THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN KUNMING

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Declaration of Originality

I certify that the substance of this thesis has not been submitted already for any degree and is not being submitted currently for any other degree. I certify to the best of my knowledge that any help received in preparing this work, and all sources used, have been acknowledged in this thesis.

Richard Hunt.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the following people for their invaluable help: my supervisor Dr Aat Vervoorn, an earlier supervisor Professor W. J. F. Jenner, Professor Yang Bangshun of Yunnan University, Dr Anita Chan, Dr Keith Forster, my interviewees in Kunming, the staff of Menzies Library, Australian National University, the staff of Universities’ Service Centre at Chinese University of Hong Kong, and the staff of Yunnan University Library.
This Thesis is the first serious study of Kunming, the capital city of Yunnan Province, China, during the Cultural Revolution years 1966 to 1970. A coherent and detailed narrative of these years has been constructed from diverse sources. I have had access, for the first time, to a large amount of Kunming Red Guard materials that, due to their emotionally loaded nature, had to be very carefully interpreted. A picture emerges of a violent and chaotic period in the city.

I try to determine the extent to which models and approaches used elsewhere in China are satisfactory for understanding this period in Kunming. I argue firstly, that class and the relative educational status of institutions in Kunming, were significant factors in the creation of the two major Red Guard factions. Secondly, I argue that Communist Party political networks of patronage and allegiance, played a large role in dividing Kunming’s workers into opposing factions. Finally, I argue that an important factor in the Kunming factional conflict was the involvement of the Army and its internal divisions, in the faction fighting.

This Thesis should contribute to our general understanding of the Cultural Revolution, especially at the provincial level. The third argument should make a significant contribution to our specific understanding of events in the highly militarised border areas of China during the Cultural Revolution.
A Note on Romanisation and Proper Nouns

All names of Chinese people, places, organisations and campaigns use the Pinyin form of romanisation. Simplified Chinese characters are also given wherever relevant and possible.
Introduction

Background

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, to use its full title, is usually periodised in two ways. It often refers to the three years from 1966 to 1968, during which intense conflict at the elite political level expanded into widespread conflicts among ordinary Chinese, tearing apart the country’s economic and social fabric. It is also dated through to 1976, to include the years of ongoing political rivalry amongst leadership groups whose conflicts in the early hot years remained unresolved until Mao’s death. This Thesis however, will concentrate on the earlier three year period.

The origins of the Cultural Revolution can be traced back to at least as early as 1956, with strains within the Beijing leadership already well developed. Certainly by the early 1960’s Mao viewed the political scene in China with increasing dissatisfaction. On a number of important issues, the Chinese Communist Party had adopted policies that were unacceptable to Mao; a return to private farming, the resurrection of material incentives in industry, the development of a two track system in education (de-emphasising the role of political education), and the reappearance of traditional themes and styles in the arts. In addition to this, Mao resented the way in which some leaders, particularly the Party Secretary-general Deng Xiaoping, failed to consult him before making decisions on major issues.

1 Blecher, Marc J., 1997, China against the tides: Restructuring through Revolution, Radicalism and Reform, Pinter, London p. 78.
At the January twenty sixth, 1965 meeting of the Chinese Communist Party’s highest body, the Politburo, Mao had begun to speak in vague language of the need for a “Cultural Revolution”. A Cultural Revolution Small Group of five top leaders was formed. In November 1965, there was a public and very critical review of a play by leading writer, Wu Han, that was perceived as anti-Maoist. After that, Mao proclaimed that the Cultural Revolution was to be carried out “...seriously, positively and prudently.”

Mao’s allies in the more doctrinaire wing of the Communist Party, responded publicly on May sixteenth 1966, with a document that vilified Beijing Mayor Peng Zhen, and has for many observers, come to mark the start of the Cultural Revolution. On May twenty fifth, a radical Beijing University Philosophy Instructor named Nie Yuanzi, pasted up a Big Character Poster (Dazibao) denouncing the University president for the suppression of criticism of Wu Han’s play. Mao had the poster republished and broadcast nation-wide on June first. Students from all over the country then formed themselves into groups that came to be known as Red Guards, and the Cultural Revolution began in earnest.3

The southwestern border province of Yunnan is the sixth largest of China’s twenty seven provinces. It is geographically varied, with towering icy mountains adjoining Tibet and Burma in the Northwest, and lush tropical jungles bordering Laos and Vietnam in the south. One of the least populated of China’s provinces, it would have had between twenty and twenty five million people at the time of the Cultural Revolution, in the 1960’s.

Yunnan was first drawn significantly into the Chinese sphere of influence in the Thirteenth Century, with the Mongol invasion. The subsequent Ming and Qing dynasties ruled Yunnan more like a vassal state, rather than a true province of China. In 1911,

3 Blecher, Marc J., 1997, China against the tides: Restructuring through Revolution, Radicalism and
when China became a republic, a local warlord group ruled Yunnan as a semi-independent state. During the Second World War, Yunnan became a major Allied base for assisting the Chinese Nationalists in their struggle against the Japanese invaders. In 1950, Yunnan became one of the last provinces to taken over by the Communists and integrated into the People’s Republic.

Kunming was established as the walled capital city of Yunnan by the Ming dynasty, in the Fourteenth Century. At an elevation of 1890 metres, Kunming sits roughly at the centre of the plateau that covers nearly two thirds of the province, in the open valley where the Panlong (盘龙) river flows into the large Dian (滇) lake (see map on page 62). The city and surrounding counties had a population at the time of the Cultural Revolution that was roughly one and a quarter million.4

This is the first serious study of the city of Kunming during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Previous studies of Kunming at this time have been at the level of conference papers, and journal articles.5 It is the first serious study of the capital of a major border province or border autonomous region at this time. Studies of Guanxi, Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Heilongjiang, have also been of shorter length.6 These border areas

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were different from other provinces during the Cultural Revolution, because of the high level of military presence and military participation in government. The problems that most of these border provinces or regions shared were predominantly problems of factionalism aggravated by inadequate military leadership during the transitional period of military control in 1967 and 1968.\textsuperscript{7} Not surprisingly, some western observers have also grouped Yunnan as one of the “four most seriously factionalised and politically unstable provinces ... cited officially by Beijing as members of a group of seven provinces whose industrial output was most seriously damaged by the gang (of four)”\textsuperscript{8} Dorothy Solinger has described the Cultural Revolution in Yunnan as an especially drawn out and embittered affair.\textsuperscript{9}

This study will attempt to understand the main factors that determined the course of this political instability in Kunming, and to assess the extent to which explanations and interpretations of the Cultural Revolution in other parts of China help us to understand what happened in Yunnan. The main factors elucidated by this study will be social class and educational competition in Chapter Two, party political patronage in work units in Chapter Three, and finally, internal military politics in Chapter Four.

Sources

My main sources for this study have been Red Guard publications of both the major Red Guard factions in Kunming. These are numerous unofficial magazines, newspapers, newsletters, and a large compilation of articles, containing highly emotional accounts of factional struggle, and critical commentaries on local leadership and national and local policies. These materials were smuggled out of mainland China to the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), over several years, starting a dozen or so years ago. CUHK then distributed copies to Western Universities.

I have tried to treat the data gleaned from these emotionally loaded publications with care and scepticism. These documents were smuggled out of China because the activists in the Red Guard factions wanted their story known. Driven by a strong sense of injustice, networks of former Red Guard comrades would have overseen the gradual leaking out of the banned materials. Their emotional energy came from a sense that certain injustices had gone unrecorded and unnoticed by the world. They wanted their various versions of the events told.

Having said that, it is also true that both major players, and some minor players, of Kunming’s factional divide are represented in these Red Guard materials. The two major conflicting biases do to some extent neutralise each other. The large compilation of magazine, newspaper and newsletter articles, known as the *Yunnan Cultural Revolution*.

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10 王先金，合编，1968·云南文化大革命英雄谱·云南八·二三《保卫长城》，昆明·云南。

11 Jean Hong, Director, Universities’ Service Centre, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Register of Heroes,\textsuperscript{12} was in fact written by a number of different groups and individuals that in many cases were only nominally or loosely associated with one side of the factional divide. Where possible I have indicated the actual authors when referring to excerpts from this compilation.

Furthermore, there is so much small specific detail (much of which I have omitted for the sake of readability) in these Red Guard materials that, allowing some room for exaggeration, the accounts must have a strong basis in the reality of what actually happened. They are either the work of a very extensive and detailed imagination, or are more or less, true! Certainly the micro-geography of the Kunming area, found in the accounts, is accurate. Also, several of my interviewees have backed many of the accounts, when I have asked them if they felt that accounts were very exaggerated. In addition, more than occasionally, other local Chinese language sources (discussed below) back up the Red Guard accounts. Finally, it must be said that, specific minutiae from the accounts are not used as evidence for any of my major arguments. Rather they are just part of an overall picture which I use to illustrate themes.

There is another mitigating factor in the use of Red Guard materials. The fact is that, at the height of the factional violence, many subgroups were changing sides or fighting independently. The situation became almost multipolar, rather than the basic bipolarity that existed in the beginning and middle of the conflict. Therefore, at the later stages of the factional fighting, factional bias became less meaningful. Indeed, some of the Red Guard accounts were written during this period of late 1967 and early 1968.

\textsuperscript{12} 项兆赋・王先金・合编・1968・云南文化大革命英雄谱・云南八・三三《保卫长城》・昆明・云南。
Other local Chinese language sources used are the official records or gazettes (Difangzhi) of all three government levels,13 official provincial chronologies (Dashiji),14 and several local interviews. I have used these sources, in combination with Western Government Monitoring Services (United States Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press; United States Consulate General, Hong Kong, Selections from China Mainland Magazines; BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts; United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, Vol. 1., People’s Republic of China), and the Hong Kong Monitors, Union Research Service and Union Research Institute, together with Taiwanese Research and most of the Secondary English Language material available concerning the Cultural Revolution. Together these sources have provided, I believe, a fairly balanced account of events in Kunming.

Xiang Zhaobin, Wang Xianjin and He Bian, 1968, Yunnan Cultural Revolution Register of Heroes, Yunnan 23rd of August “Defend the Great Wall”, Kunming, Yunnan.

13 云南省地方志编辑委员会，1997，云南省志·第十六·四十九，云南人民出版社，昆明·云南。

Compilatory Committee of Yunnan Province, 1997, Records of Yunnan Province, Vols. 8, 16, 49, Yunnan Peoples’ Publishing House, Kunming, Yunnan.


Compilatory Committee of Kunming Panlong District, 1998, Records of Panlong District, Yunnan Peoples’ Publishing House, Kunming, Yunnan.


14 陈德仁《编年》，1996，当代云南大事纪要，当代中国出版社，云南。


吴虹《编年》，1993，云南解放以来重要史事录，云南人民出版社，昆明·云南。

Wu Hong (compiler), 1993, The Yunnan Post-liberation Outline of Important Historical Events, Yunnan Peoples’ Publishing House, Kunming, Yunnan.
Outside China, the Cultural Revolution has been the subject of a wide range of secondary literature, most of which is cited in Song Yongyi and Sun Dajin (compilers), *The Cultural Revolution: A bibliography, 1966-1996*, or James C. F. Wang, *The Cultural Revolution in China: an annotated bibliography*. Western journalists and government officials, without the benefit of hindsight produced the earliest works. Good examples of this are Stanley Karnow’s *Mao and China: from Revolution to Revolution*, and Edward Rice’s, *Mao’s Way*. Since then a large body of interpretative literature on the Cultural Revolution has developed, which surveys its origins, assesses its outcomes, and places it in a broader theoretical, or historical context.

To begin with, I have categorised this literature into five simplistic groupings. Firstly is a group of works that overview the whole Cultural Revolution. Secondly, are works dwelling on the Cultural Revolution at the Provincial Level. Thirdly, are works analysing the Red Guard movement. Fourthly, is material that looks at the role of the Military in the Cultural Revolution. Fifthly, are autobiographical accounts of individuals that lived through the period. After these categorisations however, I will look at three groupings based on differing interpretations of events.

In the first category, the overviews of the Cultural Revolution, are two subgroups. Firstly, all major political histories of the People’s Republic contain substantial discussion of the Cultural Revolution. Three examples of this are Lucian Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese*
politics: a psychocultural study of the authority crisis in political development, Richard Solomon, Mao’s Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture, and Frederick Tiewes, Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China. The first two, are political science analyses that argue that, the extreme dependence of ordinary Chinese on higher political authority explains much of China’s modern political history. Teiwes book looks at the shifting nature of Mao Zedong’s authority from 1949 to 1976.

The second subgroup, are those works that specifically overview the Cultural Revolution itself. Liu Guokai, A Brief Analysis of the Cultural Revolution, Hong Yung Lee, The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and William Dorrill, Power, Policy, and Ideology in the making of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, were written right at the end of the Cultural Revolution. Liu Guokai, a member of a worker rebel group in Guangzhou, emphasised the divide between those that had “Had it good” and those that had “Not had it good”, as well as factional divisions within the army. Hong Yung Lee, a western based observer, traces the development of social inequality from the beginning of the People’s Republic and the growing ideological differences between Mao and State Chairman Liu Shaoqi. Lee attributes importance to “vertical cleavages” going from elite politics down to all levels of the system. William Dorrill, another western observer,

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especially analyses theories about the cause of the elite political conflict. Finally, Harry Harding, *The Chinese State in Crisis*, is a detailed history and analysis of the first three and a half years of the Cultural Revolution.20

The second category of works is that dealing with the Cultural Revolution at the provincial and municipal level. Three works written in the later stages of the Cultural Revolution are Richard Baum, *China: Year of the Mangoes*, Frederick Teiwes, *Provincial leadership in China: The Cultural Revolution and its aftermath*, and Deborah Davis, *The Cultural Revolution in Wuhan*.21 Baum’s work describes the meteoric political ascendancy of regional and provincial military leaders from 1967/68. Tiewes’s book is an analysis of provincial political elites, such as party committees, especially in terms of the representation of military and local members. Davis’s article, written during the Cultural Revolution, details the remarkable events in the city of Wuhan, where a large-scale military mutiny occurred. Three other works that focus on single provinces or cities, are Elizabeth Perry and Li Xun, *Proletarian Power: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution*, Wang Shaoguang, *Failure of Charisma: The Cultural Revolution in Wuhan*, and Keith Forster, *Rebellion and Factionalism in a Chinese Province: Zhejiang 1966-1976*.22 Perry and Li’s book, is a very detailed narrative and analysis of worker activism in Shanghai.

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during the Cultural Revolution. They argue that popular activism during Shanghai’s Cultural Revolution, contrary to previous belief, was neither unorganised nor uniform. This view, as we shall see, does have some relevance for understanding events in Kunming. Wang’s book is an account and analysis of factional conflict during the early chaotic period of the Cultural Revolution in Wuhan. Forster provides a detailed history of the Cultural Revolution in Zhejiang province, looking especially at factionalism and centre-provincial relations.

Next are four works that examine Yunnan province specifically; Solinger, *Politics in Yunnan Province in the Decade of Disorder: Elite Factional Strategies and Central-local Relations, 1967-1980*, Falkenheim, *The Cultural Revolution in Kwangsí, Yunnan and Fukien*, and two articles from the journal of Taipei’s, Institute of International Relations, *Facts and Features*. 23 Solinger elaborates a framework for interpreting central-elite behaviour. She notes that although central-level and local-level figures had interests that joined them in patterns of mutual dependence (also noted by Pye), 24 local politicians had separate goals aswell. In addition Solinger points to long-standing ties (Field Army connections and past working ties) between central and local politicians. Falkenheim’s description of events in Yunnan is briefer, but he categorises Yunnan as one of the “volatile border provinces”. Finally, the two Taiwanese articles were written at the height

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of the Cultural Revolution, and provide accounts of the Kunming factional fighting that correspond remarkably with the local Red Guard publication accounts.

The third category of works is that on the Red Guards and other mass organisations. Two works argue that class issues strongly affected the composition of Red Guard factions in the city of Guangzhou. These are Chan, Rosen and Unger, *Students and Class Warfare: the social roots of the Red Guard conflict in Guangzhou*, and Stanley Rosen, *Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou*. Both works are based on extensive interviews with former student Red Guards. Anita Chan also made a socio-psychological study of Red Guards in *Children of Mao*. In *Dispelling Misconceptions about the Red Guard Movement: the Necessity to Re-examine Cultural Revolution factionalism and periodisation*, Chan argues that the CCP's official 1981 appraisal of the Cultural Revolution was a gross distortion of historical reality. In presenting the Cultural Revolution as a power struggle among the ruling elite, it denied that the Red Guards were representative of serious conflicts within the broader society.

Two works that look at other aspects of mass organisations are Andrew Walder, *The Chinese Cultural Revolution in the Factories: Party-State Structures and Patterns of Conflict*, and Thomas Bernstein, *Up to the Mountains and down to the villages: the*

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transfer of youth from urban to rural China. In an argument similar to Hong Yung Lee, Walder shows that, during the Cultural Revolution, party-sponsored political networks shaped the behaviour of factory worker’s mass organisations. Bernstein’s book is an account of the government rustication program that finally ended the Red Guard movement.

The fourth category of material is that relating to the role of the People’s Liberation Army in the Cultural Revolution. Firstly, are two books that overview Chinese Military history. Harvey W. Nelsen, *The Chinese Military System: An Organisational Study of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army*, and William Whitson with C. Huang, *The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71.* Nelsen describes the overall organisation of the PLA and the chain of command, and how this functioned during the Cultural Revolution. Whitson and Huang, argue that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is divided by loyalties to pre-1945 Field Army systems and held together only by a conscious balance of power between those systems. Secondly, Jurgen Domes, in *The Cultural Revolution and the Army*, not unlike Whitson and Huang, describes the history of “loyalty groups” at the elite level of military politics, before the Cultural Revolution. Thirdly, two works written during the Cultural Revolution looking at factions in the military, are William Parish, *Factions in Chinese Military Politics*, and Chien Yu-

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Parish argues that, prior to 1967, the PLA was in fact a unified force, even though after 1967 there was limited factional activity which Whitson’s model helps us to understand. He suggests that the Cultural Revolution can be better understood through the bureaucratic model of Crozier and Downs, rather than a factional model. Chien Yu-shen’s book is mostly a detailed chronology of events, but he also asserts that “Military leaders of some regions chose sides and aroused the hostility of extremist militant Red Guard groups.”


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Most of these approaches to the Cultural Revolution are applicable to Kunming, in one
degree or another. However, as we shall see, the study of factionalism in particular is
especially relevant to Kunming, where factionalism was especially violent due to the
involvement of the military and the presence of large amounts of weaponry and military
personnel. Factional struggle in the Cultural Revolution began in September/October
1966, came out into the open with the power seizures of January 1967, and became so
intense after April 1967, that it became the main manifestation of the Cultural
Revolution. Because of this, previous researchers have found it necessary to analyse it in
detail.

Perry and Li Xun, have noted that scholarly interpretations of mass participation in
factions during the Cultural Revolution fall into three basic and mostly complementary
camps.\textsuperscript{35} First, let us look at the approach of Hong Yung Lee, Rosen, Chan and others.\textsuperscript{36}
This approach argues that socio-economic groups, especially class background, but also
age and skill level, inclined different groups of students and workers to enlist in different
rival mass organisations. "Conservatives" were generally composed of people from
"good" family backgrounds (jieji chengfen haode), such as pre-liberation industrial
workers, model workers, and former poor and lower-middle peasant families. "Rebels"
were generally from "bad" class backgrounds (jieji chengfen buhaode), such as former
capitalists, “rightists” (those who had been too outspoken during the Hundred Flowers

\textsuperscript{35} Perry, Elizabeth J. and Li Xun., 1997, Proletarian Power: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution, Westview

\textsuperscript{36} Hong, Yung Lee., 1978, The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, University of California Press,
Berkeley, Ca.
Chan, Anita., Rosen, Stanley and Unger, Jonathan., 1980, “Students and Class Warfare: the social roots of
Rosen, Stanley, 1982, Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revoluion in Guangzhou, Westview Press,
Boulder, Colorado.
Campaign of 1957), pre-liberation rich-peasant and landlord families, counterrevolutionaries and criminals. This approach was very significant, as until the Cultural Revolution observers of Communist systems had been reliant on, “a totalitarian model that downplayed the influence of social forces.”

However, as far as Kunming is concerned, it is wrong to generalise the factionalism as “rebel” versus “conservative”, because it gradually became impossible to distinguish which side was conservative in the struggle between the “23rd August” and “Artillery” factions in Kunming (or indeed the “August 15th” and “Rebel to the End” factions in Sichuan). In 1984, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) carried out a supposedly thorough appraisal of the Cultural Revolution, an article in the party journal Red Flag declared that judged from their behaviour, guiding ideology and their professed loyalty to Mao (socio-economic factors are not mentioned), both the so-called “rebel” and “conservative” organisations were indistinguishable. Furthermore, “conservatives” had never called themselves conservatives, but had always referred to themselves as “proletarian revolutionaries”.

Nevertheless, I will use this labelling on a provisional basis, because many Kunming people themselves used it, and there is indeed some socio-economic and behavioural justification for it. Liu Guokai differentiates between “rebels” and “conservatives” on the basis of the class composition of their leaders and members, in addition to their political experience before the Cultural Revolution, and whether or not they belonged to the CCP

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or its public organisations, such as the Communist Youth League. Rebel leaders tended to be children of intellectuals, whilst conservatives were generally led by cadres’ children.\textsuperscript{40} Forster observed that, radicals (“rebels”) directed their attacks against party cadres, whilst conservatives directed their attacks on the old bourgeois class. Radicals broadened, whilst conservatives restricted their scope of attack. Conservatives generally had good relations with the People’s Liberation Army, whilst radicals established links with the Cultural Revolution Small Group and Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing.\textsuperscript{41} However, if these criteria are applied to the Kunming factions, it is possible to justify the labelling early on in the conflict, but as time goes on, these criteria and others become increasingly mixed and blurred. Therefore I will contrast this labelling with my own interpretations, as the discussion proceeds.

It would not be accurate to begin this study without a mention of the \textit{xiaoyao pai} or “free and unfettered” ones. These were people who joined no organisation at all. One of my interviewees claimed to have been a \textit{xiaoyao pai}.\textsuperscript{42} Several others claimed to have been, at one stage or another, one of those only nominally belonging to one faction or the other.\textsuperscript{43} These were the most inactive elements. They joined because everyone else did, and dropped out at the first opportunity.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid. pp. 73-82.
\textsuperscript{42} Yang Bangshun 杨邦顺. Retired Professor of English, Yunnan University. Interviewed October 1999.
\textsuperscript{43} Zhao Daming 赵大明. Student of International Relations at the Yunnan Provincial Science and Technology Institute. Previously a non-aligned High School Red Guard 66-70. Interviewed 30/4/00.
Perry and Li’s second “camp”, used the approach championed mainly by Andrew Walder, which emphasises the role of political networks in mobilising workers along competing lines of patronage and allegiance.\(^{45}\) Walder argues, not unlike Hong Yung Lee, that vertical party-sponsored networks, with their attendant numerous employee benefits, cutting across horizontal group affiliations, generated most of the factional strife that gripped factories.

Finally, as mentioned before, there is the “Psycho-cultural Orientation” approach of Lucian Pye and Richard Solomon,\(^{46}\) which highlights the extreme dependence of ordinary Chinese on higher political authorities, producing periodic outbursts of disorder (daluan), throughout modern Chinese history. As many writers have noticed however, these three approaches (social strata, political networks and dependent personalities) can be seen as complimentary and interlinked. Indeed I found all these interpretations to be applicable to Kunming.


Factionalism amongst the Students

In Chapter One, I will describe the overall chronology of events during the Cultural Revolution years 1966 to 1976, in Kunming. This will provide the context for Chapters Two, Three and Four, where I will discuss the roles of Kunming’s Students, Workers, and Military respectively.

In the second Chapter, I will argue that class and educational status, were also significant factors in the creation of factions. This argument states that class background, or “jieji chengfen (阶级成分)”, combined with the comparative educational status of educational institutions in Kunming, significantly affected the composition of the Red Guard factions. Chan, Rosen, and Unger, made a similar argument about class, with regard to Red Guard factions in the city of Guangzhou. They found that, just prior to the Cultural Revolution the “class line” was pushing students into four increasingly self-aware groupings with opposing interests: cadres’ children; worker-peasant children; middle-class children; and children of bad-class background. Conflict among high school students in Guangzhou resulted from, most urban high school students in the mid-1960’s facing fewer prospects for upward mobility, and growing competition for admissions to University due to shifts in admission criteria.

I will show that the same factors would explain much, but not all, of the Red Guard division in Kunming. There were also significant local factors, including rivalry between educational institutions for power and prestige in leading the Cultural Revolution. Adding

48 Ibid. p.420.
to the rivalry was the fact that different educational institutions were associated with students of different class backgrounds.

49 Also listed as a factor was, "...increasingly anxious efforts to enter the Communist Youth League." Ibid. p.397.
Factionalism amongst the Workers

I will analyse Factionalism amongst the Workers of Kunming in Chapter Three. This chapter will argue that the faction conflict in the factories of the Kunming area followed a pattern, similar to that outlined by Andrew Walder, and mentioned earlier. Much, but not all, of the complexity of Kunming's factional conflicts within and between Work Units (mainly factories), can be explained by the vertical party-sponsored networks, with their attendant explicit and implicit worker benefits.

Evidence will be presented to show how these networks were repeatedly attacked, defended and reshaped as a result of the factional conflict, and eventually forcefully replaced by new party-army sponsored networks. I will also present evidence that, until such time as the Central government decided to act decisively and brutally, these networks that created so much division in factories and work units, were themselves exacerbated by divisions within the Yunnan military. As military involvement increased later in the Cultural Revolution, Chapter three will analyse the influence of the PLA on the Workers factional conflict, and on the course of the events generally.

It will also be shown how the hypotheses of Walder and Hong Yung Lee, do not account for all the complexity of Cultural Revolution phenomena amongst the Workers of Kunming. As party-sponsored networks disintegrated, and before the military finally imposed new networks, other factors such as sheer opportunism and personal relationships became influential.
The Military in Yunnan

As mentioned before, Yunnan was different from the other provinces in that, being a border area, it had a high concentration of military personnel. Another reason for the high militarisation was that Yunnan was the home of many surrendered Nationalist troops and officials. As Solinger noted, the Nationalist Governor of Yunnan, Lu Han actually switched his loyalty to the invading army and proclaimed the peaceful liberation of the entire province in 1950. Therefore a high premium was placed on surveillance and control, which would have led to a preference for the placement of military rather than civilian personnel in the province.\(^{50}\) The Second Field Army, initially deputised to take the province in 1949, remained as its governors. Officers of the Second Field Army had dominated the political leadership of Yunnan, although, as we shall see, their influence was severely cut back by Cultural Revolution.\(^{51}\) This study of Kunming should in fact add something to debates about highly militarised societies under conditions of extreme politicisation.

At the provincial level, military districts and subdistricts were ordered by the Central Military Commission directives of 1961 to “act like staff members and assistants for Party Committees”. The conjoining of the Party and the regional PLA was successful.\(^{52}\) The role of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was second only to Mao and the Cultural Revolution Small Group, and it emerged as the most powerful political force at the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution. The August 1966 Plenary Session of the CCP Central Committee, reshuffled the Politburo giving much stronger political power to the

\(^{50}\) Dorothy J Solinger, 1977, Regional Govt and Political Integration in Southwest China, University of California Press, Berkeley, Ca. pp. 633-34.
\(^{51}\) Ibid. p. 634.
PLA. In the last half January 1967, the Maoist leadership in Beijing took steps to establish the PLA, and especially the regional administration structure, as an independent political power base. 53

Nevertheless, with its complex system, numerous organisations, and various factions, the People's Liberation Army had many internal cleavages, conflicts, and interests, which weakened its cohesion. The discernible cleavages included Field Army factions, divisions between political commissars and military commanders, and divisions between local garrison forces and centrally controlled strategic main forces. 54

The fourth chapter will argue that an important factor in the Kunming faction conflict was the involvement of the PLA, and its internal divisions, in the factional fighting. These divisions were of two interconnected and inter-related kinds.

Firstly, there were the divisions within the Zhulibudui or main forces. These divisions were of two varieties. The first variety was the old rivalry and conflict between two distinctly separate groupings within the Yunnan Zhulibudui or main forces. The Fourth Army of the Second Field Army in Yunnan, was from the outset, deeply divided between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps on the one hand and the Southward Cadre Corps (南下干部团) on the other. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps were from Shaanxi (陕西) province, whilst the Southward Cadre Corps were from Shaanxi and Shandong provinces and from Nanjing University's cadre school. 55 Unlike the Thirteenth and

53 Ibid. p. 25.
55 Zhao Daming 赵达明, Student of International Relations at the Yunnan Provincial Science and Technology Institute. Previously a non-aligned High School Red Guard 66-70. Interviewed 30/4/00.
Fourteenth Corps, the Southward Cadre Corps was specifically trained for civilian administration. “Civil” military cadres usually did travel with purely military cadres. However, this difference in focus between the “civil” and “military” wings, would have tended to increase the sense of separateness between the two groups.

The second variety of divisions within Zhulibudui was that between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps. At one point, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps actually fought each other, by siding and fighting with opposing factions. This was a case of divisions within one “faction” of the Zhulibudui, during the most violent and chaotic stage of the factional conflict.

The second kind of military division was the division between the Difangbudui, or local militia and the Zhulibudui or major military. The Difangbudui, were connected administratively to the Yunnan Military Region, covering only Yunnan Province. The Kunming Military Region, or major military area (Dajunqu) covering all of Southwest China, was one of only several such areas in China, and was connected administratively to the Zhulibudui. Many other factors predisposed towards dissonance between Zhulibudui and Difangbudui. Difangbudui had always done the dull and tedious labour projects, and received no priority in resource allocation, with their officers in dead-end careers. By the summer of 1967, they were often the rivals in filling a political power

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57 Zhao Daming, 赵达明, Student of International Relations at the Yunnan Provincial Science and Technology Institute. Previously a non-aligned High School Red Guard 66-70. Interviewed 30/4/00.
vacuum in provinces. 58 Factional rivalries developed between local and main forces in at least seven military regions, districts and garrisons. 59

During the Cultural Revolution, personal ties to local officials tended to supplant loyalty to large national systems. Individual initiative was increased at all levels and loosening of the structure made it essential to rely on people whom one had known and trusted. 60 In addition, as mentioned earlier, Lucian Pye observed the extreme dependence of ordinary Chinese upon higher political authorities. 61 In Yunnan, this resulted in networks of connections or guanxi associated with each of the Second Field Army divisions. 62 Furthermore, the tendency of local elites to try to increase their power when there is disunity at the national level, or when their patrons have lost power at the centre, 63 served only to exacerbate Yunnan’s military divisions.

59 Ibid. p. 38.
62 Private relationships such as classmates, colleagues and family were also an important factor in forming these networks, and ultimately in choosing which faction to belong to. Zhao Darning 赵达明 - student of International Relations at the Yunnan Provincial Science and Technology Institute. Previously a non-aligned High School Red Guard 66-70. Interviewed 30/4/00.
The Scope of the Thesis

This Thesis does not deal with the period of the 1970's in Kunming or Yunnan. Dorothy Solinger is the only scholar to have attempted an analysis of this period. Solinger and some of my interviewees have attested to some recurrence of serious conflict connected indirectly with the two original Cultural Revolution factions during this period, and even as late as 1980.64

This Thesis does not deal with how the Cultural Revolution affected Yunnan's ethnic minorities (at that time few minorities would have lived in Kunming). In 1980, near the end of the Cultural Revolution, Yunnan had 9,640,000 non-Chinese people out of a total population of 31,350,000. This was 30.75%. There are twenty two nationalities with a long history of friction and resentment. Indeed there was a rebellion of the Yi and Hui (Chinese Muslim) peoples, after the fall of the "Gang of Four" in 1976.65 However, the minorities do not have a bearing on this study. The vast majority of major players in Kunming's tragic Cultural Revolution drama were Han Chinese. Clearly, the absence of this area is a significant limitation on the scope of this Thesis, and an area that most definitely still requires further research.

Luo Deyang 罗德扬. Lecturer in Mechanics, Kunming Engineering University. Interviewed November 11, 1999.
The final limitation, discussed at some length, in the Introduction and at some points throughout the Thesis, is the limitation of the Red Guard source material. Admittedly we get an incomplete picture from these accounts, but we still get a better picture of Kunming during the most violent years of the Cultural Revolution than we have ever had before.

Summary

This then, is a brief summary of the Thesis. Chapter One will provide the broad context and framework of the chronological narrative. Chapter Two will discuss the role of the Students, with regard to class and educational competition. Chapter Three will discuss the role of Workers in Kunming’s Cultural Revolution, in terms of party-political networks. Chapter Four will discuss the role of the Military and its internal politics. Finally, in the Conclusion, apart from attempting to assess the scale of the violence in the city, I will draw together the themes of the Thesis in an overall summing up of the narrative and the arguments.
Chapter One. The Context: Kunming during the Cultural Revolution

In this Chapter, I will narrate the story of Kunming’s Cultural Revolution, so as to provide a context and framework for the discussions and accounts in Chapters Two, Three and Four. As orientation is the sole purpose of this Chapter, the narrative accounts are presented in shortened form, and I do not attempt to discuss their meaning. That is left for the next three chapters. However, I will provide a framework in the form of eight stages indicated by each of the eight subheadings in this chapter.

I have already talked briefly about the history of Yunnan and Kunming before the Communist Revolution, in the Introduction Chapter. The political background of Yunnan’s post-Revolution history is also described briefly at the beginning of Chapter Three, which deals with the role of the Military. Therefore, I will not repeat those histories here, but begin the with the first actual Cultural Revolution activities.
Early Cultural Revolution activities: May to August 1966

The story of Kunming’s Cultural Revolution begins with the earliest Cultural Revolution activities. These were rallies and meetings mainly involved with student Red Guards and are described at the beginning of Chapter Two, which deals with the role of the Students. At this early stage, Kunming Party leaders, by joining in the revolutionary fervour of rallies and denunciations, tried with some success, to moderate and direct the Cultural Revolution away from attacking themselves.

The first major Cultural Revolution activity in Kunming was the “Twenty Third of August Rally”. This is also discussed in Chapter Two. It was two days and nights of protesting, marching and making “revolutionary contacts” between educational institutions, by several thousands of student Red Guards.

Some students marched several times to the Provincial Party Committee compound (see map on page 62) and verbally assaulted Committee members. A Provincial Committee member then went to convince the students that the Provincial Committee were more devoted to the Cultural Revolution than they were. He also sent “Work Teams” to moderate Red Guard anger, and to improve the image of the Party in the minds of the Red Guards. Nevertheless, over one hundred teachers and students were arrested and labelled “counter-revolutionary intellectuals”. Furthermore, on July twenty fifth, Mao

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convened a meeting with the Cultural Revolution Small Group of the CCP Central Committee, where it was decided to withdraw the Work Teams.\textsuperscript{68}

On the morning of August the 23\textsuperscript{rd}, the \textit{Yunnan Daily} newspaper reported that Red Guards in Beijing were sweeping away the “Four olds” (customs, habits, ideology, and culture) and the “Four evils” (intellectuals, merchants, landlords, and ex-nationalists). The movement to sweep away the “Four olds” and “Four evils” of Kunming then started that day.\textsuperscript{69} By the end of August, Red Guards had accomplished a considerable toll of destruction. Most of the Bodhisattva statues of the Buddha Halls in Kunming’s nine temples were destroyed. The Tang Jiyao Tomb at Yuantong (圆通) Hill and a major Nunnery were also damaged. Thirty three teahouses and eleven bookstores were closed down, and 4,700 pieces of paintings and calligraphy were confiscated. Throughout August and September many houses were searched, and their contents such as old books and old photographs were burned. Thousands of streets, and hundreds of shops were forced to change their names to ones of a more revolutionary nature.\textsuperscript{70}


\textsuperscript{69} 陈德仁 (编委会). 1996. \textit{当代云南大事纪要}. 当代中国出版社, 云南。

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid. pp. 350-351.
Red Guard divisions form: September 1966 to January 1967

On September the tenth, the first Red Guard coalition, the Kunming Red Guard Headquarters was set up. For a few days at least, no serious factional divisions had yet arisen. However, on September the fourteenth, a majority of the students at Yunnan University (see map on page 62) announced the founding of the *Mao Zedong Thought Artillery Regiment* or “Artillery”. Six days later, a majority of the students at the Kunming Engineering Institute (see map on page 62) announced the founding of the *Jingan Mountain 23rd August Fighting Regiment* or “23rd August”. After these two major Red Guard organisations were founded, all other party and government departments, corporations, and other units, set-up their own revolutionary organisations, usually known as Fighting Regiments. These Fighting Regiments made contact with both the two major Red Guard organisations, and a pattern of affiliations gradually started to form.

As described in Chapter Three, on the role of the workers, the *Yunnan Daily* (see map on page 62) then came to the attention of Red Guard organisations in September. They published public condemnations, claiming a number of *Yunnan Daily* editorials to be “full of errors”. On the fourteenth of September, a group of over one thousand left Yunnan University. Shouting slogans, the group made their way along the main ring road, to the *Yunnan Daily* offices, where they stayed for several hours. This appears to have been the start of protracted factional struggle amongst the staff of *Yunnan Daily*. By the fourteenth of December the *Invincible Brigade* and other staff groups had closed the old *Yunnan Daily*. The following day they published the first edition of the new *Yunnan*

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72 徐立群《编辑》，1996年《当代云南大事纪要》，当代中国出版社，云南。
Daily. The old Yunnan Daily was described as having served as the propaganda machine of the Yunnan Provincial Committee bourgeois line.73

The 23rd August, Artillery and over one hundred other “Rebel Organisations” reunited into the Great Alliance Headquarters of Kunming Proletarian Revolutionaries (Great Alliance), on January second. That same day the Great Alliance launched a “General Attack” on the Provincial Party Committee, setting up a stand in the yard of Provincial Committee complex, from where they continuously shouted slogans denouncing the Provincial Committee leaders.74 However, this early form of the Great Alliance quickly proved to be an ineffective coalition.

As noted in Chapter Three, in early January 1967, three “revolutionary” brigades of the Kunming Fragrant Material Factory united to seize power (of the factory), and formed a single new brigade called Carrying the Revolution through to the End. It was allied with 23rd August.75 Also in early January, the Rice and Oil Mechanical Factory announced the founding of the 8th March brigade.76

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73 项兆斌，王先金，合编，1968，云南文化大革命英雄谱，云南八、二三《保卫长城》．昆明·云南．

74 Ibid. p. 354．

75 项兆斌，王先金，合编，1968，云南文化大革命英雄谱，云南八、二三《保卫长城》．昆明·云南．

76 Ibid. pp. 205-208．

Compilatory Committee of the Kunming Wuhua District, 1995, Records of Wuhua District, Sichuan Dictionary Publishing House, Chengdu, Sichuan. p. 64.

75 项兆斌，王先金，合编，1968，云南文化大革命英雄谱，云南八、二三《保卫长城》．昆明·云南．
In early January, Provincial Committee First Secretary Yan Hongyan was repeatedly denounced with false charges. On January sixth, militants from the 23rd August entered the Kunming Military Region compound (see map on page 62) and went to the Committee building looking for Yan Hongyan. The 23rd August militants then searched for the next two days. Yan Hongyan’s corpse was then found upon opening a guard regiment’s room at the Xiaomaiyu (小麦雨) weapons factory. Aged 57, Yan had shot himself. After Yan’s death the Provincial Committee’s authority was severely eroded. The suddenness of Yan’s fall took the still fairly embryonic mass organisations of Kunming by surprise. Although a variety of organisations were active in Kunming by January, they had not yet formed effective coalitions when the field was suddenly abandoned to them.

However by January twenty second, sixty two “Battle Organisations”, dominated by Artillery of Yunnan University, separated themselves from Great Alliance, setting up the

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78 项兆斌，王先金，合编. 1968. 云南文化大革命英雄谱. 云南八，二三《保卫长城》. 昆明. 云南。
陈绩仁《编辑》. 1996. 当代云南大事纪要. 当代中国出版社. 云南。
79 项兆斌，王先金，合编. 1968. 云南文化大革命英雄谱. 云南八，二三《保卫长城》. 昆明. 云南。
台北国际关系学院. 1967. 中国共产主义年鉴. 台北。
80 Yang Bangshun 杨邦顺. Retired Professor of English, Yunnan University. Interviewed October 1999.
“Great Alliance Liaison Station of *New Yunnan* Revolutionary Rebels”. From then on, Kunming was divided into two opposing factions, the *Great Alliance*, of which 23rd August was the main component, and *New Yunnan* of which *Artillery* was the main component.⁸³

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Factional conflict begins: January to March 1967

On January twenty third, Artillery were told that Provincial Committee Secretary Zhou Xing would unilaterally give the power of the Provincial Committee and Government to 23rd August on the night of the twenty sixth. They decided to take action against this, and at 3am that day, an urgent notice was announced that their own seizure of power would begin at 10am.\(^8^4\) When at 4am, 23rd August delivered a notice asking for a conference on power seizure, Artillery just said that they would start at 10am, and 23rd August could join them if they wanted.\(^8^5\) On the twenty sixth, Artillery fought all day at the Provincial Government compound at Wuhua Hill (see map on page 62). Within several hours they had control there.\(^8^6\) Artillery seized the power of the Provincial Government, because Zhou Xing was planning to seize power with 23rd August. That same day, 23rd August lead by Zhou Xing and Huang Zhaoqi (黄兆琪) seized power at the separate Provincial Party Committee compound (see map on page 62). Artillery by seizing the power of the Government compound disrupted 23rd August's attempts to seize power alone.\(^8^7\)

In February 1967, a series of directives and statements were issued by the centre, that were intended to limit the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Red Guards were ordered to leave all Central Party Departments and Departments responsible for defence, economic

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\(^8^5\) Ibid. p. 5.
\(^8^6\) Ibid. p. 6.
\(^8^7\) Kunming Medical Institute Mao Zedong Thought March 7th Artillery Regiment, and Holding High the Torch Fighting Fighting Group, 1967, First Comment on the Wrong Orientation of 23rd August Fighting Regiment, Kunming, Yunnan. p. 2.
planning, foreign affairs, public security, finance and propaganda. The PLA assumed control over the Provincial Party Committee and communications.

On February thirty first, Deputy Political Commissar of the Kunming Military Region, Zhang Ziming (张子明), told a meeting of Red Guards that Premier Zhou wanted twenty representatives to go to Beijing. Both Great Alliance (23rd August) and New Yunnan (Artillery) separately elected ten representatives each to go to Beijing. Cultural Revolution Small Group member Chen Boda, Zhou Enlai, and Security Minister Xie Fuzhi gave them interviews. They were instructed to unite.

The violence was growing. On February 22nd, the Yunnan Military Region Military Control Committee led a group with one PLA regiment and two battalions to break in and arrest 23rd August members still asleep. Tian from the Municipal Militia Armed Forces using a handgun, arrested, hung and beat a young worker.

Meanwhile, the delegates in Beijing were received in the small auditorium of Great Hall of People on February 28th, with Premier Zhou. Reports warned against competing to

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91 Ibid. p. 3.
93 作者不明，1967，接见时的讲话，毛泽东思想战斗兵团致意团，云南大专院校红卫兵司令部昆医《东风红》战斗团，第二批根治水患大队宣传组，昆明，云南。
win friends in the higher levels of the Party, and emphasised that Yunnan must have 
Military control especially in Public Security, Post and Telegraph, Communications and 
Transport, and the News Publication Department. This would promote the three-way 
(Red Guards, PLA, and Party) unification, that was planned for the whole of China. 

Following the institution of Military control in March the chaotic situation in Kunming 
briefly calmed down. On March fifth, the Yunnan Provincial Military Control Committee 
was formed. On the ninth, the PLA took over the Yunnan People’s Broadcasting 
Station, and Yunnan Printing Factory. On March eleventh, the Military began control of 
the Yunnan Daily and on the thirty first, the CCP Central Committee formally endorsed 
the founding of the Yunnan Military Control Committee. There was another ephemeral 
attempt at unification on March thirtieth, when Great Alliance and New Yunnan, formed 
the Kunming Proletarian Revolutionary Alliance Service Station (服务站).
Escalation of the factional conflict: April to August 1967

On April first, after the CCP CC issued a directive forbidding, “the arbitrary stigmatising of mass organisations (and individuals) as counter-revolutionary” and forbidding arbitrary arrest, the whole situation changed for the worse. The directive also forbade any action against rebel groups which attacked the Army, without prior central approval, leading to increased factional violence, and delaying the establishment of the Revolutionary Committees.99

Chapters Three and Four discuss several violent incidents. On April twenty sixth, Artillery held a mass meeting. 23rd August leader Huang Zhaoqi, led a group of people into the meeting, saying that the meeting was “a mix of bad elements”. A fight started and some people were beaten.100 On May 23rd, Artillery with 42 trucks carrying over 800 people, attacked 23rd August. Twenty one were beaten with two becoming unconscious. The next day, Artillery of the military hospital beat forty members of 23rd August’s Red Headquarters, seriously wounding seven. On May 26th, Yunnan University Regiment and Communist Manifesto Brigade formed an alliance that rushed into the Great Alliance (23rd August) headquarters and beat the workers there. The next day, the military hospital

Artillery went to the Kunming Machinery Factory, and hurt twenty one members of 23rd August.\textsuperscript{101}

On May 28\textsuperscript{th}, the Artillery dominated Military Medical School held mass meetings where they complained of the crimes of 23rd August. 23rd August members sneaked onto the stage at the meeting and strongly protested. Artillery refused to debate with them and started fighting. Over forty were wounded. 23rd August brigades, totalling thousands and backed by Zhang Ziming (张子明), Deputy Commander of the Kunming Military Region, heard of the battle and quickly came to the School. Artillery retreated to the Hall, with forty captives. 23rd August rushed the Hall. Artillery were finally still not entirely dislodged, although hundreds died and thousands were wounded.\textsuperscript{102}

After this first major violence, Qin Qiwei and Zhang Lixiong (Political Commissar KMR) were recalled to Beijing for ideological training.\textsuperscript{103} The CCP Central Committee despatched Security Minister Xie Fuzhi, to forge an agreement between the factions.\textsuperscript{104}

On May 30\textsuperscript{th}, the Central Military Control Committee and the Cultural Revolution Small Group sent telegrams to the Kunming Military Region to express concern over the armed fighting between Artillery and 23rd August. They were told that cadres and the Army were

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\textsuperscript{101} The Head Office of the Teacher's College 23rd August Fighting Regiment, 1967, “The Fierce Black Wind of May. Spring City Warriors spill blood in a Just Cause”, Teacher's College 23rd August, No 2, June 7, 1967, p. 3-4. p. 3.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid. p. 4.
\textsuperscript{103} The September 15 Army of the Teacher's College 23rd August Fighting Regiment, 1967, “Yunnan’s Zhao Yongfu is now in action”, Teacher's College 23rd August, No 2, June 7, 1967, p. 2.
\end{flushright}
not to take sides and Red Guard organisations were not allowed to make contact with the military.¹⁰⁵

These moves failed to stop the violence. From June to December 1967, the two main factions further escalated their armed struggle. The PLA supported both factions, and in some places "weapons seizure" was in fact weapons distribution. There were over five thousand deaths in the whole province in 1967 alone. Production and supply conditions became very difficult as the two factions occupied various areas of Kunming, describing each area as being under their rule.¹⁰⁶

Vice-premier, Security Minister Xie (谢) Fuzhi arrived in Kunming. The delegation spent eleven days working out a temporary formula to reconcile the Red Guard factions and the local Military. On July 24th, a six point agreement was finally reached between Artillery and 23rd August dealing with the surrender of arms and conditions for the cessation of violence. However, because Xie Fuzhi had too many ties to local leaders to deal with the local scene decisively, violence flared up again.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. p. 358.
¹⁰⁷ Ibid. p. 358.

Chapter Four discusses several examples of the renewed violence, and I will summarise them here. On July twenty eighth, Artillery attacked 23rd August in sixty-one trucks. Many were killed and Artillery beat the factory gatekeeper, throwing his body into Dian Lake.\textsuperscript{108} Artillery leader, former Deputy First Secretary, Zhao Jianmin, gathered together over three thousand fighters. From July 28\textsuperscript{th} to August first, they attacked the factory’s 23rd August group.\textsuperscript{109} On August the 23\textsuperscript{rd}, Artillery used force to occupy the Provincial Military Control Committee at Wuhua Hill. The premises of Wuhua Hill were reduced to rubble, casualties were heavy, and Beijing had to rush a supervisory group to the scene.\textsuperscript{110} From August twentieth to 26\textsuperscript{th} Artillery made fourteen attacks on the Postbox 300 factory, each of which was repulsed.\textsuperscript{111}

Weapons seizures were an essential part of the escalating conflict and are discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. On August 26\textsuperscript{th}, at the Yunnan Military Region (YMR) compound, Artillery leader Fang Xiangdong (方向东) made a secret agreement with the wife of the Deputy Commander, to give Artillery weapons that very day, because twenty thousand 23rd August men were about to attack the YMR. Machine guns were placed on


\textsuperscript{109} Ibid. pp. 184-185.


\textsuperscript{111} Xiang Zhaobin, Wang Xianjin and He Bian, 1968, Yunnan Cultural Revolution Register of Heroes, Yunnan 23rd of August “Defend the Great Wall”, Kunming, Yunnan. pp. 386-387.

the high points of the compound, and the fighting began.\footnote{Ibid. pp. 377-378.} The district records report nevertheless that on August 26\textsuperscript{th}, some hundred members of 23\textsuperscript{rd} August broke into the Yunnan Military Region and stole twenty six machine guns and cartridges.\footnote{Compilatory Committee of Kunming Wuhua District, 1995, Records of Wuhua District, Sichuan Dictionary Publishing House, Chengdu, Sichuan. p. 64.} From August twenty fifth to twenty eighth, several Artillery groups went to Weapons Depots in the Western Hills (西山), Changpo (长破) and Xiaomaiyu (小麦雨), and stole over one thousand weapons and 1,020,000 bullets. They then tried to establish full control over the Electrical Lines factory.\footnote{Xiang Zhaobin, Wang Xianjin and He Bian, 1968, Yunnan Cultural Revolution Register of Heroes, Yunnan 23\textsuperscript{rd} of August “Defend the Great Wall”, Kunming, Yunnan. pp. 378 and 196.}
The period of major factional battles: August 1967 to January 1968

Next there was a period of major factional battles, discussed in more detail in Chapters Four and Three, but mainly in Chapter Four. By late August 1967, Artillery were in a strong position and they wanted to finish what remained of 23rd August’s strength, and occupy the 23rd August-controlled munitions factories Postboxes 300 and 200. On August 27th, on the shore of Dian Lake, at the Postbox 200 factory Artillery attacked. Fourteen 23rd August activists of Postbox 200 were captured and marched to a small hollow called Guoditang (锅底塘), where the Artillery fighters took their clothes and valuables. Two especially defiant activists were killed and the others threatened. A third was killed, before two escaped. When the Army arrived, the remaining nine warriors, were about to be knifed. One died shortly after from his wounds. This “Guoditang Incident”, illustrated the escalating cruelty of the conflict.

Next was a major battle analysed in Chapter Four. On August 31st, Artillery attacked the “Yan Hongyan Crimes Exhibition” at the Provincial Museum, where twenty activists from 23rd August were based. Guns started shooting from nearby buildings. Several hundred Artillery, climbed the walls and entered the Museum, occupying the first and second floors. A group of 23rd August activists rushed in to save those inside, and seven died. 23rd August retreated to the seventh floor. Artillery attacked all night with machine guns and hand-grenades, but 23rd August beat them back time and again, the whole night...

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116 Written by Kunming Medical Institute Artillery Teachers. 项兆斌，王先金，合编，1968. 云南文化大革命英雄谱·云南八、二三《保卫长城》，昆明，云南
long for seventeen hours. At 4.30am, 23rd August leader Deng Xishu (邓希术) and two others went down to negotiate and were detained. Over one hundred Artillery then walked up to the seventh floor using the captured men as human shields. In this way, Artillery were victorious.\textsuperscript{117}

On September fifth 1967, all four central authorities in China, the CCP Central Committee, the Central Military Control Committee, the State Council, and the Cultural Revolution Small Group, issued a joint directive, signed by Mao, attempting to end the armed struggle and revive the authority of the military.\textsuperscript{118} The directive ordered all mass groups to turn their weapons, and all kinds of military materials, into the army and obey military authority. However, August to December 1967, was the height of the violence in Kunming. Shops were closed, and communications were suspended. People were afraid to leave their homes.\textsuperscript{119}

On September seventh, 23rd August controlled the Electrical Machine Factory. As discussed in Chapters Three and Four, this was the only place amongst all the strategic points approaching Kunming, not controlled by Artillery. Several Artillery brigades, and the Revolutionary Union of the Army School moved to attack the Electrical Machine Factory. There were altogether over one thousand people armed with light and heavy machine guns, and hand grenades. Artillery reached the second floor, before being fought

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid. pp 380 -382.  
\textsuperscript{118} Compilatory Committee of Kunming Wuhua District, 1995, Records of Wuhua District, Sichuan Dictionary Publishing House, Chengdu, Sichuan. p. 64.  
Blecher, Marc J., 1997, China against the tides: Restructuring through Revolution, Radicalism and Reform, Pinter, London. p. 82.  
\textsuperscript{119} Pan Danke 潘丹柯, Kunming Businessman. Previously a Red Guard. Interviewed 27/11/99.  
Yang Bangshun 杨邦顺, Retired Professor of English, Yunnan University. Interviewed October 1999.
back. Many dead bodies were left. Over the next ten hours, there were several more attempts to reach the second floor, resulting in dozens more casualties. Early next morning, 23rd August had to evacuate.\textsuperscript{120}

On September the tenth, the two factions made an agreement to “stop fire and hand in weapons”, under the mediation of the Provincial Military Control Committee (MCC), and after this the MCCs began to be revitalised.\textsuperscript{121} However, Yunnan was not among the provinces that went through a process of “negotiated settlement” under the joint supervision of Premier Zhou Enlai, the Cultural Revolution Small Group and the Army in Beijing.\textsuperscript{122} The period of major battles continued.

There were a dozen major battles from October to November 1967, all discussed in Chapters Three and Four. I will introduce them briefly here. In late October, an Artillery leader moved the contents of the Yunnan Military Region’s three military equipment garages to Artillery’s central barracks in western Kunming.\textsuperscript{123} In early November, a time bomb planted by a “Mao Study Class” exploded at Puping Village near Kunming. The class members then made an abortive attack on 23rd August at Puping Village Electric Factory. Also in November, fighting erupted again at Wuhua Hill. The centre was forced


\textsuperscript{121} 昆明市五华区志编辑委员会，1995，五华区志，四川辞书出版社，成都，四川。 Compilatory Committee of Kunming Wuhua District, 1995, Records of Wuhua District, Sichuan Dictionary Publishing House, Chengdu, Sichuan. p. 64.


to send an investigating team to arrange a ceasefire. The local military split in support of different factions.\textsuperscript{124}

In November 1967, \textit{Artillery} brigades “invaded” the northern suburbs, scattering and killing 23\textsuperscript{rd} \textit{August} organisations. \textit{Artillery} besieged the 23\textsuperscript{rd} \textit{August} at the strategically placed Heavy Machine Factory. “Bad elements” of the military took part in the fighting, in defiance of Central Government directives. Many were wounded, and some were killed. Over two thousand personnel and their families evacuated the Factory and went on a “Little Long March” of about 250 kilometres, and two months, through rural counties bordering Kunming.\textsuperscript{125}

On December fourth, the Puping Village “Mao Study Class” together with \textit{Artillery} Brigades (over two hundred men) attacked PLA men who were assigned to protect a weapons factory. \textit{Artillery} brigades seized all the weapons and bullets. A PLA man was killed.\textsuperscript{126} On December fifth, more than three hundred armed \textit{Artillery} members attacked the 23\textsuperscript{rd} \textit{August} at the Small Hydroelectric Power Station (see map page 62) and the Coal Machinery Factory.\textsuperscript{127} On December tenth, a 23\textsuperscript{rd} \textit{August} vehicle arrived at the Red Guard Chemical Factory below Pineapple Village in the Western Hills (see map on page


\textsuperscript{125} 项兆斌，王先金，合编，1968，云南文化大革命英雄谱，云南八、二三《保卫长城》，昆明，云南。


\textsuperscript{126} Ibid. p. 385.

\textsuperscript{127} 陈德仁《编纂》，1996，当代云南大事纪要，当代中国出版社，云南。


Reprinted from “Change to a New Sky” No.1. 项兆斌，王先金，合编，1968，云南文化大革命英雄谱，云南八、二三《保卫长城》，昆明，云南。
62), and was ambushed by a group of Artillery. On December fourteenth, there was mass fighting at Puping Village. Artillery Brigades attacked 23rd August at the Puping Village Power Station. There was machine gun fire for two days and three died. The electric turbine was dislocated, blacking out most residential and industrial areas of Kunming.

The CCP Central Committee asked for the factions, and the leading cadres of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps, to send representatives to Beijing. Beijing also sent an inspection group to Kunming on a fact-finding tour, and then PLA authorities issued a statement revealing uneasiness amongst its ranks. Once again the peace efforts failed to stop the major battles.

On December eighteenth, there was the “East Wind Department Store Incident”, discussed in Chapter Three. A protest march by Artillery to the East Wind Department Store (see map on page 62), where 23rd August had a base, was a protest against the killing of a PLA man by 23rd August. Carrying homemade weapons, these people attacked the building, breaking the windows. Three hundred people surrounded the building. “We will not leave until the Military Control Committee sends someone to take over from us”, they said. By early morning, still waiting for the Military Control


Committee to arrive, over thirty machine guns had been arranged in all the surrounding buildings. Thirty four 23rd August members defended the East Wind Department Store’s five floors. Intense firing started and the walls, windows and doors were filled with bullet holes.\textsuperscript{132} Artillery climbed into the fourth and fifth floors. 23\textsuperscript{rd} August retreated downwards to the second and third floors. At 11am, electricity was cut off, broadcasting was suspended, telephone lines were cut and water stopped. They began negotiations. At twelve midnight, negotiations broke down. All night long, innumerable attacks were beaten back again. 23\textsuperscript{rd} August were now about twenty. At 2pm, Artillery, used ladders to get onto the second floor, killing two. 23\textsuperscript{rd} August had no bullets left, and were forced to surrender.\textsuperscript{133}

On December twenty seventh, there was a large battle on the tops of Xiao Tuan (小团) and Min (岷) “mountains”, in the Western Hills, near the suburb of Heilinpu (黑林谱, see map on page 62). Artillery attacked 23\textsuperscript{rd} August groups with the help of PLA troops. There were altogether about 10,000 attackers. This “Battle of Heilinpu”, discussed in Chapter Four, was one of the largest encounters of Kunming’s conflict. Min Mountain was four times lost and regained.\textsuperscript{134} The Red Army Battalion of the 37\textsuperscript{th} Division who were guarding Heilinpu saw 23\textsuperscript{rd} August being attacked and rushed into their factory at Min Mountain, helping people out to Bomb Shelter caves. The PLA Brigade that normally guarded Xiaomaiyu Weapons Depot then joined Artillery. 23\textsuperscript{rd} August then

\textsuperscript{132} Xiang Zhaobin, Wang Xianjin and He Bian, 1968, Yunnan Cultural Revolution Register of Heroes, Yunnan 23\textsuperscript{rd} of August “Defend the Great Wall”, Kunming, Yunnan. pp. 143-148.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid. pp. 148-153.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid. p. 158.
retreated along mountain paths beside Dian Lake. After 23rd August's retreat two members of the 23rd August Standing Committee were killed with knives. A PLA man was shot. Sick and wounded 23rd August were all killed with grenades. Thousands of 23rd August were taken out of the caves and beaten. Six died from the beatings. One was deliberately run over by a truck. Another was disemboweled. Another had his eyes gouged and tongue cut out. A total of fourteen were killed. The remaining people were forced to "concentration" camps. Many people died on the five-kilometre march to the three "concentration camps" at Yunnan University, Green Lake (see map on page 62), and Wuhua Hill.

The single most important battle in the drive to end the military and factional fighting was the campaign to crush the Western Yunnan Onward Marching Special Division (滇西挺进纵队) or Dianting (滇挺), also discussed more extensively in Chapter Four. Former deputy First Secretary, Zhao Jianmin organised the Dianting, at the beginning of January 1968, ostensibly to fight Nationalist remains and protect against invasion, but in reality to fight August 23rd and to establish Artillery control over Western Yunnan. The PLA in Yunnan were ordered to deal with Dianting. On January twenty second, the

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135 Reprinted from Spring Storm magazine 项兆斌·王先金·合编, 1968, 云南文化大革命英雄谱·云南八·二三《保卫长城》, 昆明, 云南.
136 项兆斌·王先金·合编, 1968, 云南文化大革命英雄谱·云南八·二三《保卫长城》, 昆明, 云南.
137 项兆斌·王先金·合编, 1968, 云南文化大革命英雄谱·云南八·二三《保卫长城》, 昆明, 云南.
Fourteenth Corps insisted that *Dianting* lay down their weapons. *Dianting* refused. The Fourteenth Corps attacked that night. Arriving in Western Yunnan at Xingsu (星宿) River Bridge, they asked *Dianting* to surrender. They refused again. The Fourteenth Corps attacked and *Dianting* were beaten into caves, under powerful gunfire. The PLA then rushed the caves and overwhelmed *Dianting*.\(^{139}\)

\(^{139}\) Ibid. pp. 305-309.

The violent conflict begins to wind down: January to August 1968

The next phase of events in Kunming was one where the level of violent conflict began to decline. This phase is dealt with only in Chapter Four. In Beijing on January 21st, Xie Fuzhi held a conference with leading cadres of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps, and the two factions. Xie criticised Artillery leader Zhao Jianmin, who was asked to attend, but did not. Xie and Kang ordered Zhao’s immediate arrest. He was arrested in Beijing within days, and kept in jail for eight years. After this, many cadres were persecuted, beaten to death or maimed.140

By February eleventh, eight hundred Yunnanese were in classes in Beijing, discussing the “Yunnan Problem”.141 Mao heard reports on these Yunnan classes, and the numbers were then increased to over three thousand. Mao, the Cultural Revolution Small Group, and members of the CCP Central Committee gave interviews to all Yunnan study class members.142 There was an agreement on the Thirteenth of February, to stop fighting, hand in weapons, recover transportation and guarantee smooth post and telecommunication.143 A ceasefire commenced on February sixteenth, in the whole of Yunnan. All weapons and ammunition were to be handed to the Military Control

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140 陈德仁《编稿》，1996，当代云南大事纪要．当代中国出版社，云南．


142 陈德仁《编稿》，1996，当代云南大事纪要．当代中国出版社，云南．

143 昆明市五华区志编纂委员会，1995，五华区志．四川辞书出版社，成都，四川．
Committee on March fourth. On February 21st, PLA men started to patrol Kunming City, and according to district records, the “resorting to violence” ended.

On March eighth, the Yunnan Military Control Committee published Concerning The Grasping Revolution, Promoting Production and Striking Counter-revolutionary Economics Agreement made by the two Yunnan Factions in Beijing. This emphasised productivity, normality and defence. Street corner broadcast stations loudspeakers, and propaganda vehicles were all stopped. Workers were ordered back to their units and students ordered back to their classes by March fifteenth. Provincial Mao Thought Study Classes opened in Kunming on the twentieth.

On May nineteenth 1968, Beijing assigned the Political Commissar of the PLA Engineering Corps, Tan Furen, as First Political Commissar of the Kunming Military Region, to speed up the formation of the new Army-Party-Red Guard alliance government of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee. Cooperating with former Deputy First Secretary Zhou Xing and Deputy KMR Commander Chen Kang, he forced the major factions into a more lasting coalition.

Mao urged Tan to bring the “civil war” in Yunnan to an end, because the “consequences have been incalculable”, revealing that the Yunnan clashes had taken 80,000 lives.

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144 Ibid. p. 362.
145 Ibid. p. 364.
Guard publications said 160,000). In June, Tan Furen brought the 54th Corps of the Fourth Field Army from Sichuan to Yunnan, replacing the Thirteenth Corps of the Second Field Army within the Kunming Military Region (the Fourteenth Corps remained). The Thirteenth Corps was transferred to Henan province. After that, the KMR under Tan put an end to all Red Guard factional fighting. Another factor which assisted Tan Furen to end factional rivalry and form the Revolutionary Committee was the support of a “central support-the-left” troop called the “8113th Unit” (used in Inner Mongolia and Shanxi), which supervised all other PLA units. “Central Support the Left Units” were specifically created to deal with provinces which still had not formed Revolutionary Committees.

There was a final violent outburst on June twentieth 1968. 23rd August marched through Kunming. Artillery installed machine guns at the Municipal Sanitation Committee and other buildings in order to ambush them. The machine guns fired and three 23rd August were killed. Artillery then fired on people outside the Public Security Bureau, when they talked to PLA men, asking them stop the violence. Dozens were killed.

152 项兆斌．王先金．合编，1968，云南文化大革命英雄谱．云南八．二三《保卫长城》，昆明．云南．
Establishing a new order: August 1968 to December 1970

This is the final period discussed in the Thesis, and once again is dealt with only in Chapter Four. The Yunnan Revolutionary Committee was virtually created by the Military, although cadres, mass organisations and military units all competed for representation. On August the tenth, the CCP Central Committee, Yunnan Military Control Committee, State Council, and Cultural Revolution Small Group confirmed the founding of the Yunnan Revolutionary Committee (RC). Of the RC members, 61% were faction representatives, 15% were PLA, and 24% were leading revolutionary cadres. The RC Standing Committee of forty members had twenty faction representatives, ten PLA representatives, and ten leading revolutionary cadres. Tan Furen was Chairman. Among the ten deputies were, new Political Commissar of the Yunnan Military Region Zhou Xing, the Deputy Commander of the Kunming Military Region Chen Kang, and another Deputy KMR Commander Lu Ruilin. These army men formed the "nucleus group".

On August 23rd, the Yunnan RC issued a notice for the disbanding of mass organisations, the handing over many kinds of weapons, and the release of prisoners. All over China,

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Revolutionary Committee leaders were tired of the factional struggles and responded enthusiastically to Beijing directives, sending workers to factories.\textsuperscript{156}

As discussed in Chapter Four, the \textit{Cleansing of the Class Ranks} campaign to restore order had been gathering pace. At district level in July 1968, “Study Classes for Mao Thought and Cleansing the Class Ranks” were carried out. In these classes, the “nine kind of people” (landlords, rich peasants, historical and active counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, traitors, special agents, “incorrigible capitalist-roader” and “reactionary academic”), were examined and denounced. Many were dispersed to the countryside for physical labour. Many mistakes were made.\textsuperscript{157} On October fifth, the \textit{Yunnan Daily} published a \textit{Xinhua} article saying that cadres should be sent to the countryside to do physical labour. On December sixteenth, over 5000 cadres were sent to rural areas.\textsuperscript{158}

From September to December 1968, the Provincial Revolutionary Committee issued four notices about the distribution and settlement of the graduates of educational institutions from 1966 to 1968. All should go to Army farms and become “united with workers and peasants”. On November first, over 1600 graduates went to PLA farms to receive re-education, and another 1700 in January 1969. On December thirtieth, the \textit{Yunnan Daily} reported Mao’s directive that high school and college students should go “up to the mountains and down to the villages” (上山下乡) for re-education. By the end of January

\textsuperscript{158} Zhao Darning 赵达明. Student of International Relations at the Yunnan Provincial Science and Technology Institute. Previously a non-aligned High School Red Guard 66-70. Interviewed 30/4/00.  
1969, over 130,000 young Yunnan intellectuals had gone. In addition, young intelligentsia from Beijing and other places arrived in Yunnan to do physical labour. There were altogether 330,600 by the time this was finished completely in 1980. These campaigns sealed the end of the Red Guard factional conflict.

The mass movement to reclaim land, by landfill and pumping, from Dian Lake, started on January first 1970. It involved over ten thousand people, mostly intellectuals, carrying earth from the Western Hills. Three kilometres by twenty one metres of land and thousands of new rice paddies were created. However, in the long term most land was flooded again.

From January first to fifteenth, the Provincial Revolutionary Committee held a conference to assess the history of Yunnan’s Cultural Revolution so far. It condemned the cruelty used. Over 61,000 had been maimed, and over 17,000 were “persecuted” to death. Over three hundred were killed and four thousand wounded during the Dianting campaign.

In July and August 1970, the Provincial RC held a conference about re-establishing the Party and improving administration. It was said that if the District Revolutionary Committees were “qualified”, the Party should be re-built. Many cadres and former

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159 Ibid. pp. 365-368 and p. 373.
160 Ibid. p. 369.
faction members were rehabilitated and taken into Party, along with new members. In December, there was much new construction work.\textsuperscript{163}

Tan Furen was assassinated in December 1970. Chronologically, this is the final event discussed in this Thesis, and is analysed in Chapter Four. Mystery still surrounds the assassination because Tan’s assassin was also assassinated probably to hide his identity. However, the majority opinion is that a protégé of the Fourteenth Corps assassinated Tan, because of his connection to Lin Biao, and not because of the factional conflict.\textsuperscript{164} Tan Furen was sent to shore up the position of Lin Biao, but stirred up friction with attempts to build his own local power. After arriving in Yunnan, Tan lost no time in forming a coalition around himself.\textsuperscript{165}

By 1970 two thirds of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee positions were filled by the military, with veteran Zhou Xing becoming Chairman. In the rivalry between Zhou Xing and Chen Kang, the weaker Chen Kang sought the alliance of outsider Tan Furen. After his departure Chen was made subordinate to Zhou.\textsuperscript{166} Nevertheless, Chen seized the

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid. pp. 377-380.


\textsuperscript{166} The Editor, 1977, China Record, March 1977, p. 4.


\textsuperscript{168} Tiewes, Frederick C., 1974, Provincial leadership in China: The Cultural Revolution and its aftermath, Cornell University East Asian Papers, No 4, NY. pp. 77-78.
opportunity of the presence of hundreds of thousands of radical sent-down youth in efforts to form alliances for himself.\textsuperscript{167}

The Remainder of the Cultural Revolution period in Kunming

This Thesis does not analyse the politics of the 1970’s in Kunming. However, in order to provide a context for the core seven stages (subheadings) of 1966 to 1970, an outline of 1970’s politics is provided here. Party reconstruction was very slow, being completed finally in 1972. All provinces in areas of major external threat were slow to form party committees. This may have been because national security was such a prime concern that other tasks were delayed.¹⁶⁸ The Second Yunnan Provincial Congress was held from May thirty first to June third 1971, electing and establishing the Yunnan Provincial Committee. Yunnan was one of the very last provinces to do so.¹⁶⁹

In the early 1970’s, there was intense political infighting in Yunnan centred on the rivalry between the two veteran cadres Chen Kang and Zhou Xing, which undoubtedly would have had overtones of the old Artillery (Chen) and 23rd of August (Zhou) rivalry.¹⁷⁰ By July 1974 however, Mao had denounced his wife and three other top leaders, Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan, Zhang Chunqiao, as a “Gang of four”,¹⁷¹ then beginning in 1975, political infighting was the result of competing efforts by Deng Xiaoping and the “Gang of four” to gain a base in Yunnan. During this time, large numbers of “sent-down” youth from the

¹⁷³ Blecher, Marc J., 1997, China against the tides: Restructuring through Revolution, Radicalism and Reform, Pinter, London. p. 84.
big eastern cities and restive minorities added to the tumult. Deng, Deputy Commander of the Second Field Army, and other senior leaders in Beijing helped consolidate power in Yunnan, in the hands of the Second Field Army (2FA). Indeed, the initial delegation of 2FA sent to liberate Yunnan laid the foundation for a long-term link between Deng and many Yunnan leaders. Therefore, Government, Party, and Military leaders in Yunnan have mostly had close relations with Deng Xiaoping. By October 1975, Deng, with his power at a high, was able to reorganise the Yunnan provincial leadership in a way he thought would seriously undercut the “Gang of four” faction.

On September eighth 1976, Mao’s death provoked a serious political struggle. Hua Guofeng had the “Gang of Four” arrested on a charge of trying to ferment civil war. Hua was then confirmed as Chairman of the Peoples’ Republic. Hua then formally and officially drew a curtain on the Cultural Revolution, which was declared to have lasted more than a decade.

We can see then that, the history of Kunming’s Cultural Revolution falls into eight periods or stages. Firstly, is the period of early Cultural Revolution activities, from May to August 1966, and dealt with only in Chapter Two, that analyses the role of the students. Secondly, is the stage where Red Guard divisions formed, from September 1966

to January 1967, dealt with in Chapters Two and Three. Thirdly, is the period where factional conflict began, from January to March 1967, as discussed in Chapters Three and Four. Fourthly, the period where the factional conflict escalated, from April to August 1967, is again discussed in Chapters Three and Four. Fifth, the stage of major factional battles form August 1967 to January 1968, is discussed mainly in Chapter Four, but also a little in Chapter Three. The sixth period, is that when the intensity of the conflict began to decline, from January to August 1968, and is analysed only in Chapter Four, that analyses the role of the military. The seventh period is that in which a new party establishment was developed, from August 1968 to December 1970, and also discussed only in Chapter Four. Finally, the eighth stage, not discussed in the Thesis, is the remainder of the Cultural Revolution period in Kunming until 1976.

176 Blecher, Marc J., 1997, China against the tides: Restructuring through Revolution, Radicalism and Reform, Pinter, London. pp. 85-86.
Chapter Two. Kunming Students in the Cultural Revolution

Introduction

Nie Yuanzi’s big character poster, which was first put up at Beijing University on May twenty fifth 1966, was published in the People’s Daily on June first. The poster criticised the party leadership at Beijing University, and expanded the Cultural Revolution from an intra-party phenomenon to a mass movement. Student unrest exploded on Beijing’s campuses. On August first 1966, Mao Zedong answered a letter from the Red Guards at the Middle School attached to Beijing’s Qinghua University. In his public reply, Mao strongly supported their opposition to the CCP-appointed Cultural Revolution Work Team stationed at their campus. The Work Teams were an initiative of the CCP Central Committee (still under the influence of Chairman Liu Shaoqi) that, it was hoped, would moderate and direct the Cultural Revolution away from targeting the power holders.

The student Red Guards seriously entered the political scene after Mao’s political “victory” at the rather shoddily convened Eleventh Plenum of the CCP Central Committee later that month. As the Plenum drew to a close, on September the first, the CCP Central Committee approved the “Sixteen point Decision” as guidelines for the Cultural Revolution stressing that Red Guards should take unilateral action in rooting out “Bourgeoisie” in the party, and that they and other Cultural Revolution groups were to take over power.

On August fifth, Mao put up his own Dazibao, calling for the “bourgeois headquarters” within the CCP, to be toppled. On August eighteenth 1966, Mao accepted a red armband

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with the gold characters *Hongweibing* (红卫兵) or Red Guard, from one of the politically active groups of Qinghua University’s affiliated High School. This event, regarded by many as the birth of the Red Guard movement, sent the message that all students in China were to emulate the Qinghua University groups. Massive student Red Guard rallies were held daily in Tiananmen Square. Although, at first targeting staff in schools and colleges, these fervent young people soon confronted high party officials, whom they saw as belonging to a bastion of privilege and autocracy. What at first seemed to many people to be merely an extension of the previous “Socialist Education Movement”, was now turning into a realignment of the entire hierarchy of the Party and State. The Cultural Revolution took on a momentum unprecedented in the short history of the Chinese Communist State.

Clearly, the students played a large role in the Cultural Revolution, and especially in its earlier stages. As we shall see, Beijing’s student revolutionary fervour spread quickly to Kunming. Indeed, the first spontaneous large-scale Cultural Revolution activity in Kunming was the 23rd August Rally of student Red Guards. The distinctly student variety of revolutionary fervour was probably last seen clearly in the overwhelming criticisms of First Secretary Yan Hongyan, which lead to his suicide. This was in early January 1967. After this, although student leaders played major leading roles in both major factions, students acted more closely with workers, peasants and the military. Therefore, my analysis and discussion of the students’ role will not continue past January 1967. Chapters Three and Four will discuss the later period in more detail.

The fundamental argument in this chapter will be that class and educational status, were significant factors in the creation of the two major factions in Kunming. This argument states that class background, or "jieji chengfen (阶级成分)", combined with the comparative educational status of educational institutions in Kunming, significantly affected the composition of the Red Guard factions. Chan, Rosen, and Unger made the same argument about class, with regard to Red Guard factions in the city of Guangzhou.\(^{179}\)

Chan, Rosen, and Unger found that, just prior to the Cultural Revolution the "class line" was pushing students into four increasingly self-aware groupings with opposing interests: cadres’ children; worker-peasant children; middle-class children; and children of bad-class background.\(^{180}\) Conflict among high school students in Guangzhou resulted from, most urban high school students in the mid-1960’s facing fewer prospects for upward mobility, and growing competition for admissions to University due to shifts in admission criteria.\(^{181}\)

I will show that the same factors would explain some of the Red Guard division in Kunming. However, Chan, Rosen and Unger’s hypothesis, does not entirely account for the behaviour of students in Kunming. I will also argue that some additional local factors including rivalry between educational institutions for power and prestige in leading the Revolution played an important part in shaping events. This rivalry had a long history related, as we shall see, to psycho-cultural factors, and going back several decades.

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\(^{180}\) Ibid. p. 420.
In the months before the first large scale Cultural Revolution activity in Kunming (the 23rd August Rally), Yunnan Party leaders sought first to suppress the student Red Guards, and then to co-opt them and even to evade them. Attacked Party Committees took defensive measures. Party Committees convened secret Party meetings and mobilised students close to them to sway student opinion over to their side. This resulted in school Party Committees asking higher Party units to send out Party Work Teams to oversee the Cultural Revolution. In June and July the overwhelming majority of college students followed the Work Teams. They had no idea what the emerging political storm was about. They thought Mao had sent the Work Teams. The records of Kunming’s Wuhua (五华) District show that on July eleventh 1966, the educational departments held a mobilisation meeting, where all the faculties of the district were assembled to, “...carry out the free airing of views, put up big character posters, and hold great debates”. The Red Guard materials suggest that the Provincial leadership had hoped that such activities would exhaust the rebellious energy before it turned on the local Party leadership itself. Also, as part of their evasion, local party leaders actively organised their own student Red Guards and fanned local sentiments to ward off threats from the more radical student Red

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181 Also listed as a factor was, “...increasingly anxious efforts to enter the Communist Youth League.” Ibid. p. 397.
Guards of Beijing. In the weeks leading up to the major 23rd August Rally, Provincial Party Committee First Secretary, Yan Hongyan, Provincial Committee Secretaries, Zhao Jianmin, Lin Liang, and others, “every day with their arrogance, sent directives, gave orders and controlled the Proletarian Cultural Revolution of our whole province, as if they had become the master of our province’s Proletarian Cultural Revolution.”

On August third 1966, teachers, students and staff of the Kunming Agriculture and Forestry Institute, “exposed” the “anti-socialist” Party Secretary and Principle of the Institute, Dong Shaobeng. The CCP South West Bureau and the Provincial Party Committee dismissed him. This was probably an act of evasion on the part of local Party leaders. Dong, being a scapegoat who satisfied the new directives coming from Beijing. The Party leadership, for the time being, was beyond serious attack.

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187 项兆斌，王先金，合编，1968，云南文化大革命英雄谱，云南八、二三《保卫长城》，昆明，云南。


The Twenty Third of August Rally

The first great non-orchestrated Cultural Revolution activity in Kunming, was the 23rd August Rally, and it is here that we can see the first evidence of the class factor amongst the students.

In the days that lead up to the Rally, awareness of the Cultural Revolution was clearly growing in Kunming. In the middle of August, news spread to Kunming that an important leader from the CCP Central Committee had written to the Red Guards of the Middle School attached to Beijing’s Qinghua University extending "ardent support"\textsuperscript{189}. On August thirteenth, all the colleges and middle schools held a meeting to applaud Chairman Mao's call that, “You should be concerned with state affairs, and carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution through to the end”. On August fourteenth, fifty thousand people gathered together to congratulate the decision on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, made during the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth CCP Central Committee. This appears to have been the birth of the non-establishment connected student Red Guard movement in Kunming\textsuperscript{190}.

On August twentieth, students, teachers and staff of Kunming Teacher’s Institute and Kunming Agricultural and Forestry College rallied at the Kunming Teacher’s Institute to celebrate the setting up of Cultural Revolution Committees in the two colleges. Fifteen thousand teachers and students of all Educational Institutes went along to extend their


\textsuperscript{190} District governments also held rally meetings. 昆明市五华区志编辑委员会，1995，五华区志，四川辞书出版社，成都，四川。
congratulations. Provincial Party Committee members, First Secretary Yan Hongyan (阎红彦), Zhou Xing (周兴), PLA Commander Qin Qiwei (秦**), and Minister Sun Yuting (孙余庭) spoke at the rally. Thus we see that the local elite were still co-opting the Cultural Revolution.

However, on that same day, a letter from Beijing’s Qinghua University arrived at the Kunming Agriculture and Forestry Institute. This letter was the spark for the relatively spontaneous Rally of 23rd August. It was from a certain student Red Guard leader called Wang (王). It was addressed to the Kunming Agriculture and Forestry Institute’s Red Guard leader, second year Forestry student, Zhou Hong (周鸿). The letter recommended criticising and protesting against Provincial Committees, who were suspected of blocking the Cultural Revolution. This letter, filled with revolutionary fervour, spoke about about how the proletarian revolutionary factions of Beijing and certain inner provinces had, according to Mao’s suggestion, “Bombarded the Provincial Committees and set fire to the Municipal Committees”. The letter also wanted to know why there were no Red Guards from the southwestern provinces at the Tiananmen rallies? What was the situation in Yunnan that allowed this to occur?

The letter was copied that afternoon and pasted up as a Big Character Poster or Dazibao (大字报), at the entrance to the Institute’s student canteen. This spurred the students to take action, two days later, on the night of August twenty second. Making Revolutionary

Liaisons (革命大串联), a group of about seventy students, mainly from second year Forestry, went off to various other tertiary institutions. Also, a group of more than ten third year Botany students went off to most of the High Schools.

Shortly after 9pm, the group of seventy arrived at the back gate of Yunnan University. The Yunnan University students were not preparing for Revolutionary Contacts. They were all sleeping. The leaders of the Agriculture and Forestry Students gave orders for the Yunnan University students to be woken up, before going to the Teacher’s Institute, which was also nearby. After making Revolutionary Liaisons, the Teacher’s Institute students escorted the Agriculture Forestry student leaders back to the Yunnan University Hall with a fanfare of gongs and drums.

Back at Yunnan University, they got a completely different reception. Two teachers from the Yunnan University Cultural Revolution Preparatory Committee were sent to meet them. They apparently said, “You rang us up to say you would deliver a Dazibao, but we have no idea of the content, so we can’t let the students come out and see you. Please hand over your Dazibao.” The Agriculture and Forestry Institute and Teaching Institute students exploded with anger, and argued for ten minutes with these teachers, who were described as being of “odd” class background. The arguments were fruitless.193 The experience at Yunnan University must have been a disappointment and frustration for the rallying students. They then went to the Engineering Institute, at about one o’clock in the morning. The Engineering students met with the Agriculture and Forestry and Teaching students, and hearing the contents of the Dazibao shouted, “We support the revolutionary movement of the Agricultural Forestry Institute students and teachers”. Then, three trucks

193 Ibid. p. 9.
of students from all three institutions went to the Kunming Medical Institute. In all, there were over 150 students. They got an enthusiastic welcome from more than two thousand people at the Medical Institute, who had been waiting since the previous night. 194

Clearly, from the above we can see that the students of most educational institutions in Kunming were willing to join the Cultural Revolution activities, begun by the Agriculture and Forestry Institute, 195 with the notable exception of Yunnan University. I will explain below how this constitutes the first piece of evidence for the argument that class background, combined with the comparative educational status of educational institutions in Kunming, significantly affected the composition of the Red Guard factions.

As mentioned earlier, when Chan, Rosen, and Unger, made the same argument about class, with regard to Red Guard factions in the city of Guangzhou, 196 they found that, just prior to the Cultural Revolution the “class line” was pushing students into four increasingly self-aware groupings with opposing interests: cadres’ children; worker-peasant children; middle-class children; and children of bad-class background. 197 Conflict among students resulted from fewer prospects for upward mobility and growing competition for admissions to University. 198 Liu Guokai noted that, after 1963, institutes of higher learning, when enrolling students no longer used test scores as the principle criterion. Instead, class background became a critical factor. The test score level was

194 Ibid. p.10.
195 The other group of over ten students from Botany and Agriculture, carrying a public letter from Mao to the Qinghua University Red Guards (published on the first of August), the letter from Qinghua University to Zhou Hong, and thirteen questions to be put to the Provincial Party Committee, set out at 10pm on the twenty second. Ibid. pp. 10-11.
197 Ibid. p.420.
198 Also listed as a factor was, “...increasingly anxious efforts to enter the Communist Youth League.” Ibid. p. 397.
lowered for children of cadres, workers and peasants and raised for those from “reactionary and exploiting” class families. Students from households with serious political problems would never be admitted no matter how high their scores.199

Most of the same conditions could be found in Kunming. It was most definitely the case that in Kunming, University places were difficult and competitive to get in 1965 and 1966. This was particularly true of Yunnan University.200 Yunnan University, at that time the only University, was and still is the most prestigious of all Kunming’s educational institutions. Before liberation, Yunnan University actually controlled most other educational institutions in Kunming. It was not until after 1954 that the other institutions became “independent”. Those of “good class” or hongwulei (红五类, the five red kinds: workers, peasants, cadres, revolutionary soldiers and revolutionary martyrs) background, and particularly cadre’s children, were more likely to be admitted there.201 This probably caused a lot of resentment, among “bad class” and middle-class students. Perhaps feeling less resentment about status, Yunnan University students felt less need to join the rebellious 23rd August Rally. On the other hand, the Agriculture and Forestry Institute concerned as it was, with things of a less esteemed “outdoor labouring” nature is clearly leading the rebellion at this stage.

There is reason to believe then, that “good class” (Yunnan University) students would have been less likely to join the 23rd August faction formed from the organisational

200 Zhao Daming, Student of International Relations at the Yunnan Provincial Science and Technology Institute. Previously a non-aligned High School Red Guard 66-70. Interviewed 30/4/00.
201 Yang Bangshun, Retired Professor of English, Yunnan University. Interviewed October 1999.
Luo Deyang, Lecturer in Mechanics, Kunming Engineering University. Interviewed November 11, 1999.
momentum of the rally. Chan and Barnouin have argued that the earlier Red Guards were really an exclusive club of the society's already privileged, and that late in 1966 they regrouped themselves into what became known as the “loyalist” Red Guards.\(^{202}\) As mentioned before, local party leaders actively organised their own Red Guards to ward off threats from the more radical Red Guards of Beijing. District records tell us that Yunnan University students had already formed Red Guard groups of this nature,\(^{203}\) and therefore had no wish to join with the student Red Guards of the other educational institutions.

Certainly, interviewees have maintained that many people who joined the \textit{August 23}\textsuperscript{rd} faction were from a “bad class” background and many people who joined the opposing faction \textit{Artillery}, were from a “good class” background, although this was thought by one interviewee to not be overwhelmingly true.\(^{204}\)

However, in Kunming, there was another ‘personal’ dimension, not really dealt with in Chan, Rosen and Unger’s theory. Former students have also testified to an intense rivalry and even hatred between the institutions of Yunnan University and the Kunming Engineering Institute. The leadership of the Engineering Institute, by virtue of the fact

\begin{footnotes}


\item[204] Zhao Daming thought that class was not an especially important factor. Zhao Daming 赵达明. Student of International Relations at the Yunnan Provincial Science and Technology Institute. Previously a non-aligned High School Red Guard 66-70. Interviewed 30/4/00. 


Yang Bangshun 杨邦顺. Retired Professor of English, Yunnan University. Interviewed October 1999.

Luo Deyang 罗德扬. Lecturer in Mechanics, Kunming Engineering University. Interviewed November 11, 1999.
\end{footnotes}
that it had more students than any other Kunming Institution, may have felt considerable resentment at Yunnan University’s greater prestige. A former student recalled that, even before the Cultural Revolution began, a particularly violent football (soccer) match occurred between the two institutions. Some have suggested that these two institutions, that at one stage came to lead the two main Red Guard Factions in Kunming, were competing to lead the Revolution and to be the leading Educational Institution in Yunnan. It was suggested that this rivalry was related to the traditional Chinese cultural concept that, “there can only be one Emperor” or Shantouzhuyi (山头主意).\textsuperscript{205} After the 23\textsuperscript{rd} August Rally, the Agricultural Forestry Institute served as the headquarters of the 23\textsuperscript{rd} August faction, though the headquarters soon moved, as we shall see, not to Yunnan University of course, but to the equally unesteemed Kunming Engineering Institute. By late 1967, Yunnan University had become a major base of the opposing Artillery faction, and as we will see in Chapter Four, the site of a notorious Artillery “concentration camp”\textsuperscript{206}.

Following on from the above discussion of class, educational institutions and the Kunming factions, it can be said that the 23\textsuperscript{rd} August faction would have been less likely to have had students of “good class” cadre background. As briefly noted before, the Southward Cadre Corps tended to form guanxi networks more amongst cadre children, than did the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps of the Second Field Army.\textsuperscript{207} It is therefore

\textsuperscript{205} Luo Deyang 罗德杨. Lecturer in Mechanics, Kunming Engineering University. Interviewed November 11, 1999.

not surprising that, as time went on the Southward Cadre Corps would have tended to support the *Artillery* faction, and that Yunnan University became a base for the *Artillery* faction.\(^{208}\) The evidence of military divisions that will be provided in Chapter Four, will make this seem more likely.

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\(^{208}\) Yang Bangshun 杨邦顺. Retired Professor of English, Yunnan University. Interviewed October 1999.
The “Attack” on the Party Committee and the first Party reaction

On the evening of August twenty second, yet another troop of about 160 students from the Agriculture and Forestry Institute, went in two trucks, not to other Educational Institutions, but to the Provincial Party Committee buildings (see map on page 62). They carried a Dazibao criticising the Provincial Party Committee. At about eleven o’clock, they arrived at the gate of the Provincial Committee, striding in past many iron gates and marching into the foyer of the Committee Meeting Room. The students met Provincial Committee Secretary Zhou Xing (周兴), who was also First Political Commissar of the Yunnan Military Region, and made a severe criticism of the Provincial Committee. After this the students returned to their campus.

The next morning, over one hundred students from the Medical Institute came to the Agricultural Forestry Institute to make revolutionary liaisons. They were carrying some questions to be put to the Provincial Committee. The Agricultural Forestry students joined these Medical Institute students, and went for a second time to the Party Provincial Committee compound (see map on page 62). Traditional Chinese Medicine students, Agriculture Labour Institute students, and others also arrived. Altogether, over a thousand students were inside the Provincial Committee compound. Provincial Party First Secretary, Yan Hongyan, Sun Yuting, and other Committee members, had to go to the Provincial Committee Hall, to be questioned by the students.

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On the twenty fourth, there was the first organised reaction to the “rallying” of August twenty second and twenty third, and the audacious protest at the Provincial Committee buildings. Provincial Committee member Sun Yuting personally went to the Agriculture and Forestry Institute to try and convince the students that the Provincial Committee were more devoted to the Cultural Revolution than they were. He also sent Work Teams to the Institute, although Work Teams were coming under heavy criticism elsewhere in China\textsuperscript{211}. Their idea was to moderate Red Guard anger, and to improve the image of the Party in the minds of the Red Guards.

However, on July twenty fifth, Mao had convened a meeting with Liu, the Cultural Revolution Small Group and the CCP Central Committee, where it was decided to withdraw the Work Teams, and on July twenty seventh, the Cultural Revolution Small Group held a mass rally at Beijing University to denounce the Work Teams.\textsuperscript{212} However, the withdrawal of the Work Teams merely shifted power from the Work Teams to pro-work team students in the Cultural Revolution Committees or Preparatory Committees that the Work Teams had helped to organise before their withdrawal.\textsuperscript{213} Furthermore, in Kunming, the name of the Work Teams was changed to \textit{Lianluoyuan} (联络员), meaning liaison personnel. These \textit{Lianluoyuan} eavesdropped, searched student’s houses, and checked the \textit{Dangan} (档案) or personal files of student leaders, “discovering” counter-

\textsuperscript{211} Work Teams sent by Liu Shaoqi and his group, to prevent a total attack on the CCP, were themselves attacked in many colleges and universities of Beijing. Also attacked was Liu’s, “eight point decision” restricting Cultural Revolution activities. Thirty nine institutions tried to expell the Work Teams (around June 20, 1966). The Work Teams were instructed to counter-attack, and many students were persecuted in what Mao later called the “bourgeois reactionary line”. Liu Guokai, 1986, “A Brief Analysis of the Cultural Revolution”, Chinese Sociology and Anthropology, Vol XIX, No. 2, Winter 1986-87, pp. 1-130. p. 18


\textsuperscript{213} Ibid. p. 84.
revolutionary or black files. *Xuetonglun* (血统论), or the principle of “bad” political history being passed on from one generation to the next, was used against the students.

In addition to these actions, Sun Yuting sent Journalists to the Agriculture and Forestry Institute to take “negative” pictures and recordings, to be used to support their argument that the student Red Guards there, were counter-revolutionary. Eventually, over one hundred teachers and students were labelled “counter-revolutionary intellectuals”, and arrested by the Public Security Bureau. Red Guard leader Zhou Hong was among those arrested.214

Clearly, the Party leadership was trying to contain the activities of these less Party-connected student Red Guards, who had participated in the 23rd August Rally. However, there is no evidence of students from Yunnan University taking part in such direct attacks on the Party establishment (Provincial Committee). There is also no evidence that Sun Yuting and other Party establishment figures used the *Lianluoyuan* against Yunnan University students. Surely, by now, a stronger sense of division was beginning to open up between the “better” class students of Yunnan University and the “lesser” class students of most other institutions.

Early Red Guards

Chan, and others have noted the existence of “early” student Red Guards. Liu Guokai and Barnouin observed that it was these “early” Red Guards that carried out most of the infamous destruction of all things “old”. On the morning of August 23rd, the Yunnan Daily reported that Red Guards in Beijing were sweeping away the “Four olds” (customs, habits, ideology, and culture) and the “Four evils” (intellectuals, merchants, landlords, and ex-nationalist). Yunnan Daily also republished a Peoples’ Daily editorial supporting the student Red Guards, and their movement to sweep away the “Four olds” and “Four evils” of Kunming started that day. So, on the same day that the more anti-Party student Red Guards were starting their major activities, the “better” class “early” Red Guards were also stepping up their own separate activities.

It was not surprising then that, on the evening of the twenty third, what appears to be the first small factional violence of the Cultural Revolution occurred. A troop of sixty five students from the Agriculture and Forestry Institute, after joining with another group from various High Schools and the Engineering Institute, were ambushed at the eighth High School (presumably where they were going to make revolutionary contacts) by “conservatives” headed by the Southward Cadre Corps cadre Zhu (*), of what later came to be known as the Artillery faction’s Upper Cadre Liaison Station. However, the students broke out of the encirclement and returned to the Agriculture and Forestry

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Institute on August the twenty fourth. Here we can see the first influence of the Military (the Southward Cadre Corps) on the embryonic student Red Guard factionalism. The “conservatives” here may well have been a group of “early” Red Guards, that had already been formed amongst high-cadre (hence the leadership of Zhu) and hongwulei (children of workers, lower and middle peasants, cadres, and revolutionaries’ children), possibly at Yunnan University. According to Liu Guokai, in Beijing the Red Guards of the hongwulei had disintegrated as early as the end of 1966. It is probable that by late August in Kunming, they were already becoming incensed that the “bad class” student Red Guard groups were becoming more influential. Chan, Rosen and Unger have observed that during the Cultural Revolution some worker-peasant students deserted Red Guard groups established by revolutionary cadre students. This would have created further and more personal causes for resentment on the part of the “early” Red Guard groups. Clearly, class was still a very significant factor in the formation of Red Guard factions.

By the end of August, the “early” or “conservative” Red Guards had accomplished a considerable toll of destruction in and around Kunming (This is not to say that other student Red Guard groups did not contribute). Most of the Bodhisattva statues of the Buddha Halls in Kunming’s nine temples were destroyed. The Tang Jiyao Tomb at Yuanlong (圆通) Hill and the Chen Yuanyuan Nunnery at Wacang Village were also

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damaged. According to the records of just one of the two city districts, thirty three
teahouses and eleven bookstores were closed down, and 4,700 pieces of paintings and
calligraphy were confiscated. On the buildings of both sides of fifty nine streets were
over nine thousand “revolutionary slogans”, over twelve thousand “Mao Zedong’s
Quotations” painted in varnish, over two thousand Quotation signboards, and over twelve
thousand Mao Zedong portraits.220

Throughout August and September many houses were searched, and their contents such
as old books and old photographs were burned. The demarcation of “old” was not clear,
and the student Red Guards often acted quite blindly. Wedding photographs and
graduation photographs in academic dress were regularly confiscated.221 Thousands of
streets, and hundreds of shops were forced to change their name to ones of a more
revolutionary nature. A dress code of “Mao suits” or military uniform was strictly
enforced. Religious activity stopped completely and monks and nuns were ordered to
return home to a secular life.222

We know that “radical” student Red Guards of Beijing and other areas swarmed into
Yunnan throughout August. Yan Hongyan criticised them, encouraging local people
(especially the “early” Red Guards) to fight them, resulting in some violence.223 From
August twenty eighth to September eighth, there were eight batches of Red Guards

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220 Compilatory Committee of the Kunming Wuhua District, 1995, Records of Wuhua District, Sichuan
Dictionary Publishing House, Chengdu, Sichuan, p.63.
221 Yang Bangshun 杨邦顺. Retired Professor of English, Yunnan University. Interviewed October 1999.
222 Chen Deren (compiler), 1996, The Yunnan Outline of Major Contemporary Events, Contemporary China
Publishing House, Yunnan, pp. 350-351.
223 The Editor, 1968, “Yunnan Provincial Revolutionary Committee Born In The Midst Of Armed
p.12.
coming south to Kunming from Beijing in successive waves to conduct “demagogic propaganda”. After that, various “Fighting Groups” and "Fighting Corps" were set up.\(^{224}\)

On September second, after Mao gave an interview to Beijing Red Guards on August thirty first, the first batch of Kunming student Red Guards, 430 in all, went to Beijing. On September fifth, the CCP CC issued a directive that Red Guards could travel to and from Beijing without having to buy train tickets.\(^{225}\)

This brought to an end, the initial large scale Red Guard outburst of the Cultural Revolution in Kunming. The Red Guard faction, the 23\(^{rd}\) August (Baersan 八二三), which initially came to be identified as “Rebel” or less party-connected, was eventually formed as a coalition of various “Fighting Groups”, from the organisational momentum of the August rallying. The student Red Guards from Beijing were described as “radical” and given the reaction of Yan Hongyan it is quite likely that they were of “bad class” background, and likely to support the 23\(^{rd}\) August students.

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Student divisions open up

On September the tenth, the Kunming “Red Guard Headquarters” was first suggested. This idea appeared to represent all Red Guard groups. On the surface at least, no serious factional divisions had yet arisen in Kunming. The batches of student Red Guards that had been coming south from Beijing and other cities since August twenty eighth, had been holding forums with the Kunming Red Guards. Especially prominent were student Red Guards from the Beijing Third Headquarters, whose leader was Gao Yangyi (高仰义).

On September the eleventh, numerous Corps of Red Guards were established at Universities and High Schools in Kunming. General Qin Qiwei, the Commander of the Kunming Military Region, was made chief instructor of these Corps, with senior KMR officers, Wang Yanzhuang (王砚泉) and Xu Zhifen (许志奋), as instructors. This was done merely to moderate the student Red Guards’ revolutionary fervour, rather than to unite them, and it is probable that it was mainly the hongwulei Red Guards who were drawn to these Corps. On September thirteenth at the National Defence Stadium, some 6,700 Red Guards held an oath-taking rally to celebrate the establishment of these student Red Guard Corps.

The national trend at this time was for the Cultural Revolution Small Group officials to begin to fill the vacuum in the schools created by the removal of the Lianluoyuan (Work

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227 Zhao Daming, 赵大明. Student of International Relations at the Yunnan Provincial Science and Technology Institute. Previously a non-aligned High School Red Guard 66-70. Interviewed 30/4/00.
Teams). Hong Yung Lee noted that, the rise of the Cultural Revolution Small Group together with the firm establishment of the principle of “free mass mobilisation” ushered the Cultural Revolution into new stage characterised by the “politics of manipulation”. The Cultural Revolution Small Group and Party organs manipulated the interests of various social groups (i.e. classes) in order to achieve control over the mass organisations, exacerbating the class conflict within the student Red Guard movement.

During this exacerbation, the “Kunming Red Guard Headquarters” was founded on September thirteenth. There was a large celebration conference, chaired by KMR Commander and Provincial Committee Secretary, Qin Qiwei, and attended by First Secretary Yan Hongyan, who gave a speech. However, the next day, at the meeting called the “September Fourteenth Storm”, the “Red Guard Headquarters” was banned by most other student Red Guard groups, who branded it the “Royalist Headquarters”. It soon

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232 Participants in the “September Fourteenth Storm”:

Kunming Tech Institute  Kng Med Institute  Kunming Agric Forest Institute
23th Kunming High School  Hunnan University  Beijing University
Beijing Mechanics Institute  China Science Tech Uni  Internat Relations Institute
Beijing Telegraphic Institute  China People’s Uni  Qinghua University
Beijing Steel and Iron Institute  Kng Teachers Inst  Yunnan University
Tech  Kng Furnace Institute  Yunnan Economic Middle School
Film  Nanjing University  Beijing Broadcasting Institute
Agriculture  Beijing Mechan Agric Chemical Institute
Aerotech  Central Minority Inst  Beijing Politics & Law Institute
Railway  High School attached to People’s University
2nd Beijing Foreign Lang Inst  High School attached to Beijing Geographical Institute
Beijing Teachers Institute  Beijing Med Institute
Beijing Hydraulic Electrical Inst  Beijing Iron Ore Institute

collapsed, and student Red Guards formed themselves more spontaneously, as we shall see, into the two factions mentioned earlier. By rejecting the “Red Guard Headquarters” most student Red Guard groups were trying to give the appearance of being less party-connected. Nevertheless, the conflict between Party-sponsored “early” Red Guards, and Red Guards formed after the 23rd August Rally, was now out in the open.

It is probable that the collapse of the “Red Guard headquarters” and the formation of the two major factions, was precipitated by a conference for exchanging revolutionary experiences amongst the Red Guards of Kunming’s Higher Education Institutions. This conference, held on September the seventeenth, before the founding of the “Red Guard Headquarters”, provoked much acrimonious debate amongst the student Red Guards of Kunming. About 35,000 students and teachers attended. When thirty one Red Guards from Beijing spoke of their experiences, they repeatedly referred to the unpopular family background theory of Xuetonglun and the theory of the unique importance of class origin, Weichengfenlun (唯成份论). These theories stressed that the descendants of the hongwulei should have a privileged status in society. The Five Black Kinds or heiwulei (黑五类) were described as being former landlords, former Nationalists, merchants, rich peasants, and counter-revolutionaries. On the twentieth, the Yunnan Daily published a long discussion of this conference, and for the next several months there was much heated and divisive debate in the schools about exactly what constituted the hongwulei and heiwulei.233 So once again, we see the crucial role that class is playing in creating factional division amongst the students. We know that, in Beijing, these debates divided the students into two opposing groups formed on the basis of family background.

233 陈德仁《编辑》· 1996 · 当代云南大事纪要 · 当代中国出版社 · 云南。
On September the fourteenth then, most of the students at Yunnan University and its allied Kunming Teachers’ Institute agreed to the founding of the Mao Zedong Thought Artillery Regiment or “Artillery”. Six days later, most of the students at the Kunming Engineering Institute agreed to the founding of the Jingan Mountain 23rd August Fighting Regiment or “23rd August”. After these two major Red Guard organisations were founded, all other party and government departments, corporations, enterprises and other units (including workers), setup their own revolutionary organisations, usually known as Fighting or Combat Regiments. These Fighting Regiments made contact with both the two major student organisations, and a pattern of affiliations gradually started to form.234

At the same time, the Yunnan Daily came to the attention of some of the student Red Guard organisations which had formed from the August rallying. They published public condemnations, claiming a number of Yunnan Daily editorials in September to be “full of errors”. The following incident was mentioned in Chapter Two, but here will be discussed from a student perspective. On September fourteenth, a Struggle Group of over one thousand, consisting of the Kunming Area Revolutionary Teachers and Students along with some Red Guards who had recently come down from Beijing, left the “Fourteenth September Storm” meeting at Yunnan University “in an orderly fashion”. This meeting, announced the formation of the Artillery Red Guard faction. As mentioned earlier, only most of the Yunnan University students agreed to form the faction. This Struggle Group walked out on the announcement.235 Due to the geographical proximity

234 Ibid. p. 351.
235 A minority of students and staff at Yunnan University supported the 23rd August faction, whilst a minority of students and staff at the Engineering Institute supported the Artillery faction. Yang Bangshun 杨邦顺, Retired Professor of English at Yunnan University. Interviewed December 1999.
of several different educational institutions in Kunming, it is also quite likely that
students from neighbouring institutions, would have joined the Struggle Group.

Shouting slogans, the Struggle Group made their way along the main ring road, to the
Yunnan Daily offices, where they stayed for several hours. After the Struggle Group left,
and the Yunnan Daily staff had detained eleven of their number, the Struggle Group then
took its complaints to the Provincial Committee compound. At the Provincial Committee
complex, they demanded of Minister Yue Xiaoxia that Yan come to see them, that a car
be sent to get the student Red Guards who were still detained at the Yunnan Daily, and
that the Editor-in-chief of the newspaper be invited to come to the Provincial Committee
too. However, Minister Yue Xiaoxia said that because Yan had received students from
Beijing on September the twelfth and thirteenth, he refused to see more. Nevertheless,
some of the Struggle Group students were indeed from Beijing, but had heard nothing
about this. The local Party leadership felt threatened by the more radical Red Guards
from Beijing, and had tried to create a sense of local resentment against outsiders. The
Struggle Group waited eleven hours, till 7am on September fifteenth, and not one
Provincial Committee worker came out of the Committee Offices to see them.236

This Yunnan Daily incident shows, from a student perspective, that those students who
rejected the Artillery faction at the “Fourteenth September Storm”, apart from being more
actively rebellious, were working more closely with the more radical anti-Party students
from Beijing. It was students of this kind who, as mentioned before, formed the 23rd
August faction at the Kunming Engineering Institute.

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236 项兆斌·王先金·合编·1968·云南文化大革命英雄谱·云南八·二三·保卫长城·
昆明·云南·
In summary we can say that, following the rejection of official attempts to form a united local Party-sponsored Red Guard Headquarters, two Red Guard groupings emerged. One was formed, largely by students of “bad” class background, following on from the protests of 23rd August. The other was formed largely from students of “good” class background, at the prestigious Yunnan University. So here again, we see that class issues were playing an important role in factionalising the student Red Guard movement. Also, there is more evidence of the rivalry between Yunnan University and the Kunming Engineering Institute, with each institution hosting the meetings that founded separate (and later opposing) factions.

Student activism and division continues to grow

From October eighth to twenty eighth, Mao convened and presided over a CCP Central Committee Work Conference attended by the principal leaders of provinces and municipalities. After this, dossiers compiled by educational institutions for the purpose of attacking rank and file people were ordered destroyed, and high-ranking cadre children were ordered removed from leading positions.237 Clearly, the tide was turning in favour of the more radical student Red Guards.

Due to the widespread nature of the campaign to “criticise the bourgeois reactionary line (of Liu and Deng Xiaoping)”, broad sections of society began to agitate around November and December 1966. Concurrently the more radical Red Guards of bad class background became stronger and they often started referring to themselves as Revolutionary Rebels.238

Indeed, an incident on December twenty second reveals that the factional divisions were growing further. Over thirty student Red Guard’s from the Kunming Engineering Institute, tried to use ration tickets to pay for a bus fare, as they were going to make Revolutionary Contacts. However, the Forward Guard Brigade of the Bus Department, refused them. After an altercation, the Red Guards were forcibly taken by bus to the Provincial Committee buildings at Wuhua Hill, where they were locked up in the Small Auditorium there, and beaten. The next day at 4am, a leading group of nine of the Red Guards was forcibly taken to the Large Auditorium of the Provincial Committee complex, where they were “struggled against”. These nine included Huang Zhaoqi

(黄兆琪), later to be one of the major leaders of the 23rd August faction. When their colleagues at the Engineering Institute heard of this the following day (December 24th), they sent a truck full of people to Wuhua Hill to try to rescue them. Eventually, by the end of the day, the entire Red Guard group had been allowed to leave. This incident shows that the profile of the Engineering Institute as a major factional centre was already quite high, and that the more “bad class” student Red Guards were now more assertive.

At the end of November, the Provincial Committee leadership was reportedly collapsing, as the “Rebels of Kunming” held a conference at the City Sports Stadium which criticised Deputy Governor and Provincial Committee Secretary Liu Minghui (刘**). At some time around the middle of December, Kunming’s Panlong (盘龙) District Government, then covering one half of the city, had come to a stop as leading cadres were detained and criticised, and on the twenty fifth the last full meeting of the Provincial Party Committee was held before the coming “January Power Seizures”.

Probably the last event where students acted more or less independently was the drive to unseat Provincial First Secretary Yan Hongyan. Except in a few cases, the First Secretaries of Provincial Party Committees were all targets of public criticism. The logic

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238 Ibid. p. 37.
239 章兆赋, 王先金·合编 . 1968 . 云南文化大革命英雄谱·云南八·二三《保卫长城》 . 昆明 · 云南 .
240 陈德仁《编纂》, 1996. 当代云南大事纪要，当代中国出版社，云南 .
242 陈德仁《编纂》, 1996. 当代云南大事纪要，当代中国出版社，云南 .
was that, since Liu Shaoqi was the biggest “capitalist roader” in China, there had to be a biggest “capitalist roader” in every province.243

In early January, Yan Hongyan was repeatedly denounced with false charges, and exposed to ‘kangaroo court’ style humiliations.244 At 11am, on January sixth, student militants from the 23rd August entered the Kunming Military Region Compound (see map on page 62) and went straight to its provincial Committee Secretariat building looking for Yan Hongyan. Instead they found Deputy First Secretary Zhao Jianmin “hiding” in a gloomy room. After refusing to say where Yan was, Zhao Jianmin was dragged onto a vehicle and paraded through the streets to be “shown to the masses”.245

The 23rd August student militants then apparently “ran all over the Yunnan Military Region” for next two days but did not find Yan. Suddenly some people reported that Yan Hongyan was at the Xiaomaiyu (小麦雨) weapons factory. On January the eighth, Yan Hongyan’s corpse was then found upon opening a guard regiment’s room at Xiaomaiyu.246 Aged 57, Yan had reportedly shot himself.247 On the night of January

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245 项兆斌, 王先金, 合编, 1968, 云南文化大革命英雄谱, 云南三十年三《保卫长城》, 昆明, 云南.


246 项兆斌, 王先金, 合编, 1968, 云南文化大革命英雄谱, 云南三十年三《保卫长城》, 昆明, 云南.

seventh, Cultural Revolution Small Group member Chen Boda had phoned Yan criticising him and the Provincial Committee, saying they were “frightened by the masses”. In a suicide note to his wife, Yan said Chen Boda and his ally, Jiang Qing, forced him to suicide.\(^{248}\)

An extensive propaganda campaign was conducted to vilify the memory of Yan Hongyan. It was noted that Yan had served in the Nationalist Army.\(^{249}\) Yan was also accused of trying to sabotage the Cultural Revolution, but his real mistake was to misjudge the target of the Cultural Revolution (the power holders themselves),\(^{250}\) and to oppose and persecute both the major factions, 23\(^{rd}\) August and Artillery.\(^{251}\) It appears that Yan may even have tried to nobly stay above the divisions within the student Red Guard movement and the Yunnan political scene. Indeed, most people in Yunnan now feel Yan was a good leader unjustly persecuted.\(^{252}\)

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Red Guard Newspapers confirmed Yan’s death on this date. 台湾国际关系学院, 1967, 中国共产主义年鉴, 台北。Taipei Institute of International Relations, 1967, Year Book of Communist Chinese Affairs, Taipei. p. 396.

Yang Bangshun 杨邦顺. Retired Professor of English, Yunnan University. Interviewed October 1999.


Yang Bangshun 杨邦顺. Retired Professor of English, Yunnan University. Interviewed October 1999.


Zhao Darning 赵达明. Student of International Relations at the Yunnan Provincial Science and Technology Institute. Previously a non-aligned High School Red Guard 66-70. Interviewed 30/4/00.

Yang Bangshun 杨邦顺. Retired Professor of English, Yunnan University. Interviewed October 1999.
Conclusion

After the fall of Yan, students played a leading role in the “January Revolution Power Seizures”, but increasingly they were joined by workers and various elements of the military. Although students remained active throughout the Cultural Revolution, (for example, on December fifth 1967, Kunming First High School, sent twenty two student Red Guards to Yunnan Military Region Deputy Political Commissar, Zhang Lixiong’s house in the Yunnan Military Region compound, which they occupied in a sit-in protest), they increasingly became the pawns of various military factions, as we saw in Chapter Three. Finally however, all students in Yunnan were forced to return to classes by March fifteenth 1968 by the latest, under the directive of the Provincial Military Control Committee.

I feel that, the fact that, 23rd August students led the harassment and criticism of Yan Hongyan is further evidence of the influence of class background on the formation of Red Guard factions. These students were mostly not of a “good” family background and enjoyed no particular privileges. They saw in Mao’s call to attack the “leading capitalist-roader”, an opportunity to express their resentment against the social order. The “early” Red Guards of the Artillery faction, would not have been prepared to participate in the overturning of the Party establishment because it threatened the very existence of themselves and their families.

Evidence has been presented then, that “class” background and the status of educational institutions determined, to a large extent, which students joined which faction in

\[\text{Reference: 项兆斌 \cdot 王先金 \cdot 合编 \cdot 1968 \cdot 云南文化大革命英雄谱 \cdot 云南八 \cdot 二三 \& 保卫长城} \]
Kunming. In this way, Kunming was not very different to other cities in China, during the Cultural Revolution, except that the configuration of educational institutions could not have been exactly the same. Most larger cities would have had at least two or more prestigious institutions, unlike Kunming’s solitary prestigious Yunnan University. As a final comment though, Chan, Rosen and Unger’s approach does presuppose that personal opportunities were uppermost in the minds of most students. It could well be, that for many students, they were merely taking on the tensions of the socio-political order around them.

Chapter Three. The Cultural Revolution amongst the Workers of Kunming

Introduction

I will argue here that the faction conflict in the factories and other work units (Danwei 单位) of the Kunming area followed a pattern, similar to that outlined by Andrew Walder, and mentioned earlier. Walder argues that the Cultural Revolution illustrates the ways in which the collective action of workers could be shaped by the Communist Party’s networks. These political networks divided workers into the factions around which conflict revolved at the outset of the Cultural Revolution. Successive efforts to defend and attack the networks merely led, as we shall see, to escalating cycles of persecution and cruelty. The politics of the Cultural Revolution in the Danwei was shaped by these attacks on and the defence of these networks, and by their eventual unravelling. Finally, the conflict ended in the draconian offensive of the Party-army faction to construct new networks of patronage and allegiance.254

After 1965, political organs, variously known as political departments, political sections, or political offices depending on the level of administration, were setup in every Danwei. New full-time political personnel emerged who commanded incontestable authority.255 The main way that workers could achieve promotion off the shop floor was through active participation in the Party-sponsored political organs such as the Party organisation, the Communist Youth League, the Union organisation, the factory Militia, or by working

for the factory security departments (observing and reporting on the activities of co-
workers). Candidates for promotion to group or shift leader, an office job in the Union or
Communist Youth League, or the propaganda or security departments, were selected
from activists in these organisations. Thus, the party networks were originally well
entrenched.

Walder found that Party organisations in factories exercised control over the allocation of
raises and promotions and could influence employees' access to other benefits, especially
housing. Henderson observed that the same situation existed in all Work Units or Danwei
(单位). Walder further noted that Factory Party organisations developed networks of
loyal rank-and-file Party members and other "political activists" and "backbone
elements" who were given preferential access to career opportunities and benefits in
return for their loyal support of the Party organisation and its labour policies. These
factors made the struggle of non Party-sponsored staff organisations during the Cultural
Revolution particularly difficult.

The networks formed by the activists of these Party-sponsored political organs were used
as part of the Party's effort to monitor opposition and dissent. This was evident to
workers who were not part of these networks and who resented activists, viewing them
with disdain and suspicion. These workers often harassed and intimidated activists in
places and at times when they could escape retribution. Conflicts within factories during

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the Cultural Revolution therefore were shaped heavily, though not exclusively, by divisions created in the workforce by the Party’s political activist networks.\textsuperscript{259}

The Cultural Revolution came to some factories during July to August 1966 in the form of Work Teams dispatched by the higher party apparatus to take control of the factory and conduct investigations and purges before declaring the factory politically clean. They initiated a huge “anti-Rightist” campaign. Rightists were selected on the basis of, bad class origin, possession of certain past political problems, having committed mistakes in previous political movements, poor relations with the leadership, or even grumbling and making cynical remarks. “Struggle sessions” were organised, where pre-selected targets were shouted at and often beaten. These targets were then removed from their posts and put under surveillance, and sometimes put into makeshift cells. Mao brought this anti-rightist campaign to a halt in early August, by openly declaring the purpose of the Cultural Revolution to be the attack on “power holders in the party, who follow the capitalist road”.\textsuperscript{260}

The Work Teams though, sometimes encouraged the formation of Red Guards among young politically active workers.\textsuperscript{261} These very first mass organisations were formed more by trusted clients of the party apparatus and these later came to be known as conservative (baoshou 保守) or royalist (baohuang 保皇). Later, when individuals other than these, sought to participate in the Cultural Revolution, the earliest rebel groups were


formed and severely suppressed, sometimes with beatings that brought them close to
death.262

After Mao’s repudiation of the Work Teams (September 1966), the Cultural Revolution
commonly began in the Danwei as a process of mobilisation and counter-mobilisation
along the fault-line created by the party’s clientelist networks. That is, those who
remained loyal to the power structures against those who were critical and opposed, for
whatever reason. Most Danwei split into two factions; those who had done well out of the
party network and those who had not.263 Then, factionalism emerged among Danwei
employees out of a dispute over who had the right to form popular organisations and
participate in the Cultural Revolution, and over the definition and aims of the
movement.264

The Kunming Red Guard materials tell us of some mass organisations forming within
factories by October 1966. Rival factions formed in one factory, where apparently, a
number of Small Character Posters or Xiaozibao, exposed a number of “capitalist
roaders” within the factory, belonging to the established party-sponsored network. On
October sixth, a certain Liu (probably a victim of the Work Teams) struggled face to face
with the factory’s leading “capitalist roader” Yan Shutian (阎书田). The party-sponsored
network then put up Dazibao against Liu, but this did not stop his activities, and he went
on to organise the 17th January Brigade, on that date in January. 17th January started with

171-172.

and Patterns of Conflict”, in Perry, Elizabeth J. (ed), 1996, Putting Class in it’s Place: Worker Identities in
174-175.

263 Ibid. pp. 171-172.

one hundred and grew to two thousand members. The leaders of the party-sponsored network, then called 17th January counter-revolutionary, and formed their own organisation named East Wind.265

By the middle of November, the Cultural Revolution Small Group had already promulgated the "Twelve point decision regarding the Cultural Revolution in factories and mines", that incited students to visit factories to mobilise workers.266 At this time, the Kunming Fragrant Material Factory, a small factory of eighty people, founded the non party-sponsored All Powerful brigade in late November.267 On December 12th, a Red Flag (the national military newspaper) editorial To Strive for New Victory said, "The broad ranks of revolutionary workers should now rise up and go in for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The joining of forces of the revolutionary students and the broad masses of workers marks a new beginning." Organisations that were not sponsored by the party then flourished among factory workers in December 1966. Nevertheless, Liu Guokai noted that many people in these organisations were Party members, and cadres from security, and the Communist Youth League. Most of the conformist commoners in factories automatically joined organisations sponsored by such prestigious people.268 Hence the distinction between "conservative" and "rebel" organisations in factories was

264 Based on numerous interviews with Cultural Revolution refugees in Hong Kong. Ibid. pp. 173-175.
265 廖兆安，王先金，合编 . 1968，云南文化大革命英雄谱·云南八·二三《保卫长城》，昆明，云南。
267 廖兆安，王先金，合编 . 1968，云南文化大革命英雄谱·云南八·二三《保卫长城》，昆明，云南。
often complex and unclear. This is an issue that Walder's hypothesis does not entirely deal with. It would seem that a minority of people from the party-sponsored networks, joined non party-patronised organisations. This was probably an attempt to protect their future in a climate of political uncertainty.

In early January 1967, three “revolutionary” brigades of the Kunming Fragrant Material Factory united to seize power (of the factory), and formed a single new brigade called *Carrying the Revolution through to the End*. It was allied with the less party-sponsored 23rdAugust, and it joined the *January Revolution Rebel Headquarters*, which was an early umbrella group of less party-connected organisations.\(^{269}\) Also in early January, families of the Rice and Oil Mechanical Factory announced the founding of the 8th*March* Brigade in the factory auditorium. 8th March appeared to be a less party-sponsored organisation as apparently, it would go to Chuanxingulou (穿心古楼), an ancient part of the old city wall, where many party cadre organisations were centred, and defeat them in argument. These debates would go deep into the night and last for many days on end.\(^ {270}\)

The above three factories can be seen as an example of some bolder small and middle sized factories that very early in the Cultural Revolution, started to rise against their party-sponsored networks. The organisations they formed were rebel in nature, and most joined rebel alliances, but some also joined “conservative” alliances, which had not yet shown their colours. Also some “conservative” organisations held back from joining larger “conservative” alliances until rebels were in power, at which time they joined the


\(^{270}\) Ibid. pp. 205-208.
rebel camp to stabilise their positions in their respective units. Presumably they were able to half-heartedly back the “rebels” attacks on the established party networks.

Walder interviewees reported that prominent among the first “rebels” however, were those who harboured fresh grievances from the conduct of the first stages of the movement, such as the case of Liu, mentioned earlier. These included the victims of the Work Teams, the factory party leadership, or the “royalist” mass organisations. These could be Party or Communist Youth League people, but were more commonly ordinary workers who had a history of conflict with the established party patronised networks.

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272 Based on numerous interviews with Cultural Revolution refugees in Hong Kong. Ibid. pp. 176-177.
Factionalism amongst the Yunnan Daily workers

At about the same time as factional divisions emerged in these first three factories, the first “white-collar” Danwei factional strife developed amongst the staff of the provincial newspaper, the Yunnan Daily. At first it seemed that the Yunnan Daily newspaper was beyond censure. It faithfully published the original sixteen point Cultural Revolution directive of the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth Congress CCP Central Committee on August eighth, and two of their leading conservatives made false (presumably this was not known at the time) self-criticisms. Also, later in August, after “revolutionary” staff at the Daily made the first revolutionary contact with Beijing Red Guards coming south, as well as with the local embryonic student Red Guard groups, the Daily targeted Provincial Party Committee First Secretary Yan Hongyan, in editorials and other articles.273 Party networks were being attacked, but not within the Danwei itself.

However, it soon became known that the Provincial Party Committee had been quietly conducting evasive action within the hierarchy of the Yunnan Daily, by strengthening party-sponsored networks. For example, in May, soon after Yao Wenyuan’s article criticising Wu Han’s play Hui Rai Dismissed from Office, a working group from the Provincial Organisations Department, including the deputy Minister, came to the newspaper and organised a new committee. This new committee reportedly issued a false criticism, trying to protect Chief Editor Li Mengbei (李孟北), who was allied with Yan Hongyan, Deputy First Secretary Zhao Jianmin and other Provincial Committee members. When three staff put up the first Dazibao on June twenty first, the new

273 Reprinted from the Yunnan Daily article, “Completely Invincible”. 项兆斌· 王先金· 合编 · 1968· 云南文化大革命英雄谱· 云南八· 二三《保卫长城》· 昆明· 云南·
committee was afraid that they might be “exposed”. They then started their own Dazibao campaign, and named these three staff as counter-revolutionary.\textsuperscript{274} Clearly, this is an early instance of party-sponsored networks trying to defend themselves.

As briefly mentioned in Chapter Two, the \textit{Yunnan Daily} then came to the attention of Red Guard organisations which had formed from the August rallying, and did not have the official backing of the Party. They published public condemnations, claiming a number of \textit{Yunnan Daily} editorials in September to be “full of errors”. Then on September fourteenth, a \textit{Struggle Group} of over one thousand, consisting of the \textit{Kunming Area Revolutionary Teachers and Students} along with some Red Guards who had recently come down from Beijing, left Yunnan University, to protest at the \textit{Daily}. This \textit{Struggle Group} walked out on the meeting that announced the formation of the more party-connected \textit{Artillery} Red Guard faction.\textsuperscript{275} Furthermore, due to the geographical proximity of several different educational institutions in Kunming, it is also quite likely that like-minded and like-class students (although I am not suggesting that class necessarily determined mind) from neighbouring institutions, would have joined the \textit{Struggle Group}.

Shouting slogans, the \textit{Struggle Group} made their way along the main ring road, to the highest point in Kunming, Yuantong Hill (see map on page 62). From there, they marched along other main roads to Kunming Department Store, where they stopped and

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\textsuperscript{274} Ibid. pp. 380-382.
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\textsuperscript{275} A minority of students and staff at Yunnan University supported the 23\textsuperscript{rd} August faction, whilst a minority of students and staff at the Engineering Institute supported the \textit{Artillery} faction. Yang Bangshun 杨邦顺. Retired Professor of English at Yunnan University. Interviewed December 1999.
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handed out propaganda. Finally, they went to the *Yunnan Daily* offices, where they stayed for several hours.

Using a loudspeaker, a “responsible person” of the *Struggle Group* announced that they wanted the *Daily* Chief and his Deputy to come out and listen to them read out their *Dazibao*. This was refused. A delegation was sent to meet with staff members who eventually agreed to let eleven of the Red Guards inside to paste up a *Dazibao*. These eleven Red Guards were then detained by staff of the *Daily*. The one thousand strong *Struggle Group* remained outside the gates, encouraging them to “fight till the end”.

Eventually, after the *Struggle Group* left, the *Yunnan Daily* staff suddenly decided to let the eleven student Red Guards out. This vacillating behaviour of the *Yunnan Daily* staff, must have reflected the divisions between the party-sponsored and the non-party sponsored networks amongst them.

However, the eleven Red Guards refused to go, until “the Red Guard link with the Provincial Party Committee had been strengthened” and they demanded to see Chief Editor, Li Mengbei, whom they suspected of protecting First Secretary Yan Hongyan. Minister Yue Xiaoxia (岳肖侠), of the Provincial Organisations Department that had helped strengthen the original party network, came to the *Yunnan Daily* to investigate the situation. After this, representatives from both sides went to the Provincial Committee to see First Secretary Yan Hongyan and seek a resolution to the situation.

At the Provincial Committee complex, the students’ representatives demanded of Minister Yue Xiaoxia that Yan come to see them, and that the Editor-in-chief come to the Provincial Committee too. The *Struggle Group* waited eleven hours till 7am on
September fifteenth, and not one Provincial Committee worker came out of the Offices to see them. 276

This episode marked the start of a protracted factional struggle amongst the staff of *Yunnan Daily*. On November thirteenth, six young staff met at Daguan (大观) Pagoda park, on the shore of Lake Dian, just south of Kunming, and founded the *Invincible Brigade of Mao Zedong Thought*. After this, the party faithful amongst the staff founded three organisations, and made contact with three large “royalist headquarters” (umbrella groups). However, Editor-in-chief Li Mengbei was forced to resign by a section of the *Yunnan Daily* staff, but the party network replaced him with Xue Bo (薛波), whom the *Invincible Brigade of Mao Zedong Thought*, nevertheless considered even more connected with the party network than Li Mengbei. Li Mengbei then apparently used *Xuetonglun*, the theory of “bad blood” being passed on from one generation to the next, to attack the *Invincible Brigade*. 277 Clearly the party-sponsored networks were on the offensive, and the conflict was beginning to escalate.

However, by December fourteenth, the *Invincible Brigade* and other so-called revolutionaries had closed the old *Yunnan Daily*, and drawing inspiration from events at Shanghai’s *Wenhui* (文汇) *Daily*, seized power that day, and the following day published the first edition of the new *Yunnan Daily*. The old *Yunnan Daily* was described as having served as the propaganda machine of the Yunnan Provincial Committee bourgeois line. From December sixteenth to January thirteenth, the *Invincible Brigade* and two other so-called “rebel” organisations of *Yunnan Daily* only reprinted news from central

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276 Taken from the *Yunnan Daily* article, “Completely Invincible”. 项兆斌, 王先金合编, 1968, 云南文化大革命英雄谱, 云南八, 二三《保卫长城》, 昆明, 云南。
government's Xinhua News Agency. There were no more articles actually written by the newspaper staff. Later the new controlling "network" worked with the PLA in publishing the newspaper.

By this stage, early 1967, the party networks were, for the time being at least, powerless. Indeed, once "rebels" established themselves in a factory or other Danwei, party networks became completely paralysed, with officials either under direct attack or performing labour under direct supervision, or staying at home to avoid involvement. If fighting continued, as it often did in Kunming, absenteeism rose, production slowed or halted, and in many factories nobody was in charge. Rationing was introduced as Kunming began to experience shortages of some foods and materials.

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Economism

In December 1966 and January 1967, the phenomenon of "Economism" was beginning to sweep China. Allowed by the "criticism of the bourgeois reactionary line", the long pent-up thoughts and demands of workers burst out. A prolonged wage freeze, delays in turning contract labourers into regular workers, insufficiency of labour insurance, fringe benefits, and the assignment of dormitories and overdue overtime compensation, suddenly all came out as pressing problems. Rank and file took the cadres to task, and some workers even went to Beijing to lodge their complaints.281

Some factories disbursed long overdue overtime pay, raised the limits of compensation on certain items of Medical Insurance, and expanded the coverage. Some departments even started working on plans to readjust wage scales. However, how could Mao allow the masses to take the liberty of raising so many economic demands that were diverting the course of the Cultural Revolution from its fundamental goal of attacking Liu and Deng and their supporters? Therefore, Mao and his centre issued the January eleventh, "Circular of the CCP Central Committee on Opposing Economism". Cadres then switched to flat refusal of the masses' demands. Many Red Guard worker groups issued declarations making a clear break with "economism".282 A propaganda offensive declaring a moratorium on all work-related demands was begun, accompanied by a series of official directives that ordered workers back to their posts. Rallies and meetings were held to publicise these directives. A number of groups persisted in their demands,

especially temporary and contract workers organisations. They were ordered to disband and many were arrested. 283

Both party-sponsored and non party-sponsored factions and networks would have made demands at this time. The party-sponsored networks would have been temporarily protected by the phenomenon of "economism", especially if they had made the same popular demands as "rebel" groups, which they often did. However, the less party-connected factions would have been more strident, especially those with contract labourers amongst their ranks. Contract labourers, had a lot to gain from "economism", and as a result were one of the most dissatisfied groups, after the movement collapsed.

This was the case, as we shall see, with 23rd August's fiercely rebellious 29th November Brigade. On the whole though, "economism" was a rather temporary phenomenon that influenced the network struggles in an indirect way. I have included a discussion of "economism" here, because although its effect was indirect, it was not, as we shall see, negligible.

Power Seizures

Just weeks before the January Power Seizures, there was an interesting white-collar Danwei factional conflict at the Yunnan Provincial Committee Cultural Revolution Office. Firstly, a group called Oppose till the End, started to dissent. They told the 23rd August faction that the Provincial Committee had used a part of the Cultural Revolution’s materials for other purposes (meaning surveillance of the opposition). When they heard this 23rd August, with the help of a sympathiser in the Provincial Committee, seized the Chief of the Office, Wang Dian (王鍾). Wang said that, after Yan Hongyan suicided (January eighth) they rebelled against the Danwei’s party network, because they knew about the misuse of the Cultural Revolution materials. After hearing this, the Attack and Rebel, Smash the Trap, Oppose until the End, Destroy All Enemies and other “royalist” struggle groups, and the Provincial Committee Main Office Deputy Head, Shi Feng (史峰), together went to the Kunming Military Region compound and sealed the Cultural Revolution material, so that others could not see it. The established party network of the Danwei, was clearly taking protective measures.

After this, a meeting of Red Guard groups was convened at which the “royalists” said that they would give 23rd August the Cultural Revolution material within a few days. However, 23rd August thought that the “royalists” would use the extra time to move the materials to another place. 23rd August wanted the materials immediately, and they were supported by the reportedly wavering groups Oppose until the End and Destroy All Enemies. 23rd August secretly planned to open the Provincial Archives (Danganguan

284 项兆斌·王先金·合编，1968，云南文化大革命英雄谱·云南八·二三《保卫长城》，昆明·云南。Xiang Zhaobin, Wang Xianjin and He Bian, 1968, Yunnan Cultural Revolution Register of Heroes, Yunnan 23rd of August “Defend the Great Wall”, Kunming, Yunnan. p. 195.
that night, however Shi Feng overheard this and told the “royalists” to report it to Secretary Zhou Xing (周行). Consequently, in the middle of the night six or seven people from the Provincial Committee and the Kunming Military Region arrived at the 23rd August Headquarters, the Kunming Engineering Institute, but were turned away. The above episode is evidence, I believe, of party-sponsored networks under attack even within the party-government bureaucracy of the Provincial Committee. It is also evidence of more attempts to protect party networks. This is also the first mention of the “wavering groups”, alluded to by Liu Guokai, but more completely explained by Walder, near the beginning of this chapter.

However, “power-seizure” required all factions to unite under the leadership of new power-holders certified by the Maoist leadership in Beijing. These local leaderships then moved quickly to suppress all popular organisations in factories and schools, usually with but often without the help of the PLA’s Military Control Committee (MCC). In Kunming however, a situation arose (analysed in Chapter Four) where one faction, the less party-connected 23rd August, tried to seize power alone, but ended up controlling only the Provincial Party Committee compound, whilst the more party-connected Artillery took over the main Government complex at Wuhua (五华) Hill.

So it was with individual factories. Sometimes a single faction simply took over a factory, sometimes different factions controlled different offices and workshops, within a factory. 285 Factional conflict in factories often evolved into a contest to “drag out” of office and humiliate different sets of officials, with each faction seeking to protect “good”

officials that the other side tried to attack as “reactionary”. Party-sponsored networks therefore either continued in a mutated or truncated form or ceased completely.

Several incidents in Kunming after the power seizure at Wuhua Hill, demonstrate the collapse of party-sponsored networks and their replacement by one faction or the other. Although, of course, the more party-connected Artillery faction would have maintained more of the old networks, in their power-seizures.

Firstly, on February fourteenth, Artillery seized power at the Kunming Furnace factory, although the Yunnan MCC did not support them. Many 23rd August activists were captured and persecuted, but were released after sustained protestations. Secondly, on June twentieth, there was also reported to be extensive fighting at the Auto Repair Factory at Heilinpu (黑林铺), where 23rd August were lead by Zhang Shuxian (杨树先).

Thirdly, on May twenty third, at the Kunming Electrical Lines Factory, the Artillery organisation, Yenan (延安) Brigade, tried to restore Artillery, after their loss of power to the 23rd August’s 11th December Brigade. On July second, the leader of Yenan, Pan Mingsheng (潘明生), forcefully took away the 11th December megaphone and broke it. This resulted in a mass fight, where over one hundred of the 11th December Brigade were seriously wounded. 11th December were forced to retreat to the living quarter buildings. From July third to sixth 1967, more than twenty 11th December members were badly

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286 Ibid. pp. 177-178.

beaten, coming and going from the living quarters at the Electric Lines factory.\textsuperscript{288} This was clearly a situation where different factions controlled different parts of the same factory, and the controlling network had become paralysed.

The final example how these party-sponsored networks had collapsed, is the story of 23\textsuperscript{rd} August’s 29\textsuperscript{th} November Brigade, at the Yunnan Brick and Tile Factory. From February to July 1967, Artillery headquarters at Xinhua Hill directed the factory’s Artillery organisation to attack the 29\textsuperscript{th} November activists. To write an expose and criticism of this in a Dazibao, the workers collected money to buy paper. Just after the Dazibao was pasted up however, the 29\textsuperscript{th} November activists were beaten up fourteen times, and over ten were dismissed.\textsuperscript{289}

In addition, over one hundred contract workers, who had joined 29\textsuperscript{th} November, were branded counter-revolutionary. Artillery issued official documents to their original Production Brigade, requiring them to control these youth, through forced labour back in their rural area. Although they were from poor and lower-middle peasant families (good class), they were labelled “counter-revolutionary”.\textsuperscript{290} Temporary and contract workers, who were subjected to harsher labour discipline, and assigned to undesirable jobs, receiving wages and benefits inferior to those of permanent employees, were also found to be prominent as members of early “rebel” organisations.\textsuperscript{291} As mentioned earlier, these were also the most dissatisfied group, after the collapse of “economism”.

\textsuperscript{288} Xiang Zhaobin, Wang Xianjin and He Bian, 1968, Yunnan Cultural Revolution Register of Heroes, Yunnan 23\textsuperscript{rd} of August “Defend the Great Wall”, Kunming, Yunnan, p. 196.
\textsuperscript{289} Ibid. p. 197.
\textsuperscript{290} Ibid. p. 198.
\textsuperscript{291} Based on numerous interviews with Cultural Revolution refugees in Hong Kong, Walder, Andrew G., 1996, “The Chinese Cultural Revolution in the Factories: Party-State Structures and Patterns of Conflict”,
Without money or food, 29th November had to rely on the help of other workers, especially Shanghai workers at the factory. However, after assisting 29th November, the Shanghai workers were then compelled to return to Shanghai. A leading Artillery member offered to restore 29th November wages, if they joined with Artillery in a siege of the factory’s Military Control Committee. This was refused with heroic language. However, when the PLA came to the factory at the beginning of July 1967, the 29th November were able to call a meeting, and 29th November people who were arrested as counter-revolutionaries, were released and rehabilitated. Nevertheless, on the first of August, leading party cadres, made a final attempt to brand leading 29th November activists, counter-revolutionary. However, the Political and Legal Small Group of the Provincial Military Control Committee announced a verdict of “not guilty.” The network situation in the factory was in the end, resolved by the PLA, and so marks an early example of the Army trying to establish new networks, after the collapse of the original party networks.


293 Ibid. p.199.
Extensive factional violence and Military involvement

Walder does note that factional divisions began to blur as former royalist organisations sought to frame themselves as rebels. When one faction clearly gained the upper hand or seized power, its membership levels rose with defections from the other side, although this does not explain the waiving groups of the pre-power seizure period. Walder observed that, it was not unusual for a less party-sponsored group to make an alliance with a citywide “rebels” alliance, and vice versa. However, mutual animosities between numerous groups accumulated with every confrontation, becoming increasingly personal rather than ideological.

By July fourteenth 1967, such a complex situation was already developing in Kunming. The 23rd August group, the 16th January Brigade, was “blocking” the Artillery control of the Western Kunming, by holding sway at the Electric Machine Factory. As part of their strategy to capture control of the factory Artillery tried to contact the factory’s “great alliance” network, trying to win them over. However, the “great alliance”, at that time, was an umbrella organisation of supposedly rebel groups, that included the 23rd August, though 23rd August thought the alliance was “conservative”. Nevertheless, the “great alliance” agreed to protect the leading party cadres at the Electric Machine Factory, and at the same time made plans with units of Artillery to attack 16th January. They apparently shared Artillery’s ambitions to take over the Northern and Western suburbs of Kunming. 23rd August distanced themselves further from the Electric Machine Factory’s

“great alliance” after this incident. 295 This episode illustrates, I believe, the growing complexity of the network situation at this stage.

Walder’s interviewees reported that, eventually small forces of military officers were dispatched to factories to setup new “great alliances” and eventually Revolutionary Committees. If the factory was large it would have its own Military Control Committee, as some of the above mentioned examples did. Military teams moved into factories, established themselves in the offices and began investigating the political situation. Factions rarely opposed the soldiers but tried to cultivate them. In most cases, military officers decided which factional leaders would receive punishments and which would receive positions of leadership. 296 So began the first organised attempts to establish new networks based on Military backing, with the support of the Maoist leadership in Beijing.

At the end of July, we have some evidence of an attack on these new networks, at the munitions factory known as Postbox 300. Artillery leader, former Deputy First Secretary Zhao Jianmin (赵建民), gathered together over three thousand fighters from East Wind, Aid Vietnam, and other Artillery organisations. For four consecutive days and nights, from July 28th to August first, they attacked the factory’s 17th January Brigade, that was allied with the 23rd of August. 17th January dominated the new “great alliance” that was formed by the PLA at Postbox 300. Artillery was hoping to suppress this new network at

295 项兆斌·王先金·合编，1968，云南文化大革命英雄谱·云南八·二三《保卫长城》，昆明·云南。

Postbox 300. In the process the “responsible comrade” of the new network Liu Xiangdong (刘向东) was captured, tortured and killed.²⁹⁷

This battle however, was far from over. On August fifteenth, 23rd August activists of the Electric Machine Factory, after holding a ceremony in memory of Liu Xiangdong, were suddenly attacked by the Artillery’s Red Union brigade, and over two hundred activists were seriously wounded. 23rd August did not counter-attack, but withdrew from the Electric Machine Factory. However, Artillery made preparations for more fighting (presumably at other strategic locations) by collecting weapons, occupying hilltops and setting up barricades in the street. After this, 23rd August demanded that the Representatives of the Provincial Military Control Committee stationed at their Headquarters (Military Representatives were also stationed at all Faction Headquarters)²⁹⁸ adopt measures to control the escalation, so that the activists of the “great alliance” could go back to the Postbox 300 factory. The Military Representatives negotiated a new ceasefire with Artillery, and the new military sponsored network was saved from any further attacks.²⁹⁹

Still the new network was not fully protected by Military arbitration. The “great alliance” activists did go back to the Postbox 300 factory on August the nineteenth, but some Artillery led by former First Secretary Zhao Jianmin, rejected the Military-sponsored

²⁹⁷ 翁兆 BN临, 王先金, 合编, 1968, 云南文化大革命英雄谱, 云南八、二三《保卫长城》, 昆明, 云南。
²⁹⁹ 翁兆 BN临, 王先金, 合编, 1968, 云南文化大革命英雄谱, 云南八、二三《保卫长城》, 昆明, 云南。
agreement. They wanted to attack munitions factories and seize weapons. From August twentieth to 26th Artillery made fourteen attacks on the Postbox 300 munitions factory, each of which was repulsed. So we see that the repeated attempts to attack and defend the new networks in factories led to escalating violence in Kunming. Zhao Jianmin apparently also failed in an attempt to seize weapons that were bound for Vietnam, to aid the Vietnamese in the War against America. Clearly, Zhao Jianmin and Artillery were intent on escalating the conflict.

Still, the struggles to establish new controlling networks in factories continued, despite the growing intervention of the military. On August 22nd, Artillery members from the Rice and Oil Machine Factory, led by Zhao, joined in the occupation by armed Artillery activists of the Headquarters of the Yunnan Military Control Committee at the Provincial Government compound at Wuhua Hill. The premises of Wuhua Hill were reportedly reduced to rubble, and casualties were unusually heavy (A ceasefire was later reached after Beijing rushed a supervisory group to the scene). The 23rd August, 8th March Brigade helped the wives and children who were left behind at the factory, and this reportedly moved the Artillery families so much that some joined 23rd August. So it was that 23rd August were able to replace the Artillery network at the factory with their

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302 Published in Spring City Storm, Xiang Zhaobin, Wang Xianjin and He Bian, 1968, Yunnan Cultural Revolution Register of Heroes, Yunnan 23rd of August “Defend the Great Wall”, Kunming, Yunnan. pp. 277-278.
own controlling network, whilst Artillery focused on strengthening their main base at the Provincial Government compound.

The “network struggle” became more violent with ongoing weapons seizures (discussed in more detail in Chapter Four). On August twenty fifth 1967, Artillery publicly seized state weapons, and the situation was more tense, with Artillery units Burning Fire and Yenan shooting randomly and wounding the unarmed activists of the 16th January Brigade at the Electric Machine Factory. On August twenty sixth, weapons seizures continued. At the Yunnan Military Region compound, Artillery asked the Deputy Commander Ding Rongchang (丁荣昌), for the whereabouts of weapons. Artillery leaders Li Yi (李毅) and Fang Xiangdong (方向东) reportedly made an agreement with the wife of the Deputy Commander, to give Artillery weapons that very day. 303 The district records report that on August 26th, some hundred members of 23rd August also broke into the Yunnan Military Region and stole twenty six machine guns and pistols with hundreds of cartridges. 304

From August 25th to 28th, several groups of Artillery’s Yenan Brigade members went to the Weapons Depots in the Western Hills (西山), Changpo (长破) and Xiaomaiyu (小麦雨), stealing large amounts of guns and bullets. They then tried to establish full control over the strategic Electrical Lines factory, setting up a guard station. The PLA of the 7562 and 7616 Brigades, stationed in the factory, were very concerned. After mediation failed, the PLA guarded buildings where 23rd August members were staying, so that

304 *Compilatory Committee of Kunming Wuhua District, 1995, Records of Wuhua District, Sichuan Dictionary Publishing House, Chengdu, Sichuan.* p. 64.
Yenan could not make an all-out attack. The line between military mediator and military participant becomes very fine, as the military slowly emerges as the only entity capable of decisively setting up new networks in the factories and other Danwei. This is provided that the military do not themselves factionalise (as discussed in Chapter Four).

By the end of August 1967, Zhao Jianmin and Artillery were very closely allied, and were in a strong position, with 23\textsuperscript{rd} August very weak. They wanted to finish what remained of 23\textsuperscript{rd} August's strength, and especially to occupy the 23\textsuperscript{rd} August-controlled munitions factories Postboxes 300 and 200, despite the fact that they were officially in a "union" with them. On August the 27\textsuperscript{th}, on the banks of Dian Lake, at the Postbox 200 factory Artillery started to attack. Later that day, fourteen 23\textsuperscript{rd} August activists of the "great alliance" of Postbox 200 were captured, sick and exhausted. Then they were marched several hundred metres, to a hollow place called Guoditang (锅底塘), where the Artillery fighters took their clothes, money, and valuables. Some then planned to murder the fourteen 23\textsuperscript{rd} August activists. Two especially defiant ones, Si Yuming (施玉明) and Gu Conggui (顾宗贵) were killed first and the others threatened, unless they "confess their crimes". A third was killed, before two escaped to Postbox 400, to ask for help. When the PLA arrived, the remaining eleven activists, were about to be knived. This

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305 Xiang Zhaobin, Wang Xianjin and He Bian, 1968, Yunnan Cultural Revolution Register of Heroes, Yunnan 23\textsuperscript{rd} of August “Defend the Great Wall”, Kunming, Yunnan. p. 378.


incident, known as the Guoditang incident, illustrates the escalating cruelty of the successive attacks on and defense of the (by this stage) new networks. 307

Artillery launched new attacks on the munitions factories. From August 28th to thirtieth, Artillery seized over one thousand weapons and 1,020,000 bullets, seriously harming the campaign to “Aid Vietnam and Resist America” (抗美援越). Also on August twenty eighth, Burning Fire, 24th February, and Yenan units attacked 16th January again at the Electric Machine Factory. 16th January fought back and drove them out. At 6pm, Artillery, launched another fierce attack, which failed, after which they retreated. When 16th January searched the area after the retreat, they released several people who had been imprisoned and tortured by Artillery. 308

Still the “network struggle” refused to end. On September third, Artillery made another attack on the Electric Machine Factory. The Yenan Brigade and the 278 Brigade (not PLA), fired machine gun rounds at the factory buildings, before the factory’s PLA group came to the defence of the buildings. Two people died when they tried to leave the buildings, including a small child. Artillery set off explosives in the buildings blowing up half of them. 23rd August’s 11th December Brigade decided to evacuate the buildings, and flee to the Iron Factory. The Artillery brigades then began to attack the Iron Factory with grenades and machine guns, destroying the Factory Clinic. Two were killed. 309 The 11th

307 Written by Kunming Medical Institute Artillery Teachers. 项兆斌・王先金・合编，1968，云南文化大革命英雄谱・云南八・二三《保卫长城》，昆明，云南。

308 Ibid. p. 196.

309 陈德仁 《编辑》，1996，当代云南大事纪要，当代中国出版社，云南。

Written by Kunming Medical Institute Artillery Teachers. 项兆斌・王先金・合编，1968，云南文化大革命英雄谱・云南八・二三《保卫长城》，昆明，云南。
11th December Brigade evacuated a second time, crawling through the fields towards the Electrical Lines Factory. As Artillery had re-established a new controlling network at the Electric Machine Factory, 23rd August therefore fled to the Electrical Lines Factory, where its allies had taken control. Thus, by the end of August in Kunming, the attacks on and defense of the political networks in the factories had already escalated to violent levels.

The peak of factional fighting (including the major factional battles)

On September fifth 1967, all four central authorities in China, the CCP Central Committee, the Central Military Control Committee, the State Council, and the Cultural Revolution Small Group, issued a joint directive, signed by Mao, attempting to end the armed struggle and revive the authority of the Army. The directive ordered all Red Guard groups to turn their weapons, military equipment and all kinds of military materials, into the army and obey military authority. However, as will be detailed further in Chapter Four, August to December 1967, was the height of the violence in Kunming. Shops and factories were closed, and communications were suspended. The announcement of the September fifth directive, only spured on the Artillery faction to continue the violence. Knowing that it would take time to implement the directive in the far flung province of Yunnan, they sought to consolidate their Danwei networks before the fighting was stopped.

On September the seventh, the flag of the 16th January organisation was still flying from the top of the Electrical Machine Factory. This was the only place amongst all the strategic points approaching Kunming, not controlled by Artillery. Under cover of night, the Artillery brigades, Yenan, Red Flag, 278, 24th February, Glaring Fire, Red Electricity, 5th December, and the Revolutionary Union of the PLA School (note explicit PLA involvement) moved along the road to the Electrical Machine Factory. There were

310 Compilatory Committee of Kunming Wuhua District, 1995, Records of Wuhua District, Sichuan Dictionary Publishing House, Chengdu, Sichuan p. 64.
Blecher, Marc J., 1997, China against the tides: Restructuring through Revolution. Radicalism and Reform, Pinter, London. p . 82.
Yang Bangshun 杨邦顺. Retired Professor of English, Yunnan University. Interviewed October 1999.
altogether over one thousand people armed with light and heavy machine guns, and hand grenades. They occupied strategic points in all directions around the factory.

At 4.30am, gunfire broke out. 16th January then broadcast the September Fifth ceasefire order over the factory loudspeakers. Nevertheless, a homemade bomb was thrown into the building. Two 16th January members sacrificed their bodies to smother the explosion. Artillery then rushed onto the first floor and three were killed. They reached the second floor, before being fought back. Many dead bodies were left, as Artillery retreated. Over the next ten hours, there were several more attempts to reach the second floor, resulting in dozens of Artillery and 16th January casualties. Early the next morning, 16th January began to evacuate. The PLA provided three trucks and military cover, to assist the evacuation. Artillery were then able to establish a factory network, dominated by themselves, at the Electrical Machine Factory.

On September tenth, the two factions met and made an agreement to “stop fire and hand in weapons”, under the mediation of the Provincial Military Control Committee (MCC). The September Fifth directive was published, with the additional statement that the enforcement of central orders now rested with the provincial and local Army commanders. From then on the MCCs began to be revitalised. Clearly, it was thought that the PLA were still sufficiently “neutral” and detached to fill the role of arbiter. On

the twelfth, the PLA came and stayed in the Electrical Machine Factory, and on the seventeenth, 16th January returned and started to rebuild their Danwei network, under military protection.\textsuperscript{315}

However, the fact that Radio Kunming broadcast an urgent appeal for an alliance between 23rd August and Artillery and implementation of the entire September Fifth directive on September twenty second, shows that the PLA did not at first succeed in their pacifying role.\textsuperscript{316} The call for the formation of “great alliances” nevertheless continued throughout October, all over China, following Mao’s trip around the provinces (not including Yunnan). This time the call was for the formation of Revolutionary Committees consisting of, all factions, the PLA, and veteran government cadres. “Mao Zedong Thought Study Classes” were supposed to convince the Red Guard groups that factional fighting was evil and to prepare for the formation of the Revolutionary Committees. There were some reports of success in Yunnan with the Study Classes and Revolutionary Committee formation at county level, and there are indeed less reports of fighting in October.\textsuperscript{317}

Nevertheless, in late October, an Artillery leader Shen Changxiong, moved the contents of the Yunnan Military Region’s three military equipment garages. Then Zhao Jianmin,
transported the military equipment, to Artillery’s central barracks in western Kunming.\textsuperscript{318} Furthermore, Yunnan was not among the provinces that went through a process of “negotiated settlement” under the joint supervision of Premier Zhou Enlai, the Cultural Revolution Small Group and the PLA in Beijing, culminating in being urged to sign a cease-fire agreement on November the second (this was attempted earlier with the Yunnanese).\textsuperscript{319} It was not surprising therefore that, with this and the military equipment seizures, another wave of violent factional fighting began, often with PLA involvement, over the establishment of controlling networks at various factories and other Danwei.

Firstly, in November, a time bomb planted by a “Mao Study Class” exploded at Puping Village near Kunming. The class consisted of the Yangzonghai (阳宗海) Electric Factory Artillery Brigade, Puping Village 10\textsuperscript{th} August Artillery Brigade, and the Yilihe (以礼河) Electric Factory Artillery Brigade and others. They then made an abortive attack on 23\textsuperscript{rd} August’s East is Red Brigade at Puping Village Power Station.

Secondly, in November 1967, the Artillery Brigades 1\textsuperscript{st} May and Yunnan Heavy Gun Brigade, “invaded” the Northern Suburbs, scattering and killing 23\textsuperscript{rd} August organisations along Longquan (龙泉) Highway. Fields were left in waste. Specifically, with heavy gunfire, Artillery blockaded the 23\textsuperscript{rd} August, 8\textsuperscript{th} November Brigade at the strategically placed Heavy Machine Factory. Many were wounded, and some were killed. Over two thousand personnel and their families evacuated the Factory to Eziying (阿子营) mountain village. After taking shelter there, they went on a “Little Long

\textsuperscript{318} Xiang Zhaojin, Wang Xianjin and He Bian, 1968, Yunnan Cultural Revolution Register of Heroes, Yunnan 23\textsuperscript{rd} of August “Defend the Great Wall”, Kunming, Yunnan. p. 385.
March” of about 250 kilometres, and two months, through rural counties bordering Kunming, trying to avoid Artillery controlled areas. On January twenty first 1968, they were stopped and robbed by Artillery in Congming (嵩明) and Yangming (杨林) counties. One was killed and scores were wounded. However, most of them finally reached central Kunming, where they contacted their 23rd August allies. 320

Thirdly, on December fourth, the Puping Village “Mao Study Class” together with the Cement Factory Artillery Brigade, Postbox 278 Artillery Brigade and the Chemical Factory Artillery Brigade, attacked PLA men who were assigned to protect a weapons factory. The PLA men formed a human wall to stop them entering, but the Artillery brigades climbed through the back wall, and seized all the weapons and bullets. There was intense fighting. 321

Fourthly, on December fifth, more than three hundred fully armed Artillery members attacked the January Revolution Headquarters (23rd August) at the Kunming Small Hydroelectric Power Station (see map on page 62), and the Coal Machinery Factory. The next day, over seven hundred Artillery arrived again at the Coal Machine Factory and prepared to enter. The January Revolution Headquarters members took up spears and defended the factory perimeter. 322

320 Reprinted from the War Paper of 23rd August.
321 Ibid. p. 385.
Fighting over networks continued to occur. On December tenth 1967, the January Revolution Headquarters' vehicle arrived below Pineapple Village at the Red Guard Chemical Factory, and were ambushed and robbed by a group of Artillery. Also on the tenth, there was an attack on the Kunming Fire Brigade. On the thirteenth, there was an attack on the Bridge Steel Factory.323

Fifthly, on December fourteenth, mass fighting erupted at Puping Village. 3rd November, Yezhan (野战), Aid Vietnam Resist America, and the Cement Factory 25th January, Artillery brigades together with the Artillery brigades of the Electrical Enterprise, Public Roads Engineering Department, Chemical Factory and others, attacked the 23rd August brigade, East is Red, at the Puping Village Power Station. There was machine gun fire for two days. The factory windows were all smashed and three died.324 Fighting continued sporadically, but on December twenty second became fierce. All connections with the outside were cut off, and bullets were low. A bomb was thrown and the electric turbine was dislocated, blacking out most residential and industrial areas of Kunming. At 3am the next morning, Artillery attacked again, and East is Red were confined to the main part of the Factory area. Low on water and coal, they began to negotiate with Artillery. However, there were no Factory PLA at the table, and three East is Red negotiators were kept as hostages. Artillery then rushed in, and Puping Village Power Station was lost to Artillery. Thus Meng Yucai (孟玉才), the Head of East is Red and over 130 others were


323 陈德仁《编辑》，1996，当代云南大事纪要，当代中国出版社。云南。

324 Reprinted from “Change to a New Sky” No.1. 项兆斌，王先金，合编，1968，云南文化大革命英雄谱，云南八、二三《保卫长城》，昆明，云南。
captured, fastened with iron chains, and beaten to the ground. Meng Yucai was reportedly tortured.\textsuperscript{325}

Finally, on December eighteenth, there was a protest march by \textit{Artillery} to East Wind Department Store, where \textit{23rd August} had a base. It was a protest against the killing of a PLA man by \textit{23rd August}. The dead PLA man’s body was pushed along the street on a cart by Kunming Military Region Commander, Cui Jiangong (崔建功). Carrying homemade weapons, the protest marchers attacked the building, breaking the windows. The responsible people of \textit{23rd August} ordered not to open fire, and the protesters left after a few hours. However, three hundred people in PLA apparel were sent to surround the building. “We will not leave until the Military Control Committee sends someone to take over from us”, they said.

By early the next morning, still waiting for the MCC to arrive, over thirty machine guns were arranged in the surrounding buildings. The building was blockaded. \textit{Artillery} controlled all the neighbouring places such as, Wucheng (武成) Road and the Western Gate. The East Wind Department Store represented a great obstruction for \textit{Artillery} and Zhao Jianmin. Its five floors were defended by thirty four \textit{23rd August} members. Intense firing started and the walls, windows and doors were filled with bullet holes. There were over one thousand \textit{Artillery}, many in PLA apparel.\textsuperscript{326}

\textsuperscript{325} Chen Deren (compiler), 1996, \textit{The Yunnan Record of Major Contemporary Events}, Contemporary China Publishing House, Yunnan, China. p. 358.

\textsuperscript{326} Ibid. pp. 143-148.
23rd August retreated to the second and third floors. At 11am, electricity was cut off, broadcasting was suspended, telephone lines were cut off and water stopped. By afternoon, the first combatant was wounded, and 23rd August were hungry with all supplies and contact cut. They began negotiations. At twelve midnight, negotiations broke down. All night long, innumerable attacks were beaten back again. 23rd August were then about twenty.

Artillery, said over a megaphone, “Do not believe (Provincial Secretary) Zhou Xing and (Political Commissar 37th Division PLA) Li Chengfang (李成芳)”. These two had been assisting 23rd August. The next afternoon, Artillery, used ladders to get onto the second floor, killing two. 23rd August had no bullets left. The 23rd August then asserted that, “Zhao Jianmin and (KMR Political Commissar) Zhang Lixiong (张力雄), will be defeated”.\(^{327}\) The East Wind Department Store was nevertheless, lost to Artillery, who were then able to establish their own party-leaning network at this retail Danwei.

As 1967 turned into 1968, local Public Security Police together with the Military Control Committees that supervised the new factory Revolutionary Committees, ushered in a period of repression and terror from 1968 to 1971. There were three separate campaigns. The largest and well known “Cleansing of the class ranks (清理阶级队伍)” occurred first. Later were the “Anti-May 16th elements (反五一六分子)” and the “One strike, three oppose (一打三反)” campaigns. There were long vague lists of potential suspects, which gave local officials broad discretion in persecuting those under them, with special attention being paid to “leading members” of the new Revolutionary Committees. There was no guidance on how to recognise such people. Walder has noted that, the existing

\(^{327}\) Ibid. pp. 148-153.
leadership group first settled upon a list of suspects and then for each suspect established a “special investigation group” drawn from among members of the new leadership committee and trusted activists. Confessions were extracted through threats, sleep deprivation, beatings and torture. The two later campaigns, seemed to focus especially on the heads of former factions who were deemed untrustworthy and unsuitable for the new party networks being established. Therefore, with these new campaigns, the new Party-Army backed political networks in the factories, were irreversibly established, regardless of which networks had been established as a result of the factional fighting. It is here that my discussion of the Workers’ role in the Cultural Revolution ends.

Conclusion

Henderson and Cohen argued that the Danwei was a chief element of institutional control over Chinese citizen’s lives, and that the Cultural Revolution made the Danwei more controlling than before or since. Walder’s idea that the collective action of Danwei workers could be shaped by the Danwei’s Communist Party’s networks, and that these political networks divided workers into the factions, is clearly true for Kunming during the Cultural Revolution. We have also seen numerous examples of the successive efforts to defend and attack the networks leading to escalating cycles of persecution and cruelty. Although the narrative accounts are partly based on questionable materials, we can say that this much is true.

Perry and Li Xun have pointed to subcultures of opposition from which bold individual workers sprang up to challenge authority figures. Such opposition was carried out in the name of Mao, but reflected a surprising degree of individual ambition and ingenuity. This is not at all like Pye and Solomon’s “dependent personalities”. Also uncertainties of proper targets of struggle, enabled those outside the established networks to seize the initiative in a manner unthinkable in earlier political movements. There was definitely an element of this in Kunming. Indeed new networks could have centred around bold individuals. However, no theories can fully explain all worker phenomena during the Cultural Revolution. Personal friendships, and maybe even chance were also a factor in some of these accounts. Feng Jicai’s account of the Avenger is an excellent example of

very personal and non-ideological, non-class factors in Danwei politics.\textsuperscript{331} Certainly, with regard to Kunming, the old Chinese idiom, "The mountains are high and the Government is far away" could account for much of the relatively violent and unbridled worker factionalism of such a small population of about half a million for inner Kunming and about 800,000 for surrounding semi-rural districts.\textsuperscript{332}

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\textsuperscript{332} Yang Bangshun 杨邦顺. Retired Professor of English at Yunnan University. Interviewed December 1999.
Chapter Four. The Military in Kunming’s Cultural Revolution

Background

As mentioned before, Yunnan was different from other Chinese provinces in that, being a border province; it had a high concentration of military personnel, and was also the home of many surrendered Nationalist troops and officials. With its long history of semi-independence and warlordism, the local military had always played a prominent role in Yunnan’s political affairs.

Also, as noted before, the Fourth Army of the Second Field Army (2FA) provided the majority of the cadres that had ruled Yunnan since 1950. The Fourth Army of the 2FA, consisting of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth Corps and the Southward Cadre Corps, had marched into Kunming at the beginning of that year, making Yunnan one of the last provinces to be brought under Communist control. Political conditions in Yunnan demanded that senior 2FA commanders and political commissars proceeded to establish their authority over the Government, Party, and Military of the area and its more than twenty million people. They quickly assumed occupation duties in a massive organisational movement. Fourth Army commander Chen Kang became commander of the Yunnan Military Region, deputy commander of the Southwest Military Region (later Kuming Military Region), and deputy commander of the 2FA.

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Fourteenth Corps commander Li Chengfang (李成芳) assumed command of the Western Yunnan Subdistrict, based at Dali (大理).\(^{336}\)

During the Korean War (1952-1954), the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, the Southward Cadre Corps and the Eighteenth Corps (not of Yunnan) were alone amongst all the 2FA Corps, in not participating. They remained in Southwest China and consolidated their power over the Kunming, Chengdu (Sichuan Province), and Tibet Military Regions.\(^{337}\)

From 1953 to 1956, the consolidation of power in Yunnan, in the hands of civil and military leaders formerly subordinate to Liu Bocheng (Commander 2FA) continued unabated. Liu, Deng Xiaoping (deputy commander 2FA) and other senior leaders in Beijing boosted this consolidation.\(^{338}\) Indeed, the initial delegation of the Second Field Army sent to liberate Yunnan laid the foundation for a long-term link between Deng and many Yunnan leaders.\(^{339}\) Therefore, because of their historical background, Government, Party, and Military leaders in Yunnan have mostly had close relations with Mao’s adversaries, such as Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. In the early sixties power struggle between Mao and Liu Shaoqi, they sided with Liu and Deng.\(^{340}\) This would have made them very vulnerable targets for criticism and attack during the Cultural Revolution.

\(^{336}\) Ibid. p.191.


\(^{338}\) Ibid. p.190.


Nelson noted that, at the provincial level, military districts and subdistricts were ordered by the Central Military Commission directives of 1961 to “act like staff members and assistants for Party Committees”, and that this conjoining of the Party and the regional People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was successful. The August 1966 Plenary Session of the CCP Central Committee, reshuffled the Politburo giving much stronger political power to the PLA and its supreme commander, Mao’s deputy, Lin Biao. In the last half January 1967, the Maoist leadership in Beijing took steps to establish the PLA and especially the regional administration structure, as an independent political power base.

However, with its complex system, numerous organisations, and various factions, the PLA had many internal cleavages, conflicts, and interests, which weakened its cohesion. The discernible cleavages included Field Army factions, divisions between political commissars and military commanders, and divisions between local garrison forces and centrally controlled strategic armies.


\[342\] Ibid. p. 25.

The Argument

This chapter will argue that an important factor in the Kunming faction conflict was the involvement of the Army, and its internal divisions, in the fighting. My research indicates that these divisions were of two inter-related kinds.

Firstly, there were the divisions within the Zhulibudui or major military. These divisions were of two varieties. The first variety was the old rivalry and conflict between two distinctly separate groupings within the Yunnan Zhulibudui or major military. The Fourth Army of the 2FA in Yunnan, was from the outset, deeply divided between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps on the one hand and the Southward Cadre Corps (南下干部团) on the other. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps were from Shanxi (陕) province, whilst the Southward Cadre Corps were from Shanxi and Shandong provinces and from Nanjing University’s cadre school. 344 Unlike the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps, the Southward Cadre Corps was specifically trained for civilian administration. Civil cadres usually did travel with military cadres. 345 However, this difference in focus between the “civil” and “military” wings, would have tended to increase the sense of separateness between the two groups.

The second variety of divisions within the Zhulibudui was that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps actually fought each other, by siding and fighting with opposing factions. This was a case of divisions within one “faction” of the Zhulibudui, during the

345 Ibid.
most violent and chaotic stage of the factional conflict (corresponding to the “major factional battles” stage mentioned in Chapter One).

The second kind of military division was the division between the Difangbudui, or local militia and the Zhulibudui or major military. The Difangbudui, were connected administratively to the Yunnan Military Region. The Kunming Military Region, or major military area (Dajunqu) covering most of Southwest China, was connected administratively to the Zhulibudui.\textsuperscript{346} Many other factors predisposed towards dissonance between Zhulibudui and Difangbudui. Difangbudui had always done the dull and tedious labour projects, and received no priority in resource allocation, with their officers in dead-end careers. By the summer of 1967, they were often the rivals in filling a political power vacuum in provinces.\textsuperscript{347} Factional rivalries developed between local and main forces in at least seven military regions, districts and garrisons.\textsuperscript{348}

\textsuperscript{346} Zhao Daming 赵达明. Student of International Relations at the Yunnan Provincial Science and Technology Institute. Previously a non-aligned High School Red Guard 1966-1970. Interviewed 30/4/00.


\textsuperscript{348} Ibid. p. 38.
Early Military Divisions

On September eleventh 1966, numerous Corps of Red Guards were established at Universities and High Schools in Kunming. General Qin Qiwei, Provincial Committee Secretary and Commander of the Kunming Military Region till October 1967, was made chief instructor of these Corps, along with other senior officers of the Kunming Military Region. It was most likely, at this stage, that this was done merely to moderate and guide the Red Guards’ revolutionary fervour. On September thirteenth at the National Defence Stadium, some 6,700 Red Guards held an oath-taking rally to celebrate the establishment of these Red Guard Corps. The rally was attended by Qin Qiwei, and other senior Kunming Military Region officers, along with the First Secretary of the CCP Provincial Committee, Yan Hongyan (阎红彦), Deputy Provincial Committee Secretary and First Political Commissar of the Kunming Military Region, Zhou Xing (周行), and former PLA man, Provincial Committee Secretary Zhao Jianmin (赵建民). Apart from the traditional non-violent rivalries mentioned earlier, there were no serious military divisions at this stage.

During the power seizures of January, we see the first military divisions open up. By January thirteenth 1967, the 23rd August (Great Alliance) faction were occupying the yard of the Kunming Military Region. The CCP Central Committee and the State Council sent a telegram to 23rd August congratulating them on this power seizure, but asking them to end their occupation of the yard of the Kunming Military Region (see map on page 62).

350 项兆赋 王先金，合编 . 1968. 云南文化大革命英雄谱. 云南八、二三《保卫长城》. 昆明. 云南。
After this telegram was disseminated 23rd August evacuated. On January twenty third, the Cultural Revolution Small Group and the CCP Central Committee issued a five point directive for the PLA to “actively support the revolutionary leftists in power seizure”. However, the Kunming Military Region Commander General Qin Qiwei used this order as a pretext for turning against 23rd August. The occupation of the Kunming Military Region yard may have cost 23rd August a powerful ally, and precipitated the beginnings of military involvement in the factional conflict. However, also on the twenty third, Artillery were told that Kunming Military Region First Political Commissar, Zhou Xing would hold a mass meeting to discuss “Power Seizure” on the night of the twenty sixth, and after that he would unilaterally give the power of the Provincial Committee to 23rd August. Some Artillery said they wanted to seize power before it was given to 23rd August, and they decided to take action. At about 3am on the 26th, an urgent notice was announced that the seizure of power would begin at 10am. When 23rd August asked Artillery for a conference on power seizure, Artillery just repeated that they would start at 10am, and 23rd August could join them if they wished. Thus we see the Kunming Military Region Commander and the First Political


Commissar taking opposite sides as the the Red Guard factions compete with each other in power seizure. This is the first clear case of military division.

On the twenty sixth, *New Yunnan (Artillery)* besieged the Provincial Government compound at Wuhua Hill (see map on page 62). Within several hours, they had control there.\(^{355}\) This was described by the *Great Alliance (23rd August)* as a “forced” counter-revolutionary power seizure under the guidance of *Artillery’s Upper Cadre Liaison Station* (上层干部联合占),\(^{356}\) some of whose members were Southward Cadre Corps cadres, mostly from Shandong, such as Provincial Committee Secretary Zheng (郑) and Border Committee Section Leader Zhu (朱).\(^{357}\) This a meaningful point, as we shall see later, but in the meantime, Zhou Xing had said that no group could seize power without 23rd August.

That same day however, 23rd August led by Red Guard, Huang Zhaoqi and Zhou Xing seized power at the separate Provincial Party Committee compound (see map on page 62). Nevertheless, *New Yunnan* by seizing the power of the Government compound had disrupted 23rd August’s attempts to seize power alone.\(^{358}\)

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\(^{355}\) Ibid. p. 6.

\(^{356}\) The September 15 Army of the Teacher’s College 23rd August Fighting Regiment, 1967, “Yunnan’s Zhao Yongfu is now in action”, *Teacher’s College 23rd August*, No 2, June 7, 1967, p. 2.


\(^{358}\) Kunming Medical Institute Mao Zedong Thought March 7th Artillery Regiment, and Holding High the Torch Fighting Group, 1967, *First Comment on the Wrong Orientation of 23rd August Fighting Regiment*, Kunming, Yunnan p. 2.
The split between the Commander and the First Political Commissar reflected the division between the Southward Cadre Corps and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps, who were both of the Kunming Military Region, or Zhulibudui. The fact that the Upper Cadre Liaison Station contained many cadres originally from Shandong province, is evidence of the Southward Cadre Corps’ link with Artillery (New Yunnan). The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps cadres never or very rarely hailed from Shandong. Therefore, the Southward Cadre Corps, with its local connections (mainly cadre children), tended to favour the Mao Zedong Thought Artillery Regiment (毛泽东思想炮兵团), or Artillery (Pao). The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps, with their local networks, tended to support the Jingan Mountain 23rd August Fighting Regiment (井冈山八二三武斗兵团), or 23rd August (Baersan). \(^{359}\) This clearly, a case of the first variety of the first kind of military division mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter. In terms of “good” and “bad” class backgrounds, discussed in the other Chapters, Artillery tended to be of “good” class background and 23rd August tended to be of “bad” class background.

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The role of the Military increases

The much discussed "February crackdown" actually started toward the end of January 1967, when Mao had reached a decision to make the Army responsible for provincial and local administration throughout China, and its full force didn’t subside till early April.360

On January thirty first, Deputy Political Commissar of the Kunming Military Region, Zhang Ziming (张子明), told a meeting of Red Guards that Premier Zhou wanted twenty representatives to go to Beijing. Both 23rd August (Great Alliance) and Artillery (New Yunnan) separately elected ten representatives each to go.361

In February 1967, a series of directives and statements were issued by the centre, that were intended to limit the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Mao criticised the use of violence by Red Guards. Red Guard groups were ordered to remove themselves from all Central Party Departments and Departments responsible for defence, economic planning, foreign affairs, public security, finance and propaganda.362 Most importantly, the military assumed control over the offices of the Provincial People’s Congress and Provincial Party Committee and the entire communications network.363

The process of the “February crackdown” was such that the Central Military Control Committee in Beijing had to rely on reports from the Military Control Committees of the Military Regions in order to rule which organisation was counter-revolutionary. Liu

Guokai noted that local military chieftains, immersed in Mao’s theory of “class struggle”, naturally took organisations formed with people of “high political quality” as genuine revolutionaries. Therefore, many commanders sided with the more party-connected groups in the grassroots units they were sent to supervise. In Kunming, these would have been groups leaning towards Artillery. Others attempted to strike compromises between factions. Once labeled “counter-revolutionary” an organisation would be banned and its leaders arrested. However, as we shall see, the Kunming situation was complicated by local military divisions.

In Yunnan, the Red Guard groups fought actively against these new restrictions. On February fifteenth, two 23rd August groups lead by Huang Zhaoqi, climbed over the walls of the Kunming Military Region and rushed into the yard. They then criticised the PLA men of the Military Control Committee (MCC). Artillery who were surrounding the Kunming Military Region themselves asked Fourteenth Corps commander, Li Chengfang to stop the incursion. It would appear though, that the Fourteenth Corps commander was sympathetic to 23rd August, as Li Chengfang not only failed to stop 23rd August’s “illegal” incursion, but verbally attacked Artillery for merely surrounding the Kunming Military Region compound. This is consistent with the general support of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps for 23rd August.

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Blecher, Marc J., 1997, China against the tides: Restructuring through Revolution, Radicalism and Reform, Pinter, London. p. 82.
366 Kunming Medical Institute Mao Zedong Thought March Seventh Artillery Regiment, and Holding High the Torch Fighting Fighting Group, 1967, Second Comment on the Wrong Orientation of 23rd August Fighting Regiment, Kunming, Yunnan. p. 4.
On February twenty first, the Yunnan Military Region MCC wanted 23rd August’s 29th November brigade to negotiate their status with them (i.e. whether or not they were to be classified as counter-revolutionary). Before dawn on the twenty second, “Butcher” Ding, too impatient to wait, personally lead a group of one PLA regiment and two PLA battalions that beat their way into the 29th November factory and arrest 29th November members still sleeping. Head of Security of the Yunnan Military Region, Jie brought several men carrying bayonets and attacked the home of an old party member Han, pulling clothes, ransacking boxes and finally arresting Han. Also, Tian from the Municipal Militia (Difangbudui) using a handgun, arrested a young worker Li Jiayun, then hung and beat him.367 Here we see the Security element of the Yunnan Military Region and some Difangbudui being viciously opposed to a 23rd August group. Liu Guokai observed that most Difangbudui militia were under the control of Political and Security personnel, who were usually “conservatives”.368 Also borne out here, is the administrative link between the Yunnan Military Region and the Difangbudui. This incident, I feel, is evidence of divisions between the Difangbudui and Zhulibudui influencing the factional conflict.

Alarmed by growing factional conflict, the CCP Central Committee committed the responsibility for Yunnan to Kunming Military Region and Fourteenth Corps Commander Li Chengfang, and asked both the Yunnan Military Region and Kunming

Military Region to organise together, a Leading Group to promote unification. Also, from March fifth to seventh, faction representatives still in Beijing wrote collective reports. These reports warned against competing to get guanxi in the higher levels of the Party, and said that Yunnan must have Military control especially in Public Security, Post and Telegraph, Communications and Transport, and the News Publication Department. This would promote the three-way (Red Guards, Army, and Party) unification, that was planned for the whole of China. Therefore, the policies of the “February crackdown” resulted in a still deeper intervention in provincial politics by the local military leaders. As for military divisions, either the Central Government was not aware at this stage of divisions within the Yunnan military, or it favoured the factional sympathies of Li Chengfang.

Following the “February crackdown” and the institution of military control in March the factional fighting calmed down a little. Rebel groups were weakened and the more party-connected groups were celebratory. Some hard-core “conservatives” who had protected former Provincial Committees, now revived their organisations under names that suggested they were rebel factions and styled themselves “leftists”. PLA leaders rewarded those who tried to protect the Military compounds with the laurel of “leftist”. In Kunming each faction was trying to appear more leftist than the other.

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369 Anonymous, 1967, Interview with the Yunnan Delegation, Mao Zedong Thought First Fighting Regiment, Yunnan Higher Institutions Red Guard Headquarters’ East is Red Fighting Regiment of Kunming Medical Institute, and Panlong River Propaganda Team, Kunming, Yunnan pp. 1-3.


All-round military control was implemented in Yunnan. On March fifth, Li Chengfang was made director of the Yunnan MCC. Zhang Zemin and Li Xifu were made deputies. On the eighth and ninth, the PLA took over power at the Yunnan People’s Broadcasting Station, and Yunnan Printing Factory. On the eleventh, the PLA began control of the Yunnan Daily (they tried to get “conservative” Xue Bo as Editor) and on the March thirty first, the CCP Central Committee formally endorsed the founding of the Yunnan MCC.

There was another show of factional “unification”. On March fourth, a rally of about ten thousand “revolutionaries” of mass organisations, marked the founding of the “Joint Command of the Proletarian Revolutionary Rebels in organisations under the Yunnan Provincial People’s Council”. Representatives from the PLA, Great Alliance (23rd August), and New Yunnan (Artillery) attended. However, New Yunnan (Artillery) tried to “instigate the masses” against military control, and tried to get Overseas Chinese (settlers from Malaysia) in Yunnan on their side. They put up Dazibao saying, “Down with Li Chengfang”. Li Chengfang was now clearly seen as siding with 23rd August.

373 Wu Hong (compiler), 1993, The Yunnan Post-liberation Outline of Important Historical Events, Yunnan Peoples’ Publishing House, Kunming, Yunnan. p. 165.


375 Wu Hong (compiler), 1993, The Yunnan Post-liberation Outline of Important Historical Events, Yunnan Peoples’ Publishing House, Kunming, Yunnan. p. 165.


377 The September 15 Army of the Teacher’s College 23rd August Fighting Regiment, 1967, “Yunnan’s Zhao Yongfu is now in action”, Teacher’s College 23rd August, No 2, June 7, 1967, p. 2.
Military Divisions open up

However, factional fights between the two major Red Guard groups again flared up in late March and April, with the Kunming Military Region Command turning against a “handful” who were accused of being “ultra-leftist”, probably 23rd August. They were not entirely successful in restoring peace. In April, when the army’s role in “support the left” work came under attack from the Centre, the 23rd August organisations became more active. However, the Army moved quickly to control this new offensive by declaring a united front with them.

Nevertheless, this proved to be ineffective, because on April first, the CCP Central Committee had issued a directive forbidding, arbitrary arrest and “the arbitrary stigmatising of mass organisations (and individuals) as counter-revolutionary”. Central approval would be needed in future. This provided for the release and rehabilitation of detainees. The directive also forbade any action against groups which attacked the PLA, leading to increased factional violence, and delaying the establishment of the Revolutionary Committees. The whole situation then changed explosively.

Factional struggle changed in character. Factions degenerated into the tools of the power struggle between local officials and/or military leaders. Hong Yung Lee observes that formal communication channels and organisational norms broke down, and factional

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struggles based on personal and informal relations began to rise. Cadres with fragile positions in formal organisations relied heavily on informal relationships such as personal friendships to challenge power holders and seize power. Informal and secret relationships, better suited to carrying out officially prohibited activities, were cultivated. This would not have been a new phenomenon, but it had intensified, and would have assisted the growth of military divisions.

As a result, in May the Central leadership again re-emphasised role of the PLA in preserving order, and then dispatched delegations to the provinces to negotiate agreements among feuding groups. Nevertheless, personal links to different military leaders led to more violent retaliations. There was a violent incident on May twenty eighth, where a 23rd August activist went to the Military Medical School on private business, but was detained and charged with spying. 23rd August activists from the Geographical School and Foreign Language Institute were also detained when they went to investigate. That same day, the Artillery dominated Military Medical School held mass meetings where they complained of the crimes of 23rd August. 23rd August members sneaked onto the stage at the meeting and strongly protested. Artillery refused to debate with them and started fighting.

Communist Manifesto Brigade and other Artillery brigades wounded over forty 23rd August activists. 26th January and other 23rd August brigades, totalling tens of thousands and backed by Zhang Ziming (张子明), Deputy Commander of the Kunming Military

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Region, heard of the battle and quickly came to the School. Artillery retreated to the Hall, with forty captives. They beat their captives. Early next morning, a 23rd August member sneaked out of the Hall saying how they were being beaten and some killed. About 6am, 23rd August rushed the Hall. Artillery fought with iron sticks and knives, and scores died. Sixty 23rd August activists from the 30th November, 3rd November, and 6th December brigades got into the Hall from the roof, letting themselves down onto the stage, where they were killed by Artillery. 23rd August rushed the door again. More were killed. Artillery were finally still not entirely dislodged, although there were very many dead and wounded. Whilst Zhang Ziming clearly shared the pro-23rd August orientation of his commander, the Military Medical School were clearly prepared to host Artillery.

After this first major violence connected to military divisions, Qin Qiwei and Zhang Lixiong (Kunming Military Region Political Commissar) were recalled to Beijing for ideological training. On May thirtieth, the Central Military Control Committee and the Cultural Revolution Small Group sent telegrams to the Kunming Military Region MCC to express concern over the armed fighting between Artillery and 23rd August. They were told that cadres and PLA were not to take sides and mass organisations were not allowed

The September 15 Army of the Teacher’s College 23rd August Fighting Regiment, 1967, “Yunnan’s Zhao Yongfu is now in action”, Teacher’s College 23rd August, No 2, June 7, 1967, p. 2.

to make contact with the PLA. This is now, indirect but strong evidence of direct Military involvement in factional fighting.

The Provincial Military Control Committee could not adopt security measures, but only instructed forces under it’s control to mildly suppress some groups. However, the CCP Central Committee dispatched Security Minister Xie Fuzhi, to forge an agreement between the factions. Also, on June the fourth, a letter to Kunming Military Region Military Control Committee member Li (李), suggested the Kunming Military Region hold a meeting between 23rd August and Artillery where there would be some self-criticism, and then the two factions would unite again in a new institution. Finally, on June sixth, the CCP Central Committee, State Council, Cultural Revolution Small Group and Central Military Control Committee, issued a directive to all parties, not to interfere with road and railway communications, seize weapons, set-up checkpoints, or to destroy things.

These moves failed again to stop the violence. From June to December 1967, the two main factions escalated their armed struggle. As we shall see, elements of the Military supported both factions, and in some places “weapons seizure” was in fact weapons distribution. There were over five thousand deaths from factional fighting in the whole

387 台北国际关系学院，1967，中国共产主义年鉴，台北。
Taipei Institute of International Relations, 1967, Year Book of Communist Chinese Affairs, Taipei. p. 396.
province in 1967 alone. Production and supply conditions became very difficult as the
two factions occupied various areas of Kunming city, describing each area as being under
their rule. 390

On June twelfth, the Party Committee of the Kunming Military Region gave a report to
the CCP Central Committee on how to solve problems between the Kunming Military
Region and Yunnan Military Region, and between the two factions. Chen Kang was
made Deputy Commander of the Kunming Military Region and Zhang Lixiong demoted
to Deputy Commissar of the Yunnan Military Region. Clearly, divisions between
Zhulibudui (Kunming Military Region) and Difangbudui (YMR) were now also in the
open. The Difangbudui of the YMR had probably sided mostly with Artillery.

By July twenty fourth, Xie Fuzhi had arrived in Kunming and had forged a six point
agreement between New Yunnan (Artillery) and the Great Alliance (August 23rd) dealing
with the surrender of arms and conditions for the cessation of violence. Soon after Xie
Fuzhi's departure however, new riots erupted, culminating in November with the
destruction of the Provincial Government premises. On July twenty ninth, a Yunnan
Daily editorial said that armed struggle had "appeared" in Kunming, and was "impeding
the formation of alliances". These and other flare-ups were investigated by the Provincial
Military Control Committee 391 Clearly Xie Fuzhi had failed. Xie Fuzhi had too many ties
to local leaders to deal with the local scene decisively. Most of those administering

390 Ibid. p. 358.
Yunnan in the late 1960’s were all former Second Field Army subordinates of Xie Fuzhi. 392

After this, there were ongoing cases of military interference in factional fighting. Firstly, on July twenty eighth, *Artillery* led by former Deputy First Secretary and PLA man, Zhao Jianmin, attacked a 23rd August brigade called 8th November. Many were killed. With the cooperation of the PLA, November 8th finally drove the attackers off. *Artillery* however, captured and beat their factory gatekeeper, and threw his body into Lake Dian. 393

Secondly, there was the failure of military mediation at the Postbox 300 munitions factory on August nineteenth, after a series of heavily armed *Artillery* attacks on the factory. *Artillery* led by Zhao Jianmin, casually ignored the Military-sponsored agreement, and continued their attacks. They wanted to attack munitions factories and seize weapons. 394

*Artillery*, were by now feeling that the PLA were biased against them, and on August 23rd 1967, they forcibly occupied the Headquarters of the Provincial Military Control

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Committee at Wuhua Hill. This disrupted production and supply work.\textsuperscript{395} The premises of Wuhua Hill were reportedly reduced to rubble, and casualties were unusually heavy (A ceasefire was later reached after Beijing rushed a supervisory group to the scene).\textsuperscript{396} Then on August twenty fifth, Artillery openly seized state weapons, and the situation reportedly became even more tense.\textsuperscript{397}

On August twenty sixth, the pattern of weapons seizures continued, but this time with extensive military assistance. Eighteen trucks of armed Artillery members entered the Yunnan Military Region compound, and asked the Deputy Commander Ding Rongchang (丁荣昌), for the whereabouts of weapons. Artillery leaders Li Yi (李毅, a PLA man), and Fang Xiangdong (方向东) reportedly made a secret agreement with the wife of the Deputy Commander, to give Artillery weapons that very day, because 23\textsuperscript{rd} August were about to dispatch 20,000 men to attack the Yunnan Military Region (YMR). PLA men were not allowed to open fire, therefore it was decided that the Artillery activists would have to be allowed to fight them. Machine guns were placed on the high points of the YMR, and the fighting began. After a lull in the firing, there was a meeting where Ding decided that demobilised PLA (those ready to go back home) were to be reorganised to fight with Artillery.\textsuperscript{398} Nevertheless, the district records report that on that same day, some hundred members of 23\textsuperscript{rd} August broke into the Yunnan Military Region and stole

\textsuperscript{395} Ibid. pp. 386-387.
\textsuperscript{397} Xiang Zhaobin, Wang Xianjin and He Bian, 1968, Yunnan Cultural Revolution Register of Heroes, Yunnan 23\textsuperscript{nd} of August “Defend the Great Wall”, Kunming, Yunnan. p. 377.
\textsuperscript{398} Ibid. pp. 377-378.
twenty six machine guns and pistols. Scores of 23rd August were killed. The details of this incident show that the Yunnan Military Region were now clearly taking the side of Artillery in the factional fighting. Despite the fact that Artillery were easily able to enter the YMR compound and even receive weapons, a loophole was found whereby demobilised PLA could actually fight alongside Artillery to try to prevent the 23rd August incursion.

Also, from August 25th to 28th, several groups of Artillery went to Weapons Depots at the Western Hills (西山, see map on page 62), Changpo (长破) and Xiaomaiyu (小麦雨), stealing large amounts of guns and bullets. As mentioned in Chapter Two, they then tried to establish full control over the strategic Electrical Lines factory. PLA of the 7562 and 7616 Brigades, stationed in the factory, were very concerned about this. After mediation failed, the PLA guarded the buildings where 23rd August members were staying, so that Artillery could not establish full control. Ostensibly, trying to maintain the status quo in the factory, these PLA brigades could easily be seen to be siding with 23rd August.

Artillery launched new attacks on the munitions factories. From August the twenty eighth to thirtieth, Artillery seized over one thousand weapons and 1,020,000 bullets. By now, scores of PLA men were imprisoned at Artillery’s Xinhua Primary School jail, where several hundred Artillery were stationed. The military men there were beaten with iron

399 Compilatory Committee of Kunming Wuhua District, 1995, Records of Wuhua District, Sichuan Dictionary Publishing House, Chengdu, Sichuan. p. 64.

400 Xiang Zhaobin, Wang Xianjin and He Bian, 1968, Yunnan Cultural Revolution Register of Heroes, Yunnan 23rd of August “Defend the Great Wall”, Kunming, Yunnan. p. 211.
bars and knives. By now we can see that, Artillery members obviously thought that at least some military had taken the side of their opposition.

402 Ibid. pp. 188-190.
Explicit Military complicity in factional fighting

As mentioned in Chapter Two, on September fifth 1967, all four central authorities in China, the CCP Central Committee, the Central Military Control Committee, the State Council, and the Cultural Revolution Small Group, issued a joint directive, signed by Mao, attempting to end the armed struggle and revive the authority of the PLA. The directive ordered all mass groups to turn their weapons, military equipment and all kinds of military materials, over to the army and obey military authority. Nevertheless, August to December 1967, was the height of the violence in Kunming. Shops and factories were closed, and communications were suspended. People were afraid to leave their homes. The announcement of the fifth September directive, only spurred on the Artillery faction to continue the violence, and as we shall see, military complicity in factional violence, only served to exacerbate it.

Firstly, during Artillery’s siege of the Provincial Museum (see map on page 62), a 23rd August base, the PLA was urged to mediate. 23rd August had retreated to the fifth floor, from where they catapulted written notes into the courtyard of the neighbouring National Theatre, which belonged to the Kunming Military Region, asking the PLA to help. The National Theatre loudspeaker broadcast that, Artillery’s attacks were contrary to the instructions of the Provincial MCC. Fighting went on, and 23rd August retreated to the seventh floor. 23rd August again catapulted notes into the National Theatre saying, “We

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403 昆明市五华区志编辑委员会，1995，五华区志，四川辞书出版社，成都，四川。
Compilatory Committee of Kunming Wuhua District, 1995, Records of Wuhua District, Sichuan Dictionary Publishing House, Chengdu, Sichuan p. 64.
Blecher, Marc J., 1997, China against the tides: Restructuring through Revolution, Redicalism and Reform, Pinter, London. p. 82.
have retreated to the top floor, with fifteen left”. The PLA then broadcast that both sides should stop shooting, and that a meeting be held. Wang of the Kunming City Military Control Committee then went to the fourth floor to arrange talks. However, the meeting failed and the violence proceeded unchecked until Artillery were victorious. The Military were completely ineffective here.

Next we have evidence of sections of the PLA explicitly siding with the Artillery brigades, *Yenan, Red Flag, 278, 24th February, Glaring Fire, Red Electricity, and 5th December*. The Revolutionary Union of the PLA School are named in the Red Guard materials as having moved along the road to attack *23rd August* at the Electrical Machine Factory, with these brigades. There were altogether over one thousand people armed with light or heavy machine guns, and some with hand grenades. They occupied strategic points in all directions around the factory, and then attacked.

Soon after this, other PLA provided three trucks and military cover, to assist the opposite faction, *23rd August* with the evacuation of their *16th January* brigade, when their factory was being attacked by Artillery. Over ten hours, there were several attacks resulting in dozens of Artillery and *16th January* casualties. Early the next morning, *16th January* began to evacuate.

As mentioned in Chapter Three, on September tenth, the two factions met and made an agreement to “stop fire and hand in weapons”, under the mediation of the Provincial

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Yang Bangshun 杨邦顺. Retired Professor of English, Yunnan University. Interviewed October 1999.


Reprinted from the Yunnan Daily article “Completely Invincible». 项兆斌, 王先金, 合编 1968, 云南文化大革命英雄谱, 云南八·二三《保卫长城》, 昆明·云南。
Military Control Committee. The September Fifth directive was also published, with the additional statement that the enforcement of central orders now rested with the provincial and local PLA commanders. From then on the Military Control Committees began to be revitalised again, but while the violence did not escalate, it did not diminish either. Yunnan was not among the provinces that went through a process of “negotiated settlement” under the joint supervision of Premier Zhou Enlai, the Cultural Revolution Small Group and the PLA in Beijing, culminating in a cease-fire agreement on November the second (this was attempted earlier with the Yunnanese).

Incredibly, in late October, an Artillery leader moved the contents of the Yunnan Military Region’s three military equipment garages by deception. He left them in the care of the Provincial Goods and Materials Warehouse and the Yunnan Brick and Tile Factory, which were both under his command. Then Zhao Jianmin transported the military equipment, to Artillery’s central barracks in western Kunming. It is hard to see how Artillery could have done this without significant “inside” assistance at the Yunnan Military Region. This is further evidence then that the Difangbudui were supporting Artillery.


Compilatory Committee of Kunming Wuhua District, 1995, Records of Wuhua District, Sichuan Dictionary Publishing House, Chengdu, Sichuan. p. 64.


In this more violent phase of the conflict, the third and final type of military division makes an appearance. There is no doubt that from November to December 1967, militia and regulars of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps all got involved in support of different factions. The local military was clearly split and eventually Mao sacked local commanders Qin Qiwei (perhaps Thirteenth Corps) and Li Chengfang (Fourteenth Corps). In November, new riots involving Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps men erupted, culminating in the destruction of the Provincial People’s Congress at Wuhua Hill. Beijing was forced to send an investigating team to arrange a ceasefire, along with some non-Yunnanese troops. This was perhaps the first outbreak of divisions among the “Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps faction” of the local Zhulibudui. Such cases were not common, nor were they particularly bloody. The primary mode of main force factionalism was proxy battles among contending mass organisations. Should main force units have become deeply embroiled in local struggles over political power and thus lost their usefulness as referees, Mao would have lost control of China.

In whatever form however, Military involvement in factional fighting continued throughout November and December 1967. “Bad elements” of a certain PLA Department took part in another Artillery attack, in defiance of Central Government directives to abstain. With heavy gunfire, Artillery blockaded 23rd August’s 8th November brigade at the strategically placed Heavy Machine Factory. Many were wounded, and some were killed. Over two thousand personnel and their families evacuated the Factory to Eziying.

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mountain village. After taking shelter there, they went on a “Little Long March” of about 250 kilometres, and two months, through rural counties bordering Kunming, trying to avoid Artillery controlled areas.\footnote{Xiang Zhaobin, Wang Xianjin and He Bian, 1968, \textit{Yunnan Cultural Revolution Register of Heroes}, Yunnan 23rd of August “Defend the Great Wall”, Kunming, Yunnan. pp. 284-285.}

Army men increasingly became the targets of attack, and by now they would have developed personalised feelings of revenge against whichever faction it was that inflicted death and injury on them. On December fourth, the Puping Village “Mao Study Class” together with the Cement Factory Artillery Brigade, Postbox 278 Artillery Brigade and the Chemical Factory Artillery Brigade, (altogether over two hundred men) attacked the PLA men who were assigned to protect a weapons factory (name unknown). The PLA men formed a human wall to stop them entering the Auditorium, but the Artillery brigades climbed through the back wall, and seized all the weapons and bullets, throwing them out the window. There was intense fighting. A PLA man was killed.\footnote{Ibid. p. 385.} That same day, the Seventh Company of the 37th Division (still commanded by Li Chengfang) of the Fourteenth Corps, was attacked by a large group of people who rushed into the college where they were stationed and beat the soldiers. They carried off the canon of the seventh company. PLA man, Hu (胡) seized the cannon back, and fastened it to his body, but was knocked unconscious by attackers.\footnote{Ibid. pp. 285-286.}

On December fifth, there was another telling sign of dissatisfaction with the military’s role as mediator. Kunming First High School, sent twenty two student Red Guards, to Zhang Lixiong’s (张力雄 YMR Deputy Political Commissar) house in the YMR
compound, where they stayed. After a December fifth 1967 order of the CCP Central Committee, the Red Guards were ready to move out, but were beaten by Zhang’s followers, before they evacuated. 416

In mid-December, the CCP Central Committee asked for the factions, the Kunming Military Region, the Yunnan Military Region, and the leading cadres of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps, to all send representatives to Beijing. 417 Beijing also sent an inspection group to Kunming on a fact-finding tour, and then PLA authorities issued a statement revealing uneasiness amongst its ranks, “Central Authority has begun to look into the situation and is prepared to settle the problem”. Clearly, military divisions had not healed. Also, PLA units continued to play active roles in factional fighting, and on December twenty first, Artillery attacked patrolling troops of a certain 113th Company PLA, in the Kunming area. 418

On December the eighteenth, there was one of the largest confrontations of the Cultural Revolution in Kunming discussed briefly in Chapter Three. There was a protest march by Artillery to East Wind Department Store, where 23rd August had a base. It was a protest against the killing of a PLA man by 23rd August. New Kunming Military Region Commander, Cui Jiangong (崔建功) pushed the dead PLA man’s body along the street on a cart, allegedly against his will. Carrying homemade weapons, the protest march attacked the building, breaking the windows. However, three hundred people in PLA

416 Ibid. p. 214.
apparel were then sent to surround the building. "We will not leave until the Military Control Committee sends someone to take over from us", they said.\textsuperscript{419}

By early the next morning, still waiting for the Military Control Committee to arrive, over thirty machine guns were arranged in surrounding buildings. \textit{Artillery} controlled all the neighbouring places such as, Wucheng (武成) Road and the Western Gate. The East Wind Department Store represented a great obstruction for \textit{Artillery} and Zhao Jianmin. Thirty four 23rd August members defended its five floors. Intense firing started and the walls, windows and doors were filled with bullet holes. There were over one thousand \textit{Artillery}, many in PLA apparel, commanded by Yang Kai (杨凯). The neighbouring Inspection and Planning Institute was quickly lost.\textsuperscript{420}

\textit{Artillery}, said over a megaphone, “Do not believe Zhou Xing and (former Commander of the Fourteenth Corps) Li Chengfang”. They clearly thought these two had been assisting 23\textsuperscript{rd} August. Then \textit{Artillery}, with guns, originally bound for Vietnam, and wearing PLA insignia, used ladders to get onto the second floor, killing two. 23\textsuperscript{rd} August had no bullets left. 23\textsuperscript{rd} August then asserted that, “Zhao Jianmin and (Yunnan Military Region Deputy Political Commissar) Zhang Lixiong, will be defeated”.\textsuperscript{421} 23\textsuperscript{rd} August were forced to surrender.

This, “East Wind Department Store Incident” reveals two things. Firstly, the PLA’s supposed role as mediator was being used as a propaganda tool. \textit{Artillery} organised the protest march to make it look like it had the support of the PLA leadership. They also

\textsuperscript{419} 项兆斌，王晓金，合编，1968，云南文化大革命英雄谱，云南八、二三《保卫长城》，昆明：云南。
\textsuperscript{420} Ibid. pp. 143-148.
dressed in PLA uniforms to enhance their status. It is unlikely that they could have got these uniforms without the help of PLA personnel. Secondly, elements of the PLA supported both sides. Former Fourteenth Corps Commander Li Chengfang had assisted 23rd August, but obviously Artillery had their connections in the military too, as witnessed by the participation of Cui Jiangong in the protest march, and the use of PLA insignia and uniforms, but most telling was 23rd August’s exhortation that Yunnan Military Region Deputy Political Commissar Zhang Lixiong, “will be defeated”.

PLA complicity in the factional fighting became so bad that by December twenty fourth, several representatives in Beijing (including Chen Kang and Zhang Lixiong) telegramed the Party Committee of the Kunming Military Region asking them to control PLA instability. They suggested all departments carry out the resolutions of November fourteenth, where they were asked not to participate in the Cultural Revolution. They told the Kunming Military Region to restore social order, and that all mass organisations should evacuate important communication routes and checkpoints.422 On December twenty seventh in Beijing, Zhou Enlai, Xie Fuzhi, and Cultural Revolution Small Group member Kang Shen gave interviews to leaders of factions and PLA representatives from Kunming. They said that the military should not interfere.423

Still there was a further increase of PLA involvement in factional fighting. On December 27th, the PLA was attacked with mortars and rockets in another fierce battle at the Provincial Government at Wuhua Hill. More revealing though was a separate large battle

423 Ibid. pp. 358-359.
on the tops of Xiao Tuan (小团) and Min (岷) mountains, near the northwestern suburbs. Artillery attacked the 23rd August groups Pudian (普电) Village East is Red, Red Workers Revolutionary Brigade, and 30th November, with the help of PLA troops. The Artillery groups were United Command of 7321 Factory, and the Peasant Revolutionary Army. Fighting with them were the “Revolutionary Alliance” of the Yunnan Military Region, and Militia from local districts. Altogether about ten thousand, reportedly launched the attack. This became known as “The Battle of Heilinpu (黑林谱, see map on page 62)”, and was one of the largest encounters of Kunming’s conflict.

During the attack, 23rd August fighters guarding Min Mountain, saw some Artillery wearing the yellow army uniforms of the Yunnan Military Region, evidence once again that parts of the PLA were taking part. One 23rd August was wounded. Artillery were firing Number Eight and Number Five machine guns with four barrels. These guns were officially forbidden by Military Control Committee directives, and could only have been obtained with military complicity. Min Mountain was four times lost and regained.424

Artillery then ordered the 109th Battalion of the PLA 36th Division, based nearby at Heilinpu to evacuate, or be attacked. Nevertheless, the Red Army Battalion of the 37th Division (Fourteenth Corps) who were guarding the Heilinpu area saw 23rd August being attacked and rushed into their Factory at Min Mountain, helping people to walk out to Bomb Shelter caves. The leader of the PLA Battalion, Xiang Tongming (向兔明) was killed. The PLA Brigade that normally guarded Xiaomaiyu Weapons Depot then joined


424 项兆斌，王光金，合编，1968，云南文化大革命英雄谱，云南八、二三《保卫长城》，昆明，云南。 
Artillery. This worried 23rd August and the Red Army Battalion of the 37th Division. The Standing Committee of 23rd August held an urgent session and decided that the real intention of Artillery was to attack the PLA 37th Division. 23rd August then retreated along mountain paths beside Lake Dian.

After 23rd August's retreat, Artillery killed two members of the 23rd August Standing Committee, with knives. A PLA man was shot. Other PLA men were seized and beaten. Sick and wounded 23rd August members were killed with grenades. Three workers were tied up, shot and their valuables seized. Many people were forced to go to the Bomb Shelter Caves, but this time they saw PLA men standing hand in hand in front of caves. Artillery shouted “Protectors of Li Chengfang, why do you refuse us entry”, then shot at the PLA, who did not move. Thousands of 23rd August people were hiding in the caves. Eventually the PLA men were forced to leave and 23rd August were taken out of the caves and beaten. Six died from the beatings. One was deliberately run over by a truck. Another was disemboweled. Another had his eyes gouged and tongue cut out. A total of fourteen were killed. I would like to comment here that although this account does have a feeling of bias towards 23rd August, most of my interviewees have attested to a common belief that Artillery were the more violent and barbaric of the two factions.

The account goes on that the remaining people were forced to "concentration" camps. They were forced to raise their hands whilst walking, even though they were sick and wounded. Many people died on the five-kilometre march to the three camps at Yunnan University, Green Lake, and Xinhua Hill (see map on page 62). At the Yunnan University camp, every rooftop had guns in place. The 23rd August prisoners were blindfolded and driven to the University auditorium, where they were interrogated using electric shocks. Those who professed to be 30th November were singled out, and two killed.\textsuperscript{428} The Commander of the PLA 37th Division Garrison, Instructor Man Jichun (满纪春) was taken as prisoner, sent to Xinhua Hill camp, and paraded through streets around Xinhua Hill.\textsuperscript{429} On December the 29th, he was questioned by Yang Kai and asked if the PLA had killed two Artillery at Min Mountain. He said Yang Kai was nothing compared to Li Chengfang. Yang Kai said, "Li Chengfang was finished".\textsuperscript{430} We can see, from this exchange that Fourteenth Corps Commander Li Chengfang was by now considered to be the great foe of Artillery.

Apart from showing how vicious the fighting had become, this "Battle of Heilinpu" is perhaps the clearest evidence so far of PLA division and complicity in factional fighting. Fighting with the Artillery groups were the "Revolutionary Alliance" of the Yunnan Military Region, local district Militia (Difangbudui), and the PLA brigade that normally

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Luo Deyang 罗德扬. Lecturer in Mechanics, Kunming Engineering University. Interviewed November 11, 1999.
\textsuperscript{428} Witnessed by Yang Bangshun 杨邦顺. Retired Professor of English, Yunnan University. Interviewed October 1999.
\textsuperscript{429} 项兆斌，王先金，合编. 1968. 云南文化大革命英雄谱，云南八、二三《保卫长城》. 昆明，云南
guarded the Xiaomaiyu Weapons Depot. Fighting or allied with the 23<sup>rd</sup> August groups were the “Red Army Battalion” of the 37<sup>th</sup> Division and the 109 Battalion of the 36<sup>th</sup> Division. Artillery’s hatred for the 37<sup>th</sup> Division and its commander Li Chengfang is now obvious. The fact that, Artillery fighters were wearing Yunnan Military Region (Difangbudui) uniforms, and were using machine guns that could only have been obtained with military assistance adds to the evidence of military involvement in factional fighting.

Evidence of serious PLA involvement nevertheless continued. On December twenty-eighth, 23<sup>rd</sup> August besieged Kunming Technology School, and the Thirteenth Corps rushed a unit there to suppress the violence. However, the Thirteenth Corps divided itself into two factions and participated in the struggle on both sides. At the Wuhua Hill Artillery base, nine PLA companies were besieged by 23<sup>rd</sup> August, suffering heavy casualties. They were forced to move to Xiaotu, seven kilometres northeast of Kunming. During the siege, the PLA infantrymen actually favoured Artillery, and the PLA Artillery Regiment granted its support to 23<sup>rd</sup> August. Two days later, there was another gun seizure. Several hundred people rushed into the Technical School again and searched for guns and bullets. Army men formed a human wall in front of where the weapons were stored. They were attacked, and every member of seventh company was wounded. The PLA men walked the streets wounded in their torn clothes, to the military clinic. 431

After these last incidents, the Beijing Inspection group in Kunming, broadcast a three point appeal to both factions over Kunming Radio, “Those who oppose the Thirteenth

430 Ibid. p. 244-247.
431 Reprinted from the newspaper, Red Army College, No. 22. 项兆斌，王先金，合编，1968，云南文化大革命英雄谱，云南八、二三《保卫长城》，昆明，云南。
and Fourteenth Corps actually shake the foundation of the PLA. Chairman Mao has great confidence in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps. In addition, representatives in Beijing sent a telegram to the Kunming Military Region saying the “two great sections” in the PLA should overcome factionalism. Also Thirteenth Corps Commander Wu Xiaomin, Thirteenth Corps Political Commissar Chen Zemin, and new Fourteenth Corps Commander Liang Zhongyu, issued a joint seven point statement (to the PLA),

(1) PLA and the Frontier Garrison Troops are all integral parts of the revolutionary army. (2) We should support and respect each other and maintain the prestige of the PLA in order to avoid mutual destruction. (3) We should rule out factionalism and selfishness, criticise ourselves, and not isolate ourselves from our fellow troops. (4) ... settle internal problems by ourselves before they are exposed to society. (5) We should be alert to the enemy’s trick of sowing dissension. (6) We should guarantee the internal steadiness of the troops. (7) Party Commissars of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps have to enforce the above pledges and assure the internal steadiness of our troops.

This joint statement and the other entreaties reveal that troops stationed in Yunnan were very unstable and had low morale. They had done nothing to heal their divisions. Taiwanese sources said that there were three different positions taken by the Yunnan PLA; the Thirteenth Corps took a right-neutral position, the Fourth Artillery Division supported the 23rd August faction, and the Public Security and Frontier Garrison Troops favoured the Artillery faction.

The Drive for Military unification and renewed control

In the first sign that Beijing’s patience with Yunnan was beginning to run out, the entire General Staff of the 37th Division, including Commander Li Chengfang and the Political Commissar were put under house arrest, and eleven of their soldiers were reported missing on January fourth. Later, Zhou Enlai condemned the 109th Battalion 37th Division for the terrible mistake of taking part in armed faction fighting. On January eighth, a Mao Thought Study group was organised in Beijing to solve the “Yunnan Problem”. Seven hundred representatives of the two factions and the PLA attended it.

But the single most important military action in the final drive to end the military and factional fighting was the campaign to crush the Western Yunnan Onward Marching Special Division (滇西挺进纵队) or Dianting (滇挺). Zhao Jianmin organised the Dianting, at the beginning of January 1968, ostensibly to fight Nationalist remains and protect against invasion, but in reality to fight August 23rd and to establish control over Western Yunnan. Dianting divided into two, one group marching along the Yunnan/Burma highway, and another on the Yunnan/Sichuan Highway, to Nanhua (南华), and then to Yunnan/Burma highway (to meet with the other route). All along the way they attacked important storehouses, and places connected with national defense, seizing weapons, and killing some PLA.

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435 Ibid. pp. 7-8.
The PLA in Yunnan were ordered to deal with Dianting. On January the twenty second, the Kunming Military Region’s Fourteenth Corps insisted that Dianting lay down their weapons, confess mistakes, release prisoners and handover their leaders for arrest. Dianting refused. The Fourteenth Corps attacked that night. Arriving in Western Yunnan at Xingsu (星宿) River Bridge, they asked Dianting to surrender. Dianting refused again. The Fourteenth Corps attacked and Dianting were beaten into caves, under powerful gunfire. The PLA then rushed the caves and overwhelmed Dianting.\(^{438}\) On the twenty seventh, other PLA companies attacked the other route of Dianting, in a battle at Ganhaizi (甘海子) Mine in Yipinglang (一平浪) district. Dianting counter-attacked the PLA, trying to encircle them. Two PLA men were wounded. However, Dianting laid down their arms after the eighth company rushed them, and their leader was killed. Many PLA were badly wounded and three Dianting were killed.\(^{439}\)

Meanwhile in Beijing on January twenty first, Kang Shen and Xie Fuzhi held a conference with leading cadres of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps, the Kunming Military Region, and the two factions. Xie criticised Artillery leader Zhao Jianmin, who was asked to attend, but did not. Xie and Kang ordered Zhao’s immediate arrest. He was arrested in Beijing within days, and kept in jail for eight years. After this, many cadres and others were persecuted, with a large number of false cases. Many were beaten to death or maimed.\(^{440}\)

\(^{438}\) Ibid. pp. 305-309.
\(^{440}\) 陈德胜《编辑》, 1996, 当代云南大事纪要, 当代中国出版社, 云南.
With the defeat of *Dianting* and the arrest of Zhao Jianmin and *Artillery* were seriously weakened. As they had been the more aggressive and violent of the two factions, this significantly diminished the scale of the factional fighting, and prepared the way for healing divisions within the local military.

As 1967 turned into 1968, local Public Security Police together with the Military Control Committees that supervised the new Revolutionary Committees ushered in a new period of repression and terror lasting until 1971. As mentioned in Chapter Three, there were three separate campaigns. The largest and well known “Cleansing of the class ranks (清清理阶级队伍)” occurred first. Later were the “Anti-May 16th elements (反五一六分子)” and the “One strike, three oppose (一打三反)” campaigns. There were long vague lists of potential suspects, which gave local officials broad discretion in prosecuting those under them. There was no guidance on how to identify such people. Confessions were extracted through threats, sleep deprivation, beatings and torture. They were invited again to “study classes” that turned out to be involuntary thought-reform sessions in which they were to confess their crimes. 441

By February eleventh, eight hundred Yunnanese were in such classes in Beijing, discussing the “Yunnan Problem”.442 Mao heard reports on these Yunnan classes, and said eight hundred was not enough. The numbers were then increased to over three thousand. Mao, the Cultural Revolution Small Group, and members of the CCP Central

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Committee, gave interviews to nearly all Yunnan study class members throughout May and June 1968. Kang Shen charged the Yunnanese with “aiding the enemy” by seizing and counter-seizing arms bound for Vietnam. There was an agreement on February thirteenth, to stop fighting, hand in weapons, recover transportation and guarantee smooth post and telecommunication. A ceasefire commenced on February sixteenth, in the whole of Yunnan. On February twenty first, PLA men started to patrol Kunming City, and according to district records, the “resorting to violence” ended, although there was a final burst of heavy factional fighting in one area of the city. All weapons and ammunition were to be handed to the Military Control Committee on March fourth. Solinger has noted that the two factions were forced to co-exist without one ever having been decisively capped victor over the other.

On March eighth 1968, the Provincial Military Control Committee published Concerning The Grasping Revolution, Promoting Production and Striking Counter-revolutionaries Economics Agreement made by the two Yunnan Factions in Beijing. This emphasised productivity, normality and defence. Street corner broadcast stations and loudspeakers,

446 Ibid. p. 364.
Red Guard propaganda vehicles, and the publishing of Red Guard newspapers were all stopped.449 Workers were ordered back to their units and students ordered back to their classes by March fifteenth at the latest. Provincial Mao Thought Study Classes opened in Kunming on March twentieth. The new Commander of the Kunming Military Region, Lu Ruilin (鲁瑞林), attended the opening.450

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On May the nineteenth 1968, Beijing assigned the Political Commissar of the PLA Engineering Corps, Tan Furen, as First Political Commissar of the Kunming Military Region, to speed up the formation of the new Army-Party-Red Guard alliance government of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee. Cooperating with former Provincial Committee Secretary Zhou Xing and Deputy Kunming Military Region Commander Chen Kang, he forced the major organisations into a more lasting coalition.\footnote{Domes, Jurgen., 1970, "The Role of the Military in the Formation of Revolutionary Committees 1967-68", The China Quarterly, No. 44, October – December 1970, pp. 112-145. p. 138.} Chen Kang was brought to the fore as an important “revolutionary military cadre” and a number of veteran party and civil cadres were also co-opted into new leadership.\footnote{It appears that Chen, who had been a KMR Deputy Commander throughout, had been waiting for Cultural Revolution politics to settle down, before reclaiming a leading political role. Falkenheim, Victor C., 1969, “The Cultural Revolution in Kwangsi, Yunnan and Fukien”, Asian Survey, Vol. IX, No. 8, August 1969, pp. 580-597. p. 591.}

Mao urged Tan to bring the “civil war” in Yunnan to an end, because the “consequences have been incalculable”, revealing that the Yunnan clashes had taken 80,000 lives (Some Red Guard publications said 160,000).\footnote{The Editor., 1968, “Yunnan Provincial Revolutionary Committee Born In The Midst Of Armed Clashes”, Chinese Communist Affairs: Facts and Features, Vol. 1, No. 24, September 18, 1968, pp. 11-14. pp. 13-14.} Tan, relaying the instructions of the CCP Central Committee to representatives of factions, said, “it is entirely wrong to adopt the policy of wiping out and crushing other faction”.

On June nineteenth, a remnant group of 23rd August, 28th January attacked the 38th Division of the Thirteenth Corps, and eleven PLA men were killed. Some said the
Thirteenth Corps were ready to launch a coup d'état. In another development that revealed military divisions in June, it was rumoured that a five person group of Yunnan Military Region commanders, was planning to attack the Revolutionary Committee. They were supposedly planning this in a secret room at the Yunnan Military Region compound. This played a key role in disturbing the PLA, and led to the persecution of the Yunnan Military Region leaders. These events reveal divisions between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps (who had defeated Dianting) and between the Yunnan Military Region and Kunming Military Region. Furthermore, in June, Tan Furen brought the 54th Corps of Fourth Field Army from Sichuan to Yunnan, replacing the Thirteenth Corps of the Second Field Army within the Kunming Military Region (the Fourteenth Corps remained). The Thirteenth Corps was transferred to Henan province. After that, the Kunming Military Region under Tan put an end to all Red Guard factional fighting, and at least one variety of military division was put to an end.

Another factor which assisted Tan Furen to end factional rivalry and form the Revolutionary committee was the support of a “central support-the-left” troop called the “8113th Unit” (previously used in Inner Mongolia and Shanxi), which supervised all other PLA units. More importantly, it had no connections with military groupings in

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457 Luo Deyang, Lecturer in Mechanics, Kunming Engineering University. Interviewed November 11, 1999.
Yunnan. “Central Support the Left Units” were specifically created to deal with provinces which still had not formed Revolutionary Committees.\textsuperscript{458}

Now Tan could begin to build the Revolutionary Committee. The Yunnan Revolutionary Committee was virtually created by the PLA, although cadres, mass organisations and military units all competed for representation. None of them were able to secure the unqualified support of Mao or the local PLA.\textsuperscript{459} Finally on August tenth, the CCP Central Committee, Yunnan MCC, State Council, and Cultural Revolution Small Group confirmed the founding of the Yunnan Revolutionary Committee. The Revolutionary Committee (RC) had 181 members, of whom 61% were faction representatives, 15% were PLA, and 24% were leading cadres. The RC Standing Committee of forty members, had twenty faction representatives, ten PLA representatives, and ten leading cadres. Tan Furen was Chairman. Among the ten deputies were, Zhou Xing, Chen Kang, Huang Zhaoqi, and Li Yi, formerly a PLA Political Commissar.\textsuperscript{460} The “nucleus group” was Tan, the Political Commissar of the Yunnan Military Region, Zhou, the Deputy Commander of the Kunming Military Region, Chen, and another Deputy Kunming Military Region Commander Lu Rulin, all military men.\textsuperscript{461}

\textsuperscript{460} 陈德新，《编辑》, 1969. 当代云南大事纪要，当代中国出版社，云南。
On August fourteenth, “400,000 representatives of masses”, and PLA soldiers paraded in Kunming to celebrate the establishment of the Provincial RC. Tan Furen addressed the rally, and other speakers were Zhou Xing and Chen Kang. However, the same day Artillery remnants intercepted trucks carrying PLA soldiers, beating up and injuring four PLA men. Clearly, beneath the surface, there was still much resentment against the Military.462

Meanwhile, the previously mentioned Cleansing of the Class Ranks campaign to restore order had been gathering pace. At district level in July 1968, “Study Classes for Mao Thought and Cleansing the Class Ranks” were carried out. In these classes, the “nine kinds of people” (landlords, rich peasants, historical and active counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, traitors, special agents, “incorrigible capitalist-roader” and “reactionary academic”) were examined and denounced. Many were dispersed to the countryside for physical labour.463

On October fifth, the Yunnan Daily published a Xinhua article saying that cadres should be sent to the countryside to do physical labour. On December sixteenth, over 5000 cadres were sent to May Seventh Cadre Schools in rural areas.464

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464 Zhao Darning 赵大明, Student of International Relations at the Yunnan Provincial Science and Technology Institute. Previously a non-aligned High School Red Guard 66-70. Interviewed 30/4/00.
From September to December 1968, the RC issued four notices about the distribution and settlement of the graduates of educational institutions from 1966 to 1968. All should go to PLA farms and become “united with workers and peasants”. On November first, over 1600 graduates went to the farms, and another 1700 in January 1969. On December thirtieth, the Yunnan Daily reported Mao’s directive that high school and college students should go “up to the mountains and down to the villages” (上山下乡) for re-education. By the end of January 1969, over 130,000 young Yunnan intellectuals had gone. In addition, large batches young intelligentsia from Beijing and other places arrived in Yunnan to do physical labour. There were altogether 330,600 by the time this was finished completely in 1980. These campaigns sealed the end of the Red Guard factional conflict and its related military divisions.

The most memorable of the PLA-commanded re-education through labour projects was the mass movement to reclaim land, by landfill and pumping, from Dian Lake. Starting on January first 1970, it involved over ten thousand people carrying earth from the Western Hills. Three kilometres by 21 metres of land and thousands of new rice paddies were created. However, in the long term most land was flooded again and became useless.

As a postscript to PLA influence on the factional conflict, Tan Furen was assassinated in December 1970. Mystery still surrounds the assassination because Tan’s assassin was also killed probably to hide his identity. However, the majority opinion is that a protégé of the Kunming Military Region’s Fourteenth Corps assassinated Tan, because of his

466 Ibid. p. 369.
467 昆明市地方志编辑委员会(第八分册)1999，昆明市志，人民出版社，北京。
connection to Lin Biao, and not because of the factional conflict. It is still possible that Tan was assassinated for personal reasons related to the history of factional conflict, because at that time people hated each other so much.

Tan Furen was sent to shore up the position of Lin Biao, but stirred up friction with attempts to build his own local power. After arriving in Yunnan, Tan lost no time creating or expanding cracks in relations among local cadres to form a coalition around himself. Tan’s presence intensified friction between provincial-level political organs and Revolutionary Committees at lower levels.

What effect did this have on Yunnan’s military divisions? As Solinger has noted, by 1970 two thirds of the Provincial RC positions were filled by the military, with veteran Zhou Xing becoming Chairman. In the rivalry between Zhou Xing and Chen Kang, the weaker Chen Kang sought the alliance of the outsider Tan Furen. After his departure Chen was made subordinate to Zhou. Nevertheless, with the death of his ally Tan, and the elevation of Zhou, Chen seized the opportunity of the presence of hundreds of thousands

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Zhao Darning 赵达明. Student of International Relations at the Yunnan Provincial Science and Technology Institute. Previously a non-aligned High School Red Guard 66-70. Interviewed 30/4/00.

Luo Deyang 罗德扬. Lecturer in Mechanics, Kunming Engineering University. Interviewed November 11, 1999.


of radical sent-down youth in continuing efforts to form alliances for himself, and so military divisions continued, albeit not now connected to Red Guard factional conflict. However, that history is beyond the scope of this Thesis.

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Conclusion

Despite the “limitations” of much of the primary source material, the argument that the Kunming Military were divided and that the Military division exacerbated the Red Guard factional conflict, is obviously true. Whitson’s model of Field Army loyalty systems does not sufficiently explain events in Kunming though. The Second Field Army in Yunnan was clearly too divided to have a monolithic effect on politics there. Crozier and Downs argue that bureaucratic conflict does not operate in a vacuum but is intertwined with the formal structure of each bureaucracy. When there is an effective structure, group conflict will be mediated by that structure.475

However, during a period of change, such as the Cultural Revolution, channels of authority and communication are broken up. Some individuals gain new initiative. New personal inter-dependencies appear or old ones are revived. Therefore, during the Cultural Revolution, personal ties to local officials tended to supplant loyalty to old superiors and large national (Field Army) loyalty systems. This loosening of the structure made it essential to rely on people whom one had known and trusted in the past, hence the renewal of the old Zhulibudui rivalry between the Southward Cadre Corps and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Corps.476

In addition, as mentioned earlier, Lucian Pye observed the extreme dependence of ordinary Chinese upon higher political authorities.477 In Yunnan, this resulted in the usual vast network of connections or guanxi associated with each of the Second Field Army

divisions. Furthermore, the tendency of local elites to try to increase their power when there is disunity at the national level, or when their patrons have lost power at the centre, served also to exacerbate local military divisions.

The consequences of military divisions include the blurring of lines of authority and the uncertainty among civilians about who has military and political power (especially who has links to the Centre). In a kind of vicious cycle, these consequences in turn can become yet another factor in facilitating military divisions.

One of Mao's more famous maxims was that "power came from the barrel of a gun". Revolution was regarded as essentially military in nature. So perhaps it was inevitable that the Cultural Revolution also came, in the end, to be dominated by the role of the military, rather than the roles of either the students or the workers.

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478 Private relationships such as classmates, colleagues and family were also an important factor in forming these networks, and ultimately in choosing which faction to belong to. Zhao Daming, Student of International Relations at the Yunnan Provincial Science and Technology Institute. Previously a non-aligned High School Red Guard 66-70. Interviewed 30/4/00.
Conclusion

In Chapter One I gave a narrative outline of Kunming during the Cultural Revolution. In Chapters Two to Four, I analysed various aspects of the Cultural Revolution. Chapter Two argued that class background, combined with the comparative educational status of educational institutions in Kunming, significantly affected the composition of the two major Red Guard factions.

In Chapter Three, it was argued that faction conflict in the factories and other Danwei of the Kunming area, was the outcome of inequalities resulting from the existence of the Party political networks in each Danwei. A sense of belonging or not belonging to these political networks divided workers into the factions around which conflict revolved.

Chapter Four argued that an important factor in the Kunming faction conflict was the involvement of the Army, and its internal divisions, in the fighting. These divisions were of two inter-related types. Firstly, there were divisions within the main forces or Zhulibudui and secondly, divisions between the main and local force or Difangbudui.

What was the scale of the Cultural Revolution in Kunming? The two districts of Kunming City had about 500,000 people (compared to three and a half million now), with 800,000 living in several immediately surrounding semi-rural districts. As mentioned in Chapter Four, Mao had said to Tan Furen, that 80,000 people had died in Yunnan’s Cultural Revolution by June third, 1968. Due to the relative sparseness of Yunnan’s rural population, it would be fair to guess that about 50,000 of these dead were

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480 Luo Deyang 罗德扬. Lecturer in Mechanics, Kunming Engineering University. Interviewed November 11, 1999.
481 Yang Bangshun 杨邦顺. Retired Professor of English, Yunnan University. Interviewed October 1999.
in Kunming. So, taking the more conservative figure for “inner” Kunming, roughly one in ten people died. Maybe another two in ten were injured in some way. It was mentioned in Chapter One that over 61,000 people had been “maimed” province-wide by 1970.\(^{482}\) I think it is fair to say that, almost a third of the people in Kunming could have been directly affected by the violence, by the end of the Cultural Revolution period in 1976.

Jonathan Unger noted that the desperate need to win a decisive victory, resulted from an assumption that losing out in a struggle during the Cultural Revolution was likely to lead to severe persecution and even death. Participants once entangled in factional conflict were fearful of the penalties that be would imposed if they ended up on the losing side. This would explain the spiralling violence that emerged.\(^{483}\) Liu Guokai, a participant in the factional conflict himself, had this to say,

> Retaliation is a natural impulse. In a normal society, common sense and law restrain such an impulse. In the absence of rule by law, at a time when common sense is replaced by emotion, retaliatory impulses become hatred and result in catastrophe. That was exactly what happened in China.\(^{484}\)

As Walder has noted, the Cultural Revolution is now commonly understood not as a pursuit of abstract ideals, but for what it turned out to be. It turned out to be an “unprecedented wave of virtual gang warfare and mindless violence followed by a wave

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\(^{482}\) 盛德仁《编辑》，1996，《当代云南大事纪要》，当代中国出版社・云南。


of state-instigated persecution and torture”. What does this study contribute to our understanding of the factional violence of the Cultural Revolution? If we look at Beller and Belloni’s three types of faction, we can say that the two major Kunming factions best fitted Beller and Belloni’s third type of faction. The Kunming factions were institutionalised and organised with membership basically open, and with high group cognitive awareness. The factions established and maintained horizontal linkages, but were also characterised by hierarchy. Unlike Beller and Belloni’s two other faction types, they were neither unstructured, informal groups whose membership had low levels of cognition of common interests, or personal client groups, whose organisation was based entirely on vertical links between leaders and followers, and whose existence did not at all outlive the political life of its leader.

Despite all this structure and organisation, Kunming’s factions did eventually descend into Walder’s “mindless violence and gang warfare”. In terms of definitions or types of factions, the “uncivilised” nature of the factional conflict would have had more to do with the Party’s depreciative definition of factionalism or paixing (派性), that it contrasted with Party spirit or dangxing (党性). This is not to disregard, of course, my earlier arguments about class and political networks. Nevertheless, in the tradition of Leninist

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thinking, the Party considered that factions engaged in conspiratorial activities that threatened the unity and discipline of the larger group.487

I feel that I have dealt with the problem of labelling factions “rebel” and “conservative”. However, one can still say, as Liu Guokai noted, that both factions were “rebels”, because, first they both rebelled against the provincial power holders, and secondly they each rebelled against each other. Both factions were also “conservative” in the sense that each safeguarded their own interests and each declared themselves to be protecting Mao. The real difference between the two Kunming factions was that the interests of the “conservative” Artillery usually coincided with those of the prevailing social order, while the interests of the “rebel” 23rd August were generally opposed to the prevailing social order.488 The fact that Provincial Committee Secretary and former Governor, Zhou Xing sided with the “rebel” 23rd August faction, I think can be seen as an opportunistic way for Zhou to have protected himself from attack. The same can be said for all high cadres that sided with “rebel” groups.

The main interpretations tested in this Thesis were those of Chan, Rosen and Unger, Walder, Whitson, and Crozier and Downs. Chan, Rosen and Unger, as well as Liu Guokai, and Hong Yung Lee, all fall into Perry and Li Xun’s first “camp” of socio-economic explanations. These explanations say that socio-economic groups, especially class background, but also age and skill level, inclined different groups of students and workers to enlist in different rival organisations. These explanations along with educational issues and personal relationships did relate quite well to Kunming.

Walder and Hong Yung Lee again, belong to Perry's second "camp", emphasising the role of Party political networks in mobilising workers along competing lines of patronage and allegiance. However, it seems to me that this approach is remarkably similar to the first approach, in the sense that Party patronage and allegiance would have been associated with the "good" class. Those alienated from the Party political networks, would nearly always have been those of "bad" class background. The Party was initially created as an instrument for realising ideological goals. However, as indeed Hong Yung Lee points out, the Party developed organisational interests different from those goals, and especially from the goal of equality. Eventually the party became in itself a source of new social stratification.\textsuperscript{489} At the outset, people with "higher political qualifications" (party members and activists) quite naturally banded together, and conservative organisations were formed that way. They were paid higher wages. They enjoyed many privileges in their everyday lives. They were out to defend the existing social order primarily because of vested interests. They counter-attacked the students who attacked the establishment.\textsuperscript{490} Whether, one sees this in terms of the class approach or in terms of the political networks approach, it does not change what actually happened.

The interpretations used in Chapter Three, were those specifically related to the role of the Military in the Cultural Revolution. Whitson's model of Field Army loyalty was appropriate for Kunming, only until the coming of the Cultural Revolution. Officers of Second Field Army had dominated the political life of Yunnan, but their influence was

\begin{footnotesize}


\end{footnotesize}
severely cut back by the Cultural Revolution upheavals. Also, Whitson’s model does not contradict the previous approaches, concerned as it is with the internal politics of an element of the “better” classes.

Crozier and Downs however, offer a more complex and more accurate model. They say that during a period of change, such as the Cultural Revolution, channels of authority and communication are broken up. Some individuals gain new initiative and new personal inter-dependencies appear or old ones are revived. Therefore, during the Cultural Revolution, personal ties to local officials tended to supplant loyalty to old superiors and large national (Field Army) loyalty systems. How does this relate to Perry’s third “camp” of psycho-cultural explanations, that highlight the extreme dependence of ordinary Chinese on higher political authorities, producing periodic outbursts of disorder? It is, I think, much the same idea. Crozier and Downs simply say that the higher political authorities can easily change and that for some, the dependency can become more compelling, in times like the Cultural Revolution. However, like Perry and Li Xun themselves, Crozier and Downs are also saying that there was room for initiative, rather than dependence. Uncertainties over proper targets of “struggle” permitted those outside or on the edges of Walder’s party networks to seize the initiative in a manner unthinkable in the short history of the People’s Republic. In terms of the socio-economic classes of Chan, Rosen and Unger, one can say that, many of “bad” class background were empowered as never before.

Kunming had witnessed more disorder than many cities. The Provincial Revolutionary Committee and new Provincial Party Committee were set up late (Yunnan was the twenty-fifth province to do so). The Centre nevertheless, was able to achieve its objectives quickly once its relatively permissive posture was dropped, with the Cleansing of the Class Ranks and other campaigns. Provincial strife then, was a function of central tolerance.

As a final word, I feel that perhaps the best explanation of the elite political situation in Beijing that made violent local factionalism possible is the following assertion of Walder’s. He identifies the single most important tenet of Maoism as being that hidden traitors and enemies within Chinese intellectual circles and within the party, right up to its highest reaches, conspire to overthrow Communist Political Power and restore capitalism. This tenet, borrowed from Stalinist political culture, does not however, deal with such personal issues as Mao’s desire to regain “face”, after losing the nation’s top office to Liu Shaoqi in the early 1960’s.

However, there is still much to learn about the Cultural Revolution, and it will require a greater time for reflection. The Chinese Government still has not come to a fulsome admission of the complexities of this embarrassing national disaster. From my own experience, ordinary Chinese people, constrained in part by official explanations, still often feel uncomfortable when confronted with foreigners who have some knowledge of the contradictions and complexities of the Cultural Revolution era.


APPENDIX A

CULTURAL REVOLUTION ORGANISATIONS IN YUNNAN

The two main factions.

An early attempt at factional unity on September tenth 1966, known as the Kunming Red Guard Headquarters, quickly failed. A few days later, most of the students at Yunnan University agreed to the founding of the Mao Zedong Thought Artillery Regiment or "Artillery". Six days later, most of the students at the Kunming Engineering Institute agreed to the founding of the Jingan Mountain 23rd August Fighting Regiment or "23rd of August". After these two major Red Guard organisations were founded, many other Red Guard groups made contact with both the two major organisations, and a pattern of affiliations gradually started to form.

The 23rd August, Artillery and over one hundred other "Rebel Organisations" reunited again into the Great Alliance Headquarters of Kunming Proletarian Revolutionaries (Great Alliance), on January the second 1967. However, the Great Alliance quickly proved to be an ineffective coalition.

On the January twenty second 1967, sixty two "Battle Organisations", mainly consisting of "The Southward Rebelling Faction" and "The Artillery Group of Maoism" of Yunnan University, separated themselves from the Great Alliance, and setup another organisation called "The Great United Liaison Station of New Yunnan Proletarian Revolutionary Rebelling Factions" or "The Liaison Station of New Yunnan Revolutionary Rebel Great Alliance", known as New Yunnan or Revolutionary Union (革命联合). From then on, two opponent factional coalitions formed in Kunming. One was the Great Alliance which consisted primarily of the 23rd August, and the other was New Yunnan which consisted primarily of the Artillery.
On March the thirtieth 1967, under strong pressure from Beijing, there was another failed attempt at unification, when *Great Alliance* and *New Yunnan*, formed the Kunming Proletarian Revolutionary Alliance Service Station (服务站).

**Organisations which became subordinate to either of the two main groupings.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Great Alliance (23rd August)</th>
<th>New Yunnan (Artillery)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carrying Revolution through to the end Brigade</td>
<td>Aid Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January Revolution Rebel Headquarters</td>
<td>East Wind Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jinggan Mountain Brigade</td>
<td>Teacher’s Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East is Red Brigade</td>
<td>Western Yunnan Onward Marching Special Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 30 Brigade</td>
<td>Red Electricity Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 17 Brigade</td>
<td>Kunming Medical College Mao Zedong Thought “3rd July” Artillery Regiment, 68 Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Powerful Brigade</td>
<td>December 5 Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 16 Brigade</td>
<td>Burning Fire Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunming Light Industry Brigade</td>
<td>February 24 Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Headquarters</td>
<td>Yenan Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Seeing the God of Plague” Battle Corps</td>
<td>Municipal Militia Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 8 Brigade</td>
<td>Glaring Fire Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January Revolution Headquarters</td>
<td>Southern Rebel Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 29 Brigade</td>
<td>Yunnan University Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 11 Brigade</td>
<td>Communist Manifesto Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Construction Company”</td>
<td>The Yunnan Middle and Upper Cadre Liaison Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunming Area Revolutionary Teachers and Students</td>
<td>Oppose till the end (waivered)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invincible Brigade of Mao Zedong Thought</td>
<td>Attack and rebel Struggle Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Headquarters</td>
<td>Smash the trap Struggle Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 4 Brigade</td>
<td>Yunnan Heavy Gun Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 May Battle Groups</td>
<td>Red Union Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 8 Brigade</td>
<td>278 Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 26 Brigade</td>
<td>Red Flag Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 3 Brigade</td>
<td>August 10 Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 6 Brigade</td>
<td>May 1 Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Workers Revolutionary Brigade</td>
<td>United Command of 7321 Factory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pudian Village East is Red Brigade</td>
<td>Peasant Revolutionary Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Western Yunnan Onward Marching Special Division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Apparently non-aligned organisations.**

General Headquarters for the Great Alliance of Revolutionary Rebels in the Organisations under the Yunnan Provincial CCP Committee.

The Headquarters of Revolutionary Rebels serving in all Provincial-level organisations.

Yunnan Provincial CCP Cttee Office Proletarian Revolutionaries’ Joint Headquarters.

Yunnan Proviincial Civil Affairs Department Revolutionary Rebel Joint Headquarters.

**Organisations of unclear affiliation.**

20th September Brigade

Yunnan 27th September Brigade

Red 27th September Brigade

Red Flag Faction

New East River Brigade
APPENDIX B

MAIN FIGURES OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN KUNMING

Alphabetical Order

An Pingsheng 按平生

Party First Secretary February 77 - July 85. First Political Commissar Kunming Military Region February 77 - February 79. First Secretary Provincial CCP Committee and Chairman Provincial Revolutionary Committee February 77 - February 79 Chairman Provincial People’s Congress December 79 - ? and January 80 - April 83. (JPRS 71389 30/6/78. Translations on People’s Republic of China. No 438 Kunming Radio 31/5/78)

Chen Kang 陈抗


Chen Sixin 陈司信

Deputy to Artillery leader Fang Xiangdong. (Pan Danke interview)

Deng Xishu 邓习书

Revolution Register of Heroes, Yunnan 23rd of August “Defend the Great Wall”, Kunming, Yunnan.)

Ding Rongchang 丁荣昌

Deputy Commander of the Yunnan Military Region. Forced the title of “Counter-revolutionary” on the 23 August. (Ibid)

Fang Xiangdong 方向东

By the mid-1970’s he was head of the Provincial Post Office. He was almost the number one leader of Artillery. Originally he was a physics undergraduate of Yunnan University. At one stage he was a Standing Member of the Revolutionary Committee, and at one point the only Artillery member on the Revolutionary Committee. He spent a long time in jail. (Zhu Xiaoyang interview)

Huang Zhaoqi 黄兆琪

Well-known 23rd August leader. Was an undergraduate at the Engineering Institute and a young teacher. Got a Standing position on the Revolutionary Committee. He was jailed for fifteen years in Guizhou, after the Cleansing of the Class Ranks campaign. (Zhu Xiaoyang and Pan Danke interviews).

Li Chengfang 李成芳

A Commander of the 37th Division, 14th Corps PLA, sympathetic to 23 August. A Second Field Army Veteran who was made Commander of the 14th Corps in 1956, but was demoted by the centre, after he was thought to have meddled to much in the factional conflict. (Whitson, W.W. with Huang, C., 1973, The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71, Praeger Publishers, Washington.)
Li Congzhu 李丛主

Director of the Red Guards outside the Yunnan Daily offices on 14/9/67. (Ibid)

Li Rong 李荣

Switched from 23rd August to Artillery for the promise of a house and a large sum of money, at the Pineapple Village Battle in 1967. (Ibid)

Li Xifu 黎锡福

Commander of the Yunnan Military Region 1965 – 1973. (Union Research Service No. 1829)

Lin Liang 林亮

On the Provincial Committee 1967. Later Party Secretary of the Yunnan University. Sided with Artillery. (项兆斌，王先金，合编，1968，云南文化大革命英雄谱，云南八，二三《保卫长城》，昆明，云南。Xiang Zhaobin, Wang Xianjin and He Bian, 1968, Yunnan Cultural Revolution Register of Heroes, Yunnan 23rd of August “Defend the Great Wall”, Kunming, Yunnan.)

Liu Minghui 刘明汇


Liu Xiangdong 刘向东

Responsible comrade of the Postbox 200 factory. A lawyer. Member of the Standing Committee of 23rd August. The main responsible person of Postbox 300’s 17th January Brigade. “Sacrificed” on the August second 1967. (项兆斌，王先金，合编，1968，云南文化大革命英雄谱，云南八，二三《保卫长城》，昆明，云南。Xiang Zhaobin, Wang Xianjin and He Bian, 1968, Yunnan Cultural Revolution Register of Heroes, Yunnan 23rd of August “Defend the Great Wall”, Kunming, Yunnan.)
Lu Ruilin 鲁瑞林

A vice-chairman of the Revolutionary Committee. In 1954 was Commander of the PLA Southwest Public Security Forces. 1957 was Vice-commander Kunming Military Region. In February 1968 he gave a speech at the Kunming Rally for the Revolutionary Great Alliance formation. A member of the ninth Congress of the CCP Central Committee. (Bartke, Wolfgang., 1990, *Biographical Dictionary and Analysis of China’s Party Leadership 1922-88*, K.G. Saur, Munich.)

Pan Mingsheng 潘明生


Sun Yuting 孙余庭

Part of the Yan Hongyan “gang”. A secretary of the Provincial Committee in 1965/66. (Ibid)

Tan Furen * 田任

Native of Guangdong, who was Deputy Political Commissar of the 44th Army in Lin Biao’s 4th Field Army. From 1952-1965 he served as Deputy Political Commissar and then Political Commissar of Guangxi Military District, and on the Political Department of Wuhan Military Region. In 1965 he transferred to Beijing as Chief Judge of the Supreme Military Court and a member of the Trial Committee under the Supreme People’s Court. In December 1965, he was Political Commissar of the PLA Engineering Corp. Tan appeared in six out of eight of Mao’s receptions for Yunnan Red Guards in Beijing from August - November 1966. On June third, 1968 he was the responsible person of both Preparatory Groups of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee and the Kunming Military Region. Named Chairman of the Yunnan Revolutionary Committee on August 13th, 1968. Was First Political Commissar of the Kunming Military Region ? – December

Wang Bicheng 王必成


Wang Li 王里

Sent as a peace emissary from Beijing to Kunming with Xie Fuzhi (and later to Wuhan). (项兆斌 • 王先金 • 合编 • 1968 • 云南文化大革命英雄谱 • 云南八、二三《 保卫长城》 • 昆明 • 云南。 Xiang Zhaobin, Wang Xianjin and He Bian, 1968, Yunnan Cultural Revolution Register of Heroes, Yunnan 23rd of August “Defend the Great Wall”, Kunming, Yunnan.)

Wu Zuomin * * 民

Vice-Governor of Yunnan in July 1966, who issued a joint statement with senior army officers regarding military divisions and army morale. (Ibid)

Xie Fuzhi 谢复 *

Got his original experience with security in Yunnan before going to the Beijing level. Served as Yunnan First Party Secretary for six years in the 1950's and as commander of the Kunming Military Region for two years. Central Minister of Security. Sent as an emissary from Beijing to Kunming. Was a Second Field Army veteran. (JPRS 54557 24/11/71 Translations on People's Republic of China. No 166. Der Speigel 1/11/71.)

Yan Hongyan 阎红彦

Second Field Army veteran. Provincial Committee First Secretary from September 1959 – January 1967. Suffered severe Red Guard harrassment and humiliation in early January 1967. Suicided on 8/1/67, aged 57. (项兆斌 • 王先金 • 合编 • 1968 • 云南文化大革命英雄谱 • 云南八、二三《 保卫长城》 • 昆明 • 云南。 Xiang Zhaobin,
Wang Xianjin and He Bian, 1968, *Yunnan Cultural Revolution Register of Heroes, Yunnan 23rd of August “Defend the Great Wall”, Kunming, Yunnan.*

Yang Kai 杨凯
A senior PLA officer who fought with *Artillery*, and was described as *Artillery’s “War Minister”*. (Ibid)

Zhang Jiaju 张家驹
A responsible person of the 23rd August Revolutionary Combined Headquarters. A member of the leading group of the Provincial Transport Company, and the Provincial Commercial System. He was arrested, taken to Wuhua Hill and beaten to death in late 1967. He established a Workers’ Fighting Brigade. (Ibid)

Zhang Lixiong 张力雄
Political commissar of the Kunming Military Region, allied with Zhao Jianmin and *Artillery*, and recalled to Beijing with Qin Qiwei for indoctrination. (Ibid)

Zhang Ziming 张子明
Deputy commander of the Kunming Military Region. Led the siege of the “Artillery Battallion” at the Kunming Military Medical College, May 28th, 1967. (Ibid)

Zhao Jiading 赵家丁
A leader of *Artillery* at the Provincial Museum battle on 1/9/67, and the East Wind Department Store battle on 20/12/67. Searched for and killed 23rd August warriors after the slaughter at Postboxes 300 and 200 factories in August 1967. (Ibid)

Zhao Jianmin 赵建民
Deputy First Secretary of the Provincial Committee under Yan Hongyan January 1963 – March 1967. Sided very strongly with *Artillery*. A Second Field Army veteran. (Ibid)
Zhou Hong 周鸿

The student Red Guard who received the letter from Qinghua University in September 1966. He was very briefly the first leader of 23rd August. (Ibid)

Zhou Xing 周行


Zhu Kejia 主可家

A seventeen year old educated youth from Shanghai, sent down to Mengcang commune near the border with Laos. Became Secretary of the Communist Youth League in Yunnan, then vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee, and possibly head of Yunnan Public Security Bureau. (FBIS, 4May76, p.12) Elected an alternate member of Tenth CCP Central Committee and a member of Standing Ctte of the Fifth National People’s Congress in August 1973.(URS - Biographical service – No. 1919, May 7, 74. Berstein, Thomas, P., Up to the Mountains and down to the villages: The Transfer of Youth from Urban to Rural China, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977. p. 176.) Rumours in Shanghai said his spectacular rise was due to his being a nephew of one of the “Gang of Four”. (Solinger, Dorothy J., 1982, Politics in Yunnan Province in the Decade of Disorder: Elite Fractional Strategies and Central-local Relations, 1967-1980, China Quarterly, No. 92, December 1982, pp. 628-662)
23rd August Fighters in the Battle of the Provincial Museum

Provincial Red Gun Production and Supply Department member:

Wan Tianze  
Leng Rizhu  
Yang Shuhui  
Cai Yonghen  
Li Ruhen  
Chu Zhenxing  
Li Zhaoling  
Chen Xianju  
Li Dongcheng  
Yan Mowing

Also:

Cai Chongwang – Red Army University  
Wang Fuyi – Technology Institute

The Provincial Revolutionary Committee

Chairmen of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee  

Vice-Chairmen of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee  
Zhou Xing: August 1968 - June 1971  
Lu Rulin: August 1968 - April 1973  
Xu Xuehui: August 1968 - October 1973  
Li Yi: August 1968 - October 1973  
Huang Zhaoqi: August 1968 - June 1974  
Duan Baozhen: August 1968 - July 1978  
Liu Minghui: August 1968 – March 1979  

Delegates sent to Beijing in December 1967 and January/February 1968

23rd August Faction

Huang Zhaoqi  
Jin Yidan  
Zhang Yanping  
Wang Xibian  

20th September Delegates

Zhou Shuxiang  

81 Faction Delegates

Ruan Jinxiang
Yunnan 27th September Delegates
Yang Zhiming, Zhou Shi

Artillery Faction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Li</th>
<th>Shen Canxiong</th>
<th>Fang Xiangdong</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yang*</td>
<td>Ding Dayong</td>
<td>Li Fanglin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Jiming</td>
<td>Li Yuanshou</td>
<td>Jia Wang*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Teacher's Artillery Delegates

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Artillery Regiment Delegates

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Red Flag Faction Delegates

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Red 27th September Delegates

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New East River Delegates

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Military Delegates

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<td>Cheng Zemin</td>
<td>Li Xifu</td>
<td>Li Ming</td>
<td>Wang Yinshan</td>
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The New CCP Provincial Committee

Nucleus Leading Body: PLA-3 Rev Cadres-1
Standing Committee-18
Committee Member-89
Committee Alternate member-15
Office: First Secretary-1 Second Secretary-1 Secretary-2
Members of the previous Provincial Committee-2
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