LANGUAGE OF DEVELOPMENT
AND DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE:
THE CASE OF INDONESIA

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PREFACE

It is easy for most of us to think and speak of Development as one thing, and of the word ‘Development’ as another and entirely separable entity. It is easy, because we now live in a period of history and in societies where ‘language’ and ‘reality’ are commonly believed to be essentially separable. The former is viewed as a tool for perceiving, naming, describing, or communicating about the latter. This study aims to show how deceptive this familiar view is, and how serious are its implications for a Developing nation.

Studying one’s own views is never easy, but is facilitated by an examination of views that are radically different from one’s own. Traditional communities in what is now Indonesia provide examples of radically different perceptions concerning the relationship between what we term ‘language’ and ‘reality’. Their perceptions and views still survive residually, despite ferocious repression by the views with which we have become so intimately familiar, and which have become an integral constitutive force in Development programs in the Third World.

Some of the basic ideas that became the starting point of this study initially came to me from a series of conversations with Alton L. Becker of the University of Michigan, where I studied under his supervision. He introduced me to some of the works of Raymond Williams and Ivan Illich that address the central issues of my interest. The actual research and writing have been completed more easily and quickly because of the fellowship that I received from the Rockefeller Foundation’s ‘Reflection on Development’ Fellowship Program in 1987–1988. To these individuals, and the Foundation, I am most indebted.

This work is only a preliminary exploration. It attempts to address an aspect of an extremely broad and complex subject matter in a modest scope and depth. It is restricted to a study of elite-centred, ‘top-down’ Development thinking and project implementation at a national level. Further investigations can be made to supplement this present study, for instance on how the elaborated Development thinking and activities found responses from one or more small-scale local communities over a period of history, or how the case of Indonesia as presented here can be compared to its counterparts in other, neighbouring nations.

Despite its modest nature this work has enjoyed enormous support from people and institutions whose names are too many to be mentioned individually here. I shall not fail, however, to mention Alton L. Becker, Herbert Feith, Keith Foulcher, Suzanne Brenner, James Scott, and Sharon Siddique for their thorough reading of, critical comments on, and editorial suggestions for various drafts of this work. I am grateful to two centres for Southeast Asian Studies, one at Monash University and the other at the University of Michigan, for their generous hospitality and the use of their research facilities during my brief residencies at each. My thanks are due also to my home university, Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana, my colleagues at the Department of General Studies and the Post-Graduate Development Studies Program, as well as my family and friends, all in Salatiga, for their continuous support.
This text was completed in 1988. Since then I have been fortunate to receive critical comments from various colleagues, helping me to re-examine some of the main issues raised here. Special thanks are due to Ivan Illich, Joseph Errington, Joel S. Kahn, Francis Loh, Ben Anderson, and Budiawan. However, I have decided to keep the text unchanged, except for some minor paraphrasing for this publication. It will take a separate writing to incorporate the new insights and elaborate on my earlier materials. I am very thankful to Peter Mühlhäuser for his generous interest in the manuscript, and his continued support for turning it into the present published form. Last, but not least, I thank Basil Wilson and Anne Rees, both from Pacific Linguistics, for their patient assistance in copyediting and typesetting the manuscript.
CHAPTER 1

REDEFINITIONS

1.1 INTRODUCTION

‘Development’ does not exist entirely beyond language. It is not an entity that lies in ‘the realm of reality’, having its boundary beyond language. Language, therefore, is not a transparency through which we can recognize, describe, or name that piece of ‘reality’. Any definition or redefinition of ‘Development’ is bound to deceive, unless one is critically aware of the language that shapes the defining or redefining process. To (re)define ‘Development’ one has to (re)define ‘language’, because no matter how one defines it, one does not go beyond a formulation of words which are themselves subject to an infinite series of questions of definition. Thus, a definition that states something like ‘Development is...’ requires a definition of ‘is’ as well as of what may follow. And a “[re]definition of language is always, implicitly or explicitly, a [re]definition of human beings in the world” (Williams 1977:21). Like ‘Development’, ‘language’ does not exist beyond language. But this is not to say that language exists a priori to everything else.

This study is essentially an attempt to examine how bahasa ‘language’ and Pembangunan ‘Development’ are mutually constituted in the social history of modern Indonesia, with particular focus on the period after 1966. It is a study of the history of Indonesians’ redefinition of their being, their world, and what they conceive of as alien.

This study begins with some discussion of the basic theoretical and methodological questions concerning Development studies, language studies, and the ways in which they are interrelated. This first chapter will also introduce a brief sociohistorical context of the central issues to be discussed in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 2, ‘Pembangunan’, will specifically examine the prominent position of the word Pembangunan in contemporary Indonesia, the social history of its making, and its significance to the process of national Development in Indonesia. Chapter 3, ‘Language of Development’, will elaborate further the social history concerned in a broader context, in which the making of Pembangunan is an illustrative example. Language of Development does not refer to a set of technical jargon that is dominant in the discourse of Development. It refers to a particular model of logic and discourse, structuring of words and meanings, and cohering perceptions and values. In this Language of Development the proliferation of technical jargon is only one element. The final chapter, ‘Development of Language’, is not a broad linguistic survey in the sense of how Bahasa Indonesia evolved from past to present. Rather, this chapter will offer a critical reassessment of the state-sponsored programs for ‘Developing’ Bahasa Indonesia.

For reasons to be explained a little later, the use of a capital ‘D’ for the word ‘Development’ here and in the ensuing discussion is useful.
1.2 Studying Language and Development

The relationship between language and Development has gained considerable attention from Indonesian scholars in language studies, but virtually none from their counterparts in Development Studies. Nevertheless, there seems to be a generally accepted view among Indonesian specialists in language studies and other social scientists that language is essentially separable from social reality. Thus, language is seen as a separate area of study from Development. When the interaction of the two is recognised, the relationship is viewed as extrinsic to, rather than as an integral part of, the study.2

There have been a few studies on certain key words in contemporary Indonesian political discourse (e.g. Bowen 1986; Witton 1986; Pemberton 1986; van Langenberg 1987). None of the authors is Indonesian, nor have any of them made an attempt to relate (or suggest the importance of relating) studies on those few selected words to the general social production of the language, and particularly to the conspicuous programs for language Development in Indonesia. The best study of modern Indonesian in relation to its political context in historical perspective perhaps remains the work of Benedict Anderson (1966), 'The languages of Indonesian politics'. This article was completed and published shortly before the New Order government launched Development programs, and programs for language Development. Thus, the major concerns of the present study are absent from it. When Anderson's work was reappraised twenty years later, yet again by a non-Indonesian (see Errington 1986), and with serious attention to the current language Development programs, the relationship between the Indonesian language and Indonesia's Development remained largely unexplored.

Most Indonesian scholars of Indonesian language express their optimistic belief in the important role of this language in the national Development programs. However, it is strikingly obvious that – in their assessment – the social workings of language are seen primarily in terms of instrumental functions (see Heryanto 1987). Language is believed to be important for its potential contribution to the establishment of a modern bureaucracy, the training of the prospective labour force, the management of Development projects, or the advancement of science and technology. In short, the national language is seen as a helpful tool to keep the vital machinery of Development in good shape. This premise has become the dominant rationale for the implementation of state-sponsored programs for language Development throughout the nation.

The fact that little attention has been paid to the questions of language in the growing area of Development studies, in and outside Indonesia, is hardly surprising. At the same time that language is pervasively viewed to be essentially separable from social reality, the word ‘Development’ has predominantly acquired the notions of economic growth, modernisation, and industrialisation (see Arndt 1981; Gunnarsson 1985), despite increasing reservations and critiques (see Goulet 1973; Illich 1979; Currey 1973; Mortimer 1984). All English-speaking scholars with whom I have been provisionally familiar, who have traced the semantic history of the word ‘Development’ (Illich 1979; Arndt 1981; Williams 1983) invariably note the curious extension of the meanings of the word, the shift of its central meaning in contemporary

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2 The tendency of established academic specialised trainings to separate what is conceivably complex and unitary is, of course, a familiar and old problem among scholars. By no means is the tendency in the so-called Development Studies unique. We have seen growing enthusiasm (e.g. an ‘interdisciplinary approach’) in various circles for redressing the problem, but by and large the alternatives still remain embryonic. In light of this, the work of Dede Oetomo (1987) appears to be one of the few encouraging endeavours by Indonesian scholars in language studies. It explores the relation between contemporary Indonesian and the rise of the Indonesian middle class, without subordinating one to the other.
usages, how recently these semantic changes took place, and how little attention has been paid to these changes in the expanding discourse of Development.

The increasingly rapid production of writings, discussions, and official curricula in schools that present themselves to the public as ‘Development Studies’ reaffirms the dominant definitions. Within the given ‘Language of Development’, attention is primarily devoted to issues that seem to be materially objective in nature, observable and quantitatively measurable entities: natural resources; demographic rates; economic and political institutions, policies, and behaviour; technology and infrastructural units for industrialisation. Non-material needs are not completely ignored, but they have not received equal attention. Questions of language, when raised at all, appear to be secondary and are considered only in terms of how language facilitates or impedes the transfer of messages in the Development process. Understandably, language-related questions that have received attention thus far are generally restricted to the problems of literacy and technology for mass communication. It is against this strong and persistent tendency that I wish to pursue the present study.

I wish to suggest that the importance of language in relation to the issues of Development is far greater and more complex than has been generally recognised in either language or Development studies. Language is not a neutral and objective ‘tool’ for communicating messages, nor is it a transparency through which we see reality. The primary importance of language in studying Development is probably best recognised when one deals with the questions of definition. What is ‘Development’ in the first place? Where do the boundaries lie that identify certain matters as being part or the whole corpus of ‘Development’ issues, while others are excluded?

Consider the curious confidence in a recently presented argument in reference to contemporary Indonesia: “development in Indonesia has certainly occurred since 1965” (Emmerson 1988:109). Here “development” is employed to “denote a combination of only two things: increasing economic growth and improving social welfare” (Emmerson 1988:109). The argument is elaborated and substantiated with a highly sophisticated quantitative analysis, albeit from a single source, the World Bank Report. One may raise a number of questions about the methodological as well as substantial aspects of the argument. However, at the very heart of the matter lies the question of definition. Rather than focusing on the question of whether or not ‘Development’ has taken place in Indonesia, we must seek to know not only what definition of ‘Development’ is employed and why it is preferred to others, but also who is choosing what definition and why. The latter questions are keys to a fundamental understanding of ‘what happened’!

Occasionally in beginning a discussion of Development, scholars have addressed the problem of defining their working term ‘Development’. The typical resolution is to find what seems to be the best definition from already known options or to propose an alternative one, rather than to acknowledge the problematic of the question itself. Even when this is acknowledged, it is seldom confronted on a fundamental basis. It is worthy to quote at length a good illustration from Christer Gunnarsson’s (1985:184) discreet notes:

> Of course concepts such as development and underdevelopment are highly normative and can never be defined in an absolute sense. In a general sense, however, anyone could agree that development means an improvement in the standard of

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3 The perceived relation of one thing affecting the other indicates a view that, despite their interaction, they are essentially two separable entities. Similar views can be found in contemporary Indonesians’ discussions of the relationship between kebudayaan ‘culture’, and Pembangunan ‘Development’.
living, which is achieved by an increase in the production and consumption of goods and services. Industrialisation is neither the only possible means of achieving progress, nor need it be the best. However, when we speak of the developed countries of today we refer to the industrialised countries, which means that the industrial society is the archetype of the modern developed society. (Italics added.)

By contrast, the aim of this study is not to reject any definition or propose a new one. This study rests on the proposition that words and meanings are socially and historically constructed. Therefore, my enquiry will be directed towards answering the following questions: what political, economic, or cultural variables are involved in the construction of the various and the dominant definitions of the Indonesian word for ‘Development’? What continuities and changes have taken place in these definitions from the past to the present? What implications do these changes and continuities have for contemporary Indonesian society? Finally, how do the dynamic redefinitions of the word interrelate with other closely associated words?

Before beginning with the Indonesian dimension, it is useful to reflect on the curious and intriguing history of the English word ‘Development’ (see Arndt 1981; Illich 1979; Williams 1983:102-104). Formerly, the word was used primarily as a noun of process (‘development of...’). Now, while retaining this meaning, we have become accustomed to employing the word as an independent noun (‘Development’, or ‘...of Development’). To make the distinction clear, the word is written with a capital ‘D’ throughout this essay when it is used as an independent noun. Although one can reasonably draw a similar distinction between Pembangunan and pembangunan, the similarity is partial and limited. While Pembangunan has thus far been the sole equivalent for ‘Development’, pembangunan has also been used to translate ‘construction’, or ‘building’. The noun-of-process ‘development’ has been largely translated as perkembangan, and NEVER as pembangunan.

The way the two languages operate differently in the above case indicates only a small tree in the forest of issues we have yet to explore. Nevertheless, the illustration should stand as an initial warning. It should keep us alert and help us resist the general tendency to view language as some kind of universal structure with a variety of contents in accordance with different national, geographical, or temporal settings. It is significant that not all societies have a word for what we call ‘language’ in modern English.

Working from the basis of a view of language as a primarily historical activity, richly embedded in social relations or contexts, we may note Alton L. Becker’s (1986) questioning of the familiar nouns ‘language’, ‘code’, and ‘structure’. In place of these terms, Becker prefers a new metaphor, ‘languaging’. By substituting the verb for the nouns, Becker is self-consciously emphasising his view of language activity “not [as] a structure but a process...presupposing an actor”. He asserts that “[t]here is no structure in language – but rather structuring is something we do to languaging” (Becker 1986). The idea that language ‘has’ structure or governing rules of its own, basically denies its social character. It stems

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4 Each of these familiar categories ‘political’, ‘economic’ and ‘cultural’ is problematic. They have come, through an historical process, to our daily language with the strong pretensions of ‘describing’ separate areas of social dynamics, effacing their nature as nothing but abstract categories or constructs of a particular society.

5 A similar case can be found in the development of the word ‘culture’, being a noun-of-process and an independent noun (see Williams 1977:11-20).

6 An elaboration of this point in the case of Indonesian society will be presented in Chapter 3, ‘Language of Development’.
from a particular definition of ‘language’ and of ‘human beings’, addressed by Williams as quoted in the opening of this discussion.

Fundamental and empowering as this theoretical alternative may be, it is clear that the complex relations between language and reality in specific contexts remain a vast field to explore. Admittedly, to deal with this complexity some kind of reductive analysis is necessary. Raymond Williams offers a brilliant example of such an analysis in his work *Keywords* (1983), to which I am greatly indebted. In this analysis, he concentrated on certain English “keywords”, their development, and “the process of their connections and interconnections” with social order, admittedly, “as if they were relations between simple units” (Williams 1983:23). Though such analysis does not promise immediate solutions to the social problems, it may offer what Williams (1983:24) referred to as the “extra edge of awareness”, necessary for understanding and confronting existing problems. My present endeavour, however, is not intended to produce a work which is parallel to Raymond Williams’ *Keywords*. Rather, in the following chapter I attempt to examine the keyword *Pembangunan* in a similar fashion to the approach which Williams adopted in that book. Subsequent chapters will not focus on keywords, but will provide further examination of the major issues of this study in a broader context.

To appreciate the above theoretical assertions, an introductory note concerning the specific nature and unique history of the language in question is called for at this point. Only after some minimally necessary understanding of the sociohistorical context of the issues can our discussion proceed. The section below is therefore intended to provide such an introduction in its briefest form. Further information and elaboration of the issues will evolve from time to time throughout subsequent chapters.

1.3 DEVELOPING LANGUAGE, LANGUAGING DEVELOPMENT

Bahasa Indonesia is a product of language planning, engineering, and Development programs *par excellence*. It does not evolve from communal activities in the ordinary lives of its speakers. It has not been a mother tongue to anyone. Speakers of Bahasa Indonesia learn it from authorised institutions and professionals as a language that their mothers do not speak. This language has been unanimously claimed to be the national language of this fourth largest populated country in the globe, even though almost 90 per cent of that population do not speak it at home.

This national language, just like the nation itself, is still undergoing an anxious process of being Developed. While that process is in progress, the greatest part of the population speak distinct mother tongues, which altogether constitute several hundreds in number. Today these various mother tongues are classified as ‘local’ or ‘regional’ languages, being subordinate or even seen as threats to the national language. Even among the nation’s extremely small elite minority who have had access to the prestige and privilege of learning this national language, a very few are considered competent to use it correctly or appropriately.

We can gauge what a serious business the Development of Bahasa Indonesia is in the context of the overall Development of the nation. Nation-building and nation-Development seem to be unmanageable unless a legitimate and effectively compatible language that is sufficiently well Developed is available to foster the process. At the same time, the reverse is

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The term “keywords” is used here and in the ensuing discussion in the sense originally proposed by Williams (1983:15): a significant, binding word, indicative of a certain form of thought.
true. We can recognise the importance of Indonesia’s nation-Development to the program for language Development. It is only within the context of the former that the latter can be sensible. The two are inseparable, and indeed they are mutually constituting. Despite its glaring appearance of economic-orientation, the nation-Development in its broadest sense has been explored, projected, communicated, and reproduced, among others, within the framework of Bahasa Indonesia as a Language of Development.

Initially, Bahasa Indonesia was being Developed from Malay. From the very beginning it was clear that the work of Developing this language was inseparable from the work of Developing the society in the direction and fashion desirable to the Developing agents. The Dutch colonial government initiated this enterprise nearly three centuries ago. Their aims were several. One persistent aim was to Develop a language-of-state that could function as an effective means of governing the large and heterogeneous colony under one administrative system. The choice of Malay as a major source for Developing this desired language was an outcome of a long controversy that will be discussed in Chapter 4.

Paradoxically, the Development of this non-European colonial language-of-state also meant, in a later period, a development of an anticolonial language among the early nationalists in the first few decades of this century. This, in turn, facilitated the development of a national language, as well as a new nation. Early nationalism among the indigenous elite emerged from their experience of attending the Dutch schools in the colony, as well as from interaction with various foreigners who were more conversant in the subject of nationalism. The Dutch were compelled to open schools for a few privileged indigenes to fill many positions in the colonial government bureaucracy.

These schools provided the indigenous elite not only with access to acquiring the languages of the ruling class (Dutch and ‘High’ Malay), a new body of knowledge and epistemology, new values and world views, but more importantly a new awareness of their common position in the colonial social order. They came from various communities and islands that had barely had any significant social attachment to one another. Now being grouped together in the same schools, they came to an awareness of having come from some common community, one which was larger than and differently defined from what they had previously perceived to be their homeland. They became aware that they were colonised subjects within a clearly demarcated territory (see Anderson 1983a:111). They discovered a new boundary of their extended community that was based neither on ethnic, linguistic, geographical, nor religious categories. It was principally political. This discovery soon found its effective means of articulation as these schooled\(^a\) indigenous elite learned more and more about the notion of nation, nationalism, and modern political organisations.

It was clear to these nationalists that they wanted more than freedom for individual ethnic communities in the colonial archipelago. They became engaged in an extremely new and challenging experiment of creating a new social order, a revolutionary transformation of the existing communities. In this context, again, a new language had to be created. From then on Development, in the sense of an act of creating, persists to appear desirable and imperative in the history of independent Indonesia.

As with nationalism, the idea of a ‘modern’ and ‘Developed’ language was essentially derived from Western world views. Programs for language Development among the Indonesian

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\(^a\) Following Ivan Illich (1970) the value-laden and oft-abused term ‘educated’ is not used in this work, and the more clearly and appropriately defined term ‘schooled’ is preferred. Education does not exist exclusively in schools, neither does it necessarily exist when schooling takes place.
nationalists operated within the known model formerly presented by the colonial bureaucracy and scholarship. The chief difference was that the nationalists worked for a nationalistic cause. Within the framework of the colonial legacy in language development the general population was regarded as ignorant, backward, traditional, irrational, and incapable of engaging in language activities unless an outsider with professional expertise came to develop their competence. During the colonial period European authorities played the role of the experts. Following the rise of Indonesian nationalism, the schooled indigenous emerged to take over the same role with stronger legitimacy, rather than to abandon the whole enterprise of developing people’s language and social order.

The enterprise of developing the national language and language-of-state survives to the present day in Indonesia. Only during the New Order government, however, did we begin to see its fully-fledged scale and expression. This contemporary phenomenon, again, has been simultaneously espoused by a prominent ascendancy of nation-development consciousness and practices over all-encompassing spheres of social life. To understand contemporary development programs in Indonesia one needs to be cognisant of the history of social and lingual transformations. Chapter 3 of this study will outline some of the major events in this process.

An entry point to understanding this complex process is a close examination of the construction of the Indonesian word for ‘development’ in its sociohistorical context, and particularly in relation to the process of languaging and constructing Indonesian nationhood. An historical analysis of that keyword, *Pembangunan*, as presented in the next chapter, is an indispensable introduction to understanding the social issues that have been the core of development studies. By proceeding to discern the linguistic features, the social constraints and significance, as well as the values and beliefs embedded in the process of constructing the word, we will gain some basic insight into the problems to be addressed in the remainder of this study.
CHAPTER 2

Pembangunan

2.1 KEYWORD

It would be an understatement to say that the Indonesian word for ‘Development’, Pembangunan, is important and widely disseminated. In a so-called ‘Developing Nation’, it is to be expected that ‘Development’ would be highly visible, but in the case of contemporary Indonesia, the word Pembangunan is more than just unavoidable in the general population’s everyday life. It has become one of the two most salient keywords, the other being Pancasila, the term for the official state ideology. The extent to which this word binds and legitimises certain modes of thought, as well as negating other forms of consciousness, is probably unique among the various Developing Nations.

Several foreign observers have correctly noted that New Order Indonesia is characterised by its Pembangunan consciousness, rhetoric, and programs (see McDonald 1980:68; van Langenberg 1987:20; van Ufford 1987:147,152; Emmerson 1988:109). However, the significance of this label, its past history and implications for the present, are still greatly understudied. Many of the previously cited references make only passing comments, rather than explore the issues. It is also wise to note a distinction between an outsider’s view of the issue (no matter how accurate) and the view as presented by the actors in the New Order drama. Though both views can be equally legitimate and instructive, they often give us significantly different kinds of information.

It is interesting to note how the speakers of Indonesian deal with and internalise the word in question, as well as how various members of that community express their perceptions of the significance of the word. The regime has claimed to be not only the Orde Baru, ‘New Order’, but also the Orde Pembangunan, ‘Development Order’. Retired General Soeharto, who has been the President for six consecutive terms, holds the honorary title Bapak Pembangunan ‘Father of Development’. All cabinets under the New Order government have been called Kabinet Pembangunan ‘Development Cabinet’, each distinguished from the other by a number from one to six.9

The same word has been commonly incorporated into the names of various institutions, activities, or concepts, including those over whom the government has no direct or full control. One of the three official political organisations in the country is named Partai Persatuan Pembangunan ‘Development Unity Party’. Likewise, the Golongan Karya ‘Functional Group’, or GOLKAR within the legislative body, is called Fraksi Karya Pembangunan ‘Development Functional Group’. The word Pembangunan can be attached also to entertainment activities. A 1987 carnival jointly celebrating the national Independence Day and anniversary of the

9 Philip Quarles van Ufford (1987:147) made a passing comment on this point, but failed to recognise the recurrent use of the name for all successive cabinets: “the first [sic] cabinet under the New Order was called kabinet pembangunan”.

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founding of the capital city, Jakarta, was called Pawai Pembangunan, ‘Development Parade’. A recreational centre, constructed by the local government in Central Java’s capital city, Semarang, is named Pusat Rekreasi dan Promosi Pembangunan ‘Centre for Recreation and Development Promotion’.

To complete the picture, I would like to mention examples of cases where the same word has been used adjectivally to modify concepts. The most popular ones under this category are those idioms that refer to the New Order’s period of ascendancy: era pembangunan ‘Development era’ (see Almatsier 1987; Alwi 1985; Sudewa 1984), periode pembangunan ‘Development period’ (see Kompas 1987b; 1987d), and zaman pembangunan ‘the age/time of Development’ (see Atmowiloto 1983; Kompas 1986d). Other examples of importance include nasionalisme pembangunan ‘Development nationalism’ (see Mursito 1983/4); komunikasi pembangunan ‘Development communication’ (see Muis 1987); pers pembangunan ‘Development press’ (see Sutrisno 1987). With one exception, zaman pembangunan, all the names of these concepts are clearly borrowed words from modern English or Dutch.

In light of this practice, we are readily reminded of the rhetorical aphorism ‘What’s in a name?’ that has a popular translation in contemporary Indonesian (ApaJah artinya sebuah nama?). We may be led to believe the implied message of the aphorism and dismiss the above issue of naming as trivial. Since the New Order has been so serious about the practice of naming things with ‘Pembangunan’, in studying the New Order’s Pembangunan we cannot simply ignore the process. We might be more inclined to examine the significance of this seemingly ritual naming, once we consider the immense and vigorous exploitation and transformation of the nation’s natural resources and of the population’s wealth and labour, as well as the accompanying social changes that have all been legitimised by Pembangunan. The whole undertaking is too great for us simply to ascribe the practice of such naming to a series of insignificant rites, or believe that it would not matter if the word were substituted by other words, or not used at all.

On the contrary, there is something of great importance to be recognised here. Earlier I suggested that ‘Development’ or Pembangunan does not exist beyond language. It is the very word that defines the perceived and projected reality, though it must be understood that the definition is never static, as language never is, and never isolated from the whole range of social dynamics. The keyword Pembangunan can be seen simultaneously as a constitutive force for the so-called Pembangunan process and an essential product of that process. It is ‘constitutive’,11 because it gives Pembangunan its actual existence, as well as its recognisable and workable nature. The metaphor, Pembangunan, provides a set of boundaries within which the general population is urged to concentrate their views of reality, from which and within which to explore the vast changes in which they are engulfed. It is also a ‘product’, since Pembangunan as a keyword is a construct of a particular historical process.

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10 The construction of this centre brought about a nation-wide controversy over two issues. Firstly, it was preceded by a mass protest from local inhabitants whose land was reportedly appropriated for the site of the construction. Secondly, an illegal practice of gambling was found to have been institutionally accommodated as part of the centre’s activities. Apparently, the modifying name ‘Pembangunan’ does not necessarily preclude any possibilities of public objections. Nevertheless, such naming has enhanced the confidence of many in launching important projects.

11 The notion of language as ‘constitutive’ is from Raymond Williams. For a further elaborated discussion, see Williams (1977:21-44).
The all-pervasive tendency to qualify individuals, institutions, concepts, or activities as Pembangunan-based or Pembangunan-oriented does not immediately signify certain qualities embodied in the entities named as such. In actual practice, however, the use of the term indicates the espousal of controlled or approved processes of social interaction, in thought and behaviour, which are conducive to maintaining or reproducing the state-desired economic, political, and cultural status quo. This proposition will be an area of major interest in the discussion that follows. For the moment I wish only to draw attention to a series of conspicuous phenomena in contemporary Indonesia to illustrate the point. Given the unquestionable and strictly formulated decision from the highest echelons in the social hierarchy that the primary aim of the nation-state is to undertake Pembangunan, all existing activities, institutions, and consciousness of the population are now expected to focus on, to conform to and support Pembangunan. Thus, pre-existing institutions, institutionalised activities, and mentalities of the population need to be restructured, redefined, reoriented, or at least renamed to be in tune with the legitimate Pembangunan framework.

Nationalism has been reinterpreted in a search for its direct relevance to the officially defined notion of Pembangunan (see Kompas 1987d; Rasmala 1986; Sinar Harapan 1985b). Many Indonesian intellectuals designate their current discussions of the humanities as part of the same pursuit (see Hardjosoemantri 1983/4; Kartodirdjo 1987; Sudewa 1984). In a similar vein, we find the service of Pembangunan defined as a goal in current discussion of Indonesian literature (see Basuki 1986; Hutasuhut 1986; Hutomo 1980), of the Indonesian arts (see Kompas 1986d), of local indigenous traditions (see Sinolungan 1986), and of the role of the intelligentsia (see Soedjatmoko 1985). For our present study, writings on the role of the national language in Pembangunan (see Anggoro 1981; Halim 1981) will demand our special attention in a later chapter. All these approaches attempt to find contemporary legitimation by appropriating past historical constructs. Indeed, this process is parallel to Alton L. Becker’s (1984:135,142) depiction of the essential activity of languaging:

In using language one shapes old words into new contexts...pushing old language into the present...The meaning of a word is...a combination of...the past and present contexts it evokes.

It is neither necessary nor possible to list all the examples available to illustrate the use of Pembangunan in contemporary discourse. I have deliberately excluded examples from certain areas of discourse that have been the core area of Development studies, such as economics and industrialisation studies. It is obvious that in these areas Pembangunan occupies a central position. I have a special interest in examples from the humanities, since this area has the reputation of being least concerned with, if not hostile to, pragmatic, utilitarian or materialistic concerns of social life. And yet, as is mentioned above, discussions of the humanities in Indonesia today give a great deal of attention to the supposedly economic-oriented concerns of Pembangunan. It is equally interesting to notice that a considerable number of contemporary writings on the social roles of women in Indonesia have been unashamedly reduced to and directed towards inquiries of women’s contribution to the state-sponsored Pembangunan (see Abunairn 1985; Kompas 1986c; 1986e; Soetomo 1986; Sumobroto 1986).

It must be noted here that the above examples do not represent the overall picture of contemporary Indonesian discourse and intellectual preoccupation. Neither do all the existing Pembangunan-oriented discussions in the country share the same arguments or values, or make complimentary and enthusiastic remarks about the ongoing Pembangunan programs. We should not assume that the dominant ideology of Pembangunan has exhausted the population’s consciousness and language. Nevertheless, the above examples do provide
some evidence that *Pembangunan* has succeeded in drawing remarkable attention to itself beyond official and directly state-controlled activities. It has not only created a new object of attention, but also reset the previously existing order of the people’s attention. In many cases it appears that the presence of *Pembangunan* is so insistent that even critics of the Indonesian status quo can hardly avoid addressing the issues it raises.

We find individuals, like Arswendo Atmowiloto (1983) or Herman Darmo (1986), who can be critical of the excessive propaganda of *Pembangunan* programs and its penetration into many areas of contemporary discourse. Scholars from both the humanities and social sciences occasionally express critical views, in varying degrees and styles, of the government’s policy, or the underlying assumptions, technical operation, or current outcome of *Pembangunan*. While these critical arguments deserve some attention and appreciation, they are bound to share some minimal common ground for speaking to each other: a language of Development. There is no doubt that there is some room for disagreement about ‘what has happened, should have happened, or will happen’ in Indonesia’s Development. However, it is clear that criticism or disagreement can only be articulated within the shared framework of Development metaphors, unless the individuals concerned are critically aware of this framework. Therefore, it is not so much the discussion of Development itself that needs to be challenged, as the general tendency to take for granted the shared language of the discourse. “To speak a language”, Alton L. Becker (pers.comm. 1986) once noted, “you have to believe it – you have to believe the reality you see through it”.

As we follow the expanding discussion of ‘what is happening or has happened’ in Indonesia’s Development, it is imperative to reflect, from time to time, on what the language involved does to us as well as what we can do to it. It is instructive to keep in mind the wisdom that Wittgenstein (quoted in Becker 1984:142) shared with us:

> [o]ne thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing’s nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.

We will now try to trace the frame of *Pembangunan* as a dynamic historical metaphor in Indonesian society, and pay attention to the changes, continuities, and implications which have characterised its use at various times and in various contexts. By tracing the frame through which Indonesians look at *Pembangunan*, we will, hopefully, understand better the central and the various peripheral meanings of the word.

### 2.2 Biography

Despite its prevalence and outstanding status in contemporary Indonesia, the word *Pembangunan* is remarkably young. We know little today about some of its earliest usages. There is reason enough to believe, however, that its initial debut took place only during the early decades of this century amongst the emerging Western-educated Indonesian intelligentsia. During the middle decades of this century the word was not discarded, but only during the past two decades has it developed its fully-fledged force and prominence.

While the construction of the word is relatively recent, its major ingredients are drawn from old materials. *Pembangunan* is a derivative word from the root word *bangun*. The affixes *pe(m)*- and *-an* function to ‘nominalise’ the transitive verb *membangun*. The verbs *bangun* (intransitive) and *membangun* (transitive) are principally associated with two sets of meanings: (a) to wake up, to get up, to awaken, to be awake; and (b) to build, to construct, to erect, to found. In isolation, the verbs *membangun* (kan), as well as the nominalising
affixes *pe(m)*- and *-an*, had existed for years before *Pembangunan* itself came into being. Why at a certain historical moment the verb *membangun* was nominalised to create the term *Pembangunan* suggests some significant historical events.

Old dictionaries of the Malay language, from which the Indonesian language evolved, deal with *bangun* as an entry with its various derivatives. None of them, however, mentions the noun form *pembangunan* (see Shellabear 1902; Mayer 1906; Wilkinson 1908 and 1926; Ronkel 1930). Likewise, for cross-checking we can notice that in his English-Malay dictionary, Shellabear (1916:143-144) did not consider *pembangunan* as a possible option to render his English entry “development”. Instead, he suggested several Malay words which seemed to be the best options available then, and to which we will return in later discussion: “*kkmbangan, ktumbohan, kmajuan*”.

Even the authors of later Malay dictionaries, published after *pembangunan* was already in use in some Indonesian intellectual circles, did not seem to be aware of the existence of such a word (see Wilkinson 1937; Wilkinson and Coope 1948). The earliest dictionaries I have been able to find that acknowledge the existence of the word are dictionaries of Indonesian published during and after the late 1940s (see Kramer 1948:17; 1952:215; Poerwadarminta 1952:69; 1961:88). These dictionaries give meanings of the word that are fairly close to the contemporary. Based on the limited sources given above, it seems likely that *pembangunan* probably entered the language of the Malay-speaking communities of the archipelago a little earlier than their peninsular counterparts. Whether or not this is the case, in both areas (now called Indonesia and Malaysia respectively) the same word with the same dominant meanings has become a keyword (see Iskandar 1970:71; DBP 1984:35).

One of the earliest usages of the term *pembangunan* available to us today comes from the famous *Polemik Kebudayaan* (*Polemics on culture*) from the second half of the 1930s. Essays involved in these polemics are compiled in Mihardja (1977). It is conceivable that the word made its initial debut at this time, and in this context. The polemics have been generally celebrated as an early peak or a notable beginning of Indonesian discourse on modernisation. The language required for such a discussion is unequivocally a modern, or better modernising, one. It heralded the beginnings of Indonesian nationalism. A projection of something extremely new, a hitherto imagined social order called ‘nation’, filled the indigenous thinkers with great enthusiasm. Words like *pembangunan* and *membangunkan* were vital and extremely empowering concepts. These words were derived from formal elements of the language of the oppressed indigenous people, and yet they were able to express new, liberating concepts that the nationalists learned from the language of their oppressor. The source of the words needed to be indigenous so as to evoke a genuine spirit of struggle against the alien forces. The concept was inevitably derived from the language of the colonisers, however, for only in their terms could the oppression be effectively confronted.

To a large extent, I think, the source of the newly introduced and explored concept was ‘building’ in the catchphrase ‘nation-building’. The double major metaphors of *(mem-)*bangun(-kan) we discussed earlier found revolutionary expression here. While one major set of meanings of *bangun* could perfectly translate the notion of ‘building’ a new nation, the other could readily supply extraordinarily reinforcing notions of ‘awakening’ the people’s consciousness. The most controversial figure in the course of the polemics was Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, who has remained a leading proponent of Indonesia’s modernisation in the subsequent five decades. Significantly, of all the participants in the 1930s debate, it was he who used the word *pembangunan* most frequently and enthusiastically. He spoke
alternatively of *pembangunan* and *membangunkan* with occasional reference to a Dutch phrase: "...pekerjaan Indonesia muda ialah cultuurscheppen, membangunkan kebudayaan baru..." (Mihardja 1977:17). We may confidently understand *cultuur* as ‘culture’, in the broadest sense: way of life. The word *scheppen* can be rendered as “to create” (Renier 1982:251).

Alisjahbana’s rhetoric gives us some indication of the decisive developments in metaphor that took place at that time. While the old two sets of metaphors remained recognisable at this (and even to the present) time, new visions and linguistic constructions were under way. In his assertion “...hanya mereka yang dapat lepaskan dirinya dari yang lama, akan mungkin membangun yang baru” (Mihardja 1977:65) the metaphors commonly used for house or building restoration/renovation are striking. Even more striking is his use of *rubuh* in arguing that the work of “membangun yang baru” necessitates “rubuhnya traditie yang lama” (Mihardja 1977:65). The other sense of *bangun* (to be awakened from sleep) was well preserved, for example in Alisjahbana’s argument that the awakening of the people’s consciousness was imperative so as to counter the ongoing practice of “meninabobakan rakyat banyak” (Mihardja 1977:19).

The novelty of Alisjahbana’s language is more than the new term *pembangunan*, but also its link with the idea of ‘to create’. In a separate essay he made a clear statement: “Pekerjaan pembangoenan itoe ialah pekerjaan pentjipta” (Alisjahbana 1946a). While the act of abstracting the notion of *membangun* in the form of nominalisation is linguistically creative, the conceptual substance of *membangun* as an act of ‘creating’ is indeed revolutionary.

We may recall the three Malay terms, “kkeumbangan, kteumbohan, kmajuan” that Shellabear (1916:143-144) chose to render his English entry “development”. Each of these Malay terms, as well as their modern manifestations *perkembangan* ‘unfolding’, *pertumbuhan* ‘growth’, and *kemajuan* ‘progress’ bears no resemblance to the central notion of ‘bringing about the existence of what was formerly non-existent’ historically embedded in the word ‘create’. Each of those old indigenous metaphors refers to the process of change from some pre-existing organic entity. The fact that Alisjahbana decided to introduce the new word *pembangunan* in preference to the existing available Malay terms suggests his awareness of the need for a neologism (to convey a new idea) as an integral part of the struggle to materialise that idea into social relations (a liberation from colonial oppression, a newly created society, a nation). From its incipience, the prospective nation was viewed as something created ex nihilo.

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12 I wish to provide nothing but a rough translation of quotations from Indonesian sources for readers who are unfamiliar with Indonesian. It should be clear from previous discussions that the significance of the quotations from Indonesian sources in the context of Indonesian social history is invisible once these quotations are transformed into what seems to be their translations in English, or any other foreign language for that matter. For practical purposes, the above quotation can be crudely translated as "...the work of young Indonesia is cultuurscheppen, to develop/construct/build a new culture...

13 “...only those who are able to disassociate/detach themselves from the past/old, can possibly develop/construct/build the new”.

14 “the fall/collapse of the old tradition”.

15 “to lullaby the people at large”.

16 “The work of *pembangoenan* is the work of a creator”.

‘Creating’ a new nation is fundamentally distinct from liberating the separate colonised communities of Java, Sunda, Madura, Bali, Aceh, and so on from the colonial power. While the latter had been the ambition of many people in the colony in the past years, the former had been, until then, unthinkable for most of the population. Creating the nation called Indonesia involved creating new thinking, new imagination, and new language. In his early essay that triggered off the Polemik Kebudayaan, Alisjahbana took the first several pages to emphasise that distinction. With great passion, he wrote (Mihardja 1977:16):

*Indonesia yang dicita-citakan oleh generasi baru bukan sambungan Mataram, bukan sambungan kerajaan Banten, bukan kerajaan Minangkabau atau Banjarmasin. Menurut susunan pikiran ini, maka kebudayaan Indonesia pun tiadalah mungkin sambungan kebudayaan Jawa, sambungan kebudayaan Melayu, sambungan kebudayaan Sunda atau kebudayaan yang lain.*

Putting it in a positive statement, the work of ‘young Indonesia’, in Alisjahbana’s scenario was “menciptakan sesuatu yang mempunyai cap sendiri Indonesia” (Mihardja 1977:17).

In this light, it is significant that Alisjahbana was extremely hostile towards anything from the ‘old’, as exemplified by the previously cited quotations from his argument during the Polemics: “...hanya mereka yang dapat melepaskan dirinya dari yang lama, akan mungkin...membangun yang baru” and therefore he insisted on the “...rubuhnya traditie yang lama”. A few years before the Polemik Kebudayaan Alisjahbana led a rebellious group of young intellectuals to found the journal Poejangga Baroe, ‘New Writer(s)’. Poejangga Baroe posed a direct confrontation with the then dominant linguistic and literary activities of the ‘old’ Balai Poestaka, the colonial government’s publishing house, from which Alisjahbana’s own literary career originally grew. The idea of ‘creating’ the previously unsayable and unimagined society, the Indonesian nation, evolved hand-in-hand with the ideas of ‘creative’ writings and ‘creative’ literary authors which the Poejangga Baroe learned from the Dutch Romantic writers, and to which it subscribed. In 1938 he published his piece *Kesusasteraan dizaman Pembangunan Bangsa*, (‘Literature in a time of nation-building’) (see Teeuw 1979:39). In 1945 he led the publication of the biweekly magazine *Pembangoenan*.

Alisjahbana’s nearly total rejection of the old or the past in an attempt to create the new became one of the major targets of the attacks by his opponents in the Polemics. The latter expressed the belief that one cannot and should not “melepaskan dirinya dari yang lama” in making the attempt to “membangun yang baru” (Mihardja 1977:22,29,74). Despite these reservations, and Alisjahbana’s later admission that the past was inseparable from the present and future, enthusiasm for the new, the metaphor of creativity, and undermining the given past have persistently and vigorously characterised much of the elites’ subsequent thinking.

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17 Benedict Anderson’s (1983a) thesis that a nation is essentially an “imagined community” deserves a serious consideration.

18 “Indonesia, being the ideal of the young generation, is not a continuation of [the] Mataram [kingdom], not a continuation of the Banten kingdom, not the kingdoms of Minangkabau or Banjarmasin. Likewise, in the perspective of this [young Indonesia], Indonesian culture cannot possibly be a continuation of the Javanese culture, the continuation of the Malay culture, the continuation of the Sundanese culture, or any other cultures.”

19 “to create something with its own Indonesian trademark”.

on Pembangunan. The dichotomies between the lama ‘old’ and the baru ‘new’, and between tradisional ‘traditional’ and moderen ‘modern’ have found repeated and renewed expression right up to the present day, albeit not without resistance from some quarters.

One of the most prominent slogans of Sukarno’s government was ‘New Emerging Forces’ vis-a-vis ‘Old Established Forces’. Another case that immediately comes to mind is the self-proclaimed Orde Baru ‘New Order’, that distinguishes itself from and denies any form of historical connection with what it calls the Orde Lama ‘Old Order’ (see Mangunwijaya 1986). It is as a part of the insistence on such a dissociation that some leading figures in contemporary Indonesia claim that Indonesia’s Pembangunan did not begin until the New Order came to power (see Alwi 1985) or until it launched its first Five-Year-Development program in 1969 (see Gafur 1982:4). The whole previously discussed issue of ‘creativity’ is only one of a series of important elements in the recent development of socialised thought in Indonesia that found expression in Alisjahbana’s rhetoric during the Polemics. Two other issues are worthy of mention here.

Firstly, we may notice from the Polemics of the 1930s that the word pembangunan was widely used to discuss the idea of pembangunan kebudayaan, ‘development of culture’, as contrasted with the predominantly economic growth-oriented sense of Pembangunan in contemporary Indonesia. There was a strongly held view that kebudayaan – as of ‘culture’ in many English-speaking communities at that time – was the primary determining variable in social change. Before the New Order emerged, when Pembangunan had already been used by the late President Sukarno and members of the Cabinet in special reference to economic undertakings, the residual use of Pembangunan in reference to cultural affairs and to the notion of ‘nation-building’ was still apparent. Ajip Rosidi’s (1967) Peranan Sastra dan Pembangunan Bangsa (‘The role of literature and nation-building’), (which was originally dated 18 January 1959), does not subordinate culture to an economic growth-oriented Pembangunan. Thus, it is distinguishable from the previously discussed obsession in refocusing and subordinating discussions of culture in terms of its relevance and contribution to the New Order’s economic-oriented Pembangunan.

Secondly, the initial socialisation of the word pembangunan in the 1930s Polemics also marks an important embryonic tendency that becomes prominent in the New Order’s language of Development. It is the practice of perceiving and confronting social reality in abstraction, manifested by the act of nominalisation of verbs. Although the noun pembangunan already occupied an important status in the Polemics of the 1930s, particularly in Alisjahbana’s writings, it was still used less frequently than other bangun-derived verb forms. Contrary to the general practice today, verbs like membangun, membangunkan, dibangun, dibangunkan were used a great deal more than pembangunan. Very often, Alisjahbana preceded his use of the noun pembangunan with the semantically verbal noun word pekerjaan ‘the work of’. Indicative is the title of his classic paper that provoked the Polemics: Pekerjaan Pembangunan Bangsa sebagai Pekerjaan Pendidikan (‘The work of developing the nation as an educational work’). What does this signify?

21 Herbert Feith helped me realise how unclear the term ‘Old Order’ is in reference to its date of birth. The birth of the ‘New Order’ made clear only the end of the ‘Old Order’ (ca 1966). It is curious and significant that no attempt has been made to date the beginning of the ‘Old Order’. Perhaps it is considered to be of little relevance or value to the present interests of the ‘New Order’ in propagating the contrast between the two ‘Orders’.
It is tempting to explore historically the relationships between the practice of abstraction and the profound transformation of the concepts of time and space that were shaped by, among other factors, the print industry (see McLuhan 1964; Anderson 1987). The limitations of both space and my knowledge of such a broad subject allow me to restrict myself to making merely a brief note with regard to one specific area of interest. A growing practice of abstraction in language seems to have a direct correlation with a growing phenomenon of social alienation, or ‘decommunalisation’, in the community speaking the language. Geoffrey Benjamin (1984/5:12) makes a powerful, succinct comment on recent developments in the Malay and Indonesian languages, to the effect that the ongoing tendency to focus attention towards such abstract notions as NOMINALISATION...entails that anyone speaking in the formal mode will be making reference to concerns lying beyond the immediate context of utterance, thereby shifting the situation to a more ‘outsider’ interactional frame.

We never know the past, and what ‘really’ happened when the Malay-speaking communities spoke of membangun or membangunkan. However, we can speculate that when they did that they were referring to some specific action(s) and actor(s) in the context of specific events. Unlike the formerly familiar usage of bangun-derived words in verb forms, Pembangunan is an impersonal topic or theme for thinking and engaging in conceptual discussion. While there is no mention of pembangunan in the national anthem Indonesia Raya, the repeated action-commanding verbal phrase bangunlah is given melodic emphasis. The contemporary Indonesian abstract noun Pembangunan is a generic metaphor that encompasses broad images.

An abstract mode of consciousness is obviously compatible with the abstract mode of social relations and mass production in most industrial societies. As mentioned earlier, Benedict Anderson’s (1983a) assertion that a nation is essentially an imagined community is a relevant point. So is his analysis of the relationship between the rise of nationalism and the print industry, particularly newspapers (i.e. the making of an abstract ‘public readership’). Creating a nation, implementing the so-called Pembangunan, and expounding the new word Pembangunan require the same enterprise: the socialisation of abstraction.

Some major events took place between the early emergence of Pembangunan and its present fully-fledged development. Indonesia gained Independence, and as the work of ‘building’ the new nation began to show its formal outcome the word ‘nation-building’ encountered a newly emerging English keyword ‘Development’, as an independent noun. As previously mentioned, ‘development’ had formerly found its most appropriate equivalent in the Malay/Indonesian word perkembangan. The emergence of the independent noun ‘Development’ and its rising popularity in the years that followed made it difficult for the old word perkembanganto remain a faithful equivalent of ‘Development’. Pembangunan quickly responded to this change, and revitalised itself by shifting its major position from being the equivalent of the idea of ‘(nation-)building’ to the new extension of ‘Development’. This process was not accelerated, however, until the New Order assumed power. The old word perkembanganhas been surviving quite well, despite the overwhelming vitality of its young rivalling word Pembangunan. Their coexistence and their contrast deserve our special attention in the next section, 2.3 ‘Significant others’.

Indonesia Raya (‘Great Indonesia’) was composed by Wage Rudolf Supratman, and it was sung in a formal gathering for the first time at the Indonesian Youth Congress on 28 October, 1928 in Jakarta.
Earlier we noted some claims, denying historical continuities, to the effect that the Soeharto Government was the initiator of Indonesia’s *Pembangunan*. The then Chief Commander of the Armed Forces, General Benny Moerdani, reportedly perceived the history of the nation in two periods, leaving out the years of the ‘Old Order’ period: the past *periode perang kemerdekaan* ‘the period of war of independence’, and the present *periode pembangunan* ‘Development period’ (*Kompas*, 1987b). Though it is undeniable that it is the New Order which has been primarily responsible for both the ascendency of *Pembangunan* as a keyword in Indonesia’s history and the impressive successes of economic-growth *Pembangunan* in modern Indonesia, the Sukarno government employed the same term and launched its own Eight-Year Over-All Development Plan (1961-1968) (see Feith 1964:257 and Ndraha 1987:60). But *Pembangunan* was only one of several keywords during that period, another of which was even more central in importance was *Revolusi* ‘Revolution’.  

As I have previously suggested, the past two decades witnessed not only the rise to prominence of the metaphor *Pembangunan*, but also new dynamics of complementary and conflicting values as well as competing emphases embedded in the word. There are at least two ways of seeing these dynamics. Firstly, in the current meanings of *Pembangunan* we can identify some kind of amalgam of the residual metaphors and the newly imposed ones. In this perspective we can talk about historical continuities and changes. Secondly, overlapping with the first, we can also recognise some tensions in the dynamic meanings of the word. The tensions come from two major sources: there is the official, normative, formulation of *Pembangunan* on the one hand, and there are generally understood meanings of the same word in everyday activities. The official, normative version of *Pembangunan* retains many of the older ideas of *Pembangunan* as an all-encompassing undertaking. The more practical embodiment of the meaning of *Pembangunan* is more specific and limited, and is a response to current politico-economic constraints.  

Historical continuities in the current meanings of *Pembangunan* are found in the old analogy between ‘building a building/bridge/road’ and ‘building a new nation’, as well as in a comprehensive view of the multi-faceted society to be developed. The old phrase was *membangun kebudayaan*, ‘cultural development’. The Sukarno regime had its *pembangunan semesta* ‘all-embracing development’, and its current counterpart is *pembangunan manusia seutuhnya*, as formulated in the official definition of *Pembangunan*. Thinking of ‘building’ a new nation and speaking within the Malay frame of *membangun*-centred metaphors, Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana could do nothing better than explore to his best advantage ways of elaborating his ideas within the given framework. In his ‘introductory note’ to the first issue of his magazine *Pembangoenan*, he expressed his hope that “gedoeng Indonesia Merdeka jang sedang didirikan itoe dahsjat dan permai dan koekoeh…” (Alisjahbana 1945).  

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23 The period of the Sukarno government is my major blind spot, as it is to most Indonesians born after 1950. A large portion of writings from that period have not been discussed widely and openly, or made easily accessible to the general public, since the ascendancy of the New Order. I am grateful to Herbert Feith, whose major expertise includes this particular area, for his information to the effect that “1959-1965 was a period of sharp competition between *Pembangunan* and *Revolusi*. It was not till 1963 that one could say *Revolusi* was clearly getting the upper hand” (pers.comm.). For a further glimpse of the “languages of Indonesian politics” during the Sukarno government, see Benedict Anderson (1966).  

24 This is very difficult to translate: ‘Man (*manusia*) – in Wholeness (*seutuhnya*) – Development (*pembangunan*)’.  

25 “[may] the mansion of Independent Indonesia, now being built, be great, beautiful, and strong”.

Reflecting on the newly ‘built’ Indonesian nation on its first birthday, Alisjahbana (1946b) noted some concerns:

"Boekan sadja masih banjak bahaja jang mengantjam dari loear, tetapi tiang-tiang dan sendi-sendi jang dalam tergesa-gesa itoe didirikan, masih djaoeh dari tegoeh dan mantap berdiri hitamah." 26

In his memorable address to the United Nations Assembly in 1960 Sukarno used the term ‘To build the world anew’ 27, rather than ‘Developing’ or ‘Development’. He was thinking of ‘Membangun dunia’, a more explicit statement of a commitment to radical changes than what the term ‘to develop’ suggests. The root metaphor of ‘building’ remains intact despite the fact that pembangun has been increasingly intimately associated with ‘to develop’ in the past two decades. In the first year of the New Order’s Five-Year Development implementation President Soeharto explained to his people his projection of Pembangunan Bangsa ‘National Development’ by making an explicit analogy to the effect that the work of those undertaking Pembangunan was “ibarat orang mendirikan gedung besar” (Soeharto 1971:45). 28

One of the best sources of the official and brief formulation of New Order’s concept of Pembangunan is, I think, that provided by the recently published Ensiklopedi Indonesia (Shadily 1984:2612):

Pertumbuhan, perluasan ekspansi yang bertaian dengan keadaan yang harus digali dan yang harus dibangun agar dicapai kemajuan di masa yang akan datang. Pembangunan tidak hanya bersifat kuantitatif tetapi juga kualitatif, manusia seutuhnya. Pembangunan di Indonesia berlandaskan Pancasila dan UUD 1945, dan melalui kebijaksanaan Trilogi Pembangunan. 29

The curious amalgam should be noted between the old metaphors ‘pertumbuhan’ and ‘perluasan’ that acknowledge the pre-existing conditions which impose some given constraints to the construction of anything new on the one hand, and the metaphors of ‘creatively’ building houses/bridges in the phrases ‘yang harus digali’ and ‘yang harus dibangun’ on the other. The metaphor of building houses/buildings is a clear expression of the notion of bringing about the existence of what was formerly non-existent, as opposed to a process of unfolding.

Despite the familiar widespread formulation of Pembangunan as previously discussed, in daily experience Indonesians cannot fail to notice that in practice Pembangunan has a much narrower meaning. It is primarily used to refer to the state-sponsored economic development programs and large-scale construction of economic infrastructure. As a result, there has been a great deal of criticism from those who consider that Pembangunan has caused various undesirable effects in non-economic realms of the society (in cultural values, human dignity, social harmony and so on). These have often been interpreted and explained away as dampak Pembangunan ‘negative impacts of the Pembangunan’. Though many of these critics have made strong arguments against the reduction of Pembangunan solely to matters of economic growth, they often subscribe to the generally accepted idea that economy, politics, and

26 “Not only are there threatening dangers from the outside, but its hastily constructed pillars and foundations are still far from being firm and steady on the ground.”
27 This was the English title of the address.
28 “like people building a great mansion”.
29 “Growth, extension, expansion in reference to a situation to be exploited and to be developed so as to yield progress in the future. Development is not only quantitative but also qualitative, man in wholeness. Development in Indonesia is based on Pancasila [state ideology] and UUD 1945 [the 1945 Constitution], and implemented through the Development-Trilogy Policies.”
culture are separable entities. Nevertheless, the Soeharto government has not been able to ignore these persistent grievances. As a response, it has both justified the current economic orientation in *Pembangunan* as a necessary prerequisite for attaining the ultimate aims of *Pembangunan*, and promised a more comprehensive approach to subsequent *Pembangunan* programs. How far this promise has materialised, or has the potential to materialise, is a separate question.

Even from the early years of the New Order’s *Pembangunan*, President Soeharto was already aware of the grave incongruity between the official pronouncement of what *Pembangunan* should mean, and what the government was prepared to implement. Very consciously, he stated on 11 April 1970 that “*Pembangunan Bangsa djelas tidak hanja pembangunan ekonomi sadja*” (Soeharto 1971:44). Furthermore, on the last day of the same year (1971:45), he explained:

*ibarat orang mendirikan gedung besar, Pembangunan Lima Tahun ini adalah dasarnja, ‘pondamen’ nya. Kita tidak akan memiliki gedung yang besar dan indah, djika kita tidak dapat memasang ‘pondamen’ itu.*

Understandably, therefore, in a book of quotations from Soeharto’s speeches, published by the Cabinet Secretariat, from which the previous citations were drawn, *Ekonomi* and *Pembangunan* make one topic heading: ‘*Ekonomi/Pembangunan*’.

As late as 1987, the emphasis of *Pembangunan* on economic areas still constituted a cause for concern for many, including those responsible for implementing *Pembangunan*. In an interview with the leading newspaper *Kompas* (1987f), various prominent figures in intellectual, political, and bureaucratic circles invariably stressed the need for directing future *Pembangunan* orientations towards ‘basic non-material needs’. The former Chief Commander of the Armed Forces, Retired General Benny Moerdani, reportedly said that the speedy achievements in economic development have not been accompanied by progress in other fields of the nation’s social life (*Kompas* 1987g). President Soeharto himself conceded that uplifting ‘human qualities’ must be emphasised in the next Broad Guidelines of the State (*Kompas* 1987c).

2.3 **Significant others**

The significance of *Pembangunan* is discernible not only in terms of its diachronic development, but also in terms of its synchronic connection with other Indonesian key words. The boundaries of their connections are ambiguous, and their connections are never static. Bearing that in mind, I have no intention of exploring or suggesting where such boundaries might lie or to propose a neat diagram depicting the structural relations of these

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30 Arief Budiman (1979:212-214) presents an elaborate discussion on this point. Surprisingly, however, many of his recent writings are still coloured by the dominant view that separates those abstract categories and subordinates ‘culture’ to ‘politeco-economics’ (see Budiman 1987). Similarly, Richard Robison (1981) denounces his contemporaries’ tendency to separate “Culture, Politics, and Economy” in studying New Order’s Indonesia, but without making the supposedly inseparable much clearer.

31 “National Development clearly does not constitute only economic development”.

32 “like people building a great mansion, this Five-Year Development is the basis, the ‘foundation’. We will not have a great and beautiful mansion, if we are not able to construct that ‘foundation’”. It is interesting to note the parallel between this simile proposed by someone who is extremely anti-Marxist and the metaphors of ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’ among the orthodox Marxists.
words. I simply want to consider two selected words that have special connections with
the keyword Pembangunan. They are Pancasila and perkembangan.

Of course, the list of words that we might include in this section is an open-ended one. I
have selected only two here, primarily on the basis of their importance in relation to
Pembangunan. Consequently, we will consider the significance of each of these selected
words not in isolation, but rather insofar as its interconnection with Pembangunan provides
us with further illumination of the significance of Pembangunan itself.

2.3.1 Pancasila

The official state ideology, Pancasila ‘Five Principles’, has remained a salient keyword
throughout the history of independent Indonesia. The succession of power from The ‘Old
Order’ to the presently ruling ‘New Order’ rests its legitimacy on the successor’s claim that it
assumed power in order to ‘save’ Pancasila, and thus the whole Indonesian nation-state. The
date (1 October 1965) on which the New Order’s core group made the initial overt military
move leading to its ascendancy has been annually celebrated as Hari Kesaktian Pancasila
‘Pancasila’s Victory Day’.

Furthermore, the New Order has managed to mould that sanctified ideology to fit its
interests, and to utilise it most extensively to secure and exercise its power. Pancasila, like
Pembangunan, has become a fundamental term in the everyday vocabulary of the population
at large. Like the former term, the latter has been pervasively used to modify various names
of public importance. Indeed, these two words have been the most salient keywords in New
Order Indonesia. Nevertheless, since these two keywords come from different origins, they
are bound to occupy different domains and contain different values. Thus, to a considerable
extent, they may be seen as mutually independent. Pancasila should be considered here partly
because it is the only other New Order keyword of equal importance to ‘Pembangunan’, and
partly because the two words have managed to coexist in spite of their substantial differences.

Indeed, it would be fair to argue that Pancasila slightly outweighs Pembangunan in
contemporary Indonesian discourse, though the two clearly outweigh all other existing
keywords. Pancasila is far more politically sensitive in contemporary Indonesia than
Pembangunan. Major political disputes have arisen concerning the New Order’s interpretation
of Pancasila and its all-pervasive application of that interpretation in governance. Nation-wide
Pancasila indoctrination programs have been established since 1978. All civil servants, urban
citizens, and students from primary up through tertiary school systems are required to attend
these centrally organised indoctrination sessions. Since 1985, all social organisations have
been compelled by national law to adopt Pancasila as their common ‘sole principle’. The
government has succeeded in taking all these measures despite a series of conflicts during the
past few years.

33 Michael van Langenberg (1987) attempted to make a diagram of the New Order’s keywords.
34 The ‘Five Principles’ are: (i) Belief in One God; (ii) Humanism; (iii) Nationalism; (iv) Democracy; and
(v) Social Justice. There have been some discussions on whether Pancasila in the New Order Indonesia
should be understood as an ‘ideology’ or ‘quasi-religion’ or ‘civil religion’.
35 See Michael van Langenberg (1987:20-21) for a brief account of Pancasila as a keyword in New Order
Indonesia. For an analysis of the political significance of Pancasila in the 1990s, see Ramage (1993).
In one crucial respect, however, *Pembangunan* serves the interest of the New Order better than *Pancasila*. The New Order may successfully claim to be the initiator of Indonesia’s *Pembangunan* (see Alwi 1985; Gafur 1982:4). The same government deserves the honorary title *Orde Pembangunan*. It is proud to grant the title *Bapak Pembangunan* to its President. It can hardly do anything similar with *Pancasila*, however, primarily because established history irrefutably presents Sukarno, the ‘Old Order’ President, as the one and only forefather of *Pancasila*. Attempts to refute or gloss over this history, as well as Sukarno’s merit, have been made, but to no avail.\(^{36}\)

In sum, the importance of considering *Pancasila* in this section does not lie so much in what meanings that keyword adds to *Pembangunan* as in what limitation the former sets for the latter. *Pembangunan* is more of an operational program than a competing ideology to *Pancasila*. In fact, the implementation of *Pembangunan* needs the legitimacy that *Pancasila* provides. *Pembangunan* programs have the character of being ‘international’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ in the sense that they are comparable to various ‘Development’ programs in different ‘Developing nations’ worldwide and that they are substantially inseparable from the dynamics of global industrialisation. In contrast, *Pancasila* is relatively nationalistic and ostensibly ‘authentic’. In the official state formulation, *Pancasila* is acknowledged to be the ‘basis’ or ‘foundation’ of *Pembangunan*.

2.3.2 *Perkembangan*

Earlier I noted that during its formative years the word *pembangunan* was primarily meant to be the equivalent of ‘(nation-)building’ rather than ‘development’. This is not because ‘development’ was unheard of or incomprehensible, but because ‘development’ was then understood as a noun-of-process, as *perkembangan*. The shift of the Indonesian equivalent for the powerful word ‘Development’ from *perkembangan* to *pembangunan* is a radical one. We will examine it here, before proceeding to study its relationship to the shift of prominence in the English word ‘Development’ from a noun-of-process to an independent noun.

*Perkembangan* is the nominalised form of the intransitive verb *berkembang*. Its root word is *kembang* ‘flower’. Thus, *berkembang* denotes the notion of ‘blooming’ or ‘flowering’. By extension, both *berkembang* and *perkembangan* have been used to refer to a process of similar kind. Most popular reference is made to the ‘developing’ process of human beings (from childhood to adulthood) and to incidents or events (from conflict/crisis to resolution). In essence, *perkembangan* and *berkembang* refer to a presumably natural process of change, which is motivated primarily by some internal necessity, enforced primarily, if not exclusively, by its own internal energy, its pace and extent being proportional to its own ‘nature’.\(^{37}\)

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\(^{36}\) Controversies on this matter are voluminous and still in progress. For an introspection following the ‘reviving’ idolatry of Sukarno during the latest general election (April 1987), see the cover story in *Tempo* (1987:56-67) and David Bouchier (1989).

\(^{37}\) The idea of ‘proportional’ development in natural organisms came to me after reading an illustration of a similar point, though in a different context, by Ivan Illich (1982:82): “A snail, after adding a number of widening rings to the delicate structure of its shell, suddenly brings its accustomed building activities to a stop. A single additional ring would increase the size of the shell sixteen times. Instead of contributing to the welfare of the snail, it would burden the creature with such an excess of weight that any increase in its productivity would henceforth be literally outweighed by the task of coping with the difficulties created by enlarging the shell beyond the limits set by its purpose".
I wish to propose a construct of two models of world view, each being signified by the values embedded in the two metaphors, *perkembangan* and *pembangunan*. For the purpose of clarity, I will present the two models in a rather exaggerated or simplistic fashion. They should stand as extended metaphors, rather than as an ‘objective’ depiction of immediately observable realities. The construction of these models is informed by an insider’s observation of implied meanings in the language practices of the society concerned.

The extension of the previously-mentioned metaphor *berkembang* ‘blooming, flowering’ seems to suggest something fundamental. It reveals that the so-called nature of human beings and of events in the cosmos are viewed as parallel or comparable, at least to some degree, with that of natural organisms. To believe that human beings and social events *berkembang* is to believe that they undergo changes and continuities under a certain pattern of order, similar to the governing laws of nature and natural equilibrium, ideas very familiar to many of the communities in Indonesia. Flowers grow out of seeds, turn to fruits, which then yield seeds. To ask about how a social crisis *berkembang* at a certain point of time seems to express new anxieties or residual hopes about the effectiveness of the traditionally believed metaphysical powers at work; will it develop or resolve the way things usually did in the remembered past? *Berkembang* is, in fact, just a temporary phase of the cyclical passage of life: *bertunas* ‘to sprout’ → *bertumbuh* ‘to grow and to have a stem’ → *berkembang* ‘to flower’ → *berbuah* ‘to fruit’ → *berbiji* ‘to seed’ → and back to *bertunas*. To the present time, in Indonesian there are no words derived from the root words *tumbuh* or *kembang* that are equivalent to the English words ‘grown up’ and ‘developed’ (referring to a final achieved state).

In contrast, *Pembangunan* does not only denote different meanings, but it belongs to a radically different type of world view. There is no way, at least to the present time, to say *pembangunan* from childhood to adulthood, or from a crisis to resolution. *Pembangunan* is a nominal form of the transitive verb *membangun*, in the sense of ‘to build, construct, or erect’.\(^{38}\)

In short, *pembangunan* does not even pretend to refer to things presumably in ‘nature’ or ‘natural’ processes. On the contrary, it refers to an exploitation of nature, as of human beings. In essence, it denotes craftsmanship as well as engineering, with the chief emphasis on yielding maximal product, in the most efficient pace and manner possible, by bringing external forces to bear upon the object, *bangunan*. Unlike the naturalist *perkembangan*, the characteristically human-centred *pembangunan* raises the questions of ethical values, as well as social legitimation.

It is necessary to appreciate the difference between two kinds of *membangun*, each of which is distinguished from the other by the emergence and hegemony of the nominal form *pembangunan*. Etymologically, *pembangunan* was primarily an extended metaphor for building houses, temples, roads, or bridges. Already then we have the sense that *membangun* requires human consciousness, willingness, labour, tools, as well as exploitation of natural resources. But before developing its nominalised form *pembangunan*, *membangun* was conceivably less in opposition to the whole image of *berkembang* than it was thereafter. During the pre-*pembangunan* period, the communities seemed to be self-restrained, with or without

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\(^{38}\) The other set of meanings of the reflexive verb *bangun* (to wake up, to get up, to be awake) has a different nominal form, *kebangunan*. Occasionally Indonesians speak of ‘*membangunkan*’ in a transitive sense (someone woke up someone else). If nominalised, which would be an extremely rare and strange case, this noun would more likely be ‘*membangunkannya*’ rather than ‘*pembangunan*’.
deference, in dealing with nature than their counterparts today. Nature was considered sacred and the work of membangun was a religious communal activity. Early this century some of the Western-educated Indonesian intelligentsia saw and denounced this tradition as irrational or superstitious. With the best of intentions they declared war against the old tradition and propounded modernising Pembangunan.

This kind of attitude towards ‘nature’ ran through much of Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana’s arguments from the 1930s Polemics. For several months subsequent to the issue published on 10 January 1946 (vol.1, No.3), Alisjahbana’s magazine Pembanggoenan presented the same sketch on its cover: a panorama of paddy fields, mountains, clear sky, and coconut trees at the bottom left; at the centre of the page a pair of muscular hands pushing a log from left to right in an attempt to set it erect; and a silhouette of factories with smoking chimneys at the top right corner. Today membangun is primarily used in reference to the nation, its politics, economy, culture, and so on rather than to simple houses. It has become more and more bureaucratic, based on exclusive privilege, and it is capital- as well as high technology-intensive, and hazardous to the social as well as natural environment.

The two models constructed above only serve to explore the semantic area and embedded values that the metaphor pembangunan can imply, in contrast to those of perkembangan. In reality, the contrast may not be as sharp, simple, or overt as the above discussion suggests. Nor should the above contrast be understood to take place in isolation from the processes of social change occurring in other realms and in a broader context. The transition from one particular world view to the other as signalled by the increasing prominence of the word pembangunan is certainly much more complex and gradual than the above discussion might indicate. As newer values and world views have gained prominence, their older counterparts have not entirely vanished, but have made room to coexist and compete with the newer. Hopefully the subsequent discussion on the word ‘Development’ will throw some light on some of the complexities involved here and moderate what in the preceding pages may have sounded an overromanticised account of the old past world view of berkembangvis-a-vis the presently prominent ‘engineered’ pembangunan.

The sharp contrast between perkembangan and pembangunan outlined above is invisible in the English word ‘development’ that has been commonly used to translate both Indonesian words. This is not to say that ‘development’ does not contain those contradictions, but only that the embedded contradictions are not as visibly marked in English as they are in Indonesian.

2.4 EXOGENOUS CHALLENGE, ENDOGENOUS RESPONSE

The discussion above explores some important connections between Pembangunan and two other Indonesian words. We discussed what is lost and gained from the propagation of pembangunan, at the cost of the old familiar perkembangan. What remains to be examined is why pembangunan has outweighed perkembangan in contemporary Indonesian discourse. The reason I wish to consider here is partly derived from what has happened outside Indonesia, from the changes in the word ‘development’, and partly from the relationship between Indonesian and modern English. Earlier I noted that the formation of the noun pembangunan was to a considerable degree indebted to the term ‘(nation-)building’, while the prevalence of the independent noun ‘Development’ has been responsible in large measure for the ascendancy of Pembangunan. Like perkembangan and pembangunan, ‘development’ has never been static in its history.
H. W. Arndt (1981) identifies two major streams in the development of the word ‘Development’, namely the colonial, and the Marxist. Each of these streams takes one of the pair of meanings that the word has in English: transitive and intransitive. The first (colonial) stream expounds the idea of social development in a transitive sense: society to be developed. The agent of the action is most frequently understood to be the government (Arndt 1981:462). Among the Marxists, social development is primarily viewed in an intransitive sense: society that develops of its own accord. While Arndt’s identification and particularly his labelling (‘colonial’ and ‘Marxist’) for each of the two categories of ‘Development’ is debatable, his distinction between the transitive and the intransitive senses of the word is valuable to us. It helps us in two ways.

First, it explains how perkembangan and pembangunan translate equally well into ‘d/Development’, despite the contrast of meanings between those two Indonesian words. Second, it also helps us understand the prevalence of pembangunan, outweighing perkembangan. It is related to the fact that the transitive ‘Development’ has outweighed its intransitive counterpart. Indeed, this is another way of saying that the independent noun ‘Development’ has been more dominant than its twin as a noun-of-process.

It hardly needs to be explicated that in their unequal relationship the international communities (including an Indonesian elite minority) of ‘Development language’ speakers have done a great deal more to influence, impose upon, fascinate, promise, or intimidate the speakers of ‘Pembangunan language’ than the reverse. However, this assertion should not be confused with an allegation that Indonesian is essentially dependent upon or merely echoing the dynamics of English. Despite the heavy pressure from English, Indonesian has never lost its own identity entirely. A couple of related illustrations must suffice here, one indicating the imitating tendency of Indonesian, the other showing its capacity to generate some form of authenticity.

It is obvious that new Indonesian words like Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun, program pembangunan, pembangunan daerah, studi pembangunan, and teori pembangunan are originated from their English equivalents (‘Five-Year Development Plan’, ‘Development Program’, ‘Community/Rural Development’, ‘Development Studies’, and ‘theory of Development’). It is also clear that in all these terms the word ‘Development’ is used in its transitive sense. From this perspective, it is rather striking that English has the term ‘developing nations’ which is no less prominent than all previously mentioned usages of the term ‘Develop(ment)’. In ‘developing nations’, the word ‘developing’ is not a gerund, but a present participle. It is derived from the intransitive verb ‘to develop’. Following English, Indonesian has currently adopted the idea and coined an equivalent in the term bangsa berkembang. The variation from the all-pervasive pembangunan neologism to the propagation of negara berkembang is more glaring than its counterpart in English. Logically, no negara berkembang needs pembangunan. Because negara berkembang has the capacity to ‘develop’ (intransitively) there is no need to invite and authorise any ‘Development Agencies’ to (transitively) ‘develop’ it.

While the above illustrates how faithfully contemporary Indonesian reproduces English key terms, we also have ample cases where pembangunan is used in more authentic ways. Examples are already provided in the opening section of this chapter. One example that deserves further examination is the term Bapak Pembangunan. Although the word Pembangunan in that honorary title is the same word that originates from ‘Development’, Bapak Pembangunan is not a copy of any known English title. The relative authenticity in
that Indonesian title lies at a more profound level. One of the reasons why speakers of English, particularly those who hold power, prefer the intransitive term ‘developing nation’ is, I think, because the term effaces the questions of responsibility and of legitimacy assumed by external (be they domestic or alien) ‘developer(s)’ that the transitive ‘development’ implies.

In contemporary Indonesia, the paternalistic government is fully confident of taking on the highest responsibility for the nation’s Pembangunan. It is significant that the conferring of both ‘honorary’ titles Orde Pembangunan and Bapak Pembangunan took place in Indonesia at a time when in many other places ‘Development’ was under fierce attack from many quarters (see Illich 1969; 1979). In specific reference to Indonesian politics in the context of world politics, Herbert Feith (1979:7) even discussed what he observed to be “the decline of developmentalism as an ideology” only three years before the conferment of the titles was prepared, or four years before the actual conferment of those titles.

The title Bapak Pembangunan signifies an aspect of contemporary Indonesian society that is closely related to our previous discussion of the complex transition from one view of nature to the other. I would like to consider the implications of that title by identifying major features of what being a father ‘ideally’ means, particularly, but not exclusively, in Javanese communities, which outnumber those of other ethnic groups in the nation and from which the President, as well as the largest portion of the state officials, originates.

The formation of any Bapak-Anak ‘Father–Child’ relationship is commonly perceived to be a ‘natural’ phenomenon, in the sense that it is beyond the will and control of any human being. A particular person is ‘given’ as a father to another individual or a group of siblings by some powerful forces that seem also to create, regulate, and destroy things in the cosmos. The making of a father does not involve a process of nomination and election by consensus or votes from members of a family, as that of a ‘leader’ or ‘chairperson’ in a modern formal organisation. The making of a Bapak in Pembangunan seems to re-emphasise the already familiar slogan in Indonesia that Pembangunan is to be implemented based on asas kekeluargaan ‘familial principles’. Pembangunan is not supposed to be viewed as a purely modern and professional project.

Holding the highest status and authority in Pembangunan, as if in a ‘family’, Bapak Pembangunan is not occupying a temporary position, between terms of service as commonly practised in most offices. While the father is responsible for what happens in the family to some higher authorities (e.g. more senior members of the family, of the community, or deities), not to his children or his wife, the children and wife have a great deal of responsibility to the father. By tradition, they are supposed not only to respect him but also to love and obey him. There is only one father to a family, and he will be the father of the family throughout his life and after his death. The formal text proposing the conferment of the title Bapak Pembangunan to President Soeharto includes a statement that reads:

39 Another, and more commonly acknowledged, reason is that ‘developing’ has been chosen, as a ‘euphemism’ or a ‘gentler’ and ‘more flattering’ word, to replace the already familiar terms, such as ‘backward’, ‘underdeveloped’, ‘less developed’, or ‘poor’. See Raymond Williams (1983:102-104) for the semantic history of the term ‘developing’.

Dengan demikian maka gelar Bapak Pembangunan Indonesia hanya menjadi milik seorang dan tidak untuk hal yang sama kepada orang lain. Artinya Bapak Pembangunan Indonesia manunggal dalam pribadi pemimpin nasional kita sekarang ini yakni Pak Harto (Gafur 1982:4).  

What the above statement and the preceding discussion indicate is the complexity in the world views of those engaging in the process of Pembangunan. The ‘naturalist’ outlook as embedded in berkembang persists in finding contemporary expression, and to serve the interest of the ruling government, despite the predominantly ‘human-centred’ outlook embedded in the ‘engineered’ pembangunan. In the next chapter we shall return to the history of the communities in question and make attempts to trace some of the fundamental changes that these communities experienced, and that paved the way for the evolution of words like pembangunan.

41 Therefore, the title Bapak Pembangunan Indonesia should belong only to a single person and will not be conferred to other persons for similar merits. That means Bapak Pembangunan Indonesia and the personality of our current national leader, namely Pak Harto, are one.” It is worthy of mention that the so-called “our national leader” in this quotation is earlier referred to in the same text as “a central figure in the process of national Development”, rather than as “a leader” in that process. This seems to underlie the distinction between the man-made status of “leader” and the nature-given role of “father” here.
CHAPTER 3

LANGUAGE OF DEVELOPMENT*

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The officially legitimate contemporary Indonesian language is a variant or example of what I call a ‘language of Development’. That language should not be equated with what is commonly called the ‘formal’ or ‘high’ variant of the language concerned. True, the officially legitimate language is frequently used as formal or high Indonesian, but the two are distinguishable. The officially legitimate Indonesian we are dealing with here includes both the informal and the standardised formal variants as idealised and sanctioned by dominant institutions in the motto ‘good and correct’ Indonesian, prescribed and legitimised by the professional linguists, and taught in schools across the nation. As we will see, the linguistic performance of many top government officials in Indonesia in formal and official settings is often regarded as deviant from the legitimate Indonesian. For convenience, I will henceforth refer to this legitimate Indonesian simply as ‘contemporary Indonesian’, except when it is necessary to distinguish it from other variants of ‘contemporary Indonesian’.

We can describe contemporary Indonesian as a ‘language of Development’ in two respects. Firstly, in line with the arguments proposed by Ivan Illich (1982:6) on “industrialized” languages, I observed that contemporary Indonesian is increasingly becoming a commodity. It is a product of an institutionalised Development project. It becomes a necessary tool or equipment for facilitating the implementation of Development projects in various fields. It is, as we said earlier, ‘made from without’, from outside the general population’s social activities. It has no native speakers. It is not anyone’s mother tongue or vernacular language. Although the ‘language of Development’ discussed here is essentially similar to Illich’s “industrialized” language, I prefer the former term. Not only does it conform consistently to the central keyword under study, but it also reveals the normative value involved more clearly than the technical sounding term ‘industrialised’.

Secondly, taking Raymond Williams’ (1977:21-44) analysis of the social workings of language into account, I have come to the view that contemporary Indonesian radically redefines human beings and the world in a way that fits well with the basic ideology and practice of the Development enterprise as discussed in previous chapters. I shall save further discussion of the first point to Chapter 4, ‘Development of Language’, and concentrate on the second issue below. It must be kept in mind that ‘language of Development’ is no more than a metaphorical construct. We can employ it to recognise some common characteristics of many languages of various modern nation-states, although they have different specific histories and features. The case of Indonesian language of Development will be specifically dealt with also in Chapter 4.

* A slightly different version of the discussion in this chapter appears in Heryanto (1990).
Chapter 2, ‘Pembangunan’, should have indicated parts of the process of the redefinition we are dealing with here. The construction and, later, the spread of the term pembangunan to the point of being a salient keyword is indicative of the dramatic change which has taken place in the Indonesian social order. It is not merely a creative neologism, or an addition to the existing language. Our next pursuit will be to explore the significant social change in a broader perspective, in which the case of the term pembangunan is only a part. We will begin with a brief study of another key word, bahasa ‘language’. However, ultimately we want to do more than provide another study of an ‘organism’ of meanings and linguistic structure. We want to study the ‘ecology’ in which keywords like pembangunan have come into being.

3.2 LANGUAGE-FREE COMMUNITIES

Language is not a universal category or cultural artifact and activity. Though it may sound odd, not all people have a ‘language’ in the sense in which this term is popularly used in English. The historical construction of Bahasa Indonesia as a ‘language’ is both similar and integral to the process that took place in the construction of pembangunan. What makes a study of bahasa imperative in addition to and complimenting the previous study of pembangunan is the fact that the former confronts the central issues of this whole study more directly and explicitly than the latter. We should study not only the meanings of a keyword, but the historically changing meanings of the term ‘meanings’.

Unlike pembangunan (as distinct from other bangun-derived words), the word bahasa is a very old one. It came to several communities of what is now Indonesia, as well as neighbouring areas, from Sanskrit. But it did not then mean ‘language’. The newly acquired meanings of bahasa were derived from one or more modern European languages. My provisional survey suggests that, at least in the two most widely spoken and influential languages in Indonesia (Malay and Javanese) there was no word for ‘language’ and no way of, and no need for, expressing its idea until the later part of the past century.

The word bahasa is found in R.O. Windstedt’s An English-Malay dictionary (1939:100). Even as late as that, it is used to translate the English word ‘culture’. In modern Malaysia and Indonesia ‘culture’ is uniformly equated with the even more recently coined word kebudayaan. It is very probable that the word kebudayaan was still unknown when Winstedt prepared his dictionary. His rendering of ‘culture’ as bahasa was presumably the best he could do. But to equate the old word bahasa with ‘culture’ was certainly problematic.

An American scholar (Errington 1974:7) more recently tried to exhaust modern English categories in her attempt to embrace the old idea of bahasa in Malay communities: “religion, culture, manners, norms, and speech are equated in the term bahasa”. But she quickly admitted that “it is a falsification even to say that these ‘aspects’ are ‘equated’. Bahasa is unitary…” The meanings of bhāsa in Old Javanese (see Zoetmulder 1974:146-147; 1982:220) always include some reference to mighty, highly respected, respectful, or respectable persons, activities, or things. In contrast to the apparently ‘neutral’ meanings of tool-like ‘language’, both bahasa in old Malay and bhāsa in Old Javanese did not belong to any ordinary, natural beings or persons in daily lives. Their domain was confined to persons and activities of high status within a social hierarchy.

To a considerable degree, the old sense of bhāsa survives in modern Javanese as basa (see Wolff and Poedjosoedarmo 1982:5). Basa is not an abstract and generic category such as ‘language’. It strictly refers to the Javanese language, and even more specifically to Krama.
Thus, when Javanese speak *Bahasa Indonesia*, or any foreign language to each other, they seem to be engaged in a social interaction very similar to that when they are speaking to other non-Javanese Indonesians or to any Indonesian-speaking foreigners. It is an interaction between neutrally defined individual interlocutors. When the same Javanese speak *basa* to each other, they are in a completely different world, one that is specifically Javanese, where human beings and the whole cosmos are differently defined and categorised. A Javanese who fails to speak *basa* in any situation where it is called for is commonly called *dурung nJawani* 'not yet Javanese', implying immaturity or being less than fully human. James T. Siegel (1986) provides a provocative account of the nature and complexity of the Javanese *basa*, though he indiscriminately and anachronistically calls it ‘language’.

I have noticed several foreigners, student beginners in Malay or Indonesian, who often unself-consciously speak of ‘Bahasa’ when they refer to what the Malaysians and Indonesians invariably call *Bahasa MelayulIndonesia*. Obviously, the foreigners simply want to shorten the proper name, while to contemporary Malaysians and Indonesians alike *bahasa* is a generic term, ‘language’, quite distinct from the proper name of a specific language. Coincidentally, *bahasa* was formerly an independent word, and specifically it meant Malay.

In Malay communities, especially in former times, one’s integrity and stature were to a significant degree measured by one’s *bahasa*. Again, it meant a great deal more than skills in the Malay language. The expression *budi bahasa* implies stature. Richard J. Wilkinson (1901:136) translates the phrase as “good taste and courtesy; tact and breeding”. Thus, another popular expression, *orang yang tak tahu bahasa* ‘person who does not know language’, if translated word-for-word in our modern sense, was commonly used to refer to those who have no manners, or “no breeding” (Wilkinson 1901:136). The great shift from the old to the new meanings of *bahasa* can be further gauged from the contemporary appropriation of the proverb *bahasa menunjukkan bangsa* “manners reveal descent” (Wilkinson 1901:136). To many contemporary Indonesians that old proverb translates well as ‘language reflects nationality’, a metaphor for saying ‘each community has its own way of life’. The appropriation is mostly unconscious, but discernible by examining semantic changes of the words *bahasa* and *bangsa*.

The idea of ‘nation’ was non-existent in this area for most of the past century, and was still alien to many of the indigenous intelligentsia at the turn of this century. Pramoedya Ananta Toer’s *Anak semua bangsa* (‘The child of all nations’), the second volume of a quasi-historical tetralogy, depicts how absurd the idea of ‘nation’ was to the late nineteenth-century protagonist (personifying Tirto Adhi Soerjo, supposedly the first Indonesian nationalist figure) upon hearing it for the first time from a Dutch acquaintance. Likewise, it was extremely difficult for this acquaintance to formulate an explanation for him (see Toer 1980:274-275). Even as late as 1921, when writing the now famous sonnet *Bahasa, Bangsa*, Mohammad Yamin (another notable figure in the nationalist movements) did not have the notion of Indonesian nationhood in mind. He was referring to his homeland (Sumatera) and mother tongue (Minang). Formerly, *bangsa* did not exactly or exclusively mean ‘descent’; it could be broadly rendered as ‘kind’ or ‘sort’. Descent is one of several indicators or attributes of one’s *bangsa*. Many royal families were called *bangsawan*. In today’s *bahasa*, *bangsa* is an important word, meaning ‘nation’, where *bangsawan* finds less and less significant position.

The inseparable redefinitions of *bahasa* and of the people to whom it belongs signify a complex chain of historical events. For the moment let me proceed with two major ones: the growth of the idea which views *bahasa* (as ‘language’) and human beings as two separable
entities; and the hegemonic incorporation of various non-Western vernacular conceptions and values into industrialised Western definitions of man and the world.

3.3 Vernacular Worlds Redefined

It is clear from the discussion in the previous paragraphs that in older Malay and Javanese communities the term bahasa (or bhāsa, and basa) did not pretend to refer to something abstract and neutral. It is neither simply a ‘tool’ (of ‘communication’), nor merely a ‘system’ (of codes or symbols) that arbitrarily signifies something else (a ‘reality’). It is a social activity. It is socially bound, constructed, and reconstructed in specific settings, rather than scientifically and universally ‘rule-governed’. We shall now look at the contrast between the formerly internalised meanings of bahasa and its currently legitimate definition. The prestigious and recently published Ensklopedia Indonesia (Shadily 1980:358) describes bahasa as

Kumpulan kata dan aturannya yang tetap di dalam menggabungkannya berupa kalimat. Merupakan sistem bunyi yang melambangkan pengertian-pengertian tertentu...Secara umum bahasa tak tergantung kpd. susunan masyarakat. Perubahan struktur sosial dan ekonomi sedikit saja pengaruhnya kpd. perkembanganbahasa.  

In no way do we get a sense that bahasa in the above account has any direct and essential relationship with human beings. In fact, the relationship between language and ‘social structure’ is explicitly denied. A reference to human beings is made in another Indonesian encyclopedia, Ensklopedia Umum, but the separability between human ‘thought/feelings’ and human ‘language’ remains intact. In this bahasa is defined (Pringgodigdo and Shadily 1973:139) as

ungkapan pikiran dan perasaan manusia yang setjara teratur dinjatakan dengan memakai alat bunji. Perasaan dan pikiran merupakan isi-bahasa, sedangkan bunji jang teratur merupakan bentuk-bahasa.  

Thus, in this view ‘thought/feelings’ presumably could exist beyond language and vice versa. Significantly, no example of language-free thought/feelings or thought-and-feelings-free language is ever presented by the proponents or followers of this commonly held view. Although Hassan Shadily is largely responsible for preparing both encyclopedias, surprisingly there is a striking difference of views between the two in respect of relations between language and social structure. The previously cited work notes that individual and social factors are inseparable from the kind and structure of language. “Linguistic expressions depend on the social milieu of their speakers...” (Pringgodigdo and Shadily 1973:139).

To be fair, it must be acknowledged that there are variations of views of language among the Indonesian intelligentsia. I have discussed this briefly elsewhere (Heryanto 1987:43), noting that not all Indonesians who have discussed the relationship between language and social structure see the two as having a dialectical relationship or as mutually constituted. Rather, it is common for them to view language as merely a ‘reflection’ of the social structure

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43 “Any groups of words and the fixed rules governing those words to form sentences. It is a system of sounds that symbolises certain understandings...In general, language does not depend on social structure. Changes in social and economic structure have little impact on the development of language.”

44 “an expression of human thought and feeling which is manifested in orderly fashion by the speech organ. Feelings and thoughts are the language-content, the orderly sounds are the language-form”. 
(see Simatupang 1983; Moedjanto 1985:299), reminding us of the orthodox Marxists’ deterministic argument about the ‘base’ determining the ‘superstructure’.

Despite the variation in views, the notion of ‘language’ as primarily an instrument is vividly dominant throughout the history of modern Indonesia. This view informed the initial writings of Indonesian grammars by one of the forefathers of Indonesian grammar, Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana (1959). It is also shared by Anton M. Moeliono (1982:8), who was formerly heading the national language centre when it was at its apex; by Daoed Joesoef (1983), then a Minister of Education and Culture; and by a large number of the nation’s thinkers, including Gunawan Wibisono Adidarmodjo (1983), Harsja W. Bachtiar (Kompas, 1985d) and Jujun S. Suriasumantri (1985). To complete the picture of this dominant view, we may also note that the same notion was presented by President-to-be General Soeharto in the embryonic year of the New Order (Soeharto 1967:37).

In his published dissertation Khaidir Anwar (1980:12) pays serious attention to this question and presents a strong argument in line of the mainstream thought:

as far as cognitive thought and knowledge is concerned, one’s language acts mostly as an instrument rather than a shaper. Our Weltanschauung has not much to do with our native language, and our considered opinion of an issue having socio-political significance is not shaped by our mother tongue. [English original]

Opposing views do exist among other Indonesian scholars. Unfortunately, their views are extremely rare, too far in the periphery of the discourse to draw the public attention they deserve, and mostly presented in a few lines of passing comments. Some examples worthy of mention are Slamet Iman Santoso (1983) and Sartono Kartodirdjo (1987).

The contrast between the two major views of language can also be examined by the way the old communities and their descendants deal with words and names. In Chapter 2 we noted how the modern Indonesians are familiar with the English aphorism ‘What’s in a name?’ in translation Apalah artinya sebuah nama?, emphasising the separability or arbitrary relationship between a name and the person or thing named. By contrast, the more traditionally inclined Malays and Javanese see in proper names and sacred words a supernatural power over realities. They have mantera, ‘magic formulas, charms, or spells’ to create and control perceived events. In both communities there are taboos in relation to the utterance of some names (e.g. of wild beasts).

Traditionally inclined Javanese are extremely careful about naming children to avoid misfortunes. Thus, the relationship between a name and the named is not considered arbitrary. To these Javanese, each name has what is called bobot, a term which in other senses can simply be rendered into English as ‘weight’. Bobot in relation to naming a person refers to the ‘quantity and quality’ of supernatural power it carries. Parents want to make sure that each of their children has a benevolent and auspicious name. However, each person in this community is entitled to only a particular range of possible names in accordance with his or her position within the social hierarchy. When a child often gets sick, or goes through other major difficulties and misfortunes, the common practice is to change the child’s name to lighten its burden. The child is thought to suffer from bearing a name with too much bobot.

While the proposed contrast between the old, traditional and the new or modern meanings of bahasa as well as their respectively defined worlds may now be evident, a great deal of the process of transformation that these communities experienced remains unclear. What we know is that this process undermined the old indigenous definitions of things and imposed a
new set of definitions and new ordering of meanings. It is also clear that the latter came from the modern West. Of course, this is not a unique experience of the Malay or Javanese communities. A vast corpus of writings on colonialism, imperialism, underdevelopment and dependency and so on seeks to contribute explanations of this Western domination over various communities across the globe. But, as already noted, most of these writings suffer from a serious bias towards economic determinism. Questions of language are virtually ignored. Another common feature of these writings is their common tendency to make sweeping generalisations about the histories of various non-Western communities.

As we want to deal with some of the specific experience of Indonesian communities, some of the brief remarks that Benedict Anderson (1987) makes on the impact of Western contact with Java are of great interest. Anderson describes the shattering of the old Javanese cosmology after the introduction and rapid expansion of trains, clocks, and the newspaper industry in late nineteenth-century Java. The traditional steadfastly held perspective of time, space, human beings, and all other realities was radically and fatally challenged by a new ‘representation’ of realities in the form of maps, calendar, statistical figures, and the print alphabet. Anderson (1987:3-4) shows how confident the Javanese had been in their relatively autonomous and closed cosmology:

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Javanese rulers had called themselves Pakubuwono (Nail of the Cosmos) and Hamengkubuwono (Holder of the Cosmos) without much selfconsciousness, though from today’s perspective there is something irremediably laughable about rival rulers with capitals (Surakarta and Jogjakarta) less than 50 miles apart calling themselves by such worldconquering appellations.

The extent to which the new changes in the past century affected confidence in the old cosmology can be estimated from Anderson’s (1987:4) following account:

By 1900, however, Jogjakarta and Surakarta were, above all, railway junctions along the trunk-line between the great port cities of Batavia and Surabaya. These cities in turn were subordinates to The Hague; and The Hague was the capital of a speck on the northwest periphery of Europe...there was no longer any place or person whereby the Cosmos could be nailed. In colonial classrooms cheap metal globes were being happily spun by sevenyearolds.

**Ba(ha)sa** was under a great and growing threat. “In the 1890s, the colonial regime for the first time began a sustained effort to turn local elites bi- or trilingual through the institution of government primary and (later) secondary schools” (Anderson 1987:7). It was no longer possible for the Javanese to ignore the newly perceived fact that Javanese is none other than one of many coexisting languages. In lieu of the monopoly of *basa* in the Javanised cosmos, people began to speak more and more of *Ba(ha)sa* Melayu, *Ba(ha)sa* Belanda, and later Bahasa Indonesia. It is now common for Javanese to speak of Bahasa Jawa. The use of dictionaries among the schooled elites beginning towards the end of the nineteenth century led to a further assertive assumption that “languages are translatable” (Anderson 1987:7). Still more fundamental to our concern than these all-encompassing changes, something that lies beyond Anderson’s immediate interest, was the idea and practice of learning a powerful and purely secular language in schools.

In short, the demise of the old *ba(ha)sa* and the rise of *bahasa* as ‘language’ can be seen as part of a process of globalisation and Westernisation. In this we see not only the application of industrialised Western definitions of language and of human beings globally, we also see Western languages occupying the dominant positions in the global social hierarchy, and
Western languages becoming the model for language studies. Now there seems to be a high correlation between students' achievement of mastering Indonesian and English (see Kompas 1984a). While painfully unlearning their own traditions, the indigenous communities began to learn the more powerful, and the more promising 'knowledge' and 'truth' available in the Western languages.

The shift of fundamental meanings of bahasa from being specifically Javanese, or Malay, into that of being a generic, abstract, and universal category strips off people's vernacular world views. It is not a quantitative change (in addition to the familiar Javanese bahasa, they now discover a number of other kinds of bahasa), but a qualitative one (the replacement of Javanese/Malay bahasa, with Western meanings of bahasa). Speaking of both ancient and modern colonialism, Becker (1984:145) notes that one of its most subtle forces "is the undermining of not just the substance but the framework of someone's learning".

The Western domination in bahasa is subtle, for it expresses itself in what appears to be, at face value, an indigenous old word. There is certainly a great need for a more comprehensive study on the history of Bahasa Indonesia, from a sociohistorical perspective. More important, I think, is the history of the idea and practice of bahasa. Students of Indonesian languages do not yet have what the students of Southeast Asian history have in the joint work of Anthony Reid and David Marr (1979) on the Perceptions of the past in Southeast Asia, or the students of Javanese politics in the work of Benedict Anderson (1972) on the idea of power in Javanese culture. Nearly all studies of 'language' and languages in Indonesia lack self-reflexive and critical awareness when employing the inevitably Western-derived concept and theories of 'language' in analysing the presumably pre-existing empirical 'realities' of language practices in Indonesian communities.

As we shall soon see, this Westernisation is not thoroughly covert or subtle, neither is its conquest taking place without resistance. For the moment we need to note how this substituting definition of bahasa implies a redefinition of human beings and the world, and how the new redefinition has to do with Development.45 The breakdown of the old meanings of bahasa implies a serious challenge to the former image of esteemed human beings. Now failure in performing the proper bahasa as an indication of not yet being an ideal Javanese, or Malay, hardly holds its validity. Every Javanese and Malay is now taught to view and define her/his identities and others' within the modern Western frame of view: all are indiscriminately and universally 'human beings'.

A case in point that best illustrates the experience of contemporary Bahasa Indonesia is the impressive success of the introduction of the pronoun Anda, after the English pronoun 'you'.46 The word has been introduced with specific aim to stamp out and replace the many existing options for second person pronouns, which modernists often have perceived as confusing and 'non-democratic' in character. In the 1970s a colleague of mine collected over 50 different second person pronouns in use in the small town of Salatiga, each designating a different interpersonal relationship. The successful promotion of Anda cannot be fully explained merely in terms of a cultural assertion on the part of a section of the nation's elite. It must also be attributed to the technological development in the expanding industry of the mass

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45 The next few paragraphs are considerably indebted to the insight of Ivan Illich (1969, 1979, 1982).
46 For a detailed historical account of the word Anda, see Sumardjo (1981). Though less important than the above, I wrote a critical reflection on the use of Anda (Heryanto 1978).
media in New Order Indonesia, in which messages must be communicated to a mass and abstract addressee.

3.4 The rise of developmentalism

The universal standardisation of what were formerly more exclusive and profoundly heterogeneous beings lays the foundation for what in subsequent years became Development programs. Advancing the idea of modernisation and standardisation of Bahasa Indonesia, Alisjahbana (1976:59) “consider[s] the plurality of languages in the modern world as a great handicap. It hampers...understanding between individuals as well as nations”. He asserted this with full awareness that standardised language entails standardised behaviour in general, which he valued highly (Alisjahbana 1976:101). The 1980s saw the imposition of standardisation to areas where traditional arts and ritual practices have long been independent from elite engineering (see Surabaya Post 1986; Kompas 1986b; 1989). Following the idea of essentially homogeneous, and what Ivan Illich (1982) calls “genderless”, beings is the idea of standardised “basic human needs”. As Illich (1969; 1979; 1982) argues, we have now come to a point where the presupposed “basic human needs” translate materially into a set of consumption patterns. Fulfilment of these “basic needs” is defined as consuming an increasing amount of mass-produced industrial commodities.

The use of the term ‘Western’ to designate the current world hegemony is no longer fully satisfactory. Perhaps a better term is ‘industrialisation’ or its euphemistic, and more value-laden synonym ‘Development’, in which the Western world still dominates, though no longer exclusively so. The existence and reproduction of this hegemony rely heavily on the mass and standardised consumption of industrial products. The global practice of mass consumption (like the operation of modern economics as a whole) in turn rests on the assumption of ‘scarcity’ in the provision of basic needs.

Thus, no longer do all members of the Javanese or Malay communities attempt to achieve self-defined states of being (for example, to be nJawani, or to acquire budi bahasa). They must now compete with other ‘human beings’ for the same universally standardised and scarce attainments. Equity is now seen to mean (re-)distribution of the new privilege to consume the scarce. Not only are all of us defined as ‘human beings’, but also as homo economicus, or its extreme extension homo industrialis (Illich, 1979). Even words and meanings have become ‘scarce’ industrial commodities, in a way which would have been unthinkable in the communities of the Indies archipelago during the past century. Prerequisites which were formerly only sensible in limited activities, such as construction and industry, are now regarded by the former head of the nation’s language centre as indispensable requirements for sustaining Bahasa Indonesia: “manpower, material, management, and money” (Halim 1981:335).

The communities in what is now Indonesia are losing not only their own definitions of what constitute their basic needs, but also the productive competence to satisfy them. They are now trained to be dependent on the products of industries. When the Javanese strove to be fully nJawani, or the Malay endeavoured to acquire sufficient budi bahasa, they depended on no one, let alone the outsiders. Neither budi bahasa, nor being nJawani was economically defined, or materially scarce. In the contemporary language of Development, exclusive and distinct vernacular values are disappearing. The early years of Indonesian ‘nation-building’ witnessed the beginning of a phenomenal proliferation of new words circumfixed by ke- -an, and pe(r)- -an (see Poedjosoedarmo 1981:155), a tendency which Alisjahbana (1976:58)
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considers as a desirable indication of the modernisation of Bahasa Indonesia. These circumfixes are nominalisers, significantly referring to abstraction and generalisation. The construction of pembangunan as already discussed at length was only a case in point. That word represents the old communities anew, as one of many ‘developing’ nations on the globe.

Communities of human beings across the globe are portrayed in a polarised hierarchy by the degree of their industrial Development. Some are commonly termed ‘underdeveloped’, others are ‘developing’, and still others are already ‘developed’. In the contemporary language of Development, there is only a single point of achieved state to designate the best projected possible future of these various ‘developing nations’: being ‘developed’, an appellation traditionally identified with the modern West, and only recently extended to some other newly industrialised countries in the Northern hemisphere. Seen in this light, the so-called ‘New Industrialising Countries’ are posing a challenge to their Western rivals only in terms of a game the West initiated, not a radically alternative self-redefinition of living. A bird’s-eye view of Development Studies literature (see Goldsworthy 1977) suggests that critiques of the conventional-modernist Development are often followed by attempts to reform, redefine, and modify Development. De-Development and anti-Development are hardly even considered.

Other forms of resistance on the part of the Indonesian communities are worth considering.47 Much of James Siegel’s (1986) observation of the Javanese in Surakarta during the New Order period attests to the residual vitality of the old idea and practice of basa. As Siegel (1986:18) writes, when the Javanese speak basa, the appropriate tone chosen is “not to match one’s feelings to one’s words, but to one’s listener’s sensibility”. The words are chosen “not according to [one’s] listener’s capability to understand, but as though languages are not arbitrary matters” (1986:19). In speaking basa, the Javanese “has to find out where the hearer fits in society, and then speak as though the words were attached to the status, part of the nature of the world” (1986:19). Preserving their own definition of basa as separate from “language”, according to Siegel (1986:298-299), the Javanese would only acknowledge those translatable into Javanese as “language”. And when they are seen as languages, they are treated “as though they were Low Javanese” (1986:301) that must be suppressed through being translated into High Javanese.

Despite the strong position of the Javanese in the Indonesian state, Javanese and ‘Javanism’ are not what Indonesian is all about. Unlike the Javanese that Siegel observed in Surakarta, the nationalist elite in the country is more self-conscious in confronting what they see as undesirably ‘Westernised’ standard grammars and language studies of Bahasa Indonesia. Throughout the history of the nation, the idea of ‘indigenisation’ of the national language has been expressed repeatedly, but, as should be evident, to little or no avail.48 Some of the most important and common concerns among these critical intellectuals, who are themselves products of Western-style education, are the applicability of Western linguistic categories as ‘subject, predicate, object’ or ‘nouns, verbs, adjectives’, or ‘passive and active voice’.

Reflecting on the issue, Alton L. Becker (1983:11) asked why Southeast Asians did not evolve their own “metalanguage” in the sense of “the language of the grammar”. He suggested

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47 Due to the unevenly available data, in the following we will only consider resistance from Javanese-cosmopolitan and Westernised cosmopolitan Indonesians. For brief passing comments on the case of the Malay communities, see Benjamin (1984/5).

48 A collection of works by Armijn Pane (1953) presents an early and serious questioning of this issue, but with no substantial and comprehensive alternative. Most other writers make only passing comments on the matter. One of the most recent published studies on this issue is Bambang Kaswanti Purwo’s (1988).
that there are at least two answers to the question. First, “grammar comes with writing” and basic writing systems in Indonesia (Indic, Arabic, Roman) came from elsewhere. The second answer, being “less obvious” notes Becker, is closer to the main argument of this paper: “Southeast Asians have traditionally taken a different approach to the description of language, one more appropriate to an oral noetic economy”. It appears that the enthusiastic attempts at ‘indigenisation’ or ‘nationalisation’ of Indonesian grammar will never be fundamentally attainable as long as the historical construction of what constitutes ‘language’ remains unquestioned.

Westernisation of the Indonesian language has long been a point of complaint among some circles of the nation’s emergent literati. However, to the more aggressive and influential intellectuals, for whom Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana became a key spokesman, Westernisation was not only legitimate, but also necessary and desirable. In one of its early issues, the journal *Pembangoenan* (1946a), led by Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, stated that

*Seperti bangsa Timoer jang lain, bangsa Indonesia dengan sengadja poela menjongsong keboedajaan Eropah, dengan djalan memasoeki sekolah jang didirikannja, membata boekoenja, mendjadi pegawai dalam peroesahaannja, toeroet menjertai perdagangan internasional dll.*

The process of ‘hegemonic’ Westernisation was certainly not wholly one of coercion on the part of the Western forces.

Denouncing some strong tendencies in the Indonesian of his time, Nur Sutan Iskandar, a prominent author from the first quarter of the century, lamented in a 1956 article (see Anwar 1980:117-118) “...there are many more peculiarities in the use of words and sentence constructions which only Western-educated intellectuals can grasp the meaning of”. This kind of stance was seen as ignorantly conservative by many of the leading intellectuals of his time. Even today, we find that Khaidir Anwar, from whose work the above quote has been cited, expresses the dominant elitist view that “ordinary readers tended to have much simpler ideas than the sophisticated writers” (Anwar 1980:118). Furthermore, he explained (1980:118) that those Indonesian writers

regarded themselves as intellectuals in the true sense of the word...they did not want to give the impression that they were not acquainted with the sophistication of the Western ideas they even regarded themselves as legitimate heirs of world culture...[they] by and large wrote carefully-thought-out Indonesian prose because they took pains to do so relying mainly on a Western language as a model.

As all communities across the globe are seen to possess their own ‘languages’, we have a diagram of a ‘family tree’ of languages, and a map of nations of the world. A century ago the Javanese and Malay elites acquired a new literacy which enabled them to read and locate their newly redefined *ba(ha)sa* within the global map of languages. Since the turn of the century they have accepted the self-fulfilling conviction that languages are more and more translatable. Once their *bahasa* was redefined in Western terms, by way of translation and adoption they made vigorous efforts to discover a great deal of ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ discoverable only in Western languages. In 1945 Indonesian modernists proudly published a new word list, in which 8,000 new words (mostly for scientific discourse) were introduced after being “legalized

49 “Just like other nations of the East, the Indonesian nation deliberately welcomes European culture, by attending the schools it founded, reading its books, working for its firms, taking part in international trade, etc.”
by the Indonesian Language Committee” (see Pembangoenan 1945a). So strong and persistent is the inclination to follow Western ways of saying things that in 1983 there were official changes in the adoption of Chinese words, modelled after the English ones; for example Mao Tse Tung has since become Mao Zedong (see Gondomono 1983).

Commenting on what he calls “industrialized” languages, Ivan Illich (1982:6,8) notes that they “translate easily from English into Japanese or Malay”. What must be added is the fact that “industrialized” languages, like nations, have been sharply stratified in a hierarchy. Contemporary Indonesian elites are quite convinced that some languages, like their own, are less ‘developed’ than others, or, to quote the title of Kuntoro’s (1984) essay Bahasa Indonesia belum berkembang (‘Indonesian language is underdeveloped’). To redress the ‘shortcomings’ of their language, they have chosen Western languages as models of what a ‘developed’ language is like (see Alisjahbana 1976:55; Moeliono 1977; Badudu 1985) and have launched nation-wide programs for Development of Language, which will be our central interest in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4

DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE

4.1 LANGUAGE CENTRE

In the logic of the language of Development, language is just one of the series of objects that need to be developed. Any language that develops of its own accord will be seen to be a threat. Understandably, similar to most cases of other (e.g. economic, political, educational, or technological) Development programs, language Development has always been the main interest, concern, and responsibility of two groups of authorities: the state officials and the professional experts. In New Order Indonesia, language Development programs have become one of the nation’s chief preoccupations. It is probably the most ambitious and vigorous of its kind in the history of all ‘Developing nations’.

On 1 April 1975 the New Order state established the Pusat Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Bahasa. In the official translation, this is the ‘Center for Language Development and Cultivation’, and I refer to it in the following discussion as the ‘centre’ or the ‘language centre’. With this centre’s founding, we begin to see a more or less centralised network for control and production of legitimate Bahasa Indonesia. Over a hundred professionals and bureaucrats were authorised to run the centre and its far-reaching programs across the nation. A number of European and American institutions facilitate the centre’s programs in monetary as well as academic aspects. Central to their work and the public’s acceptance is the official slogan ‘Use Good and Correct Indonesian’, now widespread throughout the nation’s major urban areas. Implicitly and quite frequently explicitly, the general population is accused of using ‘bad and incorrect’ Indonesian. The extent to which this official allegation has implications in a society where one’s bahasa and stature are traditionally inseparable, as discussed earlier, is self-evident.

Schools and the mass media, currently under the constant and tight control of the state, function as the primary institutional means of producing and reproducing legitimate words and meanings. Courses on Bahasa Indonesia, as prescribed by the language centre, are compulsory for each student from primary school to university. Nearly all newspapers and, more notably, the nation’s state-owned television network, feature regular articles and programs for consultations with the authorised experts concerning the use of ‘good and correct’ Indonesian. The language Development programs have a great deal more powerful reinforcement. The mandatory Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara ‘Broad Guidelines of the State’, of 1983 declared that “language development and cultivation are to be implemented by compelling the use of good and correct Indonesian” (see Parera 1983/4:56). The same document stated that regional languages and arts are to be respected, but only in so far as they enrich the national language, arts, culture, and identities. For some years now, October

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50 When this manuscript was completed, preparation was made for the first ‘private’ television network which will go to air for the first time in March 1989. This Cable television network belongs to PT Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia owned by Bambang Trihatmodjo, the President’s son.
has been celebrated as the *Bulan Bahasa* ‘Language Month’, during which a series of lectures, seminars, book exhibitions and writing competitions are held throughout the country to promote these language development projects extensively. This is the only significant national celebration in Indonesia which lasts one full month and is held annually.51

Broadly speaking, the official aims of the centre include research, instruction, translation, publication, and control of Indonesian as well as regional languages and literatures (see Adiwimarta 1984:25-32). In practice, however, the centre has been most well known for its vitality in the areas of coining new words and standardising various aspects of the language already in use. During the first decade of the New Order period, no less than 1,500 new words were officially coined (*Kompas* 1980). By 1980 the centre had multiplied the total number of officially recognised lexical items to 45,000, or more than twice the number recorded when the New Order assumed power (*Kompas* 1983a). The number of subsequently coined words increased in later years.

It is still difficult at this stage to come to any conclusive assessment concerning the relative success of these language development programs in achieving all their intended goals. There are bits and pieces of evidence, however, leading us to a provisional understanding of the situation. In an attempt to offer an account of the phenomenon I will employ a series of dualistic metaphors. These metaphors refer to major forces of language production, as well as to major ideological orientations and social significance of the language: ‘new—old’; ‘schooled professionals—state officials’; ‘cosmopolitan/Western—national/indigenous’; ‘technocratic—political’. I hope the use of these paired terms will be clear in the discussion below. To appreciate the rationale and set up of the language centre as well as the constraints and significance of the centre’s work, we must look at the past political history of Bahasa Indonesia and its present position in relation to the New Order’s politico-economic Development.

4.2 STATE AND NATIONALISM

Indonesian originated from Malay. But that Malay consisted of several variants. According to the mainstream historical writings and to the official view as exemplified by the two Indonesian encyclopedias cited above (see Pringgodigdo and Shadily 1973:142; Shadily 1980:358) Bahasa Indonesia originated from the Malay of Riau-Johor. This view is so well established that it leads Mulyadi (1981) to assume that “no one doubts” it. Only a handful of writers see that view as a “myth” (see Benjamin 1984/5:10). Whatever the ultimately ‘true origin’ of the language may be, there is a general understanding that its more immediate past is the ‘lingua franca Malay’. Benjamin (1984/5:10) argues that the “myth” that identifies standard Malay/Indonesian with Riau Malay is “not entirely without foundation”. He considers the possibility that Johor-Riau Malay originated “more as a trading, literary and governmental koine...than autonomously-evolving ‘natural’ language”. Assuming Benjamin is correct, it is conceivable that the making of ‘Riau Malay’ and that of some other variants of lingua franca Malay are interrelated.

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51 The ‘Language Month’ is held in October, because it is an extended commemoration of the *Sumpah Pemuda* Day (28 October), which we will discuss later. Actually, there is another annually held one-full-month celebration, the Indonesian Red Cross Charity Month. But the latter is never eventful.
From the time of her incipient formation, Indonesia has been a communion of many remarkably heterogeneous communities. These communities inhabit a total territory nearly the size of the USA, but fractured into around 3,000 islands. They remain distinguishable in terms of ethnicity, religious belief, and language. Some practical and commonly accepted unifying bonds have always been crucial to enable them to believe or “imagine” (Anderson 1983a; 1983b) that they constitute one community, one nation. Such unifying means were as important to the colonial state as they have been to its successors in assuming legitimate power. Lingua franca Malay was one of the most outstanding sources and forms of unification.

It has been commonly acknowledged that this lingua franca was one of the earliest and most powerful unifying forces in the Indonesian struggle for independence. The annually commemorated *Sumpah Pemuda* ‘Oath of Youth’ of 28 October 1928 pronounced *Bahasa Indonesia* to be one of the principal identifying characteristics of being Indonesian. Soon after Independence in 1945, the importance of the language found its expression in a clause of the new nation’s constitution, to the effect that “the language-of-state is Indonesian”.

*Bahasa Indonesia* persistently appears to be the best and perhaps the only clearly defined and concretely experienced embodiment of the supposedly Indonesian ‘national culture’. The Indonesian elite repeatedly take pride in saying that their nation is unique and superior to other formerly colonised, multiethnic, and multilingual communities in respect of the attainment and consensual acceptance of a non-European language as a national language. Indonesian contemporary intellectuals are increasingly aware that the nationalistic quality of *Bahasa Indonesia* cannot be reproduced in other social activities (e.g. technology, economy and polity) as they would wish. Attempts to formulate a legitimate and ‘uniquely Indonesian’ political system, economic system, ethical codes of the press, architecture, film-making, literary theory, and so on have not met with any substantial success.

It is inconceivable that any government could afford, or would see the need, to ignore the historical legacy of the language. In fact, it has always been in the interest of the government (past and present) to maintain it, using it to govern all the heterogeneous communities under one administration. As previously suggested, the New Order state does not fail to maintain this historical legacy. In fact, it has taken best advantage of the special status that belongs to *Bahasa Indonesia*. The modern state, according to Benedict Anderson (1983b:477), “finds in the nation its modern legitimation”, without which it “can never justify its demand on a community’s labour, time, and wealth simply by its existence”.

The question of nationalism in New Order Indonesia is considerably less crucial than in the preceding period, but by no means can the New Order afford to dismiss it altogether. The New Order has been under constant pressure to perform sufficient and impressive nationalistic gestures. To a significant degree this is due to the popular issues of the allegedly threatened ‘national’, as well as ‘traditional’, culture and social life in general. In turn, these issues have been generally attributed to the influx of foreign capital and the manifest growth of foreign (most notably ‘Western’) cultural products and commodity-consuming lifestyles. The abundance of foreign capital and imported high technology have, in fact, been eagerly invited by the New Order and other small privileged segments of the nation’s population. The New Order’s politico-economic Development has been characterised, among other things, by its

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William Frederick (1982:56) questioned whether or not the term “language-of-state” in this document can correctly be understood as identical to “national language”. An important figure in Indonesia who can address this kind of inquiry with authority has suggested, though evasively, an affirmative answer (see Moeliono 1985:42).
incorporation into the world capitalist system, orientation towards economic growth, strong concentrated alliances between top military state bureaucrats, their associates and foreign as well as politically segregated Chinese-Indonesian capitalists, emphasis on 'stability and order' where political opposition is absent, and wide disparities in income distribution and political participation. The government can be reasonably proud of its impressive success in economic Development, particularly during the oil-boom period of the 1970s. It is aware of the great problems of inequity, which have been continuously aggravated since the dramatic and constant decline of oil prices on the world market. The state makes some attempts to redress the problem of inequity, but in limited areas and without fundamental changes in its basic policies.

Although the sizable amount of foreign and Chinese Indonesian capital investment has periodically created express demands for a more 'nationalised' economy, the New Order state much prefers to demonstrate nationalistic profiles in the sphere of culture. Compared to the latter, the former appears to be too risky or costly for the sustainability of the politico-economic status quo, where 'indigenous' entrepreneurs are kept marginalised. This is not to say that culture is necessarily less powerful than politico-economy in affecting social change. It is only to suggest that the process and implications of cultural change upon the overall social order tend to be less immediately obvious than changes in the economic or political order. Above all, the distinction of 'culture', 'politics', and 'economy' must be seen as purely analytical abstract constructs (see Chapter 1, footnote 4). They are metaphors, employed here only to suggest that the New Order needs legitimation in nationalistic terms. To this end, cultural symbols seem to serve best.

As already pointed out, the past decade saw a series of state-sanctioned endeavours towards formulating the supposedly and characteristically 'national' system of politics, economy, and cultural activities. Bahasa Indonesia stands most prominently and readily in this enterprise. Understandably, none of the undertakings towards nationalisation outweighs the investment and enthusiasm devoted to the language Development programs. This also explains why in the language Development programs nationalisation of the already familiarised loan words becomes a significant component. The current Minister for Education was recently reported to have expressed his deep concern over the popular “misuse” of loan words (Sinar Harapan 1985a). Many provincial governments sternly disapprove of the popular use of ‘foreign’ words in names for buildings, offices, shops, or domestic commercial enterprises. In liberal metropolitan Jakarta, since 1984 posted signboards with 'foreign' words have been liable to a Rp.50,000 (then about US $50) fine and confiscation (Kompas 1984d). This policy was reinforced in 1993.

53. Since the New Order came to power, the most eventful outbreak of hostility against the domination of Indonesia's economy by foreign capitalists, top military bureaucrats, and Chinese Indonesians were the 15 January 1974 riots in Jakarta. “So serious did the government consider this attack on its legitimacy that in 1974 it quickly announced a series of measures to restrict both Chinese and foreign capital and boost indigenous investments” (Robison 1985:81). However, the basic problem seems to be ‘structurally inherent’ in the state’s Development strategy (Budiman 1979; 1982: 11). There has been no indication that the state could afford, or would render, any remedies of a radically ‘structural’ kind.

54. The term ‘indigenous’ is a meliorative term in contemporary Indonesian, used as an antithesis to the so-called ‘non-indigenous’ Chinese Indonesians, who have been traditionally excluded from significant political participation, and therefore could never pose a political threat to the state (see Kemasang 1985; Robison 1978; Anderson 1983b; Budiman 1985).
4.3 Technocratic and depoliticised

The language Development programs are not an exclusive undertaking of the New Order government. Neither do these programs operate exclusively to serve the government’s political interest. In fact, authorised professional linguists have a predominant position within the language centre and its programs. These people have interests and values distinct from those of the government, from which the former obtain authority. Of course, the dynamics of contemporary Indonesian production are not merely an expression of the relations between these two social groups. However, for our present purpose, suffice it to consider these as the two most dominant social forces in the making of contemporary Bahasa Indonesia. The first, the authorised professional experts, work mainly within the language centre structure and its extended network in the schools and mass media. The second, comprising predominantly the state bureaucrats, make notable contributions to the making of contemporary Indonesian in overtly practical politics. This polarisation is, again, presented here and in the ensuing discussion as a provisional construct for analysis.

By and large, the former group is composed of Western-style university graduates. They are generally characterised by a highly cosmopolitan outlook, a combination of liberal and modernist or sometimes nationalistic ideologies, as well as a commitment to sophisticated and professional performance. They have two basic working goals: (1) to design and develop a national language that is ‘modern’, ‘sophisticated’, ‘efficient’, ‘regular and rational’; and (2) to train the general population to acquire that projected language. Their models for identification are, as noted earlier, what they perceive to be the ‘well-established’, ‘well-developed’, and ‘modern’ European languages: English, French, German, Spanish, or Italian (see Alisjahbana 1976:55; Moeliono 1977; Badudu 1985).

The latter group is centred around Javanese-style military officers, with a strong inclination towards a patrimonial social order, and preoccupied with concerns for political ‘stability and order’. They are open to pragmatic aspects of modernisation and Development, but essentially observant to traditional customs and values; they are cautious of any Western values and norms embedded in modernisation and Development.

There are many ways of identifying the characteristics of contemporary Indonesian. In the following I would like to propose two major features, both attributable to the positions of the two social groups mentioned above. One feature is ‘technocratic’, and the other is ‘depoliticising’ which is a variant of political practice. Many new words and meanings are technocratic in the sense that they are typically derived from what initially belongs exclusively to the professionals and technocrats involved in wide-ranging Development projects. They are remarkably formal in tone, sophisticated and refined in style, and full of technical jargon in content. Some of the notable examples include rekeyasa ‘engineering’; usulan ‘proposal’; lesan ‘aim’ or ‘target’; teba ‘scope’; masukan ‘input’; dampak ‘impact’; kendala ‘obstacle’; alih ‘transfer’; rekanan ‘partner’ or ‘counterpart’; saling-tindak ‘interaction’; baku ‘standardised’; acak ‘random’; pantau ‘monitor’; liputan ‘coverage’; canggih ‘sophisticated’; penad ‘relevant’; sahij ‘valid’; penalaran ‘rationale’ or ‘reasoning’; and padat-karya/modal ‘labour/capital-intensive’.

Those examples are notable not only because they have come only recently into popular use, but also because they have rapidly crowded legitimate Bahasa Indonesia and are frequently used with the necessary synonyms – the more familiar words already in use – following them in parentheses. The past two decades have seen how the great majority of the nation’s Indonesian-speaking minority have been puzzled by the influx of new words which at first seem Indonesian, but cannot be understood. These new words, however, have spread
rapidly and extensively, such that many of them have reached far beyond the formal discourse of the professionals and technocrats. Dede Oetomo (1987) proposes to identify contemporary Indonesian as the language of the nation’s rising “middle class”.

The mass media have played an extremely important role in the rapid dissemination of these new words. A quick look is sufficient to see the contrast between the kind of language used in today’s newspapers with that used during the first half of this century. Today journalistic reporting and essays tend to sound ‘professional’ or ‘technocratic’, both in content and language style. Their earlier counterparts, in retrospect, tended to sound excessively ‘political’ and ‘polemical’, aiming at mobilisation of the masses.

Leading figures of the New Order state apparatus are not necessarily keen on ‘technocratic’ language, but they may be delighted to see that ‘technocratic’ language and mode of thought have crowded out the more ‘political’ discourse, especially in the writings of the mass media. Furthermore, technocratic language facilitates the training of professionals and bureaucrats, as well as the management of Development projects that the state is sanctioning. Since the state officials are never particularly interested in following the technocratic language, as prescribed by the language centre, their linguistic performance has occasionally been the target of criticism and mockery. It fits perfectly well with what has commonly been categorised as unsophisticated, and allegedly ‘bad and incorrect’ Indonesian. Notable examples include their ‘excessive’ use of the suffix -nya, and preposition daripada, as well as their habit of pronouncing the suffix -kan as -ken. Occupying the paramount position in the political life of the nation-state, these officials can simply ignore the criticism. In fact, of even greater annoyance to those subscribing to the centre’s programs, a remarkable number of non-Javanese officials have recently tended to imitate the language of their Javanese superiors, presumably as a sign of loyalty and prestige (see Kompas 1984c).

As suggested earlier, the biggest contribution that the state officials have made to the making of contemporary Indonesian is overt depoliticisation. We can distinguish two ways in which depoliticisation is taking place in contemporary Indonesian. Firstly, there is the constant effort on the part of the state authorities to avoid, negate, or proscribe words directly evoking political images or associations. Secondly, depoliticisation takes the positive form of the proliferating use of Javanese old words.

Obviously, the most revealing example of the first type of depoliticised Indonesian would concern the word politik ‘politics/ political/ politicised’. Consequently, the regime has to be especially evasive in identifying itself as a political body. The government has been generally identified with Golongan Karya (GOLKAR), ‘Functional Group’, a political organisation which in all ways functions as a political party, but refuses to call itself such. GOLKAR membership and leadership comprise the greatest portion of government officials. President Soeharto has been chairing the Dewan Pembina, a ‘politburo’ of GOLKAR for years. When this essay was completed the head of its central executive board, Soedharmono, was appointed Vice-President. In all general (parliamentary) elections throughout the New Order period, GOLKAR has been the only competing party that does not call itself a ‘political party’, and has been the sole pre-eminent winner. In all these elections, it has won over 60 per cent of the total votes, marginalising all the other political parties (see Suryadinata 1982).

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55 For further discussion of GOLKAR’s structure and the event of its choosing President Soeharto to the top position in it, as well as an analysis of his power over this pre-eminent political party, see David Reeve (1985) and David Jenkins (1984:126-133).

56 For a biographical note on Soedharmono’s political career, see David Bourchier (1987).
John Pemberton (1986) provides an instructive analysis of the New Order ‘apolitical’ politics in the 1971 and 1982 elections. His observant note on the significance of GOLKAR’s public appearance in these elections (1986:3) is worth quoting here:

[p]ositioned as choice Number Two on the ballots, Golkar appeared all the more a ‘neutral’ alternative to the ‘extremist’ tendencies of [the remaining two] party politics [the ‘Islamic’ party Number One, and the ‘Revolutionary Nationalist’ party Number Three]

Since the 1982 election, the government has called Indonesian general elections PestaDemokrasi ‘Democracy Fiesta’, further implying the government’s attempt to minimise intense political struggle. Wittily, Pemberton (1986:4) remarks that the New Order envisioned the event as, say, a Javanese-Indonesian ceremonial wedding reception where guests are ushered to socially predesignated seats to act as entertained but quiet witnesses for an event executed with close to perfect predictability...

Student politics have been remarkably important in the history of Indonesia. The New Order strictly disapproves of any political activity by students. Ironically, the ascendancy of the regime in 1966 gained legitimation thanks to the students’ mass movement to overthrow the previous regime. Without the students mass rallies at the front line, the previous succession would probably have appeared as a military takeover.

Preoccupied with maintaining the ‘stability and order’ necessary for the implementation of Development, the state proscribes any discussions that refer to existing social contradictions, such as kelas sosial ‘social class’, and pertentangan kelas ‘class conflict’. Words like radikal ‘radical’, or oposisi ‘opposition’ have been endowed with undesirable meanings. Demonstrasi ‘demonstration’, as a mode of expressing collective petition or protest, has been officially replaced with the newly coined idiom unjuk rasa ‘show one’s feelings’. It is officially taboo to discuss Indonesian society with reference to the distinction of Suku, Agama, Ras, dan Antar-golongan (SARA), that is ‘Ethnicity, Religion, Race, and Inter-Group’.

One of the most important products of the government in this series is an imposed substitution of the word for ‘labourer’. In 1985, there was an official declaration that the word pekerja ‘worker’ was henceforth to replace buruh ‘labourer’, following the official change of name in the national labour union, from Serikat Buruh to Serikat Pekerja. There was an official admission that the old word buruh was unwanted, because it carried a residual association with the past aggressive left-wing Serikat Buruh prior to the New Order’s ascendancy. However, another significant implication is obvious to the Indonesians. Buruh refers specifically to any employees who sell their labour for wages. Their position and interest are in direct opposition to those of their employer. Pekerja refers to anyone who works, including indiscriminately both employees and employers. Thus, the structural contradiction in the relations between the two is glossed over. Supplementing this linguistic change, in no time the then Minister of Labour, who was previously the Commander of KOPKAMTIB (the state’s supreme intelligence agencies) announced a decree to the effect that to strike was illegal (Komitas, 1985e).

The other notable form of depoliticisation, the prolific adoption of Javanese words and images, enhances residual values of patrimonial social interaction and harmony. Many of the new words under this category bring over nuances of Javanese basa etiquette, where sophisticated, refined, and soft gestures are the prime marks, and suppression of one’s feelings is required. Words like memohon ‘to put forward a request humbly’; restu
endorsement’, or better ‘blessing’ from one’s superior or patron; and Bapak ‘Father’, a paternalistic term of address and of reference, are the best examples. They are often used in the formulaic expression memohon restu Bapak.

Most of the new coinages, including those ‘technocratic’ examples discussed earlier, are derived from the archaic and aristocratic Javanese language. Other examples that strongly convey past Javanese patrimonial communicative codes include buana ‘cosmos’; wawasan ‘vision’ or ‘outlook’; citra ‘image’; wisma ‘house’ or ‘building’; wisata ‘trip’ or ‘excursion’; mapan ‘well-established’; busana ‘outfit’; tata ‘order’; dharma ‘obligation’ or ‘duty’; pamrih ‘self-interest’ or ‘reward’ (in a negative sense, as one should never exhibit pamrih in performing one’s dharma); lestari ‘eternal’; the various prefixes like adi- ‘great’, pra- ‘pre-’, paska- ‘post-’, tuna- ‘less’, nir- ‘non-’, nara- ‘the doer of’, purna- ‘all’ and swa- ‘self-’; as well as ‘magical’ numbers, like eka ‘one’ / ‘first’, tri ‘three’ / ‘third’, panca ‘five’ / ‘fifth’, dasa ‘ten’ / ‘tenth’, and their derivatives such as manunggal ‘united’, and dwi- ‘bi-’ / ‘dual’.

The Indonesian Armed Forces organisation justifies its position to run the state, without any intention of handing it over to civilians in the future, on the basis of its self-proclaimed concept of dwi-fungsi ‘dual function’, a doctrine which asserts the Armed Forces is responsible for both defence and socio-political matters of the nation-state. Another well-circulated slogan in contemporary Indonesian is ABRI manunggal dengan rakyat ‘The Indonesian Armed Forces and the people are unified’, an adoption of the famous Javanese religious concept manunggaling kawula lan Gusti ‘God/Lord and I are one’. We have seen how salient the word panca is, as in the name of the state ideology, Pancasila. Dharma Wanita ‘Women’s Dharma’ is the largest women’s organisation, whose membership is compulsory for the wives of all civil servants and whose leadership is structured in a complete parallel with their husbands’ official position. Another slogan in fashion today promotes the idea of making the nation’s cultural heritage lestari.

Referring to a wide range of familiar entities in everyday life, these Javanese-derived new coinages easily attract the general public at a greater speed, and to a wider scope, than the more esoteric ‘technocratic’, and specifically ‘apolitical’ counterparts. Various names for organisations and activities take up one or more of these archaic and cultural grandeur-tinged words. They are rapidly reproduced in the language of popular songs, advertisements, and propaganda.

We have noted that ‘technocratic’ coinages are the special interest and production of the language centre’s professional experts, while the politically ‘apolitical’ ones are the special concern of the state officials. Apparently, both the professionals and state officials share common interest in those new coinages that are derived from archaic indigenous vocabularies. These words give a somewhat non-Westernised look, which is then readily equated with being ‘nationalistic’. Though there is a common ideology of nationalism between the professionals and the officials, their motivations and orientations differ with regard to language Development. The former group is principally interested in modernising Bahasa Indonesia, but it also feels obliged to filter out Westernisation in the undertaking. It adopts all-encompassing Western concepts, and gives them a national look. The latter is essentially reasserting traditional

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57 On this Emmerson (1988:115) notes: “the name itself, in effect, validates and preserves a dualism associated with Western societies that clearly demarcate what is military from what is not. ... dwi-fungsi suggests a delicate binary balance whose upsetting could propel the country towards either of the two calamities: civilianisation or militarism".
concepts and cultural values into the dynamics of the legitimate national language, for immediate political purposes.

Elsewhere I have discussed how the language centre’s enthusiasm for nationalising loan words has reached the point of obsession (see Heryanto 1985a; 1985b; 1986b). There are many cases where some already familiarised loan words were officially substituted by new coinages that are even more alien. In late 1986, this was the point of criticism raised by the most prominent figure in the history of Indonesian language modernisation and Development, Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana (1986). In Alisjahbana’s view the centre has been preoccupied with trivialities, rather than modernising Bahasa Indonesia. In any case, nationalising Western keywords can never substantially mean indigenisation or de-Westernisation. No matter how genuinely indigenous the sources are for terms used to substitute for Western loan words, some of the basic concepts and modes of thought belonging to the alien words generally remain intact in substitution.

Quite independent of the language centre’s scheme, many of the New Order state officials have their own way of moulding new keywords in the currently legitimate Bahasa Indonesia. Some of the previous illustrations are cases in point. The well-known substitution of pekerja for buruh has neither involved the centre, nor followed the its prescriptions. Occasionally officials of the New Order state demonstrate what superficially appears as xenophobia, but on closer examination that has turned out not to be the case.

In 1985 some members of the parliament saw the need to make an issue of Indonesian urban youth’s adoption of the American breakdance fad, and brought it into their meeting agenda. They “feared” that this element of Western culture would harm “national resilience” (Kompas 1985c). For similar reasons, the dance was prohibited for some time in the city of Semarang by its mayor (Suara Merdeka 1984). On the other hand, in the same year the Minister for Youth and Sports Affairs (MENPORA) sponsored breakdance competition festivals for a rotating Menpora Cup (Kompas 1985b). Perhaps this only reveals some internal conflict between factions of the state official elite. Another possibility is that the Minister became aware of the fact that imposing restrictions on the dance would only be unproductive, and encounter popular resistance.

In 1986 the same Minister demanded that all the common terms commonly used in Japanese-derived Karate practices be nationalised (see Sinar Harapan 1986). In 1987, in response to the widespread popularity of the Chinese Tai Chi Chuan and Wai Tan Kung physical exercises, the same Minister was reported to have been “instructed” by the President to Indonesianise all the Chinese names of these practices and the accompanying music (Kompas 1987a). The Governor of Central Java went even further. He instructed all civil servants and their families within his territorial administration to practice weekly another form of physical exercise, so as to resist the spread of Tai Chi Chuan, and Wai Tan Kung (Suara Merdeka 1987a).

The tension between technocratic professionals of the language centre and government bureaucrats is not restricted to the fact that the latter do not always follow the former’s linguistic prescriptions. As the head of the centre complained (Moeliono 1977; 1984:29), there has been no serious commitment on the part of the latter to acknowledge the former’s authority in dealing with language control and Development. On another occasion, the head of the centre argued that the construction of new coinages, as in adopting foreign words, should be the full responsibility of the professional specialists in the area concerned (Kompas 1988).
Understandably, the government would consider it unwise to leave all aspects of the language to these professionals. In essence, the tension concerns authority and power distribution in controlling the production of the Indonesian language of Development. In response to the popular protest against the alleged gambling practices in the Semarang Centre for Recreation and Development Promotion (see Chapter 2, footnote 2), the central government decided to leave it up to their Central Java subordinates, rather than language experts, to define what ‘gambling’ should mean (Kompas 1987e).

All in all, the above tensions in the making of the Indonesian language of Development can be regarded as minor and not fundamental. As far as my study suggests, there has never been a single case of critical reappraisal, on a fundamental basis and on the part of any Indonesian, of the language Development practices and their underlying value judgments. One graceful, subtle, and yet fundamental critique of the language centre that I have encountered is from a non-Indonesian (see Becker 1983:5). At the most fundamental level, as this study has been trying to show, the problem of language Development lies in neither the question of who controls it, nor how is it done. It lies in the pervasively ahistorical view of language and, concomitant with that view, in the idea that language needs to be developed at all.

Most criticisms of the language Development programs have commented only on occasional inconsistencies and contradictory statements in the centre’s proscriptions and prescriptions. As noted earlier, even the strongest criticism that created a wave of concern in all the major mass media in 1986, that came from Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, only demanded an organisational restructuring of the centre and a sharper focus of orientation towards modernisation. My initial critiques of the programs that appeared in publication (Heryanto 1985a; 1985b; 1986a; 1986b; 1986c) have not succeeded in opening a fundamental and productive dialogue with those who are responsible for the programs. At one point, one of my articles was simply misunderstood by a key figure of these programs. It received his angry reaction (see Badudu 1985). Ready public acceptance of language Development in this society is rooted in history.

4.4 Historical Continuities and Change

Language Development in Indonesia is not new. Certainly it is not the New Order’s innovation. Its history goes back long before the Indonesian nation came into being. John Hoffman (1979) gives a detailed account of the earliest language Development undertakings in the archipelago. From the later part of the seventeenth century there were already serious controversies concerning ‘High’ and ‘Low’ Malay, as well as the standardisation of lingua franca Malay, as the preferred language of trade, religious conversion and translated scripts, diplomacy and, later, governmental administration. The controversies involved Dutch scholars, missionaries, and governmental officials. According to Hoffman (1979:66) the Malay that evolved into Indonesian was the outcome of these centuries of controversy. This is the language “to whose shape and status the Dutch made a central contribution”.

Not wanting the natives to be conversant in Dutch, apparently as a way to maintain its ‘prestige’, the Netherlands Indies administration preferred the promotion of Malay in Roman script to the rivalling Portuguese and Javanese languages, as well as the Arabic writing system. As a consequence of the development of written and printed Malay, and facilitated by concurrent developments in philology, there was a demand for standardisation, frequently with a search for the ‘pure’ or ‘correct’ Malay. Hoffman (1979:76) notes that from 1819 to 1839 “Malay in Western script and print was being linked with the Indies Government’s aim of extending and unifying its control throughout the archipelago”. Thus, we find here an
extremely odd case in the history of imperialism and of the emergence of a national language, in the words of Anderson (1983a:102-103, fn.60) “the only case of a large colonial possession in which to the end a non-European language remained a language-of-state”.

A decade after the turn of the century, where Hoffman’s essay ends, a very important event took place. In 1908 the Indies colonial government founded the Commissie voor de Volkslecture. Today this Commissie is officially recognised as being the oldest state-sponsored institution for centralised language planning and Development in the history of the archipelago. The New Order’s Pusat Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Bahasa is an outcome of a long series of restructuring and renaming for at least the past four decades. However, the colonial Commissie is not usually perceived to be the ultimate predecessor of the Pusat Pembinaan dan Pembinaan Bahasa. Although there may be no direct institutional link between the Pusat and the Commissie, the two are comparable for being the most powerful institutions of language planning and development in the history of Indonesia.

To the colonial government, the Commissie was important primarily for securing and restrengthening its threatened position during the first decade of the century. Early nationalist movements developed rapidly. The Commissie was urgently needed to suppress the unprecedented rise and widespread growth of anti-colonial publications. These publications challenged the colonial authority, in their contents, and in the language used. They were written in the lingua franca Malay, which was disapproved of by the colonial authorities. The Commissie was founded to provide the newly emerging Indonesian intelligentsia with ‘appropriate’ and ideologically ‘favourable’ reading materials. Considerable numbers of this emergent intelligentsia were to be prospective bureaucratic functionaries of the colonial state.

Classical literary works published by the Commissie, which was renamed Balai Poestaka in 1917, have a clear ideological orientation: ‘modernisation’. The language chosen was, significantly, ‘High’ Malay, which was taught in schools and was under the colonial government’s control. Apparently, the Balai Poestaka aimed not only to distract the indigenous literati from the pervasive anti-colonial writings, but also to enhance a sense of distrust and dislike towards any writings in a language which school pupils were taught to recognise as something like ‘bad and incorrect’ Malay.

Today all official writings on the history of Indonesian literature acknowledge that Balai Poestaka gave birth to modern Indonesian literature. These texts imply that the Indonesians should be grateful to the Dutch colonial government, without whose initiatives and auspices there might have been no ‘modern’ literature (see Teeuw 1972). To this day, the political rationale for founding the Commissie and what it actually did are omitted or glossed over in the official or standard histories of Indonesia. Among the extremely few and only recently published works to discuss this issue with critical perspectives are Sapardi Djoko Damono (1984) and Pramoedya Ananta Toer (1985). The latter was banned soon after its initial

58 For some accounts of the antecedents and organisational structure of the Pusat Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Bahasa, see Adiwibarta (1984:6-65) and Moeliono (1985:17-18).
59 The average number of Indonesians attending Western primary schools jumped from 2,987 in 1900-1904 to 74,697 in 1928. These figures were taken from Kahin (1952:30). “Of the 33,044 employment-seeking Indonesians who had received at least a primary education along Western lines, 45 percent were in 1928 employed as civil servants.” Anderson (1983b:480) translated those figures into an astounding conclusion that “90 percent of the colonial civil service was composed on ‘Indonesians’, and the state’s functioning would have been impossible without them”. 
circulation for political reasons that are not immediately related to the issue under discussion here.

Nearly all standard accounts of the early history of Indonesian literature deny or overlook thousands of literary works that were published outside the Dutch colonial institutions. The total number of these denied authors and works remains obscure to us, but provisional evidence already suggests that they are far greater than the whole corpus of officially recognised works and authors from the past to the present day (see Salmon 1981:10). A great deal of the former were already in existence about half a century prior to the earliest existence of the latter. The influence of the former on the latter, in style and content, is also too great to be overlooked (see Watson 1971:427-433).

Since the New Order assumed power, only recently do we find studies that challenge the official history of Indonesian literature. Most of these studies have been prepared by Western scholars, in English, and are barely accessible in Indonesia (see Watson 1971; 1982; Sykorsky 1980; Salmon 1981; Tickell 1986). In Indonesia, heavily indebted to Salmon (1981), Jakob Sumardjo (1981; 1983; 1985; 1986) enthusiastically writes short essays in journals and newspaper about this long-hidden literary tradition in Low Malay, but the works of Bakri Siregar (1964), quickly banned, and Ajip Rosidi (1969:16-19) seem to be the only early published accounts of this denied literary tradition. Pramoedya Ananta Toer has edited and republished a selection of these pre-Indonesian literary works, providing further access to this denied literature (Toer 1982; Toer, ed. 1987). Taken altogether, these works are still too minimal in number and influence to pose an alternative view.

The colonial East Indies left to Independent Indonesia not only the whole unified territorial legacy, but also an effective language-of-state. The latter also inherited a Western tradition of literary studies as well as scholarship in language studies, planning and Development. Though it has not been completely static, this tradition is greatly responsible for the fact that the idea of having a language developed by authorised experts still seems desirable, or even imperative to the contemporary ‘nation’ as well as ‘state’. In today’s New Order Indonesia, the implementation of language Development involves continuities with the old colonial desires and constraints as well as some significant new configurations.

The ultimate outcome of this commonly accepted undertaking is a widespread consciousness across the nation that Bahasa Indonesia is a national language that nearly all members of the nation are incompetent to speak properly. To make things worse, the best thing imaginable for members of this nation to attain is merely to join the ranks of the few privileged consumers, or at best reproducers, of the legitimate language, the production of which is in the hands of top state authorities and authorised professionals. This is especially true among the schooled urbanites, to whom the whole business of language Development finds a ‘market’, looks sensible, and promises personal rewards for future career promotion. They have been the main targets of pervasive public allegations concerning the ‘bad and incorrect’ language, not only from the language centre but also from their own peer group.

Titles of publications in this mainstream line of thought are invariably breathtaking, ‘Outstanding, [the use of] bad Indonesian’ (Kompas 1983b); ‘Indonesian language is underdeveloped’ (Kunto 1984); ‘Average students’ mastery of Indonesian is cause for concern’ (Kompas 1985d); ‘Indonesian students’ competence in writing is distressing’ (Sinar Harapan 1985c); ‘Indonesian language is increasingly incorrect’ (Kompas 1986a). Reporting an assessment of the quality of language use in over 100 theses of university graduates, E.
Sadtono (1976:15) came to the conclusion that the degree and multitude of imperfection in the use of language should be read as a sign of a 'national calamity'.

The schooled and urban elites are, significantly, the most motivated social group attending the language consultation programs sponsored by the language centre. To a degree unprecedented in Indonesian history, we find the development, or Development, of people's dependence on the centralised production of words and meanings to equip them with the necessary competence in social interaction and mobility. Language consultation for the public in the mass media was already in existence when Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana published his monthly journal *Pembina Bahasa Indonesia* in 1948. Before the journal published its fifth monthly issue, there were already more inquiries from the readers than the editors could handle. However, in retrospect, what is striking about that consultative forum in comparison with its contemporary counterparts is its remarkably modest stance. *Pembina Bahasa Indonesia* occasionally invited its readers to send in additional information and opinion to supplement those of the editor.

There has also been a significant change in the responses that the past and the present mass media have given to language planning and Development. Some of the past mass media directly confronted linguistic guidance, controls, or prescriptions (see Alisjahbana 1976:78-79; Anwar 1980:111; Sindhunata 1987), and their language may have gained more public acceptance than the official one (Alisjahbana 1976:112). The contemporary Indonesian mass media, in contrast, have tried to do their best to subscribe thoroughly to rules and guidelines of the language centre, as Prabangkara (1985) illustrates. Furthermore, there has been a demand for an even more detailed and consistent guidance from the centre as recently expressed by an editor of Gramedia, the largest publishing firm in the country (*Kompas* 1984b). A high standard of competence in the centre's defined 'good and correct' Indonesian has recently become a partial requirement for promotion of journalists working at *Suara Karya*, a major Jakarta-based newspaper (*Kompas* 1984b).

4.5 POTENTIAL EXTENSION AND RESISTANCE

I may have been giving the impression that the language Development programs have been successful to a greater extent than they actually are and than I truly intend to suggest. This is partly because we have focused on views, ambition, and official accounts, rather than on the realisation of officially projected goals. It is also because in discussing the issue we have been referring mainly to the nation's elite.

As I suggested from the outset, the propagation of certain views, consciousness, and values constitute the central issue of interest in this study. They are inseparable from the dynamic constitutive forces of social Development, which have been seriously understudied in the major corpus of Development studies. Multitudinous references to the Indonesian elite are inevitable in treating the subject matter, since national Development and the national language are essentially elite-centred. The vast majority of the population, which forms the lower strata of the social hierarchy, is practically excluded, or at best marginalised, from the dynamic productive process of legitimate *Bahasa Indonesia*. Many people are semi- or totally illiterate, only superficially familiar with the language, and cannot afford to acquire it. According to an official admission (see *Kompas* 1985a) more than 17 million Indonesians between the ages of 7 and 44 are totally illiterate. In 1980 only 11.93 per cent of the population spoke Indonesian in their day-to-day activities (*Kompas* 1987h). Despite the elite's acceptance of
language Development discussed thus far, we shall not ignore the fact that some challenges do exist to the currently legitimate Indonesian language. Most noticeable of these challenges come from various forms of urban youth’s discourse, based on the informal Jakarta dialect. Coming from the upper strata of the population, these youths have easy access to the means of nationwide communication in popular songs, literature, youth magazines, or entertainment programs of the various urban private radio broadcasts.

In various forms many of these urban youths seem to have developed a non-standardised lingua franca. Comparable to other traditional vernaculars of various ethnic groups, these various languages of urban youth tend to be suppressed as their speakers become school-leavers on their way to entering secured positions in the all-embracing state-controlled establishments.

The majority of the population heavily relies on its own ethnic vernaculars. Among these, as we have seen, Javanese seems to be the only one that presents any significant challenging and nurturing forces to Bahasa Indonesia. The absence of any fundamental confrontation from native speakers of ethnic vernaculars against the contemporary Indonesian language of Development is indeed remarkable. It is probably an indication that the imposition of the legitimate language has not been successful enough to affect them deeply. Even if the imposition is already extensive and effective, it is yet unclear how traditional vernaculars will readily provide their native speakers with a means of effective resistance. Their past history illustrates vividly that struggles against White colonial masters became effective only when they combined their own indigenous strength with what they acquired from Western culture. Their national independence would have been inconceivable had they not learned the idea of ‘nation’ from the West. “The spread of Indonesian as a national language was impossible, paradoxically,” writes Anderson (1966:101-102), “except once Dutch had been developed as the inner language of the intelligentsia”.

In the current situation we see initial signs of a ‘self-imposed’ Development ideology within the Javanese communities, that is one that seems to arise internally and voluntarily. Basic concepts of language planning, control, and Development are understandable in the context of Bahasa Indonesia, because it is not anyone’s mother tongue. But now we are beginning to see these concepts penetrate the Javanese-speaking communities. Believing that the younger generation speaks ‘bad and incorrect’ Javanese, in 1987 the local authorities of Central Java began to launch new programs committed to the promotion of ‘good and correct Javanese’, through the state school systems (Suara Merdeka 1987b). If this new venture succeeds in some distant future, we will no longer see native speakers of Javanese. At best, we will find mass consumers of the language as a commodity (see Heryanto 1986c).

To make things worse, there seems to be a growing tendency among contemporary schooled Javanese parents who live in urban areas to prefer speaking Bahasa Indonesia rather than Javanese to their children at home. Apparently this is a way of assuring that the children will be well prepared to assume future careers in the increasingly competitive social order. Many take this as an encouraging sign, as if it indicates that Bahasa Indonesia is becoming a first language for the young generation. At best, this is not the development of a mother tongue, but a penetration of what Illich (1982) calls a taught mother tongue in the domain of homes. Unlike the former, the latter is not ‘home-made’, not a vernacular, but something centrally controlled by institutions and professional experts. When independent Indonesia was one year old, the Indonesian Language Committee did not leave the language of the home alone, independent of its control. Thousands of new terms for use about daily
chores at home were professionally designed, declared legal, and introduced to the public (see Pembangoenan 1945b).

4.6 CONCLUDING NOTE

The central issues of this study are as a whole enormously complex in nature and broad in scope. They are probably too complex and too broad for a single study to handle. We have studied an extremely important episode in Indonesian social history, by examining a selection of the salient metaphors, with and through which communities in this area have confronted and redefined perceived realities and constructed new realities. Before concluding this study we should reflect for a moment on the difficulties that persist throughout the discussion above, and on the metaphors that we have employed to confront those difficulties.

All major categories that have been used for analysis in the preceding chapters are highly metaphorical. Undoubtedly, they are often ambiguous. Those ambiguities are inevitable, since they are symptomatic of the problems under discussion here. We ourselves are products of the social history of the global language of Development. Learning the wisdom of traditional authors and a few modern ones whose works I have been referring to favourably, I tend to deal with complex issues by making highly metaphorical expressions, a mode of discourse that is officially disapproved of by professional experts in international scholarship and within the Indonesian language centre alike. Rather than being apologetic, I am only stressing my basic assertion that Pembangunan, like ‘Development’, is essentially a metaphor.

A final metaphor concerns ‘sunrise’. We are still comfortable with the commonplace phrase ‘the sun rises in the east’, attested to by popular songs and notes from our language classes. The English language acknowledges its ‘universal truth’ by constructing the phrase in the present tense. We believe that it is a ‘natural’ phenomenon, we believe in our language as a code, or tool, for deciphering reality, rather than ambiguous and arbitrary metaphors. We believe its validity, and it gains verification from our sight every morning, even when we are well informed that the sun never rises anywhere. We are bound to have difficulty in perceiving at face value the ‘nature’ of our rotating globe, without which our existence is impossible, when our feet remain grounded on the globe. The power of these forces is comparable to the power of language, in that our social existence fundamentally depends on it, and yet we are bound to have difficulty in appreciating it, precisely because of our being linguistic creatures.

In the equatorial islands of Indonesia sunrise takes place more or less in at the same time throughout the year, and it is regularly an awakening, pembangunan, of the population from the long night’s sleep. We have seen the extended form of the metaphor, with its initial letter in an upper case (Pembangunan), and we have studied its extraordinary power. Any attempt to understand it critically is impossible without an understanding of the constitutive force of metaphors, and what they have been doing to human history.
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