MILITARY FORMATIONS: THE GOVERNMENT OF MILITARY CONDUCT

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Declaration

Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is my own work.

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This thesis is an examination of military culture and its government. It seeks to place in an historical perspective two recent official engagements with the problems of military culture in Australia. The first of these is a report seeking to improve the relationship between the Australian Defence Force and its host community. The second is the report of an inquiry into sexual harassment and the integration of women in the Australian Defence Force. The thesis argues against viewing military culture as a unified set of attitudes, and focuses instead on the architectures, conducts and habits of living which have shaped British and Australian military forces since the eighteenth century.

The thesis details changes in the management of the rank and file of the British military forces of the eighteenth century, the formation of a professional officer corps in the nineteenth century and the relationship between military forces and government in Australia since the eighteenth century. These historical investigations demonstrate the influence of changing governmental strategies in the shaping of military forces over the last two hundred years, and the practical implications of this engagement.

The study then draws upon this genealogy of the Australian Defence Force to consider the recent governmental concerns over greater community involvement and the integration of women. The thesis argues that these issues need to be considered in the light of the formation of modern military forces, in order to look again at what is so readily taken for granted about military culture. The thesis argues that these most recent concerns should take greater account of the adaptability of military forces, while recognising that further change will be negotiated within the boundaries historically formed by earlier governmental reforms targeting military culture.
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INTRODUCTION

‘A closed society of warriors’

Since the Australian colonies took responsibility for their defence forces in 1870 there has been a steady industry of concern around the problems of recruiting, training and improving these forces. The last ten years have proved no exception, with the publication of five major reviews considering different facets of the management of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). Two of the most important and interesting of these reviews concern us here. The first of these reviews addressed the relationship between the broader community and the ADF, particularly in relation to the use of part-time forces and the greater use of civilian support for defence activities. The second review examined the problem of sexual harassment in the ADF and the integration of women. These reviews are important because they have set in train a comprehensive range of activities within the Department of Defence and the ADF to address the problems they identified. They are also important because they have stimulated the latent interest of the public in military culture, in what one newspaper headline called ‘a closed society of warriors’, and in the question of the relationship between this ‘closed society’ and the rest of the community.

The first of these reviews, entitled The Defence Force and the Community was undertaken at the request of the Minister for Defence, who wanted an examination of the relationship between the defence forces and the wider community, with a view to examining ways in which the community could

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play a greater role in ‘strengthening Australia’s security’. The stated motivation for the review was:

> to seek ways of having the Australian community...become more involved in protection of the nation [and]...to identify opportunities for greater efficiency or economy in countering military threats to Australia’s security, through use of capabilities and capacities that exist or might be developed in the Australian community.

This interest in greater community involvement was founded in large part on a concern to reduce the cost of defence by identifying areas in which military personnel were doing jobs that could be done by civilian personnel at lesser cost, preferably by identifying whole functions that could be performed by civilian contractors in support of defence personnel.

The review began its examination of these issues by outlining recent opinion polling on attitudes towards questions of defence and national security which demonstrated that the Australian community supported the existence of a defence force, but had a ‘low valuation of defence as a national issue and a consistently shallow awareness of defence matters’. This was due in part, according to the review, to ‘lacklustre’ debate on defence issues and to excessive secrecy about the bases for defence planning, which tended to diminish the community’s interest in defence matters. For the review, it was also partly due to the way in which the culture of the ADF had limited the wider community’s involvement and interest in defence matters.

In order to overcome the increasing gap that the Review identified between the ADF and the community it recommended both an increased opportunity for community involvement in Defence through contracted support for defence functions and greater use of reserve forces to replace expensive full-time personnel. In these two areas, the Review estimated that considerable efficiencies could be obtained, as well as producing the added benefit of

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3 *The Defence Force and the Community*, p.539.
4 *The Defence Force and the Community*, p.539.
5 *The Defence Force and the Community*, p. 6.
better integrating the ADF with the community. The Review also very strongly advocated a change in the culture of the permanent members of the ADF to enable this community support to be successful: ‘if the military institution is to avoid becoming regarded as a costly irrelevance it needs to let go of the rigid institutional separateness into which it is inclined to lapse in frustration at the lack of discipline in wider society’.²

The Review’s characterisation of the ADF as a closed society of warriors who by design or omission limited community involvement in matters of national significance was very effective for starkly setting out the issues the Review was intended to examine, but it had the effect of antagonising those members of the ADF it was intended to reform. Public debate about the findings of the Review was limited, since both the Minister for Defence and senior representatives of the ADF chose to distance themselves from the Review’s premises about the problems with military culture.³ However, the Review’s proposals for examining the scope for contracting out functions currently undertaken by uniformed personnel was taken up, and since 1991 has meant a considerable number of functions being tested for commercial support and contracted out to the private sector.⁴

Despite the relatively limited public debate about The Defence Force and the Community the report initiated a practical reexamination of the boundaries around what constituted the ‘core’ work of the military. As well, the Defence Organisation began a number of initiatives to increase the public appeal of reserve service with the ADF, which were only moderately successful - the short-lived Ready Reserve Scheme in which people served full-time for one year and then part-time for a further four in return for assistance with the costs of attending university has been abandoned as a costly and unsuccessful

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² The Defence Force and the Community, p. 212.
means of developing a more integrated and better prepared reserve force. However, though it sharply defined the issues at stake, the report’s desire to generate widespread examination of military culture would have to await the challenge posed by the integration of women into the ADF.

In September 1993, Australian newspapers reported on two cases of sustained sexual harassment of women naval personnel on board a Royal Australian Navy vessel, HMAS SWAN. A woman medical officer had been subjected to ‘continual and deliberately offensive and derogatory discussions of masturbation, sexual encounters, “sexual exploits and women’s private parts”’ in the wardroom, and four sailors working in the electronic warfare area of the ship had been called ‘SWODS [Sailors without Dicks], sluts, bitches, half-wit sisters and other terms of abuse’, including by their Chief Petty Officer supervisor. The harassment had occurred a year earlier, during a tour of duty to South East Asia. A naval board of inquiry had investigated the incidents and its findings were made public by the female medical officer. In the wake of widespread publicity about the incidents, the strong condemnation recorded by the naval board of inquiry and strong political pressure from the Opposition, the then Minister for Defence Science and Personnel announced a Senate Inquiry into the incidents and an examination of whether the Navy had adequately addressed the problem.

While the harassment itself was severe - one of the women sailors told of how she had paid someone to try to break her leg so that she could be disembarked, and the medical doctor underwent psychiatric counselling for a long period afterwards - what captured the headlines, and the editorials, was the sense that the cases were an insight into a bigger problem of an ‘outmoded’ naval culture. ‘Outdated traditions’ headlined an article that then went on to ask whether the incidents on board HMAS SWAN ‘represented some kind of naval norm’, and to suggest that ‘there is also a broader issue which is of even more fundamental importance: how relevant

to the modern world are many of the military traditions which permeate and support permanent military forces'. Another article claimed that the problem to be addressed was wider than just the harassment of women, it was ‘the battle between Navy traditions and culture, and that of the mainstream’. The theme of military culture was taken up quite widely, with most commentary arguing that it needed to change, even if change was likely to occur slowly.

It was against this backdrop of the problematisation of military culture, that the Senate inquiry was widened to examine sexual harassment in the ADF as a whole. The Australian Senate’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade looked at the specific cases which occurred on board HMAS SWAN and sought submissions on any other instances of sexual harassment which witnesses wished to bring to the Committee’s attention. The Committee developed its recommendations on the basis of a great deal of information about the particular circumstances of HMAS SWAN and the individuals involved, and a comparatively limited amount of information on the Navy, Army and Air Force more generally. In fact, the Committee noted ‘the surprising thing to emerge in this inquiry is that there is little evidence to suggest that sexual harassment is any worse in the Defence Force than elsewhere’. The Committee did note that it was difficult to determine the extent to which the culture of the ADF may have contributed to the incidence of harassment, though it strongly disagreed with the view that harassment might be a necessary or inevitable consequence of training for war. The Committee concentrated its attention on the attitudes of service personnel,

13 The Inquiry received 85 submissions from individual service personnel discussing their experiences of and views on the incidence of harassment in the ADF. Both the Army and the Air Force also made detailed submissions to the Inquiry, but like the Navy, they had not been keeping reliable data on the incidence of harassment in the services, and unlike the Navy, had not instituted any specific programs to address the issue. See *Sexual Harassment*, especially chapter 12.
14 *Sexual Harassment*, p. vii.
15 *Sexual Harassment*, p. 306.
emphasizing the need for a widespread program of awareness-raising throughout the ADF, to address outdated attitudes. It recommended that all three services pursue the sort of program the Navy had already put into place to raise awareness and introduce attitudinal change. With better, or more informed attitudes, service personnel would be better equipped to work together in the demanding environments of warships, squadrons and army units, and they would be more in step with the rest of the community.

In these two important policy-setting documents the problem of the culture of the ADF and its implications for its external relations with the community, and its internal relations, is central. Indeed, when the cases of sexual harassment which led to the senate inquiry first became public, the author of *The Defence Force and the Community* wrote in the *Sydney Morning Herald* that ‘the harassment of women members of the RAN needs to be seen essentially as a symptom of this far wider malaise in the institutional culture of the defence force’. Yet in these two documents this military culture remains opaque - it is principally addressed as a set of attitudes which more or less acts as an impediment to greater community participation, and the integration of women military personnel. Does the culture of the ADF consist only in the attitudes of its members? How should Governments address military culture?

The rise of the military profession

The theme of cultural divergence and convergence pursued in these two documents owes a great deal to the theoriation of the military and society relationship formulated by writers such as Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz. This 'social research on the military' emerged in the late 1950s, and was focussed on describing the emergence of the United States military forces, and the professional officer corps in particular. Both the theoretical

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structure of this work, and its descriptions of the military profession have been widely used in analysing the Australian military forces.\textsuperscript{19} Examinations of the military profession in Australia take the work of Huntington, Janowitz and other military sociologists as the starting point of their analysis, noting in one case that ‘the attributes of expertise, responsibility and corporateness which Huntington has long since adduced would be accepted, broadly, in any discussion of the subject’.\textsuperscript{19}

A central component of the Huntingtonian thesis of civil military relations is the historical development of the military profession, ‘born’ in Prussia in the early nineteenth century. Huntington traces the development of Prussian, American and British military forces as they acquire the characteristics of a profession, shaped by the imperatives of providing security against military threat while maintaining broad consistency with the dominant social values and institutions.\textsuperscript{20} In this history, ‘the profession of officership...was essentially a product of the nineteenth century. It was, indeed, one of the most significant institutional creations of that century’.\textsuperscript{21} The conditions for the emergence of a professional officer corps were specific: there needed to be a ‘stalemate’ between progressive, liberal ideals which favoured a more representative military profession, and the aristocratic influence which argued for the retention of an elite body of officers maintaining aristocratic values. In these circumstances, as a compromise, an officer corps could develop independently of these influences, and be ‘organized in accordance with interests and principles of its own’.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{18}See, for example, the collection in Hugh Smith, (ed.) The Military Profession in Australia: proceedings of a conference held on 1 July 1988 by the Australian Defence Studies Centre and the Australian Study Group on Armed Forces and Society, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1988.


\textsuperscript{21}Huntington, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{22}Huntington, p. 34.
The debt to liberal or aristocratic interests in the formation of 'modern' military forces is never clear. Rather, as Huntington describes it, professionalism is seized upon as a 'device of social compromise'. While this idea of the profession as a compromise is useful in emphasising that military professionalism is not to be understood as a simple translation or extension of either liberal or aristocratic ideals, it is problematic as an historical explanation because professionalisation appears ready-made as the answer to a pre-existing question which circumstances suddenly allow to be asked. For Huntington and others, professionalisation thus arrives with its own logic of development; outmoded forms of organisation and training are swept aside, and the reforms associated with recruitment and education of officers follow a particular developmental logic, faster or slower in different socio-political milieux. As a consequence of the inescapability of professionalisation, Huntington argues that the key characteristics of the professional officer - a distinct sphere of expertise, a sense of responsibility to the state, and a corporate character - are more or less to be found in every western country by the end of the nineteenth century.

Moreover, the culture that accompanies this professionalisation is also new, and reproducible. In place of the amateurish and elitist approach to the organisation of military forces, in which existing social regulations are extended to govern military life, the profession establishes a distinctive psychological basis for its corporate organisation and behaviours: professional military personnel are governed in their actions by the psychological and physical demands of 'the management of violence', and 'the continuing objective performance of the professional function [which] gives rise to a continuing professional weltanschauung or professional 'mind'.'

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23 Huntington, p. 34-5.
24 Huntington, p. 19.
25 Huntington, p. 61.
It is with this ‘military mind’ that subsequent social research, particularly in the United States, has been concerned. This sociological perspective has meshed well with the psychological investigations of the military and their emphasis on morale. Together, these perspectives have provided the tools to shape a range of governmental concerns around the management of defence forces in Australia and elsewhere. These concerns have been focussed on the psychological relations of individuals within their group, in their workplace or professional setting. As we see with the two reports we have been discussing, the focus is on the attitudes of military personnel as a key factor to be managed in any governmental reform. Military culture is an expression of these attitudes. Given the birth of professional military forces in a vacuum created by competing value systems, the professional military culture is formed anew and shaped by the rational requirements of the conduct of war and the formation of purpose-built social relations, forms of training and institutional settings.

The Thesis

In contrast to this sociological and psychological emphasis on the military mind, this thesis sets out the partial, contingent factors which together give shape to military culture. The focus here is not on the formation of a military culture as a unified set of attitudes, but on the architectures, conducts, and habits of living which have developed in a piecemeal fashion within the British and Australian military forces, shaped largely by governmental imperatives. This thesis describes some of the key features of military forces when they are looked at as a ‘technology for living’: an improvised habitus

that combines a variety of technologies for enabling, in this case, the training and maintenance of a disciplined, predominantly military population.\textsuperscript{28} These forms of training and arts of living were not the inevitable products of a process of social development, technological progress, or particular mind set. Instead, they are the particular products of historical circumstances and adaptations. Far from being formed as the pure expression of professional interests and principles, the factors that have shaped 'modern' defence forces are drawn from a wide variety of sources, including new forms of reformatory architecture, 'aristocratic ethics', bureaucratic reforms, and advances in psychology.

In engaging with the concrete details of military culture, this thesis takes its bearings from a field of work within historical sociology, anthropology and cultural history, which, from the work of Bourdieu, Mauss and Elias, points us towards the variability and contingency in the formation of bodily, mental and moral abilities.\textsuperscript{29} In particular, these studies have pointed to the practical expression of cultural forms and the significant, but often small and ignoble points of development and contestation in the formation of cultural forms and the habitats within which they are maintained. This field of work alerts us to the way in which questions of culture are often practical problems, such as integrating groups of people with quite distinctive forms of behaviour, which require the development and modification of a range of techniques, rather than philosophical positions, for their resolution.

To broaden the picture and look further at these techniques, this thesis draws upon the work of Michel Foucault, his collaborators and those who have taken up particularly the 'governmentality' strand of Foucault's work. Such


work is sometimes called 'history of the present' because of the common interest in the way in which modern problems and certainties have become thinkable. In parallel with the curiosity about particular cultural practices, the work of Foucault and others questions the conditions for the emergence of various ways of thinking about these cultural practices, and of the ways in which these cultural practices are related to government, as both the object of government and a means through which government is exercised. In this study the approach that I have adopted pursues this interest in government, and in present-day problems of government. My method can be described as 'genealogical', in that it seeks to understand the present circumstances of the military in terms of the often accidental or contingent development of those factors which give shape to military forces. Here, the key characteristics of genealogy are that it rejects a notion of unified social or institutional interests in order to focus on the technical, contingent and often piecemeal factors which shape the development of military forces. In doing so, this study looks to key turning points in the history of the present, rather than building up a comprehensive history.

The study does not assume that military forces develop along any particular trajectory, shaped, for example, by the push and pull of the 'civil-military relationship'. The concept of civil-military relations necessitates the definition of two spheres of interests which are neither as easily defined nor as antagonistic to each other as some studies argue. The military as institution has permeable boundaries through which ideas and practices flow from and to the wider society. The categories of the civil and military are constructed categories. Their modern forms, and the question of their relation to one another, are recent and circumstantial. Thus, the study does


not look to the shape that military forces take as more or less the reflection of something else, such as the community. Rather than beginning from the terms of current preoccupations - such as whether or not the military should be transformed by greater community participation - it treats such concerns as 'historical phenomena', outcomes of the historical emergence of the military as a distinctive domain.

The study does not assume that the current form of military organisation is the necessary, modern form of organisation which earlier military forces more or less approximated. Instead, the focus is on the piecemeal, sometimes random and often incomplete manner in which old practices and ways of thinking altered. Rather than offering a sequential history of the emergence of the modern military, complete with autonomous professional status, I am concerned with the incidence of historically related 'problematisations': ways of posing the problem of the relation between the military and civilian life, and ways of framing recipes for reformations and the material effects that the formulation and solution to these questions might have. This includes paying attention to the routine and the mundane, as well as to the governmental rationales and arrangements that reshaped the everyday conduct of military life. It is in the light of details associated with the selection of soldiers, the design of barracks, the procedure of impressment and the examination of officers that answers to some contemporary questions about the military can be posed.

The thesis is not a conventional history, in the sense of aiming at a full and detailed empirical description of a particular period which framed current conceptions of military ethos and its distinctiveness from civilian life. Its scope is both broader and more circumscribed. In tracing the path of a series of problematisations and programmatic reforms, it ranges across several centuries and very different historical territories. While attempting to give due attention to these national differences, it does not pretend to deliver a comprehensive comparative history of military culture across these countries.
Rather, it seeks to illuminate key moments in the formation of British military forces and Australian military forces, in order to understand the scope and direction of contemporary governmental concerns, looking for the bases for disruptions or changes to the 'rationality' associated with certain practices, and what might influence or cause these disruptions. This method is described by Michel Foucault as 'eventalisation':

> making visible a singularity where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant...to show that things 'weren't as necessary as all that'... eventalisation [also] means rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports and blockages, plays of forces, strategies and so on which at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary.32

The interests in singularity notwithstanding, the frame within which these singular events is examined is that of the historical relationship of the British military to the tasks of government in Great Britain (and her colonies), particularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The key features associated with the formation and training of contemporary military forces - the architecture of the barrack, the importance of the regiment, the military as a 'separate institution' - present separate problems for historical description. Nevertheless, they derive from a common historical territory, at the intersection of techniques and aspirations for governing both the general population and the military population since the eighteenth century.

**Government**

The way in which the term government is used here is drawn from the work of Michel Foucault, and others.33 Foucault's work on government was outlined in a lecture series he gave in 1978 and 1979 at the College de France,

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32 Michel Foucault, 'Questions of Method', I&C, no. 8, Spring 1981, pp. 3-14, p. 6.
and in several articles. Ranging across developments from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, these lectures sketched a genealogical outline of the emergence of modern rationales for rule. Beginning with the moment when the rationalities and techniques of state-based administration were framed within early Absolutist states in Western Europe, he describes the shift away from feudal monarchic rule in states dominated by Christian pastoral forms of municipal governance and princely self-maintenance. The shift comes with the emergence of forms of state-based administration as prototypes of modern bureaucracy, that separate themselves both from the interests of the prince and from the influence of rival Christian confessional movements.

Foucault’s definition of government in general refers to what he termed the ‘conduct of conduct’ - that is, he was concerned with means found to manage both the rulers and the ruled, and he was most interested in it in terms of government as a problem, or set of problems around the art of government. As a broad definition, it directs analysis towards thinking about the exercise of rule and the means by which such thinking results in techniques for achieving the aspirations of government. For Foucault, the ‘art of government’ becomes a political preoccupation which emerged during the sixteenth century, at the intersection of the dismemberment of the structures of feudalism and the rise of ‘state centralisation’, and in the context of deconfessionalisation, where ‘at the intersection of these two tendencies...the problem [of government] comes to pose itself with this peculiar intensity, of how to be ruled, by whom, to what extent, with what methods, etc’.

This intensity derives from the desire to make practical various reflections upon government, and it is with the various schema associated with achieving the aspirations of government, with managing ‘the conduct of conduct’ that we are interested here.

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34 A short summary of the contents of these lectures in contained in Michel Foucault, *Resumes des Cours*, College de France, 1989; see also Michel Foucault, ‘Governmentality’.
Foucault is principally concerned with three main approaches to the problem of government: pastoralism, discipline, and liberalism, which together form a triangular grid of reference, a 'solid series, which even today is assuredly not dissolved'. These approaches to government were neither sequential, nor mutually exclusive. Instead, they are treated as historically overlapping forms of rule and rationalities of government that took different shapes in a variety of Western European territories from the sixteenth century onwards, converging by the mid nineteenth century in modern forms of bureaucratically organised national economic and social administration into the now-familiar forms of modern liberal government.

Each of these three key terms - pastoralism, the disciplines and liberalism - requires a brief introduction, since each provides a co-ordinate for this historical inquiry. The first term, pastoralism, denotes some key features of the eighteenth century governmental strategy known as police. Police is not used here in the contemporary sense of a constabulary force in the service of the State. Instead, it was the term used in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to indicate a conglomeration of much older forms of local and municipal regulations, codes and customs. Existing within feudal and theocratic structures of authority, 'police' regulation involved the piecemeal codification of local custom and local government, occurring within local communities governed by a mixture of church law, feudal custom, household authority and municipal regulation. The forms of rule that fell within and between these forms of authority was frequently referred to by the term 'policy'.

Police developed as a response to the breakdown of the mechanisms for the maintenance of order available within estates; in place of the feudal lord and his deputies the local county had its magistracy and body of respected (propertied) persons who had responsibility for the good government of the parish. As a form of rule police was intended to form a web of authority

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37 Foucault, 'Governmentality' p. 19.
within a designated area - usually the parish - to husband the population which by birth had a claim to live within the area, and to exclude those who had no such claim. In England in particular, Radzinowicz and others demonstrate that much of the responsibility for the maintenance of internal order was undertaken by private citizens and, towards the end of the eighteenth century, by philanthropic organisations and commercial enterprises.\(^{38}\)

In England, police was a general term which described the minor, everyday form of social organisation which frequently reflected a set of social responsibilities that fell to the nobility and aristocracy to uphold. These responsibilities were largely designed to maintain the existing order in social and economic arrangements, and to care for those who could not care for themselves. As the jurist William Blackstone outlined in 1783, ‘public police and oeconomy’ means

\[\text{the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom: whereby the individuals of the state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform in their general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighbourhood, and good manners; and to be decent industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations.}\]^{39}\]

Implicit in this form of social and economic government was the assumption that government was conducted according to the respective stations of individuals. This form of pastoralism thus both places differing responsibilities upon the different stations within the society (some will lead and others will follow), and expects people to have or develop the capacities


\(^{39}\) Blackstone, W. [1783] *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, quoted in Hindess, *Discourses of Power*, p.120.
to make their behaviour conformable.\textsuperscript{40} In England, police regulation relied upon the extension of the customary relationships between landowners and labourers, and when used referred to a generalised form of pastoral management and ordering of society. The term police was not used widely in England, and it certainly never developed into a doctrine or science of government as it did in France and Prussia. Indeed, there was a suspicion of the term police in England in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries because of its association with the French system of intendants or court spies.\textsuperscript{41} However, as Dean has argued, there were a myriad of regulations and forms of local government in England that were consistent with the aspirations of police which had developed into a much more extensive art of government in European states.\textsuperscript{42} Police was ambitious in its scope, seeking to regulate the population, as an established social and economic order, in all its aspects, and this was no less so in England than in Europe.

The general pastoral intentions of police were achievable through a combination of the vigilance of local landowners and lesser officials who utilised a whole series of techniques to monitor and regulate the activities of those who should, and should not, be within certain geographic areas. The aspirations of police to ‘fix’ the population and provide the State with the means of maximising that population’s productivity generated a variety of mechanisms for gaining an intimate knowledge of the population and its various capacities. There was a vast need for record keeping, observation, and categorisation. This ‘will to know’ the population utilised the techniques of enclosed spaces and timetables; it divided up the population into various categories such as the able-bodied poor, imposters, and those in genuine distress. These techniques are described by Foucault as disciplinary, in that they are intended to render disciplined and docile their subject populations. In their association with police, the disciplines flourished; as Foucault

\textsuperscript{40}See the discussion in Hindess, \textit{Discourses of Power}, p. 121-123.
remarks, 'the organisation of the police apparatus in the eighteenth century sanctioned a generalisation of the disciplines that became coextensive with the state itself'.

In their relationship to the functioning of a pastoral mode of government such as police, disciplinary techniques were designed to perform 'negative functions': to stop people moving about, separate and classify and monitor people, to open up as many things as possible to governmental scrutiny, and to act as a 'blockade' against an increasingly mobile and difficult to regulate society.

At the same time as the disciplines helped to achieve the aspirations of police, they worked to sow the seeds of its demise. The vast record-keeping necessary to a government which sought to control everything according to a view of the 'right order of things' was continually confronted by both the impossibility of a totalising knowledge, and the growing evidence that the population and economy had their own regularities and patterns which were not amenable to the pastoral form of control envisaged by police. Government was confronted by an economy which could not be made to perform according to the 'will' of the sovereign, and within that economy, by individual economic agents who were stifled, rather than encouraged, in their contribution to the economy, by the constant interference generated by police.

The way of thinking about government which attempted to encompass the complexity of governing in the face of both an autonomous economic base and a population made up of individuals with interests was liberalism. Part of the liberal argument rested on the demonstration that while the

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45 Albert Hirschman points to an interesting example of this given by Montesquieu, who argued that bills of exchange, which allowed the 'invisible' transfer of wealth, were developed as a means of avoiding the arbitrary and violent hand of police, and that 'through this means commerce could elude violence, and maintain itself everywhere...owing to these events, the great and sudden arbitrary actions of the sovereign have been proven to be ineffective and...only good government brings prosperity': Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passion and the Interests: political arguments for capitalism before its triumph*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 72.
government of police had as one of its principal objectives the security of the population. greater security had not been achieved by greater controls on the population, including through the use of military forces to maintain order. Liberalism shared with police a concern for security (in the more general sense of securing the economic and social conditions for the continuation and development of the society, rather than only, or even principally, in terms of military strength), but sought to achieve that security through allowing a greater degree of what Adam Smith would term 'natural' regulation - of the market, of the self-interest of economic agents, and of the society, than was possible with police. In these terms, liberalism was a doctrine of limited government, where police had sought to govern absolutely.

However, it is in this identification of the 'natural' limits on government that liberalism constructs for itself a 'fertile problematic' as Colin Gordon notes: 'the conundrum of how to establish a viable boundary between the objects of necessary state action and those of necessary state inaction'. This conundrum is all the more complex since liberalism relies on the 'natural' interests of individuals leading ultimately to outcomes which will be favourable to the common or collective good. Thus, while liberalism is critical of the degree of control that police seeks to exercise over the lives of individuals, it too must invent and reinforce direct and indirect ways of ensuring that when individuals act in their own 'interests', these interests will be consonant with certain standards of reasonableness and civility, and will work to reinforce, rather than undermine, civil society.

This emphasis on 'working with the grain of things' can be seen in proposals such as Adam Smith's regarding the formation of armed forces. Smith argued that well-trained, professional forces were much preferable to militias, particularly where they were led by 'the principal nobility and gentry of the country...who have the greatest interest in the support of the

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46 Colin Gordon, 'Governmental rationality'.
47 Hindess, *Discourses of Power*, p. 130.
civil authority'. As a mode of government, liberalism enabled the development and extension of a number of approaches to the question of an 'active' society. This included extending and invigorating the use of disciplinary techniques, as a means of both guaranteeing the capacities of individuals to exercise their social and economic independence, and maintaining a check on those agencies and institutions which exercised a governmental role on behalf of or instead of the state. In contrast to the use of disciplinary techniques to act as a 'blockade', the disciplines could also be used to 'improve the exercise of power by making it lighter, more rapid, more effective'. One of the most fruitful areas for the extension of disciplinary techniques was the state itself: the bureaucracy, state schooling and the military were all subject to the reformatory possibilities of the disciplines.

This thesis charts the government of the military in relation to these changing modes of government and disciplinary techniques. Each of these terms - pastoralism, liberalism and the disciplines - illuminates aspects of the historical relationship between military forces and what we now call the 'community'. For example, the military forces of England intersected with police in several crucial ways. First, the Army and particularly the Navy were key aspects of the sovereign's ability to secure his or her wealth and territory. Men were pressed into the service of the sovereign whenever necessary, limiting the need for either the Army or the Navy to develop manpower policies of any but the most rudimentary kind. The arbitrary, and in theory temporary nature of impressment as a form of providing recruits to the Army and Navy served to perpetuate the political comfort that England had no standing Army. Second, the Army and Navy were used as an

50 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.209.
51 See Hunter, Rethinking the school, and Bruce Smith, Governing Classrooms: privatisation and discipline in Australian schooling, unpublished PhD thesis, Griffith University, 1991.
52 See the discussion of the standing army debates of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in chapter five, below.
adjunct to the police of poor and vagrant populations in local parishes. Men without work and charged with vagrancy and other minor crimes could have their penal sentences commuted to life service in the Army or Navy. Third, the Army was used throughout the eighteenth century as a means of enforcing law and order, particularly in the growing industrial sectors of England. Until the establishment of the constabulary police forces of the early nineteenth century, the Army was used to disperse unruly gatherings and to maintain a presence in areas of social unrest.

Similarly, disciplinary techniques were important to the use of the military as an adjunct of the police of the population in general and to the internal management of military populations. In the Recruitment Act of 1796 there were both financial inducements and penalties for parish officers who were able, or unable, to assist in the identification of able-bodied men who might be recruited into the Army and Navy. To keep track of such debts and credits it was necessary to keep records of the local parish population, who had entitlements and who did not, where people belonged and what had been done about those who did not. Detailed records were also necessary to assist in catching deserters, and those who attempted to enlist more than once for the sake of the bounty.

In the Army, disciplinary techniques informed the use of barracks as a means of managing the unruly and unreliable military population. Introduced as a standard form of housing troops at the end of the eighteenth century, the use of barracks resolved two problems simultaneously: the proper oversight, training and management of the military population and the pacification of industrial populations by the Army while maintaining the segregation of soldiers. Over time, disciplinary considerations informed the changing fortunes of barrack-like architecture and use of the military as a constabulary force. In nineteenth century Australia the earlier enthusiasm for barrack-like accommodation, and the widespread use of soldiers in the policing of the population was replaced by a desire to separate the functions
of the military from the wider government of the society, and in turn to use disciplinary techniques to reform the colonial defence forces into the twentieth century.

In Britain, the greater autonomy of regiments, the introduction of a measure of commercial support in the areas of logistics and supply, the encouragement of responsibility and initiative on the part of officers, increasing standardisation of recruitment and promotion, and the eventual abolition of the system of purchasing commissions in the Army were all informed by a liberal mode of government.53 As well, the persistence of certain expectations of the ethical conduct of the officer in turn helped shape the internal government of regimental life. The military formation which arises, focussed on the regiment (in the case of the Army), but with internal concessions to the ethical sensibilities of the gentleman officer, is thus a product of an accommodation between the bureaucratic, disciplinary requirements associated with cost-effective, efficient military forces, and the governmental possibilities of the gentleman.

We can see here the main characteristics of the modern military profession - semi-autonomous, increasingly establishing standards of entry, etc - emerging from the military forces' association with changing governmental rationalities. As an institutional hybrid, the British military profession is shaped by its associations in the eighteenth century with police, modified by a variety of disciplinary techniques. In the late nineteenth century the military profession emerges as a hybrid of aristocratic and bureaucratic tendencies, increasing its capacity for self-regulation at the same time as it develops the capacities for capturing and regularising the governmental possibilities of the gentleman officer.

53 See the interesting discussion of whether the reforms of the military during this period were consistent with what has elsewhere been called the 'nineteenth century revolution', after the theoretical framework for explaining nineteenth century administrative reform developed by Oliver MacDonagh. See Hew Strachan, 'The early Victorian army and the nineteenth century revolution in government', English Historical Review, vol XCV, no CCCLXXVII, October 1980, pp. 782-809.
The present study fills out the details and complexities of this rough historical chart. As noted above, it does so not in the mode of comprehensive historical description, but by outlining key moments in the formation of the modern way of looking at military culture and its relation to civilian life and to government. Taken together, these key moments build an historical sketch of overlapping tactics and continuous processes, marked by occasional sharp breaks and adaptations. In concentrating on these, I am seeking to suggest avenues for more fruitfully exploring the relationship of government to military culture.

Chapter two begins the historical analysis of the thesis with an examination of the relationship of eighteenth and early nineteenth century British military forces to the governmental rationality of police. Out of this relationship, in which the Navy and Army acted as an adjunct to the pastoral forms of local government, developed the impetus for transforming the rank and file into manageable and accountable bodies of men. This was achieved by housing men in barracks from the end of the eighteenth century. Throughout the nineteenth century barracks were modified and improved; from their early role in containing troops, the barracks became the vehicle for the improvement of the Army as a formed body and as individuals. As the chapter demonstrates, the adoption of barracks, so critical to the subsequent development of a ‘modern’ military force, was the contingent outcome of a number of factors, including the role of the Army in the pastoral mode of government of eighteenth century Britain, theories on the management of particular populations such as the criminal and the poor, as well as changing methods of training and exercising the rank and file.

Chapter three complements this history of the rank and file with a genealogy of the ‘modern’ military officer. Arguing against mainstream sociological presentations of the transformation of the officer corps in the nineteenth
century, the chapter demonstrates the contingent development of the regiment as a means by which greater accountability, as well as greater autonomy for the Army in its recruitment and training of officers could be achieved. In turn the reinvigorated regiments acted as a basis for the refinement and inculcation of a military ethos that had previously been guaranteed only by wealth and position.

Chapter four analyses the establishment of military forces in Australia and the changing fortunes of those military forces over the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The chapter charts the demise of the military forces’ central role in governmental administration in the Australian colonies, and the way in which these forces developed in the early twentieth century. This development was guided by the range of measures of effectiveness being developed in Britain as a result of the history we traced in chapters two and three, and which increasingly served to distinguish military forces as a distinct ‘technology for living’.

Chapter five discusses the official review entitled The Defence Force and the Community, with which we began, in the context of the ‘standing Army’ debates of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The review’s proposals for change are considered in the light of both the long-standing difficulty of achieving the benefits anticipated of the community and the governmental history of the military as we have set it out in the earlier chapters. This discussion indicates both the likely limitations on such a ‘principled’ expression of the ambitions of a liberal governmentality for the shaping of military forces and the more mundane means by which the concerns addressed by the report are likely to be met.

Chapter six addresses the problem of sexual harassment in the ADF and the broader implications of this problem for the integration of women into military life. The way in which the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade problematises the issue of sexual harassment, and
the solutions that it proposes are considered in the light of the governmental history of the military developed in the earlier chapters. The limitations of the analysis contained in the Senate report are outlined and the chapter goes on to consider some of the other ways in which, given the historical perspective, the integration of women, and the culture of the ADF, might be pursued as a practical problem for government to address.

The thesis concludes with some observations on recent concerns about military culture, and suggests, given the history of military culture as a governmental concern, some of the more practical implications of this most recent governmental engagement with ‘a closed society of warriors’.
CHAPTER TWO

‘Inland Fortresses’

The development of barracks and the reform of the rank and file

Introduction

In this and the following two chapters, we will look at the ways in which the military forces of Britain and Australia have developed since the eighteenth century. These chapters identify key events in this development, and the multiple, often accidental or tactical rather than strategic objectives of which they formed a part. This chapter examines the problems associated with the rank and file of the British Army in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and the circumstances under which the decision to house troops in barracks became central to the reform of the rank and file, overturning a century or more of opposition to ‘inland fortresses’.

In the eighteenth century there were three main roles for the British Navy and Army. The first was in the conduct of warfare in support of both the balance of power in Europe and the extension of British imperialism. The second, domestic function was as an adjunct to the police of the poor, where the Navy and Army provided a ready ‘receptacle’ for those deemed idle and vagrant by local government authorities, and for those serving penal sentences for minor crimes in Britain’s overcrowded gaols. The third function performed by the Army in particular was as an instrument for maintaining order against internal dissent throughout Britain.

These numerous roles for the Navy and Army produced two consequences which are significant in the context of the present discussion. The first of these related to the fact that both the Navy and the Army required large numbers of men. In addition to voluntary recruitment and the life-long service of those whose criminal sentences were commuted, both the Navy
and Army frequently resorted to the non-voluntary recruitment of men by press-gangs. The temporary impressment of men to serve aboard the Navy’s ships and in Army regiments was justified as a long-standing customary right of the Crown; the use of impressment to supply forces to guarantee Britain’s external security also performed the secondary function of ridding local parishes of those who threatened internal security. As Radzinowicz notes, this was ‘a striking example of penal economy’. Over time, this apparent economy came to be seen as extremely costly: critics of impressment argued that it diminished military service in the eyes of potential voluntary recruits who would make better soldiers and sailors, that it contributed to the barbaric practice of flogging as the principal form of maintaining discipline in both the Navy and Army, and most importantly, that it took men away from the productive fishing industry and the merchant Navy to the ‘unproductive’ military. Impressment was gradually abandoned in the early part of the nineteenth century, largely for reasons of political economy, but its use, consistent with the more generally indiscriminate recruitment of men, had created a lasting concern for the internal government of the military.

The second significant consequence of the military’s role in the governmental strategy of police was that it performed a second ‘double function’ as both the enforcer of local law and order and as a receptacle for those deemed disorderly by such enforcement. This governmental ‘economy’ ultimately provided the justification for an extensive and expensive program of barrack building throughout Great Britain, as the only practical means of addressing the difficulties of both the unruliness of the Army and the restlessness of local populations amongst whom the Army was intended to keep the peace. After a century of strong opposition to any plan to house troops in barracks, barracks suddenly became a ‘self-evident’ solution to these two pressing governmental concerns. The building of barracks as a means of addressing both the problems of internal security and the discipline of the Army meant

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that in the space of a few years the arguments against barracks disappeared forever, and barracks became a locus for many of the governmental programs aimed at the reform of the rank and file. While the intimidatory role of barracks gradually diminished, their potential as a site for the reform and development of the rank and file ensured their continued use throughout the nineteenth century.

The concerns of nineteenth century reform were built on the consequences of the Navy and Army's association with the eighteenth century pastoral mode of government. In the space of a few years, barracks went from being the epitome of the danger to liberty of a standing Army to the site of that Army's reformation and continuous improvement. In the course of the nineteenth century the Army in particular sought to transform itself from a receptacle for the desperate and criminal population to an employer who could compete for recruits with other, more respectable forms of work, and barracks were a crucial component of this transformation. Thus many features of a 'modern military' that were developed during the nineteenth century were in large part the contingent consequences of the military's association with the eighteenth century governmental strategy of police.

**Eighteenth Century Government**

Before exploring the ways in which the military forces were used in the eighteenth century, we need to set out the broader strategy of police which characterised the eighteenth century government of Great Britain. Police was a general term which was used to refer to a type of pastoral government which incorporated all the various legal and customary means of maintaining local order and encouraging productivity. In England in particular, Leon Radzinowicz and others demonstrate that much of the responsibility for the maintenance of internal order was undertaken by private citizens and,
towards the end of the eighteenth century, by commercial enterprises. The term police was not as widely used, nor was it so conspicuously theorised and advocated as an ‘art of government’ in Britain as it was in central Europe, but this was because the term police was associated with the system of intrigue and court spies of late eighteenth century France. Mitchell Dean has argued that the term may not have had much currency because eighteenth century England had clearly defined levels of central and local government. However, as he and others have demonstrated, there was much in the spirit and the practice of the government of populations such as the poor that was consistent with European definitions of police: husbanding those who could contribute to the local economy, excising those who could not, and regarding all matters of social, economic and political life as legitimately within the scope of the sovereign to regulate and enhance.

The recruitment and deployment of military forces were an adjunct to this government of police. The use of impressment as a means of manning the Navy and Army in times of war was a typical measure of police, and was upheld by jurists like Blackstone who argued that it must ‘reside in the crown alone’. So too were the various statutes that encouraged local magistrates by way of financial commissions to provide men for the local recruiting parties, or to pardon criminals in return for lifetime service in the Navy or Army. As well, these magistrates could call upon locally stationed regiments to assist them in keeping the peace in the face of disorderly mobs. Thus the military forces were an integral part of a more general management of the population which was designed to maintain security, both externally and internally. This close linkage between the governmental strategies for the maintenance of internal order, and the capacity to wage war are characteristic of eighteenth

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4Dean, *Constitution of Poverty*, p. 60.

century government, and these two objectives are the goal of the cameralist theorists of the ‘absolutist’ governments of Europe as they are for English proposals for the recruitment of the Army and Navy from the late seventeenth century until the early nineteenth.

For example, Radzinowicz notes an English pamphlet written in 1706 which argued for the need to systematically absorb ‘anti-social elements’ of the population into the Army. This was already possible under statutes that sanctioned the forced enlistment of those who had been sentenced for crimes, but as Radzinowicz says, ‘the project of 1706 went further by suggesting that such an expedient should be adopted as a permanent measure of preventative police’. This proposal was intended to make the raising of men for the Army more systematic, and at the same time less harmful to the community by ensuring that the productive members of the community were exempted and that the idle were absorbed. Such a proposal was exemplary of the sorts of concerns more commonly associated with the absolutist states of Europe. The dual concerns of protecting the productive citizens whilst maintaining a strong Army are echoed later in the century in Prussian canton regulations which ‘express pride in the organisation of the Prussian state in which ‘beside the mightiest and most formidable Army, all the arts of peace bloom,...and many classes of subjects are hardly disturbed’’. Similarly Frederick the Great advised his son that ‘Useful hardworking people should be guarded as the apple of one’s eye, and in wartime recruits should be levied in one’s own country only when the bitterest necessity compels’. In Prussia, as in England, these two strategies operated alongside each other, and actions targeted at the ‘disorderly’ were the obverse of the eudaemonic practices directed at the productive.

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6 Radzinowicz, vol. 2, 1956, p. 23
The 1706 Discourse is remarkable for the way in which it indicates the workings of English government; it establishes the right of the magistrate to determine the fate of those who are ‘unknown in the parish’. It also demonstrates the relative (not absolute) importance placed on ‘family life’ and indicates the function that impressment with the Army was thought to serve:

If the Recruits were managed in this manner, it would not only be no prejudice, but a great advantage to the Nation and have the same good effect upon it that Physick has upon the body, when it carries off its ill Humors."

Rather than husbanded, the disorderly are to be excised or redistributed according to the benefit they might provide to the productive sectors of the community.

The way in which the military, poor and criminal populations were managed as adjuncts to one another was characteristic of this police, which Dean describes as establishing ‘great strategies of formation of the population as one of the central preconditions of capitalist social and property relations, and a resource for the liberal revolution in government which sought to secure them’. In part this ‘liberal revolution’ would be fuelled by the haphazard and inefficient manner in which such a police operated, dependant as it was upon the wealthy and well-educated in the local population who carried out numbers of police functions, particularly those of the local magistrate and constable. In part, the demise of police would be hastened by the range of

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9Radzinowicz, vol. 2, 1956, p.25. There are a number of examples of the marginal role played by ‘the family’ for the pauper; the 1706 Discourse advocates that ‘A married man or a widower with a family of children should never be chosen. “unless it should so happen that they are such notorious incorrigible Rogues...that the Parish had rather maintain their Wives and Children than be troubled any longer with them”’. Radzinowicz, vol. 2, 1956, p. 24. See also his discussion of the treatment of vagrant women with children under the Vagrancy Act of 1744: “whereas persons are often found offending against this Act, having children with them, whom they bring up to a dissolute Course of Life...prejudicial to the Kingdom, in which a race of disorderly persons will increase...’ the Act empowers Justices of Quarter Sessions to place their children, if over the age of seven, as servants or apprentices to anyone who would take them. Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 19. After a certain age, these children could then be turned over to the recruiting sergeants, under provisions of the same act.

10Dean, Constitution of Poverty. p. 66.
difficult and unintended effects it produced, which we can see in relation to the military forces of the period.

The Military as Receptacle

Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the locus of responsibility for managing the population was the parish. In the Vagrancy Act of 1744, which attempted to consolidate and clarify laws relating to both the criminal and the indigent, 'the responsibilities of the parishes which, despite their lack of real administrative resources, were still looked upon as the key to local enforcement, were laid down in great detail'.

Local magistrates were also responsible for regulating the productive population within their district, determining whom among the itinerant population should be encouraged to stay in the parish and who should not. For at the same time as regulating this productive population, the local parish also had to fund the various forms of relief that were offered to the sick and needy, and so had an interest in keeping the numbers of persons 'on relief' to a minimum as they were a drain on parish resources:

The whole history of the administration of parish relief during this period of parish domination is the history of a long struggle between their moral and financial responsibility for the Poor—a struggle in which the desire to keep the rates low was the victor.

The parish therefore devoted considerable attention to questions of eligibility for relief and assistance, for there was no obligation on the parish to assist anyone who did not have settlement in the parish; whilst an itinerant labourer would be welcome in a parish whilst working, he would be forced to return to his original parish when out of work. By the end of the eighteenth century various attempts to standardise the assistance to the poor

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12 Dorothy Marshall, *The English Poor in the Eighteenth Century: a study in social and administrative history*, London: Routledge, 1926, p. 13. See also Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 22: 'Not only was the catching of a vagrant unpopular, troublesome and sometimes perilous undertaking, but many constables who kept public houses or shops and had vagrants amongst their best customers, found it in their interest rather to encourage than molest them'; and Dean, *Constitution of Poverty*, chapter 3.
meant that 'parish authorities kept a stricter watch than ever on immigrants... Lawsuits between parishes were incessant, and in 1815 the money spent on litigation and the removal of paupers reached the gigantic figure of £287,000'.

In this preventative police centred on the parish, magistrates, who 'would best know who are the troublesome and disorderly People in [the parish]', occupied a pivotal role in the distribution of the population between the workhouse, private employers, the prison and the Army or Navy. A proposal in 1782 suggested that magistrates 'all meet from time to time to co-ordinate their actions in matters affecting public order, and should be given power to send "disorderly persons, rogues, vagabonds and persons charged with small offences into His Majesty's service by sea or land"'. Given the absence of a concern in most parishes for a husbanding of resourceful potential parishioners, the removal of persons from the parish into the Army or Navy was no more extreme than other measures to diminish the parish's responsibility for the poor. Indeed, there were considerable incentives to incorporate service in the Army or Navy into local police activities. The Recruitment Act of 1796 was typical of those of the period, and established a table of financial incentives and fines for magistrates, constables, and parish officers who were to assist with the recruitment of able-bodied men and financial rewards for other persons providing information on possible recruits.

In this calculus, decisions about the pauper population were made in terms of financial incentives and penalties. Parish government was organised in terms of how likely any person was to 'become chargeable' to the parish, for the Act of Settlement passed in 1662 gave overseers the right to remove persons who could not rent a tenement worth £10 a year if they were 'likely to be

13 Hammond and Hammond, The Village Labourer, pp. 154-155
15 See the discussion in Hammond and Hammond, The Village Labourer, p. 128-130.
16 Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 90
chargeable to the parish’. This form of preventative police had the effect of targeting ‘persons who might be expected to breed a charge on the parish’, and was particularly vicious in its treatment of pregnant but unmarried women.\(^\text{17}\) It was also acknowledged to have the effect of discouraging the marriage of labourers, for fear that the consequence of these marriages would only be more charges upon the rates; this led, unsurprisingly, to an increase in illegitimate births and consequently created a large pool of children for whom the parish had responsibility. Here too, a careful calculation was made of the long term costs of maintaining the child against a once-off payment to a master in another parish where these children were placed as apprentices. The advantage in this scheme was that the child would, after forty days, become the responsibility of the master’s parish. Marshall argues that the payment of a fee to the master acted as an incentive to insolvent masters to take on too many apprentices, thus ‘pauperising’ certain industries and limiting the likelihood that the apprentice would learn any useful skills.\(^\text{18}\)

In addition it encouraged the calculation of the child as a saleable asset; for the master who had taken on the child for the premium, or the reluctant parishioner who had had to take the apprentice or pay the parish a fine of £10, the Army and Navy recruiting parties must have appeared very attractive, ‘since all the boy’s wages, and even his prize money, were legally the property of his master’.\(^\text{19}\)

This aspect of government, the police of the parish, informed the organisation of the Army and Navy in three ways; the first was that it made the Army and Navy ‘receptacles’ for the disorderly of the parish, thus establishing certain preconditions for the maintenance of discipline within the services. The

\(^{17}\)Marshall, *English Poor*, pp. 166; 212.

\(^{18}\)Marshall, *English Poor*, pp. 186-200. ‘The tendency was for parish children to be apprenticed only to such trades as were already semi-pauperised, or else to some blind alley occupation, such as milk selling or button moulding, which was carried on entirely by this legalised form of child labour, and where there was no possible opening for them when they became adults’. p. 197. This practice was still used when the Poor Law Commissioners presented their report in 1834; as one witness said: ‘the practice of binding children at nine years of age compulsorily...was very general, and still prevails in many parts of Cornwall, Somerset and Devon, so as to form a leading characteristic in the county.’ p. 187.

\(^{19}\)Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 82.
second was that, given the level of intervention into peoples' lives possible within this form of government (the forced repatriation to parishes of settlement, apprenticing of children, discouragement of marriage), there were no strong norms of 'family life' or 'freedom of action' against which service in the Army or Navy could be characterised as deprivations. The third was that consigning individuals to service in the Army or Navy on the basis that it was financially attractive to both individuals parishioners and to the parish officers, which was consistent with the calculus applied to those 'likely to become chargeable on the parish', focussed the issue of recruitment around the distribution of financial incentives and penalties.

In the face of an increasingly difficult to manage population, and an active policing of the parish, the courts were overburdened with criminals and undersupplied with places to send them. The practice of pardoning criminals in return for service in the armed forces was a long standing one, with various acts and administrative orders used to commute prison sentences into service (for life or shorter periods) in the Army or Navy dating from the seventeenth century. The Mutiny Acts of 1701 and 1703 established that criminals sentenced to imprisonment, transportation or death could be pardoned on condition that they enter the Army or Navy 'for life or otherwise, as His Majesty shall think fit'. This practice was reaffirmed in a number of acts passed during the eighteenth century.\(^\text{20}\) The use of the services as part of the strategy of police was thus advocated by those responsible for sentencing offenders, as this practice performed two important functions for the management of the criminal population in Britain: it reduced the pressure on the gaols, which were severely overcrowded, and provided an acceptable mitigation of the death sentence, which was the statutory punishment for a vast range of crimes. This practice was to continue into the nineteenth century; a Parliamentary Committee investigating the practice in 1812 found that considerable numbers of

criminals were still being drafted into service.\textsuperscript{21} Under the pressure created by an active policing of the population, the continuing need for recruits and the absence of penal colonies, Radzinowicz comments that this convenient interchangeability between the penalties of death, transportation or imprisonment and forcible enlistment in the Army or Navy became established by statutory authority and administrative precedent, with impressment emerging as a powerful measure of crime prevention and a \textit{de facto} legal sanction. Like transportation, it provided protection and a sense of security by long term elimination of offenders from society, as well as satisfying a national need.\textsuperscript{22}

Impressment and the enlistment of convicted criminals formed one extreme of a continuum of coerced recruitment into the military - poverty could be said to be equally coercive for the large number of voluntary recruits who 'took the king's shilling'. For the population from which soldiers and sailors were drawn, the fact that almost all recruitment into the military was coerced made it little different from one's experience as a recipient of Poor relief, as an apprentice or indentured labourer. Thus there was little concern that impressment interfered with the liberty of the individual being impressed, except in the cases of those individuals who might mistakenly be picked up by press-gangs or recruiting sergeants. Enlistment acts were framed with exclusions for certain classes of persons, with provisions to allow individuals to contest their enlistment in court and to find substitutes to go in their place. For example, the Act passed in 1795 to increase the number of persons in the Navy was entitled 'An Act for enabling the Magistrates, in the several Counties in Great Britain, to raise and levy...such able-bodied and idle persons as shall be found within the said Counties to serve in His Majesty's Navy', and it exhorted the justices of the peace to 'use their utmost Care and Diligence that his Majesty's Service...be not neglected or disappointed'.\textsuperscript{23} This

\textsuperscript{21}See Parliamentary debate on the 'Convicts Discharged upon Entering the Army or Navy', \textit{Parliamentary Debates} (1812) Vol. 21, cols 1253-1258.
\textsuperscript{22}Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 96.
\textsuperscript{23}Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 90.
statute and one passed the following year sought to recruit nearly ten thousand men from the counties and twenty thousand from the ports, yet there was little danger that this would result in a threat to liberty; the pressure to send those who would otherwise be a burden to the local area was considerable and ‘the scheme soon degenerated into a sort of minor gaol-delivery. The counties tended to select their ‘bad boys’, their vagrants, tramps and idlers...The town and city authorities sent worse types still- their undesirables; beggars; minor thieves and pickpockets, or people who looked as though they might be pickpockets’. 24

A further example. In 1850 Admiral Berkeley noted that ‘he had endeavoured to trace the objections of the men to [impressment], and he had been able to find only one petition from them against it. That petition was presented in 1760, and he had no doubt that the same spirit animated them now which animated them then. That petition wound up by stating that if it could be shown that impressment was the only mode of manning the Navy, so anxious were they for the honour of the country, that they would submit to it without a murmur.’ 25 The absence of petitions over impressment includes the period of the naval mutinies of 1797, and Gill observes that:

it is surprising...to find that the mutineers made no attempt to abolish impressment, and in their negotiations with the Admiralty, showed no sign that they regarded the system as unjust or undesirable. The only mention that appears in the official records is a demand of the Nore mutineers that two months’ wages should be paid in advance to pressed men to provide themselves with an outfit. 26

As well, there were objections to the quota system of recruiting introduced under the Acts of 1795 and 1796, not because it tended to act as way of rounding up undesirables, but because these ‘quota-men’ were reputed to have received considerable sums of money in the parishes’ efforts to fill their quota: ‘The seamen who voluntarily enlisted in 1793, and fought some of the

most glorious of our battles, received only the comparatively small bounty of £5. These brave fellows saw men, totally ignorant of the profession, the very refuse and outcasts of Society, fleeing from justice and the vengeance of the Law, come on board with bounty to the amount of £70.²⁷

Amongst the rank and file, impressment did not constitute the basis of any widespread revolt, although there were occasions on which sections of the Army were required to quell mutinies amongst newly-recruited regiments, some of whom may have been impressed.²⁸ Though there was undoubted hardship associated with service in the Army or Navy, and the severing of links with families, the ‘disorderly’ class recruited into the Army in particular, did not enjoy a great sense of liberty when roaming unemployed through towns and villages that considered them a danger.

The preventative police of the eighteenth century was often characterised by the use of force, and the practices of the Army were little different from those of the charity school, the master towards his young apprentice, or parishes towards those who looked like they (or their offspring) were going to be chargeable on the rates. Glover discusses the enthusiasm for recruiting boys from 1797 and the incentives, as we have mentioned before, for adults to bring these boys to the recruiters’ attention: ‘the whole thing smells of an unpleasant and bibulous trade in children’, but, he notes, ‘this recruiting of boys antedates even the first Factory Act by twelve years...These children taken into military life need not necessarily have been worse off than those employed in civil life’.²⁹ The sorts of deprivations that one might argue for the impressed pauper were not necessarily formulated as such: ‘family life’,

²⁷Lewis, p. 122. The issue of the quota system is usually raised in terms of its ‘political’ implications, in that historians of the Mutinies argue over whether these quota-men were the instigators of the mutinies, as they tended to be better educated, and in some cases were associated with political organisations such as the London Corresponding Society. See Roger Wells, Insurrection, the British Experience 1795-1803, Gloucester: Alan Sutton, 1983, chapter 5.
‘childhood’, education, privacy, freedom of movement and regulated working hours were still to take on the forms that we would recognise in the twentieth century. A variety of campaigns would, over the next hundred years, establish these elements as critical to a well-governed society; at least until the mid-nineteenth century, these elements were marginal if not irrelevant in assessing service life.\textsuperscript{30}

Impressment and coerced recruitment were more strongly objected to as interfering with the good government of the Army. Commanding officers disliked being sent recruits who had received pardons from gaol sentences, and Wellington is famous for his descriptions of the Army as ‘the scum of the earth’. But here the problem is not with the capacity of these impressed men to fight, for Wellington could also say that ‘I certainly have had every reason to be satisfied with the Army, and I should say that they are to be relied on in all cases’, but with the difficulty of controlling the quality of recruit.\textsuperscript{31} Sir Edward Codrington’s ‘objection to impressment was, that under the pretence of impressing, it gave an opportunity of sending all the rogues and vagabonds in the country that the Magistrates were anxious to get rid of on board the fleet...and on looking to the hands of these men, he found that they were as soft as those of young ladies’.\textsuperscript{32} These men were good fighters but they were difficult to control, and as a result the focus of ‘managing’ this population was the imposition of effective punishments, for ‘who could wonder that, under such a system as this, severity of discipline was necessary to maintain anything like order or decorum?’\textsuperscript{33}

In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, punishment for all but the most serious crimes was a variable number of lashes from the cat o’ nine tails

\textsuperscript{30}See, for example, Jacques Donzelot, \textit{The Policing of Families: welfare versus the state}, London, Hutchinson, 1980; see also the statement by Hew Strachan: ‘The gradually improving position of the soldier’s wife...was due to the growing awareness of the correlation between marriage and good conduct’: \textit{Wellington’s Legacy: the reform of the British Army 1830-54}, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984, p. 64.

\textsuperscript{31}Quoted in Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 156.


\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Parliamentary Debates}, Third Series, vol. 20 (1833), cols 645-646.
before the assembled regiment. In the mid 1800s, when the brutality and excessive use of flogging became the subject of public outrage and parliamentary debate, military authorities defended the continued use of flogging on the basis that it was appropriate given the class of men who made up the Army. The ‘licentious and undisciplined’ population justified the use of punishments as spectacles that were as much for the benefit of the potential offenders in the audience as the offender himself: flogging, hangings, branding all worked on the premise that the punishment could serve the two purposes of reminding the offender of his crime and deterring others by example. The difficulty with this form of punishment was not so much that it was ‘inhumane’, but that it was arbitrary, and open to abuse. The naval mutineers of 1797 made this point when they argued to the Admiralty: ‘we do not wish you to understand that we have the least intention of encroaching on the punishments necessary for the preservation of good order and discipline necessary to be preserved in H.M. Navy, but to crush the spirit of tyranny and oppression so much practised and delighted in, contrary to the spirit or intent of any laws of our country’. In this case, as in many others that were to come to light during the debates on flogging some fifty years later, the variability in the numbers of lashes that different officers would impose for different offences, coupled with the greater or lesser strength and experience of the man administering the lashes meant that the effect of punishments was entirely arbitrary, leading to a variety of results, including the unintended death of the person being punished. Despite the campaigns that were mounted with increasing success through the middle years of the nineteenth century, the Army did not finally abolish flogging until 1881.

Those who wished to preserve it as a means of enforcing discipline continued

34 Alan Skelley describes the practice thus: ‘The cat usually had nine lashes of whipcord or rawhide sixteen to twenty-four inches long with three knots in each lash which together cut a man a total of twenty-seven times with each stroke. To receive a flogging soldiers were tied to halberds or to triangles on the parade square...The entire regiment was normally paraded to witness the event and one of the soldier’s comrades wielded the cat.’ Alan Ramsey Skelley, *The Victorian Army at Home: the recruitment and terms and conditions of the British Regular, 1859-1899*. London: Croom Helm, 1977, pp. 171-2, note 108.

35 Quoted in Gill, p. 278

to argue with decreasing conviction that the quality of the recruits to the Army continued to justify maintaining flogging as a last resort.\textsuperscript{37}

Given that impressment registered as a problem for the internal management of the Army, the impressment of convicts complicated this management, partly because convicts were said to be harder to discipline and partly because ‘it would further introduce great uneasiness and confusion into the service if these convicts should be put into H.M.’s regiments for a limited time, when the honest volunteer engages to serve for life'.\textsuperscript{38} The practice of recruiting from prisons had the effect of bifurcating the populations of the Army and Navy into criminals and non-criminals, which as distinct classes could be mixed in varying proportions to varying effects. For the services, then, this practice produced two organisational problems. On the one hand, there was the issue of contamination: ‘so that a ship of war, instead of being the home, as she ought to be, of a superior class of men...was converted into a receptacle of the violators of the law, where criminals of every shade and hue were to mingle in one common mass, till each contaminated the other’.\textsuperscript{39} On the other hand, the problem was one of carefully managing the opportunities for reformation:

It would be much better if [convicts] were placed at first in those particular corps, which had been set apart for them. In that case, if they behaved well, it might be allowed to them, as a great reward for their good conduct, to enter into some regular regiment of the line. This would be a great reward to them...[also] it would not be considered nearly so degrading to the regular regiments, to have men come in among them recommended by their good conduct’.\textsuperscript{40}

The existence of this criminal population within the Army meant that those who had enlisted voluntarily could be protected from service in the more unpleasant garrisons: ‘the forces to be stationed on the unhealthy West Coast of Africa should be supplied rather “with such men as must look upon that

\textsuperscript{37}Skelley, p. 152.
\textsuperscript{39}Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, vol. 20 (1833), col. 645.
\textsuperscript{40}British Parliamentary Papers, vol. 21 (1812), col. 1257.
duty as a mitigation of their sentences than with well-deserving volunteers". The New South Wales Corps sent to that Colony in the early 1790s included ‘prisoners from military penal establishments, and, in some cases...convicts from English gaols’.

Impressment and coercive recruitment constituted an problem of internal order, manifest in the legal framework regulating the conduct of members of the armed forces. The fear, or perhaps expectation that sections of the Army might at any time become uncontrollable, and that individuals would at all times attempt to desert was reflected in the death penalty for desertion (the consequence of such final measures, and their failure to deter, meant regular amnesties for deserters to rejoin their regiments which were always short of men), and transportation for those who assisted deserters. It was also manifest in the complex legal formulations surrounding the duties of soldiers deployed to keep the peace and in legal argument on the use of martial and military law. Soldiers were doubly constrained by the workings of civil and military law, and this manifests itself most clearly, and paradoxically, in circumstances where the Army is called in to keep the peace. In such cases the Army was assisting the local magistrate to keep the peace, and could only act to disperse the crowd at the magistrate’s instigation. In certain cases, the magistrate would fail to be present after having summoned the soldiers; in that instance, there was a dilemma for the men and their commanding officer. If the officer, without a magistrate present, gave an order to disperse the crowd with force, ‘it reduces the soldier to a choice between the hanging-awarded to him by the Local Law—for obeying his Officer, and the shooting-awarded him by the military law—for disobeying his Officer’. The discomfort afforded the soldier by this dual standard arose as a consequence

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of the need to indemnify the public, and commanding officers, against the unruliness of the soldier.

Similarly, the sanctions appropriate to maintaining discipline within the Army were (and still are) considered entirely inappropriate to the non-military community. The imposition of martial law, it was argued, was possible only in the gravest necessity, and ‘the instant the necessity ceases, that instant the state of soldiership ought to cease, and the rights with the relations, of civil life, to be restored’.

For soldiers, though, the state of soldiership did not cease, and military officers claimed the right to continue to use more summary methods in dealing with insubordination:

if five or six regiments were to mutiny in the field, would anyone tell me you must apply to Parliament before you could reduce those persons to subjection? There must be somewhere, for public safety, a right to exercise such power in time of need.

As Dundas notes, martial law was also likely to be imposed in British colonies (as it was in New South Wales), where military governors sought to control a primarily military population. The right to apply a different standard of trial, evidence and punishment is usually considered to be justified by the strictures of war, and presumably the need to maintain the unquestioned authority of the superior officer. But as Clode suggests, these justifications are premised on maintaining order amongst a certain type of soldier:

the continuance of [the supreme power of life and death] during [the reign of William III] and the succeeding reign may probably be accounted for by the fact that the Army during that period was recruited very largely with Foreign Soldiers and with lawless persons from our own gaols...During the last century the political action of the Army had ceased, but the morale of the Recruits remained—as the source of supply did—the same. Nor had the character of those who joined the service very considerably improved in 1836, when the Duke of Wellington assured the Commissioners on Military Punishments

that British Soldiers were taken entirely from the lowest orders of society.\textsuperscript{46}

In the same vein, Lord Loughborough said in support of the military continuing to be governed by the Mutiny Acts: ‘there is nothing so dangerous to the civil establishment of a state, as a licentious and undisciplined Army’.\textsuperscript{47}

That impressment was appropriate to police does not mean that it was indiscriminately applied or universally accepted, but rather that assessments of the practice would be made in terms of a variety of ‘rationalities’. For example, individuals could protest against the illegal or unfair usage of impressment, a course pursued by men who could demonstrate that they were gentlemen, as ‘gentlemen were expressly exempted’.\textsuperscript{48} One manner in which this ineligibility was demonstrated was by the appearance of the potential recruit. In justifying the impressment of an alleged gentleman before a Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1795, Admiral Markham said that the man ‘looked like a Boatswain;’ however he was overturned when the entire Committee had looked at the man and ‘decided that they “cannot concur in describing his appearance to be at all like that of a Boatswain, or any such inferior officer”, and accordingly pronounced in his favour’.\textsuperscript{49}

This manner of distinguishing between those for whom impressment was proper and those for whom it was not was consistent with a concept of government that could regulate on the basis of appearances and conduct. The capacity to make determinations about people on the basis of appearance was central to the laws which regulated the use of impressment as an adjunct of police, and attempts to control the pauper populations from which recruits were drawn regularly proposed the use of badges and distinguishing marks

\textsuperscript{47}Quoted in Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 125.
\textsuperscript{48}Lewis, p. 57.
\textsuperscript{49}Lewis, p. 57.
so as to discriminate between the deserving and undeserving poor. Distinguishing marks were also used within the services. Until 1871 it was possible to brand soldiers with the letters BC for Bad Character or D for Deserter; this practice was justified ‘as a means of identifying deserters and of preventing fraudulent enlistments’. Such marks were to assist in the cases where the local magistrates could not rely on their own capacities of ‘recognisance’; more generally this system of relying on the perceptions of magistrates and recruiting officers was considered so successful that impressment would only seize those ‘with something of the vagabond in their character’.

The governmental strategy to which these modes of managing the military population belonged was to come under increasing scrutiny during the course of the nineteenth century. From the mid-nineteenth century the Army was regularly unable to recruit sufficient numbers of men to meet its needs. Having operated as a ‘receptacle for the criminal and idle’ throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the Royal Commission on Recruitment argued in 1861 that the Army could only expect to get Recruits from among those few who may, naturally, have a predilection for a Soldier’s life, or those who may be induced to adopt it either for domestic reasons, or when, by fluctuations of trade, or the adverse influence of the seasons on agricultural operations, they are deprived of other employment.

Before turning to the reforms which arose from the military’s long association with this aspect of police, we need to look at the other principal use of the Army in the eighteenth century as a force for maintaining internal order. This role, coupled with the ‘disorderly soldiery’ had important consequences for the reform programmes of the nineteenth century.

51 Spiers, p. 62. This branding did in fact often involve the use of tattoos.
52 George Haldane, quoted in Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 87.
The Army and the problem of internal order

The second role that the Army played in the mechanisms of police was as a peace keeping force in Britain and Ireland. Troop movements in England, and the distribution of garrisons in Ireland reflected the centres of actual and potential unrest. In England, rioting was a common political form throughout the eighteenth century, and ‘Almost every account, from any part of the country, of serious disturbances...contained a reference to the imposition of the military’. The Army was called in to restore order during riots over lack of food, the imposition of new taxes, and to deal with rising industrial unrest. The Army was also responsible for patrolling for smugglers. These various tasks meant that the Army was constantly on the move and always short of manpower:

There has most frequently been so many applications for detachments from those regiments for the assisting of His Majesty’s officers of the Customs in different parts of the coast and for the quelling of riots in the several manufacturing towns etc, that it has hitherto been found, that number has scarcely been sufficient to answer to these purposes, and at the same time to give alternately some regiments the necessary opportunities of being assembled for the preservation of their discipline.

Attempts were made to diminish the regular Army’s responsibility for police, by encouraging the development of militia and yeomanry forces. The militia proved too unreliable to be used, as they had a tendency to join in the riot, but the yeomanry were retained as ‘they provided the authorities with their one efficient and trustworthy police force. During the industrial disturbances they were the principal auxiliaries to the regular Army’.

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55Report of the Quarter-Master General in 1768, quoted in Hayter, p. 23.
56Hammond and Hammond, The Town Labourer, p. 88. They also make the point that ‘Aristotle and Bacon both remarked the suitability of the cavalry to oligarchy, and when the volunteers were disbanded...the yeomanry were retained.’. See also the discussion of the militia in L.G.Boyd, The Role of the Military in Civil Disorders in England and Wales, 1780-1817, PhD Thesis, University of Tennessee, 1977, p. 126-130, and F.O.Darvall, Popular Disturbances and Public Order in Regency England, being an account of the Luddite and other disorders in England during the years 1811-1817 and of the attitude and activity of the authorities (1934), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 255-257.
assistance of the yeomanry, and with ill-fated attempts to establish a volunteer force that was also unreliable, the Army could not meet the demands of the magistrates without increasing in size. At the end of the eighteenth century, the Army had increased considerably in size, and in 1812 more than 12,000 troops were stationed in the area between Leicester and York alone.

This use of the Army was precarious as it relied on the authority of a magistrate to direct the Army to intervene; in many cases the magistrates were either not present when the Army came up against the assembly they were to disband, or the area in general was so badly served with magistrates that none could be called upon to direct the military. Radzinowicz notes that in the well-known case of the Gordon Riots in 1780, there were no magistrates present to direct the troops, and the military took no action until the Privy Council intervened to issue a general order. This order gave the military the power ‘to Act without waiting for directions from the Civil Magistrates, and to use force for dispersing the illegal and tumultuous assemblies of the people’.57

The practice of using the military as an adjunct to the magistrates in the maintenance of order was continued well into the nineteenth century; troops were still used during Chartist agitation even though a formalised police force had been in existence then for some ten years. The establishment of a specialised institution of preventative police and the gradual diminution in the Army’s use to keep the peace are not the complimentary processes their temporal proximity suggests. The decision to establish a force specifically to detect and prevent crimes was part of programme aimed at establishing a preventative mechanism that was more effective than the tradition of a shared responsibility for watch and ward that had existed for over a century. The Metropolitan Police were to deal with the high levels of crime in London which could not be prevented by the reluctant citizens taking their turns at

nightwatchman duty, and were not being addressed by the Army who were only used in cases of large-scale groups assembling and after crimes had been committed or were in process. The new institution of the Metropolitan Police was prompted by a view that England had ‘outgrown her police institutions’ and that ‘the cheapest and safest course will be found in the introduction of a new mode of protection’. The Army belonged to that old order of police which was no longer adequate to the tasks of maintaining order in the city of London. This shift away from the Army was not representative of any squeamishness about the use of the Army against the disorderly, but rather that they were inadequate to the new regime of preventative police.

At the same time as this gap in the capacities of the old institutions of police appeared, senior military officers expressed concern at the frequency with which the military was resorted to by the magistrates, and the extent to which this made the government reliant on an inherently unstable base. The Duke of Wellington, Commander in Chief of the Army, thought it dangerous to leave the maintenance of order to the Army, and recommended that since soldiers were ‘taken from the ranks, and of the class of the people, and liable to be influenced by the views and sentiments of the people...the Government ought...to form either a police in London or a military corps, which would be of a different description from the regular military force, or both’, because, as Radzinowicz remarks, ‘any mutiny of the regular soldiers would then be of little or no importance’. This new, more specific definition of police was not introduced in order to re-establish the proper role of the Army, but to create a body which could deal in a new way with the problems posed by criminal activity in London and, at the same time, limit the potential damage that the Army, as an unstable population, could have on the exercise of government.

Before any substantial shift in the responsibility for the policing of the population was to occur, the Army undertook a campaign of barrack building.

58Peel, quoted in Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 159.
in direct response to the increase in its policing responsibilities, particularly in the industrial areas of England. The problems posed by the intersection of the governmental strategies of impressment and police manifest themselves most clearly in the decision to undertake a substantial barrack-building program, beginning in the 1790s. Until this large-scale program was undertaken, the greater part of the Army in England and Scotland (but not Ireland, where barracks had been used since the early 1700s) were billeted in public houses licensed to sell alcohol. This practice was continued throughout the eighteenth century and well into the nineteenth century, even though there were regular complaints from commanders that publicans closed their doors as the Army approached in order to avoid the obligation to billet troops, and complaints from publicans that the Army always drank and ate more than they paid for, or that they never paid at all. Despite these complaints, and the difficulties posed to discipline, health and morality by the combination of soldiers and alcohol, the practice was maintained because proposals to develop separate quarters for the troops were always defeated in Parliament by the invoking of Blackstone’s view that the Army ‘should live intermixed with the people; no separate camp, no barracks, no inland fortresses should be allowed’. A more pragmatic view was advanced by William Pulteney in 1741, who acknowledged that

a Standing Army in quarters will always be more troublesome to the people then a Standing Army in barracks; but for this very reason I shall always be for keeping our Army in quarters, that the people may be sensible of the fetters which are preparing for them...I am for keeping our Army in their view, by having the soldiers quartered among them. If the soldiers were all kept in barracks the people would be insensible of their numbers, and might not perhaps think of reducing them by law... These ‘principles’ gave way to a different set of concerns late in the century, when:

The circumstances of the country, coupled with the general state of affairs, rendered it advisable to provide barracks...A spirit had

appeared in some of the manufacturing towns which made it necessary that troops should be kept near them...It would also operate as a preventive of the seduction of the Army.\textsuperscript{62}

The architecture of the barrack appeared at this intersection of concerns to provide both a means of intimidating the local inhabitants and of disciplining the troops, and a vigorous building programme was undertaken so that 'by 1815 a hundred and fifty-five barracks had been built to contain 17,000 cavalry and 138,000 infantry. Troops were distributed all over the country, and the north and Midlands and the manufacturing region came to resemble a country under military occupation'.\textsuperscript{63}

The barrack building programme of the 1790s is explained by some historians as a direct response to the threat of a French invasion, demonstrated by the concentration of barracks in the southern part of England, and the foreign circumstances at the time.\textsuperscript{64} Fear of invasion may have influenced barrack placement, but not the decision to accommodate the Army in this particular manner. The building of special purpose quarters was justified by arguing the barracks were a measure very favourable to discipline; for though the soldiers were at stated hours obliged to retire to their quarters, yet when they were quartered in a public house, this regulation could not be enforced...But this could not occur in barracks, which were equally conducive to the health and morals of the troops lodged in them.\textsuperscript{65}

The first Barrack-Master General later justified the Government’s programme on the basis of ‘the great advantage arising from the mode of establishing barracks throughout the kingdom having become evident’.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{62}Parliamentary History, vol. 30 (1792-1794) col 495.
\textsuperscript{63}Hammond and Hammond, The Town Labourer, p. 85.
\textsuperscript{64}This is most thoughtfully argued by Boyd, chapter 6, who argues that the distribution of barracks was primarily designed to respond to the threat of a French invasion. See also Skelley who states that ‘With the outbreak of the French revolutionary wars extensive barrack construction was undertaken’ (Skelley, p. 28, see also Spiers, p. 58).
\textsuperscript{65}Parliamentary History, vol. 30 (1792-1794), col. 479.
It is not a simple matter to determine how it was that the advantages of barracks had become self-evident. Barracks were in use in England in some of the larger towns, but as accommodation they were uniformly deficient.\textsuperscript{67} From as early as early as 1707 a letter written to the King spoke of ‘the garrison of Portsmouth, where, by reason of...the sickness of the place, the want of firing, and the badness of the barracks, the regiment was reduced by death and desertion to about one-half of their number’.\textsuperscript{68} In 1774 a report on the barracks at Limerick found them ‘condemned near Twenty Years, the Stairs, floors, windows and Doors very bad’.\textsuperscript{69} In Ireland, barracks were built and maintained by the Barrack Board and the Board of Works. These bodies were the subject of four parliamentary committees during the eighteenth century, all of which found them wanting. This may be why an Act passed in the 1760s gave the Barrack Commissioners the power to sell barracks that had ‘gone into ruin and decay’.\textsuperscript{70} Against this image of disrepair, the advocates of barracks were unlikely to argue that, as accommodation, the advantages of barracks were evident, and yet the critics of barracks seemed disinclined to use this catalogue of failure as a means of arguing against barracks. Indeed, concerns about barracks as accommodation were muted until after the Crimean War, when a number of investigations into the health of the Army revealed how unhealthy most of the barrack accommodation was.\textsuperscript{71} In 1837 the United Services Journal argued that ‘At present the jails and bride vells are far beyond [barracks]; and they rank only with asylums for the insane or some of the new poor-houses’, and other commentators compared barracks unfavourably to slave ships.\textsuperscript{72} At the time the decision was taken to establish barracks, comfort and cleanliness were not an important element in calculating their advantages.

\textsuperscript{67} See Houlding, p. 40-41.
\textsuperscript{68} Quoted in Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, vol. 1, p. 222.
\textsuperscript{69} Quoted in Houlding, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{71} See Spiers, p. 57.
\textsuperscript{72} Quoted in Strachan, Wellington’s Legacy, p. 60.
The register in which the advantages of barracks were manifest was in terms of their ability to overcome the principal difficulties arising from the Army’s role as an adjunct of police; again, Ireland provided a longstanding example. In keeping with this police role, by 1740 most large towns in Ireland had a barracks, the building of which was often encouraged by the local landowners; as a result, small barracks were ‘placed in various parts of the kingdom at the solicitation or by the interests of gentlemen whose estates were to be benefited by soldiers being resident upon them’. Their use by landowners to maintain order meant that they were usually small, and built ‘without regard to a military arrangement of the troops’. The use of barracks in the various districts in which the Army exercised its control doubtless added to its ability to overawe the local population, but the Army’s policing role meant that it was often widely dispersed and the barracks it used were of varying sizes, some only large enough to accommodate a company. Nevertheless, in the major towns, the barracks were substantial, and the barracks in Dublin accommodated the largest peacetime concentration of regular regiments in the British Isles. A tour of duty in Dublin provided the opportunity for corps to regain proficiency they may have lost while engaged in peace-keeping activities around the country:

When in 1777 the 11th, 30th and 32nd Foot arrived from typical dispersed quarters to begin a tour on the Dublin duty, the commanding officers of these corps ‘represented to the Commander in Chief, that as the Companies of their respective regiments had been widely distributed into County Cantonments’, they would require from a month to six weeks ‘to establish their regiments in uniformity of discipline’ before they could possibly be inspected.

Advocates of barracks for England needed to be careful in citing the Irish example, as their opponents could argue that the use of barracks made little appreciable difference to the notoriously poor discipline of the Irish Army.

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74 McCracken, p. 83.
75 Houlding, p. 55-56.
which the then Commander-in-Chief Abercromby immortalised by charging that it was, in 1795, ‘in a state of licentiousness which must render it formidable to everyone but the enemy’. This was understood at the time to be explained in part by the onerous police duties for which the Army was responsible, for towards the end of the century, it was recognised that in some parts of Ireland ‘the soldiery is the only magistracy in real authority’. It was also fuelled by a belief that within the Army, especially the militia units, were numbers of disaffected soldiers who were secretly supportive of the Defenders and the United Irishmen.

The way in which this disaffection and ‘general licentiousness’ was dealt with gives us some indication of why the advocates of barracks might have seen them as effective, even in the face of the apparent chaos of 1797 in Ireland. Barracks were effective as a visible manifestation of power; in a pamphlet distributed to soldiers in 1792, the United Irishmen described barracks as ‘the very symbol of a Bastille’. Not just symbolic, barracks were central to the disciplinary task of regulating the activities of loyal troops, and to the conduct of courts martial, floggings and executions of those found guilty of sedition and fomenting mutiny. Also, threats posed by the possible recruitment of soldiers to seditious groups were met by the military authorities reinforcing ‘traditional’ means of dealing with indiscipline, including ‘a flurry of orders insisting that troops wear proper dress, avoid taverns, and remain in barracks after retreat’. These methods went some way towards dissipating the threat of widespread insurrection (as did the practice of sending disaffected troops to the West Indies), and Bartlett adds that ‘as for indiscipline, there were no easy answers; but even here a modest start was made from the greater concentration of troops in large garrisons’.

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76 Houlding, p. 56.
78 Bartlett, p. 123.
79 Bartlett, p. 126.
80 Bartlett, p. 131.
The use of barracks in Ireland, and their limited use in England and Scotland gives an incomplete picture of why they seemed so appropriate to the difficulties of the Army in the late 1700s. They rather imperfectly provided the troops with accommodation and they symbolised the instrument of internal order, even as that was beginning to transfer to the more carefully targeted institution of the Metropolitan Police. Despite the imperfections, and limited contribution the Army would in future make to police, barracks endured because their institutional form was to promise the possibility of (re)forming the Army as well as accommodating it. In this way barracks could control the Army’s own unruly population as well as that of the industrial towns. Sharing much the same population, barracks had a place beside workhouses, prisons and asylums in the late eighteenth century, when, as Donnelly reminds us

for all these areas of social policy the design and management of ‘institutions’ or ‘residential establishments’ were immediate concerns; and for future planning the ‘institutional question’ was becoming ever more significant...not simply in matters of ventilation and drainage, but also in ‘moral architecture’, and in the use of institutions for the reform of character.81

The Basis of Nineteenth Century Reform

The Army’s future association with the institutional reform of character proceeded upon its incorporation in the strategies of eighteenth century government. The barracks, which developed at the intersection of the two uses of the Army as receptacle and instrument of force, would be the focal site for the development of the ‘modern’ Army. The effects of the Army’s

incorporation in the strategies of police formed the conditions for the emergence of the new forms of organisation that would be more consistent with the governmental strategies of the nineteenth century: the need for a different basis of recruiting, more effective forms of punishment, the institution of incentives to retain volunteers where impressed men could formerly be compelled. With these new objectives for the government of the military population, the retention and improvement of barracks as a site of moral reform, education, the development of esprit de corps and intensive physical training was assured.

In part the reform program of the mid-nineteenth century was driven by the failures of barracks to live up to the promise they had initially held. In 1855 the Barrack Accommodation Committee found that barracks 'have been generally inadequate both for the comfort and convenience of the soldiers, and for the creation of a higher tone of social habits amongst them...\textsuperscript{82} The earlier concerns of providing a means of segregating the soldier from the civilian population meant that many barracks were built without adequate ventilation and sanitation, and provided only the most basic accommodation in overcrowded rooms that had to serve as sleeping, eating and recreational spaces. Increasingly, the simple provision of adequate rations and a roof over the heads of the soldiers was not enough; the barracks needed to be contributing to the moral reformation of those who lived within them. Numerous reports on barracks throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century stressed the importance of improving both the accommodation of the soldier and the extent to which the barracks provided recreational and educational facilities.\textsuperscript{83}

After the Crimean War, reformers led by Florence Nightingale and Sidney Herbert focussed their attention on the poor condition of most of the barracks in England. While the concern for the British Regular had begun with the

\textsuperscript{82} Skelley, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{83} Skelley, p. 163.
disastrous conditions endured by the Army during the Crimean War, reforms were able to continue the campaign to improve the collective health of the rank and file after the war because barracks provided the perfect vehicle for the collection of statistics on health and mortality, the monitoring of the habits of the soldier and the opportunity for instituting reforms. Initially improvements were focussed on increasing the ventilation and cleanliness of barracks, and on determining the amount of cubic space to which the soldier should be entitled. Many of the buildings housing troops were old and difficult to adapt to meet the new standards. In addition, there was considerable reluctance to spend the necessarily large sums of money that would be required to make significant improvements. Even by the end of the nineteenth century, the Army Sanitary Committee estimated that millions of pounds needed to be spent to improve the condition of barracks, which had been neglected throughout the century.

Barracks were intended to provide an opportunity to monitor the on and off-duty activities of the soldier, and to provide him with a controlled environment in which to enjoy his limited leisure time. With the barracks came the canteen, which sold beer and spirits to the soldiers, and was for some time the only place for soldiers to go when off-duty. The existence of these canteens, and the extent to which they encouraged men to drink was strongly criticised by the growing temperance movements of the mid-nineteenth century. While one of the initial arguments for the erection of barracks had been the desire to remove soldiers from the temptations of the public house in which they were billeted, the barracks were seen by many to be perpetuating similar dangers. Reformers sought to offer other diversions for the soldier; amongst these were the encouragement of various sports (though rarely with funding for necessary equipment) and the introduction, from 1841, of regimental libraries. In the larger garrisons a number of

84Spiers, pp. 56-58.
85Skelley, p. 40.
86Spiers, p. 66; Skelley, p. 163.
‘Soldiers’ Institutes’, often including the provision of a chapel for private worship, were funded by large evangelical and philanthropic organisations to provide quiet alternatives for soldiers.  

**Conclusion**

Though the criticisms of barracks had begun almost as soon as the major barrack-building programmes of the early nineteenth century had been completed, and continued unabated throughout the nineteenth century, there was never any suggestion that soldiers should return to being billeted upon the local population as they had been in the eighteenth century. As we shall see later, barrack-like accommodation in colonial Australia was abandoned for non-military populations in the mid-nineteenth century as it appeared to several Committees of Investigation to be a brake upon the reform and economic independence of its residents. Similarly, in Britain, changes to the Poor Laws in 1834 were designed to limit the use made of workhouses by able-bodied adult men and their dependants. As Dean has argued, the objective in the changes to the Poor Laws was to create the conditions whereby adult males would be discouraged from living the dissolute and unproductive life of single men and encouraged to become wage labourers and heads of households; in turn, this first tactic of creating wage-labour as a patriarchal household would be built upon to introduce a range of interventions designed to increase the personal responsibility of the individual members within the family unit for the moral and physical care of themselves and their children. However, a similar set of tactics for

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88 See, for example, the discussion of the disadvantages of using inns and public houses for militia troops when they were called up, in the Report from the Select Committee appointed to inquire into the Operation of the present system for the Billeting of Troops, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1857-58, vol. X, Paper no. 363, p. iv: ‘Your Committee are also of the opinion that the practice of billetting troops for lengthened periods is disadvantageous in a military point of view. The dispersion of militia soldiers especially, amongst public houses in all parts of a town, is adverse to that system of discipline and control which it is the very object of the embodiment or assembling of such a force to establish’.

89 See Dean, *Constitution of Poverty*.

improving the health, well-being and efficiency of the military population was not possible.

Barracks were to remain the main form of housing for men in the Army, and until well into the second-half of the nineteenth century military administrators restricted the number of men in each regiment who were allowed to marry. There were practical reasons for this, largely based on the costs associated with the frequent movement of regiments, particularly when these movements included serving long periods in garrisons around the world. As a consequence, the reformatory possibilities of encouraging men to marry, set up independent households and become responsible for their wives and children, which was a commonplace of reform in the wider community, was not well-recognised within the military. Perhaps because of this, the largely unmarried male population living in barracks were distinguishable from the newly made ‘working classes’ of married men and their families, and still appropriately served by the more regulatory environment of the barrack. In which case, ameliorating and improving barrack life was a preferable course to having the unmarried men of the Army living again in inns and public houses.

Barracks had come somewhat accidentally to serve as the most appropriate, practical way both of governing the rank and file in the nineteenth century, and of developing a distinctive form of life. In a similar, and complementary manner, as we shall see in the next chapter, the British officer corps of the

91 Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century there was considerable interest in the future employability of soldiers. In some instances soldiers were considered to be well suited to tasks such as railway signalmen, because they had learned to be patient. In other cases the regimented life in barracks was considered a disadvantage. See for example, Report of the Select Committee to Inquire into Practicability of employing Soldiers, Sailors and Marines in Civil Departments of the Public Service, Parliamentary Papers, 1876, vol. XIV, Paper no. 356, Evidence Q 2452, ‘The real drawback is that the soldier is not taught, as a rule, to depend upon himself; he becomes, so to say, part of a big machine. Now, a policeman goes down the street, and he is really a sort of walking lawyer...something occurs, he has to act...That is not the sort of training the soldier gets; he gets, of course, habits of discipline and order, and cleanliness, and all that, which are very good in themselves; but he loses to a certain extent what I may call his personal identity, which is just what you want in a policeman’.

nineteenth century was to develop into a self-regulatory body with a much increased responsibility for, and focus on regimental and wardroom life.
CHAPTER THREE
‘Cavaliers in uniform’
The formation of professional officer corps in the nineteenth century

Introduction

The transformation of the officer corps of European, British and American military forces in the nineteenth century is seen as a crucial condition for the development of the ‘professional’ military forces of the twentieth century. For Samuel Huntington, the beginning of this transformation dates from 1808, when the Prussian Army declared that selection of officers would thenceforward be based on education and professional knowledge.¹ Over the course of the nineteenth century, other countries followed the Prussian example in reforming their officer corps, introducing a wider basis for recruitment, merit selection for promotion and an emphasis on technical expertise. Huntington argues that professionalisation was most successful where it developed as a compromise between the competing ideals of liberals and the aristocracy, leading to a ‘recognition of an independent officer corps free of partisan or class allegiance and organised in accordance with interests and principles of its own’.² The steps necessary to the formation of a professional officer corps included the development of a professional education, both for entry and subsequent career development, the introduction of a general staff function, and the ‘appearance of professional competence and esprit among the officers’.³

Huntington argues that the professionalisation of the British Army followed that of military forces such as the French and Prussian, but took considerably longer. He attributes this slower professionalisation to the fact that the need

²Huntington, p. 34.
³Huntington, p. 53.
to ‘seize upon professionalism as a device of social compromise was lacking’. A
Aristocratic ideals were still strong in the officer corps of the nineteenth
century, particularly before the abolition, in 1871, of the practice of
purchasing commissions as a means of entry and promotion. Such ideals, for
Huntington, limited the development of a professional expertise in the British
officer corps until the twentieth century. While many of the detailed studies
of the British officer corps of the nineteenth century would argue against the
central importance of the purchase system to the reform of the officer corps,
most would support the general picture of reform and gradual
professionalisation that Huntington draws.

Huntington’s thesis of the transformation of the officer corps of the nineteenth
century and the development of a profession centred on the ‘management of
violence’ is the starting point of much military sociology - which is often
engaged in refining or redefining the thesis - and has found a place in recent
Australian official considerations of the military too. Huntington argued that
the eighteenth century officer corps embodied an ‘aristocratic’ ideal which
shaped the officer corps’ way of thinking and acting. Under these
circumstances, what Huntington would describe as the military profession is
‘non-existent’ and the officer corps is ‘designed for the needs of the
aristocracy rather than for the efficient performance of the military function’.
With changes to the educational requirements for officers, the abolition of the
practice of purchasing commissions, and the general ‘liberalisation’ of
nineteenth century society, Huntington argues, professionalisation gradually
occurs.

4 Huntington, pp. 34-5.
5 Huntington, p. 53.
6 See, for example, Anthony Bruce, The Purchase System in the British Army 1660-1871, London:
Royal Historical Society, 1980; Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, The Army in Victorian Society, London:
Longman, 1980; Hew Strachan, Wellington’s Legacy: the reform of the British Army, 1830-1854,
7 See Report to the Minister for Defence, The Defence Force and the Community: A Partnership in
and the discussion in Chapter five of this thesis.
8 Huntington, p. 28.
Huntington's thesis is that professionalism flourished in circumstances where the competition between liberal ideals and aristocratic ideals was so strong that they worked to cancel each other out as an influence on the military, and the profession was left to develop on its own towards something new: the 'institutions...were neither aristocratic or democratic; they were military'.

The military profession develops a distinct sphere of competence for the State-sanctioned, legitimate 'management of violence'. This unique responsibility has the effect of separating the military professional from the rest of society:

In the eighteenth century army the rank and file formed an outcast group, isolated and distrusted, with no roots in, or connections with, the rest of society. The officers, on the other hand, had definite status in society by virtue of their aristocratic position. In the reversal of roles which took place in the nineteenth century, the enlisted men became a cross section of the national population - citizens at heart - and the officers became a separate professional group living in a world of their own with few ties to outside society.

In the previous chapter we traced the way in which the reforms directed at the rank and file in the nineteenth century had the consequence of focussing the soldiers increasingly towards their army life, within the barrack and the regiment. We shall see in the next chapter the way in which this focus on a military life served increasingly to distinguish the regular soldier from his citizen-soldier counterpart, not so much because of his ideals, but rather because of his trained discipline. In this chapter, we find ourselves similarly at odds with the Huntington thesis. While the reforms to the British officer corps of the nineteenth century increased the professional capacities of officers and dismantled the barriers to a wider field of recruitment, these reforms were not achieved in the vacuum created by competing ideals, with all the suggestion this has of eradicating an aristocratic style of life. Indeed, the British experience was perhaps closer to the Prussian, but not in the way

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9 Huntington, p. 35.
10 Huntington, p. 39.
that Huntington portrayed it. Rather, as Hans Rosenberg's study of the emergence of the modern state bureaucracy in Prussia has shown

"Democratic principles in a monarchical government", in the officers' corps, fostered a process of internal demokratisation which, in fact, resulted in the tightening up of aristocratic esprit de corps... The nobility, for a long time to come the all-dominant group of officers, was not slow in turning these corporate rights to good account by preserving the social structure and mentality of the professional military class as an exclusive caste of cavaliers in uniform. 

It is in this latter sense that we find that reforms of the nineteenth century military in Britain also worked to stabilise and enhance an 'aristocratic' ethos of military office. Firstly, this preservation of Britain's 'military aristocracy' was assisted by the reforms of the nineteenth century, particularly around the issues of appointment of officers, education and discipline, which confirmed the extent to which this aristocratic ethos provided the necessary 'tools for living' in this newly developing environment. Secondly, this military aristocracy was gradually, through these reforms, to develop a particular habitus of its own: the regiment (and the wardroom) which increasingly provided the guidance and training in the profession of arms that had previously been learnt as an adjunct to the less specialised social category of the gentleman. In the course of the nineteenth century, the professionalisation of the military occurred gradually, as a series of governmental responses to enable the officer corps to better govern themselves. In contrast to Huntington, I want to suggest that the military profession, in Britain at least, did not develop in a vacuum left between liberalism and the aristocracy, but rather that it was formed as a liberal response to the uneven and inefficient manner in which defence forces were formed as an adjunct to the social regulation of police.

In the previous chapter I have argued that the formation of military forces in the eighteenth century was illuminated by examining the connection between

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the Navy and Army and the regulation of society that was commonly referred to as 'police'. Police was a general term used to designate a form of pastoral government which sought to govern to maintain a pre-established social equilibrium. The rank and file of Navy and the Army served both as a convenient receptacle for those who disturbed this equilibrium, and the military forces as a whole assisted local government officials to maintain the peace, particularly in unstable areas such as the newly developing industrial cities. It was as a consequence of these two roles, I have suggested, that the establishment of barracks became, after a century of resistance, a necessary and inevitable framework for reforming the rank and file in the nineteenth century.

In the eighteenth century the officer corps, like the rank and file, was not easily separable from this more general pastoral government. Sons of the nobility and the gentry entered into the officer corps for periods of time, their qualification for entry and promotion, and their interest in the political neutrality of the army and (to a lesser extent the Navy) guaranteed by their ability to purchase their commissions. Their capacity to be officers was based on their social rank and their general education as gentlemen. Over the course of the nineteenth century this more general, socially-derived set of qualifications for officers came increasingly under scrutiny. The problem was that the desired qualities of the officer could not be systematically developed if left to do so on their own. Over time, the officer corps itself was invested with the capacity to generate, develop and stabilise the necessary qualifications of the officer. This occurred not in the absence of liberal and aristocratic ideals but rather in the accommodation of both.

The consequential military ethos preserved by these reforms is more robust, and less 'psychological' than Huntington's concept of the 'ideals' that twentieth century professional officers hold. The persistence of this 'aristocratic ethos' as part of the professionalisation of the military officer, and its tenacity as a practical guide to living in a military environment, is
particularly important to twentieth century considerations of the government of the military. As we shall see in chapters five and six, it is with this 'ethos' that governments are most concerned, and yet for which they have the least adequate policy tools.

The Military Aristocracy

There have been a number of studies of the composition of the eighteenth and nineteenth century British officer corps, generally with the intention of demonstrating that officers were drawn from a wider variety of backgrounds than the popular image of the 'officer and gentleman' would suppose. However, as Harries-Jenkins has argued, despite the relatively small number of men of 'aristocratic' or titled background in the Army, most came from families who owned smaller or larger amounts of land. This relationship of the Army with the 'landed interest' served to secure a high degree of what we might call cultural homogeneity, which was regarded as enabling both the good government of the army as a whole, by distinguishing officers from their men, and the good government of the officer corps itself, by enhancing the sense of esprit de corps. This homogeneity manifested itself in various norms of conduct which were crucial to the government of the Army. In official reports and personal memoirs, the conduct of officers is a key consideration in any discussion of the government of the military. For example, in defending the practice of flogging in the Army in the early nineteenth century, the Commander in Chief, the Duke of Wellington, supported the continuation of flogging because it was consistent with the appropriate conduct of the British officer:

we ought to consider a little the nature of our officer, and compare him to the Prussian officer. Our officer is a gentleman. We require that he should be one, and above all to conduct himself as such...Indeed we carry this principle of the gentleman, and the

13 Harries-Jenkins, p.45.
absence of intercourse with those under his command so far that, in my opinion, the duties of a subaltern officer, as they are performed in a foreign army, are not done at all in the cavalry, or in the British infantry of the line.  

Official investigations into various aspects of military administration throughout the nineteenth century illuminate the importance of gentlemanly conduct on the part of officers; very often this conduct was conspicuous by its absence. Men promoted from the ranks were not considered suitable as officers because their conduct was such that ‘they are not persons who can be borne in the society of the officers of the Army; they are men of different manners altogether’. In the view of the Commission investigating Military Punishments in 1833, the proposal that commissions be given to senior non-commissioned officers was rejected on the basis that it would ‘entirely alter and deteriorate the class of officers’ by introducing men who did not have the same training and habits as other officers drawn from the same ‘station and education’. The introduction of non-commissioned officers would both imperil the maintenance of discipline, since they would have difficulty maintaining the distinction ‘very strictly drawn between the officer and the soldier’, and potentially destroy the regimental esprit de corps, since ‘all our officers are on an equal footing in point of society, and it is highly important for the maintenance of a proper feeling and of what is called esprit de corps’. 

The capacity to conduct oneself as a gentleman was not strictly linked to wealth, though the more fashionable regiments, which were the epitome of aristocratic style, required that their officers had access to considerable sums of money to maintain a certain lifestyle. A Select Committee reporting on the expenses incurred by officers in 1903 confirmed that officers could not generally be expected to live on their salaries, estimating that at the time of

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their inquiries a cavalry officer needed a private income of at least 600 pounds. But wealth alone was not the test of the gentleman officer; there were in fact a number of aristocratic gentlemen whose breeding was impeccable but their family impecunious. These officers felt their access to commissions in the better regiments threatened by the sons of wealthy businessmen who could afford the purchase prices of commissions and the cost of belonging to the officers’ mess. In such cases these wealthy but unsuitable young officers were derided for their lack of manners. In his memoirs Field Marshall Sir Garnet Wolseley speaks of a cavalry regiment at the time of the Crimean War which was disparagingly known as the ‘Trades Union’ for it was largely made up of officers who were the sons of rich merchants. Wolseley then belonged to the 90th Light Infantry Battalion, which ‘was in every respect a home for gentlemen, and in that respect much above the great bulk of Line regiments...[the officers] thought themselves socially superior to the ordinary regiments of the Line, which were always spoken of as “Grabbies”’. In a number of notable cases men from the ranks or the Militia, who gained a commission particularly after their service in the Crimean War, were hounded out by their ‘brother officers’, as Wolseley tells us:

...the evenings at our mess [at Aldershot Camp in the 1850s] often ended in an attack upon the quarters of one or other of four lately joined subalterns who had practically no pretensions to the rank of gentlemen. They had been foisted upon us from the Militia during the war, as any Militia officer who could then induce a certain number of his men to volunteer for the line was given a commission. These could be easily obtained upon payment. These four Ensigns were absolutely useless as officers, and we soon got rid of them.

17 Report of the Commission appointed by the Secretary of State to enquire into the nature of expenses incurred by officers of the army, Parliamentary Papers, 1903, vol. X, Paper no. 1421; see also the discussion in Spiers, p.25.
18 Field Marshall Sir Garnet Wolseley, The Story of a Soldier’s Life, Westminster: A. Constable, 1903, vol. 1, p. 83. Interestingly, Wolseley was himself the impoverished son of a military officer, and could not afford many of the extracurricular expenses, such as keeping a horse for hunting, so that ‘Dublin was then a dreary quarter for a man like me, who could not afford to hunt, and whose wounded leg prevented him from dancing’: Wolseley, vol. 1, p. 81.
19 Wolseley, vol. 1, pp. 84-85.
Like the Prussian officer system which Rosenberg has argued preserved a caste mentality in the face of ‘democratisation’, the British equivalent of the nineteenth century retained a strong sense of appropriate conduct for officers, even as it became increasingly possible for men who did not have a close connection to the ‘landed interest’ to join the ranks of officers. Thus a nineteenth century critic of officer recruitment could argue in 1858 that: ‘The term aristocratic, as applied to the constitution of the army, is meant to express that system of exclusiveness, which whether founded upon the test of birth, caste or of money, creates a powerful barrier between the governors and the governed’.  

The characteristics of this ‘military aristocracy’ are illuminated for us through the various movements for reform aimed at Naval and Army officers during the nineteenth century. We can look, in particular, to the campaign to integrate engineer officers in the Navy with the ‘gentlemen officers’ known as executive officers, which extended over the second half of the nineteenth century. This reformatory campaign is instructive because of the success of the arguments against the integration of engineers with the executive, which turned precisely on the conduct of the engineers both in relation to their subordinates and in relation to their ward-room peers. In part, the nineteenth century campaigns were an echo of the seventeenth and eighteenth century problem of achieving an accommodation between the gentlemen officers - the men who determined the destinations of ships and negotiated with foreign dignitaries upon arrival, and the ‘tarpaulins’ - the men who had the technical skills to sail and navigate the ships and to govern the sailors. As Norbert Elias reminds us.

Pepys’s often quoted remark to the effect that among naval officers the seamen were not gentlemen and the gentlemen not seamen...was the pointed expression of one of the gravest practical problems confronting naval administrators and naval officers throughout the early history of the naval profession. Gentlemen could not learn the

21 E.B. De Fonblanque, Treatise on the Administration and Organisation of the British Army, 1858, quoted in Harries-Jenkins, p. 45.
art and craft of the seaman without feeling that they had lowered themselves in the eyes of the world. Experienced seamen, on the other hand, who had learned their trade in the only way in which it could be learned, starting early in life as seamen's apprentices, were not regarded as gentlemen. By the nineteenth century the executive officers had developed a degree of technical knowledge of the sea, though they still disliked having to navigate their ships, preferring to leave this to the masters and masters' assistants. There was little in terms of technical expertise that now separated the executive officer from the other officers of the Navy, so the arguments against the integration of executive and engineering officers turned precisely on the capacities of the engineer to undertake the command responsibilities of the executive officer and to exercise the appropriate behaviour for the executive officers' ward-room. In the various Admiralty and Parliamentary investigations into the status of engineers in the nineteenth century the existence, utility and permanence of the executive officer ethos is the standard up to which engineers must eventually be brought.

The defective background of the engineering students compromised the government of the Navy in two respects. In the first place, engineers did not have the social skills to share the executive officers' ward-room. Witnesses to an Admiralty Committee on the position of engineers reporting in 1877 argued that engineers 'are not admitted into the society, on shore, that other officers are; and although their mess, I consider, is on an equality with the gun-room mess [for junior executive officers], yet you cannot, until they raise themselves, introduce them into the society that you would wish, or introduce them into the gun-room or ward-room messes in the service'. The Report of the Committee agreed, noting:

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a defect of much importance...It is that, notwithstanding the high education to be given, and the position in which the Engineer Officers will be placed on board Ship as commissioned Officers, a large portion of the candidates for entry as Engineer Students are sons of artificers of various grades in the dockyards...or of others belonging to the same class of society...As it is undoubtedly desirable that Officers should be highly educated to perform the duties of Naval Engineers and hold the rank of Commissioned Officers, it is equally desirable that they should be in all respects fitted to take their place with Officers of corresponding rank in wardroom or gunroom messes. This evidently cannot be the case with the majority of Students lately entered. 24

In the second place, it was frequently argued that engineer officers could not cultivate and maintain the necessary detachment and distance from those they were to command. Given that engineers very often came from the same families and schools as the men they were to command, it was felt they were unable to preserve the necessary distinction between themselves and these men. Witnesses to the Admiralty Committee noted that ‘their connections will always drag them down. They may at times come in contact with some of their own relations on board ship who are in a very inferior position. It is utterly impossible for a boy to raise a member of his family to his position; therefore the boy must be dragged down to the position of that member of his family.’ 25

Earlier in the century, the same concerns had been expressed about the advantages of allowing a greater number of non-commissioned officers in the Army to take commissions. Witnesses spoke of the problems attendant upon this scheme in the same terms as they did in the Navy. Earl Grey put it this way in 1857:

In the army, as in all other professions and pursuits in life, it seems to me that nature itself has made a distinction between those who have the leisure which only a certain amount of wealth can give to gain an education and qualifications which are necessary for officers, and which are not wanted for private soldiers or in other ranks of life, for those who work with their hands...the education and habits of men

25Admiralty Committee Report, Evidence, Q2320.
brought up to bodily labour are not such as to qualify them to direct the labour of others. I think that that remark is equally applicable to the army as to all other professions and occupations in life.\textsuperscript{26}

Non-commissioned officers were almost never of the same background as their fellow officers; they had a much more limited education, and as a consequence of their necessary concentration on the minutiae of regimental life they were considered poor company in the officers’ mess, as they could speak of ‘nothing beyond military drill and discipline’.\textsuperscript{27} Moreover these men, though they had a thorough knowledge of the ‘ways and artifices’ of the men, were not considered to make good officers, because the men had a tendency to be overly familiar with them and to regard these officers with derision.\textsuperscript{28} Even those who supported a limited opportunity for promotion from the ranks, like Sir Charles Trevelyan, were of the view that ‘No non-commissioned officer would, of course, be promoted who had not proved himself fit by his conduct and manners, as well as by his education and intelligence, to hold Her Majesty’s commission’.\textsuperscript{29}

The Reform of the Officer Corps

In the nineteenth century, as we have seen, conduct was a crucial element of governmental calculation. Gentlemanly conduct, as Norbert Elias notes, was ‘the distinguishing mark of men from the upper and some portions of the middle class’.\textsuperscript{30} Schooling in gentlemanly conduct was through social emulation, enhanced by attendance at particular schools. The guarantee of such conduct was generally wealth, particularly wealth generated by land ownership, and the practice of purchasing commissions in the army was a means of ensuring particular standards of conduct would be maintained. In

\textsuperscript{26}Commission appointed to inquire into the system of purchase and sale of Commissions in the Army (hereafter Purchase Commission), \textit{Parliamentary Papers}, 1857, vol. XVIII, Paper no. 2267, Evidence, Q.3963.
\textsuperscript{28}Report of Commissioners Inquiring into Military Punishments, Evidence Q 5097.
\textsuperscript{29}Purchase Commission, Evidence Q 4603.
its simplest terms, the purchase system allowed officers to gain transfers and promotions within and between regiments by selling the commissioned rank they held, often to the most senior officer in the rank below in the same regiment, and by contributing some or all of the cost of ‘buying out’ another officer with a more attractive or more senior commission.  

Throughout the nineteenth century the purchase system was criticised by its opponents as preserving the monopoly of the aristocracy and allowing men who were unfit to hold senior ranks to do so by virtue of their wealth. Its supporters argued that it not only acted as an effective means of selecting appropriate officers, ‘the Queen’s commission, even to an ensign, was a passport to the best society - intellectual or social’, but also that it enabled a steady movement of officers through the ranks so that men were not too old when they finally reached positions of command.

The purchase system came under increasing scrutiny during the nineteenth century, and was abolished in 1871. While the system had been criticised for some two hundred years as inimical to military efficiency, its abolition was in fact brought about because it was impossible for military authorities to control illegal profiteering in the sale of commissions without abolishing the system of purchase of commissions altogether. For many historians of the military, and sociologists of the twentieth century military like Huntington, the abolition of purchase was a key feature in professionalisation of the British officer corps. Even the purchase system’s most careful historian has argued that ‘In the long run, of course, it was doomed: radical changes in the art of war, and the dissolution of the old social order...produced demands for greater professionalism and wider social representation which could not be reconciled with its continued existence’. In the Huntingtonian thesis, the abolition of purchase stands as a key moment in the demise of the aristocratic

31 See the somewhat more complex explanation, and the complicated rules and traditions associated with the operations of the purchase system in Bruce, pp. 4-5.
32 Bruce, p. 129.
33 Bruce, p. 124.
34 Bruce, p. 171.
hold on the officer corps, and the aristocracy's focus on the generalised qualities of the gentleman. 35

What I wish to suggest here is that the demise of the practice of purchasing commissions did not necessarily bring the dissolution of the old social order. As we noted in the example of the reform of the Prussian military, in which officers were appointed to their commissions, the absence of proprietary rights to commissions did not dissolve the aristocratic esprit de corps. In the British Army too, the abolition of purchase did not undermine the continuing concern for particular patterns of conduct. On the contrary, reforms to the officer corps both before and after the abolition of purchase worked to enhance the capacity of the ‘military aristocracy’ to determine the conduct of its officers, irrespective of the means by which they had attained commissions.

The process of enhancing the British military’s internal capacity for inculcating, stabilising and reinforcing the key features of gentlemanly conduct was begun well before the abolition of purchase. In a series of reforms of the officer corps which spanned the nineteenth century, the military forces were increasingly invested with the capacities to train, educate and govern their officers themselves, where they had previously relied on wealth and social standing to produce the necessary qualities in officers. These reforms were intended to introduce a systematic, and thus efficient, means of securing appropriately trained military officers in the face of the more dispersed, and less reliable practice of having the officer corps, and its relationship to the rank and file, reflect the training young gentlemen received to prepare them for their socially-determined responsibilities. This is a corollary of the role played by the Navy and Army in relation to the rank and file that we discussed in the previous chapter. In this pastoral rationality of government which characterised social administration in the eighteenth century, as a generalisation, the officer corps absorbed the younger sons of

35 Huntington, p. 47.
the nobility and gentry in much the way the rank and file absorbed the idle, vagrant and dispossessed. In the case of the rank and file, as we have seen, this role for the army in particular produced a number of problems which resulted in the greater isolation and specialisation of the rank and file. As we shall see in this chapter, the failure of social structures outside the military to produce the necessary qualities in the officer corps led to the efforts on the part of various governments to enhance the capacity of the Navy and Army to secure the necessary conduct on the part of their officers.

These reforms to the officer corps can be seen as consistent with a more generalised concern by governments in the nineteenth century to make the exercise of government, and its agencies, more efficient and less implicated in the perpetuation of patronage and a fixed ordering of society. In the nineteenth century, reform is fuelled by arguments on the need for limits on government. These limits are premised on the capacity of individuals in the society to govern themselves. However, government has an ongoing responsibility to enable and inculcate such capacities. A liberal mode of government finds itself establishing the means of enabling the self-regulation of individuals. So too this governmental rationality seeks to transform state agencies, to achieve a 'governmentalisation of the state' in which agencies such as the military cease to mirror the static characteristics of pastoralism and become themselves self-regulatory. In turn, rather than relying on a pre-existing set of trainings and governmental patterns being imported into the military by the nobility and gentry, the officer corps of the British Navy and Army are reformed to facilitate and develop the norms of conduct and technical capacities they require.

This process of transforming the officer corps is consistent with other changes in the nineteenth century state agencies; a good example of these changes was embodied in the 'reformative program' of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854. In response to the problems of patronage and consequential

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inefficiency identified by the Report, a number of steps for remedying the problems were outlined. One of these was to recognise the 'importance of establishing a proper distinction between intellectual and mechanical labour'.37 This distinction was to free those civil servants destined for superior situations from the drudgery of mechanical clerical tasks which had worked to 'exercise a depressing influence' upon them. Different classes of examination were to be introduced, with those for the higher class required to undertake competitive examinations 'on a level with the highest description of education in this country'.38 Another was to centralise the responsibility for conducting examinations, so that a standard was set throughout the Civil Service. This was particularly useful for avoiding the concerns over patronage, and for effecting the introduction of a 'lower class of appointments' which would produce a body of clerical staff who could be moved between offices as workloads demanded. A necessary consequence of these steps in the reform process was that it was clear that the Civil Service should train up young men to the duties they would have to perform, rather than take on men of mature age who may have learnt their skills elsewhere. The Commissioners argued that 'in many offices...it is found that the superior docility of young men renders it much easier to make valuable public servants out of them, than those more advanced in life'.39

The Northcote-Trevelyan Report articulated a reformatory agenda we find emulated in army reforms of the same period.40 This set of reforms was designed to improve the civil service by improving the civil servants - from their initial selection, through internal training in the ethos of office, to a regulated and decentralised system of merit promotion. Many of these concerns were reflected in the reforms to the Army in particular during the

nineteenth century, with reforms concentrated on the selection and promotion of officers and greater decentralisation of the administration of the army.

In the reforms of the officer corps of the nineteenth century, a key problem for government concerned the selection and promotion of officers. Central to this was the argument that it was impossible to test the qualities of an officer by examination. While the practice of purchasing commissions as means of gaining entry and promotion continued to be legal, reformers looked to means to ameliorate the effects of wealth and patronage, as they did in the civil service. Those who defended purchase as a means of obtaining gentlemen for the officer corps argued that there was no other means of gauging the qualities of an officer except of the basis of his background. The basic premise was that a great part of being an officer was the right sort of bearing, and the capacity to have a good moral effect upon those whom one commanded. This was elaborated to suggest that these qualities were most apparent on the battlefield, and hard to demonstrate in peacetime, and through a written test. The need to pass an examination led to an exaggerated emphasis on ‘book-learning’ and the tendency to cramming, instead of learning from life. Moreover, with such a large army, officers did not have equal opportunity to study in order to gain promotions, scattered as they were across the Empire. Above all, there was a concern that a selection process based upon examination would tend to favour the middle classes, and not the class from which officers were traditionally drawn.41

On this last concern, Sir Charles Trevelyan could put minds at rest. While he frequently advocated the need to ‘unleash the capacities of the middle classes’, he could assure the military hierarchy that the use of examinations would only serve to encourage the sons of the wealthy to take up commissions:

41See for example, the discussion on Army Education in the House of Commons in 1864, Parliamentary Debates Third Series, vol. 173, cols. 1803-1841.
It is a mistake to suppose that if our army were remodelled on professional principles it would no longer furnish suitable occupations for young men who are heirs to considerable properties. This object would be more completely attained than before. The army would be a school as well as a playground; and our young men of fortune would be the better all their lives for having been associated for a time with what really would be a liberal profession...Our aristocratic families are so strongly impressed with the necessity of giving their sons the best possible education...that we need be under no alarm about their obtaining their full share in this as well as in every other competition.\footnote{Purchase Commission, Evidence, Q4668.}

Moreover, given that examinations were only an ‘indirect’ means of determining the moral qualifications of the officer candidates, Trevelyan proposed that examination be combined with ‘the principle of nomination, which is supposed to secure the moral qualities, because it allows of a more particular reference to the antecedents of the young men.’\footnote{Purchase Commission, Evidence, Q4669.} Nominations for positions was in use in the civil service, and it worked as a most comforting assurance to all those who held, like Trevelyan, that examinations could only imperfectly guarantee character. As well, it was the system in the Navy, which as we have seen, was reiterated as advantageous in the latter years of the nineteenth century when seeking to improve the quality of engineer officers who had hitherto entered the Navy only by examination.\footnote{Admiralty Committee Report, Evidence, Q1896-7. See also Evidence Q 620: ‘Looking at that list of the engineer students who have been entered during the last three years, do think it is satisfactory as regards their social position and parentage, bearing in mind the good education they receive and the good position in which they are placed in the service? (handing the list to the witness) - I do not consider it particularly satisfactory - I have no doubt that if the system were by nomination you would get a more satisfactory class, and a class that would work more harmoniously with the rest of the service. I think that if the system of competitive examination with nomination were adopted, it would conduce greatly to the benefit of the service, and you would have a superior class of men generally in it’.}

Moreover, given that examinations were only an ‘indirect’ means of determining the moral qualifications of the officer candidates, Trevelyan proposed that examination be combined with ‘the principle of nomination, which is supposed to secure the moral qualities, because it allows of a more particular reference to the antecedents of the young men.’\footnote{Purchase Commission, Evidence, Q4668.} Nominations for positions was in use in the civil service, and it worked as a most comforting assurance to all those who held, like Trevelyan, that examinations could only imperfectly guarantee character. As well, it was the system in the Navy, which as we have seen, was reiterated as advantageous in the latter years of the nineteenth century when seeking to improve the quality of engineer officers who had hitherto entered the Navy only by examination.\footnote{Purchase Commission, Evidence, Q4669.} Bearing out the earlier concerns of those opposing selection by examination in the Army, the practice of selecting solely on the basis of examination was criticised because it demonstrated that it couldn’t obtain for the Navy the right sort of applicants, and it was proposed that examination be tempered by nominations to the Board of the Admiralty.
At the heart of these reforms, the combination of examination and nomination was an extremely important governmental step, for it confirmed that ‘moral qualities’ were essential to the good government of the military. It also acknowledged the difficulty of relying only upon examinations as a means of testing the qualities of officers. As we have already noted, the various commissions examining the education of officers had regularly encouraged the testing of younger officers in their grasp of ‘regimental duties’. At the time the Duke of Wellington reluctantly agreed to the introduction of examinations, ‘as a preparation for military service’, they were to be principally a test of the officer’s knowledge ‘with respect to matters of military skill and science’, which included the duties of officer commanding battalions.  

Throughout the century, however, the existence of such an examination was a testament to the failure of the regiment as a training ground in military duties, and of examinations in general to determine, establish or improve the education of the officer. As such, this failure was productive of endless attempts to develop a capacity for study in officers, a method of examination, a continuous consideration of what it was that the officer should demonstrate that he knows in order to be commissioned and promoted, and an ongoing questioning of the extent to which this knowledge should be acquired before or during service, by civil or military institutions.

Confirming the widely-held view that examinations were an unsatisfactory means of testing character, a committee into the education and training of army officers set up in the wake of the War in South Africa was concerned to find that in practice the examinations that had to be passed were of such a low quality, and so limited in their ability to discriminate between candidates that they were of no assistance in guaranteeing effective officers. To improve the education and training of officers the Committee made a number of recommendations, principally designed to enhance the education officer

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46 See, for example, the Report of the Royal Commission to inquire into the present state of military education, and into the training of candidates for commissions in the Army, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1881, vol. XXII, Paper no. 4221, pp. 44-45.
cadets received at the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich and the Royal Military College Sandhurst, and the training officers received in regiments. The Committee was at pains, on the basis of the evidence it had received, to emphasise the importance of practical instruction, and the measuring of officers by their performance, for it argued that ‘no examination, however well planned, either of candidates before entry or of officers after joining, can of themselves make good officers’.

In this view the Committee appeared only to be reiterating the opinion of examinations expressed by military officers throughout the nineteenth century. But there were two important respects in which the early twentieth century concerns differed from those of the nineteenth century. The first of these reflected the Committee’s impression that examinations were quickly prepared for and quickly forgotten, and that there was no connection between the examinations, and therefore no encouragement for the officer to look upon his training as a steady development - the ‘regiment as a university’. The second concern arose from the Committee’s view that the examinations did not test the officer’s regimental duties, concentrating instead upon the execution of battle, so that ‘the cadet comes out knowing how to manoeuvre three army corps against an enemy, but he does not know how to supervise the work of the pay-sergeant?’.

In its concern for the education and training of the officer the Committee tried to find a way around the perception that the only place to test the qualities of an officer was in the heat of war, and the only way to guarantee appropriate training in the conduct of an officer was to rely on the officer’s social background. These concerns gave new emphasis to the character-forming and regulatory capacities of military life itself. The Committee encouraged the more frequent use of exercises and camps to bring large groups of officers.

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48 Akers-Douglas Committee, Evidence, Q69.
together in order for them to learn, in a ‘battle-like’ atmosphere. In addition it emphasised that there needed to be continual assessment of the officer, which placed the onus on the training establishments, and the regiments, to be able to perform the task that would achieve the benefits Trevelyan hoped for when he proposed the combination of examination and nomination. In the face of the failure of examinations, the difficulty of selection and the inaccuracy of nomination, the Committee sought to develop ‘an honest, open system of merit’ by enhancing the disciplinary role of the early training and regimental life of the officer.\(^{49}\)

While examinations played a role in the promotion of more junior officers, more senior promotions were made by selection. When a Royal Commission on promotion and retirement reported in 1876 it found that since the abolition of purchase there was an increasing emphasis on the performance of the officer in the regiment as a basis for determining promotion. Commanding officers were required to prepare confidential reports on the more junior officers, commenting on ‘the conduct, abilities and military qualifications of the officers’.\(^{50}\) Under this system, officers came to focus their attention increasingly on their performance within the regiment. According to the Committee, this system of regimental reporting worked well for ‘ascertaining the character and qualities of officers, and...to maintain efficiency and good conduct in the Army’.\(^{51}\) Since, as the Committee found, promotion was ‘as a rule’, governed by seniority, it was in the interests of most officers to stay within particular regiments awaiting their opportunity for promotion.

Thus we find in the reforms of the nineteenth century and beyond, a recognition of the need for a variety of measures of the qualities of officers, and an increasing focus on the regiment as a central tool in the government of the officer corps. The crucial ‘democratising’ step that Huntington and others

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\(^{49}\)Akers-Douglas Committee, p. 39.  
\(^{50}\)Report of Royal Commission on Army Promotion and Retirement, Parliamentary Papers, 1876, vol. XV, Paper no. 1569, p. xxxii.  
\(^{51}\)Report of Royal Commission on Army Promotion and Retirement, p. xxxiii.
point to, of introducing examinations and selection to replace the practice of purchasing commissions, was never to be so clear-cut. The 'democratising tendencies' of examinations would always be tempered by the perceived need to test a range of qualities of the officer, for which examinations would always be inadequate. This in turn meant that these additional qualities of the officer had to be assessed in the context of his everyday military life, drawing the emphasis away from membership of a particular social class to a focus on regimental life.

In his evidence to the Purchase Commission of 1857 Sir Charles Trevelyan had argued in favour of adopting a system of merit selection, based on his experience with the British Army in India, in which the practice of selection was never difficult because 'we know every inch of a man's character'. At that time, the Purchase Commissioners were of the view that selection on merit was only possible in the Indian system because of the fewer numbers of officers and their geographical proximity. It seemed to them that Trevelyan wanted to base his system on factors 'which cannot exist in this country, namely a perfect knowledge of the mind and habits of every person in the service'.

There were a number of factors contributing to the limited extent to which the Army could 'know' its officers. One factor was the dispersion of regiments, the movement of officers between regiments, and the tendency of officers to spend relatively little time in contact with their regiments during peacetime. Another was the limited enthusiasm and skill for reporting and inspection on the part of senior regimental officers. The third, related factor was the 'inordinately centralised system' of management of the Army that had grown up in the face of the dispersal and instability of the regiments. This

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52 Purchase Commission, Evidence, Q4371.
53 Purchase Commission, Evidence, Q4403.
54 But see, for example, those studies of the politics of nineteenth century military reform which say that the function of the War Office had developed also as a consequence of the 'Antimilitarism [which] was a firm principle of the Liberal Party creed', W.S. Hamer, The British Army: Civil-Military Relations 1885-1905, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970, p. 149.
cumbersome management had none of the inspection and ‘intendance’ capacity of European armies, and so had achieved the combination of diminishing the responsibility of local commanders while not have the machinery to make those decisions centrally. The possibility of setting standards and comparing all officers against them was impossible, and thus the various Commanders-in-Chief preferred the system of rejection to selection on merit.

The cumbersome central machinery had been adequate to the system of promotion by purchase. A relatively ineffectual centralised machinery enabled officers to exercise a degree of relative autonomy without burdening them with the responsibility for regimental administration and the need to stay well-versed in the management of the ‘interior economy’ of their regiments. The War Office (Reconstitution) Committee, reporting two years after the Boer War, argued that the degree of centralisation had limited the ability of officers to practice all the aspects of managing their regiments that would be so necessary in war, noting that ‘It seems to have been expected that officers would be able to emancipate themselves from their peace training as soon as they took to the field’. 55

The solution was to decentralise many of the responsibilities that then lay with the War Office and the Commander-in-Chief, in order to foster the necessary responsibility and initiative in army officers that had been lacking during the Boer War. Great Britain would be divided up into a number of military districts, based on the territorial principles first elaborated in 1873, and these territorial regiments would become autonomous units, capable of readily mobilising for war. 56 A key area of decision-making that was to be

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56Esher Committee, p. 10. The ‘territorial’ system, or localisation scheme, was introduced in 1872 as a means of encouraging recruitment of the rank and file: ‘It is intended to associate every regiment and battalion of the Army with some particular district of the country, in order that the ties of kindred and locality may bring into the army a better class of men and a greater number that now present themselves’, Parliamentary Debates, vol. CCIX (22 February 1872), col. 901.
decentralised was that of promotion of all officers up to and including the rank of Major, proposed by the Committee 'with a view to enhance the position and responsibilities of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, and in order to emphasise the territorial principle'. Regimental responsibility for promotion was to be accompanied by responsibility for the myriad decisions about the training and discipline of officers formerly adjudicated centrally. With this responsibility, the General Officers would be in a position to determine promotion on merit, and to encourage their officers to see their regiment as an opportunity to develop and demonstrate the skills and initiative that might win them promotion. The Committee’s intentions were that such decentralisation would 'encourage the assumption of responsibility as far as possible'.

The Rise of the Regiment

One of the most important effects of the various reforms of the nineteenth century was the increased significance of the regiment in the internal government of the Army. Certain regiments of the Army had always been fashionable, and officers paid a scale of prices which reflected this popularity. However, for officers with the means to purchase promotion, the fastest way to secure promotion was to move between regiments, particularly seeking to join those engaged in campaigns, and avoid others sent on garrison duties in inhospitable climates. While the role of the regiment in the training and promotion prospects of the officer assumed increased importance with the abolition of the purchase of commissions, the various reforms aimed at improving the qualities of officers, which pre-dated the abolition of purchase, were already increasing the importance of the regiment. As John Keegan notes, the various reforms of the mid-nineteenth century had ‘quite accidentally, made loyalty to the regiment and service within the regiment, 

57 Esher Committee, p. 28.
58 Esher Committee, p. 9.
59 See Spiers, pp. 11; 18-19.
and to no other regiment, the passport to successful career'. With a greater role in the training of officers, more autonomy in its internal government, and, with the Localisation Act of 1872, a greater identification with a particular locality from which to recruit, the regimental system was a key factor in the shaping of the military profession in the late nineteenth century.

In the face of the persistent concern we noted earlier of the best means to both guarantee technical competence and the ‘character’ of the officer, the devolution of responsibility for recruitment and training to the regiment answered well. In relation to the professionalisation of the officer corps of the nineteenth century, the role of the regiment is important because it alerts us to the continuing importance of combining appropriate technical qualifications with an environment in which to learn and practice the conduct of the officer. The regiment stabilises the uneven training of the gentleman officer, codifies the conduct expected of him both with regard to his fellow officers and towards the rank and file, becoming

an institution which not only insisted on [the officer’s] possession of those qualities and virtues but which, in its post-Cardwellian transformation, was itself to become a school of perfection, able on the one hand to refuse entry to candidates whom it found deficient, on the other to require of its members increasingly high standards of concern for the soldiers’ welfare, personal self-sacrifice, social conformity and military efficiency'.

In its acquisition of these responsibilities for the future development of the officer corps, the regiment is a good illustration of the nineteenth century liberal mode of government’s capacity for achieving a compromise between the need for a more economical form of government and a continued concern for guaranteeing governability. Individual regiments took over the role of overseeing the careers of officers, adjudicating their grievances, monitoring their suitability for promotion and determining their additional training needs in place of the less efficient and effective central machinery which

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‘stifled initiative’. At the same time, as we have seen in our discussion of the gentleman officer, regiments became an increasingly effective way of setting and maintaining standards for the conduct of officers. Thus the liberal objective of decreasing the level of governmental oversight of the military was nevertheless able to secure, in the regiment, an effective means of recruiting, training and disciplining officers with the necessary ethos.

Conclusion

In contrast to Huntington, I would argue that the military profession in Britain, and its modern-day counterpart in Australia, is the construct of an accommodation between a liberal mode of government and an aristocratic ethos which served the newly forming profession well as a standard of conduct. With the abolition of purchase there was no vacuum in which an entirely new sort of military officer was formed. This was in part, as I have suggested, because there were a series of reforms which anticipated the abolition of purchase which were intended to make improvements to the selection, training and conduct of officers which reliance on broader social structures could not. These reforms strengthened the regiment as a normative institution. It was also, in part, because the characteristics associated with the aristocratic ethos only imperfectly guaranteed by purchase had proved themselves to be of continuing relevance to the good government of the military and were practised and perfected by the regiment and in the wardroom.

The persistence of an aristocratic ethos in the face of the various reforms of the officer corps in nineteenth century Britain may simply suggest that the Navy and the Army continued to draw their officers from the same social group, with the same expectations of conduct, as they always had. The official investigations of matters such as the integration of engineers in the Navy suggest that there was also a strong concern that such an ethos, though aspects of it may change, was crucial to the good government of military
forces. It is to accommodate the latter possibility, and its implications for the contemporary government of military forces, that the professionalisation of the British officer corps of the nineteenth century has been investigated.

As we shall see from the following analysis of military forces in Australia, the changes to military forces in Britain were to set the standards by which, from the 1880s, the newly formed Australian colonial forces were to be measured. As well, we will return to the idea of a persistent ethos of office in the assessment of contemporary military forces and their capacity for change discussed in chapters five and six.
CHAPTER FOUR
‘The rough hand of the soldier’
The changing role of military forces in Australia

Introduction

This chapter traces the changing fortunes of military forces in Australia since the late eighteenth century, and the governmental imperatives that have shaped both the role of the armed forces in relation to the rest of Australian society, and their internal organisation. In contrast to Britain, military forces in Australia have been both more and then less conspicuous; from the 1770s until the mid 1800s the British Army played a central role in the government of the Australian colonies, and the military architecture of barracks was used to house a variety of populations. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the military were displaced as a key agent of social order, leading gradually to position where the newly formed Federal governments of the early twentieth century felt they could do with only a minimum of permanent military personnel to form the nucleus of a citizen-based army.

There is no particular developmental logic to the relationship of military forces to the rest of society in Australia in which a ‘natural antagonism’ underlies the gradual diminution of a military influence upon Australian society.1 Rather, just as we have seen in the discussion of the British military in the previous chapters, the civil-military relationship, and aspects of the internal organisation of the military in Australia are shaped by a range of factors. In this chapter we look to key events in the genealogy of the contemporary ADF, and the often accidental or secondary objectives of which they formed a part. The resulting military apparatus which develops in

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1 See Peter Stanley, ‘Soldiers and fellow-countrymen in Colonial Australia’ in Australia: Two Centuries of War and Peace, eds M. McKernan and M. Browne (eds), Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1988 pp. 65-91.
Australia is a hybrid constructed of administrative reform, economic necessity, and a long-standing relationship to its British counterpart. In tracing the development of the military forces in Australia, this chapter discusses the relationship of the military to governmental strategies in a range of areas: the management of the convict population, the government of the gold fields and the training of school children, and in the development of military forces themselves.

**Policing the Convict Population**

Visitors to early New South Wales were struck by its ‘military aspect’, and historians have often written about the extent to which ‘Colonial secretaries and governors intended that [Sydney] should project “an appearance of Military Restraint”, as Lord Bathurst wrote in 1815, in order to remind convicts, emancipists, and those likely to resent existing authority, of their status and the impossibility of changing it’. In the early years of the Colony, military personnel occupied a variety of roles within the community, including magistrates, commissary officers, police, surveyors, explorers and overseers of the convict population. The regiments of the British Army stationed in New South Wales were crucial to the maintenance of order, much as they would have been had they been stationed in Ireland and parts of England. As I discussed in chapter two, the army was integral to a governmental strategy of ‘police’, both as a repository for the criminal population and as a force to control it.

This dual role meant that the army was a consistently unreliable basis from which to exercise control. This was no less the case in New South Wales. The regimental barracks which ‘occupied a commanding position’ in Sydney were ordered to be repaired by Governor Hunter after they had been allowed to

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fall into disrepair and the soldiers to live where they wished. Hunter wanted
the barracks repaired in order to keep the New South Wales Corps under
control:

The recent conduct of that part of the New South Wales Corps doing
duty at Sydney having been turbulent beyond example, and a daring
violation of the public peace of this settlement, as well as dangerous
to the lives and dwellings of its inhabitants, and as from the scatter’d
manner in which the soldiers live their general conduct cannot be so
minutely inspected by their officers as we find from experience is
requesite [sic], the commanding officer will give directions that as
soon as the barracks can be repair’d they do in future occupy them,
instead of sleeping in huts at a distance from them, those buildings
having been erected for that purpose. By this means will they be
more immediately under the eye of their officers, who will, it is
hoped, be able to prevent any such unmilitary conduct in future. 3

The building and repair of barracks was at least as important for controlling
the military as for keeping the local population in awe. Governor Macquarie
further recommended that the regiments only be posted to the colony for
three years; not so much to ensure a regular supply of fresh troops as ‘for the
purpose of guarding against the Military forming Matrimonial, or less proper
Connections, with the Women of the Country, whereby they lose sight of
their Military duty and become in a great degree identified with the lowest
Class of the Inhabitants’. 4 The danger was not so much that the military
would overpower the Colony but that the Colony and its inhabitants would
render useless the military.

The establishment and rejuvenation of barracks in the early nineteenth
century represented a vigorous attempt to impose a police of the colonial
population. In order to deal with the social problems associated with a
larger, more mobile population, including that of the army, solutions were
sought in the establishment of various forms of ‘moral architecture’, of which
the barrack was exemplary. It was this governmental strategy of segregation,

3 Government and General Order, 8th February, 1796, Historical Records of New South Wales
4 Governor Macquarie to Earl Bathurst, 31 July 1813, Historical Records of Australia (HRA), Series 1:
Governors despatches to and from England, vol. 8, p. 4.
fuelled by a desire to have knowledge and control over an entire population, that led Governor Macquarie to propose the establishment of convict barracks. It was also the basis for the Female Factory, since ‘such a building is not only extremely necessary and desirable, in regard to the comforts of the unfortunate persons themselves, but also to enable the executive Authority to keep a due control over them, and by that means to lay the Foundation for their more Speedy Reformation’.\(^5\) Earl Bathurst was to agree to Macquarie’s proposed building program, for despite the great cost,

\[\text{if the object of the Establishment in New South Wales be the Reform of the Population, I am aware it must altogether fail, unless means are provided for Lodging under proper Superintendance and Control those who may be sent there, and for affording them the Advantages of Discipline and Instruction. With this view the Barracks for Convicts, the Factory and the Churches, which you propose to erect, have my entire Approbation.}\(^6\)

Rather than an exercise in ‘militarisation’, the military and convict barracks and Female Factory can be seen as a solution to the governmental problems of colonial New South Wales; the barracks were erected to deal with the uncontrollability of the British soldiers, the limited ‘government work’ being performed by the male convicts, and the purported ‘depravity’ of the female convicts. In the use of such architectural solutions, the government of New South Wales was following a widespread strategy: the use of institutional sites of care and reform were widespread throughout Britain and Europe from the beginning of the nineteenth century.\(^7\)

Barracks, factories and churches were erected with the encouragement of Earl Bathurst because they enabled, firstly, the separation and enclosure of various parts of the population from one another. For example, ‘a Stone Wall, ten feet

\(^6\)Earl Bathurst to Governor Macquarie, 24th August, 1818, *HRA*, Series 1, vol. 9, p. 832.
high, to surround the Entire of the Said Barracks, and enclosing an extensive Area for Parade and Exercise Grounds, the Great Object of this wall is to restrain as much as possible the Intercourse between the Military and the Inhabitants of the Town. Secondly, they would enable the enclosed population’s time and activities to be monitored. The Female Factory at Parramatta was ‘particularly necessary for keeping those depraved Females at Work within Walls, so as in some degree to be a check upon their Immoralities and disorderly Vicious Habits’. The erection of the main convict barracks for males in Sydney was in part to ‘lay the foundations for their Speedy Reformation’, but it was also intended to ensure that the convicts employed on public works around Sydney worked the whole day for the Government, instead of having their afternoons free to work for private employers. As John Hirst points out: ‘For the first time in the colony’s history, convicts were to be under constant surveillance, to be locked up at night and their ‘own time’ was to be taken away from them’.

Churches, too, ensured that at least part of the convicts’ free day Sunday could be accounted for by enabling them to attend divine worship. Churches were erected or reorganised to allow for inspection of the convict population: ‘the duties of the preacher have been sometimes interrupted for the purpose of checking irregularities in the conduct of the convict during divine service. But, by placing in the new church the seat of the principal Superintendent in the gallery, this evil will be remedied’.

These forms of governmental control were established because they went some way towards achieving the aspiration of the eighteenth century mode of governing that relied on small-scale, local government apparatuses such as the parish, the local magistracy, backed by the army, which constituted the

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8 Governor Macquarie to Earl Bathurst, 28th April, 1814, HRA, Series 1, vol. 8, p. 152.
9 Governor Macquarie to Earl Bathurst, 4th April, 1817, HRA, Series 1, vol. 9, p. 353.
11 See Sir Thomas Brisbane to Earl Bathurst, 28th April, 1823, HRA, Series 1, vol. 11, pp. 75-6.
governmental regime of ‘police’. Such mechanisms were either absent in New South Wales, or ineffective (although Commissioner Bigge recommended the establishment of parishes and administrative areas called ‘hundreds’ for better policing of the population in his Report of 1821). The governmental problem that faced the governors of New South Wales was of a large, undifferentiated population which, in the absence of scrutiny, was disorderly, inefficient and potentially uncontrollable. Faced with this problem, the barracks and Female Factory were intended to separate out the populations from one another, allow for the internal inspection of the populations, and increase the work efficiency of the convict population.

In seeking to achieve these outcomes of greater security and greater productivity, police relied increasingly on a range of disciplinary techniques. As we saw in the previous chapters, these techniques assisted in imposing a semblance of order in the face of an increasingly disordered and mobile population. These techniques attempted to impose a discipline upon the population, initially by segregating, by limiting movement, and by employing mechanisms which aspired to enable an entire population to be visible and hence manageable. These governmental tactics Foucault describes as ‘discipline-blockade, the enclosed institution, established on the edges of society, turned inwards towards negative functions: arresting evil, breaking communications, suspending time’.12

Associated as they were with stasis, with visibility, and with an externally-imposed discipline, these techniques authorised by the early governors of colonial Australia soon came under criticism for their failure to achieve these goals. In order to get a proportion of the convicts to move into the barracks in Sydney Governor Macquarie had to induce them with an increase in rations and the promise that they could still work in ‘their own time’ on Saturday and Sunday afternoons. The convict barracks and the Factory could not accommodate all the ‘government’ convicts, and as a result their coverage

was so limited, and their inmate population so fluid, that they did little to effect the separation and supervision for which they were intended. More than these failures, the convict barracks and Female Factory were producing yet more problems. In a Commission of Inquiry into the Colony of New South Wales in 1821 the Commissioner, J.T. Bigge, was to caution against the dangers created by the barracks: ‘The association of so many depraved and desperate characters in one place is an evil that is complained of even by the convicts themselves’.13 Bigge noted that thefts of clothing among the inmates was ‘encouraged’ by ‘the facility with which they cast them over the barrack wall to persons who are ready to receive them on the other side’.14 He felt that the confinement of convicts to barracks did little to diminish crime, since ‘on marching them to and from...[the barracks] either to work or to church, it is found very difficult to prevent them, especially the boys, from entering houses as they go along, and from snatching at property and secreting it’.15

The Female Factory at Parramatta was even less of a success in governmental terms. Its function contained a paradox: it was intended for the ‘Employment and Residence of the Female Convicts...so as to keep them always within it and prevent them having any Intercourse with the People of the Town, until such time as they should either be Married, or Assigned as domestic Servants to Married persons’.16 The Factory was both to prevent and promote the formation of relationships between the female convicts and the rest of the population. It was successful at neither. The Factory generally employed more women than it could accommodate, so a number had to find lodgings in the town of Parramatta. A considerable number of women assigned to the non-convict population were returned by their employers as unsatisfactory, pregnant or having allegedly committed crimes. This constant traffic limited the capacity of the institution to separate and monitor the female convicts, but

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16Governor Macquarie to Earl Bathurst, 4th December, 1817, *HRA*, Series 1. vol. 9, p. 504.
any attempts to make improvements then hindered the opportunities for the women to marry or form connexions with the local population. The Factory's very existence was seen to contribute to the depravity of the general population, on the basis that it made marriages, legal or de facto, more difficult:

at some periods of the history of this colony, when a ship arrived in the Cove with females, every man, whose industry and labour enabled him to provide for a housekeeper, was allowed to select, from amongst them, one that met his approbation...This, no doubt...was an immoral connexion; abstractedly considered it was indefensible. But compare this with the life and course of conduct of most of those, who formed those connexions; compare it with the total dissoluteness, which might ensue on being turned loose, as must have been the case; compare it with what has ensued since that practice was abolished and the women shut up in the Factory; and the apologies for the system are obvious. Its total discontinuance (when we might have seen an improvement on it) has been followed by the commission of immoralities to an unknown extent, and a lamentable check has been given to the growth of the Colony.17

Initially, these failures were met with an intensification of effort. In response to Commissioner Bigge’s Report, Governor Brisbane undertook the greater classification, separation and dispersal of the convict population:

Irregularities have ceased in the police records...[reforms], when accomplished, will be an index to the moral history of the Colony...means will be afforded of pursuing the history, conduct and condition of a convict in his various situations in the colony from his arrival to his emancipation or death...classing, feeding and lodging in the twelve rooms of Hyde Park Barrack, according to the criminality of [the convicts’] offences, has been partially attempted...and shall forthwith be carried into more entire effect.18

Changes at the Female Factory were also attempted, along the lines that Commissioner Bigge recommended: ‘a complete separation should be made of the vacant spaces now left on either side of the principal building...a range of workrooms should also be constructed, in the same manner...and the entire

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17Extract from the issue of the Australian newspaper, dated 7th April, 1825, HRA, Series 1, vol. 11, p. 597.
18Sir Thomas Brisbane to Earl Bathurst, 28th April. 1823, HRA, Series 1, vol. 11, pp. 77-78.
separation of the female convicts placed in the factory for punishment, from those placed there for work and confinement, will thus be effected'. 19

The various means that Bigge recommended for the improved classification and inspection of the convict population relied for their execution upon the existing governmental apparatus of police: magistrates, special constables and the military forces of the Colony. While he recommended that ‘the future assignment of the females to settlers and others, must be left to the joint discretion of the resident magistrates at Parramatta and the female superintendent of the factory’, Bigge conceded that ‘the management of the female convicts...is a duty for which I do not conceive there is any person now in New South Wales who is duly qualified...a superintendent who has been familiar with the details of management either in a factory or a gaol, should be appointed’. 20 He also proposed that the management of male convicts in government work should be undertaken by non-commissioned officers and privates from the British army, whose ‘habits of discipline and regularity, and the knowledge of mechanics that are acquired by men of this description, qualify them, in a peculiar manner, for the superintendence and management of the compulsory labour of convicts’. 21 For the majority of convicts, it was important that they be assigned to ‘respectable persons’, whose treatment of their charges ‘must be left to the superintendence of the magistrates and officers of police’. 22

Bigge’s aspirations for an improvement in the moral and economic climate of New South Wales were not met by the greater extension of the disciplinary mechanisms he proposed. This was in part due to the inadequacy of those charged with carrying out the reforms proposed. Thus, when the Select

19Bigge Commission Report, p. 168 (see also p. 71).
22Bigge Commission Report, p. 168. Despite the criticisms of police and magistrates that Bigge encountered in the course of his enquiries, his second report on the Judicial establishments of New South Wales and Van Deimen’s Land does not canvass changes to the recruitment and selection of magistrates and police.
Committee of the House of Commons on Transportation, or Molesworth Committee, came to consider the colonies of New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land in 1837, they not only found that the problems Bigge had identified continued, but also that those charged with the police of the population were themselves adversely affected by such a system. In particular, the task of guarding chain gangs working on the roads had 'produced the greatest demoralization among the troops...[in part] by their intercourse with the prison population, which could not be prevented, because many of the men found their fathers, brothers and other relations, amongst the convicts'.

The Molesworth Committee was exemplary in its enunciation of the widely-held view that a penal system based on the extremes of transportation and the death penalty was effective neither in deterring crime nor reforming the criminal. Transportation was expensive and required extreme levels of violence to maintain order, particularly among those who committed further crimes after being transported. As well, the system of assigning convicts to work as labourers and servants for the free settlers in New South Wales was considered an arbitrary process, with all the potential evils of slavery, which had been abolished in the British Empire since 1833.

The Molesworth Committee's views were consistent with a wider agenda of penal reform which was already underway in Britain. For some years there had been agitation to amend the Criminal Code to reduce the numbers of crimes punishable by death, with recommendations that persons convicted of committing minor crimes and property offences should serve sentences in penitentiaries built in accordance with the separate confinement system.

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24 Molesworth Committee Report, p. xiv.
advocated by reformers like Jeremy Bentham and in use in parts of the United States. Thus, while it is unlikely that the criticisms of Molesworth Committee were decisive in bringing transportation to an end in 1840, the form the criticisms took were exemplary of the period, and were important to the shape of reform in New South Wales after the end of Transportation.

The Committee’s criticisms were focussed on the costly nature of a mode of government which both advocated the practice of transportation and aimed at the kind of comprehensive management of the convict population such as that attempted in the colonies. This preventative police was ambitious in its scope, but the instruments of this ambition were so inappropriate to the tasks set for them that they engendered more problems than they solved. For example, the statutory punishment of death for a large number of crimes led jurors to obfuscate the nature of the crimes in order to avoid the inevitable sentence of death or transportation for life. Similarly, petitioners to the British Parliament were frequently moved to request greater leniency of punishment in order to diminish the rate of crime; as a petition of Bankers from 214 cities and towns stated in 1830, 'the infliction of death, or even the possibility of death, prevents the prosecution, conviction and punishment of the criminal and thus endangers the property which it is intended to protect.'

Consistent with this theme, the Molesworth Committee argued that in the Colony of New South Wales order was maintained through a combination of brutality and neglect, making transportation a punishment of very unequal outcomes.

Further, transportation and the practice of assignment were productive of a vast range of evils in New South Wales: domestic servants in the towns committed burglaries, female convicts corrupted the children of settlers under their care, road parties were responsible for widespread 'disorders, crimes and demoralisation', soldiers were demoralised and undisciplined.

from guarding chain gangs, settlers and those in charge of government gangs were transformed into tyrants. In addition, ‘Transportation is not merely inefficient in producing the moral reformation of an offender; it is efficient in demoralizing those, whom accidental circumstances, more than a really vicious nature, have seduced into crime’. 27 In the case of secondary offenders, the Report argued that ‘A system of punishment, which relies for its efficacy solely upon the infliction of pain, without attempting to encourage and strengthen the moral feelings of a culprit, only hardens and brutalises him’. 28 The Committee argued that the system of transportation worked in such a way as to produce an even greater criminal population than it reformed, and that this population was then unfit to take advantage of the economic possibilities of the colony; in this way transportation was ‘costly’ at three stages: as an initial punishment, as secondary punishment and in the economic life of the colony. For, in the face of a ‘pressing demand for labour, and great facilities for acquiring wealth, crimes so numerous and so atrocious as those, perpetrated in New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land, truly indicate the depth of their moral depravity’. 29

Earlier attempts to maintain control through the use of barracks and the Female Factory were criticised by the Committee. The convict barracks, despite attempts by its administrators to increase the supervision and visibility of activities within the barracks, were a source of contamination and spread of ‘unnatural acts’, so that these were considered to be ‘more common in Sydney than in any part of the civilised world’. 30 The Female Factory was described by witnesses to the Committee as ‘a sort of lying in hospital, at the public expense...the same as the Foundling Hospital in France; it does not matter who is the father of the child, the government very liberally support it’. 31 These consequences led the Molesworth Committee to argue that ‘there

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27 Molesworth Committee Report, p. xxii.
28 Molesworth Committee Report, pp. xxii-xxiii.
29 Molesworth Committee Report, p. xxvii.
30 Molesworth Committee Report, Evidence, p. 67.
31 Molesworth Committee Report, Evidence, p. 65 (see also p. 46).
belongs to the system [of transportation], extrinsically from its strange character as a punishment, the yet more curious and monstrous evil of calling into existence, and continually extending societies, or the germs of nations most thoroughly depraved'. In the face of the 'costly' nature of the system of punishment in New South Wales, the Molesworth Committee recommended the abolition of assignment, the greater regulation of government work and the introduction of penitentiary-like practices at the penal establishments in Van Diemen's Land and Norfolk Island.

In a society largely composed of criminals, the Committee argued, there was little opportunity for reformation and everyone was 'contaminated' by the brutality such a society engendered. In this calculation, the Army was doubly represented: firstly, in carrying out its police functions, individual soldiers were demoralised and rendered inefficient by their association with criminals, and the efficiency of the regiment, by dispersing forces throughout the colony in small number to guard gangs of men, was compromised as the men could never be trained together in adequate formations or properly supervised by their officers; secondly, the soldiers of the army had blunt and often brutal ways of maintaining order, and were not trained to be providing the reformatory guidance advocated by the Committee.

With the abolition of transportation to New South Wales in 1840 and to Van Diemen's Land in 1852, and the cessation of the practice of assignment in 1841, an important source of the costly 'police' in New South Wales was ended. As the British Government encouraged economic migration to the colonies, the basis of the society of New South Wales changed, and the continued role of the Army in a police of the population came under increasing scrutiny. No longer shielded by the exigencies of maintaining

32Molesworth Committee Report, p. xli.
order in a convict population, the ‘rough justice’ of the soldier seemed increasingly uneconomical.

In part, this view was influenced by the changing terms under which Imperial troops were garrisoned in the Australian colonies. From 1849 their numbers were to be determined in accordance with the need to protect Australia from external threat rather than as the maintenance of internal order dictated. As well, from the 1840s the colonies had increasingly to shoulder the cost of garrisoning troops, and while there were a number of ‘foreign invasion’ scares in the 1840s and 1850s which led to demands for more troops, colonial governments were concerned to minimise the costs associated with defence.

In part, this calculation of the costliness of the army was consistent with a new, liberal mode of government which sought to develop a new means of addressing an inherited concern for security and prosperity. One of the consequences of this aspiration for a more efficient government was that agencies of a more generalised police, like the Army, were discarded in favour of governmental agencies with specific functions and specialised training: police forces of different kinds, gaol wardens, inspectors and surveyors of various kinds. It was this form of governmental calculation which established the terms on which the inappropriateness of military forces to generalised policing came to be demonstrated conclusively, in a way that meant that no such role would again be contemplated for such a force, except under exceptional circumstances. This shift can be well-illustrated with reference to the problem of government of the New South Wales and Victorian Gold Fields in the middle of the nineteenth century.

**Governing Colonial Australia**

When gold was discovered in New South Wales in the early 1850s, the Colonial Secretary appointed a Commissioner of Crown Lands for the
Goldfields. This Commissioner, J.R. Hardy, and others who were appointed as the goldfields expanded, issued licenses, settled claims and adjudicated disputes among the mining population. He operated with a limited number of police in support, keeping up an active inspection of the various fields by issuing licenses and verifying claims on the spot. Hardy resisted directions to establish a central office to which miners had to apply for their licenses, and he resisted the suggestion that he should appoint special constables from amongst the more respectable miners to assist him. Hardy argued that the government of the goldfields was:

an extremely delicate business to manage. I can rely on myself; I have the most perfect reliance on the men...that the government has given me; but I could never rely on special constables, however respectable...the bands of unknown and homeless men, who compose the greater part of this population, and who readily recognise me and my men in the performance of our duty, would laugh at what they call amateur constables.34

Hardy was suggesting that it wasn’t possible to adapt the system of special constables, which belonged to a practice of government more appropriate to the settled agrarian communities of eighteenth century Britain, where ‘leading and respectable men were clearly identifiable and their social superiority over the rest was harnessed in support of the civil power’.35 The identifiable sources of social control were the uniformed commissioners and police, who moved amongst the population, using the knowledge they gained from frequent inspections of the fields to assist in the settling of disputes and in informing the mining population of new finds. The size of the New South Wales fields were such that the vigilance of the Commissioners, backed up by a small force of police, appeared relatively effective in maintaining order. In 1852 a Select Committee on the Management of the Gold Fields, concerned about the management of the diverse and mobile population on the gold fields proposed that a general system of registration of everyone residing within the limits of the

Commissioner's district should be introduced. The Commissioners responded that 'no doubt the information that would be derived from it would be valuable, but it would be very difficult to enforce such a regulation'. While the Commissioners were wary of recommending only a system of management on the goldfields 'which depends for its successful operation on the personal influence of the Commissioners', they were more reluctant to preside over the elaborate suggestions of the Committee for a system of general registration.

The reluctance of the New South Wales Commissioners to operate an unwieldy system of a generalised police of the gold fields population stood in marked contrast to the practices of managing the Victorian gold fields. The Victorian goldfields were considerably larger than those in New South Wales; at its peak in 1858, the population of the various fields totalled 147,000 people. In the district of Ballarat there were calculated to be as many as 58,000 persons in 1855. Initially, the Victorian fields employed the same system of Commissioners supported by police, issuing licenses to miners every month. However, the Commissioners left much of the pursuit of miners to renew their licenses up to the local police, who were considered to be brutal and harassing, both to those who had taken out licenses and to those who had not. Opposition by the miners to the payment of the license fees increased from 1852 onwards, partly because many could not afford to pay and partly because of the way in which the fee was collected. In 1853 a Select Committee of the Victorian Legislative Council had found that the greatest opposition to government was over the method of collecting the fees for gold prospecting licenses, rather than the fees themselves. Moreover, many of the witnesses to the Committee were critical of the Commissioners, who left their police forces to operate without supervision, and were thus

considered ‘tyrannical and ineffectual’.\textsuperscript{38} Opposition was most organised at the Ballarat goldfields, culminating in the clash between miners and the police and soldiers at the ‘Eureka Stockade’ in December 1854, during which about thirty miners and five soldiers were killed.

A Royal Commission on the Gold Fields, which met shortly after the events at Ballarat, examined the causes of the widespread dissatisfactions of the miners. The Commission found that objection to the license fee was always represented to the Commission as much less an objection to the rate then the mode of its collection; with this view of the subject, the Commission entirely accord...To carry out the law in its integrity, to oblige everyone to pay the rate, or at least endeavour effectively to do so, required a constant exercise of authority, and a continual disturbance of those who had paid, in order to detect those who had not. Scenes between the police and miners were of daily occurrence, where mutual irritation, abuse and gross violence would ensue.\textsuperscript{39}

The license fee was an inefficient means of governing the population and raising revenue, causing more problems than it solved. In recommending its abolition the Commission noted that ‘Laws must not be based solely upon abstract principle or right, but be adapted also to human nature’, and in the light of this view of government, they proposed

a small charge, ostensibly for the privilege of mining for gold and with the object of some revenue being raised...It is not intended that any active search be instituted by the authorities as to whether a miner has or has not taken out this qualification; but without it, he has no right to the gold he may acquire, or to claims or digging ground he may take up and labour on...The Miner’s Right, as it is proposed to term this annual document, would be a means of distinguishing the well disposed on the Gold Fields, and of aiding the police and authorities.\textsuperscript{40}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{40} Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Condition of the Gold Fields of Victoria, p. xiii.
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The introduction of the Miner's Right was intended to overcome the inefficiencies of the license fee, the heavy burden its collection imposed and the levels of antagonism that it produced. The new mechanism of the Miner's Right both brought in revenue and was a more efficient exercise of governmental power because it was constructed to incorporate the miners' interests in its adoption. Thus, in place of a harassing police force the government could encourage the self-interest of miners. In addressing the problems of the gold fields in this way the Commission is exemplary in its concerns with the 'costly' and inefficient administration of the gold fields. In this respect the Commission echoes the earlier concerns of the Select Committee on Transportation; it had as its goal the achievement of a new set of governmental aims directed at enhancing the individual's capacities for self-government at a minimum 'cost' to government. This cost was in part calculated by considering the extent to which governmental mechanisms engender either opposition (which increases the cost), or the opportunity for an increased capacity for self-government (which reduces the cost).

Thus, when the Commission came to examine the mechanisms used to maintain order on the gold fields, it was extremely critical of the police, principally in terms of the way in which they were used:

While...the police were rendered quite inefficient for the ordinary public service, the force itself was withal twice as numerous and twice as expensive as would have been necessary under a different system...Instead of the happy accord between the police and the ordinary citizen exemplified everywhere but on the Gold Fields, this force was chiefly arrayed around the authorities at the Camp, who, as they balanced the spirit and numbers of the defiant miners, were apt to judge of the police requirements not by the proportion deemed necessary to protect the people, but by the force requisite to defeat them.41

The gold field Commissioners had used the police against the local population, and had produced more ill-effects than their presence had ameliorated. The solution for the Commission was to adjust the balance, to

41 Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Condition of the Gold Fields of Victoria, p. xiii.
have the police operating in an environment where the majority of the population governed themselves:

The Commission have already had occasion to allude to the excessive array of police upon the Gold Fields. This expensive body, obnoxious in its duties, and banded together upon a camp as if in hostilities to the people, seems to have been a deep seated cause of popular irritation...a smaller force, adequate to protect but not to defy the people, would have materially tended to abate antipathies on both sides...A happy illustration came before [the Commission] at the adjacent extensive Gold Fields at Creswick’s Creek. Amidst an immense population, estimated at that time to be 20,000 souls, the police force consisting of only nineteen persons...was so small as to be scarcely adequate even to the ordinary administration of justice...the authorities, thus destitute of all protection against the people around them, and without even the semblance of a camp, seem to have been in reality more safe than in the midst of a regiment of bayonets...It is by observation of such incidents, as well as by general reasoning, that the Commission are entirely assured of the conservative elements upon the Gold Fields.  

When considering the other arm of government on the goldfields, the military, the Commission could see no valid reason for its continued role as a police force, particularly given the military’s symbolic character, what the Commission described as a ‘defiant arrangement’:

the observations made with regard to the array of police upon these districts apply still more strongly and unexceptionally to military force...the great point should be, so as to meet the reasonable wants of the people as to prevent such social outbreak, rather than to maintain a defiant arrangement for putting it down...

The Commission believe that the crisis which was evidently gathering would have been differently and more opportunely met had there been no military arm to rely on...The rough hand of the soldier is a prompt cure; but it is a cure of the surface only, and it remedies nothing more permanently any more than effectually. In so far as there have been grievances of a valid character to redress amongst the mining population, the presence of the military in this Colony, available as they have been to encourage a resistant and unsympathetic attitude in the authorities, has been a misfortune and a stumbling block.  

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42Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Condition of the Gold Fields of Victoria, p. xxvi.
43Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Condition of the Gold Fields of Victoria, pp. xxvi-xxvii.
The ‘rough hand of the soldier’ had become a stumbling block in the management of a population such as that of the Victorian goldfields. Not because, or only because, the use of the army seemed a crude measure of force for any government, but because such temporary, superficial management of the population no longer accorded with governmental objectives. The Miner’s Right, which harnessed the miners’ self interest, and was much more ‘economical’ to enforce, was characteristic of the change in governmentality that occurred during the nineteenth century. It was against these more effective, more economical measures, that the use of soldiers, with all the problems they created, seemed inappropriate.

Changes in the exercise of government in nineteenth century Australia were felt at all levels of government. In 1842, the Secretary of State for the Colonies wrote to the Governor of New South Wales telling him that

the report, which you have just now furnished, is not of the description which Her Majesty’s Government thought it desirable to call for annually from the Governor of each of the Colonies. The Report now before me describes merely the political and judicial constitution of the colony; whereas it was the object of the instruction to produce a review, retrospective and prospective, of the state and condition of the Colony...the Report should contain such explanations and comments, which would illustrate the permanent as distinguished from the transient and occasional interests of the Colony.’’

On the gold fields in Victoria the new executive officers: the surveyors, mine inspectors and registrars were themselves subjected to the techniques they were there to effect; surveyors were not just to be appointed by the Mining Boards, but had to pass examinations which would ‘be so strict and enlarged as to ensure their competency for the offices for which they seek’; registrars of claims needed to have their offices overhauled and to institute uniform, centralised and carefully kept records of claims, instead of the situation in which ‘registrars have kept their books in so rough and loose a style, that at

44Lord Stanley to Sir George Gipps, 5th May 1842, HRA, Series 1, vol. 22, p. 36.
times they have experienced great difficulty in making use of them'. In the mining companies, too, it was not enough to appoint a manager, for 'the number of mining companies in the colony, public and private, very largely exceeded the number of competent mining managers to be found'. Mining companies had to utilise the technique of examination to gain full benefit from the appointment of a mine manager, for 'there was, in the present state of the colony, practically no means by which any company could judge the quality of the persons seeking to be employed as managers...a great boon would be conferred on the mining community...if arrangements were made for regular examinations, on the plan of those for the Civil Service, to be held in the mining museum'.

For these governmental officers, the challenges of incorporating as well as extending the techniques of a new governmentality served to strengthen their role. For others like the magistracy, the police and the military, these challenges were to be significant in determining both the process of internal reform and their role in government. The generalised skills of particularly the magistracy and the military were inadequate to a strategy that developed and extended specialised knowledges. Magistrates appointed from amongst the 'respectable population' came increasingly under scrutiny. In 1858 a New South Wales Select Committee on the State of the Magistracy would go so far as to acknowledge that 'educational attainment is desirable', but at that time thought that 'no test...can be exercised, except a man's judgement of the character of the candidate from his conversation'. By 1871, the Commission on the Gold Fields was of the opinion that 'confidence in the decisions pronounced cannot be entertained in the public mind when the persons

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46Report of the Royal Mining Commission of Victoria, p. 47.
adjudicating, however zealous, however patient, however industrious and however honest, lack knowledge'.

Amidst these shifts in governmentality, the place of ‘military’ techniques and personnel is not uniform or easily explicable in terms of a cultural ‘antipathy’, which is temporary submerged and then reemerges with the introduction of ‘democratic’ government. Rather, the role of military practices is determined by their usefulness in addressing a range of governmental questions: barracks were an exemplary form of architecture when the problem of government was the separation and segregation of the population; soldiers were appropriate to governmental practices which centred on the effects of symbolic violence; as these governmental strategies came under scrutiny, as they were demonstrated not only to have failed their explicit purpose but to have been productive of a range of secondary, unintended and undesirable effects.

**Reforming the Military**

Despite the criticisms made of the military forces in the 1850s, a few short years later inspectors with the Department of Education in New South Wales began to comment on the benefits of drill for the discipline and government of schools, and to lament its limited use: ‘There are but few schools in which a regular system of drill is practised. This is to be regretted, as it is a good corrective of slovenly habits, and a powerful agent in promoting the general discipline of a school’. The irregular practice of drill in school, which seemed to consist mostly of lining up and marching, as a way of managing students between lessons, continued throughout the 1870s. By the early 1880s drill was an examinable subject in the public schools of New South Wales. In 1881 31, 771 students gained a pass in drill, and by 1890 a total number of

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115,065 students were examined, with 83,144 gaining a pass. The enthusiasm for drill lay mainly with the Inspectors, as many of the teachers remained untrained for taking drill, and according to the Inspectors

Teachers do not appear to realise sufficiently the great aid it is to the maintenance of discipline to have their pupils trained in the playground to habits of united and prompt action. If this is well done, there is little difficulty in securing that ready attention and concentrated thought in class teaching on which depends the success of the lesson. 51

From the early 1880s the teacher training school started to instruct its trainee teachers in drill: military drill and gymnastics for the men, and drill and callisthenics for the women. The benefit here was felt not only in the schools, but also ‘the physique and general health of the [student teachers], both male and female, were much improved by these exercises and contrasted favourably with the health of those who had attended the Training School prior to the introduction of Drill’. 52

Drill was not introduced to produce recruits for the colonial defence forces. The drill taught to the general body of school students should be distinguished from the formation of cadet corps in the schools, which only involved relatively small numbers of students, and was largely unsuccessful until it was reorganised in 1888. In the early 1890s the Minister for Public Education reported that:

under the scheme of reorganisation...the public school cadet force has made very satisfactory progress...the actual enrolment at the close of 1890 was 5,842...A healthy interest in the cadet movement has now been created throughout the country...It is confidently expected that the cadet force will become firmly established as a permanent National Institution. 53

52 Report of the Minister of Public Instruction upon the Condition of Public Schools (hereafter Report...on Public Schools 1883-84), New South Wales Legislative Assembly Votes and Proceedings, 1883-84, vol. 7, p.101.
This was a small group of students (compared to the number that participated in drill) that were to be linked, via a corps of senior cadets, to the defence forces of the Colony, 'with a view to the ranks of the latter being recruited in great measure from the former'.

For the school inspectors, interested as they were in the general government of the school, drill was a vehicle for managing school students when they were between classes, in the relatively unregulated space of the playground. Inspectors were interested in drill in terms of 'its application to school movement, with a view to economise time', and its capacity to secure 'improvement in the degree of quietness, precision and expedition with which various class-movements are performed'. Nor was the introduction of drill an indication of a harsher, more unsophisticated approach to discipline; in the same reports where drill was supported, the Chief Inspector remarks that

> the government in use in schools is mild. Corporal punishment is in general resorted to only in extreme cases and when other means of removing disorder have failed... Year by year the aids for the maintenance of good order are becoming better understood and applied by teachers, and, in equal degree, harsh forms of government are disappearing from our schools.

Drill was 'an important aid in the maintenance of good order'; it taught children physical co-ordination and self-discipline, and it enabled the parts of the school outside the classroom to be ordered and regulated; these two facets contributed to the good government of the classroom. Similar results were hoped for with the introduction of drill to the boys' reformatory school, the Nautical School Ship Vernon in 1878. In his Report of 1879 the Superintendent remarked that

> the system of drilling initiated on board last year has proved successful in its results; the increased smartness and improved

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55 Report...on Public Schools 1883-84, pp. 95, 70.
56 Report...on Public Schools 1883-84, p. 105.
bearing of the boys bear testimony to the value of this form of training...a better course of training could hardly be adopted, as it gives them a cheerful, intelligent appearance and improves their physique, conducing to that desirable result the *mens sana in corpore sano*.57

By 1890 he could write that ‘the great value of a systematic course of drilling in all schools, but more especially in those of the nature of [NSS Vernon], in being conducive to order, improvement of bearing, and personal neatness, with other reasons, are now generally recognised by all competent authorities’.58 Such sentiments were also expressed by military authorities. Colonel Peter Scratchely, responsible for reorganising the Defence Forces of New South Wales in the early 1880s recommended that: ‘The boys in public and private schools... be drilled, - not for the purposes of attempting to make soldiers out of them, but with the object of teaching them obedience, self-control and respect for authority’.

The distinction drawn here between adopting drill as a mechanism for increasing the good order of the school and classroom, and the ‘self-control’ of the population, and the development and training of military forces is an extremely important one. In contrast to the enthusiasm for drill amongst educational authorities, military commanders stressed its limited role in producing efficient soldiers, either in the Permanent or Volunteer forces. This was in large part because military authorities were concerned to draw attention to the need for camps and focussed periods of training rather than measuring the efficiency of local forces against attendance at drills. In the absence of these concentrated periods of training, though drill remained an important component of military training, its role in producing well-trained soldiers, especially through improving the collective capacity of the unit, was seen as limited.

A consistent theme of military inspection reports from the 1880s onwards stresses the importance of bringing men together to train collectively in camps of instruction and exercise. Witnesses to the Military Defences Inquiry Commission of 1881 commented that ‘fourteen consecutive days should be the least amount of training, in short terms, these terms being consecutive, as opposed to detached drills’, for ‘An infantry man ought to be made a good soldier in from nine months to a year. I do not mean only the actual knowledge of drill, but the hundred-and-one things that a man picks up by being daily under discipline, accustomed to do what he is told, to exercise judgement, and at times to be self-dependent’. To be effective, drill must be attached to, and reinforced by periods of more intensive training:

The period of continuous training has especially proved of material advantage in facilitating the acquirement of habits of good order, regularity and discipline, in affording an opportunity for the practice of interior economy, and in bringing the various ranks into real military association with each other. This training is assuredly the backbone of the system, and should, if possible, be of longer duration; yet, when combined with the almost fortnightly trainings on half-days, it is, I am inclined to think, as much time as the men can be reasonably expected to sacrifice. That the training should be thus distributed over the year, instead of confined to one period...I look upon as of service in keeping up a military spirit as well as proficiency in drill.

In tracing the relationship between government and the military, we can see how drill might have become a useful auxiliary in the government of the school, as a way of developing the physical skills of the children and of ordering their behaviour outside the classroom, while in the same period its value in the government of the military was increasingly proscribed.

To an increasing degree, the training of the rank and file of the army tended towards enhancing the capacities of the individual soldier. We saw from the previous chapters that many of the reforms of the nineteenth century British

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60 Military Defences Inquiry Commission, Evidence, pp. 87, 74.
Army during this period, which set the standard against which Australian defence forces were judged, at least until after the First World War, were centred on the objects of improvements in the ‘interior economy’ of the regiment, improvements in the conduct of large scale exercises, and the reform of the officer corps. All of these reforms were predicated on the importance of having the men ‘daily under discipline’ and enhancing and intensifying the collective life of the army. The ‘interior economy’ of the regiment referred to the growing number of aspects of the good management of the men of the regiment, focussed around life in the regimental barracks: the keeping of accounts, the daily routines of meals, parades, sentry duties and ‘well-structured and improving’ recreational periods. Annual training camps were considered to be vital to achieving the necessary familiarity of the men to operating in large formations; these camps were also important for the training of officers, who frequently lacked experience in commanding large bodies of men and maintaining discipline in times of crowding and stress\textsuperscript{62}. Reforms of the officer corps also included the greater emphasis on the importance and centrality of the regiment, increasingly uniting the interests of the officer with the interests of his men within the context of regimental life.

Thus within this reformatory framework, in which the object is to increase the capacities of the individual soldier and together the output of the military, the emphasis was on the beneficial effects of an immersion in ‘military life’ - a term which was itself increasingly amenable to measurement and improvement. In this context, attendance at drills was used as a standard measure of efficiency from the mid-1860s. However, it operated as a minimum requirement; alone it produced forces capable of operating as an auxiliary to the paid volunteer forces, producing rifle companies which were

\textsuperscript{62}These annual camps were all the more desirable for being so infrequently held. See Hew Strachan, \textit{From Waterloo to Balaclava: Tactics, Technology and the British Army. 1815-1854}, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 108.
considered desirable as much for their social as their military contribution; in South Australia:

The force is very popular, and...is tending to a very great extent to develop a martial spirit of defence, not offence, throughout the whole of the Colony. Where men had nothing on earth to do in their leisure hours but frequent public-houses they now take their rifle to the practice ground. However popular this force may become it should never be considered otherwise than as an auxiliary to the paid volunteer force, who from their better opportunities of training, from their being associated together in larger numbers, and from their always being under the eye of the Commandant and experienced officers, answer the purpose of the regular force of the Colony.\(^6\)

The ‘auxiliary’ status of the part-time forces was not a reflection of their enthusiasm, or their social composition. It was determined by these forces’ capacity to demonstrate efficiency against a range of governmental norms which had become increasingly important to the reformation of the permanent forces, particularly in Britain, during the second half of the nineteenth century.

While these reforms highlighted the importance of immersion in an increasingly distinct military ‘style of life’ or military habitus, and the importance of continuous, measurable training within that habitus, there was a significant change in official thinking about the government of the military, particularly after the First World War, which served to obscure these enduring features of military life and their importance. Military populations come to be seen less as a particular world with distinct practices, and more as a temporary aggregation of individuals who could be quickly trained to meet the necessities of war. There were several factors which motivated this change in thinking about defence forces. One of these was the re-emergence of a common political fantasy about the political and social benefits of citizen participation in defence, which we will discuss further in the following chapter. Another was the widely criticised performance of the British Army during the Boer War. The Royal Commission established to examine the

\(^6\)Military Defences Inquiry Commission, Evidence, p. 77. Emphasis in original.
failures of the British forces criticised the incompetence of a military caste system in which the military officers were adept at a military lifestyle but had no technical knowledge of warfare. Furthermore, the success of the volunteers who joined the Australian Imperial Forces at the beginning of the First World War seemed to undermine the importance of military forces themselves developing the character and abilities of soldiers and officers, and as a corollary, reduced the importance attached to training as a vital component of creating efficient forces. The final factor in the shift away from nurturing a ‘professional’ military service with adequate opportunities for training was the impossibility of meeting the considerable costs associated with maintaining a large permanent defence force.

Thus, until the end of the Second World War, Australian military forces were organised and trained on the basis of a small cadre of permanent forces within the largely part-time Citizen Military Force (CMF). These part-time forces were made up in part by men undertaking compulsory military service, which was introduced in 1911 and repealed in 1929. Because the CMF consisted largely of part-time soldiers, the crucial role of the cadre of regular officers within it was largely overlooked. As the then Inspector-General of the Australian Military Forces, Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Chauvel wrote in 1921:

because of the fact that our citizen army did so extraordinarily well during the late war, there is a tendency on the part of the Australian Public to discount the value of the professional soldier, and to doubt whether he is necessary at all...people do not realise that the framework of the army...had been gradually built up for years before the war by the effort of a small body of professional soldiers

Not only was the role of the regulars in the CMF underplayed, the extent to which even this small group could be adequately trained to provide the basis

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for an expansion in war-time was limited. This was particularly the case where funding cuts had forced a dramatic reduction in the size of the CMF from 1922, and annual training camps were all but abandoned. This was all the more concerning for military authorities, who argued that the developments in weaponry, the greater use of air attacks, artillery and tanks ‘are extending the scope of military training to an almost unprecedented degree, and are making ever more difficult in war the tasks of commander, staffs and regimental leaders’. The emphasis on a cadet scheme for boys and young men, together with the retention of a very small cadre of regular officers, meant that the opportunities for officers of all ranks to train large bodies of experienced men and develop the skills necessary for command were few. The prevailing assumption was that individually trained soldiers would quickly and easily group to make the larger formations necessary to fight another war, with only a minimum of structure and hierarchy necessary to form a fighting unit. In the face of such a ‘modular’ approach to the formation of military forces, the contribution made by regular personnel was underplayed, and the concern with having the individual well-entrenched into the particular habitus of the military had largely disappeared.

After the Second World War, the numbers of regular, permanent members of the Navy, Army and Air Force was to increase substantially over the previous peacetime establishments. As Jeffrey Grey notes, ‘in contrast to all previous practice, the Citizen Military Forces were to exist for the benefit of, and to supplement, the regulars and not the other way round’. However, this greater emphasis on the importance of the regular army would take time to have its effects, since ‘the Army now had to handle a sizeable regular force with few of the things associated with the existence of a ‘standing army’, such as adequate barrack accommodation and a reasonable supply of married quarters’. Moreover, a further period of National Service was introduced in

69 Rowell, p. 185.
1951 to supplement the regular military forces and the Citizen Military Forces; the greater number of regular officers and men, and the relatively recent wartime experience of the members of the CMF meant that National Servicemen were able to be given better training and to be led by more experienced officers, but ‘the war in Korea and the introduction of National Service stretched the resources of the Regular Army to the limit.’ National Service was suspended in 1959, and reintroduced as a selective ballot in 1964 in anticipation of Australia’s involvement in Vietnam. Politically the reintroduction of conscription was very unpopular, and neither the military nor the Department of Labour and National Service supported it.

Rather than being seen as the principal form of providing defence, ‘citizen’ defence forces were now assessed in terms of their likely impact on the performance of regular forces. However, unlike previous forms of conscription in which men were conscripted to serve only as adjuncts to the regular army or as part of the part-time CMF, those conscripted between 1964 and 1972 served with regular army units and were treated as regular soldiers, including being sent overseas to fight in South Vietnam. In this most recent instance of augmenting Australia’s military forces, the goal was to produce additional full-time forces. By 1974, the ‘auxiliary’ status of other than fully trained, full-time forces was again reiterated and taken as the basis of future military manpower planning, acknowledging that however dedicated, citizen military forces as they were then called, were unable to meet the same levels of training, familiarity with military practices and equipment as regular forces.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the terms under which military forces in Australia came to be seen as no longer appropriate to the general government of Colonial Australia. In turn, the separation of the defence forces from their

70Rowell, p. 184.
role in maintaining order in the early nineteenth century provided the impetus, as it did in Britain, for changes to the internal government of these military forces. While this began on a very small scale in Australia from the 1850s onwards, these changes worked, over time, to establish the measures of an effective defence force which, contrary to the continuing enthusiasm for militia like forces, favoured the development and maintenance of a permanent, paid defence force.

As we shall see in the following chapter, any appeal to a return to the 'golden past' in which the Australian community was at one with its defence forces needs to take account not only of the difficulty of identifying such a community history, but also of the ways in which a series of governmental reforms have made community based defence, the greater use of reserves and part-time forces measurably utopian.
CHAPTER FIVE
Cultural separation or convergence?
Establishing the relationship between the Defence Force and the community

Introduction

In this chapter and the chapter that follows, we will look at two contemporary efforts to shape the Australian Defence Force (ADF). This chapter examines a recent report which has sought to revive a long-standing political debate about the relationship between defence forces and the society of which they are a part. This report, entitled *The Defence Force and the Community: A partnership in Australia’s defence*, argues that greater participation by ‘the community’ in the defence forces will achieve two things: one is that it will make the community more closely associated with the defence forces and interested in defence questions; the second is that it will diminish the ‘cultural separation’ of the defence forces from the rest of the community.

The report echoes a long history of debates about the political implications of a standing army versus militias in Britain. These debates were particularly prominent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and questions of the provision of defence forces were an important part of the debates of the Scottish Enlightenment, both in terms of the need for citizens to take an active part in defence and to avoid the political implications of a separate caste being in charge of military force. Since this time, as one historian of the ‘standing army controversy’ puts it, the anti-army tracts have contributed to an antimilitary attitude which ‘became an intellectual tradition, which in modified form still exists’.

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The standing army controversy has always been part of the political negotiation over the provision of defence forces, in Britain and Australia, forming a sort of ‘principled backdrop’ to the everyday governmental concerns which we have set out in the previous three chapters. The legacy of this intellectual tradition about the provision of defence forces can be seen in The Defence Force and the Community, which we will consider in the light of the history of military forces that we have developed in the last three chapters. This history suggests to us that the expectation of the report that it can both increase the ‘community’ responsibility for defence, and that it can effect a ‘cultural convergence’ between the military and the rest of society is unrealistic. This is because it fails to take account of the practical problems associated with the formation of the military, both officers and other ranks, and the way in which professionalisation has in fact served as an important means of effecting the most efficient provision of defence, at the same time as displacing most of the concerns about standing armies held by the early pro-militia supporters.

In 1990 the then Minister of Defence instigated a ‘review of civil-military relationships’. The Terms of Reference of this review stated that it was to ‘explore how the Australian community could play a greater role in strengthening Australia’s security and how more weight could be given to the Government’s policy of eliminating unnecessary duplication of civil and military skills and capabilities’. In its report, the review proposes the introduction of what it called a ‘Total Force’, which has as its centrepiece a much expanded reserve or part-time military force. In order to achieve a total force, the review argues for a 32% reduction in full-time, regular military personnel, a 92% increase in part-time, reserve personnel, and a 43% reduction in the number of defence civilians. These changes are intended to allow for the proportion of military personnel in ‘combat’ and ‘combat-
related’ positions to rise from about 46% to 60%, and for the part-time forces, to be called a militia, to play a more significant role in the provision of defence. The intention was to reduce the number of service personnel engaged in predominantly ‘civilian’ activities, transferring these roles to civilian contractors, to free up regular and militia personnel to take up combat and combat related positions. The review sets out in considerable detail the changed force mixes that it proposes. It also focuses in on what it argues is the central stumbling block to bringing about the changes that it proposes. ‘the root of the whole issue of community involvement in defence [is] the self-absorption that has led the defence specialists to forget their obligation to explain to the community what they are about, and do it well enough to catch the community’s interest’.

The review is centrally focussed on the ‘culture’ of the ADF, and the way in which the professional military forces have become isolated from and out of touch with the rest of the society. It is this culture that is the most serious impediment to greater civilian involvement in the provision of defence, and this culture which must change, because ‘Australia cannot allow the ADF, even if its own inclinations lead it that way, to become concerned more with internal cohesion and unique military values than with the health of the roots that bind it to and support it from the community’. In the report’s view, the resulting military culture is the expression or reflection of these unique military values, which are out of touch with, and unappealing to, potential recruits.

Greater civilian involvement in Defence becomes elevated to a matter of political and social significance. The review states that ‘there are important societal reasons, relating to the relationship between Australia’s military institution and the community, for favouring initiatives which strengthen the

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3 The Defence Force and the Community, chapters 4 and 5.
4 The Defence Force and the Community, pp xi-xii.
5 The Defence Force and the Community, p 317.
interdependence of the defence force and the community and encourage convergence of cultural values’. This interdependence is necessary to redress the balance between the military and its host community which the review argues has become unbalanced; on the one hand, the society is weakened by its failure to take a greater role in deciding on defence issues and participating in military service, and on the other hand, the professional military forces have become too dominant by being left to pursue their own course for too long. Among the most important of the initiatives proposed by the review to address this imbalance is an increase in the number of people making a ‘part-time’ commitment to the ADF through the reserve forces, and their greater integration with regular forces. This militia will act as ‘an important bridge between the military and wider society’.

‘Statesmen and Warriors’: the advantages of militias

In its focus on the political and social implications of a defence force which is ‘removed’ from the society it is to serve, the review is echoing a long tradition of concern about the effects of a professional army on the nation as a whole’s capacity for and interest in matters of defence. This concern was a key consideration of debates about the provision of defence forces in England, and later Great Britain, particularly from the late seventeenth century through to the end of the eighteenth century. Throughout this period, highlighted by the ‘Standing Army Controversy’ of the late seventeenth century, political theorists argued over the merits of militias and standing armies in terms of their contribution to the maintenance of political liberty and as an issue of national character. At this time, the questions of how to provide for defence, and protect against this military force being used as a political tool, were

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6 The Defence Force and the Community, pp. 508-509.
7 The Defence Force and the Community, p 509.
formulated in the light of the revolutionary events of the seventeenth century, and with a view to the cost of maintaining standing armies in peacetime.

For the supporters of militia forces, the arguments they advanced were largely based on reviving an idealised model of society in which land-holders would give time to military preparations in order to defend their property and the form of government that upheld their way of life. The aristocracy and gentry, and even the landed middle classes would themselves benefit from being required to take responsibility for defence, both because it was a manly, responsible thing to do, and because it would reduce the tax burden of a standing army (though raising, arming and training a militia unit could be expensive). A standing army in the service of the Crown, argued writers like Trenchard and Fletcher, could be shown by historical example to lead ‘from monarchies to tyrannies’, especially where defence was provided by mercenary forces who would only do the King’s bidding. In his highly influential tract on the effects of standing armies, Fletcher argued for a return to the ‘antient’ and ‘gothick’ ordering of society which would both ensure the proper balance between the executive and the freeholder, and provide for national defence. He argued that this balance had been displaced since about 1500, when Europe sank into ‘an abyss of pleasures’, which ‘brought a total alteration in the way of living, upon which all Government depends...Men imagined themselves to be gainers in all points, by changing from their frugal and military ways of living’. In Fletcher’s history, mercenary forces were hired instead of using vassals, and this led in turn to members of the aristocracy leading these mercenary forces while sitting in Parliament, where they could vote funds for the army’s maintenance and so perpetuate warfare. Fletcher concluded that this ‘professionalisation of warfare’, in which the morally corrupt and weak landholders allowed others to provide for their

9 Western, p. 440.
10 Andrew Fletcher, A Discourse concerning Militias and Standing Armies, London, 1697, p. 6.
11 Fletcher, Discourse concerning Militias, p. 9
defence introduced instability, for ‘what real security can be had against a
standing army of mercenaries, backed by the corruption of a nation’.12

This particular view of the proper balance of interests became even more
closely focussed on the moral implications of maintaining militia forces
during the eighteenth century. On the one hand, the relationship between the
Parliament and the Crown forged during the seventeenth century, in the Bill
of Rights and the Mutiny Act of 1689, made the consent of Parliament
necessary to the raising and maintenance of standing armies in peacetime.
This had proved to be an enduring limitation on any aspirations of the Crown
to amass military forces. On the other hand, the heavy demands of warfare in
the eighteenth century, in which the army needed up to a hundred thousand
men with increasingly sophisticated weaponry and tactics, led to the view
that militias could never do more than support a standing army. As Sher
notes, there was a shift in emphasis from ‘an anti-army to a pro-militia
position’.13 Rather than argue that militias could fully replace standing
armies, militia supporters advocated them for home defence, and addressed
themselves to the debilitating effects on the leading families of the country
who no longer took an interest in matters of defence. At the end of the
seventeenth century Fletcher had warned against the dangers of ‘Men of
Quality and Estates having power to send any wretched Servant in their
place’, for these men became ‘abject and timorous, by being disused to handle
arms’.14 In the mid-eighteenth century, at the end of the Seven Years’ War,
Adam Ferguson would argue in the face of the arguments then developing
about the advantages of a division of labour, that there needed to be a
delicate balance between the pursuit of wealth and the responsibility for
defence, ‘because the abilitys of the Statesman & those of the Warrior are

13 Sher, p. 243.
14 Fletcher, Discourse concerning Militias, pp. 25-26. This theme continued to appear in
subsequent discussions of the militia. See Western, p. 216.
intimately connected. When they are separated the Statesman becomes a Clerk...and the soldier a mere Gladiator or executioner'.

It is this formulation of the militia (and in some variations a citizen-based army), as a moral leavening against the tendency of states to prefer the service of professional military forces, that has persisted. In the early twentieth century debates on the establishment of military forces in the newly formed Commonwealth of Australia, the virtues of relying on a militia for the provision of the bulk of the defence forces was widely accepted. In his Report of an Inspection of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia in early 1914, Sir Ian Hamilton noted that ‘The Commonwealth has definitely adopted the militia principle as a means of raising its military forces’. The citizen force was to be administered and trained by a small cadre of regular officers, with the ‘militia principle’ implying ‘the abandonment of all idea of maintaining permanent troops, save in so far as they may be considered an indispensable adjunct to the Militia’.

The benefits of a citizen military force were regularly outlined in parliamentary debates in the years leading up to the introduction of compulsory military training in 1911. The Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin spoke in 1907 of the way in which the Australian military forces ‘being a citizen soldiery, should appeal to our people as no other can’. Not only was a citizen force considered to be less expensive than a regular army, but it was motivated by patriotism, and did not become separate from the society from which it sprang. In these arguments, a citizen military force is better than a permanent, professional military force. For Deakin, a citizen force relies upon patriotic feeling: ‘Our ideal is a defence of the people for the people and

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15 Adam Ferguson, from a lecture delivered at Edinburgh University. April 9, 1776, quoted in Sher, p. 253.
17 'Report of an Inspection...1914', p. 7.
18 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 13 December 1907, p. 7535.
by the people'.

Citizen soldiers do not pose the same political risk of forming a group with particular interests to pursue, nor do they need the reward of ceremony or caste privileges, and nor do they regard their military service as a form of sinecure.

In the late twentieth century in Australia, when as we have seen from previous chapters, the militia has become an adjunct to the permanent military force rather than the other way around, the benefits of militia forces are argued principally in terms of their leavening effect upon the ‘separate caste of warriors’. For The Defence Force and the Community, the arguments it sets out for the reinvigoration of part-time militia forces are firmly focussed on the moral implications of the provision of defence forces. The militia will act as a ‘bridge’ between the community and the permanent military forces to ensure both that the community takes its responsibilities for defence seriously and that the ADF does not become too inward-looking and out-of-touch with the society it serves.

Like the seventeenth and eighteenth century militia supporters, the review sets out an historical explanation for the demise of citizen interest and involvement in defence, designed to illustrate the quote from Jean-Jacques Rousseau which the review uses to showcase its argument:

As soon as public service ceases to be the chief business of the citizens, and they would rather serve with their money than with their persons, the State is not far from its fall. When it is necessary to march out to war, they pay troops and stay at home... By reasons of idleness and money, they end by having soldiers to enslave their country and representatives to sell it.

The review discusses the history of the formation of military forces in Australia, focussing in particular on the ‘attitudes’ of Australians to service in the army. It notes the referenda over conscription for active service overseas during the First World War, in which conscription was defeated on two

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19 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 13 December 1907, p. 7535-7536.
occasions ‘despite substantial popular support for the war’, and the subsequent ‘traumatic divisions in Australian society’ engendered by the use of conscripts in Vietnam. The review also points to the long periods of compulsory military service training throughout the twentieth century and notes the ‘distaste for conscription for military service abroad has coexisted with popular acceptance for compulsory military service training in peacetime’, which was only suspended because ‘the government of the day became persuaded it was not cost-effective in relation to the perceived needs of the time’, and that ‘The Army, a reluctant participant, saw the training of conscripts as a drain on resources it preferred to use in polishing its professional skills’.  

In this history as presented by the review, a fledgling militia spirit has been undermined by a combination of the inappropriate use of militia forces in conflicts which were not about the direct defence of Australia and the ‘highjacking’ of the military debate by the professional military, which had a ‘preference’ for using resources for its own development. There are thus two solutions to the militia ‘crisis’ that the review identifies, and they concentrate on altering the ‘attitudinal problem’ associated with the demise of the militia. The first is to engage in a public education campaign to improve the community’s understanding of defence issues and the current basis for defence planning, which is focussed on the defence of Australia. The second is to have the professional military forces give up their stranglehold on defence matters and seek greater involvement from the community. Together these two approaches are intended to lead to the greater participation of the community in the militia, for the review is of the opinion that ‘a better informed community...would be persuaded that more active community participation in defence was desirable in the interests of a more secure Australia’.  

The review marshals evidence from opinion polling to demonstrate both the limited understanding of defence issues among those

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21 The Defence Force and the Community, p. 5.
22 The Defence Force and the Community, p. 8.
polled, and the limited interest in the defence forces. The review questions whether a general level of community apathy is an ‘inevitable part of parliamentary democracy’, and argues for the importance of changing the extent to which people are informed about defence matters, for it sees this as a crucial step in achieving a more integrated defence force in which a militia plays a significant part. Placing great emphasis on the governmental benefits of an informed community, the review states that the objective should be to ‘achieve a level of community understanding that provides the nation with a better basis for its future protection’.  

The review is presented here with a characteristic problem, that it shares with those who advocated militias in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: how to generate this ‘interest’ in defence matters and translate it into effective participation in defence? Adam Ferguson recognised that ‘a militia established by “compulsory statute” might “leave an impression of servitude and consequently some degree of repugnance”’, and he piously hoped, like other writers at the time who emphasised the need to rekindle the spirit of civic virtue, that ‘there are many well informed liberal & high minded in the upper Ranks who will be pleased to set an Example, of so much advantage to their Country’ 24. As we have noted, the review argues for an improved public information campaign which would better explain Australia’s strategic posture and the main aspects of a defence strategy, which incorporates a significant role for a militia force. Thus a better informed community would be more inclined to consider defence issues, and to consider participation in the defence forces themselves.

But the difficulty for the pro-militia position, as it expressed in this review, and in the seventeenth and eighteenth century tracts, is that beyond encouraging the idea of participation, the review has few means at its disposal for guaranteeing that a specified number of people will come forward for participation.

23 The Defence Force and the Community, p. 22, emphasis added.
24 Adam Ferguson, quoted in Sher, p. 263.
part-time service. There are the suggestions which are aimed at making participation easier, such as legislative changes governing the activation of militia forces in time of conflict and encouraging better support by employers for employees who are in the militia. The review is also supportive of the school cadet schemes which have operated in Australia for the past hundred years, as they appear to be a good source of personnel for both regular and reserve forces. In its support the review suggested that cadets would form 'part of the overall community awareness processes...[the review] believes form an essential foundation for a successful militia'. This is reminiscent of the proposals by Ferguson who in 1802 argued that:

I agree with the Persians of old who are said to have taught all their Children to shoot the Bow as well as to speak Truth. In these indeed there was no matter for separate Professions, any more than, in our case, there is reason to withhold the Powers of Defence from any one who has a Country to defend...Military & Practical schools [should be attached to every university, thus] letters might accompany practice & the Library Student be kept in mind of his Manhood & the common cause of His King and his Country which may at some interesting time require his exertions.

Given the review's antagonism to the 'caste mentality' of the military professional, its support for cadets is curious since cadet units tend to focus to a considerable extent on inculcating the traditions and 'esprit de corps' of their parent services (and are to be distinguished from drill in schools, which, as we have seen in chapter three, was intended to assist the good government of the school, as well as improve the physical fitness of the students, rather than to develop a military capacity as such). Like most militia supporters, the review sets the militia up largely as an antidote to the professional military, and in particular sees the militia operating effectively without the 'cultural' baggage of military life. Indeed the review argues that many potential part-

25 The Defence Force and the Community, pp. 355-358.
26 The Defence Force and the Community, p. 357.
27 Ferguson quoted in Sher, p. 264.
time militia personnel are ‘often turned off by the ADF’s emphasis on customs, traditions and symbols’.  

This antagonism to the ‘lifestyle’ of the military professional is a long-standing aspect of support for militia forces, and the review’s concern to have the regular forces take a less dominant role echoes this. As we see from the remarks of Ferguson above, one element of the pro-militia position is to argue that defence is not an area that needs a separate profession; those who have become professional soldiers have had to shore up their position by erecting an elaborate culture.

In early twentieth century Australia, when the newly formed Commonwealth was considering its future defence forces, this juxtaposition between the spare, focussed militia and the extravagant professional military forces was frequently expressed. In setting out the estimates for expenditure on Defence in 1907 Deakin emphasised the distinction between the citizen soldier and a professional military force, arguing that

What we must and do trust to are not titles and rewards, but voluntary service given freely...Ours being a citizen soldiery should appeal to our people as no other can. We cast aside meretricious display, the glitter of gold lace, or the glamour of a separate caste. We replace them by a high response [sic] of confidence in the man who is doing his duty when guarding his home as much as when breadwinning for his family or fathering his children. It is on patriotic feeling that we rely; without this it would be idle to propose a citizen soldiery; otherwise we would have to buy our defence.

In part the arguments in favour of a ‘spartan’ militia service are economic ones, for as Deakin noted, the costs of arming and maintaining a military force in Australia would be ‘crushing’ unless a more simplified and largely volunteer force was developed. This theme was further pursued by Sir Ian Hamilton in his 1914 report on the military forces of the Commonwealth, where he elaborated on the implications of Australia’s decision to ‘adopt the

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28 The Defence Force and the Community, p. 31.
29 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 13 December 1907, col. 7535.
militia principle’, in particular emphasising the differences between militias and regular armies. For the most part, this meant that the Australian military forces should operate with as few of the ‘peace traditions’ of regular military forces as possible, and rely to a much greater extent on the national infrastructure to provide the support and technical expertise which would normally be organic to regular military forces. Further, one of the main ways in which Australia was intending to be both effective and economical was to begin the training of citizen forces while they were still young. Cadet training of young men for a number of years would enable the ‘raising of powerful armies for home defence with a minimum tax on the priceless time of the adult male worker’.

While the adoption of militia forces in Australia was partly for economic considerations, as we can see from Deakin’s remarks, the advocacy of militia forces is also partly a broader, political argument. For the seventeenth and eighteenth century militia supporters, the issue of the provision of defence forces is linked to questions of, on the one hand, the protection of the liberties of individuals within the society against the encroachments of the State, and on the other hand with the responsibilities of individual citizens to contribute to a collective responsibility for defence. Standing armies in the service of the Crown were regarded as a considerable danger to individual liberties, and an efficient militia was an effective argument against the need for a standing army, at least for home defence. Militias were also an embodiment of civic responsibility and a vehicle for inculcating such civic-mindedness amongst the population. While, as Western asserts, the arguments of the militia supporters involved a kind of republicanism based on a backward-looking yearning for a previous supposed golden age, the issue of defence, its cost as well as its impact upon the liberties of members of society, formed an integral part of the early liberal conception of modern society and its government.

30 ‘Report of an Inspection...1914’, pp. 8-9
32 Western, p. 437. There may be some debate about whether the various militia writers I have cited would be called liberals or themselves be engaged in formulating ‘liberal’ social
As we have noted above and elsewhere, aspects of this liberal conception pose certain difficulties for thinking about the provision of defence forces. For the militia supporters of the eighteenth century, as well as for our contemporary review of the Australian community’s involvement with the ADF, the expectation that individuals within the community will be motivated by a sense of civic responsibility to contribute to the defence effort, and that this sense of responsibility itself will contribute to the efficiency of the military force, is asserted with difficulty. The idealisation of society and the capacities of its members in the pro-militia positions we have outlined can only be sustained by placing an insupportable burden upon the civic-mindedness of citizens, and by rejecting the professional military force as an unnecessary expense of government. As we shall see, this is a kind of theoretical liberal position which is only partly supported by other liberal writers like Adam Smith whose articulation of liberalism as a mode of government focuses precisely on the difficulty of generating ‘soldierlike’ citizens. His insistence on the need for a professional military force for efficiency and disciplinary reasons indicates the more ‘pragmatic’ attempt to implement a liberal rationality of government. This pragmatism would acknowledge that professional military forces are a crucial part of the achievement of a defence force which is not a threat to liberty, so long, of course, as ‘the sovereign himself is the general, and the principal nobility and gentry of the country the chief officers of the army’.  

We have seen in the previous three chapters that the ways in which British and Australian military forces have been transformed are the result of contingent actions on the part of government attempting to develop a stable.

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self-regulatory and accountable profession. The transformation of the regiment, for example, into the locus of training, promotion, welfare provision and sentiment that it now is, is an attestation to the success of this governmental campaign, particularly over the latter half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. This ‘campaign’ - a term which suggests more coordination than existed at the time - was necessary in the face of the sorts of inefficiencies found in the traditional, and militia-like arrangements for defence inherited from the eighteenth century. The ‘professionalisation’ of the military forces was consistent with a liberalism that sought to achieve certain governmental effects, that had to try and ‘make practical’ the aspirations for limited government. As a number of writers following Foucault have remarked, a liberal rationality of government is quite active in promoting and enhancing structures within the society which will allow individuals and society as a whole to ‘govern themselves’. As Graham Burchell expresses it: ‘Liberal principles for rationalising the exercise of political power outline a framework for a possible art of government which depends upon and facilitates a proliferation of techniques for the disciplinary integration of individuals at critical points in the social order’.\(^\text{34}\)

The defence forces that developed during the nineteenth century in Britain, and which were subsequently adapted to Australian requirements, were the vehicles for achieving this ‘disciplinary integration’. One of the first, and most enduring steps in this process, as we have seen, was the establishment of barracks as the paradigmatic form of housing troops. Barracks enabled the further development of a vast range of techniques for disciplining large bodies of men as well as for encouraging their individual improvement. We have also traced the development of the officer corps into a ‘profession’ which was gradually able to take on the role of training and developing its members, in part by building on to an already existing range of techniques associated with the inculcation and enhancement of gentlemanly conduct.

For this reason, the extent to which these military forces developed into a
distinct 'caste' with particular values is a reflection in part of a range of
governmental imperatives introduced where 'society' and the 'community'
failed. The inevitability of this process, and the lines of its development, has
been an important part of the argument of the defenders of standing armies,
from the seventeenth century onwards.

'Ill officers and ill management': the defects of militias

For those who defended the standing army in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, the concern for liberty was soon put to rest. In his pamphlet
entitled An Argument Shewing, that a Standing Army, with Consent of Parliament,
is not Inconsistent with a Free Government, Daniel Defoe argued against the pro-
militia writers' use of history to justify a return to a golden age by reminding
his readers of recent parliamentary history, and the greater liberties that came
with the establishment of a properly constituted Parliament with control over
such matters as the provision of defence forces. With the formation of
Parliament the common people were saved from both the despotism of the
prince and of the lesser princes or Barons:

the People obtained privileges of their own, and obliged the King and
the Barons to accept of an Equilibrium; this we call Parliament...and I
appeal to all men to judge if this Ballance be not a much nobler
constitution in all its points, than the old Gothick model of
Government...[which] was but exchanging one Tyrant for Three
Hundred, for so many the Barons of England were accounted at
least. 35

It was the burden of providing for defence that had the potential to infringe
upon peoples' liberties, as Ferguson had noted. Adam Smith took this
argument further, suggesting that the only way to guarantee an efficient
militia was through continuous training, which would have to be forced upon
the population, who wish to be otherwise busy engaging in more productive

35 Daniel Defoe, An Argument Shewing, that a Standing Army, with Consent of Parliament, is not
and prosperous pursuits.\textsuperscript{36} While Smith supported the existence of a 'martial spirit' amongst the population as a check upon the army, he noted that 'to maintain even in tolerable execution the complex regulations of any modern militia, requires the continual and painful attention of government, without which they are constantly falling into total neglect and disuse'.\textsuperscript{37} Those writers who supported a standing army did so because there was greater opportunity of controlling and fashioning that force than there was with a militia. For Defoe, liberty was at much at risk at the hands of a poorly trained militia as it was by the existence of a standing army: 'Even our Militia, under a bad Government...under ill officers and ill management, [are] as dangerous as any Souldery whatever, will be as Insolent, and do the Drudgery of a Tyrant as effectually'.\textsuperscript{38} In these remarks Defoe points us to the two key areas of considerable significance for the contestation over the most appropriate means of forming military forces, and the main lines along which the professionalism of the regular forces would distinguish them from the part-time militia. The first of these concerns the training of military forces, and the manner in which training serves to discriminate between permanent and part-time forces. The second of these issues centres on the recruitment and training of officers. In both cases, we can see the manner in which the various reforms around these two issues in the period covered by this study have limited the practical appeal of militia forces by introducing a series of measures against which the militia would always be found wanting.

For Adam Smith, militias would always be inferior to standing armies because they lacked the opportunity to become proficient in the profession of soldiering, and they did not regularly train together to develop the discipline necessary to survive the modern battlefield. In place of the hasty recruitment and then release of soldiers to meet the immediate needs of war while pandering to the antipathy for standing armies, Smith pointed to the benefits

\textsuperscript{36} Wealth of Nations, p. 401.
\textsuperscript{37} Wealth of Nations, p. 435.
\textsuperscript{38} Defoe, An Argument, p. 22.
of the division of labour for the development of military forces as much as for the development of industry. Soldiers needed to train for warfare, and the discipline necessary for the modern battlefield could only be secured by having men make warfare their ‘sole or principal occupation’. Moreover, men would only learn to obey orders in the confusion of the battlefield if they were well habituated to it during peacetime, by living quartered with each other and under the regular direction of their officers. For Smith, discipline, or ‘the habit of ready obedience’, was characteristic of the soldiers of standing armies, and was to be distinguished from a proficiency in drill, or ‘the management and use of its arms’ that passed for discipline in the militia.\(^39\) This form of habituated discipline, and ready obedience was necessary in the confusion and terror of the modern battlefield, and had to be learnt. Such discipline was not equivalent to the ‘self-discipline’ of the militia soldier, who was free to pursue his own interests most of the time.

The soldiers, who are bound to obey their officer only once a week or once a month, and who are at all other times at liberty to manage their own affairs their own way, without being in any respect accountable to him...can never have the same disposition to ready obedience, with those whose whole life and conduct are every day directed by him, and who every day even rise and go to bed, or at least retire to their quarters, according to his orders. In what is called discipline, or in the habit of ready obedience, a militia must always be still more inferior to a standing army, than it may sometimes be in what is called the manual exercise, or in the management and use of its arms\(^40\)

These remarks of Smith’s are a good summary of the problems that would continue to dog the militia throughout the following period. At the end of the eighteenth century militia regiments could be made to be reasonably proficient, but only when they were able to take advantage of periods of training, including spending time in camps.\(^41\) These camps afforded the opportunity for concentrated training under the command of regular officers, and under these circumstances, militia units could become quite competent in

\(^{39}\) *Wealth of Nations*, p. 403.

\(^{40}\) *Wealth of Nations*, p. 403.

\(^{41}\) Western, p. 404.
various military exercises. However, these militia forces could only maintain these levels of proficiency when embodied and in regular training. When, in the nineteenth century militia forces were required to support the over-stretched regular forces, they generally had to be given a period of training with regular forces to be made efficient.\(^{41}\)

In Australia, as we have seen, from the nineteenth century onwards, though the idea of militia forces was very widely supported, the militia was usually found wanting. In the 1880s inspection reports of the colonial military forces noted that militia regiments were a good idea for providing a recreational diversion for young men in rural areas, but that such militia forces were only an ‘auxiliary’ to the paid forces, largely because the regular forces had better opportunities for training, for assembling together and for ‘always being under the eye of the Commandant’.\(^{43}\) In the twentieth century, when the Commonwealth had formally adopted a militia based system of defence, it was still acknowledged that training, particularly training in camps, was crucial to maintaining efficient forces. In his Memorandum on the Defence of Australia in 1910 Field Marshall Viscount Kitchener advised that the training periods previously set down for military training should be extended, particularly the time spent in camps, arguing that without at least six clear days of training in camps each year, the men ‘lose the incentive to home training, the habit of working in units, of moving and living in numbers, and of ready obedience to orders.’\(^{44}\) In his report of 1914, Sir Ian Hamilton took the point further, saying that while the militia forces were very keen to study the theory of warfare, and to learn all about what they would do in the field, they rarely had the opportunity to practice what they had studied, and ‘the lack of the ounce of practice begins to betray the lightness of the ton of

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theory’.\(^45\) There were certain ‘immutable principles’ associated with militia forces, and these were related to the limited opportunities for training:

Patriotism, keenness, study and careful instruction, strain and struggle upon the heels of practical experience and habits of discipline, but rarely quite catch them up. For these, in a regular army, are the product of years of continuous service, and until a Militia has been called out for service and has been for some time in the field, it will always, for this reason, lack self-confidence when faced by professional soldiers.\(^46\)

In addition to the problems of training, the other major impediment to the efficiency of militia forces was the recruitment and training of officers. For both the pro-militia supporters like Fletcher and Ferguson, and those who supported standing armies, like Smith and Defoe, there was the view that the quality of officers was crucial to the performance of both the militia and the standing army. For Fletcher, officers (and ideally all members of the militia) had to be drawn from persons of the ‘first Rank’, for several reasons. The first was that the nobility were the best educated, and thus were best able to lead others. The second was that the militia was a potentially very powerful force which needed appropriate leadership, since ‘Power Naturally follows the use of the sword. And the sword therefore should be committed to those who are most worthy of power’.\(^47\) The third reason was that the militia should be led by men of high rank because of the intimate connection between the interests of the nobility and the State. For Ferguson, it is this last reason that precludes the advantages of the division of labour extending to the provision of defence, for ‘the Statesman’ must be acquainted with all aspects of human affairs, including warfare; where they are separated, the statesman becomes a ‘clerk’ and the soldier a ‘mere Gladiator’.

For Adam Smith, the principle of the division of labour should be extended to the military, as we have seen, in order to guarantee the necessary efficiency

\(^45\) ‘Report of an Inspection...1914’, p. 33.
\(^46\) ‘Report of an Inspection...1914’, p. 33.
\(^47\) Quoted in Sher, p. 252.
and discipline on the part of the rank and file. At the same time, Smith acknowledged the concerns expressed by the militia supporters about the 'question of liberty', and argued that

where the sovereign is himself the general, and the principal nobility and gentry of the country the chief officers of the army, where the military force is placed under the command of those who have the greatest interest in the support of the civil authority, because they have themselves the greatest share of that authority, a standing army can never be dangerous to liberty.\(^{48}\)

Defoe too looked to 'Men of Quality' to be officers in the army. Such officers would secure the political allegiance of the military and diminish the likelihood that such an army would again be a threat to Parliament. But while such men might be politically appropriate as officers, Defoe did not assume they would make good officers without training. He proposed a Royal Academy for Military Exercises, acknowledging that 'Soldiers, Horsemen, Engineers, Gunners and the like must be bred and taught; men are not born with Muskets on their shoulders, nor fortifications in their Heads; 'tis not natural to shoot Bombs, and undermine towns'.\(^{49}\) In his view it was only when gentlemen undertook training that they would be able to replace the better qualified foreigners on whom the King had come to rely.

However, setting the aristocracy's involvement as so crucial to both the functioning of the standing army and the militia only served to highlight the difficulty of reaping the purported benefits of aristocratic officers. The embodiment of the militia was the subject of numerous Acts during the eighteenth century, most of which served on the one hand to highlight the inefficiency of the militia regiments and the lack of enthusiasm for serving in them, and on the other hand to increase the bureaucratic control to which these regiments would be subjected. Though the idea behind the Militia Acts was to encourage gentlemen to participate, the reluctance to compel this class of persons meant that the militia was full of substitutes. The Seven Years'
War of 1756-63 had meant the permanent embodiment of the militia, under the same discipline as the standing army, with the result, said one pamphlet, that the militia was 'so very widely differing from what either the friends or the enemies...[of militias] expected to see'. The practical effect of attempting to legislate civic virtue was exactly what Andrew Fletcher had complained of fifty years earlier - a militia composed of the 'lower ranks' of society, which was much like a standing army when a war demanded constant service, but was hard to discipline and maintain during peacetime. Attempts by Parliament to induce greater involvement by men of property included the imposition of fines, but those who could afford to simply paid the fines and additional money to locate substitutes. The property qualifications for commissions were lowered, with the characteristic effect that, in the Cambridgeshire Militia in the late 1770s, for example, of the four subalterns in the regiment, one 'was an innkeeper, another a breeches maker and the third said that he would be glad to be a nobleman’s butler'.

In his study of the militia in the eighteenth century, Western argues that a central part of the inefficiencies associated with the militia of the eighteenth century was due to the officers, who were 'insufficient both in numbers and professional competence'. In the eighteenth century, through the nineteenth and into the twentieth, when attempts were made to improve the militia it was most effective to post regular officers into militia regiments. As Western notes, non-commissioned officers and junior officers from the army, were able to keep the training and other aspects of the regiments' 'interior economy' from falling into disarray. In Australia in 1921, the then Inspector of the Commonwealth Forces, cautioned the enthusiasm for the apparent success of the Australian citizen forces during the First World War, by noting

51 Western, p. 316.
52 Western, p. 422.
53 Western notes, however, that many of the sergeants attracted to the Militia regiments were already old, and not always 'equal to the task of making the militia proficient in its military duties and compensating for the ignorance of the non-professional officers': Western, p. 322.
that the Australian army's efficiency was in large measure due to the efforts of the professional officers who provided staff support and leadership:

people do not realise that the framework of the army...had been gradually built up for years before the war by the effort of a small body of professional soldiers: that all the AIF formations were largely (entirely in the first instance) staffed by permanent officers and many were commanded by them; and that the officers of the citizen forces who attained to great distinction during the war were nearly all cases of men who had devoted years of hard work and close study to their duties. 

As we have seen in the previous three chapters, the training and discipline of the rank and file, and the emergence of a professional officer corps has been a central part of the development of military forces during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As we have suggested earlier, this development was consistent with concerns to limit the damaging effects, for the provision of defence and for the society more widely, of unruly military forces. The contingent, negotiated manner of this development, and the role of government in shaping both the rank and file and the officer corps undermines the pro-militia antagonism towards the 'profession' as a brake on militia support. In addressing the demand for a stable, self-sufficient and cost-efficient means of providing defence forces, the 'professionalisation' of the military has proved a more attractive proposition for a liberal rationality of government than 'the militia principle'. Even in Australia, where a citizen based army was adopted for the first forty-odd years after Federation, it relied upon the nucleus of a regular military force. With the demand for a large number of personnel to continue in full-time service after the end of the Second World War it was this nucleus of regular personnel that would grow to look upon the militia for its augmentation. In this transition, the framework of a professional military force, developed over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was quickly and easily established, without a great deal of modification to take account of Australia's long association with citizen-based defence.

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Achieving the ‘convergence of cultural values’

In this discussion of *The Defence Force and the Community* I have concentrated on the way in which the review argues for the need for a part-time military force, or militia, on ‘cultural’ grounds: on the basis that it will be better both for Australian society and for the ADF if, through this militia, there is a ‘convergence of cultural values’. In part, as I have suggested, this argument is a modern example of the long standing pro-militia positions that we have reviewed above, and their concern for the debilitating effects upon society where citizens take no interest in defence matters. From this aspect, the growth of professional military forces is the outcome of a weakness on the part of the society, because the society has lost its interest in matters of defence, and ‘become abject and timorous’. In the words of the review, ‘a community apathetic or ignorant about defence will not seek or even welcome involvement in defence matters’.\(^{55}\) It is this apathy or weakness that threatens the political liberty of the society. ‘The community’ does not engage in debate on defence matters, and so finds itself hostage to the particular interests of the defence forces: ‘In the absence of such a public understanding the political will to maintain a steady course will always be vulnerable to shorter-term objectives’.\(^{56}\)

We noted earlier the difficulty in determining the means by which ‘community involvement’ might be generated in order to avoid these dangers. For the eighteenth century writers, the attempts to embody martial spirit always ran the risk of being more detrimental to the liberties of citizens than a standing army. For our twentieth century review, the problem is that ‘the community’ with which the ADF is exhorted to engage is always slightly out of reach; for example, while the review encourages the development of an enhanced militia as a way in which the ADF can bring the community ‘in’ to

\(^{55}\) *The Defence Force and the Community*, p. 8.

\(^{56}\) *The Defence Force and the Community*, p. 13.
achieve a ‘convergence of cultural values’, it then speaks of further efforts that need to be made in order that: ‘The militia must feel that the community regards it as a valuable public institution that deserves support’. In the review the militia both embodies the community and stands outside it, acting as a ‘bridge’ to the community.

This ambiguous position of the community in relation to its government - in this case in relation to the question of the provision of defence forces - is a common feature of political representations inherited from liberalism. As we saw with the discussion of Ferguson, while he argued that defence should be provided by members of society rather than be imposed by government through the maintenance of a standing army, he also recognised that it is very often the case that these members of society had to be provided with both the motivation to contribute to defence and the means. Similarly, the argument in The Defence Force and the Community is that members of the Australian community should be given a greater opportunity to participate in matters of defence by diminishing the monopoly of the regular ADF and developing a militia. The review also advocates that a widespread public-relations and education campaign be undertaken to stimulate an interest in taking up the opportunities for greater involvement that it argues for. In both these examples, the argument in favour of limiting the role of regular forces is based on an assumption of a pre-existing will, a capacity, a desire in the community to contribute to its own defence; at the same time this desire and capacity has to be generated, encouraged or channelled by the actions of government.

This ambiguity around whether militia forces would arise ‘naturally’ if allowed to or whether they need to be developed as a deliberate tactic of government is a variant of a fundamental aspect of liberalism, in which the ‘figure of the community of autonomous persons...appears ambiguously in

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57 The Defence Force and the Community, p. 323.
58 See the discussion in Hindess, Discourses of Power, pp 123-131.
liberal discourse as a reality that is the basis for government in some contexts and as artefact of government practices in others. As a theorisation of the relationship of community to its government, liberalism always asserts the capacities inherent in the community (such as autonomy) which justify the call for limiting the actions of government, especially where these actions might diminish the capacities of those individuals which make up the community. However, as a mode of government, liberalism employs tactics which can both limit the work of ‘the State’ and guarantee the capacities of individuals to play their part. I have suggested that, following Burchell and others, the reformation of military forces, particularly in the nineteenth century, works as part of these tactics for the ‘disciplinary integration’ of individuals necessary to the protection of liberty and the possibility of limited government. However, the theoretical arguments in favour of a militia, such as those expressed in the review, cannot see that the problem of generating a stable, reliable and efficient defence force is a task for government which in part involves the generation of the capacities for contributing to defence, the ‘military values’, which the review assumes to be inherent in the community.

Given the role of government in shaping military forces in order to achieve this ‘disciplinary integration’, positioning the ‘community’ as the normative centre from which the defence forces have strayed creates two problems for the pro-militia position expressed in *The Defence Force and the Community*. The first of these is that the military values of which the review is so critical: ‘a complex panoply of carefully constructed traditions, specialised educational institutions with their stylish studies of the successes and failures of military history, and a tightly hierarchical organisation created by and for a “group apart from laymen”’, have developed, as we have seen in the previous chapters, as a deliberate tactic of government to produce safe, efficient and self-regulatory military forces in the absence of any such capacity developing

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naturally within the society. In so doing, government established measures of effectiveness against which militia forces would always be found wanting.

The second problem for a pro-militia position that is concerned to bring the defence force closer to the community is the difficulty of identifying the community with which the defence forces must converge. Liberal theorisations of society designate the community as something outside of government, made up of autonomous persons upon whose consent government exists and acts. For The Defence Force and the Community, the failure of successive Governments, and the ADF as an arm of government, to involve the community in defence runs the risk of the military being seen as a 'costly irrelevance', because it cannot claim to operate upon the consent of the community. The review argues that 'it seems important to strive for a sense of partnership between the defence professional and the host community in the goal of maintaining national security, which, after all, is one of the most elemental reasons people have had for banding together as a nation'. In this view, as we have discussed earlier, the community precedes government, is outside it and government in its various forms depends upon it. We have also noted the ambiguity of the term community; that it appears as an artefact of government as well. As a mode of government, liberalism depends upon, and encourages, the formation and maintenance of a number of different communities which, as in the example of the military profession, act as a form of disciplinary integration and as a vehicle for the development of autonomous persons. These various communities of different sizes, memberships, and functions are sometimes defined by discrete values, which might or might not converge with those of the military, and sometimes by function, and sometimes by geography. These various communities form part of a wider social structure that is designated as the community, but as Burchell notes, "The community" has no reality outside of this structure of heterogeneous elements operating in a territory defined by shifting sets of

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60 Hindess, Discourses of Power, pp. 157-158.
61 The Defence Force and the Community, p. 212.
topological and geographical co-ordinates'. To invoke it as a set of coherent values in opposition to an equally difficult to define set of 'military' values is an impossible task The Defence Force and the Community can only gesture at.

Conclusion

The recommendations contained in The Defence Force and the Community have been the subject of considerable activity since the review was released in 1991. There has been a significant reduction in the number of Department of Defence personnel and a number of support functions have been contracted out to the private sector or managed by ADF 'in-house' contractors. Commercial support for the ADF has been strongly encouraged and the review's secondary aim of removing unnecessary duplication of civilian and military skills has been relatively successful. The review's principal aim, of encouraging greater community participation in matters of defence, is less easily accounted for. There has been no significant change to the role and numbers of reserve or part-time personnel, though a scheme called the 'Ready Reserve' was introduced briefly to develop a more highly trained reserve based on a year's full-time service followed by four years of part-time service, but has been subsequently abandoned as expensive and unsuccessful in raising the readiness of reserve forces. As well, the Army has been reorganised in order, in part, to make better use of its part-time forces by 'embedding' them in with units of regular forces and improving their supplies of equipment and types of training.

In this chapter I have tried to suggest why the aspirations for a militia of the sort argued for in the review are no more likely to be successful than those argued for by the militia supporters of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. This most recent formulation of the pro-militia/anti-standing army position cannot see the ways in which the development of professional military forces, in Britain and Australia, has been the outcome of

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62 Graham Burchell, 'Putting the child in its place', I&C, no. 8, Spring 1981, pp. 73-96, p. 90.
a series of governmental tactics designed to overcome the inability of the ‘community’ to spontaneously generate a capacity for defence. In this way, *The Defence Force and the Community*, both places too much emphasis on the generative ability of an informed community, and takes too little account of the factors that have shaped the formation of professional military forces. Drawing on the preceding three chapters, I have argued that these formative factors are associated with the way in which professionalisation of the military has assisted in achieving the ‘disciplinary integration’ characteristic of a liberal rationality of government. I have also indicated the limitations of militia forces against the increasingly precise measures of effectiveness associated with professional military forces. In part these measures of effectiveness address a central tenet of the pro-militia position: the protection of liberties. Given the history of the development of military forces, supporters for the arguments of *The Defence Force and the Community* should be reminded of Adam Smith’s caution that the provision of defence could only be by two methods. One is by developing a professional military force in which the ‘trade of the soldier is a particular trade’. The other is ‘by means of a very vigorous police, and in spite of the whole bent of the interest, genius and inclinations of the people, [to] enforce the practice of military exercises’.  

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63 *Wealth of Nations*, p. 401.
CHAPTER SIX
‘Sailors without dicks’
The integration of women in the Australian Defence Force

Introduction

In the late twentieth century, one of the more important of the governmental questions facing the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is the integration and employment of its women members. In the early nineteen-eighties, the ADF sought exemption from the Sex Discrimination Act in order to legally exclude women from positions designated as combat or combat related. Women were consequently eligible to occupy and train for only 23.5% of the types of positions open to men. By the early nineteen-nineties, many of these restrictions had been lifted, and women were eligible to apply for more than 87% of positions. As women moved increasingly into the areas previously restricted to men, there was some expectation that there would be difficulty in their acceptance, and that this could lead to problems which included sexual harassment.

This chapter considers the way in which sexual harassment in the ADF has been addressed as a governmental problem, returning to the report by the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade entitled Sexual Harassment in the Australian Defence Force: Facing the Future Together, which was introduced in chapter one. Having examined aspects of the genealogy of the ADF, we are now in a position to return to the way in which the report sets out the issues around the incidence of sexual harassment, and the remedies that it proposes. This genealogy enables us to address the evidence available to the Senate Inquiry in order to consider the picture of the military ethos or culture that it provides, and what the Senate Committee makes of it. My argument in this chapter is that the Committee misunderstands or ignores the ways in which people have learnt to conduct
themselves in the specialised environment of the warship. The Committee fails to address conduct as a practical problem in its own right, seeing military culture rather as the reflection or expression of the attitudes of military personnel. Thus the more physical, concrete aspects of that culture are only a backdrop to identifying the right cluster of attitudes for service in a modern, integrated Navy. The Committee thus concentrates on the means of establishing a new ethos in the Navy - a new set of attitudes - in the absence of any detailed consideration of the implications of this strategy for the existing professional ethos and its associated behaviours and conduct designed to equip military personnel for service in a particular habitat.

The problem of sexual harassment in the ADF

In September 1993, the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade was asked to examine the nature and incidence of sexual harassment generally in the ADF, and to inquire specifically into several allegations of sexual harassment of a female medical officer and two female leading seamen aboard the Destroyer Escort HMAS SWAN, during a deployment to South East Asia in 1992. The sexual harassment of the medical doctor, Dr Wheat, involved verbal harassment, and unwelcome touching by one officer. Dr Wheat also alleged that one of the male officers had sexually assaulted her. This latter allegation was the subject of a court-martial, at which the charge was dismissed. The women sailors, Leading Seamen Connelly and Flannery, were subject to derogatory remarks made about them by their supervisor. They were frequently referred to not by name but as the ‘S.W.O.D.s - ‘sailors without dicks’.

The terms of reference of the Inquiry required the Committee to address the ‘incidence of sexual harassment or sexual assault in the Royal Australian Navy’, and the appropriateness of the handling by the Royal Australian Navy of allegations of such harassment or

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assault'. The Committee heard evidence from a wide range of sources, including the Royal Australian Navy, Army and Air Force, and from individuals who responded to the invitation to make submissions.

In various submissions to the Inquiry, it was clear that there were a variety of forms of sexual harassment experienced by women in all three services. Statistics on sexual harassment had only been kept in the ADF since 1989, and these showed that while there was a steady number of reported incidents, expert witnesses to the Inquiry noted that the reported numbers were 'not as high as one might have envisaged they might be, given some studies of all-male environments'. A study of career aspirations of women in the ADF undertaken in 1987 had found that 42% of women respondents had experienced sexual harassment which included uninvited physical contact such as patting, pinching and brushing against them and other behaviours such as sexually suggestive comments and uninvited requests for sexual contact. The level of harassment noted by respondents to the 1987 survey is not matched by an equivalent number of reported incidents. This 'under-reporting' of sexual harassment is consistent with the views of a number of submissions to the Inquiry, which described cases of sexual harassment, and in one case attempted sexual assault, which were not reported because of the expectation that there would be no beneficial outcome for the complainant. The Committee described the image of the Navy which came from these submissions as 'an environment charged with hostility towards working women, especially women working in the same jobs as men'.

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2Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Sexual Harassment in the Australian Defence Force: facing the future together (hereafter Sexual Harassment), Canberra: Senate Printing Unit, 1994, no page number (page following title page).
3Professor L. Bryson, quoted in Sexual Harassment, p. 307.
4Study undertaken by Major Kathryn Quinn, quoted in Sexual Harassment, p. 300-301.
5See for example, the remarks of Lieutenant Susan Sly, Sexual Harassment, p. 51.
6Sexual Harassment, p. 52.
Given the Committee’s terms of reference, the more general problem of sexual harassment was examined principally through the evidence available from the particular cases which initiated the Inquiry. This placed a heavy burden especially on the case of the medical officer, Dr Wheat. This had certain advantages, and disadvantages. One advantage was that Dr Wheat was so new to ‘ship-board life’ that her experiences of it were like those of any other person who was not a member of the Navy, and thus many of the workaday aspects of living in a warship were still remarkable to her, and thus, potentially, to the Committee. One considerable disadvantage was that Dr Wheat’s experiences were not like those of many women who have been trained in the Navy and served in a number of different types of ship; this had the effect, on the one hand, of limiting the applicability of Dr Wheat’s experiences, and on the other, of reducing the impact of the sorts of harassment noted by other women members of the ADF in their submissions.

Dr Wheat had joined the ship at relatively short notice after the rest of the crew had completed a series of ‘work-up’ exercises in preparation for a two-month deployment to South East Asia. Though a Naval Reserve Officer for some time, Dr Wheat had never been to sea for any length of time prior to her posting to HMAS SWAN. The Committee describes her ‘seasickness, her inadequate training and preparation for service at sea and what she describes as the hostility she felt in the wardroom’ as evidence of her unfamiliarity with the physical, social and professional demands of ‘ship-board life’. This unfamiliarity manifest itself in a number of small but significant ways to the other officers, including not taking on any additional duties as an officer, suggesting that she should be accorded certain privileges as the senior medical officer aboard, and appearing as though she was making insufficient effort to become part of the wardroom.8

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7 Sexual Harassment, p. 196.
8 Sexual Harassment, pp. 192-196.
The Committee sought to set the medical officer’s allegations of harassment in context, by contrasting her experiences with those of others, particularly women officers and medical officers. Most of these officers who made submissions to the Inquiry described at least initial hostility to their presence. Unlike Dr Wheat they were all able to describe techniques they had employed to overcome or live through the harassment they experienced. The woman medical officer who was posted to HMAS SWAN after Dr Wheat left the ship wrote that:

It took about three weeks before I was fully accepted into the wardroom and from then on the officers were quite relaxed in my presence. I must admit I was surprised at some of aspects of male behaviour when females are not around, eg the play fights, the frequent homosexual allusions and the conviction that violence is the ultimate answer to any problem, but I found this interesting rather than offensive.9

A male medical officer told the Committee about how he usually encountered some harassment directed at him as the medical officer, and that his technique, learnt from experience, was to take the perpetrator aside and ‘tell him to back off’.10 The Committee noted that it was ‘impressed by Dr Westphalen’s determination to overcome the difficulties that he initially ran into on the SWAN’, and concluded that Dr Westphalen’s experience supports the view that ‘early intervention at the personal level is usually effective’.11

The Senate Committee’s Strategy

The numerous examples of harassment presented to the Committee, and the various ways in which people reacted to the harassment, combined with the detailed knowledge of Dr Wheat’s case and those of Leading Seamen Connelly and Flannery led the Committee to the view that there were many factors which contributed to a situation of harassment; in Dr Wheat’s case:

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9 Sexual Harassment, p. 59.
10 Sexual Harassment, p. 201.
'The unacceptable behaviour in the wardroom of the SWAN was clearly linked to a complex interplay of factors and personalities'.\textsuperscript{12} Important among these factors was the attitudes of the various ‘personalities’ involved. In the Committee’s view it was attitude that distinguished those who were likely to succeed in the challenging environment of the military from those who were not, and the Committee’s report presented examples of officers who had successfully adapted.\textsuperscript{13}

In the case of Dr Wheat, the Committee concluded that she had not adapted well to her new surroundings in HMAS SWAN, and that amongst a range of contributory factors, an ‘important factor in the way the situation developed in the SWAN wardroom was Dr Wheat’s poor handling of the behaviour she did not like’.\textsuperscript{14} In its examination of the circumstances surrounding Dr Wheat’s complaints of harassment, the Committee found that she did not make it clear how she felt about the behaviour in the wardroom, and that she sent out ‘messages that were misleading, or at the least, unclear’.\textsuperscript{15} Her behaviour was unfavourably contrasted to that of other officers that the Committee took evidence from, particularly those who had demonstrated a willingness to confront any harassment. Dr Wheat’s response is constituted as a failure to act, given the Committee’s view that ‘nipping sexual harassment in the bud by confronting it as early in the piece as possible and directly at the personal level if at all possible, is the most successful strategy in most cases’.\textsuperscript{16}

The Committee made it clear that in its view an effective approach to addressing sexual harassment would be one which concentrated on attitudes. Attitudinal change was important because it underlay both unacceptable behaviour and, as in the case of Dr Wheat, a capacity to address sexual

\textsuperscript{12}Sexual Harassment, p. 215.
\textsuperscript{13}See, for example the discussion of women’s experiences Sexual Harassment, pp. 50-60.
\textsuperscript{14}Sexual Harassment, p. 203.
\textsuperscript{15}Sexual Harassment, p. 204.
\textsuperscript{16}Sexual Harassment, p. 207.
harassment when it occurred. The Committee was concerned to draw a sharp distinction between attitudinal change and behavioural change, arguing that

\[ \text{To bring about changes in behaviour it is not enough...to issue edicts, particularly when those edicts try to deal with an area as sensitive, complex and personal as sexual harassment, or harassment of any kind...A far more sophisticated approach, involving awareness raising and support mechanisms and a variety of conflict resolution mechanism[s] must be put in place if genuine attitudinal and behavioural change is to be achieved.} \]

In the Navy, awareness raising and support mechanisms had been introduced in the wake of the incidents aboard HMAS SWAN. A consultancy firm was engaged which specialised in ‘an holistic approach to program design, development and implementation of cultural change programs’. Based on the advise of this consultancy, the Navy had introduced a program called the ‘Good Working Relationships’ project, with its ‘long-term aim...to bring about a cultural change in the [Navy], one aspect of which is a change from the norm of an all male workplace to a mixed gender workplace’. The Committee endorsed this approach to cultural change, since it was consistent with, and had the tools to effect, a cultural change through addressing attitudes. In addition to supporting the need for an extensive awareness-raising program, and a network of personnel to monitor and assist in cases of sexual harassment, the Committee recommended a number of revisions to sexual harassment legislation, towards closer definition of sexual harassment and greater emphasis on the local resolution of problems as they arise.

In this recommendation concerning changes to legislation the Committee’s intention was to reflect greater differentiation in the types of sexual harassment and their remedy, given the Committee’s view that ‘the present subjective definition creates too many uncertainties and hence scope for

\[ \text{\cite{Sexual Harassment, p. 121 (emphasis added).}} \]

\[ \text{\cite{Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, by TriulziCollins Solutions Pty Ltd, Consultants to the ADF - NAVY, p.3.}} \]

\[ \text{\cite{Sexual Harassment, p. 279.}} \]
confusion'. As well, the Committee wanted the legislation to give greater recognition to the need for, and advantages of, local and immediate resolution of the harassment. This was to be achieved through a combination of better education about harassment, and greater support to individuals who may wish to have offending behaviour cease without bringing a formal complaint. This greater support to individuals is to be achieved by the employer - in this case the ADF - taking 'all reasonable steps' to provide support, including the provision of a confidential toll-free telephone advisory service for complaints outside the immediate chain of command, better complaints procedures and disciplinary sanctions, reporting requirements both during and at the end of sea-postings for women, the creation of a confidential database to monitor trends and identify repeated perpetrators of sexual harassment, and the use of consultants to monitor the success of the whole gender-integration programme.

At the same time as proposing this extensive array of remedies and avenues for addressing sexual harassment, the Committee sought to emphasise the need for genuine understanding and acceptance, if genuine change in attitude is to be achieved. Without a genuine change in attitude, an environment of constant policing and punishment of offenders is unlikely to produce a healthy and productive workplace.

The reason that the Committee does not see the extensive range of mechanisms it has proposed as producing an environment of constant policing is the focus on attitude. The right sort of attitude, on the part of both women and men, will mean that, in time, such a disciplinary apparatus will rarely be used, and then its proper use will be understood by both the person harassing and the person harassed. The emphasis on attitude, on the personal capacities of the individuals working in the ADF, is premised on the

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21 Sexual Harassment, p. 31.
22 Sexual Harassment, p. 25.
view that military culture is the expression of, or reflection of the attitudes of military personnel. This view is reinforced by the Committee's assessment of both the particular cases of sexual harassment it had to address, and the evidence of 'more successful' negotiations of the naval culture provided by some submissions to the Inquiry.

In contrast to the negative view of the capacities of the medical officer, the Committee constructed a composite picture of the ideal naval person with the right sort of attitudes, who will live within the new naval culture. In part this composite is formed out of the qualities of those personnel the Committee felt had learnt to fit in. The Committee supported the approach taken by the Navy in carefully selecting those women who would be 'pioneers' in the early days of integrating female personnel aboard ships. In addition to awareness-raising and the setting of standards: 'It is also sensible, in the Committee's view, for the managers in the Navy to take special care in selecting appropriate people at this early stage of the integration process'.

Appropriate personnel are generally those with a capacity to tolerate a certain degree of 'initial resistance' when they are posted. They also have the capacity to quickly and unequivocally address any behaviour they find to be unacceptable, and to be alert to and concerned about the possibility that others might be being harassed.

**Taking account of military culture**

Despite the Committee's recommendations concerning the introduction of extensive awareness-raising seminars for all personnel, it is not clear whether the Committee anticipates that the sort of people it feels will be well-suited to service in the military will be existing personnel whose attitudes are developed through the awareness training package or personnel specially

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23 *Sexual Harassment*, p. 58.

24 See for example the evidence of several officers whom the Committee felt had made a good adjustment to life at sea, *Sexual Harassment*, pp 57-58.
recruited. In drawing lessons about what constitutes appropriate and effective attitudes and behaviours the Committee appeared to feel that ‘successful’ personnel had these qualities despite their previous training and any experiences of harassment. In its cataloguing of personnel who have been able to integrate themselves successfully in a potentially hostile work environment, the Committee glosses over the range of capacities necessary to achieve this integration, and it assumes too hurriedly that these capacities necessarily follow from having the right attitude. It also ignores the ‘costs’ that might be borne in developing such capacities. For example, the Committee had several examples from women officers that they had developed a capacity for dealing with sexual harassment during their training, particularly at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA). The Committee gives no consideration to how much this early experience of harassment might lead women to expect harassment, or not see it, and certainly not report it. This then somewhat undermines the Committee’s strategy of comparing the experience of Dr Wheat to that of other women officers in order to determine the severity of the harassment Dr Wheat alleged and the ‘reasonableness’ of her response to it. This is borne out in the Committee’s discussion of the views of HMAS SWAN’s wardroom given by two women officers who were aboard HMAS SWAN at the same time as Dr Wheat. These women were called upon to give their opinion of the atmosphere of the wardroom and of Dr Wheat’s ability to fit in. One of the women officers had told the earlier Navy Board of Inquiry that she did not regard the wardroom behaviour as sexual harassment, although she had been unhappy about some of the behaviour and had spoken to some of the officers about it. The Committee goes on the say that this woman officer:

had the “advantage” of having experienced the rigours of the Defence Force Academy, where, by all accounts the situations confronting women in the early years were more challenging and difficult than anything that happened in the SWAN wardroom.25

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25Sexual Harassment, p. 206.
The Committee did not consider in any great detail the many references to a broader ‘culture’ of harassment raised in a number of submissions, and indeed, at a number of points noted that it found itself unable to consider in any detail whether there were particular aspects of military service which affected the issue of sexual harassment. The Committee did emphatically disagree with a submission from the Returned Service’s League which said that

war is a brutalising experience, and it follows that training and practising for war is also brutalising, to a degree...to recruit and train a military force on the one hand, and then to recoil in horror when its members occasionally exhibit unseemly aggressiveness or even brutality towards one another, is either deceitful or stupid...

In support of its rejection of this view, the Committee pointed to evidence taken from the ADF which insisted that the military actively discouraged recruitment of ‘Rambo-types’. However, the Committee also cited comments by Dr Westphalen about the various subcultures in the Navy, and the opportunities for ‘tribal interplay’ to get out of hand. He and others gave anecdotal evidence to support the view that there were particular ‘types’ of people and situations in which aggressive and harassing behaviour was more likely to occur.

The Committee’s limited interest in the role of training, and in the material or concrete aspects of the peculiarities of the military culture is consistent with the way in which it privileges the importance of attitudinal change over changes to behaviour in its strategies for eliminating sexual harassment.

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26 *Sexual Harassment*, pp. 50; 304-7. But note here the footnote to general harassment: ‘It may be argued that in some instances it is not only the treatment of women subordinates but also male subordinates that needs attention; and that there should, for example, be less “yelling” all around. However, the Committee accepts that in some situations the same “yelling” at both males and females may be the key to survival and unquestionably appropriate. The difficulty seems to be in agreeing where and when to draw the line’. *Sexual Harassment*, p. 30, note 54.

27 *Sexual Harassment*, p. 306.

28 *Sexual Harassment*, p. 307.

29 *Sexual Harassment*, p. 200-201.

30 *Sexual Harassment*, p. 55-56.
Rather than considering the extent to which some of these traditional behaviourally-based techniques may have worked in addressing a problem like sexual harassment, the Committee looks to having the ADF adopt a set of psychologically-based techniques for developing ‘work-life quality’ already tried and executed in a variety of settings, including large private sector organisations. The ‘Good Working Relationships’ project put together for the Navy was developed by a firm of consultants which has had considerable experience in both the public and private sector developing affirmative action, work-based childcare and anti-discrimination strategies for a number of large organisations.  

The adoption of psychologically-based expertise to address military problems has been a frequent tactic of government throughout the twentieth century. As Nikolas Rose has demonstrated, psychological expertise has had a long and fruitful association with military forces.  

As we saw in chapter four, since World War One government has taken a somewhat modular approach to the formation and maintenance of military forces, assuming that individuals would quickly group together to form the larger units necessary only in wartime.  

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31 See Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade by TriulziCollins Solutions Pty Ltd, Consultants to the ADF-NAVY.  
forces was fertile ground for the ameliorative assistance provided by psychology in selecting personnel for specific jobs, and in providing a therapeutic environment in which to build a bridge back to civilian life. Psychology was able to construct a new way of approaching the governmental issues associated with managing military populations, through the concentration on group relations. As Rose has argued:

It was not the static traits of a character that were at issue, but the ways in which individuals resolved personal conflicts in the context of group decisions, directions and cohesiveness. The invention of the ‘group’, the conception of ‘social’ or ‘human’ relations as key determinants of individual conduct, were the most consistent lesson of the psychological and psychiatric experience of war

However, while the success of psychology’s association with so many aspects of personnel selection and training during World War Two in particular established the governmental possibilities of this form of expertise, and led to an increasing variety of situations in which such therapeutic expertise would be brought to bear, it should not be assumed that other means of addressing the ‘conduct of conduct’ did not continue within military forces. The role of psychologists has largely been a therapeutic one; such expertise does not appear to have had a marked influence on the formation and conduct of the military ‘style of life’.

The approach to the possible problem of sexual harassment within the ADF, for example, has been to address it within the register of acceptable behaviours, akin to the problems of fraternisation or insubordination. Guidelines on sexual harassment promulgated to all members of the ADF have concentrated on the effects of unacceptable behaviour for operational effectiveness; sexual harassment is an example of unacceptable behaviour which ‘undermines a member’s ability to contribute to the mutual

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35 Rose, Governing the Soul, p. 48.

dependence and collective discipline of the group; or contrary to or inconsistent with, the standards of professional and personal conduct required to achieve such operational effectiveness. Moreover, while recruitment advertisements for the ADF, and particularly the Army Reserve, emphasise the extent to which service will make one a better person, this sits alongside an emphasis on what the Navy calls Character Training, conducted under the auspices of the Chaplaincy. In this training, 'character is understood to be the whole of what one is as a person, as evidenced by consistent behaviour'; the training includes the inculcation of behaviours that are consistent with the 'specific needs of Navy society and convention', as well as the development of automatic responses that 'do not require the application of reason', training in skills, techniques and habits, and education to develop understanding.

As we have noted already, the Committee was inclined to discount the governmental possibilities of strategies aimed at behavioural change without a change in attitude. Indeed, it gave considerably more weight to examining the attitudes of military personnel than it did to looking to the trained behaviours and forms of professional ethical comportment with which it was presented. In so doing, the Committee was unable to turn its attention to the more concrete aspects of military culture, or to grasp the extent to which certain behaviours, or conduct, might be the deliberate outcome of a professional ethos peculiar to military personnel that equips them for service in the conditions of a regiment or in the confines of a warship. Parts of such an ethos might easily be dismissed as sexism, and as anachronistic enthusiasm for hierarchy; but parts might also prove to have a certain salience that could act as a resource, or as a blockage, to the governmental aspirations for the elimination of sexual harassment. For these reasons, there might be governmental advantages in acknowledging and examining the contours of such an ethos, and the material culture which sustains it.

37 Quoted in Sexual Harassment, p.171-172.
Outlines of the military culture

I have suggested earlier that the sociological and psychological emphasis on military culture as the expression of the attitudes of professional military personnel pays insufficient attention to the material features of the military as a particular technology for living: a combination of habits, trainings, and physical environments. I have also indicated in earlier chapters that governmental engagement with questions of the culture of the military have always treated that culture as a practical problem to be addressed. Moreover, as previous chapters have shown, the outcomes of various reforms of the military forces of Britain and Australia have invariably taken practical form.

One of the key governmental transformations of the military was the introduction of barracks as the typical form of housing military personnel from the early nineteenth century. While, of course, ships had always imposed a certain regimentation on sea-going personnel, it was the idea that government could be effected by the physical arrangement of spaces occupied by military personnel that was particularly significant. As we have seen in chapter two, a whole series of problems associated with the Army of the eighteenth century - its levels of training, desertion, susceptibility to sympathise with those populations it was intended to pacify, were addressed by the introduction or enhancement of barracks throughout Great Britain. This architecture was intended to produce certain effects in the subject populations. Immediately upon the introduction of barracks, the intention was to impose an ordered, accountable lifestyle amongst the rank and file. Though hastily built, poorly ventilated barracks were criticised for their deleterious effects upon the health of soldiers, it was never suggested that the barrack form be abandoned, only improved upon. Over time, barracks became the site of improvement in the rank and file and non-commissioned officers. Reading rooms, savings banks, regimental chapels, school-rooms and recreational facilities were all designed to encourage the individual
soldier to improve himself, in the company of other soldiers, under the auspices of commanding officers. The barrack provided the opportunity to influence the work and leisure-time conduct of the individual; his behaviours in a range of settings were amenable to shaping in a way that had never been possible before.

Barracks, and the regulated spaces of the warship, allowed for the development of site-specific behaviours, for emulation and for the identification of distinct groupings. The importance of having these site-specific behaviours has not diminished in 'modern' military forces. In a number of submissions to the Inquiry the importance of modifying ships' architectures to assist in the integration of women was raised. For example, the executive officer of HMAS SYDNEY noted that many minor changes to accommodation, shower and toilet facilities were made before women joined the ship from mid-1992. Despite preparations for accommodating women, it was not possible immediately to avoid having the female Petty Officers living in the same Mess as the female sailors. This was considered to be a significant deficiency, as it 'slowed acceptance of female Petty Officers by their male peers and made the maintenance of the rank structure difficult for the female sailors'.

These contemporary examples echo the eighteenth century concern to shape the interaction of military personnel, and in turn the way in which particular environments come to be important to the formation and maintenance of relationships. These examples also indicate the extent to which military culture is more than an assembly of attitudes, and the extent to which military culture and its government can be quite a practical matter.

The example from HMAS SYDNEY highlights another aspect of the military ethos or culture that we have already noted in chapter three - the importance of establishing certain sorts of relationships between ranks for the maintenance of the 'rank structure'. This relationship is characterised by a

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39 Submission by Lieutenant-Commander P.D. Jones to Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, p.2.
certain formality and distance being maintained between the officer, or non-commissioned officer, and his or her subordinates. In the nineteenth century this ‘distance’ was an important yardstick by which to measure potential officers. As we have seen, in the case of engineer officers who aspired to be integrated with the executive officers of the Navy, the Admiralty considered engineers unsuitable to hold positions of command because their backgrounds meant that they were unlikely to be able to maintain sufficient distance from their friends and family who were likely to be their subordinates. In the various Admiralty and Parliamentary investigations into military administration in the nineteenth century the ethos of the gentleman officer is a crucial part of any governmental calculation for improving the Navy and the Army, and operated as the standard up to which any other aspiring officer must eventually be brought. This ethos demanded the maintenance of a social and physical detachment from one’s subordinates in order to effect command. This is achieved by the physical distance of the officer from his men, in terms of the location and quality of accommodation, and by the maintenance of a social distinction in manner, and a training in detachment from the affairs of those under his command. In the contemporary case of the integration of women, the difficulties of accommodating small numbers of women separately from one another has the potential to undermine the distinction and limited relations considered

46 See for example the discussions in: Report of Royal Commission for Inquiring into the system of Military Punishments in the Army, Parliamentary Papers, 1836, vol. XXII, Paper no. 59; Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the system of purchase and sale of Commissions in the Army, Parliamentary Papers, 1857, vol. XVIII, Paper no. 2267; Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the constitution and practice of Courts-Martial in the Army, and the present system of punishment for military offences (Two Reports), Parliamentary Papers, 1868-9, vol. XII, Paper no. 4114; Report of Royal Commission on Army Promotion and Retirement, Parliamentary Papers, 1876, vol. XV, Paper no. 1569; Report of an Admiralty Committee on the Position of Masters in the Royal Navy, Parliamentary Papers, 1866, XLVII; Report of an Admiralty Committee to consider the best means of securing the highest mechanical skill and scientific knowledge in the management of the various engines of Her Majesty’s Ships of War, and supply of Engineer Officers and Engine Room Artificers for Her Majesty’s Navy, Parliamentary Papers, 1877, vol. XXI, Paper no. 1647; see also the Report on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service, Parliamentary Papers, 1854, vol. XXVII, Paper no. 1713, and chapter three, for a discussion of the manner in which the Civil Service sought to retain the services of the sons of the aristocracy while introducing competitive examinations.
necessary to maintain the rank structure. Moreover, small numbers of women in a ship can also create problems for this culture of distance; in a submission to the Inquiry a woman officer serving in a patrol boat discussed how much more comfortable she felt when another woman joined the crew, even though 'this had the potential to cause problems...from the professional point of view. The trainee whom I was expected to direct and discipline as Navigator was also my closest friend and a source of mutual support'. This concern reflects the continuing importance of the capacity for detachment that is part of the professional ethos of the officer and in certain cases the non-commissioned officer, and the structures that support it.

Another component of the ethos which comes to light in the various reports of the nineteenth century is the concern for developing the capacity of the officer to easily fit into the company of his fellow officers. While various Governments sought for some twenty years in the mid-nineteenth century to introduce a system of officer recruitment and promotion to replace the practice of purchasing commissions in Army regiments, thereby broadening the potential pool of officer recruits, regimental officers themselves ensured that regiments did not recruit men they did not want. In the nineteenth century the capacities which fitted the officer for the company of other officers was expected to be guaranteed by the officer’s social background. From the early twentieth century, when officers were drawn from a more diverse background, various initiation practices were used to test the capacity of new recruits to meet the expectations and norms of the officer corps. In Australia, from very early in the history of the Army’s officer training college there were frequent examples of the means by which new recruits were tested for their conformity to the norms of the college. The practice of ‘hazing’ or bastardisation was a physical initiation designed in part to test the physical

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41 Submission by Lieutenant S.J. Sly to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, p. 6-7.
resources of the initiate and in part his or her capacity not to react, and especially not to report on, the activities of his or her fellow officers. It was also to test acceptance of certain non-rational aspects of military culture. To this extent, the initiate’s introduction to military culture was intended to ‘lower his or her awareness’, rather than raise it. In a more measured and officially sanctioned way, recruits to the military are also taught a range of practical skills in order to provide them with certain ‘arts of living’ in environments such as the wardroom and the regimental mess.  

**Government and military culture**

As we noted above, there has been a significant shift in the way in which military forces have come to be managed since the beginning of this century. One of the consequences of taking a more ‘modular’ approach to the formation of military forces is that it limits the interest shown by government in the subject-forming capacities of specific sites, particularly where part of that formation might inculcate deliberate subordination and role playing. The governmental potential of psychology in the management of military forces during and after the Second World War lay in its ability to provide a therapeutic environment in which people ‘returned to normal’ precisely by leaving the confines of military subordination and status behind. The invention of the group, with its focus on ‘human’ relations, produced a governmental tool that could be formulated over and over again in different settings. As we can see from the Australian Senate’s consideration of the problem of sexual harassment, governmental consideration no longer includes the kind of detailed assessment of the military ethos found in the nineteenth century.

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44 Rose, *Government of the Soul*; Rose and Miller, ‘On therapeutic authority’.
No doubt there is much of that ethos that has undergone change - in part because there has been a considerable change both in the composition of the military, and in the fortunes of a 'gentlemanly ethos' upon which the nineteenth century military ethos drew. For example, in the Australian military there were explicit attempts in the early years of the twentieth century to 'democratise' officer cadet training by paying cadets a small salary in order to limit the extent to which the officer corps was a sort of club only for those of private means⁴⁵; and there was much about the way in which the British gentleman officer led his men that Australian officers rejected.⁴⁶ However, while elements of that ethos may have been refashioned, there is no reason to suppose that an ethos of military office has disappeared entirely. As we have seen in earlier chapters, in Britain and Prussia there were a number of factors at work to increase rather than decrease the capacity of the military itself to establish and regulate its ethos. In Britain from the late nineteenth century individual regiments became very jealous of their reputations, and sought to develop distinctive styles and vigorous support from their officers and men, becoming a much less diffuse, and thus more effective source of ethical training than the more generalised ethic of the gentleman could ever be.⁴⁷

There is much in the Australian Senate report into sexual harassment in the ADF that suggests that aspects of the sexual harassment experienced by the medical officer could be recast as a kind of formulaic initiation test into the ethos of the naval wardroom, and that the sort of 'personal competence' demonstrated by various other military witnesses to the Committee in the face of harassment were good examples of the sort of detachment necessary to such a 'style of living'. In certain respects the Committee's questioning of other witnesses to determine whether they had experienced similar

⁴⁷John Keegan, 'Regimental Ideology'.
harassment recalls that of the nineteenth century inquiries into the integration of engineers in the British Navy: a picture of the ‘habitus’ begins to emerge. Only in the twentieth century case the governmental focus is on the adaptability of the individual person, the ‘human relations’ between members of a group⁴⁸, and building up a picture of the culture from their attitudes. The salience of the ethos, of the ‘character’ of officers, and the particular demands of the military habitus as a governmental concern has faded. Thus the focus of the Senate Committee cannot grasp the extent to which there is a particular ‘habitus’, which acts upon the individual bodily, habitually, and in which the criteria for successful integration might include cultivating a distinct lack of attitude or awareness.

There are at least two consequences of the Committee’s approach which are pertinent to its recommendations for the future government of the military. The first of these is that aspects of the way in which people conduct themselves, and have learned to conduct themselves in environments like wardrooms are misunderstood or ignored. The second consequence is that the ideal person that the Committee hopes will come to populate the Navy, and the Army and Air Force, may be expected to operate in accordance with a new ethos which sits uncomfortably with the old. The combined effect of these problems has meant that the comprehensive ‘work-life quality’ programme instituted by the Navy, for example, is seen by most as a specific set of measures introduced to help address the problem of sexual harassment - a problem that only occurs where women are employed, and where those women have not developed their own psychological capacities for addressing any ‘challenges’ in the work environment they may meet.⁴⁹ By themselves,

⁴⁸Rose, Governing the Soul, p.48; Miller and Rose, ‘On therapeutic authority’, p. 60.
⁴⁹The evidence for the view that the ‘Good Working Relationships’ Project is principally about sexual harassment is anecdotal - but is consistent with the major focus of the Project to date which has been on addressing sexual harassment and the integration of women. The view that the problem of sexual harassment will generally only occur when ill-equipped women are in the workplace is in part the view that the Committee took of the originating case of the medical officer, viz. ‘It appears to the Committee that, in relation to the events surrounding Dr Wheat’s tour of duty on the SWAN...a different approach by Dr Wheat
the Committee's recommendations for changes based on an awareness raising campaign are insufficient to overhaul the culture in all its material aspects.

What the historical examples are intended to suggest, in part, is that there might still be governmental advantage in considering the habitus - the habit-forming environment in which military personnel live and work as something more substantial, more engaging; as Elias puts it, as a *practical* problem for government to solve. For example, the Committee had considerable evidence, from witnesses and from the Navy's own Board of Inquiry investigation, that the sort of harassing behaviour exhibited in the wardroom was not infrequently characteristic of officers of a certain age and seniority. The Committee looked at the evidence of a number of witnesses which established a certain pattern to wardroom life not in order to investigate that pattern, but rather to use it to throw into relief the experience of Dr Wheat. She stood out for her lack of competence in dealing with the apparently formulaic harassment experienced by newcomers joining the wardroom, while the habitus of which the harassment formed a part was not highlighted by the Committee. As a consequence, the equally habituated manner in which 'successful' Navy personnel dealt with harassment was taken as evidence of their 'attitude to life in the services that is both fostered and expected by the services', though it might equally be argued that the success lay in *not* having an attitude, but rather the sort of detachment and ability to mix with one's fellow officers that comes with suspending judgement and engaging in highly ritualised and non-personal conduct for the greater good of ward-room harmony. Success, in this habitus, might be the result of having certain social skills which can be exercised without necessarily having to address a 'deeper layer' of attitudes.

would also have made an important difference': Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Sexual Harassment*, pp. 214-5.


51Sexual Harassment*, pp. 192-206.

52Sexual Harassment*, p. 206.
Similarly, not addressing the form and substance of an existing military ethos is likely to place limits on a key part of the Committee’s reform strategy in which those with a raised awareness of the problem of sexual harassment will exercise a pastoral responsibility for others who might be at risk of harassment. For example, in mounting its case against the severity of the harassment experienced by Dr Wheat, the Committee was critical of her failure to take a greater interest in the other women sailors aboard HMAS SWAN at the time:

It is, in the Committee’s view, important to note that, despite her subsequent allegations about the unacceptable behaviour she herself was subjected to, Dr Wheat at no stage sought to inquire whether the female sailors may have been experiencing similar difficulties. It seems to the Committee reasonable for [the Captain] to have expected that, following his request that Dr Wheat should make herself available to the female sailors, she would actively seek to establish if they, too, were experiencing any difficulties, and let him know if there were any difficulties not being resolved adequately at the Divisional level.  

The Committee was in part intending to suggest that Dr Wheat’s failure to take an interest in the other women aboard threw into question the severity of the harassment she was experiencing. It was also anticipating the culture that should or would be in place if the awareness of sexual harassment was heightened. That is, that ‘well adjusted, aware’ women and men would bring a particular form of expertise that can flatten out the established hierarchies, casting their gaze around the ship and taking a personal interest in their fellow crew members. Thus the expectation that Dr Wheat should have gone around the established monitoring mechanisms aboard HMAS SWAN to take an active part in checking on the female members of the crew. Given the evidence the Committee took from other medical personnel, it suggests that the expectation is that women will make a greater effort, a ‘personal commitment’ to use informal as well as formal channels to monitor any

52Sexual Harassment, p. 161.
possible harassment. To stick to formal, and therefore to ‘reactive’ channels is to demonstrate a certain degree of defectiveness, as though there is a certain part of the personality that is underdeveloped.

As we noted above, there is clearly a difficulty with this expectation of developing close personal ties with other women in terms of the degree to which this then threatens to undermine the women’s professional relationships. The sort of reforms that the Committee is advocating create a particular burden for women, who are charged, with their ‘empathetic’ skills, to be the principal vehicles in the monitoring and pastoral aspects of the reform strategy. In bearing this pastoral responsibility, individuals are being asked to work against the disciplinary habitus of the ADF, which requires officers to learn to place limits upon the interest they take in their personal circumstances and in the affairs of their peers and subordinates, and to use well-recognised systems of communication within the organisation for the resolution of personal and professional difficulties. Many women officers may find it difficult to take on these new tasks, and the new ways of conducting themselves in relation to peers and subordinates if these new ways will work to undermine aspects of the ethos they share with other officers and which guide them in the greater part of their everyday interactions with each other and with their subordinates.

**Conclusion**

The package of reforms that the Senate Committee seeks to put into place to address the problem of sexual harassment in the ADF is exemplary of the sort of therapeutic approach to governmental problems analysed by Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller and others. In the Committee’s enthusiasm for ‘genuine attitudinal change’ we can see the ways in which it expects that a new culture based on better attitudes ‘make the new opportunities work for both men and
women'. In its enthusiasm for the possibilities of this form of cultural change the Committee is advocating an approach which, as Rose and Miller put it, the 'relations that link one individual to another in the workplace...are thus perceived as if with new eyes. The very bonds that link individuals together undergo a metamorphosis'. At least, this is the governmental expectation.

I have suggested that this expectation may be met only partially, because the way in which the governmental problem of sexual harassment is formulated gives insufficient attention to the possibilities that there is a distinctive ethos governing conduct in the military which may act as a practical limitation to the metamorphosis the Senate Committee is seeking to engender. With the 'new eyes' with which the Committee looks at the problem of sexual harassment, and the integration of women into the ADF more generally, the habitual behaviours which may equip women (and men) to negotiate their acceptance into a wardroom (but which may leave aside addressing whether everyone really wants them there) will be inadequate.

I have suggested that if the Committee had been able to give some countenance to the form and substance of the military habitus, it might have found that military culture needs to be considered in the context of the demands of ship-board life: to be seen providing particular 'arts of living' in a specialised environment. These specialised skills, habits and practices can be glimpsed in the submissions to the Inquiry; some can be inferred from the earlier governmental considerations of military culture. As I have suggested, many of these nineteenth and early twentieth century practices have no doubt undergone transformation, or eradication. But the evidence available to the Senate Committee suggests that it is reasonable to assume that a distinctive military ethos is not gone altogether. If this is the case, then the 'holistic cultural change' program advocated by the Committee may not be as all-

51Sexual Harassment, p. ix.
52Miller and Rose, 'On therapeutic authority', p. 59.
encompassing as its name suggests. Awareness-raising may be only one part of a program that needs to address the practical implications of living and working together in confined spaces with a wide variety of people, and operating with a distinct chain of command. Addressing all these aspects will be necessary in considerations of the integration of women, much the way it was for the attempts to integrate engineer officers in the nineteenth century. Taking account of military culture, the integration of women and the elimination of harassment could be the kind of practical governmental problem of which eighteenth and nineteenth century administrators were all too aware.
CONCLUSION

'The sharp end'

Government and military forces in the late twentieth century

In this thesis I have sought to address two issues of current concern for the Australian Defence Force in a novel and constructive way. In doing so, I have set out certain key episodes in the history of the British and Australian military forces which are germane to the analysis of these contemporary issues. The overall picture I have sought to convey is one in which the civil-military relationship is not the line at which two distinct entities meet and exchange, but rather a much larger problem-space within which that part which constitutes the military is made and remade, in large part through the actions of the civil government.

It is a crude distortion of the genealogy of the modern military, perhaps, to focus on the extent to which it is the creature of administrative fiat. It is also shaped by the demands of warfare, technology, and as we have seen, the practical, day-to-day concerns of the operational environment. Military forces have been well-served by histories that have focussed on the imperatives of warfare and technology. Also, as I have suggested, the main sociological approaches to the military have focussed on the way in which the military’s responsibility for ‘the management of violence’ has shaped the profession and given it its distinctive ethos and relationship to the rest of society. By contrast, I have wanted to concentrate on the role of government, and British and Australian military forces in relation to government because this seems to allow for a more complex, and yet more fluid and contingent picture of the military, and civil-military relations, to be drawn.

I have suggested that changing modes of governmental rationality have tackled problems raised by military forces in different ways to build a flexible, adaptive and hybrid institution that does not have one logic, or
organising principle. It does have certain distinctive features which need to be taken account of, as I have suggested in chapters five and six; but this taking account should consider the opportunities for further adaptation and change.

This focus on flexibility and adaptability will be important in the next few years for the ADF, which has just undergone what the current Minister for Defence describes as the ‘most comprehensive review of defence for twenty years’. The Defence Efficiency Review (released in March 1997) has sought to change the culture of the management of Australia’s defence by proposing a number of efficiencies which are intended to allow a substantial redirection of defence funding from administration to the ‘sharp end’ of combat capabilities. These efficiencies are intended to introduce a more stream-lined approach to force development and administration of the ADF, and encourage the Navy, Army and Air Force to plan and work together more completely in training for combat.

Military personnel in each of the three services will be required both to become more integrated with their civilian counterparts in the preparation of policy and planning, and to become more integrated each with the other in operations. These various demands have the potential to require a considerable dexterity on the part of individuals who will move between the different parts of the Defence Organisation in the course of their careers. In particular, these differing circumstances have the potential to require military personnel to be at one time more closely identified with their ‘war-fighting’ role and their particular service, and at another time to exercise a degree of objectivity and corporate focus that separates them from the immediate concerns and sectional interests of their parent service.

The Efficiency Review notes the remark by President Truman at the end of the Second World War that ‘I have the feeling that if the Army and Navy had fought our enemies as hard as they fought each other the war would have
ended much earlier' as evidence for the need to encourage a lessening of the 'tribalism' that leads to inefficiency. Over time, it is suggested that consideration be given to a much greater use of shared facilities, joint training, particularly of cadet officers and staff, and possibly the development of 'super bases' which house members of all three services together. However, it stands as a given in official reports like the Efficiency Review that there are distinct cultures within each of the three services, and an intense rivalry that is exacerbated by competing for scarce resources. But despite the apparent, long-standing problems these differences engender, the Review stops short of suggesting the amalgamation of the Navy, Army and Air Force along the lines of the Canadian Armed Forces as a solution to the inefficiency caused by such rivalry, stating that there are 'no benefits from merging [the Navy, Army and Air Force] commensurate with the costs of blurring this specialisation in the long-term and the massive disruption that would inevitably occur in the shorter term'. This suggests then that the rivalries and differences are to be managed, even taken advantage of in certain circumstances. How then, in the name of efficiency and strategic advantage, is this cultural management to take place?

This thesis has intended to suggest that the answers to these questions, as a basis for setting new policy directions for more efficient and effective joint operations, should involve looking again at what is so readily taken for granted about military culture. I have approached this issue historically, tracing a series of sometimes minor, often apparently disconnected episodes in the formation of modern military forces, which have nevertheless had significant impact on the present shape and future possibilities of the ADF. The intention was to provide a 'history of the present', which Mitchell Dean describes as the 'use of historical resources to reflect upon the contingency, singularity, interconnections, and potentialities of the diverse trajectories of

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those elements which compose present social arrangements and experience...Such a history is geared toward the critical use of history to make intelligible the possibilities in the present and so can yield to neither universalist concepts of rationality and subjectivity nor metanarratives of progress, reason, or emancipation’.

I have sought to assemble a variety of elements which have shaped British military forces, and through them the ADF, such as the adoption of barrack-like accommodation, the adaptation of the gentlemanly ethos of the nineteenth century officer, the terms of the separation of military and civil spheres of responsibility, the development of various measures of efficiency and the enhancement of the regiment.

In particular, I have wanted to suggest that the steady progress of professionalisation as it is posited by sociologists such as Huntington, and taken up in reports like *The Defence Force and the Community*, is not as uniform, as unilinear nor as complete as its theorisation outlines. As a corollary, the civil-military relationship born of this professionalisation is not as clearly drawn either. In the Huntingtonian thesis, professional military forces can either operate in splendid isolation or be diluted by civil society. When the three arms of the profession are required to work more closely with one another it is expected that this will necessitate a weakening of the core values of each, as the Efficiency Review implies. The view of military culture here is of something that is thoroughly defining - to adapt to a new environment means giving up the existing culture, because it is so holistic in its implications that individuals shaped by that culture, by the professional military ethos, cannot simultaneously operate by any other ethos. Yet the three services will have to work more closely with each other, and with civilians, in order that the whole Defence organisation will more effectively deliver combat capability. This then sets up the apparent contradiction of requiring, on the one hand, that military personnel set aside their ethos in the interests of establishing a more efficient organisation, and on the other that

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military personnel be given greater opportunity to practice their military art, and retain their intraservice differences to avoid the 'cost of blurring specialisation', as the Review puts it.

This is a contradictory position only if a holistic or deterministic view is taken of military culture, along the lines established by Huntington. I have suggested through the course of this thesis rather that there is no need to anticipate the clash of cultures in quite this way. Throughout the periods I have examined, there is ample evidence of the adeptness with which military forces have been adaptive to new circumstances, usually in the face of expectations that either military values or 'society's' values would wholly give way to the other; in eighteenth century Britain the barrack building programme was projected by its critics to lead to the military overthrow of civilian government; in nineteenth century Britain the professionalisation of the officer corps was considered by many contemporary commentators, and subsequent historians, to be the demise of the aristocratic, gentleman officer; in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Australia the antagonism to professional military forces suggested that there would never be a need again in Australia for anything more than a small cadre of permanent officers to train and administer a large and active part-time militia.

In each of these circumstances the anticipated cultural overthrow did not occur. Instead, to elaborate on the argument of chapters two, three and four, governmental questions addressed to military culture served to specify aspects of this culture, in part to determine when and where they were

‘See for example the final vision of the civil-military relationship Samuel Huntington draws at the end of The Soldier and the State: theory and politics of civil-military relations, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967, p.466: 'Yet today America can learn more from West Point than West Point from America. Upon the soldiers, the defenders of order, rests a heavy responsibility. The greatest service they can render is to remain true to themselves, to serve with silence and courage in the military way. If they abjure the military spirit, they destroy themselves first and their nation ultimately. If the civilians permit the soldiers to adhere to the military standard, the nations themselves may even eventually find redemption and security in making that standard their own'.
appropriate and when and where they were not. The genealogy of this government of military culture demonstrates the series of accommodations that help to make sense of why following the Canadian example of amalgamation of the Navy, Army and Air Force is no more likely to occur than another 'extreme' of contracting out even the combat services provided by the ADF. For on the one hand, we have seen how military forces have migrated toward greater accountability, with the concomitant mechanisms for measuring efficiency, from the early 1800s onwards. On the other, we have seen how a variety of governmental strategies have strengthened, or made more possible, the distinctiveness between the individual services, and between military forces and civilians. The two tendencies for accountability and efficiency, and for distinctiveness pull against each other, precluding the modern ADF from being drawn too far toward either.

As this thesis also demonstrates, the development of modern military forces, in which military personnel have to be both 'more corporate' and more focussed on the 'sharp end', will be managed through a series of practical steps. Most importantly, to overcome the 'tribalism' that the Efficiency Review considers to be so divisive and inefficient, while at the same time retaining the 'combat cultures' of the three services, requires not only new attitudes on the part of military and civilian officers, but physical relocations and team building exercises. As well, it will require the development of a capacity on the part particularly of military personnel to 'modularise' their ethical comportment as they move between the more corporate, less structured and hierarchical central administrative parts of the new Defence Organisation and their parent service. We have seen how this should be possible because military personnel already exercise a high degree of site-specific behaviours that equip them for living in close quarters and operating within a command structure. It should also be possible if we can acknowledge that the more 'bureaucratic' environment of an integrated headquarters also requires similarly modular ethical capacities. The policy adviser must also be able to exercise a kind of detachment in the course of
arriving at the best means of addressing competing options, including weighing up the political, administrative and sectional interests that are likely to be at play.5

Pointing to some of the existing strengths of the Defence organisation, particularly those that have been illuminated by this genealogical approach, is not intended to suggest that this more recent reformation of military forces will be straightforward. Indeed, initial indications suggest that generating the 'cultural change' advocated by the Review will be far more difficult than generating the financial savings estimated. What this examination of the history of such attempts at reform shows, is that the Defence Organisation, and the ADF in particular, will find ways of adapting to the changes required of it, somewhere within the boundaries historically formed by earlier governmental reforms.

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