aspirations and ideals” were “repressed or perverted... hindered and thwarted...” resulting in widespread “disappointment and discouragement”. This situation developed because the “preliminary symptom” of revolution was the “marked increase of wealth, intelligence and power in the repressed portion of society” leading to an inflation of expectations. For Pettee, revolutions occurred when the state became a “barrier to change” and found itself “out of adjustment” with society causing a widespread perception of “cramp”. On this view, the contagion of personal strain spread throughout society resulting in violence and abnormality, an increase “of hobos, tramps, and bums” who constituted “a considerable part of ...revolutionary mobs”. Such crowds, incapable of reason, swayed by exaggerated and sensational ideas, showed “only violent and extreme sentiments.” The psycho-social axioms in these analyses such as rising expectations and relative-deprivation underscored the irrational or sub-rational nature of revolutionary violence.

Crane Brinton’s classic study *The Anatomy of Revolution*, achieved the same result by combining Tocquillean ‘relative-deprivation’ analysis with the sustained use of the metaphor of disease. Brinton’s thesis was that revolutions denoted a kind of pathological condition or “fever” of the body politic exhibiting definite symptoms, beginning with the violence and terror of the radicals akin to a kind of “delirium”, followed by the recuperative “convalescence” of the inevitable conservative reaction.

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48 Edwards, L.P., *The Natural History of Revolution* [1927], Russell and Russell, New York, 1965, pg. 2-4, 30. The desires to which he refers are those for experience, security, recognition, and response from others. Edwards also refers to the spread of discontent throughout society as a “contagious” condition.
50 Pettee, G.S., *The Process of Revolution* [1938], Howard Fertig, New York, 1971, pg. 7. The concept of cramp is described as “basically subjective”, dependent “upon a consciousness of barriers to full self-expression” which implies “a maladjustment with accompanying strain” when “basic psychological drives” or “basic impulses” are altered or blocked. *Ibid.*, pg. 11-12, 32-33.  
51 Edwards, L., *op.cit.*, pg. 27-28  
after which society emerged "immunised" against further attacks. Tilly clearly believes that Brinton employed the metaphor of disease "with malice aforethought..." to equate revolution with undesirable social breakdown. The use of the disease metaphor begs the question of what characterises 'normal' and 'healthy' societies. The health of a society was apparently measured by the degree to which 'equilibrium' was maintained and denoted "a condition in which the varying and conflicting desires and habits of individuals and groups... are in complex mutual adjustment." Consequently, emphasis was placed on the abnormality of violence due to the perverted masses disrupting the normal mutuality and order of society. Revolutions therefore, appeared archetypically as 'abnormal' events, outbursts, eruptions, or crises which occurred owing to some malfunction or breakdown in the normal social and political processes. Revolutions were made by individuals acting under strain; their patterns of behaviour were feverish and erratic, their wishes perverted, and they were inclined to acts of reprehensible criminality. Although often stated less stridently, these assumptions formed the bedrock of a widespread conception of revolution and civil strife which represented it as an aberration or "mutation". Superficially, this literature has been divided by the relative emphasis accorded to either human agency or structural crisis. There are however, strong continuities between these approaches in the assumptions they make about the nature of revolution and its causes.

Post-war social-scientific literature was decisively shaped by the dual employment of both relative-deprivation theory and clinical or psychological concepts, the most important of which was frustration-aggression theory. Frustration-aggression theory postulated that aggressive behaviour was stimulated by frustration in the attainment of a

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54 Ibid., pg. 17-18. It is worth noting Brinton's observation that Trotsky wrote on the events of the Russian Revolution and its aftermath "almost clinically" (pg. 263). Edwards also spoke of revolution as a disease and suggested that a "country in revolution is like a person suffering from a deadly cancer" and that recovery from revolution requires "recuperation" (Edwards, op.cit., pg. 149, 202).
56 Brinton, C., op cit., pg. 16.
57 Eisenstadt, S.N., Revolution and the Transformation of Societies: A Comparative Study of Civilisations, The Free Press, New York, 1978, pg. 198. Eisenstadt argues that revolutions are explicable as part of modern European culture and history, but even so, as forms of change modern revolutions are "mutations", a radical departure from previous forms of change.
58 Gurr, T.R., "The Revolution-Social Change Nexus: Some Old Theories and New Hypotheses", Comparative Politics, 5 (3), 1973, pg. 368. As Gurr sees it, the two styles of theory differ only in "emphasis" on either "discontent" or "dysfunction".
that people referred to revolutions as a ‘clinical’ problem, an aberration from the normal condition of society. Three assumptions informed these approaches first, that frustration lead to aggression; second, that widespread personal frustration resulted in outbursts of collective violence; third and most importantly, widespread frustration was induced by rapid economic development which inflated popular expectations. For early theorists such as Rosalind and Ivo Feireabend, frustration-aggression theory was accepted as a scientific truth. The normal order of society was thus equated with a balance between expectations and attainments, and therefore the absence of public acts of violence and conflict (riots or strikes), the relative absence of acts of government coercion, and the prevalence of “intergroup conciliation”. Political instability and revolution was therefore identified with a shared personal frustration which was most likely to occur in the process of economic modernisation due to the emergence in that process of an inevitable “gap between expectations and achievements.”

The explanation advanced for this proposition was based on what they described as a “...commonsense assumption... that revolution begin[s] in the minds of men...” and they attempted to demonstrate this by tracing a line from “political turmoil” back to “social discontent” caused by widespread frustration due to the tensions induced by modernisation,

Change, especially extensive, rapid, and abrupt change, is an unsettling and bewildering human experience. It is likely to create strain in the psyche of the individual and crisis in the social order. Old ways, familiar

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Sheldon Wolin argues that another reason for the search for general theories of revolution was the desire of American foreign policy makers and military analysts to enlist social scientists in the development of reliable “forecasts” and “measures” of revolutions throughout Asia and Africa, known as “Project Camelot”. Wolin, S.S., loc.cit., pg. 357.


environments, deep-seated habits, and social roles become obsolescent, while a new way of life... are not yet clearly established. ... [such change] moves people physically into new environments, exposes their minds to new ideas, and casts them in new and unfamiliar roles [and] is very likely to create collective bewilderment. This bewilderment may find expression in turmoil and social violence.64

As Rod Aya points out, this was not so much an argument as an inference drawn from the correlations they observed between the data on modernisation and revolutionary events.65 Despite their attempt at empirical rigour, the Feirabends’ conclusions were astonishingly unsupported, buttressed by a set of assumptions which made it all but impossible to see revolution as anything other than personal and social pathology, an aberration explicable solely in terms of psycho-social strain induced by the failure to attain one’s expectations, which as J.C. Davies observed was an elaboration of Tocqueville’s ‘liberal’ interpretation of revolution.66 According to Davies, revolutions were produced when improving economic conditions caused personal expectations to rise, but when such expectations continued to rise after an economic decline expectations would exceed the capacity to fulfil them. As the gap between rising expectations and lowering fulfilsments and satisfaction widened, frustration mounted to an intolerable level causing revolution.67 This model was premised upon the view that the stability of any given polity depended upon the “...state of mind, [or]... mood” in society.68 Davies admitted that there was no completely satisfactory way of measuring a society’s ‘mood’ short of obtaining data based on interviews and questionnaires, but this revealed yet another inference of frustration and discontent from the incidence of civil strife. Such inferences represent a leap of faith from a particular set of events or data to the individual state of mind assumed necessary for such events to take place ignoring the historic conditions which lead to revolutions.69 Frustration is inferred from the data,

64 Ibid., (1969), pg. 634.
65 Aya, R., Rethinking Revolutions and Collective Violence; Studies on Concept, Theory, and Method, Het Spinhuis, Amsterdam, 1990, pg. 29.
and once the inference is made it is further assumed that frustration will lead to discontent, and discontent to public political acts of aggression.70

III. ABNORMALITIES OF MODERNISATION

By far the most sophisticated version of the combined frustration-aggression and relative-deprivation approach was Ted Gurr’s analysis of the motivation for engaging in political violence against established regimes which was based on the view that frustrations were “situationally determined”, that is, the degree of frustration and the response to it varied according to an actor’s situation in time and place.71 An actor’s situation would in turn shape their particular expectations, and their grievances at failing to reach those expectations would accordingly vary in regard to the ambition or circumspection of their expectations. Nonetheless, Gurr’s relative deprivation theory was premised upon the frustration-aggression hypothesis. Frustration-aggression he claimed, was “apparently a fundamental part of our psychobiological makeup” activated when “we feel thwarted in an attempt to get something we want” causing us “to get angry, and ...strike out at the source of frustration.”72

According to Gurr, relative deprivation consisted in a “perceived discrepancy” between an actor’s expectations of security and property, social influence, and emotional fulfilment, and their perceived capability to realise those expectations.73 If individual expectations continued to rise beyond a society’s capacity to offer sufficient satisfaction of those expectations, increasing numbers of individuals were likely to feel deprived.74 Characteristically, the theory offered little explanation of what constituted deprivation - relative or otherwise - or more precisely, what sort of deprivations would result in aggression against the state. What we are told is that because human beings are averse


74 Gurr is quick to point out however, that the initiation of violent conflict will depend on other variables such as the perception of who is responsible for the deprivation, the prevalence of cultural norms
to relative-deprivation, individuals will exhibit a tendency to balance their expectations to their capabilities for satisfying such expectations. Consequently, "[s]ocietal conditions in which sought and attainable value positions are in approximate equilibrium... can be regarded as "normal"... and provide a base-line from which to evaluate patterns of change."75 In what society however, has such an equilibrium been attained, and what would such an equilibrium look like? Gurr's model requires an assessment of what constitutes an unsustainable level of satisfactions relative to expectations which, given the multiplicity of expectations is simply impossible. Because the inference is made that incidents of revolutionary violence indicate intolerable levels of frustration, the absence of revolutionary violence must therefore indicate equilibrium, and the absence of revolutionary violence in any society is taken to mean that individual and collective expectations are adequately fulfilled.

The chief assumption of frustration-aggression theory is that violent conflict ensues when individuals suffer frustration and strain induced by the perception of deprivation. Even if it is granted that a person feeling frustration is likely to become aggressive, is it certain that that aggression will necessarily be directed toward the origin of the frustration?76 As Gurr saw it,

Aggressive responses tend to occur only when they are evoked by an external cue, that is, when the angered person sees an attackable object or person that he associates with the source of frustration. ...an angered person is not likely to strike out at any object in his environment, but only at the targets he thinks are responsible. ...such an attack is an inherently satisfying response to anger; if the attacker has done some harm to his frustrator, his anger is reduced, whether or not he succeeds in reducing the level of frustration per se.77

According to Gurr, the "frustration-aggression mechanism is... analogous to the law of gravity..." in that frustrated individuals have "an innate disposition to do violence to its source...", and that this violence will be proportional to the intensity with which the frustrations are experienced.78 What these passages reveal is an assumption that those

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75 Ibid., pg. 46.
76 This criticism has long been recognised. Peter Lupsha for instance noted several inconsistencies and ambiguities in the use of frustration-aggression theories and preferred instead the term 'indignation' to 'frustration'. Lupsha, P.A., "Explanation of Political Violence: Some Psychological Theories Versus Indignation", Politics and Society, 2 (1), 1971, pg. 97-98, 102-104.
77 Gurr, T.R., op.cit., pg. 34. (My italics}
78 Ibid., pg. 37.
who experience frustration will identify the source of frustration and would only attack that source.\(^7\) Gurr’s explanation of this relied upon laboratory studies of the frustration-aggression mechanism according to which aggression would follow frustration when subjects recognised some stimulus or “cue” in their environment which identified “who or what” was responsible for the frustration.\(^8\)

Gurr did acknowledge however, that unlike laboratory tests in which a target for aggression was deliberately presented, sources of frustration in society were more difficult to discern. Why then, did political violence, defined as any armed ‘attack’ “within a political community against the political regime” occur? Why should we accept that frustration should lead to deliberate acts of aggression directed at the government, regime or state? Gurr’s answer to this question was that in modern societies the state occupies a central position and is responsible for maintaining order. This position however, is a precarious one because it entails that,

...ultimate responsibility for remedying economic deprivation, for resolving conflicts arising from competing goals and ideational systems, and for maintaining and reinforcing the dominant ideational system of a society and its supportive political myths rests with the political regime.\(^8\)

Consequently, modern states take a broader responsibility for social wellbeing and in conditions in which the source of frustration may be difficult to identify, the state is held responsible.\(^9\) The state is in effect caught by the need to remedy both objective and perceived deprivation, and a state which can accomplish neither is likely to face revolution. Exactly how a state is supposed to accomplish this two-fold alleviation is unexplained, for as Hobsbawm argues Gurr does not specify the actual causes of discontent and his theory is insensitive to the varying reactions to causes of discontent across cultures and time.\(^10\) What is also not explained is a method for determining when unfulfilled expectations will ignite aggression.\(^11\) In other words, the unsustainable

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\(^8\) Gurr, T.R., op.cit., pg. 179.

\(^9\) Ibid., pg. 148.

\(^10\) Ibid., pg. 180.


\(^12\) In a subsequent paper, Gurr and Goldstone argue that “state crises” which “weakens state authorities’ grip on power” are essential in the development of revolutions. Such crises result in the erosion of the legitimacy of a regime or state and hence, its loss of mass support. This formula however, is no more able to resolve the problem of when revolutions occur and why, for the authors admit that because standards of legitimacy differ across cultures and through time, they can provide no account of “...which actions or failures by authorities will lead to crisis.” Whether one talks of deprivation or legitimacy the
personal strain (frustration) which is supposed to spark aggression (and political violence) is inferred from incidents of political violence. This inference is based on the assumption that violence must be produced by aggression, and that aggression itself is produced by frustration.

Psycho-social theories rest on the contention that it is human volition, and hence the motivations of individual “...men and women... who ‘make' revolutions”, and yet even in structural theories of revolution this assumption remained crucial. Smelser’s *Theory of Collective Behaviour* for instance, although not primarily concerned with revolution, was chiefly designed to explain what he called “collective behaviour”, that is “episodes” of behaviour which attempt to redefine the elements of social action. Outbursts of collective behaviour such as revolutions, riots and mass hysteria, indicated significant “structural strain”, and broke out when significant groups in society “perceive[d]” that they did not have access to the means to alleviate their discontent causing a widespread perception of deprivation “relative to expectations.” Smelser’s approach indicated that revolutions were an aberration, a deviation from the normal condition of society which he traced significantly to the perception of relative deprivation. This analysis shares much in common with Chalmers Johnson’s definition of revolution as rapid change of the structure and nature of political authority within a society by the use of violence designed to cause mass ‘disorientation’ by disrupting “the development of stable expectations...”. The supreme end of any social system Johnson argues, is self-preservation and this requires the avoidance of ‘disequilibrium’ which is caused by “sudden, intense, or unprecedented” changes which overwhelm the “routine institutional procedures and arrangements of a system for self-maintenance.” Disequilibrium therefore denotes a severe structural crisis in the state’s ability to manage and control

problem is the same, a general theory of revolution cannot sensibly account for what constitutes either of them, and thereby, under what conditions the theory is supposed to apply. Gurr, T.R. and Goldstone, J.A., “Comparisons and Policy Implications” in J.A.Goldstone *et al.* (eds.), *op.cit.*, pg. 325 and 331.

85 Taylor, S., *op.cit.*, pg. 84. Taylor argues that this problem of ‘inference’ is inherent within all psycho-social theories. A similar claim is made by Rod Aya (see above).


87 Hagopian, M., *op.cit.*, pg. 168.


internal or external threats and the “single, most generalised characteristic of the disequilibrated system is that values no longer provide an acceptable explanation of existence.”92 As a consequence, previously accepted definitions of proscribed behaviour - criminality and deviance - are thrown into doubt, and this doubt causes widespread “personal tension” and an increasing tendency for individuals to test the boundaries of officially proscribed behaviour.93

The key assumption here is that where value consensus prevails, the definition of normal behaviour is not questioned and those who do engage in abnormal behaviour are few and easily controlled. In conditions of disequilibrium or social “dysfunction” however,

...it becomes increasingly difficult... to differentiate between behaviour that represents a dysfunction-inspired protest and behaviour that represents the now disguised deviancy of a formerly eccentric personality... [who will be] controlled as deviants after equilibrium is restored...94

The revolutionary potential of deviant behaviour is that a range of groups with different particular concerns and protests will join together “...with each other and with deviants generally to form a deviant subcultural group or movement.”95 Echoing the admonitions of Burke, Carlyle, and Dickens, Johnson describes the members of such movements as “outcasts, fools, and experts” who could be ambitious politicians, frustrated taxpayers, religious fanatics, and others from the “anarchic left”.96 When the value structure of society is called into question and deviant behaviour is on the rise, confidence in the state is eroded and this condition is described as a “power deflation” which is precipitated by “imperfect socialisation” in the value structure of society, “role strain” or failed integration of individuals into society causing mental illness, and “normative discord” between competing values.97 The structural problem of power deflation is brought about by the tendency toward deviance, and the seriousness of a power deflation depends upon the ability of the state to maintain non-deviant support. “The crucial question...” Johnson tells us “is whether or not nondeviant actors - persons

91 Ibid., pg. 73.
92 Ibid., pg. 75.
93 Ibid., pg. 77-78.
94 Ibid., pg. 78.
95 Ibid., pg. 84.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., pg. 31-34, 93.
managing their disequilibrium-induced tensions in some private manner - continue to believe in the willingness and competence of the elite to resynchronise the system.**98

The assumption here is that non-revolutionary conditions exhibit a stable, and normally invariant balance. This conception of order, or of “social inertia” as Barrington Moore once called it, is accompanied by the assumption that “social continuity requires no explanation. ... Change is what requires explanation.”99 The social-scientific literature on revolution can be interpreted as Sheldon Wolin has remarked (borrowing the phrase from Comte) as a “science of order” in which revolution and political violence in general are considered pathological abnormalities.100 Notions of disequilibrium, deviance, personal strain, frustration and aggression draw attention to the abnormality of revolution and civil disturbance. It also implies that those who engage in such activity act under the influence of sub-rational impulses such as involuntary symptoms of disease, repressed animal instincts, deviant tendencies, or merely the urge to break criminal laws. The very idea of an equilibrated system is as Stan Taylor has put it “the stuff of Utopian ideologies”.101 For theorists such as Johnson and Gurr however, equilibrium is associated with the capacity of a society to survive, but just as clearly as Zagorin noted, the survival of societies often entails “imperfect integration, numerous dysfunctions, and frequent failures in elite and governmental performance.”102 A society in equilibrium is one in which revolutionary violence does not occur, and it does not occur because the system is in equilibrium. Equilibrium is upset when significant personal strain brought on by the perception of relative-deprivation leads to the outbreak of conflict and therefore, liberal theorists have tended to agree that those societies in which revolutions are most likely to occur are those which are under strain due to the process but not the goal of modernisation, the development of liberal market economies with democratic states.

Modernisation theory is based on the assumption that stable liberal-democratic states are both peaceful and “effective”, rather than “debile”, that is, prone to civil unrest and instability. Effective political systems are those characterised by the presence of the

**98 Ibid., pg. 95.
100 Wolin, S.S., loc. cit., pg. 349-352.
101 Taylor, S., op.cit., pg. 17.
basic features of Western liberal-democratic civilisation namely, efficient, professional bureaucracies, organised political parties, high rates of public participation, civilian control of the military, mixed economies, and most important of all, the effective control of conflict. Modernisation is the historic process of transition from "traditional" to modern, effective systems, and while traditional and modern societies are each capable of stability, the debility of political systems is caused by rapid transition from traditional to modern societies. The problem is that rapid economic modernisation causes increasing mobilisation of the population, the creation of new classes, increasing literacy, and rising urbanisation which cannot be adequately controlled or accommodated by new and unstable political institutions resulting in turmoil. The main problem then, is not modernisation itself but "the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change". The transition to modern societies raises popular expectations which are unmatched by institutional development and the emergence of a value consensus. Huntington is clear however, that the primary responsibility for the development of such a consensus lies in the ability of the state to govern effectively, and the significant distinction between polities lies not in the type but the "degree of government". Debile political systems are those in which instability is endemic and the state is incapable of accommodating the demands of newly mobilised social groups.

Revolution is caused by the strains induced by mobilisation and are thereby associated with 'decay', 'instability' and 'disorder'. Importantly, the process of modernisation is essential for societies to achieve the status of 'effective', stable systems, "...modernity breeds stability, but modernisation breeds instability. ... It is not the absence of modernity but the efforts to achieve it which produce political

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102 Zagorin, P., op.cit., pg. 50.
106 Huntington, S., op.cit., pg. 5.
107 Ibid., pg. 10-24.
108 Ibid., pg. 1.
The process of modernisation is associated not only with economic and political but *cognitive* development also,

The contrast between modern man and traditional man is the source of the contrast between modern society and traditional society. Traditional man is passive and acquiescent; he expects continuity... Modern man, in contrast, believes in both the possibility and desirability of change, and has confidence in the ability of man to control change... The process of modernisation however, subjects individuals to manifold sources of strain which “break the cognitive and attitudinal barriers of the traditional culture and promote new levels of aspirations and wants” which cannot readily be met by “a transitional society” creating “a gap... between aspiration and expectation, want formation and want satisfaction...” For Huntington, civil unrest and revolution is not merely a sign of social pathology but of a problem caused by transition to modern, liberal systems.

Modernisation theory provides a historical narrative of western civilisation by interpreting the phenomenon of revolution as a problem experienced in the *process* of transition to modern, western societies, states, and economies. The development of a global market economy in which each individual society functions as both a market and a site of production has played an important role in the development of a liberal theory of civilisation, the aim of which is the creation of internally and externally pacified societies. The assumption underlying this theory of civilisation - of which modernisation theory is one expression - is that Western values, Western institutions, and the Western experience provides the template whose impression will be stamped upon the face of all non-Western societies. The violence of revolution is separated from any inherent association with the *goals* of modernisation by attributing it to the problems caused in the *process* of attaining them.

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110 Huntington, S.P., *op.cit.*, pg. 41, and 264-266.
111 Huntington, S.P., *loc.cit.*, pg. 287.
112 Huntington, S.P., *op.cit.*, pg. 53-54. Other structural theorists borrow from psycho-social theory, which merely underlines Gurr’s contention that these are two styles of theory which differ in degree and not in kind. See for example, Oberschall, A., *Social Conflict and Social Movements*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1973, pg. 83.
113 As John Gray suggests however, globalisation has also resulted in the weakening of state sovereignty, “the globalisation of organised crime and an unregulated world market in the technologies of war.” Gray, J., “Global Utopias and Clashing Civilisations: Misunderstanding the Present”, *International Affairs*, 74 (1), 1998, pg. 155.
CONCLUSION

Samuel Huntington has recently argued that the predominance of liberal civilisation is now in question, and in his *Clash of Civilisations* he conveys a sense of growing anxiety over its future. Instead of issuing in an era of global peace and prosperity on the Western model, modernisation has created powerful non-Western states aligned in non-western "civilisational blocs" which threaten the cultural hegemony of the west. While the rise of non-western powers is described as "potentially threatening" to Western civilisation, more problematic still is the "gradual and irregular decline of the West" itself, resulting in a general decay of the values and structures upon which Western civil societies are based, the family, voluntary associations, a work ethic, intellectual advancement, and most important of all the elimination of "antisocial behaviour, such as crime, drug use, and violence". "The central issue for the West" Huntington contends, is whether Western countries and especially the United States can reaffirm and revive the values of Western civilisation, best expressed in the "American Creed" of "liberty, democracy, individualism, equality before the law, constitutionalism, [and] private property." The "concentrated and sustained onslaught" on these values in the United States is being lead by "a small but influential number of intellectuals and publicists" who seek to encourage "multiculturalism" and thereby the collapse of the hegemony of Western values.

*The Clash of Civilisations* strips bare the assumption behind modernisation theory that Western civilisation - the goal of modernisation - is defined in terms of the values and goals of liberalism. It is a civilisation which promises individual and social productivity through the elimination of violence and pursuit of mutual felicity based on the mutual acceptance of individual rights. This discourse of civilisation represents particular forms of violence as problems requiring solution, and as the discussion of analyses of revolution indicate, the solution requires the management and control of the conduct of ‘the masses’. What stands out in the liberal literature on revolution is the generalised fear of the irrationality, deviance, and violence of large collectives. Much of this literature has therefore concerned itself with the development of complex theories...
designed to predict when and why revolutions will occur, and by implication how they may be avoided. Such fears reflect the concern inherent in liberalism that the creation and maintenance of civil societies, market economies and democratic states requires the ‘exclusion’ of violence. This ‘exclusion’ involves the management of populations and their conduct, the prevention of disorder and unruly, irrational violence. The remaining chapters of this thesis will be devoted to discussion of the emergence of this discourse of civilisation, in which individual and social pacification was to be achieved through the government of opinion, that is, the careful management of individual (and collective) conscience and conduct. The following chapter will begin this discussion by examining two influential early-modern conceptions of civil society and the role within them of the government of opinion.

118 Ibid., pg. 305-307.
CHAPTER 5

THE PILLARS OF CIVILITY:

PROTECTION, PROPERTY, AND THE GOVERNMENT OF OPINION

It is much more expedient to lead men by means which imperceptibly win their wills than, as is more the practice, by those which coerce them.


For the Actions of men proceed from their Opinions; and in the well governing of Opinions, consisteth the well governing of mens Actions, in order to their peace, and Concord.


The core of rebellion... are the Universities; which nevertheless are not to be cast away, but to be better disciplined: that is to say, that the politics there taught be made to be (as true politics should be) such as are fit to make men know, that it is their duty to obey all laws whatsoever that shall by the authority of the King be enacted... to make men understand, that the civil laws are God's laws... that the people and the Church are one thing, and have but one head, the King; and that no man has title to govern under him, that has it not from him... and in the mean time a resolution to obey the King’s laws... to live soberly and free from scandal; without mingling our religion with points of natural philosophy, as freedom of will, incorporeal substance, everlasting nows, ubiquities, hypostases, which the people understand not, nor will ever care for.

When Stefano Guazzo asked “[w]hat meane you by that woord Civile?” in his Civil Conversation of 1574, he highlighted an increased interest in the term and its connotations in Renaissance thought. Guazzo’s answer was that civility was a matter of disciplining the mind, or as Johann Althusen put it in his Two Books of Civil Conversation in 1611, “[c]ivil conversation may be defined as the art of applying appropriate behaviour, or as the art of making behaviour conform to propriety and right reason.” Althusen’s use of the word ‘propriety’ may here have had a double meaning. While ‘propriety’ referred to what was considered proper or acceptable conduct, it was also used interchangeably with the word property. The pairing of civil conduct and property was intimately related to the historical shifts taking place in Europe during the Renaissance, and the emerging discourse of civility embodied these in its emphasis on the need for well-ordered urban life conducive to commerce and trade, incorporating laws to which all citizens were subjected, an unambiguous mode of expression and address and most importantly, an absolute need for the careful management of human conduct. These requirements may be referred to as the ‘pillars of civility’ for, the maintenance of a civil society free from the taint of violence was held to depend upon the provision of protection of life and property and this was to be secured, as both Guazzo and Althussen averred, by the government of opinion.

The previous four chapters have examined some of the chief assumptions behind liberal discussions of violence. It has been argued in these chapters that liberal approaches to violence are informed by an image of a pacified civil society from which violence has been excluded by a series of enforced boundaries. This is an image of a fragile society, a protected realm of freedoms and privileges constantly under threat from within and without. This threat appears in the form of violence, the willful, irrational desire to harm or destroy others. In the previous chapter it was suggested that the preservation of civil society against corrosive violence required management of the conduct of the masses. The problem of violence in liberal discourse is intimately related to the problem of how to manage the conduct of the populace. This was the problem with

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2 Hale, J., op. cit., pg. 366.
which the discourse of civilisation was concerned, the elimination of violence from the realm of civil society by governing the conduct of the population and this required the development of a discourse of civility, not simply concerned with the softening of habits and customs, but chiefly with the problem of how best to govern the inhabitants of civil society. This chapter will examine the attempts made by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke in particular to confront this problem and the rather different answers they proposed. It will be argued that the conceptions of civil society both developed were premised on the identification of what and whose conduct presented most danger to the security of civil society and how this danger was to be averted. In doing so, this chapter will lay the foundations for subsequent investigation of the problem of conduct and its government in the development of liberal thought.

Liberal thought was shaped by the emergence of a discourse of civility in the urbanising centres of Western Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries emphasising the need for cultivating a range of virtues and practices associated with urban life, and especially the growing merchant and commercial classes.\(^4\) Commerce and trade were increasingly seen as essential foundations for a virtuous life of careful judgement, probity, thrift and self-discipline.\(^5\) They were also seen as essential foundations for a secure and stable state and society, and it was in the emergence of the discourse of civility that we can detect the shift toward what Foucault has called a modern ‘art of government’. Replacing older notions of personal sovereignty within a princely territory, a modern art of government locates the strength of the state in the health and well-being of the population. Government therefore has come to be seen as an activity of structuring social and economic arrangements in order that these ends could be achieved. Such activity was not merely the province of the executive of the state, but of every citizen governing themselves, their families, households or dependents in a prescribed manner. The discourse of civility therefore aimed to avert violence, in part by taming the aristocracy whose warrior ethos was viewed wasteful, extravagant, and above all a dangerous anachronism.\(^6\) In doing so, treatises on education and manners marked the emergence of a discourse aimed at the creation of a social order based on the

\(^3\) Ibid., pg. 362.
\(^4\) Ibid., pg. 364-365.
\(^6\) Ibid., pg. 28.
self-management of conduct and the re-evaluation of the medieval language of nobility with its concomitant image of an immutable social structure. In the absence of older notions of a divinely sanctioned social order, the discourse of civility also aimed to inculcate good manners and productive habits in the lower orders of society through education and discipline. This discipline was not solely envisaged as a bulwark to the excesses of the aristocracy, but to the 'rude' and 'vulgar' behaviour of the labouring masses.\(^7\) Civility was thus a quality one learned, a certain style of comportment, dress, and speech which was opposed to the rudeness of the uncultivated and unlearned. By the seventeenth-century, this opposition had been entrenched within what John Hale has called the "...'us' and 'them' strand in European self-awareness."\(^8\) In other words, it was not simply a matter of couth as opposed to uncouth conduct, but of civilised behaviour opposed to barbarism. The discourse of civility thus represented civil society as a fragile construct. Civility had to be drummed into the human mind to stifle rowdiness and violence, but even when this could be achieved, civil society was still threatened by unrestrained barbarity outside its borders.

Within the discourse of civility then, there was a dual division between both civil and uncivil conduct within society, and between civilised and uncivilised societies. This duality became an integral feature of liberal thought in which the prospect of a world without civil conduct threatened social order from within and without. Civility was held to depend therefore upon the defence of a delicate boundary between the civil realm and the realm of violence and barbarism, a boundary constantly under threat. The defence of that boundary required constant vigilance against threats from both within and without the realm of civility. On one level, the boundary could be seen in terms of the geographic boundaries and borders of the state, but there was also a deeper awareness of the threat to the boundary separating civil from uncivil conduct. As a consequence, there was an imperative to specify how conduct was to be managed and more importantly, to identify whose conduct was most in need of government and what sort of government it required. The identification of human conduct, modes of behaviour and interaction with others as an object of vigilance entailed that the boundary separating the civil from the uncivil permeated the self and its conduct in addition to defining the territorial state and its imperatives.

\(^7\) Ibid., pg. 115.
\(^8\) Hale, J., op.cit., pg. 360.
In this chapter it will be argued that the discourse of civility in the work of both Hobbes and Locke represented civil society as an object of government and discipline. It was not merely the terrain in which government and discipline operated, but was in effect an artefact of government and discipline. The most important function of government within civil society was to obtain control of the opinions and thereby the conduct of the inhabitants of civil society, and this chapter will examine two rather different accounts of civil society and the solution to the problem of government within civil society. The chapter will begin with discussion of a ‘supervisory model’ of civil society in the work of Thomas Hobbes. It will be argued that Hobbes’ conception of civil society placed a premium on private property secured by the authorisation of conduct through the supervision of opinion by the sovereign. This account of civil society will be contrasted to John Locke’s ‘self-governing model’ of civil society in the second section. Locke’s conception of civil society can be distinguished from Hobbes insofar as Locke sought a more comprehensive means of protecting property through less intrusive methods of managing conduct. In the third section it will be argued that the apparent difference between Hobbes’ and Locke’s accounts masked their shared concern to find a suitable form of governing the conduct of populations, of civilising not only those within but more importantly the property-less masses outside civil society.

I. PROTECTION AND CIVILITY: THOMAS HOBBES

Thomas Hobbes’ (1588-1679) political thought has come to be most closely associated with the imperative of protection, animated by what he believed was the natural equality between individual human beings. This equality meant that no person could be assured of such physical strength or superior intelligence that they could avoid being undone by another’s cunning or by their “confederacy with others”. Such views were shared by other political theorists who lived in an age ravaged by war and who feared that the state of nature beckoned wherever the armies of the day set foot. Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) for instance, argued that the chief characteristic of human beings in the state of nature was their vulnerability, and mirroring Hobbes conclusions, argued that the natural weakness of human beings would incline them to use any and all means to preserve themselves against others leading inevitably to “a lively and all but perpetual

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play of suspicion, distrust, eagerness to subvert the strength of others, and desire to get ahead of them or to augment one’s own strength by their ruin.”10 In the state of nature then, where no effective common authority existed to curb the actions of individuals, the only certainty was the uncertainty of one’s own security and tenure of property. While natural laws suggested that human beings should act to preserve themselves, Benedict Spinoza (1634-1677) pointed out that they did not of themselves “…forbid strife, nor hatred, nor anger, nor deceit, nor, indeed, any of the means suggested by desire.”11 Even John Locke (1632-1704), whose conception of life in the state of nature was generally more benign than either of these thinkers believed possible, thought physical insecurity endemic in that condition where nothing existed to “…restrain the partiality and Violence of Men.”12 The solution each of these thinkers proposed to these sorts of problems was civil association.

Mere association by itself did not guarantee escape from the terrors of the state of nature. As Hobbes argued, groups would always find themselves outnumbered and invaded by bigger groups, and unless they were directed by one will, multitudes would be prone to internal disagreement, disorganisation and conflict.13 Indeed although Pufendorf argued that human sociality would incline those in a state of nature to some form of association, they would be unable to alleviate the inconveniences of the natural condition.14 The form of association Hobbes and his contemporaries had in mind was a civil association in the sense that it conferred upon citizens various benefits denied them in the state of nature. Foremost among these benefits of civil association was the security of life and property and the ability to pursue wealth and material gain. For Hobbes, the term ‘civil’ denoted a structure of government of the community as in his reference to “Civill Government” as that arrangement established when individuals have contracted to live in a commonwealth.15 This condition was reached when a collection of citizens placed themselves under the authority and laws of a sovereign, and Hobbes

described this as “a COMMON - WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS.”

But ‘civil’ also denoted more than just government, for Hobbes also spoke of “Civill Laws” as those regulations to which all citizens of a state were to be subjected. Such laws Hobbes argued were the chief mechanism by which individual citizens may be controlled, and the benefits of civil association secured. Laws were for Hobbes the ties which bound the pillars of civility, and in order to understand their role it is necessary to turn to one of the chief motivations for entering civil association namely, the protection of life and property.

That material gain was a primary motivation for civil association was made plain in Chapter 11 of Leviathan where Hobbes wrote, “Desire of Ease, and sensuall Delight, disposeth men to obey a common Power... Desire of Knowledge, and Arts of Peace, enclineth men to obey a common Power: for such Desire, containeth a desire of leasure...” Elsewhere he listed the fear of death alongside “Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them” as the chief motivations individuals have for quitting the state of nature. Here Hobbes considered ease, physical gratification, knowledge, and leisure as some of the chief benefits of civil association, but the other benefit also listed - ‘the arts of peace’ - is less obviously defined. He gave some indication of what he meant by this in his infamous description in Chapter 13 of the state of nature. In such a state he argued,

...there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force, no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts, no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.

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16 Ibid., pg. 227.
17 Ibid., pg. 311. Sir John Davies described the conquest of Ireland as a process whereby the Irish may be “subdued and reduced to Civility” indicating that civility could just as easily mean conformity to English laws. Subsequently, he he suggested that such conquest would “reduce” the Irish to “Peace, Plenty, and Civility, which are the effect of Laws and good Government...”. Interestingly, he argued that English law was more civilised that Irish or Brehon law in that while Brehon law punished murder, manslaughter and robbery with fines, English law punished them with death! Sir John Davies, Historical Relations: Or a Discovery of the True Causes Why Ireland was Never Entirely Subdued nor Brought Under Obedience to the Crown of England [1664], second edition, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1983, pg. 3, 108, 150.
19 Ibid., pg. 188.
20 Ibid., pg. 186.
While Hobbes appeared to be emphasizing the incompatibility of violence with the pursuit of material gain, the incompatibility in fact extended beyond that one activity to include a complex of activities and institutions bound up together including the ownership of property, and an order based on the rule of law incorporating the predictability and transparency of contract.

Hobbes referred to the sovereign state as an institution which aimed to secure "...private men in the exercise of... [their] Trades, and Callings" through the agency of law. Hobbes was clear that in the state of nature no laws applied and this exacerbated violence, "[w]here there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice... It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but onely that to be every mans that he can get..." Consequently, in a state of nature unlike the civil condition, individuals lacked any protection of themselves or their property save that which they could provide themselves. Violence was thus the inevitable recourse of individuals who sought to control "other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell" or of those who wished to defend them, or of those who responded to any "trifles... [or] signe of undervalue". Hobbes reiterated this theme when he spoke of the 'dissolution' of commonwealths in which "there is no farther protection of Subjects... and every man [is] at liberty to protect himselfe" and his goods by any means available and "when he hath it, is obliged... to protect his Protection as long as he is able." The chief benefit of protection within a sovereign commonwealth was that a system of laws which all obeyed secured individuals in the ownership of property, and thereby prevented the outbreak of violence. It was in this sense that Hobbes wrote of the liberty of subjects who had such protection as consisting in those things on which the laws were silent and which the sovereign permitted, of which he made special mention of "the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another..." Amid the insecurity of the state of nature by contrast, property and goods were vulnerable and there could be "no inheritance, to transmit to the Son, nor to expect from the father; no

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21 Ibid., pg. 386.
22 Ibid., pg. 188.
23 Ibid., pg. 185.
24 Ibid., pg. 375-376.
25 Ibid., pg. 264.
propriety of Goods, or Lands; no security; but a full and absolute Libertie in every Particular man".  

In his *Dialogue on the Common Laws of England* Hobbes made the further claim that laws of *private* property ensured peace through protection, and that without such laws,

...everything is in such sort every Mans, as he may take, possess and enjoy without wrong to any Man. Seeing then without Humane Law all things would be Common, and this Community a cause of Incroachment, Envy, Slaughter, and continual War of one upon another... [reason] Dictates to Mankind (for their own preservation) a distribution of Lands, and Goods, that each Man may know what is proper to him, so as none other might pretend a right thereunto, or disturb him in the use of the same.27

A system of laws allowed security of possession by establishing *distinctions* to be made between what belonged to one person and what to another. Such a system of laws however, had also to enforce "contracts", which Hobbes described as the means by which these distinctions were negotiated to allow for the transferral, exchange, or trade of property.28

Contracts were the bargains by which individuals agreed to an immediate exchange of their rights to something, while covenants referred to agreements in which individuals committed themselves to the future performance of some action upon which firm expectations were based. Covenants and contracts lay at the heart of Hobbes' conception of civil society, embodying regularity, predictability and transparency of interaction, the foundation for a pattern of *predictable* behaviour and reasonable expectations of how parties to contracts were to act.29 The validity of contracts Hobbes argued, consisted in the fact that contracting parties understood one another through the use of clear and unambiguous language.30 But the guarantee that contracts would be honoured however, depended on the institution of a sovereign power with the power to compel by threat of punishment for non-observance. Without such compulsion, Hobbes thought it reasonable to assume that no contracts would be kept "[f]or he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will performe after; because the bonds of

26 Ibid., pg. 266.
words are too weak to bridle mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions...".  

Because Hobbes believed that the nature of human beings was such that "[c]ovenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all", he argued that enforcement of them was a chief end of the civil condition. The principal aim of enforcing contracts was to secure private ownership by guaranteeing the method by which that property may be transferred. Contracts therefore “make good that Propriety, which by mutuall Contract men acquire... and such power there is none before the erection of a Commonwealth." Hobbes therefore provided a picture of civil society in which private property was paramount. But security of ownership also required provision for the exchange of goods, and this provision was a crucial element in the constitution of civil life,

*Justice is the constant Will of giving to every man his own.* And therefore where there is no Own, that is, no Propriety, there is no injustice; and where there is no coercive Power erected, that is, where there is no Common-wealth, there is no Propriety; all men having Right to all things... So that the nature of Justice, consisteth in keeping of valid Covenants: but the Validity of Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a Civill Power, sufficient to compel men to keep them: And then it is also that Propriety begins.

For Hobbes then, civil association involved a system of laws effectively enforced, a social order based on the reliability of contract and covenant, and protection of private property, freedom of exchange and trade, all of which were to be guaranteed by an unchallenged sovereign.

This image of civil society was premised on the provision of protection from the violence and poverty of the natural state. The contrast between the realm of nature and the civil realm of protection was the central feature of the seventeenth-century discourse of civility. As Hobbes’ near contemporary Samuel Pufendorf put it,

...in the state of nature each is protected only by his own strength; in the state by the strength of all. There no one may be sure of the fruit of his industry; here all may be. There is the reign of the passions, there there is war, fear, poverty, nastiness, solitude, barbarity, ignorance, savagery;

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32 Ibid., pg. 223.  
34 Ibid., pg. 202-203.  
here is the reign of reason, here there is peace, security, wealth, splendour, society, taste, knowledge, benevolence.36

According to Pufendorf “[n]o animal is fiercer than man, none more savage and prone to more vices disruptive of the peace of society. For... man is driven by many vices... [and] has such a furious pleasure in savaging his own kind...”.37 In order to gain protection from the constant and unrestrained rivalry and violence of others in the natural state, human beings had to seek a civil association of which the most important feature was its provision of a body of laws. It was only by means of the law that individuals were enabled to own property by making distinctions between “...what each must regard as his own and what as another’s...”.38 As the ownership of property was considered to be necessary to self-preservation and thus guaranteed by natural law, its defence by violence in the state of nature was considered legitimate.39 “Since civil life is too fragile...” to allow private justice or “violent self-help” Pufendorf argued that “...civil laws come to the aid of natural law... [and] enable a man to exact his due in civil courts with the help of a magistrate.40 Laws therefore provided for the existence of society by diverting violent conflict over property and securing the fulfilment of contracts.

For both Hobbes and Pufendorf the institution of private property was not only a corollary of the natural law of self-preservation, it was a means of dividing goods in order to avoid continual conflicts over claims of joint ownership.41 It followed then, that because any one person could not completely provide for their own needs, agreements or contracts between individuals had to be regarded as sacrosanct “[f]or without this, we would lose most of the possible advantage of mutual exchange of services and things.”42 This was particularly the case since the value of goods was determined Pufendorf suggested, by agreement between parties. Such agreements in the state of nature were unregulated and therefore uncertain, but within the civil state were buttressed by law and authority and embodied in a currency.43 In this way Pufendorf stipulated that one of the chief benefits of civil association was the framework of laws which protected the

36 Pufendorf, S., op. cit., pg. 118.
37 Ibid., pg. 133.
38 Ibid., pg. 139.
39 Ibid., pg. 52.
40 Ibid., pg. 156.
41 Ibid., pg. 84.
42 Ibid., pg. 69.
43 Ibid., pg. 93-96.
ownership of property, and facilitated the exchange of goods at an agreed value by means of currency. All of this implied a civil order in which agreements and contracts were clear and unambiguous and most importantly, rigorously enforced by means of laws.44

The emphasis placed on the provision of laws guaranteeing security of contracts indicated that both Hobbes and Pufendorf were particularly concerned to exclude from their conceptions of civil society those whose conduct was unregulated. In emphasising the centrality of contract to civil society both writers, and especially Hobbes, implicitly acknowledged the need for conduct to be authorised.45 In other words, contracts ensured that the conduct of those within civil society would be regulated by legally binding arrangements and all agreements between citizens submitted to the sovereignty of the law. The virtue of such arrangements as both Hobbes and Pufendorf saw it, was that a premium would be placed on the identification of the threat posed to civil society by those whose conduct was unauthorised, and thus contrary to the stipulations of law. Hobbes drew particular attention to the various groups or “bodies” within society which were either lawful, such as trading corporations and families, or unlawful. Of this latter category of bodies which lacked “any publique Authority at all” he made special mention of “the Corporations of Beggars, Theeves and Gipsies” who united to better “order their trade of begging, and stealing”, and cells of provocateurs under foreign influence organised for “the easier propagation of Doctrines, and for making a party, against the Power of the Common-wealth.”46

The problem with such associations Hobbes argued, was that each represented a ‘faction’ or ‘conspiracy’ insofar as their existence was unauthorised. For an association to obtain authorisation not only must its activities be regulated by law, but the intent of the association must be known to and approved by the sovereign, “[f]or all uniting of strength by private men, is, if for evill intent, unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to

the Publique, and unjustly concealed." Hobbes' clear concern here was that unauthorised associations smacked of the private armies retained by great lords and magnates. For any person to employ a large number of retainers beyond the minimum required for "lawfull employment" Hobbes wrote, "is Faction, and unlawfull" because, 

...having the protection of the Common-wealth, he needeth not the defence of private force. And whereas in nations not thoroughly civilised, several numerous Families have lived in continuall hostility, and invaded one another with private force; yet it is evident enough, that they have done unjustly; or else that they had no Common-wealth. Here Hobbes gave voice to the concern that unauthorised conduct would give rise to violence. This concern however, was far from a Hobbesian idiosyncrasy; it was one of the defining concerns of the age, and in common with many contemporaries Hobbes here identified the pacification of society with the advance of 'civilisation'.

For some two centuries prior to Hobbes' birth English society had witnessed a steadily "increasing pressure" from successive governments on the control of "private violence" by the great magnates. This civilising pressure was eventually to result in the contrast which Stone neatly described "between a Duke of Buckingham in the early sixteenth century, with his castles, his armouries, and his hundreds of armed retainers, and a Duke of Newcastle in the mid-eighteenth century, with his Palladian houses, his handful of pocket boroughs, and his spreading political connexion". This contrast highlights the changing nature of power and violence which, from the vantage-point of the late twentieth century tends to appear as a steady and inexorable decline in the private control of violence matched by a steady and inexorable increase in the public or state control of violence. At the time however, this process was less clear and seemed a perilous, haphazard development. While the technology of early-modern weaponry was undergoing a quantum-leap in lethality, the massive increase in nominally state-controlled armies masked the reliance of such armies on colonels who acted as private contractors raising and equipping their own regiments. The gradual disappearance of Medieval retinues of armed retainers was therefore being replaced by the rise of armies

47 Ibid., pg. 286.
48 Ibid., pg. 287.
50 Ibid., pg. 97.
51 One historian has written for example that "The Venetian republic's most worthy claim to political success... came from replacing the feuds of its own magnate clans with a system of elections and the distribution of preferments...". Muir, E., Mad Blood Stirring: Vendetta and Factions in Friuli During the Renaissance, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1993, pg. 51.
consisting of sub-contracted regiments whose colonels raised, equipped, clothed, supplied, paid and commanded them as they pleased. The result was often that such regiments and the armies which they formed acted as little more than profit-making ventures for their commanders who recruited from the lowest and most desperate classes, paid them irregularly, lead them indifferently, and loosed them upon the towns, villages, cities and countryside of Europe regularly to take what they liked in order to make up for usually non-existent supplies of food, clothing, shelter, and pay. Such armies were often no better than loose collections of privately organised associations of armed criminals, and many of the great generals and officers of the age were first and foremost military entrepreneurs.52

Samuel Pufendorf obviously had the depredations of these soldiers in mind when he warned of the dangers to civil society of the unauthorised violence of armies. Military officers he wrote,

...should take care to train the soldier... and inure him to the rigours of military life; to keep military discipline in good order; not rashly expose their soldiers to be massacred; and promptly supply pay and provisions... embezzling nothing. They must also ensure that the troops always support their country and never conspire with them against it.53

Soldiers by contrast must “...refrain from pillage and harassment of the population... and choose rather to die with honour than to save their lives by running away.”54 Such advice showed a concern for the fragility of civil peace and the ease with which it could be undone by violence. It also suggests that Pufendorf was well aware of the destruction caused by the various armies in Germany during the Thirty Years War, and the legacy of famine and pestilence which continued long after hostilities ceased. Pufendorf and Hobbes envisaged civil society as a fragile creation which required the direct supervision and authorisation of conduct by the state. Above all, Pufendorf’s concern for military discipline belied a fear that the ravages of armies on the hunt for supplies and booty presented the greatest threat to the property of those within civil

53 Pufendorf, S., op.cit., pg. 176.
54 Ibid., pg. 177.
society. Such concerns foreshadowed the anxiety which was to characterise the subsequent development of liberal discourse over the relationship between the state with its military instruments and expenditures and the security of property within civil society. In *A Letter From a Person of Quality to His Friend in the Country*, which was probably written by Locke under the direction of his patron the Earl of Shaftesbury, the chief concern was that states with standing armies threatened a “government more absolute and arbitrary” than could be borne by those within civil society. But who were these inhabitants of civil society, and why could they not bear an ‘arbitrary’ government?

II. PROPERTY AND CIVILITY: JOHN LOCKE

For John Locke, the right to own property was one of the three most important natural rights pertaining to human beings, the other two being the right to life and liberty. The pursuit of these rights were enshrined in the precepts of Natural Law which prescribed that all individuals should act to preserve themselves and to endeavour to preserve the species as a whole. While Locke believed that individuals could achieve these rights in the state of nature, there could be no security in their enjoyment. As we saw in an earlier chapter, individuals in the state of nature were effectively their own judges, and hence would act with extreme partiality in the pursuit of their interests and particularly in retribution for perceived wrongs. Therefore an individual’s tenure of natural rights was uncertain where violence threatened and Locke tied the rights to life, liberty, and estate to membership of civil associations which rested upon exclusive claims of ownership. As with Hobbes, civil association had particular features, but Locke emphatically rejected the authoritarian implications of Hobbes’ civil society. If as Locke wrote, “Civil Government is the proper Remedy for the Inconveniences of the State of Nature” it could not be a government of an “Absolute Monarch” who would possess “the Liberty to be Judge in his own Case, and may do to all his Subjects whatever he pleases”. In contrast to the state of nature and association under an absolute ruler, Locke suggested that association in what he called political or civil

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56 Ibid., pg. 271.

57 Ibid., pg. 282.
society was the only condition in which individuals could achieve any security from the violence of rulers and other subjects. In Chapter VII of the *Second Treatise* Locke stipulated that the “chief end” of political or civil society was the “preservation of Property”, but exactly what he meant by the terms ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society remained unclear.\(^59\)

In Chapter VII of the *Second Treatise* Locke appeared to use the term ‘political’ society to refer to the governmental arrangements by which laws were made and controversies between citizens decided, while ‘civil’ society appeared to denote the union of individuals who had agreed to renounce their natural liberty (of being their own judge) and to establish an authority which was to act as the judge of controversies.\(^60\) In some other writings, he appeared to use the rubric of civility to describe the distinctly private, non-public and non-political considerations of individuals. This is the implication for instance of his reference to the “private civil concernments” of individuals in the *Essay Concerning Toleration*.\(^61\) In his later *Letter Concerning Toleration* of 1685, Locke expounded on the notion of the civil as coextensive with the private interests of individuals, “[c]ivil interests I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like.”\(^62\) But Locke’s use of the term was not entirely consistent, for he also used the term ‘civil’ to describe the considerations of the public magistrate with the maintenance of public peace. In this sense, Locke clearly signalled that the true vocation of political authority was law and order, in contrast to the private realm of individual freedom governed solely by conscience.

\(^{58}\) Ibid., pg. 276.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., pg. 323.

\(^{60}\) Ibid., pg. 324. The distinction does not seem to be very clear, but resides, I take it, in the rather different connotations of the descriptions provided here, to wit, that ‘political’ society consisted in the institutional, legal and penal arrangements of society, but ‘civil’ society consisted in the union of individuals who had such arrangements to appeal to. Thus, Locke wrote, “because no Political Society can be or subsist without having in it self the Power to preserve the Property, and in order thereunto punish the Offences of all those of that Society; there, and there only is Political Society, where every one of the Members hath quitted this natural Power, resign’d it up into the hands of the Community... And... the Community comes to be Umpire, by settled standing Rules...”*. Civil society however, is described slightly differently, not in terms of the institutional, legal, or penal arrangements of the union, but as the very substance of union itself, “Those who are united into one Body, and have a common establish’d Law and Judicature to appeal to, with Authority to decide Controversies... and punish Offenders, are in Civil Society one with another...”.

\(^{61}\) Locke, J., *An Essay Concerning Toleration* [1667], in D. Wootton (ed.), *Political Writings of John Locke*, Mentor, New York, 1993, pg. 188.

Moral actions belong therefore to the jurisdiction of both the outward and inward court; both of the civil and domestic governor; I mean, both of the magistrate and conscience. Here, therefore, is great danger, lest one of these jurisdictions entrench upon the other, and discord arise between the keeper of the public peace and the overseers of souls.\textsuperscript{63}

In an age dominated by vicious religious struggles in his own and neighbouring countries, part of Locke's concern was to confine the claims of religion to private conscience, thereby identifying the boundary protecting the integrity of civil society from the untoward intrusion of essentially private, religious concerns.

Clearly however, Locke thought the provision of a system of laws was an essential ingredient in the establishment of a civil society. Throughout Chapter VII of the Second Treatise Locke proceeded to demonstrate that his conception of civil and political society was incompatible with the notion of absolute monarchy or despotic power. Under such arrangements as these he contended, there was no impartial umpire making the ruler their own judge and placing him or her in a state of nature in relation to his or her subjects.\textsuperscript{64} Moreover, Locke argued that under such a regime subjects and their property would be exposed to the ruler's absolute and arbitrary power, thus placing themselves in a state of slavery. In a condition of slavery individuals were "not capable of any Property, [and] cannot in that state be considered as any part of Civil Society; the chief end whereof is the preservation of Property."\textsuperscript{65} It was thus property that lay at the heart of Locke's argument for civil association, and for political arrangements which reflected the wishes of the community in limited and constitutional government. As he put it, subjects,

...could never be safe or at rest, nor think themselves in Civil Society, till the Legislature was placed in collective Bodies of Men, call them Senate, Parliament, or what you please. By which means every single person became subject, equally with other the meanest Men, to those Laws, which he himself, as part of the Legislative had established... No Man in Civil Society can be exempted from the Laws of it.\textsuperscript{66}

For an association to be described as 'civil' then, it had to be one in which there were settled laws to which all consented (at least tacitly), a constitutionally limited assembly, an impartial means of judgement, and effective enforcement of both laws and judgements. Only in this 'civil' state he argued, could individuals be secure in the

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., pg. 421.
\textsuperscript{64} Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government, pg. 326-327.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., pg. 323, see also pg. 283-284.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., pg. 329-330
"...mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property."\textsuperscript{67}

The interesting connotation of this last line is the conflation of the three natural rights (of life, liberty, and estate) with personal property, and the implication that the enjoyment of one's natural rights to life and liberty were dependent upon the protection and preservation of the right to estate or property. Locke made this clear in his discussion of the limitations he believed should be placed on government. The government Locke had in mind was a government of laws "...bound to dispense Justice, and decide the Rights of the Subject by promulgated standing Laws, and known Authoris'd Judges."\textsuperscript{68} It was therefore a limited government, and one of the chief limitations on it was that it could not invade the property of its subjects,

...the preservation of Property being the end of Government, and that for which Men enter into Society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the People should have Property, without which they must be suppos'd to lose that by entering Society, which was the end for which they entered into it, too gross an absurdity for any Man to own. Men therefore in Society having Property, they have such a right to the goods, which by the Law of the Community are theirs, that no Body hath a right to take their substance, or any part of it from them, without their own consent; without this, they have no Property at all. ... Hence it is a mistake to think, that the Supream or Legislative Power of any Commonwealth, can do what it will, and dispose of the Estates of the Subject arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure.\textsuperscript{69}

In this passage, Locke employed the term 'property' in a dual sense, both to describe the natural rights belonging to individuals, and in the more restrictive sense of the goods or estate that belong to owners. This emphasises the degree to which Locke's conception of natural rights was based on the notion of exclusive ownership and entitlements that could only be described as belonging to individuals.\textsuperscript{70}

Importantly, this passage also referred to the danger of the 'arbitrary' power of a government acting at its own pleasure without due regard to the property of citizens. The concern over arbitrary government has been a defining concern of liberal thought, and for liberals such as Hayek referred to the fear that power became arbitrary when it

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., pg. 350.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., pg. 358.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., pg. 360-361.
was “determined by a particular will unrestrained by a general rule...”.

Hayek’s fear was that modern democracies have given rise to an “omnipotent sovereign parliament” which acts as “arbitrarily as it pleases” by which he did not mean that it acted simply as it pleased but showed partiality such as in the provision of funds for groups of disadvantaged citizens, thereby opening the “floodgates to arbitrariness.”

Carl Schmitt seized upon this aspect of liberalism in his criticism of its inability to conceive a state capable of making an exception, of reserving to itself special powers not constrained by the law. As Pasquino suggests however, this particular criticism fails to appreciate Locke’s provision for the powers of “prudential government” or a power “to act according to discretion” in the public interest outside the limits of the law. Such a prerogative however, Locke clearly thought necessary to the “publick good”, even though in most ordinary cases the sovereignty of the law determined the legitimacy of state and governmental power.

According to Hindess ‘arbitrary’ power within liberal discourse refers to the extent to which power is “not specifically constrained by law” and is thus exercised beyond the confines of law. Locke did argue that the exercise of power beyond the stipulations of law, where prerogative powers could not be justified by exceptional circumstances, constituted arbitrary power. Arbitrary government consisted in the abrogation of a specific feature of the law of civil society which made power arbitrary, and that was the consent upon which Locke argued civil laws rested. In Locke’s view civil societies were created in order to protect the life and property of its members, and the laws of civil society were to reflect the imperatives of this creation, the consent of the members of civil society and the protection of their property. Locke argued that in the state of nature, the extent of one person’s property would be set by natural limits such as the extent of their labour power, the limits of their immediate needs, and the perishability of natural items. Therefore, it was impossible for anyone to “intrench upon the right of

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72 *Ibid.*, pg. 102, 103.
75 Locke, J., *Two Treatises of Government*, pg. 375.
another, or acquire, to himself, a Property, to the Prejudice of his Neighbour, who would still have room...".77 Locke constructed a natural law justification for money on the basis that allowing goods to perish without having made use of them to preserve one’s own life or the life of others constituted an offence, thus requiring an imperishable means of preserving the value of goods which also happened to allow individual acquisitions of more property than could be consumed.78 The accrual of more property thus required other mechanisms of differentiation and protection of people’s property, and this was provided by law. But Locke’s conception of law, tied as it was to the invention of money and protection of property was also dependent upon actual or tacit consent. In other words, as,

...several Communities settled the Bounds of their distinct Territories, and by Laws within themselves, regulated the Properties of the private Men of their Society, and so, by Compact and agreement, settled the Property which Labour and Industry began... [individuals] have, by common Consent, given up their Pretences to their natural common Right... and so have, by positive agreement, settled the Property, amongst themselves, in distinct parts and parcels of the Earth...79

Locke argued that all these arrangements were “...made practicable out of the bounds of Societie...” by the tacit agreement implied by the continued adherence to such financial and legal arrangements.80 Within the security of civil society however, these arrangements took on an altogether more formal hue.

Hobbes and Pufendorf’s conceptions of civil society placed a premium on the authorisation of conduct by an overarching sovereign authority which spoke through the law. In other words, conduct in civil society was to be regulated by the stipulations of the sovereign embodied in the laws the sovereign promulgated. Consent played very little role in either conception of civil society outside of the original contract by which the sovereign was instituted. Once this consent was given, the consent of subjects to the sovereign’s commands became all but irrelevant because by the terms of the original consent subjects renounced their right to withhold consent from the sovereign. Locke’s conception of civil society however, placed a premium on the on-going consent of citizens to the laws made by the sovereign. For Locke as for Hobbes, government was still concerned with the task of managing the conduct of citizens by governing their

77 Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government, pg. 292.
78 Ibid., pg. 295.
79 Ibid., pg. 299.
80 Ibid., pg. 302.
opinions, but unlike Hobbes who thought this task best accomplished by the supervision of the opinions of the inhabitants of civil society by the sovereign, Locke believed that the most suitable and effective form of government of civil society was self-government disciplined by the “law of opinion”.81

For Locke the government of civil society was conceived as a government of laws rather than arbitrary will, and what separated the arbitrary will of the tyrant from the laws of civil society was the agreement such laws obtained from citizens. In arguing so, Locke indicated that his conception of civil society was one in which the conduct of citizens was to be self-regulated, whose effective self-government would in turn act as a limit on state power. The private conscience and opinion of citizens in civil society was governed without a need for intrusive state supervision. The key to this argument lay in Locke’s conception of property and its essential role in determining what sort of people constituted civil society. Locke argued that individuals held exclusive claims of ownership (whether it be to their bodies, rights, or goods) and therefore, were only capable of alienating any part of themselves or their property by agreement or consent.82 Such consent was crucial for individuals to agree to divest themselves of their right to be their own judge, and enter civil society. Locke did argue however, that agreement and consent may be reached in the state of nature as in his account of the invention of money.83 Consent was not as it was for Hobbes, the mark of a willingness to enter civil society, but a prior value which made civil association itself valuable. Civil society did not exist in order to make consent possible, but consent made civil association truly civil. In order to understand this more clearly, it is necessary to recall the way in which Locke described the opposite of consent, arbitrary power and violence.

Throughout the Treatises, Locke argued that civil or political society was opposed to both the state of nature and to submission to an absolute ruler. Though different, the state of nature and absolute rule had one feature in common, and that was violence. While individuals were able to act as their own judge in the state of nature, conflict

83 Ibid., pg. 293-294.
between individuals who judged their own cases with partiality was inevitable. Locke was clear that in such a condition, individuals could not be restrained from making incursions upon the rights of others, nor that those who suffered wrongs would seek a disproportionate redress. Individuals in the state of nature then, were perpetually on guard against others, treating them as potential aggressors who sought to reduce or remove the freedom of others. This Locke argued was the ultimate insult, for without freedom an individual was no better than a slave, unsure of their physical security and unable to hold property. In such a condition the individual was subjected to the will of another person, and this will Locke described as “arbitrary.” Arbitrary here did not mean that it was random, but that it was opposed to consent,

...Freedom from Absolute, Arbitrary Power, is so necessary to, and closely joyned with a Man's Preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his Preservation and Life together. For a Man, not having Power of his own Life, cannot, by Compact, or his own Consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the Absolute, Arbitrary Power of another...

It followed then, that the only rightful manner in which individuals could consent to renounce their rights was by free and unforced consent, and it was this consent upon which civil society was founded. Now, although Locke wrote of consent by open declaration of agreement between independent selves to establish a civil or political society, he was not so naive as to suppose that this was actually how societies, governments and states were established. The consent Locke believed sufficient for an individual to be considered the subject of a civil or political society was tacit.

Tacit consent was held to consist in the ownership and enjoyment of property under the jurisdiction of a particular civil or political authority. It must be recalled that the chief end of civil government was the protection and preservation of property. For a person to hold property under the protection of such a government therefore, meant that they may be considered to have given their tacit consent to the political arrangements of that government, and thus be considered a subject of civil government. But tacit consent was not perpetually binding upon subjects; it ceased to hold when the subject renounced their property. Consent which was “expressly given” by open declaration however, was perpetually binding upon subjects for as long as the civil government consented to itself.

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84 Ibid., pg. 275-276.
85 Ibid., pg. 284, 359-360.
86 Ibid., pg. 284.
lasted.\textsuperscript{88} It was only by individual consent, either tacit or expressly declared but free and unforced that subjects could enter the civil state, and it was by the means of such consent that entry into the civil state could be distinguished from the violence and arbitrary power of the state of nature or of absolute rule.

Locke's conception of civil society thus rested upon the idea that the citizens of civil society consented to the arrangements by which they were governed. Ingeniously, the very ownership of property - the chief criterion entitling and enabling membership of civil society - required the creation of government, and the continuation of the enjoyment of that property implied consent to that government. This was in effect a theory of consent to \textit{the state}, a theory which sought to show that it would be reasonable to expect property-owning citizens in civil society to consent to having \textit{a} government and \textit{a} state. But Locke made another and more subtle use of the notion of consent to outline a rather different but complimentary notion of government. Here Locke sought not to elicit the consent of self-interested citizens to a government or state, but to ensure that the \textit{members} of civil society would in effect govern themselves by consent without the need for intrusion from either government or state. This was a theory of consent premised upon the need to govern the opinions and conduct of those within civil society not through the actions of \textit{a} government, but through the achievement of self-government. For those outside civil society however, such as the idle poor and vagabonds (who owned no substantial property at all) self-government was to be buttressed by the coercion of \textit{the} government, to which consent was not required.

\textbf{III. GOVERNING CIVILITY}

The problem of human conduct lay at the heart of both Hobbes and Locke's conceptions of civil society, and the danger posed to civil society from violence was in Hobbes view an irrefutable "\ldots Inference, made from the Passions\ldots" of human beings.\textsuperscript{89} Both Hobbes and Locke suggested that the social life of the native inhabitants of North America exhibited many of the characteristics of the state of nature, but the veracity of their portrayal of the natural condition of humanity lay closer to home.\textsuperscript{90} Of course Hobbes' own experience in and antipathy toward the civil war in England provided potent

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., pg. 348.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., pg. 349.
\textsuperscript{89} Hobbes, T., \textit{Leviathan}, pg. 186.
examples of the violence and destruction which awaited societies where central authority dissipated. Indeed, the political thought of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was overshadowed by the fear that in the absence of an overarching political authority such as a divinely sanctioned monarchical state ruling in the name of a universally accepted cosmological plan, society itself would fracture and fall into violence.91

It has even been suggested that Hobbes' state of nature represented one half of an anthropological dichotomy between civilisation and barbarism, and thus performed the function of an implicit theory of history, but without any final teleological resolution.92 According to Kraynak, Hobbes associated civilisation with societies which had achieved the required level of political centralisation and consequent material and intellectual advancement, and barbarism with the lack of such achievements. According to this view, Hobbes thought the native inhabitants of North America, the Saxon colonisers of Britain, and the pre-classical inhabitants of Greece each existed in a state of barbarism, characterised by the continual struggle and meagre material existence of the state of nature.93 For Hobbes then, the state of nature was not purely an abstraction but “an ever-present possibility” which was...

...inherent in any organised political society, a ubiquitous threat which, like some macabre companion, accompanied society in every stage of its journey. It was present each night, as men sealed themselves in their homes and succeeded only in locking in fear. And even when wise policy had secured the internal life of a commonwealth, there remained the state of nature in international politics, constantly pressing in on societies...94

The roots of conflict and violence, the dreadful certainties of the state of nature, were qualities which persisted in the civil state.95 Why else, Hobbes asked his readers, would we need to take precautions to guard our possessions or our life if the nature of human beings was not so contrary? What Hobbes made clear here was that civil association was a vulnerable creation, its endurance relying upon a boundary encasing civility by excluding the chaos of violence and war. This boundary, perpetually under threat from

93 Ibid., pg. 690-691.
within and without, required in Hobbes view the direct supervision by the sovereign of the opinions and thereby the outward conduct of the members of civil society.\textsuperscript{96} In his words,

\begin{quote}
...the Actions of men proceed from their Opinions; and in the wel [sic] governing of Opinions, consisteth the well governing of men’s Actions, in order to their Peace, and Concord.\textsuperscript{97}
\end{quote}

Hobbes concluded \textit{Leviathan} with a reflection upon the problem of how to ensure “a constant Civill Amity” between individuals who exhibited a “contrariety” of “Opinions, and Manners”, and suggested that “by Education, and Discipline” of the population this end may be achieved.\textsuperscript{98} It was for this reason that Hobbes was most concerned that the sovereign take great care to determine what doctrines were to be taught and by what means the populace was to be disciplined. In his \textit{Behemoth or the Long Parliament}, a dialogue on the causes of the civil war, Hobbes argued that the chief cause of rebellion against the king lay in the teaching in the universities of the seditious doctrines of ancient “Rome and Greece” and maintained that these institutions “be better disciplined” in the matter of what is taught.\textsuperscript{99} This claim was made even more forcefully in \textit{Leviathan} where he emphasised that the content and style of education be directly administered by the sovereign.\textsuperscript{100} In this way, subjects may be instructed in their duty to obey the laws of the sovereign instead of their own conscience or other false doctrines.\textsuperscript{101}

According to Locke however, civil society was the product of voluntary agreement which separated civil authority from the paternal power of parents over their children, which lasted only so long as the children’s minority, or the “despotical” power of an absolute ruler,

\textit{Voluntary Agreement gives... Political power to Governours} for the benefit of their Subjects, to secure them in the Possession and Use of their Properties. [whereas]... \textit{Forfeiture gives... Despotical power to}

\textsuperscript{97} Hobbes, T., \textit{Leviathan}, pg. 233. See also Pufendorf, S., \textit{op.cit.}, pg. 152, 154.
\textsuperscript{98} Hobbes, T., pg. 717, 718.
\textsuperscript{100} Hobbes, T., \textit{Leviathan}, pg. 233, 291. One should also note the importance Hobbes placed on the need for subjects to be instructed in the laws; see pp. 311-353.
\textsuperscript{101} Hobbes, T., \textit{Leviathan}, pg. 364, 370.
To be subject to despotic power was, Locke told us, to be in a state of slavery subject to the “arbitrary” power of an absolute ruler who must be regarded as existing in a state of war with those who are subjected to her or him. By recollecting Locke’s discussion of consent and the implications attached to the notion of arbitrary power, it can be appreciated that for him politics and political power was the preserve of a society based on agreement and property ownership. But this was not merely the agreement described in the original compact to establish a civil society, but real and ongoing agreements between the members of civil society to the political, social, and economic arrangements therein. For Locke, the independence of the members of civil society from one another and from arbitrary power was based on the possession of property and indeed, the agreements so central to civil society could only take place between individuals who had possessions and hence rights to cede to another by contract.\textsuperscript{103} Arbitrary, despotic power was the preserve of those who existed outside civil society, did not own or respect private property, and threatened the very existence of civil society. Consequently, Locke endorsed two different but complimentary types of government appropriate to those within and to those without civil society.\textsuperscript{104}

Though different in style and form, the two types of government nevertheless aimed to create individuals who were capable of governing their own conduct. The difference lay in the requirements Locke thought necessary for those who were born into the society of property-owning citizens, namely civil society, and those who were born into the much larger, less sophisticated and more threatening society of property-less beggars, vagabonds and labourers.\textsuperscript{105} As Tully points out, Locke’s \textit{Essay Concerning Human Understanding} was an attempt to outline the mechanisms by which individuals were to

\textsuperscript{102} Locke, J., \textit{Two Treatises of Government}, pg. 383-384.
"regulate" their "assent" and "moderate" their "persuasions". But Locke's discussion here indicated that such mechanisms were not necessarily general stipulations on the governing of conduct, but were specific to the inhabitants of civil society. Tully locates three complimentary modes or strategies of governing opinion in Locke's thought, which he refers to as providential, penal, and humanist modes. While the providential mode was concerned with the conformity of conduct to the stipulations of divine commandments, both the penal and humanist modes were concerned with the conformity of conduct to the laws and expectations of state and society respectively, and it is these two to which attention will be devoted here. Penal governance refers to the activities of the state in determining the conduct of its subjects through the enforcement of laws and regulations, the distribution of rewards and punishments. Humanist governance however, refers to the shaping of individual conduct through the exposure of the citizen to the expectations and evaluations of other citizens.

According to Tully, Locke believed this last form of governance was "the most effective" of the three in that it operated through the internalisation of social mores. As Locke himself put it,

The principal spring from which the actions of men take their rise, the rule they conduct them by, and the end to which they direct them, seems to be credit and reputation, and that which at any rate they avoid, is in the greatest part shame and disgrace... the shame of being disesteemed by those with whom one hath lived, and to whom one would recommend oneself, is the great source and director of most of the actions of men... He therefore that would govern the world well, had need consider rather what fashions he makes, than what laws; and to bring anything into use he need only give it reputation.

While Locke clearly believed that this form of governance was the most effective, the implication of his arguments was that he also thought this form of governance operated most effectively within civil society. Locke described the mechanism of this form of governance as "a secret and tacit consent" among citizens whose right of private violence had been surrendered to a state but who nonetheless retained "the power of thinking well or ill, approving or disapproving of the actions of those whom they live

amongst and converse with...”  

This passage clearly implied that the people Locke had in mind when he spoke of the government of opinion by reputation were the property-owning citizens of civil society. These were the individuals he had in mind when he spoke of the contractual agreement to establish political society, and it was individuals such as these who valued their reputation and standing in the community and would conduct themselves in ways that brought further credit upon themselves.

Because civil society was conceived as a realm of economic and social interaction free from arbitrary government, Locke’s problem was how to ensure that the conduct of those within civil society could be governed without relying upon intrusive state interference. His solution was to rely upon a form of government which obviated the need for arbitrary government. That such a form of governance could be effective at all was measured by the nature of the mores, habits, and fashions inscribed upon each citizen’s mind.  

It was in this sense that Locke suggested that the education of young gentlemen take care to instil the practical arts of interaction with others of quality such as the art of conversation which provide a “fence to his virtue, when he goes into the world, under his own conduct.”  

The objective of such education was to inculcate in the mind of the pupil a variety of habits which were made pleasurable by the judicious use of praise or blame by the educator, and hence were designed to be used “to educate by habituation... through love of reputation, [which] reproduces itself, governing even the new elites it trains and legitimates.”  

Through the governance of opinion and by ensuring the formation of productive habits, Locke argued that civil society could thrive at arms length from the state.

The situation was rather different for those who existed outside civil society, namely, the vast numbers of property-less labourers, poor, vagabonds and master-less men who haunted the seventeenth and eighteenth century mind. For the governance of this class of people, Locke favoured the full and direct use of the legal and police powers of the state. As Tully suggests, the contrast between the former ‘humanist’ strategy of governance and this penal strategy was posed most starkly in Locke’s Report to the
Board of Trade... Respecting the Relief and Employment of the Poor which is a fine example of a whole genre of such documents addressed to the problem of poverty and master-lessness throughout the Tudor and Stuart period. In common with most of these documents, and in sentiment with other reports preceding and following his own, Locke’s own report shared the fear of a “multiplying of the poor” who threatened to become a “growing burden” on society. The reason for this sudden increase in the numbers of poor he argued, could “be nothing else but the relaxation of discipline, and corruption of manners” for which he recommended several remedies aimed at tightening the “restraint of their debauchery”. Locke suggested that the Elizabethan poor laws if properly enforced were still sufficient for this purpose, but a “more effectual restraining” was required for those “idle vagabonds” who made a living by wandering and were tied to no parish poor-house. Locke’s recommendations on this ‘problem’ were indicative of a form of government very different to that which operated within civil society. In effect, the restraint of the idle poor and wandering vagabonds could only be achieved through the strict enforcement of discipline by the coercive arms of the state.

To this end, Locke suggested a variety of measures such as the graduated use of corporal punishment, the use of passes to monitor offenders, the improvement of poor house management and discipline, the use of transportation, and the impressment of boys or men between fourteen and fifty years of age into the navy “where they shall serve three years under strict discipline”. Locke’s express motivation in making such recommendations was that an industrious nation could not afford to support so many people in ‘idleness’, whose labour was unharnessed and who thereby failed to contribute to social wealth. He therefore extended the principle to include “the children of labouring people” who should be placed in “working schools” where they would be “kept in much better order... and from their infancy be inured to work, which is of no small consequence to the making of them sober and industrious all their lives after”.

The rationale for such stern measures was thus that habits of self-discipline and self-
government could be imposed - by force if necessary - on the members of uncivil society. The distinction between civil and what has here been called 'uncivil' society served as a form of identification not simply of those whose conduct was self-governed, but of those who required government by stricter methods.

According to Tully, Locke's Report is significant because it "displays the objectives of the new mode of governing... to fabricate an individual who is habituated to docility and to useful labour" integrating the production of such individuals into the "collective welfare-warfare policy of increasing the strength of the mercantile state".\textsuperscript{119} In the early modern period the strength of the state came to be associated with the health and wealth of populations, and this dual concern characterised the writings of a whole genre of reports and recommendations on the poor laws. Henry Fielding's own Proposal for Making Effectual Provision for the Poor of 1753 began with the observation that "the Strength and Riches of a Society consist in the Numbers of the People..." and this required that the poor who withheld their labour - which was all they have to give - were a burden to society and "On this Labour the Public hath a Right to insist...".\textsuperscript{120} The overall tone of the piece however, displayed the characteristic fear of the poor who had to be watched, restrained, monitored, and at all costs prevented from wandering freely, begging, and thieving. His suggestions on the use of corporal punishment echoed Locke's but added to it the later interest in solitary incarceration which prevented any opportunity for an offender to "reinfect those who may possibly have made some Advancement in their Cure" while "Solitude and Fasting" were recommended as useful mechanisms by which to "persuade" the inmate that 'correction' was "for his own Good."\textsuperscript{121} Characteristic of such proposals was not simply that they did indeed aim to fabricate docile and productive individuals capable of playing their part within a productive society, but that they were specific recommendations for governing those who could not be governed by more subtle means. Coercive state powers were required to manage and control the conduct of these subjects, who if left to themselves would be a permanent burden and threat to the more productive and self-governed individuals within civil society. The conduct of the citizens in civil society required less direct state

\textsuperscript{119} Tully, J., \textit{loc.cit.}, pg. 68.
\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Ibid.}, pg. 268, 275.
intrusion and could be governed ‘at arms length’ because they had absorbed through education, religion, and the subtle disciplines of property ownership, the mores and manners appropriate to membership of a self-governed society.

CONCLUSION

Locke’s political thought was shaped by his involvement with the Earl of Shaftesbury’s opposition to the Tory establishment and reign of James II. While the chief protagonists on either side of the divide in British politics at the time were men of title, property, wealth and power, they were divided in their opinions on the best form of protection of that property and the future development of their wealth and power. While Tories defended the institution of the crown and were worried by the growing eminence of financiers and merchants, Whigs were worried by the potential of the crown to encroach upon their rights and property, and the power it had to buy favour through court patronage. As a consequence Whigs (of whom Locke’s patron, the Earl of Shaftesbury was a prominent leader) were more willing to consider the supremacy of an active, independent, and assertive parliament buttressed by financial and political support from the growing financial classes. While Tories struggled to maintain royal ascendancy, Whigs were prepared to entertain the prospect of active opposition to the regime of James II which culminated in the Glorious Revolution in 1688. It was in this context that Locke’s thought took shape and in which the Two Treatises appeared, not as the manifesto that guided the rebellion (for Locke’s views were thought too radical by most), but as a manifestation of the climate of opposition by “men of property” to the rule of a king whose desire for independent power was perceived as a threat to their own wealth and status.

Locke’s account of ‘civil’ and ‘political society’ befitted an association of independent, self-assured, and property-owning citizens such as these men of title and property, who conducted their affairs in such a manner as to respect the property of other members of society, in other words by agreement. In this, as Hume was later to put it, self-interest played some part but “even interest itself, and all human affairs, [we]re entirely

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123 Dickinson, H.T., op.cit., pg. 71; Ashcraft, R., op.cit., pg.305.
This picture of civil society was premised upon the idea of self-governing individuals whose conduct was regulated by a shared interest in the preservation of property, while those without property, the idle, wandering poor were to be governed by an altogether different form of intrusive state control. The two forms of government, although different, were complimentary in that the security of civil society was guaranteed by the strict government of those outside it. Both Hobbes and Locke shared the concern that the management of conduct was the prime task confronting the maintenance of civil society, and their thought incorporated a central dichotomy between two mutually exclusive, but equally possible realms. The realm of civility on the one hand encompassed civil society and the interaction of self-governing individuals, while the realm of incivility outside it threatened to engulf civil society in disorder and violence if inadequately governed. The discourse of civility sought to identify the boundaries and limits of civil society, and thereby exclude from it the corrosive potential of violence which was shifted to the realm of incivility. A major element in the political thought of early contractarianism was thus centred on the identification of the boundary separating civility and violence, and its representation as a defensible barrier against the corrosive threat of violence from within and without.

Traditionally this boundary has been identified with the state and its territorial borders, a discrete physical entity with geographic limits. Indeed, rulers throughout Europe in the seventeenth century were engaged in desperate and violent struggles to consolidate their states, and this often involved the attempt to define and defend firm territories. Nowhere was this trend more in evidence than in Louis XIV’s efforts to enforce the ‘ne plus ultra’ line of defensive and offensive fortifications along France’s northern marches with the Spanish Netherlands, Holland and the Empire. The concerns identified in this chapter however, relate to an altogether more amorphous ne plus ultra. The boundary to which thinkers such as Hobbes and Locke drew their attention was not simply the borders of states - though they clearly were aware of the importance of them - but the boundaries of human conduct. What they were worried about was not only the provision of sufficient military strength to defend geographical borders, but the successful management of human conduct. This management was conceived as an expressly political issue; it went straight to the heart of the question of how to construct

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a truly civil society. For both Hobbes and Locke, the ownership of property was the vital element in the construction of civil society, and differentiated it from the wider uncivil society of property-less poor. The ownership of property was vital not only in determining who were members of civil society, but in regulating the conduct of those members. Throughout the early-modern period however, the nature of property-ownership changed considerably, and in the next and following chapters, attention will be turned to the problems such changes created for the management of conduct and the control of violence.
CHAPTER 6

PEACEFUL INTERESTS OR PACIFYING DISCIPLINES:

WAR, STATES, AND CIVILISATION

...if the liberty of a man consist in the empire of his reason, the absence whereof would betray him unto the bondage of his passions; then the liberty of a commonwealth consisteth in the empire of her laws, the absence whereof would betray her unto the lusts of tyrants.


New interests beget new maxims of government, and new methods of conduct. These, in their turns, beget new manners, new habits, new customs. ... The end of the fifteenth century seems to be just such a period [of change]... for those who live in the eighteenth, and who inhabit the western parts of Europe. A little before, or a little after this point of time... all those revolutions began, that have produced so vast a change in the manners, customs, and interests of particular nations, and in the whole policy, ecclesiastical and civil, of these parts of the world.

Lord Bolingbroke’s reflections on the emergence of “new maxims of government, and new methods of conduct” in Europe between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries draw attention to some of the transformations which this thesis has attempted to trace. Bolingbroke’s identification of ‘manners, customs and interests’ indicates an awareness that the conduct of individuals as well as the conduct of nations was being transformed by an emergent process of civilisation. A central theme in the discourse of civilisation was that the conduct of both citizens and states had to be liberated as Harrington suggested, from the tyranny of passion. Passion, as we saw in the previous chapter, was identified as a source of violence requiring strict regulation. For Hobbes this took the form of the government of opinion by the sovereign, whereas Locke favoured a government of civil society by opinion. Both of these alternatives were strategies for disciplining the conduct of those within civil society. It will be the contention of this chapter that the perception of violence and the response to it within early-modern thought was shaped by concerns that new forms of discipline were required to suit the changing nature of property ownership. These concerns it will be argued, lead toward the development of a liberal discourse of *civilisation* based on the idea that the development of a commercial economy provided the means for a thoroughgoing discipline of individuals, societies, and states.¹

This view however, must be distinguished from those of contemporary liberals such as Albert Hirschman and Steven Holmes who each argued that the pacification of society was achieved by the personal employment of enlightened self-interest as a counterbalance to the dangerous passions. Albert O. Hirschman’s *The Passions and the Interests* charted the gradual displacement of religious and aristocratic conceptions of the ends of human existence by a new emphasis on the benefits of self-interest. Hirschman identified the Renaissance as the crucial phase in the emergence of this new outlook, and traced its beginnings to the post-Machiavellian literature of advice to princes on how to govern their states. This literature blossomed at a time when a divinely sanctioned ethics began to lose sway, and rulers faced the problem of how to govern their states without the aid of a cosmological scheme of exhortations and

¹ The development of this discourse in British thought and culture has been masterfully discussed in Spadafora, D., *The Idea of Progress in Eighteenth-Century Britain*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1990.
prohibitions. In this environment new methods of controlling the dangerous passions to which human beings were subject had to be found. The defining problem identified in this literature was how to avert the violent consequences of allowing free sway to the passions, particularly the aristocratic obsession with glory won in battle. This conceptual transition was explored in sixteenth-century Huguenot political literature which sought a politics based on self-interest rather than religious conviction. Self-interest was equated with cool, calm calculation of the best method of attaining one's ambition, as opposed to passions which pointed solely to immediate gratification. According to Gunn, the notion of a politics of self-interest was eagerly adopted by those in England who wished to make the interests of state the sole determinant of government action, as opposed to considerations of faith which had been so divisive in France. Gunn argued that it was not until the second half of the seventeenth-century that the term came to be associated with the private interest of individuals and became a "social force".

According to Hirschman, the emergence of self-interest as an organising principle of human conduct marked a transition from the realm of statecraft to that of the ordinary conduct of individuals in pursuit of private wealth. This in itself represented something of a radical innovation succeeding as it did the Church's teachings on the dubious morality of seeking wealth. In the wake of the collapse of the church's monopoly on public morality however, the pursuit of gain through the cultivation of self-interest in the context of an emerging market economy came to be seen as a reliable means of ensuring civil peace. That it did so Hirschman argued, owed much to the wide-spread perception at the time that the virtues of trade and commerce were thought "peaceful and inoffensive" compared to the "looting armies and murderous pirates" ravaging Europe at the time, not to mention the "passionate pastimes and savage exploits of the aristocracy." Hirschman was clear however, that the principal benefits thought to flow from the transposition of self-interest for passions were not economic, but political in the sense that it enabled the construction of a peaceful social order. In other words,

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4 Ibid., pg. 43.
5 Hirschman, A. O., op. cit., pg. 51-52
6 Ibid., pg. 63.
commercial activity and the requirements of the market would encourage the development virtues such as “industriousness and assiduity... frugality, punctuality, and... probity” which helped to pacify and moderate conduct. 7

Hirschman’s analysis of the rise of self-interest as an organising principle of social order has recently been revisited by Stephen Holmes in his Passions and Constraint. According to Holmes, self-interest came to be seen by eighteenth century thinkers, and particularly those of the Scottish Enlightenment, as an antidote not simply to glory but cruelty itself. What these thinkers were worried about Holmes asserted, was the self and socially destructive potential of “violent and subrational emotions” such as fear and anxiety. 8 Doubting the viability of an ethics based on eliminating emotional motivation the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers aimed to deploy the more constructive motivation of self-interest against the sway of passions. Passion was thought to be a form of motivation tied to the physical world, and thus inclined to express itself in various impulses which physical beings were thought incapable of resisting. While seventeenth-century philosophy was marked by the Cartesian effort to reduce the impact of passion by emphasising the deliberative use of reason, the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers sought an altogether more ‘physical’ solution to the problem of passionate motivation.

Their recommendation to control destructive passions was to deploy considerations of self-interest based on instrumental or “strategic rationality” in ways that would check, place a brake upon, or simply counter-balance those passions. 9 Holmes argued that such calculation involved being able to foresee the consequences of one’s actions in the pursuit of a “sweet life”, which he also described as a consequence of our “natural” “self-love”. 10 Holmes traced the rise of self-interest as a principle for social organisation to classical Republicanism and argued thereby that self-interest was “a profoundly egalitarian and democratic idea” deployed as a universalisable foundation for human action opposed to older elitist notions of privilege and responsibility inherent within

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9 Ibid., pg. 56.
10 Ibid., pg. 62.
one's social class. For Holmes then, the promotion of self-interest went hand in hand with the emergence of capitalist societies characterised by democratic political structures and practices and in arguing so, he affirmed along with Hirschman the pacifying role of self-interested commercial activity.

Both Hirschman and Holmes correctly identify a major theme in the development of liberal political thought, but fail to link the rise of self-interest to the articulation of broader schemes of government and discipline aimed at "restraining and moderating men for the purpose of protecting them from their own excesses." Furthermore, neither Hirschman nor Holmes give much impression of the profound anxieties and ambivalence with which early-modern thinkers greeted the emergence of what have come to be called capitalist economies, paying scant attention to the debates engendered by this development and the questions raised over the purpose of the state and its role in either reducing or encouraging violence. It will not be possible to adequately review all of these debates in detail in this chapter, so attention will focus on two important themes which were to exert an important influence over the subsequent development of the liberal discourse of civilisation. The first of these themes was the concern over the morally elevating or morally enervating influence of the transition from landed to mobile property. The second theme eloquently articulated by Montesquieu, was the reinterpretation of commerce as the means by which moral corruption and violence could be overcome.

The first section of the chapter will examine the first of these themes by focussing on the problems posed within Republican thought by the rise of commerce and the impact this was to have on the control and use of violence within commercial societies. It will be argued here that Republican thinkers viewed commerce as an encouragement to vice and a threat to virtue, and feared that the remedial use of violence could no longer be effectively controlled and administered. The problem of commerce then, was in some measure also a problem of violence. Attempts to resolve this difficulty will be discussed in the work of Bernard Mandeville and Daniel Defoe in the second section. While neither writer held much hope that commerce would lead to peace, both

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contributed to the development of a liberal discourse of civilisation by representing social order as the product of the active self-government of citizens accomplished through the medium of commercial activity. In the third section attention will turn to the articulation of a more complete theory of civilisation in the work of Montesquieu. His theory it will be argued, emphasised the disciplined and virtuous self-government of individuals in commercial societies accomplishing thereby a pacification of the conduct of both individuals and states.

I. COMMERCE AND VIOLENCE

According to John Pocock the emergence of commerce as the dominant form of property in the early eighteenth century was greeted with great anxiety by political thinkers who feared that it would fail to cultivate the necessary virtues of self-control and independence, which lead many to suspect that the central problem of government was how to control "human passions". While Hirschman and Holmes correctly identified the control of passion by interest and the consequent pacification of society as an important theme in early-modern thought, they tended to overlook the emphasis placed in this literature on the linkage between pacification and the disciplinary inculcation of virtue. Early-modern thinkers were preoccupied by the problem of how to govern the conduct of subjects whose standards of judgment were increasingly internalised, divorced from overarching, theologically derived standards. According to Pocock this problem characterised the classical Republican tradition. Derived in large part from Machiavelli's political thought, this tradition marked the transition from feudal to modern forms of government. Machiavelli himself spoke of a complex of new problems confronted by rulers who had to govern without the aid of established feudal structures and practices.

The focus of Machiavelli’s (1469-1527) thought was the means by which the stability and longevity of the republic (both the Florentine and other republics) may be ensured in a rapidly changing domestic and international environment. This environment was characterised by the collapse of the received medieval formulas of government based on divinely sanctioned schemes of authority encompassing a rigid social hierarchy linking the possession of power to the ownership of land and the use and control of violence.\(^\text{17}\) The ruler was now conceived as an individual who faced the uncertainties (fortuna) of the new environment, and had to manufacture opportunities by bold and innovative action (virtu) to preserve their states.\(^\text{18}\) This raised a new series of problems relating to the organisation, control and use of violence by rulers who governed,

\[...\text{by art... in a world which is not to be perfectly known, which is therefore mutable and prey to secondary causes. \ldots\text{part of the [ruler's]}... \text{problems... lies in the decay of the private military power formerly possessed by great nobles. The maintenance of arms and soldiers is now a matter for the public authority, and the public purse.}\]

For Machiavelli therefore, the effective control and judicious use of violence by the Prince was of capital importance. In the celebrated passage from *The Prince* for example, on whether it was better for a ruler to be loved or feared by his subjects, Machiavelli reflected on Cesare Borgia’s reputed cruelty in the Romagna by which he nonetheless “brought it to unity, and restored order and obedience.”\(^\text{20}\) Replete though it was with exhortations to use violence wisely in the pursuit of strengthening the state, *The Prince* arguably had less to say on the nature and use of violence by rulers than *The Discourses on Livy*. In this work, Machiavelli reflected on the causes and remedies for the debilities to which constitutions and states were prone, and admitted that a corrupted state may require “reordering” through “extraordinary” measures “such as violence and arms”.\(^\text{21}\) He praised the ancient Romans in particular for achieving a mastery of fortune through the decisiveness and valour with which they waged war and conquered, and for

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\(^{17}\) Viroli, M., *op.cit.*, pg. 160.


\(^{19}\) Ibid., pg. 356.


their religious practices which encouraged the pursuit of glory under arms. From these reflections he drew the important lesson that,

...it is impossible for a republic to succeed in staying quiet and enjoying its freedom and little borders. For if it will not molest others, it will be molested, and from being molested will arise the wish and the necessity to acquire; and if it does not have an enemy outside, it will find one at home... The solution to this problem, as he made clear in his Art of War, was that “a well organised city” must devote its citizens in times of peace to the study of war, and ensure that “only its citizens” be allowed to serve in a well drilled, devoted, well lead citizen militia.

Whether it was the governance of a republic or a principality however, the purpose of Machiavelli’s advice was to pursue reason of state by mastering fickle fortune. As he put it in The Discourses, there are,

...miraculous losses and miraculous acquisitions every day. For where men have little virtue, fortune shows its power very much; and because it is variable, republics and states often vary and will always vary until someone emerges who is so much a lover of antiquity that he regulates it in such a mode that it does not have to show at every turning of the sun how much it can do.

The problems Machiavelli identified were taken up by a range of thinkers who rejected older notions of the self as the subject of divine and temporal hierarchies, and pictured the self as a citizen whose ends were tied indissolubly to this world, but as a consequence were thought more vulnerable to physical motivation from emotion and passion. The problem these thinkers set themselves to overcome was how to ensure that citizens could be governed and states made secure in the absence of a divinely sanctioned system of authority and obedience.

Pocock argued that such concerns were amplified by the English Civil War and the ensuing contest for sovereignty between Parliament and the Army, which was only

22 Ibid., Book II, Chapter I and II, pg. 126 and 131-132. Here Machiavelli disparagingly refers to Christianity as a religion of meekness.
23 Ibid., Book II, Chapter 19, pg. 173.
resolved by making the claim that Parliament and the Army stood for the interests of those with "freehold tenure" of land, which had long been identified in custom as the prerequisite for the exercise of political power.\(^{28}\) This view was forcefully put by James Harrington who attempted to trace a "civil history of the sword" which "depicted the possession of arms as crucial to both the distribution of power and the exercise of civic virtue".\(^{29}\) According to Harrington, the ownership of property (and by this he meant land) gave the owner a permanent stake in the nation, and an interest in its future and well-being. To own land also entailed that the owner would have the leisure to contemplate the virtues and apply those virtues to their daily activities.\(^{30}\) Most importantly however, it was the free ownership of land which,

...determined whether a man's sword was his lord's or his own and the commonwealth's; and the function of free proprietorship became the liberation of arms, and consequently of the personality, for free public action and civic virtue.\(^{31}\)

The problem created by the decay of the feudal order which had tied the control of violence to the interests of the major land holding lords who kept their own private armies of retainers was that the great lords "no longer nourished veins that would bleed for them".\(^{32}\) This development allowed the emergence of a free "yeomanry, or middle people" who owned their own property and "living not in a servile or indigent fashion, were much unlinked from dependence upon their lords", were able to determine for themselves when and for whom they would fight, becoming "a more excellent infantry, but such an one upon which the lords had so little power".\(^{33}\)

The emergence of freehold property ownership coupled with the decline in the importance of the nobility therefore posed the problem of tyrannous rule. As Harrington put it, "a monarchy divested of her nobility hath no refuge under heaven but an army" which "must extirpate out of dominion all other roots of power, and plant her army upon that ground."\(^{34}\) Harrington's solution propounded at length in his *Commonwealth of Oceana*, was to argue that a commonwealth of freeholding citizens should place its trust in a rotational system of government by its own citizens defended by an active citizen's

\(^{29}\) Ibid., pg. 385.
\(^{30}\) Ibid., pg. 390-391.
\(^{31}\) Ibid., pg. 386.
\(^{33}\) Ibid., pg. 197.
militia. Harrington’s theme was that the control of violence, the conditions under which arms are used and who controlled them, held the key to the health of a state or commonwealth. The idea of a citizen’s militia was to exert an enduring influence on British political thought throughout the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Harrington urged his contemporaries to recognise the danger in professional armies filled with the lowest orders of society and the corresponding neglect of arms by those with a greater stake in society. Contrasting what he thought to be the wisdom of the ancient Romans with what he thought to be the complacent drift toward arbitrary government based on a professional army, he argued that by “excusing the rich” from military service “and arming the poor” the landed elite would “become the vassals” of their “servants”. Moreover, it was not “for four shillings a week, but to be capable of being the best man in the field or in the city” that the citizen-soldier fought, and this would be sufficient to make “the common soldier in this a better man than the general of any monarchical army.”

The property held by Harrington’s freeholding citizen-soldiers was tangible, it was solid and identifiable, consisting in goods exchangeable for other goods or amounts of money and above all in land. It was the possession of land by which one was enabled to enjoy the virtues of the yeoman farmer, such as patience and diligence, and it was agriculture that Harrington described as “the bread of the nation” and “a mighty nursery of strength... managed with the least turbulent or ambitious, and the most innocent hands of all other arts." The possession of land and engagement in agriculture indicated that through labour or judicious management one also possessed the virtues of a respectable, dependable and above all independent member of civil society. As Harrington put it

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34 Ibid., pg. 198-199.
36 Kubik, T.R.W., “How Far the Sword? Militia Tactics and Politics in the Commonwealth of Oceana”, *History of Political Thought*, XIX (2), 1998, pg. 199-204 [186-212]. Kubik writes of the political background to the publication of the Commonwealth that, “...in October 1655 the Protector [Cromwell] created a ‘select militia’ commanded by... eleven Major-Generals... the role of the Major-Generals had been increased beyond that of a simple militia to a form of military police. In addition, a call to levy a Decimation Tax... upon the land and property of wealthy Royalist sympathisers was advanced... The end result was apparent to all: a militia at the whim of officers by commission; and a financing system which would split military obligation into those who paid, and those who were either unfortunate enough, or who could be trusted to serve...”, *ibid.*, pg. 199.
37 Harrington, J., *Commonwealth of Oceana*, pg. 312. The passage continues, “they [the Romans], by excusing the poor and arming such as were rich enough to be freemen, became lords of the earth.”
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., pg. 304.
such individuals had “nothing else but their education and their leisure for the public, furnished by their ease and competent riches, and their intrinsic value” which was “their only way unto honour and preferment”. While agriculture entailed a sedate and settled cultivation of the virtues, manufacture and commerce in foreign goods Harrington argued lead to an insecure wealth which, in “the long run” would be found to consist solely in “the carriage of other men’s goods.”

This conception of property was challenged by the “financial revolution” of the late seventeenth century which catapulted commerce, financial speculation, and above all credit to a prominence it had hitherto not enjoyed. This transformation and the ‘new’ forms of mobile, financial wealth it generated kindled a “traumatic fear” in the minds of many. The ascent to the English throne of William III, formerly the Prince of Orange and leader of the Protestant military struggle against France, precipitated England’s involvement in major European conflicts which it had until then been judiciously avoiding. This involvement was to create grave problems in English political thought on the question of the role and powers of a standing army, which had not been faced since the creation of the New Model Army in the 1640’s. Furthermore, engagement in European struggles stimulated the financial revolution which swept commerce and speculation, national debt and credit to a highly problematic prominence.

According to John Brewer English participation in the War of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697), followed by the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713), and the subsequent War of the Austrian Succession (1739-1748), Seven Years War (1756-1763), and the War of Independence in America (1775-1783), precipitated a trebling of

40 Ibid., pg. 261-262.
41 Ibid., pg. 305. Here Harrington is speaking of the commercial wealth of the Dutch, which he thinks is far less secure than the potential wealth to gained by the English in the pursuit of agriculture.
42 Fernand Braudel shows some awareness of the deeply problematic nature this transition had for contemporaries when he writes “The new form of interchange jumbles things up, favours a few rare individuals and rejects the others. Every society has to turn over a new leaf under the impact.” Braudel, F., Capitalism and Material Life 1400-1800, translated by M. Kochan, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1973, pg. 326
the size of the army and navy and the costs associated with maintaining them.46 This growth in the size of military and naval forces, lead to the development of a standing army of professional soldiers paid by the state and serviced by a bureaucracy whose own powers, especially in the collection of taxes and excise were also extended. Brewer argues that in recent scholarship the English financial revolution has been interpreted as a consequence of the invention of public debt, credit and borrowing, but he argues that this has resulted in a tendency to overlook the reliance of the English “fiscal-military state” on the increasingly efficient collection of taxation and excise duties.47 Nonetheless new methods of finance, adopted largely from the Dutch advisers who accompanied William III, were increasingly seen as essential methods for raising revenue quickly.48

Within Parliament however, continual attempts were made to curb the financial independence of the Crown, to remove the ability of the crown to raise new taxes, or engage in long-term borrowing. It was in this context that what has come to be called “Country ideology” developed as a bulwark to defend traditional liberties against the “excesses” of the state, but which resulted in a kind of trade-off between the desire to maintain the traditional liberties of the land-holding elite, and the need to fund the military on credit.49 As a consequence, Parliament accepted the need for more stringent control of public finance, while the practice of war was increasingly “…judged... by the criteria of economic advancement and national prosperity. ...The object of [which was]... to create a prosperous nation, a rich polity based on commerce.”50 Nevertheless, the decline of the landed interest, the rise of a financial interest of bankers and speculators, the deleterious effects of increased taxation, and the growth of Court

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47 Ibid., pg. 88-89. Brewer writes for example, “The exciseman was a ubiquitous presence in eighteenth-century England, for he worked not merely in the ports and on the coast, like the customs officer, but in every small town and hamlet where beer and ale were brewed or tea sold over the counter. He was a state official... working under a system of statutory administrative law. As such, he was the symbol of a new form of government. He was also a sign of the state’s determination to extract sufficient revenues from the public to ensure that England secured its place as a major international power.” Ibid., pg. 114.
48 As Brewer describes it, Dutch finance “…used a public bank to handle the loans, based the debt on long-term redeemable annuities, and spread the debt amongst a substantial number of borrowers. … the obsession of English ministers with Dutch methods [were] so well known, and the arrival of William III and his Dutch advisors so timely, that it is hard to believe that contemporaries were wrong when they described the new fiscal arrangements as ‘Dutch finance’.” Ibid., pg. 133.
49 Ibid., pg. 155-161.
50 Ibid., pg. 189.
patronage funded by credit were all seen as sources of a sneaking corruption of public life provoked by the rise of commerce. This was accompanied by the persistent fear that a standing army would become an instrument of tyranny with which the Crown could remove the traditional liberties of the landed elite. Linked to this fear was the concern that those who controlled the circulation of money exercised a dangerous influence over the state and its army; as Daniel Defoe put it, "...he that manages your treasure is the general of your generals, and the soul of war."

The Republican alternative to the threat of a monarch backed by a professional, standing army was an alliance of the armed "yeomanry" of freeholding tenants "embodied in a militia" and "the landed aristocracy in Parliament" who,

...were the natural leaders of the landed yeomanry... In other words, the glorification of the yeoman farmer... functioned as an expression of solidarity among landowners, large and small, against the changing but continuous threats to the security of their property.

The 'standing army debate' of the 1690's revealed such concerns in the repeated warnings that a standing army would establish the "Arbitrary Power" of an "Aspiring Monarch". As Walter Moyle (1672-1721) put it, the attempt to limit the power of the crown with laws when the crown controlled a standing army was like trying to "bind Sampson with his locks on." Moyle thought the attempt to set up and maintain a standing army - especially in time of peace - was a "Breach of Trust" and answered objections that a standing army was essential to stave off invasion with a call to strengthen the navy. Andrew Fletcher drew particular attention to the implications of the decay of the feudal balance of power between monarchs and nobles in which the latter had once possessed control over the means of violence. The "Arbitrary Power" of rulers could therefore only be limited by placing "the Sword in the hands of the Subject" which would prove difficult because "most Princes of Europe are in possession

51 Ibid., pg. 199-217.
54 Trenchard, J., The Argument Against a Standing Army Discussed [1698], University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1983, pg. 12, 24.
55 Moyle, W., The Second Part of an Argument, Shewing That a Standing Army is Inconsistent With a Free Government [1697], University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1983, pg. 9.
56 Ibid., pg. 17, 20.
57 Fletcher, A., A Discourse Concerning Militias [1697], University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1983, pg. 6, 22-23.
of the Sword, by Standing Mercenary Forces kept up in time of Peace, and absolutely depending upon them".58 That difficulty notwithstanding, Fletcher proposed that a "well-regulated Militia" would be the most practicable solution not least because it would provide a useful source of popular discipline.59 This view was soundly rejected by Daniel Defoe who argued in the Court's interest that the nature and scale of modern warfare had made militias obsolete and challenged Fletcher's 'civil history of the sword'.60 According to Defoe the rise of commerce had made the innumerable exactions and local tyrannies of the nobility intolerable, and by many hard-fought battles "the People... oblig'd the King and the Barons to accept of an Equilibrium" embodied in parliament.61 Under parliamentary rule the sword was "indeed trusted in the hands of the King" but the moneys that paid for it lay "in the Hands of the People" in parliament, and this he called the "True Ballance" of the English constitution.62 Nevertheless he concluded, the rise of commerce had altered forever the nature of war and the overriding consideration of modern war was that whosoever possessed "...the longest Sword has yielded to them who had the longest Purse."63

The financial revolution of the late seventeenth-century enabled military expenditure to be funded by investment in states which thereby "felt able to accept more credit, and conduct greater activities, than could be paid for by the existing volume of capital..." thus creating a spiralling national debt.64 Credit became in Defoe's words, the new "machine" of war, entailing that the state and its army became increasingly dependent upon its creditors and their particular interests.65 These creditors, the people with the means to invest in the state, constituted a financial class of bankers and speculators whose fortunes were tied to the repayment of the national debt. Amongst this class, the possession of land no longer held the status it once had as those who engaged in speculation in the market were able to amass considerable fortunes in the business of

58 Ibid., pg. 7, 6.
59 Ibid., pg. 22-23. See also, Morgan, E.S., op.cit., pg. 169.
60 Defoe, D., An Argument Shewing, That a Standing Army, With Consent of Parliament is not Inconsistent With a Free Government [1698], University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1983, pg. 3. The Court poet Matthew Prior claimed to see in the fine arguments against a standing army no more than banal political posturing when, for instance, he wrote,"Would they leave England unprotected,/To shew how well they are affected,/And get themselves next Bout Elected?! This is the Time" Prior, M., A New Answer to an Argument Against A Standing Army [1697], University microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1983.
61 Defoe, D., An Argument..., pg. 15.
62 Ibid., pg. 16.
63 Ibid., pg. 20 (italics in original).
financing war while escaping its deleterious effects, such as the payment of spiralling land taxes.\textsuperscript{66} Importantly, the very mobility of financial wealth implied that speculators had little or no attachment to the well-being of their country for, if conditions were unpropitious at home the funds could be re-invested elsewhere. Those with property in land however, had no way of escaping the financial burden of supporting the war effort and as a consequence were thought to have a greater attachment to the nation. This divergence of attitudes toward the two different conceptions of property exercised an important influence over public debate, and played no small role in the development of liberal discourse.\textsuperscript{67} Republican thinkers in particular, argued that commercial or "mobile" property exercised no elevation of the mind and was thought on the contrary to create "artificial beings, whose appetites and powers... must be regulated by a sovereign", raising the prospect of an invasive government.\textsuperscript{68} According to Pocock the landed elites were concerned therefore not simply at the rise of a new class of financial speculators, but at the emergence of "a system of parliamentary patronage",

The mode of property which they now began to attack, and to denounce as a new force in history, transforming and corrupting society, was not property in exchange commodities - they called this "trade" and greeted it as a means to independence and virtue - but property in government office, government stock, and government expectations to which the National Debt had mortgaged futurity... a mode of property which rendered government dependent on its creditors and creditors dependent on government, in a relation incompatible with classical or agrarian virtue.\textsuperscript{69}

From a classical republican position, the problem of commerce was that it encouraged vice while also destabilising the established institutions controlling the use of violence. In the following section, attention will turn to two prominent though divergent responses to this problem.

\textbf{II. VIRTUES, VICES AND THE DISCIPLINE OF TRADE}

Pocock argued that Daniel Defoe articulated a conception of property which escaped Republican notions of virtue residing exclusively in landed property while avoiding

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\begin{itemize}
  \item Defoe, D., \textit{The Review}, VI (31), 1709, pg. 118.
  \item Ibid., pg. 106-107.
  \item Ibid., pg. 68-69.
\end{itemize}
wholesale endorsement of financial speculation.\textsuperscript{70} Defoe turned to ‘trade’ as a form of property which was truly productive, as opposed to risky speculative ventures which produced nothing, and land which without trade of the goods produced on it amounted to nothing. Trade was productive in two senses stimulating both the production of goods and thereby social development. “It is trade...” he wrote,

...has made your commons rich, your merchants numerous, your poor able to maintain themselves. It is trade has made you great, strong, terrible abroad, and busy at home. It is trade has kept your people from wandering like vagabonds on the face of the earth.\textsuperscript{71}

Defoe’s interest in trade manifested itself in the compilation of a compendium of practical advice to ‘tradesmen’ on matters ranging from book-keeping to personal conduct entitled The Complete English Tradesman. The Tradesman was concerned that those engaged in trade be properly governed by those with the responsibility for regulating the economic affairs of the nation, and that tradesmen govern themselves appropriately taking great pains to be honest, diligent, and prudent.\textsuperscript{72} Trade, Defoe argued, provided employment and wages for the poor and thus provided a “public benefit” by sustaining an increasing population.\textsuperscript{73} Importantly, Defoe argued that the wealth of trade was tied to wealth gained from agriculture, and that “…if trade and land, which are the wealth of this nation, are divided and differ, the whole body will soon stand still. And this, like the circulation in the body, will throw the whole into apoplexies, dead palsies, and every mortal disease.”\textsuperscript{74} For republicans however, financial wealth encouraged a wasteful luxury which undermined the muscular virtues of independence and self-sacrifice.\textsuperscript{75} The problem was that a commercial economy pandered to the meanest and most profligate appetites of the idle rich who indulged their passions for luxury goods, and diverted themselves from more productive pursuits in public service.\textsuperscript{76} Defoe however, argued against this view by reflecting upon the

\textsuperscript{71} Defoe, D., *The Review*, VIII (16), 1711, pg. 112.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., pg. 99.
\textsuperscript{74} Defoe, D., *The Review*, VIII (16), 1711, pg. 113-114.
industries and manufactures and the "many families [and]... multitudes of hands they employ" given over to the production of luxury goods.77

Defoe's defence however, was cautious and it was left to more strident critics such as Bernard Mandeville to argue that pandering to private vices would deliver public benefits. Mandeville's argument was that vices such as greed or avarice were an inseparable part of any commercial society.78 In his infamous Fable of the Bees, a thinly disguised allegory of British society, Mandeville wrote of a hive of bees whose ceaseless industry was driven by the pursuit of vices such as luxury, gluttony, and avarice. As Mandeville himself put it in his dubious doggerel, "Thus every Part was full of Vice, / Yet the whole Mass a Paradice".79 The indulgence of vices produced public benefits, and nowhere was his reasoning more succinctly put than in the Fable,

The Root of evil Avarice,
That damn'd ill-natur'd baneful Vice,
   Was slave to Prodigality,
   That Noble Sin; whilst Luxury
Employ'd a Million of the Poor,
And odious Pride a Million More.
   Envy it self, and Vanity
   Were Ministers of Industry;
Their darling Folly, Fickleness
   In Diet, Furniture, and Dress,
   That strange ridic'lous Vice, was made
The very Wheel, that turn'd the Trade.
   ... Thus Vice nursed Ingenuity,
Which join'd with Time, and Industry
   Had carry'd Life's Conveniences,
   ... To such a Height, the very Poor
Lived better than the Rich before;

The Fable went on to suggest that a revolution in manners within the hive resulting in the sudden practice of virtue instead of vice, the pursuit of self-restraint, abstinence, and

77 Defoe, D., The Review, IX (43), 1713, pg. 128.
78 Goldsmith, M. M., op.cit., pg. 137.
honesty would result in mass unemployment and the weakening of commerce. Goldsmith argues that Mandeville’s position was not - as his critics tended to represent it - a panegyric to vice, but a subtler recognition that pandering to the whims and desires of the feckless rich produced socially beneficial effects. Indeed Mandeville concluded the Fable with the suggestion that vice only produced socially beneficial effects when “it’s by Justice lopt, and bound” although he gloomily observed that “Fraud, Luxury, and Pride must live / Whilst we the Benefits receive. / Hunger’s a dreadful Plague, no doubt, / Yet who digests or thrives without?”

Mandeville’s image of social order was here based on the notion of society as a spontaneous order, functioning as a self-governing entity operating through the manifold, diverse and individual choices of self-interested consumers.

Conscious as they both were of the implication of personal vice or the indulgence of passions in the pursuit of commerce, both Mandeville and Defoe nonetheless stood poles apart in their respective attitudes to this problem. Rather than seeing trade as a means of harnessing the passions to socially useful ends, Defoe’s position was that trade offered the means of disciplining individuals and society itself. Mandeville however, decried the impact of discipline and sought a balance between socially useful and harmful passions based on the recognition that “strong Habits and Inclinations can only be subdued by Passions of greater Violence.”

Defoe’s Tradesman concluded with earnest reflections on the very question of the role of personal vice in fostering trade by considering the ubiquitous eighteenth century dilemma of what to do about luxury. Defoe did not dispute that the indulgence of vice and especially the consumption of luxury items stimulated trade, but argued that consumption required regulation “by some wholesome sumptuary law”. Such a law would regulate the production of luxury items by restricting their consumption, thereby freeing workers currently engaged in the production of wasteful luxuries to be employed in more serviceable tasks. The purpose

79 All following quotations from the Fable of the Bees is taken from Mandeville, B., The Fable of the Bees [1714], edited by P. Harth, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1970, pg. 67-76.
83 Defoe, D., Tradesman, pg. 227.
of Defoe’s discussion of luxury and trade however, was to propose that the error of vice did not inhere in trade but in the “minds of the people” and that the effective regulation of trade would not simply discipline commerce but the people who depended upon it.  

Defoe held up the figure of the industrious, assiduous, honest trader as a social ideal for emulation. The key to his argument was the concept of credit and the role it played in commercial activity, a role which could be both negative and positive. Credit for example, had provided the state with the means to pursue military aggrandisement, but continual warfare harmed trade. Credit moreover was almost impossible to control and defied the legislative power of national parliaments. The operations of credit were also blind to human virtue, and echoing Machiavelli’s feminisation of Fortuna Defoe feminised credit, “she blesses and blasts just as she pleases; she tyrannises over youth, beauty, virtue, estate... if she forsake the honestest [sic] woman in the world, nobody will touch her; if she covers the most scandalous behaviours, it passes for virtue...”. Credit therefore was an instrument of human passions beyond the reach of law; its operations were open to the least influence from the hopes and fears, whims and feelings of individuals caught up in the fury of the market.

Defoe however, also attempted to re-cast the role of credit as a means of fostering productive self-discipline. In other words credit - which was indispensable for trade - would only be granted to those who met the requirements of a virtuous trader, and this itself required that society and thereby credit itself would be subject to a universal social discipline to prevent it from being totally subjected to the passions. On this view the chief task of government lay in the correct management of credit by governing and disciplining the passions of individuals, enabling each to “…get on with his social life, practice its virtues, and make his contribution to the credit and confidence which men repose in one another.” The task of government was thus to administer the needs of the economy, making sure that it functioned as smoothly as possible with as little interference as practicable,

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84 Ibid., pg. 234.
86 Ibid., pg. 117.
87 Ibid., pg. 119.
89 Ibid., pg. 457-459.
90 Ibid., pg. 460.
Money is now the business: raising money is the affair, ways and means is the word. The answer is ready: where money is legally obtained, it must be legally obtained again. Subjects honestly labouring, honestly possessing, ought to be left quietly, enjoying what they are masters of; and this is the foundation of what we call law, liberty, and property... This is the end of parliaments, constitutions, government, and obedience; and this is the true foundation of order in the world, and long may it be our privilege to maintain it...91

Mandeville’s position, developed in his elaborations of the themes from the Fable entitled An Enquiry Into the Origin of Moral Virtue denounced the hypocrisy of the disciplines Defoe had praised. The purpose of discipline Mandeville argued, was to instil a “dextrous Management of ourselves, a stifling of our Appetites” which consisted in “hiding the real Sentiments of our Hearts before others” in order to avoid the sanction of shame or embarrassment.92 He argued that all animals were “Sollicitous of pleasing themselves” and possessed a natural inclination to pursue their own private advantage over that of others, while the guardians of society - politicians, priests and lawyers - sought to instil the belief in “the People they were to govern” that “it was more beneficial for every body to conquer than indulge his Appetites, and much better to mind the Publick than what seem’d his private Interest.”93 Far from seeing any violence in the indulgence of passions, Mandeville decried the violence we have been invited to commit upon ourselves.94 Society he believed, was founded upon manifold acts of private violence designed to curb natural inclinations at the behest of “skilfull Politicians” who used “flattery”, praised our “sagacity”, “understanding” and “rationality”, and employed “Notions of Honour and Shame” to promote this ceaseless violence, rendering individuals “useful to each other as well as tractable... [to] govern vast Numbers of... [us] with greater Ease and Security”.95

Mandeville saw the disciplinary inculcation of virtue as a cynical quest to conquer the natural passions of human beings, a ploy of those who desired power over others. The politeness and manners of polished society were no more than a sham, an effect cultivated in the gullible through education by those who have succeeded not in

91 Defoe, D., The Review, IV (106), 1707, pg. 133.
92 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, op.cit., pg. 102.
93 Ibid., pg. 81.
94 Ibid., pg. 82.
conquering but hiding their animal passions. In his later *A Search into the Nature of Society* of 1723, Mandeville heaped scorn on the idea of public virtue which he considered was “good for nothing but to breed Drones” fit only for “the stupid Enjoyments of a Monastick Life, or at best a Country Justice of the Peace”, totally unsuited to a rigorous life of “Labour and Assiduity... great Atchievements and perilous Undertakings.” Such a view Hundert suggests, reveals the faith Mandeville placed in the “civilising” effect of commerce. Hundert may have overstated his case; Mandeville’s faith in ‘civilisation’ was not as great as his faith in the unreformed human character,

Hunger, Thirst and Nakedness are the first Tyrants that force us to stir: afterwards our Pride, Sloth, Sensuality and Fickleness are the great Patrons that promote all Arts and Sciences, Trades, Handicrafts and Callings; whilst the great Task-masters, Necessity, Avarice, Envy and Ambition, each in the Class that belongs to him, keep the Members of the Society to their Labour, and make them all submit, most of them cheerfully, to the Drudgery of their Station; Kings and Princes not excepted.

While virtues of perseverance and patience had their uses, the vast accomplishments of industry and human ingenuity were inspired not by the calm virtues, but by the desire to gratify the ubiquitous vices of sloth, avarice, or greed. If such vices were eradicated from the human mind the whole fabric of society would disintegrate, whole professions would cease, unemployment would become uncontrollable, industry would decline, and the very purpose of social life - to indulge our vices with greater ease - would lose its utility.

For his critics Mandeville’s conception of society was a frightful image of indulgence of every vice, an undisciplined community in which every sort of wickedness was avowed and government derided. For Defoe however, government had a positive role to play in providing necessary infrastructure to facilitate the circulation of goods and money thereby fostering the correct “management” and “regulation” of populations. It would

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96 Ibid., pg. 82-85. Goldsmith argues that in Mandeville’s view, government should ideally function as a “machine” providing conditions in which the economy could flourish. Goldsmith, M. M., *loc.cit.*, pg. 250-251.
97 Ibid., pg. 337.
98 Ibid., pg. 120.
99 Ibid., pg. 368.
100 Hundert argues that such concerns animated Adam Smith’s attempt to articulate an “ethically persuasive” argument for commerce. Hundert, E.G., *op.cit.*, pg. 233.
also result in the creation of disciplined, upright citizens who by engaging in commercial activity participated in what he called the “most noble, most instructive, and improving of any way of life.”102 Here we see the rudiments of a notion of commerce as a civilising activity rather different from Mandeville’s. According to Defoe, trade presented those who engaged in it with manifold opportunities for being disciplined in the virtues of the trader, “the support and improver of power, learning and fortunes”, who must be part scholar, part traveller, able to master different languages and understand different cultures, qualified in short “for all sorts of employment in the state by a general knowledge of things and men...”.103 The disciplined trader would display “probity and punctual payment” and foster the “confidence” of fellow traders.104 In turn, the state would benefit from the merchant who alone could generate the means to transform “a wet bog” into “a populous state”, and who in the process would “enrich... beggars, ennable... mechanics, raise... not families only, but towns, cities, provinces, and kingdoms.”105 Close as they came to the view that commerce was a civilising activity Defoe and Mandeville did not argue that it also exerted a pacifying influence. Indeed they could hardly do so having documented the linkage between commerce and warmaking in Defoe’s case, and the inevitable privations and crimes Mandeville thought attendant upon commerce. Within liberal discourse however, commerce came to be seen not only as a source of discipline, but of pacifying discipline. The problem that had to be overcome here was that as Defoe recognised, commerce actually extended the state’s capacity for violence. The resolution of this problem was tied to the development of a liberal discourse of civilisation in which violence was excluded by attributing it to the persistence of uncivilised peoples and states. The foundations of this discourse of civilisation were laid by one of its most articulate proponents, Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755).

III. COMMERCE AND PACIFICATION

Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws was addressed to the nature of the relationship between the laws of a community and its political structure. The nature of this relationship depended he argued, on such variables as the style of rule, the geographical

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103 Ibid., pg. 124-125.
104 Ibid., pg. 127.
105 Ibid., pg. 125. The mention of a “wet bog” may be an oblique reference Holland with which England was in active military alliance against France, but active commercial competition.
and climatic conditions, and most importantly the spirit, customs and mores within the community itself. The problem as Montesquieu saw it, was that any form of social life required the establishment of laws, but whether a community or polity was to be enriched or impoverished by their laws depended upon how they were to be enforced, and this in turn was dependent upon the mores and manners of the people themselves. It was this problem that the *Spirit of the Laws* set out to clarify and resolve while drawing upon some of the arguments previously elaborated in his *Persian Letters*. According to Richard Sher, the mythical history of the Troglodytes described in the *Persian Letters* reflected Montesquieu's fear that the development of commerce eroded the practice of virtue, and it was this problem that he hoped to resolve in the *Spirit*.106

Montesquieu assumed that society originated in the natural "weakness", "timidity", and "mutual fear" of human beings driven to seek refuge from the rigours of the wild in company with others.107 Once in society however, individual weakness was replaced by the growing awareness of collective strength, and from this recognition proceeded a dual "state of war" between individual nations, and between individual citizens who sought domination over others.108 In order to avert this state of war laws were required to regulate the behaviour of states and of citizens within polities. The nature of these laws depended to a large degree on the nature of the polity in question, and the nature of the polity was dependent largely upon the conduct of its citizens or subjects. Montesquieu's subsequent discussion focussed largely on the distinction between republics and monarchic or despotic polities. Republics, which could be either democratic or aristocratic, were 'liberal' polities in that sovereignty resided in the people with laws made on their behalf to protect their lives, liberties, and property. In monarchic and despotic states by contrast, sovereignty resided in the person of the monarch or despot. For Montesquieu, despotic states (and to a lesser degree monarchies) represented an extreme form of undisciplined, uncivilised polity whereas republics embodied all the virtues of thoroughgoing discipline, efficient regulation, and civilisation.

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The model for the despotic states described in the *Spirit* was provided by the descriptions of the seraglio in the *Persian Letters*. Here one person ruled over all others in a ruthless tyranny, and all who were under their power were enslaved. The image of the seraglio however, was also used to convey the idea that despotic rulership involved an abandonment to the passions while those who were so ruled served only to gratify the ruler’s passions. Montesquieu’s description of the nature of despotic rule was redolent with the imagery of undisciplined indulgence. The despot’s senses "constantly tell him that he is everything and that others are nothing” and was therefore "lazy, ignorant, and voluptuous”, “drunk with pleasures”, and inclined to “abandon the public business” to his chief slave or “vizir” to follow his “most brutal passions". True discipline consisted in the practice of what Montesquieu called virtue, and virtue sprang from the knowledge that each citizen was equally subjected to and prospered under the same laws, and thereby controlled their passions in the interest of furthering the public good. “The less we can satisfy our particular passions...” Montesquieu suggested “the more we give ourselves up to passions for the general order... The more austere [this order]... the more it curtails... [our] inclinations, the more force it gives to those that remain.”

The effective control of passions however, did not only apply to individual citizens but to the very exercise of sovereignty itself. In liberal republican states the people were sovereign and the law was not enforced through terror or majesty, but obeyed because each citizen recognised that the law embodied their own interests. In such a state the equality of citizens was reflected in the making of laws, and thereby private passions and inclinations as well as the power of the state were regulated by popularly accepted laws. In despotic and monarchical states by contrast, no such discipline reigned and sovereignty was abased by the passions and inclinations of the prince or despot.

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108 Ibid., pg. 7.
111 Ibid., pg. 23. Here Montesquieu warns of the danger of virtue giving way to licentiousness and indicates the degree to which citizens in a republic are responsible for regulating their own conduct rather than having their conduct regulated by government. If virtue in a republic does recede, government must resort to interventionist rule and, as Montesquieu put it, in this situation what had been known as a "maxim is now called severity; what was a rule is now called constraint; what was vigilance is now called fear."
112 Ibid., pg. 42-43.
Monarchies in particular were characterised by the fawning of courtiers, their “flattery, treachery, perfidy... abandonment of all... engagements... [and] scorn of the duties of citizens...”.14 In despotic states sovereignty bore the taint of fear and violence which were the chief instruments of rule over “timid, ignorant, beaten-down people”, and the severity of the law embodied nothing more than the “anger and vengeance” of the despot who ruled by “chastisement.”15

States such as these were undisciplined polities, waging war “in all their natural fury” unabated by the “right of nations”, where the despot’s private interest and the “domestic government” of the “seraglio” was substituted for “political and civil government”.16 In such a state religion served only foster fear, and no enticement was offered to commerce. But despotic polities were also numerous simply because they did not require the rigorous discipline of republics,

...despite men’s love of liberty, despite their hatred of violence, most peoples are subject to this type of government [despotism]. This is easy to understand. In order to form a moderate government, one must combine powers, regulate them, temper them, make them act; one must give one power a ballast, so to speak, to put it in a position to resist another; this is a masterpiece of legislation that chance rarely produces and prudence is rarely allowed to produce. By contrast, a despotic government... is uniform throughout; as only passions are needed to establish it...17

Consequently, while it was in the nature of despotic governments to rule by force and violence, and monarchical governments sought “war and expansion”, liberal republics were characterised by “peace and moderation.”18 The peacefulness of republics extended to both the conduct of citizens in society and to the conduct of the state itself, providing thereby the most efficacious solution to the dual state of war - between citizens and nations. The peacefulness of republics was attributable to commerce insofar as it introduced a form of discipline first to the individuals engaged in it; and second, by subjecting trading nations to powerful incentives inclining them toward

15 Ibid., pg. 59 and 29. Similarly, David Hume wrote that a “...man possessed of usurped power, can set no bounds to his pretensions...” while the power of a “...legal authority, though great, has always some bounds, which terminate both the hopes and pretensions of the person possessed of it...”. Hume, D., Political Essays, edited by K. Haakonssen, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, pg. 30.
16 Montesquieu, Spirit, pg. 59-60.
17 Ibid., pg. 63.
18 Ibid., pg. 132.
peace. In despotic states as both Hume and Montesquieu averred, all material wealth was subjected to the despot and this acted as a deterrent to trade and agriculture, while in monarchical states commerce served only to fulfil the taste of the prince and his court for luxury.\textsuperscript{119} In republics however, commerce fulfilled an altogether different purpose because in these polities commerce was an encouragement not to luxury and vice but discipline and virtue. Montesquieu's general rule here was that "in a nation that is in servitude, one works more to preserve than to acquire; in a free nation, one works more to acquire than to preserve", and thus in republics acquisition was tempered by "economy" while in monarchies it served wasteful "luxury".\textsuperscript{120} Republican states were therefore most suited to benefit from commerce and thereby commerce itself was identified as the agent of civilisation. In this way, Montesquieu managed to exclude violence from the life of civilised societies by identifying it as an attribute of undisciplined, uncivilised states, societies, and individuals.

Consequently, Montesquieu believed that commerce cured "destructive prejudices, and it is an almost general rule that everywhere there are gentle [doux] mores, there is commerce and that everywhere there is commerce, there are gentle mores."\textsuperscript{121} Montesquieu claimed that commerce "polishes and softens barbarous mores" replacing them with "knowledge" gained through careful "comparison" of alternatives, which lead to social "peace" and a 'reciprocal' union based on recognition of "mutual needs" and a "feeling for exact justice".\textsuperscript{122} Barbarous nations by contrast exhibited "fierce" manners and had no conception of "exact justice", merely "banditry".\textsuperscript{123} Montesquieu was clear that the chief benefit of commerce was felt in republics where the disciplinary effects of economy would work upon the populace. A population engaged in commerce he argued, would be more able to cultivate virtue; they would be "hardworking", "just", "moderate", and "frugal", and in republics such virtues would be esteemed by both citizens and rulers alike.\textsuperscript{124} Montesquieu here hinted at the disciplinary effect of

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., pg. 61 and 99; and Hume, D., \textit{op.cit.}, pg. 56.
\textsuperscript{120} Montesquieu, \textit{Spirit}, pg. 340-341. Here Montesquieu writes, "I do not mean that any monarchies are totally excluded from economic commerce, but they are less inclined to it by its nature; I do not mean that the republics we know are entirely without the commerce of luxury, but it is less related to their constitution."
\textsuperscript{121} Montesquieu, \textit{Spirit}, pg. 338.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., pg. 338-339.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., pg. 341.
commerce on both individuals and states, and that its effectiveness hinged on the fact that it was voluntary.

That commerce was able to develop at all within feudal states and societies was, Montesquieu argued, due to the recognition by rulers of their *self-interest* in fostering it. The historical example Montesquieu used to illustrate the point was the recognition by medieval European monarchs that the persecution of the Jews, who themselves were a major source of revenue from their commercial activity, was not in their interest. Thus, "...princes have had to govern themselves more wisely than they themselves would have thought, for it turned out that great acts of authority were so clumsy that experience itself has made known that only goodness of government brings prosperity."\(^\text{125}\) The notion of interest as a productive impulse therefore made its appearance as an alternative to the destructiveness of passion, "...happily, men are in a situation such that, though their passions inspire in them the thought of being wicked, they nevertheless have an interest in not being so."\(^\text{126}\) Indeed, Montesquieu's language seems to confirm Hirschman's analysis, "let one not speak of the prince's glory; his glory is his arrogance; it is a passion and not a legitimate right."\(^\text{127}\)

Montesquieu however, did not argue that the pacification of society was accomplished solely or even largely through the supplanting of passion, nor by the rise of self-interest. The process of pacification was a consequence of the discipline which only republican regimes were able to fully achieve. Significantly, Montesquieu argued that polities which had been civilised were able to amass greater strength than uncivilised polities, and in doing so laid the foundation for the argument that became a central feature of a liberal discourse of civilisation, that civilisation made liberal states more economically and militarily powerful. As David Hume put it, "as private men receive greater security, in the possession of their trade and riches, from the power of the public, so the public becomes powerful in proportion to the opulence and extensive commerce of private men."\(^\text{128}\) Because despotic and monarchical states were based on the use of violence either internally or externally Montesquieu argued that princes and despots were trapped by the perpetual fear of conquest by other states. Despots and monarchs thus put all

\(^{125}\) Ibid., pg. 389.

\(^{126}\) Ibid., pg. 389-390.

\(^{127}\) Ibid., pg. 139.
their efforts into trying to seal-off their state from other neighbouring states. Republics on the other hand neither sought nor feared conquest and thus were able to join with other republics to form larger “federal republics” to provide greater stability and security.\textsuperscript{129} In his remarks on Britain, which was far from being a truly popular or republican state, Montesquieu nonetheless praised Britain’s subordination of “political interests” to “the interests of its commerce”.\textsuperscript{130} What he appeared to mean here was that the British realised that their state would benefit from vibrant commerce and that the task of politics was to ensure that the economy remained free and unobstructed. The implication was clearly that states subjected to the disciplines of the market were less likely to engage in the wasteful wars or vicious tyrannies of despot and monarchs and would restrict themselves to the strengthening but pacific activities of commerce. It also implied that the superior strength of civilised states was effectively controlled; such states were not inherently violent, but preferred to deal with other states in trade and commerce rather than war. In tandem with the view that commerce had banished violence to the world of uncivilised peoples and polities, the contention that civilised states possessed superior strength effectively excluded this increased potential for violence from any inherent connection with the civilising process by seeing it as a defensive measure against the inherent violence of uncivilised states.

This argument was reinforced by Montesquieu’s discussion of Christianity which he believed was a source of pacifying and civilising discipline comparable in influence to commerce.\textsuperscript{131} “The Christian religion...” Montesquieu argued was “remote from pure despotism; the gentleness so recommended in the gospel stands opposed to the despotic fury with which a prince would mete out his own justice and exercise his cruelties.”\textsuperscript{132} In contrast to the teachings of Christianity however, Islam was represented as vicious and cruel, speaking “only with a sword” with “the destructive spirit that founded it.”\textsuperscript{133} The people of Europe, he contended “...owe to Christianity both a certain political right

\textsuperscript{128} Hume, D., \textit{op.cit.}, pg. 94.
\textsuperscript{129} Montesquieu, \textit{Spirit}, pg. 131.
\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Ibid.}, pg. 343-346.
\textsuperscript{131} Hsia, R.P.-C., argues that the two confessional faiths of the German Reformation, Calvinism and Lutheranism, as well as Counter-Reformation Catholicism were each used by territorial rulers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a means of social discipline and pacification. Hsia, R. P.-C., \textit{op.cit.}, pg. 11-52, 146, 164-165.
\textsuperscript{132} Montesquieu, \textit{Spirit}, pg. 461.
\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Ibid.}, pg. 462. Interestingly, this is a contention with which Ernest Gellner concurs in his \textit{Conditions of Liberty; Civil Society and its Rivals}, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1994.
in government and a certain right of nations in war... [which] leaves to the vanquished... life, liberty, laws, goods...”. Montesquieu’s words here reflect the highly formalised ‘rules of engagement’ governing the conduct of war which had emerged from the chaos and destructiveness of the Wars of Religion and the Thirty Years War. They also indicated a desire to extend this formalised structure of interaction to the sphere of domestic social interaction, replacing action determined by private conviction with rule-governed, regulated and disciplined conduct.

In reflecting on the French Wars of Religion in the sixteenth-century Montesquieu observed that “every religion which is repressed becomes repressive itself” and “attacks the religion which repressed it, not as a religion, but as a tyranny.” Montesquieu’s chief aim therefore was to envisage a purely secular politics based on the mutual disinterest of self-governing citizens,

...it is useful for the laws to require of these various religions not only that they do not disturb the state, but also that they not disturb each other. A citizen does not satisfy the laws by contenting himself with not agitating the body of the state; he must also not disturb any citizen whatsoever.

Montesquieu was clear therefore that social pacification could only be accomplished by encouraging an attitude of polite indifference between citizens. Such indifference subsumed both passion and religious or other private conviction, preventing them from becoming an ever renewable *casus belli*. This attitude of indifferent toleration was clearly tied to the rise of commerce and the personal skills and virtues which both Defoe and Montesquieu thought necessary to its practice. On one level, this process could be conceptualised in terms of the control of passion by the cool calculation of interest, but neither Defoe nor Montesquieu took so crude a view. For them the rise of commerce and the pacification it achieved was intimately tied to broader processes of discipline which suffused whole societies. Self-interested commercial activity was therefore tied to a broader historical account of the march of ‘civilisation’. As both Defoe and

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138 Ibid., pg. 488.
Montesquieu indicated the extension of commerce was not simply the result of private decisions to pursue self-interest, but was actively encouraged by states and governments who stood to benefit from the resulting discipline. For Montesquieu in particular violence was excluded from the process of civilisation by attributing it to the uncivilised world of barbarian personalities and barbaric states. The assumptions that violence was an attribute of barbarism, that commerce was a source of pacifying discipline, and that the violence of civilised states could be explained simply as a reaction to uncivilised states were each to exert a powerful influence on subsequent liberal thought.

**CONCLUSION**

The distinction between the earlier discourse of a fragile civility upheld by the judicious government of opinion within civil society, and the emergent discourse of civilisation lay in the identification of a universal disciplinary mechanism which could drive pacification beyond the limited confines of civil society to encompass a much wider span. The ambiguity inspired by the transition from a predominantly land-based economy to one increasingly dominated by trade and commerce reflected the need to find such a mechanism in order to avert the dual fears of rampant vice among the masses and its control by arbitrary government. Republican thinkers approached this problem on the basis that moral corruption and arbitrary rule were dangers which could be averted by the wise and judicious use of violence. As Walter Moyle put it, violence could be “a remedy instead of a ruin” and observed as had “Machiavel” before him that “great dangers and violent extremities often rectify and recover a constitution of government tending toward corruption... [thereby restoring] virtue and discipline”.139

Within the emerging liberal discourse of civilisation however, violence was seen as a danger to civil society even though the commerce which drove the civilising process extended the state’s capacity for violence. It therefore became necessary to isolate violence from civilisation, and Montesquieu attempted to do just that by associating violence with uncivilised and undisciplined personalities and polities.

In doing so Montesquieu was able to defend commerce by excluding violence from any inherent connection with the process of civilisation. While commerce may have intensified the state’s capacity to use violence, civilised states would show little interest...

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in using it. Their conduct would be as restrained, regulated, and disciplined as the conduct of its politely indifferent citizens. The superior strength of civilised states thus provided a powerful incentive for rulers and citizens to pursue commerce; it would lead to greater security from the violence of uncivilised peoples and polities. The achievement of greater security was tied to the extension of processes of discipline and regulation within society. Civil society was thus assured of a brighter prospect, of greater and more effective government of conduct within society, and a stronger but non-aggressive protection from the state. The notion of a fragile civility however, did not entirely recede from liberal discourse. The civil order was still hedged about by boundaries which confined the operations of executive power, but a new and durable boundary had now been drawn between civilisation and barbarism, and subsequent chapters will explore the continuing influence of this boundary within liberal discourse. This task will begin with a discussion in the next chapter of the problem of civilisation and the violence of warfare in the work of some early liberal and other Enlightenment thinkers.
We may, with good reason, congratulate our species on their having escaped from a state of barbarous disorder and violence, into a state of domestic peace and regular policy.


I open my books about rights and morals, I listen to scholars and legal experts, and inspired by their suggestive discourses, I deplore the miseries of nature, admire the peace and justice established by the civil order, bless the wisdom of public institutions, and find consolation for being a man by seeing myself as a citizen. Well instructed as to my duties and my happiness, I close the books, leave the lecture room, and look around me. There I see a miserable people groaning under an iron yoke, the whole human race crushed by a handful of oppressors, and an enraged mob overwhelmed by pain and hunger whose blood and tears the rich drink in peace. And everywhere the strong are armed against the weak with the formidable power of law. All of this happens peacefully and without resistance. ... Before me is a panorama of murder - ten thousand slaughtered men, the dead piled up in heaps, the dying trampled by horses - and everywhere the sight of death and agony. And yet all of this is the fruit of peaceful institutions. Pity and indignation rise up from the depths of my heart. Barbarous philosopher, come read us your book on a battlefield!

This chapter will explore the relationship identified by a range of thinkers during the eighteenth-century between the domestic disciplines of civilisation which operated largely within societies, and the external or international behaviour of the states that shielded and protected them. The opening quotations introduce the paradox this relationship represented to two thinkers in particular, Adam Ferguson and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, respectively the leading critic and the leading defender of civilisation in their age. The contrast between them however, masks an important continuity. Both Ferguson and Rousseau were convinced that the processes of civilisation operating within Western Europe were creating civil societies inhabited by independent, self-governed individuals. Such societies however, depended on disciplines which went beyond the restricted circle of Locke's civil society and grasped at a more inclusive totality of disciplinary mechanisms. In the process violence was increasingly seen as an attribute of barbarism, excluded from the realm of civilisation. The problem to which the thinkers discussed in this chapter were attuned however, was that as both Defoe and Montesquieu had observed, civilisation was driving a vastly increased capacity for state violence.

This chapter will be concerned with the way in which some early liberal and other eighteenth-century thinkers approached this problem. The solution to the problem favoured by early liberal thinkers involved the conceptualisation of civil society as a realm protected by boundaries separating the peace of domestic relations from the violence of the international realm, between states which were conceived as inhabiting an international state of nature in which violence was still an accepted course of action. This sort of solution was indicative of a central assumption within the emerging discourse of civilisation, that peace was a condition secured within the domestic realm of relations within states. While Ferguson accepted the inevitability of violence on the international realm of relations between states, concerted efforts were made (as we shall also see in the following chapter) throughout the eighteenth-century to envisage an end to warfare. Rousseau's treatment of this issue in a selection of writings from the mid-century posed the most serious questions to the discourse of civilisation. Rousseau's critique exerted a most profound influence over the development of Immanuel Kant's argument that mutual antagonism in civil society lead to domestic peace, and that
mutual antagonism between states would lead to the creation of an international pacific union and put an end to war.

The chapter will begin by examining the work of Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson and the importance they laid upon the development within civil societies of commercial relations. Commerce they argued, was a source of discipline within society which combined the pursuit of productivity with the achievement of peace. The problem to which they drew attention however, was that domestic peace was underwritten by the concentration of violence in the hands of the state which it used in its relations with other states. For Ferguson in particular, the concentration of violence in the hands of the state represented a potential threat to the security and peace of commercial society itself. Rousseau's critique of the discourse of civilisation, which will be discussed in the following section, drew attention to a deeper problem in that the very independence created by the civilising process was fuelling mutual antagonism and violence between individuals within society and between states in the international realm. Toward the end of the century Immanuel Kant responded to this critique by identifying mutual antagonism as the engine of peace both domestically within states and internationally between them. In the third section of this chapter it will be argued that Kant's reconciliation of mutual antagonism with peace reflected a belief that commercial societies were those in which the most effective forms of pacifying discipline operated. This in turn reflected a fundamental assumption of liberal thought, to be explored in the following chapter, that violence had been excluded from civilised societies and polities and consigned to the realm of the uncivilised.

I. COMMERCE AND CIVILISATION IN THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT

The Scottish Enlightenment thinkers were preoccupied with the question of how dangerous and violent passions could be controlled by the pacifying considerations of self-interest, which they saw as the product of discipline and civilisation. The discipline to which they turned in particular was commerce, and one of the more important arguments they used to recommend it was that it promised an end to violence. In this respect several Scottish Enlightenment thinkers paid homage to Montesquieu.1 William

Robertson's account of the civilising process in sixteenth-century Europe for instance resonated with Montesquieu's description of the pacifying influence of commerce,

Commerce tends to wear off those prejudices which maintain distinction and animosity between nations. It softens and polishes the manners of men. It unites them, by... the desire of supplying their mutual wants. It disposes them to peace, by establishing in every state an order of citizens bound by their interest to be the guardian of public tranquility.  

The pacifying and self-controlling influence of commerce marked an important phase in the development of modern liberalism, which separated the political thought of the Scottish Enlightenment from both Republicanism and the discourse of 'police'.  

Both Republicanism and the discourse of police received impetus from the decay of the feudal order in Europe and the consequent need to find new ways of conceptualising social order. While Republican thought was based on notions of virtue inculcated in the elite by virtue of their possession of land, the discourse of police centred on a host of supervisory mechanisms aimed at subjecting populations to centrally directed administration in "an attempt to regulate not only public, but also private life."  

Kalyvas and Katzenelson see Adam Ferguson in particular as a thinker who tried to incorporate the values of classical Republicanism which stressed the need for virtue and public spiritedness and those of an emergent liberalism based on the primacy of "economic self-interest". The contention of this chapter however, is that Scottish Enlightenment thinkers such as Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson were more concerned with the problem of how to discipline self-government and ensure thereby the self-regulation of civil society and the avoidance of tyranny. As their contemporary David Hume put it, "industry and arts and trade encrease the power of the sovereign as well as the happiness of the subjects; and that policy is violent, which aggrandises the public by

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the poverty of individuals." In order to avoid this problem it became vital to establish that self-regulation and self-government could be relied upon to maintain public tranquillity. The primacy of this concern can be identified for instance, in Adam Smith’s *Theory of Moral Sentiments* in which he aimed to demonstrate how to “restrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections... [which] can alone produce among mankind that harmony of sentiments and passions in which consists their whole grace and propriety.” Throughout the early parts of the work he wrote of the “violence of the passions”, how “loathsome and disagreeable” surrender to them rendered us, how the “brutal” and “violent effects” of passions reduced us to slavery. Surrender to the passions was described as something shared “in common with the brutes”, and reflecting the overt sexism of his day women were described as particularly vulnerable to “natural” passions which must be restrained by the “laws of society”.

Nonetheless, Smith contrasted ‘social’ passions such as generosity and compassion with ‘unsocial’ passions such as hatred and anger, and sought to regulate those passions by appealing to self-interest as a way of keeping them “within the bounds of prudence and justice”. Lurking behind such prescriptions was a conception of the self and a way of life that Smith wished to recommend above all others, the essential elements of which were the “reason” and “self-command” by which individuals were enabled to foresee the consequences of their actions, and thereby to chart a course toward the greatest pleasure even if it meant enduring a present pain. It was of course the figure of the merchant that Smith had in mind here, one who practiced “frugality, industry, and application” in the “acquisition of fortune”, pursued “remote advantage” by giving up “all present pleasures”, and enduring “the greatest labour both of mind and body” to win a general “approbation”. Elsewhere Smith described the virtues of this “prudent” self as consisting in a constant care for the self-preservation of health, fortune, rank, and

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reputation; such a self was always earnest and "perfectly genuine", sincere, "very capable of friendship" while not inclined to meddle in the affairs of others, was "perfectly inoffensive", industrious, frugal and most importantly lived "within his income... by continual, though small accumulations".14 Such passages remind us of Montesquieu's and Defoe's recommendation of commerce and the virtues of the trader, and like them Smith placed these virtues within a broader scheme of socio-historical development, a process of civilisation. It was in this vein that he warned "[t]oo violent a propensity to those detestable passions, renders a person the object of universal dread and abhorrence, who, like a wild beast, ought, we think, to be hunted out of all civil society."15 The condition of civility presupposed an intimate concern for the well-being of others making it possible for individuals to share "an animated and passionate behaviour" tempered by their innate sense of propriety and prudence.16 In contrast to such "polished" people, "barbarians" possessed little sense of the humanity of others, and unaccustomed to sharing their thoughts and feelings with others were more prone to savage and "furious" displays of anti-social passions.17

The Theory of Moral Sentiments can be read as a sort of handbook on the ways in which the governing of conduct may be achieved without the need for state regulation.18 This self-regulation of conduct was a prerequisite for civil society, and its realisation was the chief distinction of a civilised people, an argument he stated more plainly in his Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms of 1763.19 Here Smith argued that the self-government of conduct was not to be achieved by encouraging calculations of self-interest, but that this sort of self-government was itself produced by discipline. One of Smith's chief concerns in the lectures was the concept of 'police' which as Pasquino points out, was not so narrowly defined as it is today and concerned the manifold ways in which the social body could be shaped through the administration of goods and services and the management of conduct.20 In his discussion of the duties of police

13 Ibid., pg. 190.
14 Ibid., pg. 212-215.
15 Ibid., pg. 40.
16 Ibid., pg. 207.
17 Ibid., pg. 208-209.
18 See for example the last section in ibid., pg. 327-342.
19 Smith, A., Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms [1763], edited by E. Cannan [1896], Augustus M. Kelley, New York, 1964. (Hereafter referred to as Justice, Police, Revenue)
Smith included the management of public cleanliness and security and the provision of goods, but he also displayed a concern for encouraging the self-regulation of conduct. Reflecting on the success with which self-government had been achieved in England, he argued that it was the central role played by commerce there since Elizabethan times that provided an occupation for the footloose former retainers of the great magnates. The transition to a commercial economy provided the means by which such individuals could be subjected to the new mastery of a firm and unforgiving yet also voluntary discipline of labour. Above all else this new discipline afforded to former retainers an independence which was the most effective form of protection from crime and vagabondage, a point he tried to drum home to his fellow Scots.

In Glasgow, where almost nobody has more than one servant, there are fewer capital crimes than in Edinburgh. ...Upon this principle, therefore, it not so much the police that prevents the commission of crimes as the having as few persons as possible to live upon others. Nothing tends so much to corrupt mankind as dependency, while independency still increases the honesty of the people. The establishment of commerce and manufactures, which brings about this independency, is the best police for preventing crimes.

The discipline of labour therefore created "a general probity of manners" and inculcated "an honest and industrious manner" in those who had to work for an honest living. Elsewhere he noted that wherever the disciplines of commerce emerged "probity and punctuality" were always produced and self-interest would "regulate... the actions of every man".

In the Wealth of Nations Smith attributed such improvements to the division of labour which subjected each individual worker to a precise regimen of disciplined labour

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21 Smith, A., Justice, Police, Revenue, pg. 155.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., pg. 156. One finds similar sentiments expressed by contemporaries, such as Sir James Stuart, "The great alteration in the affairs of Europe... by the discovery of America and the Indies, the springing up of industry and learning, the introduction of trade and the luxurious arts, the establishment of public credit, and a general system of taxation, have entirely altered the plan of government everywhere. From feudal and military, it is become free and commercial. I oppose freedom in government to the feudal system, to mark only that there is not found now that chain of subordination among the subjects, which made the essential part of the feudal form. The head there had little power, and the lower classes of the people little liberty. Now every industrious man, who lives with oeconomy, is free and independent under most forms of government." Stuart, J., An Enquiry Into the Principles of Political Oeconomy, Vol I [1767], edited by A. S. Skinner, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1966, pg. 24. By 'commercial' he apparently means that military organisation and activity are entirely subordinate to the availability and management of finance.
24 Smith, A., Justice, Police, Revenue, pg. 253.
dependent upon the mastery of "distinct operations" which increased the "quantity of work" and the "dexterity" of the "workman", but did so by employing time-saving machines to "facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of many." The advantages to be gained by these processes were that they subjected individual workers to an inescapable discipline, enforcing the development of productive habits and the elimination of rustic inefficiencies,

A man commonly saunters a little in turning his hand from one sort of employment to another. When he first begins the new work he is seldom very keen and hearty... and for some time he rather trifles than applies to good purpose. The habit of sauntering and of indolent careless application, which is naturally, or rather necessarily acquired by every country workman... render him almost always slothful and lazy, and incapable of any vigorous application...

It was the division of labour which put a stop to such indolence by scheduling labour to the impersonal tempo of agricultural and industrial machines. This new form of discipline enhanced individual and social productivity and created the "universal oppulence" of "well-governed" societies. For Smith the development of the division of labour and increases in agricultural and industrial production were the driving forces of civilisation which facilitated "order and good government, and with them, the liberty and security of individuals... who had before lived in a continual state of war with their neighbours, and of servile dependency upon their superiors." Smith also argued that before the division of labour was able to develop, individual workers were dependent upon the largesse of the great magnates whom they served as armed retainers. Such a situation entailed frequent violence in the absence of effective central authority. With the development of commerce however, and especially trade between urban manufacturing centres, the great lords were willing to surrender their power to enhance their incomes by leasing their land and living from the rents, thereby releasing large numbers of former peasants from their 'servile dependency'. As a consequence a "regular government" was introduced, and by slow and imperceptible advances driven by the autonomous and self-interested decisions of "merchants and artificers", an

26 Ibid., pg. 12.
27 Ibid., pg. 15.
28 Ibid., pg. 433. The following information has been taken from ibid., pg. 433-443.
economy based on manufactures, foreign trade, and an advanced division of labour was able to develop.29

Despite such enthusiasm, Smith did concede that the division of labour had not always resulted in beneficial effects, and he drew particular attention to the tendency in commercial nations to undervalue education and "extinguish martial spirit".30 Smith was also aware of the dangers posed by an advancing division of labour which made war itself a "trade", one which offered but poor returns for its practitioners, occasioning the employment only of "the meanest to defend the state".31 What lay behind Smith's concerns here was an awareness many other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers shared of the dangers posed by the advance of civilisation which, while promising a new regime of pacifying self-discipline also gave rise to an increased capacity for the state to use violence.32 William Robertson for instance, spoke of the rise of commerce in sixteenth-century Europe as the trigger for "greater refinements in manners, and... a more regular species of government and police...", but also noted that the division of labour had resulted in the professionalisation of modern warfare and the concentration in the hands of the state of the means of waging war.33

Concern over the effects that the division of labour was having on domestic and international peace were shared by Smith's contemporary Adam Ferguson, but despite their shared concern each held rather different views about the most suitable military structure for commercial societies. In accord with contemporaries such as Smith and Robertson, Ferguson was convinced that Western European history revealed a progression of the human species from a state of "rudeness" to that of "civilisation" or from "barbarism to refinement".34 Echoing Smith, Ferguson argued that a concern for "our external condition" including safety and comfort had driven a progression from a

29 Ibid., pg. 439, 440.
30 Smith, A., Justice, Police, Revenue, pg. 257.
31 Ibid., pg. 257, 262.
32 Sher, R.B., "Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and the Problem of National Defence", Journal of Modern History, 61 (2), 1989, pg. 245-246. Sher notes that Smith favoured nonetheless the establishment of "well regulated" standing armies, which he thought superior to the militias favoured by Ferguson. This issue will be discussed further below.
33 Robertson, W., The Progress of Society in Europe [1769], edited by F. Gilbert, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1972, pg. 32 and 56. He noted in this regard the lack of military discipline among the nobility of Europe.
natural state outside "the laws of civil society", which he described as "a scene of violence or meanness". For Ferguson however, social life required a preponderance of productive over destructive passions and a rigorous constraint of the latter. Ferguson described the passions in terms that equated them with the most unruly and "ungovernable feelings", "sentiments of great force... produced on frivolous occasions". The effects of such passions however, could only be "worn off... by degrees" by deploying one passion to offset another. Productive passions Ferguson argued, were those which inclined individuals toward friendship and affection, the pursuit of private wealth as the surest means to the public good, and the advance of civilisation. Whereas uncivilised peoples lived in "lawless confusion" characterised by "mutiny and revenge... murder and desolation... wild disorder and tumult", the civilised condition was characterised by the pursuit of "[w]ealth, commerce, extent of territory, and the knowledge of arts...".

The first step on the ladder of civilisation was the establishment of political power within communities between ruler and ruled which he traced to the prior emergence of property relations. Property relations created social stratification and thereby such societies developed "relations of patron and client, of servant and master". Property was also important because it implied a system of law or "some method of defining possession", and this involved a regime of discipline. In rude or barbarous states equality of possession and power prevailed, and consequently "the titles of magistrate and subject, of noble and mean, are as little known as those of rich and poor", all of which served to reinforce the central point that on the unequal distribution of property "the ground of a permanent and palpable subordination is laid." Just as civilised and

35 Ibid., pg. 12, see also pg. 18.
36 Ferguson, A., Principles of Moral and Political Science [1792], Volume I, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 1975, pg. 143. (Hereafter referred to as Principles)
37 Ibid., pg. 151.
38 Ferguson, A., Essay, pg. 58 and 73.
40 Ferguson, A., Essay, pg. 81. Elsewhere Ferguson suggested that the "primary object of government" consisted in securing the "property of its subjects", protecting "the industrious in reaping the fruits of his labour, in recovering the debts which are justly due to him, and in providing for the fair decision of questions that may arise in the intercourse of trade." Ferguson, Principles, Volume II, pg. 426.
41 Ibid., pg. 82.
42 Ibid., pg. 84, 98.
uncivilised societies could be distinguished, so too could civilised from uncivilised selves (invariably described as masculine). The civilised self was motivated by "considerations of interest" and acted "with a view to futurity" and thereby "restrained" themselves, avoided violence, and applied themselves to "lucrative arts" involving concentration and the patience to "wait... for the distant returns of... labour."\textsuperscript{43} The barbarian by contrast, was still the subject of "great passions", caught between "the prospects of ruin or conquest" unable to accept the dull requirements of commerce and inclined to "sloth", the barbarian nevertheless was "bold, impetuous, artful and rapacious", and in pursuit of a "quarry" would employ irresistible "violence".\textsuperscript{44}

In his later \textit{Principles of Moral and Political Science} Ferguson illustrated his point by suggesting that a barbarian made "suddenly rich" and endowed with all the refinements of civilised society would still "exhibit [all the] effects of gross and ungovernable passion, and a brutality of nature" because he or she had not been subject to the disciplines "of industry, sobriety, and frugality" and the constant "study of justice, sobriety, and good order" that the civilised individual had experienced by participating in commerce.\textsuperscript{45} Control of the passions by self-interest was vital to the advance from barbarity to civilisation, but it was but one source of motivation,

Mankind, in very early ages of society, learn to covet riches, and to admire distinction: they have avarice and ambition, and are occasionally led by them to depredation and conquest: but in their ordinary conduct, these motives are balanced or restrained by other habits and other pursuits; by sloth, or intertemperance; by personal attachments, or personal animosities; which mislead from the attention to interest.\textsuperscript{46}

In order to regulate interest and direct it to a more productive end it must be guided, and an important means of guiding it was through the law which Ferguson suggestively described as the "treaty to which members of the same community have agreed..." to maintain public tranquillity by restraining incursions upon one another's property.\textsuperscript{47}

Echoing Montesquieu, Ferguson also argued that in civilised societies law set "limits...
to the powers of the magistrate” thus identifying civilisation with limited and constitutional rule.\(^{48}\)

As important as law was in Ferguson’s scheme it did not play as important a role as commerce and the disciplines of a market economy. In this context it was not at all surprising that Ferguson identified labour as crucial to the disciplining of the great majority of society, the lower classes,

> The strength of animals, and that of man in particular, depends on his feeding, and the kind of labour to which he is used. Wholesome food, and hard labour, the portion of many in every polished and commercial nation, secure to the public a number of men endued with bodily strength, and inured to hardship and toil.\(^{49}\)

In an unpublished paper on the effects of the advancing division of labour Ferguson argued that the physical and mental disciplines of labour were essential remedies not only to the “envy and rapacity” of the poor but the “arrogance and licentiousness” of the rich.\(^{50}\) Ferguson went on to suggest that labour was a vital means in the development and maintenance of personal independence and self-discipline. In addition to labour however, commerce was identified as an invaluable mechanism with which to discipline and regulate society. Ferguson clearly thought commerce was an agent of civilisation not simply because it resulted in material advances in production, but because it was a mechanism for creating self-disciplined individuals.\(^{51}\) Those who through hard work or good fortune accumulated wealth, would be guided by the desire and the need to keep and add to it. Those who had to work for a living would be guided by the need to labour long and hard. Either way, the conduct of those in society would be governed not so much by state regulation, repression, or supervision, but by the requirements of surviving in a market economy which gave the disciplines a voluntary nature.\(^{52}\)

Ferguson recognised however, that the self-discipline he commended was linked with broader processes of discipline throughout society which paradoxically enhanced the prospect of violence between states as it had reduced it within states. Ferguson’s claim

\(^{48}\) Ibid., pg. 161, see also pg. 205.

\(^{49}\) Ibid., pg. 228.


\(^{52}\) Ferguson, A., Essay, pg. 143.
was that a society based on commerce in which each individual was responsible for managing their own conduct in the pursuit of private gain was the true foundation of mighty states whose power would increase with national prosperity and the revenues it drew in taxation. Ferguson also saw that commerce itself had altered the very nature of warfare making it subservient to financial rather than dynastic interests,

...what mighty armies may be put in motion from behind the counter; how often human blood is, without any national animosity, bought and sold for bills of exchange; and how often the prince, the nobles, and the statesmen, in many a polished nation, might... be considered as merchants.

Ferguson’s point was not simply a repetition of Defoe’s that commerce had provided the financial means for raising and requisitioning larger armies, but that commerce itself had become a kind of warfare between nations competing for access to resources and markets in the scramble for imperial expansion. Indeed Ferguson went further in arguing that the very development of a commercial society had intensified the capacity of the state to make war. The state’s increased capacity to make war was attributed to the division of labour which enabled “the practitioner in every profession...” including that of warfare, to specialise their skills and practice them at an ever higher level of sophistication. While vital to the development of commerce, Ferguson suspected the division of labour also had deleterious effects on the military. He noted in particular that the division of labour had contributed to a greater technical efficiency of modern armies, but argued that it did nothing to improve the character of soldiers or the wisdom of those in command. He was also suspicious of the separation which had occurred between civil and military jurisdictions, and lamented the lack of opportunities this separation afforded for the practice of bold virtues and the development of vigorous character.

Ferguson’s interest in military affairs was not merely academic; he served between 1745 and 1754 in the capacity of regimental chaplain to the 43rd Highland Regiment, the Black Watch, during which time the regiment saw active service in France and fought at

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58 Ferguson, A., “Of Statesman and Warriours” in W. M. Philip (ed.), *op.cit.*, Volume III, pg. 4-22. He concludes the paper by calling for a variety of reforms to the British military, inspired to some extent by his observations of the reform of the French army after the Revolution.
the battle of Fontenoy in 1745. His barely disguised admiration for the ‘modern’ laws of war was premised upon the highly disciplined manner with which the nations of Western Europe were then attempting to “carry the civilities of peace into the practice of war...” enabling them to “mingle... politeness with the use of the sword...”. Elsewhere he argued that warfare was now waged “with little national animosity” and combatants were “almost in the very heat of a contest, ready to listen to the dictates of humanity or reason...”. Echoing Montesquieu’s desire to see this mode of discipline and conduct extended to the rest of society, Ferguson argued that ordered and rule-bound warfare was the hallmark of civilisation,

Glory is more successfully obtained by saving and protecting, than by destroying the vanquished... the employing of force, only for the obtaining of justice, and for the preservation of national rights. This is, perhaps, the principal characteristic, on which, among modern nations, we bestow the epithets of civilised or of polished.

Ferguson may well have personally witnessed the apogee of modern warfare at Fontenoy, where its unrivalled master at the time - Marshall de Saxe of France - defeated the English under the Duke of Cumberland. This style of warfare however, pertained to conflicts between opponents of equal strength, who offered battle in serried ranks and shared a sense of the rules of battle. Neither he nor his regiment were present to witness how easily the rules could be discarded as at the Battle of Culloden in 1746 where the Duke of Cumberland’s victorious men were ordered to put all survivors of the battle, and a good many others in the near vicinity to the sword.

59 Ferguson, A., _Essay_, pg. 198, 199.  
60 Ferguson, A., _Principles_, Volume II, pg. 295.  
62 Hamowy, R. _loc. cit._, pg. 62. Here Hamowy writes: “He [Ferguson] joined the regiment in Flanders and accompanied it at the Battle of Fontenoy.” Kettler however, does not mention Fontenoy in his account of Ferguson’s service, “Ferguson had accordingly just been ordained and promoted to the rank of chaplain of a Highlands regiment of the British Army when Charles Stuart’s return to Scotland touched off the ‘45 Rebellion. He was with them [the Black Watch] for a year or two in Ireland and served in the daisterous expedition to Brittany under general St. Clair...” He applied for release after the signing of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, and resigned his commission when the regiment was ordered to America in 1754. Kettler, D., _The Social and Political Thought of Adam Ferguson_, Ohio State University Press, 1965, pg. 45-47.  
63 Weigley suggests that much of the bloodshed of this latter conflict was owing to the taint of civil war; nonetheless, he writes “...the aftermath of Culloden is yet another indication of of the fragility of the limits upon warlike violence that had grown up since the Thirty Years War... [and] the denouement of the Forty-Five [Jacobite rebellion] blurs the conception of the eighteenth century as an age of limited war.” Weigley, R., _The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Battle From Breitenfeld to Waterloo_, Pimlico, London, 1993, pg. 211.
Ferguson's admiration of modern rules of war however, was balanced with his awareness that the division of labour which separated the function of warfare from that of ordinary life created at the heart of every civilised society a military structure which threatened "usurpation" and "military government". Indeed, these concerns prompted his participation in the public controversy over the desirability of a Scots militia prompted in no small measure by the unexpected success of the Jacobite rising in 1745. Echoing earlier controversies over William III's standing army, Ferguson appealed to the "valour of freemen armed in defence of their country". His position however, was shaped by more than the exigencies of national defence, and derived in large measure from his concern that self-interested commerce and the division of labour - despite their advantages - tended to undermine "public spirit". For Adam Smith however, who shared some of Ferguson's concerns on this matter, the division of labour had simply made professional, standing armies necessary because once the worker left the workhouse for war the "revenue" produced by his labour was lost and he had therefore to "be maintained by the public." Furthermore, modern warfare had become in Smith's view "a very intricate and complicated science", the duration of campaigns had lengthened, and it was necessary that warfare "become the sole or principal occupation of a particular class of citizens", and concluded that the division of labour was "as necessary for the improvement of this, as of every other art."

For Ferguson a citizen's militia was the best means of ensuring the practice of vigorous, martial virtues, introducing the citizen to the disciplines, salutary hardships, obedience,

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64 Ibid., pg. 230.
67 Ferguson, A., Principles, Volume II, pg. 415, 425. In his Reflections Previous to the Establishment of a Militia of 1756 he wrote, "The happy form of our Government; the sacred Authority with which our laws execute themselves; the Perfection to which Arts are arrived; the Extent of our Commerce, and increase of our People; the Degrees of Taste and Literature which we possess; the Probyt and Humanity which prevail in our manners; are circumstances of which a Nation may be allowed to boast of. Such is the height to which every improving Nation aspires... We are, however, to blame for having suffered these halcyon days to lull us so entirely asleep. ...the Attention required to furnish what is demanded in every branch of Business, have led away from the military profession great Numbers of our People... But self-defence is the Business of all: and we have already gone too far, in the opinion that Trade and Manufacture are the only Requisites in our Country. In Pursuit of such an Idea, we labour to acquire Wealth; but neglect the means of defending it; We would turn this Nation into a Company of Manufacturers, which each is confined to a particular branch and sunk into the Habits and Peculiarities of his Trade." Quoted in Kettler, D., op.cit., footnote 11, pg. 100-101.
69 Ibid., pg. 217, 219.
fortitude, and courage of military life. For Smith however, the nature of modern industrial production meant that individual workers simply had no leisure time to devote to militia exercises, and unless “by means of a very rigorous police” such exercises could be enforced on an unwilling populace, the best alternative was the provision of a professional standing army. Smith also argued that the invention of firearms meant that the individual skill of the warrior was no longer as necessary to modern warfare as the discipline of large bodies of troops, and such discipline was better accomplished in standing armies than in militias. For Smith indeed, standing armies were necessary to civilisation itself because without them a civilised nation would lie open to “the invasion of a poor and barbarous neighbour”, while it was only by means of standing armies that “a barbarous country” could by “suddenly and tolerably civilised.”

While Ferguson believed standing armies had increased the capacity for civilised states to wage war, he conceded that at the same time relations within those states had become ever more pacified,

We may, with good reason, congratulate our species on their having escaped from a state of barbarous disorder and violence, into a state of domestic peace and regular policy; when they have sheathed the dagger, and disarmed the animosities of civil contention; when the weapons with which they contend are the reasonings of the wise, and the tongue of the eloquent.

Ferguson was concerned however, that civilisation may degenerate, that polished manners and good government may become corrupted. The prevention of corruption and degeneration was the task of government, and the problem that governments had to resolve was how to maintain alongside the market and its regime of discipline other salutary disciplines (such as that of a vigorous militia). Such disciplines ensured that the state could minimise its intrusion into society, avoiding the spectre of military dictatorship and allowing society to function through the autonomous processes of self-discipline and self-government. Ferguson was concerned that these disciplines should ensure the independent exercise of healthy virtues and prevent dependence upon base

70 Robertson, J., op.cit., pg. 88-90.
72 Ibid., pg. 222.
73 Ibid., pg. 228
74 Ferguson, A., Essay, pg. 225.
76 Ferguson, A., Essay, pg. 225, 228.
appetites and “the maxims of an animal destined to preserve his separate existence... at the expense of his species.”\textsuperscript{77} Such dependence merely encouraged “men [to] become either rapacious, deceitful, and violent, ready to trespass on the rights of others; or servile, mercenary, and base, prepared to relinquish their own.”\textsuperscript{78} It was the task of good government and wise policy to maintain forms of discipline such as the militia system, which would encourage all, “to act on maxims of probity... give a general appearance of integrity, and of innocence”, promote social harmony and “confidence”, and uphold the rule of law.\textsuperscript{79} Echoing Montesquieu, Ferguson argued that an uncivilised society was one in which no such pacific relations and institutions held and the state relied on terror and fear,

...where the manners of a people are considerably changed for the worse, every subject must stand on his guard, and government itself must act on suitable maxims of fear and distrust. The individual... must be taught, by external force, and from motives of fear, to counterfeit those effects of innocence, and of duty, to which he is not disposed: he must be referred to the whip, or the gibbet... on a supposition that he is insensible to the motives which recommend the practice of virtue.\textsuperscript{80}

The description we are provided with here was of a society in which the disciplines which should govern conduct no longer had any effect, resulting not only in violence but tyranny. “The rules of despotism...” Ferguson warned “are made for the government of corrupted men”, and corruption meant not merely the loss of virtue but the loss of discipline.\textsuperscript{81}

Hill has pointed out that Ferguson’s theory of civilisation although premised on the upward progress of humanity, nonetheless admitted the possibility of corruption and decay.\textsuperscript{82} The possibility of corruption however, was somewhat at odds with the overwhelmingly optimistic view he took of the prospects for civilisation. The possibility of decay and corruption though real enough were - like troubling clouds on the horizon - far enough distant for evasive measures to be taken. The advance from rudeness and barbarity to polished civilisation was an achievement which he believed had bestowed upon humanity (and especially those in the Western part of Europe) the

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., pg. 238-239.  
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., pg. 239. It is worth noting here Ferguson’s ambivalence in relation to the question of luxury; ibid., pg. 248. 
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., pg. 240.  
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{82} Hill, L., “The Paradox of Progress and Decline”, pg. 681-3.
benefits of material wealth, settled and humane laws, intellectual accomplishment, and the elimination of violence from the sphere of civil society. The civilised individual was the beneficiary of these accomplishments and the careful manners, refined sensibilities, and polished mores characterising the conduct of such individuals were the outcome of the pacifying disciplines which drove the advance of civilisation. Although Ferguson’s image of civilisation was clouded by the problem of violence in relations between states, he accepted as axiomatic that peace was forged and its benefits enjoyed within the confines of civil society. It was precisely this fundamental assumption however, that Ferguson’s near contemporary, Jean-Jacques Rousseau challenged.

II. BARBARISM AND CIVILISATION: JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU

Rousseau’s intellectual reputation was won largely on the basis of his early essay A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality published in 1755, which established him as one the most incisive and eloquent critics of the Enlightenment. The Discourse was in fact a thoroughgoing critique of the guiding assumptions of the faith in progress and civilisation, and among these assumptions Rousseau subjected the notion of civilisation as a process of pacification to vigorous attack. As Grace Roosevelt has suggested however, the Discourse was written during a period in which Rousseau was preoccupied with the question of the relationship between civil society and war.83 The fruits of this preoccupation consisted largely in sketches and notes which, though often fruitful were more suggestive than systematic. Rousseau’s most celebrated piece on the subject was published in 1760 under the title A Project of Perpetual Peace. It was occasioned by his engagement as editor of the voluminous and largely unpublished manuscripts of the Abbe de Saint-Pierre. The Abbe’s prose proved an unsympathetic medium on which to work, and the resulting short volume consisted of an abridgment of the Abbe’s Project to which Rousseau appended his own substantial critique entitled Judgement on Perpetual Peace.

Saint-Pierre’s concern was that the “embarrassments and hinderances” to human happiness arose less from the “internal constitution” of states than from their “foreign relations”, and that while “we are each of us in the civil state with our fellow citizens”,

our governments and states were yet in a “state of nature” with one another.\textsuperscript{84} What was meant by this was that states existed in a perpetual readiness for war in which peace was merely the result of “passing truces rather than true peace”.\textsuperscript{85} War, the Abbe argued, was wasteful of a state’s resources in population and wealth and even in victory a state suffered,

...much graver and more irreparable loss than that of the men who die, by reason of those men who will never be born, by the increase of taxation, by the interruption of commerce, by deserted countrysides and abandoned agriculture. This evil, unperceived at first, makes itself cruelly felt later on, and it is then that a country is astonished to find itself so weak as the result of having made itself so powerful.\textsuperscript{86}

The true power of states was to be measured not by their ability to triumph in war, but in the health and wealth of its population. With the certainty of a universal law the Abbe stipulated,

...men alone make the strength of kings... [and it is] by good laws, by a wise policy, by broad economic views that a judicious sovereign is sure of adding to his strength... The real conquests he makes over his neighbours are the public improvements he institutes in his domains, and all the additional subjects born to him are worth so many more enemies slain.\textsuperscript{87}

The Abbe’s solution to the problem of war was the institution of a global federation of states which possessed coercive powers to resolve disputes and compel member states to behave pacifically.\textsuperscript{88} By this means it was argued, the disadvantages of war would be replaced by the advantages of increased savings and lower taxes enabling rulers to “encourage commerce, agriculture and the Arts” to “further increase the wealth” of the population.\textsuperscript{89}

Rousseau’s reply to the Abbe’s Project, the Judgement on Perpetual Peace consisted in the main of a rebuttal of the Abbe’s contention that peace could be achieved by a European federation of states. The rulers of European states Rousseau observed, obeyed two primary objectives “to extend their rule abroad or to make it more absolute at home”, neither of which were conducive to perpetual peace.\textsuperscript{90} The very sovereignty of

\textsuperscript{84} Abbe de Saint-Pierre, A Project of Perpetual Peace [1760], translated by E. Nuttall, Richard Cobden-Sanderson, London, 1927, pg. 5-7.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., pg. 21.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., pg. 71.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., pg. 71-73.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., pg. 7, see also 45-49.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., pg. 79-81.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., pg. 103.
states the Abbe thought compatible with an international federation, would prevent any state’s ruler deferring to the decision of another authority.⁹¹ As writers such as Holsti and Chanteur have suggested, Rousseau’s arguments were based on the realist’s conviction that the determining interest of states consisted in the maintenance of their own sovereignty, and that the creation of a federation would require the voluntary infringement of that interest.⁹² Ultimately however, Rousseau’s objections were shaped by his conviction that violence and warfare were endemic not only to a world of sovereign states, but to modern civilisation itself and the civil societies created by it. Rousseau’s arguments in this respect had been shaped prior to his engagement with the Abbe’s Project and can be traced in the Discourse on Inequality and his subsequent unfinished manuscript known as “The State of War”.⁹³

For Rousseau, as with his near contemporaries Smith and Ferguson, human motivation could be traced to the passions, but unlike them he contended that the passions were neither good nor evil in themselves. Rather, the passionate nature of human beings merely provided a wellspring for the attainment of satisfaction, and in the simplest condition of existence - the state of nature - humans were motivated by the simplest passions (for such things as food, sleep, shelter, and sex) and these were “so readily supplied” that no-one thought to want more.⁹⁴ Only in the more advanced state of civilisation were human wants and desires multiplied. Human beings in the state of nature would not be inclined to violence because their simple wants would be easily satisfied. Life in civil society however, involved continual conflict with others in the incessant desire to satisfy ceaseless manufactured wants.

According to Rousseau, during the civilising process the purely natural love of self was transformed into “amour-propre” or the desire to place ourselves above and before others.⁹⁵ Amour-propre was therefore directly opposed to the compassion which

⁹¹ Ibid., pg. 105.
⁹³ Roosevelt, op. cit., pg. 92. Roosevelt points out that Rousseau was engaged to work on the Abbe’s material in 1754, immediately following the completion of The Discourse on... Inequality.
⁹⁵ Ibid., pg. 73.
Rousseau believed natural to selves in the state of nature.\textsuperscript{96} Natural selves, although concerned above all to preserve themselves nonetheless felt a direct connection to others. Arguing in similar vein to Mandeville, Rousseau contended that in civilised society humans were taught to pride themselves on their self-control, their elegance, education, or manners, and therefore to see themselves as superior to others. The institution of laws, purportedly created to control the “violent passions” of human beings, merely internalised those passions which instead of being released became pent-up sources of frustration and tension.\textsuperscript{97} Consequently, the over-blown self estimation of \textit{amour-propre} lead to inevitable conflict as a natural love of self was replaced by an artificial pride and arrogant selfishness.\textsuperscript{98} The desire for recognition from others to sustain one’s own self-estimation was therefore unlikely to be received because every other person desired the same recognition, 

Thus, as every man punished the contempt shown him by others, in proportion to his opinion of himself, revenge became terrible, and men bloody and cruel. ...nothing is more gentle than man in his primitive state, as he is placed at an equal distance from the stupidity of brutes, and the fatal ingenuity of civilised man.\textsuperscript{99}

Among the most destructive of the contrivances of civilisation was the acquisition of wealth which required the possessor to protect that wealth by force. As Rousseau put it in his unfinished manuscript “The State of War”, “...surplus awakens greed: The more one accumulates, the more one desires.”\textsuperscript{100} This greed created a domestic state of war requiring the formation of states armed to protect the property of the rich from threats within and without their borders.\textsuperscript{101} Such states Rousseau argued, confronted each other as threatening rivals and soon gave rise to an international state of war and ceaseless slaughter committed under the banners of duty and honour.

\textsuperscript{96} Cooper, L.D., “Rousseau on Self-Love: What We’ve Learned, What we Might Have Learned”, The Review of Politics, 60 (4), 1998, pg. 661-683. Cooper suggests that there was more complexity to Rousseau’s notion of \textit{amour-propre} than I have indicated, arguing that at times it provided beneficial qualities. Nonetheless, it remains the case that \textit{amour-propre} was generated by life in civil society and usually manifested itself in destructive ways.

\textsuperscript{97} Rousseau, J.-J., Discourse, pg. 77-80, 120-121.


\textsuperscript{99} \textit{Ibid.}, pg. 90-91.

\textsuperscript{100} Rousseau, J.-J., “The State of War” in G. Roosevelt, \textit{op.cit.}, pg. 187.

\textsuperscript{101} Rousseau, \textit{Discourse}, pg. 97-98.
For Rousseau the civilising process was one of intensifying violence, and civil societies were the crucibles in which this violence occurred.\textsuperscript{102} Only in civilised societies were human beings subjected to the requirements of laws and compulsions of states, driven by their own desire to aggrandise themselves at the expense of other states. Like \textit{amour-propre}, the desire of states to aggrandise themselves was a consequence of their artificiality separating them from the simple and easily satisfied wants of human beings in the state of nature. The violence that resulted from self- and state-aggrandisement was a consequence of the artificiality produced by the conventions of civilisation under the rubric of self-control, reason, law, civil society, and the state. In “The State of War” Rousseau appeared to suggest that the solution to this problem required the dissolution of civil society allowing a return of more peaceful natural instincts.\textsuperscript{103} In the \textit{Discourse} however, Rousseau was more circumspect and recognised the irreversibility of civilisation, restricting himself to a strategy of obedience to the laws and continual exertion to reduce the incidence of violence.\textsuperscript{104} Michael Howard suggests that Rousseau himself was well aware that this position did “not bear close examination”, but Rousseau’s thought was nonetheless to influence Immanuel Kant and his theory of perpetual peace - which sought to preserve a commitment to civilisation with Rousseau’s emphasis on personal independence.\textsuperscript{105}

Kant had scarce any more faith in the practicability of the Abbe de Saint-Pierre’s proposal of a world federation than did Rousseau, though he did concede that the idea of a ‘pacific union’ among European states was possible.\textsuperscript{106} This concession is belies a partial continuity between Saint-Pierre and Kant on the identification of Europe as the crucible of peace. Once incorporated into a theory of progress or civilisation the argument that Europe (or at least one or another of the European nations) was an agent

\textsuperscript{102} Rousseau, J.-J., “The State of War”, in G. Roosevelt, \textit{op. cit.}, pg. 189.
\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Ibid}, pg. 197.
\textsuperscript{104} Rousseau, J.-J., \textit{Discourse}, pg. 125-126.
\textsuperscript{106} In making explicit reference to the Abbe’s arguments, Kant both doubts the practicability of his proposals in \textit{Theory and Practice}, but concedes the possibility of perpetual peace in his \textit{Universal History}. See the relevant passages in \textit{Kant’s Political Writings}, H. Reiss (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, pg. 92 and 47-48 respectively.
of global civilisation became a recurrent feature of Western liberal thought. According to Saint-Pierre, a pacific federation of European nations would consign violence to its boundaries and its dealings with the less advanced and decidedly less peaceful "...Turks, ...Corsairs of Africa, ...[and] Tartars."\(^{107}\) Europeans would have to travel "to the frontier to learn about war; peace would reign in the heart of Europe"\(^{108}\) Though critical of the notion of a coercive federation of European states, Kant accepted the idea that in Europe a process was at work which promised not only to end war and violence, but to do so in a far more thorough and effective way than by relying upon the auspices of an international federation. What Kant saw at work in European states was a process of 'enlightenment', of gradual pacification and discipline which was premised on the mutual antagonism consequent upon self-interest. Ferguson's ambivalence toward and Rousseau's castigation of self-interest were matched by Kant's transformation of it into the vehicle for autonomy and peace.

**III. MUTUAL ANTAGONISM AND AUTONOMY**

Toward the end of the eighteenth century Kant suggested in his now famous essay "*An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?*" that although he did not live in an "enlightened" age it was nonetheless an age of "enlightenment".\(^{109}\) Although he did not speak as his Scots contemporaries Ferguson and Robertson did of 'civilisation', what Kant meant by 'enlightenment' was in some ways very similar. What Kant detected at work in his age was a grand historical movement toward the betterment of the human condition, toward the liberation of individuals from dependence and the creation of a society of autonomous selves. It was he said, an age in which the maturity of individuals was being encouraged, leading toward an era not only of greater liberty but of greater peace as well. The 'mature' person was in effect an autonomous agent, one who was capable of shaping their conduct in accord with universal \textit{a priori} principles without regard to their temporal and physical situation.\(^{110}\) As Kant put it,

Autonomy of the will is that property of it by which it is a law to itself independently of any property of objects of volition. Hence the principle

\(^{107}\) Abbe de Saint-Pierre, \textit{op. cit.}, pg. 81.
\(^{108}\) Ibid., pg. 85.
\(^{109}\) Kant, I., *An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'* [1784], in H. Reiss (ed), \textit{Kant's Political Writings}, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, pg. 58. (Hereafter referred to as \textit{Enlightenment}).
\(^{110}\) Ibid., pg. 135-136.
of autonomy is: Never choose except in such a way that the maxims of the choice are comprehended in the same volition as a universal law.\textsuperscript{111} The categorical imperative of the autonomous individual was that they had a supreme duty to act from and in accord with self-imposed, rationally derived maxims of universal law.\textsuperscript{112} Autonomy was therefore the key to moral conduct and freedom, for by being capable of moral action human beings demonstrated not simply their independence from nature, but their capacity to direct themselves rationally.

The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duties conforming to them; heteronomy of choice, on the other hand, not only does not establish any obligation but is opposed to the principle of duty and to the morality of the will. The sole principle of morality consists in independence from all material of the law (i.e. a desired object) and in the accompanying determination of choice by the mere universal legislating form which a maxim must be capable of having. That independence, however, is freedom in the negative sense, while this intrinsic legislation... is freedom in the positive sense.\textsuperscript{113}

It was precisely this sort of freedom, the freedom of the autonomous self, that Kant thought was gradually beginning to emerge when he wrote in \textit{What is Enlightenment?} that "...the obstacles to universal enlightenment, to man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity, are gradually becoming fewer."\textsuperscript{114} In this and other essays Kant attempted to place his conception of autonomy within a broader theory of progress or civilisation which made the realisation of autonomy possible.

According to Kant human “progress” could be charted from a state of “...barbarism...” toward “enlightenment” and “maturity”.\textsuperscript{115} Such progress required the emergence from ‘self-incurred immaturity’ which Kant attributed to a singular “lack of resolution and courage” to use one’s own understanding without guidance from others.\textsuperscript{116} Enlightenment involved the willingness to “make public use of one’s reason” but this ‘public use’ had some important restrictions.\textsuperscript{117} What Kant did not mean was that individuals should feel free to decide when and if they would obey the laws, but could merely engage in informed debate about the \textit{legitimacy} of such laws. As he put it,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., pg. 63.
\item\textsuperscript{113} Kant, I., \textit{Critique of Practical Reason}, translated and edited by L. W. Beck, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1949, pg. 144.
\item\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., \textit{loc.cit.}, pg. 58.
\item\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., pg. 57 and 59.
\item\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., pg. 54.
\item\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., pg. 55.
\end{enumerate}
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The citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes imposed upon him; presumptuous criticisms of such taxes, where someone is called upon to pay them, may be punished as an outrage which could lead to general insubordination. Nonetheless, the same citizen does not contravene his civil obligations if, as a learned individual, he publicly voices his thoughts on the impropriety or even injustice of such fiscal measures.\textsuperscript{118} The maturity of which he spoke then, was limited to public discussion between educated persons who were each capable of the independent use of reason. In other words, maturity and autonomy were compatible with obedience to the authoritarian rule of Frederick II. Only a strong ruler such as Frederick Kant argued, who possessed “a well-disciplined and numerous army to guarantee public security” could provide the conditions within which enlightenment may proceed, because restrictions “of civil freedom” gave “intellectual freedom enough room to expand to its fullest extent.”\textsuperscript{119} In this way Kant attempted to reconcile the apparent contradiction between the imperative of autonomous selves to act in accord with universal laws derived from independent thought, with the stricture to obey the laws of sovereign authority. In effect, Kant argued that the realisation of autonomy required the external discipline of laws and political authority, and as a characteristic of the inner, intellectual life of individuals autonomy was considered entirely compatible with political obedience. Kant explored this compatibility in his \textit{Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Purpose} in which he argued that a society of autonomous selves would be a law-abiding and peaceful society in which each individual would be radically self-determining \textit{within the law}. He clearly saw this lawful self-government as the crowning glory of individual progress from “the uttermost barbarism to the highest degree of skill, to inner perfection”.\textsuperscript{120}

Civilisation however, was not a purely individual quality but a collective endeavour, and Kant was aware that the individual capacity for reason required “practice and instruction” which could only be achieved within society.\textsuperscript{121} The society of which he wrote however, did not threaten to overwhelm the individual’s autonomous reason, but rather forced its development. Kant attributed this to humanity’s “unsocial sociability” similar in some ways to Rousseau’s \textit{amour-propre}, a desire to live among others but

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., pg. 56.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., pg. 59.
\textsuperscript{120} Kant, I., \textit{Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Purpose} [1784], in H. Reiss (ed.), \textit{op.cit.}, pg. 43. (Hereafter referred to as \textit{Universal History}).
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., pg. 42 and 44. Italics in original.
also to want control over one’s own destiny coupled with the fear that the proximity of others threatened that control.122 Kant’s debt to Rousseau was that like him Kant argued that life among those one “cannot bear, yet cannot bear to leave” was the necessary precondition for progress “from barbarism to culture...”, and that without “asocial qualities”,

...man would live an Arcadian, pastoral existence of perfect concord, self-sufficiency and mutual love. But all human talents would remain hidden forever in a dormant state, and men... would scarcely render their existence more valuable than that of their animals. ... Nature should thus be thanked for fostering social incompatibility, enviously competitive vanity, and insatiable desires for possession or even power. Without these desires, all man’s excellent natural capacities would never be roused to develop.123

While Kant and Rousseau held very similar views of the effects that the disciplines of civilisation had, they diverged sharply in their estimations of the value of those effects. The end toward which Kant felt ceaseless competition headed was a “civil society” in which the ceaseless competition between individuals prevented “idleness” and stimulated the invention of the means to alleviate “labour and hardships”.124 Within civil society the individual was forced by the fact of mutual antagonism and competition to “discipline itself”, to refine the skills and qualities of ‘civilised’ beings and live peaceably together under the auspices of law.125

Kant’s notion of progress was closely associated with the elimination of violence from the sphere of human interaction, and hence conceived peace as a condition secured at first within civil societies. The “irresistible veto” revealed by reason was that “[t]here shall be no war, either between individual human beings... or between separate states... For the condition of peace is the only state in which the property of a large number of people living together... can be guaranteed by laws.”126 Voicing similar sentiments to those expressed by Ferguson, Kant argued that civilised peoples were distinguished by the peaceful manner in which they resolved disputes, while savages and barbarians merely resorted to violence.127 In the state of nature he argued, individuals engaged in “incessant strife” to protect their “lawless freedom”, and such a condition he described

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122 Ibid., pg. 44. Italics in original.
123 Ibid., pg. 44-45. Italics in original.
124 Ibid., pg. 45.
125 Ibid., pg. 46.
126 Kant, I., *The Metaphysics of Morals* [1797], in H. Reiss (ed.), *op.cit.*, pg. 174. Italics in original. (Hereafter referred to as *Metaphysics*).
as "barbarism, coarseness, and brutish debasement of humanity."128 Consequently, the elimination of violence and particularly warfare, was one of the central virtues of civilisation. Indeed Kant referred to the "aim" and "duty" of human beings to submit "to those conditions by which war, the source of all evils and moral corruption, could be prevented. ...[allowing] the human race... [to] progressively improve...".129 The imperative to avoid violence lay behind Kant's arguments against rebellion. In resisting authority, the laws of civil society dissolved and citizens were thrown back into a "state of complete lawlessness (status naturalis) where all rights cease...".130

The certainty and security that Kant believed were ensured by discipline and law meant that individuals "should at all costs enter into a state of civil society."131 Within civil society, each individual would be protected from attack and laws would guarantee that each person's freedom would harmonise with that of all other citizens.132 For this to occur Kant argued, civil society must reflect the a priori principles of political right, and by this he signalled some of the defining characteristics of modern liberalism, namely, that individual freedom and property should be protected by the law, alongside formal legal equality for each citizen, accompanied by personal autonomy or self-determination.133 Echoing Montesquieu, Kant suggested that the form of state best suited to the realisation of these principles was 'republican', by which he meant a disciplined, 'liberal' polity founded on the idea of contract embodied in a framework of constitutional and civil laws ensuring equal rights and some form of popular consent.134 The civil societies which were able to emerge in such polities were conceived as communities of mutually interdependent people who were also mutually independent. Such selves interacted with one another to be sure, received instruction and discipline, but their actions were not allowed to infringe upon another's independence and autonomy. In Kant's civil society the mutual awareness of hostility drove each individual to autonomy, but also ensured peace through a kind of mutual stand-off

127 Ibid., pg. 171.
128 Kant, I., Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch [1795], in H. Reiss (ed.), op.cit., pg. 102-103. (Hereafter referred to as Perpetual Peace).
129 Kant, I., The Contest of Faculties [1798], in H. Reiss (ed.), op.cit., pg. 182-3. (Hereafter referred to as Contest).
130 Kant, I., On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, But it Does Not Apply in Practice' [1792], in H. Reiss (ed.), op.cit., pg. 82. (Hereafter referred to as Theory and Practice).
131 Ibid., pg. 137.
132 Ibid., pg. 73.
133 Ibid., pg. 74-79, see also Metaphysics, pg. 139.
134 Kant, I., Perpetual Peace, pg. 99-100.
embodied in the laws and rights of a republican constitution. Instead of conceiving it as a community, Kant’s civil society should properly be conceived as a kind of framework within which individual human beings were ensured the maximum possible independence compatible with that of others. Within this framework of interactions individual citizens were guaranteed a set of freedoms and rights by law which buttressed the autonomy of each individual.

As the principles of civil society were a priori principles, their validity was guaranteed by reason alone. Civil society therefore reflected the principles of right rather than the fickle dictates of human emotion or sentiment. Kant was quite clear that life in civil society was one of continual exertion, effort, and trial, and would create less happiness than the state of nature or even a benign “despotic” state. Indeed for a constitution to be based on the promotion of human happiness was a recipe for violence for happiness could never be constantly ensured or evenly shared, unlike the solid principles of right. Life in civil society therefore required that each citizen submit themselves to political authority, renounce their pre-civil freedoms in favour of firm discipline, and a mature obedience to an authority upholding the principles of right through the enaction and enforcement of laws. In this context and with specific reference to the private property rights which were essential to civil society, Kant referred to the need for a “police force” to oversee public security and especially propriety, requiring the suppression of “begging, uproar in the streets, offensive smells and public prostitution.”

CONCLUSION
Kant’s endorsement of a system of ‘police’ should be read in conjunction with Adam Smith’s own earlier endorsement. Each conceived the role of police as a useful supplement to the growing independence and self-governance of citizens. The system of police of which they spoke was not an overarching entity responsible for managing the conduct of the population, but was a pervasive system of discipline aimed at making the social environment more conducive to the pursuit of self-government by removing obstacles, suppressing rowdiness, and enforcing standards of cleanliness and hygiene.

135 Kant, I., Metaphysics, pg. 142-143.
136 Kant, I., Theory and Practice, pg. 80-83.
What took precedence in the work of Smith, Ferguson, and Kant (and even to some extent Rousseau as well) was not a system of police but the disciplines of civilisation by which individuals were enabled to control their emotions and passions and thereby govern themselves rationally. Civilisation was thus conceived as a process by which peace was to be secured by the disciplining of individuals to become rationally self-governing citizens, capable of controlling their emotional reactions, meeting the expectations of others, fulfilling obligations, and participating in the production of wealth. Rousseau forcefully challenged this view by arguing that the independence fostered by civilisation would actually lead to mutual antagonism rather than concord. Rousseau was far from alone in arguing that the civilising process had lead to an enhancement rather than a reduction of violence. Ferguson also acknowledged that the domestic disciplines of civilisation made states stronger and increased the potential for violence between them. Kant’s resolution of this dilemma turned Rousseau’s arguments in upon themselves and bestowed on the mutual antagonism of citizens and states the mantle of peace.

Rousseau had been an avowed critic of the effects of civilisation on the character of individuals, and had compared the placid interactions of ‘savages’ to the mutual antagonism, distrust, and violence of citizens. Ferguson held an altogether more ambivalent position, concerned on the one hand with the predominance in civilised societies of self-interest, but inclined on the other to see its merits. Kant however, argued that the very mutual antagonism that Rousseau had denounced and had worried Ferguson, drove the civilising process. It was the ‘unsocial sociability’ of human beings, which, in Kant’s view encouraged the development of personal autonomy, and thereby pointed ultimately to the triumph of domestic peace between citizens in civil society. As Ferguson and Kant realised however, the commercial relations so vital to the civilising process pacified internal relations \textit{within} states, as it intensified the capacity for violence in relations \textit{between} states. The following chapter will turn to the treatment of this issue in late eighteenth and nineteenth century liberalism in which warfare was conceived as ‘external’ to the life of civil societies by associating it with the uncivilised world of barbarians who lived in iniquitous savagery on the fringes of the civilised world, or with rogue states that defied the peace between civilised states.

\textsuperscript{137} Kant, I., \textit{Metaphysics}, pg. 149. One should note that Kant was willing to countenance violence in defence of one’s property, see pg. 167-168.
In the process, liberal thinkers claimed that while violence had been ‘purged’ from civil society, the commercial relations which had purged it had also made liberal states powerful. In this way, the use of violence ‘outside’ civil society against the uncivilised could be tolerated because this violence ensured the triumph of civilisation and peace.
CHAPTER 8

TRADING BLOWS:

COMMERCE, WAR, AND LIBERAL IMPERIALISM

The colony of a civilised nation which takes possession either of a waste country, or of one so thinly inhabited, that the natives easily give place to the new settlers, advances more rapidly to wealth and greatness than any other human society.


Imperialism... is atavistic in character. It falls into that large group of surviving features from earlier ages... It is an atavism in the social structure, in individual, psychological habits of emotional reaction. Since the vital needs that created it have passed away for good, it too must gradually disappear... because of the progressive rationalisation of life and mind, a process in which old functional needs are absorbed by new tasks, in which heretofore military energies are functionally modified. ...A purely capitalist world therefore can offer no fertile soil to imperialist impulses. ...Hence we must expect that anti-imperialist tendencies will show themselves wherever capitalism penetrates the economy and, through the economy, the mind of modern nations - most strongly, of course, where capitalism itself is strongest, where it has advanced furthest, encountered the least resistance, and preeminently where its types and hence democracy - in the “bourgeois” sense - come closest to political dominion.

It has been argued in this thesis that the theory of civilisation has occupied an important, though often unrecognised place in liberal political thought. Civilisation was conceived as a process of pacification, of the elimination of violence from the sphere of human relations. Joseph Schumpeter's contrast between the war-like atavism of imperialism and the rationality and peacefulness of capitalism and democracy is a singular expression of this notion of civilisation. In this chapter however, it will be argued that Schumpeter's claim that imperialism was opposed to the spirit of capitalism and liberal-democracy cannot account for the succession of liberals who grappled with the issue, and for those liberals such as Adam Smith who actually supported imperial expansion in the name civilisation. This chapter will be concerned with the impact of the discourse of civilisation on liberal approaches to the question of war and imperialism. Despite renewed interest in liberalism as a rationality of government, the theory of civilisation and the processes of pacification liberal thinkers considered to be at work in advanced societies have remained largely unacknowledged in the recent literature. Foucault has argued that early liberal thinkers were actively engaged in the task of trying to re-think the nature of society and reconceive its relationship to the state in such a way that individuals themselves could be entrusted with responsibility for disciplining their own conduct. A crucial part of this task which is only addressed obliquely in Foucauldian literature were the efforts made by a variety of liberal thinkers to argue not only that such self-discipline was possible, but that it was also effective in preventing the incessant violence that characterised early-modern Europe. It is precisely here that the liberal discourse of civilisation played such an important role.

It was argued in the previous chapter that the discourse of civilisation, conceived as a process of pacification through the inculcation of self-discipline, was linked with the rise of strong states. As Hindess has suggested, liberal discourse promoted the self-government of individuals because a self-governing society came to be seen as the most secure foundation of state power. The liberal opposition to war was not necessarily based on the view that war was evil in itself - though this argument was at times used - but because war was counter-productive. Warfare was deemed costly and expensive in

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material and human terms, and was therefore wasteful of the state’s most precious resources, wealth and a healthy population. The concern of liberal literature therefore was that states forge a perpetual peace among civilised nations on the basis of a shared pursuit of the advantages of free trade. The liberal discourse of civilisation, which linked the creation of productive societies of independent selves at home with the maintenance of productive and peaceful relations between independent states abroad, reflected the concern to promote the conditions most conducive not simply to peace but to domestic and world trade.

This chapter will explore liberal attitudes to warfare between states by tracing them to the development of the discourse of civilisation. While it will be argued that not all liberals maintained the same opposition to war, there developed a kind of ‘liberal orthodoxy’ based on the view that the interests of world trade and commerce stood opposed to the interests of war. The persistence of warfare was therefore traced to those uncivilised nations yet to appreciate the advantages of commerce, and it was against these peoples, nations, and states that civilised, liberal states could legitimately wage war in the interests of advancing civilisation. The sources of this argument can be traced in part to Montesquieu’s opposition between the discipline and peace of ‘republican’ states on the one hand, and the unrestrained violence of ‘despotic’ and ‘monarchic’ states on the other. In large part however, the liberal orthodoxy was shaped by a Kantian teleology in which liberal ‘republican’ states were destined to triumph over other states not because of any inherent moral superiority, but because they would be able to marshal superior financial and military strength. In effect, the triumph of civilisation was identified with the creation of an externally pacified federation of internally pacified civilised states based on commerce and free trade.

It will be argued in the first section of this chapter that for Immanuel Kant, the achievement of a global peace between civilised states would be driven by the very same antagonism which, as was shown in the previous chapter, had lead to the creation of internal peace within states. Nonetheless, while liberal thinkers envisaged a peace between civilised states, they were often prepared to accept the use of violence against the uncivilised to create and sustain that peace. The achievement of peace and the global advance of civilisation therefore incorporated an exclusion of violence from dealings between civilised states. In the second section this exclusion of violence will
be traced in the work of a selection of liberals who each attributed the persistence of violence to uncivilised peoples and states. The major implication of this exclusion was that liberals accepted a division between the civilised and the uncivilised, which lead to an acceptance of violence in the service of a liberal imperial civilisation. The third section of the chapter will explore the fatal consequences of the exclusion of violence in the work of John Stuart Mill who defined civilisation as a process of pacification through self-government which nonetheless required the use of violence against those who were neither 'peaceful' nor 'civilised'.

I. KANT'S PACIFIC FEDERATION

In the previous chapter it was argued that the very mutual antagonism which Rousseau had felt was heightened by the civilising process had been identified by Kant as the engine of peace. Far from seeing the self-interest of citizens as opposed to the pursuit of right, he attempted to demonstrate that civilised self-interest would be fully compatible with it and could be peacefully balanced within the framework of civil society. In this section discussion will focus on Kant’s parallel argument that the mutually antagonistic relations between states in the international state of nature would thrust the civilising process onto the global stage as individual states realised that warfare was contrary to their interests. The thrust of his argument once again rested on the notion of progress or civilisation, or in Kant’s terminology ‘enlightenment’ which “must gradually spread upwards towards the thrones and even influence... principles of government.”

The spread of enlightenment was inexorable; merely obstructed by the “vain and violent schemes” of states which could never prevent “the slow and laborious efforts of their citizens to cultivate their minds”. As enlightenment spread, warfare would increasingly be seen as injurious to “all trades and industries, and especially to commerce” and it was mainly on this argument that Kant’s opposition to war rested. Warfare was a costly activity in which “interminable” repayments to a “constantly increasing national debt” would so affect the whole society (“so closely linked by trade” to other societies) that every civilised state would sooner or later come to see that it had an interest in promoting peace thereby avoiding the constant expenditure on standing armies,

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2 Kant, I., Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Purpose [1784], in H. Reiss (ed.), Kant's Political Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, pg. 51. (Hereafter referred to as Universal History)

3 Ibid., pg. 49.

4 Ibid., pg. 50.
armaments and supplies, and diminishing the hard won savings of peace.\textsuperscript{5} Reflecting Montesquieu’s conception of commerce as an essentially peaceful activity, Kant suggested that the “spirit of commerce... [could] not exist side by side with war” and that states must realise that their own “financial power” depended upon preventing war.\textsuperscript{6}

In the international sphere individual states occupied a similar position to individual human beings in the state of nature.\textsuperscript{7} Just as the “universal violence and ...distress” of the state of nature inclined human beings to enter civil society where the principles of right could be enforced, so “the distress produced by the constant wars in which states try to subjugate or engulf each other” would promote a transnational union “under a commonly accepted international right.”\textsuperscript{8} In effect Kant argued that individual states would create an ‘international civil society’ and that the transition from a state of war to a state of peace at the international level was directly analogous to the transition from a state of nature to civil society at the individual level.\textsuperscript{9} States in other words, would be compelled through brute necessity and naked self-interest to “make exactly the same decision... as that which man was forced to make, equally unwillingly, in his savage state - the decision to renounce his brutish freedom and seek calm and security within a law-governed constitution”.\textsuperscript{10} But Kant’s argument was not simply that states and their rulers would be motivated by the idea of peace, but that the process of competition between them was weighted in favour of the triumph of civilised over uncivilised states. This teleological argument rested on the assumption that individuals were driven to form states for protection and would unite by a curious process of mutual antagonism, to form civil societies characterised by commerce and domestic peace. Conflict between states however, was unrestrained and only strong states were capable of survival. Of all the sources of state power Kant referred to “financial power” as the most reliable, hence commercial states were most likely to survive international conflict and competition.

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., pg. 51; and Kant, I., On the Common Saying: ‘This may be True in Theory, But it Does Not Apply in Practice [1792], in H. Reiss (ed.), op cit., pg. 90. (Hereafter referred to as Theory and Practice).
\textsuperscript{6} Kant, I., Perpetual Peace: a Philosophical Sketch [1795], in H. Reiss (ed.), op cit., pg. 114. He also concluded that even wars of colonial conquest, supposedly in the interest of trade, have failed to deliver material rewards; ibid., pg. 106-107. (Hereafter referred to as Perpetual Peace).
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., pg. 103.
\textsuperscript{8} Kant, I., Theory and Practice, pg. 90. Italics in original.
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., pg. 92.
\textsuperscript{10} Kant, I., Universal History, pg. 48.
and it was these states, linked by a mutual self-interest in trade that were inclined to peace.11

Kant's near contemporary Adam Smith similarly argued that the division of labour had made modern warfare a much more expensive activity than it had previously been owing to the fact that modern standing armies had to be clothed, armed, fed, and paid at public expense. This situation tipped the balance in favour of those civilised nations with market economies, not simply because of their greater wealth, but their greater capability to invest that wealth in modern military technology. As Smith put it, "the great expence of fire-arms gives an evident advantage to the nation which can best afford that expence; and consequently, to an opulent and civilized, over a poor and barbarous nation."12 Kant however, took an overtly teleological view that the goal toward which history was inexorably moving was a global peace embodied in an international civil society, a kind of framework within which the individual liberty of its members (in this case states) was preserved. Kant explicitly rejected the idea of a world government or "cosmopolitan constitution" because he thought it "the most fearful despotism".13 An international civil society by contrast, was conceived as a "kind of league" or "pacific federation" which, unlike a world government did not possess coercive powers, and unlike a mere treaty which "terminate[d] one war..." the pacific federation sought "to end all wars for good."14 The pacific federation would gradually expand "to encompass all states" through a process of mutual alliance, and it was in this vein that he denounced the "inhospitable" conquest of weak states by the strong.15

It must be asked however, how such a federation would establish itself without the aid of coercive powers. According to Macmillan, Kant's pacific federation was conceived as a union of all states brought together by their mutual self-interest in avoiding war.16 For Michael Doyle however, the pacific federation was only meant to include like-

11 Kant, I., Perpetual Peace, pg. 114.
13 Kant, I., Theory and Practice, pg. 90.
14 Kant, I., Perpetual Peace, pg. 104.
15 Ibid., pg. 104-107.
minded liberal or republican states. This latter interpretation of Kant’s argument has provided a theoretical foundation for a variety of recent commentaries on the apparent lack of hostility between democratic states. It is difficult to see Kant as a proponent of either the ‘world peace’ or the ‘democratic peace’ alternatives because his arguments fall somewhere between them. While clearly a proponent of the pacific nature of republican states, Kant’s position was informed by an implicit teleology in which the federation was conceived as an evolving or expanding union of self-interested states which were, or were in the process of becoming republican. Just as enlightenment was gradually emerging within civilised societies, Kant argued that there was a detectable shift toward more civilised political forms also. Indeed, the eighth proposition of his Universal History stipulated that human history “as a whole can be regarded as the realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally - and for this purpose also externally - perfect political constitution...”. Elsewhere in his writings Kant made it clear that the constitution toward which this progression was leading was a republican one, which he thought was most suited to the requirements of peace. Here Kant was clearly following Montesquieu’s lead, which would be echoed by later liberals such as Thomas Paine and Jeremy Bentham. Unlike monarchical governments, republican polities were disciplined and governed by an interest in peace and commerce. Kant’s position however, was more complex for he saw republican constitutions as a means of establishing peace through a combination of the principles of right and the expedience of self-interest.

Republican constitutions embodied the principles of right by which the will of the citizen body was given some consideration in the deliberations of government. By means of this popular consent Kant argued, the individual self-interest of citizens would incline the nation toward peace,

...each state must be organised internally in such a way that the head of state, for whom the war actually costs nothing (for he wages it at the expense of others, i.e. the people) must no longer have the deciding vote on whether war is to be declared or not, for the people who pay for it

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18 Kant, I., Universal History, pg. 50. Italics in original.

19 See for instance Kant, I., Perpetual Peace, pg. 99-100.
must decide. ... For the people will not readily place itself in danger of personal want...20

In his later Perpetual Peace, Kant provided more substance to the claim that enshrining the will of the people in the constitution would promote peace. In doing so he argued that citizens need not be morally inclined to peace, and that even a "nation of devils" motivated by pure self-interest could promote peace by creating a republican constitution.21 If popular consent were required,

...to decide whether or not war is to be declared, it is very natural that they [the populace] will have great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise. For this would mean calling down on themselves all the miseries of war, such as doing the fighting themselves, supplying the costs of the war from their own resources, painfully making good the ensuing devastation, and, as the crowning evil, having to take upon themselves a burden of debt which will embitter peace itself and which can never be paid off on account of the constant threat of new wars.22

Unlike the constraints upon executive power within a republican constitution, a despotic ruler could declare war without the "slightest sacrifice" to his or her wealth and luxuries.23 Within a republican state therefore, the separation of legislative and executive powers, the representation of the people in elected assemblies, and the limitation of executive power each pointed toward domestic and international peace, and the prevention of "despotism and violence".24

Thus civilisation, which was characterised by the gradual elimination of violence from relations between individuals, must be advanced by preventing violence between states through the establishment of political structures which were "incapable of bellicosity".25 Republican constitutions functioned by allowing each of its members an equal say in decision-making (at least on the question of warfare) thus counter-balancing the private interest of rulers with the private interests of citizens. A republican constitution was thus a kind of framework which aimed for a balance between competing interests in

20 Kant, I., Theory and Practice, pg. 90-91.
21 Kant, I., Perpetual Peace, pg. 112.
22 Ibid., pg. 100.
23 Ibid.
25 Kant, I., The Contest of the Faculties [1798], in H. Reiss (ed.), op.cit., pg. 184. (Hereafter referred to as Contest).
order to prevent the dominance of one despotic, militaristic will. Kant was in no doubt that life within civil society under a republican constitution would best preserve individual liberty and advance the cause of civilisation,

Violence will gradually become less on the part of those in power, and obedience towards the laws will increase. There will no doubt be more charity, less quarrels in legal action, more reliability in keeping one’s word... partly from a love of honour, and partly from a lively awareness of where one’s own advantage lies; and this will ultimately extend to the external relations between the various peoples, until a cosmopolitan society is created.26

Civilisation was thus conceived as a state of affairs in which each autonomous individual, assured of their rights and protected in their liberties, functioned within a legal network stipulating the rightful sphere of action for each citizen within civil society. Civil society was itself contained and protected by a republican constitution, a framework of limits on political power which preserved the freedom and security of citizens. On the global level, each republican state was itself an independent unit within an overarching legal structure which assured each state of its rightful liberty and regulated the interactions between them. The whole scheme from citizen to state, functioned in accord with the invisible and infallible logic of reason or self-interest until, “partly by an optimal internal arrangement of the civil constitution, and partly by common external agreement and legislation, a state of affairs is created which, like a civil commonwealth, can maintain itself automatically.”27

The ‘automatic’ functioning of the pacific federation meant that there would be no need of coercive powers because its member states would each share republican constitutions and have a shared interest in perpetual peace. It does not follow however, that this ‘pacific’ state of affairs itself developed through peaceful means.28 Kant was aware that not all states and not every nation were comparably advanced along the scale of civilisation, and it was on this basis that his teleological argument asserted itself. In effect, just as antagonism within society lead to peace, so in conflict between states only civilised republican states would prevail. In the second of two influential papers on Kant’s legacy for the conduct of liberal foreign policy Michael Doyle suggested that Kant saw “conquest or imperial intervention” as inappropriate activities for liberal

26 Ibid., pg. 188.
27 Kant, I., Universal History, pg. 48. Italics in original.
28 I am indebted to Barry Hindess for making this very point so forcefully.
states. The strength of this argument rested on Kant’s stipulation that foreigners be treated hospitably and not subjected to violence. The “natural right of hospitality” Kant argued was the principle by which contact between peoples could be encouraged and by which the uncivilised could be brought within the civilising influence of more advanced nations. While Kant clearly acknowledged the “litany of evils” which accompanied the inhospitable conquest of uncivilised nations by civilised ‘commercial’ states, his argument once again made heavy use of self-interest, for the “worst” aspect of it was “that the commercial states do not even benefit by their violence, for all their trading companies are on the point of collapse.”

Doyle’s interpretation of Kant’s anti-imperialism is however, incomplete and overlooks those of Kant’s arguments which, if not absolutely favourable to imperialism did not discount the possibility of it. In a revealing footnote to the second section of Perpetual Peace Kant argued that peaceful coexistence between two individuals or communities, one of which adhered to the requirements of civil union and the other of which existed in a state of nature, was not possible. “It is usually assumed…” Kant wrote,

...that one cannot take hostile action against anyone unless one has already been actively injured by them. This is perfectly correct if both parties are living in a legal civil state. ... But man (or an individual people) in a mere state of nature robs me of any such security and injures me by virtue of this very state in which he coexists with me. He may not have injured me actively... but he does injure me by the very lawlessness of his state... for he is a permanent threat to me, and I can require him either to enter into a common lawful state along with me or to move away from my vicinity.

This rather abstract, philosophical consideration was far from an argument for imperialism, but it did establish the requirement that the security of civil union required protection from the destabilising influences of those whose conduct was less civilised. Kant provided more substance to this claim in The Metaphysics of Morals in which he

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30 Kant, I., Perpetual Peace, pg. 105-6.
31 Ibid., pg. 106-108.
32 Ibid., pg. 107.
33 My interpretation also runs counter to Macmillan’s argument that it was solely ‘right’ and justice rather than violence and conquest which determined the foreign policies of republican states toward other republican and non-republican states. Macmillan, J., “A Kantian Protest Against the Peculiar Discourse of Inter-Liberal State Peace”, Millenium, 24 (3), 1994, pg. 553.
34 Kant, I., Perpetual Peace, pg. 98. Italics in original.
conceded that colonial or trading "settlements" may be established alongside native inhabitants by treaty, but that there were "plausible enough arguments" in favour of,...the use of violence on the grounds that it is in the best interests of the world as a whole. For on the one hand, it may bring culture to uncivilised peoples... and on the other, it may help us to purge our country of depraved characters... affording the hope that they or their offspring will become reformed in another continent... Kant however, seemed undecided on the question of imperialism in the name of civilisation. He accepted that noble intentions "cannot wash away the stain of injustice" committed on the uncivilised, but acknowledged that violence had been used to advance the cause of civilisation. Kant’s attitude to violence committed in the name of civilisation was at least ambiguous, and highlights the importance of imperialism in liberal thought.

At the heart of the matter was the corollary of the idea of civilisation, namely, that the vast bulk of humanity were uncivilised beings living by savage violence and in desperate need of the virtues of European civilisation, virtues which were apparently to be secured by innumerable acts of ‘civilised’ violence. For Adam Smith in particular the “invention of firearms, an invention which at first sight appears to be so pernicious, is certainly favourable both to the permanency and to the extension of civilisation.” Because commercial nations were best able to invest in firearms, they were best equipped to extend the reach of civilisation by establishing colonies in ‘uncivilised’ lands. Such colonies - and especially those of England - would import the habits of civilisation, “subordination”, “regular government” and a “system of laws which supports it”. While Smith acknowledged the need to treat the uncivilised with “generosity and humanity”, he clearly did not think this meant recognition of any meaningful land rights for he also thought, “[w]aste lands of the greatest natural

35 Kant, I., The Metaphysics of Morals [1797], in H. Reiss (ed.), op.cit., pg. 173.
36 Ibid., and see also pg. 162 where he concedes that political association originated in violence.
37 This has lead Michael Mann to conclude that liberal imperialism was in fact “civil society militarism”, a form of “state-supported but not state-led” aggression “directed against peoples who were often stateless”. At this kind of warfare, he argues, “the citizens of liberal regimes were the undisputed world leaders for two centuries.” Mann, M., “Authoritarian and Liberal Militarism: a Contribution From Comparative and Historical Sociology” in S. Smith, K. Booth and M. Zalewski (eds.), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pg. 235.
38 Smith, A., op.cit., Volume II, pg. 231.
39 Ibid., Volume I, pg. 76. Smith’s position here was that the government of the colonies of the various European nations were prone to the same characteristics as their ‘home’ governments. Consequently, while the English colonies were characterised by good government and a regular administration of
fertility" were available in the colonies "for a trifle." The settlement of Australia by Europeans for instance was justified on the grounds that it would ‘civilise’ the natives and ‘reform’ deported convicts. In reality it did little of either, but founded a nation upon the largely unrecognised genocide of a race of people whose prior occupation entitled them to neither land, liberty, respect, nor - for a great many - life itself. In the following sections discussion will turn to the development of a liberal orthodoxy on the relationship between commerce and world peace, an orthodoxy which was nonetheless troubled by the spectre of imperialism.

II. PEACE, COMMERCE, AND INDEPENDENCE: THE LIBERAL ORTHODOXY

While Kant first gave substance to the idea of internal and external pacification tied to an explicit teleology of progress which was represented in the rise of constitutional republican government, he was not the only liberal thinker to do so. Indeed, much of the subsequent development of liberal thought incorporated a kind of ‘liberal orthodoxy’, in which civilisation was conceived as a gradual process of pacification beginning and being secured at first within liberal states before radiating out to relations between them. The agency of pacification and hence the vehicle of civilisation, was identified in commerce and the institutions and practices of a free market. Through this agency, so the argument ran, individuals disciplined themselves to behave in non-violent ways, and eventually states were also subjected to similar disciplines. In this way, commerce was thought to create a civil society of autonomous beings within states before creating an international civil society of independent states. Thus world peace and not just domestic peace was identified as a ‘liberal’ achievement, a manifestation of the pacific will of those nations driving the extension of market relations across the globe. Importantly, this view was based on the distinction first identified by Montesquieu that the persistence of violence could be attributed to uncivilised (despotic and monarchic) states which, in the hands of later liberal thinkers was extended to include uncivilised peoples as well.

justice, the colonies of the absolutist French, Spanish, and Portuguese governments (especially the latter two) were prone to tyranny and “more than ordinary violence”; ibid., pg. 97-99.
40 Ibid., pg. 76-77.
In his little read *Principles of International Law*, Jeremy Bentham argued for world peace on the grounds that peace was most conducive to the interests of states. Warfare between states he argued, was “mischief upon the largest scale” and resulted in the “most enormous expense” because “no expedition of plunder could ever pay itself.”

The avoidance of war however, required that the activities of government be subjected to the discipline of self-interest in advancing free trade,

> All trade is in its essence advantageous, - even to that party to whom it is least so. All war is in its essence ruinous, - and yet the great employments of government are to treasure up occasions of war, and to put fetters upon trade.

This was clearly the case he thought in feudal Europe when monarchies were susceptible to constant warfare over religious division, the desire for conquest, or disputes over succession. In modern France and England however, these causes of war had been largely if not completely eliminated, and but for the needlessly expensive struggles of colonial extension warfare between civilised nations might be expected to cease. Implicit in Bentham’s argument was a theory of civilisation or progress which he thought was leading toward the gradual elimination of warfare. Bentham made this clearer in his discussion of the faults of monarchical institutions compared to more modern representative practices.

Following Montesquieu Bentham argued that monarchic states were undisciplined, hostile to the regulation of economy, and therefore prone to the triumph of the sovereign’s own personal, aggressive self-interest over the collective interest of society. Monarchical regimes were prone to violence in two areas, not simply externally in the international realm of conflict between states, but internally also. Monarchs Bentham argued, were perpetually subject to jealousy of the prestige of other monarchs, but were also fearful of their own subjects. In a representative system by contrast, no single interest prevailed amid the conflicting and counter-balancing interests which competed in the representative chamber, and as each of the delegates

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43 Ibid., pg. 552.
44 Ibid., pg. 557-558.
46 Ibid., pg. 165-166.
were elected by the citizens whose taxes paid for war, peace was more likely than war. Conquest was a 'logical' pursuit for a monarch because all conquered territory, subjects, goods, or other booty "went into the pocket" of the conqueror. For civilised nations however, wars of conquest served no purpose, for each successful conquest was paid for "by taxes" or by accruing a debilitating debt. Consequently Bentham contended that modern, civilised nations adhering to their economic self-interest would forge,

...a plan of general and permanent pacification for all Europe. ... [and] That the maintenance of such a pacification might be considerably facilitated by the establishment of a common court of judicature for the decision of differences between the several nations, although such court were not to be armed with any coercive powers.

Bentham's international court sounded similar to Kant's, for both lacked coercive might, and each were suggested as an 'external' accompaniment to various 'internal' pressures on governments to keep the peace. For Bentham, the institutions of representation and especially freedom of speech and public consultation on diplomatic matters, were essential in limiting the state's capacity to wage war. Civilised states were bound in their capacity to wage war by two complimentary pressures, almost identical to those identified by Kant. The very expense of modern war coupled with the representative nature of modern regimes and the increased capacity for free speech were the keys to perpetual peace. As the French economic theorist Jean Baptist Say wrote,

...the vast increase of expense attending national warfare has made it impossible for governments henceforth to engage in it, without the public assent, express or implied; and that assent will be obtained with the more difficulty, in proportion as the public shall become generally acquainted with their real interest. The national military establishment will be reduced to what is barely sufficient to repel external attack...

Michael Howard dismissed Bentham's arguments as "smug, parochial and simplistic" incorporating "sweeping generalisations on the basis of minimal knowledge." Howard takes Bentham to task in particular for claiming that imperial nations would renounce their colonies and adhere to an international court without coercive powers. Such

47 Ibid., pg. 212-217.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., pg. 547.
51 Ibid., pg. 556, 558-559.
53 Howard, M., *op. cit.*, pg. 33.
54 Ibid., pg. 33-34.
problems stemmed he maintained, from Bentham’s “purely utilitarian” opposition to war which assumed an identity of interests between states thereby failing to take account of the diversity of ways in which states may define and pursue their own interest.55 While no doubt framed in the familiar terms of utilitarian argument Bentham’s position was representative of a broader liberal orthodoxy on the role of commerce as the agent of global pacification. This pacification moreover, was driven by a fundamental opposition between the interests of trade or commerce, and the requirements of warfare. Bentham’s opposition to war was not a purely utilitarian position; rather, his utilitarianism buttressed deeper assumptions about the fundamental opposition between the nature of war and the nature of trade and commerce, assumptions which reinforced the fundamental boundary separating the civilised from the uncivilised.

Writing shortly after Bentham completed his Principles of International Law, Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man incorporated many of the same assumptions. Paine argued that Europe and the world itself, stood on the verge of a sweeping revolution which promised to end outmoded, tyrannical forms of monarchical government and replace them with republican forms. Large parts of this broader argument rested on Montesquieu’s (and Kant’s and Bentham’s) association of monarchy with war, and peace with republicanism. Warfare Paine believed, was the chief principle of “[g]overnment on the old construction” but the American and French revolutions brought to the fore “republican principles of peace and domestic prosperity and economy”.56 Paine’s view that republican systems were more peaceful than monarchies rested on the assumption that republics were more conducive to the pursuit of the “tranquil arts” of agriculture, commerce and industry.57 Though his views were no doubt shaped by his familiarity with Montesquieu, they had probably also been shaped by his own unhappy experiences as an exciseman in England and subsequently as a defender of the interests of the American revolutionaries against the British Crown.58

55 Ibid., pg. 35.
57 Ibid., pg. 539.
58 Keane, J., Tom Paine: A Political Life, Bloomsbury, London, 1995, pg. 231-232. Here Keane argues that Paine believed the American Revolution stood for “representative government and an international civil society”. Paine had obviously read Montesquieu and in the Rights of Man attributed to his writings “the spirit of liberty”, saying that he “went as far as a writer under a despotic government could well proceed”. Paine, T., Rights of Man, pg. 490.
For Paine, monarchy stood condemned for the “embarrassments they throw in the way of universal civilisation and commerce”.\(^5^9\) In arguing so he expressed the need for modern governments to concern themselves less with their own well-being, and more for the interests of their population, especially its wealth. If “systems of government” could be introduced that were “less expensive, and more productive”,

...than those which have existed... Reason, like time, will make its own way, and prejudice will fall in a combat with interest. If universal peace, civilisation, and commerce, are ever to be the happy lot of man, it cannot be accomplished but by a revolution in the system of governments. All monarchical governments are military. War is their trade, plunder and revenue their objects. While such governments continue, peace has not the absolute security of a day.\(^6^0\)

Monarchies in effect were undisciplined and therefore more prone to violence and war because of the problems created by hereditary succession, which when disputed lead to civil conflict, and when not resulted in the dominance of a select familial or dynastic interest over the broader interest of society.\(^6^1\) Nonetheless he argued, progress and civilisation were at work and the days of monarchical sovereignty were limited.

Paine’s conception of civilisation was remarkably close to that of Kant’s in that each saw it as a process of domestic pacification driven by the increasing independence of individuals requiring less supervision of their activities. In Paine’s words, “[t]he more perfect civilisation is, the less occasion has it for government, because the more does it regulate its own affairs, and govern itself”.\(^6^2\) Law and commerce he contended, were the twin agencies of civilisation and he spoke in this vein of the “civilisation of laws” and of civil government as “the government of laws”.\(^6^3\) Such government relied on the self-regulation of conduct and was “not productive of pretences for many taxes” leaving the civilised “to the enjoyment of that abundance” produced by unfettered commerce.\(^6^4\) Commerce itself he said was a “pacific system, operating to cordialise mankind, by rendering nations, as well as individuals, useful to each other.”\(^6^5\) By making use of the

\(^{5^9}\) Paine, T. Rights of Man, pg. 549.
\(^{6^0}\) Ibid., pg. 549-550.
\(^{6^1}\) Ibid., pg. 562.
\(^{6^2}\) Ibid., pg. 553.
\(^{6^3}\) Ibid., pg. 597.
\(^{6^4}\) Ibid., pg. 597 and 598.
\(^{6^5}\) Ibid., pg. 598.
rational self-interest of individuals commerce “would extirpate the system of war” because commerce required concord between contracting parties.66 In other words, there can be no such thing as a nation flourishing alone in commerce; she can only participate; and the destruction of it [commerce] in any part must necessarily affect all. When, therefore, governments are at war, the attack is made upon the common stock of commerce... The present increase of commerce is not to be attributed to ministers, or to any political contrivances, but to its own natural operations in consequence of peace.67

The challenge Paine thought lay before his contemporaries was to drive the process of civilisation onward, and to ensure that the pacific principles of commerce would be applied to the “barbarism of government”.68 In this way external relations between states would be pacified just as relations between individuals within society had already become pacified through the process of civilisation.

Although Paine himself was regarded by contemporaries as a radical, his faith in the pacific tendencies of commerce was far from extraordinary. James Mill’s (1773-1836) Commerce Defended, an early work written while he was still under the thrall of his mentor Bentham, ascribed to commerce the pivotal role in the progress of civilisation. Indeed it was the “slow and imperceptible insinuation of commerce” he wrote, that “burst asunder the bands of feudal tyranny, and instead of the sloth and poverty of servitude introduced the industry and opulence of liberty.”69 It is worth noting the opposition that Mill established here between the indolence and poverty he thought incumbent upon relations of ‘servitude’ in the feudal system, and the increased productivity and industry he attributed to the ‘liberty’ and independence of individuals in market society. Warfare, which was “almost always nourished by puerile prejudices and blind passions”, was the great bane of society exhibiting the “most fatal tendency to turn the balance against reproduction and prosperity.”70 Indeed Mill argued that employing soldiers and sailors was unproductive because it removed them from the labour force, and involved them in the service of perpetual consumption without any productive return.71

66 Ibid., pg. 598-599.
67 Ibid., pg. 600.
68 Ibid., pg. 597.
69 Mill, J., Commerce Defended [1805], in James Mill: Selected Economic Writings, edited by D. Winch, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1966, pg. 120.
70 Ibid., pg. 131.
71 Ibid., pg. 142.
Mill’s strongest invective however, was saved for the notion that wars may be waged for the sake of commerce. The national interest was poorly served by such logic for “[t]he truth is, that nothing creates wealth but the hands of our industrious countrymen, set to work by the means, and regulated by the skill and judgement of others.”72 Mill however, did not seem to share his mentor’s faith in the possibility of perpetual peace, but he did argue that warfare was antithetical to the interests of commerce. With a doctrinaire confidence Mill asserted that warfare was the sole cause of the miseries of humankind,

There is no other cause. This is the pestilential wind which blasts the prosperity of nations. This is the devouring fiend which eats up the precious treasure of national economy, the foundation of national improvement, and of national happiness. ...[In war] is the progression of the country stopped, and all the miseries of the stationary condition are experienced, ...[and] inroads are almost always made upon that part of the annual produce which has been previously devoted to reproduction. The condition of the country therefore goes backwards... When the blessing of peace is restored... hardly has it gained its former prosperity when it is generally restruck by the calamity of war, and compelled to measure back its steps.73

Mill therefore was somewhat less inclined than Kant or Bentham to see a steady and inevitable progression of pacification across the globe. Rather, he argued that the progress of humanity was driven by the advance of commerce, but that advance was susceptible to stagnation or reversals due to warfare. The best defence against war lay in the self-interested industry of citizens in societies with a genuinely free market. “In every country... where industry is free and where men are secure in the enjoyment of what they acquire...” he concluded,

...the greatest improvement which the government can possibly receive is a steady and enlightened aversion to war. While such a nation remains at peace, the faults of the government can hardly ever be so great, that the merits of the nation will not more than compensate them, and that society from its own beneficent tendency will not improve. Nothing however can compensate the destruction of war. The creative efforts of individuals can never equal its gigantic consumption, and the seeds of prosperity are eaten up.74

72 Ibid., pg. 151.
73 Ibid., pg. 158.
74 Ibid.
The opposition to war outlined by writers such as Kant and Bentham, Paine and Mill was based on the view that it was destructive to commerce and national savings. This was the cornerstone of the ‘liberal orthodoxy’, that war was antithetical to the interest of society in pursuing the maximisation of wealth. But these considerations were couched within the parameters of a theory of civilisation which made a distinction between civilised, commercial nations and uncivilised, primitive nations. This dichotomy lead to an ambiguous position in regard to the question of imperialism. For Paine imperialism was a product of outmoded monarchical government, while Bentham held a similar view, emphasising the economic inefficiency of imperialism. As Eileen Sullivan notes however, James Mill - who worked as a functionary of the British East India Company - articulated “a consistent case” for imperialism, or at least for British control of India.

In the eyes of some however, the question of liberal imperialism has a more ancient pedigree.

Barbara Arneil for instance, has written that John Locke incorporated within his “theory of property and conquest... a vigorous defense of England’s colonial activities in the new world.” In the Two Treatises Locke argued that the native indians of America did not have an exclusive title of ownership to their land because they had failed to exploit it by commercial agriculture or industry, had not consented to the use of money and therefore could not be said to own any property, the prerequisite for achieving a civil society. Such arguments provided a convenient justification for the expansion of England’s colonial activities at the expense of native populations. Jim Tully argues for example that Locke’s position was premised on an implicit theory of economic imperialism in which the native inhabitants of America were considered to possess only the foods they hunted and gathered but not the land itself. The superiority of ‘civilised’ agriculture and manufacture and the complex legal arrangement of property

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78 Michael, M.A., “Locke’s Second Treatise and the Literature of Colonisation”, Interpretation, 25 (3), 1998, pg. 407. Michael writes for example, “Locke offered a theory in which land is unowned until someone cultivates it; once that occurs, the land belongs to the person who developed it, and he gives his readers a picture of America in which land was in the state of nature and undeveloped.” Ibid., pg. 422.
rights which accompanied it were thought to confer on Europeans the right to appropriate the lands and determine the fate of the uncivilised. The clearest liberal arguments for this kind of imperialism were articulated by John Stuart Mill who thought that peace and prosperity would spread under the auspices of the British Empire.

**III. PEACE, PRODUCTIVITY, AND EMPIRE: J.S. MILL**

For Mill the progress of civilisation was tied to the growth of industrial capitalism and more precisely to the ever expanding volume of production. As his father before him had done, Mill identified the growth of capitalism as the best means of satisfying the needs of society thereby fuelling the growth of population. "In the leading countries of the world" he wrote, a global process of civilisation was at work driven by,

...at least one progressive movement which continues with little interruption from year to year... a progress in wealth; an advancement of what is called material prosperity. All the nations which we are accustomed to call civilised, increase gradually in production and in population: and there is no reason to doubt, that not only these nations will for some time continue so to increase, but that most of the other nations of the world... will successively enter upon the same career.⁸⁰

This was the happy prospect which lay before the advanced nations of the world, but its realisation required a two-fold elimination of violence. Within civilised societies individuals and their property had been afforded a more thorough protection from "the violence and rapacity" of others by means of an "efficient judicature and police", and the elimination of aristocratic control of the means of violence.⁸¹ The advance of civilisation had also resulted in the elimination of warfare between civilised nations. These two accomplishments of the civilising process were by no means independent of one another, and his conception of violence and its elimination was connected to a broader conception of the 'governmental' needs of liberal society, the creation of a society of independent selves whose self-discipline was so thoroughly implanted that intrusive state supervision was circumvented.

Mill’s position was that the modern industrialised societies of his day exhibited a greater sophistication both in manners and production than more ‘primitive’ societies. The key to the transition from primitive to civilised society was the inculcation in the individual

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⁸¹ Ibid., pg. 56.
of habits of independence and self-government which were stifled in primitive societies because of the savagery and violence which encompassed them,

...in an age of lawless violence and insecurity, and general hardness and roughness of manners, in which life is beset with dangers and sufferings... to those who have neither a commanding position... nor a claim on the protection of someone who has - a generous giving of protection, and a grateful receiving of it, are the strongest ties which connect human beings... [but these] sentiments, like the clanship and the hospitality of the wandering Arab, belong emphatically to a rude and imperfect state of the social union...82

Mill’s reference to ‘Arab’ clans here denotes an assumption that violence and the related dependence on others for protection were characteristics of the uncivilised world. Within uncivilised societies individuals could only hope to escape endemic violence and satisfy their needs under the protection of another. Importantly therefore, Mill was not only concerned about the violence of uncivilised societies but in common with Smith, the dependence those societies unfailingly engendered. Dependence upon another (or upon the state) for protection stifled freedom and reduced those who sought protection to slavery.83

The advanced state of the civilised societies of his day Mill argued, was to be measured by the degree to which individuals were able to take responsibility for themselves and to conduct a calm self-government of their affairs. Civilised individuals could be identified by their degree of self-government, an accomplishment he attributed not to freedom but discipline. Civilised societies made individuals,

...amenable to discipline; capable of adhering to plans concerted beforehand, and about which they may not have been consulted; of subordinating their individual caprice to a preconceived determination, and performing severally the parts allotted to them in a combined undertaking.84

In this way civilised societies were capable of a complex and interdependent division of labour well beyond the capacity of “the savage or the half-civilised”.85 The discipline of education and especially of labour were the necessary foundation upon which self-government and freedom were to be achieved, and it was for those who had been so disciplined - these “better minds” as Mill called them - to “succeed in educating the

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82 Ibid., pg. 120-121.
83 Ibid., pg. 121.
84 Ibid., pg. 58.
85 Ibid.
others into better things...".\textsuperscript{86} Mill clearly believed that disciplined and self-governing individuals constituted a privileged minority even within the civilised societies of his day. But he was also emphatic that the major challenge facing modern industrial societies was to inculcate such patterns of productive self-government into the minds of the great majority, the labouring masses. Mill rather patronisingly thought that the progress toward universal independence depended on the workers being “taught to read” and “allowed access to newspapers”, and he dutifully considered that they would “not much longer accept morals and religion of other people’s prescribing.”\textsuperscript{87}

Genuine independence however, was still unrealised by the majority of workers and although Mill spoke of them as “equals” he quite clearly saw them in need of “advice, exhortation, or guidance” in order that “they can be made rational beings.”\textsuperscript{88} If this was to be accomplished, the happy result would be that the “increase of intelligence, of education, and of the love of independence among the working classes, must be attended with a corresponding growth of the good sense which manifests itself in provident habits of conduct...”.\textsuperscript{89} These ‘provident’ habits were those central to the liberal discourse of civilisation and entailed a capacity for foresight and thrift, self-control and obedience. Mill however, did not restrict his hopes only to the capacity of the working class to enter upon civilised conduct but women also. Indeed, in writing on women Mill made it clear that it was by active participation in the discipline of labour that the love of independence and the need for foresight and rational self-control were to be instilled.\textsuperscript{90} By this means the “reckless abandonment to brute instincts” could be replaced by “prudential foresight and self-government” enabling disciplined individuals to work together on complex tasks in productive associations.\textsuperscript{91}

Mill’s position was that individual and social well being would best be achieved when individuals themselves were able to act in their own interest. The process of civilisation was the means by which individuals were disciplined to recognise what constituted their interest and to act upon it without need for supervision. Therefore in the “more

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., pg. 114.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., pg. 122.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., pg. 123. Interestingly, as is mentioned below, Mill was willing to accept the use of violence to promote these same ends in peoples even less amenable to discipline than the European working class.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., pg. 125.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., pg. 125-126.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., pg. 128.
advanced communities", individuals could be relied upon to act for themselves on most matters which would be "worse done" if left to the "intervention of government".92 State or government supervision was derided because individuals themselves took "a juster and more intelligent view of their own interest, and of the means of promoting it..." than any other person.93 Consequently, the triumph of civilisation was to ensure that individuals were so disciplined that they were able to pursue their interest while conforming to the general interest of society itself. Civilised individuals were those who had an interest in becoming industrious members of the productive associations which advanced the cause of civilisation itself. The "proper end of government" Mill observed was to end "wretched waste" by the needless expenditure of "energies now spent by mankind in injuring one another, or in protecting themselves against injury", thereby allowing the disciplined talents of individuals to be employed in "...compelling the powers of nature to be more and more subservient to physical and moral good."94

Violence was contrary to the productive ends of civilised society, and Mill urged an end not only to violence within states but between them also.95 Indeed, Mill's position was that industrial capitalism and the trade between industrialised nations would put an end to war. Among such civilised nations the acquisition of wealth would be the "principal occupation" just "as war was that of the ancient and medieval world".96 Mill's logic here, similar to that of his father before him, was that commerce had awakened the pursuit of interest, and that the interest in gaining wealth would overwhelm tendencies toward war,

It is commerce which is rapidly rendering war obsolete, by strengthening and multiplying the personal interests which act in natural opposition to it. And it may be said without exaggeration that the great extent and rapid increase of international trade, in being the principal guarantee of the peace of the world, is the great permanent security for the uninterrupted progress of the ideas, the institutions, and the character of the human race.97

92 Ibid., pg. 310-311.
93 Ibid., pg. 322.
94 Ibid., pg. 346.
95 Ibid., pg. 239-240.
96 Ibid., pg. 252.
97 Mill, J. S., Principles of Political Economy, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1909, pg. 582. Here, in chapter XVII of the third book, Mill assesses the benefits of international trade and concludes that the discipline of interest and the prevention of war are among the most beneficial, if indirect, effects of trade.
As a result violence and warfare played no part in the life of civilised nations; such destruction was unconducive to the material interests of civilised human beings. For Mill the boundary between the civilised and the uncivilised world entailed that violence could be consigned to the realms of savages and barbarians, who subsisted in fitful conflict on the fringes of the civilised world. “Wars, and the destruction they cause[d]...” he wrote, were “confined, in almost every country, to those distant and outlying possessions” where civilised nations came into “contact with savages.”98 The ‘possessions’ he referred to here were unquestionably the possessions of empire that Mill himself helped to administer for thirty years from a desk in the British East India Company.

In the concluding section to his Considerations on Representative Government, Mill expressed the belief that where imperial possessions were populated by people of European descent political independence and self-determination was feasible, but that the inhabitants of other places were “still at a great distance from that state.”99 Mill’s position here was based on the distinction between the qualities of civilised and uncivilised peoples which were set forth as early as 1836 in a paper simply entitled “Civilisation”. Here he argued that civilisation consisted in highly complex, commercial and industrial societies in which systems of law afforded protection to individuals and allowed them to co-operate as independent individuals in productive endeavours to create wealth.100 By means of regular discipline he argued, members of civilised societies were able to learn to work together on complex tasks and to accomplish a division of labour which fuelled the industrial economy.101 In contrast to the mild mannered and peaceable activities of the civilised, the uncivilised lived in societies inured to violence and suffering, and each individual or each family was perpetually on guard against others.102

April Carter has suggested that in the years after the publication of the Principles of Political Economy in 1848, Mill came to see that violence and war could not be so

98 Ibid., pg. 57. My italics.
101 Ibid., pg. 49-52.
easily eradicated by commerce, and that it could indeed serve useful purposes.\textsuperscript{103} In a short essay written in 1859 on the question of intervention in the affairs of other nations Mill argued that civilised nations, such as England and France, were likely to need to use violence against the “aggressions of barbarians”.\textsuperscript{104} Mill’s position here was but a reflection of the liberal discourse of civilisation which had informed his arguments in earlier work. As in the work of Montesquieu and Kant, Mill restricted the realm of peace to 	extit{civilised} peoples and nations, and while he mounted the argument that civilised nations had no right to intervene in the affairs of other civilised nations, in their dealings with barbarous nations there was no such restriction. Barbarians, Mill asserted, had “no rights as a nation” and it was in their best interest that they be “conquered and held in subjection” by a civilised people.\textsuperscript{105} Indeed Mill argued that the best prospect for the uncivilised masses of India and elsewhere, was “a vigorous despotism” of the civilised, which he described as “the best mode of government for training the people... to render them capable of a higher civilisation.”\textsuperscript{106} Mill did concede that European imperialism had been responsible for inflicting violence upon indigenous peoples, but as his writings on India show he also believed civilised rulers had an obligation to prevent the worse violence of savagery and barbarism, even if need be by the use of violence.\textsuperscript{107}

In his \textit{Memorandum of the Improvements in the Administration of India During the Last Thirty Years}, written during 1857 and 1858, Mill was in no doubt that the severity of British administration was required “for improving the internal government of the country, and the physical and mental condition of its inhabitants...”.\textsuperscript{108} Interestingly Mill compiled this report during the time that the infamous Indian Mutiny of 1857 was being suppressed by British troops with a ferocity at least equal to that of the mutineers themselves.\textsuperscript{109} Although Mill had little to say on the Mutiny in general, he clearly

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\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., pg. 57-58.
\textsuperscript{104} Mill, J. S., “A Few Words on Non-Intervention” [1859], in G. Himmelfarb (ed.), \textit{op.cit.}, pg. 368.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., pg. 377-378.
\textsuperscript{106} Mill, J. S., \textit{Representative Government}, pg. 516. It is worth noting here that Mill distinguished between “native” and foreign or civilised despotisms, the former being inclined to misrule, the latter providing a ‘constant’ stream of able and intelligent rulers.
\textsuperscript{108} Mill, J.S., \textit{Memorandum of the Improvements in the Administration of India During the Last Thirty Years} [1858], in J.M. Robson, M. Moir, and Z. Moir (eds.), \textit{Writings on India by John Stuart Mill}, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1990, pg. 93. (Hereafter referred to as \textit{Memorandum}).
\textsuperscript{109} Sullivan points out that Mill did object to the public desire for revenge after the Mutiny. Sullivan, E. P., \textit{loc.cit.}, pg. 611.
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believed that stringent measures were needed to administer the “passive and slavish character” of the Indians.\textsuperscript{110} To this end he suggested a more rigorous prison discipline involving harder work within prison factories, and the extension of the police system.\textsuperscript{111} The problem that such measures were designed to overcome was that Indian society was riddled with violence in the form of “gangs of professional banditti”, piracy, infanticide, and traditional practices such as suttee and tragga.\textsuperscript{112} Mill saw British rule therefore as a means of putting an end to this violence and “raising and civilising” the native inhabitants.\textsuperscript{113} Indeed Mill considered British rule in India one of the greatest achievements of civilisation,

...few governments, even under far more favourable circumstances, have attempted so much for the good of their subjects... A Government of foreigners, over a people most difficult to be understood, and still more difficult to be improved... has a right to take pride to itself for having accomplished so much; and most certainly cannot be justly reproached, by any existing Government or people, with not having effected more.\textsuperscript{114}

Mill’s liberal imperialism was not exceptional for an age accustomed to think of its own interest as coextensive with the interest of humanity as a whole.\textsuperscript{115} Imperial possessions and colonisation were the means by which the “permanent interests of civilisation itself” were to be advanced.\textsuperscript{116} Mill accepted then, that while violence between civilised nations was all but ended, violence still had a useful role to play in subjecting the “barbarous nations” to “such treatment as may, at the earliest possible period, fit them for becoming...” civilised.\textsuperscript{117}

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

Michael Mann has suggested that nineteenth-century liberal (and Marxist) social theory was founded on the idea that war had become obsolescent.\textsuperscript{118} As this chapter has

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\item[110] Mill, J. S., \textit{Memorandum}, pg. 117.
\item[111] \textit{Ibid.}, pg. 116-119.
\item[112] \textit{Ibid.}, pg. 121-125. Suttee was the practice by which widows were expected to immolate themselves on their deceased husband’s funeral pyre, while tragga was a traditional means of extorting redress for wrongs suffered. Both are explained in \textit{ibid.}, pg. 123-4.
\item[113] \textit{Ibid.}, pg. 153.
\item[114] \textit{Ibid.}, pg. 142.
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demonstrated however, there remained more than a trace in the work of J. S. Mill that war may serve the interest of civilisation itself. Michael Howard has argued that in the wake of the rise of nationalism in Europe, a succession of liberal writers came to accept war as necessary for the pursuit of national self-determination. Mill argued for example, that armed intervention could be justified where a people were being tyrannised by a regime supported from without, and although this could be said of colonial regimes, he noted that the same rules of international morality which restrained relations between civilised nations did not apply to their dealings with less civilised nations. Some liberals were also keen to defend the use of violent intervention in the service of oppressed majorities fighting for liberal rights and freedoms denied by domestic tyranny. The English liberal philosopher T. H. Green argued that “the imperfect realisation of civil equality” was a cause of war because it implied the existence of both a superior or “prerogatived class” which employed foreign conquest to control internal dissatisfaction, and an oppressed class which invited foreign intervention to alleviate their plight. In a passage reminiscent of Kant, Green proposed that the “source of war between states” lay in the “incomplete fulfilment of their function” or in “some defect in the maintenance or reconciliation of rights among their subjects.” Green’s position here was a restatement of the liberal conviction that an international peace based on free trade required each state to enshrine individual freedom, understood as “the capacity of every man” to make a “free contribution to social good”. Liberals such as Green could only explain war by reference to ‘some defect’ in the organisation of the state; in other words, to the existence of illiberal states which did not allow individual freedom to flourish. Consequently it was not the liberal state “but this or that particular state” which restricted both freedom and trade and bore responsibility for war.

In the early years of this century, the great English liberal L. T. Hobhouse ominously argued that liberalism itself arose in struggles of national liberation. In doing so, he unwittingly expressed an argument which has subsequently been used by avowedly ‘liberal’ states to justify the use of violence against a host of less powerful states, from

armed intervention in Russia in 1918 to the Gulf War in 1991 and the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, A great part of the inspiration of Liberalism... has been drawn from the struggles of the nations against Napoleon, of the Eastern Christians against Turkey, of the Poles against Russia, of the Italians against Austria, of the Irish against England. ... The safeguards of liberty cannot be maintained when one class or one nationality is being held in bondage by another, even though that other holds power nominally in virtue of majority votes.124

The litany of complaint that such arguments have been used to silence is that liberals have been just as willing to pursue war and to justify it in glowing terms, as have the most brazen apologists of realpolitik. For contemporary liberal writers such as Michael Doyle, the validity of this complaint cannot be denied; liberal states have a record of violence against non-liberal states.125 But this last qualification is crucial; the central element linking the writings of Kant with those of Mill and contemporary liberals is that wars between civilised, liberal states would cease, and that warfare still exists because not all states have become liberal and democratic.126 This remains an enduring conviction of contemporary liberalism and is manifested in the repeated emphasis placed upon the triumph of peace within and between liberal-democratic states.127 A critical eye will be cast in the two remaining chapters of this thesis over the implications of this view within contemporary liberal thought, first in relation to the boundary between (civilised) liberal-democratic and (uncivilised) illiberal and undemocratic states; and second, in relation to the boundary between (uncivil) violence and (civil) peace within civil society.

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123 Ibid., pg. 132.
CHAPTER 9

THE BOUNDARIES OF PEACE:

'TROUBLEMAKERS' AND THE INTER-LIBERAL STATE PEACE

Beginning with the origins of Liberalism in the late eighteenth century, Liberal states have with great success avoided getting into wars with one another. They are as warlike in their relations with non-Liberals as any other state is - perhaps even more prone to getting into imprudent crusades. But among themselves Liberals have established the separate peace Immanuel Kant described. This lack of war seems to be based on the features Kant identified: the restraint that representative institutions impose upon sometimes wayward governments, the respect that Liberal societies have for the freedom that each embodies, and the transnational ties of commerce, investment, and tourism that help create mutual understandings. But these very same ties - representation, a concern for individual rights, and trade - are the forces that make for sometimes imprudent aggression, suspicion, and a confused foreign policy in dealing with non-Liberals.

It has been argued in this thesis that within the liberal discourse of civilisation the liberal state is represented as a powerful entity which, when properly disciplined by constitutional separations of power, the limitations of law, and the institutionalisation of popular consent, will manifest only a desire for peace and prosperity. Previous chapters have argued that liberal discourse is premised on the view that peace is a quality achieved by communities within states, while the external world of relations between states remains an arena of conflict.¹ David Boucher has recently argued that a “growing acknowledgment” of the “need for reconciliation” between political theory and international relations is evinced by the appearance within each discipline of questions of identity which cut across the divide between the domestic and international realms.² Liberal discourse on violence however, has been shaped by the centrality of the boundary between “inside” and “outside”, of an exclusive community of citizens within and a potentially threatening world of hostile states without.³ What this division implies is that while communities within states practice a politics of universal principles, of peace, rights, and citizenship, relations outside the state are shaped by “contingency... barbarism... violence and war.”⁴ This chapter will explore the implications of this division with a particular focus on the assumption that peace is secured and emanates from within liberal-democratic states.

The quotation used on the title page of this chapter is drawn from the recent work of one of the leading theorists of the inter-liberal state peace, and illustrates the foundational assumption of liberal international relations theory, that peace is secured and emanates from within liberal-democratic states. For earlier liberals this assumption manifested itself in the attribution of violence to ‘uncivilised’ peoples and states. In common with more recent thinkers however, Doyle questions this view but maintains nonetheless that liberal states are as Kenneth Waltz put it “inherently peaceful”, and only engage in

⁴ Walker, R. B. J., op.cit., pg. 177.
warfare with *illiberal and undemocratic states.* Particular schools of liberal international relations theorists differ in the extent to which this assumption shapes the analysis of the likelihood of war or the prospects for peace. For realists such as Waltz, the notion that the internal democratic structure of states will lead to peace is "an extremely doubtful proposition." For a variety of liberal theorists however, the implicit acceptance of this ‘proposition’ can be detected in the consistent ascription of violent motives to illiberal and non-democratic states to which liberal states must be prepared to respond in kind. It will be argued in this chapter that a consistent set of assumptions on the nature of international peace and war can be detected in the work of a variety of liberal international relations theorists. The first section of this chapter will examine the chief assumption made by many liberal theorists, that only liberal-democratic states are capable of achieving a secure internal peace. The second section will discuss the impact of this assumption on contemporary liberal explanations of the inter-liberal state peace. The full breadth and scope of this substantial body of work cannot of course be adequately surveyed in one chapter, but an attempt will be made here to assess the implications of the view that only liberal-democratic states are capable of peaceful external relations. In the third section it will be argued that this assumption underestimates the significance of the fact that all states, even liberal and democratic ones, are organised in ways which maximise rather than minimise the capacity to use violence.

I. THE INHERENT PEACE OF LIBERAL STATES

It has been argued in earlier chapters that the rights, freedoms and legal protections of life and property central to liberal political discourse were guaranteed to citizens of internally pacified liberal states. Such states were to be characterised by the presence of democratic institutions and practices such as constitutional restrictions on the exercise of power, a formal separation of powers, regular elections and the rule of law. The conviction that only liberal societies with limited states were capable of eliminating violence was matched by the not entirely unproblematic presumption (explored in the previous chapter) that similarly liberal and democratic states would conduct their affairs with one another in peaceful ways. What is interesting about this view is the identification of the state as the agent of an expanding zone of pacification. The

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important assumption behind this view is that international peace is a function of domestic state structure. The domestic determination of international state action constitutes one of the “core assumptions” of liberal international relations theory. The assumption within liberal discourse is that peace can only be securely achieved within a liberal-democratic state, and that as Kant argued, only after this has been achieved can an international peace be created. The achievement of peace is therefore tied to an explicitly teleological assumption that inter-state competition between states will assure the eventual global victory of ‘republican’ or liberal-democratic states which allow some measure of public representation, provide legal protection for personal rights, and foster strong and healthy market economies.

This teleology was founded on the presumption that liberal republican states fostered the development of civilisation. As Kant put it, “profound contempt” was reserved for “the way in which savages” persisted in “their lawless freedom” and “incessant strife”, rather than submitting “to a legal constraint which they might impose upon themselves” preferring to live in “barbarism, coarseness, and brutish debasement”. As Margaret Canovan has observed however, such views tended to “take peace and order for granted” within states and ignored the often violent process by which that peace was achieved. From the perspective of contemporary democratic peace theory, the conflicts consequent upon the division of humanity into a multiplicity of states can be circumvented so long as each state conforms to liberal and democratic norms. The implication here is that only liberal or republican states are internally pacified and thereby inclined to peace in their external relations. Consequently, the argument is that non-republican or illiberal states are unrestrained in their actions while liberal polities respect popular opinion, seek compromise, negotiation, or mediation because of their

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domestic arrangements which determine the range of options governments can choose from in pursuing foreign policy. As one writer has put it, “[u]nlike their authoritarian counterparts, democratic states lack the large conscript armies, flexibility, decisiveness, and cold logic required to act solely out of considerations of realpolitik.”

According to Francis Fukuyama for instance, violence can only be averted to the degree to which human rights are entrenched and respected providing recognition (from other selves and from the state) while allowing the fulfilment of rational self-interest. Bruce Russett has drawn attention to the “powerful norms against the use of lethal force” within liberal-democratic states. Such constraints emanate from the shared acceptance that democratic procedures providing a legitimate and effective means of resolving disputes peacefully. Such normative constraints do not operate in nondemocratic or “authoritarian” states. The equation of violence with ‘authoritarian’ politics reinforces the assumption that violence is alien to the liberal order. Fukuyama for example, argues that violence can be traced to the desire to seek domination over others and is most obviously associated with illiberal movements such as religious fundamentalism and xenophobic nationalism. The exclusive and violent tendencies of nationalism in particular, “like religion before it”, have been moderated “in the most advanced liberal democracies” by making them “tolerant”. In other words “national identity has to be pushed off into the realm of private life and culture...” and thereby restricted from contaminating the public, political realm of universal rights and peaceful coexistence. Stanley Hoffmann has recently written of nationalism that its recent revival has “threatened both the liberal program at home and the cosmopolitan vision abroad” thus

14 Ibid., pg. 129.
16 Ibid., pg. 271. This is a version of the standard liberal critique of nationalism which opposes the exclusivity of nationalist feeling to the internationalism and respect for universal human rights of liberalism. See for instance the discussion of the issue in Pfaff, W., The Wrath of Nations: Civilisation and the Furies of Nationalism, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1993, pg. 196-231
“weakening the two transnational pillars of the liberal international order: a transnational economy and world public opinion.”

According to Fukuyama however, the liberal state is able to avert the problem of internal violence by recognising and respecting human rights. Anglo-American liberal-democracy’s historic victory, indeed its historic mission he argues, was to subdue the desires of would-be masters and establish the possibility of a truly peaceful society,

The bourgeois revolution of which Hobbes and Locke were the prophets sought to morally elevate the slave’s fear of death over the aristocratic virtue of the master, and thereby to sublimate... princely ambition and religious fanaticism into the accumulation of property. Where once there had been civil conflict over dynastic and religious issues, there were now new zones of peace constituted by the modern liberal European nation-state.

Fukuyama affirms the on-going liberal-democratic creation of peace in what is termed “...the spread of compassion, and steadily decreasing tolerance for violence, death, and suffering. ...the gradual disappearance of capital punishment...” As Rummel puts it, the democratic state is the “least violence-prone” of any regime while a non-democratic, totalitarian regime is most likely to engage in violence and hence, is “more likely [to]... kill its own citizens in cold blood.” Rummel produces a variety of statistical analyses designed to show that authoritarian regimes have engaged in more genocidal activity than democracies, claiming in explanation that “democratic freedom promotes nonviolence” and that the best policy for avoiding “collective violence and eliminating war” is to “enhance and foster democratic institutions - civil liberties and political rights - here and abroad.”

Rummel in fact coins the term “democide” to denote all the kinds of violence which liberal-democratic regimes have successfully avoided. Democide covers all cases of “intentional killing” of citizens by their governments, ranging from finely targeted assassination to wholesale genocide. What seems most important about these sorts of violence however, is that they are all intimately associated with the institution of the

19 Fukuyama, F., op.cit., pg. 259-260.
20 Ibid., pg. 261.
22 Ibid., pg. 33.
state. Genocide in particular would appear to be inconceivable without the state, and indeed the very term itself was coined in the twentieth-century to describe the activities of modern states. What democratic peace theorists do not question is the association between the state and various forms of ‘exclusionary’ violence premised on the distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. The violence of warfare, of imperialism, and genocide are three prominent examples of such violence which have all been carried to an unprecedented scale of killing in the last two centuries under the auspices of both liberal-democratic and other states. While this is an oversight to which democratic peace theorists seem particularly susceptible, Margaret Canovan has recently argued that liberal international relations theory in general is prone to neglecting the degree to which liberal and democratic institutions derive their legitimacy from the values and norms of exclusive, geographically bounded, national communities. Canovan claims that liberal theorists are often unwilling to acknowledge the exclusionary violence used to develop and sustain these nations and the states that enclose them. These forms of violence, such as the elimination of large proportions of the indigenous populations of ‘liberal’ and ‘democratic’ states such as Australia, the United States of America and Canada, are “embarrassing dissonances” between liberal pretensions to peace and the internal and external violence of state-formation.

The relationship between the state and violence however, is at best a secondary problem for liberals who believe that violence inheres not in the state itself but in a *particular kind of state or state structure*. Thus as Rummel contends, the absence of violence within democratic societies and states can be explained by the fact that citizens of democracies are “spontaneous, diverse, pluralistic” and belong to different social, cultural, ethnic, or occupational groups creating a need for flexibility, cooperation and compromise. Within authoritarian regimes the argument runs, spontaneity and pluralism are discouraged, and society is rigidly organised. Indeed, the whole social structure is built upon a tension or “fault line” between rulers and subjects. “There is thus a scale of political regimes from the most democratic to the most totalitarian”

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24 Ibid., pg. 4-5.
26 Canovan, M., *op.cit.*, pg. 18-44.
27 Ibid., pg. 104.
29 Ibid., pg. 35.
Rummel contends, and "we should find empirically that the more democratic the less violence in foreign and domestic affairs, the more totalitarian the more violence." Importantly Rummel does not claim that democracies are incapable of violence, but that "democratic freedom reduces violence", and notes a "consistent and significant, but low, negative correlation... between democracies and collective violence...". Consequently, "openness, political competition, leaders responsible to their people, and limited government" all tend to prevent the slide toward violence and hence the ultimate conclusion is that "democracy is a general method of nonviolence." From the perspective of liberal international relations theory, the pacific tendencies of liberal states manifest themselves in the establishment of peaceful relations with other liberal states.

II. PACIFIC STATE TO PACIFIC UNION

It is widely accepted within liberal international relations literature that liberal-democratic states do not fight one another. According to Fukuyama liberal-democratic regimes "manifest little distrust or interest in mutual domination... [because they] share with one another principles of universal equality and rights...". Indeed the peacefulness of liberal states in their dealings with other liberal states has become an almost unquestionable axiom within liberal international relations theory. For Levy, "the absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations" while Russett argues that the inter-liberal state peace "is one of the strongest nontrivial or nontautological generalisations that can be made about international relations." Exhaustive efforts have been made to demonstrate the validity of such statements with empirical data which purport to show that liberal-democracies do not fight one another. Michael Doyle however, has provided the most sophisticated defence of the argument that "constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another" and that a steadily increasing number of liberal states world-wide indicates that a "liberal zone of peace, a pacific

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30 Rummel, R. J., loc.cit., 1995, pg. 5.
32 Ibid., pg. 25. (Italics in original).
33 Fukuyama, F., op.cit., pg. 263.

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union, has been maintained and has expanded...". Nonetheless he contends that liberal states do not necessarily pursue peaceful means in their dealings with non-liberal states and hence, the pacific union "extends as far as, and no further than, the relations among liberal states...". Doyle bases his position on Kant's teleological account of the emergence of a pacific federation of republican states characterised by a unique combination of principle (right) and self-interest. Kant is celebrated for having realised not simply the normative superiority of liberal-republican states, but to have acknowledged that they were also most likely to fully engage in commerce and trade with other nations, gaining thereby greater wealth and economic power than other states. Consequently, the great complexity and diversity of economic ties between liberal, republican states prevents any conflict of interest between them from dominating and souring the overall relationship. In relations with non-liberal states however, the very paucity of relations with economically powerful liberal-republican states invites just this sort of problem. Such relationships are likely to be ruptured and may lead to war when a conflict of interest develops and no other profitable relations are able to counter-balance the resulting "tension".

The economic success of liberal states however, is not without its own perils for it may lead to aggressive policies toward weak non-democratic states to protect commercial interests, and while liberalism has enjoyed considerable success in eliminating war between liberal states, its record in dealings between liberal and non-liberal states is less than glorious. In a more recent paper Doyle suggests that the source of this conflict lies in the perception that non-liberal states are "in a state of aggression" with their own populations and hence lack legitimacy. As Owen has put it, liberal states "seek their citizens' true interests" and are therefore "pacific and trustworthy" while non-liberal states are deemed "dangerous because they seek other ends, such as conquest or

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37 Ibid., pg. 223.
38 Ibid., pg. 227-230.
39 Ibid., pg. 231.
40 Doyle, M.W., "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2", Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12 (4), 1983, pg. 326. (Hereafter referred to as "Part Two"). What is worth noting here is the primary assumption that world trade and a global market seems to be confined to the community of liberal states, ignoring the power now exerted by the global economy through its major multi-national players over individual states. See, Hoffmann, S., loc.cit., 1995, pg. 175.
41 Doyle, M.W., "Part Two", pg. 335-337.
plunder.” From the liberal point of view, non-liberal states play the role of “troublemakers” and the liberal world will “be truly secure only when the latter have been transformed into democracies, too.” The liberal response to the presence of non-liberal states is thus motivated by the perception that they are “unreasonable, unpredictable, and potentially dangerous... ruled by despots, or with unenlightened citizenries... [seeking] illiberal ends such as conquest, intolerance, or impoverishment of others.” As Russett argues “if people in a democracy perceive themselves as autonomous, self-governing people who share norms of live-and-let-live, they will respect the rights of others to self-determination if those others are also perceived as self-governing and hence not easily led into aggressive foreign policies by a self-serving elite.”

Buttressing this normative appraisal of the peacefulness of liberal-democracies is the Kantian conviction that in actual military competition liberal states will prove more powerful and resilient than non-liberal states. The reality of armed conflict between states will therefore ensure the ultimate victory of liberal over non-liberal states, thereby hastening “a global society... encompassing an ever larger zone of peace...” (which Doyle calculates to be achievable by the year 2113). What one writer has called the “stunning simplicity” of the democratic peace thesis and the “equally impressive” empirical data used to attest to it buoys such dramatic conclusions. Nonetheless, considerable dispute persists over just why liberal-democracies pursue peace. One of the more influential explanations emphasises the ‘structural’ constraints built into liberal-democratic states which militate against war-making. In other words, peace is attributed to the domestic limitations of democratic government, the separation of powers, institutionalisation of popular consent in regular elections, popularly elected

45 Owen, J.M., loc.cit., pg. 96.
50 Layne, C., loc.cit., pg. 6.
parliamentary representatives, and the supposed need of democratic governments to obtain the consent of the populace before declaring war.51

A second alternative emphasises the importance of shared norms between liberal-democracies, the respect for human rights, the aversion to violence, and the assumption that such governments serve their citizen’s (rather than their own) interests. The former explanation purports to show that liberal-democracies are inherently pacific, the latter that they are more inclined to peaceful relations with other liberal-democracies.52 Either liberal states are essentially pacific in their conduct because of structural constraints to war, which must be true of their dealings with all and not just liberal states, or liberal states are inclined to an exclusive peace between similarly liberal states. Both explanations however, privilege the association between peace and popular consent within liberal-democratic polities.53 Proponents of both explanations assume that popular consent will act as a limiting discipline upon the state’s ability to wage war, and indeed further assume that illiberal and undemocratic states which ignore the popular will face no such restriction and are thus more likely to wage war. The distinction between liberal-democratic states in which popular consent ensures peace and illiberal and undemocratic states in which authoritarian rule ensures violence signifies an assumption that these latter states are dangerous because they are undisciplined and uncivilised. In other words, it is assumed that the international system of states is composed of some states who can be relied upon to conduct themselves peacefully, and others with whom peaceful relations are unlikely. Michael Mann has argued however, that just such assumptions have bolstered what he has called “civil society militarism”, an aggressive militarism largely fuelled by a popular will to ‘civilise’ the globe.54 Consequently, a perpetual source of conflict is built-in to the international system of states based on the presumption that liberal states must arm themselves against

52 Bruce Russett has attempted to subject normative and structural factors to statistical evaluation. See for example Russett, B., op.cit., 1993, pg, 76-93.
53 Owen, J. M., loc.cit., pg. 90-96. Owen attempts to resolve the tension between ‘normative’ and ‘structural’ explanations by arguing that the vital determinant of the liberal state’s willingness to wage war are the popular “perceptions” of the citizens of each state as to whether or not the other state is in fact liberal and democratic.
uncivilised, aggressive, illiberal ‘troublemaking’ states which are both untrustworthy and illegitimate.

Liberals therefore accept that the global order is constituted as Doyle puts it, by a “heterogenous state of peace and war”, while realists interpret that same order as a “relatively homogenous state of war”. The key distinction is that realists anticipate a perpetual state of war between states over which domestic liberal and democratic institutions have little influence. According to Doyle however, liberals insist on a distinction between inherently aggressive and inherently pacific states, but beyond this fundamental claim liberal theorists diverge in trying to explain the sources and nature of the inter-liberal state peace.

What Doyle calls “First Image” liberalism traced the source of peace to the provision of rights to protection and property, while “Second Image” liberals emphasised domestic commerce and market economies. Following his earlier work on Kantian international relations theory, Doyle suggests that “Third Image” liberalism provides a more convincing explanation by focussing on the relations between liberal states, and between liberal and non-liberal states. Neither of these formulations however, entirely escapes the fundamental liberal assumption that external peace is a function of domestic state structure. Doyle’s ‘third image’ liberalism for instance, accepts that the very domestic institutions and values which incline liberal states to mutual trust and co-existence, lead to distrust and a propensity for aggression toward non-liberal states. His explanation traces the incidence of war to the perception that liberal-democratic states are “[d]omestically just” because they rest on popular consent, while “nonliberal states” are unjust in that they do not reflect the “free consent” of their populace. War is waged against illiberal states because they are perceived to be ‘troublemakers’, and they are perceived to be ‘troublemakers’ because they are neither liberal nor democratic. The very perception of another regime as legitimate and trustworthy makes warfare with that state unlikely, while the perception that a state is illegitimate leads to the view that they are untrustworthy and more warlike.

56 The following information is drawn from ibid., pg. 213-300.
As Stanley Hoffmann has argued, liberal international relations theory accepts as axiomatic that the “nature” of the state “is a key determinant” of its “behaviour” toward other states.\(^{58}\) Liberal-internationalists such as Robert Keohane claim that attributing the externally peaceful conduct of liberal states to their prior achievement of domestic peace is indicative a particular variant of avowedly Kantian or “republican” liberalism of which he is sceptical.\(^{59}\) He has therefore sought an explanation which traces peace not to the domestic realm but to the structure of the international system, and in particular to transnational agreements “that promote and guarantee openness” and “provide incentives for peaceful rather than aggressive expansion.”\(^{60}\) The assumption here is that the greater the economic “interdependence” between states, the more they will be inclined to cooperate rather than compete violently.\(^{61}\) Keohane’s “sophisticated liberalism” reverses the democratic peace argument, that domestic structure is a source of international peace, but does so only to reinforce one of the most important bulwarks of the democratic peace thesis, that the expansion of the zone of peace is coeval with the expanding global economy. Onuf and Johnson for example, argue that there is a positive link between prosperity and the development of a peaceful “cosmopolitanism” which sees war as “childish or parochial” and a threat to the “increasingly sophisticated” lives of cosmopolitan societies.\(^{62}\) Such a view tends to discount the destabilising influences of globalisation, and along with democratic peace theorists, liberal internationalists share the primary assumption that liberal-democratic states exist in an international realm of real and potential violence as already pacified, morally superior states.\(^{63}\)

The assumption of moral superiority is also central to realist analysis which claims to disavow normative explanations for peace.\(^{64}\) Samuel Huntington’s *The Third Wave* for instance, casts considerable doubt on the prospect of a global conversion to liberal-democracy, but accepts that liberal states are inherently inclined to peace because of the

\(^{58}\) Hoffmann, S., *loc.cit.*, pg. 167.
\(^{60}\) Keohane, R., *loc.cit.*, pg. 183.
\(^{63}\) Indeed, Little argues that this assumption also shapes realist and neo-realist international relations literature which, he argues, is underwritten by an implicitly liberal theory of the state. Little, R., *loc.cit.*, pg. 33-36.
\(^{64}\) Waltz, K., *op.cit.*, pg. 222.
toleration of dissent and the institutionalisation of opposition, providing governments and their opponents “fewer incentives to use violence” and making change “moderate and incremental” rather than sudden and violent. The sole sufficient condition for the existence of democracy therefore is regular “competitive elections by the people”.

While he notes the possibility that democracy can be defined in terms of important values (such as respect of civil and political rights, the separation of powers, or the value of the individual) he dismisses such “fuzzy norms” as providing an insufficient criterion for evaluating whether a state is or is not democratic. Despite this claim however, Huntington in fact attributes the emergence of liberal-democratic states precisely to democratic norms and the ability and willingness of citizens to make normative judgements. While elections clearly constitute a central element of democratic practice, Huntington admits that their value and the number of states which have institutionalised them depend upon the “prevalence of democratic norms globally” and the “development of values and attitudes supportive of democracy” within nations.

The very sustainability of democratic regimes depends he argues, on a shared commitment to “the value of the democratic system” which could not be made in the absence of shared norms. Indeed, despite his reluctance to speak of the “fuzzy norms” of democracy, it is hard to see how his analysis of democracy can be anything other than ‘normative’.

For Huntington, violence is most closely associated with non-democratic or “authoritarian” regimes. The “routine murder by government” of its opponents is “an inherent characteristic of many authoritarian regimes” he argues, claiming that the use of violence is the essential feature of authoritarian rule, and notes that,

Throughout history armed revolts have almost never produced democratic regimes. ... Governments created by moderation and

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70 Similarly, Gurr and Jaggers claim that “democracy is the opposite of autocracy.” Gurr, T.R., and Jaggers, K., “Tracking Democracy’s Third Wave With the Polity III Data”, *Journal of Peace Research*, 32 (4), 1995, pg. 469. Gurr and Jaggers do not insist on violence as the distinguishing characteristic, but maintain a firm distinction nonetheless between democracy and “autocracy”.

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compromise ruled by moderation and compromise. Governments produced by violence ruled by violence.\textsuperscript{71} The problem with this argument is that it assumes that the liberal state is “morally complete” and therefore non-violent.\textsuperscript{72} This assumption reinforces a tendency to focus on violence between states in the form of inter-state rather than civil war. One of the leading democratic peace theorists for instance, defines war as a function of state-hood involving “large-scale institutionally organised lethal violence” between states, thereby excluding civil war.\textsuperscript{73} It is assumed therefore that war can be prevented, “if enough states become stably democratic” and they, ...reconstruct the norms and rules of the international order to reflect those of democracies in a majority of interactions. A system created by autocracies centuries ago might now be recreated by a critical mass of democratic states.\textsuperscript{74} In theorising the growth of a liberal zone of peace therefore, the focus of attention is placed on organised conflict between states, while the violence which occurs within states is often ignored.\textsuperscript{75} This approach to the definition of warfare, and hence to the identification of peace is insensitive to the dramatic rise in the number and intensity of violent conflicts and warfare now occurring largely within states.\textsuperscript{76} An implicit boundary between the society of pacified liberal-democratic states, and the realm of violent, authoritarian, or troublemaking states sustains the assumption that violence within states is only a problem for this latter category of states. Thus Holsti for example, argues that those “weak” states most susceptible to domestic and international violence are those which lack legitimacy and order, while those peaceful “strong” states which possess legitimacy and order also often happen to be democratic.\textsuperscript{77} The association of peace with liberal-

\textsuperscript{71} Huntington, S.P., \textit{op.cit.}, pg. 192 and 207.
\textsuperscript{72} MacMillan, J., \textit{loc.cit.}, 1996, pg. 296.
\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Ibid.}, pg. 138.
\textsuperscript{75} As one writer defines it, a zone of peace is a “discrete geographical region of the world in which a group of states have maintained peaceful relations among themselves... though civil wars and domestic unrest and violence might still occur within their borders...”. Kacowicz, A.M., “Explaining Zones of Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers?”, \textit{Journal of Peace Research}, 32 (3), 1995, pg. 266.
\textsuperscript{76} As one recent critic has noted, “all of the major armed conflicts fought in the world in 1995 were intrastate wars.” Paris, R., “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism”, \textit{International Security}, 22 (2), 1997, pg. 54.
democratic regimes in particular, has lead to attempts to create more democracies through programmes of “peacebuilding” guided by the “assumption that the surest foundation for peace, both within and between states, is market democracy, that is, a liberal democratic polity and a market-oriented economy.”78 As critics of this approach have observed however, the belief that democracy can be “inserted and instituted” within such nations usually involves the infliction of tough micro-economic reforms upon poor countries and a corresponding weakening of state structures capable of providing relief to those who most need it.79 The imposition of market structures and democratic institutions upon war-torn nations has often failed to produce more peace because both require vigorous competition, and the high levels of inequality which usually accompany economic liberalisation has usually exacerbated social tensions.80

III. STATES AND VIOLENCE

The assumption that violence can only be eliminated within and between liberal-democratic states leads to the attribution of violence to the non-liberal world of ‘uncivilised’ states. The boundary between the peace ‘inside’ and the violence ‘outside’ the borders of the liberal-democratic state is thus sharpened by seeing this ‘outer’ violence as the responsibility of non-liberal states. Even when it is acknowledged that liberal states have fought wars, it is explained that this violence is caused by the fact that the states with which liberal-democracies fight are illegitimate, untrustworthy, and illiberal states. If there were more liberal-democracies, the argument runs, there would be more peace. In contrast to realists, liberals assume that - ideally - the state exists as the “effective expression” of the popular consent of its population and characteristically deny that each state confronts all other states as potential sources of competition and conflict.81 It remains the case however, that liberal states as much as any other type of state, must manage their domestic populations in order to maximise their strength. Sovereign states perpetuate the segregation of humanity into a series of competing entities whose sovereignty depends on the willingness to use violence to discriminate

78 Ibid., pg. 56.
80 Paris, R., loc. cit., pg. 76-78. Paris examines the progress of peacebuilding programmes in eight war-torn countries (Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda, and Bosnia), and concludes that all but one of these cases (Namibia) peacebuilding has exacerbated tensions, and in some has led to renewed hostilities. See ibid., pg. 64-73.
between its own and other populations, between citizens and foreigners, ‘us’ and ‘them’. This imperative is a function of an international system of states which imposes upon member states, both liberal and illiberal, the need to organise themselves in such a way that they may possess an efficient control and administration of violence which, “provide[s] unlimited opportunities for domestic cruelty, external interventions that aggravate violence, bloody wars, and terrorism.”

The processes by which states develop and maintain their sovereignty requires not only that they be prepared to use violence externally against other states, but that they effectively control the means of violence within their own borders also. According to Giddens, modern states have enhanced their own domestic power by removing violent challengers to their authority within their borders and focussing their increased control of violence on the international realm of relations with other states. The state’s monopoly of violence however is perpetually challenged by “unruly others”, criminals, law-breakers, dissidents, or rebels whose threats must be controlled. The incidence of war on the international level therefore is but a continuation of processes of violence within states. Indeed as John Gray has noted, wars today “are often not fought [exclusively] by agents of sovereign states but... by political organisations, irregular armies, ethnic or tribal militias and other bodies that may owe allegiance to no sovereign state.” Warfare represents one part of the process by which states separate themselves from competing sources or units of power within and outside their borders. The maintenance of state sovereignty need not always be pursued in an aggressive manner, but the logic of bureaucratic and diplomatic decision-making entails that national interests are defined and defended as separable and sovereign and thereby each state confronts other states (or other challengers to their sovereignty) as potential aggressors. Michael Mann argues for example that the Vietnam and Falkland Islands wars each developed as a consequence of “essentially private, autonomous decisions” of bureaucrats and diplomats which confined the range of options each government felt

83 Hoffmann, S., op.cit., pg. 406.
able to take to pursue their interests until war seemed the most logical and effective means available.87

Realists accept the connection between sovereign states and warfare but are inclined to conclude as Hedley Bull put it, that warfare between states has “so far proved compatible with the survival of the human species, and indeed with the maintenance of civilised social life...”.88 From this perspective sovereign states present a reasonably effective means for managing global conflict, restricting it to a narrow range of circumstances subjected to rules of engagement, preventing the eruption of domestic conflicts onto the international scene, and thereby securing a tolerably stable order between sovereign entities. This conception of order rests on the notion that each state claims an exclusive right to control a domestic population by offering protection from other states or internal competitors by developing the capacity and capability to monopolise the use of violence. Warfare is interpreted as “organised violence” between sovereign “political units” which sanction, organise, authorise, and most importantly control, limit and confine violence.89 The assumption here is that states have in fact managed to limit both the incidence of war and the violence of warfare, and that under normal circumstances they preserve domestic peace. According to Charles Tilly however, states “commonly simulate, stimulate, or even fabricate threats” in order to foist their ‘protection’ upon a subject population from which it is able to extract resources (in the form of taxes or military service), thereby enhancing its own power by operating “in essentially the same ways as racketeers.”90 In early-modern Europe, and in parts of Africa today for example, waging wars stimulates the development of state structures designed to meet foreign and domestic threats and consolidates internal control through the development of a monopoly of the control of violence thereby eliminating internal rivals.91 Securing a monopoly of violence ensures that each state can then pursue the further extraction of more resources to drive its own external and internal consolidation. Limited liberal states developed in early-modern Europe Tilly.

89 Ibid., pg. 184-185.
91 Ibid., pg. 181.
suggests, because the protection they offered struck a fine balance between a monopoly of military power and a framework of formal, legal procedures and court structures which were used not only to secure domestic peace and security of property, but to limit state power. In “the increasing scale of war and the knitting together of the European state system through commercial, military, and diplomatic interaction” in the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries “the war-making advantage” was held by those states which had fostered market economies and were better able to develop standing armies.

In the process of waging war therefore, the states which had the greatest chances of surviving and thriving were those which provided a secure protection at home and fostered the most productive and efficient economies. This involved states in a host of non-military activities, such as infrastructural development, law enforcement, and administration. In the process however, modern European states acquired unprecedented military power (spurred by scientific and technological advancement) which in the twentieth-century, has resulted in the bloodiest conflicts and highest loss of life in war. The apparently ‘peaceful’ domestic activities of the state were interwoven therefore with an imperative to control and use violence, which as the twentieth-century has also shown, can be used as easily within as outside the state’s borders. It is in this sense that Lifton and Markusen referred to the “murderous lawfulness” of the Nazi state and the “relative niceness”, “civilised demeanour”, and “democratic convictions” of the defenders of the American nuclear arsenal, the ultimate form of genocidal weapon. The taint of genocidal violence can be seen in the history of many states, not simply those of Germany and Russia, but of apparently liberal-democratic states such as the United States, Canada, and Australia. The indigenous populations of these countries were subjected to genocidal policies until comparatively recently which were often tempered only by the feeling that such peoples were destined for extinction anyway.

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92 Ibid., pg. 186. An example of such limitations was the English Parliament’s abolition in the 1630’s of the Star Chamber and other courts used to assert the Royal Prerogative.
95 Tilly, C., op. cit., pg. 72-74.
From a Foucauldian or ‘governmental’ perspective, liberalism is seen as a rationality of government, a method of developing state power by promoting individual autonomy and freedom within market economies. This rationality revolves around the idea that a domestic population is best governed by shaping individual citizens who can be relied upon to govern themselves peacefully. The aims of this discourse, which previous chapters have attempted to trace, is to create a society of autonomous citizens whose conduct is self-regulated in accord with the expectation that each individual will participate in and contribute to the productivity of society. Enhancing social productivity is in turn pursued by encouraging each individual to pursue their own material advantage, thereby driving the national economy - from which the state benefits - by extending market disciplines, such as ‘rational’ economic planning and corporate management structures, throughout society in order to ensure maximum efficiency of production while minimising direct state involvement. On this view, liberal government and its doctrines of limited state power can be seen as a particularly successful manifestation of raison d'etat. The liberal state has enhanced its power by promoting individual liberty, and the foundations for this view were laid by earlier liberal theorists such as Montesquieu, Hume, Smith, and Kant. For its proponents, the success which liberal states have had in achieving international pre-eminence is a direct consequence of having pacified their own domestic populations and their relations with other liberal states. This view effectively places the onus of responsibility for causing violence onto non-liberal states and assumes that liberal states will pursue foreign policies consistent with and constrained by domestically pacific liberal institutions, values, and principles.

By tracing the origin of peace to the domestic structure of the state liberals are unable to account for the “interactive” nature of peace, that is, its emergence within the context of particular relationships between states. It may also be argued that it was the prior

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101 Ibid., pg. 287.
creation of “niches” of international peace that allowed the subsequent development of liberal states. Recent attempts have been made to re-conceptualise the nature of the relationship between states that transcends the conventional liberal focus on either domestic state structure or the global economy as the determinants of international peace. Samuel Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilisations* is one such attempt, and displays considerable scepticism of the claim made by democratic peace theorists that the global spread of democracy heralds the prospect of a lasting global peace. Huntington claims that the post-Cold War world is riven by massive cleavages between civilisational blocs within which individual states form a loosely aligned network of “kin” states. Within this framework of supra-national, cultural identity and political allegiance,

...the most pervasive, important, and dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural entities. Tribal wars and ethnic conflicts will occur within civilisations. Violence between states and groups from different civilisations, however, carries with it the potential for escalation as other states and groups from these civilisations rally to the support of their “kin countries”.

Importantly however, Huntington’s analysis while seeming to suggest that states can no longer be considered independent sovereign entities, relies nonetheless on the concept of the state as a vehicle of peace. In effect, much of the international instability Huntington fears is described as a consequence of modernisation which has created powerful non-Western states which now threaten the cultural hegemony of the West.

Huntington goes on to claim however, that the boundaries between states are being “redrawn to coincide with cultural ones” and indicates thereby that civilisational identity is coming to resemble state-hood. As a consequence civilisational conflict closely resembles state conflicts,

...the sources of conflict between states and groups from different civilisations are, in large measure, those which have always generated conflict between groups: control of people, territory, wealth, and

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103 Huntington, S., *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1996, pg. 28. Civilisations are defined as containing a set of shared norms, manners, and culture; they are broad and comprehensive, not limited by geography or national borders, they encompass regional entities (such as cities and states), often share the same or similar religion, have long life-spans through which they continue to evolve, and may contain any number of different political entities (such as empires, states, or tribes). Huntington lists as the major civilisational blocs in the world today, Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Latin-American, and possibly an African civilisation. *Ibid.*, pg. 40-7.
resources, and relative power, that is the ability to impose one's own values, culture, and institutions on another group...106

In this new world order, peace is to be secured by "core states" from which the dominant values and cultural identities emerge and who alone are capable of establishing order within their own civilisational bloc and between civilisations, through negotiation with other "core states". If peace is to be secured at all he concludes, core states must refrain from intervention in the affairs of states in other civilisational groupings, and be prepared to negotiate their differences with the states of other civilisational blocs peacefully.107

Huntington's analysis of civilisational conflict questions the liberal faith in the spread of peace through the universal acceptance of liberal democratic norms and values. As John Gray points out however, Huntington underestimates the degree to which states are agents of violence and conflict by entrusting to them, and to core states in particular, the task of creating and maintaining peace.108 In Chapter Four of this thesis it was also suggested that Huntington assumes that peace - domestic and global - is a quality of Western civilisation, and fears that the decline of the West will entail increasing instability, conflict and war. On this view, the problem of war is traced not to the nature of states but to the persistence of non-Western, illiberal states. By seeing the state itself as intimately linked to the problem of war, other liberal theorists have attempted to envisage a "cosmopolitan democracy", the extension of democratic norms of accountability and representation to the international realm, empowering people rather than their states.109 The central aim of cosmopolitan democracy is to entrench a system of rights and a network of protective agencies which "cut across the territorial boundaries of the nation-state."110 Cosmopolitan democracy is thus built upon the recognition that violence and abuses of human rights are not confined to illiberal states, but are perpetrated by all kinds of states and regimes.

106 Ibid., pg. 129.
107 Ibid., pg. 316.

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Part of the problem is that apparently peaceful states which do not employ violence against their own or other populations are caught in a web of international relations in which they cannot help but have a detrimental effect on the peoples of other states. In other words, the very system of competing sovereign states entails that each state privileges the interests of their own populations over those of other states, and the pursuit of those interests inevitably conflicts with the interests of other peoples and states. Cosmopolitan democracy rests on the promotion of a "transnational civil society" incorporating a multitude of non-government organisations, international agencies, and global pressure groups, constituting "the only vehicle for the promotion of the law of humanity... [and] humane geo-governance...", a kind of "globalisation-from-below" challenging the "prevailing dominance of globalisation-from-above...". This view recognises that state sovereignty enforces upon its claimants the need not only to organise for war, but to pursue interests which inevitably conflict with (and inflict suffering upon) the people of other states. Such decisions are a function of the moral quarantine exercised by state boundaries in which the pursuit and protection of a 'national interest' requires the defence of that interest against the interest of all others, often represented as the 'legitimate' defence of one's own peaceful interests against the illegitimate aggression of others. The exclusionary nature of state sovereignty results in a system of competing sovereign units whose own particular interests not only take precedence over the interests of others or of humanity as a whole, but the pursuit of which requires the internal organisation and management of domestic populations in order to maximise the state's ability to employ violence. The main weakness of cosmopolitan democracy is that it cannot convincingly explain how cosmopolitanism can be established in a global environment dominated by sovereign states. The successful resistance of transnational pressures by states such as Burma, China, Iraq, and Serbia leads to a less sanguine conclusion that the faith in international courts, multilateral agreements and a global civil society is relevant only to a world of states which choose to abide cosmopolitan institutions.

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It has been argued in this chapter that liberal international relations theory is informed by an implicit discourse of civilisation. The influence of this discourse can be seen in the tendency of liberal international relations theorists to assert the connection between liberal-democratic states and peace, and to attribute the persistence of violence and war to illiberal states. The prospects for peace are therefore identified as coeval with the prospects of liberal-democracy and the modern, Western civilisation which has given rise to it. Even where a theorist like Huntington questions the spread of liberal-democracy and fears the eclipse of Western civilisation, the contention is not that some other civilisation will establish peace, but that the peace of Western civilisation will be replaced by instability and war. What is feared is the rise of non-Western civilisations and illiberal states which are assumed to be more inclined to pursue their interests through violence. Violence and warfare are thereby associated, as both Montesquieu and Kant maintained, with the uncivilised and authoritarian conduct of illiberal and undemocratic states.

Violence is here represented as the illegitimate use of force to conquer and subdue others; it represents irrational and barbaric conduct. Francis Fukuyama for instance, argues that violence is a consequence of the desire to seek unilateral recognition, to subdue or subordinate others and thereby to gain recognition and respect. Violence is thereby equated with anti-liberal norms, a “warrior ethos” evident in the activities of “gangs” who “make their living dealing drugs”, or of others who “run around risking their lives in bloody battle over a name, or a flag, or a piece of clothing...”13 This is the violence of private war and conquest; it is the deliberate, unauthorised, and bloody suppression of liberal values and institutions often associated with the rise of fanatical nationalism or religious fundamentalism.14 On this view, violence can only consist in relations of domination which by their very nature cannot exist within liberal societies and states. This is the view most articulately expressed by Hannah Arendt for whom violence was a purely instrumental attempt of the one to overpower and subdue the collective and as such was antithetical to ‘power’, a quality which inhered only when individuals acted “in concert”.15 Within the liberal literature the presence of violence

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within liberal-democracies is either overlooked or ignored, and scant reference is made to the persistence of violence such as capital punishment, or the use of torture in putatively liberal and democratic states.\textsuperscript{116}

It is no coincidence that these forms of ‘authorised’ violence are ignored, because both are perpetrated by the functionaries of law and order against those who have been identified as threats to that order. This thesis has argued that liberal discourse has been resistant to viewing the actions of the upholders of law and order as violence. The reason for this is not that liberals employ some double-standard which excuses ‘authorised’ violence while condemning ‘unauthorised’ violence. Rather, liberal attitudes to violence have been shaped by a discourse of civilisation in which violence has been equated with barbarism and the ‘law of the jungle’ which threatens to intrude upon and destroy the security and safety of civil society. Civil society is the product of the civilising process, a social realm purged of violence in which the lives and properties of citizens are secured by democratic states with limited powers committed to preserving peace within their borders and extending it beyond them. Violence is most readily identified in the actions of those individuals who defy or threaten the civil order, those “single individuals” as Arendt put it who “refuse to be overpowered by the consensus of the majority.”\textsuperscript{117} Violence is thus confined by boundaries of definition which allow its identification in those actions which threaten the peace and disturb the order of civil society. In the process, ‘violence’ is distinguished from those acts by which the civil order is itself upheld, and from those which neither threaten nor defend civil society but merely persist within the supposedly peaceful realm of civil society. In the next and concluding chapter to this thesis, attention will turn to the ways in which the ‘problem’ of violence has been framed within recent literature on civil society.


\textsuperscript{117} Arendt, op. cit., pg. 119.
...the threat (and fear) of violence always seems to have been lurking behind the concern with civility. Uncivility [sic] was the ghost that permanently haunted civil society. In this respect, civilisation was normally understood as a project charged with resolving the permanent problem of discharging, defusing and sublimating violence; uncivility was the permanent enemy of civil society. Civilisation therefore denoted an ongoing historical process, in which civility, a static term, was both the aim and the outcome of the transformation of uncivil into civil behaviour.

This thesis has explored the development and implications of a liberal discourse of civilisation in which, as John Keane’s opening quotation illustrates, violence has been associated with an uncivilised and barbaric past. Liberal discourse on civilisation is premised on the view that civilised societies have managed to exclude barbarous violence from the sphere of civil interaction, the realm of civil society. In Chapter One it was argued that this exclusion had been achieved under the auspices of states which claimed a monopoly on the right to use violence within their borders. As Norbert Elias suggested however, it has also depended on the development of patterns of self-control, self-restraint and self-government which reduced the need for the state to use violence. Liberal discourse on civilisation has therefore been characterised by persistent attempts, explored in Chapters Five to Eight, to envisage a pacified civil realm inhabited by self-governed and self-restrained individuals. Much of this discourse has been concerned to identify the boundaries of civil society, within which peace reigns but outside which violence is tolerated or overlooked. Much effort has also been devoted to specifying how self-government and self-restraint can be achieved by the inhabitants of civil society and how, once achieved, they can be relied upon to prevent the transgressions of the boundaries of the civil realm and the contamination of civil society by violence. The result, as Chapters Two to Four outlined, is that liberalism has been shaped by the fear that the appearance of violence heralds the destruction of the rights and securities upon which civil society rests.

It has already been argued that boundaries which exclude violence from the ‘pacified’ realm of civil society, protected by the benign institutions of liberal-democratic states, also imply the acceptance of violence outside those boundaries. In the previous two chapters it has been argued that liberal international relations theory has been shaped by the assumption that there is a boundary separating the ‘inner’ realm of peace and security within liberal-democratic states, and an ‘outer’ realm of violence and warfare. The celebration of peace within the boundary has therefore been accompanied by the recognition of violence outside it. In this final and concluding chapter, attention will be turned to the boundaries operating within the apparently already pacified realm of liberal-democratic states and societies. It will be argued that the very conception of civil society itself relies upon the maintenance of boundaries which separate the sphere of peaceful civil interaction from those spheres in which violence is still accorded a
necessary or useful role. The effect of such boundaries has been to sustain the image of a pacified society despite an intensification of violence alongside the values and institutions which claim its elimination from civil society.

The concept of civil society has enjoyed a rather startling revival within social and political discourse. Political analysts grappled with the term in attempting to account for the sudden collapse of Eastern European Communist regimes.\(^1\) Political theorists have sought to reinterpret and reapply the concept, breaking it free from the legacy of Hegelian and Marxist thought, while philosophers have sought to revive related notions of civility and decency.\(^2\) International relations theorists have turned to the concept in the wake of ‘globalisation’ and the growing influence of transnational organisations.\(^3\) In the realm of public policy, civil society has been used as an ideal in shaping the determination of suitable ends for policy initiatives.\(^4\) What many of these approaches share is the concern to define civil society as “a space in which social groups could exist and move - something which exemplified and would ensure softer, more tolerable conditions of existence.”\(^5\) Civil society thus represents the culmination of the civilising process, a realm from which barbarism and violence have been eliminated.

In this concluding chapter, it will be argued that the conception of civilisation as a process of pacification based on the manifold disciplines of self-government and self-restraint explored in earlier chapters, has obscured the exclusion of some forms of

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\(^3\) For applications of civil society to international relations see the essays in D. Archibugi and D. Held (eds.), *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order*, Polity, Cambridge, 1995.

\(^4\) For examples of the use of the concept in relation to policy debates see Rorty, A.O., “From Decency to Civility by Way of Economics: ‘First Let’s Eat and Then Talk of Right and Wrong’”, *Social Research*, 64 (1), 1997, pg. 112-130; one should also note Eva Cox’s 1995 Boyer Lectures broadcast on ABC Radio entitled “A Truly Civil Society” in which she argued that the revival of civil society required the development and creative use of social capital. One should also note Robert Putnam’s *Making Democracy Work: Civil Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993, pp. 17-91. Putnam discusses a variety of policy issues which he relates more closely to the classical republican ideal of a “civic community” rather than the liberal ideal of a “civil society”.

violence from the civil realm and the intensification of others. Recent liberal literature on civil society, which will be discussed in the first section exemplifies this problem by accepting as axiomatic the assumption that the realm of civil society is a realm of peace which must be extended through the institutionalisation of democratic procedures. This assumption will be explored further in the second section in which it will be argued that within this recent literature the 'problem' of violence has been framed in such a way as to represent it as alien to the values and institutions of civil society. The third section will explore the implication that the concept of civil society leads to the acceptance of forms of violence outside the boundaries of civil society, in realms enclosed and partitioned from the public peace of civil society.

I. CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE

The current interest in civil society has been shaped by persistent attempts to broaden the concept beyond the confines of earlier notions of civil society centred on the realm of unhindered economic activity. In earlier chapters it was argued that civil society was initially conceived as a highly exclusive community of property-owning individuals engaged in contractual commercial activity with one another guarded by states whose function was to protect the economic liberty of the inhabitants of civil society. On this view the state occupied a separate but parallel dimension to the civil realm, guarding its boundaries from threats not only from other states and societies, but from those sectors of the domestic population who were excluded from civil society, such as women, labourers, 'master-less men', vagabonds, pirates, and the 'idle poor'. The image of civil society was thus conceived in terms of a tripartite relation between the state, the restricted circle of citizens in civil society, and the wider uncivil society of non-citizens. Considerable emphasis was placed in this literature on identifying the boundaries between civil society and the state on the one hand and the wider uncivil society on the other. These boundaries were then to be defended against incursion from either the state or from elements of uncivil society.

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Such conceptions of civil society often resembled pacts of mutual self-preservation, emphasising the peacefulness of civil society by juxtaposing it to a partly mythical state of nature characterised by continual violence. Hobbes and Locke are often considered exemplars of this approach, but Locke’s conception in particular was subtle and complex, drawing attention to the necessary but not always clear separation of private and public realms. Locke’s warning of the “great danger” consequent upon the interference of one sphere upon the other highlighted the precarious balance that civil society had to sustain between individual freedom and conscience on the one hand, and the public authority of binding laws on the other. Importantly, both Hobbes and Locke also distinguished between civil society and the pre-civil or uncivil communities evident in their comments on pirate organisations, the ancient Greeks, and American Indians. Throughout the eighteenth century, and in the thought of the Scottish Enlightenment in particular, civil society came to be seen as an exclusively Western European creation, a product of the process of civilisation which had rendered these societies peaceful and productive by introducing the practices of self-restraint and self-government. What this implied was that civil societies were one among a number of other varieties of association, but that only civil associations offered the protection, security, and rights required for a full and flourishing life. The chief distinction between civil and uncivil societies was that only civil societies encompassed the “properly political” aspirations of its inhabitants to seek an arrangement of public power consonant with private conscience and self-government.

On this view, civil society is a bounded entity, separate on the one hand from the confined and limited state which protects it, and from the wider and threatening uncivil societies and “outlawed spaces” which surround it. Recent literature on civil society however, has attempted to break free from this image of civil society as a restricted realm separated from and threatened by other entities and forms of association. Persistent attempts have been made to escape from the exclusivity of older conceptions

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12 Ibid., pg. 912.
by broadening membership of civil society to make it a more inclusive realm incorporating sections of social life previously excluded. As John Keane defines it,

...civil society can be conceived as an aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of non-state activities - economic and cultural production, household life, and voluntary associations - and who in this way preserve and transform their identity by exercising all sorts of pressures or controls upon state institutions.

The broadening of civil society to include those elements of the population excluded from previous definitions is pursued by attempting to separate the concept of civil society from attachment to the market. Keane’s definition for instance, incorporates the conventional conception of civil society as the sphere of relations free from state control, but widens it to include “a plurality of public spheres” beyond those of the economy. The attempt to separate civil society from the economy has been fuelled by fears that ‘economic rationalism’ - and with it ‘globalisation’ - threaten to reduce civil societies to mere productive units in a world economy. What lies behind such fears is that the market in fact threatens the very diversity and plurality of contemporary conceptions of civil society by reducing social interaction to the imperatives of profit maximisation. Consequently, proponents of civil society preach the value of its diversity and the “continuously shifting alliances” of groups and associations in civil society which prevent the ossification of settled and mutually antagonistic interests.

In recent literature it is the state that is seen as the vital mechanism by which this diversity within civil society may be protected not simply from the threat of violence (as in older accounts), but from the ‘straightening’ pressures and gross inequalities of the market. It is in this sense that the current literature identifies the democratic state as central to the viability of civil society, because the extension of legal, property and franchise rights that democracy promises offers scope for the continual expansion of civil society. The health of civil society in other words, requires support from a democratic state able to protect the disadvantaged and provide funding for non-economic community groups and initiatives. Such states are also thought to be

15 Ibid., pg. 14.
16 Ibid.
18 Rorty, A.O., loc.cit., pg. 124.
19 Keane, J., op.cit., pg. 19.
20 Ibid., pg. 22-23.
vulnerable to agitation and campaigns mounted by the members of civil society, and thereby the realm of civil society is identified as a continually expanding zone of interaction from which workers, women, racial or religious minorities are no longer excluded and indeed provided with particular forms of state support, such as child care, equal opportunity or anti-discrimination legislation to enable their wider participation. The state and civil society thus stand side-by-side as component parts of a democratic whole. As Michael Walzer puts it, the state “frames” and “fixes the boundary conditions and basic rules” of civil society, and in the process the state reflects the democratic spirit of civil society,

Only a democratic state can create a democratic civil society; only a democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state. The civility that makes democratic politics possible can only be learned in the associational networks; the roughly equal and widely dispersed capabilities that sustain the networks have to be fostered by the democratic state.21

Vibrant public debate appears to be one of the necessary criteria for the viability of civil society, which in John Hall’s words requires a “complex balance of consensus and conflict, the valuation of as much difference as is compatible with the bare minimum of consensus necessary for settled existence.”22 The prevailing orthodoxy of the current literature is that democracy, in Cohen’s words, is “the most plausible general framework” within which group conflicts can be “politically mediated” and compromise sought.23 Indeed the manifold organisations and open media of civil society are seen as a source of democratising pressure continually exerted on the hierarchical and straightening tendencies of the state and the market.24

Such conceptions of civil society are descriptions of an ideal which like all ideals, is defined by the reality that does not conform to it. As one recent commentator put it, civil society may, despite its European origins, “with luck, skill and imagination, spread

24 Ibid., pg. 97-99. In a more recent work, Cohen argues that civil society is “a sphere of social interaction distinct from economy and state, composed above all of associations (including the family) and publics. Modern civil society is created and reproduced through forms of collective action” quite separate from “political society” (parties, bureaucracies, parliaments) and “economic society” (corporations and unions). See Cohen, J., “Interpreting the Notion of Civil Society”, in M. Walzer (ed.), op. cit., pg. 37-39.
to some other regions of the world” where it is yet to make itself at home. This view implies that civil society possesses a particularity which other societies do not possess, and that societies of the latter variety are by definition uncivil. What is most civil about civil societies is that they are realms in which “basic social conditions” have been secured and relations between individuals have been pacified either by law, fear of punishment, or sublimation by economic competition or the disciplines of civil conduct. By eliminating violence from the sphere of civil society the prospect of domination, of rule by force or terror is averted and civil society remains an exclusive domain, “the space of uncoerced human association”. As one writer has put it, “the use of violence to adjudicate conflicts... permissible in earlier forms of society, are outlawed” in civil society, and all are subjected alike to the requirement that disputes be resolved through peaceful judicial means.

II. FRAMING THE ‘PROBLEM’ OF VIOLENCE

Despite recent efforts to transform it, the concept of civil society remains an exclusive ideal of boundaries which separate the realm of civility from barbarism and incivility. Civil society is as one writer put it,

...nothing other than a bounded community which divides the world into a milieu of those with whom it is acceptable and safe to associate, and a milieu of those with whom association is unacceptable and potentially dangerous. ...Outside of this society lies that society which is invariably defined as inferior and, to one degree or another, beyond the pale of association.

The exclusionary nature of civil society derived from the manifest dichotomy established within the discourse on civilisation between the civil realm of peace and a barbarous realm of violence. What is remarkable about the current revival of interest in the concept of civil society is that such exclusionary implications still inhere in the language used to revitalise and reinterpret the concept. Ernest Gellner’s spirited Conditions of Liberty for instance, speaks of civil society as a creation unique to what he calls “liberal civilisation”, the foundations of which rest in the “Atlantic society” of

26 Ibid., pg. 16.
27 Walzer, M., loc.cit., pg. 7.
28 Chandhoke, N., op.cit., pg. 186.
liberal states (by which he presumably means Western Europe, the United States and Canada).31 This ethnocentric account of civil society is reinforced by the view that the Western achievement of civil society is one of the key distinguishing features between Western civilisation and culture and its great Eastern rival - Islam - which has not achieved civil society because it displays a “strong tendency towards the establishment of an *Umma*, an overall community based on [a]... shared faith and the implementation of its law.”32

Gellner’s definition of civil society incorporates as its central element the contrast (and balance) between civil society as a realm of free activity and the state,

Civil Society is that set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent it from dominating and atomising the rest of society.33 That civil society could develop at all was due to the uniquely Western pairing of internal pacification with economic growth driven by the embrace of reason and science. Within civil societies wealth rather than domination became a new means of political power, thus averting to a considerable degree the need for coercive violence.34 The capacity for violence was thus increasingly divorced from civil society and placed in the hands of states. Such states Gellner argues, developed more powerful monopolies of violence than their competitors, but were also rendered less harmful to the civil societies that provided them with the financial means for sustaining their monopolies. In other words, these states accepted limitations on their internal powers in order to gain thereby the increased revenues from flourishing market economies, and therefore became “even more effective militarily than the societies based on and practising the old martial values”,

Nations of shopkeepers, such as the Dutch and English, organised in relatively liberal polities, repeatedly beat nations with... martial and ostentatious aristocracies, addicted to the values of aggression and war.35

In liberal polities violence was used predominantly to further the economic interests of society, and war became “...a continuation of commerce by other means...” 36

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32 Ibid., pg. 21 and 26. See also, 26-27, 36-43.
33 Ibid., pg. 5. {Gellner capitalises Civil Society throughout}
34 Ibid., pg. 73-75.
35 Ibid., pg. 32-33.
Gellner's analysis is premised on the view discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, that civil society is the outcome of a civilising process in the West driven by the state's successful monopolisation of violence which created "pacified zones" within society in which individual self-government could be relied upon to maintain the public peace.\footnote{Ibid., pg. 67.}

The self-government of individuals is the foundation of what Gellner believes to be the decisive characteristic of liberal civil societies namely, "modularity", a term which conveys a conception of social order which, like modular furniture, can be assembled and re-assembled by combining free-standing units which can either be used in conjunction with other units or on their own.\footnote{Elias, N., The Civilising Process, Volume II, Power and Civility [1939], translated by E. Jephcott, Pantheon Books, New York, 1982.} The social order created by such modular selves is one in which each unit is radically individualised, and interaction with other "genuinely independent productive and property-controlling units" does not compromise or impair their capacity to function independently.\footnote{Gellner, E., op. cit., pg. 100.} The 'modular' social order is mediated by contracts between mutually independent and productive selves whose singularity ensures vigorous competition in the market as a counter-balance to the totalising power of the state. In arguing so Gellner makes civil society a function of economic development, and argues that Third World economies are too weak to prevent the domination of self-serving state elites whose activities ensure persistently low levels of economic development and high levels of internal violence. Both of these features are entirely incompatible with the "values and assumptions" of civil society which require citizens to "shed their side arms" and engage in the peaceful pursuit of improved productivity.\footnote{Ibid., pg. 88.} Despite the high levels of gun ownership and violence in 'civil' societies such as the United States, Gellner's image of liberal civil societies is one from which violence has been purged, stored unthreateningly in the institutions of limited, democratic states. This image is sustained by contrasting the apparent peacefulness of Western societies to the endemic violence and tyranny of non-Western societies.

Gellner draws attention in his analysis of civil society, to the very same features of the liberal discourse on civilisation outlined in Chapter One of this thesis, and in particular, the successful purging of violence from significant areas of social life by the inculcation

\footnote{Gellner, E., op. cit., pg. 100.}
of habits of self-restraint under the auspices of a constitutionally limited, monopoly state. More recently however, liberals on both the ‘right’ such as John Gray, and those on the ‘left’ like John Keane, have been concerned that this ‘grand narrative’ of a global liberal civilisation can no longer be sustained. They have reacted by trying to un-couple the concept of civil society as a pacified zone from its deep association with an overarching discourse of civilisation, progress and the global triumph of liberalism. Gray in particular has been animated by the desire to separate himself from what he derisively calls the “Panglossian liberalisms of the Enlightenment” which emphasised a necessary connection between liberal institutions and social harmony.41

Concerned by the growing divergences of lifestyles and moral choices in modern societies, Gray initially sought a genuine “post-liberalism” shorn of an Enlightenment faith in the progress of civilisation, but which reaffirmed “the living kernel of liberalism”, civil society.42 For Gray civil society consisted precisely in that sphere of social interaction suppressed by totalitarian states, namely, the “sphere of autonomous institutions, protected by a rule of law, within which individuals and communities possessing divergent values and beliefs may coexist in peace.”43 Contemporary Western liberal states however, were criticised on the grounds that even under neo-liberal governments they retained too much control over economic resources which prompted incessant conflicts over the distribution of those resources, in which groups pursued the advantage of being defined as ‘underprivileged’ or ‘deprived’.44 Gray’s position here stood in contrast to those conceptions of civil society discussed in the first section in which the state had an active role to play in enhancing the life of civil society through the enactment of affirmative action or other enabling legislation to promote the interests of various minority groups.

Gray argued that civil society was best able to secure peace and prosperity for its members when the state’s role was restricted to the provision and enforcement of a system of laws, and individual rights were accorded respect as the basis of the social order. The commitment to individual rights also committed him to the acceptance of the

40 Ibid., pg. 179, 193.
43 Ibid., pg. 157.
essentially incommensurable life-styles, moral choices, and desires of individuals and groups within society. Only civil societies were capable of accommodating such incommensurability and ensuring 'peaceful coexistence'. This conviction was based on the recognition that "civil war or strife is a great evil, threatening all modes of commodious living", which civil society averted by the "unending pursuit of a provisional modus vivendi" which reduced "to a minimum the decisions on which recourse to collective choice - the political or public choice that is binding on all - is unavoidable." Gray discredited alternatives to what he called "the modernist movement toward civil society" as reversions to "barbarism and poverty", but noted also that the expectation of a "universal" triumph of civil society may well be misplaced.

Gray has subsequently amplified these concerns by arguing that his earlier 'post-liberal' faith in civil society was "mistaken", and now favours a "political and legal pluralism" based on securing peace through recognition for "different communities" and "distinct jurisdictions". This shift is a significant move away from the earlier individualism of post-liberal civil society toward an arrangement whereby different groups may be able to be accommodated together which "does not presuppose, or entail, endorsement of the central institutions of Western civil society." The pluralism of which he speaks here similarly does not necessarily imply dependence on liberal or democratic political forms. Pluralism is called forth by the incommensurability between "individual plans of life and personal conceptions of the good" and hence accepts that any "ways of life embodying genuine forms of human flourishing" are to be tolerated, even illiberal ones. This "agonistic liberalism" is premised on the recognition that conflict within and between "liberal ...and other forms of life" is "an ineliminable and therefore permanent feature of the human condition". This position is contrasted to the prevailing liberal orthodoxy on value-neutrality which he believes is a recipe for social disintegration and the intensification of the incommensurability of moral choices. Value-neutrality is based he argues, on the 'Panglossian' assumption that different

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44 Ibid., pg. 211-214.
45 Ibid., pg. 315.
46 Ibid., pg. 318, 320.
48 Ibid., pg. 137.
49 Ibid., pg. 141.
50 Ibid., pg. 68.
groups within society will accept the equal right of all other groups to live as they do, and ignores the necessity for some common or shared understandings to bind society together. Agonistic liberalism on the contrary, privileges the toleration of difference based on an underlying broad consensus on the limits of appropriate conduct. Gray's position amounts to a rejection of the traditional "liberal project" of a global peace achieved through the triumph of liberal civilisation, and an acceptance of the inevitability of conflict in which only toleration and a commitment to pluralism offer the hope of securing a continually re-negotiated "peaceful modus vivendi".

The concern animating Gray's revision of his earlier 'post-liberalism' appears to be the fear of incessant conflict between the identities and choices of groups within society which modern states lack the will or the capacity to restrain. His repeated insistence on the need for a 'peaceful' modus vivendi indicates a fear that such conflict entails the possibility if not the reality of 'atavistic' violence, a reversion to what Schumpeter once called "bloody primitivism". Although modern liberal societies have been quite adept at accommodating different individuals and groups choosing widely divergent life-styles and moral choices, violence persists in such societies not as 'primitivism' nor because of weakened states, but as an intractable feature of modern societies fuelled by the supreme value placed on individual rights. In some cases, and especially in the United States for instance, the 'right' to own firearms has massively contributed to high homicide rates, and to frequent armed challenges to the state's monopoly of violence. It may of course be objected that this is an extreme case, as the passing of far more stringent gun laws in Australia following the Port Arthur massacre in 1996 indicates that in Australia at least governments are occasionally willing to "override arguments about individual rights". Nonetheless, there is still a widespread view that the inhabitants of supposedly peaceful

51 Ibid., pg. 22-29.
52 Ibid., pg. 140-141.
54 I am indebted to Christine Standish of the University of Tasmania for this point. On Gray's position see his Post-Liberalism, pg. 318; the quotation is taken from Schumpeter, J., Imperialism and Social Classes [1919], translated by H. Norden, Augustus M. Kelley Inc., New York, 1951, pg. 44.
55 Nichols, R., "Gunning for Freedom: Arms, Anti-Statism and the Right in America", Arena Journal, 7, 1996, pg. 17. Here Nichols writes that "America's 260 million people are currently estimated to possess at least 220 million guns" boosting the homicide rate to eight times that found in England, and four times of Australia's. Sixty per cent of all homicides in America are inflicted by guns, and Nichols concludes that the persistent challenges to the state from armed militias indicates that by Weberian standards, "contemporary America lacks a proper 'state." Ibid., pg. 22.
civil societies have a right to possess firearms for their “personal defence” against both the state and other individuals. The widespread ownership of such devices however, merely ensures that they are regularly used not in legitimate cases of self-defence (whatever they might be), but in innumerable cases of domestic violence and petty street crime.

Even where the persistence of such violence is acknowledged, civil society is still defended as a solution to the problem of violence. This defence hinges upon the way in which the ‘problem’ is framed, as John Keane’s insightful Reflections on Violence demonstrates. Keane questions the teleological assumptions implicit in the liberal discourse of civilisation and civil society, but does so be reiterating the relevance of the distinction between civil and uncivil societies. Although he denies that civil societies are completely pacified zones, he goes on to stipulate that civil societies may actually “regress” into less civilised conditions, clearly denoting an assumption that ‘incivility’ represents a retrograde condition. In order to hold back such a regression, he suggests a revival of interest in civility, indeed a “politics of civility”, the purpose of which is to ‘publicise and reduce’ recurrent forms of violence and exploitation, the most important of which relate to the monopoly of violence held by modern states. What Keane has most in mind here is the “rational-calculating use of violence as a technique of terrorising and demoralising” populations through war or the threat of it, programs of terror, or ‘ethnic cleansing’, all of which represent revivals of incivility.

The democratic overtones of Keane’s discussion are deliberate, for the survival of civil society in the face of potentially massive state violence requires the “democratisation of the means of state violence”, that is, the subjection of those who have control over the state’s monopoly of violence to public scrutiny and supervision. What he has in mind here is not simply the institutions of popular election which have often been ineffective in preventing violence, but “organised citizen’s initiatives” for peace or against war.

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59 Ibid., pg. 22, 28.
60 Ibid., pg. 31.
61 Ibid., pg. 44.
62 Ibid., pg. 50-51.
This ‘politics of civility’ he argues, is a vibrant affirmation of the purpose of modern, democratic, civil societies, a form of “resistance to intrusive and violent forms of state power that... restrict and overwhelm the plurality of independent associations that are the stuff of which civil society (ideally) consists.”

The reality however, is that incivility is a “chronic feature” of all societies and may dominate social interaction resulting in increases in acts of violence which are described as “prima facie incompatible with the civil society rules of solidarity, liberty and equality of citizens.” For Keane then, violence is uncivil and is by definition inconsistent with the conditions of civil society. Although violence may persist in even the most civil of societies, he argues that it is a regrettable fact which - if the society in question is truly civil - remains relatively limited by the prevailing civil peace. In arguing so, Keane wishes to distance his own account of civil society from the exclusivity of earlier notions which identified violence as the artefact of a pre-civil or uncivilised barbarism. It is not at all clear however, that Keane manages to escape just this sort of dichotomy because at significant junctures his approach to violence belies a tendency to see violence as both uncivil and barbaric.

Violence occurs in civil society Keane argues, because of the very complexity of modern civil societies which present individual citizens with a bewildering array of pressures and influences, competing values, and contradictory signals which tend to “unnerve and disorientate” citizens. Here Keane assumes that because humans are “prone to stress, anxiety and revenge” the complex social and economic pressures of modern society (such as unemployment or anomie) cause “anxiety and frustration [which] encourages violent responses...” resulting in “archipelagos of incivility within an otherwise civil society...”. This approach places violence in the category of the irrational; an instinctive or pre-reflexive response to a triggering stimulus, such as “confusion, fatigue, ambivalent feelings of love and hate... emotionally and intellectually impoverished visions... [or merely] a crazed decision to murder...”. He observes that many contemporary terrorists and guerilla fighters behave as if “autistic”,
and that urban gangs “mindlessly” seek to gratify their “private fantasies” through violence and “take leave of sense itself”. Even the emergence of nationalism is interpreted as an attempt to resolve the ambivalence and confusion of modern society by imposing upon it an artificial unity with a “fanatical core”. Analyses such as this are premised upon the questionable assumption explored in Chapter Four of this thesis, that emotional imbalance or psychological distortion brought about by social or economic pressures results in a ‘moral short-circuit’ which makes violence likely. On this view violence is equated with sub-rational, pre-reflexive, instinctual or natural forces which are normally restrained by civilised individuals who have learned to use reason to restrain their impulses, and to govern themselves appropriately. Despite his endeavour to escape from the implicitly teleological and ethnocentric language of civil society, Keane’s analysis of violence tends to fall-back on many of the assumptions of this earlier discourse.

The current spate of bitter conflicts in Algeria, Bosnia, Kossovo, and Afghanistan for instance are described as “uncivil wars” which expose the fragility of civil society. What is striking about Keane’s analysis of ‘uncivil wars’ is his reliance upon the old dichotomy between a civil and uncivil condition, in which civility denotes order, rules, and restraint, while incivility conveys a sense of uncontrolled, irrational and barbarous violence. He argues for instance, that many contemporary conflicts “lack any logic or structure” defying the “sober restrictions covering the ground rules of war” causing massive and apparently senseless slaughter and terror. Despite Keane’s criticism of his approach we hear in these arguments a distinct echo of Adam Ferguson’s conviction that a central standard of civilisation was the development in the West of strict rules and codes of war. Modern uncivil wars Keane contends, disrupt the order of civil societies, “produce chaos” and,

...ransack the legal monopoly of armed force long claimed by states; they put an end to the distinction between war and crime; ensuring that conflict degenerates into ‘criminal anarchy’... into deathly destruction and self-destruction...
Keane also resurrects the Kantian dictum that “war is often bad for business”, not only in consuming valuable profits and destroying property and vital infrastructure, but in wasting the “dense and delicate forest of nonviolent civil institutions” upon which a healthy market economy depends.

Keane contends that the greatest hope of reducing violent incivility lies in the defence and extension of public debate within civil society itself because there is a “categorical tension” he claims, between violence and free public debate which subjects the violent to public scrutiny, criticism and ridicule, and provides a medium for offering victims sympathy and support. Public debate has certainly played a role in reshaping public attitudes to violent phenomena such as corporal punishment and may still play a useful role in campaigns against female genital mutilation, child abuse, and animal cruelty. But public debate may itself be strictly limited and its applicability determined not only by the vigour of public debate, but the instruments of publicity, and the responsiveness of both victims and perpetrators. It is often the case for example, that people who suffer violence are unwilling to talk about it, or even to see their sufferings as ‘violent’. As the literature on rape laws indicate, the publicity of trial can often be a painful experience for those who seek redress, and therefore acts as a deterrent to others to publicise their own experiences. The effectiveness of publicity is also limited when the perpetrators can obtain protection from the law, where the violence is implicitly or explicitly sanctioned by the authorities (as is often the case with torture of political prisoners), or where there is substantial community sympathy for it (as in cases of racist violence). The right to free speech itself may be no real defence against violence where for example, it is used as a defence for the publication of all kinds of offensive, violent, racist, and sexist material. Where the publication of material such as pornography, has contributed to violence perpetrated on the individuals or groups represented in that material as targets for violence, the ‘liberal’ right to free speech itself is implicated in

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73 Ibid., pg. 154-155.
74 Ibid., pg. 166.
the perpetration of that violence. It also makes the alleviation of suffering more difficult because the violence is perpetrated under the legal protection afforded by a right to free speech which is zealously guarded against infringement. It is also doubtful that free speech and publicity has much hope of reducing violence beyond the confines of the society in which it occurs. Maximum publicity failed to prevent slaughter in the former Yugoslavia, violent persecution in Palestine, or genocide in Cambodia.

None of these are arguments against publicising violence of course, but the problematic assumption which lies behind the strategy of publicity is that the reduction of violence is best pursued within democratic civil societies. Here again we return to the problem of exclusivity within the liberal discourse of civility and civil society; peace is seen as a condition secured by the practices of civility nurtured within the cradle of civil society. The democratic procedures which are assumed to be vital to civil society ensure that campaigns to publicise and thereby reduce violence remain centred on life within civil society. The corresponding assumption is that those who live in civil society have already achieved a substantial pacification of their relations with one another, and are therefore best placed to achieve further reductions of violence. This is but a restatement of the conviction central to liberal discourse, explored in earlier chapters and especially in Chapter Nine, that civil societies are those characterised by a secure internal peace. Faith in the peacefulness of civil societies however, masks the extent to which violence not only persists within liberal civil societies, but has actually been encouraged and intensified by the very values and institutions which claim its elimination.

III. DISCIPLINED CRUELTY, CIVILISED VIOLENCE

It has been argued throughout this paper that the early-modern and contemporary discourse of civil society is premised on exclusivity. This exclusivity expresses itself most clearly in the dichotomy between the peace of civil society and the barbarous violence of ‘uncivil’ societies. Consequently the discourse of civil society, in both its modern and earlier variations, represents violence as an outburst of irrationality, a

77 MacKinnon, C.A., “The Roar on the Other Side of Silence” in C.A. MacKinnon and A. Dworkin (eds.), In Harm’s Way: The Pornography Civil Rights Hearings, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1997, pg. 7. Of course the hearings documented in this book provide some substance to the claim that public debate may offer hope that violence at least can be addressed; but where such public debate challenges the deeply entrenched belief in the necessity for free speech, its chances of reducing violence seem remote.
throw-back to some precivil condition, or as a wild "untamed fragment of nature". Violence thus appears in this discourse as a problem; it is seen as a threat to civil society and its elimination is required in order for civil society to be secured. I am not of course suggesting that violence is unthreatening or unproblematic; rather, that the discourse of civil society defines the problem of violence in such a way that it masks the insinuation of violence within civil society. The idea that civil societies are those in which substantial pacification of individuals and society as a whole has been accomplished, rests on the mistaken premise that violence is equivalent to brutality and barbarism and that because the civilising process which gave rise to civil societies involves the transcendence of brutality and barbarism, violence - *ipso facto* - has been eliminated. Violence is conceived as a deliberate choice to engage in an act of brutality which defies the rules of lawful, orderly social conduct. This assumption leads to the mistaken attribution of violence largely (if not solely) to those who resist or defy the law while exonerating those who use violence to uphold it. The role of violence in the creation and maintenance of normal, civil order is thereby ignored leading to the misleading assumption that that order is free of violence.

This thesis has argued that liberal discourse on civilisation represents liberal civil societies as realms from which violence has been largely expunged. As a consequence, liberalism has been characterised by the tendency to interpret violence as a reversion to barbarism, as the wilful, malicious, infliction of pain upon others, abrogating their rights as fellow citizens of civil society. Such acts constitute a ‘problem’ and are to be suppressed, but such an approach is based on a restriction of what constitutes violence. The appearance of other forms of violence within civil societies is either ignored or tolerated by defining them as unproblematic, restricted to areas where it cannot intrude upon the relations of civil society. Many have drawn attention, for instance, to the violence of the law. "Legal interpretation" Cover argued “takes place in a field of pain and death” occasioning the “imposition of violence upon others” leaving behind “victims whose lives have been torn apart by these organised, social practices of violence.” The argument developed in this chapter however, is not simply that liberal


civil societies rely on forms of violence which are systematically obscured, but that liberal conceptions of violence both restrict the extent of the ‘problem’ of violence and make that problem intractable.

Recent feminist literature for example, suggests that the extent and nature of violence against women (and others) in civil societies is misconstrued in liberal literature. Much of this violence is gendered insofar as women are targeted as women. This goes well beyond the conventional liberal view that violence consists in acts of individual malice which merely obscures the regularity of violence against women, perpetrated not by malicious individuals at random but by a very high proportion of ‘normal’ men in the context of ‘normal’ families. The social context of violent men is such that they do not merely interact in transparent relations with other individuals, but are decisively shaped by the context in which they act. In other words, their actions alone do not constitute the context in which they interact; that context is in part pre-constituted and makes particular forms of action probable or likely. Male violence against women is therefore enabled by the condition of patriarchy which, as Millett observed, ‘pervades’ and shapes self-development and interaction with others. Such violence has traditionally been overlooked within liberal discourse because most of it occurs in the private sphere of the home and family “in which male domination... traditionally realises and asserts itself.” Marital rape, domestic violence, child abuse, and routine exploitation of female labour in the home have all taken place against the backdrop of an uneven distribution of power between the sexes. As Elizabeth Stanko put it, such violence is a “manifestation of male domination” which is “not prohibited” but “regulated” as a legitimate power “afforded to men as a gender over women as a gender.” In other words, male violence against women is deeply ingrained and shapes, even when not directly present, the lives and expectations of men and women.

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80 An exception to this observation is John Keane’s *Reflections on Violence.*
83 Walby, S., *op.cit.*, pg. 143.
The focus on the peace of the public realm of interaction in civil society thus obscures the extent of violence in the private sphere and contributes to the unwillingness of political and legal systems to enforce women’s rights through effective intervention.87 Marilyn French has argued that acts of violence against women are employed to reinforce the subordinate position of women in those societies; such acts include forced marriage and childbirth, rape, domestic violence, genital mutilation, the regular abortion of female foetuses and the killing of baby girls in some societies.88 According to French, such acts “could not be as epidemic” as they are “without the cooperation of the entire social system...[and the] firm backing” of political and legal institutions.89

Violence against women is clearly implicated in the maintenance of and contributes to the unequal power relationship between men and women in society, and often still receives official sanction from the courts, or is demonstrably lightly punished. Thus Edwards argues that current legal systems overwhelmingly construe violence narrowly, emphasising visible physical harm (such as broken bones and puncture wounds) inflicted by weapons, and excluding intimidation, harassment, and even rape.90 In this way, legal systems often perpetrate a form of violence against women who seek redress. Police inaction if not overt hostility to complaints, non-prosecution and comparatively light sentences for offenders, and the notorious ‘second rape’ of court room cross-examination (often involving the accusation that the survivor was responsible for initiating the attack) all intensify the harm already suffered by survivors of violence. Furthermore, this has resulted in the virtual omission of the responsibility of violent men for their actions, and has contributed to keeping a great many cases of routine


88 French, M., The War Against Women, Summit Books, New York, 1992, pg. 118. French quotes the estimation of Amartya Sen that over 100 million women have been killed by such means as part of “...men’s purposeful policy...” and she asks, “If this figure referred to a religious, ethnic, or racial group, we would be using the term ‘genocide’”. French also refers to pornography as encouraging male “sexual terrorism and the subordination of women.” Ibid., pg. 168. For feminist analyses of rape as violence see Brownmiller, S., Against Our Will; Men, Women and Rape, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1973; and Card, C., “Rape as a Terrorist Institution” in R.G.Frey and C.W.Morris (eds.), Violence, Terrorism, and Justice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pg. 296-319.

89 French, M., op.cit., pg. 182.

violence against women out of the courts altogether.91 The relations which sustain the civil realm therefore go beyond the very public relations between individual citizens, or between competing interest groups, and includes the largely hidden relations of power between men and women separated from the ‘public’ realm. Such ‘private’ relations of power shape the construction of self-identity and the self-expectations of individual men and women, and hence have important implications for the ‘public’ position of men and women, largely determining how easy or difficult it will be for them to access social resources.92

While the civilising process has unquestionably resulted in a greater intolerance for some forms of violence such as public executions, torture, and the maintenance of private armies, other forms of violence remain. According to Elias, the civilising process does not eliminate violence as such but has merely removed it, shunted it behind the scenes of the everyday life, locked it up in the barracks and prisons, or replaced it by less physical forms of violence such as economic competition. All the same he argues, we are better off for it because violence is now a less obvious and threatening presence in the life of society. As we saw in the first chapter however, Zygmunt Bauman argued that as we have become more ‘civilised’ so too has our violence, and we fail now to notice it at all.93 Civilisation may have removed some forms of violence from everyday life, but it has done so only by making state violence and genocide a much more real and frightening possibility. Bauman’s critique of modernity hits hard at the raw nerves of the self-image of our age. But Bauman’s alarmist critique tends to ignore the disquieting possibility that although admittedly horrific, episodes of genocide are just that, episodes of terror in an otherwise less spectacular, less noticeable continuum of everyday violence and repressed suffering which goes on under our very noses. What Bauman does not discuss is the possibility that violence is not recognised because it is merely one among a whole range of human behaviours which like all other behaviours (modes of dress, speech, gestures) is prone to

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change, alteration and cultivation. To blame violence - or genocide at least - on the artificiality of modern modes of thought leaves us without a clue as to how to explain the very ubiquity of violence throughout all societies, in every age, throughout recorded history. What is important about this recognition is that it requires us to understand how violence is understood and why it is defined in one way rather than another. The first four chapters of this thesis attempted to demonstrate that liberal thought is premised on a limited conception of violence which was traced in later chapters to a discourse on civilisation.

If violence lies at the very heart of modern, civilised, disciplined societies it is not barbaric, savage violence, nor is it episodic, genocidal violence; it is rather a more common place, often unnoticeable violence which shapes and moulds our conduct or is inscribed within the very structures and values of civil society. Foucault’s work on the disciplinary society and governmentality point toward this interpretation; in an unforgettable phrase he suggested that “[w]e are now far away from the country of tortures, dotted with wheels, gibbets, gallows, pillories.”94 Modern societies are no longer dominated by the spectacle of violent and tortuous executions, and have substituted for it penal institutions “linked to a whole series of ‘carceral’ mechanisms... intended to alleviate pain, to cure, to comfort... [and] which all tend, like the prison, to exercise a power of normalisation. [...]all resting on] techniques, ‘sciences’ that permit the fabrication of the disciplinary individual.”95 Nonetheless, Foucault also suggested that the positive power over the life and health of individuals magnified in modern civil societies was matched by a corresponding enhancement of the modern state’s capacity to inflict massive violence and death. Foucault’s explanation of why these two effects of power should manifest themselves together remains incomplete because it is unclear what significance is attributed to the development of the monopoly of violence by modern states. The connection Foucault identifies between “life-administering” power and the “formidable power of death” in modern states rests on the fact that power in modern states is now “exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and... population” and consequently, this imbues the exercise of power with the need to use


95 Foucault, M., *Discipline and Punish*, pg. 308.
violence to ensure the physical survival of the race or population, resulting in the intensification of violence in warfare and genocide.\textsuperscript{96} This analysis implies however, that the increased potential for violence in modern states is part of the self-consciousness of civil society, and thereby underestimates the degree to which modern civil societies rest upon a sweeping \textit{denial} of violence which was traced in the development of a liberal discourse on civilisation in chapters Five to Nine.

Michael Shapiro has recently written of the moral and physical "distantiation" which became the hallmark of modern military technology, allowing the development of a massive potential for violence held by the same states which nurture and protect domestic civil societies.\textsuperscript{97} This increased potential for violence is only partly explicable as a consequence of the modern state's monopoly of violence, and arguably less explicable as a result of the development of modern "life-administering power". The unprecedented concentration of specific technologies of war and genocide has largely been developed in states and societies which see themselves as having transcended violence. The peculiar accomplishment of the liberal discourse on civilisation is that its greatest influence is exerted in states and societies which possess a frightful capacity to inflict violence in the name of pacified civil societies from which violence - the barbarous and cruel infliction of pain on others - has been (largely) expunged. This is clearly the view shared by many in Australian society (and the current and former governments) of their history, which shuns the record of genocidal acts and policies unquestionably directed at the original inhabitants of this land.\textsuperscript{98} This systematic attack upon and dispossession of the Aboriginal peoples of Australia had been obscured until very recently, by the legal fiction that the continent was 'discovered' in 1788 and found to be unoccupied and empty. Such violence "did not occur in single acts of policy centred on state or para-state agencies like the Nazi Holocaust" but was "irregular, decentralised" though nonetheless "persistent, organised violence" driven by public


\textsuperscript{97} Shapiro, M., \textit{Violent Cartographies, Mapping Cultures of War}, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1997, pg. 75-80.

opinion and the very citizens who accepted that it was their “civilising mission” to use this violence against the uncivilised.99

For Lawrence Keeley the modern intensification of the violence of warfare is attributable simply to the “vastly greater resources” that “civilised societies” are able to deploy.100 The study of warfare in so called ‘primitive’ or tribal societies reveals that such societies were no less violent than modern societies, and that on the contrary, “peace was a scarcer commodity for members of bands, tribes, and chiefdoms than for the average citizen of a civilised state.”101 Indeed, in a manner reminiscent of Ferguson’s celebration of Western warfare Keeley suggests that the armies of civilised states are more inclined than ‘primitive’ warriors to clemency and mercy toward their vanquished foes, and seek mere “submission” of enemies rather than “genocide”.102 ‘Primitive’ warfare however, “consists of war stripped to its essentials: the murder of enemies; the theft or destruction of their sustenance, wealth, and essential resources; and the inducement in them of insecurity and terror.”103 In these circumstances, high levels of combatant casualties, property destruction, and the obliteration of any distinction between combatants and noncombatants are to be expected, and the claim that modern warfare is in fact more prone to these phenomena is unsustainable. The argument of this thesis however, does not call into question a continuity between ‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’ violence, but suggests that there are powerful reasons for supposing that in modern civilised states and societies violence may perhaps be more widespread, but is certainly more lethal owing to the development of the technology of killing.

In modern civilised societies many types of violence are administered insofar as the incidence of such acts invites the sanction of the law administered by the police, the courts, and penal or ‘correctional’ institutions.104 The objects of this ‘administration’ are

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101 Ibid., pg. 39.
102 Ibid., pg. 87.
103 Ibid., pg. 75.
104 According to Foucault the prison system does not ‘correct’ but administers criminality. It is through association with the prison system that inmates can be watched, interrogated, become informants and lock most inmates into a life of crime which effectively isolates the individual criminal from public sympathy and support. The modern ‘criminal’ is not the ‘highway man’, ‘pirate’, ‘bush ranger’ or ‘bandit’ of pre-modern societies. In modern societies, criminality is perceived as a social problem and the criminal as an
the perpetrators of those ‘barbarous’ and ‘cruel’ acts which transgress the boundaries of civil society and intrude upon and interfere with the processes of discipline which create self-governing, productive, autonomous citizens. Violence which does not intrude upon this process attracts less attention (and consequently fewer sanctions) because it is confined to areas of social life in which it presents little or no threat to the aims and purposes of productive society. In other words, violence which is carefully contained within boundaries which exclude it from civil society is regarded as less problematic than violence which is not so contained. The boundaries of civil society largely exclude the violence of the private sphere or that of the moral nether-world of the prisons from consideration because both occur outside the public, civil realm. Much of the violence within the prison system for instance, is perpetrated by inmates on other inmates within the physical and moral confines of a system which has been purposely isolated from the rules, rights and regulations of civil society. While few could deny that the violence occurs, the point is that it is not perceived to be as much of a problem as violence on the streets for example. One is contained within walls and is perpetrated by and on those who have been (temporarily) suspended from civil society. The other occurs in the heart of civil society and endangers the security and liberties upon which civil societies rest.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has argued that modern liberalism has been shaped by an implicit discourse of civilisation in which violence is seen as extrinsic to the life of civil society - hidden away in the private sphere or confined within the walls of institutional structures. When violence appears in civil society, it is decried as the brutal and undisciplined act of the uncivilised, those who have been unable to benefit from the civilising process and remain, despite their modern appearance, barbarians in modern society. If violence occurs in civil society, it appears as John Keane put it as an “archipelago of incivility in an otherwise civil society”. But the violence that is being referred to here is of a particular kind; it is obvious, deliberate, and physical; it occurs outside of institutional control and sanction; it is undisciplined and appears to be spontaneous; it links victim anti-social individual. As Manning Clark made clear in his monumental History of Australia, the ‘bush ranger’ was a kind of social rebel, a focus for political and social opposition and a far more costly and dangerous problem for the authorities than mere petty criminality. The official response to bushranging he also points out, was conditioned by the conviction that such “outlaws and ruffians” were no more than “bush barbarians” to be forcibly suppressed by “the forces of order and civilisation”. The transformation of the ‘social bandit’ into the ‘criminal’ is a mechanism of channelling the ‘delinquent’ into a life of petty
and perpetrator in an intimate and destructive relationship. This violence is unruly and barbarous, it crosses the carefully constructed boundaries of modern civilised life - between the state and civil society, between government and citizens, and between individual citizens.

On this view, violence is an obstacle to be removed, a problem to be solved, and its solution involves drawing more boundaries around it, institutionalising it, subjecting it to a regime of administration. This should not be mistaken for the elimination of violence, but merely a change or substitution of form. The discourse of civilisation is premised on the view that cruelty and violence are attributes of a barbarian mentality, a mentality uncontrolled by the courtesies and sensibilities of civilisation. Alasdair Maclntyre once counselled us to wake up to the corrosive impact of liberalism on the moral life of modern societies by drawing a parallel between our time and the last days of ancient Rome. The barbarians, he thought, were no longer knocking at the gate, but had been ruling us for some time. Perhaps a little of the barbarian has been rubbed-out in all of us and we have all, like those ancient Visigoths, swapped our bearskins for togas and look back on our tribal forbears with a shudder of revulsion. But in our haste to separate ourselves from that dreadful past, do we notice that the togas we wear are perhaps a little shabby?

Some forms of violence are now almost entirely consigned to the pages of history, and this thesis does not question that achievement. The elimination of capital punishment and torture (in most if not all civil societies), slowly increasing awareness of domestic violence, rape, and child abuse, as well as vigorous campaigns against cruelty to animals bear witness to some little progress in the reduction of violence. But in saying so, it does not follow that we have become less willing to inflict harm on our fellow creatures; or that we have become more sensitive to the suffering of others. If we accept the image of barbarians as wild and cruel, this much at least can be said of them, that there was no denying their violence and brutality. But brutal though they may have been, their violence was also limited by the reach of the sword, limited by the strength of the
sword-arm, limited by the stamina of the horse, limited because it was technologically primitive. The technological advancements pioneered by modern civil societies have greatly increased the capacity to inflict injury, and have given rise to the possibility that one person can kill tens, hundreds, or thousands without even having to see their victims or the effect of their actions. What is more, we can do it under the comforting illusion that we are not responsible for it. Conversely, this same weapons technology, the ease of access and the supposed ‘right’ to possess and use such weapons has intensified the terrible intimacy of killing. It could be said that there is now a kind of ‘cottage industry’ of violence in many civil societies due to the widely dispersed and relatively simple manufacture and endemic use of automatic and semi-automatic weapons.\textsuperscript{107} What is remarkable about the contemporary discourse on violence is the widespread acceptance of the idea that liberal civil societies represent pacified zones despite the frightening intensity of killing power now at their disposal. In the story of civilisation, the barbarian’s inescapable awareness of their own brutality has been transcended by the citizen’s awareness of their own peaceful civility. Such convenient assumptions maintain the comforting illusion that life in civil society is not violent. What I have suggested in this thesis is that concentrating on the idea of barbarous violence leads to an unwillingness to acknowledge our own civilised violence and disciplined cruelty.

\textsuperscript{107} I am indebted to Barry Hindess for making this point.


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