Dynamics vs Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy
Motivation
— Beijing's Fifth Column Policy in Hong Kong as a Test Case

BY

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A Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy of the
Australian National University
DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is the result of my own original work.

Yin Qian
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CONCLUSION

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Abstract

This thesis presents original evidence of a previously undisclosed dark side to China's Hong Kong policy after 1982. It documents a covert program of immigration from the mainland to Hong Kong which was designed to put in place a classic fifth column of Communist loyalists to be used if all other institution-based arrangements for the power transfer of the British colony to Chinese rule failed.

This finding is revealing and important in its own right as a contribution to study of the Hong Kong transition. But the thesis focuses more on the broader significance of the motivation of such a fifth column policy for both the study of Chinese foreign policy and international relations theory.

Studies of international affairs regularly impute motives to states or their leaders. Yet, when it comes to analysis of the imputed motives, most scholars see that as nearly impossible given the difficulty of penetrating the minds of the individual leaders concerned. However, a small number of scholars have taken up the challenge. They believe that foreign policy motivation can be studied despite its apparent complexity and elusiveness. They see the study of motivation of a given foreign policy as the only way of grasping its essence and, therefore, of ascertaining clues about its future development.

These scholars of foreign policy motivation have tried to break new ground by establishing tangible theoretical parameters to account for the dynamic nature of such motivation. Unfortunately, their voices have largely been ignored and their approaches have been marginalised by the mainstream schools of international relations. For example, the various schools of realism refused to acknowledge the richness and diversity of the motivation approaches. The Marxist-Leninist theoretical paradigm emphasised class struggle as the basic unit in projecting international relations.

This thesis argues that motivation study advances our understanding of Chinese foreign policy. Drawing on an investigation of existing theoretical studies of motivation, the thesis identifies and synthesises three approaches to the study of motivation that seem particularly relevant to the Chinese case: perception; personality; and structural/situational constraining factors. This thesis analyses the historical, political culture, ideological and structural sources of Chinese policymaking to illustrate how these three elements can elucidate Chinese foreign policy motivation.

Its conclusion is then tested against the case of China's fifth column policy in Hong Kong. The findings from the Hong Kong case study reflect two parallel but contradictory lines of motivation in the reform era of Deng Xiaoping: a dynamic adjusting and learning process on the one hand, and a strenuous effort to retain its traditional practice on the other.

This thesis concludes that, despite increasing pressures for adaptation from constant and tremendous changes in global and national settings, Chinese foreign policy motivation could not in the final analysis overcome the constraints imposed by its underlying doctrines and practices, which had been so firmly embedded in the minds of the Communist leaders that it became a traditional mode of responding to the unknown and uncertainty—a culture of Chinese foreign policy.
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BL</td>
<td>Basic Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLCC</td>
<td>Basic Law Consultative Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CITIC</td>
<td>China International Trust and Investment Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Central Military Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPPCC</td>
<td>Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exco</td>
<td>Hong Kong Executive Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBIS</td>
<td>Foreign Broadcast Information Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>HK</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
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<tr>
<td>HKFTU</td>
<td>Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>HKMAO</td>
<td>Hong Kong-Macao Office of State Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>HKTUC</td>
<td>Hong Kong Trade Union Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>Independent Foreign Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>JD</td>
<td>Joint Declaration</td>
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<td>JLG</td>
<td>Joint Liaison Group</td>
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<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legco</td>
<td>Hong Kong Legislative Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOFTEC</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSS</td>
<td>Ministry of State Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North America Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>NCNA</td>
<td>New China News Agency (Xinhua Office)</td>
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<td>NIEs</td>
<td>Newly Industrialising Economies</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National People’s Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>PWC</td>
<td>Preliminary Working Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Special Administrative Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEZ</td>
<td>Special Economic Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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**Note:** The *pinyin* system, the official romanisation system in the People’s Republic of China, has been adopted by the United Nations and other international organisations. It has become the system most universally used in scholarship and journalism in the West. This thesis uses *pinyin* whenever appropriate, with some familiar exceptions for well-known place names and personal names that would be difficult to recognised in *pinyin*. For example, Hong Kong, Tibet, Taipei are retained in preference to Xianggang, Xizang, and Taibei; and Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek and Lee Teng-hui are used rather than Sun Zhongshan, Jiang Jieshi and Li Denghui.
INTRODUCTION
On 24 September 1982, China’s paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, explained to the British Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, that he could not let the British continue to rule over Hong Kong after 1997 because he would not allow himself to become another Li Hongzhang, the high official of Qing emperor’s court who signed the 1898 treaty that leased Hong Kong’s New Territories to the British.¹

This seemingly innocent comment was truly remarkable. On the one hand, it crystallised the fundamental Chinese sense of history and the reference point of the Chinese foreign policy perceptual framework—the continuity of the past and the weight of history. On the other hand, by juxtaposing events of the late nineteenth century that signed away Hong Kong with those of the late twentieth century that would recover Hong Kong’s sovereignty, Deng unequivocally declared the great symbolic role of Hong Kong in the minds of Chinese leaders. Deng’s comment was a powerful statement that challenged traditional international relations theories in understanding foreign policy motivation—factors other than narrowly-defined national interests and security considerations might play pivotal roles in foreign policy formulation under certain circumstances of specific historical and cultural settings. This comment was also a sharp reminder that although politics of sovereignty and national reunification could override

¹ With the publication of the third volume of Deng Xiaoping’s Selected Works in October 1993, the official Chinese account of Deng Xiaoping’s talk to Mrs Thatcher on their first meeting on 24 September 1982 was released for the first time. It was significantly titled ‘Our Basic Position on the Question of Hong Kong’. Deng said: “On the question of sovereignty, China has no room for manoeuvre....If China failed to recover Hong Kong in 1997, when the People’s Republic will have been established for 48 years, no Chinese leaders or government would be able to justify themselves for that failure before the Chinese people or before the people of the world. It would mean that the present Chinese government was just like the government of the late Qing Dynasty and that the present Chinese leaders were just like Li Hongzhang!...If we failed to recover Hong Kong in 15 years the people would no longer have reason to trust us, and any Chinese government would have no alternative but to step down and voluntarily leave the political arena.” Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. III (1982-1992) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994, p. 23). It can also be found in Deng Xiaoping, On the Question of Hong Kong (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1993, pp. 1-2). Both are translations from the Chinese edition published in October 1993.
everything else, including economics, in China’s Hong Kong policy, this very policy was also founded on some personalised dimension, closely related to the leadership motivation at an individual level.

The observation of this significant incident gives rise to two important questions: What are the determinants of China’s Hong Kong policy motivation? And what does China’s Hong Kong policy say about China’s foreign policy motivation in general? These will guide the research agenda of this thesis.

Not only has the study of motivation been controversial, but attempts to include it in the study of Chinese foreign policy have often been treated with suspicion and hostility. Clearly foreign policy motivation is a difficult subject for academic study given the inherent limitations of social science. But if there is such a thing as foreign policy motivation, then it is essential to go beyond the comfort zone of what is already known to explore this frontier of possibility.

Since 1980 a number of monographs have addressed many aspects of Chinese foreign policy, but very few have tackled China’s foreign policy from a motivation perspective. Most scholars assume and assert a set of motives for Chinese foreign policy but make little effort to understand how these motives come into being. This means that, in spite of greater interests and a wider agenda being pursued in the study of Chinese foreign policy, scholars in general are still reluctant to address foreign policy motivation. What, then, could a serious and comprehensive investigation of motivation say about Chinese foreign policy? This interesting question has recently inspired a group of scholars to

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apply some elements of motivation theories in their studies of Chinese foreign policy. However, what has been lacking is a conscious and systematic effort to analyse all the key variables of motivation in the study of either a specific or general Chinese foreign policy.

This thesis is based on the following assumptions:

First, no foreign policy can be made without motivation. But motivation—no matter how important it might be—is only one component of action.3 While the secrecy and complexity of foreign policy decisionmaking processes might prevent observers from articulating directly the underlying motivation, it nonetheless can be inferred indirectly. There is rarely a single motivation operating to the exclusion of all others. Rather there is a configuration of motives, which cluster together in a related course of actions. This configuration of motives is inevitably found in institutions and political culture.4 That is because at any one time, though seemingly random, there will be an order of relative dominance among these motives. Since there is always more than one motive, other overarching, supportive and even conflicting motives also appear. Motive conflict is probably the rule5 which involves competitive demands for attention.6

Second, the effect of motive conflicts on decisionmaking and the effect of resolution of such conflicts can give clues to consistency of direction.7 The making of foreign policy

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3 Motivation interacts with other components like perception, choice, value, belief, strategy, immediate and long-term goals, and ultimate aims etc.
5 ibid.
7 ibid.
Introduction

is an organised activity where the system of dispositions is exceedingly complex because of the wide range of influences at work on the participants.\(^8\) Groups and individuals responsible for making foreign policy bring to the process different sets of values—each moulded differently by the particular political culture.

Third, instead of being static, the motives of actors can change in dynamic ways in order to allow for repositioning and accommodation in the light of emerging agendas.

Last, but not least, because of limitations imposed by internal or external circumstances and institutional, resource or personal constraints, not all motives can be satisfied equally or simultaneously.\(^9\)

This thesis identifies four reasons for applying a motivation approach to the study of Chinese foreign policy. First, it seems necessary to investigate the role of motivation in foreign policy initiatives because motivation is the absolute foundation for any country to behave as it does. It is impossible to probe state behaviour without taking into account the motivation of decision makers\(^10\)—be it an individual or a group. Richard Snyder and his colleagues argue that to assume motivation begs many of the most significant questions which arise in the study of international politics.\(^11\)

Second, if properly conceived and executed, motivational analysis ought to provide a much more satisfactory basis for linking the specific historical and internal social

\(^9\) *ibid.*
\(^10\) *ibid.* pp. 133-138
settings within which foreign policy decision makers operate.

Third, a comprehensive theory of motivation might serve to synthesise discrete concepts such as perception, personality, values, learning, attitudes and external constraints, which have been constantly used in decisionmaking analysis\textsuperscript{12} but have not been linked together consistently and effectively in much of the literature.

Fourth, since the foreign policy motivation of any country is fluid, variegated, interactive and sometimes contradictory, no single theory can fully and adequately explain the motivation of that foreign policy as a whole—its hypothesised ‘logic’.

The intention of this thesis is to identify and amalgamate the core elements of various competing foreign policy motivation theories in relation to the study of Chinese foreign policy from 1982-1997. At the heart of this thesis, there is a case study of the Hong Kong transition, which is chosen to test motivation theories.

The value of selecting Hong Kong as a case study of Chinese foreign policy lies in the unusual nature of the colony’s circumstances and its unique status in Chinese leaders’ decisionmaking. The Hong Kong case straddled domestic and foreign policy\textsuperscript{13} much more explicitly than other issues in Chinese foreign affairs—it directly linked China’s

\textsuperscript{11} ibid.
\textsuperscript{12} ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} This can be understood by China’s negotiation process of recovering Hong Kong. While dealings with Great Britain over Hong Kong followed standard diplomatic protocol, the Chinese government granted Hong Kong policy a status separate from other foreign policy issues. The most obvious evidence of this was that the policy for Hong Kong was formulated primarily in the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office (HKMAO) rather than in the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The twist, however, was the fact that Qian Qichen, then Foreign Minister, was the most senior Chinese official actively involved in the whole process.
Introduction

national and international policy considerations. Indeed, it encapsulated in a nutshell the dilemma of Chinese foreign policy in Deng's reform era—preserving sovereignty as the ultimate question of principle while recognising economic benefit as the foundation of a necessary pragmatism. China's dealings with Great Britain over Hong Kong held significant implications for other foreign policy areas. Because the Hong Kong issue was treated by the CCP with extreme sensitivity, deliberation and caution, China's Hong Kong policy can be seen as embodying the country's highest foreign policy objectives as well as manifesting the CCP's deepest concerns over the regime's survival in the modernisation process. This policy therefore would serve as a perfect case for a broader investigation of Chinese foreign policy motivation under Deng Xiaoping.

Structure of the Thesis

The thesis comprises three parts. Part I is the theoretical investigation which establishes two fundamental premises of this dissertation: 1) that motivation is central to foreign policy decisionmaking process; and 2) that such motivation can be studied by observing its conceptual and analytical components. Perception, personality, structural/situational constraints and the course of interactions among them are identified as the major agents in the dynamic process of foreign policy motivation process. The complex and changing nature of the motivation is stressed.

International relations studies so far have treated the foreign policy motivation approach with two distinct views—simplicity or suspicion. These views are represented by
mainstream political theories, which address foreign policy motivation in the most general and simplified terms. They take it for granted that motivation is itself a fundamental analytical unit which does not need to be further dissected. For example, realism/neorealism have regarded power as the ultimate motivation of a foreign policy; liberalism/neoliberalism have claimed the moral ground and economic equality to be the foundation for interstate relations; and Marxism has insisted on historical materialism and class struggle as primary sources for foreign policy. In emphasising their own theoretical paradigm, these theories tend to be biased against other alternative explanations and, therefore, have not provided adequate insight into the complexity and dynamics of the foreign policy motivation process.

Study of motivation as a theory of foreign policy, however, has not been totally ignored by the international relations discipline. A group of scholars have been engaged in the research to establish foreign policy motivation theories. They have succeeded in the sense that their investigations have deliberated on and stressed the role of individual motivational elements, but arguably have failed to link the discourses of these building blocks in a cohesive manner.

This unsatisfactory situation partly explains why motivation theories are often viewed with suspicion in the field of international relations studies. Concepts such as perception and personality, generally taken as referring to the inner psychological state and quality of actors in explaining overt behaviour, are more likely to be criticised simply because of the inherent circularity of such explanations: one seeks power because of a need for
power. However, this view only scratches the surface. This thesis identifies perception, personality and situational constraints to be the key motivational elements in the formulation and implementation of a given foreign policy. While the huge complexity of the motivation issues may tempt scholars to resort to just one of several motivation theories, it remains important not to lose sight of the complementarity and mutual enhancement of each of the elements in the overall assessment of motivation intensity and tendency.

The three chapters in Part I form the intellectual scaffolding of the thesis. Chapter One outlines the ‘pillar’ theories of the three classical political philosophies (realism, liberalism and Marxism) in their approaches to foreign policy motivation. Chapter Two investigates other scholarly works on foreign policy motivation to identify elements that are particularly relevant to the study of Chinese foreign policy. Chapter Three evaluates the significance of a newly emerging trend of taking motivation as the research focus in the study of Chinese foreign policy.

Part II of this thesis seeks to test the applicability and viability of motivation theories presented in the previous Part in understanding the thrust of communist China’s foreign policy motivation in general, and, in particular, the nature of the transformation of such motivation under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership. It does so by drawing on an existing rich body of literature on Chinese foreign policy. It argues that each of the three main elements of foreign policy motivation—perception, personality and structural/situational constraints—plays a distinct role in the formation of Chinese foreign policy motivation over different historical periods and issues. However, it is the intrinsic relationship

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among them and the delicate changes of balance between them that decide the final motivation for choices and preferences.

There are four chapters in this Part. Chapter Four traces the historical sources of the perception of various regimes affecting Chinese Communist foreign policy motivation. It goes back in time to understand one of the essential ingredients in the CCP’s perception melting pot. It contends that it is the competing notion of China’s inherent cultural superiority coupled with its fundamentally insecure and besieged mentality that has put China in an uneasy relation with the established world order. And it is also this tremendous sense of history and the loss of empire that has been the primary historical source of Chinese foreign policy perception. Ideological components are also discussed to illuminate the lingering utility of ideology in the process of transformation of CCP’s perception of outside world.

Chapter Five sketches the personal attributes of two paramount Chinese leaders, Mao and Deng, in reshaping the discourse of contemporary Chinese foreign policy. This paves the way to discuss their influence in instilling and reinforcing the political culture of ‘rule by man’ in China’s foreign policy thinking. It contends that, as a logical extension and natural spill-over of the practice of personalised politics in much of the Chinese political history, the CCP has always had a high expectation of the readiness and reliability of its cadres to fulfil its goals and to serve its best interest. As such, the roles of the cadre system as an organisational input in the foreign policy deliberation is also discussed to identify the aggregate characteristic of the CCP cadre contingent. This is an important step because, with the disappearance of paramount leaders from the
Chinese political scene, more and more practical power has been passed to the broader political elite, of which the CCP cadres are the major beneficiaries.

Chapter Six assesses the impact of structural changes and systemic transformation on the formation of the CCP’s core values in its foreign policy motivation in both the Mao and the Deng eras. It examines the constraining effect of the CCP dominance within a party-state structure in setting policy priority, as the party positions and adjusts itself in domestic and international affairs. The major structural transformation under Deng is analysed to reveal how the structural framework itself had to change rapidly to accommodate the motivation process.

Chapter Seven highlights the dynamic and changing nature of Chinese foreign policy by incorporating the analytical outcomes of the previous three chapters. This dynamic interaction is further supported by reflecting upon three issues: pragmatism in Mao’s foreign policy; changing priorities in the reform era; and the origin of ‘one-country two systems’ policy.

Part III takes Beijing’s fifth column policy in Hong Kong during the transition period from 1983 to 1997 as a case study. It is intended to inject new empirical rigour to further test the validity of motivation theory in observing Chinese foreign policy motivation. The fresh evidence and ensuing comprehensive analysis of the so far little known fifth column operation in Hong Kong reveal a dark side of Chinese foreign policy in Deng’s open and reform era.
Introduction

There are two chapters in this Part. Chapter Eight first outlines the CCP’s official representation in Hong Kong, then records the fifth column operation against this background to set the scene for later unveiling of the policy motivation in Chapter Nine. Chapter Eight engages three basic questions: How was the fifth column policy formulated? How did it evolve? And how was it being implemented? Chapter Nine examines the intimate relationship between the fifth column policy in Hong Kong and Chinese foreign policy motivation more broadly. It does so by returning to the original theoretical paradigms set out in Part I to canvass the findings and evidence. On the basis of this, a conclusion of the motivation of Beijing’s Hong Kong policy during the transition, and indeed, China’s overall foreign policy motivation can be drawn.

Methodologies

The methodology used is a combination of traditional inductive and deductive reasoning. It avoids excessive quantification of data and complex behavioural jargon. The thesis does not limit itself to one particular social science. Insights are drawn, whenever possible, from the fields of political science, history, culture, psychology and philosophy.

This thesis is essentially a diagnosis, based on the discussed theoretical premises. It seeks to demonstrate how perception, personality and structural/situational considerations affect the Chinese foreign policy motivation processes, and why they do so. Facts are usually quite complex in international relations, even more so in the study of Chinese foreign policy motivation. But when one is willing to learn to respect them
Introduction

and is prepared to take different approaches to observe them, nuances appear instead of black-and-white or good-and-evil dichotomies. It is this complexity and intricacy that make the motivation proposition such a tempting approach.

The methodology of Part I is largely descriptive. By reviewing and analysing the existing international relations theories, it crystallises three core elements that dominate foreign policy motivation process.

Part II applies a deductive method to test the validity of the parameters established in the theoretical chapters of Part I. It identifies the general thrust of Chinese foreign policy motivation under both Mao and Deng. This is accomplished in two steps. Firstly, it uses theoretical paradigms derived in Part I to analyse Chinese foreign policy from the perspectives of perception, personality and structural/situational constraints. Secondly, these concepts are synthesised against a wider spectrum of Chinese foreign policy behaviours to uncover the dynamics of Chinese foreign policy motivation.

The case study in this thesis constitutes what Theodore Lowi calls "one of the more important methods of political science analysis". Part III uses an inductive methodology and relies heavily on field work findings to extract a policy rationale. Chapter Eight is largely narrative, but this artificial abdication from the theoretical domain is useful at this stage to allow the evidence and subsequent diagnoses to speak for themselves. The subsequent return in Chapter Nine to the theoretical framework of the thesis ensures the structural and theoretical consistency from which a final balanced

15 Theodore Lowi, 'American Business, Public Policy, Case-studies, and Political Theory' World Politics (Vol. 16, No. 4, July 1964, pp. 686-688)
conclusion on the viability of motivation approach as a theory in understanding Chinese foreign policy behaviours can be elicited.

The Hong Kong case study is largely based on interview notes and other information/data collected during field work in London, Washington, Hong Kong, Taiwan and mainland China in 1996 and 1997. The interviewees include some senior Chinese and Hong Kong government officials, politicians, leading China scholars and 28 participants of China’s fifth column in Hong Kong.

Acknowledgments

I have contracted innumerable intellectual debts in the course of writing this thesis. An enlightened guide able to identify key issues and to point out the right direction by wading through a mountain of materials has been crucial in every step of the progress. Dr Greg Austin, the Chair of my supervising committee, has been a constant source of encouragement and inspiration. His intellectual generosity, invaluable guidance, availability, approachability and endless patience have greatly assisted me to arrive at the end point.

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In December 1997, I was invited by the Royal Institute of International Affairs to attend the ‘Hong Kong in Transition Conference’ at Chatham House in London. The paper I gave, titled ‘Beijing’s Fifth Column and Power Transition in Hong Kong’, was based on Part III of this thesis. I would like to thank Prof. Michael Yahuda, Prof. Ian Scott, Dr Brian Hook, Prof. Diana Lary, Prof. Peter Wesley-Smith, Dr Michael Degolyer and Dr Robin Porter for their constructive comments on, and encouragement of, my presentation at this Conference.

Many friends and my family members have given me irreplaceable support throughout these trying years. Particularly, I would like to thank Leigh, Percy, Peter and Wei for their understanding, encouragement, care and wonderful helps in every imaginable way. My daughter Me-Li-Sa has been a delightful companion and loyal friend in this three-year journey—she has not only taught me how to differentiate night from day, but also shared with me the excitement, frustration and general pressures of being a PhD student.
This Part investigates general propositions about the role of motivation in foreign policy decisionmaking and how it can be studied.

The three chapters in Part I are intended to establish the research direction, methodologies and theoretical framework of the thesis. Chapter One overviews three influential classical schools of thought (realism, liberalism and Marxism), in particular their understanding and approaches to foreign policy motivation. Chapter Two examines other scholarship on foreign policy motivation to identify elements that are pertinent to the study of Chinese foreign policy motivation process during the periods this thesis concerns. Chapter Three places the general motivation theories in context with current emerging trend of motivation approach in the study of Chinese foreign policy.

Part I therefore serves as the theoretical backbone which will sustain the deliberation of dynamics vs tradition in Chinese foreign policy motivation in Part II and Part III.
Chapter One
Classical Approaches

This chapter first examines and defines the concepts of foreign policy and motivation in the context of this thesis. It then reviews the three classical and most influential political theories—realism, liberalism and Marxism—to ascertain their positions on the subject of motivation. As it will be noted later in the chapter, none of them directly confronted the issues of foreign policy motivation, but nor did they overlook the importance of motivation in the foreign policy process. Instead, all of them made sweeping and implicit assumptions, taking motivation as a given and as a basic analytical unit in their observation of the international affairs.

Foreign Policy Defined

A policy may be taken to mean a formulated program designed to achieve a specific objective by the use of authority. Therefore, policy may take the form of a statement of priorities, a call for support, an explanation or a claim to consistency.\(^1\) Foreign policy means the deliberate framing of a program to achieve the best possible position for a state in the world beyond the territorial jurisdiction of its government.\(^2\) Or as Hugh Gibson defines it:

... a well rounded, comprehensive plan, based on knowledge and experience, for conducting the business of government with the rest of the world. It is aimed at promoting and protecting the interests of the nation....Anything less than this falls short of being a national foreign policy.\(^3\)

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1 Roy Jones, *Principles of Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Martin Robertson & Company Ltd. 1979, pp. 77-78)
3 Hugh Gibson, *The Road to Foreign Policy* (reprinted by Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1944, p. 9)
A number of questions arise from these two definitions. The most obvious one is that the world beyond domestic jurisdiction is made up mostly of other domestic jurisdictions. A policy towards this outer world is therefore in large part about what goes on, or may go on, within these other domestic jurisdictions. Reciprocally, it follows that other governments must have policies relating to what goes on, or may go on, within one’s own domestic jurisdiction. Foreign policy as a whole is then substantially about what goes on within the domestic jurisdictions of other governments. It must therefore be the case that foreign policy is not only about conduct directed towards external jurisdictions but is also about conduct within those other internal jurisdictions, which is part of the material of other foreign policies and which not only affects them but is also affected by them.

From this, it can be stated that much domestic policy, both within one sovereign state and within other sovereign states, is thus logically a concern of ‘foreign policy’. In this sense, this definition of foreign policy contradicts itself because it contains terms whose effect is to destroy the distinction it intends to make plain. Given this, the wall dividing domestic and foreign policy collapses. Foreign policy cannot be a program aimed at the achievement of an external objective only. It should contain many programs of varying degrees of clarity and obscurity, open and covert, many of whose objectives are both internal and external at the same time. It likewise follows that there can be no single motive for framing foreign policy as such, since foreign policy cannot be reduced to a specific domestic or external activity, although the specific policy may warrant certain

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5 ibid.
7 ibid.
emphasis and priority in the minds of decision makers.⁸

Motivation Defined

Any act includes perception, decision and performance, which are often elusive and difficult to document. The concept of motive can tie them all together, and this is true both for the individual and the state.⁹ Although a government’s foreign policy can be presented in many and diverse ways, it is nonetheless possible that there exists a motive pattern—a sequence of behaviour characterised by consistency of goal orientation and policy direction¹⁰ in a government’s foreign policy deliberation.

From this, foreign policy motivation can be defined as:

a) the central foundation (perception, values, belief system, leadership personality and external constraints) and impulse of a given foreign policy, which encapsulates diverse group activities presented as a single foreign policy articulation; and

b) a mental inclination and readiness of the political leadership, in which efforts and resources are organised to take actions towards objectives,¹¹ with cognisance of processes essential to their achievement.¹²

Definition a) suggests the inherent complexity of foreign policy motivation because of

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⁸ ibid.
¹⁰ ibid. pp. 56-58
¹¹ ibid. pp. 74-75
its reference to mental tendencies and willingness.\textsuperscript{13} Definition b) emphasises its choice to preparative and promotional acts which help mobilise energy to achieving goals.\textsuperscript{14}

In commenting on these two definitions about motivation, Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin note that the 'motivated state' of the actors is in response to needs and tensions arising in the operating settings which impel the actors to seek actions for policy satisfaction.\textsuperscript{15} Necessarily, these needs will not be simple and separate, but complex and grouped in a system. Tensions are relative and a minimum level is always present.\textsuperscript{16} They believe that these definitions also imply that one course of action may be the result of several motives, and one motive may lead to several courses of action, too.\textsuperscript{17} Causation is larger than motivation. They stress that foreign policy motivation and behaviour of a given country can be fluid, variegated, interactive and sometimes contradictory. The psychological, cultural and systemic state of leadership's preference to act and their political willingness to adopt necessary decisions in motivation process remain a focus of major interest to this thesis.

**Realist Approaches**

Although there were many schools of realism, all realists shared the same core value of 'state' and 'power' in the international relations. And despite rhetorical opposition to motivation analysis, realist schools did not omit foreign policy motivation. Instead they

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{ibid.} pp. 406-407
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{ibid.} These mediating processes of motivation, in effect, account for the interaction of the actors and the stimuli which form part of a particular situation. The response of actors would be expressed in the tendency to acquire certain objectives and to seek their achievement.
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{ibid.} pp. 141-143
made simplified and crude assumptions about it—the realist concept of power provided them with an all-inclusive motivation for every government’s foreign policy.

There were at least three basic assumptions by realist schools. First, states were seen as primary actors in world politics because they made the crucial decisions with the aim of furthering their own state interests. Realism typically insisted on a continuity of international behaviour with the state at the forefront of interaction, at least since the beginning of the modern state system in 1648. Second, the state system was anarchic—meaning that no global government was superior to the states and states did not subordinate their self-interests to the good of humanity or any supranational culture. Third, states were rational actors chiefly engaged in enhancing power and pursuing security interests.

These three basic assumptions were the start and end points of understanding foreign policy motivation in realist schools of international relations. Closely related to state supremacy was the realist concept of power, which was defined by Singer, for example, as the ability to get others to do what they would not otherwise have done and to prevent them from doing the same to you. Or, alternatively, it was defined as national interest. The basic rationale of this realpolitik dictated, then, that power would be most avidly pursued when it was vital to influence others or to minimise their influence on

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19 ibid.
22 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979, pp. 58-87)
you—and it was often narrowed down to imply naked military coercion to the highest form of power.

Although the concept of state and security motives were no doubt important in any country’s foreign policy, they were far from being inclusive in describing the range of state behaviour. Realism’s emphasis on power enhancement as the end product and the sole goal of state efforts denied the possibility of states’ diverse motivation in the international systems. World politics in the 1990s has clearly showed that it was misleading to say that states merely responded to those situations that could enhance their power, because, as Most and Starr pointed out, that gave far too much weight to the ‘opportunity’ to do so and relatively little to the ‘willingness’ dimension.

The realists, explicitly or implicitly, used the individual as analogue. Collective man appeared to be interested in exercising optimal influence in interstate relations just as individual man did in interpersonal relations. For example, George F. Abbott contended, in commenting on Thucydides’ approach to the Peloponnesian Wars, that under all surface diversities, mankind possessed the same attributes, mental and moral, either 2,500 years ago or today in the twentieth century. The external conditions varied only within limits. Hence it followed that, by studying the present, the past could be understood and the future anticipated, since the factors shaping history—circumstances and human nature—did not change in essence. The future would, in effect, repeat the

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23 Conventional wisdom equated power with the ability to influence others. But at least two other concepts—force and authority—were frequently used more or less interchangeably with that of power. Robert Dahl designated such concepts as influence, deterrence, persuasion, coercion and compulsion to add to the list. See Robert Dahl ‘Power’ in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: The Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1968, pp. 405-418)


This single-minded power driven motivation was given its most extreme expression by William Riker. He noted that: "What the rational political man wants, I believe, is to win, and this is a much more specific and specifiable motive than the desire for power." This belief in motivational monocausality and universality constituted the theoretical parameters of realist schools in their understanding of world politics. Foreign policy motivation was therefore assumed and given simple treatment as being power-driven and about power-fulfilment.

Given this motivational simplicity and immutability, realist schools clearly pointed to a simple power determinism in which behaviour flowed inexorably from the relative power potential of various actors. If the "strong do what they can and the weak do what they must", weak powers would naturally seek to appear morally self-righteous as an obvious defensive device. Strong powers, capable of expanding their influence, were likely to wrap this national-interest objective in ideological garb such as fascism, Marxism, or even liberalism—the process of 'nationalistic universalism'.

Realists thus focused narrowly on gross patterns of foreign policy behaviour and paid little attention to the individual state's decision process or personal inputs to deduce foreign policy motivation. Realist schools often sought to produce grand theories which
relied on the concept of national power as the underlying explanation for foreign policy behaviour, but which did not investigate motivation, a step that would have given much credibility to such theories.

However, realist notion of national power itself was not a single concept. As Hans Morgenthau conceded, realism included such unknowable and unmeasurable elements as ‘national character’, ‘national morale’, ‘the quality of diplomacy’, and ‘the quality of government’.32 Ultimately, Morgenthau admitted that the calculation of national power was “an ideal task but incapable of achievement”.33 Therefore, ‘power’ could mean different things and matter in different ways to different countries, regimes and cultures. For example, in the period leading up to the World War II, politicians of Britain and the USSR could not anticipate Hitler’s moves that repeatedly refused to conform to the realist formula of balance of power.

Later, when neorealism suggested the utility of a system-level approach to understanding international politics, it did not change the notion in realism that the state, as a unitary operator whose status was defined primarily by the distribution of power or capabilities, remained the core explanatory variable.34 Exemplified by the writings of Kenneth Waltz, unit-level analysis of the factors internal to the state was omitted. In his book *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz argued that realism was a theory of the market, not the firm.35 He viewed states as unitary, purposive actors whose internal characteristics did not vary, just as micro-economists assumed the unitary, rational, undifferentiated nature of firms. He went on to defend his neglect of unit-level analysis

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as a conscious and necessary choice:

...The behaviour and practice of states and of statesmen are omitted from international-political theory not because of their unimportance but because their exclusion from the systems structure requires a distinct theory dealing with the politics and policies of states. I see something problematic about this only for those who think that domestic and international politics must be combined in one theory...The theoretical separation of domestic and international politics need not bother us unduly.\(^{36}\)

However, at a practical level, the realist schools suggested how problematic the disjunction of their state- and power-based assumptions of the systemic theory were. For example, Hans Morgenthau, while rejecting the study of perception and motivation of statesmen as unknowable, nevertheless paid a great deal of attention in *Politics Among Nations* to drawing distinctions between the motivation and cultures of various states and the international implications of the rise of nationalism within them.\(^{37}\) And as Inis Claude observed, Morgenthau's preemptive position in realist scholarship gave him a psychological advantage and great influence in the motivation debate.\(^{38}\) Similarly, Kenneth Waltz, too, ultimately succumbed to explanations of international behaviour in terms of subunit-level phenomena.\(^{39}\) Ironically, then, the realists' choice to omit unit-level variables was undone by the analysis of their own theoreticians.

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\(^{35}\) Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979, pp. 71-73)
\(^{39}\) Kenneth Waltz, 'Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics' Robert Keohane ed. *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 333-334), where the nonexercise of power was explained by a lack of concern by the state's officials instead of state itself.
Liberal Approaches

Within domestic society, liberalism as a domestic ideology largely restricted the role of government to legislation, law enforcement and adjudication. In the society of states, by contrast, given that no supemational government existed, nor was there an economic order to obey the self-equilibrating laws of nature, liberalism believed that foreign policy, or indeed any policy, should be based on moral justification, economic utility and harmony of interests.\(^40\)

Like realism, liberalism did not directly address foreign policy motivation issues. The relevance of liberalism to this subject was mainly expressed through its challenges to realist power politics. From a theoretical point of view, the liberal philosophy presented a departure from those realists who denied that morality possessed any authority in the realm of international affairs. As discussed earlier in this chapter, realists insisted that the pursuit of national interest provided the only legitimate guide to conduct in an autonomous political realm of foreign policy. All too often the national interest was identified with an uninhibited pursuit of national security and of national economic advantages. Contrary to this, liberals argued that, as a general principle, foreign policy must be founded on moral considerations, although they differed in what morality actually required.\(^41\) Because of its basic values, liberalism was rejected by some on the ground that its strong commitment to moral equality was simply irrelevant to the

\(^{40}\) Jeremy Bentham wrote three major essays on international affairs: 'Objects of International Law', 'War Considered in Respect of Its Causes and Consequences', and 'A Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace'. These
conduct of foreign affairs.

From a practical point of view, however, liberal governments often subscribed to the same policies which the realists would favour, and often these were accomplished by violation of liberal principles.\(^4^2\) It was therefore open to speculate that many liberals who employed moral language were in fact realists, and especially so about international affairs.\(^4^3\) Marshall Cohen observed that Hobbes and the realists were correct when they argued that in the international realm, moral language could only be used ideologically and strategically, but there was little doubt that it often was so used.\(^4^4\) Many who availed themselves of moral language were certainly indifferent to moral considerations or actively sceptical about their pertinence to international affairs.\(^4^5\)

Another major theoretical difference between liberalism and realism was the liberals’ commitment to universal application of its basic principles in national and international arenas, while the realists concluded that nations acted not on ethical but on political grounds, and that the conduct of international affairs was exempt from morality.\(^4^6\) In the naked power supremacy tradition, it was maintained by many realist theorists that nations existed in a state of nature, and that in a state of nature there could be neither justice nor injustice because there lacked a sovereign whose commands established right and wrong. Viewed from this theory, in international politics, the ultimate goal of a

\(^{41}\) Colin Gray and Keith Payne, ‘Victory Is Possible’ *Foreign Policy* (Vol. 39, Summer 1980, p. 21)


\(^{43}\) pp. 70-73

\(^{44}\) ibid.

\(^{45}\) ibid.

\(^{46}\) Michael Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs’ *Philosophy & Public Affairs* (Vol. 12, Nos. 3 & 4, Summer and Fall 1983, pp. 218-236)
government's foreign policy was to enhance its power in order to survive and to create conditions for extending such survival. Such a theory left little room for pursuing a liberal foreign policy.

Basic Values

The classic version of liberalism was a continuation and elaboration of the major themes of the Enlightenment with such concepts as equality, rationality, liberty and property. The reformulation of the old idea of the moral equality of man into more abstract social, economic and human rights at the turning of the eighteenth century lay at the heart of John Locke's political philosophy of government, Immanuel Kant's idea of autonomy and John Stuart Mill's opposition to coercion even of nonautonomous actions, as long as such actions were compatible with the autonomous functioning of other individuals. Essential to liberalism were the moral criticism of dictatorship, arbitrary power, intolerance, repression, persecution, lawlessness and the suppression of individuals by entrenched orthodoxies.

The basic assumptions of different versions of liberalism were that a liberal state should a) be guided by values that reflected a plurality of conceptions of a good life; b) guarantee the freedom and equality of its citizens; and c) maintain a just distribution of the goods its citizens needed to pursue their conceptions of a good life. And it was assumed that citizens not only could but also should make decisions for themselves about the conceptions of a good life as they acted autonomously within the private

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The basic liberal values were then identified as pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, enabling individuals and states to live autonomously. The aim of liberalism was to create and maintain political institutions that fostered these values and, through them, autonomy.51

Challenges from Neoliberalism

The most powerful challenge to realism/neorealism was mounted by neoliberal institutionalists, who brought liberalism closer to the discourse of international politics and injected new life into the liberal tradition. The term 'neoliberalism' distinguished itself from earlier varieties of liberalism, such as commercial liberalism, republican liberalism, and sociological liberalism.52 The immediate intellectual precursors of neoliberalism were theories of international regimes.53

As discussed in the previous section, various schools of realists emphasised power, international anarchy, reliance on self-help, the utility of military force, and the importance of balance of power calculations. Likewise, various liberals emphasised international economic interdependence, international law and institutions, international communication, and societal norms.

49 Ludwig von Mises, Liberalism (San Franciscio: Cobden Press, 1985, pp. 10-14)
50 ibid.
51 ibid.
Chapter One

Perhaps the closest counterpart of the modern debate between realism and neoliberalism was found in the works of some of the French philosophers at the end of the eighteenth century. These works attacked almost all the assumptions embraced by realists by espousing the concepts of a world civilisation and world citizenship, promoting the idea of the primacy of domestic affairs over foreign affairs, denouncing military alliances, and disputing the theory that maintaining the balance of power could ensure peace.\textsuperscript{54} They emphasised the mutual interests of states and advocated free trade which, they argued, would help prevent war.\textsuperscript{55}

In the early twentieth century Woodrow Wilson propagated the idea that free trade could promote peace if there was an international organisation to promote the same goal.\textsuperscript{56} The period between the two world wars in the first half of this century was described by William Fox as characterised by the assumption of an underlying harmony of international interests coupled with a belief that improved understanding and international institutions could rid the world of the scourge of war.\textsuperscript{57} However this optimism was tarnished by the invasion of Manchuria, the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, and the failure of League of Nations' sanctions against Italy, which planted the seeds for the resurgence of modern realism.\textsuperscript{58}

Although two fundamental concepts used by both neoliberalists and neorealists were

\textsuperscript{54} Joseph Nye, 'Neorealism and Neoliberalism' \textit{World Politics} (Vol. 40, January 1988, pp. 241-242)


\textsuperscript{56} Filex Gilbert said: "intellectually, a straight line leads from the enlightenment to Wilson's concept. His ideas about a 'new diplomacy' were definitely dependent on and influenced by the ideas which the eighteenth century had developed on this subject." Filex Gilbert, 'The 'New Diplomacy' of the Eighteenth Century' \textit{World Politics} (Vol. 4, October 1951, p. 37)

\textsuperscript{57} William Fox, 'Interwar International Relations Research: The American Experience' \textit{World Politics} (Vol. 2, 1949, pp. 67-79)
anarchy and power, they had different connotations to each of them. During the 1970s and 1980s, the debate between neorealism and liberal institutionalism began to take more definite shape. Three especially important works on the liberal side were ‘Transnational Relations and World Politics’ by Keohane and Nye in the special issue of *International Organisation* in 1971; Keohane and Nye’s *Power and Interdependence* in 1977; and ‘International Regimes’ by Krasner on the special issue of *International Organisation* in 1982. The first raised the questions about the state-centric focus of realism and discussed such non-state actors as the Roman Catholic Church, the Ford Foundation, and multinational business enterprises. In the second, Keohane and Nye explicitly challenged realism with respect to the state-as-actor assumption, the relative importance of military security on foreign policy agenda, the role of military force in international politics, and the replacement of power resources among issue areas. In the third, Stephen Krasner discussed and compared both realist and liberal views on international cooperation and institutions.

The following six points not only summarise the terms of debate between neoliberalism and neorealism, but also highlight the terms of reference to foreign policy motivation from a liberal’s perspective.

i) The Nature and Consequences of Anarchy

Although neither side denied that the international system was anarchical in some sense, there was disagreement as to what this meant and why it mattered. Arthur Stein distinguished between the ‘independent decision making’ that characterised anarchy and

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the ‘joint decision making’ in international regimes, and then suggested that it was the self interests of autonomous states in a state of anarchy that led them to create international regimes.\(^5^9\) Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane emphasised the importance of anarchy defined as the absence of government but argued that this constant feature of world politics permitted a variety of patterns of interaction among states.\(^6^0\) Helen Milner identified the “discovery of orderly features of world politics amidst its seeming chaos” as “perhaps the central achievement of neorealists”, but she indicated that the idea of anarchy was overemphasised while interdependence was neglected.\(^6^1\) Duncan Snidal viewed Prisoner's Dilemma situations as examples of the realist conception of anarchy, while Grieco associated Prisoner's Dilemma with neoliberalism.\(^6^2\) In general, neorealists saw anarchy as placing more severe constraints on state behaviour than did neoliberalists.

ii) International Cooperation

Although both sides agreed that international cooperation was possible, they differed as to the ease and likelihood of its occurrence. According to Grieco, neorealists viewed international cooperation as “harder to achieve, more difficult to maintain, and more dependent on state power”\(^6^3\) than did the neoliberalists.

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iii) Relative vs Absolute Gains

Although it would be misleading to characterise one side as concerned only with relative gains and the other as concerned only with absolute gains, the neoliberals stressed the absolute gains from international cooperation, while the neorealists emphasised relative gains.

Stein depicted the liberal view of self-interest as one in which actors with common interests tried to maximise their absolute gains.64 Lipson suggested that relative gain consideration was likely to be more important in security matters than in economic affairs.65 Grieco contended that neoliberal institutionalism was preoccupied with actual or potential absolute gains from international cooperation and overlooked the importance of relative gains. He suggested that “the fundamental goal of states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities.”66 Snidal disputed the neorealist contention that concerns about relative gains inhibited cooperation except in the special case of bipolar relationships between states preoccupied with relative gains. He also suggested that the distinction between relative and absolute gains was not as clear-cut as it might seem. The relative gain problem could be stated in terms of trade-offs between long and short-term absolute gains.67 This view was echoed by Keohane, acknowledging that neoliberal institutionalists underestimated the importance of relative gains in world politics under certain

65 Charles Lipson, 'International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs' World Politics (Vol. 37, October 1984, pp. 15-18)
conditions. The important thing, according to Keohane, was to specify those conditions. He noted that this might be difficult since the behaviour of states pursuing relative gains might be very similar to the behaviour of states pursuing absolute gains.68

iv) Priority of State Goals

Neoliberals agreed that both national security and economic welfare were important. Lipson argued that international cooperation was more likely in economic issue areas than in those concerning military security. Powell constructed a model intended to bridge the gap between the neoliberal emphasis on economic welfare and the neorealist emphasis on security. In his model, states were assumed to be trying to maximise their economic welfare in a world where military force was a possibility.69 For the most part, neorealists or neoliberals treated state goals by assumption. As Keohane pointed out, neither was good at predicting interests.70

v) Intentions vs Capabilities

The classical realist Hans Morgenthau depicted concern about the motives of statesmen as a fallacious way to understand foreign policy. Instead he advocated assuming that statesmen “think and act in terms of interest defined as power”,71 which would enable analysts to understand the actions and thoughts of statesmen better. Although

69 Robert Powell, In the Pursuit of Power and Plenty (Berkeley: University of California, 1991)
contemporary neorealists were unlikely to take such an extreme position, they were likely to emphasise capabilities more than intentions. Grieco was of the view that uncertainties about the future intentions and interests of other states led statesmen to pay close attention to capabilities, "the ultimate basis for their security and independence." \(^7^2\)

In a similar vein, Krasner criticised the neoliberals for overemphasising intentions, interests and information, but underemphasising the distribution of capabilities.\(^7^3\)

Keohane argued that the sensitivity of states to the relative gains of other states was significantly influenced by perceptions of the intentions of such states. Thus states worried more about relative gains of enemies than of allies.\(^7^4\) Stein explained international regimes in terms of the pattern of preferences of member states. In Stein's analysis, capabilities counted only insofar as they affected the preference and intentions of states.\(^7^5\)

vi) Institutions and Regimes

Both neorealists and neoliberals recognised the number of international regimes and institutions that had emerged after 1945. They differed, however, with respect to the significance given to such arrangements. "Much of the contemporary debate," according to Keohane, "centers on the validity of the institutionalist claim that international

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\(^7^3\) Stephen Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier" *World Politics* (Vol. 43, April 1991, pp. 336-366)


\(^7^5\) Arthur Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration Regimes in an Anarchic World" *International Organisation* (Vol. 36, Spring 1982, pp. 299-324)
regimes, and institutions more broadly, have become significant in world politics.\(^76\)

The neorealists agreed that this was an important point of contention. They believed that neoliberals exaggerated the extent to which international institutions were able to “mitigate anarchy’s constraining effects on inter-state cooperation.”\(^77\)

These six points show that it was obvious that liberalism/neoliberalism and realism/neorealism were not at opposite ends of a spectrum. In practice, these two main theoretical schools were not sharply demarcated. Rather, they interacted and overlapped. Sometimes it was difficult to determine where realism ended and where liberalism began.

**Marxist Approaches**

Classical Marxist theory was considered to be inadequate or insufficient by mainstream international relations theorists for the task of explaining global politics\(^78\) for one simple reason: it did not take inter-state relations as the primary focus of its theories. Instead, Marxist theory took class as a basic analytical unit in presenting its own methodology, namely that of historical materialism by using the dialectics both as a form of logic and as a crucial tool in the analysis of society through time.\(^79\)

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For Marx, politics was merely a function of economics. Classical Marxist tradition accorded such prominence to economic determination that other motivational factors were almost omitted. Marx viewed the state apparatus itself as no more than a reflection of the balance of economic classes in society. Marx saw the political system and the state as part of the ‘superstructure’ built upon the economic ‘base’. In almost all of his major works, Marx articulated the recurrent thesis that the state was only an instrument of class rule and political conflict was a manifestation of class struggle—be it between classes or within the class. For Marx, the economic conditions determined the balance of political forces in the struggle for state power as well as the institutional structure of the state over which political struggle was waged.

In this sense, Marxism was fundamentally revolutionary, not so much because of the concerns to which it drew attention, but because it did not accept the traditional state-centric model of world politics.

However, although Marxist theory did not adopt state as the focal point of its theory, it developed a notion of man and international relations, which insisted on placing man, history, state and relations of production within a ‘world historical’ context. Therefore, an ‘intra-national’, if not an ‘inter-state’, perspective was arguably central to the theory.
Chapter One

of Marx and Engels. In defending the relevance of Marxism to international relations, Howard Williams contended that Marx's political theory was inherently an international theory, because what Marx and Engels offered was a theory of international relations, with its philosophical, methodological and conceptual foundation based in historical materialism. Martin Shaw bolstered this view by stating that both Marx, and particularly Engels, concerned themselves with the central problems for international relations—peace and war.

The third of the trinity of classical Marxism was Leninism. Lenin's work on imperialism seemed to bring Marxism closer to the discipline of traditional international relations. Lenin used concepts formulated and articulated by Marx and Engels to discuss the integration of industrial and financial capital and to explain the consequent division of the world by the great powers. For Lenin, imperialism was the monopoly and last stage of capitalism. His work on imperialism formed the intellectual baseline for later theorists to explore the interrelationship of capital and class on an international scale. Lenin showed a much clearer perception of the nation state and its behaviour. He didn't further elaborate on it because he saw it as a temporary phenomenon, likely to be gone by 1930.

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87 *ibid.*
89 Vladimir Ilich Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982)
92 *ibid.*
However, it was the essential denial of the primacy of the state as the basic unit of analysis that put the Marxist perspective into a category of international relations theory on its own. The Marxist contribution to the understanding of foreign policy motivation theory could be appreciated in its broadest context. This included the dialectical historical materialism paradigm and class as the basic unit of analysis.

**Historical Materialism Paradigm**

Fundamental to Marxism were its materialist philosophy and its emphasis on materialism, rather than nationalism or idealism, as the basis of society. Marx opposed Hegel’s idealist philosophy which stressed the motive force of ideas in society, seeing history as a series of existence determined by different modes of comprehending the world; or that social reality was ancillary to the mind. Marx, on the other hand, strenuously argued that it was the other way around, with the existence of matter being independent of human consciousness. In other words, one’s consciousness was substantially determined by the objective conditions of social and material existence. In Marx’s own words:

> The mode of production of material life conditions the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of man that determines their existence but, on the contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness.\(^95\)

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\(^93\) The word “paradigm” has developed a range of meanings as Lakatos and Musgrave in their *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971) pointed out. For the purpose of this analysis, Rosenau’s interpretation was used: “A general orientation towards all events, a point of view or a philosophy about the way the world is.” See James Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (New York: Nichols Publishing Co. 1980, p. 107)


\(^95\) *ibid.* p. 84
In international relations, the Marxist tradition was primarily treated as an ideology in the formation of the foreign policies of some countries. In the true spirit of Marxism, to reduce its theories to a system of ideas in order to rationalise and justify a foreign policy process or the emergence of revolutionary movements was fundamentally against Marx's basic principles. Paradoxically, for a long time, the heritage of Marxism was treated as a dogma by its believers in countries with a socialist system, notably the former USSR and China. The international relations literature in China, for example, thus concerned itself largely with explaining the relationship between Marxist-Leninist thought and foreign policy. This literature utilised Marxist approaches to develop ideological perspectives which shaped both domestic and foreign policy.96

Class as a Basic Analytic Unit

As mentioned earlier, one of the fundamental differences between Marxism and realism was classical Marxist theory's emphasis on the basic unit of analysis being class, not nation.

But giving class such a distinctive status in Marxist theoretical deliberation was itself an historical phenomenon. When Marx recognised the immense growth of productive forces unleashed by the Industrial Revolution, which was accompanied by rapid polarisation of society, he was more concerned with conflicting class interests than with the nation itself. The dominant class, the bourgeoisie, made strong by industrialisation,

was responsible not only for intensifying exploitation because of the increased opportunities, but also for constantly expanding the overseas markets for its products. Above all, this class, while stoutly retaining its national identity, had “through its exploitation of the world market, given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country.”97 On the other hand, a new class of proletarians was born out of this process, whereby,

Big business created everywhere the same relations between the classes of society, and has destroyed the peculiar individuality of the various nationalities...while the bourgeoisie of each nation still retained separate national interest, big industry created a class, which in all nations has the same industry and within which nationality is already dead.98

Two features could be drawn from this: a) the transnational characteristic of class, especially that of the proletariat, which led Marx provocatively to state that, as the human victims of capitalism, it knew no particular country; and b) the interdependence of nations. The implication of these two features was in complete contradiction to the realist framework of nation-states. By adding to class the observation of the transnational and international characteristics of capital and its immutable link with the capitalist state and the development of imperialism, the essential framework of the traditional Marxist paradigm of international relations was made. This was a framework of a dialectic relationship among production, class, capital and the state which was an effect of class, and not its cause.99

97 Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1972, p. 83)
Classical Marxist tradition never directly addressed the theory of international relations, nor did it specifically mention foreign policy motivation. As discussed above, although Marx formulated the theories of a world capitalist system and of a world market, and later Lenin developed Marx’s thought into theories of imperialism and of world revolution, neither of them articulated a well-argued theory of international relations. This was probably due to the fact that only at the turn of this century did international relations become a separate teaching and research discipline.

Classical Marxism was a structured attempt to understand the dynamics of the social system that encompassed the world. As Martin Wight observed, in terms of the debates between three groups of thinkers: the Machiavellians, the Grotians and the Kantians, the traditional Marxist perspective represented a fundamentally different choice. In this context, Marxist tradition occupied a unique place to the extent that the theoretical concepts developed by Machiavelli and Kant and used so extensively by subsequent realist and liberal scholars needed to be amended to account for it.

In the Marxist tradition, it was only at a superficial and transient level that international politics was about relations among states; at a deeper level it was about relations among the human beings of which states were composed. “The ultimate reality was the community of mankind, which existed potentially; even if it did not exist actually, and

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100 Martin Wight, Power Politics ed. by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (Leicester : Leicester University Press, 1978, pp. 151-153)
was destined to sweep the system of states into limbo."\(^{101}\)

The above discussion clearly suggested that the Marxist tradition rejected psychological moods, ideas or moral principles as the determining factors in international relations.\(^{102}\)

It could therefore be inferred that classical Marxism would also reject taking these elements as parameters in determining foreign policy motivation of a government.

**Conclusion**

This chapter first set out the terms of reference for both 'foreign policy' and 'motivation' in this thesis. By definition, foreign policy motivation in this study referred to persistent mental inclination and political will of government leaders to take actions towards achieving their foreign policy objectives.

This chapter then examined the three main schools of political thought—realism, liberalism and Marxism. Particular attention was given to their possible reference to foreign policy motivation. It concluded that although all of these schools gave some consideration to the motivation of international actors, be it individuals, nations or classes, the fundamental theoretical assumptions of their approaches precluded a need to further investigate motivation issues. The realist supremacy of state and power, the liberal moral standards and notion of freedom, and the Marxist emphasis on class and historical materialism were boundaries where classical approaches to the question of motivation of states ended. The theoretical paradigms of these three schools of thought

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fundamentally rejected the value of foreign policy motivation study, and their methodologies did not easily accommodate alternative ways of elaborating the subject.

Chapter Two

Three Alternative Approaches Addressing Motivation

The previous chapter outlined the theories of three major schools of political thought (realism, liberalism and Marxism) and their influence on international studies. Special attention was given to their treatment of foreign policy motivation. The chapter revealed the inherent limits and problems of the realist, liberalist and Marxist approaches in developing their theoretical premises and prototypes.

The task of this chapter is to widen the investigation of motivation beyond the approaches taken in the classical schools of international relations. This chapter will address more comprehensive approaches to the study of foreign policy motivation, and will identify motivation elements potentially important to the study of Chinese foreign policy in particular. Since the list of all the motives of all participants under all circumstances in foreign policy decisionmaking process is almost inexhaustible—a task far beyond the scope of this study—this chapter focuses only on those essential building blocks which are considered to have the most direct impact on foreign policy motivation. This will be achieved by examining the works of a group of scholars using different methodological imperatives in their research agenda.

Contrary to the classical approaches, which tended to treat foreign policy motivation as monolithic and a simple analytical unit, the approaches revealed in this chapter explored the basic components of foreign policy motivation by breaking down this abstract concept into manageable and tangible parts for further investigation. In other words, the approaches move beyond simple mon causative and rational traditions to examine
foreign policy motivation by emphasising its complexity and diversity.

Foreign policy motivation is, above all, a process, and many factors contribute to its formation and presentation. However, only those basic elements which are identified to represent the major research contributions to the study of foreign policy motivation are to be contested in this chapter. Or more specifically, three basic determinants of motivation (perception, personality and structural/situational constraints), which are considered to be most relevant to the inquiries of this thesis, are selected for analysis in this chapter. The theoretical sustainability and viability of these three propositions in the study of Chinese foreign policy motivation will be tested in the subsequent analysis of this thesis.

Perception

Perception is not a new concept to the long quest of human beings to understand themselves. Many profound thinkers in history attempted to develop a comprehensive idea of perception. Aristotle, for example, was among the first to explore the nature of perception. He formulated the idea of laws of association in an attempt to explain how some ideas were linked together in memory while others were discarded.¹ Today the important role of perception has been widely studied in many disciplines. As Lloyd Kaufman predicted, “the future will have a science of perception as one of its cornerstones.”²

To many, the meaning and understanding of perception appeared simple and obvious, but to grasp its essence often required critical discipline. Although many scholars have conceded that perception had an important role in international relations study, only few actually applied it to foreign policy motivation analysis.

In the opening sentence of his book *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Robert Jervis asked a simple yet important question: Did the decision makers' perceptions matter? He argued that it was often impossible to explain crucial policies and behaviours without reference to the decision makers’ beliefs about the world and their images of others. He believed that this level of analysis was necessary because decision makers in the same situations behaved differently, due to their different perceptions of the world in general and of other actors in particular. How was perception linked with motivation? Jervis contended that the cognitive process of perception was part of the proximate cause of the relevant motivation, which other levels of analysis could not replace.

To fully appreciate Jervis’ comment, it would be necessary to first address a preliminary question in the context of foreign policy motivation—what is perception?

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5 *ibid.* p. 28
6 *ibid.* pp. 25-31
Chapter Two

What Is Perception?

Perception study in international relations has essentially been concerned with the psychodynamics of individuals, groups or nations in the day-to-day exercise of their autonomy which must take into consideration the total environment.\textsuperscript{7} Perceptions were formed by subjective and objective variables, both conscious and unconscious. Some scholars, such as David Winter, conceded that subjective inputs to the formation of perception were very complex and were jointly determined by processes that could not always be lucidly and precisely explained.\textsuperscript{8} The key to understanding perception was that people projected their own interpretation, meaning and structure onto an experience, which was itself the outcome of the previous round of similar processes. Perception, therefore, was as much influenced by a subjective as by an objective mechanism.\textsuperscript{9} In other words, people designated meanings to their experience, and not the other way round. Perceptions were also strongly influenced by expectations.\textsuperscript{10} When the environment did not conform to expectations, new information that disagreed with beliefs was frequently ignored or dismissed, resulting in further misperceptions.\textsuperscript{11} Another important characteristic of perception was that once formed, it acquired a strong inertia which was not easily compromised.

From this observation, it could be understood that although people were always confronted with a great amount of information and the task to observe and classify that information, only a select few would become the ‘facts’ through perception filters. Facts

\textsuperscript{8} ibid.
\textsuperscript{9} ibid. pp. 156-161
\textsuperscript{10} ibid.
did not emerge naturally from reality, but were screened pieces of information gleaned from reality because they were considered important.\textsuperscript{12} People's understanding of reality did not flow directly from the nature of reality itself. Knowledge, therefore, possessed both subjective and objective components. Facts were subjectively defined on the basis of previously held perceptions which had themselves been formed at a much more fundamental level.\textsuperscript{13} Therefore, a fact could be said to be a selected ordering of reality used to support a particular theory.

In this sense, perceptions could be construed as the first and basic line of reaction when one undertook to judge and interact with others and the outside world. Also in this sense, perceptions could be understood not to become policies in themselves. Rather they provided the cognitive link in the motivation chain upon which decisions and policies were conceived, and at times they reacted directly with these decisions and policies.

\textit{The Role of Perception in Foreign Policy}

As foreshadowed in the Introduction, while the importance of perception in foreign policy decisionmaking was widely acknowledged, study of the role of perception was often avoided by scholars because of its elusive nature. Robert Jervis was one among the few who announced that he had attempted to explore the decisionmaking process in international politics by utilising all the psychological tools available.\textsuperscript{14} He analysed the foreign policy operational environment not only through his extensive research into

\textsuperscript{12} F. Matthew Bonham and Michael Shapiro eds. \textit{Thought and Action in Foreign Policy} (Basel: Birkhauser Verlag, 1976, pp. 51-53)

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{ibid.} p. 52
diplomatic history, but also, importantly, by assessing the psychological environment of the actors. As a result, he offered the study of politics valuable insights drawn from psychological investigations on attitudinal change, social psychology, cognitive psychology, and visual perception. Through experimental psychological studies at the international politics level, Jervis made an important contribution to the foreign policy motivation studies. He believed that perceptual formulation took place within the process of interactive relationships involving belief systems and the environment as a whole. Nothing should be excluded in such an environment—everything must be considered as a potential input into perceptual formulations.15

While Jervis’ vision of perception study sounded daunting, Richard Cottam undertook a more moderate study of foreign policy motivation. In his book *Foreign Policy Motivation—A General Theory and A Case Study*, the only book exclusively devoted to the study of foreign policy motivation in the existing literature, he defined foreign policy motivation as “a compound of factors that predispose a government and people to move in a decisional direction in foreign affairs.”16 He stressed that the critical word in this definition was ‘predispose’. Cottam’s major contribution to foreign policy motivation study was that he systematically criticised the interpretation of single-minded foreign policy motivation by bringing into his own motivation analysis political, historical, cultural, group and individual dimensions. However, despite his repeated denunciation of the realist version of foreign policy motivation as being simplistic and self-serving, Cottam refused to incorporate analysis of perception of individuals into his

16 Richard Cottam, *Foreign Policy Motivation* (London: Feffer and Simons Inc. 1977, p. 31)
foreign policy motivation inquiry.\textsuperscript{17} He warned the peril of giving motivation a psychological definition and the danger of seeking to include the motivation of individuals into the foreign policy decisionmaking scheme.\textsuperscript{18} In his view, the risk of doing so was that it would put endless probabilities into the often limited analytic process, thereby making it almost impossible to reach a convincing scientific conclusion.\textsuperscript{19}

Despite the obvious differences with Jervis' view on the degree of individual participation, Cottam also laid great emphasis on perception as the central element in forming foreign policy motivation. He believed that the most important requirement for foreign policy formulation was an accurate understanding of the motivation of other governments and peoples, which was rarely articulated by them, if at all. But because of the essential importance of such knowledge in foreign policymaking, the decision makers of a given government had to rely on available information to postulate its counterpart's motivation. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the interpretation of fact itself was very much subject to the previously held perceptions of the interpreters. If that was the case, then it must rely even more on perceptions for a government to speculate other governments' foreign policy motivation. This being the case, Cottam suggested that foreign policy motivation of a government could only be inferred by

\textsuperscript{17} Cottam said that "individual differences can generally be disregarded at the level of foreign policy analysis because they can be included in the larger assumption in nonindividual terms. For example, if a motivating force behind tribal imperialism is the desire for loot, analysts need not look into the range of individual intensities of interest in loot within the tribe." \textit{ibid.} pp. 31-32

\textsuperscript{18} Cottam was quoted as saying that to address motivation in a psychological dimension was 'self-defeating' and "underscores the pessimism of those who see no promise in this approach." See William Ganson and Andre Modigliani, \textit{Untangling the Cold War} (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971, pp. 22-24)

\textsuperscript{19} However, Cottam did concede that some very important individual's role, like that of Adolf Hitler's and Winston Churchill's, in directing foreign policy, "must be looked at separately and individually", but he did not believe that "individual motives and motives ascribed to a collective are sufficiently parallel to be used even homomorphically." Richard Cottam, \textit{Foreign Policy Motivation} (London: Feffer and Simons Inc. 1977, pp. 29-33)
what he called a 'world view,'\textsuperscript{20} or a series of perceptions.

Cottam's study found that a given country's prevailing world view in each decisional area might differ, but it was remarkably consistent and congruent with the choice among policy alternatives that a decisional group made.\textsuperscript{21} Presidential-level and bureaucratic-level policies would differ because implicitly, and only rarely explicitly, they were based on differing estimates of the situation, including especially the intent of governmental friends and adversaries.\textsuperscript{22}

Cottam also strongly believed that from the policy adopted by a given state, one could infer a prevailing perception approximating that held by a hypothetical decision maker. Different perceptions might be held by different leaders or groups of leaders within a country often with the most dominant position being that which was most congenial with the particular foreign policy patterns pursued by the state.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, those individuals or groups having the closest representation to the prevailing perception were taken to be instrumental in policy formulation. The motivation behind a particular policy line could then be inferred from an analysis of the objectives of those actors closest to the decision process.\textsuperscript{24}

To further pursue the relationship between perception and motivation, Cottam's study hypothesised that the perception of threat and of opportunity would affect the images of a decision maker and that the types of decision patterns were the products of these

\textsuperscript{20} Cottam's definition of world view was that construction of reality within which an individual perceived and chose among policy alternatives. \textit{ibid.} p. 10
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{ibid.} pp. 4-11
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{ibid.} pp. 14-25
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{ibid.}
images. He noted that if one country perceived that it was threatened by another country, and if that other country was regarded as approximately equal culturally and in capability, then a stereotyped enemy image would soon surface.\(^\text{25}\) This example showed, he said, that an image in this context possessed three dimensions of perception: threat and opportunity, cultural similarity or difference, and similarity or difference in capability.\(^\text{26}\) Moreover, the greater the intensity of the perception of threat or opportunity, the more inclined the actor was toward stereotyped images.

This finding led Cottam to a more general inquiry into what actually were the makings of perception. In his study, Cottam identified the following five key considerations to be in the perception process. They were:

- economic (population, loot, trade, investments abroad, domestic investments)
- communal (grandeur, participant excitement, frontier dynamics)
- messianic (religious messianism, cultural messianism, ideological messianism)
- governmental (bureaucratic vested interests, military vested interests, domestic personal power drive, external personal power drive)
- and defence\(^\text{27}\)

This list, Cottam argued, was a reasonably inclusive taxonomy of factors, with each having clear connotation of perception, which entered into the compound that formed the predispositional base of foreign policy motivation.\(^\text{28}\)

\(^{24}\) *ibid.* Cottam was contradictory here in his account of the relations between the unitary actor—government, and important individuals in the making of foreign policy motivation.

\(^{25}\) *ibid.* pp. 54-92

\(^{26}\) *ibid.*

\(^{27}\) *ibid.* pp. 31-35

\(^{28}\) *ibid.*
Cottam claimed that his intention in formulating this list was to construct a scheme later in the book for making both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of these ingredients that went into a particular foreign policy motivational compound. However, a ‘motivational compound’ was far more than just a simple sum of its parts. Rather, as Cottam pointed out, it resembled a chemical compound, a dynamic reaction process. Though simplified, he said, the list nevertheless summarised the most relevant factors and saved the motivation research from falling into a dilemma of wrestling with endless possibilities. More precisely, the list eliminated those ‘endless possibilities’ in order to more effectively concentrate on the few more pertinent conditions.

Interestingly, despite his constant warnings of the disastrous consequences of letting the sub-national factors into the analytical process of motivation, Cottam nonetheless suggested that finding out information on who were involved in the foreign policy decisional process, what they said and what they did, would greatly assist to clear the picture about a specific foreign policy motivation of a given country. It seemed that in order to present an adequate perception approach to foreign policy motivation study, Cottam had to address individual perception attributes in addition to his governmental level of analysis, despite his rhetorical criticism to inclusion of such a dimension.

Cottam conceded that the determinants of individuals’ perception were manifold—historical experience, community values, political relevance, role interests

29 ibid. p. 44
30 ibid. p. 43
31 ibid.
and idiosyncratic socialisation patterns.\textsuperscript{32} These factors were all at work, with different intensities, in responding to different times and issues. When an individual was compelled to choose among alternatives in any given situation, only a fraction of the values he/she held would be affected or, in other words, would for that decision have any particular salience.\textsuperscript{33} For example, an individual might be a nationalist and place a primary value on his/her national community, but only the rarest of decisions that individual made would reflect that fact. In day-to-day life, only a fraction of the decisions an average citizen made had any political affiliation after all, even though most individuals held some politically relevant values at the primary intensity level.\textsuperscript{34}

However, for leaders on decisionmaking positions, the simple notion of threat and/or opportunity had much to offer in political value analysis.\textsuperscript{35} Cottam observed that a particular politically relevant value and belief became salient for an individual if he/she perceived either a threat or an opportunity associated with it. Beliefs and experience influenced perception through their relation to expectations and interpretations. Beliefs set up expectations, and experience could either reinforce or reduce them. When an event occurred, individuals were likely to interpret the event in relation to their expectations. These expectations had three prominent effects that were noted: they permitted rapid identification of the expected object or event; they admitted a relatively wide range of objects or events as fulfilling the expectation, a characteristic that produced misidentification as well as identification of the target object; and they might lead to a failure to observe significant nonexpected objects or events. On this issue,
Cottam shared the same view as Jervis' and he provided a number of examples to show how beliefs could influence a person's perception.\footnote{For example, during WWII, British flyers hunting for the German battleship Bismarck bombed a British ship, the Sheffield, by mistake, even though the two ships did not look alike. Similarly, when Washington officials contacted General Walter Short in Pearl Harbour about the need to expect "hostile action", he interpreted the message as referring to sabotage rather than the way it was intended, that of an attack from external sources. This interpretation apparently occurred because sabotage was an issue of concern at Pearl Harbour. Robert Jervis, \textit{Perception and Misperception in International Politics} (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 13-28) \footnote{Richard Cottam, \textit{Foreign Policy Motivation} (London: Feffer and Simons Inc. 1977, p. 46)}}

Based on the five types of underlying considerations of perception, Cottam proposed a 'motivation system' as a structure to assess a given foreign policy motivation. In this system, a number of perceptual elements were present with different intensity. Within each system, the intensity of perceptual patterns decided motivation tendency and they differed in accordance with the order. Since the list of the motivation types could be extended, so the combination of them (motivation systems) could also be formulated on a larger scale.

For example, Cottam took the American foreign policy motivation as seen by a supporter in the mid 1960s. The motivation system thus formed was as followed:

- **A. (1st intensity)** Defence
- **B. (2nd intensity)** Economic vested interests: domestic investments
- **C. (3rd intensity)** National grandeur, cultural messianism\footnote{Richard Cottam, \textit{Foreign Policy Motivation} (London: Feffer and Simons Inc. 1977, p. 46)}

In each system, the nature or orientation of the foreign policy motivation was determined by the factor with dominant intensity, i.e. A. Cottam explained that in this particular system shown above, foreign policy motivation would essentially be seen as

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status-quo, not imperialism. That was because it firstly reflected the belief that American involvement in the affairs of others was primarily for the peace and security of, or ‘defending’, the American people. Second down the list was the economic factor, since a healthy domestic economy was regarded by most American people as a legitimate objective which necessitated a foreign policy to safeguard it. Although there was a concern for the prestige and dignity of the nation, most Americans saw little threat to American prestige and dignity—thus it was conferred a third place in this system. The motivation system allowed generous room for flexibility to accommodate different views and situations in different countries at different times—the elements could be added, reshuffled to form new system orders or be restructured to serve the different intensities.

Despite the apparent fluidity and freedom in the selection and combination of perception, motivational types and motivational systems, and despite the different interpretations which could be placed on a given foreign policy, Cottam argued that his motivation systems had some definite advantages. Although the number of possible combinations of the motivational types was high, he believed that “only a few motivational elements would ever be depicted as being present in three parts, and the element or combination of elements granted would suggest the flavour of the resultant foreign policy.” Most important of all, Cottam insisted that the motivational system approach had immediate utility for dealing with the perceptual base of conflict—it permitted a systematising of the motivational assumptions on which different policy

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38 ibid. pp. 43-46  
39 ibid.  
40 ibid. pp. 43-49  
41 ibid. p. 45. In a variation of intensity, Cottam used 3,2,1 instead A,B,C to indicate the strength. So here he referred 'three parts' to A—the most intense one.
preferences were based.\textsuperscript{42}

Cottam’s study on foreign policy motivation confirmed Jervis’ proposition that perceptions must be inferred if motivation was to be understood at all.\textsuperscript{43} Based on his five perceptual patterns, Cottam further proposed five world views: enemy, allied, complex, imperial, and colonial,\textsuperscript{44} “in response to a perception of threat to or opportunity for something intensely valued which has relevance at the interstate level, most commonly the nation itself.”\textsuperscript{45} These five world views correlated with the perceptual patterns and motivation systems Cottam proposed earlier. And it was these three sets of variables that reacted and interchanged at three layers of policy environment that produced a particular foreign policy motivation.\textsuperscript{46}

\textbf{Personality}

Like perception, personality study of foreign policy has always been a controversial subject. But unlike perception, the personality approach seems to have encountered a more hostile audience in the field of international relations than the treatment of perception, to which both its proponents and opponents disputed in degree rather than substance. Is personality an accountable element of foreign policy motivation study? Or is it just a residual issue with little role in motivational inquiries?

There is no easy answer to these questions. The bureaucratic politics approach rejected

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the importance of personality analysis in the motivation study. The proponents of personality analysis explored how an individual’s particular personality traits could relate to that person’s foreign policy position in a particular political cultural setting, while the bureaucratic approach argued that such analysis might be unnecessary given the possible dominance of organisational position in the system. However, the bureaucratic approach had two distinct weak points. First, it assumed the bureaucratic politics to be the dominant administrative form of government for most states, which was far from being the case. Second, even within a bureaucrat-dominant political system, statistics showed that personality was often used to explain a relatively large percentage of the variance in foreign policy behaviour when a leader had the command of absolute power, or had capacity to allocate resources. This would apply particularly if the leader was the head of a government with ultimate responsibility for foreign policy decisions; when there was an international crisis; when the policy situation was ambiguous and in situations in which vested interests, organisational imperatives and standard operating procedures were in a state of flux. Some studies found that what political leaders were like could vitally influence what government did in the foreign policy arena. These scholars admitted, however, that exactly how personality impacted on government foreign policy decision was not straightforward, especially when different political cultures were taken into account. They also found that the weight of personality in foreign policy differs significantly in different sets of political cultures.

47 ibid.
50 ibid.
This session intends to address the role of personality in foreign policy motivation through analysis of works by Margaret Hermann, Charles Hermann, Richard Snyder and his colleagues.

Margaret Hermann and Charles Hermann

Margaret Hermann was a strong proponent of personality analysis in foreign policy motivation. She believed that the personality approach could shed light on foreign policy study because it could complement the bureaucratic approach.

To prove her point, in her work ‘Personality and Foreign Policy Decision Making’, Hermann first hypothesised that political leaders had an interest in foreign affairs to enhance the effect of their personality on government policy. This interest acted as a motivating force, increasing the attention a leader paid to foreign policy issues and increasing the leader’s participation in making foreign policy decisions. The interested head of government would then want to be consulted on decisions and to be kept informed of developments in foreign affairs.51 Hermann found that the reasons behind a head of government’s interest in foreign policy—political influence, economic and security benefits, value system, desire for a peaceful environment, fear of competitors and enemies, seeing foreign policy as a leverage to strengthen domestic position—might predetermine the course of action such a leader sought to implement.52 With little interest in foreign affairs, heads of government were more likely to delegate authority to their aides and other staff, thereby negating the effect of their personality on the

52 ibid. pp. 62-63
resultant policy.\textsuperscript{53}

Hermann observed that leaders' sensitivity to the policy environment affected the consistency of the relationship between other personal characteristics and foreign policy. This sensitivity, which referred to how important incoming information was to the political leaders in determining what they would try to influence their governments to do, should therefore be treated as an effective indicator in motivation study.\textsuperscript{54} The less sensitive political leaders were to information, the more fixed was the impact of their other personal traits on foreign policy motivation. Such leaders paid less attention to, and were less likely to request, information from the sources that might force them to change their goals and attitudes or the foreign policy strategies they had always used.\textsuperscript{55} In other words, their policy motivation would be largely determined by their habitual rationalisation and tended to be stereotyped.

On the other hand, the more sensitive leaders were to information, the more likely they were to follow what was happening and to seek out data about the changed situation.\textsuperscript{56} Generally, they tended to be more open-minded and willing to adapt to the environment. Sensitive leaders were interested in accommodating themselves to the situation, perceiving that there was often political gain in such a compromise. Thus, the relationships between the more sensitive leaders' personality traits and their foreign policy motivation might be less consistent than those less sensitive leaders.\textsuperscript{57} Hermann also found that as a logical extension, the less sensitive policy makers tended to adjust incoming information to fit a certain set of viewpoints, while the more sensitive policy

\textsuperscript{53} ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} ibid. pp. 71-72
\textsuperscript{55} ibid.
makers attempted to deal with the environment, changing their views if incoming information suggested such adjustment was required.  

In their 1989 joint study of ‘Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry’, Margaret Hermann and Charles Hermann further polished their view on the role of personality in the foreign policy decision process. They observed that if the predominant leaders were the ultimate decision units in a political system, a single individual had the power to make the choice for the government. When such a leader’s position was known, those with differing points of view generally stopped voicing alternative positions either out of respect for the leader or out of fear of political reprisals. In this type of decision unit, to learn about the personality of the dominant leader became particularly important in foreign policy motivation study. The leader’s personal attributes might shape their initial inclinations and determine how they would regard different views and advice from others, and how they would react to information and assess the political risks associated with various actions.

They argued that of particular relevance in explaining a predominant leader’s reaction to a foreign policy problem was knowledge about the leader’s orientation to foreign affairs—his/her composite set of views about how governments should act in the foreign policy arena. This orientation defined the leader’s conception of his/her nation’s role in the world and presupposed a specific political style in dealing with foreign policy.

56 *ibid.* p. 73  
57 *ibid.* pp. 73-74  
58 *ibid.* pp. 74-77  
59 It referred to leaders or ruling parties who had the ability to commit the resources of the government and the power to prevent other entities within the government from reversing their position. Margaret Hermann and Charles Hermann, ‘Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry’ *International Studies Quarterly* (Vol. 33, No. 4, December 1989, p. 365)  
60 *ibid.* p. 367  
61 *ibid.*
problems. Most importantly, orientations indicated how sensitive the leader would be to advice and information when making a foreign policy decision. If a leader’s orientation suggested that he/she had a strong view of the world and used this view as a lens through which to select and interpret incoming information, then the leader was likely to be looking only for cues that confirmed his/her beliefs when making foreign policy decisions. They were guided by their dispositions, taking an ‘inside looking outward’ perspective and selectively using incoming information to support their predispositions.

However, there were predominant leaders whose orientation led them to be sensitive and open to others’ opinions and to incoming information. In this case knowledge of the environment in which the predominant leader was operating helped to predict what the government was likely to do. Because such leaders were more ‘pragmatic’—more guided by the situation and interpersonal influences—the contextual implication must be taken into account. The sensitive leader would want to ascertain where others stood with regard to the problem, to consider how other governments were likely to act, and to examine conflicting information before making decisions. They would tailor their behaviour to fit the demands of the situation.

They concluded that when the ultimate decision unit was a predominant leader, the key question to understand its foreign policy motivation was whether or not the leader’s orientation to foreign affairs would lead him/her to be relatively sensitive or insensitive.

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62 ibid. pp. 361-363
63 ibid.
64 ibid. pp. 364-369
65 ibid.
66 ibid.
67 ibid.
to information from the political environment. If the leader was relatively insensitive, knowledge about the leader’s personality would provide cues about what the government’s foreign policy behaviour was likely to be. The insensitive predominant leader was more or less a self-contained decisionmaking unit. If the leader was more sensitive, then other aspects of the political system needed to be studied in order to suggest what the government was likely to do in terms of foreign policy. In the words of the Hermanns, the sensitive predominant leader “became an externally influenceable decision unit.”

Margaret Hermann also found that the personality of political leaders appeared to have varying degrees of impact on foreign policy motivation according to political cultures. She suggested that Western democratic systems seemed to encourage political leaders to be more open and responsive to information in their foreign policy process, while such an incentive was dampened in the leaders of more authoritarian governments. The strongest relationship between the leaders’ personality and the governments’ foreign policy behaviour was found when sensitivity to information and interest in foreign affairs on the part of the leaders were combined.

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68 ibid.
70 ibid. p. 77. One other work on the importance of the analysis of personality for understanding foreign policy was concerned with those personality traits that may affect perceptions of the policy environment. Lloyd Etheredge generated a typology of the characteristics that might be incorporated into such an analysis—the components including cognitive complexity, tolerance of ambiguity, level of distrust, self-esteem, neurosis, and proclivity toward dominance in interpersonal relations. See Lloyd Etheredge ‘Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1898-1968: A Test of Interpersonal Generalisation Theory’ American Political Science Review (No. 72, 1978, pp. 434-451). Also A World of Men: Private Sources of American Foreign Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978). Etheredge found that personality traits could be associated with distortions in the processing of information owing to individuals injecting their personal motives and fears into the interpretation of other actor’s intentions. In addition, personality could influence the range of policy options considered as viable responses to an external challenge—for example, dominant individuals were more likely to use force.
Chapter Two

Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin

The book *Foreign Policy Decision Making* by Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin represented yet another perspective of personality approach in the study of foreign policy motivation. They pointed out that the important thing to understand in the study of motivation was that it was a concept, not a thing or a datum. Motivation was not behaviour but inferences drawn from behaviours. Likewise, personality was a concept, and its role in motivation process could be indirectly observed by examining a range of variables. As human beings were bearers of motivation, their personalities could play a critical role in the motivation system.

The study by Snyder and his colleagues showed that motivated behaviour had an inner-outer connection: there was a condition internal to the behaving actor and something in the external situation which was wanted, and the two were linked. In other words, motivation was initiated within one’s mind, but was stimulated by and interacted with the environment. They argued, however, unlike the study of human psychology, foreign policy motivation was concerned mainly with motivation that was socially acquired and learnt. Because of this characteristic, it could be said that two main attributes of foreign policy motivation were durability and persistence. Being motivated to take a foreign policy decision was not a momentary state, although other contingent elements could accelerate or delay the process. Motivation might be reinforced through the continued performance of an act. Reward, familiarity, and feedback from success may all

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72 *ibid.*
73 *ibid.*
74 *ibid.* p. 142
Snyder, Bruck and Sapin further elaborated this point by drawing a distinction between *because of* and *in order to* motivation. In *order to* referred to an end state of affairs envisaged by the actor. Such motivation thus referred to the future. On the other hand, *because of* reflected the actor's past experience, to the sum total of factors in his/her life which determined the particular course of action selected to reach a goal. They argued that such simplification was helpful, given the impossibility of tracing every act back to an ultimate cause. As they explained:

> Were we required to account for 'because of' motivation we should have to explain a particular act in terms of a sequence of past behaviours.... Whereas in the case of 'in order to' motivation, we are concerned with the future consequences of an act—its relationship to an ultimate end from which motive can be inferred.

In order to explain why foreign policy motivation exhibited the characteristics of durability and persistence, Snyder and his colleagues introduced two subsidiary notions: attitude and frames of reference in their inquiry. Attitude was defined as the "readiness of individual decision makers to be motivated" with close connotation to personality, and the frame of reference included "perception, valuation and evaluation as analytical components."

For Snyder and his colleagues, a leader's personal perception, which was included in the frame of reference, was a vital aspect of motivation, too. They contended that being

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75 ibid. pp. 142-144
76 ibid. pp. 133-138
77 ibid. p. 138
78 ibid. pp. 149-152
79 ibid. pp. 142-143
motivated meant that the individual's energy and attention were selectively directed, and a motivated action brought a set of values to any situation.\textsuperscript{80} In this sense, a motivated action was not the end result of perceptions and values, rather, an agent embodying such perceptions and values. Therefore a motivated action had an active role to play in the situation. In the same way, valuation, as an accompaniment of perception, was a behaviour directed toward the establishment of preferences.\textsuperscript{81} Although valuation basically concerned the nature and range of objectives which would be injected into the situation, it also concerned the preferred paths or strategies which directed specific acts toward the objective or objectives selected.\textsuperscript{82} Snyder, Bruck and Sapin concluded that the frame of reference became a determinant of behaviour after an attitude or an attitude cluster was triggered by stimuli.\textsuperscript{83}

However, they emphasised that this artificial separation of motivation, attitude and frame of reference was made only for analytical purposes. In reality, a sequence of behaviours defied any strict categorisation. Yet, Snyder and his colleagues regarded it as a necessary step to observe the actual deliberations of foreign policy makers as they grappled with a specific problem.\textsuperscript{84} They believed that crucial questions needed to be addressed in the study of the role of personality in foreign policy motivation including:

What purposes and attitudinal sets did they bring to it? What habits of selection and relating information and previous experience affected the sense they made of the situation? What values did they think were involved in the situation? How did they calculate a proper integration of objectives and techniques?\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{80} ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} ibid. pp. 149-156
\textsuperscript{82} ibid. pp. 150-152
\textsuperscript{83} ibid. pp. 149-156
\textsuperscript{84} ibid.
\textsuperscript{85} ibid. p. 152. It is interesting to compare this set of questions with those raised by Cottam in the previous section.
Snyder and his colleagues recognised that the paradox of personality in foreign policy motivation was that people were often either sceptical about linking personality with decision process, or were attracted to the great-man-making-history explanation. They also admitted that to face up to personality as an aspect of motivational analysis was akin to opening Pandora's Box. But one way to solve the dilemma of using the personality approach seemed, they argued, to differentiate what mattered and what did not matter among the government leaders and top foreign policy decisionmaking elites. Although this sounded utilitarian, they believed it nonetheless to be the most effective way of solving the problem.

As a practical way of furthering this argument, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin presented a threefold division of personality structure. They hypothesised that human personality consisted of three separate components: the physiological organism, the psychic structure, and the social being. In a study of motivation, however, only the sociological aspect of personality was significant, because it was this component which was shaped and changed by interactions with other ‘actors’ in a social setting. This social personality, which was a product of interaction between the individual and society during a relatively long period of time, possessed a comparatively stable nature and, therefore, should be a more thoughtful reference for motivation study. In Snyder

86 However, it was not a reliable analytical parameter for the study of the role of the individual in the foreign policy motivation. Analysis of the motivation of Franklin Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler and Mao Zedong would not automatically provide the motivations of foreign policy of the U.S., Russia, Britain, Germany and China in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. Although the diplomacy of the world in the 1930s and 40s were full of the imprints of these important historical figures Roosevelt’s calculation, Stalin’s suspicion, Churchill’s first appeasement, later staunch resistance and Hitler’s misjudgment in the winter of 1941 in Russian battlefields were all indubitably decisive contributions to the final outcome of the World War II. The typicality of the time and events themselves limited the conditions for a generalisation to be extended freely into overall analytical methodology. Except in some extraordinary historical moments, foreign policy motivations would reflect the outcome of individual, bureaucratic and institutional bargaining processes.

88 ibid. p. 171
89 ibid. p. 160
and his colleagues' view, it was the social personality, shaped by its interactions with other actors and by their place in the system, that really mattered to their study. However, they qualified the role of this social personality by accepting to take into account the influence of other needs and tensions, but they insisted that the behaviour of the decisionmaking actor be explained \textit{first} in terms of personality factors relevant to his/her membership and participation in a decisionmaking system.\footnote{ibid.}

Snyder and his colleagues also explored another three factors closely related to the personality analysis. They were: intellectual skills, interpretation of competence and personality types in decisionmaking.\footnote{ibid. p. 161} They argued that since the key features of decisionmaking were deliberation, choice, and problem-solving, the question of what kinds of intellectual operations were performed by decision makers in a given decisional system became vital.\footnote{ibid. pp. 160-173} Decision makers analysed situations, estimated needs, defined problems, established ranges of alternatives, assigned relevancy and significance to events and interpreted information. In this exercise, the decision makers' intellectual inclinations would be expressed. This intellectual property would be affected, then, by the training and professional experience inside or outside the decisionmaking organisation: namely through their continued professional affiliations and working theories of knowledge.\footnote{ibid.}

Hence, for Snyder and his colleagues motivational analysis should start at the level of

\footnote{Which referred to: "ideas, concepts, formulas, and proverbs concerning human nature and behaviour which circulate in any given culture and which may not be inculcated through specialised training and experience, but are absorbed in normal adult socialisation." ibid. pp. 162-163}
the individual decision maker rather than at the level of the decisional system.\textsuperscript{95} They had strong views that the intellectual qualities—certain personality traits relevant for decisionmaking—were extremely important in foreign policy motivation and they would be affected by the group process of decisionmaking.\textsuperscript{96} That was because for decision makers, a group decisionmaking process represented the possibility of both pooling and modification of intellectual skills. If an individual decision maker was making a decision alone, he/she might be inclined consciously or unconsciously to push his/her professional perspective to the limit. On the other hand, in a group setting, the interplay of specialisation would result in some modifications.\textsuperscript{97} This kind of interplay did not necessarily reduce the importance of personality in decisionmaking. On the contrary, since a wider range of alternatives might be considered and a more thorough exploration of consequences might result, the leaders could broaden or narrow the actual impact of intellectual skills of other participants in the decisionmaking process.\textsuperscript{98} Viewed from this perspective, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin concluded that “the whole notion of personality in foreign policy motivation study did not at least open up the possibility of either unexplainable or a hopelessly wide range of behaviour patterns.”\textsuperscript{99}

Snyder and his colleagues concluded that the role of personality in foreign policy motivation was not without problems. It was constrained by a few factors. Group dynamics, for example, could reduce the weight of personality in the decisionmaking process. Even when a single individual had the authority and ability to commit a government’s resources, he/she was likely to have two incentives to involve other

\textsuperscript{95} ibid.
\textsuperscript{96} ibid.
\textsuperscript{97} ibid.
\textsuperscript{98} ibid.
\textsuperscript{99} ibid. p. 169
people in the decisionmaking process. Firstly, the inclusion of others could enhance a
decision’s legitimacy. Political leaders wanted to be able to say that their decisions were
based on the best advice available, thereby giving them an incentive to seek the counsel
of experts. More broadly, because political leaders wanted to be able to say that they
governed on behalf of the governed, they had an incentive to include at least a few
representatives of the governed in the policy making process.100

Secondly, the inclusion of others could help reduce the psychological strain of
decisionmaking with a ‘shared-burden’ expectation if things ever went wrong. Political
leaders often faced foreign policy issues involving great complexity, uncertainty and
ambiguity,101 and found it difficult to reconcile the multiple and competing values
embedded in a particular issue. They also frequently lacked the information needed to
achieve the best outcomes when faced with a range of alternatives.102 Given these
circumstances, solace and certainty could be sought by obtaining support from other
people.

Structural and Situational Constraints

Some scholars have fruitfully explored the question of the role of structural and
situational factors on foreign policy decisionmaking. For example, as early as the 1960s
Harold and Margaret Sprout observed that:

environmental factors (both nonhuman and human) can affect human activities
in only two ways. Such factors can be perceived, reacted to, and taken into

100 Fritz Gaenslen, ‘Decision-Making Groups’ Eric Singer and Valerie Hudson eds. Political Psychology and Foreign
101 Alexander George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice
102 Gilbert Winham, ‘Negotiation as a Management Process’ World Politics (Vol. 301, 1977, pp. 87-114)
account by the human individual or individuals...In this sense alone can environmental factors be said to ‘influence’, ‘condition’, or otherwise ‘affect’ human values and preferences, moods and attitudes, choices and decisions. Secondly, environmental factors may be conceived as a sort of matrix ...which limits the execution of undertakings.\textsuperscript{103}

Donna Kinder and Janet Weiss, in their 1978’s article, ‘In Lieu of Rationality: Psychological Perspectives on Foreign Policy Decision-Making’, maintained that “situational forces exert powerful influences upon a decision maker’s ability to perform all the complex processing tasks involved in the pursuit of foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{104} Since the Sprouts, Kinder and Weiss, it has been generally acknowledged that foreign policy actions are affected and cognitively constrained by situational factors which, in Carlsnaes’ words, “are intended jointly to encompass all the crucial elements in foreign policy decisionmaking.”\textsuperscript{105}

But it was Walter Carlsnaes’ three-levelled analysis that provided a lucid account of how structural and situational dimensions could impact on foreign policy motivation. It was his clear elaboration of the relationship among the intentional, dispositional and structural/situational elements in the analysis of foreign policy motivation that made his theory a particularly useful reference to this thesis.

In his book \textit{Ideology and Foreign Policy}, Carlsnaes held that the framework for any analysis of foreign policy would be best pursued in terms of a tripartite approach consisting of intentional, dispositional and situational dimensions of explanation.\textsuperscript{106} This was because, he argued, these three dimensions could “be conjoined in specific

\textsuperscript{103} Harold and Margaret Sprout, \textit{The Ecological Perspective in Human Affairs} (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 11)


\textsuperscript{105} Walter Carlsnaes, \textit{Ideology and Foreign Policy} (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. UK, 1986, p. 107)
ways to render increasingly exhaustive explanations of the motivation of political actions. Carlsnaes strongly believed that the explanation of foreign policy motivation lay, first of all, in a thorough understanding of the interplay among personal, cultural and societal elements. As perception and personality factors have been discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, this section will pay greater attention to his third element, ie. structural/situational component, in the context of foreign policy motivation.

Intentional Dimension

Carlsnaes' intentional dimension embraced two conceptual categories which he considered to be essential to all explanations of foreign policy action: 1) the particular choice implicated in a policy; 2) the motivation underlying its pursuit.

Carlsnaes observed that often when motivation was described as a force that led to a particular policy being pursued, people always had in mind the aim, the goal or the objective which the policy in question was intended to accomplish. But in ordinary usage, motivation and choice tended to be used interchangeably to mean both ends and means. Often the two were conflated, usually in the sense that ends were used—consciously or not—to legitimise or rationalise means in one way or another.

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106 ibid. pp. 84-85  
107 ibid. p. 84  
108 ibid. pp. 85-87  
109 ibid. pp. 95-116  
110 ibid.  
111 For example, this was the case, Carlsnaes argued, when a decision such as that of bombing Hanoi was defended by referring exclusively to the need for vouchsafing American security (ibid. p. 85) (yet American security was in no way directly at risk). Because there was no direct link between the bombing and American security in any common notion, we were impelled to distinguish between the choices involved in taking particular actions, and the motivation underlying these actions. Or as Martin Hollis wrote, “the actor...needs to be found good reasons for his choice of goals. The enquirer looks for further goals to which the immediate goals are a means” Martin Hollis, Models of Man
Carlsnaes warned against mixing these two quite different concepts of choice and motivation. On the basis of the two conceptual premises mentioned above, Carlsnaes gave the following specification of the nature of, and distinction between, the two. He argued that although both choice and motivation belonged to intentional dimension in his analysis, the role of each was different. Choice referred to the reasons for an actor's decision in the face of a particular decisionmaking situation, while motivation pointed to a condition or state of affairs which an actor intended either to change or to maintain. Choice indicated why an actor opted for a particular course of action in the pursuit of an intended state of affairs, while motivation described this intention itself. Or in other words, a particular action was motivated by some purpose or other, which in turn implicated a choice (or a series of choices) with respect to its pursuit. Motivation, in this explanation, was thus a given factor, while the range of possible choices was limited by it.

Dispositional Dimension

The second component in Carlsnaes' scheme was the dispositional dimension. Carlsnaes also included two elements in this dimension: perceptions and values, which he saw belonged to cultural explanation. Carlsnaes related perceptions and values to the notion of dealing with the 'national interest' in particular, and with the role of values in general in the formulation of foreign policy. He proposed that 'values' could, in a crucial sense, be seen as determining foreign policy interest, either in the sense that such...
interests were essentially the form that values took in this context, or because values ‘stood behind’ such interests.\textsuperscript{114}

Carlsnaes contended that the advantage of this type of explanation was that the factors characterising the intentional dimension could themselves be further explored in terms of concepts belonging to this dimension.\textsuperscript{115} More specifically, it was suggested that the particular motivation and choices, which determined why a particular policy was pursued, could in turn be explored in order to answer a question that the intentional framework itself could not accommodate. He argued that this allowed us to pursue the query why a decision maker was cognitively disposed towards a particular intention rather than towards some other state of affairs.\textsuperscript{116}

Carlsnaes confirmed that perceptions and values were causal notions to motivation. More specifically, he indicated that values belonged—both logically and empirically—to a different and antecedent dimension in the decisionmaking process. For while in the intentional dimension motivation and the range of available choices were given, in the sense that they were themselves unproblematic descriptions of actual intentions, the same did not hold for the nature of values.\textsuperscript{117}

In Carlsnaes’ view, once value was conceived in a causal manner, the determinants of particular motivation and choices could be explored, together with the reasons for possible incompatibilities between them. These could then be analysed as a

\textsuperscript{112} Walter Carlsnaes, \textit{Ideology and Foreign Policy} (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. UK, 1986 pp. 82-91) \\
\textsuperscript{113} ibid. p. 81 \\
\textsuperscript{114} ibid. pp. 90-95 \\
\textsuperscript{115} ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{116} ibid.
consequence of values, as "values applied in the light of situations as they appear to people involved in them." 118 From this it followed that, if and when there was a conflict or a contradiction between motivation and a particular choice, then this was the result of a prior condition of value-complexity. Carlsnaes believed that the same must be said for the case where conflicts of this kind remain unresolved: in such instances the explanation ultimately rested on incompatible values, not on incongruous motivation and choices.119 Intentional motivation and choices operated within the dimension of dispositional perceptions and values.

Situational Dimension

Carlsnaes placed a greater emphasis on the situational dimension in relation to the first two, and indeed, to the whole of his theory. He believed that a well-addressed situational dimension allowed his analytical framework to have acquired a systematic wholeness to fully function, despite the semi-autonomy of its constituent dimensions.

Carlsnaes' situational dimension contained the type of analysis that posited all situational factors as indirect and cognitively mediated rather than in the form of directly causal variables. Foreign policy decision makers of a given state were seen as being cognitively constrained by factors and processes such as the economic system, political interaction or bureaucratic procedures as independent structural variables in foreign policy motivation.120 Carlsnaes' point of emphasising the constraining factors in foreign policy motivation was consistent with the fundamental premise by Anthony

117 bid. pp. 98-101
118 Alexander George and Robert Keohane, 'The Concept of National Interests: Uses and Limitations' Alexander George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo. 1980, p. 221)
Giddens that motivation and the resulting behaviours were closely linked to the type of structure characterising the decisionmaking system.\textsuperscript{121}

Having emphasised the cognitively mediated character of all situational and environmental factors, Carlsnaes then proceeded to place this dimension within his framework as a whole by offering two congruent concepts, which, he claimed, were intended jointly to encompass all the crucial structural/situational factors in catalysing foreign policy motivation and decisionmaking process.\textsuperscript{122} These two concepts were the objective conditions and the organisational setting.\textsuperscript{123}

Objective conditions characterised the situation within which a foreign policy maker was placed to act.\textsuperscript{124} Suffice to note, he argued, that these conditions knew no international or domestic boundaries, and their pervasiveness was such that no country could escape their steady and enduring grip, although this grip itself had many forms and degrees of intransigence.\textsuperscript{125} Carlsnaes argued that being both socio-economic and physically concrete, these conditions were as much man-made as a product of natural history and other seemingly implacable forces.\textsuperscript{126} Carlsnaes warned against the putative effects of objective conditions to be over-stressed, and that they should not be underestimated or ignored in the study of foreign policy motivation.\textsuperscript{127}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} Walter Carlsnaes, \textit{Ideology and Foreign Policy} (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. UK, 1986, pp. 90-101)
\item \textsuperscript{120} ibid. p. 107
\item \textsuperscript{121} Anthony Giddens, \textit{Central Problems in Social Theory} (London, Macmillan, 1979, pp. 73-85)
\item \textsuperscript{122} Walter Carlsnaes, \textit{Ideology and Foreign Policy} (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. UK, 1986, p. 107)
\item \textsuperscript{123} ibid. pp. 110-116
\item \textsuperscript{124} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{125} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{126} ibid. pp. 108-109. In Kenneth Waltz's notion, for example, they pertained equally to the supply of colonisable land during the heyday of the imperialist scramble, to the economic conditions of the Great Depression, and to the geographic and market vagaries of the oil supply today. See Kenneth Waltz, \textit{Theory of International Politics} (Mass.: Reading, 1970, pp. 69-72)
\end{itemize}
While the concept of objective conditions referred to the concrete givens of a situation (be they political, economic, social, demographic, geopolitical, technological), the type of constraints from the organisational setting were viewed by Carlsnaes as structural for the reason that this was a different and wholly abstract type of notion. He emphasised that although both objective and organisational factors acted as constraints on foreign policy motivation, their constraining propensities differed fundamentally in so far as the first referred to the multitude of materially objective elements characterising the situation of a state (or society) in the international system, while the second related to an abstract notion that was used to characterise the policy situation of particular actors.

Carlsnaes found the difficulties about determining the organisational setting, or structural constraints, lay in the fact that there was no neat organisational chart with formally defined hierarchies and powers available, and this setting only operated in terms of the various factors—formal and informal—interrelatedly structuring the motivation and decisionmaking system.

However, Carlsnaes contended that because of this, the organisational setting could be characterised structurally in terms of two broad functions which impacted on motivation. The first of these had a dynamic import, while the second constituted a conservative process sustaining the status quo. If the dynamic view of the organisational setting stressed the notion of a tough game with high stakes and powerful players, then

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128 ibid. pp. 104-116
129 ibid.
130 ibid. Also, as William Bacchus wrote: “participants in the policy-making process do not inhabit a neatly defined and regularised world, although much of what they do is determined and channelled by bureaucratic norms and operating patterns. Rather, the characteristics of this complex and untidy process define the context in which each participant functions.” *Foreign Policy and the Bureaucratic Process* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974, p. 38)
the static or conservative model of such setting quite openly played down the active role of rival players. Instead it emphasised the impact of the organisational factor *per se* on the structural character of the decisional setting.

Carlsnaes believed that this did not mean that the concept of situational setting was a causal factor in the analysis of foreign policy motivation, in the same sense that perception, personality and cultural structures could be said to 'cause' anything in the dispositional or intentional dimensions previously discussed. Although 'paradigmatic', both functions could probably be said to have empirical reference to most organisational settings, although the mix in each particular case undoubtedly showed variation both over time and across different settings.

Diagrammatically, Carlsnaes presented his argument on structural/situational constraints on foreign policy motivation as follows:

![Diagram](image)

1 = Intentional dimension
2 = Dispositional dimension
3 = Situational dimension

1 = Reciprocal relationship
2 = Teleological relationship
3 = Causal relationship

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1 = Intentional dimension
2 = Dispositional dimension
3 = Situational dimension
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Source: Walter Carlsnaes 'Ideology & Foreign Policy', p. 108

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This diagram presented the key structural properties in supporting Carlsnaes' approach to the analysis of foreign policy motivation. While the relationship between 1 and 2 was causal, the relationship between 3 and the other two was one of constraint, limitation or intervention, or 'intervening variable'. In terms of organisational setting, this model showed that under certain structural conditions, certain types of perceptions and values might be fostered or present while others were suppressed or absent.

The crucial predication of Carlsnaes argument was that 'mind encounters organisational settings', not the other way round. Emphasising constraining effect in foreign policy motivation and behaviours was to expose the role of volatile and sensitive structural and situational changes in the system. By in depth analysis of intentional, dispositional and situational dimensions of foreign policy motivation, Carlsnaes justified the prominent role of structural/situational dimension in his foreign policy motivation analysis.

Conclusion

The consensus of the scholarship reviewed in this chapter suggested that far from being a monolithic analytic unit, such as power, economic measures or class struggle, foreign policy motivation was a product of a complex process involving perception, leadership personality and structural/situational elements. These scholars undertook in-depth studies of such elements to establish the viability and analytical power to challenge

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\[132\] ibid. p. 115
\[133\] Or in John Steinbruner's words that: "if stable features of the mind encounter stable features of organisational settings, it should produce coherent, recurring patterns of behaviour in the organisational decision process, other things being equal." John Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974, p. 124)
classical theories in explaining foreign policy motivation. These alternative approaches also provided a theoretical framework upon which the analysis of Chinese foreign policy motivation could be conducted in the later chapters.

It should be noted that the views of scholars with these alternative approaches to foreign policy motivation often converged over some fundamental components such as perception, values, beliefs and personality. While the arguments of each alone might not be adequate to fully account for the complexity of foreign policy motivation, they, taken together, could offer a new point of departure for the study of foreign policy motivation with their complementarity and combined strength.

This chapter concluded that it was difficult to articulate a definite answer to a hypothetical motivation of a country over a specific foreign policy initiative—mostly because the choice was inevitably a matter of judgement. Nevertheless, the study of the three elements highlighted in this chapter would provide a rich yet focused conceptual repertoire for drawing relevance. And on the basis of this, an impulse of foreign policy motivation of a given country at a given time could be diagnosed.

The perception argument placed at the centre of motivation inquiries its predispositional base, which, as Richard Cottam contended, was reflected in the decisional process and resulted in a particular foreign policy decisional thrust. This approach emphasised that a focus on motivational attribution was vitally important for prescriptive international relations theory, because a policy based on an accurate assessment of its target's motivation was more likely to achieve its own objectives than the one based on illusory or fantasised estimates. The reason behind this was, Cottam claimed, that what emerged
as a foreign policy resembled only the tip of an iceberg. The vast majority of decisions were made subsurface in a routinised, repetitive manner by a huge and self-interested bureaucracy, who could be driven by a range of motivations. But in foreign policy decisionmaking, only the motivation of the state leaders acting in the 'national interest' had the command of both authority and capability to translate it into foreign policy actions.

Sometimes, Cottam's view on perception was very general, perhaps too broad in describing on-going complexity within a 'government', since it was obvious that the sub-components, such as the above-mentioned bureaucracy, possessed widely varying interests, and therefore a variety of motives. Cottam's omission of the role of sub-groups in his study resembled the realist approach on this subject. As it became obvious that the state was not, and indeed had never been, a unitary actor, it could never have monopolised the motivation process although it might appear to make foreign policy decisions on behalf of its people. Therefore while a foreign policy decision mechanism might remain the same, the substance was changed.

The personality approach advanced its argument by avoiding the fallacy of 'great-men-making history'. Instead it focused on the intellectual quality and social formation of decision makers. The Hermanns, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin emphasised the prominence of the social dimension and the importance of the structural environment in shaping meaningful personality in foreign policy motivation.

The Hermanns and Snyder and his colleagues contributed to the personality approach by adding a poignant dimension of political culture to the study. They believed that the
persistence and durability of such political culture in foreign policy motivation varied in different political systems, but were more robustly displayed in a system where a political culture had a long history and was well entrenched. This persistence and durability of motivation in foreign policy did not have to depend on the continued presence of the original drive or stimulus. New motivation could grow out of old ones by the simple process of turning objectives into desirable outcomes—even in the absence of the original need which gave rise to the selection of the particular objective. In other words, when a certain motivation was repeatedly adopted over a relatively long period of time, it could gather a momentum of its own and become a habitual tendency regardless of the changing circumstances. Means employed to satisfy a given motivation through the achievement of an objective might become an independent source of satisfaction and therefore displaced the original motivation. This could explain why nations pursued objectives which no longer made sense in terms of their original interests, or needs.

While admitting the importance of perception and personality attributes in foreign policy motivation, the structural/situational constraint argument emphasised the role of objective conditions and organisational settings in the motivation process, and claimed these were the most dynamic force indirectly affecting the configuration of the foreign policy motivation. The essence of Carlsnaes’ explanation of foreign policy motivation was couched in terms of the structural/situational dimension, ie. with reference to objective conditions and organisational settings which constrained the motivation in foreign policy options of actors. Carlsnaes believed that, given that situational factors exerted a constraining influence on the intentional and dispositional levels of understanding of foreign policy motivation of decision makers, they should be treated as
a fundamentally authoritative source of dynamics in the motivation system.

There were at least two implications of Carlsnaes' structural/situational explanation. First, it showed that the three explanatory dimensions (intentional, dispositional and situational) were not clearly distinguished from one another. They were logically interrelated. Second, it highlighted the supremacy of objective conditions and organisational settings in foreign policy motivation explanation—when it was expressed in terms of the link to the intentional and dispositional dimensions. Being neither causal nor teleological, a situational explanation alone could by definition never rival either perception or personality explanations. However, the three elements were interrelated, not mutually exclusive. Carlsnaes urged that scholars should first determine the decisional environment for a foreign policy choice before attempting to explain foreign policy motivation in terms of such causal factors as leadership perception, belief, values and personality, if a given foreign policy motivation would be correctly understood at all.

The paradox of this methodology, however, was that the constraining factors could only be introduced into the explanatory position once the causal factors were identified. Given this logic, although a full explanation of a foreign policy motivation must of necessity always contain a structural/situational dimension, it should not, and would not, replace intentional and dispositional variables in the analysis. And only by giving this balance, the three competing elements of foreign policy motivation could be fairly assessed.

Part II and Part III of this thesis will test the applicability of these approaches in the
study of Chinese foreign policy motivation.
Chapter Three

The Place of Motivation in Scholarship on Chinese Foreign Policy

The previous two chapters have established the theoretical premises for this thesis. The scholarship on the roles of perception, personality and structural/situational constraints in foreign policy motivation process have set parameters against which foreign policy motivation could be analysed and judged. These two chapters were projected to serve dual purposes. On the one hand, they will be the theoretical guides that steer the analytical course of the subsequent inquiries into Chinese foreign policy behaviours; and on the other hand, their own applicability and validity as a credible methodology in the study of Chinese foreign policy will be rigorously tested.

This chapter, as a necessary step to bridge the gap, surveys the current state of the art in the study of Chinese foreign policy, and makes links between the observed motivation theories with trends of scholarship in Chinese foreign policy. More specifically, this chapter seeks to establish the scope and depth of the influence of the ‘rational actor’, cooperation and revolutionary war and peace models on the study of Chinese foreign policy, and to find out how the concepts of perception, personality and structural/situational factors were applied to the understanding of Chinese foreign policy motivation in the existing literature.

After the second World War, a general interest focusing on the study of China in turn rapidly developed into a scholastic inquiry centred on the study of contemporary Chinese foreign policy. During the 1950s, this study spawned a rich subfield in the
international relations discipline. Especially from the late 1970s through to the early 1990s, a dramatic increase in Western scholarly monographs accompanied by a mushrooming of Chinese scholarship on foreign policy greatly boosted the status of Chinese foreign policy study and further augmented its potency. This unprecedented intellectual diversity in China's foreign policy somehow compensated for the previously more rigid and simple-minded scholarship, which tended to regard Chinese foreign policy as either too peculiaristic or too subtle to be granted serious study within the modern European international relations discipline.

This myth of China's uniqueness and the stereotyped analytical framework have been successfully challenged from many fronts, especially by the current scholars on Chinese foreign relations since the 1980s. These scholars have enjoyed access to new research materials and opportunities quite unlike the relative paucity of data that characterised the Fairbank generation.

Literature on foreign policy, following the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 to the late 1970s, fell into some fairly distinctive genres. Until the late 1960s, the literature was divided among three schools: the traditionalist, the Maoist ideology and the rational actor. During the late 1960s and late 1970s two new schools of thought—the strategic triangle and factional politics—came to prominence as offering a

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1 Allen Whiting, 'Foreign Policy of China' Roy Macridis Foreign Policy in World Politics (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall International, 1992, pp. 222-266)
3 For example, John Fairbank commented on the role that traditional China had in the thinking of Western scholars: "Until very recently, premodern China has remained so different from the rest of the world, so cocooned in its distinctive culture and writing system, that it has seemed like a galaxy apart, a single Chinese nebula in the Western world's firmament." John Fairbank, 'The State that Mao Built' World Politics (Vol. 19, July 1967, pp. 665-666)
better way of understanding China's domestic and foreign politics.

By the end of 1980s, scholars had grown dissatisfied with these five approaches, which, in their view, were either too simplistic, deterministic (traditionalist/Maoist/realist approaches), or had suffered too much from the "Zhongnanhai (factionalist) syndrome".\(^5\) There was a growing interest in the more nuanced micro policymaking mechanisms (mostly below the top-level decision makers), and in pre-policy making processes which primarily drew on the roles of perceptions.\(^6\) These five approaches were the point of departure for scholars taking on the institutional and perceptual approaches. The last two approaches gave greater emphasis to China's foreign policymaking structural environment and the mind-set/perceptions of those who worked in these structures.

Indeed, with more data available, scholars of Chinese foreign policy produced more discriminating studies than ever before.\(^7\) More recently, scholars such as Alastair Johnston, Michael Swaine, Thomas Christensen, Greg Austin and Lu Ning seemed to have outgrown the existing explanatory paradigm of Chinese foreign policy by the perceptual and institutional schools, and have started to explore new frontiers in the research field.

For this particular group of scholars, the existing mainstream theories appeared to have limited expository power in the study of Chinese foreign policy, which was further

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\(^6\) Michael Hunt, "Normalising the Field" (Paper presented at the Wilson Center Conference on 'CCP External Relations', Washington D. C. June 1992, p. 3)

obscured by some distinct characteristics of Chinese foreign policy behaviours. The range of explanatory capacity of the mainstream theories failed at least one of the two criteria for a theory—the capability to forecast future trends and events. In addition, both foreign policy decisionmaking and implementation were constantly in a dynamic process. The theories widely applied in the study of Chinese foreign policy seemed to be relevant in the study of a specific single incident, or a group of events, of what was essentially a series of laterally related motion pictures of China's foreign policy motivation. The rational actor, bureaucratic politics and organisational process models, for example, only captured segments of the dynamic process. This group of scholars regarded the existing mainstream theories as providing necessary leads for a better understanding of some of Chinese foreign policy motivation and as a useful, though not always reliable, tool for prognosis purposes. This inadequacy of the existing theoretical paradigm challenged this group of scholars and resulted in the growing trend by these scholars to rekindle interest in motivation study. As a logical step further, they committed themselves to the study of motivation in search of a more satisfactory explanatory norm for Chinese foreign policy.

There are three sections in this chapter. The first section assesses the achievements in the field of study of Chinese foreign policy, against the background of the Western theories outlined in Chapter One. The second section deals with the new generation of scholarship of institutional and perceptual schools which emerged in the last twenty years or so. The last section summarises current trends in the study of Chinese foreign

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policy by identifying the place of motivation approach in Chinese foreign policy study.

Conventional Wisdom

In line with the classical schools of international relations, there were roughly five conventional streams of thought that for some time dominated the study of contemporary Chinese foreign policy: the traditional/historical, the Maoist/communist ideology, the realist/rational actor, the factional and the triangular.9

Traditional/Historical Approach

The traditional/historical approach tried to understand the foreign policy behaviour of the new China largely in terms of its past.10 John Fairbank, as a key proponent of the approach, argued that to "deal with a major power (like China) without regard for its history, and especially the tradition in foreign policy, is truly to be flying blind."11

In other words, he suggested that without a deep understanding of China's 5,000 years of history, little insight could be gained into its foreign policy. The foreign policy under

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11 John Fairbank, 'China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective' Foreign Affairs (No. 47, April 1969, p. 449)
the Communist regime represented a continuation of the practice of traditional Sinocentrism according to which the world, as perceived by the Chinese rulers, was not one based on the concept of sovereign equality of nation/states, but one structured in hierarchical terms.\footnote{ibid. pp. 450-451} Under such a world system as perceived by the Chinese rulers, China—the ‘Middle Kingdom’—was the preeminent power that maintained a suzerain-tributary relationship with the rest of the world. A nation’s status within this system depended on its level of sinicisation. The primary sources of Chinese foreign policy were to be found in such traditional philosophies as Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism.\footnote{ibid.} 

This general approach was accompanied by a method of inquiry which tended to be equally grandiose and ambitious in its selection of topics, breadth of inquiry, and time span. This research tradition regarded China as a colossal and frequently exhausted giant, lurching slowly toward modernisation and reacting to the outside world either sluggishly or violently.\footnote{Francois Geoffroy-Dechaume, China Looks at the World (London: Faber and Faber, 1967, pp. 34-36)} The core of this thought stressed China’s centuries-old mindset of self-centredness and cultural superiority.

\textit{Maoist/Communist Ideological Approach}

China’s uniqueness was challenged by the Maoist/communist ideological school of the early 1950s. The challenge coincided with the onset of the politics of the Cold War and American military involvement in Asia. This school argued that the historical and cultural legacy of the past was less relevant than the principles of orthodox Marxism-
Leninism and its Chinese derivative—Maoism—in understanding contemporary Chinese foreign policy behaviour. It suggested that China interacted with the rest of the world based largely on the ideological belief of its political elite as personified in Mao Zedong, some of whose ideas often appeared antithetical to Chinese tradition.¹⁵

This approach argued that the Maoist/communist ideology resulted in unique foreign policy tactics that differed both from the strategy derived from China's traditional past and from orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideologies. As a result, some specific features of Chinese Communism, like the 'people's war' and 'united front', developed rapidly and successfully during the CCP's revolutionary period, and have strongly influenced the making of PRC's foreign policy ever since.¹⁶

Despite obvious differences between the traditional and Maoist approaches, they both tended to contend that the key factor in China's foreign behaviour was China itself, acting from a traditional stance or a Communist stance. In other words, China was unique and had to be understood on its own terms.


Chapter Three

Realist/Rational Actor Approach

While both the traditional and ideological schools stressed the significance of the subjective ‘psychomilieu’ of China’s power elite in the formulation of the nation’s foreign policy, the realist/rational actor school focused its attention on the objective ‘operational condition’. Instead of viewing China through its own imperial lens or a Sinified version of Marxism-Leninism, realist scholars applied the prevailing Western realist notions of power, national interests, and international containing power to the study of China's foreign policy, especially to its crisis behaviour.17

Some realists maintained the view that Chinese foreign policy makers, like their counterparts in the West, always took into account the military and economic power of their allies and adversaries.18 This, they believed, was evidenced by some major shifts in China's foreign policy, such as its honeymoon with Moscow in the 1950s and the later rapprochement with Washington and Moscow in the late 1970s and 1980s—shifts that reflected, at least in part, political, economic and strategic imperatives imposed by fundamental changes in China's internal development and global environment.19

In his landmark study China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War, Allen Whiting was able to reconstruct the events that led to the Chinese decision to intervene in the Korean War.20 By carefully analysing US intelligence information and sifting through Beijing’s public pronouncements at the time, Whiting concluded that the

19 ibid.
20 Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960, pp. 52-81)
Chinese action of entering the Korean War was largely reactive, and the motivation was self-defence. This explanation therefore did not lie in an aggressive communist ideology or a traditional impulse to pacify its periphery, but in the same realism to be found at the heart of mainstream Western theories on international relations. Whiting argued that China's decision to enter the war was motivated by its national security concerns sparked by American rhetoric and actions, especially those of General Douglas MacArthur from Tokyo,\(^\text{21}\) and Washington's refusal at that time to heed explicit Chinese warnings against crossing the 38th parallel.\(^\text{22}\) This calculation was based on the high stake of the regime's ability to continue its existence and nation's survival, which eventually led to China's audacious decision to intervene before it was too late.\(^\text{23}\)

Given the operational environment, the realist/rational actor school argued that the Chinese foreign policy behaviour was not very different from other countries. Chinese foreign policy could be viewed in traditional Western theoretical paradigms of balance of power, national interests and domestic economic, military and systemic manipulation.

These arguments, whether of the China-unique school or the realist 'gross variable' approach,\(^\text{24}\) interpreted China's foreign policy orientations in only the broadest strokes. Only few of them concerned themselves with the timing and content of particular initiatives and major decisions in China's foreign policy; and few of them looked at the management of certain sensitive issues and relationships that were influenced by more

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\(^\text{21}\) ibid. pp. 59-65  
\(^\text{22}\) ibid. pp. 12-14  
\(^\text{23}\) ibid.  
dynamic domestic variables. The need to take account of internal politics when examining foreign policy eventually led some scholars to proposing the factional and triangular approaches.

**Factional Approach**

In the early 1970s, scholars consistently started to emphasise elite politics. Some earlier studies of this type in the late 1960s analysed the internal debates among top Chinese elites and policy institutions, due to the publically available flood of accusations and revelations made during the Cultural Revolution. Instead of looking at China as a unitary rational actor, the factional approach placed greater emphasis on the influence of domestic variables on China’s top decisionmaking elite in the formulation of its foreign policies. In an era of open and fierce factional infighting during the late 1960s and early 1970s, it was only natural to assume that factions in dispute over domestic policy orientations would also have different approaches to foreign policy.

The significance of this school was its contribution to demolishing the concept of a monolithic unified Chinese state and initiating the search for group attributes in the

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process. The significance of the factional school's contribution was impugned in recent years, notably by diplomatic historians. For example, according to Michael Hunt, new archival material from both sides of the Pacific indicated that the factional model offered "little to support even a circumstantial argument for the existence of factions." And at worst, "the model tells us as much about them (those who used the factional model) as it reveals about China."26

**Triangular Approach**

Unlike the factional approach that focused on the internal setting within which decision makers had to operate, the triangular approach that came into vogue in the early 1970s stressed the big-picture global environment, particularly the foreign policy behaviours of the United States and the Soviet Union in relation to China and each other.27 Instead of examining a broader operational field, they narrowed their study to an examination of China's relationship with the other two key players only, and concluded that the so-called strategic triangle was critical to understanding China's foreign policy behaviour. Many theories were advanced concerning what was essentially perceived as a three-power game.28

The triangular approach was largely a variant of the earlier realist, unitary-actor school.

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26 For a detailed critique of the factional model, see Michael Hunt, "'Normalising' the Field" (Paper presented at the Wilson Center Conference on 'CCP External Relations', Washington D. C. June 1992)
27 Ilpyong Kim, ed. *The Strategic Triangle: China, the United States and the Soviet Union* (New York: Paragon House, 1987)
Part of the ambiguity and confusion surrounding this concept lay in the failure of scholars to see that the notion of triangular politics was in itself a complex and fragmentary pattern of political/strategic interaction among the three players. It was a specific form of strategic alliance or rivals which had been employed often in the first half of this century by the European regimes for the political and military balance of power which culminated in the two World Wars. According to Joseph Nogee, the China, US and USSR triangle differed essentially from the notion of tripolarity, which was both a more static concept based largely on the distribution of power among relevant actors and a basically structural feature of the world system or subsystem in the modern world political history. Despite this, with the highs and lows of the Sino-US and Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s and its increasing impact on the world, the triangular perspective was able to maintain its scholastic relevance and attracted supporters for quite some time in the 1980s in the Chinese foreign policy study.

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In summary, despite their focus on different key variables, these five theoretical frameworks, established under the conventional wisdom of Chinese foreign policy study, attempted to apply the classical theories of foreign policy to China’s state behaviour in terms of its position in world affairs. Foreign policy choices were viewed as the more or less purposive acts of a unified state based on logical means of achieving
given objectives.

The conventional study of Chinese foreign policy stressed the rationality of decisionmaking, sourced either from China's own history or from a realist's calculation of its own interest. This was a reflection perhaps of the Western intellectual's faith in the essential rationality of human behaviour, inherited from the Enlightenment. With a gradual erosion of this belief, scholars in recent years shifted their attention from decisionmaking as mere rational choice among possible maximum-utility alternatives to decisionmaking as an incremental process containing partial choices and compromises among competing organisational considerations, bureaucratic pressures and group interests.

New Scholarship

Many scholars became dissatisfied with the earlier conventional models, viewing them either as too simplistic or deterministic. From the mid 1980s to early 1990s, therefore, greater emphasis has been given by scholars to China's foreign policymaking structures and the mind-set/perceptions of those who work in these structures. Substantial interest and efforts were devoted to the more nuanced micro policymaking mechanisms (mostly below the top-level decision makers), and in pre-policy making processes. This new trend of the scholarship could be understood in terms of institutional and perceptual perspectives, which drew on some of the elements from the conventional wisdom, but

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31 Michael Hunt, "Normalising the Field" (Paper presented at the Wilson Center Conference on 'CCP External Relations', Washington D. C. June 1992, pp. 3-5)
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went well beyond it in proposing methodologies and models to explain Chinese foreign policy behaviours in world politics.

This focus was largely the outcome of three developments. Firstly, there had been considerable expansion in research and education in international relations in China in the post-Mao period. Secondly, the opening of China to the outside world had made a vast array of information on the foreign policymaking structure available to Western scholars. Finally the cognitive/decisionmaking approach in favour in mainstream international relations and foreign policy studies was being integrated into the previously more or less self-contained field of Chinese foreign policy.

Institutional Approach

While the rational actor model was still deemed useful, the institutional approach in the 1980s offered two useful frames of reference that focused on the governmental machine instead of state actors: the organisational process model and the bureaucratic politics model.

The organisational process model regarded governmental behaviours less as a matter of deliberate choice and more as independent outputs of several large, key organisations which were only partly controlled and coordinated by government leaders.

behaviour of these organisations was primarily determined by standard or routine operating procedures with only gradual, incremental deviations.\textsuperscript{35}

The bureaucratic politics model, on the other hand, hypothesised intense competition among decisionmaking units with foreign policies resulting from bargaining among the different units within a bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{36} At times, the players were guided less by conceptions of national or even bureaucratic and personal goals. Sometimes, it was a win-or-lose game, but more frequently the result was a decisional compromise, less than what was sought by any individual or group, but the best achievable outcome. The outcome depended not on the rational justification for the policy nor on routine organisational procedures, but rather on the relative power positions and negotiating skill of the bargainers.\textsuperscript{37}

Well before the rise of the institutional approach in decisionmaking theories, some scholars had shifted their focus from the power elite to the study of bureaucratic institutions and structures that supported political power.\textsuperscript{38} In his trail-blazing study \textit{Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China}, Doak Barnett for the first time unequivocally highlighted the importance of perception and bureaucratic


\textsuperscript{36} Graham Allison, \textit{Essence of Decision} (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971, pp. 95-107)

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibid.}

institutions in China’s domestic policymaking mechanism. These early works relied heavily on official documents, both public and internal, and on interviews with mainland refugees elsewhere in the world.\(^{39}\) In the early 1980s, as China embarked on economic reform and opening to the outside world, Western scholars took the opportunity to access the vast Chinese bureaucratic system hitherto closed to outsiders. This increased availability of research materials led to a new crop of studies on the Chinese bureaucratic institutions in the domestic policy process, but most of them were limited to specific fields such as economy or education where interaction with the outside world was relatively intense, reflecting an uneven degree of openness in the Chinese system.

Despite China’s commitment to a more open and transparent system, foreign affairs remained a field that was jealously guarded by the elite and carefully shielded from scrutiny by outsiders due to Chinese sensitivity over the formulation and process of the nation’s foreign policies. China’s increased political, economic, military and academic exchanges across a wide range of fields, however, created many opportunities too for Western scholars to penetrate Chinese government organisations and institutions, including China’s top institutes of international studies.\(^{40}\) As a result, the preemptive roles of these institutions and structures in Chinese foreign policymaking were firmly established supported by convincing data.\(^{41}\)


\(^{41}\) *ibid.*
About 20 years after his work on China’s domestic policymaking process, in 1985 Doak Barnett published the first major study on Chinese foreign policy bureaucratic system decision procedures. *The Making of Foreign Policy in China* was the first successful attempt of this kind to examine, in considerable detail, the major sector of the Chinese foreign policy system. This was followed in 1988 by a more comprehensive and in-depth study of the whole policymaking structure conducted by Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg.

In summary, the new institutional approach believed that the traditional (historical, ideological, rational actor, factional and triangular) models failed to accommodate the evolution of Chinese foreign policy reality in the new era, and they did not capture the important roles of the essential players in the process. The institutional approach believed that the key factors affecting the final outcome in Chinese foreign policy deliberation were organisational processes, bureaucratically based institutions as well as group inputs.

**Perceptual Approach**

Another strand in the new scholarship emphasised the images or perceptions held by Chinese leaders and foreign policy makers at different levels. There were also a

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44 The new interest in how Chinese leaders and scholars viewed the world was also a reaction to the traditional and Marxist ideology approaches of the earlier generations of scholars. While all argued that images matter, the traditional approach argued that the images were based on Chinese traditional and imperial thinking; the Marxist/ideology school held that the relevant images came from ideology; the scholarly focus on images was more complex and certainly incorporated those perceptions that came from day-to-day political reporting and analysis.
45 Some of the major works include David Shambaugh, ed.: *The American Study of Contemporary China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); idem, ‘China’s America Watchers’ *Problems of Communism* (No. 37, May-August 1988); idem, ‘Anti-Americanism in China’ *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*
number of studies that focused on the perceptions and particular groups of Chinese foreign affairs experts on specific countries in an attempt to shed new lights on China's policies toward major powers.46

The perceptual or cognitive/image orientation to the study of Chinese foreign policy was best exemplified by three scholarly works in the late 1980s and early 1990s: Gilbert Rozman's *The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism, 1978-1985*,47 Allen Whiting's *China Eyes Japan*,48 and David Shambaugh's *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990*.49 These studies focused on some principal concerns for contemporary Chinese foreign policy—the relations with the former Soviet Union, Japan and the United States. Taken together, these works broke new ground that led to a deeper understanding of Chinese thinking and its impact on China's foreign policy conceptualisation.

These three studies were quite different both in scope and findings. Rozman and Shambaugh examined the mind-set of those in China who occupied important policy positions and who focused on the former Soviet Union and the United States. Whiting

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probed a broader socio-historical context, examining the popular images of Japan dating back to the turn of the century, and especially those developed in World War II. All three scholars emphasised importance of the recent past when China began to pursue a pragmatic and ‘independent’ foreign policy, but their findings revealed that there were major differences in China's perceptions of these three countries.

Rozman discovered that the Chinese had been developing more positive perceptions of the former Soviet Union from the late 1970s to early 1980s, which paved the way for the eventual normalisation of relations with Moscow. He found that China’s negative perceptions of the Soviet Union gradually declined after more than twenty years of hostility between the two countries, and this generated momentum to improve relations with Moscow during the early 1980s.

Whiting found that an underlying negative image of Japan remained basically unchanged across all levels of the society and policymaking elite due either to historical animosity or to current ignorance of Japan. According to Whiting, most Chinese still had strong negative feelings about Japan dating back to the Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s, but these were often counterbalanced by China's admiration for contemporary Japanese economic efficiency and high-quality consumer products. Mixed feelings among top leadership and vast bureaucrats alike tended to give rise to a poorly orchestrated policy toward Tokyo, which, in Whiting’s view, frequently worked

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50 Allen Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989)
52 ibid.
54 ibid. pp. 87-92
against China's interests. This attitude jeopardised China's interests because better relations with Japan would serve China's modernisation needs. This perception also created difficulties for the Chinese government at home, ranging from spontaneous student-led anti-Japanese demonstrations in the 1980s to reshuffling of top-level elites under the pressure of popular sentiment.

Shambaugh's book was very thorough in documenting the perceptions of China's America watchers over an extended period of time. The work systematically explored both the structure of, and interrelationship between, various agencies of China's foreign policymaking community based on his earlier work and the perceptions of the US by those who worked in these institutions. His main contribution lay in his effort to bridge both institutional and cognitive approaches in the field. In terms of scope and accuracy, Shambaugh’s study surpassed Barnett's 1985 study on the same subject and had no parallel in the books by Rozman and Whiting. Shambaugh’s depiction of China's community of America watchers could also be extended, to a certain degree, to China's foreign policy and international study communities as a whole.

Shambaugh's conclusions, however, were somewhat unexpected and controversial. Despite his concession that there was a learning curve among China's Americanists, he believed that “with a few exceptions, the vast majority of America Watchers in China

55 ibid.
56 For example, the removal of Hu Yaobang, the party's general secretary, in 1987 for his softness toward Japan, which Whiting noted was not the only reason that he was removed. But the Japan factor did contribute to the outcome. See Allen Whiting, *China Eyes Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, pp. 150-153 and p. 184)
58 Bin Yu, 'The Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: Problems and Prospect' *World Politics* (No. 46, January 1994)
do not understand the United States very well". If this finding was fair, a significant 'perceptual gap' on the Chinese side would continue to contribute to the fluctuating nature of Sino-US relations.

This finding was quite different from the observations by Rozman and Whiting in their respective studies of China's images of the Soviet Union and Japan. Both of them detected some general perceptual characteristics and trends among decision makers, scholars, and the general public that could find roughly corresponding patterns in the main thrust of China's policies toward the Soviet Union and Japan.

However, David Shambaugh's argument that China's America watchers were ignorant and critical of the United States might well be superficial—their public views might well be suppressed and might not necessarily reflect their true views about the US. Indeed, opinions publicly expressed by these scholars were frequently different from their writings for internal circulation at various classified levels. The latter tended to be more factual and less ideologically or politically oriented.

It was almost a cliché to say that policy, especially foreign policy, was made on the basis of both perceptions and misperceptions, and that the latter may be more important. The making of China's foreign policy was no exception. Harry Harding speculated that even if China in the future developed political and economic systems

comparable to that of the US and other major powers—therefore closing up gaps in material terms, the different perceptions, culture/values, historical experiences and geopolitical locations would still make for some unavoidable and necessary differences on the same issues.\footnote{Harry Harding, *A Fragile Relationship: The Untied States and China since 1972* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991, pp. 18-19, p. 359)}

By the same token, the image of China in the minds of its foreign counterparts would continue to be rooted deeply in China’s history as a whole rather than judged in terms of its more recent development. In this regard, there would still be a tendency to view China in terms of “simplistic, exaggerated, and emotional images...as ally or adversary, as willing student or as ideological antagonist”.\footnote{ibid. pp. 360-361}

Among other works addressing the relationship between perception and foreign policy, the book by Chih-Yu Shih *The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Psychocultural View* stands out for its unique research methodology. Chih-Yu Shih examined Chinese diplomatic history from a cross-level ‘psychocultural-cybernetic’\footnote{Chih-Yu Shih, *The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Psychocultural View* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990)} perspective. He focused on the cultural-historical context of Chinese leaders such as Li Hongzhang, Yuan Shikai, Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao Zedong, in order to establish linkages between the underlying motivation and the making, implementation, and outcome of foreign policy. He believed the key factor in China's diplomacy was “to maintain the integrity of the national face in front of the world, the internal citizenry, and statesmen themselves.”\footnote{ibid. p. 190} This ‘face-saving diplomacy’, he claimed, was the common denominator among all prominent Chinese foreign policy makers—from the last emperors to the...
nationalist generalissimo and finally to the communists. All of them were the products of the distinctive Chinese mix of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and traditional values.

Shih's book was based on his impressive knowledge of China's cultural heritage and marked by the distinctive methods he employed to argue the case. He conducted an in-depth study into the mind-set of some important foreign policy players in China's diplomatic history, viewed from the perspective of the Chinese cultural context. However, his use of the contemporary Western psychological technique of cybernetics did not seem to advance understanding of contemporary Chinese foreign policy at a more general level.

Gradual Emergence of Motivation as the Main Focus

The above review showed that despite the increasingly rich and diverse literature on Chinese foreign policy and foreign relations since China's opening to the outside world, despite the newly available research information and opportunities, and despite indisputable advance in both the quantity and quality of scholarship, no single existing 'model' seemed to have possessed sufficient analytical power to fully cover the complexity and magnitude of Chinese foreign policy. Precisely because China's sheer physical size and its complex social, historical, cultural, ethnic and demographic dimensions were so diverse, any theoretical attempt must give its object a capacity to absorb strength from other relevant disciplines.

68 ibid. p. 18
The new generation of scholarship on Chinese foreign policy discussed in the previous section not only demarcated new lines of inquiry, but also opened up possibilities for a more comprehensive and thoughtful understanding of China's foreign policymaking institutions and individuals. Its achievements, both in scope and depth, were necessary stepping-stones for the emergence of the current trend of scholarship on the study of motivation of Chinese foreign policy.

In recent years, quite a number of academic works on Chinese foreign policy chose to use interrogative titles. These choices could be said to be deliberately put to convey a growing sentiment of dissatisfaction and perplexedness among scholars as they found inadequacy of theories in the study of Chinese foreign policy. Despite the enormous advance in the study of Chinese foreign policy, as discussed in this chapter, a theory that was capable of handling the magnitude and complexity, the nature and scope of China's foreign policy was still lacking.

This state of affairs nurtured an interest in taking motivation analysis as the main focus in the study of Chinese foreign policy, and a group of scholars took the challenge. This trend was exemplified by such works as *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-Macro Linkage Approach*,71 'Motives of the People’s Republic of China in Contemporary International Relations',72 *The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security*,73 *China’s Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force, and National Development*.

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69 ibid.
70 This kind of interrogative titles are typified by Francis Fukuyama's 1992 essay 'End of History?' in dealing with more generic issues of the international relations, and David Shambaugh's book *Greater China, The Next Superpower*? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) in dealing specifically with Chinese foreign policy.
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Security Policymaking,73 China: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy,74 Useful Adversaries,75 The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China.76 What differentiates these scholars from their predecessors was the attention being paid to the Chinese leadership perceptions of the political obstacles to their grand strategies. Their refocus on the Chinese decision makers’ calculation of high domestic hurdles and international pressure, and on the intense interactive process among all of these factors to manipulate resources to reposition themselves, projected a new insight to the study of Chinese foreign policy decisionmaking process.

Allen Whiting welcomed this new phenomenon by giving it his personal support and encouragement in his recent review essay on Christensen’s Useful Adversaries. Whiting observed that motivational analysis was a tentative option and a valuable research methodology under certain conditions. He argued that motivation approach was especially necessary when “the event is long past, the evidence is partial, and the actors are unavailable.”77 The study of Chinese foreign policy constantly faced the same dilemma and was often handicapped by the unavailability or partial availability of evidence. Whiting predicted that motivation study would prove to offer a special theoretical insight and empirical value to the study of Chinese foreign policy.78

The newly emerged trend of taking motivation analysis as main focus in the study of Chinese foreign policy was a welcoming sign in the field of Chinese foreign policy

74 Michael Swaine, China: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy (Calif.: Santa Monica, RAND, 1995)
75 Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996)
76 Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997)
77 Allen Whiting, 'Leaping over the Great Wall Between Security and China Studies' Security Studies (Vol. 6, No. 4, Summer 1997, p. 188)
78 ibid.
study. There was evidence that the motivation approach has expanded its influence and has gathered momentum to become a significant analytical paradigm in the field of Chinese foreign policy study.

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the literature on the Chinese foreign policy in the broad context of international relations theory. Particular attention was paid to the new scholarship of institutional and perceptual approaches and the emergence of a trend that took interest in investigating Chinese leadership motivation as a crucial analytical variable.

This chapter argued that the complex and dynamic nature of Chinese foreign policy required that concepts or theories posited to explain it should reflect the magnitude of the task and should be robust. However, the immensity of the unknown, the volatility of political developments, the elusiveness of values in quantitative analysis, the intricate interaction between domestic/societal and external/systemic factors and the continuous shifts and changes in the contemporary international system compounded the difficulties in formulating a comprehensive theoretical framework.

This chapter demonstrated that despite indisputable advances in the study of Chinese foreign policy in the last two decades, and despite significant contributions to Chinese foreign policy literature, the limitations of existing analytical methodologies led some scholars to redirect their attention to perceptual/motivation analysis as a more effective alternative in the study of Chinese foreign policy. With newly available evidence and archival information, these scholars produced some fruitful research outcomes that
started to affect the general study of Chinese foreign policy.

This chapter concluded that unlike in democratic systems, politics (especially foreign policy) in China was always conducted in a highly secretive manner with little transparency. This reality made the motivation approach a particularly attractive tool—a way of inferring what was otherwise enclosed and hidden. The newly emerging trend in motivation study tended to confirm the practicality and relevance of this approach. Indeed, one of the principal advantages of adopting the motivation approach was its ability to enhance the visibility of the studied object, thereby making the forecast of future policy directions possible.
PART II

DYNAMICS AND LIMITS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
TRANSFORMATION FROM MAO TO DENG

Part I has identified three elements, i.e. perception, personality and structural/situational constraints, as central to the study of motivation in foreign policy. Part II, by applying deductive methodology, tests the viability and rigour of these examined motivation theories. It does so by reviewing pivotal elements of communist China’s foreign policy considerations in general and the nature of the transformation of the motivation under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership in particular.

There are four chapters in this Part. Chapter Four traces historical and cultural sources of perception that have affected Chinese Communist foreign policy motivation. Chapter Five probes personal attributes of Mao and Deng in shaping contemporary Chinese foreign policy. Chapter Six assesses the impact of structural changes and systemic transformation on the formation of the CCP’s core values in its foreign policy. And Chapter Seven highlights the dynamic nature of Chinese foreign policy by incorporating the analytical outcomes of the previous three chapters. By drawing on existing literature from history and political science, this Part evinces more specifically than has been done previously the way in which perception, personality and structural/situational factors have moulded Chinese foreign policy motivation over different periods and issues.

The main aim of this Part is to hypothesise that in spite of the dramatic transformation in the appearance of Chinese foreign policy in the last 20 years, the central motivation legacy of Mao’s foreign policy remains in place in Deng’s much-championed open and reform era. Part III will provide an empirical case study to verify that general hypothesis.
Chapter Four
Perception—from Besieged Mentality to Pragmatic Global Player

The analysis of motivation theories in Part I has established that there were at least three elements that were essential building blocks of a given country's foreign policy motivation—perception, personality and situational constraints. This chapter examines one of the trio—the role of perception in Chinese foreign policy motivation under both Mao and Deng.

The importance of perception in foreign policy motivation was identified by many scholars, but exactly how much weight perception would exert in a given policy environment depended much on how such a perception itself was formed. Historical sources and political ideology could be two crucial moulding forces that cast leadership perception. For example, Robert Jervis suggested that the principal source of perception or 'image' was stereotyped interpretations of significant historical incidents, particularly wars and revolutions.¹ Both Jervis and Cottam argued that historical experience could be one of the most important ingredients in the crystallisation of perception.² The Hermanns concluded that perception based in past experience, if combined with an extended political culture, would have an enduring effect.³ It was also widely acknowledged that perception was largely grounded on past experience, pressures from current development and the knowledge and inspiration of the leadership.⁴

¹ Robert Jervis, ‘Hypotheses on Misperception’ World Politics (Vol. 20, April 1968, p. 458). He argued that it was impossible to explain important foreign policy decisions without understanding decision makers' beliefs about the world and the motives of other actors in it. Perception and Misperception in International Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 93-105)
² ibid. and Richard Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation (London: Feffer and Simons Inc. 1977, 43-49)
The magnitude and speed of changes in China’s foreign policy decisionmaking and behaviour from 1978 to 1997 were widely acknowledged as a distinctive transformation in China’s foreign policy posture, but scholars remained divided over the question of whether Beijing had abandoned its revolutionary foreign policy philosophy which viewed the world with suspicion and hostility, or whether the changes were merely pragmatic adjustment with the underlying motivation remaining unchanged.\textsuperscript{5} This chapter suggests that some light can be thrown on the motivational foundations of the transformation of China’s foreign policy through an analysis of the concept of perception elucidated in Chapter Two.

This chapter looks at the historical sources and ideological underpinning of the perceptions of various regimes which affected Chinese communist foreign policy motivation. It goes back in time to understand one of the essential ingredients that impacted on the CCP’s perception of world order and its uneasy relations within it. It argues that it was China’s embedded sense of insecurity and siege mentality that were the primary historical sources of Chinese foreign policy perception. This historical heritage was exemplified by the dynastic rulers’ tremendous effort in building the Great Wall throughout thousands of years of the feudal reign, and which was reinforced by another century or so of national humiliation imposed by the Western powers on the modern China. This chapter contends that although China’s pragmatic policies in the last two decades of the twentieth century marked a significant departure from the encircled and isolated mentality in its foreign policy presentation, this historical obsession was nonetheless still a recurring feature in China’s handling of sensitive


\textsuperscript{5} For example, see Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Learning Versus Adaption: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s’ *The China Journal* (No 35, January 1996)
issues such as sovereignty.

This chapter analyses changes in the perception of Chinese leaders by examining four basic questions: What was the historical and ideological foundation of the CCP’s perception in relation to its foreign policy thinking? What were the stimuli that reinforced or reduced the perception intensity in terms of China’s positioning its relations with other countries under different circumstances by the same historical events? How did the regime’s perceptions affect motivation? And finally, how did motivation in turn impact on the leadership’s perceptions?

There are two sections in this chapter. The first deals with historical sources of foreign policy perception by focusing on the single most prominent event in Chinese history—the building of the Great Wall—to demonstrate how at different historical junctures actual and perceived threats could impose enduring effects upon the conceptualising process to produce a threatened and siege mentality. By surveying the political, strategic and military rationales that lay behind the ‘wall-building’ practice in China’s long past, the impact of the rulers’ fixation on a deep-seated dichotomy of ‘others’ vs ‘us’, and their uncompromising attitude to ‘enemies’, are made clear. The second section deals with ideological components and transformation. It investigates China’s more recent communist history by analysing the ideological foundation of the CCP’s foreign policy and the diminishing role of communist ideology in foreign policy perception in the last two decades.
Historical Sources

The diplomatic historian Michael Hunt observed in his 1996 book *The Genesis of Chinese Foreign Policy* that “history is essential and central, not optional and incidental, to an understanding of Chinese foreign policy.”\(^6\) He argued that a more sophisticated historical approach had returned to the centre of focus in the study of Chinese foreign policy after decades of dispute over its real value because such an approach did provide a sense of the enduring pulse of Chinese interaction with the world.\(^7\) According to this view, China’s rich and colourful historical legacy should therefore be unapologetically taken as the logical starting point in understanding the perception of Chinese leaders in their approaches to external relations.

However, the notion of historical sources of Chinese foreign policy perception should not be taken as equating to a single-strand determinism. Instead an inclusive connotation of historical approach should make it possible to accommodate various perspectives. In addition to the presumptuous ‘middle kingdom’ mentality and the indignity of more than a hundred years ‘humiliation’ at the hands of imperialists, ruthless power struggles and constant wars within the interstate system were also important in the Chinese historiography. As shown in such classics of Chinese history as the *Chronicle of the Warring States*\(^8\) and in popular tales such as the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms,*\(^9\) the arts of the polity were displayed in full: temporary

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\(^{7}\) Ibid.

\(^{8}\) Sima Qian, *Chronicles of the Warring States* (Beijing: Shangwu chubanshe, 1922). This is a history book, recording wars and politics in the Chinese warring states period from 480-222 BC.

\(^{9}\) Luo Guanzhong, *San guo yan yi* (*Romance of the Three Kingdoms*), translated by C. H. Brewitt-Taylor (Rutland, Vermont: C. E. Tuttle, 1959). It is a story about politics, military strategies and diplomacy in the three kingdoms period.
accommodation, alliances made and abandoned, ambush and treachery, the careful
cultivation of domestic resources, morale, psychological warfare and raw military
power all occupied important places in the arsenal of the statesmen who wanted to rule
and maintain power.\textsuperscript{10}

With such a rich and diverse repertoire of prolonged war, peace, court politics and
governing arts, and with recurring behaviour patterns towards the outside world, it is
clear that China’s historical development had an enduring impact on its overall foreign
policy thinking. With a few exceptions,\textsuperscript{11} until the mid nineteenth century when
Western powers forced open the door of China to the modern world system, the Chinese
ruling houses demonstrated inward-looking, culturally superior attitudes in dealing with
foreign relations. When a ‘threat’ arose, they quickly returned to the defensive posture
by resuming to build the Great Wall in order to ‘keep out’ enemies, instead of looking
for other options.\textsuperscript{12}

The establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949 was claimed to be a fundamental
revolution in the sense of breaking away from these ideological constraints and adapting
to a new world system of states. However, before China’s open door policy in the late
1970s, China had remained a reluctant player in the international system with rules laid
down by the Western powers (or ‘others’), and had largely isolated itself outside the
increasingly interdependent world. Even in its ambitious attempt to integrate China with

\textsuperscript{10} ibid. Chpts. 2 and 3
\textsuperscript{11} For example, the Yuan (1271-1368) and the Qing. All these dynasties conquered China by force, but they could not
culturally transform it. In fact, the conquerors were forced to assimilate into the Chinese culture for their own
survival and expansion.
\textsuperscript{12} See Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross eds. \textit{The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress} (New York: W.W. Norton,
1997). The Great Wall has given China an unequivocal landmark that finds no easy parallel in other civilisations. The
gradual decline and final fall of the Great Wall during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries and its dramatic
resurrection to the status of national symbol from the beginning of the twentieth century by both the KMT and the
CCP speak profusely of the symbolic importance of the Great Wall to the Chinese political leadership.
the rest of the world in the reform era, the theme of China's humiliation at the hands of
the West and Japan in the last two hundred years was, on many occasions, used
successfully by the CCP to manipulate public anti-foreign sentiment. The CCP's
obsession with history tightly linked China's present to the past.

This paradox meant that the study of historical influences on the Chinese leadership's
foreign policy perceptions must be pursued on two fronts. First, the impact of
extraordinary historical occurrences on perception should be highlighted in order to
better understand the relationship between an historical event and its present-day policy
implications. Second, the reverse effect of a deeply entrenched perception reinforced by
the prolonged and repeated practice (eg. building of the Great Wall) on the Chinese
rulers' strategic thinking and foreign policy choices should be analysed and compared.

Others, Threats and Wall-building

The flourishing and decline of ancient Chinese civilisation was paralleled with perpetual
apprehensions over national security and actual armed conflicts across the northwest
frontiers. Various nomadic tribes followed a pastoral way of life, subsisting on the
products of their flocks, and usually moved with the seasons from one place to
another. Yet until modern weaponry finally shifted the balance, nomads possessed a
powerful military advantage over settled peoples, and from one end of Eurasia to the
other, they were treated as the most dangerous of adversaries. In addition, China's

14 ibid. Edwin Seligman pointed out that "certain pastoral people have built up military organisations formed on
democratic lines, without slaves or social stratification but with rigorous discipline exercised by the elders...The
Manchus, Turks and Mongols not only dominated central Asia in this way but also invaded surrounding regions. In
geographical proximity and relatively advanced agrarian system producing abundant food and other products made it a natural target for nomad’s plunder.

While some might have exaggerated the military prowess of the nomads, ancient Chinese writers were quite correct when they pointed out the disproportionate military effectiveness of nomadic forces when compared with the Chinese. The Chinese, like other settled peoples in most of the Eurasian continent, had no reliable military solution. To assault the nomads on their own terms was difficult: logistically, horses did not flourish in China and peasants made poor cavalrymen. Yet defence was also not a fully satisfactory option either: it was hard to hold a long perimeter in the face of a mobile foe, and it was very costly.

This dilemma forced the ruling classes to opt for two strategies in order to thwart the menace—moral campaigns to condemn the injustice of aggression and building a defence line in China’s northwest to maximise its military capability and to stop the invaders from trespassing.

The traditional Chinese moral campaigns aimed at implanting a perception of inferiority of nomads and ingraining this image in the whole Chinese society. Typical Chinese views usually depicted nomads as making war on settled societies simply because it was

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16 Gerald Segal, *Defending China* (London: Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 55-57)
in their nature. *Shi Ji*\(^{18}\) had the following paragraph describing the *Xiong-nu*\(^{19}\):

> It is their custom to herd their flocks in times of peace and make their living by hunting, but in periods of crises they take up arms and go off on plundering and marauding expeditions. This seems to be their inborn nature.\(^{20}\)

From the first few centuries of the first millennium, nomads were attacked for their physical lowliness to stress their moral unworthiness. For example, *Han Shu* defined the same people as “covetous for gain, human-faced but animal-hearted.”\(^{21}\) Just as their nature marked the limits of human character, so their homeland was thought of as the edge of the world.\(^{22}\) The *Xiong-nu* were believed to dwell in the north where the harsh climate and austere living conditions matched their cruelty and barbarism.\(^{23}\) *Shi Ji* repeatedly called the *Xiong-nu’s* lands “unfit for habitation; they were nothing but swamps and saline wastes.”\(^{24}\) In military skirmishes, when ‘chased’ by Chinese troops, the *Xiong-nu* would hide in “the north of the desert in a cold bitter land where no other lives exist.”\(^{25}\)

It is interesting to compare these stereotyped description of *Xiong-nu* with those of the Westerners from overseas in Qing time. Wang Chung Yang portrayed the British as having “the beaks of eagles, the eyes of cats, red beards and hair, and long legs which

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\(^{19}\) *Xiong-nu* referred to nomads in today’s Mongolian areas, or ‘barbarians’ as they were called.


\(^{22}\) *ibid.*


\(^{24}\) Quoted in *ibid.* p. 53

\(^{25}\) *ibid.* p. 55
could not bend, making it impossible for them to run or jump." These derogatory images were comparable to those of fierce-looking Xiong-nu described above. The physical and cultural inferiority formed the Chinese rulers' perceptions, and popular perceptions, of 'others'.

The ruthless attacks on the moral worthlessness of the enemies paved the way for the Chinese ruling houses to justify their defence strategy of building the Great Wall as a military means to ward off danger. The Great Wall was designed not only to protect Chinese territory, but also to safeguard the civilisation from moral decay. These perceptions about nomads, and later, Westerners, were central to construe the dilemmas of the wall-building syndrome by the dynasty rulers, whose handicapped military capability had to rely on moral righteousness for justification. On the one hand, the military advantage of nomads was extremely difficult to challenge; on the other hand, the willingness on the Chinese side to meet and manage nomadic conditions for peace and to reduce the threat of aggression were often at odds with fundamental cultural norms. Under these circumstances, wall-building, with its overriding motivation to keep out the nomads was the logical solution to the quandary.

Mark Mancall observed that before they adopted their predecessors' old tactics of wall-building, almost all dynasties went through the cycle of appeasement/accommodation with and confrontation of the nomads: the former tried to meet many of the basic needs from both sides, but almost all accommodation policies were gradually displaced by a more uncompromising attitude because of the inevitable intensification of court politics,

which often resorted to increasing cultural pressures to crush the opponents. Once further concession was ruled out as a means of dealing with the on-going danger, the choice facing dynastic rulers was limited to either attempted conquest or exclusion. As discussed above, since offensive warfare was extremely costly and almost impossible, the ultimate choice, at the end of each cycle, was usually to return to consolidation of the northern frontiers by repeated efforts to continue wall-building.

The pivotal question, however, was why a more accommodating policy could not prevail and persist, if it seemed to be in the practical interest of the ruling house. This provoking question was constantly asked by Arthur Waldron in his book *The Great Wall of China*. He maintained that to understand the chronic wall-building syndrome, the civilian politics and the fundamental cultural orientation in defining it beyond the border held the key. He argued that the Chinese rulers' belief, which was cultivated by cultural traditions, had been well established long before the nomads appeared. This belief system provided no intellectual framework to deal with people as different in every respect as the nomads. Furthermore this belief system simply could not accommodate the degree of equality and reciprocity required for a smooth working relationship with the nomads and their increasing demands on the Chinese empire.

These policy choices lay at the heart of Chinese concepts of morality and cultural superiority. As a result, while accommodation could be practised temporarily, it could never legitimately be elevated to become a strategy without also violating moral

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28 Mark Mancall, *China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1984, pp. 56-61)
30 *ibid.* pp. 132-135
31 *ibid.*
32 *ibid.*
Chapter Four

norms. And as long as the Chinese dynastic rulers continued to perceive ‘others’ and their ‘threats’ from these perspectives, to build and reinforce the Great Wall along the northern border seemed to be the only rational option for them.

The Effect of Wall-building on Perception

So far it has been made clear that one common theme that ran through Chinese dynastic foreign policy thinking was that the rulers’ perception of enemies and their perils often led to the recurring policy of building or reinforcing the Great Wall as a last defence. In Part I of this thesis, it was established that a perception could be strengthened by a repeated policy or action. What was, then, the consequent effect of the strategy of wall-building on the Chinese rulers’ foreign policy perception, past and present? This section concludes that although the wall-building syndrome was the direct result of the perception of the dangers posed by ‘barbarians’ on the part of the dynasty rulers as well as the indirect consequence of a combination of moral self-definition and military incapability, the chronic practice of seeking refuge behind the Great Wall over a long period of time had a crippling effect on the ruler’s strategic thinking, and it reinforced the original Chinese sense of besiegement and distrust in its foreign policy motivation.

More importantly, this reverse effect on China’s foreign policy perception seemed to outlast the wall-building activities. Arthur Waldron recapitulated that, in the later years of China’s long feudal reign, the building of the Wall became a symbol rather than having any military utility. For example, when the construction work was still proceeding on the Great Wall in the Ming period, the dynasty fell into the hands of

33 ibid. p.156
Manchu state, initially a typical frontier polity, which grew up like others on the margins of China.\textsuperscript{35} The Great Wall, like the French Maginot Line, turned out to be of little use when real invasion occurred.

The real value of the Great Wall’s building was, however, lying more in its psychological potency of moral inimitability than in military \textit{raison d’être}. It was arguable that had the Ming taken an active interest in steppe politics, they might have been able to control the Manchu threat before it grew too strong. This could have been achieved by using trade and diplomacy to cement a bilateral relationship, while simultaneously seeking to develop some Mongol military counterweight to the Manchu threat.\textsuperscript{36} The political problems that earlier beset the court policy toward the nomads from Mongolia were applied toward the Manchus as well. The same kind of political squabbles and moral controversy contributed to the effective elimination of this option.\textsuperscript{37} The various dynasty rulers’ intellectual ability for policy judgement regarding peace or war, concession or confrontation, hostility or ‘kinship-making’ (\textit{he-qin}) was severely circumscribed by the same overwhelming perceptual bias, which at once had to uphold the belief of Chinese moral supremacy and respond to the insurmountable military hegemony from the outside. The cycle of wall-building practice in turn further reinforced this sense of isolation and siege. The Manchu conquest in the seventeenth century eventually brought down the Great Wall and forced China to open its frontier to foreign partition. This was the beginning of China’s modern chapter of ‘humiliation’

\textsuperscript{34} ibid. pp. 211-223  
\textsuperscript{36} Thomas Barfield, ‘The Hsiung-nu Imperial Confederacy: Organisation and Foreign Policy’ \textit{Journal of Asian Studies} (Vol. 41, No. 1, 1981, p. 31)  
history which the Wall was designed to prevent in the first place.38

The upshot of this historical event left a profound impact on the CCP’s foreign policy perception, with different intensities, in both the Mao and Deng eras. The CCP inherited at least two unmistakable historical legacies in its foreign policy thinking. One was the siege mentality, the other a deep suspicion and distrust of ‘others’.

i) The Siege Mentality

As discussed above, for almost all Chinese ancient rulers, the decision of ‘to build’ or ‘not to build’ the Great Wall did not come automatically as the first and only option to deal with domestic and foreign problems. As Owen Lattimore found, court politics was also ridden with political contention, disagreement and policy stalemate rather than commanding a cohesive and unified wall-building policy consensus.39 Just as there was no single, enduring border established in ancient times, so there was no single fixed security policy for each and all dynasties.40 Rather, at various times, a whole series of policy possibilities were adopted and tried out, such as offensive military action, diplomatic persuasion and economic integration.

Although wall-building often won the debate within the ruling classes as an ultimate measure for dealing with the problems in political, ideological and military conflicts with nomads, it was by no means the only policy choice. The realisation that the

nomads could not simply be defeated led the Tang and Han, for example, to develop policies that sought to manage the threat either by economic and diplomatic exchanges, or by using these in combination with military pressures. The Han model of this approach was called "he qin", meaning literally "peaceful and friendly relations", and was followed for nearly sixty years. It combined the establishment of kinship and blood ties with the opening of markets on the borders and the payment of subsidies to the nomads by the Chinese. A treaty was signed between Han and Xiong-nu declaring that a Chinese princess was to be married to the nomadic ruler.

However, the influence of these gestures on the Chinese diplomatic record was almost negligible compared with the dominant besieged world view. Even the much-used tributary system in the fifteenth century, with its more open economic relationship with the peripheral peoples in the following centuries, did not change the Chinese

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43 ibid. pp. 15-18
44 ibid. pp. 41-42. However, "he qin" policy was not a complete success. Hostility continued while the dynasty suffered material loss. Most importantly, it was viewed with deep disapproval from moral stand: to recognise the leader of the nomads as a brother, to marry even a very minor royal princess into his line, to deliver Chinese goods to the "barbarians"—all flew in the face of attitudes about Chinese culture that were deeply entrenched even in this early period of the imperial state. It is worth quoting Jia Yi’s criticism on such a policy at length, because it was revealing that what really upset some in the Han court was its incompatibility with Chinese ideas of hierarchy. He said: “The situation of the empire may be described as like that of a person hanging upside down. The Son of Heaven is the head of the empire. Why? Because they should remain on the top. The barbarians are the feet of the empire. Why? Because they should be placed at the bottom. Now, the Xiong-nu are arrogant and insolent on the one hand, and invade and plunder us on the other hand, which must be considered as an expression of extreme disrespect toward us. And the harm they have been doing to the empire is boundless. Yet each year Han provides them with money, silk floss and fabrics. To command the barbarian is the power vested in the Emperor on the top, and to present tribute to the Son of Heaven is a ritual to be performed by the vassals at the bottom. Hanging upside down like this is something beyond comprehension.” ibid. pp. 10-12
45 The tribute system was a structure of fictive kinship through which non-Chinese rulers accepted a position of ritual subordination to the Chinese emperor. This relationship was expressed through periodic missions, in which the tributary or his envoys would present goods and perform required rituals, in return for Chinese patronage and gifts. See John Fairbank and Edwin Reischauer, East Asia: The Great Tradition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960). Tributaries might call for Chinese help if attacked, while the exchange of tribute and gifts amounted to a form of trade. Modern scholars have drawn on Qing’s practice of tribute system and argued that this system and belief in it pretty well defined pre-modern international relations in East Asia, in a Sino-centric way. Furthermore such a mental tendency was said to have significantly influenced the contemporary outlook of the Chinese foreign policy. See John Fairbank, ‘A Preliminary Framework’ The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 1-19)
fundamental rejection of the outside world, either. The final return to an enclosed and inward-looking wall-building posture at the end of almost every dynastic cycle reflected the persistence and dominance of the siege mentality among the ruling classes. As Arthur Waldron incisively pointed out:

> the failure to reconcile pragmatic and idealised visions of the world, and the tendency to inject morality into political controversies, are two of the policy’s most enduring characteristics.

When in 1644 the Manchus seized the throne of China, the Great Wall finally collapsed and lost its economic, political and military functions. No longer did it mark a military or even a national boundary: the Qing held the territory on both sides of the Wall. And whatever abstract philosophical significance the Wall might once have had as a dividing line between ‘barbarism’ and ‘civilisation’ was also necessarily expunged.

As mentioned above, the siege mentality did not dissipate with the end of feudal rule in China. On the contrary, the nationalist and communist regimes in the twentieth century fortified the siege mentality in their foreign policy conceptualisation. For example, by providing a set of strong self-sufficient and self-reliant political, ideological, military,

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46 For example that Ming’s tribute system worked was to some extent due to the fact that the nomads had their own rationalisation of the concept of ‘tribute’, one which gave them a high status in a way that mirrored what the Chinese saw in the system. Thus the Mongols believed that because they had helped the Ming in its empire building, they were entitled to the goods derived from tribute presentation. See John Fairbank and Edwin Reischauer, *East Asia: The Great Tradition* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960). According to Henry Serruys, Mongol chronicles were “poor witnesses to the exact nature of the events, but they clearly reflect a tradition among the Mongols that return gifts for their tribute were a tribute to them, non-payment of which was apt to trigger instant retaliation.” See Henry Serruys, ‘Sino-Mongol Relations During the Ming, II. The Tribute System and Diplomatic Missions (1400-1600)’, quoted in Arthur Waldron, *The Great Wall of China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 85). So for the Ming system to work, it required accommodation from both sides, and when unwillingness prevailed over the court to simply let tribute be the rubric for trade, conflicts inevitably occurred. It was also this unwillingness to trade with the Mongols and being unable to defeat them militarily that, by the middle of the sixteen century, the Ming had no policy choice left but to resume large-scale wall-building activities in an attempt to exclude the nomads by artificial barriers. Thus from then on to the end of the century witnessed the heyday of wall-building in China. The Great Wall now visible is the remain of the defence system of that era. This self-besieged and isolated mentality in the Chinese part showed the insurmountable hurdle in a clean breakaway from that tradition. In other words, the ‘spell of the Great Wall’ (Lu Xun’s description of the suffocating historical burden of the Great Wall on the Chinese) seemed to have fast fixed on the Chinese minds.
social and economic nation-building arguments, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution demonstrated this inclination to be a powerful source to have continuously influenced the CCP’s foreign policy deliberation process.

ii) Suspicion and Distrust of ‘Others’

Closely related to the siege mentality was the warily suspicious nature and easily-indulged distrust of ‘others’ in traditional Chinese communist foreign policy. Strong suspicion and distrust of various Chinese regimes had certainly existed prior to the CCP, and it seemed to deepen with the decline and final fall of the Great Wall as the Manchus successfully expanded to both sides of the Wall in the north, and as the Western powers infiltrated Chinese territories in the southeast from the nineteenth and the early twentieth century. From the Chinese communist perspective, China had experienced nothing but subjugation and disparagement by the international conspiracy of imperialist forces from then until 1949. All these events further cemented an already deep-rooted suspicion and distrust in the minds of the Chinese communist leaders regarding the motivation of any Western powers towards China. This became an essential point of departure for Chinese communist foreign policy and lay at the heart of Chinese foreign policy conceptualisation.

The Western presence in China ushered in great changes in the mid nineteenth century. This new situation was also characterised by the military superiority of the enemy—only this time it was much more powerful. The ominous Western threat caught

China unprepared, not only because of the direction from which it came, but also because of its indisputable military strength.\textsuperscript{50} The fundamental difference lay in the fact that the West was not a nomadic power, but rather a maritime one. Li Hong Zhang, a high official of the Qing court who signed the third treaty which ceded the New Territories to the British rule in 1897, was reported as saying that the awesome military power of the West was demonstrated by its devastating cannon which could destroy China’s ‘strongest positions’, leaving coastal and inland strongholds ‘defenceless’. He thus concluded that the West was the most powerful enemy that China had ever faced during the past several thousand years.\textsuperscript{51} When comparing modern Westerners with the nomads, he noted that:

China’s frontier problems usually occurred in the northwest where the strength of China equalled that of the invaders. Besides, there was a demarcation line in the Great Wall between China and the foreign land. But today our southeast coast of more than ten thousand li is open to foreigners for commercial and missionary purposes...This is indeed a changed situation which we have not seen during the past several thousand years.\textsuperscript{52}

Indeed, that experience in China’s modern history, beginning with the Opium War against Britain and ending with the Yalta concessions to the USSR, was essentially one of humiliation and a one-sided struggle. The late Qing and the Republican eras in the early 1900s witnessed China’s loss of strategic control over its periphery, the imposition of a series of unequal treaties, invasion by Western forces with the capital falling twice, a carving up of China proper into spheres of foreign influence, and finally occupation by Japan. This long string of setbacks no doubt imprinted even deeper a distrust of

\textsuperscript{49} ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} Arthur Waldron, \textit{The Great Wall of China} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 211-221)
\textsuperscript{52} ibid. p. 158
'others' on the perceptions of Chinese revolutionary leaders towards international affairs.

Although the CCP official line was that the only past that was meaningful was the recent one, defined in terms of oppression and struggle against Western powers over the last century and a half, the historical impact in reality went back much further and deeper as demonstrated from the above analysis. Built into mythical proportions, this orthodoxy contributed to the rise of a revolutionary spirit, the triumphant eradication of imperialist influence within China. It led to the emergence of a post-1949 foreign policy with the principles of full and formal reciprocity and equality in dealing with others, and of opposition to great power dominion.\(^{53}\)

This officially sanctioned history reserved an important place in Chinese history textbooks to articulate the CCP's interpretation of the pivotal relations between history and its foreign policy. It also provided 'hard evidence' to be repeatedly denounced of the atrocities committed under foreign imperialists. Although the emotional power of anti-imperialism drained away substantially as the pre-1949 period faded away in the broad canvas of Chinese history, to be replaced by a more pragmatic economic and modernisation program, the deep-seated distrust of 'others' from those particular pages of historical feuds was a persistent element in the Chinese leadership's perception of the outside world.

Ideological Components and Transformation

The motivation theories by Jervis, Cottam and Carlsnaes also gave much emphasis to the role of ideology in foreign policy motivation through the perception process. They argued that ideology often could be manipulated by political leaders to mobilise public sentiment and popular mental readiness which were needed to support a specific foreign policy. Ideology was also often important in selecting and accepting assumptions, expectations, views and preferences that formed part of conceptualising process.54

In much of the Chinese communist history, including foreign policy, ideology played a crucial role. Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought was once elevated to a divine status during the radical Cultural Revolution years. Ideology was empowered with magic force that was said to be able to overcome any difficulty. However, ideology as a main variable for explaining Chinese politics began to lose significance not long after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. Superseded by various more sophisticated social science models, ideological justification seemed to quickly become outmoded under modernisation pressures from Chinese society.55 When Deng consolidated his power, he pragmatically proclaimed an end to the ideological politics of the Mao era, and declared that the party’s work focus should shift to the more urgent tasks of building national wealth and strength.56 However, even in the heyday of relative political freedom before June 1989, when an unprecedented ‘liberal’, open and reform consensus prevailed within the party, Deng and the CCP top leadership were quite unprepared to

relinquish Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought entirely, or to permit the proponents of other ideologies to challenge the party’s authority as the highest arbiter of power. After the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, there was a panicky effort by some party conservatives trying to restore a unified ideology as a regulatory mechanism within the party and society. Although it was never again restored its previous glory, such attempts indicated that the CCP leaders valued a continuing role for ideology in their policy considerations and recognised its importance in legitimating their political rule.

In seeking to define the ideology that inspired and guided the CCP’s policy approaches to its external relations, scholars came to no simple conclusion about one single line of ideology being adhered by the CCP. As Steven Levine pointed out:

Many of the ideas that the leaders of the People’s Republic of China consciously brought to the foreign policy arena derived from the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, a formal system of ideas which provided a perceptual prism through which they viewed the world and which, they believed, explained reality. An additional cluster of ideas, values, assumption, and prejudices—an informal ideology which often operated at an unconscious level—also shaped the external outlook and influenced the foreign policy choices of Chinese elites.57

Represented by Mao and his comrades, the CCP’s ideological foundation began with a youthful preoccupation with restoring the nation’s proud past that in turn gave way to a formal party orthodoxy derived from the Comintern.58 The ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and Deng’s socialism with Chinese characteristics were by no means fixed nor static. Orthodoxy itself was in turn subject to constant revision,

reinterpretation and transformation to satisfy situational *sine qua non*. In Deng’s reform decades, virtually all of the specific features of radical Maoism were in practice jettisoned by the CCP leadership, but at the same time the party insisted on the continuing validity of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. This, along with the socialist road, the people’s democratic dictatorship, and the leadership of the Communist Party, were proclaimed as the Four Cardinal Principles, the unshakeable political pillars of China’s course of modernisation.\(^59\) In this sense, ideology functioned as both an embellishment and as an essential basis of policy legitimacy.

The century of humiliation was always a favoured point of reference, both within China and outside, for explaining the CCP’s basic policy stance toward foreign culture and powers. Some scholars contended that this explanation, with excessive emphasis on China’s abasement seemed incomplete. Humiliation and subjugation were themselves hardly unique in history, as they were the sorry experience of many peoples and cultures in the three centuries of Western colonisation and domination over large sweeps of the rest of the world. Suffering humiliation did not predetermine behaviour—it resulted in a range of responses from capitulation and/or collaboration to desultory resistance to persistent, organised struggles for cultural or national revitalisation.\(^60\)

The narrowly defined terms of reference of this humiliation-revolution formula accentuated the Chinese intolerance of and indignation at foreign domination and to define the course of actions in causal and absolute terms, as discussed in detail in the

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previous section of this chapter. However, this approach would only make sense in the case of China if this experience was put into the context of a tradition of a strong and continuous state.\textsuperscript{61}

In addition to the Marxism-Leninism, the formal founding of the CCP in 1921 started the process of creating a party creed which brought together the strands of patriotism and nationalism, and gave expression to a lasting and deep-seated commitment to the state.\textsuperscript{62} It helped the CCP to speak across political lines and unify them. Patriotism and nationalism themselves served as a kind of bridge for the first generation of Chinese communists, including the survivors of the numerous unrelenting power struggles within the party who later led the party to power. This generation of communists came to the conclusion that rebuilding the Chinese state was inextricably tied not just to revolutionising China but also to transforming the international order.\textsuperscript{63}

In the 1930s and 1940s, when the CCP confronted a number of vital foreign policy issues directly concerned with its own quest for power, the Leninist concept of a united front provided a basic ideology for foreign relations, a set of axioms to be used in analysing China’s relations with particular foreign actors, and a vocabulary of discourse.\textsuperscript{64} Ideology gave a general framework within which the CCP leaders could evaluate relations with other powers and states. Some scholars believed that rather than providing a set of prescriptions that the CCP could follow blindly, Marxist-Leninist ideology actually empowered the party. Its commitment to Marxism-Leninism inspired a high degree of confidence in the party leaders’ ability and gave them a methodology

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{61} \textit{ibid.}
    \item \textsuperscript{62} Edgar Snow, \textit{Red Star over China} (New York: Gove Press, 1961, pp. 55-58)
    \item \textsuperscript{63} \textit{ibid.} pp. 123-132
\end{itemize}
to identify and unite with optimal coalition partners. Notably, after the establishment of the People’s Republic, in foreign policy arena, China played largely by the conventional international rules, apart from a brief aberration in the height of the Revolution in the 1960s.

The disparity between formal ideology and the specific foreign policies the CCP pursued characterised the role of ideology in post-1949 Chinese foreign policy. The towering ideology of Marxism-Leninism served a dual purpose in these early years of the People’s Republic. As an international linking mechanism, it connected China with the socialist camp through a range of interest commonalities, symbols, political rituals and slogans. At the same time, it served as a boundary marker, demarcating the inner world of socialism from the outer world of China’s ideological adversaries across in the imperialist camp.

In the early 1960s, Mao’s polemic assaults against Khrushchev’s ‘revisionist’ policies were carried out in the name of defending the revolutionary legacy of Lenin and Stalin. The breakaway from the Soviet Union demonstrated the profound commitment of Mao and his lieutenants to defend their ideological principles. The ideological conflicts between the two communist giants were not an abstract philosophical disputation. They impacted directly on quite a number of issues concerning domestic and foreign policies that affected the redistribution of power and authority inside China and within the

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65 For example, see Steven Levine, ‘Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy’ Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh eds. Chinese Foreign Policy—Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 35-36)
67 Ibid.
international communist movement.  

This ideological high was in sharp contrast to the subsequent and distinct lowering of China’s international ideological profile in the post-Mao period. The revolutionary, transformative rhetoric of Maoist ideology was shelved in favour of a much softened language in correspondence with China’s effort to be a rule-playing member in the prevailing world system.

As Samuel Kim noted, the expression of China’s foreign policy ideology in the reform era was largely cautious and pragmatic, aiming at the long term need to establish and maintain a placid external environment conducive to continued economic growth and prosperity. Such a policy outcome was marked by the maintenance of positive diplomatic, political and economic relations with virtually every foreign country, especially with nearby Asian neighbours. It involved recognition of the importance of a comprehensive security strategy that combined political, cultural and economic means, not just military power, and a belief that China faced no pressing external military threat. China’s foreign policy pragmatism also suggested the need to preserve continued good relations with the United States and to provide limited support for multilateral efforts in UN initiatives and other regional activities. Chinese involvement in regional activities was intended to promote a more acceptable pattern of behaviours

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68 ibid. pp. 18-19
69 ibid. pp. 33-34
72 ibid.
in the region, and to convey an image of Chinese cooperation.\textsuperscript{74}

However, ideology died hard in China. Instead of disappearing as a contending factor from the perceptual process of Chinese foreign policy motivation, ideology was redefined many times to compete for its place in the new explanatory paradigm. The concepts and language of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought continued to inform the thinking of Chinese political leaders, and they continued to justify their foreign policy choices in ideological terms, albeit in a more moderated way.

During the 1980s and the 1990s, CCP leaders consistently claimed that Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought was China's long-term ideological framework within which, over many decades, fundamental social values and a developing economy were constructed.\textsuperscript{75} This official ideology was extended to the realm of foreign policy. In the same period of time, Chinese leaders discarded the old jargon of class struggle and world revolution, but kept Marxist peace and development theories to justify their use of conciliatory leverage in pragmatic diplomatic manoeuvre.\textsuperscript{76} It was this change in ideological emphasis that paved the way for Beijing to gradually normalise its relations with two of its major adversaries of the preceding decades, the Soviet Union and India. But it should be noted that the salience of ideology in China's actual foreign relations varied with respect to countries, issues, geographical areas and time periods. As Steven Levine observed, the erosion of ideology transformed it from a sacred guide to something like a catalogue from which the CCP leadership could pick and choose those

\textsuperscript{74} ibid. pp. 27-31  
\textsuperscript{76} ibid.
items to suit its purposes.\(^{77}\) In general terms, he pointed out, ideology continued to form the perceptual foundation of Chinese political leaders and to have both prescriptive and proscriptive functions in Chinese foreign policy.\(^{78}\)

The CCP's accomplishment as a mature and skilful ideology operator was encapsulated in the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union in early 1990s. Although the event stunned the CCP leadership, Deng Xiaoping and his team did not prematurely retreat to the easy alternative of returning China to Mao's isolated socialist orthodoxy. Instead, Deng paradoxically issued a series of warnings to the party officials reaffirming that to accelerate and deepen the reform process was the only hope for China if it wished to avoid the same fate of disintegration and disunity of the Chinese nation. This incident manifested the CCP's renewed commitment to a prudently balanced ideology in China's domestic and foreign affairs. In this context, ideology was again defined within a Chinese context as the value framework for conducting internal and external affairs.

**Conclusion**

This chapter examined two important variables that induced the Chinese foreign policy perceptions: its long cultural tradition with a Chinese specific cognition, and its ideological crusade and transformation. The analytical parameters based on these two fundamentals helped to clarify the perceptual procedures of the making of the CCP's

\(^{77}\) *Ibid.* p. 45

\(^{78}\) *Ibid.* pp. 46-47. For example, the gloss for the debate within the system over the nature of the world environment in 1989 were these two kinds: a) a peaceful, benign perception and, b) hostile, conspiratorial forces engaging in peaceful evolution.
foreign policy motivation, against a background of rapid changes in political, economic, military and social contexts in both domestic and international scenes. It argued that although perception was not and did not equate to foreign policy motivation, this policy motivation, nonetheless, was built on the perceptual source, and at times could be identified to be directly related to foreign policy itself.

This chapter found that one significant commonality in foreign policy practice in imperial China was the repeated effort by rulers to erect a boundary to protect Chinese unity. The prolonged practice of this political, diplomatic and military strategy profoundly shaped the view through which the world was configured by the Chinese ruling classes. The deep-rooted siege mentality and distrustful nature of the Chinese foreign policy proved to be a consequence of the reverse effect of the cognitive process—the practice of wall-building on the Chinese perception of 'others' and its relations with them in the international setting.

It remained much the same in terms of ideology. In one form or another, ideology played a role in the perceptual system of foreign policy motivation of every state. This chapter confirmed that what distinguished the CCP from many other countries, particularly in the early years, was the elevation of the highly articulated and systematic ideology of Marxism-Leninist in the realm of foreign policy. However, the application of ideology was flexible and often open to different interpretations as demonstrated by China’s foreign policies towards the USSR and the US in the 1960s and the 1970s. The relative decline of ideology in the Deng era reflected a weakening of orthodoxy and rigidity in the interpretation and application of ideology to Chinese foreign policy analysis. As a consequence, the importance of ideology was reduced and it played a
diminished role in setting the Chinese foreign policy agenda. Instead, ideology in Deng's reform period tended to function as an *ad hoc* or interim measure to serve the multiple and changing needs of the CCP as it pursued a wider range of interests in economic domain and the world affairs. China's extended cultural background and its own path of modernisation, compounded with indigenous and imported ideologies, were accountable for advancing a comprehensive understanding of the role of perception in its foreign policy motivation process.
Chapter Five

Personality—Leaders and the Role of the Cadre System

In Chapter Two the role of political leaders and political elites in the motivation process of foreign policy was explored. Margaret Hermann and Richard Snyder, among others, argued that the qualitative input by such leaders or groups was important, sometimes critical. Personal attribute variables interacted within a certain political setting and cultural context, and could increase pressure on the overall motivation system. They emphasised that weight of the personality in a given foreign policy environment could be determined as much by individual effort as by political culture.

This chapter examines Chinese foreign policy motivation from a personality perspective as defined above. It focuses primarily on the personalities of two Chinese paramount leaders—Mao and Deng, and the aggregate character of the CCP cadre system, through which those individual political leaders stamped their personality on the policymaking and implementation process. The intimate link between the individual leaders and the structure or system highlights the ultimate statecraft of 'rule by man' in China’s political system. The CCP cadre system not only formed the backbone of the massive

\[1\] See Chpt. 2 of this thesis.
\[2\] ibid.
\[3\] ibid.
\[4\] 'Rule by man' (renzhi) as a traditional governing art was opposed to the concept of 'rule by law' (fazhi). It was the predominant philosophy of social notion of status and control that have prevailed in Chinese society. The Chinese political system not only produced some specific individual personalities, but also created this elite class with a distinctive and recognisable characteristic to support the smooth running of the state apparatus. The Confucian origin of 'rule by man' could be noted that rule by example by a virtuous ruler was held in higher esteem than rule that depended on fear of punishment. Hence shame gave rise to li (rules of proper conduct) and fear to fa (law). The Analects of Confucius (II:3) provides the classical context: "The Master said, 'Guide them by edicts, keep them in line with punishments, and the common people will stay out of trouble but will have no sense of shame. Guide them by virtue, keep them in line with the rites (li), and they will, besides having a sense of shame, reform themselves.'" However, for many CCP leaders, 'rule by man' equated 'rule by power', and it was a given that was inherently enshrined in their rulers' status. The function of this ruling system was different from that of the bureaucratic structure in Western democracies, which was supposed to be politically neutral and regulated by law.
Chinese state apparatus, but also was the political powerbroker and lieutenant to smooth the paths for the party to achieve policy objectives. In this sense, this cadre system was a special variant of the institutional form of Chinese leadership’s personal power and was the embodiment of an extended political culture of ‘rule by man’.

This chapter is comprised of two sections to further investigate these two aspects of the role of personality in Chinese foreign policy motivation. The first section reviews the personalities and work styles of Mao and Deng, and their personal imprints on Chinese foreign policy decisionmaking. It explores their personal attributes, in particular, Mao’s deep distrust of bureaucracy and institutional arrangements in managing political and economic affairs, and Deng’s predominant pragmatism in framing Chinese foreign policy.

In the second section, the aggregate features of the ruling CCP cadre system are analysed against the backdrop of the Chinese political culture of ‘rule by man’. As a logical extension and natural spillover of the practice of personalised politics in much of Chinese political history, the influence of the CCP cadre system through its organisational and structural controls and its evolution in the Chinese political system is assessed.

This chapter concludes that despite the great changes that have taken place during the reform era, the CCP remained jealous of its own state power and was determined to continue tight control over the nation’s high political process. It is argued that past revolutionary practice and the top leadership’s expectation of a strong and reliable cadre contingent dictated that changes in the CCP’s cadre system could only be gradual. This state of affairs weighed heavily on the social personality formation of CCP leaders, and
contributed to the leaders’ mental preparedness and preferences within which Chinese foreign policy was conceived and implemented.

Leaders

The most important characteristic of China’s foreign policy decisionmaking was that it was highly centralised and that, in terms of key decisions, it was very much personalised.\(^5\) This was true both in the Mao and Deng eras, despite steady institutionalisation in the reform period. The degree and extent of this personalised political process was both deep-seated and pervasive, not only when compared with the general practice in the West but also when compared with decisionmaking in China over matters purely of domestic concern.\(^6\) The key foreign policy decisions included those that concerned questions of the basic orientation of national strategic posture, decisions over military operations that involved actual or potential conflicts with foreign powers, decisions in the formulation of regional policy and policies towards key world powers like the United States, the former USSR and Japan.\(^7\)

In referring to the role of leaders’ personality in Chinese domestic and foreign policies, no one rivalled Mao or Deng. In other words, in terms of analysing personality and the CCP’s external policy, there is little need to look beyond those two men.\(^8\) The two paramount figures possessed very different personalities, and they impacted on the Chinese foreign policy discourse in very different manners. For example, Mao’s view of

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\(^6\) *ibid.*

\(^7\) *ibid.*

\(^8\) Benjamin Yang, *From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March* (Boulder: Westview Press 1990, pp. 82-101). Of course, many others might hold the view that Zhou Enlai should be included in the discussion. However, although Zhou played a very important role in Mao’s foreign policy, he nonetheless was often shadowed by Mao, and therefore was more a chief administrator rather than a final arbiter in some crucial policy decisions. See Shao Kuo-kang, *Zhou Enlai and the Foundation of Chinese Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996)
the world was very much that of a dichotomy—friend and foe, good and evil, ‘us’ and ‘them’.9 He was widely reported to have suddenly abandoned those comrades whom he was close to, often following political and emotional disputes. Mao made a lot of dramatic policy changes, always with an intuitive justification and usually in the context of fighting ‘enemies’.10 Deng’s style, on the contrary, was said to be less emotional and much more detached.11 Judged by the Chinese standard of political loyalty, Deng was surprisingly impersonal and often cold and distant in his personal dealings with his associates.12 He had no truly close friends or deeply-hated enemies within the party. Over the years Deng went through many sudden policy reversals, especially as he vacillated about the speed of economic reforms and even more about the degree of political liberalisation.13 Thus anyone who committed himself to Deng at one point could have been made an outcast at the next if not being able to change swiftly with the tide.14

However, despite these obvious differences in individual approaches, the personal authority of both Mao and Deng left profound impacts on Chinese foreign policy decisionmaking. Mao and Deng shared the same fundamental beliefs and were strongly committed to Communism. They both inherited traditional Chinese political values and

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10 ibid.
12 For more detailed account about Deng’s handling with his close associates, see He Zi, ‘Yang jiajiang shishi neimu’ (The Inside Story about General Yang’s Decline in Power), Zhongguo shibao zhousan (China Times Weekly) (American edition, No. 44, 1992, pp. 9-12)
13 ibid.
14 For example, the dismissals of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang from top party positions. This point was made clear by Liu Binyan, eminent Chinese dissident overseas, in his essay in the *Ming Bao*. Liu Binyan made the point that people could not identify with Deng because of his elusive character and policy contradictions. This significantly reflected in the succession struggle that none of the potential heirs publicly made a point of being a close personal follower of Deng. Several identified themselves with the reform policies which Westerners associated with Deng, but they all seemed to distance themselves from Deng as an individual. This was partially in response to Deng’s detached manner, and to his erratic ‘pragmatism’ in policy directions. See *Min Bao* 4 June 1992, p. 5
the art of ‘rule behind the scene’ and ‘rule by man’. Their practice of personalised politics contributed contemporary relevance to the continuation of these traditions. Although personal upbringing, work experience, powerbase, political skills, bargaining leverage, opportunity and timing had a lot to say about the particularities of the paramount status of Mao and Deng in Chinese foreign policy, this section largely concentrates on the role of personality of Mao and Deng as paramount leaders in reinforcing the concept and culture of ‘rule by man’ in policymaking process.

*Mao and Chinese Foreign Policy*

In his position as top Chinese leader with absolute power in foreign policy decisionmaking, Mao was first and foremost regarded as a patriot.\textsuperscript{15} His concept of internationalism was always firmly situated within a border of distinctly China-centred outlook.\textsuperscript{16} In his view, other revolutionary movements were without question part of a global process of transformation that was also carrying the CCP forward. However, any sacrifice made for those movements should be in proportion to their salience to his party’s success and to China’s revival as a nation.\textsuperscript{17}

Mao’s personal influence on foreign policy arena came foremost from his dominant position in domestic politics.\textsuperscript{18} Mao had a leadership style of his own, and this was also

\textsuperscript{15} Pei Jianzhang et al eds. *Xin zhongguo waijiao fengyun I* (*New China Diplomacy I*) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1990, pp. 3-9). Pei explained that in his quest to understand China, Mao was, like his contemporaries, prompted by strongly patriotic feelings. Like them, he was concerned with the revival of state power and all that implied: above all the restoration of China’s prestige and power in the world. Also like those contemporaries, Mao drew on a rich, robust and complex Chinese intellectual tradition—into which he sought to assimilate foreign ideas and foreign models. Mao possessed very strong patriotic instincts which was essential to his revolutionary practice.


\textsuperscript{17} See Mao Zedong, *In Memory of Dr Norman Bethune* (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1965). Mao’s thinking on international affairs appeared initially to have drawn on the statecraft school which emphasised China’s revival and security. Mao also at times toyed with the balance-of-power expedient that had been a mainstay of late-Qing policy discussions.

\textsuperscript{18} *Ibid.* It was during Mao’s rise to prominence in the early 1930s that he laid down a series of basic policies, which, with his ascendancy to paramount leader status, exerted important implications for foreign relations. See also Mark Selden, *China in Revolution: The Yenan Way Revisited* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, pp. 122-132)
important to the course of the CCP external relations.\textsuperscript{19} Mao was said to have been “an obsessive worker capable of abrupt shifts in interest.”\textsuperscript{20} Contrary to common belief, Mao also took a particularly strong interest in the wide-ranging and important party work in foreign policy and in the related areas of propaganda and military affairs.\textsuperscript{21}

Michael Hunt found that the intellectual framework that guided Mao was a complex and unstable set of broad but somewhat paradoxical theories and models, home and abroad.\textsuperscript{22} His thinking consisted of multiple strands twisted uneasily together, and his explicitly experimental style gave considerable play to combining ideas in different patterns as he faced changing circumstances.\textsuperscript{23} Mao created his own popular posture by cultivating an image as an aloof, reflective figure.\textsuperscript{24} He presented himself as a man of many talents—Marxist theoretician, inspired propagandist, military genius, rural sociologist.\textsuperscript{25} As his stature grew and the deference to him deepened, he easily won acceptance of questionable policies and implemented them in the face of sometimes

\textsuperscript{19} Edgar Snow, \textit{Red Star Over China} (New York: Gove Press, 1961, p. 112)
\textsuperscript{21} Mark Selden, \textit{The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China} (Mass.: Harvard East Asia Studies, 1971, pp. 22-24). Mao was said to be assertive, using hands-on approach to project assurance and secure deference from his associates. In the early stage of power building, in order to win political support and consensus among his comrades, Mao used to move patiently and informally, putting in long hours in private chats that allowed him to convey to colleagues an understanding of the calculations and assumptions behind his policy. This practice allowed Mao to use his closest associates as sounding boards to test his own evaluation of unfolding national and international developments. Only after a leadership consensus had taken form would Mao seek formal endorsement from the Political Bureau, the Central committee, or even a party congress. The priority Mao gave to the creation and maintenance of this consensus, at least in his early years as party leader, was evident in a number of important foreign-relation related cases: the redefinition of the united front, the positions endorsed by the Seventh Party Congress, and the shifting line pursued from the end of the Pacific War down to 1949. After 1949, especially in his late years as the party chairman, Mao increasingly adopted an one-sided, patriarchal relationship with colleagues at odds with his commitment to internal consensus. The dominance derived from a commanding personal confidence, and it was reinforced by the myth-making machine within the party. Success of CCP gave the party unprecedented appeal and legitimacy which carried it to power. This added to Mao’s preeminence, and the connection to the domineering, hypersensitive leader that emerged in the late 1950s and 1960s was clear.
\textsuperscript{23} ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Stuart Schram, ed. \textit{The Scope of State Power in China} (London, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1985, pp. 115-134)
substantial doubts and great human cost.²⁶

It was Mao’s emphasis on practical knowledge on the one hand, and repeated refusals to open his mind to foreign cultures and the capitalist world on the other, that presented an unbridgeable gap in his comprehension of international relations.²⁷ This in turn often made him an incompetent decision maker in foreign policy²⁸ when international relations became more complex after the establishment of the new China, as Carol Lee Hamrin observed. By his own logic, as long as he could concentrate on what he knew best (China and especially the countryside) and on what he was passionate about (China’s revolution), Mao proved to be a knowing and effective political leader in his early years. But when later his revolution impinged on international relations and became involved with the great powers as it did in the late 1940s, Mao found difficulties in formulating a perceptive picture of friends and foes in a complicated international setting.²⁹

In his persistent pursuit of a communist world for all, Mao was said to have derived his strategic thinking on international affairs largely from the Chinese classics such as Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Chronicle of the Warring States and the writings by Sun Zi.³⁰ He showed particular fondness for coalition building and diplomatic manipulation and manoeuvre—all well suited to the hard-pressed position often occupied by the weak.³¹ He was also guided by a strong, widely shared faith in the power of personal cultivation and personal deals to make a difference in handling

²⁷ Ibid.
³⁰ ibid. pp. 205-210
foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{32}

It was noted by Stuart Schram that Mao's voluntarism was central to his foreign, as well as domestic, strategy.\textsuperscript{33} Mao firmly believed that by developing and exercising will power, China could stand up to its enemies. Conversely, a failure to resist and fight would only embolden enemies to continue their abusive and overbearing treatments of China. This same voluntarism led Mao to think of China's liberation from foreign imperialists and their Chinese allies as an immediately realisable project in the 1930s and 1940s. Once he had essentially completed that task in 1949, he turned with equal impatience to the task of national revival. He demanded quick results and depended above all else on the great enthusiasm and energy of the Chinese people.\textsuperscript{34} Mao's unequivocal belief in self-reliance and self-study—a faith that knowledge could be generated through personal effort even in unpromising circumstances—led to a tendency to despise bureaucratic procedure and institutional approaches.\textsuperscript{35} He believed that fighting imperialism meant, first of all and above all, grasping “the characteristics and facts of China”\textsuperscript{36} and that “all genuine knowledge originates in direct experience.”\textsuperscript{37} Anything beyond these was distinctly secondary.

By establishing the PRC, Mao retained some of the most essential values and practice of the traditional Chinese ruling philosophy. For example, Mao was following the same

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{31}]\textit{ibid.}
\item[\textsuperscript{32}]Stuart Schram, ed. \textit{The Scope of State Power in China} (London, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1985, pp. 245-265)
\item[\textsuperscript{33}]\textit{ibid.}
\item[\textsuperscript{34}]\textit{ibid.}
\item[\textsuperscript{35}]Michael Hunt, \textit{The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 202-211). His rural origin stayed on throughout his career due to his lost chance for overseas exposure in the early years when travel might have made a considerable impact. He lacked any interest in science and had little knowledge about foreign cultures and languages.
\item[\textsuperscript{36}]Mao, quoted in Jerome Ch'en ed. \textit{Mao Papers: Anthology and Bibliography} (London: Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 22)
\item[\textsuperscript{37}]\textit{Selected Works of Mao Zedong} (Beijing: \textit{Renmin chubanshen}, 1969, Vol. 1, p. 200)
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
path as the centralising state rulers of the Chinese imperial past.\textsuperscript{38} He concentrated political power in the hands of a few: signs, Lawrence Sullivan said, anticipated that Mao’s imperial order was already evident before 1949.\textsuperscript{39} The rectification campaign in Yenan in early 1940s and the iron discipline imposed on subordinate units to report to, and follow the lead of, the party Central Committee reflected his intention of pressing for a single source of authority within the party. From 1949 to 1976, Mao, as Chairman of the CCP, of its Central Military Commission and, till 1958, State President, dominated China’s foreign policy formulation and decisions. Mao’s role in the key decisions that determined the fundamental orientation of China’s foreign policy which pushed China into the Korean War, as documented by Thomas Christensen, and in decisions concerning the implementation of key country policies, was a clear demonstration of his imperious and personalised work style in foreign policymaking.\textsuperscript{40}

As mentioned above, Mao’s authority in foreign policy came from his dominant position in domestic politics. For example, in 1953 he asserted the right to have the last word on party directives, and the rest of the decade revealed a determination to dictate policy, sometimes against the wishes of his ‘colleagues’.\textsuperscript{41} Allen Whiting observed that contrary to the normal bureaucratic model, major foreign policy decisions during the Maoist era were made by the Chairman personally without consulting any relevant departments.\textsuperscript{42} In the case of the bombardment of offshore islands in 1958 Mao

\textsuperscript{38} Lawrence Sullivan, ‘Leadership and Authority in the Chinese Communist Party: Perspectives from the 1950s’ \textit{Pacific Affairs} (Vol. 59, Winter 1986-87, pp. 605-633)

\textsuperscript{39} ibid.

\textsuperscript{40} ibid. Thomas Christensen’s finding of Mao’s vacillation to the last moment on China’s entry to the Korean War proved the importance of Mao’s role in China’s decisionmaking process. See Thomas Christensen, \textit{Useful Adversaries} (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996, Chpts. 2 and 3)

\textsuperscript{41} Lawrence Sullivan, ‘Leadership and Authority in the Chinese Communist Party: Perspectives from the 1950s’ \textit{Pacific Affairs} (Vol. 59, Winter 1986-87, pp. 605-633)

\textsuperscript{42} Allen Whiting, ‘Foreign Policy of China’ Roy Macridis ed. \textit{Foreign Policy in World Politics} (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1992, p. 241)
personally assumed responsibility in admitting that he miscalculated the American
response which stymied the attack.\textsuperscript{43} Whiting’s comment was confirmed by another
study by Lu Ning, who also noted that Mao had a firm grip on foreign and military
affairs decisions.\textsuperscript{44}

Paralleling Mao’s patriarchal decision style was his equally intolerant attitude to his
colleagues. Ruthless personal persecution within the party effectively silenced his
opponents.\textsuperscript{45} This imperial court-like practice extending into international affairs meant
that Mao could hardly compromise with disdain, abuse and threats from foreign powers.
Nor could he pretend to be a satisfied junior partner of the USSR within the communist
movement. US imperialism was the ‘number one’ enemy in his vision of a new
international order which dated from the May Fourth movement in 1919. By the same
token, unable to reconcile himself to either superpower, Mao proved ready in the 1960s,
at least in rhetoric, to take on both at once.\textsuperscript{46}

Like most other countries, China’s foreign policy was always projected to fulfil at least
two objectives: the nation’s security and the nation’s economic development.
Throughout the Mao era, the nation’s security was the primary concern.\textsuperscript{47} Incessant
wars and threats to China’s security on its periphery, from Korea to Taiwan, to
Indochina, to India and to the Sino-Soviet border, led Mao to believe that a major war
was inevitable and imminent. Diplomacy, balance of power and military strength were
used as important instruments to contain the perceived threats to security.\textsuperscript{48} Because of

\textsuperscript{43}ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China (Colo.: Boulder, Westview Press 1997, p.
155)
\textsuperscript{45}ibid. pp. 150-156
\textsuperscript{46} Benjamin Yang, From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March (Boulder: Westview Press
1990, pp. 133-154)
\textsuperscript{47}ibid.
\textsuperscript{48}ibid.
this, economic development in Mao’s era was subordinated to the overriding concern of protecting the nation’s territorial integrity and peace. These constant crises created a situation within which Mao’s personality in foreign policy could continuously play a dominant role.49

**Deng and Chinese Foreign Policy**

The most fundamental change in the dynamics of Chinese foreign policy decisionmaking was the shift of focus on the part of the central leadership from the nation’s security to the nation’s economic development.50 Although the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1970s had caused considerable concern about China’s security, it soon became clear to Beijing that they were blessings in disguise—the overseas invasions had drained Hanoi and Moscow’s resources and the threats they posed to Beijing were reduced substantially.51

This shift came as a matter of objective necessity and subjective limitation, as well as leadership personal style. When Deng Xiaoping returned to the centre of power in 1977, he took over the portfolios of defence and foreign affairs. From then until the early 1990s Deng Xiaoping was intensively involved with major Chinese foreign policy decisionmaking. He did more than any other Chinese leader to promote relations between China and the rest of the world through the ‘open-door policy’.52

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The personalisation of policy did not wholly end with Mao’s death. Deng’s reputation as China’s key foreign policy maker coincided with his ascendance to the paramount leader status. Allen Whiting observed that although he did not seek to use the despotic personal power exercised by Mao, neither did he dictate decisions to the same degree as Mao had done, and despite the broadening of the number of institutions involved in the conduct of Chinese foreign policy, Deng nevertheless managed to have the final say to matters that he regarded as crucial by making sure his position prevailed at key moments. Allan Whiting supported his analysis by noting that Deng personally claimed credit for the 1984 Sino-British agreement on Hong Kong with the formula of ‘one country, two systems’, and for the designation of 14 coastal cities as special foreign investment sites in the same year.

David Shambaugh found that Deng’s long and diverse revolutionary career made a simple and general summary of his personality difficult. His unpredictable and often contradictory policies in response to the changing domestic and international environment further complicated this. Although Deng was entrusted by Mao to carry out a number of foreign engagements, notably in confronting the Soviet Union during the dispute in the early 1960s, he was unable to play a key role in foreign policy making early on because of his lack of seniority in the CCP top hierarchy. The vacuum left by

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53 Allen Whiting, ‘Foreign Policy of China’ Roy Macridis ed. Foreign Policy in World Politics (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1992, pp. 233-241). Deng’s position in foreign policy can also be inferred by setting the terms for the conduct of normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union (and its successor states) and the key decisions to attack Vietnam in 1979. In the 1980s when Hu Yaobang and later Zhao Ziyang were the party secretaries, Deng remained the ultimate decision maker although he had officially retreated to the second line. Deng would get personally involved either on his own initiative or under solicitation by Hu and Zhao. See Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China (Colo.: Boulder, Westview Press 1997, p. 159)
54 ibid.
55 ibid.
57 ibid.
the death of Mao finally gave Deng the opportunity to articulate his views and to chart his preferred course without being subject to Mao’s arbitration.59

Deng’s intellectual orientation and style were in many ways in striking contrast to Mao’s, and this led many scholars to attribute these differences to his personality.60 His well cared-for childhood61 and good education—first at the local capital city, then in France—proved to be key factors that later differentiated him from Mao in leadership style and strategic thinking.62 Harrison Salisbury made an interesting point that despite Deng’s happy memory of his childhood, he never returned to his native village once he left as a 12-year-old.63 This detached attitude towards one’s past was noted as ‘unusual’ in Chinese culture, yet as ‘typical’ of Deng’s general approach to politics.64 This led Lucian Pye to conclude that Deng, throughout his life, simply closed the book on one period and went on to the next, and never looked back.65 Deng’s unsentimental nature reinforced his tendency to concentrate on his immediate preoccupation, which became central to his leadership style.66

Like Mao, Deng’s world view was guided by two rather different traditions: the imperial Chinese way to rule and Marxism-Leninism theories. On the one hand he was said to consult regularly the 11th century massive compilation Zi Zhi Tong Jian (The

61 For detail about Deng Xiaoping’s childhood, see Harrison Salisbury, The New Emperors (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992, Chpt. 4)
62 ibid.
63 ibid.
65 ibid.
66 ibid. p. 18
General Mirror for the Aid of Government), that detailed for the emperor in 294 chapters how his predecessors in the previous 1,300 years had handled difficult issues.  

On the other hand, he strenuously insisted that Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought should be one of the cardinal pillars in China’s reform program.

Deng’s introduction to Communism differed somewhat from Mao and most other Chinese revolutionary leaders. Michael Hunt speculated that it was by chance rather than by choice that Deng became a communist and later ascended in the party hierarchy. Deng’s subsequent career progression was based on a series of ties to powerful patrons: first Zhou Enlai, then Mao. It was under Mao’s patronage that he was made the Secretary General of the party at the Eighth Party Congress in 1956. It was during Deng’s decade as Secretary General that he intensified efforts to bind all cadres in patron-client networks, too. He was involved in the promotion and transfer of huge number of cadres, which gave him a privilege to establish his own extensive network within the party. It was this experience of cadre arrangement that made him acutely aware that in Chinese political culture, one important source of power for a leader stemmed from the management of party officials. Because Deng did not

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68 ibid.
69 Michael Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 201-231). In Hunt’s view, it did not call for any serious decisionmaking on his part, since he at that time was living with a group of Chinese in France, who were much older and who in a sense looked after him and assured him that he belonged to the “family” group. Nora Wang, in ‘Deng Xiaoping: the Year in France’ The China Quarterly (Vol. 92, December 1982, pp. 698-705) shared Hunt’s view and his research found Deng’s political association with Communism was just the natural thing to do at the time and under the circumstances. There were really no alternatives for him to consider, given the closeness and intimate relationship he shared with other Communists in a confined community. Similar things could be said about Deng’s early advancement into a leadership position in the Communist movement: In 1925 most of the leaders in the newly-established Chinese Communist Party in Paris had to flee France or were deported because the police were after them for their revolutionary activities. Deng simply moved up to fill the leadership void.
72 ibid.
73 ibid. pp. 32-35
possess the absolute authority that Mao had once commanded, and he alone could not
dictate every major decision if it was challenged within the central leadership, Deng
realised that it was necessary for him to build consensus among his colleagues.74 While
keeping the most critical decisions firmly in his own hands, Deng believed in delegation
of power and placed his chief lieutenants in the front line of decisionmaking.75 His
distinctive leadership style was characterised by identifying the right persons for top
jobs and then stepping back and allowing the appointees to perform—a very
untraditional Chinese practice, indeed.76 It also suggested that Deng’s mastery of the
behind-the-scenes craftsmanship revealed an extraordinarily self-confident and secure
personality.77

Lucian Pye’s study on the relationship between Deng and Chinese political culture also
noted that the practical side of party work also made Deng think of communism in
organisational rather than ideological terms.78 The significance of this difference from
Mao was that, for Deng, allegiance to the party often meant defending its organisational
structure and power base rather than preserving the purity of its ideology or adhering
rigidly to the party line.79 Deng’s interpretation of the CCP’s role in Chinese society
was not constructed during the reform era; instead it was formed in the early 1940s and
remained remarkably consistent ever after.80 He placed considerably greater emphasis
than Mao did on the importance of bureaucracy and institutions, as well as on the drive
for economic modernisation. Indeed, where Mao saw mass mobilisation as the engine

162)
75 ibid.
76 Benjamin Yang, From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March (Boulder: Westview Press
1990, pp. 56-58)
77 Lucian Pye, ‘An Introductory Profile: Deng Xiaoping and China’s Political Culture’ David Shambaugh ed. Deng
78 ibid.
79 ibid.
80 ibid.
for change, Deng had a more technocratic vision of China’s future. Deng frequently criticised the ‘leftist excesses’ that came with the politics of mobilisation.\textsuperscript{81} Whereas Mao and many other Chinese leaders relied on communist ideology to draw strength, Deng believed that the party’s supreme imperative was not the obligation to preserve abstract Marxist ideology, rather it was to sustain the organisational integrity, and hence the power monopoly, of the party.\textsuperscript{82} This line of thought gave him a more pragmatic theoretical backing to policy initiatives, domestic and foreign, throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.

However, pragmatic as Deng was, there were some significant limits to such pragmatism. Politically there were certain values which he would not sacrifice even for the sake of ultimate modernisation—the most important being the organisational integrity of the party and its monopoly of political power.\textsuperscript{83} While Deng initiated a series of reforms, there were limits to each of these reforms, too.\textsuperscript{84} Some scholars argued that Deng tolerated a certain degree of liberalism and some mild challenges to Communist Party political hegemony only because he believed such a concession to be a greater accommodation and facilitation to the development of economy, at no risk to the party monopoly at all.\textsuperscript{85} The political reform that Deng personally supervised during the 1980s recoiled after 1989 with the tightening of the party’s grip on the instruments of coercive power in the early 1990s, when such threat emerged.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{80} Allen Whiting, ‘Foreign Policy of China’ Roy Macridis ed. \textit{Foreign Policy in World Politics} (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1992, pp. 222-267)
\textsuperscript{81} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{83} Kenneth Lieberthal, \textit{Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform} (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995, Chpts. 4 and 5)
\textsuperscript{84} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{85} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{86} David Goodman, \textit{Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution: A Political Biography} (London and New York: Routledge, 1994, pp. 34-37). Deng’s highly complex personality was reflected in his often contradictory behaviours,
Chapter Five

On the foreign policy front, Deng took personal interest in some pivotal issues and important decisions, as exemplified by China’s ‘one country, two systems’ policy towards Hong Kong reunification. Deng Xiaoping once gave a succinct instruction to the conduct of foreign policy for China: “Observe the development soberly, maintain our position, meet the challenge, hide our capacities, bide our time, remain free of ambitions, and never claim leadership.” Michael Yahuda commented that in many respects, this advice was followed in China’s major foreign policy decisions, such as China’s cautious use of its veto on the UN Security Council in dealing with its increasingly complicated positions in a range of international issues, and China’s discreet collaboration in the UN with Western powers in the 1990s over some important resolutions such as those concerning the Gulf War, Cambodia and Bosnia.88

Role of the CCP Cadre System

So far, it has been established that the individual personalities of CCP leaders left some distinctive imprints on the Chinese foreign policy decision system. This conclusion was based on references to Mao and Deng’s upbringing, education background, intellectual tendency, career experience and work styles. This section examines the aggregate characteristics of the CCP cadre system—its philosophical underpinning, its roles in both the revolutionary and socialist periods and its transformation in the reform era. The importance of this step is sustained by Richard Snyder’s argument that a deliberation of

in particular when he was in paramount leader status. For example, he would not balk at the necessity of using force or coercion at Tiananmen, yet did much to curtail the arbitrary repression of the Maoist era and to enliven the social and professional lives of Chinese from many walks of life. He dramatically improved the standard of living and diversity of life for one-fifth of the world’s population, while denying them fundamental political and human rights. Similarly, he wanted to see China wealthy in a materialistic sense and strong internationally, but he also feared that China could be robbed of its essence and contaminated by foreign influences. Deng’s ambivalence was thus similar to that of the 19th-century first generation of Chinese reformers who came up with the idea of adopting Western technology while preserving essential Chinese values. See Paul Cohen, ‘The Post-Mao Reforms in Historical Perspective’ The Journal of Asian Studies (Vol. 47, No. 3, August 1988, pp. 518-540)

personality in foreign policy study must necessarily explore the sociological connotation of such a personality. More importantly, in many cases, the sociological aspect of personality can only be inferred to as it often lies beyond direct empirical monitoring.

As foreshadowed earlier in this chapter, an intimate relationship between the paramount leaders and the CCP cadre establishment meant that an investigation of their personalities might well be superficial if the interdependence of the two was not subsequently considered. Furthermore, an analysis of the role of the cadre contingent would provide an appropriate indicator of the sociological environment to elucidate the individual leader's personality.

The CCP's personnel management system was organised according to the 'rule by man' assumption vis-a-vis the 'rule by law' philosophy. This system was designed to effectively maintain the party's grip over state operations. In order to achieve foreign policy objectives, both Mao and Deng highly valued the need to groom and nurture a credential force to execute them. The historical and empirical observation from the perspectives of the Chinese revolutionary and reform processes identified a top-down, heavy-handed human intervention in both goal setting and policy implementation regimes. The development of institutional power as a check-and-balance and of decentralising policymaking process was cautiously and gradually proceeded under Deng's reform initiatives. Final arbitrary power for policy still firmly rested in the hands of a few at the top, who in turn had to rely on the massive cadre establishment for policy outcomes.

88 ibid.
89 See Chapter Two. Snyder emphasised that it was the sociological aspect of personality that was meaningful in juxtaposing these two seemingly disparate categories. In fact, he further argued that it was this aspect of personality that 'mattered' in the foreign policy study.
90 ibid.
The first 65 years of the CCP’s revolutionary and socialist experience profoundly shaped the political terms of reference for generations of its cadres. China’s ability to maintain the role of ideology in setting the nation’s ultimate goals and safeguarding the party’s structural integrity was evidence of the effectiveness of the cadre system through generations of painstaking efforts. As the vanguard, agent and instrument of the party, the cadre system closely reflected the CCP leaders’ prevailing political tenets, ideological beliefs, strategic thinking and organisational preferences.

Mao’s Party Building Strategy

The CCP was born out of the domestic and international crises that China encountered at the turn of the twentieth century. According to Lenin’s theory, as the vanguard of revolution, the party should recruit its members from the industrial proletariat, and initially launch revolts in urban areas which would in time spread to the countryside to the final victory. This theory was followed in the early years of the CCP in the 1920s.

Faced with the formidable political task of unification and revitalisation of a fragmented and weak China, the CCP built a temporary alliance in 1924 with its rival party the KMT, with an immediate goal of eradicating warlordism. After the breakdown of this front, the CCP revolutionary force suffered a great loss. The CCP had to retreat its remaining force from urban areas to the countryside, where it gained valuable time and space to reflect and recover. The party then learnt and determined to mobilise the

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91 Deeply concerned with China’s survival in the face of foreign encroachment, warlordism and social disintegration, Mao and twelve other intellectuals, representing fifty-seven members of the various regional Marxist groups, set up a national organisation of the Communist Party in July 1st, 1921. See Cao Yunfang and Pan Xianying, eds. Zhongguo gongchandang jiquan fazhan shi (History of the Power and War of the Chinese Communist Party) (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue dangan shi, 1984, pp. 11-20)

92 This temporary alliance was known as the first united front of the CCP and the KMT cooperation.

93 For example, in Shanghai alone, the coup by Chiang Kai-shek in April 1927 reduced CCP members from 57,000 to 10,000. See Zhonggong dangshi jiangyi (Highlight of Chinese Party History) (Liaoning: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1984, pp. 57-58)
peasant population and exploit their enthusiasm to construct an extended revolutionary base in the countryside.\footnote{ibid.}

It was during this period that Mao discarded the Soviet model of party building and developed his own party building theory and strategy appropriate to the dire reality in China. He came to realise that because of the paucity of an industrial working class, the revolutionary focus should be placed on peasants under the Chinese circumstances.\footnote{ibid. pp. 77-95}

However, this shift raised theoretical and practical problems which found no easy answers in the Marxist-Leninist textbook, and which were challenged from both international and domestic sources.\footnote{Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organisation in Communist China* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968, pp. 82-85)} Firstly, Mao was questioned by the Comintern over his authority to revise the tenets of Marxism-Leninism to fit China’s reality, and the CCP was under constant pressure to correct this deviation.\footnote{ibid.} Secondly, although the majority of the Chinese rural population had already demonstrated ample revolutionary potential in their willingness to revolt against the existing order in the late 1920s, there were obvious differences in the level of revolutionary consciousness between the Russian industrial workers and the Chinese peasants.\footnote{ibid.} This difference brought practical problems, such as goal setting and organisation, to the CCP’s working agenda.

Mao resolved these issues by, firstly, denouncing those leaders within the CCP leadership who echoed the Comintern’s view, and launching campaigns to remove them from leading positions. Secondly, he emphasised political and ideological education, and the inspiration and persuasion of the peasants. He argued that through education, peasants would obtain a ‘proletarian political consciousness’, thereby transcending their

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\footnote{ibid.}
\footnote{ibid. pp. 77-95}
\footnote{ibid.}
peasant mentality. The Confucian tradition of emphasising education thus reinforced the CCP's practical need to instil peasants with a proletarian revolutionary consciousness. It was during the Jinggangshan period from 1927-1933 after the failure of urban revolution that Mao transformed the party from a 'proletarian party to a mass party' by recruiting 'a large number of members from revolutionary elements among the peasants and petty bourgeoisie.'

Many factors contributed to the CCP's 1949 success, and many scholars also advanced different explanations from their theoretical perspective. But Mao himself attributed the success to the 'three magic weapons': the united front, armed struggle, and party organisation.

A report published in 1981 on the CCP's party history by Peng Zhen was most revealing in that it detailed how the CCP established, consolidated and expanded its influence and controls in the 1930s through organisational arrangement and personnel management. In short, organisationally the CCP developed a multi-layered structure

98 ibid.
100 ibid.
101 Ma Jipin and Zhou Yi, eds. Mao Zedong jiandang xiang yu dangshi yanjiu (Mao Zedong's Thought on Party-Building and Research Note on Party History) (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1984, p. 167). Mao believed that through political education, this transformation of the party would not necessarily lower the quality or change revolutionary nature of the party itself.
103 Peng Zhen, Guanyu Jin-Cha-Ji bianqu dangde gongzuo he juti zhengece baoqiao (Report on Party's Work and Policies in Jin-Cha-Ji Border Areas) (Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1981, p. 134-144). Peng started by saying that during the 1930s, when party organisation entered an unfamiliar village for the first time, it usually employed the following methods to establish a new power structure and party branch. First, military representatives used 'administrative methods' by ordering the leader of the village to convene a villagewide mass meeting. Even though appointed by the KMT, the leader was compelled to call for a mass meeting and formally to introduce party representatives. The representatives would explain the need to set up a mass organisation against the Japanese. Sponsorship by the power elite in each locality helped to legitimise the representatives and to break the ice in establishing contact with the masses. According to the CCP, this method was necessary because of the peasants' dependency and conservatism prior to their being mobilised. Second, membership in the anti-Japanese organisation was open to almost anyone in the village, including 'speculators, class enemies, and alien elements', because 'the task facing the party was enormous and urgent, whereas the available manpower was very limited. Third, the CCP representatives skilfully nurtured the anti-Japanese organisations, letting them gradually take over functions previously
in the countryside to consolidate its control in the ‘red’ areas. At the outer rim was the anti-Japanese association, with membership open to all; then came the peasants’ and workers’ associations, with membership largely determined by the members’ economic positions. At the core was the party branch, with carefully selected peasants who were regarded as being politically reliable. The party branch controlled mass organisations through cadres. In building up these layers, the CCP exploited the prestige and ability of the existing elite to mobilise peasants and establish mass organisations. The crucial role played by the party members in the 1930s and 1940s reflected the organisational skill and capability of the party leaders. Without this, party leaders could not have maximised the effect of the political, economic and social grievances of the various classes and groups in China, while adjusting the party programs and policies to fit the changing situation. As Roy Hofheinz rightly concluded, neither ‘contextual’ nor ‘motivational’ theories that did not take into account the adaptability and capacity for realistic assessment of the Chinese Communists could explain the success of CCP.

Without flexible and skilful leadership of the party, whatever revolutionary potential performed by village leaders, which created a ‘dual power structure’. The official guidelines contained specific instructions to avoid the forcible removal of the village leader; instead, he was to be drawn into the anti-Japanese mass organisation so that whatever legitimacy he had could be transferred to it. Fourth, once the umbrella anti-Japanese mass organisation had set up offices in charge of different projects, party representatives kept a careful eye on the active workers, hired labourers, and poor peasants who appeared to have the trust of the masses and who demonstrated leadership ability. Once potential candidates were selected, the party representatives told them to set up peasants’ and workers’ associations. Naturally, when these organisations were formed, the activists assumed leadership. Fifth, the representatives led the associations to discuss current socioeconomic conditions in the village, often explaining Marxist theory along with CCP’s policy on these problems. These specialised associations eventually demanded reduced rents, increased wages, and shorter working hours. As class-conflict-related issues arose, some of the former activists forming the economically better-off backgrounds groups withdrew. Vacancies were filled by persons with good class backgrounds whose interests were tied to the CCP program. Sixth, those original leaders with questionable motivation and backgrounds were replaced by more reliable elements who had proven their activism, dedication, and leadership ability. This replacement ensured that each mass organisation—including the original united front organisation—would operate as the party wished. Seventh, in selecting the cadres, the most reliable people were approached, tested, and given the option of joining the party. If they responded positively, they were groomed as members. After joining the party, each person was sent to a higher level to receive training. Then, he or she was returned to the native area to recruit other members.

Areas under the CCP’s influence vis-a-vis those regions under the KMT controlled.


Chinese society had would have remained as mere potential.\textsuperscript{107}

These CCP’s mobilisation tactics and skills graphically illustrated Mao’s party building theory. Mao strongly argued that in China’s circumstances, pure Leninist party theory—to organise urban proletarians to rise against capitalism for the victory of socialism—was not practical in China, which had the majority of its population scattered in the vast rural areas.\textsuperscript{108} Willingness to adapt to the socioeconomic conditions of China and the ability to restructure party work orientation in line with China’s reality were the two prerequisites for the ensuing victory in China.\textsuperscript{109} Under the Chinese circumstances of that time, only through rallying the rural population, guided by the Leninist revolutionary principles, and through cultivating the vast and solid base in the power-vacuum of the countryside, could the final nationwide victory be achieved.\textsuperscript{110} Mao continued to argue that the semi-feudalist and semi-colonial social reality of China necessitated the course of revolution to be from countryside to city. The party-building strategy should therefore be rural-based, sourcing its members from local areas.\textsuperscript{111}

This important theoretical and practical departure from Marxist and Leninist orthodoxy profoundly impacted on the CCP leaders’ strategic thinking and work style orientation. Mao’s comments on building a solid base in the vacuum of the Chinese countryside during the party’s formative years cast a governing framework for subsequent CCP’s domestic and international politics.\textsuperscript{112} The mutual dependence between the party

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{107} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{109} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{110} \textit{ibid.}
\end{footnotesize}
leadership and its cadre system to create a political and physical stronghold for survival and expansion in the revolutionary era had a lasting effect on Chinese leaders’ assessment of, and their preference for, using cadres in policy implementation in the years to come.\textsuperscript{113}

\textit{Importance of the CCP’s Cadre System}

The CCP cadre system reflected the CCP party building theory and practice. The importance and the inner working of this system held the key to understanding the characteristics and the role of cadres in Chinese political system, as well as its value to the party leaders.

Originally developed in the context of the Russian revolution, and then translated into Chinese, the term ‘cadre’ (\textit{ganbu}) referred to the backbone of the revolutionary movement—people whose high level of political consciousness qualified them to assume responsibility for specific political tasks.\textsuperscript{114} The cadres in the Chinese political system served the structural need and as a direct link between party’s policy choice and its implementation. Defined as embodying sacred missions and often as a means of achieving specific core tasks at a given time, the cadres in turn enjoyed pervasive powers widely impacting on the structure, orientation, and capability of the political system (which included the decisionmaking process, the conflict structure and the way the party-state interacted with society).\textsuperscript{115}

The CCP’s cadre building and control were achieved mainly through the mechanisms of

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Ibid.}\n\textsuperscript{114} Franz Schurmann, \textit{Ideology and Organisation in Communist China} (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968, pp. 1-35)\n\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Ibid.}
nomenklatura.\textsuperscript{116} Theoretically, before 1949, the CCP cadres were first and foremost inspired and mobilised as spearheads for the Chinese revolution. The cadres’ role as the revolutionary vanguard was expressed through their willingness to endure extreme hardship and dangers.\textsuperscript{117} After 1949, there was a great transformation of the cadre operating environment. In Mao’s era, cadres were still expected and motivated to continue their revolutionary functions as pillars for socialist construction. During Deng’s reform era, however, the roles of cadres changed considerably to reflect the party’s shift of work emphasis and accommodate the competing priorities.\textsuperscript{118} However, through the control of nomenklatura, the CCP managed to further consolidate and institutionalise the practice of the traditional ‘rule by man’ through the cadre system, and enhance the functional importance of its cadres in political and economic life.\textsuperscript{119}

Pareto and Mosca noted that a political elite could exert enormous influence in shaping a political system regardless of the forms of government.\textsuperscript{120} This was also salient in traditional China, where a well-defined elite of scholar-bureaucrat-landlords dominated not only the political but also economic and cultural life. The continuous practice of ‘rule by man’ and the all-encompassing power of the cadre system in Mao’s era reinforced this political tradition.\textsuperscript{121}

Ezra Vogel observed in 1965 that the Chinese socialist system, with ultimate faith in the rationality of human mind, substituted allegedly chaotic market control with decisions consciously made by the political oligarchy—the CCP cadres located in a hierarchically

\textsuperscript{117} Lawrence Sullivan, ‘Leadership and Authority in the Chinese Communist Party: Perspectives from the 1950s’ Pacific Affairs (Vol. 59, Winter 1986-87, pp. 605-633)
\textsuperscript{118} ibid.
constructed organisational setting.\textsuperscript{122} And unlike the Eastern European socialist
countries, where former revolutionaries started to co-opt technical experts into the
ruling elite immediately after seizing political power,\textsuperscript{123} the elite transformation in
China from strenuous revolutionaries to liberal-minded reform leaders took place over a
period of almost three decades after the foundation of the PRC. Moreover, the
prolonged and tortuous transition was frequently marked by ruthless inner party
conflicts, purges, prosecution, and external struggles for survival.\textsuperscript{124} If “the state refers
to all those individuals who occupy offices that authorise them and them alone to make
and apply decisions that are binding upon all segments of the society,”\textsuperscript{125} as Eric
Nordlinger defined, then the Chinese cadre system, which was cultivated by
\textit{nomenklatura}, was the ‘state’ itself. Or, as John P. Burns pointed out, the cadre system
itself was significant “because it encourages the development among the leadership of
patron-client relations”\textsuperscript{126}—cadres depended on the system for career, promotion,
power, wealth and status. The practice of patron-client relations, within the tradition of
‘rule by man’, enabled these cadres to occupy important political positions and
subsequently influence domestic and international policy orientations.\textsuperscript{127}

The concrete task of the CCP cadre system changed, either subtly or dramatically,
throughout its more than 75 years history. Hong Yung Lee’s study on this change found

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{122} Ezra Vogel, ‘From Revolutionary to Semi-Bureaucrat: The ‘Regularisation’ of Cadres’ \textit{The China Quarterly}
(Vol. 29, January-March 1965, pp. 36-60)
\textsuperscript{123} Juan Linz, ‘Totalitarianism and Authoritarian Regimes’ Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby eds. \textit{Handbook of
Political Science} (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975, pp. 175-192)
\textsuperscript{124} Ezra Vogel, ‘From Revolutionary to Semi-Bureaucrat: The ‘Regularisation’ of Cadres’ \textit{The China Quarterly}
(Vol. 29, January-March 1965, p. 36-60)
xxxii). The fact that cadre appointments required approvals from the next two levels upward in the party hierarchy
tied cadres to senior supporters and created a system of obligation.
\textsuperscript{127} Thomas Bernstein, ‘Leadership and Mass Mobilisation in the Soviet and Chinese Collectivisation Campaigns of
\end{flushright}
that the transformation was accomplished mainly through a dialectic process of
recruitment and structural adjustment within the party system. He said:

Although a political system at any given moment enjoys a certain amount of
autonomy in selecting its main task and interests, perceptions, and preferences
of the existing cadre corps, the choices made in recruiting cadres thus produce a
structure that constrains the policy choices at the next stage. In this sense, the
cadres are creators as well as agents of the state structure; the cadres create
political, economic, and social structures that largely reflect their ideological
vision. Once this basic structure is established, however, it operates as a
constraint on the cadres' behaviour.128

The shift in the regime's main task from revolution to economic development in 1978
resulted in a big change in the CCP's recruitment policy for cadres,129 and,
subsequently, the composition and the role of the cadres in the new reform era. With the
replacement of senior political leaders and a large number of old revolutionary
vanguards by better educated bureaucratic technocrats, China's new political leaders
tried to restructure the existing cadre system.130 New sociopolitical and economic
arrangements were needed in this reform to balance the political needs of the Leninist
party and the perceived structural requirements of economic and political reforms.131
Indeed, in Deng's reform era, the party recruits were mainly sourced from those with
better knowledge, skills and education, instead of on pure political consciousness, as
had been the case before.

The Party-state and the Cadre System

The fact that there was no formal notion of 'separation of powers' between the
executive, legislature and judiciary in the Chinese constitution revealed a poorly

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128 Hong Yung Lee, *From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China* (Berkeley and Los Angeles,
129 ibid.
130 ibid.
conceptualised relationship between the party and state. Jeffrey Pfeffer noted that the party-state was the ultimate form of power expansion and concentration by the ascendance of the party elite over state affairs.\textsuperscript{132} In China, the party-state with a strong cadre system gave the CCP unlimited power and the ability to rule.

China's party-state structure that gradually evolved in the 1950s and 1960s reflected the PRC founders' experiences, particularly "their own pre-1949 experience in conducting revolutionary struggle and administering liberated areas".\textsuperscript{133} Other factors such as the theoretical Leninist model of 'democratic centralism', the post-Leninist model of Soviet society and China's centuries-old tradition of authoritarianism, elitism and ideological orthodoxy also helped to shape the party-state structure of the PRC in its early years.\textsuperscript{134}

These factors and visions of a concentrated power were filtered through the founders' rural orientation, which, more importantly, stressed subsistence and self-sufficiency, moralised politics, and which exhibited poor knowledge about the functional prerequisites of modern society.\textsuperscript{135}

The scope of activities directly regulated by the Maoist party-state in the first three decades of the People's Republic was all-inclusive.\textsuperscript{136} In the name of the socialist revolution and transformation, the party-state gradually expanded its control not only over coercive instruments but also over all economic and human resources, including the goods and services that the Chinese people needed in their daily lives.\textsuperscript{137} As the party-state took over the functions traditionally performed by social organisations and

\textsuperscript{131} ibid.
\textsuperscript{134} ibid.
\textsuperscript{135} ibid.
\textsuperscript{136} For a characterisation of the Maoist system and its transformation by 1982, see Michel Oksenberg and Richard Bush, 'China's Political Evolution: 1972-82' \textit{Problem of Communism} (No. 12, September-October 1982, pp. 1-19)
individuals, ordinary people’s personal autonomy shrunk and dependency on the state increased.\textsuperscript{138} The elimination of the labour market and the introduction of a centralised allocation system enabled the party-state to control all social mobility. Since the party-state rejected exchange relations as a mode of social interaction on the grounds that they were capitalistic, its power and authority permeated every aspect of social interaction.\textsuperscript{139}

Although the CCP was not a monolithic entity, the party’s monopoly of power, in conjunction with the personal clout of paramount leaders, often silenced other voices and denied diverse views in the policy process. Despite the temporary intention—initially introduced in 1942 as a means of resolving the lack of coordination among the various organisations of the party, government and military that were scattered all over the guerrilla base areas\textsuperscript{140}—party committees came to dominate every organisation, be it political, economic, social or cultural after 1949, and well into the socialist state building period under Mao. The party cell (\textit{dangzu}) system, originally introduced in government ministries as a temporary unit to supervise work in 1949, continued to dominate government bureaucratic bodies and directly managed the business of functional organs in agriculture, industry, commerce, education, military matters, politics and party affairs.\textsuperscript{141} In response to the increasing power of party committees and secretaries, the boundary between the party on the one hand and state organs and social organisations on the other was blurred and merged. As a direct consequence of blending the party’s policy setting with state administrative functions,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{137} \textit{ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{139} \textit{ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{140} ‘\textit{Xin shiqi dangde renwu}’ (Party’s Role in the New Era) \textit{Xinhua Wenzhai (New China Digest)} (No. 11, 1987, pp. 1-5)
\item \textsuperscript{141} \textit{ibid.}
\end{itemize}
the party-state’s accountability to society declined.\textsuperscript{142} In addition, Mao’s ‘politics in command’ allowed a uniform imposition of the official ideology on all sectors of the party-state and society.\textsuperscript{143} The Maoist version of socialism—which attached paramount importance to distribution rather than to production, and which stressed egalitarianism over efficiency in order to provide minimum material needs for all Chinese—took precedence in decisionmaking considerations in all functional fields.\textsuperscript{144}

In this tightly controlled party-state structure, revolutionary cadres were the movers and shakers. The party-state relied on them to carry out policy initiatives and they were expected to play conflicting roles as politicians, administrators and bureaucrats.\textsuperscript{145} As agents of the state, these cadres were expected to make and implement the optimal economic and social policies in the best interests of state and society. But as agents of the party, these cadres owed not only their jobs but also their power and status to the CCP. As the beneficiaries of this order, they had interests to defend.\textsuperscript{146} To the revolutionary cadres, dedication, obedience and diligence in exchange for their status, privileges and influence were more important than ability, efficiency and innovation.\textsuperscript{147}

As mentioned earlier, the new leadership in the reform era bought a new dialectic prospect into the CCP’s leadership style. The emergence of a new generation of party leaders and the shift of work emphasis to economic development during Deng’s reform period fundamentally affected both the structure of leadership and the composition of

\textsuperscript{142} ibid.
\textsuperscript{143} Hong Yung Lee, \textit{From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China} (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991, pp. 387-398)
\textsuperscript{144} ibid.
\textsuperscript{145} For the distinction between the politician and the bureaucrat, see Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam and Bert Rockman, \textit{Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies} (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981)
\textsuperscript{147} ibid.
the cadre system. As distinct from the old revolutionaries, China’s new generation of leaders jointed the party after the liberation in 1949—a group known as the third generation.\(^{148}\) David Lampton believed that the third generation leaders, not directly exposed to guerrilla warfare experience, were more likely to exercise flexibility and be more approachable than those old guards who, by virtue of their knowledge of tradition, values, norms or ideology, tended to act as critics of a more open system.\(^{149}\) The succession of this generation of leadership was a necessary condition for Deng’s more open and liberal domestic and international policies.\(^{150}\)

Although a political qualification was still used in selecting the leading cadres, its contents changed substantially under the Deng’s reform initiative.\(^{151}\) However, as Andrew Walder noted, the universal achievement-oriented criteria were not uniformly applied to every qualified candidate for promotion—personal connections operated and, to a large extent, determined the outcome. This practice resulted in the ‘unprincipled universalism’ as opposed to the ‘principled particularism’ of the Mao era.\(^{152}\)

Like their counterparts in Western government systems, the new Chinese bureaucratic technocrat leaders were less committed to political ideology—whether a broadly

\(^{148}\) The first generation referred to those who joined the revolution before the Long March, and the second generation, those who participated in the anti-Japanese war. Evolved from the best-educated segment of the Chinese population, most of the CCP’s new top leaders were themselves the beneficiaries of the party’s privilege and elite power which were extensively enjoyed by their parents or patrons. Most of them had studied natural sciences in college and worked as specialists in production-related fields in bureaucratic organisations before they rose to leadership positions. ibid.


\(^{151}\) During the Mao era, it included such ideological criteria as an understanding of Marxism-Leninism, a dedication to the mass line, and a willingness to sacrifice one’s private interests. ibid. Under the new leadership, it referred to one’s dedication to the ‘socialist principle’, which was broadly interpreted in turn to include any principle that brought good fortune to the people, enhanced productivity or contributed to prosperity. See ‘Xin shiqi dangde renwu ’ (Party’s Role in the New Era) Xinhua Wenzhai (New China Digest) (No. 11, 1987, pp. 1-5)

\(^{152}\) Andrew Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986, pp. 95-107)
defined socialism or Mao Zedong’s discredited thought—than the disappearing old revolutionary leaders.\textsuperscript{153} They tended to be more responsive to public demand and popular sentiment. Some veteran revolutionaries, therefore, openly feared that the obvious lack of basic understanding of the Marxist principles and the good party tradition would lead to a general deterioration in the party’s standing.\textsuperscript{154} Moreover, lacking personal involvement in the party’s ‘fine tradition’ of the Yenan period, they were more susceptible to new ideas and changes. If the bureaucratic technocrat leaders had any common ideology, it was the simple pragmatism necessary for what Ezra Suleiman called ‘to get the job done’.\textsuperscript{155}

Conclusion

This chapter explored the elusive themes, yet clearly traceable marks, of personality in Chinese foreign policy motivation by examining Chinese paramount leaders Mao and Deng. The sociological aspect of their personality was confirmed by examining the aggregate characteristics presented by the CCP cadre system. The chapter focused on the importance of the CCP’s cadre system and the impacts of the party-state on China’s political system.

What emerged from here was that ‘rule by man,’ as the essence of the Confucian political philosophy and Chinese political culture, also lay deep at the heart of China’s political system under both Mao and Deng. It was typically expressed in the form of heavily relying on the political elites who exercised their power within a well defined

\textsuperscript{153} ibid.
\textsuperscript{154} Xin shiqi dangde renwu’ (Party’s Role in the New Era) Xinhua Wenzhai (New China Digest) (No. 11, 1987, pp. 1-5
systemic structure. The difference was that contemporary Chinese political power was more or less shared and executed by the CCP’s cadre system under the auspices of paramount leaders whereas in the traditional mode power was concentrated in one ruler.

The rise of the new technocratic party elite and the change of cadre composition had deep ramifications in political life in China. The emergence of the new generation of party leaders greatly facilitated the reform process and raised expectations that practising socialism with a market-oriented capitalist system was feasible as the party’s leaders adjusted their strategies to the new international political environment.

The rapid ascendancy of the new generation of the CCP cadres to the top CCP leading positions, under the patronage of Deng Xiaoping, cleared the bureaucratic, administrative and political grounds for Deng’s reform program in China. The rise of the third generation of leaders had several significant effects—it not only opened up the possibility for Deng to carry out substantial economic and social reforms in China, but also helped to maintain the dominant position of the cadre system and the supremacy of the party-state itself. The cadres were the agents that turned the previously unthinkable political, economic and social changes from Mao’s era into reality under Deng, while still keeping the socialist banner flying through the rhetoric of the four cardinal principles. These new generation leaders were not old orthodox revolutionary cadres, nor were they advocates of free capitalism in China. The fundamental values and mentality from the revolutionary past did not change completely with the arrival of the new generation. This was because within the party-state system, the very survival of the leadership’s political ambitions depended on the survival of the party-state’s structure itself. In this sense, the cadres were limited by the structure that the old generation of revolutionaries had created.
This chapter demonstrated that in China’s political system, the personality of the individual paramount leaders, by relying on an elite group and party-state structure, had important leverage in both domestic and foreign policymaking processes. The sociological aspect of Chinese political tradition and the party-state system were dominant factors which empowered individual leaders. The impact of the party leaders’ personality and the role of the CCP cadre system on Chinese foreign policy will be further tested in the case study in Part III, which will provide further evidence of the CCP’s commitment to, and continued practice of, ‘rule by man’ in its external affairs.
Chapter Six

Structural/Situational Constraints—Limit of Organisational Setting
and the Scope of Systemic Transformation

Walter Carlsnaes’ three-level analytical model of foreign policy motivation placed high priority on the role of ‘organisational setting’ and ‘objective conditions’. He argued that it was this situational dimension, not the intentional nor dispositional aspects, that decided the key features and main thrust of a foreign policy. Given the precedence of this structural/situational aspect of the external operating circumstance in the motivation process, Carlsnaes concluded that the study of the effect of structural/situational circumstances held the key to the final motivation outcome.

China’s transformation from a revolutionary power to a post-revolutionary state, and to a socialist state with Chinese characteristics under Deng’s open and reform policy was underpinned by two key features: one was Mao’s ‘revolution’, and the other was Deng’s ‘modernisation’. The implementation of these two major themes were accompanied by unique structural features or systemic transformation, which directly impacted on the leadership’s foreign policy motivation. This was highlighted in two extraordinary events in Chinese foreign policy: Mao’s decision to enter the Korean War in late 1950, and China’s reconciliation with South Korea in the early 1990s after more than 40 years’ hostility. These two seemingly incompatible foreign policy decisions demonstrated that the objective conditions and organisational settings were important considerations in shaping the Chinese leadership’s foreign policy motivation.

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1 See Chpt. 2. Carlsnaes’ main argument was that among the three motivational dimensions, the situational aspect which included objective condition and organisational settings played a dominant role.
2 **ibid.**
3 **ibid.**
This chapter seeks to understand how the structural condition and its mutation over time informed the CCP leaders’ core values and key terms of reference that largely determined the optimal strategy and options of their foreign policy. It explores how the party monopoly over the state apparatus and its dominance over all aspects of people’s lives was achieved, and how it affected Chinese foreign policy.

There were many factors contributing to the establishment of China’s political system under Mao, most notably totalitarianism. But this chapter only focuses on examining structural and systemic components. It first discusses the consequences for Chinese foreign policy of the party’s monopoly of power under Mao. Mao’s doctrine of self-reliance as both a central notion to mobilise domestic resources and as an extensive revolutionary practice in China had resulted in a particular framework for foreign policy decisionmaking—for a long time it had to conform to this doctrine. Under Mao, self-reliance often equated to isolation and prevented China from adopting more conciliatory attitudes towards the two superpowers in the 1960s and 1970s. However, Mao’s doctrine of self-reliance was often complemented with a quite contradictory practice—the united front, which was a strategy for the CCP to achieve effective power in both the revolutionary and early People’s Republic periods, even though often in an inferior position and outnumbered by other forces. In foreign policy, the united front strategy gave China flexibility through selectively allying with friends and dividing enemies.

The chapter then assesses some significant structural changes in Deng’s period and the

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flow-on effect on the Chinese leadership's foreign policy thinking. The structural and systemic transformations under Deng reduced, in many ways, the party's power monopoly over China. As a consequence, the Chinese political system evolved from vertical to horizontal authoritarianism, with increasing participation of the bureaucracy providing the necessary structural change to facilitate such a development. This account of structural transformation takes into consideration such elements as institutional inputs, the scope of the bureaucratic participation and the degree of transfiguration in institutional structure, rules and norms governing the formulation of Chinese foreign policy.

Party's Monopoly as Structural Constraint

Under Mao, the party's monopoly over ideology, organisation and administration in China provided a dominant and unified structural setting within which the policy makers operated and drew reference. The existence of such a monopoly gave the CCP unbridled power to control over both domestic and foreign policy decisionmaking. As the predominant governing medium, the CCP's power monopoly in the Mao era cast a rigid framework to regulate policy formulation. Under Deng, although the party's monopoly of the system was significantly weakened and gradually reduced by the increasing function of institutional mechanisms, the efforts to maintain the privileges of the party's power was nonetheless a repeated theme in Chinese domestic politics. As such, it was directly implicated in the making of Chinese foreign policy.

6 The party monopoly did not equate to a monolithic bloc. The CCP's monopoly did not negate that there were policy debates within the party leadership. It is so used in this chapter to express the policy outcome rather than process. See
The question of how the structural setting affected Chinese foreign policy would be best addressed by understanding this set of related issues. Domestically, the two basic theories and the practice of self-reliance and the united front played pivotal roles in putting in place a structural setting which shaped the CCP’s monopoly in Chinese society under Mao. But in dealing with international relations, they severely limited China’s foreign policy choice and expression.

Self-reliance as Foundation of Mao’s Foreign Policy

Self-reliance was originally a sheer necessity for the CCP’s survival in the hardship of the isolated Chinese rural areas. It was later consolidated into the foundation and guiding principle for China’s foreign policy under Mao. In discussion of the influence of the CCP’s power monopoly over Chinese foreign policy, one noticeable phenomenon was that such a policy at the end of World War II was shaped largely within the contours of the communists’ own political and military history. This was a history that centred on the political struggles between Mao and Soviet-trained party leaders, and was also firmly rooted in the revolutionary experience of the CCP.

As demonstrated in Chapter Five, Mao differed in background, experience and basic policy preference from his rivals within the CCP who favoured a united front with the Kuomintang and its foreign supporters in the 1930s. Mao built his political base in the countryside, and favoured a strategy of relying on the peasants rather than trusting in

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9 ibid.
the good will of the Chinese bourgeoisie or its foreign patrons. \(^{11}\) Mao’s political opponents were trained in the cities and abroad. They had control over the party through the intervention of Stalin and they were instructed to form a united front with the KMT. \(^{12}\) Such uncompromising differences and the subsequent efforts to resolve them influenced not only the Chinese Communist movement throughout 1930s and 1940s, but also its foreign policy orientation after 1949. \(^{13}\)

Stuart Schram described early Mao as conscious of the collective force of the Chinese people—undifferentiated between urban and rural or even classes—in fulfilment of China’s destiny. \(^{14}\) His staunch nationalism helped make him an enthusiastic supporter of the KMT during the 1920s and a serious practitioner of the strategy of the united front from that time on. \(^{15}\) But for Mao the turning point came in 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek’s bloody purge of the Left ended the First United Front. The Central Committee of the CCP went underground in Shanghai; Mao and a group of followers took to the hills. \(^{16}\) From then until the Communist victory in 1949, Mao viewed China and the world from his mobile base in the countryside, \(^{17}\) and was forced to rely solely on the CCP as an organisation to realise his revolutionary aspirations for China. \(^{18}\)

Mao’s rural orientation and sentiment reflected his choice of strategy and the preferred social base for the Chinese revolution. For him, the attempt to cooperate with the urban

\(^{10}\) ibid. pp. 112-142

\(^{11}\) ibid.

\(^{12}\) ibid.


\(^{15}\) ibid.


\(^{17}\) ibid. pp. 132-155

\(^{18}\) ibid. Quite unlike the first united front with the KMT in the 1920s, the CCP’s return to the second united front in 1935 through relying more on its own strength and leadership.
bourgeoisie had proven to be catastrophic; and only a program of mass mobilisation in the countryside would enable the revolution to survive and prosper.\textsuperscript{19} “Can the countryside defeat the cities?” he asked. “The answer is that it is difficult, but it can be done.”\textsuperscript{20}

The 1942-1944 party rectification campaign with its daunting slogan of self-reliance was the most important single enterprise in the revolutionary decades.\textsuperscript{21} Its central message—that the theory of Marxism must be made to square with the reality of rural China—left an imprint on all aspects of Chinese Communism.\textsuperscript{22} The spirit of the rectification movement stressed independence, and the synthesis of the Marxist-Leninist tradition with the real-life problems of China to create a new, uniquely Chinese form of Marxism.\textsuperscript{23} This theoretical redefinition of Marxist-Leninist theories gave the CCP the sole authority to interpret its meaning, thus paving the way for the CCP’s absolute right to monopolise political power in China.

Self-reliance was an accurate description of the way Yenan made its decisions. Despite pressures from Stalin and the Comintern, Yenan largely made up its own mind.\textsuperscript{24} The best evidence for the CCP’s independence came from the periods before August 1945 and after March 1946.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{20} Mao Zedong, ‘On the New Stage’ Stuart Schram \textit{The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung} (New York: Praeger, 1969, p. 288)
\textsuperscript{22} ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} Sheng Hua, Zhang Xuejun and Luo Xiaopeng, \textit{China: from Revolution to Reform} (Basingstoke, England: Macmillan Press, 1993, pp. 82-87). In both cases Moscow advised Yenan to seek a peaceful settlement with the KMT but the Communists opted for civil wars. During the nine-month interim, Russian influence on the Communists was important, in some cases even decisive. This had little to do with Moscow’s organisational or ideological hold over Yenan perhaps. It simply reflected the Communists’ appreciation of Russian power in China. Decision makers in Yenan called the shots; they weighed the Soviet factor like any other.
Self-reliance was a virtue born of necessity—a product of situation rather than of choice. Ezra Suleiman noted that as an insurgent movement before 1949, the CCP lacked foreign recognition, and the KMT government for the most part succeeded in blocking its contacts with the outside world. As a rural movement, tucked away in the remote hinterland, hemmed in by the KMT and Japanese armies, the CCP lacked access to the cities, the coast, and lines of international communication. The exigencies of war left the Chinese communists with no choice but to create a network of self-sufficient economic and military units, linked by a common ideology and a disciplined but slender organisation. This was in the first instance a domestic strategy, a means of survival in a lonely, hostile environment due largely to Yenan’s isolation, but it was applied to foreign policy later as well.

Self-reliance was above all a psychological and political weapon designed to concentrate the party’s power. Such a concentration inevitably led to monopoly. The Central Committee directive ‘On Diplomatic Work’ set the tone for Yenan’s attitude toward the outside world—the CCP would welcome foreign visitors and what they brought with them, but the Chinese people were never again to supplicate favours from abroad. ‘On Diplomatic Work’ declared that:

We must intensify the feeling of national self-respect and faith in ourselves. This is what constitutes the correct national platform, this is what constitutes the essence of the prototype of the new man in new democratic China.

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27 ibid.
29 ibid.
30 ibid.
This message was meant to kindle national pride and stiffen backbones among the party faithful. It was also a selling point, a reason for following the CCP. Mao said: "We are not like Chiang Kai-shek. No nation needs to prop us up. We can stand erect and walk on our own feet like free men."

Later on, when Mao's preference for the rural-masses was tied to new Chinese foreign policy, it was articulated in the policy of self-trust or self-reliance. James Reardon-Anderson noted that the most significant outcome and lessons of this rectification campaign decreed that the CCP would not treat the world without on the basis of self-reliance and the creation of their own power from within.

The stress on self-reliance, however, did not equate to renunciation of external assistance, for Mao recognised that China's position was too precarious and the power of the foreigners too great to permit a policy of blind autarky either before or after 1949. Mao and other communists did their best to attract support from the Americans and the Russians during 1940s. After the victory in 1949, Beijing was quick to turn to the Soviet Union for assistance in defending China and rebuilding its economy. Tens and thousands of Soviet experts and technical personnel came to China and Soviet-built equipment was flooding China's industries. Rather, the idea of self-reliance crystallised gradually in response to events at home and abroad. Domestically, an important turning point came in late 1939, when Moscow concluded the Nazi-Soviet Pact and reached a

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34 Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (New York: Grove Press, 1968, pp. 115-124)
The signing of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact and the accompanying Frontier Declaration in which Moscow pledged to respect the territorial integrity of the puppet state of Manchuria shocked the CCP leadership, but confirmed the correctness and timeliness of Mao's wisdom of self-reliance. Mao was the first to assert his leadership over the Chinese communist movement without the Soviet or Comintern support. He rode to power aboard a program of rural revolution and self-reliance which was in marked contrast to the policies of his predecessors.

Internationally, as Reardon-Anderson noted, there was no evidence that communist ideology prohibited alliance and cooperation with the USSR, the US and other powers. Rather, it was after the Americans had repeatedly turned against the CCP—first in China's civil war in the 1940s, and later in Korean War in the early 1950s—that Mao used self-reliance as an instrument to mobilise public sentiment and to appeal for Soviet support. Reardon-Anderson speculated that if the American military had aided the CCP, then cooperation between the two sides might have developed its own momentum quite independent of Leninist socialist-imperialist theory. This was also the view of Michael Schaller—although the Marxist theory prepared the CCP to take Americans as number one enemy, initially this was not the case at all. The CCP eagerly sought support and military assistance from the US in the 1930s and 1940s. Only after the US constantly refused to assist the CCP and persistently supported the KMT in the war

36 *Ibid.* pp. 88-91
with the CCP did the Chinese communists come to regard it as an arch enemy.40

The success of the Chinese revolution not only proved the effectiveness of the self-reliance policy, but also gave Mao and other old revolutionaries profuse political capital to claim jurisdiction over domestic as well as international relations.41 The theme of self-reliance was an important part of the Chinese revolutionary legacy which placed little limit on subsequent Chinese foreign policy. Ultimately, the CCP learnt that the only sensible strategy was to rely on themselves, to expand their power and to deal with all outsiders from a position of strength and autonomy.42 Self-reliance was elevated to the status of a guiding principle in China’s domestic and foreign policy in the Mao era. During the first three decades of the new China, Mao often returned to the theme of self-reliance to draw political inspiration and authority in dealing with both domestic and foreign policy crises.43 As a direct consequence of this order, the thrust of self-reliance became an essential moulding force of the contemporary Chinese foreign policy.44

As a foundation of Chinese foreign policy, self-reliance served as a powerful reminder that when China was deprived of autonomy, it was caught among the foreign powers

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41 Alan Liu, How China is Ruled (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1986, pp. 233-251)
42 ibid. pp. 120-132
43 ibid. Self-reliance was evoked in some major domestic campaigns, such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, when Mao sought to reassert his authority and consolidate the CCP’s rule. Internationally, the Soviet alliance and proletarian internationalism as main foreign policy cornerstones ended in early 1960. The CCP resorted to self-reliance doctrine to conduct its foreign policy after its bitter disputes with the USSR, which saw the withdrawal of all the Soviet technical personnel and the assistance from China.
44 ibid. The influence of this legacy on the contemporary Chinese foreign policy were deep and long-lasting. Indeed, it seemed that Mao had reasons to reserve his attitude. Mao and some of his comrades were suspicious of any foreign aid. Even the Soviet Union, a supposed communist movement ally and ‘big brother’, was giving only lukewarm support to the CCP’s struggle for socialism, and offered limited material assistance when its interests and Chinese ones coincided. The zigzag course of Russian policy towards China during the revolutionary years proved that Stalin’s support came only when his interest was taken into account. The Soviet had no consistent policy of helping a fraternal Communist party. See Michael Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 55-61)
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and subject to decisions over which the Chinese had no control.\textsuperscript{45} It was self-reliance that revived China’s standing among the world nations.\textsuperscript{46} When this Yenan myth was brought forward as a symbol of the wisdom of the founding fathers, its lesson was that reliance on the elemental force of the Chinese people was a more reliable means of restoring China’s unity and greatness than any course which depended on foreign support.\textsuperscript{47} This myth therefore fulfilled the CCP’s important domestic need to concentrate all decisionmaking power in its own hands: it served, on the one hand, to prove that only the CCP could save China; and on the other hand, that the CCP had the legitimacy to exercise such a monopoly lest China be subject again to foreign subjugation and manipulation.\textsuperscript{48} Self-reliance did not necessarily dictate every Chinese foreign policy decision, but it remained a powerful instrument in the hands of those who wanted to retain the party’s power monopoly and chose to invoke Chinese nationalist sentiment in achieving the foreign policy objectives.

\textit{The United Front as Strategy in Mao’s Foreign Policy}

The CCP’s power monopoly within the party, and later over Chinese society, was achieved also by effective support of very successful united front work in both revolutionary struggles and in the socialist development. The united front, as a strategy, enabled the CCP to harness all potential resources to consolidate and retain its monopoly position in China’s domestic and its international affairs.

The CCP did not stride to power in 1949 entirely on its own two feet. From an early

\textsuperscript{45} Sheng Hua, Zhang Xuejun and Luo Xiaopeng, \textit{China: from Revolution to Reform} (Basingstoke, England: Macmillan Press, 1993, pp. 78-84)

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{ibid.}
stage onward, at critical moments, the united front strategy was deployed as a way of building alliances and relationships with sympathetic non-communist groups for the purpose of enhancing its power and popular support, and defeating the enemy of the day.\textsuperscript{49} Together with the party’s leadership and the armed struggle, the united front was one of the three ‘magic weapons’ for the success of the Chinese revolution.

However, the CCP did not automatically assume the united front theory from its formation. It was during the process of revolution that it learnt to use this powerful weapon to great effect. In the given historical situation in which China found itself in the 1920s and 1930s, it was not only necessary\textsuperscript{50} but also possible for the CCP to form a united front with other forces, specifically that of the KMT, in order to jointly oppose Western imperialism and militarism.\textsuperscript{51} The usual Leninist reservations, however, were made as condition for such a front: the alliance was to be considered only as a short term expedient pending a nationalist victory, after which the party and the KMT would find themselves in opposition to each other.\textsuperscript{52}

i) United Front Theories

The international united front theory had its origin in the writings of Lenin.\textsuperscript{53} According
to Lenin, revolution had to be seen as a process, not as a single momentous event.\textsuperscript{54} Given this, an important attribute of a Lenin's party was an ability to adapt itself immediately to the most diverse and rapidly changing conditions of struggle.\textsuperscript{55} Lenin believed that the party's alliance policy should take account of both the nature of the revolutionary process and the need for flexibility:

...the immediate task of our party is not to summon all available forces to the attack right now but to call for the formation of a revolutionary organisation capable of uniting all forces and guiding the movement in actual practice and not in name alone.\textsuperscript{56}

Lenin held the strong view that permanent alliances with any party were unnecessary since different stages of the revolutionary process would bring to the fore different forces to which a revolutionary party might need to attach itself.\textsuperscript{57} The party also needed to be in constant readiness to take advantage of the ebb and flow of revolution and for this reason a key aspect of its alliance policy was what was later to be called 'the united front from below'.\textsuperscript{58} This united front required a network of contacts and positions of influence at levels below that of the leadership of existing organisations in order to be able to mobilise 'the masses' when the time was 'ripe'.\textsuperscript{59}

However, other theories explaining the most important reason for building up a 'united

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\textsuperscript{54} Lenin said: "...the revolution itself must not be regarded as a single act...but as a series of more or less powerful outbreaks rapidly alternating with periods of more or less complete calm." Lenin, 'The Assessment of the Russian Revolution' \textit{Collected Works} (Moscow: The Progress Publishing House, 1961, Vol. 15, p. 57)
\textsuperscript{56} Lenin, 'Where To Begin' \textit{Collected Works} (Moscow: The Progress Publishing House, 1961, Vol. 5, p. 20)
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{ibid.} pp. 23-24
\textsuperscript{58} Lenin distinguished between 'struggle from below' and 'action from above' in his 'The Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution' \textit{Collected Works} (Moscow: The Progress Publishing House, 1961, Vol. 9 p. 29-30)
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{ibid.}
front from below' argued that it was due to the long term aims of Lenin’s party, which were not the same as those of its allies.\(^60\) Indeed, the dialectical view of history implied not only that any alliance would inevitably collapse at some point, but also that the ally of Lenin’s party in one historical stage could become its principal enemy in another.\(^61\) Hence the party needed to build up its popular strength by means of a ‘united front from below’ in order to retain the real power and to prepare for the ultimate split.\(^62\)

Lenin’s united front theory, especially his ‘united front from below’, had tremendous ramifications on the Chinese revolution strategy as Mao quickly saw its close relevance to the Chinese reality.\(^63\) It fitted well with the CCP’s experience in fighting with many powerful enemies around it. In addition, this particular version of Lenin’s united front theory was later applied to Chinese international relations partly because of its earlier success in Chinese domestic politics.\(^64\)

After two attempts at cooperation with the KMT, especially after the second one in the 1930s, the CCP claimed that the united front was a successful means of carrying out the Chinese revolution.\(^65\) When Mao started to advance this theory in his subsequent articles, he treated it as an historical law.\(^66\) This emerged clearly in the way Mao integrated the concept of united front into the total ideology of Marxism-Leninism in his principal essay on dialectics, ‘On Contradiction’.

\(^{61}\) ibid.
\(^{62}\) ibid. pp. 27-31
\(^{64}\) ibid.
\(^{65}\) Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and China’s Foreign Policy* (Berkeley: University of California, 1970, pp. 35-36)
\(^{67}\) In this essay Mao explained the Chinese revolution with Engels’ formulation of dialectical laws. His starting point was the Marxist theory of history and nature: nothing was static; all things were involved in a continual process of
ii) United Front as a Strategy

The united front as a revolutionary strategy was defined succinctly by Mao in his essay ‘On Policy’. It was: “...to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few and crush our enemies one by one.”

As a domestic political strategy, the united front aimed to ‘win over the many’. Mao’s confidence in the possibilities of winning over the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people to a united front might in part reflect the universalistic aspects of the united front doctrine as it developed in China in the 1920s. It was also regarded by Mao as following logically from a correct dialectical analysis of a particular situation. Dialectics to Mao was essentially a matter of making distinctions, or ‘splitting one into two’. James Armstrong suggested that the CCP’s united front should be seen from three different perspectives: it was the actual alliance of the Communist Party with other parties; it was a general policy directive instructing communists to be alert to the many possibilities of securing allies; and it was an expression of a belief that the dynamics of dialectics would inevitably produce allies.

With this strategy, the enemy would be defeated ‘one by one’. Once a united front
achieved its purpose by isolating and defeating one enemy, another would emerge, this time directed against an erstwhile ally. Each defeated enemy constituted a successful stage in the revolutionary process. For this reason the united front strategy was essentially a revolutionary ‘dual policy’.

In the international context, the general principles of the united front in China’s domestic politics also shaped the form of its foreign policy strategy, and the purpose of such a strategy would be seen as a convenient way of confronting the principal contradiction of the time—Japan in 1937, the US in the 1950 and the promotion of world revolution in the 1970s.

This was not to say that such a strategy might not also have a defensive aspect as Peter Van Ness argued. Indeed it could be contended that a policy of uniting all possible forces against an enemy pointed to an essentially defensive purpose. However, a genuine united front strategy would have one fundamental distinguishing feature: it would be a ‘dual policy’ with the aims not only of opposing an enemy but also of revolutionising allies.

James Armstrong found that there was much that Lenin and Mao had in common in their writings on international united fronts. For example, both saw it as a ‘dual policy’ and urged communists to ‘struggle against’ as well as ‘unite with’ their allies. Both based their advice on a distinction between broad categories of social force.

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72 ibid.
73 Peter Van Ness, China as a Third World State: Foreign Policy and Official National Identity (Canberra: Department of International Relations, ANU, 1991)
74 ibid.
76 ibid.
However, for Lenin united fronts were ‘transitional’ policies: temporary expedients to be employed only during periods of communist weakness. For Mao they were an intrinsic and essential part of the revolutionary process, necessary even after a communist victory because contradictions would continue to exist, even ‘amongst the people’ and the united front was one means of resolving contradictions.  

Marxist dialectics, Leninist ‘dual policy’ and Mao’s ‘win over the many’ set a general theme of Chinese foreign policy: to exploit contradictions between capitalist countries and to form a united front to achieve the CCP’s foreign policy objectives. Mao and the CCP leaders often stressed to the party the importance of identifying the principal enemy at any particular moment and forming the broadest possible united front against it. As early as 1940, Mao developed the concept of ‘limited alliances’. He contended that in dealing with China’s main enemy it was necessary to unite with all possible forces, even the enemies of China’s principal foe, and to treat alliances formed in the process as limited and temporary. He called on the party “to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few and crush our enemies one by one.”

Furthermore, the CCP’s united front strategy in foreign policy reflected the Chinese traditional practice of ‘playing one barbarian off against another.’ During the Opium

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77 ibid.
79 ibid.
80 Interestingly, this coincided with *Sun Zi’s* famous saying: my enemy’s enemy is my friend. *Sun Zi binfa (Military Arts by Sun Zi)* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1961)
82 On traditional Chinese practice in handling foreign powers, see Earl Swisher ed. *China’s Management of the American Barbarians: A Study of Sino-American Relations, 1841-1861, with Documents* (Conn.: New Haven, Yale University, 1953, pp. 3-6)
Wars, officials of the Qing dynasty contemplated the possibility of playing the Americans off against other powers, especially the British. Later, in its effort to abolish extraterritoriality in the late 1920s, the KMT government also attempted to exploit contradictions between Britain, France and the United States. These historical parallels would not be overlooked by Mao and his comrades, who took history seriously. The attempt to drive a wedge between the United States and Britain became a consistent goal in the CCP’s foreign policy in the 1940s, too.

The CCP skilfully manipulated the united front strategy to buy the time and space when it was weak and vulnerable domestically and internationally. It successfully exploited the united front as an effective strategy to boost its strength within China and to advance its position in the international relations. The continued practice of the united front strategy in the first thirty years of the Republic not only contributed positively to consolidate the CCP’s power monopoly domestically, but also greatly enhanced China’s international status in the world.

The Scope of Systemic Transformation

One of the salient features of the Chinese political system was the concentration of power in the CCP, through monopoly mechanisms discussed above. Within the party, power was further concentrated in the hands of one or a few leaders. Foreign affairs, together with military affairs and party organisational affairs, were considered to be one of the most sensitive areas that demanded an even higher concentration of

83 ibid.
84 ibid.
85 ibid.
decisionmaking power. The 1958 CCP Central Committee and State Council joint circular stipulated:

With regard to major policy orientation, principles and guidelines, and to implementation planning and supervision, government organs and their party groups have the power to make recommendations. But the decisionmaking power belongs to the Party Centre.

This rule remained an effective description of the relationship between the CCP centre and the bureaucracy in the area of Chinese foreign policy, even under Deng.

One important characteristic of China’s reform under Deng, however, was that while the overall structure of the party-state remained largely intact, the substance within this structure underwent many drastic changes. That is to say, while nominally those fundamental principles governing the system, such as the supremacy of party power and authority with the underpinning self-reliance and united front strategies, were still official slogans, the applicability of them to the running of state affairs was considerably reduced.

It was also well documented that China’s political system and foreign policy

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87 Seng Qian, Pang Song, Han Gang and Zhang Zhanbin, *Dangdai zhongguo zhengzhi tizhi fazhan gaiyao (An Outline of the Evolution of the Contemporary Chinese Political System)* (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1988, pp. 91-92)
88 ibid.
89 Governing regime of the PRC consisted of three major vertical system: the Communist Party, the Government, and Military. At the apex of these systems was the Political Bureau of the CCP, which was often further crystallised in the form of a leadership core. The three major systems operated on five levels: central, provincial, prefectural, county and township. Horizontally, on each level there existed a set of seven standard institutions: the CCP Committee, the CC Advisory Committee, the CCP Discipline Inspection Committee of the party system, the People’s Congress, the Government, the People’s Political Consultative Conference of the government system and the Military. See Yan Huai, ‘Zhongguo dalu zhengzhi tizhi qianlun’ (Understanding the Political System of Contemporary China) (*Papers of the Centre for Modern China*, No. 10, August 1991, pp. 2-4)
90 The basic structure for foreign policy decisionmaking remained unchanged, i.e. it was in the order of the Apex, the paramount leader and leadership Nuclear Circle, Politburo and its Standing Committee and the CCP Central Committee Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group. See Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 8-13)
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decisionmaking process under Deng underwent a series of drastic changes.\textsuperscript{91} The reform momentum in the Deng era gathered sufficient consensus within the party to affect the process of foreign policymaking. Such consensus permitted significant departures from the rigid ideology and structural arrangement to more flexible approaches.\textsuperscript{92} However, China's political system remained authoritarian in nature. This was particularly noticeable in the formulation of foreign policy, which continued to be highly centralised and, on occasions, was personalised despite the general trend of growing institutionalisation across the board. That is to say, foreign policy was an area that continued to be highly reflective of either some individuals', or certain groups', perceptions, tendencies and preferences.\textsuperscript{93}

Three important trends emerged in the reform era in China that directly impacted on the making of Chinese foreign policy. Firstly, the organisation of the Chinese policymaking apparatus shifted from vertical authoritarianism to horizontal authoritarianism.\textsuperscript{94} Secondly, Beijing moved away from the Mao's approach when a single leader dominated foreign policymaking to allow greater participation by the bureaucracy and


\textsuperscript{92} ibid.

\textsuperscript{93} A number of scholars analysed this 'halfway change', which stopped short of transforming the authoritarian nature of Chinese politics. Harry Harding called the post-Mao regime a 'consultative authoritarian' regime. (Harry Harding, \textit{China's Second Revolution: Reform After Mao}, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987, p. 200) He argued that China had experienced a significant departure from totalitarianism, but did not come a truly pluralistic, or even quasi-democratic, political system. Robert Scalapino pointed out that while "keeping a rein on political rights yet enabling initiatives to operate in such areas as enterprise and religion, governments achieve a mix of stability and dynamism suitable to indigenous conditions." (Robert Scalapino, \textit{The Politics of Development: Perspectives on Twentieth Century}, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 127) Scalapino believed that the Asian Leninist states, primarily China, "are now gravitating in this direction". Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton raised a 'fragmented authoritarianism model' to describe bureaucratic politics and decision-making in post-Mao China. This model argued that "authority below the very peak of the Chinese political system is fragmented and disjointed. The fragmentation is structurally based and has been enhanced by reform policies regarding procedures." (Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton eds. \textit{Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China}, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, p. 8)

\textsuperscript{94} The notion was developed by Zhao Quansheng in his article, 'Domestic Factors of Chinese Foreign Policy: From Vertical to Horizontal Authoritarianism' \textit{The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science} (No. 519, January 1992, pp. 159-176)
other interest groups. Thirdly, increasing levels of political tolerance allowed a degree
of political and academic freedom to express different opinions, which more or less
facilitated the move to a more accountable government.

These three important changes in the policy process represented the scope and degree
of systemic adjustment in meeting the challenge of structural reform. They also
underpinned the significant transformation of China’s political system itself in order to
accommodate such changes. This section examines the level and extent of the
transformation of these three aspects and assesses these structural/situational impacts of
foreign policy motivation.

*From ‘Vertical’ to ‘Horizontal’ Authoritarianism*

In the early years of the People’s Republic of China, Mao allowed a limited degree of
top leadership participation in some of the key foreign policy discussions and debates,
such as the early decision to enter into a strategic alliance with the Soviet Union,
known as ‘leaning to one side’ in the new regime’s foreign policy orientation, and most
importantly the decision to intervene in the Korean conflict in 1950.

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97 The terms vertical and horizontal used here refer primarily to the policymaking process rather than to the nature of
the regime itself, although the two may have a close connection. Furthermore, the terms here refer only to the scope,
character and nature of participation in the foreign policy-making process (e.g. collective decision-making vs. one-
person domination), and not to the command channels of foreign policy. Indeed, foreign policy formulation and
implementation in virtually every country, authoritarian or democratic, takes place within vertical command
channels. Horizontal authoritarianism refers to a policy-making process that is essentially authoritarian and highly
centralised, but in which several power centres at the top level represent and coordinate various interests and
opinions. Multiple command channels, both institutional and ad hoc, exist. More players participate in the foreign
policy-making process, and conflicting voices may occasionally represent different interests and policies. See Zhao
Quansheng, ‘Domestic Factors of Chinese Foreign Policy: From Vertical to Horizontal Authoritarianism’ *The Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (No. 519, January 1992, pp. 162-165)
This limited involvement on the part of the top CCP leadership soon came to an end when Mao assumed an increasing totalitarian position after stifling dissent first in society (the 1957 Anti-Rightist Campaign) and later within the CCP (1959 Lushan Conference).\textsuperscript{99} By the end of the first decade of the communist victory, a strong-man with a small elite (vertical authoritarian) model emerged in China’s foreign policy decisionmaking.\textsuperscript{100} Together with high level appointments and military affairs, foreign policy decisionmaking became one of the three most centralised areas in China’s political system. Mao, as Chairman of the Communist Party and its Military Commission, dominated foreign policy decisionmaking until his death in 1976.\textsuperscript{101}

Deng’s reform opened up China to the outside world. The political system as a result evolved from a vertical to horizontal authoritarian model.\textsuperscript{102} China’s foreign policy decisionmaking was also in the process of transformation from a ‘strong-man’ model to one characterised more by bureaucratic, sectoral and regional competition.\textsuperscript{103}

As the Long March generation passed from the scene, the new group of political leaders lacked the necessary authority and charisma to dominate foreign policy decisionmaking. This weakness at the power centre necessitated power to be redistributed to, or shared with, other functional organisations. As a consequence, the foreign affairs bureaucracy became increasingly influential.\textsuperscript{104} At the same time, with the process of decentralisation and opening up to the outside world, new actors like the

\textsuperscript{100} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{101} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{102} Nicholas Kristof, ‘China Sees Market-Leninism as Way to Future’ \textit{The New York Times} 6 September 1993
\textsuperscript{103} \textit{ibid.}
defence industry, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and provincial authorities, which had previously played little role in foreign policy decisionmaking, gained a stronger voice in foreign affairs. These new players formed a wider network of horizontal approach.\textsuperscript{105} The increasingly important roles of these players in Chinese foreign policy arose from the fact that some major points of contention between China and the West were focused on the areas they represented: such as overseas arms sales by the defence industry and the PLA, the pirating of intellectual properties, textile quota evasion and the aggressive marketing of prison-labour products.\textsuperscript{106}

\textit{Increasing Institutionalisation}

The highly centralised decisionmaking power in a few created much inertia to discourage the broader bureaucratic establishment from taking initiative in the formulation of major foreign policies.\textsuperscript{107} During the Mao period, the initiation of major foreign policies became almost exclusively the prerogative of Mao and Zhou.\textsuperscript{108} In the reform era, although Deng was no longer the only initiator within the nucleus of leadership in foreign policy decisionmaking, the basic dynamics remained substantially unaltered. Most major foreign policy initiatives still originated by him or from the top leadership.\textsuperscript{109}

However, reform in China did bring about a process of gradual institutionalisation, which was achieved mainly through expanding bureaucratic participation in the

\textsuperscript{104} Benjamin Schwartz, \textit{China and Other Matters} (Harvard University Press, 1996, pp. 125-138)
\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{107} Quan Yanchi, \textit{Zouxia shengtan de Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai Desanctified)} (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1994, pp. 7-11)
\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Ibid.}
system. Furthermore, such institutionalisation was not limited to the central government only, for beneath the structure at the apex of political power, there were a number of institutions which operated somewhat independently in foreign affairs. But these different elements still had to be resolved near the top.

In China, every major political institution is led by the Communist Party. However, the party and the government had separate agencies for dealing with foreign affairs—each with different functions. The International Liaison Department of the CCP, for example, was in charge of the party’s international activities, while the State Council controlled several ministries that had jurisdiction over foreign policy issues, most notably the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Many other institutions also had sections that dealt with foreign affairs.

The administrative reforms of the 1980s brought a generation of technocrats into leading positions in the government bureaucracy as discussed in Chapter Five. These technocrat bureaucrats were relatively young, well educated, confident and assertive in their fields of specialisation. As David Bachman argued, this younger generation of leaders, including the State president and the party’s general secretary, Jiang Zemin and

109 ibid.
110 Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 13-14)
111 Most of them were of provincial/army ranks. In the government system, they were chiefly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and Xinhua News Agency. In the party system, there was the CCP Central Committee International Liaison Department. In the Military system, there was the PLA General Staff Department. The Commission of Science Technology and Industry for National Defence which had the responsibility to oversee China’s defence research and development and defence industry straddled the government and the military systems. ibid.
112 However, at the 13th Party Congress, the party constitution was revised to abolish the party group in the leadership structure of government bureaucracies, which conflicted with the minister-responsibility system introduced in the PRC Constitution. Pang Song and Han Gang, ‘Dang he guojia lingdao tizhi de lishi kaochayu gaige zhanwang’ (A Historical Review and Reform Outlook of the Party and State Leadership Systems) Zhongguo shehui kexue (China Social Sciences) (No. 6, 10 November 1987, p. 5)
114 For example the National People’s Congress had a foreign affairs committee to look after its own foreign affairs. ibid. pp. 12-14
115 See Chpt. 5 of this thesis for more details.
then Premier Li Peng, had a smaller power base and less authority than the older generation, which included Mao, Zhou and Deng. As such, politics in the post-Deng era had to be based more on persuasion and compromise; bold, new initiatives which may have harmed the entrenched bureaucratic interests were less likely. This new generation of bureaucrats, including those working in foreign affairs, participated actively both in the policymaking process and in the protection of bureaucratic interests.

The increasing bureaucratic participation in the policymaking process was primarily reflected in day-to-day affairs. Foreign affairs bureaucrats played an active role within their own jurisdictions. In the Chinese Embassy in the United States, for example, diplomats improved their efficiency by focusing on key institutions of US foreign policy, including the executive branch and the legislature. In the mid 1980s, the Chinese embassy in Washington established a division of congressional affairs to conduct extensive research and diplomatic activities. The insights gained from this allowed foreign affairs bureaucrats to have opportunities to make policy suggestions to the top leadership, thus enhancing their influence in the policymaking process.

The National People’s Congress (NPC) offered another example of increased bureaucratic participation in the policymaking process. In China, the staff of party central organisations, the central government and the National People’s Congress were all regarded as government employees; they were all part of the central bureaucracy.

117 ibid.
118 Zhao Quanshen, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 80-84)
119 ibid.
120 ibid.
The NPC Foreign Affairs Committee largely consisted of retired high-ranking diplomats; it too could be considered a part of the bureaucratic establishment.\textsuperscript{122}

Although the NPC had been regarded as a rubber-stamping body, from the 1980s it has increased its influence over important policymaking in China.\textsuperscript{123}

In summary, during the Mao era, the foreign affairs bureaucracies played little role in foreign policy decisionmaking. They were used mainly as instruments for information collection and processing, and for policy implementation.\textsuperscript{124} During the Deng era, the role of the foreign affairs bureaucracies in decisionmaking began to increase as China greatly expanded its interaction with the rest of the world, and as a result, management of foreign relations became more complex.\textsuperscript{125} The new generation of leadership was dominated by technocrats who had relatively narrow power bases in the political system and thus were more susceptible to lobbies by bureaucratic interests.\textsuperscript{126} Based on this, it could be said that as the decisionmaking process became more institutionalised, the significant role of the bureaucracies in decisionmaking would continue to increase.

\textsuperscript{121} ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} ibid.
\textsuperscript{123} An interesting episode regarding the confusion of decisionmaking authority on the issue of Hong Kong took place in May 1984, several months before the signing of the historic Sino-British agreement on Hong Kong's return to China in 1997. It was reported that Deng Xiaoping made an unplanned statement to some Hong Kong and Macau reporters and the delegates to the NPC. Deng made it clear that only he himself, the premier, the foreign minister, the director of the State Council's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, and the director of the Hong Kong Branch of Xinhua could speak officially about Beijing's Hong Kong policy. Deng's angry remarks were aimed at two NPC vice-chairmen, Geng Biao and Huang Hua, who had served as defence minister and foreign minister respectively before serving on the NPC. Geng had openly suggested that China would not deploy any troops in Hong Kong; and Huang had said that Hong Kong could be represented in the Chinese mission to the United Nation. Although the two senior NPC leaders' statements were refuted by the paramount leader, who emphasised that the PLA would be stationed in Hong Kong after 1997, the fact that they could express a different view at all was a significant indicator of the NPC's competing policy role. For detailed recollection of this episode, see Andy Ho, "Tracking Down China's Official Line" \textit{South China Morning Post} 27 October 1994, p. 23
\textsuperscript{124} Lee Hong Yung, \textit{From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, pp. 155-162)
\textsuperscript{125} ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} ibid.
Growth of Political Tolerance

As one of the main indicators of systemic transformation in China's political system, the degree of political tolerance exhibited by the leadership should also be assessed.

The existence of various factions at the top level of Chinese politics was widely documented. Early on, Mao and Zhou Enlai differed in their perceptions of the outside world and on foreign policy issues. Under the vertical authoritarian rule, however, the paramount leader was usually able to silence contrary opinions, and at times of differences. Zhou often suppressed his opinion to follow Mao's decision. According to Doak Barnett, Mao's influence in the making of broad strategic decisions on foreign policy "greatly overshadowed that of Zhou's". While Zhou's remarkable political skills and his role as indispensable chief administrator in the Chinese government enabled him to escape political campaigns and purges throughout many decades, most other top leaders were ruthlessly dealt with and prosecuted. The muffling of different opinions and disagreements among the leadership meant that there was little room for political tolerance under the tightly-controlled vertical political system.

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127 Kenneth Lieberthal identified three prominent schools of thought within the Chinese foreign policymaking establishment: nativists, who encouraged a closed-door foreign policy; eclectic organisers, who wanted to strengthen China by using foreign technology, while shielding the country from the cultural influences that accompanied technological imports; and the all-around modernisers, who strived to alter the fundamental nature of Chinese culture in favour of rapid economic development to speed up the country's modernisation process. See his article, 'Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy' Harry Harding ed. China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s (Conn.: New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984, pp. 44-45). Also see Carol Lee Hamrin, 'Elite Politics and the Development of China's Foreign Relations' Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh eds. Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994)


129 ibid.


131 For example, top leaders such as Wang Jixiang, Peng Dehuai and Liu Shaoqi

Political tolerance grew considerably in Deng’s reform period when the party’s work focus shifted to economic development. In the leadership centre, the fact that Deng did not possess absolute authority at the beginning of 1980s also meant that it was harder to silence or eliminate different political voices, especially those who held different views but had similar power.\textsuperscript{133} Leaders with weaker power bases, such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, could still be removed quickly from leading positions.\textsuperscript{134}

After the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, Deng designated Jiang as the ‘core’ of the CCP’s “third generation of collective leadership”.\textsuperscript{135} In eight years’ time, Jiang gradually built up his own power base, mainly on consensus. Because Jiang’s power was far from being absolute, he learnt to be more tolerant of rival opinions and to use consultation, coordination and compromise to reconcile the differences at the top level.\textsuperscript{136} This process often led to an inclination at the top leadership to maintain the status quo as the best temporary solution, which in turn led to other problems and policy stagnation.\textsuperscript{137} This was especially true in the field of foreign policy because foreign policy issues could appear less relevant to a top-level power struggle than domestic issues such as political and economic reform.\textsuperscript{138}

The growth of political tolerance at the top level of the CCP leadership was conducive

\textsuperscript{134} ibid.
\textsuperscript{135} While emphasising that Jiang Zemin was the core of the third generation of collective leadership, Deng claimed that “the core of our first generation of collective leadership was Chairman Mao” and “I am the core of the second generation”. See Deng Xiaoping, ‘Urgent Tasks of China’s Third Generation of Collective Leadership’ on 16 June 1989, \textit{Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping} (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, Vol. 3, 1994, pp. 300-302)
\textsuperscript{137} ibid.
to overall systemic transformation. More importantly, it provided a base for further structural changes and institutionalisation. The effects of changes in China’s political system and decisionmaking process helped move China towards a more pragmatic foreign policy regime and a more open society. The dialectic relationship between the changes and the agents for such changes formed the core of the structural/situational setting, within which the Chinese foreign policy motivation was modified, redefined and constrained.

Conclusion

This chapter contended that structural/situational factors (as constraints or catalysts) played an active role in modeling Chinese foreign policy motivation by highlighting the dynamic aspect of this influence. The transition from the party’s monopoly of power in the Mao era to horizontal authoritarianism under Deng fundamentally shifted China’s organisational settings and political decisionmaking culture. Furthermore, the emergence of new internal power politics, new bargains and concessions, and leadership succession also proved to be key structural elements in foreign policy considerations. In Deng’s reform period, the reform process loosened the party’s grip over many administration responsibilities. Greater institutionalisation and political tolerance enabled power to be shared horizontally within the party and government system.

The CCP’s power monopoly, under vertical authoritarian control, placed a serious organisational constraint on Chinese foreign policy motivation. This chapter argued that

138 ibid.
concentration of power in the hands of a few was achieved in the first thirty years of the PRC through the practice of self-reliance and a strategy of united front. The successful application of these two strategies in China’s domestic politics helped to structurally integrate them into China’s foreign policy decisionmaking consideration.

As China’s top foreign policy priority remained “the pragmatic quest for a stable environment needed for effective modernisation and development,” China’s foreign policy would ‘continue to be subordinated by its powerful desire to modernise the Chinese economy and the need to maintain a peaceful international environment’. Under normal circumstance without triggers of sensitive issues, Chinese foreign policy motivation would be largely based on economic considerations and would be generally disposed towards trying to abide by international rule and practice. In the reform decades the very system of the party-state came under serious challenge and the system was forced to undertake critical adjustments in response to the situation. The substantial reduction of party power monopoly in Chinese society paved the way for greater transformation of Chinese political system and its foreign policymaking regime.

As China continued its reform process, the motivation for its foreign policy became more complex and diversified. The process of institutionalisation helped to install a degree of certainty in the study of the Chinese foreign policy motivation, as the modernisation program required optimal utilisation of the national and international conditions to serve China’s central goals, while some core principles and structure were

141 ibid.
still regarded as essential to the regime’s political legitimacy and survival. This contradictory condition brought structural/situational dilemmas to the party leadership, and complicated the foreign policy process by introducing a larger number of factors into consideration. This situation would tend to make foreign policy motivation more dependent and dynamic as next chapter will contend.
Chapter Seven

The Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy Motivation

The previous three chapters of this Part demonstrated the relevance of foreign policy motivation theories investigated in Part I to the study of Chinese foreign policy. The applicability and validity of the three motivation elements (perception, personality and structural/situational constraints) as analytical paradigms for Chinese foreign policy were tested in the three previous chapters of this Part. However, this artificial separation of the individual motivation element was done only for investigating purposes. The roles of perception, a strong belief in personal attributes and 'rule by man' and structural/situational constraints in Chinese foreign policy motivation did not always operate independently with full autonomy within a well-defined setting. The dynamic nature and close interplay of these three elements in each specific case determined their relative weight and salience in that specific motivation.

Based on the analysis of the previous three chapters, this chapter synthesises the three essential motivation elements against some broader aspects of Chinese foreign policy behaviours to appreciate the dynamic discourse of the Chinese foreign policy motivation. Contrary to common belief, a certain degree of flexibility and pragmatism in China's foreign policy motivation existed even in the Mao era. Treatment by the new Communist government after 1949 of state succession and various treaties which it inherited from previous governments is a case in point, as will be discussed below.

However, it was Deng's reform era that generated unprecedented flexibility and brought greater dynamism into Chinese foreign policy. Under Deng, almost all aspects of
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Chinese political, social and economic life underwent dramatic changes, which in turn created a necessary environment which called for broader thinking and offered possibility of handling issues differently. The innovative formulation of 'one country, two systems' towards Hong Kong and Taiwan reunification, for example, could be said to be a truly revolutionary breakthrough in Chinese foreign policy philosophy and practice. The change of priorities in Deng's reform period and the shift in the foreign policy theoretical paradigm and practice, as incarnated in the 'one country, two systems' formula, will be examined later in this chapter as an illustration of the dynamic process at work. The emphasis, however, is not intended to provide a detailed account of that policy's formulation; rather, it extracts the key policy relevance to demonstrate how dynamic forces acted upon this policy motivation. The focus is on the dialectic process of shifts in foreign policy thinking from world revolution to world peace, from isolation to participation, from political-military orientation to economic modernisation, from dogmatism to pragmatism, and finally, from an uncompromising nationalistic view on sovereignty to a 'one country, two system' approach in the recovery of Hong Kong.

There are three sections in this chapter which explore these issues. The first section studies two cases of the handling of treaties to accentuate the dialectic process in Chinese foreign policy in the Mao era. The second section reveals changing priorities and some fundamental departures of Chinese foreign policy thinking and practice in the reform era. The third section looks at some crucial variables that underscore Beijing's development of 'one country, two systems' policy.
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Pragmatism in Mao’s Foreign Policy

The Chinese government always insisted that China was, for a long time, the victim of Western imperialist expansion.\(^1\) China was not treated as an equal sovereign country by the Western powers and was forced to conclude various unequal treaties during the carving up of China in the nineteenth centuries.\(^2\) Through imposed treaties, Western powers enjoyed many non-reciprocal, extra-territorial rights and privileges. In particular, these treaties laid down a special status for several ‘concessions’, ‘settlements’ and ‘treaty ports’.\(^3\) They established a system of consular jurisdiction, under which the nationals of the foreign powers were exempted from Chinese territorial laws but subject to the authority of their respective consuls, in both civil and criminal cases.\(^4\) In the field of trade, travel rights for foreign merchants and missionaries were specified and a maximum limit for customs and tariffs on imports to China was laid down. Concessions were granted to foreign enterprises in the fields of mining, railways and shipping.\(^5\) Through several treaties, China was forced to cede or to lease territory to foreign powers, including Hong Kong to Great Britain.\(^6\) These treaties came to form the bases of territory and border disputes between the new Chinese government of the People’s Republic and those countries which acceded to the treaties.\(^7\)

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\(^1\) Chen Lungfong, *State Succession Relating to Unequal Treaties* (Conn.: Archon Books, 1974, pp. 10-15). Also see Chpt. 4 of this thesis.
\(^2\) ibid.
\(^3\) Wesley Fishel, *The End of Extraterritoriality in China* (New York: Octagon Books, 1974, pp. 21-23)
\(^4\) ibid.
\(^7\) ibid. When the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, the territory problems it inherited from the Qing Dynasty and the KMT governments included the special rights enjoyed by the Soviet Union in Manchuria, the questions of Hong Kong and Macao, the position of Outer Mongolia, and boundary issues between China and its neighbouring countries. All these matters stemmed from treaties signed by either the Qing government or the KMT government. See also Chen Lung-fong, *State Succession Relating to Unequal Treaties* (Conn.: Archon Books, 1974)
On the question of state succession and the law of treaties, the Chinese government’s interpretation differed from that of Western countries in many respects. Although the PRC government regarded itself as the successor government of the continuing state of China, it particularly rejected—or would at least seek to modify—the principle that a successor government was required by international law to perform the obligations undertaken on behalf of the state by its predecessor.

Some of China’s law scholars argued that even though the PRC, being subject to international law, took over from the previous governments of the state of China, the foundation of the People’s Republic initiated a totally new state in terms of the social system. Theoretically, they insisted that it was inappropriate for the PRC government to consider international responsibility and commitment borne by previous Chinese governments as a simple question of state succession. Arguing from this point of view, the Chinese government categorically refused to admit its obligations under all the unequal treaties. Zhou Gengsheng, a leading professor in international law, stated:

The People’s Republic, on the one hand, is the successor government of the continuing state of China and is naturally subject to international law, but on the other hand, with its socialist characteristic, the PRC does not only change the form of government, but also establishes a new country so that the People’s Republic should not recognise an international responsibility which is incompatible with the criteria of the new system. To those treaties imposed by imperialist countries, the new China has absolutely no obligation to accede.

Yet, in practice the PRC objected only to some particular aspects of the general theory

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9 ibid.
11 ibid.
12 ibid. pp. 157-158
of state succession. J. C. Hsiung found in his study on law and policy of Chinese foreign relations that China's territorial claims and positions on border questions after 1949 were actually based on rights of succession from past dynasties—notwithstanding that these were feudal and 'reactionary' systems. In defending its claims, the Chinese government often used historical evidence and records from the 18th and 19th centuries, when imperial China also conducted an expansionist policy against tributary states, seeking economic and security advantages and territorial expansion. Normally the Chinese government referred to conflicts between imperial China and these tributary states as 'ethnic contradictions' within a big 'Chinese family'. Fairbank argued that both Nationalist and Communist China "have inherited a set of institutionalised attitudes and historical precedents not easily conformable to the European tradition of international relations among equally sovereign nation states."

China's reluctance to integrate into this system of international relations was also due to the fact that China itself was a victim of foreign expansionist policy of foreign powers, and was forced to enter an alien treaty system characterised by patently unequal relations. The PRC categorically insisted that unequal treaties existed, and that they were in violation of international law and therefore without legal binding force on China. The government classified all treaties signed by previous Chinese governments

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14 *ibid.*
15 *ibid.* pp. 115-119
16 John Fairbank, 'A Preliminary Framework' John Fairbank ed. *The Chinese World Order, Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 18-19). John Fairbank commented that the relations of the Chinese with neighbouring areas were indeed different from general international relations based on the idea of the nation-state and sovereignty. China's foreign relations were coloured by the concept of Sino-centrism and an assumption of Chinese superiority. Such relations continued until the Western powers intruded into East Asia in the middle of the 19th century.
17 *ibid.* p. 4
19 *ibid.*
and foreign governments into two major groups—equal and unequal. According to the individual contents, the government determined whether to recognise, abrogate, revise or renegotiate them.\textsuperscript{20} There appeared to be no uniform rules as to how unequal treaties should be handled, which, deliberately or otherwise, left room for future contention over specific clauses of a treaty.\textsuperscript{21} As Chen Lunfong observed, this technical flexibility allowed China to exercise selectivity as to how best it might be used in order to serve particular strategic considerations.\textsuperscript{22}

Notwithstanding the rhetoric on the issue of unequal treaties, the PRC was adaptable in establishing its position over territorial claims—its position could be based on the concept of China’s traditional order and/or the concept of modern international law.\textsuperscript{23} Leaving the Hong Kong issue aside, two other cases help to illustrate the complex and dynamic internal and international forces that influenced China’s handling of pre-existing unequal treaties in the Mao era. The case of the Soviet Union’s continuous presence in China after the establishment of the People’s Republic was strong evidence which demonstrated that the Chinese leadership was prepared to tolerate special privileges for a foreign power, albeit a socialist power, in its territory if that presence at that specific time was believed to help enhance China’s strategic position in the region.\textsuperscript{24} In the case of Outer Mongolia, China chose to apply the state succession principle in recognising the independence of the Mongolian People’s Republic, instead of denouncing its legality.\textsuperscript{25} This confirmed the view that Beijing was quite flexible on such issues so long as it could be justified as being in its best interests to do so.

\textsuperscript{20}ibid.
\textsuperscript{21}Chen Lungfong, \textit{State Succession Relating to Unequal Treaties} (Conn.: Archon Books, 1974, pp. 68-81)
\textsuperscript{22}ibid.
\textsuperscript{24}ibid. pp. 131-135
The Case of the Soviet Union

The Soviet government, in its early years after the October Revolution, declared that it would abrogate all unequal treaties made by Czarist Russia, which were based on "territorial expansion, seeking economic and security advantages, and resorting to the use of force in order to gain a privileged position at the expense of weaker nations". In a note to the Chinese government on 27 September, 1920, for example, the Soviet government sought to conclude a new treaty with the Chinese government which was supposed to confirm that all agreements concluded by the former Russian regimes with China were no longer in force. It would renounce seizures of Chinese territory, give up Russian concessions in China and return to China unconditionally all that had been take away from it by the Czarist government and the Russian bourgeoisie.

This kind of declaration remained essentially in the realm of good intentions. In practice, the Soviet Union did not always carry out the promises made in the early years of the Revolution. No agreement was ever made regarding the rectification of Russian territorial acquisitions gained at the expense of China. On the contrary, the Soviet Union regained, by the secret Yalta agreement and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945, its former rights in Manchuria which Czarist Russia had lost during the Russo-Japanese...
When the Chinese communists established a new government on the mainland in 1949, the Soviet Union had to make a decision on how to handle its special rights in China’s Manchuria, including ‘preeminent interests’ in the internationalised free port of Dairen, the naval base (leased) at Port Arthur, and control of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway.33 When the two communist giants entered negotiations in 1949 towards an alliance, the Soviet Union agreed to abandon all special rights inherited from the previous treaties with the KMT government. But the PRC invited the Soviet Union to stay on because of its “consideration of the existing international situation and the need to counter the imperialists”.34 In accordance with the eventual agreement between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese government accepted a continued Soviet presence in Port Arthur and Dairen until 1952.35 Zhou Enlai later formally requested Stalin to stay on after the deadline.36 The two ports were finally returned to China in May 1955, following the withdrawal of the Soviet army.37

Various considerations were behind the Chinese tolerance of a Soviet presence for more than 6 years after the establishment of the new sovereign state of China. Among them, there were two very important reasons. Firstly, China hesitated to take any action for

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32 ibid.
34 Shao Kuo-kang, Zhou Enlai and the Foundation of Chinese Foreign Policy (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1996, pp. 123-130)
36 ibid. pp. 77-79
37 ibid.
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fear of ‘hurting the feelings’ of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{38} When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the PRC was even more in need of Soviet moral support and economic aid, especially as the US and its allies soon imposed an embargo on China.\textsuperscript{39} Secondly, the Soviet presence in Port Arthur and Dairen challenged American naval superiority in the waters off Northern China, providing a valuable counter to American military threats during the Korean War.\textsuperscript{40}

The Case of Outer Mongolia

The Chinese government’s recognition of the Mongolian People’s Republic represented an interesting case of the CCP’s ambivalent handling of bilateral treaties. Outer Mongolia was under China’s sovereign control before it claimed independence in 1921.\textsuperscript{41} In 1924, the Soviet Union and the Chinese KMT government signed an agreement under which the former recognised Outer Mongolia as a “component of the Chinese Republic” under Chinese sovereignty while the Chinese side acknowledged Moscow’s \textit{de facto} control there.\textsuperscript{42} In January 1946, the KMT government withdrew its previous stand of non-recognition and accepted Outer Mongolia as an independent state, on condition that the validity of such independence be recognised by a referendum to be held under international supervision.\textsuperscript{43} Such a referendum was, indeed, held in 1946\textsuperscript{44} with the expected result favouring Mongolia’s independent status. However, when the

\textsuperscript{38} Dangdai zhongguo waijiao (the Contemporary Diplomacy of China), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC ed. (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1987, pp. 25-26)


\textsuperscript{40} \textit{ibid.} A reference to this important factor was made in a communiqué issued by the USSR and the PRC after the Korean War which said that, with regard to the changes that had taken place in the international situation in the Far East, the Soviet Union had agreed to withdraw its military units from Port Arthur and Dairen, although such withdrawal did not eventuate until 1955. \textit{ibid.} pp. 138-139

\textsuperscript{41} Dennis Doolin, \textit{Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict} (Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1965, pp. 144-172)

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{ibid.}
KMT government was defeated on the mainland and fled to Taiwan in 1949, it abrogated its previous recognition of the Mongolian People’s Republic, claiming that the result of the 1946 referendum was manipulated by the Soviet Union.\(^{45}\)

Before 1949, the Chinese communists had made no formal statement on the issue of Outer Mongolia, although Mao many times made his position of disagreement clear. In 1936, he predicted that, once the Chinese revolution was victorious, Outer Mongolia would of its own accord join the Chinese federation.\(^{46}\) In 1939, Mao redefined the frontier of China so as to include both Outer and Inner Mongolia.\(^{47}\) After the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, the Chinese Communists adopted a foreign policy of ‘leaning to one side’ and saw close Sino-Soviet relations as essential for safeguarding China’s security. Mao visited Moscow in December 1949 and concluded the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance (signed in February 1950).\(^{48}\) Mao later admitted that he had a difficult time in the two months of negotiations with his Russian counterparts, which he saw as a ‘struggle’ with them.\(^{49}\) In these negotiations, the Chinese government made considerable concessions, one of which was the recognition of the independence of the Mongolian Republic. At a press conference in September 1965, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, claimed that in 1945, Chiang Kai-shek’s government had concluded a treaty with the Mongolian People’s Republic. The new China decided to follow that commitment and recognised Mongolia as an independent socialist country, establishing diplomatic relations in

\(^{45}\) ibid.
\(^{46}\) ibid.
\(^{47}\) ibid.
\(^{49}\) ibid. p. 233
\(^{50}\) ibid. pp. 197-199
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October 1949.50

In this incident, the CCP seemed to be willing to accept a *fait accompli* under pressure from the Soviet Union. Yet, the new China did not want to be seen as responsible for the loss of Chinese territory. Therefore, instead of directly recognising Mongolia, it used the principle of state succession to justify the action.51

However, the CCP’s concessions made in recognising Outer Mongolia were not without ambiguity. In a talk to a group of parliamentary deputies from Japan, Mao said that during Khrushchev’s visit to China in 1954, “we took up the Mongolian question, but he refused to talk to us.”52 Mao raised the issue again with Khrushchev in 1957, insisting that China had sovereign rights over Outer Mongolia. According to the Soviet version, the Chinese leaders attempted to reach agreement with Khrushchev to make Outer Mongolia a Chinese province.53 Such an agreement did not materialise as later development of Sino-Soviet relations did not favour such a move.

These two cases show that even under Mao’s orthodox regime, there was enough room in Chinese foreign policy to exercise compromise and concession despite the seemingly uncompromising Chinese stand over such key principle issues as sovereignty and territory integrity.

50 ibid. p. 233
53 ibid.
Chapter Seven

Changing Priorities in the Reform Era

The Deng era was clearly different from Mao’s period in determining China’s national priorities and in its international behaviour toward the rest of the world. Mao’s revolutionary state supported, at least rhetorically, a ‘continuous revolution’ internally and externally, whereas Deng’s reform programs set economic development as the first priority, thereby introducing ‘a more mass-regarding political climate.’\(^{54}\) While Mao’s revolutionary inclination treated the state as an outsider trying to change the status quo within the international community, Deng’s post revolutionary state acted like an insider seeking maximum opportunities for its own development from within the existing order.\(^{55}\) While the Mao era emphasised ideological considerations, Deng believed that pragmatism better served China’s national interests.\(^{56}\)

China’s foreign policy experienced a fundamental change in Deng’s reform era. Under Mao, the regime emphasised revolutionary objectives: dramatic and sweeping social reform in the domestic arena and survival as a communist nation among the international capitalist hostility. This period was characterised by an emphasis on revolutionary ideology, hostile to the Western-controlled international norms and an extreme sensitivity to outside threats.\(^{57}\) The perception of external threats to the new Chinese communist regime often led the Beijing leadership under Mao to counter the perceived threats to China’s security with military means.\(^{58}\)


\(^{55}\) ibid.

\(^{56}\) ibid. pp. 479-507. As showed earlier in this chapter in the case of treaty treatments, Mao possessed complex personality. It was under Mao that China took up the UN seat, and Kissinger and Nixon were invited to visit China. Therefore, here that Mao was characterised as such was relative and in comparison.


\(^{58}\) Allen Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: the Decision to Enter the Korean War* (New York: Macmillan, 1960, pp. 54-85)
Deng’s modernisation program not only brought about a tremendous increase in social wealth and an improvement of people’s living standards, but also moved the Chinese leadership and the nation beyond a narrow and single-minded preoccupation with the concept of world revolution. As the world became increasingly interdependent, particularly in terms of economic integration, the Beijing leadership recognised that the regime’s survival depended on many broader issues rather than on just a few. Similarly, national security was not only related to political and strategic issues, but also to economic development. Under Mao Beijing was, of course, also aware of the importance of economics, but there was the strong belief that economic development and security guarantees could be achieved in a self-reliant, self-sufficient and socialist fashion. Deng’s version of economic supremacy necessarily also meant China’s economic integration and interdependence with the rest of the world, which required a less antagonistic foreign policy behaviour than the Maoist ideology would prescribe. Deng’s repeated warnings that China would face the danger of losing its qiuji (global citizenship) if its economy failed to catch up with that of other developed countries expressed his raison d’être for such an urgent policy change in China.

To further illustrate the magnitude of change, it is necessary to examine some major aspects of foreign policy evolution under Deng—the Chinese top leadership’s interpretations of and practice in China’s domestic and international affairs. In particular, the changes in the following four pairs of themes are examined: global revolution and world peace; isolation and participation; ideological dominance and

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59 Richard Walsh, Change, Continuity and Commitment: China’s Adaptive Foreign Policy (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988, pp. 73-88)
60 ibid.
economic supremacy; rigidity and flexibility.

From Global Revolution to World Peace

In the Mao era, ‘continuous revolution’ was a guiding principle and a key strategy in China’s foreign policy. Mao emphasised that “our revolutions follow each other, one after another.”62 Internally, class struggle and political campaigns were emphasised; and externally, China pursued radical policies to promote world revolution.63 Furthermore, according to the Maoist theory of revolution, domestic and international politics were on an equal footing in regard to the implementation of world revolution.64

These global revolutionary theories and actions were reflected in two areas of Chinese foreign policy. The first was an effort to increase Chinese influence in the communist world, where an ideological debate was being waged concerning the nature of true Marxist-Leninist countries and adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles.65 This debate divided the communist camp and was particularly fierce from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s.66 The second was that China asserted its independence within the communist camp, and developed closer relations with Albania and later with Czechoslovakia and Rumania.67 These close relations were resented by the Moscow leadership.68 The

61 ibid.
63 ibid. pp. 194-201
66 ibid. During this period the Soviet Union was under the leadership, first of Nikita Khrushchev and then Leonid Brezhnev.
movements of the nearby countries, such as Burma, Cambodia, Japan, India, Indonesia, Korea, Laos, Malaya, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. The CCP made similar attempts to influence communist parties in Australia, New Zealand, Europe, Latin America and Africa. At the same time, Beijing projected itself as a leading representative of the third world interests, and played an active role in the internal politics of Asian and African countries.

In 1965, China's then Defence Minister, Lin Biao, elaborated Beijing's strategy for world revolution in his famous article, 'Long Live the Victory of the People's War'. Lin, basing himself closely on Mao, believed that the Chinese communist strategy of people's war—the establishment of a revolutionary base in rural districts and the subsequent encirclement of the cities—could be applied equally well to world revolution. Because the Asian, African and Latin American people made up the overwhelming majority of the world's population, the world revolution hinged on the revolutionary struggles of the third world. As the logic of this theory dictated, China gave strong support to the struggles of these third world countries and vigorously opposed the two superpowers, a clear departure from the 'leaning to one side' policy of the 1950s.

During this period, China was the major supporter of communist armed movements in

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67 ibid.
68 ibid.
70 ibid.
72 Lin Biao, 'Long Live the Victory of People's War' Beijing Review (3 September 1965, p. 19)
73 Quoted from Daniel Dudley Lovelace, 'People's War' and Chinese Foreign Policy: Thailand as a Case Study of Overt Insurgent Support (Calif.: Claremont, 1971, p. 122). Lin Biao analogised that Europe and North America were the cities, the Third World countries were the countryside.
74 ibid.
South-East Asia, including Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Malaya, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. On some occasions in the 1950s and 1960s, Beijing sent military advisers to supervise local military activities. The Chinese support greatly assisted the Vietnamese victory in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu, which was followed by the agreement of the Geneva Conference that temporarily settled the Indochina conflict.

Since the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, China accused the Soviet Union of ‘revisionism’, charging that under Khrushchev the Soviets were seeking ‘peaceful coexistence’ with ‘the number one imperialist country’, the United States, and therefore, was abandoning its ‘revolutionary’ responsibilities. Mao and his colleagues were also alarmed by what they perceived as the Soviet attempts to control China, such as Khrushchev’s proposal in 1958 to establish a joint Sino-Soviet fleet.

At the same time, the US was viewed with no less hostility. China supported North Korea and North Vietnam in their respective conflicts with the United States. Those countries that stood with the US, such as Japan, South Korea and South Vietnam, were labelled ‘running dogs of American imperialism’. Mao’s preoccupation with world revolution continued even into the era of rapprochement between the US and China.

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76 It was no secret that several well-known Chinese generals, such as Chen Geng and Wei Guoqing, directly advised the Vietnamese in their fight against the French in the early 1950s. See Han Huai, *Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo* (Contemporary Military Affairs of the Chinese Army) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1989, pp. 16-18).
79 Ibid.
Although Mao was the major architect of the reconciliation with the United States, he never relinquished his revolutionary ideals. On the contrary, Mao continued to advocate struggle against the two 'hegemonic countries'—'the American imperialists' and 'the Soviet social imperialists'.

This radical continuous world revolution position was abandoned in 1978, which signified the start of Deng's modernisation undertaking. No longer did China regard itself as the centre of world revolution—on the contrary, it frequently vigorously denied such a reference, and often willingly assumed a low profile when necessary in a bid to obtain more economic assistance and favourable trading terms from world organisations. Furthermore, the Chinese leaders repeatedly claimed that the maintenance of international peace was one of the major goals of Chinese foreign policy. On a number of occasions, Deng Xiaoping emphasised the importance of world peace to China. In 1984, for example, Deng stated, "the aim of our foreign policy is world peace." He further confirmed that "we sincerely hope that no war will break out and that peace will be long-lasting, so that we can concentrate on the drive to

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83 Harry Harding, *A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972* (Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992, pp. 55-71). Also see Samuel Kim, 'China and the Third World' Samuel Kim ed. *China and the World: New Directions in Chinese Foreign Relations* 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989, pp. 133-152). Three explanations could be found for Chinese foreign policy motivation in this period. First, with national survival preoccupying the Beijing leadership, China was exceptionally sensitive to outside threats, particularly when the PRC was fragile in the first two decades of the Republic. Second, the Chinese communists regarded their revolution as a part of the world revolution. After defeating the US-backed forces of Chiang Kai-shek, the Beijing leadership saw no reason not to continue its successful pursuit of world revolution. Third, the historical consciousness of 'China as the central kingdom of the world' remained in the minds of many Chinese leaders, especially Mao. For a long time, especially during the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese propaganda machine vigorously affirmed that China was the centre of world revolution and Mao its 'great leader and great helmsman'—an obvious echo of the middle kingdom mentality.

84 Kate Hannan, *China, Modernisation and the Goal of Prosperity: Government Administration and Economic Policy in the Late 1980s* (New York: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1995, pp. 223-233)


modernise our country." This statement, compared with Lin Biao's 1965 article on 'People's War', completed the ideological transition of Chinese foreign policy from global revolution to world peace.

From Isolation to Participation

China's actions in the first two decades after the establishment of the PRC in 1949 demonstrated a strong dissatisfaction with the existing international order. China's bitter experience with the imperialist powers, starting from the Opium War of 1839 to 1842, profoundly influenced the attitudes of the Chinese leadership and people toward the Western countries. When, in the mid 1950s, the Soviet Union began to conduct what Beijing perceived as 'a chauvinistic and expansionist' policy toward China, the Chinese became even more suspicious of the established powers.

In addition to fighting the two superpowers simultaneously, Beijing, under Mao's leadership, also vigorously criticised existing international systems, particularly that of the United Nations, from which it had been excluded until 1971. From the early 1950s, China emphasised its relationship with the third world countries. In 1954, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharla Nehru jointly

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87 ibid.
89 Douglas Stuart and William Tow, China, the Soviet Union, and the West: Strategic and Political Dimensions in the 1980s (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982, pp. 6-7)
91 Lillian Craig Harris and Robert Worden, China and the Third World: Champion or Challenger? (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House Publishing Co. 1986, pp. 55-57)
issued the well-known ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,’ which later became the official base of Chinese foreign policy.

Although the PRC took up the China’s seat in the United Nations in October 1971, Chinese ambivalence and suspicion of the United Nations and other international organisations did not disappear. In the early 1970s, Mao and the Gang of Four continued to criticise the United Nations for its vulnerability to being easily manipulated by the two superpowers. However, it was also during this period that the PRC strengthened its relations with some major West European countries such as France and Germany.

This self-imposed isolation was discarded when China embarked on its far-reaching policy of reform and openness in 1978. China began to participate actively in international economic and cultural organisations, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank and other international events. China also learnt to make better use of the United Nations by enhancing its working capacity in the UN.

As Harry Harding observed, “Beijing has secured the formal recognition of all major

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92 That is mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.
93 Lillian Craig Harris and Robert Worden, China and the Third World: Champion or Challenger? (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House Publishing Co. 1986, pp. 75-77)
95 ibid.
96 ibid.
97 In 1984, the PRC sent teams to participate in the Olympic Games for the first time; and in 1990 China hosted the Asian Games in Beijing. In 1992-1993, China lobbied the international community (although ultimately unsuccessfully) to select Beijing as the host for the 2000 Olympic Games. See Samuel Kim, China and the World, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p. 8-11)
98 For example, in addition to the regular members of its UN permanent delegation, the PRC greatly increased the number of its UN staff. The number of Chinese staff members reached 171 in 1990, ranking third only after the United States (466) and France (235), and ahead of Britain (166), Germany (122) and Japan (96). See Edward
nations, occupies a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, is respected as a major regional power in East Asia, and is considered by some analysts to be a 'candidate power' which will make an increasing mark on global issues as well."

China's constructive participation in international affairs was widely recognised by Western policy makers and scholars. Of particular interest to them was China's position on UN peacekeeping forces to the world's troubled spots. Under Mao, Beijing consistently opposed the establishment and dispatch of UN peacekeeping forces. Even after it joined the United Nations, China often continued this opposition—abstaining from voting rather than vetoing outright—to authorising peacekeeping missions. The Deng era brought a significant change to this position. From 1978 onward, Beijing began to embrace a greater role for the United Nations and to support the UN peacekeeping forces in the Middle East in the General Assembly. For example, In 1985, Beijing began to explore the possibility of sending a group to join

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100 Michael Yahuda, *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995* (London: Routledge, 1996). Other scholar like Judy Polumbaum observed that: "sentiment in China itself favours continued integration internationally, not a return to isolation." Judy Polumbaum, 'Dateline China: The People's Malaise' *Foreign Policy* (Vol. 81, Winter 1990/91, pp. 180-181). Another example was China's attitude toward the ASEAN. China no longer considered ASEAN a threat to its security; rather, Beijing believed that ASEAN was very important to regional stability, especially to the settlement of the Indochina situation. China significantly improved its relations with every ASEAN member state. In July 1994, China, as an invited guest, participated in the first ASEAN Regional Forum in Bangkok, which was considered a significant first step at reducing opportunities for confrontation in a potentially volatile region. The Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen used the meeting as an effective platform to provide a detailed explanation of China's military build-up and Chinese foreign policy towards this region to his audience. See Joyce Kallgren, Noordin Sopiee and Soedjati Djiwandono eds. *ASEAN and China: An Evolving Relationship* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988, pp. 122-131); Leo Suryakmata, 'Indonesia-China Relations: A Recent Breakthrough' *Asian Survey* (Vol. 30, No. 7, July 1990, pp. 682-696); Rodney Tasker and Adam Schwarz, 'Preventive Measures' *Far Eastern Economic Review* (4 August 1994, pp. 14-15); Nayan Chanda, 'Gentle Giant: China Seeks to Calm Southeast Asia's Fear' *Far Eastern Economic Review* (4 August 1994, pp. 15-16)


102 ibid.

103 See Li Luye, 'UN Role in Establishing a New World Order' *Beijing Review* (30 September-6 October 1991, pp. 12-16)
the UN peacekeeping forces in the Middle East. The Chinese voted for 258 of the 262 resolutions related to the Middle East that were adopted between 1982 and 1988, including 22 on the financing of Middle East peacekeeping forces. And in 1992, Beijing sent a small contingent of troops (consisting of some 370 military men) to Cambodia to join the UN peacekeeping forces there. This was the first time the Chinese government ever sent troops to participate in UN peacekeeping activities.

The Chinese government appeared more flexible in other international disputes, too, notably in the long-standing antagonism between Cambodia and Vietnam. China’s efforts to become actively involved in global, regional and bilateral relationships in order to advance its own interests fully demonstrated that it had come out of its self-imposed cocoon of isolation and was ready to play an important role in international affairs.

**From Ideological Dominance to Economic Supremacy**

Under Mao Zedong, revolutionary ideology largely set the goals for and dictated Chinese foreign policy, often at the cost of economic development. The ambitious

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105 ibid
107 This was a very slow change, not necessarily directly linked to economic considerations but to the strategic reassessment of the Soviet Union from mid 1982. In November 1991, Beijing and Hanoi normalised relations after a summit meeting in Beijing, claiming that ‘a new era has begun in Sino-Vietnamese Relations’. See Chen Jiabao, ‘A New Era Begins in Sino-Vietnamese Relations’, *Beijing Review* (Vol. 34, No 46, 18-24 November 1991, pp. 7-9). Despite the unsolved territorial disputes over islands in the South China Sea, Li Peng conducted an official visit to Vietnam in December 1992, signing four agreements guaranteeing foreign investment in each other’s countries and encouraging economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation. China also provided Vietnam up to RMB 80 million (US$14 million) worth of interest-free credit. See Murray Hiebert, ‘Comrades Apart’ *Far Eastern Economic Review* (13 April 1995, p. 23)
foreign policy objectives of securing maximum political influence and military strength arose in part from a sense of vulnerability, rooted in painful memories of successive invasions by foreign powers. These experiences were reinforced by regional wars following the establishment of the People’s Republic—the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the border clashes with India and the Soviet Union. Convinced that World War III was inevitable, Mao, Lin Biao and other radical CCP leaders firmly believed that China must prepare for ‘an early and total war.’ They also sought to develop political and military power in order to further China’s leadership of world revolution and its support of other countries’ revolutionary causes. In addition, when master-minding domestic political campaigns, Mao constantly stressed the importance of continuous revolution and class struggle. When applying these principles to foreign policy, political rhetoric and national security issues had to be considered.

These beliefs were first overshadowed and later discarded in the Deng era. The new leadership realised that China was not only far behind the developed countries, such as the United States and Japan, but also behind its smaller neighbours. Even Hong Kong and Taiwan, Chinese territories ruled by capitalist governments, were far more prosperous than the socialist Mainland. In order to revitalise China, Deng decided in 1979 that the ‘foremost national priority should be China’s economic interests’. For the first time in China’s modern history, economic modernisation became the primary

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109 ibid.
110 Quan Yanchi, Mao Zedong yu heluxiaofu (Mao Zedong and Khrushchev) (Jilin: Changchun renmin chubanshe, 1989, pp. 58-61)
111 ibid.
112 ibid.
114 Yan Xuetong, ‘Deng Xiaoping de guojia liyiguan’ (Deng Xiaoping’s View About National Interests) Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations) (Vol. 57, July 1994, pp. 28-32)
goal for national development under Deng’s reform auspices.

These changes from ‘politics in command’ to economic supremacy were reflected in Chinese foreign policy behaviour. Beijing’s modernisation drive had two chief components—reform and openness—both of which focused on economic development rather than on political campaigning. Furthermore, China decided to enlarge the range of foreign policy issues to include not only political-strategic elements, but also economic and cultural aspects. As confirmed by then Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in December 1994, economic development was a major goal of Chinese foreign policy in the 1980s and 1990s.

China’s ‘economics first’ policy permeated the formerly unlikely areas such as highly protected military technology. Economic priority took an extreme turn when it came to arms sales, driven by Deng’s reform imperative. China became one of the largest arms suppliers in the world in the 1980s and early 1990s. While principally motivated by long-term political and strategic calculations, Beijing’s military leaders also welcomed arms sales as a means of financing the army’s modernisation.

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116 Ibid.
117 Renmin ribao 15 December 1994, p. 2. China’s new direction of pragmatism in its foreign policy was largely recognised by the international community, and the Western powers adjusted their foreign policies to take account of this transition. As European Commissioner Leon Brittan pointed out: “China is at a turning point in its relations with the outside world... It is in Europe’s interest to steer China into the world economic and political mainstream and away from isolation.” See Shaha Islam, ‘Softly, Softly: EU Wants Closer Ties with China’ Far Eastern Economic Review (20 July 1995, p. 20). Based on this consideration, the European Union Commission in Brussels unveiled an ambitious new blueprint in July 1995 to further upgrade Europe’s relations with China. One notable outcome was that bilateral Euro-Chinese trade grew steadily over the 1980s and 1990s, rising from US$12 billion in 1985 to over US$40 billion in 1994. Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
From Rigidity to Flexibility

At the peak of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, the political and ideological rigidity of the leadership left little room for China to conduct its foreign policy within the basic diplomatic norms of courtesy, equality and respect.\textsuperscript{121} Mao’s continuous revolution theory encouraged harsh political persecution of its own citizens\textsuperscript{122} and the adoption of an unyielding posture towards the outside world.\textsuperscript{123} One of the most revealing examples was China’s recall of all but one of its ambassadors in 1967,\textsuperscript{124} effectively shutting down its already narrow diplomatic channels with the outside world. This, however, should be looked at with a specific reference to the height of the Cultural Revolution, and not a general behaviour pattern.

China paid a heavy price for this rigid and isolationist foreign policy. Economically, it lagged far behind most other countries. Strategically, it had a real sense of being ‘encircled’ by the two superpowers and hostile neighbours.\textsuperscript{125} Although in the 1970s Mao made efforts to break the isolation by seeking rapprochement with the United States, Japan and most of the Western powers, his revolutionary rhetoric and dogmatic principles remained fundamentally unchanged—this was evidenced by Beijing’s actions.

\textsuperscript{121} Lowell Dittmer, \textit{China’s Continuous Revolutions} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, pp. 163-173)
\textsuperscript{122} People were jailed for the ‘crime’ of listening to foreign radio broadcasts such as ‘Voice of America’ or ‘Radio Moscow’.
\textsuperscript{123} During this period, China was fighting against both superpowers: in border clashes with the Soviet Union in the north, and in an undeclared war with the United States in Vietnam in the south. There were major differences of opinion between China and many of its socialist ‘brothers’ and Third World friends. Among the many countries with which China was at odds were Indonesia, Burma, North Korea, Britain (over Hong Kong), Japan, Thailand and India. Beijing maintained good relations with a handful of small countries, such as Albania and several African states. See Leo Suryadinata ed. \textit{Southeast Asian Chinese and China: The Political-economic Dimension} (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1995, pp. 111-123)
\textsuperscript{124} Wu Xieqian, \textit{Huiyi yu huanian} (Memoir) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991, pp. 88-103)
\textsuperscript{125} Lowell Dittmer, \textit{China’s Continuous Revolutions} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, pp. 156-158)
following the catastrophic Tangshan earthquake in 1976.\textsuperscript{126}

It took a change in the top CCP leadership to transform rigidity in Chinese foreign policy to a more flexible posture. Under Deng, Beijing adopted more reform-oriented and practical economic policies, both internally and externally. China dramatically changed its attitudes towards such previously labelled ‘capitalist practices’ as joint ventures, foreign investment and foreign loans. Throughout China, governments at the central, provincial and district levels worked hard to attract investment from abroad. This became one of the main avenues for obtaining foreign capital and updated technology, and for gaining access to international markets.\textsuperscript{127}

The fruitful economic reform outcomes provided Beijing with sufficient legitimacy to justify the exercise of greater flexibility in its ‘independent foreign policy’, which started in 1982. This policy was aimed, on one hand, at maintaining a friendly relationship with the United States, and, on the other hand, at improving its ties with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{128} In practice, however, China moved closer to the West, which was

\textsuperscript{126} Tangshan, a large coal manufacturing city in northern China, was struck by an earthquake that killed at least 250,000 people (by official account). Many governments, organisations, and individuals from throughout the world offered their help. The Beijing government, however, refused all such offers, believing that if they were accepted, China’s principle of ‘self-reliance’ would be violated. In addition, the Gang of Four was still in power, and one of their most infamous slogans was ‘we would rather have socialist grass (to eat) than capitalist grain’. How, then, could a socialist country accept support from capitalist nations? It would be wrong, however, to assume that foreign policy was totally dominated by such rigidity all the time over all the events during the Mao era; occasionally, Chinese foreign policy appeared pragmatic. But the paradox was that even on these pragmatic occasions, the Chinese leaders had to pay lip-service to dogmatic considerations. See Lowell Dittmer, \textit{China’s Continuous Revolution} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, pp. 33-65). One typical example was Mao Zedong’s decision to invite Henry Kissinger, US President Richard Nixon’s national security adviser, to visit Beijing in October 1971. This decision was obviously based on the realistic and geopolitical considerations of world politics rather than Mao’s traditional ideology. But after Kissinger and his aides arrived in Beijing, they were shocked by the big eye-catching posters at the airport and the small pamphlets at their hotel rooms, all carrying such slogans as ‘Down with the US imperialists and their running dogs’. Mao, himself, had to explain these away to his American guests as \textit{fang kongpao} (meaning issuing empty statements for propaganda purposes), a way to stick to China’s projected revolutionary image in the world. See Li Gong, \textit{Kuayue honggou: 1969-1979 zhongmei guanxi de yandian} (Across the Wide Gap: the Evolution of Sino-US Relations, 1969-1979) (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1992, pp. 144-146).


\textsuperscript{128} Sheng Lijun, ‘China’s ‘Independent Foreign Policy’” \textit{Pacific Focus} (Vol. ix, No. 1, Spring 1994. pp. 5-45)
better able to meet the demands of China's modernisation drive than the Soviet Union, or today's Russia. In fact, the whole Chinese foreign policy in the reform era could be described as a 'tilted independent policy'—tilting toward the United States, Japan and Western Europe in the 1980s and to Russia, Japan and Southeast Asian countries in the 1990s—as far as economic benefit was concerned. Clearly, this constituted a reversal of Mao's policy in the 1950s of leaning toward the Soviet Union. And it was a profound shift from the 1960s and early 1970s' policy of fighting against the two 'hegemonic powers'—the Soviet Union and the United States.

No better examples demonstrated the depth of change in China's foreign policy than those of establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, South Africa and South Korea. For many years, China had refused to establish any official contact with these countries. This position reflected Beijing's deeply committed moral righteousness, its support for the Arab states, its disapproval of South Africa's apartheid system and the Chinese government's appreciation of the 'blood-linked' comradeship with North Korea. Diplomatic recognition of Israel and South Africa highlighted a turning point in the

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129 ibid.
130 ibid.
131 ibid.
132 Beginning in the 1980s, China, while retaining its pro-Arab stance, first created unofficial ties with Israel by establishing academic exchanges in Tel Aviv and Beijing, and then moved to full diplomatic relations in 1991. This flexibility paid off for Beijing. There was some form of increasing military cooperation between the two countries. The Chinese military, for example, was able to acquire some advanced technology, such as that for air-refuelling, from Israel to upgrade its equipment. See Nayan Chanda, 'Fear of the Dragon' Far Eastern Economic Review (13 April 1995, p. 25). More importantly, Tel Aviv chose to be closer to Beijing in the PRC-Taiwan rivalry. In the spring of 1995, for example, unlike neighbouring Jordan and the Gulf monarchies, Israel flatly refused to accept an 'unofficial' visit by Taiwan's president Lee Teng-hui. See Yarosiyav Thofimov, 'Jilt and Tilt: Israel Stops Wooing Taiwan and Turns to China' Far Eastern Economic Review (25 May 1995, p. 29)
133 A similar, although more gradual development has taken place between China and South Africa. In 1990, the two countries set up unofficial offices in one another's capitals—the 'Centre for Chinese Studies' in Beijing and 'Centre for South African Studies' in Pretoria. See 'New Development between China and South Africa' Beijing Review (19-25 September 1991, p. 3). Most staff members in these two 'cultural centres' are diplomats. Since then, a few high-level visits have been made between the two countries. In October 1991, for example, South African Foreign Minister R. W. Botha paid a clandestine visit to Beijing to discuss bilateral relations. See 'China Card' Far Eastern Economic Review (31 October 1991, p. 9). This diplomatic manoeuvre confirmed that the Chinese leadership was much less concerned about ideological differences now than ever since 1949. The election of Nelson Mandela in April 1994 as the first black South African President ended the notorious apartheid system in South Africa, which also cleared the way for China to further develop the bilateral relation. In early 1997 South Africa decided to terminate its diplomatic
PRC’s rigid foreign policy approach as it moved to a more accommodating and amicable posture.

However, among these diplomatic breakthroughs, it was the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with South Korea that tested Beijing’s pragmatism and the extent of flexibility. The theme of modernisation in China played a pivotal role in Beijing’s shift in policy toward the Korean Peninsula, and it was a very complex and difficult issue for the Chinese leadership because of China’s long involvement with North Korea’s party and state building since the Korean War.134

In 1950, China, inspired by a perceived threat of invasion by the Western imperialists, entered the Korean War and provided substantial military support to the North Koreans in their war with the South. Strategic and political calculations dominated China’s Korea policy in this period, because Beijing was extreme sensitive to its border’s security and its implications for China’s survival and development.135

With the changing international and domestic environments in the 1980s and 1990s, Beijing substantially adjusted its Korea policy. Despite its openly stated alignment with Pyongyang, China had (since the complete withdrawal of its military forces from the North in 1958) ceased to support a North Korean military attack on the South.136

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136 Chen Jian, *China’s Road to the Korean War: the Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, Chpt. 2). There were sporadic quarrels between Beijing and Pyongyang in the past; the nadir occurred in 1969, the peak of China’s chaotic cultural Revolution, when Chinese and North Korean forces clashed along their border. See Nayan Chanda, *Lesser Evil* *Far Eastern Economic Review* (21 December 1995, pp. 17-18). Despite the increasing difficulties, the PRC nevertheless managed to maintain a warm and workable
reform era, Beijing consistently expressed interest in avoiding another major military conflict in the region, and had a genuine interest in the creation and maintenance of a peaceful and stable situation on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing hailed the first high-level talks that took place in September 1990 between the North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyoung Muk and the South Korean Premier Kang Yong Hun as "a good beginning that will help alleviate tensions and promote the process of Korean reunification." Beijing also encouraged both Pyongyang and Seoul to create a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, a move that would be in line with China’s national interests.

However, it was not at all easy for Beijing to finally decide to establish formal relations with Seoul. As Wu Weiqun observed, Beijing’s need for North Korean support for the Chinese communist regime after the Tiananmen Incident became a potential obstacle to establishing relations with South Korea. Beijing and Pyongyang were both isolated at that time from the other remaining socialist countries and from the international community at large. They relied very much on each other for moral support.

Furthermore, mutual moral supports in the long revolutionary past between the two relationship with North Korea. High-level bilateral visits took place virtually every year. Political developments in China and Eastern Europe since the late 1980s brought Beijing and Pyongyang closer together. Kim Il Sung was one of the few world leaders who openly supported Deng Xiaoping’s military suppression of student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square 1989. According to Nayan Chanda, from the 1960s to the mid-1980s, Pyongyang was able to play the 'Beijing card' against the 'Moscow card', effectively preventing China from moving closer to Seoul. As the international situation changed, especially after the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries established diplomatic relations with South Korea, the PRC gained more freedom and confidence in expanding its relations with Sough Korea. In fact, in the post-Cold War era, beginning with the late 1980s, Beijing had strong incentives to develop relations with Seoul, because a closer relationship might increase China’s leverage in dealing with the Korean problem and with East Asia as a whole. As one US official in Washington suggested, "having good relations with both (Koreas) puts China in the best possible situation" in world politics as well as regional affairs. See Nayan Chanda, ‘Chinese Welcome North Korea’s Kim, But Relations are Subtly Changing’ The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly (21 October 1991, p. 24, p. 26)
countries had been translated into personal relations at the top leadership level, which made it even harder to break away.\footnote{The Chinese attachment to North Korea throughout the 1980s was underpinned by personal ties and sympathies. Leaders such as Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Yang Shangkun, Li Xiannian, Peng Zhen, Wang Zhen and Bo Yibo, who held leading positions during the 1950s, 1980s and 1990s, were personally involved to varying degrees in the Korean War. Their contemporaries in North Korea, headed by Kim II Sung, also retained power. This decades-long friendship was sustained and enhanced through frequent, mutual public or private visits. It was much more difficult for the Beijing leadership at that time to break or downplay its ties with North Korea than it was for Gorbachev, who shared with Kim Il Sung neither age nor personal ties. See Chen Jian, \textit{China's Road to the Korean War: the Making of the Sino-American Confrontation} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, pp. 177-252)\textsuperscript{142}}

On the other hand, China had long since shifted its domestic priorities from political campaigning to addressing economic reality in a pragmatic manner. The need for economic development was Beijing’s primary incentive for normalising relations with South Korea.\footnote{Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, ‘Looking Across the Yalu; Chinese Assessments of North Korea’ \textit{Asian Survey} (Vol. 35, No 6, June 1995, pp. 528-545)\textsuperscript{143}} China’s modernisation programs could not be realised without extensive external support and exchanges from industrialised countries that were able to provide advanced technology, capital, markets and managerial skills. As a newly industrialised country and a close neighbour, South Korea was in a very good position to provide China with valuable experience and lessons in economic development strategy, especially in ‘export-led’ industrialisation.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} Also, strategically, the addition of supplies from Korea would help to reduce China’s dependence on imports from Japan and the West.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}

Several events that took place in 1990 paved the way for Beijing’s final decision.\footnote{These events included the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Russia; three meetings between the prime ministers of North and South Koreas; and the decision by China and South Korea to set up non-governmental trade offices in each other’s capitals. These developments were seen as part of the ‘realignment of relations among Asian nations.’\textsuperscript{144}} In a leading \textit{Beijing Review} article, South Korea was described as having shed off ‘the cloak of the Cold War’, which was, in the eyes of the Chinese government, indicative of
changes in South Korea towards being more friendly and cooperative.¹⁴⁷

China’s achievement of successful relations with the two Koreas tested the scope of the transformation of Beijing’s foreign policy. Any change of such magnitude required considerable political flexibility and a need to balance various demands from the both sides by careful diplomatic skills.

From the above analysis, it becomes clear that in a departure from previous practice under Mao, Beijing substantially reformed its work priorities and effected a transition from an isolated society to a more open country with remarkable achievements. In the political area, China shifted from world revolution to world peace, an essential prerequisite for creating an international environment conducive to China’s modernisation program. In the strategic area, China discarded its self-imposed isolation to become an active player in world affairs. On the economic development front, China abandoned the ‘politics in command’ in favour of reform measures designed to stimulate economic growth. Finally, on the diplomatic front, China showed more flexibility in order to optimise the positive international factors to best serve its national interests.

‘One Country, Two Systems’ and Its Policy Source

The previous two sections of this chapter compared and contrasted Chinese foreign policy under Mao with the transformations which took place in Deng’s reform era by

examining Mao’s pragmatic foreign policy and the changing priorities under Deng. The paradigmatic shift and pragmatic changes in the reform decades reached its climax when China announced the ‘one country, two systems’ policy, undoubtedly one of the most significant Chinese foreign policy initiatives in the 1980s.

This section dissects the policy source of ‘one country, two systems’ from three perspectives: theoretical challenges, past practice and policy motivation. The purpose of exploring this subject in this order is not to study the formulation of ‘one country, two systems’ policy in detail, which is a task beyond this chapter. Rather, it is an attempt to examine some key policy sources which had to be taken into account in the process of formulating this policy. This example highlights the dynamic nature of Chinese foreign policy motivation.

The fundamental shift in Chinese foreign policy from the Mao era to the age of Deng could be seen to be encapsulated in China’s ‘one country, two systems’ policy. The origin of this policy could be sourced in China’s evolving response to Taiwan’s reunification. The liberation of Taiwan by military force was a major objective of Chinese foreign policy during the Mao era. The mainland’s slogan ‘Liberate Taiwan’ was paralleled by the Taiwanese slogan ‘Recover the Mainland’.148 In the late 1970s, Beijing made a significant change in its Taiwan policy by promoting ‘peaceful unification’.149

Mao proclaimed that, as a continuation of the civil war between the CCP and the KMT,
Chapter Seven

the regime in Taiwan must be overthrown and Taiwan must be integrated into the PRC as a province governed by socialist principles.\textsuperscript{150} During the 1950s and 1960s, Beijing was prepared to use military force to take over Taiwan, and sporadic military clashes occurred.\textsuperscript{151} Given the prevailing atmosphere at that time—class struggle internally and world revolution externally—little room existed for Beijing and Taipei to reach a compromise on the Taiwan issue.\textsuperscript{152} When economic modernisation took priority, Beijing abandoned its generally hostile, uncompromising position in international affairs, and substantially modified its stance towards Taiwan, too.\textsuperscript{153}

Before the term ‘one country, two systems’ was formally adopted by the Chinese government in solving the Hong Kong issue, the core of the idea had already become evident in the changed policy towards Taiwan after 1978.\textsuperscript{154} However, the official announcement was made by the NPC Standing Committee in September 1981, which for the first time stated that after reunification, Taiwan would be permitted to enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region and have the right to retain its armed forces.\textsuperscript{155} Although the term ‘one country, two systems’ was not explicitly used, the idea was already clear.

\textsuperscript{150} Wu Hsin-hsing, \textit{Bridging the Strait: Taiwan, China, and the Prospects for Reunification} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, Chpt. 1)

\textsuperscript{151} Lee Lai To, \textit{The Reunification of China: PRC-Taiwan Relations in Flux} (New York: Praeger, 1991, pp. 21-30)

\textsuperscript{152} \textit{ibid.} Hostility between the two sides was expressed in a propaganda war, in which each side offered huge cash incentives to lure defectors from the opposite side.

\textsuperscript{153} \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{154} In November 1978, in an interview with the Washington Post correspondent, Deng said that after a peaceful reunification of the country, Taiwan might still retain its capitalist economic and existing social system. See ‘Deng on Maintaining Hong Kong Policy’ \textit{Documents on ‘One Country, Two Systems’}, ed. by Taiwan Affairs Office of Shanxi Province, 1988; See also, \textit{Beijing Review} (No. 1, 4-10 January 1988, p. 17). In the meeting with the governor of Hong Kong in March 1979, Deng again stated that: “We have always taken the special status of Taiwan into account. The social system there need not change and people’s living standards need not be affected and as a local government, it may have extensive autonomy and armed forces for its own defence.” \textit{ibid.} p. 13

\textsuperscript{155} “Chairman Ye Jianying’s Elaboration on Policy Concerning Return of Taiwan to Motherland and Peaceful Reunification” \textit{Beijing Review} (No. 40, 5 October 1981, p. 10)
The concept of ‘one country, two systems’ was formally articulated by the Chinese government during the Sino-British negotiations on the future of Hong Kong. From the Chinese leadership’s perspective, under the ‘one country, two systems’ framework, the mainland would continue its socialist system while Hong Kong would maintain its capitalist system within a unified China. This concept was also seen by Deng to have history-making significance—setting a good example for peaceful settlement of issues left over by history. Deng emphasised that ‘one country, two systems’ was a new concept for the world, and a new way to solve conflicts, such as those between North and South Korea, or between East and West Germany.

**Theoretical and Ideological Challenges**

The basic concept of ‘one country, two systems’ recognised the reality of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and sought to continue the socio-economic systems there for a considerable period after formal reunification.

During the negotiations between China and Britain on the future of Hong Kong, the concept was further developed. Beijing claimed that it was in accordance with this concept of ‘one country, two systems’ that China reached agreement with Britain on the Hong Kong issue. A *Beijing Review* editorial stated:

> The formula of ‘one country, two systems’, which forms the basis of the Hong Kong accord, is not someone’s whim. It is solidly grounded on a theoretical

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156 Wang Enbao, *Hong Kong, 1997—the Politics of Transition* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995, Chpt. 2)
157 *ibid.*
158 ‘Deng Xiaoping Talks to Hong Kong’ *Documents on ‘One Country, Two Systems’* ed. by Taiwan Affairs Office of Shanxi Province, 1988, p. 21
160 *ibid.*
understanding of the extended duration of the socialist transition period. When this is appreciated, lingering doubts about the durability of the present arrangements will disappear.\textsuperscript{161}

In the framework of 'one country, two systems', the relations between the mainland, where a socialist system would presumably continue, and Hong Kong, where a capitalist system would remain, were central. The policy could be seen as an outcome of Beijing’s pragmatic tendency in decisionmaking, but it was not without challenge.

The first challenge was constitutional—the problem of how to interpret China’s national constitution in conjunction with Hong Kong’s local capitalist law. It seemed inconceivable that under the Chinese socialist constitution, which stressed the ‘four cardinal principles’, there could be room for the existence of a capitalist system.\textsuperscript{162}

This difficulty seemed to be solved by Article 31 of the Chinese constitution, which gave the NPC the right to set up special administrative regions in which different socio-economic systems could be adopted.\textsuperscript{163} Under the Sino-British agreement, the NPC enacted and promulgated the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) in accordance with the constitution of the PRC, stipulating that “after the establishment of the HKSAR, the socialist system and socialist policies shall not be practised in Hong Kong and that Hong Kong’s previous capitalist system and life-style shall remain unchanged for 50 years.”\textsuperscript{164}

\textsuperscript{161} 'The Hong Kong Solution' \textit{Beijing Review} (No. 41, 8 October 1984, p. 4)
\textsuperscript{162} Kevin Lane, \textit{Sovereignty and the Status Quo: The Historical Roots of China's Hong Kong Policy} (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 63-71)
\textsuperscript{163} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{164} See \textit{A Draft Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Future of Hong Kong}, 26 September 1984
Thus, from a constitutional point of view, with this special article in China’s national constitution and the international agreement between China and Britain, HKSAR’s capitalist status had a legitimate basis and legal protection.

The second challenge was ideological. The CCP maintained that the ‘four cardinal principles’ constituted the fundamental prerequisite for achieving China’s modernisation in a socialist manner. The CCP had often claimed to perceive the danger of ‘bourgeois liberalisation’ in any challenge to the four principles. The CCP leadership insisted that socialism was the historically correct choice of the Chinese people and that it was socialism that had saved and helped China to remain strong politically and militarily. Socialism was the cornerstone that enabled the country to stand independently in the world. It argued that if China gave up socialism, then the foreign capitalist economies would “occupy China’s markets and destroy China’s national economy”, and politically, China would “fall under their control and lose its independence in foreign affairs.”

Chinese scholars managed to find some theoretical justifications for ‘one country, two systems’. They argued that although there was no such notion as ‘one country, two systems’ in classical Marxist works, the concept was actually not in contradiction with the principles of Marxism, since the core of Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought was to ‘seek truth from the facts’. The concept of ‘one country, two systems’ was the result of combining the basic principles of Marxism with the changed situation in order to solve a

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166 ibid.
167 'Official Stresses the Four Principles' Beijing Review (No. 3, 19 January 1987, p. 4)
new problem.168

The third and the biggest challenge was the uncertainty and debate over the applicability of such a policy in Hong Kong. Since it was a policy without precedent, there was no easy answer to the challenge. However, a brief examination of the past practice of two systems in Chinese society may give a clue to the answer of this challenge.

Past Practice of Two Systems in China

In international relations, China often selectively applied some Western concepts to defend its foreign policies. For example, China found the concept of sovereignty very practical in justifying its behaviour. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 marked the system transition from a unipolar/papal hierarchical conception of medieval society to a new multipolar horizontal conception of world order based on the coexistence and coordination of sovereign states.169 Westphalia, therefore, stood for the traditional approach to regulating a highly decentralised world of sovereign states.170 Countries with different social systems were said to manage to coexist peacefully for longer periods, because they acknowledged the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.171 As a consequence of the definition and practice of the state itself, it became questionable later on as to whether the government in question, within a single jurisdiction where the central authority commanded absolute power to

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168 Lu Deshan, 'Lun 'yiguo liangzhi'' (On 'One Country, Two Systems') Shehui kexie (Journal of Social Science) (Jinlin: Jilin University, March 1986, pp. 132-145)
169 Samuel Kim, China In and Out of the Changing World Order (New Jersey: Princeton University, 1991, p. 12)
170 Ibid.
conduct its internal affairs and no external country with the right to intervene, could maintain two distinct social systems.\textsuperscript{172}

China under Mao always insisted that the principle of peaceful coexistence was applicable only to international relations, and that it was not suitable for regulating relations in a country's domestic politics.\textsuperscript{173} It also held that so long as "the state remains a state, it must bear a class character" and "there must exist class struggle".\textsuperscript{174} Therefore, it could be understood that within the Chinese state, there could only be one political authority, namely that of the CCP's, which was constantly fighting with other political forces for maintaining such authority over the whole society.

With the changes in China's domestic politics in the 1980s and 1990s, the principle of peaceful coexistence acquired a new dimension. Deng Xiaoping found this principle particularly useful not only for handling state relations, but also for dealing with internal affairs.\textsuperscript{175} Deng pointed out that peaceful coexistence between two different systems within China could have certain advantages.\textsuperscript{176} When the principle was applied internally, it could help settle disputes by peaceful means on the bases of respecting reality and history with neither side seeking to undermine the other, but rather trying to complement each other. This could result in mutual cooperation and mutual understanding.\textsuperscript{177} He also argued that the major part of the system within the framework of 'one country, two systems' should be socialist in nature and the central government

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{172} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{173} Samuel Kim, \textit{China In and Out of the Changing World Order} (New Jersey: Princeton University, 1991, p. 55-63)
\item \textsuperscript{174} 'A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement', the CCP's letter to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 14 June 1963, \textit{CCP's Correspondence with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union} (Jilin: Jilin University, 1988, pp. 107-113)
\item \textsuperscript{175} Deng Xiaoping, \textit{To Construct Socialism with Chinese Characteristics} (Beijing: People's Press, 1987, p. 84)
\item \textsuperscript{176} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{177} Deng Xiaoping, 'Talks on the Delegation of Hong Kong Prominent Business People', on 22 June 1984, \textit{On 'One Country, Two Systems'} ed. by the Taiwan Affairs Office of Shanxi Province, 1988, pp. 9-12
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
should represent national sovereignty. Within such a framework, the special administrative regions should only have autonomous rights as granted by the National People’s Congress.\(^{178}\)

Some Chinese scholars argued that two different systems had in the past existed both in China and in other countries. According to their view, the cases in question included the duality of slavery and feudalism in the Liao Dynasty of 926-1125 A. D. in China; a system of slavery and feudalism in Japan from the 7th century to the 9th century; and the coexistence of a slavery in the South and a capitalist system in the North in the United States in the period of 1789-1865.\(^{179}\)

Other Chinese scholars disagreed. They said that in order to make a meaningful comparison, there must be distinguishable differences between the two systems, and that they must represent two totally different and opposing socio-economic systems, such as capitalism and socialism.\(^{180}\) In the cases mentioned above, there was no fundamental difference between the co-existing systems because they were all exploitative in nature, and therefore, they could not be viewed as ‘one country, two systems’.\(^{181}\) According to this argument, the two systems must be opposing ones, and must have their respective administrative regions and conduct themselves independently.\(^{182}\)

According to this understanding, it seemed that in East Asia there was only one case

\(^{178}\) *ibid.*
\(^{179}\) Li Jiachun and Yao Yiping, ‘On ‘One Country, Two Systems’’ *Journal of Taiwan Studies* (No. 1, 1986, pp. 51-55)
\(^{180}\) Lu Deshan, ‘*Cong xianfasue lun yiguo liangzhi*’ (On ‘One Country, Two Systems’ from the Constitutional Perspective) (Jilin: Jilin University, March 1986, pp. 48-53)
\(^{181}\) *ibid.*
which met the criteria of ‘one country, two systems’—namely the case of Tibet.¹⁸³ This case was, in fact, cited by some Hong Kong scholars as an example which challenged the feasibility of the concept of ‘one country, two systems’ in Hong Kong. In some of the papers written by mainland scholars, Tibet was also mentioned in the context of speculating on the feasibility of the policy in Hong Kong.¹⁸⁴

On another occasions, though, senior Chinese officials dismissed the case of Tibet as being of little relevance to Hong Kong, saying that, for example, “the Tibetan example is cited repeatedly by some scholars, but that is a complete distortion because there was an open rebellion there that was supported by foreign powers.”¹⁸⁵

Arguments by both mainland scholars and Chinese official statements contained considerable ambiguity, however. The case of Tibet was frequently mentioned by those who were doubtful about the applicability of the concept, suggesting that what happened in Tibet would inevitably be repeated in Hong Kong. To clarify the picture, it is therefore worth briefly looking at points of commonality and difference with the cases of Tibet and Hong Kong.

In constitutional theory, Tibet had a completely different system from the rest of China

¹⁸² ibid.
¹⁸³ Wang Enbao, Hong Kong. 1997—the Politics of Transition (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp. 94-97)
¹⁸⁴ For instance, an article on this subject, published in the Journal for Taiwan Studies, stated: “After the establishment of the PRC, a system differing from that of other provinces was introduced in Tibet. The central government fulfilled strictly the ‘Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on the Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet’ reached in May 1951. For the next eight years, Tibet continued to implement a feudal slavery system. In March 1959, the ruling clique of Tibet, at the instigation of foreign powers, openly tore up the agreement and launched an armed revolt, in an attempt to establish the independence of Tibet. Then, the central government, in coordination with local patriotic leaders, and strongly urged by Tibetan people, gradually carried out democratic reforms and abolished the brutal slavery system. ‘The Relationship between Tibet and Central Government’ Journal for Taiwan Studies (No. 58, 1989, pp. 139-142)
¹⁸⁵ Li Chuwen, Deputy Director of the Xinhua Office in Hong Kong, interviewed by Newsweek, Newsweek 23 January 1984, p. 12
before 1959.\textsuperscript{186} There was also an agreement between the central government and the local Tibetan government to maintain the status quo in Tibet.\textsuperscript{187} For about eight years after this agreement, Tibet enjoyed considerable autonomous rights, which allowed the Tibetan government to conduct local affairs based on established practice.\textsuperscript{188} The Chinese central government had promised not to change the existing socio-economic and political system, nor to introduce reforms in Tibet.\textsuperscript{189} However, in practice, autonomy in Tibet was more restricted than had been promised on paper, though Tibet had far more autonomy than other autonomous regions, such as Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. Even so, the Tibetan local government did not have the right to conduct external relations, and there was no separate customs border.\textsuperscript{190} Theoretically, local officials including the Dalai Lama, had to ask permission from the central government to visit foreign countries. The Tibetan government was under the close supervision of the military administrative committee, too. For the Chinese government, the stationing of the PLA in Tibet was important, since the army could carry out defence activities, and at the same time could watch over Tibetan activities and act as a deterrent force.\textsuperscript{191}

Some scholars believed that the Chinese government was cautious in its policy implementation in Tibet. For example, Grunfeld wrote:

Most of the effect of the Chinese rule was informal and indirect, and much of it concerned only the fringe areas of Tibetan life without penetrating the inner recesses of the community’s traditions....Although many of the more barbaric and objectionable aspects of Tibetan customary law and justice were discouraged and in practice abandoned, the main body of communist China’s

\textsuperscript{187} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{188} \textit{ibid.} pp. 126-131
\textsuperscript{189} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{190} \textit{ibid.}
statutory law was never enforced in Tibet.\textsuperscript{192}

Others had different views and examined the Chinese government’s important steps towards change, which included the setting up of the ‘Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet’ in April 1956. Although the committee had the Dalai Lama as chairman and the Panchen Lama as vice-chairman, with fifty-one members (five of them were officials sent by Beijing), it functioned only on matters that the Beijing authorities had already decided, leaving the committee with no real power or autonomy. The establishment of the committee was seen as an important step towards changing the constitutional structure of Tibet.\textsuperscript{193}

In respect of day-to-day work, the Chinese leaders seemed under pressure to offer practical and immediate relief to the masses in order to obtain their allegiance. The Chinese leaders acknowledged that anything less than that level could create alienation and resentment among the Tibetan people.\textsuperscript{194} On the other hand, there existed powerful local forces in Tibet which actively sought independence and resisted the Han presence in the region.\textsuperscript{195} A confrontation and final showdown was inevitable. The coexistence of the two systems ended in 1959 after an unsuccessful revolt led by the Dalai Lama.\textsuperscript{196}

A combination of factors contributed to Beijing’s failure to maintain its original plans for Tibet—these included a “misunderstanding of the nature of Tibetan society, a lack of consistency in Beijing’s political line, persistent Chinese chauvinism and an inability

\textsuperscript{192} ibid. p. 119
\textsuperscript{195} ibid.
\textsuperscript{196} ibid.
to respond adequately to growing resentment on the part of the Tibetan populace.”

In comparison with the situation of Hong Kong, Tibet’s position was much more vulnerable. Firstly, the agreement between the central government and the local Tibetan government was not an international agreement, and therefore the central government was not bound by international law of any kind. There was, moreover, no third party in a position to influence CCP’s policy.

Secondly, the Tibetans lacked bargaining power and were almost at the mercy of the central government. There was no clear guarantee from the central authorities as to the duration of the promised Tibetan status quo. In retrospect, to maintain the status quo in Tibet at that time seemed to be an expedient, tactical policy rather than a fundamental state policy. Although the Chinese leaders were committed to leaving the status quo in the short term, they believed that the Tibetan system had to be changed when the conditions were ripe.

Thirdly, strong ideological and cultural tensions existed between the two sides. According to official propaganda, the social system of Tibet was “a reactionary, dark, cruel and savagely feudal serf system”, and only the introduction of democratic reforms would “liberate the Tibetan people, develop the economy and culture of Tibet and provide the groundwork for building a prosperous, happy and socialist Tibet.”

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197 ibid. p. 126  
200 ibid.  
201 ibid.  
Above all, the independent tendency among Tibetans and the Chinese government’s determination not to let go led to the final fracture. Tibet was important to China, politically, strategically and culturally. In addition, China was deeply concerned about a possible ‘chain reaction’ following Tibetan independence, since China’s other minority regions, such as Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, could follow Tibet in demanding independence. Official Chinese historiography regarded Tibet as a classic example of separatism being encouraged and assisted by foreign imperialists, and as an area that all Chinese leaders were determined to see remaining with China. Thus, while the Chinese government was flexible towards the apparently intolerable socio-economic conditions in Tibet, it became quite ruthless towards any Tibetan move for independence, since this directly related to the highly sensitive matter of sovereignty. In this sense, in spite of the great differences, the case of Tibet still contained some valuable relevance for Hong Kong.

Policy Motivation

The previous two sections discussed the theoretical challenges and practical parallel of ‘one country, two systems’ in mainland China. What, then, was Beijing’s main policy motivation as it sought Hong Kong’s reunification within this formula?

To put it in perspective, ‘one country, two systems’ policy as a solution to the Hong Kong problem was developed in parallel with one of China’s most important foreign

\[\text{\underline{Notes}}\]

204 Wang Enbao, Hong Kong, 1997—the Politics of Transition (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp. 94-97)
205 ibid.
policy decisions in the Deng era—its abandonment of the anti-hegemonic united front foreign policy in favour of the ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ (IFP) in 1982. The essential purpose of IFP was not concern about immediate national security nor the reunification of Hong Kong and Taiwan at all costs. Rather it was an attempt to comprehensively enhance China’s economic strength through modernisation, which in Deng’s view was itself the best way to ensure national security and China’s reunification.

According to Deng, a deciding factor and the core of the ‘one country, two systems’ theory was the superiority of the mainland’s socialist system and on-going modernisation drive. The mainland’s socialism would be politically dominant in the anticipated unified China and the pledge to maintain capitalism in Hong Kong and Macao for fifty years was based on the assumption that within that period the mainland economy would catch up with those regions. Wang Enbao observed that a major characteristic underlying Deng’s ideas about ‘one country, two systems’ was his confidence in what James Rosenau described as a ‘linkage’ theory: a linkage of China’s domestic politics with international issues; a linkage of China’s modernisation with the Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwanese economies; a linkage of the PRC’s socialism with the capitalism of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan; and a linkage of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan in the framework of China’s reunification. For Deng, mainland China’s ambitious modernisation program and its socialist system were the

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207 ibid.
208 Deng listed reunification as one of the three tasks for China in the 1980s together with modernisation and opposing hegemony, however he immediately pointed out that the fundamental way to achieve this reunification lay in modernisation. See Deng Xiaoping, ‘Muqian de xingshi he renwu’ (The Present Situation and the Task), Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping 1975-1982 (Beijing: People’s Press, 1983, p. 204)
core of the 'one country, two systems' structure, without which it would not exist.\textsuperscript{211} The success of capitalism in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan would serve the mainland's modernisation purposes, and the success of modernisation would guarantee those regions' sustainable prosperity.\textsuperscript{212}

Deng's strong confidence in the dialectic relations between his political assessment of Hong Kong's future and the realisation of modernisation in the mainland was clearly shown in the priority he assigned to the two: despite its rising importance and urgency, the Hong Kong issue never superseded China's ultimate goal of four modernisations in the Deng era.\textsuperscript{213} This meant that the Hong Kong issue was handled within the framework of advancing China's modernisation program. This also meant that the policy motivation for China's recovery of Hong Kong in 1997 and the terms and manner with which the takeover was accomplished were closely tied to Deng's vision of a stronger China.\textsuperscript{214}

Viewed from this perspective, Beijing's 'one country, two systems' proposal was the best policy choice for China in the circumstances, allowing it to achieve its twin goals of national modernisation and resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{215} In order to maintain and maximise Hong Kong's functions as a global financial centre, regional headquarters for manufacturing firms, regional center for other services such as accounting and taxation, a trade window, a technology purchase window and

\textsuperscript{211} Wang Enbao, Hong Kong, 1997—the Politics of Transition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1995, p. 50)
\textsuperscript{212} ibid.
\textsuperscript{213} ibid.
\textsuperscript{215} William Overholt, The Rise of China (New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc. 1993, pp. 178-193)
international financial capital for China,\textsuperscript{216} China conceded that Hong Kong had to have
different rules from those of the rest of China. Only if Hong Kong’s economic
powerhouse status were maintained could China use it to fully benefit its four
modernisations program.\textsuperscript{217}

The above discussion indicated that the principle of sovereignty notwithstanding,
economic motivation also prevailed in Deng’s Hong Kong agenda in the early 1980s,
which, in the final analysis, was seen as offering the best guarantee for sustaining
national sovereignty, unity and security.

**Conclusion**

This chapter examined the transformation of Chinese foreign policy motivation in both
the Mao and Deng eras, demonstrating its dynamic nature. Mao’s China adopted a
selective policy towards international law as far as state succession and the law of
treaties were concerned. The Chinese government regarded itself as the successor to
past Chinese dynasties and even the KMT government on some questions, but not on
others. In the handling of specific cases, the Chinese government tended to fight for a
formal right first, then applied flexibility in its subsequent actions. The degree of
flexibility given depended on the judgement of the leadership on the relative importance
of the issue in question. It was these self-interest, strategic considerations and
perception of the existing international situation that determined whether to recognise or

\textsuperscript{216} ibid. p. 200
\textsuperscript{217} ibid.
abrogate pre-existing treaties.

The two cases discussed in this chapter suggested that Beijing’s practical approach towards so-called unequal treaties was prudent. Although the Chinese government always insisted that it was not bound by these unequal treaties, it nonetheless never directly challenged their validity before negotiated settlements were reached. There were conscious attempts to maintain at least a semblance of consistency on these issues and to follow general international practice. The CCP’s tolerance of the continued Soviet presence in northern China until 1955 was largely an outcome of strategic considerations stemming from the Korean War rather than from a lack of political will on the part of the leadership; while the recognition of Outer Mongolia as an independent sovereign state involved accepting an historic reality under Soviet pressure. In both cases, despite the core values of sovereignty and territorial integrity, it was the perception of national interests at that specific time that determined China’s attitude and policy towards these cases.

Changing priorities in the reform era injected new dynamism into China’s foreign policy motivation. Beijing overcame a range of difficult issues of ‘principle’ to adopt a more flexible and pragmatic foreign policy. Evidently, the shift in the top leadership’s position, from a single-minded political-strategic concern to a more encompassing approach to national interests, was accompanied by fundamental changes in both the domestic and international settings. These changes, together with the normalisation of relations with the United States in 1979 and the restoration of party relations with the USSR in 1989, enabled the Chinese government to gain greater economic, strategic and political leverage in global affairs, and to play a more important role in reshaping the
new world order. This policy pragmatism continued in the early 1990s and resulted in the establishment of previously unthinkable diplomatic relations with Israel, South Africa and South Korea. Beijing was quite successful in exploring this bonus in foreign relations to serve its changing priorities, and eventually turned them into valuable assets in China’s modernisation drive.

International cooperation, in turn, influenced Beijing’s interpretation of the outside world. Beijing, under the leadership of Deng, no longer viewed the international system as invariably hostile in the 1980s. This gave Beijing new confidence in dealing with the Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao issues and, as a result, its attitude towards solving these issues became much more conciliatory, with the Maoist slogan of ‘Liberate Taiwan’ surrendering to Deng’s ‘peaceful unification’ and ‘one country, two systems’.

Despite theoretical dilemmas and practical challenges, the policy of ‘one country, two systems’ proved to be the best possible policy decision in achieving China’s twin goals of economic development and recovery of Hong Kong’s sovereignty from Britain. It took a fundamental change in foreign policy thinking on the part of the top Chinese leadership to accept such a departure from previous orthodoxy. The political implications of this in future China’s foreign policy would no doubt be profound.

This was not to suggest that Beijing had no other concerns in its foreign policy motivation except the single-minded pursuit of sovereignty and economic development. National security and political strategic calculations were regarded as closely connected to the successful Hong Kong policy, too. Ideological argument also still exerted influence—depending on the political need envisaged by the CCP leaders. It was the
dialectic relations among these and other factors that formed the dynamic changes of Chinese foreign policy motivation.
PART III

BEIJING’S FIFTH COLUMN POLICY IN
HONG KONG TRANSITION PERIOD
- A TEST CASE

This Part is a case study which provides fresh empirical evidence by documenting the CCP’s fifth column operation in Hong Kong during the transitional period. It looks to test the hypothesis that transformation of Chinese foreign policy behaviours could be pragmatic and cosmetic, while very similar manifestations of perception, personality and structural/situational elements as those that had existed in Mao’s foreign policy remained the key motivational drives of Chinese foreign policy under Deng.

Chapter Eight records the CCP’s fifth column operation in Hong Kong from 1983-1997. Chapter Nine examines the political *raison d’etre* of this policy and its relationship with Chinese foreign policy motivation more broadly. Part III has revealed the lingering revolutionary determination of the Party leaders to preserve the grip of power in Hong Kong in their seemingly single-minded pursuance of modernisation at the national level.

The findings of the case study have tested positively the hypothesis set out in the earlier Parts. Part III has also advanced the previous theoretical exploration, empirical analysis and desirability debate of Chinese foreign policy motivation study to a new level of understanding.
Chapter Eight

The Operation of Beijing’s Fifth Column

During the transitional period from 1983 to 1997, Beijing quietly undertook a covert immigration scheme—the fifth column policy by definition of this thesis—to send tens of thousands of its cadres to Hong Kong. This special human transborder movement to Hong Kong was first conceived and set in motion in early 1983 while the Chinese and British governments were negotiating the terms of reversion of Hong Kong to China. More than 83,000 mainland officials entered Hong Kong under such a scheme, many with changed names and false identities, as part of a secret operation mounted by the Chinese government to install a political force extraordinaire in Hong Kong. The contrivance of this scheme was in fact simple: these fifth columnists were given the appearance of being ordinary immigrants for family reunion, but in reality they were sent with the Chinese government’s official blessing to carry out the CCP’s mission while not legitimately qualifying for the entry status they claimed.

The main argument sustaining this chapter is that during the transitional period from 1983 to 1997, Beijing made strenuous efforts to successfully expand its existing party establishment and united front network, which had mainly targeted big business and professional elites, into grassroots businesses and community groups in Hong Kong through a fifth column policy. This policy was initiated as a political insurance device by some dubious minds within the CCP leadership. It was intended to complement the official CCP’s representation and was designed as a safety mechanism in case the more generic political structure outlined in the two basic documents did not work out.
This chapter records the operational side of the fifth column in Hong Kong and leaves the analysis of the motivation of such a policy to Chapter Nine. As an important background and to put the fifth column operation in perspective, the CCP's official presence in the territory is first investigated. The first part of this chapter reviews how the CCP organisationally consolidated and reinforced its official structure in Hong Kong during the transitional period from 1983 to 1997. The three layers of the CCP's official presence in Hong Kong were buttressed up by a fourth and the most weighty form of presence—the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Hong Kong Garrison on 1 July 1997. By analysing the restriction and limits imposed on the CCP's official operations in Hong Kong, the first half of this chapter discusses why, to the Beijing leadership, the institutional arrangements for the Chinese government's representation in Hong Kong were inadequate to serve Beijing's needs in the transitional period and beyond.

The second half of this chapter gives evidence that discloses how the CCP covertly deployed a large number of fifth columnists in Hong Kong. It documents fifth column activities in the transitional period by examining the issues relating to the policy initiative, recruitment procedure, missions and loyalty control. The operation details recorded in this chapter strongly suggest that Beijing was indeed pursuing a fully-fledged fifth column policy in Hong Kong, although the expectations for and practical value of such a policy fluctuated in accordance with the dynamics of political transition.

By contrasting the CCP's overt and covert techniques, official and underground operations in Hong Kong, this chapter prepares a new empirical ground for the theoretical examination in Chapter Nine. By linking these two forms of the CCP's presence in Hong Kong, it becomes possible for this chapter to offer, in the conclusion,
a complete picture of Beijing’s political status at every stage of Hong Kong’s transition, and outline the CCP’s strategic thinking to improve its standing in the future. However, this picture is by no means simple and clear-cut, instead, it is complex, and in places contradictory. For one thing, although the fifth column policy was itself consistent, its operational contents, such as the recruitment process, were widely abused, and loyalty controls were only fitfully administered by relevant authorities. The problematic operation of fifth column policy gave rise to doubts about the wisdom of continuing the fifth column policy in Hong Kong.

**The Fifth Column—A Definition**

Although the term ‘fifth column’ was probably coined during the Spanish Civil War by the Nationalist general Emilio de Mola,¹ the fifth column strategy, as an old art of war and politics, could be dated at least to 500 BC in the writing of Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War*. In this book, Thucydides commented on the conflicts between oligarchic and democratic factions in the various Greek cities as the main triggers to invite in the Peloponnesians or the Athenians respectively. The conflicts and wars provided ample opportunities for secret and treasonable activities in that either side of the conflict could get military aid from outside in order to consolidate its own power and destroy the opponents. Loyalty to the state provided little protection for lives and property. Party and faction loyalty, Thucydides believed, became stronger even than

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¹ Generally, people who are engaged in treacherous and subversive activities against their own country for a hostile foreign power are called fifth columnists. The term of fifth column arose during the Spanish Civil War, when the Spanish nationalist general, Emilio de Moló (1887-1937), was asked at a press conference which of four army columns he expected to capture Madrid. He answered ‘the fifth column’, meaning organised sympathisers within the opposition camp would rise from within in a concerted effort to topple the enemy. Roger Scruton, *A Dictionary of Political Thought* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 1982, p. 172)
Chapter Eight

The survival of the fifth column strategy in the twentieth century suggested its enduring value in being able to accomplish what other open and more conventional means sometimes failed to achieve. By common definition, foreign agents, domestic traitors and enemy dupes formed the backbone of a fifth column. The main tasks of a fifth column would include espionage, sabotage and subversion in order to leave their host countries demoralised, divided and militarily unprepared for war. The fifth column strategy became a favourite technique not only for Franco’s Spanish Nationalists but also for other governments. In this century, many countries were believed to have employed the fifth column strategy one way or another in both wartime and peace periods, but the term was most strongly associated in the existing literature with Germany in the first half of this century. Hitler’s attacks on continental Europe and beyond, especially his blitzkrieg victories in the spring of 1940, seemed explicable to many military commentators as the success of Trojan Horse treachery or fifth column strategy. Historian Louis De Jong pointed out that fear of Nazi espionage, sabotage, and subversion was an international phenomenon that gripped nations in Europe, North America, and South America, and that the “fifth column certainly did exist.” In Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, for example, the Nazis had relied on ethnic

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4 ibid. The circumstances for deploying fifth columns differed from case to case. The rationale for a fifth column in the fifth century BC as mentioned above would be significantly different from that in the first half of this century in Europe. The actual tasks set for the fifth columns also varied from country to country, but they share a common motivation: to weaken from within. See Luis Losada, The Fifth Column in the Peloponnesian War (Netherlands: Lugduni Batavorum E. J. Brill, 1972, pp. 108-121)
6 ibid.
Germans to help conquer these countries.

De Jong further observed that the functions of the fifth column could be divided into peacetime and wartime activities. In peacetime chief functions consisted of creating propaganda, supplying detailed information on commercial, industrial and political activities and national morale, maintaining surveillance of important citizens of the ‘host land’, and above all, preparation for an emergency. In conducting all these tasks, the fifth column could manipulate all the social, political and idealistic ambitions and aspirations of various groups of people of the ‘host land’ to lull that land into a false sense of security so as to undermine its defence preparations and sow political, class and racial dissension.⁷

Other scholars tended to agree. Francis MacDonnell believed that in peacetime, the deployment of fifth column by a government was closely related to its fear and sense of insecurity. In this sense, many governments would be inclined to resort to fifth column strategies in one way or another at times of crisis. It was widely alleged that Italy, Japan, the Soviet Union and US were seeking to undermine their adversaries from within by employing a fifth column, which in turn brought about the ‘red scare’, ‘yellow scare’ and Axis scare in the twentieth century.⁸

The Chinese government was a skilful fifth column operator in its domestic politics. For example, in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, the CCP was actively engaged in the

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⁷ *ibid.* pp. iv-vi  
policy of ‘divide and rule’, or ‘blend sand with soil’, by strategically dispatching its hundreds and thousands of Han cadres to penetrate the local borders and to control local governments and population. The successful application and positive results of this policy in China’s remote frontiers enhanced the value of this strategy in the minds of the Chinese policy makers. As China and Britain entered into negotiations over the future of Hong Kong in early 1982, to resort to the traditional fifth column tactics quickly became an attractive option for some of the Chinese top leaders, notwithstanding the CCP’s general good-will and sincere intention to allow the Hong Kong people to govern Hong Kong.

Beijing’s political efforts to penetrate Hong Kong’s social fabric predated the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949 and was all-encompassing. However, the fifth column in this study refers specifically to a group of selected CCP cadres who were quietly sent to Hong Kong during the transitional period. The purpose of this exercise was to position a force of the CCP’s trusted personnel in the territory. These people went to great trouble to hide their real identities with changed names, false birth certificates and fabricated personal background information. The vehicle for this operation was to hijack an existing immigration program for one-way exit permit holders—an annual quota agreed to allow migrants from the mainland to reunite with

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9 The Chinese idiomatic expression ‘blend sand with soil’ has the same connotation as fifth column. It literally means that if soil becomes too tightly sticking together, it is necessary to put some sand in and blend them, so that the soil will loosen up for better use.

10 The good-will was expressed most clearly in the Sino-British Joint Declaration signed in December 1984. For example, it reads: “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The laws currently in force in Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged.” “The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the life-style. Rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and of religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Private property, ownership of enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and foreign investment will be protected by law.” See Joint
their families in Hong Kong. The obvious convenience of using this channel was that China could deceive Hong Kong authorities to accept these people, who would otherwise not be able to obtain their lawful resident status upon arrival, and would not be granted permanent residential rights until after they had live in Hong Kong for seven years.11

Taking this into consideration, China’s fifth column in Hong Kong was different in many respects from the traditional definitions. These immigrants were not undercover agents whose tasks might include collecting intelligence—political/economic/military information with national importance on security, defence, trade and technology. Nor were they trained to undertake radical actions or to stage uprisings in Hong Kong after July 1997. Nor were they simply transborder immigrants whose identities would be acknowledged by and registered with the local authorities. The missions of the fifth columnists in this study seemed to have been premised on more realistic yet more ambitious aspirations, reflecting several levels of concerns and needs of the CCP leadership. Firstly, in the minds of the policy makers in Beijing, the existence of a fifth column was a psychological assurance—at the very least, it could boost the CCP’s presence in Hong Kong by having the ‘numbers’. Secondly, a fifth column could serve as an integral part of China’s Hong Kong policy. As an auxiliary force to the Chinese government institutions in Hong Kong, it could accomplish what the official representation might have difficulty in achieving. This would include to infiltrate local communities and grassroots organisations. Thirdly, the fifth column was expected to

Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, December 1984, Article 3
11 Philip Webster, ‘Hong Kong Told of Citizenship by Points’ The Times 5 April 1990, p. 2
Chapter Eight

gradually influence Hong Kong's political configuration and general social disposition through aggressive business integration at the broader community levels, to manipulate the popular mood, and to mobilise support from within Hong Kong's body politics. Fourthly, and most importantly, as a political insurance device, it was designed as 'wild cards', ready and able to play significant roles in accommodating Beijing's future interests if all other institution-based political mechanisms failed.

Nominally, these fifth columnists were not attached to Chinese official establishments in Hong Kong. This gave them substantial freedom to exercise political and economic autonomy, and this fundamentally differentiated them from those employees with official status working for the Chinese government organisations and businesses, who were subject to strict regulation and discipline. However, political allegiance, a patron-client relationship with the party and business self-interest of the fifth columnists were projected by the CCP's leadership to be strong enough to bind them together to the party's ownership in times of need. The fifth column policy was aimed at achieving long-term benefits—to spread China's influence widely and deep-down in the grassroots of Hong Kong society, and to cover as much ground as possible to generate local support for the CCP.

Although these people originated from a diverse background in terms of age, education, profession, origin of work locations and sponsoring organisations, they usually had one important thing in common: they were well-connected within the Chinese party-state system and often enjoyed prominent patronage within the party. Most of them had access to intimate and complex relations with various levels of party bosses, government bureaucrats and major corporation executives. Ultimately they were the
winners in mainland domestic politics and economic reform.

Once in Hong Kong, these fifth columnists dispersed in a wide range of professions, such as lawyers, academics, executives of multinational trading companies, publishers, contractors, private dealers, property developers, hotel owners and tourist operators. Some of them had received a certain amount of financial assistance from the sponsoring bodies to kick-start their new life in Hong Kong. When the businesses were rolling, they usually tried to pay the ‘loans’ off quickly so that they could be ‘debt-free’ and have more autonomy in their business decisions. Others were just given the opportunity to ‘swim’ by themselves. Most of these people were doing well because of their close connections with the mainland and their sound knowledge of business norms in Hong Kong. These people usually were in their 30s or 40s, with good education, training and skills. Despite their relatively late entry into the game, generally they were good survivors and faring well.

**CCP’s Official Presence**

The Chinese government had had no legal representative office in Hong Kong prior to 1984 when the New China News Agency’s Hong Kong Office (the Xinhua Office) was publicly confirmed in the Joint Declaration to be China’s official representative. However, Chinese communist activities in Hong Kong could date back at least from 1921, and its existence was an open secret and tolerated by the Hong Kong

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government. There were roughly three periods into which the CCP’s 1949-1997 history in Hong Kong fell: 1949-67, 1968-81, 1982-1997, and throughout all three periods, the CCP operated as an underground political force in Hong Kong.

Under British rule, the CCP steadily expanded its organisational structure. At first, there was the CCP’s Hong Kong-Macao Work Committee (Work Committee), chaired by the director of the Xinhua Office, with other major stakeholders appointing their senior officials as committee members. Strictly speaking, the Work Committee was structurally at its highest level representing the CCP, and the Xinhua Office was de

Kong people were among the first targets for recruitment when the CCP was formed in 1921. After its second congress in the following year, the CCP concentrated on the need to provide leadership to the workers’ movement in Hong Kong through the Chinese Trade Union Secretariat. In 1922 and 1923 more than 180 strikes were called by workers throughout the mainland with 300,000 people taking part, including a general strike by 100,000 seamen in Hong Kong against the British. The organisers of the general strike in Hong Kong were mostly Guangdong natives. Among them were So Zhaojin, Zeng Sheng and Chen Yu, who would later become prominent members of the Communist Party. But the party activities in Hong Kong soon came to an abrupt halt in 1927 following a purge of the CCP by the nationalist KMT on the mainland after the failure of the first CCP and KMT cooperation (the first United Front). Communist activities in the British colony dwindled significantly in the 1930s when the CCP became engaged in a battle for survival with the KMT on the mainland. A change occurred in 1937 when the CCP and the KMT cooperated for the second time (the second United Front) in the war against Japanese aggression. In 1938 Liao Chengzhi, who would later become director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, set up an army liaison office in Hong Kong to collect funds for the communist-led Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army. During the eight years of war against the Japanese, guerrilla fighters led by communists fought in Hong Kong, Kowloon and the New Territories. They were known as the East River Guerrilla Column. Some of these fighters remained in Hong Kong after the British regained Hong Kong at the end of World War II in 1945. Others became senior officials of the Work Committee which later assumed the title of the Xinhua Office Hong Kong Branch in 1948. Historically, the Xinhua Office provided leadership to the major riots, strikes, union movements and left-wing propaganda campaigns in the territory.

13 Ian Kelley, *Hong Kong: A Political-Geographic Analysis* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986, pp. 82-87). The first period ended with the violent riots sparked by the Cultural Revolution, when Hong Kong security forces suppressed many local trade unions and leftist groups. The middle period was one of quiet rebuilding. The latter began with the announcement that a new unit would be set up by the Chinese government to handle reunification matters, the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office. Its first director was Liao Chengzhi, a specialist on reunification issues. The office was senior to the Xinhua Office in the Chinese government hierarchy.

14 The communist activities were strictly illegal under British rule. See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, ‘Beijing’s Post 1997 Strategies and Its Cadre Establishment in HKSAR of Hong Kong’ working paper on the conference ‘Futures: The Political Transition in Hong Kong’, Perth, Australia, 2 May 1996. It had long been Beijing’s intention that the party organisation should remain underground even after the transfer of sovereignty. If it came out to declare its power, it would inevitably be seen as the true locus of Beijing’s authority to interfere with HKSAR government’s autonomy, which would cause local anxiety and might send an unwanted signal to Hong Kong people. Furthermore, Beijing would not wish to be placed itself in a position where it might be subject to the uncertainties of elections contested by secret ballot.

15 Xu Jiutun, *Hong Kong Memoir* (Hong Kong: United Publishing Press, 1993, pp. 67-68). Xu revealed that other Work Committee members included chief executives of Bank of China, China Resources and China’s Tourist Bureau, trade union leaders and other groups.
facto representative of the Chinese government. But in practice, the functions of these two units were fused with the party secretary of the Work Committee publicly holding the director position of the Xinhua Office. These key players formed a standing committee which had a mandate from the CCP headquarters in Beijing to implement the CCP directives, to maintain party discipline and party organisation, and to coordinate united front activities.\textsuperscript{16} Another important function of the Work Committee was its role in reporting and advising Beijing on Hong Kong related issues.\textsuperscript{17}

Later, under the leadership of the Work Committee, there were China’s wide-spread business entities, security/intelligence establishments, which sprang up like mushrooms during the transitional period, to complete the CCP’s official presence in Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{18} The PLA Garrison would be officially added to this organisational chart in July 1997.

The structural and functional divisions among these players was not well differentiated, for in reality their responsibilities often intertwined and overlapped.\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{Work Committee and Xinhua Office}

The Work Committee and the Xinhua Office had notionally separate but overlapping responsibilities and there was a degree of rivalry between them as a result.\textsuperscript{20} The Work Committee, appointed by the party’s Central Committee, was headed by a secretary,\textsuperscript{21}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{16} John P. Burns, ‘The Role of the New China News Agency’ John P. Burns ed. \textit{Hong Kong and China in Transition} (Toronto: Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1994, pp. 29-21)
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{18} Xu Jiadun, \textit{Hong Kong Memoir} (Hong Kong: United Publishing Press, 1993, pp. 72-78)
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{20} Robert Cottrel, \textit{The End of Hong Kong} (London: John Murray, 1993, pp. 97-133)
\textsuperscript{21} The power and status of a Work Committee secretary differed according to his personal power base, linkage within the CCP network and relationship with top leaders. Zhou Nan, who held the position from 1990-1997, used to be a vice minister for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.}
several deputy secretaries, and a secretary general. It also comprised a number of ordinary members.\textsuperscript{22} The deputy secretaries of the Work Committee were drawn from among some of the deputy or assistant directors of the Xinhua Office.\textsuperscript{23} In the 1980s and 1990s, other members of the Work Committee were mainly from among the leaderships of state-run companies based in Hong Kong, such as China Resources, China Merchants, Bank of China and China Travel Service.\textsuperscript{24} In the words of a senior Chinese official in the Xinhua Office, the relationship between the Work Committee and the Xinhua Office was 'one body with two faces', with the Xinhua Office serving as a 'public face' or 'window'.\textsuperscript{25}

The CCP's strength in numerical terms and the position of various CCP elements in Hong Kong, including the Work Committee and the Xinhua Office, have never been disclosed by the Chinese side. Due to the secrecy of the CCP's personnel arrangements and staff management in Hong Kong, and also due to the consistent denial of the existence of such an undeclared party contingent by the British colonial authority, the exact numbers of cadres working in Hong Kong was very difficult to confirm.\textsuperscript{26} According to Xu Jiatun, in 1983 there were only about 6,000-7,000 CCP members in Hong Kong and Macao, among whom those of mainland origin numbered about 3,000,

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\textsuperscript{22} Deng Feng, 'Xianggang xinhuashe-gongwei caigande waiyi' Dangdai (Contemporary), (No. 4, 16 December 1989, pp. 17-21)
\textsuperscript{23} ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} Interviews with senior officials of the Xinhua Office in Hong Kong, December 1996
\textsuperscript{26} Jonathan Mirsky, East Asia editor of The Times (London) said that the information 'leaked' from the Special Branch indicated that around 23,000 to 28,000 Communist members were active in Hong Kong by the end of 1995. Interview with Jonathan Mirsky, Hong Kong, December 1996. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Associate Editor & China Editor of South China Morning Post gave a more conservative figure about 15,000. For a further discussion of the size and operations of the underground party cell, see 'Communists Mark Time Under Wraps' Guardian (London), 2 September 1995; 'China's Magic Tool for Hong Kong' The Economist 18 March 1995
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while more than half were local CCP members. Although China would be the legitimate sovereign of Hong Kong from 1 July 1997, the party system still could not operate as it did in mainland China due to Beijing’s international commitment to the Hong Kong people. These considerations and restrictions were the constant source of concern to the Beijing leadership, and reinforced the CCP’s determination to adopt a long-term strategy to compensate for this deficiency.

As mentioned earlier, the CCP’s interest in penetrating Hong Kong’s political life predated 1982, when the Chinese and British governments finally sat down to talk in detailed terms about the future of this tiny colony. Since the Xinhua Office became the Chinese government’s official representative in Hong Kong in 1948, it not only was the locus for the mainland CCP members working in Hong Kong under the British rule, but also provided separate leadership to local underground Hong Kong communists by appointing designated individuals directly from the Beijing-based CCP Central Overseas Chinese Committee. This situation ended in 1983 when Xu Jiatun, former director of the Xinhua Office, consolidated his power by merging the two party systems under the sole responsibility of the Work Committee, expanding the Xinhua Office’s power to include providing guidance and supervision of indigenous Hong Kong CCP members.

29 Xu Jiatun, *Hong Kong Memoir* (Hong Kong: United Publishing Press, 1993, Chpt. 1). Xu described the Xinhua Office as the engine house for the management of mainland-sent CCP members working for the Xinhua Office, other Chinese establishments or their own businesses (fifth columnists), p. 26
30 *ibid.* p. 69. Before 1983, Li Qixin, Deputy Director of the Xinhua Office and appointed by the Overseas Chinese Committee of the Party Central Committee, had been in charge of this task.
31 *ibid.* p. 27
The evolution of the Xinhua Office before 1982 revealed the increasing importance the CCP attached to Hong Kong. From 1949 to the late 1970s, the role of the CCP in Hong Kong developed organisationally to accommodate its position as a party out of power operating in what it perceived to be a largely hostile capitalist environment. Consequently, its power in Hong Kong was largely exercised in the market place—during the 1950s, 60s and 70s, the CCP exercised its control largely at nominally economic levels.

The process of Hong Kong’s reversion to Chinese sovereignty from 1982 to 1997 created an urgent need for the Xinhua Office to expand its working agenda to include achieving its direct political participation and expanding its influence in the transitional period. The Chinese government gave the Xinhua Office a renewed mandate to elevate its economic and political control to a new administrative level.

Indeed, during the transitional period, the Xinhua Office greatly raised its public profile and status by strong performance in committing itself to the critical foundation-laying work for the return of Hong Kong to China. It played an irreplaceable role in lobbying, consulting and convincing Hong Kong business leaders in the lead up to the drafting of both the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law in the 1980s. It supplied personnel for China’s negotiating teams in the Joint Liaison Group and elsewhere. Its officials often spoke on behalf of the Chinese government on important policy initiatives and

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32 John P. Burns, 'The Structure of Communist Party Control in Hong Kong' *Asian Survey* (Vol. XXX. No. 8, August 1990 p. 748)  
33 ibid. p. 763  
34 ibid.  
35 Xu Jiatun, *Hong Kong Memoir* (Hong Kong: United Publishing Press, 1993, pp. 69-75)
responses, including matters of a technical kind involving major infrastructure projects such as the new airport. In addition, the Xinhua Office was also charged with the tasks of winning over the support of many social groups and isolating those identified as enemies.\(^{36}\)

In many respects, the Xinhua Office was given the role of ‘shadow government’ during the transitional period, waiting in the wings for the handover in 1997.\(^{37}\) It not only exerted influence within Hong Kong territory, but also assisted in the conduct of China’s relations with other Chinese communities in the region, particularly with Taiwan.\(^{38}\) At the end of 1996, it was entrusted with the sole responsibility for the selection of Hong Kong’s first Chief Executive,\(^{39}\) Tung Chee-Hwa.

During his term as the director of the Xinhua Office from 1990 to 1997, Zhou Nan adopted a series of hard measures to organisationally and structurally strengthen the Xinhua Office in response to increasing tension between the Chinese and British governments. At the end of 1996, it employed around 500 staff, more than double its pre-1982 level.\(^{40}\) In the early 1990s, the Xinhua Office was organised into ten

\(^{36}\) Ibid.

\(^{37}\) John Burns, ‘The Structure of Communist Party Control in Hong Kong’ *Asian Survey* (Vol. XXX. No. 8, August 1990 p. 748)

\(^{38}\) Ibid.

\(^{39}\) The Joint Declaration stipulates that Chief Executive of HKSAR would replace the governor as head of the government. It reads: “The chief executive will be appointed by the Central People’s Government on the basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally.” See *Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong*, December 1984, Article 3

\(^{40}\) Interviews with senior Xinhua Office official in Hong Kong, December 1996. The pre-1982 figure was around 200.
departments, a research office and a general office. The Coordination Department was primarily responsible for united front work, the most important work of the Xinhua Office. It was expected to identify not only the rich and powerful among Hong Kong political and business circles, but also those people with great potential to become powerful. Its work emphasis was to continuously groom and cultivate a close relationship with them in order to win and maintain their support in implementing China’s policies in Hong Kong.

This same period also saw the emergence of the model of future party extension into Hong Kong in the form of dangzu (party cores), which were sprouting at a brisk rate in the mainland corporations in Hong Kong as well as in unexpected places such as the universities and other academic institutes. As more Chinese professionals who were the CCP members found employment in large establishments such as banks, trading houses, multinational corporations and media units, dangzu were expected to increase in number to accommodate the party constitutional request on the structure.

The signing of the Joint Declaration ushered in a new dimension of political sensitivity and challenge to the work of the Xinhua Office. During the transitional period, the Xinhua Office had to reorient its work focus and diversify its functions to meet new challenges. These included propagating the CCP’s policy position in the territory,
supervising and reporting on China’s key organisations, coordinating China’s business activities in Hong Kong and “building a coalition to support party policies through aggressive united front work”, including “recruiting candidates for leadership in the post-1997 Hong Kong government.” Among these functions, united front work continued to be the “most important.” This involved identifying credible locals to speak out on China’s behalf on critical issues. Well before 1949, the CCP had appointed Hong Kong residents to various consultative bodies in Beijing and Guangdong province. With the imminent transition of Hong Kong to Chinese rule, appointments of this kind were expanded to facilitate the increasing need to achieve concrete results on various fronts. Or as John Burns vividly described it—the “net has been cast a little wider.” The Xinhua Office, as the CCP’s mouthpiece, administrator and the highest official representative in Hong Kong, could be said to have done all it could to advance Beijing’s interests in the territory during this crucial period. However, it was exactly because of this high official status that the Xinhua Office was cautious not to be seen as directly engaging in community and grassroots-based activities, lest it be criticised as being instigating. Of course, resource constraints also added to this restriction.

The operation of the fifth column in Hong Kong inevitably added a new responsibility

45 ibid.
47 ibid.
48 ibid.
49 Such as the National People’s Congress or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and their provincial affiliates.
to the Xinhua Office, which found itself under great pressures to deal with increasing workloads. This situation to some extent exacerbated some contending internal issues, such as staff shortage and job division among 10 Departments, and was regarded by some officials as an unwanted burden. However, this new obligation in turn empowered the Xinhua Office to oversee the political well-being of the fifth columnists and to monitor the policy development and implementation in general. This duty continued at least until the new office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) assumed its function in mid 1997.

Business Establishments

As mentioned earlier, China-owned business operating in Hong Kong was part of China’s official, or ‘overt’, presence. The imminent change of sovereignty gave the mainland business establishments a greater leadership role in Hong Kong’s economy, and there was evidence that Beijing would not fulfil this role without a political sting—there wasn’t a clear line separating government and business work.

Most large mainland enterprises in Hong Kong were headed by China’s senior bureaucrats or communist capitalists. For example, Gu Yongjiang, chairman of China

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51 Interviews with officials from the Xinhua Office, Hong Kong, December 1996 and December 1997
52 For example, in 1996, the new chairman of the Hong Kong Association of Banks was Yang Zilin, chief executive of the Bank of China’s Hong Kong and Macao Regional Office. Yang came to Hong Kong in 1994 from the bank’s head office in Beijing. Later that same year, Yuan Wu, a senior vice president of China Merchants, the shipping and property conglomerate controlled by the Ministry of Communications, was selected to join the 60-person Provisional Legislature, the interim body appointed by Beijing to take over from the 1995 Legislative Council on 1 July 1997. The directors of the board of Hong Kong Chinese Enterprises Association, a body like the local chambers of commerce, highlighted the relationship between the mainland Chinese firms and the Chinese state. At the end of 1997, its chairman, Gu Yongjiang, was also the chairman of China Resources and formerly a vice minister in MOFTEC. Among the vice chairmen, there was Yang Zilin of the Bank of China; Li Yinfai, president of China Merchants Holdings (whose chairman, Huang Zhendong, was the Minister of Communication in Beijing); and Zhu
Resources, arrived in Hong Kong from the central government bureaucracy only in 1996. There was an obvious link between the mainland enterprises in Hong Kong and functional ministries in Beijing or at the provincial level. Despite efforts within China to minimise the direct control of enterprises by governmental organs, and despite some of the larger and more successful enterprises having a fairly high degree of management autonomy, most were far from being autonomous commercial entities. For example, China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC), despite looking more like a private company than any other Chinese business in Hong Kong, clearly had to take orders from Beijing during the 1995-96 disputes over Dragonair.

A wide discrepancy existed between official Chinese statistics and popular beliefs about the actual number of the mainland-origin companies operating in Hong Kong.\(^5\) The upbeat of these companies undoubtedly was an effective image boost for China, and the

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Yuening, chairman and general manager of China Travel Service and the former vice mayor of Shenzhen. Two other vice chairman with links to southern China were He Keqin, chairman of Guangdong Enterprises, the commercial arm of the Guangdong provincial government; and Wang Chengming, chairman and general manger of Fujian Enterprises, the same for that province. Another example could be founded by looking at the ascendancy of Huang Diyan who held the special post of honorary president of the association. Huang came to Hong Kong from Beijing in 1983 and rose to chief executive of the Bank of China's Hong Kong and Macao Regional Office. He retired from this post in 1994, but stayed on at the bank as managing director and adviser to the regional office. He also sat on the bank's board of directors in Beijing; and back in Hong Kong he was a member of China's Preparatory Committee overseeing the formation of the first HKSAR. Interviews with officials from China Resources, Bank of China, China Merchants, China Travel Service, and staff from Hong Kong Chinese Enterprises Association, December 1996 and December 1997.

\(^5\) The Xinhua Office held that there were less than 1,800 such companies, while many others put this figure to more than 3,200. Interviews with senior official of the Xinhua Office, and with Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Associate Editor & China Editor, South China Morning Post, December 1996. This discrepancy might be the result of the confusion over counting on the Chinese side. For example, although authorities had only approved 300 mainland-based organisations to set up operations in Hong Kong by 1987, by then more than 1,000 had opened for business without appropriate approval. Adding to this confusion, the mainland China's financial institutions, large trading corporations and other companies in Hong Kong could be further divided into five categories: (i) wholly owned subsidiaries of State Council units such as MOFTEC and the Finance Ministry; (ii) representative companies of provinces and cities; (iii) Hong Kong companies that were wholly owned by China's units of the first two categories, controlled by them, or in partnership with them; (iv) 'grey-area companies' such as those owned by the PLA or private entrepreneurs, which the Xinhua Office was aware of, but did not acknowledge; and (v) underground companies not registered with the HKMAO or the Xinhua Office. The former three had, by request of the Party Constitution, set up either party committees or branches to supervise work, and were obliged to consult with the Xinhua Office over organisational and administrative issues. No wonder the HKMAO complained, "we have lost control, and this is a problem of the system" of running Hong Kong. See John P. Burns' paper ''The Role of the New China News Agency' John P. Burns ed. Hong Kong and China in Transition (Toronto: Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1994, p. 33)
successful operation of these business establishments, particularly those of leading state-owned corporations, generated much needed capital and market share for the CCP to plant its feet firmly in the territory. Their rapid business and financial influence in Hong Kong helped China to more confidently claim its sovereign legitimacy over the territory.\(^{54}\)

At the administrative level, the fact that all these mainland companies were under dual leadership and supervision of both mainland authorities and the Xinhua Office created some complicated management problems. In principle, the Xinhua Office had the supervisory power over all China’s business and trading outlets in Hong Kong. But in reality, it had no absolute control over them\(^ {55}\) due to its inability to solve many of their practical problems. The authority of the Xinhua Office was further weakened when it came to be widely regarded by the mainland companies as a policing body functioning as a regulatory unit, which delivered no real economic benefit, nor advanced their business interests.\(^ {56}\) Handicapped by resource constraints, the Xinhua Office’s power extended little beyond relaying the CCP’s directives, organising political studies, discipline inspection and absorbing new party members.\(^ {57}\) In business and personnel management matters, the corresponding sponsoring mainland ministries enjoyed indisputable authority. In many ways the companies were more willing to report directly to, and seek assistance from, the mainland authorities, which were often regarded as the real sources of power—capable of providing funding and staff, generating business opportunities and, in many cases, standing up for the rights and even the very existence

\(^{54}\) Ken Davies, *Hong Kong to 1997: A Question of Confidence* (London: The Economic Intelligence Unit Limited, 1990, pp. 152-168)

\(^{55}\) Xu Jiatun, *Hong Kong Memoir* (Hong Kong: United Publishing Press, 1993, p. 69)
of these companies in Hong Kong. For example, China Resources—Beijing's main trading arm in Hong Kong—often bypassed the Xinhua Office to report directly to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), while the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company did the same thing by answering mainly to the Ministry of Communications. Lacking genuine economic leverage, the Xinhua Office was gradually sidelined in day-to-day running of these companies.

Because of their mainland connections to the party, the State Council, provincial governments and other channels of authority, this group of Hong Kong-based red capitalist enterprises quickly ascended to prominence and played an increasingly important role in Hong Kong's business and financial institutions. By the mid 1990s, some of the bosses of these companies had been listed among the top 100 most powerful and wealthy businessmen in Hong Kong social and business circles, including chambers of commerce, the Royal Hong Kong Jockey Club and other charity and sporting outfits. The political significance of these 'new rich' was tipped to grow, especially if taking into account their intimate association with the Chinese authorities, and their close relationship with local Hong Kong business tycoons, whose commercial interests were guaranteed to be well looked after.

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56 ibid. pp. 78-82
57 ibid. p. 69
58 Interview with senior officials from China Resources, Hong Kong, December 1996, December 1997
59 ibid.
60 Conflicts between the self-interested mainland companies and the Xinhua Office over the control of the business establishments could be further evidenced by drawing from the experience of Xu Jiujun when he was the director of the Xinhua Office. According to Xu, he investigated the mismanagement of Everbright Company for the alleged purge of subordinates by its director Wang Guangying. When Xu presented his findings to Zhao Ziyang, then the Chinese Premier, Zhao asked Xu to quietly drop the matter. Xu later found out that Wang gave financial support to one of Zhao's relatives, Zhang Shaohuang, who opened a company with only two Hong Kong dollars as its real capital, but since had been doing well under the patronage of Wang. See Xu Jiujun, Hong Kong Memoir (Hong Kong: The United Publishing Press, 1993, pp. 260-261)
61 Mark Roberti, The Fall of Hong Kong (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1994, pp. 305-322)
62 For a discussion of the 'red aristocracy' in Hong Kong, see ibid.
These mainland business establishments not only incarnated one pivotal level of the CCP’s official presence in Hong Kong, but also greatly enhanced the image of the CCP. In addition to the immediate and direct commercial benefit to the Chinese government, a strong contingent of mainland business firms in Hong Kong served at least one other objective—by permitting selected bureaucrats or party officials to manage these enterprises in Hong Kong, the CCP relied on them, in their capacity as caretakers and ‘insiders’, to ensure the smooth implementation of Beijing’s policy.63

Intelligence and Security Establishments

Another form of the CCP’s official presence in Hong Kong was its intelligence and security establishments. Hong Kong’s geographical proximity to mainland China and its social and economic system held a natural attraction for international intelligence—it was known as Asia’s ‘den of spies’.64 It was reported in April 1997 that China had allotted $HK1.2 billion during the transitional period to enable more than 900 special agents from military and state security organs to set up companies and other business outlets in Hong Kong.65 It was also estimated that there were about 5,000 foreign spies, other than mainland agents, in Hong Kong at the beginning of 1997.66

Given Hong Kong’s colonial history and its would-be Special Administrative Region status in the Chinese system, China itself was probably the most interested party to plant

63 ibid.
64 Bruce Gilley, ‘Ferment in Asia’s Den of Spies’ The Canberra Times 27 October 1997
65 ibid.
new listening posts in Hong Kong and to upgrade the sophistication of its intelligence facilities during the transitional period.\textsuperscript{67} China’s inability to tap into the substantial flow of useful commercial, political and military information across airwaves and telecommunication lines in the territory had long left it frustrated.\textsuperscript{68} China used to rely on a station in Hainan province to monitor signal traffic. The facility was poorly equipped and the information was patchy because of the distance and because the station spent most of its resources tuning into activities in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{69} The new office of the MFA, headed by China’s former Ambassador to Britain, Ma Yuzhen, was expected to become China’s new intelligence centre in the region, with better equipped staff and facilities.\textsuperscript{70}

During the transitional period, Beijing showed even greater sensitivity to the possibility that Hong Kong might be turned into a ‘base of subversion’.\textsuperscript{71} The CCP adopted two concrete measures to prevent this scenario from being realised. Firstly, a clause banning subversive activities was added to the Basic Law in 1990 after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. Secondly, Beijing accelerated stationing a large corps of counter-intelligence and security personnel in Hong Kong to guarantee the effectiveness of the clause.\textsuperscript{72}

Coincidentally, China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) was created in 1983 to take over the counter-espionage and political police functions of the Ministry of Public

\textsuperscript{66} ibid.  
\textsuperscript{67} Interviews with senior Chinese security officials, December 1996  
\textsuperscript{68} ibid.  
\textsuperscript{69} ibid.  
\textsuperscript{70} Interviews with senior Xinhua Office officials in Hong Kong, December 1996  
\textsuperscript{71} William Overholt, \textit{The Rise of China} (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993, Chpt. 5)  
\textsuperscript{72} ibid.
Security (MPS). The main purpose in establishing the MSS was to “counter espionage, counter subversion and counter forces destructive to the Chinese people at home and abroad”, which had become an agonising problem for China as it proceeded with its ‘open and reform’ commitment. The MSS, with due responsibilities of countering international espionage and thwarting ‘subversive’ and ‘counter-revolutionary’ activities, controlled most of the Chinese intelligence establishments in Hong Kong. From early 1990 to 1997, it ran numerous companies in Hong Kong as fronts for its agents. At the same time, it also used the services of various academic and international-exchange institutes in North America, Europe and Southeast Asian countries as staging grounds for Hong Kong. Such ‘transit points’ or springboard set-ups were commonly used by the MSS to smooth the entry of its agents to non-Chinese businesses and to non-leftist circles in Hong Kong.

Given the vital importance of Hong Kong to China’s modernisation program, to maintain the CCP’s official presence by ensconcing a great number of intelligence and security specialists was perhaps not only in Beijing’s best interests, but also absolutely necessary. Usually, there were two ways to deploy China’s intelligence personnel. One was, as mentioned above, to set up companies or business outlets as their covers and points of contact; and the other was to disperse them among other mainland establishments. These somewhat shadowy intelligence figures usually wore the hats of the Xinhua Office officials, or were said to be affiliates of other mainland departments.

73 Ministry of State Security Set up on Mainland China’ Issues and Studies (July 1983, pp. 5-8)
74 ibid.
75 Interviews with officials of Hong Kong Government, senior Xinhua Office officials and fifth columnists, Hong Kong, December 1996 and December 1997
76 ibid.
77 William Overholt, The Rise of China (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993, Chpt. 5)
or, most commonly, were employees of other PRC business corporations.\textsuperscript{79} For these ‘under cover’ agents working in the PRC companies, their real identities were not known to most of their colleagues.\textsuperscript{80} A large proportion of the security and intelligence officers in Hong Kong worked under the co-ordination of the Security Department of the Xinhua Office.\textsuperscript{81} Officials from the MPS were charged with the internal security work of the Xinhua Office and other mainland large corporations, while those from the MSS were responsible for information gathering and counter-espionage activities commonly assigned to all other intelligence workers.\textsuperscript{82}

Although the Xinhua Office in principle managed the overall intelligence work in the territory, the intelligence and security officers often bypassed it to communicate directly with one of the following central government level departments: the MSS; the MPS; the intelligence wings of the various PLA units; the intelligence outfits of such CCP’s Central Committee units as the General Office, the United Front Department and the International Liaison Department.\textsuperscript{83} According to Xu Jiatun, the provincial department of the State Security as well as the PLA’s regional commands also posted their intelligence experts in Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{84}

To complicate the matter even further, there was a small group of agents working

\textsuperscript{78} Xu Jiatun, \textit{Hong Kong Memoir} (Hong Kong: United Publishing Press, 1993, pp. 221-225)\textsuperscript{79} \textit{ibid.}\textsuperscript{80} For more detail about the activities of mainland agents in Hong Kong, see ‘Mainland Security in Hong Kong’ \textit{Next, 27 January 1995}\textsuperscript{81} Xu Jiatun, \textit{Hong Kong Memoirs} (Hong Kong: United Publishing Press, 1993, p. 76)\textsuperscript{82} \textit{ibid.} p. 53. This coincided partially with a statement by Wang Dong, Director of the Xinhua Office Security Department. He was reported as saying that his unit was mainly responsible for the security matters of the Xinhua Office as well as the mainland Chinese companies. Naturally, he did not mention the role of State Security’s intelligence and counter-intelligence work. See ‘Security Responsibility of Xinhua Office’ \textit{Sing Tao Daily News} 12 April 1996\textsuperscript{83} Xu Jiatun, \textit{Hong Kong Memoirs} (Hong Kong: Untied Publishing Press, 1993, pp. 53-55)
directly as ‘private liaison officers’ for some senior CCP leaders. As in similar operations in most countries, intelligence officers based in Hong Kong were expected to report only to the units that directly supervised them. As a consequence, duplication of information gathering efforts, turf battles and ‘cross fires’ happened from time to time.

**PLA’s Hong Kong Garrison**

The Basic Law, which was promulgated in 1991, confirmed that a PLA garrison would be stationed in Hong Kong from 1 July 1997. In late December 1996, the ‘Garrison Law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the PRC’ was published by the policy-setting Central Military Commission (CMC) and was approved by the Standing Committee of the 23rd meeting of the eighth National People’s Congress (NPC), although the exact size and components of it was not disclosed then.

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84 ibid.
85 ibid. Especially Yang Shangkun and Li Xiannian. Chpt. 1
86 ibid. Xu Jiatun tried to unify various intelligence operations in Hong Kong to avoid confusion and in-fighting. Turf battles among different branches of the intelligence and police apparatuses in the Shenzhen and Hainan SEZs were frequently reported in the Hong Kong and Taiwan press, too.
87 Jeffrey Parker, ‘Red First Regiment Ready for Hong Kong’ Reuters, Beijing, 28 January 1996
88 The CCP’s main newspaper *Renmin ribao* hailed the promulgation and implementation of the law as being of: “great significance to ensuring that the troops sent to Hong Kong by the central government to take charge of defence matters will fulfil their obligations in accordance with the law, safeguard state sovereignty, reunification and territorial integrity, and maintain Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability...The Garrison Law has embodied the principle of state sovereignty in a clear-cut manner.” See ‘Garrison Law Enshrines State Sovereignty Principle’ *Renmin ribao* 31 December 1996, p. 1. The law stipulated in full detail the functions of the garrison and its terms of reference; the methods of troop administration; legal jurisdiction over the soldiers; and the garrison’s relationship with HKSAR authorities. The provision that the Hong Kong garrison troops be composed of three services demonstrated the determination of the CCP to resume the overall exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong in its land territory, territorial waters and air space. See James Pringle, ‘Elite Unit Selected for Colony by Peking’ The Times 29 January 1997. With the special political missions of the garrison in mind, the CMC laid great emphasis on the loyalty and ideological purity of the garrison. According to the Commander of the Guangzhou Military Region, General Tao Bojun, selection of garrison members was made under the direct supervision of the CMC. General Tao commented that the elite corps was made up of “the best, the most superior cadres and soldiers”, and “it will be a civilised, militarily distinguished garrison.” See ‘Hong Kong Garrison Law Is an Important Law’ Hsin W an Pao 24 October 1996. The political sensitivity also reflected in the CMC’s selection of the garrison. The bulk of the garrison was made up of troops from the illustrious Red One Brigade, which was formed in the 1927 Autumn Harvest Uprising by Chairman Mao. After the founding of the People’s Republic, the Red First Regiment took part in the Korean War (1950-1953) and other military operations and “built brilliant feats.” See ‘China’s Red First Regiment Ready for Hong Kong’ Beijing: Xinhua News Agency via Reuters, 28 January 1996. Former Red One Brigade alumnus included Generals Yang Dezhi and Su Yu. The naval and air force units of the garrison came from divisions that had
Given that the CCP had always attached a special value, and accorded a unique status, to the PLA, this announcement was of particular significance under the circumstances. For the Chinese leadership, the garrison would be a powerful guarantor for the continuous existence and expansion of the three other forms of the CCP’s official presence in Hong Kong after the sovereignty of Hong Kong changed hands. In one of the CCP’s traditions, which was dramatised in Mao’s famous quotation: power came from the barrel of gun, the PLA’s Hong Kong Garrison would be seen by the Chinese leadership as a fourth and indispensable form of the CCP’s official presence after July 1997.

To station the PLA’s Hong Kong Garrison would not only symbolise China’s full recovery of the territory, but also give teeth to China’s other institutional arrangements in Hong Kong. This military presence was essential for China in the sense that it would bridge the crucial gap of a meaningful sovereignty expressed in political, economic and military forms.

distinguished themselves in flashpoints including the Spratly Islands. They had also escorted top leaders on domestic trips. See James Pringle, ‘Elite Unit Selected for Colony by Peking’ *The Times* 29 January 1997. However, in order to reflect the ‘five lakes and four seas’ principle of the PLA personnel management, the members of the garrison were recruited from different military regions. Officers with the rank of platoon chief or above have college-level education. The recruits were trained in subjects including English, Cantonese, Hong Kong Laws and international affairs in Shenzhen from 1993. *ibid.* In terms of command and control, the relations with other CCP organisations in Hong Kong, the garrison commander, Maj-Gen. Liu Zhenwu, was reported to have indicated that the garrison would be administrated in a ‘closed-door’ or behind the barrack fashion, and funded directly by Beijing. See ‘Hong Kong Garrison Law Is an Important Law’ *Hsin Wen Pao* 24 October 1996. It would report directly to the CMC and take orders from the Central Government. However, in logistics support and other areas of administration, it would work closely with the Guangzhou Military Regiment. It was conceivable that should the troop strength in Hong Kong prove insufficient to handle contingencies, the HKSAR garrison could be quickly reinforced from the PLA units based in Shenzhen and Huizhou.
CCP's Invisible Presence—The Fifth Column

The above-discussed four official institutions constituted a major structural framework with which the CCP would exercise its power before and after 1997. In other words, these different levels of arrangements provided the CCP with legal cover-up to operate in Hong Kong. However, the examination in the previous section concerning the CCP’s official presence in Hong Kong brought to attention a fairly weak CCP’s powerbase in grassroots Hong Kong society. This serious inadequacy was detected by the Chinese leadership at the very beginning of the transitional period, and steps were taken to redress the issue. A detailed analysis of how and why the CCP felt strongly about this insufficiency and therefore a policy to fix it will be covered in depth in Chapter Nine.

The main task of this section is to document China’s invisible presence in Hong Kong during the transitional period—its fifth column. The record is based on the information obtained through interviews with some senior Chinese government officials, Hong Kong government officials and 28 fifth columnists, who possessed inside knowledge of the CCP’s Hong Kong policy and who were involved in various degrees with the fifth column policy development and implementation. It shows that the launching of a fifth column as an ultimate political insurance policy as well as a practical program to assist the CCP’s official representation in achieving China’s Hong Kong policy objectives added a poignant mass-oriented work dimension to the base of the CCP’s hierarchical pyramid structure in Hong Kong. It was also the final touch that completed the CCP’s Hong Kong organisational mapping.
The Chinese government's ability to exploit grey areas of the existing immigration agreement with Hong Kong authority to systematically, yet secretly, organise a human transborder movement of such a magnitude proved not only its committed political will, but also the lengths it was prepared to go to ensure the recovery of Hong Kong in an unmistakable manner. The camouflaged and invisible existence of the fifth columnists was due partly to the secretiveness of this scheme, and partly to the gradualness and long-term projection of its policy outcome in Hong Kong society, as compared with the influence of the CCP's formal institutions. While CCP's official presence attracted much public scrutiny, the fifth column activities went largely undetected—its elusive existence created obscurity to suppress public interest.

During the thirteen years of transitional period, the perceived values of the fifth column vacillated in corresponding to the drastic changes taking place in Hong Kong's political battlefield. The full significance of the fifth column policy revealed itself gradually as Hong Kong's political transition unfolded, which will be further examined in Chapter Nine.

Before going into the details of the operation, it is necessary to discuss first some background on the mainland immigration to Hong Kong, in particular, the principles and practice of immigration under the family reunion category.

*History of Mainland Immigration to Hong Kong*

Hong Kong's transformation from a tiny fishing village into a major international trading centre would have been impossible without the millions of people who came to
Hong Kong over a period of more than a hundred years. They came from all over the world but predominantly from mainland China. Although from time to time immigrants were rejected because of concerns about the size of the population in the small territory, the exceptional turnover through emigration and immigration was accepted as one of the important elements contributing to Hong Kong's success.

Migrants from the mainland before the 1940s were pushed into Hong Kong by political and economic pressures—constant wars and a devastated economy—rather than pulled to it by the economic attractions. The first time mainland Chinese immigrants became explicitly subject to immigration control was in 1940 when a universal requirement to carry travel documents was introduced in Hong Kong by the Immigration Control Ordinance. This measure was apparently intended to cope with the large influx of refugees from mainland China as a consequence of the war between China and Japan which intensified sharply in 1937, and resulted in the fall of Guangdong to Japanese

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89 When the British first took Hong Kong island, its population was rather small. In June 1845, a figure of 23,817 was given, while the entire territory was home to about 100,000 people at that time. See David Podmore, 'The Population of Hong Kong' Keith Hopins ed. Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 23-25)

90 Edward Hambro, The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, Report submitted to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 1955, pp. 12-13 (Hong Kong: Public Record Office). Subsequently, Hong Kong witnessed a considerable increase in its population through several waves of immigration from mainland China—only later did this come to be seen as a problem. See David Podmore, 'The Population of Hong Kong' Keith Hopins ed. Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 23-25). At first the resident population remained very small, overall growth rate was quite limited and more people were needed. The establishment of the colony did not, in itself, restrict freedom of movement in both directions across the border. See Edward Hambro, The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, Report submitted to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 1955, pp. 12-13 (Hong Kong: Public Record Office)

91 Elizabeth Cheng and Stacy Mosher, 'Free for All: Economic Strategy Inspired by Hong Kong' Far Eastern Economic Review (14 May 1992, p. 29)

92 Edward Hambro, The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, Report submitted to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 1955, pp. 21-33 (Hong Kong: Public Record Office). For example, The Taiping Rebellion (1839-64) produced a large group of refugees from various parts of Southern China, which increased the population of Hong Kong to about 165,000 by 1861. Following the 1911 Revolution, which brought down the last Imperial dynasty of China, the Qing Dynasty, the population of Hong Kong increased from about 300,000 in 1901 to 625,000 in 1921. See Jean-Francois Destexhe, 'Hong Kong and 1997: The Facts' Werner Menski ed. Coping with 1997 (England: Trentham Book Ltd. 1995, p. 23)

93 Edward Hambro, The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, Report submitted to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 1955, p. 16 (Hong Kong: Public Record Office)
rule in 1938. The new controls, however, were ineffective and did not stop immigration from mainland China.\textsuperscript{95} Due to the continuous pouring in of refugees, the population grew rapidly during this period.\textsuperscript{96} After 1945 came the largest influx of immigrants in Hong Kong's history, due to China's civil wars and the uncertainty posed by the change-over to communist rule on the mainland.\textsuperscript{97}

Hong Kong's first census was taken in 1961. The figure indicated that between 1950 and 1960, immigration from mainland China fell substantially as political stability in mainland China increased and border control was enforced by the Hong Kong government. Podmore argued that Hong Kong's population increase between 1950 and 1970 was mainly due to natural increase rather than to immigration. Also tight policing of the border with China contributed greatly to the reduction of the immigration level, at least for a time being.\textsuperscript{98}

In the 1960s and the 1970s, many Chinese continued to come and settled down in Hong Kong, and Chinese authorities actually appeared to encourage this trend.\textsuperscript{99} This fast-growing population soon strained Hong Kong's infrastructure and intensified some

\textsuperscript{95} David Podmore, 'The Population of Hong Kong' Keith Hopins ed. \textit{Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony} (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 24)
\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Ibid}. Podmore emphasised that there were no accurate data available for this period. But official estimates spoke of 275,000 refugees by the end of 1937, 450,000 a year later, and 700,000 at the end of 1939. By 1941, Hong Kong's population had risen to 1,639,999. Podmore indicated that the true figure might well have been much higher.
\textsuperscript{97} By the late 1940s, the population had increased to 2,360,000. After the PRC was established in 1949, a stricter immigration policy for Hong Kong was put into place by the British government. See George Endacott, \textit{A History of Hong Kong}, 2nd ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 197)
\textsuperscript{98} David Podmore, 'The Population of Hong Kong' Keith Hopins ed. \textit{Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony} (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 25)
social problems, which turned local opinion against further immigration.\textsuperscript{100} So the burden of ensuring at least a semblance of border control fell on the Hong Kong authorities.\textsuperscript{101} These controls were not very effective, nor were they probably meant to be: Hong Kong's industrialisation constantly needed more people to sustain its labour supply. The situation, in fact, bore a striking resemblance to today's porous Mexican/US border.\textsuperscript{102}

In 1971, for the first time the immigration law of Hong Kong fell into step with the legal traditions and practice of law in Britain.\textsuperscript{103} The global decolonisation process, particularly in Africa during the 1960s, had already affected the legal rights of people in the former colonies. The exclusionary ground rules of British immigration policies to keep out of Britain the non-Caucasian residents of former colonies became consolidated in the Immigration Act, 1971.\textsuperscript{104} In Hong Kong, the Immigration Ordinance, 1971 superseded the Deportation of Aliens Ordinance of 1935, the Deportation (British Subjects) Ordinance of 1936 and the Immigration (Control and Offences) Ordinance, 1958.\textsuperscript{105} Thus, in 1971 all immigration-related laws plus those on deportation were put together in a single statute, indicating a more coherent policy on immigration.\textsuperscript{106}

The 1971 Ordinance introduced three categories of Hong Kong residents: Hong Kong

\textsuperscript{100} In the early 1960s, for instance, provision of fresh drinking water became a severe problem at certain times of the year, leading to rationing and calls for stricter controls on what was seen as illegal immigration. However, the Chinese authorities did little to stop its citizens from migrating to Hong Kong. See David Podmore, 'The Population of Hong Kong' Keith Hopins ed. \textit{Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony} (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 31)

\textsuperscript{101} ibid.


\textsuperscript{103} Albert Chen, 'The Development of Immigration Law and Policy: The Hong Kong Experience' \textit{McGill Law Journal} (Vol. 33, No. 4, 1988, pp. 627-629)

\textsuperscript{104} ibid.
Belongers, Chinese Residents and Resident United Kingdom Belongers.\textsuperscript{107} The term ‘citizen’ was carefully avoided in this nomenclature. These three categories differed particularly in terms of rights to hold immovable property and with regard to deportation rules applicable to them.\textsuperscript{108}

Officially, the Hong Kong government continued to negotiate with Chinese authorities on an annual basis the terms and quotas of immigrants from the mainland—over 90\% of them were supposed to come to Hong Kong for family reunion. The number of such immigrants was substantial. Albert Chen estimated that there were over 97,000 for the period of 1974-1977 alone.\textsuperscript{109} A new policy, introduced on 30 November 1974, became known as the ‘reach-base’ or ‘touch-base’ policy. It meant that illegal immigrants who had clandestinely reached the territory of Hong Kong and had found proper accommodation with relatives or friends, could have their stay regularised through simple procedures. However, immigrants who were caught in the border area or in the territorial waters of Hong Kong would be subject to repatriation.\textsuperscript{110} The practical application of Hong Kong’s immigration laws was to a large extent based on discretion. This had, first of all, the effect of encouraging irregular immigration from mainland China to continue.\textsuperscript{111} This basic policy approach could not be more different from what the authorities in Britain aimed for, namely to use strict entry controls as a central element of immigration policy.\textsuperscript{112}
A mixed policy of this kind, familiar in several European countries, but not in Britain itself, seemed to have two distinct advantages to those in charge of Hong Kong affairs. Firstly, its discretionary basis allowed the authorities to exercise flexible immigration control, in terms of both numbers and quality of new entrants. As long as new immigrants were needed, less forceful implementation would allow more candidates to regularise their stay in Hong Kong. Should the immigration pressure get out of control, the application of stricter border controls would enable the authorities to put a firmer check on illegal border crossings and increase the number of persons subject to repatriation.\textsuperscript{113}

However, with its booming economy and virtually full employment, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, Hong Kong's manufacturing and service trades relied on a constant stream of new immigrants to sustain its economic growth.\textsuperscript{114} On the other side, there was little doubt that one of the obvious motives for China to adopt relaxed attitude towards its citizens emigrating to Hong Kong in the 1970s was because "a kind of peaceful take-over has been achieved in this way."\textsuperscript{115} From the early 1980s, a large exodus of Hong Kong residents to elsewhere in the world led to further significant manpower shortages in some sectors in Hong Kong, which were quickly filled by skilled and talented immigrants, mainly from mainland China.\textsuperscript{116} If the British government had its own immigration agenda regarding Hong Kong residents' right of

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{116} \textit{ibid.}
abode, so, too, had China. But the underlying motives of the two could not be more different.

During the transitional period from 1984 to 1997, immigration to Hong Kong from the mainland continued to be, first of all, an economic necessity for the territory, but it also became a political device for the Chinese government. In the 1980s, the relevant laws in Hong Kong underwent significant modification. The British Nationality Act, 1981 distanced the people of Hong Kong still further from London. Following the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong in December 1984, as the British realised the inevitability of Hong Kong's transfer to China in the mid 1997, several important steps were taken by the British authorities to reclassify the people of Hong Kong and keep their immigration status vis-à-vis Britain under control, as much as possible. This was done in line with the Hong Kong (British Nationality) Order of 1986.117

The 'Resident United Kingdom Belongers' category was retained under the reforms of immigration laws in the 1980s, although precise definition of who belonged to this category was tightened up. The former category of 'Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies' under the British Nationality Act, 1948 was broken down by the British Nationality Act, 1981 into several distinct groups of British citizens with dramatically

117 Prakash Shah, 'British Nationality and Immigration Laws and Their Effect on Hong Kong' Werner Menski ed. Coping with 1997 (England: Trentham Books Lit. 1995, pp. 95-96). In essence, the earlier category of 'Hong Kong Belongers' was replaced by 'Hong Kong Permanent Resident', which, under a revised section of the 1971 Ordinance, also included the former category of 'Chinese Residents'. This, on the one hand, claimed the former immigrants from mainland China as people belonging to Hong Kong and gave them the right of abode in the territory and exempted them from restrictions on their stay and certain deportation powers of the authorities. On the other hand, most of the people in this category lacked the right of abode in the UK, and the right of immigration to Britain was certainly not extended to them.
different rights.\textsuperscript{118}

\textit{Immigration for Family Reunion}

The motives for the immigrants from the mainland to Hong Kong in the last few decades of colonial rule were quite different—Hong Kong was seen as ranging from a political refuge or sanctuary to an economic shelter or haven. As those earlier immigrants settled down and their businesses flourished, they began to bring out their family members and relatives to join them. As more and more people applied for this reason, the family reunion program became the dominant category of Hong Kong's immigration scheme.

One deciding factor that gave Hong Kong's immigration this distinctive characteristic was the fact that at any one given time since the beginning of this century more than 90\% of Hong Kong residents claimed to have immediate or extended family members living in mainland China.\textsuperscript{119} Immigration from China, under the family reunion program, was a constant source of cheap labour that Hong Kong economic development was craving for. In fact, both Chinese and Hong Kong immigration authorities agreed that over 90\% of emigrants from China each year were accepted nominally for the purpose of family reunion, and only less than 10\% of entry was under the 'special

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{ibid.} pp. 84-86
The second characteristic of Hong Kong immigration from the mainland was that immigration applications were almost all unilaterally handled by the source country rather than by the receiving end. In world immigration practice, the opposite is more common—the host countries control not only the total number but also screen individual applicants on the basis of agreed merits.

The procedures regarding applications for emigration to Hong Kong stated that they must be initiated by sponsoring Hong Kong residents to Chinese authorities, and the Chinese side retained the privilege to check and prove or reject the applications. Historically, many Hong Kong residents were once refugees from the mainland. When they fled, they usually took no documents that would furnish evidence of the claimed relationship between the applicants and the sponsors. This technical difficulty effectively ruled out the Hong Kong authority’s role in verifying the cases and allowed it to concern itself only with daily quota and border checking. In practice, Chinese authorities were virtually given a free hand to play the game. This also meant that Beijing had the convenience to shuffle the cards and blend its own cadres into the emigration flow with little likelihood of being challenged by the Hong Kong authorities. This was exactly what Beijing did.

There was little doubt that the Chinese government had been sending its own cadres to

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120 Interviews with the officials from the Xinhua Office and Hong Kong Immigration Authority, December 1996. This 10% referred to heirs, people with special skills, and the professions Hong Kong had a great demand for.
Hong Kong through this way, but it was the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 that significantly highlighted the viability of this practice in serving the CCP’s more urgent needs, and accelerated the scale of the operation. Chinese authorities seized this opportunity and maximised its potential to systematically channel the fifth columnists into Hong Kong. With fabricated documents and false identities, these fifth columnists replaced the deceased, the unknown or the non-existent under the name of ‘family reunion’, who did not exist in the first place. These fifth columnists were merged with those genuine ‘one-way exit permit’ holders to enter into Hong Kong undetected.

There was some evidence of negotiations between the Chinese government and the Hong Kong immigration authorities, which were seeking to pressure China to tighten its verification procedures. This implied that the Hong Kong side was aware and concerned that permits were being issued to inauthentic immigrants. Beijing denied that there was any wrong-doing. However, in order to ease the tension, the Chinese government, as a gesture, maintained, and later reduced to, a smaller annual quotas of emigrants for family reunion in the 1980s. But, as will be discussed in detail later in

121 Interviews with Hong Kong Immigration Authority, December 1996. Interviews with former senior policy adviser of Hong Kong Immigration Department, London, December 1997
122 ibid.
123 According to figures discussed by Albert Chen, the Chinese government gradually reduced the number of exit permits from a peak of 310 per day in December 1978 to about 150 per day in 1980. This meant about 55,000 new immigrants to Hong Kong each year, which was seen as too high. See Albert Chen, ‘The Development of Immigration Law and Policy: The Hong Kong Experience’ McGill Law Journal (Vol. 33, No. 4, 1988, p. 639). Yun-Wing Sung reported that China exercised ‘voluntary export constraint’ during the Sino-British negotiations in the early 1980s by unilaterally halving the quota of emigrants from 150 to an average of 75 persons per day, which totalled annual 27,000 or so mainland immigrants. See Yun-Wing Sung, ‘The Hong Kong Economy: To and Beyond the 1997 Barrier’ paper for the Conference on the Chinese and Their Future: Beijing, Taipei and Hong Kong, Washington D.C. January 1991. However, from November 1993, this number increased to 105 per day, and from July 1995 to handover, it was further increased to 150 per day—the same level as in late 1970s—at the request of the Chinese side. Interview with senior Hong Kong immigration officials, December 1996. Also see Siu Yat-ming, ‘Population and Immigration: With a Special Account on Chinese Immigrants’ Nyaw Mee-kau and Li Si-ming eds. The Other Hong Kong Report—1996 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1996, pp. 327-347)
this chapter, the actual number of fifth columnists was not affected by this adjustment.

According to the Hong Kong authority’s official statistics, the Chinese government approved more than 465,987 immigrants from the mainland to Hong Kong for ‘family reunion’ from 1983 to June 1997. If it is estimated at a conservative figure of 18 percent\(^{124}\) of total mainland emigrants to Hong Kong being the fifth columnists, the number reached more than 83,000—representing more than 1.4 percent of total Hong Kong population of 6 million. In simplified terms, if taking the 35 percent of Hong Kong’s 2.6 million registered voters who cast their ballots in 1995 Legislature Council election—the highest turnout ever in Hong Kong election history—as the parameter, then in real terms these 83,000 could have accounted for more than 9.12 percent of Hong Kong’s actual electoral votes. If Hong Kong was going to operate with a high degree of autonomy and gradually evolve into a more democratic society as China promised in the two basic documents, then this voting bloc would be very significant, and the fifth column should be seen as being well positioned to play a critical role in the democratic processes ahead.\(^{125}\)

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\(^{124}\) Interviews with senior Chinese officials. This percentage was said to be conservative and in the sense of ‘at least’, because sometimes (eg. 1985-87 and 1990-92) the percentage was much higher.

\(^{125}\) The Pro-China camp and fifth columnists did not do well in 1995 Legislative Council election. According to some Xinhua Office officials, one of the reasons was that anyone needed to satisfy living in Hong Kong for 7 years before becoming eligible voter. Therefore only those arriving in Hong Kong before 1988 were eligible for the 1995 election. The Chinese officials complained that they did not ‘have the number’ and saw it to be one more reasons to continue the fifth column policy, which they hoped would pay off in the future elections. Interviews with Chinese senior officials and officials from the Xinhua Office, Hong Kong, December 1996, December 1997
Family reunion, with its humanitarian connotations, tends to arouse sympathy. Therefore it could be easily exploited to benefit a hidden agenda. The historical bond between the mainland and Hong Kong made ‘family reunion’ a convenience for China and a ‘natural’ event for many Hong Kong people. This situation provided perfect cover for the CCP to hijack this traditional immigration program. By so doing, China was able to piggyback its own political agenda on a basically social policy to serve its long-term aspiration.

Beijing always consciously sought to improve its comparative strength and to emphasise its absolute power in Hong Kong, which has been examined in the previous section on the CCP’s official presence in Hong Kong. Immigration to Hong Kong long represented an additional and legal option for Beijing to further consolidate its political agenda. The initiation of the Sino-British negotiations on Hong Kong and the final agreement by the Chinese and British governments on the issue greatly enhanced the political sensitivity and urgency of immigration to Hong Kong. From then on, for Beijing, questions of who were going to stay in Hong Kong, what they would be doing before and after 1997, and how to rally support from all levels of Hong Kong society around its official powerbase became matters of considerable interest. There was little doubt that left to its own devices, Beijing would almost certainly have flooded Hong

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126 This section is based on interviews conducted with Chinese officials, Hong Kong government officials and 28 participants in China’s covert migration program at the end of 1996 in mainland China, Hong Kong and Taipei. Additional interviews were undertaken in Hong Kong and London at the end of 1997. The names of the interviewees were suppressed to protect their identities.
Kong with many more mainland cadres. However, because of its international obligations and promises, because its own vital political and economic interests were at stake, and also because the watchful eyes of countries around the world were on Hong Kong, Beijing's choices were circumscribed. With all these restrictions, to further exploit the existing immigration program, which, as discussed previously, left some grey areas and weak links, became an even more attractive option to the CCP.

i) Initiative

It was an open secret that the Chinese government had used the immigration program to channel some of its agents into Hong Kong well before 1983. But the number of people previously involved was not at all comparable to the fifth column policy which Beijing initiated in 1983, soon after the Chinese and British governments started to negotiate on the terms for Hong Kong to return to China.

In late 1982, two highly confidential documents from the CCP Central Committee were circulated among leading party officials at ministerial and provincial party committee levels. These documents, later referred to as 'Hong Kong issue guiding documents' in many subsequent party circulars, set the scene for the party to launch a fifth column program. In essence, these documents highlighted the nature of the CCP's work in Hong Kong—complex and delicate, and the CCP's ultimate goal in Hong Kong—to recover both nominal and actual sovereignty. The documents relayed Deng Xiaoping's
directives on ‘participation’ in Hong Kong affairs, which fully demonstrated China’s rock-solid determination that it should not only recover sovereignty but also the administration of Hong Kong. These documents read that considering Hong Kong’s domestic and international importance to China and its British colonial history, the party Central Committee decided that it was absolutely necessary to strengthen the party’s work in Hong Kong. They stressed that the purpose of Comrade Deng’s ‘participation’ comments was aiming to expand China’s influence in the territory, to win support from the Hong Kong people, and to prepare for the final resumption of sovereignty. The documents revealed that the CCP’s Central Committee had assigned the central Organisation Department to consider a comprehensive practical proposal.

In retrospect, many, who sighted the documents at that time, said that they did not sense anything unusual in these documents. Their experience with the CCP had prepared them for such political crusade over events as important as Hong Kong’s reunification. In line with the CCP’s tradition, they could well expect that China would undertake actions to upgrade its institutional arrangements and reinforce the presence of its personnel in

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127 In the early 1983, Deng was quoted saying that: What would be our work focus in the remaining years up to 1997? Participation.....Since the sovereignty issue had been settled, if we did not settle the concrete issues, there would just be a hollow shell. It was certain that a heavy burden would be left to Hong Kong people and to the Chinese Hong Kong government in the future. So the key lay in participation. Interview with Chinese official, December 1996. Similar text was reported by He Po-shih later in 1991. See He Po-shih, ‘Five Major Tasks Are Aimed at Control’ Dangdai (Contemporary), (No. 7, 15 October 1991, pp. 14-15)

128 The documents interpreted Deng’s directives on four levels: First, participation on the diplomatic level. Second, participation at the local government level. Third, participation in various consultative organisations. Fourth, participation in mass organisations. It stressed that it was necessary to rely on the broad patriotic masses and guide them to act in keeping with the arrangements of the central leadership. It was necessary to build up extensive social connections and establish a good and popular image among the masses, thus enabling the local masses to understand and accept what we were doing.
Hong Kong. Few would have, however, guessed the means by which the ‘participation’ was to be accomplished would be what it turned out to be.

Months later, the central Organisation Department of the CCP circulated its own documents to follow up the previous two CCP’s ‘guiding’ documents. One of them was entitled ‘Regulations on the Selection of Cadres to Work in Hong Kong’. This was a concrete, detailed plan for intensifying and widening the party’s participation in all levels of Hong Kong society in the years to come. But central to this document was its announcement that in close consultation with other central government agencies, in particular Hong Kong & Macao Office under the State Council (HKMAO), the CCP central Organisation Department had completed a proposal to send the ‘best and brightest’ cadres to reinforce the party’s work in Hong Kong. It laid down some broad principles for organising the program: at the central government level, five major sponsoring bodies—HKMAO, MSS, the CCP’s United Front Department, the Overseas Chinese Office under the State Council and the Taiwan Affairs Office under the State Council—were nominated to be the main caretakers for coordinating the recruitment and management of the ‘outpost’ cadres. HKMAO, however, was the most important one among the five equals—its close links with the CCP and the State Council leaders gave it authority, and its long involvement in Hong Kong affairs gave it a prestigious status—it would not only keep track of the movement of the fifth columnists, but also would be the arbitrator if disputes arose.

All these five bodies, except HKMAO, had affiliations at most of the province (or autonomous municipality) levels. In practice, this meant that these ‘big five’ not only
horizontally managed other functional ministries and agencies such as MOFTEC and the Ministry of Finance, as far as the fifth column program was concerned, but also vertically controlled their direct subordinate bodies at provincial and municipal levels. At the provincial level some governments of the south-east coastal provinces and autonomous municipalities were also given the privilege of inclusion in the program.

All the party committees at ministerial and provincial levels were encouraged to assist in the implementation of this program. These documents urged all those in leading positions to support this initiative by becoming actively involved in recommending and selecting those 'politically reliable, professionally excellent' party cadres to work in Hong Kong. These documents themselves, however, did not spell out administrative details of the program, for example, how and by what vehicle the designated fifth columnists could be sent to Hong Kong, and what resident status they would assume. The documents did specify, however, that the Entry/Exit Management Departments of the MSS and its provincial subsidiaries would be the sole agents to process all the technical details.\textsuperscript{129}

ii) Recruitment


\textsuperscript{129} It meant travel/identity documents.
Each year, the number of the recruits was decided through a yearly quota system, mainly on the advice of HKMAO. The number was generally set around 18-20% of that year’s immigration quotas for family reunion to Hong Kong. During those two peak periods, the ratio could soar as high as 30% or over. The yearly quota then was distributed among those five sponsoring bodies at the central government level and some key provincial governments under the supervision of the CCP’s central Organisation Department and HKMAO. The division, however, was by no means meant to be equal and ‘fair’, with a working principle of ‘each according to its needs’.

In the first few years, the lion's share of the quotas was consumed by the five bodies at the central government level, leaving their provincial affiliates and those provincial governments badly trailing behind. The disquiet and resentment of disgruntled provincial leaders, especially those in Guangdong and Fujian, resulted in a compromise: a quota plus an ‘actual need’ with considerable flexibility was to be practised at provincial government level from 1985.

This meant that although the local governments might not receive the same quotas as some central government bodies, or different local governments might find unequal quotas among themselves, the individual local authority could partly compensate for the deficiency by syphoning off additional numbers from the locally controlled yearly quotas of normal emigrants to Hong Kong. The central government gave tacit consent to this adjustment as a way to balance central-regional interests. This explained the first peak in number of fifth columnists from 1985 to 1987. This irregularity in practice also made a headcount of the actual number of fifth columnists very difficult for the HKMAO.
When the five government sponsoring bodies obtained their quota, they were obliged to disperse them horizontally among other ministries, departments and agencies at the central level, as well as to trickle some down vertically to its affiliates at the local government level—all of the five sponsoring bodies except the HKMAO had their affiliates at the provincial level. The fact that these affiliates were under double leadership from Beijing and local governments turned out to be a blessing for them: as far as this program was concerned, they were in a position of being able to source from both of them. This practice, in the succeeding 15 years, gave them strong, accumulated bargaining positions that extended to other domains of the system as well because of China's internal power structure and interrelations. As will be seen later in this section, widespread corruption and abuse of this very privilege were common among the local party officials in the recruitment process. This significantly weakened the projected upshot of Beijing's fifth column policy in Hong Kong.

Under the principle of 'politically reliable and professionally excellent', the central Organisation Department and HKMAO set out the following recruitment procedures: 1) interest expressed by candidates; 2) written recommendation by party committees of the relevant work units; 3) cleared with ministerial or provincial party organisation departments; 4) approved by sponsoring bodies; and 5) registered with HKMAO. However, in practice all these were observed 'with discounts'—meaning that there were various degrees of distortion or violation of these guidelines.

This study found that there was no uniform, consistent approach to recruit fifth
columnists. Contrary to the general trend of institutionalisation of the government division of labour in China during the reform era, the recruitment of fifth columnists virtually still stuck to the CCP’s old revolutionary methods from the 1920s and 30s for recruiting its party members. This practice gave those individuals in charge the right to recommend, assess, appoint, approve and control candidates. Of course, the candidates’ work units were required to give clearance to the candidates, but they were often not consulted beforehand and left with little choice but to accept the *fait accompli*.

To emigrate to Hong Kong with legal status and enormous economic potential represented a golden dream for many Chinese. Therefore, to be able to board the fifth column ship to Hong Kong was regarded as a tremendous opportunity and reward. Not surprisingly, there was a lot of competition among the prospective candidates. It was reported that two most effective currencies to secure a fifth column candidature were personal network and bribery. Good networking to find a powerful patron was pivotal in the whole recruitment process. Securing patronage often, however, came with a price.

There were two parallel ways for interested persons to seek their patrons—to use their connections abroad or within the party. Patronage abroad required the prospective candidates to identify their overseas connections by demonstrating that they had good contacts with important people in Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Southeast Asian countries, or in other parts of the world. The identified overseas patrons should have the potential to realise some business, or possibly political, benefits for China, and they should usually command prominent positions in the local business circles and have high standing in their communities. If they had all these attributes, they were almost certain to be added to the CCP’s united front work list, if not already on it.
There was a great diversity and complexity regarding the details of application through this channel. Some of the candidates were able to secure this kind of patron because they had previously worked in Hong Kong or other countries for those Chinese official institutions. During their stay, they had built up good personal and business relations with these people in Hong Kong or elsewhere. When they tried to come to or to continue to live in Hong Kong by changing their status from Chinese government officials to Hong Kong residents, they turned to these patrons for help. At the same time, good personal relationship and business self-interests could often motivate these patrons to commit themselves to be sponsors. The fifth columnists by this patronage, either voluntarily or urged by the sponsoring bodies, were encouraged and usually approved quickly (the so-called ‘express lane’). Although the actual number of fifth columnists with such patronage accounted for only a small proportion of the total, the fact that Beijing was keen on tapping this potential revealed the CCP’s determination to leave no stone unturned when it came to the issue of Hong Kong reunification.

The majority of the fifth columnists were recruited through patronage within the party. Generally, as a first step, interested individuals needed to find powerful patrons within the system. Such patrons did not necessarily hold high office, but had to possess ‘practical’ power and skills to navigate and bargain within the system. As China’s political culture encouraged personal clout and patronising rather than institutional transparency and accountability, an individual’s career development and promotion depended heavily on the good will of people higher up on the party or bureaucratic ladder. Because the whole fifth column recruitment process was supposed to be completed in a secret and sealed-off ‘internal’ party circle, it was effectively protected
and shielded from any outside scrutiny. Under such circumstances, reliance on good networking and patronage were even more important than it would normally be.

It was observed that in the early years of the implementation of the policy, the rules and regulations were more strictly adhered to than in the later years (the late 1980s and the early 1990s). With the CCP’s official representation quickly expanding and consolidating its influence during the transitional period, the original fears and uncertainty that underlined the motivation for the fifth column policy in Hong Kong were gradually replaced by confidence and a general optimism that Hong Kong would work with the terms set out in the Joint Declaration and, later, in the Basic Law. This changed situation in the mid and late 1980s led to an apparent laxity in the fifth columnist recruitment procedure. Although the quantity of outpost fifth columnists in these years peaked or remained steady, the decline in political quality of the recruits substantially compromised the standards and undermined the effectiveness of the policy. Widespread and entrenched corruption, furthermore, allowed some organisations and individuals with power to reduce the recruitment process into a lucrative business to be operated with market exchange principles for their own benefit.

It was reported that the level of corruption worsened in those traditionally more ‘sanctuary’ institutions which had strong links with both central and local governments. As discussed earlier in this chapter, for example, some coastal provincial Departments of State Security, were under the dual leadership of both the MSS and the local provincial governments. In the case of fifth columnist recruitment, every year the provincial Departments of State Security were allocated a quota directly from the MSS in Beijing. At the same time, they were also always successful in demanding an
additional quota from local governments. Although the MSS was only established in 1983, it enjoyed special status and treatment both at the central and local government levels because of its claimed importance in safeguarding the nation’s security. As a consequence of this doubling up, after years of positioning its own members in Hong Kong, these provincial Departments of State Security later often had ‘extra’ quota at their disposal. As migration to Hong Kong remained the dream shared by many in the mainland, the ‘extra’ quota gave these Departments a relentless power to pursue their own objectives. This strong bargaining position gave the provincial Departments of State Security a compelling leverage over other organisations and individuals who were also eagerly trying to expand their sectoral power bases or personal interests in Hong Kong—they could always strike handsome deals with other departments and interested parties to trade-off part of their quota. The currency in this exchange could be money, favour, promotion, housing, job or other privileges. This practice was reported to be a great source of corruption, and caused considerable resentment among other ministries, departments and individuals.

There was a general understanding between the sponsoring bodies and the fifth columnists that in guaranteeing them one-way exit permits, the government did not accept responsibility for giving their spouses and children the same treatment. In theory, this meant that their family members would need to join the long waiting queue for the ‘family reunion’. In reality, however, most of them brought their family members across the border in a relatively short span of time. This was again the pay-off of good connections plus good money. For some mainland border officials, this created yet another opportunity to squeeze profits from the fifth columnists to fill their own pockets—a ‘shared prosperity’, so to speak.
iii) Mission

Over the period of 15 years, the original mission of the operation underwent a series of transformation, transpiration and redefinition in response to the fluid political developments in Hong Kong— from the originally instinctive and crude reaction in the early 1980s to the more sophisticated and targeted manipulation in the mid 1990s. The former was strongly influenced by a cold war rigidity and simplicity in Chinese foreign policy thinking, while the latter responded to the changing policy setting and work priorities in Hong Kong.

While the CCP was strongly committed to a fifth column policy in Hong Kong from the outset, the policy objectives were adjusted many times throughout the transitional years, intentionally or otherwise, to serve the perceived changing political needs. The irony was that, contrary to the official mission statement to strengthen the party’s work in Hong Kong, many individuals/groups involved in the process took a free ride at the expense of the party’s principles and reputation. Paradoxically, while the policy was meant to be the party’s collective effort based on long-term political considerations, many individuals mainly sought to reap immediate and quick personal gains.

There was approximately a three-staged transformation of the fifth column missions in Hong Kong. In the first stage (1983-1984), as mentioned above, the mission was initiated as a political insurance policy—by having numbers there in case things went wrong. It was a time when the cold war mentality still prevailed in China’s foreign
policy thinking, and there was a strong distrust of the British intentions regarding the future of Hong Kong. The mission reflected uncertainty and concerns of the CCP’s leadership. The second stage (1985-1989) witnessed increasing cooperation between the Chinese and British governments in resolving a series of transitional issues. It was during this period of time that the Chinese official establishments expanded rapidly and functioned well. This was also a period of rising confidence and good-will on the part of the Chinese government, notwithstanding conflicts with the British government from time to time. It was against this backdrop that the original mission of the fifth column seemed out of context and became less relevant.

However, it was also during this period that the previously subdued practice of corruption (seeking personal gains through power and connections in the fifth column recruitment process) surfaced and spread widely across the relevant party organisations and government bureaucracy. In fact, the lucrative business generated from corrupt practices gathered such momentum of its own that it seemed to be operating independently, having little in common with the designed mission of the policy.

The redefining of the fifth column’s mission at the third stage (1989-1997) came after 1989 when the British government joined the Western countries in sanctions against China and Chris Patten assumed a tough stand on political reform in Hong Kong in 1992. Patten’s reform agenda not only greatly irritated Beijing, but also alerted it to review the fifth column policy, to reassess its value and to redefine its mission. In this stage, the bitter arguments and final breakdown of the Sino-British consensus on the scale and speed of political reform in Hong Kong to a large extent revived the logic of the fifth column policy as stated in the first stage. Patten’s 1992 political reform
proposals and two (1991 and 1995) Legislative Council election results clearly showed that, in the eyes of Beijing leadership, a future task lay in wooing votes and winning the ‘numbers’ through universal suffrage in Hong Kong. It was the combination of the inevitable democratisation and electoral imperatives that, for the first time in the operation of the fifth column in Hong Kong, gave the fifth column a clear and concrete mission by adding a new dimension—to form a voting bloc in the post 1997 period, and to mobilise popular support around it.

iv) Loyalty Control

The official selection process of fifth columnists stressed the primacy of political awareness and reliability as criteria for screening candidates. Evidently, the sponsoring bodies in the mainland were requested to do everything right to ensure the political loyalty of their outpost cadres.

In addition to the formal selection procedures, the organisation departments at various levels would arrange ‘informal’ one-to-one talks with the candidates before they departed for Hong Kong. The talks usually had two major themes. Firstly, the candidates were urged to report to the Department of Coordination of the Xinhua Office and to keep each other informed. They were encouraged to turn to the Xinhua Office for assistance if they encountered ‘difficulties’. Secondly, they were requested to keep in close touch with the sponsoring bodies back in the mainland by submitting written work reports at regular intervals of 6 to 12 months. Other forms of contact included oral reports, facilitating the visits by the officials from the sponsoring bodies, and calling in when they returned to the mainland for business or family visits. These talks, in fact,
were referring to a reporting system and instating a surveillance mechanism.

Some fifth columnists who were among the first to arrive in Hong Kong in 1983 and 1984 recalled that, at that time, the staff from the Xinhua Office's Department of Coordination would every now and then invite a group of them to attend informal gatherings, such as ‘yuong cha’, to ‘chat’ with them as a way of keeping in touch. Most later arrivals also reported having some irregular contacts with the Xinhua Office when they were new to Hong Kong. However, this kind of contact quickly faded away for two reasons. Firstly, the understaffed Xinhua Office found itself struggling to cope with the number of fifth columnists pouring in. Secondly, ‘other work’ of economic importance took priority on the part of the fifth columnists. As a result, even this semblance of control ceased to exist. This showed that the CCP had little idea, or experience, of how Hong Kong society worked—and therefore how the fifth columnists should be managed in the early 1980s.

It was reported that majority of the fifth columnists felt more comfortable, and considered it more useful, to keep in regular contact with their mainland sponsoring bodies. They did so in many ways, by establishing extended commercial networks or through business transactions. Informal oral reports were common when opportunities arose.

This meant that the fifth columnists’ activities were largely outside the direct scrutiny of the party network in Hong Kong, which was totally contrary to what had been stated in the two guiding documents of 1982. Indeed, compared with those working within the mainland official establishments and to the publicly identified CCP cadres, the fifth
columnists enjoyed enormous political freedom and economic autonomy. The presence of a large fifth column in Hong Kong with a loose loyalty control mechanism was suggestive of the CCP’s poor management of, or inability to handle, the policy effectively under challenging circumstances. It would be hard to imagine that those fifth columnists, who were used to party discipline and authoritarian supervision in the mainland, would not have a sense of release and might behave differently when a conflict of interests arose.

This lack of coordinated supervision was also caused by the CCP’s inadequate command of resources in Hong Kong to put in place a more efficient control regime. Some traditional practices such as political coercion and punishment common in the mainland would be hard to reinstate in Hong Kong. Despite China’s awareness of the potential danger of lapses of loyalty, little was done to curb the trend and the apparent drift-away of loyalty remained a sticking point for the more effective operation of the program. In 1990, Xu Jiatun’s ‘unauthorised trip’ to the US highlighted the serious inadequacies in commanding the loyalty of Chinese officials and fifth columnists in Hong Kong.

Loyalty control, however, took a different form by the CCP to link it with commercial interests and opportunities. Maintaining loyalty to the sponsoring bodies in the mainland was often rewarded handsomely with favourable trading conditions and business opportunities, which enabled the fifth columnists to succeed and prosper in the fierce competition in Hong Kong society. This mutually beneficial arrangement was very important in the Chinese economic system, which was often marred by personal favour, non-transparency and irregularity of the policy regime. As with many other
Chapter Eight

aspects of the Chinese politics, doing business with the mainland depended to a large extent on the goodwill of party leaders and government agencies.

However, despite all the unsatisfactory aspects, the fifth column policy was able to continue and developed steadily. In fact the CCP was prepared to pay the cost. In the words of some senior Chinese officials, the party believed that most of the fifth columnists would act on their conscience and demonstrate their ultimate loyalty to the CCP when needs arose. In the worst scenario, if only 50% of the fifth columnists maintained their political allegiance and party affiliation to the CCP, then the fifth column policy should be seen as a success and all the efforts would be paid off.\(^\text{130}\) This was a quite revealing statement, although the base for such confidence might be doubtful for many.

Conclusion

This chapter showed that the CCP was enthusiastically engaged in a traditional two-handed approach in setting its Hong Kong policy. On the one hand, China aggressively pursued institutionalisation to consolidate its official presence and expand its influence in Hong Kong society. On the other hand, China secretly moved tens of thousands of its cadres across the border to penetrate Hong Kong’s grassroots communities. It was ironic that this persistent infiltration effort by the CCP with its party members (the fifth columnists) was little known by the public in Hong Kong, and therefore no public outcry was raised; on the other hand, the presence of the PLA Garrison, which was one

\(^{130}\) Interviews with senior Chinese officials, December 1996
of the most institutionalised and disciplined aspects of China’s projected official presence, encountered fierce and vocal opposition from quite a number of Hong Kong political groups.

The CCP’s central Organisation Department was the policy powerhouse of the fifth column scheme, but, like other politics in China, the real authority for operating this program resided in the HKMAO of the State Council. The administrative responsibility for recruitment and approval rested with each ministry, department, agency or provincial government. Needless to say that there was much in-fighting, complaints and jealousy over the ‘unequal distribution’ or ‘unfair treatment’ among the organisations and individual candidates.

The predominance of political reliability as the primary qualification for the fifth columnists was, to a large extent, watered down as the policy progressed, and the standard of selecting ‘the best and brightest’ was compromised by a widespread practice of corruption by party officials. The whole selection process was in the end manipulated by a few to gratify their own sectoral and personal interests, and to extend or cement patron-client relationships within the party.

The central Organisation Department was aware of the erosion of these policy guidelines in implementation of the fifth column policy, but could do little to alter the trend. Deng’s reform in China brought a new contingent of political elite into the existing bureaucratic structures. These people possessed the best qualifications in terms of education, expertise and skills, and some had considerable political connections and influence. Since they constituted the backbone of the party and state apparatus at both
central and provincial levels, the government relied heavily on them for policy advice and formulation. However, in the case of Hong Kong, the dilemma was that the party also had to rely on these people to implement its Hong Kong policy, since they represented 'the best and brightest'. Many of the fifth columnists were from, or had close ties with, this elite group. Therefore this policy elite often had a stake in both sides, and to keep the fifth column policy going was in their own interests.

This chapter discovered that in practice, the party's long-term objectives in Hong Kong often succumbed to the immediate self-interest of those policy practitioners. In particular, it proved that the absence of a regulatory framework and a transparent system in the recruitment process of the fifth columnists permitted patronage, favouritism, abuse of power and other forms of corruption to gain ground. It needed more than political will, perhaps an overhaul of the system, to fix the widespread corruption.

In the early stage of the fifth column policy implementation, the discrepancy between the CCP's political expectation of its fifth columnists and their quick transformation into profit-driven 'capitalists' in Hong Kong's market economy were highly suggestive that the CCP had little knowledge of how Hong Kong's political and capitalist systems functioned, and hence how it should be governed. Loyalty control became increasingly ineffective and problematic. While the CCP might envisage to cultivate a whole new generation of 'red capitalists' in Hong Kong through a fifth column policy, most fifth columnists seemed to have pragmatically curtailed their roles into profit-hunting, and have invested their energies elsewhere.

These findings pose an interesting question: if the fifth column policy was so ineffective
and problematic, why, then, was Beijing continuing with it throughout the whole transitional period? It seems dysfunctional that Beijing should devote so much effort to groom a large fifth column in Hong Kong which would turn out to be of little use. But the reality that the CCP always operated outside the laws of Hong Kong, and would continue to do so, and that its jurisdiction after 1997 would be subject to close international scrutiny helped to make sense of such an arrangement. A strong contingent of fifth columnists in Hong Kong was not an indication of CCP’s optimism and confidence in its position in the future HKSAR. Rather it was a political insurance policy, which was reflective of Beijing’s insecurity, uncertainty and an embedded distrust of the colonial government and its proxies in Hong Kong.

These findings raise fundamental theoretical issues that coincide with the study of Chinese foreign policy motivation in general. Questions of considerable relevance to this chapter are: what was the fifth column policy motivation? What were the factors that determined the fifth column policy motivation? What was the dialectic process behind such motivation during the transitional period? What was its connection with broader Chinese foreign policy motivation? These questions are to be addressed in the following chapter.
Chapter Nine

The Motivation of Beijing's Fifth Column Policy

Chapter Eight documented China's fifth column policy in Hong Kong from 1983 to 1997. Evidence showed that although the policy was consistent, the perceived value and real content of the policy changed over time. For instance, as mentioned in Chapter Eight, the need for a fifth column policy in 1983 stemmed from the fear that to fully rely on an institutionalised process might not serve China's best interests in Hong Kong. In the early 1980s, China was in the initial stage of domestic reform after decades of political turmoil and economic stagnation; and internationally, it was still locked in the battles with two superpowers as the Cold War continued, despite the establishment of diplomatic relations with the US in 1979. By 1982, Deng had been in power for only four years and his authority was far from being absolute when China was suddenly forced to face one of the most critical foreign policy issues—the recovery of Hong Kong. It would not be hard to imagine that the CCP's leadership consensus would instinctively favour a fifth column policy to be put into place as a political insurance. Even Deng himself might have genuinely espoused and endorsed such an idea. By the end of 1980s, the generally smooth development of institutionalisation in the transitional period made the logic of fifth column policy less relevant.

However, the British government's sanctions against China after 1989 and its push for rapid democratisation in Hong Kong in 1992 struck the most sensitive point of the CCP's apprehension over Hong Kong, and quickly revived and reinforced the original motives of the fifth column policy. Evidence in Chapter Eight showed that as a counterbalance, the fifth column not only received a boost in numbers in the early
1990s, but was also given a more clearly defined role to play—the originally perceived value of the policy was overlain with a new dimension to shore up the pro-Beijing voting bloc in future HKSAR elections. However, what was more significant was that China was able to continue to consolidate institution-based approaches from 1992 to July 1997 despite bitter disputes with Governor Patten, while at the same time intensifying its fifth column operation in the territory. On 1 July 1997, the glorious and momentous handover ceremony climaxed a highly successful undertaking which was mainly based on negotiated institutional process and procedures. It could be argued, in this event, that institutionalisation was recognised to be the primary vehicle for China’s Hong Kong policy. In contrast, the fifth column policy seemed to have waned into insignificance.

The seemingly contradictory efforts by Beijing to strengthen institutional power on the one hand and to deploy a fifth column force to undermine the very authority of this power on the other could be accounted for through analysis of the intimate and mutually complementary relationship of the two policies. These two parallel, yet competing, developments suggested that far from being simple and static, Beijing’s fifth column policy motivation responded to the more profound changes in China’s foreign policy in general. On the one hand, the fifth column policy in Hong Kong from 1983 to 1997 was sustained by two intellectual pillars: the continuation of a siege mentality of wall-building in Chinese foreign policy thinking—trying to erect human barriers to keep in as well as to keep out; and a political self-sufficient and self-reliant philosophy to build up a contingent of supporters for emergency. On the other hand, this policy justification fluctuated considerably during the course of its implementation. The increasing success of the institution-based approach not only gave the Chinese policy makers more
confidence and predictability to exercise decision autonomy, but also at times led to the
downgrading of the fifth column tactics to secondary consideration in practice. This
situation accounted for the apparent laxity in loyalty control of the fifth column
operation, which was responsible for the compromised standards and ineffectiveness in
management. As a result, the importance of using a covert approach to achieve China’s
overall Hong Kong objectives was reduced during the transitional period.

Between 1985 and 1989 the weakening of the fifth column policy from its original
objectives gave its recruits freedom to engage almost solely in business activities with
little political pertinence to their official missions. This serious policy erosion did not
lead Beijing to scrap the program altogether. Instead, Beijing allocated considerable
resources for its continuing operation. This paradox revealed that there must be some
deeper concerns in the minds of Beijing’s leadership that could not be easily removed.
The persistence of the fifth column policy without a clear goal during this period
coincided with two major hiccups in China’s domestic political and economic reform
process—the loss of the party secretaryship by Hu Yaobang in 1987 and by Zhao
Ziyang in 1989. In these two incidents the conservative forces in the party were able to
temporarily restore more traditional ways of conducting domestic and international
affairs. It is possible that either Beijing was not fully informed of the problems of the
fifth column operation, or advice on the policy review was rejected by the leadership.
Either way, the continued operation of the fifth column program must have had support
from the top leadership.

The findings in Chapter Eight give rise to questions of great importance for this thesis:
where did the fifth column which the CCP so painstakingly installed in Hong Kong fit
in the overall picture of China’s Hong Kong policy and China’s foreign policy in
general? Why did China pursue such a policy in the first place given that its sovereign
rights in Hong Kong were already recognised and guaranteed by the Joint Declaration
and, later, by the Basic Law? Did the final event of Hong Kong’s historic handover
represent the failure of Beijing’s fifth column policy? What were the major
considerations underlining Beijing’s motivation? What was the motivation of this policy
after all?

The evidence of Beijing’s fifth column operations in Hong Kong from 1983 to 1997
gave no simple answer to these questions, nor could it clarify the motivation behind
such a policy in a nutshell. This chapter considers these questions by analysing the
historical, political, structural and situational sources underpinning the CCP’s decision
to embark on the fifth column policy, and the changes that occurred from 1983 to 1997
which impacted on the continuation of the operation. This chapter argues that despite
the ostensible non-performance of the policy and a simultaneous expansion of
institutional mechanisms for China’s rule in Hong Kong, the ever increasing numbers of
fifth columnists fulfilled the original and core objective of the fifth column policy—
political insurance. The CCP was prepared to bear potential political cost in exchange
for peace of mind. For one thing, it was with the psychological support of the fifth
column’s invisible presence that the CCP was able to embrace institutional
approaches—knowing that it had something to fall back on if other means did not work
out.

This chapter is structured to analyse Beijing’s motivation of the fifth column policy on
the basis of evidence presented in Chapter Eight. It returns to the theoretical framework
identified in Part I of this thesis to elucidate the roles and the interplay of perception, personality and structural/situational factors in analysing the motivation of such a policy. There are three sections in this chapter. Firstly, the CCP’s perception of sovereignty and the issue of Hong Kong are discussed in the context of Chinese revolutionary historiography. Sovereignty was a very sensitive issue for the CCP, not only because it was an important principle of Chinese foreign policy, but also because of China’s bitter experience of abuse of its sovereignty by the international powers and institutions in modern history. Because the loss of Hong Kong in many ways symbolised the beginning of so-called ‘centuries of humiliation’ to the Chinese nation, resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong would signify the end of this national shame. China’s obsession with sovereignty was one of the official justifications for launching and sustaining a fifth column policy in Hong Kong.

Secondly, the role of the Chinese leadership and the influence of ‘rule by man’ as an entrenched political culture are examined. Two of Deng Xiaoping’s quotations revealed the fundamental considerations for the CCP to adopt ‘rule by man’ in Hong Kong’s transitional period and beyond. Following this lead, this section also assesses Hong Kong as a Chinese society to conclude Beijing’s judgement of the political feasibility for applying ‘rule by man’ as an appropriate methods of government in Hong Kong.

Thirdly, the volatile political developments in Hong Kong from 1983 to 1997 are reviewed to demonstrate how structural/situational components affected the fifth column policy motivation. The disintegration and realignment of Hong Kong’s political forces during the transitional period constantly shifted the delicate balances among all political forces, and Beijing’s assessment and reassessment of its own comparative
strength at all levels of Hong Kong society provided performance feedback for it to adjust the fifth column operation.

**Perception—Issue of Sovereignty**

In Chapter Two, perception was identified as one of the principal elements in a foreign policy motivation. The investigation of Chinese foreign policy in Chapter Four confirmed this theory and empirically demonstrated how the Chinese leadership’s perception of the world was held hostage by its own past, and how ideologies helped to shape and reinforce this perceptual foundation. What, then, were the makings of the CCP’s perception which motivated its fifth column policy in Hong Kong?

There are two aspects to this question. First, China had a particularly hostile view of Britain. The CCP in the 1950s regarded London as a power belonging to the reactionary camp headed by the United States.¹ In a foreign policy comment in 1949, Mao asserted:

> The US and British governments belong to the type in which the bourgeoisie, and this class alone, exercises dictatorship over the people. Contrary in all respects to the people’s government, this type of government practises so-called democracy for the bourgeoisie but is dictatorial toward the people.²

On another occasion, Mao dismissed the idea of seeking help from the British and American governments as “naive”. “Would the present rulers of Britain and the United States, who are imperialists, help a people’s state?” Mao asked. If they wanted to do business, Mao reasoned, it was not because they wanted to help the Chinese people but

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because "their capitalists want to make money and their bankers want to earn interest to extricate themselves from their own crises."\(^3\)

The CCP’s perception of Britain also, naturally, was influenced by its reading of history. To the Communists, Britain was an old imperialist power that had taken the lead in encroaching upon China. Since the Opium War of 1839-1842, the United Kingdom had involved itself in a series of aggressive actions: the Anglo-French intervention in 1856, the suppression of the Boxers, and hostility toward the Chinese Nationalist Revolution in the 1920s.\(^4\) These stereotyped descriptions formed the popular image of Britain in the minds of the ordinary Chinese people.

Second, two closely linked and emotional issues in the minds of the CCP leadership—that of sovereignty, and that of Hong Kong as a symbol of national humiliation as well as an inspiration for generations of Chinese revolutionaries struggling for its restoration—should be analysed to adequately address the question. Both the concept and practice of sovereignty were important because they not only informed the Chinese leadership of China’s international rights, but also empowered it to take actions to perpetuate such rights for enhancing its domestic legitimacy.

*Theories and Practice of Sovereignty over Hong Kong*

The concept of sovereignty was central to the CCP’s leadership in that it not only sensitively linked China’s internal politics in its peripheral areas such as Tibet, Xinjiang

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and Inner Mongolia, but also impacted on international issues such as Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, all of which involved reunification with regions in which different political systems had evolved.

For Communist China, which rejected much of international law as 'bourgeois' or 'liberal' in origin, the concept of sovereignty, which had been the essence of the Western notion of nation-state international law for about four centuries, became a unifying political force for China and a stick with which it attacked the bourgeois states.

There are many definitions on the concept of sovereignty. But basically, it is a theory of politics which claims that:

in every system of government there must be some absolute power of final decision exercised by some person or body recognised both as competent to decide and as able to enforce the decision. This person or body is called the sovereign.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) D. L. Sills, *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968, p. 231). Theories of sovereignty could be traced to Aristotle's *Politics* and in the classical works of Roman law. However it was the modern French thinker Jean Bodin who first systematically discussed the theory of sovereignty. Bodin asserted that the sovereign had "the power to make law binding on all his subjects in general", and that other rights of sovereignty included making peace and war, hearing appeals from the sentences of all courts, appointing and dismissing state officials, taxing, granting privileges of exemption to all subjects, determining coinage, and receiving oaths of fidelity from subjects. See Jean Bodin, *Six Books of the Commonwealth*, published in 1576, M. J. Tooley, translated and ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962, pp. 43-45). After Bodin, Hobbes was the first thinker to make a great contribution in the development of the theory of sovereignty. In his *The Leviathan*, published in 1651, Hobbes argued that sovereign power was necessary for men to "defend them from invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another." See Thomas Hobbes, *The Leviathan* Michael Oakeshott ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960, pp. 107-120). These theories were challenged by Locke and Rousseau. Locke did not directly reject Hobbes, but reinterpreted natural law as encompassing innate and inalienable rights inherent in each individual. Locke moderated Hobbes' view that state sovereignty was coercive and supreme, and he argued that the government should rule with the consent of the governed. See John Locke, *The Second Treatise of Government* J. W. Gough, ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976, pp. 81-93). In his *The Social Contract*, published in 1756, Rousseau agreed with Hobbes that state sovereignty was absolute, indivisible, inalienable and infallible; it was the result of a contract in which individuals surrendered their will. See Kenneth Thompson, *Fathers of International Thought: The Legacy of Political Theory* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994, pp. 22-56). Marx argued that these approaches to the theory of state sovereignty were actually philosophical formulations rather than political reality. The state only represented the interests and will of the ruling class, not the general interests of society. See Kenneth Thompson, *Fathers of International Thought: The Legacy of Political Theory* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994, pp. 22-56).
According to this definition, the concept of sovereignty has two implications. Firstly, sovereignty is a power of highest authority and that power is supreme, absolute and independent. Secondly, sovereignty is a special attribute of the independent state.

Though modern thinkers differed about who was sovereign and how sovereignty functioned within a state, they did not deny sovereignty—a supreme and absolute power—itself. Under this concept of sovereignty, unchallenged authorities were created to settle legal disputes and to maintain social order within the nation-state. In addition, sovereignty became a fundamental concept in conducting international relations.\(^6\)

However, there was an essential difference between the practice of sovereignty in domestic politics and in international politics.\(^7\) Jean Hampton argued that in domestic politics, sovereignty was generally a source of order. National authorities in such forms as governmental, legal and judicial agencies, military forces, and the police maintained the normal operation of national affairs. In most cases, these authorities had the ability to enforce the law, settle conflicts or disputes, and maintain social order.\(^8\)

In international politics, the exercise of sovereign rights had quite opposite consequences to those which applied to domestic affairs.\(^9\) Because each state was sovereign, there was no authority that was superior to any one state. Therefore, each state had the authority to interpret international laws and defend its own interests. If one state claimed a piece of territory over which another exercised sovereignty, there was no authority above the two states, such as a world government, to settle that dispute.


\(^{7}\) ibid.

\(^{8}\) ibid.

\(^{9}\) ibid.
Because the possession of territory was essential to the existence of a nation-state, no state was willing to share sovereignty over its own territory with another state if the former was powerful enough to resist occupation and defend itself. States were less likely to agree to compromise over territorial disputes than over other matters.\(^9\) In most cases in a dispute over territorial matters the stronger power or powers (military, economic, political, or technological) were likely to win no matter how the two parties interpreted international law or defended their positions theoretically.\(^10\) This situation accounted for most changes on the political map of the world in the centuries after a modern state system was established under the concept of sovereignty.\(^11\)

These 'bourgeois' or 'liberal' theories became central to China's foreign policy and helped to explain the changes of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1842 as well as in 1997. Despite the twists and turns in Chinese foreign policy over the years, the concept of sovereignty remained dominant in the Chinese image of world order. In Beijing's view, sovereignty meant that a state had "the power, in accordance with its own will, to decide its own form of state, political system, and socio-economic system, and intervention by other states in these matters is absolutely not permissible."\(^12\) China also considered the principle of sovereignty to be one of the most important principles of international law and had always been extremely sensitive to questions of sovereignty.\(^13\)

In the case of Hong Kong, before the Sino-British negotiations began, Beijing had

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\(^11\) ibid.
\(^13\) Yu Fan, "Speaking about the Relationship between China and the Tibetan Region from View Point of Sovereignty and Security" *People's Daily* 5 June 1959
already consistently stated that Hong Kong was part of China’s territory and that the settlement of the question of Hong Kong was entirely within China’s sovereign rights. However, despite its non-recognition of the three unequal treaties of the 19th century, China was tolerant of the existence of Hong Kong as a British colony and had never challenged Britain’s administration.\textsuperscript{15} Beijing held that no action would be taken until conditions were ripe.\textsuperscript{16}

The fundamental change in China’s domestic politics under Deng and the shift in the CCP’s focus from class struggle to economic development led to the emergence of a new pragmatism,\textsuperscript{17} which has been discussed in detail in Chapter Seven. With the development of China’s reforms and its open-door policies after 1978, the Chinese leadership noticeably adopted a more flexible attitude towards the issue of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{18} This, in turn, enabled the Chinese decision makers to be more flexible in dealing with sensitive issues such as economic relations and foreign investment.\textsuperscript{19} The creation of special economic zones and the introduction of a range of more flexible policies to some 14 coastal cities in the early 1980s created a completely new situation, which needed not only a legal codification, but also a theoretical justification.\textsuperscript{20}

Beijing recognised to a considerable degree the theory of interdependence and international markets which, in previous years, had been regarded as a form of imperialist encroachment upon the sovereignty of other states.\textsuperscript{21} However, the change

\textsuperscript{16} ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Kevin Rafferty, City on the Rocks: Hong Kong’s Uncertain Future (New York: Viking, 1990, pp. 105-109)
\textsuperscript{18} ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Wang Gunwu and Wong Siu-lum eds. Hong Kong in the Asia-Pacific Region (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, Centre of Asian Studies, 1997, PP. 4-5)
was also accompanied by a growing nationalism in both China’s domestic politics and its foreign policy. Nationalism, often in the name of patriotism, appeared to bolster the legitimacy of the CCP whose ideology, as a result of the repudiation of the old doctrines of the past, became a less powerful source of enthusiasm and support in China’s domestic politics.22

During the reform era, it seemed that China was prepared to accept the constraints of increased commercial and military links with the outside world, while at the same time making efforts to preserve its sovereignty and autonomy.23 Beijing considered resolving the long outstanding issue of the reunification of the nation as one concrete step in achieving this goal.24 There were several reasons why the Chinese leadership wanted to be seen as firm on the question of sovereignty. Firstly, the top Chinese leaders were from the old revolutionary generation, who had long experience of fighting foreign powers and foreign influence. They had participated in establishing the People’s Republic. For them, the unification of the whole of China was particularly important and was a special task which they determined to complete.25

Secondly, any concessions on sovereignty would bring great political damage to those who made them. Prior to the Sino-British negotiations, Deng Xiaoping was on the point of consolidating his leading position in China. He had to balance different factions within the party, particularly the reformers and the more conservative leaders.26 Deng

22 ibid.
24 ibid. In this context, Peng Zhen, then chairman of the National People’s Congress, reiterated in a report in November, 1981 that: “We stand firmly on the principle of defending sovereignty, national unification and territorial integrity.” See People’s Daily 30 September 1981
26 ibid.
himself had a reputation of being highly flexible, but he often seemed to exercise this flexibility within certain limits. 27 Anything that went beyond these limits would become unacceptable to him. To remain firm in China's position on recovering sovereignty would add to Deng's national prestige and further consolidate his authority. 28 Had he failed to stick to this policy, his position could have been challenged by others. 29

Thirdly, the issue of sovereignty was not only applicable to Hong Kong and Macao, but also had great relevance to the question of Taiwan and, potentially, the positions of Tibet and other national minority regions in the Chinese state. 30 Beijing considered that any compromise on its position over sovereignty could have a domino effect. Any concession on principle over the Hong Kong issue could carry forward to later negotiations on Taiwan and weaken Beijing's bargaining position. 31

China's sensitivity on the sovereignty issue was further provoked by Britain's initial hard line on the Hong Kong question. In her first visit to Beijing in September 1982, Mrs Thatcher, as the British Prime Minister, disagreed with China's stand that the unequal treaties were illegal, and stated that all three 19th century treaties concerning Hong Kong were legal and valid under international law. 32 Deng Xiaoping was reported as angrily telling the British Prime Minister that China would recover all territories of Hong Kong by 1997, peacefully or otherwise. 33 As a result of Thatcher's visit, neither China nor Great Britain was willing to make concessions on the sovereignty issue, although they did agree to negotiate on the disputed territory and to maintain stability

27 Enbao Wang, Hong Kong, 1997: the Politics of Transition (Colo.: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995, Chpts. 2 and 3)
28 ibid.
29 ibid.
31 ibid.
and prosperity in Hong Kong.34

When the Sino-British negotiations started, soon after Mrs Thatcher’s visit, the question of sovereignty was the most contentious issue. The British proposed that the settlement of Hong Kong should be based on the model of ‘divided sovereignty’—Chinese sovereignty and British administration.35 This meant that China would resume sovereignty over Hong Kong but the British would continue to administer the region. Britain’s motives for this model were revealed by Colin Moynihan, Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the British Conservative Party. He said that “the British role in Hong Kong is the key to its economic stability”, and that in order to “maintain Hong Kong’s stability, Britain cannot give up its right of administration over Hong Kong.”36 An article published in The Economist asserted that there were only two alternatives for the Chinese leaders: they could either resume sovereignty and suffer a depression in Hong Kong, or ask the British to stay in order to assure the prosperity of Hong Kong.37

Some scholars such as Robert Skidelski and Felix Patrikeeff, suggested in September 1982 that Britain should take a tougher line on the Hong Kong issue. They argued that Hong Kong’s prosperity, which China wanted to assure, was dependent on an economic “spine” that consisted of 20,000 people who would withdraw their investments from the colony if the status quo were not maintained. They even suggested that “the objective of British diplomacy should be to secure a new lease of some 15 to 30 years for the

32 Gerald Segal, The Fate of Hong Kong (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993, Part I)
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Enbao Wang, Hong Kong, 1997: the Politics of Transition (Colo.: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995, Chpts. 2 and 3)
36 Colin Moynihan’s interview with Hu Bao, 14 September 1983. See ‘Britain’s Argument is Untenable’ Beijing Review (Vol. 26, No. 41, 10 October 1983)
Anthony Dicks, a British scholar and lawyer, defended Britain’s position from a legal perspective. He claimed that the concept of divided sovereignty was the latest development of international law in the West. Dicks explained:

Sovereignty is said to be divided where the sum total of powers accorded by international law to a fully sovereign state are exercised in respect of a territory by two or more states. The manner in which the powers are distributed varies. One state may exercise most or all of the plenary powers, and may be said to have ‘effective’ sovereignty, while the other may have merely ‘titular’ or ‘residual’ sovereignty, as has been the case with most leased territories. Again, one state by reason of its small size or lack of defensive capacity may entrust its external relations and defence to a more powerful state, while retaining full control of its own internal affairs. Still more complex examples of divided sovereignty are provided by the United Nations Trust Territories.

The essence of divided sovereignty was that sovereignty could be separated and shared between states. This was indeed a new concept for the interstate system, since the modern concept of sovereignty meant supreme and absolute power within a state. However, as Dicks suggested, a state that lacked the military capability to defend its sovereignty might accept the arrangement of divided sovereignty. But China in the early 1980s had the military power to take over and to defend the territories, and was, therefore, not likely to accept any divided sovereignty arrangement proposed by Britain.

On the issue of sovereignty over Hong Kong, Beijing actually had few options it could toy with. The concepts of sovereignty, strong Chinese nationalism, Beijing’s traditional position on Hong Kong, the decolonisation of the British Empire, and China’s military

37 ‘Hong Kong’s Future: That Ring of Confidence is Fading’ The Economist (12 March 1983, pp. 52-54)
capability all played important roles in determining China’s tough stance over Hong Kong. It was unimaginable that Deng Xiaoping and other leaders would have renewed the lease of the New Territories or would have allowed the British to remain in Hong Kong island and Kowloon. As will be discussed later in this chapter, for over a hundred years the Chinese had insisted that the British presence in Hong Kong was illegal. If Deng had agreed to let the British to continue their rule in Hong Kong, his authority would have been greatly weakened to say the least, or at worst would have collapsed.

Not surprisingly, China categorically denounced the British proposal of ‘divided sovereignty’. Jin Fu, a prominent Chinese legal scholar, wrote:

Sovereignty as a legal concept is indivisible in itself. What is sovereignty? It is the inherent right of a state, which manifests itself internally as supreme authority, namely, the exclusive jurisdiction of a state over its territory and, externally, as the right of independence, namely, the complete independent exercise of right by a state in international relations free from any outside interference. What is administration? It means administrative power, the power of a state to rule in its territory. It is a concrete expression of sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty naturally embraces administration. Since the two are indivisible, there can be no question of exchanging one for the other.40

The New China News Agency (Xinhua) published a statement in support of this view. It stated that: “If administrative powers remain in the British hands, how can China be said to have recovered sovereignty? In what sovereign state in the world is administrative power in the hands of foreigners?”41 From this official statement, in conjunction with what Deng had said on this issue, it was crystal clear that China had little room for compromise and its leaders would not make any concessions on sovereignty. Under such circumstances, the only choice for China to achieve its goal of

reunifying Hong Kong without military force was the manner in which sovereignty would be transferred. This was indeed the case as it later developed into ‘one country, two systems’ policy.

The proposal by the British government in the early 1980s for ‘divided sovereignty’ only served as a grim reminder to Beijing that the British government was trying hard to maintain and extend its colonial rule in Hong Kong. This conclusion fortified Beijing’s leadership on the perceived threat posed by the ulterior motives of the British imperialists on China’s sovereignty, and it impacted directly on the formation of the fifth column policy in Hong Kong.

To the Chinese leaders, sovereignty also included the right to exercise authority within its own jurisdiction, and they were thus extremely sensitive to the possibility that this power over Hong Kong could be reduced after 1997. Because of this, China rejected any arrangement that would make it possible for the British to retain undue influence in the territory. China also demonstrated repeatedly its intense fear that Hong Kong might become a base for subversion to the mainland. At the very least, in Beijing’s view, sovereignty included the right to eliminate any threats to the central government. Therefore, Beijing’s perception of sovereignty over Hong Kong implied taking control of its affairs.

41 Xinhua News Agency, 21 September 1983, in FBIS, 16 September 1983, E1
43 *ibid.*
44 *ibid.*
Pride and Politics of Sovereignty in Hong Kong

In the context of Hong Kong’s reunification with China, the significance of Hong Kong was most widely recognised for its important role in China’s reform and modernisation program. However, although economics was certainly crucial, so, too, were politics, culture and China’s relations with Taiwan and the global community.

From Beijing’s perspective, the undoubted economic significance of Hong Kong was matched by nationalist pride in finally re-establishing sovereignty over the first territory to have been lost to foreign imperialists in the century of shame and humiliation that began with the Opium Wars of 1839-1842. The intensity of Chinese nationalistic sentiment for regaining sovereignty over Hong Kong was so high at the beginning of the 1980s that it shocked some senior British negotiators, who admitted later that they were surprised by the depth of the Chinese feelings on the matter. For the Chinese leaders, the recovery of Hong Kong’s sovereignty was not only part of the re-establishing process of a unified Chinese state, but also the beginning of a healing process to finally purge the humiliation. To recover Hong Kong was a critical issue in Chinese thinking, uniting the KMT and the CCP, but the politics of sovereignty had never been more intensified for China’s communist leaders in the 1980s and 1990s, as the appeal of communist ideology had eroded substantially and nationalism served as a convenient and legitimating substitute.

Modern Chinese history had two major themes: the foreign occupation of Chinese

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45 Michael Yahuda’s interview with Sir Percy Cradock in June 1992. See Michael Yahuda, Hong Kong: China’s Challenge (London and New York: Routledge, 1996, pp. 22-23). Sir Percy Cradock remarked that "Deng Xiaoping was determined to take (Hong Kong) back into full Chinese sovereignty even if it meant taking it back as a barren rock." Also see Percy Cradock, Experiences of China (London: John Murray, 1994, pp. 180-190)
territories through various treaties or by force, such as in the case of Hong Kong, and strong anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist movements. Even as early as the last years of the Qing Dynasty, Chinese intellectuals called on the Western powers to return Chinese territories.  

Although the KMT and the CCP had different ideologies, they shared an identical nationalist view over Hong Kong. Dr Sun Yat-sen, the first President of the Republic of China after the 1911 Revolution, condemned the agreements concluded by the Qing Dynasty and the Western powers as unequal treaties. Sun argued that the Western powers’ political and economic oppression made China a “hyper-colony.” Under the leadership of Dr Sun Yat-sen, the KMT declared its anti-imperialist foreign policy and the party’s position on the unequal treaties. Sun urged his followers that “the abolition of unequal treaties should be carried into effect with the least possible delay.”

46 See Kevin Lane, Sovereignty and the Status Quo (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 20-23). These intellectuals argued that the circumstances under which the treaties were conducted had changed. In the 1890s, Kang Youwei, a well-known leader of the 1898 Hundred Day Reform, criticised the imperialist countries’ treatment of China. Kang said that although China was nominally still an independent country, Chinese territory and major economic systems such as railways, shipping, trade, and banks were under the control of powers who could “grab whatever they like.” Kang argued that China was “really no longer independent although outwardly it remains so.” See Hu Sheng, Imperialism and Chinese Politics (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1955; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1973, p. 123). Kang also pointed out that the unequal treaties imposed on China were a source of “an extreme national shame”. Also see Tung-ming Lee, The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong: A Political and Legal Perspective (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1985, p. 87)

47 Sun Yat-sen wrote: “The result is that China is everywhere becoming a colony of the Powers. The people of the nation still think we are only a ‘semi-colony’ and comfort themselves with this term, but in reality we are being crushed by economic strength of the powers to a greater degree than if we were a full colony. China is not the colony of one nation but of all, and we are not the slaves of one country but of all. I think we ought to be called a ‘hypocolony.’” See Sun’s San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People Frank W. Price translated, The Commission for the Compilation of the History of the Kuomintang (Taipei: China Publishing (no date), p. 1 and p. 10)

48 As part of the KMT’s foreign policy as announced in its first National Congress in the 1924, it stated: “(1) All unequal treaties such as those providing for leased territories, extraterritorial privileges, foreign control of the customs tariff, and exercise of political authority on Chinese territories which impair the sovereignty of the Chinese nation, should be abolished, and mutual respect of sovereign rights.

(2) All countries that are willing to abandon their special privileges in China and to abolish their treaties which impair Chinese sovereignty should be accorded most-favoured-nation treatment.

(3) All other treaties between China and the foreign powers which are in any way prejudicial to the interests of China should be revised according to the principle of non-infringement of each other’s sovereignty.” See Kuang-sheng Liao, Anti-foreignism and Modernisation in China, 1860-1980: Linkage between Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1984, pp. 82-83)

When the KMT, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, broke off cooperation with the CCP in 1927 and established government in Nanjing, it continued the foreign policy principles laid down by Dr Sun Yat-sen. For example, the KMT announced in 1928 that it would recover all Chinese territories occupied by other powers.\(^50\) As a result of Chinese pressure and a stronger government under Chiang, the Western powers considered giving up part of their privileges in China, among them, extraterritoriality.

By the end of 1928, the KMT government successfully terminated or modified some of the foreign powers’ privileges and recovered China’s tariff autonomy.\(^51\)

The KMT’s diplomatic efforts to terminate foreign privileges in China were suspended after the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931.\(^52\) Japan’s invasion of China in 1937 and its occupation of major Chinese ports also weakened the Western

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\(^{50}\) In June 1928, the KMT declared: “For 80 years China has been under the shackles of unequal treaties. These restrictions are a contravention of the principle in international law, of mutual respect and sovereignty and are not allowed by any sovereign state... Now that the unification of China is being consummated we think the time is ripe for taking further steps and begin at once to negotiate—in accordance with diplomatic procedure—new treaties on a basis of complete equality and mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty.” See *Foreign Relations of the United States* The State Department of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Vol. 2, 1928, pp. 413-414). Chiang also asserted that China’s weakness was mainly a result of Western powers’ exploitation under unequal treaties. He stated that: “The implementation of unequal treaties constitutes a complete record of China’s national humiliation.” See Chiang Kai-shek, *China’s Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory* (New York: Roy Publishers, 1947, p. 44). At the 1931 National People’s Convention, the KMT government proclaimed the “Manifesto Concerning the Abrogation of Unequal Treaties” and concluded: “1) The Chinese people will not recognise all the past unequal treaties imposed by the Powers on China. 2) The National Government shall, in conformity with Dr Sun Yat-sen’s testamentary injunction, achieve with least possible delay China’s equality and independence in the Family of Nations. ‘Manifesto of the National People’s Convention Concerning the Abrogation of Unequal Treaties’ The Chinese Social and Political Science Review (Vol. 15, supplement, 1931-32, pp. 461-465)

\(^{51}\) Tung-ming Lee, *The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong: A Political and Legal Perspective* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1985, pp. 249-257). Britain was also pressured to renounce its concessions at Hankou and Jiujiang in 1928 and to return the leased territory of Weihaiwei in 1930. But the British did not return Hong Kong, including the New Territories, to China. This was because by the 1920s Hong Kong was important to the British for its Far Eastern trade and it remained in Britain’s interests to continue to rule Hong Kong while relinquishing some other extraterritorial privileges in China. See Kevin Lane, *Sovereignty and the Status Quo* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 44-45). Britain and other powers could not accept the Chinese government’s request that all extraterritorial privileges be terminated by January 1, 1930, even though the powers agreed to the principle of a gradual withdrawal after that date. For the KMT government, the existence of foreign extraterritoriality continued to be a symbol of Chinese humiliation, but it was not powerful enough to abrogate all the treaties in one move. See George Endacott, *A History of Hong Kong*, 2nd ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 42-43). Another reason why Chiang could not abolish all the treaties was the imminent Japanese threat to China. In 1931, Japan occupied Manchuria, and the next year attacked Shanghai. Japan’s rapid encroachment upon large Chinese territories threatened China’s survival, and a response to Japan was more urgent than the abolition of the unequal treaties with Western powers.

\(^{52}\) Tung-ming Lee, *The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong: A Political and Legal Perspective* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1985, pp. 112-113)
extraterritoriality system.\textsuperscript{53} After the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour and Hong Kong in 1941, China became an ally of the United States and Great Britain against the Japanese; and the KMT took the opportunity to request Britain to give up colonial rule in Hong Kong, but without success.\textsuperscript{54}

The Japanese defeat in 1945 aroused tensions between China and Britain over which country should accept Japan’s surrender at Hong Kong. When the British obtained support from United States President Harry Truman, Chiang’s government had to allow Britain to accept the Japanese surrender and continue its colonial rule.\textsuperscript{55} To assuage the Chinese people’s concern about the future of Hong Kong, Chiang promised that his government would continue to negotiate with the British for the settlement of the Hong Kong question through diplomatic channels.\textsuperscript{56} Chiang’s decision demonstrated that he could do little but accept the status quo. In 1949, the KMT was overthrown by the Chinese Communists, ending its opportunity to settle the Hong Kong issue.

The CCP was a strong anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist party from the time of its establishment in July 1921. The Manifesto of the Second Congress of the Party, published in 1922, used colourful and emotional language to denounce the Western powers’ violation of China’s sovereignty. For example, it stated that China was under “the domination of international imperialism” and had been “trampled underfoot by

\textsuperscript{53} ibid.

\textsuperscript{54} G. B. Endacott, \textit{A History of Hong Kong} 2nd ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 277-304). In 1942, the 100th anniversary of the signing the Treaty of Nanking, the Nationalist government made a public appeal to abolish all unequal treaties. China’s position was supported by the United States, where anti-colonialism was strong. United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt clearly stated several times from 1943 to 1945 that Britain should return Hong Kong to China, because Clause Three of the Atlantic Charter of 1943 called for the liberation of all peoples and applied to the people overrun by the Germans and Japanese as well as to the people under British colonial rule. However, the British rejected the Chinese proposal and refused to relinquish Hong Kong. They did promise to reconsider the Hong Kong question when the war was over. See also Kevin Lane, \textit{Sovereignty and the Status Quo} (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 46-53)

Britain, the United States, France and Japan,\textsuperscript{57} and that imperialist oppression of China and conflicts among imperialist powers for economic interests in China accounted for “China’s present special status in the field of international relations.”\textsuperscript{58}

Mao Zedong also offered his view on modern Chinese foreign relations. He argued that since the First Opium War of 1840, the Western powers had invaded China and forced open China’s door. The Chinese suddenly found that their country was much more backward than the Western countries.\textsuperscript{59} In his 1939 Essay, ‘The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party’, Mao stated that the real motives of the ‘imperialist powers’ in invading China was not to replace feudal China with a capitalist system, but “to transform China into their semi-colony or colony”. The powers “forced China to conclude numerous unequal treaties.” They gained control of all the important “trading ports in China by such treaties, monopolised industries and banks in China and jeopardised the development of China’s own industry and banking system.”\textsuperscript{60} Mao further pointed out that imperialism controlled “not only China’s vital financial and economic arteries but also her political and military powers.”\textsuperscript{61} Mao concluded that “the contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation...is the principal one among the various contradictions”. Therefore, the primary task of the Chinese revolution was “the national revolution for the overthrow of imperialism.”\textsuperscript{62}

Mao viewed the Chinese revolution as the continuation of the nationalist movement

\textsuperscript{56} ibid.
\textsuperscript{58} ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} Robert North, \textit{The Foreign Relations of China} (Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1978, pp. 80-84)
\textsuperscript{61} ibid.
\textsuperscript{62} ibid.
initiated by Dr Sun Yat-sen in fighting colonialism and imperialism. In his draft for the inscription on the Monument to the People’s Heroes erected in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, Mao wrote that the Chinese communists’ cause was to continue the struggle begun in 1840 to “resist the enemy, domestic and foreign, to strive for the independence of the nation and the freedom of the people.”

In 1948, after three decisive victories over the KMT in China’s northeast battlefields, the communist forces were about to take power over all the mainland. When the People’s Liberation Army approached the border with Hong Kong, the total strength of forces available to the British to defend Hong Kong was reported to be at most 25,000. It was believed initially that China was then determined to take military steps to recover Hong Kong. In the wake of the mainland’s liberation, it seemed perfectly logical that the next step was to take back Hong Kong, especially given the prevailing anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist sentiments among the rank and file. Regarding itself as the genuine leading power in China’s anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist movements, the CCP had no conflict of principles towards a takeover of the British colony, which would have wiped out the humiliation that the three treaties represented. Because the CCP did not recognise the treaties bearing on Hong Kong, it did not consider itself bound by them. Thus, from a legal point of view, it could justify its actions, too. Given that there was no universally-accepted interpretation of international law and no sufficiently authoritative international body to enforce the law, China’s position was

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67 ibid.
consistent and would at least win support from the communist bloc.\(^69\) Moreover, a takeover could increase the new China’s prestige among Third World countries.\(^70\)

However, the CCP decided not to take over Hong Kong immediately after it claimed power in the mainland.\(^71\) It was clear that the CCP’s toleration of Hong Kong as a British colony was the decisive factor for the island’s survival until 1997. The CCP’s consent to Hong Kong’s colonial status, however, did not alter its principled stand over Hong Kong.\(^72\) The emergence of the People’s Republic as a military power after the Korean War strongly reinforced this point.\(^73\) In 1950, one year after the establishment of the PRC, China entered the Korean War and fought against the United Nations forces, which included the military forces of the United States and Great Britain. China’s

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\(^69\) William McGurn ed. Basic Law, Basic Questions (Hong Kong: Review Publishing Company, 1988, pp. 107-114)

\(^70\) ibid. In this context, a People’s China editorial stated in 1950 that the Chinese people’s victory not only provided indirect assistance to all colonially-exploited peoples by laying down a proven pattern for successful struggle, but also provided direct and concrete assistance to them, for it has shaken the whole colonial system to its foundations. People’s China (Vol. 1, No. 4, 16 February 1950, p. 3)

\(^71\) In November 1948, Qiao Mu, then the Chinese Communist spokesman in Hong Kong and the head of the Xinhua Office, in an interview with the Reuters correspondent in Hong Kong, H. C. Bough, assured the British government that a future Communist government in China would not cause any trouble in Hong Kong. He indicated that the Chinese Communists could have perfectly normal relations with the United Kingdom and suggested that the status of Hong Kong was only a minor diplomatic issue. Qiao also suggested that the Hong Kong question should be settled only at the highest level and that it would be considered by the Communists as an integral factor in Communist-British relations. ‘The Consul General of Shanghai (Cabot) to the Secretary of State’, 17 December 1948, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: The United States Government Printing Office, Vol. VII, 1973, p. 66) Another source proved Qiao’s statement. The Consul-General at Beijing was informed on 24 September by L. K. Tao (known to Ambassador Stuart), that he had recently met with Lo Lung-chi who had a conversation on 20 September with Mao Zedong. Mao had told Lo that the position of Hong Kong could presently be considered safe, since it had been decided by the CCP that all treaties signed before the Nationalists came to power would be accepted, while those signed after that period would be made the subject of study. ibid. Vol. VIII, 1978, p. 539

\(^72\) On 8 March 1963, the People’s Daily, in response to criticisms from the Communist Party of the USA, announced that questions such as those of Hong Kong and Macao relate to the category of unequal treaties left over by history, treaties which the imperialists imposed on China.” See People’s Daily 8 March 1963. In September 1964, at a World Youth Forum in Moscow, a resolution was passed calling for the elimination of colonies in Asia. Tabled by the Ceylonese (Sri Lankan) delegate, it put Hong Kong and Macao on a par with Timor Island, Papua, Oman and Aden, and demanded the end of colonial rule in these places in accordance with the United Nations declaration on decolonisation. The Chinese delegate condemned the resolution and pointed out that Hong Kong and Macao were Chinese territories occupied by British and Portuguese imperialists on the strength of unequal treaties. See People’s Daily, 27 September 1964. Again, on 10 March 1972, when the UN General Assembly’s Special Committee on Colonialism included Hong Kong and Macao in its list of colonial territories, Huang Hua, Beijing’s UN representative, handed a memorandum to the committee, stating: “As is known to all, the questions of Hong Kong and Macao belong to the category of questions resulting from the series of unequal treaties left over by history, treaties which the imperialists imposed on China. Hong Kong and Macao are part of the Chinese territory occupied by the British and Portuguese authorities. The settlement of the question of Hong Kong and Macao is entirely within China’s sovereignty and does not at all fall under the ordinary category of colonial territories.” See Joseph, Y. S. Cheng ed. Hong Kong, in Search of a Future (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 54)

\(^73\) Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, Chpt. 2)
military capability, as demonstrated in the Korean War, proved that China had become a military power.\textsuperscript{74} It was not clear how the Korean War affected British foreign policy towards Asia and in particular towards Hong Kong. However, in 1952 Great Britain did change its position on Hong Kong and abandoned its plan to defend Hong Kong if it came under a large-scale Chinese military attack.\textsuperscript{75}

After the Korean War, the PRC was more confident of its military capability and demonstrated that it was willing to use force to take disputed border territories.\textsuperscript{76} China’s military capability could be one of the reasons that the Chinese leaders were firm about sovereignty over Hong Kong in the 1980s. The Qing Dynasty lost Hong Kong when the Chinese were defeated in the Opium Wars about 140 years earlier. But in the 1980s, although Great Britain was still one of the military powers in the world, it had lost its dominant position in relation to China. The Chinese military capability no doubt strengthened China’s negotiating position.\textsuperscript{77}

In conclusion, politics of sovereignty and the issue of Hong Kong were closely linked in Chinese revolutionary historiography. Hong Kong was perceived as the living evidence of the imperialist, in particular the British imperialist, carving up of Chinese territory

\textsuperscript{74} ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} A British Cabinet Memorandum stated: “We do not consider that our strategy in Hong Kong should be changed by a French withdrawal from Indochina, although it may be necessary to maintain a larger garrison to ensure internal security and, if attacked, to cover an orderly evacuation.” Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong 4th ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 233-246). This secret document revealed that in the early 1950s, Hong Kong’s status became uncertain and the British were prepared to withdraw from their colony if China determined to recover Hong Kong militarily.
\textsuperscript{76} Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, Chpts. 2 and 3). In 1962, China defeated its neighbour, India, in a war over a disputed border, and in 1969 fought with the Soviet Union for possession of Zhenbao Island, located on the Ussuri River border. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese initiated several military attacks against the Vietnamese in the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, which both China and Vietnam claimed. Chinese military power could also be seen in its possession of an atomic bomb in 1964, its production of a hydrogen bomb in 1967 and in its launching of a satellite in 1970.
\textsuperscript{77} Ken Davies, Hong Kong to 1997: A Question of Confidence (London: The Economic Intelligence Unit Ltd. 1990, pp. 70-73)
when China was weak. Hong Kong was a symbol of national humiliation at the hands of Western powers. Though the CCP and the KMT differed fundamentally in ideology, their nationalistic sentiment over sovereignty issue tended to blur the distinction between them. It was unthinkable that during the Sino-British negotiations in the early 1980s that policy makers in Beijing would risk agreeing to a continuation of Hong Kong’s British rule, because no Chinese leader would want to be labelled as a national traitor in history. Deng Xiaoping summed up the real feelings of the top CCP leaders in Beijing when he said that he would not want to be a second Li Hongzhang. Chinese nationalism and its passion on sovereignty were the historical crux of Chinese efforts leading to the 1984 Hong Kong settlement, and the motivation of such efforts could not be correctly explained without an understanding of that tradition.

**Personality and Political Culture of ‘Rule by Man’**

*Relevance of Leaders’ Personality*

Chapter Two showed that the impact of leadership personality on foreign policy decision making varied with political system and culture. The less open the decision making system was, the more likely personality would imprint on the policy.

In the case of Hong Kong transition, it was well-known that the Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping weighed heavily on many of the Chinese Hong Kong policies. However, one level lower from Deng, how did the personality of other top leaders influence China’s Hong Kong policy?
Some foreign observers believed that what would happen to Hong Kong after 1997 depended on who were in power in Beijing. This was true to a point: when moderate leaders like Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were running the party and the government in the 1980s, policy towards Hong Kong was not as harsh as it was in the early 1990s. Both of them were proteges of Deng, and yet both lost their top jobs within the CCP in the 1980s.

However, official policy towards Hong Kong was softer in the 1980s for a variety of reasons that were not directly related to top leaders like Hu and Zhao. One important thing was that the Tiananmen crisis had yet to occur, which meant the party felt more secure within China. Politics in Hong Kong was still largely ‘colonial’, meaning direct elections based on universal franchise and real political parties had yet to come into existence. And Beijing had yet to witness the spontaneous reaction in support of Beijing’s student movement.

While conceding that a paramount leader like Deng commanded high authority in making important Chinese foreign policies, or in this case, China’s Hong Kong policies, this line risked the danger of being proliferated into general understanding of the role of Chinese leadership. The limitations of the individual leader analysis became apparent from the fact that while Zhao Ziyang did not survive 1989, many of his close colleagues did, including Qiao Shi and Yao Yilin. And of course, so did Deng. So suggesting what would happen to Hong Kong after 1997 on the basis of who would hold which formal rank in Beijing begged the question: how widely should the net be cast? Policy was more moderate when Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng, Qiao Shi and Yao Yilin were in charge. Policy became conservative when Zhao left the scene but Li, Qiao and Yao were still
around, plus a few new faces (including the new General Secretary Jiang Zemin)—all were supposed to be under the unified leadership of Deng. This seemed to support the conclusion that there were much more sophisticated factional models operating within the CCP leadership under Deng.

Therefore, there were two more relevant ways to understand the roles of personality in China’s policies towards Hong Kong. Firstly, Deng Xiaoping as paramount leader exercised extensive personal influence over China’s Hong Kong policy. Secondly, China’s core policies towards Hong Kong were basically a product of both the party’s collective mindset and its collegiate reactions to external pressures.

‘Rule by Man’ as a Political Culture

The issues of ‘rule by man’ or rule by law went to the heart of the differences between Hong Kong and China. Beijing recognised this, which was why the Basic Law stipulated that the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary laws should be maintained in the new HKSAR. This seemed an extraordinary concession at that time since it meant that China, though delighted to be ridding Hong Kong of British colonial government, was willing to allow the fundamental legal precepts of English tradition to remain behind.\(^78\)

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\(^78\) The common law owed its origin to the post-Norman Conquest period of English history (1066 onwards), when government became more centralised and judges developed a coherent body of legal principles applicable to the whole country—hence the word ‘common’—from England’s disparate local customary laws. As judges applied these precepts to new cases, a huge body of case law developed and the ‘doctrine of precedent’ evolved, binding courts in later cases to decisions made in similar earlier cases. Yet the common law could be inflexible and sometimes harsh: Justice was done as long as the proper legal processes were followed and the relevant law fully applied, even if the end result seemed unfair and wrong. So there developed another type of law designed to soften the common law and allow for some discretion by judges—the ‘rule of equity’. This meant that law was the antithesis of arbitrary political power; everyone should obey it, including government officials; everyone was equal before the law; law was impartially administered by independent judges; law was formal and rational; and law benefits the individual (who was presumed to be innocent in criminal cases until proven guilty). See Peter Wesley-Smith, *An Introduction to the Hong Kong Legal System* 2nd ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 32-36). Also Anne Carver, *Hong
As discussed in Chapter Five, China had a long and entrenched political tradition of relying on ‘rule by man’, rather than on rule by law, as a major operating apparatus in its domestic politics. As a natural extension of this tradition and practice, they also impacted on Chinese leaders’ anticipation and strategic thinking of how Hong Kong should be governed both before and after 1997. The CCP leadership’s this expectation, not surprisingly, was reflected in one of the most proclaimed slogans during the Hong Kong transitional period: ‘Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong’—vis-à-vis the other option: ‘Hong Kong law rules Hong Kong’.

The following two excerpts of Deng Xiaoping’s speeches in 1987 demonstrated Beijing’s deep-rooted suspicion of possible political disturbance in Hong Kong in the future, and the necessity for China to adopt effective measures to prevent it from happening. It not only revealed Deng’s personal principled view on how Hong Kong should be managed, but also summarised the consensus of the party on the issue. On the occasion of meeting the drafters of the Basic Law, Deng said:

Don’t ever think that everything would be all right if Hong Kong affairs were administered solely by Hong Kong people while the Central Government had nothing to do with the matter. That simply wouldn’t work—it’s not a realistic idea. The Central Government certainly will not intervene in the day-to-day affairs of the special administrative region, nor is that necessary. But isn’t it possible that something could happen in the region that might jeopardise the fundamental interests of the country?...You should also consider a few other things, for example, after 1997 we shall still allow people in Hong Kong to

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79 This apparently straightforward dictum was supposed to mean just what it said: that only Hong Kong people should be allowed to participate in government. But the notion of Hong Kong people changed during the transitional period. The Joint Declaration stated that the government... would be composed of ‘local inhabitants’. Article 3 of the Basic Law changed this to “the executive authorities and legislature...shall be composed of permanent residents of Hong Kong”. While local inhabitants implied people who were born in Hong Kong, permanent residents only required 7 years’ residency, hence many more people would be qualified. In theory, this would enable immigrants who were fairly recently from the mainland to enter HKSAR government, including Beijing’s fifth columnists. It was this shift to ‘permanent residents’ from ‘local inhabitants’ that allowed for a different view of political participation than the slogan ‘Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong’ seemed to imply.
attack the Chinese Communist Party and China verbally, but what if they should turn their words into action, trying to convert Hong Kong into a base of opposition to the mainland under the pretext of ‘democracy’? Then we should have no choice but to intervene...

On another occasion, in commenting on the possibility of the Legislative Council becoming too fractured by party politics to allow the Executive to govern effectively, for example, the passage of important bills and legislation could be obstructed, Deng said:

Isn’t it possible that something could happen there that would jeopardise the fundamental interests of Hong Kong itself? Can anyone imagine that there are no forces that might engage in obstruction or sabotage? ...If the Central Government were to abandon all its power, there might be turmoil that would damage Hong Kong’s interests. Therefore it is to Hong Kong’s advantage, not its disadvantage, for the Central Government to retain some power there.

As discussed in detail in Chapter Five, traditional Chinese social order was basically Confucian in nature. This order was based on a conception of human nature which not only allowed for the natural inequality of man, but also required a rationalised hierarchical order of status and roles. The legitimacy of the government in this society was not contingent upon the consent of some higher institution. In traditional China, the government was the political institution, and politics was nothing other than politics within the government. All other social groups and institutions were subject to the government, and no institutional or legal limits were set upon the power of the state.

Although the CCP claimed to have a fundamentally different ideology and political

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81 ibid. p. 220
82 Donald Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969, pp. 23-24)
84 ibid.
system from that of the traditional ruling classes, it could not escape the pervasiveness of such a political culture. In fact, more than three decades of single party rule had greatly reinforced this tradition. Deng’s second revolution in China did not alter this basic practice.

The above two quotations of Deng Xiaoping clearly argued for, from Beijing’s perspective, the *raison d’être* of why Hong Kong should be ruled by man after 1997. This was supported by the CCP’s assessment of Hong Kong as fundamentally a Chinese society with the same prevailing traditional values, which gave Beijing the confidence that Hong Kong could be ruled by man.

Unlike China, which until the late 1970s pursued a strategy of autarkical development, Hong Kong’s export-oriented industrialisation ineluctably exposed it to international economic risks and fluctuations,\(^\text{86}\) which turned it into a prosperous and vibrant capitalist metropolis. The Chinese government played a dominant role in restructuring mainland Chinese society through a combination of political coercion, mass mobilisation, ideological inculcation and various other control measures.\(^\text{87}\) The Hong Kong government, on the other hand, under the guiding *laissez-faire* principle, had a much less direct role in the economic, social and cultural domains of Hong Kong people’s lives.\(^\text{88}\) The ensuing rise of the living standards and emergence of a wealthy middle class in Hong Kong did not bring about a much predicted democratisation

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\(^{86}\) Kathleen Cheek-Milby and Miron Mushkat, *Hong Kong: The Challenge of Transformation* (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1989, pp. 45-63)

\(^{87}\) ibid.

process. On the contrary, the political beliefs and the ethos of many scholars, politicians and businessmen contributed to the maintenance of Hong Kong's status quo and political stability.

More than 140 years of British rule did not separate close cultural and social ties between the mainland and Hong Kong, although its unique colonial history and modernisation process made it a distinctive economic entity in its own right. Despite its commitment to capitalism, Hong Kong remained first and foremost a Chinese society, with well entrenched concepts of good politics and governance shared by many Hong Kong Chinese. Many of the traditional political values were retained throughout the British rule, such as the hierarchical ordering of political roles, the primary function of political authority to maintain social order, and a dependence on governmental authority for preserving both public and private interests. Lucian Pye observed that traditional Chinese generally lacked an abstract concept of government as a structural entity. Paternalism in traditional China was a political ideal upheld by both officials and people.

This was certainly true for Hong Kong: the most intriguing aspect of colonial governance in Hong Kong Chinese society was the undeniable legitimacy of authority. The fact that Britain was able to maintain continuous and stable rule over Hong Kong for about 150 years (except for the brief period of Japanese occupation in the 1940s)

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89 ibid. They argue that the rise of the middle class in Hong Kong did not lead to a stronger demand for democratisation, at least before 1989, which was a topical issue being discussed in many scholarly works.

90 Lau Siu-kai, Decolonisation Without Independence: The Unfinished Political Reforms of the Hong Kong Government (Hong Kong: Centre for Hong Kong Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1987, pp. 53-71)

91 Penelope Hartland-Thunberg, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the World Trading System (London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 151-153)

92 ibid.

without suffering large-scale dislocation from nationalistic challenges showed that the colonial government managed to enjoy a certain level of legitimacy among the Hong Kong people.\textsuperscript{94} Although the establishment of colonial rule in Hong Kong was based on military and diplomatic coercion, maintaining such a rule throughout 150 years would have to depend more on law and order, the institutional power and importantly, the consent of the majority of Hong Kong people.\textsuperscript{95} Occasionally, some subtle reference to the doctrines of economic prowess and cultural superiority of British people emerged to justify colonial rule.\textsuperscript{96} However, there was never an elaborate, clearly articulated theory to buttress the British authority in Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{97}

This sense of ‘givenness’ of colonial authority and the surprising immunity of colonial legitimacy from nationalistic challenge lay in the very fact of prevailing political beliefs in power, authority and hierarchy held by the Hong Kong Chinese society.\textsuperscript{98} This could also be understood in terms of that the colonial rule created vested interest groups and the middle class who identified themselves with a continued colonial presence.\textsuperscript{99} The reluctance of the local Chinese elites to support the claims of the Nationalist government to sovereignty over Hong Kong in the aftermath of the Second World War, and the aversion of most of the Hong Kong people in the early 1980s towards the Chinese takeover in 1997, expressed their preference for the status quo as opposed to rule by uncertainty and the unknown.\textsuperscript{100} This political ‘givenness’ was not only an

\textsuperscript{94} Norman Miners, \textit{The Government and Politics of Hong Kong}, 5th ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 112-134)
\textsuperscript{95} Dick Wilson, \textit{Hong Kong! Hong Kong!} (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990, pp. 121-125)
\textsuperscript{96} ibid.
\textsuperscript{97} ibid.
\textsuperscript{98} Hungdah Chiu, \textit{Hong Kong’s Transition to 1997: Background, Problems and Prospects} (Baltimore, MD.: University of Maryland, 1993, pp. 25-33)
\textsuperscript{99} ibid. pp. 91-102
\textsuperscript{100} ibid.
important source of legitimacy for the British rule, but also fitted in well with the Chinese concept of pre-existing power and authority. In addition, British colonial system provided little support for participatory democratic forms, which, coupled with the political culture, provided a social acceptance for Beijing to practise ‘rule by man’ in Hong Kong.

Beijing’s Assessment of Changing Balance

Among all the compelling forces for the Chinese to regain Hong Kong, the sovereignty issue commanded the major focus, as discussed in the previous section of this chapter. This issue carried the historical weight that ran from China’s forced submission to ‘unequal treaties’, to the KMT regime’s efforts to abrogate those treaties, and to the success of a communist movement that relied heavily on a nationalist appeal. The symbolism of Hong Kong’s return remained powerful, since the treaty that ceded Hong Kong island to the British initiated the painful course of foreign intrusions that turned China into a semi-feudalist and semi-colonialist country. Xiao Weiyun, a member of the Basic Law Drafting Committee and a law professor at Beijing University, was quoted as saying that for China it was a matter of sovereignty to determine Hong Kong’s post-1997 political structure.

During the transitional period, the political forces in Hong Kong disintegrated, realigned

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103 ibid.
104 ‘Sovereignty Seen by Professor Xiao’ *South China Morning Post* 6 January 1994, China News Digest (Internet), 7 January 1994
and converged with great fluidity. While the original motive of fifth column policy in Hong Kong was based on traditional revolutionary calculations, the subsequent political fluctuation in the transitional period served to either reduce or reinforce the motivation. This oscillation approximately corresponded to the dynamic political changes during 1983-1997. If the whole transitional period could roughly be divided into two parts—before 1990 and after—then the first part with the increasing institutionalisation and Sino-British cooperation over a series of important issues tended to discount the original perceived political worthiness of the fifth column policy. The second part, however, the breakdown of consensus between the Chinese and British governments over the speed and scale of political reform in Hong Kong meant that the original motive was revived and reinforced by the CCP’s new policy commitment.

The changing political balance during this period could be seen as a result of last minute manoeuvres by both Chinese and British governments. On the British side, Chris Patten

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105 The Chinese and British cooperation in the first part of transition period could be identified by the new airport agreement and the Court of Final Appeal agreement. These agreements demonstrated that how China and Britain could work hard together to solve the differences, even though they disagreed on the British proposal of right of abode in Britain and the colonial government’s introduction of a Bill of Rights. It was also under the auspices of this cooperative spirit that Hong Kong was able to join GATT (WTO), IMF and many other international organisations with independent status. Prior to 1990, Beijing and London even had reached agreements on the principle and speed of bringing in representative democracy before and after 1997. The concept of through train and convergence with the Basic Law were products of Sino-British cooperation in political matters. Guided by these concepts, the two countries consulted each other, mainly through the Joint Liaison Group, on major issues and sought mutually agreeable solutions. The Joint Liaison Group was able to provide a forum in which the both governments could consult, discuss and solve a number of issues which had previously been thought impossible. This development of cooperative relations between the Chinese and British governments through institutional avenues in the first part of the transition period somewhat made the practice of fifth column policy in Hong Kong less relevant. ibid. Also see Steve Shipp, *Hong Kong, China: A Political History of the British Colony’s Transfer to Chinese Rule* (Jefferson, N. C. McFarland, 1995, pp. 102-104).

106 The watershed of the breaking down of cooperation with confrontation and intensified contention between the two governments were the events of 1990. The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as well as the pro-democracy student movement in 1989 critically affected Britain’s Hong Kong policy. It was the misjudgement of the then new administration under John Major that China would soon follow the same path of disintegration, or at least fatally wounded, that pushed the British government to expedite establishing a more representative system in Hong Kong before 1997—with the goal to extend the influence of the Westminster system by strengthening the hands of local democratic advocates. Chris Patten as the new governor to carry out Britain’s revised China and Hong Kong policies encountered strong opposition from Chinese government. The 1991 and 1995 Legco elections were perceived by the Chinese government as well-orchestrated political blackmail by the British government to undermine Chinese authority in the territory. The vow by China in September 1995 to abolish the Legislative Council after 1997 was made more explicit on 24 March 1996 by the vote of the Preparatory Committee to scrap Legco and to replace it by an appointed ‘provisional’ legislature. ibid.
pushed for a rapid democratisation in Hong Kong before 1997. On the Chinese side, more seemed to have been done. In addition to consolidating institutionalised mechanisms, Beijing was also engaged in an aggressive united front strategy to ‘win the numbers’, and a political asset stocktaking of its traditional allies such as the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions. These two moves were closely linked to China’s Hong Kong policy because Beijing could not realistically assess its relative strengths and weakness without also taking into account these two aspects.

**Democratisation—Means or End?**

Hong Kong’s political system was a product of British colonial rule,\(^\text{107}\) which heavily relied on bureaucrats, political institutional arrangements and law. The CCP, on the other hand, had always been suspicious of bureaucratic and institutional approaches, and was even more so in the case of Hong Kong. This was because the CCP had learnt that, as a late comer in the international politics, if it played only by the rules set by others, it would never gain an upper hand in the power game.

In the 1984 Sino-British agreement, China announced that after 1997 Hong Kong’s economic system, legal system and way of life would remain unchanged for fifty years. The basis for this confidence and generosity was China’s assumption of the continuation of Hong Kong in its early 1980s mode—an executive led political system with a

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\(^{107}\) After Hong Kong was ceded to Britain in the 1842 Nanking Treaty, the British Crown issued the Letters Patent and the Royal Instructions in April 1843, which regulated the political system of the new colony and consequently became the constitution of the British colony of Hong Kong for over 150 years. The Letters Patent stipulated the relationship between Hong Kong and London as well as the colony’s internal political system. The core of Hong Kong’s political system was the governor, who was appointed by the Queen of the United Kingdom and was the representative of the British Crown in Hong Kong. The governor was not only the highest authority of the colony, but also the commander-in-chief of British military forces in Hong Kong. He possessed the power to make laws for the colony. See Peter Wesley-Smith, *Unequal Treaty 1898-1997: China, Great Britain and Hong Kong’s New Territories* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1980)
basically complacent population. The fluid political situation in Hong Kong during the transition period gathered a momentum that challenged Beijing to adjust its policy accordingly.\textsuperscript{108} This dynamic process brought changes to the transient and delicate political balance, which in turn impacted on Beijing's assessment and adjustment of its Hong Kong policy.

It became clear in the early 1990s that Britain and China pursued different political agenda in the remaining years running up to 1997. For decades Hong Kong had been a politically inactive but economically dynamic city which was ruled and administered by a vast and efficient Weberian type of bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{109} The colonial government had never taken initiatives to instil political consciousness in the residents. The Hong Kong government had never seriously thought of transplanting British or other Western types of democracies into the colony, either.\textsuperscript{110} For decades, the Hong Kong government had deliberately created hundreds of consultative committees at various levels of the bureaucracy, through which the views and feelings of the industrial-business elites, professionals, and even ordinary people were fed back into the administrative decisionmaking process.\textsuperscript{111} Through this institutionalised process of consultation and absorption, Hong Kong developed a unique political system which was characterised by elitist politics.\textsuperscript{112} The essence of this political system was the bureaucratisation of politics. The efficiency and effectiveness of the system absorbed potential political elites into the administration, which made politics almost unnecessary outside

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\textsuperscript{110} \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{112} \textit{ibid.}
government.\textsuperscript{113}

As 1997 drew near, Governor Chris Patten pushed to accelerate Hong Kong's political reform process by installing a series of new rules, including such sensitive matters as a more representative form of government and an electoral system.\textsuperscript{114} For the Beijing authorities, Patten's plan totally dismantled the Sino-British arrangement for the transition of sovereignty based on the concept of the 'through train', under which the colony's last Legislative Council installed in 1995 would continue to work through to 1999.\textsuperscript{115} The Basic Law confirmed this arrangement on the condition that the composition of the last Legislative Council and its members met the requirements of the law. Patten's change of the manner of election of Legislative Council members was seen as a deliberate defiance to Beijing, therefore a declaration of war to China.

For Beijing, the motive of Patten's political 'coup' was to hastily prop up a \textit{de facto} political reality and system prior to Hong Kong's handover in 1997, which would give China little choice but to accept the \textit{fait accompli}. Worse still, it was also considered to be a conspiracy by the old British colonists aiming to insult China.\textsuperscript{116} Because of this,

\textsuperscript{113} Ambrose Y. C. King, 'Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong: Emphasis on the Grass Roots Level' \textit{Asian Survey} (Vol. 15, No. 5, May 1975, pp. 422-439)

\textsuperscript{114} There were several major reforms in the governor's plan: (1) The Legco and the Exco should be separated, and no members of the Exco would also be members of the Legco. (2) All members of the Legco would be elected in 1995, and the governor would no longer appoint members of the Legco. (3) Most importantly, the way of filling the Legco seats returned by the Election Committee and the functional constituencies in the 1995 election would be rearranged, and those seats would be produced on a more open and democratic basis by a method of "one person, one vote". Patten's other proposals included reducing the voting age from 21 to 18 and encouraging the development of political parties before the 1995 Legco election. In addition, the governor would like to see that all members of the District Boards, the Urban Council, and the Regional Council be elected directly in the 1994 and 1995 elections. See 'Hope for Hong Kong: Chris Patten on His Plans to Safeguard a Way of Life' \textit{The Times} 8 October 1992, p. 14. See also Michael Binyon and James Pringle, 'Patten Move to Broaden Democracy Angers China' \textit{The Times} 8 October 1992, p. 11; Jesse Wong, 'Hong Kong Governor's Speech Raises Hackles in Beijing with Proposals for More Democracy' \textit{The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly} (No. 41, 12 October 1992, p. 5, 12); and Frank Ching, 'Hong Kong: Cleared for Action' \textit{Far Eastern Economic Review} (22 October 1992, pp. 20-21); 'Text of the Governor's Televised Policy Speech' FBIS, 8 October 1992, pp. 27-46.

\textsuperscript{115} Jamie Allen, \textit{Seeing Red: China's Uncompromising Takeover of Hong Kong} (Singapore: KHL Printing, 1997, pp. 112-157)

\textsuperscript{116} Interviews with officials of the Xinhua Office, Hong Kong, December 1996, December 1997
the Chinese government was furious over Patten’s reform proposals, and threatened to retaliate by ‘setting up another kitchen’.\(^\text{117}\) Beijing had two options: to accept Patten’s new arrangement for the transfer of sovereignty which breached the Basic Law; or to reject it and break China’s original promise to establish the first government of the HKSAR with a Provisional Legislature.\(^\text{118}\) Given the circumstances, Beijing seemed to have no choice but to reject Patten’s plan.

On the surface, the irony of Patten’s political reform in Hong Kong was that China tried to maintain Hong Kong’s status quo while Britain tore up its 150 years’ rule book to install a new order. China wanted to preserve the existing executive-led system, long in force under the Letters Patent and Royal Instructions, while Patten chose to change 150 years’ practice and build a representative government. From China’s perspective, Patten’s reform would significantly expand the Hong Kong electoral base by patronising certain social (eg. the young) and other professional groups of voters, making it more difficult for China to extend its influence.

But in essence, Patten’s reform package to empower ordinary Hong Kong people with broader rights and to encourage their political participation could also be seen as the British government’s belated and desperate policy trying to recapture some ground that had been lost and infiltrated by Beijing’s fifth columnists in the previous decade. There was evidence that Patten had been warned of Beijing’s fifth column activities in Hong Kong,\(^\text{119}\) so it was possible that Pattern intended to, under the umbrella of democratisation, offset part of the CCP’s increasing influence in grassroots society. It


\(^{119}\) Interviews with former senior adviser to Hong Kong government, London, December 1997
could therefore be argued that Pattern’s democratisation was not a genuine proposal aiming to give Hong Kong people more democratic rights, but a deliberate act to thwart Beijing’s fifth column policy in Hong Kong. By the same token, it could also be said that Beijing’s predictable reaction to Patten’s proposal was no more than a routine exercise—the CCP did not suffer a terrible blow because of this, knowing that it had already been one step ahead of the game.

The CCP’s United Front Work

As discussed above, under the British rule, Hong Kong’s power structure incorporated business sectors in the government’s administrative decisionmaking process. However, the system of appointment of local representatives gave rise to the specific problem of the exclusion of ethnic Chinese from the colonial government. Although ethnic Chinese accounted for 95 percent of the colony’s population, few were appointed to high-level administrative offices before the 1980s.\(^\text{120}\) As a consequence, in the early 1980s, China was relatively weak and lacked a strong network and representation in both the formal political system and business circles.

Britain’s sovereignty over Hong Kong was embodied in the appointment of the governor and major government officials, and in the colony’s foreign affairs and defence.\(^\text{121}\) Hong Kong had no independent diplomatic relations with any states. Its

\(^{120}\) Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong, 4th ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 168-179). Between 1947 and 1960 the colonial government appointed only seven Chinese as administrative officers, compared to forty-one expatriates. In the following decades, the proportion of Chinese in the directorate class was slowly increased. By 1970, Chinese comprised 19 percent and by 1980, 39.2 percent; and by 1985, 52.5 percent.

\(^{121}\) Steve Shipp, Hong Kong, China: A Political History of the British Colony’s Transfer to Chinese Rule (Jefferson, N. C. McFarland, 1995, pp. 122-128)
external relationships and negotiations were conducted on its behalf by Britain, and its security was protected by British military forces stationed in Hong Kong. More importantly, the governor was sent to the colony to implement British policy.\textsuperscript{122}

One of the characteristics of Hong Kong’s colonial system was that although in the last decades of the British rule, Hong Kong people enjoyed a degree of Western-style political freedom—freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and freedom of assembly—there was no Western-style democracy encapsulated in the representative government and competitive political parties.\textsuperscript{123} Before the Sino-British negotiations on Hong Kong in 1982, elections had been introduced but only for the Urban Council.\textsuperscript{124} During more than 140 years of the British rule in Hong Kong, no member of the Legislative Council was elected directly by the people until 1991.\textsuperscript{125} In the mid 1980s, the rapid increase in the number of Chinese in the senior civil service, professional organisations and other positions of similar status was due to political pressure from the transitional process and the weakening of the colonial government itself, rather than a voluntary concession of the British ruler.\textsuperscript{126}

Beijing noted that the British government’s motive in excluding ethnic Chinese participation in the political system was to instil its own proxies from the top down in order to consolidate and extend colonial rule. It was against this background that the CCP accelerated its united front work in Hong Kong during the transitional period.

\textsuperscript{122} ibid.
\textsuperscript{123} Hungdah Chiu, Y. C. Jao, and Yuanli Wu eds. The Future of Hong Kong: Toward 1997 and Beyond (New York: Quorum Books, 1986, pp. 67-71)
\textsuperscript{124} ibid. But the franchise was highly restricted to voters who qualified in one of twenty-three categories by standards of education, tax paying, or membership in professional bodies. Of the estimated 440,000 eligible voters in a city of over five million, only 35,000 registered; and 6,195 actually voted. See Steve Shipp, Hong Kong, China: A Political History of the British Colony’s Transfer to Chinese Rule (Jefferson, N. C. McFarland, 1995, pp. 182-183)
\textsuperscript{125} Steve Shipp, Hong Kong, China: A Political History of the British Colony’s Transfer to Chinese Rule (Jefferson, N. C. McFarland, 1995, pp. 229-232)
As Chapter Six discussed, the CCP did not stride to power in 1949 entirely on its own two feet. At critical moments, it deployed the united front tactics—a way of building alliances and relationships with sympathetic non-communist groups or individuals for the purpose of enhancing its power and popular support to defeat the enemy of the day. The economy and society of pre-1997 Hong Kong was admittedly very different from pre-liberation China, yet there remained some uncanny political similarities.

The CCP’s united front in Hong Kong could be seen to be a loosely-knit coalition, not a formal body and had no single organisational structure. Although this front comprised a fairly solid cadre of key people at the core, it was far more fluid around the edges—the zone occupied by less important individuals and community groups. It was essentially a strategy of divide and rule, one which played upon existing social and economic divisions for maximum political advantage.

Deng set the tone for the CCP’s Hong Kong united front work by stating that since the party’s policy on Hong Kong was different from the mainland—the maintenance of capitalism not the creation of socialism—the targets of the united front would have to be different too. He was quoted as saying that: “We don’t demand that they be in favour of China’s socialism system; we only ask them to love the motherland and Hong Kong.”

The Xinhua Office started recruiting supporters from among the local business and political elite in addition to its traditional work with left-wing trade unions, intellectuals,

newspapers and schools as early as in the 1950s. But it was the years of Xu Jiatun and Zhou Nan that were extremely productive in winning over the colony’s business elite to the united front. However, it was really in the early 1990s (following the Tiananmen Square Incident) that united front work began to be consolidated. The first China appointed committee was inaugurated in March 1992 and consisted of a group of 44 prominent businessmen, pro-Beijing politicians and professionals, academics and unionists. They were called ‘Hong Kong Affairs Advisers’, a deliberately neutral term chosen to dampen alarm among the Hong Kong public and government officials that the group would function as a ‘second power centre’ alongside the colonial administration.

Over the following three years, a further three groups of advisers from similarly diverse backgrounds were appointed—in March 1993, April 1994 and April 1995—taking the total number to 186 people. The significant point about this troop of local leaders was that, along with Hong Kong delegates to the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, these people formed the long list from which Beijing chose the bulk of its appointees to subsequent committees. Equally important was the fact that Beijing went outside the Basic Law to create its Hong Kong Affairs Advisers—as it did when it established its next unilateral body, the Preliminary Working Committee (the Working Committee).

128 Li Knok-sing, China’s United Front (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1995, p. 73)
129 Both were former directors of the Xinhua Office. Xu was from 1983-1989, and Zhou was from 1990-1997.
130 For example, it could count all the leading tycoons as members: Li Ka-shing (of Cheung Kong), Cheng Yu-tung (of New World) and Lee Shau-kee (of Henderson Land) appeared prominently on one or more of Beijing’s various committees. So did a younger generation of entrepreneurs like Tsui Tsin-tong (China Paint, Citybus, and the New China Hong Kong Group), Walter Kwok (Sun Hung Kai Properties) and Vincent Lo (Shui On).
131 ‘Beijing’s Advisers on Hong Kong Affairs’ South China Morning Post 23 March 1992
133 ibid. For example, the Preliminary Working Committee and the Preparatory Committee
Formed in July 1993, the Working Committee’s task was to examine political, economic, legal, cultural and social/security issues and to decide whether or not they accorded with the Basic Law, then to offer suggestions on what to do if they did not.\textsuperscript{134} In essence, it was established to do the legal and policy spade work for a more important transitional body—the Preparatory Committee, which was appointed in December 1995 and charged under the Basic Law with forming the first government of the Special Administrative Region.\textsuperscript{135}

The setting up of the Working Committee outside the Sino-British agreed framework was justified by Beijing on the ground that Chris Patten had violated the Basic Law with his proposals for an expedient democratic reform. An enraged China decided to go it alone by assembling the Working Committee, designed to leave British and Hong Kong officials out of the loop on key decisions affecting the shape of the Special Administrative Region.\textsuperscript{136}

One more institution of the united front is worth mentioning to complete the picture—the Provisional Legislature. Also not prescribed by the Basic Law, this body was formed by Beijing to replace Hong Kong’s last pre-reunification Legislative Council on 1 July 1997. The latter was elected in 1995 under Patten’s new democratic voting system, which Beijing angrily decided to disband. The Provisional Legislature was chosen in December 1996 and would cease to function in mid 1998, when a new

\textsuperscript{134} The Working Committee covered a range of transitional matters such as how to set up the first post-reunification government, how to manage the ‘tainted’ civil service, what the structure of the future electoral system should be, and how China’s Nationality Law should be applied to Hong Kong. The committee also examined civil and political rights, legislative amendments that would be necessary to stop Hong Kong laws conflicting with the Basic Law, and a raft of ongoing economic issues. See Ming Chan and David Clark, \textit{The Hong Kong Basic Law: Blueprint for 'Stability and Prosperity' under Chinese Sovereignty?} (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1991, pp. 78-85)

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{ibid.}
two-year Legislative Council was promised to take its place.\footnote{Simon Li, ‘PWC Moots Stopgap—Provisional Legco’ \textit{Eastern Express} 6 September 1994}

At a lower level, the non-elitist side of the CCP’s united front in Hong Kong included umbrella associations of various circles in different geographic, age and occupational areas, such as the Hong Kong Eastern District Association of Various Circles, the Kowloon Eastern District Association of Various Circles, and the Hong Kong Women’s Federation Association of Various Circles. One task of these groups was to mobilise support for China at the community level and to maintain links between district pro-China groups. The Xinhua Office kept in contact with all these grassroots groups through its three district offices in Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, and the New Territories.\footnote{Dorothy Liu, ‘The Working of the United Front’ \textit{Hong Kong Standard} 4 April 1995}

From the above analysis, it can be seen that Beijing’s united front work succeeded in winning over a large number of business elite and local leaders from a broad spectrum of Hong Kong society, but such front work was restricted and failed to have a decisive impact on the hearts and minds of the general public. In other words, the united front was spread out yet shallow. It was full of generals, captains and lieutenants, but lacked for ordinary soldiers.

\textit{The CCP’s Traditional Allies}

Apart from using united front work to incorporate Hong Kong’s business and professional elites, Beijing also laid great emphasis on left-wing organisations such as
trade unions, newspapers and schools,139 which formed the CCP’s power base at the grassroots Hong Kong society. China’s assessment of the transformation of these traditional allies directly affected its Hong Kong policy considerations during the transitional period, too.140

According to Marxist-Leninist theory, about 40 years of spectacular economic growth and rapid industrial development in Hong Kong should have provided objective conditions conducive to the development of labour unionism. However, contrary to this hypothesis, membership of Hong Kong trade unions dropped while industrialisation deepened.141 In 1991, about one-third of these 452 labour unions were affiliated with one of the two rival political federations—the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (HKFTU) on the left and the Hong Kong and Kowloon Trade Union Council (HKTUC) on the right.142 Founded in 1948, the Pro-Beijing HKFTU had 82 affiliated unions with some 174,500 members in the early 1980s. Many of these leftist unions were industrial units covering workers in shipyards, textile mills, public transport, public utilities, and printing and construction industries.143 The pro-Taipei HKTUC, also founded in 1948, had 70 affiliated unions with a total membership of 31,000. Many of these were craft unions in the restaurant and building trades.144

The rivalry between the left and the right among the local labour unions had for a long

140 ibid.
141 ibid. According to official data at the end of 1990, there were 452 employees’ unions with a total membership of 439,500 in Hong Kong. See *Hong Kong 1991* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Printer, 1991, pp. 107-111). The number of labour unions was quite impressive yet the average enrolment, at nearly 1,000 members per union, was rather low, and the union membership density of 18 percent among a total workforce of 3 million was not a sign of strong unionisation. ibid.
142 Kathleen Cheek-Milby and Miron Mushkat, *Hong Kong: The Challenge of Transformation* (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1989, pp. 196-198)
143 ibid.
144 ibid.
time afforded the Hong Kong government ample opportunities to play a balance of power game.\textsuperscript{145} The right-wing unions generally suffered from undersized membership while the left-wing unions had a much broader grassroots base, with a more substantial and stable source of members.\textsuperscript{146} In the 1970s, the right-wing of organised labour tended to collaborate much more with the colonial regime than did their leftist counterparts. There was always one or more representatives from the HKTUC-affiliated unions sitting on the government’s official consultative body and the Labour Advisory Board.\textsuperscript{147}

Historically more militant, the left-wing unions suffered serious setbacks in the Cultural Revolution-inspired disturbances of 1967, both in public esteem and in the colonial regime’s tolerance.\textsuperscript{148} The 1967 disturbances marked a crucial turning point for the left-wing unions. They developed a relatively more enlightened social policy with greater concern for the grassroots, such as labour legislation and official measures for industrial welfare.\textsuperscript{149} These undertakings also had the effect of toning down vigorous unionism and radical collective action that might disrupt social stability and economic prosperity.\textsuperscript{150}

The signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in December 1984 turned a new page in local union politics. The local labour leaders and unions played more active political roles in reforming themselves on the one hand, and in renewing their commitment to the

\textsuperscript{145} Jamie Allen, \textit{Seeing Red: China’s Uncompromising Takeover of Hong Kong} (Singapore: KHL Printing, 1997, pp. 68-111)
\textsuperscript{146} Ming Chan and Gerard Postiglione, \textit{The Hong Kong Reader: Passage to Chinese Sovereignty} (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996, pp. 99-101)
\textsuperscript{147} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{148} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{149} Jamie Allen, \textit{Seeing Red: China’s Uncompromising Takeover of Hong Kong} (Singapore: KHL Printing, 1997, pp. 68-111)
\textsuperscript{150} \textit{ibid.}
transitional process on the other. To start with, the leftist HKFTU completely reversed its previous 'abstentionist' policy towards both the Hong Kong government and the local community.\textsuperscript{151} It no longer boycotted, instead it willingly participated in, the government's labour consultative committees.\textsuperscript{152} The September 1985 election for Legislative Council saw the two seats allotted to organised labour in the 'functional constituency' categories split and shared by the left and right.\textsuperscript{153}

As discussed in the previous section, the CCP's united front work was quite successful in building an extensive network that bound local business and professional interests with those of China's. In this sense, it could well be argued that China could rely on them to mitigate part of the rising threat from the democratic lobby. But most of these big business and professional elites had only limited popular appeal and narrow constituencies.\textsuperscript{154} Furthermore, while some of these elites displayed pro-Beijing sentiments, many of them had in the past enjoyed special privileges under British patronage, too. They were of dubious allegiance to Beijing as their firm opposition to a more democratic political system had little to do with their adherence to the official Chinese principles but was based more on a self-centred desire to preserve the status quo.

Obviously, when Beijing assessed its overall strength in Hong Kong, political well-
being of the CCP’s traditional allies was important to it, of which the HKFTU system was the undisputed flagship. However, with membership of about 174,500 among a 3 million workforce, the CCP’s political influence on the working class through this channel could only be seen as marginal. The diminishing political clout of HKFTU was due partly to the ineffective support of Beijing and the functional restriction of the Coordination Department of the Xinhua Office to deliver it. The official status of the Xinhua Office as being the Chinese government’s representative greatly inconvenienced it to engage directly in grassroots united front work and to encourage openly left-wing trade union activities. In addition, shortage of resources also placed severe constraints on its ability to undertake this task.

Beijing’s Assessment

How did the above analysis on Patten’s democratisation proposal in 1992, China’s united front work during the transitional period and the diminishing functional status of Beijing’s traditional allies in Hong Kong together contribute to Beijing’s motivation for a fifth column policy in Hong Kong? Strategically, the need to continue the fifth column operation in Hong Kong required Beijing to comprehensively assess and reassess its strength and inadequacy in Hong Kong’s whole political system. The assessment of the above three areas of concerns provided a reliable base for Beijing to do so.

It has been made clear in this Part that, during the transitional period, China passionately pursued its goals by maximising every option to advance its perceived interests—an institutional mechanism was fully installed; the united front was efficient

155 ibid.
in the sense that it won crucial support from Hong Kong business and professional elites; traditional allies, such as the HKFTU, functioned but were weak. But judging from Chinese revolutionary experience, leadership in Beijing would note that something important was missing from this power structure, which might well constitute an obstacle to prevent the CCP from achieving its ultimate goal in Hong Kong. As identified in this chapter, in the mass-based grassroots Hong Kong society, the CCP’s influence was limited.

The outcome of the assessment of the changing political balance in Hong Kong during the 1980s and 1990s clearly pointed to a deficiency in the CCP’s representation in the lower strata of Hong Kong society, which, for the decision makers in Beijing, would jeopardise its long-term and overall objectives. This assessment provided one of the catalysts, and a constant justification, for Beijing to launch, and to continue, its fifth column policy in Hong Kong—as a way of compensating for its relatively weak ‘sphere of influence’ on Hong Kong’s political balance sheet.

Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter showed that Beijing’s motivation for the fifth column policy in Hong Kong was a logical outcome of Beijing’s apprehensions about Hong Kong’s political future. These apprehensions were sourced from a mixed bag of considerations, including the burden of Hong Kong’s colonial history, its understanding of sovereignty, its political tradition of ‘rule by man’, and an assessment of changing political balance in Hong Kong during the transitional period, especially its political standing in grassroots society. Domestic politics and international forces determined not only that
China would take Hong Kong back, but also, more importantly, the way in which the restoration would be accomplished.

This chapter demonstrated that although the CCP’s philosophical underpinning of the fifth column policy in Hong Kong, namely suspicion, distrust, political self-reliance and self-sufficiency, insecurity and fear, was consistent, the motives of the policy were adjusted several times to accommodate volatile political development in both China and Hong Kong. This dynamic nature of the policy operating environment reflected the enormous complexity, subtlety and rapid changes of Chinese foreign policy itself during this period. The British and local liberals’ push to hasten the democratisation process in the early 1990s finally vindicated China’s fifth column policy in Hong Kong.

It would be fair to ask whether Beijing’s use of such a covert policy was fundamental to the assertion of its sovereign rights in Hong Kong? The possibility of armed local resistance against the Chinese government had always been nil. Rural resistance in the New Territories? Pitched battles in the crowded streets of Kowloon? Scuba divers mining mainland ships in Victoria Harbour? Such scenarios were obviously preposterous. Yet if these scenarios sounded ridiculous and China was not fighting a civil war in Hong Kong, why the quasi-military tactics, then?

The answer to this was that, from the analysis of this chapter, for the Chinese government, effective sovereignty in Hong Kong must include formal recognition of Hong Kong as a part of China and the Chinese government’s autonomy to exercise ultimate authority there. This level of understanding of sovereignty empowered the CCP with almost absolute rights to use any means to achieve this end. Its deeply-entrenched
concept of ‘rule by man’ provided a cultural justification for a policy such as the fifth column in Hong Kong. Given Beijing’s awareness in the early 1980s of its declining political base at the grassroots Hong Kong society (exemplified by the left-wing trade unions) and the enormous task ahead with the imminent return of Hong Kong in the mid 1990s, a fifth column policy seemed to be a limited, yet rational choice for the CCP under the circumstances.

This chapter also demonstrated that the core value of the fifth column policy as political insurance was accomplished and preserved. For Beijing, Chris Patten’s radical reform package was only the tip of the iceberg of the complicated political and social relations in the future Hong Kong. For example, the most dangerous threat, or dilemma, lay in the scenario that through a gradual democratisation process, which China was obliged to implement, some prominent political figures hostile to Beijing might be popularly elected to high office. To effectively avoid this happening, the fifth column policy not only seemed highly appropriate, but also became an absolute necessity to reduce damage caused directly by Patten’s proposal, and to prepare for the more general trend of democratisation in the future.

Viewed from this perspective, it could be concluded that Beijing’s fifth column policy in Hong Kong during the transitional period was the continuation of a traditional siege mentality of wall-building in China’s foreign policy motivation. It was also a testimony to the enduring and pervasive political culture of ‘rule by man’ in the minds of the Chinese leadership, especially in its approaches to dealing with the unknown and uncertain. The effects of the structural/situational evolution and changes in the political environment on motivational intensity and direction of the fifth column policy
reinforced the interactive and dynamic process of Chinese foreign policy.
CONCLUSION
The evidence in this study strongly suggested that, despite the rapid emergence in China of a pragmatic and more flexible policy regime, despite the indisputable institutionalisation of the policy process and the weakening of personal intervention in it, and despite 'sweeping' changes in China's strategic thinking and foreign policy considerations, the three core elements—perception, personalised politics and structural/situational constraints—that underpinned Chinese foreign policy motivation under Mao persisted in Deng's reform era. The thesis also demonstrated that the intensity and domain of each core element in the motivation configuration varied according to the specific time and the specific foreign policy issue.

Classical international relations theories of realism, liberalism and Marxism were inadequate in explaining the complex and dynamic nature of motivation in foreign policy. These three main schools of thought addressed motivation in grossly simplified forms—using broad and general concepts such as power, modernity or class struggle, for example.

Scholars who went beyond these classical boundaries into the theoretical exploration of foreign policy motivation were able to abandon the simplified theoretical paradigms set by the classical schools. They have provided useful alternatives to penetrate and to expose the heterogeneous and constantly changing characteristics of foreign policy motives. The theories on foreign policy motivation analysed in this thesis were found to be highly complementary and often dependent on the similar sets of crucial variables.

The thesis was structured to first elucidate these three critical elements—perception,
personality and structural/situational factors—and their interrelationship in the motivation process. It then tested their applicability to the problem of understanding the Chinese government’s foreign policy motivation. However, given the CCP’s inherited historical burden, the persistent political culture and value in the Chinese decisionmaking system, and the rapid changes in the last 20 years in China’s domestic and international settings, this thesis found that no single motivation theory seemed by itself to have the capacity to fully explain Chinese foreign policy motives. It was only with the combined strands of the different schools of foreign policy motivation theory that this task seemed to be attainable.

Politics, especially foreign policy, in China was always conducted in a highly protected and secretive manner. For scholars, this has meant incomplete evidence, unavailability of the actors and frequent irregularity of the decision mechanism, which in turn have created severe research barriers for them to hypothesise and prove a consistent policy tendency or preference. This thesis has argued that the motivation approaches could compensate for this deficiency and enrich the study of Chinese foreign policy by showing new ways of sifting through the scant information and to reach out to feel the real policy pulse. Indeed, another principal advantage of adopting motivation approaches was the opportunity to assess more accurately China’s future policy directions. The rising trend of taking motivation as the main focus in the study of Chinese foreign policy in the 1990s tended to confirm the practicality and relevance of these theories.

The investigation into the existing motivation theories in Part I of this thesis identified three major elements that were pertinent to Chinese foreign policymaking—perception,
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personality, and structural/situational constraints. In analytical chapters of Part II, the roles of these three elements and their variant forms were investigated in the context of the conception, articulation and implementation of Chinese foreign policy in both the Mao and the Deng eras. This exercise also tested the validity and effectiveness of these motivation theories in studying Chinese foreign policy.

The thesis confirmed that perception played a crucial role in Chinese foreign policy motivation. The political leaders’ views on political reality, whether simple and intuitive, or highly complex and formally articulated, set the reference points for policy deliberation and decisionmaking. These views also informed the leaders’ considerations of various courses of action and provided the motivation for foreign policy judgement and choice. Many Chinese leaders consciously or unconsciously brought to the foreign policy process a mixed system of ideas, values, assumptions and prejudices (such as Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, Deng’s modernisation rationalisation, Confucian ‘rule by man’ philosophy and indigenous nationalism) and these acted as a constantly adjusting perceptual prism through which they looked at the world, filtered information and interpreted reality.

Richard Cottam divided the concept of perception into two aspects—perceptual components and patterns—in order to demonstrate the linkage between a concept and its origins. He argued that the determinants of perception included historical experience, community values, political relevance, role interests and idiosyncratic socialisation patterns. He also pointed out that a particular value and belief would become salient for an individual or a group if it was perceived either as a threat or as an opportunity. Furthermore, Cottam maintained that beliefs influenced perception through their
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relation to expectations and interpretations.

In one form or another, perception played a role in the foreign policy of every state, and China was certainly no exception to this rule. What distinguished China, particularly in the early years of the People’s Republic, was the application of the highly articulated, systematic, formal ideology of Marxism-Leninism to the realm of foreign policy on the assumption that it could provide China’s leaders with an accurate guide to the choices they faced in the international arena. The behaviours of other states, including China’s formal ally the Soviet Union, often diverged, however, from what the predicates of ideology suggested, so gradually the function of formal ideology changed. But the concepts and language of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought continued to frame the thinking of Chinese political leaders, and they continued to justify their foreign policy choices in ideological terms whenever needs arose.

The analysis of the sources and role of perception in China’s foreign policy in this thesis has indicated how productive this approach could be. Chinese leaders saw the world in the rigid terms of the Cold War era as a dichotomous universe of faithful comrades and treacherous enemies locked in an historic struggle between opposing class forces. But the CCP’s own experience over time in both domestic politics and foreign relations revealed the world in fact to be much more complex and variegated.

The diminishing role of ideology in the Deng era allowed China to practise a more pragmatic foreign policy. The transformation from an enclosed, politically self-sufficient and ideologically driven foreign policy to a more open and flexible policy regime did not reduce the primary role of perception in the Chinese foreign policy
motivation process. In general terms, perception continued to have both prescriptive and proscriptive functions in Chinese foreign policy, but the entire system of thought became so broad and adaptive that few foreign policy behaviours were excluded by it. This could be seen in China’s actual foreign relations in the reform era where the strict adherence to ideology varied with respect to country, issue, geographical area and time period.

Margaret Hermann and Richard Snyder and his colleagues discerned that the personality of individual leaders could play an important part in foreign policy motivation, and this role depended on the polity of the country in question. They believed that the more open, transparent and institutionalised the system was, the less likely the leaders’ personalities were to influence foreign policy outcomes. China’s unique political culture and practice, consolidated through the CCP’s cadre system and the party-state monopoly, were reviewed in the thesis to emphasise the role of eminent political leaders and the party elites in shaping Chinese foreign policy motivation. The deeply-entrenched concept of ‘rule by man’ as an art of governance as well as a political culture in the minds of the CCP leaders crystallised their mental inclination and practical expectation in handling China’s foreign relations. The extensive practice of ‘rule by man’ added one important characteristic to Chinese foreign policy motivation—an excessive dependence on political allegiances, party connections and the personal experience of the CCP cadres to achieve China’s foreign policy goals, instead of reliance on institutional and bureaucratic power which was limited by laws, regulations or more objective assessments.

This thesis found the two main attributes of foreign policy motivation—durability and
persistence as highlighted by Richard Snyder and his colleagues—to be of particular interest in the Chinese case. It proved that being motivated was not a momentary event and that a particular motivation could be reinforced through the continued performance of a policy, program or plan. Reward, familiarity and feedback from previous success would strengthen motivational orientation. Decision makers had a tendency to keep their policies within this comfort zone. This last point was strongly supported by the case study on Beijing’s fifth column policy in Hong Kong from 1983 to 1997. Beijing’s deep suspicion and distrust of the British government in turn was directly translated into a policy that mobilised and transported a large force of CCP cadres to boost the party’s comparability with Hong Kong—and tying it directly through the fifth column to the true spirit of the CCP’s revolutionary tradition. The Hong Kong case demonstrated powerfully that the CCP was willing and ready to take a big risk and determined to employ every possible means to achieve its ultimate foreign policy objectives. Therefore, the argument that Chinese authorities would make all the concessions in order to retain Hong Kong’s economic prosperity was weak simply because it failed to take into account the critical role of sovereignty and the nationalistic dimensions of China’s politics, which acquired special salience as Deng Xiaoping’s reform deepened and the process of leadership succession intensified.

However, the durability and persistence of China’s foreign policy motivation did not equate to a monolithic set of static circumstances—durability would often encounter survival crises and persistence would often be challenged by the need for learning and adapting. This point was clearly demonstrated and emphasised in analysing the dynamics of Chinese foreign policy process in Part II.
Walter Carlsnaes’ contribution brought into motivation study an indispensable variable—structural/situational elements, which could modify or accelerate the impact of both perception and personality on foreign policy motivation. Chinese international relations in the Deng era provided many practical examples to prove the value of considering this aspect. In light of this, this thesis treated each component of foreign policy motivation—whether historical, ideological, personal, cultural or institutional—in a relative and probabilistic rather than an absolute, deterministic manner in order to delineate the range of permissible and possible foreign policy choices that could be made at a given time on a specific issue according to the situational factors.

Relying on Carlsnaes’ approach, this thesis covered a range of changes in the organisational settings which acted as catalysts in Chinese foreign policy motivation. The central importance of perception and personality dimensions in Chinese foreign policy motivation notwithstanding, this thesis concurred with Carlsnaes’ theory that changes in objective conditions and organisational settings were the most active and dynamic agents affecting the configuration and final outcomes of foreign policy motivation. This proposition was proved positively by the drastic changes in China’s foreign policy decisionmaking, which, being under enormous domestic and international pressures, registered an exceptional degree of flexibility in order to achieve goals of Deng’s reform program.

Having made these observations about the core themes of China’s foreign policy under Deng, the thesis linked the interaction between perception, personality and structural/situational constraints in a case study of CCP’s fifth column policy in Hong
Kong during the transitional period. Although migration from the mainland to Hong Kong had played a major role in Hong Kong’s industrialisation and the legendary emergence as an ‘economic tiger’ during the colonial rule, it was never carried out with such pervasiveness, vigour and covert purpose, nor was it as socioeconomically or politically significant, as during the transitional period from 1983 to 1997. Never before had ‘family reunion’ migration flow from China been so pertinent to Beijing’s projected future interests in Hong Kong and so closely connected to politics in China.

This thesis discovered that perception, the embedded practice of ‘rule by man’ and constant reassessment of the political balance in Hong Kong were the three main sources of this policy. Although the logic of Beijing’s fifth column policy stemmed from an underlying fear, suspicion and distrust, the immediate goals and implementation tactics of the policy had to be adjusted and modified several times to serve the ultimate objectives of China’s foreign policy. The evolution of China’s fifth column policy in Hong Kong demonstrated an important disposition of China’s foreign policy motivation—the absolute necessity to adapt to the vulnerability, volatility and dynamics of the policy environment.

The thesis found that Beijing’s passionate pursuit of the fifth column policy in Hong Kong was, in spite of some fluctuation, a consistent, not an aberrant, action. This, however, went hand in hand with China’s vigorous push for more constructive participation in institutional arrangements. While China’s successful exploration of institutional avenues to soothe Hong Kong’s transition might represent its willingness to adapt and learn, the operation of the fifth column in Hong Kong was a manifestation of the lingering legacy of traditional values of perception and political culture in Chinese
foreign policy motivation. It also frustrated the expectation that adaptation might have become the dominant feature in China’s leadership decisionmaking under Deng. There was no better evidence of this than the resurgence of Beijing’s interest in the fifth column policy after democratic movements in Hong Kong boiled over in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident and after Governor Patten introduced his democratisation proposals for the Legislative Council in 1992—challenges which threatened what had until then been viewed by China as an increasingly favourable trend of developments achieved through reliance on an open, negotiated and institution-based approach.

Thus, integration of the three competing motivation theories and extensive empirical analysis of Chinese foreign policy allowed this conclusion to be drawn: despite being increasingly diversified by constant changes in global as well as national contexts, and despite impressive transformations in both scale and magnitude, Chinese foreign policy motivation could not, in the final analysis, transcend and overcome certain perceptual prejudices, political traditions and systemic limits imposed by the underlying doctrines and practice. Although certain motivation elements might have been temporarily weakened or dissipated under certain circumstance of motivation, the philosophical foundation of the three elements in Chinese foreign policy motivation persisted and the deeply entrenched political tradition was never far from the surface in the practice of Beijing’s fifth column policy in Hong Kong.

After the CCP’s Fifteenth Party Congress in September 1997 and the National People’s Congress in March 1998, a new Chinese leadership has emerged with Jiang Zemin having consolidated his power as the party’s General Secretary and Zhu Rongji replacing Li Peng as the state Premier. Would this high level personnel reshuffle affect
China’s foreign policy motivation in the years ahead? Or to what extent would such an arrangement impact on the changing balance between the necessity to adapt and the persistence of tradition in China’s foreign policy decisionmaking? Obviously, these questions are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, what has been concluded in this thesis suggests strongly that, for a considerable period of time to come, the key elements that cast the Chinese foreign policy motivation framework would remain largely unchanged. As such, China’s foreign policy could be expected to continue to stake heavily on issues such as sovereignty and national reunification on the one hand, and embrace economic pragmatism and necessary political adjustment on the other.
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