Identity Diplomacy:
A Study in Diplomatic Representation and the Ordering of International Society.

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I declare that this thesis is the result of my original work and all sources have been acknowledged.

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This dissertation focuses on a protracted exchange of insults that occurred between Russian and Baltic diplomats in the early to mid-1990s, revolving around the issue of which of these nations had the right to call themselves “European.” It argues that scholars interested in diplomacy and in concepts of international society can find much of interest in this seemingly marginal diplomatic spat, which, due to historical circumstance, throws into stark relief three features of international politics that often have been underplayed in the bulk of the International Relations literature. First, diplomatic exchanges are permeated with debates on the nature or fundamental qualities—one might say the identities—of nations, governments, and other pertinent actors in the global social arena. Second, they are also permeated with debates over the existence and membership of collectivities of actors—regions, for instance, or ‘clubs’ of states. Third, emerging from and feeding into these debates run further debates over the relative social position, or status, of these collectivities as well as of individual actors. The international ‘order’ being negotiated through diplomatic exchanges is thus as much a social order as it is the presence of rules or the absence of war. Furthermore, the struggles within these exchanges—over self-representation, inclusion and exclusion, and the establishment and maintenance of social hierarchies—are all ones that have the potential to carry powerful emotional charges. By putting these three sources of emotional involvement together, we can begin to understand how Russian and Baltic diplomats could be so engaged and frustrated by the task of creating knowledge about the nature, not only of their own nations, but of their neighbors and antagonists.
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Elle est à toi, cette chanson,
Toi, l'Auvergnat, qui, sans façon,
M'a donné quatre bouts de bois
Quand dans ma vie il faisait froid...
Ce n'était rien qu'un feu de bois,
Mais il m'avait chauffé le corps,
Et dans mon âme il brûle encore
A la manière d'un feu de joie...
- Georges Brassens

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Toi, l’Auvergnat, quand tu mouras,
Quand le croc-mort t’emportera,
Qu’il te conduise, à travers ciel,
Au Père éternel.
Introduction

"Diplomacy is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states..." Sir Ernest Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*.

"You don't frighten us, English pig-dogs! I fart in your general direction! Your mother was a hamster and your father smelled of elderberries!" *Monty Python and the Holy Grail*.

Diplomatic exchanges between post-Soviet Russia and the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have often been, to say the least, undiplomatic.

"Imperialists!"1
"Apartheid-mongers!"2
"Soviet holdovers!"3
"Ethnic cleansers!"4
"Fascists!"5
"Nazi sympathizers!"6
"Revanchists!"7
"Ingrates!"8
"Historical revisionists!"9
"Hysterical screamers!"10
"Cannibals!"11

No one actually said "I blow my nose at you," but then, who needed to? The Lithuanians, with the heroic exception of President Vytautas Landsbergis, bowed out of some of the harshest language fairly early on, satisfied that their generous citizenship policies had earned them enough Russian goodwill to ensure a relatively speedy withdrawal of former Soviet troops from their territory. But Latvian representatives continued to weigh in until the last troops had left Baltic soil; and well after that watershed, the Russian-Estonian exchange continued, now sotto voce, now at full volume, like mutterings and imprecations between a mastiff and a fox terrier stuck on adjacent podiums at a dog show.

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5 Estonian delegation to the CSCE, May 1992.
I loved it. Trudging dutifully through the research for one worthy dissertation topic after another, I looked forward to each next Baltic or Russian sally with the furtive pleasure of a librarian sneaking off on her tea break to watch "South Park." The blatant exaggeration, the shameless manipulation of historical and contemporary analogies, the pious self-justifications all made for high drama in the otherwise rhetorically restrained world of Russian relations with the former republics of the Soviet Union.12 Fateful issues were being hashed out between the Russian Federation and its other former Union-mates: the destiny of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, the division of the Black Sea Fleet and other Soviet military and financial assets, refugee flows, energy supplies. But Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev had emphasized in 1992 that former fellow-republics of the USSR needed even more careful public handling than traditional partners, lest "our neighbors...believe that we do not treat them as they deserve;" and for the most part, Russian diplomats and officials hewed to this punctilious line, and were addressed with similar restraint by their counterparts in the "near abroad."13 In this tense but drab environment, Russian–Baltic scenery-chewing came as welcome comic relief, particularly since the facts seemed to stand in such sharp opposition to the rhetoric. Certainly, the issues looming behind the epithets were crucial ones. The three Baltic states demanded the speedy and orderly withdrawal of former Soviet military forces, over which the Russian government assumed command in January 1992, from Baltic soil; the Estonian and Latvian governments had also raised questions about the validity of their post-World War II borders with Russia. Meanwhile, the Russian government was sharply critical of Estonian and Latvian disenfranchisement of residents (mostly post-World War II immigrant ethnic Russians or Russian-speakers and their descendents) who lacked direct connection to the pre-World War II Estonian or Latvian states. But Russian-speakers were not fleeing the Baltic region in fear for their lives, as their fellows were from parts of Central Asia and the Caucasus; troops were exiting in a steady trickle from all three Baltic states, unlike those in Moldova or Georgia, where the Russian government paid not even lip service to the notion of a withdrawal.14 It all seemed a bit over-wrought.

The more Baltic–Russian invective drifted under my nose, the more intriguing the story appeared. First, these insults, while they sometimes figured in direct Russian–Baltic communication, clearly were not intended exclusively for each other’s ears. Nor, if the environments and publications in which they emerged were any indication, were they primarily aimed at domestic audiences, as some observers opined.15 Rather, they appeared to be directed toward other governments, both directly and through the medium of international and intergovernmental organizations. Primary among these organizations were the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, which became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in

12 Many Baltic representatives take sharp objection to references to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as Soviet "republics," arguing that the three interwar states never relinquished their independence—a position supported by Western non-recognition policies during the Soviet period. This thesis uses the term "republic" exclusively as a matter of convenience to help distinguish between events taking place during the period of Soviet control over the Baltic states and those taking place after the restoration of Baltic independence in August 1991.

13 Moscow Television, 3 August 1992 (FBIS SOV-149, 3 August 1992: 13); for further discussion, see Russell 1995b, Kreickemeyer 1995: 98. The term "near abroad" is used here to refer to the non-Baltic former republics.

14 For example, a poll conducted by the Moscow-based Russian Minorities Research Centre found that by early 1995, 93% of ethnic Russians living in Estonia intended to stay on, although approximately one-half had not applied for Estonian citizenship (The Baltic Independent, 5-11 May 1995: 2).

15 See, for example, Foye 1992: 30 or Hurlburt 1995: 14.
December 1994); the Council of Europe; and the consultative arm of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC, which became the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in July 1997). It was in the arena of meetings—not only those open to the public but also those (as I was to discover later) taking place in camera—of these organizations that Russian and Baltic representatives conducted some of their most persistent mutual denunciations.

Second, this exchange of insults appeared to have a life of its own. Initially, Baltic and Russian recriminations appeared to be part of efforts to drum up international (particularly Western) support for their positions on issues of bilateral or multilateral concern—troop withdrawals, citizenship, and the like. Amidst broader efforts to “internationalise” these issues, the vituperations of Russian and Baltic representatives added rhetorical fire to claims that one or the other side was acting in a way that threatened the interests of other European states, or was failing to meet its legal obligations under the charter of one or another European organization. Yet well after institutional sway had been brought to bear on offending parties, well after the majority of member governments had come down for one or the other side, well after organizations had declared issues effectively closed, the sniping continued.

Protracted exchanges of insults seem at odds with general conceptions of “diplomacy,” and not just because of the public’s association of the profession with tact and compromise. Few who have observed diplomacy up close believe that it is a province of wise and gentle individuals tirelessly seeking international accommodation, even though diplomatic manuals from the Renaissance on have certainly held up this image as an ideal towards which diplomats should strive. Most commentators nevertheless do consider diplomacy and its rhetoric to be strategic in character, aimed at producing particular outcomes: The strategy behind the Russian–Baltic exchanges, however, was far from clear.16 As noted above, international support for particular positions had already been won or lost by mid-1993. Furthermore, it was evident that Baltic–Russian rhetoric was generating bad feeling in all four capitals.17 Analyses with titles like “Relations with Russia turn bitter” or Overcoming Unfriendly Stability opined that the rhetorical battle was increasingly counterproductive.18 Indeed, emotions were running sufficiently high to provoke both sides, in the description of the head of the Riga CSCE office, to “unnecessary and provocative acts.”19 Some European diplomats, aware of the effect that Baltic rhetoric was having on Russian moderates, were indeed advising Baltic representatives to “choose a psychologically prudent language” in their relations with Moscow.20 So what explained the bad language of the Russian–Baltic dispute? Was it simply the irrepressible effect of “historic animosities?” Or was something more interesting going on?

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16 For analyses of Russian-Baltic relations that, while often informative and insightful, do not adequately address this question, see Giriunias 1994, 1995, and 1996b, Kionka 1994, Malachov 1997, or Medvedev 1998, as well as Russell 1995a, 1995b. For a partial exception (partial because it discusses only Estonia), see Giriunias 1996a.
18 See, for example, Giriunias 1996a or Moshes 1999.
"Identity diplomacy" and its consequences

This dissertation argues that scholars interested in diplomacy and in concepts of international society can find much of interest in this seemingly marginal diplomatic spat. Due to historical circumstance, the Baltic-Russian relationship of the early 1990s throws into stark relief three interlocking features of international politics that often have been underplayed in the bulk of the International Relations (IR) literature. First, diplomatic exchanges are permeated with debates on the nature or fundamental qualities—one might say the identities—of nations, governments, non-state actors, or indeed any pertinent actor in the global social arena. Second, diplomatic exchanges are also permeated with debates over the existence and membership of collectivities of actors. The "society" of states is itself one such collectivity; so, however, are smaller groupings within it—"regions," for instance, or "clubs" of states. Third, emerging from and feeding into these diplomatic debates run further debates over the relative social position, or status, of collectivities as well as of individual actors. In this way, diplomatic exchanges are an important part of the constitution, grouping, and status of identities in the global arena. The international "order" being negotiated through diplomatic exchanges is thus as much a social order as it is the presence of rules or the absence of war.

This dissertation argues that all three of these debates are clearly visible in the Russian–Baltic acrimony of the early 1990s. It observes that Baltic and Russian representatives waged a protracted battle to gain the upper hand in international debates over the fundamental natures—the "national identities"—of the nations and governments they represented and of those of their opponents. It suggests that these debates were part of a broader effort to gain recognition of Baltic and Russian association with a valued collective entity: Europe. And it argues that Europe's value in the eyes of Russian and Baltic representatives stemmed from their conviction that Europe and its institutions represented loci not only of power, of security, and of belonging, but also of status in the interstate social order.

The Russian–Baltic exchange further provides an unusually clear view of an aspect of international social interaction that frequently is ignored in the international relations literature: its emotional charge. The emotional consequences of social interaction, including struggles over self-representation, inclusion and exclusion, and the establishment and maintenance of social hierarchies, are well-documented in the literatures of social psychology and the sociology of psychology (the former focusing on the impact of individual psychic needs on social interaction, the latter focusing on the impact of social interaction on the psychic state of the individual). With only a few exceptions, however, scholars of international relations and of diplomacy have chosen to avoid discussion of these dynamics, judging their presence difficult to

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21 Drawing on discussions in Hopf (1996: 148-153), Neumann (1997, 1999: 2-20), and Somers (1994) and on Peter Gries' discussion of the dialectics of "face nationalism" (1999), I proceed from the position that the 'national identities' being presented, like all collective identities, exist primarily in the stories told about them and the debates that surround them. The identities presented in these stories and debates can be thought of as both ascriptive ("primordial") and constructed, as well as both affective and instrumental. Furthermore, they can be thought of as evolving through a process of debate that involves input from both elite and masses within and outside of national borders and cultural polities, constituting an ever-emerging relationship between the national self and salient others as well as between present and past national selves.

22 For an excellent overview of different approaches to the sociology of emotion, see Smith-Lovin 1995.
establish and their impact difficult to quantify.\textsuperscript{23} However, it is by putting together the impact of disagreements over self-representation—in terms of normative qualities, in terms of group membership, and in terms of social position, or status—that we can begin to understand how and why Russian and Baltic diplomats could be so engaged and frustrated by the task of creating knowledge about the nature, not only of their own nations, but of their neighbors and antagonists.

This dissertation will proceed in six chapters. The first two chapters are largely historical: Chapter One sketches the history of the triangular relationship between the Baltic polities, the Soviet Union, and leading Western powers and institutions—the predecessors of the “Europe” of the 1990s—across the twentieth century, while Chapter Two goes on to outline the immediate circumstances behind the Baltic–Russian acrimony of the early 1990s. Chapters Three through Six, however, move on to discuss how each of the three debates outlined above—over identities, groupings, and social status—manifested themselves in the Russian–Baltic conflict and the implications of these vignettes for the IR literature. Chapters Three and Four expand the diplomatic studies literature’s traditional focus on diplomacy as a venue for negotiation of action, rules, and values to discuss the protracted battle that Baltic and Russian diplomats waged to gain the upper hand in international debates over the fundamental natures—the “national identities”—of the nations and governments they represented and those of their opponents. Chapter Five draws on the IR literature on region construction to move from debates over individual identities to debates over collective identities, discussing Baltic and Russian efforts to portray their nations as fundamentally European in character as well as in practice. And Chapter Six uses the international society literature as well as sociological approaches to international politics as jumping-off points from which to discuss battles for status in interstate society, with special focus on the way in which exclusion of rivals plays a role in status competitions—a theme that has been insufficiently examined in the IR literature on status.

**Interstate society and its ordering**

This dissertation adds its voice to a broad body of literature that emphasizes the societal quality of state interaction. The idea that states (or their historical predecessors) exist in a form of society is one that can be traced back in the European tradition at least as far as Jean Bodin (1530-1595).\textsuperscript{24} In this conception, the sovereign state is the constitutive community of an interstate society; its obedience to the norms of this society both reaffirms its own identity of the sovereign state and reconstitutes the structure of the society in which it operates.\textsuperscript{25} The existence of this society (as opposed to an anarchical system), in the view of its believers, can be seen in the evolution of not only rules, but also social institutions shaping interstate behaviour, permitting the application of domestic societal analogies.\textsuperscript{26} In the twentieth century Anglophone IR literature, it is writers at least loosely affiliated with what has come to be known as the “English School” who have not only posited most strongly the existence of such a society, but

\textsuperscript{23} Among the few exceptions, see Gries (1999) and to a lesser degree Ringmar (2002).
\textsuperscript{24} Knutsen 1992: 64.
\textsuperscript{25} Dunne 1995: 379. For reasons that will become evident in Chapter Six, this dissertation uses the term “interstate society” to refer to the state-dominated social grouping that many writers refer to as “international society,” although authors’ terminology will be retained in quotations.
\textsuperscript{26} Bull 1977: 13; Suganami 1989: 24-39. In this view, the expansion of these rules and institutions to govern the domestic behaviour of states—as in the case, for instance, of human rights law—simply strengthens the argument for the power as well as the existence of the interstate society.
have dedicated the most time to the examination of its social nature.\(^{27}\) Martin Wight and Hedley Bull were seminal figures in the discussion of modern interstate society’s institutions and mechanisms; Bull and Adam Watson are among the primary historians of its development. As Tony Evans and Peter Wilson have observed, some of these scholars treat an interstate society’s existence as dependent on the meanings statesmen give to their actions and the assumptions that underlie these actions; others take a more positivistic approach, discerning such a society’s existence through the existence of its institutions.\(^{28}\) But all perceive the existence of this society as playing a vital role in maintaining order in world politics.

The issue of what constitutes “order,” however, is a complex one: the term means different things to different people. For writers in the self-styled “realist” spectrum, ranging from Hans Morgenthau in the classical camp to Kenneth Waltz on the neorealist end, “order” is essentially the absence of war that results from effective accumulation and balancing of power.\(^{29}\) For rational institutionalists such as Robert Keohane, “order” is also the absence of war, but that which results from the existence of rules that permit the maximizing of preferences.\(^{30}\) In both these views, order is essentially an outcome of particular types of behavior within conditions of anarchy.

Bull, however, who devoted an entire book (arguably the most famous work of the English School) to the subject of order in world politics, attempted to move towards a broader conception of order, one that could accommodate more than outcomes. His definition of order, as “a pattern that promotes a particular result, an arrangement of social life” linked to the promotion of the elementary goals and values of the society of states, has informed most writers of the English School.\(^{31}\) This order, Bull argued, is maintained and enforced by the five main institutions of interstate society, which include two interstate mechanisms enjoying broad legitimacy among all states (international law, institutionalized diplomacy), one coercive practice (war), one pattern of modern state behaviour (the impulse towards power balancing), and one social

\(^{27}\) This is a slightly different issue than the social quality of international interaction, a topic to which scholars across a variety of approaches—constructivist, post-structuralist, historical sociological—have dedicated extensive attention. The interests of English School writers also differ in a number of important respects from those of regime theorists, despite the focus of both groups on international law. For comparisons between English School writers and regime theorists, see Evans and Wilson 1992 and Hurrell 1993; for a discussion of the relationship between constructivist approaches and the English School, see Reus-Smit 2002.


\(^{29}\) Morgenthau and Thompson 1985; Waltz 1979.

\(^{30}\) See, for example, Keohane 1989.

\(^{31}\) Bull 1977: 4. Goals that Bull considers to be “elementary” or “primary” are ones that he deems to make social life possible: they are pursued by any group that wishes to live socially, and a group that failed to pursue them “we should hardly call a society at all” (Bull 1977: 5). At the primitive or domestic social level, Bull considers these goals to be threefold: the limitation of violence, the keeping of promises, and the stabilisation of possessions through the rules of property. But although Bull discusses the ways in which states meet these goals as well (through the just war tradition, the principle of \textit{pacta sunt servanda}, and the recognition by states of each others’ sovereignty), he begins his discussion of international order by formulating three “elementary” goals specific to international society—by which he means “a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values...(who) conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions” (Bull 1977: 13). At the level of international behaviour, in Bull’s estimation, the first of these goals is the general preservation of the system and society of states itself; in other words, order becomes the means by which the society of states strives for self-reproduction. The other two goals are more specific: first, the maintenance of the independence or external sovereignty of individual states, and second, peace, in the sense of the absence of war among states as the normal condition of their relationship (Bull 1977: 4).
convention increasingly under fire, even in Bull's day: the special rights and responsibilities extended by the community of states to the Great Powers.\textsuperscript{32}

A scholar of a sociological bent might argue that an interest in Bull's last institution leads logically towards a different, still broader sense of the term "order." It is possible to conceive of the entire global social arena as "ordered" in the sense that the separate elements of the group are arranged in relationship to each other—not only grouped, but ranked. \textsuperscript{33} Of course, one of the critical ranking devices—indeed, the major fault line running through the global political arena—is the division between entities legally recognized as states and those lacking this recognition. This ordering is as evident in scholarly writing as it is in political practice. As Martin Shaw among others has noted, scholars interested in the society of states have tended to discuss this collectivity as though it is the only (rather than merely a major) social grouping or ordering mechanism in the worldwide totality of political interaction.\textsuperscript{34} Scholars such as Shaw and Yale Ferguson have taken objection, in Ferguson's words, to "a definition of 'international society' that allows for only one important polity type, the state, and only those values derived from European diplomatic culture that state polities hold in common." \textsuperscript{35} That the collectivity of states is \textit{not} seen as only a "sub-society, or perhaps sub-culture, of human society in some wider sense" is, to these writers, a devastating comment on the discursive power of the dominant practice of statehood. \textsuperscript{36}

State-centric scholars would argue in their own defense that any privileging of the society of states in their work simply mirrors global realities. As Chapter Six will discuss further, the material distinctions between entities recognized as states and those deprived this status are often very fine, and the process of inclusion and exclusion from the club is a highly politicized and contestable one. However, this division is a powerful ordering force, in the sense of establishing a social ranking between forms of political organization. The practical outcomes of this division are clearly visible in Bull's two interstate mechanisms, those of international law and institutionalized diplomacy. In the first instance, the state/non-state divide marks the line between the privileged group of entities possessing the legal power to create "order" (in Bull's sense) and other social entities in the global arena lacking this legal power. The fact that the legal power enjoyed by entities participating in diplomacy stems from these entities' relative monopoly over the instruments of violence does not obviate the fact that these entities also derive power from their reciprocally recognized status as legitimate law-making entities. In the second instance, the institution of diplomacy serves as a tangible dividing line demarcating the club of states: both in its essence, by serving as a marker of privilege, and in function, since it is through diplomatic activity that new actors are selected for statehood, which only existing states can grant. The privileged communications system that diplomacy sets up between diplomatic participants is of course a critical factor ensuring some degree of cohesion within that group, which in turn only toughens the divide between state and non-state actors.

\textsuperscript{32} Bull 1977: 195-223.
\textsuperscript{33} http://dictionary.oed.com/ (accessed 6 November 2000).
\textsuperscript{34} Shaw 1992: 427-431.
\textsuperscript{35} Shaw 1992; Ferguson 1998: 201-202. As Bull himself put it: "States are simply groupings of men, and men may be grouped in such a way that they do not form states at all. Moreover, where they are grouped into states, they are grouped in other ways also" (Bull 1977: 20).
\textsuperscript{36} Shaw 1992: 429. Different conceptions include those of Ferguson (who instead of the "interstate" and "intrastate" political arenas enshrined in the classical tradition sees a "single arena that encompasses countless individuals as well as layered, overlapping, and interacting political authorities," which he also calls "polities") and Niklas Luhmann (Ferguson 1998: 201-202; Albert 1999).
An appreciation of the ordering power of the state/non-state divide in the global social arena should not, however, deflect attention from ordering principles operating within interstate society itself. The notion that that interstate society is ordered in its own right is of course hardly novel: the political effects of discrepancies in material capabilities, particularly military capabilities or wealth, have received extensive attention in the IR literature. It is the argument of this thesis, however, that the degree to which interstate society is ordered by principles of social status as well can be observed from the amount of attention that state representatives devote to seeing their nations' inclusion in status groups, or "clubs," in interstate society.

A word on language...

As the above discussion suggests, this dissertation takes a strong interest in language, and the relationship between characterization, understanding, and action. In so doing, it incorporates elements of three major approaches to language in the literature of International Relations. One group of scholars has focused on the way in which language can be used as a tool, permitting actors more or less consciously to manipulate audiences and justify decisions through the creation of categories such as "terrorist" or "freedom fighter." Another group has focused on how language can become a trap, examining the ways in which metaphors, analogies or terminology constrain cognition and hence limit decisionmakers' ability to think creatively about problems. And a third group has focused on language as a productive force, examining the way in which language creates and naturalizes categories of being as well as documenting the relations of power inherent in and perpetuated by ostensibly value-neutral language. Elements amenable to all of these approaches can be found in the Russian-Baltic dispute—for example, the deployment of terms such as "colonizers" or "human rights abusers," the limitations put on creative solutions to border problems through the language of "sovereignty," or the very debate over "Europeanness" itself.

For the most part, this dissertation is a historically-oriented examination of rhetoric, in its classical sense as persuasive discourse. The three genres or modes of rhetoric isolated by Aristotle—epidetic or ceremonial, dedicated to praise or blame and primarily present-oriented; deliberative, moving audiences to agreement on action and primarily future-oriented; and judicial or forensic, which looks into the past to judge guilt or innocence—are richly evident in the language of Russian-Baltic relations. The association between the classical rhetorical tradition and the law is particularly appropriate to the Baltic-Russian example, where the behaviour of both sides resembled that of barristers in a courtroom, speaking not to, but about each other to an audience that would have the opportunity to vote on the persuasiveness of their arguments.

As is often the case with modern studies of rhetoric, this dissertation shows a number of similarities to many analyses of narrative or discursive practices. This dissertation shares with these analyses an interest in the politics of representation and a focus on the relational positioning in which identities are placed and by which they are distinguished from one another. With them, it takes an interest in the way in which some actors are authorized to speak or act "definitively," and how some voices are enabled and others

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37 See, for example, Chomsky and Herman 1988.
38 See, for example, Khong 1992.
39 See, for example, Doty 1993, 1996a; Fierke 1996.
40 Donahue and Prosser 1997: 147.
41 Donahue and Prosser 1997: 140.
42 Beer and Hariman 1996: 11.
are silenced or excluded by particular definitions. It is also similar to discursive practices analyses in that it examines oppositions of identities that establish a relationship of power, in the sense that one element of the opposition is privileged.43

Many analyses of discourse or narrative, through their focus on the power of linguistic structures, downplay the degree to which speakers control language. Indeed, as Neumann has observed, poststructuralist analyses of discourse or narrative, due to their wariness over the possibility of any subject being “sovereign,” tend to background issues of intentionality. 44 This dissertation, however, is as interested in the rhetorical choices made by the speakers involved in the Russian–Baltic dispute as it is in the discursive structures in which they operated. This interest is understandable when one considers that this work focuses on a period of discursive instability, when the grip of dominant representations on the imaginations of actors all over Europe was loosened following the collapse of the Soviet Union. During this period of conceptual turmoil, Russian and Baltic representatives palpably strove to achieve consensus on the validity of new as well as old metaphors, relationships, or notions of identity. In so doing, they certainly reproduced many elements of dominant discourses or narratives. However, under the pressure of new demands, Russian and Baltic diplomats also dove to salvage narratives and images that had been only shallowly submerged during the Soviet period, or dried off language that had resurfaced during the last days of the USSR. Furthermore, they recombined elements of existing discourses in new formations—visible, for example, in the argument by Russian representatives that Russia was harnessing great-power status to democratic values. In short, the Russian–Baltic dispute affords a nicely-framed view of agency meeting structure: of individuals, while operating within the constraints of discursive structures, nevertheless drawing on them creatively for particular political purposes.

Of course, Russian and Baltic diplomats were not the only agents in the theatre; in their choices of language, they were playing to European audiences. Russian and Baltic representatives chose figures of speech not only to stir European notions of material or practical interest, but also for their historical resonance or emotional impact, their power to flatter or reproach their hearers. Sensitivity to the potential responses of Western audiences influenced not only what themes Russian and Baltic representatives put in their speeches, but also what they left out. For instance, as several authors have discussed, the image of Russophone residents as a potentially disloyal “third column” permeated security discourse within all three Baltic states.45 Yet this was a theme that was almost never raised by Baltic representatives in European forums, probably because it both cast doubts on the success of Estonian and Latvian citizenship policies and raised the possibility that the three republics might, their vehement protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, become the kind of “security consumers” disdained as new members by NATO. Nor did Baltic representatives raise in European forums the kinds of racist anti-Russian language that was all too common in domestic political discourse but was certain to offend European sensibilities. 46 Institutional codes of conduct also had an impact on Russian–Baltic rhetorical styles. Familiarity with the rhetorical traditions of the Soviet-era CSCE, an institution with a tradition “of publicly

43 Milliken 1999: 228-229
45 See Jaeger 1997: 27 for a useful bibliography.
46 See, for instance, Neumann 1999: 107 for Estonian parliamentarian Tiit Made’s sweeping views on the genetic sources of inherent Russian aggressiveness. Made, incidentally, consistently showed a creative turn of phrase: in discussion of the Estonian law on aliens, he referred to Estonia as a “cultivated garden” and to the Russophone minority as “vermin ants” who should be eradicated (Kommersant-Daily, 23 June 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-120, 24 June 1993: 6)).
embarrassing members of the club into compliance with its standards,” may have encouraged Baltic and Russian confidence in the appropriateness of combative language there.\(^\text{47}\) By mid-1993, however, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe had made it quite clear that non-members in particular would do well to watch their language—a point that many Baltic and Russian representatives took to heart.\(^\text{48}\) Indeed, several Russian parliamentarians attending the Assembly publicly declared themselves appalled by the anti-Baltic tirades in the Assembly of fellow deputy Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, although they had not felt the need to respond to his views or his manner of presenting them at home.\(^\text{49}\) In short, the complex factors influencing the choice of language designed to persuade particular audiences bring actors even more sharply into focus.

Notably, the ends to which these rhetorical means were working were often ones that give concrete social meaning to the relational positioning of interest to post-structuralists. The interests at stake in these debates were not just material interests. Rather, participants were pursuing, on behalf of the states and nations they represented, a complex set of social goals: acceptance, social standing, the ability to engage in self-definition rather than be defined by others. The outcomes of these efforts were tangible manifestations of the hierarchies of power and virtue revealed in analyses of discursive practices or narratives; and the acrimony of the Russian–Baltic dispute represents the lived consequences of these hierarchies for participants in their negotiation. Rhetoric has often been denigrated as appealing to emotion over reason; but in these instances it is the structural consequences of rhetorical appeals, as well as the appeals themselves, that carry an emotional charge.

...and on feeling

The emotional dimension of international politics is one that the discipline of IR has largely ignored in recent years. It was not always thus; classical philosophers of international relations held an abiding interest in the relationship between reason and emotion in human action, underpinned by the assumption that the “passions” had an important role to play in international conflict. Thucydides, detailing the progress of the Corcyran civil war, saw revenge as more important than self-preservation; and his Athenians, explaining their expansionist ambitions to the Spartans, describe their primary motivation as fear of Persia.\(^\text{50}\) In the seventeenth century, Hobbes, Spinoza and Grotius all explained the causes of war in terms of human emotions such as greed and pride. While liberal thinkers of the eighteenth century such as Locke, Bentham, and Kant looked forward to a reason-based transnational consensus of interest, by the end of the eighteenth century both conservative (Burke) and radical (Marx and Engels) critics “took issue with the liberal axiom,” concluding that “man is passionate as well as rational.”\(^\text{51}\) Writers within the classical realist tradition of the twentieth century also do not shy away from emotion; for example, the writings of Hans Morgenthau are

\(^{47}\) Kritz 1993: 23.

\(^{48}\) Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Official Record of Debates (henceforth \textit{PACE ORD}), 13 May 1993: 1060, 1063, 1071.

\(^{49}\) \textit{PACE ORD}, 14 April 1994: 416.

\(^{50}\) 1972: 243, 80. Their second motive, ahead of profit, was concern for their state’s honor.

\(^{51}\) Knutsen 1992: 92-93, 112, 136. “History,” wrote Burke, “consists of the miseries brought upon the world by pride, ambition, avarice, revenge, lust, sedition, hypocrisy, ungoverned zeal, and all the train of disorderly appetites” (Burke 1986: 247).
sprinkled with references to trust and love, exaltation and pride, and frustration, insecurity and fear.\footnote{Morgenthau and Thompson 1985: 34-35, 119, 124-125.}

Despite this history, emotion gradually disappeared from the IR and diplomatic studies literature after the second World War. At the formal level, as Jon Mercer has argued, emotion dropped from the list of concerns of IR theory; at the informal level, as Neta Crawford has pointed out, emotion remained ubiquitous but undertheorized.\footnote{Mercer 1999; Crawford 2000: 116.} In part, this eviction of emotion coincided with and can be explained by the gradual marginalisation of diplomatic history within IR, as the discipline moved toward a search for general laws of behaviour rather than an elucidation of the behaviour of idiosyncratic players operating within specific historical and cultural contexts. As the search for monicausal explanation intensified, so the difficulties of focusing on emotion—whose relationship to cognition and action is notoriously difficult to quantify—shifted scholars away to more tractable areas. The main clusters of scholarly worldview within the discipline, while frequently treating collective bodies (whether states, organisations, or economic entities such as classes) as possessing some human attributes (motives, for instance), also showed themselves hostile to “irrational” attributes, including emotion. Realist scholars, attempting to portray the state as a unitary, rational actor, naturally shunted issues of emotion to one side. Liberal theories, seeking to replace or supplement the state as the primary unit of analysis, added on similarly dispassionate entities—international organisations, bureaucracies—without calling into question rationalist assumptions; Marxian discussions did the same with economic structures. The rise of rational choice approaches to social action further reduced interest in ‘irrational’ complexities. Even constructivist scholars, with their conscious opposition to rationalist assumptions and emphasis on social practices, through their lack of attention to theories of mind of the individual have avoided engaging with issues of emotion and its social sources or power.\footnote{Checkel 1997:489.} Even in the subset of the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) literature that deals with decision-making, affect and emotion have not received the attention they deserve (especially given the interest of the discipline in conflict and conflict resolution); the focus has been on action and cognition.\footnote{For example, affect is listed as an “additional factor” in Snyder, Bruck and Sapin’s list of components that shape a policymaker’s “definition of a situation” (1962: 66). Indeed, a look at Herrmann et al. 1997 reveals that even analyses that explicitly set themselves the goal of examining affect end up spending much more time on cognition. Most of the few FPA studies that focus explicitly on emotion and affect have used a psychoanalytic, individualistic approach; they focus on the individual in dramatic situations, such as crisis, defeat, or victory (see, for example, Hirschbein 1997). For good overviews of the FPA literature and its preoccupations, see Ripley 1993, Hudson 1995; for seminal works in the psychological approach to foreign policy decisionmaking, see De Rivera 1968 or Jervis 1976.} Finally, the diplomatic studies literature has been effectively mute on the subject, in the process stripping accounts of diplomatic interaction of much of their human quality.

This dissertation does not aspire to any causal analysis of the role of emotion in Russian–Baltic relations; it simply attempts to make respectable the proposition that we should expect diplomatic exchanges, particularly the type described in this dissertation, to generate feeling. The idea that diplomatic exchanges might be pervaded with feeling would not surprise one group of scholars, those focusing on the social sources of emotion. Sociological approaches to the study of emotion take as their point of departure the social environment surrounding the individual—interpersonal interaction,
social structures—and examine the impact of participation in a social world on the emotional life of the individual. In this view, the focus of psychoanalytic and social psychological theories of emotion on the individualized, internally generated quality of emotion is at best excessive and at worst misplaced.36 "An emotion," Robert Solomon writes, "is intrinsically tied up with our social existence and our relations with others ... [The problem] is to retain the personal and experiential ('phenomenological') grasp of emotions but place emotions in a larger social context, treating them not only as the result of but as constituted in relations with other people."57 In other words, sociologists of emotion use social independent variables to explain dependent variables at the level of the individual—such as emotional responses to various situations.58 This approach is a mirror image of that of social psychology, in which individual independent variables (psychic needs) are used to predict social dependent variables (social outcomes). The two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive. On the contrary, individual and social outcomes can be viewed as mutually constitutive, and differences in emphasis on one or the other side of the equation may be seen as reflecting different scholars' differing interests and research questions, rather than a battle to establish absolute analytic primacy. For example, a social psychological approach works well for the examination of particular types of group interactions; ethnocentrism, for instance, can be understood as a result of personal motivation of each group member to acquire and maintain positive social identity through group membership.59 A sociological approach, on the other hand, is particularly valuable for understanding the cumulative emotional properties of enduring social relationships, which are based not only on present and past interactions, but also on anticipations of future contacts.60 But on one fundamental point both approaches agree: emotions are a constant natural outcome of social interactions at every organizational level of human life, from the interpersonal to the intergroup to the international. Indeed, far from being solitary events, "a very large class of emotions result (primarily or frequently) from real, imagined, or anticipated outcomes in social relations."61 Most also agree that how events and interactions affect individuals emotionally depends on how they see themselves and others, and how they define events that occur.62

It is evident from the discussion above that any dense social interaction such as the practice of diplomacy carries the potential to trigger a wide range of feelings. It is worth noting that not all of these feelings will involve the stereotypical outburst of rage, tears of joy, or suchlike. Smith-Lovin, for instance, draws distinctions between four concepts: affect, emotion, sentiment, and mood. "Affect" is the most general term, referring to any general evaluative orientation towards an object or situation. "Emotion" is generally used to refer to a subset of affect involving a degree of physiological response. "Sentiment" refers to a more socially constructed and enduring state than emotion; it refers to enduring, latent tendencies to respond emotionally in the context of a social relationship. And "mood" is also more enduring than emotional response, but is tied more to a person across situations than to a social context or relationship.63 Diplomatic exchanges may generate any or all of these four categories of response; for the purposes of this dissertation, therefore, all four categories will be grouped together under the

57 Solomon 1997: 3.
58 Kemper 1990: 231.
60 Gordon 1990: 150
general term of “feeling.” This dissertation focuses on one category of feeling issues, those arising from practices of representation, or (somewhat differently put) from the creation of knowledge, both about the self and about others.

**Two notes on terminology**

Two notes on terminology are in order. First, this thesis focuses on statements by individuals authorized to speak and act in the name of a particular state or intergovernmental organization. This authorization frequently extends beyond those individuals traditionally known as “diplomats”—individuals accredited to another state—to include heads of state, ministers, government officials, parliamentarians, or different specialists representing their state, either abroad or at home in exchanges with foreign delegations. Robert Jackson refers to these persons—“those special people who act on the behalf of sovereign states”—as “statespeople.” However, in keeping with the focus of this dissertation, I will use the term “representatives.”

Second, no satisfactorily economical or rigorous term has evolved to denote ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers living in the Baltic republics who, due to their lack of connection (either personal or inherited) with the interwar Baltic states or to their service in the Soviet security apparatus, either believed prior to the restoration of Baltic independence that they might be disenfranchised, or who ultimately were denied automatic citizenship in the restored Baltic states. (While during the late Soviet period the ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking communities in all three Baltic republics faced these pressures, after the restoration of independence virtually all of the people in this category were residents of Estonia or Latvia, although a few Russians and Russian-speakers resident in Lithuania were denied automatic citizenship due to their connections to the Soviet security services.) For the sake of brevity, and to avoid confusion with representatives of the Russian Federation, I use the shorthand term “Russophones” to cover such people. This designation does not cover ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers who gained Baltic citizenship automatically, either through Lithuania’s generous citizenship policy or through their connection to the interwar Estonian or Latvian states, who are referred to as “ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking Baltic (or Estonian/Latvian/Lithuanian) citizens.”

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64 Indeed, in terms of understanding long-term political relationships, “sentiment” may be the most useful of the four concepts. For instance, in their discussion of the Athenian list of concerns discussed above, Chittick and Freyberg-Inan note that “the term used by the Athenians for the concept of fear, deos, indicates a lasting state of alarm as opposed to a sudden fright” (Chitick and Frebyerg-Inan 2001: 73).

65 Jackson 2000: 34.

66 See Melvin 1998: 36-39 for a discussion of the various terms used by the Russian government and the advantages and disadvantages of various English terms, as well as Simonsen 1996 for a discussion of the distinctions between russkie and rossiiane in the international as well as domestic contexts.

67 In quotes, however, I retain the terminology used by the speaker.
Chapter One: Déjà Vu All Over Again?

In early 1992, Western governments and institutions found themselves the targets of intensive appeals by the Baltic governments of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia on the one hand, and their neighbor the Russian Federation on the other. Both sides were appealing for assistance with troublesome issues—troop withdrawals, citizenship issues. But both were also appealing to be reunited with the "civilized" world—to be let in, so to speak, from the Cold War.

But to understand where these appeals came from, it is first necessary to understand the triangular and later quadrilateral relationship between the Baltic states, Western powers and institutions, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and finally the Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist Republics (RSFSR), later to become the Russian Federation, over the course of the seventy-four years between 1917 and 1991. On the Baltic side, the watchcry of "No more Yaltas!" was a distillation of nearly a century’s pain, anger, fear, frustration, and determination. Since their declarations of independence after the collapse of the tsarist Russian empire in 1917, Baltic leaderships and populations had been all too aware of the degree to which their futures hung on relations between London, Washington, or Berlin to their west and Moscow to their east. Half a century of ineffectual and inadequate concern on the part of the Western great powers for the principle of Baltic self-determination had done little to alleviate the bloody and destructive consequences of Soviet rule, established through the forcible incorporation of all three states in August 1940. The Yalta Conference of February 1945, at which US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill definitively abandoned the Baltic republics1 to Soviet General Secretary Josef Stalin and to their fate, was only the most famous example of Western unwillingness to “die for Daugavpils,” not the most decisive.2 Now Baltic leaders felt that they had to make sure that they would not be abandoned again by the West. Meanwhile, Boris Yeltsin, the President of the newly independent Russian Federation, had suffered diplomatic snubs of his own from Western leaders anxious not to do anything that might weaken the domestic position of former Soviet General Secretary (and later President) Mikhail Gorbachev, whose continued political survival Western leaders had considered to be of paramount importance. Russian as well as Baltic representatives thus found themselves in a struggle for recognition (first legal, and then symbolic) and acceptance by Western audiences.

To lay out the background to this situation, this chapter examines three periods of particular importance for Baltic-Western-Soviet-Russian engagement: 1917–1922, 1939–1945, and 1985–1991.

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1 As noted in the Introduction, this thesis uses the term “republic” as a matter of convenience to help distinguish between events taking place during the period of Soviet control over the Baltic states—which I define as starting with incorporation in August 1940 and ending with international recognition of the restoration of Baltic independence in August 1991—and those taking place prior to incorporation or after the restoration of independence. Similarly, in describing events during the Soviet period, I refer to cities and now-independent republics by their Soviet-era names (e.g. Leningrad, Belorussia, Moldavia).

2 As will be discussed later in this chapter, Anglo-American military strategy effectively doomed the Baltic republics to their eventual reoccupation by Soviet forces—a political reality, effectively complete by the time of the Yalta Conference, in the face of which a more principled political stance would have counted for little. Furthermore, Roosevelt and Churchill had already signaled that they would not make Baltic annexation a sticking point in post-war relations with the Soviet Union by the Teheran Conference of November-December 1943.
The political wishes of the populations of the Russian imperial provinces that now make up Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, or indeed of most of the subjects—Russian or non-Russian—of the Russian empire, came very low on the list of priorities of most Western governments in the years during or immediately after World War I. By the time that the tsarist Russian regime collapsed in February 1917, the imperial hold over the Baltic provinces of Estonia, Livonia, Courland, Kovno, and Vilna was already substantially weakened. In 1914, in the judgment of John Hiden and Patrick Salmon, it would have been impossible to predict whether, or at what point, Baltic nationalist demands for autonomy within the tsarist empire would be translated into a full call for independence. But German forces had occupied Lithuania and Courland by September 1915, and the German government had permitted the formation of a Lithuanian National Council. In Estonia and Livonia, nationalist groups were also seeing the chance to become masters in their own house.

The Baltic populations met the installation of the Provisional Government in Moscow with enthusiasm, confidently expecting a speedy transformation of the empire. Baltic representatives rapidly approached Allied as well as Russian officials to discuss the issue of the formation of independent Baltic states. However, the Provisional Government in Moscow was one with which the Allied governments hoped to build good relations; American leaders in particular viewed the new government as a force for beneficial change across the territory of the former empire. Allied governments were able to justify their stance by pointing out that officials of the Provisional Government had professed themselves ready to forge partnerships with non-Russian nationalist leaders. And more importantly, no Allied government was willing to take steps that might put in jeopardy the Russian military contribution to the common struggle against Germany and her allies. Russian forces were suffering badly on the Eastern Front, but at least they were keeping German forces occupied. The fall of the Provisional Government and the Bolshevik assumption of power in Moscow in November 1917 was a virtual irrelevance in the face of this military consideration. While Allied forces moved onto Russian soil—for instance, in March 1918 British forces occupied Murmansk, which had been a point of entry for British war supplies since 1914—their intervention was directed against German forces and designed to take pressure off the Western Front. In line with Lenin’s prescription to wait out the period of the greatest weakness and capitalize on any conflicts within the bourgeois world, the new Bolshevik government kept avenues of contact with the Western powers open. Even the 15 December 1917 Russian-German armistice taking Russia out of the war did not provoke

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3 What is now Estonian territory includes the former imperial province of Estonia and Estonian-speaking areas of Livonia; Latvia is made up of the remainder of Livonia and Kurland, while Lithuania incorporates most of Kovno and Vilna.
4 Hiden and Salmon 1994: 25.
5 Both the German Eastern High Command and factions in the Reichstag promoting a separate peace with Russia had encouraged the political integration of Lithuanian territory and the formation of a Lithuanian National Council. The High Command, however, expected that the Council could be pressured into severing ties with the Russian empire and seeking incorporation into Germany, while peace groups expected to join forces with the new Provisional Government in Moscow in securing self-determination for the empire’s borderlands (Page 1959: 32-35).
6 Von Rauch 1974: 27.
7 Hiden and Salmon 1994: 30.
8 Tarulis 1965: 34.
Nevertheless, the weakening of central political authority in Russia and the potential fragmentation of imperial territory raised serious issues for Allied leaders, most notably Woodrow Wilson. Wilson's substantial commitment to the principle of political independence and territorial integrity for small nations is well known. However, he and his adviser Colonel Edward House also viewed the dismemberment of empires as risky business: as House wrote, “empires cannot be shattered and new states created without disturbance.”

Furthermore, Wilson was anxious for the future of the Russian people, who he greatly admired. He and other administration officials hoped that the Bolshevik government would be a short-lived phenomenon, a “black period” from which a democratic Russia, would re-emerge. And American leaders operated under the premise that in order to be economically and militarily strong, a post-imperial Russia would need access to Baltic ports, as well as a safety zone on the Baltic littoral.

Consequently, the Russian situation (according to House, who worked on the draft) formed the chief raison d'être of Wilson's celebrated “Fourteen Point” message. This address, delivered to a Joint Session of Congress on 8 January 1918, expressed commitment to the rights of small nations to “political independence and territorial integrity.” In the section specifically concerning Russia (Point VI), however, Wilson made no reference to the aspirations for independence of numerous non-Russian areas of the former tsarist empire, in effect advocating a hands-off policy toward Russian internal affairs. Baltic representatives were told that the US government would wait “until the majority of the Russian people had expressed their will.”

Admittedly, the situation on the ground in the Baltic region was hardly one to inspire confidence in the concept or future of Baltic self-determination. In Estonia and Latvia, White Russian and Bolshevik forces, the latter both Russian and local, were battling with local nationalists and each other for political control. In Lithuania, the National Council, having hastened in December 1917 to declare independence before peace talks could open between Berlin and the new Russian government, nevertheless had agreed to the establishment of a military, transport, customs, and currency alliance with the German Reich. German control was rapidly spreading northwards and eastwards. Riga had fallen in September 1917, and in February 1918, after negotiations over a peace treaty between Berlin and the Bolsheviks seemed to have broken down, German forces occupied the remainder of Latvia in short order. With White Russian and Bolshevik

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10 Tarulis 1965: 40. The Allied governments, seeking to put into place in Moscow a government that would reactive the Eastern Front, did attempt in 1918-1919 a strategy of direct intervention in the Russian Civil War, of what Adam Ulam calls “a most variegated character.” British and French agents conducted secret negotiations and intrigues; Allied marines landed in the north of Russia and Siberia (most notably Murmansk and Arkhangelsk); the Japanese sent a substantial contingent to Vladivostok; the Czechoslovak Legion sowed confusion along the Trans-Siberian railway. But ultimately, direct intervention was “puny and dispersed,” and (more importantly for our story) did not involve reaching out directly to non-Russian nationalists (Ulam 1974: 90-91).
11 Cited in Tarulis 1965: 22.
12 Tarulis 1965: 28, 55, 75.
14 Tarulis 1965: 18.
15 Tarulis 1965: 12. This position was not quite as disingenuous as it now sounds; for example, at the end of July 1917 the Riga Conference of the most important Latvian political organizations initially declared for continuing association with a democratic Russia as an “autonomous political unit,” a position only abandoned after the Bolshevik revolution (Page 1959: 66; Tarulis 1965: 88).
16 Hiden and Salmon 1994: 28. A followup declaration, issued on 16 February 1918, dissolved all bonds previously entered into with, or forced upon by, neighboring states.
forces in retreat, Estonian nationalists were able to declare independence on 24 February 1918, one day before German troops entered Tallinn. When the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was finally signed between the Bolsheviks and the German government on 3 March 1918, under Article 4 “Estonia and Latvia (were) without delay (to) be cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guards (and were to) be occupied by a German police force until security (was) ensured by proper national institutions and until public order (had) been reestablished.” 17 The entire Baltic region was thus to remain under German occupation until the Armistice of November 1918.

In the midst of this confusion, British and French officials were increasingly considering the role that self-governing Baltic populations could play in controlling both German and Bolshevik expansionism in the Baltic region. Both governments, in an effort both to frustrate German efforts at legal incorporation of the region and to strengthen anti-German forces, extended de facto recognition to the Estonian government in May 1918; the same was extended to the Latvian government following its declaration of independence in mid-November (Lithuania had to wait until September 1919 because of its continuing border disputes with Poland). The Armistice of 11 November 1918 shifted Allied hostility from Germany to the Bolshevik government in Moscow, which the French government in particular viewed with undiluted antipathy. Indeed, French and also British leaders felt that the eastern forces of their former enemy provided the best chance of stemming a Bolshevik advance. 18 Hence, under Article 12 of the Armistice, German forces on former Russian imperial territory were to postpone their return to Germany until “the Allies (thought) the moment suitable having regard to the internal situation of these territories.” 19 German troops, however—many of whom were already sympathetic to the Bolshevik cause due to the sufferings of the war—began a disorderly retreat immediately after the signing of the Armistice, with Bolshevik troops close on their heels. 20 By December 1918, the Red Army had replaced Germans as the occupying force in much of the Baltic region.

Faced with the threat that Bolshevik power and ideology might spread as far as Germany, but also exhausted by the war and with unpleasant memories of direct intervention in 1918, the Allies now embarked on a messy strategy involving three prongs: the use of German volunteers in the Baltic region (particularly Latvia), direct support to Baltic nationalists themselves, and support to White Russian forces. German volunteers comprised a Baltic German Landeswehr as well as from former German troops; under leaders such as General Rüdiger von der Goltz, they proved formidable forces, driving back Bolshevik advances in Latvia and taking control of Latvia’s borders by early 1919. 21 However, the British and French governments remained highly suspicious of potential German expansionism; since German forces received most of their supplies and reinforcements by sea, the British went so far as to establish a naval blockade of coast of Courland. 22 Allied fears were confirmed by an attempted putsch by General von der Goltz in Latvia in April 1919, which had as its aim the creation of a new German power base in the eastern Baltic. 23 Allied governments resolved, at a series of conferences in Paris in 1919, to replace German volunteers with soldiers drawn from the Baltic countries or, if necessary, from Scandinavia. 24 At the same time, a sizeable

17 Page 1959: 82. After three years of German occupation, Lithuania was free of Russian forces.
18 Hiden and Salmon 1994: 32.
19 Cited in Tarulis 1965: 95.
22 Page 1959: 147.
23 Hiden and Salmon 1994: 34.
flow of Allied arms, equipment and money began to Estonia and Latvia.\textsuperscript{25} Thanks to Allied pressure on the German government and the efforts of Baltic fighters, Estonia and Lithuania were cleared of both Soviet and German forces by April of 1919.\textsuperscript{26}

Baltic leaders not unreasonably assumed that this Allied enthusiasm for their military security might translate into political recognition. Baltic representatives advanced their own versions of the “buffer” thesis that was receiving discussion in Allied capitals. Lithuanian spokesmen depicted Lithuania and Poland as the “last line of defense between a Germany that was tending more and more toward Bolshevism and the forces of Lenin in Russia.”\textsuperscript{27} A memorandum of December 1918 from the Latvian Foreign Minister urged the establishment of independent Baltic states as a \textit{cordon sanitaire}—possibly the earliest use of this term in this context.\textsuperscript{28} These campaigns were not without their success: efforts by Russian representatives—Bolsheviks and anti-Bolsheviks alike—to depict the nascent Baltic states as German puppets, undeserving of recognition, and their leaders as German agents were for the most part greeted with skepticism in Western capitals.\textsuperscript{29} However, even though Baltic arguments for \textit{de jure} recognition received a cautiously positive hearing in London and Paris, the American government—which had not yet extended even \textit{de facto} recognition—greeted Baltic demands for military assistance and recognition with noncommittal replies, and attempted to convince their British and French counterparts to do the same.\textsuperscript{30} The State Department informed the British government that “(p)ublic and official declarations which have been made by the Government of the United States on various occasions proclaiming its friendship and loyalty to Russia and the Russian people cause it to feel honor bound to refrain from adopting any premature action before the meeting of the Peace Conference.”\textsuperscript{31} At the same time, the Allies broadened their support for Russian anti-Bolshevik forces; most importantly, although not recognizing Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak’s Siberian-based government, the Allies in June 1919 nonetheless declared their willingness to supply it with material aid for the purpose of creating an all-Russian government.\textsuperscript{32} The American government in particular hoped that Kolchak’s government would soon assume power over all of Russia, and that “the thorny Baltic problem could be solved by agreement between the Baltic and the Russian peoples.”\textsuperscript{33}

This hope, however, and the attendant urgings by Allied governments that Baltic populations lend their strength to the White Russian campaigns, did not take account of the fact that none of the White leaders were willing to entertain the possibility of independence for the Baltic region.\textsuperscript{34} White forces were for the most part “headed by fervent Russian nationalists whose ideological frame of reference was expressed in

\textsuperscript{25} Page 1959: 175. Allied forces had already briefly intervened on the direct behalf of Baltic forces, albeit only from a distance; a British naval squadron had foiled a Soviet naval attack on Tallinn in December 1918.
\textsuperscript{26} Misiunas and Taagepera 1993: 9-10.
\textsuperscript{27} Cited in Tarulis 1965: 114.
\textsuperscript{28} Tarulis 1965: 117.
\textsuperscript{29} Tarulis 1965: 78.
\textsuperscript{30} Tarulis 1965: 77. Von Rauch suggests that French interest extended only as far as developments in the Baltic region affected the establishment of the new Polish state (von Rauch 1974: 62).
\textsuperscript{31} Cited in Tarulis 1965: 101. Ironically, the result of this stance was that American diplomats adhered closely to Bolshevik practice in regard to acts that might imply recognition of the Baltic states (Tarulis 1965: 84).
\textsuperscript{32} Page 1959: 149-150.
\textsuperscript{33} Tarulis 1965: 181.
\textsuperscript{34} Or indeed for any of the non-Russian peoples of the Russian empire (Ulam 1974: 102; Page 1959: 147-148).
[General Anton Denikin’s] term ‘Russia great and undivided’." Kolchak had assured Allied leaders that he was willing to consider autonomy for the Baltic provinces; but it rapidly became evident that his idea of “autonomy” for the Baltic states extended to little more than education and public health. In such conditions, although Baltic forces were willing to assist White campaigns when they stood to gain something as well—Estonian forces, at British urging, supported the efforts by White Russian commander General Yudenich to capture Petrograd, and gained some 2,000 square kilometers of territory for Estonia in the process—their support was half-hearted. Furthermore, with their territories largely secure (with the exception of one Latvian province held by Soviet forces and the persistent Lithuanian-Polish territorial crises) and their governments largely stable, the Baltic states were now able to wait for the world to come to them.

It was, ironically, the Bolsheviks who first offered Baltic governments de jure recognition. In July 1919, Bolshevik officials began to float talk of accepting Baltic self-determination and the territorial status quo, in hopes of encouraging Baltic governments to withdraw all support for the Whites. The Latvian and Lithuanian governments indicated some skepticism; nevertheless, the Baltic response was basically favorable. As an official Latvian government statement put it: “Neither Latvia nor her nearest neighbors recognize it as their mission to overthrow Bolshevism in order that its place be taken by Kolchak or Denikin, whose relations toward Latvia and all other small democratic states on former Russian soil (are) well known to everybody.” When the government in Moscow offered to open peace negotiations with Estonia “on the basis of irrevocable recognition of the independence of the Estonian state,” it was a difficult offer to turn down, although Tallinn made acceptance of the offer conditional on suspension of hostilities toward Latvia and Lithuania as well.

The attitudes of the Allied governments to these developments ranged from the disapproving to the hostile. The French and American governments were particularly opposed; the Latvians “were bluntly told that the United States would take a negative attitude if Riga opened peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks, and it would break off relations if peace were concluded.” However, largely due to American intransigence, Allied advice that the Baltic governments avert their eyes from their Gorgon neighbor was not coupled with any promise of effective aid. Consequently, happy to turn their attention to other concerns and to receive a modicum of international legitimacy at last, all three Baltic governments signed armistices with Soviet Russia in late 1919 and early 1920; between February (Estonia) and August (Latvia) 1920, each of the three governments negotiated and signed separate peace treaties. In these treaties, Soviet Russia recognized the three Baltic states de jure as independent states and renounced “voluntarily and forever all rights of sovereignty held by Russia” over their peoples and territories. These treaties have subsequently been referred to by Baltic politicians as

36 Tarulis 1965: 193.
38 Von Rauch 1974: 71.
39 Cited in Tarulis 1965: 246.
40 Tarulis 1965: 246-247.
41 Tarulis 1965: 247.
42 Tarulis 1965: 250.
43 Tarulis 1965: 258.
44 The Latvians delayed signing any armistice until the province of Latgale had been recaptured, with Polish assistance, from Soviet forces (Von Rauch 1974: 74).
the “birth certificates” of the Baltic states. However, the Baltic states were not the only ones for whom the treaties constituted a symbolic and legal turning point. Lenin called the conclusion of the Russian-Estonian agreement—Soviet Russia’s first permanent arrangement with a European state—an event of “gigantic historical significance.” Meanwhile, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgii Chicherin called the Estonian treaty “the first experiment in peaceful coexistence with bourgeois states” and “a dress rehearsal for understanding with the Entente.”

Soviet recognition of the Baltic governments was the beginning of the end for the Allied non-recognition strategy. The Americans continued to stall, saying, as Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby put it in August 1920, that “(w)e are unwilling that, while it is helpless in the grip of a non-representative government, Russia shall be weakened still further by a policy of dismemberment, conceived in other than Russian interests.” A note by Colby outlining reasons why the Baltic states should not be recognized by other nations reportedly even played an important role in the League of Nations’ rejection of Baltic applications for membership in December 1920. However, Washington could no longer hold its allies on the issue. As a British Foreign Office analysis somewhat ruefully concluded in April 1920, “In Russia, the Social revolution, in the ex-Russian states the Nationalist revolution have...come to stay.” On 26 January 1921 the major European Allied powers, with the French in the lead, recognized Latvia and Estonia de jure, while expressing reservations over Lithuania due to its border dispute with Poland. The League of Nations eventually followed suit, admitting all three Baltic states in September 1921. However, it still took over a year for the American government, which had never even extended de facto recognition, to finally recognize all three states de jure, in July 1922.

The history of Allied policy toward the creation of independent Baltic states in the wake of the Russian empire’s collapse reveals the major themes that would recur in Western approaches to Baltic self-determination over the course of the twentieth century. First, “the Baltic question” was to be consistently subordinate to “the Russian question,” whether relations with Moscow were good or bad. Second, although material aid might be forthcoming, Western lives were not to be risked for Baltic survival. And last, issues of principle, while not meaningless, were always to be subject to severe pressure from issues of practicality. Meanwhile, Soviet policy towards the Baltic states was on the

46 The “birth certificate” metaphor has been used by numerous Baltic politicians; see, for instance, Estonian President Lennart Meri at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE ORD, 25 April 1995: 323).
48 Cited in Tarulis 1965: 309.
49 Tarulis 1965: 313.
50 Hiden and Salmon 1994: 43.
51 Tarulis 1965: 327. The allied powers eventually announced their final intention to grant Lithuania de jure recognition in June 1921, but the recognition did not take effect until December 1921.
52 In its instrument of recognition, the State Department stated: “The United States has consistently maintained that the disturbed conditions of Russian affairs may not be made the occasion for the alienation of Russian territory, and this principle is not deemed to be infringed by the recognition at this time of the Governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which have been set up and maintained by an indigenous population” (Tarulis 1965: 363).
53 The American position in particular serves as a sharp rejoinder to idealized accounts of Woodrow Wilson’s commitment to self-determination for small nations. Wilson’s Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, later wrote that to Wilson, pronouncements in favour of self-determination were nothing more than “an expression of a moral precept as something to be desired but generally unattainable in the lives of nations.” Indeed, in Lansing’s view, it was Wilson’s policy toward Russia that particularly discredited Wilson’s own slogan that “self-determination is not an empty phrase” (cited in Tarulis 1965: 335).
face of things somewhat more encouraging. However, as the next section will outline, 1939 would reveal an aspect that Baltic leaders were later to fear could become a fundamental aspect of Baltic–Russian relations as well: perfidy. Between Soviet aggression and Western impotence, the principle of Baltic self-determination was about to be put on hold for fifty years.

1939–1945

With the rise to power in Germany of Adolf Hitler in 1933, the territories of the Baltic states acquired a new significance in the eyes of the western powers. From being buffers against an expansion of Bolshevism, they gradually became a zone outside the possibility of effective western concern, a political arena in which the German and Soviet governments “vied with one another for political supremacy.” With the failure of a policy of appeasement made palpable by Germany’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, the British government began in that month to consider security guarantees for those states considered to be at the greatest risk of Hitler’s aggression. Despite extending guarantees to Poland and Romania, however, British leaders made it clear in April 1939 that they would offer no such assurances to the Baltic states. London’s disinclination to draw the Baltic states under the British wing stemmed from several factors. First, Baltic governments themselves were pursuing policies of neutralism. Baltic leaders hoped through the formation of the neutral Baltic Entente in 1934 to keep clear of any great-power bloc, thereby (they hoped) protecting their states from being forced into “security” agreements that would bring troops from surrounding powers—Germany, the USSR, or Poland—onto their soil. Neutralist sentiments persisted in Estonia and Latvia even after Lithuania was forced, under threat of aerial bombardment, to transfer in March 1939 the port of Klaipeda (Memel) and its surrounding district to Germany. Second, British officials recognized that the Soviet Union was as immediate a threat to Baltic security as Germany. Since 1921, however, when the Royal Navy Baltic squadron was withdrawn, the British government had warned the Baltic states it could no longer promise material support against a Soviet attack. Now, at a time when the menace from Hitler was growing, conflict with a potential ally against Germany—particularly one as powerful as the USSR—was the last thing the British government needed. But finally, a degree of indifference toward Baltic self-determination also permeated British thinking. It is true that by 1932 a member of the Foreign Office felt able to assure an audience that “it was not necessarily to be

54 Von Rauch 1974: 175.
55 Dallin 1978: 103.
57 Watt 1990: 157 If this neutralism veered off center in any direction, the tendency was in fact more toward Berlin. Many Baltic high officials had written off Britain and France, as well as the League of Nations, after Munich; many others were actively pro-German (Watt 1990: 363; von Rauch 1974: 197).
58 In September 1934 the British Minister to the Baltic states, in a lengthy cable on developments in the region, wrote: “There is a ‘lives of the hunted’ element in the attitude of these small states to their great neighbors, and it would be difficult to decide which in the last resort they fear most—the protective solicitude of the Soviet Union, the clumsy directness of Germany, or the devouring overtures of Poland. Obviously the intentions of none of the three are strictly Honourable...” (cited in Hiden and Salmon 1994: 88). Baltic fears of the Soviet government grew steadily as the 1930s progressed (Watt 1990: 224). By the late 1930s, the Estonian government in particular did not hide from British representatives its concerns (von Rauch 1974: 208).
59 Hiden and Salmon 1994: 61. John Hiden and Patrick Salmon note somewhat ruefully that “[d]espite Britain’s formal statements to the contrary, Baltic leaders continued well into the 1930s to believe that the Royal Navy would be on hand once again when the moment of crisis came” (Hiden and Salmon 1994: 73).
assumed" that Estonia or Latvia would "ultimately be re-incorporated with Russia, though that this fate was in store for them both was regarded as axiomatic a few years ago. 60 But such thinking did not change the fundamental British opinion, expressed in a 1926 Foreign Office memorandum, that "[a]part from obligations which may arise under the Covenant of the League [of Nations], we should not feel called upon to object to any change such as the federation of the Baltic states, or their reabsorption by Russia." 61 Although British commercial interests in the region had been growing steadily, to British leaders it was, as the British Minister to the Baltic states put it in 1934, "idle to pretend that the Baltic States are a factor of first importance in European affairs." 62 The author of a December 1941 Foreign Office memorandum on the Baltic states therefore was probably not on his own when he wrote, "I do not feel that the independence of the Baltic states is a European necessity." 63

Another individual who shared this opinion was Soviet General Secretary Josef Stalin, who was increasingly fearful of what might develop in the Baltic states. The Soviet leadership had show busts of paranoia in relation to the Baltic states before; the 1925 Treaty of Locarno that effected a degree of German-Western reconciliation sparked exaggerated fears in the Soviet Union that the Baltic states were about to become military outposts for a British anti-Bolshevik crusade. 64 The Baltic-Soviet non-aggression pacts signed between 1926 and 1933 had soothed Soviet fears for a while. But now the Soviet leadership was obsessed with the possibility of what they referred to as "indirect aggression:" the organization of a coup in the Baltic states or the adoption by those states of a pro-Hitler orientation, which they believed would be "precisely the most profitable manner of subordinating the Baltic to Nazi Germany." 65 Since Baltic governments showed no interest in dealing with Moscow directly, the Soviet government tried to include them in the multilateral security arrangement it was pursuing with Britain and France. 66 In negotiations between April and July 1939, the Soviet government pushed for the creation of a tripartite security system guaranteeing "assistance" in case of German aggression in a belt of states, from Finland to Turkey, lying between Germany and the USSR—whether or not the states in question desired or even refused such a commitment. The wording of the Soviet proposal was designed to extend its coverage to the "indirect aggression" that Stalin so feared, including the inciting of states to adopt a pro-German orientation. 67 Baltic governments, who were kept at least partly abreast of developments in these negotiations, immediately informed

60 Cited in Hiden and Salmon 1994: 74.
63 Kirby 1978: 168. Even Edward Lord Halifax, who was not totally unsympathetic to Baltic concerns, confessed that "he was rather cynical with regard to the Baltic states" and that "he did not think that the Baltic peoples were peoples who demanded very much respect or consideration" (Hiden and Salmon 1994: 122).
64 Hiden and Salmon 1994: 68.
65 Cited in Dallin 1978: 104.
66 The Soviet government had already tried approaching the Baltic governments directly, to no avail. After the German annexation of Klaipėda, the Soviet government warned the Latvian and Estonian governments of "the immense importance the Soviets attached to the maintenance of their independence," and that any agreement with a third power that could diminish that independence would be regarded by Moscow as a violation of the existing Baltic-Soviet non-aggression pacts (Watt 1990: 223; Lithuania, since the annexation of Klaipėda, was already assumed to be a German puppet state). Unsurprisingly, this statement met with stiff replies: the Estonian government asserted that "Estonia intended to defend her independence herself, and could not allow anyone else to judge how she fulfilled her international responsibilities" (Watt 1990: 224). A subsequent offer by Moscow of Soviet assistance in the case of German aggression met with a similarly cool response in Tallinn and Riga.
67 Dallin 1978: 103.
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain that they wanted no part in such a system, which they felt opened the doors to the same expansionist meddling that the pact was ostensibly designed to check. However, the broad definition of “aggression” also raised concerns among British leaders, who had not been that enthusiastic about bringing the Soviet Union into collective action against Hitler in the first place. The British Ambassador in Moscow had been instructed that “[o]ur object is, of course, to prevent our being dragged into war by Russia over a Baltic state without our having any voice in the matter.” The British government temporized in talks with the Soviets, pointing out that the Baltic states had shown “a distinct disinclination to be guaranteed.” A British and French counteroffer, influenced by Latvian submissions, proposed that aid be granted to European states that had requested such assistance in order to resist a violation of their neutrality. These refinements Soviet diplomats refused to accept; indeed, British reluctance to sacrifice Baltic feelings or bring the Baltic governments to heel bolstered suspicions in Moscow that London was trying to direct German aggression directly at the Soviet Union through the Baltic States, bypassing Poland and Romania. The British Ambassador in Moscow in response advised London that “Soviet assistance is not worth purchasing at the price of extra hostility on the part of the Baltic states and other countries (not to mention the effect on British and probably American opinion) which we should earn by yielding to Soviet demands for what amounts to compulsory guarantees imposed on states who violently object to Soviet help.”

As 1939 progressed, however, the worth of Soviet cooperation to both Allied and German strategy became increasingly evident. British and French diplomats were aware that the Anglo-French guarantee of Poland had little chance of deterring Hitler without Stalin’s support. Similarly, Hitler needed a guarantee that his movement against Poland would not be foiled by Soviet intervention. And it was evident in London, Paris and Berlin that concessions relating to the Baltic states would be critical to their courtship of Stalin. Even British Prime Minister Winston Churchill conceded that “for Russia it is of vital interest that these states not fall into the hands of Nazi Germany.” In these

68 Crowe 1978: 116. Estonian Foreign Minister Karl Selter indicated, however, that Estonia would welcome British support in the case of a Soviet attack. The Foreign Office replied blandly that if Estonian security appeared to be threatened by the USSR, “the British government would naturally be interested in dissuading (the) Soviet government from it” (Crowe 1978: 116). They further assured the Estonians that an Anglo-Soviet agreement, if reached, would reduce the danger of Soviet meddling (Tarulis 1959: 103).

69 Chamberlain felt “the most profound distrust of Russia...I distrust her motives, which seem to me to have little connection with our ideas of liberty, and to be concerned only with getting everyone else by the ears.” Cited in Feis 1957: 4.

70 Cited in Dallin 1978: 103.


72 Tarulis 1959: 104.

73 Crowe 1978: 116; Watt 1990: 224, 363. To make matters worse, on 15 April US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued an open letter to Hitler and Italian leader Benito Mussolini, seeking assurances that they would not attack or invade the territory of thirty-one nations, including the Baltic states. Unfortunately, this well-meaning ploy backfired: German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop promptly sent messages to all the capitals named, politely asking if the country concerned felt itself to be threatened by Germany. Unsurprisingly, none wished to answer “yes.” The Estonian and Latvian non-aggression pacts with Germany, although intended by Tallinn and Riga only to guarantee their neutrality, further strengthened Soviet fears that they had joined the German camp, as did visits of several high German military and intelligence officials, as well as warships, to the Baltic states in June 1939 (Watt 1990: 262, 364-365).

74 Tarulis 1959: 106.

75 Hiden and Salmon 1994: 100.

76 Dallin 1978: 106.
conditions, British diplomats found it prudent to follow the example of the French government, which had on 22 April accepted the Soviet proposals. Setting aside Baltic concerns, British diplomats on 23 July 1939 agreed to attach to the proposed tripartite security agreement an accompanying protocol—to be kept secret—that would list Latvia and Estonia (among others) as objects of assistance in case of aggression. The pact included the provision that the three powers would come to each other's assistance if any one of them was involved in defending against aggression a state "whose independence or neutrality the contracting party feel obliged to defend."77

This British and French capitulation, however, was not as attractive to Stalin as the German counteroffer.79 The British and French governments still, in the words of a Soviet account, "refused to act against Germany if she resorted to indirect aggression."80 Meanwhile, Hitler was anxious to strike a deal: time was running out before the attack on Poland was due to be launched. And the German government was willing to offer terms that the Allies could never have matched. As late as 26 July, German negotiators were insisting that "the territorial integrity of the Baltic states must be respected at all costs."81 However, on 3 August the German Ambassador in Moscow informed Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov that Germany was willing to respect "vital Soviet interests" in the Baltic region, whereupon the Soviet side suggested a special protocol that would spell out mutual spheres of influence.82 In the end, the ten-year Soviet-German non-aggression pact signed by Molotov and German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop on 23 August 1939 included a secret protocol regulating German and Soviet spheres of influence "in the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belong to the Baltic States."83 The territories of Estonia and the former Livonia were assigned to the USSR from the start of the talks; the rest of Latvia was ceded to Stalin in last-minute negotiations.84 The bulk of Lithuania was renegotiated into the Soviet sphere on 28 September in exchange for other territories and a compensation of 7.5 million gold dollars, and the final strip of Lithuanian territory was ceded to the Soviet sphere in September 1940.85

Western governments, reeling from the shock of Soviet defection and the speed of Germany's invasion of Poland, offered little comment on Soviet activities in the Baltic

77 Lithuania was omitted because the earlier drafts spoke of "neighbor" states "bordering" on the Soviet Union; in 1939 Lithuania was still separated from Soviet borders by a narrow strip of Poland (Dallin 1978: 103).
78 Cited in Dallin 1978: 104.
79 Historians disagree on why the tripartite talks failed to produce an agreement; some blame British and French footdragging and Soviet doubts about the wisdom of Allied military plans, while others suggest that Stalin used the talks with the British and French to acquire a safety net and strengthen his bargaining position while waiting to see what Hitler might offer. In his explanation to the USSR Supreme Soviet of the decision to give up on the talks, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov focused on the disagreements surrounding the concept of "indirect aggression," although he did not mention the Baltic states directly. See Roberts 1989: 141, 152; Kissinger 1994: 345; Tarulis 1959: 113.
80 Both cited in Dallin 1978: 104.
81 Von Rauch 1974: 209.
82 Dallin 1978: 105.
83 When the text of the agreement to be presented for public consumption came up for discussion at the final meeting, Stalin immediately suggested that the magnificent preamble be scratched; "[a]fter six years of shoveling mountains of cow dung over each other, said Stalin (his language was much coarser), they could not suddenly go public with this kind of profession of eternal friendship" (Watt 1990: 458).
84 For a dramatic account of the negotiations, see Watt 1990: 458-461.
states in 1939 and early 1940.\footnote{The contents of the secret protocol on spheres of influence of course not yet having become known, many in the Baltic states thought that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact would have little effect on their position. Indeed, the Estonian Minister in London transmitted on 25 August his government's "sincere thanks for the understanding shown by His Majesty's Government, during these last months, for Estonia's policy of neutrality" (Tarulis 1959: 113).} After the Soviet invasion of Poland on 17 September 1939, all three governments were pressured into signing "mutual assistance pacts" allowing Soviet military bases on their territory, although they retained nominal sovereignty.\footnote{Ulam notes that the Baltic agreements "offered a poignant commentary on the Russo-German alliance. Against whom did the USSR need military and naval bases in the small Baltic countries?" (Ulam 1974: 287). Interestingly, the three Baltic governments concluded trade agreements with Berlin between December 1939 and April 1940 under whose terms 70\% of all Baltic exports went to Germany, giving the region considerable significance for Germany's wartime economy (von Rauch 1974: 219).} But by May of 1940 Izvestiya was arguing that:

> The recent war events have once more proved that the neutrality of small states that do not have the power to support it is a mere fantasy...All considerations of small countries on the question of justice and injustice in relations with the Great Powers which are at war for their 'to be or not to be' are, at the very least, naïve.\footnote{Cited in Nahaylo and Swoboda 1990: 84.}

In the middle of June 1940, the Soviet government issued ultimatums to all three Baltic governments, demanding a change in all three governments and the free entry of unlimited troops to secure strategic points.\footnote{Dreifelds 1996: 32.} Rigged elections to new "People's Assemblies" were held in all three republics on 14 and 15 July, and within a fortnight all three new governments had proclaimed their territories to be socialist and had formally requested admission to the USSR. Unsurprisingly, these requests were granted in the first week of August.\footnote{Dreifelds 1996: 33. For an interesting discussion of whether incorporation was Stalin's goal from the start, see Roberts 1995.} As Bronis Kaslas writes, "[t]he Soviet authorities attempted to legitimize the annexation of the Baltic states by attempting to preserve the form, if not the substance of proper legal processes during the transition from independence to Russian control."\footnote{Kaslas 1976: 283-284. The Soviet argument that the Baltic incorporations took place in actual, rather than notional, conformity with Baltic constitutions overlooks the point that the constitutional law of all three Baltic states rendered parliaments incompetent to perform acts by which the sovereignty of the state would be changed without express approval of their populations (Kaslas 1976: 285).} Accordingly, Soviet officials were careful to portray all their acts, in spite of the fact of military occupation, as being in conformity with the constitutions of the Baltic states.

Western response to the Soviet incorporation, however, was unswervingly negative. Beside Germany and governments subservient to Berlin (like Vichy France), only Sweden recognized the annexations.\footnote{Misiunas and Taagepera 1993: 29. The West German government withdrew recognition after the partition of Germany (Waldren 1993: 21).} The US State Department issued on 23 July a statement on the impending incorporation:

> During these past few days the devious processes whereunder the political independence and territorial integrity of the three small Baltic republics...were to be deliberately annihilated by one of their more powerful neighbors have been rapidly drawing to their conclusion...The people of the United States are opposed to predatory activities no matter
whether they are carried on by the use of force or by the threat of force. They are likewise opposed to any form of intervention on the part of one state, however powerful, in the domestic concerns of any other sovereign state, however weak...The United States will continue to stand by these principles, because of the conviction of the American people that unless the doctrine in which these principles are inherent once again governs the relations between nations, the rule of reason, of justice, and of law—in other words, the basis of modern civilization itself—cannot be preserved.93

Due to the circumstances of the takeover, there were no Baltic governments in exile around which international recognition could be organized. Nevertheless, Baltic legations continued to operate in the United States and Great Britain; the British government told resident Baltic ministers that “the circumstances attending recent political changes in their states were not such as to cease treating them as accredited representatives of their respective countries.”94 The US and British governments, as well as many others, also froze Baltic assets.95 The withholding of recognition provoked a protracted and vigorous exchange between the Soviet Ambassador to Washington and the State Department, and remained a sore point with Soviet diplomats worldwide; the response of the Soviet Ambassador in London to Churchill’s offer in April 1941 to provide aid should (as he anticipated) the USSR come under German attack was that “such help would be the more welcome if Britain first recognized Soviet absorption of the Baltic states.”96

The invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany in June 1941, however, moved Anglo-US-Soviet cooperation to an impressive new level. Churchill had secured US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s agreement to welcome the Soviet Union as an ally in case of attack, a welcome that was extended the day after the German invasion began.97 According to American sources, the total value of American Lend-Lease shipments to Russia, which began within weeks of the German attack, came to over US$11 billion, a figure to which British shipments and American private relief added considerably.98 The Soviet government accepted Western aid gratefully; in his May Day speech of 1942, Stalin assigned first place among the freedom-loving countries to Great Britain and the United States, “with whom we are bound by ties of friendship, and who render our country more and more military aid against the German fascist invaders.”99

However, cooperation did not preclude disagreements over a post-war order, about which American, British, and Soviet leaders had started thinking almost as soon as the war began. For the Americans, the issue was the Atlantic Charter, signed by Roosevelt and Churchill on 12 August 1941—a “set of common principles” on which the signatories base “their hopes for a better future for the world”. The first article of the

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93 Tarulis 1959: 255-256.
94 Cited in Pajaujis-Javis 1980: 64. The Lithuanian and Latvian legations stayed in Washington, DC; the Estonian Consulate General in New York performed the functions of a legation (Tarulis 1965: 370).
95 Waldren 1993: 22.
97 Feis 1957: 7. Herbert Feis cites Churchill’s response to criticisms that he was “bowing down in the House of Rimmon:” “I have only one purpose, the destruction of Hitler, and my life is much simplified thereby. If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favorable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons.”
99 Gallagher 1963: 27. For a fascinating account of changes in Soviet historiography of World War II, and in particular of the post-war downgrading in Soviet histories of the importance of cooperation with Great Britain and the US, see Gallagher 1963 in toto.
Charter asserted that the signatories sought no aggrandizement, territorial or other; the second expressed opposition to territorial changes that did not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the populations concerned; the third affirmed the signatories' respect for the right of all people to choose their form of government, and their "wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." The Soviet Ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky, complained to British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that it seemed "as if England and the USA imagine themselves as almighty God called upon to judge the rest of the sinful world, including my country. You cannot strengthen the alliance on such a basis." Nevertheless, Maisky signed the Charter for the Soviet government on 24 September, although with the qualification that the practical application of the principles of the charter would need to be adapted to "the circumstances, needs, and historical peculiarities of particular countries."

For the Soviet leadership, the burning issue was that of post-war borders. By December 1941, when a British delegation visited the Soviet Union to discuss Anglo-Soviet cooperation, German forces were still menacing Moscow (in November they had come within 18 miles) and the Red Army was terribly weakened; there was no guarantee that Soviet forces would be able to recapture the Baltic region by the end of the war. In this context, the Soviet side raised the nature of an eventual post-war settlement; specifically, Stalin sought to retain territories gained under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. In discussions with Eden, Soviet negotiators justified the absorption by the Soviet Union of sections of Polish and Romanian territory on the grounds that the new frontiers were "ethnologically correct;" incorporation of the Baltic republics, however, needed no justification in Soviet eyes, since these populations had voluntarily requested admission to the Union.

British policymakers also were thinking over the longer term. Churchill was less idealistic than Roosevelt, and he would have agreed with the Foreign Office argument that "there will be no counterweight to Russia in Europe [after the war ends]...Common prudence requires that we should [assume] that if we want Russia's collaboration after the war, we shall have to be prepared to make such a policy advantageous to her..." But he nevertheless was anxious that a post-war order should not leave the democratic cause weaker in any vital sphere. Upon being notified of Stalin's demands, he shot back a response that the proposal was "directly contradictory to the first, second, and third articles of the Atlantic Charter." Eden, however, took a more conciliatory line with Stalin, assuring him that the British government neither took Soviet demands to be contrary to the Charter nor was inclined to dispute the justice of any of them; rather, its

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100 Reproduced in Brinkley and Facey-Crowther 1994: xvii-xviii.
101 Cited in Gardner 1994: 52. Maisky's comment does not take account of the fact that American and British leaders themselves were in some disagreement about the full implications of the Charter. Roosevelt clearly hoped that the self-determination clause would apply to British dominions in Asia; Churchill's indignant response was that "I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire" (Brinkley and Facey-Crowther 1994: 57).
102 Gaddis 1997: 16. Gardner notes that British and American special emissaries to Moscow Lord Beaverbrook and Averell Harriman urged Stalin to adhere to the Eight Points, even if in an ambiguous fashion, since peace objectives were important to the American public opinion on which the Lend-Lease Program depended (Gardner 1994: 52).
104 Charlton 1984: 33.
105 Wilmot 1952: 130.
106 Cited in Schlesinger 1970: 81. Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office Sir Alexander Cadogan expressed the point rather more forcefully, complaining that it would be better not to "crawl to the Russians over the dead bodies of all our principles" (cited in Kirby 1978: 168).
hands were tied by its promises to the Americans.\(^{107}\) And by March 1942, Churchill himself was sufficiently alarmed by the military situation that he wrote personally to Roosevelt, saying that the “increasing gravity of the war” led him to conclude that the Atlantic Charter “ought not to be construed so as to deny Russia the frontiers she occupied when Germany attacked her,” since “this was the basis on which Russia acceded to the Charter.”\(^{108}\) Churchill further communicated this position to Stalin.\(^{109}\) The British Ambassador in Washington argued to Roosevelt that “the enjoyment of self-governance by the Baltic states, which had not been very successful since 1919, could not be compared in important to the assurance that the Soviet Union would not sign a separate peace or refuse to cooperate after the war.”\(^{110}\) By May 1942, Eden explicitly stated to Soviet diplomats that his government was prepared to accede to Soviet demands on the Baltic states, although not on Poland.\(^{111}\)

Roosevelt was not completely unsympathetic to the British or Soviet positions. In private conversations with his friend (and Assistant Secretary of State) Adolf Berle, Roosevelt “mused” that the Soviets “might have the Baltic republics” and the other territories transferred under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, if only they would stay in the war.\(^{112}\) Indeed, Soviet records indicate that in March 1942 Roosevelt assured the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Maxim Litvinov, that he did not foresee “any difficulties” about the border issues after the war; “(h)e himself had always thought it had been a mistake to separate provinces from Russia after the war.”\(^{113}\) There were, however, strong opponents of such a stance operating in the State Department. US Secretary of State Cordell Hull had warned Eden before his Moscow visit that the US government thought it would be “a great mistake” for the Soviet, British, or American governments to enter into any agreements in regard to the specific terms of postwar settlements.\(^{114}\)

Now Hull described the Anglo-Soviet exchanges “as contrary to the Atlantic Charter, as a defiance of America’s historic opposition to territorial changes by force, and as a throwback to the power politics of a discredited past.”\(^{115}\) State Department experts were specifically opposed to extending recognition to Baltic incorporation: approving forced incorporations would not only destroy the meaning of one of the most important clauses of the Atlantic Charter but through the abandonment of “high principles of international conduct” would run the risk of losing the US the respect of the smaller countries of Eastern Europe.\(^{116}\) Roosevelt himself also disliked the idea of payment in advance, and feared the recriminations from vocal Baltic voters that would surely follow any deal.\(^{117}\) And he entertained a persistent hope that he could convince Stalin that his security needs could be taken care of without violating the Charter.\(^{118}\) Indeed, Roosevelt believed that he had “gotten through” to Molotov during the latter’s visit to Washington in May 1942, telling a British diplomat that he had succeeded in getting the Russians to

\(^{107}\) Feis 1957: 27.

\(^{108}\) Gardner 1994: 55. Churchill added that he imagined that “a severe process of liquidating hostile elements in the Baltic states, etc., was employed by the Russians when they took these regions at the beginning of the war.” As Gardner observes, this was a curious way of “defending” the Charter: Churchill was in effect arguing “that the self-determination clause could not be implemented because of the elimination of all prospective pro-independence elements!” (Gardner 1994: 55)

\(^{109}\) Churchill 1956, vol. 4: 293.

\(^{110}\) Davis 1974: 26.

\(^{111}\) Kirby 1978: 170.

\(^{112}\) The diaries of Berle—who said he was appalled by the suggestion—are cited in Persico 2001: 195.

\(^{113}\) Cited in Gardner 1994: 55.

\(^{114}\) Feis 1957: 25.


\(^{116}\) Davis 1974: 21.

\(^{117}\) Feis 1957: 60.

drop their demands—which he believed never to have been serious—for “those piffling little places.”" Accordingly, at American urging, Churchill refused to budge on his unwillingness to consider territorial questions during Molotov’s visit to London in May 1942, explaining that his “difficulties” stemmed from the fact that he needed “to take account of our own and American opinion.” Molotov, his quest for promises of a second front made all the more urgent by serious Soviet setbacks along the Eastern Front in the two days prior to the visit, eventually signed an Anglo-Soviet treaty that contained no reference to the issue of borders.

It was evident, however, that Soviet territorial demands were not going to go away, and it is equally evident in hindsight that Western resolve on the issue of Baltic self-determination was weakening. By March 1943, Roosevelt told Eden at a meeting in Washington that “he did not intend to try to force Russia to give up the Baltic states, although he still hoped for a plebiscite.” Eden, who had just met with Maisky in London, believed that Stalin would reject the plebiscite proposal; Roosevelt reportedly replied that it might be necessary for the United States and Britain to agree to such an absorption, but, if so, that it should be used as a bargaining chip. Over the summer of 1943, Hull softened on the issue as well, suggesting that the US might accept a quid pro quo of Soviet agreement to go along with “our ideas on the general post-war plan;” presidential advisor Harry Hopkins casually informed Eden that Roosevelt had said as much to Litvinov and Molotov.

In such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Allied military strategy during the war was not formulated with any intention of preventing a Soviet reoccupation of the Baltic region. The Baltic states do not appear to have featured in Churchill’s frustrated efforts to devise a plan of campaign that would win not only the war but the peace. However, the Baltic issue had already received discussion in Washington, where the Territorial Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy had “specifically agreed” in 1942 that the US would not oppose by force the acquisition by the Soviet Union of territory up to the pre-BARBAROSSA borders. American unwillingness to commit troops or incur casualties in Europe beyond those deemed necessary for the

120 Churchill 1954, vol. 4: 301.
121 Feis 1957: 63; Wilmot 1952: 711; Kirby 1978: 171. Churchill was careful to present Molotov with an aide-mémoire stressing that that due to problems of supply no promise of a second front could be extended, and indeed was sufficiently anxious about Soviet reactions to the failure of the front to materialize that he flew to Moscow to explain the situation to Stalin in person (Churchill 1956, vol. 4: 305, 409). When no second front had materialized by 1943, Stalin demonstrated his displeasure by recalling his ambassadors from London and Washington (Wilmot 1952: 710).
123 Feis 1957: 122.
125 During 1943 Churchill had become increasingly concerned about the necessity of restraining Stalin’s ambitions in Eastern Europe; in his opinion, the interests of Britain, and in the long run of the United States, demanded the restoration of democratic influence in Central and Eastern Europe. Accordingly, while continuing to put the defeat of Hitler first, he sought to devise a plan of campaign that would not only bring military success, but would consolidate the position of the democratic powers on the continent. The American command, however, “felt that they could justify to their own people the presence of American forces in Europe only if these were used for the strict military purpose of defeating Hitler by the most direct and speedy means. Accordingly, they took the view that in making strategic decisions the Allies should not be influenced by political considerations of the kind that influenced Churchill” (Wilmot 1952: 130-131).
126 Davis 1974: 77. The Advisory Committee was a body made up of State Department officials and other eminent persons inside and outside government, including representatives of the Departments of War and Navy; it is not clear to me to what degree its “agreements” were binding.
defeat of Hitler, or to permit Anglo-American military strategy to be determined by the longer-term political concerns expressed by Churchill, stymied Churchill’s proposal, presented at the meeting of the Anglo-American High command in May 1943, for a push up through the Balkans. The rejection of this plan, which might have blocked the Red Army’s eventual western advances, was a stance that effectively doomed the Baltic republics to their eventual reoccupation by Soviet forces. The launching of the Red Army drive westward in 1943 proved decisive; by late 1943 Soviet forces had already crossed the Dneiper, and “[t]he Soviet government was no longer so anxious to obtain recognition of frontiers the Red Army was about to man.”

If eventual Soviet reoccupation was made possible by Allied military strategy, the Teheran Conference of 28 November–1 December 1943 provided the political seal of approval. Roosevelt and Churchill believed that military necessity required continued Soviet cooperation against the Germans; furthermore, Roosevelt was anxious to make certain of Russian participation in the war against Japan and the establishment of the United Nations. Nor was either leader willing to relinquish American and British spheres of influence in Western Europe and in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Latin America, and East Asia. At Teheran, there was no discussion of post-war boundaries during the plenary sessions; when Churchill raised the issue one evening over dinner, Stalin answered that “[t]here is no need to speak now about Soviet desires, but when the time comes we will speak.” Rather, Stalin worked to create a strategic situation that would enable him to enforce the Soviet Union’s territorial claims, whether other countries liked them or not. In particular, it was apparent to Churchill at least that Stalin did not want any Anglo-American forces in the areas he was bent upon “liberating”—hence his requests for assurances that the amphibious resources in the Mediterranean would be used in Southern France, and not in the Balkans. He met no strong opposition to these demands, making it almost certain that post-war Soviet influence would extend deep into Central Europe and the Balkans. As Chester Wilmot writes: “Pushed by the Russians and pulled by the Americans, the overall strategy of the Western powers had been diverted away from the area of Soviet aspirations...[T]he Teheran Conference not only determined the military strategy for 1944, but adjusted the political balance of post-War Europe in favour of the Soviet Union.”

Meanwhile, in private discussions with Stalin, Roosevelt overtly renounced the Baltic states. He explained that his political difficulties about recognizing the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union stemmed from his concern for the opinion of the millions of Americans of Baltic extraction. Still, he said, he did “not intend to go to war with the Soviet Union on this point;” all he desired was some sort of referendum or plebiscite. Stalin, according to some sources, commented only that there were sufficient opportunities under the Soviet constitution for the expression of public will;

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127 Wilmot 1952: 130
128 Kirby 1978: 171. Soviet forces might have reoccupied the Baltic states by 1944 had Hitler taken the advice of his generals in January to move westward and concentrate on holding the most direct line between the Black and Baltic Seas. However, Hitler feared that abandoning the Baltic states would lead to disruptions of iron ore shipments from northern Sweden and cost Germany its only safe U-boat training area (Wilmot 1952: 146-147).
129 Wilmot 1952: 447.
130 Gaddis 1997: 16.
131 Cited in Wilmot 1952: 710.
132 Wilmot 1952: 140.
133 Wilmot 1952: 142.
134 Gardner 1994: 67. Bohlen, who was Roosevelt’s interpreter, recalls Roosevelt’s comment as being that “when the Soviet troops reoccupied the Baltic states, he did not intend to go to war,” but describes it as a joke (Bohlen 1973: 151).
according to other reports, he responded with a casual “You want a plebiscite? Of course!” and admitted that some propaganda work would indeed be necessary. At any rate, Vice President Henry Wallace noted in his diary on 18 December 1943 that during a lengthy monologue on the subject of the Teheran conference, Roosevelt had expressed enthusiasm over the results of the conference and his new relationship with Stalin, and that “the President defended Stalin’s attitude with regard to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.”

Given this leadup, from the point of view of the future of the Baltic states the infamous Yalta Conference of 4–11 February 1945 was actually something of an anti-climax. Soviet forces had reoccupied all three Baltic states by January 1945; at the conference, they were not discussed by name. Neither Churchill nor Roosevelt offered to extend recognition to the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic states, but both agreed to accept the Soviet Union’s pre-BARBAROSSA borders in practice. On only one point involving the Baltic states did Stalin back down. He had previously demanded that all 16 republics of the USSR be represented in the General Assembly of the proposed United Nations. But by the time the conference started, he had already retreated to three: Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania, because these three “had made great sacrifices in the war; they were the first to be invaded, and had suffered greatly.” Although Churchill supported the first two, the issue of Lithuanian representation faded from the agenda. “Although it was not stated at the conference,” writes Adam Ulam, “her case was really too embarrassing.”

For the next forty years, British and American policy between 1939 and 1945 seemed to have been an unmitigated catastrophe for the cause of Baltic self-determination. Once again, good relations with the Soviet Union had taken priority in Western capitals over international law, the principle of national self-determination, or the specific issue of Baltic sovereignty. The doctrine of non-recognition of forcible seizure of territory, which was enshrined in Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaty of Paris and enunciated in US policy in what has been called the “Stimson Doctrine,” found manifestation in the restoration of independence to Albania, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Poland after the conclusion of World War II and the entry of the principle into customary international law as well as Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. Nevertheless, the section of the State Department Manual of December 1945 dealing with the Baltic states read: “In as much as the Soviet government continues to insist that these states were duly incorporated into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and in view of the position we took in 1940 with regard to this matter, we have endeavored to steer a course which would prevent our different

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137 Including the short-lived Karelo-Finnish SSR.
138 Churchill 1954 vol. 6: 312.
139 Charles Bohlen, who was at the conference, suggests that Churchill’s position was not a surprise, “since we all knew of his desire to get India into the United Nations” (Bohlen 1973: 194).
140 Ulam 1974: 373. In 1946, the Soviet government brought the three Baltic ministers of foreign affairs—it should be recalled that every Union republic nominally possessed its own foreign ministry—to the Paris Conference, trying to make them part of the peace process and to obtain seats for them at the United Nations; but these efforts failed (Misiunas and Taagepera 1993: 126).
141 The USSR violated 15 international treaties and agreements in its forcible incorporation of the Baltic states, including 11 bilateral treaties between Moscow and the three Baltic republics, the 1928 General Treaty on Renunciation of Wars as an Instrument of National Policy (signed by 63 states), the Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, and the Covenant of the League of Nations (Baltic Committee 1973: 39-42).
142 Waldren 1993: 6-7, 23.
attitudes from disturbing American-Soviet relations.\textsuperscript{143} It appeared to matter little whether Churchill and Roosevelt's policies were the result of a ruthless pursuit of national self-interest at the expense of principle or of a regretful collapse of idealism in the face of overwhelming military realities. The outcome for the Baltic states appeared to be unarguable: the only members of the League of Nations whose sovereignty was not fully restored after the war, they disappeared from the world's maps and most of the world's attention. It was not until the late 1980s that the importance of one seemingly cheap and impotent gesture—the failure, in 1940, of most Western governments to extend \textit{de jure} recognition to the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic states—would begin to become fully evident, as the next section will begin to detail.

\textbf{1985–1991}

In March 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), only a congenital optimist would have argued that Western leaderships were likely to strengthen their commitment to the principle of Baltic self-determination. True, Baltic legations continued to operate in the United States; US diplomats based in Moscow even avoided travelling to the Baltic republics; as the process of seeking the mandatory permission for such travel from the Soviet authorities could be read as accepting Soviet sovereignty over these territories.\textsuperscript{144} But other than such seemingly cosmetic measures, the recent history of Soviet-Western relations seemed to offer little hope that Western governments would ever seriously pressure Moscow over Baltic self-determination. In 1975, Western and Warsaw Pact governments had signed in Helsinki a Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that made no mention of the Baltic states.\textsuperscript{145} Despite Western assurances to Baltic émigrés that their policy of non-recognition remained unchanged, the Soviet leadership took the agreement by signatories of the Final Act to respect one another's frontiers and territorial integrity as representing tacit acceptance of the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic states.\textsuperscript{146} The US position at Helsinki proved particularly disappointing to Baltic groups; despite promises on the eve of the conference, the US delegation failed to voice support for Baltic independence at the conference. The US retreat was seen by many as proof that Western leaders were no more likely to prioritize Baltic self-determination over détente with the Soviet Union than Roosevelt might have been.\textsuperscript{147}

But in fact, since 1945 three factors had emerged in the formulation of Western and particularly American Baltic policy that were to have important implications for the Baltic states once Soviet power began to wane. First (as already intimated in Roosevelt's self-justifications to Stalin), particularly for American leaders, maintaining the good opinion of citizens of Baltic origin was increasingly important. Wilson had faced little public input on his Baltic policy; Roosevelt was already facing greater pressure after Baltic emigration rose in the 1920s and 1930s. But during and after World War II, over 200,000 Baltic citizens fled their states to resettle in the West, with

\textsuperscript{143} Cited in Davis 1974: 254-254.
\textsuperscript{144} The United States continued to refuse to extend either \textit{de jure} or \textit{de facto} recognition to Soviet sovereignty in the Baltic republics; most other Western governments, while withholding \textit{de jure} recognition of Soviet control, recognized it \textit{de facto}. Western non-recognition policies were facilitated by the continued absence of any general European peace settlement.
\textsuperscript{145} The CSCE became the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) in December 1994.
\textsuperscript{146} Kritz 1993: 17, 28. The Western position relied on the fact that the Final Act did not constitute a treaty under international law; the Helsinki Declarations constituted "political and moral commitments" but were not legally binding (Kaslas 1976: 277-283).
\textsuperscript{147} Lange 1994: 234.
the majority resettling in the United States. Many of these émigrés refused to consider their nations' situations as anything but temporary; national committees of Estonian-, Latvian-, and Lithuanian-Americans and worldwide émigré organizations such as the Baltic World Council worked hard to keep the issue of Baltic self-determination on the agenda in the United States and internationally. Crucially, Baltic lobbyists were successful in winning advocates, particularly among conservative Republicans, in both houses of the United States Congress, multiplying their impact on US presidential decisions.

The cause of these Baltic lobbyists had been aided by two other factors. First, by the time of Gorbachev's rise to power, Western governments had nearly five decades of rhetoric to live up to. Concepts that were still relatively malleable at the end of the war had by now been elaborated by individual Western governments and in the charters of Western organizations such as the Council of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); principles had been stated and restated in these contexts to the point where they were difficult to sidestep in the name of political expediency. Second, this rhetoric was being heard more frequently. This was in part thanks to the proliferation in the post-war years of Western international and intergovernmental institutions dedicated to the promotion of democratization and human rights, such as the Council of Europe. But also, despite the shortcomings (from the Baltic point of view) of the Helsinki Final Act, from 1975 on Western governments took on the stance of defenders of human rights in the Soviet Union at the CSCE, a position that Baltic activists were quick to exploit in the interest of their cause. Despite the disappointing results overall, Baltic representatives were still met by American State Department officials at the first CSCE session in Helsinki, and French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing presented the Baltic case in the assembly. Western delegations continued to stress their support for Baltic sovereignty in subsequent meetings. During the Reagan administration, the US had backed away from the conciliatory stance of the period of détente, with American diplomats openly attacking Soviet Baltic policy at for instance, the CSCE meeting on human rights in Ottawa in 1985.

CSCE meetings also gave Baltic delegations a chance to make their cases themselves, albeit from the sidelines. While Western leaders were unwilling to jeopardize the outcomes of the meetings through offense to Soviet delegations and as a consequence did not support Baltic representatives attending meetings as state representatives,

148 Horm 1961: 287. Some scholars estimate that 60,000 Estonians, 100,000 Lithuanians, and 50,000 Latvians fled to the West between 1939 and 1945 (Misiunas and Taagepera: 354). Many scholars focusing on individual Baltic nations but the numbers of refugees from their nation of interest to be higher; Horm, for instance, puts the number of Estonian refugees at 72,000 (Horm 1961: 287).

149 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 198-199.

150 Formed in May 1949 with the goal of strengthening democracy, human rights and the rule of law (fundamental values that the Council declared to be “no longer simply an internal matter for governments”) throughout its member states, the Council of Europe regularly drew attention to the Baltic cause. In 1960 the Council's Consultative Assembly (to be renamed Parliamentary Assembly) passed a resolution on the twentieth anniversary of the annexation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union noting that “this illegal annexation took place without any genuine reference to the wishes of the people” and expressing “sympathy with the sufferings of the Baltic peoples.” Further resolutions denouncing the Soviet annexation were issued in 1963, 1983, and 1986. (http://neon.coe.fr/eng/present/about.htm, accessed 30 July 1997; Consultative Assembly Report “On the situation of the Baltic States on the 20th anniversary of their forced incorporation into the Soviet Union” (Doc. 1173, 23 August 1960); remarks by Estonian Foreign Minister Jiiri Luik to the Committee of Ministers meeting of the Council of Europe, 11 May 1994, Strasbourg.)


delegates from the Baltic World Council attended some meetings as representatives of a non-governmental organization (NGOs). As a consequence, over the next decade, Baltic groups continued to lobby CSCE delegates, joining the “counterconferences” of other émigré groups and human rights organizations during CSCE meetings in Belgrade, Madrid, and Vienna. CSCE-related events such as the 10th Anniversary of the signing of the Final Act became opportunities for Baltic émigré organizations to conduct protests designed to draw attention to Baltic issues. Helsinki monitoring committees made up of private citizens were formed in Lithuania and Latvia; the trial and imprisonment of many of their members only served to keep their fates on the agenda at CSCE meetings.

The arrival on the scene of Gorbachev, however, portended momentous changes in the Soviet Union’s international posture. By October 1986, US President Ronald Reagan and Gorbachev had endorsed at their summit in Reykjavik the idea of eliminating all offensive strategic arms within 10 years. In December 1987 Gorbachev came to Washington to sign a treaty banning intermediate range nuclear forces. By the time of George Bush’s inauguration as US President in January 1989, Soviet forces had been withdrawn from Afghanistan; Eastern European communist parties had been granted substantial autonomy from the CPSU in their running of their countries’ domestic affairs; Gorbachev had told the world at the United Nations General Assembly in December 1988 that he believed that the “use or threat of force” could no longer be an instrument of foreign policy, and had pledged to shift the Soviet Union’s military doctrine to purely defensive stance. The end of the Cold War appeared imminent.

Meanwhile, equally momentous changes had been occurring within the USSR, with far-reaching implications for the Baltic republics. From the outset, Gorbachev had made it clear that his first priority was to reinvigorate the Union’s stagnant economy. The cause of perestroika (restructuring) was one that Baltic republic leaderships rapidly seized on, taking Gorbachev’s general principles—of khozraschet (cost-accounting), for instance—and developing them to suit local interests. Gorbachev viewed these development favorably; he hoped that the already relatively economically advanced Baltic republics, once given free rein in the economic sphere, would demonstrate to the rest of the Soviet Union that the great experiment of economic reform could indeed bring a better life for the citizenry. The formation in the Baltic republics of grassroots Popular Fronts for the support of perestroika between April and October 1988 seemed on the face of it to bode well for cooperation between Gorbachev and his fellow-reformers in Moscow on the one hand and the populations of the three Baltic republics on the other.

In fact, however, the pace of political developments in the Baltic republics had long since outstripped the potential of the centre to keep up. By mid-1987, Baltic intellectuals had begun to take advantage of the new “openness” (glasnost’) not only to criticize existing Soviet policies (for instance in the area of environmental policy, an area of great discontent in all three Baltic republics) but also to call for more honest descriptions of the Soviet takeover of the Baltic states and the filling in of “blank spots”

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158 Nahaylo and Swoboda 1990: 279.
159 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 111. The three Baltic republics, despite the depredations of the war, had by 1970 moved to the forefront of Soviet economic performance, with the highest per capita incomes in the Union (Vardys 1975: 38).
in Baltic histories, such as those surrounding the mass deportations that accompanied incorporation. The Baltic Popular Fronts themselves rapidly metamorphosed from forces of loyal opposition into powerful nationalist movements levying detailed demands for a fundamental change in the existing relationship between Moscow and the non-Russian republics. Local Communist Parties were unable (and frequently unwilling) to stem the nationalist tide. In November 1988 the Estonian Supreme Soviet passed a “Declaration of Sovereignty” giving the republic the right to veto laws issued from Moscow; Lithuania followed suit in May 1989 and Latvia in July 1989. In August 1989, the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact sparked major protests: the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet declared the Pact “illegal and invalid,” and on the fatal date, almost two million Baltic citizens formed a human chain stretching 600 kilometers from Tallinn to Vilnius. Baltic nationalists buttressed their condemnations of the illegal character of Baltic annexation into the Soviet Union with invocations of their right under the USSR constitution (reconfirmed in the course of constitutional amendments in 1936 and 1977) of union republics to “free exit” from the USSR. The growing strength of nationalist movements elsewhere in the Union, especially in Georgia and Azerbaijan; the intensifying conflict between Armenian and Azeri forces over Nagorno-Karabakh; and the emergence in the RSFSR of a competitor for Gorbachev’s popularity, former Moscow party boss Boris Yeltsin, all suggested rocky times ahead for central control over all the Union’s republics, the Baltic republics most of all.

Indeed, it was increasingly evident to Western observers that developments in the Baltic republics had important international implications. On the one hand, for the first time in forty years, it was becoming possible to imagine a restoration of the Baltic sovereignty to which Western leaders had lent so much rhetorical support. While Gorbachev clearly remained committed to keeping the Union together, he and his Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had repeatedly stressed the reformists’ commitment to dealing with secessionist movements by non-violent means. Gorbachev’s senior advisor Aleksandr Yakovlev even held a press conference in August 1989 in which he “unequivocally condemned” the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, although he continued to insist that secession was out of the question Western pressure had more than once given Gorbachev the excuse to take policy steps opposed by more conservative party figures. However, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had also made it clear that international meddling in Baltic politics was not appreciated; they were, they intimated, already doing their best. Furthermore, Gorbachev was already beginning to feel political repercussions from the unexpected centrifugal effects of his reforms. The potential for a showdown between Gorbachev’s reformers and members of the Central Committee and the military who were committed to tight central political and economic control over the republics, many of whom were also opposed to broadening economic or military reform, was becoming evident. The chances of a reactionary backlash in Moscow that would endanger not only Baltic freedoms but also growing Soviet-Western cooperation left Western leaders grappling with a simple question: how far was it safe to rock Gorbachev’s boat?

162 Nahaylo and Swoboda 1990: 328.
163 Senn and Motulaite 1993: 27.
164 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 110.
166 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 110, 270.
In the opinion of most Western leaders, the answer was “not very far.” Gorbachev’s political survival was deemed by most Western governments to be more important to international peace and stability, and to by extension to Western interests, than Baltic independence, although they were happy to extend such moral support as was unlikely to derail reforms in Moscow. The US and German governments, with their overriding interest in German reunification, were particularly concerned to reassure Gorbachev that the Soviet Union would not be isolated or humiliated, and that its security interests would not be impaired. At the Malta summit meeting of 2-3 December 1989, as Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott tell it, Bush offered Gorbachev his personal assurances of non-interference in Baltic affairs:

Speaking with great care...Bush reminded Gorbachev that in forty-nine years, the US had never recognized the Soviet annexation of the Baltics. Nor had it relinquished its desire for Baltic independence. Still, he was ready to ‘respond to the generosity of your position’—that is, Gorbachev’s repeated promise not to use force against the Baltics. Bush said that if the central Soviet authorities caused an outbreak of violence in the Baltics, it would ‘create a firestorm’ of anti-Soviet feeling in the United States. But if Gorbachev kept his word and avoided violence, the US government would reciprocate with restraint in what it said on the subject, because, as Bush put it, ‘we don’t want to create big problems for you.’

Indeed, when in mid-December 1989 the Lithuanian Communist Party severed its links with the CPSU, Bush was insistent that he wanted official rhetoric to “stay cool;” his spokesman informed the press that although the United States had never recognized Baltic annexation, “[w]e don’t want to take any positions that are not helpful to either side.” After the Lithuanian Supreme Council declared independence on 11 March 1990, Bush was carefully non-committal, saying that “[w]e rejoice in this concept of self-determination...beyond that, we think that it’s very important that whatever happens should be peaceful;” the United States did not offer to extend recognition. After Gorbachev imposed economic sanctions on Lithuania, US leaders expressed “concern,” but Bush ordered administration officials to avoid escalating rhetoric. At the same time, at various points Bush indirectly warned Baltic leaders about “the realities of life:” they should not appeal to the US to fight their battles for them, but instead should attempt to work out the best deal they could with Gorbachev. Furthermore, the administration made clear its preference for Baltic leaders who supported a gradualist approach toward independence, with the moderate Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimera Prunskiené receiving an invitation to the White House in May 1990 while letters to Bush by the outspoken Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis received no answer.

This American response was fairly representative of the Western response overall. Even leaders such as British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who described herself as strongly committed to Baltic independence, agreed that it would be unwise to push Gorbachev too hard in public. Indeed, some European leaders advocated going much farther toward renouncing Baltic self-determination to ensure political stability in

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167 Pond 1993: 164.
168 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 163.
169 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 174-175; 193; 199; 201; 206-207.
170 Beschloss and Talbott 1993. See also, for example, Thatcher 1993 for the British response; Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 201-205 for the French and German responses; Archer 1999 for the Nordic responses.
Moscow, but their proposals were generally shot down. For instance, Thatcher recalled that at the October 1990 European Council meeting in Rome, European Community Commission President Jacques Delors “proposed that the Council should issue a statement saying that the outer border of the Soviet Union must remain intact”—a proposal that Thatcher, French President François Mitterand, and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl successfully opposed.172

This cautious public stance angered many supporters of Baltic self-determination. In the United States, Baltic-Americans lobbied the President directly and through members of Congress, many of whom were stinging in their denunciations.173 Congress resolved in May 1990 to withhold US trade benefits from the Soviet Union until Soviet economic sanctions on Lithuania were lifted and negotiations had begun with Vilnius.174 In the Baltic republics, leaders complained to the press that the Balts were being “sold out” and that the world was witness to “another Munich”—an analogy that was deeply resented by Bush.175 A 1989 proposal by Henry Kissinger that had called for a more explicit and broad-ranging adoption of the policy that Bush was pursuing in private—a promise by the United States not to accelerate change in the Soviet bloc in return for limits on what steps Moscow could take to preserve its interests—had already been dubbed “Yalta II” by the State Department.176 Many feared that the United States was unwilling to in any way disrupt the status quo in the Soviet Union and would once again unhesitatingly abandon the Baltic republics to their fate: that Western policy was turning out to be, in Yogi Berra’s famous phrase, “déjà vu all over again.”177

If anyone had real reason to complain that he lacked the Western world’s goodwill during this period, however, it was Boris Yeltsin. Appointed by Gorbachev to head the Moscow city CPSU organization in December 1985, Yeltsin had rapidly earned wild popularity among Muscovites through his aggressive pursuit of reforms. However, his resignation from the CPSU Politburo in October 1987 cast him into direct opposition to Gorbachev, who he effectively accused of having produced little for Soviet citizens through perestroika except words.178 Removed from his Moscow position three weeks later in a traumatic session, Yeltsin spent the next 15 months in political Siberia.179 However, his opportunity for a political resurrection came in March 1989, when elections were held for delegates to the Soviet Union’s first substantially democratic legislative body, the Congress of People’s Deputies. Rather than run for a relatively safe seat—he had been offered candidacy in around two hundred districts—he chose to

172 Thatcher 1993: 767.  
174 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 206. Bush eventually resolved to sign a commercial treaty with Gorbachev in May 1990, before the sanctions were lifted; Moscow secured Congressional approval by lifting the sanctions a month later (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 223).  
175 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 196, 205-206.  
176 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 15, 45-46. The British government had strongly opposed the Kissinger proposal (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 46).  
177 Bush, on the other hand, was worried about a different Berra-ism; when pondering the prospect of inadvertently setting back the progress that had been made in Eastern Europe, he said, he often feared that he might “make the wrong mistakes” (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 205). In particular, he was keenly aware of the analogy to the Hungarian uprising of 1956: he did not want US rhetoric to encourage Baltic leaders to adopt uncompromising positions that would lead to bloodshed, or to be “a president who gives subject peoples the false impression that if they rebel, they are going to get help” (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 200).  
179 His new post was as First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Construction (Morrison 1991: 71).  
180 The Congress could not be called fully democratic, as a proportion of its seats were reserved for delegates from Party organizations.
stand for National Territorial District 1: the unified Moscow seat, the country's largest and most important, with a constituency of more than six million inhabitants. His victory, claimed with a dazzling 89.6% of the vote, was the election's most powerful blow not only to the old guard of the Party, but also to the new. Opponents of Gorbachev's reforms had suffered an enormous setback, but the Moscow elections had also revealed the extent of popular discontent with Gorbachev's limited concepts of reform. The Party's efforts to block Yeltsin from the Supreme Soviet, a smaller body elected from deputies to the Congress that would serve as the permanent parliament, only resulted in more high drama when a successful candidate from Siberia announced that he would hand over his place. Yeltsin no longer belonged just to Muscovites; he was on his way to becoming the political face of the entire Russian republic.

Unfortunately, Yeltsin's face was not one that was particularly welcome in many Western corridors of power. Western governments, unwilling to encourage any political competition that might lead hardliners to unseat Gorbachev and bring his reform program to an end, were at least as anxious about extending public recognition to Yeltsin as they were about fostering Baltic separatists. For example, when Yeltsin visited the United States in September 1989 on a privately-sponsored lecture tour, Bush was worried about meeting him. But a compromise was reached: Yeltsin would be received by Brent Scowcroft, but Bush and Vice President Dan Quayle would "just drop by." Bush, during his quick visit, made a point of stressing his "very positive relationship" with Gorbachev. After the meetings, Yeltsin was keen to make the visit look as substantive as possible, but this approach only earned him more resentment in the White House, where officials complained that he was grandstanding in an effort to compete with Gorbachev. But by mid-1990, his position was unassailable: in March, he had been elected to the Russian republic Congress of People's Deputies from his home town of Sverdlovsk with 84% of the vote, and in May, after frantic but ultimately counterproductive efforts by Gorbachev to block him, he was elected Chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet. Whether or not Western leaders liked it, his battle with Gorbachev over the future of economic and political reform was now on in earnest.

In January 1991, the crisis in Soviet–Baltic relations came to a head. The three republics had in 1990 declared either their independence (Lithuania on March 11) or transition to independence (Estonia on March 30 and Latvia on May 4); no blandishments or threats appeared sufficient to dissuade them from their course, and the crisis of laws was

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182 Leaders who proceeded cautiously included Bush, Mitterand, and British Prime Minister John Major (Morrison 1991: 25). Indeed, the US administration's reluctance to deal with Yeltsin extended well beyond its realization that it was time to begin to reach out seriously to other current and potential Soviet leaders beyond Gorbachev (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 241).
183 Morrison 1991: 103. Presidential spokesman Marlin Fitzwater told the press that "[w]e don't want to do anything to foster internal conflict...[or look as though] we were trying to provide a platform for dissent" (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 102).
184 The plan nearly failed; when NSC staffer Condoleezza Rice greeted Yeltsin at the side entrance to the White House, he snapped, "This isn't where visitors arrive who are going to see the President." Rice eventually convinced him to come in to meet Scowcroft, and Bush "stopped by" for fifteen minutes (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 103).
185 Neither side made a good impression: Baker later described Yeltsin as a "flake," and during the latter's hour-long exposition of his views on economic reform, Scowcroft fell asleep (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 103).
186 Morrison 1991: 103-104. Welcomes in Europe were not much warmer; when Yeltsin visited the European Parliament in April 1990, the French deputy delivering his "welcome" speech accused him not only of irresponsibly opposing Gorbachev but also of being a "demagogic personality" with dubious democratic credentials (Morrison 1991: 26).
growing. On 13 and 20 January 1991, Soviet Ministry of the Interior special forces went on the offensive, killing 15 in Vilnius and six in Riga. 188 The incident provoked rather different reactions from the leaders of the major Western powers than it did from Western intergovernmental organizations. The Western stake in Gorbachev's safety from Soviet conservatives had grown after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990: the US administration in particular was more anxious than ever to avoid doing anything that could either help to unseat Gorbachev or cause the latter to withdraw Soviet support for the UN coalition. 189 At the bilateral level, therefore, the response of the major Western powers was weak. For example, after the first attack on 13 January, in Vilnius, Bush expressed his fears that the violence could "set back or perhaps even reverse the process of reform" in the USSR but failed to criticize Gorbachev directly. After the second attack in Riga a week later, the administration reluctantly cancelled a planned summit meeting between Bush and Gorbachev; however, in his State of the Union address on 29 January 1991, Bush told his audience that "our objective is to help the Baltic people achieve their aspirations, not to punish the Soviet Union." 190 Although resolutions supporting Baltic independence passed Congress by wide margins, the administration did not change its line. 191 Meanwhile, the responses from European responses were not significantly stronger.

Thanks to the voices of smaller states, however, Western intergovernmental organizations responded much more indignantly. At the CSCE, seven states called for a special session to assess the events, although the proposal had to be abandoned due to a Soviet veto. 192 The moment was a turning point for Baltic attendance at CSCE, which up to then had been blocked; at the June 1991 CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers meeting, Baltic representatives were permitted to participate in the public sessions as official guests of the Scandinavian delegations. 193 NATO issued a démarche, and member states discussed invoking CSCE prescriptions against "unusual military activity" in relation to Soviet troops movements in the Baltic republics. 194 The attacks similarly sparked anger at the Council of Europe, where in May 1990 the Parliamentary Assembly had already called on the Soviet and Baltic governments "carefully to negotiate the restoration of the latters' independence in conformity with the principles of mutual security and cooperation in the spirit of the CSCE process." 195 Now the

189 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 299.
190 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 308, 319/
191 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 322. During his visit to Moscow in March 1993, however, US Secretary of State James Baker reiterated to Baltic representatives that as the United States had never recognized Baltic incorporation, the Bush administration did not expect the Baltic republics to abide by the Soviet law on secession (Tallinn Domestic Service, 16 March 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-054, 20 March 1991: 36).
192 The seven were Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (Lange 1994: 240).
193 In May 1990, the three Baltic presidents had issued a joint declaration on their intention to seek CSCE membership; in November the three states had launched a campaign for participation in the heads of state and government meeting in Paris. The French government initially extended them "distinguished guest" status, but retracted the invitation after Gorbachev threatened to quit the conference over the issue. Baltic efforts to take part in CSCE meetings in Copenhagen (June 1990), Vienna (July 1990), Paris (November 1990), La Valetta (February 1991), and Cracow (May/June 1991) similarly lacked success; in their capacity as representatives of an NGO, Baltic delegates were only able to participate in public sessions.
195 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) Recommendation 1124, 8 May 1990. The text, and an amendment to a Political Committee report on the subject, were initially proposed to read "[The Council of Europe] recognizes that the secret protocol of 1939 between Germany and the Soviet Union makes the situation of the three Baltic republics a European problem to be settled between the
Council’s Committee of Ministers adopted a declaration warning that failure to end violence would “bring into question the very basis of the co-operation which has been established between the Council of Europe and the Soviet Union.” The Parliamentary Assembly similarly condemned the situation. After a parliamentary delegation visit to Moscow and the Baltic republics in February 1991, the parliamentary Bureau of Assembly concluded that while it could not grant special guest status to the Baltic republics prior to a restoration of full independence, it should express “constant international concern” for the future of the Baltic republics and take pragmatic and practical steps to strengthen relations between the republics and the Council. Baltic presidents were invited to attend a hearing on Baltic issues at the Parliamentary Assembly on 27 June 1991, and called for member countries’ help in regaining independence, as well as for economic assistance.

Such cordial treatment was not being handed out to the RSFSR or its leader, despite (among other things) the latter’s strong condemnation of the January attacks. Although Yeltsin was received at the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly in April 1991, he was harangued by a minor French Socialist politician who accused him of demagoguery and irresponsibility in his opposition to Gorbachev. General Secretary Catherine Lalumière noted that “[i]n the near future, at the very least, it is impossible for us to establish direct ties with Russia, as only the Soviet Union is recognized in the international arena.” Although the RSFSR had begun participating in CSCE meetings, it was due to a deal having been worked out with the all-Union government, not with the CSCE. Nor was Yeltsin’s welcome in Western capitals any warmer.  

Baltic republics and the Soviet Union and to be finally confirmed within the context of the CSCE,” but this language was voted down (PACE ORD, 8 May 1990: 94-95).


197 PACE Recommendation 1139, 29 January 1991 (debate to be found in PACE ORD 29 January 1991: 606-607). Thirty-five delegates issued a blistering statement declaring “support for the Lithuanian, Latvia, and Estonian peoples in the battle which, putting their trust in perestroika and glasnost, they have resolved to fight to protect democracy and reassert their sovereignty” and drawing “Moscow’s attention to the inviolable sovereignty of the three Baltic countries, unlawfully occupied since 1940 as a result of the Stalin-Hitler pact, which our democracies do not recognize as which even the parliament of the Soviet Union has declared illegal.” Twenty-one of these, in a statement of support, further appealed “to all the member states of the Council of Europe to send parliamentary delegations to the capitals of the Baltic republics as a show of solidarity in their struggle for freedom and democracy” (“On the situation in the Baltic countries.” PACE Written Declaration 204, 31 January 1991 (Doc. 6385); “On the Baltic republics.” PACE Written Declaration 203, 13 May 1991 (sic) (Doc. 6383)).


199 Soviet delegates initially refused to take part in the Baltic hearing but joined at the last minute after being informed that the Council would strip the Soviet Union of its special guest status if it tried to block discussion of the Baltic issue (The Baltic Independent, 5-11 July 1991: 1, 5).

200 He was further accused of “surrounding himself with a few social democrats and liberals, and above all with many right-wing extremists” (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 April 1991: 1; Morrison 1991: 26).


202 As Kozyrev described it, the RSFSR expressed in late 1990 a wish to participate in the all-Union delegation to the CSCE summit in Paris on 19-21 November 1990, a request to which the all-Union Foreign Ministry finally acquiesced. “I must say, though,” said Kozyrev, “that this was done at the last minute. Our representative managed to jump on the rear platform of the last car on the last train leaving for Paris. We had to swallow our pride in this case” (TASS, 8 November 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-218, 9 November 1990: 46); Komsomolskaya Pravda, 26 December 1990: 3 (FBIS-SOV-91-001, 2 January 1991: 74)). After the August coup attempt, Kozyrev was to give a little lecture on the CSCE’s attitudes: “Focusing on the Union center, which has the right to veto any decisions within the CSCE framework, the states participating in the all-European process could not or would not hear the
When in early 1991 Yeltsin wanted to visit Washington again—this time on the condition that he would be “properly received” by Bush—the administration felt that the “time was not right,” even though other republic leaders were visiting the White House. When US Secretary of State James Baker traveled to Moscow in mid-March, he refused to meet Yeltsin at the Russian parliament building, instead suggesting a meeting before or after a dinner he was hosting at the American Ambassador’s residence for a range of republic leaders and intellectuals. It was not until the Republic and Democratic party leaders of the Senate invited Yeltsin to Washington in April that Baker and Scowcroft told the American Ambassador in Moscow to extend an invitation to the White House—but to inform the Soviet government first. When RSFSR Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev travelled to Washington to prepare for Yeltsin’s visit, he was privately warned that if Yeltsin attempted to create the impression that the Bush administration was undermining the Soviet president, “[i]t won’t be a great visit;” when the visit eventually took place in June, Bush in his welcoming speech in the Rose Garden concentrated on praising Gorbachev. Yeltsin commented afterwards “that Bush still seemed to be ‘under the illusion’ that everything depended on his personal relationship to Gorbachev.”

The attempted putsch by Soviet hardliners of 18–21 August 1991, its collapse in the face of resistance from Yeltsin and his supporters, and its aftermath marked the lowest point in the US approach toward both Baltic self-determination and the Russian democratic opposition to Gorbachev. The administration’s hesitant and cautious response to the coup—Bush initially referred to it only as “extraconstitutional” and issued no stinging condemnation—was in many ways understandable; as Scowcroft warned, “we may have to deal with these guys.” The US reluctance to recognize the three Baltic declarations of independence, issued on 20–21 August, before the coup had definitively collapsed was also understandable; precipitous action could have led to another, bloodier crackdown. But after the coup plotters had been jailed or committed suicide, after the Russian republic had recognized the independence of all three Baltic republics on 24 August, after the full European Community had extended recognition on 27 August, the United States was still politely waiting for the Soviet Union to pass through the door first. Bush had undertaken in late August to hold off on recognizing the Baltic states until the Soviet government had extended recognition; Gorbachev promised recognition by 30 August, but then called to ask for more time. On 31 August, alarming voices that destroyed the cozy picture of an emerging new international order with the participation of a restructured Soviet Union and its nice leader. Furthermore, they sometimes issued stern reminders of the benefits of obedience for the sake of the stability of the existing Union” (Komsomolskaya Pravda, 5 September 1991: 3 (FBIS-SOV-91-173, 6 September 1991: 75)).

Scowcroft told his aides: “Yeltsin can come here, but we don’t want any White House fingerprints on his visit...We’re not going to do anything that looks like we’re casting our lot with Yeltsin against Gorbachev” (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 347).

Yeltsin boycotted the dinner, sending in his place the chairman of the parliament’s foreign relations committee, Vladimir Lukin (Beschloss and Talbott: 353).

Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 361; 392. Bush said: “Let’s not forget that it was President Gorbachev’s courageous policies of glasnost’ and perestroika that were the pivotal factors enabling us to end the Cold War and make Europe whole and free.” Yeltsin took the hint, saying “I shall seek to develop this achievement together with President Gorbachev” (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 392). Bush went so far as to place a call to Gorbachev during his meeting with Yeltsin in the Oval Office; the call could not go through, but Bush spent 40 minutes the next day briefing Gorbachev on the results of the visit (Morrison 1991: 26).

He compared Bush to gullible Russians who had fallen under the influence of a popular television faith healer, Anatoliy Kashpirovskiy (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 399).

Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 429.

In fact, the RSFSR had recognized Lithuanian declaration of independence with the signing of a Russian-Lithuanian interstate treaty on 29 July 1991.

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Bush telephone Landsbergsis and promised that US recognition was imminent; but two days later, still Gorbachev had not moved. Unable to wait any longer, the Bush administration finally extended recognition to all three Baltic states on 2 September.209

International organizations held out their arms to the Baltic states as well. The CSCE, extended full membership to all three states at a meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension on 10 September 1991—a meeting that, appropriately enough, was held in Moscow. At the Council of Europe, a special meeting of the Committee of Ministers welcomed the restoration of Baltic “sovereignty and independence...which will enable these states, after more than fifty years, to resume their rightful place in the family of the democratic nations of Europe.”210 The Parliamentary Assembly similarly welcomed the restoration of independent statehood in the Baltic republics; the Assembly recommendation also expressed concern, however, “about the proliferation of ethnic and other tensions in the area and insists that high standards of minority rights protection are necessary to prevent and resolve such conflicts.”211 Nevertheless, the Parliamentary Assembly immediately approved special guest status for all three Baltic states.212 The North Atlantic Assembly, an assembly of parliamentarians from NATO member states and selected guests, also admitted the three Baltic states as associate members in October 1991.213

Meanwhile, Yeltsin’s courageous stand during the putsch had led to a thaw in Western rhetoric. Once again, it was international organizations that were in the forefront of those offering their praise. For example, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers congratulated “those [Soviet] leaders who, with the President of Russia, in these difficult and tragic hours, bravely defended the rule of law and the policy of democratic reform and the promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights.”214 The Council’s Parliamentary Assembly on 19 September further paid tribute to “the Parliament and the President of Russia, and to the courage of the citizens who risked their lives to preserve democratic principles and the rule of law.”215 Meanwhile, European leaders were extending to Yeltsin the personal touch. British Prime Minister John Major met with Yeltsin and chairman of the RSFSR Council of Minister Ivan Silayev during a visit to Moscow in early September, expressing admiration for the courage displayed by the “defenders of freedom and democracy.”216 The German and Italian Foreign Ministers as well as the President of the European Community Council

209 Bush said publicly, “When history is written, no one will remember that we took forty-eight hours more than Iceland or whoever else it is” (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 443-444). The USSR State Council finally recognized the Baltic states on 6 September, and all three became members of the United Nations on 17 September. The Bush administration went some way towards making amends by granting the leaders of all three Baltic Supreme Soviets a ninety-minute meeting in mid-September (TASS, 17 September 1991 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, USSR/Former USSR (henceforth SWB), 19 September 1991: A2/1)).


212 PACE ORD, 18 September 1991: 245; PACE ORD, 6 February 1992: 684. After the breakup of the Union, the Russian Federation was the only former republic to be granted special guest status automatically.

213 Radio Vilnius, 23 October 1991 (SWB, 29 October 1991: A2/5). While Assembly leaders described themselves as favoring associated membership for the Russian republic, the Soviet Union was dissolved before a decision was reached; however, Russian representatives attended as observers (Russian Television, 28 October 1991 (SWB, 30 October 1991: A1/3)).


of Ministers similarly met with Yeltsin and/or Silayev in early September. Meanwhile, Baker failed to meet with Yeltsin on a trip in mid-September that involved a swing through the three Baltic states and Kazakhstan, although he did have a conversation with St. Petersburg mayor Anatoliy Sobchak during a stopover there. In Washington, Bush and Scowcroft were unable to conceal their anxiety about Yeltsin. Scowcroft told CNN that it was "not clear exactly to what end Yeltsin would use his power; anonymous administration sources told the Washington Post that Yeltsin had an instinct toward the demagogic. The new US Ambassador, Robert Strauss, complained from Moscow that "this Yeltsin-bashing is really stupid!" Soon, however, the waning of the central Soviet government’s power was increasingly evident through the growing foreign policy impact of the RSFSR, which became more obvious by the day. Russian representatives were soon routinely included in Soviet delegations to major international organizations, and on their own terms. Describing the RSFSR approach to the Conference on the Human Dimension held in Moscow in September 1991, after the failure of the coup, Kozyrev said that “[we] formulated a line of supporting the conference and participating in the Union delegation only on condition that the forum is not used for general reassuring speeches, but for critical analysis of the urgent problems that exist in the USSR.” In practice, this meant prominent Russian reformer and long-time human rights activist Sergei Kovalyev, as co-head of the Soviet delegation to the 1991 Moscow Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, presenting proposals to use the CSCE and Western human rights organizations to monitor observance of human rights commitments through the period of disintegration of the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union continued to occupy the Council of Europe’s guest seat, during a trip to Moscow, the Council’s Secretary General Catherine Lalumiè re met with Yeltsin, Kozyrev, and the acting chairman of the Russian parliament’s foreign affairs committee Yevgeniy Ambartsumov; reporting on the trip to the Parliamentary Assembly, she said Russian leaders had indicated their desire to be the Council’s "partner." Meanwhile, Russian representatives continued to make frequent visits to European capitals. By October Kozyrev had lined up an official visit to France for Yeltsin in early 1992. Yeltsin’s visit to Germany in November 1991, his first official visit since his election to the position of President, was described by Kozyrev as a “breakthrough” that would “turn the final page of this difficult history.” Kozyrev was finally invited to visit Washington DC in November; to his welcome by a wide range of administration and Congressional figures and the assistance proffered, he responded warmly that “we did not expect less from the American democracy.”

Within a fortnight of Kozyrev’s Washington visit, of course, everything had changed at home. On 8 December, Yeltsin, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, and Chairman of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet Stanislav Shushkevich announced in Minsk the formation of a new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and declared that “the USSR, as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality, [had ceased] to

220 "The plan," Heather Hurlburt writes, "was rejected by Western states as too grandiose. But the proposal was typical of the Russian approach" (Hurlburt 1995: 11).
221 PACE ORD, 18 September 1991: 250.
On 21 December, eight of the other nine remaining Union republics announced their intention to join them. The responses from Western capitals were once again cautious: US officials, for instance, indicated their intention to continue contact with Gorbachev and the central authorities. But when Baker visited Moscow a few days later, met with Kozyrev and Yeltsin before Gorbachev. Kozyrev stressed in their meeting that “Russia is now acting as an independent state and aspires to have that status recognized.”

After the final announcement of the Soviet Union’s dissolution on 25 December 1991, the Russian Federation replaced the USSR in all international organizations. The Russian republic had already on 19 December taken over control of the USSR foreign ministry and all its property, including embassies and missions abroad. On 21 December, a resolution passed in Alma Ata by the 11 heads of state of the new CIS declared that “the commonwealth states support Russia in continuing [note: not “succeeding to”] the USSR’s membership of the United Nations, including its permanent membership of the Security Council and of other international organizations.” As a result of this “continuer state” status, Russia acceded to special guest status in the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly and a CSCE nameplate without needing to apply. Indeed, Russian Federation officials were already participating in CSCE meetings by 8 January 1992; the subject of the meeting was “the eventual CSCE participation of the former Soviet republics.” Russian representatives also joined their Baltic counterparts in the newly-formed North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), an institution bringing together the foreign ministers of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, plus Albania and that was designed to “break down the suspicions and stereotypes of the cold war.”

It turned out that Western governments had not served the cause of Baltic sovereignty badly during the last years of the USSR, although that fact was not obvious at the time to those outside their highest levels. In fact, American and British officials had applied much more pressure on their Soviet counterparts in private than they did in public. In meetings with Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and Shevardnadze’s successor Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Bush and Baker reiterated American support for Baltic independence; both reminded their interlocutors that continued American public tacit depended on Moscow’s pursuit of a non-violent course of action. Although frequently painting themselves as hostage to public and Congressional opinion, administration officials nevertheless warned Soviet officials that pressure on the Baltic republics would

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225 TASS, 8 December 1991 (SWB, 10 December 1991: C1/1).
229 TASS, 19 December (SWB, 21 December 1991: i).
231 PACE ORD, 6 February 1992: 684. The USSR had been granted special guest status at the Parliamentary Assembly in mid-1989.
232 5th Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) meeting, Prague, 8-10 January 1992 (5CSO/J3, annex 3). According to Hurlburt, “Russia tried repeatedly to represent the other former Soviet republics in the period just after the dissolution of the USSR...The Russian delegation, then and subsequently, attempted to represent absent delegations from the various republics, and from time to time sent Russian delegation members to occupy their seats” (Hurlburt 1995: 11).
233 Talbott 2002: 94.
235 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 110, 163, 201, 202, 208, 322. Baker attempted to sell Shevardnadze on the benefits of Baltic independence, argued to Shevardnadze that the worst thing could happen was that the USSR would have “three new little Finlands” on its border (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 110).
endanger American-Soviet negotiations at a range of levels and on a range of issues. For example, in a private letter to Gorbachev after the attacks in Vilnius and Riga, Bush threatened to cut off all economic assistance to the Soviet Union if the violence did not cease. In the final analysis, the cautious pressure exerted by Western governments in the last years of the Soviet Union did not serve the Baltic republics badly. According to Bessmertnykh, Gorbachev was “extremely relieved” by Bush’s promise at Malta not to “trap” or “undermine” him in his dealings with the Baltic republics. Bessmertnykh’s conclusion two years later was that “[without] Malta, the Soviet Union would never have so smoothly surrendered its control of Eastern Europe and the Baltics.” Furthermore, the Western policy, which had often seemed so inconsequential, of non-recognition of the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR turned out to be the linchpin of eventual Baltic self-determination. The lack of recognized Soviet legal sovereignty over the Baltic states made their alienation from the Union a simple legal matter; the legal ability of the new Baltic governments to “restore,” rather than establish de novo, their independence made international recognition easy to secure.

Conclusion

With the end of the Soviet Union, the Baltic States and the Russian Federation faced their Western interlocutors with renewed hope. Both sides desperately needed economic assistance; for this, they needed political good will. For Boris Yeltsin, the challenge was to move Western governments away from nostalgia for Gorbachev and the certainties of a divided world and towards cooperation with the new Russian Federation. To this end, Yeltsin had already begun wooing the West during the last days of the Union with proposals of even more radical cuts in strategic weapons than Gorbachev was willing to contemplate. Meanwhile, the task of Baltic leaders was to separate their states from the “Russian question” for once and for all: to play on the high-mindedness, the hard-mindedness, the sympathy, and if necessary the guilt of Western policymakers to ensure that Baltic self-determination would not again be abandoned by the West for the sake of good relations with Moscow.

But the cause extended beyond continued sovereign existence. The Baltic cry of “No more Yaltas!” was more than an expression of a desire for sovereignty: it represented a rejection of a particular approach to world and European order that, in the minds of Baltic activists, the tripartite conference represented. To Baltic activists, Yalta stood for a world where the strong could apportion the weak amongst themselves without compunction. Furthermore, it stood for a gulf that, in their minds, Western policymakers had already permitted to emerge by the time of the conference between a “core” and a “peripheral” Europe; as much as it was the cause of a divided Europe, it was also its result.

236 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 204, 209, 319. Meanwhile, Gorbachev did not hesitate to use the domestic card himself; after Bush warned during the May 1990 Washington summit that he would not send a trade treaty to Congress or grant the Soviet Union Most Favored Nation status until the blockade on Lithuania was lifted, “Gorbachev pleaded with him not to link the agreement to Lithuania; that would make him appear weak and subject to outside pressure in the eyes of hard-liners at home. With great reluctance, Bush agreed to this request” (Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 223).


238 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 165.

239 Beschloss and Talbott 1993: 156.

240 None of the three leaders was terribly anxious to hide their disdain for the role of the smaller powers in conducting world affairs (Heller and Feher 1990: 7). Indeed, at the first dinner of the conference, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky had declared that “the Soviet Union would never agree to the right of the small nations to judge the acts of the great powers” (Chamberlin 1972: 87-88).

With these goals in mind, Baltic and Russian representatives approached the challenge of rebuilding relations with the West. But at the same time, they faced significant problems in their relations with each other. It is to these problems, and to the way in which these problems and relations with the West became intertwined, that the next chapter turns its attention.
As the previous chapter has indicated, across the course of the twentieth century the Baltic states' eastern neighbor, in its various political permutations—the tsarist empire, the Soviet one—had shown itself the greatest threat to Baltic self-determination. However, by December of 1991, the Russian threat appeared to be receding rapidly. The president of the newly independent Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was no stranger to Baltic soil: most famously, he had made a lightning visit to Tallinn after attacks by Soviet troops on civilians in Vilnius and Riga in January 1991, condemning Soviet brutality and pledging Russian support for Baltic sovereignty. His support for Baltic independence, and the conclusion of “interstate” treaties between the three Baltic republics on the one hand and the RSFSR on the other, appeared to bode well for Russian–Baltic neighborly relations.

How and why Russian–Baltic relations moved from this seemingly auspicious beginning to the acrimony that dominated relations by the end of 1992 is the subject of this chapter. The chapter opens with an overview history of relations between Baltic and Russian reformers through the end of the Soviet period. It goes on to discuss the bilateral and multilateral irritants that rapidly emerged in Baltic–Russian relations after the collapse of the USSR in December 1991 and attempts by the Russian and Baltic governments to address these issues among themselves. However, it also opens the discussion of efforts by both Baltic and Russian representatives to “internationalize” their disputes, particularly in three European institutions: the CSCE, the Council of Europe, and NATO.

Soviet era relations

Russian reformers had been looking to the Baltic republics for inspiration for almost as long as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had been under Soviet control. Even to the staunchest opponents of political reform, the Baltic republics were an economic and cultural inspiration. To some degree, this advanced state was a product of initial advantages. The Baltic republics (as Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev himself publicly pointed out) were hardly “backwards provinces” when they entered the Soviet Union. In 1938, average workers in each of the Baltic states earned considerably higher real wages than their Soviet counterparts, and at the time of incorporation in 1940, Baltic literacy rates were 98% for Estonia, 93% for Latvia, and 86% for Lithuania, as compared with 87% for the USSR as a whole. Estonia’s Hanseatic-era Tartu University was a highly respected academic institution; Vilnius was a historic centre of Jewish scholarship. But Soviet-era Baltic economic administrators also showed an impressive degree of innovation and flexibility in the implementation of central plans. The rate of industrial growth in the Baltic republics was higher than the Soviet average in the

1 Vardys 1975: 34.
2 Vardys 1975: 36; Kung 1980: 44. These figures are largely consistent with those of the imperial period, when Estonia and Latvia constituted the most economically developed parts of the Tsarist empire. In 1897, for example, Estonia’s overall rate of literacy was 95% and Latvia’s was 92%, compared to St. Petersburg’s 62%, Lithuania’s 54%, and the Moscow guberniya’s 49% (Vardys 1975: 35-36). Even during the imperial period, the Baltic region had been a testing ground for reform; for instance, Alexander I used the provinces of Livonia in 1804 and Estonia and Courland in 1816 for experiments in emancipation of serfs (Christian 1994: 82).
postwar period, with a heavy move out of agricultural labour. By 1970, despite the depredations of the war, the Baltic republics led the Union in per capita income. At the same time, the “Soviet West,” as many half-jokingly called the Baltic republics, enjoyed an enviable reputation for intellectual sophistication. Baltic literary publications were highly regarded among the Soviet intelligentsia, and the Baltic arts scenes were considered to be among the Union’s most sophisticated. To observers not anxious to challenge the political status quo, the Baltic republics could thus be cited as an indication of the potential of the Soviet Union overall.

But interest among those interested in undermining the Soviet system was high as well. Baltic and Russian dissidents had cooperated in the struggle for the observance of human rights and the democratization of the USSR since the 1960s. Baltic deportees had an impact on Russian dissident thinkers through shared time in the camps. For example, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn spoke of his conversations in the gulag with Arnold Susi, a former member of the Estonian government: “To understand the Revolution, I had long since required nothing beyond Marxism...and now fate brought me together with Susi. He breathed a completely different sort of air...I listened to the principles of the Estonian Constitution, which had been borrowed from the best of European experience, and to how the hundred-member one-house Parliament had worked. And, though the why of it was not clear, I began to like it all and store it all away in my experience.” And in return, democratically minded Russians “made the cause of Baltic independence a part of their own program for democratic change in the USSR as a whole.” For example, Sergei Kovalev, later to become a critic of Estonian and Latvian citizenship policies, was tried in December 1975 in Vilnius for “dissemination of the Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church via the Chronicle of Current Events and other means.” Later, the Moscow and Lithuanian Helsinki Groups worked in close cooperation. Indeed, Andrei Sakharov was one of the signatories of a “Statement of Russian Democrats” which stated: “Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia have been annexed into the Soviet Union...essentially as a result of the occupation of the Baltic States by the Red Army.”

As already touched upon in the previous chapter, once Mikhail Gorbachev began to suggest the possibility of economic and political reform, Baltic republic leaderships rapidly took up the challenge. Gorbachev’s proposals for reform were intended to revitalize the unitary Soviet Union, not to splinter it. By the beginning of 1989, however, the Baltic republics were at the forefront of a push for greater republic-level political and economic freedoms. The Estonian legislature in November 1988 passed a declaration that gave the republic legislature the right to veto laws from Moscow; Lithuania and Latvia followed suit in May and July 1989. The Baltic popular fronts, brought together under the umbrella “Baltic Council” in May 1989, rejected an

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3 Vardys 1975: 37.
4 Vardys 1975: 38.
5 Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997: 75
6 In part, this cosmopolitan quality stemmed from broader exposure to Western and Eastern European sources of information: for instance, Estonians in Tallinn and adjacent coastal areas could tune into Finnish TV, and Polish television signals could be received in some parts of Lithuania, which had not only a sizeable Polish minority but also a number of ethnic Lithuanian Polish-speakers (Vardys 1983: 21-22).
7 Cited in Misiunas and Taagepera 1993: 128.
8 For a detailed description of Baltic-Russian dissident cooperation, see Shtromas 1994: 106-108.
11 Cited in Krickus 1993b: 169 (no date given for the statement).
economic autonomy scheme proposed by the central government in March 1989 and instead called for the Baltic republics to be given virtually total control of their economies by early 1990. After the USSR Supreme Soviet rejected in April 1989 calls led by Baltic representatives for a new union treaty that would have provided for a fresh basis for relations between the center and the republics, Baltic legislatures passed a series of resolutions asserting control over their economies and allowing for, among other things, private ownership of land. By the time the USSR Supreme Soviet finally passed a proposal initially put forward by Baltic deputies for a degree of economic autonomy, it was a case of too little, too late. The resolutions of the September 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum on the nationalities question similarly fell on deaf Baltic ears. In December 1989 the Lithuanian Communist Party declared itself independent from the CPSU, and the Lithuanian legislature abolished the republican constitutional clause giving the Communist Party a monopoly on power. And in March 1990, Lithuania declared independence, a step that was met with an oil blockade by Gorbachev. By early 1990, therefore, the Baltic republics had become “the focus of the struggle between those who wished to preserve the Union and those who wished to emancipate themselves from it.”

These moves were not lost on Russian reformers seeking to push back the level of central control. Russian and Baltic reformers were already cooperating at the level of all-Union structures. Baltic and Russian deputies were the driving force behind the formation of the Inter-Regional Group of Deputies formed during the First Congress of People’s Deputies May 1989, “in effect a pro-democracy faction within the USSR congress.” Estonian academician Viktor Pal’m was voted one of five cochairmen of the group, along with Yeltsin, Sakharov, Yurij Afanasyev, and Gavriil Popov. By the Second Congress Baltic deputies had changed their status to that of “foreign observers,” but continued to consult with Russian and other democratic forces. Russian reformers also followed the Baltic example with efforts to form an all-republic Russian Popular Front, whose founding congress was finally held in October 1989. The Front’s “specifically ‘liberal’ nationalist agenda was confirmed in such proposals as the need for all nationalities within the RSFSR to be given equal rights and in its support for the mixed economy and the extension of democratic freedoms.”

By mid-1990, Yeltsin and other Russian reformers had made a choice. Real power was clearly shifting to the republics; an opposition movement that claimed to represent the entire USSR risked being torn apart. It was time to transfer the struggle to the RSFSR. In May 1990, when Yeltsin was elected chairman of the RSFSR legislature by a narrow margin, he was at the forefront of voices within the Russian republic that were expressing concern that the RSFSR could fall behind the non-Russian republics in the ongoing “war of laws” with the central government. Accordingly, on 12 June 1990, the RSFSR legislature passed its own declaration of sovereignty. From this point on, the RSFSR was solidly behind the Baltic republics in their struggle with the center.

12 Nahaylo and Swoboda 1990: 323.
15 Dunlop 1993: 81.
16 Dunlop 1993: 83.
17 Kaplan 1993: 216.
18 Flenley 1996: 239.
Even in the eyes of émigré community scholars, Yeltsin was not just anti-center: he was “fundamentally pro-Baltic.” Unquestionably, he hoped that the USSR leadership would be able to offer a compromise that would satisfy Baltic demands for greater sovereignty within the Union context. In early 1990, for example, he called for the central government to preserve “only some small sector of strategic planning with a minimal apparat...The republics should decide everything else.” Under such conditions, he suggested to an Estonian newspaper, “[w]hy not try such independence, but within the USSR?” Still, he firmly stated that “[i]f everything that has not been promised only remains on paper...then it is fully permissible for the republics to leave the USSR.” As he said in mid-1990, speaking of the blockade against Lithuania: “If a people strives for independence, you cannot restrain them by force. And the more pressure the authorities exert, the stronger the people’s resistance will be.” Later, at an RSFSR Supreme Soviet session discussing the drafting of a bilateral treaty with Ukraine, he elaborated: “History has taught us that a people who hold sway over other peoples cannot be happy. This leads not to prosperity, but to decline. We are categorically opposed to a unitary state.”

Of course, not all Russians were so impressed with developments in the Baltic republics. Many Russians resented the anti-Russian sentiments that appeared to motivate national movements in the Baltic as well as the other non-Russian republics, feeling that they were being unjustly blamed for the mistakes of the Soviet system. In reply to Baltic deputies at the June 1989 Congress of People’s Deputies, Russian nationalist writer Valentin Rasputin burst out: “Believe me when I say that we are tired of being scapegoats, of enduring the slurs and the treachery...The blame for your misfortunes lies not with Russia, but with that common burden of the administrative-industrial machine, which has turned out to be more terrible to all of us than the Mongol yoke, and which has humiliated and plundered Russia as well.” In all three Baltic republics (as well as in Moldavia), “international fronts” or “international movements” sprang up between mid-1988 and early 1989. These organizations, whose membership was largely ethnic Russian or Russophone, decried Baltic sovereignty drives and called for a restoration of central control. Their tone was openly confrontational: at its first congress in March 1989, for instance, the Estonian Intermovement adopted a resolution calling for the formation of a Russian autonomous region in northeast Estonia, with Tallinn as its capital. These fronts and movements, as John Dunlop has noted, were “energetically supported and aided by the directors of the large Union plants, by the KGB, and by conservative elements in the military and the military-industrial complex.”

Enjoying such a warm welcome from Russian reformers, and faced with threats from both the center and local Russian hardliners, Baltic politicians and populations had every reason to be well-disposed towards Yeltsin. Estonian deputy Mikk Titma, asked by an interviewer “What does Yeltsin’s coming to power in Russia do for other republics, for Estonia? Have the republics been given hope that their problems—sovereignty and independence—will be solved?” answered “Undoubtedly...I believe

25 Dunlop 1993: 137. Delegates also appealed to the USSR Procurator for criminal proceedings to be instituted against the president and Prime Minister of Estonia and leading officials of the Estonian Communist Party for “contemptuous” treatment of the state flag (Dunlop 1993: 137).  
that as a pragmatist Yelstin is going to build his relations with the republics in a completely different manner."27 Estonian parliamentary deputy (and later Prime Minister) Marju Lauristin, who participated in Estonian-Russian talks in October 1990, said "I would assess them as something quite new...It has been, in fact, a meeting of equal representatives. We did not have any sense of disdain or attempts to apply any kind of pressure, or that it was some kind of great-power approach on Russia's part...this was a meeting with the new Russia, with the Russia of the future."28 These feelings did not diminish with the course of 1991. Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergs described talks with Yeltsin in June 1991 as "very good, amicable, friendly and specific," he said that it had always been "very easy" to hold talks with Yeltsin.29

Baltic approval of Yeltsin and the Russian reformers was only strengthened by the RSFSR response to the attacks by Soviet Internal Ministry forces on civilians on 13 and 20 January 1991 that killed 15 in Vilnius and six in Riga.30 The Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet denounced the killings, and Yeltsin issued an impassioned plea to Russian soldiers not to use force against civilians of other nationalities.31 Yeltsin further travelled to Estonia to express his disapproval over the use of force by the central government, which he described having implications for the survival of democracy in the RSFSR as well as in other republics.32 Although he did not explicitly discuss the issue of possible independence, while in Tallinn, he and the chairmen of the three republics’ Supreme Soviets signed a joint declaration asserting the four sides’ recognition of each other’s sovereignty.33 In March 1991 an Estonian literary prize (the Eduard Vilde prize) was conferred on Yeltsin’s Confessions on a Pre-Set Theme, not for its literary merits but for its “mission;” the prize was described as an expression of gratitude to Yeltsin for having helped to reduce tension in Tallinn during his January visit.34 The government of independent Lithuania further awarded Yeltsin a medal in January 1992 for his “bravery and efforts to defend Lithuanian independence” in January 1991.35 (Activists of the “Democratic Russia” voting bloc later announced their intention to put before the RSFSR Supreme Soviet the question of the occupation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union in 1940, although the proposal came to naught.36)

Yeltsin’s January visit to Tallinn was the occasion for the formalization of a concrete expression of mutual support: a Russian–Estonian treaty. One of Yeltsin’s priorities had been to build up formal bilateral ties among the Union republics in order to circumvent the authority of the central government. On holiday in Latvia in July–August 1990, he had discussed the question of bilateral treaties with the leaders of all three Baltic states.37 Consequently, negotiations had begun between Baltic and Russian legislative delegations on what were referred to even then as “interstate” treaties, to create a framework for political and economic relations between republics. The Estonian–Russian treaty resulting from these negotiations was signed during Yeltsin’s visit to

33 Moscow Domestic Service, 14 January 1991 (SWB, 16 January 1991: B17). Actually, Vytautas Landsbergis was stuck inside the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet building in Vilnius at the time, so the document was signed by a designated representative.
36 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4 July 1991: 3.
Tallinn; treaties with Latvia and Lithuania were signed later in January and in July of the same year respectively. The opening articles of all three treaties declared the two sides to recognize each other as sovereign states and entities under international law; the treaties with Estonia and Latvia further contained the provision that each side recognized the other’s right to realize state sovereignty in whatever form it chose, while the Lithuanian treaty described recognition as extended in accordance with the two sides’ “state status,” which in the Lithuanian case was described as following from the Lithuanian declaration of independence of 11 March 1990.\textsuperscript{38} This phrasing extended implicit Russian recognition for the Estonian and Latvian announcements of 30 March and 4 May 1990 of the beginning of transition periods which would eventually lead—with no date set—to the restoration of fully independent republics, and of the Lithuanian declaration of independence of 11 March 1990.\textsuperscript{39} These treaties provided Baltic governments with something very close to a guarantee that the RSFSR government, at least under Yeltsin, would not oppose their drives for independence. As Yeltsin described the Latvia treaty: “The agreement will be the basis for our mutual relations, no matter how Latvia’s relations with the center develop and independently of the Latvia participation in the Union Treaty.”\textsuperscript{40} During discussion of upcoming CSCE events held between Baltic and Russian deputy foreign ministers in February and March 1991, the two sides even discussed questions of diplomatic recognition for the Baltic republics.\textsuperscript{41}

Confirmation that the Russian government would not stand in the way of Baltic independence came after the failed coup attempt in August 1991. The Russian–Baltic bilateral treaties had not yet been ratified by the Russian parliament by the summer of 1991, although Democratic Russia deputies promised Estonian Popular Front representatives in July 1991 that they would be taking steps to secure ratification as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{42} But their phrasing enabled now-President Yeltsin (a position to which he had been elected in June 1991 by an overwhelming majority) to announce on August 24, immediately after the collapse of the attempted coup in Moscow, that the Russian Republic recognized the full independence of the three Baltic states. (Indeed, the Russian government tied for third place in recognising the Baltic states, neck and neck with Hungary and Denmark, and only beaten out by Iceland.)

Then Yeltsin, and the Baltic governments, went off to attend to immediate business. Yeltsin was attempting to strip the central Soviet government and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev of most of their powers while at the same time attempting to avert a collapse of the Union, or at least of Russian cooperation with Ukraine. The Baltic governments were attempting to negotiate a withdrawal of Soviet troops from their territories, as well as to consolidate, though new domestic institutions and laws and new international relations, their newly achieved state sovereignty. Neither side appeared to feel excessive concern about the future of relations; as Lennart Meri, in his first press conference in Tallinn as Foreign Minister of an independent Estonia, said: “We have the most friendly relations with the Russian Federation.”\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{38} “Agreement on the foundations for interstate relations between the RSFSR and the Estonian Republic”, 12 January 1991; “Agreement on the foundations for interstate relations between the RSFSR and the Latvian Republic,” 13 January 1991; “Agreement on the foundations for interstate relations between the RSFSR and the Lithuanian Republic,” 29 July 1991 (\textit{Vneshnaya Politika Rossii}: 29, 35, 58.)

\textsuperscript{39} Bungs 1993.

\textsuperscript{40} TASS 1 August 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-149, 2 August 1990: 65).


\textsuperscript{42} \textit{The Baltic Independent}, 5-11 July 1991: 2.

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{The Baltic Independent}, 30 August-5 September 1991: 4.
Issues straining relations

Within weeks, however, of the announcement on 8 December 1991 in Minsk by Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian leaders of the formation of a new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the decision on 21 December by eight of the other nine remaining Union republics to join them and to declare the Soviet Union defunct, relations between the Baltic states and the newly independent Russian Federation were already strained. There were three issues that had created, and were to continue to create, serious problems; and as it happened, the Western non-recognition policy of the post-war era was at least marginally implicated in two of these.

Troop withdrawals

The first bone of contention was the problem of former Soviet troops stationed on Baltic soil. These troops comprised naval, air force, and army troops belonging to the Soviet military’s Northwest Group of Forces (the successor to the former Baltic Military District). The Group had its headquarters in Riga; Tallinn was the headquarters for the Northern Group of the Baltic Fleet, and the large phased-array radar installation at Skrunda, in Latvia, was an important part of the Soviet ballistic missile warning system. Figures for these troops were notably difficult to obtain in both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. However, unofficial estimates put their total number in the region at 600,000 in 1990—100,000 in Lithuania, 200,000 in Estonia, and 300,000 in Latvia.

Immediately after the restoration of Baltic independence in August 1991, Baltic leaders decided to make the withdrawal of Soviet forces, which they feared might launch a revanchist strike, their major foreign policy goal. Despite disagreements about how best to approach the issue, a Baltic Council meeting in October 1991 ultimately issued a resolution calling for a swift and complete withdrawal of all troops from the Baltic capital cities, as well as of assault troops and paratroopers elsewhere on the three states’ territories. Soviet Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov had concluded agreements with the three Baltic governments acknowledging the Soviet Union’s responsibility for withdrawing troops in autumn 1991, but had stalled on withdrawal timetables. Nevertheless, withdrawals began in October 1991, with the result that by late January 1992, Baltic and Western analysts conservatively estimated the total number of troops remaining in the Baltic states at 128,000, including 28,000 officers, of which 43,000 were stationed in Lithuania, 60,000 in Latvia, and 25,000 in Estonia.

After the Russian government assumed jurisdiction over the forces on 28 January 1992, citing concerns about the difficulty of establishing a joint CIS command structure, Baltic governments continued to demand an immediate withdrawal of forces. Calling the continued presence of forces “a violation of sovereignty,” Baltic leaders, parliamentarians, and diplomats, individually or together at regional associations such

44 See Bungs 1992a for a discussion of the difficulty of obtaining precise figures.
46 Girnius 1992a: 29. Lithuanian Supreme Council chairman Vytautas Landsbergis favored a maximalist approach, insisting that a withdrawal should not be a question for negotiation and that all military personnel should leave the Baltic capitals by 1 November and all three states by the end of the year. Latvian and Estonian leaders considered his proposed deadlines unrealistic, and according to some reports “heated discussions almost prevented a consensus from being reached” (Girnius 1992a: 29).
48 The Baltic Independent, 4-10 October 1991: 1.
49 The Baltic Independent, 7-13 February 1992: 1; Bungs 1992a: 19. As noted, these were conservative estimates; some analysts put the figures substantially lower, at 34,000 for Lithuania, 48,000 for Latvia, and 23,000 for Estonia (Bungs 1992a: 19).
as the Baltic Council or the Baltic Assembly (an interparliamentary advisory group), demanded an immediate withdrawal, beginning with the Baltic capitals. They further proposed that the troops leave behind military hardware that could be used to set up new Baltic defence forces, “taking into account the military property of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania seized in 1940.” But above all else, they stressed that a withdrawal had to be complete, orderly, and immediate.

The Russian Federation political leadership, for their part, indicated clearly early on that they considered a withdrawal to be inevitable. Immediately after the 8 December 1991 Minsk meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev had told the RSFSR Supreme Soviet that it was the government’s aim to withdraw Russian forces from the territory of the other newly independent states, and Yeltsin in late December told journalists that troops would leave the Baltic states. But the military had for some time been voicing its opposition to a speedy pullout, citing the lack of housing for returning troops. Furthermore, Russian negotiators had made it clear that the military hoped to retain limited basing rights in the region, particularly at the Paldiski naval station in Estonia, which was an important submarine training base, and the Skrunda radar installation in Latvia. Soon the Russian side was making it clear that although the concept of a withdrawal was unqualified, its speed, timing and conditions were not.

Citizenship rights

Second was the problem of citizenship rights and social guarantees for Russophones living in the Baltic states, particularly in Estonia and Latvia. This issue arose due to the extreme demographic changes that had taken place in the Baltic republics since incorporation. Baltic population losses after August 1940 had been terrible. Western estimates put the population losses of the three Baltic states between 1940 and 1945 (during which period the republics were under Soviet, Nazi and again Soviet rule) at 20% of their populations. Nor did Baltic population losses halt in the post-war years: after 1945, Estonia lost about 100,000 citizens due to deportations, executions, and guerrilla warfare; Latvia, at least 150,000; and Lithuania (where guerrilla activity was more widespread), about 450,000. Furthermore, the Soviet government had encouraged substantial immigration to the Baltic republics, particularly to Estonia and Latvia; for example, total net immigration to Latvia from 1945 to 1990 was 941,000. As a consequence, while in 1989 ethnic Lithuanians still made up approximately 80% of their republic’s population, ethnic Latvians accounted for only 52% of their republic’s population, and ethnic Estonians only 62% of theirs. Meanwhile, ethnic Russians, most of whom had moved to the republics after 1940, now made up 30.3% of the Estonian and 34% of the Latvian populations; when Russian-speaking Slavs were added, the percentage rose to 34.9% in Estonia and 42% in Latvia.

As the Gorbachev period had progressed, Baltic resentment of Russophone residents—many of whom were recent arrivals, and who were often indifferent to or even 

56 Clemens 1991: 56.
57 Latvian Academy of Sciences, cited in Krickus 1993a: 3.
contemptuous of local cultures—and the Russification they represented had received increasing public expression. The more radical elements of the three Popular Fronts made no secret of the fact that they would be happy to see most Russophone residents leave, although the latter were not for the most part under physical threat. Indeed, the rise of the interfronts described above was due to some degree to the growing fears of local Russophones, who were particularly alarmed by laws passed in the three republics in 1988–1989 making the titular nationality languages the official languages of the republics (all three laws mandated a specific period within in which all government officials and sales personnel were required to become proficient in the official language) and stipulating residence requirements for those wishing to stand for elected office. The growth of the interfronts, however, only increased Baltic resentment and concerns about the possibility that Russophones were a potential "fifth column" for the centre. In fact, many local Russophones supported the Baltic independence drives. For example, when the three Baltic republics conducted referendums between 9 February and 3 March 1991 on the desirability of independence (while boycotting the 17 March all-Union referendum on the future of the Union), survey data suggested that about 30% of non-Estonians voted for the restoration of independence of the Republic of Estonia. Even in many heavily Russophone areas of the three republics, 50% or more of the population voted for independence. But the radical language of some Baltic nationalists on the one hand and the interfronts on the other heightened fears on both sides that accommodation was impossible.

As detailed above, Yeltsin and other Russian reformers were aware of the situation facing Russophones in the Baltic, and the strong feelings that the issue raised among Russian nationalists. At a December 1990 RSFSR Supreme Soviet session on the future of the Union Treaty, Yeltsin had been explicit: "We are in favor of any problem being tackled with the maximum of democracy and glasnost', in the spirit of interethnic accord and trust in one another...The Russian leadership will not be taking the stand of outside observer in these matters. We are not indifferent to the fate of the peoples of the republic, wherever they may live, be it the Russian population or other peoples without any national formation or existence outside its borders." By 1990, the Russian republic government had already begun to bring up its concerns about the status of Russophones with Baltic governments, which were discussed by the Russian side under the rubric of "human rights." In fact, Russian reformers viewed empire-saving elements of the Baltic Russophone population with disapproval; Yeltsin, asked immediately after the attacks in Vilnius of January 1991 about the attitude of the Russian republic leadership towardsRussophones in the Baltic republics, answered: "We must express our position very frankly and say that we support democratically-oriented forces, including those among the Russian population." But in a personal appeal a few days later, he appealed to Baltic populations as well to display maximum restraint, strength of spirit, and tolerance in warding off inter-ethnic conflict, and said that the Russian Federation's opposition to "any form of discrimination in interethnic relations" was "clear and

59 Sheehy 1993: 7
60 Misiunas and Taagepera 1993: 325; Lieven 1994: 192. A counter-effort by the USSR Supreme Soviet in November 1989 to pass a language law enshrining Russian as the official language of the Soviet Union by virtue of its status as "the language of inter-ethnic communication" was strongly opposed by Baltic and Georgian deputies, who decried the step as "colonial" (Nahaylo and Swoboda 1990: 343).
61 Taagepera 1993: 194. The same survey data suggests that around 40% opposed independence and about 30% failed to participate in the referendum, possibly indicating indifference or neutrality.
The Russian government’s concern was motivated at least in part by worries about a possible flow of Russophones from the Baltic states to the Russian republic; Russian officials had already suggested that a republic migration service be set up to handle refugees from interethnic conflicts that had reached a violent stage elsewhere in the Union. (Yeltsin actually had indicated in September 1990 that the RSFSR would welcome back any compatriots who wished to return to Russia, although he emphasized that he was not urging them to return.)

Yeltsin and his supporters had anticipated that the status of Russophones would be adequately covered in the bilateral treaties under discussion between the Baltic and Russian governments. These treaties were, after all, intended to be “all-embracing,” covering the political, economic and social spheres, with sections on interethnic relations. However, as Kozyrev later said: “Immediately after my being appointed Russian foreign minister, the guns were sent to Vilnius, so our immediate concern was to save the independence and democracy movement in those states against the Soviet crackdown. So we were in confrontation with Moscow much more than with the nationalists in those republics for the protection of human rights.” As a consequence, the treaties did contain some ambiguous language (as detailed below) designed to make rapid agreement possible. Indeed, some members of the Russophone community in Estonia voiced concern that the treaty did not go far enough to protect the rights of minorities in the future, which they attributed to the fact that the treaty had been drawn up without the input of the small Russophone faction in the Estonian legislature or other representatives of the Russophone community in Estonia. However, the Russian government reacted stiffly to these criticisms, with Yeltsin telling the press in Tallinn that the Russian-Estonian treaty was neither a retreat nor a betrayal, but was legal protection for the Russophone population. The Russian government also called into doubt the depth of Russophone opposition to the treaty in Estonia: Yeltsin's deputy in the legislature, Ruslan Khasbulatov, told a radio interviewer that when the Estonian parliament voted on 15 January to ratify the treaty, only 10 of nearly 70 Russian-speaking deputies had voted against ratification.

In September and October 1991, the Estonian and Latvian legislatures began considering laws or resolutions on citizenship. In each case, the legal continuity of once-again-independent states with the interwar Estonian and Latvian states—a position cemented by the Western non-recognition policy—was the animating principle behind the new legislation. A Latvian resolution (not yet finalized in the form of a citizenship law) limiting automatic citizenship to residents of the interwar Latvian republic and their descendents was passed on 15 October 1991; the Estonian parliament, rather than draft a new citizenship law, on 6 November 1991 reinstated the citizenship law of 1938. The Estonian citizenship law and the draft Latvian citizenship legislation stipulated that residents who did not qualify for automatic citizenship (which in both cases was limited to residents of the Soviet-era republics who were citizens of, or descended from citizens of, the interwar Republics) would have to meet a series of requirements (including residency and language requirements) and go through a

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69 See, for example, interview with Boris Yeltsin, Moscow News, no. 23, 17-24 June 1990: 7.
74 The Estonian law came into force on 26 February 1992 (Sheehy 1993: 8).
potentially cumbersome application process. Length of residence in Estonia or Latvia during the Soviet period was considered to be irrelevant. Persons deemed to be a threat to Estonian or Latvian security—in particular those who had served in the Soviet security apparatus—were ineligible to become citizens. Under these conditions, approximately 475,000 Russophones living in Estonia and 734,000 Russophones living in Latvia were abruptly rendered stateless for a period of at least three years. When other groups were taken into account, the Estonian government ended up disenfranchising nearly 30% of the country’s potential voters, and the Latvian government over 40%. Significantly, citizenship was more than an issue of the right to vote: it also served as the basis for the allocation of economic and employment rights.

Unsurprisingly, the Russian government protested that Estonian and Latvian citizenship policies were discriminatory against Russophones. Russian representatives argued that the Estonian and Latvian laws violated the terms of the January 1991 Russian-Estonian and Russian-Latvian treaties, which were obviously intended to calm local Russophones’ fears about their long-term status in the republic and which the Russian government believed had established a “zero variant” option on citizenship. In particular, Article III of each of the treaties agreed that all those living on territory of each republic at the time of signing of the agreement should have “the right to maintain or achieve citizenship in the RSFSR or the Republic of Estonia/Latvia according to their expression of free will.” The Estonian and Latvian governments, of course, argued that they were sticking by the letter of the treaty; any resident of the Soviet-era republic (except for members of the security services), regardless of ethnicity, who wished to achieve citizenship in time, provided that they met the language requirement and passed the civics examination. Nevertheless, the Russian Supreme Soviet, although it had already ratified the Russian–Estonian treaty on 26 December 1991, called on the Russian Foreign Ministry in January 1992 to prepare within two months a draft bilateral agreement on questions of citizenship and ownership; to proceed in their relations with the Estonian government “on the premise that in the sphere of human rights and freedoms, including the rights of national minorities, the norms of international law apply.”

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75 For example, residents of Soviet Estonia who wished to acquire Estonian citizenship could apply after residing on Estonian territory for two years, starting from 30 March 1990; applications would then be subject to a one-year waiting period, with the result that the earliest a resident could acquire citizenship would be 30 March 1993. Candidates for citizenship also had to pass an Estonian language test and an examination, conducted in Estonian, of their knowledge of the Estonian constitution (Torni 1994: 74). The laws thus “created a formidable set of practical and psychological hurdles” for Russophones to negotiate if they were to become equal members of Estonian and Latvian society (Melvin 1998: 43).

76 In Estonia, for instance, 78% of the Russophone population in 1991 had lived in the republic for 21 years or more; about 90% had lived in the republic for at least 10 years (Forced Migrations Project 1998: 20).

77 Chinn and Kaiser 1996: 113. The earliest date by which an Estonian resident could be naturalized was 30 March 1993. A Latvian citizenship law was not passed until 22 June 1994; it called for a ten-year residency requirement, a drop from the sixteen-year requirement stipulated by the Supreme Council resolution on citizenship of 15 October 1991 that served in its place until that time. Under amendments to this law (already revised in August 1994) passed in March 1995, the residency requirement was dropped to a five-year period beginning no earlier than 4 May 1990 (Girnius 1994: 31; Orentlicher 1998: 301-302).

78 Bungs, Girnius, and Kionka 1992: 1-2; Bungs 1992c: 3. When the Estonian government held a referendum on the new Estonian constitution on 24 June 1992 that included the question of whether non-citizens should be permitted to vote, 53.9% of Estonians rejected the proposition (Brady and Kaplan 1994: 193).

have priority over national legislation for all states belonging to the CSCE;” and to proceed “from the premise that the Russian Federation intends to offer protection to its citizens living on the territory of the Estonian Republic.”

Many prominent Russian politicians, military figures, and other citizens soon appeared convinced that as a consequence of Baltic citizenship policies, Russophones in Estonia and Latvia faced hardship ranging from loss of human and civil rights to mass expulsion.

Status of the 1920 treaties, legality of incorporation, and accompanying border issues and compensation claims

A third problem could be found in the complex of issues surrounding the status of the 1920 Soviet-Baltic peace treaties. After the restoration of independence, the Estonian and Latvian governments in particular stepped up calls for the Russian government to accept the 1920 treaties as the legal basis for bilateral relations. These treaties were of high symbolic significance to the Baltic states: as the first international agreements to have been signed by the three independent Baltic governments, they had served as the “birth certificates” for the interwar Baltic states. Their recognition as valid, Baltic representatives argued, would be the final proof that these states (thanks in large degree to the Western non-recognition policy) had now truly been legally reanimated.

From the Russian perspective, however, legal reanimation of the interwar Baltic states had already shown a disagreeable side in the ability of the Baltic states to reinstate existing citizenship laws rather than pass new ones. Furthermore, recognition of the 1920 treaties had the potential to put legal flesh back on an even more unwelcome skeleton, that of Soviet Russia. By virtue of the Russian Federation’s status as a continuer (rather than successor) state of the USSR, the Russian government was already flirting dangerously with the possibility that a degree of legal identity could be discovered between Russia and the Soviet Union; if the Russian government now recognized the 1920 treaties as still valid, claims of legal identity with Soviet Russia would be hard to avoid. And this would mean—as Baltic representatives themselves had made quite clear—claims for compensation for damages inflicted by the Soviet government between 1940 and 1991, as well as continuing damage by former Soviet military forces still on Baltic territory. (The Lithuanian government, to give an idea, calculated the worth of damages at US$150 billion.) Nor was there any logical reason why the Baltic states should be the only ones to raise claims. The Yeltsin administration thus faced a possible compensation nightmare should the 1920 treaties be found to be still valid.

Even more dramatic was the question of boundaries. The three treaties delineated borders between their Baltic signatories and Soviet Russia; under their terms, Soviet Russia renounced “voluntarily and forever all rights of sovereignty held by Russia” over Baltic territories and their populations. However, after the recapture of Estonian and Latvian territory from German forces in 1944, the Soviet government transferred about

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82 The “birth certificate” metaphor was that of Estonian President Lennart Meri; see, for instance, PACE ORD, 25 April 1995: 323.


84 Bungs 1994.
2,300 square kilometers (about 5%) of the territory of the interwar Estonian Republic and about 1,400 square kilometers (about 2%) of the territory of the interwar Latvian Republic to the RSFSR, adding some parts to Leningrad Oblast' and combining others with existing RSFSR territory to form a new RSFSR administrative unit, Pskov Oblast'. An additional 700 square kilometers of Estonia was transferred in 1953, and the town of Ivangoord (Jaanilinn in Estonian—traditionally considered by Estonians to be part of the Estonian city of Narva, although it lies across the Narva River) was transferred in 1954. To many Estonians and Latvians, the idea of "restoring" the interwar states without the full complement of their interwar territories was like the idea of reincarnation minus a limb: it not only constituted, in their eyes, a historical injustice, but called into question the project of recreating a past state.

While the possibility of compensation claims against the Russian Federation, as opposed to the central government, had only arisen since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the salience of the territorial issue had been evident to the RSFSR since well before. As a consequence, in late 1990 and early 1991 the RSFSR government had been extremely wary of making any mention of the Tartu or Riga Peace Treaties in the Russian-Estonian or Russian-Latvian interstate treaties. Ultimately, in these treaties the two sides based their claims to sovereignty (and hence to the right to enter into treaties) on declarations made by currently existing state entities—in the Russian case, the June 1990 declaration of sovereignty, in the Estonian case the March 1990 declaration of transition to independence and an August 1990 resolution setting guidelines for independence talks with the USSR, and in the Latvian case the May 1990 declaration of the restoration of independence. As the Russian declaration of sovereignty made no mention of Soviet Russia, neither side thereby committed themselves to a stance that could imperil their legal claims to the transferred territories. This ambiguous situation persisted through the last days of the Soviet Union. After the August 1991 attempted coup in Moscow, Yeltsin's office issued a statement: "The Russian Federation casts no doubts on the right of every state and people to self-determination. However, the problem of borders still exists. It may be left unresolved and is only tolerable as such if there exists a relationship of alliance which is registered in a relevant treaty. In the event that such a relationship ceases, the RSFSR reserves the right to revise borders. This applies to all contiguous republics, with the exception of the Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, whose independence has already been recognized by Russia, confirming that the territorial problem in bilateral relations is solvable." But Baltic governments begged to differ, reminding the Russian government that the border issue was still open; after the restoration of independence, the Estonian government in particular took immediate steps to annul all Soviet-era decrees on borders in order to clear the way for territorial readjustments. At a press conference on the occasion of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the RSFSR and Estonia, Kozyrev and his

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87 In the Lithuanian case, where no potential territorial dispute existed, no reference was made to any legal basis for sovereignty, the two sides instead stating their certainty that the "elimination of the sovereignty-violating consequences of the Soviet Union's annexation of Lithuania in 1940" would create additional conditions for trust between the contracting sides and their peoples ("Agreement on the foundations for interstate relations between the RSFSR and the Estonian Republic", 12 January 1991; "Agreement on the foundations for interstate relations between the RSFSR and the Latvian Republic," 13 January 1991; "Agreement on the foundations for interstate relations between the RSFSR and the Lithuanian Republic," 29 July 1991 (Vneshnaya Politika Rossii: 29, 35, 58); Kionka 1991: 1).
Estonian interlocutors were forced to skirt the issue by emphasizing that until the issue of borders was settled by treaty, both republics would “proceed on the basis of the status quo.”

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the issue of borders resurfaced. On the Baltic side, some Estonian and Latvian politicians began to speak of the possibility of seeing territory restored. The Latvian government approved in early 1992 the printing of maps that showed the disputed territories as part of Latvia. Furthermore, the new constitution approved by Estonian voters in July 1992 made reference to Estonia’s pre-war borders. Meanwhile, for its part, the Russian government unsurprisingly wanted the border issue dropped. The Russian Supreme Soviet had already shown itself highly sensitive on the issue, ratifying the Russian–Estonian treaty on 26 December 1991 but calling on the Foreign Ministry to hold off on any talks about border changes until the question had been examined by the legislature. A Russian Foreign Ministry statement issued in April 1992 stressed that Russia would “strongly oppose” any efforts to regain territory. Furthermore, the Russian government dug in its heels on the broader question of the continued validity of the 1920 treaties. Russian officials argued that the treaties had been invalidated by the course of history; as a consequence, Russian delegations simply refused to entertain any possibility of recognizing the validity of the treaties or of using them as starting points for negotiations.

All of these issues were emotive ones for those involved. The general political climate in early 1992 all four states was already highly emotionally charged. In the Baltic states, pride over the restoration of independence competed with what Vamik Volkan described a few years later as “generalized anxiety:” anxiety over the fate of their independence; anxiety over their economic futures; and anxiety about creating (or re-creating) “pure” Baltic identities (particularly in Estonia and Latvia, where demographic pressures put additional strains on projects such as the resuscitation of national languages). In this context, the issues of troop withdrawals and border restoration took on emotional significance beyond their immediate practical implications. Meanwhile, Russians both within and outside the Baltic states were experiencing the shock of redefinition, from being “locals” to being “occupiers.” Indignation on the part of Russian national-patriots at Baltic “ingratidute” for liberation from Nazi control and infrastructure laid down during the Soviet period merged with indignation from Russian reformers over Baltic “ingratidute” for Russian support during the Baltic struggle for

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90 TASS, 24 October 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-208, 28 October 1992: 70). Following the failure of the coup, the RSFSR claimed for itself the right to establish diplomatic relations in parallel with the all-Union Foreign Ministry.

91 For example, Estonian parliamentary speaker Arnold Rüütel, visiting Moscow the day after the CIS was formed, told Yeltsin that Estonia wanted to correct “to a certain extent” its borders with Russia, as there was “no logic at all” in the borders established by the Soviet government—although he felt the problem should be addressed through negotiations (TASS, 9 December 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-237, 10 December 1991: 53); Estonian Radio, 9 December 1991 (SWB, 12 December 1991: A2/4)).


97 Volkan 1997: 146.
independence. In this atmosphere, the prospective humiliation of a hasty withdrawal of “occupying” troops or of ceding territory made such steps even less palatable to Russian representatives.

Attempts to address questions bilaterally

Both sides initially attempted to deal with these issues at the bilateral level. Both sides moved quickly to signal good will through high-level visits. Kozyrev made a quick trip to Estonia, the first former Soviet republic that he visited after the collapse of the Union, on 14 January 1992. Lithuanian president Vytautas Landsbergis met with Yeltsin in Moscow on 17 January 1992, with the two sides announcing imminent bilateral talks on troop withdrawals. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev further visited all three Baltic states in May, professing the Russian government’s desire for good relations with all three states.

Unsurprisingly, the issue of a troop withdrawal rapidly became the top item on the two sides’ agenda. Talks addressing the issue did not start up as quickly after the collapse of the USSR as the Baltic leaderships would have liked, due to confusion about how the newly formed CIS intended to deal with jurisdictional issues. At a Baltic Council meeting on 5 January 1992, the Baltic presidents issued a joint appeal to the now-independent former Soviet republics to recall their citizens serving in the forces stationed in the Baltic states. The appeal stated that “the former USSR’s armed forces are still illegally located on the territory of the independent states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, regardless of the repeated demands of the Baltic States to withdraw these troops from their territories. This situation cannot be combined with international rights; it is a violation of the state sovereignty of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and does not promote the strengthening of our confidence in the Commonwealth of Independent States.” Finally, with little progress occurring on the formation of a CIS joint command structure, on 28 January the Russian government declared legal authority over all former Soviet forces deployed outside the CIS. Within a fortnight of the Russian government’s assumption of jurisdiction over former Soviet forces, a Russian delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakhrai visited all three Baltic states, signing communiqués with Latvia and Lithuania stating that withdrawals would begin by March and February respectively; withdrawals were already underway from Estonia.

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98 As State Secretary Gennadiy Burbulis told researchers, “We marched arm in arm with [Baltic leaders] to ensure that their independence would be peacefully attained, and then as soon as they were independent they became nationalists and began discriminating against the Russian-speaking population. They betrayed their friends.” Similar sentiments were expressed by parliamentarians Sergei Stankevich, Evgeniy Ambartsumov and others (Guroff and Guroff 1994: 93). On the subject of “ingratitude” for liberation from Nazi control, Vamik Volkan provides a fascinating description of a meeting, at which he was an observer, between Latvian officials and Russian diplomats in 1993. During heated exchanges, a Latvian official—a key figure in drafting the country’s new citizenship laws—married to a Russian asserted that his children were pure Latvian, that they were not “contaminated” by his wife’s Russian blood; the first secretary of the Russian Embassy, who had expressed pride at the Soviet Union’s role in defeating the Nazis, ended up shouting at him “I saved you!” (Volkan 1997: 146-147)

By mid-1992, however, it was evident that withdrawal negotiations were unlikely to be completed soon. Although Russian politicians insisted that a withdrawal was inevitable, the Russian side soon became adamant that a withdrawal could not take place immediately. In late December 1991, Yeltsin had told the press in Rome that due to the housing crisis provoked by the need to repatriate troops from Eastern Europe as well as the Baltic states, a withdrawal could take up to three years, the same time allotted to the troop withdrawal from Germany.\(^\text{105}\) During his trip to Estonia in January, Kozyrev had said that a withdrawal would be gradual and would take two to three years, although he emphasized that Russia would not “purposefully delay” the withdrawal.\(^\text{106}\) Shakhrai, when asked during his visit if the Russian army would be gone from Estonia by 1994, had responded “Yes, I am convinced of that, and I hope it could happen even sooner.”\(^\text{107}\) But the commander of the North West Group of Forces, Colonel-General Valery Mironov, had told reporters before Shakhrai’s visit that “[w]e have already encountered problems generated by the rashness with which troops were moved out of East European countries. We cannot allow a situation where officers and men live in tents in the open field.”\(^\text{108}\) By a few weeks later Shakhrai had qualified his estimates, saying that “[t]he Russian delegation does not wish to repeat the lamentable experience the Soviet Union had with Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Poland.”\(^\text{109}\) Indeed, some Russian representatives began to suggest that a withdrawal could not begin until former Soviet troops had left Germany and Poland in 1994.\(^\text{110}\) By mid-1992, although Yeltsin had offered substantial withdrawals in 1992 and 1993, the best final withdrawal dates proposed by the Russian side were 1997 for Estonia and 1999 for Latvia.\(^\text{111}\) Nor were the Russians the only ones complicating negotiations: for example, Russian–Estonian talks were called to temporary halt by Estonian side in late May in protest over a Russian non-paper describing Estonia as part of the “near abroad” and the two sides’ inability to agree on legal point of departure (the 1920 treaty or the Estonian declaration of independence of 20 August 1991).\(^\text{112}\) In August, however, Kozyrev at a meeting with Baltic foreign ministers in Moscow produced a proposal to withdraw forces by 1994. The proposal, however, came with a list of nine conditions; unsurprisingly, Baltic representatives rejected them indignantly.\(^\text{113}\)

Meanwhile, the Russian side similarly was trying to achieve bilateral accord on the legal status of Baltic Russophones. Faced with crises not only in the Baltic region but also in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Russian government had moved to assume a high level of responsibility for the fate of Russophones even before the collapse of the USSR. At the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies convened after the August 1991 coup attempt, Yeltsin told the assembled delegates that while the Union structure as a whole needed to provide strict guarantees of human rights throughout the whole territory of the country, “Russia affirms adherence to its contractual obligations in this

\(^\text{107}\) The Baltic Independent, 7-13 February 1992: 2.
\(^\text{110}\) Girnius 1992a: 29.
\(^\text{112}\) Kionka 1992b.
\(^\text{113}\) Bungs 1992a: 27. The conditions included the granting of legal status to troops so as to ensure their normal functioning during the transition period; dropping compensation claims; guarantees of social security and civil rights for Soviet officers who had retired in the Baltic states and their families; alteration of laws infringing on the political and economic rights of Russophones; and dropping territorial claims.
matter and will defend the interests of the Russian people beyond the borders of the republic."\textsuperscript{114} Now, during his February 1992 visit, Kozyrev passed to the Estonian side draft treaties on the defense of national minorities, citizenship, legal assistance, and consular issues worked out in accordance with the Russian-Estonian interstate treaty of January 1991.\textsuperscript{115} He also met with Russophone representatives, promising that Russia would defend their rights.\textsuperscript{116} At the April 1992 round of Latvian-Russian troop withdrawal talks, the two sides agreed to form a subgroup to discuss humanitarian issues; a similar move was proposed by Russian side during talks with Lithuanian representatives in May.\textsuperscript{117} Meanwhile, Shelov-Kovedyayev assured Baltic governments during his visit in May that Russia would act "according to international norms" in its efforts to defend the interests of local Russophones.\textsuperscript{118}

In pursuing their aims, both sides resorted to pressure tactics. Baltic governments employed, or profited from, three basic strategies. The first was logistical pressure. For instance, the Latvian government in January 1992 banned all military maneuvers by former Soviet troops on Latvian soil and made troop movements subject to parliamentary approval.\textsuperscript{119} The Estonian government, blaming Russian non-delivery of flour and cereals, announced in January 1992 that it would stop provisioning former Soviet troops.\textsuperscript{120} Similarly, the Tallinn city council passed a resolution, effective 10 July 1992, which declared the city of Tallinn off-limits to recruits and junior officers of Russian border guard and army units, as well as to military transports between 4 PM and 9 AM.\textsuperscript{121} Krasnaya Zvezda, the military newspaper, reported in August 1992 that Latvia had banned Russian troops from using three training grounds and that in Lithuania servicemen were having difficulty getting food, as they could not use local stores. "What is the point," the reporter asked, "of the decision...instructing Russian servicemen not to move outside their unit except in groups of at least ten men accompanied by an officer who has appropriate permission from the Estonian administration?" Similar bans were also in place on vehicular and ship movement in all three states.\textsuperscript{122}

The second Baltic pressure tactic was demonstrations of the strength of domestic public opinion. In the Latvian and Estonian cases, these took the primary form of parliamentary or other public resolutions; for example, the Latvian parliament adopted a resolution in January 1992 denouncing as illegal the 1940 annexation.\textsuperscript{123} Meanwhile, in Lithuania, a public referendum on the desirability of a troop withdrawal was held on 14 June 1992. The referendum drew a 76% voter turnout; of these, 90.8% agreed with the necessity for a complete and unconditional withdrawal by the end of 1992, as well as for compensation for damages accumulated since 1940.\textsuperscript{124}

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\textsuperscript{114} Moscow Central Television, 3 September 1991 (SWB, 5 September 1991: C1/4). Yeltsin's next sentence after this statement, however, was: "Russia will build relations with sovereign states on foundations of equality, good neighborliness, mutual benefit, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs."
\textsuperscript{115} Izvestiya, 2 April 1992: 5.
\textsuperscript{116} The Baltic Independent, 24-30 January 1992: 2.
\textsuperscript{118} The Baltic Independent, 8-14 May 1992: 1.
\textsuperscript{119} The Baltic Independent, 17-23 January 1992: 5.
\textsuperscript{120} "Obviously," the Estonian official commented, "Russia does not want to feed its soldiers"(The Baltic Independent, 9-15 January 1992: 1).
\textsuperscript{123} The Baltic Independent, 24-30 April 1992: 1, 9.
\end{flushright}
The third pressure tactic, which cropped up most frequently in Estonia and which did not always involve direct government action, was armed attacks on military installations. Various reports indicated that attacks against installations and servicemen took place across the first half of 1992. One report noted that between May and July, ten cases of “unlawful action against Russian servicemen;” another calculated that between the two months to 14 August 1992, nine incidents took place involving an exchange of fire between Russian and Estonia soldiers, and there were four more “near misses.”

A further story reported more than forty armed attacks on military subunits between June and August, including the seizure of a military airfield. These exchanges frequently involved not regular Estonian military forces, but members of volunteer paramilitary groupings. For example, on 5 July 1992, the all-volunteer “Kaitseliit” paramilitary division, a civil militia division of the Defense Ministry, carried out an attack on military installation in village of Ritsi and stole military vehicles; on 27 July they attacked the Baltic fleet compound, resulting in the capture of 24 Estonians. An Estonian commission investigating the latter episode found all responsibility on Russian side, implying that latter should issue an official apology. As the state minister heading the commission wrote, the “[l]egally unfounded engagement of Russian troops in the capital of a sovereign state ought to be qualified as a disregard of the sovereignty of Estonia and a blatant violation of international law.” While attacks on installations were averted in Latvia and Lithuania, tensions were still high; for example, Lithuanian soldiers in May 1992 shot out the tires of Russian military vehicles that failed to stop for checkpoints.

Unsurprisingly, these attacks provoked a firm response from the Russian government. Kozyrev told reporters in July that “[s]o far we are acting in a civilized fashion [in response to attacks on military installations in the Baltic states]. However, we may be compelled to use force...This would be pure self-defense and we could not be accused of anything.” After the attack on the Baltic fleet compound, an Estonian Deputy Foreign Minister conveyed the Estonian government’s regret to the Russian embassy in Tallinn, saying that that the actions, and the Estonian Defense Forces’ participation in them, were recognized by the Estonian government as mistakes. On 10 August the Estonian government ordered that any armed actions by defense forces, including civil militia units, be coordinated with the Defense Forces General Headquarters and occur only by order of the government. Prime Minister Tiit Vahi told the media that armed attacks not sanctioned by the Defense Forces or government would be considered “provocative acts,” and noted that “Estonia will only be able to count on confidence in military issues on the part of other countries if its own armed forces are under control.”

127 Kionka 1992c: 34. The Estonians were released after negotiations, but not before the Russians stripped them and gave them a beating (Krasnaya Zvezda, 29 July 1992: 1; Komsomolskaya Pravda, 29 July 1992: 1 (Joint Publications Research Service, Soviet Union/Central Eurasia (henceforth JPRS USR) JPRS-USR-92-100, 7 August 1992: 9)).
130 However, he also argued for the need to come to some agreement with Baltic governments over the legal status of forces stationed in the Baltic states, acknowledging that as long as they had no legal status, they could enjoy no legal protection (Komsomolskaya Pravda, 9 June 1992: 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-111, 9 June 1992: 12)).
Meanwhile, the Russian side was not above a little arm-twisting of its own, although the Russian Foreign Ministry was able to let the far more nationalist Supreme Soviet do much of the dirty work. That body issued on a string of statements on Baltic issues, culminating in July 1992 with a statement on the rights of Russians in the Baltic; on the same day, legislators passed a resolution calling on Russian government to consider the settlement of citizenship issues to be its first task in negotiations and to prepare to impose temporary economic sanctions against Estonia if it continued to practice “brutal violations of human rights against the Russian-speaking population.”\textsuperscript{134} They further appealed to the United Nations to take up the issue, and called for the legislature’s foreign affairs committee to draft by 20 September an additional resolution suspending the January 1991 Russian–Estonian interstate treaty.\textsuperscript{135} The Foreign Ministry and the Russian government successfully fought against or stalled these harsh measures, permitting Kozyrev and Yeltsin to lay claim to the moderate position while profiting from the threats of others.

But the Russian side had another big card up its sleeve: the possibility of linking citizenship issues to a troop withdrawal. Russian reformers consistently balked at the idea of sending troops to intervene on the behalf of Russians living outside the Russian Federation. Kozyrev had argued in April that “[w]hen it comes to defending Russians’ rights, yes, we will defend them...but not sending groups of armed people. Any violation of international law will rebound against the Russians there, and in most cases this simply spells defeat.”\textsuperscript{136} However, the government was coming under substantial pressure, and not just from the “red-brown” opposition communist and nationalist-patriotic forces, to help Russians outside the Russian Federation. State Counselor Sergei Stankevich, for instance, argued that Kozyrev was setting up a simplistic opposition of “occupying the territory of a republic and imposing a grim regime of terror” to “solving everything in a civilized manner,” while refusing to discuss measures such as unilateral sanctions. “It is 18 months,” he wrote, “since Russia signed treaties with Estonia and Latvia in which, in particular, the sides guaranteed civic equality of all ethnic groups. The Latvian and Estonian parliaments grossly violated these treaties...But Russia has not hitherto insisted on the inclusion of this item on the agenda for bilateral talks with the Baltic republics’ delegations. Where do ‘civilized methods’ take priority here? How many years are we going to spend trying to get people to heed us and take account of our pain?”\textsuperscript{137} Meanwhile, members of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy’s right-wing Liberal Democratic Russian Democratic Party’s political council were disseminating statements demanding that the RF government apply “decisive and effective measures” in connection with Baltic “infringements upon legitimate human rights.”\textsuperscript{138} Kozyrev in April had warned that the Russian government would not be above “strong-arm methods” if necessary; and indeed, low-profile efforts to establish the legitimacy of linkage began to emerge in Russian-Baltic talks.\textsuperscript{139} In August 1992, however, the Russian political leadership began to talk openly about linking withdrawal timetable to Baltic laws on citizenship and willingness to grant residence permits to immigrants.\textsuperscript{140}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{134} Rossiskaya Gazeta, 24 July 1992: 2 (JPRS-USR-92-101, 10 August 1992: 2).
\item \textsuperscript{135} Rossiskaya Gazeta, 24 July 1992: 2 (JPRS-USR-92-101, 10 August 1992: 3); Kionka 1992c: 36.
\item \textsuperscript{136} Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1 April 1992: 1,3 (FBIS-SOV-92-064, 2 April 1992: 20). Yeltsin had similarly argued to Russian servicemen during the events of January 1991 that violence in the Baltic republics would endanger the position of local Russians (Riga Domestic Service, 13 January (\textit{SWB}, 15 January 1991: 19).
\item \textsuperscript{137} Izvestiya, 8 July 1992: 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-133, 10 July 1992: 36).
\item \textsuperscript{138} Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1 August 1992: 2 (JPRS-USR-92-104, 15 August 1992: 2).
\item \textsuperscript{139} Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1 April 1992: 1,3 (FBIS-SOV-92-064, 2 April 1992: 20); Bungs 1992a: 24.
\item \textsuperscript{140} Lange 1994: 242.
\end{itemize}
But both sides had a further potential source of pressure, into which both sought to tap: both sides turned rapidly to the international community for sympathy and support for their positions. The Baltic governments were much quicker off the mark and more explicit about what they were doing.\(^{141}\) This was partly due to the fact that Balts already had a history, both of the strategy of internationalization and with the institutions in question. For example, during the Council of Europe parliamentary delegation visit in February 1991, Baltic governments stressed their determination to “internationalize” the Baltic issue, hoping that the outside world would give practical recognition of the republics’ independence.\(^{142}\) At a Baltic hearing of the Parliamentary Assembly in Helsinki in June 1991, Baltic representatives had stressed that the Baltic issue was “an international question.” Baltic determination to internationalize their approach to relations with Russia appears to have solidified at a Baltic Council meeting of March 1992, at which representatives of the three countries issued their stiffest and broadest-ranging criticism of the continued presence of troops and of the Russian government’s approach to the problem to date.\(^{143}\) But it did not take long for the Russian government to take up the strategy as well. Galina Starovoytova, Yeltsin’s adviser on interethnic affairs, said in May 1992: “We are bringing more pressure on the leaders of republics where the rights of Russians are being infringed on through international organizations—the CSCE, the European Parliament, and others.”\(^{144}\) And Kozyrev told the press a few days later that “all European countries and institutions” should be engaged in the process of finding solutions for the problem of “mass and systemic violation of human rights” in Latvia and Estonia.\(^{145}\)

“Internationalization” took many forms. First, both sides, but particularly the Baltic governments, approached individual Western governments for support for their positions. These appeals were particularly aimed at neighbors and at leading states such as the United States and Great Britain; for example, in September 1991, Baltic leaders had urged Bush to pressure the USSR into pulling its troops out of the Baltic states.\(^{146}\) Second, both sides appealed to groups of powerful states or aid donors, such as the Group of 7 (G-7) or a 64-country conference on aid to the former Soviet Union held in Lisbon in May 1992.\(^{147}\) Prior to the July 1992 G-7 meeting in Munich at which aid to Russia was to be discussed, the Baltic Council issued an appeal for pressure for a troop withdrawal, requesting that the G-7 make economic aid directly dependent on “the plan and graphs of the Army’s withdrawal from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia submitted by the Russian Federation and coordinated with the Baltic states and on real steps towards unconditionally withdrawing the entire army.” They further proposed that the G-7 allocate funds to finance the troop withdrawal.\(^{148}\) Third, particularly the Baltic states appealed to groups of neighbor states, including the Nordic Council and the Baltic Assembly. Fourth, both sides approached international institutions outside the European

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\(^{144}\) “But,” she noted, “it should not be forgotten that Russia’s capabilities are restricted by international legal norms and the sovereignty of states” (Smena, 6 May 1992: 1 (JPRS-USR-92-065, 3 June 1992: 16).


\(^{147}\) *The Baltic Independent*, 29 May-4 June 1992: 1, 3.

context, such as the United Nations. For instance, the three Baltic delegations to the United Nations requested that a point entitled “The complete withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territory of the Baltic states” be included on the agenda of the UN General Assembly session in September 1992; leaders of all three Baltic states addressed the session, calling for a troop withdrawal and, in the case of Latvian President Anatolijs Gorbunovs, voluntary repatriation of ethnic Russians from the Baltic to Russia.\(^{149}\) (In this arena, Baltic representatives for the most part had access only to the General Assembly; but Russian representatives were able to address the Security Council as well.\(^{150}\)) Fifth, political actors within and outside of government, particularly in the Baltic states, appealed to the international academic and non-governmental organization (NGO) community for support. For instance, the Estonian Greens asked Greenpeace and other international environmental organizations to join them in protesting the continued presence and closed status of Paldiski naval base.\(^{151}\)

Finally, Baltic and Russian representatives approached three European institutions: the CSCE; the Council of Europe; and NATO.\(^{152}\) As early as January 1992, Estonian Foreign Minister Lennart Meri complained to the Prague meeting of CSCE foreign ministers that renaming the Baltic Military District to the Northwest Group of Forces was the only change that had occurred in the status of Soviet forces since the restoration of Baltic independence and called for CSCE monitors to oversee a withdrawal.\(^{153}\) These became the most persistent and comprehensive campaigns for help. Baltic and Russian representatives increasingly raised issues of concern; by mid-1992, they were speaking up at virtually every session of these three institutions. At the CSCE, one or both sides raised issues at the Councils of Foreign Ministers in March 1992;\(^{154}\) the preparatory meeting in March 1992 for the July Helsinki CSCE heads of state and government summit;\(^{155}\) follow-up meetings between March and July 1992;\(^{156}\) Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) meetings in Helsinki in early and mid-May 1992;\(^{157}\) and the summit in July.\(^{158}\) At the Council of Europe, Baltic and Russian representatives spoke at the February and May sessions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and at the PACE Political Commission.\(^{159}\) At NATO, Baltic and Russian delegates spoke at a NATO conferences on security in the Baltic states in December 1991–January 1992 and April 1992 and at the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) meeting in June 1992.\(^{160}\) In many cases, Baltic or Russian representatives issued appeals to all these organizations at once. For instance, after Yeltsin announced a suspension of troop withdrawals on 29 October 1992, Baltic leaders at a meeting of the

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\(^{151}\) The Baltic Independent, 22-28 May 1992: 3.

\(^{152}\) As noted earlier, the CSCE became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in December 1994 and the NACC became the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in July 1997.

\(^{153}\) The Baltic Independent, 7-13 February 1992: 2.

\(^{154}\) The Baltic Independent, 7-13 February 1992: 2; Statement, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, opening session, CSCE Ministerial meeting, Helsinki, 24 March 1992.


\(^{156}\) Statement, Russian delegation member I. Shichanina, meeting of Working Group Three, Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, Helsinki 9 April 1992.

\(^{157}\) 10th CSO Meeting, Helsinki, 29 April-1 May 1992 (10CSO/J); The Baltic Independent, 22-28 May 1992: 3.

\(^{158}\) See, for instance, address by Latvian Supreme Council Chairman Anatolijs Gorbunovs, CSCE Summit Meeting, Helsinki, 9 July 1992.


Baltic Council appealed to the Council of Europe, the European Community, the CSCE, the UN Secretary General, and NATO for support.\textsuperscript{161}

In these appeals, Baltic delegations showed themselves better organized and better coordinated, possibly a legacy of cooperation against the Soviet leadership. Baltic speakers—for instance, the three chairmen of the three Baltic legislatures in their presentations to the July 1992 CSCE Helsinki Summit Meeting—showed a strong consistency of themes, whether or not their statements had been formally coordinated.\textsuperscript{162} The Baltic delegations were also adept at proposing coordinated language, for instance for the Declaration to be issued at the Helsinki Summit Meeting of the CSCE in July 1992.\textsuperscript{163} Baltic delegations to the PACE held trilateral meetings to further cooperation both at the PACE and in Political Affairs Committee meetings.\textsuperscript{164} Russian delegations similarly sometimes showed coordination in themes, although frequently among delegates of roughly similar political persuasions.\textsuperscript{165} However, Russian delegations often seemed to have failed to coordinate issues among themselves, let alone with other delegations; for example, the Russian delegation to the PACE frequently showed itself divided on the issue of Baltic membership.\textsuperscript{166}

Many of these appeals, of course, were picked up by the press. As Chapter Three will discuss in further detail, Baltic governments in particular were sensitive to the need to play to an international public audience; and major meetings, which were of more likely to attract media attention, were seen as prime venues for appeals. For example, Baltic representatives considered the July 1992 Helsinki Summit Meeting of heads of state and governments, which was supposed to mark the final end of the Cold War, as a particularly good venue to try to internationalize the issue of a troop withdrawal.\textsuperscript{167} (In fact, Baltic and Russian diplomats engaged in nearly four months of negotiations and lobbying over the language of the Final Declaration, which was widely distributed to the press.\textsuperscript{168} ) Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to discuss these efforts as purely media-driven, as appeals emerged as persistently \textit{in camera} as they did in public venues. At the public meeting of the Helsinki preparatory meeting in March 1992, for instance, Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans spoke of the need to draw international attention to the issue of the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Baltic states.\textsuperscript{169} But meanwhile, in closed sessions of working groups, Baltic delegations were arguing that “only through an internationalized discussion of this issue can a rational and reasonable solution [to the troop withdrawal issue] be found.”\textsuperscript{170}

\textsuperscript{161} Some Baltic diplomats opined that these sweeping statements were not particularly effective. “These appeals go straight into the recipients’ filing cabinets,” one reportedly said, adding that “it would be more useful in the foreign ministers would communicate on the phone more regularly” (\textit{The Baltic Independent}, 13-19 November 1992: 3).

\textsuperscript{162} Address, Latvian Supreme Council Chairman Anatolij Gorbunovs, 9 July 1992; Address, Estonian Supreme Council Chairman Arnold Rüütel, 9 July 1992; Statement, Lithuanian Supreme Council President Vytautas Landsbergis, 10 July 1992.

\textsuperscript{163} Proposed text, paragraph 15, Helsinki Summit Meeting declarations, delegations of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, 7 May 1992.


\textsuperscript{165} See, for example, similar emphasis by Russian delegates to the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Ivan Rybkin and Sergei Baburin on the dangers of applying “double standards” for membership (\textit{PACE ORD}, 5 October 1992: 452; \textit{PACE ORD}, 6 October 1992: 499).


\textsuperscript{167} Interfax, 5 June 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-110, 8 June 1992: 9).

\textsuperscript{168} \textit{The Baltic Independent}, 10-16 July 1992: 1, 6.


\textsuperscript{170} Estonian delegation statement to the opening session of Working Group II, Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, Helsinki, 31 March 1992.
What were they asking for?

Both sides appealed for practical support, particularly from the CSCE, the organization to which all sides already belonged. Baltic representatives called for three specific measures. The first was the involvement of CSCE representatives in Russian-Baltic bilateral talks. The second was the deployment of CSCE observers to monitor the troop withdrawal, which was first raised at the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers in January 1992.171 The third was the proposal, raised for instance at the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials meeting in Helsinki in May 1992, that the CSCE take the withdrawal of troops under its control.172 (The Estonian government requested that the CSCE appoint a special representative to mediate juridical debate over the implementation of the 1920 treaty.173) Meanwhile, the Russian side supported existing proposals for the creation of a High Commissioner on National Minorities, a post that Kozyrev had also suggested might be created within the Baltic Council.174 The Russian side also called in early 1992 for the CSCE’s Office on Democratic Institutions and Human Rights to send a mission of experts to Estonia.175 As regulations stood, such missions required an invitation from the country they were to visit; however, Kozyrev told the CSCE meeting of foreign ministers in March 1992 that as far as he was concerned, “[i]ssues relating to human rights and, accordingly, to national minority rights should not...be limited by the principle of non-interference. We support the consensus-minus-one formula.”176 On back-to-back visits to NATO headquarters in May 1992, both Russian State Secretary Gennadiy Burbulis and the three Baltic foreign ministers also made pleas for NATO assistance: Burbulis told the press that Russia sought NATO’s financial and technical aid in organizing the Russian troop withdrawal from the Baltic states, while Baltic foreign ministers appealed for NATO oversight of the withdrawal and for the alliance to take a tougher stance on the issue.177

Both sides, but particularly the Russian side, were particularly interested in securing financial assistance for a withdrawal; Russian negotiators had indeed intimated that assistance with housing for returning troops might hasten a withdrawal.178 While Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev indicated in May 1992 that an optimal time for a pullout to begin would be late 1994, after all troops had been withdrawn from Poland and Germany, he suggested that “[t]he withdrawal could be accelerated only if the Baltic states give us financial assistance or practical assistance in building houses and barracks.”179 Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi similarly suggested that a proposed withdrawal period of 1995–2000 could be speeded up “if these countries were to agree to reciprocal actions (that is, we leave garrison installations and housing facilities in the Baltic countries, and the Baltic countries build garrison installations and housing

173 The Baltic Independent, 26 February-4 March 1993: 3.
175 The Baltic Independent, 15-21 May 1992: 3. The mission was eventually sent in December 1992.
178 At a NATO-sponsored conference on stability in the Baltic region held in Tallinn in October 1992, the Russian delegation said that housing was required for 34,211 officers, with an estimated cost of over 47 billion rubles (The Baltic Independent, 30 October-5 November 1992: 14).
facilities in Russia for the troops being withdrawn). This was a possibility that some Baltic figures, including Estonian parliamentary speaker Arnold Rüütel and deputy chairman of the Lithuanian parliament Ėsilas Stankevicius, had already considered, although they stressed that Baltic support would be dependent on receiving financial aid from Western capitals. All stressed, like Stankevicius, that Baltic governments did not feel that they had “moral obligations to help solve social problems of the departing military.” But at the donor conference in May, for instance, Lithuanian Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius suggested that the West provide aid to the Baltics to rehouse the troops in Russia, which he suggested would be “one of the most effective ways” of speeding up the departure. Estonian and Latvian delegates supported the idea as well, although Latvian representatives suggested their support could depend on Latvian enterprises winning the construction contracts. Vagnorius further noted that the Baltic populations would find it difficult to understand other aid being given to Russia unless this aid was directly linked to a withdrawal. Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev told the conference that an international program under CSCE auspices for military-civil conversion would also help to speed the troops’ return to Russian soil.

To secure such practical support, however, Russian and Baltic representatives had first to win the sympathy of Western audiences. And indeed, confirmation of sympathy, in the simple form of condemnation of their opponents, was a major Baltic and Russian goal in itself. As much as they sought practical support, Russian and Baltic representatives sought the inclusion of their concerns, in clear and condemnatory language, on the list of concerns of European organizations, as exemplified by (for instance) communiqués or documents emerging from important meetings. But on what grounds was such condemnation to be based?

182 The Baltic Independent, 7-13 February 1992: 1. As Velio Saatpalu, chairman of the Estonian parliament’s foreign affairs committee, complained: “We can’t help them. Why should we? It’s their problem. In 1940 when they came in they found places to stay in one day” (The Baltic Independent, 30 October-5 November 1992: 14).
183 The Baltic Independent, 29 May-4 June 1992: 3.
Chapter Three: Identity Diplomacy, Part One

As the previous chapter has indicated, Baltic and Russian diplomats had specific, practical causes for which they wanted international, and particularly Western, support; furthermore, they wished to undercut support for the causes of their opponents. Support in the form of practical assistance was of course welcome. It is the argument of this chapter, however, that just as importantly, Baltic and Russian representatives sought condemnation of their opponents by international audiences, in particular Western governments and European international organizations.

There are many ways to invoke condemnation of an opponent's behavior. One way is to invoke legal norms of behavior against which one's opponent can be said to transgress. And indeed, at the most basic level, Russian and Baltic representatives based their arguments for the unholy quality of their opponents' actions, and the virtue of their own cause, on legal arguments. Both Baltic and Russian representatives argued to European audiences that their opposite numbers' actions violated international law or were in breach of commitments made to the European organizations in which both sides held membership. Thus, at the 13 April 1992 Helsinki Follow-up Meeting; Russian representatives issued a statement asserting that Estonian citizenship legislation contradicted the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act, the Vienna Concluding Document, the Charter of Paris, and Chapter 4 of the Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE. A Russian memorandum circulated at the May 1992 session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) similarly denounced Baltic citizenship policies as breaching CSCE commitments. In late 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin in a letter to United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali further accused Latvian and Estonian policy of violating the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights, the Conventions on Employment Policy and Discrimination in Labour and Employment, and the Declaration of Social Progress and Development. Meanwhile, Baltic representatives had consistently stressed the illegal nature of the presence of Soviet troops on Baltic soil, a theme that was rapidly renewed after the collapse of the USSR and the transfer of former Soviet troops to Russian control. Indeed, Baltic statements stressed that the injunction against the unwanted presence of foreign troops violated by continued Russian deployments was neither obscure nor precious, but was among the most basic principles of international law.

But those seeking condemnation of their opponents often will also evoke less formal, social norms of behavior, for instance characterizing their opponent's behavior as "threatening." In these cases, actors will often broaden their claims to include assessments of an opponent's nature or character. This is because (as for example Thomas Risse-Kappen's work on the democratic peace has observed) a conception of the basic nature or character of interlocutors plays a fundamental role in how actors

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5 Statement, Chairman of the Latvian Supreme Council Anatolijs Gorbunovs, CSCE summit meeting, Helsinki, 10 July 1992.

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assess their interlocutors' material attributes or behavior: a democratic state in possession of nuclear weapons, for instance, is not perceived by other democratic states as being as threatening as a non-democratic nuclear state. Consequently, at the same time as—indeed, often in the process of—making legal claims, Russian and Baltic representatives were also in the process of making broader claims about their opponents, and about themselves. At the most abstract level, one might say that they were attempting to achieve a degree of international consensus on the fundamental natures—the identities, so to speak—not just of their states, but of those of their opponents. In so doing, they sought to win their audiences over not only to their explanations of the present, but also to their predictions of the future.

This chapter, and the next, attempt not only to describe Baltic and Russian rhetorical campaigns of the early 1990s, but also to place this behavior within the spectrum of diplomatic practice. This chapter opens with a brief overview of the four major subjects of diplomatic negotiation: action, rules, values, and identities. It goes on to discuss Baltic and Russian efforts to characterize each other's practices and natures. It argues that though the two sides hurled different epithets, the purpose of both sides was the same: to discredit their opponents as threatening, not just to their neighbors but to Europe itself. Chapter Four continues the discussion, outlining not only the progress of the debates—and of the issues driving them—but also the emotional implications for diplomats of participation in these battles over representation.

Diplomatic functions

There are as many definitions of the functions of diplomacy as there are diplomats and scholars. At a minimum, most practitioners and scholars cite the tasks outlined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, which include representing the sending state in the receiving state; protecting in the receiving state the interests of the sending state and of its nationals, within the limits given by international law; negotiating with the Government of the receiving state; ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving state, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending state; promoting friendly relations between the sending state and the receiving state, and developing their economic, scientific, and cultural relations. Many scholars have expanded on these tasks to provide more comprehensive definitions. For example, R. P. Barston, in what appears to be the broadest-ranging statement in the Anglophone diplomatic studies literature, breaks the everyday tasks of diplomacy down into five broad areas. These are: representation, especially substantive representation, or the explanation and defence of national policy; advice on trends in the host country, and 'laying the groundwork' for new policies or initiatives; "reducing friction or oiling the wheels of bilateral or multilateral relations;" contributing to order and orderly change, as well as to the resolution or continuation of a dispute or conflict; and the creation, drafting and amendment of "international rules of a normative and regulatory kind that provide structure in the international system." When the definition of "diplomacy" is broadened, as the Introduction has suggested, to include the activities of all individuals authorized to speak and act in the name of a particular state or intergovernmental organization—not only traditional "diplomats" (individuals accredited to another state) but also heads of state, ministers, government officials,
parliamentarians, or different specialists representing their state, either abroad or at home in exchanges with foreign delegations—the list of practical functions can seem endless. However, Alan James has argued that all of these everyday functions—and exceptional functions as well, such as negotiation of crises—can be boiled down to the simple principle of communication, whether this involves talking at someone, or talking with them.9

But what are representatives communicating? On what topics are they holding forth, conducting conversations, debating, negotiating? This dissertation proceeds from the assumption that diplomatic exchanges provide the opportunity for the discussion or negotiation of at least four broad topics: action, rules, values, and identities.

Action

A first, core topic of diplomacy is action. Diplomatists, in their exchanges, achieve agreement on what the bodies they represent are going to do. Alliances, trade agreements; agreements on exchanges of consulates, Presidential visits, tactics for the war on drugs, financing development projects, strategies to combat climate change—these are the “business,” “relations,” or “affairs” to which most classical scholars of diplomacy refer in their definitions of diplomacy. Indeed, much diplomatic history focuses on little other than the negotiation of action; with Chapter Two and its description of Baltic and Russian calls for action behind us, we will not devote more attention to this topic now.

Rules

Another subject of negotiation in diplomatic exchanges is the rules governing the actions of states outside, and sometimes inside, their borders.10 This function lifts diplomacy, in Brian White’s terms, from the “micro” perspective of states and other international actors to the “macro” level of world politics as a whole.11 In other words, diplomatists do not merely communicate narrow national demands; at the same time, they participate in the creation, drafting, elaboration, amendment, and enforcement of “international rules of a normative and regulatory kind that provide structure in the international system.”12 These rules—discussed under the rubric of “regimes” in some parts of the International Relations literature—provide, in Hedley Bull’s view, “the means whereby international society moves from the vague perception of a common interest to a clear conception of the kind of conduct it requires.”13 They include international law, formal international agreements, and informal international agreements, such as those that evolved among the European powers in the nineteenth century establishing principles for non-interference in each other’s colonial administration.14 This ongoing process of the negotiation of the rules of international society between its member states, according to Adam Watson, “is one of the great constructive achievements of diplomacy.”15 Indeed, it is due to diplomacy’s role in the

10 Koh 1997: 2635-2641. The term “rule” has been very broadly employed by some writers, for example Hedley Bull, to cover law, morality, custom or etiquette, or simply operating principles—“the rules of the game” (Bull 1977: 54); it will be used here in the restricted sense outlined above. For further discussion, see Bull 1977: 67-74; Kratochwil 1989; Lipson 1991.
13 Bull 1977: 71; on regimes, see Krasner 1983 and most of the chapters of Rittberger 1993.
15 Watson 1982: 40, 42. Elsewhere, however, Watson notes: “Even where states locked into international systems do no constitute what we have called society, they evolve regulator rules and institutions and formulate them in capitulatory agreements because they cannot manage without. No system has
negotiation of international law—"the most essential evidence of the existence of an international society"—that Martin Wight calls diplomacy "the master-institution of international relations."\(^\text{16}\) However, even the rules of diplomacy itself, Watson argues, are under continual negotiation: "[a]s the context of international relations changes, so the rules and institutions elaborated by the diplomatic dialogue to enable international society to function also change."\(^\text{17}\)

Values

An interest in rules leads the eye naturally to a third topic under discussion in diplomatic exchanges: the normative frameworks that underpin rules. In some cases, these frameworks apply as much to the domestic affairs of states as they do to the international environment in which states operate, such as the debates over the merits of differing social systems that animated the Cold War. In other cases, these frameworks apply primarily to standards of behaviour adopted by states in the international environment, and the moral and ethical principles underlying them. As Watson writes, "[t]he diplomatic dialogue must not only determine the regulatory mechanisms of the society...it must also undertake the modification of the principles and the standards which underlie the specific rules."\(^\text{18}\) David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla refer to this type of diplomacy as "noopolitik," a practice dedicated to the spread of ethical values and norms; Stanley Hoffman uses the more elegant "idealpolitik."\(^\text{19}\) In engaging in this type of debate, governments are guided in their actions not merely by their notions of self-interest or their legal commitments, but also by a sense of appropriate behaviour, defined by morals, ethics, or the demands of propriety. Diplomatists may seek to justify their states' actions on their own moral, ethical, or ethological grounds, and to attempt to persuade others to accept their conceptions of appropriate behaviour. More importantly, however, their governments often—although not always—accord sufficient respect to other individual states, groupings of states, or the collectivity of states assembled into an international society to be willing to consider changing their own conceptions of appropriate behaviour, and of the normative guidelines that underlie it.\(^\text{20}\) Diplomacy not only permits this furthering of consensus on normative principles, it depends on it; for, as Sasson Sofer has written, "[d]iplomacy's fate is bound up with the acceptance of political norms and rules of behaviour that make international society a meaningful reality."\(^\text{21}\)

Identities

A final topic of diplomacy that has received increasing attention over the last decade is that of identities in the international realm. Authors focusing on this topic of diplomacy explicitly or implicitly approach in new ways the concepts of diplomatic "representation" and "recognition," demonstrating how diplomatists consciously or

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\(^\text{16}\) Wight 1978: 107, 113.
\(^\text{17}\) Watson 1982: 223.
\(^\text{18}\) Watson 1982: 42.
\(^\text{19}\) Ronfeldt and Arquilla 1999; Hoffman 2001: 142.
\(^\text{20}\) For examples of studies focusing on this aspect of diplomatic exchanges, see, for instance, Jackson 1993; most chapters in Katzenstein 1996; Klotz 1995; Legro 1997; Lose 1998; Risse 1997, 1998.
\(^\text{21}\) Sofer 1988: 207. Some would argue that the salience of this function grew steadily across the course of the twentieth century. For example, Herbert Butterfield wrote in 1966: "Recent years have seen an important development of the role of what might be called the 'moral factor' in international relations...an imponderable factor has acquired unusual importance. It is this which is altering (or which ought to alter) the character of twentieth-century diplomacy more than anything else" (Butterfield 1966: 190).
unconsciously participate in international debates about the existence and nature not only of specific political units, but also of the very concepts on which diplomatic practices base themselves: "the state," "international society," "diplomacy" itself. At the same time that these analyses expose the contestable nature of such concepts, they demonstrate how moments of consensus, forced or voluntary, fix temporary outlines of these concepts in the minds of diplomatic participants, at least until the next debate emerges. The debates surveyed by these authors encompass a variety of questions, including ontological questions ("What is a state?" "What is a great power?"), normative questions ("What is a legitimate state?" "What is a responsible great power?"), taxonomic questions ("Is Russia European?" "Is Russia a great power?"), and essentialist/descriptive questions ("What is Russia's true nature?" "What is the character of the Russian regime?").

The identities championed by diplomatists may emerge in the form of narratives or in scattered images; the debates surrounding them may be explicit or implicit. Some of these debates, particularly ontological ones, are so submerged in daily diplomatic practice—at least that between and concerning established states—that their outlines are barely discernible. For instance, the question "What is a state?" rarely receives discussion in daily diplomatic life; yet the reigning answer, as we have seen in the Introduction to this dissertation, is inextricably linked to diplomacy, and is reiterated in every aspect of diplomatic practice between established states. Participation in diplomatic communication with other states is a marker of statehood; it is in fact mandatory for a "real" state, because, as James Der Derian writes, it is a "formal means by which the self-identity of the sovereign state is constituted and articulated through external relations with other states." Indeed, in situations of governmental and infrastructural breakdown accompanying civil strife or foreign invasion, sometimes participation in the interstate diplomatic system is one of the few visible markers of sovereignty, and hence "statehood," left to a government. As a consequence, the need to debated the essential nature of statehood arises relatively infrequently in daily diplomatic practice between established states, a context in which participants find a ready answer to the question "What is a state? in the entity they represent. In a similar way, the fact that diplomacy is both a symptom of, and a prerequisite for, the existence of some kind of international community of established states permits deflection of debate over the exact nature of that "international society." As Alan James points out, a sense of society between states could not exist without a communications system like diplomacy: "[a]ny group of persons can only behave and be envisaged as a collectivity if its members are able to communicate with each other." The emergence of a communications system in turn serves as proof that some form of international community exists, if only thanks to the contact provided by diplomacy. Indeed, the diplomatic profession may be, as Bull calls it, "a custodian of the idea of international society." In debates over normative identities, diplomacy frequently plays a more obvious role. For example, the debate over what constitutes a legitimate established state is one that occurs in many situations where international intervention is under consideration.

22 For a good discussion of the narrative bases of identity formation, see Somers 1994.
23 Der Derian 1993: 244; italics mine.
25 James 1993a: 100, 95.
Diplomatists attempting to justify normative frameworks do not base their arguments solely on the merits of their point alone; they have to ground them in higher-order claims. As Finnemore writes, “[n]ormative claims become powerful or prevail by being persuasive; being persuasive means grounding claims in existing norms in a way that emphasises normative congruence and coherence.”\textsuperscript{29} In some cases, these higher-order norms related to precepts for action; in other cases, however, as Christian Reus-Smit observes, actors draw on “deep-rooted, collectively shared ideas that define what constitutes a legitimate social actor.”\textsuperscript{30} The concept of “sovereignty,” as Cynthia Weber observes, in its essence refers to what an entity must do in order to be recognised by other states as one of them; when other states, for whatever reason, wish to act in a way that violates the rights of non-intervention conventionally assigned to sovereign states, the legitimacy of the “sovereignty” of the target entity is the first thing to come under attack.\textsuperscript{31} In some cases, this may consist of denying the entity’s right to a separate sovereign existence in the first place, as in the Iraqi government’s characterization of Kuwait as an Iraqi “province” gone wrong. In many cases, however, the issue under debate has been whether an entity’s domestic authority is authorised to speak for its polity in international affairs.\textsuperscript{32} For example, as Weber has documented, when the United States intervened in the Mexican Revolution in 1914, Mexico’s right to a continued existence as a state was not under question. However, the Wilson administration successfully argued that the Mexican military dictatorship did not enjoy the support of the wellspring of its sovereign authority, namely its population, and hence could legitimately be overthrown by another government claiming to act in the name of the Mexican people.\textsuperscript{33} In these cases, diplomatists fall back on many of the themes that animate the third layer of diplomatic practice: questions of the normative standing of differing systems of social and economic organization, questions of whether an entity’s behaviour in the international arena can be said to be in accordance with international normative consensus.

However, a number of authors have observed that diplomacy plays one of its most visible roles in international discussion and debate over the characteristics of political and social collectives in the international system, ranging from the nation to the state to interstate groupings to non-state actors.\textsuperscript{34} These debates play a vital part in the ongoing complex of debates aimed at achieving at least momentarily stable consensus on the nature and character of these entities.\textsuperscript{35} Although often ostensibly purely essentialist/descriptive, these debates cannot fail to possess a normative character as well, with judgement implicit in description; this normative character is part of what lends them their emotional power.\textsuperscript{36}

Of the authors who have examined these types of debates, some have focused on efforts by state representatives to “sell” coherent images of their own nations (or “self”), both

\textsuperscript{29} Finnemore 1996b: 141.
\textsuperscript{30} Reus-Smit 1999: 28.
\textsuperscript{31} Weber 1992a: 200.
\textsuperscript{32} Weber 1992a: 200.
\textsuperscript{33} Weber 1992b: 322-323.
\textsuperscript{34} See Razuvayev 1994 for a parallel discussion of many of the points that follow.
\textsuperscript{35} Although this discussion focuses on the building of interstate consensus on identities, a vital function of resident diplomats is of course to characterize, in their reports back to their capitals, the governments and states to which they are accredited. See, for instance, George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” on the nature of the Soviet state, which was essentially aimed at answering, in a fashion that would lead to consensus among US policymakers, the question “What is the true nature of the Soviet species?” (Stephanson 1989: 51).
overseas and in some cases domestically.\(^{37}\) For example, Reus-Smit has discussed the "oratorical diplomacy" of the Renaissance Italian representatives, which was oriented towards conveying "carefully orchestrated images of their city states."\(^{38}\) Closer to home, Susan Jeffords has outlined the way in which US diplomatists have promoted an image of the United States as a selfless hero acting in the name of victimized populations, while David Campbell has discussed geopolitical representational practices as central to the domestic as well as international constitution of the United States.\(^{39}\) Others have examined efforts by diplomatists to characterize different states (or "others"); for example, Giulio Gallarotti has noted the repertoire of epithets marshalled during the Cold War against the United States and its allies by the Soviet Union, while Charles Nathanson has catalogued the analogous rhetoric emanating from the United States.\(^{40}\) And some have discussed the use, through favourable or unfavorable comparison, of characterizations of the "other" in creating characterizations of "selves," both singular and collective.\(^{41}\) Most of the cases studied have involved a process of drawing dividing lines; for example, Iver Neumann has discussed the use of Russia as a constituting "other" by Central European diplomatists.\(^{42}\) However, at the same time that groups establish boundaries, they also reach out to others to create collective identities, as Jennifer Milliken's work on the way in which interventions in Korea and the Balkans have helped in the ongoing construction of "the West" demonstrates.\(^{43}\) In some cases, this process even involves the denial of the possibility of divisions between self and other, as revealed in Neumann's examination of American characterizations of the United States as a "microcosm of the world"—a description that negates any basis for understanding diplomacy as a dialogue across cultural dividing lines.\(^{44}\)

This identity-negotiating function of diplomacy may be thought of as diplomatic "representation" in its most literal form. Diplomats have been said to act as "representatives" in many ways. Hans Morgenthau suggests that diplomats are not only the symbolic representatives of their countries, but also the legal representatives of their governments, as well as the "itinerant incarnations" of foreign offices: "[w]hile the foreign office is the brains of foreign policy, the diplomatic representatives are its eyes, ears and mouth, its fingertips..."\(^{45}\) Professional diplomats in particular, but also ad hoc diplomatists, have historically been held to represent their polities due to their status as embodiments of their sovereigns, who in turn embody their polities.\(^{46}\) Paul Sharp notes that the composition of a nation’s diplomatic corps has also been held to embody its cultural identity, a conception that has underpinned moves by many foreign ministries to make their diplomatic corps representative of their nations’ cultural mix.\(^{47}\) However, the identity-negotiating function of diplomacy also means that diplomatists are actively involved in presenting and re-presenting images of their states; hence Der Derian’s observation that diplomacy is "the formal means by which the self-identity of the sovereign state is constituted and articulated through external relations with other

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\(^{38}\) Reus-Smit 1999: 79-81.

\(^{39}\) Jeffords 1994, Campbell 1990. See also, for example, Dalby 1998.


\(^{41}\) Watson cites Jean-Jacques Rousseau: "The body politic is forced to look outside itself to know itself..."(Watson 1982: 14).

\(^{42}\) Neumann 1999: 143-160; see also, for example, Neumann and Welch 1991.

\(^{43}\) Neumann 1999: 36, Milliken 1996.

\(^{44}\) Neumann 2001b: 6-7.

\(^{45}\) Morgenthau and Thompson 1985: 566-567.

\(^{46}\) Sharp 1997: 612.

\(^{47}\) Sharp 1997: 613. Sharp notes that this practice has been referred to in the Canadian case as "identity diplomacy."
As Erik Ringmar has observed, it follows that “recognition” can similarly be conceived in broad terms, not only in terms of legal status, but also in terms of acceptance of self-characterizations. As Ringmar writes, “we ask our audiences to recognize us as the kinds of persons that our stories identify. Only if they affirm the validity of the description have we survived the test: only as recognized can we conclusively come to establish a certain identity.”

For continuing evidence of these practices, one has to look no farther than the daily newspapers, where US President George Bush has invoked both historical and contemporary analogies in his characterizations of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq: “[O]ur alliance of freedom is being tested again by new and terrible dangers. Like the Nazis and the Communists before them, the terrorists seek to end lives and control all life. And like the Nazis and the Communists before them, they will be opposed by free nations, and the terrorists will be defeated.” Or, for an example of state representatives debating the nature of actors outside the state system, consider the case of Chechnya: the Russian government has consistently insisted that it is fighting “terrorists” and “bandits” in Chechnya, not political separatists. The Chechen example indeed provides an excellent example of the intertextual quality, if one likes, of the process of characterization—the way in which diplomatists draw on the rhetoric of others to build consensus on both individual and collective identities. As Igor Torbakov notes, Russian President Vladimir Putin has mimicked US diplomatic rhetoric on al-Qaeda in its statements on the Chechnya (stressing that the war is financed, armed and increasingly fought by Islamic militants from abroad) and US rhetoric on Iraq in its statements on Georgia (presenting the “Pankisi story” as an integral part of the global struggle against state support for international terrorism). After the hostage crisis in Moscow in October 2002, Putin launched a further rhetorical offensive, this time against other governments: in line with the Bush administration’s approach to doubters of the wisdom of a war against Iraq, governments expressing qualms about a military solution to the Chechen conflict were accused of “abetting terrorism.” For example, when Akhmed Zakayev was released in Denmark in December 2002, Russian officials said that Denmark was not taking the fight against terrorism seriously and that “the Danish authorities probably have their own interpretation of terrorism...which differs from the international view.”

Interestingly, of all the four topics of diplomatic debate, the negotiation of identities is the one with which many scholars, and many diplomats, seem the most uncomfortable. This may be partly due to the fact that diplomacy has historically been associated with confidentiality, while identity debates frequently are played out in view of the public. There are in fact two areas of intergovernmental communication whose natural habitat is assumed to be the media spotlight; one is so-called “public diplomacy,” and the other is propaganda. In each case, the intended audience is thought to be foreign publics, rather than (rarely in addition to) foreign governments. The practice of public

48 Der Derian 1993: 244.
52 Bransten 2002.
53 Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller retorted that “Denmark is upfront when it comes to fighting terrorism” (Associated Press, 3 December 2002 (Johnson’s Russia List 6585, 4 December 2002)).
54 Tuch 1990: 3.
diplomacy is generally associated with the cultivation of sympathy, approval, or understanding in a fashion not explicitly threatening to the host government (what Thucydides discussed as *eunoia*). Meanwhile, propaganda is associated with the fomenting of disloyalty or the assassination of reputation, usually through falsehood and in a fashion devoid of moral sense. Both, however, are assumed to be at some distance from “real” diplomacy; and indeed, diplomats who engage in public identity debates, as we shall see, frequently face accusations of engaging in “propaganda.” However, in fact identity debates, as is the case with all the topics we have mentioned, permeate all aspects of diplomatic discourse; they occur *in camera* as well as in front of the cameras, and to treat them as the province of only one arm of a diplomatic service is to fail to appreciate their impact and currency among other representatives.

Of course, as mentioned earlier, all of these four topics are in practice heavily interlinked, and negotiation of one is frequently linked to the negotiation of another. For instance, in attempting to address the policy question “Should State X be admitted to the Council of Europe?” state representatives will be required to debate the taxonomic question of whether State X is an appropriate candidate for Council membership. This question in turn has the potential to lead to debate over whether State X is geographically European; whether State X is culturally European; whether State X violates particular Council of Europe regulations; whether State X violates principles not codified in Council regulations but that members hold dear; whether the Council should bend regulations, or members relax their principles, for State X; whether the Council should pass additional regulations to which State X can be forced to adhere before its membership can be considered; or whether the Council should provide financial or logistical assistance to help State X meet Council standards. Indeed, as Ringmar has observed, these elements will often come together into entire narratives, creating a presence not only for entities, but for entire relationships across space and time. In the end, all form part of the efforts of representatives to encourage their interlocutors, as a former US ambassador has put it, “to do what we want them to do and be what we want them to be.”

**Identity diplomacy**

With the previous discussion in mind, we can now move to Russian and Baltic contributions to the international debate over the nature and characters, not only of their

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55 Wight 1977: 68.
56 For discussions of both public diplomacy and propaganda, see for example Nicolson 1969: 169-170; Thayer 1959: 190-192; Tuch 1990: 3-9; Wright 1955: 287. A few scholars—for instance, Hans Morgenthau (Morgenthau and Thompson 1985: 352-359), and Harold Lasswell (McDougal 1984: 117-149)—discuss “propaganda” as encompassing both of these practices. This position is perfectly in keeping with the original meaning of the term (the dissemination of ideas and information), but is relatively unusual in the context of the IR/diplomatic studies literature (Tuch 1990: 9).
57 As any lawyer knows, the definition of a situation, including the definition of the identities of its players, is vital in the determination of whether or not actors have broken rules; at the same time, the determination of whether or not an actor is breaking rules plays a vital part in how others define it. See Barbara Tuchman’s discussion of British protests to the Dutch over their tolerance for the sale to the rebellious American colonies of military supplies: “Because the Colonies were not a recognized state, they had in the British view no belligerent rights and thus their sea captains had no valid commissions, which explains why the British were so free with the term ‘pirates.’ ” Meanwhile, Dutch administrators invoked the principle of “free ships, free trade” to argue that the American colonies, regardless of their legal status, had the right to engage in trade, making their captains, by definition, not pirates (Tuchman 1989: 20, 23).
58 Ringmar 1996: 76.
own states, but of their opponents as well. A few basic themes were visible throughout, although received different amounts of attention at different times.

**Peaceful versus aggressive**

One of the most basic and important themes on which Russian and Baltic representatives focused, and clashed, was the question of whether their states, and particularly Russia, were innately peaceful or aggressive. Russian leaders and diplomats, in the wake of the collapse of the USSR, were anxious to disassociate themselves, and the newly independent Russian Federation, from the belligerent reputation of the former USSR to the greatest degree possible. Russian President Boris Yeltsin, addressing the Russian diplomatic corps in Moscow in February 1992, summed up his administration’s public position concisely: “As it emerges into the world, Russia intends to carry out an honest, open, and moral policy that is not subordinate to any ideological diktat. Our chief priority is the interests of the Russian nation, which values peace no less, and possibly even more, than others. Our nation, like all other nations, wants prosperity and stability, and has a self-interest in the precise guarantees of the rights and freedoms of the citizen and of man in conformity with international rules.”

Yeltsin had already laid out this non-aggressive position at the United Nations in late January: “We are ready to actively participate in the preparation and formation of an all-European collective security system...Russia sees the United States, the West, and the countries of the East not as mere partners, but as allies. This is a most important prerequisite for, I would say, a revolution in peaceful cooperation among the states of the civilized world.” Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev had already stressed the Russian Federation’s new approach towards even the USSR’s historic antagonist, NATO: “We do not see NATO as an enemy...[but] as one of the buttresses of stability and security in the world.”

One of the points on which Yeltsin, Kozyrev, and other liberal reformers in the new Russian government were particularly insistent was that the Russian Federation harbored no resentment over the breakup of the Soviet Union, and no aggressive intentions towards its newly independent neighbors. As Yeltsin told the Russian diplomatic corps: “A strong democratic Russia, and this is precisely the kind of Russia that our citizens want to see, will never again become an empire. On the contrary, our goal is to join with the other countries of the world in the process of confirming in the human community the ideals of humanitarism, freedom and democracy.”

This position was not new. Describing to delegates to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies after the failed coup of August 1991 the Russian republic’s commitment to defending the interests of Russians living outside the republic, Yeltsin nevertheless said that “the Russian state, having chosen democracy and freedom, will never be an empire or an older or younger brother. It will be an equal among equals.” Kozyrev had been promoting this line even longer; he told reporters in December 1990 that “[w]hat has traditionally been considered domestic policy will be one of the main directions for

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60 Russian representatives at least were not unaware of the task before them. As State Secretary Gennadiy Burbulis said: “[i]f you are talking about foreign relations, they always presuppose a clear understanding between us and those with whom relations are being established. We are trying to create a Russian state, in the full sense of the word...This is the most fundamental interest of Russia’s foreign policy today” (Russian Television Network, 3 June 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-109, 5 June 1992: 23)).

61 Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, 4-5, 29 Feb-15 March 1992: 77-79.
64 Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, 4-5, 29 Feb-15 March 1992: 77-79 (emphasis in the original).
65 Moscow Central Television, 3 September 1991 (SWB, 5 September 1991: C1/5).
Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I am talking about establishing new, non-imperial and non-totalitarian relations with the sovereign republics. The relationship between Russia and the other republics should be based on universal norms of international law, first of all the norms of human rights. This is the key to solving many inter-republican interethnic problems in a civilized way instead of the means traditional for the totalitarian regime—spetznaz, OMON, and cheremukha, which only aggravate the situation.66

Meanwhile, representatives of the three Baltic republics were equally engaged in efforts to see their nations recognized as essentially peaceloving. “The Baltic states,” Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis told the CSCE Helsinki Summit, “...use peaceful diplomatic means to fight for the withdrawal of foreign troops from their land, for the termination of willful behaviour of foreign forces, for the elimination of threat and for the respect of principle.”67 Baltic representatives pointed out that the three Baltic states were coming out of a lengthy period of victimization. As Estonian representative Tunne Kelam told the PACE, “For fifty years the three Baltic states have been...kept as prisoners, victims of terror and genocide, being deprived of all human and political rights, and pushed to the verge of losing their identity and culture.”68 Now, Baltic representatives emphasized, all three states were happy to resume their place among what they considered to be the peaceloving nations of Europe.

On the subject of Russia, however, Baltic representatives were far less sanguine. By early 1992, Baltic leaders and diplomats were openly expressing their fear that Russia retained an aggressive, indeed imperialist streak. As Lithuanian Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius put it, “Russia has never rejected its claims of control over the Baltics...The Russian leadership hasn't intended to release the Baltic countries for even an instant. More precisely, it was forced to soften its position for an instant, but now it has hardened it once again....their national self-consciousness is oriented on empire....In a couple of years Russia will rise to its feet, and it will become a threat to us once again.”69 Estonian delegate to the PACE Marju Lauristin similarly argued that Russia had ambitions to restore hegemony in the Baltic region: “We can again see in Russian policy the strains of imperialist chauvinism.”70

These Baltic accusations provoked indignant cries from Russian representatives. The most common counter-argument was that voiced, for example, by Sergei Stepashin, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Defense and Security Committee: “It was exactly Russia, Boris Yeltsin, who actually saved democracy in Lithuania in the tragic days of January. Russia was the first to raise the issue of independence for Lithuania after the August events.”71 Yeltsin told a joint session of the US Congress in June 1992 that “[i]t is Russia that has put an end to imperial policies and was the first to recognize the independence of the Baltic states.”72

66 Komsomolskaya Pravda, 26 December 1990: 3 (FBIS-SOV-91-001, 2 January 1991: 73). Spetznaz refers to special military forces; OMON, to special Interior Ministry forces; cheremukha, to riot control gas.
68 PACE ORD, 13 May 1993: 1062.
70 The Baltic Independent, 15-21 May 1992: 1, 3.
Some Baltic speakers indeed made occasional attempts to differentiate within the Russian political spectrum. Then-Estonian Foreign Minister Lennart Meri, in an address in Stockholm in February 1992, was careful to refer to “imperialistically-minded circles in Moscow” rather than the Russian government, and said “[m]anipulators can be found in Russia: the strongest structure is still the Red Army, who are being threatened with the loss of their privileges.”73 The Baltic Council, in a statement of March 1992, referred to Russian troops (which they accused of “behaving like conquerors” and inflicting significant damage) as showing “a lack of clear subordination to the Russian government.”74 But ultimately these fine distinctions broke down. As an Estonian Foreign Ministry statement accusing Russia of trying to reestablish control over Baltic states said, “however much we may wish to support the democratic forces in Russia, we can realistically do so only if the Russian democrats respect all of Russia’s international commitments.”75

Democratic/human-rights-oriented versus authoritarian

Another key disagreement that emerged in Russian and Baltic rhetoric centered on the question of whether these states were fundamentally democratic and human-rights-oriented, or whether they were authoritarian. Again, the Russian government strongly argued that the newly independent Russia was a democratic and rights-regarding state. Well before the Soviet Union’s collapse, Kozyrev described the Russian republic as by itself aspiring to join the “chain of highly developed democratic countries with market economies.”76 On the eve of the Union’s dissolution, he proclaimed that “Russia’s foreign policy will be based on values common to all mankind and above all on the protection of human rights.”77 At the 48th UN Human Rights Commission meeting in February 1992, he argued: “Now, following the victory of democracy over totalitarianism, international standards in the area of human rights are becoming identical to the internal interests and tasks of Russia’s democratic change, in the full meaning of the term. It is on their basis that we want to build a new system with democratic institutions which, from its very start, would be consistent with existing international standards.”78 Russian representatives indeed argued that the new Russian state was particularly sensitive to minority rights. Russian representative to the PACE Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, for instance, stated: “The policy we are now implementing is based on guaranteeing human rights throughout Russia, protecting minorities and combating xenophobia and racism. I know of not a single case of anybody being persecuted for reasons of nationality or race…”79

At the same time, Russian representatives portrayed Estonia and Latvia as possessing only questionable democratic credentials, precisely because (Russian representatives argued) they violated minority rights. Russian delegate to the PACE Ivan Rybkin asked the assembly if, as in the case of Estonia, it was possible to disenfranchise 40% of the total population without jeopardizing democracy.80 Kozyrev, speaking of Estonia before the World Human Rights Conference in June 1993, said: “A democracy cannot be recognized as genuine if it is created only for the ‘indigenous’ population while

73 In the same speech he said of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy that “Hitler too was elected State Chancellor by a people manipulated to the point of desperation” (The Baltic Independent, 13-19 March 1992: 2).
75 The Baltic Independent, 9-15 April 1993: 3.
79 PACE ORD, 3 February 1993: 734.
80 PACE ORD, 5 October 1992: 452.
representatives of ethnic minorities are either forced out of the country or placed in the position of outcasts.”

Indeed, Russian representatives painted Estonian and Latvian nationalists as ethnocrats. A Russian memorandum circulated at the Council of Europe in May 1992 described Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws as “paving the way for intolerance, aggressive nationalism and xenophobia.”

A Supreme Soviet statement on the rights of Russians in the Baltic states circulated by Russian representatives at various European forums argued that “[i]n the political circles of Latvia and Estonia, a program of constructing monoethnic societies is being openly proclaimed.”

Russian representatives at the PACE accused the Estonians and Latvians of trying to create ethnically pure regions. A letter from Yeltsin to UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali of November 1992 read: “The existence in Europe of conditions for flagrant discrimination against a considerable part of the population of a state, and the emergence of new hotbeds of tensions and conflicts, is inadmissible.”

Baltic representatives countered by pointing out that the Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws were in keeping with those of countries held up as models of democracy. They further noted that the Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws made no mention of ethnicity, but instead were based exclusively on whether an individual or their ancestors had held citizenship in the interwar Estonian and Latvian states. Especially in the Latvian case, a sizeable number of ethnic Russians were thus eligible for automatic citizenship.

Going on the offensive, Baltic representatives further argued that the Russian state was not as committed to minority rights as its officials claimed. A Baltic Council appeal to the CSCE in September 1992 expressed concern over Russian “disrespect for human rights and the rights of ethnic minorities.”

The Estonian government was particularly active in expressing concern for the Finno-Ugric Setu minority. Estonian delegates brought the issue to the attention of the Helsinki Follow-up meeting, at which Russia was accused of pursuing a “hostile policy” towards its minorities. Estonian President Lennart Meri further urged his Hungarian counterpart Joszef Antall to join forces with forces in Estonia to protect Finno-Ugric minorities living in the Russian Federation “who are on the brink of extinction due to aggressive Russian oil exploitation.”

However, the Latvian Foreign Minister Georgs Andrejevs also expressed to the UN Human Rights Commission his “deeply [concern] with the fate of Latvians in Russia.”

Indeed, Baltic representatives fundamentally questioned the democratic credentials of the new Russian state. As Meri argued at the PACE: “We know that democracy and the protection of human rights are not static qualities but constitute a dynamic process. We must fight for those freedoms every day, because when democracy is taken for granted or worse, is ignored, or still worse, is staged in the best traditions of Potemkin and of the Soviet Intourist, democracy can become weakened to a point beyond return.”

Indeed, Baltic representatives stressed, good relations between the Baltic states and Russia depended on the development of “democratic forces and traditions” in Russia—a

84 PACE ORD, 7 October 1992: 599.
88 The Baltic Independent, 5-11 February 1993: 3.
89 The Baltic Independent, 26 February-4 March 1993: 3.
stance that left no doubt in their interlocutors’ minds as to whether those forces and traditions could already be said to exist. As Kelam told the PACE, “I do not need to convince this audience that Estonia, having suffered on various occasions in our history as a result of Russia’s expansionism, will feel secure only when Estonia’s eastern neighbor has firmly established a system of democracy and the rule of law.”

Degree of separation from the USSR

A further question that was vital to answering both of the questions posed above was the degree to which the Baltic states and Russia could be said to be distanced from their “predecessor” of sorts, the USSR. Michael Urban has spoken of “two mutually reinforcing moments” through which national communities recreate themselves: one involving the “positive expression of nation...and the recovery of those identity markers...that had been suspended and suppressed during the communist epoch...the other... negative, [involving] purging the nation of...markers associated with the period of communist rule.” Baltic rhetoric celebrated both these moments; the extent to which the second had been embraced in Russia was, however, a topic of heated disagreement for Baltic and Russian representatives.

Baltic representatives of course held strongly to their position that to talk about the “post-Soviet” Baltic states was a fallacy, as the Baltic states were never legally part of the USSR. As Landsbergis reiterated at Chatham House in January 1992, the Baltic states were not constituent republics of the Soviet Union and hence were not successor states. Baltic representatives forcefully pointed out that the Baltic states had re-established, rather than established, diplomatic relations with other countries, including the USSR. If the Baltic states had never been part of the USSR, they could not be held responsible for its iniquities. “Lithuania,” Landsbergis proclaimed at Chatham House, “did not attack Afghanistan, Lithuania did not build submarines, did not finance putsches and uprisings in Africa and Latin America, did not create aggressive space programs and did not bug the US Embassy in Moscow.” Nor, as the Baltic Council argued in a statement in March 1992, were they responsible for the USSR’s spendthrift ways: “The Baltic states are not the successors of the former USSR, and therefore cannot be held responsible for the settlement and repayment of the former USSR’s foreign debt.”

91 Baltic representatives had held this position since before the collapse of the USSR; see, for instance, Estonian Supreme Soviet Chairman Arnold Rüütel’s inaugural address to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1991 (Estonian Radio, 14 September 1991 (SWB, 19 September 1991: A2/2).
94 This dissertation unfortunately lacks the resources for a proper discussion of the battle between Russian and Baltic representatives and historians over whether the Baltic states joined the Soviet Union voluntarily; for a brief overview, see Forced Migration Projects (1997).
96 The Baltic Independent, 9-15 January 1992: 5. Then-Estonian Ambassador to Finland Lennart Meri reportedly even turned down a Finnish offer of an impressive building in central Helsinki as Estonia’s new embassy on the grounds that it was not Estonia’s pre-war embassy and that strict continuity was more important that a central location—a position that reportedly left the Finns unimpressed (The Baltic Independent, 8-14 May 1992: 2).
representatives were so insistent on the illegal quality of Baltic incorporation into the USSR.\(^{99}\)

The Russian government, on the other hand, ran a rather more complicated line. As Urban has noted, the disassociation from communism practiced by the bulk of the former Soviet republics and satellites was facilitated by a "background understanding" that communism was never "our" doing in the first place, but belonged to "another nation, Russia."\(^{100}\) This strategy was a luxury that the Russian nation did not enjoy. As Urban has observed, many Russian liberal-democratic reformers sought to overcome the identity crisis induced by the collapse of the USSR by reexamining Russia's (false) identification with empire and building a (true) identity for itself "in consonance with the precepts followed by any—here the stock phrases—'normal,' 'civilized' country."\(^{101}\) Yet the Russian government's approach to the issue of legal succession did not help the process of disassociation. The Russian Federation assumed the legal status of the Soviet Union's *continuer* state, not successor; the chain of legal continuity was not clearly severed. Nor did Russian representatives attempt to disassociate the new Russian Federation completely from its predecessor: as Kozyrev told the press after the dissolution of the Union in December 1991, Russia must now identify its "normal state and normal national interests, which consist partly of the heritage of what was good in the past, and mind you, such heritage is not only that of the Soviet, but also of the Russian period."\(^{102}\)

Russian representatives certainly tried to argue that the fact that Russia had assumed continuer-state status did not make it responsible for past Soviet activities, in particular the stationing of troops in the Baltic states. Kozyrev argued strongly at the Council of Europe in May 1992 that "Russia's democratic leadership did not send troops to the Baltics."\(^{103}\) At the July 1992 CSCE Helsinki Summit Meeting, Kozyrev responded to a speech by Landsbergis calling the troops "Russian" by saying "Essentially, these are the former USSR's troops, Russia did not put them there."\(^{104}\) The same line was put forward by Yeltsin at the July 1992 G-7 summit in Munich: "These are the troops of the former Soviet Union that have been and are stationed there but that have been

\(^{99}\) The Soviet government had never conceded on this issue; despite the best efforts of Baltic representatives to see a reference to the "illegal actions" of the Soviet leadership in 1939-1940, the State Council declarations recognizing Baltic independence in September 1991 simply spoke of the need to take into account "the specific historical and political situation" that "preceded the entry" of the Baltic states into the USSR (Radio Vilnius, 4 September 1991 (*SWB*, 6 September 1991: C1/3); TASS, 6 September 1991 (*SWB*, 9 September 1991: B/15).

\(^{100}\) Urban 1994: 733. Urban argues that the effect of this impossibility of constructing "some other nation onto which might be loaded the negative moment in the recreation of a national community" was responsible for the transposition onto domestic conflicts of "the Manichean logic of unqualified nationalism." This analysis, Urban argues, helps to explain why Russian political players actually attacked each other far more viciously than most of them ever attacked foreign antagonists, as "the aggressive, blame-laying edge of this discourse [was] perforce...turned inwards." (Urban 1994: 733-734, 748).

\(^{101}\) Urban 1994: 741.


\(^{103}\) *The Baltic Independent*, 15-21 May 1992: 3. An Estonian Foreign Ministry spokesman responded tartly that if the troops actually were not there at Russia's behest, then international observers or mediators clearly were needed immediately.

\(^{104}\) "And," Kozyrev added, "it seems to me that in general the fledgling Baltic states, which obtained their independence first and foremost thanks to the democratic forces in Russia, ought to recognize their moral obligations and not replay the Russian democrats by posing the question incorrectly and violating human rights." *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 11 July 1992: 5 (FBIS-SOV-92-135, 14 July 1992: 8).
transferred to Russian jurisdiction because they cannot just belong to no one.”¹⁰⁵ Kozyrev told journalists from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that “[t]here is a lot of confusion about this, and that is why sometimes, for instance in the Baltic states, they speak of the ‘return’ of Russian troops, but that is entirely misleading terminology because the Russian Federation never sent those troops there in the first place. Those were the troops of the Soviet Union that we inherited...When people who have no [extensive knowledge] of the situation say this, I understand it. But when people who know every step, every minute of this struggle—when they start speaking of Russian imperialism and saying that we have to withdraw those troops we never sent there, that is something totally immoral.”¹⁰⁶ Nor, Russian representatives argued, should Russia be held responsible for compensation for damages. As the head of the Russian delegation for negotiations with Lithuania Viktor Isakov argued in an interview with the Baltic News Service, “[t]he Soviet Army was common to all the republics of the Union. Why, therefore, should the damage connected with its stay on the territory of Lithuania—which, by the way, was also a Union republic—be imposed on Russia alone?”¹⁰⁷

At the same time, Russian representatives emphasized that while certain legal continuities existed between the former USSR and the Russian Federation, they were accompanied by a fundamental change in content. As Russian State Secretary Gennadiy Burbulis put it: “[w]e are trying to be recognized as a new state which, at the same time, is basing itself on Russia’s centuries-long history, with the continuity with regard to those international achievements which we have inherited from the Soviet Union, but with substantially changed inner content of its foreign policy...This is the most fundamental interest of Russia’s foreign policy today.”¹⁰⁸ As a consequence, Russian representatives argued, Russian policy, and the Russian Federation itself, should be assessed de novo.

Baltic representatives found this line of argument deeply unconvincing, arguing that the Russian government was trying to have its cake and eat it too. “The Russian Federation,” an Estonian representative argued, “is a successor state to the Soviet Union; the Soviet Union was a successor state to Soviet Russia; therefore Russia is successor state to the state that occupied the Baltics in 1940 and 1944.”¹⁰⁹ Landsbergis stated at the July 1992 CSCE Helsinki Summit Meeting that “[t]oday Russia is the inheritor of the Soviet Union’s rights and responsibilities. It is, no doubt, also an inheritor of the afore-mentioned Soviet Union’s violations of legal agreements.”¹¹⁰ Baltic representatives were particularly cross that the Russian Federation refused to recognize their legal continuity with the interwar states, but insisted on its own succession rights. Russia, an Estonian representative complained, “wants to achieve something new in international law—a partial succession, referring only to rights and

¹⁰⁵ Indeed, Yeltsin argued, Russia was doing the former Soviet republics, including the Baltic states, a favour: “[These troops] ought to fall under someone’s jurisdiction, so that they are financed accordingly” (Bungs 1992a: 26).
¹⁰⁶ Kozyrev 1994: 39, 42. Russian representatives were quick to cite Western validation of this position; thus, for example, a Russian delegate to the PACE stated that “[w]e obviously agree with Doc. 6680, which describes these troops as belonging to the former Soviet Union” (PACE ORD, 6 October 1992: 503).
¹⁰⁷ Girnius 1992a: 33.
¹⁰⁸ Russian Television Network, 3 June; SOV-92-109, 5 June p. 23
¹⁰⁹ Statement, Estonian delegation head, plenary of the CSCE follow-up meeting, Helsinki, 6 May 1992.
¹¹⁰ Statement, President of the Lithuanian Supreme Council Vytautas Landsbergis, CSCE Helsinki summit meeting, 10 July 1992.
not to responsibilities.” “So,” he asked the Russian delegation, “is the Russian Federation a full successor, thus accepting the validity of the Tartu Treaty?”111

**Historical and contemporary analogies**

To Baltic representatives, the inability of Russian representatives to make their minds on the extent of continuity between the USSR and the Russian Federation was symptomatic of a continuity of nature between the two entities, one that would lead eventually to the Russian Federation replicating the errors and possibly the crimes of its predecessor. History, Baltic representatives feared, was already repeating itself in the Baltic states, and was likely to repeat itself further. Consequently, Baltic representatives drew extensively on historical analogies to characterize Russian behaviour and nature.

The most obvious analogy, as the foregoing has suggested, was to the former USSR. For a start, Baltic representatives suggested that little change had occurred in the former Soviet mindset. For example, Kelam stated: “[The Russian representative’s] claims that the Russians were invited to the Baltic states by the Baltic leaders reminded me of the group of still unspecified Czech comrades who, according to Moscow, sent an invitation for the Soviet army to come and oppress the fledgling Prague Spring. I am worried about the continued imperialist-style thinking and wording.” A Latvian delegate to the PACE deplored having to “deal with such unpleasant attitudes that are associated with the former totalitarian regime.”113 And Meri later told the PACE that “unfortunately, a great number of Russians are… a special kind of people. In theoretical literature we call them *homo sovieticus.*”114 As a consequence, comparisons between Russian proposals, position papers etc. and the darkest moments of the Soviet era, in particular the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, were frequent.115 Even the structure of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) evoked suspicion; as Landsbergis said, if the CIS had one border guard, one army, and one currency, it might “pose a threat to Lithuania just as the Soviet Union did.”116

However, Baltic representatives also advanced analogies to other historical moments that were likely to carry especially negative connotations for their Western interlocutors. One of the most frequently invoked was the Nazi era. Comparisons were on occasion drawn between individuals; for instance, Meri called Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy the “Russian Hitler.”117 But more general comparisons were drawn between policies as well. For instance, an Estonian delegation member statement at a CSCE followup meeting, describing Russian statements on Moscow’s intention to defend the rights of ethnic Russians abroad, argued that only Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany propagated policies where the ethnic interests of one nation were put above the sovereignty of states, resulting in World War II and genocide.118 Commenting on a

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111 Statement, Estonian delegation head, 11th CSO meeting, Helsinki, 18 May 1992. The Russian charge in Tallinn, Oleg Popovich, had a sharp reply to this line of argument: “If we accepted Estonian logic [about the continuing existence of the pre-war state], then we could claim another 19 years in Paldiski [submarine base, due to the defense and mutual assistance pacts signed with the Soviet Union in September and October 1939, under duress but before the introduction of Soviet troops]” (The Baltic Independent, 19-25 June 1992: 3; Misiunas and Taagepera 1993: 15).

112 PACE ORD, 30 June 1993: 1246-1247.


115 See, for example, The Baltic Independent, 12-18 June 1992: 1.


Russian memo to the Council of Europe on the situation of Russians in the Baltic, Lauristin commented: “Russia is blowing on the embers in the northeast of Estonia so that it can point the finger at us on the international stage. The situation is strangely reminiscent of Germany and the Sudetenland.”119 Indeed, in Baltic rhetoric, the two regimes most hated in much of the Western world, the Nazi and Stalinist regimes, were often painted as two sides of the same coin, which currently bore the stamp of the Russian mint. For example, Landsbergs told radio journalists in May 1992 that “recent statements by Russian high officer and other officials invited comparisons to 1932–1940, when totally similarly-based expansionist claims (special security interests, interests of a Russophone population) were spread from Berlin and Moscow.”120

Meanwhile, Russian representatives were not shy in drawing unflattering historical and current comparisons of their own. Some of these were mirror images of Baltic rhetoric. For instance, Russian as well as Baltic officials invoked comparisons with Nazi as well as Stalinist policy. For example, Sergei Kovalyev, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Committee on human rights and erstwhile supporter of Baltic independence, and Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Committee on foreign relations, wrote a stiff letter in February 1992 to Council of Europe General Secretary Catherine Lalumière on the subject of Estonia’s citizenship laws: “The illegal character of this law, which lowers human worth, can be noted through its exceptions. Allowances can be made for those who have rendered exceptional services to Estonia. Does this not remind you, dear Mrs. Lalumière, of the privileges for a few distinguished Jews during the Third Reich? Or the allowances for those especially distinguished representatives of peoples driven by Stalin from their lands?”121 Another analogy drawn by Russian representatives was to the apartheid policy of the formerly white-dominated South Africa. In the same letter, for example, Kovalyev and Lukin wrote: “If you really believe, as was written in Izvestiya, that ‘the extension of the right to vote to all Russians could endanger the identity of Estonians,’ then to an even larger degree this could be said of the white South Africans, or let’s say, the Belgian Walloons....This kind of division is translated as ‘apartheid’ in a whole series of European languages.”122 Yeltsin similarly described Estonian legal changes in mid-1993 as being “the introduction of an Estonian version of apartheid.”123

But historical analogies were not the only ones that the two sides drew upon. Among current situations, Bosnia was the one that elicited the most comparisons. The Russian Foreign Ministry, for instance, issued a statement in response to the Estonian Law on Aliens calling it an example of “aggressive nationalism”—the language used by the Ministry to describe the Balkan phenomenon.124 Speaking on issues of concern in Russian foreign policy, Kozyrev similarly observed that “‘ethnic cleansing’ is also carried out in ‘white gloves,’ so to speak. It is impossible to recognize as full-fledged the democracy being created solely for the ‘indigenous’ population, while the representatives of ethnic minorities are either being ousted from the country [sic].”125

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125 Moscow News, no. 25, 18 June 1993: 4. This kind of language was not exclusive to Russian representatives attempting to win Western support; for some time, it had been part of servicemen’s appeals to the Russian authorities for a slowing of the troop withdrawal and a guarantee of servicemen’s rights. For example, a letter to the Russian Supreme Soviet from the Latvian Union for the Protection of Veterans’ Rights and officers’ unions of the NWGF of October 1992 argued that
Estonian legal changes were similarly described by Yeltsin as “the practice of ethnic cleansing.”\textsuperscript{126} Meanwhile, Baltic representatives were drawing on the Bosnia analogy freely as well. For instance, an Estonian delegation head at a CSCE follow-up meeting argued that Soviet forces were as much a threat as the forces of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{127} Landsbergis similarly asked delegates to the PACE: “Who is the minority in Latvia? Which half of the population should be the object of international concern? Which is the suffering minority in Bosnia? I would ask the Assembly to think about the rights of individuals and nations, not of minorities. That is particularly important when a great power uses the minority issue against a small neighbor.”\textsuperscript{128}

\textit{Baltic Russophones}

As the last quote suggests, the legal and moral character of another group was at issue here as well, that of what (as the introduction has indicated) we will for the sake of simplicity call Baltic Russophones. As noted earlier, the Russian government’s initial primary concern had been to avert a mass migration of Russophones from the territory of the former Soviet Union, rather than to build political links to members of these groups resident outside Russia. However, to a significant degree in response to the situation of ethnic Russians and Russophones in Estonia and Latvia, the issue of the Russian state’s relationship to Russophone communities steadily developed broader salience in Russian politics.\textsuperscript{129} In December 1991, Kozyrev was already stressing that “[i]t is necessary to protect the interests and rights of our compatriots both abroad and in the republics of the former Soviet Union.”\textsuperscript{130} By the end of 1992, policy towards Russophone communities on the territory of the former Soviet Union had become a key issue in a broader debate over the nature of the new, post-imperial Russian state and its place in the world. As even the Westernizing elements of the new Russian political elite came to believe that the Russian state was organically linked to Russophone communities and bore responsibility for their well-being, the status of these communities gradually coalesced into that of a “Russian diaspora.”\textsuperscript{131} The development of the concept of the diaspora “served to help to cement a new ruling elite; it provided a common sense of identity and purpose, and justified the assertion that Russia had a leading role to play in the post-communist world.”\textsuperscript{132} Meanwhile, the Estonian and Latvian populations and leaderships in particular often showed a tendency to use their resident Russophone populations as embodiments of the old system in their societies against which new, “true” Estonian and Latvian society could be contrasted.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{126} ITAR-TASS, 25 June 1993 (S

\textsuperscript{127} Statement, Estonian delegation head, plenary of the CSCE follow-up meeting, Helsinki, 6 May 1992.

\textsuperscript{128} PACEORD, 1 July 1993: 1311.

\textsuperscript{129} Melvin 1998: 27.


\textsuperscript{131} Melvin 1998: 36-37. By autumn 1994, the term “compatriot” (sootechestvennik) had emerged as the standard official term to describe members of the diaspora; although ambiguous, it had a variety of pragmatic and political advantages over other terms such as “ethnic citizens of Russia” (etnicheskie rossiane) (Melvin 1998: 38-39).

\textsuperscript{132} Melvin 1998: 41. It also provided the Russian military with an additional sense of mission: defense of the rights and interests of Russians “and those identifying ethnically and culturally as Russian” was listed as a particularly important task in the Russian General Staff’s draft military doctrine of late 1992 (Lough 1993a: 22).

\textsuperscript{133} Lieven 1994.
While, like all the themes mentioned thus far, the debate over the character of Baltic Russophones played itself out in all available forums, Baltic and Russian representatives pursued it particularly vigorously at the Council of Europe, which from early 1992 was caught up in the political nightmare of attempting to define what constituted a “national minority.” Russian representatives, unsurprisingly, argued that Baltic Russophones constituted a legitimate example of this politically sensitive category. As one Russian delegate to the PACE put it: “Why draw an artificial distinction between various types of minorities? What is a historical minority? Did history stop after 1940?” As a consequence, they argued, Russophones in the Baltic were merely trying to regain their legitimate rights: citizenship in their state of residence and the ability to vote. The failure of the Estonian and Latvian governments to extend these rights as automatically as they had to other residents—and many non-residents—of their states constituted discrimination, as a White Book circulated by the Russian delegation at the July 1992 CSCE Helsinki Summit Meeting argued. Indeed, a Russian representative to the PACE insisted, it was a “strange idea” to hold “Russian-speaking workers and Russians in general responsible for the 1940 occupation, whereas they also suffered occupation by a totalitarian system.” Furthermore, as Kovalev told a UN High Commission on Human Rights meeting, Russia certainly did not want to Russophones in the Baltic states into an embryonic “fifth column;” on the contrary, he argued, the Russian government wanted them to be integrated into and play a useful part in Baltic societies.

Baltic representatives, meanwhile, varied between two descriptions of Russophones. The first was “colonizers.” Estonian parliamentary speaker Ülo Nugis, back from a PACE conference, told the media that members of the Council were “gradually coming to understand” that Russians in the Baltic were not traditional ethnic minorities, but citizens of the former USSR: “What is going on...is a process of decolonization.” Lauristin, at the PACE, agreed: the Baltic Russophone problem was a political, rather than an ethnic one, related to the “more general problem of settlement of territories that are under foreign occupation.” The second was “migrants.” Andrejevs at the PACE called Russophones in Latvia “immigrants;” Meri, at a meeting of ten Baltic nations, specified that they were “illegal immigrants.” Meanwhile, Estonian delegates to the CSCE suggested that their status was in essence comparable to that of migrant workers in Western Europe. Properly speaking, Baltic representatives argued, Baltic Russophones were citizens of the Russian Federation, not the states where they were resident. Estonian Foreign Minister Jan Manitski told the United Nations General
Assembly that "[b]ecause Russia is the self-styled successor state to the Soviet Union, Estonia considers citizens of the former Soviet Union who currently reside in Estonia as a result of Soviet occupation to be Russian citizens, unless they have become citizens of another country." The Latvian delegation to a CSCE meeting concurred: "Latvia did not appear as a result of the breakdown of the USSR...Since non-citizens of Latvia have the right to acquire Russian Federation citizenship until 1 February 1995, they cannot be considered stateless: the Russian Federation, not Latvia, is a successor state of the USSR."

A point on which Baltic representatives were unanimous was that Russophones in the Baltic were not deserving of Western sympathy. These were not the world’s downtrodden, Baltic representatives argued; rather, they were members of a formerly privileged group who were anxious about losing their favored status. A Latvian delegate told the PACE: "Russians are worried about losing their dominating position and privileges in the Baltic states, which they have regarded as their property for 280 years." An Estonian delegate put the same case: "[I]f colonising foreigners are in one sense or another socially or politically privileged, tension is created in society, and it cannot be said that such tension is unreasonable. For example, it is impossible in the Baltic states to say ‘Let the retired KGB officers retain their privileges because it is disputable from the human rights point of view to rob them of their privileges’...any kind of unsubstantiated privilege creates substantiated discontent and gives birth to the ideology of revenge."

Anxious though Baltic Russophones might be about their privileges, Baltic representatives further argued, they were not anxious to be naturalized. As a Lithuanian delegate to the PACE put it, "[w]e think that there is a difference between ethnic minorities which have naturally and freely settled in one or other territory or have a historical past, and minorities which have been artificially displaced into occupied and annexed territories and do not show any wish to naturalize." This issue sometimes put Baltic delegates, otherwise strongly disposed towards the causes of underdogs and the dispossessed, on the conservative side of the house. For instance, a Latvian delegate to the PACE, participating in a debate over a broad-scale report on the fight against racism, xenophobia, and intolerance in Europe, noted: "Incoming people often—as in Latvia—do not ask permission or say ‘thank you’ or other nice things, but decimate us and practice genocide. They immediately disregard local customs and conditions. I am not talking about spitting where no one else used to spit. Is it discrimination to ask people not to spit or should we change over and ask them to accept us into their society and start learning to spit?"

The underlying purpose of the debate over the legal and moral character of Baltic Russophones, of course, was to establish the nature of the Estonian and Latvian states and of Russian intervention on Russophones’ behalf. If Western audiences agreed to a characterization of Baltic Russophones as legitimate national minorities in Estonia and Latvia, this outcome would support the Russian government’s dim view of Estonian and Latvian citizenship and social security laws. If, however, Baltic Russophones came to

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143 The Baltic Independent, 2-8 October 1992: 3.
144 Statement, Latvian delegation to the Committee of Senior Officials-Vienna Group, 9 September 1992.
145 PACE ORD, 13 May 1993: 1068.
146 PACE ORD, 29 September 1993: 1514.
147 PACE ORD, 30 June 1993: 1239.
be generally thought of as colonial holdovers, Estonian and Latvian legal practice would be vindicated. But even more importantly, such a conclusion would support the Baltic view that Russian interest in the fate of Baltic Russophones was at best inappropriate, and at worst positively sinister.

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And indeed this was the ultimate thrust of all Russian and Baltic characterizations, from those about the nature of Russophones to those about the nature of the Russian and Baltic states: to convince Western audiences, not just that the situation was bad (in exactly what way, of course, depended on who was speaking), but that worse was to come. In the Baltic case, this sense of menace focused around a military threat, not only to the current sovereignty (in the sense of the right to free one’s territory from unwanted foreign troops), but also to the future integrity and possibly the future independence of the three Baltic states. For example, at a North Atlantic Assembly conference on security in the Baltic states held in Vilnius in December 1991, delegates ranging from Landsbergis to Latvian Defense Minister Talavs Jundzis asked for NATO assistance in securing the withdrawal of troops, characterizing the troop presence as a threat to Baltic sovereignty.¹⁴⁹ Andrejevs at a UN Human Rights Committee meeting openly accused Russian conservative forces (at that time seemingly growing in strength) of wanting to re-annex Latvia (“They want Latvia back...because it’s an approach to the sea—it’s very simple”) and Jundzis was quoted by an indignant Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman as telling foreign audiences that the Russians had “everything ready to reoccupy Riga.”¹⁵⁰ Indeed, Baltic representatives described the threat to the Baltic states as ultimately emanating not just from the Russian military, but from the political character of the Russian state. As a Lithuanian representative at the PACE put it: “The realization of [Baltic security] will depend entirely on the success of the process of democratization in the former USSR.”¹⁵¹

In the Russian case, the main potential victims of Baltic aggression were Baltic Russophones. Kozyrev, speaking of Estonia before the World Human Rights Conference in June 1993, said: “In Estonia...a discriminatory law on local self-government was adopted while the Tallinn authorities are getting ready to forcibly evict thousands of people from their apartments with the help of police.”¹⁵² Kozyrev stated the case most concisely at the World Human Rights Conference in June 1993: “A democracy cannot be recognized as genuine if it is created only for the ‘indigenous’ population while representatives of ethnic minorities are either forced out of the country or placed in the position of outcasts. This is happening, for instance, in Estonia... where on the following day after its admission to the Council of Europe, a discriminatory law on local self-government was adopted while the Tallinn authorities are getting ready to forcibly evict thousands of people from their apartments with the help of police.”¹⁵³ But threats to Russophones carried a broader menace as well; as a Russian Foreign Ministry statement responding to changes in Estonian citizenship laws put it, “Estonia’s line for confrontation is fraught with serious consequences, not only for our two states but the whole Baltic region.”¹⁵⁴

¹⁵¹ PACE ORD, 6 February 1992: 701.
But the Baltic states and Baltic Russophones were not the only ones portrayed by the two sides as being at risk: also in danger was Europe itself. This menace was to some degree described as tangible. In the case of the Baltic states, Russian representatives described Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws as threatening to unleash another Balkan crisis. A Russian memorandum “The violation of human rights in the Baltic countries,” circulated at the May 1992 session of the PACE (which Kozyrev as well as Baltic delegates addressed) stated that Baltic citizenship policies increased “the likelihood of organized anti-discrimination action (strikes etc.) by the Russian-speaking population that could destabilize the situation in these countries and Europe as a whole.” \cite{155} Yeltsin in his letter to Boutros-Ghali of late 1992 wrote: “Europe must not become the site of conditions fostering outrageous discrimination against a substantial segment of the population of these states and the creation of new seats of tension and conflict.” \cite{156} A Russian Foreign Ministry statement on a draft Latvian law on elections argued that it was necessary to take action before it was too late to prevent “aggressive nationalism from flourishing in the Baltics—a danger for Europe about which Russia has frequently warned the world.” \cite{157} In the case of Russia, Baltic representatives argued that, as Chairman of the Latvian Supreme Council Anatolijs Gorbunovs put it at the July 1992 CSCE Summit Meeting in Helsinki, the presence of Russian troops was “not only a domestic problem of the Baltic states, but a threat to overall European security.” \cite{158} Andrejevs used similar language at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in February 1992: “The Baltic military district forces must be withdrawn and their units dismantled...If we want to ensure the security of the whole of Europe, we must start from today.” \cite{159}

But equally importantly, Russian and Baltic representatives were keen to describe their antagonists’ actions and nature as a threat to European values. In the same letter cited above, for example, Kovalev and Lukin wrote: “[If apartheid] is becoming quite intolerable in South Africa, it is incomprehensible how it can be justified in the system of European democracy.” \cite{160} Speaking in 1993 on issues of concern in Russian foreign policy, Kozyrev opined that “[i]nattention to the rights of ethnic minorities threatens to damage the Baltic region and really turn Europe into a zone of special, yet not supreme but minimized and double standards.” \cite{161} Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste meanwhile argued that the Bosnian situation holds an “important message for the West regarding Baltic security:” “If the New Europe is to succeed, all who belong to the New Europe must be seen as relevant, and Western democracies must be willing to stand by the principles upon which those states and societies are based. We in Estonia believe they will. We must believe that, because we share these ideals, and these ideals necessarily are a cornerstone to our security.” \cite{162} As Meri later put it in Stuttgart: “If Europe is unable to find an adequate resolution to the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict and to Russia’s regrettable Monroe doctrine, Europe will bleed to death, both morally and physically. A thousand little jabs, which each on its own seems painless and insignificant, can bring about a fatal result: the destruction of Europe’s basic values, and

\begin{itemize}
\item \cite{155} The Baltic Independent, 15–21 May 1992: 3.
\item \cite{157} ITAR-TASS, 23 December 1993 (SWB, 1 January 1994: E/2).
\item \cite{158} Address, CSCE Summit Meeting, Helsinki, 9 July 1992.
\item \cite{159} PACE ORD, 6 February 1992: 692.
\item \cite{160} Izvestiya, 25 February 1992: 3.
\item \cite{161} Moscow News, no. 25, 18 June 1993: 4.
\end{itemize}
thus its peaceful and democratic future.” In the final analysis, Meri told an audience at the Royal Institute for International Affairs in London, “[t]he Baltic states are serving as a test case for world peace, because the Moscow conservatives are using the Baltic states to see...how strong is West Europe’s commitment to international law.”

**In lieu of a conclusion**

All of these rhetorical campaigns, particularly the Baltic campaign, were strikingly well-organized and well-coordinated. After all, as Landsbergis told reporters in August 1992, Russian initiatives were an effort to put the Baltic states on the back foot: they had to respond. After Yeltsin attacked Latvian “ethnic cleansing” in April 1992, Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar told reporters that the three Baltic Prime Ministers had already discussed countering the Russian propaganda effort, and that Estonia “would not let Latvia be singled out in a Kremlin attack.” According to one Russian press report, representatives of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia intended to meet in August 1992 in order to discuss a program of action against Russian claims of human rights abuses. The report quoted the chairman of the Latvian parliamentary legal commission as saying that “Baltic politicians must work to fight back disinformation about human rights abuses in their countries.”

Of the three Baltic governments, the Estonian government’s response was particularly professional. In August 1992, a conference on information policy brought together representatives of the State Chancellery, the Foreign Ministry, and the Estonian media. The conference discussed ways to influence foreign opinion; it also discussed strategies for countering “propaganda hostile to Estonia.” A Foreign Ministry representative was quoted by reporters as saying that the Ministry’s Information Department had decided to set up a “counter-propaganda team,” with press attaches to be posted to major embassies abroad. (The Foreign Ministry had already set up in April 1992 a three-person human rights bureau responsible for compiling and distributing information on the treatment of Estonia’s Russophones.) A press release by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued in January 1994 gives some idea of the department’s level of organization and rhetorical skill. Entitled “Rough ideas and themes to help formulate letters to the editor, comments etc. on Kozyrev’s statements (concerning a continued Russian military presence on the territory of the former Soviet Union),” the release opens with the disclaimer that “[t]hese are not necessarily Estonian Foreign Ministry positions.” It then goes on to suggest themes for concerned citizens: “Big bully terrorizing smaller, weaker neighbors; Russia...views Baltic independence as a temporary annoyance; Kozyrev turns out to be Zhirinovskiy.” On the subject of “concepts such as ‘near abroad,’ ‘historic sphere of interests,’” it suggests: “When Hitler announced his plans, the world powers did not take him seriously at first. The West set out on a path of appeasement...A bite of the Baltics will not fill the bear’s stomach; it will merely whet his appetite.” It suggests as a closing line: “Will we now hear demands for the

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163 *The Baltic Independent*, 14-20 May 1993: 3.
166 *The Baltic Independent*, 30 April-6 May 1993: 1.
169 *The Baltic Independent*, 4-10 December 1992: 3.
resignation of some or all of the Baltic leaders to be replaced by individuals more ‘friendly’ to Russia? Where have we heard things like this before?"\textsuperscript{170}

But all three Baltic governments worked well together to coordinate their lines of argument. Coordination was particularly evident at the PACE, where the Lithuanian and Estonian delegations met prior to sessions to agree on lines of attack.\textsuperscript{171} Baltic delegates frequently used almost identical language to drive their points home. Thus Landsbergis told the PACE that the war in Chechnya was “[a] dirty, nineteenth-century-type colonial war for subjugation (waged) by one side, and a twentieth-century war for liberation (fought) by the other,” while Kalam called it “a colonial war against a national minority that is a hangover from the nineteenth century.”\textsuperscript{172}

Some coordination was also evident among Russian representatives and within Russian delegations, although most frequently between representatives from the same general end of the political spectrum. For example, Rybkin and Sergei Baburin used strikingly similar language in their presentations on Estonia at the PACE in October 1992: Rybkin cautioned against “the tendency to adopt double standards,” noting that the challenge facing the Council of Europe was to successfully implement its many resolutions on human rights in Yugoslavia and Estonia, while Baburin urged against allowing “double standards, for example towards Yugoslavia and Estonia.”\textsuperscript{173} However, sharp disagreements also emerged among Russian delegations, for instance to the PACE, where Zhirinovskiy was consistently more extreme in his statements that his fellow delegation members. One incident is revealing: shortly after one particularly rabid rant by Zhirinovskiy, Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas made a speech at the PACE in which he condemned extremist statements by “some Russian politicians.” In question time, a member of the Russian delegation “thanked the President for his detailed statement with its peaceful connotations. He appreciated the words which had been spoken with regard to certain extremists, and noted approvingly that one of these had been disappointed during his visit to Strasbourg, as his comments had fallen on deaf ears.”\textsuperscript{174}

This chapter has introduced the basic themes and aims of Russian and Baltic rhetoric, and has attempted to place them within the spectrum of diplomatic practice. But how much support did Baltic and Russian representatives succeed in attracting to their causes? How did Baltic and Russian rhetorical campaigns change over time? And what

\textsuperscript{170} Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release, 18 January 1994. This kind of organization paid off, at least in the eyes of the media. As an editorial in the Tallinn-based English-language newspaper \textit{The Baltic Independent} stated: “Estonia’s public relations leave Latvia and Lithuania standing. In most cases, officials are available, and the reaction is determinedly persistent. Every serious piece of Russian defamation meets with a due response. Admittedly, not every Foreign Ministry statement makes the international press, but it shows policy-makers and diplomats in the West and in Russia that Tallinn is awake and articulate.” The paper later praised the Estonian Foreign Ministry for its ability to dispatch “crisp, useful statements by fax and e-mail within hours of an issue becoming topical.” By contrast, the paper complained, “the Lithuanian government does not even use e-mail, and statements tend to be bureaucratically worded and late...And there is nothing to stop the President or Prime Minister from taking the initiative in the propaganda war—if Mart Laar can write for \textit{The International Herald Tribune}, why can’t Mr. Šieževicius?” (\textit{The Baltic Independent}, 25 February –3 March 1994: 6; \textit{The Baltic Independent}, 8-14 July 1994: 6).


\textsuperscript{172} \textit{PACE ORD}, 2 February 1995: 244; \textit{PACE ORD}, 23 January 1996: 118.


\textsuperscript{174} \textit{PACE ORD}, 14 April 1994: 416. Needless to say, Zhirinovskiy’s inclusion in the Russian delegation to the PACE was a godsend to the Baltic rhetorical campaign. As Estonian delegate Tunne Kalam politely said: “I would like to thank Mr. Zhirinovskiy for his utterances because, against that backdrop, [our] case... is even more convincing” (\textit{PACE ORD}, 31 January 1995: 51).
kind of emotional impact may these battles have carried? These questions are the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter Four: Identity Diplomacy, Part Two.

The last chapter has introduced the basic themes and aims of Russian and Baltic rhetoric that emerged in 1992. This chapter outlines the course of events of the next few years. It sketches out the amount and kind of support that Baltic and Russian representatives succeeded in attracting to their causes, as well as the way in which the Russian and Baltic governments responded to outside pressure. It details the ways in which the Baltic and Russian rhetorical campaigns changed over time. And it attempts to outline the emotional implications for diplomats of participation in these battles for their nations' honors.

The ripping yarn continues

As described in the previous chapter, by early 1992 it had become evident that bilateral efforts to reach agreement on a troop withdrawal or citizenship issues were going to be fractious affairs. As a consequence, by the middle of 1992, Baltic and Russian representatives were routinely reaching out to European organizations for support. During the early months of 1992, relatively few strong statements of support for either side emerged from any of these organizations. From March on, the CSCE was caught up in preparatory meetings for the July Helsinki Summit Meeting, with few major statements being issued in the interim. Meanwhile, NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner told Baltic politicians that NATO did not consider it possible to exert economic or political pressure on Russia to speed up a withdrawal, although the issue could be a topic of discussion for the NACC.\(^1\) NATO sources said that the alliance was unwilling to get involved in the dispute: one NATO official told Reuters that "[f]irstly, we don't have the money, and secondly, we don't want to see NATO getting involved in rows like this." However, he and other NATO sources suggested that the alliance would extend "moral support" to the Baltic states.\(^2\) The PACE was similarly cautious about coming down in favour of either side on troop withdrawal or legal issues.\(^3\)

By mid-1992, however, the Baltic states had received support for their position on troop withdrawals from two organizations: NATO and the CSCE. The Final Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council (NAC, the council of NATO foreign ministers) meeting in June, while it expressed the ministers’ sympathy for the “practical problems for Russia connected with such withdrawals,” nevertheless affirmed the ministers’ understanding for Baltic concerns about the lack of progress in negotiations. Affirming the “basic principle of international law that the presence of foreign troops on the territory of a sovereign state requires the explicit consent of that state,” the ministers called on “the states concerned to conclude agreements soon, establishing firm timetables for the early withdrawal of former Soviet forces."\(^4\)

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3. This caution continued over the following years: motions for resolutions condemning the slow pace of the Russian troop withdrawal (24 September 1992, Doc. 6680; 17 September 1993, Doc. 6919), Russian recalcitrance in returning embassies belonging to the interwar Baltic states (6 September 1994, Doc. 7119), and Russian minority nationality policy toward the Finnic Setu people (7 February 1995, Doc. 7235) were tabled at various points, but lacked the parliamentary support to be passed.
4. Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), Oslo, 4 June 1992. This call was echoed at the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) meeting the next day, but with somewhat weaker language (“Military forces should be stationed on the territory of a foreign state only with the consent of that state. We recognize the importance of establishing soon, in the negotiations underway, a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Baltic states”)—a
A month later, the final document of the July CSCE Helsinki Summit Meeting, while diplomatic in its language, also came down solidly on the side of the Baltic states. Baltic, Russian, and other CSCE representatives had been engaged in intensive negotiations since preparatory meetings started in March as to whether the issue of a troop withdrawal should be included in the final document. Russian representatives made strong objections, arguing that the issue should be regarded as purely bilateral, and demanding that there be no reference to international law, as well as no explicit mention of Russia as the culprit. Meanwhile, the Baltic states, especially Lithuania, had threatened to veto the summit declaration if their concerns were not met. As a compromise, the Helsinki Summit document included the statement: “Even where violence has been contained, the sovereignty and independence of some States still needs to be upheld. We express support for efforts by CSCE participating States to remove, in a peaceful manner and through negotiations, the problems that remain from the past, like the stationing of foreign armed forces on the territories of the Baltic States without the required consent of those countries. Therefore, in line with basic principles of international law and in order to prevent any possible conflict, we call on the participating States concerned to conclude, without delay, appropriate bilateral agreements, including timetables, for the early, orderly and complete withdrawal of such foreign troops from the territories of the Baltic States.” This language was virtually identical to that proposed by the combined Baltic delegations a few days earlier; reportedly as a compromise with Russian representatives, Russia’s name was not mentioned, and references to “violations” of international law were dropped.

But concern was also mounting at the CSCE and elsewhere for Russophones in Estonia and Latvia. The responses of teams sent by the Council of Europe in late 1991 and early 1992 to assess the human rights situation in Estonia and Latvia respectively were indicative of the response of many European observers: while neither team found that Estonian or Latvian policy violated international law, they both nevertheless expressed concern that the policies in practice excluded large number of residents from citizenship, certainly in the short term. While the citizenship law passed by the

cchange that reportedly resulted from Russian pressure (Statement, Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Oslo, 5 June 1992; The Baltic Independent, 12-18 June 1992: 10). These sentiments were reaffirmed at the December 1992 NAC/NACC ministerials, with an appeal from the NACC to both sides to “exercise flexibility and moderation in negotiations to resolve remaining problems, including those of a social and material nature.” However, both communiqués added that the withdrawal should not be linked to other issues. The Russian delegation succeed in altering into the NACC communiqué language slightly to read “This withdrawal should not be—and is not—linked to other issues” (Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels (M-NACC-2(92)106, 17 December 1992); Final Communiqué, Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Brussels (M-NACC-2(92)109, 18 December 1992)).

5 The Baltic Independent, 17-23 July 1992: 1. Indeed, one meeting of the Baltic Council threatened to refrain from signing Helsinki document if no agreement was reached on specific timetable (Radio Riga, 26 June 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-126, 30 June 1992: 9)).

6 “The Challenges of Change,” CSCE Helsinki Document, 10 July 1992. A week earlier, the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly had called for a troop withdrawal in their final declaration, attached to which was also a special statement, “On the presence of Soviet troops in the Baltic countries.” The statement called for a Russian withdrawal “as soon as possible,” but also acknowledged the existence of practical difficulties accompanying a withdrawal, including housing shortages, and called on CSCE states to provide financial assistance to aid the withdrawal (Declaration, CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Budapest, 5 July 1992).

7 The Baltic Independent, 17-23 July 1992: 1. Further CSCE declarations in 1992 were largely consistent with the line taken at Helsinki; for example, the Stockholm Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in December 1992 expressed “concern” that the withdrawal was not yet complete (“Decisions on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes” (JSTOCK92.e, 15 December 1992)).

Estonian parliament in February 1992 had established only a two-year residency requirement (plus language and civics tests), the earliest that a resident not granted automatic citizenship could apply for naturalization was 30 March 1993; furthermore, non-citizens were not permitted to vote in national elections or to stand for national-level elected offices. As a consequence, of a total population of 1.6 million, the number of registered voters at the time of the June 1992 referendum on the constitution was only 660,000; only about a sixth of the non-Estonian population was eligible to vote on the constitution (which of course enshrined the citizenship law) or in the elections for the first post-Soviet parliament in September 1992. As a consequence, the Estonian parliament elected in September 1992 contained not a single Russian-speaker. Meanwhile, Latvian Russophones were in limbo, with their legal status uncertain and the establishment of formal procedures for naturalization on hold. In December 1992, a CSCE team requested by the Russians and invited by the Estonian government assessed Estonia’s citizenship laws and compared their elaboration and implementation with international human rights standards (the lack of established legislation made such a visit to Latvia pointless). The mission’s report, which was distributed confidentially through the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), determined that the Estonian constitution and citizenship laws met “international standards for the enjoyment of human rights” and that steps to overcome shortcomings of existing legislation were underway. Furthermore, it concluded that “[n]either under Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights nor under any of the CSCE documents is Estonia obligated to grant its citizenship to all residents without any preconditions.” However, the report noted the potentially negative psychological impact of the existing legal situation on non-citizen Russophone population and made extensive recommendations.

In considering further action, the CSCE relied for further action on the opinions and advice of two groups: its High Commissioner on National Minorities and its in-country missions. The CSCE had emphasized protection of minority rights as a particular concern in the final documents of the November 1990 Paris summit and the September-October 1991 Moscow meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE. As a consequence, the Office of High Commissioner on National Minorities was established in July 1992 at the Helsinki Summit Meeting; former Minister of State of the Netherlands Max van der Stoel was appointed as Commissioner in December 1992. Van der Stoel inaugurated his tenure—and the function of the new position—with

10 Torniidd 1994: 74. For example, residents of Soviet Estonia who wished to acquire Estonian citizenship could apply after residing on Estonian territory for two years, starting from 30 March 1990; applications would then be subject to a one-year waiting period, with the result that the earliest a resident could acquire citizenship would be 30 March 1993. Candidates for citizenship also had to pass an Estonian language test requiring a mastery of 1,500 words and an examination, conducted in Estonian, of their knowledge of the Estonian constitution (Torniidd 1994: 74; Vares 1994: 122).
11 The power to pass a new citizenship law was delegated to a new Latvian parliament, whose election—in which non-citizens were barred from voting—was delayed until June 1993 (Girnius 1994: 30). Thus, as Lowell Barrington observes, “while Latvia lacked a citizenship law, it had a citizenship policy” (Barrington 1995: 738).
a tour of the Baltic states in January 1993 to assess the situation first-hand, and returned in March, sending recommendations to the Lithuanian, Estonian and Latvian Foreign Ministers in letters of 5 March (Lithuania) and 6 April (Estonia and Latvia) 1993. Meanwhile, a November 1992 CSO meeting in Prague secured agreement for the Chairman in Office to appoint a personal representative to explore the possibility of a CSCE mission to Estonia; a decision was reached to appoint the mission at the December 1992 CSO meeting in Stockholm, and the mission’s terms of reference were approved at the February 1993 CSO meeting in Prague.

Many European governments, however, were reluctant to extend too sympathetic a hand to Baltic Russophones, at least partly because some were not anxious to see precedents set that might increase pressure to naturalize guest workers in their own countries. The Council of Europe, for example, acknowledged indirectly the problems facing Baltic Russophones. Nevertheless, the Council’s exclusion in early 1993 of Baltic Russophones from the category of “national minority” and their effective redefinition as “migrants” was an important moment for the Baltic campaign. In February 1993, after much negotiation, the PACE recommended in February 1993 the adoption of an additional protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to concern persons belonging to national minorities. This Recommendation defined a “national minority” as a group of persons in a state who “reside on the territory of a state and are citizens thereof”—thereby effectively sidestepping the issue of Russophones who had not yet attained Estonian or Latvian citizenship. However, an extensive debate was already underway over a PACE resolution on population movements on the territory of the former Soviet Union. On 4 February 1993, major changes occurred during parliamentary debate to paragraph 3 of the draft Document 6739. The document initially read “Twenty-five million Russian-speaking people living in the Baltic states, Moldova, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and the republics of Central Asia are becoming increasingly concerned for their safety and their rights in response to indigenous nationalist and Islamic fundamentalist pressure and prejudice.” After debate, the paragraph was changed to read “Twenty-five million Russian-speaking people...are becoming increasingly concerned by changes in their

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14 CSCE Communication 124, 23 April 1993.
15 17th CSO meeting, 5-6 November 1992, Prague (17CSO/J2); 18th CSO meeting, Stockholm, 13-15 December 1992, (18CSO/J3, annex 2); 19th CSO meeting, Prague, 2-4 February 1993 (19CSO/J2, annex 1). The terms of reference of Estonian mission were to: establish contacts with competent authorities; collect information and provide technical assistance and advice on the states of communities in Estonia; facilitate the re-creation of a civic society, in particular through the promotion of local mechanisms to facilitate dialogue and understanding; prepare for the transfer of the Mission’s responsibilities to local representative institutions. For a useful overview of the Mission’s activities in Estonia, see Sousa Freire 2001.
16 Personal interviews, Council of Europe, June 1998.
17 As part of its Demosthenes project, starting in 1992 the Council proposed, approved and administered in the three Baltic states and Russia (as well as elsewhere in the former Eastern bloc) a series of programs of cooperation and assistance designed to facilitate the creation and consolidation of democratic state institutions, ranging from advice on legal reform to programs designed to strengthen local institutions. While limited in scope and budget, the programs targeted both indigenous and Russophone non-governmental entities in its efforts to build both state and non-state capacity (Manas 1996: 114-118). See Activities of the Council of Europe, the Council’s annual report, from 1992 forward for details of cooperation activities in specific countries.
18 As well as that of guest workers (PACE Recommendation 1201, 1 February 1993). This definition drew upon an earlier PACE recommendation, in which the PACE had defined national minorities as “separate or distinct groups, well-defined and established on the territory of a state, the members of which are nationals of that state and have certain religious, linguistic, cultural or other characteristics which distinguish them from the majority of the population” (PACE Recommendation 1134, 1 October 1990).
political and economic positions, including losing their privileges, and for their rights...” 19 As a rapporteur for the Council’s Political Affairs Committee later put it: “We must therefore always draw an important distinction between ‘national minorities’ (which are historical or indigenous) and a massive influx of nationals of an occupying state.”20 The ruling was an important factor in removing barriers to Estonia’s admission to the Council of Europe, which eventually occurred in May 1993 (and which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter).

Shortly after Estonia’s admission to the Council, major controversy broke out in Russian-Estonian relations over two new laws on the status of non-citizen Russophones. On 19 May the Estonian parliament passed a law on local elections that allowed all residents to vote but barred non-citizens from running as candidates. Furthermore, on 21 June, the Estonian parliament adopted a law that declared all non-citizens as “aliens.” The purpose of the law was to regularize the position of non-citizens, who for the most part had applied neither for Estonian citizenship (which they would only have been eligible to do since 30 March) or Russian citizenship, and who as a consequence were residing in Estonia on the basis of their Soviet-era propiska (residency registration papers). Aliens had two years in which to apply for residence and work permits, as well as to decide which citizenship they wished to take out. Since the law gave aliens no guarantee that they would receive residence or work permits, which in any case were only valid for five years, many Russophones feared that the law was tantamount to an expulsion order.21 The move came at a dangerous time, as Russophones were already planning to hold referenda on local autonomy in the heavily Russophone-dominated cities of Narva and Sillimae in Estonia’s northeast in late July. Unsurprisingly, the two laws provoked a firestorm of Russian official criticism, with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and President Boris Yeltsin freely invoking images of “apartheid” and “ethnic cleansing.”22 A Russian Foreign Ministry statement responding to the law argued: “Those foreign partners of Estonia who now close their eyes to its aggressive nationalism and who unreservedly support Tallinn’s dangerous course will also be affected.”23

The Estonian law on aliens in particular (as well as to a lesser degree that on local elections) provoked concerns in Western institutions and capitals. The CSCE CSO meeting of June/July 1993 noted “with concern” developments in the situation of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia and in relations between Estonia and Russia, and urged both sides to demonstrate their commitment to the CSCE principles of dialogue, specifically calling on the Estonian government to take into consideration recommendations by the High Commissioner on National Minorities.24 Indeed, before signing the legislation into law, Estonian President Lennart Meri submitted to it to the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Council of Europe for comments.25 While both found the law entirely acceptable with regard to non-residents of Estonia who might seek to live and work there, both had concerns about its application to those already resident, especially those whose residence was long-standing. Van der Stoel’s comments focused on the “political and ‘mass psychology”

20 PACE ORD, 13 May 1993: 1057.
24 22nd CSO meeting, Prague, 30 June-1 July 1993 (22CSO/J2, annex 2).
25 Van der Stoel had already been heavily involved in making recommendations to both Estonia and Latvia. For a detailed discussion of HCNM activities in Estonia and Latvia, see Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations 1997: 52-56, 65-68.
aspects” of the contemplated law, while the Council of Europe’s more legalistic approach resulted in a series of recommendations designed to remove ambiguities that might be open to arbitrary interpretation by authorities. In response to these comments, Meri recommended changes, approved by the Estonian parliament on 8 July, that won praise from the OSCE mission in Estonia and Van der Stoel himself.

Meanwhile, despite the lack of formal agreements, troop withdrawals were in fact proceeding steadily. After the Helsinki Summit Meeting in July 1992, Russian representatives expressed commitment to the withdrawal process and predicted major breakthroughs at a meeting of Baltic and Russian foreign ministers in August. However, Baltic representatives found the proposals put forward by the Russians at that meeting unacceptable. Moreover, Yeltsin issued a directive on 29 October suspending troop withdrawals from the Baltic states, a move which provoked enormous alarm in Baltic capitals and an expression of “concern” from the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Stockholm in December 1992. Nevertheless, the directive did not appear to slow withdrawals significantly, and troop strengths were down to about 10,000 in Lithuania in January 1993, about 6,500-7,000 in Estonia in May 1993, and about 23,000 in Latvia in April 1993.

Furthermore, significant progress was occurring towards a complete withdrawal of troops from Lithuania. On 8 September 1992, the Lithuanian and Russian defense ministers had signed a preliminary agreement that provided for the departure of former Soviet troops no later than 31 August 1993; although a Russian Foreign Ministry official told the press that Yeltsin’s directive of 29 October suspending the withdrawal had voided this agreement, Yeltsin later assured Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis that this was not the case. Kozyrev, defending during a visit to Vilnius a differentiated Russian policy towards the three Baltic states (which some had described

26 Huber 1994: 8; Sheehy 1993: 9. The CSCE Chairman In Office, Swedish Foreign Minister Margaretha af Ugglas, particularly emphasized the importance of Van der Stoel’s advice in a letter to Meri of 8 July (Huber 1994: 10).
27 In particular, residence and work permits were guaranteed to any alien who had been registered as a resident prior to 1 July 1990; the stipulation that permanent residence and work permits were to be renewed every five years was also dropped (Sheehy 1993: 9). These changes largely met the Council of Europe’s concerns. However, not all of Van der Stoel’s recommendations were accepted. Van der Stoel continued to play an important role in defusing tensions surrounding the referenda on autonomy in Narva and Sillamae, the postponement of which he had unsuccessfully urged (Kand 1994: 94). Van der Stoel engaged in active consultations with all parties, including the Russian government; for example, en route to Estonia on 25 June, he met with Kozyrev, whose carefully worded endorsement of the High Commissioner’s activities avoided compromising Van der Stoel’s mission (Huber 1994: 10).
28 The Russian side demanded that the three Baltic states: 1) grants legal status to the armed forces in the interim to ensure their normal functioning; 2) accept Russian control over the strategic installations of Paldiski naval base and Skrunda radar station for the near future; drop compensation claims for damage inflicted by the USSR from 1940 to 1991; 4) help construct housing in Russia for the returning troops; guarantee transit rights for military transport going to Kaliningrad; 6) provide compensation for the land and property vacated by the troops; 7) guarantee social security (including pensions) and human rights for retired Soviet officers and their families; 8) alter laws that infringed on the rights of Russophone non-citizens; and 9) drop territorial claims (Bungs 1993: 52).
29 “Decisions on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes” (STOCK92.e, 15 December 1992). Western officials—for example, the defense ministers of the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Iceland, and Canada—also made individual statements (Rudensky 1994: 75). The final declaration of the July 1993 Parliamentary Assembly meeting reaffirmed that group’s concern that the withdrawal was not yet complete (“Final Helsinki Declaration of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly,” 9 July 1993).
30 Bungs 1993: 53, 55, 56.
31 Bungs 1993: 53.
as an effort to divide and conquer), said: “Of course there’s a difference, but in our view, it is a difference that is in Lithuania’s favor...we certainly take [different Baltic policies such as citizenship policies] into account in developing our contacts and relations...[the approach of the Lithuanian government] not only in matters of human rights but in many other issues, such as dealing with the military...is somewhat significantly quieter and more civilized.” By mid-1993, while no political agreement had been reached, the Lithuanian side was confident that essential problems had been solved, and that troops would be indeed out by 31 August. And in fact, the last of the troops were withdrawn on schedule, despite last-minute footdragging by Russian negotiators.

All three Baltic governments, while welcoming the withdrawal, stressed that it was only the first step in a total withdrawal from the Baltic states, and that hence there was no cause for complacency. This position was for the most part that taken by European organizations and governments as well. The communique of the December 1993 NACC ministerial meeting reiterated the language of the June communiqué, again “stressing” the need for “an expeditious withdrawal” for the sake of regional and European security. The December 1993 Rome CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers meeting also again expressed “concern” that the withdrawal was not yet complete. The CSCE weighed in again in early 1994, with the March CSO meeting recalling “the commitments undertaken under paragraph 15 of the Helsinki Summit Declaration 1992, in the Summary of Conclusions of the Stockholm Council Meeting and in the Decisions of the Rome Council Meeting, the Committee of Senior Officials,” and urging “all parties to promptly conclude appropriate agreements, including timetables, through a speedy and continuous negotiating process for the early, complete and orderly withdrawal of the remaining Russian troops from the territories of the Baltic States.” However, the meeting also welcomed the progress towards an agreement between Latvia and Russia on Skrunda. The Estonian delegation to the meeting entered into the

33 Bungs 1993: 54.
34 Girnius 1994: 30.
35 For example, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys pointed out that, despite the pullout from Lithuanian soil, Lithuanians would not feel safe as long as troops remained in the other two Baltic states (he also mentioned Kaliningrad) (Latvian Radio, 27 October 1993 (SWB, 29 October 1993: E/2)).
36 On only two occasions did Western organizations fail to offer rhetorical support to the Baltic position. One of these was the Council of Europe’s summit of heads of state and government in Vienna in October 1993, at which the Council had promised to consider a Baltic proposal for a declaration on troop withdrawal that would call for detailed instructions for the withdrawal and request economic assistance to speed the pullout. However, in the event the heads of state and governments issued a declaration on the events in Moscow of September–early October, deploiring “the heavy loss of life that resulted from the resort to violence, provoked by the opponents of reform” and affirming their solidarity with “the supporters of reform under the leadership of President Boris Yeltsin.” Also, no mention was made of troop withdrawal issue in the January 1994 NAC ministerial communiqué, because of the focus on the announcement of the establishment of the Partnership for Peace (The Baltic Independent, 8-14 October 1992: 3; “Declaration on Russia,” Meeting of Heads of State and Government, Vienna, 8 October 1993; Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels (M-1(93), 11 January 1994)).
37 Statement, Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Brussels (M-NACC-2(93)71, 3 December 1993). The June 1993 NAC meeting communiqué had skirted the issue of the troop withdrawal, but the NACC ministerial communiqué had been stiffer, “stressing” that “an expeditious completion of the withdrawal” was important for regional and European security (Final Communiqué, Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Athens (M-NAC-1(93)38, 10 June 1993); Statement, Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Athens (M-NACC-1(93)39, 11 June 1993)).
record an interpretative statement, in which it characterized the Russian backing off of the agreed final date as “unilateral” and protested the linkage by the Russian delegation of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia to “issues of a different nature.” Furthermore, all Western organizations made it clear that linkage between the troop withdrawal and citizenship issues would not meet with their support.

However, the status of Russophones in Estonia and Latvia was still high on the list of Russian concerns. In early 1994, the Russian government approved a draft program on “The main directions of the state policy of the Russian Federation towards compatriots living abroad,” which indicated that “[q]uestions of financial, economic, social, and military-political cooperation between Russia and the individual states will be linked to the concrete policy they pursue regarding the rights and interests of Russians (rossiyane) living on their territory.” Furthermore, the problems of Russophones in Latvia, who were still in legal limbo, had been growing. The Latvian parliament had been considering since late 1993 a citizenship law that set a sixteen-year residency requirement for people who wished to be naturalized, as well as setting yearly naturalization quotas. Non-citizens born in Latvia would be eligible to apply for naturalization from 1 January 1995; those not born in Latvia would have to wait until 2000, at which point 2000 per year would be permitted to apply. The estimated figure for Latvian-born non-citizens being 230,000, this meant that in 2000 there would still have been around 500,000 non-citizens, whose naturalization would have taken 250 years. Unsurprisingly, European organizations had reacted unfavorably. The 9 September 1993 CSCE CSO-Vienna Group meeting appointed a CIO personal representative to Latvia; a monitoring mission was approved at the 21-23 September 1993 CSO meeting, and the terms of reference were approved at the 7 October 1993 CSO-Vienna Group meeting. Meanwhile, the Council of Europe had reported critically on the bill, and Council representatives had indicated that passage of the law would prevent Latvian admission. The Latvian parliament had already twice considered recommendations by the Council and the High Commissioner on National Minorities for changes, but had voted them down each time. But now the parliament passed a final version on 21 June 1994. Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis, however, refused to sign the law; acting on his recommendations, the parliament amended the law

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39 25th CSO meeting, 2-4 March, Prague (25CSO/J3).
41 But harsh measures against delinquent states “will be executed only after a serious situational analysis, taking into consideration the interests of the people they are intended to defend” (Kolsto 2000: 93). Estonian Foreign Minister Jüri Luik commented that “[t]he draft program sounds to us very much like Hitler’s program of protecting the so-called Volksdeutsche living outside the boundaries that then constituted Germany. As we all know, Hitler’s program was a justification for the invasion and annexation of the Sudetenland. Because the program refers to ethnic Russians, one is forced to wonder whether the Russian Foreign Ministry also intends to carry out its program in, say, Brighton Beach?” (address at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2 March 1994 (http://www.vm.ee/speeches/1994/94mar2.html)).
45 28th CSO-Vienna Group (CSO-VG) meeting, Vienna, 9 September 1993 (VG/J28); 23rd CSO meeting, Prague, 21-23 September 1993 (23CSO/J3, annex 3); 31st CSO-VG meeting, Vienna, 7 October 1993 (VG/J31, annex 1). The terms of reference of Latvian mission included: provision of advice to Latvian government authorities and to non-governmental institutions and individuals on citizenship issues and related matters; gathering information; and reporting on developments (19th CSO meeting, Prague, 19CSO/J2, Annex 1, 3 February 1993; 31st CSO-Vienna Group meeting, Vienna, VG/J31, Annex 1, 7 October 1993).
on 22 July to remove the quota system and dropped the residency requirement to five years.47

Meanwhile, the troop withdrawal from Latvia and Estonia moving into its final phase. In November 1993, a breakthrough had occurred in Russian-Latvian talks when Russian representatives suggested Russian forces could be withdrawn by 31 August 1994 if the Russian military were allowed to retain Skrunda for six years and if military pensioners were given social guarantees. On 30 April 1994, reportedly after heavy pressure on the Latvian side by the United States, Yeltsin and Ulmanis signed a final agreement: while troops were to be out by 31 August, Skrunda was to remain in Russian hands for four more years, with an additional 18 months for dismantling.48 Furthermore, the Latvian government undertook to provide social protection for the withdrawal of troops and social guarantees for pensioners who had retired before 28 January 1992.49

However, although Russian forces continued to withdraw from Estonia, handing over bases as they went, Russian-Estonian negotiations had reached an impasse. In November 1993, Russian representatives had proposed a deadline of 31 August 1994; however, negotiations in early March 1994 came to halt when Russian negotiators called the deadline into question, demanding additional financial assistance for the construction of housing in Russia for the withdrawing troops and permanent residence permits for all retired officers.50 The Russian move provoked concern in European organizations and Western capitals. The communiqués of the NAC and NACC ministerials in June 1994 mentioned that the members “expected” an Estonian-Russian agreement to match that signed with Latvia; the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly in July 1994 added its support.51 US President Bill Clinton, who had pushed hard for Yeltsin’s inclusion as a full participant at the 10 July G-7 summit in Naples, privately warned Yeltsin that he expected a withdrawal from Estonia in return.52 Furthermore, on 13 July

47 Ulmanis signed the law on 11 August; minor amendments were passed in March 1995 (Girnius 1994: 31; Ortenlicher 1998: 302). Ulmanis told the press that the US, UK, French and German governments had also sent letters criticizing the law (Latvian Radio, 28 July 1994 (SWB, 30 July 1994: E/1)).
51 Final Communiqué, Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Istanbul (M-NAC-1(94)46, 9 June 1994); Statement, Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Istanbul (M-NAC-1(94)48, 10 June 1994); “Vienna Declaration of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly”, Vienna, 8 July 1994 (PA(94)7).
52 According to Clinton advisor and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Clinton's words were: "Boris, don't screw this up. You've got to get out of Estonia. Everyone is watching. You'll either confirm the worst that a lot of people think about Russia or you'll confirm the best I've been saying about you" (Talbott 2002: 127; see Talbott 2002: 124-129 for an informative overview of the course of negotiations). Clinton's ability to take such a forthright stance stemmed at least in part from the sympathy that he had expressed for Russian concerns about the status of Baltic Russophones. A joint statement issued by Yeltsin and Clinton at their meeting in Vancouver in April 1993 had stated that: “Admitting that violation of rights of minorities and ethnic communities has been an increasingly important source of international instability, both parties have emphasized the importance of full protection of human rights, including the rights of ethnic Russians and other minorities on the territory of the former USSR. The presidents reaffirmed their commitment to peaceful settlement of conflicts in that region on the basis of respect for independence, territorial integrity, and security interests of all states” (quoted in Rudensky 1994: 75). Clinton also promised to increase assistance for construction of housing for troops being withdrawn from the Baltic states (Talbott 2002: 63). At the US-Russian summit in Moscow in January 1994, Clinton also told the press that he had agreed to “press strongly [with the leaders of the Baltic states] the proposition that the Russian-speaking people in those republics must be respected” (Lynch 1994: 17).
the US Senate passed an amendment to the foreign aid bill blocking aid to Russia if troops were not out by 31 August. And indeed, after much to-ing and fro-ing, on 26 July Yeltsin and Meri finally signed two agreements, one on a withdrawal by 31 August, one guaranteeing social protection, if not necessarily citizenship, for military pensioners. On 31 August 1994 the last Russian troops withdrew from Latvia and Estonia, an event that local leaders, reportedly heeding hints from Moscow, declined to turn into a celebration.

It might have seemed, then, that two of the three major issues plaguing Russian-Baltic relations had been effectively resolved by the end of August 1994. First, the troop withdrawal was complete; and indeed, in the course of 1992-1994 the three Baltic states had considerably consolidated their security vis-à-vis their larger neighbor. For instance, although economic issues are outside the scope of this dissertation, it is worth noting that throughout this period the Baltic states showed themselves substantially immune to Russian economic pressure. In principle, the Baltic states were potentially vulnerable: as late as 1996, Russia remained Latvia’s and Lithuania’s most important trade partner and Estonia’s most important export partner, as well as the three republics’ only source for gas and main supplier of oil. The Russian legislature had repeatedly called for economic sanctions against Estonia and Latvia, a call to which the Russian government occasionally succumbed. For example, in July 1994 the Russian government placed all the Baltic states in the highest tariff category for agricultural imports. But Baltic governments had successfully fought back most efforts at pressure through diversification or simply quick thinking. For instance, when Yeltsin in November 1992 announced that the Baltic states were to be required to pay hard currency for their

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53 As Talbott complained, "[t]he Republicans were positioning themselves so that when the deadline passed and Russian troops were still in the Baltics, they could declare the beginning of Russia's return to an imperialistic footing and the failure of the Clinton administration's foreign policy" (Talbott 2002: 128). This was not the first time that the Senate had weighed in on this issue. In July 1992 and again in October 1993, the Senate had voted to tie US aid to the troop withdrawal: unless the White House could certify in a year's time that Russia had made "significant progress" towards a troop withdrawal and ending military activities in the region, US aid would be restricted to humanitarian aid (The Baltic Independent, 10-16 July 1992: 3; Interfax 29 September 1993 (SWB, 8 October 1993: C/2)).

54 Talbott later heard from the Estonian side that Meri had made an emotional plea directly to Yeltsin, saying that "Yeltsin had heroically broken Russia free from its own history and given it hope of a better future...[and] had been a defender of Estonia's freedom in the last days of the Soviet Union. But now he seemed to be behaving like Stalin." In response, Yeltsin asked plaintively why Meri had not been willing to talk to him directly: why had he "turned his friends in the West against him, particularly Bill Clinton?" (Talbott 2002: 129). The agreement on pensioners contained the provision that the Estonian authorities could deny citizenship to individuals who they felt posed a security risk, provided that a CSCE representative was included on the examining commission to ensure fair play (Girnius 1994: 32).

55 Estonian Radio, 25 August 1994 (SWB, 27 August 1994: E/1). Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar, for instance, told the press that "all Estonian political forces and the whole nation should forget hatred and resentment and make a new beginning," and that no major festivities would be organized (ibid.). The three Baltic presidents issued a joint statement calling the 31st "a significant day" and saying that the withdrawal would give the Baltic states better opportunities to strengthen their democratic institutions and raise the standard of living of the Baltic people (Latvian Radio, 31 August 1994 (SWB, 2 September 1994: E/2)). The three Baltic foreign ministers also issued a statement celebrating the fact that "fifty-five years after the beginning of World War II, the Baltic states [are now] free of any foreign occupying troops" (BNS, 31 August 1994 (SWB, 5 September 1994: E/1).

56 For details, see Drezner 1997, Girnius 1995.

57 Girnius 1996b: 19.

58 Only occasionally; for example, the Supreme Soviet passed a resolution in July 1993 demanding that economic sanctions be imposed on Estonia within two weeks, a call that the government sidestepped (Rossiskaya Gazeta, 7 July 1993: 1 (SWB, 9 July 1993: A2/2).

energy deliveries due to their differing economic and political policies, the Latvian
government shut down deliveries through the oil pipeline running from the Russian
border to the port of Ventspils—a move that while it cost the Latvian authorities $10
million a month in lost transit and port fees, cost Russian oil suppliers $70 million a
month in unfilled contracts. Similarly, when the Russian gas supplier Gazprom raised
its prices after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Latvijas Gaze immediately responded
with price hikes to customers, keeping its debt down to a manageable amount.
Furthermore, although threatening statements sometimes emerged from the Communist-
dominated Duma, popular support for any kind of revanchist military action seemed
low. In sum, the security and future of the Baltic states seemed, if not assured,
nevertheless substantially strengthened.

Second, the legal situation of Russophones in Latvia and Estonia had largely stabilized.
Although many Baltic Russophones were unhappy with their marginalized status, few
appeared to consider themselves in any physical danger. Indeed, relatively few had felt
it necessary to leave the Baltic states. Between 1989 and 1993, a total of around 141,000
people had moved to Russia from the Baltic region (39,248 from Lithuania; 59,130
from Latvia; and 42,604 from Estonia), with a substantial proportion in each case
having left before the collapse of the USSR and the large majority having left in 1992.
By the end of 1993, emigration from all three states had slowed dramatically. The vast
majority of those left were under no threat of expulsion; almost all enjoyed social
guarantees close to, if not equal to, those of Baltic citizens. Indeed, few had felt it
necessary to apply for Russian citizenship (a point that had the potential to calm Baltic
fears of a fifth column as well); as of 1 July 1994, only 42,000 Russophones living in
Estonia, 25,000 living in Latvia, and 15,000 living in Lithuania had taken out Russian
citizenship. And in fact, although sometimes with some misgivings, Western experts
had judged Estonian and Latvian laws to be in line with international law and European
practice. The OSCE missions to Estonia and Latvia stayed in place, and the High
Commissioner on National Minorities continued to make occasional recommendations
on measure to make naturalization easier, particularly as regarded the language tests.

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60 Drezner 1997: 106.
61 Drezner 1997: 108. A number of analysts (see, for instance, Girnius 1994) have noted that the Russian
government’s attempts to impose economic costs on the Baltic states hurt Russophones as much as
anyone else, arguing that this point raises questions about the seriousness of Russian government
concern for their plight.
62 For instance, in March 1996 the Duma passed a ‘non-binding’ resolution that branded as “illegal” the
Belovezhskaya agreement that abolished the USSR. Yet “a broad survey taken by Russian state radio
less than a month after the Duma vote found that only 14% of those polled saw the restoration of the
USSR as ‘an important task.’ Meanwhile, over 46% considered that it was impossible to ‘restore’ the
USSR” (Buck 1997: 8).
64 Girnius 1994: 33. While the number of residents taking out Russian citizenship tapered off sharply in
Lithuania, it continued to rise in Estonia and Latvia; 120,000 Estonian residents had taken out Russian
citizenship by spring 1997 (Kolsto 2000: 90.)
65 Orentlicher 1998; Chinn and Truex 1996 (see the latter for a comparison of the Estonian and Latvian
citizenship policies with those of other major European states.) Meanwhile, US Secretary of State
Lawrence Eagleburger had advised Estonian leaders in September 1992 that the United States had no
problems with Tallinn’s handling of citizenship and human rights issues (Park 1994: 83); Deputy
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott similarly told the Latvian government that the US administration did
not believe that “violations of human rights” were occurring in Latvia, although he felt that “political
problems” existed (Latvian Radio, 16 September 1993 (SWB, 24 September 1993: E/3)).
66 Lack of citizenship, although it no longer led automatically to the threat of expulsion from either
Estonia or Latvia, nevertheless still left many Russophones in fear for their futures. In the Estonian
case, for instance, the Estonian Law on Aliens contained provisions permitting the expulsion of aliens
who were unemployed for more than nine months. Citizenship was also necessary for individuals to
be members of trade union leaderships, a restriction that Andersen argues seriously impeded non-
The Council of Europe also continued to recommend steps that Estonia and Latvia could take to promote naturalization of non-citizens. In this substantially changed environment, one might have expected Russian and Baltic representatives to take a breather.

Even more clearly, Western interest in and patience with further calls for action were running out. The Council of Europe extended membership, its ultimate imprimatur of approval, to Estonia as well as Lithuania in May 1993 (Latvia, due to its lack of a codified citizenship law, had to wait until January 1995), a judgment with which no major European government or organization disagreed. Furthermore, the PACE explicitly upheld its earlier definition of a national minority in a January 1995 recommendation on the protection of rights of national minorities. Consequently, if Russian representatives still felt concern (despite the cheering assessment of European observers) for Baltic Russophones, it seemed unlikely that they were going to find European audiences supportive. Furthermore, Western governments had made it abundantly clear that Estonian and Latvian calls for border revision would receive no support. Indeed, even the Lithuanian government broke ranks with its neighbors, insisting on the inviolability of post-World War II borders, as a return to pre-war borders would mean giving up a substantial amount of territory (including the national capital of Vilnius and the important port of Klaipėda), seized by the Soviets from Poland under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, that had been transferred to Lithuania by the Soviet government in 1939.

The campaigns continue

Any optimism that a lull might emerge, however, was soon dashed. On the Baltic side, some representatives extended to the Russian government some slight credit for finally having effected a complete troop withdrawal. The Estonian and Latvian Prime Ministers Mart Laar and Valdis Birkavs, in a statement on the withdrawals from their countries,

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67 PACE Recommendation 1255, 31 January 1995. The failure of Russophones to act with alacrity to take up citizenship in Estonia (where the majority of non-citizen residents were eligible to apply for citizenship immediately after 30 March 1993, although of course they still had to pass the language and civics exams) or in Latvia (where those born in Latvia became eligible to apply in 1997, and those born outside Latvia in 1998, after amendments to a law that would originally have required them to wait until 2000) has prevented the emergence of what the Council would define as a substantial Russophone national minority in either state. For instance, of the 120,000 individuals in Latvia whose “window” had opened by autumn 1998, fewer than 10,000 had received citizenship (Kolsta 2000: 118, 121).

68 Indeed, not all Russians were supportive: Aleksandr Yakovlev, Gorbachev’s former advisor and deputy director of the new Gorbachev Foundation, told the press during a visit to Estonia that he was convinced that the stories of the hardships facing Russophones in Estonia were “largely exaggerated” and expressed amazement that one could live somewhere for twenty or thirty years and not learn the local language (Estonian Radio, 11 January 1993 (SWB, 15 January 1993: A2/1)).

said: "The continuation of democratic processes in Russia, a distinctive mark of which is the departure of the Russian troops from the soil of the Baltic states, gives all of us a better feeling of security and takes away unnecessary fears and worries."70 Furthermore, a joint statement by the three Baltic presidents (Meri, Ulmanis, and Algirdas Brazauskas) circulated at the CSCE after the withdrawal noted that "[w]ith the completion of the withdrawal of its forces from our countries, Russia now moves closer to the accepted norms of international behaviour."71 And indeed, some Russians appeared prepared to acknowledge, at least in retrospect, the anxiety that the presence of troops had caused. Presidential spokesman Vyacheslav Kostikov, for instance, when asked if Russian troops had been withdrawn from Germany too soon, answered: "If Russian troops had stayed any longer, we could have got ourselves into a situation where Russia would have been rejected both morally and physically. We overstayed in certain places in the Baltic region and are now considered there to be occupiers. If we had wished to avoid this in the Baltics, we should have done what we have done now [i.e. withdraw]."72

Nevertheless, trouble soon started up again. Within days Baltic representatives were expressing criticism of the way in which the withdrawal was handled.73 Furthermore, Baltic representatives soon were arguing that the troop withdrawal was, as Estonian Foreign Minister Jüri Luik described it, only the "first step towards Baltic security."74 (While Estonian representatives were the most actively involved in the continuing campaign, and Lithuanian representatives—with the notable exception of soon-to-be-former-President Landsbergis—the least, the continued campaign was not the exclusive province of any one Baltic government.) Nor, for their part, did Russian representatives show any signs of softening their jaundiced view of the Estonian and Latvian governments in particular. As Kozyrev argued in early September, the issue of human rights in the Baltic states had been overshadowed by the continuing presence of former Soviet troops; now that the troops were gone, it was "our neighbor’s turn to act."75

To some degree, familiar themes reasserted themselves in these new Baltic and Russian rhetorical campaigns. Any shadow of military forces in the Baltic region continued to provoke Baltic condemnation; for instance, in the opinion of Estonian Deputy Speaker Arnold Rüütel, the Russian government’s unwillingness to mandatorily repatriate retired military officers from the Baltic states was evidence of a Russian “colonial mindset,” and the transit of Russian military cargo destined for Kaliningrad through Lithuania was “the most serious threat to the security of the Baltic states.”76 Russian reforms continued to be treated with the greatest skepticism, with Meri summing up Russia as “a Potemkin democracy.”77 Nor were Russophones in the Baltic region experiencing rehabilitation: Estonian Foreign Minister Siim Kallas, for instance, commented that Russians in the

70 Statement of the Prime Ministers of the Republic of Estonia and the Republic of Latvia, 31 August 1994 (circulated at the CSCE, no date or document number given).
71 Joint Statement of the Presidents of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 31 August 1994 (circulated at the CSCE, no date or document number given).
72 Radio Russia, 3 September 1994 (SWB, 6 September 1994: S1/3).
73 The Estonian Foreign Ministry, for instance, issued a statement on 2 September complaining that some servicemen had been illegally demobilized and must be repatriated; that bases had not been handed over properly; and that the military had caused extensive environmental damage in the process of the pullout as well as during their tenancy (ETA, 2 September 1994 (SWB, 9 September 1994: E/2).
75 Interfax, 14 September 1994 (SWB, 16 September 1994: B/5).
76 The Baltic Independent, 28 April-4 May 1995: 2; Estonian Radio, 5 October 1994 (SWB, 8 October 1994: E/1).
Baltic were “worth their weight in gold” as a fifth column for “the Kremlin’s imperialistic plans.” For the Russian part, Baltic citizenship policies continued to be described in grim terms. For instance, a Foreign Ministry statement on amendments to the Estonian citizenship law that established a six-year residency requirement for naturalization, instead of the previous three, described the legislation as “another regrettable step designed to legitimize the policy of discriminating against the country’s Russian-speakers and trampling on their basic rights.” The Foreign Ministry further continued to characterize Estonian policy as one of “step-by-step ‘soft’ ejection of non-Estonians,” with Russian representatives telling the PACE that if Estonian (and later Latvian citizenship laws) were permitted to stand, “Russians may end up as refugees.”

But some new themes emerged as well. For their part, to demonstrate that Russia still posed a tangible threat to Baltic security, Baltic representatives focused on three issues: the Russian concept of the “near abroad” and accompanying concerns about an emerging “sphere of influence;” Russian peacekeeping aspirations; and the situation in Chechnya. The first two of these concerns emerged in Baltic rhetoric most clearly between 1992 and early 1994; however, they continued to inform Baltic thinking after the troop withdrawal was complete. The last, however, emerged after the withdrawal was complete.

The first of these concerns related to a phrase initially used relatively innocently by Kozyrev in January 1992: “What is taking shape around us is something that could probably be called the ‘near’ abroad. The ‘former’ fraternal republics, who are tired of totalitarian oppression, have chosen, just like Russia, the path of independent development. This is a gratifying process that reassures us and is a guarantee of new friendship.” Baltic representatives, however, took strong objections to the term: as a Latvian delegation to the CSCE complained, “[o]ne also often hears offending formulations by our Russian colleagues: near abroad, post-Soviet space, territory of the former USSR.” Baltic objections stemmed from a fear that this and other terms carried sinister implications. First, Baltic representatives feared that application of this term to the entire territory of the former Union would blur the very distinction that they were so anxious to draw between the Baltic states and the other former republics of the Soviet Union: that the Baltic states had never been a true part of the Union, and therefore should not be considered to share in other Union-mates’ problems, or the solutions that Russia offered to those problems. Second, Baltic representatives feared that the Russia solution to “common” problems was in fact to establish a sphere of influence on the territory of the former Union that would leave them open to meddling in their internal affairs. For instance, in June 1992 Estonian negotiator Endel Lipmaa leaked a Russian “position paper” of undisclosed provenance that referred to the Baltic

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81 This chapter only deals with issues of relative significance for the broader European community. For glimpses of the tedious Russian-Estonian exchange over the status of the Russian Orthodox Church in Estonia or Russian and Baltic foreign ministry claims and rejoinders regarding the putative presence of white-stockinged female Baltic snipers in Chechnya, see, for instance, Estonian Radio, 6 December 1994 (SWB, 9 December 1994: E/1); “Russia” TV, 18 January 1995 (SWB, 24 January 1995: E/3); ITAR-TASS, 10 December 1995 (SWB, 12 December 1995: B/11); BNS, 17 January 1995 (SWB, 25 January 1995: E/3).
83 Statement, Latvian delegation to the Committee of Senior Officials-Vienna Group, 9 September 1992.
84 Baltic governments were not mollified by the fact that the Russian Foreign Ministry had assigned them to its Second European Department, along with northern and western European countries, and not to the CIS department (The Baltic Independent, 19-25 June 1992: 3).
countries as part of a "near abroad" described as "ours" and advocated Estonia paying for Russian military "protection" and participating in a joint army. In Lipmaa's assessment, "[t]his draft agreement would mean a Russian protectorate in Estonia that in no way differs from Germany's rights in the Czech republic during the last war."85 Meri in 1993 blasted a new foreign policy concept advocating "the maximum integration of the former Soviet republics in all areas of life" and renewed concentration on Eastern Europe as a zone "historically in our sphere of influence," saying "[t]his change in Russia's foreign policy places the democratic world before a choice, which has a great deal in common with the fateful pre-Munich days. I recall for example the use of armed forces beyond internationally recognized boundaries under the pretext of 'protecting' the human rights of the Sudeten Germans."86 Luik later said that relations with Russia largely depended on whether Moscow "had the courage" to renounce the "near-abroad doctrine," which he said reflected "neo-imperialist" thinking.87 Even the relatively soft-spoken Brazauskas told Polish reporters that statements by Russian representatives about Russian "special interests" in the Baltic region were "unacceptable, absolutely inadmissible in today's world. And they cannot be put into effect, either. If they cannot be implemented, why say such things? In order to frighten someone? Who needs this?"88

The second issue, which was closely related, was that of Russian peacekeeping efforts. The Russian Foreign Ministry "concept" of Russian foreign policy published at the end of 1992 optimistically stated that "[t]he leading democratic states of the world have an interest in ensuring stability in the geopolitical space of the former USSR and recognize the role of Russia and its policy in the support of such stability; moreover, they are conscious of the need to strengthen this role."89 Kozyrev had proposed in mid-1992 that Russian forces involved in conflict situations in the CSI operate under CSCE or UN sanction, a call that Russian representatives repeated throughout 1993 and 1994.90 (For instance, in a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1993, Yeltsin suggested that international organizations such as the United Nations and the CSCE should not only respect Russia's status as the chief peacemaker on the territory of the former USSR, but should also help Russia bear the costs of the task.91) Baltic leaders had strongly condemned these ideas from the start. For example, a Baltic Council statement of June 1992 expressed the concern of Baltic leaders that "Russian state representatives and military authorities are speaking more and more of the possible use of Russian military might on the territories of other sovereign states, allegedly to defend Russians and Russian interests in those countries. [These] statements violate UN regulations and Helsinki Final act and create atmosphere of tension and imaginary conflict....[They] can be regarded only as propaganda and a psychological preparation for actions which would violate the norms of international law and mutual relations of countries participating in the CSCE meeting."92 In the end, neither the UN nor the CSCE were willing to extend their sanction to Russian forces, a position strongly supported by Baltic representatives. For instance, Landsbergis described the Russian

86 The Baltic Independent, 14-20 May 1993: 3.
91 ITAR-TASS, 28 September 1993 (SWB, 30 September 1993: B/3); Crow 1993: 1. Kozyrev also suggested that organizations such as the UN and the CSCE could help with training Russian peacekeepers, who he suggested were apt to act in emergencies "according to their revolutionary self-awareness" (Rossiskaya Gazeta, 30 October 1993: 1, 7 (SWB, 3 November 1993: B/9)).
proposal that the UN grant Moscow a mandate to guarantee peace and stability on the territory of the former USSR as constituting a request to interfere in the affairs of its neighbors, in an effort to make Russia “the gendarme of Europe.”

The issue that attracted the most Baltic attention, however, was that of Chechnya. The issue was one that engaged a broad segment of the population in all three Baltic republics, with the three Baltic parliaments setting up Chechnya support groups and demonstrations outside Russian embassies cropping up frequently. This concern was to a large degree the legacy of Baltic suffering under Soviet rule and consequent support for the principle of self-determination. As Rüütel told the Baltic Assembly: “At the end of the day, this does not concern Chechnya alone, but is an issue for small nations in general.” Baltic representatives frequently expressed a sense of responsibility to extend to others the support that had been extended to them; as Estonian Premier Andres Tarand said, Estonia might not be able to wield substantial influence in world politics, but “we were aided by world public opinion in our own fight for independence.” As a consequence, Baltic representatives were among the world’s most vociferous in condemning Russian actions in Chechnya. Baltic representatives were not the only ones to declare the Chechen conflict indicative of the character of the Russian state. But to an unusual degree, they drew on the situation to predict what their own states could face from political and military figures in Russia for whom, in the words of an Estonian Foreign Ministry statement calling on the countries of the world to condemn events in Chechnya, “the use of force has become a means of imposing their will on others.”

Statements by Baltic representatives about Chechnya focused on a few basic points. Most Baltic representatives described the conflict in Chechnya as a war of decolonization. For example, a Latvian delegate to the PACE argued: “The bloody events in Chechnya were, and should be viewed as, a glaring violation of human rights, which also include a nation’s right to self-determination. The suppression of the freedom movement of the Chechen nation, which not so long ago had been ‘punished’ by the Soviet Union with whole-scale deportations to Asia and with the killing of over one fifth of the population, has not ended.” Landsbergis similarly argued that the war in Chechnya was a “colonial” one that would have to be brought to the attention of the CSCE and the Council of Europe. In this line of analysis, not only Russian military actions in Chechnya, but by extension also the unwillingness of the Russian government to contemplate independence for the region showed the Russian government’s true disregard not only for human rights, but also for minority rights. Furthermore, they

93 Lithuanian Radio, 3 March 1993 (SWB, 6 March 1993: B/1).
96 Interfax, 29 November 1994 (SWB, 2 December 1994: E/2).
97 For a range of responses to the events in Chechnya, see the PACE parliamentary debate on the subject and its relation to Russia’s application for membership in the Council of Europe (PACE ORD, 2 February 1995, 221-253).
101 See, for example, Estonian Television, 22 April 1995 (SWB, 25 April 1995: E/1). Baltic representatives at the PACE, were also quick to bring up a United Nations Human Rights Commission
indicated the Russian state’s imperialist character. As Estonian representative Tunne Kelam told the PACE: “Conducting war against the majority of the population can only be called genocide...We see here the classic elements of a colonial war...I am not caught by surprise by the Russian action—one should remember the extreme reluctance of the Russian government to withdraw its troops from the Baltic states, which was accompanied by the ever-present veiled threats to use force if Moscow’s wishes would not be met. Such an attitude, always including an element of intimidation, has logically led to [the current violence].” And this character, Baltic representatives insisted, boded ill for the Baltic states. As a Lithuanian representative at the PACE put it: “The events taking place in Chechnya cause great anxiety throughout Europe, and especially in the states that border Russia...[D]o the events that are taking place in Russia allow one to assert that democracy is being established and human rights respected? [Chechen events are linked to] political forces which incite restoration of the former Soviet Union.”

For their part, Russian representatives kept up their emphasis on the rights-abusing nature of the Estonian and Latvian governments, and the dangers of their policies. Russian representatives for the most part simply refused to accept characterizations of Baltic citizenship policy as in line with international law, and continued to issue claims that human and civic rights of Russophones were being abused. As the Executive Secretary of the Russian Foreign Ministry had argued earlier, the fact that CSCE and other European missions had given Baltic citizenship laws their seal of approval did not mean that they were fairly applied in practice: “The laws and declarations make little different—Stalin’s constitution was also considered progressive. What is important is how they are interpreted.” But Russian representatives also stepped up accusations that the Estonian and Latvian governments in particular were highly untrustworthy. The latter theme, implicit in earlier Russian complaints that Baltic nationalists had turned their backs on Russia and had broken legal and moral commitments to Russia and others, emerged strongly in June 1993 after the passage of the Estonian Law on Aliens, which Russian representatives felt broke Tallinn’s commitments to the Council of Europe. In particular, Russian representatives extrapolated from Estonian actions to potential Latvian actions. Drawing together a number of themes, Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council of the Russian Federal Assembly Ramazan Abdulatipov, in an open letter to Van der Stoel, wrote in relation to potential Latvian membership in the Council of Europe that “[m]any [Russian-speakers resident in Latvia] actively supported the nationalist movement in Latvia...They weren’t the only ones who were fooled [by the democratic positions and slogans of the movement]... Thus thought, and acted, Boris Yeltsin and democratic circles in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Unfortunately, upon

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103 He went on to say that: “[t] he Russian mass media, in reporting events in Chechnya, has stepped up propaganda against the Baltic states, [alleging that] Lithuania’s special services send spies to Russia, that more than a hundred Lithuanian mercenaries are fighting [in Chechnya] and that snipers from the Baltic republics are killing Russian soldiers...It is not difficult to guess [this propaganda’s] purpose...it is useful to some Russian political forces to incite Russian citizens against the independence of Lithuania” (PACE ORD, 2 February 1995: 230).
taking power, yesterday’s Latvian democrats quickly transformed themselves into harsh nationalist-ethnocrats. If Latvia is admitted to the Council of Europe this will be taken in Latvia as approval on the part of the West for the conducting of national-radical policies of ethnic ‘cleansing’ and will weaken the position of those favoring a more considered course of action.\(^{107}\) The Russian Foreign Ministry also counter-attacked on Chechnya, suggesting that Baltic support for Chechnya not only was interference in Russian internal affairs, but indicated Baltic support for “international terrorism.”\(^{108}\)

In the final analysis, the conclusions that the two sides drew, and attempted to win others over to, were much the same as those outlined in the previous chapter. To Russian representatives, the Estonian and Latvian governments in particular were made up of rights-abusing ethnocrats. To Baltic representatives, Russia was a colonialist, potentially expansionist power.\(^{109}\) And the actions of both, in the characterizations of their accusers, were not only a danger to their own populations and to bilateral or regional relations, but also to Europe. As Kallas (not yet Estonian Foreign Minister) told the press in January 1995, “Russia can never be a friend to the Western world.”\(^{110}\)

The “war of words”

Baltic and Russian attempts to address these characterizations of their nations by their opponents generally fell into two categories.\(^{111}\) In the first place, Russian and particularly Baltic representatives simply attempted to refute their opponents’ claims. Russian representatives tended to issue broad denials, often invoking past Russian support for the Baltic cause.\(^{112}\) For example, a Foreign Ministry statement of August 1992 stated: “Finally, we cannot keep silence on attempts to ascribe to Russia power diplomacy. Now that the anniversary celebrations marking the August triumph of democracy in our country are held, it will be appropriate to recall that it was precisely the position of democratic Russia that paved the way to independence of Baltic states and that, inherently and on principle, it provides for renouncing the threat of use of force and any forms of pressure.”\(^{113}\) Meanwhile, Baltic representatives offered more factually detailed counterarguments: for instance, Chairman of the Latvian parliament Ivars Godmanis emphasized to the Canadian ambassador in 1992 that, Russian claims to

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\(^{107}\) Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14 October 1994: 2.

\(^{108}\) Girnius 1996b: 17. The Liberal Democratic Party also made the interesting argument in an official statement condemning Estonian support for Chechnya that Estonian intervention on this issue showed that “the idea of the inseparable destiny of Estonia and Russia survives in the consciousness of Estonian statesmen despite the solemn declarations of freedom and other fine words” (Interfax, 13 February 1995 (SWB, 15 February 1995: B/6)).

\(^{109}\) Giriukas 1996b: 17. The Liberal Democratic Party also made the interesting argument in an official statement condemning Estonian support for Chechnya that Estonian intervention on this issue showed that “the idea of the inseparable destiny of Estonia and Russia survives in the consciousness of Estonian statesmen despite the solemn declarations of freedom and other fine words” (Interfax, 13 February 1995 (SWB, 15 February 1995: B/6)).

\(^{110}\) On both sides, the smallest issues could result in the invocation of the direst imagery. For instance, Meri complained of the fact that the pre-incorporation Estonian presidential insignia, looted by the Red Army at the time of occupation, was still held in the Kremlin despite Estonian requests that it be returned, “as though Stalin’s regime still persists in some parts” (Estonian Radio, 24 February 1995 (SWB, 2 March 1995: E/1)).

\(^{111}\) Neither of which included admitting that the other side might have a point. A rare exception was Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin, who told the press that he did not consider it “expedient” to use the term “near abroad” in official statements and documents because its use had caused “misunderstandings, and a negative reaction has come from some former USSR union republic capitals.” In his opinion, “the Baltic countries [should] in no way be included in the ‘near abroad’ because those countries left the USSR even before it disintegrated and [were] not likely to seek membership in the CIS.” At the same time, he stressed that the term should not be interpreted as a threat, but as an analytic concept (Estonian Radio, 27 January 1994 (SWB, 29 January 1994: E/1)).

\(^{112}\) See, for example, the bald denials—“Russia has no imperialist ambitions”—issued by Russian Federation Council speaker Yegor Stroyev at an Interparliamentary Union conference in Istanbul (ITAR-TASS, 16 April 1996 (SWB, 18 April 1996: B/16)).

the contrary, "only 17,000 people left Latvia this year, compared to hundreds of thousands of refugees from Central Asia." Baltic representatives leaned heavily on the fact that Baltic citizenship laws and practices had been subjected to extensive international scrutiny. For example, Kallas (now Foreign Minister) argued: "To picture Estonia as a problem country only because Russian leaders sometimes express their dissatisfaction means not to respect reality. The fact that about twenty observer missions have visited Estonia and have generally agreed that the rights of the Russian minority in Estonia are not violated testifies that this is not only the Estonian government's view." Indeed, Baltic officials stressed their nations' willingness, in fact eagerness, to undergo international scrutiny of their human rights practices. A Baltic Council meeting in July 1991 announced that "[t]he leaders of the republics...intend to send a letter to the US national committee on human rights requesting the dispatch of a committee of experts, which would be tasked with determining whether it is true, as one often hears, that contradictions are noticeable in the Baltic [states] between the observation of human rights and the aspirations of the republics' leaderships to establish state independence." At the May 1992 CSCE Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) meeting in Helsinki, speeches by Estonian and Latvian delegates invited CSCE experts to come to the Baltic states to examine the living conditions of Russians there to prevent "defense of the Russian-speaking minority" from being used as a pretext to delay a troop withdrawal. As Kelam sarcastically remarked to the PACE in June 1993, "[w]e are keen to be monitored further on what is happening in our country, even after at least fifteen various European commissions have testified to developments in Estonia." But both Russian and Baltic representatives also went on the offensive against their opponents' very methods, often characterizing them as "propaganda" or "smear campaigns." For instance, Latvian representatives told a CSCE meeting in May 1992 that the Russian government had launched a "comprehensive, wide-scale propaganda war" against the Baltic states, accusing Kozyrev of disseminating "totally inaccurate" figures and an "unrealistic" picture of Latvia in his statement at the Council of Europe about human rights violations. In the same vein, the Estonian Foreign Ministry told the press in early 1994 that the Estonian Ambassador to Moscow had been assigned the task of "protesting in connection with the continued Russian campaign of statements that fabricate and distort reality." Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembskiy told the press in May 1992 that Latvian Ambassador to Moscow Janis Peters had given a "distorted picture" of Latvian–Russian relations at a CSCE meeting in Helsinki; he said that Peters' comments, which he called "purposeful misinformation," did not "correspond to universal norms [of diplomatic behaviour]."

116 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 July 1991: 3.
119 For an instance of the "smear campaign" description, see The Baltic Independent, 23-29 October 1992: 3.
120 Statement, Latvian delegation head, plenary meeting of the CSCE Helsinki Followup meeting, Helsinki, 13 May 1992.
122 The Baltic Independent, 8-14 May 1992: 3.
123 OMRI Daily Report, 5 May 1996. This was not to be the only "propaganda war" identified by Russian representatives; Russian Deputy Premier Sergei Shakhrai was later to say that Russia had lost the
Neither side hesitated to describe the campaigns as showing off their opponents’ worst characteristics, or to draw comparisons to Soviet practice. For example, Landsbergis opined that Russian allegations against Estonia “very much remind us of the propaganda war the leadership of the former Soviet Union waged against Lithuania a few years ago.” Latvian delegate to the PACE similarly noted that when Russian delegates accuse the Baltic states of discrimination, “[w]e should object to that and understand that it is also xenophobia. We must deal with such unpleasant attitudes that are associated with the former totalitarian regime.” Meanwhile, Yastrzhembskiy described comments by Estonian ambassador to Germany Tiit Matsulevits as being “in the best style of the cold war period.”

Some Baltic representatives saw Russian rhetorical campaigns as an effort to ratchet up tension to provide an excuse for Russian intervention in the Baltic states. Landsbergis, for instance, told radio journalists in May 1992 that a special campaign was being waged by Moscow to increase tension and pressure, which “must evoke international concern.” Latvian Foreign Minister Georgs Andrejevs opined that the “constant blustering accusations” against the Baltics made by Russian representatives before the international community were meant to keep the Balts off-balance and to justify a continued Russian military presence in the region: “One must be absolutely blind not to follow this, not trying to analyse why.” The Russian campaign was also interpreted by Baltic representatives as an effort to divide and conquer. For example, Landsbergis speculated that the Russian rhetorical campaign against Latvia was an effort to weaken the strategic unity of the Baltic states: “Having failed to subordinate the entire region, Russia is making efforts first to split it by becoming firmly established in Latvia and later perhaps even to annex it.”

Both Russian and Baltic representatives, however, were more likely to describe this “propaganda war” as aimed first and foremost at the West. As a Lithuanian representative to the PACE put it, “some political forces in Russia, and even state officials, are trying to convince democratic states in Europe and elsewhere that permanent violations of the Russian-speaking population are taking place in Lithuania.” In the same vein, the Estonian Foreign Ministry told the press in early 1994 that the Estonian Ambassador to Moscow had been assigned the task of protesting in connection with the continued Russian campaign of “slanderous” statements directed at world public opinion that were designed to isolate Estonia. Karasin complained after Baltic representatives accused Kozyrev of revanchist thinking that “[o]ur Baltic partners have lifted individual quotations out of context in order to attract [Western] attention yet again.”

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124 The Baltic Independent, 14-20 August 1992: 3.
130 PACE ORD, 14 April 1994: 399.
Indeed, isolation of the Baltic states from Europe was the main goal that Baltic representatives imputed to the Russian campaign. Landsbergis, back from the UN General Assembly, saw what he described as Russian Foreign Ministry efforts to develop “anti-Baltism” in the West as a “new Cold War” intended to hinder the integration of the Baltic states into the Western community in order to maintain Russian influence in the region.\textsuperscript{133} But as late as 1998, the head of the Estonian Foreign Ministry Central and Eastern Europe Dept was complaining that the Russian campaign was making Estonia and Latvia less attractive as potential members of Western multilateral structures: “In the OSCE and the UN, it is harder and harder to convince people that we are not eating Russian children.”\textsuperscript{134}

Russian representatives, for their part, similarly saw Baltic efforts as attempts, as Yastrzhembskiy put it, as attempts “to set the West against Russia.”\textsuperscript{135} Furthermore, Russian representatives described the Baltic rhetorical campaigns as designed to conceal their own sins and to further Baltic campaigns for integration into NATO. Karasin, for instance, described Baltic representatives as attempting to “whip up an artificial hullabaloo” to distract attention from the plight of Russophones.\textsuperscript{136} But Baltic campaigns were also, to Russian representatives, attempts to hide their own sins in order to further their goal of integration into European structures. Karasin, for instance, accused Kallas, through allegations during a trip to Germany of Moscow’s “revanchist psychology” and annexationist plans, of trying “to scare Europe with an alleged ‘Russia threat’ in order to implement its ambitious plans to integrate into Europe’s military organizations and conceal its discriminatory policy towards ethnic Russians.”\textsuperscript{137} And Russian representatives described some Baltic campaigns as simply exhibitionist. For example, a Russian Foreign Ministry statement responding to a Baltic Assembly resolution calling for the demilitarization of Kaliningrad as a “necessary part of the Central European and European security process” acidly stated: “Having lost their sense of moderation and reality, Baltic parliamentarians are trying to make the future of Kaliningrad a problem for all of Europe...The Baltic parliamentarians’ anti-Russian complex is evident from the fact that they have proposed restoring the previous names of localities in Kaliningrad Region. The absurdity of this proposal is clear. Why, in that case, not start with the restoration of all [historic] names in the Baltic countries—Memel, Wilno, Kovno, Reval...The resolution of the Baltic Assembly is a graphic example of irresponsible intrigue, of a desire to attract the attention of the world at any price, so as to compensate for what they see as a certain lack of attention since the completion of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries.”\textsuperscript{138}

In fact, many Baltic and Russian representatives feared that their opponents’ campaigns were indeed hurting their nation’s image abroad. Baltic concern was partly for world public opinion; as Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste said, “A small nation like Estonia doesn’t have the resources to compete with a huge nation’s propaganda

\textsuperscript{133} The Baltic Independent, 9-15 October 1992: 1.
\textsuperscript{134} Forced Migration Projects 1998: 12.
\textsuperscript{135} ITAR-TASS, 5 June 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-100, 8 June 1992: 22).
\textsuperscript{136} “In our view,” Karasin opined, “the West too should be concentrating attention on these problems rather than criticizing a Russian minister, in the way that an official spokesman of the US State Department allowed himself to do” (ITAR-TASS, 20 January 1994 (SWB, 22 January 1994: B/6)).
\textsuperscript{137} ITAR-TASS, 23 April 1996 (SWB, 26 April 1996: B/18).
\textsuperscript{138} Lithuanian Radio, 14 November 1994 (SWB, 18 November 1994: B/9); ITAR-TASS, 16 November 1994 (SWB, 18 November 1994: B/9). Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas later went on to “categorically reject all extremist, irresponsible statements attempting to call into doubt Kaliningrad’s inclusion in Russia or to sow doubts concerning Lithuania’s present borders with Russia, Poland, and Belarus” (ITAR-TASS, 29 November 1994 (SWB, 2 December 1994: E/5).
machine. It’s no surprise: the front page of the New York Times is not automatically open to us.” But Baltic representatives were also anxious about Russian successes in particular settings, for example the Council of Europe. An Estonian delegate to the PACE Marju Lauristin told reporters in late 1992 that “Russia’s psychological attack against Estonia has proved successful” in Strasbourg: “Only two months ago everyone was positive about the idea of Estonia becoming a full member of the Council of Europe from next January or February. They were just waiting for the outcome of our elections.” Latvian representatives similarly noted ruefully that “[t]he Russians have played the citizenship card very well.” Meanwhile, members of the Russian guest delegation to the PACE expressed concern that Estonia’s abrasive tone towards Russia in meetings with Western officials was adversely affecting their country’s international image.

The response of many Baltic representatives in particular to these setbacks was to vow to work harder. As Estonian Foreign Minster Toomas Henrik Ilves said, “[o]ur responsibility is to promote Estonia’s general trustworthiness as a state as well as a partner.” Luik opined that “[a]s part of our new and broader world view, we need to pay more attention to explaining what is happening at home, and to campaign for similar protection of human and civil rights abroad.” Some representatives also cautioned against handing their opponents public relations plums. As Ulmanis complained when returning the Latvian citizenship bill to the parliament for changes after it encountered serious international criticism: “Our mistake, our unsuccessful week was used by Russia to consolidate its diplomatic authority. And Latvia lost much of its political baggage [sic—“capital”?] abroad because of the law adopted by mistake.” And indeed, Baltic efforts were vindicated by, for instance, the Council of Europe’s decision to deny Russophones the definitional status of “national minority,” opening the way to Council membership for Estonia; the Estonian Foreign Minister later announced that at the level of Western governments, Estonia had “won” the propaganda battle about the rights of the Russian minority.

Russian representatives in many instances attempted to simply shrug off Baltic rhetoric. For example, an unnamed Russian diplomat told the press that “arguing with Landsbergis is as pointless as arguing with Zhirinovskiy...[Landsbergis’s “escapades”] have become so biased and subjective that they can hardly be taken seriously.” But the campaigns were clearly taking a toll on bilateral relations. For instance, Luik expressed concern over the impact on Estonian-Russian relations of the deteriorating “verbal war” with Russia (which he said was caused by the “neo-imperialist statements of some Russian politicians”). Kallas suggested that relations with Moscow were unlikely to improve as long as Russian representatives continued to describe Estonia as “an unstable country where human rights are violated on a mass scale.” Andrejevs expressed similar concerns, adding that “repetition of untrue accusations [about human

142 The Baltic Independent, 4-10 February 1994: 1.
146 Park 1994: 83.
rights abuses in Latvia] did not promote democracy in Russia either." Meanwhile, the Russian Foreign Ministry called in Estonian diplomats in Moscow to complain that "the biased character" of a speech delivered by Meri in Hamburg (in which, the Ministry observed, he made "anti-Russian" statements about Russia's alleged progress down an imperialistic path) "lends proof to the opinion that the Estonian leadership is using every opportunity to add rigidity to its position in relations with Russia;" the Ministry expressed the hope that Estonia "would find the strength to stop shifting towards confrontation with Moscow." Indeed, Sergei Prikhodko, chief of the Baltic division of the Second European Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, specifically attributed what he called particularly bad relations with Estonia to the fact that "[o]ur Estonian counterparts often pull propaganda stunts attracting the world community."

In the midst of the fray, some voices were urging moderation. Some European diplomats, aware of the effect that Baltic rhetoric was having on Russian reformers, were advising Baltic representatives to "choose a psychologically prudent language" in their relations with Moscow. Meanwhile, Lithuanian representatives were increasingly willing to distance themselves from some of the more extreme statements being issued by other Baltic representatives as reflecting a "preconceived negative attitude." Brazauskas, for instance, complained publicly about the content and tone of a Baltic Assembly resolution on Kaliningrad, saying that "statements made by the three Baltic states are heard by other states, especially by the politicians of neighboring states" and that the Baltic Assembly was not actually authorized to make statements on foreign policy of individual states. When Landsbergis at a Baltic Assembly session in 1996 proposed a resolution condemning the outcome of the Russian State Duma elections as bringing closer to power groups representing "militant chauvinism, revanchism and the desire to restore imperial forces," a spokesman for the Latvian delegation said that much of what Landsbergis had said "was undiplomatic and might be seen by some forces in Moscow as interference in Russia's internal affairs."

Indeed, tempers appeared to be running high, particularly on the Russian side. Kozyrev's response to Landsbergis speech at the CSCE Helsinki meeting in July 1992 (which compared the Russian Federation with the USSR of the 1940s) was that the Baltic states "ought to recognize their moral obligations and not repay the Russian democrats [who supported their independence] by posing the question incorrectly." In early 1993, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman called speeches delivered abroad by Latvian Foreign Minister Georgs Andrejevs and Defense Minister Talavs Jundzis (in which Andrejevs accused Russia of de facto colonization and Jundzis said that Russia "has everything ready to reoccupy Riga") "unfriendly and irresponsible." Kozyrev, after another round of Latvian accusations of imminent Russian intervention in the former Soviet republics, snapped: "If the Baltic states want to be civilized states, perhaps Latvia, rather than raising this artificial and absolutely unfounded screaming, should concentrate on drawing up agreements on the conditions for withdrawal."

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150 Latvian Radio, 10 April 1993 (SWB, 14 April 1993: A2/1).
159 Ostankino Television First Channel Network, 19 January 1994 (FBIS-SOV-94-014, 19 January 1994: 3). A few days later Kozyrev went on to say that "[the Latvians] even speak about the sovereignty of
Yastrzhembskiy described Matsulevits’ comparison between Russian policy and Soviet imperialism as “discourteous,” and sarcastically noted that “[d]espite all its ringing tone,” the statement was not backed up by fact, but was simply an example of an “unseemly political game.” Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin, blasting a Baltic Assembly meeting at which delegates issued an appeal to the Council of Europe to demand that Russia openly renounce expansionist doctrines before being considered by the Council for membership, complained that Baltic Assembly meetings “invariably pass documents that have a practically undisguised context of confrontation with Russia.”

After Meri’s *homo sovieticus* speech at the PACE, Russian delegates said that the aim of Meri’s statement was to “pick a fight with Russia.” As one delegate put it, “[h]is speech led one to think Russia has lost its national identity and territorial integrity.”

Many Baltic representatives dismissed Russian anger as fleeting, unreasonable, or domestically oriented. For example, Landsbergis brushed off the Russian response to a Baltic Assembly resolution on Kaliningrad as containing “more anger than common sense.” Kelam, although admitting that the Russian delegation was “clearly upset” at Meri’s *homo sovieticus* speech at the PACE, he called the Russian response “more an outburst of anger than a serious argument,” and attributed Russian indignation to the fact that “Russia is continuing to experience difficulties in adapting to a situation in which its words do not automatically count.”

Laar responded to Russian indignation over Estonia’s acceptance to the Council of Europe by saying “I understand that internal problems of Russian politics necessitate it to beat up on Baltic governments, and this secures success internally.” Others, however, saw it as a sign of something much more sinister. Laar, discussing the Russian Foreign Ministry statement blasting the Estonian law on aliens, commented that the release of the statement on the first anniversary of the kroon (the new Estonian currency) “shows that our success is not the Baltic states, which they fear Kozyrev may damage. This is even more comic if one recalls that it was Boris Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev who presented representatives of the three republics with a presidential degree recognizing their sovereignty [in August 1991]. Speaking about their sovereignty and independence that they are so carefully protecting from my statements, they address the United States in a public statement. It seems they are seeking to get into another dependency” (ITAR-TASS, 19 January 1994 (*SWB*, 21 January 1994: S2/1)).

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161 He added that “Estonian President Lennart Meri has traditionally acted as first fiddle on this issue” (Interfax, 5 December 1995 (*SWB*, 7 December 1995: B/6).
164 *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 14 May 1993: 3. European representatives similarly attributed Russian displeasure over Estonian admission to a desire to play to the home audience; Lalumière saw no need to “overdramatize” Kozyrev’s response, as it was “dictated by domestic political causes” (*Izvestiya*, 15 May 1993: 3). But by 1996 Estonian Foreign Minister Siim Kallas was warning against the dangers of this analysis, which he described as promulgated mostly by Western government to placate well-founded Baltic fears (*Postimees*, 25 April 1996, circulated as a press release by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Meanwhile, Russian representatives also attributed Baltic rhetoric to a desire to play to the home audience; for example, a Foreign Ministry spokesman attributed “unfriendly and irresponsible” speeches delivered abroad by Andrejevs to the coming Latvian parliamentary elections and the bad state of the country’s economy (*Baltfax* 2 March 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-039, 2 March 1993: 16)).

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liked by Russia.” Kallas similarly opined: “Many Russian political circles see Estonia as the country from which the collapse of the Soviet Union began…and the country [of all the former republics] which has most clearly turned itself to the west. This results in a psychological revenge moment and the desire to smother Estonia at any cost.”

**Hard feelings: Take One**

It is a curious thing that the notion of state representatives standing outside emotion should still persist in popular thinking as well as much scholarly writing. The ideal of the dispassionate diplomat is certainly one that has been perpetuated by generations of diplomatic handbooks. One of the “essential” qualities of a diplomat listed by Harold Nicolson is “the quality of calm.” Jules Cambon, in his treatise on “the diplomatist,” similarly opines that “what really distinguishes the diplomatist from the common herd is his apparent indifference to its emotions.” A deep distaste for moments of negative emotion pervades classical diplomatic texts. As Nicolson recounted in appall: “The occasions on which diplomats have lost their tempers are remembered with horror by generations of their successors. Napoleon lost his temper with Metternich in the Marcolini Palace at Dresden on June 26, 1813, and flung his hat upon the carpet, with the most unfortunate results. Sir Charles Euan Smith lost his temper with the Sultan of Morocco and tore up a treaty in the imperial presence. Count Tattenbach lost his temper at the Algeciras Conference and exposed his country to a grave diplomatic humiliation. Herr Stinnes lost his temper at Spa.”

But Cambon’s word “apparent,” and Nicolson’s catalogue, reveal the underlying message: what classical theorists of diplomacy were advocating was the ability not to eradicate, but to repress emotion, particularly the negative emotions. Nicolson, surveying fifteen and sixteenth century diplomatic manuals, noted their insistence that an ambassador must be “imperturbable, able to receive bad news without manifesting displeasure, or to hear himself maligned and misquoted without the slightest twinge of irritation.” The diplomatist, Cambon opined, “must beware of being carried away by his feelings.” As Nicolson wrote of the ideal diplomat: “In the first place, he should be good-tempered, or at least he should be able to keep his ill-temper under perfect control.”

If diplomats are, in the classical tradition, expected to keep their own feelings under control, they are at the same time expected to have a keen appreciation of the feelings of others. A successful negotiator, Abraham de Wiquefort observed in 1679, must be able to play on the emotions of others: “Ministers are but men and as such have their weakness, that is to say, their passions and their interests, which the Ambassador ought to know if he wished to do honor to himself and his Master.” Three hundred years

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166 The Baltic Independent, 25 June-1 July 1993: 1. Estonian representatives in particular took pride in the notion that the Russian government found them the most “obstinate” of the Baltic states (The Baltic Independent, 12-18 June 1992: 10).


169 Cambon 1931: 3.


171 Nicolson 1954: 36.

172 Cambon 1931: 14.


174 Cited in Craig 1979: 25.
later, former British Ambassador Peter Marshall concurred: "Diplomacy must rank as one of the higher forms of persuasion. People may be persuaded by reason or by feeling, or in all probability by a combination of both. They may be convinced, cajoled, flattered, inspired." But even more importantly, diplomats are expected to be considerate of others' feelings. Sir Ernest Satow's famous formulation—"Diplomacy is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states"—sums up the emphasis that classical diplomatic theorists placed on letting sleeping emotions lie.

But let us return for an instant to Nicolson's phrase: "able to receive bad news...or to hear himself maligned..." The first half of the phrase identifies outcomes in international politics as the source of emotion; the second identifies language. European diplomacy in fact evolved an entire series of linguistic conventions to permit diplomats and ministers, as Nicolson describes the "guarded understatement" of diplomatic language, "to say sharp things to each other without becoming provocative or impolite." Indeed, one of the reasons that classical theorists of diplomacy have damned much of the public diplomacy of the 20th century as "propaganda" appears to be that the language involved has been designed to rile up, rather than soothe, the negative emotions. To thinkers of this complexion, the sight of heated slanging matches at the UN General Assembly was dismayng. "It would be wrong," Nicolson opined, "to take as an example of modern diplomatic method the discussions that are conducted in the Security Council or the Assembly of the United Nations...[these meetings] are exercises in forensic propaganda...it is not diplomacy by loud-speaker or diplomacy by insult that we need to consider." The deliberate stirring up of bad feeling was not in this view, just bad form; it had dangerous consequences. "Can it be claimed," exclaimed Neville Bland, "that the airing of national dislikes and prejudices in uncontrolled language...is less likely to lead to international friction? [Indeed,] can these practices rightly be called diplomacy?"

Implicit in these concerns, of course, is the assumption that the feelings of state representatives are subject to be riled, not only by unfavorable international political outcomes, but by exchanges of slurs about their nations. Nor should this be surprising: state representatives, by virtue of their ability to speak in the name of states, serve as embodiments of some of the most highly emotionally charged political entities in the modern world. State representatives are for the most part self-selecting; most have chosen to take on a role that permits them to speak in the name, and to some degree serve as an embodiment, of a nation. Indeed, while the advice of classical theorists of diplomacy for representatives to control their emotions may be good negotiating strategy, a degree of emotional identification with the nation may be a necessary part of being an effective representative. First, representatives who are emotionally unengaged...
with the entity they represent will be less concerned with its fortunes, and may be less vigorous in pursuing its "interests." Second, for a representative of an entity, particularly one as potentially highly emotionally charged as a nation/state, not to be emotionally engaged with its fortunes would call into question in the eyes of others that entity’s ability to inspire loyalty. As a consequence, a genuinely emotionally detached state representative would have the potential to be more of a liability, both in practical and in public relations terms, than an asset. And indeed, diplomatic memoirs reveal ample evidence of diplomats’ emotional engagement with the fortunes of their nations.181 As Cambon himself noted, commenting on a diplomat’s need to put himself in the shoes of the representatives with whom he is negotiating: “This is by no means an easy matter sometimes, when one’ sympathies are involved.”182

Of course, sociologists of emotion, as noted in this dissertation’s Introduction, would find nothing surprising in the idea that diplomatic exchanges, as examples of dense social interaction, would have the potential to be pervaded with feeling. Indeed, such scholars might well point to a central focus of this chapter and of Chapter Three, the issue of social recognition of self-characterizations, as a key area of emotional engagement.183 This issue of struggles for recognition is one that has received some of its most extensive discussion in the IR literature in a few of the works of Erik Ringmar.184 In these pieces, which focus in part on the “selling” to the world (by force if necessary) of constitutive narratives of state identity, Ringmar has argued that particularly at “formative moments”—moments when individuals and groups are telling new stories about themselves—the tellers of constitutive narratives look to audiences for confirmation of their self-presentations.185 While Ringmar’s work does not deal explicitly with issues of feeling, extrapolating from the literature of the sociology of emotion, it is possible to argue that for story-tellers as with individuals, the degree to which these self-characterizations are accepted, and the types of characterizations that others advance—and in particular, discontinuities between self-characterizations and characterizations by others—have the potential to bring hard feelings to the surface.186

Obviously, exchanges of what one or both sides consider to be insults indicate a basic level of discontinuity between self-characterization and characterizations by others that carries an emotional punch.187 For example, then-US Ambassador to Moscow George Kennan’s recorded in his diary in mid-1963 the strain of living through an unusually vitriolic anti-US Soviet propaganda campaign, which he found “foul, malicious and insulting.”188 One common source of insult is the unflattering comparison, an art form the dangers of which are well known. For instance, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgii Chicherin wrote in early 1927 to Nikolai Bukharin, then leader of the Comintern: “Would you please stop equating Chiang Kai-shek with Kemalism. This is

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182 Cambon 1931: 22.

183 For a discussion of emotion as the confirmation or disconfirmation of identity, as well as the link between discontinuities in characterization and emotion, see Smith-Lovin 1990: 246-249.


186 See, for instance, Dijker et al. 1996.

187 See, for instance, “Uneasy neighbors: calling President Bush a “moron” has not helped Canada’s relationship with the U.S.” The Guardian, 2 December 2002 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,852207,00.html, accessed 3 December 2002).

188 Kennan 1972: 162.
absolutely ridiculous and spoils our relationship with Turkey. Isn’t spoiling our relationship with Germany enough for you?...Now you are definitely spoiling our relations with Turkey!”189 (Kennan was himself declared persona non grata by the Soviet government in September 1963 for having irritably compared the complete social isolation to which diplomats were subjected in Moscow to the conditions of the internment he had experienced in Germany in 1941-1942, a comment that the Soviet government called a “slanderous attack hostile to the Soviet Union in a rude violation of generally recognized norms of international law.” 190)

Much of the tension surrounding the Baltic and Russian “identity diplomacy” campaigns indeed appeared to stem from the fundamental disagreements over self-characterization outlined in this chapter and in Chapter Three. These disagreements did not need to involve exchanges of insults. A key worry of Baltic representatives, for instance, was simply that the world, and Russian policymakers in particular, could not accept the very concept of the restoration of Baltic sovereignty. As an official Estonian statement said in June 1992, “[t]he Russian side refuses to see Estonia as a country that was illegally occupied.”191 In Baltic eyes, Russian policymakers were starting from a position of disadvantage: as Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste said, “[Russians] never understood that Estonia was not a constituent part of the Soviet Union. They have been so badly indoctrinated that they honestly believe that they liberated us—this is total nonsense.”192 As a consequence, however, Baltic representatives feared that the Russian government and the Western world, rejecting Baltic self-characterizations as having broken definitively with everything to do with the former Soviet Union, saw the Baltic states as a potential part of a Russian “sphere of influence.” Anxiety over this point underlay the obsessive legalism of Baltic campaigns over the issues of legal reanimation, borders, and even histories of incorporation, as well as Baltic opposition to the “offending formulations” by Russian colleagues such as “near abroad, post-Soviet space, [or] territory of the former USSR.”193

This is not to say that characterizations perceived by both sides as insults helped matters. As Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry Second European Department, Aleksandr Udaltsov, complained to reporters: “our country has always been confused [by the Baltic states] with the Soviet Union of the Stalin era. No effort has been spared to blame it...Russia’s partners in the Baltic region have failed to overcome the syndrome of historical insults.”194 Kallas complained that “Russia should give up describing Estonia as an unstable country where human rights are violated on a mass scale.”195 Baltic resentment of Russian characterization of the Estonian and Latvian polities as ethnocratic, Russian resentment of Baltic characterizations of the Russian government as proto-imperialist, both sides’ resentment of the other’s characterizations of their governments as undemocratic were heightened by the fact that both sides

190 Kennan 1972: 160-165.
191 The Baltic Independent, 12-18 June 1992: 10. Nor were these issues raised only with the Russian side. Presenting an explanatory memorandum on the legal aspects of the restoration of Baltic independence to the PACE, Andrejevs explained: “We ask members of the Assembly to use only concise terms...it is right to say that the three Baltic states whose independence was restored in 1990-1991 succeeded in breaking free again, this time from Soviet occupation. On the other hand, it is incorrect, legally and historically, to define the Baltic states as newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union [as they] never lost their independence de jure” (PACE ORD, 3 February 1993: 729).
195 Interfax, 21 December 1995 (FBIS-SOV-95-246, 21 December 1995 (electronic)).
considered these to be undesirable qualities. Furthermore, both sides were anxious that others might believe their opponents’ unflattering characterizations over their own, competing self-characterizations. Hence, for instance, Meri’s “visible anger” that US President Bill Clinton had not contradicted a statement by Yeltsin at the April 1993 Vancouver summit that human rights were being abused in the Baltic states.  

Conclusion

This chapter, and the last, have attempted not only to describe Baltic and Russian rhetorical campaigns of the early 1990s, but also to place this behavior within the spectrum of diplomatic practice. It is the argument of this chapter that in the process of diplomatic exchanges, state representatives discuss at least four major themes: action, rules, norms, and identities. Indeed, in the context of the last category, representatives engage in claims and counter-claims about the qualities, not only of their own states, but also of other states and other entities, be they friend or foe. This chapter has detailed Baltic and Russian rhetorical campaigns and counter-campaigns, arguing that their purpose was to gain a degree of international consensus on some aspects of the fundamental natures—aggressive versus non-aggressive, democratic versus non-democratic, Soviet versus post-Soviet—of both their states and those of their opponents. It suggests that through establishing consensus on these identities, Russian and Baltic representatives further hoped to see their opponents’ behavior considered and condemned as threatening while legitimizing their own behavior, outcomes that would increase pressure on their opponents to change their behavior while lessening pressure on their own governments to change theirs. It has identified some of the outcomes of these rhetorical battles that Russian and Baltic representatives might have found more or less satisfactory. But it also has argued that battles over self-representation and the representation of others in themselves have the potential to generate hard feelings among participants.

In discussing Russian and Baltic efforts to characterize each other’s practices and natures, this chapter has argued that though the two sides hurled different epithets, the purpose of both sides was the same: to discredit their opponents as threatening, not just to their own populations and their neighbors but potentially to Europe itself. But why did Russian and Baltic representatives they spend so much time warning European audiences of the threat that Europe faced, when Europeans themselves seemed far less alarmed? Why, indeed, were Baltic and Russian representatives so insistent on promulgating these characterizations in European forums?

Ringmar, in his analysis of constitutive narratives of identity, notes that state representatives do not tell stories to just anyone: they tell stories to audiences who they feel count, whose confirmation will matter. These audiences are what Ringmar calls “circles of recognition:” other story-telling entities that an actor recognizes and respects as being a kind to itself. “Ultimately,” Ringmar suggests, “only those people have the power to bestow a certain identity upon us who already are what we would like to become.” But who, or what, did Russian and Baltic representatives wish to become? It is to this question that Chapter Five will turn.

196 “You know as well as I do that President Yeltsin was lying!” Meri snapped to reporters (The Baltic Independent, 31 March-5 April 1993: 1).
Chapter Five: The Importance of Being European

As the previous chapter has sought to demonstrate, Russian and Baltic representatives waged a protracted rhetorical battle after the collapse of the Soviet Union designed to convince Western audiences that their opponents, by nature as well as by behavior, were in important respects aggressive, undemocratic, and threatening, not just to their neighbors, but to European security or values. This chapter seeks to link these debates to a second feature of “identity diplomacy,” namely the negotiation of collective identities. Specifically, it argues that Baltic and Russian representatives sought, through exchanges in European institutions, not only to establish consensus among European audiences on the characters of their nations and of their opponents, but also to establish the relationship between these nations and the collective entity of “Europe.” First, they sought to establish that by virtue either of their nature (geography, history, culture and political traditions) or of their behavior, their nations were legitimate candidates for inclusion in “Europe;” second, they sought to establish that by nature or behaviour, their opponents’ nations were not.

In approaching these questions, Russian and Baltic representatives were not debating geographical location. Rather, as Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov has written of the Russian case, Russian and Baltic social and political thought “understood the concept of ‘Europe’ not only in a geographic sense, but also as encompassing a specific culture and civilization...Europe has often been synonymous with a certain set of political and economic principles, a certain set of moral values, and a certain cultural space.”1 For both Russian and Baltic representatives, as Inga Pavlovaite has written, “Europe” has functioned as a “discursive nodal point knitting together more general discourses of how ‘we’ should develop, of where ‘we’ should go and where this will take ‘us’.”2

It is not surprising that many Baltic and Russian interventions into these debates took place within forums of the CSCE, the Council of Europe, and NATO. In the aftermath of the collapse first of the Soviet bloc and then of the USSR itself, these three organizations, plus the European Union (EU), were at the institutional forefront of a broader complex of European debates over where to draw the theoretical as well as practical boundaries of the new, post-War “Europe.”3 These debates had first blossomed after the conclusion of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 1987 and the new détente: it was widely assumed that “these processes would somehow lead to a ‘Europeanization’ of Europe,” with “Europeanization” referring not to a specific development, but “to an empty space to be filled.”4 However, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union cemented a general assumption that any “Europeanization” of Europe would consist of adoption by the states of the Soviet bloc of the political, economic and social standards of the nations of Western Europe. Implicit in this assumption, which was widespread on both sides of the former Iron Curtain, was the idea that the states and nations of Western Europe had served during the Cold War as a repository of “true Europeanness” into which the states of the Soviet bloc would eventually choose to tap. Although notions among Western European policymakers and thinkers of “Europe’s” proper extent and content varied widely, nevertheless it was clear to all that the badge of “Europeanness” was in the

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1 Ivanov 2002: 92.
4 Waever 1992: 2
process of being extended toward the east, and would continue to be so. In this period of definitional flux, the four institutions mentioned—the CSCE/OSCE, the Council of Europe, the EU, and NATO—served as markers of Europe’s boundaries: membership in European organisations, especially those with high symbolic content such as the Council of Europe, became as good a measure as any of whether a country could be considered, or consider itself, to be part of “Europe.”

This chapter, after a brief discussion of the subset of the IR literature that examines region construction, goes on to examine Russian and Baltic reasons for wanting to be included in the region known as “Europe.” It suggests that Baltic and Russian representatives approached “Europe” in at least four ways, three of which are discussed here: as a locus of security, as a locus of prosperity, and as a locus of identity. The chapter details the arguments advanced by Russian and Baltic diplomats for their inclusion in one quintessentially European institution, the Council of Europe; it also details the arguments they advanced to secure their opponents’ exclusion. It describes the response of the Council to these arguments, and closes with a discussion of the emotional impact of these debates and their outcomes.

Imagined proximities
The Russian-Baltic debate over Europeanness reflects many of the themes raised in the growing subset of the IR literature dealing with region construction—the conjuring up of, in Amitav Acharya’s term, “imagined proximities.” As Greg Fry has written, “[n]aturalization of the idea that the world is divided up into entities larger than states, called ‘regions,’ has evolved over time in association with the expansion of European interests throughout the globe.” This idea has facilitated the tendency to generalize about conditions or peoples or customs within “regional” boundaries. However, the political and intellectual project of the identification of regions has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, often inspired by Benedict Anderson’s work on “nation-building.” Furthermore, this scrutiny is taking place at a time when many argue that regions are playing an increasingly important role in world politics. Proponents of a region-centric picture of world politics point to the strengthening of existing regional institutions and the creation of new regional organizations; to increasing demands being placed by the United Nations and the United States on regional organizations to play significant security-management and economic roles since the end of the Cold War; and to changes in the international environment such as the emergence of a “unipolar moment” in world politics. As a consequence, interest in regions and their construction is high.

Scholarly understandings of how regions are defined have changed over the last two decades. Many classic studies of regions relied heavily on the notion of geographical proximity combined with other criteria such as cultural, economic, linguistic or political ties. Iver Neumann has observed two lines of argumentation in classic analyses of

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5 Waever 1990b; Rupnik 1994.
7 Fry 2000: 123.
8 Anderson’s most-cited work (entitled Imagined Communities) focused on the constructed quality of modern national polities, motivated by the observation that “all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined...[and are to be distinguished] by the style in which they are imagined” (Anderson 1991: 6).
9 Hurrell 1995b: 1; Mansfield and Milner 1999: 589
10 Fry 2000: 119-120.
regional composition: inside-out and outside-in. The first line of analysis typically postulates a "center, a core area where the internal defining traits are more similar, and interaction more intense, than in the regional periphery." The second line of analysis typically focuses on systemic factors, states, and "natural geopolitical strategic landmarks such as mountain ranges, rivers, and bodies of water." In each case the existence of a region has been taken as given. However, attempts to define and delineate regions "scientifically" have produced few clear results. More recent scholarship thus has tended to emphasize non-geographic criteria, in particular what Acharya has described as "shared perceptions of the regional subsystem as a distinctive theatre of operations." Social constructivists have described the latter quality in terms of "identity," arguing that countries sharing a communal identity can be thought of as a region regardless of their location. This observation leads on logically to the argument that regions, as socially constructed entities, are by their nature politically contested, with processes of political contestation moving through various stages and involving various actors within and outside a region. "As with nations," Andrew Hurrell writes, "so regions can be seen as imagined communities which rest on mental maps whose lines highlight some features whilst ignoring others." As a consequence, IR scholars have become increasingly interested in a number of regional processes. One is what Neumann has called "region-building:" the process by which political actors decide what political ties, cultural similarities, economic transactional processes, spatial and chronological markers etc. will be made relevant to the identity of the human collective in question. One is what might be called "region-selling:" the way in which political actors disseminate their conception of their imagined community to others, both within and outside the community. One is what might be called "region-making:" the way in which external forces attempt to define regions, sometimes in dialogue with, sometimes in the absence of voices from within the area in question. And another is what might be called "region-joining:" efforts by political actors outside a self-defined region to secure inclusion in this collective identity. In this case, the goal is to examine how (to slightly change Neumann's

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13 Acharya 2000: 4. These points are in line with thinking advanced in the field of critical geopolitics, where one increasingly hears the argument that "what really makes a difference in international relations is the way in which a state's relative location is constructed and what strategic meaning is given to its territory" (Berg 2000: 2).
15 Hurrell 1995b: 333-334. Russell Fifield, for instance, identifies five major steps in the evolution of Southeast Asia as a regional identity: "the creation of the Southeast Asia Command; the development of Southeast Asian Studies, especially in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s; the first and second Indochinese wars and the articulation of the 'domino theory' by successive US administrations; the decolonization process; and the acceptance and development of the regional concept by the region's governing elite" (cited in Acharya 2000: 10).
17 Neumann 1999: 114-115. See also, for example, Acharya 2000 and Sidaway 2002. Acharya suggests that in some cases region-building can be a consequence of an existing sense of shared identity, while in other cases it can be an effort to cobble together a common identity in the face of shared problems (Acharya 2000: 1).
18 See, for example, Neumann 1999: 113-141.
19 See, for example, Fry 2002, Sidaway 2002.
20 This last category is reminiscent of Sven Tägil's concept of ethnic "identification," the "active, willful process of consciously adhering to a specific ethnic community" (cited in Waever 1990b: 19).
formulation) certain people, at a certain point in history, within a certain political context, attempt to secure their inclusion within a generally recognized “region.” It is on this “region-joining” aspect of the Baltic and Russian rhetorical campaigns outlined in Chapters Three and Four that this chapter will focus.

Russian and Baltic engagement with “Europe”

The construction of “Europe” as a region is a process that has been under way since the consolidation of the idea of “Christendom.” As Delanty has argued, every age has “reinvented the idea of Europe in the mirror of its own identity.” The concept of Europe was initially formed (in the late fifteenth century) within a religious discourse which equated Europe with Western Christianity. However, the sixteenth century witnessed a growing use of the concept of Europe in an international political context, with states beginning to “speak” to each other within a formalized context of criss-crossing relations (military, economic, political, and legal) that was referred to as “Europe.” This project—what Delanty calls “a debased normative standard”—culminated in the Concert of Europe. Meanwhile, Delanty argues, “Europe” took on associations with a universalistic idea of civilization, while nations became the repositories of particularistic national cultures.

After the rise of the competing concept of Mitteleuropa and the collapse of the idea of European unity in the course of two World Wars, the rebuilding of the “idea of Europe” in the countries of what were now known as “Western Europe” became part of post-war reconstruction and an important political project in the context of the Cold War. “Europe” increasingly became perceived as Western Europe, spreading out from the six signatories of the Treaty of Rome. The defining of “Europe” operated on two logics, one of differentiation, the other of drawing together. At the level of differentiation, as Delanty writes, the Cold War subsumed Europe into “a wider opposition of West versus East...A new historical category was born, to which Europe was subordinated: the North Atlantic.” At the level of drawing together, the new European project was dominated by the language of the market: with the idea of Europe as a spiritual or philosophical community discredited by the two World Wars, the new Europe was an economic community. The project of Europe, as Wæver writes, was not to launch Europe back onto the stage of world history but to prevent another world war from starting on European soil. Economic and political integration was designed to promote peace and prosperity, not to seek out a unique or dominant role in world politics. But at the same time, a new politics of European identity was coming into being, seeking legitimation in bourgeois high culture and “best practice” standards of human rights.

From the middle of the 1980s, however, with a breakdown in the post-war liberal consensus represented by the Atlantic alliance, serious political and intellectual debate...
about the meaning and scope of Europe reemerged.\textsuperscript{30} As Ole Waever has written, "Europe [was beginning] to emerge from the long shadows cast by the Second World War. The air of guilt stemming from colonialism, war and holocaust had largely evaporated and after four decades of superpower domination it was the USA and the USSR that tended to attract criticism on the wider world stage."\textsuperscript{31} In this atmosphere of debate, CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's dramatic shift in Soviet rhetoric—in which "Europe" previously had appeared only as a narrow, descriptive term—towards invocation of a "Common European Home" further encouraged hope that the narrow equation of "Europe" with western Europe might be coming to an end. Furthermore, after the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union, debate over what constituted "Europe" took on broader scope across the continent. At the level of drawing together, the Maastricht debate of 1992-1993, the gradual expansion of European institutions such as the Council of Europe, and talk of possible expansion of the European Union and NATO led to a growing sense of a Europe that might be both deeper and broader. At the same time the emergence of the Balkans as Europe's "anti-Europe" not only acted as a new outlet for impulses towards differentiation, but also created a powerful anti-model for European behaviour.\textsuperscript{32} In this climate, debate intensified over what Europe was, where it was going, and who belonged within its fold.

Well before the collapse of the Soviet Union, discussion and debate had emerged in the Baltic states and in the Russian Federation over these nations' appropriate relationship to "Europe;" after the collapse, these debates intensified. The geopolitical reasoning involved in deciding where their nations were located would help Russian and Baltic elites to "choose a suitable historical truth from many, separate versions of "our people" and "the others," and set up a hierarchy of friendly and hostile nations as well as proximate and distant countries."\textsuperscript{33} But equally importantly, the decisions over where their nations were located would help Baltic and Russian governments and representatives to identify their "circles of recognition;" the audiences from whom Russian and Baltic representatives hoped for recognition and respect.\textsuperscript{34}

In approaching the question of their nation's relationship to Europe, as well as their opponents', Baltic and Russian representatives approached Europe in at least three ways: as a locus of security, as a locus of prosperity, and as a locus of identity.

\textit{Europe as a locus of security}

The notion of Europe as a locus of security, although pervasive in both Baltic and Russian thought, was naturally far more obvious in Baltic rhetoric. In the Baltic case, representatives operating first and foremost from a concern for individualized security: maintenance of their individual states' political sovereignty through freedom from

\textsuperscript{30} Heffernan 1998: 217. As Heffernan observes, "[t]he Anglo-American agenda was markedly at odds with the consensual orthodoxy of most western European countries, where economic and social policies remained interventionist and where geopolitical objectives were still influenced by the idea of détente with the east" (Heffernan 1998: 217).

\textsuperscript{31} Waever 1993: 175.

\textsuperscript{32} As Maria Todorova has noted, the Balkans have become "the object of a number of externalized political, ideological, and cultural frustrations and have served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the 'European' and 'the west' has been constructed...the rest of Europe proclaims itself 'civilized' partly in contrast (Todorova 1994: 455).

\textsuperscript{33} Berg 2000: 2.

\textsuperscript{34} Ringmar 1996: 81.

133
military or economic attack or political subversion. Baltic conviction that Russia constituted a danger to Baltic sovereignty, as outlined in Chapters Three and Four, was accompanied by recognition that Baltic military forces by themselves were always going to be incapable of guaranteeing territorial integrity or political sovereignty. As a consequence, Baltic leaders, rejecting any concept of neutrality, considered a degree of integration into European security complexes as absolutely vital to guaranteeing Baltic sovereignty and territory—to "protect the ethnic nation and secure the protecting state." As Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis put it, "[i]f Central European countries and the Baltic states do not find shelter under the NATO wing of political protection, they will be left to face ever-increasing pressure from Russia." Many Baltic leaders also believed that over the longer run, participation in European security structures would further improve the international position of the Baltic states and consequently better defend their national interests in any foreign policy field.

Russian representatives, on the other hand, conceived of Europe as a locus of a different kind of security, that associated with the containment of conflicts in the former Soviet space. Russian representatives had indicated repeatedly their hopes that European standards of state behaviour would eventually spread to the territory of the CIS to prevent outbreaks of ethnic conflict or separatist violence; they further hoped that CSCE norms would prevail in interstate relations within the CIS and on the whole territory of the former Soviet Union. A vital Russian goal within the context of this broader agenda was of course the protection of Russophones across the entire territory of the former Union, including the Baltic states. But the project of curtailing the kind of violent instability that had already broken out in Tajikistan and threatened to spread across much of Central Asia and to the Russian Federation itself was also one in which Russian representatives hoped that European structures, particularly the CSCE, might play a role. It was of course possible that institutions like the CSCE would themselves have to change to keep up with the times. But as Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev told the United Nations Human Rights Commission in January 1992, Russian leaders were convinced that "the creation of a strong, democratic, and stable Russia and the construction of a new Europe are inseparable."

Europe as a locus of prosperity

The notion of Europe as a locus of prosperity for both Baltic and Russian representatives moved beyond the issue (in the Baltic case) of vulnerability to economic attack to the question of rebuilding their nations' economies. The contrast between continuing prosperity in the countries of western Europe and stagnation in the Soviet bloc (most strikingly evident in the case of the divided Germany) had already been a powerful impetus towards a rejection of the planned economic model. The economic

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38 Lithuanian Radio, 8 December 1993 (SWB, 13 December 1993: E/3).
40 Flynn and Farrell 1999: 514
43 Malcolm 1994a: 12.
decline, verging on collapse, that accompanied the transition away from planned economies in the Baltic states and Russia, however, made the situation even more urgent. At the most basic level, therefore, both Russian and Baltic representatives expected substantial aid from the West for their transition to market economies and for the creation of modern, democratic institutions.\textsuperscript{44} The Baltic states lacked their own currencies and central banks; their economic planning institutions had to be constructed from scratch.\textsuperscript{45} The Russian Federation, meanwhile, faced equally parlous conditions in its dysfunctional heritage of Soviet banking and planning structures and a currency initially shared by eleven other economies in worse shape than its own. As a consequence, both the Baltic and Russian governments moved towards what Bobo Lo has called the “economization” of foreign policy, working to mobilize international support for economic reforms, to attract Western public and private investment, improve market access for exports, or (in the Russian case) to obtain relief from mounting obligations under the old Soviet debt.\textsuperscript{46} Baltic governments were particularly insistent that over the longer run, Baltic integration in the European trading system, and eventually possibly even into the EU, would be vital to the region’s future economic prosperity.\textsuperscript{47}

Particularly in the Baltic states, however, the issue was not just one of assistance or integration but one of fundamental reorientation. Despite occasional claims to aspirations to play the role of economic “bridges” between West and East, Baltic economic planners (particularly in Estonia) nevertheless hastened to sever their economic links with Russia as quickly as they turned towards the West. Baltic determination to sever trading links with Russia to the greatest extent possible stemmed partly from a desire to identify themselves with the developed European economies and states; partly from hostility towards Russia by radical nationalists; partly from a desire to reduce their vulnerability to Russian economic blackmail; and partly from anxiety over the precarious state of the Russian economy.\textsuperscript{48} Economic reforms in Estonia, and to a lesser degree in Lithuania and Latvia, were designed to achieve competitiveness in the European market as rapidly as possible, with little concern for their impact on economic ties with countries to their east.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{44} Arnswald 1998: 20-21.
\textsuperscript{45} Lieven 1994: 316.
\textsuperscript{46} Financial assistance from the West had the further political dimension of providing domestic legitimation for reformist regimes. As Kozyrev observed: “[e]verything that promotes economic development and normal life for the Russians would be in line with our interests in foreign policy” (Lo 2002a: 44-45; \textit{Krasnaya Zvezda}, 21 December 1991: 1 (FBIS-SOV-91-247, 24 December 1991: 50)).
\textsuperscript{47} Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997: 32. Notably, Baltic leaders showed little interest in the establishment of a common Baltic economic space: instead of pushing for integration, Baltic leaderships concentrated on competitive strengthening of their own nation’s economic structures (Vihalemm 1997: 142).
\textsuperscript{48} Estonian planners reportedly were particularly insistent that Estonia should not be relegated to the position of \textit{entrepot} (Lieven 1994: 331). As noted in Chapter Four, the Baltic states indeed rode out reasonably well both instability in the Russian economy and occasional Russian efforts at economic pressure; Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar commented in early 1994 that Russian efforts at pressure demonstrated that the course adopted by the Estonian government to reorient the Estonia economy towards the West was the only correct one (Estonian Radio, 29 March 1994 (\textit{SWB}, 1 April 1994: E/1).
\textsuperscript{49} Interestingly, Lauristin and Vihalemm (1997: 108) write: “Despite the international recognition of results achieved by Estonia’s liberal economic policy, they appeared alien and incomprehensible to many people and did not receive unanimous public support at home. There were definite psychological shortcomings in the implementations of the plans. Unlike in the Czech Republic, the reforms were not sufficiently explained to the people. More concerned with international reactions, the government failed to develop public relations in its own country.”
Europe as a locus of identity

But both Russian and Baltic representatives also saw "Europe" as a locus of something far more fundamental, one of identity. The concept of "Europe" was a vivid one in all four capitals. Few Baltic or Russian representatives would have disagreed with Gorbachev's characterization, made in 1987, that "Europe 'from the Atlantic to the Urals' is a cultural historical entity united by the common heritage of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, of the great philosophical and social teachings of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries."\(^{50}\) The questions for all sides, however, were those of where their nations fit in to this entity; what functions it could play for them; and how it could help them answer the questions posed by Lennart Meri in 1988: "Who are we? Where are we from? Where are we going?"\(^ {51}\)

Russia's relationship to Europe had historically been highly complicated. Russian geographers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had played an important role in the mapping of the European continent, contributing to an "objective" conception of Russia as European; but Russian confidence in Russia's place in Europe as a broader cultural or political project had never been unshakeable (as this dissertation's conclusion will discuss in rather more detail).\(^ {52}\) The reformers who made up the bulk of the Yeltsin foreign policy team, however, saw Russia's European glass as more than half full. It was true that prior to Peter the Great's reign, Muscovites, although closely involved in the strategic and economic dealings of northern Europe, "regarded themselves, and were regarded by the states that developed out of Latin Christendom, as outside the civilization and traditions of Europe."\(^ {53}\) By the eighteenth century, however, it had become "commonplace both in Russia and abroad to think that the difference between Russia and the rest of Europe was not very significant," with Peter's reign having established Russia as a solid member of the European comity of nations.\(^ {54}\) Furthermore, it was through the engagement with European politics begun under Peter that the Russian empire began to acquire the characteristics that would eventually make it a major player in European and world politics; as Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov has written, "[i]t was through Europe that Russia was destined to find her place as a world power."\(^ {55}\) By the nineteenth century, by which time the Russian empire was embroiled in virtually all aspects of European interstate relations and dynastic politics, debates between Russian liberals and socialists over Russia was a "sister" or a "cousin" in the European family nevertheless presupposed the applicability of the kinship metaphor.\(^ {56}\) Despite the efforts of generations of Soviet ideologists to emphasize the distance that separated Soviet civilization from that of the "decadent" West, with Western culture presenting endless opportunities for "subversion," Europe remained Russians' essential point of reference throughout the Soviet period.\(^ {57}\)

Furthermore, the theme of Russian indivisibility from Europe had experienced a dramatic upturn in the final decade of the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that the Soviet military presence in Germany's eastern zone and the other Warsaw Pact countries had brought the Soviet Union "into Europe" willy-nilly after World War II, Soviet era

\(^{50}\) Gorbachev 1987: 197-198.
\(^{51}\) Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997: 104.
\(^{53}\) Watson 1984: 64.
\(^{54}\) Vihavainen 1990: 3.
\(^{55}\) Ivanov 2002: 33.
\(^{56}\) Neumann 1996: 60. Adam Watson dates Russia's full acceptance as a great power by the European states as having taken place around 1760 (Watson 1984: 71).
rhetoric had for most of the post-war period been dedicated to undermining European unity, with the process of western European integration “denounced as an instrument of capitalists seeking to shore up their faltering authority by facilitating international trade and intensifying the exploitation of the working class.”\[58\] To the extent that common bonds between the Soviet Union and western Europe surfaced in Soviet rhetoric, it was as part of repeated efforts to decouple the United States from Europe and to weaken NATO, with Soviet representatives arguing that “we Europeans should stand together in peace, but we are being thwarted by the intrusive presence of the Americans in Europe.”\[59\] By the late Soviet period, however, all this had changed. First, as Ole Waever has noted, the Soviet approach towards European unity had changed: while previous Soviet leaderships had sought to push the US out of Europe, Gorbachev’s main concern was now to make sure that the Soviet Union itself was not pushed out.\[60\] “Now and then,” he complained, some people “as if inadvertently... equate ‘Europe’ with ‘Western Europe.’” Such ploys, however, cannot change the geographic and historical realities.\[61\]

Second, however, Gorbachev also emphasized a new vision of Europe that had less to do with geopolitical categories than with an understanding of common interests, interdependence, and all-human values, as well as cultural reasons for Soviet engagement in European affairs.\[62\] “We are Europeans,” he argued; “the history of Russia is an organic part of the great European history.”\[63\] This “common European home” theme, Neil Malcolm argues, was more than just a ploy aimed at Western public and leadership opinion; “for the most Westernized groups in the Soviet elite, it represented the culmination of a long-running organic process in Soviet post-war intellectual life, rooted in a revulsion against Stalinism and neo-Stalinist nationalism and isolationism, something which with the wisdom of hindsight seems perfectly predictable.”\[64\]

Russian reformers enthusiastically took up this theme. Immediately after being appointed RSFSR Foreign Minister, Kozyrev stressed that “[a]n entirely new foundation should be laid for the Russian Federation’s relationship with Western Europe. Instead of advancing senseless ideological claims, the two sides should work for a single and unified European system.”\[65\] Asked by an interviewer in November 1990 whether Russia would be a “desired guest” in Europe, Kozyrev replied “We are at a very low point economically, and we can still see worse times coming. But...from the point of view of cultural and spiritual potential, Russia is far from destitute...it is with her baggage, with her dignity that she can be accepted in the, as we say, common European home.”\[66\] Indeed, Boris Yeltsin’s first trip abroad as Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, in April 1991, had been to the Council of Europe and the European Parliament: there he announced to the press his intention to “correct a 73-year old injustice” and to “return Russia to Europe.”\[67\] By the time that Kozyrev traveled to Strasbourg to submit Russia’s application to the Council of Europe, the nineteenth-century “family” metaphor had resurfaced: “In the capacity of a great power we wish to enter into the family of democratic nations of Europe.”\[68\]

\[58\] Malcolm 1994a: 8; Heffernan 1998: 222; see also Ulam 1983.
\[59\] Waever 1993: 186; see also Adomeit 1994.
\[60\] Waever 1992: 2.
\[61\] Gorbachev 1987: 91.
\[63\] Gorbachev 1987: 91.
\[64\] Malcolm 1991: 49.
\[68\] Izvestiya, 8 May 1992: 1.
Meanwhile, that their own nations deserved to be considered a legitimate part of the European cultural complex was never in doubt in Baltic minds. As Eiki Berg has observed, this was partly due to geopolitical reasoning drawing on "[t]housands of years of permanent settlement on the eastern coast of Baltic Sea and the north-south trade links described by Tacitus." But Baltic thinkers also emphasized the longevity of the Baltic Christian traditions and the centuries of German, Swedish and Polish cultural and political influence to link their nations to the broader European cultural project. (For instance, the Lithuanian Law on the Basics of National Security lists amongst its "guiding principles" the statement that "the Lithuanian State, established many centuries ago and resting on the Christian cultural foundation unifying Europe, is an integral part of the community of European nations." Furthermore, many Baltic representatives considered their nations not only to be European, but also to be Europe's easternmost outposts. Indeed, many Baltic thinkers drew on the "clash of civilizations" thesis of American political scientist Samuel Huntington to validate their conception of the Baltic states as "the last resort of the West-European Roman (Catholic and Protestant) tradition located at the border of the Slavic Byzantine (Orthodox) world." As Meri was fond of saying (often within Russian earshot), "our border marks the border of European values."

Starting from this point, for Baltic representatives "Europe" functioned first and foremost as a place where the Baltic nations could reconnect with their pre-World War II past. Baltic thinkers argued that the Baltic states had been removed from their proper civilizational context by Soviet occupation. The restoration of independence, as Pavlovaite has described, was presented in all three Baltic states as an opportunity to resuscitate "true" Baltic identities through a reunion with a "Europe" that stood in opposition to everything that the communist past and the Russia present represented. For example, Meri, after being sworn in as Estonian President, told journalists that he wanted to make Estonia part of Europe again: "For more than half a century, Estonia has been cut off from the rest of the world...we will use all our perseverance to strongly integrate Estonia into Europe again." But a return to Europe also constituted a path by which Baltic thinkers could distance themselves both from Russia and from their own communist past. For many Baltic representatives, "Europe" ended on their state's eastern border, and membership in European organizations was seen as the institutionalization of this move. Taken together, this return to a "natural" place of belonging thus was constructed as "an overcoming of enforced estrangement in the past and a distancing from the East that represents danger and threat to the sovereignty of the state."
This Baltic theme of reunion with Europe occurred in tandem with the broader move to "return to Europe" of all the former Soviet bloc states of eastern and central Europe; and indeed, some Baltic thinkers were anxious to represent it as part of the same historical trend.\(^82\) In this line of thought, the three Baltic nations were an organic part of an Eastern European community of belief in Europe, the existence of which had prompted Hugh Seton Watson to write that "[n]owhere in the world is there so widespread a belief in the reality, and the importance, of a European cultural community, as in the countries lying between the EEC and the Soviet Union."\(^83\) Central European writers had in fact rebuked Western Europe for usurping the marker "European," arguing that this could not be done without Europe "losing a vital (or even 'organic') ingredient of itself."\(^84\) Few Baltic thinkers were prepared to go this far; but many were happy to paint themselves as keepers of a flame who were relieved to find themselves reunited with the bonfire party. As Meri, at his first Estonian press conference as Foreign Minister of an independent Estonia, said: "I wouldn't like to oppose Western Europe to Eastern Europe. Estonia is a part of Central Europe, a concept that has been forgotten. Now it is reemerging."\(^85\)

Of course, the question of with which Europe—that of 1939 or 1989—the Baltic states were to be reunited was not so simple.\(^86\) As Gražina Minotaitė has noted, "[t]he Baltic states themselves saw the fact as the restoration of historical justice, as getting back to Europe from which they were brutally cut off in 1940. Yet on one interpretation this return is here conceived as the restoration of former states, while on the other interpretation it is conceived as joining the Europe of liberal democracies."\(^87\) While initially the former interpretation dominated both domestic and foreign policy, with the restoration of interwar constitutions and citizenship laws aimed at restoring inter-war ethnic compositions, by mid-1993 it was becoming evident to Baltic leaderships that Europe expected them to catch up with the times.

But both Russian and Baltic representatives knew that what they thought of Europe was not the only thing that was important; equally important (as Meri said) was "what Europe thinks of us."\(^88\) Russian representatives might have described themselves as having to overcome European prejudice; Baltic representatives might have described themselves as having to overcome European ignorance. Certainly good will towards Russia was running high; for all that it had taken some time for Western leaderships to embrace Yeltsin, substantial optimism existed in European capitals that, as European thinkers had sporadically argued across the centuries, Russia (whatever its existing political state) had the potential to be an excellent student of European political and economic practices.\(^89\) However, many Europeans also continued to view Russia's "Europeanness" with varying degrees of ambivalence. As Iver Neumann has argued, Russia historically had played the role of Europe's main liminar, with European ambivalence at various points focusing on the distinction between the Roman (Catholic and Protestant) and Orthodox traditions; the alleged thinness of the line between Russian culture and barbarism (an argument that sometimes drew on racist conceptions of the "Asiatic" quality of the Russian gene pool); and a putative Russian

^{83}\) Cited in Heffernan 1998: 220.  
^{84}\) Neumann 1999: 149.  
^{86}\) Lieven 1994: 374.  
^{87}\) Miniotaitė 2001: 3.  
^{89}\) Neumann 1999: 107.
fascination with authoritarianism. The Cold War had permitted the explosion of these themes, with “Soviet” and “Russian” freely equated in European minds, and the worst qualities of both conflated; there was no guarantee that these themes would not experience a resurgence. Meanwhile, Baltic representatives were keenly aware that for most of their brief period of independence, the Baltic states had been considered peripheral to Europe. While Czechoslovakia had at least had its Munich, the Baltic states had been abandoned by the West with barely a mention. Indeed, the Yalta conference, while creating “a geopolitical entity, ‘Eastern Europe,’ [that] as a polity or community of destiny had never before existed,” had written the Baltic states out of even that attenuated relationship to the European mainstream. While the non-recognition policy had kept the Baltic states in the moral spotlight for Western governments, and Western goodwill had been built up by the three states’ non-violent independence strategies, Baltic representatives knew that there was no guarantee that the previous view of the Baltic region as somewhat peripheral to Europe might not reemerge. Both sides, then, needed to put their nations “not only on the geographical map of Europe, but on the mental map of Western policymakers.” As Estonian Foreign Minister Toomas Henrik Ilves told the Estonian parliament: “Estonia must uniquely place itself in the west…because no one else will do it for us.”

Joining Europe

Unsurprisingly, the three organizations we have already encountered—the CSCE/OSCE, the Council of Europe, and NATO—were three of the forums in which Baltic and Russian representatives conducted their most persistent efforts to see their nations returned to Europe. In part, this was because these three organizations brought together representatives of many western European states, with the CSCE the most inclusive and NATO the most exclusive. But in part, it was also because these three institutions, plus the European Community (EC, later to become the European Union (EU)), had been at the forefront of debates over the future nature and composition of “Europe.”

It is worth noting that these four institutions constituted in 1992 very different types of organizations, with different criteria for membership and different types of input into the formulation of “Europe.” The CSCE took a broad, non-geographic approach to membership: all the former Warsaw Pact signatories and all the former republics of the Soviet Union, including the Central Asian states, were granted virtually automatic membership. Nor did the CSCE/OSCE show excessive regard for issues of type of government or concern for human rights; the CSCE/OSCE process was in essence a political one, a setting for give-and-take rather than absolute rulings. The Council of Europe’s definition of “Europe,” on the other hand, coincided with the geographical definition of the European continent, extending from the Atlantic to the Urals. The

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91 Heller and Fehér 1990: 16.
94 Kritz 1993: 26. The CSCE/OSCE’s decision to suspend the membership of the rump Yugoslavia and its delay in admitting Georgia until that country gained a minimal degree of political stability were the two exceptions to this relatively ecumenical approach.
95 The PACE’s recommendation on the enlargement of the Council reads: “Membership in the Council of Europe is in principle open only to states whose national territory lies wholly or partly in Europe and whose culture is closely linked with European culture. However, traditional an cultural links and adherence to the fundamental values of the Council of Europe might justify a suitable cooperation
Council had already indicated its intention to expand its membership to European states that shared its commitment to democratic, rights-defending government. However, the criteria by which this commitment were deemed to be demonstrated (already informally in place, and codified in the Vienna Declaration of October 1993) were relatively rigorous, and included a list of specific legal criteria, and membership required a formal application and a lengthy assessment process. Membership in the Council thus required a formal application and a lengthy assessment process. The EC/EU similarly tied potential membership to a geographical conception of Europe, and had similar aspirations to see the entire continent eventually united under its regime. However, the Community had not yet taken the formal decision to expand. Furthermore, since non-performing Community members had the potential to impose tangible costs on other members, it was evident that were the Community to decide to expand, it would be relatively inflexible in demanding from prospective members a high degree of compatibility of financial, trading and monetary systems, as well as relatively high levels of prosperity. EC/EU membership thus would in effect be a sign that a state had achieved western European levels of prosperity through western European economic models. Finally, NATO was by this time expressing rhetorical commitment to a movement away from a simple alliance structure towards becoming “a security community based on common values and a collective identity of liberal democracies.” However, as its name suggested, NATO had no restrictively European focus in its membership policies; indeed, it had no official aspirations to incorporating all or even most European countries. In 1992, the possibility of NATO expanding its membership was only under preliminary discussion; it was already clear that if expansion were to occur, membership would be by invitation, and would depend on achieving exacting standards of compatibility not only of political structures and foreign policy aims, but

with other states neighboring the ‘geographical’ boundaries. The boundaries of Europe have not yet been comprehensively defined under international law. The Council of Europe should therefore in principle base itself on the generally accepted geographical limits of Europe. Accordingly, within their internationally recognized borders, all member states of the Council are European...The states whose legislative assemblies enjoy special guest status with the Parliamentary Assembly are also considered European...The possibility of membership is open to Serbia, Montenegro and Andorra...In view of their cultural links with Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia would have the possibility of applying for membership provided they clearly indicate their will to be considered as part of Europe. However, a new iron curtain should not be drawn behind these states, as this would run the risk of preventing the spread of the Council’s basic values to other countries” (PACE Recommendation 1247, 4 October 1994).

96 However, as the Chairman and Rapporteur of the Political Affairs Committee later outlined to the PACE, some Council members argued that regardless of whether Russia was geographically European, it should be excluded from potential membership “because the view is held that a shifting of the political axis would take place if one of the two great powers of the second half of this century were to become a member of the Council and the other one were to be left out” (PACE ORD, 26 January 1994: 140).

97 Manas 1996: 102. The Vienna Declaration states: “Accession presupposes that the applicant country has brought its institutions and legal system into line with the basic principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. The people’s representatives must have been chosen by means of free and fair elections based on universal suffrage. Guaranteed freedom of expression and notably of the media, protection of national minorities and observance of the principles of international law must remain, in our view, decisive criteria for assessing any application for membership. An undertaking to sign the European Convention on Human Rights and accept the Convention’s supervisory machinery in its entirety within a short period is also fundamental. We are resolved to ensure full compliance with the commitments accepted by all members states...” The Declaration describes these qualities as “the values that define our European identity” (Vienna Declaration, 9 October 1993 (http://neon.coe.fr/eng/std/vienna.htm, accessed 30 July 1997)).


99 Risse-Kappen 1996: 395; for an analysis of NATO’s transition from alliance to security community, see Williams and Neumann 2000.
also of military structures. NATO membership (assuming that the organization were willing to expand) thus would confirm not only legal and ideological but also military strategic and technological compatibility with western Europe’s greatest powers, as well as with the United States.

It was in the halls of these organizations that Russian and Baltic representatives pleaded their case for their nations’ Europeanness. As a member of the first Latvian delegation to attend the PACE as special guests said, “our fifty-year-long dream is being fulfilled. We are ready and determined to return to the free world not just as observers but as active participants in European and world democratic structures, so as to become a full member of the Council of Europe...We are proud that we are Europeans and that we can finally be embraced by our European brothers and sisters.”

Meanwhile, Russian delegates to the PACE stated that “Russia sincerely hopes to become reintegrated into Europe, at a human as well as a political level. Russia and the Russian delegation are attached to Europe’s common principles and its common moral and cultural values. The European experience of the past decades is helping us to renew and restore our own traditional values—values that are true and constructive, not totalitarian and destructive—and hence Russian history, which is closely linked to European history.” Both Baltic and Russian statements emphasized that the Soviet system had deprived their nations of their rightful place in Europe. So, for instance, Estonian representatives at the PACE noted that the occupation of 1940 “excluded” the Baltics from Europe; meanwhile Russian delegates deplored the Soviet censorship that had kept Russia from its rightful cultural milieu, while optimistically noting that Russia’s cultural Europeanness was allowing it to move relatively painlessly away from communist ideology.

Naturally, Baltic and Russian representatives were anxious for a degree of confirmation of their nations’ acceptance into Europe. This confirmation could, in the eyes of Baltic and Russian representatives, take several forms. One was simply rhetorical confirmation by other representatives. Another was support on issues of importance, particularly those concerning their opponents; for instance, Latvian delegates declared that the inclusion of the Baltic states’ concerns in the Helsinki Final Document of July 1992 was a confirmation that “Latvia has indeed regained its place in Europe.” Another was the removal of any distinguishing marks that might impose a stigma of non-Europeanness through criticism of state practice—for instance, the CSCE/OSCE monitoring missions in Estonia and Latvia.

But the most potent form of recognition, Baltic and Russian representatives clearly felt, would be membership in European institutions. Which of these institutions to focus on, of course, was another story. The CSCE/OSCE, as mentioned above, was already all-inclusive. NATO and the EU were engaged in debates about which way their structures should evolve, and whether they should expand at all. Furthermore, the Baltic and Russian governments had very different attitudes towards NATO. Baltic governments

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100 PACE ORD, 18 September 1991: 246.
105 For a discussion of Estonian efforts to rid the country of the stigma of the OSCE monitoring mission, see Sousa Freire 2001.
aspired to membership in an expanded and revitalized NATO; the Russian government, on the other hand, was adding its voice to those arguing that the alliance should be scaled back or abolished. Meanwhile, the Council of Europe not only had begun the process of enlargement, but also had a history of aggressively promoting itself as representing the “essence” of Europe through its role as protector of “core” European values. European governments might disagree on the degree of political and economic integration (via the EU) or military integration (via NATO) that they wanted, but the democratic and rights-observing values exemplified and promoted by the Council were (so Council literature argued) a constant among western European states. As a consequence, the organization was increasingly synonymous with a particular conception of the European region. The Council of Europe, therefore, was a logical first port of call for an institutional certification of “Europeanness,” even though the general case was argued in the halls of all three organizations.

Both Russian and Baltic representatives clearly saw the Council as having the potential to bring a number of benefits. Some of these were practical. On the one hand, membership in the Council would provide access to assistance, both financial and in the form of advice, that would help to strengthen domestic democratic and economic institutions. On the other hand, both Russian and Baltic representatives saw membership in the Council having the potential to help with foreign policy problems. For example, Kozyrev argued in 1992 that “Russia is attracted to the Council of Europe by real interests of the Russian state, primarily the need for further cooperation in upgrading national legislation, including the new Constitution.” He also mentioned the attractiveness of economic cooperation, describing the Russian government as particularly interested in programs aimed at the development of small and medium businesses and farms and the commercialization of large state enterprises. However, he also described the Council as potentially helpful in matters having to do with openness of borders and the interests of Russians in the former Union republics, as well as the interests of representatives of the republics’ nationalities living in Russia. All in all, he believed, the Council could play an important role in preventing and eliminating spots of armed conflict.”

However, the Council’s value went beyond practical issues. As noted above, it served as a marker of adherence to a particular set of values. As a member of a Council delegation that visited the Baltic states in April 1992 put it, “[m]embership in the Council is a badge of stable democracy.” Baltic and Russian representatives felt, as the Russian Consul General in Strasbourg Vladimir Sukhov put it, that admission to the Council would have “weighty symbolic significance,” since they would thereby be recognized as states “having made an irreversible choice in the favor of democracy and respect for human rights.” These values were, to Russian and Baltic representatives, ineluctably associated with a liberal conception of “Europe.” Gorbachev had expressed the sentiments of most Russian and Baltic reformers when he described the Council in July 1989 as “one of the epicentres of European politics and the European Idea.” Furthermore, it was evident that in the post-Cold War climate, these values were no

107 The Baltic Independent, 17-23 April 1992: 3.
109 PACE ORD, 6 July 1989: 198-205. Secretary General of the Council, Catherine Lalumiére, concurred: as she said on the occasion of the Baltic states being granted special guest status: “There is no other political organization [in Europe] that symbolizes these values [of democracy and human rights] so effectively. There is no other political organization that can offer the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe new moral and ideological reference points to replace the ones which they have lost” (PACE ORD, 18 September 1991: 250-251).
longer the exclusive province of the western European states; rather, they were the values to which millions of citizens of the former Soviet bloc believed that they aspired, and thus (as Kozyrev said) the Council’s “most precious treasure.” As a consequence, tangible adherence to these values appeared to many Baltic and Russian representatives to be proof of true “Europeanness,” not just in the sense of adherence to Western European values, but in the sense of adherence to the values of (as one PACE delegate put it) “the Europe in which we believe.” And of course, it did not hurt that the stamp of adherence to these values had practical as well as abstract benefit: Council of Europe representatives egged potential members on by noting that Council membership was an effective prerequisite for membership in the European Community, with its powerful economic benefits.

How, then, did Russian and Baltic representatives approach the Council of Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union? As noted above, at the most basic level, Baltic and Russian representatives stressed at the Council and elsewhere the degree to which their nations and governments identified themselves as part of Europe. But Baltic and Russian representatives also advanced more specific arguments as to the suitability and desirability of their states’ membership in the Council. Baltic representatives pursued a few basic themes. First, they argued that legally, their states were up to scratch. As an Estonian delegate told the PACE, “We have succeeded in ridding ourselves of the heritage of the totalitarian regime by adopting measures on human rights, on the rights of minorities, and on democratic pluralism, with the aim of creating a state governed by the rule of law.” Second, they argued, as one Estonian deputy put it, that non-member status was “destabilizing” for their nations; as a consequence, delay in admission was dangerous, both for their nations and for Europe. This last factor was invoked ever more anxiously as relations with Russia became more tense; for instance, Latvian

111 PACE ORD, 6 February 1992: 703. For Baltic representatives, this was also the Europe that had believed in them: as Meri said, the dedication shown by the Council to Baltic democracy and self-determination during the Soviet era was “not surprising, as the Council is the oldest and most esteemed guardian of common European values” (PACE ORD, 25 April 1995: 316).
112 The Baltic Independent, 17-23 April 1992: 3.
113 Regretably, due to the confidentiality of Council committee proceedings, the discussion that follows is limited to statements made by Baltic and Russian representatives to the PACE, as well as public statements. The inside story, particularly of the issue of Estonian membership, would doubtless be even more interesting. In particular, it would be extremely interesting to know if Baltic representatives used a tactic that Frank Schimmelfennig has described as common among Eastern European applicants to the EU, that of “shaming,” or the public exposure of illegitimate goals and behaviours (Schimmelfennig 2001b: 64-65). As Schimmelfennig writes, “The Central and Eastern European governments have based their claims to membership on the standard of legitimacy of the European international community: European identity and unity, liberal democracy, and multilateralism. They invoked the community’s membership rules and took its ritualized pan-European liberal commitment at face value. They tried to demonstrate that these values and norms obliged the EU to admit them and that failing to do so would be an act of disloyalty to the ideational foundations of the European international community. They uncovered inconsistencies between the constitutive values and the past rhetoric of the EC, on the one hand, and the community’s current behaviour toward the Central and Eastern European countries, on the other hand. In doing so, they have managed to ‘mobilize’ [the EU’s] institutionalized identity and to make enlargement an issue of credibility.” In so doing, applicants have attempted to emphasize that “for the new democracies, Europe remains a powerful idea, signifying the fundamental values and aspirations which their peoples kept alive during long years of oppression” (Schimmelfennig 2001b: 68, 72).
114 The Baltic states had lodged their applications for membership almost immediately after regaining independence; the Russian government announced its lodgment of an application for membership with great fanfare in May 1992, with Kozyrev traveling to Strasbourg for the occasion.
115 PACE ORD, 18 September 1991: 246.
parliamentary speaker Anatolijs Gorbunovs, in letter to the leaders of the 32 member parliaments of the Council, argued that the issue could become “a destabilizing factor in Latvia’s internal politics at a time when the population is very sensitive to Russian-Latvian relations.”

Russian lines of argument, although they showed initial similarities to the lines of argument of Baltic representatives, rapidly diverged dramatically. Russian representatives similarly opened by arguing that legally, the Russian Federation was nearly up to scratch. Kozyrev, submitting Russia’s application for membership, had said that “[t]he foundational values of the Council of Europe—the priority of human rights, pluralistic democracy, and supremacy of law—were defended on the August 1991 barricades by Russians now striving to make them a fact of daily life.” But unfortunately, “striving” was still the operative word: in fact, the Russian Federation’s ability to meet many of the Council’s basic legal requirements, such as a constitution that had been ratified by a democratically elected legislature, was far from clear. As a consequence, Russian representative argued, as Justice Minister Yuri Kalmykov told a PACE delegation, that “[t]he situation in the country is not ideal, but everything possible is being done to maintain human rights at the level required for Council membership.” Furthermore, Russian reformers also advanced the destabilization argument, although in the form of warnings that unless Europe helped them, it would soon face a Russia governed by national-patriots (the “red-browns”).

But the argument to which Russian representatives rapidly turned was that admitting Russia to the Council of Europe was as much in the Council’s interest as it was in Russia’s. As Kozyrev said, when submitting Russia’s application: “[t]he young Russian democracy will not be able to flourish without Europe with its huge democratic experience. In its turn, Europe will not defeat the challenges of the post-communist era without a powerful, stable and democratically transformed Russia.” To a large degree, the faith of Russian representatives in this argument stemmed from a sense of the difficulty of the European mission to spread democratic values across the entire former Soviet bloc. As Sukhov said, “[i]t is worth keeping in mind that our full membership [in the COE] is in the interests… of the Council of Europe. The latter faces the task of becoming an all-European organization, capable of unifying towards one goal the West and the post-totalitarian East of the continent. To take on the resolution of a problem of this scale without Russia really isn’t realistic.” But it also emerged from a strong sense of what Kozyrev called Russia’s enormous and original political, historic-cultural, and economic potential, which would complement the Council’s existing resources. As a consequence, Russian representatives frequently painted a picture of Russian admission to the Council as a process of, as Kozyrev described it, “rapprochement and mutual adaptation” rather than Russia adapting to the Council’s

117 The Baltic Independent, 30 September-6 October 1994: 4. In his letter, Gorbunovs gently hinted that the “hinderances placed in the path of Latvia becoming a member of the Council” were causing concern among the population of Latvia.
119 RIA-Novosti, 12 September 1994. Kalmykov pointed to “objective factors” such as mass migration resulting from the breakup of the USSR.
requirements. At the very least, Russia and the Council were on their way towards, as Kozyrev said, "our joint progress into the future." But it was evident from the start that a membership battle was brewing between the Russian Federation and the three Baltic states. Russian initial statements were veiled; a Russian delegate to the May 1992 PACE session declared only that "I cannot conceal the fact that our main preoccupation is the violation of human rights, notably the rights of minorities in the republics of the former Soviet Union, including some of those which have applied to join the Council of Europe and will become members of it." But three days later Kozyrev accompanied Russia's application to the Council with a memo entitled "On the Violation of Human Rights in the Baltic Countries," criticizing Baltic citizenship policy. The memorandum noted that "[t]he young Russian democracy, risking its initial achievements, backed the desire of the Baltic republics to restore their independence. We hoped they would be an example for the rest. But something quite different happened. Extreme nationalism is rearing its head there. Human inequality has been legalized. Violations of human rights and, above all, the rights of the Russian-speaking population have become widespread and systematic." It argued that "[u]ndoubtedly each state has the right to handle independently the matter of citizenship and procedures for granting it. However, one cannot help noticing that the situation created as a result of the above mentioned laws is one that paves the way for intolerance, aggressive nationalism and xenophobia...Preconditions have been created for a massive violation of human rights. The events of the last few days in Estonia point to the likelihood of organized anti-discrimination action (strikes etc.) by the Russian-speaking population, which could destabilize the situation in these countries and in Europe as a whole." And it expressed the hope that "an analysis of the 'unfavorable' situation by the Council may contribute to the search for a way out of this complicated problem."

From this point on, the battle over Council membership was engaged. This struggle went through two major phases. From 1992 to mid-1993, Russian delegates tried to keep Estonia and Latvia from gaining membership. Then, after Lithuania and Estonia were admitted in May 1993, the focus of the battle shifted, with Baltic delegates concentrating on keeping Russia out of the Council. In the course of their arguments, Baltic and Russian delegates drew on all the themes raised in Chapters Three and Four,

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124 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20 August 1992: 1, 4. Indeed, Kozyrev once went so far as to say that “[d]emocratic Russia is joining Europe and Europe is adapting to democratic Russia”—perhaps not quite what the Council had in mind (ITAR-TASS, 7 May 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-090, 8 May 1992: 14)).


131 Prior to gaining membership, Baltic representatives focused primarily on the specific issue of securing Council support for a troop withdrawal rather than addressing the issue of Russian membership, possibly because Russian membership did not appear imminent and possibly because they recognized the dangers of non-members attempting to dictate Council policy. For example, Baltic deputies circulated in February 1992 a Baltic Assembly appeal for a complete troop withdrawal to the Council of Europe’s committee on relations with non-member states—a fact that the Latvian and Lithuanian representatives brought up on occasion of the Russian Federation being welcomed to special guest status at the PACE the next day (PACE ORD, 6 February 1992: 692, 702.).
deploying the full range of arguments about their opponents’ natures in aid of their specific argument that they should not be extended the Council’s imprimatur.

Russian and Baltic arguments against each other’s memberships took several forms. For their part, Russian representatives argued that legally, Estonia and Latvia were not up to scratch. As Kozyrev’s memorandum of May 1992 argued, “obvious prerequisites have been created for the large-scale violation of human rights.” Russian representatives argued that Estonia and Latvia were ignoring European admonitions; for instance, Russian representatives circulated a Foreign Ministry statement on Latvian citizenship bill that stated that “Latvian parliamentarians continue to ignore recommendations made by the Council of Europe and CSCE specialists.” While Russian representatives did not suggest that Baltic legal systems were irredeemable, nevertheless they argued, as Kozyrev did in a letter to Council General Secretary Catherine Lalumière, that Estonian and Latvia membership would be “premature.” Indeed, Russian representatives argued, admitting Estonia or Latvia right away would effectively validate aggressive nationalism by providing international legitimation of discrimination against the Russophone population. They further argued that such admission would establish double standards; as one Russian representative told the PACE, it was no good to pass resolutions condemning abuses of human rights in Yugoslavia if the same principles were not applied in Estonia. Finally, in the case of Latvia, they drew on images of the Baltic governments as unreliable and cited the Estonian law on aliens as evidence that Council membership would encourage even more aggressive behavior. Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council of the Russian Federal Assembly Ramazan Abdulatipov drew together most of these themes: “[m]any [Russian-speakers resident in Latvia] actively supported the nationalist movement in Latvia...They weren’t the only ones who were fooled [by the democratic positions and slogans of the movement]. When the Russian parliament, reformist forces in the then-RSFSR supporting the formation of the new Baltic governments, we hoped that together with democratic Russia would be civilized democratic countries. Thus thought, and acted, Boris Yeltsin and democratic circles in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Unfortunately, upon taking power, yesterday’s Latvian democrats quickly transformed themselves into harsh nationalist-ethnocrats... [If Latvia is admitted to the Council of Europe] this will be taken in Latvia as approval on the part of the West for the conducting of national-radical policies of ethnic ‘cleansing’ and will weaken the position of those favoring a more considered course of action.” In short, Russian representatives argued, the Council should “adhere to its founding principles.”

Baltic representatives, for their part, also advanced the argument that Russian practice fell short of the Council’s standards. “Just as a banker would not accept a dollar that is slightly forged,” argued Estonian Foreign Minister Siim Kallas (formerly a banker), “this body should not succumb to accepting members that fall slightly short of Council norms. The goal of the Council is to forge democracy, not to settle for a forged

134 Izvestiya, 12 May 1993: 3 (FBIS-SOV-93-091, 13 May 1993: 11). Kozyrev’s phrase was thrown back back by Estonian delegation head Kritiina Ojuland before the vote on Russian membership in January 1996: Estonia was “not opposed in principle” to Russian membership, “but admission now would be premature” (The Baltic Independent, 2-8 February 1996: 1).
136 PACE ORD, 5 October 1992: 452.
democracy.” As long as Russian troops were on Baltic soil, these remained a prominent focal point of Baltic opposition. But most Baltic representatives treated these as only the most immediate manifestations of a more fundamental problem: the question of how the Russian government perceived and intended to interact with its neighbors. As one Lithuanian delegate told the PACE: “The liberal democratic, communist, and some other political parties in Russia from time to time make statements about the creation of a unitary or federal Russia covering the whole territory of the former Soviet Union where the Russian ethnic minorities would play an important role in this process. The Council of Europe ought to find some forms of response to such statements.”

In this situation, Baltic representatives urged Russian leaders to prove their innocence by disassociation. For example, Brazauskas told the PACE that a troop withdrawal would favorably reflect Russia’s intention to conduct peaceful relations with its neighbors; however, “[t]he Baltic states and, I assume, the Council of Europe would [further] appreciate a formal renunciation by the Russian authorities of the statements made by certain Russian parliamentarians and political groupings which deny the legality of Baltic independence and question the territorial integrity of other European states.” Specifically, Baltic representatives such as Estonian Foreign Minister Jüri Luik argued that Russia must “officially reject its concept of the Near Abroad, which we see as a euphemism for the antiquated idea of spheres of influence. This concept, which intellectually drives Russia foreign policy today, is in complete contradiction to the mentality of cooperation and integration that marks democratic European thought of the late 20th century.” Baltic representatives further urged the Russian government to officially condemn extremist statements by the likes of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and to “affirm their willingness to respect the independence and territorial integrity of all states in central and eastern Europe.”

Issues of the future were not the only ones on which Baltic representatives focused. One issue on which Baltic representatives were particularly insistent was that the Russian government should issue a formal denunciation of the USSR’s incorporation of the Baltic states, which (they reminded their audiences) the Council itself had repeatedly denounced in the past. As Luik told the Committee of Ministers, the Council’s resolutions over the years denouncing the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR showed the Council’s dedication to democracy and sovereignty: “We are convinced that this dedication to historical and intellectual honesty should remain one of the high standards that the Council demands of prospective members.” Meri redirected this retrospective thrust into the future, arguing that for Russia to be considered for Council membership, the Estonian government expected Moscow to “honestly and openly distance itself from the policy of the former USSR,” to “state officially that it does not regard itself as a successor to the aggressive Stalinist policy,” and to “declare officially that it does not consider itself the legal heir of the Stalinist policy of aggression.” A Lithuanian deputy to the PACE similarly complained: “What is being done in the textbooks with the two-headed Russian eagle on them? There one can find maps drawn according to the old Soviet style, where Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are still called Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as texts with notes

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139 The Baltic Independent, 17-23 November 1995: 3.
140 PACE ORD, 4 October 1994: 736.
141 PACE ORD, 14 April 1994: 412.
143 PACE ORD, 14 April 1994: 399.
144 The Baltic Independent, 29 April-5 May 1994: 2.
about the ‘liberating’ missions of the Soviet Army in the 1940s. This new educational system in Russia is not an internal problem of Russia. This is the problem of our security. These textbooks are preparing millions of young people for the future.”

Representatives of the three Baltic states made it clear that their hospitality to the idea of Russian membership was also dependent on parochial concerns. Lithuanian representatives complained about Russian intransigence over property issues; as Landsbergis told the PACE, “I could not recently and I will not in future be able to vote in favour of a country that still occupies the territories and buildings of my own country, such as the embassies of Lithuania in Paris and Rome...The Second World War, with all these Nazis and occupations, must be finished before we discuss full accession by Russia.” Latvian representatives were concerned about the continuing presence of retired army officers and the Russia’s “callous” disregard of issues of reparations. And Estonian representatives raised questions early on about the status of ethnic minorities in Russia, as well as demanding that the Russian Federation promise to resolve its border disputes according to international law.

Finally, needless to say, the war in Chechnya became the most important point of opposition for Baltic representatives. Estonian delegate Tunne Kelam put the case succinctly: “The methods of the Russian authorities [in Chechnya] are totally opposed to the behaviour expected from a democratic state based upon the rule of law...the actions of the Russian authorities show complete disregard and lack of respect for the most basic principles of this Organization.” In light of this fact, Baltic representatives argued, Russian membership in the Council was doubly inappropriate. First, it would send the wrong message to members: as Kelam argued, “if we accept a member whose hands are dripping with blood, then any other country would say it is justified to act in the same way.” Second, it would set a fox to guard the chicken coop: as one Latvian representative asked the PACE, “how could Russia, [which “continues to indulge in human massacre”], as a member of the Council of Europe, become a judge of other nations’ behaviour?” Furthermore, Baltic deputies argued, delaying Council membership was one way of making the Russian government realize that its actions had consequences outside its borders: as a Latvian delegate put it, the Council needed “to demonstrate to Russia itself—indeed, not only to Russia but to others—that there is no possibility of paying a cheap price for a decision to use weapons against people.”

Ultimately, however, Baltic deputies relied on expressions of moral outrage. In so doing, they pitted themselves against the bland language of diplomacy; as Landsbergis said, “I am convinced that to call evil by its name is the first means by which to stop it.” Kelam urged the PACE: “To begin, let us be precise in our terms: this is not just a ‘situation.’ This is a war.” And Landsbergis told deputies: “When Mr. Kozyrev calls the invasion of a city with tanks and killings of civilians ‘a material strengthening of the negotiation process’ or when he justifies the bombing of an orphanage or a nursing

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home saying that ‘Russia is forced to kill them because they resist!’—this is the same cynical mockery as that when someone still tries to call the complete disaster and massive exile from Chechnya ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘bringing order’.”157 And when dissimulating language was peeled back, Baltic deputies argued, the moral qualities of the situation were clear: as Kelam put it, “[i]t is immoral to accept a country with blood on its hands.”158 As Landsbergis told the PACE: “If Russia decides to be non-European in its behavior, non-democratic and not-ruled-by-law, then we have nothing more to decide. It is their choice to stay outside Europe...Of course, we all know about great Russia’s contributions to European culture. But this business of drunken killers attacking mountain villages and bus stations with rockets does not remind us of the dances of the little swans at the Bolshoi. Today Russia’s name is destruction; therefore...we should not wish for a similar destruction here.”159

Indeed, Baltic representatives argued that admission of Russia to the Council would have implications far broader than the immediate legal ramifications: it would constitute an abandonment of the Council’s ideals and the Council’s identity. As Landsbergis told the PACE, “[w]e have a choice and a right to make a choice between a Europe based on principle and one has few principles and is based on benefits. I have a strange feeling that if we choose the second, we shall face the worst agony of the European spiritual heritage. It was our function to be honest and to believe. I say ‘was’ rather than ‘is;’ the worst may happen if the Council agrees to lose its identity before Russia is asked to restore its specific, but also European identity. It should at least be asked not to be so anti-Western.”160 And such an abandonment, Baltic representatives argued, would lead in turn to a return to a world of Yalta-style sphere-of-influence politics. Baltic representatives repeatedly told Council members that, as Estonian deputy Tunne Kelam put it, “Russia’s so-called ‘near abroad’ policy...is truly alarming for Russia’s neighbors. We take that view because it envisages a new division of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe.”161 It was Europe’s responsibility, Baltic representatives argued in the Council and elsewhere, to take all possible measures to prevent the emergence of what Meri called “Russia’s regrettable Monroe doctrine.”162 To signal otherwise through the acceptance of Russia, as Kelam put it, would “place the future of democracy in all of Europe in doubt.”163 As Meri argued, “Europe will bleed to death, both morally and physically. A thousand little jabs, which each on its own seems painless and insignificant, can bring about a fatal result: the destruction of Europe’s basic values, and thus its peaceful and democratic future.”164

Of course, Russian and Baltic representatives fought back against these claims. In their efforts, Baltic delegates were clearly anxious that Russian arguments were having some effect on what they considered to be otherwise well-disposed audiences; as a consequence, they devoted substantial energy to refuting what they called a “disinformation campaign.”165 As in the broader “identity diplomacy” campaigns described in Chapters Three and Four, Baltic representatives circulated information refuting Russian statements; publicized the favorable findings of other organizations, such as the CSCE and the UN; and invited Council members to come to the Baltic states

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157 PACE ORD, 2 February 1995: 244.  
159 PACE ORD, 2 February 1995: 244.  
161 PACE ORD, 29 September 1993: 1484.  
162 The Baltic Independent, 14-20 May 1993: 3.  
164 The Baltic Independent, 14-20 May 1993: 3.  
on fact-finding trips. They further hit back in the PACE, calling Russian presentations "slander." After Lithuania and Estonia were admitted to the Council in May 1993, Lithuanian and Estonian delegates continued to strongly argue Latvia’s case; for instance, Luik told the PACE that “Latvia’s legal system is based on universally recognized principles of justice and that Latvia is a democratic state which honors and fully respects human rights.” And particularly as the Russian campaign in Chechnya intensified, they suggested that Russian delegates had no moral leg to stand on in criticizing Baltic policy. As an Estonian delegate put it, “[t]oday we have heard in some speeches about so-called discrimination against Russian-speaking people in Estonia and Latvia...since those countries have regained independence, no human being has died in those countries for being Russian....The first human right—the right to life—has been guaranteed by law, by morality, and by the tradition of those societies. It is very different in some other member states or applicant states to the Council of Europe.”

Russian delegates were in a somewhat different position in their counter-campaign. From the beginning, but particularly after the Chechen campaign got under way, the Baltic states were not the only opponents of Russian Council membership; a resolution to suspend Russia’s application for membership indefinitely was approved nearly unanimously in February 1995. Russian delegates directed the occasional remark towards Baltic criticisms; for example, a Russian representative welcoming Lithuania’s access to the Council commented that contrary to Baltic accusations, Russia entertained no imperial ambitions towards the Baltic states, and that “no past bitterness should be allowed to prevent Russia’s full inclusion in the international community.” But for the most part, Russian delegates did not dignify individual Baltic lines of argument with a response, instead concentrating their efforts on addressing doubters as a whole. For the most part, Russian arguments continued to focus on the need for the Council to encourage Russia in its efforts at reform. Russian representatives accentuated the positive: as Russian delegate Vladimir Lukin, head of the Duma Foreign Relations Committee, told the PACE, Russians “achieved freedom of expression and the media, freedom of non-governmental organizations and free and fair elections at all levels; millions of people no longer lived in political fear.” Furthermore, Russian representatives argued, at least the Russian government realized that it still needed to improve. As a letter from Yeltsin, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, Chairman of the Federation Council Vladimir Shumeyko, and Chairman of the State Duma Ivan Rybkin urging Russia’s admission stated: “Our desire to gain full membership of the

170 “On Russia’s request for membership in light of the situation in Chechnya,” 2 February 1995 (Resolution 1055(1995)). The Assembly, although considering the conflict in Chechnya an “internal matter,” nevertheless declared the means employed to “violate Russia’s international obligations. The Assembly therefore unreservedly condemns the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force by the Russian military, n particular against the civilian population...These actions also constitute a grave violation of the Council of Europe’s most elementary human rights principles, which Russia, by requesting membership of the Organization, pledged to uphold.” Baltic delegates told the press that they felt that they had played a significant part in the decision (The Baltic Independent, 2-8 February 1996:1).
171 PACE ORD, 11 May 1993: 935. He and another delegate also made not-so-veiled appeals to Baltic gratitude by observing that without the “fraternal help” of Russian democrats, Lithuania would “not have been able to triumph” (PACE ORD, 11 May 1993: 936).
COE is a logical consequence of our current policy aimed at establishing the rule of law strengthening democracy, and genuinely securing human rights in Russia. We have succeeded in obtaining substantial results in this regard. However, we are aware that we still have a long way to go. The main thing is to perceive the dynamics of the current transformations, estimate the existing achievements at their full value, and observe the determination of Russia’s political forces as well as its leaders and mass media to carry on legal reform. With this broader transformation, items of individual concern would, Russian representatives assured their audiences, change as well. As a Russian delegate told the PACE, membership “could help to cure the Chechen problem...[and] would help Russia attain European standards in international relations. As Goethe said, endeavor will always be rewarded with success.”

Implicit, and often explicit, in the arguments of Russian reformers was the threat that if Russia did not receive European help, worse might be to come. While the issues resulting in Russia’s suspension had been resolved, Lukin told the PACE, and the threat of a return to communism had been laid to rest, there was still a danger of Russia backsliding into fascism. Consequently, he asked the Council “to encourage Russia along the democratic path.” (The wrong choice, he later argued, would have reflected as badly on the Council as it did on Russia: “Was Russia to become one of the democratic countries of Europe or would the Council of Europe play Pontius Pilate and wash its hands of the country?” Even the communist delegate Gennadiy Zyuganov told the PACE that “[a]cceptance of Russia by the Council was in Europe’s interest,” as the alternative would “encourage the war-mongers, fundamentalists and nationalists.”

But at the same time, Russian representatives continued to stress that the Council could benefit from Russian membership. As the letter from Yeltsin and others stated, “[t]he admission of Russia to the COE in the near future will be of historical significance. New important prerequisites for the creation of a greater Europe with a common humanitarian legal social and cultural space will be created. The transformation of the Council into an organization comprising the whole of Europe will make it possible to defend together the common values shared by all European nations and ensure democratic security in a consistent manner.” Russian delegates further reminded the PACE that “many European security problems could only be solved with Russia’s help.”

Russian and Baltic arguments started from the implicit or explicit positions described above: that their opponents were aggressive, undemocratic, and threatening, not just to their neighbors, but to European security or values. Russian delegates used the language of “ethnic cleansing” and repeatedly invoked the “unreliability” of the Estonian and Latvian governments. Baltic representatives continued to draw historical analogies to Soviet period; as one Latvian delegate told the PACE: “The suppression of the freedom movement of the Chechen nation, which not so long ago had been “punished” by the Soviet Union...had not ended.” Meanwhile, Chechnya was the spur for a fresh round

175 PACE ORD, 26 September 1995: 811.
180 PACE ORD, 26 September 1995: 821.
of historical analogy to the Nazis from Baltic deputies. For instance, Landsbergis told the PACE that Landsbergis at PACE: "[S]pecial methods employed by Moscow could be compared to the total destruction and annihilation carried out by the German national socialists in Warsaw... 'Never again,' it was stated later as a solemn oath; but now we have it again...the Russian Gauleiters and Sturmbandführers...‘will level the city to the ground, then leave it and forget about it,’ as one of the defending commanders said recently."181

But Baltic representatives also called into question the very concept of Russia’s potential to be European, at least in the immediate future. Kelam opined to the press that admitting Russia would mean “Europe’s political boundaries will extend to the Pacific and verge on China. Europe in a certain sense would become a peninsula adjoining the turbulent continent of Asia. It would be far from clear whether Europe would start organizing Asia or whether parts of Asia would gradually start ‘disorganizing’ Europe.”182 And Meri, as noted earlier, told the PACE: “[t]he problem that we have to face is that, unfortunately, a great number of Russians are not Europeans, but rather a special kind of people. In theoretical literature we call them homo sovieticus.”183

Hard feelings: Take Two

The proposition that social inclusion and exclusion can be a powerful source of feeling is hardly a controversial one, with supporting research emerging in both social psychology and the sociology of emotion.184 Furthermore, the responses of both Baltic and Russian representatives to the process of seeking Council membership certainly conformed to the literature’s expectations. On the Baltic side, admission to the Council for their nations was a joyful occasion, with representatives taking the Council’s acceptance as a vindication of their self-conception as European. As Meri told the press, “[w]e have always considered ourselves Europeans, and Estonia, a European country. But it is one thing what we think of ourselves, and it’s another matter what Europe thinks of us.”185 Speaker of the Estonian parliament Ülo Nugis told the PACE that “[w]e are honored to be included in this prestigious organization of European democratic states.”186 Latvian delegates told the PACE that “Latvia’s accession to the Council of Europe is for us the second most important event [since independence]... Upon our return into the community of European countries, the occupation of Latvia, which began in 1940, ceased.”187 A Lithuanian delegate, commenting on Latvia’s accession, called membership in the Council a demonstration that the Baltic states are “fully-fledged members of the European family.”188

Meanwhile, in keeping with the sociology of emotion literature’s predictions, resentment over Russia’s exclusion had been growing among Russian representatives. Kozyrev had stated in early 1992 that “I must say that we have satisfied ourselves that Europe is waiting for us and we are ready to enter it.”189 A group of Supreme Soviet deputies representing all parliamentary factions denounced the Council’s “double

181 PACE ORD, 2 February 1995: 243
184 See Abrams and Hogg 1990, Dijker et al. 1996.
186 PACE ORD, 13 May 1993: 1074.
188 PACE ORD, 31 January 1995: 54.

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standards” in admission of new members, say admission was being “artificially delayed” through the imposition of additional terms of admission, and demanded: “Is it acceptable to make Russia wait too long in the European antechamber?” Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin complained in late 1993 that Russia’s failure to be admitted to the Council of Europe “is becoming a bit embarrassing...We’ve been knocking on the door of the Council for a year and a half and yet we’re told wait, wait, while countries are being accepted which, in my opinion, do not differ from Russia in any positive way as far as democratic standards are concerned. We say quite openly that, on the whole, we can get on fine without the Council, but it would be better if we were members.” Yeltsin indeed turned down an invitation to the Council’s summit meeting in October 1993, saying he would only attend once Russia was a member. As Lukin grumbled, “The impression is that the Russians are bad because they are Russian.” Indeed, when Russian membership finally came in January 1996, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov, addressing the PACE, took a reserved tone, saying that Russia was “well aware that membership imposes serious obligations,” which he was confident that the Russian government would meet. (But Yeltsin was delighted: “Well, here we are in Europe!”)

Little direct mention exists in the literature of sociology of emotion, however, of the emotional implications of competition over group membership. And if Baltic and Russian representatives were happy to see their own nations included in Europe at last, they were not so pleased by the Council’s decisions to admit their opponents. Kozyrev, who had sent a personal letter to the Council arguing against Estonian membership, pulled out of the May 1993 session of the Committee of Ministers in protest at Estonia’s admission, saying that it might be interpreted as international legitimation of discrimination against Russophones in Estonia. “We expect,” Kozyrev complained, “the application of the corresponding Council procedures and mechanisms for the purpose of conducting a more fundamental legal appraisal of Estonia’s legislation in the sphere of human rights to protect the nonindigenous population from aggressive nationalism and an apologia for ethnic cleansing.” Russian delegate Yevgenniy Ambartsumov told the PACE on the event of Estonia’s accession that: “[s]ome years ago I was one of the Russian democrats who went to Estonia, before it declared independence, to try to convince the Russian-speaking minorities to support the Estonian national movement, as we hoped that, if it were victorious, it would help to..."

190 ITAR-TASS, 6 July 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-128, 7 July 1993: 20); Izvestiya, 6 July 1993: 4 (FBIS-SOV-93-128, 7 July 1993: 20). A few years later, State Duma deputy Mikhail Lapshin told reporters: “I’ve been to Council of Europe meetings more than once, and I’ve never been so humiliated in my whole life. Even before Chechnya, there was always some reason why they didn’t accept us” (Prism, 20 October 1995: 1).

191 Ostankino Channel 1 TV, 17 October 1993 (SWB, 19 October 1993: B/6).

192 Ostankino Channel 1 TV, 17 October 1993 (SWB, 19 October 1993: B/6).


194 Nevertheless, he called Russian admission “a major step towards the genuine unification of Europe” and stressed that Russia was not joining the Council “with empty hands;” its cultural, historic, scientific and intellectual potential would enrich the activities of the Council (ITAR-TASS, 28 February 1996 (FBIS-SOV-96-041, 28 February 1996 (electronic))).


196 Susan Fiske and Janet Ruscher’s general observations on interdependent relationships, however, seem apposite: “[f]or the extent that two people are interdependent (willingly or not), they have the ability to interrupt or facilitate each other’s goals... Hence, any interdependent relationship would be a candidate for the experience of strong emotional reactions” (Fiske and Ruscher 1993: 244-245).

197 A notable exception was Lithuania’s accession, which Russian representatives welcomed (PACE ORD, 11 May 1993: 935).


guarantee equal rights for all those living on Estonian territory. Today, I am frankly
disappointed because human rights are not fully secured to the Russian-speaking sections
of the population. Is this not discrimination? 200 Latvian accession in January 1995,
although not greeted with the same antipathy, nevertheless provoked a comment from
Foreign Ministry representatives that the Council "seems to have resorted to double-
standards practice once again." 201

Furthermore, Estonian inclusion in particular appeared to heighten Russian pique over
continued exclusion. In mid-July 1992, Russian delegates to the PACE told reporters
that "there shouldn't be any problems with entry into the Council of Europe...which
one can't say about, for instance, the Baltic states or Moldova." 202 Now, Sergei Krylov,
Executive Secretary of the Russian Foreign Ministry, commented after Estonia's
admission that "the Council of Europe has decided that "Estonia is worthy of its
'mark'...On the other hand, there isn't much fervor about letting Russia in. In a purely
human way this really causes a feeling of annoyance. Wasn't Russia the first to
recognize the independence of the Baltic states, doesn't it sincerely strive to help the
former Union republics to receive all the attributes of statehood, including membership
in international organizations?" 203 Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy
Karasin complained in October 1993 that "[i]t is not quite clear why Russia has for 18
months now been waiting for membership in the Council of Europe while countries
such as Estonia and Romania have been admitted." 204

Nor were Baltic delegates happy to see Russia accepted into the Council in January
1996. Although substantial opposition still existed in the Council to Russian actions in
Chechnya, a number of individuals and delegations (the German delegation in
particular) had been pressing for admission on the grounds that it was better to have
Russia in than out. 205 A Council of Europe delegation to Moscow in January 1996
recommended Russian admission on the grounds that Russia had started to reform its
legal system and that admission would encourage further reform. Nevertheless, the
delegation said that due to the continuation of serious violations of human rights in
Chechnya and frequent violations by the criminal justice system of rights of the
accused, Russia could not currently be considered to be a "rule of law state." 206
Capitalize on these lingering doubts, Baltic representatives had been instrumental in
securing three of the longest list of conditions ever put forward for a new member: that
Russia settle international as well as internal disputes by peaceful means; that it settle
international border disputes according to the principles of international law, abiding by
existing international treaties; and that it "denounce as wrong the concept of two
different categories of foreign countries, whereby some are treated as a zone of special
influence called the 'near abroad'." 207 The Estonian delegation head, Kristiina Ojuland,
told the press that the conditions were accepted by the PACE leadership to buy Baltic

200 PACE ORD, 13 May 1993: 1064.
201 Interfax, 1 February 1995 (FBIS-SOV-95-022, 1 February 1995 (electronic)).
204 RIA-Novosti, 12 October 1993.
205 German delegates argued that once admitted Russia would be obliged to accede to the European
Convention on Human Rights and ensure that its legislation conforms with that convention;
furthermore, Russian citizens would have the right to appeal to the European Court if they felt that
their rights had been violated (The Baltic Independent, 2-8 February 1996: 1).
206 Open Media Research Institute Daily Report, Russia (henceforth OMRI Daily Report), 15 January
1996.
207 "Opinion on Russia's request for membership," 25 January 1996 (Opinion no. 193 (1996)). The
Russian government had already agreed to assist in returning home persons who had been deported to
locations in the RSFSR from the Baltic republics during the Soviet period.
votes. Nevertheless, the whole Estonian delegation voted against admission (the only delegation to do so); two Latvian delegates voted “no” and one was absent; and one Lithuanian delegate voted “no,” one abstained, and two “preferred to be out of the hall” when the vote was taken.\(^{209}\) (Russian Foreign Minister Yevgenniy Primakov sent letters of thanks to the Lithuanian and Latvian delegations, but not to the Estonian one; a Russian diplomat told the press that “there was simply nothing for which to thank Estonia.”) Landsbergis complained that “I am disappointed to see a Europe that rejects the Chechen nation’s right to self-determination,” believing that 90% of those who had voted “yes” did so out of “fear of Russia.”\(^ {211}\)

Baltic opposition to Russian membership in fact heightened the tension between the four delegations to the Council. After Russia’s admission, Yeltsin called on deputies serving as PACE delegates to “resist attempts [at the PACE] to put pressure on Russia, to interfere in Russia’s internal affairs, or to apply double standards.”\(^{212}\) Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgenniy Primakov told the PACE that Russia “expects” the Council to take “more consistent and vigorous steps” to protect the rights of Russophones in the Baltic states.\(^{213}\) For his part, Estonian Prime Minister Tiit Vähi warned that when Estonia assumed the chairmanship of the PACE in May 1996, it—“as a country honoring all its commitments”—would pay “particular attention” to the observation of human rights in Russia.\(^ {214}\) As Kelam told the press, Estonian representatives saw Estonia’s role in the Council as being one of pointing out things that “larger countries were afraid for some reason to say...Often, Estonia plays a moral role...We try to boldly stress the moral values of the organization, in particular in connection with Russia. There should be no double standards for different countries, and we are in a position where we should remind everyone of this.”\(^ {215}\)

**Conclusion**

This chapter has argued that the diplomatic debates over national “identities” described in Chapters Three and Four play into related debates over the ways in which these identities can be grouped in the world—in this case, into regions such as “Europe.” It has argued that Russian and Baltic representatives conceived of Europe, and European audiences, as their “circle of recognition” due in part to their conceptions of Europe as a locus of security, as a locus of prosperity, and a locus of identity. It has argued that in the struggle to see their nations included in the Council of Europe, a key regional marker institution, Baltic and Russian representatives drew not only on technical issues of legal compatibility, but also on more general characterizations of their nations’ “Europeanness.” It also has argued that Russian and Baltic representatives drew on many of the themes outlined in Chapters Three and Four, as well as more specific arguments, to convince their audiences of the degree to which the nature or behavior of their opponents should not be considered to be worthy of Council membership, and

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\(^{208}\) The Baltic Independent, 2-8 February 1996: 1.

\(^{209}\) The Baltic Independent, 2-8 February 1996: 1. Of 263 delegates to the PACE, 35 voted ‘no,’ with 15 abstentions.

\(^{210}\) Cited in Giričius 1996a: 43.

\(^{211}\) The Baltic Independent, 2-8 February 1996: 1. Baltic representatives reportedly had themselves come under pressure; Estonian representatives claimed afterwards that the Finns threatened to withdraw support for Tallinn’s EU and NATO aspirations if the Estonian delegation voted against Russian membership, and Latvian sources said that German representatives had issued similar threats in Riga (The Baltic Independent, 2-8 February 1996: 1).

\(^{212}\) OMRI Daily Report, 13 March 1996.

\(^{213}\) OMRI Daily Report, 3 May 1996.

\(^{214}\) Interfax, 20 April 1996 (FBIS-SOV-96-080, 20 April 1996 (electronic)).

hence of certification as “European.” And it has attempted to outline why the results of these battles might have evoked hard feelings in their participants.

The battle over membership in the Council of Europe was but the first of the battles over membership in European institutions that were to play themselves out between Baltic and Russian representatives. Russian opposition to possible Baltic membership in NATO, Baltic opposition to a restructuring of NATO that would give Russia a substantially expanded voice in that organization, and Russian efforts to hold Estonian and Latvian applications to the EU hostage to border issues are, regrettably, outside the scope of this thesis. But in each of these battles, the “identity diplomacy” themes that this thesis has introduced in Chapters Three and Four continued to reverberate. And as with the struggle for Council membership, all of these battles—particularly over NATO membership—evoked strong feelings in their participants.

But a few questions remain unanswered by our analysis so far. First, it is not completely clear why Russians from across the political spectrum, many of whom held Europe in some suspicion, were at least initially united in support of joining the Council. Slavophile and Eurasianist strains of thought had been growing in Russian politics; for moderates in this camp, Russia at the very least had “the choice whether or not to be part of Europe, depending on whether the latter corresponds to Russian notions of humanity, Christianity, and social order.” Hardliners, on the other hand, celebrated the allegedly non-European traits in Russian culture as advantages that would eventually take Russia ahead of the “decaying West.” Russian national-patriot representatives like Rybkin and Sergei Baburin were not people who identified strongly with European values or a European identity for Russia. Yet with virtually no exceptions, Russian politicians expressed their desire to see Russia take a seat in the Council of Europe.

Second, it is not entirely clear why both Russian and Baltic representatives expended such energy on keeping their opponents out of the Council, and out of Europe. Regional membership was not, after all, a zero-sum game. Indeed, Russian and Baltic representatives showed no particular concern over questions of membership for Eastern European states; Baltic representatives supported the admission of Ukraine (on the basis of its “substantial progress in the theory and praxis of establishing democratic institutions”), which prior to the Chechen war could not have been said to have been far ahead of Russia in terms of consolidation of democratic institutions. Nor could Council membership for their opponents be said to pose any serious dangers to Baltic security, or to Baltic Russophones; indeed, Council programs for member states were designed to help the democratization processes that Russian and Baltic representatives professed to so fervently hope for in their opponents. Baltic and Russian representatives may have hoped that Council membership could serve as a bargaining chip: if the Council agreed with Baltic or Russian characterizations of their problems with their neighbors, it could threaten to withhold membership until appropriate changes were made. But if this was the case, why were Baltic and Russian representatives so certain

217 Morozov 2001: 2.
218 The lone exception, in this as so many things, was Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, whose opposition to all things European was undisguised.
that their opponents wanted Council membership badly enough to change their policies? It is to these questions that Chapter Six turns its attention.

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220 As the Foreign Ministry admitted in an exchange of articles with Pravda, Council membership was potentially expensive; the Russian contribution, for instance, was estimated at close to US$15 million a year (Pravda, 28 July 1993: 7 (FBIS-SOV-93-144, 29 July 1993: 14)).
In the previous chapter, we have seen that Russian and Baltic representatives were eager to secure membership in European organizations for a variety of reasons: to ensure their states’ security, to enhance their states’ prosperity, and to cement their states’ identity as “European.” Yet these factors do not entirely explain the fact that Baltic and Russian representatives argued nearly as passionately to see their opponents excluded from European structures as they did to see their own states included.

This chapter focuses on a final aspect of the debates over identities that pervade diplomatic exchanges. This dissertation has so far argued that representatives attempt to gain international consensus on their nation’s identities and the identities of their opponents, and that they attempt to group these identities into collectivities such as regions. But this chapter argues that in the course of their “identity diplomacy,” representatives attempt to do something else as well: to position these identities relationally in social terms. From this point of view, Europe’s attractiveness stemmed at least in part from a function as a locus not only of security, prosperity, and identity, but also of status: membership in the European club, which (as Chapter Five has already discussed) could be symbolized by Council of Europe membership, had the potential to both confer and confirm a degree of social status on the Baltic states and Russia.

The IR literature has, of course, dedicated substantial discussion to issues of prestige and status. As Sylvan, Graff, and Pugliese have observed, however, much of the scholarly literature treats “prestige” and “status” as effectively interchangeable concepts, as does much of the literature examining Russian foreign policy. ¹ The two concepts, however, are usefully distinct: prestige may be thought of as “influence or good reputation derived from past achievements or association,” while (social) status may be thought of “social position, rank, or relation to others.”² Needless to say, the social nature of the concepts of prestige and status makes them incompatible with any analysis of interstate interaction as taking place in an asocial system. To pursue prestige or status for their nations, governments must exist in a state of mutual awareness and assessment; furthermore, the assessment of prestige requires a minimal notion of shared values, and the assessment of status, a minimal shared conception of social structure. “Status” is thus a more inherently comparative concept than “prestige,” and the pursuit of status (with its clearer distinctions between winners and losers) carries, as we shall see, the potential for substantial competitive—and hence emotional—engagement.

Prestige and status

The pursuit of prestige and status in international politics is an issue that has interested International Relations (IR) scholars for many years. As David Sylvan, Corrine Graff and Elisabetta Pugliese have observed, many branches of IR turned their backs in the 1970s and 1980s on the sociology of international politics and on social phenomena such as the pursuit of status, with scholarly interest focused instead on identifying gradations of power.³ This relative lack of interest, however, was a departure from past

¹ See Sylvan, Graff, and Pugliese 1998 for a further discussion. In the Russian studies literature, see, for example, Tuminez 1996, Sestanovich 1996. The majority of these authors use “prest‘ge” as a catch-all term to refer to both prestige and status.
scholarship and philosophy. Thucydides’ Athenians, after all, cited concern for their “honor” as their second reason for their expansionist ambitions, behind fear of Persia but ahead of profit. 4 “Glory” was for Hobbes one of the three principal sources of quarrel, and a key focal point for Grotius as well. 5 Raymond Aron, Martin Wight, and Hans Morgenthau all dedicated substantial attention to the concepts of “glory” or “prestige.” 6 Scholars outside IR did not shy away from applying the concepts: Weber himself wrote on the interplay of power and prestige in the designation of “Great Powers.” 7 Furthermore, these themes, even if perhaps underrepresented, certainly have not vanished from the IR literature. Scholars with a sociological focus, as well as writers within the subset literature of Foreign Policy Analysis, take for granted the notion that national leaders and elites pursue prestige and status for their nations in the international system. 8 Efforts have further been made to assess the status ordering of interstate society from positivist as well as post-positivist perspectives. 9

From whom, however, do governments seek recognition of prestige or status? Much of the classical literature on prestige and status is imprecise on this subject, leaving the reader with the impression that governments broadcast their desire for prestige or status with equal intensity across the entire states system. 10 However, Sylvan, Graff and Pugliese have argued that governments seeking esteem for their nations “do so with respect to specific others...For example, during the heyday of European imperialism, Great Powers arguably sought recognition of their status from various groups of European states, as well as from selected non-European states. They also sought recognition of this status from particular groups within their own countries, e.g., newspaper editorialists or financiers who provided state loans. But they did not seek it from most other groups within states, or from many non-European polities (states or otherwise). We can therefore say that Great Powers sought esteem from a particular collection of members of different groups who, jointly, could be said to form the Great Powers’ ‘international society’.11 Iver Neumann’s work on state diplomacy and the landmines issue similarly suggests that state representatives on occasion also seek the esteem of non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations. 12 Consequently, Erik Ringmar’s concept of “circles of recognition” is once again appropriate; and once again, the nature and composition of the “circle of recognition” from which state representatives seek confirmation of prestige or status is a question that requires empirical examination from instance to instance.

How do governments approach their “circles of recognition” in search of prestige or status? One way, that on which the IR literature has focused to the greatest extent, is through the acquisition of military or economic might. 13 Another, clearly, is through worthy deeds. 14 But the social nature of the concepts of prestige and status, their inherent dependence on the assessment of others, also makes them amenable to pursuit through persuasion. As a consequence, the pursuit of prestige and status is an endeavor to which diplomats have devoted much time and energy over the years. Christian Reus-

4 Thucydides 1972: 80.
7 Weber 1946: 159-179.
8 See, for instance, Luard 1990 and Cottam 1997 for good bibliographies.
10 See, for instance, Morgenthau and Thompson 1985: 86-100.
12 Neumann 2001a.
13 See, for example, Morgenthau and Thompson 1985: 92-93.
14 See, for example, Neumann 2001a.
Smit, discussing the "oratorical diplomacy" of the Renaissance Italian city-states, notes that the primary role of resident ambassadors was not to negotiate; "instead, they maintained the identity of their city-state, cultivating and maintaining an image of communal honor and glory." Various authors have observed that the "old diplomacy" of absolutist Europe was preoccupied with social hierarchies, which produced an obsessive attention to diplomatic protocol that Garrett Mattingly has described as the "chief burden" of the ambassador's representative function. With the post-World War I spread of the principle of sovereign equality of states, many of the most glaringly visible manifestations of status competition between states were mitigated in practice. However, state representatives continue to dedicate substantial energy, not only to describing their nations' characters, but also to declaiming their nations' virtues in pursuit of social esteem.

Both Russian and Baltic representatives had signaled early their determination to secure prestige, in the general sense of a positive image, for their nations in the eyes of the world at large. Even before Baltic independence was restored, Edgar Savisaar, chairman of the Estonian Council of Ministers, told Estonian representatives that "We must not relinquish the position that we have won internationally...The word "Estonia" must have a ring of prestige, plausibility and trust to it." Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, meanwhile, wrote in his New Year's outline of foreign policy priorities for the newly independent Russian Federation that "present-day Russian diplomacy...[wants] the word ‘Russian’ to have a proud ring." As a consequence, Russian and Baltic representatives—as already suggested in Chapters Three and Four—spent a fair amount of time declaiming their nations' virtues. Baltic representatives stressed their nations' ability to weather adversity and their rapid transition to a new life. Within a month of the collapse of the USSR, Estonian delegates were telling the PACE that “[w]e have succeeded in ridding ourselves of the heritage of the totalitarian regime by adopting measures on human rights, on the rights of minorities, and on democratic pluralism, with the aim of creating a state governed by the rule of law.” Russian representatives, meanwhile, placed much of their emphasis on, as Kozyrev put it, Russia's "originality, cultural traditions and colossal economic potential." But Russian representatives also stressed the new Russian government's break with disgraced practices; Yeltsin told the a joint session of the US Congress that "it is Russia that has put an end to imperial policies and was the first to recognize the independence of the Baltic states." As a consequence of these attributes, both Baltic and Russian representatives were happy to present their nations as bearing the prestigious label of "civilized.”

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16 See, for example, Morgenthau 1985: 87-89 for the case of Napoleon’s meeting with the Pope; Nicolson 1969: 98-101 for the case of the Ambassador’s carriage; Reus-Smit 1999:109 for the case of the Westphalia negotiations.
17 See, for instance, the change in the procedure of designating the doyen of a local diplomatic corps—a position that previously was reserved for one of the ambassadors of the Western powers, but that now is occupied by the resident ambassador with the longest length of service in that capital, regardless of country of origin (Nicolson 1969: 130). But anyone who doubts that many of the same motivating factors still operate, and in many of the same ways, has but to read accounts of Chinese concern for due diplomatic deference from Beijing’s international partners or of De Gaulle's "conserve sa figure" (Gries 1999; Passeron 1962: 383).
20 PACE ORD, 18 September 1991: 246.
But as this final term suggests, the individual virtues being declaimed by Russian and Baltic representatives did not exist in a social vacuum. Indeed, while the pursuit of prestige, in the generalized sense of a positive image, need not be explicitly competitive, nevertheless the choice of images presented reflects a sense of community values. Rather, both Baltic and Russian representatives stressed their desire to see their nations occupy a “worthy” place in the world—in other words, to establish their nation’s social position, rank, or relation to others in the global social arena. It was to this pursuit of social status that Russian and Baltic representatives turned much of their attention.

Russian and Baltic representatives had several different rhetorical tactics for portraying their nations as occupying social positions superior to those of other states. One way in was to emphasize a Russian or Baltic pedagogical role. Russian representatives drew on several centuries of mission civilisatrice thinking to justify and conceptualize a post-Soviet role for Russia as a bringer of norms of “civilized” behaviour to the former republics, especially those in the Caucasus and Central Asia. As Kozyrev told an interviewer in early 1992, “we are interested in involving [all the post-Soviet] republics in civilized international intercourse.” Meanwhile, Inga Pavlovaite has documented a similar strain of thinking emerging in Lithuanian thinking about relations with “less lucky” neighbors such as Belarus and Kaliningrad. But both Russian and Baltic conceptualizations of this pedagogical role were linked to another, less individualized source of status—association with Europe. The norms that both Baltic and Russian representatives sought to spread were, as Russian and Baltic representatives made clear, broader European ones. Baltic representatives drew directly on their success in securing admission to European organizations such as the Council of Europe to portray themselves as teachers “of European norms acquired at the school of Europe.” Meanwhile, the “civilized principles” that Russia had a particular responsibility to establish on post-Soviet territory were those exemplified, in Kozyrev’s opinion, by the CSCE and other European organizations. In stressing their ability to act as the conduits of these European norms, Baltic and Russian representatives thus were stressing their links with the originating cultural complex. Indeed, Seymour Becker’s observation about the imperial period of Russian engagement with Central Asia was still relevant: “In bringing to her Oriental subjects the fruits of Western civilization, Russia would be demonstrating her membership in the exclusive club of European nations.”

In the previous chapter, we have already discussed Europe as a region. But to understand how it might be possible to discuss Europe as a “club,” we must talk for a moment about the nature of and composition of interstate society.

**Clubs in interstate society**

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24 Russia’s colonization of the east was emphasized by Russian scholars as a vital part of disseminating European civilization among Asiatic “barbarians” (Hauner 1990: 39). For discussions of the Russian mission civilisatrice in Central Asia during the imperial, Soviet, and post-Soviet periods, see Bassin 1994, Becker 1991, Brooks 1981, Hauner 1990.


29 Becker notes that at least during the imperial period, Russian thinkers conceived of their mission civilisatrice as going one further than Western efforts: “in absorbing these subjects into the Russian nation, still in the process of formation, Russia would be carrying out her civilizing mission on a level unattainable by the West” (Becker 1991: 61-62).
Much of the literature dedicated to the analysis of interstate society has considered the issue of the nature of this society. One of the questions that has arisen in this literature that of where this society might sit between Ferdinand Tönnies' ideal societal types of *gemeinschaft* (held together by bonds of common sentiment, experience, and identity) and *gesellschaft* (more consciously organizational, contractual and constructed in character) societies.\(^{30}\) Notably, efforts to fit modern interstate society neatly into one or the other category have proven largely unsatisfactory. At the most basic level, as Ole Waever has pointed out, imposing dichotomies such as the *gemeinschaft*/*gesellschaft* split on any nuanced social environment (domestic as well as international) can obscure as much as it reveals, since few social environments are likely to fall neatly into these ideal types.\(^{31}\) But it also is quite possible to view the totality of modern interstate society as possessing qualities of both ideal types. Certainly some scholars have emphasized the practical, contractual quality of interstate social interaction, arguing that states share few goals or purposes.\(^{32}\) However, as Reus-Smit observes, "[i]n one sense...modern international society is indeed a practical [*gesellschaft*] association, but in an equally important sense, a deep structural sense, it is informed by the institutional and organizational values of the constitutively prior European (now Western) *gemeinschaft* society.”\(^{33}\) That this is so is partly because European “international society” only expanded its boundaries to new members once members of the inner circle had accepted many of their cultural norms.\(^{34}\)

But these *gemeinschaft* bonds also can be said to have expanded to the broader society of states simply due to the process of recognition that states extend to one another.\(^{35}\) The question of what entities are entitled to be considered as states is clearly one that enjoys no objective answer. The Montevideo Convention of 1933, which remains the only attempt at defining what constitutes a state that has gained international ratification,\(^{36}\) lists four qualities required of a state as a person of international law: a defined territory, a permanent population, a government, and a “capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”\(^{37}\) But the first three criteria specified by the Convention are in fact possessed by a number of political entities that lack the ultimate prize of juridical sovereignty (for example, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus).\(^{38}\) A “state” thus is not merely a territorial or political actor, but an entity with social meaning (particularly to representatives of other states) that depends for its existence upon intersubjective recognition from representatives of other entities deemed to be “states.”\(^{39}\) In the absence of a supreme authority to constitute or legitimize states, it is thus the last criterion of the Montevideo Convention, that of the reciprocal recognition of other participants in diplomacy, that is in fact the vital one.\(^{40}\)

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\(^{30}\) Buzan (1993: 333).


\(^{32}\) See for example Nardin 1983. Even E.H. Carr, whose name is often associated with the group of scholars interested in interstate society, occasionally subscribed to this view; he wrote disgustedly to a colleague that “[n]o international society exists, but an open club without substantive rules” (cited in Keal 2000: 66).


\(^{34}\) Little 1995: 30.

\(^{35}\) Buzan 1993: 335.

\(^{36}\) Despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that it had only 19 signatories, three of whom attached reservations.


\(^{40}\) O'Hagan 1998: 180; Dunne 2001: 75. Indeed, the Baltic states continued to exist in international law owing to the refusal of other states to withdraw their recognition of those states as sovereign entities; the Soviet Union’s use of force against the Baltic states did not constitute a legal step capable of
sovereign states, which some have described as having been accompanied by a jettisoning of legal or moral standards, thus has not been haphazard: it has privileged entities whose political and economic organization are recognizable and acceptable to existing members.41

This phenomenon has had two obvious consequences. On the one hand, as Tim Dunne has noted, many potentially self-determining communities were, and continue to be, denied membership in the purportedly “universal” post-World War II international society.42 On the other hand, the process of the expansion of the collectivity of states has been one that has helped to cement a sense of collective identity among the members of the society of states, as like has accepted like.43 Indeed, participation in diplomacy—one of the prizes of statehood—has the potential to bring participants further together. The privileged communications system that diplomacy sets up between diplomatic participants creates an important condition for the sense of shared identity. As Peter Marshall, himself a retired British ambassador, writes: “[sovereign actors] with the capacity to communicate with one another will readily understand the extent to which they face problems in common. The prospects for dealing with them are likely to be improved by tackling them in a spirit of mutual comprehension, even mutual commiseration.”44 The co-evolution of diplomatic services has further ensured a degree of community in the way that state representatives address problems among the community of states.45 This degree of gemeinschaft feeling thus has the potential to be relatively evenly distributed across all participants in the arena of diplomatic interaction, even though the formal bonds of the interstate society in which they operate are of a weak, gesellschaft model. Anecdotal evidence indeed suggests that many state representatives carry both societal ideal types in their heads; the way in which they think of interstate society at any given moment depends to a large degree on the nature of the problems facing them, and by extension facing interstate society. When state representatives discuss threats coming from outside interstate society—for instance, from terrorist organizations—their discussions tend to emphasize the gemeinschaft aspects of the society of states, focusing heavily on shared qualities (such, indeed, as statehood itself) and the need to pull together in the name of common values.46 When

nullifying this recognition (Kaslas 1976: 276-277). James, arguing why the collectivity of states should be called a “society” and not a “system,” focuses on precisely these issues of recognition, admission, and exclusion: “The collectivity of states has...set up a very significant entrance barrier [in the concept of sovereignty]...A “system” usually refers to a closed arrangement; there is no question of an admission procedure. One does not think, for example, in terms of joining the digestive system” (James 1993: 285-286).

41 Jackson 1990: 55; Donelly 1998: 13; Keal 2000: 64. As Keal has observed, at least “in its constitutary role of determining legitimacy, international society is a purposive association” (2000: 70).
42 Dunne 2001: 91.
43 As David Strang has demonstrated, state status is hard to shake. Since the beginnings of the European states-system (which Strang puts at 1415), once mutual recognition has been established, sovereign state status has almost never been revoked—a fact that Strang attributes to the cultural constitution of the Western states system (Strang 1991: 162). The Soviet government would of course have liked to see the Baltic states added to the short list of anomalies.
45 As Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, writing about the period after the 1815 Congress of Vienna, observes: “As one of the most active participants in European politics at the time, Russia’s diplomatic service developed in close interaction with the diplomatic agencies of the other leading powers” (Ivanov 2002: 36).
46 They further can be indignant when other state representatives fail to heed their appeals. See, for instance, Barbara Tuchman’s discussion of British protests to other nations over their tolerance for the sale to the rebellious American colonists of military supplies. In regards this issue, Tuchman opines, “...it was the Dutch more than the Colonies who were raising British blood pressure...[worse even than the “insolence” of rebels who “annoy and disturb” the British empire was that a] “nation—a
facing problems from within the states system, on the other hand, representatives are much more likely to emphasize the contractual, gesellschaft quality of the ties binding them to their opponents—sometimes to the point of disowning all shared identity or values through the application of the label “pariah state,” the recipient of which label can then be treated as an entity subject to social, and in some cases legal, exclusion from “legitimate” interstate society.47

These points made, however, it would appear that some groupings of states have stronger gemeinschaft-type bonds—senses of shared identities and shared values—than those current in the community of states as a whole. The European example is of course the one most frequently raised,48 and its coincidence with the historical site of origin of modern interstate society has led some to speak of “core” and “peripheral” interstate societies. An early example of such a visualization can be seen in the works of Wight, who, drawing on Grotius (who saw a universal society extending to the entire human race, but also a particular bond uniting Christian states), wrote of the expanding interstate system of the nineteenth century that “a proper view of the nascent states-system will be stereoscopic, seeing in the state-system a dual nature, two concentric circles, European and universal.”49 More recent examples of this conceptualization can be seen in the works of Barry Buzan, including those with Richard Little. “Especially in the later twentieth century,” Buzan and Little argue, “the Western states began to develop a much more intense set of shared rules, norms and institutions amongst themselves on a wider range of issues than they shared with the rest of the international system”—a process that they describe as establishing a “core” of interstate society that “creates pressures (both coercive and persuasive) on the periphery to follow the core’s path.”50

This (roughly) Western core/non-Western periphery distinction is useful in identifying one gemeinschaft-type grouping in world politics, and in highlighting the fact that gemeinschaft bonds can indeed arise within gesellschaft-type groupings, particularly when the levels of gesellschaft-type bonds differ within the group.51 However, excessive focus on the Western core/non-Western periphery distinction runs the risk of obscuring the existence of other gemeinschaft-type groupings in interstate society. In fact, the interstate social sphere is one of multiple and frequently overlapping social groupings of states whose governments perceive themselves, for material or other reasons, as having something in common—be this problems, opportunities, responsibilities, concerns, values, or identities (to list only a few potential factors). In

47 See James 1993: 228 for a discussion of pariah status and Dore 1984: 408-415 on the issue of senses of community among those who act on the behalf of states, as well as among national élites.
48 See Diez and Whitman 2002 for a good bibliography.
49 Wight 1977: 118, 126.
50 Buzan and Little 2000: 338. This language appears to echo the work of Goldgeier and McFaul, who posited the existence of “two worlds” in international politics (Goldgeier and McFaul 1992). In both cases, the use of the term “core” carries deterministic overtones, with Buzan and Little’s choice of words in particular carrying the powerful suggestion that any gemeinschaft associations that emerge among states in the “periphery” are unlikely to develop along very different lines from those that have evolved between the European states (Buzan and Little 2000: 338). Wæver’s term of “nodal points” avoids these teleological implications (Wæver 1996: 235).
51 One might argue that an important factor that has drawn many Europeans together, creating the possibility for the collective identification necessary for a gemeinschaft grouping, is the extent and depth of gesellschaft-style legal harmonization between the states of the European Union—a project so uniquely extensive as to have fostered a sense in many European policymakers and populations of participation in an unprecedented political project.
these circumstances, state governments frequently will draw themselves together into association, creating entities that may usefully be thought of as "clubs." Some of these clubs possess formal organizational structure, others little or none, existing as circles of mutual recognition akin to cliques in other social arenas. Furthermore, as will be discussed in greater detail in a moment, membership criteria and policies vary widely, from the effectively unlimited to the effectively closed.

While their structure and membership policies may vary, all these entities possess a characteristic feature: members perceive and describe each other as being, at least in relation to some issues, more of a "like unit," to borrow Buzan's term, than other states. This is the case even in instances of groupings that at first glance seem highly technical. For example, the Egmont Group, to which Russia was admitted in June 2002, would on the face of it appear to be a simple problem-solving exercise, designed to promote coordination and information exchange towards what might seem to be a universal goal of governments: combating money laundering and other ways of legalization of criminal incomes. However, on further examination, it becomes evident that many governments have little interest in combating money laundering. What appears at first glance to be a simple problem of technical cooperation turns out to involve an underlying value judgment about the practice being combated and a willingness to devote "significant" resources to its eradication. As a consequence, the importance of the recognition of existing members as a "like unit" appears as crucial to membership as it is to entry into the club of states, and as politicized. For example, in the case of the Egmont Group, the judgment of what constitutes a "significant" commitment to combating money laundering on the part of an applicant government turns out to be highly subjective. As a consequence, clubs may experience the same evolution of *gemeinschaft* feeling through the process of like recognizing like as we have described in regards to the society of states.

Of course, different clubs start out with different degrees of a sense of shared identity or values; consequently, the intensity of *gemeinschaft* feeling within these groupings varies widely. It is difficult, for instance, to argue that the Chinese and US governments enjoy a powerful sense of shared identity or values by virtue of their mutual membership of the nuclear club. Nevertheless, as with the society of states, a sense of shared problems, shared opportunities, or shared responsibilities often leads to a sense of at least minimal collective or shared identity, at least in relation to the issues falling within the group's remit. As Wæver has observed, "the distinction between regulatory rules and constitutive rules is problematic, and regulative rules will always end up becoming more or less constitutive as well. Whatever 'practical' arrangement is formed among a group of powers, will therefore also tend to become part (maybe only a small part, but part nevertheless) of the identity of these units." Furthermore, as with the

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52 Buzan 1993.
53 RIA Novosti, 6 June 2002 (Johnson's Russia List 6294, 7 June 2002).
54 Classical economic theories of clubs discuss them as interest-based organizations designed to maximize the welfare of their members. In this view, members will not join or remain in the club unless a net gain results from membership; more importantly, club enlargement will take place only if existing members reap net benefits from admitting a new member (Schimmelfennig 2001a: 165, 166-168). If the "benefits" in question are limited to material benefits, however, this conception of clubs fails to accommodate the identity- and value-based dimensions of many existing clubs in international as well as domestic society. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that many use the word "club" to denote primarily identity- or value-based, rather than material-interest-based, organizations. For instance, in opposing NATO expansion, British Defense Secretary Malcolm Rifkind argued that NATO "was not a club but a security organization. New members would have to clearly enhance the security of the organization" (Mihalka 1994: 6).
society of states as a whole, the very process of obtaining and maintaining club membership is one that fosters a degree of *gemeinschaft* feeling among self-designated like units.\(^{56}\)

Up to this point, the “clubs” under discussion might be said to be difficult to distinguish from many international organizations, or from groupings of states such as Emmanuel Adler’s “imagined security communities.”\(^{57}\) Indeed, in some cases efforts to draw distinctions between the applicability of these concepts would be labored and artificial. But one characteristic does set some clubs apart: they are perceived by their members, or by aspiring members, as loci of status within a particular circle of recognition.\(^{58}\)

(While the nature of such clubs is still open to an empirical examination, it would seem likely that they would be entities whose membership was in principle open—unlike, for instance, the British Commonwealth, with its limits on membership to former British colonies or dependencies—but whose entrance qualifications were high and somewhat subjective, making applicants highly dependent on recognition from existing members.) These are the entities that are routinely described within their circle of recognition as “prestigious.” Indeed, their prestige may be far from universal; to governments outside their circle of recognition, they may be effectively irrelevant. But within their circles of recognition, membership in these clubs serves as both a marker and a source of status. Indeed, the more a club’s members consider membership to convey a sense of superiority, the less important the opinion of those who are not potential members becomes.\(^{59}\)

From the preceding discussion, it is possible to argue that many regional institutions function at least in part as clubs. We have already noted in Chapter Four that the process of region-building frequently involves efforts to add a sense of collective identity—to inject the *gemeinschaft* spirit, in effect—into geographic proximity or shared concerns. To the extent that certain organizations remain exclusive in nature (not automatically incorporating every member of a geographic region) while at the same time claiming to represent the essence of a region, they serve as clubs within the regional context. But when, as was the case with the Council of Europe, they are sufficiently identified with increase the “clubby” feel of the regional concept.

To Russian and Baltic policymakers still recovering from the collapse of the Soviet Union, then, “Europe” was the region-cum-club *par excellence*. To some degree this

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57 Adler 1997.
58 Sylvan, Graff and Pugliese 1998; Luard 1990: 170. For a thorough discussion of status groups in the context of international politics, see Luard 1990: 168-176.
59 Policymakers are by no means insensitive to the status issues involved in expanding club membership. Indeed, extending membership in a desirable club has been a time-honored way of rewarding a government for good behaviour, welcoming a new government that is presumed to be more friendly than its predecessor to existing members, or encouraging a recalcitrant interlocutor. As Steven Sestanovich has written, discussing Western efforts after the end of the Cold War to integrate the post-Soviet states into the Western international system: “Western policy paid special attention to the institutional side of it—to the ‘club memberships’ that would give countries that had been kept out of the Western mainstream a place in Western institutions. Their participation was expected to give them a stake in a more regularized, consensual, rules-based international order. The prestige of membership would confirm that they had not been permanently relegated to second-class status by decades of communism... Most important, the practical benefits of drawing steadily closer to Western institutions would create continuing incentives for governments and societies to reshape themselves—their economies, their military establishments, their international conduct, their way of thinking” (Sestanovich 2000: 6). At the time of writing, Sestanovich was ambassador-at-large and special advisor to the US Secretary of State for the New Independent States (NIS).
was due to cultural prestige: as Igor Ivanov was to write in 2002, Europe maintains its place as “the world’s leading intellectual and cultural center.”60 But Europe’s cachet was also hardly surprising, since European domination of the interstate club had been a feature of international politics since at least the nineteenth century. To a certain degree this domination was unsurprising: after all, as Bull has observed, the rules and institutions of international society were not only made by Europeans; “in a certain sense, they were made for them.”61 As a consequence, “the international rules and institutions of the late nineteenth century reflected and sanctified the dominant position of the European powers, expressed on the one hand in the institution of colonialism and on the other hand in a maintenance of a distinction between states that were full members and states that were merely partial members of international society.”62

This domination took two forms. The first was the application of material power by European states to issues only tangentially related to their own survival or well-being. This aspect of domination has been most visible in the activities of the club of the Great Powers—states who both formally and informally have asserted the right (and have accorded each other the right) to determine and act on issues that affect the peace and security of the international system as a whole, said to exist in addition to (or as opposed to) the narrower interests of their own states.63 This reciprocal arrangement had its abortive beginnings in the Holy Alliance of 1815, inspired by the Russian tsar Alexander I, which envisaged a Europe whose affairs would be dictated by an alliance of sovereigns pledged to defend the spiritual, religious, and social values of their common European civilization against the destructive revolutionary forces that Alexander saw manifesting themselves in Russia as well as in France and other countries.64 The treaties on which the Alliance was based clearly assigned a ruling role to five self-identified “major” states—Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia—with “minor” states expected to submit to the decisions taken jointly by the preponderant powers.65 As Watson has written: “In the eighteenth century Europe was regarded as a commonwealth divided into several states, of which Russia was one of the most powerful. It was what we call an international society, but not yet a collectivity in whose name great powers presumed to act. The use of the term Europe as a diplomatic entity, in the sense of a group of states having common interests and duties and in whose name member states could take joint decisions, is no older than the nineteenth century. The change which this usage reflected was brought about especially by Alexander and Metternich.”66 Although the organized system of international government envisioned by Alexander lasted only a few years, this distinction between great and small powers as an institution of international politics and organization, carrying differences in legal status, continued to reverberate in international politics, manifesting itself in the membership lists for the permanent members of the Council of the League of Nations and the United Nations Security Council. While the ultimate inclusion of Japan in the former, and China in the latter, went some way towards breaking the European lock on the club, nevertheless the right to determine what

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60 This was despite the fact that Europe had “forfeited its ability to effect change in the world” (Ivanov 2002: 93).
63 Bull 1977: 196. Of course, particularly for a state of global reach, no international issue can truly be said to exist in isolation from national interests; but it is one of the conventions of the Great Power club to treat disinterested action as a possibility.
constituted threats to law and order remained solidly in Western (and numerically disproportionately in European) hands.

Related to this last point, the second form of European domination of the interstate club was social, relating to the moral value of what constituted “civilization” at the global level. The history of this seizure of the social high ground in the global arena by European state representatives has been well-documented by English School writers.67 For our purposes, it is simply worth noting that he expansion of European material power and the projection of European military and economic power onto the global stage that occurred between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries initially did not reflect universal assumptions by European statesmen of their ability (or, in some cases, their right) to impose social as well as material domination.68 “Prior to the nineteenth century,” Robert Jackson writes, “it was natural for Europeans to assume the superiority of their civilization but not its hegemony.”69 However, between the mid-seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries, “the states-system came to be described as European by those who operated and described it.”70 Furthermore, during this period, a waxing idea of the “unity and intimacy” of European states laid the grounds for the growth in the nineteenth century of an element of cultural chauvinism and racism in the attitudes of European statesmen, who came to think of their nations as superior not only to pre-literate (“savage”) peoples but also to peoples non-European civilizations, and conceived of their states as “forming an exclusive club enjoying rights superior to those of other political communities.”71 Faced with two problems—protecting the lives and property of Europeans abroad, and determining which countries deserved recognition as sovereign states—the European colonial powers adopted a “standard of civilization” that not only defined “civilized” state conduct, but also laid down criteria that non-European entities had to meet to gain admission to the rights and privileges of the diplomatic and legal system that had developed among European states.72 This standard, while initially informal, eventually emerged as “an explicit legal principle and an integral part of the international law of the time.”73 As Bull and Watson have written, “the very conception of the entry of non-European states into international society, conceived of as a process whereby candidates were accepted by the original members, prepared and finally deemed to have graduated, took for granted a world directorate of European states.”74 Application of the standard “resulted in the incorporation of some political systems into the exclusive club of independent states by constitutive recognition, and the subordination of the rest within a dependent framework of colonialism.”75 While the inclusion of non-European states into the legal and diplomatic framework of interstate society (a gradual process prior to World War II, but that accelerated dramatically in the post-war era of decolonization) gradually reduced European domination of that grouping, nevertheless the principles animating interstate society continued to be European ones.

67 Gong 1984 and Bull and Watson 1984 are the classic texts for this discussion.
68 Bull 1984: 123.
69 Jackson 1990: 72.
70 Bull 2000: 176.
72 Jackson 1990: 72; Gong 1984: 3-6. One of the requirements of a “civilized” state, incidentally, was the establishment and maintenance of “adequate and permanent avenue for diplomatic interchange and international communication” (Gong 1984: 18).
75 Jackson 1990: 61.
Despite the demise of the nineteenth-century legal "standard of civilization" and the end of European formal dominance of the interstate system, reports of the death of the concept of standards of civilization may have been exaggerated. As Jack Donnelly has detailed, in the period between the two World Wars, the insistence of the European powers on the adherence of newly sovereign European polities to treaties on the treatment of their own citizens "brought the standard of civilization back home" to European soil. In the wake of the Holocaust, European leaders and populations further turned their interest in raising the global moral tone inwards. The development of a substantial body of human rights law saw the interwar efforts to bring the standard of civilization "back home" dramatically expanded in substance and applied to all European states, not just the newer ones. Indeed, the post-war preoccupation with human rights at home became a factor enhancing Western European cohesion, as policymakers built on internationally recognized human rights to develop "best practice" standards. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was these "best practice" standards that defined the outlines of the "core Europe" whose outlines emerged through membership in European organizations. Furthermore, these best practice standards were from 1975 on a prominent feature of East-West relations, with increasing European unity on human rights issues translating into pressure on the Soviet government through the CSCE process. As Neil Kritz has noted, the USSR and its satellites had already committed themselves to much more comprehensive catalogues of rights in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—commitments which they had ignored with impunity. But the CSCE accords linked human rights obligations to cooperation in the fields of security, technology, and trade, and provided for regular review by the participating states of the implementation of these commitments. Furthermore, CSCE meetings subjected Soviet bloc governments to public embarrassment, as Warsaw Pact delegations were forced to sit and listen as the Western delegations presented names of imprisoned activists and "refuseniks" barred from emigrating. Western governments might ultimately be unprepared to jeopardize good relations with the Soviet Union over human rights issues, but their public rhetorical commitment validated the aspirations of Soviet bloc human rights activists and gave them a sense of being part of a larger European political project. The legitimacy of European efforts to establish a new "standard of civilization" was thus well-accepted among Russian and Baltic reformers. As Kozyrev said, "[y]ou can drive a tank in the wrong lane defying traffic rules. But our choice is different: to progress according to generally accepted rules. They were invented by the West, and I'm a Westerner in this respect."

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76 Dunne 2001: 91.
77 States created after the First World War, including the three Baltic states, in order to obtain League of Nations membership were required to issue declarations undertaking substantial obligations for the protection of religious and ethnic minorities on their territories; furthermore, "these rights were declared 'obligations of international concern' " (Donnelly 1998: 10).
80 Kritz 1993: 18.
81 Kritz 1993: 18.
82 As Gong and Dunne have argued, the evolution of the standard of civilization is associated with the evolution of Europe as a political, not merely cultural idea. The original European political project was associated with organization of territory into sovereign states, constant diplomatic communication, and shared principles of public law and politics, as well as religious foundations. Now, the European political project is associated with the manner in which governments treat their people, with a steady privileging of liberal democratic constitutional entities (Gong 1984: 46; Dunne 2001: 76).
Joining the club

Both Baltic and Russian representatives were thus anxious to see their nations considered as appropriate members of the European club. However, the two sides took very different rhetorical tacks. Russian representatives had stressed since before the collapse of the Soviet Union the need for Russia to regain a “worthy” place in the world. To Russian representatives, that “worthy” place was patently the European club, as well as the West more broadly. As Kozyrev said in December 1991, “one of our foreign policy priorities in to get back in the ranks of our natural partners and allies. At the end of the last century Russia held its proper place among states like France, Germany and the United States. We need to get back to that circle.” Two years later, he was stressing the same theme: Russia needs “to occupy a worthy position in the club of leading Western states, democratic states.”

In justifying their pre-eminent suitability for membership in the European club, Russian representatives drew heavily on a notion of Russian potential, a theme strongly enunciated by Kozyrev. After all, Russia was (as Kozyrev stressed) “a whole continent.” Kozyrev noted that Russian entry into the COE is essentially would be “the beginning of a process of rapprochement and mutual adaptation, because the Russian Federation is not simply one of the new members but an entire continent with an enormous and original political, historical-cultural, and also economic potential.” As a consequence of this potential, Russia eventually (Kozyrev opined) “can and should become not worse that its Western partners in terms of democratic and cultural development.”

But faith in this potential was justified, rhetorically as well as psychologically, by confidence in another quality: Russia’s derzhavnost’, or “great powerness.” One of Kozyrev’s most-repeated phrases was that Russia was “fated” or “doomed” to be a great

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84 As Bobo Lo has written, “[f]or all the fissures over whether Russia is principally Slavic, European or Eurasian, the fact is that no alternative civilizational orientation has ever received serious consideration. Reduced to its essentials, the debate has centred on the modalities of interaction with the West and the extent to which Russia should seek to ‘integrate’, not whether it should go east or south. [This] fundamental premise—the ‘superiority’ and emotional/intellectual closeness of the West to Russia—remains basically intact, as true for Slavists and Eurasianists as for Westernizing liberals” (Lo forthcoming).


86 Ostankino Channel 1 TV, 14 November 1993 (SWB, 20 November 1993: B/1).

87 This theme is not a new one, as Michael Urban has observed: “Russian makers of symbol and myth have repeatedly transformed the sense of inadequacy engendered by contact with the west into a profusion of stories about some greatness to come” (Urban 1994: 740).


91 Some Western scholars have argued that concern with the politics of status was the province of Russian statist nationalists and was only taken on by reformers as a consequence of changes in the international environment, domestic politics, and elite interests (see, for instance, Tuminez 1996). Because reformers disassociated themselves from other goals of the statist nationalists—empire-saving, Great Russian ethnic nationalism—and described themselves as moving away from the “ideological” foreign policy goals embodied by statist nationalists, these observers assumed that they had turned their backs on the pursuit of international status as well. Bobo Lo, however, has convincingly argued that an emphasis on derzhavnost’ was always one of the few things on which the Russian political elite, divided on virtually every other issue, could agree (Lo 2002: 21). Steve Sestanovich has indeed argued that given the circumstances in which Russian leaders found themselves in 1992, status-pursuing policies were not only understandable but virtually inevitable (Sestanovich 1996: 7-8).
power. This “fate,” in this thinking, stemmed not only from Russian material or other characteristics, but also from the perception of other states. “It is not all that easy,” Kozyrev noted, “to become a normal great power, and the world sees Russia precisely as a great power. Instead of being a superpower—the USSR—based on a military threat, we must become a normal power that is based not on threats, but at the same time is able to live in a world where there are conflicts.” The abiding principle of this derzhavnost’ ideology, as Bobo Lo has observed, “was the belief in Russia’s global status.” Submitting Russia’s membership application in May 1992, Kozyrev told reporters that “Russia, as a great country declaring its intention to join the Council of Europe, is striving not be isolated from the life of the international community and would like to develop comprehensive cooperation with the Council.” Meanwhile, Yevgenniy Ambartsumov told the press that joining the Council would give Russia “the ability to include itself in all democratic processes unfolding on our continent.”

A second, closely related point was that solutions to international problems were “inconceivable” without Russian participation. As Kozyrev said, when submitting Russia’s application: “[t]he young Russian democracy will not be able to flourish without Europe with its huge democratic experience. In its turn, Europe will not defeat the challenges of the post-communist era without a powerful, stable and democratically transformed Russia.” To a large degree, the faith of Russian representatives in this argument stemmed from a sense of the difficulty of the European mission to spread democratic values across the entire former Soviet bloc. As Russian Consul General in Strasbourg Vladimir Sukhov said, “[i]t is worth keeping in mind that our full membership [in the COE] is in the interests... of the Council of Europe. The latter faces the task of becoming an all-European organization, capable of unifying towards one goal the West and the post-totalitarian East of the continent. To take on the resolution of a problem of this scale without Russia really isn’t realistic.” Consequently, any organization benefited from its membership. As Kozyrev put it: “A whole continent with its originality, cultural traditions and colossal economic potential is joining the great European club...Democratic Russia is joining Europe and Europe is adapting to democratic Russia.” Indeed, one Russian delegate went so far as to suggest that “Russia is interested in affiliation with the Council of Europe, but the Council is equally interested in Russia’s membership. This will enhance its prestige and transform the organization into a unique instrument of pan-European cooperation.” “In a word,” Lo writes, “Russia was ‘indispensable.’” Russia’s joining the Council would further enable it to play “an integrating role” in common European processes.

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92 See, for instance, ITAR-TASS, 7 May 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-090, 8 May 1992: 14). The theme was consistently echoed by Yeltsin at meetings with world leaders; for instance, at his meeting with presidential candidate Bill Clinton in late 1992, Yeltsin stressed that “[w]e’re not asking for handouts. Russia is a great power. What we want from the U.S. is a model of leadership for others to follow” (Talbott 2002: 32).
93 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1 April 1992 (SWB, 3 April 1992: A1/1).
94 Lo 2002: 53.
97 Lo 2002: 53.
102 Lo 2002: 53-54.
A corollary of these two themes, however, was an assumption by Russian representatives of Russia’s additional right to have a say in decisions taken by organizations of which it was not yet a member, particularly on issues such as membership. For example, as already mentioned in Chapter Five, Kozyrev took the unusual step of sending a personal letter to Council of Europe General Secretary Catherine Lalumière in which he was “sharply critical” of the Council’s plans to extend membership to Estonia, calling such a move “premature.” Arguing that the planned inclusion of Estonia in “the club of genuinely democratic states” would serve as international legitimation of discrimination, according to Izvestiya, Kozyrev “demanded” that the question be deferred. After Estonian admission went ahead regardless, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembskiy complained that the fact that Kozyrev’s arguments had gone unheeded in Strasbourg was “surprising, in view of the fairly constructive relations prevailing recently between the Council of Europe leadership and Moscow.” “In these circumstances,” Yastrzhembskiy noted, “the minister has taken the difficult decision for us of refraining from his trip to Strasbourg and his address to the Council of Europe.”

Meanwhile, Baltic representatives were initially much more cautious in their approach. As outlined in Chapter Five, they argued their worth primarily on technical grounds; in particular, they stressed that their state structures and policies were compatible with European practice. For the most part, however, Baltic representatives were very modest about their nations’ place in the world. As Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gyllys said, “[w]e would like to be not a small state, but a partner. The reality, however, is different: there are both superpowers and small states. Lithuania has been performing the function of a superpower...by initiating a number of changes in Europe and the former USSR. However, it is extremely difficult to remain in this position.”

But as each Baltic state gained Council membership, their representatives became much bolder in their ability to comment on status issues concerning the Council and its membership, and in particular on the issue of Russian membership. Baltic representatives argued the Council had made no exceptions in considering Baltic membership; now it must make no exceptions concerning others. Estonia, stressed Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste, had been given “a clean bill of health;” now “Estonia believes that believes that the COE must maintain the same high standards of admission for new members-states as those applied to current members.” Latvian delegates similarly noted after their admission that “Latvia had worked hard to get in itself;” as a consequence, Riga opposed easy membership for Russia.

One of the main points of Baltic representatives was that Russia’s derzhavnost’, to whatever extent it existed, was not a quality that was translatable into status in the new democratic, rule-of-law Europe. The Council, the Estonian Foreign Ministry argued, should not alter its standards of admission for “political, geographic or other

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111 The Baltic Independent, 10-16 February 1995: 2.
reasons.” 112 Rather, Estonian Foreign Minister Jüri Luik argued, “[w]e believe that the Council must be careful to apply human and civil rights standards non-selectively. There can be no exceptions because of size or geographical location, because of cultural heritage or history, because states are in transition or because the political situation is delicate. The standards that are applied to one must be valid for all other Council of Europe states. In other words, there can be no rubber rulers.” 113 The unacceptability of applying double standards based on calculations of power was a common theme. “We must avoid,” Kelam told the PACE, “the slippery slope of small nations having to prove themselves as diligent schoolboys and be subjected to thorough and detailed examinations, whereas big countries could become members mainly as a result of political decisions.”114 Meri similarly argued that Russia could not be admitted just because it was a great power: “more civilians have already been killed in Chechnya than in Bosnia before rump Yugoslavia became a pariah in the international community.”115 Indeed, if anything, Russian derzhavnost’ should subject it to the highest standards, Kelam argued: “Russia is not a small child for whom you constantly make concessions. You can’t go on saying that it has a difficult childhood behind it, that one of its parents was a criminal, and that if you don’t give in it will start behaving even worse. Russia is a superpower and must be treated as such.”116

Indeed, Baltic delegates argued that inclusion of Russia would be disastrous to the prestige of a status group of which they now were concerned members. First, they argued that Russian admission would require a lowering of Council standards—a step they naturally opposed. Kelam told the PACE: “The Council of Europe is a quality organization embodying high standards of democracy. We have to find concrete ways of ensuring that enlargement will not lower those high standards.”117 Luik agreed, telling the Committee of Ministers that “[t]he choice we face is simple. We can either decide to lower standards to fit subjective conditions, or we can maintain those standards to the ultimate benefit of Europe’s values.”118 Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Gailis similarly told the PACE: “The Council of Europe sets out justifiably high criteria for membership. Latvia expects that those requirements will not be lowered for any applicant country.”119

Second, and more importantly, Baltic representatives argued that admitting a Russia that was not yet up to the Council’s standards would harm the reputation of the Council itself. Luik told the Committee of Ministers: “I urge all of us seated here to guard the credibility of the Council of Europe when considering potential new members.”120 “If the Council accepts Russia,” Kelam argued, “it will be hit by a quality crisis that could reduce it to a regional UN: an ecumenical organization representing all interests.” 121 Velliste concurred: “Finally, in the area of relations with potential member-states, I will stress the desirability of maintaining the COE’s historically high standards. If, for some reason, the Council were to relax heretofore strict standards, the danger of diluting the strength of the institution could well arise. [Estonia wants] the

Council to retain its integrity as a guarantor of democracy and as Europe's premier standard-bearer in these questions of fundamental importance to us all...Any politically-motivated lowering of standards for admission to the Council could result in an undesirable decline in the prestige of the Council of Europe itself and a decline in confidence in its statutory principles and objectives.”

As Kelam told the PACE: “Let us be realists. The Council of Europe is not, unfortunately, a potent and many-sided organization that is in a position to save Russia and to solve the future of that vast country. On the contrary, by venturing such a solution we would put at risk our own basic values. We would put at risk our credibility and moral strength as a unique human rights organization. Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Gailis took a more altruistic line, telling the PACE that Latvia viewed Russia’s application with “neighborly understanding,” but that a lowering of the Council’s “justifiably high criteria for membership” not only would cause the Council to lose credibility, but would harm the interests of the inhabitants of the applicant country granted membership on more lenient terms. But Landsbergis warned the PACE that “[i]t would be a pity to see our respected international institutions run the danger of becoming ridiculous.”

**Hard feelings: Take Three**

The subject of status negotiations is one of the topics in the sociology of emotion literature that has received the most detailed analysis and empirical testing. In particular, one group of researchers, of whom perhaps the most prominent is Theodore Kemper, has moved beyond a narrow focus on capabilities to focus on a question of relevance to the study of emotional response across political or other boundaries: the degree to which particular social-relational patterns are productive of particular emotions. Kemper’s research suggests that negotiations of relations of power (defined as the ability to secure involuntary compliance) and status (defined as the ability to secure voluntary compliance) are particularly likely to generate strong and predictable emotional outcomes; indeed, argues that “emotions are among the primary effects produced by power and status behaviors.” Kemper’s results are in broad agreement with those of other sociologists and social psychologists, including those of Candace Clark, a sociologist, who has focused on the creation and negotiation rank, standing, or “social place” in face-to-face encounters and relationships.

Russian and Baltic responses to the competition to gain European recognition bear many of the hallmarks of Kemper’s predictions. Interestingly, Baltic representatives periodically let slip that they considered their nations to be in a membership race. An Estonian Foreign Ministry press office representative called Estonia’s achieving Council membership before Russia “very important;” Latvian Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs described Latvia’s gaining admission prior to Russian entry “imperative.” And indeed, particularly Estonian admission to the Council led Baltic representatives to invoke the language of victory and defeat. Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar told the press that a “fierce propaganda has been conducted against Estonia so as to prevent

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123 PACE ORD, 25 January 1996: 242. Kelam later posed reporters the rhetorical question: “Will democratic Europe have the will and resolve to transform gigantic, turbulent, I’m-the-enfant-terrible-of-Europe Russia into a true democracy? Hardly...No form of education ever succeeds if the desire to be educated is not present” (The Baltic Independent, 26 January –1 February 1996: 6).
127 Clark 1990: 305
Estonia from becoming a member of the Council of Europe. Now, however, Estonia has
won a victory in that war.¹²⁹ Latvian representatives similarly called Estonia’s admission “the most severe diplomatic defeat” for Russia.¹³⁰ Estonia, said Velliste, was now safe from “ungrounded accusations”: “If some country would try accusing us without any ground, we won’t have to pay much attention to this.”¹³¹

Indeed, the admission of the three Baltic states before Russia brought on not a little
gloating. It sometimes seemed that few Baltic representatives could mention their
country’s acceptance into the Council, and into the collective European identity, without
mentioning Russia’s continued—in their view justified—exclusion. Baltic statements
wavered between the condescending (“The electorate in Russia is influenced by the
pervasive totalitarian education system that prevailed during the past 70 years. That is
why the only thing left for us is to help them to rebuild the lost milestones of European
standards of relations between human beings...the Council of Europe with its firm stand
today should help our Russian colleagues to adopt necessary laws now lacking and to
learn how to respect them”) and the triumphal (“Instead of Estonia integrating into the
CIS, as many Russian politicians call for, Estonia will have the opportunity to oversee
Russian integration into the Council of Europe”).¹³² Baltic speakers emphasized the
“we” in statements calling for Russia’s continued exclusion from the Council (see, for
example, Kelam’s “Let us be realists” statement cited above¹³³). And Baltic
representatives were delighted to stress that this “we” that was sitting in judgment on
Russia constituted, as Estonian parliamentary speaker Toomas Savi put it in the context
of a discussion of Chechnya, “[t]he community of civilized states.”¹³⁴

Meanwhile, Russian reformers had begun to express concerns that Russia was being
slighted by its Western partners, and particularly in regard to the Baltic states. Yeltsin,
in a speech at the Foreign Ministry collegium, criticized the Ministry’s performance,
saying: “Russia has begun to be perceived in the West as a country which only ever says
‘yes.’ A state which does not notice how particular accords are violated with regard to
it. What is not allowed with regard to other great powers has become allowed with
regard to Russia. And as a result...interest in us has begun to decline in the past two
months...Yet Russia is not a country that can be kept in the waiting room. We can
express a certain gratitude to the West for its support....But we also have every grounds
for expressing disillusionment....Moreover, a policy of double standards is retained in

that “[t]he admission of Estonia is not a defeat for the Foreign Ministry but a reflection of positive
changes taking place in the post communist world. Membership n the Council places additional
responsibilities on Tallinn to make its laws and practices correspond to European and international
law” ITAR-TASS, 18 May 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-095, 19 May 1993: 16). However, in light of
Kozyrev’s non-attendance at the Council, their protestations seemed unconvincing.
68).
¹³⁴ PACE ORD, 22 January 1996: 10. Indeed, Baltic representatives became highly exercised at any
suggestion that they might have received special treatment, particularly when comparisons to Russia
appeared to be in the air. In 1996 the Council’s General Secretary, promoting Russian membership,
argued that the Council had already applied a “favorable interpretation” of its rules when Estonia
applied in 1993: “By making Estonia a member we have been promoting positive developments...and
when we make Russia a member, we are going to promote positive developments in that country too.”
Estonian deputies reacted sharply: Tunne Kelam said that no concessions had been made, while
Kristiina Ojuland said that there had been concessions to some new members “but never to an
applicant country that is killing innocent people.” The Baltic Independent, 26 January-1 February
regard to us. How much talk there was about discrimination along national lines in the former USSR, but now that the Baltic states are pursuing the same policy, this has not been a cause of indignation among the world public."\(^{135}\) Kozyrev’s decision to cancel a visit to the Council after Estonia’s admission reflected Russian indignation at being denied a voice in the Council’s membership decisions. As Foreign Ministry spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembskiy said, “we are somewhat surprised that no heed is being paid to Russia’s arguments in this instance. In these circumstances the minister has taken the difficult decision for us of refraining from his trip to Strasbourg and his address to the Council of Europe.”\(^{136}\)

Resentment of Moscow’s continued exclusion thus was only reinforced by the implications for Russian status. As Bobo Lo has noted, the Russian logical corollary to the assumption of Russian indispensability was that Russia had a right of involvement in any matter it deemed important to its interests; no one had the right to exclude or marginalize it from the processes of international decisionmaking, including membership in major international organizations.\(^{137}\) Furthermore, as Neumann has observed, Russian representatives experienced “an obvious sense of disequilibrium between accepting the role of ‘learner’ from Europe and maintaining the notion that Russia is a European great power, a notion that presupposes some kind of equilibrium with (other) European great powers.”\(^{138}\) As a consequence, Russian reactions to continued exclusion increasingly focused on the perceived loss of status associated with “this great European people,” as Yevgenniy Ambartsumov put it to the PACE, being kept in the Council’s “halfway house.”\(^{139}\) Russia was being treated as some “third-rate” country, Ruslan Khasbulatov complained after coming back from a PACE session, and there was an apparent desire to “dictate terms to Russia.”\(^{140}\) Indeed, increasingly Russian representatives spoke of letting the Council come to Russia, rather than remaining in the position of the eternal supplicant. As presidential aide Viktor Kostikov put it, “Russia considers itself to be a great power and the successor to the Soviet Union and all its might. Everyone understands that Russia cannot and does not want to stand in the doorway of the ‘European home’ asking permission to enter.”\(^{141}\)

Interestingly, Russian and Baltic representatives were not the only ones to become exercised over membership issues: Russian efforts to secure Estonian exclusion had brought on a blast from Council. At the PACE session marking Estonian accession, a Swedish representative publicly chided the Russian delegation: “We have all received letters or representations from the Russian government advising us not to admit Estonia to the Council of Europe at this point. That letter from the Russian foreign minister may go down in the annals of history as one of the most unproductive letters ever. Whatever resistance there was in the Assembly to Estonian membership was finally broken by that letter...That shows that certain limits and norms have to be observed in post-colonial diplomacy. I thin that our Russian friends will soon learn that lesson.”\(^{142}\) A Polish delegate added that “Mr. Kozyrev sent us a special letter. I would like to speak very delicately about that letter. It is really tactless. I do not want to speak provocatively. It is really interference by a Russian minister in the internal affairs of independent Estonia. It

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\(^{137}\) Lo 2002: 53.

\(^{138}\) Neumann 1999: 108.

\(^{139}\) *PACE ORD*, 30 June 1993: 1242.


\(^{141}\) ITAR-TASS, 8 December 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-235, 9 December 1993: 3).

\(^{142}\) *PACE ORD*, 13 May 1993: 1060.
is also very tactless in respect of all of us in the Council of Europe.” 143 And one of the rapporteurs for relations with non-member states “strongly emphasized” that “the way in which the Russian delegation has demanded special rights with respect to Estonia has startled many of us.” Lalumière also reportedly later told Khasbulatov that she had been “surprised” by Russian deputies’ “arrogance as regards our procedure for admissions to the Council of Europe. No one is opposed to admitting Russia. There is a certain procedure and no one is allowed to disregard it.” (Khasbulatov’s response was: “I personally am not a supporter of Russia’s hasty accession to European structures. We are not poor relations and we are not asking anything of them. We must cooperate and get to know each other. And then when the Council of Europe expresses a desire and readiness to invite us into membership in its club, we will join.” 144)

Perhaps as a consequence, Russian deputies were quick to seize on any occasion to inform the Council of the foolishness of its decision on Estonia. The passage of the law on aliens provided Russian representatives with an opportunity to press home the argument that Council membership was being used to legitimize discriminatory practices rather than serving as a brake on such activities. Kozyrev sent a stiff letter of protest to Lalumière claiming that the Estonian authorities had perceived the Council of Europe’s admission as “a ‘blessing’ for their course of ethnic cleansing in the republic.” 145 Alexandr Udaltsov, head of the Foreign Ministry’s Baltic desk, regretted that membership failed to produce a “positive effect” in Estonia; on the contrary, after admission “Estonian authorities felt that they had their hands free.” 146 Deputy Foreign Minister Churkin similarly argued that the Estonians had interpreted their admission as an opportunity to go on the offensive. 147 Some Russian representatives phrased their complaints in a tone of gentle disappointment: for example, Vasily Svirin, heading up Russian talks with Estonia, told the press that “[w]e expected that [Estonia’s admission] to the family of highly civilized states would induce it to gradually eliminate discrimination [against Russophones]...To our great disappointment, this was not to be.” 148 But others issued a clear “we told you so” to the Council. Ambartsumov noted: “The Russian Supreme Soviet and Foreign Ministry warned the PACE that Estonia could regard Council of Europe membership as a virtual green light for its discriminatory policy...and could even toughen it up. Which is what has happened. And the example of Estonia is inspiring Latvia to similar illegal measures.” 149 “Their deeds,” Churkin complained,” are at variance with their words [and] their actions are at variance with contemporary standards of civilized conduct, with the high standards of the CSCE and of the Council of Europe, to which Estonia—despite our serious objections—was admitted recently. Incidentally, what is now happening once again demonstrates that the decision by the Council of Europe was erroneous and that Russia was correct to warn...that the Estonian authorities would regard this as carte blanche to do anything they wanted.” 150 Indeed, Russian representatives murmured, the Council had let itself down. The Council, Kozyrev opined, “demonstrated unacceptable complacency by accepting Estonia into its ranks a few days ago, and, what is more, as one of the first in Eastern Europe. And this is despite the presence in that republic of hundreds of thousands of people without citizenship, frustrated in their basic rights! So even our

143 PACE ORD, 13 May 1993: 1063.
144 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16 June 1993: 1.
partners have room for improvement." Such a basic error, Kozyrev indeed wrote to Lalumière, might “cause a fall in the prestige” of the Council.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the diplomatic debates described in Chapters Three through Six played into an additional debate over the ordering of identities, in this case through social status. It has argued that Russian and Baltic representatives approached the European “club” as a locus of status in interstate society, capable of both conferring and confirming social status. As a result, Russian and Baltic representatives advanced justifications for their nations’ inclusion in Europe in status terms. The chapter has suggested that Russian representatives argued not only that Russia’s derzhavnost’ (great power quality) made it a fitting member of the European club, but that its inclusion would actually lift the status of that club. Meanwhile, Baltic representatives argued the opposite: that not only was Russia’s derzhavnost’ irrelevant to true “Europeanness,” but that the inclusion of Russia in the European club on the grounds of derzhavnost’ had the potential to lower the club’s international status.

In attempting to draw on derzhavnost’ as a justification for European status, Russian representatives showed a confusion over contemporary European self-conceptions. As Bruce Porter has argued, Russia has always faced two Europes. The first was “the liberal, democratic West of the Enlightenment, the West that embodied high principles of individual worth, human liberty and dignity, rationality, dialogue and tolerance, the rule of law, representative government, and constitutionalism…This was the West that the Westernizers of old (and those of today) thought they were following. The other West was the militarized, regimented, technological juggernaut embodied by the armies of Charles XII of Sweden, Frederick the Great of Prussia, Napoleon Bonaparte of France, Kaiser Wilhelm of Imperial Germany, and Adolf Hitler of Nazi Germany. This was the West that time and time again sparred with or invaded Russia, that dazzled Russian leaders with its technical-military superiority, and that acted as a constant spur to military modernization and bureaucratic reform.” By failing to appreciate that what was currency for status in the second Europe (derzhavnost’) was not currently currency in the first, Russian representatives not only failed to achieve their goal of rapid inclusion in the European club, but in fact highlighted the differences between mainstream Russian conceptions of the ordering of interstate society and those dominant in the gemeinschaft community of the European club.

This chapter concludes this dissertation’s examination of the rhetorical strategies of Baltic and Russian representatives on a dark note. It has been an argument of this thesis that diplomatic debates over character, collective identities, and social ordering have the potential to engage their participants emotionally; in the story outlined here, the impact of such debates has been one to leave bad feeling among participants. Various scholars, most prominently Jack Barbalet, have argued that emotion is a prime factor driving changes in social structure. Such scholars would be likely to see Russia’s backing away from European engagement across the course of the 1990s as being at least in part a result of the disappointments, humiliations, and frustrations of failing to find recognition, either of collective identity or of status, within the European “family.”

Pessimists among them might also anticipate continued Russian efforts to either drop out of or secure changes in the European structures that have created the occasion for such frustrations. That Russian engagement has not in fact ended, however, is a reminder that "identity diplomacy" need not be deterministic.

As Ronald Dore discusses, "the resentful urge" to correct one nation's perceived deprivation of, among other things, prestige continues to be a source of tension between status quo and non-status quo powers (Dore 1984: 412).
Conclusion

This dissertation has argued that diplomatic exchanges are permeated with three types of debates: debates concerning identities, debates concerning the grouping of identities, and debates concerning the relational social positioning of identities. Through an examination of Russia and Baltic diplomatic rhetoric, it has attempted to demonstrate that Baltic and Russian representatives sought to win European audiences over to conceptions of their own nations as democratic, peaceloving, and having broken in important respects with their Soviet past. It has attempted to demonstrate that at the same time, Russian and Baltic representatives sought to portray their opponents and undemocratic and aggressive (whether internationally or towards their own populations); furthermore, they sought to portray their opponents' actions as threats not only to their own interest, but also to European security and/or values. It has further argued that Baltic and Russian representatives drew on these characterizations to make a another argument: that their nations were appropriate members of the European cultural and political complex, as exemplified by the emblematic organization of the Council of Europe, and that their opponents were not. It suggests that in so doing, Russian and Baltic representatives in fact argued two cases. In the first instance, Baltic and Russian representatives argued that the nature and behavior of their states made them appropriate members of Europe, while their opponents' nature and behavior rendered their Europeaness suspect. In the second instance, Russian and Baltic representatives argued that their own nations were appropriate members of a “Europe” thought of not only as a political or cultural construct but also as a status group, or club, in interstate society. In so doing, Russian representatives argued not only that Russia’s derzhavnost’ (great power quality) made it a fitting member of the European club, but that its inclusion would actually lift the status of the club. Baltic representatives, meanwhile, argued the opposite: not only that Russia’s derzhavnost’ was irrelevant to true “Europeanness,” but that inclusion of Russia in the European club had the potential to lower the club’s status.

This dissertation has further argued that it should not be surprising that all three of these debates engaged and frustrated their participants, generating hard feelings particularly on the Russian side. It has drawn on the literature of the sociology of emotion, which sees the types of dense social interaction exemplified by such diplomatic exchanges as prime instigators of feeling, to suggest the possible emotional implications of debates over self-representation, over group membership, and over status positions. While not attempting to assess the intensity or to assign causal value to the feeling caused in Russian and Baltic representatives by these debates, it has tried to suggest that discussions of such debates that fail to give a place to feeling strip processes of the production of knowledge of much of their meaning for those involved.

Indeed, one of the most interesting aspects of the story outlined in this dissertation was the campaign by Baltic representatives to become authoritative sources of knowledge about Russia in the European arena. Post-structural and post-colonial analyses, for reasons with which one can easily sympathize, have often focused on instances where the power to characterize and categorize has been closely tied to material or political power. Indeed, during the Russian imperial and Soviet eras, the fields of geography, ethnography, and anthropology were largely dominated by ethnic Russians, who occupied a predominant if not always strictly dominant position in imperial Russian and

Soviet society. As a consequence of the strong Baltic intellectual tradition, the Baltic peoples were studiers as well as the studied; but Russians were for the most part unaccustomed to having knowledge about them produced by other ethnic groups. Nor were Baltic representatives entirely confident about their chances in the global information environment; for instance, as already noted in Chapter Four, Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste complained that “a small nation like Estonia doesn’t have the resources to compete with a huge nation’s propaganda machine. It’s no surprise: the front page of the New York Times is not automatically open to us.” But Baltic representatives stressed, as Landsbergis put it, the contribution of their “special historical experience” to their ability to speak authoritatively on things Russian. As Meri said: “Having been behind the Iron Curtain, we know the way Russians think.”

Regrettably, it has been beyond the scope of this dissertation to examine in more than the most fleeting detail the responses of European audiences to Russian and Baltic “identity diplomacy” campaigns. This work has been able to do no more than indicate the degree of European official legitimation extended to particular Baltic and Russian characterizations; it has not been able to assess the degree to which European audiences, in extending this legitimation, had been persuaded by Russian and Baltic rhetoric, selected those themes of Baltic or Russian rhetoric that fit in with their own predispositions, or were moved by entirely different factors. Indeed, a fascinating history waits to be written about the impact of Russian and Baltic representations on how European institutions and governments have faced a changing “Europe.” But that, dear readers, is another story.

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4 PACE ORD, 11 May 1993: 931.

5 The Baltic Independent, 1-7 May 1992: 4. Meri later told reporters that he knew Russia better than Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin (Estonian Radio, 17 February 1994 (SWB, 23 February 1994: E/1)). Interestingly, this language was picked up by the President of the PACE, Miguel Martinez, who reportedly said during a visit to Tallinn in November 1995 during which Russian membership was discussed that “Estonia was one of the few members of the Council of Europe who knew Russia well” (Radio Tallinn, 20 November 1995 (FBIS-SOV-95-224, 20 November 1995 (electronic))).
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185


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