The Pleasure of Being
Culture Dialogue and Genre

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DECLARATION

This thesis is the sole work of the author whose name appears on the title page and contains no material which the author has previously submitted for assessment at The Australian National University or elsewhere. Also, to the best of the author's knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where reference is made in the text of the thesis.

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February, 1996.
Abstract

Working within and building upon a tradition of Australian semiotics, the aim is to arrive at a way of understanding, analysing and interpreting cultural artefacts which "escapes the taint of some mere application of terms drawn from individual experience" as Fredric Jameson puts it. Programmatically the work is organised in five Parts.

Part 1 presents an introduction to some of the themes and issues recurrent throughout the research and contains a brief survey of some contemporary theories and models of the phenomena associated with the problematics of culture, dialogue and genre, most notably those of Fredric Jameson, Julia Kristeva and Walter Benjamin.

The second part initiates the move to establish empirical foundations for the inquiry, initially through an early work by Gilles Deleuze and subsequently through a critique of radical subjectivism which is a central tenet of Michael Reddy's critique of the conduit metaphor model of meaning. The implications of rejecting radical subjectivism are explored through Eric Michaels' work with the Walpiri people of central Australia, in the context of a search for a semiotics of authenticity.

Part 3 introduces the Hellenistic debate on signs, provides an overview of Epicurean empiricism and builds upon the themes introduced in the first part. The links between Epicurean semiotics and Michael Halliday's systemic-functional description of semiosis are also explored. The final section addresses important sceptical arguments associated with the criteria for authenticating "knowledge" and suggests a way of moving beyond scepticism.

The fourth part explores the ethical implications of the empirical paradigm through a discussion of Epicurean hedonism. The links between ancient and modern semiotic theories are discussed in detail, primarily through the work of Roman Jakobson and Louis Hjelmslev. Bridging ancient and modern arguments is the concept of the stabilising-grammar which is the most fundamental innovation introduced in the dissertation as a whole. The result is a cross-cultural model of dialogue and genre and this is illustrated through a discussion of the semiotics of driving. The final section draws out some of the implications of the cross-cultural model and sets out a general methodology for the pragmatics of genre analysis.

Part 5 explores the critical implications of the cross-cultural model, primarily through the work of Mikhail Bakhtin. The model is set into play through the analysis of four generic artefacts: a poem by Oodgeroo Noonuccal; the 1967 amendment to Part V, s.51(xxvi) of the Australian Constitution; Recommendation 86(a) of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody; an artefact recovered from a DSS office in Sydney. Finally the main features of the research are summarised, along with suggestions for future research.

The work as a whole represents an eclectic but original contribution to research in the human sciences, providing a generalised theory of semantics and semiosis, something which, up until now, appears to have been lacking.
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Preface

In preparing a preface to a dissertation the central problematics of which turn on the nature of culture, dialogue and genre, it would seem appropriate to begin by reflecting on the nature of the text to follow. What genre is it? Moreover, what culture-specific conventions are invoked and how do these constrain or enable the dialogue so created?

When the present research was commenced these questions proved to be both unavoidable and insurmountable. As research progressed some 'answers' began to appear and eventually the text that follows took shape. I want to use this preface to furnish the reader with an expectation of what is to come and, more importantly, what preceded the present research and from where it came.

The title of the dissertation - The Pleasure of Being - is drawn from ideas which proved to be central but arrived relatively late in the overall process. The major influences which preceded the present work were Mikhail Bakhtin’s dialogism and semiotics in the Australian tradition with its emphasis on Michael Halliday’s systemic-functional description of linguistic semiosis. The major influence to emerge in the course of the research arrived in the context of an inquiry into semiotics in the ancient Greek tradition. Most of Part 3 and a portion of Part 4 are devoted to this inquiry though the bias towards the Hellenistic period and Epicurean empiricism in particular is made explicit throughout the paper as a whole.

The notion of "pleasure" contained in the title derives from what could be described as the Epicurean empiricist semiotic tradition and Epicurus' scientific method is central to the epistemology sustaining the research as a whole. Without anticipating too many of the details here, perhaps the most useful concept for explaining the sort of epistemic processes underlying the research is one which is introduced at the beginning of Part 1 - "world-view".

The concept of "world-view" is a useful way of relating people in groups that are not necessarily culture-specific. Although most people belonging to the same cultural grouping will share a similar world-view, the possibility remains for people sharing differing cultural backgrounds to share similar world-views: the international environmental movement, the nuclear disarmament lobby and the international feminist movement are contemporary cases in point. The important point about the concept of "world-view" is its resistance to a totalising individualism. In other words the potential number of world-views is finite and any attempt to equate a "world-view" with an individual view of the world would require an assumption of radical subjectivism. If everyone shared a different world-view the notion of society would be rendered meaningless and culture would be lost amidst the anarchy of irreducible and irreconcilable attitudes and values. Much of Part 2 is directed towards a critique of radical subjectivism as enshrined in the work of Michael Reddy and his influential critique of the conduit metaphor model of meaning.

What makes the concept of world-view so workable is the empirical constitution of the creatures who have one. For some people, "world-view" may extend for only a few kilometres in either direction, with everything beyond an interference and disturbance. For others, "world-view" may extend into the domain of ideas and so include the cosmos as well as chaos. But for everyone, "world-view" comprises much that is common and indeed, unavoidable - the primary faculties of sense-perception, the ability to experience pathos and knowledge of what brings pleasure and peace and what causes pain and disturbance. According to this sort of empirically based world-view, what separates us as individuals is almost insignificant and certainly arbitrary, compared
with what we share as a species. Differences which do appear are manifested in the spheres of what we call culture and the genres. In this scheme, dialogue is common to all but possessed by none. "World-view" is what informs all our dialogues and is itself a manifestation of the ongoing dialogue of life. Bakhtin will describe it as "that commentary on consciousness" and call it "behavioural ideology". Whatever it's called, it's about belief and, more importantly, the feeling of believing.

Unfortunately people believe just about anything. During the preparation of this dissertation at least three events occurred which provided stark evidence of this fact - the Waco cult massacre in the US, the cult inspired terrorism in Japan and cult related suicides in Canada, Switzerland and France. As well as a belief in a world-view, a healthy dose of scepticism provides an antidote to the unbridled fantasies propagated in these more extreme belief systems. The connection between the sceptical and empirical traditions is explored in detail in the section entitled "Beyond Scepticism".

The desire to believe must be tempered by the possibilities of belief. But all belief must be accorded the integrity of authenticity even if others find the particular belief(s) to be undesirable. It is this dialogue between belief and desire, between what we think and what we feel which motivates much of what is to follow. Mediating this dialogue is a sceptical sense of prudence concerning what is necessarily desirable, what is necessarily believable and what is germane to these qualities in our culture, dialogues and genres.

Finally I would like to acknowledge the assistance of my principal supervisor, Dr Livio Dobrez, without whose patience and understanding the preparation of the present research would have been a tortuous task indeed.

And so there remains beneath all my scepticism this grain of belief.*

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* This line is a paraphrase of one by Australian author David Malouf in his appropriately titled, in the context of the present dissertation, *An Imaginary Life* (Sydney: Picador, 1980) 10.


Introduction

All perception is a process whereby our minds form upon a single proposition some image, and this is known as the process of perception. However, the act of perception is not just a simple act of forming an image. It is a complex process that involves several stages. The first stage is the formation of an image, which is the result of the interaction between the senses and the mind. The second stage is the process of interpretation, which involves the mind's attempt to make sense of the image. The third stage is the process of evaluation, which involves the mind's attempt to determine the significance of the image. The fourth stage is the process of decision, which involves the mind's attempt to make a decision based on the image. The final stage is the process of action, which involves the mind's attempt to act on the decision. These stages are not always clear-cut, and they may overlap and interact with each other in complex ways. However, understanding these stages is crucial for understanding how perception works.
Part 1

Introduction

All perceptions are true.

If it were possible to base an entire dissertation upon a single proposition then this would be it. Such are its ramifications - both philosophical and political - that it can easily embrace a theory of culture, dialogue and genre alongside corresponding theories of semiotics and subjectivity. What these theories are will emerge in the course of what follows. But I want to begin with the concept of genre and its relationship with systems of belief and ideology and the methodological problems this presents not only for this work, but for discourse and research in the humanities in general.

Genre and Ideology

Genre is, in and of itself, a fundamentally "ideological" concept. Australian scholars Terry Threadgold and Gunther Kress, working within the framework of what can be called "Australian semiotics", admit as much in their relatively recent work, "Towards a Social Theory of Genre":

... the ideological apparatuses surrounding the social production of particular text categories are reinforced by the kind of genre-theory that is applied to the study of texts.

The problem with genre is that it can only be measured in words, unlike economic behaviour and the subjects in physics and chemistry which can be empirically quantified. The same may be said for discourse in the humanities in general. In what the French like to call the Human Sciences (les sciences humaines), the object of study is no longer quantifiable on the basis of its empirical existence - as are the objects of study in the physical sciences. Rather the "object" of study in the human sciences is really a "subject" of study which is partially identifiable with the subject undertaking the study. The problems of objectivity and "value-free" or "value-neutral" knowledge are virtually insurmountable in the humanities given the inherently reflexive and reflective nature of research into the discourses and artefacts of human creativity.

The French theorist Lucien Goldmann, writing in the sixties, draws out the implications of dealing with a different class of phenomena in the human, as opposed to the physical sciences. While Goldmann's discourse reflects a preoccupation with Marxist, or at least materialist and sociological theories of literature and cultural production, his comments on methodology in the human sciences are still relevant today and are worth quoting at some length:

1 Australian semiotics is a general term which embraces a broad approach to the analysis of social meaning, drawing upon the work of theorists such as Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, Louis Althusser, Mikhail Bakhtin and, in particular, the social semiotic approach to language and grammar developed in the functional linguistics of Michael Halliday.


So on the one hand, the historical and human sciences are not, unlike the chemical and physical sciences, the study of a collection of facts external to man and the world upon which their actions are carried out. They are, rather, the study of the actions themselves as well as their structure and the aspirations which animate them and the changes which they undergo.

On the other hand, given that consciousness is only one aspect of human activity - a real if partial one - historical studies should not be limited to conscious phenomena. It should be linked with the conscious intentions of the actors of history and the objective meaning of their disposition and activity.

Two consequences follow from this.

a) When it comes to the study of human life, the process of scientific knowledge is itself a human as well as an historical and social fact. This implies a partial identity between the subject and object and this is why the problem of objectivity arises more so in the human sciences than in physics and chemistry.

b) Given that human activity is the fact of a totality*, any attempt to separate the "material" from the "spiritual" can only be, at best, a provisional abstraction and this will always involve great dangers for knowledge. This is why the researcher needs to always strive to recover the concrete totality of reality, even if he/she knows that this can only be approached in a partial and limited way. And because of this he/she needs to include in the study of historical and social facts, theories about those facts ...

* The totality is a relative one and only one element in the totality man-nature. (Goldmann 1966, 33-34. My trans.)

When those social and historical facts comprise genres, the problems Goldmann refers to are compounded. Genre as such is the fact of a collective and of a totality of individual facts and associations. The totality which is genre is a relative one and only one element in the totality which is human activity and human activity, as Goldmann observes, is only one element in the totality man-nature. The "facts" which comprise each genre are aspects of social and historical meaning which have their existence in symbolic forms of representation. In the discourse and discipline of semiotics these so-called "facts" are replaced by "signs" and "theories about those facts" become theories about signification and the nature of the sign. One theory of the sign which will have a profound influence on the discourse and direction of the present research is derived from the quite brilliant life's work of Russian scholar Mikhail Bakhtin.4

At the heart of Bakhtin's approach to semiotics lies the nature and value of dialogue. The concept and activity of dialogue disrupts the unity of genre as a relatively discreet totality. Dialogue puts into play social and historical meanings and grounds them in the empirical actuality of the semiotic event. One commentator at least has recognised the empirical foundations of what she calls Bakhtin's "social semiotic". Maria Shevtsova describes her approach to cultural criticism as "harmonised" with the works of Bakhtin.

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4 Dispute over the Bakhtinian bibliography has become a topic for research in its own right. This dispute is largely irrelevant to the detail of the present work. I will be attributing to Bakhtin those works for which there has been cause for disagreement. For a more detailed discussion of the issues associated with the constitution of the Bakhtinian bibliography, see Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1984).
... who did not describe himself either as a semiotician or a linguist, but preferred to speak of 'translinguistics', which, with its great emphasis on how and why signs are social through and through, and, moreover, do incorporate the empirical world, can be adequately renamed a social semiotics.5

Shevtsova also notes that the standpoint of a social semiotics is an inherently critical one and taking this in the context of the empirical foundations of both approaches, whether "translinguistic" or "social semiotic", in as much as they can be made to coincide or, as Shevtsova puts it, "harmonised", the need still remains for an adequate account of the "empirical world". Much of the energy underlying the current work has been directed towards arriving at just such an account, based on one first articulated by the Hellenistic philosopher Epicurus whom Hegel described as "the discoverer of empirical natural science".6 That Hegel is otherwise scathing and dismissive of Epicurean empirical philosophy is evidence enough of the threat to all philosophical idealisms that empiricism necessarily represents.

... if existence for sensation is to be regarded as the truth, the necessity for the Notion is altogether abrogated, and in the absence of speculative interest things cease to form a united whole, all things being in point of fact lowered to the point of view of ordinary human understanding (277).

My approach to genre theory will be based on a combination of an Epicurean account of the empirical world, Bakhtin's account of the dialogic world and Michael Halliday's systemic-functional description of the semiotic world. I will come back to Halliday and Epicurus in due course.

Although Bakhtin did not couch his discourse in the terms I have chosen, his work does provide a penetrating insight into the processes of linguistic and literary creativity and, especially in his early work, he examined the all pervasive role that "ideology" has to play in these processes. Bakhtin's basic thesis in this respect is that wherever there are signs there is "ideology" and "without signs there is no ideology."7 Indeed he goes so far as to assert that "the individual consciousness is a socio-ideological fact".8 Writing in one of his earlier works, Bakhtin explains the status of ideology in his scheme of things:

The reality of ideological phenomena is the reality of the social sign. The laws of this reality are the laws of semiotic communication and are directly determined by the system of social and economic rules. Ideological reality is a superstructure situated directly above the economic base. The individual consciousness is not the architect of this superstructure but only a tenant inhabiting the social edifice of the ideological sign (1977, 31. My trans.).


8 "La conscience individuelle est un fait socio-ideologique." (Bakhtin 1977, 30).
Whatever the merits and flaws of the base/superstructure paradigm might be, what is important here is Bakhtin's characterisation of the relationship between the individual human consciousness and ideology. The conflation of what Bakhtin calls "ideological phenomena" and "the reality of the social sign" means that, in practical terms, it is impossible to separate the two. In other words the distinction between "ideology" and social meaning is, at best, to use Goldmann's expression, a "provisional abstraction" since, according to Bakhtin, all meaning is ideological. I accept Bakhtin's thesis in this regard. To suppose otherwise would imply a privileged form of meaning somehow independent of ideological colouring. The belief in superior knowledge-forms and the epistemology surrounding this belief will be explored in further detail, later, in the context of the ancient debate on signs in Hellenistic philosophy between the Stoics and the Epicureans. What will emerge from that discussion is an understanding that "ideology" is simply another word for "belief" and to call some beliefs ideological and others not is sophistry of the worst kind. I will agree with Epicurus who held that all "scientific" knowledge is a matter for belief and opinion.

Given, then, that the human world is as full of ideology and ideological systems as it is replete with belief and belief systems, the question arises as to what remains of "reality" and whether any sort of "objective" knowledge of reality remains possible.

Goldmann has already signalled the particular problem of "objectivity" in the human sciences but he does not go on to say that objective knowledge in the human sciences is not possible. Rather he argues that the difference between the physical and human sciences is one of nature, not one of degree, so any attempt to apply a methodology appropriate for the physical sciences to the human sciences will be flawed. He will go on to develop his own particular variety of what he calls "genetic structuralism", based primarily on the Marxist science of dialectical materialism and the idea of a "world-view" (une vision du monde) derived from the work of German theorist Georg Lukács and his class-based notion of "potential consciousness" (la conscience possible).

Goldmann's work has the advantage of foregrounding the "totality" of human existence and experience and the methodological problems this presents for research in the humanities. His solution is more than mere procedural caution and amounts to an exhaustive analysis of the social and historical background to the production of cultural meaning. This is evidenced in his monumental work Le Dieu Caché (The Hidden God) which is a study of "the tragic vision in Pascal's Pensées and Racine's theatre". In terms of "reality" and "objective" reality, Goldmann eschews the epistemological relativism which has blighted much of contemporary research in the human sciences, without necessarily falling into the idealist traps of absolutism and universalism.

In this dissertation I will be particularly interested in developing a methodology appropriate for the "cross-cultural" analysis of genre. By "cross-cultural" I mean to signify "that which is not culture-specific". To this end, any notion that one form of cultural belief is more or less true than any other is utterly anathema to the sort dialogue I wish to engage. One of the great and most shameful hallmarks of Western science and epistemology has historically taken the form of a belief in the absolute and universal nature of the truth and knowledge which it delivers up. The radical critique of Western philosophy and epistemology is far from novel in recent academic history - Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger and Derrida to name a few, have all contributed to the feeling of what

J.G. Merquior calls *Kulturkrisis* which has come to pervade much of post-modernist and post-structuralist thinking.\(^{10}\)

Brazilian intellectual, observer and participant in the culture of French intellectual life during the heady days of the nineteen-sixties, Merquior is scathing of the post-modernisms and post-structuralisms which have so muddied the waters of humanities research in recent times. He qualifies the "object" of post-modern and post-structuralist critique in terms of a belief in modernity which embraces "a Cartesian faith in science, a Kantian faith in humanity and a Hegelian faith in history" (Merquior 1988, 240). The feeling of *Kulturkrisis* - of culture in crisis - derives from a collapse of belief in this characterisation of (Western) modernity. "Modern culture", writes Merquior, "is deemed to be in crisis because its mental set is 'shown' to be fallacious" (240). What concerns Merquior is the circularity of this argument and its particularly dominant incarnation in the "philosophy" of deconstruction and Derrideanism. The crisis, Merquior holds, is less an object of counter-cultural thought, than its product. Elsewhere Derrideanism is described as "a cure still worse than the illness".

What is conveyed in the discourses of post-modernism and post-structuralism is not a crisis for (Western) culture - I am not convinced that the arcane language of these discourses can penetrate so deeply into the fabric of contemporary human experience as to engender the crisis which they ostensibly theorise. The crisis, I'm sure Merquior would agree, is a crisis of theory itself. Post-structuralists in their Nietzschean epistemology, according to Merquior, "eagerly uphold the idea that there are no thoroughly neutral and independent facts, all observations being already theory-laden and thus bound to a prior interpretation of reality" (243). This crisis in theory of which Merquior is so critical is akin to the epistemological relativism which Goldmann was so keen to avoid. Moreover the result of such relativism is a dismissal of empirical experience in favour of a purely discursive one - one which dogmatically claims, for instance that "there is no outside of the text" ("il n'y a pas de hors-texte")\(^{11}\) and which leads to constructivist and deconstructivist theories of subjectivity and culture. I will be returning to the problematic of textual and cultural interiorities and exteriorities throughout this dissertation, first through a critical examination of Michael Reddy's influential work on the conduit metaphor and, later, through Bakhtin's emphasis on "outsidedness" as a necessary condition for evaluating that most elusive of critical and aesthetic qualities - "greatness".\(^{12}\) Suffice it here to observe, as North American intellectual Fredric Jameson has already pointed out, that "the idea that there is no outside of language is as indefensible as it is unanswerable".\(^{13}\) And, as Merquior notes, because our knowledge of the world presupposes certain values and interests, it does not in the least follow that the world itself is a mere product or projection of those values and interests (244). He continues:

Post-structuralist thought marks the ultimate intellectual decay of this vacuous ideological posturing; and within it, deconstruction, the tame

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\(^{12}\) See Part 2 - "The Conduit Metaphor Revisited" and Part 5 - "Greatness".

pseudo-Nietzscheanism of academe, is a gloomy histrionics passing for theoretical insight. (242).

So while the theory of genre I will develop in the course of this dissertation will have quite radical implications for criticism and methodology in the humanities, this is nothing new, and the problematical status of theory, which Merquior rails against, will also need to be addressed. This is one of the major reasons why I have chosen to foreground empiricism in general and, because of its ethical implications, Epicurean empiricism in particular. Without a belief in the truth of something concrete and common to all, and here I have chosen human perceptions and the empirical paradigm based on them, there can be no defence against the criticisms of relativism, absolutism and "vacuous ideological posturing". Without a belief in a concrete reality - albeit one which we only "perceive" and "imagine" to be true - we run the risk of falling back into that distended generic nightmare which is our modern age.14

I understand ideology in the broadest possible sense of the word as "belief". By tying a theory of perception to a theory of genre, what will emerge is a theory of belief and culture. The problematic is a complex one. Belief is contingent upon perception but "how" something is perceived will depend upon the way in which perception is accomplished. At this level of analysis, the subjective and the cultural become virtually indistinguishable. I will return to the link between "imagination", "perception" and "ideology" presently. For the moment I want to explore in further detail the connection between subjectivity and culture and in particular the nature of the fundamental opposition which enables the abstraction of subjectivity from culture in the first place.

Cross-Cultural Concepts and the Problem of Mediation

Bakhtin paraphrases Socrates in Plato's "Phaedrus":

not the trees in the forest, but the people in the cities interest me ... 15

And he glosses the aphorism as "Nature juxtaposed to man"; a meditation on one of the most fundamental oppositions in Western epistemology: the distinction between physis and nomos.

As for me:

not the people in the cities, but the trees in the forest ...

So to speak.

The key term in all of this is "Western" as in "Western epistemology". What "genre" is this? It is the genre of "nature versus culture" with all its attendant sub-plots and intrigues: historical materialism v. philosophical idealism, anti-humanism v. humanism, brother against brother, as it were. Threadgold describes the nature/culture opposition as "another culturally constructed dichotomy" which:

14 Jameson, in his "Preface" to Prison House of Language writes, "There is ... a profound consonance between linguistics as a method and that systematised and disembodied nightmare which is our culture" (ix).

is too entrenched discursively, too bound up with those other culturally
constructed pairs - mind/body, rational/irrational, masculine/feminine - to
allow or enable meanings which would not bear their marks or traces.\textsuperscript{16}

I will return to Threadgold's insightful work below. The point I want to make here
concerns the implied cultural-specificity of the "Western" genre, with its dichotomous,
some might say schizophrenic, presumptions: this begs the question, central to the
present work, of the possibility for a genre which is not culture-specific, one which
escapes what Fredric Jameson calls "the taint of some mere application of terms drawn
from individual experience."\textsuperscript{17} But the "nature v. culture" belief system is not an easy
one to escape, let alone problematise. To do so requires a journey beyond the boundaries
of one cultural belief system and "world-view" into the boundaries of another. In places
like Australia, Canada and the USA one doesn't have to travel too far. Indigenous belief
systems are characterised by the presumption that nature and culture are one so the
question of opposition between the two never arises, let alone becomes institutionalised:

\begin{quote}
This ground and this earth...
lake brother and mother\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

Says Big Bill Neidjie, an elder of the Bunitij clan and the Gagudju (Western genre:
\textit{Kakadu}) nation of far north-western Australia:

\begin{quote}
Our story is in the land
it is written in those sacred places ....
\end{quote}

(Big Bill 1986, 46).

No longer is the problematic one of a culturally constructed opposition between "man"
and "nature". The journey beyond its boundaries entails an experiential move into a field
of reality which is fundamentally different from the one I have glossed as the "Western"
genre. Epistemology begets ethnography. The problematic is now one of cross-cultural
communication and the narrative contextualisation of one culture by another. This begs a
form of the central question I referred to earlier: is it possible to tell/reconstruct Big Bill
Neidjie's stories and culture in terms of "Western" genres of knowledge and
understanding? For Big Bill the answer is transparent:

\begin{quote}
White European want to know...
asking 'What this story?'
This not easy story.
No-one else can tell it....
because this story for Aboriginal culture (47).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{16} Terry Threadgold, "Paradigms of Semiosis: Grammatics for Cryptogrammars or Metalanguages for
Interdisciplinary Symposium} (Bochum: Universitatsverlag, 1989) 164.


\textsuperscript{18} Big Bill Neidjie, \textit{Kakadu Man}, Stephen Davis and Allan Fox eds. (Darwin: Resource Managers Ltd,
1986) 46. The text is transcribed from Bill Neidjie's oral account of the Gagudju peoples' law and
history.
This raises one of the key issues most central to the problematic of cross-cultural communication: the ownership/stewardship of cultural knowledge. The concept of "cultural knowledge" can be described in terms of the "special" knowledge specific to the experience of a particular culture. The "special" knowledge in Aboriginal cultures can only be told by people of Aboriginal descent since such knowledge is, by definition, bound up with culture-specific experiences and beliefs. "Authentic" cultural knowledge can only be conveyed by someone who shares and participates in the experience and exchange of that knowledge. Cultural identity (= cultural self-knowledge) is thus an issue which is inextricably tied to its forms and modes of expression. At the same time, cultural identity is grounded in the empirical experience of a reality moulded and shaped by semantic possibilities initiated through the available forms and modes of communication and reflection.

What I've called "special" knowledge effectively constitutes a semantic precondition for the expression of a cultural subjectivity. While it is not possible to conceive of/think about cultural identity outside its meaning as invested in various forms of special knowledge, this by no means exhausts the scope of the problematic of cultural knowledge and identity. Beyond the artefacts and discourses of cultural self-expression lie the sentient creatures whose "expression" these "texts" represent/recreate/reproduce. But in order to locate the "content" of these expressive forms, focussing on textual/symbolic processes alone will not suffice. The content/expression relation is central to Danish linguist Louis Hjelmslev's glossematic semiotic and will play an important role in the context of the present research. For the moment, however, I want to explore in further detail some theories about the dynamic nature of the processes underlying semiotic activity.

French theorist Julia Kristeva, in her early writings during the late sixties and seventies, developed an elegant model of semiosis, based on a series of complex assumptions which endeavoured to render articulate the ineffable domains of the extra-textual and pre-symbolic. The term "domain" here fails to convey the metaphorical sense of place implicit in Kristeva's own term: semiotic chora. The sense of chora in Greek is that of "receptacle" and it is in the sense of keeping/storing/preserving that the idea of place seems to derive. But this "place" is not comprised of ordinary space in the geometric sense of the term. Rather, to paraphrase Kristeva, the semiotic chora is a "non-geometric space" composing a motility of primordial energies and impulses. It is the geometry of the symbolic order which constrains and regulates (Fr. réglementation) the chaotic impulses of the "semiotic chora". Literary production, located in the symbolic order, nevertheless has its (unconscious) foundations "in" the semiotic chora. What determines the peculiar character of literature as a privileged discourse (a form of "special knowledge") is its position with respect to the culture's entire system(s) of signification. Kristeva refers to this discursive positioning of subjectivity - what she calls the "subject of enunciation" - in terms of a semantic precondition for language itself, called the "thetic".

All enunciation, whether of a word or of a sentence, is thetic. It requires an identification; in other words, the subject must separate from and through his image, from and through his objects.20

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A former student of Kristeva and Australian scholar, John Lechte explains that "the thetic is also the precondition of the difference between signifier and signified, denotation and connotation, language and referent; in effect it is the basis of all theses and antitheses, of all oppositions ... there is no language without the thetic."21 In terms of Saussure's Sa/Se (signifier/signified) dichotomy, the "thetic" would be represented by the bar separating the terms. In Kristeva's theory of semiosis, the Sa/Se opposition is transformed into a far more complex and sophisticated model of dialectical exchange and regulation. The thetic condition/phase functions primarily to regulate dialectical exchanges between the symbolic order and semiotic chora. In modernist texts such as those of Lautréamont and Mallarmé, this process of regulation (la réglementation) is challenged and disrupted in a material way such that the semiotic chora "violates" the order of the symbolic. For Kristeva, the fundamental dynamic comprising the semiosis of poetic language is this challenge to thetic conditionality which entry of the semiotic into the symbolic entails. The origin of the thetic goes back to the child's acquisition of language skills and its entry into the (regulatory) symbolic order. Finally the regulation of pre-verbal/semiotic impulses requires the operation of a negativity in order to keep-at-bay/constrain the otherwise destructive/disruptive energies and drives comprising the semiotic chora: a process Kristeva calls "rejection" (le refoulement).

So for Kristeva, the "extra-textual" and "pre-symbolic" are located in an "unconscious" - and to that extent transcendental - place. Freud's influence here is most apparent and quite profound though I will reserve particular criticism of Freudianism and psychoanalysis for a place later on. The relevant point here relates to what I earlier called the "content" of cultural expression. In terms of poetic language, which occupies a privileged place in Kristeva's model (and in the "Western" genres generally, as a form of special cultural knowledge), "content" and meaning ultimately derive from processes which extend far beyond the mere imprint of the signifier, into the ineffable domain of pre-verbal/non-verbal processes and activities.

In Kristeva's model the thetic condition/phase constitutes the semantic precondition for signifying activity/processes of cultural production and self-expression. The merit of the model, in my view, is in the insights it provides into the possibilities for regulation, challenge and exchange which are inevitably bound up with the processes of meaning-making and communicative activity. And while my summary of the model has been rather terse, the attentive reader will have already noticed the absence of one particular, some might say pivotal, concept; namely: History. Kristeva's model is not so much concerned with the historiography of specialised forms of cultural expression as with the processes and conditions which underlie the activity of such cultural self-expression. In order to introduce some of the issues surrounding the thorny problematics of history and historical/cultural being, I will leave Kristeva (for the moment) to journey across the Atlantic and entertain the theory of genre and mediation proposed by Fredric Jameson.

In The Political Unconscious, Jameson describes mediation as "an area strategic for any literary or cultural analysis" and the concept of mediation is modelled in terms of "the relationship between levels or instances and the possibility of adapting analyses and findings from one level to another" (39). Jameson also calls mediation "transcoding": the domain of one level or instance of experience is transcoded to the domain of another level or instance of experience eg. the base-superstructure paradigm is a classic problematic for mediation and "transcoding". This is also as much a problem for "metalanguage" as it is.

for mediation and transcoding. The problem goes to the heart of discourse in the humanities where the interpretation of textual "structures" can only be carried out using a discourse which is itself context-bound and culture-specific. In other words the interpretation and the interpretive discourse - the hermeneutic, if you will - will always be context-bound and culture-specific.

Language is a pervasive form of mediation and in describing "mediation" as a process of "transcoding", Jameson is deliberately drawing attention to the mediatory function of language and the conscious selection amongst linguistic alternatives. He describes "transcoding" in the following terms:

... the invention of a set of terms, the strategic choice of a particular code or language, such that the same terminology can be used to analyse and articulate two quite distinct types of objects or "texts", or two very different structural levels of reality (40).

By emphasising its connection with language as a "transcoding" operation, Jameson regards mediation as an ephemeral but symbolic reunification of knowledge and experience. He ties this symbolic reunification in with the "fundamental reality" of the totality of human activity and experience. In this way he is able to at least momentarily overcome Goldmann's provision that the totality of human experience can only ever be recovered in a partial and limited way. The means by which this is accomplished is the text and such complex discursive-cultural movements as "modernism". The elegance of Jameson's paradigm is revealed in the way the text is theorised as the symbolic reunification of an underlying determinate, if absent, contradiction or subtext. Hence the treatment of history:

... history is not a text, not a narrative or otherwise, but that as an absent cause, it is inaccessible to us except in textual form and that our approach to it and to the Real itself necessarily passes through its prior textualisation, its narrativisation in the political unconscious (35).

What results from this complex dialectical marriage of Marxism and psychoanalysis is a fairly sophisticated semiotic theory of language and culture. The text, for Jameson, is a surrogate for an underlying, but inaccessible, reality. In this respect the text functions as a sign of an underlying but absent "Real". What is interesting about Jameson's theory is the nature of the connection which mediates the relationship between the "text" and the so-called "Real". The connection is genre:

The strategic value of generic concepts for Marxism clearly lies in the mediatory function of the notion of genre, which allows the coordination of immanent formal analysis of the individual text with the twin diachronic perspective's of the history of forms and the evolution of social life (105).

Genre, for Jameson, is an expression of the historicity of the connection between the "text" and the "Real". The problem now becomes one of inscription, the historicity of written genres and, principally, their generic classification and description. Jameson proceeds past this methodological minefield by historicising the concept of genre and its generic categories "which are so clearly implicated in the literary history and the formal production they were traditionally supposed to classify and describe" (107). The story of genre then becomes the story of "History" - or at least its symbolic representation - and the problem, one of categories and words like "Romance", "Realism", "Myth" and, for Jameson in particular, "reification" and "fragmentation". The end result is the
accumulation of a veritable arsenal of dialectical concepts and categories which effectively deliver up an authentic (Marxist) theory of language, culture and history. Jameson can hardly be criticised for this. Indeed such directness and clarity of commitment and belief merits nothing but praise. Where I would be more cautious is in the use of the concept of the "unconscious". There is no evidence to suggest that the concept of the "unconscious" is not itself yet another historically and culturally specific category. It is all the more surprising, given Jameson's strong words on the historicity of perception and the mediatory power of genre, that a concept of such recent generic origin as the "unconscious" should gain such structural prominence in his theory. Nevertheless his use of the "unconscious" does have the distinct advantage of rendering his own theory culture-specific and in this also lies its greatest value. By framing his discourse in terms drawn from the culture he is seeking to explore, and tying these terms down to a specific belief in the history of that (European/Western) culture, Jameson is able to penetrate the inner logic or, to use a Bakhtinian term, the "inner speech" of that culture. Moreover, Jameson is aware of the problematical historicity of the concept of the "unconscious" and the paradigm to which it belongs. However he is willing to accept its terms in return for the insights it will inevitably yield - at the expense, I believe, of a more authentic cross-cultural perspective on genre:

The conditions of possibility of psychoanalysis become visible .... only when you begin to appreciate the extent of the psychic fragmentation since the beginnings of capitalism, with its systematic quantification and rationalisation of experience, its instrumental re-organisation of the subject just as much as the outside world (62).

The notion of "psychic fragmentation" ties in with the historicity of perception and the related movements of capitalism and modernism. This defines the central connection in what might be called Jameson's psycho-cultural theory of genre. I do not necessarily disagree with the story it tells. Indeed there is much to recommend it, in my opinion. The differences between Jameson's theory of the political unconscious and the sort of theory I am putting forward here are not so great as to render them anti-thetical nor are they so small as to subsume any distinction. The major differences lie in what I've called the "empirical", which in Jameson's scheme is rendered as an absent cause; and in the nature of the connection between the empirical world and the semiotic world, which in Jameson's scheme takes the form of a complex psychoanalytic-dialectical semiotic. Ultimately Jameson sidesteps the problem of mediation by historicising the concept of genre and the categories used in its description and effectively internalising it, making at an endogenous feature of his model.

Imagination, Perception and Ideology

Perception is the most primordial means of communicating with and receiving communication from the environment and other creatures - by sound, by smell, by touch etc. Perception is the most basic form of dialogue. But the semantic possibilities of a discursive, artistic and cultural "praxis" cannot necessarily be attributed to the faculties of perception on their own. While the attribution of any sort of causality to the emergence of language and culture is meaningless, a provisional, if abstract, starting point or "potential" is necessary. To this end I take "imagination" to be the expression and twin bearer of both perception and creativity (language/art/culture).

Such emphasis on the category of the imagination may seem to render even more problematic the already problematical status of an ideology ridden reality. The link
between ideology, imagination or perception and reality is a close one, as Louis Althusser so lucidly describes in his famous essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses"

What is represented in ideology is therefore not the system of real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live.22

Althusser also writes of "the imaginary distortion that we can observe in all ideology" and his "system of real relations" reflects a materialist-structuralist model of economic behaviour and production. Notwithstanding the details of Althusser's Marxist approach to structuralism, he is also concerned with the totality of reality and social being. His division of relational states into the "real" and the "imaginary" - concepts which derive from the discourse of Lacanian psychoanalysis - is similar to those accounts Kristeva calls the "semiotic chora" and the "symbolic order", respectively. Similar not in terms of the content of the respective categories but in terms of their respective forms: Althusser's "imaginary" domain and Kristeva's "symbolic" order are both forms/models of empirically accessible reality whereas his "real" and her "semiotic chora" are not accessible and their presence is signified only tangentially through the material constraints of what Kristeva calls the "thetic", what Jameson calls the "logic of content" and Althusser, more directly, calls "ideology". However theorised, the links between imagination, perception and ideology are close and complex. Genre has a central role to play in moulding and shaping the way we perceive and imagine the world to be. The importance of this connection between "genre" and "perception", between the "symbolic" and the "semiotic", the "real" and the "imaginary" cannot be overstated. It is a connection which finds expression in what has been called the "historicity of perception". I will cite Walter Benjamin on this subject below but Jameson is unequivocal in his response to the issue:

... if, in spite of our thoughts about history, we still feel that the Greeks, or better still, that primitive peoples, were very much like ourselves and in particular lived their bodies and their senses in the same way, then we surely have not made much progress in thinking historically (Jameson 1981, 229).

Jameson's concept of "progress" here is similar to Benjamin's "modes of human sense perception" and where Benjamin will speak about the "contemporary decay of the aura" Jameson speaks in terms of "reification" and "fragmentation". For both Benjamin and Jameson, what changes over time is not the biology of perception, although presumably "evolution" is going on all the time, but the "culture" of perception. In the culture of perception, genre has a key mediatory role to play.

A concept which may help explain some of the points I want to make here is the rather eclectic concept of the "aura" developed by Walter Benjamin. I will explore in some detail a brief excerpt from Benjamin's writings which provides a context for, and exposition of his concept of "aura".

In his insightful essay, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction", Benjamin writes:

During long periods of human history, the mode of human sense perception changes with humanity's entire mode of existence. The manner in which human sense perception is organised, the medium in which it is accomplished is determined not only by nature but by historical circumstance ... if changes in the medium of contemporary perception can be comprehended as a decay of the aura, it is possible to show its social causes.23

The great changes in "the mode of human sense perception" also denote changes in culture and perceptions of culture. In terms of Goldmann's language, what Benjamin is talking about here might be construed in terms of changes which a "world-view" (une vision du monde) inevitably undergoes as the "world" itself changes. What changes, as Benjamin deftly observes, is not the "world" in a physical sense but the way in which the world is perceived and the medium through which perception is accomplished.

Benjamin qualifies his concept of the "aura" by tying it to the phenomenon of distance. He explains it in terms of naturally occurring phenomena or what is translated as the "natural ones":

We define the aura of the [natural ones] as a unique phenomenon of distance, however close it might be (222).

Distance here, although cast in terms of physical distance, must be understood in terms of both physical distance and "experiential", or what I will call "dialogic" distance which encompasses the two.

Benjamin's concept of the "aura" - although connected to the phenomenon of distance - has more to do with the way human experience is communicated and perceived and the social desire to share common experience. The term I have chosen to explain the concept of "aura" - dialogic distance - encapsulates the physical and experiential dimensions of Benjamin's idea. Benjamin explains the "contemporary decay of the aura" in terms of two circumstances which relate to the increasing significance of the "masses" in modern life:

Namely, the desire of the contemporary masses to bring things "closer" spatially and humanly, which is just as ardent as their bent toward overcoming the uniqueness of every reality by accepting its reproduction (223).

I am not convinced that Benjamin's criticism of the "masses" for accepting the cultural artefacts of the industrial age is justified. The consumer - for that is who Benjamin is talking about when he talks about the "masses" - is a follower, not a leader. In economic terms, the consumer can only be defined in terms of the products which are consumed. Benjamin's reference to the "masses" is an unnecessarily class-based approach. When he speaks of the desire for the masses to bring things closer, on both a spatial as well as a human level, I believe he is referring to a tendency common to all social creatures. The contemporary decay of the "aura" is not the "fault" of the masses, but a result of the commodification of perceptual and aesthetic experience which changes in the media of perception have wrought. While Benjamin does not speak in these terms, they do seem to convey the sense of his message:

Every day the urge grows stronger to get hold of an object at very close range by way of its likeness, its reproduction. Unmistakably, reproduction as offered by picture magazines and newsreels differs from the image seen by the unarmed eye. Uniqueness and permanence are as closely linked in the latter as are transitoriness and reproducibility in the former (223).

The distinction Benjamin is making here is that between empirical experience and the genres of reported experience such as news reels and magazines. The impact of the content of the "news" genres is ephemeral even if the form of expression is infinitely repeatable. In the genres of empirical experience, content and expression merge in a unique experience the effect of which is permanent. I will come back to the Hjelmslevian distinction between content, expression and form later. At stake here is the nature and structure of the phenomena upon which human experiences and perceptions are based. Benjamin continues:

To pry an object from its shell, to destroy its aura, is the mark of a perception whose "sense of the universal equality of things" has increased to such a degree that it extracts it even from a unique object by means of reproduction. Thus is manifested in the field of perception what in the theoretical sphere is noticeable in the increasing importance of statistics (223).

Universal equality implies internal homogeneity and eradicates the necessarily heterogenous nature of experience across differing social and cultural groups. Prying an object from its shell, severing the text from its context, for the sake of mass reproduction and consumption, this is what I believe Benjamin is referring to when he speaks of a "decay" in the aura: no longer is the world experienced directly, rather reproduction constrains both the range and the structure of empirical experience, depending on mode eg. graphic forms, audio forms, audio-visual etc.

Benjamin's signalling of the contemporary decay of the aura reflects, I believe, a movement away from a relatively unmediated positioning of subjectivity towards a more highly structured/mediated experience of reality. In both cases, what is experienced is necessarily real, what changes is, literally, the way in which reality is perceived and this defines, in my view, the essence of genre.

Structure and Psychoanalysis

Australian feminist philosopher Elizabeth Grosz describes in empirical terms the relationship between "structure" and "structuralism" and their relation to the problematical "object of study" in the humanities:

Structuralism contends that the object of social science is not an empirical given ... but is a latent system within which the empirical object finds its context. Structuralism seeks out the underlying structures or relations between empirical elements, seeing the empirically given object merely as the manifestation of this broader system.25

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24 Merquior notes, somewhat dryly, that when Lacan died in 1982, "there were really only two persons in the world able really to understand the theories of Dr. Jacques Lacan: himself and God." (149). I am therefore grateful for the exegesis of Lacanian psychoanalysis given by my compatriot Elizabeth Grosz.

Goldmann speaks primarily in terms of the "whole" and the "parts" and his method of passing from one to the other also relies heavily on a structural analysis of the historical and social context of the work. Jameson's theory of the political unconscious relies heavily on concepts of structure although his account reflects a concern with subjectivity which is lacking in Goldmann's "genetic" structuralism. The key issue here is the problematical nature of the connection between what are perceived to be two structurally different levels of reality. The connection between the "material" and the "spiritual" in Goldmann's scheme is one of partial identity and semi-autonomy. The connection between the "symbolic" and the "imaginary" in Jameson's scheme reflects the sort of connection between language and the unconscious described in Lacanian psychoanalysis. I will have more to say about this particular connection presently.

Structure, then, is an important concept because structure is what divides things up into parts and makes them recognisable and perceptible. In this very broad sense, genre can be described as a structure. The peculiar characteristic of generic structures is the mediatory role they play in the constitution of human discourse and social interactivity. Given a certain equivalence between the problematics of genre, mediation and structure as they relate to object of discourse and research in the humanities, the possibility for an unstructured and unmediated experience of reality must also be explored. The question of where to look for such an unmediated positioning of subjectivity arises under a different guise in the discourse of Lacanian psychoanalysis. There it takes the form of an inquiry into the "gaps, flaws" and "silences" which are so crucial to the fabric of discourse and communication. Grosz makes the relation explicit:

Conscious discourse obeys the imperatives of grammar, syntax, logic and coherence; by contrast the unconscious articulates itself only through the gaps and silences, moments of indecision and errors that intervene in consciousness (Grosz 1989, 23).

Two issues are relevant here. Firstly, how empirical givens such as the gaps, flaws and silences in the flow of spoken discourse can be applied to the analysis of written discourse and, in particular, literary discourse. Secondly why these lacunae should be directly associated with an inaccessible realm called the "unconscious".

The first issue relates to the connection between language and the unconscious. Lacan is famous for having claimed that "the unconscious is structured like a language". Jameson's theory of the political unconscious is, in a sense, a meditation on the implications of this dictum. I would be more inclined to the view that the unconscious is "caused" by language. Bakhtin presents a critique of the "unconscious" based on a similar view which I will discuss shortly.

In his re-interpretation of him, Lacan effectively takes Freud out of the bedroom and puts him in the library. Freud's pre-occupation with sexuality is rendered by Lacan in terms of discourse and culture and their impact on the constitution of subjectivity. On a psycho-cultural level, then, and not a Freudian psycho-sexual one, the defining feature of Lacanian subjectivity is called the "mirror stage" which refers to the child's identification with its own image. The mirror-stage signifies the first phase in the transition from a pre-oedipal "imaginary" realm into the acculturating "symbolic" order. Grosz explains the impact this transition has on the constitution and structure of subjectivity:
The overcoding of the imaginary by the symbolic entails the advent of repression and the construction of the unconscious (22-23).

The unconscious thus emerges in the course of the "normal" processes of acculturation. Not only does entry into the "symbolic order" signify the acquisition of language skills, it also entails the repression/suppression of a primordial narcissism and chaos associated with a pre-redipal "imaginary" stage. The act of repression itself, even though it is by definition not a conscious act, engenders a rift in the psychic constitution of subjectivity. It is in this sense that the unconscious seems to be "caused" or initiated through language. But the crux of my critique is based on the pathology engendered in the constitution of Lacanian subjectivity by the present-absence of the unconscious. This pathology derives from the effect of the mirror stage on the formation of subjectivity:

... the mirror-stage thus provides the child with the grounds of its identity as a being separate from other beings, it is also the basis of an alienation, a rift which it will forever unsuccessfully attempt to overcome. It is necessarily split between what it feels ... and what it sees ... [the mirror-stage] results in an image of the self modelled on another, a necessarily social subject. For this reason Lacan also claims that the ego is an alienated and paranoid construct - always defined by/as the other (22).

I am not at all critical of Lacan's conclusions. They seem almost inescapable given the unconscious rift which they presuppose. Where I would be critical is on a point relating to the nature of "otherness" in the constitution of subjectivity. The Lacanian paradigm seems to locate "otherness" not only outside the self but in a necessarily estranged relation to the self. These social, cultural and discursive "others" underwrite the advent of unconscious repression. Such a system might be appropriate for a society of strangers or a culture of hermits, perhaps, but the story that it tells already assumes the existential alienation it ostensibly theorises.

Speaking of the challenge presented to post-Cartesian philosophy by psychoanalysis, Grosz articulates the status of the unconscious and its relation to "otherness" in the complex scheme of the (psycho)analytic paradigm,

... otherness is the duplication of consciousness. The unconscious is the displacement of consciousness from the centre or core of subjectivity... The subject's identity is not given in consciousness in the form of an ego, but comes from being positioned in language as an 'I'. The subject is not the master of language, its controlling speaker, but its result or product (19).

"Otherness" as the "duplication" of consciousness reflects the social foundations of the concept of "otherness". But this formulation still does not explain or justify the underlying relationship of estrangement between the self and the social/cultural other. A society or culture which is estranged from its component subjects (people) should not, in my opinion, serve as a model for all societies and cultures. It is quite possible to retain the important concept of "otherness" and at the same time reject the underlying assumption that "otherness" is inherently barbaric/chaotic/strange. These elements do have a role to play in the development of belief and belief systems but when it comes to the constitution of subjectivity they remain at the periphery and only enter into the problematic at specific junctures and particular points.

In many respects it seems that the contents of the unconscious must be repressed. The unconscious thus functions as a receptacle (cf. Kristeva's semiotic
chora) for all that is primal, incestuous and orifice-related. It becomes, in my view, a very convenient "other place" in which to hide and thereby explain away all manner of deviation and discourse. Finally the emergence of the unconscious is predicated on the existence of a patriarchal, phallocentric cultural law (represented through the Lacanian paternal name/law le nom/non du père) in which is inscribed the relation of Otherness which initiates repressive tendencies. Indeed it is through the concept of the Phallus as the signifier of language itself that the Lacanian paradigm acquires its hermeneutic insight and potential:

In substituting the Phallus for the penis, Lacan has provided a socio-cultural and political analysis in place of an ontological and biological one (25).

The concept of the Phallus as the sublimation of a phallocentric system of law and value is, in my view, a culture-specific construct. The Phallus also denotes the emergence of the unconscious through the continual need to keep repressed certain primal energies which are in conflict with a manifestly censorious symbolic order. Such symbolic censorship and closure underpin Bakhtin's critique of the Freudian psychoanalytic paradigm. However the most curious aspect to the unconscious part of Lacanian subjectivity is the impossibility of knowing what its contents are. Transparent self-knowledge breaks down with the advent of the unconscious and this is where the gaps, flaws, and silences in discourse enter into the problematic. By ascribing to these empirical givens the constitution of a pathological subjectivity ie. by relating these things to the unconscious, the resulting interpretation can only be one which includes a survey of their pathology. The gaps and silences and "slips of the tongue" are read as surface manifestations of an underlying absent-presence called the "unconscious". Once again, I am sceptical about the appropriateness of turning an "unconscious" connection into a panacea for the interpretation and evaluation of all caveats in discourse. Nevertheless it is precisely this connection which paves the way for psychoanalytic literary theory.

As Grosz explains, the connection between language and the unconscious can be expressed in the Freudian terms/processes of "condensation" and "displacement":

Condensation occurs when several terms are compressed together on the basis of certain express similarities, while other similarities remain implicit. Displacement occurs when one term transfers its meaning or significance to another which is somehow associated with it and which can then represent it (23).

Furthermore, Lacan draws on the work of Russian linguist Roman Jakobson and conflates condensation with a metaphorical signifying structure and displacement with a metonymic structure. Lacan also draws a parallel between metaphor and repression - as the burial of one term over another - and metonymy with desire - as the endless substitution of one thing for another, also emblematic of the unconscious "lack" implicit in the post-oedipal positioning of subjectivity. By tying elements of discourse in with elements of the psyche, Lacan succeeds in constructing a paradigm of enormous explanatory potential, even if that potential is restricted in cross-cultural terms. While Grosz does not make this point she does articulate the nature of the connection between psychoanalysis, the unconscious and language:

Through the very precise operations of metaphor and metonymy the movements of the unconscious can now be understood in detail, using nothing but the speech of the analysand. Psychoanalysis is, indeed, as its
most articulate hysteric, Anna O., described it, "the talking cure" ... its objects, methods, processes and aims are shown by Lacan to be structurally identical with language itself (24).

Returning now to the questions I raised above.

It is through the link with metaphor and metonymy that empirical givens such as gaps, flaws and silences in spoken discourse can be translated to the purely symbolic realm of written and literary discourse.

As to why these lacunae and discursive operations should be directly connected to the unconscious and be thereby ascribed a pathological status within the constitution of Lacanian subjectivity, this seems to be axiomatic within the Lacanian system.

I have already mentioned my scepticism regarding pathological status ascribed to the content and structure of the unconscious - as if by nature the human creature, without the civilising repressiveness and censorship of the (official) symbolic order, would be an anarchic and depraved beast. Such an outcome for subjectivity strikes me as being the very antithesis of social being. Bakhtin makes a similar point in his critique of Freudianism which I want to briefly explore before returning to the question of how to obtain an unmediated positioning of subjectivity.

In his Freudianism: A Marxist Critique, Bakhtin states his position on (Freudian) psychoanalysis in the following terms:

Freud's whole psychological construct ... is nothing but a special kind of interpretation of utterances. 26

This is certainly consistent with the description of psychoanalysis given above, as the "talking cure". Bakhtin is not only critical of psychoanalysis as merely a special sort of dialogic engagement, he also criticises the ontological status ascribed to the unconscious in the psychoanalytic paradigm. For Bakhtin the distinction between conscious and unconscious psychic levels is "ideological":

[Bakhtin] boldly reformulates the distinction between the unconscious and the conscious as a difference not between two kinds of reality, since both concepts are variants of the same phenomenon, consciousness. The difference between the two is ideological rather than ontological. The unconscious is a suppressed, relatively idiosyncratic realm, insofar as ideology can ever not be shared, whereas the conscious is a public world whose ideologies may be shared openly with others. Freud's "unconscious" can thus "be called the 'unofficial conscious' in distinction from the ordinary 'official conscious'" (Clark and Holquist, 180-181).

In the distinction between the "unofficial" and "official" spheres of consciousness resides the socially and historically conditioned "private" and "public" spheres of existence. For Bakhtin, and I am inclined to agree, the difference between these two spheres of consciousness is carried by censorship and ideology. Moreover, to build a model of human cultural subjectivity on the basis of a schism wrought by a censorious and paternalistic symbolic order is to forever alienate the speaking subject.

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from the text of its own culture and subjectivity. Bakhtin does not necessarily speak in these terms, but he does express a view of language which emphasises its fundamentally social origins and the need to take into account its fundamentally social nature:

We shall never reach the real, substantive roots of any given single utterance if we look for them within the confines of the single, individual organism, even when that utterance concerns what appears to be the most private and most intimate side of a person’s life (1987, 87-88).

In his critique of Freudianism, Bakhtin restores to subjectivity the integrity of its social, historical and cultural identity. Bakhtin not only allows human consciousness to speak for itself, he also enables it to act for itself:

Consciousness is in fact that commentary which every adult brings to bear on every instance of his behaviour ... (88).

The "commentary" which Bakhtin refers to here may be thought of as a meta-functional totality, from the point of view of the individual speaking subject, which guides and directs behaviour according to the opportunities and constraints afforded by each particular situation and experience. The commentary is thus of a specifically ideological and cultural character and Bakhtin describes the combination of speech and action brought about by this quasi-transcendent commentary on consciousness as "behavioural ideology". At this level of Bakhtin's analysis there is no necessary rift in the structure of subjectivity. For Bakhtin the "unconscious" is indicative of a pathological subjectivity and does not represent a "healthy" outcome for the individual speaking subject. The "unconscious" thus emerges only at particular points and specific junctures within the Bakhtinian paradigm. The structural rift which initiates the advent of unconscious repression is specifically related to the censorship of consciousness and the closure forced upon it as a result of a coercive "symbolic order". Where such coercive apparatuses and censorship do not exist, much of the language of psychoanalysis loses its significance and the distinctions upon which it is based lose their meaning. This very important point is made in the following excerpt from Freudianism which begins with the Bakhtinian distinction between "inner speech" - the language of thoughts, dreams and ideas - and "outer speech" - the language of conversation, discourse and social relationships:

Let us call that inward and outward speech that permeates our behaviour in all its aspects "behavioural ideology" ... In a healthy community and in a socially healthy personality, behavioural ideology, founded on the socio-economic basis, is strong and sound - here, there is no discrepancy between the official and the unofficial conscious ... The content and composition of the unofficial levels of behavioural ideology (in Freudian terms, the content and composition of the unconscious) are conditioned by historical time and class to the same degree as are its levels "under censorship" and its systems of formulated ideology (morality, law, world outlook). For example the homosexual inclinations of an ancient Hellene of the ruling class produced absolutely no conflicts in his behavioural ideology; they freely emerged into outward speech and even found formulated ideological expression ... (88-89).

There is much merit in Bakhtin's critique of the psychoanalytic paradigm, in my opinion. The foregoing provides evidence to suggest that Bakhtin shared my
scepticism regarding the structure and composition of the unconscious as a universal feature of human subjectivity. Bakhtin's emphasis on the social nature of language helps to restore some integrity to constitution of cultural self-knowledge and identity. A psychology which focuses exclusively on the individual, as Bakhtin has observed, will inevitably miss most of the substantial issues influencing the individual case. Moreover, individualism, as a politico-ideological positioning and movement, carries within itself, I believe, the seeds of its own pathology and ultimate deconstruction.

The Epicurean Subject

I introduced Lacanian theory as a means of approaching the question of how to theorise an unmediated positioning of subjectivity. Such an unmediated positioning has been related to Walter Benjamin's concept of "aura" which was described in terms of "dialogic" distance. In Kristeva's model, symbolic function constrains the possibility for an unmediated positioning of subjectivity. For Jameson however, an unmediated subjectivity is at least implicit in the theory of History as Necessity. I will come back to Jameson's model shortly. The key to apprehending what I mean by an unmediated positioning of subjectivity lies in the concept and value of silence.

Within a psychoanalytic framework, an unmediated positioning of subjectivity is rendered problematical because of the potential for unconscious processes of mediation. In the context of the empirical framework being introduced here, the so-called "gaps, flaws and silences" will acquire a different significance relative to the pathological status ascribed them in psychoanalysis.

Silences and silence in general will have a key role to play in the empirical model. By silence I don't mean the complete absence of sound. Rather the "ordinary" sense of the word as the relative absence of sound. The complete absence of sound is, apparently, a potentially destabilising experience for those who can hear. But as the background and context for what might be called the "noise of culture", silence is indeed a valuable concept.

Silence is what happens when conversation ceases, when a TV is turned off, when a passing train has gone, when a bell stops ringing. If it hasn't happened already, silence will one day be commodified. It already features positively as an attribute sought by urbanites for their leisure time. Silence is also what makes conversation possible otherwise everyone would be talking at once. Silence is what makes the act of speech such a significant thing. The attraction of the Epicurean empirical paradigm, it will be seen, is that it recovers the empirical significance of silence and projects this onto a model of culture and subjectivity.

In terms of the model of subjectivity being developed here, perceptions of culture coincide with perceptions of reality and these empirically given perceptions represent "the truth" for the individual speaking subject. Belief and ideology are integral to the acculturation of subjectivity and through them a mediated positioning of subjectivity is achieved which effectively locates the speaking subject according to the underlying laws, values and expectations associated with the various systems of belief and ideology. In contrast to this mediated positioning of subjectivity, I have also emphasised the importance of theorising an unmediated positioning of subjectivity. Such a positioning can be described in terms of the concept and value of silence (or at least relative silence), signifying an empirical state free from disturbance. I will refer to the archetype for an unmediated positioning of
subjectivity as the "Epicurean subject" because at the heart of Epicurean empiricism lies a state free from disturbance - both physical and spiritual - called ataraxia.

An Epicurean theory of subjectivity will not operate according to principles of censorship and coercion, though these are manifest in the purely negative realm of Necessity, but more so according to processes of stability and similarity. Moreover, the basis of an (Epicurean) empirical calculus is not located in the abstract structures of symbolic representation, but in the inner speech, to coin a Bakhtinian term, of feelings and impressions. These latter are highly problematical given their intimate connection with desire and the constitution of subjectivity. In the empirical model it will be seen that desire is not constituted on the basis of some archaic "lack" at the core of subjectivity, nor on the basis of some intrinsically transgressive (Id-inspired) "drive". Rather desire will ultimately seek for itself a state of order, continuity and "untroubledness" (ataraxia). In terms of a distinction that will be explored later, between pleasures of motion (kinetic) and pleasures of stability (katastematic), desire can be recast in terms of desire for consensus (stability/rest) and desire for "seduction" (movement/music). The hegemony of desire and perceptions of pleasure will have a determining influence on how culture and self-identity are perceived, along the lines of what Bakhtin has called "behavioural ideology". Through seduction, the consumer fetish is able to become the basis for the expression of cultural identity. The speaking subject becomes the post-modern one: a particulated and psychically fragmented subject alienated from its "Real" place in favour of another "imaginary" place. The patterns, values and expectations generated in this imaginary/imaginative place comprise a totality whose component genres reflect the fragmented identity of a partially constituted subjectivity.

Through consensus and seduction, the needs of the subject can be transformed into highly structured desires and expectations. This is achieved via the interface between the speaking subject and the media of perception. Subjectivity constructed on the basis of the mediated consumption of highly structured forms of cultural expression will be a predominantly passive structure whereas in terms of an empirical model of the sort I am looking towards, the speaking subject must be granted the integrity of an active positioning in the construction of social and cultural identity. Whatever the outcome for the structure/health of subjectivity, it will be reflected in what has been called the "behavioural ideology" of the individual speaking subject. In terms the effect on the cultural health of subjectivity, I believe there are two conditions which pose particular problems.

The first relates to the solipsistic nature of the position occupied by the passive consumer of mediated culture. This position is, by definition, an anti-social one and, I would go so far as to say, a counter-cultural one since the speaking subject no longer speaks or actively engages but merely watches, listens and consumes. The relation lends itself to the cultivation of a fetishistic solipsism driven by a narcissism nourished by the structured desires and expectations of the consumers themselves. The "system" feeds off itself, cannibalising the very subjects it seeks to nurture. Fear and desire - fear of rejection (shame) and desire for inclusion (respect) - combine in an endless circularity of possession and ephemeral satiation. Values change with the channels of communication and attitudes acquire the tones of fashion, sophistication and social venerability or, for the dialectically challenged, Revolution! The result is a politico-ideological individualism which reflects a breakdown in human intra-cultural

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27 I am using "hegemony" here in its specifically Gramscian sense of legitimised, consensus based leadership.
relations. Alienation and isolation - and their counterparts in the psyche, paranoia and schizophrenia - are the hallmarks of individualism on the level of culture.

The second condition follows from the first and relates to the impact on empirical experience made by the consumption of mediated culture. I have already indicated that the speaking subject does not speak when consuming mediated messages, the positioning of subjectivity is passive: receiving impressions but not making expressions, the dialogue of subjectivity is closed at one end. It is this particulated and fragmented model of human perception which underlies the partial nature of the constitution of post-modern subjectivity. The post-modern subject can never be psychically complete in any sense of the word since its very constitution is predicated on a structural disjunction between two spheres of consciousness - the "conscious" and the "unconscious", to use the language of psychoanalysis, the "symbolic" and the "semiotic", to use the language of Kristeva, the symbolic/imaginary and the Real, to use the language of Jameson and Althusser.

The models of culture and semiosis conveyed in the particular works of Kristeva, Jameson, Althusser and Lacan are based on what I would call a "paradigm of repression" in which the act of self-inscription occasions the negation of an unmediated positioning of subjectivity. Bakhtin, it will be recalled, circumvents the problematic of repression by restricting its effect to a particular type of structural relationship between public and private forms of knowledge. The particular context in which a model of repression becomes appropriate is that of pervasive censorship and coercion where what Bakhtin calls the "unofficial" and "official" spheres of human activity clash and resist and revolt. What Kristeva calls "the revolution in poetic language" is precisely this dynamic of repression and resistance between a secret/private/unofficial (unconscious) semiotic order and a common/public/official (conscious) symbolic order. What these models of repression seem to reveal so clearly is the impact of genre on perception and, ultimately, on the "content" of empirical experience. Jameson and Benjamin describe this impact in terms of the "historicity of perception".

There is also a sense in which genre operates to effect a semantic closure of empirical experience and it is in this respect that genre can be said to function like a structure on the imagination, foreclosing not only imagination but constraining the empirical experience of reality itself. Where coercion has a role to play in closing-off empirical experience, it might be that particular memories, experiences and desires become relegated to a repressed, unconscious realm.

This does not appear to be the case for the archetypal survivor of Siberian prison camps, Ivan Denisovitch. Despite being reduced to the ultimate genre of a statistic, Denisovitch retains the integrity of his experience and survives the dehumanising, homogenising structures and processes of prison camp existence. He relies on the truth and detail of his own authentic existence - the marginalised realities of "normal" life become ritualised ceremonies of finite enjoyment and satisfaction which sustain the enterprise of an otherwise harsh and inhuman existence. While the character of Denisovitch is a fictional creation, he was born of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's own experience of imprisonment in Stalinist Russia.

There is perhaps more room for talk about the unconscious in the context of another great creation of literature, Madame Bovary. Gustave Flaubert somewhat famously claimed to closely identify himself with his creation - "Madame Bovary, c'est moi!". At the time, Flaubert's work caused quite a scandal and he was taken to court facing charges of insulting public morality. In one scene, the adulterous Madame Bovary temporarily consummates her largely unrequited passion, signalled by the scandalous image of an ungloved hand appearing from a passing carriage.
window. From the outset of the story it is evident that the principal figure had always been unable to reconcile her hunger for romance and passion with a reality that was otherwise unromantic and quite dispassionate. Ironically, the source of Mme Bovary's anxious and troubled pursuit of her "knight in shining armour" is given as her childhood consumption of tales about chivalry and romance. The character of Madame Bovary may be seen as an experiment in what happens when a special genre-based reality is superimposed over the common/empirical one. Superimposing special desires, values and expectations onto the common experience of reality ultimately gives rise to a pathological model of subjectivity. This is reflected in Mme Bovary's behavioural ideology which is thoroughly schizophrenic - on the one hand living a lie and lying to the boorish creature with whom she is wed and, on the other, attempting to fulfil a generic dreaming (fantasy) which had its basis in a reality that could never have existed for her. Her actions and ultimate demise can be interpreted either as an immanent critique of literary values or as a justification for foolish and extravagant behaviour. Whether as heroine or idiot, Mme Bovary remains, in my view, a prototype for the post-modern subject. And the quest for satisfaction and self-fulfilment remains a post-modern project even if such a project has its origins in the needs of a creature that is only too human.

In reality, people are people, no more no less, and an objective of this dissertation is to restore some integrity to the ordinary empirical experience of a common humanity in a world which often seems to value above all else its generic dismemberment and incarceration.

Paradigms of Culture and Semiosis

The issue and concept of the "unconscious" initially arose in the context of a discussion about mediation and the possibility of adequately theorising an unmediated positioning of subjectivity. Unconscious processes of mediation render transparent self-knowledge and interpretation irreducibly problematical, at least in the absence an understanding of the specialised key or code the psychoanalyst uses to access and decode the sub-conscious encryptions of the unconscious mind. The predominance of psychoanalysis has been a very twentieth century phenomenon and, as Jameson has already observed, the conditions of possibility for psychoanalysis are specific to the history and culture of "European" civilisation - what I've glossed the "Western" genre and which he describes in terms of the related movements of capitalism and modernism. While this effectively rules out the paradigm of psychoanalysis for use in a cross-cultural model of genre, the so-called "paradigm of repression" - based in psychoanalytic theory - does provide useful insights into the processes of exchange, regulation and resistance underlying semiotic and symbolic activity.

I want to now broaden the discussion beyond the problematic of mediation and return to a less structural and more empirical consideration of the issues involved. I have already raised the issue of the "special" knowledge associated with the constitution of cultural identities. By labelling the collective of such property, in one instance, the "Western" genre I am deliberately inviting the post-modern critique of all such attempts at

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28 The title of this chapter is borrowed from Terry Threadgold's important paper "Paradigms of Culture and Semiosis: Grammatics for Cryptogrammars or Metalanguages for the Ineffable." In this section I will be preparing the ground for some of the persuasive arguments mounted by Threadgold in favour of a generalised theory of semantics and semiosis which is sensitive to both linguistic and non-linguistic levels of communicative practice.
labelling, masquerading as they allegedly do for a transcendental essence which supposedly defines and contains that which, in this instance, is Western in the "Western" genre.

In terms of the argument I want to develop at this juncture, what post-modernism ultimately rejects is not the possibility for "meaning" - clearly people do mean and genres do exist - but rather the possibility for an authentic/originary type of meaning. It's in the rather unfashionable context of "authenticity" that the equally unfashionable issue of "essence" emerges: authenticity being, as it were, an "essentialised" meaning, different somehow from other sorts of meaning and semiotic processes - something like the special knowledge which is specific to the experience of particular cultural realities and therefore related/connected to the semantic systems of those cultures in an essential and special way. In other words, special knowledge requires special modes of expression and many systems of meaning-making practice have evolved to serve this purpose. This is where the act of self-inscription enters the problematic and the transmission of cultural knowledge acquires an ideo-graphic and an aesthetic flavour. Now the problematic of mediation comes in, in order to explain how meaning is transmitted / constructed / preserved through the special codes and genres which have evolved for this purpose. This is why language - as in natural language - and theories about language must be central to any serious analysis of genre. But I want to leave language, code and grammar aside for the moment and return to something closer to an unmediated positioning of subjectivity through the idea of "common" knowledge which underlies that of special knowledge.

Common sense, common experience, common humanity; all these ideas are associated with common knowledge. But "knowledge" is too strong a term here; from an empirical viewpoint I would prefer to say "common sense" but am loath to do so given the academic degradation of the term. I will leave the problem of label aside for the moment and concentrate instead on the structures and processes associated with the constitution of this other sort of (common) meaning.

Ironically, the concept which seems to best sum up the nature of the structures and processes associated with common knowledge/meaning is the "unconscious" but not, I hasten to add, the unconscious of psychoanalysis which is functionally related to repressive models of cultural mediation, but the unconscious of linguistics, which denotes not those elements outside consciousness, but those elements and features outside the special language/code into which it is the object of linguistics and semiotics to inquire. Those features of situation and culture which comprise the broader systems of semiosis, from which background the text emerges, form part of this unconscious-because-absent background. Jameson will call this the "political unconscious" and Threadgold, following Halliday, Whorf and others, will speak about a "cryptogrammar" which is encoded through non-verbal/non-graphic systems of semiosis and meaning potential.

North American linguist and scholar, Benjamin Lee Whorf developed the notion of "cryptotype" in order to show how it is that all human beings do not mean alike, and how their unconscious ways of meaning are among the most significant manifestations of their culture. I am paraphrasing Halliday here who was profoundly affected by Whorf's theories:

Whorf's notion of the cryptotype, and his conception of how grammar models reality, have hardly yet begun to be taken seriously; in my opinion
they will eventually turn out to be among the major contributions of twentieth century linguistics.29

Ultimately this path will lead to a systemic-functional appraisal of the codes which have evolved to serve the purposes of human communication and cultural self-expression. Taken in this context, genre becomes a matter for semantic function, operating across the verbal and non-verbal domains of semiosis. In terms of the "Western" genre, this returns us to the reconstructions of anthropology and ethnography and the problematic of "special" cultural knowledge. But in terms of common knowledge and empirical experience, there is I would suggest a necessary continuity across the species, transcending the boundaries of culture and condition.

For instant, feelings of pleasure and pain (comfort and sorrow) are common knowledge to all people and, it would seem, all sentient creatures. The nature of our being as an evolved species, on this planet, would seem to imply that such (common) knowledge is a necessary (a priori) condition for empirical experience. In other words, empirical experience is structured in such a way as to "immanently coordinate" responses according to perceptions of pleasure and pain. I would go so far as to suggest that this argument is self-evident - that all people are not only capable of discriminating between pleasure and pain, but that, as sentient creatures, they are inherently biased towards pleasure ie towards conditions that suit/are fit/and comfortable. This is a version of the position occupied by Epicurean empiricism and Epicurus ventures even further to suggest that "pleasure" (ataraxia in the sense of silence signifying freedom from disturbance) is the criteria for not only action (choice and avoidance) but truth, as well. I will return to a more detailed discussion of the Epicurean arguments later. The point I want to make here is that common knowledge, in the sense of that which is associated with the non-verbal/extra-textual environment, and in the sense of common experiences such as those of comfort and sorrow, points towards the possibility for more adequately theorising an unmediated positioning of subjectivity. Moreover this path would seem to have the advantage of overcoming what I consider to be the problematical discontinuity in the historicity of aesthetic experience in Jameson's model. But this is only a minor point in Jameson's overall scheme which provides many important insights into the historical constitution of cultural being. Even the concept of "History" as "Necessity" fits into what I have called "common" knowledge as the knowledge of need (material/physical and cultural/self-expressive/spiritual). I want to pause briefly on the theory of the political unconscious in order to draw out some of the important issues and arguments and to extend the discussion beyond the abstract type of an Epicurean subject, towards a more concrete model of subjectivity and cultural self-expression.

The Political Unconscious

Jameson defends the critical insights of Marxism as constituting the semantic precondition for intelligibility of literary and cultural artefacts. At the heart of Jameson's theory lies the (Marxist) science of dialectical materialism but the beauty of his approach lies in the way this Marxist heartland finds expression through the signifying practices of society and culture. The "semantic precondition" is History (sic) as the experience of Necessity (sic). History as the "experience" of Necessity points towards an unmediated positioning of subjectivity which necessarily transcends symbolic and economic modes.

of production - "and it is this alone", to quote Jameson "which can forestall its thematisation or reification as a mere object of representation or as one master code among many others" (Jameson 1981, 102). At this level of analysis the connection with Marxist theory is most apparent: History seen as the ultimate semantic horizon for the expression of cultural being. In terms of the interpretation of individual texts and symbols of culture, Jameson describes History as "the formal effects of what Althusser, following Spinoza, calls an 'absent cause'" (102). The point on which I would question the theory underlying Jameson's model is that "[c]onceived in this sense, History is what hurts, it is what refuses desire and sets inexorable limits to individual and collective praxis" (102, emphasis added). There is underlying negativity at work here which seems to me to be at loggerheads with the very foundations of empirical philosophy, marking a return to an existential scepticism which it was, originally, the project of empirical philosophy to overcome. It may well be that a particularly potent admixture of philosophical scepticism and epistemological structuralism has produced the current stasis in post-modern theory: there no longer being anything left to believe, let alone know. In response to the sceptical rejection of what the ancients called the "clear truth",30 empiricism begins by grounding the possibilities for knowledge and meaning in the phenomenal domain of observation, experience and belief. In a sense empiricism is about the "calculation" of belief, it is an integrative logic, a logic of putting things together, of making things "mean". Empiricism is this process of making wholes out of parts, but not absolute unities or totalising realities, rather wholes which combine in complex interacting systems of wholes and so on. Hence the affinity, as I see it, between empirical philosophy and systemic-functional theory. Empiricism, in my view, is avowedly re-constructive, not de-constructive.

The deconstructive logic is predicated on the movement of an underlying negativity which ruptures the cognitive unity of particular concepts into paradoxical binaries whose terms are valued as either normative or negative. Such a logic, however, is little more than the reflection of structure. I understand structure here, following Jameson, in the Althusserian sense of "structural causality" wherein:

the whole existence of the structure consists of its effects ... the structure
[which] is merely a specific combination of its effects, is nothing outside its
effects.31

The paradox underlying structural causality lies in the illusion of its effects. Althusser also describes the relationship between structure and effect as one of "metonymic causality" and while, as an empirical given, a particular structure is nothing outside its system of effects, the result, nevertheless, is the appearance of an interiority/of a cause/origin/source. The paradox is an imaginary belief in an underlying but absent Real. The negativity underlying the paradigm which sets such inexorable limits on the possibilities for human being and demarcates the absence of the Real, signifying History as an "absent-cause", appears to derive from the act of self-inscription and semiotic engagement. The underlying assumption here seems to be based on a view about the human condition which runs counter to the principles of empirical philosophy. The assumption seems to be that acts of self-inscription and symbolic/semiotic engagement inaugurate the negation of an unmediated positioning of subjectivity. The breakdown of

30 From the Greek to saphés passed down through the writings of Xenophanes and Alcmeon. See "Beyond Scepticism", below, for more detailed discussion of the issues involved here.

transparent self-knowledge, the apparent loss of an unmediated positioning of subjectivity are necessary preconditions for the emergence of psychoanalysis. Jameson has already canvassed the problematical historical specificity of the "conditions of possibility of psychoanalysis". Here I want to briefly canvass another issue related to the hermeneutic potential/explanatory power of psychoanalysis. This issue relates specifically to the use of the psychoanalytic paradigm as an interpretive model or what Threadgold and Halliday will call a "metalanguage".

By effectively subverting the psychic integrity of observation, experience and belief, psychoanalysis replaces the (empirical) philosopher with the (psycho-) analyst. The analyst becomes the privileged reader of semiotic fields which transcend the domain of ordinary, uninitiated self-hood. Theoretically this would seem to place the analyst in a position of almost limitless power and control over the relatively ignorant analysand. This relationship is called "transference" in psychoanalytic theory but - and I agree with Bakhtin here - this is just another name for a special case of dialogue. The question that concerns me at this point, however, is how can the analyst, in theory, be wrong?

The basis of the analyst's power lies in the observation and interpretation of empirical givens in terms of a structure whose contents cannot, by definition, be defined. The (Freudian/Lacanian) unconscious becomes this convenient "other place" in which to hide and explain away all manner of discourse and deviation, it seems to function like a virtual void at the heart of the human soul (psyche), marking the reflection of an existential alterity and estrangement, a seemingly irretrievable rift in the psychic constitution of subjectivity, as though Narcissus' gaze had answered "Who is this stranger before me?": the very question negates the possibility for an unmediated positioning of subjectivity by displacing subjectivity from the core of its psychic constitution. The dialogue is no longer between two persons -self and other, the dialogue at the core of psychoanalysis stretches from one part of the psyche (soul/mind) to the Other (unconscious part). What the analyst endeavours to do, to put it crudely, is to access this inner dialogue via empirical givens such as the gaps, flaws and silences in discourse; these are interpreted as signs of underlying unconscious processes of mediation. The shepherd of the soul (psyche) becomes the shepherd of the psyche (psyche), priest becomes analyst. My concern is that, in theory, the analyst can be no more wrong than the priest since both are equally metaphysical in their approaches to the assessment of the human condition: one approach locating itself in a transcendental exteriority (a "divine" substance: Spinoza), the other in an equally transcendental interiority (an "unconscious" substance: Freud).

The historical materialism at the heart of Jameson's theory has the virtue of setting empirical constraints on what I consider to be the problematical transcendentalism of psychoanalytic theory. But Jameson is careful not to give purely psychoanalytic readings of individual texts and their creators. The theory of the political unconscious is a psychocultural model of genre and symbolic function rather than a psycho-analytic one. The problem as I see it is not so much the feature of repression per se since theories about repression and violence must enter into any serious discussion about models of semiosis. Rather, as a corollary to the paradigm of repression which has fuelled an entire genre of models of genre, it is assumed that the act of symbolic mediation presupposes the negation of an unmediated positioning of subjectivity; this radically problematises the interpretive act. That over twenty-five percent of Jameson's text is devoted to a single section entitled "On Interpretation" is an indication of the complexity and status of the
problematique of symbolic representation and interpretation. Jameson's response to the problematic is an interesting one.

The symbolic text and cultural artefact are read as a "combinatoire" of semiotic levels whose elements are precisely those which delimit structural norm and textual deviation and History as an "absent-cause". The first two features embrace what I earlier described as a deconstructive logic, the terms of which are valued as either normative or negative. The final term, History, signifies the limits of possibility for semiotic engagement ie History functions as a limiting instance on semantic potential or what I would call the "historico-cultural imagination":

the combinatoire aims not at enumerating the "causes" of a given text or form, but rather at mapping out its objective conditions of possibility, which is quite a different matter (148).

The combinatoire delimits the structural possibilities for cultural self-expression. In addition to this Jameson organises the semantic potential of expressive forms according to a tri-stratal semiotic that can be viewed as a movement through three progressively wider horizons or "frames": briefly these are - (i) the symbolic act which can be "more or less construed as coinciding with the individual literary work or utterance" (76); (ii) the ideologeme or "dialogical organisation of class discourse" (98); (iii) the ideology of form which "seeks to reveal the active presence within the text of a number of discontinuous and heterogenous formal processes" (99). The final moment in the analysis of symbolic structures and processes arrives with the dialectical transformation of the combinatoire itself: historicising the very elements about which the symbolic structure is organised. This final move opens out onto what Jameson calls the "logic of content":

the semantic raw materials of social life and language, the constraints of determinate social contradiction, the conjunctives of social class, the historicity of structures of feeling and perception and ultimately of bodily experience, the constitution of the psyche or subject, and the dynamics of temporal rhythms of historicity (147, emphasis added).

The scale and scope of Jameson's project is admirable, as is the paradigm which he brings to its apprehension. But the "moral of the story" is uttered in the first two words of the text: "Always historicize!" In contradistinction to what Merquior brands a Nietzschean aestheticist anti-historicism, Jameson's aestheticism is profoundly historicist. This point is borne out by the correspondence drawn between "aesthetics" and "ideology", between "structures of feeling and perception" and the structures of history and historical being:

ideology is not something which informs or invests symbolic production; rather the aesthetic act is itself ideological and the production of aesthetic or narrative form is to seen as an ideological act in its own right, with the function of inventing imaginary or formal 'solutions' to unresolvable social contradictions (79).

The "text" which Jameson cites in defence of his argument here is the facial decoration of the Caduveo Indians. According to Lévi-Strauss - the father of structural anthropology and, some say, structuralism - the formal contradictions and asymmetries can be interpreted as:
the fantasy production of a society seeking passionately to give symbolic expression to the institution it might have had in reality had not interest and superstition stood in the way.\textsuperscript{32}

History as "absent-cause" is noticeably present in the structural analysis of the artefacts of cultural expression. But it is the aesthetic function of the symbolic structure which is the focus of attention here. As Jameson notes, real social contradictions, insurmountable in their own terms, find a purely formal resolution in the aesthetic realm. The combination and correspondence between aesthetics and ideology is I believe a necessary move insofar as it unites corporeal (empirical) experience with historico-cultural being. Where I would err on the side of caution is in the drive to historicize even the structures of feeling and perception and, ultimately, bodily experience, which, in the context of Jameson's avowedly utopian framework designed to provisionally unite these very structures, even in the midst of their historical dissolution and fragmentation, has the paradoxical outcome of asserting the historical discontinuity of aesthetic experience and the cultural specificity of ideological form. This would seem to render the prospect for cross-cultural dialogue irreducibly problematical. But in the same way that one might examine the concentric rings of a tree in order to determine its age and the history of climate change, Jameson uses the ideology of form to "measure" the semiotic layers and intertextual traces which inevitably accrue to symbolic/semiotic processes over time and these semiotic "layers" are then used as signs of changes that may have occurred in the surrounding (historical-cultural) environment:

The ideology of the form itself, thus sedimented, persists into the later more complex structure as a generic message which coexists - either as a contradiction of, on the other hand, as a mediatory mechanism - with elements from later stages (141).

In what amounts to a dynamic theory of semantic "density" (or what Jameson calls "sedimentation"), what the "ideology of form" (the third semantic horizon/frame) appears to lack is any explicit connection with empirical experience. But this connection is presupposed in the ideology of form itself and its nature is most clearly revealed through the natural semiotic processes which require the appropriation of past genres for the production of new. The formal structures through which ideology is propagated themselves transmit an ideological message but one whose "content" is purely formal. The ideology of form is thus the immanent expression of a formalised aesthetic whose object is given to appropriation and exchange across time and across culture. So the minuet in music is to folk-dance as the pastoral in literature is to rural life. What persists in these forms of literature and music is not their specific/original content but their formal organisation about an underlying aesthetic such as dance or nature. It is this formal organisation which seems to give the ideology of form its aesthetic quality and it is in this context that the connection with empirical experience can be evaluated. The connection is dual: either integrative or dissociative or, as Jameson puts it "either as a contradiction or, on the other hand, as a mediatory or harmonising mechanism". In other words, the appropriation and fashioning of new generic forms out of existing (semiotic) material means that latent messages buried within the material must be "functionally reckoned into the new form" (141). This brings us back to the final moment in Jameson's model which involves the dialectical transformation of these immanently expressed messages onto the plane of the so-called "logic of content" where even the structures of perception and

\textsuperscript{32} Jameson citing Lévi-Strauss's \textit{Tristes Tropiques}. See \textit{The Political Unconscious}, 79.
bodily experience yield their processes to the historically reflexive imagination. But in taking this step we are returned to (what I consider to be) the problematical historicity of perception:

The scandalous idea that the senses have a history is, as Marx once remarked, one of the touchstones of our own historicity; if in spite of our thoughts about history, we still feel that the Greeks or better still, that primitive peoples, were very much like ourselves and in particular lived their bodies and senses in the same way then we surely have not made much progress in thinking historically (229).

On the other hand, perhaps we have made too much progress in thinking historically, to the point where history has become a series of structural transformations and discontinuities and subjectivity is passively constructed on the basis of contradictions, most of which appear to derive from the presence of the structures themselves. While I agree that it is wrong to assume that one’s own (socio-cultural) experience of the world is the same as everyone else’s, it is equally wrong to assume that there exists no common humanity, no common experience. What I believe Jameson is endeavouring to explore is the impact of generic form and symbolic structure on the historical imagination which he theorises in terms of a dynamic/dialectical model of the political unconscious. Circumscribing the political unconscious is the movement of a dialectical negativity, the effect of which is to ultimately specify the historical discontinuity of aesthetic experience and the cultural specificity of ideological form. In terms of a cross-cultural model for genre, this at least calls for a reconciliation between the theoretical discontinuity of aesthetic experience in Jameson’s model and the biological constants of sense-perception and sentient experience (what I’ve called “common knowledge”) which underpin empirical philosophy. The general problem arises because the empirical conditions for inquiry and engagement are rendered absent as a collection of givens whose virtual summation is Necessity: empirical need, human want and desire. The experience of this Necessity as unmediated, some might say, raw passion/desire/grief is the very stuff/matter/material of History itself. Paradoxically History as "absent-cause" is what circumscribes human experience:

[it] is what hurts, it is what refuses desire and sets inexorable limits to individual as well as collective praxis (102).

But H(h)istory, I will argue, is not what "hurts" and "refuses", it is what pleases and relaxes. What Jameson’s theory describes so well is a culture whose history is one of slavery and bondage, of colonisation and domination, a culture in which pleasure is based on privilege, power and reward. The "commodification of desire", the "deperceptualisation of the sciences", the fragmentation of the psychic economy, these are all elements of the "Western" genre. Apart from belonging to the somewhat arbitrarily defined "Western" genre, what all these elements have in common is an underlying disjunction and discontinuity: between feelings and objects, sense perception and "scientific" knowledge, between consciousness and itself. These are yet further recurrences of the ancient nature v. culture (physis/homos) division/disjunction.

I want to revisit the nature/culture dichotomy, within a more rigorously defined empirical framework, this time with a view to radically problematising the dialectical negativity sustaining the opposition. As meaning-making, sentient creatures, what is conveyed in the process of aesthetic/symbolic representation is, I will argue, a celebration of culture, not its refusal and an opening-up of culture, rather than its limit. This line of
argument might appear to be skewed in favour of semantic openness at the expense of the closure and boundary conditions which are so integral to dialectical models of semiosis. But from here on the emphasis will be on similarity, not contradiction and on the conditions most propitious for cultural self-expression rather than those which foreclose/constrain and repress such behaviour. The problematic will turn on dialogic structures and processes, a movement away from dialectical arguments, toward the heterogenous field of human engagement, experience and expectation. It will be the task of empiricism, in the remainder of this dissertation, to "bridge the gap" between dialectics and dialogue, ideas and impressions, people and things. Empirical philosophy will give back to dialogue what Bakhtin argues dialectics takes away:

Dialogue and dialectics. Take a dialogue and remove the voices (the partitioning of voices), remove the intonations (emotional and individualising ones), carve out abstract concepts and judgements from living words and responses, cram everything into one abstract consciousness - and that's how you get dialectics (Bakhtin 1986, 147).
It may well be that the relationship between matter and pattern is an essential part of the epistemology and methodology of the "Western" world as we know it. In terms of the history of science, the concept of the "Western" world is certainly not limited to interactions in the sense that Descartes and his contemporaries were thinking. The concept of the "Western" world is, on the contrary, the historical framework for an entire tradition of thought and culture. The Western scientific and technological achievements have been the result of a complex interplay of historical, social, and cultural factors.

In this context, the "Western" world as a concept refers to the "West" in the broad sense of the term. The term "West" is often used to refer to the countries that were colonized by Western powers. However, it is important to recognize that the concept of the "Western" world is not limited to these countries. The Western scientific and technological achievements have been the result of a complex interplay of historical, social, and cultural factors.

In conclusion, the concept of the "Western" world as a concept refers to the "West" in the broad sense of the term. The term "West" is often used to refer to the countries that were colonized by Western powers. However, it is important to recognize that the concept of the "Western" world is not limited to these countries. The Western scientific and technological achievements have been the result of a complex interplay of historical, social, and cultural factors.

...
Part 2

That Other Science (A)

It may well be that the opposition between nature and culture is so entrenched in the epistemology and imagination of the "Western" world as to be unbreachable. In terms of the history supporting the opposition and the ideology and economic capital invested in maintaining the opposition, the breach is certainly substantial: it has become one of the cornerstones for dialectical and competitive models of struggle and supersession. Nevertheless the "return to nature" is a theme never far away from the Western imagination - the pastoral in literature, music and art, Rousseau's utopian savage and the great struggle against the elements which is the context for so much of human history and culture. In looking towards a cross-cultural model for genre there is an assumption that the opposition can be at least resolved, if not removed. There is, as I have already suggested, a common ground for human experience, a common humanity sustaining the human condition and, by implication, a common discourse for the expression of that condition. In addition to this essentially ineffable language - which might be dubbed the "silent discourse" of the human condition - are the "special" languages and codes which correspond more closely to traditional notions of communication such as mother tongue (natural language) text, ideo-graphic design, the inter-related semiotic systems of dance, music, performance and ritual. The distinction between the "special" and the "common" is an important one for what could be called the cross-cultural hypothesis and, importantly, the distinction itself has its foundations in empirical philosophy. Put simply, the cross-cultural hypothesis states that successful cross-cultural communication is possible despite differences in world-view. These issues will pervade much of the rest of this second part. Ultimately what will be sought is a dialogic-empirical model of semantics and semiosis which will provide the basis for an examination and evaluation of the Hallideyan systemic-functional linguistic (semiotic) paradigm.

Paradigms of semiosis and inquiries into the nature of meaning and knowledge were very much established as part of the philosophical landscape by the time of Epicurus. Hellenistic philosophy delivers up a debate on the nature of the sign, at least as vigorous as the debates still raging today and many of the key issues remain the same. Empirical philosophy seems to translate well across time, perhaps because empiricism takes as its "object" not the nature of the "subject" but the nature of the subject's movement through space which is as close as empiricism gets to modelling time.

Elizabeth Asmis, in her valuable work, Epicurus' Scientific Method states that "Epicurus' method of inference originated with the early atomists, and belongs to an important empirical tradition of inquiry that once rivalled the systems of Plato and Aristotle but has been largely lost from view in the history of scientific method".1 Epicurus was born only ten years or so after the death of Plato (c.341 BC) and he would have been a young man when Aristotle died two decades later. Epicurus was an empiricist although the Epicurean model of empiricism can be distinguished from the Empiricist physician's medical model. I will examine these connections presently as well.

1 Elizabeth Asmis, Epicurus' Scientific Method, (London: Cornell UP, 1984) 12. For this and a great deal of the discussion on Epicurean empiricism I am much indebted, amongst others, to the scholarly research and exegesis of Elizabeth Asmis.
as those with some of the other major schools of the day, in particular the Stoics whose thought and method provide an interesting parallel with contemporary conceptions of truth, logic and correctness and above all semiosis - the process of making inferences through signs. I will also explore the history of Epicurean empiricism, that other science, and the tradition to which it belongs in the Greek context. In terms of a more recent academic history, Karl Marx completed his doctoral dissertation on Epicurus' particular variety of atomism and Kant viewed him as a representative of "dogmatic" empiricism while Hegel suggested that he was the discoverer of empirical natural science (Asmis, 9).

But I want to begin the investigation into empiricism from an even more contemporary perspective, if only to highlight the underlying continuity in the themes and concerns which pervade empirical scientific inquiry. I have already mentioned observation, experience and belief as being amongst a core of key categories in empirical philosophy. And much of the discussion so far has been taken up with issues that are predominantly psychological in nature, pertaining to subjectivity and the nature of the nexus between (private-historical) individual experience - what Bakhtin calls the "unofficial" consciousness - and the constraints placed on that experience through its formal semiotic expression - what Bakhtin calls the "official" consciousness. The connection here is essentially one of difference. Difference as inscribed through the formal structures of symbolic process marks the exteriority of subjectivity relative to these expressive semiotic forms (themselves internal to the context of culture). Communicative (expressive/interactive/dialogic) activity necessitates access to (socially ratified) semiotic structures - in essence genres. The dialogic appropriation of the genres for the purposes of cultural self-expression implies something about the underlying nature of semiosis and this will have an important bearing on the sort of metaphorical analysis of the way language means to mean, conducted by Michael Reddy in his work on the conduit metaphor.2

The metaphor of the conduit as the carrier of a "semiotic substance" serves as a paradigm - in the sense of an organising principle - for the genre of metaphor which is concerned with getting meanings across, as it were, as if the signs themselves were only the most imperfect and provisional purveyors of meaning. This does not bring us any closer to understanding the nature of "meaning" - the semantic content, as it were. But it does highlight the importance of the relationship between "structure" and "semantics" which, it will be seen, is also central to the organisation of Hallidays' systemic-functional semiotic paradigm. But I want to leave aside the question of semantics and meaning, along with Reddy's arguments on the conduit metaphor, for the moment, and return instead to the question of subjectivity. This time in the context of its re-working through the empiricism of a young Gilles Deleuze.

Empiricism and Subjectivity

French philosopher, Gilles Deleuze, in his early work, managed to avoid the psychological problematic and associated arguments which inevitably encumber reflections on the nature of subjectivity, by drawing on aspects of British empiricist David Hume's inquiries. Space simply will not permit even a moderately detailed overview of the history of empirical thought. Here the influential and perceptive work of

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David Hume (1711-76) will be refracted - to use a Bakhtinian metaphor - through a selective examination of an early work by Deleuze entitled Empiricism and Subjectivity.  

Beginning with Deleuze will have the advantage of accentuating the contemporary relevance of empirical philosophy for research in the human sciences. Moreover, the contemporary nature of Deleuze's "language" will enable a lucid introduction to some of the recurrent themes and problematics of empirical inquiry, many of which I have so far only alluded to in passing. Deleuze's "language" is perhaps more accessible than the one which must inevitably surround the exegesis of the categories and systems from Hellenistic philosophy, and, within that context, the linguistically idiosyncratic position occupied by Epicurean empiricism.

One year prior to the publication of Empiricism, a collaborative work involving Deleuze appeared entitled: David Hume: Sa vie, son oeuvre, avec un exposé de sa philosophie. These works suggest that Hume's empiricism had a seminal influence on the development of Deleuze's intellectual trajectory. Here I want to examine only a few brief excerpts which specifically deal with the implications of empiricism for theories and models of subjectivity. These excerpts will serve to introduce some of the central issues in a relatively accessible genre. More importantly, they will provide an insight into "the content of subjectivity" and what Deleuze calls "the absolute essence of empiricism".

The point of entry into the text Empiricism and Subjectivity is the chapter entitled Empiricism and Subjectivity and specifically a portion of that chapter which deals with the nature of the nexus between empiricism (the given) and subjectivity (the process). Deleuze's description of subjectivity, in terms of a subject "in development", anticipates Kristeva's dynamic model of the sujet en procès (the subject "in process") and his analysis of the structures supporting the subject's development will lead to the revelation of what he calls "the absolute essence of empiricism".

What is the nature of the "subject" and its relation to the "content of subjectivity"?

The subject is defined by the movement through which it is developed. Subject is that which develops itself. The only content we can give to the idea of subjectivity is that of mediation and transcendence. But we note that the movement of self-development and of becoming-other is double: the subject transcends itself, but it is also reflected on .... inference and invention, belief and artifice.... In short, believing and inventing is what makes a subject a subject.


4 In French, procès has the dual connotations of "process" and "trial", thereby conveying the dialectic of symbolism and repression embodied in Kristeva's model.

5 All citations in this section, unless otherwise indicated, are from pages 85-87 of the English translation. Similarly, all emphasis is added.
Here "mediation" and "transcendence" are analogous to "inference" and "invention" i.e. "believing" and "inventing" are what makes a subject a subject. The distinction between "belief" and "invention" is similar to the one between "opinion" and "knowledge" which will occupy the bulk of the discussion on Epicurean empiricism. The foundations of the distinction derive from ancient sceptical arguments of the same period, leading to the rejection of all possible "criteria" for "truth". The sceptical rejection of the "criteria" not only problematises the distinction between opinion and knowledge, ultimately it leads to the rejection of the possibility for any sort of "knowledge" at all. The empiricist's project is to establish a set of criteria which are at least consistent with the anti-transcendentalism of the sceptical arguments. Empiricism is thus an inquiry into the nature of knowledge but one which begins with its immanent apprehension rather than its conscious reflection. Nevertheless processes of conscious reflection and arguments about the way meaning is made and conveyed are integral to the structure of the problematic and in Deleuze's discussion they belong to the domain of invention and artifice.

The nature/culture (physis/nomos) distinction persists in Deleuze's dualistic resolution of the empirical processes supporting the constitution/development of subjectivity; through belief and opinion, supported by nature, Necessity and habit (the domain of physis); through invention and reflection, supported by the semiotic systems and processes of culture (the domain of nomos). Later I will suggest that what Threadgold and Halliday call the "ineffable", encoded through extra-textual cryptogrammatical processes of semiosis, coincides well with the trans-textual and trans-linguistic environment presupposed by the realm of physis.

But to return now to the issue of the subject's nature and its relation to the constitution of subjectivity. The following excerpt is a further reflection on the nature of the dualism between action and reflection (the dualism itself is the result of "reflection"), expressed in terms of "transcending" the (immanence of the) "given":

Such is the dual power of subjectivity: to believe and to invent... We must explain and find the foundation, law or principle of the dual power... To believe is to infer one part of nature from another, which is not given. To invent is to distinguish powers and to constitute functional totalities or totalities that are not given in nature.

The problem is as follows: how can a subject transcending the given be constituted in the given... This subject who invents and believes is constituted inside the given in such a way that it makes the given itself a synthesis and a system. This is what we must explain. In this formulation of the problem we discover the absolute essence of empiricism.

What is interesting here, apart from the manifest circularity of the argument, is the association of "transcendence" with the realm of the "not given". In terms of the Epicurean model, what here is described as "not given in nature" covers two empirically distinct domains. Epicurus distinguishes between "the evident" (which Deleuze calls "the given") and he divides the "not evident" into "the non-apparent by nature" and "the expected to appear". The latter category of "the expected to appear" also provides a convenient place to locate the category and concept of genre. It also provides a context for the problematic of mediation. Such a discreet positioning of such apparently complex and amorphous concepts is less problematic than it seems if it is accepted that language as such operates as a secondary modelling system, encoding and interpreting, reflecting and refracting, processing the material received through the primary modelling systems of
perception and affection. These arguments will be explored in further detail in Parts 3 and 4.

Deleuze, for his part, reformulated the immanence/transcendence problematic associated with the "subject transcending the given being constituted in the given" in terms of a *systemic* response to "the given". The obvious question then arises:

But what is the given? It is says Hume, the flux of the sensible, a collection of impressions and images, or set of perceptions. It is the totality of that which appears, being which equals appearance. Empiricism begins from the experience of a collection, or from an animated succession of distinct perceptions. It begins with them, insofar as they are distinct and independent. In fact, its principle, that is, the constitutive principle giving status to experience, is not that "every idea derives from an impression" whose sense is only regulative; but rather that "everything is distinguishable and everything distinguishable is different".

This is the principle of difference [the absolute essence of empiricism].

The "given" according to Deleuze, following Hume, consists of impressions and perceptions and "being which equals appearance". While this is a further step in what I would consider to be the right direction, the association between "collection", "set" and "totality" reflects a preoccupation with systemic responses to the Humian "flux of the sensible". But rather than focussing on what seems to be the inherently systemic nature of empirical process and response - and the implications that such systematisation might hold for establishing a generalised set of empirical criteria - Deleuze, at this point in his argument, emphasises a principle of difference. The principle of difference also supports the notion of "structure". In Epicurean empiricism, a principle of difference is manifest through what is sometimes called the "method of counterwitnessing" according to which belief is maintained in the absence of evidence to the contrary. But rather than constituting the "absolute essence" of Epicurus' empiricism, "difference" assumes a less structural role, only entering the problematic at the level of what could be called phenomenological contradiction, necessitating a re-evaluation of previously accepted observations and, occasionally, revolutionising entire systems of belief and world-view.

The emphasis on the principle of difference in Deleuze's scheme seems to derive from his emphasis on system and, by implication, structure. I should add that Deleuze also emphasises the importance of repetition in Empiricism. Moreover the preoccupation with difference seems to leave wanting the more pressing demand for a set of empirical criteria. What is suggested in Deleuze's formulation of the problem is the potential importance of boundary conditions, margins and limits. But empiricism is the art of putting things together, not taking them apart, even if these things come together as distinct impressions. So while I agree with many of Deleuze's arguments, I must ultimately reject his conclusion here: the absolute essence of empiricism is not the principle of difference, it is I will argue a principle, or rather a logic (Gr. *logismos*) of similarity (called *epilogismos*). To put this another way, empiricism is about "system" (a point which Deleuze clearly identified) more than "structure" (a point which, I believe, Deleuze over-emphasised). The distinction being drawn here between system and structure brings us back to the relation between structure and semantics which prefaced this Deleuzian digression.
The Conduit Metaphor Revisited

The distinction between semantics and structure is a formal one in the sense that "meaning" must be "expressed" in order to be understood/apprehended/interpreted. In other words, there are at least two components to the semiotic act: message and medium. This partitioning of semiosis corresponds to Hjelmslev's content/expression division - itself an elaborated model of the Saussurean structural sign. The Saussurean division of the (linguistic) sign into signer (Sa) and signified (Se) is a highly formalised account of linguistic semiosis.

The Saussurean hypothesis postulated an arbitrary relationship obtaining between (Sa/Se). While this accounted for the seemingly arbitrary nature of the relationship between words in different languages meaning the same/similar thing, it failed to answer the semantic question: how is meaning successfully communicated? Hjelmslev and, later, Halliday will resolve the opposition in terms of a systemic-functional model of the relationship between signer/expression/structure and the signified/content/semantics. Rewriting the opposition in this way, paradigmatically as it were, does oversimplify the problematic somewhat: Hjelmslev, as well as distinguishing between the planes of "content" and "expression" further divides these according to "form" and "substance". And what for Halliday would be Hjelmslev's content plane contains both a semantics and a lexico-grammar. These are important arguments which I will need to return to later. Here I want to resolve the message/medium problematic in terms of the semantic question: How does meaning mean? What is the nature of meaning? Is it something that comes to us in little parcels called "words" or "images", or is it some ultimately transcendent system of inspired imagination and invention?

The semantic question is similar to the metalanguage problem which is central to Threadgold's discussion on paradigms of culture and semiosis (Threadgold 1988). In that discussion reference is made to Michael Reddy's 1979 paper on the "conduit metaphor". Here I want to explore Reddy's hypothesis in further detail - as a way of approaching the semantic question - with a view to both re-evaluating some of his conclusions and examining some of the insights the conduit metaphor model provides into the way language means to mean.

Islands, Pipes or People

Is "every man an island unto himself" or is "no man an island unto himself"? When it comes to modelling the way meanings are made and conveyed through the processes of human communication (semiosis), such questions become crucial. The former, in the affirmative, coincides with the "postulate of radical subjectivity" which supports many of Reddy's arguments against the semantic reliability of the conduit metaphor model. The latter, in the affirmative, coincides with the implications of accepting the proposition that the conduit metaphor provides a more accurate model of semantic function and later I will refer to this as the "postulate of social subjectivity". This postulate is central to the cross-cultural hypothesis. I will argue that the conduit metaphor provides a more accurate model of semantic function than Reddy's alternative model of communication, the so-called "Toolmaker's paradigm", which is based on the postulate of radical subjectivity and mathematical information theory.

Reddy organises his taxonomy of the conduit metaphor according to two frameworks - a major framework wherein semantic function is modelled according to metaphors such as the conduit, containment, insertion and extraction (metaphors of semantic closure and interiority) - and a minor framework which models semantic
function according to spatial metaphors of absorption and ejection (metaphors of semantic openness and exteriority). I will provide part of Reddy's characterisation of these frameworks and juxtapose some examples taken from the text also (Reddy 1979, 290-291):

**Major Framework** of the conduit metaphor implies that:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Framework</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) language functions like a conduit transferring bodily thoughts from one person to another</td>
<td>“Try to get your thoughts across better” “You still haven't given me any idea...”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) in writing and speaking, people insert their thoughts or feelings in the words</td>
<td>“You have to put each concept into words...” “Insert those ideas elsewhere in the paragraph”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) words accomplish the transfer by containing the thoughts or feelings and conveying them to others</td>
<td>“The sentence was filled with emotion” “Your words are hollow...”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) in listening or reading, people extract the thoughts and feelings once again from the word</td>
<td>“I hope you read this and get something out of it”6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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6 This is my example, not Reddy’s.
**Minor Framework** overlooks words as containers and allows ideas and feelings to flow, unfettered and completely disembodied into a kind of ambient space between human heads:

| (1) thoughts and feelings are ejected by speaking or writing into an external "idea space" | "Mary poured out all her sorrow..."
| "Put those thoughts down on paper"

| (2) thoughts and feelings are reified in this external space, so that they exist independently of any need for living humans to think or feel them | "That concept has been floating round for ages"
| "You'll find better ideas than that in the library"

| (3) these reified thoughts and feelings may, or may not find their way into the heads of living humans | "You have to 'absorb' Aristotle a little at a time"
| "Her delicate emotions went right over his head"

As a model of linguistic semiosis, the conduit metaphor implies a fundamental dualism in semantic function. This dualism is similar to the one constructed in terms of medium/message and Hjelmslev's content/expression as well as Saussure's Sa/Se opposition. Reddy preserves a version of this dualism through his application of mathematical information theory in the analysis of the conduit metaphor. There "information" is modelled in terms of a systemic relationship between "signal" and "message" - the "system" relating the two is called the "code". Reddy's description of the theory underlying his model is worth citing at some length:

Information is defined as the ability to make non-random selections from one set of alternatives. Communication, which is the transfer of this ability from one place to another, is envisioned as occurring in the following manner. The set of alternatives, and a *code* relating these alternatives to physical signal are established, and a copy of each is placed at both the sending and receiving ends of the system. This act creates what is known as an 'a priori shared context'. At the transmitting end a sequence of alternatives, called the *message* is chosen for communication ... But this sequence of alternatives is not sent. Rather, the chosen alternatives are
related systematically by the code to some form of energy patterns which can travel quickly and retain their shape while they do travel - that is, to the signals.

The whole point of the system is that the alternatives themselves are not mobile, and cannot be sent, whereas the energy patterns, the "signals" are mobile.... In information theory the "messages" are not contained in the signals.... The whole notion of information as "the power to make selections" rules out the idea that signals contain the message (303).

Mathematical information theory, I will argue, has the virtue of elegance but the vice of inconceivability. I want to criticise the theoretical foundations of Reddy's analysis in the broadest possible terms with a view to providing an alternative way of thinking about the conduit metaphor and what it means to mean. The problem as I see it is that information theory brings an abstract (mathematical) paradigm to what is a fundamentally organic, or as Bakhtin would say, dialogic process. The postulate of radical subjectivity underlying Reddy's model derives from a separation between "message" and "signal" which is very difficult to reconcile with a social theory of meaning, although the concept of an "a priori shared context" does go some way towards accounting for the social nature of meaning as "shared meaning potential". I want to revisit the conduit metaphor and some of Reddy's arguments from an alternative theoretical/epistemological viewpoint of which but the barest outline will be given here.

The central question here is the semantic one - the nature of meaning. I want to begin considering this question by disregarding altogether the structural decomposition brought by mathematical information theory to the problematic of meaning-making activity. How is it, then, that we mean to mean?

Signs of Sound and Dialogues of Silence

In one of his late essays entitled "The Problem of the Text", Bakhtin approaches the question of meaning from a point of view that can only be described as dialogic: "The word is a drama in which three characters participate" writes Bakhtin (1986, 122); "Dialogic boundaries intersect the entire field of living human thought" (120). The essence of Bakhtin's dialogism is dialogue and at the heart of dialogue lies dialogue: the word moves forward in search of responsive understanding .... the word wants to be heard, understood, responded to, and again to respond to the response, and so forth ad infinitum. It enters into a dialogue that does not have a semantic end (123).

Bakhtin's semantic universe is avowedly open-ended, in contrast to the closed system implicit in information theory. Moreover each utterance in Bakhtin's model has the status of a semantic whole (122), encompassing all the elements accounted for by information theory as well as the necessary tension between "the given" and the "new" intrinsic to the communicative act:

An utterance is never just a reflection or an expression of something already existing outside it that is given and final. It always creates something that never existed before, something absolutely new and unrepeatable, and moreover, it always has some relation to value (119-120).

The dimension of novelty inherent in all communicative/dialogic experience is almost impossible to account for in terms of the relatively inert and dehumanised mechanisms of
mathematical information theory. Information defined as "the power to make selections" and signals seen as "some form of energy patterns" foregrounds the transfer of energy underlying the communicative process and is consistent with the second law of thermodynamics: the law of entropy or the tendency for systems of organisation to run-down, decompose and settle. But the creation of something new - which is what happens every time communication takes place - requires an input of energy, hence, mathematically, information is defined as negative entropy or "the power to make selections". What the mathematical model fails to adequately account for is the non-repeatability of each utterance or communicative act. I want to explore the implications of semantic uniqueness and non-repeatability for information theory.

While the law of entropy requires that energy be expended in order for communication (information transfer) to take place, this energy is restricted to the "power to make selections" and the signals representing the set of selections i.e to the semiotic acts of encryption/inscription and decryption/interpretation. What this framework fails to account for is the transformation of the whole system each time communication takes place.

The system is the code which contains (sic) the systemic relationship between signal and message. Each time communication takes place the code is invoked in a unique way (Halliday will say "instantiated") and this uniqueness not only contributes to the continual renewal of the system as a whole, it also forestalls any possible systematisation of the system as a whole. In other words, the system is, as Bakhtin suggests, open-ended. Combining an open-ended semantic system with the postulate of radical subjectivity would seem to make successful communication practically impossible; each participant inhabiting a different semantic universe. Moreover I would suggest that what Bakhtin's open-ended, dialogic view of the world implies is not a postulate of radical subjectivity but a postulate of social subjectivity.

Underlying the postulate of radical subjectivity is an assumption which strikes at the heart of the nature of the human condition: the structural disjunction between message and signal. Reddy describes this condition in terms of "repertoire members" (RMs) which comprise the collective of thoughts, feelings and emotional material unique to each individual. RMs are non-transferable. Reddy's argument regarding the inconvertibility and uniqueness of RMs would appear to be consistent with the one I have made concerning the uniqueness and non-repeatability of the communicative act. In fact they are at loggerheads: what the concept of "repertoire member" fails to account for is the social composition and constitution of subjectivity - shared experience makes for shared meaning, if not shared views of the world. According to the postulate of radical subjectivity, the content of subjectivity is alienated and isolated in the form of RMs which must be condensed into messages and displaced into signals in order for communication to occur.

But how does information theory account for communication where no external signals or selections are made? For instance, what about silence and silences in discourse? These are integral to the structure of the energy patterns comprising the signal. What Reddy calls the "shape" of these patterns will be influenced the gaps and silences surrounding the signals. But where there are no external signals in the form of energy patterns - as, for instance, during a dramatic pause, meaning must be inferred on the basis of the "a priori shared context". If meanings can be exchanged in the absence of the signals encoding them, as the use of silence in discourse would seem to suggest, then this leaves information theory at a loss to explain how meaning/information can be communicated without the expenditure of energy in the form of a semiotic act of
The silent communication of meaning implies that a part of what Reddy calls the "repertoire members" must be able to be exchanged, or at least shared, in the same way as the "a priori context" is shared. In dialogues of silence, part of the "repertoire members" must be exchanged in order for each participant to appreciate what the other is feeling and thinking. I will call this relation *empathy* (Gr. en, - 'in' + pathos, 'feeling/affection').

The postulate of radical subjectivity undermines the potential for "empathic" dialogic exchanges. Nevertheless, the postulate of social subjectivity implies that, to some degree at least, what Reddy calls RMs must be shared. No man is an island unto himself. Indeed the separation of RMs, the "a priori shared context" and the "code" is an abstraction from what Bakhtin would call the concrete context of dialogic exchange. In practice all these elements combine in each attempt at communication. Let me spell out the argument here.

The postulate of radical subjectivity implies the non-transferability of RMs. The postulate of social subjectivity implies that some part of the RMs must be transferable or at least shared. Some of the message must be contained inside the signals. Given that the energy patterns comprising the signals originated from "inside" one participant and that their successful communication requires their reception "inside" the other participant and, moreover, given that the signals themselves - as social-symbolic forms - construct the representation of an interiority which is the tangible embodiment of socio-cultural meaning, then I don't believe that the insights the conduit metaphor provides into the nature of meaning are as "confused" (296) as Reddy would lead us to believe. The postulate of radical subjectivity is the assumption of an idealist and mathematician but not of a social scientist and dialogic thinker.

In the second stage of this investigation I want to locate the theoretical framework of information theory within the broader historical context of ancient Greek and Hellenistic systems of thought, with particular emphasis on the need to establish empirical foundations for an alternative (social semiotic) theory of meaning. I will argue that, as a predominantly deductive apparatus, mathematical information theory is ill-suited to modelling the inductive procedures also intrinsic to the communicative act.7

**Adversus Mathematicus**8

The early Greek philosophers adapted the method of mathematics as a model of their thought, and as result they constructed their philosophical systems deductively from certain fundamental principles which they accepted as self-evident.9

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7 Inductive arguments are those which proceed by analogy, from similar to similar. Epicurean empiricism will stress that the only reasonable *kriteria* for inductive calculation (*epilogismos*) are sense perception (*aisthēsis*) and affective experience (*pathos*).

8 "Against the Professors", also the title of a work by Sextus Empiricus.

In mathematical information theory, the "fundamental principles" are those comprising the set of alternatives and their relation to the signals. The set of alternatives and the code form part of the "a priori shared context" and are assumed to be self-evident to both participants in the communicative act. The other part of mathematical information theory is modelled in terms of the sign and signal/message disjunction.

The philosophical debate on the nature of the sign also has its origins, in the West at least, in early (pre-Socratic) Greek philosophy. There it represents an alternative tradition in the history of thought which has coexisted with what has been broadly described above as the "mathematical" one. This empirical semiotic tradition in Western philosophy has its origins in ancient medicine - the Hippocratic corpus - and in ancient scepticism, such as it is represented in the extant fragments of Alcmeon and Xenophanes, in ancient atomism - in the teachings Democritus and Leucippus - and in the earliest scientific writings of the Ionians (eg Thales as reported by Aristotle in "De Anima"). But the tradition which has had a profound influence on modern conceptions of truth and knowledge is the mathematical one - rationalism incarcerated within the abstract (non-human) paradigm of an, at times, divine geometry: reflection at the expense of affection. Empirical philosophy will redress the inequity.

The ancient debate on signs reached its climax in the Hellenistic period, in the generations following the death of Aristotle. The scepticism of Pyrrho, the empiricism of Epicurus, the empiricism of the empiricist physicians and Stoic philosophy are among the major schools of thought during this period. In considering any or all of these - especially the philosophies of Pyrrho, Epicurus and Zeno (the father of Stoicism) - it is important to remember that what the ancients considered to be "philosophy" - fidelity to wisdom - is a way of life: both philosophy and belief - philosophia - a therapeutics for the soul, as it were, comprising what Pierre Hadot - a contemporary scholar of the period - describes in terms of spiritual exercises:

Each school, then, represents a form of life defined by an ideal of wisdom. The result is that each has its corresponding inner attitude - for example, tension for the Stoics or relaxation for the Epicureans - and its own manner of speaking.... But above all every school practices exercises designed to ensure spiritual progress toward the ideal state of wisdom, exercises of reason that will be, for the soul, analogous to the athlete's training or to the application of a medical cure.10

I share the ancients' attitudes about philosophy, especially those of the Epicureans. Here I want to briefly summarise an argument put forward by a later Epicurean, Philodemus, which asserts that the demonstrative validity of (Epicurean) empirical inductive argument is prior to the alleged validity of Stoic deductive argument. This distinction between "experience" and "logic" lies at the heart of many debates in Hellenistic philosophies. Particular attention is also given to disclosing the nature of the criteria (kritēria) to be used in determining the truth/correctness/validity of a "particular" sign or argument. I mean "particular" here in a technical sense: in the Hellenistic period a common framework for the analysis of signs divided signs into two groups - "particular" signs and "common" signs. The division here is very similar to the one between "logic" and "experience" but it is more often represented in terms of the distinction between opinion (doxa) and

knowledge (*epistēmē*): "particular" signs provide the basis for inference and "scientific" knowledge (*epistēmē*), common signs provide the basis for conjecture and opinion (*doxa*). The Epicurean empirical position, as argued by Philodemus, problematises the distinction between opinion and knowledge, as well as the one held between special and common signs by asserting the priority of the empirical *kritēria* (*perception and affection*) over the relatively abstract processes of cognition and reflection. Hence the often cited Epicurean observation that all scientific knowledge is a matter for opinion.

What makes the Hellenistic debate so interesting is that many of the schools recognised the importance of empirical observation and experience but each had a different response to the same fundamental issue: what is the nature of wisdom (knowledge/meaning/truth) and is it attainable/containable through/within experience. This paradigmatic way of writing about the fundamental issue here - the nature of wisdom and hence meaning, truth and knowledge - reveals the same model of semantic function (wisdom) as the conduit metaphor; perhaps re-writing it will make the comparison clearer:

meaning is attainable through experience (minor framework, spatial metaphor: openness)

meaning is containable within experience (major framework, conduit metaphor: closure)

Of course if wisdom (true/authentic meaning) is transcendent then neither of these propositions hold. But for the Epicureans, wisdom and virtue were avowedly anti-transcendent. The *kritēria* of perception (*aisthēsis*) and affection (*pathos*) comprise the ultimate measure (*kanon*) and represent the embodiment of wisdom through an inner state - which Hadot referred to in his inaugural lecture as relaxation - called *ataraxia*. There is a close connection between *ataraxia* as a state of relaxation and the empirical experience of silence, that is freedom from noise and disturbance. I would consider relative silence a necessary condition for *ataraxia*. While I cannot go into the Stoic position here, I want to suggest that within both the ancient and modern frameworks, the sign functions as a medium for inference.

The nature of the inference in information theory is primarily deductive: the self-evident principles according to which the signals are systematically related to options or alternatives in the code form part of the "a priori shared context". Similarly the Stoic method of inference proceeds on the basis of deductions according to technical criteria such as soundness and cohesion. For the Epicureans, however, inference proceeds on the basis of past experience and present perceptions, according to inductive arguments by analogy, also called the method of similarity which Philodemus describes as a "reasoning by the phenomena" called *epilegismos*.

When it comes to the concrete context of human communicative/semiotic activity, I would suggest that the major resource dialogic participants have at their disposal is their past experience in communication. However, as Bakhtin suggests, each time communication takes place the semantic system is renewed and renovated - according to the exigencies of context and creative/communicative subjects. As a result of this open-endedness, the semantic system cannot be modelled as a stable or static system - which is implicit in information theory. Rather the system is as Threadgold, Halliday and others will call it - metastable - continuity within flux: the "Heraclitus' postulate", as it were. The assumption of metastability seems to account for the nature of language and other semiotic systems as evolved and evolving systems of meaning potential.
The concept of information as a "meaning potential" is implicit in information theory but it is not the dynamic model of semantic function elaborated by Halliday and explicated by Threadgold. The notion of the ongoing evolution and change of semantic systems is constrained by the static/synchronous nature of the "a priori shared context". In reality there is no one context - only a plurality of contexts which overlap and dialogue with each other in complex and detailed ways; each context a reality, each reality a language, each language a genre. From an empirical viewpoint the "shared context" amounts to a "shared experience" and I've already suggested that "shared experience" also implies shared RM's which is something disallowed in the mathematical paradigm. I will go even further to suggest that what Reddy calls RM's must be shared if what we desire is an empirically based, dialogic-semiotic theory/model of meaning and semantic function. Since the essence of our being as social creatures is predicated on the empirical nature of shared experience, I will refer to the empirical fact of shared experience the "postulate of social subjectivity".

What the postulate of social subjectivity implies is access to similar codes and therefore similar methods of inference (meaning-making/communicative activity) - not access to the same codes and methods of inference which is a necessary condition under the postulate of radical subjectivity. At some point in the semantic system - which I call genre - there will exist at least a partial identity of RM's across individuals and it is through this point or "dialogic filter", to coin an appropriate metaphor, that a plurality of contextual realities can be filtered and focussed, or as Bakhtin would say "refracted". While the genres, according to this description, have the appearance of an exteriority, this is only because I am writing about and reflecting on the nature of meaning and semantic function. As a shared meaning potential, the semantic system exists both inside and outside the lived human consciousness; our only access to this creative energy is through experience and the points at which we share a common experience will define the genres of our being.

**RM's and MR's**

So far I have criticised mathematical information theory for its inability to theorise successful communication in the absence of externally motivated signals - dialogues of silence, as it were. Secondly the "postulate of social subjectivity" - derived from Bakhtinian dialogism and Epicurean empiricism - was recommended over Reddy's "postulate of radical subjectivity" which I regarded as inconceivable outside the abstract framework within which it is posited. These criticisms led to the conclusion that what Reddy calls RM's can be, at least in part, shared. In other words, part of the content of subjectivity is shared experience and this provides the basis for an empirically based, social theory of meaning.

Here I want to further explore ways in which RM's can be shared. To do this I want to briefly introduce a similar concept derived from work in critical language study (CLS) by Normal Fairclough, British theorist and intellectual, namely "members' resources"; ironically the acronym Fairclough uses (MR) is an anagram of Reddy's concept (RM). Fairclough's MR's, however, specifically relate to a shared stock of cultural capital. In more general terms Fairclough and the CLS school emphasise the pervasively ideological nature of language and discourse - a view entirely consistent with Bakhtin's description of the socio-ideological nature of the sign in Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. Fairclough's central thesis - which I accept - turns on the nexus between relations of power, ideology and language:
the exercise of power, in modern society, is increasingly achieved through ideology, and more particularly through the ideological workings of language.\(^\text{11}\)

In practical terms what Fairclough attempts to do is show how common-sense assumptions about the nature of meaning, belief and reality often obscure the way in which particular relations of power and obligation are maintained and renewed. I will argue that these hidden relations are only obscured from the point of view of those for whom these relations constitute the interiority of their cultural life-experience. The most effective way to problematise and deconstruct these hidden relations of power and ideology is to view them from the outside - from the point of view of the Jew in Nazi Germany, of the Aboriginal in colonial and "post"-colonial Australia, of the excluded, marginalised and déclassé groups within society. Taking these sorts of world-views into account will inevitably produce a more complete and coherent assessment of the way in which we have our lives constructed for us. I will return to these arguments later but it is in this context of a heterogenous field of conflicting and intersecting realities that the concept of MR is deployed. In terms of its theoretical genealogy, the concept of MRs derives from a similar source to Reddy’s RMs ie. cognitive psychology and cybernetics. In contrast to Reddy’s RMs, however, Fairclough emphasises the shared/social nature of MRs and in so doing he develops an implied critique of information theory which is worth examining in some detail:

... you do not simply 'decode' an utterance, you arrive at an interpretation through an active process of matching features of the utterances at various levels with representations you have stored in you long-term memory. These representations are prototypes for a very diverse collection of things - the shape of words, the grammatical forms of sentences, the typical structure of a narrative, the properties of types of object and person, the expected sequence of events in a particular situation type, and so forth. Some of these are linguistic and some of them are not ... let us refer to these prototypes are 'members' resources' or MR for short. The main point is that comprehension is the outcome of interactions between the utterance being interpreted, and MR.

... cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence have given little attention to the social origins or significance of MR.... [A]ttention to the processes of production and comprehension is essential to an understanding of the interrelations of language, power and ideology.... This is so because MR are socially determined and ideologically shaped, though their 'common-sense' and automatic character typically disguise that fact (10-11).

I want to emphasise that "common-sense" here is only so from the point of view of those operating within a particular social and cultural semiotic environment. Fairclough’s arguments against "common-sense" pertain to relations of power and ideology which contribute to the cross-cultural organisation of our semantic systems whereas Reddy's arguments against "common-sense" pertain to the conduit metaphor in natural language and the nature of meaning itself. Already within Fairclough’s view of the world there are insides and outsides to both meaning and experience - the boundaries of discourse which regulate the exchange of meanings between the disparate groups

comprising society construct internal realities which can be impervious to those groups who find themselves on the outside looking in.

The active process of matching features of utterances with structures present in the long-term memory, which Fairclough describes in the extract, is already an empirical description of the way meaning is made: inference by the method of comparing similar with similar (epilogismos). But even in Fairclough's MRs there is no suggestion that the sign/signal wholly contains or embodies the message/meaning, only that meaning is as much a part of the sign/signal, as it is of the context in which the sign occurs. Mathematical information theory requires the abstract separation of sign from context but in an empirically based (critical) social theory of meaning the two are not only inseparable but dialogically inter-dependent. While he doesn't express himself in those terms, Fairclough accounts for this inter-relatedness by placing the communicative act firmly on social ground and then conceiving of language as a social practice in an active relationship with reality - one which also changes reality. This relationship is referred to as the "dialectic of structures and practices" though I would prefer to model it in terms of a dialogue of structures and practices:

... social structures not only determine social practice, they are also the product of social practice. And more particularly, social structures not only determine discourse, they are also a product of discourse (37).

The totality represented by Fairclough's MRs through the dialectic of structures and practices is difficult to access in theoretical terms since it effectively comprises an interiority, which is the concrete context for lived social, cultural and historical experience. The conduit metaphor, in the major framework, projects this interiority onto the individual sign and, in the minor framework, onto the ambient interiority surrounding the sign ie the social space which is the inter-subjective domain of the (social) sign. One way of accessing, in theoretical terms, the totality of the semantic whole which is each utterance is through that part of the whole which is not the utterance ie the non-verbal context. While the non-verbal context of discourse is ultimately - as Halliday and Threadgold note - ineffable, it still impacts in a systematic way on the composition of the text/utterance as a whole. The way in which the non-verbal aspects of semiosis enter into the semiotic act can be described by another term used by Halliday and Threadgold - "cryptogrammar".

In its raw state, the conduit metaphor implies a distinction between language (as the lexico-grammar) and meaning (as the semantics) by locating the latter within the system of signs comprising the former. Threadgold, in a paper sub-titled "Grammatics for Cryptogrammars or Metalanguages for the Ineffable" makes a similar point. There is, however, I believe, an inconsistency between accepting Reddy's arguments against the conduit metaphor and the defence of systemic-functional linguistics which takes as its object "natural language". The problem is the metalanguage one:

When you have no metalanguages for engaging with the problem of the cultural and social realisation of social meaning-making practices, you are left with metaphors and more importantly, you are denied the possibility of any effective form of social action (Threadgold 1989, 165).

I agree but the problem with metalanguages is that they can force semiotic structures which are injurious and oppressive or alien and foreign to the nature of the materials, meanings and processes they are there to describe. This is certainly the case with mathematical information theory. Threadgold, following Halliday, indicates how a
systemic-functional appraisal of the nature of meaning will avoid this great problem with metalanguage:

If we are to understand at all, how any kind of meaning is 'recovered from discourse' we must try to understand the 'grammar of natural language', that is, how it is that the natural language - 'the one non-designed human communication system, on the basis of which all other artificial systems are conceived' - is at once part of our experience and also a 'theory of experience' (175).

Despite such emphasis on "natural language", which is the domain of the conduit metaphor, Threadgold and others accept Reddy's arguments against the conduit metaphor. Given that the conduit metaphor is integral to the structure, fabric and textuality of (the English) natural language, it is difficult to accept that the insights it provides into the nature of meaning are counter-intuitive, as Reddy claims, and that we can all be so unconsciously wrong about the ways in which we feel we mean to mean. From a cross-cultural perspective, the conduit-metaphor is quite an accurate model of the plurality of ideational fields and interpersonal boundaries which construct realities as a complex semantic networks of openings/opportunities and closures/constraints. Insides and outsides are everywhere - in language as in life - they meet each time communication takes place but they otherwise form part of the ineffable context of lived experience. In terms of the metalanguage problem, since the individual text/utterance is the only objective access into the semantic system (viewed as an inter-subjective "shared meaning potential") there must be some point at which system and process converge and language and meta-language merge. Threadgold makes a similar point in her discussion of the way in which the meanings of Halliday's grammatical categories can "slip" between the status of metalanguage and the natural language processes being described:

The 'slippage' between these meanings is fundamental because it constitutes what Derrida would have called a radical deconstruction of a number of semantic dichotomies that structure in cryptogrammatical and unconscious ways, modes of thinking about meaning in language. It does this by demonstrating the essentially indeterminate nature of meaning precisely by forcing us to take difference and similarity, and different interpretations of the same phenomena into account at once, instead of trying to keep them separate and distinct ... (185).

A more detailed description of the theory and practice associated with Halliday's systemic-functional linguistics will have to be put aside for the moment. Threadgold's emphasis in the extract is on bringing the diverse levels of semiotic experience together, rather than keeping them separate and distinct. This returns us to empirical arguments based on the similarity of observed experiences both past and present (epilogismos).

Following the Epicurean Philodemus, I will argue that the empirical structures supporting inductive arguments are necessarily prior to those associated with deductive methods of inference. Indeed the two procedures both oppose and complement each other: induction proceeds from the observation of particulars to inferences concerning the general relations that so obtain; deductive methods proceed from general principles to particular arguments. The communicative act, I would suggest, is primarily an inductive procedure in which similar contexts and situations lead to similar exchanges of sign and meaning. Moreover, the association of similar with similar is, I would also suggest, the fundamental logic (or epilogic) underlying the composition of the genres. As empirical
givens, however, the genres operate primarily as deductive apparatuses, as the loci of identities, as "strands of sameness" - establishing a priori expectations and values which guide and support communicative activity. Access to a diversity of genres - spoken/written, graphic, multi-medial etc can only be acquired through the processes of socialisation and acculturation ie through empirical experiences. As a "resource" for meaning-potential which draws together particular combinations of sign, function and context of culture, genre as such also embodies the concept of MR which Fairclough explicitly locates in the empirical domain of long-term memory. This provides further evidence against the inconvertibility of Reddy's RMs, suggesting they can be exchanged or at least shared. I regard this hypothesis as a necessary condition for a social theory of meaning.

It is possible to take the hypothesis one step further by applying the concept underlying Fairclough's MRs to the metafunctional framework outlined in Halliday's work. Fairclough views the text as a product rather than a process i.e. the product of the process of text production (Fairclough 1989, 24). And the term "discourse" is used to refer to the totality which is the process of social interaction of which the text is just a part. The text, therefore, according to Fairclough, contains "traces" of the discursive processes of production and "cues" to the discursive processes of interpretation. This approach to language study gives rise to a series of tripartite stages and levels of analysis: the level of the "social situation", the level of the "social institution", the level of "society as a whole" (25); the stages of "description", "interpretation" and "explanation" (26); the dimensions of "contents", "relations" and "subjects" (112); the corresponding values of "experiential", "relational" and "expressive" (112). These last two trilogies in particular are analogous to Halliday's model of context as field/tenor/mode and his model of semantic (meta)function in terms of experiential, interpersonal and textual relationships. There appears to be a close correspondence between aspects of Fairclough's approach and Halliday's systemic-functional framework: Fairclough's critical approach is the sort of "social action" Threadgold refers to and whereas functional grammar will only disclose what language is doing in any particular context, when combined with Fairclough's approach we come closer to understanding the "why" and "how" of meaning.

What I would like to suggest at this point is that Fairclough's rather neat division of intellectual labour rests uneasily alongside the basic idea underlying his approach to critical language study, namely the dialectic of structures and practices. It is in the context of this social-semiotic dialectic, as it were, that the important concept "members resources" is promulgated. It will be recalled that MRs are part of the material signifying practices of culture - they are the very stuff/matter/material of meaning, knowledge and power. As a set of dynamic inter-relations which extend across and form part of the institutional, semiotic and inter-personal domains - at all levels and stages - Fairclough recognises the pervasiveness of MR (24). The concept of MR underlies the last two stages of his three stage approach to the critical analysis of discourse and social meaning, namely, the stages of "interpretation" and "explanation":

... whereas [interpretation] is concerned with how MR are drawn upon in processing discourse, [explanation] is concerned with the social constitution and change of MR (163).

The three stages of critical discourse analysis correspond to what Fairclough regards as the three dimensions of discourse - text, interactions and contents. But even in his applied analysis of a text relating to former British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, the notion of MR seems to become lost. I want to suggest that the meta-language which
Fairclough constructs in order to engage the applied analysis of texts is structurally incompatible with aspects of the theory which ostensibly underlie the CLS approach. Specifically I mean that the systematic, tri-stratal organisation seems to betray the unsystematic, open-ended and, I would add, dialogic nature of MRs. To somehow circumvent this problem I want begin by pursuing a dialogic approach and reformulate "members' resources" as "members voices". This will have the advantage of foregrounding the dialogic nature of the relations which inhere through MRs as well as retaining the scope of the original idea as a set of inter-related experiences, discourses and patterned behaviours.

Bakhtin, somewhat famously, towards the end of his life, observed "I hear voices everywhere and dialogic relations between them" (Bakhtin 1986, 169). The category of "voice" in Bakhtin's work has a very broad church indeed- not simply voices to which proper names may be appended but the voices of institutions, eras and epochs, the voices of profession, intimacy and authority; in short, the voices of multifarious discursive and generic totalities whose dialogues produce what Bakhtin describes as the "poly-phonie" (many-voicedness) nature of semiosis. By problematising textual/discursive realities as being derivative of the overall process of meaning-making activity - the dialogues of the voices that speak in and through the text, as it were, - it may be possible to arrive at a way of understanding our own cultural capital as mediated stock of knowledge/truth/power relations.

In practice, using the tools supplied by Halliday, what I am referring to here is basically cohesion, understood from a dialogic perspective. Cohesive features contribute to the textuality of discourse by integrating it into the context from which it emerges and into that which it creates. For instance, cohesion may be expressed through the collocation of lexical items, through referential structures such as pronouns and through anaphoric, cataphoric and exophoric systems of reference, elliptical structures and substitution and through conjunctive relations between clauses (elaboration, enhancement and extension). Many of the features which contribute to cohesion also participate in the other metafunctional domains, namely the "interpersonal" and "ideational" (experiential and logical). The analysis of the resources and voices that are brought to bear in the composition of discourse will ultimately involve an examination of all the systems and realisational levels associated with the exchange-event. Because Halliday's model effectively delivers up an inter-related network of functional labels, what I want to emphasise here is the way in which a critical approach to language study can make great use of the systemic-functional "tool-box". But without the prior concerns of a critical approach, Halliday's "tools" will still show up the way language is used but not how and why it is used in the way that it is. To put it somewhat crudely, systemic-functional theory will tabulate the formal "effects" of semantic function, critical theory will elaborate on the nature of the underlying social and cultural "causes".

Genre has a vital role to play in both spoken and written systems of communication as an organising principle through which participants may be positioned and structurally identified. Mathematical information theory does not identify "genre" as such. According to Reddy, the genres which draw on the conduit metaphor model are creating a false impression about the nature of meaning. I have suggested that when it comes to the nature of meaning, genre, not sign, and utterance, not word, are the basic

units of measurement and apprehension. The problem of identifying individual genres is not a difficult one - it is a process which is going on all the time: walk into any video store, look up the subject index in any library, take the faculties, departments and courses of any university. Genres are literally all around us. The very hard part is drawing them together, not keeping them apart. But before that process can begin, something more needs to be said about the importance of the medium and mode of transmission ie. oral, written, graphic, electronic, multi-medial etc. I will argue that the predominant mode of transmission in all human societies and cultures is oral/aural and that all other modes ultimately perform in the service of oral systems. To present this argument I will draw on the writings of anthropologist/ethnologist/semiotician Eric Michaels and his work with the Walpiri people of central Australia.

I also want to suggest that the exercise of speech communication involves a dialogic nexus/connection/relation which is fundamentally tactile in nature. To paraphrase Plato, speaking to someone is like touching their soul. Whether the outcome of the exchange is extreme consensus or conflict, touching ie. physical contact - hands, noses, lips, cheeks etc. will often parenthesise and punctuate the entire communicative act. This argument deserves far greater exploration than I am able to give it here. It points towards another genre of semantic metaphor which might be called the tactile metaphor: the implication here is that meaning is capable of producing a kinetic effect in the consciousness of the interlocutor thereby realising the potential energy invested in the semiotic act. This "movement" in consciousness is perceived as a change in consciousness and can be referred to as pathos, understood in the most general sense as an affection or disturbance of the perceptual organ ie empirical experience. What is of interest at this point is the way in which this potential energy is organised into energy patterns, but not the individual signs/signals which information theory recognises, rather the form of the entire sequence of energy patterns which is partly pre-determined by genre. Furthermore, I don't wish to imply that all semiotic acts "touch the soul". Would that were so, trauma, stress and grief would be synonymous with watching TV nightly news. The "tactile" metaphor has more to do with the relation of "empathy" described above - as an exchange or meeting of experiential resources (RMs and MRs) enabling each participant to appreciate how the other is feeling and thinking. There are at least two implications which derive from accepting the proposition that the semantic system - as a "shared meaning potential" - is capable of inducing an empirical change in the consciousness of the participants involved. The first relates to the conduit metaphor and the second to the nature of "authenticity" in meaning.

Firstly the "tactile" metaphor model appears to be consistent with the conduit model, though this must be the subject for future research. For example the locution: "Am I getting through to you?" falls somewhere in between the major and minor frameworks of the conduit metaphor and the tactile metaphor: the notion of transference, in the ordinary sense of the word, implicit in the locution is integral to the organisation of the conduit metaphor, while the implication of the question is: "If you were, you would be 'moved' in such a way as to be consciously aware of it". Expressions such as: "What really struck me ...", "Her kind words touched him deeply ...", "It was a profoundly moving speech ..." all belong to the relatively unexplored territory of the tactile metaphor. They all seem to imply, here at least, that not only do words have insides and outsides but that their insides may conceal poisoned barbs or convey pleasing news, altering consciousness whatever the specific content. So whatever the outcome of the exchange, if communication is successful then it will engender a change in the consciousness of the participants involved in the communicative act.
That some communicative acts are successful and others not is a proposition integral to the semantic question, but what is lacking in Reddy's research is an adequate account of the criteria for success. I have been suggesting that the criteria are fundamentally empirical and experiential, not logical as implied in the mathematical framework. Successful communication imparts a degree of "authenticity" to the meanings so realised, an authenticity which is absent from semiotic acts which fail to impact on consciousness. This has less to do with failing to understand a particular joke, for instance, than with being unable to understand and appreciate a particular viewpoint, from the point of view of the person putting it. Empathy - being "touched" or "moved" by meanings - involves a dialogic connection which radically subverts the postulate of radical subjectivity; perhaps the alternative postulate of social subjectivity ought to be retermed the "postulate of radical inter-subjectivity". In either case, the relation of empathy and tactile metaphors of meaning constitute the empirical grounds for a radical critique of the concept of RM's so central to Reddy's analysis of the conduit metaphor. The question now is one I follow Eric Michaels in daring to ask: How do we determine a semiotics of authenticity?
For a Semiotics of Authenticity

The published work of Eric Michaels resists categorising according to the boundaries of "traditional" academic disciplinary genres. David Hebdige, in his forward to a posthumous edition of some of Michael's work, frames the problem of generic categorisation in terms of the library metaphor which I referred to above:

... in which section of the library does the name "Eric Michaels" belong? At a superficial level, there at least three possible locations. Direct lines of affiliation connect Michael's central project to the Canadian tradition of communications research (Innis and, especially, McLuhan), to work on orality and literacy (Ong, Derrida) and to the anthropological literature on the uses of communications technology among traditional indigenous enclaves (Carpenter, Worth, Adair). However, none of these locations qualifies as "home".2

Michaels' academic eclecticism and "homelessness" mirrors in some respects his own experience as a North American researcher domiciled in Australia, working with Aboriginal people in a remote Central Australian community north-west of Alice Springs, examining the impact in the community of electronic (TV, satellite, video) communications technology and assisting in the development of media policy guidelines and protocols required by bureaucratic processes, state instrumentalities and the international market place. Marcia Langton, anthropologist, intellectual and Aboriginal activist, in her introduction to the collection, locates Michaels' work in the concrete context in which it evolved and within a broader semiotic framework which "goes beyond the politics of representation":

Whatever the impact of Michaels' findings on government policy and its technocratic concerns, it is possible to situate his contribution to Aboriginal TV and telecommunications by tracing developments at Yuendumu, where he worked.... Yuendumu is on the edge of the Tanami Desert in Central Australia. Founded as a Baptist mission in 1943, it has been self-governing since 1978. Five hundred to a thousand people reside there, depending on the season. There is a community store, town office, police station, primary school, health clinic, art association and, most recently, a local television relay and broadcast facility. Its Walpiri and other local residents demonstrate a strong determination to survive, to fight back, to retain a heritage of great antiquity and continuity.

In Michaels' work ... he highlights the need to understand the process of cultural incorporation - namely, how the Walpiri, in this case, the people of Yuendumu, actually socialise Western things. Further, he argues that the

1 The word "authenticity" has a heavy intertextual burden to bear but I am not concerned here with the philosophical baggage which is inevitably bound up with its use. Such an exploration is worthy of a dissertation in its own right. Rather "authenticity" must be taken in the ordinary, dictionary-definition, sense of the word as "genuine, real, true". This sort of understanding of the term will, I believe, make more accessible some of the observations and arguments Michaels presents in favour of a semiotics of authenticity.

2 Eric Micheleas, Bad Aboriginal Art: Tradition, Media and Technological Horizons, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1994) ix-x.
problem with introduced technology, or instruments of mass communication such as TV, goes beyond the politics of representation (xxvii).

I will focus on two papers in particular from the collection: one outlining a Walpiri reading of Hollywood iconography, the other on Western Desert sandpainting and postmodernism. Both relate to aspects of Michaels' work with the Walpiri and both problematise in different ways the fundamentally Western dichotomy between fact and fiction (in the library, fiction and non-fiction; in the university, science and literature; in the video shop, documentary and drama).

I want to preface the discussion with a reference to another paper from the collection, entitled "Para-Ethnography" which demonstrates the scope of Michaels' researches and reflections and draws out some of the major issues associated with the deconstruction of the fact/fiction dichotomy.

In what amounts to a cross-cultural literary criticism, Michaels endeavours to compare, contrast and, interestingly, evaluate two recent, popular works of "fiction" - Bruce Chatwin's (1987) The Songlines and Sally Morgan's (1988) My Place. Only Sally Morgan is of Aboriginal descent and the thrust of Michaels' critical evaluations stem from problems associated with locating these written works within a complex semiotic tradition that has evolved in the service of an historically oral economy:

"I think these books pose certain difficulties, not the least of which concerns classification, and so it is worthwhile to begin with a question of genre: How should we read, regard and criticise these texts in comparison to others? (165)"

I will not go into the details of the discussion here, but as the title of the paper suggests - Para-Ethnography - Michaels is making an attempt to explore the connections which exist between ethnography, anthropology and literary criticism by bringing his writing about these literary works under the umbrella or genre of "para-ethnography". While Michaels is aware that labelling his writing about these texts in this way is "starkly appropriative", the move itself implicitly problematises the category of "fiction" and leads to a new series of questions about the nature of meaning, knowledge, subjectivity and culture:

"To what extent do we now regard ethnography as a narrative, even literary form, and not just as an objective mode of scientific reportage? What is the self in any culture and how do characterological conventions affect cultural conceptions? What is a defensible position for the cultural subject and how are the relations of observer to observed to be themselves observed? And what are the responsibilities of inscriptive practices, the consequences of publishing folk traditions? (175)"

I have problems with Michaels' criticism of the alleged privileged authenticity of the Morgan text but I want to pursue this argument in the more general context of the essay entitled "A Walpiri Reading of Hollywood Iconography". In this paper Michaels notes that the Walpiri in fact utilised a graphic system of representation not unlike the semiotic system we know as "writing". Although Walpiri design and graphics, along with other indigenous design systems, is usually classified by outsiders as art rather than writing, Michaels is unambiguous about the rapprochement between Walpiri graphics and Western (alphabetic) writing systems:
Walpiri graphics ... is as close to what we call writing (logo/ideo-graphic or alphabetic) as you can get without compromising the authority of the human speakers and interpreters - that is, it is a writing in the service of orality (85).

This rapprochement has widespread implications for received (Western) notions of literacy and media history. Here I want to examine a closely related set of important criticisms directed at what Michaels refers to as "the fallacy of unilineal evolution of culture" (81).

Also known as "social Darwinism" this widespread, "Western" world-view was responsible for the belief, for instance, that people too unlike the Victorian English gentry represented a less evolved stage in the single great chain of culture. And while, as Michaels notes, anthropology had "well and truly repudiated the theory of unilinealism" by the time of the horrific theatre inspired by Nazi cosmology - which took unilinealism to its logical conclusion in the Final Solution - nevertheless "evidence of the persistence of unilinealism is everywhere" (81).

Our (Western) thinking about "primitives" and our conceptions of what constitutes "history" as opposed to "pre-history" are intrinsically biased towards culture-specific concepts of progress, knowledge and truth. The truth is:

... very few people believe what anthropology teaches: that indigenous, small-scale societies are not earlier (or degenerate) versions of our own. They are rather differing solutions to historical circumstance and environmental particulars that testify to the breadth of human intellectual creativity and its capacity for symbolisation (81-82).

Even the qualifier "oral" is often displaced in favour of the purely negative term "pre-literate" and where it is not, it may become confused with "tribal" - "a word whose technical meaning is inappropriate for many of the groups so classified" (82). For Michaels these arguments call into question the very foundations of our Western ideas about literacy and the sequence of media history. The central thesis in "Hollywood Iconography" turns on a certain equivalence between oral and electronic systems of communication, bypassing the "traditional" pre-requisite stage of writing and literacy. This is expressed in terms of a (Western) "literate myopia":

One problem with this literate myopia has been that we haven't paid much attention to what other people do instead of writing, and how information is processed, stored, transmitted, shared or received in its absence (83).

Aboriginal cultures in Australia stretch back over at least forty thousand years and with European invasion only a handful of generations ago (1788), the result is what Michaels describes as "a continuous cultural sequence such as is to be found nowhere else" (82). After thousands of generations, in the early 1980's, the Walpiri, having survived a traumatic contact experience, began to view Hollywood video tapes and later were to begin receiving television from the AUSSAT satellite. Michaels was a privileged observer and participant in the so-called "electronic invasion" and his insights, along with those of others working in similar contexts, have yet to be fully appreciated and integrated into existing Western conceptions of communication, knowledge and progress; conceptions which still suffer from the bias of unilinealism:

I spent three years living with Walpiri Aborigines of the Yuendumu community undergoing this imposed transition [the 'electronic invasion'], partly engaged in applied research and development leading to the birth of an indigenous community television station that challenged government policy...
and licensing. In the process, I noted what many other field-workers in non-
literate, Third World, and indigenous enclaves are recognising: that electronic
media have proved to remarkably attractive and accessible to such people
where often print and literacy have not (80).

Evidence Michaels presents in support of the oral/electronic analogy turns on the
similarity in the production processes and content of Walpiri graphic and design systems,
and Walpiri TV and video productions. It is worth citing at some length Michaels' observations since they also impact on notions of authenticity ie the perceived truth and
correctness of semiotic phenomena:

... proper videotape production for a particular story may require the presence
of several families including many people. But not only do most of these
people not appear on the tape, but a proportion of them (related to the on-
screen "owner" of the story through the mother's patrilineage) must not
appear on screen. They may, however, operate the camera. This is
consistent with equivalent rules in ceremonial performance. But what attracts
our attention is that everybody seems to know how that tape was made and
whether these rules were observed, and therefore if the tape is a "proper" and
"true" story, without any apparent evidence on the tape itself. Similarly,
what are to the European observer semantically empty landscape pans are
explained by Aboriginal producers and viewers are full of meaning. The
camera in fact traces "tracks" or locations where ancestors, spirits, or
historical characters travelled. The apparently empty shot is quite full of life
and history to the Aboriginal eye. The electronic inscription process may be
said to be operating for the Walpiri in a way not unlike their graphic system,
providing mnemonic, evocative symbols amenable to interpretation and
historical accuracy, when viewed in the proper social and cultural context
(92).

Adherence to complex systems of social obligation and relation is an integral part of what
for the Walpiri would be an "authentic" and "proper", "true" story or account. And it is
worthwhile noting in passing, that the use of the conduit metaphor in the extract
("semantically empty" pans and the "empty shot is quite full of life and history") is
inescapable in the cross-cultural context; further evidence to suggest, I believe, that we
should accept, not reject, the insights into meaning provided by the conduit metaphor
model. An unauthentic story for the Walpiri would be one which does not conform to the
complex exigencies of Aboriginal authorship, producing what Michaels, somewhat
provocatively, calls "bad Aboriginal art". But even the category of "author" is
problematised in a process which foregrounds the maintenance and stewardship of
(special) cultural knowledge. Michaels makes this point and draws out the interesting
implications for information theory:

To call the owners of these [Walpiri] designs their authors is not precisely
correct, however. Walpiri cosmology is staunchly conservative. It insists
that truth pre-exists human apprehension. The creation and recreation of the
world is an established eternal process; the stories, songs, dances, and designs
that contain and explain these truths are likewise unchanging....
In terms of what we know of cybernetic systems, this is impossible, a
prescription for total cultural entropy. To explain how novelty enters into
the system, so that it can respond to environmental circumstances and remain
viable, we have to step outside the explanation the system offers us (86-87).
While it is impossible in practice to measure the impact of one paradigm of semiosis over another, it is nevertheless quite feasible and indeed appropriate, at this point, to contrast the "mode" of Western alphabetic writing systems with the "mode" of Walpiri graphic design systems. The comparison will lead to the deconstruction of the concept of "mode" but the point I would like to make here is that such a comparison can also be viewed as a contrast between the paradigm of communication offered up by mathematical information theory (represented by Western writing systems, at one extreme "morse code") and the alternative model I am suggesting which turns on empirically motivated kriteria and oral/aural systems of communication (represented by Aboriginal writing systems, at the other extreme servicing a complex oral semiotic economy). Michaels makes the comparison between alphabetic writing and Walpiri graphics by drawing on the metaphor of the croquet game from "Alice in Wonderland":

Because the "icon", the inscription medium, and the surface are all meaningful semiotic elements to be considered in the reading of Walpiri graphics, it begins to appear that the system contains too many functioning semiotic levels to achieve either the denotation of pictographs or the abstract creativity of alphabets.... We have a problem like the one ... exemplified by the croquet game in Alice in Wonderland: If the balls, the wickets and the mallets are all independently motivated, moving elements, the game is too unpredictable to play. It is therefore an organic system, not a mechanical one.... Writing, if it is to accomplish the functions it achieves in the Western world, must be a mechanical system, rule bound and predictable. Reading must become automatic, transparent .... "the purely passive instrument of the spoken word". The system must detach itself from the author and operate more or less equivalently for all literate users. This is precisely what Walpiri graphics do not attempt.

... Walpiri graphics oppose publication and public access. They do this partly by limiting denotation, operating instead as an evocative mnemonic, recalling stories without asserting any authorised text or privileged reading. They also do this by restricting access to both the production and viewing of designs (86, 87).

Secrecy requirements and taboo restrictions are pivotal features of Walpiri culture and pervade the semiotic systems of production as well as the interpretive strategies that are brought to bear in their "readings". While it is true that, in one way or another, all societies and cultures practice some form of taboo and secrecy requirements, the way in which this is accomplished in Walpiri society needs to be functionally reckoned with its accomplishment within Western systems of literacy:

The evidence from Walpiri graphics and Walpiri video proves useful to the re-examination of the "oral/electronic" analogy proposed by my media historians [Ong, Innis, McLuhan, even Lévi-Strauss]. It would be important in this re-examination to note first that some "oral" societies, for example the Walpiri, do have writing of a particular sort: a writing subservient to, and in the service of, oral performance and living authorities. The writings that became the source of Western literacy are distinguished functionally from "oral writing" in that they subverted and replaced orality as the interpreting mode of symbolisation for society (93-94).
The essential point here is that the electronic media have proved to be acceptable and accessible for the Walpiri and other indigenous societies, in a way that alphabetic systems of representation and the print media have not.

The final point I would like to glean from this paper is perhaps the most important for a cross-cultural model of genre, namely the absence in Walpiri cosmology of any category that pertains to what in the West would be called "fiction". This point is borne out by Michaels' observations of the impact of Hollywood iconography and electronic media in traditional indigenous societies:

... Aboriginal people were unfamiliar with the conventions, genres and epistemology of Western narrative fiction. They were unable to evaluate the truth value of Hollywood cinema, to distinguish, for example, documentary from romance. This may be because all Walpiri stories are true, and the inscription and interpretation processes that assure their preservation also ensure their truthfulness (or at least engineer a consensus on what is true at each re-creation, which amounts to the same thing). Thus I was observing the impact of fiction on Aboriginal people much more than the impact of television per se (90-91).

The interpretive strategies invoked in the apprehension of the Hollywood genres reflect the prior concerns, values and expectations of the viewers and, for the Walpiri, this at least entails a detailed description of the kinship relationships which obtain between all the characters as well as the kinship domain to which each belongs:

When Hollywood videos fail to say where Rocky's grandmother is, or who's taking care of his sister-in-law, Walpiri viewers discuss the matter and need to fill in what for them is missing content. By contrast, personal motivation is unusual in Aboriginal story: characters do things because the class (kin, animal, plant) of which they are members are known to behave this way. This produces interesting indigenous theories, for example, of national character to explain behaviour in *Midnight Express* or *The A-Team*. But it is equally interesting that it tends to ignore narrative exposition and character development, focusing instead on dramatic action ... (91).

This meeting of electronic media and Walpiri society is captured by what Michaels elsewhere refers to as the "Aboriginal invention of TV". Far from being inaccessible or subversive for the Walpiri viewer, Hollywood iconography represents a very partial account of a story requiring a good deal of interpretive activity in order to be rendered meaningful. Nevertheless this very fact displaces questions about literacy and "visual literacy" and instead places both the message and the medium (mode) in the service of particular cultural ends:

... Walpiri viewers, and perhaps now many others, put video fictions to quite different uses and make quite different sense of them (94).

Moreover, the most accessible genres for the Walpiri are those which the "traditional" academic/literary critic would scarcely deign to recognise, let alone theorise (these are the "video-shop" genres referred to above):

It could prove promising that the most popular genres appear to be action/adventure, soap, musicals and slapstick. Whatever our educated palates may think of these forms, they have advantages in the context of this...
analysis. As the least character-motivated, most formulaic fictions, they may encourage active interpretation and cross-culturally varied readings. The trend in popular TV and international video marketing continues to be in favour of those entertainments in which universal familial relationships are highlighted, action is dominant, and culture-specific references are either minimal or unnecessary ... (95).

I would submit that such genres constitute the material starting point for a cross-cultural semiotics. Speaking as they do to aspects of a common humanity, these popular genres are capable of yielding a great deal of insight into the nature of that ultimately ineffable context/content which is our human being.

Laughter and violence, pleasure and pain are the quintessential "ingredients" of this content and if we are to have any sort of empirical basis for the concept of authenticity then I believe we need to rely upon such experiences. By this I don't mean the laughter of an individual character in a particular book, the violence suffered by any one at the hands of another, nor pleasure and pain as though they were inherently alienating and radically subjective experiences; rather, the laughter of audiences, groups and gatherings (what is it that people laugh at/find amusing?), the violence suffered by whole nations at the hands of others (when is violence justified?) and pleasure and pain as part of our common experience (the cycles of birth, death, feast, defecation, copulation, imagination...)

Michaels is somewhat ambiguous about the nature of authenticity. On the one hand, in his para-ethnographies, he regards (Aboriginal) authenticity as being verifiable according to the sort of complex set of criteria the Walpiri would invoke through ceremony and design. This is also the view underlying the cross-cultural exposition in "Hollywood Iconography. On the other hand, in his post-script to recent acrylic paintings by senior Walpiri Aborigines at Yuendumu - the sub-title to his essay on "Western Desert Sandpainting and Postmodernism" - Michaels, in asking the question "how do we determine a semiotics of authenticity", seems to be calling on the need to embrace the ineffable rather than the need to follow, proscriptively as it were, complex sets of guidelines and protocols which are, at any rate, internal to the semantic systems of the cultures in which they evolved.

The paintings which are the subject of this essay are not Western Desert sand-paintings but authentic reproductions, made by the appropriate people in the appropriate way, on the doors of the local school at Yuendumu. The reproduction and displacement in this way of the original design concepts and context represented a moment of enormous history for the Walpiri people at Yuendumu. And for the Elders who were involved in the production process, suitable recognition/reward was expected:

After all, this was a staggering and unprecedented feat: they were establishing publicly the major Dreamings, and thus the charters and the knowledge, for the land extending from the Yuendumu settlement. The explicitly secret designs, those accessible only to initiates, were of course edited out of the door paintings... But the decision to assemble all this, at one place and at one time, must be seen as a historic moment in the life of Walpiri tradition. It was not one to be celebrated by small honorariums (53).

Indeed such was the moment that it ultimately inspired the book containing the essay by Michaels outlining the process whereby the paintings came into being. Communicating the approximate meaning of this moment to people from other (non-Aboriginal) cultures is not impossible, but fraught with difficulty. Michaels describes the problem as it exists
in forms of Western art criticism but begins by emphasising the impossibility of a stranger/outsider gaining access to the "closed" and restricted layers of content in the Walpiri designs:

I do not "understand" these paintings, not in terms of the meanings the painters put there.... These meanings are complex, implicit, even restricted. To understand them one would need to be a full member of a particular Walpiri kin group, initiated and competent in the stories and ceremonies and landscapes that are intimately associated with the sources of these paintings. Even then, some meanings would remain inaccessible until the painter, reciprocating some ancient or contemporary obligation, passed on the design to another. The ability to interpret these paintings is inseparable from the right or obligation to paint them....

Usually the problem of meaning in traditional art is managed cross-culturally by offering a reduced, schematised gloss of some figurative meanings associated with the non-Western and unfamiliar images.... The confrontation with the image is reduced to an exercise in cryptography. Of course, modern abstract and expressionist art can be subjected to the same procedure. In both cases, I believe this to be at the expense of art and of meaning (50).

So even though the "content" of the designs is out of bounds for strangers, so to speak, the possibility for some meaning to be imputed to the work remains open. It is this possibility which opens up the potential for a cross-cultural semiotics of authenticity. What seems to be implied in the extract is that there comes a point at which interpretation and meaning merge, but not in a way that resolves the semiotic product into a wholly transparent entity, rather one in which the product is celebrated as a sign of human creativity. In other words, "meaning" is not simply a encoding/decoding operation. This is all that information theory recognises, ignoring the organic and dialogic foundations of semiosis and interpretive activity. Rather, in determining a semiotics of authenticity, the fundamentally ineffable nature of human being, and the contexts in which it occurs, is foregrounded over and above the relatively mechanical processes of encryption and interpretation.

Information theory assumes that the "code" is transparent to all participants. In terms of the systemic-functional semiotic paradigm, this assumption seems to be implied in the description of the semantic system as a "shared meaning potential" ie. the potential is a homogeneous one to which all participants have equal access. In reality this is far from the truth and Fairclough's work in critical language study (CLS) is based on this very issue. There and here language is regarded as a heterogenous plurality of interdependent, sometimes conflicting, codes. The fundamental insight that a cross-cultural semiotics has to offer is that there is no one language or code associated with a culture's semantic system, but a multiplicity of (social) languages and a plurality of codes and therefore many semantic systems, not just one abstract, transparent, "shared meaning potential". In Walpiri society, these manifold codes and associated semantic systems are clearly delineated according to long established lines of stewardship, obligation, taboo and exchange. By contrast, Western societies manage the ownership and distribution of (special) cultural knowledge through public and private educational and research institutions. Libraries, and now electronic storage facilities, house the knowledges of Western cultures and in this respect Michaels is quite right to assert that the writings which have informed the values underlying the Western canon have replaced "orality" as
the dominant mode of symbolisation. But I want to step back from asserting an extreme
dichotomy between oral and written modes of semiosis.

We have already seen how Walpiri graphics and design constitute a writing
system - one in the service of an oral economy. But the fact which renders the concept of
"mode" devoid of any structural significance in the cross-cultural model is the
oral/electronic analogy proposed by certain media historians and confirmed by Michaels
in his research. As the Walpiri's encounter with electronic communications technology
demonstrates, "mode" ultimately performs in the service of the cultural codes comprising
the culture's semantic systems. Of course a particular "mode" - be it written, oral,
electronic, graphic or otherwise - will always bring with it certain constraints and
opportunities, but this is inherent in all forms of semiotic practice.

In all modes and contexts, whatever the semiotic act, there is only one process
going on - the process of self-inscription, of cultural self-expression. I have chosen to
foreground the essential ineffability of human experience and the contexts in which it
occurs. By dispensing with the message/medium dichotomy what this leaves us with is a
multiplicity of semiotic/semantic environments and realisational levels - some articulable,
others not. These environments comprise the "insides" and "outsides" of our cultural
belief systems and socio-political systems of organisation. These environments are each
one a semantic system and the extent to which they are integrated according to a particular
organising principle, or set of principles, will determine the genre of the communicative
act.

To determine a semiotics of authenticity, we also need to inquire into the nature of
"deception" in order to determine the nature of the "unauthentic". For the Walpiri,
deception would comprise the unauthorised and inappropriate reproduction of a design or
story: what in Postmodernism is called "appropriation" and "quotation", in many
indigenous cultures would be called theft. Herein lies the essential difference between
"postmodern" culture and indigenous culture: postmodernism denies the possibility for
any authentic meaning, authenticity becomes simply one more genre, one more series of
intertexts, one more nostalgic reference to the content of a contentless history; for
indigenous cultures, like the Walpiri, authenticity means that a painting or story is a "proper law one" and that it coheres with custom and practice (85).

In a cross-cultural model, the question of authenticity cannot be resolved from the
outside looking in, by a stranger to the culture, as it were. And if the conditions for
authenticity are completely internal to the culture itself, as appears to be the case for the
Walpiri, then the prospect for a cross-cultural semiotics of authenticity is rendered
irreducibly problematical - there being no common measure and no common standard for
the commensurability of cross-cultural concepts. If this were the case, cross-cultural
communication would be almost impossible. I have consistently appealed to the ineffable
content/context of human being and subjectivity as a way of theorising the possibility for
a semiotics of authenticity and this seems to be the direction Michaels is coming from in
asking "how do we determine a semiotics of authenticity?":

Or is there a manner in which, despite the vast cultural and especially
semiotic distances that separate the Walpiri from us, some sense of truth of
Walpiri philosophy is being communicated through these paintings to the
uninitiated viewer? (58)
Everything in information theory rejects the possibility for the ineffable/silent communication of an authentic relation to human being. In other words, information theory is incapable of theorising the ineffable connection which can exist between people and cultures, a connection to our common humanity. Michaels' experiences with the Walpiri people at Yuendumu, and the ancient open earth out there in central Australia, led to the realisation of just such a relation, one which palpably went beyond his "knowledge" of the local custom and law, into a more profound, even spiritual, appreciation of the relation between people and place. But uttering the ineffable is never easy, especially in a theoretical or scholarly context, and the struggle is evident in the following (final) extract from Michaels' work. Here he reflects on the incongruity and distance between feelings and theories and he provides a refreshingly profound meditation on the nature of meaning, outside the text-based, systems-oriented, sign-centred contexts in which such discussions usually take place:

Nothing in semiotic theory or contemporary scientific philosophy accounts for any such ability of phenomena to communicate directly, unmediated, their history and meaning. Rationally I have to reject the possibility, and admit that I have been influenced by my reading and other prior associations and information. But I recognised that the epistemic problem raised here is precisely the one of such interest to Aboriginal philosophy, and the one the paintings [on the doors at Yuendumu] themselves attempt to bridge.... Do they convey some authentic vision beyond the cultural and linguistic specificity of the iconic and semiotic codes employed in their construction? Or are they "art" merely because of the correspondence of their surfaces to current fashions of form and technique, elevated in value only because of their ethnographic rarity and curiosity? I believe they attempt the former (59-60).

There are two possible approaches to determining a semiotics of authenticity. But only one is empirically valid.

One approach is to proceed on the basis of criteria internal to the culture, eg. Walpiri customary law and practice. This is the approach Micheals seems to favour in most of his work. It works well for participants within the culture but for strangers/outsiders to the culture such authentication is practically impossible.

The other approach is the one finally alluded to in "Western desert Sandpainting and Postmodernism", according to which the criteria become our empirical kritería and the process of authentication proceeds on the basis of cross-cultural dialogue and exchange, establishing a relation I have previously described in terms of "empathy". There are important sceptical arguments against this hypothesis which I will need to return to later.

A semiotics of authenticity is possible, even necessary, certainly overdue. In the cross-cultural model, authenticity can only be determined through the ineffable context/content of human being. The criteria for authenticity must ultimately be the empirical kritería we are born with and it is to a detailed consideration of the nature of the kritería and the empirical foundations of the cross-cultural model that I now turn.
That Other Science (B)

Epicurus: First Stage

The concept of a universe was the essential element of all Epicureans and, indeed, all of humanity. The first stage of discovery was the observation of natural phenomena and the comprehension of their nature. The second stage was the understanding of the universe as a whole and the comprehension of its laws.

Epicurus: Second Stage

The second stage of discovery was the development of a system of logic that could be used to understand the universe and its laws. This system was called the "principles of Epicurean philosophy."
That Other Science (B)

Epicurean Empiricism

According to Epicurus, scientific discovery occurs in two stages: a stage of nature (*physis*) and a stage of calculation or measurement (*logismos*) (56). In the first stage, humans respond directly to the environment without any critical reflection upon their responses; in the second stage they use calculation to take control of their responses to the environment. Because the second stage results in the imposition of "policies" or what could be called "ideologies", it can also be called a stage of *nomos* or convention. In this way Epicurus' two stages of discovery retains the traditional thematic contrast in Greek philosophy between *physis* or "nature" and *nomos* or "convention".

The second stage - the stage of calculation, of *logismos* and *nomos* - can be characterised as a technical stage wherein argumentation and reason (L.*ratio*, Gr. *logos*) intervene and impose particular judgements and structures on the phenomena that are observed and experienced in the first stage. The two stages also reflect the fundamental distinction in empirical philosophy between the evident (*enarges*) and the expected (*prosmenon*)

Corresponding to these two stages of discovery are Epicurus' two rules of scientific inquiry. These rules are not so much prescriptive as procedural. They describe an empirical view of the world and the effect that all forms of inquiry must necessarily have on pre-existing and, in a sense, primordial perceptions. Before examining these rules in further detail, a final word about the two stages of discovery and the view of the world they imply.

The general concept of "regularity" is implicit in the first stage. The concept of regularity may be regarded as the foundation of all Epicurus' and, indeed, all legitimate empirical inquiry. To paraphrase Epicurus, nature (*physis*) furnishes a concept of regularity then calculation (*logismos*) takes place in order to discover the underlying causes of obscured regularities (60). Against a background of regularity the potential for disturbance emerges. A state free from disturbance called *ataraxia* lies at the heart of Epicurean empirical philosophy.

Epicurus' First Rule or: The Requirement for *prolepsis*

A *prolepsis* is a self-evident concept which is required at the outset of any investigation. Put simply, it is a sign used to express the problematic and it has its basis in empirical observation and experience. The paradigmatic case for a *prolepsis* is the concept of "regularity" implied in Epicurus' first stage of inquiry. It is only against such a background of the regular and known that it is possible to constitute a system of understanding about the emergence of truth and knowledge. It is only against a background of perceived regularity and freedom from disturbance that the possibility for an alternative state of affairs and set of evaluations emerges.

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1 Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to Asmis 1984. Where appropriate I will also indicate the relevant ancient source.

2 "Letter to Herodotus" 75.
How such a background of regularity and untroubledness is manifested through the culture of the creatures in question will give rise to the set of presumptions and prior associations. Each presumption or prolepsis comprises at least two basic attributes:

1. Perception (aisthēsis);
2. Affection (pathos).

The crux of Epicurus' method lies in exploiting these elements in order to infer what is non-apparent (adélon) or what is expected to appear (prosmenon). The term prolepsis literally means a "grasp" that has been obtained before an inquiry starts. In the doxography this has a technical meaning which Epicurus avoids, preferring instead, as he usually did, to prepare and explain the concept in ordinary (natural) language by using the form "to have grasped". It is not so much the meaning of the term that I want to emphasise here, although that is important, but Epicurus' characteristic use of ordinary language. Indeed a great deal of misunderstanding of Epicurus' main ideas has been the result of their translation into the technical and literary idiom of the historically dominant form of Hellenistic philosophy by doxographers such as Diogenes Laertius, who remains today a major source of Epicurean empirical philosophy. Epicurus, not unlike modern philosophers such as Kierkegaard, Derrida, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Husserl, wrote in a style that was consistent with his philosophical beliefs and opinions. This sort of consistency between the "what" and the "how" of truth is an important feature of both the Epicurean and Stoic schools of philosophy. The important point here is that Epicurus' use of the word prolepsis is in harmony with the first rule itself, which is precisely a demand for an initial, ordinary understanding prior to any technical elaboration (22-23).

In order to appreciate where the first rule comes in the context of Epicurus' overall thought and method, it must be understood that Epicurus rejected reliance upon logic or logos, which was a cornerstone of Stoic philosophy, as the sole means by which truth and knowledge of the world is adjudicated. Epicurus' major opus, called the Kanon (from the Greek word denoting a rule, measure or standard), is divided into Physics and Ethics. It is said that in substituting the Kanon for logic, Epicurus subordinated logic to physics (logos to physis) (20). The Epicurean empirical philosopher relies not so much on logic as his/her method of assessment and inquiry but on a collection of observations about the world, called the kanon, the first group or type of which comes under the genre of prolepsis. These are simply the ordinary words and ways used to describe what is being investigated. In Part I the problematics of ideology, perception and belief were described in terms of consciousness, dialogue and the imagination and each of these concepts is a prolepsis in the context of this dissertation. Asmis' term for prolepsis is "initial concept".

A prolepsis is formed on the basis of what Epicurus understands to be perception. For Epicurus, perception encompasses sense-perception (aisthēsis) as well as the mind or mental sense which includes dreams, emotions and the imagination (pathos). Aristotle excludes this mental sense from his understanding of perception or aisthēsis and this is consistent with his famous belief that man is the animal with logos. Somewhat ironically perhaps, Epicurus' understanding of perception or aisthēsis coincides with Plato's use of it in the "Theatetus" where mental presentations of the sort assigned to the mind by Epicurus are included in the Academic use of the term. The very substantial difference between Plato and Epicurus derives from the Platonic rejection of perception or aisthēsis as the basis of obtaining knowledge and truth about what is unobservable or non-apparent. Plato, it will be recalled, preferred the super-sensible
world of forms and ideas. Later I will be referring to the Platonic position as perpetrating a form of pseudo-scepticism. For Epicurus, however, "all perceptions, including perceptions ordinarily thought of as deceptive, qualify as a basis of inference for what is unobserved" (87). Hence also the Epicurean 'postulate' or *prolepsis* that all perceptions are true. In common with other philosophers "Epicurus held not only that all sensory awareness is the result of an affection (*pathos* used in the most general sense) of the perceptual organ, but also that sensory awareness is of two kinds:

[1] an awareness of things as external to ourselves;

[2] and awareness of inner conditions (97-98).

Perceptions and affections thus complement each other by showing two distinct kinds of reality: the world of external objects and the world of inner conditions. This distinction also captures on an empirical level the one Bakhtin draws on a discursive one between inner and outer speech. The distinction is also consistent with the conduit metaphor model of meaning.

Finally it must be noted that there is little in Epicurus' first rule that makes him stand out against the general background of Hellenistic philosophy. Where Epicurus depart from the mainstream is revealed through the second rule.

**Epicurus' Second Rule or: Applying the kritēria**

In the second rule, empirical observation and experience is used as a sign in order to infer what is "yet to be appear" (*to prosmenon*) or what "cannot be observed" (*to adelōn*). The Epicurean *kritēria* thus comprise empirical observation and experience. In Stoic philosophy, the *kritēria* designate the standards against which the correctness of knowledge and truth is to be judged. Epicurus uses the term to designate all the faculties of sense-perception including the cognitive and affective dimensions of empirical experience. I will explore in further detail the nature of the Epicurean *kritēria* below. However in order to apprehend the application of the *kritēria* in the second rule the key terms are *evidence* (*enargeia*) and *observation* (*terein*).

In his "Letter to Herodotus", Epicurus uses the term evidence or *enargeia* to designate the impression made on the mind and senses by the phenomena. These impressions are explicitly qualified as being imposed from the outside (98). I will come back to the concept of empirical evidence shortly. Perhaps the most important term in the statement of the second rule is observation or *terein*.

In the ancient Greek vernacular, *terein* had the primary meaning of "keep" or "watch" with the narrower, more technical meaning of "observe" arriving by the time of Epicurus (100-101). This latter meaning is consistent with Epicurus' statement concerning the *kritēria* as being "in accordance with the perceptions and affections" (see below). There is also a sense in which observation is derivative of the perceptions for Epicurus but the strongest associations of the term are derived from Empiricist medicine.

The Empiricist physicians explained *experience* (*empeira*) as the observation of what has often appeared in the same way (101). This ties in with the idea of regularity underpinning the formation of "initial concepts". *Terein* or observation also has the sense "memory" for Epicurus and this is conveyed through the connotation of observation with "preservation" in the vernacular of the day: "the observation is viewed as something that must be kept safe or preserved in one's awareness" (101). This is also consistent with the Fairclough's use of long-term memory in the CLS model, which I
have already suggested provides the foundations for an empirically-based model of culture, dialogue and genre.

The second rule most clearly differentiates Epicurus from his contemporaries and predecessors. In particular, Epicurus differs from both Plato and Aristotle "by stipulating that the knowledge that we have at the outset of the investigation consist of empirical observations, and that the extension of knowledge consists in using these observations as a basis of inferring what is to be expected or what is not apparent" (103). The second rule also provides the basis for an (Epicurean) empiricist semiotic. Indeed Hellenistic philosophy delivers up quite a vigorous and sophisticated debate on signs (sêmeia) and I will be recasting Epicurus' thought and method in the broader context of this debate presently. I will close this brief synopsis of the second rule by citing Asmis' translation of Epicurus' own statement of the rule:

... it is necessary to observe all things in accordance with the perceptions [aisthêsis ... têrein] and simply the present applications [epibolas] whether of the mind or of any of the criteria [kritêria] and similarly the affections [patê] that obtain so that we may have the means to infer both what is expected [prosmenon] and what is non-apparent [adelon] (83).3

To summarise, the Epicurean empirical paradigm resolves the sort of semantic and empirical questions arising out of a concern for the nature of meaning and truth by conceiving of consciousness as simultaneously participating in at least two stages or levels of semiosis and communicative/meaning-making activity.

The first stage represents what Deleuze and Jameson would call the "unmediated" experience of the world. According to a more rigorously coherent (Epicurean) empirical model of scientific inquiry, not only are all perceptions true but they also inform the composition of the self-evident concepts and exercises - each one a prolepsis - which provide the empirical basis for all scientific inquiry. In practice, these "initial concepts" are part of the vernacular - the ordinary, commonly understood language of the day. From a cross-cultural perspective, a prolepsis would reflect a culture-specific reference point and evaluation, manifested through what systemic-functional theory describes as natural language. In the first stage empirical scientific inquiry "meaning" is "made".

Similarly, what the systemic-functional model refers to as "metalanguage" - which is equivalent to the status of "theory" in "traditional" scientific paradigms - is accounted for through the second stage of inquiry where all concepts are regarded as differing models of opinion and belief (doxa) based on empirical evidence (enargeia), acquired through experience and memory (the empirical kritêria). Error is due to the addition of false opinion and cannot be ascribed to the inherently truthful kritêria. In the second stage meaning is "re-made", ie. reflected on and opinion added.

The distinction between the two stages of empirical inquiry is also similar to the one between "action" and "reflection" which is important in systemic-functional theory. Here I want to take the analogy one step further by projecting it onto a cross-cultural context and representing it in terms of "special" and "common" knowledge-types and semiotic process-types.

The Walpiri Aboriginal Elder, the Western university professor, the Eastern religious prophet are all "keepers" of specialised knowledge and associated semiotic

3 "Letter to Herodotus" 38.
processes. At the same time, these sorts of people, as people, are also capable of friendship and sharing experiences together and in this measure they all possess the same sort of common (human empirical) knowledge. In the cross-cultural context, more emphasis is placed on the ineffable qualities of affective experience since the potential for cross-cultural exchange and dialogue lies here, "outside" the special signing systems which convey the particular meanings of culture-specific experience. The cross-cultural model moves beyond the Marxist problematic of History as the unmediated experience of Necessity, by locating this problematic in the context of human experience and creativity. Beyond empirical need and necessity (hunger, thirst and shelter/security) there is pleasure and play, peace and relaxation, and always laughter. Affective experience is perhaps the major part of "common" empirical knowledge. It is certainly fundamental to the constitution of the Epicurean empirical kritēria: the ultimate empirical measure being an absence in the disturbance of the affections and perceptions - a reprieve or freedom from pain and anxiety called ataraxia. This is not to say that tension, conflict, pain and anxiety are undesirable - they are unavoidable.

The distinction being drawn here between "special" and "common" types of knowledge is based on the accepted distinction in Hellenistic schools of thought between "special signs" and "common signs". Similarly the distinction between special and common signs mirrors the one that we recognise today in terms of "public opinion" and "scientific fact/knowledge". Examining empirical arguments will have the distinct advantage of refining our views and judgements about the nature of the criteria that are invoked in the adjudication and defence of what is called, somewhat hopefully it seems sometimes, scientific knowledge (epistēmē). Epicurus did not refute the possibility of scientific knowledge, he merely located such knowledge in the same framework as ordinary opinion (doxa), effectively deconstructing the Platonic and dialectical tradition in scientific inquiry.

Opinion and Knowledge

In the "Meno" Plato contends that "true opinions" are a sufficient guide for life, but that they are not firmly fixed unless they are secured by dialectical examination ("calculation or cause"). Plato held in addition that opinion or doxa is in this way converted to "knowledge" or epistēmē. After Plato, the distinction between opinion and knowledge was elaborated by the Stoics, who regarded opinion as "weak assent" and knowledge as "secure apprehension that cannot be overthrown by knowledge or reason". The distinction between opinion (doxa) and knowledge (epistēmē) came to be adapted as a standard framework of philosophical discussion in the Hellenistic period (37).

The Epicureans dissented in one major respect from this generally accepted framework. They held that an opinion may be secured through argument and calculation, but they refrained from calling the result of this (semiotic) process "knowledge". This is consistent with the fundamental tenet of Epicurean science given above - there is no level of cognition superior to that of true opinion. How such a paradigm of semiosis translates into a scientific model of the real world is worth exploring in some detail.

Using the concept of evidence (enargeia) implicit in the second rule, Epicurus divides reality into two domains - the "evident" (enargēs) and "not evident". The "not evident" is further divided into that which is expected or anticipated to appear (to

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4 The arguments here concerning the exegesis of doxa are not strictly mine but those of Asmis (1984). I accept her arguments and present them here in support of mine.
prosmenon) and that which is not evident or non-apparent (to adélōn). The Epicurean empirical view of the world may be illustrated in the following way:

![Empirical World-View Diagram]

Empirical World-View

Closely related to the concept of "evidence" is the concept of "demonstration" (apodeixis). That which is evident or enargēs does not require demonstration or apodeixis. Hence all immediate objects of perception (phantasia), and consequently each presumption (prolēpsis), is evident (enargēs). The argument here is an important one in epistemological terms since in the absence of a prolēpsis which is self-evident, there can be no basis on which to proceed in scientific investigation. A prolēpsis must not require demonstration otherwise there would be an infinite regress of starting points and no possibility for any form of scientific inquiry to commence. The connection between "evidence" and "demonstration" is also an important one and defines the locus for ancient semiotic arguments.

For the Stoics, demonstration was a type of sign called the "indicative" sign (endeiktikon). The Stoics claimed that the indicative sign was a proposition and thus something "intelligible" (noēton) whereas the Epicureans held it to be something "perceptible" (aistheton) (183).

The Greek term for sign is sēmeion and a form of this term appears in Epicurus' second rule where he exhorts Herodotus to observe all things in accordance with the phenomena in order to acquire the means of inferring (sēmeiousthai) what is non-apparent (to adélōn) and what is expected (to prosmenon). The term sēmeiousthai from sēmeion is rendered "the means to infer" and implies that "observations are to be used as signs or sēmeia of what is unobserved" (175). Epicurus states this function of observations explicitly in his "Letter to Pythocles" when he points out that the phenomena (phainomena) may be used as signs or sēmeia of what goes on in the heavens. For the Epicureans then, observation (terein) functions as a sign (sēmeion) of what is not apparent (to adélōn) or expected to appear (to prosmenon). Semiosis (sēmeiousthai) may be defined as that act involving the use of signs to infer what is not immediately apparent or expected to appear.
Demonstration or *apodeixis* is the method of proving by argument what is unobserved. By contrast, Epicurean calculation (*epilogismos*) differs from *apodeixis* in that it is an analysis of what is observed, not an attempt to demonstrate what is unobserved. It is in this sense that Epicurus holds that what is "evident" through the "phenomena" does not require "demonstration". To appreciate the distinctions being drawn here, it will be appropriate to introduce Sextus Empiricus' presentation of Stoic thought.

As well as dividing reality into two - the evident and the non-evident - Sextus' distinguishes between two corresponding types of sign - the so-called "hypomnestic" (commemorative) sign and the "indicative" sign (*endeiktikon*). Loosely speaking, the commemorative sign operates according to an associative or connotative function, while the indicative sign functions as an argument in scientific demonstration.

Sextus also distinguishes between the commemorative and the indicative signs by relating them to two different uses of the word for sign - a *general* use, corresponding to the commemorative sign, where a sign is anything that is thought to "show" something; and a narrower, *technical* use where a sign is said to be indicative of what is non-apparent. In this technical sense, an indicative sign signifies something "out of its own nature and condition" (181-182). In addition the Stoics held that the indicative sign is, in every case, co-present with what is signified, for the reason that the indicative sign is a proposition. It is also in this sense of propositioning that the Stoics derived their concept of demonstration or *apodeixis*. By the time of Sextus, the epistemological distinction between "opinion" and "knowledge" had come to be associated with the two categories of sign: the indicative sign being the harbinger of scientific knowledge (*epistēme*), argument and demonstration (*apodeixis*); and the commemorative sign being the carrier of opinion (*doxa*), belief and conjecture (*stokasmos*).

An indication of the highly technical nature of Stoic logic can be found in how, according to Sextus, the Stoics defined the indicative sign:

> a true antecedent proposition in a sound conditional revealing the consequent (182).

Both the antecedent and the consequent must be sound propositions, with the antecedent revealing the consequent in such a way that the consequent cannot be known by itself, as something evident, but can only be known by means of the antecedent, which Sextus' expresses in the form of a conditional. For example "(if) this woman has milk in her breasts, this woman has conceived". Here the fact that the woman has conceived cannot be known by itself but is revealed by the fact that she is lactating. The Stoics attached great importance to the logic of language and it will be seen below that the foundations of Stoic logic go back to the dialectical method of Socrates. Indeed it has been said that the Stoics developed the philosophy that Socrates failed to find (see below).

The Epicureans rejected the logical form with which the Stoics invested the indicative sign, but they agreed that it was possible to know what is by nature non-apparent (*to adelon*) through inference according to what is evident (*enargēs*). Sextus' therefore attributes to the Epicureans a belief in the indicative sign even though the

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5 Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicus* (Against the Professors).

6 Sextus Empiricus *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*.
Epicureans themselves preferred to emphasise the priority of inductive logic (epilogismos, see below) as opposed to the deductive logic of Stoics.

In addition to the demonstrative arguments associated with the indicative sign, the Stoics also spoke of "conjecture" (stokasmos) as an art associated with the practice of divination and, in particular, the interpretation of divine applications in dreams. The art of conjecture or stokasmos is based on the commemorative sign and the arguments upon which conjecture is based may be described as "inductive" in the following sense:

An argument which leads up to the conclusion without revealing it not only has a conclusion that follows from the premises but is accepted because of past experience. Such an argument may be said to be inductive.7

The Stoics held that divination consists of opinion (doxa) and conjecture (stokasmos), based on the commemorative sign, which they regarded as fallible, rather than the knowledge (episteme) and truth (aletheia) which are based on the indicative sign and demonstrative argument. On this basis, the Stoics distinguished between the two types of sign as stages in scientific progress, framed according to a perceived difference between opinion and knowledge. This distinction between signs was also prominent in Hellenistic medicine with the so-called rationalist physicians or logikoi, on the one hand, adhering to the Stoic conception of the indicative sign, and the Empiricist physicians, on the other, recognising only the commemorative sign-type.

Having just characterised "opinion" in terms of an inductive inference associated with the art of conjecture, based on the commemorative sign, it will be useful to examine the Empiricist medical model which, like the Epicurean model, avoided making claims of universally certain truths.

**The Empiricists and epilogismos**

The Empiricist school dates back to the second half of the third century BC. They elaborated a system of empirical investigation that rivals both the Stoic and Epicurean methods of inference.

The Empiricists described the directly perceived condition of a patient in terms of symptoms (sumptomata) which can be associated with each other in a complex known as a syndrome (syndrome). These symptoms serve as signs of what is not presently observed.

The Empiricist art of medicine is based on experience (peira) which comprises personal acquaintance (autopsia) and past experience (empeira). In addition to their own past experience and acquaintance with the patient's history, the Empiricist physicians also admitted the report of someone else's past experience which they called istoria. It is from such a conception of experience that the Empiricists derived the theorems (theoremata) of their art.

The Empiricist physicians therefore proposed to rely on experience (empeira, autopsia and istoria) as a means of conjecturing what treatment will benefit a particular patient. They regarded any treatment they prescribed as only possibly correct, subject to the determination of the outcome or result of the treatment. In place of the logical consequent embedded in the Stoic conception of the indicative sign, the Empiricists

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7 To paraphrase Asmis 186.
admitted the type of consequent that is discovered by, or discoverable through, experience. This empirical type of consequent can be shown to consist in a constant conjunction of one event with another, through repeated observations of what occurs contemporaneously, before and after the events in question (188). Through the use of the commemorative sign, the Empiricist recalls observations and infers upon what is not presently manifest. Sextus Empiricus calls this type of empirical consequence the "consequence of observation" (188). Implicit in this use of the commemorative sign is the method of inference by similarity or analogy and this is comparable to the inductive method supporting Stoic conjecture.

The type of reasoning that the Empiricists applied in conjecturing about what is not presently perceived is called epilogismos:

Epilogismos is explained consistently in our texts as a type of reasoning that deals with the phenomena; it is glossed as "reasoning of the phenomena" or phainomenon logos. By contrast the type of reasoning used by the rationalist physicians was called analogismos. The function assigned to analogismos was the discovery of things non-apparent by nature (adela phuseios), whereas epilogismos was regarded as useful for discovering what is non-apparent under the circumstances [Epicurus' to adelon] (189).

It will be recalled that Epicurus distinguished between demonstration (apodeixis) of what is unobserved on the one hand, and calculation (epilogismos) according to what is observed on the other. This compound form of the Greek term for calculation - logismos - may be distinguished from two other compound forms: analogismos or argument by analogy, as used by the rationalist physicians to calculate similarities, be they among the phenomena or between the phenomena and what is unobserved; and syllogismos which designates the combination of concepts through argument and was put into great effect by Aristotle in his syllogistic figures (177).

Apparently Epicurus does not offer any technical elaboration on the notion of syllogism nor does he endorse the forms of argument put forward by Aristotle and the Stoics. He does use the term syllogizesthai in his "Letter to Pythocles" in the non-technical sense of "to think out" that which is in agreement with the phenomena. Nor does he offer any technical elaboration of analogismos, although he does use it as an important means of extending knowledge from what is perceived (enarges) to what is unperceived (adelon). The compound form epilogismos is prominent in both Epicurus' own writings and in the later doxography - particularly through the Epicurean, Philodemus. The term epilogismos is also notably absent from the writings of Plato and Aristotle in connection with scientific inference and discovery. I want to examine in further detail Epicurean empirical calculation or epilogismos as an alternative to the academic and peripatetic methods of scientific inquiry.

8 Adversus mathematicus.

9 See "Appendix" for a brief summary of Aristotelian semiotics.

10 Epicurus was a contemporary of Zeno, the founder of Stoicism. Most of Epicurus' polemic was directed against the metaphysics of the Platonists and dogmatic rationalism.
The Epicurean Philodemus and epilogismos

Philodemus is said to be the author of a well preserved fragment that was almost certainly entitled "On Phenomena and Significations" (peri phainomenon kai semeiosis), the conventional Latin title being De Signis or "On Signs". Apparently the treatise is a compilation of answers to objections directed against the Epicurean method of inference.

Like the Empiricists, Philodemus describes epilogismos as a calculation involving the phenomena and he also uses the gloss phainomenon logos or "reasoning of the phenomena":

According to Philodemus, we may obtain valid inferences by calculating [epilogizoumenos] the similarity and difference among the phenomena; and this is the method of drawing conclusion by epilogismos (205).

I will examine Philodemus' criteria for making valid inductive inferences presently but for the moment it needs to be noted that Epicurus' use of epilogismos is in agreement with Philodemus' explanation of it as a calculation based on the phenomena. But while nowhere in his extant writings does Epicurus present epilogismos as a means of inferring that which is unobserved or non-apparent by nature (to adelon), his use does seem to imply that he too regarded epilogismos as a means of knowing what is unobserved:

This view of epilogismos is in striking contrast with that of the Empiricists; although the Epicureans agreed with the Empiricists in using epilogismos as a means of inference, the Epicureans [also] held that it is a means of discovering what is non-apparent by nature [to adelon]... the many uses of epilogismos by the Epicureans and others show clearly... that epilogismos is a calculation performed on the phenomena and does not extend beyond them, even though the Epicureans used epilogismos as a means of demonstrating what is unobserved (205-206, n 23).

According to Philodemus, epilogismos is a method of calculating and obtaining valid inductive inferences. Philodemus' two requirements for making valid inductive inferences may be summed up as "careful observation" on the one hand - including, importantly, the observations of others (istoria) - and "the absence of any evidence to the contrary", also called the "criterion of inconceivability" (adianoesia) (de Lacy 154).

In De Signis, Philodemus carefully sets out a hierarchy of inferences which is intended to secure the closest possible similarity between observed entities or phenomena,

Philodemus specifies that we must infer from individual men to men most like them and from the genus of men to an attribute of the entire genus; from animals of a certain kind to animals most like them, and from the genus of animals to an attribute of the entire genus; from a certain kind of body to a body of a [very similar] kind, and from a generic body to a generic attribute of the body; from a certain kind of existent to existents most like this, and from generic existence to a generic attribute. The two subdivisions in each category appear to be specific signs (eidicha) and generic signs (genicha) respectively.... In accordance with this division Philodemus regards individual human beings as eide or species and the general type, to which these species belong, as a genos or genus (Asmis 207, n 31).
An echo of this arrangement may be heard in Epicurus' claim, in respect of perceptions and feelings, that we must pay attention "to those that are common (choinais) in accordance with what is common, and to those that are individual (idias) in accordance with what is individual" (71). The distinction between the "common" and the "individual" reflects Philodemus' distinction between "generic" signs and "specific" signs (genicha and eidicha). The key to apprehending Philodemus' description of inductive calculation (epilogismos) lies in the nature of the distinction between the common and the individual (choinais and idias).

By beginning with inferences in which individual human beings are each viewed as "species" and then continuing with inferences concerning the attributes of the "genus", the inductive process goes onto successively higher levels (animals, bodies, existents) with a distinction made at each level between the species into which the genus is divided and the genus itself. The direction of inference is from the ground up, as opposed to the top-down approach implicit in logos-based and linguistic models of semiosis:

By establishing a hierarchy of inductive levels, Philodemus attempts to show that a careful analysis or calculation (epilogismos) of the phenomena allows us to find the right degree of similarity on which to base our inferences (208).

It needs to be emphasised here that Epicurean empiricism, that other science, is, in many ways, the science of appearances (phantasia) and perception (aisthesis and pathos). Whether a given behaviour or communicative act is perceived to be true and authentic or false and deceptive, whether a word is perceived to meaningful or empty, these are matters not only for individual perception but also for genre. The point of Philodemus' scheme is to ensure that the movement from perception to genre, from the evident to the expected is based on solid empirical foundations. On the first level, the individual thing forms the basis for a group of similar things of which the individual thing is but an associated sign. On the second level, the generic grouping with which the individual sign is associated forms the basis for an inference about an attribute of the entire group or genre. By following Philodemus' scheme the outcome will at least be correct in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.

Much of Epicurean philosophy was a reaction against Plato and the Academe and therefore a reaction against the epistemology underlying the institutionalised distinction between opinion (doxa) and knowledge (episteme). Philodemus' exposition of the inductive process was in direct response to the Academic criticism of making inferences based on spurious or irrelevant similarities. Throughout his treatise, Philodemus indicates that science consists in distinguishing chance similarities from those that are connected by scientific law. Philodemus' particular expression for "inference by similarity" does not appear in Epicurus' own writings. However, despite this betraying a strong Empiricist leaning in his terminology, Philodemus remains faithful to the method of Epicurus. Most significantly, it was Epicurus who established the basic principle on which all of Philodemus' analysis and the concept of epilogismos stands, that the observed facts and they alone serve as signs for what is non-apparent (adelon). This principle, moreover, was directly opposed by the Empiricists who rejected the possibility for "conclusive" (see Appendix) arguments and the indicative sign, believing that the phenomena only provide signs of what may be observed in the future (Epicurus' to prosmenon).

11 "Letter to Herodotus"
The Hellenistic concept of a "common sign" has more in common, today, with astrology than anything contemporary semiotic theories derived from the work of Saussure might deliver up. The method of calculation by *epilogismos* begins by associating a particular perception with a similar one based on past experience. For instance, a cry for "Help!" heard at the amphitheatre will be related to other such theatrical cries for "Help!" and this will in part determine the response to the gesture/perception. The second part of the calculation involves associating the cry for "Help!" with the genus of all such cries (the "Help!"-genre) known to the experience of the investigator/audience/critic and this stock of knowledge (cultural capital/ RMs or MRs) will inform the choice of an attribute suitable for all elements within the genus. eg. authentic (convincing) or fake (artificial). These two parts of the calculation may be thought of in terms of two parts of the same context: a special part relating to the individual features of particular signs associated with (specific) "genres of culture"; and a common part relating to the ineffable attributes of common signs associated with the "genres of being".

Michael Halliday's functional grammar is also based on a semiotic theory of "context". The common ground shared by systemic-functional theory and (Epicurean) empiricism is worth exploring in some detail.

**Common Ground: Towards a Cross-Cultural Model of Genre**

Michael Halliday's work in systemic-functional linguistics and his social semiotic approach to the analysis of cultural meaning-making practices is a worthy measure of empirical inquiry in its own right. To appreciate this observation it is not necessary to have a working knowledge of Halliday's functional grammar - though the researcher in the human sciences is much the poorer without it. Rather, functional grammar is already being taught in some Australian schools and the basic approach to the study of language is relatively accessible since it relies on "common sense" observations about the way in which language works and meanings are made.

Put simply, functional grammar is a theory of context in which the text is seen as a functional product of the systemic processes of contextualised meaning-making activity. In putting together a theory of context Halliday draws on the work of anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942). Malinowski developed the concept of "context of situation" in order to provide a framework for locating instances of Kirwinian language use - the language spoken by the Trobriand islanders in the South Pacific. In explaining the genealogy of the concept, Halliday distinguishes it from the "traditional" notion of "context":

Up to that time, the word 'context' in English had meant 'con-text'; that is to say, the words or sentences before and after the particular sentence that one was looking at. Malinowski needed a term that expressed the total environment, including the verbal environment, but also including the situation in which the text was uttered ... [I]n an article written in 1923, he coined the term CONTEXT OF SITUATION (Halliday 1985a, 6).

In terms of common sense assumptions, the "context of situation" is simply the place where communication takes place - like the place you occupy now in reading this. Of course most linguistic activity is oral and the basis for oral exchanges of meaning is the same as the basis for all semiotic activity, namely, *dialogue*. Halliday's theory of language as a social semiotic accounts for the dialogic nature of semiotic activity by investing the potential for dialogue in the "context of culture" and enabling its specific
realisation in the "context of situation". Halliday explains the (important) distinction between 'context of situation' and 'context of culture':

The general notion of context of situation is as necessary for the understanding of English or any other major language as it is for the understanding of Kirwinian. It is simply that the specific contexts of culture are different ... the general principle that all language must be understood in its context of situation is just as valid for every community in every stage of development (8).

In systemic-functional theory, the "context of situation" provides the basis for making inferences about the likely outcome or direction of the communicative event. Successful communication relies heavily on a great deal of "assumed" information which contributes to the texturing and predictability of social meaning-making (semiotic) practices:

What the linguist is concerned with is how do we make these predictions? The first step towards an answer is: we make them from the context of situation. The situation in which linguistic interaction takes place gives the participants a great deal of information about the meanings that are being exchanged, and the meanings that are likely to be exchanged (10).

Reality is textured by regular situations leading to partially realised (cryptogrammatical) semantic structures, called genres, which comprise the "assumed information" in contextualised semiotic environments. The extent to which meaning is successfully communicated will depend upon the extent to which these partially realised meanings are in fact shared by the participants in the dialogic exchange. These partially realised meanings comprise the ineffable expression of cryptogrammatical processes which organise the facility to make meanings mean.

In the cross-cultural context of situation, systemic predictability breaks down where, for instance, Western mediated representations enter into Walpiri contexts of situation. So while Halliday will focus on the systemic-functional predictability of natural language and semiotic processes, in particular contexts of situation, I want to address the problematic from a cross-cultural perspective which radically problematises the prior textualisations meaning passes through, undermining the probabilistic structures associated with culture-specific semiotic practices. Halliday theorises the "context of culture" - a concept also derived from Malinowski - only indirectly, as the context for a shared "meaning potential" which constitutes the semantics of culture (Halliday 1985b, 7). By contrast the bulk of systemic-functional theory is based on an elaboration of the systemic processes and functions which are instantiated through the (textual/semiotic) realisation of meaning in actual contexts of situation:

We have not offered, here, a separate linguistic model of the context of culture; no such thing yet exists, although there are useful ideas around. But in describing the context of situation, it is helpful to build in some indication of the cultural background, and the assumptions that have to be made if the text is to interpreted ... (47).

The "context of situation" provides the foundation for systemic-functional linguistics: the context is modelled according to a tri-partite structure based on participants, processes and semiotic mode. Halliday describes this in terms of Field (what is going on?) Tenor (who is involved?) and Mode (what role are signs playing?) and from these derive the meta-functional (semantic) categories of Ideational
(comprising experiential and logical), Interpersonal and Textual. This is a somewhat crude synopsis of Halliday's theory of text and context but the point I want to make here is that most of Halliday's systemic-functional grammar is organised about semantic and functional categories derived from the theory of context of situation. However the theory of "context of culture" is scarcely developed beyond the rather transparent observation that it is simply the specific contexts of culture which differ.

In the cross-cultural context of situation the familiar features which lend predictability to similar contexts of situation are problematised or, to use the vocabulary of the Russian Formalists, estranged. In the cross-cultural context, communication is much less likely to be successful since many of the cohesive, informational and thematic attributes of discourse are grounded in the ineffable contexts of each culture's particular semantic systems. Nevertheless it is pointless to base a model of semiosis on the failures to communicate since even systemic failure is only apparent in contrast to potential success. But if the criterion for successful communication, in a given context of situation, relates to a shared or common cultural experience of those situations and contexts (the "genres of culture") then the question arises as to the nature of the criteria which will determine successful cross-cultural communication. The criteria are, I will argue, the (Epicurean) empirical kritēria and the relation they give rise to, in the cross-cultural context, is the one I have called "empathy" and described in terms of "genres of being". What is being communicated here is not "meaning" as such, since meanings are realised through a culture-specific semantics and particular signing-systems, but a type of meaning-potential which is realised through the common ground shared by dialogic participants involved in the cross-cultural exchange. Let me briefly illustrate the point being made here with reference to the cross-cultural context of Australia.

The history of contact discourse between the indigenous and non-indigenous cultures of Australia is hardly replete with instances where cross-cultural dialogue and exchange was successfully managed to the benefit of both cultures. Nevertheless such an outcome reveals more about the discursive and political strategies of the invading (non-indigenous) cultures than the nature of Aboriginal culture and society. I want to characterise the other type of meaning potential which comes to the fore in cross-cultural exchanges, and at the same time distinguish it from the sort of meanings that are typically realised through natural language and culture-specific semiotic processes, by recasting the cross-cultural problematic in terms of the ancient distinction between special signs and common signs.

The context of situation may be characterised by the functions of special signs (eidicha) whose meanings are bound up in specific situations in specific cultural contexts, giving rise to what I have called the "genres of culture". The cross-cultural context may be characterised by the functions of common signs (genicha) whose meanings are associated with (affective and sensible) empirical experience, giving rise to what I have called "genres of being". Now I want to use the special/common distinction to develop an empirically-based, cross-cultural theory of context.

The distinction between special and common signs can be described as a difference of "meaning potential". In other words, the distinction is a semantic one as well as an empirical one and goes beyond the systemic-functional semantic categories based on Field/Tenor/Mode. In much the same way that systemic-functional linguistics will distinguish between "natural language" and "metalanguage", the division of meaning potential according to special and common sign-types can be described in terms of the two basic functions that Halliday identifies language as having evolved to serve - action and reflection:
for all human beings ... the environment in which they live has these two validations: it is something to be acted on, turned into food or shelter or other needs; and it is something to be thought about, researched and understood. Language has evolved to serve both these elementary needs (Threadgold 1989, 193).

Associated with each category of sign-type is a corresponding category of genre-type. Genre as such has already been described as a principle of organisation associated with a contextualised meaning potential. That description can now be refined to account for the existential processes of action and reflection which give rise to differing, although inter-dependent, types of meaning potential. I will refer to the type of meaning potential associated with the engagement of common signs in terms of the "genres of being". Similarly I will refer to the type of meaning potential associated with the reflection of culture-specific signing-systems in terms of the "genres of culture".

The genres of being belong to the ineffable domain of human (affective and sensible) experience, while genres of culture are precisely those which contribute to the texturing and vocalisation of culture-specific realities and the creation of probabilistic social semiotic structures. In practical terms, this division of "meaning potential" may be described in terms of the distinction between technical / secret / special languages and the ordinary/everyday/common vernacular.

In the cross-cultural context the question is the empirical one concerning the way in which human experience is communicable across cultures. Relations of power and questions about who controls the direction and discourse associated with the cross-cultural exchange now become crucial. For instance, to return to the Australian cross-cultural context of situation, and the situation is similar for indigenous cultures in other places, one of the major sites for cross-cultural exchange and negotiation has historically been the courtroom. Here the arcane discourse of legalese, the highly formal architecture and interior design, the elaborate dress and structural positions of the participants involved, all contribute to the texturing of a cross-cultural context which is heavily biased towards one particular (dominant) system of culture and law. When Aboriginal people in courtroom situations avoid making eye contact, engage in protracted periods of silence and agree with statements whose meanings are not immediately apparent (so-called "gratuitous concurrence"), it is assumed that this is so because they are "Aboriginal". I would suggest it has more to do with being confronted by an inherently intimidating situation and feeling shame as a result of powerlessness in the face of a largely incomprehensible and intrinsically adversarial environment. These responses require no empirical defence however much they may have historically constituted the grounds for prosecution.

The cross-cultural analysis of meaning involves the determination of a semiotics of authenticity in which the central relation is one of empathy, giving rise to attitudes such as respect and evaluations based on the (sensible and affective) experience of being human. Such a relation, I have suggested, is analogous to the relation associated with common signs (genicha). In the cross-cultural context, questions about how meanings are realised assume priority over questions about what those meanings are. The question of genre also has more to do with how meanings are realised than what those meanings are. The question of authenticity, which is the fundamental question facing a cross-cultural theory of genre, requires both the what and how of meaning-making activity to be accounted for in a way that explains the equivalence or divergence between these two levels of semiosis.

The most pressing question, however, remains the one I alluded to at the end of Part 2, concerning the sceptical rejection of the relation of "empathy". Indeed some degree of scepticism seems appropriate given that the relation, as I have described it, is
grounded in the domain of the ineffable and voiceless - having the potential to impact on (all) others, but not being able to be impacted on; touching others but not being able to be touched (to use the tactile metaphor); an ineffable relation grounded in an intangible substance. It is to such scepticism and the scientific tradition to which it belongs that we now turn.
Beyond Scepticism

Pseudo-Scepticism

Epicurean inquiry begins with perception (*aisthēsis*) and affective experience (*pathos*). The empirical grounds for scientific inquiry is that of nature - *physis*, the physical universe. The feature of the physical universe which has overriding observational predominance is that of regularity. It is in contrast to this background of regularity that the possibility for change, innovation and calculation emerges. The "initial concepts" which obtain from such empirical experience comprise signs which may be used as evidence to demonstrate or calculate what is non-apparent by nature (*adēlon*) or what is expected to appear (*prosmenon*). The category of genre belongs to the latter domain of that which is expected to appear (*prosmenon*). Epicurean calculus - called *epilogismos* - is based on perceptions of similarity and the criterion of inconceivability.

The results of calculation by the method of similarity or *epilogismos*, comprise the canon for Epicurean scientific knowledge and inference. To therefore say that the Epicureans are sceptical about scientific "knowledge" would be to misrepresent the argument. I have already suggested that the Epicurean empirical method represents an alternative to the academic and scholastic methods of scientific inquiry. The criterion for empirical truth and knowledge is implicit in the canonical status accorded the *kritēria*. I will return to a detailed discussion of the Epicurean *kritēria* below as they will comprise an important element in the empirically-based, cross-cultural theory of dialogue and genre.

According to Epicurus, all scientific knowledge is a matter for opinion. In the context of Epicurus' thought and method, the dichotomy between knowledge (*epistēmē*) and opinion (*doxa*) is a false and empty one. However the important point is that to accept the dichotomy in the first place - as a framework within which to conduct an epistemological or scientific investigation - means accepting its (pseudo-)sceptical (see below) implications as well as presupposing the outcome of the investigation which will always be a belief in some sort of knowledge (*epistēmē*) which is always superior to mere belief (*doxa*).

I have already suggested that one of the great and most shameful hallmarks of Western civilisation has been a misguided but powerfully dogmatic belief in the cross-cultural superiority and universality of its own canons and institutions. I will argue that the basis of this false belief lies in the false dichotomy that has historically been drawn - from the time of Plato until Nietzsche's philosophical parricide - between knowledge (*epistēmē*) and opinion (*doxa*).

There is a direction of (scientific) progress implicit in the dichotomy between knowledge and opinion, reflecting a value system which exists outside the discursive instantiation of the opinion/knowledge dichotomy, in the ineffable context of the "Western" cultural experience. The direction of scientific progress is from crude opinion to a refined knowledge, from the primitive to the civilised, from slavery to freedom. The underlying "value" system is, I will argue, based on a presumption or *prolepsis* implicit in the dichotomy itself. This *prolepsis* takes the form of a pervasive scepticism directed towards empirical experience and opinion in the composition of what is perceived to be scientific knowledge. Ironically, this use of scepticism is quite contrary to its original use when it first emerged in Greece, before the time of Socrates and Plato. In order to
distinguish it from the original, I will call it a "pseudo-scepticism". This pseudo-
scepticism has its basis in linguistic and logos-based models of scientific inquiry which
subordinate empirical arguments to logical forms of validation and authentication.
Philodemus argued against this priority and reversed it by according primacy to the
empirical kriteria and the (empirical) criterion of inconceivability. Nevertheless the
pseudo-sceptical tradition which asserts the value of abstract logical principles over
empirical life experience is, to put it crudely, the one that has dominated the apologetics
of much of the Western philosophical and epistemological canon.

Access to the essentially technical genres of truth (aletheia) and knowledge (episteme), from the time of the Greeks to the twentieth century, has been the exclusive
domain of a privileged few able to acquire the technical knowledge and expertise required
to discern what really is the truth and how such truth can be authenticated. This is
certainly the case with the Stoics whose system of thought, logic and grammar is so
technically sophisticated, it almost seems to have been designed to keep the uninitiated
out. I will come back to the Stoic perception of "truth" and the related concept of
catalepsis below. For the moment it will suffice to point out that even the doxography
exposes aspects of Stoic philosophy to the criticism of being simply jeux de mots, plays
on words. I will argue that in the Stoic calculation of truth, the most important element is
not what result is obtained, but how it is arrived at.

The difference between the what and the how of scientific inquiry is reflected in
the epistemological distinction between opinion (doxa) and knowledge (episteme). On a
discursive level this distinction manifests itself in terms of "special" genres associated
with the formation of knowledge, and "common" genres associated with the formation of
opinion. The distinction can also be described in terms of "natural" language and
"technical" language, or, to use a specific example, between the genres of high English
and the genres of low English. On an empirical level, such a generic difference would be
experienced as an attitude or value which speaks in favour of knowledge and high
English ("literary language"), and a corresponding negative attitude or value which
speaks against opinion and low English ("vulgar language"). The division of language
into "high" and "low" genres is as much a socio-political division of the speakers as it is
of the generic use of language. High and low language forms have often been different
"national" languages - for the nobility of the Roman Republic, it was not Latin but Greek
which was spoken should the subject turn to topics of learning and erudition; and in more
recent centuries French has often been spoken by those who prefer their mother tongue to
be left to matters coarse and domestic ie. nineteenth century Russian aristocracy and, in
the twentieth century, areas of Africa and the Middle East. The point is that the
relationship between high and low forms of language-use is the similar to the
relationship, in socio-political and dialectical terms, between master and slave.

In empirical terms, the difference between master and slave can be restated in
terms of ataraxia. Ataraxia defines the greatest good to be the complete absence of pain
and anxiety. In empirical terms, the experience of the slave will be more painful relative
to that of the master. The need to avoid pain and overcome the condition of slavery is
implicit in the concept of ataraxia, although it must be noted, per Epicurus, that not all
pain is to be avoided nor all pleasure sought. The important point here is that regardless
of whether the master-slave paradigm is cast in (Epicurean) empirical or (Hegelian)
dialectical terms, the outcome will be the same: history as the slave's struggle to
escape/supersede/transcend his/her own condition. In terms of relative power and value,
the paradigm is one of domination and subordination. There are two important points
here.
The first point concerns the structural deficit in the relative power, value and status of one of the elements in the paradigm. The master-slave paradigm constructs its own languages and genres. The key genres are those, obviously enough, of Master and Slave but these categories are each valued differently from the point of view of the other. The *dialectical* negativity is also a *dialogic* negativity and the result is not only two different genres but two different cultures of being. *In the cross-cultural context there is no such thing as language, there are only languages.* The thesis that different socio-political and cultural groups speak different languages, even where the same "national" language is spoken, has been established by Bakhtin through the concept of "heteroglossia".

The second point relates to the structure of otherness where one element or cultural grouping dominates, or is perceived to dominate the other. The element of domination and perceived superiority means that, in practical terms, "otherness" will always lie with the subordinated or devalued element. The structure of the paradigm therefore lends itself to an "expansionist" model of supersession and self-empowerment. The foundations of Western civilisation reflect a belief in the superiority and certainty of culture-specific canons and institutions - what the ancient sceptics rejected as the clear-truth (*to saphēs*, see below) and what Eric Micheals called the "fallacy of unilineal evolution of culture". Western culture, such as it is, reflects the historical rift between those enfranchised few with power, knowledge and value, and those disenfranchised many defined by their lack of such and through their apparent need to seek improvement in, and the supersession of, their condition. This paradigm is relatively unsophisticated in empirical terms. As implied above, to describe slavery in terms of a state of relative pain does not necessarily entail the need to escape slavery, although in general it will. People have to be pushed to a point of considerable deprivation and distress before they will embark upon a course of revolution in the structure and fabric of their entire existence. This in no way implies the acceptance of slavery as a normal condition, it merely reflects the empirical need to survive; most people, like most creatures, will, first of all, attempt to survive under the conditions and circumstances they find themselves in and, secondly, bring about change, where possible, to ameliorate those circumstances and conditions, in order to thereby improve their own condition. The guiding principle here is one of pleasure (*hédonē*) which I will return to in detail later.

There is nothing so destructive of culture as a complete upheaval in the circumstances and conditions in which people find themselves. This upheaval, where it is related to an expansionist model of cultural hegemony follows the direction and values associated with unilineal ideals of scientific progress and civilisation. These ideals are reflected in the epistemological bifurcation of (empirical) experience into "knowledge" and "opinion" and the politico-dialectical unity of Master/Slave. I will refer to the paradigm of closure and domination as the "unilineal paradigm", in order to emphasise the uni-directional - or monologic, as Bakhtin would say, - nature of its structures and processes and the underlying *prolépsis* or belief in cultural and intellectual superiority which this entails.

On both a conceptual and political level, unilinealism reflects a model in which one language and cultural grouping dominates another. Without this initial move, the negativity which sustains the dynamic underlying the paradigm will not emerge and History, as in History of the Western Civilisation, would not have begun. All that is required is an initial belief in the universality and truthfulness of one set of beliefs over another and this has been expressed in terms of the epistemological bifurcation of empirical experience into opinion and knowledge.
A key element in the epistemology of unilinealism is a pseudo-scepticism which subverts the integrity and authenticity of empirical experience as the basis for knowing and interpreting the real world. The cross-cultural model has the advantage of redressing the structural imbalance inherent in the unilineal paradigm and this is achieved through the somewhat different approach to scepticism which an empirically-based approach inevitably entails. To appreciate the nature of the point being made here, a brief exploration of the history of the sceptical and empirical traditions of inquiry is required. This will also have the advantage of re-structuring the unilineal model of cultural otherness as a potentially negative experience (a barbaric world-view, see below) into a cross-cultural model of mutual otherness as a potentially positive experience (the barbarous world-view, see below).

**But for all there is Belief**

The origins of scepticism coincide with those of "epistemology" and may be traced back to the Presocratics and among them, at least, Xenophanes. One commentator maintains:

... the early Presocratics did ... invent epistemology or the science of knowledge, and they brought a form of scepticism to birth.¹

The relevant fragment from Xenophanes is the longest of four which bear upon matters "epistemological" and it runs as follows:

And the clear truth (to saphēs) no man has seen nor will anyone know (eidos), about the gods and concerning everything of which I speak. For even if he should actually manage to say something that is the case, nevertheless he himself does not know. But for all there is belief (dokos) (120).²

Before entering into a discussion of the fragment I want to preface the arguments with a reminder that technical concepts such as "epistemology" themselves presuppose the possibility of a knowledge of knowledge existing or having the potential to exist. It will be seen that scepticism breaches this possibility and problematises the categories of "epistemology" and "knowledge". I will argue that the early evidence on scepticism suggests a preoccupation with the limits of belief (doxa), as opposed to the limits of knowledge (epistēmē). The latter presupposes the existence of a (universally certain) "clear truth" (to saphēs) while the former is much more than mere procedural caution.

Consider the exegesis of 120:

...eidos in line two contrasts with dokos in line 4, and since dokos can only mean "belief", eidos will naturally be translated by means of the verb "to know" (138).

¹ Johnathon Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982) 136. I will be following, somewhat critically, Barnes' commentary in this and the following section.

² The number in bold type follows from Barnes' own calibration of the fragments as they appear in his text. I have omitted the standard cross-referencing because what I am performing here is not, strictly speaking, exegesis. Where appropriate I shall use a page number in plain type to indicate Barnes' own arguments and a fragment number in bold-type to indicate an ancient argument.
By implication Xenophanes is subordinating belief (dokos), which is accessible by all, to the clear truth (to saphēs) which no one can know (eidos). The basis of scepticism derives not from the rejection of belief (doxa) but from rejecting the possibility of a (transcendental) clear truth (to saphēs). The original sceptical attitude appears to be motivated by the absence of any apparent criterion or measure by which to judge or ascertain whether or not what is the case is universally the case. Certainly such scepticism was warranted in a scientific climate populated by transmigrating Pythagorean souls on the one hand, and Thalean magnets with souls on the other, amongst others.

Another fragment attributes to the gods what is "clear truth" for Xenophanes. The fragment, of which a portion here reported in the doxography, runs:

Alcmeon of Croton ... said this ... concerning things unseen the gods possess clear understanding (saphēneia) (119).

According to Alcmeon, the gods are the only ones capable of accessing a clear understanding (saphēneia) of the truth (to saphēs). The human creature is, by implication, disenfranchised of the clear truth (to saphēs). Also, by implication, the set of beliefs (doxa) that people are left with is subordinate to the clear understanding (saphēneia) and truth (to saphēs) deprived them and rendered to the gods.

"But for all there is belief" is Xenophanes' rejoinder and conclusion. What sort of belief remains when knowledge of the truth (to saphēs) becomes a matter for metaphysics and divine revelation is attested for in the Hippocratic corpus where, it is suggested, Alcmeon's sceptical position regarding the nature of truth may be interpreted as an elaboration of the epistemology underlying Xenophanean belief (dokos) (137).

The relevant fragment is from the Hippocratic treatise "On Ancient Medicine":

If one should state and declare how these things are, it would be clear neither to the speaker himself nor to his hearers whether they were true or not; for there is nothing by referring to which one can know the clear truth (to saphēs) (121).

The absence of a criterion or kanon with which to adjudicate the "clear truth" leads to the sceptical rejection of the existence of the knowledge (saphēneia) of such truth (to saphēs). The extract 121 from "On Ancient Medicine" also implies a link between early scepticism and empiricist medicine. Indeed it might be argued that scepticism gave birth to empiricism. Before broaching any such argument, however, I want to comment further on the composition of Xenophanean belief (dokos) implicit in 120 and the sort of scepticism this implies.

Barnes' argument runs as follows:

The second couplet of 120 begins with an inferential particle:

For (gar) even if he should manage to say something that is the case nevertheless he himself does not know.

3 I accept Barnes' argument here.
Xenophanes is implying that knowledge consists of belief and something more; the implication was developed in Plato’s *Theaetetus*; and it has stood as a central problem in modern epistemology. Knowledge is more than true belief; but what must be added to true belief to attain knowledge? and how can the addition be secured? (141).

These are, of course, leading questions which implicitly reject the scepticism according to which they are posed. While it is clear that Xenophanes' scepticism is of a limited type - limited to the impossibility of certain types of knowledge called the clear truth (*to saphēs*), it is not clear how such truth might be obtained, if at all, nor whether such a quest is either desirable or feasible. The argument runs that because Xenophanes did not explicitly deny the possibility of grasping such knowledge he must therefore have held that such knowledge be possible. This, it seems to me, is a watering down of the sceptical position as adumbrated in 120. It is also suggested in the commentary that for Xenophanes "true belief will amount to knowledge if its causal antecedents are reputable" (143). Such an inference, it seems to me, incorporates Xenophanes' scepticism into a broader epistemological framework which equates scepticism with epistemic closure, reducing it to a mere procedural caution or obstacle on the way to securing the clear truth (*to saphēs*) understanding (*saphēneia*) and knowledge (*eidōs*). This interpretation strikes me as being overly Aristotelian.

The framework within which "epistemology" originated presupposes the existence of superior and special forms of knowledge and truth. If it is accepted that the possibility exists for grasping such forms of meaning, then scepticism becomes functionally redundant within the epistemological framework - there no longer remaining anything to be sceptical about. The sceptical argument, however, is a strong one in epistemological terms - it has come to be perceived as either an obstacle or starting point for the elucidation of (scientific) belief, however the calculation then proceeds. It is on the basis of the latter that empiricism is constituted with the emphasis on securing clear opinions rather than (metaphysical) clear truths. Empiricism is a move beyond scepticism.

**Empirical Knowledge**

The key to the foundations of empirical knowledge can be found in another fragment from the Hippocratic treatise "On Ancient Medicine":

> You will find no measure or number or balance by referring to which you will know with certainty - except perception (127).

Here the paucity of criteria by which to secure belief is at least partially overcome with "perception" being installed to fulfil the role of criterion. Herein lies the kernel of empiricist thought and methodology - the reliance upon the senses and, by implication, experience in the calculation of belief. How sense perception and memory function in this calculation will depend upon the processes and structures involved in the calculation. For example, Aristotle is said to be the originator of empiricism in its "modern" guise. For Aristotle, "scientific" knowledge is "expressible in universal propositions ... and it offers a causal explanation of how such knowledge is possible" (150). By contrast, Epicurean empiricism does not, strictly speaking, admit to universal propositions - only to true opinion and belief - and the knowledge that does result from an empirical calculation of the phenomena (*epilogismos*) does not necessarily comprise a causal complex of the variety implied by Aristotelian empiricism. In both cases the particulars of sense perception and empirical experience form the basis of beliefs which are stored.
in the memory over time. But for Aristotle, what emerges is not yet knowledge \((\textit{epistêmê})\), but experience \((\textit{empeira})\):

Knowledge comes about when these various memories \textit{come to rest} \((\textit{eremein})\) and somehow coalesce into universal propositions.... Universal knowledge is thus possible (150).

For Epicurus, it will be recalled, there is a close correspondence between observation, experience and belief; there is no abstract separation of "opinion" and "knowledge" or "belief" and "understanding". This problematical disjunction, it seems, is attributable to Alcmeon who, according to Theophrastus, says

\begin{quote}
Man differs from other animals because he alone has understanding \((\textit{sunesis})\), while the others perceive but do not understand \((144)\).
\end{quote}

Apparently Alcmeon was singular among the Presocratics in proclaiming such a sharp distinction between perceiving and understanding and between sensation and knowledge (149). To accept this distinction, however, is to be sceptical about the value of empirical \textit{kritēria} in the composition of knowledge and truth. Universally certain knowledge and truth \((\textit{to saphês})\) is derived at the expense of the epistemological integrity of the empirical \textit{kritēria}. So while perception and experience are necessary (empirical) conditions for knowledge \((\textit{epistêmê})\), they are not in themselves sufficient or adequate to the task of securing the "clear truth". The sceptical position rejects the division of empirical experience into inferior and superior semiotic process-types. Indeed scepticism originated as a rejection of the very existence of superior knowledge forms \((\textit{to saphês})\). The extreme form of scepticism practised by the Pyrrho and his followers rejected even the empirical \textit{kritēria}, preferring instead to greet the world with an attitude of "equipoise". I will come back to the Pyrrhonist sceptical argument shortly.

The pseudo-sceptical rejection of empirical \textit{kritēria} as the basis for authenticating claims to scientific understanding \((\textit{saphêneia})\) and truth \((\textit{to saphês})\) is a complete reversal of the original position within scepticism. It is the task of empiricism to take over from where scepticism originally left off, and elucidate the means whereby true belief and empirical knowledge may be calculated. Empiricism has the effect of "re-connecting" perception \((\textit{aisthêsis} \text{ and } \textit{pathos})\) with truth \((\textit{aletheia})\) and belief \((\textit{doxa})\) with knowledge \((\textit{epistêmê})\). But empiricism \textit{begins} with the sceptical rejection of transcendental / superior / universal forms of knowledge \((\textit{to saphês})\) - at least as such knowledge had come to be perceived in terms of things which only the gods could surely know. The reason for the sceptical rejection of \textit{to saphês} is the absence of any criteria by which to judge whether or not what is perceived to be the case is in fact a universally certain truth.

Unilinealism asserts not only a belief in the existence of \textit{to saphês} but to the actual cultural possession of it. The link between superior knowledge \((\textit{to saphês})\) and the gods is important in this context because it points to the foundations of the only possible justification for such fantastic belief. Truth with a capital 'T' \((\textit{to saphês})\) is a matter for God and for God's men; empirical experience no longer has a role to play in the composition of (divine) Truth; it is subjected to a divinely inspired but, I will argue, an entirely false scepticism, what I have called a \textit{pseudo-scepticism}. The important point here is that scepticism originally rejected the existence of (absolute) Truth, well before the time of Plato and the birth of Christ. However this original form of scepticism and the empirical tradition which derives from it have been marginalised by the dominant academic and scholastic traditions. These traditions have relied heavily on a belief in the
superiority of the culture-specific knowledge and truth which they deliver. But there is no empirical basis for the argument in support of universally certain forms of truth and meaning potential.

Epicurean empiricism does not assert that truth and knowledge are not possible. Indeed the Epicurean paradigm is directed towards securing the foundations for belief itself. But nothing is "added" to belief in order to arrive at an (Epicurean) empirical knowledge. Rather Epicurean empirical philosophy, in common with many of the Hellenistic schools, begins with the sceptical rejection of to saphēs and follows particular kritēria in order to authenticate what may be described as true belief which, for the Epicureans, constituted scientific knowledge. I will come back to the Epicurean kritēria below and the important role that pleasure has to play in the determination of empirical knowledge and truth.

The path which empirical inquiry takes will depend upon what is accepted and perceived at the outset as being true. Epicurean empiricism emphasises the regularity of phenomena over the constant change of things. This latter position within empiricism is spelled out, somewhat famously, by Heraclitus, that enigmatic Presocratic who is also seen by some as a sceptic. I want to examine Heraclitus' style of empiricism for it implicitly deconstructs the opinion-knowledge dichotomy and asserts the pursuit of knowledge as a fundamentally solipsistic undertaking. Let me explain.

**Heraclitus**

The sceptical view of Heraclitus appears to be derived from the alleged opacity of the Heracleitean logos. Heraclitus does not deny the possibility of acquiring an understanding of the Law or logos. He does however suggest that such knowledge is not readily acquired:

Men do not understand what they meet with, nor when they learn do they gain knowledge - but they seem to themselves to do so (Barnes 128).

This should not be taken to imply that such knowledge is difficult to acquire. Rather there seems to be something in people themselves which prevents them from apprehending what is the case:

The Law (of the universe) is as here explained, but men are always incapable of understanding it, both before they hear it and when they have heard it for the first time. For though all things come into accordance with this Law, men seem as if they had never met with it (Diels D1).

What it is that prevents some people from obtaining a clear understanding of what is the case is hinted at in 142:

Bad witnesses for men are the eyes and ears of those who have barbarous psuchai (Barnes 142).

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4 This fragment is from Kathleen Freeman's Ancilla to the Presocratics which is a translation of Diels-Krantz Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. The number in bold-type corresponds to Diels' calibration.
The key term here is "barbarous" which closely resembles the Greek term it translates - *barbaros*. Barnes notes that "[t]he Greeks used the word *barbaros* to denominate, rudely, foreigners. Etymologically it is connected with the idea of twittering or babbling: *barbaroi* are men who cannot talk intelligibly" (147). It is argued that a metaphorical interpretation of *barbaros* is appropriate here:

*barbaros* psuchai are ignorant, uncomprehending psuchai; they are characteristic of men who have no intellectual grasp of things ... (148).

This interpretation seems to be based on the view that "*barbaros* minds belong to [people] with some sort of linguistic deficiency" (148). In the absence of any explicit determination regarding the nature of the deficiency it is concluded that Heraclitus never intended the linguistic analogy to be heard in 142 and that a metaphorical interpretation is appropriate. The rejection of the linguistic analogy is based on a presupposition regarding the nature of language on the one hand, and a thesis regarding Heracleitean epistemology on the other. I want to examine these assumptions individually as they both impact upon how language may be conceived from an empirical standpoint. I also want to use this discussion to develop a cross-cultural model of "otherness" which escapes the resonances of unilinealism.

The argument in favour of a metaphorical interpretation of *barbaros* in 142 is based on a dichotomous view in which language is regarded as a either "national" or "foreign". Clearly Heraclitus does not mean to imply that the majority of his contemporaries were literally incapable of speech, hence, the argument runs, the linguistic analogy may be rejected.

I do not accept the assumption that language is either national or foreign, nor do I accept this dichotomy as the basis for interpreting Heraclitus' *barbaros psuchai*. What is evident, I believe, is the connotation of foreignness in *barbaros* but not a foreign tongue per se, rather a foreign way of languaging which is alien to the ear of the other culture. Language is not monolithic but a heterogenous structure of systems and processes comprising myriad languages and genres. The possibility for foreignness in language emerges from within the heteroglot contexts of culture associated with its use. This interiorisation and relativising of difference through the linguistic paradigm means that foreignness of language can be conceived within a national language and not simply as the result of speaking a foreign tongue. The distinction is an important one and leads to a view of language and "otherness" quite different from the one implied by the metaphorical interpretation of 142. Nor is this inconsistent with another interpretation of 142 to which I am more inclined, namely that "your sense will deceive you if you do not have an accurate understanding of your own language" (148).5 This interpretation strikes me as being more consistent with other fragments which emphasise the solipsistic nature of the Heracleitean enterprise:

I searched for myself (Barnes 136).

and the sceptical foundations of Heraclitus' thought:

Nature likes to hide itself (59).

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5 The commentator here is Martha Nussbaum; her interpretation is cited by Barnes and rejected.
Finally in Diels 1, there is a strong sense of forgetting when "men seem as if they had never met with it [Law/logos]" (D1 above). So despite being surrounded by the Law or logos, men are still incapable of understanding it. It is as if the languages they speak are foreign to what it is they desire to speak of or know. This creates false expectations "for though all things come into accordance with this Law, men seem as if they had never met with it". Why should Heraclitus’ Law or logos be so easily forgotten? Perhaps for the simple reason that Heraclitus seems to rely heavily on sense-perception and empirical experience to build up his knowledge of the Law:

The things we learn by sight and hearing, those do I prefer (Barnes 139).

This raises the second issue referred to above - the thesis regarding Heracleitean epistemology which was used to sustain the metaphorical interpretation of barbaros in 142:

Heraclitus was an empiricist; indeed our evidence suggests that he was not only an empiricist but a sensationalist: knowledge must be built on experience, and specifically sense-experience [...] Heraclitus’ main ‘metaphysical’ tenets derive not from a consideration of language but from a contemplation of the evidence of the senses (146,148).

It is difficult to reject the thesis that Heraclitus appears to have relied heavily on data from sense-perception. I do not propose to do so here. Rather it is useful to refer to the solipsism of 136 and note that Heraclitus requires each individual to apprise him/herself of the Law and account of things, and not rely solely on the thoughts and opinions of others - as do the polymaths and the masses. Those who do not choose to seek for themselves will be confounded by the cacophony of other people's thoughts and opinions on the one hand, and other peoples' gods on the other. It is only a short step to suggest that barbaros psuchai comprise not ignorance in any generic sense of the term but rather, as I've suggested, the everyday languages, dialects and speech genres, what Bakhtin, in a global sense, calls "heteroglossia".

Far from suggesting that Heraclitus' empiricism mitigates against the language analogy applying in 142, I am suggesting the contrary. Even empiricism of the "sensationalist" variety implies little about a theory of language but neither does it remove the possibility for an empirical appreciation of language. I believe that Heraclitus did possess an awareness of language and that his style of empiricism supports the arguments for a close linguistic analogy applying in interpretation of barbaros.

I have laboured the point regarding the linguistic analogy applying in 142 because it provides the foundations for an empirical appreciation of language. Given Heraclitus’ preference for individual (empirical) research and discovery, as well as his attested aversion for those who rely too heavily on the opinions and thoughts of others (the polymaths), it is not unreasonable to suppose, as I have done, that Heraclitus' did possess a sophisticated awareness of the nature of people and the many "languages" they speak. To presuppose that the ancient Greek mind saw language in the bleakly dichotomous way implied by the metaphorical interpretation of barbaros, is to foist upon the problematic of Heracleitean knowledge a constraint that may be utterly foreign to it:

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6 See Barnes 137: "Polymathy does not teach understanding..."; and 129: "... they put their faith in folk singers and they use the multitude as a teacher ..."
that language is an internally homogeneous institution and no barrier to the acquisition of knowledge and understanding. This latter view reflects a pseudo-sceptical rejection of the empirical kritería in favour of a logos-based model of (linguistic) semiosis. There are also interesting implications for the models of cross-cultural otherness associated with each of these interpretations (the empirical and the pseudo-sceptical) of language. These can be cast in terms of the cross-cultural and unilineal paradigms of culture and semiosis.

I will use the term barbaric to denote a model of otherness based on the pseudo-sceptical rejection of empirical experience as the basis for authenticating belief. Here cultural "otherness" is, by definition, devalued according to the culture-specific canons of the dominant cultural grouping. In the barbaric model of otherness, the cross-cultural context is inscribed with a potentially negative value.

I will use the term barbarous to denote an alternative model of cross-cultural otherness - one which does not equate "otherness" with ignorance and deficit but with the unfamiliar and the unknown, the "undiscovered country" as it were, awaiting reconciliation between the apparent (enarges) and the unapparent (to adelon) and so deserving of, at least, respect. Here the cross-cultural context is inscribed with a potentially positive value. For instance, take the familiar sounds of unfamiliar accents which sustain the ambience of such cross-cultural sites as the Queen Victoria Markets in Melbourne or Paddington Markets in Sydney - these are barbaros: other but still brother.

In the cross-cultural context, all cultural groupings are mutually barbarous unless evidence to the contrary presents itself - such as invasion, theft and pillage. The reasoning lies in empirical experience. Only in unilineal systems are all "other" cultures barbaric. As Micheals has already observed, in unilineal paradigms of cultural evolution, the absence of a written culture is often interpreted as a sign of cultural regression or primitiveness. What unilinealism fails to account for is importance of orality and vocalisation in the composition and maintenance of cultural belief systems. Both the Heracleitean logos and the Epicurean prolepesis have a basis in the spoken forms of language. Indeed, I would suggest that, as a cross-cultural phenomenon, literacy levels are only just in the present century reaching measurable proportions, informing the attitudes and values of the many rather than maintaining those of the few.

The Epicurean prolepesis is inevitably an ordinary concept whose meaning can be expressed through the spoken idiom, as opposed to the technical or written idiom. The beliefs and opinions which build up in certain words and genres over time, though oftentimes false, nevertheless comprise an oral tradition whose force of presence cannot be underestimated in pre-literate or non-literate societies. This seems to be the sort of tradition implied by Epicurus' prolepesis, and Heraclitus' conception of logos also has a decidedly oral resonance:

And of this account (logos) which is the case always men prove to be uncomprehending, both before they hear it and once they have heard it. For although everything comes about in accordance with this account (logos) ...
(Barnes 33, portion only).

The exegesis of logos in Heraclitus is a popular sport. In the case of 33, there appears to be little ground for an opaque rendering of the meaning of logos:

... a logos or 'account' is what a man legei or says. We may suppose that [the] fragment was preceded, in antique fashion, by a title-sentence of the form: 'Heraclitus of Epheseus says (legei) thus ...' The noun [logos] picks up, in an ordinary ... way, the verb legei ... (59).
The *logos* or account which Heraclitus gives has a strong sense of being associated with spoken tradition and oral history. The similarity between Heraclitus and Epicurus is based on a belief in the integrity of not only the spoken word, but also the speaker, and the account which they provide, as a basis for arriving at an understanding of the world. The difference between the two philosophers derives largely from the extent to which each elaborate on key concepts such as *logos* or account on the one hand, and *prolépsis* or initial concept, on the other. In particular Heraclitus may be accused of solipsism while Epicurus' "initial concepts" are, by definition, self-evident and derived from a shared system of "meaning potential", based on the empirical *kritēria*, including the accounts of others (*istoria*), and therefore not solipsistic:

The view that truth is on the level of perception rather than on the level of opinion might seem to lead to epistemological solipsism or scepticism; yet Epicurus gave it a positive social significance through his analysis of language. Epicurus' position is that words have the same meaning for all the members of a social group because their meaning is based on the immediate experience of objects that are known to the members of the group ... for Epicurus language, like truth, is on the level of perception rather than opinion.... He holds that the only correct language for a philosopher is the language that has gradually been built up by society as a practical means of communication about the objects of experience.... [T]he Epicureans maintained that on the empirical level language involves no distortion of reality. By a psychological and half-conscious process based on accumulated experiences, objects have been divided into classes according to their similarities and differences; and by virtue of this process, which produces what Epicurus calls [*prolépsis*], the person who uses or hears a word knows the sort of object to which that word refers (de Lacy 139,140,141).

It may well be that Epicurus developed the philosophy that Heraclitus failed to find.

Scepticism, I have argued, originated as a rejection of superior/transcendental forms of knowledge (*to saphēs*). The pseudo-sceptical rejection of sentient experience and the empirical *kritēria* in the determination of such knowledge is a complete reversal of the original sceptical position. The sceptical rejection of non-empirical criteria reflected a need to impose limits on the possibilities for knowledge in order to secure the foundations for belief. Empiricism, born of scepticism, is the science of belief. By commencing with an initial belief (*prolépsis*), the inductive calculation (*epilogismos*) takes over and empirical inquiry ensues. The inductive move is not from the particular to the universal - any inference regarding what is universal is inconceivable since this implies the existence of a universal criterion. Rather the calculation is far more discrete - moving from the individual to the generic, from genre to attribute, resulting in beliefs that are generally, but not necessarily universally, true. Any account which claims to secure universal knowledge presumes the existence of criteria for the authentication of such knowledge. Such a semiotics of authenticity can only be based on the pseudo-sceptical rejection of the empirical *kritēria* and can only operate on the level of discourse and convention. The assumption which posits the existence of superior forms of knowledge and Truth is enough in itself to undermine the sceptical hypothesis and render empirical scientific inquiry obsolete.
Perceptions of Knowledge

I want to revisit the opinion/knowledge dichotomy, this time in terms of a "dialogue" between Zeno and Epicurus, with a view to elaborating on the nature of the distinction between paradigms of semiosis based on abstract (logical) principles - what I will call logos-based models - and paradigms based on concrete empirical experience - what I will call pathos-based models. The dialogue is an artificial one - Epicurus was well established by the time of Zeno - but it can be interpreted metaphorically, by way of analogy, implying similarity between ancient arguments and modern conditions.

Both philosophers begin with the sceptical rejection of Truth (to saphēs) and both proceed to elaborate a theory of knowledge based on perception and empirical experience. The key element about which the dialogue turns is the structure and nature of the standards and criteria used to secure true belief and empirical knowledge.

A key concept in the Stoic theory of scientific knowledge and truth is that of cognition or katalēpsis. Cicero, the Roman statesman and philosopher, provides an account of how Zeno signalled with a gesture of his hand the meaning of katalēpsis:

He would spread out the fingers of one hand and display its open palm, saying, 'An impression is like this'. Next he clenched his fingers a little and said 'Assent is like this'. Then pressing his fingers quite together, he made a fist, and said that this was cognition (and from this illustration he gave that mental state the name of katalēpsis, which it had not had before) (Long and Sedley 41A2-4).

Sextus Empiricus, in his discourse "Against the Professors" (Adversus mathematicus) locates the concept of katalēpsis within the framework of Stoic epistemology:

The Stoics say that there are three things which are linked together, scientific knowledge [epistēme], opinion [doxa] and cognition [katalēpsis]. Scientific knowledge is cognition which is secure and firm and unchangeable by reason. Opinion is weak and false assent. Cognition in between these is assent belonging to a cognitive impression; and a cognitive impression, so they claim, is one which is true and of such a kind that it could not turn out to be false. Of these they say that scientific knowledge is found only in the wise, and opinion only in the inferior, but cognition is common to both, and it is the criterion of truth (Long and Sedley 41C1-5).

A cognition or katalēpsis comes in between scientific knowledge (epistēme) and opinion (doxa). It mediates the process of inquiry and is a common ground for scientific inquiry. As a criterion of truth, the inference here is that katalēpsis is necessary for the demonstration of scientific knowledge.

The Stoic category of katalēpsis is similar to the Epicurean category of prolepsis: a firm apprehension based on the direct evidence provided by the faculties of inner and outer perception (pathos and aisthēsis, respectively). The following fragment from Cicero supports this argument by spelling out the mediatory role of katalēpsis in the constitution of Stoic scientific knowledge:

What was grasped by sense perception Zeno called itself a sense-perception, and if it had been so grasped that it could not be disrupted by reason, he called it scientific knowledge; but if it were otherwise, he called it ignorance, taking this to be the source of opinion as well, which was something weak and related to what was false and incognitive. That cognition I mentioned above \[\text{katalepsis}\] he placed between scientific knowledge and ignorance, counting it neither as good nor as bad, but said that it was to be trusted on its own. Accordingly he also attached reliability to the senses, because ... he regarded cognition affected by them as both true and reliable; not because it grasped all of a thing's properties, but because it left out nothing capable of confronting it, and also because nature had given it as the standard of scientific knowledge.... (Long and Sedley 41B1-3).

The so-called \textit{katalepsis} or cognitions are, then, affected by the senses but not wholly coincident with the category of sense-perception. Neither are they yet scientific knowledge. I will argue that they are a faculty of sense-perception and, in conceptual terms, a synthesis of the Epicurean \textit{kritēria} with the addition of a special sort of semiotic potential. I will argue that the real criteria for authenticating Stoic scientific knowledge are not empirical, but linguistic and grammatical - what I have called \textit{logos}-based.

The first part of the argument comes out at an earlier juncture in the fragment just cited. The speaker is the Antiochean Verra in defence of Stoic epistemology, commenting on the changes wrought by Zeno on the thinking of the day:

... he made some new statements about sense-perceptions themselves, regarding them as compounded out of a sort of blow provided from outside ... but adding to these impressions, received as it were by the senses, the mind's assent, which he took to be located within us and voluntary. He did not attach reliability to all impressions but only to those which have a peculiar power of revealing their objects. Since this impression is discerned just by itself, he called it 'cognitive' \[\text{katalepton}\]. But once it had been received and accepted, he called it a 'grasp' \[cognition\], resembling things grasped by the hand (Long and Sedley 40B).

The Stoics' reliance on sense-perception lies at the very core of their epistemology and is a direct response to the strength of the sceptical arguments upon which much of Hellenistic philosophy was based. Epicurean empiricism similarly observes the implications of rejecting scepticism, and, importantly, includes affective experience (\textit{pathos}) as an activity of the \textit{kritēria}.

The Stoic requirement for scientific knowledge is not ultimately achieved through the correct apprehension of \textit{katalepsis}, though this is certainly a necessary condition. Rather, Stoic scientific knowledge derives from the application of a rigorous and consistent logic in the process of authentication. By practising within the discipline of a consistent, cohesive framework of knowledge and understanding, one becomes wise - in the Stoic sense of the term - and the knowledge he/she acquires becomes \textit{scientific knowledge}. There is little to distinguish the status of Stoic scientific knowledge (\textit{epistēmē}) from the status of the (absolute) clear truth (\textit{to saphēs}). The Stoic argument, as the commentators Long and Sedley note, is based on an underlying belief in the nature of things; it is essentially an \textit{ethical} argument:

... we should remember that the Stoics' principal philosophical motivation was ethical. What chiefly inhibits people from becoming wise, in their view,
is proneness to emotional disorder, and this is reflected in the startling identification of ignorance and insanity. The 'unstable and fluttering impulses', which ignorance is said to exhibit, are the passions, which are false judgements of what is good and bad for men ... Scientific knowledge in Stoicism, it turns out, is an intensely practical disposition, and a far cry from Aristotelian contemplation (theoria). In its prevailing emphasis on the avoidance of error and baseless opinion, it is most convincingly interpreted as an attempt to provide foundations for the kind of knowledge that Socrates failed to find (259).

Two important points here. Firstly the explicit connection, in Stoic philosophy, between emotional disorder, the passions (affective experience) and ignorance and insanity - as if by nature the affections are inherently destructive and deceptive and thereby merit such denigration. This contrasts with the Epicurean position which regards the affections as central to the activity of the kritēria. The Stoics, moreover, explicitly equated belief and opinion (doxa) with "ignorance" and they identified ignorance with insanity. At this level, an ethical abyss exists between the Stoic and Epicurean views of the world.

The second point relates to the connection between Stoic scientific knowledge and "the kind of knowledge that Socrates failed to find". Socrates used to interrogate his interlocutors and his technique of questioning through dialogue, as it has come down to us through Plato, provides the paradigmatic form for the classical dialectic. Long & Sedley note elsewhere that "[t]he Stoic view of argument had a dialectical background in which each premise was posed as a question to an interlocutor and required his agreement". The significance of this point will become evident below. For the moment, however, something more needs to be said regarding the role of affective experience in Epicurean empiricism and its function as kritēria.

Asmis in her work on Epicurus' scientific method notes that:

... what Epicurus understands by criterion is the faculty or instrument that judges what is real by having it present as evidence (enargeia) and Epicurus uses the term consistently to designate the mind and the senses (3).

In Epicurean science, the mind is not repressive or dismissive of the affections. I have noted elsewhere that, for Epicurus,

all sensory awareness is the result of an affection (pathos used in the most general sense) of the perceptual organ [and] sensory awareness is of two kinds [1] an awareness of things as external to ourselves and [2] an awareness of inner conditions.

The Epicurean kritēria comprises a unity in the sense that they originate from an "internal perceptual organ" - the brain and central nervous system is a more contemporary model of the same thing. Thus affective experience, the faculty of inner perception or what I called the "imagination" in Part 1 of this dissertation, is a fundamental element in the composition of the Epicurean kritēria. The ethical foundations of the Epicurean paradigm also rest on this prolēpsis. The action of the Epicurean kritēria is such that no separate faculty of mind, intellect or cognition is required since what is perceived and felt is always evident and in no need of demonstration. As Epicurus says - all perceptions are true. Yet these self-evident truths bear a striking resemblance to the truths given up through Stoic katalēpsis. And both Zeno and Epicurus would, I'm sure, agree that
perceptual experience, in one way or another, is the cornerstone for the authentication of truth. Yet whereas Epicurus made the action of the *kriteria* his *kanon* or standard measure, thereby subordinating logic to physics (*logos* to *physis*), the Stoics invested a special semiotic potential in the disciplined practice of logic to the exclusion of the relatively disordered realm of the affections and passions. The synthesis of the empirical, sense-based criteria into the Stoic concept of *katalepsis* and the consequent writing down or devaluation of affective experience is indicative of the Stoic imperatives of wisdom and virtue. And whereas for Epicurus there is no form of knowledge superior to that of true belief, the Stoics did not officially recognise the authenticity of such knowledge. The Stoic equivalent of belief is the *katalepsis* (cognition) of ignorant/inferior/insane people (Long and Sedley 258).

By valuing the processes of logic and reason over the ostensibly disordered realm of the affections, the Stoics were able to cultivate a complex culture of thought which was both highly prescriptive and given to the institution of false expectations: in empirical terms the presumption of the existence of Stoic scientific knowledge is a false one. Even in Sextus' day the Stoic argument had already been recognised as a play on words:

For what they call cognition and assent to a cognitive impression occurs in either a wise or an inferior man. But if it occurs in a wise man, it is scientific knowledge; and if in an inferior man, it is opinion; and there is no further variation except a purely verbal one (Long and Sedley 41C7).

For the Stoics, scientific knowledge is not only superior to opinion and belief, it is also exclusively the domain of the wise. The important aspect for the Stoic-wise of scientific knowledge is not so much its content ("what" it says) as the way it's expressed ("how" it's said):

The evidence does not suggest that the wise man must grasp more facts than other people. His scientific expertise is rather a function of what he knows and *how* he knows what he knows - systematically, completely securely, so rationally grounded that no reasons can be furnished which could possibly subvert it (259).

The empirical connection integral to both Epicurean and Stoic philosophies is subordinated in Stoic philosophy to the institution of a linguistic and conceptual apparatus supporting the structures and processes of Stoic wisdom and scientific inquiry. By reversing the priority of the empirical connection and according primacy to techniques of rational justification such as "cohesion" and "entailment", the Stoics were inevitably led in the direction of deductive and syllogistic modes of argumentation.

While the Stoics did not, strictly speaking, reject the empirical *kriteria*, they did require that empirical evidence be cast in such a fashion as to render it amenable with what they thought scientific knowledge ought to look like. This is not to say that Stoic scientific knowledge had its basis in whim and fancy, only that it required the command of a rigidly defined and technically sophisticated generic language. Once the Stoic "code" had been mastered, the acquisition of (Stoic) scientific knowledge, wisdom and virtue was sure to follow. Conversely, if the code could not be mastered then not only could scientific knowledge not begin, no "authentic" knowledge at all, as far as the Stoics were concerned, was possible. The Stoics denigrated ordinary opinion and belief to the extent that its status in their epistemology is tantamount to that of a "barbaric" otherness. For the Stoics there was only one language for the expression of scientific
knowledge and it was theirs. Despite their efforts to remain faithful to the sceptical rejection of the Truth (to saphēs), the end result for the Stoics is a belief in the superiority of their own (generic) truth and conventions.

The "world-view" which Stoic epistemology offers up is one which lends itself as a model for unilineal paradigms of culture and semiosis. The history of European hegemony and imperialism is entirely consistent with a world-view in which one set of beliefs is regarded as Truth and all the others as based in ignorance and regression. While the twentieth century has seen a growing awareness (in the West) for the integrity other cultures' belief systems, it has also witnessed some of the greatest and most shameful acts of barbarity in the history of "civilisation". The construct of unilinealism is one way of trying to understand the nature of the circumstances and conditions which must exist in order for a false (pseudo-) scepticism to enter the psychology of culture. Unilinealism implicitly denies the authenticity and validity other cultural experiences. Moreover, if the circumstances and conditions are such as to contradict the authenticity of what can be called the unilineal Truth (to saphēs), then what must change, in the unilineal model, is not the Truth but the contradictory circumstances in which the Truth finds itself. This is not very scientific and indeed presents the very anti-thesis of what might be reasonably regarded by any measure to be scientific method. Nevertheless the paradigm on which it is based derives from a tradition in Western scientific thought in which some sorts of belief, called "knowledge" (epistēmē), are valued over and above other sorts of belief, called opinion (doxa).

For the moment, however, something more needs to be said concerning Stoic and Epicurean perceptions of knowledge since these two sets of perceptions are metaphors for the two paradigms of semiosis (the "unilineal" and "cross-cultural") which will ultimately inform the empirically-based model of dialogue and genre being developed in this dissertation. I want to return to the Epicurean and Stoic criteria for authenticating truth and locate them in the context of a framework which is amenable to both systems of thought.

**Authenticating Knowledge and the *kritēria***

Sextus Empiricus provides an analysis of the criteria for truth which is amenable to both Stoic and Epicurean sciences. Asmis records the analysis in the following way:

> In the widest sense, a criterion of truth is 'every measure of apprehension' (pan metron katalēpsis) and includes natural measures such as sight, taste and hearing. Second, in a narrower sense, a criterion of truth is 'every technical [technikon] measure of apprehension'; this includes such measures as the rule and compass and excludes natural measures. Third and narrowest, a criterion of truth is 'every technical measure of apprehension of a non-apparent thing' [adelon pragmatos]. Sextus calls this the 'logical' [logicon] criterion; and he explains that this no longer includes the criteria that have to do with life, but is used by dogmatic philosophers for the discovery of truth (94).\(^8\)

Sextus' scheme may be illustrated for the sake of clarity:

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\(^8\) Sextus Empiricus, "Outlines of Pyrrhonism"
The narrowing of the criteria from the open-endedness of the impressions made through sense-perception to the relatively closed-off-from-life logical criterion is reminiscent of the phases of Zeno's "kataleptic" gesture (see Long and Sedley 41A1-4, above) - from the open hand signifying sense-impression, closing the fingers slightly to signify assent and agreement and pressing them tightly together to demonstrate the act and state of cognition or katalepsis. The connection between katalepsis, scientific knowledge and wisdom and Zeno's gesture is brought out in the remainder of 41A:

[continuing 41A1-4] Then he brought his left hand against his right and gripped it tightly and forcefully and said that scientific knowledge was like this and possessed by none except the wise man (Long and Sedley 41A5)

It seems to me that this image reinforces the unilineal/uni-directional and teleological nature of the Stoic logical criterion. The Epicurean criterion of truth, however, is empirically determined and inductively demonstrated and admits of no closure other than the closure instituted of the impressions made by the phenomena on the senses. There are two points here.
Firstly, in Sextus, the term criterion is used to designate the impressions obtained by the organ of perception from the outside whereas "Epicurus uses it to refer to the organ of perception itself insofar as it obtains an impression from the outside" (Asmis 95). The connection with inner perception (pathos) in Epicurus is anterior to any logical connection or criterion of truth. In both Sextus' scheme and for Epicurus, "the criterion consists in having a presentation [phantasia] directly from the outside without any addition of opinion" (95). Furthermore any mistake, says Sextus, is due to the addition of opinion "for opinion adds something to the presentation or takes something away from it" (95). Sextus divides opinions into two kinds:

- conjectures about what is yet to appear
- opinions about what is non-apparent.

Both types of opinion, as in Epicurus, are verified or falsified by reference to the empirical evidence and this is given as the foundation of all inference. The Stoics, however, while recognising the importance of this connection did not recognise its inherent verisimilitude.

The second point has been made by Long and Sedley in their commentary on the epistemology of the Stoics and their criteria of truth:

> Whereas Epicurus had argued that sensations cannot refute one another, the Stoics, from Zeno onwards, maintained the converse thesis, holding that there is a type of impression which gives its recipient an absolute guarantee that it represents the object with complete accuracy and clarity. As the criterion of truth, the cognitive impression [phantasia kataleptike] is nature's gift of a standard for securely determining what really is the case (250).

Furthermore, in Zeno's terminology, cognitive impressions "have a peculiar power of revealing their objects" (40B2). Long and Sedley also note that "[t]he essence of Zeno's claim is probably captured by the notion that it is sufficient to see things in a certain way (clear and strikingly) to be sure that out perception is reliable" (258). This argument is attested for in 40K3-4 where Sextus Empiricus emphasises the importance of not "what" impressions are apprehended but "how" they are apprehended:

> Therefore the cognitive impression is not the criterion of truth unconditionally, but when it has no impediment. This impression, being self-evident and striking, all but seizes us by the hair, they say, and pulls us to assent, needing nothing else to achieve this effect or to establish its difference from other impressions. So too, whenever someone is keen to grasp something precisely, he is seen to chase after such an impression of his own accord ... (Long and Sedley 40K3-4).

The Stoic katalēpsis and Epicurean prolēpsis are each a description of essentially the same thing: the truthfulness of the impressions made on the senses by the phenomena. The difference between them is subtle but has profound implications. For Epicurus, all sensory awareness is the result of an affection (pathos) of the perceptual organ. The Epicurean kriteria represent the activity of the organ itself; the sense-impressions created by the phenomena are a result of the activity of the kriteria. For the Stoics, the criterion for truthfulness is located in the impressions themselves, thereby yielding two sorts of impression: false impressions which belong to ignorant and inferior
people, and the cognitive impression (*phantasia kataleptike*) "which is nature's gift of a standard [kanon] for securely determining what really is the case".

In both the Stoic and Epicurean systems, empirical *kritēria* are fundamental to the composition of their respective truths. But whereas the Epicurean *prolepsis* is based on the inherent verisimilitude of all sense-impressions, the Stoic *katalēpsis* is based on a particular *genre* of sense-impression which specifically relates to Stoic wise-people and specifically excludes the (false) impressions which comprise the ordinary beliefs held by ignorant/inferior/insane people. Rather than following the Stoic method of differentiating between true and false impressions, Epicurus distinguishes between sense-impressions on the basis of pleasure and pain. I will examine this aspect of Epicurean empiricism in further detail below, in the context of the tradition to which it belongs, namely Greek (ethical) eudemonism.

The important point here is that the difference between the Epicurean and Stoic methods is, in the final analysis, an ethical one. It is a difference in a fundamental belief about the nature of people, knowledge and culture. Goldmann might have called it a difference in world-view. I will describe it in terms of the difference between *katalēpsis* and *prolepsis* and another important concept in Stoic philosophy closely related to *katalēpsis* - "proper function" (*kathēkon*):

The breadth of reference of the term [*kathēkon*] is indicated by the fact that it includes, at one extreme, activities of animals or even plants as well, and that utterly rare class of 'right actions' which are the peculiar province of the completely and unfailingly wise or virtuous men (Long and Sedley 365).

The concept of proper function or *kathēkon* is inherently teleological and as such comprises the ethical basis and justification for Stoic knowledge, wisdom and virtue, even of reason. Being prior to the activity of rational process, *kathēkon* implies directed form of activity and "is founded on a conception of what man's nature, as a rational being demands" (366).

The great difference between the Stoics and Epicureans lies in their views regarding the nature of man. The Stoics' dismissal of affective experience is in direct contrast to the canonical role ascribed it in the thought and method of Epicurus. And so also the difference in the way language is handled by the two schools. Epicurus' conscious use of terms from ordinary language and his aversion of technical language is in striking contrast to the highly elaborated logic and grammar of the Stoics. It is a distinct advantage of Epicurean empiricism, I believe, that it assiduously avoids the burden of a cumbersome and inevitably complex metalanguage. Nevertheless, by denying affective experience a role in their epistemology, the Stoics were able to compose an entire language virtually uninterrupted by the emotions and unhealthy, passionate states of mind. This Stoic metalanguage, inherited partly from preceding traditions, became the standard framework for debate in Hellenistic philosophy. This was the case with the Epicurean Philodemus who entertained Epicurean arguments via categories which Epicurus himself never used. The point remains, however, that for the Stoics it is man's nature, potential and "proper function" to be virtuous and wise and to subscribe to the canons of Stoic logic and grammar; while for Epicurus it is man's nature to avoid pain and anxiety. In this way, the Stoic and Epicurean paradigms each represent alternative sources/systems of meaning-potential. I will return to the concepts of Epicurean pleasure (*bēdonē*) and *ataraxia* below. But first I want to comment briefly on
the dialectical foundations of Stoic epistemology and argumentation, in the broader context of the debate on signs.

Central to the structure of Stoic scientific knowledge is the indicative sign. We have seen that the Stoics defined the indicative sign as "a true antecedent proposition in a sound conditional revealing the consequent". It is the expression of the argument specifically in terms of a conditional which is of interest at this point.

Long and Sedley, in a commentary on Stoic logic and semantics note that:

The Stoic view of argument had a dialectical background in which each premise was posed as a question to an interlocutor and required his agreement. Despite the great formality imposed by the logical handbooks, this dialectical aspect was never lost sight of. Arguments are standardly "asked" not just stated, and although the texts rarely set out the premises in interrogative form, the reader is nevertheless expected to take them that way (218).

The Stoic (indicative) sign, therefore, although expressed by Sextus in terms of a conditional argument, originated as a question. The general point is that a question, however asked, presupposes the concepts and terms (the prolepsis) according to which it is framed and, to this extent, the lexico-semantic structure of the question partly predetermines the answer that is likely to follow. In other words the question institutes an expectation about what the likely response will be and to this extent the question operates as a reflexive method of inference. Reframing this in terms of the Stoic definition of the indicative sign - a true antecedent proposition in a sound conditional revealing the consequent - merely formalises the linguistic structures and semantic processes associated with the act of questioning and interrogation of the premises. Let me explain.

Consider what a "question" is a sign of: I would say that it is a sign of a search for meaning. Such a search, for the Stoics, might be regarded as the "proper function" of "rational man". Yet the possibility for such a search is a presumed in the structure of the sign itself. In terms of the "metalanguage" of Stoic logic and grammar, I would suggest that it is not so much the self-evident facts comprising the antecedent premises which provide the basis for authenticating Stoic argumentation, as the way in which these self-evident facts are organised and expressed in language, according to the metastructures of Stoic logic and grammar. It is not so much the antecedent premises which serve as a sign of what is non-apparent, as "how" these premises (signs) are organised and expressed through language which signifies the validity of the non-apparent consequent/conclusion. It is not so much authentic (empirical) experience which provides the basis for a Stoic katalépsis, as a special genre of representation reflecting consistency (homologia) with the canons of Stoic logic, grammar and ethics.

I am also reminded here of an epithet by Bakhtin who said, in the context of his own dialogic approach to language that "the word moves ever forward in search of meaning" (Bakhtin 1986, 127). What the purpose of the search might be can only be found in the finding for it ultimately reveals and resolves itself in the ineffable contexts and contents of human being. It is very difficult, however, to dissociate "word" and "meaning". The teleology of Bakhtin's observation is something of a tautology - the word must move forward in search of "meaning"; it's not as though the search could be called off - that would leave silence and no words. This is the Epicurean position - silence - inscribed in the ineffable domain of inner conditions and perception (pathos). In contrast to the empirical, pathos-based model, the logos-based model must needs an ends/goal/result; it is inherently teleological (in the Bakhtinian sense). The difference
between the two, as I have already suggested, is a profoundly ethical one, to do with differing opinions on the nature of the human condition and the telos of being. But what the telos of being might be is a fundamentally cross-cultural question even if it has not always been asked in that context. And ethics is not about the good of one culture over another, it is about the good in all cultures and the potential for the good common to all. At least this is the case in Epicurean ethics where, it will be seen, the underlying principle is one of altruistic hedonism, based on the experience/condition/standard of ataraxia - what I have described as the pleasure of being.
The Pleasure of Doing

"... and they must not be after other...

The pleasure of doing is more than passing interest. It is the experience of being in a situation and being fully involved in it. It is the capacity to be immersed in the moment of doing. The sense of enjoyment and the sense of self are fused in this experience. The pleasure is not merely the satisfaction of a desire, but the engagement of the whole being in the act of doing.

The philosopher Aristotle thought of pleasure as the essence of the active life. He believed that the active life is called eudaimonia or a flourishing life. The virtues and the vices are both seen in terms of pleasure and pain. The pleasure of doing is seen as the foundation of eudaimonia. Virtue and happiness are both seen as the basis of eudaimonia.

The Chinese philosopher Confucius, on the other hand, believed that happiness is the essence of the active life. He believed that the active life is called ren or humaneness. The sense of belonging and the sense of self are fused in this experience. The pleasure is not merely the satisfaction of a desire, but the engagement of the whole being in the act of doing.

The pleasure of doing is seen as the essence of the active life. It is the capacity to be fully engaged in the moment of doing. The pleasure is not merely the satisfaction of a desire, but the engagement of the whole being in the act of doing.

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And on the connection between doing and the understanding faculty. Fluent, or active understanding is necessary to understand the pleasure of doing. The sense of belonging and the sense of self are fused in this experience. The pleasure is not merely the satisfaction of a desire, but the engagement of the whole being in the act of doing.

Part 4

The Pleasure of Being

"... and they lived happily ever after."

The fairy-tale ending is of more than passing interest here. The desire to live happily is a common one, and later I will describe it as one of the primary genres of being. But what is "happiness" and what is the nature of its connection with genre? These are profound questions and in many ways the remainder of this dissertation will be spent answering them and incorporating them into an empirically-based model of culture, dialogue and genre.

The tradition in Greek thought which places happiness at the centre of the debate on the goal or telos of human existence is called eudemonism (<eudaimonia : happiness). The Stoics and the Epicureans both place the question of happiness at the centre of their ethical systems and both resolve the question differently: the Epicureans in terms of pleasure (hedone) and the Stoics in terms of virtue and consistency (homologia). Virtue and consistency are closely related in Stoic philosophy and both are integral to the pursuit of Stoic happiness. The Epicureans equated happiness with pleasure and saw the greatest pleasure as a state in which the perceptual organ was free from disturbance of any kind (ataraxia). I will return to the Epicurean model below.

The position taken by the Stoics is attested for by Stobaeus, a fifth century AD anthologist who recorded:

[the Stoics] say that being happy is the end [telos] for the sake of which everything is done.... This consists in living in accordance with virtue (Long and Sedley 63A1).

Diogenes Laertius describes Stoic "virtue" as "the natural perfection of a rational being as a rational being". At an earlier juncture in his reporting of Stoic philosophy the connection between "virtue" and "consistency" is explained - consistency (homologia) is a sign of virtue:

Virtue is a consistent character, choiceworthy for its own sake and not from fear or hope or anything external. Happiness consists in virtue since virtue is a soul which has been fashioned to achieve consistency in the whole of life (Long and Sedley 61 A 1-2).

Consistency is not only a sign of virtue, it's a prerequisite for virtue. The status that the concept of virtue has in Stoic philosophy is demonstrated through its connection with what the Stoics call the "commanding-faculty":

The Stoics say that the commanding-faculty is the soul's highest part which produces impressions, assents, perceptions and impulses. They also call it the reasoning faculty (Long and Sedley 53H1).

And on the connection between virtue and the commanding-faculty, Plutarch, the Greek biographer and Platonist philosopher of the late first and early second century AD, writes:

1 Diogenes Laertius cited at Long and Sedley 383.
All these men [Plato, Zeno, Chryssipus, amongst others] agree in taking virtue to be a certain character and power of the soul's commanding-faculty, engendered by reason or, rather, a character which is itself consistent, firm and unchangeable reason (Long and Sedley 61 B8).

While Stoic virtue may not be entirely coincident (equivalent) with Stoic happiness, the connection between Stoic virtue and happiness, Stoic virtue and the commanding-faculty, Stoic virtue and consistency remains. Long and Sedley spell out the implications of these connections and pick up on the importance of consistency (homologia):

Central to Stoic ethics is the claim that virtue is an utterly self-sufficient art of living.... Homologia, the term translated as 'consistency' was ideally suited to capture the essence of Stoic virtue, since its linguistic form (homo-logia) is interpretable as 'harmony' of (or with) reason (383).

Through "consistency" as "harmony with reason" lies the Stoic path to virtue; happiness rests in a life lived in harmony with reason. In practical terms this means living in accordance with the canons of Stoic logic and grammar. In ethical terms the result is a belief in participating in the highest part of Being. By Being with a capital 'B' I mean that part of human being which the Stoics associated with the "reasoning faculty" and the "commanding faculty", and which they saw as being connected with the highest part of the soul. The point here is the circularity of the argument engendered through the Stoic interpretation of consistency as homologia or harmony with reason. For the Stoics, "scientific" knowledge is a measure which is used to assess the validity of knowledge as such while "ethical" knowledge of the "good" is the principle governing choice and avoidance in action and conduct. Long and Sedley note "the good itself was characterised as agreement and consistency" (383). This is attested for by Cicero in his discourse "On ends":

Since that good is situated in what the Stoics call homologia (agreement will be our term for this, if you don't mind) - since it is in this, then, that good consists to which everything is the means, that good which is the standard of all things, right actions and rectitude itself.... But since those things which I called proper functions originate in nature's starting points, it must be the case that the former are the means to the latter ... (Long and Sedley 59 D5).

Cicero's interpretation of homologia as "agreement" is, I believe, closer to the real nature of Stoic virtue as not only living in harmony with reason, but more precisely, living in agreement with the canons of "rational" being. The link Cicero draws between (Stoic) "good", "agreement" and "proper function" is clearly spelt out by Diogenes Laertius who says at 59 E4 that "it is always a proper function to live virtuously". Rational consistency is the archetypal principle associated with virtue and virtuous action. The criterion for such consistency is hinted at through the concept of proper function (katēkōn) which, as Diogenes reports elsewhere, is based on the beliefs of particular individuals:

It [proper function] also extends to plants and animals. For proper functions can be seen in them as well. Zeno was the first to use this term katēkōn, the name being derived from kata tinas hekein, 'to have arrived in accordance with certain persons'. Proper function is an activity appropriate to constitutions that accord with nature (Long and Sedley 59C).
Despite the Stoic preoccupation with *katalēpsis* - supposedly *common* to all (human) creatures - Stoic knowledge is justified on the basis of the *special* knowledge held by certain persons. It is enough to live in accordance with the canons of Stoic epistemology and ethics in order to be not only "happy" - in the Stoic sense of the word - but in being so to be participating in what is believed to be the highest part of Being. As a system of meaning potential therefore, or as what Hadot might call a set of spiritual exercises, the Stoic system seems to rely heavily on a belief in the privileged nature of its "forms of life and forms of discourse", to use another phrase from Hadot.

A whole set of technical terms exist, some of which have been briefly introduced here, about which the lexico-grammar of the Stoic semantic system is organised. But in the context of Stoicism, as a particular system of semiosis, the function of these technical terms is essentially deictic - pointing towards an "ideational field of reality", to use a metaphor drawn from Halliday's systemic-functional framework, which is not only believed to be fundamentally different from other (external) fields of reality but also impervious to these external influences which are, in any case, somehow inferior to the canons of Stoicism.

The point here is not so much the details of Stoic philosophy as the way in which its central concepts and processes are organised to perform in the service of an underlying belief in the privileged nature of Stoic Truth and Being. Virtue, *homologia*, the "commanding-faculty" and "proper-function" (*kathēkôn*) are all highly elaborated, technical concepts within Stoicism and in one way or another they all serve the essentially ethical function of guiding man in the nature of his being, which the Stoics unambiguously believed to be *rational* being. Moreover the school of thought which descended from the Stoa was not the first nor the last to erect a complex edifice of *philosophia* based on and in defence of man's hypothetical potential for rational being. Given the Stoic belief in superior forms of knowledge and being, based on the criteria established and followed by an inducted few, and given the Platonic rejection of sentient *kritēria* as inherently deceptive and troublesome, it is perhaps not so difficult to appreciate, as Hadot suggests, how their synthesis in Neoplatonism could have appeared so attractive to the nascent realm of Christendom, seeking an appropriate *philosophia* within which to couch its theology.

The Stoic position as I have represented it is an extreme one and designed to illustrate in a paradigmatic way the general processes associated with organising belief (*doxa*) about a central, elevated, unilineal conception of cultural Truth and Being (*to saphēs*). There are two important points here.

Firstly, the specific nature of the difference between unilineal systems of belief and other sorts of belief system is such that these other belief systems are viewed as either derivative or inferior to the unilineal system. The implied relationship with other belief systems is therefore one of subordination and domination.

Secondly, assuming that the unilineal vision is a culture specific one - and this appears to be the case since not all cultures confess to the absolute supremacy of their truth and ways over all others - then a contrasting vision encompassing other sorts of belief system might be termed the cross-cultural one. In a cross-cultural world (-view), difference is relativised rather than canonised.

From a cross-cultural perspective, the ineffable contexts of human creativity are not pre-figured by the templates of *logos*-based *philosophia*. Rather the "figuring" proceeds by way of a *pathos*-based *philosophia* wherein the experience of one person is regarded as authentic as that of the next. Other cultures and tendencies are no longer regarded as being inherently "barbaric", as is their negative designation in the unilineal
paradigm. Rather cross-cultural awareness is barbaros - strange but not intrinsically hostile, different but not radically alien, "other" but still "brother". In this way the unilineal and cross-cultural paradigms represent what Lucien Goldmann would describe as different "world-views". I have endeavoured to characterise the difference in terms of the Stoic and Epicurean philosophical systems. It is on the basis of these essentially ineffable but divergent beliefs in the underlying nature and potential of human being that I believe it is possible to regard each as an alternative paradigm of semantics and semiosis.

The Australian cross-cultural context of situation is a good illustration of some of the points I'm trying to make here. Unilinealism, as Eric Micheals implied, was imported to Australia. According to the unilineal hypothesis, indigenous cultures represented a less evolved form of culture. Of course given that indigenous cultures in Australia pre-date the emergence of Western civilisations by some tens of thousands of years, the alternative hypothesis is precisely the contrary. But it is dangerous to talk of some groups having more "culture" than others since it is just such reasoning that leads to the validation of the unilineal hypothesis. The truth is, as Micheals pointed out, that indigenous belief systems represent alternative solutions to historical contingency and circumstance. The fallacy of unilinealism is that there can be no criteria by which to authenticate the (universal) certainty of the underlying beliefs. If unilinealism is inherently flawed in this way, there must come a point at which the canons of unilinear belief are challenged by the authenticity of cross-cultural experiences and systems of belief. The effect is a relativising one and to this extent transgressive. Bakhtin makes a similar point in the following excerpt from an essay on novelistic discourse where, instead of using terms such as "unilinear" and "cross-cultural", he speaks in terms of "unitary, canonic" languages of a "hermetic" character and the heteroglossia which displaces such a monologic linguistic consciousness from the centre of man's (unilinear) semiotic universe:

The resistance of a unitary, canonic language, of a national myth bolstered by a yet-unshaken unity, is still too strong for heteroglossia to relativise and decenter the literary and language consciousness. This verbal-ideological decentering will only occur when a national culture loses its sealed-off and self-sufficient character, when it becomes conscious of itself as only one among other cultures and languages.... There will arise an acute feeling for language boundaries (social, national, semantic).... [t]his will occur, moreover, at all layers of language without exception, even in the layers of greatest intentionality - the languages of the high ideological genres. Language (or more precisely languages) ... no longer conceived as a sacrosanct and solitary embodiment of meaning and truth, becomes merely one of many possible ways to hypothesise meanings.2

The Pleasure Principle in Epicurus

In his "Letter to Menoeceus", Epicurus states:

... from it [pleasure] we begin every choice and avoidance and to it we revert, judging every good by the affections [pathe] as though by a rule ... (Asmis 97).

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From this it is easy to infer that "pleasure", for Epicurus, is a criterion of "action" and not a criterion of "truth". This seems to be the position of authorities such as Diogenes Laertius, Cicero and Sextus Empiricus who favoured the somewhat misleading, I believe, division of the criteria into "truth" and "action". In point of fact, Epicurus held that the affections were a criterion of both truth and action. Moreover, the Epicurean "style" of empiricism implicitly deconstructs the dichotomy itself.

In the Epicurean paradigm, it will be recalled, sensory awareness is the result of an affection (pathos, in its most general sense as disturbance) of the perceptual organ. There is a strong sense in which all sensory awareness is a function of pathos, which I have also called "inner" perception. This does not, however, reduce Epicureanism to solipsistic psychologising or crude sensualism. Rather it affirms the priority of the empirical connection with the phenomena and locates the foundation of empirical experience in the activity of the perceptual organ itself. The activity of the perceptual organ corresponds the activity of the Epicurean kritēria and also includes sense-perception, or what I've called "outer" perception. Hence the Epicurean characterisation of sensory awareness as being of two kinds: an awareness of things external to ourselves (aisthēsis) and an awareness of inner conditions (pathos).

Elizabeth Asmis, whose argument I am following here, suggests that Epicurus, in his second rule of inquiry, assigned equal functions to perception (aisthēsis) and affection (pathos). In the first rule, it will be recalled, there is the requirement for "initial concepts" as a means of establishing the investigation; in the second rule, empirical experience (observation, memory and the experience of others) is used as a sign of what is unobserved (adelon) or expected to appear (prosmenon). It is important to recognise in this scheme the canonical role ascribed to the affections (pathos) as a criterion for both truth and action:

Even as a criterion of action, however, the affections qualify as a criterion of truth in a wide sense, for the Epicureans held that pleasure and pain determine action by showing what is truly pleasant and good, truly painful and bad (99).

Sense-perception (aisthēsis) and affective experience (pathos) both function according to a principle regularity and stability which is implicit in the Epicurean equation of pleasure (hēdōnē) and ataraxia. I will return to the important concept of ataraxia presently but here I want to focus on the meaning and nature of what could be called the "pleasure principle" in Epicurean empiricism.

The translation of hēdōnē into "the feeling of pleasure" would be problematical for speakers of Greek who would have difficulty conceiving disparate pleasures in terms of a particular quality or generic experience called "pleasure". The point here is not whether pleasure is related to the affections but whether it is one sort of feeling or predicated on a whole variety of experiences and associations. Thus extracting pleasure from "the feeling of pleasure" avoids conflating hēdōnē with the affections alone.3

In his "Letter to Menoceus", Epicurus insists that pleasure is the archē and telos, the beginning and the end of the blessed life since the pursuit of pleasure governs and unifies all our rational choices and gives structure to our lives as a whole (Mitsis 15): a structure or pattern which is prior to any structure or pattern imposed from the outside.

Epicurus called the application of the phenomena to the mind and senses "presentations" (phantasia). Sextus Empiricus, in his discourse Adversus mathematicus, reports that Epicurus also used the term as a synonym for "evidence" (enargeia). A presentation (phantasia) is the result of an affection which is produced by something that really is just as it appears. Any mistake is due to the addition of opinion. Correcting false opinion is the function of contradictory evidence, called the method of counter-witnessing (antimarturēsis) (Asmis 194).

The criterion of consistency (homologia) is an important one in Stoic philosophy and in Epicurean empiricism it is equally important but there it is described in terms of a calculation based on the phenomena: epilogismos. The basic principle underlying calculation through the method of reasoning by the phenomena (epilogismos) is the principle of regularity - comparing similar with similar and likeness - measuring change and process according to pre-existing patterns of relatively stable types which I call genres. The point about Epicurean pleasure and its function as kanon in Epicurean empirical philosophy is the self-evident premiss (prolepsis) that the capacity to experience pleasure and pain is an attribute common to all people. For instance, sensible and affective experience (aisthēsis and pathos) is common among people in a way that cuts across cultural boundaries and particular contexts of situation. Empirical experience is therefore able to function as a standard for scientific inquiry in a way that language cannot; as Epicurus states in his so-called Key Doctrines (Kurai doxai 23):

If you fight against all sensations, you will not have a standard against which to judge even those of them you say are mistaken (Long and Sedley 16D).

In this way the Epicureans regard all perceptions as being true, as Sextus also reports:

Epicurus used to say that all sensibles are true, and that every impression is the product of something existent and like the thing which moves the sense; and that those who say that some impressions are true but others are false are wrong, because they cannot distinguish opinion from self-evidence.

One recent commentator on Epicurus' ethical theory notes that "the identification of hēdonē with freedom from pain and mental disturbance [ataraxia] is Epicurus' most distinctive though most problematical claim about the nature of pleasure" (Mitsis 15). Cicero, in his work "On Ends" (De finibus), records:

Hence, Epicurus did not accept the existence of anything in between pleasure and pain. What some people regarded as in between - the complete absence of pain - was not only pleasure but the greatest pleasure. For anyone aware of his own condition must have either pleasure or pain. Epicurus, moreover, supposes that complete absence of pain marks the limit of the greatest pleasure, so that thereafter pleasure can be varied and differentiated but not increased and expanded (Long and Sedley 21 A7).

This treatment of pleasure's contribution to happiness may be contrasted with the hedonism of the Cyrenaic school which was founded by Anstippus of Cyrene and flourished in the later fourth and early third centuries BC.

The Cyrenaics claimed that happiness is desirable not for its own sake but for the individual episodes of pleasure. Thus happiness for the Cyrenaics was not the final end or telos but rather comprised an indulgence in those practices and activities which were perceived to be associated with, or expected to occasion the experience of pleasure.
(however transient and ephemeral). The Cyrenaics recognised only the affections as criterion and their manifest sensualism bases itself in an extreme form of scepticism. Ironically, Cyrenaic hedonism is often mistakenly taken (in the popular imagination) for Epicurean hedonism when, in truth, Epicurus openly disagreed with the Cyrenaics, as Diogenes Laertius reports:

Epicurus disagrees with the Cyrenaics on pleasure: they do not admit of static pleasure but only the kinetic type, whereas he accepts both types, for soul and for body, as he says in his book On Choice and Avoidance ..."Freedom from disturbance and absence of pain are static pleasures; but joy and delight are regarded as kinetic activities". He has a further disagreement with the Cyrenaics: they take bodily pains to be worse than mental ones ... but he takes the mental ones to be worse since the flesh is storm-tossed only in the present, but the soul in the past, present and future (Long and Sedley 21R).

Diogenes is referring here to Epicurus' division of pleasure into two types - "kinetic" pleasures associated with the action of satisfying a desire (corresponding to Cyrenaic happiness) and "katastematic" or, simply, static pleasures, associated with stability and rest, having satisfied a desire. The character of Epicurean ethical eudemonism comes out, I believe, through Epicurus' treatment of desires and their relation to pleasurable states called ataraxia and aponia, in his "Letter to Menoeceus":

We must reckon some desires are natural and others empty, and of the natural some are necessary, others natural only; and of the necessary some are necessary for happiness, others for the body's freedom-from-stress [aponia], and others for life itself. For the steady observation of these things makes it possible to refer every choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the soul's freedom-from-disturbance [ataraxia], since this end belongs to the blessed life. For this is what we aim at in all our actions - to be free from pain and anxiety (Long and Sedley 21B1).

For the sake of clarity, the scheme may be illustrated in the following way:

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Happy

necessary

Stress-free

natural

Life

necessary

Life

desired

natural

Empty

Empirical Model of Desire

So Epicurus holds that when we have satisfied our necessary and natural desires we will be in the most pleasant psychological (ataraxia) and bodily (aponia) condition.
Moreover, in so doing, a state will have been attained that satisfies the formal eudemonist requirements of "completeness", "invulnerability" and "self-sufficiency" (Mitsis 35). There are two points to be made here. The first relates to Epicurus' rejection of determinism and teleological systems of thought in general. The second to the subordination of "kinetic" pleasures to pleasures of rest and stability (katastematic pleasures).

With regard to the first, Long and Sedley note:

What must be borne in mind, in considering the grounds of his ethics, are Epicurus' rejection of teleology and of divine administration of the world and his rigorous empiricism. If he was to contest the Pyrrhonian thesis that 'nothing exists which is good or bad by nature' he had to do so on the basis of his own criteria of truth ... (122).

The *kriteria* are of course the senses and affection - the faculties of inner and outer perception - and the memories of the experiences impressed upon them. Epicurus' central claim is that each person's feelings indicate the self-evident desirability of pleasure and undesirability of pain: we are so constituted that we unavoidably seek to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. In effect, this is Epicurus' response to the Pyrrhonist sceptical attitude of so-called "equipoise" - indifference or speechlessness.

The nature of the sceptical attitude comes out in a fragment by Eusebus on Aristocles who reports that, according to Timon:

... Pyrrho declared that things are equally indifferent, unmeasurable and inarbitrable. For this reason neither our sensations nor our opinions tell us truths or falsehoods. Therefore for this reason we should not put our trust in them one bit, but we should be unopinionated, uncommitted and unwavering, saying concerning each individual thing that it no more is than is not, or it both is and is not. The outcome for those who actually adopt this attitude, says Timon, will be first speechlessness, and then freedom from disturbance; and Aenesidemus says pleasure (Long and Sedley 1 F3-5).

There is more than a passing connection between the Pyrrhonist attitude of equipoise as "freedom from disturbance" and Epicurean *ataraxia*. Epicurus is said to have admired Pyrrho's lifestyle (1 B2) which was characterised by always being in the same state of mental indifference towards things (equipoise), entrusting nothing to the sensations (1 A4), practising philosophy on the principle of suspension of judgement and following these principles in his actual way of life. Long and Sedley make the point in the following way:

Although freedom from bodily pain and freedom from mental disturbance jointly constitute the Epicurean good, the superiority of mental pleasure ... makes freedom from mental disturbance (*ataraxia*), or tranquillity, the supreme hallmark of Epicurean happiness. It is perhaps no coincidence that tranquillity was represented as the good by Pyrrho whose personal example of lifestyle and temperament Epicurus had greatly admired (124).

Far from entrusting nothing to the affections, the Epicureans made them the *kriteria* for truth and action. The Stoics theorised empirical experience through their concept of *katalépsis* and both philosophies may be seen as attempts to respond to the "paralysing"
Pyrrhonian thesis that "neither our sensations nor our opinions tell us truths or falsehoods".

Closely related to pleasure - which Epicurus also calls the "primary and congenital good" (21 B3) - is the important virtue of "prudence" (phronésis) which Epicurus calls "the greatest good ... even more important than philosophy" (21 B6). Prudence is the link between pleasure and the other virtues: "honour" and "justice". Prudence provides "sober reasoning which tracks down the causes of every choice and avoidance and which banishes the opinions that beset the soul with the greatest confusion" (21 B5). This idea of prudence seems to underlie what Epicurus means when he says not all pleasures are to be desired and not all pain is to be avoided:

Every pleasure, then, because of its natural affinity, is something good, though not every pleasure is choiceworthy. Correspondingly every pain is something bad, but not every pain is by nature to be avoided. However, we have to make our judgement on all these points by a calculation and survey of the advantages and disadvantages. For at certain times we treat the good as bad and conversely the bad as good (Long and Sedley 21B3).

Such a calculation of advantages and disadvantages in each choice and avoidance is similar to the analysis associated with economic decision-making processes. The big difference is in the basis of the calculation: the economic calculation is based on variations in an abstract medium of exchange whereas the empirical calculation is based on phenomenal processes whose currency is concrete experience, not an abstract universal equivalent. What I have called the "pleasure principle" in Epicurus, amounts to a rejection of teleological systems and a move beyond scepticism in a way that remains faithful to Pyrrho's goal of equipoise and freedom from disturbance without the inherent indeterminacy of Pyrrhonist scepticism.

The second point to which I referred earlier was Epicurus' subordination of kinetic pleasures to the pleasures of rest and stability (katastematic pleasures).

A characteristic feature of Epicurus' ethical thought is the attempt to show how happiness consists entirely of states such as ataraxia (freedom from mental disturbance and anxiety), aponia (freedom from bodily pain and stress), aphobia (freedom from fear) and hedone (the experiences of pleasure). Coupled with this emphasis on the inner psychology of happiness - as a function of the affections or "inner perception" (pathos) - is Epicurus' claim that "virtue" is related to "happiness" by the strongest possible causal link:

The virtues are naturally united with a life of pleasure while virtue alone is inseparable from pleasure (Mitsis 60 n3).

The force of the pleasure principle as freedom from disturbance comes out, I believe, in one of Epicurus' "Key Doctrines" (Kurai doxai 17) where he makes an important connection between "justice" and ataraxia:

The just <life> is most free from disturbance, but the unjust life is full of greatest disturbance (Long and Sedley 22B 3).

Epicurus' emphasis on internal states and conditions reflects his treatment of all sensory awareness as the result of an affection or pathos of the perceptual organ - the faculty of "inner" perception. Only this faculty (which also includes sense-perception) is capable of registering the absence of pain and anxiety or the satisfaction of a desire. As long as
there is an absence of pain and anxiety, the individual will enjoy the katastematic pleasure of stability and quietude called ataraxia. Kinetic pleasure, however, only lasts as long as the activity sustaining it. Hence, though necessarily good, kinetic pleasures are incapable of challenging katastematic pleasures (ataraxia, aponia, aphobia) as a viable long-term "excellence" (areté) which embraces the whole organism and removes all bodily and mental pain:

Epicurus plainly recognised that we derive pleasure from the process of satisfying desires, i.e. removing pains. What he is anxious to combat is the Cyrenaic thesis that a truly pleasurable life consists solely in a constant succession of such enjoyments. Plato had satirised such a life as one of constantly seeking to replenish a leaking jar ... an image repeated by Lucretius. Hence Epicurus firmly subordinates kinetic to static pleasure, treating the former either as a stage on the way to the ultimate goal of absence of pain, or as a variation of that condition when achieved (Long and Sedley 123).

The subordination of kinetic pleasure to pleasures of stability is thus not only in keeping with the activity of the kritēria, which I have described in terms of the "pleasure principle", it is also a response to the crude indulgences of Cyrenaic sensualism and a move, once again, beyond scepticism.

The "pleasure principle" in Epicurus is comparable with what could be called the "logo-semantic" principle in Stoic philosophy. The distinction between the two is reflected in the one I have drawn between "genres of being" and "genres of culture": the former derive from the ineffable context/content of human being while the latter derive from culture-specific systems of organisation and semiosis. In a very general sense, the genres are simply an expression of the ways and patterns of human creatures going about their business, creatively expressing their experience of culture. Genre as such has its primary foundations in the ineffable context of empirical experience rather than the vocalised structures and discourses which give rise to the category of what Bakhtin will call "secondary" genres and what I have called "genres of culture". This emphasis represents a considerable variation on logos-based or textual and linguistic models of semantics and semiosis. These models typically fail to account for the phenomenon of genre as it is manifested outside the (logo-centric) structures through which it is ultimately realised. The cross-cultural model foregrounds the dialogic nature of the connection between empirical experience and its potential for realisation. Most problems in communication, it seems, arise as a result of a conflict between empirical experience and the genres which have evolved for the purposes of its expression. The problematicalness of unilinear systems is a direct result of prioritising one sort of cultural (empirical) experience over all others. Using the Stoic paradigm as an analogy, one of the most important criteria for the sort of truth and correctness which unilineal systems deliver up is consistency (homologia). Consistency (homologia) in this context denotes an internal, culture-specific monologia. The sort of consistency appropriate for cross-cultural contexts is one which "harmonises" the semantic (logos-based) and the empirical (pathos-based), producing a certain equivalence between the levels of cognition and affection. This can be called a "principle of equivalence".

**Principles of Equivalence**

I am making more than a passing reference here to the "principle of equivalence" supporting Jakobson's "poetic function" in language. But before exploring the content
and context of Jakobson's own substantial contribution to twentieth century humanities research, I want to draw together some of the underlying themes which have pervaded much of the preceding discussion and incorporate them into a more succinct description of what a cross-cultural semiotic might look like.

There are two self-evident principles ("initial concepts") underlying the model. Taken together they are emblematic of the two stages of scientific empirical inquiry. Taken separately they each embody a fundamental insight into the nature and constitution of the empirical condition:

1. All Perceptions are true.
2. Perception is the most basic form of dialogue.

*Perception* here needs to be understood in terms of empirical experience and the activity of the *kritéra*. This includes sense-perception (*aisthésis*) and affective experience (*pathos*). As the most basic form of dialogue, perception operates according to the impressions made on it (*phantasia*) and these impressions constitute the empirical evidence (*enargés*) upon which inference and understanding (*semeiousthai*) is based. The function of *phantasia* in the empirical model is a semiotic one but the conception of the sign which this implies is much broader than the Saussurean linguistic sign and even broader than Halliday's systemic-functional description of semiosis. The empirical sign is, in its simplest form, an observation, an impression, a *phantasia*. It emerges from the ineffable context of human being and impacts on consciousness in a way that requires explanation and satisfaction. The underlying principle at work here, establishing the primary mode of human inquiry and understanding, is a principle of regularity, regulating empirical experience according to pre-existing types and patterns of behaviour, called *genres*, manifested through particular combinations of culture and situation. The genres contribute to the texturing and cohesion of cultural realities and, following Bakhtin, I will describe them in terms of two types: *primary* and *secondary*. In both cases, the genres operate as a measure of expectation while the significance of individual signs will depend upon their attribution to one genre or another. There are no unique signs in this scheme since even uniqueness is an attribute defining a genus. The connection that I want to emphasise at this point is the connection with the pre-existing, the regular, the stable - the "given". This empirical connection is implied in the "pleasure principle".

The pleasure principle is based on the Epicurean conception of *ataraxia* and prioritises processes promoting stability and rest (katastematic pleasures) over those involving change and disturbance (kinetic pleasures). There are two points here.

Firstly the principle of regularity is an environmental attribute common across all contexts of cultures. Even catastrophic processes of cultural upheaval such as those associated with war and invasion have the potential to become a common feature of the cross-cultural context of situation. The continuing struggle of indigenous peoples the world over is an ongoing case in point. Without some degree of regularity and continuity there can be no stable measure of experience. Epicurus expresses this argument as the demand for a *prolepsis* without which inquiry would collapse into an infinite regression of starting points. Regularity is thus part of the environmental context of culture. Against a background of regularity the potential for change and disturbance emerges. This brings us to the second point.

Disturbance is only perceptible against a background of regularity and continuity. In empirical terms what constitutes disturbance will depend upon the continuum of impressions and experiences about which disturbance is measured. The value system
inherent in the pleasure principle is not based on the wholesale rejection of all forms of disturbance. This would be absurd since it would entail rejecting part of empirical experience - a bit like trying to reject your left arm. Rather empirical disturbance, like the experiences of pleasure and pain it may be associated with, is an unavoidable and necessary part of sentient being. In Epicurean empiricism this is reflected in the belief that not all pleasures are to be necessarily sought nor all pain to be so avoided. The avoidance of impulsive behaviour is described as prudence (phronēsis) and is regarded by the Epicureans as the most important of the virtues, even more important than philosophy. The important point here, however, is that the valorisation of processes promoting regularity and stability reflects an empirical bias in the model rather than a political one underlying the theory.

The promotion of order and regularity inevitably points toward politically conservative and culturally stable systems of values and forms. But the empirical significance of processes of stability - as conveyed through the pleasure principle - lies in its therapeutic value as a thermometer for the human condition: measuring disturbance according to its impact on the empirical condition/kritēria. The pleasure principle operates according to the empirical bias towards those processes and phenomena which don't disturb. Of course the great problem with the pleasure principle and the associated activity of the kritēria is that they belong to the ineffable context of human being. Even so, the empirical model enables us to conceptualise empirical experience in terms of its two extremes or, better still, "poles": the pole of regularity and continuity and processes promoting the preservation and production of such experience; and the pole of change and disturbance and processes associated with such experience. Corresponding to the poles of empirical experience are the poles of semiosis which, according to the prolepsis that the nature of perception is dialogic, have their empirical basis in the poles of experience.

Bakhtin has already described the poles of language in one of his late essays and by analogy his description there may be applied to all semiotic phenomena (recall that, in the empirical model, "observation" (phantasia) is a "sign"):

It is possible to proceed toward the first pole, that is toward language - the language of the author, the language of the genre, the trend, the epoch; toward the national language (linguistics) and, finally, toward the potential language of language (structuralism, glossematics). It is also possible to proceed toward the second pole - toward the unrepeatable event of the text (Bakhtin 1986, 107).

The poles of language and experience may be illustrated in a way that highlights the correspondence between the two:
The poles each extend from an environment of stability and regularity to an environment of change and disturbance. Taken together the scheme represents a model of the internal composition of semiotic and empirical experience. The scheme represents the foundations for an empirically-based, dialogic theory of culture and context. By accounting for the semiotic and the empirical domains in a way that draws out the nature of the correspondence between the two, what results is not a "theory" of context as such but the beginnings of an empirically based "description" of context. But as a description is still lacks something of the semantic and experiential "whole" which is each text-context. Before examining Bakhtin's observations on the nature of "context" and its relationship with "genre", I want to explore the implications of an empirically-based model of the sign for mathematical information theory.

Michael Reddy, it will be recalled, applied information theory in his analysis of the conduit metaphor. There information was defined as "the power to make selections" and communication as the transfer of this ability from one place to another. There are two aspects of the paradigm that I would like to concentrate on here. The first relates to the description of information in terms of a potential energy latent within the system itself and the second to the implied nature of the relation between dialogue (semiosis) and place.

To take the second point first. In information theory, place is theorised in terms of an "a priori shared context" in which each communicative "node" is "connected" to the code. While Reddy does not speak in terms of "nodes", the essential point here is that place is defined abstractly in terms of access to the code and not in terms of the empirical context (place) of the utterance - what Halliday would call the "context of situation". The communicative act is therefore considered to be transparent in the sense that both sender and receiver have equal access to a homogeneous system of shared meaning potential, called the "code", so that whatever signals are exchanged between the two communicative "nodes", the message will always be successfully interpreted, other things being equal. The transparency of the process stems directly from the notion of "place" as an "a priori shared context" which implies both sender and receiver inhabit formally identical semantic universes. In the cross-cultural context of situation, however, this condition is completely abrogated. But as Halliday and others have established - including Jakobson and Hjelmslev - the nature of the relationship between sign and place and sign and code is far from arbitrary in the Saussurean sense. Rather sign, code and place merge in what Halliday calls the "context of situation" where the underlying principle is one of function rather than denotation.
The cross-cultural work of Eric Micheals with the Walpiri people of Yuendumu foregrounds the primary nature of signifying activity as an activity of (cultural) self-inscription and a form of social action. The nature of signifying practice is of a social and cultural character - relating in the first place to the need for cultural self-expression and in the second place to utilitarian and material needs. This description of semiosis embraces both the functional and the aesthetic domains of human activity, reflecting the need for both material and spiritual satisfaction. In the cross-cultural model, the semantic and aesthetic domains are associated with patterns of meaning potential called genres and their function in each context of culture is one of preservation and maintenance, promoting stable social and cultural formations.

One of the reasons why the functionalism supporting Halliday's approach fails to adequately account for the "aesthetic" domain of semiosis is that it derives from a transactions-based model of dialogic exchange and speech function. I want to examine Halliday's description of speech function and then compare this with Bakhtin's description of speech genre. It will be seen that the essential point of divergence between the two derives from the nature of the implied connection with context. This brings us back to the first point referred to earlier, namely the treatment of information as a meaning potential and here I want to suggest that realised semiotic forms do not exhaust the meaning potential invoked through their instantiation. I will go even further and suggest that, as part of each communicative event, there is a residual potential energy invested in the communicative environment (Halliday's "context of culture") which interacts with the realised semiotic forms in a way that either enhances or diminishes the meanings so realised. This argument will become clearer once Bakhtin's comments on the nature of the relation between speech genre and context have been dealt with.

Halliday recognises two fundamental types of speech role associated with the organisation of language as a process of exchange:

The most fundamental types of speech role, which lie behind all the more specific types that we may eventually be able to recognise, are just two: (i) giving, and (ii) demanding. ...

Cutting across this basic distinction between giving and demanding is another distinction equally fundamental, that relates to the nature of the commodity being exchanged. This may be either (a) goods-&-services, or (b) information. These two variables, when taken together, define the four primary speech functions of OFFER, COMMAND, STATEMENT and QUESTION (Halliday 1985c, 68).

The notion that every dialogic encounter and each communicative act is reducible to its function as either offer and command or statement and question reflects a materialist and utilitarian model of dialogue. Likewise the notion of language as function in context, while an accurate description of semiotic process, is nevertheless an incomplete description of semiosis. Bakhtin highlights the nature of the relationship between context and genre in his description of speech genres:

Language is realised in the form of individual concrete utterances (oral and written) by participants in the various areas of human activity. These utterances reflect the specific conditions and goals of each such area not only through their content (thematic) and linguistic style, that is, the selection of the lexical, phraseological and grammatical resources of the language, but above all through their compositional structure. All three of these aspects - thematic content, style and compositional structure - are inseparably linked to
the whole of the utterance and are equally determined by the specific nature of the particular sphere of communication. Each separate utterance is individual, of course, but each sphere in which language is used develops its own relatively stable types of these utterances. These we may call speech genres (Bakhtin 1986, 60).

Bakhtin's description of the genres as "relatively stable types" is an empirical observation based on the similarity of semiotic forms in terms of their thematic, stylistic and compositional relation with the "whole". The "whole" embraces the context and place where semiosis occurs. It is also here that the distinction between "context" and "place" is resolved in terms of the "relatively stable types" or "genres" enjoining the two.

In addition to the essentially utilitarian functions Halliday and others have identified language as having evolved to serve, I want to suggest that there is an "aesthetic" function which operates alongside the utilitarian one, informing choices in style, tone and composition and contributing to the cohesion and texturing of specific cultural realities. This so-called aesthetic function is similar to Jakobson's poetic function, writ large.

The only comment that needs to be made before examining Jakobson's description of linguistic function is that Jakobson, like Bakhtin, inherited many of the values associated with the Russian Formalist tradition. This influence is succinctly conveyed in the nature of the question which Jakobson poses before embarking on his famous description of the poetic function in language: "What makes a verbal message a work of art?" The poetic function is Jakobson's answer to this question. Perhaps it was the right answer, but to the wrong question.

Jakobson analyses linguistic function through a constitutive analysis of the principal elements associated with the communicative act:

Language must be investigated in all the variety of its functions. .. An outline of these functions demands a concise survey of the constitutive factors in any speech event, in any act of verbal communication. The ADDRESSER sends a MESSAGE to the ADDRESSEE. To be operative the message requires a CONTEX

Jakobson illustrates the scheme in the following way:

CONTEXT

ADDRESSER.............MESSAGE...ADDRESSEE

CONTACT

CODE
The spatial arrangement of the elements fails to adequately account for the nature of the relationship between each element. However Jakobson's description of the poetic function partly redresses this imbalance. Corresponding to the fundamental constituents of the speech event, Jakobson identifies six functions of language:

REFERENTIAL

POETIC

EMOTIVE...........................................CONATIVE

PHATIC

METALINGUAL

The poetic function represents a focus on the message, in the same way that the metalingual function represents a focus on the code. I want to suggest that the poetic function in language denotes not only a focus or functional orientation toward the message but, in particular, toward the function of message in its "context of culture". For Halliday the emphasis is placed on the function of the message in its "context of situation". While Halliday's model is, as I've already implied, the more rigorous of the two, it nevertheless lacks what is so central and fundamental to Jakobson's model - a poetic function.

One of the examples Jakobson draws on in his description of the poetic function is a political slogan from the American Presidential campaign genre:

ai laik aik

(I like Ike)

His analysis of the slogan is typically structural:

The political slogan [is] succinctly structured [and] consists of three monosyllables and counts three diphthongs each of them symmetrically followed by one consonantal phoneme. The make up of the three words presents a variation: no consonantal phonemes in the first word, two around the diphthongs in the second, and one final consonant in the third.5

What this description fails to account for is the coincidence of the slogan in the context of culture in which it originally occurred, namely, an American Presidential campaign series. The force of the message is carried simultaneously on the two axes of language - which Jakobson follows Saussure in describing as the "syntagmatic" and "paradigmatic" - and a third axis which I am suggesting here, namely "context of culture". The force of the message as a historically effective campaign slogan is dependent not only on its

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4 This transcription is based on the current IPA, not Jakobson's original transcription.

overall (formal) composition but also on the potential for a semantic "resonance" invested in the context of culture from which it originated. Without a substantial set of choices already made, the slogan of itself is an entirely inadequate explanation for its success as a message.

The nature of the relationship between the context of culture and the individual speech act is difficult to describe since it relates to essentially ineffable qualities and attributes which contribute to the texturing and cohesion of particular cultural realities. Nevertheless the description of the poles of language and experience given above and the definition of (speech) genre as a unit which combines similar instances of sign, function and context goes some way toward establishing the beginnings of an empirically-based model. There still remains, however, the problematic status of the aesthetic object in this scheme of things. What I've called the "aesthetic function", based on Jakobson's poetic function, accounts for an intrinsic socio-cultural need for self-inscription - irrespective of the specific speech roles, types and functions involved. But in considering the possibility for an alternative system of meaning potential based on this "aesthetic" potential it is necessary to avoid privileging one set of culture-specific aesthetic forms over another. I want to suggest that a concern with form, while an appropriate focus for the cross-cultural analysis of genre, is nevertheless only half the story. For Bakhtin the essence of genre is the social and social content is dialogically correlated with aesthetic form. The differing position of Bakhtin and Jakobson on the question of "form" is worth exploring in some detail as it will highlight some of the theoretical arguments associated with the position being pursued in the present research as well as provide a further insight into the historical and cultural context for these arguments.

Form and Content

Bakhtin and Jakobson share a common heritage in the Russian Formalist critical tradition but within that tradition they each pursued alternative paths. The early Jakobson was a staunch formalist who defended the radical "futurist" poetry of Velemir Khlebnikov with the formalist categories of Victor Shklovsky. While Jakobson was to later draw heavily on categories derived from Saussurean structural linguistics, his formalist background betrays a disregard for social "content" which will pervade even his later work. Merquior picks up on the connection with Saussure and emphasises the importance of the concept of "defamiliarisation" for the young formalist:

None of Shklovsky's key concepts - device (priem), deviation, defamiliarisation (ostranenie) and 'literariness' (literaturnost) had anything in common with Saussurean categories or structural linguistics ... Jakobson's Newest Russian Poetry derived from Shklovsky's views - indeed it was a vindication of Khlebnikov with the help of Shklovskian concepts. Jakobson justified the new, subversive poetry of the futurists, most vigorously embodied in Khlebnikov's playful verse, by referring to the primacy of

6Victor Erlich, in his excellent Russian Formalism: History-Doctrine, writes of the futurist movement of the Russian 1920's:

The Futurists declared war on all the idols of respectable society ... they repudiated all authorities, all established standards - social, ethical, aesthetic ... [they] insisted on the poet's right to revolutionise the vocabulary, syntax and subject-matter of verse, to do away with all literary conventions ... (42).
artifice (device), the need for deviation and the positive effects of
defamiliarisation (Merquior 22).

The concept/device of "defamiliarisation" or "estrangement", as it is sometimes known, is
a useful one in the cross-cultural context where the outstanding feature is a confrontation
with the unfamiliar, the unknown, the strange/alien etc. I have already indicated some
possible alternative models of otherness (the barbaric and barbaros models of otherness),
but the point I would like to make here concerns the nature of the relation between
(aesthetic) form and (social) content.

Merquior emphasises the aesthetic value of formalist categories and the
connection with the empirical world which so attracted Shklovsky. In referring to a
manifesto-essay by Shklovsky entitled "Art as Device", he also emphasises the empirical
values underlying the propagation of what could be called the Russian formalist aesthetic:

... Shklovsky asserted art's right to offer things not as they are known but as
they are sensuously perceived. Instead of the Unknown, he extolled the
'sensation of life' through the life of sensation, regardless of content. In order
to recover the sensation of life, art had to defamiliarise, to make objects
unfamiliar by making forms difficult, shattering the layer of custom on our
humdrum perceptions; and defamiliarisation, in turn, had to be achieved
through the use of unmotivated devices invariably based on deviation from
established norms of language and style (21-22).

The critical value of "defamiliarisation" needs to be appreciated in its historical context as
the embodiment of a reaction against a pre-existing set of critical values represented by
the movement in Symbolist poetics. Victor Erlich's eloquent description of the
Symbolist movement is based on an implied contrast with the Formalist canon which
threatened to supplant it:

To the Symbolist theoretician, poetry is a revelation and ultimate Truth, a
higher form of cognition, a theurgy*, capable of bridging the gap between
empirical reality and the unknown. The poetic is seen as a mystical logos,
reverberating with occult meaning. The metaphor... is elevated from a mere
figure of speech to a Symbol, the function of which is to express the
parallelism of the phenomenal and the noumenal (Erlich 35).

There are two important points here. First the reliance on concepts of standard
and deviation was as much a reaction against an existing set of standards (the Symbolist
canon) as it was a reaction in favour of a new, alternative canon. In seeking to "make
things strange", the Formalists were also working against the fundamental kanon of
empirical experience according to which, to paraphrase Merquior, today's deviation
becomes tomorrow's norm. In this respect, one of the critical values underlying the
Russian formalist position may be described as a requirement for a counter-normative
aesthetic.

Second the implied model of "otherness" in the concept of defamiliarisation draws
on a literary-semiotic model of context against which background the potential for
deviation and ostranenije emerges. Certainly the concept of ostranenije has considerable
artistic, if not forensic merit, but in the context in which it originally emerged it had an
intrinsic critical value: the function of the concept - "to loosen the syntax" in the Futurist

* A "theurgist", Erlich explains, is a possessor of occult knowledge.
idiom\textsuperscript{7} - was to expose limits and reveal the boundary conditions regulating the potential for completely innovative forms of expression. It is just such a revolution in literary values that Julia Kristeva will both celebrate and theorise in her doctoral dissertation \textit{La Révolution du langage poétique}. As Merquior observes, historically all this was done in the name of form, regardless of content. Kristeva, as we saw in Part 1, attempted to redress the imbalance by drawing on categories from psychoanalysis and phenomenology. I have already indicated the empirical fallibility of applying culture-specific psychological models to all cultures.

For a way out of the formalist impasse, some consideration must be given to "context" ie social content. This is the focus for Bakhtin and others, including Jan Mukarovsky (1881-1975), whose work is also described, like Bakhtin's, as a social semiotic. It was Mukarovsky, Merquior observes, who responded to the formalist penchant for \textit{ostraneniye} with the observation (which has been made more than once in this dissertation) that "for deviation to be meaningful it had to act against a background of regularity" (26). Merquior succinctly describes the nature and impact of the approach followed by Mukarovsky and others (including Bakhtin):

> There is today a near consensus to the effect that Mukarovsky marks a decisive shift toward a sociological explanation of the literary system. He saw literature as a set of social signs, both in their use and their content. And since the gist of his departure from the fetishism of form was to recover a sense of the changing social contexts of literary functions and literary meaning, I propose to call it socio-semiotics (27).

I will come back to Bakhtin's (dialogic) social semiotic presently but here I want to indicate an alliance of the approach being pursued in the current work with the tradition in social semiotics which has its modern origins in the Russian schools of the 1920's. It is in this context that some of the categories formalism may be quite useful. Of particular use is Jakobson's poetic function which I will come back to below, and the device/category/concept of \textit{ostraneniye} which has already been described.

With regard to the alliance of the social semiotic project with the project here, the similarity is, I believe, brought out in Merquior's description of the Mukarovskyan project:

> Mukarovsky wanted to insert the 'cultural sciences', always on the brink of collapse into idealistic chimeras, into an empirically-based theory of the sign - and he found in aesthetics the perfect field for carrying out this cognitive readjustment. He insisted that the aesthetic object (the artwork as sign) should be regarded as the 'signified' of its material signifier (the artwork as thing). At the same time, his semiotic approach was emphatically sociological: he enjoined us to examine the institutional dimension of aesthetic phenomena as well as to scrutinise the relation between aesthetic norms and social structure, since neither the bindingness nor the variability of the former can be explained and justified solely from the viewpoint of

\textsuperscript{7} "The champions of Russian Futurism shared their predecessors distaste for realistic art and an abiding belief in the superior evocative power of the poetic word... Moreover the Futurist slogan of 'shaking loose the syntax' may be indirectly traced back to Mallarmé's painstaking attempts to substitute rules of poetic euphony for those of logic" (Erlich 44).
either the species or the individual - they require an understanding of society and history... (26).

A central project underlying the present dissertation has been the development of an empirically-based theory of the sign. Central to the conception of the sign as observation/impression/phantasia, is the ineffable background/context from which the sign emerges. Whereas the formalist canon did not move beyond a standard-deviation model of context, this model in fact represents the starting point for the empirically-based model being developed in these pages.

I have endeavoured to suggest that the poetic function, which I have renamed the "aesthetic" function, operates at the level of (the context of) culture. Renaming the poetic function in this way is intended to reflect the added scope and breadth of application. The aesthetic function accounts for a particular type of semantic "resonance", relating to the overall compositional structure of the message in its specific context of culture. This "resonance" is impossible to account for in terms of purely referential and logos-based models of context. Something of the nature of this resonance is present, I believe, in Bakhtin's description of speech genre as a stable type embracing both sign and context. But perhaps the point that needs to be emphasised here is that Jakobson's poetic function - even as it was originally conceived - extends well beyond the normative concept of poetry as it exists in the Western canon. This returns us to the question Jakobson began with "What makes a verbal message a work of art?" which I suggested was perhaps the wrong question producing the right answer. Perhaps the question ought to have been "What makes a message successful?" at least this would have avoided the formalist trap of privileging the aesthetic over the social.

In asking the (formalist) question "what is poetry" or, more generally, "what is art", one might as well inquire into the nature of music or of colour; the final empirical question will always be "what impact do these (semiotic) forms have?" I have described this impact in terms of an aesthetic based on Jakobson's poetic function but expanded to include the overall context of culture. I want to move a long way from the empty symbolism of art for art's sake. Poetic and aesthetic function renders a quality, an attribute, a feature embracing style, theme, composition and context of culture and it is common across cultures, even if it is realised in widely divergent ways. This "phenomenal" description of poetry takes the concept well beyond its considered usage in the context of the poetic canon and beyond even Jakobson's own very broad description of the poetic function:

> the linguistic study of the poetic function must overstep the limits of poetry and ... the linguistic scrutiny of poetry cannot limit itself to the poetic function ... (Jakobson 154).

Jakobson demonstrates here that he was aware of the potential compass of the poetic function and his definition of poetics seems to account for this:

> poetics ... may be defined as that part of linguistics which treats the poetic function in its relationship to the other functions of language. Poetics in the wider sense of the word deals with the poetic function not only in poetry, where this function is superimposed on the other functions of language, but also outside, when some other function is superimposed upon the poetic function (156).

While Jakobson may have been aware of the potential importance of the poetic function, it may be that his formalist privileging of the aesthetic object prevented him...
from seeing the poetic function as an essential attribute of all cultural self-inscription, the effect of which is aesthetic as much as it is semantic. Here I want to emphasise Bakhtin's description of the speech genres in terms of two semiotic types and then relate this back to aesthetic potential associated with the poetic function.

While noting the extraordinary heterogeneity of speech genres, Bakhtin also observes a very significant, non-functional alliance of genres which he describes in terms of two types, primary and secondary:

The extreme heterogeneity of speech genres and the attendant difficulties of determining the general nature of the utterance should in no way be underestimated. It is especially important here to draw attention to the very significant difference between primary (simple) and secondary (complex) speech genres (understood not as a functional difference). Secondary (complex) speech genres - novels, dramas, all kinds of scientific research, major genres of commentary, and so forth - arise in more complex and comparatively highly developed and organised cultural communication (primarily written) that is artistic, scientific, sociopolitical and so on. During the process of their formation, they absorb and digest various (simple) genres that have taken form in unmediated speech communion (Bakhtin 1986:61-62).

The distinction between primary and secondary speech genres which Bakhtin draws here is similar to the one underlying all semiotic practice, namely the processes of "expression" and "reflection". These distinctions operate on the level of discourse and semiosis and I have described their analogues on the level of empirical experience in terms of genres of being and genres of culture. The distinction, as Bakhtin implies, is semantic, not functional and points toward a conceptualisation of the semantic system which extends well beyond the functional description in terms of a single, homogeneous "pool" of meaning potential. Here there are at least two meaning potentials. To indicate the potential impact of the poetic function I will refer to its associated system of meaning potential as an "aesthetic potential" to be considered alongside, and in dialogical relation to the realisational levels of meaning potential associated with the systemic-functional description of the semantic system.

The relationship between the principle of equivalence, the poetic function, aesthetic potential and an empirically-based theory of context may be drawn out through a comment by Jakobson on rhyme. He notes that "[rhyme] is only a particular, condensed case of a much more general ... even fundamental problem of poetry, namely parallelism" (164). Jakobson draws together parallelism and rhyme and speaks of "equivalence" in sound:

Briefly, equivalence in sound, projected into the sequence as its constitutive principle, inevitably involves semantic equivalence, and on any linguistic level any constituent of such a sequence prompts one of two correlative experiences ... 'comparison for likeness sake' and 'comparison for unlikeness sake'. (165).

The sequence that Jakobson is referring to here is the syntagmatic combination of terms based on contiguity. The relationship between "equivalence" and "context" is brought out by the qualification of equivalence in terms of "comparison for likeness sake or
unlikeness sake". The connection here with the inductive procedure of *epilogismos*, outlined earlier, is, I believe, a close one:

According to Philodemus, we may obtain valid inferences by calculating (*epilogizoumenos*) the similarity and difference among the phenomena; and this is the method of drawing conclusion by *epilogismos* (Asmis 205).

Hence the selection amongst linguistic alternatives "is produced on the base of equivalence, similarity and dissimilarity, synonymity and antonymity" (Jakobson 155). Equivalence, therefore, is not defined purely in terms of the internal constitution of the message. The relationship between equivalence, context and the contiguity of the instantiated message gives rise to what Jakobson calls "sound symbolism":

In poetry any conspicuous similarity in sound is evaluated in respect to similarity and/or dissimilarity in meaning.... The relevance of the sound-meaning nexus is a simple corollary of the superposition of similarity upon contiguity. Sound symbolism is an undeniably objective relation founded on a phenomenal connection between different sensory modes, in particular between the visual and auditory experience... (169).

In other words, poetry *sounds* like what it *means*. The phenomenal connection referred to here provides an indication of Jakobson's own style of phenomenology. Indeed a former student of Jakobson, Elmar Holenstein, characterises Jakobson's discourse as a "phenomenological structuralism" and she signals the empirical connection with induction as well as its (implied) advantage over the pitfalls of Husserlian phenomenology:

The most important point is the fact that Jakobson does not follow the methodological monism into which phenomenology has increasingly fallen. It is all too obvious that the very nature of the phenomena treated by structural linguistics ... allows equally for the application of methods condemned in phenomenology, namely empirical induction and mathematical formalisation....

And this not without reason for, as Jakobson observes, "poetry is a kind of language" (173).

By operating as a principle of organisation which is presumed throughout the inauguration of the text as message, what lies behind the principle of equivalence is not a different sort of meaning or message so much as a different language and another sort of meaning potential, what I propose to call an "aesthetic potential":

In other words, poeticalness is not a supplementation of discourse with rhetorical adornment, but a total reevaluation of the discourse and of all its components whatsoever (Jakobson 173).

All acts of communication are invested with an aesthetic potential and the extent to which this potential is realised will depend upon complex systems of values associated with the individual contexts of culture and situation. What remains now is a critical evaluation of

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the systemic-functional framework, in light of the empirical-dialogic (cross-cultural) description of context and genre. The special place that genre must occupy in the cross-cultural model derives from its function as a "relatively stable type" and the bifurcated system of meaning potential which this implies - realising both semantic and aesthetic potentials.
Creativity and Function

Bakhtin's dialogism has pervaded the present work from its inception and yet no clear definition of either dialogue or dialogism has been given. This is because dialogue is an act, a dynamic event-structure and a process which is occurring at all levels of human experience from the perceptual (perception as the most basic form of dialogue) to the psychological (the dialogue of inner speech and the pleasure principle) to the physical (acts of self-inscription - oral, graphic etc). The closest we may get to a definition has been the description of the poles of semiosis where the artefacts of dialogue are organised according to their structural permanence or uniqueness. Indeed there would be no loss of meaning if the poles of semiosis were re-named the poles of dialogue for there is no language outside of dialogue and no sign exists independently of its exchange.

Halliday analyses dialogue according to the underlying nature of the commodity being exchanged but this is, as I have suggested, an incomplete description of semiosis. What is missing in the systemic-functional description is an account of the aesthetic potential of semiosis. This "aesthetic" potential is a measure of creativity, artistry and a type of sensible-spiritual satisfaction which I have endeavoured to describe in terms of the pleasure principle and ataraxia. While Bakhtin never used the expression "aesthetic potential" he was acutely aware, throughout his life's work, that the "material" of dialogue is "life" - what I have described as empirical experience and the ineffable context of human being - and all dialogue is fundamentally unique and unrepeatable and, to this extent, distinctly creative:

The distinctly creative personality is a constitutive element of the artistic form: here its subjectivity becomes a culturally significant creative objectivity.1

Bakhtin's problematising of the Russian formalist's conception of the "aesthetic object" brings with it not so much a theory of text and social context but of a dialogic con/text which gives form "above all to man, then to the world, but only as the world of man" (82). For Bakhtin the world is social and cultural through and through. The Formalists modelled their aesthetic in terms of a prosaic socio-semiotic other and sought to accommodate this conception through such concepts as defamiliarisation. This amounted to a deconstruction of difference based on the literary-semiotic reflection of self with no regard for the social content of these reflections, only for deviation based on pre-existing forms. Criticism of the formalist aesthetic, as Merquior suggested through the work of Mukarovsky, had to be based on a concern for content and, specifically, the social, cultural and historical nature of such content. Such concerns underpin the development of what has been called social semiotics. This, it seems to me, is in large part the project of Bakhtin and a similar enterprise characterises Halliday's theory of language which has also been described as a social semiotic. By first of all examining Halliday's work in further detail, in particular the meta-functional hypothesis, and then returning to Bakhtin's dialogic semiotic, we may be able to arrive at an appreciation of meaning-making activity which accounts for the semantic as well as the aesthetic potential of semiosis.

In his introduction to Halliday: System and Function in language, Gunther Kress states that there are two possible approaches to the study of language - (1) the socially

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oriented, and (2) the psychologically oriented and he positions Halliday firmly within the first. And Halliday himself, in his collaborative work *Language Context and Text: Aspects of Language in a Social Semiotic Perspective*, will indicate that the phrase "language in a social semiotic perspective" characterises the sort of approach he and others have been following. Taking natural language forms as the "object" of his study, Halliday will construct a meta-discourse on language, reflecting a social semiotic perspective. Semiotics here should be understood not as the study of signs per se, but as the study of sign systems. Another commentator, Terry Threadgold, points out that "Halliday interprets semiotic in a basically Hjelmslevian sense." Halliday is explicit about the importance of Saussure and especially Hjelmslev for systemic theory:

Systemic theory accepts the Saussurean concept of how the system is represented by the observed *actes de parole*. But ... this has to be interpreted as Hjelmslev interpreted it: first in the framework of system and process where the process 'instantiates' the system, and secondly, with a distinction between instantiation and realisation. The latter refers to the stratal organisation of the system (and therefore also of the process) whereby the expression is said to 'realise' the content ... whereas Saussure, in separating *langue* from *parole*, drew the conclusion that linguistics was a theory of *langue*, systemic theory follows Hjelmslev in encompassing both (1985b 9,10).

The Danish linguist Louis Hjelmslev (1899-1965) was one of Saussure's principal "disciples". Out of the Saussurean system, based on an arbitrary relationship between signifier and signified (the "Sa/Se" dichotomy), Hjelmslev derived the linguistic science of "glossematics". Hjelmslev extended the Saussurean paradigm in two ways. Firstly by including the disembodied world of thought or "inner speech" in the determination of linguistic "content" (a category derived from Saussure's *signified*). Secondly by expanding the phonological paradigm supporting the Saussurean conception of the linguistic sign to include the non-phonic possibilities for semiosis (such as gesture, physiognomy) in the determination of linguistic "expression" (a category derived from Saussure's *signifier*). Hjelmslev corrected an assumption underlying structural phonology - that the differential "packets" of sound are themselves internally homogeneous across space. A broader, social consideration of the significance of sonic phenomena will be required in order to overcome the analytic bias inherent in the purely structural model of phonetic phenomena.

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4 The term glossematics derives from the Greek *glossa* meaning 'language' and this name was chosen to "stress its originality and its entire independence of every preceding linguistic theory": Siertsema, *A Study of Glossematics*, 2nd ed, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965) 14.
Saussure's phonemes were "des entités oppositives, relatives et négatives"\(^5\) and the elegance of the structuralist enterprise turned on an equivalence between difference and meaning which others have observed to be a rather delicate balancing act:

> Meaning used to spot difference as the diacritic support of structure, difference equated with sense: this delicate balance between form and meaning lay at the core of the structuralist enterprise, as it came to fruition in the study of language (Merquior 15).

We have seen how Jakobson's phenomenological structuralist semiotic modelled semiosis according to six principal constituent attributes and six corresponding functions. Hjelmslev's glossematic semiotic attempts to model semiosis according to both formal and functional principles. In addition to the categories of "content" and "expression", Hjelmslev recognised each as a relation involving "form" and "substance". The relationship between form and substance also sheds some light on the nature of the distinction between content and expression:

> Form manifests itself through a substance which can be regarded on two planes, either as a physical phenomenon (sounds or graphemes on the plane of expression), or as a psychological phenomenon (the idea of a speaking subject, of sounds and things) (Siertsema 16).

Hjelmslev's semiotic is organised about two planes, derived from the Saussurean model of the linguistic sign, called the expression plane and content plane. Corresponding to the formal composition of each plane are the basic functional units of glossematics - cenemes and pleremes:

> Both cenemes and pleremes are exclusively defined by their relations, [this] is what Hjelmslev calls their functions (18).

The terms "ceneme" and "plereme" derive from the Greek for "empty" and "full" respectively and the system may be illustrated in the following way:

**Expression form:** langue + aesthetic potential: cenematics \(<\text{Gr.} \ kenos: \text{empty}\)

**Content form:** parole + semantic potential: plerematics \(<\text{Gr.} \ pléres: \text{full}\)

Associated with each of the planes are the "homoplane" functions which correspond to Saussure's rapport syntagmatiques (relations between signs in the text), and rapports associatifs or the mental and connotative associations which extend beyond the text. These functional relations correspond to the syntagmatic - paradigmatic distinction also important in the models of Jakobson and Halliday. Halliday's description of language as a "functional paradigm" is based on categories derived from Hjelmslevian linguistics. But before returning to Halliday's model, I want to comment briefly on the concepts of "form" and "substance".

The glossematic concept of "substance" is rather amorphous as suggested by the description of form as manifesting itself through a substance which can be regarded on either of the two planes. But the content/expression distinction is an abstract one and the notion of substance pervades each:

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... it is not only the substance of the content which is "mental", nor the substance of the expression alone which is physical. Both can be conceived in either way (Sierteema 16).

**Taking substance into account, Hjelmslev's model may be represented in the following way:**

\[
\begin{array}{c|c}
\text{form} & \text{substance} \\
\hline
\text{Expression} & \text{Content} \\
\end{array}
\]

**Hjelmslev's Planes of Expression and Content**

In order to appreciate how the Hjelmslevian categories of form and substance contribute to our understanding of semiotic process, I will take up a brief discussion from John Sturrock's introductory work, *Structuralism*. The excerpt is expressed in relatively ordinary ("natural") language and is a deliberate attempt at explicating the relation between form and substance on the planes of content and expression:

On the plane of expression in human language, it is fairly easy to grasp the distinction, which is the one we have already met in distinguishing the sounds of language, or phonemes, from the continuum of non-linguistic sound capable of being produced by the human speech apparatus. Phonemes are forms, the continuum of undifferentiated sound is the substance. On the plane of linguistic content the distinction is a little more elusive, being between the content as differentiated by a language or other system of signs, and what lies beyond the content: ie. the continuum we call the world, that inexhaustible and transcendent source from which the content itself derives (79).

The substance associated with each of the planes derives from a continuum of relations, much like the background of regularity associated with the poles of semiosis and experience. On the plane of expression, the continuum of non-linguistic sonic phenomena forms a background of regularity against which the potential for dialogue emerges. Broadening this phenomenological description of language to include the expressive potential for semiosis in general will see the relation of "substance" - as a background for disturbance - taken over by the empirical category of *pathos*. Pathos here may be defined as a "potential for disturbance" while the forms through which such disturbance is realised can be modelled in terms of the common sign-type (*genicha*) eg the sounds of language. On the plane of expression the predominant "style" of meaning-making activity is aesthetic rather than semantic.

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On the plane of content, the continuum of relations called "the world" comprises a
semiotic substance in the Hjelmslevian sense. The world, however, as the empirical and
semantic background for human activity, is a function of culture. On the plane of
content, the substance of semiosis is social and cultural through and through. The form
in which this cultural substance manifests itself, on the plane of content, can be described
in terms of special sign-types (eidicha). This somewhat broader conception of the
Hjelmslevian scheme may by illustrated in the following way:

![Diagram of Modified Hjelmslevian Model]

**Modified Hjelmslevian Model**

The relation between the planes of content and expression defines the "heteroplane"
function which Hjelmslev considered to be the key function on which all linguistic
analysis is based. The heteroplane function is based on the recognition of a functional
relationship between the "entities" in one plane and those in the other (Sturrock 19). The
elegance of Hjelmslev's scheme derives from the structural parallelism between the
planes of content and expression - a parallelism Jakobson sought to explain in terms of
the poetic function:

Even if we don't follow Hjelmslev all the way when he establishes a perfect
parallelism between the structure of the content and that of the expression, it
remains beyond dispute that we cannot study the one without referring
ourselves to the other (Sturrock 20).

The value of Hjelmslev's scheme for the present work lies in the division of semiosis
across two parallel planes each characterised by internal systems of (functional) relations
based on form and substance. Halliday uses Hjelmslev's scheme to locate the relation
between semantics and grammar and move beyond the arbitrariness of the Saussurean
sign in a way that preserves the distinction between content and expression. Arbitrariness, Halliday notes, exists only "when we are referring to the Saussurean
content and expression relation" (1978, 44). He continues:

But if we considering the relation between semantics and grammar, which is
all within Hjelmslev's content, then I would say that it is not arbitrary (45).

The term being anticipated here is "function". As Kress points out, the purpose
of Halliday's social semiotic is to "specify the functions which language has in society,
and then to establish what reflection these functions find in the structure of language
itself" (Kress vi). Halliday is interested in examining natural language and semiotic
process in terms of the functions such processes have evolved to serve:

... we are taking a functional view of language in the sense that we are
interested in what language can do ... we try to explain the nature of
language, its internal organisation and patterns, in terms of the functions that it has evolved to serve (1978, 16).

By describing "function" in terms of "language that is doing some job in some context" (1985a, 10), Halliday is implying a non-arbitrary relation between the semantic system and the lexico-grammar (1978, 44). I will return to centrality of the lexico-grammar in the systemic-functional model presently. What needs to be clearly delineated here is Halliday's distinction between the "uses" of language and the "functions" of language. The concept of "use" underlies the description of language as a systems-network and turns on the act of choice in the selection of options within the linguistic system in the context of actual situation types (46). By contrast the functions of language are small in number and refer to a set of underlying functions about which the linguistic system is organised. It is one the basis of this latter that Halliday will construct a set of "metafunctions" which are described as "areas of meaning potential which are inherently involved in all uses of language (47).

The metafunctions comprise the semantic component of the linguistic system and are projected onto the lexico-grammatical and phonological systems. It is at this level of his "meta-discourse" on language that the description of language as a "shared meaning potential" (1) derives. Based on this description, the text is the instantiation of the "meaning potential" in actual contexts of situation (Kress xxi). The strength of Halliday's social semiotic lies in the way it embraces both system and process in its account of signifying practice:

The process of exchanging meanings engenders (brings into being) the system, and the system of meaning potential engenders (brings into play) the process. Language creates text and simultaneously text creates language.7

The organising concepts of syntagm and paradigm are as indispensable to Halliday as they were to Saussure, Jakobson and Hjelmslev. In particular, Halliday's linguistic model is based on the concept of system modelled as an abstract functional paradigm (Halliday and Martin 14). The three metafunctions which Halliday identifies language as having evolved to serve comprise this abstract functional paradigm. According to Halliday's metafunctional hypothesis, the semantic system is organised around three functional semiotic attributes - process, participants and phatic or, to put it more crudely, "what is going on", "who is involved" and "what role are signs playing in the overall scheme". These are described as the ideational, interpersonal and textual metafunctions respectively and together they comprise the semantic system which is projected onto the lexico-grammatical and phonological systems. The text as product realises all three metafunctions simultaneously on three levels within the text. Corresponding to the semantic metafunctions of the text, Halliday describes three attributes of the context (of situation): field, tenor and mode. The metafunctional hypothesis supporting Halliday's theory of text and context is based on the belief that:

it is possible to show a systematic relationship between the text, the linguistic system, and the situation provided that the situation is interpreted ... as a semiotic structure whose elements are social meanings (Kress xxi).

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The text/context relationship is probabilistic and reflexive, based on pre-existing patterns of choice and semiotic form and leading to a standard-deviation model of semiosis:

the context plays a part in determining what we say; and what we say plays a part in determining the context. As we learn how to mean we learn how to predict from each other (Halliday 1978, 3).

Taking this argument one step further, Halliday will see culture as a semiotic construct and language as one particular, constitutive semiotic within this edifice of meaning potential. The ineffable context of culture becomes a mediatory mechanism which constructs and is constructed by its habitant - social man. As I've already suggested, what is absent from Halliday's description is a more detailed account of the context of culture which I have endeavoured to account for in terms of an aesthetic potential inherent in semiosis.

The semantic system for Halliday, defined as a "shared meaning potential" and modelled as an abstract functional paradigm, is characterised by an internal homogeneity and transparency which others, like Fairclough and the CLS school, will question and deconstruct. The alternative approach being developed in this dissertation reflects from an empirically-based model of culture, dialogue and genre which gives rise to two sorts of meaning potential - semantic and aesthetic.

Halliday locates the semantic system in Hjelmslev's content plane. Here I would like to suggest that the aesthetic potential of semiosis is associated with Hjelmslev's expression plane. This will have the advantage of maintaining an existing, accepted framework, at the same time as modifying it to reflect certain fundamental insights, in particular, that the "grammar" of semiosis is organised about two meaning potentials (at least) - the one semantic, the other aesthetic. The implied relation between the planes of content and expression, and their associated meaning potentials, comprise what Hjelmslev called the "heteroplane" function. I will come back to the possible permutations in the heteroplane function later, but here I want to emphasise two points.

First, "aesthetic" in this context is supported by an empirically-based semiotic in which the "sign" corresponds with sensory impressions or phantasia. Halliday's social semiotic theory of context is based on a much narrower conception of the sign - one which corresponds to its potential for material realisation in the form of phonemes or graphemes and the like. This relationship, between the nature of the signs corresponding to each of the domains of semiosis (the semantic and the aesthetic) is similar to the one the ancients recognised between "special" and "common" signs: the common sign fulfilling an associative-connotative role, providing a basis for opinion (doxa), the special sign fulfilling a specifying-cognitive function, providing a basis for knowledge and certainty (epistēmē). This description of semiosis was itself deconstructed by the Epicureans who regarded all scientific knowledge (based on special signs) as matter for opinion (based on common signs). The simple point is that (Epicurean) empiricism asserts the priority of opinions based on affective experience, reversing the Platonic and Stoic bias toward special / reflective / complex signs. Just as the semantic system is based on a particular (narrow) concept of sign, so does the "aesthetic system" have a related (much broader) concept of sign. This brings us to the second point.

Aesthetic in this context also turns on the empirical distinction between pleasure and pain. This distinction has been described in terms of the "pleasure principle" and the closely related concept of ataraxia as the embodiment of a state free from pain and disturbance. The pleasure principle is an empirical criterion for determining the ethical basis of all "choice and avoidance". Choice also underlies Halliday's description of language as a system-network but here I want to emphasise the point that the "aesthetic"
potential of human creativity embraces the potential for violence, conflict and tension as much as it embraces the potential for calm, peace and stability. As an empirically-based, aesthetic-semiotic, however, the model is intrinsically biased toward inertial states or what Halliday and others appropriately call "metastable" systems. A similar point comes out in the following excerpt from Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus (128) on "the good life":

A steady view of these matters shows how to refer all moral choice and [avoidance] to bodily health and [ataraxia] - these being the twin goals of happy living. It is on this account that we do everything that we do to achieve freedom from pain (aponia) and freedom from fear (aphobia). When once we come by this, the tumult in the soul is calmed and the human being does not have to go about looking for something that is lacking or to search for something in addition with which to supplement the soul and the body.8

Once all sources of fear and pain - both psychological and physical - have been removed, there is no need for pleasure since such a state cannot be surpassed without further disturbance (eg kinetic pleasure). The empirical bias toward katastematic pleasure is consistent with psychological foundations of the empirical model. Fear and pain and the desire to be free from them are very much at the heart of an empirically-based aesthetic. I will briefly return back to the implications of the empirical model for a social theory of emotion later. But first I want to consider the centrality of the lexico-grammar in Halliday's functional model and the theory of "context of culture" which it implies.

Halliday locates the relation between "semantics" and "grammar" within Hjelmslev's content plane and in so doing posits a non-arbitrary relation between the two. The centrality of this relation to Halliday's model is expressed in terms of the "lexico-grammar". The lexico-grammar is an artefact of linguistic-semiotic process and, as Threadgold observes, represents a unique source of evidence for the modelling of semiotic systems:

The lexico-grammar is the material realisational level for all the others. It is the only access we have to the system (an 'instantiation' of it) and to the other levels (which it realises) (1989, 202).

Prior to this observation, Threadgold, following Halliday, describes the lexico-grammar as "the central processing unit" where "meanings of different kinds are brought together as wordings". These two descriptions represent the fundamental conflict involved in taking something which is "alive" (natural language) and studying it as something which is "dead" (lexico-grammar).

This is not a criticism of functional grammar or Halliday's approach. Rather the conflict is inherent in the nature of all scientific inquiry where the object of study becomes detached from its originary, life-giving context/environment. In making a similar point about the conflict involved in modelling semiotic systems, Threadgold explains the situation as a paradox involving what are essentially two "orders" of discourse - the metalanguage and the realisational (lexico) grammar:

This is central to the paradox that is inherent in the modelling of semiotic systems, and that structures the two quite incompatible realities that are constructed by:

8 George K. Strodach, Philosophy of Epicurus (Easton: Northwestern UP 1963) 181.
(a) a metalanguage (a grammatics) which keeps levels distinct in order to see them as related by realisation, and
(b) a realisational grammar (lexico-grammar) which, in order to make the system work, collapses all levels into one in a carnival of polyphony and multi-accentuation (202).

At the centre of this paradox lie the one described earlier in terms of "uttering the ineffable". The description of the lexico-grammar as a "carnival" of "polyphony" and "multi-accentuation" - a description derived from the lexico-grammar of Bakhtinian dialogism - is an endeavour to recover something of the (ineffable) substance of dialogue through the construct of a realisational grammar. The problem as I see it is a forensic one - to do with the nature of the semiotic evidence. It's not that the lexico-grammatical evidence is false or misleading, rather it provides an incomplete basis for the interpretation of semiotic process. An appropriate analogy may be drawn with biology where examining the lexico-grammar to describe linguistic semiotic function would be like studying the skin shed by a snake in order to describe reptilian biological function - in both cases the evidence is useful but incomplete. The remainder of the evidence belongs to the ineffable context of culture and this is the point that Threadgold emphasises:

in order to understand the workings of a semiotic system one has to model it (a grammatics), using the material realisation of the system [the lexico-grammar]... while understanding the inaccessibility to conscious thought or material realities of the processes one is trying to describe and the ineffability of the categories one uses to try to model them with (203).

Ultimately it is the "ineffable" which drives Halliday's description of context as a metafunctional construct. The concept of realisation, as the process whereby meanings acquire material form, carries with it an implied relation with the crypto-grammatical processes which inform the act of signification. The process of realisation is an important one and Threadgold describes its relevance for overcoming the paradox inherent in modelling semiotic systems:

It is the concept of realisation between language and social structure/social action/culture (language as reflection) that allows the interpretation of lexico-grammar as cryptogrammar... and means that one has to read Halliday's functional grammar (the grammatics) as the interpretation of that cryptogrammar (204).

The distinctions between "grammar", "grammatics" and "cryptogrammar" arise out of the need to describe the relation between two "incompatible realities" which derive from the nature of language itself - as a medium for both action and reflection. Halliday's theory of language as a social semiotic accommodates this fundamental duality through a grammatics - the metafunctional hypothesis - according to which meanings are organised about a small number of underlying (metagrammatical) functions. Threadgold describes the relation between the semantics, the context of culture and lexico-grammar, and provides a useful illustration but she begins by locating language in the overall scheme:

... language is not a thing in itself, but part of a wider set of phenomena, the social system (or the culture). Thus language is one of a number of interacting semiotic systems which constitute the culture. The relationship between language and social structure (or culture - these actually need to be kept distinct but are not in Halliday's current work) is modelled as another
level of realisation. The semantic system (organised into three) realises the social structure and the culture:

Social Structure and Culture
realised as / realising

Semantics
realised as / realising

Metafunctions
realised as / realising

Lexico-grammar
realised as / realising

Clause
realised as / realising

Text
(203-204).

This model of context and language as a social semiotic, based as it is on a particular, narrow conception of the sign, nevertheless attempts to accommodate the broader, associative-connotative sign-function through the conception of language as an abstract functional paradigm - the so-called "grammatics". I have suggested that, following an empirically based approach, this broader, more generalised sign-type fulfils an essentially aesthetic function which includes the potential for not only beauty in style, form and composition but also for violence and conflict and for pleasure and peace. Incorporating this additional potential into the systemic-functional model is not as problematic as it seems. I have already associated it with Hjelmslev's expression plane whereas Halliday's lexico-grammar is associated with the content plane. Because Halliday's description already includes an account - albeit a partial one - of the ineffable and cryptogrammatical processes which inform semiosis, incorporating categories based on another sort of meaning potential will simply require an extension of the existing model rather than its complete dismemberment and re-organisation. This is not to say that there will not be implications which will entail a partial re-organisation of the existing model, only that systemic-functional grammar - as both a grammatics and a cryptogrammar - is sufficiently sophisticated to provide an entirely adequate basis for a more generalised theory of culture, dialogue and genre.

Culture, Dialogue and Genre

From his earliest work in the 1920's to his latest work from the nineteen sixties and early seventies, the notion of "dialogue" pervades Bakhtin's description of language:

La langue ne vit que dans l'échange dialogique entre ses usagers. Le commerce dialogique est justement la sphere véritable dans laquelle evolue une langue.9

L'orientation dialogique du discours est ... un phénomène propre à tout discours. C'est la fixation naturelle de toute parole vivante.10

Dialogic boundaries intersect the entire field of human experience ... the dialogic nature of our thinking about works, utterances - in general our thinking about people (1986, 129).

The message from Bakhtin is that it is not possible to conceive of the sign outside the dialogic field of contestation, exchange and social interaction. Bakhtin's notion of the "text" in Speech Genres is such that it encompasses all signifying activity:

if the word 'text' is understood in the broad sense - as any coherent complex of signs then even the study of art (the study of music, the theory and history of fine arts) deals with texts/works of art (103).

Bakhtin's broad conception of dialogue and the social semiotic foundations of artistic and expressive activity takes him beyond the Formalist bias towards the "aesthetic object" and it is probably for this reason that he is sometimes described as "post-Formalist". Indeed his theory of the dialogic nature of understanding brings him close, in some respects, to Derrida's idea of the sign involving processes of difference and deferral (Derridean différence):

The understanding of a sign involves ... drawing together the sign understood and the signs already known; in other words, understanding is a response to a sign with the help of other signs. The chain of creativity and of ideological understanding, moving/displacing from sign in (sic) sign is unique and continuous: from a link of a semiotic nature ... we pass without interruption to another link of the same nature. Nowhere is the chain broken (Bakhtin 1977, 149-150. My trans).

For Bakhtin, the sign is a social phenomenon and as such it can only be manifest in the domain of the inter-individual and the inter-subjective (29). The life of the sign is contingent upon "understanding":

... any study of signs, regardless of the direction in which it may subsequently proceed, necessarily begins with understanding (1986, 113).

Understanding involves the dialogic appropriation of the sign by the speaking subject. Understanding is therefore a form of dialogue and the models of human understanding we build must reflect this fundamental fact (1977, 146; 1986, 111 119 121 125). Dialogue in this context is a "meeting place" of both language and experience - both "inner speech" and "outer speech", both "inner perception" and "outer perception". The process of understanding is a response/reply to the voices/meanings already present within the word/sign and to words/signs already "overflowing with plurilingual intentions".11 The category of "voice" is central to much of Bakhtin's description of language and as a semantic category it derives from the nature of dialogue itself:


Each word contains voices that are sometimes infinitely distant, unnamed, almost impersonal ... almost undetectable, and voices nearby and simultaneously ... understanding itself enters as a dialogic element in the dialogic system and somehow changes its total sense (1986, 124 126).

The nature of dialogue pervades the word, the text, the utterance, the genre because what we are describing here is the underlying nature of all semiotic practice at all levels. Here there can be no abstract separation of text from context, only a dialogic con/text whose entire reality is intersected by dialogic boundaries. The "utterance" for Bakhtin, is not a "unit of language" but a "unit of speech communication that has not mere formal definition, but contextual meaning" (125). Associated with the "utterance" is the "speech genre" and this has been described as a relatively stable type meaning potential. But in order to distinguish the semantic and the aesthetic meaning potentials inherent in the semiosis of genre, the category of genre can be divided according to two principal types - primary and secondary. Dialogue confers on the sign a contextual meaning which relates to systems of value and evaluation, this is inherent in the nature of the word/sign/utterance/genre and its understanding.

The evaluative and critical dimension of semiotic activity leads to a conception of dialogue which involves at least three participants:

The word is a drama in which there are three characters (122).

This third character plays the role of "super-addressee" - a subliminal participant in dialogue whose response is presumed and indeed solicited (126). This third participant stands for social cohesion, "public opinion", official values, Ideology - belief (doxa):

... he is a constitutive aspect of the whole utterance who, under deeper analysis, can be revealed in it (127).

The silent dialogue of the "super-addressee" resounds in the dialogue of the word. The super-addressee is a construct which represents the evaluative and critical dimensions of discourse - furnishing discourse with a background of regularity and consensus with which to begin dialogic exchange, establishing normative foundations for the dialogic event as a whole. The only problem with the concept of a third participant involved in the act of dialogic exchange is that this participant - the "super-addressee" - is the embodiment of a socio-cultural interiority which breaks down and is radically problematised in cross-cultural contexts of situation. Nevertheless, when it comes to the reality making/maintaining function of dialogue, the normative contexts and practices associated with such activity are integral to the function of genre as a trans-linguistic device, central to the organisation of culture's aesthetico-semantic meaning potentials.

There are two aspects of Bakhtin's dialogism that I would like to highlight here. The first relates to the constituent structure of dialogue, the second to the nature of the underlying dynamic.

Bakhtin refers to the constituents of dialogue as "utterances" and he describes the utterance as a "unit of speech communication" (71). Underlying this conception of dialogue is silence (    ):

The boundaries of each concrete utterance as a unit of speech communication are determined by a change of speaking subjects, that is, a change of speakers ... The utterance is not a conventional unit, but a real unit, clearly delineated by the change in speaking subjects, which ends by relinquishing the floor to
Halliday measures the period of silence that can be comfortably accommodated in the course of "spontaneous speech ... without the rhythm being lost" as "two complete 'silent feet'" (1985, 273). Silence in dialogue therefore has a structural semiotic function equivalent to that of sound - indeed it is not possible to conceive the one without the other. Silence is what delimits the utterance as a unit of speech communication and silence is what makes "responsive understanding" possible. The speech genre - as a unit of meaning potential - is an organisational structure based on the utterance and the normative foundations of dialogue. This brings us to the second point which relates to the nature of the dialogic dynamic.

Earlier I described dialogue as a "dynamic event-structure". Here I want to foreground the operation of the dynamic itself - as the movement of a semiosis against a background of regularity, continuity and relative silence. There is a necessary and fundamental tension associated with the semiotic "disturbance" of these background conditions. This is realised through the cryptotypical and generic processes of dialogue and the intrinsic potential for innovative, creative and, to this extent, transgressive/revolutionary meaning-making practices. In Halliday's Functional Grammar something of this tension is reflected in the description of the "information unit" as a "process of interaction between what is already known and predictable and what is new or unpredictable" (275). It is the interplay of the new and the not new, Halliday notes, which generates information in the linguistic sense. Hence the information unit as a structure comprises two functions: the "New" and the "Given". Such tension is also constitutive of the bi-polar model of semiosis and experience - one set of poles determined by principles of regularity and continuity, the other by unique events, creativity and disturbance. The character of tension, it will be recalled, was also central to Hadot's description of Stoic philosophia and I would suggest that it is characteristic of all logos-based models. The (Epicurean) empirical model balances this necessary and unavoidable tension by taking a state free from tension (ataraxia) and making it the ethical as well as the empirical basis of being.

In the empirically-based model I have already indicated that there will be an intrinsic bias toward inertial or metastable states. This empirical bias generates a structural bias which will produce a corresponding skewing in the probability structures associated with the aesthetic and semantic meaning-potentials. In other words, returning to Halliday's model, there is a non-random relationship between context and text. Threadgold makes the point in the following way:

What happens to connect field, tenor and mode (which are non-linguistic) and text (which is linguistic) is that in any given instance of a situation-type 'the interactants', who are producing the text, 'access certain aspects of their semiotic potential' [Threadgold provides reference], in such a way as to 're-order the probabilities' among the global set of probabilities of semantic choice that, for them, constitute language. This re-ordering or realignment of the semantic probabilities is always constrained by the particular contextual configuration, the field, tenor, mode (1989, 209).

The primary "experiences" underlying the empirical model are pleasure and pain. The empirical bias inherent in the model is reflected in the "pleasure principle" and through the closely related concept of ataraxia. The bias toward pleasure is an inherent (endogenous) bias toward katastematic pleasure ie pleasures of stability and continuity.
Conversely not all pleasures are to be desired and sought nor all pain to be feared and avoided. The "key" emotions here are desire and fear. The pleasure principle may be described as "the desire to be free from fear". Fear constitutes one of the three principal empirical states associated with the Epicurean empirical model - the others being physical pain and mental disturbance (anxiety). Happiness is defined empirically as freedom from fear (aphobia), freedom from pain (aponia) and freedom from anxiety (ataraxia). Describing the pleasure principle as "the desire to be free from fear" covers all these states of being. It also implies that ataraxia is both the "beginning" (arché) and the "end" (telos) of being. I believe this empirical state of happiness is very similar to the one underlying the secondary genres grouped according to "...and they lived happily ever after". An investigation into the implied nature of happiness across a wide range of these genres would be required in order to authenticate such a belief. Of course these days, in the late twentieth century, living "happily ever after" usually seems to require a considerable amount of "money" not so much "in addition" to living happily ever after but in order to... It should be clear that a material bias toward wealth is quite separate from the empirical bias toward pleasure. Separate but not unrelated. The emotions of desire and fear are primary genres of being. To use Halliday's terminology - "desire" and "fear" are the emotional "metafunctions" "realising" an aesthetic potential. Developing a detailed theory of emotion must remain the subject for future research. Here I will briefly describe what I believe to be some of the fundamental categories of affective experience associated with the "emotional metafunctions" of desire and fear.

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<th>Desire</th>
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<td>friendship</td>
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**The Stabilising-Grammar**

I want to begin drawing together the various elements which make up the cross-cultural model of dialogue and genre. The "key" elements are (Epicurean) empirical philosophy, Bakhtin's dialogism and Halliday's functional grammar. I have already indicated how Halliday's model may be extended to incorporate the insights of empirical philosophy. This included a discussion of the Hellenistic debate on signs which turned on the epistemological distinction between special and common signs. The Epicureans deconstructed this opposition through the method of "reasoning by the phenomena" called epilogismos. Here I want to focus on the correspondence between the Hellenistic distinction and the syntagmatic-paradigmatic distinction underlying much of post-Saussurean linguistic-semiotic modelling and use this discussion as a way of reflecting on the dialogic foundations of the cross-cultural model as a whole.

Perhaps the easiest way to think about the relation between syntagm and paradigm is in terms of Jakobson's description of the poetic function: the syntagm being described as the "axis of combination", the paradigm as the "axis of selection". The principle of equivalence underlying the poetic function is projected from the axis of selection onto the axis of combination - the effect of which Jakobson describes in terms of semantic parallelism and sound symbolism. The distinction between processes of selection and combination also corresponds to the distinction between the processes of instantiation and realisation. I will come back to Halliday shortly.

I have endeavoured to extend the application of the poetic function in language beyond even Jakobson's broad consideration of the issue, to encompass the application...
of an aesthetic potential in semiosis. This empirically-based aesthetic is reflected in the "pleasure principle": the poetic function no longer being a mere device that is invoked to achieve a particular literary-semiotic effect but a generalised type of meaning potential inherent in all acts of signification across all contexts of culture.

The "axis of selection", abstracted from its Euclidean framework and re-oriented around the small set of functions that language has evolved to serve, will reveal itself as an "abstract functional paradigm" and be realised as the metafunctional hypothesis supporting Halliday's grammatics. "Grammatics" in this context is a word used to describe the grammatical and crypto-grammatical processes underlying semiosis; these processes relate two incompatible realities: the ineffable and the articulate. Another way of thinking about these processes is in terms of the distinction between the processes of instantiation and realisation. In Halliday's model this relation is modelled in terms of the centrality of the lexico-grammar which is the material realisational level for the metalanguage (the grammatics).

In the extended model I have endeavoured to suggest that round the "edges" of the lexico-grammar there exists another sort of grammar - related to an aesthetic potential not usually accounted for in "traditional" logos-based models of semiosis - what I propose to call the "stabilising-grammar". The problem as I see it is an forensic one: to do with the nature of the semiotic evidence which forms the basis of inference and understanding.

We have already seen how, following Bakhtin, the process of understanding is a dialogic one and that the models of human understanding we build must reflect this fundamental fact. So if the evidence used to base inferences on is incomplete, then our understanding/interpretation of the evidence will also be incomplete. Incorporating an aesthetic potential for semiosis into the systemic-functional model goes some way toward providing a more complete description of semiosis. This account is supplemented by the ancient distinction between special and common sign-types. What remains now is a more detailed account of the nature of the relation between these two meaning potentials. Jakobson's principle of equivalence is one such account and the pleasure principle extends this account into a general theory of semantics and semiosis.

The basis of the theory is a version of the common sign. Common signs, it will be recalled, are those which form the basis for opinion (doxa) and, in the empirically-based model, they reflect the "initial concepts" used as the starting point for scientific, empirical inquiry. As I have already suggested, the function of common signs is not denotative and referential - these are functions of special signs - but connotative and associative. What common signs refer to are not meanings in the Saussurean semiotic sense of "signifieds" but a type of meaning which is more like a state of belief, or a condition of being, as it were. The aesthetic potential of semiosis has been associated with Hjelmslev's expression-plane and in this respect it both complements and correlates with the semantic potential which Halliday locates in the parallel content plane. In this context, the "aesthetic" has both "substance" in the Hjelmslevian sense of a specific relation with form and in the empirical sense of having the potential to generate an impact on experience (pathos). This is a description of a pathos-based model of semiosis. In some respects it is a "ground-up" version of the characteristically "top-down" approach reflected in logos-based models. Kress, in his work on Halliday: System and Function in Language, notes that systemic-functional theory must needs a top-down methodology:

... in a theory which attempts to provide a description of language in terms of function (of linguistic units) in context, this is the necessary direction: the structure of the larger unit specifies the context of classes, which are systems composed of terms from the next level above (xvi).
I believe, however, that the empirical model has the added advantage of providing a context for cognitive-linguistic (logos-based) models in a way that these models cannot do for pathos-based principles, except by negation and exclusion (Cf. Stoic and Platonic treatment of the affective experience).

There is a close and natural connection between pathos - as an empirical condition and criterion for knowledge - and the common sign - as the basis for empirical, scientific inquiry. The connection can be described in terms of Saussure's *rapports associatifs*: relations which are external to the text but internal to the culture - the connotative/associative function of semiosis. In the empirically-based model of the sign, this function is anterior to the other (secondary) function of semiosis which is based on the special sign. In Saussurean terms this other type of sign operates according to a set of functional relations described as *rapports syntagmatiques*: relations internal to the structure of the text and the structuring of semiosis. In this way, the two types of semiotic process, derived from the Hellenistic semiotic framework, can also be described in terms the action/reflection opposition which is central to most functional semiotic models. But the distinction is an abstract one since even reflection is ultimately a form of action. The opposition was also central, if not problematic, for Deleuze in his discussion of empiricism and subjectivity. The connection with subjectivity is important at this point as it provides a nexus between culture, dialogue and genre.

What transforms the sign - as the embodiment of some energetic representation which has the potential to impact on experience - into a sign which actually impacts on experience - is the presence of people. Without people there can be no dialogue for the sign to enter into. Central to Bakhtin's model of dialogue is the concept and value of silence: silence has a structural semiotic role to play equivalent to that of sound and it is impossible to account for one phenomena without at the same time taking into account the other. Closely related to silence is the background of regularity against which semiotic exchange is most often enacted. The concept of a "background of regularity" furnishes the starting point for an empirically-based description of "context of culture". The environmental context of culture is textured by pre-existing, familiar semiotic (crypto)types and forms and patterns of association or areas of meaning potential called *genres*.

The Hellenistic model of the sign implies the classification of genre according to the underlying sign-type - common (*genicha*) or special (*eidicha*). Rather than following the Hellenistic framework dogmatically, I will use a similar distinction from Bakhtin's dialogic model between primary and secondary genres.

For Bakhtin the distinction between primary and secondary genres is semantic, not functional. In the context of a dialogic model of human understanding this distinction will inevitably be central to the organisation of the semantic system. Bakhtin also describes the distinction in terms of "simple" and "complex" genres. This suggests the distinction is one of degree, altering the character of the sign as well as its content. Here I want to suggest that the distinction will be useful as a methodology, providing the foundations for an empirically-based description of genre as such. I have already described primary genres in terms of the empirical experiences of pleasure and pain and the associated "emotional metafunctions" of desire and fear. In addition, the model is biased toward the pleasure principle, defined as the desire to be free from fear.

The sorts of issues which primary genres give rise to will be of a moral and ethical character. For the purposes of the present dissertation I will restrict the discussion to two primary genres that have had an almost thematic presence in the present work: the fear of "otherness" and the desire to "...live happily ever after". As a class based on the common sign, demonstrating paradigmatic patterns of association which contribute to the
texturing of cultural realities, these primary genres realise an aesthetic potential which is effectively an environmental attribute of the context of situation in its context of culture, integral to the process of instantiation, anterior to the process of material realisation. In the process of material realisation, not all emotions invoked are realised nor all possible responses expressed - only one (which Halliday recognises as the lexico-grammar) which must somehow resolve these complex systems of meaning potential in a coherent way.

The relation of empathy helps to "fill-in" the semantic gaps left by the realisational grammar and it is in this respect that dialogues of silence are inevitably the most emotionally moving of all. But much of the semiotic "work" is done by the set of "extra-linguistic" (common) signs which comprise the stabilising-grammar and realise the aesthetic potential of semiotic process. I want to pause briefly to explore one particular part of the stabilising-grammar.

An important set of common signs are the group of words sometimes called vulgarisms or expletives or, in the vernacular, "swear words". Some would dispute that these lexical-items even merit the status of language and certainly, in most English language cultures, their official use is usually restricted both socially and legally. In this sense, coarse language exists outside language and the associated lexical items have a structural function which sets them apart from other items fulfilling similar functions. For instance, to take an example drawn from the Australian vernacular: *we fuckin' flew out of there* and compare it with a sanitised version with a similar meaning: *we got out of there quickly alright*. Even Jakobson would agree, based on the principle of equivalence, that the former realises a poetry which remains only implicit in the latter. Indeed, all "good" swearing, it seems to me, is aimed at producing an essentially poetic effect - reinforcing the meanings being made and attempting to compensate for those left unrealised. The effect is an aesthetic one and, to this extent, also a playful one. Any rejection of swearing as a legitimate and valid form of cultural self-expression cannot be based on empirical, scientific value. I chose to discuss the class of expletives alongside primary genres since - as common signs - they instantiate an aesthetic potential and realise a common meaning.

This brings us back to the class of secondary or complex genres. The present dissertation belongs to one such genre; most of the artefacts of semiotic process can be associated with one or more secondary genres. This includes the traditional literary genres, the associated film, television and video-shop genres and hybrids such as music-video and multi-media genres. It is also worth recalling that here there is no necessary opposition here between message and medium. Such terms as "virtual reality" and "cyberspace" implicitly deconstruct the opposition and are simply attempts to capture and dramatise the effect of inhabiting an entirely synthetic, electronic semiotic environment. The genres which the so-called information superhighway gives rise to will inevitably be related to similar genres from similar environments eg telephone conversation, epistle, telegram, fax, commercial transaction, entertainment etc. Even if geographical location is no longer as important or as problematic as it once was, before the age of digital electronic and satellite communications technology, a meeting still needs to take place, signs still need to be exchanged and the need to validate cultural self-expression remains to be addressed. If any of these conditions remains unfulfilled then communication will not be successful. In this context, successful communication means responding to both the aesthetic and semantic potentials of meaning-making activity.

Jakobson’s example *I like Ike* is a fine instance of successful communication in this sense, responding to the need for cultural self-expression through the poetic reinforcement of the meanings so realised. The result is the co-ordination of a dual semiotic response - emotional/aesthetic and cognitive/semantic - in the one message. In this case the stabilising-grammar which realises the aesthetic potential coincides with the lexico-grammar realising the semantic potential. Indeed it is impossible to separate the
two since the aesthetic potential is realised as an attribute associated with the "whole" utterance while the semantic potential is realised through attributes associated with the "parts" of the utterance. Put another way, the impact of the utterance as a whole is much greater than, and qualitatively different from, the impact of its individual parts.

In terms of the primary/secondary method of classification, Jakobson's example may be described as a primary genre instantiating the emotions of friendship and respect and a secondary genre realising the attribute of political slogan. An alternative description, based on a less charitable assessment of the democratic political process, could see the slogan in terms of distrust and cynicism, but this is a question of culture-specific belief and value. From an outsider's point of view ie from a cross-cultural perspective, the slogan is politically motivated and based on a desire to achieve friendship and respect. Irrespective of the meanings realised in the utterance and the secondary genres with which the utterance may be associated, the aesthetic potential - as a sonic-cultural phenomenon - remains. This returns us to the priority of the common sign in the empirically-based models of culture, dialogue and genre along with the associative-connotative and aesthetic potential of semiosis which this implies.

I would like to draw this section of the dissertation to a close with an analogy for linguistic and semiotic practice which will serve to highlight some of the main points being made here and provide a basis for illustrating the "cross-cultural" semiotic model as a whole.

**The Semiotics of Driving: The Pleasure and the Pain**

If semiotics is to be the science of signs (*semeia*) and signing (*semeiousthai*) in sign-systems then it must involve a description which is common to all such systems. Halliday's systemic-functional model goes a long way toward establishing just such a description. But it lacks an "aesthetic sensibility" or any appeal to the resonant background of culture which is, after all, the environmental context of being. It would seem that in the experience of driving there is an even greater lack of such an "aesthetic" but appearances can be deceiving - especially when we believe (in) something which is not empirically grounded. A similar point is made in relation to poetry which is described as the "devil's wine" in an essay by Francis Bacon (1561-1626), a seminal figure in the development of modern scientific thought:

> One of the Fathers, in great severity, called poesy *vinum daemonum*, because it filleth the imagination, and yet is but with the shadow of a lie. But it is not the lie that sineth in, and settleneth in it, that doth hurt ... truth, which doth only judge itself, teacheth that the inquiry of truth, which is the love making, or wooing of it; the knowledge of truth, which is the preserve of it; and the belief of truth which is the enjoying of it; is the sovereign good of human nature.\(^\text{12}\)

Driving is the apotheosis of movement; the transposition of place far beyond the pace of horse and cart or, yet again, man on foot. And this without so much as working up a sweat. Leaving aside the somewhat solipsistic nature of the undertaking which is the experience of driving (passengers notwithstanding), it involves a fairly rigid adherence to a particular system of signs in much the same way that the activity of talking involves adherence to a particular sign-system. Moreover talking enters into the

experience of driving (eg yelling at other drivers) in much the same way that the
experience of driving might enter into talking (eg expressing anger and frustration).
Talking and driving are two particular sign-systems which, along with others such as the
writing, painting, singing, and dreaming systems, help to make culture what it is. But
all the sign-systems put together doesn't add up to "culture". The "context of culture" is
defined through/by the empirical experience of these semiotic systems and each particular
signing-system is simply another semiotic context, another semantic environment,
another "context of situation" for the expression of an essentially ineffable (cultural)
experience.

If semiotics is to be an empirically-based science of signs and signing-systems
then it must involve an empirically-based theory of the sign. For at least one seminal
empirical philosopher, empirical experience was not only the basis of scientific inquiry
but the experiences of pleasure and pain lay at the heart all empirical science, as criteria
(kriteria). Moreover, the experience of driving, especially in the Australian context
where distances are vast and seemingly endless, becomes quite a close approximation for
the ideal state of empirical happiness - ataraxia, defined as an absence of pain, stress and
fear. Alternatively, the experience of driving in a metropolitan-cosmopolitan-urban
environment should, in theory, demonstrate what an empirically-based science
endeavours to avoid ie. stress, fear and pain. Nevertheless this is the place where most
driving is done, where the signs are most dense and their policing most rigid.

Two categories of sign-type comprise the driving sign-system: there are the
technical, special, particular signs (eidicha) which have to be acquired in order to obtain a
drivers licence; and there are the ordinary, everyday common signs (genicha) such as a
fist being shaken in the air around the driver's seat. Semiosis - the act of using signs to
communicate/infer with - is organised about these two types of sign. The special type of
sign establishes the "mode" of contact (Jakobson's phatic) and is associated with a "field"
of external reality (Jakobson's referential function). The common sign-type is associated
with the domain of inner conditions and "inner perception" and is realised through the
"tenor" of the exchange-event (Jakobson's emotive, conative and poetic functions).

The field-tenor-mode model reflects a systemic-functional description of
language as a social semiotic. In that model, however, each component is structurally
equivalent, realising the corresponding metafunctions of ideational, interpersonal and
textual. The structural parallelism here seems to be an all too rigid adherence to
Hjelmslev. Moreover the need to be more specific about the field, tenor, mode "hook­
up" has already been discussed by Threadgold (1989, 214). Here I want to suggest that
an empirically-based social semiotic will resolve the problematic of context into at least
two levels or domains, based on Hjelmslev's planes of content and expression, reflecting
the two levels of semiosis which, in a sense, "drives" the
semantic system as a whole. These two domains of semiosis and the corresponding
sign-types reflect the nature of the connection underlying each sign-system. Consider the
semiotics of driving.

On dusty outback tracks - far from the maddening roads of metropolis - there are
few signs and even fewer vehicles and so the semiotic constraints are relaxed. These
constraints are technical in nature, based on particular signs whose "grammar" or system
of association regulates the possibilities and the "potential" of the experience of driving.
As a meaning-potential, therefore, the semantic system is comprised, in part, by special
sign-types which have the effect of regulating the possibilities for experience. The other
part of the semantic system is empirical experience which far exceeds the potential
invested in any one semiotic act, constrained only by the culture of experience and even
then there is room for a soul (*psyche*). Conceived in this way, semiosis may be defined as a dialogue between two structurally incompatible levels of experience and reality.

All signing-systems operate according to internally generated systems of association - which in language are realised through the lexico-grammar and in driving through "road-signs" - as well as an externally motivated culture of experience which may operate either in harmony with or in opposition to the internal "grammar" of the particular signing-system. The common thread here is an empirical one which weaves its way from birth to grave, appropriating the semiotic potential given it and deploying it according to culture, dialogue and genre. The common sign is the empirical basis for cultural (self-) expression. There are two possible orientations for this type of sign, as I've already suggested, but these orientations represent radically different outcomes for semiosis.

In the description of driving so far there have been two expressed or implied underlying states of experience: anger and relaxation. These correspond to the two possible empirical states of being: disturbance and regularity. The pleasure of driving, as a kinetic pleasure involving movement, falls short of the empirical criterion for happiness (*ataraxia*) but as a katastematic pleasure and a form of relaxation it comes close to the *arche* and the *telos* of being.

On the road it is possible to do one of two things: follow the rules or break them - be relatively safe or possibly die. These possibilities represent socially desirable and undesirable outcomes respectively. To challenge the rules of the road depends as much on the road as it does on the rules. Returning again to the Outback, there are scarcely any roads, let alone rules which renders the prospect for challenge problematic. Unfortunately there is no "outback" for language in the sense of operating in an environment relatively free from external disturbance and constraint (perhaps inner and intimate speech). Nevertheless there do exist environments for both driving and language which are socially sanctioned to be relatively unconstrained: the Grand Prix circuit, for instance for driving, and poetry, for instance for language. Perhaps the call of the Russian Futurists to "loosen the syntax" can also be heard in the call of others to "burn some rubber". In either case the challenge is socially sanctioned, within culturally ratified limits. When such challenge is not officially sanctioned then conflict and misunderstanding inevitably ensue - the chase scene, the rhetorical argument, the symbolic battle etc. The racing car driver is able to break the rules of the road in much the same way that the artist of language is able to break the rules of syntax and form (Mallarmé, Lautréamont, Khlebnikov etc).

Affective experience (*pathos*) - defined as an aesthetic pleasure - is the empirical ground of semiotic activity. The irony here is that *pathos* constitutes an (aesthetic) exteriority with respect to the structural interiority of the particular signing-system when in fact the purpose of the latter is to give expression to the former without there appearing to be any inside or outside. The reality is that many insides and outsides constitute the negotiation of culture without these necessarily being apparent to all. But just as the Grand Prix circuit gives pause to reflect on the value and aesthetics of driving, so does poetry give pause to reflect on the value and aesthetics of language. In both cases the underlying aesthetic is associated with the satisfaction of a katastematic pleasure which is both anterior to the act of signification (dialogic appropriation) and external to the particular signing-system - in empirical terms it is both the *archē* and the *telos* of being. The difference between the semantics and aesthetics of driving can also be described in terms of the difference between the "act" and "art" of driving.

The *act* of driving is a fairly mechanical process, based on the negotiation of particular signs many of which are the same the world over. The *art* of driving bears a
connection with empirical experience which transcends the negotiation of the associated particular (driving) signing-system. The art of driving is inextricably bound up with the pleasure of driving - as both craft and comfort (both kinetic and katastematic pleasure). The art of driving focuses on driving for the sake of driving, projecting the principle of pleasure from the axis of experience onto the axis of indication. The analogy here with Jakobson's poetic function is intended to both invoke and broaden the poetic focus on the message in language to include a focus on the aesthetic potential of semiosis in general.

Particular signing-systems are based on a differential principle of association - Saussure's phonological sign is the paradigm for structuralist semiotics. By contrast the principle of association underlying common sign-systems is based on similar experiences and similar histories and the background for common signs is always affective experience (pathos), unlike the context for particular signs which is an internally generated domain of semiosis - a semiotic interiority whose causality is structural in the Althusserian sense of a structure which is nothing outside its system of effects.

Halliday's tri-stratal description of context of situation is a response to the need for a general theory of semantics and semiosis which accounts for both the experiential (empirical) environment and the textual (lexico-grammatical) environment. These environments constitute incompatible realities although there is a fundamental and necessary relation between them. Halliday describes this relation in terms of the metafunctional hypothesis and the associated description of context. An empirically-based theory of the sign suggests that this relation is realisable through two different sign-types which operate simultaneously to produce the effect of a unique sign. But the underlying structure of the sign is dialogic - instantiating an aesthetic potential, realising a semantic potential. The models of semiosis that we build must reflect the empirical-dialogic foundations of semiosis, focussing simultaneously on the aesthetic and semantic potentials of meaning-making activity. These meaning potentials are themselves an abstraction from actual contexts of culture where semiosis - the act and art of signing - is always dialogic and always aimed at soliciting a "responsive understanding" (to use Bakhtin's term) to the movement of cultural self-expression.

In the semiotics of driving, a "responsive understanding" is sought on two levels or, to use a topographical metaphor, in two domains. One is the domain of particular signs which includes road signs and markings, vehicle lights and indicators as well as the system of rules and regulations governing them (the traffic code). As a system based on the particular sign-type, related by a code and enforced by policing, only one sort of responsive understanding is sought: affirmation, adherence, acquiescence, agreement. In other words, as a system of meaning potential, that is, as a semantics, the responsive understanding is "monologic" - to use another important Bakhtinian category. Transgression in this particular context is dangerous and may lead to a chase if not a crash.

The semiotics of policing is inextricably bound up with the semiotics of driving. Of relevance here is the policing function which both reflects and enforces adherence to the particular signing-system associated with the code of driving. In this respect, policing performs a meta-semiotic function, derived from a reflection of the particular sign-system and associated cultural code. The policing function is related to the referential function by which the particular sign (eg stop sign) indicates an expectation, circumscribing the potential meaning of the experience of driving in a way that must be both recognised and respected. There is no place in the domain of particular signs for rhetorical dispute and argument. Such a potential lies in the domain of common signs, driving the system as a whole.
Common signs reflect the nature of people and subjectivity, including the driver and other drivers and, in general, the dialogic relations between them. This also includes peripheral participant relations such as passengers, pedestrians and even animals on the road. Of relevance here is not "what" is going on (ie. "driving") but "how" it is being accomplished (the dialogic orientation toward the experience of driving).

In language, the focus on the dialogic relation between speakers is analogous to the focus on the dialogic relation between drivers. In language this represents a focus not on what is being said, but on how it is being said, on the message itself, as the realisation or, more precisely, the instantiation of an aesthetic potential. In the semiotics of driving the analogy is revealing.

Whether it be a songful nonchalance behind the wheel or the violent anger vented during traffic jams, both are equally revealing in their connection with the common human experiences of pleasure and pain. The aesthetic potential of semiosis resides in the expressive potential of empirical experience and is realisable through the various modes of semiosis and genres of being which have evolved to meet these fundamentally social and cultural needs. In this way the "context of culture" can be described as a system of genres realising both semantic and aesthetic meaning potentials. Semiosis is the dialogic appropriation of these patterned meaning potentials for the purposes of cultural self-expression.

Focussing on how people express themselves across the diversity of semiotic environments through which they move will reveal a primary genre (an attitude) which will ultimately inform the way in which the secondary genre (the message) is to be interpreted. In this sense, just "driving along the road" is not a primary genre; it is a secondary genre, abstracted from the creative, dialogic and contextualised potential associated with the figure behind the wheel.

The following excerpt illustrates well the dialogic nature of the relation between primary and secondary genres as they relate to the semiotics of driving. The excerpt is from The Day of the Dog, a novel by Archie Weller which presents an indigenous perspective on life in and around Perth, during the Australian 1970's. The young man at the centre of Weller's story - Doug Dooligan - is neither hero nor anti-hero but there is something fundamentally good in the nature of his character although its expression is sometimes thwarted and misdirected. Like the author's, as a nyongah or indigenous person from the Perth region, Doug Dooligan's story is part of the history of cross-cultural negotiation between the Anglo-European and Aboriginal cultures of Australia.

The experience of driving crosses all cultures where the technology and infrastructure are available and accessible. Just because the technology is "Western" doesn't mean that the values and beliefs associated with its use must also always be "Western". In other words, Doug Dooligan's desire to go for a drive is an expression of his own cultural experience and is not a cross-cultural exchange in the same way as his angry and fearful encounters with the police. Alternatively, if the experience of culture can be equated with the culture of experience then all experience and all contexts of situation are fundamentally cross-cultural. For Doug Dooligan, the experience of driving represents the potential to escape for a day from work and from his wadgula (white) brother-in-law, Jamie McDonald, who is away for the day. The Rover in the garage fulfils an aesthetic function independent of the potential for transport and movement:

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The Rover sits out in the garage, like one of Jamie’s stud bulls. It represents achievement; a sign of equality, even superiority, for Jamie McDonald has finally made it and can move amongst his peers with self-esteem. The McDonalds have always been regarded by the older established gentry as being slightly lower on the social scale. Besides, old Iain has often rubbed people up the wrong way with his Highlander bluntness. But now his son has gone to a public school and built a property into something worthwhile. He has a gorgeous wife and two nice children and a brand new Rover, low and silver and shining.

Doug’s wily eyes gaze at those keys now, as though he is in a trance: like a bird before a darting, dancing cobra.

If he borrowed the car, just think what a figure he would cut, he ponders. He would be back before Jamie arrives home and - why not? - he could pick up that piece at the Halfway House. They could take a spin up to Perth and he could ride around the streets like a knight on his silver charger, or a sly robber with his Maid Marian beside him. He remembers what Pretty Boy told him once: ‘If ya got a car, buddy, you can pick up any yorga. Girls like a boy with a car. Ya king of the world!’.

As he rolls a smoke and listens to the kettle whistling in the cold, lonely kitchen, the idea seems better every minute.

It is good to sit behind the wheel of the glossy, sensuous car. It gives him a sense of power he has never had before. He drives carefully at first, then, as his hand become used to the movements of his new machine, he puts on speed and revels in its power (139).

In this excerpt there does not appear to be a great deal of evidence relating to the particular signing-system of driving. Rather the bulk of the evidence derives from a responsive understanding to the cultural experience of driving (and owning a vehicle). This includes the mechanical negotiation of the particular sign-system and extends into the aesthetic domain of potential pleasures both kinetic - "They would take a spin up to Perth and he could ride round the streets like a knight on his silver charger" - and katastematic - "Ya king of the world!". Notably it is the katastematic pleasure of power and control (stability) that underlies the aesthetic potential latent in the experience of driving, for both Doug and his brother-in-law Jamie. The secondary meaning associated here with the semiotics of driving derives from processes associated with the "act" of driving such as taking a spin up to Perth and stopping on the way to pick up a yorga. But it is the "art" of driving, as an aesthetic experience involving both kinetic and especially katastematic pleasures, which ultimately compels Dougie to take behind the wheel and pursue his desire, providing a context for and ultimately informing the act of driving itself. In this way the context of culture instantiates an aesthetic potential which ultimately informs the secondary genres realised through the actual context of situation.

According to an empirically-based description of semiosis, the process of instantiation is dialogically anterior to the process of realisation and the context of culture is a functional constituent of the specific context of situation. The relation between the context of situation and the context of culture is "monologic": the context of culture - Doug Dooligan's own cultural experience - informs the context of situation - the Rover in the garage - in a way that is not reversible ie the Rover reveals nothing about Doug outside his dialogic appropriation of it.

Ironically perhaps, the artefacts recoverable from particular semiotic exchanges, in particular contexts of situation, constitute the basis for scientific inquiry into semiotic process. So while, in practice, the way in which particular semiotic environments are negotiated will depend largely upon (cultural and cross-cultural) factors external to the
particular signing-system, in theory it is necessary to work in reverse, re-constructing retrospectively what may have been the common factors underlying the particular exchange. I have already described this problem as a forensic one - to do with the nature of the semiotic evidence available and the way in which such evidence is interpreted. Threadgold recognises the problem of retrospectivity and locates it specifically in the "text-producing function" associated with the contextual configuration of "mode":

When we know a good deal about the conditions under which texts are produced, and about the social construction of the identities and the individual investments in certain kinds of action of those producing them, we can predict a good deal about the way the probabilities will be skewed. But, in the end, the system, the text-producing function Halliday calls the textual function has a dynamism of its own which is only ever retrospectively explicable (1989, 214).

Since most of what is retrospective in past semiotic exchanges depends on factors which are largely external to the particular event/utterance/text - factors which Halliday and others will describe in terms of ineffable, cryptogrammatical semiotic processes - we must go to great lengths as researchers in the human sciences - and as "forensic semioticians" - to piece together at least some of the major factors surrounding the production of particular cultural artefacts. In the semiotics of driving this amounts to a consideration of the common sign-types (genicha) associated with the expression of the experience of driving (anger, pride, relaxation etc.) as well as the particular sign-types (eidicha) associated with the code and content of driving.

The context of culture furnishes a background of regularity for the instantiation of not one but two meaning potentials. Each of these meaning potentials has congruent levels of realisation which, according to Hjelmslev's scheme, may be represented on the plane of content - for the semantics and its realisational (lexico) grammar - and on the plane of expression - for the aesthetics and its realisational (stabilising) grammar. The particular contextual configuration which realises the meaning potentials instantiated through semiotic process is the "mode", corresponding to Halliday's textual function and Jakobson's phatic function.

I have already indicated that the category of "tactile" metaphor is probably more suggestive of the nature of semiotic process than the so-called "conduit" metaphor. In a narrow sense the mode of exchange does operate as a conduit for the transfer of information but this is a very formalist account of semiosis and lacks any connection with the empirical foundations of the actual semiotic event. Information is not simply the power to make selections amongst alternatives, it is evidence (enargeia) for inference and understanding (semeiousthai) and as such it generates an impact (epibolas) on experience, rendering impressions (phantasia) which must be accounted for. In this respect, the particular contextual configurations of field and tenor inform the ultimate compositional structure of mode. There are two important points here.

First, field and tenor are dialogically anterior to mode. Since mode realises a set of functions which are ultimately invested with semantic and aesthetic potentials associated with the context of culture, the instantiation of these meaning potentials will depend upon the circumstances, processes and participants in the particular (cross-cultural) context of situation. In other words field and tenor pre-exist the mode of exchange as a bi-furcated system of meaning potential instantiated through the context of culture. What this anteriority generates is an expectation and a fundamental tension concerning the outcome of exchange and what is likely to occur, given the nature of the

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circumstances, processes and participants. In general terms the particular configuration of field, tenor and mode realises the contextual attribute of genre.

Second, the configuration of field - as the domain of objects, processes, causes and circumstances - and the configuration of tenor - as the interpersonal domain of attitude, manner, value and evaluation - are structurally similar but dialogically anterior to the configuration of mode. "How" a particular exchange event is ultimately realised will depend on the particular combination of these configurations as they impact on the mode of exchange. The mode also places some constraints on choices in field and tenor. The important point here is the instantiation of an aesthetic potential through particular selections in tenor, the instantiation of a semantic potential through particular selections in field and their congruent realisation through the configuration of mode. In turn, each system of meaning potential has a corresponding realisational grammar - for the semantics the lexico-grammar is central, for aesthetics the stabilising-grammar is central.

The relation between mode and choices in field and tenor is called genre since genre is the way (weg, chemin, Tao) of meaning in particular contexts of situation and culture. Bakhtin classified genre according to two types - primary and secondary and I have related these to the common and particular sign-types which were prominent in the Hellenistic debate on signs. Taking into account the relation between genre-type and sign-type, and the understanding that genre, in it purest form, as Bakhtin observed, is a relatively stable type of patterned meaning potential, the cross-cultural model as a whole may represented in the following way:
The model works from the ground-up, as opposed to the top-down approach which some have suggested characterises systemic-functional models. The context of situation is part of what Bakhtin would call the "extra-textual context". The other part is the so-called context of culture. In Halliday's model, the context of culture remains outside systemic-functional framework, as a background of regularity against which system and function evolve. In the cross-cultural context of situation, the background condition of regularity is abrogated and the internal probability structures associated with culture-specific system-networks break down, systemic predictability no longer being the basis for semiotic exchange. While the cross-cultural context may be inherently unpredictable in terms of its semiotic outcomes, some structural semiotic features of the exchange-event remain. In particular, the Hjelmslevian distinction between the planes of expression and content remains as well as the correlation within each of these planes between semiotic form and substance.
On the plane of expression, "form" is manifest through the common signs which have evolved to serve the purposes of cultural self-expression. These common signs are organised into patterns which I have glossed as (primary) genres of being. Following Bakhtin's classification, this class of genre is represented by the category genre (i). Such a description of expressive form certainly goes beyond the Hjelmslevian phonemic description of form, where it is differentiated from the "continuum" of non-linguistic sonic phenomena, against which background of regularity, or "substance" in the Hjelmslevian sense, the expressive potential for semiosis emerges. But in broadening the category of form on the plane of expression to include the graphic, kinetic, silent and other possibilities for semiosis, this does not fundamentally alter the interpretation of Hjelmslevian form, rather it has been extended to reflect an empirically-based model of the sign, one which was at least latent, if not implied, in the models of Saussure and Hjelmslev.

The relation between form and substance on the plane of expression has the appearance of structure when modelled in terms of the Saussurean linguistic sign. But even there, an underlying empirical connection remains - the phoneme, as a unit of difference in sound, depends on a background of (sonic) regularity, providing a responsive environment to the potential for the semiosis of sonic phenomena. Replacing the category of substance, on the plane of expression, with the empirical category of pathos (defined as the potential for disturbance) retains the contrast between regularity and disturbance underlying the Hjelmslevian form-substance relation. Associated with the plane of expression is an aesthetic potential for semiosis. According to the empirically-based "aesthetics" propagated in the preceding pages, the aesthetic response can be distinguished according to a measure of pleasure and pain. This distinction is an internal (endogenous) feature of the model and mediates the relation between the planes of content and expression. Hjelmslev called this relation the heteroplane function and considered it to be central to the overall glossematic semiotic project.

On the plane of content, semantic form is organised into systems of particular signs and related codes - what I have glossed as the (secondary) genres of culture. In the cross-cultural model, semantic form is differentiated from a culture-specific substance according to particular patterns of expectation which comprise the class of secondary genres - genre (ii).

Corresponding to the generic configurations on the planes of content and expression are the contextual attributes of Field and Tenor. On the plane of expression the important feature is the semiotic impact of the signifying phenomenon on the consciousness of the dialogic participants. In the cross-cultural model, this impact is measured according to an experiential potential for pleasure and pain. The underlying activity here is a disturbance of the perceptual organ called pathos, instantiated through an activity of the kriteria and realised through the Tenor of the relations between or within the dialogic participants involved. On the plane of content, the activity of the kriteria is manifest through the Field of external and internal objects, processes and causes. The culture-specific experience of reality provides a background of regularity for each context of situation, against which particular signing-systems acquire both meaning and value. On the plane of expression, the background of regularity is defined as a freedom from disturbance (ataraxia) and is reflected in the potential for disturbance (pathos). Indifference in this context would be similar to Pyrrhonist sceptical attitude of "equipoise" and speechlessness (ataraxia). Indifference to all things, however, would amount to a cynical rejection of the possibility for "true belief" (empirical knowledge) and would imply a Cyrenaic hedonistic model of pleasure for pleasure's sake. The phenomena about which we are indifferent is a profoundly ethical question which remains to be addressed but not, unfortunately, here.
The empirical bias in the cross-cultural model is toward meta-stable systems and processes, towards that which tends not to disturb ie towards pleasurable (in the Epicurean empirical sense) states and this will be manifest through an intrinsic tendency to maintain and preserve the existing Tenor of dialogic relations, in those contexts where there is not excessive and unnecessary pain ie consensus is valued over antagonism: antagonism of its nature necessitates additional disturbance whereas consensus is a pre-condition for ataraxia. A similar condition or, more specifically, tendency, also holds on the plane of content where there is an empirical bias toward the maintenance of existing particular signing-systems and a tension associated with the potential for their transgression, challenge or overthrow. In other words, maintaining existing structures - be they semiotic or concrete - is the priority on the plane of content, while maintaining existing perceptions - be they common or unique - is the tendency on the plane of expression. These intrinsic tendencies/biases/prejudices are a feature of the cross-cultural model as a whole and are ultimately realisable through the mode of exchange.

The particular mode, including the medium of exchange, may also impact on choices in Field and Tenor. The potential for constraint should not be overstated, however. Eric Michael's insightful deconstruction of the message/medium dichotomy through the oral/electronic analogy leaves little suggestion that the technical nature of the way in which communication is accomplished (the mode-medium of exchange) places unnecessary constraints on the cultural content and expression of the exchange. The possible exception here is the particular task of writing. Perhaps the perceived prestige and value of writing in some cultures is less the result of it having come about to begin with, than of the facility it extends to the memory and the pain associated with its acquisition. Writing is, I would maintain, a very painful and time-consuming way to remember: from the pharonic hieroglyph to the Monk's quill to the student's word-processor, writing will become unnecessary when the spoken word can be rendered as written by simple virtue of it having been spoken: voice-activated textual-reproduction renders the intrinsic need for the particular task of writing obsolete - the technology already exists and the wordprocessor is already partly achieving this. Writing, some day soon, will be left as calligraphy. But the implied opposition between spoken and written modes of exchange can be easily overstated since the most important process associated with the production of cultural meaning is repetition and penetration ie repetition of the particular semiotic event (phantasia) and its impact (epibolas) or penetration on the individual consciousness. There are implications here for an empirically based semiotics of the "psyche" (psychê<soul) - I hesitate here in invoking the somewhat nebulous problematics of psychology and psychoanalysis - but this must also remain the subject of future research. Perhaps the significance of mode can be demonstrated through the empirical observation that human beings are highly impressionable creatures and what matters in evaluating the impact of these impression is not so much the way in which they are accomplished ie the mode of exchange, but how they impact on the orientation in the tenor of the exchange-event, and what variations are induced in the configuration of field.

In general, then, the model can be read from the ground-up, and occasionally particular constraints resulting from the mode of exchange may be noted but, as Michaels observed with the Walpiri, the effect is more likely to be enabling than constraining. The product of the model - the result of the calculation - the output of the semiosis - is the semantic and aesthetic evidence (enargeia) available for interpretation, in particular contexts of situation. The way in which these sources of semiotic evidence are internally organised is called their grammar. On the plane of content, the semantic evidence is organised about a particular lexico-grammar. On the plane of expression, the aesthetic evidence is organised about a particular stabilising-grammar. With regard to the notion of a stabilising-grammar, the concept derives from the "um's" and "er's" of speech which are often referred to as stabilisers. The notion of a stabilising-grammar is, as far as I am
aware, a neologism, in its particular context here, and it is perhaps worth reiterating that what the notion implies is an addition to the existing systemic-functional interpretations of lexico-grammatical evidence.

Read from the ground-up, the model is an empirically-based description of semiosis. Read from the top-down, the model is an empirically-based reflection of semiosis. It is with this latter perspective that the researcher in the human sciences must engage, where the "object" of inquiry is of a semiotic nature such as recorded words, written transcripts, paintings present or reproduced, actions actual, filmed or acted-out or, indeed, any context where the attribute is one of research and analysis rather than participation and direct engagement. Terry Threadgold has already noted, in effect, that the archaeology of knowledge relies heavily upon the lexico-grammatical evidence available from the artefacts of past semiotic encounters and contexts. What the cross-cultural model might be able to accomplish is a re-evaluation of the systemic-functional description of semiosis in a way that might displace the centrality of the lexico-grammar in the overall scheme and enable the inclusion of another system of relations connected with the expressive and aesthetic potential of semiosis, realising a grammar which contributes to the stability of the system as a whole - the stabilising-grammar. Together the stabilising and lexico-grammars create the appearance of a unique semiotic event, but in piecing together the evidence, after the event, both meaning potentials will need to be accounted for. The outcome for interpretive activity and hermeneutics in general is less drastic than Benjamin supposed in his famous critique of "Civilisation". Paraphrasing and, in a sense, completing the famous observation: every document of civilisation is a document of barbarism and at the same time a document of beauty. While Benjamin's understanding of civilisation may be such as render any association with beauty problematic, the important point here is the inclusion of an aesthetic perspective, one which is grounded in empirical experience and, as such, given to the potential for pleasure as well as pain. The notion of "civilisation" as a process associated with change and disturbance, called "progress", runs counter to the empirical pre-disposition toward processes of stability and freedom from disturbance - a tendency that could appropriately be called "culture". Nevertheless, Michelangelo's "David" remains a great work of art and at the same time it is an artefact of its particular cultural milieu(x). Similarly, Archie Weller's Day of the Dog remains, in my view, a great work of literature and at the same time it is an artefact of its particular cultural milieu(x).

A Brief Note on Genre

The formal description of the cross-cultural model is less interesting than its application in actual contexts of situation. Here I want to preface the pragmatics of genre analysis with a description of the model which highlights the important role of genre in the overall compositional structure of the dialogic event and the centrality of the heteroplane function in the interpretation of the cross-cultural model.

To begin with, consider Bakhtin's description of the sign as the embodiment, or at least anticipation, of a "responsive understanding". The notion of a third structural participant involved with the act of dialogue - Bakhtin's super-addressee - is also associated with (culture) specific "global" probabilities and expectations:14

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14 cf. Goldmann's "world-views".
Each dialogue takes place against the background of the responsive understanding of an invisibly present third party who stands above all the participants in the dialogue (Bakhtin 1986, 126).

I will come back to the triadic structure of dialogue shortly.

Successful communication involves a relation of consensus and agreement about the nature and implications of the meanings exchanged. In the discourse of jurisprudence, a successful outcome is a unanimous decision - the unity of opinion providing the empirical basis for the establishment of the (cultural) Law.

The semiosis of collective agreement ("hegemony" in the Gramscian sense) is substantially different from the semiosis of isolated, individual episodes of agreement. Perhaps Heraclitus' paradox of the one and the many will help explain the point here: that which is agreed to by many groups will inevitably be valued (culturally) over that which is agreed to by individual groups. In between the individual groupings and the "whole" there are coalitions, alliances and multifarious complex associations. But the essential point here is the nature of the substance which binds together these groups in society, making culture what it is.

Rather than "substance" (understood in the empirical sense of that which has a potential to produce an impact (epibolas)), another way to approach the problem is in terms of the system of relations associated with the dialogic event. This is the approach Bakhtin follows in postulating the notion of a super-addressee. The notion of a super-addressee implies the existence of a dialogic relation which is substantially different from the unmediated dialogic relation between the participants. I have described the potential for this latter sort of unmediated exchange in terms of the relation of "empathy".

In terms of its empirical substance, the super-addressee impacts simultaneously, though not necessarily similarly, on each of the dialogic participants. Where consensus/agreement/unanimity is achieved, the outcome for semiosis will be similar to the relation of empathy, but manifested in a way that reinforces / resonates with and contributes to the maintenance of an existing social and cultural order (Law). Ultimately the super-addressee stands for a substance which is organic to the dialogic event as a whole, encompassing all the systemic-functional aspects of the semiosis - Field, Tenor and Mode. The super-addressee could also be described as a "semiotic substance" which serves as a "binding agent", drawing together the parts of the dialogue, making the exchange-event as a whole "cohere". This "substance" is also associated with the expressive (aesthetic) potential of semiosis. Let me explain.

A useful way to think about the nature of the substance associated with the super-addressee is to consider the effect of a deliberate inversion in the expected agreement of the super-addressee. This is the case with satire and parody. The double meaning associated with these distinctively critical genres derives from the transfer of "narrative integrity", for want of a better term, from the addresser-addressee nexus to the super-addressse, reflecting a responsive understanding to the context of situation in its specific context of culture.

Rather than reinforcing an existing set of relations, satire subverts and transgresses through a deliberate inversion in the relative position of the super-addressse. This is the case with satire and parody. The double meaning associated with these distinctively critical genres derives from the transfer of "narrative integrity", for want of a better term, from the addresser-addressse nexus to the super-addressse, reflecting a responsive understanding to the context of situation in its specific context of culture.
participant, responding to satire inevitably requires access to a considerable amount of what Fairclough, following Bourdieu, calls "cultural capital" (126). Without access to the relevant cultural beliefs and expectations - and these may be specific to particular cultural groupings within society - the satiric effect will be lost and the dialogic event will appear to be transparent. The super-addressee is therefore more than a simple dialogic relation - it is a complex system of relations involving a membership and a belonging to particular social and cultural milieux. The substance associated with the super-addressee is this feeling of obligation towards and respect for the culture. In other words, culture as a whole, as realised through the genres, impacts on the participants involved in such a way as to ensure the preservation of the culture (system) as a whole. Were this not the case, the outcome for semiosis would be radically unpredictable - as is the case with cross-cultural exchanges where one or all participants deny or fail to recognise what is common to each. Genre is this relation involving an empirical-semiotic substance which impacts simultaneously on the notional participants associated with the dialogic event.

As a phenomenon of an empirical-semiotic nature, genre exceeds the individual experience of the notional participants (addresser-addressee). The genres are manifestations of regular expectations and patterns of behaviour associated with specific dialogic contexts. For the artist of language the genres comprise ordered-probability event-structures, or what Bakhtin calls "templates":

Genres (of literature and speech) throughout the centuries of their life accumulate forms of seeing and interpreting particular aspects of the world. For the writer-craftsman the genre serves as an external template, but the great artist awakens the semantic possibilities that lie within it (1986, 5).

The important point here is that genre functions as an environmental attribute associated with the context of culture. Genre as such pre-exists the specific forms of expression through which it is ultimately realised. Paradoxically, however, as Threadgold has observed, the only access we have to the genres is through the semiotic artefacts that remain once they have been realised. The problem for researchers is therefore similar to the one faced by the artist-writer in producing great work - working with what is given (enarges) and reproducible in order to infer something about what is not given (adélon) and, to this extent, unique. The distinction here is similar to the one Benjamin observed (see Part 1 above) as obtaining between the newsreel image and the "unarmed" eye:

Unmistakably, reproduction as offered by picture magazines and newsreels differs from the image seen by the unarmed eye. Uniqueness and permanence are as closely linked in the latter as are transitoriness and reproducibility in the former.

It is important not to overstate the distinction Benjamin draws between mediated and unmediated forms of communication since it is possible for images from a newsreel to create impressions that are unique and permanent. Benjamin seems to be particularly concerned with the potentially homogenising impact of the tele-visual medium but, in structural semiotic terms, there is little difference between a newsreel and a newspaper. Both are perceived with the naked eye and both may convey a similar content. It seems to me that Benjamin's real concern is not with the medium itself but with how perception is accomplished and affected through the media of mass reproduction. The outcome for Benjamin is a decay in the aura of perception i.e. a truncation of perceptual (empirical) experience:
The manner in which human sense perception is organised, the medium in which it is accomplished is determined not only by nature but by historical circumstance... if changes in the medium of contemporary perception can be comprehended as a decay of the aura, it is possible to show its social causes.

This returns us to the problematic of the super-addressee and the super-ordinate structure of dialogue. What Benjamin draws our attention to, albeit somewhat unintentionally, is the connection between empirical experience and the genres. The nature of the connection pertains to the super-addressee and the experience of belonging to specific social and cultural milieux. In the case of projected news stories, the super-addressee could be crudely described as an amalgam of journalistic and editorial bias, engendering a responsive understanding consistent with the desires of parties largely absent from the text itself. In the absence of these parties, the text appears transparent and, to this extent, unmediated.

It is as much the task of the researcher as it is the task of the artist and the critic to bring to the fore those elements in the genres which would otherwise remain hidden. A similar thinking underlies the approach followed by Fairclough and the CLS school. Indeed the model of culture, dialogue and genre outlined in this dissertation should be amenable with the sort of work being undertaken by Fairclough and others. In this respect the distinctive features of the cross-cultural model are twofold:

- an emphasis on the category of genre as an organising principle which is associated with the super-ordinate structure of dialogue and realised through differing sign-types associated with the planes of content and expression (the primary and secondary genres);

- an emphasis on the different connections associated with the planes of expression and content and, because of this, the inclusion of an aesthetic potential based on an empirical (emotional) substance called pathos.

In essence, the cross-cultural model is a description of the connection between empirical experience, the genres and "truth" or, at least, authenticity. Empirical experience is built upon the genres of culture and being. The genres are given (enarges) or, at least, expected (prosomenon) and provide the basis for truth and true belief (doxa) in culture. The connection with truth exists on the planes of content and expression. In the case of satire, the semantic burden is carried on the plane of expression and this will be reflected in the sort of truth ascribed to the exchange-event as a whole. By contrast, the burden of the semantics may be carried on the plane of content. Alternatively, it may be unmarked with respect to content and expression or be shared equally between the two planes.

Based on the number of possible permutations in the relation between the planes of content and expression - what Hjelmslev called the "heteroplane" function - it is possible to count four major genre types. I will gloss these as "satiric", "diatribe", "news" and "poetic".

In the satiric genres, the "semantics" derives substantially from the plane of expression. The content of the individual episodes of dialogue is made to perform in the service of the super-ordinate effect of satire. The effect is also a poetic one, to the extent

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15 Semantics here is intended to encompass both the planes of content and expression. In this respect, what I have called the "cross-cultural model" is also a generalised theory of semantics and semiosis.
that the emphasis is on the "form of expression" and its related "substance". Here I would also include the subversive poetry of the Russian Futurists and modernist French writers such as Mallarmé and Lautréamont whose work tends towards un-textuality, exposing the textual substance as a wound would bone and gristle. Here freedom of expression reaches its non-sensical limits.

The genres which emphasise "content" tend to diatribe and monologue: speaking but not listening, as it were. In these genres, the expressive potential for dialogue is made to perform in the service of a super-ordinate monologic/monocultural system of relations. Here I would include the fundamentalist religious, philosophical and scientific genres as well as the unilinealism associated with the barbaric (cf.barbaros) cross-cultural genres (the discourses of apartheid, racism, eugenics etc). These are also the genres of cultural Law-making practices, since the pronouncements they stand for are, culturally, absolute.

There are also genres which present themselves as given (enarges) since they stand for actuality, factuality, reality, the weather, the trees in the forest etc. These genres stand "independently" and form part of what we call "news". The characteristic feature of the news-genres is the tendency to appear value-free and neutral with respect to culture-specific bias and interpretation. Of course the newsreels, newspapers and electronic news media are scarcely value-free interpretations of the events they report. At one extreme they may tend to diatribe (in those countries where limitations are placed on freedom of expression and content), at the other they may tend to dialogues of irrelevancy and fear-mongering (in those countries where economic imperatives dictate news content and expression). The present dissertation belongs primarily to the category of "news" genre, as does all scientific (empirically-based) research. The critical issue associated with news-genres is the empirical bias/prejudice towards conservative social, political, scientific and philosophical institutions and belief systems. Where these genres present themselves as value-free, "objective" and, to this extent, self-evident, it is the task of the researcher/ satirist/ critic to expose the bias. Julia Kristeva was acutely aware of the sort of auto-critical thinking required to acknowledge and, so avoid, the problems of bias and omission. But just because all semiosis is value laden does not imply that it is not possible to render an account which has (empirical) scientific value. It is the task of semiotics to provide an account of both "value" and "meaning".

Finally there are the genres which involve a sort of "inner dialogue" between the planes of content and expression, both planes sharing the burden of the "semantics" more or less equally. These genres are by far the most widespread since they are unmarked with respect to the semantics and so given to dialogue as much as poetry, to intimate conversation as much as the novel. Here nothing is made to perform in the service of anything. Meaning is constantly being negotiated and re-negotiated according to both "what" is said and "how" it is said. In my view, this latter distinction constitutes the most fundamental insight associated with the pragmatics of genre analysis. The distinction between the "what" and "how" of meaning is the most direct manifestation of the heteroplane function which Hjelmslev believed to be the key function on which all linguistic analysis is based.

The four major genre-types derived from the cross-cultural model (and future research may reveal more) reflect differing permutations in the heteroplane function and provide a basis, Bakhtin might say a "template", for the analysis of semiotic practice in general. It would be difficult, if not impractical, to expect any one instance of dialogue to conform with only one genre-type. All acts of dialogue typically involve some, or
possibly all genre-types, but the coherence of the dialogue, as a whole, will depend on its association with one or other genre-types at any particular point in the text.

Further research into each of the major genre types is required in order to appreciate the inner dynamics and semiotic mechanisms associated with the homoplane function which I have described in terms of primary and secondary genres. In each case the essential component of the analysis will be taken up by a consideration of the way in which the "what" and "how" of semiosis interact and combine to produce the effect of the particular genre-type. Incorporating the context of culture as a variable endogenous to the analysis/model enables a description of semiosis based on genre-type and sign-type. The nature of the medium remains peripheral to the pragmatics of genre analysis. In this respect, Benjamin's "aura" is a metaphor for the gamut of perceptual and emotional experience, associated with life in the natural world (the "natural ones"), away from books, radio, television, multi-media and, of course, cyberspace. These media tend to truncate empirical experience through an impoverishment of the senses not required for their apprehension. Although Benjamin's metaphor is appropriate, the category of tactile metaphor strikes me as being more suggestive of the empirical foundations of semiosis.

The potential for meaning to make a permanent impact on experience, in any particular case, is not something that can be predicted with certainty. However, given the remnants of semiotic process and some information about the compositional structure of the dialogic-event in its contexts of culture and situation, it may be possible to infer a great deal, indeed, not only about "what" is being communicated and "how" it is being accomplished - very important issues on their own - but also about why meaning is made in the way that it is and, finally, whether it succeeds and, if so, how much so. Shakespeare, for instance. And the critical question of "greatness..."
Democracy and the Ending of History

In the final section I will try to pinpoint some of the important findings generated in the previous macro-metaphorical model, in addition to the broad agenda in that section I also strive to identify a beginning point in the sequence at the project concerning time and space. This data is also tied to the beginning of the world.

Conclusions

I want to begin by briefly taking up the global dimensions of the above outlined model.

Skepticism is a line held by the methodology in the human sciences, and also as cognition in the human sciences is a fundamental difference to note. It is one empirical measure in the process of explaining which distinctions related to the humanism held toward it by empirical scientists.

The most general question here is a fundamental condition of everyday life. This implies that there is no common experience equally the same. Any manner of social being is a condition in which a person’s condition is both by itself and in its entire situation. This condition is one where human beings understand the world and are equal, and upholding, each other.

There is nothing new that could be said, as this view is drawn from the work of Thomas Galbraith, and the book, development, after a few years the subject of my study at the time. The book has been described in the context of the problems of the human sciences and the rhetoric of the humanities. It is not that no new perspective is based on a deconstruction of the institution, establishing a new position in the development of the human sciences, research, and education in the humanities, but it is not the subject of the book, which is the subject of the book. There are many ways to understand this perspective. It is a way that is used to understand the perspective.

As a question of social theory, how the world, which is conditioned by the book is the character of human sciences and research, and education in the humanities. The book is an attempt to understand this perspective, and also to understand the human sciences. There are an attempt to understand the human sciences. This perspective is also a way that is used to understand the human sciences.

The necessary condition is that it is a condition of everyday life. This implication is that there is no common experience equally the same. Any manner of social being is a condition in which a person’s condition is both by itself and in its entire situation. This condition is one where human beings understand the world and are equal, and upholding, each other.

The root of the human sciences is that it is a condition of everyday life. This implies that there is no common experience equally the same. Any manner of social being is a condition in which a person’s condition is both by itself and in its entire situation. This condition is one where human beings understand the world and are equal, and upholding, each other.
Part 5

Demonstration and Concluding Remarks

In this final section I want to put into play some of the insights and suggestions contained in the preceding pages and allow the model to develop for itself, so to speak.

In this respect I have come to the end of a beginning but, in the context of the present research, time and space dictate that what follows must be the beginning of an end.

Greatness

I want to begin by briefly outlining the critical dimensions of the cross-cultural model.

Bakhtin, in a late essay on methodology in the human sciences, noted that cognition in the human sciences is a fundamentally dialogic process and it is this empirical reaction to the 'object' of inquiry which distinguishes research in the humanities from research in the physical sciences:

The exact sciences constitute a monologic form of knowledge: the intellect contemplates a thing and expands upon it. There is only one subject here - cognising (contemplating) and speaking (expanding). Any object of knowledge (including man) can be perceived and cognised as a thing. But a subject as such cannot be perceived and studied as a thing, for as a subject it cannot, while remaining a subject, become voiceless, and consequently, cognition of it can only be dialogic (1986, 161).

There is nothing new here. Indeed a similar observation, drawn from the work of Lucien Goldmann, was made at the outset where it was noted the object of study is really a subject of study partially identifiable with the subject undertaking the study. The subject/object dichotomy is therefore highly problematic in the human sciences. Much of Bakhtin's dialogism, it seems to me, is based on a deconstruction of the opposition, establishing a re-orientation toward the dynamic nature of the processes underlying research, cognition and discourse in the humanities. But it is not the subject/object opposition that is relevant here. Rather the implications of accepting dialogue as the basis of human apprehension and understanding. In this regard one of the central theses put forward in this dissertation has been that perception is the most fundamental form of dialogue. As a faculty common to all sentient creatures, it is not perception as aisthésis which drives the cross-cultural model, but the character of perception as pathos - the evaluative/emotional/aesthetic potential invested in human experience. At the heart of the model lies the "pleasure principle" and the desire to live "happily" ever after, happiness being defined as an empirical "value" - a katastematic pleasure of stability denoting freedom from fear and disturbance (ataraxia). Here also lies the potential for a "mutual understanding" or empathy, which crosses cultures in a way that grammar and language, on their own, cannot.

The cross-cultural context of situation is characterised by the inherent unpredictability of the exchange-event. In the cross-cultural space, genre as such breaks down and is replaced by a context of situation which not only transcends specific cultural experiences but also the "content" of those experiences. What remains is gesture and expression, contact and empathy and the potential for a mutual understanding. Here also lies a set of "phenomenal" (empirical) values, for want of a better description, the significance of which comes out through Bakhtin's description of "great" time:
The mutual understanding of centuries and millennia, of peoples, nations and cultures, provides a complex unity of all humanity, all human cultures (a complex unity of human culture) and a complex unity of human literature. All this is revealed only on the level of great time (167).

The critical and evaluative dimension for the researcher, as for the artist, lies on the scale of "great time". For instance "a long time ago, in a galaxy far, far away..." - the prologue to the cinematic *Star Wars* trilogy - lies on the scale of great time. The "forces" associated with the constitution of the *Star Wars* texts are put into play in a way that, as Jameson puts it, "escapes the taint of some mere application of terms drawn from individual experience" (1981, 294). Violence, sex, death, pleasure and pain all exist on the level of great time and all are "primary" genres of being. The ineffable environmental conditions which background the production of cultural meaning is textured by such primary genres. Bakhtin describes this environment as a "dialogising background":

The extratextual intonational-evaluative context can only be partially realised in the reading (performance) of a given text, and the largest part of it, especially in its more essential and profound strata, remains outside the text as the dialogising background for its perception (166).

In order to locate the essential and profound strata of a work's interpretation it is necessary to look beyond the individual work/text, toward another level of interpretation - the dialogising background. The cross-cultural model renders this context partly in terms of an aesthetic potential which imparts to the work a resonance that a strictly semantic analysis of meaning is incapable of yielding. I have also briefly commented on the implications for genre analysis of the closely related concept of "super-addressee". Here I am interested in the phenomenon of "greatness" as it is manifested on the level of culture and, more importantly, the potential for its transmission across cultures. For Bakhtin, the essential component of "creative understanding" ie. the appreciation and evaluation of greatness, is not access to any specific socio-cultural interiority, although this is a necessary condition, but a cultural "outsidedness" in order to apprehend the phenomenon as a whole:

In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding - in time, in space, in culture....

In the realm of culture, outsidedness is a most powerful factor in understanding. It is only in the eyes of another culture that foreign culture reveals itself fully and profoundly ... they engage in a kind of dialogue, which surmounts the closedness and one-sidedness of these particular meanings, these cultures .... Such a dialogic encounter of two cultures does not result in merging or mixing. Each retains its own unity and open totality, but they are mutually enriched (1986, 7). 

**Poetry and Dialogue**

The history of dialogue between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australian cultures could scarcely be described as one which has been mutually enriching. The experience of outsidedness is a negative one when it is not balanced by an appreciation of what goes on within the culture. Here foreignness turns from opportunity to otherness and where this is reciprocated the only outcome is war (mutual "antipathy"). Indeed such has been the history of contact between the world's indigenous and non-indigenous cultures. Happily war must give way to peace, even if the peace is a genocidal one. In
Australia genocide did occur and an effective, though not entirely official, system of apartheid existed between the indigenous and non-indigenous populations up until the civil rights movements of the 1960's. One particularly inhuman aspect of the system was the removal of Aboriginal children from their families and their placement in institutions such as Cootamundra Girls Home and Kinchelas Boys Home in NSW, where they were "de-Aboriginalised". The outsider can only imagine the impact of such experiences on Aboriginal perceptions of the non-indigenous culture. Nevertheless the story of indigenous Australia is one of extraordinary continuity and survival. It might be expected that the sort of Aboriginal poetry to emerge from such a traumatic cross-cultural experience would be highly politicised and subversive of the invading culture. The following poem by Australian poet, Oodgeroo Noonuccal, who, incidentally, was accused of communist subversion in the paranoid decades of the nineteen fifties and sixties, is an instance of greatness, in the empirical sense, in so far as it transcends the problematic of cross-cultural conflict and speaks on a level that can survive in "great time" ie. for all time. Indeed, the dedication of the collection from which the text is drawn speaks to a common humanity and stands on common ground which crosses all cultures. The system of cross-cultural relations which comprise the "dialogising background" to Oodgeroo's poetry involve fundamental conflict on a number of levels. Against this background, Oodgeroo's writing emerges as a form of "social action", to use Threadgold's expression, functioning as a paradigm of resolution and hope - appealing to the empathy of a common humanity. The "Dedication" to the collection is evidence of this:

Dedicated with pride,

To all members of the Federal Council of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Advancement, whose motto is:

'All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights ... and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.'

(Article I. Declaration of Human Rights)

A poem to her son, Denis, this text first appeared in a collection entitled We are Going, published during the early 1960's.

Son of Mine
(To Denis)

My son, your troubled eyes search mine,
Puzzled and hurt by colour line.
Your black skin soft as velvet shine;
What can I tell you, son of mine?

I could tell you of heartbreak, hatred blind,
I could tell of crimes that shame mankind,
Of brutal wrongs and deeds malign,

1 The process of "de-Aboriginalisation" belongs to the ugliest tradition of unilinealist social policy. The official euphemisms for this process have historically included "Protection" and "Assimilation".
Of rape and murder, son of mine;

But I'll tell instead of brave and fine
When lives of black and white entwine,
And men in brotherhood combine -
This would I tell you, son of mine.²

The poem itself is a manifestation of the pleasure principle - the desire to be free from pain, fear and anxiety. This desire represents a fundamental empirical condition and need. To satisfy it requires peace, stability and comfort.

The outstanding features in the expressive form of the poem (taking these terms in their Hjelmslevian sense) are highly stable patterns in rhythm and tonicity. Here the substance of the expressive form, its pathos, comprises the experience of patterns of regularity. This regularity is itself a freedom from disturbance and so represents a symbolic expression of the empirical condition of ataraxia. Against this background, the formal content of the poem resonates and clashes in a way that represents the cross-cultural conflict germane to the collection as a whole.

The primary genres associated with the expressive form of Oodgeroo's poem are those of peace and stability. The secondary genres associated with its formal content are those involving a mother's concern for her child, a woman's concern for her culture and a human being's concern for humanity - "when ... men in brotherhood combine ..."

The substance of the content - the "culture" of the poem - is the paper or surface on which the signs are inscribed since, whatever surface the poem is rendered on, its being read/rendered/represented is enough to ensure a continuation of the social action which Oodgeroo undertook when she published her work, for her people and her culture and for what is still known in the indigenous vernacular today as the struggle.

Diatribe and Law

In contrast to and, to some extent, in conflict with the sort of poetic dialogue which characterises the text from We Are Going, the following text from the Australian Constitution reflects an intrinsic bias towards the plane of content, relying heavily on intricate lexico-grammatical structures designed to remove the sort of ambivalence and dialogism characteristic of the satiric and poetic/everyday genre-types.

The particular excerpt is a sub-section containing an amendment to The Constitution, passed in 1967, by a majority of voters in a majority of states, altering "Part V.- Powers of the Parliament" with respect to indigenous people (S.51 (xxvi)).³ A single line passed through a portion of the sub-section effected the amendment, altering the course of the official history of cross-cultural relations in Australia. The relevant preamble and sub-section run as follows:

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² Kath Walker, We Are Going (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1964). The collection is published under the author's former name.

PART V.- POWERS OF THE PARLIAMENT

51. The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:-

(xxvii) The people of any race, other than the aboriginal race in any State, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws.

There is more than a passing connection between the passage of the 1967 amendment and the poetry of Oodgeroo Noonuccal. Oodgeroo's poetry was part of a broader agenda for social action in the Australian nineteen-sixties which united the indigenous and non-indigenous populations in opposition to the official discrimination of Aboriginal people encoded in The Constitution. There is no ambiguity associated with placing the "offending" words of S.51(xxvi) sous rature. The general process being undertaken here is a censoring of official discrimination against Aboriginal people. The way in which such discrimination is encoded through the text, and the way in which such discrimination is encoded in the cross-cultural context, are parallel instances of essentially the same process - specifying identity on the basis of (racial) exclusion. Drawing together the text and cross-cultural context and making them cohere, in the Hallideyan sense of the term, is a simple process of "subtractive extension" - removing part of a whole in order to specify the meaning of the whole (Halliday 1985c, 207).

To begin with, the material process which informs the semantic core of the exchange-event is law-making - the process whereby culture regulates itself. The key participant in the process, fulfilling the semantic function of Actor, is "The Parliament". The beneficiary of the process, fulfilling the participant function of Client is "The people of any race". The Parliament makes laws for "the people of any race", "other than" in this context functions as a hypotactic relation of subtractive extension - extending the meaning of a whole by specifying the removal of some of its parts. It also contributes to the texture of the exchange-event and forms part of the exophoric referential structure by referring to groups within Australia society with corresponding nominal groupings in the text. The semantic process of subtractive extension, in its context here, mirrors the cross-cultural process of racial discrimination: excluding one particular group in order to preserve and maintain the identity of the whole.

Placing the conjunctive expression under erasure not only negates the semantic content of the expression, it leaves a semantic "hole" which effectively renders the whole [of S.51(xxvi)] semantically empty. In terms of the content, a valid and equivalent alternative to erasure would be the substitution of "other than" for a circumstantial process of accompaniment such as "including". While the semantic effect of such a substitution is neutral, the aesthetic impact is substantial i.e altering the semantics but not the semantic content. The impact manifests itself through the plane of expression. The erasure-line disrupts the composition of the text as a whole, not only negating the semantic content of that part of the text, but effectively deconstructing the textuality and

4 Halliday glosses the logical meaning as "X but not all X".

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coherence of the text as expression. This creates the appearance of aberration and error, of something being corrected or, at least, concealed. The substance of the expression, associated with the Tenor of the cross-cultural relations, is affected in a more subtle but most profound way. Let me explain.

The text is thematically organised about the powers of the Australian Parliament but cohesively tied to the specific experience of Aboriginal peoples. The original and amended forms of expression both relate to the pronunciation of an absolute truth, a diatribe: to exclude or not to exclude. The substance of each derives from a desire for peace, order and the good, but in its original form, this desire specifically excluded people of Aboriginal descent and S.51(xxvi) is an expression of the content of this desire. In terms of its content as social action, S.51(xxvi) was discriminatory in the most basic sense of the word. Substituting "including" for "other than" would be equally discriminating. By contrast, placing the hypotactic/discriminatory expression under erasure, while also rendering the sub-section semantically empty, nevertheless admits a reversal in the Tenor of the exchange-event - away from a barbaric view of Aboriginality, toward the censoring of official discrimination. A line through eight words in S.51(xxvi) is a manifestation of this change, leaving in its wake a semantically empty appendage to The Constitution, part of the historical expression of an evolving cross-cultural relationship. If The Constitution were to be re-drafted in any future move towards an Australian Republic, I believe S.51(xxvi) should be retained as a symbol of Aboriginal struggle and survival, against a system which explicitly sanctioned the official discrimination and exclusion of Aboriginal people from the ambit of Federal processes and responsibilities.

News and Freedom of Expression

Whereas diatribe and the legal genres reflect an overriding concern for content, at the expense of expressive form, the news-genres are characterised by an apparent absence of bias toward either content or expression. The news genres comprise reports of what is given (enargēs) or expected (prosmenon). The underlying feature here is one of neutrality when compared with the explicitly politicised genre-types such as diatribe, satire and dialogue. The appearance of "value-free", "objective" and "unbiased" reporting is characteristic of news-genres. However, given the empirical bias towards the maintenance of existing patterns of stability (the genres) it would be quite fraudulent to make any claims of objectivity or unbiasedness, especially for journalists and researchers in the human sciences. The task of the journalist/researcher/reporter is to engage in a dialogue with the relevant eyewitnesses/writers/participants, to acknowledge the absence of information (evidence - enargeia) due to time and other constraints, and finally, to disclose prior interests, values and expectations where these conflict with subject-matter at hand. It may be the case that none of these conditions is met, as in the case of plagiarism and self-promotion. I firmly believe that one of the most important tasks confronting the academic and researcher in the humanities lies in exposing the lies of those news-genres which pretend to be objective.

For the purpose of illustrating the news-genre, without the added complications of specious objectivity, I will draw on an official report (called, somewhat anachronistically, a "Royal Commission") prepared by the Federal Government of Australia in response to the disproportionate number of deaths of Aboriginal people in custody. The particular text is "Recommendation 86", drawn from volume 1 of the report, Aboriginal Deaths in Custody: Response by Governments to the Royal
The recommendation belongs to a group of ten recommendations (out of three hundred and thirty-nine) which relate to diversion from police custody:

These recommendations and responses look at ways to ensure that fewer Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are arrested and placed in police lock-ups (iv).

Specifically the Commissioner recommends:

86 a. the use of offensive language in circumstances of interventions initiated by police should not normally be occasion for arrest or charge; and

b. Police services should examine and monitor the use of offensive language (302-305).

For the purpose of the present investigation I will take as "given" (enarges) the evidence (expression and content) of the text and assume that there are no hidden meanings or underlying flaws (biases) associated with the preparation of the text. A case could be made against these assumptions, on the basis of the cross-cultural prejudice which led to the institution of the Royal Commission's inquiry. However, assuming the text is transparent and, to this extent, truthful, then not only is it possible to believe in the text, it is also possible to evaluate it critically as news. The question is therefore not whether the text is true but whether, as "news", it is possible to infer something further about the belief (doxa) it expresses. News in this context may be described as empirical evidence presented in support of a belief or opinion concerning the truth of a particular phenomenon.

The "particular phenomenon" which forms the core of "Recommendation 86" has less to do with relations between police and people of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander descent, than with the nature of language and cross-cultural perceptions of language. Indeed "offensive" language is almost unique as a semiotic phenomenon in exposing the boundaries between what Bakhtin would call the "official" and "unofficial" levels of consciousness. In a healthy society and culture, Bakhtin asserts, there will be no discrepancy between these two level of consciousness. The use of offensive language creates such a discrepancy since, by definition, it is language which is not acceptable for official use: a part of language which is not "officially" part of language. The proposition that offensive language is non-language, while perhaps consistent with intellectually and politically conservative belief-systems, is, nevertheless, empirically unacceptable.

"Recommendation 86" calls into question the discrepancy between official and unofficial (colloquial) levels of language use. The text, in isolation, is a diatribe aimed at police, instructing them not to arrest solely on the basis offensive language. In its broader context, as part of a Royal Commission, the text is news not only for police but for (Australian) society as a whole, in relation to the phenomenon of offensive language. I briefly want to investigate further the phenomenon of offensive language, in a cross-cultural context of situation through Archie Weller's Day of the Dog. First, however, I would like to draw a distinction, which I believe is important and useful, between "freedom of expression" and "freedom of content".

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The general idea here is the popular democratic ideal of "freedom of speech". Of course, the official censoring of offensive language contradicts "freedom of speech". So what do we mean when we talk about "freedom of speech"? Is it "freedom of expression" or "freedom of content" or both? An investigation into the nature of "swearing" will help answer these questions.

The central feature of offensive language is its absence of semantic content (although it is still part of the semantics). Where present, the offending lexical items function as expressive forms realising an aesthetic potential and contributing to the stabilising-grammar of the "text" or exchange-event as a whole. The act of swearing involves the selection of lexical groups which, while semantically empty (except, perhaps, for residual associations with bodily functions, parts and so on) nevertheless provide a lexical "space" for the expression of an unmediated aesthetic response - something like "pure" emotion or pathos. For instance, consider the way fear and panic are expressed by the character of Silver in Day of the Dog, when an armed robbery goes horribly wrong:

Fuckin' get out of here! Christ! Someone help! Fuckin' Christ.

And the way in which feelings of freedom and happiness are expressed by Doug Dooligan, following his release from prison:

Hey, y'know wha'? Guess wha'? Willice an' Jerry? I'm free. Free as a fuckin' bird!

And the violent anger Silver expresses towards Doug following the bungled robbery, which claimed the life of their mutual friend, Pretty Boy Floyd:

You little jerk! You killed Pretty Boy, you bastard. I'll fucking blow your fucking kidney's out, you cunt!

I would suggest that what offends in offensive language is not the words themselves, nor necessarily the base connotations they may possess, but the unmediated - direct - nature of the aesthetic potential so instantiated. In many cases, the use of so-called "offensive" language facilitates the expression of "raw" emotional states such as fear and happiness. The direct nature of this form of communication, impacting as it does in a way that invokes an emotional responsive understanding, places it in the domain of private (though not necessarily "unofficial") discourse and quasi-intimate speech.

The official censoring of offensive language seems to be based on a fear of unregulated emotion/disturbance (pathos) and, conversely, a desire to maintain the official sphere of consciousness free from such disturbance (pathos). Priority is accorded to public order and stability over the disturbance of pathos, as expressed through particular words which are perceived to interrupt / transgress / disturb the existing order.

Once again, it is not the words themselves that offend but the aesthetic potential they realise. In the public domain, the use of offensive language is typically interpreted as a mark of disrespect for the system of values and relations regulating society and culture as a whole. However, this system of values and relations has historically discriminated against indigenous people and officially sanctioned their exclusion from the Federal public domain (up until 1967). The resulting Tenor in the cross-cultural relationship could be characterised by a mutual disrespect. Combine a mutual disrespect with a natural language well equipped for the expression of such disrespect, and a law
outlawing the use of such expressive potential, and the result is the sort of situation that produced the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. The incarceration of any person, not for “what” they said but “how” they said it, is, in my view, a crime. That people have died not because of “what” they said, but “how” they said it, is, moreover, a crime against humanity.

Freedom of speech is therefore, at least, a freedom of expression. Expression here may be defined as the instantiation of an aesthetic potential associated with stabilising-grammar or compositional structure of the exchange-event as a whole. Freedom of content remains impractical since all cultures practice some form of semiotic taboo and secrecy requirements. But if the content of the message is “I’m free, free as a bird”, the presence of offensive words will not alter this. So if the content of the text is socially acceptable, then no matter “how” this content is expressed, the text as a whole must remain acceptable.

For the researcher and critic (and social scientist), freedom of expression must be interpreted as freedom of emotional (aesthetic) expression. It is the freedom to express one’s feelings for or against a particular phenomenon. The nature of the phenomenon, in its context of situation and culture, will determine the content of the expression. Similarly, the nature of the individual and the tenor of participant relations will determine the expression of the content. For a given (acceptable) content, there can be no empirical justification for the constraint (censorship) of its expression. The exceptions to this general rule are those cases where the means of expression cause unnecessary pain or disturbance, and those cases where there is a desire to restrict (censor) the potential range of expressive and aesthetic experience. Restricting and censoring particular forms of expression implies a desire to change or correct an existing or potential emotional state. This is more the territory of the psychologist and the Law and takes us to the limits of the analysis here.

Freedom of expression is difficult to achieve and maintain especially if the expressive voice is officially excluded from the system as a whole. Freedom of content is virtually impossible to achieve and I doubt that it is even desirable. The phenomenon of offensive language is an interesting one in terms of the way it exposes the boundaries between the planes of expression and content, producing a dualistic/dialectical model of human consciousness in which empirical values are officially censored. More interesting, however, is the range of empirical values (emotions - pathē) that can be realised. Given that the emotions are intrinsically truthful, since, as Epicurus says, all perceptions are true, the ultimate irony of “Recommendation 86” is that it directs police not to arrest indigenous people for speaking the truth. The perversity of the logic sustaining such arbitrary persecution defies all reasonable measures and empirical standards. It is the logic of a unilinear “Western” culture-specific history, one which has only recently begun to be relativised and decentred by the diversity and plurality of other cultures and histories.

In my opinion, the real news to emerge from Recommendation 86 is the right of every individual, black or white, to freedom of expression. The corollary to the “real” news is a relative absence of such freedom in the late twentieth century, where the lives of a few groups seem to determine the experiences of many. The phenomenon as a whole will provide a fertile domain for future research.

Big Bill Neidjie, of the Gagudju, was aware of the mutual disrespect (antipathy) between black and white and the associated systemic bias against Aboriginal people. His “recommendation” is reminiscent of a certain oracle at Delphi, which has, ironically, but not surprisingly, been the inspiration for so much of Western culture:
White European can't say 'Oh, that Aborigine no good.'
Might be that Aborigine alright.
Man can't growl at Aborigine,
Aborigine can't growl at European...
Because both ways.
Might be both good men,
might be both no good...
you never know.

So you should get understand yourself.
No matter Aborigine or white European (38).

Satire, Identity and Respect

Whereas the news-type genres are probably the most interesting and critically challenging, and the poetic genres are undoubtedly the most diverse and widespread, the satiric genres are by far the most crucial to the internal dynamics of the cross-cultural model as a whole.

In his essay "Discourse in the Novel", Bakhtin demonstrates a profound understanding of the role parodic genres have played in the evolution of novelistic discourse. I will come back to a portion of Bakhtin's arguments shortly. The reason for the manifest importance of satiric genre-types is the requirement for semiotic "material" drawn from other genre-types such as diatribe, news and poetry. To put this another way, all four genre-types (and future research may reveal more) are necessary, but only the satiric-type is sufficient for conditioning cultural expectations; satire pre-supposes some, or all the other genre-types. In this respect, satire represents a dialogue between genres.

I have already described the satiric effect in terms of the relation between the addresser-addressee nexus and the super-addressee. The triadic structure of dialogue reveals something about the global composition of the semiotic event. The super-addressee, however, is an invisible relation or, as Halliday and others would say, "ineffable". In terms of the heteroplane function, the satiric effect has been described as a "shift" in the semantics from the content plane to the expression plane. The result is an effect which is primarily aesthetic and secondarily semantic. I should emphasise here that the satiric effect does not imply a comedic one. This is certainly one possible outcome, and often desirable, but the underlying attribute here is not necessarily the effect of laughter or even humour. Rather, the effect is an attribute associated with the expressive (aesthetic) potential of the entire exchange-event: the semantic content of each "part" altered according to the aesthetic orientation of the "whole".

In satire, the individual parts comprise genres from other genre-types and the global (formal) effect is one of estrangement (ostraneniye), revealing boundaries and exposing taboos. The effect is a deconstructive one and, to this extent, auto-critical. The important attribute, however, is the demonstration of an alternative set of values to those conveyed in the underlying genre-types. Such a description takes us well beyond the normative concept of satire into such genres as science fiction and formalist poetry. In these genres, the effect of estrangement remains, as do the underlying genre-types of dialogue and poetry, but the semantics is determined by a value system which is implicated on the plane of expression. In the case of the science fiction, the underlying genres are expressed against the (dialogising) background of alien creatures, alien worlds and alien space - "the final frontier". In the case of what I've called "formalist" poetry
which would include the "futurist" poetry of Khlebnikov), the underlying genre is obviously poetry. The alternative system of values is conveyed through the substance of the expressive form, creating a disturbance in the aesthetic of the text, rendering non-meanings and, often, seemingly chaotic sequences of inscriptions. Once again, the effect is a deconstructive one but here the limits of deconstruction lie with the limits of semantics. Outside meaning (Derrida may disagree) there is rest (ataraxia).

The text I have chosen to demonstrate the breadth of the satiric genre-type is an artefact recovered from a welfare office (of the Department of Social Security - hereafter DSS) in Sydney. Before broaching the analysis of this text, I want to examine the way in which Bakhtin's analysis of the "two stylistic lines" in the development of the European novel reflects the differing permutations in the heteroplane function and the associated major genre-types derived from the cross-cultural model.

Bakhtin attaches tremendous importance to the impact of parodic stylisation on the evolution of "literary" conventions. Indeed the problematic of "literariness" (literaturnost) depends on a variety of genre-specific conventions - the etiquette and protocols associated with the judicial, rhetorical, hagiographic and, especially, the dogmatic religious genres. This grouping broadly corresponds to the diatribe and news-type genres. These genres tend to be content-oriented and operate on the level of what Bakhtin calls "official" consciousness. They also belong to what he calls the "first stylistic line" in the development of the novel. The "second stylistic line" is characterised by the parodic stylisation of these first-line genres. The two lines represent tendencies rather than simple categories. However, given the breadth of the categories associated with the four cross-cultural genre-types, I do not believe it would be a misrepresentation of Bakhtin's position to describe the first-line as a phenomenon of resistance to expressive plurality and aesthetic diversity. I will come back to the second line below.

Bakhtin traces the first line back to classical antiquity and the discourse of the Sophists. The polished rhetoric of the ancient orators underlies one of the most fundamental attributes of the first line: literariness in language. Such highly stylised language remains impervious to the heteroglossia of the manifold social dialects and languages which exist, in a sense, "below" or, at least, "outside" the official genres of expression. For Bakhtin, a necessary condition for the first line is the social stratification of language. The underlying value-system here is associated with a certain superior or ennobled "attitude", what Bakhtin calls "a pose of respectability" towards those aspects of the world which are perceived to fall outside the canons of respectable/acceptable speech and behaviour. Such a system of values reflects a desire for authenticity and a rigid adherence to particular patterns of behaviour and systems of expectation. The outcome is the emergence of an official authentic figure consistent in both thought and action, the sort of rational and ethical consistency the Stoics called homologia. The authentic first line figure represents an official "heroic" world-view. By contrast, authentic second-line figures - such as the fool, the clown and the rogue - represent unofficial and transgressive world-views. First line genres, such as the diatribe and news-types, tend to reinforce existing semiotic and semantic boundaries, excluding inconsistencies or removing them through assimilation, where necessary. What this

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6 Much of the following discussion is based on Bakhtin's essay "Discourse in the Novel" (1981, 259-422). Most of the specific examples are mine.
means in practice is a close affinity between the image of the official hero figure and the identity of a desirable (respectable) society.

In the classical chivalric romance in verse, the solidarity between the canons of medieval respectability and the discourse and deeds of the hero-figure gives rise to one of the most enduring images of the hero-figure in European literature and culture - that of the "Knight". The "knight in shining armour" has long since been canonised in both the spoken and written vernaculars and, since Don Quixote at least, often with a parodic stylisation. But there is no hint of parody in the following excerpt from Chaucer's prologue to the "Canterbury Tales" which fits well into the first line style of classical chivalric romance in verse:

A Knyght ther was, and that a worthy man,
That fro the tyme that he first bigan
To riden out, he loved chivalrie,
Trouthe and honour, fredom and courteisie...?7

The connection between the "official" (hegemonic) domain and "literariness" in language only makes sense against the dialogising background of the unofficial world of heteroglossia (other languages). In other words, it only makes sense if what is not respectable and what is not literary is taken into account. There are two important points here.

Firstly the "official" genres reflect social convention and, in particular, the conventions and values of the dominant group within a heteroglot social structure. This separation of the dominant group and the heteroglot remaining majority is analogous to the dysfunctional cross-cultural relationship characteristic of unilinear systems.

Second, the dialogic negation of that which is inconsistent with the canons of respectability and literariness follows from the division of the social "whole" into privileged and poor kinds, itself an expression of the world-view according to the dominant group and ruling elite. Thus when it comes to the emergence of the chivalric romance in prose, the genre is set against the "low" and "vulgar" heteroglossia of virtually all areas of life which fall outside the stylised and idealised, proscriptive canons of respectable, "ennobled" language and society. The important point here is the extent to which first line genres are canonised while other genres and genre types are devalued for their alleged coarseness and vulgarity (cf the discussion on "offensive" language above). It should come as no surprise then that Bakhtin describes "literary language" in terms of its area of activity in the conversational language of a literarily educated elite and the language of respectable society (381). Literariness can also be manifested in the written language of the everyday so-called "semi-literary" genres such as letters and diaries, the language of the socio-ideological genres (mainly diatribe and news-type) such as public speeches, pronouncements, official reports, printed articles and so on. In the first line, the feature of literariness acts as a global principle of organisation and stylisation whereas, in the second line, it becomes only one amongst a multitude of heteroglot social languages. Bakhtin goes so far as to say that the stylistic essence of the first line turns on the canonical opposition between "respectable" language and "coarse"

7 Geoffry Chaucer, General Proluge to the Canterbury Tales, ed. Dr Peter Mack and Chris Walton (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994) 1.43-46.
language. It is the function of the second line to disrupt/disturb/decentre the dialectical
unity of the first line genres.

An early example in modern times of how the feature of literariness came to be
decentred and relativised is the work of Rabelais, on whom Bakhtin based his own
doctoral dissertation (rejected by the Soviet establishment of the 1940's). For Rabelais,
the literary image of the authentic hero figure associated with the chivalric romance not
only becomes one amongst the many images of society and culture (heteroglossia), it also
undergoes a parodic stylisation aimed at undermining the authenticity of the image and
exposing it as a lie and deception. This critical function of discourse in the second line
finds its expression in dialogic categories such as the rogue, the clown and the fool (the
Australian equivalents perhaps being the larrikin, the drongo and the smart-arse).

The satiric genre-type problematises the other genre-types by calling into question
the authenticity and integrity of particular (official) genre-specific conventions, values
and expectations. The most important attribute associated with this genre-type, however,
lies outside the particular signs through which the semantic content is realised. The
super-ordinate effect of satire is accomplished on the plane of expression, through a
system of relations associated with the stabilising-grammar of the exchange-event. The
"effect" is, more precisely, an "affect", since the key attribute here is an (unmediated)
aesthetic response which determines the semantics of the exchange-event as a whole.

To put it crudely, satire has the effect of driving an aesthetic wedge between the
planes of content and expression: the "content of the expression" and the "expression of
the content" no longer perform in the service of the same semantics, rather they signify
divergent belief and value systems, comprising a dual semantics - the conflicts and
contradictions of differing world-views. Great satire is able to expose such contradiction
and conflict in a way that requires no defence.

Certainly Balzac did not need to defend his pointed parodies on the arrivisme of
the post-Revolutionary bourgeoisie. The "normative" set of values and beliefs
sustaining much of Balzadian satire is largely derived from the ancien régime and reflects
the desire for a past stability and order. The desire to retrieve the values of a lost
classicism may be characteristic of Western modernity in general, but the important point
here is the requirement for an alternative "normative" value system to that implicated
through the particular signs comprising the text in isolation. This importance of this
point is demonstrated in the artefact recovered from the DSS office in Sydney.

The DSS artefact falls into the satiric genre-type, although on the surface it
appears to comprise two separate texts - a printed (official) one on the front and a
handwritten (unofficial) one on the back. There is a definite dialogue between the signs
inscribed on the surfaces of the artefact. Because of this, neither inscription can be
considered independently of the other and the artefact must be interpreted as a single text
(hereafter the DSS text). The reason for its consideration here - as an object worthy of
critical inquiry - is the presence of the (unofficial) handwritten inscription and the
particular way it sets up a response to the printed, official inscription.

Taken as a whole, the handwritten signs indicate a brief message or note. The
first few signs ("I would like to get a counter-cheque...") indicate that the intention of the
author is to formulate a reply to the printed text which is entitled "Hardship". Whether

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8 For example La Cousine Bette, 1848 (Paris: Gaillmard, 1972).
Hardship payments

Are you experiencing hardship despite having substantial assets because you are unable to rearrange your financial affairs due to certain circumstances? If so, you may be eligible for hardship payments if:

+ your pension is reduced because of the assets test;
+ you own an asset which you cannot sell or be reasonably expected to sell;
+ you cannot borrow against your asset;
+ you are in severe financial hardship because of the assets test.

You are considered to be in severe financial hardship if:

+ your total income (including any pension paid under the assets test) is less than the maximum rate of pension; and
+ you do not have more than $6,000 (if a single pensioner) or $10,000 combined (if a married couple) available money.

The rate you are paid under hardship provisions depends on your particular case and is calculated using a special formula. Your payment will commence from the pension payday following the date you lodged your hardship claim.

The Pension Loans Scheme

You can apply for help under the loans scheme if your pension has been reduced or cancelled under the assets test, and you cannot, or do not want to, sell or rearrange your assets.

The loan makes up the difference between the amount you get now under the assets test and what you would get under the income test. The loan can be for a short period while you rearrange your financial affairs, or for an indefinite period. Simple interest at 10% is charged on pension loan payments.

As the amount of loan adds up each fortnight, it reduces the net market value of your assets. As the net market value of your assets reduces, your pension entitlement increases.

The Home Equity Conversion Scheme

If you take out a mortgage-secured loan of up to $40,000, for home repairs and improvements or simply to improve your standard of living, it will not be taken into account as an asset for three months nor as income for pension purposes. If it is invested any interest will be assessed as income for pension purposes.
I would like to get a Counter Cheque because I never had any money for 2 months, and I'm living off people who hasn't got any money because they lost it up 2 up the other day and one cunt who drank all his money shouting every other cunt up.
intentionally or not, the author of the handwritten text exploits the irony invested in the relation between the title of the printed text and its content. The title "Hardship" creates the impression that having no money would be a sufficient condition for receiving a hardship payment. However, the first few signs of the official text indicate that hardship payments are for those who already have substantial assets ("Are you experiencing hardship despite having substantial assets... "). The author of the handwritten text makes no pretences regarding the extent of his/her asset base ("I never had any money for two months...") or the likelihood of receiving financial support through his/her current circumstances ("And I'm living off people who hasn't got any money...").

One of the most striking features of the unofficial text is the way the handwritten signs start off small and neat and end up large and relatively messy. Clearly, less attention was paid to the act of inscribing the last few signs than the first few. It would seem reasonable to infer from this that once the overall meaning of the message had become clear to the author, the process of inscription became peripheral to the accomplishment of the response. The overall response incorporates expectations associated with the official text, refracted through the particular circumstances and values which the unofficial text brings to its context of situation. In the space of fifty - orthographically faultless - words the writer is able to make a formal request, provide reasons, elaborate on related issues and provide specific details. In terms of its semantic content, the text is quite complex and sophisticated, telling not just one story, but two. The second story is realised through the expression of the text as a whole. There are perhaps two outstanding attributes of the text as expression.

One is the use of language which is officially considered to be offensive.

The other is the complex system of interpersonal relations informing the content of the expression, making the text highly cohesive in this respect.

Although ostensibly an attempt to secure a welfare payment, the handwritten text is more a demonstration of the value of enjoyment and sharing pleasurable activities. Despite the manifest "moneylessness" of the author, the directness of the handwritten expression implies a sense of defiance through the response it provides - knowing the "official" world would not accept gambling, swearing and drinking-up as sufficient reasons to hand out money. The official world and language of the printed text is subverted in both expression and content by the handwritten text.

The values which inform the official text are the "$" values of assets, incomes and mortgages. The values which inform the unofficial text are empirical values such as material need and happiness. The official text, as an information statement, should - in theory - belong to the news-type genres. However, given its complex internal semantics and an overuse of nebulous, conditional clause-complexes, it may be more appropriate to describe it as diatribe. Whatever the case, the impervious system of values legislated for in the official text form the basis of the response expressed in the unofficial text. The unofficial response reflects an entirely different set of values and beliefs. It seems as though there is a cultural difference at work here and I am convinced that this is the case. While this hypothesis is not directly verifiable, I suspect that the writer was of Aboriginal descent (most likely Koori ie. from the NSW region). This suspicion was confirmed when the text was shown to a Koori person who immediately and confidently identified the text and its writer as Koori (or at least of Aboriginal descent). This confirmation was partly expressed through laughter in response to the meanings realised in the unofficial text.

Subsequent to the discovery of the DSS text, I conducted informal surveys of members of the Koori community with whom I came into contact. Each time the response was similar - identifying with the humour invested in the text and an empathy for the values it expresses in contra-distinction to those contained in the official text.
The second story the text tells is, therefore, a joke - a joke about Australian society and conflicting value-systems. It is also a parody on official language and expectations, subverting the money-based, official value system in the very act of officially requesting money. Meaning is simultaneously made and un-made. What remains is the potential for human happiness and laughter, the empirical rather than the economic.

It is perhaps not so unusual to be confronted with an anonymous text and attempt to divine the identity of its author. What struck me about the DSS text was the unity of response by the Koori people I showed it to - everyone laughed. The story it tells is not just about having no money, but about a system that has no culture except for money and surviving that system despite having no money. The solution is being able to laugh and know that real (empirical) value has very little to do with material value.

It would be impossible to analyse the DSS text without some understanding and appreciation of the cross-cultural context informing its constituent parts. This text was an inspiration behind the present dissertation: I wanted to arrive at a way of thinking about the sorts of meanings and values associated with cross-cultural exchanges which would provide some insight into the complex interrelations of culture, dialogue and genre which texture our realities and identities. Such is the nature of the task that we are called upon to undertake, as researchers in the human sciences and such are the phenomena that we are required to investigate, as "forensic semioticians", delving beyond appearances into the world of inner conditions and the emotions and beliefs which inform the culture of our signs and signing systems.
Concluding Remarks

Without some systematic appreciation of the complex way in which signs and signing-systems interact and inform the way we understand and experience the world, it would be difficult indeed to even begin to "search for oneself" - to paraphrase Heraclitus. That other science on which I chose to base the present re-search - Epicurean empiricism - provides a description of semiosis (semeiousthai) which both complements and supplements Halliday's systemic-functional model. In addition, Bakhtin's dialogic understanding of the life of the sign furnishes the model with an appreciation of the internal dynamics of the sign qua sign, locating it firmly in the domain of the intersubjective and cross-cultural, engendering the potential for semiosis to impact on the consciousness of the individual sentient subject, so providing an essential connection with empirical experience, a connection which seemed to be lacking or at least only implicit in Halliday's model. Dialogue, empiricism and semiotics are therefore the three strands / ingredients / components which have been drawn upon in order to render what I believe to be some likeness to actual phenomena which confront our understanding as researchers in the human sciences.

I prefaced this dissertation with a reflection on the nature of the task at hand: what genre would it be and what culture-specific conventions would need to be invoked? Moreover, how would these impact on the dialogue that was to follow? While answers to these questions did not appear to be immediately forthcoming, they now appear transparent.

The present work belongs to the "news" genre. The burden of the semantics is carried by the lexico-grammatical content of the text in tacit opposition to the potential for a more expressive, aesthetic semiotic form. In its cross-cultural context of situation, the research relies almost exclusively on the written word, save for a few diagrams. The written word operates as a constraint of sorts - but only a technical one: I doubt that its being read aloud, in whatever language, would improve its transmissibility across cultures.

The written mode of the text is therefore less of a constraint on the potential for dialogue and responsive understanding than the secondary genre to which it belongs - the dissertation/thesis/doctorate genre. This tends to reduce the potential interlocutors from the many to the few. Moreover the culture-specific conventions that enter into the genre at this level are such as to render the work as a whole one conducted primarily in the "Western" tradition, or what could perhaps be more appropriately described as the European tradition.

Nevertheless the process of reflection characteristic of secondary genres is aided immeasurably by a healthy dose of what Bakhtin would call "cultural outsidedness". From the outside, particular cultural boundaries and rites appear starkly estranged. But from the inside - as lived experience - the boundaries are seamless and the rites habit. The secondary genre therefore places considerable constraint on the potential for cross-cultural dialogue. Opening up the text to this sort of potential requires another sort of meaning.

Marked in words, inscribed in the ineffable, the primary genre of the work reflects a desire for some sort of order: to make sense out of a world that in many respects appears to have lost, or at least forgotten, its senses. Such a desire for order and stability reflects a fundamental empirical value, one which is anterior to the semiosis of its expression. A similar value is reflected through a different genre-type in the poem by Oodgeroo Noonuccal.
In essence the primary genre belongs to the pleasure of being and the desire happiness in the empirical sense of a state free from unnecessary disturbance. Ironically, perhaps, it would be difficult to describe the task of undertaking the present research as a pleasant one - in any sense. But there were occasional moments of memorable delight, usually associated with a piece of the puzzle(s) falling into place. I suspect, however, that the greatest pleasure will occur shortly after the research is formally submitted, when there is rest....

The concepts of stability, rest, regularity and order have been constant themes of the present research. They are central to the foundations of empirical philosophy and find formal expression through the present research in what is probably its most fundamental innovation - the concept of a stabilising-grammar.

Existing alongside and in dialogical relation with the lexico-grammatical patterns of association, the stabilising-grammar enables the semantic system - what I have called the "semantics" - to be modelled according to a bifurcated system of meaning potential. In other words the semantics is associated with not one but two meaning potentials. The stabilising-grammar integrates the affective dimensions of human experience into a generalised theory of semantics and semiosis or what I have called the "cross-cultural" model.

Halliday and others have provided a very detailed description of the lexico-grammatical functions and systems and I have already indicated that there is much within that description that is amenable to the notion of a stabilising-grammar. This will need to be the subject for future research. In particular the systems of tone and tonicity - the "melodic" dimension of speech communication - and the associated choices in mood and modality, impacting on the tenor of the exchange-event as a whole. These aspects of the systemic-functional description have an aesthetic impact, in the empirical sense of these words, and so contribute to the stabilising-grammar, realising an expressive potential the substance of which is pathos/emotion/feeling/affection. In the context of the present research, however, the concept of a stabilising-grammar has scarcely been elaborated beyond the class of expletives ("offensive" language) as a distinct group of items whose primary function is non-lexical. The description of the stabilising-grammar therefore remains at a seminal stage at the end of the present research. I suspect that its full elaboration will require the researches of the many rather than the few, let alone the one.

The stabilising-grammar in dialogical relation with the lexico-grammar emulates a sort of "inner-speech" and provides the dynamic underlying the system/model/semantics as a whole: a dialogue between thoughts and feelings, ideas and attitudes, cognition and affection. This dialogue is built upon past experiences, memories, desires and the influences of others. I have already indicated the major textual influences on the present work but the most significant influence/experience/memory is of a non-textual or extra-textual (ineffable) nature: the soothing music of peace/calm/rest - ataraxia.

Writing about the ineffable in this way, paradigmatically as it were, using slash marks to enjoin lexical items belonging to a similar lexico-semantic grouping, is a deliberate strategy aimed at dispersing attention from individual/specific/particular meanings in order to touch upon meanings which are not word-specific or word-centred - what I have called logos-based. In stylistic terms, this paradigmatic way of writing is one of the few features of the dissertation as a whole which marks the work as a pathos-based description of semantics and semiosis. Words are unimportant here, certainly less important than the feelings associated with the meanings they realise. The anteriority of the affective over the cognitive in this respect, or what I have also called "inner-perception" over "outer-perception", is a fundamental assumption (prolēpsis) in the cross-cultural model.
There are implications for information theory here, some of which have already been touched on. The major result, I believe, is the emphasis on the category of tactile metaphor as a model of meaning and semiosis. Touch is perhaps the most basic instinct/sense/affection and is the most appropriate metaphor, I believe, for the sort of empirical impact that meaning can have. A great deal of further research into the category of tactile metaphor will be needed in order to fully explore the implications for our models of semantics and semiosis. In the context of the present research, most of the emphasis has been placed on the closely related concept of ataraxia.

Ataraxia is less a state of being or set of empirical conditions than a place people are predisposed to try to reach. That place may be one of freedom from enslavement and persecution, it may be a place of imagined paradise and material wealth or it may be a place of eternal bliss in blissful opposition to one of eternal torment. Wherever that place may be - and it is often very near - the outcome/desire is invariably the same - to live happily ever after. This is not the stuff of fairy-tales but the arché and telos of being.

The stories which always end more happily than life ever seems to are an almost unmediated expression of the desire for and belief in the pleasure of being. On the other side of the equation, so to speak, is the reality of pathos: of disturbance and disaster, of invasion and insurrection. Yet for as much unnecessary suffering as there has been in the history of humanity - and the cries will never die out - I believe the measure of pleasure to be the greater. Such utopian reflections must be brief, however, when that place of peace for so many remains at such an impossible distance: the carnage in the central African republic of Rwanda, the brutal oppression of the Burmese people and the continuing struggle of indigenous peoples around the world are measures of the distance to peace.

Most of the critical issues associated with genre analysis are best perceived from without - from the world-view of the woman under a patriarchal system of law, from that of the indigenous person under an invader's system of values or simply from the world-view of an Australian living outside, though not always apart from, the European and Anglo-American traditions.

It is no coincidence that where possible the present research has drawn upon the work of Australian scholars. While the systems of Descartes, Kant, Hegel and Heidegger might have been congenial to the sort of dialogue I wished to engage in this dissertation, apart from the obvious constraints of time and space it was necessary to locate the research in a physical place as well as an ideological one and it could not be France or Germany, or Greece or Russia as in the cases of Epicurus and Bakhtin - it had to be Australia(n).

The result is a body of research that now belongs to a tradition in Australian semiotics. I have endeavoured to build on this tradition in an attempt to refine our present understanding of the way semiotic systems operate and interact. Michael Halliday's systemic-functional description of linguistic semiosis is an elegant model and excellent starting point.

What Halliday's model lacks in the way of "aesthetic sensibility" finds expression in Jakobson's description of the "poetic function" in language. Taken together, these models inform a poetics of presence, so to speak, wherein sound, image and impulse merge in the process of sign-making/using activity. There is an underlying bias at work here, toward the word/sign/text, implicitly negating the potential for silence/rest/peace. This systemic bias toward nomos and the "forgetting" of physis finds redress in the empirical natural philosophy of Epicurus.
The distinction itself is reflected in the two stages of Epicurean empirical scientific inquiry - the stage of nature and regularity (physis) and the stage of reflection and calculation (logismos, nomos). The Epicurean empirical distinction between special signs (eidicha) and common signs (genicha) turns on the empirical "connection" with "inner perception" or pathos. The Epicureans assert that this connection is anterior to the connection associated with processes of technical argument and calculation. What this implies for a generalised theory of semantics and semiotics is the need to account for the empirical/aesthetic connection in a way that appropriately distinguishes it from the sort of cognitive/semantic "connection" associated with processes of calculation (logismos) and reason (logos).

The underlying dualism at work here is the action/reflection one central to most functional semiotic theories. Bakhtin described the semiotic manifestation of this dualism in terms of primary and secondary genres, simple and complex genres. Halliday resolves the issue through a theory/modelescription of context and text which turns on the metafunctional hypothesis: the functional description of context according to Field, Tenor and Mode; the parallel realisation of these semiotic configurations in actual contexts of situation through corresponding selections in the Ideational, Interpersonal and Textual levels/systems of the lexico-grammar. The centrality of the lexico-grammar in the systemic-functional model reflects its role as the interface of all relevant semiotic functions. Halliday describes three such functions which merge in the expression of the lexico-grammatical content. The model put forward in this dissertation builds upon the triadic structure of the metafunctional hypothesis - a structure which was also implicit in Bakhtin's description of the "super-addresssee" in dialogue.

The empirical description of the sign as pathos, understood in its most general sense as a disturbance of the perceptual organ, deconstructs the "poetics of presence" implicitly constructed in the works of Halliday, Jakobson, Hjelmslev and what I have more generally described as a logos-based/centred tradition in semiotic modelling. Correcting for this we are left with the far more tantalising prospect for a "poetics of the ineffable", so to speak, or what I have also described as a pathos-based approach.

Empirical subjectivity is implicated in this scheme in a way that both constitutes and transcends the individual instances of its semiotic instantiation. The underlying empirical/dialogical opposition is that between activity and rest, not the dialectic of action and reflection. This dialogue between the empirical states action and inertia in a sense reflects the sort of dialogue between the articulate and the ineffable which Halliday endeavours to model. I have stressed the need to account for this fundamental dialogue in a way that reflects the different connections associated with the underlying empirical states of the kinetic and the katastematic.

It is this empirical distinction between movement and inertia - between the poetics of rhetoric and rest - which forms the basis for the model of semiosis put forward in this dissertation. A version of this distinction is also present in Hjelmslev's description of the homoplane functions associated with the planes of content and expression.

The basic functional units associated with the plane of expression are cenemes, from the Greek for "empty". The discussion on offensive language turned on the observation that such words/expressions appear lexically empty but semantically dense in a way that is typically not accounted for in logos-based model of semiosis.

The basic functional units associated with the content plane are called pleremes, from the Greek for "full". "Fullness" of meaning is demonstrated most strikingly in the 1967 amendment to the Australian constitution. The bias toward the content plane is accentuated in this diatribe genre by the fact that the particular signs expressed desires that were culturally absolute. So full were these words of meaning that their weight bore down on Aboriginal people as did, in so many instances, the chains upon their necks. It
is in this much broader, empirical context of the potential for human pain and pleasure that I have chosen to interpret Hjelmslev's model.

The anteriority of empirical subjectivity is reflected in the extended Hjelmslevian model on the plane of expression, through a system of relations which functions to promote and preserve the subjective-cultural empirical experience. I have described this system of relations in terms of "primary genres of being", producing an "aesthetic" impact and associated with the interpersonal realisational system in Halliday's model.

Constituted outside the subjective experience of pathos and in dialogical relation with this "inner" connection is the external world of objects and processes which inform the content of experience. I have described this content in terms of "secondary genres of culture", producing a cognitive/semantic impact and associated with the contextual configuration of Field in Halliday's model.

Finally there is the materiality of the signifier as expressed through the particular signing systems of culture. However, given that empirical subjective experience remains largely ineffable and that some words may be "fuller" of meaning than others, it is important not to rely too heavily on the lexico-grammatical evidence alone - the remnants of semiotic process. I have suggested that this evidence needs to be interpreted in the context of a broader semiotic framework/model, one which accounts for the potentially arbitrary weight of words and the potential for silence in their absence. On this account, Halliday's textual metafunction can be interpreted as being organised about not one grammar (system of relations) but two. The stabilising-grammar integrates the lexico-grammar into its context of culture - adding weight to words, engendering and ensuring, where possible, the stability and survival of the whole subject / culture / experience.

Halliday's systemic-functional description of semiosis is central to the organisation of the model put forward in this dissertation. Given the centrality of the Hallidayan model to the development of a tradition in Australian semiotics it would seem appropriate to conclude with an illustration/summary of the model which highlights the implications for Halliday's metafunctional hypothesis - re-ordering the metafunctions according to an empirically based description of semantics and semiosis and extending them to include the potential for another sort of meaning/dialogue - an ineffable silence/presence which has no name but which nevertheless contributes to the stability of the system as a whole and to what has also been described as the pleasure of being:
Context of Situation

- Lexico-grammar
- Field "logical"
- Stabilising-grammar
- Field "experiential"

Content

Mode

Tenor

Expression

Semantic impact

Aesthetic impact

Context of Culture
Appendix

Aristotle on the Sign

I do not propose to enter here into a detailed elaboration of Aristotle's extensively documented system of thought. I merely wish to signal those elements in his work which are relevant to the debate on signs.¹

In his "Prior Analytics", Aristotle provides the following explanation of a sign,

A sign (sēmeion) is meant to be a demonstrative (apdodiktikē) premise that is either necessary or commonly accepted (Asmis 212))

A sign, according to Aristotle, consists of a single premise. If another premise is used as well, a syllogism is said to be formed. It will be recalled that the term for syllogistic logic - sullogismos - is one of the compounds of the term for calculation (logismos) and designates the combination of concepts by argument. Aristotle distinguishes three varieties of syllogism and points out that only a sign corresponding to the middle term of a first figure syllogism can form a valid syllogism. Only this type of sign can constitute a conclusive proof. I will examine the nature of the criterion Aristotle applies in his derivation of a conclusive sign presently. Aristotle also calls this conclusive type of sign a token (tekmerion) and distinguishes it from non-conclusive signs which belong to the other syllogistic figures. The details are not as important here as the fact that, as in Stoic philosophy, the explanation is technical and requires specialised knowledge.

The method of inference by signs is given in the middle term of a second figure syllogism. Aristotle claims to expose a fallacy involved in signs of this type. The fallacy is that of affirming the antecedent on the grounds of affirming the consequent. Aristotle extends this criticism to all rhetorical "demonstration" by signs. This general criticism presupposes that all inference by signs, at least by those who practice rhetoric, conform to syllogisms of the second figure. The direction the inductive process takes in signs of the second figure is from the universal to the particular.

Having already established that conclusive signs correspond to the middle term of a first figure syllogism, it follows that both the remaining two syllogistic figures will expose fallacious argumentation. The fallacy that belongs to signs of the third figure is that of a universal conclusion which is based on a claim that is neither universal nor necessarily relevant. The direction of inference here is from the particular to the universal. This is the same direction taken by Philodemus' inductive method of similarity, although here it is framed in strictly logical terms, which brings us to Aristotle's criterion for the conclusive validity of the first figure sign type.

Conclusive signs of the first type are recognised as valid by Aristotle for the reason that the premise in which the sign obtains is enjoined by a universal statement which justifies the inference. In effect, the conclusive sign is an antecedent from which what is signified follows as a consequent. Strictly speaking there does not appear to be a direction of

¹ Once again I am indebted to Asmis' researches here.
inference at work here. The sign is accepted as being conclusive and true by virtue of its association with an appropriate universal. But even conclusive signs fall short of Aristotle's requirement for scientific or "demonstrative" validity,

Aristotle not only distinguishes the use of signs from his own method of scientific demonstration, but also dissociates it from his [own] method of induction (epagōgē). This is implied by his classification of signs as attempted demonstrations, as well as by his classification of rhetorical arguments ... into two types, the enthymeme and the example (paradeigma) ... [these] correspond respectively to syllogism and induction; and he classifies inference by signs under the enthymeme, distinguishing it consistently from the use of examples (Asmis 215).

Aristotle's Logic

The method of inference by signs must therefore be distinguished from Aristotle's own method of induction. The method of inference by signs is based on a distinction between observed particulars and unobserved particulars and attempts to demonstrate that the one follows upon the other. The premises must be connected in such a way that it is impossible for what is evident to be the case and what is non-apparent not to be the case.

Aristotelian induction is based on a distinction between the particulars of sense perception and the universals that apply to them and attempts to pass from the one to the other through a direct intuition of the universal as it exists in the particular. This is entirely consistent with the teleology inherent in Aristotle's biology and his doctrine of causes. The direction of inference here is in a sense predetermined by the system itself. For a premise to operate as an inductive demonstration, in the Aristotelian sense of these words, it must belong essentially and necessarily to what is demonstrated or signified and thereby provide a causal explanation for what obtains.
It must be noted that Aristotle does in fact make frequent use of the method of inference by signs. In the "Nicomachean Ethics" he explicitly endorses the use of signs:

…it is necessary to use evident things in witness of non-evident things....
(Asmis 216).

Here Aristotle provides a summary of the method of signs: a distinction is made between that which is evident and that which is not, and the use of one is called on as a sign or witness of the other. Although Aristotle accords only one type of sign any real explanatory power in his overall system of thought - the so-called conclusive sign or "token" - his division of signs into two types, based on his critique of the syllogistic figures sustaining rhetorical argument, does anticipate the later Stoic classification of signs into indicative and commemorative types. And despite the poverty of scientific demonstrative validity which Aristotle attributes to all three syllogistic figures, there is clear evidence of his own somewhat extensive application of the method of signs throughout his work:

Although Aristotle does not admit inference by signs as a method of scientific demonstration, he makes surprisingly frequent use of signs in his own investigations (216).

As well as the "Nicomachean Ethics" there are examples from every field of Aristotelian inquiry including medicine, meteorology, zoology, psychology, physics and metaphysics. Indeed the method of inference by signs, as is suggested by Aristotle's own theory and practice, belongs to a tradition in Greek thought which extends to well before the time of Aristotle, as far back as, arguably, Thales.

In his treatise on the soul, "De Anima", Aristotle reports that,

even Thales seems ... to have supposed that the soul is productive of movement, if he really said that the magnet has a soul because it produces movement in iron.2

Following Aristotle, the method of signs was taken up by the Stoics whose redefinition of the sign not only exposed a system of thought at least as rigorous as that of Aristotle's, but also preserved the notion that scientific discovery begins with observations and ends with the "revelation" of that which cannot, by nature, be observed. Through their definition of the indicative sign, the Stoics ensured both the conclusiveness of the sign - in the Aristotelian sense of the term - and its demonstrative and scientific validity - an attribute which Aristotle refused to concede the sign.

It will be recalled that the demonstrative validity which the Stoics attributed to the indicative sign is also attributed to the Epicurean inductive sign. In respect of Aristotle's conclusive sign or so-called "token", Epicurus, in his "Letter to Herodotus", uses the verb tekmairesthai, implying a tekmerion or "token" in the sense of thereby inferring what is non-apparent through an associated calculation,

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... it appears that Epicurus agreed with Aristotle in using the word *tekmerion* to designate the conclusive type of sign and using *semeion* as a general term embracing both inconclusive and conclusive signs (176).

Finally, while Aristotle held that a sign could only be conclusive in a narrowly defined sense and could not be demonstrative in any sense, Philodemus countered Aristotle's claim by pointing out that "the demonstrative validity of signs is prior to the alleged validity of the Aristotelian demonstrative syllogism" (221).
Glossary of Greek Terms†

adēlon* nonapparent; unobservable; what cannot be perceived.

aisthēsis* perception; an activity of the sense organs (and, by extension, of the mind) resulting in an impression produced directly from outside without the addition of any interpretation by the mind.

antimartureśis* counterwitnessing; counterevidence; the incompatibility of something nonapparent. The method of counterwitnessing is the method of falsifying a claim about what is nonapparent and hence of verifying its contradictory.

archē beginning; principle; rule. Epicurus held pleasure (hēdonē) to be the archē and telos of being.

aphobia freedom from fear. One of the conditions associated with the empirical state of ataraxia.

apodeixis* demonstration; showing by argument (that is, by logismos, "calculation") something nonapparent.

aponia freedom from physical pain. One of the conditions associated with the empirical state of ataraxia.

ataraxia freedom from disturbance; tranquillity; equipoise. A sceptical term taken over by the Epicureans to denote the greatest good, the archē and telos of being.

doxa* opinion; belief. Opinions are judgements about the phenomena or about what is unobserved; and there is no more certain type of cognition than true opinion. All scientific theories are opinions.

eidicha special/particular signs. Particular signs provide a basis for inference and "scientific" knowledge.

enargeia* evidence; a presentation obtained directly by the senses or the mind from outside, without any interpretation by the mind. The term is synonymous with phantasia.

enargeś* evident; not requiring demonstration. All immediate objects of perception, and consequently all presumptions, are evident.

endeiktikon indicative sign. The Stoics claimed this type of sign was a proposition and hence something intelligible (noēton) whereas the Epicureans held it to be something perceptible (aithēton).

† Items marked with an asterisk (*) are taken from Asmis' "Glossary of Epicurean Terms" (351-353) along with the relevant descriptions.
epilogismos* calculation; reasoning about the phenomena; an analysis of the phenomena. The prefix "ep-" signifies that this is a calculation directed at the phenomena.

epibole* application; an act by which the senses or the mind apprehend an object, either (in the case of the mind and senses) by obtaining a perceptual impression or (in the case of the mind) by making an interpretation that is verified by the phenomena (whether directly by epimarturēsis or indirectly by ouk epimarturēsis).

epistēmē knowledge; scientific knowledge. Used here in contrast to opinion and belief (doxa).

genicha common signs. Common signs provide the basis for conjecture (stokasmos) and belief (doxa).

hedonē pleasure. In Epicurean hedonism, the absence of pain (aponia), fear (aphobia) and anxiety (ataraxia) is not only pleasurable but constitutes the greatest pleasure (ataraxia). Beyond this, pleasures may be varied and differentiated but not increased.

homologia consistency; agreement. The term homologia was ideally suited to capture the essence of Stoic virtue, since its linguistic form (homo-logia) is interpretable as 'harmony' of (or with) reason (Long and Sedley, 383).

kanon rule; measure; standard. In Epicurean empiricism, the kanon comprises the kriteria of outer perception (aisthēsis) and inner perception (pathos).

katalēpsis* apprehension; an assent to a claim that is necessarily true. This is a Stoic term, taken over by the followers of Epicurus to designate a true opinion.

katastematic of rest; stability. Pleasures and stability and rest (having satisfied a pleasure) are regarded by the Epicureans as not only good but constitutive of the greatest good (ataraxia).

kathēkon proper function. Closely associated with the Stoic term homologia (harmony with reason), every living thing has its proper function; for 'man', it is always a proper function to live virtuously.

kinetic of motion; movement; action. Epicurus divided pleasures into pleasures of motion/movement (kinetic) and pleasures of stability/rest (katastematic) and held the latter to be more desirable than the former.

kritēria criteria. The activity of the Epicurean empirical kriteria comprise the faculties of sense-perception (aisthēsis) and affection (pathos).

logismos* calculation; reasoning. Three important types of logismos are analogismos, analogy, epilogismos, an analysis of the phenomena, and sullogismos, reasoning used to draw a conclusion.

nomos name; law; convention. In contrast with the physical universe (physis), denotes the world of culture, society, language and institution; also denotes the second of the Epicurus' two stages of scientific discovery.
pathos* affection; feeling. The two primary affections are pleasure and pain. Along with perceptions, (aisthēsis), the affections furnish the basic facts of scientific inference.

physis nature; the physical universe. The first stage of Epicurean scientific inquiry, the stage of physis, furnishes a background of regularity for the second stage, the technical stage of calculation (logismos) or nomos.

prolēpsis* presumption; first concept; initial concept; preinvestigative concept. A presumption is empirically acquired, and all investigations are conducted by reference to presumptions.

prosmenon* waiting to appear; expected to appear; expected to be evident. All investigation concerns either prosmenonta or adēla; and an opinion concerning something prosmenon is verified by witnessing (epimarturēsis) and falsified by no witnessing (ouk epimarturēsis).

psyche soul; psyche; animator. The psyche or animator is that part or feature of animate being which endows it with life; and since the primary signs of life are cognition and mobility, the psyche is the source of knowledge and locomotion (Barnes 1982, 472).

to saphēs the clear-truth. Important in the development of early scepticism, Xenophanes claimed that the clear-truth (to saphēs) no one has seen nor will any one know.

sēmeion* sign; a self-evident fact on which an inference is based. All signs are phenomena; and they signify either what is expected to appear of what is nonapparent.

sēmeiousthai* use a sign; infer. The phenomena are used as signs, either to conjecture what will appear or to discover what is nonapparent.

stokasmus conjecture; divination. The Stoic art of conjecture or stokasmus relied on a broader category of sign-type (genicha) than that associated with formal argument and scientific knowledge (eidelcha).

tērein* observe; keep in one's awareness an object of perception.

phainomenon* phenomenon; an object appearing directly to the senses or the mind in an act of perception, without any interpretation by the mind.

phantasia* presentation; the appearance of an object of perception, without any interpretation by the mind.

phronēsis prudence. The ability to resist impulse and to discern natural, necessary and empty desires. Epicurus describes prudence as the primary and congenital good, even more important than philosophy.
Works Cited*


* Disagreement over the constitution of Bakhtin's bibliography has already been mentioned (see Part 1, n.4). Where appropriate the name of the published author will be indicated in parentheses following the citation.


---. "Bakhtin/Medvedev: 'Sociological Poetics.'" The CEA Critic 52.3 (Spring 1990): 62-70.


