KEEPING CONSCIOUSNESS IN MIND

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I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is all my own work, and that all sources have been acknowledged.

Andrew Gardiner
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ABBREVIATIONS

Works by Franz Brentano:

PvomES Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt
W&E Warheit und Evidenz
S&D ‘Sprechen und Denken’
T&E The True and the Evident
PES Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint
S&NC Sensory and Noetic Consciousness
DesP Deskriptive Psychology
DP Descriptive Psychology

Works by Edmund Husserl:

Ideas The Idea of Phenomenology
LI Logical Investigations
Crisis Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy
The Crisis The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy
Ideas I Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy
INTRODUCTION

Brentano, Husserl and the Philosophy of Mind

There is a view of the world, and our place in it, that since early modernity, since the time of Galileo Galilei and René Descartes, has become the received wisdom. This view runs as follows: the world just is what the natural sciences tells us it is. The ongoing success of the natural scientific project constantly reaffirms this conclusion. We, as human beings, are part of this world, and are thus also subject to natural scientific investigation. The success with which we can explain the workings of our anatomy reaffirms this corollary. If our intellectual integrity can no longer entertain dualism, then our minds too must be considered a mere effect of a sub-set of these anatomical processes: consciousness too must yield to natural scientific explanation. Unless one nostalgically clings to some notion of the soul, then this conclusion is just obvious. If it is not, then, as John Searle remarked somewhere, you must have been socialised in a radically different culture to my own.

This position is what I shall refer throughout this thesis as 'naturalism'. Let us, however, be careful to distinguish between two senses in which one may be a naturalist. In one sense 'naturalism' can mean 'methodological naturalism', that is, the belief that a real knowledge of things is attained by, and only by, using the methods of natural science. This sense is distinct from an 'ontological naturalism', in which it is held that only those entities are real which form part of a true scientific account of the world, since science tells us what things really are. (Schmitt 1995, 343) Clearly the two senses are related, if one was an ontological naturalist then presumably one would also be a methodological naturalist. The converse, however, need not be the case, one may accept that the most appropriate means of acquiring knowledge, in the
sense of an accumulation of empirically tested facts, is that of natural science, without committing oneself to accepting that the ontology of science is exhaustive. When I use the term 'naturalism' I shall be referring the position of the 'ontological naturalist'.

However, is it really so obvious that a naturalistic account of mind can be given? The motivation behind this question need not be any deep seated need to retain a notion of soul, or to maintain our dignity as human beings. Rather, there can be good reasons for the question: reasons deriving from the phenomenological tradition, which raises a challenge to contemporary naturalist accounts of mind. Not that it refutes the naturalist account, but, rather, that it displays in all its complexity the phenomena which the naturalist optimistically thinks can be explained in natural scientific terms.

When Franz C. H. H. Brentano distinguished between descriptive and genetic psychology he inaugurated the style of philosophising that is characteristic of phenomenology. As Brentano understood it genetic psychology talks about the causes that give rise to human consciousness. (Brentano 1995 DP, 4) Thus understood, genetic psychology is synonymous with physiological psychology (op. cit., 3), it is the attempt to give a naturalistic account of psychological processes. By contrast, descriptive psychology makes no use of natural scientific explanation. It seeks merely to provide a description of the phenomena in question, as they appear in themselves. According to Brentano, and this is the heart of the descriptive psychological/phenomenological enterprise, description must precede explanation if we are ever to succeed in giving an adequate account of the phenomena (op. cit., 8):

a genetic psychologist without [descriptive psychological] knowledge is like a physiologist without anatomical knowledge. Even so, one often finds researchers who dare to approach genetic psychological investigations in a pitiful ignorance of [descriptive psychology], which, in turn, has the effect that all their efforts are in vain. There are many people who conduct investigations into the causes of the phenomena of
memory [Gedächtniserscheinungen] without knowing even the principle characteristic peculiarities of these phenomena. (op. cit., 10)

It is central to Brentano's approach to the philosophy of mind that we must first have an accurate description of the phenomenon we are to explain, if we are to have any chance of adequately explaining it.

This is in fact the methodological procedure which I want to put into practice in this thesis. One of my central conclusions will be that only subsequent to a phenomenological description of the phenomena of perception can we properly appreciate the naturalist's contribution to our understanding of that phenomena. That is, I want to argue that a naturalistic account of mind could only ever provide an explanation of the physiological processes which situate entities such as ourselves in the world. It seems to me a truism that we are embodied entities, and that this embodiment provides the grounds upon which the phenomenon of intentionality can be established. However, I want also to argue that such a naturalistic account could only ever provide a necessary component of the explanation, but never a sufficient explanation, of this most basic of the mind’s attributes.

I shall throughout this work use the terms 'descriptive psychology' and 'phenomenology' interchangeably. The former is the term that is predominantly used by Brentano to describe his project. This term was adopted by Husserl in his early work, up to the publication of the first edition of the Logical Investigations. However, because of the tendency with which his readership interpreted it psychologically, that is, as empirical generalisations not a priori insights, Husserl chose later to adopt the term 'phenomenology'. Phenomenology is by my understanding merely descriptive psychology that is performatively conscious of the a prioricity of its enterprise. That is, it is an

1 Brentano also used the terms 'psychognosy' and 'descriptive phenomenology' to characterise his approach to questions of mind.
investigation into the sense of our experiences, not into their empirical occurrences. This is precisely how Brentano saw his own project:

[m]y psychological standpoint is empirical; experience alone is my teacher. However, I share with others the conviction that a certain ideal intuition is entirely compatible with such a standpoint. (Brentano 1924 *PvomS*, 'Vorwort' to the 1874 Edition, 1; my translation; my italics)

Brentano's descriptive psychology was itself attempting to articulate a priori insights into the nature of consciousness, only not as self-consciously as Husserl. Consequently, I understand no real distinction between the terms 'descriptive psychology' and 'phenomenology'.

At the outset some remarks are in order regarding the difficulty of interpreting Brentano’s descriptive psychological doctrines. In the first place, that work which he intended for publication, namely, the *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, is particularly terse, his doctrines are concisely formulated with little room given to their elaboration. This poses a challenge to any would-be interpreter to understand for themselves just what these doctrines amount to. The extant material we have available to shed light on our interpretation, namely, written fragments, lecture notes and dictations taken when Brentano's failing eyesight no longer permitted him to write of his own accord, do not make matters any easier. To say the least it is fragmentary and itself frustratingly terse. As interpreters of these fragments, we do not have the benefit of the asides and explanations Brentano may have given in the course of his lectures or dictations.

Reading Brentano is thus a highly reconstructive exercise. My interpretation will no doubt prove contentious in the face of the generally accepted

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2 Linda McAlister's translation renders the passage I have italicised as '... that this is entirely compatible with an ideal point of view.' (Brentano 1973 *PES*, xxvii) McAlister's translation, however, fails to capture the sense of Brentano's remark: he wanted to convey his conviction that the insights of his descriptive psychology were a priori, and not empirical generalisations. In fact, McAlister's translation literally contradicts Brentano's assertion that his position is empirical.
scholarship. I want to categorically deny the received wisdom that by the intentional object Brentano meant an immanent, mind dependent entity. Brentano's philosophical position, on my reading, is far closer to that of Husserl than is generally accepted.

Interpreting Husserl is only a little less of a problem. He repeatedly struggled to articulate the basic principles of his phenomenological enterprise: the *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology* (1982), the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1969), the *Cartesian Meditations* (1988), and the *Crisis of the European Sciences* (1970) are all characterised by Husserl as introductions to phenomenology. These attempts at clarification, however, do little to dissolve the difficulty of understanding Husserl's work. Consequently, my treatment of Husserl will be an attempt to explicate what I take to be the essential thrust of his phenomenology. Thus, a major task of this thesis will be scholarly: I wish to provide an accurate and accessible account of the basic insights of Brentano and Husserl's descriptive psychological/phenomenological work.

Scholarship, however, is especially valuable insofar as it sheds light upon contemporary concerns. Thus, the main thrust of this thesis, and the substance of my interest in Brentano and Husserl, is the degree to which their work can profitably contribute to current debates in the philosophy of mind. Understanding the development of descriptive psychological analyses through Brentano to Husserl can contribute to our discussions because it lays bare in all its complexity the phenomena that needs to be accounted for.

Contemporary accounts of mind are dominated by the belief that an account can be given in natural scientific terms. It is a central assumption of the naturalist that all mental representations, and their contents, can be either
reduced or eliminated\(^3\), in favour of an explanation given in terms of our causal interactions with the world and attendant physiological processes. This assumption places strict constraints on what may count as representational content for the naturalist, if, indeed, any use is made at all. By being constrained to causal interaction, and physiological processes - more causality - the only sense of content that is amenable to natural characterisation is that of symptom to a cause. It is simply assumed that our mental life can be given in these terms, and that we are in need of no other sense of content.

Phenomenology poses a challenge to the naturalist by providing a detailed account of just what it is that is in need of explanation. Thus, my aim here is to elucidate for a wider audience some of the key elements of the phenomenological account of consciousness. This elucidation will serve its purpose if some doubt is sown about the obviousness of the naturalist's assumption.

A few remarks are also in order about the presentation of this thesis. I have in the case of translations generally provided the page reference to the English translation, rather than the German text as is customary. My reason for doing so is that many of the translations with which I worked did not themselves refer to the German pagination. It would thus have been inconsistent to give the German reference in some cases and not others. I have attempted to overcome this omission by providing as generous reference details as possible, so that the reader may find the German original if desired. I stray from this convention in the case of citations from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, where I provide both the English and German reference. This is for rhetorical effect: I wanted to emphasise that the citations all come from the first edition of Kant's work. In these instances the reference to the German will be placed after a slash

\(^3\) Reductionism and eliminativism are not exhaustive of the attempts to naturalise the mind: there are also doctrines of supervenience. I am not here going to be considering any supervenience account.
following the reference to the English. Of course, in those cases where I have translated directly from the German, I have given the German reference.

In several instances I have provided my own translations from the German of important passages, either because there was no translation available to me, or because I found the available translation wanting. I would like to admit that they are not, despite acknowledging them as such, purely 'my translations': I am here indebted to Bruin Christensen for comments and corrections.
Brentano is most famous for providing a description of mental phenomena in terms of the 'intentional inexistence' of its object or 'the reference to something as object'. (Brentano 1973 PES, Bk II, Chap. I, §5, 88) This is the doctrine of intentionality. Brentano's reappropriation of this doctrine from scholastic philosophy and his introduction of it into modern philosophical debates is generally considered to be his notable philosophical achievement. It shall be the main task of this chapter and the next to give a faithful account of his doctrine of intentionality, as opposed to the widespread misreading one finds throughout the secondary literature on Brentano.

§1

It is important to realise that Brentano did not regard the famous passage from the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, where he introduces the doctrine of intentionality, as a definition of mental phenomena. It is in fact a description of mental phenomena, an attempt to characterise what is necessarily common to all such phenomena. The definition, the necessary and sufficient conditions, which Brentano actually gives of mental phenomena is that they 'are either presentations or they are based upon presentations'. (op. cit., §3, 80) By
"presentation" we do not mean that which is presented, but rather the presenting of it. This act of presentation forms the foundation not merely of the act of judging, but also of desiring and of every other mental act. Nothing can be judged, desired, hoped or feared, unless one has a presentation of that thing. Thus the definition given includes all ... the phenomena belonging to this domain. (loc. cit.)

In this passage Brentano is insisting on the distinction between the appearing of something and that which appears, as the basis for understanding the notion of presentation. This is a distinction, which in his opinion, is often conflated. The mental phenomena is the appearing as such, not that which appears. Given that this passage articulates Brentano's definition of mental phenomena, his doctrine of intentionality falls into place not as itself the definition of mental phenomena, but as a description of what is necessarily characteristic of mental phenomena as defined above.

It is also important to observe that Brentano, in his Psychology, in fact provides three separate, but nonetheless related, descriptions of mental phenomena: an enumeration of mental phenomena is set out in explicit contrast with examples of physical phenomena (op. cit., §2, 78-80); there is the doctrine of intentionality (op. cit., §5, 88); and, the observation that mental phenomena are only perceived in inner consciousness, and as such, are immediate, infallible and self-evident (op. cit., §6, 91). The third of these characterisations is intimately connected to the second, so much so that both descriptions constitute different views of the same aspect of mental phenomenon. Unfortunately, I will not here be able to discuss the intimate relation of intentionality with inner perception. What I shall argue is that the first description in terms of the enumeration and second description in terms of the doctrine of intentionality are, despite their relatedness, descriptions of different aspects of mental phenomena. They should not be taken as descriptions of the same aspect of mental phenomena. When taken as describing the same aspect, they
immediately lead to the common mis-characterisation of Brentano’s doctrine of
intentionality. Conversely, when not thus taken, they show what Brentano’s
doctrine really comes to.

Let us look at the first of these descriptions of mental phenomena, where
Brentano enumerates examples of mental phenomena and juxtaposes them to
physical phenomena. Brentano writes that

hearing a sound, seeing a colored object, feeling warmth or cold, as well
as similar states of imagination are examples of what I mean by [mental
phenomena]. I also mean by it the thinking of a general concept,
provided such a thing actually does occur. Furthermore, every
judgement, every recollection, every expectation, every inference, every
conviction or opinion, every doubt, is a mental phenomenon. Also to
be included under this term is every emotion: joy, sorrow, fear, hope,
courage, despair, anger, love, hate, desire, act of will, intention,
astonishment, admiration, contempt, etc. (Brentano 1973 PES, Bk II,
Chap. I, §2, 79)

By contrast,

e xamples of physical phenomena ... are a color, a figure, a landscape
which I see, a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, odor which I sense; as
well as similar images which appear in the imagination. (op. cit., 79-80)

Note that in this list of mental phenomena some phenomena have correlates
in the list of physical phenomena, for 'hearing a sound' we have 'a chord'.
Thus, for 'seeing a colored object' 'a color', etc. However, not all items in the
list of 'mental phenomena' have physical correlates, for this list also includes
judgements, recollections, expectations, acts of will, etc. This shows that the

1 'A landscape which I see' seems to be incongruous, given the other items on this list. The list is
comprised of those properties of a physical object from which our sensations are derived, and a
landscape is certainly not in any obvious sense the cause of a sensation. I think that Oskar Kraus is
correct in interpreting Brentano as meaning by 'landscape' 'extended colored shapes at some
distance from us' (Brentano 1973 PES, Bk II, Chap. I, §2, 80n); thus, reducing 'landscape' to
sensations, and maintaining its congruity with the other items in the list.
class of 'mental phenomena' comprises more than those mental phenomena which Brentano has here correlated with certain physical phenomena; this is an important point to keep in mind when we come to interpret Brentano's description of mental phenomena in terms of intentionality.

In addition to this let us also note that the correlation between elements of each of Brentano's lists is not fortuitous; Brentano is seeking to draw our attention to it. Take, for example, Brentano's examples of 'hearing a sound' and of 'a chord' which I hear. Brentano intends these as a correlate pair in the following sense: the first of these is the mental act itself, while the second is its sensuous content insofar as sensations may be considered as a sub-class of contents\(^2\). Notably, Husserl also interprets Brentano's distinction in this way (Husserl 1970(a) *LI* Vol. 2, Inv. V, Chap. II, §11, 573-4; 1982 *Ideas I*, Part III, Chap. II, §85, 206)\(^3\), and we shall have much cause, in Chapter 3, to draw upon Husserl's elaboration of this distinction.

This indicates something very often misunderstood: the class of physical phenomena, which Brentano is here correlating with psychical phenomena, is actually a rather restricted class. In particular, it does not include such everyday things as tables, chairs, etc. That by physical phenomena Brentano means physical things, is a common misunderstanding. Roderick Chisholm, for example, makes it. (Chisholm 1960 *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology*, 4) Against this misunderstanding Linda McAlister warns that

\(^2\) It has since come to my attention that Dermot Moran has independently come up with a similar interpretation of the relationship between mental and physical phenomena. (Moran 1996 'Brentano's Thesis', 20)

\(^3\) In an unrelated passage Brentano himself supports this interpretation of 'physical phenomena'. He writes that '[physical phenomena] are taken into account only as the content of mental phenomena when we describe the specific characteristics of the latter.' (Brentano 1973 *PES*, Bk II, Chap. I, §9, 100; my italics)
Brentano does not include everyday entities in his class of physical phenomena because he assumes that all immanent perceptual experience, for example, of a chair, could be reduced to the perception of sensible qualities, the various colours, tactile sensations, etc., that constitute the experience. Brentano, as I shall argue below, equivocates between the sensible qualities of things and the sensations caused in us by such sensible qualities. Nonetheless, and despite this equivocation, he is here distinguishing either sense from the thing itself. Consequently, in order to provide a complete account of all possible perceptual experiences, Brentano considers it only necessary to provide a taxonomy of the basic building blocks out of which all complexes of phenomena could be constructed.

Brentano's physical phenomena can be called the contents of perceptual acts. Content in this sense is the sensible property of a thing which causes the relevant sensation in us. We need to clearly distinguish this usage of the term 'content' from either Gottlob Frege (1984(b) 'On Sense and Meaning', 158) or Edmund Husserl's usage 'sense', as that which fixes reference. In the latter usage the content is that character possessed by a linguistic expression (Frege) or intentional act (Husserl) which determines the object to which the expression
or act is directed. It is the component of the expression or act that is common to all expressions or acts that pick out the same object. This second sense of content has its counterpart in Brentano's conception of mental phenomenon. As we shall see, in Chapter 2, the actual development of Brentano's thought should be understood as an attempt to articulate, and find a place, for this sense of content in his theory of intentionality. Thus, in order to understand Brentano, it is essential first to distinguish these two different senses of content so as then to elucidate their necessary interrelatedness. In this section, I shall concentrate on the notion of content qua content of perceptual acts.

As Husserl points out, there is a crucial ambiguity within Brentano's notion of physical phenomena. On the one hand, there is content qua the general, sensible universal qualities had by the object I perceive; and on the other hand, there is the content qua the particular, sensible moments of my perception of that object. (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part III. Chap. II, §85, 206) It is clearly the latter sense which Brentano has in mind for his physical phenomena; it is only in this sense that they can be understood as the immanent contents of the mind. It is because Brentano understood physical phenomena in this sense that commentators have interpreted him as proposing a version of phenomenalism. Content in the sense actually intended by Brentano is therefore something private. Content in the other sense, that is, content qua the objective, physical causes of content in the 'subjective' sense, is what is common to my act and yours. The two senses are deeply interrelated, but require distinction. Brentano fails to make this distinction, and this leads to a confusion in his work.
This confusion is most apparent in Brentano’s argument against the localisation of mental phenomena. One could only consider mental phenomena as having localisation, he argues, if one confuses mental with physical phenomena. Only by confusing the hearing of a sound, a mental phenomenon with no localisation, with the sound itself, the physical phenomenon with localisation, could one consider the mental phenomena to themselves have localisation. (Brentano 1973 PES, Bk II, Chap. I, §3, 83-4)

Against this argument one must, however, point out that if by physical phenomena one means the content immanent to the act, then it makes no more or less sense to locate them than it does to locate mental phenomena. Clearly, Brentano has confused the immanent content of the mental act with the objective property which is interpreted as being the cause of the immanent content.

Only because Brentano’s physical phenomena are contents in the immanent sense can they, despite Brentano’s failure to clearly do so, be distinguished from the object to which a mental act may be properly said to be directed. (cf Section 3) Physical phenomena, for Brentano, are the sense impressions of which perception of physical things are built up. When one undertakes an explicit analysis of perception, when, for example, one is engaged in descriptive psychology, then each sensible quality itself becomes an object, that is, the immanent object of an intentional relation. They become intentional objects,

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4 There is, of course, a sense in which mental phenomena have localisation: they are localised within the bounds defining my sense of self. Note, however, that I attribute this localisation only by taking a third person stance towards myself, as construing myself in this or that spatial relation to other objects. It makes little sense to localise my mental phenomena when I am living in the first person perspective, dealing with objects external to my sense of self. It is this latter sense that I take Brentano’s argument to be directed.

5 Despite this confusion on Brentano’s part the thrust of the argument remains valid, and requires only a subtle rephrasing to accommodate this distinction. We need only maintain that those who localise mental phenomena confuse the mental phenomena with the source of the immanent content of that mental act.
however, only after adopting an unnatural, philosophically motivated standpoint. In our everyday dealings with objects we do not attend to the sense-impressions, but, rather, to what we take to be the objects themselves. Thus, just because Brentano admits that sense-impressions can be intentional objects, does not commit him to maintaining that ordinary things, horses, chairs, etc., the bearers of content in the objective sense we distinguished above, could not themselves be intentional objects. Nothing Brentano says seems to preclude this; and, in fact, elsewhere, where he is not concerned to provide a taxonomy of physical phenomena, his examples of intentional objects are real objects such as horses, people, etc. (see Brentano 1966 T&E, Part I, Chap. 1, 14-5; Part III, Chap. 1, 77; op. cit., Add Ess XIV, 321)

Consequently, we should be wary of claiming that the objects of the intentional relation are necessarily the immanent physical phenomena, or complexes of such phenomena. It is this move which renders the intentional object as necessarily a real, immanent part of the mental, and thus as a phenomenal object. By resisting this move we are left open to interpret the physical phenomena as immanent to the intentional or mental acts, and, precisely for this reason, distinguishable from the physical things. We are now free to interpret the physical phenomena as the results of a transaction between subject and object, so to speak in the middle. These contents, in the second, subjective sense, when incorporated into truly intentional acts, can then be understood as pointing to the contents in the first, objective sense, that is, as properties common to my act and yours. This is indeed, as Husserl saw, how the two senses of content are interrelated. Brentano, when he talks about intentionality,
obsures this point by failing to distinguish between the content as the immanent part of a mental act; and the actual, objective property of the object.

By not conflating the immanent content with the intentional object one avoids a common misunderstanding of Brentano. He is often accused of holding a position ultimately incoherent and indeed contradictory because (1) given what one would ordinarily or intuitively understand the act as directed at, the external, non-immanent object of perception ended up immanent; while (2) given what one would ordinarily or intuitively take to be immanent to the mind, the intentional object of perception ends up being our perceptual sensations.

It is not hard to see how such an incoherent picture of intentionality could be attributed to Brentano: in his *Psychology* Brentano writes that mental phenomena

> are those phenomena which alone possess real existence as well as intentional existence. Knowledge, joy and desire really exist. Color, sound and warmth have only a phenomenal and intentional existence. (Brentano 1973 *PES*, Bk II, Chap. I, §7, 92-3; see also §9, 97-8)

It appears at first glance that Brentano is indeed endorsing a phenomenalistic account of the intentional object. However, by colour, sound, etc., Brentano means physical phenomena *in his sense*, and physical phenomena in his sense are not physical things. It is the immanent perceptual contents that, according to Brentano, do not have any real existence. This is to make no claim about the existential status of the physical object.

Brentano is led to conclude that the immanent perceptual contents have no real existence, in the first place, by natural science.
Man has the innate tendency to trust his senses. He believes in the actual existence of colours, tones and whatever else may be contained in a sensory presentation. After all, this is why one has spoken of outer perception, which, in its reliability, was placed side by side with the inner kind.

The experienced and, in particular, the scientifically enlightened [person] no longer has this trust. (Brentano 1995 DP, Part 2, 17)

Quite in line with the standard metaphysics of science which deriving from Descartes, Galileo7 and other scientifically minded thinkers of the seventeenth century, Brentano thinks that science teaches us that physical bodies do not have qualities of colour or sound, or the like. Our perception is understood as the result of physical properties acting upon our sense organs to generate sense-impressions, which we mistakenly regard as real properties of physical things. So, Brentano is led to think, insofar as the physical phenomena are by definition the qualitative phenomena of everyday experience, they cannot be real; they cannot be the properties of real physical things 'out there'.

Elsewhere, Brentano relies upon another kind of consideration to establish the irreality of sensory phenomena. For example, he cites the Lockean example of one's hand withdrawn from cold water feeling a different sensation of temperature from one's other hand removed from hot water if they are both immersed in the same water. (Brentano 1973 PES, Bk I, Chap. I, §2, 9-10) Thus, according to the law of non-contrariety, that the same thing cannot suffer contrary predicates, sensations of temperature cannot be said to really exist in

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7 This is, of course, an oversimplification of the differences between early modern philosophical positions. Galileo and others, Pierre Gassendi, for example, held an eliminativist attitude towards the sensory properties: sensory properties were considered to be no more than effects of an underlying reality. This, however, was not Descartes' position. For Descartes sensory qualities still retained a substantial position in his ontology, only they were relegated to the res cogitans. These differences aside, the essential point for our discussion which is common to both positions is that the sensory properties were held not to exist in physical nature, Descartes' res extensa. For more on this topic see Stephen Gaukroger's Descartes: An Intellectual Biography (1995, 345-6).
the water. This, however, does not prove that the temperature has no objective, qualitative identity in the water. One can only conclude that it does by begging the question, since a defender of the reality of qualitative properties could always say that the quality of heat experienced in the uncooled hand is genuine, whereas that experienced in the cooled hand is an illusion quite on a par with perceptual illusions involving those primary qualities which, according to Locke at least, are really in the things 'out there'. Where perception has not been manipulated, where it is functioning normally, the qualities it reveals are really in the objects perceived. Brentano does, at times, concede that there is no proof that sensory phenomena do not exist in the objects to which we ascribe them. (Brentano 1973 PES, Bk II, Chap. I, §7, 93) He does, however, imply that the weight of evidence should convince us to regard this as true.

So Brentano did consider sensory qualities to have only a phenomenal, not real, existence. This conviction of Brentano's is taken by many commentators to mean that the intentional object in general has no real existence, that is, that the intentional object is not something real, but rather, an irreal, mind dependent entity. (See, for example, Mulligan & Smith 1984 'Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind', 642; Smith 1994 Austrian Philosophy, 44-5) Such a generalisation loses its plausibility once we acknowledge that physical phenomena or immanent contents are to be distinguished from intentional objects per se, and can at best only be considered - and then only very questionably, as Brentano himself was later to realise - as a sub-class of intentional objects. At the very most all that Brentano has sought to establish is that the sense-impressions which are physical phenomena are not as they in fact appear to be, namely, sensory qualities in the intentional object. They are rather a subjective contribution to experience. He has not established, nor did
he mean to establish, that the object itself is subjective, that it is a mind dependent third thing.\footnote{Brentano himself supports this reading when he writes: 'For if we want to admit generally that it is certain that these acquired aptitudes [that is, cognitive capacities, such as the acquisition of a language] are tied up with real things (and I, at least, do not hesitate to do so, although there are other metaphysicians, John Stuart Mill for example, who would have reservations) ...'. (Brentano 1873 \textit{PES}, Bk I, Chap. III, §6, 60; see also \textit{op. cit.}, Bk II, Chap. II, §7, 122-3) In this passage Brentano explicitly distances himself from the phenomenalism of Mill, and asserts his conviction that thought is 'tied up with real things'.}

Whatever misuses Brentano may have put the distinction between mental and physical phenomena to, it is clear that what underlies the description is the distinction between act and its contents. This distinction is not the same as the distinction between the act and its object. The description of mental phenomena in juxtaposition to physical phenomena should not be confused with the description of mental phenomena in terms of its intentional character. Brentano has, so to speak, provided separate partial descriptions of the same phenomenon, where each partial description attempts to articulate a different aspect of that phenomenon.

§2

We may now examine the famous passage where Brentano describes mental phenomena in terms of the doctrine of intentionality:

\[\text{every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every}\]
mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. (Brentano 1973 PES, Bk II, Chap. I, §5, 88)

How are we to interpret this doctrine, that is to say, to understand what Brentano meant by his doctrine? What common misunderstandings has this passage been subject to?

Let us first of all make clear what the traditional interpretation of Brentano's doctrine of intentionality is actually claiming. Among the growing number of commentators on Brentano the work of Barry Smith stands out as providing an insightful and profitable presentation of Brentanian doctrines. Smith points out that Brentano's concept of intentionality 'has proved to be one of the most influential in all of contemporary philosophy.' (Smith 1994 Austrian Philosophy, 35) He goes on, however, to say that Brentano's doctrine of intentionality has been repeatedly misunderstood. While I agree with Smith on the influence of Brentano's doctrine and that it has been often misunderstood, I disagree as to the precise nature of this misunderstanding.

The point at issue is what is meant by the 'intentional (or mental) inexistence' of an object. More specifically, the question revolves around whether or not the intentional object is to be interpreted as a third thing, a tertium quid, that hovers between the mind and what we would normally call its object, that is, the object in the external world - a third thing which is at the same time something the mental act is directed at. According to Smith one misunderstands Brentano's doctrine if one interprets the intentional act 'as directed to external objects'. (op. cit., 42) As Smith interprets Brentano, the intentional object is indeed a third thing as defined above. Smith implies that
the interpretation according to which Brentano regards the intentional relation as directed to external objects is the standard one, but he only cites one source for this interpretation, namely, the first edition of Michael Dummet's book the *Origins of Analytic Philosophy*. (loc. cit.) By and large, however, most commentators agree with Smith in his claim that, according to Brentano, the intentional object is not the external object. We find, for example, the intentional object interpreted as a third thing in the commentaries of Oskar Kraus (1919, 26), Herbert Spiegelberg (1936, 120; 1960, 40), Marvin Farber (1943, 12-3), Roderick Chisholm (1967b, 201), Gustav Bergmann (1967, 269-70), Linda McAlister (1974, 154fn), Dagfinn Follesdal (1982(a), 72), John Searle (1983, 14), David Bell (1990, 9), Richard Sorabji (1991, 247) and of course in Smith's own work itself.

Elsewhere, George Nakhnikian, in his introduction to Husserl's *The Idea of Phenomenology*, provides us with a succinct formulation of the traditional interpretation of Brentano's doctrine of intentionality. He writes that

[i]t is also possible to interpret Brentano as saying that on *every* occasion of a mental act, whether there be a physical thing as referent or not, there is an intentionally inexistent entity; so that, for example, when I desire the apple in front of me, the apple is the object of my desire in

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9 Interestingly Spiegelberg in his 1960 *The Phenomenological Movement*, suggests that this interpretation might in fact be wrong; he writes that [Brentano's] characterization of the psychological phenomenon makes use of two phrases: "intentional inexistence" and "reference to a content." It is the first of these phrases which has attracted most attention, and it has even given rise to the view, supported by both anti-scholastic and neo-scholastic critics, that this whole doctrine was nothing but a loan from medieval philosophy. While a quick reading of the passage may seem to confirm this view, it is nevertheless misleading. "Intentional inexistence," which literally implies the existence of an "intentio" inside the intending being, as if embedded in it, is indeed a Thomistic conception. But it is precisely this conception which Brentano did not share, or which in any case he abandoned, to the extent of finally even dropping the very term "intentionality." (Spiegelberg 1960 *The Phenomenological Movement* Vol. 1, 40)

In this passage Spiegelberg has dropped his explicit commitment to interpreting Brentano's 1874 doctrine as endorsing a third thing. Instead, he leaves it open as to whether Brentano's original conception involved such a commitment.
one sense of "object," namely, as the thing that could satisfy my desire; but there is also another object, the intentionally inexistent apple which is the common and peculiar element in all desires of apples. (Nakhnikian 1964 in Husserl 1964 Idea, XIV fn)

In this passage it is clear that the intentionally inexistent object is understood as in some sense having 'being', however loosely this is understood, in the sense of being an entity in its own right.

It is not surprising that such an interpretation of Brentano's doctrine has gained such widespread acceptance. Oskar Kraus, who was one of Brentano's closest students, writes in his influential book *Franz Brentano: Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre* that

> [a]lready when [Brentano] wrote the *Psychology*, what he saw as the essential feature of every 'psychic phenomenon' was ... the direction towards an object, the so-called 'intentional relation'. Which he, however, at that time, still understood as the 'mental inexistence' of the object, as 'immanent objectivity'. (Kraus 1919, 26; my translation)

Kraus goes on to write of 'immanent objectivity' as the 'doctrine of the indwelling of the object' (*op. cit.*; my translation), indwelling, that is, in the mental act. Here we have it clearly stated by one of Brentano's pupils that the intentional object was, at least at the time of writing his *Psychology*, necessarily a third thing mediating between mind and its object in the world.

However, if the common misunderstanding of what Brentano takes the intentional object to be is *not*, *pace* Smith, that it is the external object, what is this common misunderstanding? In my opinion this misunderstanding is precisely Smith's interpretation, more particularly, the claim made by him, and,

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10 We might also note that, according to Nakhnikian, Brentano regarded the intentionally inexistent entity not merely as a third thing intentionally inexistent between the act and the real, existing apple, but also something *universal*!
as we have seen, by so many others, that the intentional object is a third thing. Far from clearing up the misunderstandings associated with Brentano's doctrine, Smith is merely reiterating them.

It is worth noting in this regard that Brentano's most famous student and critic, Edmund Husserl, nowhere explicitly attributes to his teacher the doctrine of the third thing. When in the *Logical Investigations* Husserl does criticise Brentano's account of intentionality, he directs his criticisms towards the lack of clarity with which Brentano presented his account, a lack of clarity which may *lead* to misunderstandings of the doctrine. Husserl sees a source of misunderstanding in Brentano's suggestion 'that we are dealing with a relation between two things, both present in equally real fashion (reell) in consciousness, an act and an intentional object'. (Husserl 1970(a) *LI* Vol. 2, Inv. V, Chap. II, §11, 557) Underlying this criticism is Husserl's denial of Brentano's doctrine of inner perception, according to which, in every intentional relation two objects are given, its intentional object, as primary, and the act itself as secondary. There is no room here to discuss this part of Brentano's work; however, what is important for our purposes is that this criticism makes no mention of the intentional object as a third thing residing somewhere between the act and the object in the world.

Husserl also suggests that Brentano's account implies 'that we are dealing with a real (realen) event or a real (reales) relationship, taking place between 'consciousness' or 'the ego', on the one hand, and the thing of which there is consciousness, on the other'. (loc. cit.) As we shall see below, this criticism correctly identifies a fault in Brentano's original presentation which he himself came to recognise. This fault is, however, no doctrine of the intentional object as third thing, as is so often maintained. Nor is Brentano's subsequent correction of his original presentation a matter of rejecting such a doctrine,
since he claims he never held such a doctrine. As I shall argue in the next chapter (cf Section 4), what Brentano comes to reject is his original commitment to a truly relational, hence, extensionalist, account of reference, and the attendant ontology it invoked. In fact when Husserl himself comes to criticise the absurdity of the belief in such a third thing as an immanent object, he makes no mention of Brentano. (Husserl 1970(a) *LI* Vol. 2, Inv. V, Chap. II, App. to §§11 & 20, 593-6) Nowhere does Husserl ever characterise Brentano's doctrine as conceiving the intentional object as existing or quasi-existing somewhere in the mind, possibly between it and the transcendent, external object 'outside'.

Nonetheless, it has been Kraus' interpretation that has gained the most widespread acceptance. We can trace the spread of this interpretation of Brentano's doctrine into the English speaking philosophical community, back to the influential commentaries of Herbert Spiegelberg. (Spiegelberg 1936; 1960) Spiegelberg claims that

in Brentano the term 'intentional' is intimately connected with a conception of the experiential structure according to which all objects to which an experience relates are at the same time contained in this experience, they exist within it ... In Brentano the word 'intentional' is thus synonymous with 'immanent' and stands in contrast to 'transcendent', and 'intentional object' is synonymous with 'immanent object'. (Spiegelberg 1936 "Intention" and "Intentionality" in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl', 120)

Here, as with Kraus' interpretation, we find 'objects', in the sense of 'intentional objects', explicitly understood as having some kind of quasi-existence in the mind. It is precisely this interpretation that has become the standard
interpretation of Brentano’s doctrine. As I shall subsequently argue, it is, however, wrong as an interpretation of Brentano.

§3

Brentano himself resisted the interpretation of his notion of ‘intentional object’ as an immanent, mind dependent entity. Even those commentators who interpret Brentano’s early doctrine of intentionality as ascribing immanence to the object accept that this doctrine cannot be attributed to his later work. After all, in 1917, Brentano dictates that someone who is thinking of a stone is not thinking of it as a thought-of stone, but as a stone. Otherwise, when he affirms it he would also be affirming it only as a thought-object, and a person who is denying the stone will do that, once he is conscious of denying it, just as much as the person who is affirming it will. (Brentano 1973 PES, Add Ess XIV, 321)

This later passage undeniably expresses antipathy to the idea of the intentional object, the referent of the intentional relation, as a third, mind dependent thing. Brentano’s position here is quite contrary to any such notion: the referent of the intentional relation is expressly said to be the real thing in the world. It is a feature of Brentano’s later writings that he found the supposition of such a third thing quite untenable; he writes, for example, to Oskar Kraus that ‘[i]t is paradoxical in the extreme to say that a man promises to marry an ens rationis and fulfils his promise by marrying a real person’. (op. cit., cf Oskar Kraus’ Introduction to the 1924 ed., 385; 1966 T&E, cf Oskar Kraus’ notes, 174) Here Brentano explicitly wants to draw attention to the difference between the real object in the world and the object of thought, and to stress the absurdity
involved in saying that it is the object of thought with which one deals as the direct object\textsuperscript{12}. As a consequence of such textual evidence about what Brentano believed later in his life, commentators who ascribe the belief in a third thing to Brentano have to distinguish this position as an earlier one from his later position. (see Kraus 1919 \textit{Franz Brentano}, 26; Spiegelberg 1936 ""Intention" and "Intentionality" in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl', 121) Thus, amongst such commentators there is the general consensus that Brentano had changed his doctrine about the referent of an intentional relation. The date of this change in doctrine is agreed to be sometime before 1905, which is the year that Brentano's extant writings contain explicit arguments to the effect that the intentional object must necessarily be a thing, that is, a physical object.

The question is, however, whether Brentano's later explicit denial of the intentional object as a third thing constitutes a self-criticism, and thus a genuine progression from an earlier to a later position. Certainly, Brentano himself did not understand this denial as a progression or development in his thought. He explicitly maintained that he had \textit{never} changed his doctrine as to the referent of an intentional relation, and that his later exposition was consistent with his earlier position. In 1905 he wrote to Anton Marty that

\begin{quote}
[i]t has never been my opinion that the immanent object is identical with the 'object represented'. The representation does not have the 'represented object', but, rather, 'the thing'; thus, for example, the representation of a horse has not the 'represented horse', rather, 'horse' as its object - object taken in the sense of immanent object and thus in the only genuine sense in which one could speak of an object here at all\textsuperscript{13}. (Brentano 1958 \textit{W&E}, Abt. III, Kap. I, 87-8; my translation)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{12} Brentano is not alone in realising the substantial difference between the real object in the world and the object of thought. We can also find this point addressed in various writings by Gottlob Frege, see, for example, 'Sense and Meaning' (Frege 1984 \textit{Collected Papers}, 161-2); the 'Review of E. G. Husserl, \textit{Philosophie der Arithmetik I}' (op. cit. 207-8); and 'Thoughts' (op. cit., 360-4).

\textsuperscript{13} Note here that Brentano is talking here of the immanent object, which he is distinguishing from the existent entity in the world (\textit{was außerhalb des Geistes ist}). His point is that this
What are we to make of these conflicting claims? On the one hand there seems to be a consensus that Brentano, in the early period of his work, is proposing the view that the intentional object is a third thing. On the other, we have Brentano’s insistence that he never meant this, and that he had always considered the referent of an intentional relation to be the real ‘external’ thing we would normally take it to be. There are three possibilities here, either (a) the commentators are right, and Brentano did change his mind, only to try to misrepresent retrospectively both his earlier doctrine and his own subsequent development; (b) there was in fact no change in doctrine at all between the earlier and later positions; so that any distinction between an early or later position is spurious; or, (c) that there is a difference between the earlier and later positions, one which does not concern the referent of an intentional relation per se, but, rather, a different, albeit related belief which Brentano held up until about 1905. I shall argue for the third option: Brentano’s conception of the referent of the intentional relation was the same in both the early and late periods of his work, only what changed in his doctrine was what could count as an intentional object proper.

In order to see that the third option is in fact the case, a careful reading of Brentano’s rather dense 1874 definition is necessary. Several of the clauses therein are precisely the ones usually cited as evidence for the standard interpretation according to which Brentano regarded the intentional object, the referent of an intentional relation, as a third thing immanent to the mind. In the first place, the phrase ‘intentional inexistence’ is itself generally interpreted as a commitment to the third thing. I shall examine, in Section 5, Spiegelberg’s immanent object is not a representation of an object, a tertium quid, but rather the sense of the object, the ens rationis (cf Chapter 2 Section 2), by which the object is referred to.
influential argument for this reading, and in Section 6, challenge the central premise of this argument. Secondly, the parenthetical remark 'which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing' might also be cited as evidence for the standard interpretation, that is, for the doctrine of the third thing. I shall leave it until Chapter 2 to show that this reading rests on a misunderstanding of the point of the remark. Moreover, I shall argue that an understanding of the sense of this remark explains just what it is that changed in Brentano's thinking between the early and later periods. By providing the correct interpretations of the various clauses I will be able to reconstruct Brentano's doctrine of the intentional in its intended sense.

§4

Before embarking on a detailed examination of Brentano's doctrine of intentionality let us make some distinctions which are important for understanding the sense of any theory of intentionality. In the first place there is an ambiguity in the notion of reference. In one sense reference can mean the property of a mental state or linguistic expression in virtue of which it points out into the world and determines a certain object as what must exist if its pointing is to be 'successful', that is, to really meet with an object. Let us call this first sense - reference in an intensionalist sense - 'R1'. On the other hand, reference can mean 'relation to an object', that is, reference in the sense of successful reference R1. Where reference in the sense of R1 is 'successful', there must exist something to which the mental state refers. Let us call such successful reference 'R2'. Even in a case of successful reference R2, it is still an open question as to how the reference relation R1 reaches its object. On this
reading R2 implies R1. This is indeed how the intensionalist account of reference would construe the relationship between R1 and R2.

However, if one conceives of mental reference as genuinely relational, which is a possible interpretation of Brentano’s doctrine of intentionality, then one effectively obliterates the distinction between reference R1 and successful reference R2 (successful reference R1 = reference R2). For a relation, in any standard sense, to be instantiated both relata must exist; consequently, in a truly relational model of mental reference, there is no sense in differentiating between reference as determining an object, R1, and reference as successful reference, R2. Thus, by interpreting reference as truly relational, one is unable to capture reference in the sense of R1, that is, as intensional. Instead, one finds oneself committed to what we might call an extensionalist account of reference.

As is well known a relational or extensionalist account of mental reference cannot accommodate with any ease the possibility that the referent does not exist, whether the referent be fictitious, the perception nonveridical, or the judgement erroneous. Consider, for example, my maintaining the seemingly correct judgement 'I believe that Pegasus is a winged horse'. In a quite ordinary sense of the word, my belief involves a reference to an entity, Pegasus. Unfortunately, 'Pegasus', is not generally held to in fact exist, accordingly, if we endorse the view that mental reference is truly relational, we would be forced to conclude that it is impossible for me to think of Pegasus or any other non-existent object, which is palpably false. If in the case where the object of mental reference does not exist, this object is inessential for the mental activity, then neither is the object of relevance in the case where it does in fact exist. Similar considerations apply in cases of nonveridical perception or erroneous judgement: the non-existence of the referent does not alter their character as perceptions or judgements.
We see then that there is a case for considering the actual object, qua thing or real entity referred to by the mental activity, as external to, and not a constitutive element of, that activity. This means that reference has to be conceived of primarily as reference R1, that is, as intensional: reference as primarily a property of a mental state or linguistic expression which determines a certain object as what must exist if the pointing to is to be successful. Note, however, that the pointing need not be successful.

For obvious naturalist reasons the idea of regarding the reference of a mental state as a causal transaction between the mental state and the world is attractive. If, however, one interprets reference thus, one is committed to construing it extensionally. Thus, the difficulty an extensional conception of reference has in dealing with error and reference failure is a difficulty for any such causal conception. The ability to deal with error or reference failure indicates the fundamentally 'normative' character of reference which is only captured by a genuinely intensional notion of reference. Against any extensional conception of reference, the intensional notion emphasises the fact that certain mental states and experiences seem to be states or experiences intrinsically subject to a standard. That is, they are intrinsically 'normative' in the sense that they have essentially the property of determining a certain condition or object as what must exist in order for these mental states or experiences to be 'successful', 'in order', or 'as they "ought" to be' qua the kind of mental state or experience that they are. This is what it means to say that reference in the sense of R1 'has the property of determining a certain object as what must be the case if its pointing
is to be in order' - I stress 'determining' because they do not involve an object\textsuperscript{14} qua object in the everyday sense\textsuperscript{15}.

Thus, beliefs and perceptions are intrinsically subject to the standards of correctness; perceptions and beliefs can be right or wrong and indeed this is what we are getting at when we describe beliefs as true, perceptions as veridical (and conversely, as false and erroneous)\textsuperscript{16}. In using these adjectives we are most emphatically not just saying that these mental states as a matter of fact reflect how things are. This would be to treat them as comparable to the utterance in a play of the sentence 'We came here yesterday', which may express an objective truth, but is, however, neither seriously asserted by the actor nor possibly believed by him\textsuperscript{17}. When we speak of beliefs and perceptions as true or veridical, we are stating not merely that they articulate an objective truth \textit{but also that in virtue of this fact they are 'as they pretend, hence ought to be'}. These facts are what motivate the very term 'intentionality' and the frequent descriptions of intentional states as somehow 'trying' to have a content which is realised (true, fulfilled, satisfied, veridical, etc.).

\textsuperscript{14} That is, the intentional object does not include any object other than the subject which bears the intentional relation.

\textsuperscript{15} It is in this sense that John Searle uses the term 'representation' in his locution 'every Intentional state consists of a representative content'. (Searle 1983 \textit{Intentionality}, 11) According to Searle the representation is not a picture or an object in any standard sense (op. cit., 11-2), but, rather, the 'conditions of satisfaction' or 'conditions of success' appropriate to the psychological mode. (op. cit., 10)

\textsuperscript{16} This is what Husserl is getting at when he writes of the narrower sense of intention corresponding to a fulfilment: 'In our metaphor an act of \textit{hitting the mark} corresponds to that of aiming, and just so certain acts correspond as ‘achievements’ or ‘fulfilments’ to other acts as ‘intentions’ (whether of the judging or the desiring sort). The image therefore fits these latter acts quite perfectly; fulfilments are, however, themselves acts, i.e. ‘intentions’, although they are not intentions - at least not in general - in that narrow sense which points to corresponding fulfilments. (Husserl 1970 \textit{LI} Vol. 2, Inv. V, Chap. II, §14, 563)

\textsuperscript{17} I am indebted to Bruin Christensen for bringing this point to my attention.
The traditional account of Brentano's early doctrine of intentionality assumes that he understands reference as extensional and interprets his account of intentionality in this light. I do not wish to question this assumption. What I do want to question is the account of the referent of this intentional relation to which this assumption has led those who made it. As we have seen, according to the traditional account the referent of the intentional relation is interpreted as an immanent, mind dependent entity. We saw in the previous section that Brentano himself resists this interpretation of the intentional object, and I think he did so consistently. For Brentano, the intentional object, if it did indeed exist, was the physical object in the world. Thus, the reference relation was not between the subject and an immanent object, but between the subject and the transcendent object, the physical object in the world. At the same time this relation was indeed seen by Brentano as a genuinely extensional relation.

My claim that Brentano's early doctrine of intentionality, while implicitly committing itself to an extensional notion of reference, understood one of its relata as transcendent to the relation, will no doubt appear contradictory. Surely we can only sensibly conceive of a transcendent relatum if we interpret 'reference' in the sense of R1. What we have is a conflict in Brentano's early formulation of this doctrine of intentionality. On the one hand, he was implicitly committed to the extensionalist assumption that mental reference was akin to an everyday relation, in which case both relata must exist if the relation was to be instantiated. In his earlier writings he was convinced that there must be a referent, and this led him to assume that the content of the act just was the object of the intentional relation. (see Brentano 1973 PES, Bk II, Chap. I, §5, 88) More precisely, he did not conceive of the act's having a content as opposed to, or distinct from, its object. This was the case whether the object was a really existing physical thing, a fictitious object, or an abstract object such as a proposition.
In short, in his earlier writings Brentano simply failed to make any tripartite distinction between act, act content and the act’s object. He tried to make do with a naive conception of reference as a real relation. Later he was able to formulate a more intensionalist account of reference, which conceived of reference in the sense of R1. Only then was he able to characterise the content of the act as a property of the act rather than the act’s object. (cf Chapter 2 Section 4)

Even so, Brentano, even in his earlier writings was poised to articulate a sense of reference R1, despite his implicit commitment to an extensionalist notion. That he was so poised is suggested by the mere fact that he chose to reappropriate the term ‘intentional’ from the Scholastics. As we shall see below (cf Section 6), there is considerable evidence that Thomas Aquinas, who Brentano regarded as his teacher (Brentano 1966 T&E, App. II, §3, 141), was struggling to articulate this sense of reference. This is mildly paradoxical because it is to the scholastic roots of Brentano’s doctrine of intentionality that Spiegelberg turns in order to show that Brentano did intend the intentional object to be interpreted as an immanent, mind dependent entity.

§5

In his 1936 article ”‘Intention” and "Intentionality” in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl’ Spiegelberg reads Brentano's definition as providing two distinct characterisations of mental phenomena. The first of these is couched in terms of the ‘intentional inexistence’ of their objects, the second in terms of the idea of
‘reference to a content (or object)\(^{18}\). It is central to Spiegelberg’s discussion of Brentano’s doctrine of intentionality that we take these two conceptions as in fact being inconsistent with one another.

Spiegelberg regards the latter conception as Brentano’s original contribution to philosophy because it avoids any mention of the third thing; according to Spiegelberg, however, Brentano himself had not in 1874 understood this import - this was left to his student Husserl. (Spiegelberg 1936 "‘Intention" and "Intentionality" in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl’, 122) On the other hand, the former conception is understood as highly scholastic, and according to Spiegelberg, involves the third thing in the guise of the scholastic *intentio*: the expression ‘intentional’ ‘is intimately connected with a conception of the experiential structure according to which all objects to which an experience relates are at the same time contained in this experience, they exist within it.’ (loc. cit.) The centrality Brentano gave to the concept of intentional inexistence shows, Spiegelberg argues, that in line with his Scholastic roots, Brentano did initially conceive of the intentional object, the referent of the intentional relation, as a third thing ‘in’ the mind, if only to later abandon it.

Let us consider Spiegelberg’s understanding of the Scholastic *intentio*. He assumes that in scholastic philosophy ‘intentional inexistence’ literally implies the existence of an *intentio* inside the intending subject:

> the term “intentio,” as used in scholastic philosophy, signifies the peculiar image or likeness formed in the soul in the process of acquiring knowledge, thus representing, as it were, a kind of distillate from the world outside. This “intentio” is linked up with the so-called species theory of human knowledge, which goes back to Aristotle’s theory of

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\(^{18}\) It needs to be remembered that Brentano at the time of the *Psychology* did not differentiate between ‘content’ and ‘object’. Consequently Spiegelberg is merely following Brentano in using these terms as interchangeable with one another.
perception as the reception of the form of an object without its matter. ... Never is there any suggestion of a reference to an object as the distinguishing characteristic of these "intentions." (Spiegelberg 1960 *The Phenomenological Movement* Vol. 1, 40)

The first part of this quote suggests that the *intentio* is the sense or content of the act, as opposed to its object, and in a manner not unlike more Fregean/Husserlian conceptions. However, the second part, beginning 'Never is ...', might well be taken as suggesting that while the Scholastics had such a notion of sense, they tended to confuse it with reference. On the one hand, both the immanence and the 'pictorial' character of the *intentio* suggest its status as a representation of the intentional object, that is, as something like a sense; on the other, a lack of appreciation of its character as being about something, as representing something other than itself, or as a thing similar to something other than itself, suggests a tendency to confuse the *intentio* with the *intentum*, that is, with the intentional object in the sense of referent. Spiegelberg, however, does not take things this way: Rather than concluding that the Scholastics may have been guilty of this confusion, Spiegelberg wants the *intentio* to be understood as unambiguously a referent immanent to the mental act, an unambiguous reading he assumes Brentano also adopts.

There are grounds, however, for being wary of Spiegelberg's unambiguous reading of the Scholastic *intentio*, and derivatively of Brentano's usage of the expression 'intentionality', which Brentano explicitly acknowledges as having Scholastic origins. (Brentano 1973 *PES*, Bk II, Chap. I, §5, 88fn) The etymological root of 'intentionality' is the Latin *intentio* which is the nominalisation of *intendere*, 'to stretch out forth', 'to bend a bow', 'to aim or direct towards a thing'. The Latin term does, however, also have the figurative sense of 'a directing of the mind towards any thing', and it is this sense that Brentano, and Husserl after him, appear to be drawing upon. In this light the *intentio* does
indeed suggest a third thing, but not as the referent of the intentional relation, but qua the sense of the relation. (see Chapter 2 Section 4) This point seems lost on Spiegelberg.

When accounting for why after 1905 Brentano became wary of the term 'intentional' Spiegelberg cites a footnote added in 1911 to the second edition of the Psychology. In this footnote Brentano writes that

[This expression [i.e. 'intentionality'] has been misunderstood in that some people thought it had to do with intention and the pursuit of a goal. In view of this, I might have done better to avoid it all together. (Brentano 1973 PES, Bk II, Chap. V, §2, 180fn)

That Brentano did not want the term 'intentional' to be interpreted as 'the pursuit of a goal' is right. However, Spiegelberg regards this particular possibility of misinterpretation as Brentano's sole reason for becoming dissatisfied with the terminology of 'intentionality' which he had used in his 1874 definition. Spiegelberg, in his 1936 article, does not think that Brentano may have reconsidered using the expression 'intentional inexistence' precisely because his audience, among whom Spiegelberg must be included, had misinterpreted it as implying some kind of immanent 'being' as the referent of the relation.

Moreover, by emphasising the unwanted implication of the pursuit of a goal as Brentano's reason for his dissatisfaction with the term, Spiegelberg can make it sound plausible that Brentano was willing to give up the expression 'intentional' 'in order to throw the mental inexistence of the mental phenomena into even bolder relief'. (Spiegelberg 1936 "Intention" and "Intentionality" in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl', 121) Spiegelberg finds justification for this claim in the remainder of the 1911 footnote: after
declaring that he might well have done better to avoid the term 'intentional',
Brentano goes on to write that

[i]instead of the term "intentional" the Scholastics very frequently used the term "objective." This has to do with the fact that something is an object for the mentally active subject, and, as such, is present in some manner in his consciousness ... (Brentano 1974 PES, Bk II, Chap. V, §2, 180-lfn)

This Spiegelberg takes as proof that in 1874 Brentano meant by the 'intentional' 'nothing but that which is present, immanent in consciousness'. (Spiegelberg 1936 "'Intention" and "Intentionality" in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl', 121) By dropping the term 'intentional', and replacing it with 'objective', Spiegelberg thinks, Brentano could avoid the unwanted nuance of 'pursuance of goal' and thus focus attention on the immanence of the mental act's referent.

We should be suspicious that this is an accurate reconstruction of Brentano's thought. In the first place, if, as Spiegelberg himself later claims, Brentano's use of the term 'intentional' is original, if he does not confer the same sense on it as did the Scholastics such as Aquinas (Spiegelberg 1960 The Phenomenological Movement, 40), then why does the move not apply to his use of 'objective'? After all, Brentano is explicitly equating 'intentional' with 'objective'. Secondly, this footnote upon which Spiegelberg draws is from the 1911 edition of the Psychology, which is after the recognised date of Brentano's supposed rejection of the idea that the referent of an intentional relation was an entity indwelling in the act itself. If Spiegelberg is correct then it is puzzling in the extreme why the later Brentano, who has rejected the immanent inexistence of the intentional object, would wish to explain his doctrine by invoking it. It will not do to answer that he was explaining his earlier doctrine not the later, because, as we have seen, he denies that third things were a part of his earlier doctrine.
By relying on this rather dubious line of reasoning Spiegelberg is free to interpret the development of Brentano's thought in what is now the traditional manner. After Brentano had dispensed with the 'intentional' (because of its suggestion of the pursuit of a goal), all that remained of his doctrine is the clause which involves mention of 'mental reference to something as object', which, Spiegelberg concedes, Brentano was the first to point out. (Spiegelberg 1936 "Intention" and "Intentionality" in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl', 121) Spiegelberg further concludes that, pace the early Brentano, this characterisation of mental phenomena in no way necessitates or motivates the terminology of 'intentionality', because 'objects to which I direct myself do not by any means have to exist immanently.' (loc. cit.)

Brentano, it seems to Spiegelberg, has confused 'intentional inexistence', and its implication of an immanent object, with 'reference to something as object'. It is because of this confusion on his part that Brentano occupies a strange position on the dividing line between the medieval and the modern conception [of intentionality]. On the one hand, his use of the term 'intentional' is highly scholastic; on the other hand, the conception of mental reference, which does not yet bear the designation 'intentional' is modern. (op. cit., 122)

Thus Brentano's contribution to the philosophy of mind is to have provided the phrase 'reference to an object'. Meanwhile, it is assumed that Brentano remained otherwise scholastic in his belief that this object was an entity within the mind, a third thing. In such a manner, Spiegelberg's 1936 article set the stage as to how Brentano has come to be recognised by the general philosophical community today.
As already noted, Spiegelberg's reading of Brentano's doctrine of intentionality hinges upon understanding the 1874 definition as containing two distinct and ultimately inconsistent characterisations of mental phenomena: as having an immanent intentional object which enjoys 'intentional inexistence' and 'reference to something as object'. (Spiegelberg 1960 *The Phenomenological Movement*, 40) By contrast, Ausonio Marras has argued, 'the idea of reference to an object not only is not incompatible with the scholastic idea of intentional inexistence, but is in fact constitutive of that very idea'. (Marras 1974 'Scholastic Roots of Brentano's Conception of Intentionality', 129) If Marras is here correct, then Spiegelberg's argument, to the effect that the early Brentano did think of the intentional object as a third thing, loses its central premise.

There is ample textual evidence in Aquinas that Spiegelberg has misunderstood the sense of the *intentio*, and that it is compatible with the notion of reference to something as object. First of all let us consider the mode of being which the *intentio* has in the understanding. If Spiegelberg is right in construing the *intentio* as an individual entity in the understanding, then there must be two separate entities, each existing in their own right, one in the empirical world, the real object one would normally take as the act's referent, the other in the understanding. This, however, is not how Aquinas describes the being of the *intentio* in the understanding: he writes that

> it is proper to [the human intellect] that [it] know a form existing in corporeal matter, but not as existing in this individual matter. But to know what is in individual matter, yet not as existing in such matter, is to abstract the form from individual matter ... (Aquinas 1945 *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas* Vol 1, 813)
According to Aquinas, any individual entity has a form in virtue of which it is of such and such a kind. At the same time it has matter which individuates it as this particular thing and no other. In the passage, just quoted, Aquinas is saying that to perceive any empirical object is to abstract its form. However, to abstract its form is not literally to remove the thing's matter and take its form literally into the mind as an additional individual entity. Consequently, the form, *qua intentio*, need not at all be conceived of as a substance, a thing or entity, in its own right; it can safely remain an aspect, a dependent feature, of the object cognised. That is, only if the form is conceived of as quite literally abstracted from the matter could it be an individual entity, a third thing, in the mind, distinct from both the external object and the intellect. The *intentio* has being as a modification of the subject, of which the intellect is one part, and is individuated by the substance of that very subject, not in virtue of any substantial being as an individual in its own right. The *intentio* is not necessarily an entity in the mind; it may merely be an aspect or property of the subject, in its capacity as a subject mentally involved with objects.

On the basis of this interpretation, Marras argues that we should understand Aquinas' *intentio* not as an object, as does Spiegelberg, but rather as a species.

To say that an object *exists formally* (immaterially, intentionally, etc.) in the subject is merely to say that the *form* of the object exists in the subject ... As soon as we recast the original claim in this way it becomes clear that the sense of existence postulated by the doctrine of intentional inexistence is to be assimilated not to the sense of existence in 'the Parthenon exists', nor even to the shadowy sense of subsistence in 'Pegasus subsists (in some possible world)', but rather to the sense of existence in 'Redness exists _in the rose_. In other words, a careful reading of scholastic texts reveals that the 'formal existence' of an object in a subject is to be understood by reference to the *attributive* or *predicational* sense of existence according to which we say that a form or attribute exists in, or is *exemplified* by, an object - the object in this case being the mentally active subject himself. As the Scholastics put it, the form of the object exists in the subject as an attribute or *modification* of the subject. (Marras 1974 'Scholastic Roots of Brentano's Conception of Intentionality', 131)
Marras' point is that the doctrine of intentional inexistence does not necessarily commit us to the perverse idea of individual objects existing in two senses, real existence and a somewhat shadowier intentional inexistence. In order to understand the original doctrine of intentional inexistence or formal existence, we need to distinguish between the existence of things, the existence of attributes or forms in things, and the existence of forms 'in' the knowing subject.

There is, however, for Aquinas, a difference between the being of the form in the external object, and its being in the subject as a principle of knowledge: '[i]t is evident that the form of a stone existing within a soul has a far different nature from the form existing in matter, but inasmuch as it represents the stone, it is a principle which can lead to knowledge.' (Aquinas 1952 Truth Vol. 1, 374)

To understand how, according to Aquinas, this process of abstraction is enacted, we must appreciate that between the form as it is instantiated in the material object, and the form in the intellect, there is an intermediate stage. This intermediate stage is a phantasm, which resides in the corporeal organs or senses, and, hence, is still an individual. It is here that the form of the external object, though stripped of its original substance, is first represented. (Aquinas 1945 The Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas Vol. 1, 813) The next step 'is to abstract the form from individual matter which is represented by the phantasms' (loc. cit.), whence the intellect can be said to know the external object. This here is the point of entry, according to Aquinas' epistemology, of the 'intentio' or 'species': 'the intellect knows bodies by understanding them, not indeed through bodies, nor through material and corporeal likeness, but
through immaterial and intelligible species, which can be in the soul by their own essence.' (Aquinas 1945 *The Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas* Vol. 1, 785) To sum up, the passage of the form from its real existence in things to its existence 'in' the knowing subject is as follows: the form of the external object is stripped of its original matter in the senses. It is then stripped of all individuating properties by the intellect, where the form resides in the manner of intelligible species.

What does it mean for the species to 'be in the soul by their own essence'? Here we need to understand just how Aquinas thought that the intelligible species represented, or was a likeness of, the form of the external object. Aquinas distinguishes two means by which one thing may be said to be a likeness of another. The first of these is agreement in 'common nature' (Aquinas 1952 *Truth* Vol. 1, 74), where form effects like form.

It is according to the form of the effect pre-existing in the agent that the effect attains likeness to the agent, for an agent produces its like with respect to the form by which it acts. Now, in some cases the form of the agent is received in the effect according to the same mode of being it has in the agent; the form of fire generated has the same mode of being as the form of the generated fire. (Aquinas 1955 *Summa Contra Gentiles* Vol. 2, 140)

There is agreement in common nature when the form in the likeness has the same being as the form in the cause, as, for example when one combusting entity sets alight a second. In this case the second entity comes also to have the form of fire, and may be said to share a likeness with the first. Analogously there is a relationship of common nature between the object in the external world and the phantasm in the senses of the subject: 'the objects of imagination and sense are certain accidents from which the shape or image of a thing is made up.' (Aquinas 1953 *Truth* Vol. 2, 20) Just as the fire causes something with the same form, the other fire, so, too, the object causes something in the sensory
organs with the same form. In each of these cases, that of fire causing fire, and object causing phantasm, there is an external, hence contingent, relation between cause and effect.

At the same time the intelligible species, the *intentio* itself, as that which counts as *knowledge* of the object, is not the phantasm itself. For the *intentio* is in no standard sense a picture of the object, unlike the phantasm. If the *intentio* were a picture, then it would be an expression of the visual form of the object, hence have the same order of being, and agree in common nature. This, however, is *not* how Aquinas describes the relationship between species or *intentio*, and its object. He in fact writes that the *intentio* expresses a distinct manner in which one thing may be said to be the likeness of another, and this is likeness by 'the mode of representation'. It is in this sense that the form or species, once abstracted from the phantasm, 'acquires the logical status of an actual universal and thus plays a role in cognition' (Marras 1974 'Scholastic Roots of Brentano's Conception of Intentionality', 133), and can truly be said to 'represent' its object.

A thing is known because it is represented in the knower, not because it exists in him; for the likeness existing in a knowing power is a principle by which the thing is known, not under the act of being it has in the knowing power, but under the aspect of the relation it has to the thing known. (Aquinas 1952 *Truth* Vol. 1, 91)

The species or *intentio* bears a likeness to its object, because it bears a 'relation' to its object, in the sense of being subject to conditions at least comparable to truth conditions.

In some kind of quasi-truth conditional 'relation' there need be no agreement in common nature, because
Such a likeness between the knower and the known is not required; indeed, we sometimes see that the smaller the likeness the sharper the cognition. For example, there is less resemblance between the intellectual likeness of a stone and the stone than there is between the sense likeness and the stone, for the intellectual likeness is farther removed from matter; yet the intellect knows more profoundly than sense. (Aquinas 1952 *Truth* Vol. 1, 74)

The species or *intentio* is not a picture, not a representation that goes proxy for the real object in the world, because this would be just one form of agreement in common nature. It is, rather, a likeness in virtue of its relation to its object. (Aquinas 1955 *Summa Contra Gentiles* Vol. 2, 188; 1955, 44) Moreover, it is a directed relation, in which

...the forms in our minds first and mainly refer to things which exist outside our soul according to their forms. (Aquinas 1953 *Truth* Vol. 2, 19)

...the sensible species is not what is perceived, but rather that by which the sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species is not what is actually understood, but that by which the intellect understands. (Aquinas 1945 *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas* Vol. 1, 816)

As we shall see in Chapter 4 (cf Section 2), Husserl too wants to characterise the mind's relation to its object in this manner: the mind does not represent its object by resemblance, but, rather, by meaning its object.

There are thus two points at which we can contest Spiegelberg's understanding of the scholastic *intentio*. Firstly, the likeness the *intentio* or species bears to its object should not be confused with pictorial resemblance. In the second place, the relation the species is said to have to its object should always be expressed in terms which highlight the directional character of the relation.

It is this intentional or referential aspect of the species *qua* representation that Spiegelberg seems to have utterly overlooked in his comments about the doctrine of intentional inexistence. To be sure he is correct in saying that this doctrine 'implies the existence of an
"intentio" inside the intending being'; but he fails to realise that the nature of an intentio is precisely to tend to, be directed towards, an object. (Marras 1974 'Scholastic Roots of Brentano's Conception of Intentionality', 135)

If Brentano did have the scholastic conception of the 'intentio' in mind for his doctrine of intentionality, then it is quite possible that this was closely related to the conception of 'reference to something as object'. Spiegelberg cannot maintain his argument that Brentano's conception was scholastic, and therefore necessarily involved a mediating third thing, qua between mind and object, because, as we have seen, the conception of a third thing was quite alien to scholastic thought. I agree with Marras that it is open to conjecture as to what extent Brentano was aware of this connection. (Marras 1974 'Scholastic Roots of Brentano's Conception of Intentionality', 129) However, the connection is there, and undermines Spiegelberg's claim that the scholastic conception of the intentio is independent of the conception of mental phenomena in terms of their reference to something as object. He cannot maintain his distinction between 'intentional inexistence' and 'reference to an object' upon which he constructs his argument that Brentano endorsed the existence of a third thing. His argument rests on very shaky foundations.

Addendum

There is textual evidence that Brentano was conversant with the scholastic doctrine. In his Psychology Brentano presents an account of inner perception or self-consciousness in which he argues that the mind's activities are given secondarily, along-side with our experience of the external world. (Brentano
1973 PES, Bk II, Chap. II, §8, 126-8) This is strikingly similar to Aquinas’ own account of self-consciousness:

that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands. But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of understanding, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is secondarily that which is understood; but that which is primarily understood is the thing, of which the species is the likeness. (Aquinas 1945 The Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas Vol. 1, 817; my italics)

Thus, for Aquinas, the intellect knows primarily the external object, and secondarily it knows its own act of understanding. Moreover, the mind cannot know itself without first having an experience of an external object:

our mind cannot so understand itself that it immediately apprehends itself. Rather, it comes to a knowledge of itself through apprehension of other things ... (Aquinas 1953 Truth Vol. 2, 41)

This is strikingly similar to Brentano’s own doctrine of inner perception, and though circumstantial, strongly suggests that he was indeed closely familiar with the scholastic doctrine.
CHAPTER 2

Intentionality and the Intentional Object:
'Which is not to be Understood Here as Meaning a Thing'

In Chapter 1 we saw what Brentano meant by reference to 'something as object', and what it is to say that the object has 'intentional inexistence'. It does not imply the shadowy subsistence of a third thing that exists as an immanent referent between mind and what we would normally take to be its object, the external thing in the world. There is, however, a second remark in Brentano's doctrine of the intentional that may dispose us to interpret him as regarding the intentional object as a third thing immanent to the mind. This is the parenthetical remark qualifying his use of the term 'object', which stipulates that it 'is not to be understood here as meaning a thing'.

The aim of this chapter is not simply to deny that the remark in question in no way implies the third thingness of the intentional object. Rather, this denial will be developed into an exposition of Brentano's philosophical development between the early and later periods of his philosophy. Brentano's mature thought is best understood when his later work is seen as dominated by the rejection of the doctrine expressed in this remark. Underlying this remark is Brentano's earlier belief that irreal entities are independently specifiable, self-subsisting objects: his remark is in fact alluding to this philosophical conviction. However, in order to see this we will have to investigate areas of Brentano's philosophy that may seem unrelated. As the chapter proceeds, their appositeness should become clear.
Directly after describing mental phenomena as 'reference to a content, direction to an object' Brentano adds the parenthetical remark 'worunter hier nicht eine Realität zu verstehen ist' (Brentano 1924 PvenES Bd I, Bh II, Kap. I, §5, 124-5)

How to interpret Brentano's usage of the term Realität has proved controversial. Linda McAlister has argued (McAlister 1974 'Chisholm and Brentano on Intentionality', 151-59) that there is a widespread misunderstanding of Brentano's intended meaning of the term Realität, a misunderstanding she attributes to the influence of Roderick Chisholm's commentaries on Brentano, (op. cit., 151) in which he translates the remark in question as 'which is not to be understood as a reality'. (Chisholm 1957 Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, 168)

Chisholm's translation is motivated by his correctly interpreting Brentano as arguing that for a relation between physical objects to be instantiated, both relata must exist. Both 'Diogenes' and 'his bathtub' must exist for the relation 'Diogenes sits in his bathtub' to be true, whereas in the intentional 'relation' 'Diogenes looks for an honest man' no 'honest man' need exist for the mental relation to be true. (op. cit., 169) However, where Chisholm goes wrong lies in his taking Brentano as making this point in his parenthetical remark.

McAlister rightly points out that when Chisholm translates 'Realität' as 'reality', he interprets the term as meaning 'something that exists'. (McAlister

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1 Chisholm's translation of this passage agrees with the translation given by D. B. Terrell. (Terrell 1960 Extracts from Brentano's Psychologie, 50)
1974 'Chisholm and Brentano on Intentionality', 153) This is indeed the most literal and natural way to translate *Realität*. Thus, for Chisholm the sense of the remark is that mental phenomena exhibit a reference to something as object, which is not to be understood to mean something that exists. However, McAlister argues, this is not what Brentano is saying in this remark.

In order to bring out the real point of the parenthetical remark, McAlister translates it as 'which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing.' (Brentano 1973 *PES*, Bk II, Chap. I, §5, 88; McAlister 1974 'Chisholm and Brentano on Intentionality', 151) Although this involves a somewhat less natural translation of *Realität*, it is motivated on textual grounds. For Brentano was in fact using the term *Realität* in a technical sense. He makes a clear distinction between *Realitäten* and *Existierenden* (the existent). He says '... of the existent [Existierenden],' that it is 'a concept that is thus certainly distinct from the concept of the concrete [Dinglichen], the substantial [Wesenhaften], the real [Realen] ... ' (Brentano 1958 *W&E*, Abt. I, Kap. II, §50, 24; my translation)

Here Brentano is clearly distinguishing between what exists and the idea of a possibly existent entity with determinate properties and characteristics - what we can thus legitimately regard as a thing, at least when this word is taken widely.

Why does Brentano distinguish between the existent and the idea of a determinate entity in which properties inhere? The answer is that he also considered fictional entities, which obviously do not exist, as *Realitäten*. That at least the later Brentano did include such fictitious entities as unicorns, hippogriffs and centaurs as 'Realitäten', is evidenced by the following passage from 1911:
[a]ll references refer to things \(^2\) ... in many cases those things do not exist ... All it means is that a mentally active subject is referring to those things. It is only consistent to go on and permit such statements as "A centaur is half man, and half horse," although in the strict sense centaurs do not exist and so, in a strict sense, there is not centaur which has a body that is half of human form and half in the form of a horse. (Brentano 1973 PES, Supp. Rem. IX, 291)

Brentano's point is that a fictitious entity such as a centaur would be an item in the real world if it did in fact exist. The set of all _Realitäten_ (things) comprises all possible entities that might inhabit the world, whether actually existing or not.

If, as I shall argue below, Brentano's later position is marked by his renouncing his previous conviction that irreal entities could be the direct objects of intentional relations, then there is no reason to doubt that in 1874 Brentano meant by 'Realitäten' what he later meant. Hence, Chisholm is wrong to translate 'Realität' in a way which suggests that Brentano means something that exists. A Realität is simply 'the concept of something [Wesenhaften] which can act and be acted on' (Brentano 1966 _T&E_, Part I, Chap. II, §4, 27), whether or not it exists.

Thus, on Brentano's technical understanding of the terms, the term 'thing' designates what he originally believed to be a sub-class of 'objects' \(^3\). For the

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\(^2\) For the sake of scholarship I have to admit that the term Brentano used here was 'Dinge' (Brentano 1924 _PomES_ Bd 2, Nach. Bem. IX, 158) and not 'Realitäten'. However, I am in complete agreement with Oskar Kraus' comment on this passage that Brentano meant 'Realitäten': 'Instead of things [Dinge] it would be appropriate to say a real entity [Reales] or reality [Wesen]' (Kraus' footnote to Brentano 1924 _PES_ Bd II, Anm., 297; my translation)

\(^3\) We can henceforth dispense with talking about 'the existent'. Brentano seems only to introduce the term to illustrate that fact, that for him, this was a sub-class of 'thing', namely, those things that did in fact exist. Brentano, when discussing intentionality, is not interested in what may or may not exist, this is a matter for ontology, but, rather, what could be considered as the object of an intentional relation.
early Brentano, however, they were not exhaustive of the class of objects. As we saw, in Chapter 1 Section 4, the early Brentano construed intentionality as just one kind of relation in the traditional sense. Because the 'directedness' of an intentional state or experience consisted in its being related to something, Brentano encountered the problem of explaining the directionality acts of judgement directed towards states of affairs, negative states of affairs, modal judgements, existence claims and other objects, which would not be regarded as possible individual material things. (see op. cit. Chap. I, §§32-54, 16-22) His solution to this problem was to introduce irreal entities into his ontology so as to act as the referents of such judgements.

Brentano may never have explicitly endorsed the introduction of irreal entities, but it was the solution he had in mind. It was the solution he felt he had to propose, however veiledly, when he remarked in his thesis of intentionality about what could count as the referent of an intentional relation. This much he admits in a letter of 1909 in which he explains the development of his thought:

> it is true that at one time I treated the contents of judgements ... as though they could be the objects of presentations, judgements and emotions, just as things can be. At that time a man existing in the past and a man existing in the future were both objects of affirmation for me, and, I believed in an infinite number of impossibilities as well as possibilities existing from eternity. (Brentano 1973 PES, 'Introduction to the 1924 Edition' by Oskar Kraus, 383)

The admittance of these irreal entities provided a neat solution - if, as he was to later realise, one that was ad hoc - to the problems one encounters in

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4 It could be argued that Brentano's difficulties in these matter were a consequence of his adherence, albeit in a modified version, to traditional syllogistic logic. He was unable to avail himself of what today we would consider the more satisfactory logic of predicate calculus.
maintaining a thorough going extensionalist account of the intentional relation\(^5\).

According to the early Brentano what unites both 'things' and 'irrealia' under the class heading of 'object' was their apparent common characteristic of fulfilling the role of what was directed towards in an intentional relation. Thus, neither the term 'thing' or 'irrealia' imply any existential commitment, they are both to be distinguished from the existent. In discussing his usage of the term 'object' he asks whether we are

> concerned with "being" in the strict sense when we say the rose is a flower. "The rose," does not seem to have as much being as a rose; we seem to be thinking of the universal which, as such, exists only in thought and in this case only as an object. (Brentano 1973 PES, Add. Ess. XV, 332; my italics)

Clearly Brentano understands 'object' to only have designation as an object of thought. It is what his student Anton Marty called 'synsemantic', that is, it has no independent meaning apart from the phrase in which it appears. (op. cit., 332-3) Thus, 'object' in Brentano's phrase 'direction to an object' is a synsemantic part of the whole expression; rather than constituting a variable occupying a free place in the expression 'directed to ...', it is bound into the whole expression as a part. The role of the word 'object' is merely to mark the

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\(^{5}\) There is a second reason why Brentano admitted the existence of irreals entities, a reason that he could only appreciate with hindsight:

> part of the answer [why I admitted the existence of irreal entities] might be that essentially I came from the Aristotelian school. And Aristotle often spoke as though when you answer the question "Is it true that no triangle has angles whose sum is greater than two right angles?" with an \(\varepsilon\varepsilon\varepsilon\varepsilon\), you are using \(\varepsilon\varepsilon\varepsilon\varepsilon\) in the same sense as when you say of a thing "It is." (Brentano 1973 PES, Introduction to the 1924 Edition' by Oskar Kraus, 383)

Brentano had in his earlier writings taken locutions involving the verb 'to be' as unequivocal: it meant 'real existent' whenever it was applied. He had found in Aristotle, and in his own writings, numerous passages where the contents of judgements and similar non-things were subject to this verb. As a consequence, he, under the influence of this quirk of language, had been inclined to ascribe being to such non-things, to class them as entities.
ide of there being something which must exist if the directedness, the pointing of the act is to 'measure up' to its own internal standard. As a consequence of Brentano's thoroughgoing extensionist account of the intentional relation, both things and irrealia seemed to fulfil this function.

McAlister proposes that we should opt for her translation of the parenthetical remark, and interpret Brentano's terminology thus:

Brentano talks about realia and irrealia (Realitäten and Nichtrealitäten), and about what exists and what does not exist, and he means something different in each case. For Brentano, reales or a Realität is a particular individual thing, while an irreales is a non-thing, as for example, a universal, a species, a genus, a state of affairs or values. Brentano maintained that something could be a Realität, ie an individual, a thing, even if it did not exist. A unicorn or a hippogriff, for example, would be particular individual things, and hence realia, even though they do not exist. So 'eine Realität' does not mean 'something that exists' and it is wrong to interpret the remark that something need not be a Realität as meaning that something need not be understood as existing. (McAlister 1974 'Chisholm and Brentano on Intentionality', 154)

In Brentano's terminology 'Realität', the 'real', is to be contrasted with 'irreal', not with the non-existent. As we saw in Chapter 1, the referent of an intentional relation was in some cases the object in the world. However, at the time of writing his Psychology, Brentano also believed that the referent of an intentional relation may also be an independently subsisting, irreal object, that is, 'a universal, a species, a genus, a state of affairs or values', etc. Following McAlister I shall adopt the terminological conventions of using 'thing' to mean any possible physical entity; and 'irreal object', or 'irrealia' to mean a non-real, abstract object.

Thus, the parenthetical remark included in Brentano's original description of intentionality is a veiled admittance of the (quasi-)existence of irreal entities:
the object of an intentional relation need not be a thing in the sense of a possible physical entity, it could be an irreal object, or as he calls them elsewhere 'entia non realia'. (Brentano 1966 T&E, Bk III, Chap. II, 80)

It should now be clear that the sense of Brentano's parenthetical remark was not that the intentional object should not be understood as something that exists. In fact there is no evidence that Brentano ever endorsed such a doctrine. What the remark in fact means is that the intentional object could in some cases be an irreal object. Consequently, it is misleading to characterise the change in Brentano's philosophical position circa 1905 as the 'Crisis of Immanence', that is, as his rejection of his belief in the third thing mediating between subject and object. The attribution of such a crisis is purely apocryphal.

What did mark a change circa 1905 was Brentano's rejection of the ontology of irrealia. This change in his philosophical position is signposted by a sharpened sense of the pernicious role language could play in creating philosophical problems. It is this self-consciousness, and the rethinking of his own position in its light, that reflected the substantial change in his philosophical position regarding irreal entities: he came to deny categorically that they could have independent existence or be the direct referent of an intentional relation.

However, before discussing the change in Brentano's philosophical position, I would like to dispel a confusion surrounding his use of the term 'entia rationis'. It is important to get a clear grasp of what Brentano meant by this term because this concept provides the key as to how he sought to redefine the proper place of contents and universals in ontology. Interestingly, when, circa 1905, Brentano attempts to redefine the place of irrealia, we find him struggling to articulate an interpretation of the intentional relation in terms of a tripartite
division into act, content and object. In so doing, he drops his original naive extensionalist view of intentionality and moves to a more intensional one.

§2

I seems to me that one should not confuse, as Srzednicki does (1965 *Franz Brentano's Analysis of Truth*, 29-35), Brentano's conception of the *entia rationis*, with his conception of irreal entities. The two concepts are related, but they are certainly not synonymous.

The concept of the *entia rationis* certainly plays an important role in Brentano's mature writings. We find him arguing for the meaningfulness of this concept in a fragment dated 'not later than 1902'.

We form with respect to ourselves the concept of a thinking being whose thought is directed upon a certain object $A$. The concept of this object $A$, like that of the person who is thinking, is the concept of a thing. We may also say of this thing $A$ that it is an object which is contemplated or thought about. It is just as true that this $A$ is a contemplated $A$ [*ein gedachtes A*] as it is that this $A$ is an actual $A$, existing in reality. $A$ can cease to be actual and yet continue to be thought about - so long as the thinking person does in fact think about it. And conversely it can cease to be thought about - if the person stops thinking about it - and yet continue to be actual. (Brentano 1966 *T&E*, Part I, Chap. II, §4, 27)

There appears to be two distinct things involved in the contemplation of a thing:

[i]n contrasting the $A$ which is contemplated or thought about with the $A$ which is actual, are we saying that the contemplated $A$ is itself
nothing actual or true? By no means! The contemplated A can be something actual and true without being an actual A. It is an actual contemplated A and therefore - since this comes to the same thing - it is an actual contemplated A which may be contrasted with a mere contemplated A. (One may think that someone is thinking about an A.) (Brentano 1966 T&E, Part I, Chap. II, §4, 27)

Brentano appears to be asserting an independence between 'A as an object of thought' and the contemplated 'A', that is, the 'A' as a thing.

Srzednicki interprets this passage as an argument for the independent existence of entia rationis, that is, 'entities of reason'. (Srzednicki 1965 Franz Brentano's Analysis of Truth, 30) Such entities are presumably non-worldly entities that exist only in the sphere of reason. This class of 'entities of reason' is, on Srzednicki's reading, meant to include not merely all the irreal objects encountered in the previous section, but also all non-existent entities, all the non-actual realities, such as, Pegasus or Santa Claus. According to Srzednicki, Brentano's argument establishes the plausible thesis that when one says that they think of something, that something must be an object of their thought. If I am now thinking of a flying horse then, that horse is an object of my thought. In this example, however, the object of my thought does not exist; consequently, the object of my thought is not a concrete object. 'But it is manifestly impossible to say that the object of my thought, as such, does not exist; after all, I am thinking of something, so it must be more than nothing, but less than something concretely there: in fact, a fictional entity.' (op. cit., 31) On Srzednicki's reading the flying horse is an independently specifiable fictional entity which serves as the referent for the intentional relation about that entity, and this fictional entity is an ens rationis.

Srzednicki is correct in reading the passage in question as an argument for entia rationis; however, he has misunderstood what Brentano meant by such
entities. For Brentano the referent of an intentional relation was the object in the world in those cases where the object does in fact exist, and this much Srzednicki admits (op. cit., 32). Pace the standard interpretation deriving from Spiegelberg, in such cases the referent is not a third thing or mind immanent entity standing between the act and the world. However, if the argument for entia rationis is understood as being an argument for such non-worldly entities in the cases where the object does not in fact exist, then the referent for every intentional relation would have to be a third thing⁶. Brentano’s argument would demand this conclusion:

[t]here cannot be anyone who contemplates an A unless there is a contemplated A; and conversely. But we must not infer from this fact that the one who is thinking about the A is identical with the A which he is thinking about. The two concepts are not identical, but they are correlative. Neither one can correspond to anything in reality unless the other does as well. But only one of these is the concept of a thing ... The second is the concept of a being which is only a sort of accompaniment to the first; when the first thing comes into being, and when it ceases to be, then so too does the second. (Brentano 1966 T&E, Part 1, Chap. II, §4, 27; my italics)

It is part of Brentano’s theory that every contemplation of an object is accompanied by the contemplated object. This is what he means when he says that they form a correlative pair. So in every case of an intentional relation there is, according to Brentano, intended object, an ens rationis. If, as Srzednicki would have it, ens rationis is the referent in the case where the object does not exist, then it is also the referent in the cases where the object does exist. This would seemingly contradict how Brentano wants to understand the intentional relation.

⁶ Michael Dummett in his Origins of Analytic Philosophy agrees with this conclusion. (1993, 35-6)
There is, however, no contradiction because Srzednicki misunderstands the ontological position which Brentano ascribes to entia rationis. Entia rationis are not, pace Srzednicki, irreal entities existing independently of reason, which is how we would have to conceive of them if they were fictitious objects or irreal entities. In a letter to Anton Marty, Brentano explicitly argues against considering entia rationis to be irreal objects in this sense. He writes that

> [t]he expression [entia rationis] is justified only in reference to "objects of thought", for "ratio" has the same comprehension as Descartes' "cogitatio". It is not enough to note that if there were no reason, then such entities would not be grasped in their individuality. This would be to commit the mistake of those "who prove too much". The point is that the understanding does not produce such entities.

But if one must speak about such entities, then one should be consistent and affirm that in addition to whatever is a thing, there is a second set of entities, subsisting quite independently of reason, and that these might be called entia non realia but not entia rationis. (Brentano 1966 T&E, Part III, Chap II, 80)

Entia rationis are 'objects of thought', that is, they are mind dependent entities. Irreal objects, on the other hand, which the early Brentano accepted into his ontology but later rejected, are quite independent of the mind.

According to Brentano it is quite incorrect to say that irreal or non-existent objects are entia rationis, that is, are immanent in the mind,

if what is thus called "immanent" is taken to be the "contemplated horse" (gedachtes Pferd) or the "universal as object of thought" (gedachtes Universale). For "horse contemplated by me here and now" would then be the object of a general thought about a horse; it would be the correlate of me as an individually thinking person, as having this individual object of thought as object of thought. One could not say that universals as universals are in the mind, if one of the characteristics of the "thing existing in the mind" is that they are "objects of my thought". (op. cit., Chap I, 78; see also Brentano 1973 PES, Add. Ess. XIV, 322; XVI, 347-8)
If I am thinking generally about a horse, that is, I am contemplating the universal 'horse', it cannot be that the universal is an 'object of thought', an entia rationis. If it were an 'object of thought' then it would be my personal 'object of thought', which is quite distinct from any other subject's contemplation of the universal 'horse'. One would not be able to say which 'object of thought' was in fact the universal 'horse'. It would make no sense to say that a judgement about the universal 'horse' was true about that universal per se. We could only say that it is true about this individual universal 'horse', which is thought of by this subject, and we must then admit that the same judgement may be false concerning some other subject's universal 'horse'. Similar arguments can be run for mathematical objects, such as the number 'one', or fictitious entities such as 'Santa Claus' or 'Pegasus'. If they were no more than 'objects of thought' then any subject who thought of them would have as their object a subjective number 'one' or 'Pegasus'. The objection here resembles the arguments of Gottlob Frege (1950 Foundation of Arithmetic, 'Introduction' and Part I), and Edmund Husserl (1970 LI Vol. I, 'Prolegomena to a Pure Logic') against psychologising accounts of mathematics and logic. The essential point is that in order to maintain our belief in the shared, public character of truth and falsity, we cannot think of the referent of an intentional relation as an ens rationis, or mind dependent entity.

What then are entia rationis? According to Brentano, they are not nothing. As to what Brentano thought they were, we have already encountered a clue in the passage above, where Brentano writes that they have 'the same comprehension as Descartes' "cogitatio"\(^7\). (see also Brentano 1981 S&NC, Part II, Chap I, 41) The cogitatio are, for Descartes, what are left after he has placed himself in the position of hyperbolic doubt. They are what he finds when he turns his regard

\(^7\) As we shall see (cf Chapter 3 Section 4) Husserl also affiliates his methodology for investigating essences with Descartes' hyperbolic doubt.
inward and discovers himself as an entity that thinks. This is also how Brentano understands the *entia rationis*: in his argument for the meaningfulness of the concept of *entia rationis*, Brentano argues that whenever anyone contemplates an *A* a correlative pair is established in which one member is the contemplated *A*. If, say, someone contemplates a horse, then

> [t]he "contemplated horse" considered as object would be the object of inner perception, which the thinker perceives whenever he forms a correlative pair consisting of this "contemplated horse" along with his thinking about the horse; for correlatives are such that one cannot be perceived or apprehended without the other. (Brentano 1966 *T&E*, Part III, Chap I, 78)

The *ens rationis* is part of a correlative pair which is established whenever a subject thinks about anything.

Whenever a subject directs their attention towards something, an intentional relation is instantiated, and the *ens rationis* would appear as an integral part of the sense of that intentional relation. Brentano describes the ontology of this relation as comprising of an 'intentional pair of correlates'. (Brentano 1995 *DP*, Part II, 23)

As with every relation you also find two correlates here. The one correlate is the conscious act, the other is that on which it passes judgement. ... These correlates ... display the peculiarity that one alone is real, the other in opposition is not real [not a thing]. As little as a person who has ceased to be is something real [a thing], so is a thought of person. The thought of person has for that reason no real cause, and cannot really exercise an effect. Rather in the act of consciousness, in which the thought of person is effected, the imagined person, the non-real correlate, is also there. The correlates are not separable from one another, except when they are distinguishable. (Brentano 1982 *DesP*, Part II, 21; my translation)

When in an act of consciousness one thinks about something, specific determinations about that something are constitutive parts of that act. These
determinations are what specify that the act is about this something rather than that something else. We can distinguish these determinations as independent moments within that act, they are what philosophers call 'contents'. These contents, however, only come into being 'in a loose and improper sense' (Brentano 1973 PES, Add. Ess. XV, 335), as a correlate of the act. Thus, to say that the imagined person, the non-real correlate, comes into existence, is to say no more than that an act is established for which specific determinations about the object thought are constitutive parts of the act.

It is not, however, this determination of an object which is primarily thought about:

what are experienced as primary objects, or what are thought universally as primary objects of reason, are never themselves the objects of inner perception. Had I equated "object" with "object of thought", then I would have had to say that the primary thought relation has no object or content at all. (Brentano 1966 T&E, Part III, Chap. I, 78)

Brentano's reasoning here is that the 'objects of thought' or entia rationis are secondary objects of perception. They are concomitantly presented with the presentation of a primary object, the object towards which the intentional relation is primarily directed\(^8\). If 'object of thought' was identical with 'object', then thinking would be about parts of our own thought, it would never get out of the sphere of consciousness. Thought is, for Brentano, often about objects that are external to our mental lives; hence, the entia rationis are not what is primarily thought about. The entia rationis are that by means of which we think about objects, and now it seems that via the notion of ens rationis

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\(^8\) The concomitancy of this presentation follows as a direct consequence of Brentano's brilliant analysis of inner perception (Brentano 1973 PES, Bk II, Chap. II, §§8-10, 128-34), which, unfortunately, there is no room to go into here. However, for our purposes it need only be understood that the content is concomitantly present because it is lived through as the sense of the experience.
Brentano is groping towards that more Husserlian and Fregean notion of content discussed in Chapter 1 Section 1. To put this another way, a way relevant for the ensuing discussion of Husserl, the *entia rationis* are slowly showing themselves to be reference-fixing properties of the mental act.

As a property of the mental act the *ens rationis* is that *by means of which* the intentional relation is instantiated, by means of which the act of consciousness picks out this object as being so and so. The similarity here to Aquinas’ conception of the *intentio* is no coincidence; they are both expressions of a realist account of mental relations, according to which the mind is understood to have direct access to the objects in the world. Brentano was indebted to Aquinas, amongst others, for this doctrine. His innovation, his contribution to this doctrine, was to establish a systematic approach to elucidating the reference-determining relations, these *intentiones* or *entia rationis*. Such systematic elucidation is the task of descriptive psychology or phenomenology.

Brentano seems to have had a notion of the *entia rationis* both in his early and later periods. However, at no stage of his thought were the *entia rationis* irreal objects or fictitious entities. Brentano’s later clarification of the concept of the *ens rationis*, which we have here been considering, is deeply tied up with how he sought to account for judgements about such irreal or fictitious entities. We shall now turn to this part of Brentano’s thought.
In the chapter 1 I argued that even in Brentano's early work the doctrine of intentionality saw intentionality as a genuine relation between the mind and world. There is here no notion of an immanent referent as the traditional interpretation would have. Consequently, strictly speaking, there was no such thing as the 'Crisis of Immanence' of 1905. That is, there is no such crisis if this is understood to mean Brentano's rejection of an intentional object immanent to the mind. For Brentano never held any such doctrine.

However, neither is the 'Crisis of Immanence' the rejection of the *ens rationis*, that is, of the correlative part of an intentional relation. There is no evidence that Brentano *ever* considered rejecting the *entia rationis*. In fact it is precisely in his later writings that we find him explicitly arguing for the validity of distinguishing the *ens rationis* as a correlate to the mental act. He consistently maintained his belief in the dependent existence of such an entity.

Nonetheless, around 1905 there was a notable change in Brentano's philosophical position. I would like to call this change Brentano's 'Linguistic Turn'. From approximately 1905 onwards, Brentano's extant philosophical fragments display a striking sensitivity to what Brentano takes to be the misleading influence that the structure of language can have upon our philosophical theories.

This sensitivity is particularly striking in a fragment dated 1905, entitled *Sprachen und Denken*. In this essay Brentano argues that it is a mistake to
accept the grammatical form of a linguistic term as *prima facie* evidence for the terms being genuinely referring. If we take words that grammatically function as substantives too literally then we are inclined to over-realistic conceptions. [People that use language] think that if one is healthy then he contains health. When he is big, largeness is in him. If he judges then judging or judgement is in him. Therefore he unthinkingly expresses the idea that this is healthy by saying that he has good health. ... and since being big is not largeness; having a known position is not space; and judging is not the judgement, therefore, strictly speaking, a number of things are improperly added to those which exist in fact. (Brentano 1965 *S&D*, 119)

Just because linguistic terms which designate such concepts as largeness, judgement, etc. often take the grammatical position of a substantive, is not reason enough to treat them as akin to proper nouns which pick out an independently specifiable entity. Of course, in speaking of people with overly realistic conceptions, Brentano means, or should mean, the naive philosopher who draws implications from everyday grammatical form.

Brentano came to think of this naive acceptance of everyday grammar as a grave mistake, because '[i]f one takes a word to be a name, when in fact it is not a name, if one searches for the concept designated by this alleged name, when in fact none is associated with it, then naturally one's definitions can never agree, and one's teaching about the origin of concepts must be hopelessly mixed up.' (op. cit., 121) Brentano's reticence to commit himself to explicitly postulate the independent subsistence of irreal entities shows that he was always suspicious of such a philosophical position. It is only in this later period, that we are now considering, that Brentano is able to explicitly articulate his intuition that irreal entities do not constitute an independent realm of ontology.
In a fragment dated 1915 he reconsiders his doctrine of intentionality, and asks what it means to say that mental phenomena exhibit 'reference to something as object'.

Anyone who thinks thinks of something. And because this is part of the concept of thinking, this concept cannot be a unitary one unless the little word "something," too, has a single meaning. (Brentano 1973 PES, Add. Ess. XIV, 321; see also 1966 T&E, Part III, Chap III, 83; 94; 95; Part IV, Chap I, 108)

'Thinking', Brentano believes, must be a univocal concept, it cannot have multiple meanings. A description of this phenomena, in order to maintain this univocality, must therefore also contain univocal concepts; consequently, 'something', and by implication 'thing', must also be a univocal concept. What then, asks Brentano, is the meaning of the word 'something' in its usage as a description of intentional phenomena? To answer that it is the 'thought object', will not do, as this would be circular, and we would not have got anywhere in our elucidation of 'thinking'.

What we can say of this 'something', the referent of an intentional relation, is not only that whoever is thinking is thinking of something, but that also that he is thinking of something as something, as for example one thinks of a man as a man in a less definite way as a living creature. But that second something we added, and always have to add, must obviously be univocal too, if the term for thinking is univocal. But nothing is more apparent than that this second something is not to be taken in the sense of "a thought-object." Someone who is thinking of a stone is not thinking of it as a thought-of stone, but as a stone. Otherwise, when he affirms it he would also be affirming it only as a thought-object, and a person who is denying the stone will do that, once he is conscious of denying it, just as much as the person who is affirming it will. (op. cit., Supp. Rem. XIV, 321)

'Something', the predicative, second 'something' in the locution 'something as something', does not here mean a 'thought-of object'. (cf Section 3) It is,
however, a univocal concept under which everything that can be an object of thought must fall. Clearly the paradigmatic example of a 'something', a subspecies of all possible 'somethings', is the concept of an entity such as a stone, which, if it exists, is an entity which belongs in the everyday world in which we live. If this counts as an example of a something as the referent of thought, and 'something' is univocal, then all referents must be entities like a stone.

[I]t must be maintained that anyone who is thinking must have a thing (Reales) as his object and have this object in one and the same sense of the word. This is in opposition to Aristotle, who denied that there was any generic concept common to the ten categories he distinguished and to many moderns who say that we do not always have a thing, but often have a non-thing (Nicht-Reales), as our object. (Brentano 1973 PES, Supp. Rem. XIV, 322)

The only true referent of an intentional relation was a 'thing', in the technical sense defined in Section 1. That is, an intentional relation can only obtain if in this relation the subject is directed towards an entity that could possibly be an item in the real world. It is central to Brentano's later thought, and contrary to his earlier position, that there could not be an intentional relation that was primarily directed towards an irreal object.

Complementary to this restriction on what could count as the referent of an intentional relation was Brentano's realisation that assuming the independent subsistence of irreal entities was intrinsically absurd in the first place. After 1905 Brentano repeatedly argues that if one admits just a few irreal entities into one's ontology, then one must assume that innumerable irrealia have existed throughout eternity ... these include, in particular, an infinity of impossibilities, the beings of these impossibilities, and the non-beings of these impossibilities, and the non-beings of the beings of these impossibilities, and the non-beings of the non-beings of other
impossibilities, as well as the non-beings of realia, or things⁹. (Brentano 1966 T&E, Part III, Chap III, 86; see also op. cit., 88; 1973 PES, Add. Ess. XV, 338; cited in Oskar Kraus' introduction to the 1924 ed., 385)

Against this infinite multiplication of entities Brentano was fond of citing Aristotle's ridicule of Platonic 'ideas': 'if we have trouble computing with a small sum, we are not likely to solve our problem by adding one that is incomparably greater.' (op. cit. 87) No problem is really solved by introducing these irreal entities. After all they were only introduced in the first place as ad hoc devices to patch up problems with Brentano's extensionalist account of intentionality, that is, with his determination to construe the intentional relation as a genuine relation.

It is central to Brentano's post 1905 thinking that the supposition of such irreal entities is actually unnecessary to perform the task that many philosophers, including Brentano in his early work, had introduced them to do. They were supposed to fulfil the role as referents of such things as negative or false judgements. This, however, was a conclusion forced upon him by his naive acceptance of the judgement's grammatical structure. As Brentano's philosophical position matured he came to think that all judgements ostensibly about irreal entities could be reduced to judgements about things that would belong to the world if they in fact existed. (op. cit., 84) If this reduction could be consistently carried out without any change in the truth conditions of the original judgements, then a greatly simplified ontology would be achieved. This would be a theory that did not need to rely upon the introduction of ad hoc devices to gloss over its problems.

⁹ I should acknowledge that in this passage Brentano in fact uses the term entia rationis as synonymous with irreal entities. This wayward usage of the term is explainable because in this letter Brentano is replying to Anton Marty, and Brentano has merely adopted Marty's usage, that is, as meaning 'irreal object'.
The analysis of a judgement, Brentano came to think, which putatively refers to an irreal entity will reveal that it is not in fact the direct referent of the intentional relation. In any act apparently directed to an irreal entity there is in fact an indirect reference to a property, an *ens rationis*, of a possible intentional relation, that is, to a thing, a conscious subject. I shall provide an example of such an analysis below. The later Brentano wants to argue that there is a strong tendency to overlook the complexity of the intentional relation, and take this indirect reference as a direct one to some irreal entity. In the case of such acts and such judgements there is no question of there being 'something subsisting in and of itself, which, under certain conditions, may *become* the content of a judgement.' (Brentano 1966 *T&E*, Part III, Chap III, 82) There is only the property of the possible act, which is instantiated with the performance of the act.

Brentano's rejection of the independent subsistence of irreal entities is intimately tied to the growing appreciation he came to have of the inner complexity of intentionality. This complexity was far greater than that described in his *Psychology*. Freed from the undue influence of grammatical form, Brentano was able to provide a clearer characterisation of his doctrine of intentionality, one that was not muddied by a presumption that intentionality had to be a relation in the standard sense.

Brentano came to realise that the term 'relation' was in fact equivocal. In its usual sense it is the case that if the relation which I am thinking about is to be
instantiated, both relata must exist, as, for example, in causal or quantitative relations. Things, Brentano realised, are otherwise with mental reference.

If someone thinks of something, the one who is thinking must certainly exist, but the object of his thinking need not exist at all. In fact, if he is denying something, the existence of the object is precisely what is excluded whenever his denial is correct. So the only thing which is required by mental reference is the person thinking. The terminus of the so-called relation does not need to exist in reality at all. For this reason, one could doubt whether we really are dealing with something relational here, and not, rather with something somewhat similar to something relational in a certain respect, which might, therefore, better be called "quasi-relational" ("Relativliches"). (Brentano 1973 PES, Supp Rem I, 272)

Thus, an unprejudiced description of mental phenomena reveals that they form a distinct class from relations in the usual sense. They exhibit what Brentano, in an alternative locution to the troublesome 'intentional inexistence', called 'reference to something as object' (op. cit., Bk II, Chap. I, §9, 97; Supp. Rem. I, 271), where 'object' is understood synsemantically. In this formulation the notion of reference is not understood as necessarily, successful reference; there need not actually be a referent. All that is required for this type of relation to be instantiated is that there be a relation to an object, that is, a determining what must be the case if the pointing is to be successful. As we shall see (cf Chapter 3 Section 3) this is an understanding of intentionality which Husserl was to considerably develop.

As I have stressed, (cf Chapter 1 Section 3) Brentano's 1974 formulation of the doctrine of intentionality did not make this point clear, and for this reason was subject to the criticisms Husserl would eventually make of it. However, as the passage from Brentano's later writings shows, it is a criticism that Brentano accepted and which he sought to rectify. I leave it open as to whether Brentano made this revision independently of Husserl's criticism, or whether it is an
unacknowledged response to Husserl. There seems to be little evidence either way.

This theory offers the beginning of a relatively simple account of reference failure, as, for example, when my intentional relation is directed towards a hallucination or otherwise non-existent entity \textit{as if it were a real entity}. In such cases the intentional relation determines its reference by means of the \textit{ens rationis}, that which specifies conditions for successful reference. The mind relates to the world just as it would in any other case of intentionality, only in this case it relates unsuccessfully to an object. This, however, is an analysis of reference to non-existent entities \textit{as if they were real entities}, that is, as involving an existential claim. It does not purport to be an analysis of reference to non-existent entities \textit{qua} non-existent entities, that of \textit{fictional} reference. According to Brentano understanding this latter mode of reference involves an altogether more complex analysis.

In order to understand this analysis, however, one must understand Brentano on a seemingly unrelated topic; namely, his account of what is involved when one is conscious of a special class of objects. That is, we are concerned with another person's consciousness of something, when they think or judge about something. The issue of what goes on when one talks about 'intensional' states of affairs, others' beliefs, statements, etc., is distinct from the issue of what might be the structure and nature of intentionality. However, one's view about the latter will certainly help shape one's views about the former, and vice versa. As we shall see this is precisely what occurs in Brentano's work.

According to Brentano, mental reference and relations in the usual sense do not constitute two entirely different classes because 'like someone who is
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thinking of a relation in the proper sense, someone who is thinking of a mental activity is, in a certain way thinking of two objects at the same time.' (Brentano 1973 PES, Supp. Rem. I, 272) In Brentano's terminology one of these objects is thought of in recto and the other in obliquo. (loc. cit.; see also 1981 S&NC, Part II, Chap I, 43) What, however, does it mean to refer indirectly to an ens rationis? Brentano writes that

If I think of someone who loves flowers, then the person who loves flowers is the object I am thinking of in recto, but the flowers are what I am thinking of in obliquo. That, however, is similar to the case in which I am thinking of someone who is taller than Caius. The taller person is thought of in recto, Caius in obliquo. (op. cit., 273)

In the thinking of a relation, one of its relata is the direct object of thought, in the above examples 'the person who loves ...' and 'the taller person'; and the other is thought of indirectly, in its relation to the direct object, as in the 'flowers' or 'Caius'. In this respect, thinks Brentano, both the common sense of relation and the intentional relations find their unity as relations.

What distinguishes mental relations from relations proper is that in the case of the former the reference in modo obliquo need not in the strict sense exist.

The [modus rectus] is never absent when we are actively thinking. The second is present along with it, however, whenever we are thinking of something which has mental reference or something relative in the strict sense. Besides the mentally active subject, which I think of in recto, I always think of his object too; besides the fundament of the relation, which I think of in recto, I also think of the terminus in obliquo. (op. cit., Supp. Rem. III, 281; see also Add. Ess. XIV, 325-6)

This is a quite general observation regarding thinking about thought. It is, thinks Brentano, the key to the analysis of terms which purportedly refer to thought-objects. Take, for example, an instance where someone is thinking about a 'man'. Clearly 'man' does not here refer to a real entity, an item in the
world. 'What is involved is a thought-of man and if he is affirmed, what is really being affirmed is only someone who is thinking of him.' (Brentano 1973 PES, Add. Ess. XV, 334-5) The thought-of man should be understood as being referred to in modo obliquo, as the ens rationis instantiated in the someone's act of thought, the object in modo recto.

Let us make some observations that are essential for understanding Brentano's argument. Note, first of all, that my thinking of the subject who is thinking about something may be quite general, I need not be thinking of any particular person. In fact, if the generality of my thought is sufficient it will include in its extension myself as if I were engaged in that thinking about the something. So, in a sense, the thought is about every subject, and yet again about no subject in particular: the subject is indeed a 'someone' with no existential commitment, that is, the subject is an 'anyone'. The only thing that is determinately thought about is the thought-object, the ens rationis. Notice, also, that because the primary object of my thought is a someone as a thinking entity, that is, an entity that would be an item in the world if it did in fact exist, the univocity of the word 'thing' has been preserved. On this analysis there is no need to postulate the independent subsistence of an irreal entity. Brentano is going to draw upon these observations to facilitate his analysis of supposed reference to irreal or fictitious entities.

Remember that at this stage of his thought Brentano has become wary of drawing conclusions about one's ontology from grammar. He observes that while many terms can be used by themselves, many others cannot, for example prepositions, conjunctions, adverbs, and so on. (Brentano 1973 PES, Add. Ess. XIV, 332) What he wishes to argue is that terms which appeared at first to be autosemantic, as he had earlier understood terms which designate irreal objects, may in fact be synsemantic.
Substantives and adjectives have been included among those which have meaning by themselves, although they are ordinarily used only as parts of speech. This was done because they are said to evoke ideas in and of themselves and, what is more, to evoke the idea of the thing which, thought of in modo recto, is associated with the word. But it is doubtful whether nouns and adjectives are not often synsemantic too. So, particularly in all the cases in which a term is used as the name of an ens rationis of the kind we have been contemplating, we should consider whether it is really possible to say that here the name by itself designates an ens rationis in the same way as in the other case names designate real things. (op. cit., Add. Ess. XV, 323-3; see also XIV, 322-3; 1966 T&E, Part III, Chap III, 87-8)

Philosophers - and here Brentano intended his own earlier self - are often led to suppose the independent existence of irreal and fictitious objects because the substantives which purportedly designate them are taken to function like just any other substantive. In the standard case of a substantive, where the term designates an entity that could belong to the world, the term appears to function autosemantically, that is, it evokes the idea of that entity independently of the phrase in which it appears. Brentano's idea is that the class of substantives is not in fact united by a common mode of referring to their objects, and that substantives that designate irreal objects only refer to their object in the phrase in which they occur. This distinct mode of referring only comes to light when the locution in which they occur has been properly analysed.

According to Brentano, despite the grammatical forms with which we describe such situations, when we are conscious of something fictitious as fictitious, for example in an act of fantasising or imagining, we are not really having a presentation in recto of something thought of. We are really only having a presentation in recto of someone thinking of that thing, but not as fictitious. It is this observation that underlies Brentano's analysis of statements which purport to refer to fictional objects qua fictional objects: the direct object of reference is not in fact the fictional object, but, rather, someone, thought of
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quite generally, thinking about that object. The fictional object has no real being, but is referred to in modo obliquo as an ens rationis instantiated as a moment of that subject’s thought.

Brentano wishes to extend this idea to account for all contents or irreal objects. Take, for example the true judgement 'A centaur does not exist'. Brentano had earlier thought it necessary to suppose that in some sense the content object or state of affairs, 'the non-existence of the centaur', subsisted independently of the act of judgement. (cf Section 1) This supposition, he had thought, was necessary in order to provide a referent for the true judgement. However, according to his later analysis

[i]f it said that this content has being in the active subject, then once again "to be" is being used in a loose and improper sense [that is, it is an ens rationis, as characterised in Section 2] and means exactly the same thing as is expressed by the use of "to be", in its proper sense, in the words, "A mentally active subject is denying a centaur in the modus praesens." ... Anyone who says that the non-existence of a centaur has being, or who answers the question as to whether a centaur does not exist by saying, "That is so," only wants to say that he denies centaurs in the modus praesens, and, consequently, also believes that anyone who denies a centaur judges correctly. (Brentano 1973 PES, Supp. Rem. IX, 292; see also 1966 T&E, Part III, Chap III, 101)

Thus we see that, strictly speaking, talk of the content of 'A centaur does not exist' has its true sense in the alternative locution 'A mentally active subject is denying a centaur'.

Notice that in this reformulated sentence the someone is judging a fictional object as if it were a thing in the world. We encountered this mode of judgement above, and saw that, on our interpretation of Brentano’s analysis, where there was in fact no referent corresponding to the content (in this case the determination of something that is half man and half horse) of the
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judgement, the affirmative judgement was false. So, conversely the negative judgement is true: the someone is correctly asserting that there are no centaurs.

Consequently, Brentano's analysis of the content of 'A centaur does not exist' is that I, or any subject for that matter, am thinking of a someone, thought of completely generally, denying that there is a centaur in the world. Furthermore, I judge that this someone judges correctly. Thus, the object of my judgement is someone denying a centaur, which I affirm, and an affirmation of a truth is itself a true judgement. As we noted above the determination of the someone who is denying the Centaur is so general that the only actual determinate part of my thought is the *ens rationis*, the content 'A Centaur does not exist'. Nevertheless, I have never ceased to have as the direct object of my thought an entity which could be an item the world, that is, a thing. In this way Brentano seems able to account for true statements about contents, without having to postulate the independent existence of irreal objects. A judgement about an irreal entity is in this manner reducible to a judgement about a thing.

In a similar manner Brentano would analyse a judgement about the universal 'red' into a judgement about someone experiencing that sensory quality. Brentano never actually outlines such an analysis of sensory qualities, but it does follow from his belief that universals *qua* universals do not exist, that they are only realised in individual things. (Brentano 1966 *T&E*, Part III, Chap III, 99) Consequently, to think quite generally about 'red', one must think of a general conception of someone experiencing an individuated instance of redness. Similarly with all other sensory qualities, and universals. Brentano came to believe that all judgements that appear on face value to refer to irreal entities can be subjected to an analysis which reveals that the judgement is in fact about a thing:

it holds true generally that only that which falls under the concept of a thing (*Reales*), can provide an object for mental reference. Nothing else
can ever be, like a thing, that to which we mentally refer as an object—neither the present, past, nor future, neither present things, past things, nor future things, nor existence and non-existence, nor necessity nor non-necessity, neither possibility nor impossibility, nor the necessary nor the non-necessary, neither the possible nor the impossible, neither truth nor falsity, neither the true nor the false, nor good nor bad. Nor can the so-called actuality (ἐνέργια, ἐντελέχεια) of Form (ἔνδοξος, λόγος, μορφή), of which Aristotle speaks, and which we express in our language by means of such abstractions as redness, shape, human nature, and the like, ever be the objects of a mental reference, and this is true further of objects as objects (Objekte als Objekte) as for example, the affirmed, the denied, the loved, the hated, the presented. (Brentano 1973 PES, Supp. Rem. IX, 294)

This is the essence of Brentano's later position; all judgements supposedly about such entities can be analysed into judgements that refer only to things, where 'thing' is understood univocally to encompass only such entities as might exist in the world, entities of which it would make sense, if not necessarily truth, to ascribe 'existence' in the strict sense. Talk of irreal entities is in fact talk about possible subjects whose mental life is governed by determinate contents, the entia rationis; Brentano's mature position regarding ontology is rigorously parsimonious.

§5

Brentano's analysis of judgements about purported irreal entities does not preclude an investigation into universals or contents; quite the contrary, it is the very task of descriptive psychology to describe such entities and their interrelations. He never wished to deny that they can be thought about. (Brentano 1966 T&E, Part III, Chap III, 82) As I have argued in Section 2, whenever something is thought about, an ens rationis can be distinguished as a moment
instantiated in this act of thinking. It is in this sense that universals and other irreal entities have their quasi-being, namely, always and only in their capacity as a property of a subject's thought. That is, as a property of an entity that could exist in the world.

I also argued in Section 2 that the *entia rationis* are the objects of inner perception. Here inner perception is understood as rendering explicit the sense of our experiences, of the senses which we live through and are already acquainted with, however indeterminately, as we have experiences. It is by careful descriptive analysis of the objects of inner perception that descriptive psychology is able to engage in a 'pure logic' in Husserl's sense. We are able to systematically examine such entities by means of abstract or conceptual thinking, where the objects of investigation are what Brentano called 'noetic' objects. (Brentano 1981 *S&NC*, Part II, Chap I, 44-5) It is not by intuition proper that we can thematise such objects, but rather, by distinguishing them as objective moments within our everyday intuitions, as they govern those intuitions. In such a manner it is the aim of descriptive psychology or phenomenology to lay bare the very sense of our logical and universal terms. This, however, is not a form of psychologism, because the thinking of these *entia rationis* can be quite general and free from any existential commitment. (Brentano 1973 *PES*, Supp. Rem. IX, 306-7; 1966 *T&E*, App. I, 136-7) Our inquiry is directed at the very essence of any subject's intentional directedness to objectivities.

Those who are familiar with Husserl's early work will recognise this point. Dallas Willard has, I think correctly, characterised Husserl's phenomenology as an attempt to reconcile two claims about rational thought, which when taken independently appear quite acceptable: in the first place there is the claim that logical truths govern, or are applicable to, the 'particular concernings,
assertings, and inferrings of particular persons' (Willard 1972 'The Paradox of Logical Psychologism', 43); secondly, there is the claim that these statements 'as Husserl, Frege, and others have shown do not draw their evidence from the examination of such events.' (Willard 1972 'The Paradox of Logical Psychologism', 43) These statements are, when taken together, seemingly hard to reconcile: 'How can claims about a certain sort of thing fail to draw their evidence from the examination of the things of that sort?' (loc. cit.) The problem is how one can reconcile the apparent ideality of logical laws, while allowing that they apply to the thoughts of empirical subjects.

Husserl's solution to this apparent incommensurability is to claim that the content of any intentional act whatever, that which remains identical from act to act

is none other than the identity of the species. As a species, and only as a species, can it embrace in unity (ιμβαλλεν σε άλλων), and as an ideal unity, the dispersed multiplicity of individual singulars. The manifold singulars for the ideal unity Meaning are naturally the corresponding act-moments of meaning, the meaning intentions. Meaning is related to varied acts of meaning - Logical Presentation to presentative acts, Logical Judgement to acts of judging, Logical Syllogism to acts of syllogism - just as Redness in specie is to the slips of paper which lie here, and which all 'have' the same redness. (Husserl 1970(a) LI, Vol. I, Inv. I, Chap. IV, §32, 330; see also 1972 'A Reply to a Critic', 37; 1977 'The Task and Significance of the Logical Investigations', 210)

The content of a perceptual experience or the proposition expressed by a judgement act, is, for Husserl, referential properties, characters of the acts in which they are instantiated. It is by means of these act characteristics that the act refers to the object. The content is not itself the reference of the act, but may itself be attended to in a distinct act with an appropriate, phenomenological attitude. The act characters are not the instantiations themselves of course, but the species of which the individual act moment is an instantiation: we should not confuse this particular redness of this particular object with the essence
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I'll redness'. The same content may be instantiated in multiple acts at various times, and hence unite all the empirical acts as referring to the same object in a like manner. I take it that this is the accepted understanding of Husserl's doctrine (see Willard 1972, 51-2; Mohanty 'Husserl's Thesis of the Ideality of Meanings', 77; 1977 McIntyre & Smith, 82; et al.), and, as such, uncontroversial. What I want to add is that it is also the position which Brentano adopted in his later writings: Brentano's ens rationis has the same significance as Husserl's act species.

What Brentano wishes to guard against, hence what explains the different emphasis in his work from that of Husserl, is the tendency promoted by the grammar of language to posit universals and irreal entities as entities existing independently in their own right. We need not, however, become encumbered with prolix locutions which repeatedly make explicit the analysis of terms designating universals and irreal entities. As a matter of practical expediency we may treat these terms as if they designated their referents in the same manner as those terms that refer to things. This is to treat those terms as a form of linguistic shorthand, a practice which has precedence:

language makes use of many fictions for the sake of brevity; in mathematics, for example, we speak of negative quantities less than zero, of fractions of one, or irrational and imaginary numbers, and the like, which are treated exactly like numbers in the strict and proper sense. And so language has abstract as well as concrete terms and uses them in many ways as if they referred to things which are parts of the relevant concrete entity. (Brentano 1973 PES, Add. Ess. XIV, 322-3; see also cited in Oskar Kraus' introduction to the 1944 ed., 386; 1966 T&E, Bk III, Chap III, 83)

Just as mathematics may proceed with the use of linguistic shorthand to investigate its object domain, so may descriptive psychology proceed in its own object domain. It seems to me wrong to claim, as do Kevin Mulligan and Barry Smith, that Brentano's theory of universals and irreal entities makes it
impossible (except in a round about way) to formulate a science of essences *qua* Husserlian phenomenology. (Mulligan 1982 'Pieces of a Theory', 34) There is nothing in Brentano's doctrine to hinder the investigation into the essence of such terms as 'red' or 'possibility'. The investigation proceeds by means of abstract or noetic thought, which is the Brentanian term for what Husserl calls eidetic intuition. All that Brentano wishes to guard against is the further misleading step of treating universals and irreal entities as independently existing members of our ontology.

At the time of writing his *Psychology* Brentano had not developed these analytic tools for analysing judgements about universals or contents. As a consequence, and under the pressure of accommodating the intuition that perfectly sensible and possibly true judgements could be made about such entities, he relied upon the *ad hoc* device of admitting such entities as the referents of intentional relations. (cf Section 1) This is the meaning of the parenthetical remark from the 1874 doctrine of intentionality: when Brentano writes that the object to which an intentional relation is 'not to be understood here as meaning a thing [*eine Realität*]' he means that it may be an irreal entity. As we have here seen, this is a claim which Brentano was later to categorically reject. On Brentano's mature view an intentional relation could only be instantiated towards a thing. Any judgement about an irreal entity had a thing as its primary object, and only obliquely referred to the irreal object in its instantiation as a distinguishable moment of that primary object. It is this theoretical change that divides Brentano's early work from his later, not any change in conviction regarding the ontological character of the referent of an intentional relation. To stress the point once again, Brentano never endorsed the absurd view that the intentional object was a third thing that mediated between mind and world.
CHAPTER 3

Intentionality and the Philosophy of Mind:
Edmund Husserl and Phenomenology

The preliminary account of intentionality provided in Chapter 1 Section 4 is richer in descriptive detail than anything to be found in Brentano's own writings. We have been involved in a reconstructive exercise because Brentano's own writings do not provide such an elucidated account. In fact, this account has been elaborated with an eye to the later more developed account of intentionality to be found in the phenomenological tradition, in particular in Husserl. Husserl's writings are so extensive, in fact, that we will henceforth restrict our investigation to the most basic of intentional relations, namely, the intentionality of perception. Husserl's accomplishment is to articulate in all its complexity the phenomena to be accounted for in any adequate account of our mental lives. It is these descriptions of mental phenomena that the naturalist (of the ontological kind defined in the Introduction) needs to provide an adequate explanation for, or, failing this, an account of why it appears to us that there are such phenomena.

Let us then turn to Husserl's investigations into the nature of intentionality. What distinguishes his account from many other modern accounts is his procedure whereby he attempts to clarify the phenomenon without the constraints of a prior theory. This is the essential move in phenomenology: to approach the phenomenon in question with as little theoretical baggage as is possible, in the hope of clarifying just what it is that is in need of an explanation.
In Chapter 1 Section 1 we saw that Brentano distinguished between physical and mental phenomena. The former we interpreted as the sensuous contents of perceptual acts while the latter were interpreted as a crude attempt to capture the Fregean/Husserlian sense of content as that which fixes reference. Brentano made the distinction, I argued, to facilitate taxonomising the mental and physical components of experience. However, once this distinction has been made, it is used little by Brentano for elucidating the phenomenon of intentionality - we are merely told that mental phenomena are intentional while physical are not. This insight contributed to our understanding of Brentano's doctrine of intentionality because it demarcated the purely phenomenal component of intentional experiences from the object of those experiences. Thus, on the basis of this distinction we were protected from drawing the erroneous conclusion that the object of an intentional relation had a merely phenomenal existence. Husserl, however, puts this distinction to far greater use, and, consequently, was able to describe intentionality at a level of clarity never reached by Brentano.

In particular, Husserl wants to establish the givenness in direct intuition of the object of external perception. By Anschauung Husserl is invoking the ordinary sense of the word, whereby something is legitimated as given in originary experience quite apart from any theoretical explication. (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part I, Chap. I, §1, 6) Such intuition is typically exemplified in perception of physical things, whereby we intuit tables, chairs, cats, dogs, and other such everyday entities. However, no real understanding of Husserlian phenomenology is possible if it is not first appreciated that his essential motivation is to legitimate a further class of intuitional experiences. Husserl wished to establish the validity of an intuition by means of which we directly
intuit categorial objects, the objects of logic and mathematics, and eidetic objects, universals. Much of Husserl's philosophical project can only be properly understood when seen in the light of this guiding goal. However, Husserl saw that this task could only be accomplished after clarifying the everyday, more mundane sense of intuition. It is the light shed by his descriptions on such everyday experience that concerns us here, and which bring the peculiar characteristics of the intentionality of perception to the fore. I shall continue to use the term 'perception' in referring to this restricted class of intuitions. However, it needs to be remembered that for Husserl there could also be perception of ideal objects, and indeed of inner states, exhibited by one's consciousness of oneself.

Husserl realised at the outset that it was an error to conceive of the intentional relation as a 'relation between two things, both present in an equally real fashion (reell) in consciousness, an act and an intentional object'. (Husserl 1970(a) LI, Inv. V, Chap. 1, §11, 557) We have already acknowledged that this was a misunderstanding encouraged by the way Brentano formulated his 1974 doctrine of intentionality. Brentano's talk of 'immanent inexistence' had misled others into conceiving of the intentional object as a real part of the intentional relation; thus, generating all sorts of non-existent and irreal objects. Husserl sees such a conclusion as countersensical:

I have an idea of the god Jupiter: this means that I have a certain presentative experience, the presentation-of-the-god-Jupiter is realized in my consciousness. This intentional experience may be dismembered as one chooses in descriptive analysis, but the god Jupiter naturally will not be found in it. The [so-called] 'immanent', 'mental object' is not therefore part of the descriptive or real make-up (descriptiven reellen Bestand) of the experience, it is in truth not really immanent or mental. But it also does not exist extramentally, it does not exist at all. (op. cit., Chap. 2, §11, 558-9)
In those cases where the intentional object does not exist we need to accept that the object is neither transcendent nor immanent to that act - it simply doesn't exist.

In those cases where the intentional object does exist, nothing becomes phenomenologically different. It makes no essential difference to an object presented and given to consciousness whether it exists, or is fictitious, or is perhaps completely absurd. I think of Jupiter as I think of Bismark, of the tower of Babel as I think of Cologne Cathedral, of a regular thousand-sided polygon as of a regular thousand-faced solid. (Husserl 1970(a) LI, Inv. V, Chap. 2, §11, 559)

The insight here is that the existence or non-existence of the referent of the intentional relation makes no essential difference to the intentionality of the relation qua its directedness towards an object. We should note that Husserl qualifies this passage by saying 'no essential difference' because here the relation is being considered from the side of the subject directing its intention towards an object. There is, of course, some difference from the side of the object. If the object does not exist the intention, as we shall see, will be empty, and lack satisfaction, or in Husserl's terminology, 'fulfilment'. However, regarded from the side of the subject the intentional relation is exhausted by its directedness or 'aiming at' an object whether that object is the god Jupiter or Bismark, whether it is in fact raining or not. The intentional relation does not contain, but 'aims at' or 'points to' its intentional object which may or may not be a really existing entity.

To both avoid construing the intentional relation as a relation between two things, and capture the essence of consciousness, Husserl uses the locution 'intention' in a sense closer to its etymological root. (cf Chapter 1 Section 5) In this original sense it 'hits off the peculiarity of acts by imagining them to aim at something'. (op. cit., §13, 563; see also Inv. VI, Sec. I, Chap. II, §13, 707) By drawing upon its root sense, 'intention' serves to articulate the peculiarity of
mental acts as involving the grasping of something that is other than the act itself. Thus, Husserl speaks of the intentional object as being 'referred to' or 'aimed at' by the intentional relation, and considers this 'aiming at' as entirely exhausting the composition of the intentional relation.

As we have seen (cf Chapter 1 Section 4), Searle also attempts to capture the sense of consciousness (intentionality) as its directedness to an object. According to Searle, this directedness is achieved by that part of the intentional relation he calls its 'representative content'. (Searle 1979 'What is an Intentional State?', 76; 1983 Intentionality, 11) Searle's use of 'representation' is illuminating for understanding what Husserl meant by the mind 'aiming at' an object. What Searle did not mean by 'representation' was any ontological, determinately specifiable entity, such as a mental picture. (Searle 1983 Intentionality, 12) Rather, 'representation' is, for Searle, a purely logical notion, borrowed from his theory of speech acts, whereby 'its propositional content determines a set of conditions of satisfaction under certain aspects'. (loc. cit.) The 'conditions of satisfaction' are, as we have seen in Chapter 1

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1 Searle uses the term 'representative content' to distinguish it from the 'psychological mode' of the intentional relation. (Searle 1979 'What is an Intentional State?', 76; 1983 Intentionality, 12) Quite simply, the psychological mode is the attitude in which the intentional relation is directed to its object: an intentional attitude may involve judging, denying, desiring, loving, etc. the intentional object. Correlatively, in Husserl, this aspect of the intentional relation is called the 'act quality'. (Husserl 1970 LI Vol. 2, Inv. V, Chap. II, §20, 586-90; Chap. III, §22, 597; 1982 Ideas I, Part III, Chap. IV, §117, 281; §126, 296; Part IV, Chap. I, §129, 310; §133, 317)

2 There are legitimate grounds for maintaining that both Searle and Husserl did have similar conceptions of what constituted the 'aboutness' of an intentional relation. Searle was led to the investigation of the phenomenon of intentionality as a supplementation to his speech act theory. (Searle 1992 The Rediscovery of the Mind, xi) He realised that a speech act could only derive its representational properties from the intentional properties of the mind. (Searle 1979 'What is an Intentional State?', 75; 1983 Intentionality, 27) Thus, Searle's methodological procedure was to explain intentionality by means of speech acts, even though ontologically the order of dependence was the other way round. In a similar manner, Husserl, in Investigation I, begins his account of the 'aboutness' of intentional states by considering linguistic expressions. Husserl sought to explain how mere marks on a page or sound could be given meaning, that is be about things other than themselves, by arguing that they derived it from the intentionality of the mind (cf Inv. VI, Chap. I). Thus, both Searle and Husserl see intentionality as a primitive phenomenon which can be conferred on other objects. It makes no sense to speak of conferring some inner picture upon a written expression, but it does make sense to consider the written expression as having logical conditions of satisfaction bestowed upon them.
Section 4, just those determinations of what must be the case if the intentional relation is true or veracious:

if I have a belief that it is raining, the content of my belief is: that it is raining. And the conditions of satisfaction are: that it is raining - and not, for example, that the ground is wet or that water is falling out of the sky. (Searle 1983 *Intentionality*, 13)

On this conception of intentionality the belief that it is raining need not involve an explicit mental picture of raining, but merely a relation to the world subject to conditions of truth or falsity, satisfied by the current presence or absence of rain. This is a minimal conception of 'representation' which makes no claims regarding ontology. In a similar vein, we should understand minimally what Husserl calls 'matter' in his *Investigations* and 'noema', or more accurately 'noematic sense', in his *Ideas*.

§2

The intentional object, whether existent or not, is not a real part of the intentional relation - only in a loose and extended sense could we, with Brentano, speak of the intentional object as having 'immanent objectivity'. However, perception as a sub-class of intentionality is not a nothing, containing no real parts: it is a necessary part of every perceptual consciousness that it involve percepts, sensuous experience.

Percepts constitute, as we indicated above (Chapter 1 Section 1), the sensuous, immanent contents of the intentional experience. In the *Ideas* Husserl terms these immanent contents 'hyle'. He himself does not provide a detailed discussion of the hyle but claims that their description is a 'self-contained discipline' within phenomenology. (Husserl 1982 *Ideas* I, Part III, Chap. II, §86,
210) Despite this omission, we can provide some descriptive analysis of the hyletic data, while maintaining our freedom from preconceived theoretical commitments.

While performing our descriptive analysis of perception it is essential to maintain the distinction between the sensuous contents or fullness (Fülle) of perception and the objective things and properties perceived. (cf Chapter 1 Section 1) Experience testifies that we need to make such a distinction. Consider, for example, a perception I may have of a blue box: I see a blue box and come to believe this box is blue. In believing that it is blue, I of course believe it to have a certain colour property, which it has whether I see it now, later, here or over there. It is in this sense that the 'blue' is ascribed as a genuine property of the object. At the same time, my actual perceptual awareness of the box and its colour, the concrete effect 'in' me of the box, is essentially perspectival: throughout different perceivings of the box there will be subtle shadings, changes in the ambient light, contrasts with background, etc. The hue I perceive at any one time will likely never be exactly the same. For the most part I am never aware of the variation in hue, I just see the blue. It is only when I reflect on the act itself, that I notice that the box presents itself to me as blue in the these varying hues of blue. Sensuous data never remain constant, variations in the ambient light, alterations in my relative orientation to the object, etc., all provide me differing sensuous intuitions. The property, however, of which I am perceptually conscious remains constant throughout these variations.

Husserl attempts to capture this distinction between the objective property and the sensuous data, the 'hyle', by noting that the latter are only ever given as members of a series of adumbrations, all of which constitute the 'appearance' of the objective property.
The color of the seen physical thing is, of essential necessity, not a really inherent moment of the consciousness of color; it appears, but while it is appearing the appearance can and must, in the case of a legitimating experience, be continually changing. The same color appears "in" continuous multiplicities of color adumbrations. Something similar is true of every sensuous quality and also of every spatial shape. One and the same shape (given "in person" as the same) appears continuously but always "in a different manner," always in different adumbrations of shape. That is a necessary situation, and obviously it obtains universally. (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part II, Chap. II, §41, 87; see also §44, 96; Part III, Chap. IV, 97, 237)

I perceive this object as having the shape of a box, despite the changing adumbrations of shape with which I am presented; I perceive it as this shade of blue, despite the various shadows cast on it, and the changing light in which I view it.

This pre-theoretical description of the phenomenon of perception reveals that a perceptual intention essentially, in our manner of speaking, points past the immanent percepts to the property inherent in the object itself. As we noted above it is only by changing one's regard from a perceptual experience towards the perceptual experience that one even becomes aware that there are such percepts, immanent to the act, at all3. (cf Section 2) The immanent percepts are not primarily that towards which the intentionality of perception is directed: 'any piece of a sensed visual field, full as it is of visual contents, is an experience containing many part-contents, which are neither referred to, nor intentionally objective in the whole.' (Husserl 1970(a) LI Vol. 2, Inv. V, Chap. II, §10, 556) That is, the immanent contents of our perceptual experiences are not themselves perceptions; rather,

they constitute the act, provide necessary points d'appui which render possible an intention, but are not themselves intended, not the objects presented in the act, I do not see colour-sensations but coloured things, I

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3 The point is that this is not our everyday mode of consciousness, we are for the most part primarily attending to the objects themselves. It is only in a deliberate, theoretically motivated alteration of regard that we ever attend to the sensuous experiences themselves: it may even be true that most people never directly regard, say, sensuous red as opposed to the redness of an object.
do not hear tone-sensations but the singer's song etc. etc. (op. cit., §11(a), 559; see also 1982 Ideas I, Part III, Chap. II, §86, 210)

Our perceptions are of physical objects, in which inhere, as part contents, the physical properties.

Note, however, that in and through this immanent content I nonetheless see the box as out there with some independent property, in no sense do I see either the box or its colour as in anyway in me. So, there is on the one hand the qualities had by the object we all perceive; and on the other, there is the content qua the particular, sensible moments of my perception of that object.

§3

While it may be true that sensuous contents are necessary for building up the perceptual relation (they are the 'points d'appui'), further description reveals that they are not sufficient. It would be a confusion to think of the sensuous, immanent contents as constituting the intentional relation by themselves:

it need only be recalled that in the stuffs themselves, by virtue of their own essence, the relation to the Objective unity is not unambiguously predelineated; the same material complex, instead, can undergo a diversity of mutually discrete and shifting construals by virtue of which

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4 Notice that I am not here saying anything about the ontology of the sensuous contents. What I am arguing remains ontologically neutral between whether sensuous qualities should be ascribed an substantial ontological status of their own (cf Nagel 1974 'What is it like to be a Bat'; Jackson 1886 'What Mary didn't Know'), or whether such qualities should be eliminated in favour of 'dispositions to react' (cf Dennett 1991 Consciousness Explained; Churchland 1995 The Engine of Reason). This ontological question has no bearing on the point I am making. I am merely arguing that such sensory properties, whatever they may in fact be, should be identified with the immanent contents of our perceptual experience, and that this is a constitutive part of our perceptual experience. The point is that it is upon these contents that we can instantiate a relation to the objective property, whatever that may be. It does not matter for this point whether these immanent contents are truly qualia or merely relative dispositions that give the illusion of being qualia.
different objectivities are intended to. (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part III, Chap IV, §97, 203; see also 1970 LI Vol. 2, Inv. V, Chap. II, §14, 566-7)

That the sensuous contents are not themselves intentional is most dramatically illustrated by those cases were what I perceive becomes radically altered despite no change in the immanent content of the perception.

Let us imagine that certain arabesques or figures have affected us aesthetically, and that we then suddenly see that we are dealing with symbols or verbal signs. In what does this difference consist? Or let us take the case of an attentive man hearing some totally strange word as a sound-complex without even dreaming it is a word, and compare this with the case of the same man afterwards hearing the word, in the course of conversation, and now acquainted with its meaning, but not illustrating it intuitively. (Husserl 1970(a) LI Vol. 2, Inv. V, Chap. II, §14, 556-7)

Clearly the only difference we can ascribe the intentional relations in each of these cases is the act character, there is no difference in the sensuous contents. By stressing the importance of the act character to perception, Husserl is arguing for the necessity of considering the mind to contribute a conceptual component to perceptual experiences. The mind contributes the 'How' of the object in its determinations (see Chapter 4 Section 4), which gives the act the character of being right or wrong depending on how things are in the world. (cf Section 1)

The intentional relation, to push Husserl's metaphor of 'aiming at', uses the sensuous contents as the 'sight' by which it targets the object itself. Of course it

5 Ludwig Wittgenstein's discussion of 'aspect seeing' in Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein 1953 PL, II, xi) seems in part to be an argument for the necessity of distinguishing between the sensuous contents and the interpretative, truly representational function of consciousness.

6 Kevin Mulligan argues that, for Husserl, perception can indeed be non-conceptual. (1995 'Perception', 170-2) However, Mulligan equates 'conceptual' with 'propositional'. Thus, when he argues, quite rightly, that for Husserl there are non-propositional perceptions, he takes this to mean that they are also non-conceptual. There is, however, no need to equate 'conceptual' with 'propositional'. It is perfectly consistent to maintain that there is a conceptual character to all perception, and that this conceptual ingredient need not be explicitly, that is, propositionally, articulated. For the most part our perceptual experiences remain at the pre-predicative level: we see 'the cup of coffee', not 'that the cup is full of coffee'. This, however, does not entail that my seeing 'the cup of coffee' does not include a conceptual component.
is always a possibility that one does not aim truly. Sensuous experience can be misinterpreted, and this is the source of hallucination or radical error. Moreover, it is also possible in free fantasy to sensuously present to oneself something which has no existence in the world, when, for example, I see in my mind's eye a winged horse, Pegasus. Here one so to speak 'aims at nothing'. In the former case, one's aim is not true; in the latter, one's aim is not serious, it is without a target. However, these are differences in either the objective side of the relation, or in the psychological attitude. In either case there is a common sense in which intentionality means its object, directs itself towards the object. There is in each instance an interpretative component over and above the immanent, sensuous contents, which constitutes the 'aiming at', the condition of successful reference. (cf Section 1)

It is due to these considerations that we have been careful to distinguish both the 'immanent sensuous' and 'objective property' senses of content from the Fregean/Husserlian sense of content as that which fixes reference. Moreover, In Chapter 1 Section 4 we further distinguished this sense of reference, reference in the sense of R1, from successful reference, R2. At the same time, reference in the sense of R1, and thus also R2, must be distinguished from any causal relation or transaction between either the object determined by R1, if there is such an object, and the mental state which refers to this object, at least in the sense of R1.

We can, however, while remaining faithful to our descriptive standpoint, note that the immanent contents are essentially 'subject-related' and perspectival. These immanent contents depend upon my relative circumstances and orientation towards the object. It is then reasonable to conclude that the immanent contents are an effect in us, resulting from a transaction between the object of successful reference and the mental act which refers (in the sense of either R1 or R2).
According to Brentano (see Introduction) and Husserl, only once we have thus descriptively clarified the phenomena can we turn to causal and natural scientific explanations. However, under this interpretation they can only ever be by themselves representations in the sense of a symptom to its cause. Naturally, the effects of any such causal transaction will represent its causes in the sense of being a symptom whose structure will reveal something about its cause: it will involve structural information crudely isomorphic to its cause. Note, however, that this is a new sense of representational content which needs to be kept conceptually distinct from either perceptual content, in both its senses, and content as that determining reference.

One cannot simply construe the intentionality of acts as simply identical with some causal process or transaction without further grounds to do so. Our maintaining this distinction is well motivated because once we have introduced casual, naturalistic explanation, and thus a theoretical explanation that always exceeds the description of the phenomena, we have ceased to operate in the domain of phenomenology. It is for this reason that we must keep the concept of the content in the sense of being a symptom for something distinct from the perceptual content. It is an empirical, hence, genetic question as to whether the latter can be reduced to, or eliminated in favour of, the former; and whether a reduction or elimination of reference fixing content can be similarly carried out. This, however, is merely to leave natural science its own object domain and methodology, something which neither Brentano or Husserl would wish to challenge. The question that needs to be raised is to what extent this naturalistically acceptable sense of content can explain the apparent validity of the other phenomenologically elucidated senses of content.
§4

Phenomenology does not and must not postulate the existence of any perceived object. This is not to say, however, that the concept of an intentional object is outside the sphere of phenomenological investigation; on the contrary, establishing the objective validity of this concept is at the heart of the project. To understand how it is that the existence of the intentional object can make no essential difference to the investigations of phenomenology, even though the concept of such an object is part of its object domain, we must elucidate our everyday mode of mindedness at its modifications, and their relation to the *epoché*.

It is important not to misunderstand Husserl at this point. It would be easy to interpret his claim that the existence of the intended object makes no essential difference to intentionality as an endorsement of phenomenalism. This would be wrong because Husserl qualifies the passage in question by stressing that we are here considering 'a particular sort of experience or particular mode of mindedness (Zummutesein)'. (Husserl 1970(a) LI, Inv. V, Chap. 2, §11, 559) That is, Husserl is elucidating intentionality by considering the intentional relation in a specific attitude or mode of mind.

The mode of mindedness which Husserl is here describing is that of 'mere' presentation, in the sense of having the idea of, say, the god Jupiter or Bismark hovering before the mind 'in this or that descriptively determinate fashion.' (loc. cit.) This form of mindedness is related to, but not the same as, the form of mindedness involved in judgement: [t]o *judge* about this Schloss, to delight in its architectural beauty, to cherish the wish that one could do so etc. etc. are new experiences, characterized in novel phenomenological terms.' (loc. cit.) A judgement, about any thing or state of affairs whatever, is by its very nature
subject to the conditions of truth or falsity, veracity or inveracity. A mere presentation, on the other hand, is subject to no such considerations, it merely hovers before the mind and involves no opinion about reality.

Having a mere presentation hovering before the mind is to be contrasted with our everyday mode of mindedness where we are involved with objects, accepting them as really existing in the world. However, as Husserl rightly points out, this acceptance is not something added to a mere presentation; quite the contrary, the unquestioning acceptance of the existence of that which is presented in everyday experience is the primary mode of mindedness in which we live:

[t]he general positing, by virtue of which there is not just any continual apprehensional consciousness of the real surrounding world, but a consciousness of it as a factually existing "actuality," naturally does not consist of a particular act, perchance an articulated judgement about existence. It is, after all something that lasts continuously throughout the whole duration of the attitude, i.e., throughout natural waking life. (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part II, Chap. I, §31, 57)

If we attend to the phenomena of consciousness, leaving aside theoretical presuppositions, we must see that consciousness essentially regards the world of things as existing. There is for everyday consciousness no doubt that things are just as it takes them to be.

This general principle is not falsified hallucination. In the event of an hallucination, what was once taken as existing is brought into question, and this bringing into question is only effected by the incongruence of what was once posited with its surrounds which remain posited and unquestioned. This incongruence is resolved by declaring the experience 'a mere hallucination', and the assumption that this perception was related to the originally posited object is annulled. (op. cit., Part III, Chap. III, §88, 215) We may then discover
the real source of the hallucinatory percept or not, but in either case we fall back into our natural attitude of posittings.

Even when we are not in the natural mode of consciousness, when, for example we engage in free fantasy, or turn our regard to the realm of mathematical objects, etc., the natural mode of consciousness is ever-present as background. It is an ubiquitous possibility of any mode of mindedness that one can effortlessly fall back upon the natural mode of mindedness. (op. cit., Part II, Chap. I, §28, 54)

What this pre-theoretical description of everyday consciousness reveals is that the having of a mere presentation is not the primary, most basic, mode of mindedness. It is not the case that consciousness involves a mere presentation to which an explicit judgment that this is so is conjoined. In the case of everyday consciousness existence is not a predicate, it is rather an implicit moment revealed in the very sense of everyday being-conscious-of\(^7\). Mere presentation, in its capacity as a distinct mode of mindedness, is a modification away from the natural mode of mindedness. Moreover, it is a modification whose very possibility is founded upon the primary mode of mindedness whereby the world is posited as existing:

\(\text{[i]t is a matter ... of a modification which, in a certain way, completely annuls, completely renders powerless every doxic [that is, opining] modality to which it is related - but it is a modification in a totally different sense than that of negation which, moreover, ... has its positive effect in the negatum: a non-being which is itself again a being. \text{<The modification> does not cancel out, does not "effect" anything: it is the conscious counterpart of all producing: its neutralization. It is included in every abstaining-from-producing something, putting-something-out-of-action, "parenthesising" it, "leaving-something-undecided" and then having-an-"undecided"-something, being-"immersed"-in-the-producing, or "merely conceiving" the something}}\)

\(^7\) This is not to say that 'existence' cannot be rendered explicitly as a predicate. It is always a possibility of mind to judge that something exists. However, such a judgement involves an altogether distinct mode of mindedness of a higher order whose very possibility is founded upon the positing of everyday consciousness. (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part III, Chap. IV, §116, 276-8)
produced without "doing anything with it." (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part III, Chap. IV, §109, 257-8)

This mode of mindedness is ever-present as a possible modification of the natural regard. At any time what was just accepted as existing, posited as being-so in the world, may be regarded with this positing put out of action. We can regard it as mere presentation, in its capacity as a presentation, without paying heed to the existence (or not) of that which is presented.

Mere presentation, as an already given mode of mindedness, is appropriated by Husserl and given a central position in the methodology of the phenomenological project. It is the adoption of this specific mode that constitutes the essence of the *epoché*. The *epoché* is not some new and radical discovery revealed to the world by phenomenology, but, rather, the putting to use of an already familiar mode of mindedness. It is also, as Husserl recognises, a philosophical move already made by René Descartes.

One procedure, possible at any time, is the attempt to doubt universally which Descartes carried out for an entirely different purpose with a view toward bringing out a sphere of absolute indubitable being. We start from here, but at the same time emphasize that the attempt to doubt universally shall serve us only as a *methodic* expedient for picking out certain points which, as included in its essence, can be brought to light and made evident by means of it. (op. cit., Part II, Chap. I, §31, 58)

Before Husserl, Descartes had also made use of the mode of mindedness involved in having a mere presentation. However, phenomenologically, Descartes had gone too far, his suspension of positing 'is so predominant that one can say that his attempt to doubt universally is properly an attempt to negate universally.' (op. cit., 59; see also 1964 Idea, 4) Descartes negates everything posited in the natural regard, and is left with what he takes to be the indubitable being of the *cogitations*, presentations regarded *qua*
presentations, and the clear and distinct idea *cogito ergo sum*. Husserl concedes that Descartes is correct to conclude the *sum* on the basis of the *cogito* (op. cit., Chap. II, §46, 100); but argues that the radicality of his doubt led him to misunderstand the nature of the *cogito*. It is precisely the nature of the *cogito* that Husserl believes can be elucidated by means of the *epoché*. By abstaining from the positing of the natural regard one can focus one's attention upon the mental act itself, whereby its 'essence' 'can be brought to light and made evident'.

Against Descartes, Husserl realises that the mode of mindedness involved in abstaining from positing does not constitute genuine doubt. In the *epoché*

\[w]e do not give up the positing we effected, we do not in any respect alter our conviction which remains in itself as it is as long as we do not introduce new judgement motives: precisely this is what we do not do. Nevertheless the positing undergoes a modification: while it in itself remains what it is, we, so to speak, "put out of action" [sic] we "exclude it," we "parenthesize it". (op. cit., Chap. I, §31, 58-9; see also Part III, Chap. IV, 109, 258)

The *epoché* does not involve the imposition of a radically new epistemological reconstrual of experience. It is everyday experience itself in a particular mode of mindedness. The harnessing of this mode of mindedness is 'important for preparing the way to phenomenology' (op. cit., Part III, Chap. IV, §109, 258), because by 'putting out of action', by 'bracketing' the positing, regarding the presentation *qua* presentation, one may bring to light the sense, the nature of consciousness. This methodological principle only becomes explicit in the *Ideas*; however, it is implicit in much of the *Investigations*: it is what Husserl means when he writes that the existence or non-existence of the intentional object makes no essential difference to the intentional relation when seen from a particular mode of mindedness.

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8 Brentano also equated his conception of the *entia rationis* with Descartes' *cognitiones*. (cf Chapter 2 Section 3)
It is important to note what is meant by saying that a mere presentation is not subject to the conditions of truth/falsity, etc. An important distinction must be drawn:

the expression "conditions of satisfaction" has the usual process-product ambiguity as between the requirement and the thing required. So, for example, if I believe that it is raining then the conditions of satisfaction of my belief are that it should be the case that it is raining (requirement). That is what my belief requires in order that it be a true belief. And if my belief actually is a true belief then there will be a certain condition in the world, namely the condition that it is raining (thing required), which is the condition of satisfaction of my belief, i.e., the condition in the world which actually satisfies my belief. (Searle 1983 *Intentionality*, 13)

This distinction permits a clearer demarcation of what is and is not involved in the case of mere presentation. When we speak of a 'mere presentation' not involving truth/falsity etc. we are denying that the presentation has any relation to the 'required', that is, the Schloss, the state of affairs that it is raining, etc. This is what is meant when we speak of the mere presentation hovering before the mind and having no relation to reality. What we are not saying is that in a case of mere presentation there are no conditions of satisfaction qua conditions of satisfaction. In the case of mere presentation there is still in Searle's sense the requirements. Even a mere presentation 'aims at', it is just that the aiming is, so to speak, cancelled.

This point is appreciated by Husserl, and its implications are essential to the establishment of positive phenomenological insights. As we saw in Section 2, sensuous data are really inherent parts of perception. They are not, however, themselves that upon which perception is directed: they are the point d'appui, the 'gussets', the 'building blocks' (Husserl 1970(a) *LI* Vol. 2, Inv. V, Chap. II, §14, 566) upon which the perceptual relation is established. In perception we find

such concrete really immanent Data as components in more inclusive concrete mental processes which are intensive as wholes; and, more
particularly, we find those sensuous moments overlaid by a stratum which, as it were, "animates," which bestows sense (or essentially involves a bestowing of sense) - a stratum by which precisely the concrete intuitive mental process arises from the sensuous, which has itself nothing pertaining to intentionality. (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part III, Chap. II, §85, 203; see also Part II, Chap. II, §41, 88; 1970 LI, Vol. 2, Inv. V, Chap. II, §14, 566-7)

The sensuous data are in the language of the Investigations 'interpreted', and the language of the Ideas 'given animating construings'. These 'animating construings' are what effect the positing of the object, and they involve the requirements, in Searle's sense, as moments within themselves.

Thus, we can appreciate what is not unimportant to the phenomenological regard. As we have seen the bracketing brought about by the epoche permits us to disregard 'any judgement which makes use of the positing of the "actual" physical thing'. (op. cit., §90, 220) However, let us reflect upon a case of mere presentation: it does not consist of a jumble of sense data; it too has a sense. A 'mere presentation' of a horse is a 'mere presentation of a horse'. We see then that the epoche does not affect the positing qua positing. In this mode of mindedness

we contemplate them [the posittings]; instead of joining in them, we make them Objects, take them as component parts of the phenomenon - the positing pertaining to perception as well as its components. (loc. cit.)

The positing, or to use Searle's term, the requirements - but not the object posited, the required - are themselves a real part of the intentional relation, and thus included in the object domain of Phenomenology. (op. cit., Chap. IV, §97, 238) Thus, we can see that the subjective side of intentionality, the subject's positing of an object, is included in the object domain of phenomenology. This positing of an object is 'content' in the sense of that which fixes reference.
We should note that under the phenomenological regard the claims made about the positing of an object in perception are *not* empirical, but, rather, claims about the very sense of perception itself. What we want to capture are the essential characteristics of perception such that any phenomenon which did not display these characteristics could not properly be called perception. Our appeal to examples is only an expedient to this end.\(^9\)

Moreover, it should not be thought that this phenomenological turning of one's regard to the sense of a perceptual experience is an easy task:

> while it may be quite natural for the logician or linguist to attend to the meanings of expressions, judgements, or utterances and ignore the objects or states of affairs to which they might refer, it is very unnatural to make the analogous move in the case of nonlinguistic acts. (Hall 1982 'Was Husserl Realist or Idealist?', 174)

It is difficult to turn one's attention to the sense of a perceptual experience because virtually all our everyday interests are tied to objects in the real world. It is most natural for us to live in the acts by which we perceive the real objects. Moreover, all of our acts take place within the context of our everyday interests with such objects. Our everyday getting about is infused with the tacit belief that objects exist pretty much as we take them to be. This background informs all our non-philosophical experience, both prescientific and scientific. Consequently, adopting the phenomenological perspective by disconnecting the object of reference from the meaning of the perceptual act 'is not simply a matter of shifting attention within the natural context of experience, but of transforming or abandoning the context as well.' (loc. cit.) Whereas phenomenology may draw upon a familiar mode of mindedness, it does so in a manner which is decidedly unnatural.

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\(^9\) It is this constant reference to experience, albeit in its *sense*, not its empirical matter of factness, which permits the results of phenomenology to elude Moore's Paradox. It is certainly true that phenomenology is concerned with conceptual clarification. However, it is not an empty clarification of the meaning of our words precisely because it keeps one eye upon the objects to which these concepts apply, that is, the phenomena themselves. The concepts must, so to speak, become adequate to their objects.
We are thus faced with the difficult task of elucidating the manner in which the intentional acts, the noeses in Husserl's terminology, actually animate the construings, in which they constitute consciousness-objectivities. Of fundamental concern to a phenomenology of the perception of external objects is the way in which noeses, e.g., with respect to Nature, by animating stuff and combining it into manifold-unitary continua and syntheses bring about consciousness of something such that the Objective unity of the objectivity allows of being harmoniously "made known," "legitimated" and "rationally" determined. (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part III, Chap. II, §86, 207)

We shall turn to this question in the following section, in which we shall prepare the ground for asking the question as to whether the content of this positing contains grounds for accepting the givenness of the object.

There is a distinction to be made between the mental act of perceiving, and the perceived thing; otherwise, it would make no sense to speak of being 'conscious of' something. Yet, according to Husserl, despite this conceptual distinctness, mind and world are essentially interrelated. This interrelation is so intimate, he contends, that there are strong grounds for considering the mind to be already at its object, in the sense that the entity is itself given.

More accurately the object is given as the object of my perception, which is to say that it is given 'under certain aspects'. (Searle 1983 Intentionality, 12) To say that an object is 'given under certain aspects' is to affirm the traditional content/object distinction as made famous by Frege in his paper 'On Sense and Meaning' (1984(b)), in addition to the distinction between act and object. The content, as Frege construes it, is a peculiar entity. In the first place it is that
aspect of a linguistic expression which determines the manner or aspect under which the object or state of affairs is intended. The distinction between the content and the object may be understood by noting that an expression designating the former in a proposition is intensional, that is, substitution of distinct expressions with identical reference is not truth preserving; whereas, an expression designating the latter is extensional, that is, truth preserving over similar substitution. Secondly, the content is that aspect of the expression which is common to any expression which intends the object or state of affairs in the same manner. That is, the content is not a real part of the expression but an atemporal sense which is, so to speak, correlated with the empirical occurrence of the expression.

A question that is often raised against the Fregean account of content is just how this content is in fact correlated with empirical occurrences of the expression. Husserl attempts to address this problem by first of all generalising the notion of content to cover any intensional, hence, mental act, not just linguistic acts. (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part III, Chap. IV, 294; see also McIntyre & Roland 1982 'Husserl's Identification of Meaning and Noema', 80; Follesdal 1969 'The Notion of Noema', 74) He then, as we shall see in Section 7, argues that the sense is a logical property, in a manner akin to Kant's categories of the Understanding, of mental acts. (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part I, Chap. I, §16, 31) According to Husserl (and also Searle), linguistic acts derive their intentionality from mental acts. Thus, Husserl appreciates this concept/object distinction as a significant insight. (op. cit., Part IV, Chap. I, §129, 309) However, and this will be the central theme Chapter 4, he considers the traditional conception of content too restricted, and too separated from the object itself.
§6

In order to clarify the actual sense of a perceptual experience we need to examine a concrete example of perception. We have established that perception involves sensuous contents, but should not be confused with truly representational contents, that is, those contents which fix reference. For Husserl this distinction is a fundamental insight that must be clearly understood before phenomenology can begin. To illustrate this distinction Husserl refers us to the perception one might have of a box.

I see a thing, e.g. this box, but I do not see my sensations. I always see one and the same box, however it may be turned and tilted. I have always the same 'content of consciousness' - if I care to call the perceived object a content of consciousness. But each turn yields a new 'content of consciousness', if I call experienced contents 'contents of consciousness', in a much more appropriate use of words. Very different contents are therefore experienced, though the same object is perceived. The experienced content, generally speaking, is not the perceived object. (Husserl 1970(a) LI Vol. 2, Inv. V, Chap. II, §14, 565)

In perception we attend to an object, the sense of which remains identical throughout the changing percepts. The givenness of the object as an identical something can only be the result of a construing animating the sensuous data. (cf Section 4) There is nothing in the percepts, the immanent perceptual contents, which by themselves collectively constitute such an identity.

The percepts can only ever give the object perspectively: '[t]he object is not actually given, it is not given wholly and entirely as that which it itself is. It is only given 'from the front', only 'perspectivally foreshortened and projected' etc.' (op. cit., Inv. VI, Sec. I, Chap. II, §14 (b), 712; see also 1982 Ideas I, Part II, Chap. II, §42, 91) It would be, however, wrong to conclude that any current perspectival view of an object exhausts the sense of that object in our intentional regard.
While many of its properties are illustrated in the nuclear content of the percept, at least in the (perspectival) manner which the last expressions indicate, many others are not present in the percept in such illustrated form: the elements of the invisible rear side, the interior etc., are no doubt subsidiarily intended to in more or less definite fashion, symbolically suggested by what is primarily apparent, but are not themselves part of intuitive, i.e. of the perceptual or imaginative content, of the percept. On this hinges the possibility of indefinitely many percepts of the same object, all differing in content. (Husserl 1982(a)LIVol. 2, Inv. VI, Sec. I, Chap. II, §14 (b), 713)

Husserl is here challenging a central assumption of traditional empiricist philosophy; namely, that at any one time our actual acquaintance with an object is exhausted by the perceptual content we are currently experiencing. Husserl's insight is that attention to the phenomenon of perception, if it is regarded without the imposition of a theory about perception, reveals that the object of perception is given in far greater substantial unity than what is explicitly given in the content of our current percept. Husserl is claiming that the unseen features of the object, the completing features, are also, in a manner, co-intended with the current perspectival view.

When we claim that the object itself is given to consciousness, what is not meant is that the presence of the object requires no further fulfilment. (op. cit, 712) This would be to misrepresent an actual case of perception. In any actual perception of an object there is an infinite continuum of other possible percepts currently not being fulfilled. The object of external perception is, to use Husserl's terminology, never given in complete 'adequacy'. This, however, is no reason to conclude that the object is not, in some approximation of this adequacy, given in a manner more encompassing than this current percept. If we attend to the sense of our perceptions we see that

[the features which enter into perception always point to completing features, which themselves might appear in other possible percepts, and that definitely or more or less indefinitely, according to the degree of our 'empirical acquaintance' with the object. Every percept, and every perceptual context, reveals itself, on closer analysis, as made up of components which are to be understood as ranged under two
standpoints of intention and (actual or possible) fulfilment. (*op. cit.*, Chap. I, §10, 700-1; Chap. II, §14(b), 713)

The content of perception is not confined to what is contained in the percepts one is currently experiencing. That would be a restricted and artificial sense of perceptual content.

If we attend to our actual experience we see that perception is a complex phenomenon which in addition to a purely intuitive intention also contains significative intentions. (*op. cit.*, Chap. II, 710) A significative intention, in its most general characterisation, is a mode of mindedness in which an object given in perception is regarded as a mediator, as referring, to an object which may be absent from perception. (*op. cit.*, Inv. V, Chap. I, §§1-7, 675-94; Chap. II, §14, 710) The complexity of a perceptual intention is established by the intuitive intention also functioning as a sign whereby the unintuited perspectives are co-intended.

To illustrate this broadened conception of content let us again consider the percept one might have of a box. The box is given in a single percept, and the box as given in this percept 'fulfils' the intention. However, this percept, so to speak, signifies other possible fulfilments, other possible percepts of the one identical box. That it does so signify is exemplified by the possibility of myself imagining myself rotating the box in my hands. Note, however, that perception need not involve an imaginative presentation, or any explicit expectation: we do in fact conduct ourselves in our everyday getting about without such explicit imaginations. (*op. cit.*, 700) In my imagination I articulate the fact that the current percept signifies that if I rotated the box in my hands from right to left, I would expect that what is now a percept of a square surface, would undergo a gradual change in its character. My expectation would be that my percept of the square surface would gradually be replaced by the presentation of two trapezia joined at an edge which was before the edge of the original square. This edge
would gradually progress from the right of my perceptual field, moving towards the centre of my percept. Throughout these changes in percepts I would expect that at first the left trapezium would be wider than the right, and as I continued to rotate the box to the right, that the right trapezoid would gradually increase in size while the left correspondingly diminished. Only when the foremost edge is at its closest to me would the trapezia be approximately the same size\(^{10}\). None of these percepts are contained in the sensuous content of my original percept of the square evenly coloured surface. Nonetheless, they are present in the sense of this percept in its truly representational capacity; it is perfectly rational to expect this succession of percepts if I were in fact to rotate the box. (Husserl 1970(a) \textit{I}, Vol. 2, Inv. VI, Sec. I, Chap II, §15, 717) The imaginative intention explicitly articulates the implicit, signifying co-intentions into a presentation of 'how the other sides might look'. This is already to identify more in the perceptual content than anything given in the current perception in the sense of 'hyle'.

The imaginative presentation does in fact articulate a continuum of significative intentions which are already co-present with the intuitive intention, and is not merely constructed in the free-play of our fantasy. In contrast to the intuitive intention, the significative intentions co-present with the intuitive intention are empty, they are not fulfilled. They can only attain fulfilment when I do in fact rotate the box: by rotating the box each co-intention in turn receives its fulfilment within a continuous series of percepts. (\textit{op. cit.}, Chap. I, §10, 701) That the content of this articulation is internally related, and not merely arbitrarily associated to my current perception of the box, is demonstrated by the possibility of being \textit{surprised}. When I rotate what I have

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\(^{10}\) Of course, my imaginative intention would make no explicit reference to trapezia, and other geometric notions. I am merely attempting to describe the complex continuum of images one would expect to 'see'. 
interpreted as a box it may be that it is not in fact a box: it may in fact be a pyramid whose base I have until now been viewing\textsuperscript{11}.

It is not an unusual part of our everyday comportment to objects that there are cases in which our intentions, or, rather, the co-intentions within the broad content of our intentions, are frustrated. Frustration is correlative with fulfilment (\textit{op. cit.}, §11, 701; see also 1982 \textit{Ideas} I, Part II, Chap. II, §46, 102; Part IV, Chap. II, §145, 345): the senses of fulfilment and frustration are, in this usage, like truth and falsity, internally related - one cannot understand the sense of one without the other. When a case of frustration arises, when things are not as I took them to be, there is a consequential revision of my original intention: in the present example, my total intention is no longer towards a 'box' but towards a 'pyramid'.

Of course the revisions that may be necessary to my original intention need not be as radical as realising what I once took to be a box was in fact a pyramid: it may be that the box was not in fact a uniform colour, each face may have been a different colour; or it may be that there is no actual revision in my intention to an object, but, rather, an increase in the determinate content of my intention. In the intuitive presentation the significative intention becomes itself fulfilled; consequently, what was only vaguely intended in the significative intention finds greater determinacy in intuitive presentation.

This account of perception points to what Husserl is getting at when he speaks of the adequation of knowledge to its object. When I am presented with a new and relatively unfamiliar object, it is quite natural to turn it over in my hands, so as 'to get to know it'. As I turn it in my hands I am presented with ever new percepts, perspectives of the same object in which

\textsuperscript{11} A better example might be a case where I believed I was looking at a building, only when I walked around to see the rear I discovered that it was in fact a clever façade.
gain and loss are balanced at every step: a new act has richer fullness in regard to certain properties, for whose sake it has lost fullness in regard to others. But against this we may hold that the whole synthesis of the series of imaginations or percepts represents an increase in fullness in comparison with an act singled out from the series: the imperfection of the one-sided representation is, relatively speaking overcome in the all-sided one. (Husserl 1970(a) I, Vol. 2, Inv. VI, Sec. I, Chap. III, §16, 721)

As I 'get to know' an object by turning it over in my hands each individual percept of that object, or, more correctly, the matter of each percept, is in turn fulfilled at the expense of the previous percept. However, the increased determination of content of each successive presentation is synthetically unified into my total apprehension of that object. My unified intention, which included variously indeterminate co-intentions, gradually becomes more determinate with regard to its overall content. Consequently, it should be considered suspicious to think, pace empiricist philosophy, that our acquaintance with an object consists of a conjunction of disparate percepts. A description of the phenomenon itself suggests that single percept already contains, however indistinctly, the content of the unperceived sides; and thus, the idea of adequately knowing the object.

§7

At the same time, Husserl stresses that the imperfection, the inadequacy, of the presentation is relatively speaking overcome in an all-sided one because strictly speaking it is part of the sense 'spatial object' that the object cannot be directly intuited from all sides at once. (loc. cit.; see also 1982 Ideas I, Part II, Chap. II, §42, 91-2; Part IV, Chap. II, §138, 331) The presentation of the object cannot ever do away with the signifying intentions which point beyond this current percept. Certainly one can become better acquainted with the object by turning it in
one's hands, and increasing the determinacy of the partial intentions, and hence the total intention. However, it remains a constraint on perception that no perceived object can ever be intuited from all sides at once.

So in a sense, all that is 'properly given' in perception is a single, perspectival presentation. (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part IV, Chap. II, §138, 331) However, as our discussion of the phenomenon of perception reveals, our direct perception of a physical object also points to completing features, those sides currently unseen. If for a moment we consider 'physical object' in its most general sense, abstracted from the particular senses 'box', 'house', 'chair', etc., then we can see that a perception, any perception, points to the fact that there must be completing features, further determinations of possible percepts. Clearly this is the *sense* of 'physical object'.

If the sense of the physical thing is determined by the data of physical-perception (and what else could determine it?), then that sense demands such an imperfection and necessarily refers us to continuously unitary concatenations of possible perceptions which, starting from any perception effected, extend in infinitely many directions without limit, being always dominated throughout by a unity of sense. (op. cit., Part II, Chap. II, §44, 94-5)

It would in fact be countersensical to think of our perception of a physical object as being solely comprised of the sensuous content of just this one perceptual adumbration.

Even if I never in fact do perceive another side of an object, this presented side *always* points to, in various degrees of determinateness, the infinite series of completing features. It is only by being already understood as having a place upon the continuum of possible perceptions that *this* perception can have any sense for us as a percept of a *physical object*.

What "properly" appears cannot be separated from the physical thing as, let us say, a physical thing for itself; in the full sense of the physical thing, the sense-correlate <of what properly appears> fashions a *non-selfsufficient* part which can only have unity and selfsufficiency of sense
in a whole which necessarily includes in itself empty components and indeterminate components. (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part IV, Chap. II, §138, 331)

This is a point of fundamental importance: it is only by already perceiving this as a non-self-sufficient part of a completed spatial object, as a presentation located as a single point upon an infinite continuum of perspectives, that my current percept can have any sense as a percept of this object. This is not an empirical generalisation about how we in fact perceive spatial objects, but an expression of the sense of perception. Any entity whatever of which it could sensibly be said to have perception of an external world must perceive the worldly objects in this way. (op. cit., Part II, Chap. II, §42, 91)

Clearly the content of perception is more contentful than what is contained in any individual percept. It is this realisation which suggests to Husserl that 'the sense which the fulfilment of the perceptual intention would carry out - is not wholly different from the object realized, however imperfectly, in the percept.' (Husserl 1970(a) LI Vol. 2, Inv. VI, Sec. I, Chap. II, §14(b), 713) We can already appreciate that Husserl is bridging the gap between the subjectivity of knowing and the object of that knowledge.

Thus far, there is nothing in this which would run counter to the idea of a naturalistic account of perception. All we have shown is that there is more to perception than the sensuous contents in the sense we attributed to Brentano. As Brentano saw, there is of course the intentional relation, the truly representational content. A naturalistic account need only interpret the mind as performing operations upon these basic sensuous contents, or upon causally determined effects in our sensory apparatus, if the sensuous contents are considered illusory and to be eliminated, so as to produce the more complex, supposedly, representational contents, or at least the illusion of such contents. This is the assumption we must hold up to question: could the truly
representational content be built up from the sensuous contents or causally
determined effects, and the causal operations of the mind? This is a question
about the sense of our broadened conception of content. More particularly, it is
a question about the logical priority of this sense: is it imposed upon perception;
or is it a precondition for the possibility of perception?

Husserlian phenomenology is articulating the insight that in any perception of
a spatial object there is an internal relationship between my current
perspectival view and the complete determination of the object as a whole: it is
only by already perceiving the object as a complete spatial object that my percept
can be of a spatial object; and, on the other hand, only on the basis of my current
percept ('what else could determine it?') that I intend a spatial object. The point
being made here is not just that there is more to perception than the hyle, but
that this 'more' is not merely something 'added' on to the hyle, rather, the
'more' is internally related as an intrinsic moment of the unitary perceptual
experience. The perceptual contents are, we said, the points d'appui which
function to ground the actuality of the intentional relation. They do not,
however, exhaust the perceptual content. The sensuous contents are
interpreted or construed, and this construal is, to use Husserl's terminology,
governed by a rule or law [Regel]12.

Husserl's use of 'rule' must not be confused with the algorithmic sense of term.
It is not at all obvious to think, as does Hubert Dreyfus, that there is

considerable evidence ... that Husserl thought of the noemata as
complex formal structures, since even without the digital computer to
supply a model for his intuition, he thought of a noema as a "strict rule
(feste regel) for possible syntheses." (Dreyfus 1982(a) 'Introduction' to
Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science, 10)

12 We might note, since in Chapter 4 we shall interpret Husserl's phenomenology as a
development of Kant's critical theory, that Kant also refers to the application of the categories
of the Understanding as 'rules' which govern experience. When these rules have a necessary
application to experience he refers to them as 'laws'. (Kant 1929 Critique of Pure Reason,
A108/137; A113/140)
The sense of rule which Dreyfus is ascribing to Husserl, is that of a mental operation, whether syntactical (Fodor) or a recurrent pathway (Churchland) which generates new presentations of the unintuited sides of an object. This mental operation supposedly generates the series upon the basis of the input of the current percept. If this sense of rule is the appropriate one, then the governing sense of 'physical object' is logically subsequent to the perceptual experience.

Neither Husserl nor an adherent of a naturalistic account of mind would disagree that there can be, on the one hand, an articulated presentation of an object, and on the other, a simple perception of that same object. What is at issue is the order of logical priority we ascribe to the sense 'physical object': is the directly intuited, truly representational content, founded upon the articulation of presentations; or, is the articulation of presentations founded upon the direct intuition? It is clear that the latter must be the case. If my current perception did not already include the co-positings as moments within itself, then there would be no ground upon which to perform the articulation. There would be no necessity to the sense 'spatial object' beyond being an empirical generalisation. It must be the case that the perception is already implicitly articulated, in however indeterminate a form, otherwise it would not make sense to ascribe a series of possible percepts to the object of that perception. That is, the implicit articulation of the perceptual object as a continuum of possible percepts is logically antecedent to the perception itself.

This account of the logical priority of the perception as a perception of a completed spatial object, is clearly what Husserl has in mind. According to Husserl, an explicitly generated series of presentations of possible percepts, is a higher level, complex presentation of an object. (Husserl 1970(a) LI Vol. 2, Inv. VI, Sec. II, Chap. VI, §47, 789-90; 1982 Ideas I, Part III, Chap. IV, §98, 240) It is a
categorically articulated presentation whose possibility is founded upon the unitary intuition we have of that object, an intuition governed by the sense 'physical object'. The point is that we cannot have a categorial intuition of a physical object, rather, only of such things as states of affairs; the intuition of an object in direct perception cannot be founded in anything. However, on the basis of this intuition we may found the categorial intuition of the explicitly articulated presentation of that object.

This law governs the construing which is built upon the current perceptual contents. It prescribes, within certain boundaries, demarcated by the regional sense 'box, 'table', etc., what would count as completing features, if the object is in fact what I took it to be. (op. cit., Sec. I, Chap. I, 10, 700; Chap. II, §16, 720; 1982 Ideas, I, Part IV, Chap. II, §142, 341-2)

There belongs to the essence of such a physical thing-noema, and with absolute evidence, ideal possibilities of "limitlessness in the progression" of harmonious intuitions and, more particularly, according to typically determined predesignated directions (therefore also parallel limitlessness in the continuous sequential concatenations of the corresponding noeses). (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part IV, Chap. III, §149, 358)

Husserl's use of 'rule' is an attempt to capture the fact of experience that we do experience objects as sensible, orderly continua of percepts. To put the same point negatively, it is constitutive of experience that it does not consist of randomly accumulated percepts. Indeed it is hard to see how a completely random, ungoverned stream of sensuous data could ever be called 'experience' at all. Of course, we can all imagine what it may look like for our sensuous intuitions to be entirely chaotic, but let us not draw wrong conclusions. It is only because we do perceive an orderly sensible world that we can negate this sense and imagine a senseless world. The possibility of the senseless intuition is founded upon our acquaintance with a sensible one and not the other way around.
It is this governing sense of 'object' as 'completed spatial object' which we attend to when we turn our phenomenological regard to the 'requirements', 'conditions of satisfaction' or 'positing' of our intentive perceptual states. We 'attend' to them rather than discover them, that is, we do not perceive them in any strict sense of the term. We are already implicitly acquainted with them in our getting about and dealings with the everyday, individuated objects: 'the individual is not the essence, it is true, but it "has" an essence, which can be said of it with evident validity.' (Husserl 1965 Crisis, 116) We, so to speak, live in the senses of our perceptual experience. They are not explicit ideas, mused over and considered in individual experiences, but, rather, the structure of our perceptual experiences themselves13.

Experience is orderly. We know 'as a matter of experience' that one can get to know an object better, and the degree to which we know an object meets its limit at the Idea of perfect adequation:

perfect givenness is nevertheless predesignated as "Idea" (in the Kantian sense) - as a system which in its eidetic type, is an absolutely determined system of endless processes, an a priori determined continuum of appearances with different, but determined, dimensions, and governed throughout by a fixed set of eidetic laws. (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part IV, Chap. II, §143, 342)

It is this Idea that governs the application of the rules. As we have again and again stressed, a perception of an object is necessarily incomplete. However, the implicit sense of the perceptual experience, that it is a perception of a spatial object, is governed by the Idea that it can approximate completion through a synthesis of contents met in its successive presentation in other perceptions.

13 This notion puts a whole new perspective upon the innate versus learned ideas debate. To engage in the debate restricted only to using these terms, constrains one to conceive of the idea of, say, 'spatial object', as either innately built into the subject, or as something learned by that subject. Instead we should look for the Idea in the structure of experience itself. In this sense there is no idea which 'comes with the subject', nor is it learned; rather, it is given, a priori, with experience.
Moreover, the particular perceptual experiences are more determinately governed by their sense as a particular species, or eidos, of spatial object, such as a 'box', as a 'house', etc. The degree of determination depends upon the eidos, species governing the perception: the possible completing presentations one may have of a box is far more rigidly determined than those of a house. It is because perception is so governed, that in any actual case of perception its sense points beyond the current percept, by means of co-intentions, to the variously determined completing features.

§8

This constitutes a radical reappraisal of the traditional act/content/object distinctions. We find that it is our understanding of 'content', in the sense of that which fixes reference, that is in need of phenomenological clarification. In our present example there is the mental act, or what Husserl, in his Ideas, calls the noesis, and there is the object, the box. There is also the aspect under which the box is presented. In our discussion we have been considering the box under the aspect of its boxlike spatial shape. This is what is traditionally called the content of the act, that aspect of the object towards which my regard is directed, and is called by Husserl the 'matter', in the Investigations, or 'noema', in the Ideas, of the intentional relation. Dagfinn Føllesdal is correct to suggest an affinity between Husserl's notion of the noema and Frege's sense. (Føllesdal 1969 'Husserl's Notion of Noema', 74; see also Mohanty 1977 'Husserl's Thesis of the Ideality of Meanings, 79-80; Dreyfus 1982(b) 'Husserl's Perceptual Noema', 98) Husserl does indeed write of the noema as if it were a Fregean sense: '[e]very noema has a "content," that is to say, its "sense," and is related through it to "its" object.' (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part IV, Chap. I, §129, 309) Both Frege's sense and Husserl's noema need to be understood as atemporal. That is,
they can only be understood to be correlated with an expression (Frege) or a perception (Husserl) which intends its object in the same manner, and not confused with an expression/perception at a specific time or place.

For Frege, however, the sense is an object, only one which does not exist in space and time. This is not how we should literally understand Husserl’s noema. Despite its apparent objectivity to any particular perceptual act, for Husserl, the noema is only ever instantiated as a member of a noetic-noematic correlate. (Husserl 1982 *Ideas* I, Part III, Chap. III, §88, 214) It is necessarily correlated with a noesis, that is, an actual empirical occurrence of a mental act. Moreover, there can be no noesis without it having its correlative noema, that is, its sense. This is simply to understand that every mental act must have its sense: the sense is a property of the act, and not some independently specifiable entity. When Husserl misleadingly speaks of the noema as an entity we need to understand such locutions as employing what Brentano thought of as a linguistic shorthand. (cf Chapter 2 Section 5)

Moreover, there is a sharp contrast between what could count as perceptual content in the traditional, naturalistic conception and Husserl’s noema. The noema circumscribes of an orderly continua of possible percepts, and importantly this orderly procession of percepts is governed by, and internally related to, the sense that it is of, for example, of a chair, or of a house, etc. The stipulation of the latter clause is important because an ordered continuum of percepts by itself (which is clearly not conceptual) could not fix reference. It is only the governing sense that the perception is of, say, a chair that fixes, indexically in the case of perception, the reference of the perception as *this* object here in front of me now. If perceptual content were determined solely by the causal relation between the object and the senses, that is, content in the sense of a symptom, then it would indeed be exhausted by the hyle encountered at any one moment. We are here claiming more than that it is difficult to
understand how certain causal inputs could ever generate an act with intentional directedness. The claim is that, on the basis of the descriptive evidence provided by Husserl, there is an incommensurateness between the content of our actual perceptual experiences and what could count as content in the natural scientific explanation. The total content, the noema, of this complex intention, is directed towards the box via its total boxlike shape, not any single foreshortened perspective. This is clearly a broader, more contentful understanding of content.

Seen in such a light, Husserl’s, admittedly broadened, conception of content still has a lot in common with the traditional conception. This is, however, only to see the noema one-sidedly, to see it only from the side of consciousness. When, as we have thus far done, one attends to the consciousness side of the intentional relation

we find the full noesis related to the full noema as its intentional full What. It is then clear, however, that this relation cannot be the one meant in speaking of the relation of consciousness to its intentional objective something: for to each noetic moment, especially to each positing noetic one, there corresponds a moment in the noema and, in the latter, there is set apart from the complex posited characteristics the noematic core characterized by them. (op cit., Part IV, Chap. I, §129, 310)

We have only thus far been attending to the specifically posited characteristics of the perceived object. As we have seen, these posited characteristics receive their positing via the noesis, the animating construing founded upon the immanent sensuous data: the object is given in that manner of construal, under that aspect. The noema, thus conceived, is determined by the consciousness of: [i]ts esse consists exclusively of its "pericipi" - except that this proposition does not have the Berkeleyian sense because here the esse does not include the percipi as a really inherent component piece.' (op. cit., Part III, Chap. IV, §98, 241) The noema, thus understood, relates to its object without yet capturing the givenness of that object. Our attention has been restricted to
investigating the sense of what Husserl calls the 'full noema', if we include the quality of positing, the 'thetic' character (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part III, Chap. III, §90, 217-8), or the 'noematic core' if we exclude the thetic character (op. cit., Part IV, Chap. I, §129, 310).

Our investigations have been guilty of a sleight of hand: we have gained insight into our 'consciousness of', by first of noticing that we see blue, see a box, etc. and then turning our regard, so to speak, inwards and attending to the conscious intention: 'we can designate all those noetic components only by appealing to the noematic Object and its moments' (op. cit., Chap. IV, §97, 238 see also §98, 241) The presence of the object itself has been glossed over. It is Husserl's insight in the Ideas that there is more to sense of perception than just the aspect under which the subject attends the object. We will now turn to this 'more', the object in its givenness, in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 4

Intentionality and the Philosophy of Mind:
Representational Content and the Intentional Object

We find a description of the phenomenon of perception extending throughout the *Logical Investigations*' Investigations V and VI. Husserl was led to write the *Investigations* as a result of his reflections on the nature of logical and mathematical knowledge, and this interest expands in that text into the idea of a theory of theory, that is, of all kinds of knowledge. One primary objective of this expanded interest is that of describing the nature of 'categorial intuition', everyday intuition being merely of subsidiary interest. In the *Ideas*, however, the emphasis shifts away from categorial to everyday intuition. Despite this change in emphasis the descriptive account of perception found in the *Ideas* is for the most part merely a recapitulation of that in the *Investigations*: it essentially involves an elaboration of the inter-relationship between the intuitive and significative intentions, the concept of which we introduced at the end of the last chapter.

There is, however, a significant addition to the descriptive account offered in the *Ideas* which is not to be found in the *Investigations*. The description of the interrelationship between the intuitive and significative intentions is articulated in terms of a deeper level understanding of the grounds of the possibility of such a relationship. Indeed, Husserl had always been searching for just such grounds, as when he wrote in the 'Forward' to the *Investigations* that he was striving to articulate the relation between 'the subjectivity of knowing and the objectivity of the content known.' (Husserl 1970(a) *LI*, Vol. 1, Forward I, 42) Due, however, to the negative opinion of Kant he had inherited from Brentano, he failed to see how Kantian this approach was. (Husserl 1976
'Reminiscences of Franz Brentano', 50-1) This was an opinion that Husserl was to reverse, possibly after reading the neo-Kantian, Paul Natorp's review of his *Investigations*. (Natorp 1977 'On the Question of Logical Method') There thus appears throughout the *Ideas* an implicit transcendental argument, especially in the fourth part, to the effect that it is a condition of the possibility of perception that the object *itself* be given. Where Husserl differs from Kant is in his conviction that in principle it must be possible for us to perceive the object as it really is; there is not notion, for Husserl, of the *Ding-an-sich*.

§1

Clearly we have already, in Chapter 3, broached the question of the object in the 'How' of its 'givenness': it is given by the sensuous phenomena which we interpreted as immanent components of the intentional relation. Furthermore, and alongside these sensuous contents, we have distinguished the 'animating construings', the object in the 'How' of its determinations, as further moments immanent to the intentional relation. Phenomenology can thus claim as part of its object domain these requirements, the positing of the object. (cf Chapter 3 Section 3)

Perception ... has its noema, most basically its perceptual sense, i.e., the *perceived as perceived*. ... In every case the noematic correlate, which is called "sense" here (in a very extended signification) is to be taken *precisely* as it inheres "immanently" in the mental process of perceiving ... ; that is, just as it is offered to us when we *inquire purely into this mental process itself*. (Husserl 1982 *Ideas* I, Part III, Chap. III, §88, 214)

The positing (the requiring) is to be distinguished from the posited (required) characteristic, *the* colour, *the* shape, etc. (cf Chapter 3 Section 4) The latter is not to be found in the act itself, it is transcendent to the act. However, this posited
transcendence is itself a part of the perceptual sense, it is effected by consciousness. Thus, to say that the 'sense' of the intentional object is included in the mental act of intending is to admit that we have not yet established the 'givenness' of that object in perception. We have not yet, so to speak, 'got to the object itself' in its sense as a self-subsisting entity given to consciousness.

Husserl came to realise that the *Investigations* had only concentrated upon the subjective side of the intentional relation. (op. cit., Part IV, Chap. I, §128, 308) Similarly, the first three parts of the *Ideas* are almost exclusively given over to elucidating this side of the relation. This is also the aspect of the intentional relation that is emphasised by Husserl's commentators, Marvin Farber (1943, 222fn, 523, 526), Dagfinn Føllesdal (1982(a), 75; 1982(b), 94-5), Roland McIntyre and David Woodruff Smith (1982, 89), Hubert Dreyfus (1982(b), 97), David Bell (1990, 172-3; 179-83), et al. It is only by so emphasising the intensional, conceptual character of the noema that it can appear puzzling to Bell (1990, 183) and Dreyfus (1982(b), 105) as to how it could possibly reach its object.

Dreyfus elucidates this supposed conundrum particularly clearly. In his exposition Dreyfus relies heavily on the analogy with Fregean senses to interpret the perceptual noema. On the Fregean model the sense of an expression, what Dreyfus calls the signifying component, determines its object, and is true if indeed there is an object that is thus. In a similar manner, Husserl understands the relation between a judgement and what he calls its fulfilment, the intuition of the intended object: the judgement has its noema, and is fulfilled, shown to be true, if it can be identified with the noema of a perceptual experience. (Husserl 1970(a) *LI* Vol. 2, Inv. VI, Sec. I, Chap. I, §8, 696) Note that in this case the noema of one intentional experience is fulfilled by the noema of a second. Dreyfus' puzzlement arises when he applies *this* example without any due alteration of details to understanding the relationship between a perceptual noema and *its* fulfilment.
Dreyfus correctly understands that, for Husserl, an act of perception needs to be interpreted as an act of direct intuition if the act is to get at its object. However, according to Dreyfus, the intuitive act must also have its content (sense), its signifying component, because

[i]f the intuitive act did not have such content, we could never tell whether our anticipations had been fulfilled. The content of the intuitive act must tell us, as completely as possible, the determinations of the object being intuited. Then, in the case of successful perception, the intentional contents of the signifying and the intuitive acts will correspond and can be identified. (Dreyfus 1982(b) 'Husserl's Perceptual Noema', 104)

This, Dreyfus argues, leaves Husserl's noema in a position where it can never coincide with its object.

The intuitive act will indeed have its own intentional content, which can be entertained independently of whether this content is fulfilled or not, but then an act having this content is not necessarily the fulfilling act. And we will have to seek again for an act which necessarily supplies the fulfilling. (op. cit., 105)

We are led, thinks Dreyfus, into a regress where the perceptual noema as signifying component is fulfilled by another noema: 'a]t each stage we arrive at a fulfilling meaning for an intending meaning, but at no stage does the fulfilling meaning imply a sensuous filling.' (loc. cit., 105) It is noema all the way down, and since the noema is atemporal it can never be the object itself.

The only solution to this regress which Dreyfus can envisage is that of an 'incarnate meaning, a meaning which is not abstractable from the intuitive content which it informs.' (loc. cit., 105) This is clearly not how Husserl understands his noema: the noema is atemporal, and abstractable from the intuition. Consequently, Dreyfus concludes, the perceptual noema can never actually constitute the self-presence of the perceived object. Let us note, however, that this conundrum is only set up by interpreting the relation
between the perceptual noema and its fulfilment as entirely analogous to that between a judgemental noema and its fulfilment. If the relationships in each case are different, as indeed they are, then room is left to interpret how the perceptual noesis might get to its object by means of the noema.

Let us note that Dreyfus is here making two distinct claims about Husserl’s perceptual noema. Firstly, that the concept of the perceptual noema, as understood by Husserl, is unable to ground itself in direct perception despite Husserl’s pretensions to the contrary. An appropriate foundation can only be supplied, Dreyfus maintains, if we interpret the noema as a property of ‘[o]ur habits and skills for coping’\(^1\), which supposedly fit the criteria of being ‘aspatial and atemporal’ \(\textit{op. cit.}, 122\), while avoiding the regress. This is, as I shall argue below, a complete misunderstanding by Dreyfus of how Husserl understood the relation between a perceptual act and its fulfilment. In the second place, Dreyfus is defending his teacher Dagfinn Føllesdal’s interpretation of the perceptual noema as supplying a conceptual ingredient to perception, against Aron Gurwitsch’s interpretation of the noema as a \textit{Gestalt}.

Gurwitsch, too, finds Husserl’s account of the perceptual noema as underdetermined, and wants to supplement that account by interpreting the noema as a \textit{Gestalt}. Gestalt psychology developed in Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, in opposition to the then prevailing psychological atomism of the empiricist tradition. According to the gestalt psychologist, perception does not consist of a collection, or bundle, of independent sensory components, rather, it consists of a plurality of constituents, each one of which is qualified and made to be what it is by its relation to, and significance for, the other constituents. (Gurwitsch 1965 ‘The Phenomenology of Perception’, 21-2)

\(^1\) We can here appreciate Dreyfus’ own philosophical bias which informs his interpretations of other philosophical positions. See, for example, Dreyfus’ book \textit{Being-in-the-World} (1991), in which this notion of ‘coping’ governs his interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy.
By way of example Gurwitsch introduces the perception of a melody. Within a melody each of the component notes is determined as to its character by its 'musical function and significance within the melodic contexture.' (Gurwitsch 1965 'The Phenomenology of Perception', 22) Due to this reciprocity between the notes, each of them mutually determining and qualifying the others, we may say that '[i]n each of its notes the melody is present as a whole. (loc. cit.) We may then best understand our perception of the melody as the perception of a Gestalt-contexture, which determines our perception of the individual notes.

Gurwitsch wants to extend this notion of the function significance of Gestalten in perception to fill the supposed lacuna in Husserl's account of the perceptual noema. The Gestalt is meant to fulfil the role of the 'incarnate meaning'.

We interpret the perceptual noema, considered in a static analysis, as a Gestalt-contexture whose constituents are what is given in direct sense experience, on the one hand, and on the other hand other perceptual noemata merely referred to, i.e., aspects under which the building may, but does not at the present moment, appear in perceptual experience. That which is given in direct sense-experience is essentially determined, qualified, and made to be what it is by the functional significance which it has with regard to other possible adumbrational appearances of the building. (op. cit., 23)

Let us note, however, that while the Gestalt may not be in any strict sense perceived, is given in perception: 'for Gurwitsch the perceptual noema is a concrete sensuous appearance, through which the object of perception is presented.' (Dreyfus 1982(b) 'Husserl's Perceptual Noema', 98) If we were to identify the noema with a Gestalt then the noema would not be a sense governing the perceptual experience but part of what is perceived. Dreyfus is quite correct to conclude that while Gurwitsch may be supplementing Husserl's account of perception by introducing the incarnate meaning in the form the Gestalt, he does so by departing radically from Husserl's own project.
Moreover, there are strong reasons to question whether Gurwitsch’s Gestalt could ever actually provide the desired supplementation to Husserl’s account of perception. Consider this example: it is an accepted scientific fact that radio waves are emitted from the solar corona of the sun. These waves propagate through the background electro-magnetic radiation left permeating the universe as a residue of the big bang. Some of these radio waves come into contact with a radio-telescope here on the surface of the Earth. The energy of these radio waves, as they pass the antenna of the telescope, are converted into weak electrical signals, which are amplified and stored as a bit pattern in the radio telescope’s computer system. For the sake of the astronomers wanting to observe the solar corona, the bit pattern needs to be displayed in some convenient form, as pattern of pixels on a visual display unit, for example. At each of the stages between corona and observer we have objects very different in nature, radio waves, electrical signal, bit pattern and pixel pattern. However, each stage is related to the others by a fact highly significant for the possibility of radio astronomy: they are each possessed of a common structural organisation, that is, each stage is approximately isomorphic to the others. This isomorphism of structural information seems to capture what the Gestalt psychologist means by the elements of perception being mutually dependent on each of the others for their functional significance. However, we cannot simply say that any of the succeeding stages of this process are isomorphic to the solar corona of the sun. The pixel pattern on the VDU is for the astronomer, only an image of the solar corona when seen from a particular point of view. That is, when interpreted by the astronomer as such. The gestalt psychologist may be correct to interpret the relationship between the component parts of our perception as a Gestalt; however, there is still a conceptual aspect to the perception which has to be accounted for.

2 I am indebted to Bruin Christensen for this example.
A mere Gestalt could never have a thetic character, hence, could never be cognitively relevant. This is the reason why we must understand the perceptual noema as conceptual. Note, however, that conceptual need not be propositional. It may, as would seem to be our everyday gettings about and dealing with the world, be pre-predicative, that is, conceptual but non-propositional. Dreyfus is right to insist on the conceptual character of Husserl's noema. It is, however, questionable that Dreyfus' interpretation has succeeded in capturing the full story of Husserl's account of perception. There is also, as Husserl repeatedly stress, the hyle. We need to inquire as to whether there is a middle ground between Dreyfus' and Gurwitsch's interpretations of the noema such that we can retain the conceptual character of the noema, and recognise something given in perception which plays the genuinely foundational role. As we shall see it is the hyle that fills this role: the hyle constitute the Fülle, the object in the 'How' of its 'givenness', as opposed to the object in the 'How' of its determinations. However, in order to appreciate the manner in which the noema and hyle come together in perception we will need to provide a deeper understanding of the necessary interrelation of the two in perception.

§2

While Follesdal, Dreyfus and others are correct to see the conceptual aspect to Husserl's noema, they do so at the expense of appreciating its Kantian influence - to my knowledge only Aron Gurwitsch seems to appreciate this point. In the fourth and final part of the Ideas Husserl turns to a deeper elucidation of the sense of the perceptual act. There he turns his phenomenological investigation towards the more abstract sense of perceived
object as it governs any particular perceptual experience. He wants to remain true to the époché by only drawing upon what is found in the sense of the intentional relation, that is, by appealing to only what is found immanently in the act. Husserl turns to an argument in the Kantian sense of a critical exposure of what is essentially involved in perception, if only to radically transform Kant's transcendental philosophy in the process. Husserl is seeking the conditions of the possibility of there being perception of a physical object, from within the sense of 'perception'.

While wanting to draw out this Kantian aspect to Husserl's phenomenology, let us note an essential difference between their respective philosophical positions. Both are to be sure interested in establishing the grounds for our faith that we do indeed have knowledge of the objective world. However, for Kant, the objective world is that of 'mathematical science, the mathematical physics of his time, that is, Newtonian physics - the physics which describes the objective world.' (Gurwitsch 1960 'The Kantian and Husserlian Conception of Consciousness', 150) It is for this reason that so much of the Critique of Pure Reason is dedicated to justifying our ability to discover causal regularities in the world. For Husserl, on the other hand, the objective world is not primarily the world described by the physics of his time, that is, Einstein's physics. For him the objective world is primarily the pre-predicative, pre-theoretical world of our everyday experience, a world of everyday objects and sensory properties. To be sure, Husserl admits of greater levels of objectivity: there is the world of my own personal experience, the world of my social milieu, the world as it is experienced by any possible subject in any milieu whatever, and of course, the world of science. However, Husserl's point is that these objectivities derive the possibility of their elaboration from the primary everyday experience, and not the other way round, as Kant would have it. Despite such a marked philosophical difference, both Kant and Husserl are united in taking as their
task the justification of our knowledge of an external world, albeit that this justification has a very different sense in each case.

Like Brentano, Husserl wanted to identify the object presented in perception with the object itself, the really existing object in the world. Consequently, he had to maintain that there was a more intimate relationship between the perceptual noema and its object than that between a judgemental noema and its fulfilment. Without such an intimate relationship, if the perceptual noema merely pointed to its object, then Dreyfus’ objection against the perceptual noema ever reaching its object would indeed be valid. (cf Section 1) Husserl needs to demonstrate that the sense of the perceptual noema transcended the content of the noetic-noematic correlation. That is, that it was more substantially involved with its object than the relationship between the judgement and its object. This deeper sense to the perceptual noema is precisely what Husserl means when he speaks of the ‘noematic essence’ or ‘object core’.

In order to justify the claim that the perceptual noema has this extended sense, let us again consider our example of a perceptual experience of a box. In the actual perceptual experience it is not the case that the box is regarded statically under the aspect of its box like shape, which is how we have until now considered the experience: we have been guilty of a deliberate oversimplification. In fact, it is only as the result of a laboured intellectual effort that one could restrict one’s regard to a single aspect of an object. In an actual case of perception one's regard rapidly moves its attention through various modes of mindedness and over multiple aspects: I regard now the shape, now the colour, the texture, the solidity; I regard the object as to its value, what is its function? what could it be used for? how might it be of use to me? (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part III, Chap. III, §92, 223; Part IV, Chap. I, §135, 324) All of these variations constitute a change in the noesis of my intention, and
correspondingly an alteration in the noematic correlate. When I attend to the box like shape, this shape is the noematic correlate; when I attend to the colour, this colour is the correlate, etc.

Actual perceptual experience shows that our regard travels through many modes of regarding the object, and over many aspects of the object. If we consider each of these intentions in their individuality we note that the perceptual experience has, according to its essence and in a pre-eminent sense a "direction" to something objective. In other words, there belongs to its noema "something objective" - in inverted commas - with a certain noematic composition which becomes explicated in a description of determinate delimitation, that is to say, in such a description which, as a description of the "meant objective something, as it is meant," avoids all "subjective" expressions. (op. cit., Part IV, Chap. I, §130, 311-2)

Each partial intention within a total perceptual experience is directed towards a transcendent property which we naturally ascribe to the object. These properties may involve various degrees of abstraction or generality. At the lowest level of generality we have what Husserl calls the 'determinations of material content', such as the colour, texture, shape, etc. At a higher level we have the 'material-ontological expressions' such as 'physical thing', 'bodily figure' which describe the general characteristics had by any object belonging to the regional ontology of physical objects. (op. cit., 312) As our attitudinal modifications move over the determinations of the object, each of these properties in turn, is given in relief from the unitary total intention to the object.

It is perfectly possible, and indeed natural, to express the content of these intentions in a manner which makes no reference to the subjectivity of the perceptual experience. Any perceptual experience of a worldly object can be

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3 At a still higher level of abstraction we have the properties belonging to any object whatever in any regional ontology whatever. These are what Husserl calls 'formal ontological expressions', and include such categories as, 'object', 'determination', etc.
described by a set of such objective expressions, predications that are deemed true of that object. It makes perfect sense to report on the basis of a perceptual experience 'There is a blue box', and a little unnatural to say 'I am having a perceptual experience of a blue box'.

Note also that, while it would be perfectly sensible, it would be strange to say of a perceptual experience 'There is a bodily figure' or 'There is a spatial object'. These are contents of a perceptual experience that govern logically any perceptual experience, and as such, are taken for granted. This is an important point to bear in mind. It is usual to express the material contents of a perceptual experience because they are given sensuously, and may be otherwise. There is always the possibility that my expectations may be frustrated. The formal material contents, on the other hand, are not given sensuously, they are in fact 'lived' through as the very sense of perceptual experience itself. Their explicit articulation would be considered a redundancy or mere pedantry on the part of a philosopher.

In the objective expressions, reporting the content of a perceptual experience, a 'quite fixed content in each noema is delimited'.

Each consciousness has its *What* and each means "its" objective something; it is evident that, in the case of each consciousness, we must essentially speaking, be able to make such a noematic description of "its" objective something, "precisely as it is meant;" we acquire by explication and conceptual comprehension a closed set of formal or material, materially determined or "undetermined" ("emptily" meant) "predicates" and these in their modified signification determine that "content" of the object-core of the noema which is spoken of. (Husserl 1982 *Ideas* I, Part IV, Chap. I, §130, 312-3)

When one reports a perceptual experience, making no reference to the subjectivity of that experience, one is articulating the noematic essence (object core) in the extended sense which exceeds any individual noetic-noematic correlate. It is this noematic essence which we assume remains constant
throughout our different modes of attending to the object; to our attending to this or that aspect; and which remains identically the same in different perceptions at different times.

In consciousness these distinguishable aspects are synthetically united and jointly ascribed to the one self-same identical object. (op. cit., §135, 324; see also 1974 'Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy', 33-4) The question here is whether or not this object is

*actually the same?* And *is the object itself "actual"?* can it not be non-actual while the manifold harmonious and even intuitionally fulfilled posita - posita of any essence-content whatever - still flow off in the way peculiar to consciousness. (loc. cit.)

We must inquire into the grounds for our faith in there actually being an object in which the properties we ascribe to it are in fact so united in a self-same object. It still remains pertinent to ask whether it is reasonable to identify this articulated noematic essence with an object transcendent to any particular noesis. Could it not be the case that the unity of the noematic sense is a merely apparent unity, a fabrication of consciousness? Could there in fact be no self-same, identical something, transcendent to consciousness, of which it was reasonable to ascribe all the properties one takes it to have?

§3

The answer to our scepticism is, when considering the possibility of perception in general, in the negative. As we have seen, for Brentano, 'consciousness' must always be 'consciousness of something'. (cf Chapter 2 Section 4) Husserl also understands this as an essential characteristic of consciousness. When we
articulate our list of objective expressions, and attribute them to our current perceptual object

\[ \text{the predicates are } \ldots \text{ predicates of "something," and this "something" also belongs, and obviously inseparably, to the core in question: it is the central point of unity of which we spoke above. It is the central point of connection or the bearer of the predicates, but in no way is it a unity of the sense in which any complex, any combination, of the predicates would be called a unity. It is necessarily to be distinguished from them; just as, conversely, they are its predicates: unthinkable without it, yet distinguishable from it. (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part IV, Chap. I, §131, 313) } \]

It is essential to the sense of external perception that we attribute the perceived objective properties to something. This too is revealed when we attend to the noetic sense of our intentional process. Not only do we grasp the sense of, say, 'box' with its governing rule for possible completing fulfilments, but we also gain the more general insight that this intention is towards a 'physical object'. 'Physical object' has for its sense the Idea of a self-subsisting entity which remains identical with itself throughout differing percepts, modes of mindedness, etc.

It is at this point in Husserl's argument that he is involved in a Kantian style critical inquiry into the conditions of the possibility of perception. In particular, we should note that Husserl is steering a path close to the transcendental deduction found in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. It is this deduction which Husserl interprets as moving within the sphere of phenomenology. (op. cit., Part II, Chap. IV, §62, 142; 1970(b) The Crisis, Part III, A, §28, 104) A notable feature of this deduction is that certain passages, interpreted by Norman Kemp Smith as early, pre-Critical or semi-Critical formulations of Kant's doctrine of the transcendental unity of apperception (Smith 1950 A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 204), involve a twofold distinction within epistemology. This is in contrast to the tripartite distinction found in Kant's later Critical formulation of the doctrine. (op. cit., 206)
In these early passages Kant distinguishes only between 'appearances' and the 'transcendental object'. (Kant 1992 Critique of Pure Reason, 137/A108-9) Of 'appearances' he says that they

are themselves nothing but sensible representations, which, as such and in themselves, must not be taken as objects capable of existing outside our power of representation. (op. cit., 134/A104)

Kant is clearly in line with the dominant philosophy of his time, at least with respect to accepting that our sensory experiences are merely an effect of our sensory organ's causal encounters with the world.

Kant, however, and this constitutes his great philosophical insight, wants to establish the objective validity of our knowledge of the external world, knowledge that exceeds the mere play of our sensory experiences. However, as Smith argues, Kant's first edition understanding of the object of our knowledge is pre-Critical; it is not, as in his later Critical philosophy, sensuous intuition governed by the categories, rather, the object of knowledge is understood to be the 'transcendental object'.

But these appearances are not things in themselves; they are only representations, which in turn have their object - an object which cannot itself be intuited by us, and which may, therefore, be named the non-empirical, that is transcendental object = x. (op. cit, 137/A109; see also 134/A104)

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4 That Kant did indeed accept this conclusion from the new science is further evidenced by this passage from a letter he wrote to Markus Herz in 1772:

I propounded to myself this question: on what ground rests the relation of that in us which we name representation (Vorstellung) to the object. If the representation contains only the mode in which the subject is affected by the object, it is easily understood how it should accord (gemäß si) with that object as an effect with its cause, and how [therefore] this determination of our mind should be able to represent something, i.e. have an object. (Kant 1922 Werke Band IX, 103; cited and translated in Smith 1950, 206)

In this passage Kant only distinguishes between the object and its effects on our senses, that is, between the transcendental object and appearances.
Kant is quite clear as to how he wanted the term 'transcendental object' to be understood. In related passages from the first edition, which were also omitted in the second edition, he explicitly equates 'transcendental object' with the 'thing in itself': '[w]hat matter may be as a thing in itself (transcendental object) is completely unknown to us'. (Kant 1992 Critique of Pure Reason, 344/A366; see also 347-8/A372; 514/A613-4) As Smith interprets the text, in these early passages Kant was concerned with how the sense-representations relate to their object, an object transcendent to the play of sense impressions. (Smith 1950 A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 206) His problem, one that he inherited from David Hume, was justifying how our knowledge claims, based as they are upon the flux of sense impressions, could legitimately be held to be of an objective reality.

It is with a notion akin to Husserl's 'determinable X', namely the 'something in general', the 'transcendental object = x' that Kant proposes his early solution to the problem of knowledge.

The pure concept of this transcendental object, which in reality throughout all our knowledge is always one and the same, is what can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, that is, objective reality. (Kant 1992 Critique of Pure Reason, 137/A109)

Experience must always be of something, and it is because this concept implicitly governs all experience that our representations are prevented from being merely a haphazard concatenation of appearances. This governing principle necessitates that appearances are ordered in such manner that, manifold and varied as they may be, they can yet be self-consistent in their several groupings, and so possess that unity which is essential to the concept of an object. (op. cit., 134-5/A104-5)

This formulation of the transcendental deduction could never have satisfied Kant for long, as it involves applying the categories to the thing in itself. (Smith
The thing in itself or transcendental object is by its very sense that which is transcendent to our experience of it, and for that reason unknowable. It is, as Natorp characterises it, the idea of 'unlimited objectivity'. (Natorp 1976 'On the Question of Logical Method', 59) Kant's philosophy had not yet become fully Critical, it had not clearly demarcated the bounds of the knowable from the unknowable.

It is only, according to Smith, in passages attributable to a later date that Kant comes to write in terms of a tripartite distinction between 'appearances', 'empirical object', and the 'thing-in-itself'. This later formulation of the transcendental deduction would not have appealed to Husserl. The idea that there is an intermediary realm of empirical objects to which the claim for the objectivity of our knowledge correctly applied, but which was not the world in itself, was unacceptable to Husserl's direct realist account of knowledge. Kant, when reflecting on the conditions of knowledge, was committed to the new science and the theory of mind it entailed: under these influences he accepted that there was a gulf between our perceptual experiences and their externally related causes. Husserl, on the other hand, wanted to leave such theoretical commitments aside and justify the grounds for our knowledge of the world as it appeared to us to be.

Thus, it is the deduction from the first edition of the *Critique* which interested Husserl. Husserl may well have appreciated these passages because of the twofold distinction between appearances and the transcendental object. As we have just seen this is a distinction which Husserl himself had come to appreciate in his own phenomenological investigations. He saw the need to distinguish, on the one hand, the appearing of the object, and, on the other, the enduring, self-identical object that persisted throughout the multifarious noeses, and modes of mindedness with which that object was regarded. Husserl, however, because he had at the outset of his investigations bracketed all
commitments to metaphysical assumptions about perception, wants to resist Kant's move of locating this transcendental object behind the veil of appearances. As we shall see, for Husserl, the appearing of the object and the transcendent object itself, while conceptually distinguishable, are intimately linked and not merely connected by an external, causal relation.

Husserl is developing Kant's distinction between the appearing of an object and the transcendental object by maintaining that our descriptive analysis of perception is in need of a double application of the concept/object distinction.

As soon as we go into it [describing the content of external perception] more precisely we are immediately cognitively aware that indeed the distinction between "content" and "object" is to be made not only for "consciousness," for the intentive mental process, but also for the noema taken in itself. Thus the noema too is related to an object and possesses a "content" by "means" of which it relates to the object ... (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part IV, Chap. I, §129, 311)

When describing the intentionality of perception from the side of consciousness we were careful to distinguish between the content of the act, the noematic sense, and the object, the property to which this noema pointed. However, as our further investigations have shown, we need also distinguish between the fully articulated noema, the noematic essence, and the object, the objective, identical something which bears these properties.

If the fully articulated noema, the list of objective expressions, is always understood as noematic description of the currently meant as meant and if this description, as is possible at any time, is made in pure adequation, then the identical intentional "object" becomes evidently distinguished from the changing and alterable "predicates." It becomes separated as a central noematic moment: the "object" ["Gegenstand"], the "Object" ["Objekt"], the "identical," the determinable subject of its possible predicates" - the pure X in abstraction from all predicates - and it becomes separated from the predicates or, more precisely, from the predicable-noemas. (op. cit., §131, 313; see also 314-5)
Husserl's use of Kantian terminology, the 'determinable subject', the 'pure X' is no accident. He too wants to articulate the insight that it is essential to the sense of a perceptual experience that we can distinguish between the appearing of an object, and the object as it subsists identically throughout these multifarious appearances. We cannot, of course, really isolate a predicateless core from its predicações. That would be absurd, because the physical object can only ever be thought with its predicates. A perceptual object can only appear to us under its perceptual aspects. (compare this with Kant 1992 Critique of Pure Reason, 135/A105) Nonetheless there is a sense in which we can distinguish this central core from any aspect we actually attend to, or any list of objective expressions describing those aspects which have caught out attention.

We need to postulate this core, the determinable X, because it is part of the sense of our perceptual experience that the physical object always exceeds our current attentive regard. The object can never be given in complete adequacy, and may endlessly be given under new aspects with ever increasing determinateness. Moreover, it is understood that this excess of determinacy still belongs to the selfsame object. This governing sense of the perceptual experience cannot be attributed to the vicissitudes of our empirical construction or of our empirical generalisations. It is in fact a formal ontological category which governs the very possibility of perception of an external world. (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part IV, Chap. I, §131, 314) Notice Husserl's move here: whereas Kant had understood the transcendental object as something unknowable, hidden behind appearances, and construed it as only causally related to these appearances, Husserl has reconstrued the idea of the 'determinable X' as a governing principle of the perceptual act itself.
As a consequence of this interpretation of the determinable \( X \) we can understand how, as a formal ontological category governing the sense of external perception, it is itself given adequately in any actual perceptual experience despite the necessary inadequacy which governs the givenness of the physical object itself. (Husserl 1982 *Ideas* I, Part IV, Chap. III, §139, 356) The core, the 'determinable \( X \)', is not found in the objective description of the perceptual experience, but, rather, is constitutive of the sense of the noema, of the possibility of this description. There can be no "sense" without the "something" and, again, without "determining content." In that connection, it is evident that the subsequent analysis and description do not first introduce such a thing but rather that, as condition of the possibility of evident description and prior to this, it inheres actually in the correlate of consciousness. (op. cit., Chap. I, §131, 315)

That is, the apprehension that this consciousness is of something is a prior condition of the possibility that I may describe it, that I may be able to give it an objective description. It is a condition of the possibility of perceptual experience that it be of a something which may be sensibly described, predicated of.

It is this governing sense of the perceptual experience that justifies our faith that the object itself is given in perceptual experience. What is the condition of the possibility that one can have sensibly ordered experience such that the Idea of a continuously identical something is pre-given and justified in governing that experience? The answer is that there must be persisting identical somethings to which one can reasonably and justifiably ascribe the properties and qualities of our descriptions. This is, suitably transformed, the Kantian move in Husserl's phenomenology. It is constitutive of the noematic sense that it contain 'the "Object," the "Determinable \( X\)'". (op. cit., 313) This material
ontological category dominates the sense of perceptual experience; it governs the perceptual experience by, so to speak, guiding the intentionality of perception through the subjective aspects and construals to the object itself.

It is of course possible that in any one instance one may be wrong: there may not in fact be an object to which all the properties which I wish to predicate of it inhere. However, one cannot be wrong all of the time. It is a condition of the possibility of mistaking an object that experience is in general sensibly ordered, that it is for the most part involved with existent objects in which the properties I ascribe are in fact present. This is why Husserl speaks of the positing of an object as being 'rationally motivated'.

Position belongs to any appearing "in person" on the part of a physical thing: it is not just somehow one with the appearing (perhaps even as merely a universal fact - this being out of the question here); it is one with it in a peculiar manner: it is "motivated" by <the appearing> and again, not just somehow, but "rationally motivated." That is to say, position has its originary legitimizing basis in originary givenness. (op. cit., Chap. II, §136, 328)

The orderly, sensible proceeding of experience provides us with the rational grounds for positing the object just as we take it to be.

We can see then that Dreyfus' insistence on radically separating the 'object as it is taken to be' from the 'object given' (Dreyfus 1982(b) 'Husserl's Perceptual Noema', 105-6) is spurious when applied to Husserl's account of everyday perception. Dreyfus could only perceive a problem in Husserl's account of perception because he understood it in strict analogy to the case of a judgement and its fulfilment, in which case a veridical judgement found fulfilment when its noema was identified with the noema of a perceptual act. Nowhere does Husserl imply this relationship between the perceptual noema and its

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5 Husserl explicitly describes the relationship between the act, noema and object in these terms in his Crisis of the European Sciences. (Husserl 1970(b), Part III, A, 171)
fulfilment. Admittedly it is difficult to find passages where Husserl gives an explicit account of this relationship. He seems only concerned to stress that the perceptual object is given intuitively in an originarily presentative mode, and not presented mediately.

In the perception of the landscape the sense is fulfilled perceptually; in the mode of "itself in person" there is consciousness of the perceived object with its colors, forms, and other determinations (in so far as they "are included in the perception"). (Husserl 1982 Ideas I, Part IV, Chap. II, §136, 282)

There are, however, clues as to how we should interpret the originarily givenness of the perceptual object. In the first place, Husserl had already in his Investigations noted that the perceptual experience always involves the correlative possibilities of fulfilment and frustration. In the second place, the perceptual noema sets certain limits to the continuum of possible perceptual experiences consistent with its sense as of a box, of a house, etc. Thus, we should understand the perceptual noema as fulfilled, not by a second noema, and hence producing the regress Dreyfus' found in Husserl's account, but by the dynamic interplay of the perceptual sense with the sensory data or hyle which it governs. If the sensory data continues to remain within the bounds set by the noema then the perceptual experience is fulfilled; if, on the other hand, it frustrates the noema, then the perceptual experience is in need of re-interpretation6.

This is why Husserl is adamant that nothing is lost in the epoché: [t]he excluding has at the same time the characteristic of a revaluing change of sign; and with this change the revalued affair finds a place once again in the phenomenological sphere. (op. cit., Part III, Chap. II, §76, 171) We have bracketed the world only to find that through a phenomenological clarification

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6 Strictly speaking, we should not say that the perceptual noema fulfils the judgemental noema; rather, the judgement is fulfilled by the perceptual noema insofar as the hyle it governs proceed coherently within the prescribed limits determined by the noema.
the world is returned to us with a certainty of sense that resists the imposition of speculative theories.

§5

We can illustrate this interpretation of the relation between perceptual noema and the object by means of an example: sitting at my computer I am completely absorbed in my work, or, alternatively, I may be daydreaming and thinking of anything but my work. In either case my absorption has left me minimally aware of my surroundings. Suddenly I am made aware of my surroundings by an object’s sudden presence fluttering in my face and interfering with my concentration, or lack thereof. Initially I can make little sense of the experience, we might want to say its occurrence is absurd. However, the experience is not without any sense. Contrary to what Dreyfus may claim, I am not presented with pure hyle devoid of any sense. (Dreyfus 1982(b) 'Husserl’s Perceptual Noema', 107) At the very minimum, even when the experience is still an absurd incursion which I have yet to make sense of, it is still understood as an experience of a physical object. Moreover, there are still some vague determinations of the experience: coloured object, flying, etc. It is just that the experience has not yet attained a more specific determination of sense. I grope for an interpretation and understanding of the experience, and rapidly come to the conclusion that a butterfly has flown into my face. Suddenly a wealth of determinations come to bear upon the experience: now I see wings, the individual colours thereon, the greyish body, antenna, eyes, etc. What was initially an inarticulate experience, has been given form, and the individual
details now become clear, each standing out on their own in sharp relief from the others. 

Note that all this happens without a self-conscious, active effort. While absorbed in my work I was not attending to the world. Its sudden intrusion necessitated that I rapidly make sense of the experience. However, this rapid making sense was merely a directing of my regard towards the physical world. Experience itself is sensible, it does not, in our everyday dealings, involve actively bringing sense to experience. We can here understand the dynamic interplay between the hyle that suddenly incurred into my activities and the noema which articulated the experience into a perceptual experience of a butterfly.

Moreover, the perceptual experience is at every point governed by the idea of it being of something, the 'determinable X', the transcendent self-identical object. As we have noted above, in our everyday dealings with objects we do not explicitly attend to the sensuous contents, but, rather interpret them as properties inhering in an object, the perceived object itself. Thus, as the interplay between the perceptual noema and hyle is enacted, we always, in the first place, before any abstract reflection, understand the perceptual properties as inhering in 'that object'. As Gurwitsch notes it is a consequence of Husserl's analysis of the intentionality of consciousness that

we are in direct contact with the world. Living our conscious life, we are "at" the world, "at" the things encountered in that world. This should be seen as a consequence of the theory of intentionality rather than being credited as original with subsequent existentialist philosophies. (Gurwitsch 1982 'Husserl's Theory of the Intentionality of Consciousness', 67)

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7 This view on the relationship between the noema and the hyle was developed in conversation with Bruin Christensen.
It is this dominant sense of the perceptual noema as being of something, and its interplay with the hyle via the local sense, house, box, etc., that makes it sensible to say the object itself is given in perception. It is precisely the character of perceptual acts to be self-giving, and this is to say it does not need fulfilling through another act.

Note that we are not claiming anything here about the ultimate nature, the ontology, of the objects that populate the world. It is perfectly consistent with our discussion that objects could ultimately consist of matter, or Berkeleyian ideas, or whatever your favourite metaphysical assumption may be. Rather, what has been clarified is the mind’s relation to the world, whatever in the final analysis that world may be. This is a point of epistemology. The mind, we have argued, is in direct contact with the objects of its perceptual experience.

All that has in fact been attempted is a description of the phenomenon of perception as it appears qua perception, that is, without relying upon an accepted theory or ontology as the explanatory framework. Moreover, there is no claim to have provided an exhaustive description of the phenomenon. Perception’s internal relationship to the dimensions of time, language, historicality and sociality have not even been touched upon. We have only, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, traversed a complex landscape by means of a single route. There are many other routes also to be followed which intersect and complement the one we have taken. Nevertheless, we have elucidated some important characteristics of the phenomenon of perception. It is left as a challenge to a naturalistic account of mind to account for these characteristics, or why it appears that there are such characteristics, if it is to provide an adequate explanation of the phenomenon of perception.
CHAPTER 5

Conclusion:
Naturalism and the Mind

We can now bring our reflections thus far to bear upon the concerns of contemporary philosophy of mind. The point is not to come up with a knock down argument against the naturalist, merely grounds to raise suspicion against the naturalist's self-assurance that their account of mind could actually give an explanation of intentionality. What I wish to bring to the fore is a sense of puzzlement as to how the truly world directing content of mental states can be captured by the sense of content that is self-imposed upon the naturalist: it is difficult to understand how the symptomatic contents of a causal relation could be understood as truly world directing and intentional. However, I do not intend my discussion to be entirely negative. I wish also to put forward an interpretation of how the natural scientific explanation of mind may in fact contribute to our understanding of that phenomenon.

Talk of the intentional is rife in contemporary philosophy of mind. The intentional is in fact one of its basic problems. The task is to provide an account of how mental events, understood in favoured ontological terms, can be 'about' things. It is of course quite impractical to provide an overview of all the current positions in the philosophy of mind. The sheer volume of writings published on this topic would be daunting to even the most dedicated commentator. As a compromise, I shall focus my attention on just three of the main protagonists in the philosophical debate on the nature of mind, namely, Jerry Fodor, Paul Churchland and Daniel Dennett, who I take to be representative of some major positions.
§1

A detailed exposition of Fodor, Churchland and Dennett's respective philosophies of mind would reveal in each case a highly sophisticated and technically complicated theory. These accounts are by no means in agreement, as the ongoing debates in the literature show. However, beneath the apparent complexities there are simple basic elements of explanation which all three theorists share.

All three philosophers assume that an explanation of mind must be naturalistic, which is to say that the mind just is symbolic structures realised in the brain (Fodor), or points in a vector space realised in the neural architecture of the brain (Churchland), or a functional organisation parasitic upon the neural architecture (Dennett). Moreover, they all assume that for any specifiable mental state in the ordinary 'folk-psychological' sense, there must be a naturalistically specifiable state within the brain (and possibly the nervous system) which can be pointed to as the bearer of the representative content. Here the major point of disagreement between the theorists is over what the favoured terms are which constitute a description of the mental state.

In order to facilitate a clear elucidation of what is to count as a representational state, and the representational content, in each of the respective theories we will need to re-invoke a conceptual distinction introduced in Chapter 3 Section 2. There we were careful to distinguish between the immanent sensory contents of our perceptual experiences and the perceived physical properties which inhered in the physical things. We were also careful in Chapter 3 Section 3 to distinguish both these folk-psychological senses from that sense of immanent content which was the product of a causal transaction between the subject and the object. The latter sense is clearly that of content as a symptom.
to its cause, and thus consequent to theoretically motivated considerations and conceptually distinct from the former. To what degree the two are related, or one may be reduced or eliminated in favour of the other is still a question open to further philosophical and empirical investigation. Nevertheless, and this is a key point for our subsequent discussion, both senses are to be kept conceptually distinct from that sense of content which is truly intentional and world directing.

Our presentation of the theories of mind we are here considering will follow a fairly simple methodological procedure. We shall first assume the general outline of the respective theory, so as to determine what counts as mental representation given the constraints of the theory. Then we can ask what the representing relation must be if it is to be consistent with the overall strictures as to what can count as an explanation. While I make no claim to be providing an exhaustive account of each of the theories I do not want to appear dismissive in the presence of what are very sophisticated and sincere attempts to naturalise the mind; hence, we shall delve in some detail into these basic notions which underlie each theory.

Fodor's account of mind is now famously known as the 'Language of Thought Hypothesis', which is the hypothesis that mental representations are language-like symbols. Fodor's theory in its essentials, is beautifully simple. Modern 'information semantics' provides us with a means of parsing complex propositional contents into atomistic semantic constituents. On the basis of these semantic units one can, armed with a set of syntactic rules, generate all possible sentential structures. A computer programmed with these semantic units and rules could perform this task. Fodor's philosophy of mind assumes that the mind is analogous, at least in part of its function, to just such a computer. (Fodor 1980(b) 'Methodological Solipsism', 486)
On Fodor's view the representational states of the mind are none other than these atomistic semantic units; hence why he often refers to his theory as a 'Representational Theory of Mind'. The distinguishing feature of his account of mind is that the appropriate level of explanation is at the level of these semantic units; however, his naturalism commits him to giving a naturalist explanation of these states as in some way instantiated in the brain (and nervous system). We may expect then, that the representational contents will turn out to be immanent contents in the sense of the symptomatic contents outlined above.

For Fodor intentional states are identical with these representational states: the content of intentional state of the mind 'reduces to the content of mental representations.' (Fodor 1987 *Psychosemantics*, 98; see also 1980(a) 'Searle on What only Brains can Do', 520) For our purposes the important question is how these 'representational states' get their contents (meanings). In order to make his account of semantic content palatable to his physicalistic, hence, naturalistic commitments, Fodor needs to provide an account of this representational relation in non-semantic, non-intentional terms. His solution is in the form of a 'Crude Causal Theory' (op. cit., 99):

What is required to relieve the worry is therefore, at a minimum, the framing of naturalistic conditions for representation. That is, what we want at a minimum is something of the form 'R represents S is true iff C where the vocabulary in which condition C is couched contains neither intentional nor semantic expressions. (Fodor 1984 "Semantics, Wisconsin Style", 32; see also 1986 'Why Paramecia don't have Mental Representations', 14; 1980(a) 'Searle on What only Brains can Do', 520)

The only feasible candidate for 'C' that Fodor can foresee is a reliable causal relation; after all, '[c]ausal relations are natural relations if anything is.' (Fodor 1987 *Psychosemantics*, 98; see also 1984 Semantics Wisconsin Style', 33)

'Reliable causation' requires that the causal dependency of the tokening of the symbol upon the instancing of the corresponding property be counterfactually supporting: either instances of the property actually do cause tokenings of the symbol, instances of the property would cause
tokenings of the symbol *were they to occur*, or both. (Fodor 1987 *Psychosemantics*, 99)

Semantic content is established by a counterfactually supporting causal regularity between the world and our sensory organs.

Thus, Fodor is offering a specific kind of naturalistic account of the mind, namely a reductive one. Mental representations just are atomistically identifiable states of our neurophysiology. This is to say that they are immanent contents of the mind. Moreover, the intentionality of these mental states is established by a causal regularity with the external world, which is to say that Fodor is endorsing a causal account of intentionality. The contents are immanent in our symptomatic sense.

Paul Churchland's naturalistic account of mind differs from Fodor's in that whereas Fodor is a realist about propositional, hence, intentional attitudes, Churchland is eliminativist. Belief in such attitudes is, he thinks, the consequence of a misplaced faith in folk-psychology, a 'theory so fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed neuroscience.' (Churchland 1981 'Eliminative Materialism', 67; see also 1995 *The Engine of Reason*, 225-6) For Churchland a proper explanation of the mental representation is not to be given at the level of basic semantic units (Fodor), but at the level of neural architecture.

Churchland sees no problem in eliminating the intentional in favour of the physical because intentionality is nothing other than the content of propositional attitudes, and the propositional attitudes only exist as organised in everyday folk-psychological theories about the world. (op. cit., 68-72; 1984 *Matter and Consciousness*, 63-4) According to Churchland, propositions in a
theory only have their meaning due to their relational features with other propositions in that theory. There is therefore

no problem in assuming that physical states could have propositional content, since in principle they could easily enjoy the relevant relational features. (Churchland 1994 *Matter and Consciousness*, 66)

If a neurophysiological theory, which does not appeal to propositional attitudes, can do the explanatory work of a folk-psychological theory, which does; and it, the folk-psychological theory is false: then our only alternative is to endorse the neurophysiological theory.

According to Churchland there is nothing more to mind than the natural scientific fact that

the brain represents the general or lasting features of the world with a lasting configuration of its myriad synaptic connection strengths. That configuration of carefully tuned connections dictates how the brain will react to the world. (Churchland 1995 *The Engine of Reason*, 5)

The synaptic connection strength is merely the degree to which the ante-synaptic neuron will excite or inhibit the post-synaptic neuron. It is a matter of physiology that the ante-synaptic neuron (I am here considering a neuron on the sensory periphery) is itself excited by the presence of a specific sensory input. This excitation may be interpreted as representing this property in the sense of symptom to its cause. Depending upon what it is the post-synaptic neuron's function to represent, the synaptic connection strength may be excitatory or inhibitory, to greater or lesser value. Thus, on Churchland's eliminativist neuro-computational account of mind, representation is made possible by a correspondence of structural information between the 'myriad synaptic connection strengths', and the 'world'. We are thus led to understand that complex features of the world can be represented as an n-dimensional vector space where each dimension corresponds to a degree of freedom in that which is to be represented. (see Churchland 1981 *Eliminative Materialism and
the Propositional Attitudes', 84-5; 1995 The Engine of Reason, 21-34) The neural architecture of an organism attains these representing connection strengths through adjusting the connection strengths to optimal performance throughout the development of that piece of architecture.

Whereas the representing possibilities of a neural architecture are embedded in a complex configuration of synaptic connection strengths, actual representations are instantiated within this architecture as 'a fleeting configuration of activation levels in the brain's many neurons, such as those in the retina or visual cortex'. (Churchland 1995 The Engine of Reason, 6) The actual features of the world with which the organism is at any time in contact is represented as a complex of activation states distributed throughout the overall architecture. (op. cit., 23) This may be understood as a point in the n-dimensional vector space marked out by the synaptic connection strengths. Clearly, on this understanding of representational content, the content is immanent to the perceptual process.

Even more explicitly than in Fodor's Representational Theory of Mind the theoretical tool which provides an explanation as to how the representational state receives its representational content is the causal relation. The sensory apparatus of the organism is in causal contact with the world. This contact causes physiological changes in those organs which translates into excitation (representational) states in the peripheral nervous system. The representational information is selectively passed (causally) along the series of neurons, in the form of excitation or inhibition states. What determines the representational content is the causal interaction with the world and this content is an ordered set of synaptic connection strengths. Once again, we are dealing with immanent contents in the symptomatic sense.
This characterisation of neural processes is deliberately simplistic, as Churchland would no doubt object. As I have characterised it, there is only one linear progression of information. The brain, however, appears to operate and process massive amounts of individual pieces of information, often converging disparate series of processing at a common neuron, *all at the same time*: the brain appears to be a Parallel Distributed Processor. (Churchland 1984 *Matter and Consciousness*, 121-2; 1995 *The Engine of Reason*, 11) Moreover, the information imputed to any one neuron need not be confined to that which has ascended the information processing capabilities of the system. There are also neural pathways descending the system, bringing information from a higher level of processing to a lower level. That is, the neural architecture is not confined to a single direction in its processing, it also contains 'recurrent networks'\(^1\). (Churchland 1995 *The Engine of Reason*, 99)

Clearly, in this account we are at all times dealing with causal relations, with a 'content' determined by a causal chain that leads back to a physical encounter with the external world. At every stage we are dealing with representations in the sense of symptoms of causes. This naturalistically specifiable encounter determines a configuration of excitation states distributed throughout the neural architecture of our brains, and in this configuration the representational properties of the mind find their explanation. Intentionality for Churchland, in any substantive sense of the word, is a merely apparent phenomenon. A completed neuro-science would construe our belief in such a phenomenon as an archaic, naive mistake, on par with a belief in phlogiston. As with Fodor, Churchland provides an explanation of intentionality in terms of symptomatic, immanent contents and causality.

\(^1\) As I shall argue, I do actually believe that such neural activity *is* necessarily involved in (our) intentionality - it is the *points d'appui*. (cf Section 2) What I am here questioning is whether it is *sufficient* for intentionality, as Churchland seems to think.
Whereas Fodor was a realist about intentional states, and Churchland an eliminativist, Daniel Dennett is an instrumentalist. Dennett prescribes for us a methodological strategy which he calls the 'intentional stance': we ascribe beliefs, representational states about things in the world, to a system when to do so provides the only properly explanatory account of its behaviour. (Dennett 1981 'True Believers', 29-30; 1991 Consciousness Explained, 76-7) At the same time this is a stance only; Dennett does not really believe that there are intentional states in any substantial sense. The difference between Dennett and Churchland here is merely that Dennett thinks there is still a role for intentional talk.

Dennett's explanatory model of how an entity could be so constructed so as to give us reason to adopt the intentional stance and ascribe representational states to it, is a mixture of neurophysiology and functionalism. In the Preface to Consciousness Explained, Dennett announces that he 'will explain the various phenomena that compose what we call consciousness, showing how they are all physical effects of the brain's activities, how these activities evolved, and how they give rise to illusions about their own powers and properties.' (Dennett 1991 Consciousness Explained, 16) Indeed much of the early text is dedicated to explaining how a purely neurophysiological approach, much like that proposed by Churchland, can explain many peculiar effects we attribute to consciousness.

Dennett, however, wants to supplement this purely physiological approach to consciousness with the idea that our complex cognitive functions involve the neural architecture acting as a vehicle which can be parasitised by complex functional organisations he calls 'memes'. (op. cit, 200) This idea is simply

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2 It may appear from my presentation that both Churchland and Dennett agree on ontology, and only differ with regard to the usefulness of folk-psycho l ogy as an ex pl anatory device. Indeed Churchland only criticises Dennett for his belief in the usefulness of folk-psy chological explanation. (Churchland 1995 The Engine of Reason, 265) This is, however, misleading because,
explained in analogy to the operation of a personal computer. (op. cit., 210) At the basic physical level a computer is a hardwired silicon chip(s), with suitable input and output devices. The usefulness of this artefact is that the circuitry of the chip displays sufficient functional complexity that it permits the running of many different software programs. It is the same Macintosh computer that permits me to run both Microsoft Word 5.0.1 and Doom. The software is quite real - it would be strange to try to convince someone that they were not in actual fact now using Microsoft Word - but it is not to be found in the hardware of the computer. However, in a very real sense whatever software may run on your computer will only run because of the particular design structure of the hardware.

The human mind, according to Dennett, can be understood in much the same manner. There is the neural architecture, the hardware, upon which mental software, which he calls memes, can be instantiated. Memes are quite simply ideas which may be of greater or lesser complexity. There are memes for the wheel, wearing clothes, vendetta, right angle, etc. (op. cit., 201) There is little control over which memes populate our minds because there is no central controller to adjudicate. Our minds just are a complex of such memes, and the hardware upon which they are instantiated.

The level at which, according to Dennett, one can provide an adequate description of the organisation of the neural architecture, and the parasitising memes is the level of the overall systems functional organisation: Dennett is advocating a version of functionalism. (Dennett 1991 Consciousness Explained, 206)

for Dennett, memes are real entities which exist in the memosphere. (Dennett 1991 Consciousness Explained, 206)

3 It may be the case that an incredibly clever engineer may find it implicit in the transient voltage patterns and configurations of on/off switches, but the point is that nowhere is it explicitly coded into the hardware. Dennett thinks that a clever engineer could not interpret the voltage pattern as a functional architecture (Dennett 1991 Consciousness Explained, 219), but I do not see that this is at all obvious.
According to functionalism a mental state is nothing more than a loci in the overall functional organisation, whereby the state the system is to move into next is determined by the current state and the current input. The mental state is defined by its causal relations to other states, inputs and outputs. Understood in such a light, functionalism is just one more naturalistic explanation of what it is to have a mind - as Putnam, the father of functionalism, says, the theory is mechanistically inspired. (Putnam 1967 'The Nature of Mental States', 200) Once again, we are provided with an explanation of intentionality which relies upon symptomatic, immanent contents and causality.

Clearly, in each of these three cases, the respective theorist is committed to a view of intentionality in terms of immanent contents and causality. However, as our phenomenological investigations have revealed, such immanent contents, either in the folk-psychological sense or the theoretically motivated symptomatic sense, are not themselves intentional. (Chapter 3 Section 3) The question we are justified in raising is how such contents could suffice as an explanation of the intentional, in the rich sense of world directing contents we have been describing in the previous chapters.

Fodor, Churchland and Dennett would no doubt answer our puzzlement by pointing out that accounting for intentionality in our sense was not their
problem. In fact, they would consider it as only a pseudo-problem. According to their respective eliminativist or reductionist naturalistic standpoints, they are only committed to an explanation such that 'content' in the symptomatic sense is intentional if and only if representation in their scientific sense does all one would reasonably ask of it by way of explaining cognition and intelligent behaviour. Indeed the completed account should make no mention of 'intentionality' if the explanation is not to suffer from circularity.

Nonetheless, if the reductive or eliminativist account is to count as a sufficient explanation it must explain 'cognition and intelligent behaviour' as we have described it in our preceding analysis. It is the supposed obviousness that this can be done, given the constraints the naturalistic explanations place upon themselves, that we are here bringing into question.

In order to illustrate this point let us consider an attempt at providing a naturalistic explanation of how these immanent, symptomatic contents could account for the apparent world directedness of our intentional states. This attempt seems to me to be the kind of answer that all three theorists we have been considering would and must endorse. According to Dennett, an explicit case of perception, which may be accompanied by an utterance of, say, 'There is a chair', is an experience continuous with a case of a 'presentiment'.

If you have ever had a sudden presentiment that someone was looking over your shoulder, or a premonition that something dire was about to happen, you are acquainted with the phenomena. These events are propositional episodes, thinkings that $p$; there is normally some inclination to express them (although the inclination is easily suppressed or cancelled), and we may not even express them to ourselves in "inner speech". When they occur to us, we have not the faintest idea what their etiology is (unless we have some theory about the causes of premonitions; my point is that "to introspection" they arrive from we know not where). (Dennett 1986 'Toward a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness', 165)
What is clear in the case of everyday presentiment is that we are conscious of
the results of our mental processes, but not of the processes from which they
arise.

Dennett's contention is that such an experience is not an isolated
phenomenon, but, rather, an extreme phenomenon continuous with all actual
cases of perceptual experience. The case of presentiment of someone looking
over your shoulder is striking because of its isolation from the flux of ongoing
understanding of what is going on with me at any one time.

Right now it occurs to me that there are pages in front of me, a
presentiment whose etiology is not known directly by me, but which is,
of course, perfectly obvious. It is my visual system that gives me this
presentiment, along with a host of others. I can say all sorts of things to
elaborate on and supplement my initial report. But if I am put in an
abnormal perceptual environment - for instance, in a tachistoscopic
experiment - I may be less sure why I want to say what I do. I sort of
have a hunch that is [sic] was: an English word you flashed on the
screen, but did I really see it? I cannot say what word it was, or describe it
in any detail. (Dennett 1986 'Towards a Cognitive Theory of
Consciousness, 166)

Dennett is arguing that even in the case of normal perception, for example, of
this computer in front of me now, I have no direct access to the processes upon
which this belief is founded. It is only that I have a constant stream of
consistent beliefs about the computer affecting my senses that makes it appear
that I do have such access. To put it another way, we have no personal access to
the sub-personal processes that constitute the inner workings of our minds. To
maintain consistency with his naturalist/functionalist account of mind
Dennett must say that perception involves the causal interaction of the system
that constitutes my mind with the world, and all that there is to my belief in
the perceived object is a functionally determined output which says 'There is a
computer'. This output is merely a product of the functional organisation,
which has no direct access to how it came to be said; though a sufficiently
complex system could have other functionally determined outputs which said that it did.

Fodor and Churchland are surely also, relative to their respective theories, committed to this same conclusion. We have already seen that the basic explanatory tools each has at their disposal is the causal relation. In each of the theories the content of the representational state is determined by a causal relation between the system and the world, and is supplemented and processed by more causality going on within that system. Thus for them also, the belief, or more accurately, the disposition to utter the sentence declaring that there is a computer now in front of me, could only be a product of this causal system; and, as Dennett says, could have no direct access to the how of its genesis.

Let us consider what we are here being asked to accept, because it seems that there is already, without even having to draw upon our positive characterisation of perception, some grounds for suspicion that the naturalist is providing us the grounds for a satisfactory explanation. When, for example, we are faced with fire it is surely true that it affects our senses. This, however, cannot constitute the desired account of truly representational relation. Just consider that there are many other causal relations happening concurrently: the fire is also heating the surrounding air molecules, to name just one. Surely we would not want to ascribe truly representational properties to these air molecules. What might be the difference between the fire's effects upon our sense organs and its effects upon the surrounding environment? Of course, there are innumerable attendant effects occurring in our brains (and nervous systems), but note, these further effects are just more symptoms to causes. There will be also be attendant effects in the environment, radiating heat, production of visible electromagnetic radiation, etc. At what point, or with what manner of organisation, do the attendant effects in the physiology of our brains explain the apparent truly representational properties of our minds?
Without invoking the mind itself as an explanation it seems we must conclude 'nowhere'. This is why Dennett's suggestion that perceptual acquaintance is no more than a presentiment is an answer consistent with his account of mind. However, note that this disposition to utter 'There is a computer' is only a representation resultant on a series of causal relations, that is, a symptom to a chain of causes.

We have good reason to resist the confidence motivated by faith in natural scientific explanation, that such an explanation, however sophisticated it may become, could ever satisfy our description of the phenomenon of perception as we have described it in the previous chapters. We can readily admit that psychological states of our brains (and nervous system) are causally determined by their interaction with the world; and that, in a sense, these affects are representations of that which caused them. However, the sense of representation with which we are dealing is the sense of symptom to its cause. We are told, of course, that these contents are processed by the system, but this processing is again determined by causality and can only ever provide more finely tuned and organised symptoms. How are we to understand Dennett's explanation capturing the extended sense of perceptual content we described in Chapter 3? or the sense that perception already reaches its object as described in Chapter 4?

What then, are we to make of the success of natural science in the discipline of neurophysiology, in amassing scientific fact regarding the functioning of our brains? With regard to perception, which we have here been considering, neurophysiology is successfully mapping the occipital lobe of our cerebral cortex with locations exhibiting heightened neural activity corresponding to the stimuli of colours, lines of various orientations, angles between lines,

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5 John McDowell argues for a similar inability to understand how Dennett's account of perception could possibly be adequate. (1994 'The Content of Perceptual Experience')
movement, etc., that is, all those physical properties Husserl would want to argue that we directly see. (see Mulligan 1995 'Perception', 173-80)

In response let us consider the descriptive analyses we have been engaged in throughout the main part of this text. One conclusion of our analyses was that the folk-psychological, immanent, perceptual contents could not themselves be considered perceptions, that is, be intentional. We did, however, allow that these contents were the result of a transaction between the object of perception and our mind. (cf Chapter 3 Section 3). On the basis of this descriptive analysis, and here we have been faithful to our methodological principle that description must precede explanation, we argued that we were now justified to bring in theoretical explication and interpret this transaction as a causal relation. As our brief discussion of Churchland has shown this causal transaction results in an incredibly complex process of attendant effects. Nevertheless, we are at all times dealing with content in the sense of symptoms to their causes. Moreover, all this process merely constitutes the theoretical explication of what we have described as the immanent contents of our perceptual processes. That is, on the basis of the preceding argument, we should not consider the locations on the cerebral cortex, which respond with excitatory neural activity to visual stimuli, as the perceptions themselves. They should only be understood as the points d'appui (cf Chapter 3 Section 2): that which renders an intentional relation possible, but which does not constitute the intentional relation itself.

Thus, and this is the central, speculative point of this thesis, natural scientific investigation into the functioning of our brain and nervous system provides an account of the points d'appui, that which grounds such entities as ourselves in the world and makes intentionality possible. Natural science then gives an account of the necessary conditions of intentionality. However, there is no obvious reason, other than an obsequiousness towards natural scientific
explanation, for accepting out of hand that a *sufficient* account of intentionality can be given in natural scientific terms.


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