CHINESE NATIONAL SECURITY

AND

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

1978-1988

by

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DECLARATION

Except where otherwise indicated
this Thesis is my own work.

J. Mohan Malik

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ABSTRACT

Arguing that the role and significance of the "medium-sized" nuclear powers like China can no longer be ignored in the nuclear arms control process, this study examines the central relationship between China's national security and nuclear arms control policies in order to gain a better understanding of China's response to nuclear arms control issues. The major focus is on Chinese policy towards formal and nuclear arms control pacts in the period 1978-1988.

This dissertation undertakes a detailed examination of China's response to three nuclear arms control issues, viz., the nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZs) and the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) talks. The case study on nuclear non-proliferation shows that the stemming of nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation has still not become an integral part of Chinese nuclear arms control policy, Beijing's declaratory policy notwithstanding. An examination of Chinese policy on nuclear free zones demonstrates that, contrary to popular assumptions, Beijing is not an unconditional and unequivocal supporter of NFZs. Rather, it is the specific characteristics of NFZs and their implications for Chinese national security that shape China's response to the establishment of NFZs around the world. The third case study illustrates how the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) talks of the 1980s brought about a convergence of security interests among China, France and Britain and led Beijing to adopt an articulated arms control strategy to prevent its nuclear weapons capability from being undermined by the superpower arms control process.

This study goes on to demonstrate that while China has been unusually active in the arms control arena since the early 1980s, there has been little substantive change in Beijing's policy regarding its own participation in the nuclear arms reduction process. The essence of China's nuclear arms control policy has been (and is likely to be) to avoid, at all costs, having its own nuclear forces limited by external constraints. Besides, China's evolving military thinking and defence strategy, and trends in the Chinese nuclear force modernisation programme in recent years have led to a hardening of Beijing's stance on China's participation in the nuclear arms control talks.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABC	Atomic, Biological and Chemical
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACD	Arms Control and Disarmament *
ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ADM	Atomic Demolition Munition
APCs	Armoured Personnel Carriers
ASAT	Anti-Satellite Weapon
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BIISS	Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defence
C3I	Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence
CASS	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CBMs	Confidence-building Measures
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CD	Committee on Disarmament
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMC	Central Military Commission
COCOM	Co-ordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSS	Chinese Surface-to-Surface
CTB	Comprehensive Test Ban
DC	Disarmament Commission
DF	<i>Dong Feng</i> [East Wind]
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
EEZs	Exclusive Economic Zones
ENS	Emerging Nuclear Suppliers
GCD	General and Complete Disarmament
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
IIS	Institute for International Studies
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
INF	Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
IOZOP	Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace
IRBM	Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile
LANWFZT	Latin American Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty
LRINF	Long-range Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MIRV	Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle
MND	Ministry of National Defence
MRBM	Medium-range Ballistic Missile
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime

*The abbreviation ACD used in the thesis means specifically *Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament* except where the context indicates otherwise.

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCI	Nuclear Control Institute
NFU	No-First-Use
NFZ	Nuclear Free Zone
NNP	Nuclear Non-Proliferation
NNWS	Non-Nuclear Weapon State
NPC	National People's Congress
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers' Group
NTB	Nuclear Test Ban
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
NWS	Nuclear Weapon State
OTA	Office of Technology Assessment
PINSTECH	Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PNE	Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
PRC	People's Republic of China
PTBT	Partial Test Ban Treaty
PWR	Pressurized Water Reactors
PWUMC	People's War Under Modern Conditions
R&D	Research and Development
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SANWFZ	South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SEANWFZ	South East Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM	Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM	Sea-launched Cruise Missile
SLOCs	Sea Lines of Communications
SPNFZT	South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
SRBMs	Short-range Ballistic Missiles
SRINF	Short-range Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
SSB	Ballistic-Missile Submarine
SSBN	Nuclear-fuelled SSB
SSN	Nuclear-powered attack Submarine
SSOD	Special Session on Disarmament
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TNF	Theatre Nuclear Forces
TNWs	Tactical Nuclear Weapons
TTBT	Threshold Test Ban Treaty
UF	United Front
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VLF	Very Long Frequency
ZOP	Zone of Peace
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Friendship and Neutrality

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

Since 1964, when the People's Republic of China (PRC) joined the exclusive nuclear club as the fifth nuclear weapon state (NWS), China's nuclear weapons, defence strategy and its implications for the global nuclear balance of power have been the subject of analysis and writings of many China specialists.¹ However, the question of the impact of China's nuclear weapons on the ^{nuclear} arms control and disarmament (ACD) process, generally speaking, has been given little attention by the strategic and arms control communities.² This is surprising, because China has emerged as the third largest nuclear weapon state in the world³, has acquired a credible second-strike capability against a superpower-enemy⁴, and has a sizeable nuclear arsenal that complicates the ACD negotiations of the two superpowers.⁵ The lack of appreciation of the increasing significance of China for the global arms control process can be attributed partly to the Euro-centred or US-Soviet-centred nature of ^{nuclear} arms control talks, theories and concepts⁶ which have tended to neglect the question of integrating Chinese nuclear forces with the arms control process. Part of the responsibility for this neglect also lies with the Chinese themselves: their political system which severed China's links with the rest of the world for almost two decades; their suspicions and fears of external powers for historical reasons; and their adoption of a highly sceptical and initially hostile attitude towards the ACD process which was seen in Beijing as a superpower tool to maintain and perpetuate US-Soviet nuclear duopoly.⁷

There is no denying the fact - as the Chinese have always argued in defence of their exclusion from the arms control arena - that the primary responsibility for nuclear arms reductions lies with the two superpowers which possess more than 90 per cent of the world's total nuclear weapons.⁸ Nonetheless, the role and significance of the nuclear arsenals of "medium-sized" or "third" NWSs like China, Britain and France cannot and should not be underestimated.

Firstly, it is worth noting that China's position in the global nuclear balance of power is unique (and distinct from that of France or Britain) in the sense that China has justified its acquisition of nuclear weapons in terms of a perceived threat to its national security first from the United States and later from the Soviet Union. Moreover,

Beijing's historical quest for an "independent foreign policy" course necessitates the development, deployment and targeting of nuclear weapons to deter *both* the superpowers.⁹ In contrast, the sole *raison d'être* of "going nuclear" in the case of France and Britain has been and will remain the need to counter a threat from one quarter - the Soviet Union. Thus, the nuclear weapons capability of Britain and France in a sense tends to augment and supplement the nuclear deterrent of the other superpower, the United States.¹⁰ Though France has also sought to justify the acquisition of nuclear weapons in terms of maintaining some degree of strategic independence from the United States, the French never have had and are unlikely to have an adversarial relationship with the Americans. In sharp contrast, the Chinese armed forces have engaged in actual combat with the American forces in the Korean and Indochina wars. In spite of a thaw in Sino-US relations since the 1970s and the talk of convergence of Sino-American strategic interests between 1978-82, Beijing is widely believed to have devoted a not insignificant portion of its nuclear deterrent force towards countering the threat to its security from the United States. Besides, China also continues to monitor American air and naval activities in the Pacific Ocean. Thus, given the fluctuating nature of Beijing's relationships with Washington and Moscow, neither superpower can afford to count on the Chinese nuclear weapons in the event of a conflict with the other. The configuration of "medium-sized" NWSs like China, France and Britain in relation to the superpowers and China's unique position in the global nuclear balance of power is shown in figure I.I.

Figure I.I

The Nuclear Forces of Five Nuclear Weapons States

Secondly, although the Chinese military capability is and is likely to remain inferior to those of the United States and the Soviet Union, its existence introduces an element of uncertainty and unpredictability which both superpowers have to take into account in formulating their strategic and arms control policies. As one student of Chinese arms control policy has succinctly observed:

China's nuclear strength acts as a catalyst for the "triangularisation" of the three states' nuclear strategies, where decisions regarding force size and doctrine by one state alter the perceived strategic balance for the other two.¹¹

Thirdly, in order to maintain and enhance the relative credibility of their nuclear deterrent *vis-à-vis* the USSR and US, the Chinese are "continuing military preparations in the nuclear sphere and, in some fields, at a very fast rate."¹² If the ongoing superpower talks on 50 per cent cuts in strategic arms succeed, the gap between superpowers and medium-sized NWSs would narrow considerably and make it increasingly difficult for the Chinese (or French and British for that matter) to continue to justify their exclusion from the nuclear arms reduction talks.¹³ All three medium-sized NWSs - China, France and Britain - have nuclear modernisation programmes under development which will significantly increase the number of warheads in their possession. The implementation of the 1987 US-Soviet Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty - which obligates Washington and Moscow to destroy ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres - has already left China with a virtual monopoly in INF systems in Asia.¹⁴ The ongoing qualitative improvement and quantitative expansion of Chinese nuclear forces coupled with the possibility of superpowers agreeing to cut 50 per cent of their strategic weapons means that by the end of the 20th century, Chinese nuclear forces, already impressive, will be quite formidable. An increase in the relative strike capabilities of Chinese nuclear forces would make it difficult for either superpower to ignore the "China factor" in the strategic arms limitation talks. The Soviet Union has already said that it expects "the issue of the nuclear missiles forces of third countries [to] 'mature' for consideration after 50 per cent cuts in the Soviet and American strategic nuclear forces."¹⁵

The nuclear force that China can be expected to possess by the end of the 20th century raises a number of questions about arms control: What effect will the Chinese nuclear modernisation programme have on the superpower military balance and superpower arms control? What types of future arms control negotiations might China be interested in, and what types ^{of ACD} would the Chinese probably oppose? What role can

China play in bilateral and/or multilateral arms control efforts in regional security theatres?

Fourthly, China's physical absence from the arms control tables does not mean that it has not figured prominently in the arms control negotiations and pacts conducted by the superpowers. Each arms control measure since the early 1960s - be it the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1967, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I & II (SALT) of the 1970s, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) of 1972, or the INF Treaty of the 1980s - has had something or other to do with the Chinese nuclear weapons. While the testing of a nuclear device by China in 1964 provided the impetus towards global non-proliferation efforts culminating in the conclusion of the NPT in 1967, the US-Soviet negotiations on eliminating short-range and intermediate-range missile systems in the 1980s were complicated by the deployment of Chinese INF systems targeted at the Soviet Union.¹⁶ Several analysts of China's military have argued that the Chinese nuclear capability has the potential to destabilise superpower control when it may be needed most in a crisis, to prompt or to escalate conflict, and to increase the chances of accidental or unintentional nuclear war.¹⁷ Likewise, China's unwillingness to contribute to nuclear arms control could hinder the prospects of an agreement between superpowers to substantially cut their nuclear forces. As the significance of China's nuclear factor in US-Soviet defence and arms control doctrines is increased, the need for a greater understanding of China's arms control policy grows.

Finally, instead of waiting around for the two superpowers to make significant cuts in their nuclear strategic weapons before Beijing (and Paris and London) could engage in multilateral talks on arms reductions, there are a number of ACD areas where the five NWSs can start immediate talks on an equal footing.¹⁸ Michael Tucker argues that in view of the growing trend towards a diffusion of military power and the widespread development of "dual-use" civilian technologies with potential military applications, many issues on the global ACD agenda can be effectively resolved only with the cooperation of all NWSs and near-nuclear capable states.¹⁹ For example, given the political will, the five NWSs can formulate a joint strategy to control the spread of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, check the extension of arms race into outer space, negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty, and encourage the establishment of nuclear-free zones (NFZs) and respect such zones in letter and spirit once they are established.

From the foregoing, it is evident that the problem of the integration of Chinese nuclear weapons with the arms control process is one which must not be ignored. In recent years a consensus has also emerged among the arms control specialists that in the long run, no global nuclear arms control agreement can be fully effective without China's active support and participation.²⁰ If nuclear arms control is to make further progress, the Chinese (and Anglo-French) nuclear forces will have to be included in future talks. This raises an obvious question, namely - is there any evidence that the Chinese leadership have the political will to contribute in a positive manner towards global nuclear arms control efforts?

Political will itself is dependent on, and determined by, the sense of security and confidence a country's leadership has in its ability to deal effectively with external threats to its security and territorial integrity. If a country feels insecure *vis-à-vis* its perceived enemy, it is unlikely to engage in an arms reduction process unless that process is mutual and works to the military disadvantage of its opponent. On the other hand, if a country's deterrent capabilities are judged as sufficient, then, it might be more forthcoming on ACD issues. Thus one cannot answer this question without looking into the relationship between a country's national security and arms control policies because this relationship may be critical in determining that country's approach to ACD. After all, no country can engage in an arms control process if it perceives ACD as undermining the country's national security. It has been pointed out that "[a]rms control and disarmament policy, being an important aspect of foreign policy, must be consistent with national security policy."²¹

The Study

This study examines the relationship between China's national security policy and ACD strategy. It argues that national security provides the best perspective from which to analyse, measure and predict a country's response to arms control issues. Reliance on any other analytical perspective will lead to misleading conclusions and conjectures. The central question this thesis proposes to examine is how Chinese national security policy affects its ACD policy and is, in turn, influenced by it. In other words, the objective is to investigate the central relationship between China's ACD and national security policies. The conclusions drawn in the thesis will not necessarily be capable of extrapolation to explain Chinese policy on arms control as it relates to non-nuclear weapons.

Some Definitions

National security policy can be defined as military, economic, and political/diplomatic means taken by a country to protect itself against external threats.²² Chinese national security strategy, defined thus, is a sum total of military programmes, diplomatic initiatives, internal and external economic policies which are influenced by the country's geostrategic location, state of economic development, and its foreign relations.²³

It should be noted that terms like disarmament and arms control, though often used interchangeably, are not the same. Disarmament is the reduction or abolition of armaments whereas arms control is restraint exercised upon armaments policy, whether in respect of the level of armaments, their character, deployment or use.²⁴ Past experience is a testimony to the fact that "disarmament is not likely to be achieved in a single leap, and arms control, however modest its result in actual reduction might be at certain stages, may prove to be more effective and realistic - albeit intermediate - path leading to the ultimate goal."²⁵ The three classic goals of arms control have been identified as: (i) to reduce the risk of war, (ii) to reduce its destructiveness should it occur, and (iii) to limit the burden of peacetime defence expenditure.²⁶ The linkage between national security and arms control is explained by Gerald Segal:

Sensible arms control combines concern with national security, national independence and international interdependence. Independence, because first and foremost, arms control is intended to enhance national security. But also interdependence because such security especially in the nuclear age, is dependent on controlling the actions of other states.²⁷

Viewed thus, arms control or the notion of controlling arms races is accepted and pursued by a nation-state as an essential element of its national security policy.²⁸ It may be pointed out that this study is concerned primarily with *formal* arms control, i.e., negotiated arms control agreements aimed at restraining the arms race, reducing armaments, checking military forces and affecting military strategy in a way conducive to the general principles of arms control. However, this is not to undermine the significance of *informal* arms control measures such as unilateral/bilateral, unstated steps and *de facto* confidence-building measures (CBMs) undertaken by a state or states which reduce tensions, and prevent the outbreak of war.²⁹ Arms control specialists have been debating the need to broaden the definition of traditional arms control theory "to include political, social, economic, organisational, educative, formal and informal steps"³⁰ which lead to reduction in tensions, reduce the threat of war, and enhance crisis stability. It has been argued that such a redefinition of arms control theory would be

especially useful in the Asian context in general, and the Chinese context in particular in view of the tendency of Asian countries to engage in undeclared, low-profile arms control initiatives to resolve bilateral disputes.³¹ It could also facilitate, in the long term, the integration of Asian and European arms control processes. Nonetheless, since the ongoing debate about redefining arms control has yet to produce a more comprehensive and logical framework, for the purposes of analysis this study is concerned mainly with China's response to *formal* arms control.

Literature Review

The sudden surge of interest in Chinese attitudes towards arms control soon after the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964, quickly evaporated as it became clear that China, being highly sceptical about the utility of arms control and suspicious of the motives of the two superpowers, had no intention of participating in the formal ACD process - which was excoriated as "sham peace" and "superpower collusion to encircle China."³² However, this does not diminish the significance of the works published during mid and late 1960s on Chinese attitudes towards arms control issues. The most important contributions in this regard have been those of Morton Halperin, D.H. Perkins, Alice L. Hsieh, W.C. Clemens Jr. and Jonathan Pollack.³³ During this period, China was militarily weak and vulnerable; hence it saw arms control as threatening its national security and opposed it in the absence of any positive military incentive for negotiating arms control agreements. A major weakness of these studies, conducted as they were during the Cold War era, was the tendency to overemphasise the importance of ideological factors in the making of Chinese national security policy. Another problem was their rapid obsolescence as most of these studies were undertaken from the perspective of implications for American security interests. Though these studies of the early 1960s still remain useful as reference material on the early Chinese attitudes to nuclear weapons, arms control, and war and peace, they are, nonetheless, outdated by more than two decades of changes in China's domestic and external policies, as well as by dramatic changes in the international arena.

At a slightly more analytical level are the works published during the early and late 1970s that attempt to analyse the role of "China factor" in US-Soviet arms control negotiations such as SALT I and II and the ABM Treaty of 1972. The works of Harry Gelber, Michael Pillsbury, Alice Hsieh, Pollack, Doak Barnett and studies undertaken by US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and Hoover Institution fall in this category and provide a useful insight into Chinese perspectives on arms control.³⁴

Gelber devoted one section to arms control in his 1973 study *Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Policy*. After analysing the Chinese attitudes to various arms control issues, Gelber reached the conclusion that

[b]y concentrating on the impractical declaratory aim of eliminating all nuclear weapons it [Beijing] effectively gains time for quantitative and qualitative Chinese force improvements, which will strengthen both China's security and her negotiating position.³⁵

Michael Pillsbury in his monograph *SALT on the Dragon* in 1975 conducted a thorough content analysis of Chinese statements and commentaries on SALT negotiations but stopped short of inferring a general Chinese policy towards arms control. The studies undertaken by ACDA were largely speculative in nature and were overtaken by the events of the late 1970s.

Since the early 1970s, international politics have undergone a sea change. China has normalised its relations with both the USA and the USSR, launched a domestic modernisation drive with significant implications for the outside world and has been playing a more active and positive role on the world stage. The strategic alignments and arms control issues of the 1980s are also vastly different from the 1960s and 1970s. Since late 1970s, the volume of Chinese comment on international arms control issues has also increased significantly. China's active participation in the UN disarmament machinery and Beijing's high-profile arms control diplomacy have once again drawn the attention of students of Chinese foreign and defence policies. Hence the last few years have seen a renewed interest in the study of Chinese arms control policy. Valuable work on this subject from a world order perspective has been done by Samuel Kim and Shao-chuan Leng.³⁶ These works have been accompanied and supplemented by shorter studies of Chinese arms control policies by Amos Yoder, Bruce D. Larkin, David Salem, Gerald Segal, Karl W. Eikenberry, Reinhard Drifte, Richard Fieldhouse, Robert G. Sutter, and larger studies of Chih-chiang Hu and Alastair I. Johnston.³⁷ Segal and Sutter continue to write perceptively on the subject. Segal attaches greater importance to *informal* arms control initiatives taken by China such as CBMs while Sutter is concerned primarily with the implications of China's ACD stance for American security interests.

It is the works of Chih-chiang Hu and Alastair Johnston which deserve particular attention for two reasons. One is the comprehensive character of their studies. The second is the period covered, namely from 1949 to the mid 1980s if Hu's and Johnston's studies are put together. Hu documented the evolution of the Chinese ACD policy

covering the period between 1949 and 1978 and relied heavily on Beijing's declaratory posture to grasp its ACD strategy. The historical approach of the study tends to neglect other core issues facing the Chinese elite on arms control questions. While some of Hu's assumptions and arguments (e.g., "economic costs are not potent in the formulation of Chinese ACD policy") can be disputed, one cannot find fault with his conclusion that during this period "China remain[ed] unconvinced of the *value* of [ACD] activities."³⁸ Hu cited the historical, cultural, ideological, and military-security factors for explaining China's opposition to the ACD process between 1949-78. The significance of this work lies in the fact that this was the first attempt to put together a comprehensive survey of China's ACD policy as expressed in the official statements and proposals. Hu's study pointed to the direction for further exploring the influence of security factor in the making of Chinese arms control policy.

Johnston's monograph is the most authoritative overview of Chinese arms control policy to date, and one in which he has raised critical questions which deserve further analytical examination. Johnston, like Chih-chiang Hu, draws on Chinese history, culture, strategic tradition and ideology to explain Beijing's apparent contempt for international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons and reduce the risk of war through negotiated ACD pacts. His main contribution is in detailing where and by whom China's arms control policy is made in Beijing. Johnston describes in detail the nature and activities of various research institutes, the role and background of China's arms control specialists who have an input in the policymaking process and the training of the personnel. Furthermore, he contrasts Beijing's attitude towards arms control issues in the 1980s with that of 1960s and 1970s. Though some of his assertions are debatable, Johnston's conclusion surprisingly does not differ much from what Gelber had observed more than a decade before. Johnston concluded:

From a cynical perspective, of course, all of China's ACD policies are "safe": none commit China to reduce its military forces...most hinge on progress towards ACD in other quarters first...Unless superpower arms control moves forward rapidly, China has absolved itself from any responsibility.³⁹

Could this be interpreted to mean that China's arms control 'policy' had undergone no change between 1973 and 1986? If yes, then it seriously challenges the popular and basic assumption underlying most of the earlier works on this subject, that as a result of China's integration into the international economic and political system and attainment of sufficient nuclear retaliatory capability, the Chinese will eventually come to grips

with the political and military instrumentalities of global arms control process and play an active, positive, and constructive role in the arms control arena.⁴⁰

On the other hand, there are several analysts of Chinese foreign policy who claim to have observed elements of "new thinking"⁴¹ in Beijing's approach to ACD as manifested in China's active participation in UN disarmament fora and the number of ACD proposals put forward by Chinese officials in the 1980s. In fact, the truth lies somewhere in between these two extremes. That there has been a noticeable change in Beijing's attitude towards ACD issues in general is hard to deny. But at the same time, it is also evident that Beijing's position on core nuclear arms control issues remains substantially the same. The apparent contradiction, in my view, can only be explained by reference to Chinese national security considerations which have impeded *as well as* accelerated Beijing's movement towards arms control arena. In short, events of the past one decade require a new look at China's national security policy and its implications for arms control. It is the purpose of this study to examine this question afresh.

The Scope and Delimitations

Before outlining in detail what this study is about, it will be useful to state at the outset what this study is not about. It is not a study about the evolution of Chinese positions on arms control. Nor will it restate or re-examine China's changing attitudes and approaches to ACD issues, as this has already been done ably by others, notably Alastair I. Johnston and Gerald Segal. Nor will there be any comprehensive or descriptive account of *all* arms control and disarmament issues. Furthermore, given the time and space constraints of writing a dissertation, this study confines itself specifically to the task of investigating the relationship between China's *nuclear* (and formal, as stated earlier) arms control and national security policies. As such, conventional arms control efforts and CBMs are beyond the scope of this study.⁴² This is so because it is the nuclear capability which accords Beijing the near-superpower status, makes it a member of the US-Soviet-PRC strategic triangle, and above all, complicates the nuclear arms control negotiations of the superpowers. A content analysis of Chinese statements made in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) conducted by Alastair Johnston in early 1988 also showed Beijing's preoccupation with nuclear issues.⁴³ My survey of Chinese commentaries and writings on arms control generally supports Johnston's finding.⁴⁴

This dissertation covers the period from 1978 to 1988, the reform decade in China's contemporary history. Major events occurring before 1978 will be recapitulated where

necessary as a background. The starting year marks a watershed in the post-Mao history of the People's Republic of China. That was the year that certain signs of a change in the Chinese position on ACD related issues appeared. As part of a broader reassessment of domestic and foreign policies which began with the Third Plenum of the 11th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee in 1978, Beijing agreed for the first time to participate in an international disarmament forum - the UN General Assembly's Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD). A report on a session of the CCP Central Committee released in December 1978 failed to mention the "inevitability of war" and spoke of it only as a "serious threat."⁴⁵ The early eighties saw China reassessing its strategic outlook and threat perceptions, abandoning an anti-Soviet united front policy and moving towards adopting an "independent foreign policy."⁴⁶ This fundamental shift in China's national security policy was endorsed at the 12th Congress of the CCP in September 1982. Though China continued to remain concerned about the potential Soviet threat to its security, it signalled the Chinese intention to improve relations with Moscow so as to gain better leverage with Washington. Beijing now found the international environment less dangerous than previously diagnosed. The changes in threat perception led to the decision to concentrate on the long-deferred tasks of restructuring the economic system, raising the living standards of the population, upgrading the technological level of Chinese industry, and reducing the size of the Chinese military establishment and the military's share of the annual national budget.

Since 1978, the post-Mao leadership in Beijing has apparently taken a more positive approach to ACD issues and is beginning to come to terms with the complexities and dilemmas of the ACD process while at the same time appreciating the role of ACD in enhancing China's national security. The main indications of China's changing attitude towards arms control and a reevaluation of its previous appraisal of the ACD process are:

- * its active participation in the UN disarmament machinery since the late 1970s;
- * its Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament first put forward in 1979 and several ACD proposals made since then;
- * its signing of the Seabed Treaty and ratification of the Outer Space Treaty in 1984;
- * the reaffirmation of its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation goals;
- * its joining of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984 and acceptance of the nuclear safeguards;

- * its ratification of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty in 1987;
- * its opposition to chemical and biological weapons, and support for a multilateral chemical weapons convention to facilitate the banning of such weapons;
- * its insistence on the consideration of Chinese security interests in any superpower arms control agreement such as intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) talks; and
- * its active opposition to an extension of a superpower arms race into outer space as manifested in the US "Star Wars" or SDI programme and Soviet countermeasures to it.

Above all, it was also in the 1980s that China finally gave up its erstwhile "all or nothing" approach, i.e., preference for general and complete disarmament (GCD), and embraced arms control as a more realistic way to lessen international tensions. Whereas during the 1960s and 1970s, Chinese officials and publications deliberately refrained from using the term "arms control" (*wuqi kongzhi*) and talked only about "disarmament" (*caijun*), the 1980s have seen no inhibition on the part of Chinese leaders and official media on using the term arms control.⁴⁷ It reflects a Chinese recognition of the fact that "a general and complete disarmament for a number of complex reasons...lies beyond the world's reach, at least under present conditions."⁴⁸

The Focus

This dissertation seeks to provide generalised propositions concerning Chinese national security and nuclear arms control strategy. The main themes will be the content of the strategy; the security, economic and diplomatic influences on the formulation and implementation of the national security and ACD policies; the contrast between policy pronouncements and policy performance; and, finally, the ability of the Chinese to implement the strategy in operational terms. It is argued that the superpower arms control process has been, continues to be, and will be affected by China's nuclear capability and it, in turn, has influenced (and will influence) Chinese national security policy.

Since security considerations are the most dominant factor in the formulation of a country's ACD policy, any analysis of China's arms control doctrine must consider the relationship between advantages and disadvantages of arms control for Chinese national security. After all, "arms control is about China's nuclear capability; it is about the perceived superpower threat to China; it is also about China's relationship with the two superpowers. Most of all, it is probably where the Chinese feel most vulnerable."⁴⁹

This study contends that evolving internal and international developments have an impact on China's national security objectives which in turn determine advantages and disadvantages of a particular arms control issue for Chinese security. In other words, the external and internal settings which impact on China's arms control doctrine are variable, as is the nature of China's national security policy on its domestic and external environments. Let us first identify these internal and external variables.

The internal factors include the following:

- (a) China's changing perceptions of external threats, military capabilities, its evolving defence doctrine, and the perceived value of ACD for Chinese national security.
- (b) The domestic development priorities.
- (c) The diplomatic considerations of prestige and influence in world politics.

The external factors include the following:

- (a) The military capabilities, strategies and arms control policies of the two superpowers - the US and the USSR - and their impact on China's national security goals and strategy.
- (b) The degree of China's cooperation with and dependence on the international economic and political order.
- (c) The response of the world community in general and the Third World/Non-aligned nations in particular towards arms control and disarmament issues.

Without an appreciation of the perceived linkages between internal and external developments as well as among the external events themselves, it is impossible to grasp the complete situation that confronts the Chinese policymaking elite on arms control issues. This is perhaps a more pertinent issue for the present study and has not been adequately examined before.⁵⁰ Taking China's ACD doctrine as the dependent variable which is influenced by three independent variables, one can portray Chinese arms control strategy as follows:

Figure 1.2

The Dynamics of China's Arms Control Doctrine

These three variables interact at many points and reinforce each other and are closely interlinked in their functioning and effects. The central causal factor is national security. The basic hypothesis of this study is that China's arms control doctrine of the 1980s is the product of (i) changes in Chinese threat perceptions, defence strategy, and the value of arms control in enhancing or undermining China's national security; (ii) changes in domestic development priorities; and (iii) the diplomatic considerations of projecting a peaceloving image and acquiring prestige and influence in international politics.

With this perspective in mind, this study seeks to answer the following major research questions:

- (a) What is the role and function of arms control in China's national security policy?
- (b) What are the factors that play a dominant role in the formulation of China's arms control policy?
- (c) In what ways does China's national security policy enhance or undermine global and regional security and the ongoing efforts at achieving arms control?
- (d) What are the implications of Chinese arms control strategy for future nuclear arms control initiatives?

In order to examine the linkage between Chinese national security and nuclear arms control strategy or the relevance of nuclear arms control to Chinese security interests, I propose to undertake three case studies on major nuclear arms control issues: (1) nuclear non-proliferation (NNP), (2) nuclear free zones (NFZs), and (3) intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). Three indicators are used for assessing articulated attitudes: the amount of attention, the priority of importance ascribed to a particular nuclear arms control issue, and the degree of threat to peace (read, Chinese security) suggested or implied in Chinese analyses of the superpower arms race. Each indicator in itself provides only a partial basis of assessment, but in combination the three define the parameters of expressed Chinese attitude and interest in the arms control process as a whole. The criterion for selection was also influenced by the relevance of an ACD issue to the Chinese national security interests, such as security and economic benefits and diplomatic advantages, and for the reasons summarised below. Assuming these three arms control issues, viz., nuclear non-proliferation, NFZs, and superpower INF talks provide a key to an understanding of Chinese nuclear arms

control doctrine, three chapters of the thesis will be devoted to examining their linkage to and value for Chinese security goals.

One of the most fundamental and basic issue in nuclear arms control has been the need to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Chinese policy on nuclear proliferation has always been a subject of intense debate, speculation, and concern. Two contradictory developments in the 1980s make it imperative to take a fresh look at the Chinese policy with regard to nuclear proliferation. The first is the series of confirmed and unconfirmed reports since the early 1980s which hold Beijing responsible for aiding the nuclear weapons programmes of near-nuclear weapons states like Pakistan, South Africa, Argentina, and possibly India either through sales of uranium, heavy water, and nuclear-capable delivery systems or through exchange of technical information. The second development is the public acceptance by the Chinese leadership of non-proliferation goals and principles, and Beijing's decision to join the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984. In order to understand China's commitment to nuclear arms control, the area of nuclear non-proliferation provides a useful testing ground.

Closely related to the issue of nuclear non-proliferation is the subject of nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZs) and nuclear free zones (NFZs). The NFZ is a nuclear arms control proposal which aims to curb the geographical spread of nuclear weapons by prohibiting their possession, deployment, and use from specified areas. Chinese leaders and official media have always cited China's "consistent and principled" support for the concept of NFZ as evidence of Beijing's commitment to ACD and world peace. In 1987, China became the second NWS after the Soviet Union to sign the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty - the only NFZ which has come into existence since the 1973 agreement establishing a NFZ in Latin America. Chinese policy on NFZs also reflects Chinese perceptions of regional security issues in different parts of the world as they relate broadly to the arms control process. At the same time, it brings into sharp focus the role/influence (if any) of regional actors in the making of China's nuclear arms control policy. An in-depth analysis of Chinese policy on NFZs is long overdue in order to distinguish the declaratory from the operational character of Chinese posture. This case study can provide insights into the factors underlying the making of Beijing's ACD strategy and help to provide answers to the four research question outlined above.

Thirdly, a survey of Chinese commentaries and analyses in the mass media and major publications since the early 1980s reveals China's increasing concern and interest

in the superpower INF talks due to their perceived impact on Chinese security interests. Interestingly, INF was one ACD issue which brought into sharp focus the correlation between Chinese nuclear forces in the East and Anglo-French nuclear weapons in the West. Apparently, it also forced the Chinese to reconsider their traditional antipathy towards the arms control process and devise an arms control strategy which is broadly consistent with national security objectives. As a case study for looking into the relationship between nuclear arms control and Chinese security, INF promises an unparalleled and challenging opportunity.

Beijing's interest and concern in the US-Soviet INF negotiations during this period is matched only by one other ACD issue, i.e., the implications for Chinese security of the US Strategic Defense Initiative or "Star Wars" programme. The subject of China's response to SDI has already been dissected by Johnston, John Garver, and Bonnie Glaser and Banning Garrett.⁵¹ Moreover, there are so many uncertainties about the future of the SDI programme in terms of the form it will take and the systems it will produce, that any analysis of its implications for Chinese security at this stage must be rather speculative. Therefore, instead of doing a separate case study on this subject, it will suffice to outline in this study major Chinese concerns about the space-based weapon systems as they impinge upon the making of Chinese arms control strategy. Similarly, Chinese positions on a nuclear test ban or comprehensive test ban treaty, and negative security assurances such as No-First-Use will be examined as part of the overall Chinese approach to nuclear arms control.

The case studies undertaken here will try to identify the underlying factors in the making of Chinese nuclear arms control strategy and may provide clues to arms control decision making process in China and in understanding the directions of China's future role in the arms control process.

Potential Contributions

As stated earlier, this study proposes to investigate China's nuclear arms control strategy through the end of 1988 by examining the relationship between Chinese national security policy and arms control policy. It aims at making three main contributions to the existing literature on Chinese arms control policy. First and foremost, it attempts to provide a general explanation of the changes and continuities in Chinese nuclear arms control policy. Second, the three case studies on nuclear issues provide the first comprehensive account of the dilemmas facing the Chinese arms

control policymakers on formulating an appropriate response consistent with the national security objectives in these three key issue areas. The findings of the dynamics of China's arms control strategy may also offer valuable insights into the understanding of the dilemmas and problems concerning the nuclear arms limitation process faced by the other medium-range nuclear powers like Britain and France. Third, the analytical objective is to infer a general PRC policy with respect to each particular aspect of nuclear arms control. This would help us in forecasting Beijing's attitude towards nuclear arms limitation trends of the foreseeable future. In short, the topic has relevance for both policymakers and students of Chinese foreign and defence policies.

Structure

This dissertation consists of seven chapters, Chapter 1 being the introduction and Chapter 7 the conclusion. Chapter 2 'Chinese National Security and Nuclear Arms Control: A Historical Overview' is divided into four major periods to provide an analytical perspective of the evolution of China's national security and arms control policies, setting the scene for the rest of the study. It seeks to identify the major factors underlying the formulation of Chinese national security and arms control strategies.

With China's national security objectives and arms control constraints clearly in mind as a basis for further analysis, the discussion in the third chapter will focus on the role and significance of nuclear weapons in China's national security framework which is expected to provide a valuable insight into the pulls and pressures on the policymaking establishment concerned with arms control issues. To do this, China's geostrategic situation, military capabilities, particularly nuclear capabilities and recent military exercises (which are indicative of Beijing's deployment and targeting plans) are subjected to detailed scrutiny. The greater part of this chapter examines the ongoing debate in China about the country's defence strategy for the rest of the 20th century and beyond, and highlights the potential implications for Chinese arms control policy.

As stated above, three case studies viz., NNP, NFZs, and INF, have been selected for in-depth analysis and each one forms the subject of fourth, fifth and sixth chapters respectively. The mode of exposition pursued in each case study is determined largely by the specific characteristics of the case itself. Each case study begins with a short introduction followed by descriptive analysis of Chinese attitude towards a particular issue and attempts to answer the four key research questions outlined above.

The thesis concludes with a summary of the major findings of the study and makes a general appraisal of the Chinese approach to nuclear arms control. Since the chapters covering NNP, NFZs and INF contain their own concluding paragraphs, more attention has been focused on the major implications of China's evolving national security and arms control strategies for nuclear arms control proposals of the foreseeable future.

Sources

This study is based primarily on research in both Chinese and English-language sources. Since the early 1980s, the Chinese media have become much more open in discussing national security affairs, the country's nuclear and conventional capabilities and arms control issues. Nonetheless, there still remain two broad categories of mainland Chinese primary sources. One is the 'open' or 'public' (*gongkai*) periodicals, newspapers and publications which are freely available to Chinese readers and foreigners. Under the first category come the traditional sources like *Xinhua News Bulletin*, *Beijing Review*, *China Daily*, *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*), *Liaowang* (*Outlook*), *Shijie Zhishi* (*World Affairs* or *World Knowledge*), *Guangming Ribao* (*Enlightenment Daily*), *Ban Yue Tan* (*Bimonthly*), *Hongqi* (*Red Flag*), People's Liberation Army's *Jiefangjun Bao* (*PLA News* or *Liberation Army Daily*), *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* (*China Youth News*), *Guoji Xingshi Nianjian* (*Yearbook of the International Situation*), and *Foreign Affairs China*. In addition there are some theoretical journals published by a few research institutes affiliated with or run by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The most important are the Institute of International Studies' quarterly journal *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu* (*International Studies*), and the Institute of Contemporary International Relations journal *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi* (*Contemporary International Relations*). The Chinese commentaries and articles in these publications, though aimed at disseminating the official line, also reflect the dominant thinking and views of the Chinese experts and analysts on a given subject.

The second category is that of 'restricted' or 'internal' (*neibu*) periodicals, policy papers and publications which are meant for the high-level Communist Party and government cadres and leaders and contain a more realistic, non-doctrinaire analysis of internal and external issues and presumably have greater input into the policymaking processes. Under this category come periodicals such as *Reference News*, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences publication *Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi Cankao* (*Reference Materials on World Economy and Politics*), and the recently established Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies (BIISS) journal *Guoji Zhanlue* (*International*

Strategic Studies). Some educational institutions also bring out their own journals which are meant for restricted circulation. This study relies on the following such journals: the Beijing Foreign Affairs College's - which is credited with training China's future diplomats - *Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao* (*Journal of Foreign Affairs*); the Beijing University Department of International Politics publication *Zhengzhi Yanjiu* (*Political Research*); the Beijing Institute of International Relations internally circulated journal *Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan Xuebao* (*International Relations Study Journal*); the Shanghai Institute of International Studies journal *Guoji Wenti Ziliao* (*Materials on International Studies*); and the North-East Institute of International Problems journal *Waiguo Wenti Yanjiu* (*Research on International Problems*). English translations of important Chinese newspaper and journal articles and radio broadcasts are published in the *Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (hereafter cited as *FBIS-China*), *Joint Publications Research Service - PRC* (*JPRS-China*), and *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Far East* (*SWB/FE*).

The second chapter which gives a background perspective on Beijing's ACD policy is based largely on traditional primary and secondary sources, and earlier standard works on Chinese foreign, defence, and arms control policies. Mention should also be made of *Zhongguo daibiaotuan chuxi lianheguo youguan huiyi wenjianji* (*A Collection of Documents of the Chinese Delegation at the UN and Related Assemblies*), which provides a detailed account of China's arms control activities in the UN disarmament fora.

For the third chapter on the ongoing debate about Chinese military strategy, I have relied mainly on articles in Chinese journals, newspaper reports and analyses. As regards Chinese nuclear capabilities and military exercises, the information is collected from a variety of sources, Chinese as well as Western. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute *Yearbooks*, the International Institute for Strategic Studies annual *Military Balance*, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, *International Defense Review*, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, *Pacific Defence Reporter*, and the earlier works of Western observers of Chinese military affairs provide valuable information on the Chinese military capabilities and their implications for the global balance of power.

English-language primary source materials for the chapters on NNP, NFZs, and INF include a variety of UN documents and published working papers submitted by the Chinese delegations. Such documents consist of regular and special reports to the UN General Assembly by the Commission on Disarmament, position papers, proposals and

statements made by the Chinese ambassador for disarmament, UNIDIR's research papers, as well as Records of the International Atomic Energy Agency, UN Secretariat's Yearbooks and other publications, which I was able to glean during my field-work in Geneva and New York. I also interviewed and spoke informally to Western and Chinese analysts of China's foreign and defence policies in Stockholm, London, New York, Washington, Michigan, Boston, and Beijing.

NOTES

- 1 On Chinese nuclear weapons, see Morton Halperin, *China and the Bomb* (New York: Praeger, 1966); S. Devkinandan, *How China May Use Atom Bomb: 7 Military Scenarios* (Delhi: New Century Books, 1974); Bradley Hahn, *Strategic Implications of People's Republic of China Nuclear Weapons and Satellite Rocket Programs* (Hong Kong: Asian Reserch Service, 1980); William M. Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse, *Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1985); John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).

On Chinese defence strategy and implications for the global balance of power, see Harold Hinton, *Communist China's External Policy and Behaviour as a Nuclear Power* (Arlington, Virginia: Institute for Defence Analysis, 1963); Alastair Buchan (ed.), *China and the Peace of Asia* (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965); Arthur Huck, *The Security of China: Chinese Approaches to Problems of War and Strategy* (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, Chatto & Windus, 1970); Leo Yueh-Yun Liu, *China as a Nuclear Power in World Politics* (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1972); Donald C. Hellman (ed.), *China & Japan: A New Balance of Power* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976); Doak A. Barnett, *China and the Major Powers in East Asia* (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1977); Ray Bonds (ed.), *The Chinese War Machine* (London: Salamander Books Limited, 1979); Onkar Marwah and Jonathan D. Pollack (eds.), *Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India, Japan* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980); Charles D. Lovejoy Jr. and Bruce W. Watson (eds.), *China's Military Reforms: International and Domestic Implications* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986); Chong-Pin Lin, *China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition within Evolution* (Lexington Books, 1988).
- 2 With the exception of the works of Alastair I. Johnston, Gerald Segal, Robert Sutter, Chi-chiang Hu in the 1980s and Morton Halperin, Doak Barnett, Harry Gelber and few others in the 1960s and early 1970s (which will be mentioned below), the field remains unexplored when compared with the attention paid to the integration of British and French nuclear forces with the arms control process. A number of studies have been undertaken on the question of the integration of Anglo-French nuclear forces with the arms control process, see e.g., Geoffrey Kemp, *Nuclear Forces for Medium Powers* (London: IISS, Adelphi Papers Nos. 106 and 107, Autumn 1974); Robin F. Laird, *French Nuclear Forces in the 1980s and 1990s* (Professional Paper 400, Center for Naval Analyses, August 1983); Peter Malone, *The British Nuclear Deterrent* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984); Eric J. Grove, *Where and When? The Integration of British and French Nuclear Forces with the Arms Control Process* (London: The Council for Arms Control, Faraday Discussion Paper No. 5, September 1985); Robin F. Laird, *France, the Soviet Union, and the Nuclear Weapons Issue* (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1985); Eric J. Grove, "Allied nuclear forces complicate negotiations," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, (June/July 1986), pp. 18-23; John Prados, Joel S. Wit and Michael J. Zagurek, Jr., "The Strategic Nuclear Forces of Britian and France," *Scientific American*, Vol. 255, No. 2, (August 1986), pp. 33-41; Philippe G. Le Prestre (ed.), *French Security Policy in a Disarming World* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989); and Francois Heisbourg, "The British and French nuclear forces," *Survival*, Vol. 31, No. 4, (July/August 1989), pp. 301-320.
- 3 According to the London-based IISS, China had 248 strategic delivery vehicles by 1985 while SIPRI estimates for the year 1985 are between 301-641. France and Britain had about 150 and 64 strategic delivery vehicles by 1985 respectively. *The Military Balance 1985-86* shows the total strategic weapons megatonnage of Britain, France and China as 38, 110, and 366 respectively. *SIPRI 1987 Yearbook* estimates of total megatonnage of the three NWSs were higher than those of *The Military*

- Balance 1985-86* - 56 mt for Britain, 121 mt for France and 417-563 mt for China. According to *The Military Balance 1988-1989*, the gross strategic weapons megatonnage of Britain, France and China are 38.4, 111.6 and 400-550 respectively. Also see Lin, *China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy*, op. cit., pp. 2, 218.
- 4 Since the early 1980s, China's civilian and military leaders have claimed on several occasions that China has acquired a credible second-strike nuclear counter-attack capability, see, for example, *Xinhua*, 18 October 1982, in *FBIS-China*, 19 October 1982, p. K1; and *Renmin Ribao*, 29 October 1984, in *FBIS-China*, 30 October 1984, p. K1. For a detailed analysis of China's nuclear capabilities, see Chapter III, Table 3.1.
 - 5 See the works of Dan L. Strode, "Arms Control and Sino-Soviet Relations," *Orbis*, Vol. 28, No. 1, (Spring 1984), pp. 163-188; Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1979); Gerard Smith, *Double Talk: The Story of SALT II* (New York: Doubleday, 1980), p. 141; Gerald Segal, *The Great Power Triangle* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), pp. 129-131; Alastair I. Johnston, "Chinese Nuclear Force Modernisation: Implications for Arms Control," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2, (June 1983), pp. 13-28; Alastair I. Johnston, *China and Arms Control: Emerging Issues and Interests in the 1980s* (Aurora Papers 3, The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1986); and USSR Academy of Sciences, *Disarmament and Security: 1987 Yearbook* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1988), p. 144.
 - 6 Johnston, *China and Arms Control*, op. cit., p. 6. For a detailed study of the ACD concepts, principles and theories, see Christopher J. Lamb, *How to Think About Arms Control, Disarmament, and Defense* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1988); and Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "Arms Control Theory," in Walter Fischer and Richard Dean Burns (eds.), *Armament and Disarmament: The Continuing Dispute* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub., 1974).
 - 7 On the early Chinese attitudes towards nuclear weapons and arms control, see Alice L. Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1962); Morton Halperin, "Chinese Attitudes towards the Use and Control of Nuclear Weapons," in Tang Tsou (ed.), *China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives* (Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1968); Jonathan Pollack, "Chinese Attitudes Towards Nuclear Weapons," *China Quarterly*, 50, (April/June 1972), pp. 249, 251; and Oran Young, "China's Views on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," *China Quarterly*, No. 18, (April-June 1966).
 - 8 This has been the standard Chinese position right from the very beginning. See "China's Stand on Disarmament," *Beijing Review*, 13-19 June 1988, p. 14.
 - 9 This point is elaborated in the second chapter on 'Chinese National Security and Nuclear Arms Control: A Historical Overview'.
 - 10 Note 2.
 - 11 Johnston, "Chinese Nuclear Force Modernisation," op. cit., p. 22.
 - 12 *Disarmament and Security: 1987 Yearbook*, op. cit.
 - 13 This has been the view of a number of analysts, see note 2 and note 5.
 - 14 Bradley Hahn, "Nuclear weapon capability small but growing," *Pacific Defence Reporter*, (May 1989), p. 42.
 - 15 *Disarmament and Security: 1987 Yearbook*, p. 61.
 - 16 See note 5.
 - 17 This point has been illustrated by Johnston, "Chinese Nuclear Force Modernisation," op. cit. Similar arguments have been advanced to press the case for the integration of Anglo-French nuclear weapons with the superpower arms control talks. See for example, Edward A. Kolodziej, "British-French Nuclearization and European Denuclearization: Implications for U.S. Policy," in Le Prestre (ed.), *French*

- Security Policy*, op. cit. pp. 106-7; and Heisbourg, "The British and French nuclear forces," op. cit.
- 18 *Disarmament and Security: 1987 Yearbook*, op. cit., p. 144.
 - 19 Michael Tucker, *Non-Nuclear Powers and The Geneva Conference on Disarmament* (Occasional Papers Number Seven, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, March 1989), p. 1.
 - 20 Andrew Mack and Paul Keal (eds.), *Security & Arms Control in the North Pacific* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1988); and Curt Gasteyger, *Searching For World Security* (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, A Publication of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 1985), pp. 74-75; and see note 5 above.
 - 21 United States Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 cited in *Arms Control Today*, (January/February 1988), p. 29.
 - 22 National security policy, generally speaking, means "all the measures a government takes to provide for itself the armed forces it needs and to use those forces to support its policies," observes Samuel B. Payne Jr.. See his *The Conduct of War: An Introduction to Modern Warfare* (Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 279. According to Payne, a government's answers to the following questions constitute its national security policy: What does it seek to attain by the use or threat of military power? What are its most likely or most dangerous enemies? What are their political goals and how might they use their military power to attain them? Given the enemies it faces and their military capabilities, how can it use its military power to attain its political goals? Such definitions, however, tend to overemphasise the military component of a country's national security policy. This study's definition of national security policy is more comprehensive in order to take account of Chinese characteristics and is in accord with Bruce Parrott's usage of the term, see Bruce Parrott, "Soviet National Security Under Gorbachev," *Problems of Communism*, (November/December 1988), p. 2. Also see Peter Van Ness, "Three Lines in Chinese Foreign Relations, 1950-1983: The Development Imperative," in Dorothy J. Solinger (ed.), *Three Visions of Chinese Socialism* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 113-142; and Richard Smoke, *National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma* (New York: Random House, 1987).
 - 23 Ibid. Although broader than customary notions of national security, this definition has the advantage of clarifying the thrust of Chinese national security and ACD policies. It is also in tune with the Chinese thinking on this subject. For example, according to a Chinese analyst, Song Yimin, Head of the World Politics Studies Programme at the Foreign Ministry's Institute of International Studies, Beijing, "To China, national security involves not only military considerations - which is as it should be - but also political and economic factors..." See Song Yimin, *On China's Concept of Security* (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, April 1986), p. 1.
 - 24 See H. N. Bull, *The Control of Arms Race* (New York: Praeger, 1965), Ch.1; and Andrew Mack, "Conclusion: The Future of Arms Control," Ch.14 in Des Ball and Andrew Mack (eds.), *The Future of Arms Control* (Australian National University Press, 1987), p. 299.
 - 25 Chih-chiang Hu, "Arms Control Policy of the People's Republic of China 1949-1978." (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Balliol College, Oxford University, U.K., 1984), p. 7.
 - 26 Bull, *The Control of Arms Race*, op. cit.
 - 27 Gerald Segal, "China and arms control," *The World Today*, Vol. 41, Nos. 8-9, (August\September 1985), p. 162.
 - 28 Ibid.
 - 29 Even Thomas Schelling, one of the noted modern arms control theorist, has expressed scepticism about too much reliance on formal arms control agreements. See Thomas Schelling, "What Went Wrong With Arms Control?" *Foreign Affairs*, (Winter 1985/1986). According to Joseph S. Nye, "in one sense, all of arms control is

a confidence- and security-building measure...informal operational arms control and formally negotiated reductions are not exclusive alternatives; they can complement one another." Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Arms Control After The Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, (Winter 1989/1990), p. 45.

- 30 Alastair I. Johnston, "China and Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region." (Paper presented at the Conference on Maritime Security and Arms Control in the Pacific Region, May 1988. University of British Columbia, Institute of International Relations), p. 1. For an interesting debate on the successes and failures of arms control, see Hedley Bull, "Arms Control and World Order," and Bernard Brodie, "On the Objectives of Arms Control," in *International Security*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Summer 1976), pp. 3-36; and Michael Krepon (ed.), "Has Arms Control Worked?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, (May 1989), pp. 26-45; Gerald Segal (ed.), *Arms Control in Asia* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1987), pp. 1-17; Gerald Segal, "Informal Arms Control: The Asian Road to Conventional Reductions," *Arms Control Today*, (May 1989), pp. 16-20; Henry Kissinger, "A New Approach to Arms Control," *Time*, 21 March 1983.
- 31 Segal, op. cit. Also see Segal, "Arms Control in Asia," *Arms Control*, Vol. 8, No. 1, (May 1987), pp. 80-94.
- 32 Pollack, "Chinese Attitudes Towards Nuclear Weapons," op. cit.
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- 40 This remains the basic assumption of most of the earlier works done on this subject, for example, see Hu, op. cit., p. 6. It goes without saying that the Chinese and non-Chinese conceptions of 'active, positive, and constructive role' are bound to differ.

But still a less hostile and more cooperative support to global arms control efforts would be the minimum to expect from China.

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- 43 Johnston, "China and Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region," op. cit., pp. 6-8.
- 44 My review of primary Chinese source material mentioned in the section on sources in this chapter confirms Johnston's finding.
- 45 For details, see Anton Bebler, "On the Mutations of Marxists' Positions on Peace and Disarmament," *Arms Control*, Vol. 6, No. 3, (December 1985), p. 294.
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Chapter II

CHINESE NATIONAL SECURITY & NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Ever since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the major objectives of the Chinese leaders and policymakers have been to ensure security against external threats, restore national strength through domestic economic development and achieve independence and influence in the global power structure. The PRC leadership was acutely aware of the external threats to its newly-won independence and territorial integrity in the immediate post-World War II period, which was also the era of Cold War. The Chinese knew that without adequate military strength and rapid economic development, their quest for independence and sovereignty in international relations which had its roots in the bitter lessons learnt from Chinese history of interaction with the outside world during the 19th and early 20th centuries - a history of semi-colonisation, annexation and occupation - could never be fully realised. The imperatives of security, economic development, and influence and status in world affairs have not only influenced the making of Chinese national security policy during the last four decades, but also shaped Beijing's attitudes towards arms control issues. As a consequence, China's relations with the two superpowers have constituted key elements in Chinese national security policy. Beijing's relations with Moscow and Washington also account for the frequent shifts and turns in its national security policy. This chapter is divided into four major periods to provide an analytical perspective of the evolution of Chinese national security and arms control policies.

The 1949-1964 Period: Sino-US-Soviet Relations and Arms Control

After taking stock of the prevailing international strategic environment, China decided in 1950 to enter into an alliance relationship with the Soviet Union which offered China explicit security guarantees, substantial economic and military assistance, and political support. This "leaning to one side" (i.e. the Soviet Union) was deemed necessary to counter the growing American hostility and perceived threat to Chinese security, and was aimed not only at enhancing China's weak strategic position in the early years of the People's Republic, but more importantly at building up the economic and military power which was an essential prerequisite if Beijing wanted to be able to "stand on its own" in world affairs.

It has been argued by some analysts that Chinese leaders, including Mao Zedong, were aware of the utility of nuclear weapons and acknowledged their "unprecedented destructiveness" but refused to admit that nuclear threats could intimidate the Chinese.¹ This explains Mao's denigration of the atomic bomb as a "paper tiger" and deliberate attempts to play down the military decisiveness of nuclear weapons in a war at a time when China did not possess them and its enemies did. A public stance other than this would have caused fear, demoralisation and confusion in the Chinese armed forces and the public.

The traumatic experiences of the wars in Korea and Indochina, during which the United States threatened the use of nuclear weapons against China twice (in 1953 and 1954), started a strategic debate within China and added weight to the arguments of those in the Chinese leadership who favoured acquiring nuclear weapons to meet the nuclear threat from the US "imperialists" as part of the military modernisation programme.² While a majority of the civilian and military leadership favoured developing indigenous nuclear technology and relying on the Soviet nuclear umbrella until it was locally developed, some elements in the military wanted to buy nuclear weapons from the Soviets straight away to build a nuclear deterrent.³

Mao Zedong is believed to have given his approval by early 1955 to a programme to build nuclear weapons and reportedly remarked that the world would not "take us seriously" unless and until China acquired the bomb and a reasonable economic potential.⁴ Addressing a Politburo meeting in April 1956, Mao justified constraining other national programmes in order to release funds for nuclear weapons for security reasons:

If we are not to be bullied in the present-day world, we cannot do without the bomb. Then what is to be done about it? One reliable way is to cut military and administrative expenditures down to appropriate proportions...⁵

In 1956, Beijing started negotiations with Moscow to gain Soviet technical assistance to China in the fields of nuclear weapons, and advanced missile and aviation technology. These negotiations culminated in the October 1957 Agreement on Advanced Defence Technology. This agreement also included the training of Chinese nuclear scientists and technicians, the delivery of a sample atomic bomb and technical data for its manufacture. However, it soon became clear that, in concluding this agreement, the two sides had apparently totally divergent perspectives and expectations. For the Chinese, the ultimate objective was to enable China to "stand on its own", i.e. enhance the country's security, prestige and safeguard its independence and sovereignty.

Moscow, on the other hand, saw Beijing as a dependent ally, much like the East European countries, in its struggle with the United States and hoped to develop a stronger military alliance with Beijing in the East, along the lines of Warsaw Pact in the West, so as to strengthen its strategic position *vis-à-vis* the NATO alliance. Khrushchev's efforts during 1958-59 to seek a joint defence system with the Chinese, including in particular, Soviet control over nuclear weapons to be developed by the Chinese, were seen in Beijing as an infringement of China's national sovereignty and independence. The Chinese leadership led by Mao was unwilling to accept the role of a subordinate member of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Meanwhile, the divergent views on issues such as war and peace, nuclear weapons, value of arms control, peaceful coexistence between communism and capitalism, socialist models of economic development and boundary disputes also emerged during this period between the two communist giants. The strains in the Sino-Soviet relationship were further aggravated by China's provocative behaviour during the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958 which led the Americans to threaten nuclear strikes (for the third time since 1953) unless Chinese forces stopped shelling the Quemoy and Matsu islands. Chinese actions during this crisis had the potential to draw the Soviets into a direct nuclear confrontation with the Americans and seriously undermine Khrushchev's strategy of peaceful coexistence and efforts to regulate and control superpower nuclear arms competition.⁶

Apparently the failure of the secret Mao-Khrushchev discussions in 1958 convinced the Soviets of the folly of their promise to provide China with a sample atomic bomb. The split between China and the Soviet Union finally came on 20 June 1959 when Moscow repudiated the 1957 agreement to aid China in manufacturing nuclear weapons. The Soviet action was motivated by Khrushchev's desire to seek rapprochement with the US and distance himself from what he saw as the confrontationist policies of the Chinese leadership.

The Soviet refusal to back China over the Sino-Indian border dispute in August and the US-Soviet summit held at Camp David in September of the same year were interpreted in Beijing as further evidence of the appeasement policy pursued by the "revisionist" Soviet leadership, and the withdrawal of the Soviet security guarantees to China for good. Moscow responded to Beijing's public denunciation of Khrushchev's foreign policy and ideology in June 1960, by withdrawing all Soviet scientists, technicians and military advisors stationed in China a month later. For Beijing, the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations came at a time of economic hardships at home.

China retaliated by launching a no-holds-barred attack on Soviet views on nuclear weapons, war and peace and disarmament which incidentally provided valuable insight into Chinese views on these issues. They rejected as a "naive illusion" Khrushchev's view that war was no longer inevitable and that disarmament was possible.⁷ They argued that

[t]he emergence of nuclear weapons does not and cannot resolve the fundamental contradictions in the contemporary world [or] alter the law of class struggle...If one regards general and complete disarmament as the fundamental road to world peace, spreads the illusion that imperialism will automatically lay down its arms, and tries to liquidate the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and nations on the pretext of disarmament, then this is deliberately to deceive the people of the world and help the imperialists in their policies of aggression and war...⁸

Though national security considerations took precedence over ideological protestations, the Chinese views on ACD were also partly influenced by and justified in terms of the Marxist-Leninist concepts of class struggle, war and change.⁹ From the Chinese viewpoint, ever-lasting peace could only be realised after the establishment of a classless and stateless international society. To this end, the socialist states had to step up war preparations, not limit or restrict arms acquisition. Beijing viewed ACD as a bourgeois approach to world order which aimed at the maintenance and stabilisation of the existing international distribution of power (i.e., the bipolar system dominated by the two superpowers). The existing international power structure was, then, perceived as a major stumbling block to realisation of the Chinese objectives of greater security, independence and influence in the world system. In Chinese eyes, acquisition of a nuclear capability would accord China the prestige and status of a "super-state" because "only a super-state, which has fine delivery vehicles and large quantity of nuclear bombs, is qualified to lead the world and to control and direct those countries which do not have nuclear weapons..."¹⁰

China's response to the various arms control proposals needs to be examined against this background. Although China has supported the creation of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones in different parts of the world since the late 1950s, it is evidently opposed to the establishment of such zones in China's vicinity which could place limits on its nuclear weapons programme or adversely affect its deployment posture. Thus, Beijing viewed with apprehension the Soviet plan for a nuclear-free zone in the Far East, as a deliberate Soviet attempt to deprive China of nuclear weapons. And in January 1960, Beijing declared its complete independence in the nuclear arena by proclaiming that it would not be bound by arms control pacts made by other nations.¹¹

Chinese fears of US-Soviet collusion to prevent China from developing nuclear capability under the cloak of arms control and disarmament (ACD) had originated from the note sent to the Central Committee of the CCP by the CPSU on 20 June 1959 in which, according to one authoritative Chinese account,

[the Soviet side] proposed to suspend cooperation in a number of key areas and to reconsider the situation after two years, on the pretext that the Soviet Union, the United States, and other countries were negotiating a nuclear test ban in Geneva and that the efforts of the socialist nations to achieve peace and alleviate international tensions might be negated if the West were to become aware of Soviet assistance to China in the area of advanced technology.¹²

Evidently, the Chinese leadership was now more than ever determined to pursue the nuclear option in order to achieve independence in security affairs. Beijing decided to call Khrushchev's bluff by launching *Project 596* "to commemorate June 1959, the date the Soviets reneged on their promise to help China develop the bomb."¹³ Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders made several statements during the widening Sino-Soviet rift which underlined the strategic value of nuclear weapons for China's security. Mao was quoted as saying that the success of the nuclear programme would "boost our courage and scare others" and he declared in mid-1958 that "it is entirely possible for some atom bombs and hydrogen bombs to be made in ten years time."¹⁴

China's worst fears of US-Soviet condominium to block its acquisition of nuclear weapons came true in July 1963 with the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). This arms control agreement came at a time when China was about to carry out its own nuclear test and was interpreted as an "international conspiracy" to prevent China from developing indigenous nuclear weapons. The signing of the PTBT led to an intensification of Sino-Soviet polemics. The Chinese media denounced the Treaty as a "dirty fraud", a trap designed "to manacle the Socialist countries", and an attempt on the part of the USA, USSR and Britain to preserve their "nuclear monopoly."¹⁵ Beijing was particularly concerned that the PTBT did not hinder America from pursuing its policy of nuclear blackmail and proliferation of its nuclear weapons, it "did nothing to reduce US nuclear stockpiles, did not restrict the American use of nuclear weapons...[and] did nothing to prevent the US from improving and using tactical nuclear weapons."¹⁶ The Chinese concluded that a major objective of such arms control measures was to deprive the Chinese people of their right to take steps to resist the nuclear threats of US imperialism which now had the active support of the Soviet revisionists. As a result, seen from Beijing's viewpoint, the external threat to its security had increased, not decreased. Hence, there was no reason for China to slow down its military build-up or

accept external limits on its nuclear weapons programme. If anything, the conclusion of the PTBT only strengthened the resolve of the Chinese leaders to acquire nuclear weapons as soon as possible and almost a year later, on 16 October 1964, China joined the exclusive nuclear club by testing its first nuclear device. However, being conscious of its image in the world, China put forward its own ACD proposal for completely outlawing and destroying all nuclear weapons.¹⁷

The 1964-1970 Period: "Dual-Enemy" or Anti-Superpower Foreign Policy and Arms Control

The post-1964 period saw China making concerted efforts to rapidly develop a nuclear deterrent to counter the perceived superpower threat to its security. This shift in Chinese national security policy, from strategic alignment of the 1950s with one superpower to a "dual adversary" strategy of opposition to both superpowers in the 1960s, further precluded any softening of China's attitude to the ACD process. The signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in July 1968 only served to reinforce the Chinese perception of ACD as a superpower tool to preserve and perpetuate their nuclear domination while "depriv[ing] the non-nuclear states of their right to develop nuclear weapons for self-defence."¹⁸ The Chinese Communist Party organ *Renmin Ribao* defiantly declared that

China is continuing the development of its nuclear weapons...the nuclear monopoly held by the US imperialism and Soviet revisionists has long been broken and will certainly be further broken.¹⁹

The period between 1964 and 1970 was the most critical one for Chinese national security. Mao's "cultural revolution" had not only turned the Chinese socio-political system upside down internally, but also left hardly any friends and allies in the outside world. To make matters worse, a series of events, such as the eruption of the Sino-Soviet territorial dispute, the signing of the Soviet-Mongolian defence agreement in 1966 leading to a massive increase in the Soviet nuclear and conventional forces deployments on the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders (the number of Soviet divisions on China's northern frontiers mounted from 15 or less to more than 35 between 1964-70), the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the promulgation of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine in 1968, highlighted the increasing Soviet threat to Chinese security from the north. In addition, China was still locked in confrontation with the United States because of its involvement in the Indochina war on its southern frontiers, and US

strategic nuclear forces deployed in the Pacific reportedly included China on their list of targets.²⁰

Militarily, China was ill-prepared to face the ever-growing threat to its independence and security from the north as well as from the south. During this period, Chinese conventional forces were no match for the technologically superior fighting machines of the Soviet Union and the United States. In the nuclear field, China had only recently begun testing nuclear weapons and had a long way to go before it could possess an *operational* second-strike nuclear deterrent capability. China's small arsenal of few medium-range *Dong Feng* or *DF-2* (Western designation is Chinese Surface to Surface or CSS-1) missiles and nuclear-capable B-6 bombers during this period was totally insufficient to deter the two nuclear superpowers. The Chinese leadership was well aware of the possibility that either the United States or the Soviet Union might decide to destroy the embryonic Chinese nuclear capability with a pre-emptive strike before China acquired an effective and reliable deterrent against such a move. It was this realisation which prompted Beijing to make a no-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge, stress the defensive character of its nuclear capability, and support the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons through international consultation. But the Chinese remained adamantly opposed to arms control proposals, such as halting all nuclear testing, which had a negative impact on China's nuclear weapons development. Thus, ACD had no positive relevance or value for Chinese national security during this period of strategic weakness and insecurity. Hence most of the arms control pacts negotiated during this period such as the PTBT (1963), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), or the Outer Space Treaty (1967) were either denounced or simply ignored by Beijing. Had there been arms control proposals which placed limits on the nuclear weapons development programmes of the "two major sources of international instability, war and imperialism," i.e. the US and USSR, China would have probably supported them. But this was not the case. On the contrary, there were indications that the two superpowers were not only carrying out an "unremitting and frenzied nuclear arms expansion" but they were also trying to undermine China's nascent deterrent capability by embarking upon "the construction of an anti-ballistic missile system 'against the threat of a missile attack by mainland China.'" This was cited as an example of US-Soviet collusion against China under the cloak of "nuclear disarmament."²¹

In March 1969, the decade-old Sino-Soviet "war of words" finally culminated in armed clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops on the disputed Damansky/Chen Bao Island. These clashes led to further militarisation of the Sino-Soviet frontier, which included the deployment of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), particularly SS-4s equipped with 1-megatonne warheads, and targeted on key Chinese strategic and industrial centers, and of 35 Soviet divisions. The Chinese, on their part, speeded up the development and deployment of their MRBMs and nuclear-capable bombers and launched country-wide war preparations to meet the growing threat from the Soviet Union. The war hysteria reached its climax when reports appeared in the Western media which suggested that Moscow was seriously considering a pre-emptive nuclear surgical strike against China's nuclear installations in order to get rid of the Chinese nuclear threat to the Soviet Union "once and for all."²² On 18 August 1969, Soviet diplomats in the US reportedly made queries regarding US reaction to a pre-emptive strike against Chinese nuclear installations but were discouraged by Washington against such an attack.²³ Ten days later, an editorial in *Pravda* lent credence to the speculation when it declared that if a war with China did break out, it would involve "lethal armaments and modern means of delivery" strongly implying the inevitability of the use of nuclear missiles against China in any such war.²⁴ China apparently took seriously the looming danger of war with the Soviets. Throughout 1969-70, Chinese media made repeated references to Soviet "nuclear blackmail", the aggressive nature of Soviet nuclear and conventional deployments against China and the possibility of a Soviet nuclear strike to wipe out Chinese nuclear facilities.²⁵ Editorials in *Renmin Ribao* and *Jiefangjun Bao* warned that any surgical strike would certainly lead to an all-out long-term war with the Soviet Union and insisted that China would not be intimidated by "nuclear blackmail."²⁶

Though tension was diffused after the Zhou Enlai-Kosygin talks in Beijing in September 1969, the threat of a Soviet nuclear strike had a lasting impact on China's security planners. Just as the Soviet leaders decided, after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, never again to bargain with the US from a position of weakness, and embarked on a massive military buildup to match that of their rival, the Chinese leaders also seemed to have reached a similar decision. If 1962 was a watershed in Soviet global policy, so was 1969 for the Chinese. It also highlighted the dangers of pursuing a foreign policy which was in opposition, or hostile, to both the superpowers in times of weak military capabilities. In the aftermath of this crisis, the Chinese leadership immediately took two steps. First, in order never to be caught again in a state of military unpreparedness,

Beijing stepped up the development of its nuclear weapons, carrying out more tests of thermonuclear devices and delivery systems, and started concealing them in hardened silos and mountain caves to ensure the survivability of its strategic missiles and bombers from enemy's first strike. Second, and more important, was the Chinese decision in mid-December 1969 to improve relations with the United States by resuming ambassadorial-level talks at Warsaw. The resumption of Beijing-Washington dialogue led to its logical conclusion in 1972, when President Nixon visited Beijing, ending more than 20 years of hostility and enmity.

The 1970-1978 Period: Sino-US Normalisation and Arms Control

From the foregoing, it can be seen that nuclear weapons and conflicting perceptions of arms control and disarmament played an important role in bringing the two erstwhile allies (PRC and the USSR) to the brink of a nuclear war and pushed two former enemies (PRC and the USA) towards rapprochement. However, this does not imply that China and the US came to see eye to eye on the nuclear weapons or ACD issues. Chinese scepticism and suspicion of ACD was based on the belief that it was detrimental to Chinese security interests in view of Beijing's limited nuclear capability which needed to be strengthened, not weakened. The Sino-US detente meant, as Premier Zhou Enlai put it in 1973, that the Soviet Union now replaced the United States as "number one enemy of the Chinese people."²⁷ If the US nuclear threats against China in 1953, 1954 and 1958 forced Beijing to acquire its own nuclear weapons, the Soviet nuclear threat of 1969 contributed significantly to the Chinese determination to possess a second-strike nuclear counter-offensive capability. To this end, China made some progress by developing and deploying long-range IRBMs (*DF-3s* or *CSS-2s*), bombers (*B-5s*) and *DF-4* or *CSS-3* limited-range inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of striking European Russia but not Moscow.²⁸ Though Chinese achievements in the nuclear field undoubtedly lessened the chances of a Soviet nuclear pre-emptive strike in the future, Beijing still did not possess a credible nuclear counter-strike deterrent capability to dissuade its adversaries from undertaking hostile military action. And so long as China lacked such a capability *vis-à-vis* its enemy, there was no scope for arms control in Chinese national security policy. Therefore, Beijing continued to deride the various arms agreements of the 1970s such as the Sea-Bed Treaty (1971), Biological Weapons Convention (1972), the ABM Treaty (1972), the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement I (1972), Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement (1973), Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974), and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (1976). The only arms control treaty to which

China acceded during this period, albeit with reservations, since its ratification in the early 1950s of the 1925 Geneva protocol on chemical and bacteriological weapons, was the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a NWFZ in Latin America^{in August 1973.} China also refused to participate in the Soviet-proposed conference of five nuclear weapon states in March 1971 to "discuss nuclear disarmament of all states in possession of nuclear weapons."²⁹ Addressing the UN General Assembly in November 1971, China's Vice-Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua explained the reasons for his country's intransigence on arms control:

*China's nuclear weapons are still in the experimental stage and China would never take part in the so-called nuclear disarmament talks behind the backs of the non-nuclear powers.*³⁰

He also stressed that before any serious talks could start the Soviets and the Americans must act to reduce the threat of nuclear war by making a no-first-use (NFU) pledge. As Beijing accelerated its nuclear weapons buildup, it adopted a more and more critical, negative, and inflexible attitude towards the US-Soviet arms control process. China was now genuinely concerned that the Soviets, having failed in their efforts to prevent China from becoming a nuclear power or intimidate it with their threats of nuclear strike, would try to use the superpower disarmament talks to undermine the Chinese nuclear deterrent. And there was enough evidence that the Soviets were doing just that. During the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT-I) in July 1970, the Soviet delegation came up with a proposal for US-Soviet "joint retaliatory action" against any "third nuclear power" that undertook "provocative" action against either country.³¹ This "third nuclear power" was obviously China because the possibility of the US taking "joint retaliatory action" with the Soviets against France or Britain - the other two NWSs - could be completely ruled out. Unlike in the 1960s, the Americans were now reluctant to be drawn into an arms control agreement with the Soviets which had anti-Chinese overtones and which could have harmed Sino-US relations. Nonetheless, Moscow repeatedly tried these tactics to weaken the growing Beijing-Washington ties by making radical arms control proposals throughout the 1970s. During the negotiations for a US-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, the then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger resisted Soviet efforts to include a provision which required both sides to "prevent situations in which the actions of *third parties* might lead to war."³² Again in 1979, during the Carter-Brezhnev Summit to negotiate the SALT-II pact, the Soviet leader reportedly said that he "would like to pursue the idea that in case of an attack on either of us from a third nation [i.e., China], the other will pledge to mount a joint rebuff."³³ During the US-Soviet ASAT talks in the late 1970s, the issue of Chinese

nuclear weapons was again raised by the Soviet side. In addition to enticing the Americans to join them in forming an anti-China compact through arms control, the Soviets also asked the Carter administration to exert pressure on China to "join the disarmament process."³⁴ Understandably, the Chinese came down hard on the SALT agreements of 1972 and 1979. From Beijing's perspective, "SALT I did nothing to limit the shorter-range Soviet systems which [were] the most urgent threat" to Chinese security.³⁵ Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai said that "the SALT agreements were by no means "a step" towards ending the arms race [but] marked the beginning of a new stage of the superpower arms race."³⁶ He added that

"disarmament" was out of question, let alone international peace and security... [so long as] the superpowers continued to intensify their arms expansion and war preparations...to direct nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats against the peoples of all countries.³⁷

Beneath China's repeated references to "nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats" or demands for a NFU pledge by the US and the USSR lay its fears of insecurity *vis-à-vis* the two superpowers. A no-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge by the Big Two would presumably have gone a long way in assuaging Beijing's apprehensions regarding a first strike. Similarly, China's opposition to the nuclear test ban question was also influenced by these considerations. It opposed the Soviet test ban proposals because "Soviet revisionism has had enough testing and because now it wants to limit the development of nuclear weapons by countries without nuclear weapons, and *especially by our country*."³⁸ As Table 2.1 shows, as many as 14 nuclear tests or about 50 per cent of China's total nuclear tests were carried out between 1970-1978.

Until mid-1973, the Chinese media maintained a stance of even-handed criticism of *both* the superpowers for talking disarmament but working towards gaining nuclear superiority. However, the first signs of a softening of Beijing's criticism of the United States, induced apparently by the Sino-US thaw, appeared in a lengthy article in *Renmin Ribao* on 6 November 1973. This commentary derided the June 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War for its non-inclusion of a NFU pledge by the USA and USSR, gave a detailed account of Moscow's growing nuclear capability, and warned the United States of the serious consequences of continuing ACD talks with the Soviets:

It is crystal clear that the Soviet Union has gained time through various agreements on false disarmament, and is trying to catch up with and surpass the United States on strategic weapons both in quantity and quality.³⁹

This theme of the Soviets trying to gain military superiority over the Americans through the ACD process persisted in Chinese analyses of the US-Soviet military balance and arms control talks until the early 1980s.

The 1978-1982 Period: The United Front (UF) Strategy and Arms Control

The emergence of the Soviet Union as the primary threat to Chinese security once again brought about a shift in Chinese national security policy towards the end of the 1970s. In 1978, the post-Mao leadership led by Deng Xiaoping unveiled its domestic development strategy of Four Modernisations (i.e., agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defence) which required a long-term peaceful international environment and called for the formation of a global United Front of the US, Western Europe, China and Japan to counter the increasing threat of what it now called "Soviet hegemonism." This United Front strategy was intended to offer the Chinese their real opportunity to use diplomacy to further their national security and economic developmental objectives.

By the late 1970s, the strategic environment around China's periphery had undergone substantial changes. In the north, the perceived threat to Chinese security had increased due to an unabated Soviet military buildup in the Far East which included a rise in the number of Soviet divisions from 40 to about 55, the deployment of hundreds of bombers and ballistic missiles (including the advanced SS-20s targeted on the key Chinese economic and military installations) and a build up of Soviet naval power in the Pacific.⁴⁰ While the threat to Chinese interests in the south from US involvement in Indochina had receded after the end of the Vietnam war, the formation of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance in 1978 was seen as harmful to China's security interests in its own backyard. The Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 1978 and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 were interpreted in Beijing as part of Moscow's encirclement strategy to put military and political pressure on China. In contrast, since the mid-1970s, the Americans had either withdrawn or significantly reduced their military presence in the region. Hence, the Chinese concluded that any further decline in American power would surely be exploited by the Soviets and the only solution was to form a United Front of the US, Western Europe, China and Japan to confront and contain the Russian Bear.⁴¹ This assessment of the US as a "declining power" and therefore on the defensive, and the USSR as an "ascending power" and therefore on the offensive, was instrumental in shaping the Chinese critique of the superpower arms control process in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Ever since the Sino-Soviet split, Beijing had been apprehensive of US-Soviet collusion or detente as manifested in their attempts to reach various arms control accords at the expense of Chinese security interests. Seen from Beijing's view, such a "ganging up" of the two superpowers spelled considerable problems for Chinese national security and domestic developmental policies in a time of relative weakness. The adoption of the United Front strategy adopted in the early 1970s was pursued with greater vigour after the complete abandonment of the superpower detente process when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, and subsequent convergence of Sino-US strategic interests. Evidently, it had several advantages for the Chinese. First, it allowed China to become the "swing" member of the US-Soviet-PRC strategic triangle. Second, it provided Beijing with an opportunity to use its leverage with the United States so as to influence the outcome of US-Soviet arms control deliberations in a way beneficial to Chinese security interests. Third, it permitted Beijing to concentrate on the domestic economic modernisation programme with the extensive help of advanced Western capitalist societies, without having to divert its own scarce financial resources from the economic sector to the defence sector to meet the Soviet threat.

For these reasons, China became an ardent advocate of American military preparedness, increased defence spending, a strong NATO alliance; it supported continuing the US military presence in Asia and endorsed US-Japanese defence cooperation; and Beijing even called on Japan to step up its military buildup.⁴² A commentary in *Beijing Review* stated:

The key to putting off war lies not in holding talks and concluding agreements, as is vociferously suggested by some people, but in the united struggle of the people of all countries against hegemonism.⁴³

Not surprisingly, then, Beijing remained vehemently opposed to the superpower arms control process. While holding both the US and USSR responsible for carrying out the "feverish armament expansion and war preparations under the cover of disarmament," the Chinese sought to portray the Soviet Union as the real villain.⁴⁴ A commentary in *Beijing Review* in 1978 questioned the efficacy of ACD by pointing out that

there have been 228 resolutions on disarmament adopted by the United Nations since World War II...Despite all this, the armaments of the two superpowers, instead of reducing, have increased by two fold or even ten fold. The speed of Soviet arms expansion is unprecedented and the scale is far beyond its "security" needs.⁴⁵

Beijing regarded the US arms control talks with the Soviet Union as a no-win zero-sum game, and a sure sign of lack of willpower and military strength to fight the "most dangerous source of war in the contemporary international system."⁴⁶ A *Xinhua* commentator revealed the extent of the Chinese scepticism and pessimism regarding the value of the ACD process by observing:

History is inexorable. The ten years during which social imperialism [i.e., the USSR] kept clamouring for "disarmament" have been ten years of Soviet contention with the United States for nuclear superiority, for a nuclear overlord position, and for frenzied armament expansion, nuclear arms expansion in particular.⁴⁷

From Beijing's perspective, arms control had failed to control, restrain or stabilise the US-Soviet arms race. As an article in *Hongqi* stated, "Historically, the struggle for disarmament has never stopped the expansion of armaments."⁴⁸ Chinese analysts argued that arms control agreements with the Soviet Union were a mere waste of time and effort in view of Soviet expansionism in the Third World and a qualitative and quantitative growth in armaments. Therefore, the Chinese cautioned their United Front allies against continuing arms control negotiations with Moscow and advocated joint military measures to "frustrate the war schemes of the Soviet hegemonists."⁴⁹ As a commentator in *Renmin Ribao* succinctly observed, "it would be better to consider the question of military building than to consider the question of disarmament."⁵⁰

Justifying China's opposition to the US-Soviet detente of the 1970s - an important basis of which was the arms control treaties of SALT I and II and the ABM - a *Shijie Zhishi* commentary in September 1988 stated that

[i]n substance, this detente was to maintain an "upward balance" [*xiang shang ping heng*] between the United States and the Soviet Union in their strategic nuclear forces...At that time, the US and the Soviet Union...[continued their] sharp contention to build up their own spheres of influence in the Third World. As a result, many regional hot spots emerged which endangered world peace and security.⁵¹

In short, throughout the 1970s and particularly during the United Front strategy of 1978-82, Beijing denounced arms control pacts with the Soviets as appeasement and for being detrimental to the cause of world peace and security. The Chinese believed that arms control had failed because

1. arms control had neither checked the Soviet nuclear arms buildup nor contained US-Soviet competition for spheres of influence;
2. the Soviets had achieved military superiority over the Americans through the arms control agreements of the early 1970s - SALT I & II - and taken advantage of the US-Soviet detente of the early 1970s to carry out expansion in Africa, Middle East, Southwest and Southeast Asia;

3. qualitatively and technologically speaking, the arms race had gained momentum partly because of the ACD efforts to place limits on the quantity of weapons systems to be possessed by each side;
4. the threat to world peace and security could not be removed by signing arms limitation agreements with the Soviets but only by rearmament on the part of the US and its NATO allies;
5. Soviet disarmament and peace proposals were part of a wider strategy to disarm the West, win over the Third World to its side, and establish its political and military supremacy over the United States.

However, from a long-term perspective, the United Front strategy and its concomitant anti-Soviet orientation of Chinese national security policy had also its disadvantages. First of all, it led to a closer identification of China with the Western bloc and thus violated the principle of independence and equidistance from both the superpowers. Beijing's experience with the Sino-Soviet alliance had made it wary of dependence on an external power for security needs.

Second, while the United Front strategy precluded the possibility of US-Soviet collusion at China's expense, China did not "wish either the Soviet Union or the the United States to perceive Beijing as an appendage of American power"⁵² which restricted its freedom of manoeuvre in the strategic triangle.

Third, as Jonathan Pollack points out, Beijing soon realised that US-Soviet relations had a distinct and different agenda of priorities from the Sino-US ties and it feared that "Washington was dealing with China only to gain leverage in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union."⁵³

Fourth, the virulent anti-Sovietism of the 1970s belied China's much-advertised claim that "its opposition to the superpower ACD was in solidarity with the interests of the Third World."⁵⁴ Beijing's security alliance with the developed North and its refusal to support the ACD proposals for nuclear test bans, strategic arms control, five-power disarmament talks, and reductions of military budgets put forward by a large number of the developing countries further damaged China's prestige as a champion of the Third World.

Fifth, the anti-Soviet orientation of Chinese national security policy had the potential to further polarise the world into a bipolar system, heighten East-West tension, and provoke the USSR, thereby forcing China to devote more resources to the defence modernisation which had a comparatively low priority for the post-Mao leadership. Such an outcome was perceived as undermining China's domestic

development strategy which required a long-term peaceful international environment to succeed.

Sixth, the Chinese were also disappointed by US arms sales to Taiwan and restrictions placed on the transfer of advanced dual-use technology and liberal economic aid to China in the initial years of the Reagan administration. Beijing increasingly turned to Western Europe and Japan as alternative sources of aid and technology. This led to the realisation that the emergence of a multipolar system would provide China with greater opportunities to achieve its strategic and economic objectives than would a bipolar world dominated by the two superpowers.

Seventh, by the early 1980s, most of China's key political and strategic objectives had been achieved. The coming to power of the Reagan administration in the United States in 1980 which was committed to increased defence spending, and strategic superiority over the Soviets was seen in Beijing as an indication of American determination to counter and contain Soviet expansionism and hegemonism around the world. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was not only bogged down in Afghanistan, but also facing serious economic problems on the domestic front.

Last but not least, since the early 1970s China had achieved remarkable strides in its nuclear weapons programme, had tested and deployed IRBMs, full-range ICBMs (DF-5s or CSS-4s) capable of striking the European part of the Soviet Union including Moscow, and reaching any target throughout the North American continent, and also successfully tested an submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in October 1982. After nearly two decades of strenuous efforts, Beijing finally appeared to be attaining its goal of acquiring an effective and reliable second-strike nuclear counter-offensive capability *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union and limited deterrence against the United States. This capability imparted a sense of security and confidence to deal with any external threat to Chinese security on its own, and played a significant role in the formulation of Chinese national security and arms control policies of the 1980s.

To sum up, by late 1982, the perceived advantages of the United Front strategy had been outweighed by the potential disadvantages. And China abandoned its pro-US, anti-Soviet United Front strategy of the late 1970s in favour of an "independent foreign policy" in late 1982.

Nonetheless, in spite of Beijing's across-the-board denunciation of the arms control approach to resolve problems of international peace and security, certain signs of subtle

changes in the Chinese position on *ACD-related issues* had appeared in the late 1970s. These changes were part of a broader reassessment of domestic and foreign policies which began with the Third Plenum of the 11th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee in 1978. A report on the Central Committee session released in December 1978 failed to mention the "inevitability of war" and spoke of it only as a serious threat.⁵⁵ This policy shift represented an important ideological break from the Maoist position that a third world war was inevitable unless there was a global revolution in view of the contradictions among imperialist countries. That was the year that China agreed, for the first time, to participate in an international disarmament forum - the United Nations General Assembly's Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) and its two institutional offspring, the Disarmament Commission (DC) and the Committee on Disarmament (CD).⁵⁶ China's participation in the DC and the CD in early 1980 led to an abandonment of the general and complete disarmament approach in favour of the limited arms control approach. In May 1979, China put forward a Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament at the UN Disarmament Commission. It said that

when *substantial* progress has been made in the destruction of the [US-Soviet] nuclear weapons...other nuclear states shall join them in negotiation for the total destruction of nuclear weapons.⁵⁷

Three years later in June 1982, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua, speaking at the UN Second SSOD, specified that

the Soviet Union and the United States should...*reduce by 50 percent* all types of their nuclear weapons and means of delivery. Thereafter, *China would join all other nuclear states* [in the reduction] of their respective nuclear arsenals according to agreed levels and procedures.⁵⁸

This proposal was significant because it committed China, for the first time, to start actual nuclear weapons reduction after a 50 per cent reduction by the superpowers. And in September 1983, the Chinese government added the specific demand for convening an international conference on disarmament. However, after the 50 per cent reduction became the basis of US-Soviet strategic arms negotiations in 1986, Beijing reverted to its 1979 position calling for *substantial reductions* (without defining them) *instead of 50 per cent reductions*.⁵⁹ This illustrates, on the one hand, the ambiguous and uncertain nature of Chinese arms control policy. On the other hand, it highlights the dilemma facing the Chinese in seeking to reconcile the security and prestige requirements of Chinese foreign policy agenda.

In the past, China had abstained from UN disarmament deliberations, much to the indignation of the Third World, on the grounds that it stood for *total disarmament*, i.e.,

the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons as opposed to the limited, partial, and selective *arms control* approach. As Samuel Kim pointed out, Chinese officials and media had deliberately avoided using the term "arms control" [*wuqi kongzhi*] and showed their preference for the term "disarmament" [*caijun*].⁶⁰ Thus, all US-Soviet arms control agreements were condemned by Beijing as "sham disarmament", not as "sham arms control."⁶¹ One could argue that such an approach was motivated by Beijing's firm belief that while total disarmament was impossible to achieve, arms control was possible to realise. By championing the cause of total disarmament, Beijing was aiming to kill two birds with one stone. On the one hand, it wanted to enhance its image in the Third World as an uncompromising defender of peace and disarmament. On the other hand, it could successfully resist any external efforts to limit or control the development of its nuclear weaponry through an arms control treaty.

At the 1978 SSOD, Beijing softened its opposition to the arms control process partly in response to the growing denuclearisation demands of the Third World and to refurbish its image damaged by its tilt towards the US and NATO. The shift in the Chinese stand on ACD can also be attributed in part to the realisation that the politics of arms control had become "too important a business to be left to the two superpowers in post-Mao foreign policy."⁶² Samuel Kim argues that Beijing's decision to participate in the multilateral disarmament deliberations (DC) and negotiations (CD) was no more than a tactic "to compete with the Soviets in their favourite disarmament arena and perhaps to beat them at their own game."⁶³ In view of the rabid anti-Soviet orientation of Chinese national security policy during this period, it is hard to dispute Kim's assertion.

The 1982-1988 Period: China's Adopts An "Independent Foreign Policy" and Arms Control Strategy

The early eighties saw China reassessing its strategic outlook and threat perception, abandoning an anti-Soviet United Front policy, and distancing itself from American strategic objectives. This fundamental shift in China's national security policy was endorsed at the 12th Congress of the CCP in September 1982. Defined as China's "independent foreign policy", [*duli zizhu waijiao zhengce*] - a euphemism for an equidistant position between the Soviet Union and the United States - CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang said: "China would never attach itself to any big power or group of powers and would never yield to pressure from any big power."⁶⁴ (Despite the adoption of an "Independent Foreign Policy" line, China remained suspicious of Moscow and it was only after 1986 that this policy came into effect.)

In real terms, it was an assurance by China to the Soviet Union that Beijing would not align itself with Washington and Tokyo against Moscow as it had done in the past. China's decision to normalise relations with the Soviet Union was motivated by two considerations. One was to work towards the alleviation of the threat in its immediate neighbourhood, and the second was to acquire greater leverage with the Americans. Beijing's close strategic alignment with the West since the late 1970s had proved counter-productive insofar as it led to an increase in the perceived Soviet threat to Chinese security instead of alleviating it. By the mid 1980s, the Soviet forces deployed against China numbered 271,400 troops, 820 aircraft, 8,100 tanks, 10,200 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and 9,400 artillery pieces - about 25 per cent to 30 per cent of the Soviet Union's 3-million strong armed forces.⁶⁵ In addition, the Soviet Union had doubled the size of its Pacific Fleet, and increased the number of the three-warheaded SS-20s deployed in the Far East from 75 to 171.⁶⁶ The two decades of Sino-Soviet hostility had forced both countries to devote considerable resources towards military preparedness to the detriment of domestic economic development. Between 1979 and 1985, 17-12 per cent of China's national budget was being spent on the defence sector.⁶⁷ The hard realities of defence and economy apparently necessitated a change in the country's foreign policy agenda.

In spite of downgrading the Soviet threat from an immediate to a more long-term one, Beijing continued to view with apprehension the Soviet military deployments in the Asian region, talked about the threat of a war because of hegemonism, asked Moscow to remove three obstacles to pave the way for Sino-Soviet detente, and remained wary of Soviet arms control and peace offensives.⁶⁸ Responding to Gorbachev's calls for CBMs in Asia and "proportionate reductions" in the Sino-Soviet ground forces in his Vladivostok speech in July 1986, an analyst from Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies (BIISS), Yao Wenbin, warned that the new Soviet "peace offensive" in Asia was designed to divide the "anti-hegemonic" forces and to sow discord in US relations with China, Japan, and other Asian countries.⁶⁹ Faced with an avalanche of Soviet arms control proposals, Chinese leaders have repeatedly asked the Soviets to first make unilateral arms cuts on the Sino-Soviet border to demonstrate their desire for friendly relations with Beijing. Geostrategic reasons prevent the Chinese from taking Soviet peace overtures seriously. Nonetheless, by claiming to be "non-aligned" or "independent" from the two superpowers, Beijing signalled to Moscow its intention to improve Sino-Soviet relations.⁷⁰

Beijing's revised security logic now found the international environment less dangerous than previously diagnosed. According to Chinese analyses of the international situation, the Soviet economy was stagnating, Soviet armed forces were bogged down in Afghanistan, American military power under Reagan was on the ascendant, and a major war was no longer inevitable.⁷¹ Deng Xiaoping stated that,

the growth of the forces for peace in the world will outpace the growth of the forces for war...It is possible that a large-scale world war will not break out...There are hopes for safeguarding world peace.⁷²

This optimistic projection was offered by Deng and other Chinese leaders to justify their decision to turn China's attention to the long-deferred tasks of restructuring the economic system, upgrading the scientific and technological levels of Chinese industry, and more importantly, reducing the size of the Chinese military establishment in order to make it a more modern, professional and technologically well-equipped fighting machine. The downgrading of the Soviet threat to China's security was also calculated to facilitate reduction of PLA manpower and pave the way for the reorganisation, modernisation, and professionalisation of the armed forces. Interestingly, the military buildup by the superpowers was viewed by Beijing not as a direct military threat to China but as an indication of US-Soviet rivalry for supremacy. Chinese analyses of ACD once again turned critical of *both* the superpowers and reflected a greater awareness of the implications of an unrestricted US-Soviet arms race for Chinese security interests. There was also a shift in the Chinese position on questions of war and peace, nuclear weapons, and peaceful coexistence.⁷³ The Chinese now showed more flexibility and appeared to be confident of developing their own responses to the various ACD issues - a posture which was in sharp contrast to Chinese attitudes towards ACD in the 1960s and 1970s. In the summer of 1983, Beijing took a further step by appointing China's first ambassador for disarmament. The most plausible explanation for this change of heart on China's part lies not in Moscow or Washington but in Beijing itself.

A quarter of a century's development of nuclear weapons, including land-, sea-, and air-based delivery systems, had made China capable of deterring nuclear and conventional threats from *both* the superpowers entirely on its own. Since the early 1980s, Chinese civilian and military leaders have claimed on several occasions that China had acquired a second-strike nuclear counter-attack capability. Less than a month after China adopted an "independent foreign policy," Defence Minister Zhang Aiping noted that "we have...established a certain defensive capability in terms of strategic weapons."⁷⁴ By mid-1983, China had deployed between 200-250 missiles of all

types targeting key military, industrial and civilian centres throughout the Soviet Union. A great majority of these missiles, concealed and hidden in mountains and hardened silos, were unlikely to be detected by Soviet spy satellites. In October 1984, a *Renmin Ribao* report on the Strategic Missiles Forces Unit also stated that China "now has the combat capability to counter a surprise attack and to launch a nuclear counteroffensive."⁷⁵ A 1984 secret report by the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) quoted a high-ranking Chinese military official as claiming that

the Soviet Union no longer has a first strike capability against China because the Chinese nuclear arsenal is so well hidden that it ensures sufficient retaliatory capability to inflict intolerable damage on the Soviet Union.⁷⁶

Another report in early 1987 said that China had established a protected command post defence system in deep bunkers similar to those of the USA and USSR.⁷⁷ China's nuclear forces are believed to be widely deployed and mobile which make it difficult for any attacking force to wipe them out completely. While China's nuclear arsenal *vis-à-vis* the United States is very small, its symbolic and psychological impact is more significant. As noted earlier, since 1980, China has deployed full-range (13,000 km) ICBMs (DF-5s or CSS-4s), some equipped with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) capability, in addition to deploying SLBMs, which give it the capability to strike the North American continent. The Soviets have also sought to portray China's growing nuclear capabilities in recent years more in anti-American terms than in anti-Soviet terms.⁷⁸ Though China's ability to strike the continental United States is still limited, one should not underestimate the Chinese capability to strike US nuclear forces in South Korea, Japan, and the Pacific. The fact that some Chinese missiles would certainly reach American targets in a nuclear exchange between the two countries means that some degree of deterrence *vis-à-vis* the United States has also been achieved. The considerable significance that Beijing attaches to the preservation and enhancement of this retaliatory capability is demonstrated by the extensive modernisation and diversification of its nuclear weapons in the post-Mao period. As outlined in the next chapter on military capabilities, China's most impressive achievements - full-range ICBMs, acquisition of an MIRV capability and sea-based deterrent including SLBMs, tactical nuclear weapons, and dual-use space technology - have all been made in the 1980s. Ironical though it may seem, it is true that Beijing's increased interest in ACD has been accompanied by an increased emphasis on nuclear force modernisation and diversification.

This enhanced military capability has not only engendered a sense of confidence of being able to meet an external threat to China's security without reliance on any external power, but also enabled the Chinese leadership, for the first time in the history of the PRC, to achieve its goals of independence and influence in world affairs as an *equal*, not subordinate, of the two superpowers. By avoiding alignment with either superpower, and exploiting US-Soviet rivalry as a fulcrum for strategic leverage, economic and trade benefits and political influence, China came to occupy the much-coveted pivot position in the US-Soviet-China triangle. As a consequence, China finally acquired freedom of manoeuvre, i.e., a strategic position independent of both superpowers, but not in conflict with either. This was one of the basic objectives or as the Chinese put it, a "cardinal principle"⁷⁹ of Chinese foreign policy ever since 1949, but had been difficult to achieve because of inadequate military capabilities in the early years of the People's Republic. And the contribution of nuclear weapons in helping China achieve this goal and great power status must not be overlooked.

The changes in Chinese threat perceptions, the imperatives of economic modernisation, and the acquisition of adequate military strength eventually contributed to a rethinking of Chinese policy towards arms control in the early 1980s. China's primary concern now was (and is) to preserve and enhance its nuclear deterrent capability *vis-à-vis* the two superpowers - a capability achieved after an enormous investment of human and material resources over 25 years. This consideration forced Chinese analysts to make a detailed examination of the implications of the US-Soviet arms control talks for the Chinese nuclear weapons programme.

This task was facilitated by two developments. First, as a result of China's participation in the United Nations ACD fora and strategic interaction with the Western world, a small community of arms control experts had developed within the Chinese foreign policymaking organs which had a greater understanding of the dynamics and mechanisms of the ACD process.⁸⁰ Second, ever since May 1978, when US National Security Adviser Brzezinski had briefed the Chinese on the SALT II negotiations to allay their misapprehensions, the United States has kept the Chinese informed of its position on ACD *vis-à-vis* the USSR. And since 1984 the United States has been regularly dispatching US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) officials to hold consultations with their Chinese counterparts and elicit their views and support on ACD issues. Not willing to be left behind, since March 1986 the Soviet Union, too, has been following this practice by sending Bureau of Arms Limitation and Disarmament

officials to court Beijing for support on Soviet arms control proposals.⁸¹ The Chinese have used these exchanges as a sounding board to make their views and concerns known to both Washington and Moscow, with varying degrees of success.

Chinese analysts were quick to recognise the value of arms control as a tool to further Chinese security interests as soon as the US-Soviet talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) got under way in the early 1980s.⁸² Any lingering doubts about the efficacy of arms control in enhancing or undermining Chinese national security, were removed when US President Reagan launched a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or "Star Wars" programme in March 1983. The SDI programme or the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems posed a worrisome dilemma for the Chinese: in the longer term, the US "Star Wars" programme and its Soviet counterpart as well as a budding anti-satellite arms race could conceivably neutralise or undermine the independent nuclear deterrent capabilities possessed by China, France, and Britain, leaving them vulnerable to nuclear blackmail or coercion by one or both superpowers. Thus, the prospects of an extension of the superpower arms race into outer space and the possibility of the USA and Soviet Union reaching an INF agreement detrimental to Chinese national security interests underscored the adverse consequences of China's indifference towards the ACD process.

As a result, an intense debate started within China on how to protect Chinese security interests from the negative fall-out of superpower arms control agreements negotiated at the expense of or in total disregard of a third country's security interests.⁸³ It was during these internal debates, which intensified between 1984-86, that a consensus among Chinese arms control experts seems to have emerged on the following issues:

- A. an unremitting US-Soviet arms race leading to increased tension and rivalry is detrimental to China's security interests and could derail its domestic development plans if Beijing is forced to divert scarce financial resources to the defence sector to join the arms race;
- B. arms control agreements which place restraints on US-Soviet nuclear weapons without requiring similar restraints on Chinese nuclear forces in effect enhance the relative credibility and potency of China's minimum nuclear deterrent capability;
- C. active disarmament diplomacy would be in accordance with Third World aspirations, China's global status as a NWS, and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and would beat the Soviets at their own favourite game;

- D. hence, arms control could play an important role in enhancing Chinese security if Beijing tried to influence the outcome of superpower arms control talks in a way beneficial to its own security interests;
- E. China should adopt a high-profile diplomatic posture which is more pro-arms control and disarmament in general terms, but which maintains an exclusionist stance on its own nuclear forces; and
- F. China's arms control strategy should seek to achieve its objectives through political-strategic relations with both superpowers, particularly the United States.

Close scrutiny of the above-mentioned characteristics of China's arms control strategy provides an explanation of China's arms control "activism" of the 1980s as manifested in Beijing's ratification of the Seabed Treaty [A & C] and Outer Space Treaty in 1984 [A, B, & D], signing of the ^{Protocols to the} South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty [C & E], membership of the International Atomic Energy Agency and acceptance of its nuclear safeguards, reaffirmation of commitment to nuclear non-proliferation goals [C & E], opposition to ~~chemical weapons~~ "Star Wars" programmes [A, B & E], and insistence on the consideration of Chinese security interests in US-Soviet INF talks [F]. *Apart from one mention of chemical weapons, all the instances of Chinese ACD "activism" in the 1980s were nuclear-related.*

In spite of China's arms control "activism" of the 1980s, there are indications of a hardening of Chinese attitude particularly since the signing of the INF Treaty and the beginning of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). While in principle China remains committed to the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, in practice Chinese policymakers see little possibility of this occurring in the foreseeable future. As noted above, in 1982 Chinese Foreign Minister expressed a willingness to include China's nuclear weapons in multilateral nuclear arms reduction talks once the two superpowers agreed to "reduce by 50 per cent all types of their nuclear weapons and means of delivery." However, there has been an important change in the Chinese position since then. The current Chinese position is that "the two superpowers must reduce their weapons *well below the 50 per cent nominal or 30 per cent actual outlined in the START negotiations.*"⁸⁴ Chinese analysts now insist that a 50 per cent reduction is insufficient without a halt to the US-Soviet qualitative arms race. One Chinese strategist has gone so far as to suggest that Beijing must not join multilateral five-power nuclear arms control talks until "the Soviet-Chinese ratio of warheads reached 5:1 or even 3:1 which amounts to 85 to 90 per cent reduction."⁸⁵ That the Chinese posture is now stricter than that of France is demonstrated by the fact that China is unwilling to discuss reductions to its own nuclear weapons until the two superpowers have agreed to "three cessations and one reduction".⁸⁶ This means that the superpowers must reduce

nuclear weapons well below the levels currently being discussed (the exact ratio is deliberately left undefined in order to strengthen China's bargaining position in the future), and agree not to test, produce or deploy such weapons. Such a stance is aimed at reducing the current imbalance between the nuclear capabilities of the superpowers and China, and thereby enhancing China's nuclear potential.

An offshoot of the Chinese debate on an independent foreign policy posture is the theory of multipolarisation, which has wider implications for the Chinese arms control strategy. According to this theory, the international system has been undergoing a transformation from a bipolar system dominated by the two superpowers to a multipolar system dominated by five great powers as a consequence of the relative decline in the influence and power of the USA and USSR over their respective blocs, and consequently, over world politics. The five great powers identified by the Chinese are the US, USSR, Western Europe, China and Japan. As a recent commentary in *Jiefangjun Bao* stated:

A transition from polar to multipolar system is being effected in the international strategic structure and the capability of the United States and the Soviet Union to dominate the world situation is waning. Meanwhile, the political and economic status of Japan, Western Europe, and China will be increasingly consolidated.⁸⁷

Chinese commentaries on multipolarisation were preceded by detailed analyses of the superpower military balance and the serious economic problems besetting both Washington and Moscow. According to Chinese analysts, the rise of Western Europe and Japan as world economic powers, the movement for greater independence and self-reliance within the Western and Eastern European nations, the serious economic problems faced by Washington and Moscow which are the result of an uncontrolled US-Soviet arms race, and China's growing economic and military strength are strong indications that the "global power pattern established in the aftermath of World War II is gradually vanishing."⁸⁸ As one Chinese analyst observed: "There is already a multipolarised world economy and a politically multipolarised world is in the making. Militarily, the bipolar pattern is weakening."⁸⁹

Apparently Beijing's past experience with the two superpowers led to the conviction that China could benefit more in a pluralised international structure than from a bipolar strategic system. However, a multipolar world provides China with opportunities as well as challenges. The emergence of a multipolar world is seen by Beijing as a positive development which would prevent or delay the outbreak of a world war, strengthen the forces of peace, promote detente and stability. It has brought about a convergence of strategic and political interests between China and Western Europe. Both are

determined to reduce international tensions, lessen their dependence on the US, seek better ties with the Soviet Union, maintain and enhance their nuclear and conventional deterrent capabilities, and emerge as independent strategic centres in the international system. The multipolarisation theory also negates the premise on which the Soviets base their argument for lumping the Anglo-French and American nuclear forces together to demand compensation for third-party interests. The fear that inclusion of the Anglo-French nuclear forces in the US-Soviet arms control talks might eventually set an example for bringing the Chinese nuclear weapons onto the negotiating table lies behind China's vested interest in the preservation of the independent nuclear forces of Britain and France.

At the same time, the Chinese believe that a relative decline of the superpowers might force the USA and USSR to seek detente and reach arms control agreements in order to recover strength for a contest for supremacy in the next century. They fear that such superpower-negotiated arms control agreements could not only jeopardise the vital security interests of Western Europe and China but could also be a medium through which to maintain and perpetuate the bipolar division of the international diffusion of power. Chinese apprehensions are based on the US proclivity during the INF talks to reduce its military commitment to Western European security and undermine Chinese security by initially allowing the USSR to keep its 100 nuclear warheads deployed in the Far East. Hence, China opposed the Soviet attempts to include the French and British nuclear weapons in arms reduction talks, supported Western Europe's efforts to maintain and enhance its nuclear deterrent capability, and demanded that the Soviet arms reductions should not be limited only to the European theatre but should extend to the Asian theatre as well. Likewise, Beijing has derided the US SDI programme and the Soviet counter-measures, the objective of which is "to ensure [the US-Soviet] hegemonic positions and return world politics to the early post-war bi-polarity in order to control world affairs."⁹⁰ A similar line of reasoning made Beijing reject Soviet proposals for a simultaneous nuclear freeze and comprehensive test ban by the five NWSs. A *Xinhua* commentator remarked that the Soviet proposal was aimed at maintaining the position of the two superpowers as nuclear overlords" and claimed that "the 'bipolar world' concept with the two superpowers manipulating world affairs remains popular in Moscow."⁹¹

Evidently, China looks at ACD as a mechanism which can accelerate the growth of a multipolar world and as an important instrument to reduce the political and military

domination of the two superpowers. It remains to be seen how China proposes to accommodate the interests and perspectives of the other four poles in the emerging multipolar world, particularly those of Japan and the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

The analysis presented above demonstrates that no proper understanding of Chinese attitudes towards ACD issues is possible without analysing China's national security objectives, contours and orientations. At an early date, the Chinese leadership decided to build nuclear weapons in order to be able to "stand on its own" in national security matters. Whatever the differences within the Chinese leadership on domestic or foreign policy directions, there has been a consensus on all political sides that the nuclear weapons programme is an important symbol of China's international independence, self-reliance and prestige. The political significance of nuclear weapons is well understood in Beijing. Nuclear weapons capability, not its economic wealth or power projection capabilities, has given China an international status, prestige and influence in world politics.

Beijing parted company with Moscow over the latter's refusal to help China in its pursuit of a nuclear capability. The conflicting views held by Moscow and Beijing on nuclear weapons, arms control, war and peace and peaceful coexistence played a significant role in bringing the two allies to the brink of a nuclear war. China's nuclear weapons programme may have had its origins in seeking security in its perceived threat from the US in the fifties, but its real development has taken place in support of a strategy of nuclear deterrence *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union.

Under these circumstances, it was natural that China viewed with suspicion and hostility the various arms control proposals put forward by the Big Two. The crux of China's opposition to arms control in the 1960s and 1970s was that the US and the Soviet Union tried to use ACD to prevent China from developing nuclear weapons. At a time when there was visibly no let up in the threat to Chinese security, Chinese military capabilities were weak and vulnerable, China's nuclear weapons were in an experimental stage, and the deterrent was non-existent, Beijing could not afford to accept the limitations imposed by ACD.

By the early 1980s China had acquired a credible second-strike nuclear counter-offensive capability *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union as well as the United States. Meanwhile, China had improved relations with the United States, joined the United Nations,

become integrated into the world economic and political system, and had become a champion of world peace and development. The shift to a balanced relationship with the two superpowers and economic modernisation priorities necessitated an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. It can be surmised that China's quest for independence which led it to break with the Soviet Union in the 1960s eventually led it to seek better ties with the Soviet Union in the 1980s. In view of Beijing's historical quest for independence and the non-permanence of its relationships, it should not be surprising if a small portion of China's nuclear arsenal has been deployed against the United States in order to demonstrate the "independent" or more balanced nature of its foreign policy.

It is obvious that the state of Sino-Soviet and Sino-US relations has had a major bearing on China's ACD policies and is expected to continue to do so in the future. China's early threat perceptions of an immediate large scale war made it wary of placing much hope on ACD, and inclined it to question the efficacy and soundness of ACD theories and concepts. Whereas in the 1960s and the 1970s, Beijing's military vulnerability, coupled with its hostile relations with one or both superpowers coloured its opposition to the ACD process, Beijing's detente with both Washington and Moscow in the 1980s, combined with its sufficient deterrent capacity, introduced an element of flexibility in Chinese positions on arms control questions. [See Table 2.1] Unlike in the past, Beijing could no longer justify its opposition to arms control in terms of superpower hostility to China. In the medium and long terms, a significant relaxation in US-Soviet tensions, and an absence of a world war is seen as serving the interests of relatively weak countries such as China. A peaceful environment provides Beijing some breathing space to enhance its economic and military capabilities. Therefore, in sharp contrast with the 1960s and 1970s, Beijing now urges both superpowers to conduct arms control negotiations in earnest without jeopardising the security interests of third countries. It can be surmised that whereas in the early years of the PRC, Beijing sought security through deterrence and defence, in the 1980s, it seeks security through deterrence, defence and detente. To put it this way,

1960s-70s | deterrence + defence = national security
1980s | deterrence + defence + detente = national security

The Chinese have also come out in support of a multipolar world in which China - as one pole in addition to the US, USSR, Western Europe and Japan - is supposed to have greater freedom of manoeuvre and the status of a global power. Thus Beijing is opposed to those aspects of the US-Soviet arms race which seem to perpetuate US-Soviet bipolarity. From the Chinese perspective, the ACD process could hasten the transition

from a bipolar to a multipolar world in so far as it restrains the superpowers' arms race and limits their ability to dominate world politics.

There is no doubt that China continues to regard the Soviet Union as a more pressing military threat than the US for geostrategic reasons. This prevents Beijing from adopting a truly equidistant posture between the two superpowers. It seems that China is now inclined to use ACD to ameliorate the Soviet threat to its security instead of resorting to military means or alliance relationships. The development of an arms control community within China and periodic consultations with Western security experts have brought about a greater understanding and recognition of the value of ACD in enhancing Chinese national security interests and in maintaining international peace and security. The most fundamental objective of Beijing's arms control strategy is and will remain the maintenance and enhancement of Chinese national security. The three case studies undertaken in this thesis further investigate the relationship between Chinese national security and nuclear arms control.

Table 2.1

CHINESE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

PERIOD	LEVEL OF THREAT PERCEPTION	PERCEIVED ENEMY	RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITY	NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY ORIENTATION	ARMS CONTROL TREATY	CHINESE ATTITUDE TO ACD	NUMBER OF NUCLEAR TESTS
1949-60	VERY HIGH	USA	WEAK	PRO-USSR, ANTI-US	-	-	-
1960-64	VERY HIGH	US/USSR	WEAK	ANTI-USSR & US	PTBT	HIGHLY CRITICAL	-
1964-70	VERY HIGH	US/USSR	WEAK	ANTI-USSR & US	NPT	HIGHLY CRITICAL	11
					TLATELOLCO TREATY	CRITICAL	
					OUTER SPACE TREATY	CRITICAL	
1970-78	HIGH	USSR	MODERATE	ANTI-USSR	SALT I	CRITICAL	14
					SEA-BED TREATY	CRITICAL	
					CONVENTION BANNING		
					BIOLOGICAL WARFARE	CRITICAL	
					ABM	CRITICAL	
					TTBT	CRITICAL	
					TLATELOLCO TREATY	SUPPORTED WITH	
						RESERVATIONS	
1978-82	LOW	USSR	IMPROVED	ANTI-USSR, PRO US	SALT II	CRITICAL	1
1982-88	VERY LOW	USSR	CREDIBLY STRONG	DETENTE	NON-PROLIFERATION		
					GOALS, NOT NPT	SUPPORTS	7
					IAEA	SUPPORTS	
					OUTER SPACE TREATY	SUPPORTS	
					TREATY OF RAROTONGA	SUPPORTS	
					CHEMICAL AND		
					BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS		
					TREATY	SUPPORTS	
					BAN ON ATMOSPHERIC		
					TESTING, NOT PTBT	SUPPORTS	
					INF	SUPPORTS	
					START	SUPPORTS	

NOTES

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- 2 Alice L. Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1962), p. 173; Ghosh and Sreedhar, op. cit., p. 55; and Harvey Nelsen, "Strategic Weapons in the Sino-Soviet Dispute: An Overview." (Paper presented at the 27th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, California, March 1986), p. 3.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 John Gittings, "China: Half a Superpower," in Chomsky, Steele and Gittings (eds.), *Superpowers in Collision* (London: A Pelican Original, 1984), p. 95; and John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988).
- 5 Mao Zedong, "On the 10 major relationships," in *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung* Vol. V, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), p. 288.
- 6 Liu Xiao, who served as China's ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1955 to 1962, when Sino-Soviet relations turned sour, recounts in his memoirs the differences over military strategy and China's dealings with Khrushchev. Liu's memoirs, titled "Chushi Sulian" [An Envoy to the Soviet Union] were published in 1987 in a journal, *Shijie Zhishi*, Nos. 3,6,12,14,16 and 18. Also see "The riddle of research and development on China's atomic bomb, hydrogen bomb, and nuclear-powered submarine," *Liaowang*, 15 June 1987, p. 5; Ghosh and Sreedhar, op. cit.; Hsieh, op. cit.; Amos Yoder, *Chinese Policies Toward Limiting Nuclear Weapons* (Occasional Paper 22, Muscatine Iowa: The Stanley Foundation), pp. 5-12; Morton Halperin, *China and the Bomb* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965), pp. 79-80; *Peking Review*, August 15, 1963, p. 14; Peter Jones and Sian Kevill, *China and the Soviet Union 1949-84* (London: Longman, 1985), pp. 8-9, 11, 13; Kazuko Mori, "Sino-Soviet Relations: From Confrontation to Cooperation," *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 2, No. 1, (Spring/Summer 1988), pp. 42-46; and Alastair I. Johnston, *China and Arms Control: Emerging Issues and Interests in the 1980s* (Aurora Papers 3, The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1986), p. 17.
- 7 Jones and Kevill, op. cit., p. 7.
- 8 Ibid., p. 34.
- 9 For a detailed analysis of the impact of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism on Chinese attitudes towards ACD, see Johnston, op. cit., pp. 13-16.
- 10 *Zhongguo Qingnian* (China Youth), Nos. 3-4, 10 February 1963.
- 11 Nelsen, op. cit., p. 7; Morton Halperin, *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1967), p. 150; and Jones and Kevill, op. cit., p. 13.
- 12 Nie Rongzhen, *Nie Rongzhen huiyilu* [Memoirs of Nie Rongzhen] Vol. 2, (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Chubanshe, 1984), pp. 800-804.
- 13 Johnston, op. cit., p. 19; *Liaowang*, 15 June 1987, in BBC SWB/FE/8605/BII, 27 June 1987, p. 3; and Shao-Chuan Leng, *China's Nuclear Policy: An Overall View* (University of Maryland: Occasional Papers No. 1, 1984), p. 1.
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- 15 "A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 3, 1963," in William Griffiths, *The Sino-Soviet Rift* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964), pp. 342, 347, 345, 351-2; *Peking Review*, 6 September 1963, p. 13; Jones and Kevill, *China and the Soviet Union*, op. cit., pp. 45-6; *Peking Review*, 22 November 1963, p. 15;

- Peking Review*, 4 January 1963, pp. 12-13 and 23 October 1964; and *Renmin Ribao*, 22 October 1964.
- 16 Johnston, p. 19.
 - 17 See the statement issued by *New China News Agency*, 16 October 1964; and *Peking Review*, 16 October 1964.
 - 18 *Peking Review*, No. 32, August 1966, pp. 15-16; *Renmin Ribao*, 13 June 1968; and *Peking Review*, 21 June 1968, pp. 17-18.
 - 19 Ibid. Also see Jonathan Pollack, "Chinese Attitudes Towards Nuclear Weapons, 1964-1969," *The China Quarterly*, No. 50, (April/June 1972), pp. 258-259.
 - 20 See Marko Milivojevic, "The People's Liberation Army of China - Part 2," *Armed Forces*, Vol. 7, No. 9, (September 1988), p. 413. The US strategic plan outlined in Presidential Directive-59 or PD-59 intended to strike 100 targets in China, see Gerald Segal, *Sino-Soviet Relations after Mao* (London: IISS, Adelphi Papers, No. 202, Autumn 1985), p. 22.
 - 21 *Survey of China Mainland Press* (hereafter *SCMP*), No. 3823, 18 November 1966, pp. 39-40; *SCMP*, No. 4131, 5 March 1968, pp. 29-30; *Peking Review*, No. 27, 5 July 1968, p. 33.
 - 22 Nelsen, op. cit., p. 9. An article written by Victor Louis was published in *London Evening News* on 16 September 1969. It said: "The Soviet Union prefers using rockets to manpower. She has a variety of rockets to choose from depending upon the terrain and other circumstances." Also see Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1979), p. 184; and Arkady Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow* (New York, Alfred Knopf and Co., 1985), pp. 1654-66.
 - 23 Information in this paragraph is based mainly on Harry Gelman's, "The Siberian Military Buildup and the Sino-Soviet-US Triangle," in Rodger Swearingen (ed.), *Siberia and the Soviet Far East* (Stanford University: Hoover Institution, 1987), pp. 191-192.
 - 24 *Pravda*, 28 August 1969, editorial cited in Gelman, p. 219.
 - 25 On official Chinese reaction, see *New China News Agency* (NCNA), 24 May 1969, 2 June 1969, 6 July 1969, 1 and 14 August 1969. Also cited in Gelman, op. cit., p. 220.
 - 26 *Renmin Ribao*, 30 September 1969, p. 1; *Jiefangjun Bao*, 30 September 1969, p. 1; and *Xinhua*, 9 October 1969.
 - 27 *Peking Review*, Nos. 35-36, 7 September 1973, p. 19.
 - 28 CSS-2 was first deployed in 1972 and China's first ICBM CSS-3 was deployed in 1978. As Harry Gelman observes, "In view of the entry into operational status of both the Chinese CSS-2 and CSS-3 surface-to-surface missiles, and their deployments in modes likely to diminish Soviet confidence in the total effectiveness of any disarming strike, the Chinese deterrent against any Soviet attack had been considerably augmented since 1969." See Gelman, "The Siberian Military Buildup," p. 202.
 - 29 Ghosh and Sreedhar, op. cit., p. 71. This proposal was made by Brezhnev in his inaugural address to the 24th CPSU Congress in Moscow on 30 March 1971. See *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts-USSR* (SWB-USSR), 31 March 1971.
 - 30 See Qiao Guanhua's speech in *Peking Review*, No. 47, 19 November 1971, p. 9.
 - 31 Gelman, op. cit., p. 195; and Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 547-548. This issue has also been discussed in detail in Dan L. Strobe, "Arms Control and Sino-Soviet Relations," *Orbis*, Vol. 28, No. 1, (Spring 1984), pp. 163-88.
 - 32 Dan L. Strobe, "Soviet China policy in flux," *Survival*, (July/August 1988), p. 341. Also see Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1982), p. 275; Richard M. Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), p. 1030; Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 258; and Gerard Smith, *Double Talk: The Story of SALT II* (New York: Doubleday, 1980), p. 141.
 - 33 Ibid.
 - 34 Strobe, "Arms Control and Sino-Soviet Relations," op. cit.

- 35 Harry Gelber, *Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Policy* (London: IISS, Adelphi Papers, No. 99, Summer 1973), p. 29.
- 36 *Renmin Ribao*, 1 October 1972, p. 1.
- 37 *Radio Peking*, 17 July 1972, *BBC SWB-Far East*, 18 July 1972.
- 38 Emphasis added. Johnston, op. cit., p. 20; cited from K.C. Chen (ed.), *China and the Three Worlds: A Foreign Policy Reader* (New York: M.E. Sarpe Inc., 1979), p. 157. Addressing the UN in late 1972, Chinese vice-foreign minister Qiao Guanhua rejected the idea of a complete test ban because it could only "hinder countries with few or no nuclear weapons from developing their nuclear capability for self-defence, but will not affect in the least the nuclear hegemony of the superpowers." See *Peking Review*, 3 November 1972, pp. 22-24; and *Peking Review*, 13 November 1972, pp. 5-6. Also cited in Gelber, op. cit., p. 29.
- 39 *Renmin Ribao*, 6 November 1973.
- 40 On the Chinese concerns regarding the Soviet buildup in the Far East, see "Heighten Our Vigilance and Get Prepared to Fight a War," *Beijing Review*, 11 August 1978, p. 8; "Social-Imperialist Strategy in Asia," *Beijing Review*, 19 January 1976, p. 13; "Soviet Strategy for East Asia," *Beijing Review*, 23 March 1981, p. 20; *Xinhua*, 9 October 1981, in *FBIS-China*, 14 October 1981, p. D1; Gelman, op. cit., pp. 198-199; Johnston, op. cit., pp. 21-22; John Erickson, "The Soviet Strategic Emplacement in Asia," *Asian Affairs*, (February 1981), pp. 1-18, and Segal, *Sino-Soviet Relations after Mao*, pp. 16-22.
- 41 "Increasing Soviet Menace," *Beijing Review*, 25 August 1980, p. 11; "Global Strategy," *Beijing Review*, 2 March 1981, p. 3; Thomas W. Robinson, "Choice and Consequence in Sino-American Relations," *Orbis*, Vol. 25, No. 1, (Spring 1981), pp. 29-51; Johnston, op. cit., pp. 21-23; and Jonathan Pollack, "China's Global Strategy and Soviet Power," *Problems of Communism*, No. 1, (Jan./Feb. 1981).
- 42 Ibid.
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- 44 *Beijing Review*, No. 28, 14 July 1978, p. 29.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 See *Beijing Review*, 24 June 1977; and "Soviet Social-Imperialism - Most Dangerous Source of World War," *Beijing Review*, 15 July 1977, pp. 4-10, 21.
- 47 *Xinhua* commentary in *FBIS-China*, 6 August 1978, p. A4.
- 48 "On Disarmament," *Hongqi*, 1 June 1980, p. 47, cited in Johnston, op. cit., p. 11.
- 49 Commentator, "The Plotter of a Siege Is Being Besieged," *Hongqi*, No. 11, November 1978, in *FBIS-China*, 29 November 1978, pp. A9-13.
- 50 *Renmin Ribao* 10 April 1980, in *FBIS-China*, 18 April 1980, pp. A1-2.
- 51 Ji Yin, "US-Soviet Detente and Western Europe," *Shijie Zhishi*, No. 17, 1 September 1988, pp. 2-4, in *FBIS-China*, 23 September 1988, pp. 5-8.
- 52 Jonathan D. Pollack, *China and the Global Strategic Balance* (Santa Monica, CA.: The Rand Corporation, The Rand Paper Series P-6952, January 1984), p. 11. This paper was also published in Harry Harding (ed.), *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 153-165. Also see Song Gang, "China and Detente," *Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 39, (5-20 August 1988), p. 30.
- 53 Ibid.
- 54 Johnston, p. 23.
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- 56 For a detailed analysis of Chinese ACD policy during this period, see Samuel S. Kim, "Whither post-Mao Chinese global policy," *International Organization*, Vol. 35, No. 3, (Summer 1981), p. 442-3.
- 57 Emphasis added. *Peking Review*, No. 24, 16 June 1979, p. 23; and Leng, op. cit., pp. 10-11.
- 58 Leng, p. 11; and "China's Position on Disarmament," *Beijing Review*, No. 25, 21 June 1982, pp. 15-17.

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- 60 Kim, pp. 443-4.
- 61 Ibid. *Renmin Ribao* 30 May 1978, pp. 2,4; *Peking Review*, No. 24, 16 June 1978, pp. 22-24; and *Peking Review*, No. 22, 2 June 1978, pp. 5-13.
- 62 Kim, p. 447.
- 63 Ibid.
- 64 See Hu's report in *FBIS-China*, 8 September 1982; Qi Wen, "Correctly Understand Our Country's Independent Foreign Policy," *Hongqi*, No. 21, 1 November 1982, pp. 24-28; in *FBIS-China*, 19 November 1982, pp. K14-20; and *The Constitution of the People's Republic of China* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1983), p. 7.
- 65 Tai Ming Cheung, "Defence 3: Lifting the curtain," *FEER*, 31 August 1989, p. 31.
- 66 In 1981, there were only 75 Soviet SS-20s deployed in the Far East. In 1985 the number went up to 135 and in 1986, there were approximately 171 SS-20s in the Far East. See Rodger Swearingen (ed.), *Siberia and the Soviet Far East* (Stanford University: Hoover Institution, 1987), pp. 212 and 244. It is worth noting that the Soviet deployment of SS-20s in the Far East coincided with significant improvement in the Sino-American relations.
- 67 *FEER*, 18 August 1988, p. 88; and Gary Klintworth, *China's Modernisation: The Strategic Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989), p. 33.
- 68 These three obstacles, viz., (i) removal of all Soviet troops from Mongolia and the reduction of Soviet forces deployed on the Sino-Soviet borders; (ii) cessation of Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia; and (iii) withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, were outlined for the first time by the then Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in the first round of Sino-Soviet normalisation talks held in Beijing in 1982.
- 69 Yao Wenbin, "Soviet Military Deployments in the Asia-Pacific Region: Implications for China's Security," in Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka (eds.), *The Soviet Far East Military Buildup* (London & Sydney: Croom Helm Ltd., 1986), pp. 97-105.
- 70 China cannot really be nonaligned or independent from the two superpowers as long as the Soviet Union is perceived as the principal security threat. In a sense, Chinese claims to nonalignment can be compared with India's claims to nonalignment. For geostrategic reasons, nonalignment for New Delhi means, in real terms, closer strategic ties with Moscow. For similar reasons, nonalignment for Beijing means closer strategic relations with Washington. Discussing the pattern of US-Soviet-Chinese triangular relations, a senior Chinese analyst Peng Di admitted that due to vast disparities in economic and military strength, "it is impossible [for China], in the strict sense, to have an 'equidistant' policy." See Peng Di, "Views on the Triangular Relations," *Liaowang*, No. 17, 24 April 1989, pp. 27-28, in *FBIS-China*, 3 May 1989, pp. 2-5.
- 71 Shi Wuqing, "Superpowers Reach Military Balance," *Beijing Review*, No. 3, 21 January 1985, pp. 14-15; *Liaowang*, No. 2, February 1983, in *FBIS-China*, 13 April 1983, pp. B2-3; and Pollack, "China and Global Strategic Balance," op. cit.
- 72 *Xinhua Domestic Service*, 11 June 1985, in *FBIS-China*, 12 June 1985, pp. K1-2. Also see Jonathan D. Pollack, "China's Changing Perceptions of East Asian Security and Development," *Orbis*, (Winter 1986), pp. 771-794.
- 73 See Zhang Yining, "Major Changes in Modern Times of Marxist Theory on War and Peace," *Jiefangjun Bao*, 3 January 1989, p. 3, in *FBIS-China*, 11 January 1989, pp. 19-25. This article discusses at length the changes in Chinese views on nuclear weapons, ACD, war and peace. It is also representative of China's present judgement that war is a thing of the past and that the world is progressing from confrontation to dialogue, from tension to relaxation, and that military conflict will be superseded in future by a struggle for economic and technological growth.

- 74 *Xinhua*, 18 October 1982; in *FBIS-China*, 19 October 1982, p. K1.
- 75 *Renmin Ribao*, 29 October 1984, in *FBIS-China*, 30 October 1984, p. K1.
- 76 DIA report quoted in *The Economist Foreign Report*, 1 November 1984.
- 77 "Beijing's N-defence network 'ready for action,'" *South China Morning Post*, 3 February 1987.
- 78 Segal, *Sino-Soviet Relations after Mao*, p. 22.
- 79 Zheng Weizhi, "Independence Is The Basic Canon," *Guoji Guanxi Yanjiu*, No. 4, 1984; and *Beijing Review*, No. 1, 7 January 1985, pp. 16-17, 38.
- 80 For an excellent discussion of the development of ACD community in China, see Johnston's monograph, *China and Arms Control*, op. cit., pp. 38-44.
- 81 See Julian Baum, "Moscow, Washington court Peking for support on arms control," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 1 August 1986, p. 13; and Strode, "Soviet China policy in flux," op. cit., p. 341. In March 1986, Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev was the first Soviet leader to hold talks with the Chinese leaders on disarmament issues. Since then, Sino-Soviet bilateral exchanges on arms control issues have been conducted frequently.
- 82 It was during this period that Chinese foreign policy underwent important changes. For a detailed analysis, see the chapter on INF.
- 83 Interviews with arms control experts at the Foreign Ministry's Institute for International Studies, April 1987. Johnston's and Bonnie Glaser's writings also support this view. A symposium on disarmament held in October 1986, shortly after the failure of the Reykjavik Summit, which for the first time brought together China's arms control specialists from various research institutes and national defence and foreign ministries, concluded that it was in China's own interests to "pay greater attention to the study of disarmament question." See the report in *FBIS-China*, October 1986, p. .
- 84 See Kevin Clements' report on the 53rd Pugwash Symposium on Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region held in Beijing in late 1988 in *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. XIV, No. 1, (Jan./Feb. 1989), pp. 14-15.
- 85 Cited from Alastair I. Johnston, "China and Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region." (Paper presented to the Conference on Maritime Security and Arms Control in the Pacific Region, University of British Columbia, Institute of International Relations, May 1988), p. 30. Also see Hua Di, "Nuclear Strategy and Arms Control From A Chinese Point of View." (Paper presented to the American Association for the Advancement of Science Annual Conference, February 1988), p. 13.
- 86 On the new Chinese formula of 'three stops and one reduction', see *Pacific Research*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (November 1988), p. 19.
- 87 Zheng Yining, "Major Changes in Marxist Theories on War and Peace," *Jiefangjun Bao*, 3 January 1989, p. 3. On the theme of multipolarisation, also see Zong He, "Changes and Developing Trend in the International Situation," *Beijing Review*, No. 32, 8 August 1983, pp. 14-17; Peng Di, "Prospects for World Peace as Viewed From the Present International Strategic Posture," *Jiefangjun Bao*, 2 January 1987, pp. 1, 4, in *FBIS-China*, 4 February 1987, pp. A5-9; Wan Guang, "Trends Toward Global Multipolar Development," *Liaowang*, No. 11, 16 March 1987, pp. 28-29, in *FBIS-China*, 24 March 1987, pp. A2-5.
- 88 Ji Yin, "A Rest and Reorganisation Period Before a Further US-Soviet Contest in the 21st Century," *Shijie Zhishi*, No. 21, 1 November 1988, pp. 2-4, in *FBIS-China*, 23 November 1988, pp. 4-6.
- 89 Ibid.
- 90 Zheng Fangkun, "China Holds Symposium on Peace," *Beijing Review*, No. 23, 9 June 1986, p. 15.
- 91 Tang Shan, "What Does Soviet 'Nuclear Freeze' Proposal offer?" *News From Xinhua News Agency Weekly Issue 751*, 7 July 1983, pp. 10-11.

Chapter III

CHINESE MILITARY CAPABILITIES, STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

Since arms control strategy is a function of a country's national security policy, no proper understanding of Chinese attitudes towards arms control issues in the 1980s is possible without first dissecting the inter-relationships between Chinese national security, nuclear weapons capabilities, and nuclear arms control. This chapter seeks to analyse the role and significance of nuclear weapons in China's national security policy, which could help resolve many of the riddles of Beijing's arms control policy. In order to understand the role of nuclear weapons in a country's national security policy, one has to examine its military strategy.¹ China's military doctrine can be inferred from its relative military capabilities, from the military exercises carried out by the Chinese armed forces, and from the Chinese press commentaries and public statements made on the country's defence strategy.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section discusses China's geostrategic location, its military capabilities with particular reference to nuclear capabilities, and the military exercises insofar as they provide an insight into the country's deployment and use of nuclear weapons. The second part of the chapter deals with the ongoing debate about China's defence strategy and its implications for Chinese arms control policies.

I

China's Geostrategic Location

Geostrategic factors play an important role in the formulation of a country's national security policy and China is no exception in this regard.² China is the only nuclear weapon state which shares a 7,020km long boundary with a nuclear superpower, the Soviet Union - a boundary which is disputed and has been the cause of tension and conflict between the two countries. China is the only NWS which has also been in conflict with the other nuclear superpower, the United States, during the Korean and Vietnam wars, and during the Taiwan Straits crisis in the 1950s and 1960s. Once again it is the only country which has been subject to direct or indirect nuclear strike threats from both the nuclear superpowers. Besides, China is also surrounded by

a number of near-nuclear or potential nuclear weapon states - Pakistan, India, Taiwan, Japan, North Korea and South Korea. As one Chinese analyst puts it, China is located in the Asian-Pacific region which is a very sensitive "hot spot" region and whose peripheral situations are extremely complicated. China, he observes, is, in fact, situated in the "crevice of the rivalry of the two superpowers."³ In short, China's geographical location inevitably plays a determining role in the formulation of that country's national security and arms control policies.

China's Military Capabilities

After three decades of painstaking and arduous research efforts in the field of nuclear weapons development, which cost Beijing huge human and material resources, China has been able to build up a full "triad" of nuclear forces (land-, air-, and sea-based), and has surpassed both France and Britain to become the third largest nuclear weapon state after the United States and the Soviet Union.⁴ [Table 3.1]. Since the early 1980s, China's civilian and military leaders have claimed on several occasions that China's nuclear forces possess "a fair-sized nuclear retaliatory capacity" against the enemy.⁵ China's next generation of nuclear weapons is already in an advanced stage of development and it is widely believed that China has already acquired tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) and is on its way to build neutron bombs.⁶

On 16 October 1964 China joined the exclusive nuclear club by testing its first 20 kiloton (KT) atomic bomb. In June 1967, it successfully tested a 3 megaton (MT) thermonuclear/hydrogen bomb, thus stealing a march on the Soviet Union, Britain, the United States and France which took four, five, seven and eight years respectively to achieve the transition from fission to fusion. Beijing took special pride in stating that China had the "fastest rate of development" of nuclear weapons in the world.⁷ Since 1964, China has carried out 34 nuclear tests, mostly in the atmosphere.⁸ In March 1986, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang announced the discontinuation of atmospheric testing. The most recent low-yield underground test, conducted in September 1988, was preceded by an exceptionally large underground blast of 150 KT. An evaluation of the Chinese nuclear tests since 1964 demonstrates a steady and persistent determination to acquire state-of-the-art nuclear technology. Beijing is estimated to have stockpiles of several hundreds of fission and fusion weapons.

Table 3.1

NUCLEAR WEAPON CAPABILITIES OF CHINA, FRANCE AND BRITAIN (1988)

Weapon System	Number Deployed	Year Deployed	Range(km)	Warheads/ Launcher	Total Warheads	Gross Megatonnage
1. People's Republic of China						
<i>Land-Based Missiles</i>						
DF-2(CSS-1) ^a	40-60	1966	1,100	40-60	40-60	
DF-3(CSS-2)	85-125	1972	2,600	85-125	85-125	
DF-4(CSS-3)	-10	1978	7,000	-10	-10	
DF-5(CSS-4) ^b	10	1980	13,000	2-3 MIRV	10	
[under development] DF-6(CSS-5)	-	to be deployed in 1990s	16-20,000	-	-	
<i>Aircraft</i>						
B-6	100	1966	5,900	100-30	100-30	
B-5	15-30	1979	1,850	15-30	15-30	
Bomb ^{sc}					250-350	
<i>Submarine-Based Missiles^d</i>						
CSS-N-3	24	1980	3,300	24-38	24-38	
[under development] CSS-NX-4	-	to be deployed in 1990s	-	-	-	
					514-653^e	417-563^f
2. France						
<i>Land-Based Missiles</i>						
S-3D	18	1980	3,500	1RV	18	
Pluton	32	1974	120	-	32	18
<i>Aircraft^g</i>						
Mirage/IVP/ASMP ^h 16-18		1986	1,500	-	18-20	
Mirage 2000N/ASMP13-15		1988	1,570	-	15	
Bomb ^{si} [carried by Mirage IIIE	15	1972	600	-	35	
Jaguar A]	43	1974	750	-	60	0.8
<i>Submarine-Based Missiles^j</i>						
M-20 SLBM	80	1977	2,900	1RV	80	
M-4A SLBM	16	1985	4,500	6RVs	96	
M-4B SLBM	16	1987	6,000	-	96	92.8
[under development] M-5	-	to be deployed in 1990s	-	-	-	
Carrier-based aircraft Super Etendard	38	1978	650	-	38	
					490^k	111.6^g

Weapon System	Number Deployed	Year Deployed	Range(km)	Warheads/ Launcher	Total Warheads	Gross Megatonnage
3. Great Britain						
<i>Aircraft</i>						
Tornado GR-1	220	1982	1,300)			
Buccaneer SEB	25	1962	1,700)	-	155-175	
Bombs ^l						
<i>Submarine-Based Missiles^m</i>						
Polaris A3-TK	64	1982	4,600	2-3MRVs	128-192g	38.4
					363-447	38.4g-56^f

- Notes:
- a Chinese DF-2 MRBMs are likely to be replaced by new and more accurate missiles in the 1990s.
 - b Some DF-5 ICBMs are believed to be equipped with MIRV. The estimate given by the IISS is six, including both the full and the limited range ICBMs. But according to the US Defense Intelligence Agency, CIA and SIPRI, China possesses ten DF-4s and ten DF-5s.
 - c Estimates of nuclear bombs in China's possession vary from 200 to 400. All bombs are carried by B-5 and B-5 aircraft.
 - d China has two *Xia*-class SSBNs and one *Golf*-class SSB. In 1988, only one *Xia*-class submarine was operational. Three more *Xia*-class SSBNs are under construction.
 - e Some estimates credit China with possessing 930 warheads (see *PDR*, May 1989, p.43). On 16 October 1984, *Jiefang Ribao* cited, without contradiction, the Japanese journal *Aviation*, which asserted that China currently has 940 nuclear weapons (see *FBIS-China*, 9 November 1984, p. K4). According to Johnston, total Chinese warheads, including strategic, theatre and tactical, range between 560 and 775.
 - f According to *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (December 1987), the gross megatonnage of China's nuclear arsenal was 417-563mt in 1987, while those of France and Britain were 121mt and 56mt respectively. *The Military Balance 1987-88* calculation of China's total megatonnage was 366mt.
 - g According to Francois Heisbourg, Director of the IISS, "the French will probably move towards a dyad" (i.e. land-based and sea-based nuclear forces), after the phasing out of France's 18 Mirage IVP bombers during the 1990s (see *Survival*, Vol.xxxi, No.4, July/August 1989, p.305). If this happens, China will be the only medium-sized NWS to possess a "triad" of nuclear forces. Heisbourg calculates French and British nuclear weapons megatonnage as 111.6mt and 38.4mt for the year 1988-89 respectively.
 - h ASMP (air-to-surface missiles) are carried by Mirage IVPs and Mirage 2000N.
 - i French nuclear bombs are carried by Mirage IIIE and Jaguar A.
 - j France has a total of six SSBNs - 5 *Redoutable* and 1 *Inflexible*.
 - k A more conservative estimate of total French nuclear warheads is 352.
 - l Bombs are carried by British Tornados and Buccaneers. Britain is expected to have about 80 bombs in stockpile to be carried by nuclear-capable aircraft.
 - m The number of British SSBNs is four.

Sources: *Arms Control and National Security* (Washington DC: Arms Control Association Publication, 1989), p.156; *The Military Balance 1988-1989*; *The Military balance 1989-1990*; *SIPRI Yearbook 1988*; *SIPRI Yearbook 1989*; *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December 1987, p.52; *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June 1989, p.34; *Survival*, July/August 1989, pp.304-7; Bradley Hahn, "Nuclear weapon capability small but growing," *Pacific Defence Reporter*, May 1989, p.43; Alastair Johnston, "China Enters the Arms Control Arena," *Arms Control Today*, July/August 1987, pp. 11-17. Chong-Pin Lin, *China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988); *Renmin Ribao*, 28 September 1988, p.1; and *Liaowang*, No.46, 14 November 1988, p.4.

In 1966, China succeeded in testing its first medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) armed with a nuclear warhead, known in the West as CSS-1 and in China as *DF-2* (or *Dong Feng-2*, meaning East Wind), with a range of about 1,100km. The total number of operational MRBMs remains between 40 and 60. Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) CSS-2 or *DF-3*, first deployed in 1972, have a range of 2,600km. The Chinese Foreign Minister confirmed the sale of a "few" CSS-2 IRBMs to Saudi Arabia in March 1988. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates, China has deployed roughly 85 to 125 IRBMs. A large number of these MRBMs and IRBMs are based in Nagqu in Tibet, in western Xinjiang and in Shanxi province in Central China, and can destroy a broad variety of targets in eastern and central Soviet Union as well as in East and South Asia. In the mid-1970s, China started deploying its "limited-range" intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) CSS-3 or *DF-4* which, with a range of 7,000km, could reach targets in European Russia and all of Asia. In May 1980, Beijing successfully test-fired its full-range multi-stage ICBM called CSS-4 or *DF-5* into the South Pacific. The CSS-4 has a range of 12,000-13,000km and is the only Chinese land-based ballistic missile capable of reaching targets throughout the Soviet Union, Europe, Asia, Oceania and more importantly, North America. China is reported to have deployed in hardened silos 20 liquid-fueled ICBMs (10 limited-range CSS-3s and 10 full-range CSS-4s, equipped with 1-5 MT warheads). Recent evidence indicates that China is on the way to deploy an extended-range ICBM called CSS-5 or *DF-6* in the 1990s which will be solid-fueled and more powerful than the full-range ICBM CSS-4.⁹ According to the *SIPRI Yearbook 1986*, China has also built some 50 extra ICBMs "but has not decided whether to deploy them as operational missiles or to use them as space launch vehicles."¹⁰ Most likely, these extra launchers will be used for China's burgeoning civilian space industry.

China may also be working to develop multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) for its IRBMs and ICBMs. Since 1981, when China launched three satellites simultaneously into orbit by a single rocket carrier, writes Bradley Hahn,

"PRC nuclear weapons industry has been working overtime...to develop a MIRV capability for new as well as existing launch systems."¹¹ In September 1984, an improved CSS-2 IRBM fitted with a MIRV-type nosecone was flight-tested from China's Xichang Satellite Launching Center in Sichuan province. In the course of flight tests in 1985 and 1986, China practised launching MIRVed CSS-4 ICBMs. Hence Hahn concludes that "a significant portion of China's strategic missile force is undergoing, or has, a MIRV capability."¹² The MIRV capability not only means a significant quantitative increase in China's strategic defence forces but also an enhancement in their capability to penetrate BMD systems.

The value of the Chinese deterrent has long been undermined by the fact that many of its missiles are liquid-fueled, land-based and largely immobile and take several hours to prepare for launch. This renders them vulnerable to an enemy's first strike. China has recently overcome this problem by acquiring solid-fuel technology. In 1987, China developed a new short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) called M-9 which uses solid-fuel, has a rapid reaction time of 30 minutes, maximum range of 600km and is mobile. According to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies *Military Balance 1988-1989*, another short-range missile known as M-11, which is also mobile and uses solid-fuel, is under development. The M-9 missile has been displayed in international arms bazaars for sale as well as for demonstrating the significant advances made in Chinese missile technology and capability. By developing the M-9 missile with solid-fuel, China may be embarking on a programme to convert all its land-based missiles from liquid to solid fuel. This would represent a quantum leap in Chinese nuclear capabilities insofar as the mobility and survivability of its land-based missile force are concerned.

Apart from land-based ballistic missiles, China is believed to have some 110-150 nuclear-capable aircraft - B-5, B-6 and Qiang-5 - which are modifications of the Soviet Il-28 Beagle and Tu-16 Badger bombers. Aircraft have been used to drop at least 16 Chinese nuclear bombs in tests.¹³ China is presently engaged in a modernisation of its air force with American and West European assistance which would significantly enhance its capability to penetrate sophisticated air defences. Some reports suggest that China's new fighter aircraft, the F-9, is also nuclear-capable. According to *SIPRI Yearbook 1988*, modern bombers would be one option for China to increase its nuclear capabilities if the superpowers, particularly the USSR, proceed to develop nation-wide ballistic missile defences (BMD). The other option is nuclear-armed cruise missiles as a countermeasure to BMD systems.¹⁴

The third component of the Chinese nuclear forces "triad", and the one which is most important to ensure the survivability of China's nuclear retaliatory force, is its sea-based fleet of nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). In April 1981, China launched its first *Xia*-class SSBN, it then succeeded in testing its first solid-fuel, two-stage ballistic missile (CSS-N-3 SLBM) from underwater from a diesel-electric-powered *Golf*-class submarine on 12 October 1982. The CSS-N-3 SLBM is reported to have a maximum range of 3,300km. In mid-1985 the Chinese Navy completed sea trials of another nuclear-powered submarine that culminated in an underwater launch of a submarine-launched cruise missile.¹⁵ The priority attached to enhancing China's nuclear deterrent by the post-Mao leadership was once again demonstrated in September 1988 when the Chinese press reported the successful launching of a "new type of strategic underwater rocket (CSS-NX-4 or *Julang-1* missile) propelled by a new type of solid fuel" from a submerged *Xia*-class SSBN.¹⁶ The Chinese naval chief hailed this as an "important and major breakthrough" and another "leap forward" towards an *operational* sea-based nuclear deterrent.¹⁷ A *Liaowang* commentary in November 1988 claimed that the Chinese Navy has acquired "both strategic and tactical guided missiles in addition to a complete range of guided missiles of all sizes and types."¹⁸ The newly acquired solid-fuel technology used in the SLBMs also opens up prospects for its application to land-based missiles which would improve the mobility and reaction times of Chinese land-based forces. China has two operational *Xia*-class SSBNs and is believed to be building a further four to six SSBNs.¹⁹ According to Chinese sources, each SSBN is equipped with 20 missile tubes²⁰, although Western estimates say the *Xias* could probably only carry 12-14 tubes.²¹ Various reports suggest that China plans to procure six to eight SSBNs with 12 to 16 tubes each.²² The port of Qingdao in China's northeast is considered as the most likely base for Chinese SSBNs. It is not yet known when the planned Chinese SSBN force will reach initial operational capability. As regards command, control and communication (C3), the Chinese press in 1987 reported the improvement of a VLF communications station with worldwide range at Changde that has been in operation since 1980. Thus, all five NWSs now use VLF as the primary means for control of and communication with their submerged submarines.²³

In addition, China is known to possess tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). In June 1982, the Chinese military carried out large-scale simulated theatre nuclear warfare exercises in Ningxia near the Mongolian border.²⁴ The Chinese media has reported the development of solid-fuel technology for "tactical rockets" and "cruise missiles capable of supersonic speed, ultra-low altitude and automated and accurate guidance systems."²⁵

It is safe to assume that many of China's shorter-range systems are intended for tactical battlefield use. Although not officially confirmed, indications such as several recent nuclear tests of low-yield warheads under 20 KT, military training exercises which simulated the use of TNWs (discussed below), ongoing plans to develop tactical missile technology, and miniaturised nuclear warheads, suggest that China "may already have built a stockpile of distinctly 'tactical' nuclear weapons for less than all-out nuclear warfare."²⁶

For quite some time now, there has been speculation in the West as to whether China is contemplating building neutron bombs or enhanced radiation devices.²⁷ Several articles have appeared in recent years in the PLA's *Jiefangjun Bao* and other Chinese newspapers which dwelt upon the possible advantages of building a stockpile of neutron bombs, which were seen as making "great contributions to the economy [and] national defence."²⁸ The contribution to national defence lies in the fact that neutron bombs (together with TNWs) could check the advance of a large-scale Soviet armoured invasion in the thinly settled regions of Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang where nuclear fallout would be very limited. The economic rationale is explained by pointing out that even a limited stock of neutron bombs would reduce China's need to build the thousands of tanks required to check a huge Soviet armoured invasion and thus save billions of dollars. After China exploded a low-yield underground device in September 1988, *Jane's Defence Weekly* reported that China had tested a neutron bomb, though *Guangming Ribao* said that such tests were only part of development of "third generation nuclear weapons."²⁹ The third generation of nuclear weapons concepts also include neutron bombs of very low yield. According to Western defence analysts Bradley Hahn and Tai Ming Cheung, and Chinese analyst Liu Huaqiu, China has all the necessary technical wherewithal to produce neutron bombs whenever it desires.³⁰ The major constraints could be financial, since one neutron bomb costs around \$1 million; an inadequate supply of tritium; and operationally, China's No-First-Use policy.³¹

In view of these constraints, China might opt either for an increase in the number of Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM) or nuclear land mines and TNWs which are presumably already in place along the Sino-Soviet border to check the advance of Soviet invading force without having to worry about collateral damage.

Furthermore, the 1980s have seen China make remarkable strides in the field of dual-use space technology. While criticising the extension of the US-Soviet arms race into outer space, Beijing is making all-out efforts to keep pace with and acquire state-of-the-art space technology. Since 1970, China has launched 25 satellites - 4

telecommunication, 11 retrievable, 1 meteorological and 9 for photographic and reconnaissance functions.³² The research and development spin-offs of China's civilian space programme will have important implications for the country's nuclear weapons modernisation programme. Recent advances made by China in this field have prompted one Western analyst to conclude that China is "attempt[ing] to expand its strategic nuclear force triad into a nuclear deterrent 'self-defence' tetrad (land-, air-, sea-, and space-based)" for the 1990s and beyond.³³

In view of the focus of this study on Chinese nuclear arms control policy, the nuclear component of China's military capabilities has been dealt with in detail above to demonstrate the significance of nuclear weapons in Chinese national security. Still, it is worthwhile briefly to discuss China's conventional military capabilities. The modernisation of the PLA which began in 1978 has significantly enhanced the combat capability of Chinese forces, reduced manpower to release funds for modern weapons and equipment, reinvigorated Chinese military industry, reorganised military regions, established group armies, given the navy an air capability, established a marine corps, improved C³I, and modernised the air force.³⁴ In 1987, Chinese Defence Minister, Zhang Aiping, identified the key objectives of national defence modernisation as: (i) intensified restructuring and training; (ii) modernisation of conventional weaponry; (iii) *improving a limited and yet effective nuclear counterattack force*; and (iv) *keeping in pace with high-tech weapons developments* and forecasting developments in major weapons production technologies.³⁵ In short, the modernisation of China's armed forces has been "most rapid and sustained since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949."³⁶

China's Military Exercises

Since the early 1980s, the Chinese military has been regularly conducting land, air and sea exercises simulating nuclear and chemical attacks in addition to conventional war exercises based on combined arms operations. According to *Jane's Defence Weekly*, China's Strategic Missile Forces Unit alone has conducted more than 120 exercises over the past five years.³⁷ The most significant of these exercises which are also indicative of the evolving Chinese military doctrine are listed below:

1. In February 1980, the PLA conducted an exercise in which it attacked an enemy armed with TNWs with a miniaturised nuclear warhead of five-kiloton yield³⁸;
2. China's land and air forces conducted a tactical nuclear war exercise close to the Sino-Soviet border in June 1982;

3. in mid-October 1987, the East China Sea Fleet of the Chinese Navy conducted exercises simulating combat under nuclear warfare conditions in the West Pacific and South China Sea³⁹;
4. in June 1988, the PLA navy conducted large-scale exercises in the East China Sea under simulated nuclear warfare conditions called "defensive wars under nuclear conditions"⁴⁰;
5. in July 1988, PLA's nuclear-capable aircraft off China's coast simulated dropping of a 5 KT nuclear bomb and more than 100 chemical munitions onto an enemy naval base⁴¹; and
6. in September and October 1988, all of the PLA's anti-chemical warfare units were massed to test their combat performance in China's northeast and Tibet regions.⁴²

According to *Jane's Defence Weekly*, the Shenyang Military Region, defending the industrial heartland of the northeast, has turned its emphasis from studying divisional level defensive operations under nuclear conditions to more complex group army manoeuvres, including defending fortified positions under nuclear attack.⁴³ A *Renmin Ribao* analyst commenting on the war exercises emphasised the need for training to deal with atomic, biological and chemical weapons, increasing the navy's ability to fight wars nuclear conditions, and paying close attention to the building of anti-chemical warfare squads.⁴⁴ The military exercises show that Chinese armed forces plan to use TNWs in support of infantry against the enemy's forward lines. The large and advanced scale of recent exercises, at a time when China has publicly ruled out the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war in the near future, and the superpowers are engaged in serious talks about reducing nuclear weapons, is particularly intriguing. If nothing else, such military preparations do indicate the seriousness with which Chinese leadership takes its nuclear capability and reflect current thinking on the use and deployment of nuclear weapons in China's calculus of deterrence. Reviewing a number of recent nuclear-weapon related developments in China such as nuclear tests, SLBM test, missile and space programmes, and nuclear war exercises, *SIPRI Yearbook 1989* concluded that Beijing has shown "no lack of interest in continuing to modernize its nuclear forces."⁴⁵

II

China's Security Debate: From "People's War" To "People's War Under Modern Conditions" Strategy

Since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, Chinese military doctrine has been synonymous with the Maoist notion of "People's War".⁴⁶ The strategy and tactics of "People's War" were developed and tested successfully during the Chinese civil war of the 1930s. As Liu Huaqiu explains, "[b]orn of necessity when facing superior enemy forces, the people's war doctrine requires the classic strategic withdrawal, trading space for time, to lure the enemy in deep, overextended supply and communication lines⁴⁷", thus transforming enemy strength into weakness, and then launching a strategic offensive to defeat the enemy already weakened and exhausted by a war of attrition. This doctrine is based on the Maoist belief that "men not weapons" ultimately decide the outcome of a war, and it requires the support of a politically and ideologically mobilised people and the army fighting side by side to defeat the enemy in a protracted guerrilla war. Application of the "People's War" concept during the long war of national liberation "helped to provide cohesive military capabilities, albeit at the human and low-end of technology spectrum."⁴⁸ In the post-liberation period, it evolved from a strategy of revolution into a doctrine of national security, "incorporating into it the sophistications of nuclear and conventional deterrence."⁴⁹

Beijing's continued adherence to this strategy long after it had acquired nuclear weapons was cited by the Chinese as evidence of the resilience, flexibility, and adaptability of Mao's "People's War" concept.⁵⁰ However, geopolitical factors explain why China continued to rely on this doctrine.⁵¹ First, China's predominantly agrarian economy, huge rural population, and large territory made it less vulnerable to total destruction in a nuclear attack than the more urban and industrialised Western countries. A few nuclear strikes against Chinese industrial centres and cities were considered inadequate to subjugate the country.⁵²

Second, China perceived serious threats to its national security and territorial integrity emanating either from the sea (that is, the United States) or from the land (Soviet ground invasion of north China). These threats were both nuclear and conventional in nature. Chinese military planners concluded that in order to defeat China, nuclear strikes from either of the superpower's would eventually have to be followed by a conventional ground offensive against which the Chinese were

overwhelmingly well prepared because of their huge manpower, territory and terrain. Thus, "People's War" was the only effective strategy to be employed in a conventional war of attrition.

Third, any change in military strategy following the testing of nuclear weapons would not only have negated the premise of superiority of men over weapons, but might also have unnecessarily tempted the superpowers, armed with vastly superior strategic forces, to obliterate the Chinese nuclear installations. China's interests lay in deemphasising the significance of its nuclear weapons so long as it lacked a credible deterrent capability *vis-à-vis* the US and USSR.

Fourth, this strategy embodied the concept of total war, which enormously raised the costs for potential enemies of a surgical nuclear strike or a conventional war against China or both. It demonstrated China's will and determination to fight to the finish by taking advantage of the country's geographic and demographic assets and thereby deterred its enemies from getting mired in a war of attrition.

Finally, it served to raise the morale and confidence of the people in general, and of the armed forces in particular, at a time of strategic vulnerability and technological backwardness.

Nonetheless, the doctrine of "People's War" was based on certain fallacies and was subjected to criticism from time to time by high-ranking military leaders even during the Maoist rule. Ellis Joffe in a recent study, *The Chinese Army after Mao*, points out that one of the "dubious premises" of the "People's War" strategy was that "an enemy would launch an all-out nuclear attack on China as a prelude to a ground invasion of the mainland."⁵³ The second fallacy was that "a massive ground invasion to conquer China would follow a nuclear strike." Joffe also questions China's "professed readiness to abandon densely populated centres" either to the Soviets or the Americans in order to lure the enemy in deep. The validity of Joffe's critique is borne out by the fact that the "People's War" doctrine has *never* been applied by the Chinese in any of their armed conflicts and is not likely to be employed. China has resorted to the use of force on about twelve occasions between 1950 and 1988⁵⁴ - from the Korean War to the Sino-Vietnamese clashes on the Spratly Islands - and in none of these instances could the "People's War" strategy be applied "because the conditions necessary for the application of this strategy simply did not exist."⁵⁵ As Gary Klintworth has stated:

In fact, all of China's military engagements since 1949...were standard conventional wars where there was an obvious need for superior air and naval power, an efficient logistics tail, effective command, control and modern communications and effective joint service/combined arms coordination.⁵⁶

The lessons of the past military engagements, particularly the Sino-Vietnamese conflict of 1979, set off a debate among Chinese military strategists regarding the suitability of the "People's War" doctrine to meet external threats to Chinese security. This debate on a future war-fighting strategy was also influenced by the post-Mao leadership's reassessment of the threat environment and comprehensive changes in economic and foreign policies. Since the late 1970s, the Chinese have been describing their new defence doctrine as "People's War under Modern Conditions" which consists of two parts: conventional defence plus limited nuclear deterrence.⁵⁷ The evolution of China's new military strategy has followed a tortuous path. Many Western analysts of Chinese military affairs believe that the Chinese debate on defence doctrine is far from over and that Beijing has yet to formulate a coherent and comprehensive defence strategy.⁵⁸ The ongoing Chinese debate on military strategy has serious implications for the country's present and future arms control policies. This security debate which began in the mid-1970s and reached its climax during 1986-88 has centered on several key issues such as: (i) the changing threat environment; (ii) the nature and type of future wars and the men versus weapons question; (iii) the deployment and use of nuclear weapons; and (iv) nuclear arms control and superpower strategic balance.

(i) *Changing Threat Environment:*

The Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee in December 1978 had discarded the notion of the imminence of a major war, and concluded that the country was unlikely to become embroiled in a major conflict for upwards of the next 50 years, a timeframe anticipated to allow China to pursue economic development.⁵⁹ Until the late 1970s, Chinese military strategy was oriented to meet the threat of an immediate and major conventional and nuclear war. But changing threat perceptions necessitated a change in military strategy. While acknowledging that the Soviet Union remained a primary and long-term security concern, Chinese strategists started devoting more attention to the question of regional conflicts and local wars. The year 1985 marked a major "strategic shift" in Chinese defence planning.⁶⁰ A global threat assessment made by the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC) in early 1985 provided the strategic rationale for China's military modernisation and set forth in explicit terms the doctrinal principles on which China would base its national security. According to the CMC assessment, a major war was highly improbable for the rest of this century or longer because

the world is now situated in a "balance of terror" caused by mutual deterrence and containment between the two blocs headed by the US and Soviet

Union...[and] this gives time to China to concentrate on economic construction.⁶¹

Accordingly, China's defence planning shifted "from basing work on a combat readiness posture of 'fighting an early war, a major war and a nuclear war' onto the track of peacetime construction."⁶² The other changes carried out included the formation of group armies [*jituanjun*], reduction of the PLA manpower by one million, and reorganisation of China's Military Regions.

(ii) *The Nature and Type of Future Wars and the Men versus Weapons Question:*

The question of the nature and type of future military conflicts also became the subject of intense debate among Chinese military strategists. The Chinese recognised the fact that since the Second World War, the concept of war had undergone important changes. Wars were no longer being fought to conquer countries or territories and wars started with this purpose had completely failed to achieve the original objectives. The Iran-Iraq war was a case in point. In this sense, the "People's War" doctrine based on a total war concept had become anachronistic.

Though several military leaders had long recognised the need to overhaul their outdated military strategy and modernise PLA weaponry, none of them "dared to talk, or to talk openly, about these questions" during the Maoist era because of the influence of "ultra-left" thinking.⁶³ Soon after the death of Mao and the downfall of the "Gang of Four", a number of authoritative articles appeared in the Chinese military press arguing in favour of military modernisation and discussing new concepts and theories of war. A pioneering article, written by Su Yu, Political Commissar of the Academy of Military Sciences in August 1977, elaborated on the significance of "positional warfare", "mobile warfare", "offensive campaigns", "quick and decisive battles", and stressed that it was necessary to "change tactics, and study and master the latest tactics developed along with new technology and equipment."⁶⁴ Two years later, Su remarked succinctly: "Some of [Mao's] principles no longer fit the actual conditions of future wars, and we should have the courage to break through them."⁶⁵ Presumably, the lessons learnt from China's war with Vietnam also provided impetus to the demand for a change in the country's military strategy. In a speech delivered on 1 October 1979, Defence Minister Xu Xiangqian lent his support to the pro-change lobby when he observed that "our military thinking must tally with changing conditions...War is now conducted in a way different from that in the past."⁶⁶ Su Yu and Xu Xiangqian thus set the broad

parameters and identified certain themes which became the basis of Chinese security debate in the following years.

A common theme running through all Chinese commentaries and articles was the "new conditions in contemporary warfare which did not exist before." As Vice-Chairman of the CMC Yang Shangkun observed:

Modern military science and technology are changing each passing day. Since the fruits of the world's latest science and technology are extensively applied in war, a whole series of changes has taken place in the forms of war, strategy, tactics and military operations. Hence...we must step up the building of a modern national defence and raise the armed forces' combat capability to a new level.⁶⁷

Closely related to the question of the nature and type of future wars was the controversial issue of men versus weapons or human versus material factors. Whereas the "People's War" strategy contended that men and not weapons were the decisive factor in war, the proponents of the concept of "People's War under Modern Conditions" stressed that men as well as weapons were important in a future war. In an important speech commemorating the PLA Day on 1 August 1982, Yang Shangkun broadened the definition of "human factor" to include not only the commonly understood human qualities of courage, consciousness and spirit of sacrifice but also wisdom, talent, intelligence, and acquisition of advanced skills which are required to operate hi-tech weapons systems.⁶⁸

The requirements of fighting a modern war also brought into focus the need for advanced weapons and equipment. Chinese analysts began arguing that "the state of weaponry has an important bearing on the formation, establishment, strategy and tactics of the army."⁶⁹ On several occasions, the Defence Minister, Zhang Aiping, emphasised the need to carry out defence modernisation as soon as possible because "China is still behind the developed countries in weapons involving high technology, including microelectronics, lasers, infrared rays and invisibility."⁷⁰ The introduction of new advanced weapons systems in conventional forces was motivated by the "active defence" strategy as opposed to "lure the enemy in deep" strategy. In Chinese calculations, the reliance on the People's War strategy which allowed enemy troops to intrude deep into Chinese border areas even for a short period before launching an all-out attack on them would mean the certain destruction of virtually all of China's nuclear plants and missile bases.

Moreover, China of the 1980s is no longer as underdeveloped, rural or lacking urban and industrial centers as it was in the 1950s and 1960s. Beijing is now unwilling to surrender to an invading force high-value industrial and economic centres in the

country's northeast and southeast - regions where China has faced threats to its security in the past. Defence of political and industrial-economic centres is regarded as essential to the outcome of a war, writes Paul Godwin, because of the dependence of Chinese armed forces on their industrial infrastructure to meet logistic requirements.⁷¹ One Western analyst argues that China's rapid urbanisation during the last 40 years could be a contributing factor to the demand for change in Chinese defence strategy because "a half a dozen nuclear explosions over the key northern and eastern China's industrial and population centres would cripple China's ability to wage a war."⁷² According to one estimate, China's urban population is expected to reach 51 per cent of the total population by the year 2000, compared with just 13 per cent in 1953.⁷³

These, then, were the "modern conditions" which necessitated a change in Chinese military doctrine. The key characteristics of modern warfare identified by Chinese strategists are: (i) *three-dimensional warfare*, that is, warfare is now simultaneously carried out in the air, on land, and at sea, and it is difficult to differentiate between the frontline and the rear areas; (ii) *combined warfare*, that is, combined operations of infantry, armoured units, artillery, marines, and airborne units under an integrated command; and (iii) *general warfare*, i.e., war is not only a trial of military strength but also a general trial of strength of various war factors, such as economy, science and technology, politics and diplomacy.⁷⁴ In other words, while the concept of war had broadened, the scale of war had become limited but more destructive.

(a) Local Wars or Regional Conflicts:

A global threat assessment made by CMC in 1985 stipulated that while the outbreak of a major war was unlikely in the near future, "small-scale wars [were] continually breaking out."⁷⁵ Defence Minister Zhang Aiping, speaking on the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PLA in 1987, also pointed out that "local wars have not stopped even for a single day since the end of the Second World War."⁷⁶ In addition to the fighting on the Sino-Vietnamese border, "there exist unstable factors along other borders," he said, noting that as a reason why China should not weaken its military power. Of particular significance was his assertion that "the future war will be a *conventional war under the threat of nuclear weapons*."⁷⁷ The reference to "unstable factors along other borders" was obviously to the unresolved territorial disputes along the Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet borders and the Spratley Islands dispute in the South China Sea.

This prompted Chinese analysts to focus on the implications of local wars [*ju bu zhan zheng*] of limited duration. A *Jiefangjun Bao* commentator, noting that partial

wars have never ceased in the four post-War decades, stressed the need to "maintain high vigilance, and strengthen special training to heighten our capability to deal with [such] eventualities."⁷⁸ Implying that developments in nuclear weapons had changed the traditional concepts of war, Zhang Zhen, commandant of the PLA's National Defence University, observed that these developments "made the launching of a [nuclear] war a more complex and serious matter."⁷⁹ This theme was taken up by three Chinese analysts in an article on "A Study and Exploration of Local War Theory" published not in the conservative army paper but in the moderate *Liaowang* in late 1986.⁸⁰ This article stated that the emergence of weapons of mass slaughter and destruction invalidated the notion of "war as a continuation of politics" and argued that the concept of a world war or total war may become an "alien force" in politics rather than a means of achieving political aims. The authors contended that due to the developments in science and technology and economic conditions, world war would be substituted by a local war "through which both tactical and strategic aims can be achieved" and that local warfare would not only be more "acceptable" to mankind to pursue political aims but also be an effective means to check a world war.⁸¹ Hence they derided the tendency to make "full preparations for a world war, which is not actually possible...[while] neglect[ing] local warfare" and went on to caution that such a tendency "will lead to dangerous strategic planning and erroneous macro-policy making."⁸² To add weight to their argument, the authors cited the special preparations made by the United States, Soviet Union and NATO countries in their war-fighting strategies to meet the threats of low-intensity wars or small-scale regional conflicts.

In a major exposition on war and peace, another Chinese analyst, Zhang Yining, argued that partial wars had in fact "drained the factors inducing large-scale wars" and echoed the view that

[nuclear war] cannot be a continuation of politics; it will instead be a termination of politics...Today, no country in the world can conquer another country by means of war and war does not bring benefit cherished by the warring nations...⁸³

A number of articles arguing in favour of greater preparations for meeting the threat of low-intensity or small-scale regional conflicts appeared in the Chinese press between 1986-88. Attention was drawn particularly towards the "complicated" situation along the Chinese border where "there are many latent hot spots" and "territorial disputes involve a fairly large area of precious land and sea."⁸⁴ A *Jiefangjun Bao* article in July 1988, few months after the Sino-Vietnamese clashes over Spratly Islands, stated:

Our army must do its best...to defend our territorial integrity...[and] ensure that our rights and interests at sea will not be encroached upon. *We should give full play to the special role of our military forces in international competition.*⁸⁵

The alleviation of the perceived threat from the north i.e., the Soviet Union, the significance of open Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) for China's burgeoning trade and maritime interests, and Beijing's expanding geostrategic horizons, extending into the Pacific and Indian oceans, apparently led Chinese military strategists to redefine their enemies and adopt a corresponding military strategy. Hence they started focusing on the threats to Chinese security interests from the emerging military and economic powers like Vietnam, India, Taiwan and Japan. Evidently, the doctrine of "People's War" had no use for future military conflicts along the Sino-Vietnamese, Sino-Indian borders or in the South China Sea because regional conflicts did not require the mass mobilisation of population and economy. A noted Chinese analyst at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Zhang Jingyi, voiced the common concern of many Chinese strategists when he observed that,

with the relative decline of the superpowers, regional powers will feel even more free to use force...bipolarity will lead to a situation of several hegemonists contending with one another...the next 20 years...will be a period of limited conventional wars and armed conflicts of varying scale, duration and intensity but which still take place under the implicit threat of nuclear force.⁸⁶

Under these circumstances, it is argued, Beijing is left with no other option but to continue to strengthen its conventional and nuclear forces in order to protect China's perceived interests from encroachment by the contending regional powers in the near and distant future. The imperatives of modern warfare led the PLA to make changes in its training techniques and tactics. In what might be an indication of new training, tactics and strategy, the PLA Chief of Staff Chi Haotian announced in late 1988 that the whole army had "scored new successes" in studying the theories, patterns and principles and features of local war.⁸⁷ The formation of rapid deployment forces, "Fist Platoons", marine corps, amphibious forces and special airborne forces took China further away from the "People's War" strategy towards preparations for fighting regional wars beyond the country's borders. Besides, Chinese strategists seemed unmindful of the prospect that the talk of a rapid response strategy, offensive campaigns or quick and decisive battles might be interpreted in neighbouring Asian capitals as offensive in intent, even to the point of being pre-emptive. This could lead to a chain reaction, prompting countries traditionally suspicious of China's intentions and capabilities to embark upon their own military build-up. Not only that, evolving strategic thinking which envisions China's impending competition with the emerging military powers is likely to rule out

any softening of Beijing's stand on its participation in regional CBMs or arms reduction process. Thus, regional arms control proposals which seek to restrain Chinese military behaviour in its periphery are likely to meet with China's opposition.

(b) *Large-Scale Nuclear Wars:*

However, not everyone in the military establishment agreed with the view that the PLA's strategy should shift from preparing for an imminent, major nuclear and total war to preparations for limited conventional wars, albeit under the threat of nuclear weapons. There were several dissenting voices. Few months after the appearance of the *Liaowang* article on local wars, PLA's *Jiefangjun Bao* in April 1987 published a lengthy article entitled "It is still necessary to base our plans on fighting a major war."⁸⁸ The author of this article, a serving military officer named Zhang Jian, questioned the premise of the local war theorists and stated explicitly that China's defence strategy for the 21st century "should be based on fighting major wars and fighting nuclear wars." To substantiate his argument, Zhang referred to the changing defence strategies of great powers, especially those of the US and USSR as manifested in the SDI programme and the Soviet countermeasures against it, which he described as "an offensive and defensive plan for fighting a large-scale war."⁸⁹ So long as nuclear deterrence and nuclear rivalry remained an important part of the superpower defence strategies, the author said, "the possibility of fighting a nuclear war must not be ruled out."⁹⁰ He added that China's "previous strategic principle" of preparing for a major nuclear war was of "positive significance" as it prevented the outbreak of a major war in the past. Had China prepared only for small-scale wars, "then it is very possible that a major war would have occurred and brought about dreadful consequences." Therefore, in order to cope better with the small-scale limited wars of the future and in view of China's geopolitical location in the "crevice of the superpower rivalry," China's defence strategy "must be based on fighting large-scale and nuclear wars."⁹¹

(c) *Weaponry of the Future Warfare: Space-, Sea-Based Deterrents and Tactical Nuclear Weapons:*

The implications of the SDI or "Star Wars" programme on the future state of warfare became the subject of many strategic writings, which called upon the leadership to keep pace with the latest developments in the nuclear, space and oceanic technologies. Noting US, Soviet, French, Japanese, and Indian plans for space technology and oceangoing fleets, a commentary in *Jiefangjun Bao* in early 1987 stated:

The future major powers in the world must be the countries with a high degree of space technology and oceanics...In future warfare, outer space will become a

new battlefield...outer space and oceans are no longer the means of strategic contention, but have become direct, important targets of strategic contention. The rivalry centering around the new strategic theatres is no longer distant...deep oceans are now the best shelter for strategic nuclear strike forces and outer space is the offense channel for strategic missiles...⁹²

It went on to argue that the "*rapid development of the nuclear, space, and oceanic technologies and the other military high technologies in every country is undoubtedly a rigorous challenge to us,*" and called upon the leadership to "break the monopolies of outer space and the oceans as early as possible, just as we broke the[ir] monopoly of nuclear weapons years ago."⁹³

The theme of "future wars for the colonisation of outer space and oceans" was the subject of another article published in *Jiefangjun Bao* in mid-1988. Analysts Zhang and Zeng asserted that

in the next century, making use of outer space for military purposes will determine a country's position in international politics. The "Star Wars" programme and the "Eureka Plan"...which have occurred over the past five years, have shown that the competition of scrambling for space has entered a wider and more intense stage...⁹⁴

They warned that China should pay sufficient attention to this development because "any country that is unwilling to be deprived of its 'share in the world' cannot avoid this challenge."⁹⁵

From the foregoing, it is obvious that the 1980s have seen an intensification of the strategic debate encompassing all fields of warfare and emergence of a powerful lobby within the Chinese military establishment which believes that "China's army should not confine itself to a continental concept; a marine as well as a space concept are necessary."⁹⁶ Although serious differences exist within the military establishment over issues such as the type of future warfare and the means to deter it, yet the nuclear weapons lobby appears to have gained an edge over those who prefer conventional weapons modernisation.

Apparently the high economic costs of equipping China's 3-million strong conventional forces with state-of-the-art military hardware and the constraints on financial resources tilted the balance in favour of those elements within the post-Mao leadership who favoured assigning higher priority to the country's nuclear weapons programme. An article in *Hongqi* in March 1983 by Defence Minister Zhang Aiping called for greater emphasis on nuclear weapons programmes.⁹⁷ The 1984 decision to set up a Strategic Missile Forces Unit was a natural corollary of it.⁹⁸ While the military's share of China's national budget has continuously declined from 17.5 per cent in 1979 to 8.2 per cent in 1988,* developments in the nuclear forces and space technology during

**Military Balance 1989-1990* puts China's defence spending as 1.9% of China's total GNP/GDP. However, according to *World Military and Social Expenditures 1989*, the figure is as high as 6.0 per cent. *SIPRI Yearbook 1990* estimates that actual Chinese military expenditure in 1988 could have exceeded 40 billion yuan.

this period suggest that funds for these might have been increased.⁹⁹ Rejecting as "preposterous" the view held by "some people" that the enormous financial costs of developing nuclear weapons, missiles and satellites impoverished the state, Defence Minister Zhang Aiping pointed out in July 1987 that development of nuclear and space technologies "strengthened [China's] ability to curb war and played an important role in raising China's international position."¹⁰⁰ It is safe to assume that nuclear arms are looked upon as the cheapest and most effective instrument for ensuring military security, a sort of protective shield behind which China can afford to make unilateral cuts in its huge armed forces and postpone the modernisation of its conventional forces.

To ensure the survivability and enhance the retaliatory capability of its strategic nuclear forces, China's nuclear weapons programme has followed a two-track policy in the 1980s: the first is to develop a sizeable fleet of SLBMs, and the second is to invest in the development of advanced and accurate tactical nuclear weapons in addition to cruise missiles and MIRV technology. Both these developments, which are the product of a long Chinese debate on an appropriate military strategy, merit close attention.

In view of the vulnerability of their land-based, liquid-fueled, and relatively inaccurate ballistic missiles to an enemy's first strike, Chinese military strategists advocated the development of a sizeable SSBN and SLBM fleet. The value of a sea-based deterrent was acknowledged by PLA Navy chief Liu Huaqing in an interview with *Liaowang*:

In the face of a large-scale nuclear attack, less than 10 percent of the coastal launching silos will survive, whereas submarines armed with ballistic missiles can use the surface of the sea to protect and cover themselves, preserve the nuclear offensive force, and play a deterrent and containment role.¹⁰¹

Admiral Wang Huique, who commanded the successful test-firings of SLBMs in 1982 and 1988, also expressed similar concerns when he observed:

Ballistic guided missiles are now launched from underwater because "spying" reconnaissance satellites have rendered guided missile bases on land, as well as underground silos, exposed and unsafe places for the storage and launching of guided missiles. Underwater mobility is an ideal way to prevent detection by reconnaissance satellites...In the event [of war] they can quickly attack enemy targets by launching guided missiles from underwater.¹⁰²

The decision to pursue an SLBM option, taken in 1978, was aimed at giving China an assured second-strike capability against both superpowers ^{in due course.} Chinese naval planners are also conscious of the implications for Chinese national security of US and Soviet naval strategies and the naval buildup undertaken by regional powers like India and Japan. Pointing to the importance attached by India and Japan to the development of their maritime military power and the fact that seventy percent of US warships and

almost double the official figure, amounting to around 4% of GNP/GDP and 15% of government expenditure. This compares with the United States' 6.4% and Soviet Union's 11.5% of GNP spent on military.

almost all the major Soviet warships are capable of fighting a nuclear war, a *Jiefangjun Bao* analyst recently advocated equipping warships with nuclear weapons to meet the growing challenge of what he called "sky blue strategy."¹⁰³

The second dimension of Chinese nuclear force diversification and one which has wider repercussions for China's warfighting doctrine and arms control policy is the acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) capability. Since the late 1970s, Chinese strategists have been debating the need for tactical nuclear weapons and tactical nuclear strategy in order to deter any large-scale conventional Soviet invasion. The first indications of a debate on this subject appeared with the publication of an article in *Jiefangjun Bao* in September 1979.¹⁰⁴ Rejecting the arguments of those who felt no need to develop TNWs, the writer Xu Baoshan said:

Once the enemy launched an aggressive war...the will to fight on both sides and the scope and intensity of the war would be unprecedented...Our stiff resistance and repeated counterattacks could make the enemy so frustrated that he might resort to tactical nuclear weapons to spring a shock attack.¹⁰⁵

Arguing that the use of TNWs "restricts rather than escalates nuclear war," the same Chinese analyst warned against any complacency in this regard:

We must be prepared...for the use by our enemy of tactical nuclear weapons in the initial stages of a future war. If we are so prepared emotionally and materially, we will be able to cope with any complex situations. On the other hand, if we believe a nuclear war is "unlikely to occur", pay very little attention to the study of nuclear war, do not include nuclear war in training and do not base combat planning on the possibility of tactical nuclear attack but go by subjective, wishy-washy concepts, the consequences will be unthinkable in case the enemy actually uses nuclear weapons.¹⁰⁶

Another commentator in *Jiefangjun Bao* argued that the employment of TNWs "involved relatively small risks and could meet certain military needs" compared with the use of strategic nuclear weapons which would certainly lead to massive retaliation and destruction in the event of a nuclear war.¹⁰⁷ In other words, TNWs would allow the Chinese to respond in kind to enemy's (presumably Soviet) TNWs, without having to escalate war to the strategic level. Evidently, the proponents of TNWs in China either do not accept the view that "tactical nuclear war, by the very nature of the weapons, has a built-in escalation mechanism," or they are not aware of the arguments of anti-TNWs strategists like Thornton Read in the West who believe that "it is hardly consistent to argue that nuclear weapons will inevitably be introduced because they are more efficient than conventional weapons and then assume that, once nuclear combat begins, both sides will be content to employ only the least efficient nuclear weapons."¹⁰⁸ Whatever the case, the proponents of TNWs seemed to have eventually won the argument in

China and exercises simulating the use of TNWs began to occur more frequently. It is safe to assume that many "Chinese strategic experts favour a doctrine of flexible response and controlled escalation at the theatre level."¹⁰⁹ Nonetheless, the effectiveness and reliability of the Chinese nuclear deterrent, in the ultimate analysis, depends on its enemy's belief that China possesses a second-strike capability and that China *can* and *will* retaliate if attacked with nuclear weapons.

(iii) *The Deployment and Use of Nuclear Weapons:*

The Chinese leadership's pronounced reliance on the nuclear potential and plans to employ a variety of nuclear weapons under the whole range of strategic conditions have made it necessary to re-examine Beijing's strategic objectives and question the validity of the commonly-held views about China's nuclear posture. China's nuclear doctrine has generally been described as one of "minimum deterrence." Some Western analysts of Chinese defence have also called China's nuclear strategy as one of "deterrence by denial"¹¹⁰, "flexible deterrence"¹¹¹, "integrated deterrence"¹¹², and in more recent years, one that is similar to NATO's "flexible response" and nuclear warfighting.¹¹³ A great degree of confusion prevails among outside observers which can be attributed to the paucity of information on the development and deployment of Chinese nuclear weapons, partly due to the country's closed society and extreme secretiveness about military affairs, and partly due to deliberate attempts to maintain a stance of ambiguity to hoodwink potential enemies about Beijing's true capabilities and intentions. However, since the "opening up" of China brought about by the new economic, political and foreign policies of the 1980s, the Chinese have been publicly airing their views even on such "sensitive" matters as nuclear strategy.

Thus, in recent years we have seen a remarkable increase in the volume of Chinese comment on the country's nuclear development and deployment strategy. While there is a consensus among Western analysts of Chinese military that China has always placed and will continue to place the highest priority on its strategic nuclear programme, there is wide divergence of opinion on how to describe Chinese nuclear strategy. Instead of seeking to analyse China's nuclear strategy through Western concepts of minimal or proportional deterrence, mutual assured destruction (MAD) or suicidal strategic attack, it is better to analyse first the Chinese views on nuclear strategy before ascribing any standard Western terms to it, or fitting it within more familiar theoretical constructs.

For the first time since China developed nuclear weapons in 1964, *Jiefangjun Bao* published a lengthy essay on China's nuclear strategy in March 1987.¹¹⁴ Describing

China as a "medium-sized nuclear power" in the category of France and Britain, the author Zhang Jianzhi began by highlighting the differences between the nuclear strategies of the superpowers and that of China. Reiterating the Chinese government stand on the self-defensive character of its nuclear weapons and NFU pledge, he underlined the importance of nuclear weapons for China's security objectives by stating that the nuclear forces of China allow it to play its part in world affairs.

According to Zhang, a "workable" balance of nuclear forces between the medium-sized nuclear powers and superpowers exists because the superpowers are unwilling to suffer nuclear damage caused by the limited nuclear forces of the medium-sized nuclear powers like China in the event of a nuclear conflict.¹¹⁵ Under these circumstances, China's nuclear strategy is that of "limited self-defensive counterattack." The author is critical of the superpower strategy of deterrence because "nuclear deterrent is equal to nuclear blackmail." China's strategy, he contends, can be termed as one of "anti-deterrence." The distinction between deterrence and anti-deterrence is explained as the difference in the objectives and intentions of those who possess nuclear weapons.¹¹⁶ Whereas superpowers intend to use their nuclear weapons to "win" a nuclear war, he claims China possesses nuclear weapons not to win but to oppose and check the outbreak of a nuclear war. This approach is called a strategy of "resisting the nuclear deterrent." (This is, in fact, a reiteration and modification of the old Chinese argument of the 1960s that "nuclear weapons in the hands of socialist countries help peace but those of imperialist countries threaten peace"). Zhang sees four functions for a nuclear strategy¹¹⁷:

1. supplementing manpower shortages, e.g., tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) can be employed to compensate for weaknesses in conventional force capabilities;
2. deterring an enemy's large-scale offensive, that is, medium-and short-range nuclear weapons and missiles can be used in support of an active defence strategy to threaten an enemy's massing of troops for a large-scale offensive;
3. deterring an enemy by forcing him to consider the serious and unbearable consequences of a nuclear counterattack; and
4. deterring intervention by superpowers in border conflicts, i.e., the nuclear retaliatory capacity of medium-sized nuclear powers can stop intervention and meddling by big powers.

On this basis, Zhang Jianzhi outlines the key characteristics of China's nuclear strategy of "limited self-defensive counterattack"¹¹⁸:

1. *its defensive nature*: China will maintain an actual combat capability primarily for defensive purposes;
2. *its anti-deterrent nature*: its nuclear force can resist the superpowers' nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail in peacetime;
3. *its self-defensive counterattack nature*: "We shall not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we shall certainly counterattack";
4. *its limited nature*: China will develop a nuclear force of limited quantity but fine quality in the light of its own national conditions; and
5. *its effective nature*: although China's nuclear strength is limited, it is reliable. Once it launches a nuclear counterattack, it undoubtedly will inflict an unacceptable damage on the enemy.

Defining the objective of their nuclear weapons as self-defensive only, Chinese military strategists have always been critical of Western concepts of deterrence and the deterrent strategy of MAD. Therefore, Zhang Jianzhi's categorisation of nuclear deterrence as nuclear blackmail and description of Chinese strategy as one of "resisting the nuclear deterrent" or "anti-deterrence" is nothing more than a calculated attempt to draw distinct lines between the nuclear forces of China and the superpowers, to justify China's acquisition of nuclear capability, and is an exercise in propaganda to ward off criticism of Beijing's sceptical approach to arms control. Despite their denunciation of the concept, Chinese have long recognised the value of deterrence. In fact, China had embraced a form of nuclear deterrence as early as the 1960s. This is evident from the memoirs of the father of China's atom bomb, Nie Rongzhen. He observed that the development of the strategic rocket forces had enabled China "to own the minimal means to stage a counterattack in case our country suffered a surprise attack by the imperialists."¹¹⁹ A *Hongqi* commentator wrote in November 1982 that China's strategic nuclear weapons capability "is an important factor deterring the imperialists (read, enemies) from launching a large-scale invasion against us."¹²⁰ Not only that, deterrence is implied in Zhang's admission that a "workable" balance of nuclear forces already exists between China and the superpowers. As Harlan Jencks points out, deterrence is understood in Beijing as a broad geopolitical strategy which includes armed power of all kinds, plus political and psychological factors.¹²¹

The fact that China is well aware of the value of nuclear deterrence concept brings us closer to another important but controversial question: whether the Chinese are pursuing a "minimum deterrence" strategy or a strategy that goes beyond minimal deterrence, for example, nuclear warfighting similar to NATO's "flexible response" strategy. The concept of "minimum deterrence" is associated with the French *force de*

frappe strategy and is defined as "a strategy to deter a rational attack by relying on a small strategic nuclear force capable of inflicting limited, yet unacceptable, damage to an enemy."¹²²

As Chong-Pin Lin observes, this strategy requires a state of mutual vulnerability, a very limited number of delivery systems and warheads not more than 200-250, an unexpansive range of delivery vehicles confined either to one kind of land-based or sea-based missiles, and an immediate and "all-out" nuclear counterattack.¹²³ What distinguishes the nuclear warfighting strategy from minimum deterrence is the will and the capability to use tactical nuclear weapons, neutron bombs, - i.e., the use of nuclear weapons in the early stages of a conflict - and the development of a complete land-, air-, and sea-based triad of strategic nuclear forces. As stated earlier, China's stockpile of deployable systems and warheads exceeds the 200-250 limit required for a "minimum deterrence" strategy and make it the third largest nuclear power after the two superpowers. Similarly, China's delivery vehicles are not confined to one category as are those of France and Britain - primarily IRBMs in the case of the former and SSBNs and SLBMs in the case of the latter. Instead the Chinese have acquired all kinds of strategic missiles from MRBMs to full- and extended-range ICBMs and a few SLBMs. Finally, minimum deterrence anticipates that "nuclear war is likely to be spasmodic."¹²⁴ In other words, this strategy would expect China to launch an immediate and all-out retaliatory strike soon after an enemy's nuclear attack for fear of "using or losing" its nuclear weapons. However, as Chong-Pin Lin has stated, "the Chinese have always perceived general war, conventional and nuclear, to be a protracted conflict."¹²⁵ Though the Chinese have divulged very little about their "operational plans such as at whom the nuclear weapons are targeted, where in that country they intend to strike, and when exactly they will launch a retaliatory attack"¹²⁶, a high-ranking Chinese nuclear strategist, Hua Di, has revealed the current Chinese thinking on the subject which shows that in spite of their public denunciation of MAD doctrine, the Chinese are, in fact, one of its adherents. Hua Di argues that

the concept of MAD that has deterred nuclear war for so long rests not on the destruction of missile silos but on the assured destruction of [urban centres], civilians and social wealth. Civilians and social wealth cannot be taken out of hostage status. Without aiming at civilian targets nuclear weapons would cease to be a deterrent force.¹²⁷

He seems to be implying that the Chinese do not accept the counter-force doctrine in which cities play no major role and enemy's nuclear weapons and military installations alone become the key targets of nuclear retaliatory strike. On the contrary, he argues

that targets greatly valued by the enemy should be held hostage. This stance would bring China closer to the counter-value nuclear strategy which requires strategic attacks aimed at an enemy's urban and economic-industrial centres. But more alarming than this is what Hua Di says about the type of protracted nuclear war Chinese military planners are contemplating to fight.

On the assumption that China was likely to become involved in nuclear war only with one of the superpowers, it would not have sufficient warheads to destroy the enemy's silos, whereas the superpower-enemy would still have enough not only to destroy China, but to confront the other superpower... Since no superpower could hope to occupy China, China would not launch its missiles when attacked or warned, but would keep those that escaped destruction as a sword of Damocles over the enemy to be used to retaliate at some uncertain times, perhaps hours, days, weeks, months, or even years later, thus preventing the superpower from ever resuming a normal social life.¹²⁸

This, he believes, is a "limited, defensive, and desperate deterrence", but it is "relatively cheap and reliable." This, indeed, is a "chilling scenario, especially for the superpowers."¹²⁹ This type of protracted nuclear warfare not only undercuts the premise of minimum deterrence theory that a nuclear war would be very short and quick but also calls into question the view espoused by some analysts that the Chinese rely primarily on the "psychological dimension" of their nuclear deterrent and do not envisage nuclear warfighting.¹³⁰

Another development which runs contrary to the principles of minimum deterrence is China's development of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). A large number of Chinese strategists, including Zhang Jianzhi cited above, have advocated the use of TNWs to compensate for weaknesses in Chinese conventional strength and the use of short- and medium-range nuclear weapons in a theatre mode to break up the massed Soviet armour and repel the enemy's large-scale conventional offensive. This would bring Chinese nuclear strategy closer to the NATO doctrine of earlier decades. At a symposium held in July 1986 on Chinese national defence strategy for the 21st century, one Chinese expert, Ye Zhangrong, argued that China should closely follow developments in Western Europe's defence strategy because "China's strategic position is quite similar to Europe's in many respects."¹³¹

Furthermore, Zhang Jianzhi's admission that nuclear weapons play a role in checking superpower intervention and meddling in border conflicts and regional wars means that China assigns a much greater role to its nuclear capability in its calculus of deterrence than generally perceived. In Beijing's view, nuclear weapons not only deter a nuclear war but also help to deter *any* attack and prevent the escalation of a conventional war into a nuclear one.

It would be worthwhile here to look at what the Soviets think about China's nuclear strategy. According to a study prepared by the USSR Academy of Sciences, the probable targeting and structure of China's nuclear forces suggest that China's "military doctrine calls for something else besides minimal deterrence."¹³² This study quotes Deng Xiaoping, while commending SLBM test personnel in 1986, as saying that their work had "led to increases in flying range, multiple targeting ability and operational flexibility."¹³³ The use of the term "operational flexibility" by Deng is cited by Soviet analyst Andrei Kuzmenko as an evidence of the fact that

China has a number of different operational plans as regards the use of its nuclear forces complementing the concept of minimal deterrence, which calls for a massive nuclear response to aggression. Therefore, one can presume that China's military options include "intra-war deterrence" and "nuclear escalation."¹³⁴

It is evident from the above account that the Chinese have deviated from the minimum deterrence path in recent years and moved closer to adopting a nuclear warfighting doctrine or what some analysts have called the "beyond minimum deterrence" approach and NATO's "flexible response" strategy. This is also indicated by an increased emphasis on anti-ABC (atomic, biological and chemical) training undertaken by combat troops in forward areas. No matter how the Chinese define (or choose not to define) their nuclear strategy, the acquisition of a credible and survivable second-strike capability combined with more accurate and sophisticated strategic and tactical nuclear weapons of various kinds certainly provides new strategic, operational, and tactical options which are similar to NATO's "flexible response" and counter-value nuclear war-fighting doctrines. It can thus be surmised that China's evolving military doctrine emphasises the interdependence and integration of the conventional, tactical nuclear, strategic nuclear, and chemical and biological warfare capabilities in defending China against an enemy.

(iv) *Nuclear Arms Control and Superpower Strategic Balance:*

As regards nuclear disarmament, Chinese strategists insist on making a clear distinction between medium-sized nuclear powers like China "which have only a small number of nuclear weapons for protecting their own security and those of the superpowers which have the capability to destroy the world several times over." This distinction has been the basis of Chinese opposition to the attempts made by anti-nuclear and disarmament forces to put Chinese nuclear weapons (along with those of British and French) in the same category as the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers

and provides an escape route to the Chinese from the corridors of arms control negotiations. According to Zhang Jianzhi, nuclear weapons "are an objective reality in the world of today" and "an important means to contain wars and defend those countries' security."¹³⁵ Zhang is also quite pessimistic about the realisation of the goal of a nuclear-free world because:

*Demanding total destruction of nuclear weapons from superpowers is no different from asking a tiger for its skin...even if all nuclear weapons on earth were really destroyed and society returned to the times of having no nuclear weapons as before the First and Second World Wars, perhaps the world would not become stable and tranquil immediately.*¹³⁶

Maintaining that "there is still the need for nuclear weapons as deterrents and as political means"¹³⁷, a number of Chinese analysts claim that the superpower arms control talks are motivated primarily by the need to reduce redundant weapons systems and their strategy to achieve strategic superiority through SDI. Two Chinese analysts reviewing the US-Soviet nuclear strategies in 1988 pointed out that although "nuclear weapons have always been an important factor for the US and USSR in formulating their national security strategies since the late 1940s"¹³⁸, and will continue to do so, three significant changes have taken place in their defence strategies in recent years¹³⁹:

1. since the 1980s, because of the tremendous destructive capabilities possessed by both sides, the US and the Soviet Union have gradually given up the thinking that nuclear weapons would win a war, and concluded that nuclear war should not be fought;
2. therefore, the superpowers have increasingly turned to applying the means of arms control and disarmament to check the outbreak of nuclear war or another world war; and
3. since it is impossible for either the US or USSR to achieve military superiority by means of existing nuclear systems, both are seeking new ways in vying for military superiority. The American SDI programme is an obvious example of this.

In the light of these developments, the Chinese believe that the superpowers are undergoing the evolution from "the pure offensive-type strategic weapons to a nuclear strategy serving both defensive and offensive purposes."¹⁴⁰ It is the changes in their nuclear strategies which have made possible the pairing of the arms race with disarmament. Whereas in the past the US-Soviet ACD talks aimed at an "escalating balance", now both sides have decided to reduce superfluous and outmoded weapons in order to develop new and highly advanced systems. The signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the proposal for 50 per cent reduction in nuclear

strategic weapons, it is argued, should be seen only in this context.¹⁴¹ To quote Chen Feng and Zhai Zihai:

On the one hand, both the United States and the Soviet Union are conducting disarmament of their offensive strategic nuclear capabilities. On the other, they have both stepped up their strategic defence systems with offensive functions...¹⁴²

From Beijing's viewpoint, such developments portend problems for the Chinese national security in the foreseeable future. The current superpower detente - the hallmark of which is arms control treaties - is regarded as a "period of recuperation" for the US and USSR in preparation for their future competition in the 21st century.¹⁴³ As one Chinese analyst explains:

Both countries recognise that lowering the nuclear arms level will conform to the interests of both sides; the reduction of nuclear weapons has become the breakthrough point for the present detente...Now both the United States and the Soviet Union are in relative decline and are aware of the limits of their national power. In the coming period, neither of them will be able to break the existing strategic deadlock. Politically, economically, and militarily, both need a relatively long period of detente.¹⁴⁴

However, the Chinese believe that "one or two arms control agreements cannot change their [the superpowers'] overall pattern of rivalry for world hegemony" because "they will not ease their race in the modernisation of nuclear forces and in the development of outer space weapons."¹⁴⁵ According to the director of the CASS Institute of American Studies, Zi Zhongyun, the mutual distrust and antagonism between Washington and Moscow stem not only from different ideologies or systems, but also from geopolitics and history. She argues that "a major power with enormous capacities for expansion, the Soviet Union, *even if it was not a socialist country*, would eventually clash with the United States."¹⁴⁶

Since the US and USSR continue to be rivals, so the argument goes, this period of detente would be characterized by confrontation, competition and rivalry. The only change could be in the nature of the US-Soviet competition which "will shift from seeking superiority in military strength to that for superiority in military technology"¹⁴⁷ and "the focus of the arms race will switch from nuclear weapons to space weapons."¹⁴⁸ This line of reasoning leads to the inevitable conclusion that while it is possible to avoid a world war in the present century, the superpower rivalry and arms race "lays the condition for increasing the factors of a world war in the next century."¹⁴⁹

What lessons do the Chinese analyses of superpower strategic balance and arms control hold for Beijing's national security policy planners? An insight into the military

establishment's thinking is provided by Defence Minister Zhang Aiping's address in July 1987. He said:

Far from being very stable, the relatively peaceful situation in the current world is fraught with the smell of gunpowder, given the contention of relative balance of forces between the United States and the Soviet Union...the danger [of war] still exists...Under such circumstances, we should not, as some people have said, hold that we are now "in a peaceful environment of 'not being invaded by hostile countries,'" enjoying "piping times of peace," and that we can seemingly "put the weapons back in the arsenal and graze the war horses on the hillside."¹⁵⁰

He cautioned that this type of "pacifist thinking" is not only out of tune with the real international situation but would also be harmful for defence modernisation. To remove doubts, if any, about the course of China's nuclear weapons programme in view of the US-Soviet commitment to cut their strategic arms by fifty per cent, Chinese Minister for Nuclear Industry, Jiang Xinxiong, reiterated that China will "continue to vigorously develop nuclear weapons."¹⁵¹

At the same time, many Chinese strategists remain concerned about the potential impact of superpower arms control talks on their nuclear weapons and some are even talking about the need to chalk out a strategy for the "post-nuclear age". For example, a recent article in the army's newspaper stated:

During the difficult years of the 1960s, China joined the nuclear club, which strengthened our position in the world. However, *once an agreement is reached banning the use and testing of nuclear weapons, we will lose our position as a nuclear power.*¹⁵²

In order to meet this "threat", the authors suggested the development of China's space technology arguing that "*our national defence should be strengthened rather than weakened...*[We should] think of the needs of a future war and make preparations for the change from a period of peace to a period of wars."¹⁵³

To buttress their viewpoint, Chinese analysts cite the "fierce arguments" between the two superpowers over the SDI programme in their arms control talks, particularly during the INF talks, as an evidence of the fact that "the two countries regard the development of space weapons systems as a key link directly affecting the future strategic strength and predominance of both sides."¹⁵⁴ Hence the argument goes that sooner or later China will have to accept the challenge of the superpower arms race in space and respond in an appropriate manner. Calling upon the government to break the superpower monopoly of outer space, a *Jiefangjun Bao* commentary emphasised that

nuclear weapons are, in fact, not that "absolute". Every generation of weapons experiences a process of birth, development, ascent and decline...nuclear weapons are no exception and are not likely to constitute the end of the history of weapons development...Reliance on space weapons systems will be a specific

reflection of the third weapons revolution, after thermonuclear weapons. In the foreseeable future, a new generation of space weapons might exceed nuclear weapons to become the main strategic means.¹⁵⁵

This illustrates that while maintaining a critical public posture towards extension of arms race into outer space, Beijing also appears to accept the inevitability of the SDI and other such programmes. Though the Chinese are not averse to using the arms control process to prevent or delay the realisation of space-based defence plans, some sections of the military establishment would prefer adding a space-based deterrent to China's existing land-, air-, and sea-based nuclear deterrent, thereby transforming nuclear triad into a nuclear "tetrad" rather than waiting around for arms control to succeed. Special emphasis placed on China's military and civilian space programme since the early 1980s needs to be examined against this background.

However, it may be noted that the majority of Chinese strategists believe that an SDI type "shield" would need a very long time, from 30 to 50 years, to be deployed, and therefore consider it to be a long-term threat. At least until then China has "an appropriate nuclear offensive and counterattack capability sufficient to guarantee it of the benefits of a deterrent against nuclear attack."¹⁵⁶ In addition, Beijing is continuing to modernise and diversify its nuclear forces and invest in space technologies in order to narrow the technological gap between the superpowers and China. The changes in nuclear warfighting strategy require the enhancement of China's nuclear capabilities which would include MIRV-equipped ballistic missiles, sea-based missiles, ground-based BMDs etc. Suffice to say, emerging trends in Chinese strategic thinking do not bode well for the nuclear arms control process. In essence, the very concept of restraining an adversary's behaviour or constraining his power by mutual and negotiated constraints remains unfathomable to Chinese military planners.

Conclusions

It is evident from the above account that China has always regarded nuclear weapons capability as an important instrument to realise its national security objectives. A significant proportion of China's material and financial resources has been invested to develop both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, a chemical warfare defence capability, and achieve a strategic counterattack capability. Through military exercises conducted under ABC conditions, Beijing is demonstrating its will and determination to the potential enemies to deal with all kinds of external threats - nuclear and conventional - to its security. The Chinese leadership is expected to continue to improve, modernise, and diversify China's nuclear arsenal in order to raise

the costs for its enemies of an attack to a clearly unacceptable level. The Chinese are also acutely conscious of the prestige and influence accorded by their nuclear capability in world affairs.

The period between 1978-1988 has witnessed the most intense, lengthy, and sometimes obscure public debate by China's strategic policy community over a military strategy that would meet the requirements of Chinese national security for the remaining part of this century and the early 21st century. Though Beijing has officially adhered to People's War Under Modern Conditions strategy since 1979, opinion is divided among Chinese and Western analysts over what the new Chinese defence strategy represents in the form of changing threat perceptions, modernisation of conventional and nuclear forces, deployment, and arms control policies. This chapter has attempted to identify the major themes of the Chinese security debate as reflected in the views and writings of China's military experts. The focus of China's strategic debate has been on one key question: whether China should prepare for a major and nuclear war or for fighting a limited conventional war in a period of detente. This question has also affected the formulation of China's defence strategy and arms control policy. With the passage of time, a consensus seems to be emerging that China should be prepared for fighting both conventional and nuclear wars in the future. Believing that the future war of aggression would be a conventional war under the threat of nuclear weapons, Beijing has sought to beef up its conventional forces and reinforce and diversify its nuclear arsenal. But while doing so China has moved away from the traditional people's war strategy towards active defence strategy in the conventional domain and shifted from a minimum deterrence approach towards a warfighting strategy in the nuclear domain.

The Chinese debate on strategy indicates that an overwhelming majority of Chinese strategists does not want to wait around for arms control efforts to succeed but would like China to push ahead with third-generation nuclear weapons development and step up civilian and military space programmes in order to prepare the country for all contingencies. This would rule out any softening of Chinese opposition to a total ban on nuclear testing. Chinese analyses of arms control in recent years have focused more on the *sincerity* of the superpower arms control talks whereas in the past they used to question the *value* of the ACD process. Moreover, the development and use of TNWs and neutron bombs to achieve tactical and strategic goals brings into question China's commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons, though it has been argued by some that if confined strictly to Chinese territory, it would not violate China's NFU pledge.¹⁵⁷ Similarly, China's stockpile of chemical and biological weapons would seem to contradict

its public stand of opposition to chemical and biological weapons, and its active role in the drafting of a treaty banning the development and use of such weapons. Finally, the growing interest of some elements in the PLA in the development of ballistic missile defences and a sea-based nuclear deterrent would raise further problems for the Chinese arms control policymakers and complicate superpower negotiations on ballistic missile defences and naval arms control.

It is also incorrect to underestimate the nuclear component of PWUMC or to deal separately with China's nuclear strategy as distinct from and independent of PWUMC. In fact, conventional defence and nuclear deterrence are integrated and interrelated aspects of China's warfighting doctrine. China's military doctrine for the rest of the 20th century and beyond is going to be People's War Under Modern Conditions, with particular emphasis on *modern conditions*. The people's war concept has been put on the backburner for the most unlikely scenario of a large-scale conventional invasion of the Chinese mainland. Modern conditions refer to new types of warfare, advanced weaponry, the changing superpower strategic balance, nuclear and space arms race and arms control. The Chinese have been trying to strike a fine balance between the conventional and nuclear components of their calculus of deterrence. But whether they will be able to reconcile their national security requirements with those of arms control considerations remains to be seen.

NOTES

- 1 A broad definition of military strategy is given by Z. Zarski. He writes: "Military doctrine is the officially adopted view, within a given state system, of the nature, objectives and character of a future war; the ways of preparing the political and decision-making apparatus and the military forces of a state for such a war; and of the manner in which military activities are to be conducted." See Z. Zarski, "The role of military forces within a European security system," in Gerhard Wachter and Axel Krohn (eds.), *Stability and Arms Control in Europe* (SIPRI, July 1989), p. 29.
- 2 For an excellent outline of the geostrategic factors which influence China's national security policy, see Gerald Segal, *Defending China* (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 10-23.
- 3 Zhang Jian, "It Is Still Necessary To Base our Plans on Fighting a Major War," *Jiefangjun Bao*, 24 April 1987, p. 3, in *FBIS-China*, 4 May 1987, pp. A2-A3.
- 4 Richard Fieldhouse, "Chinese nuclear weapons: an overview," in *SIPRI Yearbook 1986: World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 97-111; *SIPRI Yearbook 1988*, pp. 52-4; Gerald Segal, "As China grows strong," *International Affairs*, Vol. 64, No. 2, (Spring 1988), p. 226; Bradley Hahn, "Beijing's growing global missile reach," *Pacific Defence Reporter*, (February 1987), pp. 12-3; R.S. Sassheen, "Beijing Climbs The Nuclear Arsenal League," *Asian Defence Journal*, (September 1988), p. 114; "China in nuclear forces build up," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, (hereafter *JDW*), 15 April 1989, p. 642. The most extravagant estimates accord China more than a thousand nuclear weapons but the more accurate figure may be around 550 weapons.
- 5 BBC, *Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East (SWB FE) 0045/B2/1*, 11 January 1988. In October 1982, *Jiefangjun Bao* had quoted Defence Minister as saying that "We have...established certain defensive capability in terms of strategic weapons," see *FBIS-China*, 19 October 1982, p. K1; and in 1984, a *Renmin Ribao* report stated that China "now has the combat capability to counter a surprise attack and to launch a nuclear counteroffensive," see *FBIS-China*, 30 October 1984, p. K1.
- 6 *JDW*, op. cit.
- 7 See "The mystery of China's development of atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs and nuclear submarines," *Liaowang*, 15 June 1987, p. 5, in *SWB FE/8605/BII*, 27 June 1987, p. 7. The information in this section is based on the earlier works of Bradley Hahn, "Quick nuclear leap leads to credible nuclear deterrent," *Pacific Defence Reporter*, (hereafter *PDR*), May 1987, pp. 29-30; and Bradley Hahn, "The Nuclear Industry in China," in Larry M. Wortzel, (ed.), *China's Military Modernization: International Implications* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1988), pp. 27-55; *Military Balance 1988-1989*, (London: IISS), pp. 146-7; Robert G. Sutter, "Developments in China's Nuclear Weapons and Attitudes Toward Arms Control," in Charles D. Lovejoy, Jr. and Bruce W. Watson, (eds.), *China's Military Reforms: International and Domestic Implications* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 101-110; Fieldhouse, "Chinese nuclear weapons," op. cit.; and William M. Arkin and Richard Fieldhouse, *Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), pp. 41,44,50,53-55,56,60,62,290-1.
- 8 According to one estimate, China has conducted 34 nuclear tests out of which 22 were atmospheric tests, see *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, (May 1989), p. 57.
- 9 *Defense & Foreign Affairs World Missiles*, No. 12, (March 1989), pp. 7, 31; John Prados, "China's 'new thinking' on nuclear arms," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, (June 1989), p. 34; and *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, (December 1987), p. 52.
- 10 *SIPRI Yearbook 1986*, op. cit.
- 11 Bradley Hahn, "Beijing's growing global missile reach," *PDR*, (February 1987), p. 13.

- 12 Ibid.
- 13 "China's missiles," *The Economist Foreign Report*, (London), 1 November 1984, p. 2.
- 14 *SIPRI Yearbook 1988*, (Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 54.
- 15 Richard Nations, "Concealed nuclear pride," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (hereafter *FEER*), 22 August 1985.
- 16 Shih Chun-yu, "A Chinese Nuclear Submarine Fires a New Type of Missile," *Ta Kung Pao*, 29 September 1988, p. 2, in *FBIS-China*, 30 September 1988, pp. 26-28; and *Renmin Ribao*, 28 September 1988, p. 1.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 Huang Caihong, "New Developments in Naval Guided Missiles," *Liaowang*, No.46, 14 November 1988, p. 4.
- 19 According to London-based IISS, China has built two *Xia*-class SSBNs and eight more are planned, *Military Balance 1987-1988*. Estimates of SSBNs vary from 6 to 12 for the total programme, writes Richard Fieldhouse, op. cit.
- 20 *Liaowang*, 14 November 1988, p. 4.
- 21 *JDW*, op. cit.; and *PDR*, (March 1987), p. 18.
- 22 Ibid.; *SIPRI Yearbook 1986*, p. 109; and *Aviation Week & Space Technology* (hereafter *AWST*), 12 January 1987, p.28.
- 23 *SIPRI Yearbook 1988*, p. 54; *Xinhua*, 15 July 1987, reprinted in *News Review on East Asia*, (New Delhi: IDSA), August 1987, p. 784.
- 24 "The Might of Helan Shan Shakes," *Ningxia Ribao*, 29 June 1982, p. 1, in *FBIS-China*, 3 August 1982, pp. K7-K10.
- 25 *Jiefangjun Bao*, 8 October 1988, p. 1.
- 26 Fieldhouse, op. cit., p. 110; also see *JDW*, op. cit.
- 27 Ibid. "Neutron, or enhanced radiation, bombs are miniature thermonuclear devices that kill people mostly with concentrated radiation, rather than blast or heat, leaving the surrounding physical environment more or less intact," writes Tai Ming Cheung. The information in this section is based on Tai Ming Cheung's article, "China: New Bomb-makers," *FEER*, 16 March 1989, pp. 27-28.
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 *PDR*, February 1987, p. 12; Cheung, op. cit., p.28; and for Chinese perspectives, see Liu Huaqiu, *China and the Neutron Bomb* (Stanford University: An Occasional Paper of the Center for International Security and Arms Control, June 1988).
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 On China's burgeoning space programme, see Bradley Hahn, "Rising Star in space exploration," *PDR*, May 1988, pp. 17-20; *China Daily*, 6 July 1988, p. 1; *Zhongguo Tongxun She*, 22 December 1988, in *FBIS-China*, 22 December 1988, p. 17; *Xinhua*, 29 August 1988, in *FBIS-China*, 29 August 1988, p. 20; Tim Furniss, "China's fragile grip on space," *Flight International*, 1 July 1989, pp. 25-27; and Cheung, op. cit., p. 29.
- 33 Chong-Pin Lin, *China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition Within Evolution* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988); and Bradley Hahn, "China: Nuclear weapon capability small but growing," *PDR*, (May 1989), p. 43.
- 34 An Zhiguo, "For Peace & Security," *Beijing Review*, No. 31, 3 August 1987, p. 4. Emphasis added.
- 35 *Xinhua*, 23 June 1987, in *SWB FE/8605/BII/1*, 27 June 1987.
- 36 Gerald Segal, "As China grows strong," *International Affairs*, Vol. 64, No. 2, (Spring 1988), p. 217.

- 37 JDW, 15 April 1989, p. 642.
- 38 *Jiefangjun Bao*, 29 February 1980, p. 1.
- 39 Chong-Pin Lin, "From Pand to Dragon: China's Nuclear Strategy," *The National Interest*, (Spring 1989), p. 52.
- 40 *Renmin Ribao*, 2 July 1988, p. 4.
- 41 JDW, op. cit.; and "PLA Navy Conducts Multi-Arms Defensive Exercise Under Conditions of Nuclear Warfare," *Jiefangjun Bao*, 19 July 1988, pp. 18-19.
- 42 *Jiefangjun Bao*, 16 September 1988, p. 1.
- 43 JDW, op. cit.
- 44 "Naval Base Conducts Defensive Exercises Under the Conditions of Nuclear War," *Renmin Ribao*, 2 July 1988, p. 4, in *FBIS-China*, 5 July 1988, p. 47.
- 45 *SIPRI Yearbook 1989*, p. 34.
- 46 For an analytical study of Chinese military doctrine, see Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, *Modernisation of Chinese Military: Imperatives and Implications* (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, April 1986), pp. 10-15. The author is grateful to Air Commodore Singh for his permission for citation. Mao Zedong outlined the advantages of 'People's War' strategy in his report *On Coalition Government* in April 1945. See *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), p. 215.
- 47 Liu, *China and the Neutron Bomb*, op. cit., p. 25.
- 48 Singh, op. cit., p. 12.
- 49 Ibid.
- 50 For example, see Li Jijun, "The Characteristics and Historical Position of Mao Zedong's Military Thinking," *Hongqi*, No. 14, 16 July 1982, pp. 11-16, in *FBIS-China*, 5 August 1982, pp. K15-K23; Song Yimin, *On China's Concept of Security* (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Desarmament Research, April 1986), pp. 17-20; *Jiefangjun Bao*, 4 February 1982, and 25 March 1982, p. 1; Liu, op. cit., p. 26. Jasjit Singh rightly observes that "military leaders rarely jettison in a hurry strategies which have led to success," op. cit., p. 12.
- 51 The discussion in this section relies heavily on Ellis Joffe, *The Chinese Army After Mao*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), pp. 70-93. For detailed analysis of China's military strategy, also see Paul H.B. Godwin, *Doctrine, Strategy and Ethic: The Modernisation of the Chinese People's Liberation Army*, (Air University, Alabama: Maxwell Air Force Base, 1977); Georges Tan Eng Bok, "Strategic Doctrine," in Gerald Segal and William T. Tow, (eds.), *Chinese Defence Policy* (London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 3-17; Jonathan D. Pollack, "The Logic of China's Military Strategy," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, (January 1979), pp. 22-23; Paul H. B. Godwin, (ed.), *The Chinese Defence Establishment: Continuity and Change in the 1980s* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 21-40; Harlan W. Jencks, "People's War Under Modern Conditions: Wishful Thinking, National Suicide, or Effective Deterrent?" *China Quarterly*, No. 98, (June 1984), pp. 305-319; and Thomas C. Roberts, *The Chinese People's Militia and the Doctrine of People's War* (Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 1983).
- 52 As General Su Yu, former General-Secretary of the Central Military Commission, once observed: "[Nuclear weapons] cannot be counted on to decide the outcome of a war...such weapons pose a much greater threat to...the countries whose industries and population are highly concentrated...Our economic construction cannot therefore be destroyed by nuclear weapons." See Su Yu, *Great Victory for Chairman Mao's Guideline on War* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1978), p. 15.
- 53 Joffe, *The Chinese Army After Mao*, op. cit., p. 74.
- 54 According to Jonathan Pollack, China had resorted to the use of force on eleven occasions between 1950 and 1979 - that is from the Korean War to the Sino-

- Vietnamese conflict, see Jonathan Pollack, "China as a Military Power," in Onkar Marwah and Jonathan Pollack (eds.), *Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India, Japan* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 46. The March 1988 Sino-Vietnamese clashes in the Spratly Islands would make it twelve occasions on which the Chinese used force since 1949.
- 55 Singh, op. cit., p. 13.
 - 56 Gary Klintworth, *China's Modernisation: The Strategic Implications For The Asia-Pacific Region* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989), p. 41.
 - 57 Liu, op. cit., p. 26. The term 'People's War Under Modern Conditions' was introduced for the first time by Su Yu in an article in August 1977, see *FBIS-China*, 8 August 1977, pp. E10-21.
 - 58 For example, see Paul H. B. Godwin, "Changing Concepts of Doctrine, Strategy and Operations in the Chinese People's Liberation Army 1978-1987," *China Quarterly*, No. 112, (December 1987), pp. 572-590; Fieldhouse, op. cit.; and Tai Ming Cheung, "Trends in the research of Chinese military strategy," *Survival*, (May-June 1987), pp. 239-251.
 - 59 *SWB FE*, 20 September 1985, cited in Tai Ming Cheung, "Disarmament and Development in China," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 28, No. 7, (July 1988), pp. 757-774.
 - 60 The Chinese commentaries on defence matters always refer to 1985 as the year which marked a 'strategic shift' in PLA's military planning. This was also the year when a decision regarding the reduction of PLA's size by one million was announced after two years of deliberations. See "Shift in China's Strategy for Building Armed Forces Shows New Evaluation of World Situation," *Ta Kung Pao*, (Hong Kong) 16 February 1986, p. 1, also in *FBIS-China*, 18 February 1986, pp. W11-12.
 - 61 Zhu Songchun, "Chinese Scholars Discuss Strategy for the Development of National Defence in Year 2000," *Liaowang*, No. 29, 21 July 1986, pp. 6-8, in *FBIS-China*, 25 July 1986, pp. K3-K8; and Yang Dezhi, "A Strategic Decision on Strengthening the Building of Our Army in the New Period," *Hongqi*, No. 15, 1 August 1985, pp. 3-7, in *FBIS-China*, 8 August 1985, pp. K1-K7.
 - 62 *Ta Kung Pao*, 16 February 1986, p. 1; and *SWB FE/8244/BII/1*, 28 April 1986.
 - 63 *Xinhua*, 19 January 1979, in *SWB FE/6023/BII/6*, 23 January 1979; and *Xinhua*, 23 June 1987. 'Ultra-leftist' is a term used by the Chinese to criticise the radical policies pursued by the so-called 'Gang of Four' during the last years of Mao Zedong's rule which hampered the modernisation of Chinese armed forces. An article in *Hongqi* blamed the "leftist" policies pursued during the 'Cultural Revolution' for the sorry state of PLA which also affected the estimation of the international situation, see Chen Qiman, "Tentative Discussion on Postwar Changes in International Relations and the Possibility of Winning Lasting World Peace," *Hongqi*, No. 13, 1 July 1986, pp. 20-26, in *FBIS-China*, 28 July 1986, pp. A13.
 - 64 *Xinhua*, 5 August 1977, in *FBIS-China*, 8 August 1977, pp. E10-21, also cited in Joffe, op. cit., p. 77. For an interesting and lively debate by Chinese strategists on the country's defence strategy, see Joffe, op. cit.; and Roberts, op. cit.
 - 65 *Xinhua*, 19 January 1979, in *SWB FE/6023/BII/6*, 23 January 1979.
 - 66 *Hongqi*, 2 October 1979, in *FBIS-China*, 18 October 1979, pp. L12-L19.
 - 67 Yang Shangkun, "Build a Strong Modern Revolutionary Army," *Hongqi*, No. 15, 1 August 1982, pp. 6-10, in *FBIS-China*, 25 August 1982, pp. K20-K27.
 - 68 Ibid.
 - 69 Shao Huaze, "A Reliable Guarantee for Socialist Construction," *Hongqi*, No. 21, 1 November 1982, pp. 19-23, in *FBIS-China*, 19 November 1982, pp. K20-26.
 - 70 *Xinhua*, 23 June 1987, *SWB FE/8605/BII/1*, 27 June 1987.

- 71 This point is elaborated in Paul H. B. Godwin, "People's War Revised: Military Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations," in Charles D. Lovejoy, Jr. and Bruce W. Watson, (eds.), *China's Military Reforms*, op. cit. pp. 5-7.
- 72 Gary Klintworth, "China's Security Policy," (Paper presented at the Conference on Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific, 12-14 August 1987, Peace Research Centre, A.N.U., Canberra), p. 26.
- 73 *The China Business Review*, (March-April 1987), pp. 12-13.
- 74 *Hongqi*, No. 15, 1 August 1982, pp. 6-10; *Hongqi*, No. 21, 1 November 1982, pp. 19-23; and Zong He, "Tentative Discussion of the Characteristics of Modern Warfare," *Shijie Zhishi*, No. 15, 1 August 1983, in *Joint Publications Research Service, China Report (JPRS-China)*, No. 461, 11 October 1983, p. 79.
- 75 See notes 60 and 62.
- 76 Note 70.
- 77 Ibid. Emphasis added.
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 - 111 Robert S. Wang, "China's Evolving Strategic Doctrine," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 24, No. 10, (October 1984), p. 1050.
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- 123 Ibid. pp. 53-54.
- 124 Ibid.
- 125 Ibid.
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- 131 Zhu Songchun, "Chinese Scholars Discuss Strategy for the Development of National Defence in Year 2000," *Liaowang*, No. 29, 21 July 1986, pp. 6-8, in *FBIS-China*, 25 July 1986, p. K6.
- 132 USSR Academy of Sciences, *Disarmament And Security 1987 Yearbook* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1988), p. 148.
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- 135 Zhang, op. cit., p. K30. He is critical of "some people" who "blindly oppose nuclear weapons," put the blame on all five NWSs for the danger to human civilisation, and attributes this view to an unsound understanding of the nuclear force and strategic nuclear theory which leads to failure in "distinguish[ing] between right and wrong."
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and Wang Shu, "Study New Changes in the World with New Thinking and New Perspective," *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu*, No. 4, (13 October 1988), pp. 1-4; and Peng Di, "What Does the Year of Detente Mean?" *Yangcheng Wanbao*, 23 December 1988, p. 2, in *FBIS-China*, 5 January 1989, pp. 8-10.

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Chapter IV

CHINA AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

Since the dawn of the atomic age, efforts have been made to restrain the military threat of nuclear power. The global nuclear non-proliferation regime is an outgrowth of the steps taken during the last four decades to halt the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. The international non-proliferation regime consists of five key components: the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), founded in 1957, and comprising 112 member states; the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) banning the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space or underwater; the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which has attracted a record number of adherents for an arms control agreement - nearly 141 countries (including Taiwan, which is no longer recognised as a state by the United Nations)¹; the London-based Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), formed in 1974, which requires IAEA safeguards on all of its participants' nuclear exports; and the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) aimed at halting the proliferation of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems. The overall record of the non-proliferation regime has been a mixture of success and failure. Since the early 1980s, the global nuclear non-proliferation regime has been seriously undermined by new developments such as the emergence of new suppliers of nuclear technology, the growing trade in nuclear-capable delivery systems and the transfer of nuclear-powered submarines to NNWSs, and an alarming increase in the number of threshold nuclear states. Apart from the five declared NWSs (the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and the People's Republic of China), Argentina, Brazil, India, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, and Israel are widely believed to have made significant progress towards acquiring nuclear weapons capability. It is particularly disturbing that China has been held responsible for aiding, either directly or indirectly, the nuclear weapons projects of six out of the seven nuclear threshold states mentioned above.²

Needless to say, the question of Chinese policy on nuclear non-proliferation is a complex one and has been the subject of intense debate and speculation since the early 1960s by a number of specialists in the field.³ A study of China's nuclear non-proliferation policy should logically begin with the period immediately before and after the Chinese acquisition of a nuclear capability in 1964. However, there is no need to duplicate here the excellent studies dealing with Chinese policy during the early and

late 1960s. Nonetheless, the major findings of these works provide a useful background perspective to examine the evolution of China's policy regarding proliferation to date. It would be worthwhile, therefore, to make a few comments on this period and then proceed to a detailed analysis of Chinese policy towards nuclear non-proliferation during the 1978-88 period.

Opinion is divided among students of Chinese nuclear politics on how to explain and analyse this issue. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that, apart from issuing general declaratory statements on proliferation and related issues, the Chinese have not come out with any exhaustive analysis in the public domain. This, in turn, has led to a wide divergence of views among observers of China's attitude towards proliferation. Some dub it as reckless, irrational and irresponsible; others see it as cautious, deliberate and realistic, given China's vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that Chinese policy towards nuclear non-proliferation since 1949 is not a "unilinear approach of consistency"⁴ but a shifting one of national expediency conditioned by Beijing's perceived national security objectives. This study shows that the need to serve national security goals has led Beijing to make several tactical turnabouts with regard to the proliferation issue.

A recent study on China and nuclear non-proliferation by Charles Van Doren and Rodney Jones examines the proliferation potential of China and its record of nuclear export and co-operation activities, and offers some innovative suggestions for initiatives to bring China closer to the non-proliferation regime.⁵ However, the major flaw in this study is that it ignores completely the underlying security considerations which motivated China to undermine the non-proliferation goals. For example, Van Doren and Jones acknowledge that China has assisted Pakistan's nuclear weapons project and are concerned that Sino-Pakistani cooperation in this field may continue in the future, but fail to offer any convincing explanation as to why this should be so.⁶ They rely too much on Beijing's declaratory non-proliferation posture since 1984 to conclude that Chinese nuclear non-proliferation policy has changed significantly during the last five years, once again with the possible exception of Pakistan.

This study examines the fundamental factors that have led Beijing to disregard the non-proliferation regime in the past and might lead it to continue to do so in the future. The acquisition of nuclear weapons occurs for a wide range of reasons and has repercussions well beyond a country's borders. The most fundamental and generally accepted factors behind a country's quest for nuclear weapons technology can be identified as security, domestic-economic and diplomatic.⁷ Taking these factors as the

three key independent variables, this study argues that their interplay can help explain the evolution of Chinese attitudes to nuclear non-proliferation since the early 1960s to the present.

This chapter is divided into three sections. It begins with a brief survey of Chinese attitudes towards nuclear weapons, PTBT, and proliferation from the early 1950s until 1970. The second section is devoted to analysing China's policy towards the remaining four components of the nuclear non-proliferation regime from the late 1970s up to the present. The 1980s have also seen China embarking upon an extensive civilian nuclear energy programme and entering into nuclear cooperation agreements with a number of countries. The implications of these for Beijing's stance on the NPT and IAEA, its role as an emerging nuclear supplier and attitude towards NSG, and China's response to the MTCR are explored in more detail in the second section. Last but not least, China's reported nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan and other countries provides the backdrop for a detailed analysis of what the Chinese have said and done, and more importantly why, with regard to proliferation at different times.

I

Chinese Attitudes Towards Nuclear Weapons, PTBT, And Proliferation: 1949-70

When the People's Republic of China came into existence in October 1949, it was confronted with a hostile external environment. In a period of less than five years, the United States threatened twice to use nuclear weapons against the PRC, once during the Korean War in 1953, and again during the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958. However, it was the Sino-Soviet split and the withdrawal of Soviet technical aid and advisers in October 1960, and the Soviet refusal to back up a Chinese nuclear weapons programme which strengthened China's resolve to accelerate its nuclear weapons programme. A number of earlier studies have argued that despite the Chinese rhetoric which denigrated nuclear weapons as "paper tigers", the leadership in Beijing was aware, even during the 1950s, of the implications and the destructive capability of nuclear weapons and nuclear war.⁸ China's demonstrated interest in obtaining nuclear weapons (as evidenced in the Sino-Soviet agreement of 1957) and willingness to devote considerable economic resources to the quest (at a time of severe economic hardships) suggest the predominant influence of the security factor in the formulation of Beijing's internal and external policies.

In January 1965, a few months after China tested its first atomic bomb, Mao revealed China's desire to compete with other NWSs. He told Edgar Snow: "Yes, we need them [bombs]. No matter what country it is, what bombs they are, A-bombs or H-bombs, we must overtake them."⁹ The head of China's nuclear programme, Nie Rongzhen's belief in the need for a nuclear deterrent and Foreign Minister Chen Yi's linkage of nuclear weapons to diplomacy, display motives little different from those of the other NWSs. Nie reminisces:

As for me, my opinion was always clear. To get rid of imperialist bullying, which China had suffered for more than a century, we had to develop these sophisticated weapons. At least then, we could effectively counterattack if China were subject to imperialist nuclear attack...

Comrade Chen Yi said that even if we had to pawn our pants, China was still determined to make its own sophisticated weapons. He told me humorously many times that as foreign minister, he still felt he could not straighten his back. If China could make the missiles and atom bombs, then he would have strong backing.¹⁰

The foregoing suggests that the Chinese leadership, right from the very beginning, assigned an important role to nuclear weapons in the pursuit of their national security goals and were determined to resist any outside attempts to restrict or control the development of China's nuclear capability. Thus, Chinese opposition to, and strong denunciation of, the superpower-sponsored PTBT of 1963 needs to be understood against this background. The Chinese statement of 15 August 1963 on PTBT, which implicitly argued the Chinese case for nuclear weapons, had this to say on the proliferation issue:

With regard to preventing proliferation...a class analysis must be made. Whether or not nuclear weapons help *peace* depends on who possesses them. It is detrimental to peace if they are in the hands of imperialist countries; it helps peace if they are in the hands of socialist countries. It must not be said indiscriminately that the danger of nuclear war increases along with the increase in the number of nuclear powers. Nuclear weapons were first the monopoly of the United States. Later, the Soviet Union also came to possess them. Did the danger of nuclear war become greater or less when the number of nuclear powers increased from one to two? We say it became less, not greater. Nuclear weapons in the possession of a socialist country are always a means of defence against nuclear blackmail and nuclear war.¹¹

As one analyst points out, what is meant by *peace* in the above statement is "the countervailing power of the socialist camp which would increase with the possession of nuclear weapons by China."¹² Hence the argument that "more may be better." In other words, China was legitimizing and encouraging proliferation at a time when it was preparing for its own nuclear test and it was unwilling to see itself permanently denied strategic parity with the superpowers, which seemed implicit in acquiescence to the PTBT.

After the first successful test came a change of emphasis and there were several ambiguities regarding nuclear proliferation. While verbal support for nuclear proliferation continued, the Chinese media after 1966 became focused on the ongoing negotiations for a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Apparently, China's nuclear test of 1964 gave a major impetus to the debate and efforts at curbing further proliferation in the Western capitals.¹³ And the Chinese knew that they were at the root of the new moves for the NPT. Therefore, when the NPT was finally signed in Washington, Moscow and London on 1 July 1968, Premier Zhou Enlai attacked it as "a big conspiracy and swindle" by the US and USSR, in their attempt to turn the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWSs) into "protectorates" and press forward with a new type of colonialism, "nuclear colonialism."¹⁴ The Chinese Communist Party organ, *Renmin Ribao*, denounced it as

a nuclear fraud jointly hatched by the United States and the Soviet Union...it had totally deprived the non-nuclear states of their right to develop nuclear weapons for self-defence...the nuclear monopoly held by the US imperialism and Soviet revisionists has long been broken and will certainly be further broken.¹⁵

However, despite its condemnation of NPT as being more "unscrupulous and outrageous" than the PTBT, Beijing did not subject it to the kind of extended attack to which the PTBT had been subjected. Conspicuously missing from the Chinese statements was the kind of sophisticated logic with which Beijing had previously expounded its case for the further spread of nuclear weapons. The reason, observes Chi Chiang Hu, was that the implications of the PTBT were more serious than that of the NPT. The PTBT was concluded when China was committed to its first nuclear test, and was seen by Beijing as part of an "international conspiracy" to prevent China from going nuclear. It may be recalled that Beijing at this stage lacked the capability to conduct underground nuclear tests and could only test its nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, which were prohibited by the PTBT. The NPT, on the other hand, not only left the continuous development of Chinese nuclear programme unaffected, but actually accorded it legitimacy.¹⁶ The key elements of Chinese policy on nuclear proliferation during this period can be summarized as follows:

- A. Nuclear weapons in the hands of socialist states helped maintain peace and China's nuclear weapons were meant for self-defence only.
- B. China had to "go nuclear" because of the increasing nuclear threat posed by the US.
- C. Beijing would not have developed nuclear weapons if its demands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons had been met.

- D. China was opposed to any agreement, e.g. NPT, which curtailed the sovereign rights of NNWSs and perpetuated superpower hegemony.
- E. China pledged never to use nuclear weapons first and not to use them against NNWSs.
- F. China hoped a greater number of countries would be able to make nuclear weapons but it was unrealistic to expect Chinese help in their nuclear activities.

A critical analysis of the above-mentioned characteristics of Chinese policy would show that these positions were totally consistent with China's security objectives, economic constraints and diplomatic goals. A and B point to the perceived threat posed by a potential enemy and China's response to it, whereas the stress on the defensive nature of its nuclear weapons in A is reinforced by E, i.e., the No-First-Use pledge, the combined effect of which is not only to reduce the incentive for a pre-emptive or surgical strike by one or the other superpower against China's nuclear installations, but also to allay the fears and uneasiness of its non-nuclear potential adversaries in Asia. C and D aim at realising the diplomatic objectives of projecting China's image as a reasonable and responsible power in the Third World and as a champion of the sovereign rights of the NNWSs while F indicates the limits of Beijing's pro-proliferation stance. It also indicates, as Rodney Jones puts it, that "nuclear resources were too scarce to think of exporting" in the early years of China's own nuclear programme.¹⁷

II

China, the IAEA, and NPT: 1978-88

The early 1970s saw China emerging from its self-imposed isolation and a rapid decline in the vitriolic radical rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution. The increasing Soviet threat which the Chinese perceived on their northern borders forced Beijing to pursue *realpolitik* and to improve relations with the US and Western Europe. In 1971, the PRC took its seat in the United Nations. At the First NPT Review Conference in 1975, China did not adopt an aggressive posture it had adopted in 1968. A commentary on the review conference merely criticised the superpowers for the arms race, but said nothing significant on the treaty as such.¹⁸

Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua, speaking at the UN Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) in May 1978, said that China considered NPT and similar other arms control measures made since 1968 as attempts by the US and USSR to consolidate

their position as "nuclear overlords", to subject other countries to "nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail." He further added:

We have always held that *all countries have the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes* and we are firmly opposed to the attempts of the superpowers to hamper, on the pretext of nuclear non-proliferation, the development by other countries of their own *nuclear industry*.¹⁹

This statement indicated a major shift in Chinese non-proliferation policy in the intervening period of a decade since the NPT and the UN SSOD. Although it restated Chinese opposition to the superpowers' nuclear duopoly, it said nothing about the right of other countries to acquire nuclear weapons. Rather, the emphasis was on their "right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes" and "nuclear industry." The militant posture of 1968 that "nuclear monopoly will be further broken" had given way to ambiguous assertions that superpowers were hampering the development of nuclear energy for "peaceful purposes."²⁰ It also set the tone for future Chinese commentaries on NPT.

(a) *China's Civilian Nuclear Energy Programme:*

Evidently, there was a domestic dimension to the softening of Chinese criticisms of the NPT in the late 1970s. Nuclear technology and nuclear power were accorded top priority by the post-Mao leadership in order to solve the massive energy shortages that had hindered China's industrialisation and modernisation programme. As had been the case with each of the four other NWSs, the development of civil nuclear power in China followed, rather than preceded, the acquisition of a nuclear military capability - though in China's case, the interlude between the two was longer than for the others.²¹ In 1978, China decided to set up several nuclear power plants and achieve the goal of having 10,000MW of installed nuclear capacity by the year 2000. To realise this goal, China needed to obtain considerable foreign technology aid, and acquire manufacturing and other infrastructure. The Chinese leadership provided the following rationale for its ambitious nuclear energy programme²²:

1. China has substantial uranium resources.
2. Its coal supplies and hydro capabilities are concentrated in the north and the west while China's industrial centres are predominantly in the eastern coastal areas, which are short of energy.
3. China's nuclear weapons programme has created a significant cadre of well-trained nuclear scientists and a nuclear industry infrastructure.

In 1984, the then Defence Minister Zhang Aiping told a National Work Conference that while his ministry had a continuing responsibility to support national defence

goals, China's nuclear industry should shift its main strength to serving the civilian sector and concentrate on supplying power to China's industrial sector.²³

(b) China's Nuclear Cooperation Agreements: Implications and Problems:

China's civilian nuclear programme made it imperative to seek agreements on nuclear cooperation with the suppliers of nuclear technology such as the United States, Japan, France, West Germany, Britain, and Italy.[See Table 4.1] These countries also happened to be signatories to the NPT and champions of the non-proliferation regime.

TABLE 4.1
CHINA'S NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENTS

Country	Year of Agreement	NPT Member Yes/No	NSG Member Yes/No
Brazil	1984	No	No
France	1984	Acts as a member/No	Yes
West Germany	1984	Yes	Yes
Italy	1984	Yes	Yes
Romania	1984	Yes	No
Argentina	1985	No	No
USA	1985	Yes	Yes
Britain	1985	Yes	Yes
Spain	1985	Yes	No
Japan	1985	Yes	Yes
Yugoslavia	1985	Yes	No
Indonesia	1985	Yes	No
Iran	1985	Yes	No
Pakistan	1986	No	No
Chile	1989	No	No

Sources: Charles N. Van Doren & Rodney Jones, *China & Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Two Perspectives* (University of Southampton, PPNN Occasional Paper Number Three, July 1989), p. 13; and Jozef Goldblat, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The Status and Prospects," *CIIPS Background Paper No.29* (Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security), June 1989.

The United States was the first country to which China turned for help after its nuclear power programme was unveiled in 1978. In 1979, the Carter administration authorized Framatome, a French government-run reactor manufacturing corporation, to offer Beijing a nuclear power reactor for the Guangdong project. The understanding was that France would have the right to monitor China's use of French-supplied nuclear materials. Talks on a nuclear cooperation agreement between the US and China started in 1981 under the Reagan administration, but were suspended because of intelligence reports about China's clandestine nuclear collaboration with Pakistan, South Africa and Argentina. (China's nuclear collaboration with Pakistan and other nuclear threshold states is discussed in detail in the third section). Negotiations resumed after Beijing agreed to join the IAEA in late 1983 and accept global non-proliferation norms and obligations.²⁴ Beginning in 1984, Chinese leaders at the highest levels repeatedly reiterated Chinese opposition to further proliferation but refused to ratify the NPT. The Chinese representative at IAEA in October 1983 stated:

We cannot go along with any attempt at arbitrary and unilateral widening of the scope of restrictions and controls in the name of strengthening the non-proliferation regime. We believe this practice would not be conducive to the *development and worldwide peaceful uses of nuclear technology, to the economic and scientific development of various countries* . . .²⁵

Nonetheless, in order to take the heat out of Congressional opposition to US-China nuclear cooperation over reported Chinese nuclear aid to countries of high proliferation risk, Beijing formally ended its 30-year boycott of the IAEA by joining the Agency on 1 January 1984. It also agreed to apply IAEA safeguards to any nuclear technology exported by China to NNWSs, apparently signaling an end to nuclear transfers without safeguards. But China declared at the 27th General Conference of the IAEA in October 1983 that membership in the IAEA did not imply any change in its official position on the NPT:

China remains critical of the discriminatory nature of the treaty. Nevertheless, *we respect the desire of a great many non-nuclear weapon states not to test, use, manufacture, produce and acquire nuclear weapons*. We hold that international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy involves some *delicate issues* which should be dealt with cautiously...China will accept the Statute of the Agency and fulfill obligations arising therefrom. China will take into account relevant provisions of the Statute, including safeguard provisions, in its future international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in its transfer of nuclear material, nuclear technology and nuclear equipment.²⁶

This statement was significant in several respects. First, as Reinhard Drifte states, it was the farthest any Chinese regime had gone towards a positive evaluation of the NPT.²⁷ Second, it signalled the demise of the previous Chinese doctrine propounding

the virtues of a nuclearized world. Third, China's acceptance of IAEA safeguards amounted to adherence to NPT principles and objectives on abstinence. Fourth, it weakened Chinese opposition to the NPT in so far as it failed to explain how adherence to the NPT could be more detrimental to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for China than for the other NWSs which were parties to the Treaty.²⁸

China took a further step in terms of its public commitment to non-proliferation when Premier Zhao Ziyang, during his US visit in January 1984, stated:

We do not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation. We do not engage in nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do we help other countries develop nuclear weapons.²⁹

The prominence given to Premier Zhao's statement by Chinese official media, particularly *Renmin Ribao*, was indicative of a major shift from China's previously ambiguous policy. However, this initiative soon got embroiled into a controversy on Capitol Hill because (a) Zhao's statement was not phrased in the future tense, and (b) not long after it was made, Chinese scientists were discovered at the Kahuta site in Pakistan, where a clandestine nuclear enrichment plant was being built. It was this discovery which led to further delay in the conclusion of the proposed US-China nuclear pact. Hence the US State Department sought further clarification from Beijing that covered future activities as well.³⁰ In May 1984, Premier Zhao Ziyang elaborated at the National People's Congress (NPC), but still in the present tense, stating:

China is critical of the discriminatory [NPT]...But we by no means favour nuclear proliferation nor do we engage in such proliferation by helping other countries to develop nuclear weapons.³¹

The deadlock was finally resolved on 18 January 1985 when Vice-Premier Li Peng, in an interview with the official newsagency, *Xinhua*, quoted Premier Zhao's statement to the NPC and added:

I would like to reiterate here that we have no intention either *at present or in the future*, to help non-nuclear countries develop nuclear weapons. Last year, China joined the IAEA...China will abide by the agency's stipulations...China's nuclear cooperation with other countries, either at present or in the future, is confined to peaceful purposes alone.³²

On balance, Chinese membership of the IAEA and Li Peng's statement put China in much the same position as France - i.e., it will not sign the NPT but will behave as if it had. Subsequently, the Sino-US nuclear agreement was initialled when China agreed to implement its non-proliferation policy "in a manner consistent with basic non-proliferation practices common to the United States and other suppliers."³³ In late 1985, Beijing announced its decision to place *some* of its civilian nuclear installations

under IAEA safeguards. Three years later in September 1988, China signed an agreement with the IAEA to accept agency safeguards on *all* its civilian nuclear installations.³⁴ Though this initiative is yet to be matched by any corresponding steps to build the legal, institutional, bureaucratic and technical apparatus necessary to facilitate such inspections by IAEA in China, yet this move brought China in line with the other four NWSs. It would seem that China's need for nuclear cooperation with the suppliers of nuclear technology such as the United States - which are signatories to non-proliferation agreements providing for safeguards and controls - brought about a change in China's own nuclear proliferation and nuclear export policies.

Still, Beijing was unwilling to give the impression that China's membership of the IAEA, and its willingness to place non-military nuclear installations under the IAEA inspection and acceptance of IAEA safeguards on its nuclear exports, were related to the US-China nuclear agreement of 1984. The Chinese side was at pains to explain that this was "not the result of any bilateral negotiations."³⁵ Apparently, this indicated Beijing's desire not to be seen bending backwards under American pressure, as it could have set a bad precedent.

While the talks with the United States on a nuclear accord were still going on, China signed an agreement with Japan on 16 March 1984 for the purchase of a pressure vessel for a planned powerplant in Qinshan, Zhejiang province. This agreement handled the sensitive issue of safeguards - to quote Reinhard Drifte, "in an extremely ingenious way" - and for the first time, the Chinese government went so far as to agree to commit itself to on-site inspections by the aiding party.³⁶

Similarly, the Sino-Brazilian accord on nuclear cooperation signed in October 1984 drew China further into the non-proliferation regime. It provided for the application of IAEA safeguards to assistance, equipment and materials provided by either party. For the first time, China required the recipient of its aid to accept IAEA safeguards, and also agreed to accept such safeguards within its own territory.³⁷ The agreement specifically ruled out any exchange of "sensitive technology"³⁸ - an issue of vital concern to US policymakers. Besides, Chinese leaders informed American officials in their private communications that "China plans to follow this pattern in all of its future nuclear cooperation agreements with [NNWSs], but [would] prefer the equivalent of bilateral control arrangements (and "peaceful assurances") in its agreements with nuclear-weapon states."³⁹

Thus, in recent nuclear cooperation agreements with Brazil, Japan and Argentina, the Chinese have accepted "reciprocal" application of IAEA safeguards. The US-China

nuclear agreement committed China *not* to transfer nuclear materials produced by US reactors to third countries without gaining prior consent of the US.⁴⁰ But China, being a NWS, declined to accept provisions for the inspection of Chinese nuclear facilities by American observers on the ground that US law does not require such provisions for US nuclear exports to NWSs.⁴¹

Despite these positive changes in Chinese non-proliferation policy, the fact remains that China has refused to ratify the NPT, which is regarded as the most important instrument of a global non-proliferation regime to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Admittedly, the NPT's success in preventing horizontal proliferation has been greater than in checking vertical proliferation. As of December 1988, it had 141 member states.⁴² Unlike most other arms control agreements, NPT has a limited lifespan of 25 years. In 1995, a conference will be convened to decide on whether it should survive and if so, in what form and for how long. The future of the NPT in part depends on whether the two NWSs, China and France, endorse it or not. Though China has recently indicated, like France, its intention to "act as if it were party" to the Treaty, Beijing's critical attitude towards NPT still encourages a number of near-nuclear states (for example, India) to stay away from it. This raises the obvious question: what are the prospects of China's formal adherence to the Treaty?

Basically, signing the NPT would not be disadvantageous to China (or for that matter, France) since it is primarily directed at preventing horizontal proliferation - i.e., preventing an increase in the number of NWSs. By joining the NPT, Beijing could project its image as a responsible nuclear power and claim it as an important confidence-building measure (CBM) to reduce tension and promote stability in Asia. However, such a possibility seems remote in view of long-standing Chinese opposition to superpower-sponsored arms control pacts. Second, it would amount to Chinese acceptance of the fact that China's own nuclear weapons are a part of the problem - something which Beijing is loth to admit. Third, the considerations of prestige and loss of "face" also rule out ratification of NPT in its present form by Beijing. The value traditionally put on *mianzi* (face) should not be ignored.⁴³ Besides, Chinese would find it hard to justify a step which could be interpreted as China's endorsement of the division between nuclear have-nots and nuclear haves. Another obstacle is that Chinese opposition to the NPT is now enshrined in a legal document passed by the NPC in May 1984.⁴⁴

Preventing proliferation, from China's perspective, requires a treaty different from the present NPT. It may require active Chinese participation, considerable

renegotiation, and basic structural changes in the treaty to incorporate the concerns of the vast majority of NNWSs before China considers NPT membership. It may also demand substantial reductions in superpower nuclear arsenals and the removal of threats to Chinese security in return for Chinese support for the NPT in an amended form.

China As An Emerging Nuclear Supplier: Problems & Implications

Closely related to the question of nuclear non-proliferation regime is the issue of the emergence of China as a "second-tier" nuclear supplier state in the near future. Since the early 1980s, a number of new nuclear supplier states, like China, have entered the international nuclear market. They are neither signatories to the NPT nor members of the London-based Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), and their role has caused concern among proponents of the non-proliferation regime because of their capability as potential exporters of nuclear fuel, (whether enriched uranium or plutonium), heavy water, research reactors, nuclear-capable delivery systems, dual-use items or even sensitive technology. Also called the "emerging nuclear suppliers" (ENS), these countries include South Africa, India, Argentina, Brazil, and South Korea as well as China. The ENS states could undermine the global non-proliferation regime if they fail to base their nuclear exports on reasonable non-proliferation assurances and controls.⁴⁵ It may be noted that the willingness of these ENS states to aid and abet nuclear weapon programmes in other states may give them a competitive edge *vis-à-vis* the existing suppliers and increase pressures on the latter to dilute their controls.⁴⁶

A recent study by prominent proliferation specialist, Lewis A. Dunn, shows that of the thirteen emerging nuclear supplier countries, only China is capable of exporting *all* items of potential utility to a nuclear weapons programme.⁴⁷ These items include natural and low-enriched uranium, enrichment or reprocessing aid, heavy water, research reactors, nuclear explosives knowhow and dual-use items such as planes and ballistic missiles.

China's refusal to join the NPT and the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, which has established guidelines to regulate nuclear exports by the major suppliers, remains a matter of serious concern. These guidelines include commitments to require IAEA safeguards on exports; to obtain promises of peaceful use and other assurances for nuclear exports on a government-to-government basis; and to exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive reprocessing or enrichment technology or equipment. When measured against the NSG guidelines, China's past record is far from reassuring.⁴⁸

China has not only criticised the NSG guidelines but also called for greater technology transfer between developed and developing countries so as to facilitate the development of nuclear energy. As Lewis Dunn points out, with the notable exception of early Chinese nuclear export practices, the other ENS countries have so far acted relatively cautiously as nuclear exporters.⁴⁹

Beijing has now offered to accept IAEA safeguards on nuclear exports, although the specific items to be covered remain to be determined and their institutions for export control to be tested fully.⁵⁰

In view of China's recent unsafeguarded nuclear transfers to countries of high proliferation risk, serious questions remain as to whether Beijing's current commitment to non-proliferation is anything more than a commitment of convenience, that could just as easily be reversed in the future. During the Congressional hearings on the proposed US-China nuclear accord in 1984-85, a number of experts voiced their concern over the possible diversion of foreign aid and technology to China's nuclear weapons programme, over problems of verification, and over the legal status of verbal non-proliferation commitments in view of Beijing's past "devil-may-care" attitude to non-proliferation.⁵¹ These criticisms of China's increasing nuclear cooperation with the West and its implications deserve careful scrutiny.

The major concern remains that China's increasing nuclear cooperation with the Western world, Japan and developing countries could undermine global non-proliferation efforts. There are two aspects of this problem. First, there is the possibility of diversion of imported nuclear technology/aid from civil to military purposes within China. Second, there is the issue of China's emergence as an exporter of nuclear or nuclear-related material and technology to third countries.

(a) *Domestic Implications: China's Own Military Nuclear Programme*

As Harold Hinton has observed, China's policy towards technology imports, both civilian and military, has consistently been to study, copy, adapt and combine them with indigenous technology. The primary objective is to achieve self-reliance as soon as possible, a condition that Beijing values very highly. He adds that, "[w]here necessary, on account of objections on the part of supplier, this has been carried out covertly. I see no reason to think that Beijing's approach to nuclear power will be any different."⁵²

As regards the relationship between China's civilian and military nuclear programmes, it is obvious that the military nuclear sector is the older, larger, more important and more entrenched. The nuclear weapons programme began in 1956, whereas the decision to build nuclear power plants dates back only to 1978. Hence there is likely to be considerable military input into research in the civilian sector. In

comparison with the powerful Military Scientific Council of the Communist Party's Central Military Commission (CMC) which is headed by Deng Xiaoping, the Ministry of Nuclear Industry and the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation - both in charge of civilian programme - lack both bureaucratic power and resources.⁵³

Furthermore, there are differences among China's nuclear scientists and leaders over where to draw the line between developing nuclear energy for military and non-military purposes. One problem is the background of China's nuclear scientists in the nuclear weapons programme. This could bias them towards diverting foreign nuclear energy aid to military purposes, China's public commitments to the contrary notwithstanding. As Vice-Premiers Wang Zhen and Fang Yi stated at the first congress of the Chinese Nuclear Society in February 1980:

Atomic energy cannot be divided into two sectors, one for military use and the other for civilian use. It is hoped that scientists, while continuing military research to strengthen the national defence capability, will *integrate military and civilian respects*, devote some of their research efforts on atomic energy to civilian use and vigorously conduct research in nuclear power, medicine, chemistry, radiology and atomic energy agronomy in order to catch up with the advanced world levels.⁵⁴

Thus, it is apparent that, as late as 1980, the Chinese leaders not only saw little difference between nuclear energy for military and peaceful uses but also stressed closer integration and coordination between military and civilian nuclear programmes. It is difficult, however, to assess how representative the above statement is, because it has not been followed by any similar one. Chinese spokesmen now incessantly emphasise the peaceful nature of their nuclear power programme and do not accept the view that civil and military nuclear programmes are, as Petra Kelly puts it, "Siamese twins."⁵⁵ Vice-Premier Li Peng noted in 1985 that the prior existence of the military nuclear sector does provide an infrastructure for a civil programme,⁵⁶ but the Chinese insist that this programme is motivated only by the growing demand for energy which accompanies modernisation, and by the scarcity of supply.

During the Congressional review of the Sino-US nuclear accord, some Congressmen and China specialists expressed their concern over the fact that pressurized water reactors (PWR) used in powerplants and in submarines have a common technological origin and that, therefore, access to Western PWR technology could be helpful in overcoming technical problems the Chinese have with their nuclear submarines which are slow and noisy.⁵⁷ Although the United States Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) study "found no specific contribution which civilian nuclear technology transfers would make to China's naval programme,"⁵⁸ it concluded that access to the advanced

techniques of the Western nuclear industry, such as quality control, would assist the Chinese nuclear industry generally and eventually their military reactor programmes also.⁵⁹ It was considered a *minor* risk, given China's status as a NWS, considering the benefits that would accrue to the US by entering into nuclear cooperation with China that would provide opportunity for drawing China further into the non-proliferation orbit.

The other area of concern is the possible implications of China's offer to accept spent nuclear fuel or nuclear waste from Western Europe and Japan for storage in the Gobi desert - an offer which could net China hundreds, even thousands, of tons of separated plutonium. In February 1984, several West German companies confirmed the signing of a letter of intent with China to this effect. It seems unlikely that China's aim is to extract enriched uranium or plutonium from the separated plutonium for its nuclear weapons programme, since China has abundant uranium/plutonium resources of its own. Hinton speculated that the Chinese might be attempting to create a radioactive belt against Soviet attack and such nuclear waste could be useful for nuclear mines.⁶⁰ However, this suggestion is not very convincing. First, there is no evidence to substantiate it, and second, China has agreed to allow IAEA monitoring of all spent fuel it receives - itself a significant departure from Beijing's earlier opposition to IAEA on-site inspection of China's nuclear activities. A more plausible explanation is found in China's need to obtain foreign currency.

(b) *External Implications: China's Nuclear Exports to NNWSs*

Another aspect of concern is related to China's nuclear exports to NNWSs. As already noted, China has refused to ratify the NPT, which would have made the application of safeguards to its exports a legal requirement, nor it has given any indication so far that it intends to follow the guidelines of Nuclear Suppliers' Group as a basis for its export control policy.⁶¹ Instead, it has agreed to abide by IAEA safeguards only on specific items it exports to such nations.

There is also an element of truth in the critics' contention that Premier Zhao's non-proliferation commitment, made at the White House in January 1984, was not only ambiguous, but was made primarily to improve the chances for nuclear cooperation with the US. As Hinton suggests:

All it appears to commit China to avoid is what the Soviet Union did for China between 1957 and 1959 in a transaction fortunately unique to this day in nuclear history - give necessary and sufficient aid to a foreign nuclear weapons programme known to be such by the aiding party. Since then, various other countries aspiring to nuclear weapons have developed a covert, piecemeal, indirect approach to which foreign suppliers can, while claiming, perhaps

sincerely, to believe that nuclear power, and not nuclear weapons, is the object of the exercise.⁶²

In addition to China's nuclear cooperation agreements with a number of existing nuclear supplier states, Beijing has also entered into nuclear cooperation "for peaceful purposes" with several developing countries which are not parties to the NPT and are believed to be actively pursuing their nuclear weapons programmes. States like Argentina, Brazil, and Pakistan fall into this category. Though China's nuclear cooperation agreements with Argentina and Brazil do contain some positive provisions, a recent study argues that they are, nonetheless, less stringent than those required under the NPT guidelines.⁶³ The contents of Sino-Pakistan nuclear agreement of 1986 have not been made public. Though it is reported to include IAEA safeguards on exports of Chinese nuclear materials to Pakistan, the potential for trouble remains given China's past record, and the fact that "China's bilateral agreements for nuclear cooperation are drafted in a manner which imposes less rigorous constraints upon them in the area of the *transfer of information* than is the case of equivalent United States agreements."⁶⁴ Thus, the problem lies in China's nuclear exports to a number of non-NPT member states like Pakistan, Argentina, and Brazil where surveillance of nuclear developments is a much more difficult task. Past experience shows that IAEA safeguards are not very effective when it comes to the transport of the nuclear materials and accountability for possession of nuclear materials to prevent theft and diversion into undesirable hands.⁶⁵

Concern has also been expressed by experts about the legal status of Chinese commitments, about the contemporary Chinese understanding of international law and treaty obligations, given that policy prevails over law in communist societies, and given the susceptibility of policy to political change - an all too frequent feature of China's recent history.⁶⁶ These concerns are not unfounded, but there are some positive signs, particularly since 1978, which indicate that the post-Mao leadership attaches far greater importance than did previous leaders to the observation of legal norms and principles at home and in the conduct of foreign affairs. This respect for law is deemed necessary for China's realisation of its modernization goals.⁶⁷

As to the question of written assurances on non-proliferation, the Chinese have adopted a two-track policy. As far as NNWSs are concerned, they are much more forthcoming. Statements on China's willingness to allow IAEA safeguards, for example, have been incorporated in agreements concluded with Japan, Brazil and Argentina - all of them non-nuclear weapon states. The purpose of requiring IAEA safeguards, asserts

the Chinese ambassador to United States, is none other than to comply with the IAEA objectives of non-proliferation.⁶⁸ But the Chinese resistance to put on paper what it has pledged orally to the US - a NWS like China - probably derives from Chinese sensitivity to questions of sovereignty and equality in foreign affairs and domestic political considerations.⁶⁹ For example, a request for written assurances from the US officials during the negotiations on the US-China nuclear agreement was seen as damaging to China's prestige and honour.⁷⁰

This suggests China does not want to give the impression that it is giving in to the demands of the superpowers. For both domestic and diplomatic reasons, it is very important to Beijing that it not align itself too closely with the US, particularly on a sensitive matter like nuclear cooperation. It may be recalled that a major issue in the Sino-Soviet split was the question of nuclear cooperation, and this has not been forgotten by the Chinese leaders. This could explain why the Americans failed to obtain the "iron-clad" safeguard provisions which were obtained in China's agreements with Japan, Brazil and Argentina.⁷¹ Though by doing so, China unwittingly highlighted the differences that separate NNWSs from the NWSs with regard to the application of IAEA safeguards.

To assuage worldwide concerns about China's role as an ENS, Beijing needs to be persuaded to take concrete steps to assure that it will abide by the 1977 London Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers agreed upon by the Nuclear Suppliers' Group. In this context, the Western suppliers of nuclear energy to China have an important role to play. As demonstrated above, by making their bilateral nuclear cooperation with China conditional upon the latter's adherence to the non-proliferation guidelines and existing nuclear supply norms, the US, Western Europe and Japan have already brought about a significant change in Beijing's policy regarding proliferation.⁷² Even without being a formal member of the nuclear suppliers group, Beijing has promised, particularly since 1984, that it would require safeguards on all its future exports. This step brings it closer to the NSG. If Japan, together with other Western countries, could persuade China to join the NSG or to accede to the NPT, it would certainly contribute to alleviating apprehensions about its future transfer of nuclear energy capabilities.

Keeping in mind China's sensitivities on nuclear issues, the possibilities of initiating a dialogue between the emerging and the established nuclear suppliers with a view to working out generally acceptable rules for nuclear transactions could also be explored. This would give Beijing an opportunity to air its views on the subject as an equal participant.

It is also true, as some non-proliferation experts have always argued, that from a long term perspective, preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons, whether in the Far East, South Asia or Middle East, would serve China's own security interests.⁷³ The nuclear developments in Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, India, and Pakistan undoubtedly cause concern to the policymakers in Beijing. The worst scenario for Beijing would be one in which many Asian countries managed to acquire nuclear weapons, which would force China into a much larger nuclear armament programme to build and maintain a deterrent against multiple threats in an entirely different setting, and with even greater uncertainties for its security. Eventually, therefore, Beijing might come around to accept the prevalent view that further proliferation would have a negative impact on China's own security, that it would increase the risk of superpower confrontation in regional conflicts, and threaten the peaceful external environment sought by Beijing to accomplish domestic economic modernisation.

That Beijing is already aware of the negative consequences of further proliferation is clearly demonstrated by the Chinese insistence on the continuation of IAEA safeguards in Taiwan, though on a "non-government" basis, which has "meant an abandonment of Beijing's principle of opposing international bodies' treatment of Taiwan as a separate entity."⁷⁴ China remains especially concerned about nuclear developments across the Taiwan Straits because of their impact on Chinese security. This suggests more eloquently than anything else that China's stake in closing the nuclear club for new entries can be as great as that of the other four NWSs. Besides, through their increasing interaction with the world community, the Chinese have come to realise that irresponsible pro-proliferation rhetoric or actions would cost China a lot in terms of prestige and goodwill in the world.⁷⁵

Nevertheless, unless China abides by non-proliferation norms and principles in deeds rather than words, other countries will remain sceptical of Chinese assurances, given Beijing's cavalier attitude in the past towards proliferation. It is feared that China, while unwilling to foster proliferation as a matter of national policy, may still prove susceptible to the lure of economic and political advantages to be gained from exporting the materials, technology and equipment relevant to another country's nuclear weapons programme.⁷⁶

China and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

The apprehensions raised in some quarters about the strength of China's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation seem justified if one looks at what the Chinese

have done since 1984, the year when Beijing joined the IAEA and publicly accepted nuclear non-proliferation principles and practices. Just when the Americans were busy patting themselves on the back for their success in persuading China to join the IAEA and become an active participant in international efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, and less than three months after the signing of the historic US-Soviet INF Treaty (December 1987) aimed at destroying all intermediate-range nuclear missiles from the superpower arsenals, came the news that the Chinese had sold surface-to-surface *Dong Feng-3A* (or East Wind CSS-2) IRBMs, which have a range of 2,600km, to Saudi Arabia - a country with which Beijing did not even have diplomatic relations.⁷⁷ The Chinese sale of IRBMs has been the only example of a country transferring ballistic missiles to a third world country in a war-torn region which had serious implications for regional security and the global non-proliferation regime, and it drew widespread criticism from the world community.

However, this time there was one difference. Unlike its previous nuclear material/technology transactions, Beijing was quick to acknowledge the deal. On 29 March 1988, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman confirmed that China had sold its *Dong Feng-3A* missiles to Saudi Arabia but added that "China does not favour nuclear proliferation..." and that these missiles were non-nuclear and for self-defence only.⁷⁸

It may be noted that all of *Dong Feng-3A* missiles in China's inventory were designed to carry nuclear warheads. The nuclear proliferation risk topped the list of concerns of arms controllers and military analysts.⁷⁹ Arming ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads is only a small step because these missiles, which are difficult to intercept, remain the best delivery system for nuclear and chemical weapons, and are too inaccurate and expensive to act as conventional warhead platforms. Therefore, one should take the Chinese assurances that "it will never sell nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia" with a grain of salt. Many US officials viewed Beijing's and Riyadh's "only conventional warheads" promises with scepticism because "warheads can be changed in a matter of hours [in the event of a war]. What really matters is the delivery system."⁸⁰ Testifying before the US House Foreign Affairs Committee on 10 May 1988, Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Murphy, admitted that the CSS-2 could be converted from conventional to nuclear or chemical warheads in the event of a war.⁸¹ That is why under the terms of the 1987 INF Treaty, the US and the Soviet Union agreed to destroy not only the nuclear warheads but delivery systems as well.

Moreover, China's sale of IRBMs to another country also posed a serious challenge to the Missile Technology Control Regime, set up in April 1987 by the "Group of Seven"

countries (Britain, Canada, France, the FRG, Italy, Japan and the US) to complement existing restraints on the supply of nuclear material and equipment by adding dual-capable weapon systems, that is, systems capable of delivering either nuclear or conventional weapons.⁸² The idea was to prevent countries on the threshold of making nuclear weapons from acquiring matching delivery systems. The new regime was also the first multilateral effort to include potential delivery systems under nuclear nonproliferation controls. Beijing's total disregard of its guidelines significantly diminished China's credibility as a country committed to the cause of non-proliferation.

The dangerous implications of Chinese missiles in Saudi Arabia were still being debated when *The New York Times*, quoting reliable American and Pakistani administration sources, revealed that Pakistan had test-fired a missile on 25 April 1988, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead and reaching Indian cities of New Delhi and Bombay.⁸³ It further stated that the Pakistani missile was of "home design" but produced with the help of Chinese experts. A few days before the test, a US administration official had claimed that the United States had evidence that China was helping Pakistan with its missile development.⁸⁴ The authoritative *Jane's Defence Weekly* also reported that China provided assistance with the guidance system for the Pakistani surface-to-surface *Hatf-I* (80km) and *Hatf-II* (300km) missiles.⁸⁵ Though Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Li Zhaoxing, claimed that "the allegation about China's assistance in Pakistan's launching of a medium-range missile is utterly groundless"⁸⁶, Pakistani officials later acknowledged the Chinese contribution to their missile development project when they admitted that 70 per cent of the development of their surface-to-air missile *Anza* - which bears close resemblance to the Chinese version of "Grail", HN-5 - was indigenous and 30 percent had been achieved with Chinese assistance.⁸⁷

The most troubling development is that Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Israel, Saudi Arabia, India and now Pakistan - all possess ballistic missiles with varying degrees of sophistication and range. This capability will radically alter the nature and course of future conflicts in the Third World. India has already tested 250km-range *Prithvi* and 2,500km-range *Agni* missiles while Israel has reportedly deployed intermediate-range (over 1,000km) ballistic missiles called Jericho-I and Jericho-II in the Negev Desert.

The London-based IISS has identified 22 other Third World countries which have either bought or manufactured ballistic missiles that can be armed with atomic, biological and chemical warheads.⁸⁸ Among the NWSs, China and the Soviet Union are the most prolific suppliers of the nuclear-capable delivery systems [See Table 4.2].

TABLE 4.2
CHINA'S MISSILE ASSISTANCE TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES: 1984-88

Country	Missile Designation	Missile Range (km)	Missile Sales and Potential Sales	Missile Technology Assistance
Argentina	Condor-2	900	-	Guidance and Control Systems
	CSS-2?	2,600	Coproduction	
Brazil	?	?	-	Guidance and Control Systems
Iran	Scud-B	160-300	-	Extended Range
	Oghab	40	-	
	Shahin II	100	-	
	Nazeat	130	-	
	M-9	200-600	Negotiations Held	
	M-11	400	Negotiations Held	
Iraq	Scud-B	250-300	-	Technical assistance Guidance, Control and Launching Systems
	Scud-B (Modified)	650	-	
	M-9	200-600	Negotiations Held	
	M-11	400	Negotiations Held	
Libya	M-9	200-600	Potential Sale	
	M-11	400	Potential Sale	
North Korea	SA-2	300	-	Technical assistance Guidance, Control and Launching Systems
Pakistan	Hatf-I	80-100		
	Hatf-II	300		
	?	1,000 to 2,000		
	Anza	50		
	M-9	200-600	Potential Sale	
	M-11	400	Potential Sale	
Saudi Arabia	CSS-2	2,600	Sold	
Syria	M-9	200-600	Sold	
	M-11	400	Negotiations Held	

Sources: *Arms Control Today*, January/February 1989, p. 18; *South*, August 1989, p.103; *Military Balance 1988-89*, Leonard S. Spector, *The Undeclared Bomb* (Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishing Co, 1988); *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 11 March 1989; *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 23 December 1989, pp. 1384-5; and *Defense & Foreign Affairs*, August 1989, p. 20.

China has not only helped Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to acquire nuclear-capable delivery systems, it has also assisted Iran's efforts to develop and build its short-range *Oghab*, *Shahin* and *Nazeat* missiles, as well as to adapt Soviet-designed Scud missiles.⁸⁹ A number of countries, such as Syria, Iran and Pakistan, have expressed interest in buying China's new, accurate and solid-fueled short-range and medium-range M-9 and M-11 missiles. (In May 1989, China sold M-9 missiles to Syria.)^{*} In addition, Argentina is believed to have reached an agreement with China to licence-produce Chinese *Dong-Feng-3* IRBMs sold earlier to Saudi Arabia while Brazil is reportedly negotiating with China for the transfer of technology to manufacture missile guidance systems.⁹⁰

Ballistic missile proliferation has been proceeding at a rapid pace. The seven-nation Missile Technology Control Regime led by the US has tried to control it with few tangible results. There is a broad consensus among arms controllers and proliferation experts that the MTCR would have to be subscribed to by all existing and potential suppliers of missiles, including China (and the Soviet Union), if it is to be effective in reducing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, especially among non-parties to the NPT.⁹¹ It has also been argued that MTCR itself should be made more comprehensive to include all types of nuclear-capable delivery vehicles such as aircraft. To make it more effective and ensure compliance by member-states, concrete measures need to be taken to give teeth to it. Aaron Karp rightly points out that

as currently structured it is too weak to do much...unlike the London group [NSG], which can rely on the International Atomic Energy Agency, the missile control regime has no international agency to monitor compliance and no mechanisms to enforce restraint.⁹²

A separate US-Soviet dialogue on ballistic missile proliferation has begun since the June 1988 Moscow Summit and there is a likelihood of Moscow either joining the MTCR or agreeing to abide by its guidelines in the near future.⁹³ However, the Chinese have neither indicated their willingness to become involved in a multilateral attempt to control the spread of nuclear-capable delivery systems, nor accepted the US proposal made in mid-1988 for regular and formal discussions of missile proliferation. During his official visit to China in July 1988, US Secretary of State George Shultz tried to dissuade the Chinese leaders from selling ballistic missiles to nuclear-proliferation-prone regions such as the Middle East and South Asia but appeared to have had little success.⁹⁴ "They are not listening to us," said a State Department official, and wondered whether, if Beijing still persisted in its course, the US and other COCOM countries might reimpose tight export restrictions on technology transfers to China which were relaxed after Beijing agreed to suspend the sale of Chinese Silkworm missiles to Iran

^{*}*Defense & Foreign Affairs* (August 1989) reported the sale of M-9s to Syria.

and just before the Chinese sale of IRBMs to Saudi Arabia.⁹⁵ Partly for fear of losing much-needed advanced Western technology and partly due to Washington's diplomatic pressure on Beijing to cease the sale of nuclear-capable missiles and missile technology, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping assured the visiting US Secretary of Defence Frank Carlucci in September 1988 that "China would exercise restraint on missile sales because restraint may be warranted *under certain conditions*."⁹⁶ Though Deng did not explicitly rule out further sales and/or transfers of missiles and ballistic missile technology, his assurance to exercise restraint "under certain conditions" could be interpreted to mean that China will refrain from introducing such weapons in tension-ridden regions.

In short, China's participation in the nuclear and missile non-proliferation regime is an essential prerequisite for the success of the worldwide efforts to check the further spread of nuclear weapons and delivery systems not only in Asia but in the world. Several suggestions have been made to induce Beijing to abide by the MTCR guidelines⁹⁷ - even without a formal membership of the regime - which seek to supplement nuclear export controls with effective multilateral restraints on exports of missile equipment and technology for use in nuclear-capable missiles. If China is sincere in its peace professions and wants to restrict the flow of nuclear technology to proliferation-prone regions, it could at least agree to a moratorium on the transfer of dual-capable weapons systems or make their sale conditional upon adherence to the NPT norms by the recipients.

III

China As A Nuclear Proliferator?

Ever since China acquired a nuclear capability in 1964, there have been persistent reports of its alleged help to other NNWSs in their efforts to go nuclear. In fact, China's reputation for irresponsibility in nuclear matters far exceeds that of any other NWS. In 1965, it was widely reported that Beijing promised Indonesia "nuclear status" by testing one of Jakarta's nuclear weapons on Chinese territory. Since the early 1980s, similar reports of Pakistan planning to test its nuclear weapon on Chinese territory have appeared from time to time. Beijing has also been accused in the world media of unsafeguarded nuclear exports to South Africa, Iraq, Argentina and Pakistan. What are the contradictions and ambiguities in Chinese declaratory and operational policies on

nuclear non-proliferation? How does one explain the motives behind China's nuclear assistance to countries known for their clandestine nuclear weapons programmes?

On the question of transferring nuclear technology to other countries, the Chinese leadership made it clear as early as in 1965, soon after its second test, that it would be "unrealistic" to expect China to offer assistance in the manufacture of the bomb. The then Foreign Minister Chen Yi observed:

There are two aspects to the question of nuclear cooperation. As for the peaceful use of atomic energy and the building of atomic reactors, China has already been approached by several countries, and China is ready to render assistance; as for the request for China's help in the manufacture of atom bombs, this question is not realistic.

Any country with a fair basis in industry and agriculture, science and technology, will be able to manufacture atom bombs with or without Chinese assistance. China hopes that Afro-Asian countries will be able to make atom bombs themselves and it would be better for a greater number of countries to come into possession of atom bombs.⁹⁸

Chen Yi's statement was significant in two respects. First, it was the first sign of Chinese reluctance to assist other countries in developing nuclear weapons. Second, it reserved Beijing's flexibility to share its nuclear technology with other states, when necessary, under the cover of "nuclear cooperation for peaceful uses only."⁹⁹

There are conflicting opinions as to whether Chen's remarks of 24 September 1965 were meant to pave the way for, or put a brake on Beijing's reported nuclear cooperation programmes with Indonesia and Egypt in the 1960s.¹⁰⁰ Clemens believes that Chen's statement offered a sign of China's "maturity" on the proliferation question - i.e., China was trying to downplay any expectation that it was prepared to offer nuclear assistance to other states. But Chi Chiang Hu argues that another explanation could be that Chen was preparing a theoretical basis for the legitimization of China's "peaceful" nuclear cooperation with other states, be it Indonesia or Egypt.¹⁰¹

This interpretation is consistent with a report in the *New York Times* of 5 August 1965 that Brig. Gen. Hartono, then Chief of the Indonesian Army Arsenal, had predicted that Indonesia would be able to conduct its first nuclear test by the end of 1965.¹⁰² However, the dramatic failure of the coup in Indonesia on 30 September 1965, and the subsequent suppression of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), rendered Hartono's prediction unverifiable. Even if Chen's remarks were meant to "pave the way" for nuclear assistance to Jakarta, Beijing would have abandoned the idea after the failure of the coup, which led to a serious deterioration in relations between the two countries.¹⁰³ The diplomatic debacle in Jakarta might also have led Beijing seriously to reconsider

and eventually put the proposed plans for Sino-Egyptian nuclear cooperation on the backburner.

Chen Yi admitted that after China's successful test, "several countries" had approached China for nuclear aid. Realising that its nuclear knowhow was a powerful lever in its relations with many countries of the developing world, Beijing was faced with a dilemma. On the one hand came formidable international pressure, including pressure from Third World countries, against nuclear proliferation. On the other hand, China was in desperate need of firm allies, particularly after the Sino-Soviet split and Sino-Indian war. The temptation to use this leverage in improving China's difficult international situation was, indeed, great.¹⁰⁴ Yet, between 1967 and 1978, there was little or no evidence to show that China had actually helped any country in acquiring nuclear weapons, its rhetoric notwithstanding. In fact, Beijing politely but firmly turned down a request from Libyan leader Gaddafi for Chinese help in the making of nuclear weapons.¹⁰⁵ It may also be pointed out that this was the period of Cultural Revolution in China and the country's consequent self-imposed international isolation.

In recent years, Chinese statements defending the right of NNWSs to acquire nuclear weapons have been few and far between when compared with the number of such statements made in the 1960s and 1970s. Occasionally, however, Beijing has deemed it necessary to reiterate its position on the issue. For example, in February 1980, a Chinese delegate observed in the Conference on Disarmament (CD):

China is against big-power monopoly of nuclear weapons. We hold that when the superpowers are constantly expanding their nuclear arsenals and carrying out nuclear threats, *it is clearly not fair to ask all non-nuclear weapon states to give up their right to acquire nuclear weapons for self-defence.* . . .¹⁰⁶

Again in mid-1980, in its discussions with a Japanese official of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Chinese side reiterated

two fundamental principles, namely that all countries should enjoy equally the benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and that as long as the Soviet Union and the United States did not completely renounce nuclear weapons *all countries had the right to acquire them.*¹⁰⁷

It is not clear whether these statements were also meant to justify Chinese nuclear cooperation with Pakistan which started in earnest only after Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. A theme running through all Chinese statements since the early 1980s is that horizontal and vertical proliferation are interlinked. As the Chinese delegate put it in CD in 1982:

...as the vertical proliferation nuclear weapons is halted, and the nuclear threat faced by the numerous small and medium sized countries reduced, favourable

conditions will be created for the prevention of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.¹⁰⁸

This posture tends to ignore, perhaps deliberately, the relationship of nuclear proliferation to regional rivalries and holds the superpower failure to reduce their nuclear arsenal solely responsible for the drive by several states to acquire nuclear weapons. Not only that, this linkage of vertical to horizontal proliferation, writes Alastair Johnston, overlooks some of the strategic realities that have driven horizontal proliferation.¹⁰⁹ In most cases, the decision by regional powers to acquire nuclear weapons has got more to do with specific regional rivalries and threats than to the US or Soviet nuclear domination or the vertical increase in their nuclear arsenals. For instance, Israel's, South Africa's and even Argentina's efforts to acquire nuclear capability are very obviously related to regional rivalry; in India's case, the decision to go nuclear was motivated primarily by the Chinese nuclear capability and Chinese military support to Pakistan and not by superpower nuclear weapons. Similarly, Pakistan's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons can be explained as an inevitable result of India's nuclear capability. In fact, ultimately it will be the Chinese nuclear modernisation and defence posture, not the superpowers' nuclear capabilities, that will influence the nuclear weapons policies of a number of threshold Asian countries like India, Vietnam, Indonesia, Taiwan, and South Korea.

Seen in retrospect, one can argue that Chinese linkage of vertical to horizontal proliferation and its advocacy of other countries' right to acquire nuclear weapons for self-defence between 1980-82 was not just a coincidence, but an attempt to justify its alleged nuclear weapons aid to Pakistan and sale of heavy water to Argentina and enriched uranium to South Africa.¹¹⁰ It is also evident that to some Chinese, nuclear weapons appear to be no more than the next rung on the armaments ladder and this view tends to prevent China from extending unqualified support to the global efforts to check the spread of nuclear arms. A commentary in *Jiefangjun Bao* in early 1987, citing Western estimates, stated that "by the end of this century, more than 30 countries in the world will possess nuclear weapons," and went on to argue that Chinese military planners should take into account this fact while formulating China's future military strategy.¹¹¹ Can we attribute this type of pessimistic thinking about the inevitability of nuclear proliferation to China's cavalier attitude towards non-proliferation norms and restraints?

As said earlier, a number of reports, emanating from US and Western intelligence sources, have appeared in the 1980s which hold China responsible for exporting nuclear

commodities to countries of high proliferation concern, notably Pakistan, Argentina, Iraq, South Africa and India as well. (China is alleged to have supplied heavy water to India, but considering the hostile state of Sino-Indian relations, it is unlikely that China would knowingly assist India's nuclear programme). A survey of the available material, particularly various intelligence accounts, media reports, and subsequent official reaction in Beijing leads one to believe that China has violated the bounds of international non-proliferation norms and policies. Commenting on the implications of China's unsafeguarded nuclear transfers, Leonard S. Spector in his 1984 authoritative study *Nuclear Proliferation Today* stated:

Significantly, because of the particular commodities and recipient countries said to be involved, China's unsafeguarded exports may have contributed to the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. The reported sale of low-enriched uranium to South Africa, for example, may have allowed Pretoria to triple the production of weapons-grade uranium at its Valindaba enrichment plant by using low-enriched uranium as feed instead of natural uranium. Similarly, if China supplied heavy water to India,...it may have subsequently allowed New Delhi to start up the Madras I Nuclear power plant...[which] is India's first unsafeguarded nuclear power plant and is capable of producing...plutonium...¹¹²

Surprisingly, a month after Buenos Aires denied the purchase of twelve kilograms of enriched uranium and heavy water from China, Beijing confirmed, in November 1985, the supply of unsafeguarded heavy water to Argentina but denied making uranium sales.¹¹³

However, more alarming than these transactions were reports of Chinese help in the development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, which led the US to suspend talks with Beijing on nuclear cooperation in mid-1981 and to impose a nuclear embargo against the PRC.¹¹⁴ Beijing was believed to have given Islamabad detailed nuclear weapons design information and also helped it in the building of a centrifuge uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta. Since China has been held responsible for undermining non-proliferation regime by *directly* and *knowingly* aiding Islamabad's nuclear weapons project, the case of Sino-Pakistan nuclear collaboration deserves special scrutiny.

Though the history of Pakistan's nuclear development dates back to early 1960s, Sino-Pakistani cooperation in the nuclear field is believed to have begun only in the late 1970s.¹¹⁵ Pakistan's efforts to acquire a nuclear capability gained momentum after India's nuclear test of 1974 and Islamabad's search for external nuclear aid led it to hold negotiations with Canada, the US, France, West Germany, Belgium and China.

On 26 May 1976, Pakistan Premier Bhutto led a high-level scientific-military delegation to Beijing and signed two agreements on military and scientific cooperation. Several observers believe that one of these agreements contained a clause or section

pertaining to nuclear cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad.¹¹⁶ Bhutto indirectly referred to such an agreement in his memoirs when he called it the "most important and greatest achievement" of his public life.¹¹⁷

Ashok Kapur argues that this agreement should be seen as "a part of substantial Chinese military support to Pakistan after the China-India war (1962)."¹¹⁸ It was followed by the setting up of a Coordination Board for Nuclear Technology between China and Pakistan and Chinese language training was started at the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH).¹¹⁹ As regards the exact date when actual cooperation started, opinions differ. David Hart believes China began technical assistance in the building of Kahuta enrichment facility in 1977 whereas Kapur says that "during 1977-79, China did not do much to the agreement" but after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in late 1979, Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation increased substantially.¹²⁰ Soon after Pakistan's leader Zia-ul-Haq visited Beijing in August 1980, a Saudi Arabian magazine, *8-Days*, reported that Chinese nuclear experts had arrived in Pakistan to "speed up Pakistan's first peaceful nuclear explosion."¹²¹

Reports of Chinese aid to Pakistan in the Western media first appeared in mid-1981 when a British journal, *New Scientist*, citing intelligence sources, revealed an agreement between Pakistan and China on selecting nuclear test sites. In August 1982, US Assistant Secretary of State, James Malone, confirmed in an interview with *Nucleonics Week* that China had apparently supplied Pakistan with material other than fuel-related items, which he declined to specify.¹²² In February 1983, the *Washington Post* reported that China had provided Pakistan with sensitive bomb design information and that the Chinese, without exploding a device, had confirmed that Pakistanis' subsequent nuclear device would work, and added that "[n]o other weapon state in recent history has knowingly provided design aid of this kind."¹²³ In early 1984, a State Department official told a Congressional committee that "the CIA had definite proof that China and Pakistan had held discussions on the possibility of manufacturing nuclear weapons in Pakistan."¹²⁴ In February 1984, Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan, head of Pakistan's nuclear programme, declared that Pakistan could achieve a nuclear capability without a test.¹²⁵ A month after, Indian Foreign Secretary M. K. Rasgotra claimed that China had actually tested a Pakistani nuclear device on its territory. Similarly, Paul Leventhal of the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), in his testimony to the US Congress, stated that NCI had received indications from authoritative sources that a nuclear test was conducted in China in 1983, at which Pakistani Foreign Minister, Sahebzada Yakub Khan, was present.¹²⁶ Chinese officials denied these reports of testing a Pakistani

bomb, but did not reply to other allegations of collaboration and active assistance.¹²⁷ The *New York Times* of 23 June 1984 reported that the Reagan Administration had evidence that in 1983 China had passed on to Pakistan test data of its fourth low-yield nuclear test conducted in 1966. In mid-1984, several press accounts stated that Chinese scientists were still present and working with their Pakistani counterparts at Kahuta nuclear plant near Islamabad.¹²⁸

These reports of continuing Chinese nuclear aid to Pakistan and Beijing's refusal to withdraw its technicians from Kahuta, which ran counter to Premier Zhao Ziyang's non-proliferation assurances made in January 1984, caused the Reagan Administration to put the US-PRC nuclear cooperation agreement, initialled in April 1984, into cold storage for more than one year while US officials sought further assurances from Beijing in this regard.¹²⁹ The Soviet reaction to the alleged Chinese support for Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme was revealed in a Radio Moscow world service broadcast of 26 August 1984:

China made a direct contribution to the development of Pakistan's nuclear potential...Chinese nuclear experts and Pakistani scientists are jointly working in Kahuta on the atomic bomb documents that China gave to Pakistan. That bomb was tested by China back in the mid-1960s. Besides, they are jointly using the drafts stolen by Pakistani experts from the Urenco Netherlands concern ten years ago. Some other reports say that Peking recently gave concentrated uranium to its Pakistani partner that can be used to produce a nuclear explosive device.¹³⁰

Thus there was complete agreement between Moscow and Washington on at least one issue: that Beijing had assisted Pakistan's nuclear weapons endeavour. However, in spite of overwhelming documentary evidence in possession of Western intelligence agencies on Islamabad's Chinese connection¹³¹, Beijing routinely denied that "anything beyond normal scientific exchanges ever took place"¹³² between China and Pakistan. Apparently, to buttress its position that Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation was above board and limited only to "peaceful purposes," China concluded a nuclear accord with Pakistan in September 1986 requiring IAEA safeguards on China's nuclear exports to Pakistan. But, as Leonard Spector points out, "the accord does not require as a condition of supply that Pakistan place all of its nuclear installations under the IAEA system"¹³³ which is required by the United States and members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Spector pointedly adds:

*It remains possible that China will use the accord as a cover so that it can offer technical assistance - for which safeguards are not apparently required - for more sensitive aspects of Pakistan's nuclear program.*¹³⁴

Intelligence and press accounts of continuing Chinese support for Pakistan's nuclear weapons project still appear in the world media from time to time. According to *Foreign Report*¹³⁵, Chinese scientists have resumed their periodic visits to Kahuta and the head of Pakistan's nuclear installation Dr. A.Q. Khan visited China in November 1988. This led to renewed speculation in US intelligence circles that China was preparing to arrange a nuclear test for Islamabad at its Lop Nor testing site sometime in 1989. Despite China's repeated denials, there is certainly more to the Sino-Pakistan nuclear connection than meets the eye.

Besides, as stated earlier, the 1980s have also seen the emergence of China as a predominant supplier of new categories of weapons systems - ballistic missiles and missile technology - in the Middle East, South Asia, and Latin America. Acquisition of missiles by some states increases pressures on others to acquire them, and a chain-reaction from the missile race leads to destabilisation and increased tension in the regional security environment. Take the Middle East, for example. Though Iran and Iraq had purchased Soviet Scud-Bs and Frog missiles from the international arms market and also from the Soviet Union, it was the Chinese technical and material assistance which enabled both the combatants, engaged in a protracted war, to fire these missiles with extended range and a heavier payload. In order to protect itself from Iran's Chinese-supplied surface-to-surface and anti-ship Silkworm missiles, Saudi Arabia bought about 60 *Dong Feng*-3A IRBMs from China while Syria started negotiations on the acquisition of China's most advanced M-9 shorter-range ballistic missile.¹³⁶ The scramble among the Middle Eastern states for dual-capable missiles in turn led Israel and the US to sign an agreement for the joint production of an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) to provide Israel with the capability to shoot down missiles such as Soviet designed Scuds or Chinese-made IRBMs and M-9s.¹³⁷ Not only that, China's sale of IRBMs to Riyadh brought into sharp focus the spill-over effects of the introduction of sophisticated long-range weapons systems in one region - the Middle East - onto its adjoining region - South Asia. The Saudi acquisition of IRBMs had alarm bells ringing in India for two reasons. First, it brought the greater part of Western India within the target range of Saudi Arabia's Chinese IRBMs, and thus constituted as much a threat to India as to Iran or Israel. Second, and more important, given Pakistan's close military links with Saudi Arabia and the reports of alleged Saudi financial support for Pakistan's development of "Islamic Bomb", and given the lack of delivery capability for Pakistan's few atom bombs (until then, the US-supplied F-16 fighter bomber was seen as Islamabad's possible delivery system for nuclear weapons), Indian military planners

were concerned that Pakistan, a close friend of China and Saudi Arabia, now had a source of delivery systems for its nuclear weapons.¹³⁸ It served to strengthen the resolve of the Indian defence establishment to acquire an IRBM capability as soon as possible. Thus, at one stroke, China's supply of IRBMs to Saudi Arabia caused strains in Sino-American, Saudi-American, Arab-Israeli, Sino-Indian, and Indo-Pak relations. The storm created by the Chinese transfer of IRBMs to Saudi Arabia had hardly settled down when reports appeared about the test-firing of a missile by Pakistan, with extensive Chinese technical assistance, which could be equipped with nuclear warheads.

The point is that selling or transferring a delivery system and/or related technology can be as destabilising as selling nuclear weapons technology. It is a tangible act of proliferation. What the Chinese refused to acknowledge is the fact that their introduction of sophisticated weapons and delivery systems into potentially conflict-prone regions had made the world a more dangerous place.

But why did China decide to collaborate with and help Pakistan build its nuclear weapons and delivery systems when it had steadfastly declined similar requests from Libya and Egypt in the past? Any attempt to answer this question is made difficult by the fact that Beijing has refused to explain the nature or divulge the details of its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. Therefore, conclusions have to be necessarily inferential because of China's reticence on this issue. Based on the available evidence, several explanations can be attempted.

First of all, to understand China's reported support for Pakistan's weapons activity, one has to put it in the broader context of Sino-Indian-Pakistani relations and the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Since the Sino-Indian war of 1962, Pakistan has played an important role in Chinese strategy to curb India's ambitions and capabilities as a regional superpower. From the geopolitical viewpoint, Pakistan - an Islamic state - lies on the border between Middle East and Asia, a region of importance to China as a counter to increasing Soviet influence. Hence, Beijing has established close economic-military ties with Islamabad and consistently supported it, irrespective of the type of regime in power.

Furthermore, several important developments affecting China's vital security interests took place during the 1970s. First, the dismemberment of its closest ally in South Asia, Pakistan, and the creation of a new state of Bangladesh by India in the 1971 war resulted in the weakening of Beijing's influence and credibility in the region. This was followed by the testing of a nuclear device by India in May 1974 and the breaching of the non-proliferation line which had stood still for a decade since China's entry into the nuclear club in 1964. A number of analysts pointed out that the acquisition of

nuclear capability by India could hardly be welcome to the Chinese, notwithstanding their public posture.¹³⁹ The emergence of a potential nuclear threat from India, coupled with New Delhi's close military ties with the Soviet Union, considerably complicated China's security problems, and the decision to deploy some of its medium-range and intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Tibet could have been motivated by this consideration. At the same time, China was faced with increasing pressure from the Pakistani leadership to provide nuclear assistance in order to enable Islamabad to match New Delhi's nuclear capability. However, it was the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in late 1979 - seen in Beijing as part of the Soviet strategic encirclement of China - which may have acted as a major catalyst in removing whatever inhibitions Beijing may have had in providing nuclear aid to its ally.

Several analysts seem to support the above propositions. Reinhard Drifte, Rodney Jones and Ashok Kapur believe that the temptation for China was to assist Pakistan to become sufficiently potent with nuclear weapons in order to tie down India's nuclear assets as much as possible and reduce the potential nuclear threat to China.¹⁴⁰ John Copper argues that China was playing balance of power diplomacy on the Indian subcontinent by assisting Islamabad to acquire nuclear capability and thereby to prevent India from becoming the dominant regional power.¹⁴¹ Robert Sutter opines that the Chinese support was "probably intended, from China's perspective, to give Islamabad confidence in withstanding Soviet and particularly Soviet-backed Indian pressure, thereby preventing a consolidation of Soviet influence in the region."¹⁴²

Similarly, China's sale of IRBMs to Saudi Arabia and assistance in Pakistan's missile development project in the 1980s need to be seen in terms of Chinese national security interests. Though China publicly refuses to acknowledge the relationship of proliferation to regional rivalries, its actions demonstrate that it is well aware of this relationship. Chinese military planners have been concerned with India's extensive defence modernisation programmes, underway since the early 1980s, and with New Delhi's attempts to project its power beyond its frontiers. For instance, India's recent efforts to extend its sphere of influence from South to Southeast Asia by building a closer political-military relationship with Vietnam, China's prime adversary in the region (more or less on the lines of Sino-Pakistan alliance in South Asia)¹⁴³, as evidenced in the signing of Indo-Vietnamese nuclear cooperation accord following the conclusion of the Sino-Pakistan nuclear agreement could hardly have gone unnoticed in Beijing.¹⁴⁴

Chinese policymakers must also have assessed the dangerous implications of an Indo-Pakistani nuclear arms race for Chinese security. This, coupled with India's

acquisition of a nuclear-powered submarine from the Soviet Union equipped with cruise missiles in early 1988, and New Delhi's growing missile capabilities, might have created fresh doubts in Beijing about the efficacy of a global non-proliferation regime in checking the spread of nuclear weapons in its neighbourhood. By the end of 1988, India was estimated to have about 200-250 kilograms of unsafeguarded plutonium, sufficient for 40-50 weapons, and had the capability to deliver them by combat aircraft or medium-range missiles.¹⁴⁵ The strategic significance of India's testing of a 2,400km-range IRBM *Agni* lies in the fact that it can reach major population and industrial targets in southern and central China. It has been stated that New Delhi is embarked on the road towards adopting a strategy of "limited deterrence"¹⁴⁶ *vis-à-vis* Beijing and Islamabad.

These developments on the subcontinent coupled with the protracted Iran-Iraq war, which at one stage seemed likely to engulf the whole of the Middle East, must have led Chinese policymakers to reconsider their options. A significant point to note, in this context, is that Pakistan's missile test-firing came only a month after the revelation that China had sold its IRBMs to Saudi Arabia and intelligence reports about Chinese technical assistance to Pakistan's missile programme. This lends credence to speculation that the two events might be linked, and that Pakistan might have fired a Chinese-designed missile. There were serious doubts about Pakistan's capability to design and produce indigenous missiles.¹⁴⁷ Despite big efforts, Pakistan's rocket programme failed to make much headway till the Chinese stepped in, once India's missile capability became known in early 1988 with the test-firing of a SRBM called *Prithvi*. This would be consistent with the Chinese policy of building up Pakistan's defences to match those of India. Since China has helped Pakistan achieve nuclear weapons capability, it would also seem logical that Beijing provide its ally with a delivery system. Moreover, considering that prior to the recent influx of American weapons in the wake of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Chinese arms constituted 65 to 75 per cent of Pakistan's weaponry, the Beijing connection in the missile programme need not come as a surprise.

There is also a possibility that Islamabad might have played an intermediary's role in the Saudi-Chinese deal as normal diplomatic relations between Beijing and Riyadh did not exist at the time of the sale, and that the work on the Pakistani missile project started simultaneously with that on the transfer of CSS-2 IRBMs to Riyadh. Apparently, the Chinese decided not to transfer such missiles to Pakistan for fear of greater diplomatic and political costs involved in their relations with the Soviets and Indians, and instead opted for assisting the Pakistanis in their missile development project, just as they had aided the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme almost a decade before.

This inference seems plausible in view of the later evidence of direct Saudi-Pakistani missile connection. Exactly one year after the Saudis purchased Chinese CSS-2 missiles, US intelligence sources reported that Pakistani technicians had been working alongside their Chinese counterparts in setting-up CSS-2 East Wind missiles in Saudi Arabia.¹⁴⁸ Training Pakistani technicians in installing Chinese ballistic missiles in Saudi Arabia could have been intended to familiarise them with the technical aspects of the missiles. If security considerations have motivated Beijing to help Islamabad with the latter's nuclear weapons and missile programmes (and it is evident that they may have), then, the world certainly has not heard the last of the Sino-Pakistani collaboration in this field.

The second possible explanation is that Chinese scientists working at the Kahuta centrifuge enrichment uranium plant were trading nuclear assistance for worthwhile technological data and resources in the possession of their Pakistani counterparts. Was it technological data, information sharing or something else that the Chinese were interested in? Various motives have been attributed to the Chinese decision to associate themselves with Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. Some analysts, like Tai Ming Cheung, believe that Beijing shared nuclear test-data with Islamabad and verified a Pakistani nuclear bomb design, possibly as a *quid pro quo* for the unauthorised transfer of Sidewinder missiles supplied to Pakistan by the United States.¹⁴⁹ However, a widely-held view is that China supplied a limited quantity of irradiated material for reprocessing and the design of its fourth nuclear test of 1966 to Pakistan in exchange for the Western centrifuge enrichment technology of Urenco, which was stolen by a Pakistani scientist from the Netherlands. The belief that Pakistan made Urenco designs available to China in return for the latter's hands-on assistance at Kahuta was strongly shared by US intelligence sources.¹⁵⁰ It is well known that Chinese scientists were unfamiliar with the "centrifuge method" as such and China's uranium enrichment programme was based on the diffusion technique at its Lanzhou Gaseous Diffusion Plant.¹⁵¹ The diffusion technique is much costlier and consumes more energy than the centrifuge method. *The Economist's Foreign Report* also reported that China could benefit from this technology and learn how to build its own plant for providing the enriched uranium needed in its planned network of nuclear power stations. Until then, China was dependent upon a gaseous diffusion enrichment plant acquired from the Soviet Union in the 1950s.¹⁵² Thus, one Chinese motivation for collaboration with Pakistan might have been the acquisition of centrifuge technology.

This could explain why Chinese experts had still not been withdrawn from Pakistan as late as 1985, despite Chinese declarations to the IAEA and Premier Zhao's public assurances on nuclear non-proliferation made in January 1984. As noted earlier, it was this discovery of Chinese scientists in Pakistan that put the US-China nuclear accord on hold for a long time. This shows that Beijing regarded its nuclear cooperation with Islamabad as being of sufficient importance to put at risk its prestige and at least some elements of its growing relationship with the US.¹⁵³ The inference is that Chinese scientists were engaged in some important project with the Pakistanis which could not be abandoned half-way, even if it meant losing goodwill and external cooperation.

However, China is not the only NWS to have engaged in a *quid pro quo* deal. As Oran Young points out, the Soviets apparently made some gains along these lines when they were giving nuclear aid to China. Specifically, they seem to have acquired some unprocessed uranium and they may well have reaped some benefits from the research of a number of top Chinese scientists at the Dubna plant outside Moscow in the 1950s. Similarly, it is believed that the French, too, got useful technological returns from their nuclear cooperation with the Israelis.¹⁵⁴ In short, joint enrichment efforts between Beijing and Islamabad turned out to be mutually beneficial to both parties. The motivation of access to advanced technology has also turned out to be an important reason for China's transfer of missile technology. In 1986, China agreed to provide technology to Brazil on liquid rocket fuels and rocket guidance systems in return for Brazil's know-how on solid rocket fuels.¹⁵⁵ In 1988, it was reported that China had agreed to share technology with Argentina for missile production in return for Chinese access to Argentinian research stations.¹⁵⁶

Yet another explanation could be serious differences within China's policymaking apparatus, particularly between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of National Defence (MND), over how much nuclear help should be given in the absence of a clear-cut policy, and the pulls and pressures from the Chinese nuclear establishment to share its nuclear aid/materials in return for some valuable technical information from Pakistan. Until now, the nuclear industry and nuclear weapons programme - the sacred cows - have been considered to be an exclusive domain of the military establishment. The bureaucratic turf battles between MFA and MND could explain the continued presence of Chinese scientists at Pakistan's Kahuta plant as late as 1985 in spite of the Chinese leaders' declaratory policy. Moreover, one should not overlook the domestic political situation in China at the time of the conclusion of the secret Sino-Pakistani nuclear agreement in 1976. At that time the political situation in

Beijing was fluid, and it was not until early 1980 that Deng Xiaoping had consolidated his power and emerged victorious in the long power struggle which started after Zhou Enlai's and Mao Zedong's deaths in 1976. Chinese foreign policy during 1976-82 was also characterized by sharp extremes, for example, the United Front doctrine, themes of Soviet hegemonism and expansionism, and the fear of strategic encirclement of China by the Soviets, which initially increased by Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. While the external strategic environment and domestic political situation initially led Beijing to aid Islamabad's nuclear weapons project, the technological gains and security considerations of later years made it difficult for the Chinese to disassociate themselves completely from Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes.

As regards China's missile transfers to a number of Middle Eastern states, one can attribute them to significant diplomatic and economic motivations. Close on the heels of the news of the Chinese sale of IRBMs to Riyadh came the announcement that Beijing was to establish diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia¹⁵⁷, an important regional power in the Middle East, which had diplomatic ties with Taiwan and was at the time the object of an intensive Soviet diplomatic offensive launched by the new Soviet leader Gorbachev. Since the mid-1980s, Arab countries have turned to China for weapons because of Soviet reluctance to sell dual-capable weapons. For example, Syria expressed interest in buying the shorter-range Chinese missile, M-9, after Moscow refused to supply Damascus with the SS-23 missile (which has a range of about 200 miles). Libya also reportedly held talks with the Chinese regarding the purchase of M-9 missiles.¹⁵⁸ The two Arab countries are armed with Soviet-built Frog-7, SS-21, and SS-1 surface-to-surface missiles. The M-9 missile is estimated to have range several hundred kilometers in excess of the Soviet missiles. Consequently, there has been a marked warming of Arab-Chinese relations lately and the Middle East has effectively replaced Africa as an area of influence in the Chinese national security policy of the 1980s.

Moreover, Beijing's pursuit of foreign exchange reserves has also led it to undermine the non-proliferation regime from time to time. It has been argued that economic gain was the prime motivation behind Chinese sales of enriched uranium to South Africa, and of heavy water to Argentina (and possibly India) and more recently behind its sale of IRBMs to Saudi Arabia.¹⁵⁹ The Saudi deal is reported to have fetched Beijing billions of dollars. It is worth noting that in recent years, China has promoted its foreign military sales in an attempt to earn hard currency to finance the country's ongoing defence modernisation plans. It is estimated that China earns US\$2 billion each year from its weapons sales, putting it among the top five arms exporters in the world.¹⁶⁰

However, China is not alone in this category; Swiss, French and other Western suppliers have been equally opportunistic.

To sum up, we can say that security and economic considerations, the incentives of technological gains and domestic (bureaucratic) factors provide explanations for China's assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons and missile programmes. This case is significant because it reveals the circumstances and conditions which can lead a NWS to undermine a global non-proliferation regime. It also shows that considerations of prestige and greater economic-technological cooperation can also make a country amenable to support non-proliferation.

Conclusion

During the 1960s and 1970s, China repeatedly endorsed the spread of nuclear weapons as a means of breaking the superpower nuclear duopoly. It entered into no international legal obligations, and refused to submit itself to controls and safeguards for its nuclear exports. The PTBT, NPT, IAEA, and efforts to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban, were seen as a means of maintaining and perpetuating superpower hegemony.

Nonetheless, the evidence shows that between 1966-76, at a time when China was still publicly supporting proliferation, it followed the practice of *not* providing nuclear assistance to other nations. Thus, several countries, such as Libya and Egypt, found, much to their consternation, that Beijing did not practise what it preached. But still acquisition of nuclear capability widened China's strategic options, and gained it recognition as an important member of the strategic community.

Since 1978, China has gradually and reluctantly joined other NWSs by adopting nuclear non-proliferation policies and practices, which it had previously eschewed so vociferously. The shift in Chinese non-proliferation policy is apparent in the steps Beijing has taken in the past few years. For example, Beijing has

- * ceased all atmospheric nuclear testing, prohibited by the PTBT, since 1986.
- * supported the efforts to achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban and in early 1985 indicated its willingness to participate in the Committee's ad hoc group on CTB.
- * joined the IAEA in 1984.
- * repeatedly declared its opposition to proliferation and has pledged that its future nuclear exports to NNWSs will submit to IAEA safeguards.

- * considerably softened its opposition to on-site inspections on Chinese territory by foreign observers and agencies like the IAEA and promised to use imported nuclear aid/technology only for peaceful purposes.
- * entered into nuclear cooperation agreements with Japan, Brazil, Argentina, the US, France, Britain, West Germany, Italy, and Pakistan which provide for the application of IAEA safeguards to nuclear technology and materials transferred under them.
- * offered to accept IAEA safeguards on all of its civilian nuclear facilities.
- * given an assurance of exercising restraint so far as the transfer of nuclear-capable delivery systems like ballistic missiles is concerned.

At the same time, China's slow movement towards embracing the non-proliferation regime has been marred by Beijing's unsafeguarded transfers and exports of highly enriched uranium, heavy water, nuclear weapon designs, and ballistic missiles. Thus, the positive changes in Beijing's nuclear non-proliferation policy have been overshadowed by China's irresponsible nuclear transactions since the early 1980s. There is little doubt that China deviated from the non-proliferation path by providing technical assistance in Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, and selling enriched uranium, heavy water and nuclear-capable ballistic missiles to countries of high proliferation risk. In fact, this study shows that at a time when the Chinese were publicly championing the cause of proliferation, their words were not matched by their deeds. But when they were actually involved in aiding the nuclear weapons of other countries, notably Pakistan, they refrained from eulogizing nuclear proliferation. This apparent contradiction, it is argued, can be best understood as resulting from domestic/economic, security and diplomatic considerations. These three factors led China to acquire nuclear weapons in the 1960s, determined and shaped Beijing's opposition to non-proliferation in the 1960s and 1970s, propelled China to undermine it in the early 1980s (by unsafeguarded exports of nuclear-related material and technology to NNWSs), and could cause it to erode or support and strengthen the global non-proliferation regime now and in the future.

It is evident that most of the non-proliferation initiatives by Beijing were taken between 1983 and 1986, when China was in the process of negotiating nuclear cooperation pacts with several developed countries which themselves were bound by the NPT and NSG norms and guidelines. And China demonstrated considerable adroitness in ensuring that its non-proliferation policy did not impinge upon its economic objectives. For instance, when its opposition to the NPT presented problems in gaining access to Western nuclear aid and technology, it responded by joining the IAEA.¹⁶¹ The

benefits of such cooperation outweighed the costs. For Beijing knew that external economic/technological support will not only widen its industrial base, which is vital to durable military power, but also eventually help China improve its research and development standards in military nuclear science and technology.

It is true that Beijing has adamantly refused to sign the NPT, but then the focus of its statements on NPT has shifted to support the right of NNWSs to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes rather than for military purposes. This is so despite the fact that the logic of China's linkage between nuclear weapons and national security (as evidenced by the statement on first nuclear test in 1964 and reiterated several times since then) should have been to emphasise the validity of such a linkage for several other countries.¹⁶² Understandably, Beijing has not done so because nuclear non-proliferation has become important to China for security reasons. The Chinese know quite well that nuclear proliferation could threaten their vital security interests and undermine China's status as the only declared NWS in Asia and the entire Third World. This realisation has led it to make a tactical turnabout on the issue and come out in support of "the right of NNWSs to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes" and "*respect the will of numerous [NNWSs] which seek to promote the progress of nuclear disarmament and help reduce the danger of nuclear war by forswearing the right to possess nuclear weapons.*"¹⁶³ Hence Chinese leaders, while continuing to reject the NPT as inequitable, have repeatedly reiterated, particularly since 1984, Chinese opposition to further proliferation.

Similarly, the Chinese emphasis on checking vertical proliferation rather than horizontal proliferation is also consistent with its own security objectives, because each increase in the superpowers' nuclear arsenal enhances Soviet and American military capabilities *vis-à-vis* China and thereby widens the gap between Chinese and superpowers' capabilities. Moreover, given China's relative economic and technological backwardness, and the hi-tech nature of the arms race pursued by its potential rivals, it is not difficult to guess which would emerge victorious in the long run.

Finally, the diplomatic considerations of acquiring a peaceloving and responsible great power image for itself, and Beijing's desire to enhance its international prestige and status, impose certain constraints on Chinese external behaviour and policies. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was common to find references to the prestige associated with developing nuclear weapons. However, since the early 1970s, writes Lewis A. Dunn, "world opinion increasingly has come to regard the acquisition of nuclear weapons as no longer legitimate, with the accompanying conviction that pursuit of nuclear weapons

does not enhance either a nation's prestige or security." As was evident after India's 1974 nuclear test, such a step brings opprobrium, not applause.¹⁶⁴ Similarly, the reports of Chinese aid to Pakistan's nuclear weapons activity and sale of IRBMs to Saudi Arabia evoked the international community's strong disapproval and condemnation, and put the Chinese leadership in a quandary. Beijing now knows that any public pro-proliferation stance would not only elicit worldwide criticism and damage its prestige, but would also have negative consequences for China's image as the acknowledged leader of the Third World.

In short, there are valid reasons to assume that China stands to gain nothing from advocating or supporting proliferation because doing so would harm its own vital security, economic and diplomatic interests. While China remains critical of the NPT, security, economic and diplomatic interests drive Beijing to honour the spirit of the Treaty. These same factors could also ensure China's adherence to existing nuclear supply norms and practices and eventually lead to its acceptance of NSG and MTCR guidelines in the future. **Nevertheless, the lure of economic gains, i.e., the pursuit of hard currency reserves or dramatic changes in the external strategic environment - such as India or Taiwan¹⁶⁵ publicly going nuclear and deploying an anti-China deterrent - might force China to take countermeasures which could present serious problems for the efforts to curb proliferation.**

If past experience is any guide to future action, there is a need to adopt a carrot-and-stick approach to draw China into the non-proliferation orbit. The carrot of external aid in its economic development has made Beijing agree to substantial concessions on the non-proliferation issue so far, and could ensure that it does not take an intransigent stand in favour of proliferation in the future as well. The stick of restrictions on technology transfers from the West following China's sale of ballistic missiles to the Middle East was instrumental in bringing about a change in Chinese policy on missile proliferation. In this context, it should be noted that ultimately the only effective way to dissuade China from undermining the non-proliferation regime is for the United States and Soviet Union to adhere strictly to nuclear and missile non-proliferation norms and practices, both in letter and spirit. The American and Soviet tendency to turn a blind eye to nuclear proliferation when it is committed by their respective strategic allies certainly does not help the cause of non-proliferation.¹⁶⁶

An examination of China's official response to each of the five components of nuclear non-proliferation regime such as PTBT, IAEA, NPT, NSG and MTCR reveals that, contrary to the common perception, China has still a long way to go before it can be said

with certainty that it has fully accepted non-proliferation goals and practices. There still remain several contradictions and ambiguities in Chinese non-proliferation policy which could hinder China's slow movement towards embracing nuclear non-proliferation regime.

TABLE 4.3
CHINA AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime	Nuclear-Weapon States Parties to the Regime	Nuclear Weapon States NOT Parties to the Regime
IAEA (1957)	US, USSR, UK, France, China	-
PTBT (1963)	US, USSR, UK	France, China
NPT (1968)	US, USSR, UK	France ¹ , China
NSG (1975)	US, UK, USSR, France	China
MTCR (1987)	US, UK, France	USSR ² , China

NOTES:

1. France has declared explicitly that it will behave "as though it were a member".
2. USSR and US are currently engaged in a dialogue on this issue. The possibility remains that Moscow will either join MTCR or agree to abide by its guidelines in the future.

As Table 4.3 shows, China is the only NWS which still remains a non-party to four out of five non-proliferation treaties. Moreover, it should be noted that Beijing's decision to join IAEA in 1984 was made not out of concerns for nuclear proliferation but simply because it was left with no other option but to do so, to gain access to Western nuclear technology and aid. This fact also challenges the view espoused by some proliferation and arms control experts that, since 1984, China's nuclear proliferation policy has changed significantly for the better or that China has abandoned what Charles Van Doren calls its "deplorable pre-1984 behaviour."¹⁶⁷ Given China's past record as a nuclear supplier, such an assessment is over-optimistic. Should China's security be endangered by nuclear proliferation in its vicinity, Beijing would not hesitate to provide nuclear arms aid to its allies in the region if doing so undermined the security of China's enemies. This case study also contends that Chinese nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan and other countries reveals a tension between two broad policy options: one

tends to push China towards supporting non-proliferation for its own self-interested reasons, whereas the other, by accepting the inevitability of nuclear and missile proliferation, would have China steer this process in a way beneficial to Chinese security interests. Though evidence is sketchy, it can be said that China's foreign policy establishment propounds and supports the first policy option for diplomatic and security reasons while the country's defence establishment would seem to support the second option for security and economic reasons. This tension between two contradictory policies has led Beijing to take several tactical turnabouts on the proliferation issue, and reflects the overall uncertain nature of China's nuclear arms control policy.

NOTES

- 1 The significance of the NPT compared with other *arms control* treaties is pointed out by noted proliferation expert Jozef Goldblat. He writes, "The NPT is the only existing international document under which the major nuclear powers are legally committed to nuclear disarmament. However, with the exception of the ABM Treaty restricting ballistic missile defences, the strategic nuclear arms control agreements concluded in the 1970s - the 1972 SALT Interim Agreement and the 1979 SALT Treaty - were of low disarmament value, as they merely regulated the US-Soviet competition at a high level of armaments. Besides, these agreements are no longer in force. The first meaningful measure of *nuclear disarmament* was adopted in 1987 with the signing of the US-Soviet INF Treaty eliminating ground-launched missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometres." See Jozef Goldblat, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The Status and Prospects," *CIIPS Background Paper No. 29* (Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security), June 1989, p. 4. Emphasis added.
- 2 These six threshold or near-nuclear weapon states are Argentina, Brazil, India, North Korea, Pakistan and South Africa.
- 3 The major works published during the Sixties are: Alice L. Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in Nuclear Era* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962); Morton H. Halperin and D. H. Perkins, *Communist China and Arms Control* (London: Praeger, 1965); Morton H. Halperin (ed.), *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1967); W. C. Clemens Jr., *The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations* (Stanford, Calif.: The Hoover Institution, 1968); Y. L. Wu, *Communist China and Arms Control - A Contingency Study, 1967-1976* (Stanford, Calif.: The Hoover Institution, 1968); Wu Yuan-li and others, *Communist China and Arms Control* (Stanford, Calif.: The Hoover Institution, 1968); Oran R. Young, "Chinese Views on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," and Jeremy J. Stone, "Arms Control: Can China Be Ignored," in *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, Vol. II* (Report to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University, 1966); Arthur Huck, *The Security of China* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1971); Leo Yueh-yun Liu, *China as a Nuclear Power in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1972); Morton Halperin, "Chinese Attitudes Toward the Use and Control of Nuclear Weapons," in Tang Tsou (ed.), *China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives, Vol. 2* (The University of Chicago Press, 1968); Jonathan D. Pollack, "Chinese Attitudes Towards Nuclear Weapons, 1964-9," *China Quarterly*, No. 50, (April-June 1972); and Harry Gelber, *Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Policy* (London: IISS, Adelphi Papers, No. 99, Summer 1973).
- 4 K. N. Ramachandran, "China and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Issue," *IDSA Journal* (New Delhi), Vol. XIII, No. 1, (July-September 1980), p. 94.
- 5 Charles N. Van Doren and Rodney W. Jones, *China & Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Two Perspectives* (University of Southampton, Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation Occasional Paper Number Three, July 1989).
- 6 Ibid. For example, Charles Van Doren identifies three factors which have motivated Beijing to undermine non-proliferation regime: acquisition of advanced foreign technology, foreign trade and counter-trade possibilities. But he himself describes the relative value of these three factors as "low" in the case of Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation. While Rodney Jones refers to the deteriorating security environment as perceived by the Chinese due to nuclear developments on the Indian subcontinent, he does not elaborate this point to provide an explanation as to why Sino-Pakistani nuclear and missile cooperation has continued to date. This could be attributed to Jones' primary concern with offering some suggestions for integrating China with the non-proliferation regime. See pp. 1, 13, and p. 23.

- 7 See Stephen M. Meyer, *The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984). Meyer's study based on a comprehensive research done by several specialists on the motivations for nations to go nuclear identifies three basic types of incentives. First, he cites the incentives of international political prestige and image-building. Second come the incentives to advance national military and security objectives, to minimise external threats to the country and to strengthen its relative power position and finally, the incentives to support and promote domestic economic policies. These then are the fundamental motives for proliferation and can help us explain Chinese non-proliferation policy. Kenneth Watman also identifies three major incentives to go nuclear, viz., military security, political prestige and domestic considerations, see Kenneth Watman, "Nuclear Proliferation," in B. Thomas Trout and James E. Harf (eds.), *National Security Affairs* (New Brunswick and London, Transaction Books, 1982), p. 333. Also see Michael Sheehan, *The Arms Race* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983), pp. 61-65; B. W. Augenstein, "The Chinese and French Programs for the Development of National Nuclear Forces," *Orbis*, Vol. 11, (Fall 1967), p. 852; and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better* (London: IISS, Adelphi Papers No. 171, Autumn 1981), pp. 7-8.
- 8 Hsieh, op. cit.
- 9 Edgar Snow, *The Long Revolution* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 210.
- 10 Nie Rongzhen, "How China Develops Its Nuclear Weapons," *Beijing Review*, 29 April 1985, pp. 15-18.
- 11 Chinese Government Statement in *New China News Agency* or *NCNA* [*Xinhua*], (Beijing), 15 August 1963. Also see *Peking Review* [now *Beijing Review*], 16 August 1963, pp. 7-15. Italics mine.
- 12 Ramachandran, p. 96.
- 13 Gerald Segal's study shows that the superpower manoeuvres for a NPT and the simultaneous construction of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems by the superpowers were in part a reaction to the series of Chinese nuclear tests. See Gerald Segal, *The Great Power Triangle* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), pp. 129-131.
- 14 Zhou Enlai cited in *SIPRI Yearbook 1968-69* (SIPRI: Stockholm, 1969), p. 159; and *NCNA*, (Beijing), 24 January 1968.
- 15 *Renmin Ribao*, 13 June 1968; and *Peking Review*, 21 June 1968, pp. 17-8.
- 16 For a detailed analysis of this period, see Chi Chiang Hu, "Arms Control Policy of the People's Republic of China 1949-1978." (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Balliol College, Oxford, 1984), p. 151.
- 17 Doren and Jones, p. 18.
- 18 Fan Xiuzhu, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty a Scrap of Paper," *Peking Review*, No. 24, 13 June 1975, pp. 20-21.
- 19 *Peking Review*, No. 22, 2 June 1978, pp. 7-9. Emphasis added.
- 20 Ramachandran, op. cit., p. 98.
- 21 US House of Representatives, *Nuclear Energy Cooperation with China*. Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on U.S. Trade with China of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, Serial No. 98-148, 16 May 1984, pp. 20-21; and "People's Republic of China: The civilian nuclear program today," *Nuclear News*, December 1983, pp. 79-82.
- 22 Vice-Premier Li Peng's interview to *Renmin Ribao*, reprinted in *Beijing Review*, 20 May 1985. Also see Louis Mackay, *China: A Power For Peace?* (London: Merlin Press/European Nuclear Disarmament, 1986), pp. 50-51; and Yu Yu-lin, "Communist China's Nuclear Policy," *Issues & Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 12, (December 1985), pp. 4-6.

- 23 Cited from US House of Representatives, *Nuclear Energy Cooperation With China*. 1984, op. cit., p. 21.
- 24 Leonard S. Spector, *Nuclear Proliferation Today* (New York: A Carnegie Endowment Book, Vintage Books, 1984), pp. 316-319.
- 25 Statement by Wang Shu, Head of the Chinese delegation to the 27th General Conference of the IAEA, 11 October 1983, *Record of the IAEA*, 27th Session, 1983. Emphasis added.
- 26 Ibid. Italics mine; and statement made by spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 10 August 1983, in *Zhongguo guoji fa niankan* [*Chinese Yearbook of International Law*]. (Beijing, Xinhua Press, 1984), p. 489. Also see Wu Xiuquan, "China," and Reinhard Drifte, "China," in Jozef Goldblat (ed.), *Non-Proliferation: The why and the wherefore*. (SIPRI: Taylor & Francis, London and Philadelphia, 1985), pp. 41-55; and statement by Jiang Xinxiong, Chairman of the Chinese delegation to the 28th General Conference of the IAEA, September 1984, *Record of the IAEA*, 28th Session, 1984.
- 27 Drifte, "China," in Jozef Goldblat (ed.), *Non-Proliferation*, p. 50.
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 *Renmin Ribao*, 11 January 1984, p. 1; "Zhao's Nonproliferation Stand Seen As Path To U.S. Aid Pact," *The Washington Post*, 13 January 1984.
- 30 Leslie H. Gelb, "U.S. Aides Suspect Continuing Chinese Nuclear Aid to Pakistan," *IHT*, 24 June 1984, pp. 1-2; Leonard S. Spector, *Nuclear Proliferation Today* (New York: A Carnegie Endowment Book, Vintage Books, 1984), p. 324. Also see U.S. House of Representatives, *Nuclear Energy Cooperation With China: The Role of Other Supplier Nations in the Pacific Rim*. Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on U.S.-Pacific Rim Trade of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 99th Congress, 1st Session, 12 September 1985, pp. 6-7.
- 31 Report delivered on 15 May 1984 and adopted on 31 May 1984, at the Second Session of the Sixth National People's Congress. See *Xinhua* (Beijing), 31 May 1984, reprinted in *FBIS-China*, 1 June 1984, pp. K14-15.
- 32 "Li Peng on China's nuclear energy development," *Xinhua*, 18 January 1985; and *Renmin Ribao*, 19 January 1985. Italics mine.
- 33 Leonard S. Spector, *The Undeclared Bomb* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, A Carnegie Endowment Book, 1988), pp. 73, 344.
- 34 "Nuclear Safeguard Agreement Signed With IAEA," *Xinhua*, 20 September 1988, in *FBIS-China*, 21 September 1988, p. 1.
- 35 Zhou Ping, chief delegate to the annual congress of the IAEA said, "The Chinese government has decided to voluntarily offer to place some of its civilian nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards." The agreements allow inspectors to conduct checks to establish that nuclear material or equipment intended for peaceful uses is not diverted to military purposes. Zhou added that this decision was made in line with China's independent foreign policy and that "it was not the result of any bilateral negotiations," for details, see 7 *IAEA Bulletin*, Winter 1985, p. 59; and "China to Allow Inspection of Nuclear Plants," *IHT*, 25 September 1985.
- 36 Drifte, in Jozef Goldblat (ed.), *Non-Proliferation*, pp. 51-52.
- 37 Ibid. SWB\FE\7774\i, Part 3, 15 October 1984; and Dwight J. Porter, "The Nuclear Industry and The NPT: A Perspective From Washington," in David B. Dewitt (ed.), *Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Security* (London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 141-142.
- 38 "Sensitive technology" includes the reprocessing of spent fuel, uranium enrichment and heavy water production.
- 39 Porter, "The Nuclear Industry and The NPT," op. cit. p. 142.

- 40 Alastair Johnston, *China and Arms Control: Emerging Issues and Interests in the 1980s* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Aurora Papers 3, June 1986), p. 49; and Spector, *Nuclear Proliferation Today*, p. 323.
- 41 US law does not require such provisions for US nuclear exports to nuclear weapon states. See Charlotte Saikowski, "US Doubts Deepen Over China's Nonproliferation Stance," *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 June 1984; Bernard Gwertzman, "US, China Are Said to Make Progress on Complications With Nuclear Pact," *IHT*, 11 July 1985; Peter David, "US-China nuclear treaty: Congress makes difficulties," *Nature*, Vol. 309, 21 June 1984, p. 657; and *Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy*, 23 July 1985. Similarly, in its nuclear cooperation agreements with other NWSs such as Britain and France, China was opposed to including the provision of IAEA safeguards in those agreements because IAEA safeguards are not required for NWSs.
- 42 Goldblat, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation," op. cit. p. 1.
- 43 Tao Tai Hsia, Chief of the Far Eastern Law Division, US Library of Congress, believes this to be a major obstacle in the way of Beijing's ratification of the NPT and its written assurances by China on the non-proliferation. See U.S. House of Representatives, *Nuclear Energy Cooperation With China*, op. cit., p. 164.
- 44 However, some analysts believe that China might eventually become a signatory to the NPT. For example, a SIPRI study concludes: "A change of heart cannot, therefore, be excluded. In 1984, for example, France and China acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention, which they had categorically refused to sign 12 years earlier on the grounds that the Convention did not include satisfactory provision for international verification, ban the use of biological weapons or prohibit the possession of chemical means of warfare - that is, for reasons which are much more substantial than those given by the two states in refusing to sign the NPT," in Jozef Goldblat (ed.), *Non-Proliferation*, op. cit., p. 29. Alastair Johnston also believes that it is only a matter of time before either the NPT collapses or China joins it. See Alastair Johnston, "China and Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region." (Paper presented at the Conference on Maritime Security and Arms Control in the Pacific Region, May 1988, Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia), p. 17.
- 45 On the implications of emerging nuclear suppliers, see John Woodliffe, "Nuclear weapons and non-proliferation: The legal aspects," in Istvan Pogany (ed.), *Nuclear Weapons And International Law* (Aldershot & Sydney: Avebury, 1987), Ch. 5, p. 97; Lewis A. Dunn, *Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 41-43; Rodney Jones, Cesare Merlini, Joseph Pilat and William Potter (eds.), *The Nuclear Suppliers and Nonproliferation* (Lexington, Mass.: D C Heath and CO., 1985), pp. 93-127; William Potter, "Creating a Database on International Nuclear Commerce," *CISA Working Paper No. 59*, (UCLA Center for International and Strategic Affairs, September 1987); and Porter, pp. 140-143.
- 46 Sam Thompson, "The NPT Regime, Present And Future Global Security: An American View," in David B. Dewitt (ed.), *Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Security*, op. cit. Ch. 11, p. 159.
- 47 Lewis A. Dunn, "The Emerging Nuclear Suppliers: Some Guidelines for Policy," *CISA Working Paper No. 61*, (UCLA Center for International and Strategic Affairs, February 1988).
- 48 Ibid., p. 6. These guidelines for nuclear transfers, announced in 1978, are not legally binding. Text reproduced in 17 International Legal Materials, 1978, pp. 220-234. France, though a non-party to the NPT, is a member of the NSG. For guidelines, also see Istvan Pogany (ed.), *Nuclear Weapons And International Law*, Ch. 5, p. 96.
- 49 For example, see Alain Cass, "U.S. faces dilemma over its ties with Asia," *Financial Times*, 6 June 1985; "China as Nuclear Partner," *IHT*, 25 July 1985, Alain Cass,

- "U.S. nuclear sector licks its lips over China," *Financial Times*, 15 August 1985; Patrick E. Tyler and Joanne Omang, "China Said to Offer Iran U.S. Nuclear Technology," *IHT*, 24 October 1985; Robert Thomson, "China denies nuclear weapon allegations," *Financial Times*, 25 October 1985; Robert Thomson, "Nuclear charges plague Chinese," *Financial Times*, 4 November 1985; Nayan Chanda, "Nuclear nonsense," *FEER*, 28 November 1985, p. 23; Patrick E. Tyler, "Nuclear Accord: China's clandestine activities almost axed pact with U.S.," *The Ann Arbor News*, 9 February 1986, pp. D1, D11; and Kenneth Adelman, Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Nonproliferation Assessment Statement for the US-China Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, July 1985.
- 50 Ibid.
- 51 Notes 21 and 30. For the implications of China's civilian nuclear programme, also see the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency memorandum to the President on "Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement for the Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Between the US and China." 19 July 1985, pp. 1-5, 11-14; and United States Department of State, "U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement," *Current Policy No. 729* (Washington, DC: Bureau of Public Affairs), August 1985, pp. 1-6. On China's burgeoning nuclear interaction with other countries and IAEA, see Zhang Chunting, "Foreign Exchanges and Cooperation by China's Nuclear Industry," *Liaowang*, No. 11, 16 March 1987, pp. 35-36, in *FBIS-China*, 23 March 1987, pp. K13-16.
- 52 Testimony of Harold C. Hinton in the US House of Representatives, *Nuclear Energy Cooperation With China*. Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on U.S. Trade with China of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, Serial No. 98-148, 16 May 1984, p. 109.
- 53 Ibid., pp. 109-110; and *FEER*, 24 March 1988.
- 54 "First Congress of Chinese Nuclear Society Opens in Beijing", *FBIS-China*, 22 February 1980, p. L2. Also see John R. Lamarsh, "China's Nuclear Programme," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, (May 1980); and Dori Jones, "Why China Wants Nuclear Power," *The China Business Review*, (January-February 1981).
- 55 Petra Kelly at the Amsterdam END Convention, July 1985, cited in Mackay, *China: A Power For Peace?* op. cit., p. 51.
- 56 Ibid. Also see "Li Peng on China's nuclear energy development," *Xinhua*, 18 January 1985.
- 57 Note 30.
- 58 Testimony of Alan T. Crane, Director, Energy Technology Transfer To China Project, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), in the US House of Representatives, *Nuclear Energy Cooperation With China: The Role of Other Supplier Nations in the Pacific Rim* Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on US-Pacific Rim Trade of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 99th Congress, 1st Session, 12 September 1985, pp. 25-28. Also see OTA Technical Memorandum, *Energy Technology Transfer to China* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1985).
- 59 Ibid.
- 60 Harold C. Hinton's testimony before the US House of Representatives, op. cit., p. 210. Also see Spector, op. cit., pp. 329-331; P. Marshall, "Political implications could threaten China's offer to store nuclear wastes," *IHT*, 3 April 1984; Porter, "The Nuclear Industry and The NPT," pp. 142-3.
- 61 Spector, *Nuclear Proliferation Today*, op. cit., p. 324.
- 62 Hinton's testimony, p. 111.
- 63 Doren and Jones, pp. 4-5, 8-9.
- 64 Ibid.

- 65 See note 60. Harold C. Hinton in his testimony dealt with the ineffectiveness of IAEA in controlling nuclear proliferation, pp. 209-210.
- 66 For detailed examination of these and related issues, see Tao-tai Hsia's testimony before the Special Subcommittee on US-Pacific Rim Trade, 12 September 1985, op cit., pp. 33-38, 158-175; and the US Senate, *US-PRC Nuclear Agreement*. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 99th Congress, 1st Session, 9 October 1985, pp. 66-75.
- 67 A prominent Chinese legal scholar, Tao Zhenghua states: "The present-day development of international economic relationships and scientific and technological progress makes it impossible for any country to develop its economy in isolation...Opening to the outside world has already been made a fundamental policy of our country. In order to carry out this policy, first of all, we must have a peaceful international environment. It behooves us to observe and use the basic principles, rules and institutions of international law to conduct foreign affairs, maintain world peace, and further economic and technological cooperation and exchange with other nation." See Tao Zhenghua, "Opening to the Outside Necessitates Strengthening Studies of International Law," *Faxue Yanjiu* [Studies in Law], 83, (February 1985). This is an authoritative law journal which reflects the official thinking on this subject.
- 68 Han Xu, "The View from the People's Republic of China," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 4, (Winter 1986), p. 37.
- 69 Note 66. Tao-tai Hsia's testimony before the Special Subcommittee on US-Pacific Rim Trade, 12 September 1985, op. cit., pp. 163-4.
- 70 See the statement of Zhou Ping, Deputy Minister of China's Ministry of Nuclear Industry, quoted in *New York Times*, 25 September 1985, p. A6; and *IHT*, 25 September 1985.
- 71 Christopher E. Paine, "Fuzzy safeguards for U.S.-China deal," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, (October 1985), pp. 6-7; and George D. Moffett, "Closing loopholes in US-China nuclear pact," *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 October 1985, p. 4.
- 72 The gist of the Chinese assurances is that the US *can expect* that the PRC's undertaking not to assist a NNWS to acquire nuclear explosives will be implemented "in a manner consistent with non-proliferation practices common to the US and other suppliers," - this could be construed as a veiled reference to the NSG guidelines.
- 73 For example, Lewis A. Dunn suggests that one way to encourage the emerging nuclear suppliers to follow internationally accepted nuclear supply norms is to identify their security, economic and prestige interests and let the interplay of these three factors influence their nuclear export policies. Dunn, "The Emerging Nuclear Suppliers," op. cit., p. 21.
- 74 Drifte, p. 53.
- 75 The possibility remains that China would be attracted by the prospect of enhancing its prestige and international status by joining the exclusive London-based Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) and getting recognized as one of the few technologically advanced nations. In fact, China is the only non-NPT nuclear weapon state which is not a member of NSG. France is the only non-NPT member of the NSG. China can also follow France's example and become a formal member. Moreover, the prospect that China would benefit economically and technologically more if it abides by the rules of the game might induce Beijing to adopt cautious nuclear supply policies and practices.
- 76 Thompson, op. cit., p. 159; Johnston, op. cit., Spector, op. cit.,; and William Walker, "Nuclear trade relations in the decade to 1995," in John Simpson, *Nuclear Non-Proliferation: An Agenda For The 1990s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), Ch. 5, pp. 64-81.

- 77 John Goshko and Don Oberdorfer, "Saudis Buy Medium-Range Missiles From China," *IHT*, 19-20 March 1988, p. 1; Joseph Fitchett, "Chinese Sale of Missiles To Saudis Called Risky," *IHT*, 22 March 1988, pp. 1-2, 4; Daniel Southerland, "Saudi Sale Spotlights China as Arms Supplier," *IHT*, 5 April 1988, pp. 1-2; and *The Military Balance 1988-89* (London: IISS, 1988), p. 147.
- 78 *SWB/FE/0119/i*, 7 April 1988; and *FEER*, 14 April 1988, p. 10.
- 79 See Geoffrey Kemp, "Missile Mania, From the Mediterranean to India," *IHT* 28 March 1988 and "Missiles Galore as the Big Two Dither," *IHT*, 29 March 1988; "Saudi Purchase of Chinese Missiles Changes Middle East Military Balance," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 28 March 1988, p. 30; P. Lewis Young, "Saudi Arabia's Missile Acquisition," *Asian Defence Journal*, (July 1988), pp. 30-38; Francois Heisbourg, "Missiles: Steps That Might Check Proliferation," *IHT*, 30 March 1988; Aaron Karp, "The frantic Third World quest for ballistic missiles," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, (June 1988), pp. 14-20; Spector, *The Undeclared Bomb*, op. cit.; "Another Arms Race," *Newsweek*, 12 April 1988, pp. 114-116; *The Economist*, 26 March-1 April 1988, p. 34; Adel Darwish, "The shape of wars to come," *The Middle East*, No. 166, (August 1988), pp. 13-14; and Rodney W. Jones and Harald Muller, "Preventing a Nuclear Sarajevo: Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia," *Arms Control Today*, (January/February 1989), pp. 15-22.
- 80 Cited from Nayan Chanda, "The Third World race for ballistic missiles," *FEER*, 2 June 1988, p. 24.
- 81 For details, see Joseph A. Jampietro, "Saudi Arabia May Sign NPT To Ease Fears of its New Missiles," *Arms Control Today*, (June 1988), p. 18. Apparently, in a damage-limitation exercise, the Saudi Government announced on 26 April 1988 its willingness to sign the NPT of 1970. The Chinese foreign minister Wu Xueqian said that China had also received a commitment from Saudi Arabia not to transfer the missiles to a third party. The Saudi decision appeared to be an attempt to allay any apprehensions that its IRBMs might eventually be fitted with nuclear warheads. It was also aimed at stemming US Congress' opposition to the billion dollars US military aid to Riyadh. The Saudi decision to sign the NPT appears to be a US-Saudi compromise but the signing does not allow for the inspection of individual Saudi weapon systems. The Saudis turned down a US request to inspect the missiles to verify that they do not carry nuclear warheads on the grounds that it was a question of strict confidentiality between Saudi Arabia and China.
- 82 On MTCR, see David M. North, "Seven Nations Curb Nuclear Weapon Launch System Exports," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 20 April 1987, pp. 28-29. The MTCR was aimed at halting the spread of missiles capable of travelling at least 320km and carrying warheads of at least 450 kilograms, criteria set with nuclear weapons in mind.
- 83 Bernard E. Trainor, "U.S. Says Pakistan Has Tested Missile Suited for A-Arms," *IHT*, 25 May 1988, pp. 1-2; "Pak test fires Delhi, Bombay range missile," and Mahendra Ved, "China aided missile programme," *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 25 May 1988, p. 1.
- 84 Ibid. Some reports said that Pakistan fired a Scud B-2 missile with Chinese technical help and aided by the launching infrastructure originally developed with West German assistance for sending communication satellites. According to *US News and World Report*, Islamabad tested "King Hawk" missile with Chinese assistance. See *The Hindustan Times*, 20 July 1988.
- 85 Mushahid Hussain, "Pakistani missiles," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 11 March 1989.
- 86 "Peking Denies Sharing Arms Knowhow," *Asian Defence Journal*, (July 1988), p. 90.
- 87 Note 85.
- 88 According to the SIPRI, 24 developing countries either have, or are developing, long-range rockets that can be armed with ABC warheads. See *Armed Forces Journal International*, (July 1989), p. 37.

- 89 Judith Perera, "The Missile Race Hots Up," *South*, (August 1989), p. 103.
- 90 On Sino-Argentine missile cooperation, see Tai Ming Cheung, "China's bargain sale: bangs for a buck," *FEER*, 2 June 1988, p. 22. China, however, denied a *Sunday Times* report that it had signed a secret agreement during President Raul Alfonsin's visit to Beijing in late May 1988 to supply Argentina with technology for producing anti-ship and medium-range missiles capable of hitting the Falklands, see *Asian Defence Journal*, July 1988, p. 90. As regards Sino-Brazilian missile deal, Leonard S. Spector writes, "In 1986, China agreed to provide technology to Brazil on liquid rocket fuels and rocket guidance systems in return for Brazil's know-how on solid rocket fuels..." see Spector, *The Undeclared Bomb*, op. cit., pp. 43, 335. The new Chief of Staff of the Brazilian Air Force has declared that "Brazil is going to acquire from China, France, Russia, and anywhere else possible" the technology for manufacturing a rocket guidance system, see *PPNN Newsbrief*, No. 6, July 1989, p. 8.
- 91 See note 79 and Lewis A. Dunn, "Nonproliferation: The Next Steps," *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 17, No. 9, (November 1987), p. 4.
- 92 Aaron Karp, "The frantic Third World quest for ballistic missiles," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, No. 5, (June 1988), p. 16.
- 93 "At Washington's invitation, the Soviet Union in mid-1987 agreed to consider whether to join the regime...On 1 June 1988, in the final communique of the Moscow summit, President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev stated that they had agreed to "bilateral discussions...on the problem of proliferation of ballistic missile technology." This raises the possibility that Moscow may yet be willing to join the new missile export control system." Leonard S. Spector, *The Undeclared Bomb*, op. cit., p. 43. In September 1988, to get the Soviet support, American and Soviet officials held their first in-depth discussions on evolving a common approach to curb the proliferation of such weapons. See *The Hindustan Times*, 28 September 1988, p. 7.
- 94 *FEER*, 2 June 1988, p. 24.
- 95 "Why China Sells Arms," *Newsweek*, 12 July 1988, p. 56; and Don Oberdorfer, "U. S. bid to halt missile spread," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 24 September 1988, p. 25.
- 96 Cited from Doren and Jones, p. 31.
- 97 See note 79.
- 98 Chen Yi, "China is Determined to Make All Necessary Sacrifices for the Defeat of the U.S. Imperialism," *Peking Review*, No. 41, 8 October 1965, pp. 7-14.
- 99 As Chi Chiang Hu observes, "Beijing knew only too well that the division between civil and military nuclear programmes was extremely tenuous, for it had [also] attained its weapons capability under a "peaceful" civil nuclear research programme." See Hu, op. cit., pp. 124-126. Much of the argument relating to Chen Yi's remarks which follows in this section owes a great debt to Chi Chiang Hu's research on this period. For an account of China's development of the bomb, see Arnold Kramish, "The Great Chinese Bomb Puzzle - and A Solution," *Fortune*, Vol. 18, No. 6, (June 1966), pp. 157-8.
- 100 Hu, op. cit.
- 101 Ibid.
- 102 *New York Times*, 5 August 1965, cited in Hu, op. cit. For Sino-Indonesian relations and the coup, see Antonie C.A. Dake, *In the Spirit of the Red Bandung: Indonesian Communists Between Moscow and Peking 1959-65* (The Hague: Mouton, 1973); S. W. Simon, *The Broken Triangle: Peking, Djakarta, and the PKI* (Baltimore, Md., John Hopkins Press, 1969); and T. Vitachi, *The Fall of Sukarno* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1967).
- 103 Hu.
- 104 Ibid.

- 105 M. H. Heikal, *The Cairo Document* (New York, Doubleday, 1973), pp. 304-305 and 312-313 and M. H. Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (New York: Quadrangle, The New York Times Book Co., 1975), pp. 76-77. Also see Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb* (New York: Times Books, 1981), pp. 55-57.
- 106 *Final Record of the 53rd Plenary Meeting*, CD/PV. 53, 5 February 1980, p. 26. Emphasis added.
- 107 *Asahi Shimbun* (Tokyo), 22 August 1983, cited in Drifte, op. cit., p. 49.
- 108 Tian Jin, *Final Record of the 152nd Plenary Meeting*, CD/PV. 152 (9 February 1982), p. 50, cited in Johnston, *China and Arms Control*, p. 48.
- 109 Ibid. Mark J. Moher also refers to the circuitous argument, that is, Pakistan will move if India moves; India will move if China does; China will if the Soviet Union and the United States do and so on, see Mark J. Moher, "The Politics of Supplier Nations," in David B. Dewitt (ed.), *Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Security* (London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987).
- 110 Ibid. Also see Paul Leventhal, "The Chinese Nuclear Deal Should Set An Example," *IHT*, 10 May 1984; Leslie H. Gelb, "Pakistan Link Perils US-China Nuclear Pact," *New York Times*, 22 June 1984; Leslie H. Gelb, "Peking Said to Balk at Nuclear Pledges," *New York Times*, 28 June 1984; and William Proxmire, "The Risks in Selling China a Stronger Nuclear Genie," *Wall Street Journal*, 25 May 1984.
- 111 Zhang Jian, "It Is Still Necessary To Base Our Plans on Fighting a Major War," *Jiefangjun Bao*, 24 April 1987, p. 3, in *FBIS-China*, 4 May 1987, p. A2.
- 112 Spector, *Nuclear Proliferation Today*, op. cit., pp. 318-9; and Spector, "Nuclear Proliferation - the Pace Quickens," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 41, Jan. 1985, p. 11.
- 113 See Richard Kessler, "Argentina Officials Deny Any Purchases of Chinese Heavy Water," *Nucleonics Week*, 31 October 1985; and "Premier Zhao Ziyang Appeared to Confirm that China...", *Nucleonics Week*, 14 November 1985. Spector writes: "It appears that some unsafeguarded transfers of Chinese nuclear materials to Argentina and possibly South Africa continued into 1985, although these were supposedly based on pre-existing contracts. China also apparently held talks with Iran on nuclear trade..." Spector, *The Undeclared Bomb*, p. 344.
- 114 Notes 112 and 113.
- 115 The best account of the development of Pakistan's nuclear capability is provided by Ashok Kapur, *Pakistan's Nuclear Development* (London, Croom Helm, 1987). Also see, Weissman and Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb*, op. cit.; D.K. Palit and P. K. S. Namboodiri, *Pakistan's Islamic Bomb* (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979); P. B. Sinha and P. R. Subramanian, *Nuclear Pakistan* (New Delhi, Vision, 1980); B. M. Kaushik and O. N. Mehrotra, *Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb* (New Delhi, Sohan Publishing House, 1980); Rodney W. Jones, *Nuclear Proliferation: Islam, the Bomb and South Asia* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981); Dieter Braun, "Pakistan," in Harald Mullar (ed.), *A European Non-Proliferation Policy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), Chapter 6, pp. 163-202; and P. K. S. Namboodiri, "Pakistan's Nuclear Capability - Some Revealing Evidence," *The Times of India* (New Delhi), 11 May 1985, p. 8.
- 116 Ibid. Also see Shrikant Paranjpe, *US Nonproliferation Policy in Action: South Asia* (New York: Envoy Press, 1988), p. 77; and "Doctor Strangelove," *The Illustrated Weekly of India*, 19 February 1989, pp. 13, 16.
- 117 Z. A. Bhutto, *If I am assassinated* (Delhi, Vikas, 1979), p. 203; B. K. Kumar, "Nuclear Nexus Between Peking and Islamabad: An Overview of Some Significant Developments," *Issues & Studies* (Taipei), Vol. 21, No. 8, (August 1985), pp. 140-150. There is a consensus among observers of Pakistan's nuclear development that the 1976 agreement which Bhutto highlights in his memoirs, was between China and Pakistan. See Palit and Namboodiri, *Pakistan's Islamic Bomb*, op. cit. Kapur believes that "this agreement was established after, and possibly in response to, the

- cut off of Canadian nuclear aid to Pakistan even though the idea of such cooperation existed prior to this," see Kapur, op. cit., pp. 244-245.
- 118 Kapur, op. cit., p. 245.
 - 119 Kumar, op. cit., pp. 140-141; Yacoov Wertzberger, "The Political Economy of Sino-Pakistan Relations: Trade and Aid: 1963-82," *Asian Survey*, 23, (May 1983), pp. 637-652; "Sino-Pakistan Ties Acquire New Dimensions," *FBIS-China*, 13 May 1982, p. F1; and P. K. S. Namboodiri, "Foreign Links: Axis With China," *World Focus* (New Delhi), Vol. 5, No.1, (July 1984), pp. 15-20.
 - 120 David Hart, *Nuclear Power in India* (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1979), pp. 132-3; and Kapur, *Pakistan's Nuclear Development*, p. 246.
 - 121 Cited in Kumar, p. 142.
 - 122 Rob Laufer, "Interview with Malone: Defense of Policy and Assessment of 'Hot Spots'," *Nucleonics Week*, 19 August 1982, p. 2. Judith Miller, "U.S. Is Holding Up Peking Atom Talks," *New York Times*, 19 September 1982.
 - 123 Milton R. Benjamin, "China Aids Pakistan on A-Weapons," *Washington Post*, 28 February 1983.
 - 124 *Strategic Survey 1983-84* (London: IISS), p. 87.
 - 125 Dr. A. Q. Khan interview with *Nawai Waqt* (Lahore), 10 February 1984, in "Press Comment on Controversy Over N-Scientist's Interview," *Public Opinion, Trends, Analyses and News Service (POT): Pakistan Series* (New Delhi), 17 February 1984, pp. 540-541.
 - 126 *The Times of India*, 27 March 1984 and 27-28 July 1984. Also see US Senate, *US-PRC Nuclear Agreement*. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 99th Congress, 1st Session, 9 October 1985, p. 254.
 - 127 "PRC Denies Nuclear Cooperation With Pakistan," AFP, 1220 GMT, 26 February 1983, reprinted in *FBIS/NDP*, 21 March 1983, p. 9.
 - 128 Bernard Gwertzman, "Chinese Nuclear Pact to Help Curb Spread of Arms, U.S. officials say," *IHT*, 4 May 1984; "China Nuclear Pact Raises Concern in Congress," *Congressional Quarterly*, (5 May 1984), pp. 1042-3; Don Oberdorfer, "Toast By Zhao Formed Basis of China Pact," *IHT*, 7 May 1984; "Chinese gave no nuclear pledges," *The Guardian*, 9 May 1984; Mohsin Ali, "Washington worry holds up nuclear pact with China," *Daily Telegraph*, 19 June 1984; David Shears, "China 'aided Pakistan in A-bomb work'," *Telegraph*, 22 June 1984; Leslie H. Gelb, "U.S. Aides Suspect Continuing Chinese Nuclear Aid to Pakistan," *IHT*, 23 June 1984; "Chinese Nuclear Pact," *IHT*, 3 July 1984; and Robert Manning, "A Backyard Bomb?" *FEER*, 2 August 1984, p. 10.
 - 129 Spector, op. cit.; Simon Henderson and Alain Cass, "Washington may freeze nuclear pact with China," *Financial Times* (London), 17 July 1984; "China's Bombshell," *The Economist Foreign Report*, 2 August 1984; "Chinese Nuclear Agreement Misses an Opportunity on Hill," *Congressional Quarterly*, 18 August 1984, p. 2040; "Faulty Data Seen Sinking Nuclear Sale," *Radio Free Europe* wireservice 16:47, 23 August 1984; and *Washington Post*, 12 Jan. 1986, pp. 1, 20, 21.
 - 130 *Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB)*, 1 September 1984, cited in Kapur, p. 245.
 - 131 Spector, *The Undeclared Bomb*, pp. 127, 365-6.
 - 132 Ibid. Also see Doren and Jones, op. cit.; Hedrick Smith, "A Bomb Ticks in Pakistan," *New York Times Magazine*, 6 March 1988, p. 39.
 - 133 Spector, *The Undeclared Bomb*, p. 74. Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. A. Q. Khan, in an interview with the *Financial Times*, said that Sino-Pak nuclear cooperation pact covered "all nuclear activities," i.e., military nuclear activities as well. See Simon Henderson, "China May Help Build Pakistan's N. Bomb," *Financial Times*, 29 September 1986.
 - 134 Spector, *The Undeclared Bomb*, p. 74.

- 135 "Pakistan's atomic bomb," *Foreign Report*, 12 January 1989, pp. 1-3.
- 136 *FEER*, 14 July 1988, p. 9; and Jozef Goldblat, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The Status and Prospects," *CIIPS Background Paper No. 29*, June 1989, p. 5.
- 137 The US and Israel signed an agreement on 28 June 1988 to cooperate on ATBM research following the Chinese sale of IRBMs to Saudi Arabia. The jointly funded missile of which 80 per cent of the developmental cost is to be borne by the US has been designated *Arrow*. See Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. to Build New Missile With Israel," *IHT*, 1 July 1988, p. 1; and Ravi Shastri, "Israel satellite: A keyhole in space," *The Hindustan Times*, 30 September 1988, p. 11.
- 138 "The nuclear debate," *Pacific Defence Reporter*, (July 1988), p. 26; R. R. Subramanian, "Chinese Missiles: New factor in Gulf," *The Hindustan Times*, 21 April 1988; "Pakistan 'n-gift' for Saudis dangerous," *The Hindustan Times*, 18 April 1988; *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 17 April 1988; and Spector, *The Undeclared Bomb*, op. cit. During US Defence Secretary Frank Carlucci's visit to India in April 1988, Indian Prime Minister Gandhi conveyed his concern over the sale of Chinese IRBMs to Saudi Arabia and its potential impact on the Indo-Pak and Sino-Indian relations. See Tai Ming Cheung, "China's bargain sale," *FEER*, 2 June 1988, p. 22.
- 139 Clough et al., *The United States, China and Arms Control*, pp. 25-26. In this context, one should analyse Chinese responses to Indian nuclear test. Ramachandran's study shows that "as regards Indian explosion, Beijing has very little to say of any significance in public discussion - either categorically expressing its concern or disapproval. One observation by the Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping blandly said that a costly nuclear programme would have an adverse impact on India's economic development. Yet another statement...merely indicated that India has the "right" to pursue its own nuclear path. Such expressions do indicate a calculated ambiguity arising from the Chinese decision not to express its real assessment in public," see Ramachandran, op. cit., p. 102. Also see J. Mohan Malik, "China and South Asian Nuclear-Free Zone," *China Report*, Vol. 25 No. 2, (April-June 1989), p. 114.
- 140 Kapur, op. cit.; Drifte, op. cit., p. 53; Rodney W. Jones, "Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Outlook from the United States," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 4, (December 1985), p. 35.
- 141 US Senate, *US-PRC Nuclear Agreement*, op. cit., p. 236.
- 142 Robert Sutter, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia for China," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, op. cit., p. 53.
- 143 For a detailed analysis of Sino-Indian rivalry in Indochina, see John W. Garver, "Chinese-Indian Rivalry in Indochina," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 27, No. 11, (November 1987), pp. 1205-19.
- 144 For example, see *Xinhua's* coverage of the Indo-Vietnamese nuclear accord in *FBIS-China*, 17 August 1988, p. 20.
- 145 *PPNN Newsbrief*, July 1989, p. 9; Richard Sale, "India assembled high-tech arsenal," *The Australian*, 24 March 1988, pp. 1-2; and David Ottaway, "Hydrogen bomb being developed, warns CIA," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 20 May 1989, p. 23.
- 146 "India's Agni success poses new problems," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 3 June 1989, p. 1052.
- 147 Notes 84, 86. Also see editorial and a newsreport "Experts discount Pak missile test report," in *The Hindustan Times*, 26 May 1988; and Jasjit Singh, "Missiles: Let us not be shy of Agni," *The Hindustan Times*, 19 April 1989, p. 11.
- 148 "Ballistic Training," *FEER*, 27 April 1989, p. 8.
- 149 Tai Ming Cheung, "China's bargain sale," *FEER*, 2 June 1988, pp. 22-3.
- 150 See the works of Leonard S. Spector and Doren and Jones.

- 151 Kumar, p. 144; *Financial Times*, 17 July 1984; Kapur, op. cit., p. 246; and US House of Representatives, *Nuclear Energy Cooperation with China*. op. cit.
- 152 *The Economist Foreign Report*, 2 August 1984.
- 153 *Financial Times*, 17 July 1984.
- 154 Oran R. Young, "Chinese Views on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," in Morton Halperin (ed.), *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control*. op. cit., pp. 51-52.
- 155 Note 90.
- 156 Note 90.
- 157 Jasper Becker, "Beijing to form ties with Saudis," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 April 1988, p.9; and *FEER*, cover story, 2 June 1988, pp. 23, 28.
- 158 *Asian Defence Journal*, (August 1988), p. 87; and "Smugglers raise arms race fears," *The Australian*, 29 June 1988, p. 6. Libya's Col. Gaddafi turned to China after the Soviet Union rejected his request for SS-21 intermediate-range missile. Defence analysts expected China to reject the Libyan request, given the furore the Saudi sale provoked and China's acknowledgement that Col. Gaddafi is a less reliable customer than Saudi Arabia. See "Gaddafi seeks arms from China," *The Australian*, 4 July 1988.
- 159 Doren and Jones; *FEER*, 2 June 1988, pp. 22-28.
- 160 See *The Economist*, 14 May 1988, pp. 28-9; *FEER*, 22 September 1988, p. 42.
- 161 Karl W. Eikenberry, "China on Arms Control and Disarmament," *Parameters*, Vol. 16, No. 3, (Autumn 1986), p. 73.
- 162 Ramachandran, p. 99.
- 163 Wu, "China," in Goldblat (ed.), *Non-Proliferation*, p. 43.
- 164 Lewis A. Dunn, "The NPT and Future Global Security," in David B. Dewitt (ed.), *Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Security*. op. cit., Ch. 2, p. 15.
- 165 Like India, Taiwan has also built medium-range Skyhorse missile (625 miles, approx. 1,000km) bringing parts of mainland China within its target range and it can be equipped with nuclear warheads. On Taiwan's missile programme, see *The Economist*, 2 April 1988, p. 24; and *South*, August 1989, pp. 102-3. On Taiwan's nuclear weapons programme, Leonard Spector writes, "Taiwan has one of the largest nuclear power programs in the developing world...events during 1987-1988 suggested that it may still harbor nuclear ambitions." See Spector, *The Undeclared Bomb*, op. cit., pp. 75-78, 345-6. Taiwan's continuing interest in nuclear weapons option was revealed in early 1988 when it became known that Washington had forced Taipei to stop work on a secret installation which could have been used to obtain plutonium. China has repeatedly threatened that it would invade Taiwan if Taiwan developed and deployed nuclear weapons. For details, see Stephen Engelberg and Michael Gordon, "U.S. Forces Taiwan to Shut N-Plant," *IHT*, 24 March 1988, pp. 1, 4.
- 166 The United States' selective approach to nuclear proliferation is discussed in Gerard C. Smith and Helena Cobban, "A Blind Eye To Nuclear Proliferation," *Foreign Affairs*, (Summer 1989), pp. 53-70.
- 167 Doren and Jones, *China & Nuclear Non-Proliferation*, p. 1.

Chapter V

CHINA AND NUCLEAR-WEAPONS-FREE ZONES

The nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) is a nuclear arms control proposal which seeks to remove nuclear weapons from specified regions by prohibiting their possession, deployment and use.¹ The primary objective of a NWFZ is to prevent member states from acquiring nuclear weapons. A NWFZ, it is argued, would in the first place help to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war by promoting regional stability and security and, if a war did take place, would help to protect the specified NWFZ region from nuclear devastation. The NWFZ concept "presupposes guarantees that the zone is both free of nuclear weapons and immune from the threat of having nuclear weapons used against it."² Though nuclear-weapons-free zone and nuclear-free zone (NFZ) are often used interchangeably, there is a difference between the two concepts. The NWFZ is primarily an arms control measure whereas the NFZ concept is concerned with arms control *as well as* protecting the environment by prohibiting or restricting all nuclear fuel cycle activities such as mining, dumping and transportation. In this sense, the NFZ concept is broader than the NWFZ concept.³ Nonetheless, both NFZs and NWFZs represent a regional approach to the question of curbing the nuclear arms race.

Although many analysts have challenged the validity of assumptions underlying a NWFZ and have expressed considerable cynicism and reservations about the ultimate effectiveness of NWFZs - particularly since the "nuclear winter" theory was put forward - the idea of NWFZs has become popular because of a greater awareness of the implications of the destructive potential of nuclear weapons, the growing strength of the anti-nuclear movement throughout the world, and the failure of superpower arms control efforts to achieve significant results. Since the 1950s, various proposals for the establishment of NWFZs in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Korean Peninsula, Latin America, and South Pacific have been put forward, but only in the two latter regions such zones have been established.⁴

Since late 1957, China has affirmed its support for the principle that regional states have the right to establish nuclear-weapons-free zones and zones of peace. In 1973 Beijing signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco and since 1987, it is also a signatory to the Protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty which created a NWFZ and NFZ in Latin America and the South Pacific respectively. Chinese policy on NWFZs reflects Chinese perceptions of regional security issues in different parts of the world as they relate broadly to the arms control

process. In spite of Chinese governments' consistent advocacy of such regimes since the 1950s, Chinese writings on proposals for NWFZs are not extensive. This case study will provide insights into Chinese perceptions of regional security issues as reflected in China's NWFZ policy, and highlight the role of regional actors in influencing China's arms control policy.

This chapter begins with a brief survey of the evolution of the Chinese policy on NWFZs from the 1950s to the mid-1960s; this is followed by a critical analysis of Beijing's response to the Latin American Treaty of Tlatelolco from 1966 to 1973. The shifts and turns in the Chinese NWFZ policy from the early 1970s to the 1980s are examined against the background of China's changing threat perceptions and security perspectives. After identifying the key elements of China's NWFZ policy, the discussion turns to China's response to the establishment of NWFZs in the South Pacific, Southeast Asia and South Asia. The main findings are summarised at the end of this chapter.

Chinese Policy on Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones: 1949-65

The NWFZ is the only arms control and disarmament measure which has elicited favourable response from Chinese governments since the 1950s. In fact, Samuel Kim's research on Chinese voting patterns in the UN led him to conclude that the most optimistic note in China's ACD policy is the PRC's "firm, positive and unequivocal support for the establishment of nuclear-free zones around the globe."⁵

The idea of the NWFZ was first mooted by Adam Rapacki of Poland in the 1950s, and had its origins in the 1956 Gromyko proposal for the "denuclearisation" of Central Europe. Rapacki produced a plan for a nuclear-weapon free Central Europe and the removal of nuclear weapons from East and West Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. This was the period when China was closely aligned with its "socialist brother country" the Soviet Union and generally supportive of the Kremlin's foreign policy initiatives, which aimed at undermining the Western alliance's military capability and reducing the perceived threat to the socialist bloc. Thus, on 19 December 1957, Beijing came out in support of the Soviet Union's peace proposals including one which would prohibit the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of East and West Germany and "other countries."⁶ Chinese Communist Party organs *Renmin Ribao* and *Guangming Ribao* published a series of articles and editorials supporting the cause of a nuclear-free Europe and the Soviet proposal of 21 January 1958 that the Middle East should also "be turned into an area free of nuclear and rocket bases."⁷

In his first major pronouncement on the NWFZ issue, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, in his address to the First National People's Congress on 10 February 1958, supported the proposal of Indian Prime Minister Nehru on NWFZ calling for "the establishment and expansion of an area free from weapons of mass destruction [in the Asian-Pacific region which]...the Chinese people have all along supported."⁸ This proposal was consistent with China's national security interest in eliminating the American nuclear threat. According to Alice C. Hsieh, it was meant to "create distrust between the United States and its allies" in the Asian-Pacific region⁹ as well as to highlight the potential threat to the newly-independent countries of the Asia-Pacific from American nuclear weapons deployed in the region.

However, as the Sino-Soviet dispute developed, the differences in the Soviet and Chinese approaches to NWFZs became increasingly evident. These differences have been examined by Morton Halperin and Dwight Perkins.¹⁰ Halperin and Perkin's conclusions have been largely substantiated by the memoirs of Nie Rongzhen - the father of China's nuclear bomb - published in 1985. Nie says that during this period the Soviet Union was trying to convince China not to develop nuclear weapons and instead to rely on the Soviet nuclear guarantees and support NWFZ proposals for Asia-Pacific.¹¹ Though less enthusiastic about the efficacy of NWFZs than the Soviets, the Chinese decided to pay lip service to the NWFZ proposals in the interests of maintaining the facade of Sino-Soviet unity, and to cash in on the political and security advantages of this posture.¹² In August 1960, Zhou Enlai even went to the extent of advocating that "the countries of Asia and around the Pacific, including the USA, conclude a peace pact of mutual non-aggression and join the whole of this area into a nuclear-free area."¹³ Not only that, in order to outmanoeuvre the Soviets and justify its opposition to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, Beijing proposed several steps:¹⁴

1. Establishment of NWFZs in Asia and Pacific which would include the US, the Soviet Union, China and Japan; a NWFZ in Central Europe; NWFZ in Africa and a NWFZ for Latin America.
2. Countries possessing nuclear weapons should undertake to respect the NWFZs.
3. Nuclear powers should refrain from exporting and importing in any form nuclear weapons, and technical data for their manufacture.

Of these, Beijing's position on the transfer of nuclear weapons technology to other countries is particularly noteworthy, and could have been motivated by several considerations. One could have been the fear of American deployment of nuclear

weapons in Japan and was thus aimed at strengthening the anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan. Secondly, having acquired significant nuclear technology assistance from the Soviet Union for its own nuclear weapons programme, Beijing might have been attempting to foreclose the option of other countries moving along that path. Finally, it amounted to the first official endorsement by China of the idea of non-proliferation. However, this statement was not repeated subsequently, particularly after China tested its nuclear device in 1964.

After China tested its own atom bomb in 1964, it began to emphasise that unless all nuclear weapons states (NWSs) first made a no-first-use (NFU) pledge, it was unwilling to accept an Asian NFZ. In a major statement on disarmament issued on 22 November 1964, Beijing said:

Many countries at present are keenly interested in the establishment of nuclear-free zones. However, to really free the nuclear-free zones from the threat of nuclear war it is first necessary for the nuclear powers to undertake *not to use nuclear weapons*. Otherwise, the establishment of nuclear-free zones would be impossible...¹⁵

Since then, China has consistently maintained that a NFU pledge is an essential prerequisite for the establishment of NWFZs in the world. When Zhou Enlai visited Africa in December 1963-January 1964, he also extended his support for the African NWFZ proposal adopted as a resolution by the United Nations in 1965. Proposals and calls for the creation of NWFZs in the Balkans, Baltic, South Asia, South Pacific, Latin America, Middle East and Africa have received Chinese support with varying degrees of emphasis.

China's entry into the exclusive nuclear club was also followed by subtle changes in the Chinese attitude towards superpower-negotiated ACD agreements in general, and a hardening of its stance on the NWFZ issue in particular. Beijing denounced, in very strong terms, the PTBT, the NPT and the ongoing efforts to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty on the grounds that China stood for total and thorough nuclear disarmament, in contrast to limited ACD measures such as PTBT, NPT and NWFZs which "establish nothing."¹⁶

China's Response to the Latin American Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty (LANWFZT) or the Treaty of Tlatelolco

The PRC's response to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which created the first NWFZ in an inhabited region of the world, provides a good case by which to analyse Chinese policy towards NWFZs, because it was the first time that China had to demonstrate that its

declaratory commitment to the ACD process was genuine. The impetus for the creation of a NWFZ in Latin America appears to have originated from the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, when it was feared that Cuba was intending to install nuclear weapons supplied by the Soviet Union.¹⁷ However, when the agreement to denuclearise Latin America was reached in 1967, China responded by saying that "it was in no position to support the NFZ because the treaty had been negotiated within the UN framework and China was not then a UN member."¹⁸ When China finally became a UN member in 1971, Beijing refused to support the Latin American NWFZ claiming that "the present difficulties obstructing the establishment of nuclear-free zones...do not come from the Chinese side."¹⁹ Chinese representative Qiao Guanhua added further preconditions when he called upon all NWSs

to guarantee that they will not use nuclear weapons against [non-nuclear] countries and [non-nuclear] zones and will *withdraw all their nuclear forces and dismantle all nuclear bases and nuclear installations from these zones.*²⁰

He said that these were the necessary "first steps" to realise the objective of establishment of NWFZs. During the 26th UN General Assembly, China abstained from voting on the resolution for a Latin American NWFZ. Chinese representative Chen Zhu reiterated his government's position on the issue but added one more precondition:

Really to free the nuclear-free zones and the peace zones from the threat of nuclear war, it is necessary, first of all, for all nuclear countries, particularly the two nuclear superpowers, to guarantee not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances; to dismantle all their nuclear bases on the territories of other countries; not to stockpile weapons and station nuclear armed troops on the territories of other countries; and immediately to *stop their aggression, interference, control and subversion against other countries.* Otherwise, there would be no guarantee at all for the establishment of nuclear-free zones and peace zones.²¹

Such stringent preconditions drew criticism from the Latin American and some Third World countries whose leadership role Beijing was keen to assume in its UN diplomacy, and proved to be damaging to China's international image. Therefore, in a significant turnabout, Chinese Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei informed the Mexican ambassador to China on 14 November 1972 that China had agreed in principle "to respect and support" the establishment of a NWFZ in Latin America, and to abide by the obligations prescribed by Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.²² Nonetheless, Ji Pengfei repeated that "China was in no position to formally sign the Protocol," this time on the grounds that "*the preambles of both the Treaty and Protocol II referred favourably to UN resolutions on the NPT and the PTBT...to which China has always been opposed.*"²³

Not only that, the Chinese Government also proposed the inclusion of two more provisions to the Protocol:

1. *Dismantling of all foreign military bases in Latin America* (instead of only nuclear bases as earlier demanded by the Chinese); and
2. *Prohibition of the passage of all means of transportation and delivery [of] nuclear weapons through the territory, territorial sea or territorial airspace of Latin American countries.*²⁴

A commentary in *Renmin Ribao* noted that the Chinese Government had also given its assurance on what is not laid down in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, "namely, the non-dispatch of means of transportation and delivery [of] nuclear weapons to traverse the territory, territorial sea and territorial airspace of Latin American countries," and cited this as an example of China's "vigorous support" for the establishment of NWFZs.²⁵

Thus, in a short span of eight years between 1964 and 1972, China had made its adherence to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, or for that matter any NWFZ, conditional upon no less than six preconditions - a No-First-Use Pledge; the withdrawal of all nuclear forces and dismantling of all nuclear bases and installations; an end to superpower aggression, interference and subversion against other countries; acceptance of its opposition to the PTBT and the NPT; the dismantling of all foreign military bases; and, more importantly, a prohibition on the transit of nuclear weapons by land, air and sea through the NWFZs.

A few days after the Chinese Foreign Minister's offer to the Mexican ambassador was made public, *Renmin Ribao*'s commentary described China's proposal regarding the "prohibition of the passage of nuclear vehicles" as a "goodwill gesture" meant to demonstrate China's strong support for the Latin American NWFZ, but it made no mention of the "dismantling of foreign military bases" or such other often-repeated conditions.²⁶ But why did the Chinese, in the first place, set down such preconditions which were unlikely to be met by either the Latin American countries or the superpowers? Chi Chiang Hu offers the following explanation:

It is likely that Beijing had intended to use these additional provisions either as a *sine qua non* for its formal signature on the Protocol, or more importantly, as an extra barrier to prevent a possible Soviet adherence to it. For one thing, the "dismantling of all foreign military bases in Latin America" would immediately threaten Soviet military presence in Cuba.²⁷

This explains why China reneged on its earlier stand which called for the dismantling of superpower "nuclear bases" only and instead "opted for an entirely new formulation of foreign military bases."²⁸ Beijing knew very well that though the Soviet Union did not have any nuclear bases in Latin America, it did have military bases in

Cuba, and thus Beijing's demand for the dismantling of foreign (read, Soviet) military bases would make future Soviet ratification of the Treaty a much more difficult task.²⁹

Since Beijing did not have and was not likely to have any military or nuclear bases in that region in the foreseeable future, this strategy helped it to identify itself as anti-superpower nuclear arms race and a champion of developing countries seeking to extricate themselves from the superpower hegemony and rivalry. At the same time, it provided Beijing with an opportunity to establish diplomatic relations and cement its ties with Latin American countries, particularly Mexico, which "had played a major role both in the establishment of a Latin American NWFZ and in other general UN disarmament activities."³⁰ On 14 February 1972, China and Mexico established formal diplomatic relations and the Sino-Mexican communique issued on this day noted that

[t]he Chinese Government supports the just position of Mexico and of other Latin American states regarding the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Latin America and considers that all nuclear weapon states should assume the obligation of not utilising such weapons against that zone or those states.³¹

During Mexican President Luis Echeverria's official visit to China in April 1973, China agreed formally to sign Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This indicated a major compromise on the part of the Chinese Government which only a year previously had categorically ruled out Chinese ratification of the Treaty unless and until the "necessary first steps" - that is, six prerequisites identified by China for the establishment of a NWFZ - were taken to make the nuclear-free zones "really free".³² Perhaps the answer lies in the Soviet attitude towards the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Moscow had announced, after considerable internal debate on this issue, that it could not sign the Treaty in its present form.³³

The Soviet opposition was based on two reasons. One was that "the Treaty permitted explosions for peaceful purposes at a time when there did not exist any distinction between such explosions and those of nuclear weapons"³⁴, and was therefore contrary to the objective of preventing direct or indirect nuclear proliferation. Second, the Soviet Union refused to recognise the 200-nautical-mile territorial sea limit defined by Latin American countries for the zone.³⁵

Moscow's reluctance to support the LANWFZ was immediately seized upon by Beijing to launch a massive anti-Soviet diplomatic and propaganda offensive. The UN General Assembly became witness to one of the most vituperative exchanges between the Chinese and the Soviet representatives with each attacking the other's position on, and commitment to, the NWFZ concept.³⁶ Articles and commentaries in *Beijing*

Review, Renmin Ribao and other official organs during 1972-73 sought to expose Soviet "designs" and attempts to "infiltrate and expand" in Latin America and focused on the potential threat to American security interests in America's own backyard.³⁷ A survey of Chinese media shows that while there was no reference to, or any analysis of, Chinese principles or prerequisites underlying the LANWFZ, there were many critical remarks about the sincerity and credibility of the Soviet Union on the ACD process.³⁸ A commentary in *Beijing Review* exultantly quoted a Mexican representative to the UN as saying that the Soviet position on the LANWFZ "has been consistent but has been one of consistent error, in open contradiction to the position of enthusiastic theoretical support for the establishment of nuclear-free zones reiterated disgustingly by the Soviet Government."³⁹

A Chinese commentary accused the Soviet Union of using "wily tactics to refuse to undertake any obligation to a NWFZ in Latin America."⁴⁰ A *Xinhua* commentator noted that

Soviet considerations for support of such zones do not proceed from any desire to support the peaceful aspirations of the peoples of these areas...but from its desire to prevent the "proliferation" of nuclear weapons. This is to say that only a superpower like the Soviet Union, not any of the small or medium-sized countries, is entitled to possess nuclear weapons...⁴¹

This illustrates that China, unlike other NWSs, does not regard NWFZs as part of the nuclear non-proliferation regime but as a political/strategic response to the perceived threat from the superpowers, and supports NWFZs in order to fulfil the "peaceful aspirations of the peoples of these areas." Given China's critical stance on the NPT, this delinking of NWFZs from the non-proliferation regime is quite understandable. Second, China has subsequently supported the Third World countries' demand for 200-mile sea limits and exclusive economic zones (EEZs).⁴² The Soviet Union's refusal to recognise the 200-mile maritime right was cited as an example of that country's efforts "to maintain its expansionism so that its fleets and planes, carrying nuclear weapons, can freely enter off-shore waters of the Latin American countries and carry out infiltration and expansion in Latin America."⁴³

The preceding analysis shows that Beijing's overriding security consideration to isolate Moscow in the world community, by playing up the Soviet threat and "expansionist designs" in Latin America, led it to push the six prerequisites for the creation of a NWFZ under the carpet for the moment. Beijing was also conscious of the fact that the creation of a NWFZ in a distant region would in no way impinge upon

China's national security interests but would certainly curb the activities of the two superpowers, particularly the Soviet Union.

Still, being conscious of its image, China, while not making an issue of it, was careful not to give the impression that it was repudiating or softening its earlier stance on the acceptance of six conditions for the realisation of "really free" nuclear-free zones. Therefore, when the Chinese ambassador to Mexico formally signed Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco on 21 August 1973, he reiterated that China's signature would neither "imply any change whatsoever in China's principled stand on the disarmament and nuclear weapons issue" nor "affect the Chinese Government's consistent stand against the PTBT and the NPT."⁴⁴ Furthermore, a statement issued on this occasion did not fail to restate China's position, ostensibly for the purposes of the official record, that to achieve the objective of a truly free Latin American NWFZ, "all nuclear countries and particularly the two superpowers...[must] be asked to undertake to observe and implement" the two additional conditions suggested by the Chinese Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei on 14 November 1972, viz., the "dismantling of all foreign military bases in Latin America" and the "prohibition of the passage of any means of transportation and delivery carrying nuclear weapons" through Latin America.⁴⁵ Such a posture, argues Chi Chiang Hu, meant that "Beijing was bent on substantiating its claims that its ACD positions remained unchanged with its signature on Additional Protocol II...[and] implied that the Chinese were reserving an option in insisting upon these conditions when necessary."⁴⁶

The Treaty of Tlatelolco, as mentioned earlier, does not prohibit peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) nor does it prohibit the transit of nuclear weapons, the granting or denying of which is left to each state to decide for itself. In order to champion the right of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWSs) to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, Beijing tended to support the PNEs. However, Moscow said it could not accept PNEs as permissible. Interestingly, this position was also shared by the United States and Britain. But China singled out the Soviet Union for attack when it decided to accede to the Treaty in 1978 and denounced the Soviet "acceptance" of Additional Protocol II as a "fraud".⁴⁷ The Soviets were denounced on the basis that their "acceptance" of the Treaty was contingent upon their understanding that Latin American countries did not have the right to conduct PNEs, and that these countries would not receive Soviet recognition of declared Latin American sovereign rights over 200-mile exclusive economic zones.⁴⁸ Thus, by endorsing the right of NNWSs to conduct PNEs, Beijing sought to align itself with what it claimed to be the "reasonable" position of Third World countries.⁴⁹ But if

China and the Soviet Union disagreed on the issue of PNEs, they found themselves on the same side when it came to the question of transit of nuclear weapons through the zone. Of the five NWSs, the US, Britain and France claim the right of transit of nuclear weapons through the zone's territory whereas China and the Soviet Union have declared such transit incompatible with the principles of the NWFZs.⁵⁰ Xia Pu, Chinese representative to the UN Sea-Bed Committee, had stated China's position in July 1972 when he said:

...we should first of all prohibit the activities of all the nuclear-powered submarines in the international sea-bed area and in the sea-bed area of other states. It is not enough to merely prohibit the emplacement of nuclear weapons and the carrying out of nuclear tests in the sea-bed area.⁵¹

However, in recent years, Beijing has considerably softened its stance on this issue as well, presumably because of Chinese acquisition of SSNs and SSBNs. Besides, as some critics have pointed out, even after twenty years, the goal of establishing a NWFZ in Latin America has not yet been realised. The Treaty is still not applicable to four militarily significant states in the region - Cuba, Argentina, Chile and Brazil. And whether China has been able to check the spread of Soviet influence in the region is a debatable point.

Chinese Policy towards NWFZs: 1973-88

Since 1973, China has consistently voted in favour of UN resolutions calling for the creation of NWFZs in the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, South Asia, the South Pacific and Africa. In response to the increasing demand for the NWFZs in various parts of the world, the UN Committee on Disarmament published a report in 1976 called the *Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones in all its Aspects*.⁵² This report identified nine major principles as the guiding elements of a NWFZ:⁵³

1. The initiative for a NWFZ must come from the states of the region;
2. regional states should negotiate a multilateral treaty establishing the zone in perpetuity;
3. the zone should include all militarily significant states in the region;
4. existing treaty relationships within the region must not be disturbed;
5. an effective verification system should be established;
6. peaceful nuclear development should be allowed;
7. there should be clearly defined and recognised boundaries;

8. the member states must respect international law, including freedom of the high seas and straits used for international navigation and of international airspace; and
9. the zone should have the support of all the nuclear weapon states.

The 1978 UN Special Session on Disarmament, in which China participated, endorsed the 1976 report on NWFZS. But the UN definition of NWFZ principles left many questions unanswered. As Ramesh Thakur points out, it did not provide a definition of nuclear weapons nor did it resolve the issue of existing security relationships between NWFZ member states and NWSs if they came into conflict with the objectives of NWFZs.⁵⁴ It was also ambiguous about the relationship between PNEs and peaceful nuclear development.⁵⁵ Not only that, such a definition of NWFZ allowed the transit of nuclear vessels through a zone and port calls by nuclear ships within it, which, according to China, was incompatible with the goals of NWFZs. The key Chinese principles such as an NFU pledge and dismantling of foreign military bases were also not incorporated. In other words, the UN-defined NWFZ was at best a "limited" or "partial" NWFZ, not a "comprehensive" NWFZ which was implied in the Chinese statements on the issue. Although Chinese representatives kept on repeating their "principled" stand on the "dismantling of all military bases on foreign soil and the withdrawal of all armed forces abroad" until 1979, China did not criticise the UN approach to NWFZs nor did it press for the inclusion of such provisions in the NWFZ concept.

After 1979, there was a discernible shift in Chinese policy towards the NWFZ issue. Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua's address to the 10th Special Session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament turned out to be the last time China demanded the "dismantling of all military bases and withdrawal of forces" from the proposed NFZs.⁵⁶ The *Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament* put forward by the Chinese delegation at the UN Disarmament Commission on 15 May 1979 merely said that "these zones [should] be free from rivalry for hegemony between the superpowers," and referred to the first, third and fourth principles of the UN-defined NWFZ concept when it said:

Zones of peace or nuclear weapon-free zones shall be established in the light of the *specific conditions prevailing in different parts of the world* and the *desire of the states* in the region concerned.⁵⁷

It can be surmised that the reference to "specific conditions" could have been to the existence of foreign military bases in some countries or existing security relationships with the external NWSs while the "desire of the states" meant that the initiative for the

creation of a NWFZ must originate from the regional states including militarily significant states.

However, at the end of the first session of the UN Disarmament Commission, Lai Yali, Chairman of the Chinese delegation, regretted that the final document had failed to make any specific reference to many "important points" such as the "termination of all forms of foreign occupation and domination, dissolution of military blocs, withdrawal of all foreign forces, dismantling of foreign bases, removal of 'grey-area' nuclear threats...[and] all foreign military presence and the elimination of aggression and intervention from the zones of peace and nuclear-free zones."⁵⁸ Chinese disarmament proposals submitted at the 21 June 1983 Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament were conspicuous for the lack of any mention of the phrases used by Lai Yali in 1979 and only emphasised the importance of a NFU pledge by NWSs.

The Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament, Fan Guoxiang, addressing the Conference on Disarmament in August 1986 once again called upon all NWSs to "undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear-free zones" and noted that China had declared on many occasions that it unconditionally assumes this obligation.⁵⁹ And Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian addressing the 42nd session of the General Assembly on 23 September 1987 reiterated that

China respects and supports the countries and regions that are endeavouring to establish nuclear-free zones or zones of peace *on the basis of voluntary agreement to be reached through consultation among themselves*. We have signed the additional protocols of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.⁶⁰

Thus, it is evident that since the early 1980s, China has dropped its insistence on four of the six principles - all except the NFU pledge and its opposition to the PTBT and the NPT - it enunciated in the 1960s and the 1970s. What factors explain this perceptible change in Chinese NWFZ policy and Beijing's abandoning of the concept of a comprehensive NWFZ in favour of a limited or partial NWFZ concept? The answer lies in the changes in Chinese threat perceptions and foreign policy.

The primary strategic consideration behind China's national security policy since the early 1970s has been the perceived Soviet threat to its security and strategic goals in the Asian-Pacific region. Even though there has been significant improvement in Sino-Soviet relations since the beginning of the 1980s, owing partly to the adoption by Beijing of an "independent foreign policy" in 1983, this perception of Soviet threat and the need to counter it lies at the root of the Chinese arms control policy as well. For example, China no longer sees the American military bases in the Indian and Pacific oceans as

threatening China's interests, but views them as a necessary counterweight to the Soviet military presence in the region. Beijing no longer calls for the withdrawal of superpower forces and bases because the present balance of power serves its purposes, whereas a withdrawal could create a vacuum which might be filled by powers inimical to Chinese security. This explains China's relative silence and ambivalence on such key issues as the elimination of foreign bases, prohibition on the transit of nuclear vessels and port calls or prohibition of naval exercises in international straits - issues which were deemed as essential prerequisites for the creation of NWFZs in the 1960s and the 1970s.

It is argued that just as the Soviet Union is seen in Beijing as extending its influence and reach in the Asia-Pacific region through military and diplomatic means, Moscow sees China's military links with the US and its allies, exemplified by the British and American nuclear warships' port calls at Chinese ports, China's build-up of a blue-water navy, particularly an SLBM capability, and Beijing's steadily growing economic and military clout as threatening Soviet strategic interests in the region.⁶¹ To undermine the Sino-Western strategic relationship, Moscow has put forward a number of arms control proposals including support for comprehensive NWFZs which embody many principles originally espoused by the Chinese. How far has Beijing been successful in its attempts to counter this Soviet strategy while at the same time extending support to NWFZs in various regions? This question cannot be answered without an investigation of China's response to other NWFZs.

China's Response to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZT) or the Treaty of Rarotonga

China sees the north and south Pacific as a region of vital economic and strategic significance and envisages an important role for itself in this region. The growing security and economic relations between China and the US as well as Japan, Australia and New Zealand have endowed China's foreign policy with what one analyst calls a "Pacific component"⁶² which is likely to grow in importance in the future. At the same time Beijing also views with apprehension the Soviet Union's involvement in the western and southern Pacific and feels the need to respond in a befitting manner. As a whole, Chinese commentaries on the South Pacific reflect the anti-Sovietism of their outlook and more often than not tend to exaggerate the Soviet threat to the region. For instance, Liu Xumin's article on the South Pacific argues that "[d]isputes between the

two superpowers have also made waves in the South Pacific islands. In recent years, the Soviet Union...has been trying to get a finger in the pie."⁶³

Examining the motives behind Gorbachev's new Asia-Pacific policy, Jia Bei, a Chinese expert on the Soviet Union, observes:

To improve its strategic position in the region, Moscow is seeking to strengthen its military presence...and to infiltrate the South Pacific area. By so doing, it hopes to threaten US ocean defence and transport lines, and to put psychological pressure on the Asia-Pacific countries...It even attempted to extend its naval cruising area to the South Pacific after the disintegration of the United States-Australia-New Zealand pact. All these moves have...made [Pacific states] suspicious of Moscow's sincerity about peace.⁶⁴

China's growing interest in the South Pacific was underscored by the tour of the region in April 1985 by Chinese leader, Hu Yaobang, who visited Australia, New Zealand, Western Samoa, Fiji and Papua New Guinea (PNG). Since then, the official interaction and economic relations between China and the South Pacific region have increased manifold. The South Pacific states want to keep their region free from superpower rivalry and China shares their perception. The Chinese leaders have reportedly assured the region's leaders that they have no intention (nor the capability) of becoming a Pacific naval power.⁶⁵ China's cordial diplomatic relations with a number of these states testify that Beijing is not regarded as a threat to the region.

It is against this background that China's response to a South Pacific NFZ can be properly examined. Back in September 1975, China was the only NWS which voted in favour of a NFZ in South Pacific when it was put to a vote in the UN General Assembly. However, this attempt to establish a NFZ failed because (i) the proposal was too vague and comprehensive; (ii) it did not get sufficient support from Australia and the US; and (iii) the conditions in the region were not ripe for it.

The principal concerns of the South Pacific states were the French nuclear testing in Mururoa Atoll in French Polynesia, the dumping of nuclear waste in the South Pacific, and the superpowers' nuclear arms race, and contention for hegemony in the region. The proposal to create a SPNFZ was given a new lease of life in 1983 after the Labor Party returned to power in Australia and the proposal was finally endorsed by the 13-member South Pacific Forum in Rarotonga on 7 August 1985.

Four months before the Treaty of Rarotonga (or the SPNFZT) was signed, the Chinese leader Hu Yaobang, in his address to the National Press Club in Canberra on 16 April 1985, said:

China would like to see the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China supports the opposition of the South Pacific countries

to the threat of a nuclear war and their desire to make the South Pacific a nuclear-free zone.⁶⁶

The Treaty of Rarotonga is based on the UN guidelines on NFZs and is modelled more or less on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, though it goes further than that treaty in a number of important respects. While the Tlatelolco Treaty allows member states to carry out PNEs, the Rarotonga Treaty specifically prohibits the testing of any nuclear device even for peaceful purposes. The Rarotonga Treaty also bans the dumping of radioactive nuclear waste in the zone. However, unlike the Tlatelolco regime, which bans nuclear weapons from the high seas under the treaty zone's, over 200-miles from the shore; the Rarotonga Treaty bans the presence of nuclear weapons only on the territories of South Pacific states, up to the 12-mile territorial sea limit.⁶⁷ The SPNFZT also guarantees the freedom of navigation of the high seas and each state retains the right to allow port calls, transit by nuclear warships or aircraft of its territorial waters and airspace, the use of territory within the zone for command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I) activities for nuclear weapons systems, and allows the continuation of existing security arrangements.⁶⁸ Likewise, it imposes no ban on the testing of nuclear launch vehicles such as missiles by outside powers within the treaty's zone. It may be mentioned here that China and the Soviet Union have been testing missile delivery systems for nuclear warheads in the South Pacific⁶⁹, and the Rarotonga Treaty does not seek to curb their missile testing so long as they do not test nuclear warheads. Such an approach, according to one analyst, "was essential to secure the support of states in and outside of the region."⁷⁰

After the treaty came into effect on 1 December 1986, the Soviet Union, a long standing champion of NFZs, became the first NWS to sign it on 15 December 1986 followed by China which signed Protocols II and III on 10 February 1987. A statement issued on this occasion said that "China respects the status of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone and will not use or threaten to use or test nuclear weapons in the region." China will fulfil its obligations under the two protocols, the statement said, but added:

The Chinese Government reserves the right to reconsider these obligations if another nuclear state or the contracting parties to the treaty take any action in gross violation of the treaty and its attached protocols, thus changing the status of the nuclear free zone and endangering the security interests of China.⁷¹

It also emphasised that the signing of the protocols does not imply China has changed its position on the PTBT or the NPT. Similar statements were made by China when it signed the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1973. Although the Rarotonga Treaty is more favourably inclined to complement and supplement the NPT and links with the IAEA

than is the Tlatelolco Treaty, China did not criticise it on this account, nor did it take this opportunity to emphasise the right of NNWSs to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This indicated a change in Beijing's earlier stance on the PNEs, particularly after India had conducted the so-called PNE in 1974.

Much more significant in this regard is the Chinese silence on port calls by nuclear ships and transit of nuclear warships and aircraft through the treaty's zone. In view of the stand taken by Beijing when it signed the Tlatelolco Treaty, one would have expected China to condemn the stationing of American military facilities in Australia, the granting of free passage to nuclear warships, submarines and aircraft through the SPNFZ and port calls by nuclear ships, and to endorse the Soviet stand and that of some of the South Pacific island nations such as the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and PNG, that ships and planes carrying nuclear arms should be prohibited from transiting the South Pacific. However, China's security interests dictated that Beijing not comment - in sharp contrast with its past practice - on such potentially controversial but "important" points.

Chinese policy on port visits by nuclear armed ships provides an interesting example of the contradictions in Beijing's declaratory and operational policies. When New Zealand banned nuclear-armed and -powered vessels calling at its ports in 1985, China welcomed the move and called it a "completely correct decision" which indicated that "the superpowers can no longer tell their allies what to do."⁷² Later in April 1985, in his zeal to emphasise the identical interests and policies of China and the South Pacific states endeavouring for a NFZ, Chinese leader Hu Yaobang said that China would also not allow port calls by nuclear-capable ships.⁷³ He thus conveniently overlooked the fact that China, unlike the South Pacific states such as New Zealand, is a nuclear-weapon state, and it would be highly hypocritical for China to claim that foreign nuclear-armed ships calling at its ports constitute a more serious danger than its own nuclear installations and weapons. The question of port calls by British and American nuclear warships to China has already been examined elsewhere in detail.⁷⁴ It is sufficient to say here that Beijing later made a significant turnabout and allowed British and American nuclear warships to call at Shanghai and Qingdao. In so doing, China backed away from its port ban in the larger and more important interest of developing strategic ties with the West.

Thus, it is not surprising that the Chinese have not come out with any exhaustive analysis of the SPNFZT as they did when the LANWFZT was being negotiated.⁷⁵ This reticence reflected Beijing's assessment that a ban on transit of nuclear warships or port calls or demand for the dismantling of American military installations in the South

Pacific would disadvantage the United States much more than the Soviet Union. It would also have been in contravention of the SPNFZT articles which specifically state that each party is free to decide for itself on such issues as port visits and transit rights. Still the fact remains that while the Soviets were complaining that the Australian Prime Minister, by pushing the Washington line on transit rights and port calls, had "weakened the efficacy of the treaty"⁷⁶, the Chinese must have been happy to note that the Treaty was designed to avoid constraining free navigation by US naval vessels and to keep the region off-limits to their enemy, the Soviet Union. It was precisely for this reason that the Soviet Union, while signing the Rarotonga Treaty, raised objections regarding transit rights and port calls and attached conditions which, according to Andrew Mack and Robyn Lim, defeated the very purpose of signing the Treaty.⁷⁷ However, this time the Soviet position on the SPNFZT was not subjected to criticism and ridicule by Beijing's propaganda machinery, apparently because China's own position, when compared with its previous policy on NFZs, was far from tenable.

Beijing knew only too well that the Soviets had been clamouring for a more comprehensive NFZ in the South Pacific with a view to excluding American warships and aircraft from the territories close to US allies. It also knew that the nuclear issue was being exploited by the Soviet Union to get maximum propaganda mileage because of the existence of a strong anti-nuclear sentiment and peace movement in Australia, New Zealand and other South Pacific countries. Very often, the Soviet Union sought to convert this "anti-nuclearism" into "anti-Americanism" in an attempt to curtail the US military presence and influence through calls for NFZs that would have a much greater impact on US strategic mobility than on that of the Soviet Union.⁷⁸

Apparently for these reasons, Beijing tried to highlight the Soviet threat to the region. One Chinese analyst suggested that "the Soviet military buildup in the Pacific region - especially the Soviet base in Cam Ranh Bay and Soviet support for Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea - constitutes a threat to Oceania's peace and security."⁷⁹ Another article by Gui Tongchang also argued along the same lines when it said that "by holding Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay, Soviet naval forces have been stretched to the South Pacific..." but the author was more sympathetic to the Reagan administration which

has encountered a series of military difficulties as the Kampuchean issue is far from settled, South Korea is in the throes of unrest, and New Zealand continues to refuse to harbour US nuclear warships in its ports.⁸⁰

Just one month before the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Rarotonga on 15 December 1986, one of China's prominent Soviet-watchers, Wang Hexing, while appreciating the South Pacific nations' endeavour to set up a NFZ, warned that

US influence in the South Pacific has decreased as a result of disagreement with New Zealand over its anti-nuclear policy, which cripples the US-Australia-New Zealand alliance. All this has helped the Soviet Union to make certain gains...It has also pushed its way into the southern Pacific region, signing fishery agreements with Kiribati and setting up diplomatic relations with Vanuatu.⁸¹

Thus, Beijing's suspicion of Soviet designs in the region coupled with its desire to develop close relations with the South Pacific states predisposed it to support the SPNFZT. Besides, from China's perspective, the Rarotonga Treaty, like the Tlatelolco Treaty, does not in any way impinge upon Chinese security interests. It essentially maintains the status quo in the region. Furthermore, it allows and legitimises China's test-firing of its long-range ICBMs and SLBMs in the South Pacific. Similarly, it places no restrictions on the movement of China's nuclear submarines in the South Pacific waters or naval exercises within the zone. In May 1986, the Chinese navy conducted one of its most extensive exercises yet in the Pacific Ocean close to the SPNFZ waters. And during an official visit to New Zealand in 1988, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen surprised his hosts by saying that "China accepted the right of France to test nuclear weapons in the Pacific."⁸² The Chinese support for French nuclear testing in the Pacific, though in opposition to the aspirations of South Pacific states, is consistent with Beijing's support for the preservation and enhancement of France's nuclear deterrent capability. In short, SPNFZT not only legitimises American military involvement, but also serves Chinese security interests equally well.

China and the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ)

Southeast Asia is a region of critical strategic and geopolitical importance to the Chinese national security. At the same time, it is also a "problem area" for China as far as policy making is concerned.⁸³ For historical reasons, fear and suspicion of China run deep throughout Southeast Asia. Geographically, Southeast Asia shares long land and maritime boundaries with China and links the vital sea and air lines of communication between the Indian and Pacific oceans which are as important for China as for the two superpowers. Moreover, it is a volatile region characterised by fluctuating relationships and the pervasive involvement of the superpowers. The US maintains a significant military presence in Southeast Asia with its bases in the Philippines. The Soviet Union,

too, has military bases in Cam Ranh Bay and Danang in Vietnam. Furthermore, a satisfactory solution to the Kampuchean problem is yet to be worked out.

China's rivalry with the USSR has led to greater Soviet involvement in the region, where the Soviet Union is seen as engaged ^{not only in competition with the US but} in the containment of China. This explains Beijing's uneasiness over the Soviet-backed Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. Seen from the Southeast Asian nations' perspective, China - a regional superpower with its large size, considerable military forces armed with nuclear weapons, its efforts to develop a blue-water naval capability and with a history of intervention in the region - poses a potential threat to security and stability of the region. The principal nuclear threat to Southeast Asia comes from the nuclear weapons stored by the two superpowers in their respective bases and their targeting of each other's bases.⁸⁴ It has also been reported since 1979 that some of China's IRBMs are targeted at the Soviet bases in Vietnam. This means, of course, that the whole of Southeast Asia is within range of Chinese nuclear missiles. Theoretically speaking, China's strategic weapons could "be used in support of a Chinese ground offensive into Southeast Asia."⁸⁵

The fear of their large neighbour has forced some of the Southeast Asian states to rely upon the support of the two superpowers - the Soviet Union in the case of Vietnam, and the United States in the case of ASEAN - to act as a counterweight to China. Southeast Asia is thus subject to the countervailing influence and power of three NWSs - the US, the Soviet Union and China; the primary objective of these three powers "is not so much to win as to prevent its adversary from winning."⁸⁶

Since the signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty and Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea, China has been treating ASEAN with increasing sympathy and has sought to identify itself with ASEAN's fears of both Hanoi and Moscow. China's growing military ties with Thailand to shore up Bangkok's military capabilities are a pointer in this direction.⁸⁷ Beijing has supported the concept of a "Zone of Peace, Friendship and Neutrality" (ZOPFAN), seen as a means of extricating the region from the superpowers' rivalry. However, though it refrains from saying so in public, China wishes to "retain an American presence both to offset Soviet power, and to moderate [its] difficult relations with the ASEAN states."⁸⁸ This Chinese stance is incompatible with the ideals of ZOPFAN.

There is no consensus among ASEAN states on how to deal with the involvement in the region of external powers. The Kampuchean conflict has made ASEAN's goal of freeing the region from superpower rivalry and adopting a policy of equidistance impossible to achieve. Indonesia and Malaysia are none too happy at the evolving

military relationship between China and Thailand, which has given Beijing - an external power seen as posing a long-term threat to the region - a foothold in Southeast Asia. These two states view as undesirable the policy of weakening Vietnam which is considered an ultimate bulwark against the long-term expansion of Chinese influence in the region. Furthermore, Indonesia and Malaysia have indicated on more than one occasion that the Soviet military presence in Southeast Asia is intended to balance that of the United States' and is no cause of concern to them. Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Musa Hitam outlined the objective of a ZOPFAN thus in March 1984:

The countries of Southeast Asia must not only seek non-involvement in the Sino-Soviet and US-Soviet conflict, but also act to prevent hegemonism whether it be Soviet or *Chinese* or American.⁸⁹

It is no coincidence then that the demand for the creation of a NWFZ in Southeast Asia has also originated from Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta. In 1982, Indonesia proposed a NWFZ for Southeast Asia at the UN Conference on Disarmament. Two years later, at the Jakarta meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers in July 1984, Indonesia received support from Malaysia for its SEANWFZ proposal and a working group was set up to study the issue. The nineteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, held in Manila in June 1986, noted with interest the conclusion of a nuclear weapons free zone in August 1985 in the South Pacific, and directed the continuation of the study "with a view to drafting as soon as possible a treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone."⁹⁰ And the Manila Declaration issued at the end of the Manila ASEAN Summit in December 1987 stated:

ASEAN shall intensify its efforts towards the early establishment of a Southeast Asian NWFZ, including the continuation of the consideration of all aspects relating to the establishment of the zone and of an appropriate instrument to establish the zone.⁹¹

The proposal for a SEANWFZ poses a number of tactical problems for China despite Beijing's support for Third World countries which "are striving for the establishment of nuclear free zones" so as to "ease international tensions."⁹² As the preceding analysis shows, Beijing has already ratified the Tlatelolco and the Rarotonga treaties and has been more forthcoming on NWFZ issues than any other NWS. This has led many observers to conclude that China would unreservedly support a SEANWFZ treaty as and when it is signed. On the surface, this might seem plausible. Having supported NWFZs in other regions, Beijing would not want to be seen as dragging its feet on the issue of a NWFZ in its own vicinity. And yet the fact that a NWFZ is to be created in its vicinity makes things difficult for China.

A survey of the Chinese media and official statements shows that while Beijing has been very enthusiastic and consistent about the creation of NWFZs/NFZs in distant regions of the world, be it Latin America or South Pacific or the Middle East, when it comes to the establishment of such zones nearer home, Beijing maintains a discreet silence and ambiguity. Southeast Asia is one such region, the other is Northeast Asia. Although the talk of establishing a NWFZ in Southeast Asia has been in the air for quite some time now (for four years to be exact), one hardly finds any mention of the subject in Chinese commentaries on the ASEAN or NWFZs. This is apparently because of the perceived negative impact of such zones on China's security interests, its force deployment and strategic doctrine.

During Vice-Premier Tian Jiyun's visit to Malaysia in October 1986, he was briefed by the Malaysian Government on the SEANWFZ proposal.⁹³ One news report later quoted him as stating that "China favours the concept of a demilitarised, nuclear-free, peace and neutral zone in the ASEAN region."⁹⁴ However, there was no mention of Tian Jiyun's remarks in support of a SEANWFZ in the Chinese media, notably in the authoritative *Beijing Review*. Beijing's lack of enthusiasm is also evident in Tian's reported support for a nuclear-free zone in the ASEAN region (which does not include Indochina) in contrast to the whole of Southeast Asia. A commentary in *Beijing Review* on the December 1987 ASEAN Summit particularly highlighted the fact that,

differences arose between summit participants on thorny regional security issues such as the declaration of Southeast Asia as a nuclear-free zone. They failed to sign a resolution on the issue as expected and decided to hold further discussions and conduct a thorough study on the proposal.⁹⁵

In March 1987, China's Vice-Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, addressing the Regional Conference on Disarmament in Beijing, reiterated China's support for NFZs without referring to the SEANWFZ proposal. He said:

China unequivocally supports the proposals for the establishment of nuclear free zones in Latin America, the South Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean Peninsula.⁹⁶

Once again, the notable omission was any reference to the proposed SEANWFZ. Was it deliberate? Could it be interpreted to mean that Beijing had not yet formulated its response to a SEANWFZ? Perhaps. Whatever the case, one thing is obvious: Beijing realises that a SEANWFZ cuts too close for comfort particularly when it takes into account the motives of the protagonists behind this move - Indonesia and Malaysia.⁹⁷ Besides, there are a number of issues which would determine China's response to a SEANWFZ.

1. *Boundaries of the Zone:*

Unlike Latin America and the South Pacific, Southeast Asia is not a distinct geographical entity. What is worse, the region is divided into two camps holding divergent worldviews: six pro-Western ASEAN states and the three communist states of Indochina. In addition, there is the isolationist Burma. Moreover, territorial disputes within the region remain unresolved, creating further problems for the creation of a SEANWFZ.

To take the territorial disputes first, Chinese claims to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, located nearly 1,000 km from the Chinese mainland in the South China Sea, overlap with the claims of Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines. The Spratlys are regarded by these states as part of the Southeast Asian region because of their geographical proximity and therefore would come under the proposed NWFZ. However, it is highly unlikely that China would agree to join a NWFZ either as a Southeast Asian state (because of its claims to Spratly and its southern province of Hainan) or renounce its claims to South China Sea islands. On the contrary, there is evidence that China is engaged in a massive buildup of its naval forces, following naval shootouts between Chinese and Vietnamese forces in early 1988, as a prelude to "recover[ing] the islands at an appropriate time."⁹⁸ In view of strategic trends in the Southeast Asian and South Asian maritime regimes, Chinese naval planners see the Spratlys as ideally located not only to contain Soviet military activities in the region but also to allow China to expand its maritime interests in the Indian Ocean.⁹⁹ China's acquisition of a blue water navy and its intransigence over its claims to the South China Sea islands serve as a potent reminder to Southeast Asian states as to "how far China's historical and security interests penetrate into the Southeast Asia" and pose a future threat to regional stability.¹⁰⁰ In short, Beijing is not likely to endorse a SEANWFZ proposal which is seen in any way compromising Chinese claims of sovereignty over the Spratly Islands.

Another issue affecting the delimitation of the zone is the Kampuchean problem which needs to be resolved before a NWFZ covering all of Southeast Asia can be established. Beijing has made it quite clear that unless Vietnam withdraws its troops from Kampuchea and paves the way for the setting up of a neutral regime, there cannot be the lasting peace and stability in the region, which is a prerequisite for the creation of a NWFZ. China is unlikely to support a NWFZ which only embraces the ASEAN states because it would amount to unilateral disarmament on the part of pro-Western countries while leaving out the Indochinese states and the Soviet Union. Such a measure would be deemed as undermining Chinese strategic interests. Furthermore, it

would also violate the principle established by the UN that a NWFZ "should include all militarily significant states in the region."¹⁰¹ In short, Chinese security interests make it an unlikely supporter of a NWFZ limited only to ASEAN, but Beijing would be more forthcoming should the zone cover all of Southeast Asia.

2. *Existing Security Relationships:*

All Southeast Asian states have security relationships with external powers. Thailand and the Philippines have bilateral security pacts with the United States and since 1979, Thailand has also developed burgeoning military ties with China. Malaysia and Singapore are members of the Five-Power Defence Pact with Britain, Australia and New Zealand. Indonesia is also the recipient of extensive military aid from the West and Brunei has a security alliance with Britain. Vietnam has entered into military alliance with the Soviet Union and plays host to Soviet bases. None of these states would want its existing security ties with external powers to be adversely affected by a NWFZ. Therefore, a SEANWFZ treaty modelled on the Rarotonga Treaty which does not affect existing security ties would have more chances of gaining adherents. In the past, Beijing has opposed security alliances between extra-regional powers and regional states, but no longer views such ties as destabilising. Indications are that Beijing might seek refuge in the UN principle to this effect so as not to affect its own relations with Bangkok, because China wants to build up Thailand as a counterweight to Vietnam and Indonesia in the region.

Similarly, Vietnam, which views China as its number one enemy, is also likely to support a NWFZ treaty which does not disturb its security ties with Kampuchea, Laos or the Soviet Union. The three Indochinese states have already indicated their support for "Indonesia's proposal concerning a nuclear-free Southeast Asia."¹⁰² Since Vietnam shares Indonesian and Malaysian perceptions of China as a threat, such a zone could, from Hanoi's perspective, have anti-Chinese overtones and serve to check the expansion of Chinese influence in the region.

3. *The Presence of Superpower Military Bases:*

China is well aware that the real issue in Southeast Asia is neither horizontal nuclear proliferation nor nuclear testing, but the presence of superpower military bases, and that a NWFZ in the region would be impossible without US withdrawal from the Philippines and the dismantling of Soviet bases in Vietnam. It is the first time that the NWFZ concept and the issue of military bases have become closely interlinked with one another. Beijing's policy on this issue is an exercise in ambiguity, if not self-serving and opportunistic.

The Soviet facilities in Vietnam have made China acutely conscious of the utility of maintaining American military bases in the Philippines. Ideally speaking, said one Chinese analyst, China would like to see no foreign military bases in the region; but then to counterbalance Soviet bases in Vietnam, the American presence is seen as serving a useful purpose.¹⁰³ Fears that an American withdrawal would create a vacuum which could only benefit the Soviet Union explained Chinese ambivalence on the issue until now. Beijing's position was also in line with the stand of those ASEAN states which want to retain an American military presence as a counter to the Soviets.

However, there has been a significant shift in Beijing's policy on the Soviet bases in Vietnam recently. For the first time since 1985, when Deng Xiaoping said that the Soviet base in Cam Ranh Bay did not bother China as it was directed mainly at the Americans, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Zhou Nan, on 10 September 1988, asked the Soviets to dismantle their naval base in Vietnam.¹⁰⁴ He said that during Soviet Vice-Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev's visit to Beijing in August 1988 to discuss the Kampuchean problem, the Soviet minister had been told that "no normal relations could exist between Beijing and Moscow unless the Cam Ranh Bay base was dismantled."¹⁰⁵ Zhou Nan's statement that a Soviet pullout from Cam Ranh Bay was a "key question" and a test of good relations between China and the Soviet Union surprised many observers and was interpreted as a hardening of the Chinese stance preparatory to the Gorbachev-Deng Xiaoping summit meeting to normalise relations in 1989. This also marked an important change in Chinese policy on the Soviet bases issue which can be attributed to several factors.

First, in view of increasing opposition to the American military presence in the Philippines, Beijing fears that the US might be forced to withdraw its bases to Guam and other territories under its control. In the absence of a corresponding Soviet withdrawal, such a step would upset the regional balance of power which until now has favoured Chinese, ASEAN and American interests.

Second, as the demand for a NWFZ in Southeast Asia is gaining momentum, Beijing has revived its campaign for the withdrawal of Soviet bases. Otherwise, a future US withdrawal from the region would improve Moscow's strategic position at the cost of Chinese security interests.

Third, Beijing might be signalling to the Southeast Asian states that it regards the solution of the Kampuchean problem, as well as dismantling of Soviet bases in Vietnam as critical prerequisites for the creation of a NWFZ in the region.

Fourth, by making an issue of the Soviet bases in Vietnam, Beijing might be indirectly reinforcing the suspicions of Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines - three ASEAN states opposed to the SEANWFZ proposal - that a SEANWFZ would jeopardise rather than enhance their vital security interests.

In sharp contrast is China's position on the US military bases in the Philippines, which brings into focus the contradictions in Chinese NWFZ policy. For obvious reasons, Beijing has said nothing substantive on the US bases. Whenever asked to comment on this issue, Chinese leaders and officials have sought to portray the issue as a "domestic question" for the Philippines to resolve. During his official visit to the Philippines in November 1986, Vice-Premier Tian Jiyun had this to say on the US bases controversy in Philippines:

So far as the US military bases in the Philippines are concerned, this question should be solved through consultations between the governments of the Philippines and the United States. It is my belief that the *Philippines government and the people can make a wise decision and appropriate arrangements to deal with this question*.¹⁰⁶

Thus, it is evident that China does not regard the US military bases as constituting a hurdle in the creation of a NWFZ but just an "internal political question" for the Philippines to resolve. This low-key response contrasts with Beijing's insistence on the dismantling of the Soviet bases in Vietnam and illustrates the primacy in China's policy of national security interests over arms control considerations.

4. Port Calls and Nuclear Transit:

Chinese policy on port visits by nuclear ships has been examined in the last section on the SPNFZT. The transit of nuclear vessels through the proposed SEANWFZ would be as important to China as to the superpowers because Southeast Asia is a vital link between the Indian and Pacific oceans. The Chinese position on this issue was spelt out by its representative Shen Weiliang to the 1982 UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. He said:

With regard to the passage of warships through territorial sea, the Chinese Government's stand [is] that *coastal states have the right to require prior authorization or notification for the passage of foreign warships through territorial sea* in accordance with the laws and regulations of the respective coastal states.¹⁰⁷

In the past, China has lent its unequivocal support to the Philippines and Indonesia on the "archipelago principle". Beijing now suspects that its public position on transit rights and the archipelago principle might be exploited by Indonesia to curb Chinese naval activity in the region through a NWFZ. As Robyn Lim points out:

Given their fears of China, Indonesia and Malaysia see in a NWFZ a possible mechanism to control future Chinese naval activity in their maritime environments...A NWFZ Treaty, especially if its wording was closer to that of Tlatelolco than to Rarotonga on "Law of the Sea" issues, might conceivably give Indonesia the ability to exercise greater control over nuclear-capable naval vessels, including submarines, in its archipelagic waters in the future. It might, for example, allow Indonesia to insist that Chinese nuclear-capable submarines transiting its archipelagic waters travel on the surface.¹⁰⁸

Obviously, China would not be pleased with an arms control measure which limited the transit and/or deployment of its nuclear submarines. However, if the proposed SEANWFZ treaty resembled the SPNFZ treaty (which does allow for the transit of nuclear and nuclear-armed vessels), China could be expected to support it.

Thus, Beijing's ambiguous stance on the SEANWFZ could be explained by the fact that the original NWFZ proposal was more like a comprehensive NWFZ which envisaged a ban on nuclear ships transiting through Southeast Asian waters, port calls, and the withdrawal of foreign military bases. However, the proposal being talked about now would prohibit the possession, deployment or manufacture of nuclear weapons by signatory states but would allow port calls and transit of nuclear warships through territorial waters.¹⁰⁹ In this sense, it would be closer to the SPNFZ framework and more acceptable to the parties concerned.

Regardless of any reservations it might have, there are several reasons for Beijing to extend its verbal support to a SEANWFZ proposal. First, since the Soviet Union has already supported the move, Beijing cannot be seen to be doing less. Second, China would be little troubled by a proposal which will take many years before it can be translated into practice. Third, lack of regional consensus and US opposition to it would rule out any successful negotiation of a treaty which constrained Chinese or superpower freedom of force deployment on land or sea. Beijing knows that even if Moscow dismantles its bases in Vietnam, Washington is unlikely to follow suit because of the region's importance in America's global deterrent strategy. Thus Beijing has nothing to lose by supporting a proposal which is unlikely to materialise, at least not in the foreseeable future. Fourth, an eventual withdrawal by both the superpowers, should it take place, would be in the long-term interests of China. Fifth, Beijing might like to use a SEANWFZ to prevent the possibility of Vietnam's going nuclear in case Hanoi perceived the Sino-Soviet detente as rendering the Soviet security guarantees to it unreliable. Finally, by supporting a SEANWFZ, China can enhance its prestige not only in the world but also in its own backyard where its credibility is quite low. This would also demonstrate the "independent" nature of China's foreign policy. Hence it can be

surmised that Beijing's low-profile stand on the SEANWFZ is a no-cost strategy to hedge its bets in case of either possibility.

China and South Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (SANWFZ)

South Asia is another region where the creation of a NWFZ has been talked about for many years now. Several proposals have been put forward since the early 1970s, but these have failed to elicit unanimous support and approval of all the South Asian states. The region also serves as an arena for competition between China, the United States and the Soviet Union for influence. South Asia has long been a region rife with distrust and conflicts stemming from a variety of regional contradictions and problems. Furthermore, the danger of horizontal nuclear proliferation and a deadly nuclear arms race is much more real in this part of the world than anywhere else. Unlike Africa and the Middle East where nuclear capabilities of South Africa and Israel are unmatched by their rivals; in South Asia, both India and Pakistan, having an active adversary relationship with a history of three wars between them, are engaged in a dangerous pursuit of nuclear weapons. And China has always cast a major shadow over the region.

The preceding analysis has shown that the major objective of Chinese national security policy has been to counter the perceived Soviet threat and to undermine Soviet-backed attempts at establishing a balance of power in Asia contrary to Beijing's interests. China's policy towards South Asia in general and towards India in particular is also a reflection of Beijing's perceived threat to its security from India and India's close friend, the Soviet Union.

Soon after its entry into the United Nations, Beijing voted for the UN General Assembly resolution, sponsored by Sri Lanka, on the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (IOZOP).¹¹⁰ This was the *first* time China had voted unconditionally in favour of a UN-sponsored arms control measure. The move was aimed at curbing the increasing naval presence of the two superpowers, particularly the Soviet Union. Then on 2 October 1974, at the 29th session of the UN General Assembly, Chinese representative Qiao Guanhua supported a Pakistani proposal for the establishment of a NWFZ in South Asia. In his speech, Qiao Guanhua left no one in doubt about the motives behind China's support to the resolution. He said:

The dismemberment of Pakistan by India [in 1971] with the backing of the Soviet Union gave rise to turbulence and unrest on the South Asian subcontinent...But a new wave arose when the previous one had barely subsided. In May [1974], India exploded a nuclear device *allegedly for peaceful purposes* [and] in June, the Indian Government annex[ed] Sikkim. It is another naked act of expansionism perpetrated by the Indian Government...The Soviet

Union is unscrupulous in its efforts to interfere in, subvert, divide and control the South Asian countries...It dreams of opening a corridor to the Indian Ocean to serve its interests in its contention with the other superpower for hegemony in the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean...The proposal put forward by Pakistan for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia is entirely reasonable. China gives it her firm support.¹¹¹

Qiao Guanhua's statement makes it obvious that China was very concerned about the decline of its influence in the region as a result of the dismemberment of its closest ally, Pakistan, while events such as India's testing of a nuclear device and its emergence as the predominant regional power coupled with the increasing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean were seen as threatening China's security interests. More significant is Qiao's observation that "India exploded a nuclear device *allegedly for peaceful purposes*." On the one hand, it indicated Beijing's disbelief of India's assertion regarding a PNE. On the other hand, Indian nuclear test apparently led Beijing to conclude that a distinction between nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and those for military purposes simply did not exist. This explains Beijing's relative silence over the issue of PNEs since 1974. Since the resolution for a SANWFZ was proposed immediately after India's nuclear explosion of May 1974, China's support to it could be interpreted as a means of putting brakes on India's nuclear weapons programme.

Since then, Beijing has consistently supported the demand for a SANWFZ in international forums and in its bilateral talks with other South Asian states. Explaining China's vote for the draft resolution on SANWFZ at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on 20 November 1974, Chinese representative Lin Fang said:

We hold the Pakistan proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia is just and reasonable...The South Asian subcontinent has seen the intensifying contention between the two superpowers, *one of which has supported the expansionist policies of a certain country in the region*...if the desire for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia is to be realised, it is imperative to guard against and oppose the superpower intervention and the expansionist acts of any country.¹¹²

The repeated references to "expansionist acts" in the Chinese statements undoubtedly referred to India's actions in South Asia which were also supported by the Soviet Union. Implicit in these statements was China's concern about further proliferation of nuclear weapons and its impact on China's national security.

On 24 October 1974, Pakistan called upon the UN Secretary-General to convene a conference of South Asian states to discuss and implement the proposal. Since then, Pakistan has repeated its case for a SANWFZ annually in the UN and in 1986, UN General Assembly asked the Secretary-General to explore the best possibilities for the establishment of a NWFZ in South Asia. However, the SANWFZ proposal has not

materialised so far, primarily because of India's opposition to it. India's position regarding the Pakistani proposal was summed up by its representative to the UN. He said:

We have supported such zones whenever it has been demonstrated that there is an agreement in regard to them in particular regions. This has meant prior consultations and agreement among the states of the region.¹¹³

India resented the fact that Pakistan had not consulted any other South Asian state before it introduced its resolution in the United Nations on a NWFZ and thereby violated the UN principle which states that "the initiative for a NWFZ should come from the states of the region concerned." Furthermore, there is no regional consensus on which states fall within the South Asian region. The Indian representatives have argued that unlike Latin America, South Asia is not a distinct and separate zone geographically and politically. South Asia is surrounded by nuclear weapon states or countries aligned to the NWSs. However, the real motive behind India's rejection of the proposal was the perceived threat to its security from nuclear China which was "deliberately excluded" from the region in the Pakistani SANWFZ proposal.¹¹⁴ K. Subrahmanyam, the then director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, elaborated this point:

We should agree with General Zia-ul-Haq [the then President of Pakistan] that the nuclear issue is a regional one, but disagree with him that it is restricted to India and Pakistan only. It involves China, the USSR and the United States.¹¹⁵

In an article "Countering Zia's Proposals" in *The Times of India*, he argues:

Nuclear missiles on the Tibetan plateau are sitting ducks vis-a-vis the USSR but terrifying instruments of intimidation in respect of India. Half of China lies south of Kashmir and geographically China is part of South Asia. Pakistanis always insist that China is a South Asian country with legitimate interests in the area. Therefore leaving China out of a regional nuclear security arrangement can only be intended to disarm India vis-a-vis China and subject it to latter's domination.¹¹⁶

Thus, the China factor weighs heavily on the Indian security considerations. India's own nuclear development owes a great deal to the imbalance in the Sino-Indian nuclear capability and the perceived threat posed by the Sino-Pakistani military relationship. New Delhi sees the idea of a NWFZ in South Asia and its endorsement by Beijing as a clever ploy to perpetuate a Chinese nuclear monopoly in the region while denying the nuclear option to India. And so long as China excludes itself from any regional arms control initiative, India is likely to oppose a NWFZ in South Asia which would place restraints on its own nuclear programme.

Moreover, the strong evidence of Islamabad's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons capability, allegedly with China's help, further exacerbates tension and mutual distrust

between New Delhi and Islamabad and between New Delhi and Beijing. In fact, Pakistan's intensified efforts to "go nuclear" have been paralleled by a series of regional arms control proposals ranging from the Indo-Pakistani renunciation of nuclear weapons to the joint ratification of the NPT. This has prompted one Indian analyst to conclude that the Pakistanis seem to have taken a leaf out of China's book. He observes:

The Chinese example of urging for a NFZ in the Asian-Pacific region as they were pressing ahead with their efforts to make the bomb does not evoke much credibility when nations either known to be making efforts to make the bomb or to have a clandestine arsenal come out with fervent pleas for NWFZ.¹¹⁷

Addressing an international conference on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in South Asia in Islamabad in September 1987, Pakistan's Foreign Minister S. Yakub Khan acknowledged India's position that the "proximity" of nuclear powers to South Asia was an important factor inhibiting a regional denuclearisation arrangement.¹¹⁸ He proposed that the NWSs should be asked to undertake, in a legally binding manner, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the South Asian states. To break the present impasse over the issue, he suggested that "[t]hey could also be asked *not to deploy nuclear weapons adjacent to the region or, to remove them, where such deployments already exist.*"¹¹⁹ However, such a formulation ignores the fact that no NFZ so far has required the NWSs to dismantle their existing weapons systems deployed in or adjacent to a NWFZ. It is precisely for this reason that the proposal for a Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone has got bogged down.

Another formula which takes into account India's security concerns about nuclear China is suggested by prominent nuclear nonproliferation experts Rodney Jones and Harald Muller.¹²⁰ They have proposed that China declare Tibet a nuclear-free zone, perhaps on condition that this be accompanied by undertakings by adjacent powers, including India, the Soviet Union and Pakistan, not only to recognise the zone but to guarantee by parallel commitments the efficacy of a nuclear-free zone in a wider region. According to Jones and Muller, this unilateral measure by China would create a non-nuclear buffer between China and India, assuring India that China's nuclear forces are committed to deterrence of "other threats". A nuclear-free Tibet would make it easier for India to explain to domestic audiences that there is no immediate need for nuclear weapons, and that accepting nonproliferation constraints forecloses no longer-term options.¹²¹

This proposal also requires Beijing to take unilateral steps to reduce and/or remove its nuclear weapons from a certain part of its territory to facilitate the creation of a NWFZ. China is not likely to view such a proposal favourably because this would set a

precedent for states in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia to demand similar cuts in Chinese nuclear forces or changes in deployment posture to facilitate the establishment of NWFZs in those regions. Second, it would mean bringing Chinese nuclear weapons "prematurely" to the negotiating table. "Prematurely" because such a measure would be inconsistent with the 'consistent' Chinese position that the superpowers must make *substantial reductions* in their nuclear arsenal before other nuclear powers join them in the disarmament process. Third, such arms control proposals, from Beijing's perspective, "unnecessarily" shift the world attention to Chinese nuclear weapons and present them as part of the problem - something which the Chinese are loth to concede. Therefore, the prospects of China undertaking unilateral nuclear arms reductions in a sensitive and strategic region like Tibet do not look bright. All that Beijing is expected to do to assuage Indian concerns is to reiterate its NFU pledge and respect for NWFZs. But given the history of Sino-Indian relations, negative security assurances would lack any credibility in India.

The Chinese response to a SANWFZ cannot be explained in isolation from China's perspectives on the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean to its security interests. As noted earlier, China supported the UN resolution on the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace in 1971. This was ostensibly aimed at excluding the two superpowers from the Indian Ocean. However, since the late 1970s, Beijing has deliberately refrained from condemning or commenting on the American naval bases located at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, which are seen as counterbalancing the growing Soviet and Indian naval capabilities in the region.

A number of analysts have speculated that China's growing blue-water capability and its increasing reliance on a sea-based nuclear deterrent coupled with its need to bring a greater number of European Russian targets within the range of its SLBMs may eventually lead Beijing to deploy them in the Indian Ocean.¹²² Such a strategy would also ensure the survivability of its nuclear deterrent force because Chinese submarines can hide themselves better in the Indian Ocean because of the limited Soviet capability for surveillance.¹²³ Like other NWSs, the Chinese have adopted a sort of "neither confirm nor deny" policy when asked to comment on where their SSBNs were going to be deployed.¹²⁴ According to published reports, the first of these strategic submarines, belonging to the *Xia*-class, made a familiarisation trip into the Indian Ocean in 1983 during which it may have entered the Arabian Sea. The second such mission by a Chinese nuclear submarine was undertaken in late 1986.¹²⁵ In December 1985, Chinese

warships - a destroyer and a supply ship - also called at the ports of three South Asian countries - Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan.¹²⁶

Thus, a Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean in the near future will further complicate the negotiation of a SANWFZ treaty. Though this deployment will be directed primarily against the Soviet Union, it will have the incidental consequence of bringing Chinese naval vessels into India's vicinity.¹²⁷ Furthermore, developments such as India's acquisition of a nuclear-powered submarine from the Soviet Union in January 1988, which prompted Pakistan to initiate talks with China on buying one of its nuclear submarines¹²⁸ (though it seems unlikely that Beijing would dispense with one from its small fleet of SSNs and SSBNs), would only serve to aggravate the arms race in the region and scuttle the chances, if any, of the realisation of a SANWFZ idea. In short, the Chinese and superpower naval presence in the Indian Ocean would put a regional arms control initiative on hold "till there are verifiable measures to ensure that no sea-based nuclear weapons are deployed within a threatening distance of the subcontinent."¹²⁹

The United States has supported the SANWFZ concept - so long as it does not affect its naval presence and bases in the region - in order to prevent the risk of further proliferation of nuclear weapons.¹³⁰ The Soviet Union, knowing India's opposition to the proposal, has not pressed for the establishment of a NWFZ in South Asia. And China will continue to support the Pakistani proposal for a SANWFZ and the Sri Lankan proposal for IOZOP, but "it seems unlikely to engage in any concrete steps to contribute to the realisation of these proposals."¹³¹ India, for obvious reasons, could be willing to enter into a limited regional security agreement with Pakistan, which enjoins both countries not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against each other, but would like to keep its nuclear weapons programme operational in view of the Chinese nuclear capability. However, such an arrangement is unlikely to be accepted by a Pakistani government.¹³²

To sum up, the lack of any shared security perception, sharp differences over the delimitation of the zone, regional tensions and rivalries between India and China and India and Pakistan and, finally, India's opposition to the NWFZ concept seen as "deviously attractive subterfuges designed to commit nations to the [discriminatory] NPT regime indirectly"¹³³ mean that the prospects of establishing a SANWFZ are as remote as those of a SEANFZ. It seems that even positive developments such as the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the installation of a democratic regime in Pakistan, and an improvement in Sino-Indian relations are unlikely to bring about any

fundamental change in the strategic realities on the ground which have until now prevented the realisation of SANWFZ proposal.

Conclusions

This case study demolishes the prevalent myth that China alone among the five NWSs, perhaps with the possible exception of USSR, has been the most consistent and fervent supporter of NWFZ/NFZ proposals. It shows that China's voting behaviour in the UN, which led Samuel Kim to observe that PRC has extended "firm and unequivocal" support for the establishment of NFZs around the globe, is certainly no guide to explaining Chinese policy on NWFZs or nuclear arms control. **This chapter illustrates that all NWFZs (both those already established, and those proposed) have distinct features, and that it is the specific characteristics of each NWFZ and their implications for Chinese national security and diplomacy that determine China's policy.**

It is argued that Chinese support for NWFZs/NFZs has never been (and will not be) unconditional or unequivocal, but has been determined by strategic and diplomatic considerations. For instance, China's proposal for an Asian-Pacific NWFZ in 1963, at a time when Beijing was engaged in a massive effort to acquire nuclear weapons capability, was intended to reduce the perceived threat to its security and to curry favour with the socialist bloc and newly-independent Afro-Asian countries.

After China became a NWS, it adopted an "all or nothing" approach to arms control. It denounced PTBT, NPT, and by implication, NWFZs as limited ACD measures which "establish nothing" and instead advocated complete and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. When asked to sign the LANWFZ Treaty, Beijing identified a set of principles which it expected a NWFZ to be based upon before China could extend its support to it. However, the strategic imperatives of isolating the Soviet Union and diplomatic imperatives of projecting a peace-loving, anti-superpower image of itself impelled Beijing to sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1973 though none of its prerequisites for a NWFZ were met. In doing so, Beijing abandoned the concept of a comprehensive NWFZ - which was implied in the six principles established by China - in favour of a limited or partial NWFZ.

Since the early 1970s, China's policy towards NWFZs has been motivated by its objective of finding complementarity of interests with the Third World countries in an attempt to constrain the growth of Soviet influence in different regions of the world. China's support for the Latin American and the South Pacific NFZs needs to be

understood against this background. Both of these NFZs are aimed at keeping the regions off-limits to the Soviet Union while maintaining a *status quo* so far as the American involvement is concerned. Similarly, in South Asia, China's support for the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace proposal is aimed at constraining Soviet naval presence while its support for a South Asian NWFZ seeks to place restraints on India's nuclear weapons programme. Interestingly, it also reveals the contradictions in China's stand on PNEs. In 1972, China criticised the Soviet Union for objecting to Latin American states' right to conduct PNEs, permissible under the Tlatelolco Treaty, and denounced Moscow for desiring to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. China argued that PNEs were essential for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, when India conducted what it claimed to be a PNE in 1974, China did not believe India's assertion and came out in total support for Pakistan's SANWFZ proposal. Thus, Beijing was doing exactly what it had accused Moscow of doing less than two years before - attempting to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Likewise, China's relative reticence and ambiguous stance in the 1980s concerning the presence of foreign military bases, port calls, and transit rights can only be explained by reference to changes in Chinese threat perceptions and national security policy. Beijing's non-committal stand on the creation of NWFZs in Southeast and Northeast Asia is a manifestation of its concern with their potential negative impact on the existing security relationships and military balance of power equation in these regions, which might harm Chinese interests. Hence, the proposed NWFZs in Southeast and Northeast Asia confront China with a policy dilemma: much as Beijing would like to win the goodwill and friendship of its neighbours by supporting their demands for NWFZs, it would not for national security reasons want restrictions placed on the movement of Chinese and friendly powers' (in this case, American) naval activities or force deployment. This explains why Beijing has made several tactical turnabouts on the question of port visits by nuclear warships at its ports and the presence of Soviet and American military bases in Southeast Asia. Thus, it is important not to underestimate the degree to which Chinese thinking on the NWFZs reflects important elements of its strategic perceptions.

It can be surmised that as the movement for the creation of NWFZs moves closer to China's borders, such proposals will get a more deliberate and cautious response from Beijing. China can be expected to be more forthcoming in the future on the limited NWFZ rather than comprehensive NWFZ proposals. Second, a distinction needs to be made between NWFZs which

maintain the status quo and those which seek to alter existing security relationships. China would welcome the former and would support the latter only if it perceives them to be enhancing Chinese national security and/or undermining that of its rivals. This leads us to the inevitable conclusion that in spite of its so-called "consistent" support for NWFZs, China, like other NWSs, also considers that such arms control measures are for other states rather than for itself, and that such arms control measures must not affect its own security interests or strategic doctrine.

Apart from strategic imperatives, diplomatic considerations of international prestige, and a peace-loving image also play an important role in the formulation of Chinese policy on NWFZs. In fact, support for NWFZs has become an essential component of China's Third World diplomacy. Beijing sees Third World countries' endeavours to set up regional NWFZs as an attempt to end superpower domination, to achieve greater political, economic and strategic independence, and to disentangle their regions from superpower rivalry and the arms race. It also regards them as an effort to forge Third World unity, and as being part of an inevitable trend towards the multipolarisation of world politics. **Unlike other NWSs, Beijing's support for NWFZs has less to do with its concerns for nuclear proliferation and more with its struggle against superpower hegemony, particularly the Soviet hegemony.** Thus, Chinese writings highlight anything that points to Soviet misconduct and misadventure in the Third World, and contrast it with China's peaceloving aspirations and actions. Such a strategy has helped Beijing project its image as a responsible and peaceloving NWS. The desire of many states to opt out of superpower politics through regional security arrangements also suits China's long-term strategic and diplomatic goals.

However, China's public support for NWFZs has at times been exploited by the Soviet Union, which is keen to draw China closer into its proposals for comprehensive NWFZs aimed at undermining Western security interests. Noting the identical ideas of China and the Soviet Union on the NWFZ concept and the promptness with which the two countries extended support to the South Pacific NFZ, a Soviet writer triumphantly noted that "the USSR and PRC are acting in parallel in this question."¹³⁴ In spite of an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, Beijing remains sceptical of the Soviet ACD diplomacy, its proposal for the creation of a NFZ in the Asia-Pacific and the "empty talk" of getting rid of nuclear weapons from the world by the end of the century. China believes the motive behind Gorbachev's peace offensive is to undermine China's strategic

relationship with the West, and that Moscow wants to "win people over by playing protector of third world interests."¹³⁵ Thus, the Chinese have to compete with the Soviets in their rival attempts to court the developing world through support for NWFZs. This competition might lead to a situation where China decides to support a NWFZ proposal even if it is deemed to threaten China's security interests, for example, say in Southeast or Northeast Asia, for the simple reason that its rival is doing so. And to prevent the possibilities of such a proposal being translated into practice, Beijing can always rely upon the United States and its regional allies to thwart it.

China's interests lie in not being seen to be too closely aligned with the Soviet Union on the NWFZ issue, as this might antagonise the US and prove detrimental to its own security interests. Moreover, Beijing would also not like to get too involved in the arms control process, as it might lead to a situation, for example in the North Pacific, where it is asked to sit at the negotiating table to discuss arms reductions.

Thus, China has to do some tightrope walking in order to avoid giving the impression of toeing the Soviet line on the NWFZs issue while at the same time continuing to support Third World demands for NWFZs so as to demonstrate the "independent" nature of its foreign policy.

1. *Renmin Ribao*, 23 Jan. 1965 and *Guangming Ribao*, 24 January 1965, in SCMP, No. 1701, 29 January 1965, pp. 23-25.
2. JCMS, Peking, 11 February 1964, cited in Hsieh, op. cit., p. 106; and Marion Halpern and Dwight Perkins, *Communist China and Arms Control Questions*, Praeger, 1965, p. 92.
3. Hsieh, p. 106.
4. Halpern and Perkins, pp. 92-102.
5. See Ma Hongshan's remarks published in *Beijing Review*, 28 April 1965, pp. 11-15.
6. Notes 6 and 7.
7. 13. SCMP, No. 2814, 10 August 1960, pp. 104-6, cited in Halpern and Perkins, p. 100.
8. K. N. Rajasekhara, "China and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Issues," *Journal of the Indian Council of World Affairs*, Vol. XXII, No. 1, July-September 1967, pp. 100-1.
9. *Peking Review*, No. 48, 27 Nov. 1964, pp. 12-14; and Halpern and Perkins, p. 102.
10. An editorial in *Renmin Ribao* on 22 Dec. 1974 denounced the 1963 FROZ and modified the PRC's previous support for NWFZs - a concept first put forward on 31 July 1961. The editorial asserted that "unless preceded by a 'no-first-use' agreement, the establishment of such zones would only bind the hands and feet of non-nuclear countries while leaving the nuclear powers in complete freedom, monopolizing or even the use of nuclear weapons." See Long, op. cit., p. 197. "Commentary: At Longlast We're Preserving the Status," SCMP, No. 3421, 18 April 1975, p. 62, and David Salus, *The People's Republic of China, International Law and Arms Control* (Baltimore: University of Maryland, Occasional Papers No. 6, 1974), pp. 50-51.
11. Frangos and Davidson, p. 112.

NOTES

- 1 See Peri Pamir, "The Quest for a Balkan Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone," Chapter 7, in David Pitt and Gordon Thompson (eds.), *Nuclear-Free Zones* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 94-109; Felix Calderon, "Nuclear weapon free zones: the Latin American Experiment," in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (eds.), *The Arms Race in the 1980s* (London: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 252-72; and David Freestone and Scott Davidson (eds.), "Nuclear weapon-free zones," in Istvan Pogany (ed.), *Nuclear Weapons and International Law* (Avebury: Aldershot and Sydney, 1987), pp. 176-216.
- 2 Pamir, p. 94.
- 3 I am indebted to Greg Fry of the Department of International Relations, Australian National University, for drawing my attention to the difference between NWFZ and NFZ concepts. Also see Richard Tanter, "Nuclear-Free Zones as a Demilitarization Strategy," in Yoshikazu Sakamoto (ed.), *Asia: Militarisation & Regional Conflict* (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1988), p. 184.
- 4 If one adds the uninhabited Antarctica, the ocean floor, and outer space, the number of NWFZs already established is five.
- 5 Samuel Kim, *China, the United Nations and World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 172. Also see Shao-chuan Leng, "Arms Control and Disarmament in Chinese Global Policy," in James Hsiung and Samuel Kim (eds.), *China in the Global Community* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), p. 169.
- 6 *New China News Agency (NCNA or Xinhua)*, Peking, 19 December 1957, in *SCMP*, No. 1678, 24 December 1957, pp. 42-43, cited in Alice L. Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 105, 156-66.
- 7 Ibid. *Renmin Ribao*, 25 Jan. 1958 and *Guangming Ribao*, 24 January 1958, in *SCMP*, No. 1701, 29 January 1958, pp. 25-26.
- 8 NCNA, Peking, 11 February 1958, cited in Hsieh, op. cit., p. 105; and Morton Halperin and Dwight Perkins, *Communist China and Arms Control* (London: Praeger, 1965), p. 99.
- 9 Hsieh, p. 106.
- 10 Halperin and Perkins, pp. 99-102.
- 11 See Nie Rongzhen's memoirs published in *Beijing Review*, 29 April 1985, pp. 15-18.
- 12 Notes 6 and 8.
- 13 13. *SCMP*, No. 2314, 10 August 1960, pp. 136-8, cited in Halperin and Perkins, p. 100.
- 14 K. N. Ramachandran, "China and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Issue," *IDSA Journal* (New Delhi), Vol. XIII, No. 1, (July-September 1980), pp. 100-1.
- 15 *Peking Review*, No. 48, 27 Nov. 1964, pp. 12-14; and Halperin and Perkins, p. 102.
- 16 An editorial in *Renmin Ribao* on 22 Dec. 1974 denounced the 1963 PTBT and modified the PRC's previous support for NFZs - a concept first proffered on 31 July 1963. The editorial asserted that "unless preceded by a 'no-first-use' agreement, the establishment of such zones would only bind the 'hand and foot' of non-nuclear countries while leaving the nuclear powers to continue production, stockpiling or even the use of nuclear weapons." See Leng, op. cit., p. 167. "Commentary: At Loggerheads Yet Dreaming the Same," *SCMP*, No. 6321, 18 April 1977, p. 52; and David Salem, *The People's Republic of China, International Law and Arms Control* (Baltimore: University of Maryland, Occasional Papers No. 6, 1983), pp. 50-51.
- 17 Freestone and Davidson, p. 188.

- 18 *New York Times*, 2 October 1966, p. 27, cited in Chi Chiang Hu, "Arms Control Policy of the People's Republic of China 1949-1978." (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Balliol College, Oxford, 1984), p. 206. Chi Chiang Hu's study of Chinese response to the Treaty of Tlatelolco is well-researched but fails to identify the key elements of Chinese policy towards NFZs as expressed in the official Chinese statements.
- 19 Cited from Jack Homer, *Chinese Positions on Disarmament at the United Nations* (Washington, DC: SANE, Disarmament Report, 1 March 1973), p. 6.
- 20 "Chiao Kuan-hua (Qiao Guan-hua) Explains Chinese Government's Principled Stand," *Peking Review*, No. 49, 3 December 1971, pp. 14-16.
- 21 Hu, p. 174; and Homer, p. 6.
- 22 "Chi Pengfei (Ji Pengfei) Supports L. America Nuclear-Free Zone," *NCNA*, Peking, 15 November 1972 in *FBIS-China*, 15 November 1972, pp. A17-18; and see "Note from Foreign Minister Chi Pengfei to the Mexican Ambassador in Beijing," 14 Nov. 1972, in *Documents of Disarmament 1972* [hereafter *DOD*] (Washington, DC: US Dept. of State, 1972), pp. 785-7, cited in Hu, p. 207.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 "Latin American Countries' Will Should Be Respected," *Peking Review*, No. 47, 24 November 1972, p. 8.
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Since the early 1980s, no other arms control issue has evoked so much concern and interest in the People's Republic of China as the superpower intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) talks. This has been primarily due to their perceived impact on Chinese national security. The significance of the recently concluded INF Treaty does not lie in the number of weapons to be destroyed but in the nature of the agreement and the issues it raised. The INF issue which dominated nuclear arms control in the 1980s involved not only the two superpowers but also their allies in the East and West, and had an impact on relations among all of them. For the first time, it brought into sharp focus the correlation between Chinese nuclear weapons in the east and the British and French nuclear forces in the west. The Chinese argued against the inclusion of British and French nuclear weapons in the US-Soviet agreement, on the elimination of INF missiles, because of the apprehension that this precedent could be used by the Soviets to press the Chinese in Asia to bring their nuclear arms over the negotiating table. And, the INF talks demonstrated, once again, how the existence of China's independent nuclear deterrent complicated arms control negotiations between the two superpowers in global and regional contexts.

This chapter will examine several critical issues. First and foremost is the perceived impact of INF talks on China's national security interests. Second, the correlation between Chinese nuclear forces and Anglo-French nuclear weapons and their combined effect on the superpower arms control negotiations. Third, implications of the INF agreement for Chinese arms control strategy, and, finally, the prospects of Chinese participation in bilateral or multilateral arms control process in the future.

As a case study for looking into the relationship between nuclear arms control and Chinese national security, the INF issue promises to be a challenging opportunity. I propose to examine the above issues and other related questions by critically evaluating public and private statements and commentaries on INF by the Chinese since 1981. Alastair Johnston in his 1986 study of *China and Arms Control* has briefly examined the Chinese response to the ongoing INF talks.¹ Two other short studies have been conducted by Reinhard Dröge and Beate Glaser from different angles.² The focus of this chapter, however, will be on the relationship between Chinese security perceptions

Chapter VI

CHINA AND THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TALKS

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as they relate to arms control and an in-depth analysis of the correlation between the Chinese and Anglo-French nuclear arsenals.

China's Response to the INF Talks: 1981-1982

China's perceptions of the international strategic environment have played an important role in shaping its policy preferences on the INF issue right from the beginning. The Soviet deployment of the highly mobile and accurate SS-20 intermediate-range (5,000-km) missiles first began in 1977, and continued in the early 1980s. Some Western analysts have suggested that the SS-20 was originally developed with both European and Asian theatres in mind and that the Soviet Union made its initial deployments of SS-20s in the mid-1970s to East Asia, not Europe.³ The period from 1977 to 1982 also happens to occupy a distinct place in the history of Chinese national security policy. This was the time when China was staunchly anti-Soviet, pro-West, and a strong advocate of forming a united front comprising the United States, Western Europe, China and Japan to check what Beijing called the "global menace" of Soviet hegemonism and expansionism.

Not surprisingly, Chinese commentaries on the INF issue during this period reflected Beijing's preoccupation with the allegedly increasing Soviet threat to world peace, and scepticism regarding prospects for any fruitful arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. In general, Chinese media commentaries supported the arguments of those Western leaders and analysts who argued that the Soviet deployment of SS-20s since 1977 had given the Soviets a political-military advantage in Europe, and called for a greater American commitment to the defence of Western Europe and for the modernisation of NATO's theatre nuclear forces. As one article in an authoritative Chinese publication noted in April 1981:

Soviet deployment of SS-20s has put it ahead in theatre nuclear forces in Europe, in addition to its superiority in conventional forces...and parity in strategic weapons with the United States...which is why Moscow is satisfied with the present balance, while Washington is not.⁴

A few months later, two Chinese analysts, in a scathing attack on the "Expansionist Soviet Global Strategy," pointed out that Soviet nuclear superiority was aimed at making the "US nuclear umbrella over Western Europe ineffective and to exacerbate the US credibility crisis in Western Europe."⁵ They also cautioned the West against expanding East-West trade and economic relations:

No one should pretend not to see that the Soviet Union is an expansionist power. Vital strategic interests should be taken into account when economic and

technical assistance to the Soviet Union is being considered. One should not "add wings to a tiger"...[otherwise] it will be too late for regrets.⁶

From the Chinese perspective, the Soviet INF deployments were intended as a means of "decoupling" the security of Europe from that of the United States. The SS-20s would allow the Soviets to wage a nuclear war limited to Europe.⁷ Therefore, like NATO member-states, China supported the December 1979 "dual-track" decision - which sanctioned US modernisation of theatre nuclear forces by permitting deployment of 572 US-made Pershing-II and Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missiles to counter the Soviet SS-20s beginning in late 1983, while at the same time pursuing arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit INF systems to equal levels. China regarded the 1979 decision as essential to the nuclear re-coupling of the USA and Europe.⁸ Chinese commentator Zhang Fan provided a clear formulation of the strategic rationale for the deployment of American INF weapons in Europe:

Since Western Europe's ability to make an independent response to Soviet expansion is limited...Western Europe cannot do without the United States militarily. Its security still depends on the US nuclear umbrella...It is in the interests of both to contain Soviet expansion, so they must adopt a common strategy and coordinate action.⁹

Some observers of Chinese arms control policy, particularly Gerald Segal and Alastair I. Johnston, have argued that though Beijing was very outspoken and vocal in its criticism of the threat posed by the Soviet SS-20s to European security, it maintained silence until 1983 on the threat to its own security from the Soviet INF deployments in the Soviet Far East.¹⁰ However, my review of the Chinese literature during 1981-82 does not support their contention. On the contrary, there is evidence that the Chinese were concerned about the threat to their security from the Soviet SS-20s deployed near the Sino-Soviet border.¹¹ For instance, a researcher from the Foreign Ministry's influential Institute for International Studies (IIS) pointed out in early 1981 that in its quest for world domination, Moscow had strengthened its military capabilities in East Asia which included a "quarter of its total armed forces, SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers...concentrated to the east of Lake Baikal, seemingly directed against China."¹² There were repeated references to the growing Soviet military threat to Asian countries in the Chinese media during this period. In early 1982, the official newsagency *Xinhua* warned:

Moscow will continue to bolster its dispositions in the East for fighting a "war on two fronts"...So more SS-20s, Backfire bombers, D-class submarines, and other surface ships have been moved to the Far East so as to deal with the US Armed Forces in the Pacific and threaten Japan and China.¹³

In March 1982, Beijing asked the West to reject Brezhnev's "moratorium on deployment" of SS-20s proposal because it was applicable only to the European part of the Soviet Union and would exclude the Asian part of the Soviet Union. "If reduction means only a temporary transfer of SS-20s to other sites," said a commentator, "this would not result in decreased international tension."¹⁴ It can be surmised that the lack of any mention of the "Asian angle" in Chinese commentaries on the Soviet INF deployments in Europe could be attributed to the Eurocentric nature of the US-Soviet arms control talks on the so-called "Euromissiles", not to lack of an awareness of the potential threat to Chinese security.

The Chinese were greatly annoyed by the Soviet rejection of the NATO "deployment and negotiations" decision and Moscow's threat to take countermeasures.¹⁵ Beijing also accused Moscow of supporting and encouraging the anti-nuclear pacifist movement in Western Europe in order to thwart NATO's "dual-track" decision and thereby maintain Soviet military superiority in Europe.¹⁶ An editorial in *Beijing Review* in March 1982 noted with concern that "whereas the US medium-range missiles have yet to arrive, the Soviets have already deployed about 250 SS-20s posing a grave threat to Western Europe," and warned the "peaceloving European people that a general appeal for peace or opposition solely to the US plan to deploy new missiles in Europe will not bring peace and security but, objectively, will only do the Soviet Union a favour."¹⁷

Furthermore, the various proposals for reduction of INF systems put forward by Brezhnev during 1981-82 were seen in Beijing as representing merely a change in Soviet tactics intended to maintain Soviet military superiority, exploit the contradictions between the US and Europe on questions such as detente, Europe's security, the deployment of US medium-range missiles, and upset their plans of joint resistance to the Soviet Union. As in the past, Chinese official statements and comments indicated that they were not expecting any substantial results from the superpower INF talks which began on 30 November 1981.¹⁸

One reason cited was the totally divergent assessments of the East-West military balance. For Washington, the deployment of Pershing-IIs and cruise missiles was necessary to restore parity; for Moscow, such deployment upset parity. The Chinese press criticised Soviet attempts to distort the true INF balance by including "figures for forward-based systems, British and French nuclear weapons and US aircraft carrier-based nuclear systems in the US data base while excluding equivalent Soviet systems"¹⁹ in order to support its "parity" theory.

Second, there was disagreement on the type of weapons to be negotiated for reduction in the talks. Chinese analysts saw various Soviet proposals, such as "a freeze on the intermediate-range forces to be followed by negotiated reductions", or a "moratorium" on the further deployment of medium-range missiles by the Soviet Union in return for the cancellation of NATO plans to modernise its theatre nuclear forces, and restraints on the expansion of British and French nuclear forces, as attempts at maintaining Soviet superiority.²⁰ The American "zero option" proposal put forward by President Reagan on 18 November 1981 - which offered to cancel the American deployment of its Pershing-II and cruise missiles if the Soviets dismantled their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles including those deployed in the Soviet Far East - received a more sympathetic hearing in China because of its potential to undermine Soviet strategic objectives.²¹

However, Brezhnev's outright rejection of the American proposal convinced the Chinese of the futility of such talks. They concluded that the two sides had no desire to reach an agreement through negotiations. In fact, one *Xinhua* commentator even questioned the very rationale of holding talks on medium-range weapons instead of negotiating on "the limitation of strategic arms."²² He added that "the Soviet Union and the United States know very well that their strategic missiles can become medium-range missiles with only a few adjustments."²³ This explained the relative indifference of the Chinese to the outcome of such talks and their dismissal of Soviet disarmament proposals as "old tricks" and "old, empty words with a new label."²⁴ Beijing also ridiculed the Soviet proposal for holding talks with China and Japan put forward in early 1981 and again in 1982 on the issue of "confidence-building measures" (CBMs) in Asia and the Far East and asked:

How can Asia and the Far East talk about "confidence" in the Soviet Union if it does not withdraw its millions of soldiers along the Sino-Soviet border, its troops from Afghanistan, [and] if Vietnam does not withdraw its troops from Kampuchea...?²⁵

From the Chinese perspective, the Soviet proposals for holding separate disarmament talks between West European countries [i.e., Britain and France] and the Soviet Union in Europe and CBMs talks with China and Japan were nefarious Soviet attempts to promote discord between the US and its allies, stir up the ideological trend of pacifism and nullify NATO's 1979 "dual-track" resolution.²⁶

Beijing Adopts an "Independent Foreign Policy"

In late 1982 and early 1983, a series of articles and commentaries appeared in the Chinese media (beginning with Communist Party General-Secretary Hu Yaobang's report to the 12th National People's Congress), which emphasised the "independent" nature of Chinese foreign policy.²⁷ This indicated a perceptible shift from the fierce anti-Sovietism of the United Front policy of the late 1970s towards maintaining equidistance between the two superpower blocs. This was accompanied by a greater awareness and more precise evaluation of the costs and benefits of the superpower arms control talks, particularly the INF negotiations, for Chinese national security interests. Partly due to the changes in their own national security policy and partly owing to the concessions made by the new Soviet leader Andropov on the INF question on 21 December 1982, Chinese commentators reassessed their position on the existing East-West military balance as well as the rise of the peace movement in Western Europe.²⁸ The US under President Reagan was credited with having considerably strengthened its military and political posture against the Soviet Union whereas the Soviet Union, beset with economic difficulties and its misadventure in Afghanistan, was seen as on the defensive.²⁹ Thus, in a significant turnabout, a Chinese analyst, Chen Weibin, stated: "The peace movement in Western Europe is not a pacifist movement as was asserted by some last year...[Rather], the movement is playing a role in checking the arms race between the superpowers."³⁰ This marked a significant departure from the previous line which portrayed the peace movement in Europe as Moscow's "Trojan Horse."

It was against this background that a *Renmin Ribao* commentary on 31 December 1982 called the Andropov proposal - reduction of Soviet SS-20 missiles to 162 (i.e., a level equal to the strategic nuclear arsenals of Britain and France) if Washington gave up its planned deployment of Pershing-II and cruise missiles - "flexible" and "a step forward."³¹ However, Andropov's proposal would not require the Soviets to reduce or even limit the number of SS-20s in the Far East. Hence analyst Fang Min stressed that it would be "meaningless if the redundant SS-20 missiles are moved from the west of the Urals to the east...[because] doing so can hardly lessen the menace to the West Europe."³²

Meanwhile, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement in January 1983 during a visit to West Germany to the effect that "medium-range missiles above the level fixed for Europe by an agreement would be stationed in Siberia, behind a line where they could not hit targets in Western Europe"³³ received particular attention in the Chinese media.³⁴ In a press conference on 12 April 1983, Gromyko reiterated Soviet plans to

transfer SS-20s to Asia for defence against medium-range missiles deployed in Japan, China and South Korea. Chinese newsagency *Xinhua* expressed grave concern over Gromyko's statement and demanded the destruction and not the transfer of Soviet missiles.³⁵ The Soviets' plans to shift redundant SS-20 missiles to a site closer to the Sino-Soviet border, their refusal to accept global ceilings on their INF deployments as required in the US "zero option" proposal, combined with speculation in the West about the possible conclusion of an INF agreement in 1983, apparently set off an internal debate within China on how to protect Chinese security interests from the negative fallout of superpower arms control agreements reached in total disregard of a third country's security interests.³⁶ The internal debate led to a consensus that Beijing should attempt to influence, through bilateral exchanges with Moscow and Washington, the superpower arms control negotiations in a way beneficial to its own security interests while avoiding direct participation in INF talks.³⁷

China responded by spelling out, for the first time, its official position on the US-Soviet INF talks at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 8 February 1983, and by stepping up its campaign for global ceilings on intermediate-range missiles in its diplomatic exchanges with Europe, the United States, Japan, and other Asian countries. The head of the Chinese delegation at Geneva, Li Luye, stated in February 1983 in very clear terms that

[t]he outcome of the Soviet-American nuclear negotiations should in no way prejudice the interests of third states...any INF agreement which allowed the Soviet Union to transfer theatre nuclear forces to the Far East was unacceptable to China.³⁸

To buttress this position, *Xinhua* published articles in mid-March and early April 1983 citing the Japanese and Philippines' leaders' "concern and anxiety" over reported Soviet moves to transfer nuclear missiles to the Far East which would endanger peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific region.³⁹ A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman demanded that the reduced nuclear weapons should be destroyed instead of transferred.⁴⁰

At this stage, there was an element of ambiguity in the US attitude towards the Soviet proposal to transfer SS-20s to the Far East. Apparently, Washington was willing to let Moscow station INF missiles in Asia partly because of the Eurocentric nature of the INF issue, and partly because it calculated, "with veiled equanimity, that Soviet and Chinese forces could go some distance in nullifying each other."⁴¹ The fears of American acquiescence in the Soviet redeployment schemes prompted a deputy director of the IIS, Pei Monong, to observe that "we must be warned by the fact that for the sake of their

temporary advantage, [the superpowers'] talks do not rule out the possibility of selling out the security interests of a third country."⁴²

The posture of an "independent foreign policy" and the need to make both superpowers sensitive to Chinese security interests required a more even-handed treatment of the Soviet as well as American positions on nuclear arms control. Hence Chinese commentators now started arguing that the "Soviet and US military forces are evenly matched and roughly balanced"⁴³ and showed a more positive evaluation of the Soviet arms control proposals, which were attributed to Moscow's economic and political difficulties.⁴⁴ At the same time, Chinese writings on the subject became critical of the United States' hardline stance on the INF issue, which was seen as undermining Europe's peace and security.⁴⁵ Though belatedly, Beijing reacted strongly to President Reagan's "Star Wars" programme, announced in March 1983.⁴⁶ It called on both sides to work earnestly towards reaching an agreement on nuclear arms reductions and refrain from aggravating tensions by extending US-Soviet arms race to the outer space.

In May 1983, a commentary in the authoritative *Renmin Ribao* set out the Chinese position on INF talks in uncompromising terms which largely remained unchanged throughout the negotiations period from 1983 to 1987. It is worth quoting in full:

The two superpowers are carrying on a fierce arms race not only in Europe but also in Asia...It is very evident that if the sole result of these disarmament negotiations is to allow the Soviet Union to transfer its highly mobile SS-20s from the European to the Asian theatre, *this cannot provide a genuine guarantee for West European security* and can only add a new and complex factor to the international situation and intensify the Soviet-US nuclear arms race in Asia. This attempt cannot but arouse grave concern among Asian countries close to the Soviet Union, including China. It goes without saying that if the Soviet Union really wants to reduce the number of its SS-20s in the European theatre, then *it should destroy these missiles* and should certainly not move them somewhere else. Moreover, the Soviet Union has already deployed a large number of SS-20s in its Asian region to deal with the so-called Asian nuclear threat...[The Soviet Union] *should also greatly reduce the number of these missiles in the Asian theatre*.⁴⁷

This commentary went beyond the original Chinese demand for the non-transfer of redundant Soviet SS-20s to Asia and enunciated three key principles which Beijing wanted to be the basis of superpower dialogue on the INF reductions:

1. that the European arms control process is related to, and closely interlinked with, Asian arms control, i.e., world peace and security is indivisible;
2. that there should be no transfer of excess INF missiles from the European part of the Soviet Union to its Asian territory; and

3. that the Soviet Union should *greatly reduce* (note, not totally eliminate) the number of SS-20 missiles already deployed in its Asian territory, i.e., there should be global ceilings on the INF weapons.

Fortunately, the Chinese found an ally of sorts in the Japanese Prime Minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone, who was also at this time spearheading a campaign against the Soviet redeployment of SS-20 nuclear missiles in the Far East. At the Williamsburg Summit of industrialised countries in May 1983, Nakasone insisted that "the security of our countries is indivisible and must be approached on a global basis," and endorsed NATO's position on the INF talks.⁴⁸ Undoubtedly, Tokyo's posture on INF served Beijing's security interests as the Japanese were equally uneasy at the prospect of an enhancement of Soviet military capabilities in the Asian theatre.

By the end of August 1983, the Chinese campaign seemed to have paid off. Andropov, in an interview with *Pravda* on 26 August 1983, offered to destroy all Soviet medium-range missiles above the number of nuclear weapons in British and French arsenals removed from the European theatre, instead of transferring them east of the Urals. He also promised to freeze the number of SS-20s facing China. Earlier, in late March, US President Reagan had retreated from the "zero option" and instead proposed an "interim solution" in which both sides would substantially reduce, but not eliminate, their intermediate-range missiles, impose global ceilings on the Soviet missiles and exclude Anglo-French nuclear systems from any restraints.⁴⁹ Much to the delight of Beijing, Reagan's "interim solution" and Andropov's offer to destroy the superfluous INF missiles accorded well with two of the three principles enunciated by the Chinese government, and alleviated its security concerns.⁵⁰

However, China was apparently not satisfied with the acceptance of two out of its three demands by the superpowers, and decided to cash in on the Soviet desire to gain leverage over the United States by improving relations with China in their triangular diplomacy. Beijing now started focusing on the third demand, that is, *significant reduction of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear weapons already deployed in the Far East*. Referring to Andropov's proposal to destroy the excess Soviet SS-20s instead of relocating them in the Asian region, a *Renmin Ribao* commentary on 17 September 1983 described it as "a step forward but inadequate" and urged the Soviet Union to "considerably reduce its missiles in Asia which pose a grave threat to China and other Asian countries." It further added:

China has asked the Soviet Union to remove three hurdles in the way of developing relations between the two countries. One of the hurdles is the Soviet

armed forces in the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian border areas, and *that naturally includes the missiles*.⁵¹

By including the reduction of SS-20s in Asia as part of one of the so-called "three obstacles" to Sino-Soviet normalisation, Beijing was testing the political will of the Soviet leadership to make unilateral arms cuts. The PRC now appeared to be as much concerned about the dismantling of the Soviet nuclear missiles already deployed near the Sino-Soviet border as about the prevention of possible future deployment of such missiles in Asia. This was evident in the address of Chinese representative Qian Jiadong to the UN General Assembly in mid-October 1983:

China holds that all nuclear weapons being reduced...should be destroyed. The reduction of nuclear weapons should not be confined to the European region either. *The Soviet Union should reduce by a wide margin the large number of intermediate-range nuclear missiles already deployed in Asia...*⁵²

This change in Chinese stance was brought about by the realisation that Chinese ICBM sites located in central China were extremely vulnerable to the highly accurate and mobile Soviet SS-20 missiles.⁵³ However, the Chinese were bitterly disappointed when the superpower INF talks broke down in November 1983 mainly because of the Soviet insistence on taking British and French nuclear forces into account, and refusal to impose limits on its Asian deployments, apparently in view of the perceived threat to Soviet security from Chinese nuclear weapons capability.

The Correlation Between Chinese Nuclear Forces and the British and French Nuclear Weapons: INF Talks 1981-86

The Superpower INF talks between 1981-83 revealed for the first time in the most explicit manner the correlation between Chinese and the British and French nuclear forces and their cumulative impact on superpower arms control negotiations. Although the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States alone account for nearly 90 percent of the world's total nuclear weapons; yet the combined military capabilities and destructive potential of the other three NWSs - China, France and Britain - not only pose a threat that neither of the two superpowers, particularly the Soviet Union because of the geopolitical and strategic alignments, can afford to ignore, but also complicate the nuclear arms reduction talks between the "Big Two".⁵⁴ Ever since the SALT-I negotiations of 1969, the Soviet Union has maintained that to counterbalance the growing Chinese, British and French nuclear missile forces, "equal security" with the United States requires that the Soviets be granted extra nuclear weapons to cope with the threats from "third parties."⁵⁵ This Soviet demand for "equal security" - that is,

"equality in force levels to all its opponents, a formula that implies superiority over the United States alone"⁵⁶, or alternatively, Soviet attempts to include Chinese, British and French nuclear forces in the arms control talks - was strongly resisted by successive US administrations in the SALT process of the 1970s.

However, the beginning of INF negotiations in November 1981 once again brought into sharp focus the problems associated with reaching an arms control agreement without including British and French nuclear forces in Europe and Chinese nuclear weapons in Asia. Since the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s, Western Europe and China have always had one thing in common - a shared perception of the external threat to their security posed by their common neighbour, the Soviet Union. But it was the superpower talks on INF which brought about a convergence of interests between China and Western Europe and impelled them to devise a joint strategy to protect their small but significant nuclear deterrent capabilities from being the subject of US-Soviet arms control negotiations.

As noted earlier, China actively supported the NATO "dual-track" or "deployment and negotiations" decision of December 1979, and strongly opposed Soviet attempts to include Anglo-French nuclear weapons in the INF talks. Chinese analysts expressed their preference for the US "zero option" proposal of November 1981 for two reasons: first, it required global limits on the Soviet INF systems; and second, it excluded British and French nuclear forces from any limits.

However, the Soviets persisted with the argument which considered the Anglo-French nuclear forces to be part of NATO's deterrent. Rejecting the US "zero option", Moscow proposed reductions of Soviet forces down to the Anglo-French level of 162 and stated that a "true zero" would be the elimination of Anglo-French forces in return for the elimination of Soviet IRBMs. The Soviet stance increasingly worried the Chinese because of their apprehension that "the inclusion of Western European nuclear forces in arms control with the Soviets would increase the pressure on China to follow this precedent and negotiate bilaterally or multilaterally with the Soviets."⁵⁷ Hence China urged Western Europe to be on its guard and to strengthen its political and military unity. China also believed that the "zero option" would never be accepted by any Soviet leader, and urged the West to find an agreeable proposal.⁵⁸

The shift in Chinese national security policy in early 1983 towards a more balanced relationship with both superpowers coincided with a change in the Soviet leadership, and the flexibility shown by both superpowers on the INF issue. The Chinese government's interest and involvement in the INF talks deepened when Andropov

softened the Soviet stand, and when Reagan proposed an "interim agreement" in early 1983.

From the Chinese perspective, an INF agreement based on Andropov's December 1982 and August 1983 proposals and Reagan's "interim solution" seemed to offer a way out of the blind alley. Some Chinese analysts started predicting the conclusion of an INF agreement in early or mid-1983. Such an agreement would have partly satisfied Chinese security concerns insofar as it prevented the redeployment of SS-20s in the Soviet Asia and excluded the nuclear deterrents of France and Britain from arms reductions. However, when Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko rejected the US "interim agreement" on 2 April 1983, stating that British and French nuclear missiles were an integral part of NATO, and therefore "it is impossible to close our eyes to them"⁵⁹, the Chinese media once again came down hard on the Soviet approach to an agreement. The Chinese press also took up the cudgels on behalf of Britain and France, arguing that their nuclear weapons should have nothing to do with the US-Soviet negotiations. A *China Daily* commentator pointed out that even if the Soviets reduced their SS-20 missiles to 162 to match the Anglo-French nuclear systems, "it [the Soviet Union] will still enjoy substantial superiority in medium-range missile capability"⁶⁰, because SS-20s had three independently targetable warheads, thus leaving the Soviets with 486 warheads as compared to Anglo-French total of 162.⁶¹ Another article criticised "Moscow's practice of equating their [British and French] submarine-launched missiles to its land-based medium-range missiles."⁶² Beijing also chided Moscow for issuing threats that, since France's nuclear weapons were "obviously pointed at the Soviet Union and its allies," Western Europe would become the target of destructive attacks in case of a nuclear conflict.⁶³ A number of articles published by *Xinhua* rejected as untenable the Soviet argument that Anglo-French nuclear weapons complicated the Soviet defence strategy in Europe.⁶⁴ The potential analogy between Anglo-French and Chinese nuclear forces was very obvious to the Chinese. Suspicion persisted in Beijing that the Americans would buckle under pressure from the Soviets to include Anglo-French nuclear forces in the INF talks. Hence some commentators favoured the limited deployment of US Pershing-II and cruise missiles in order to restore the military balance in Europe.⁶⁵

After the US proposed to base its calculations on the number of warheads, the Soviet Union announced on 3 May 1983 that it was ready to "reach an agreement on the balance of nuclear potency, including carriers and warheads" but still reiterated that the "nuclear forces of Britain and France must be taken into account."⁶⁶ The Soviet insistence on including Anglo-French nuclear missiles led some Chinese to conclude that

unless both sides made compromises to save the talks, the deployment of US Pershing-II and cruise missiles was inevitable and this would, in turn, invite Soviet retaliatory measures. Such an outcome was seen as damaging China's security and harmful for its economic development strategy because it could heighten East-West tension, and accelerate the US-Soviet arms race in Europe as well as in Asia. Hence Beijing turned its attention to the US and Western Europe, asking both to be flexible. A *Xinhua* commentator warned that "if Washington rigidly holds to the 'zero option', the US-European rift could widen."⁶⁷ An article in *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu* cautioned that while "West Europe is willing to see the United States take a firm stand towards the Soviet Union," it did not want Washington to be "too tough, for fear that a state of tenseness may ultimately spread into peaceful and prosperous Europe."⁶⁸

In a detailed study of the US-Soviet INF negotiations, analyst Gong Weixin summed up the dilemma facing the Western Europe:

On the one hand, the West European countries feel menaced by the Soviet SS-20 missiles and hope the new US missiles will counterbalance the Soviet threat...On the other hand, many are worried that the deployment of US missiles may exacerbate the US-Soviet nuclear confrontation and create still greater tension in Europe.⁶⁹

The question of inclusion of Anglo-French nuclear weapons appeared to become the major obstacle to the conclusion of an INF agreement. To resolve the impasse, the so-called "walk in the woods" formula, agreed informally by the chief American and Soviet delegates in July 1982, but subsequently rejected by Washington and Moscow, was revived in the summer of 1983. The main points of this plan were:⁷⁰

1. The United States would abandon its plan to deploy 108 Pershing-IIs in Europe, and reduce its planned cruise missile deployment to 75;
2. The Soviet side, in exchange, would keep only 75 SS-20s in Europe and freeze SS-20s deployed in the Soviet Asia at current levels; and
3. British and French nuclear forces would be excluded.

The Chinese were apparently pleased with the reconsideration of the "walk in the woods" proposal because it met two Chinese demands, i.e., the exclusion of Anglo-French nuclear forces from any restraints (and by implication, those of the Chinese as well) and, second, the freezing, though not reduction, of the Soviet SS-20s in Asia at their current levels. As *Renmin Ribao* commented:

This plan has attractions for both sides...the US would be able to deploy medium-range missiles in Europe, where it had none before, and weaken the Soviet superiority in MRBMs in Europe, exclude British and French nuclear forces; while the Soviet Union would be able to eliminate the US Pershing-IIs,

which cause it the most concern, and also lighten the heavy economic burden of a new round in the arms race.⁷¹

The commentary concluded optimistically that the superpowers would be able to reach some sort of compromise based on this plan. However, Beijing's hopes for an agreement based on the "walk in the woods" formula proved unfounded as both Washington and Moscow again disowned the proposal. Explaining the reasons for the plan's rejection by Moscow, Soviet negotiator Kvitsinsky blamed his failure to get some compensation for "third country forces," i.e., French and British nuclear forces. The only tacit compensation offered, non-deployment of American ballistic missiles, was insufficient to persuade the Kremlin to accept the proposed SS-20/cruise missiles trade-off.⁷²

The stalemate in the talks, the Soviets' unwillingness to budge from their position on Anglo-French forces, and their intransigent stand against any reductions of their Asian deployments naturally disturbed the Chinese. Chinese analysts frequently expressed concern over the deterioration in international strategic environment that would follow the breakdown of talks and NATO's deployment of new missiles in accordance with its December 1979 resolution.⁷³ At the same time, China had a vested interest in supporting the British and French opposition to trading in their forces. Beijing's stance was motivated by the need to prevent its own nascent nuclear deterrent capability from being cut below the level of credibility. As Alastair Johnston writes, "[China] identified with the role of France's *force de frappe* minimum deterrent, and tended to describe its structure and purpose in similar terms to that of China's [nuclear] forces."⁷⁴ On 28 September 1983, the day French President Mitterand, responding to Soviet pressure, spelled out in his address before the UN General Assembly three preconditions for French participation in the five-powers nuclear arms limitation talks⁷⁵, *Renmin Ribao* published an article equating the Chinese position on the issue with that of France and Britain, and vehemently criticised

...the Soviet effort to drag in British and French missiles and use this as an excuse to obstruct NATO from carrying out its plan to modernise its missiles, so that the Soviet Union will continue to maintain superiority in the missile field...[And] to mention the limited deterrent system of France in the same breath with the enormous arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union is "utterly meaningless."⁷⁶

The same commentary also noted, without comment, that "some political parties and legislative members" in Western Europe, who wanted to achieve a breakthrough in the talks "have agreed to taking the British and French strategic nuclear strength into consideration under 'one form or another'."⁷⁷ Johnston interpreted this as a sign of

wavering on the part of Beijing in its commitment to the preservation and expansion of British and French nuclear forces, regarded as an essential prerequisite for the emergence of an independent, strong Europe.⁷⁸ Why would the Chinese do this knowing that inclusion of the Anglo-French nuclear weapons in the US-Soviet arms talks would eventually bring China's own nuclear forces closer to the negotiating table? Johnston's explanation is that Beijing might have compromised, or that some Chinese analysts might have posed the possibility of compromising the Chinese stand on Anglo-French forces in the hope that "an INF agreement which served Chinese shorter-term security interests was more immediately relevant than the longer-term evolution of an independent Europe."⁷⁹ But evidence that the Chinese ever contemplated such a course is very sketchy, because no other commentary or article discussed such a possibility. On the contrary, Chinese leaders and media deeply resented the Soviet attempts to impose restraints and derail the plans for the modernisation of the Anglo-French nuclear forces through the INF talks. In fact, a *Xinhua* commentator went to the extent of warning France and Britain to be careful of *both* the superpowers' designs:

France has to see to it that its independent nuclear force be maintained. The Soviet Union...[wants] the nuclear forces of France and Britain to be included in the talks, while the United States, though officially being supportive of London's and Paris' rejection of the proposal, does not really want to have their nuclear weapons excluded in a possible deal. As France is unshakeable on this issue, it has to keep guard on both Moscow and Washington.⁸⁰

This suggests that China was apprehensive that the United States' quest for an arms control agreement might lead it to compromise the Anglo-French nuclear arsenals. Even if some Chinese analysts did argue that it would be politically difficult for the British and French to persist with the precept of non-negotiability, they did not reflect the dominant view of the Chinese government, which remained steadfastly and vociferously opposed to the inclusion of Anglo-French forces, on the grounds that it would set a bad precedent for China. A Chinese analyst indirectly voiced Beijing's own concern when he said that if France participated in the talks, "it would place the modernisation of its own defence means under the control of the two superpowers."⁸¹

In this context, one should also note that the three French preconditions for participation in the US-Soviet-Britain-France-China nuclear arms reduction talks were strikingly similar to the Chinese demands for "substantial reductions in superpower arsenals"⁸² put forward by Beijing from time to time: (i) there would have to be *significant and verifiable reductions* in the two superpowers' excessive levels of nuclear weapons; (ii) significant progress in conventional and chemical disarmament in Europe; and (iii) no significant upgrading of anti-ballistic missile systems.⁸³ The British position

was also outlined by the British Foreign Secretary before the UN General Assembly on 28 September 1983:

...if Soviet and US strategic arsenals were to be very *substantially reduced*, and if no significant changes had occurred in Soviet defensive capabilities, Britain would want to review her position and to consider how best she could contribute to arms control.⁸⁴

Thus, the convergence of security interests and the need to keep their nuclear forces out of the US-Soviet arms control process led Beijing, Paris and London to adopt strikingly similar posture on their participation in multilateral nuclear arms control talks.

The final round of US-Soviet INF talks started in October 1983 in Geneva. The Soviet side remained committed to its position on the inclusion of Anglo-French nuclear weapons and the exclusion of its SS-20s deployed in Asia from any limitation. This made progress very difficult. On 23 November 1983, the talks were discontinued, when the Soviet delegation walked out in protest against the deployment of Pershing-II and cruise missiles in Europe. The breakdown of talks and the prospect of retaliatory Soviet countermeasures in Europe and Asia were very disturbing to Chinese policymakers. Addressing the UN General Assembly, Chinese representative Qian Jiadong expressed China's indignation over the failure of the INF talks, and held both superpowers responsible for putting forward arms control proposals "designed to weaken the other and maintain its own supremacy."⁸⁵ He reiterated China's position on the nuclear forces of France, Britain and China when he said:

Small and medium-sized states [presumably China, France and Britain] are entitled to maintain their necessary forces for national defence. The disarmament process should in no way jeopardise the independence, sovereignty and security of any state.⁸⁶

After the collapse of the INF talks in late November 1983, the tone of Chinese commentaries turned sharply critical of the Soviet Union, while it suggested approval of the US deployment of MRBMs. A *Renmin Ribao* editorial called the deployment of Soviet operational-tactical missiles in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia in response to the arrival of American missiles as "a grave step" while *Xinhua* described the situation as "the most dangerous escalation of the US-Soviet nuclear arms race."⁸⁷

In their private talks with European leaders, Chinese leaders supported the deployment of US missiles in Europe in order to bridge the gap with Moscow in this area⁸⁸, but in their official pronouncements, the Chinese tried to be even-handed, by condemning both Washington and Moscow over missile deployments. Interestingly,

Beijing suddenly began to support the pacifist movements in Western Europe and accused the US of trying to neutralise them and the Soviets for trying to coopt them.⁸⁹ This contradiction in Beijing's declaratory and operational policies - which could only be explained by its desire to demonstrate the "independent" nature of its foreign policy without leaning towards any superpower - was most apparent in a *Renmin Ribao* editorial of 8 November 1983, which expressed support for the peace movements but categorically stated that "faced with the Soviet threat, Western Europe has a greater and greater need to be protected under the US umbrella."⁹⁰

It can be argued that Beijing was trying to moderate the opposition of the peace movements to the deployment of US Pershing-II and cruise missiles in Europe by playing up the Soviet threat and urging the peace activists as well as West European leaders to accept the deployment as a "necessary evil." For the Chinese, the necessity for US deployments had both military and political underpinnings. Militarily, the Chinese wanted the Western alliance to enhance its nuclear capability in order to undercut Soviet objectives aimed at decoupling Western Europe from the USA, thereby undermining NATO's unity and resilience, discouraging West European military integration, and especially the development and modernisation of the British and French nuclear forces. Politically, the Chinese saw the deployments as reinforcing the US commitment to the defence of Europe, strengthening its political relations with the West Europeans, and checking the spread of Soviet influence.

At the same time, the intense debate on the implications for Chinese security of an INF agreement was accompanied by a flurry of articles and commentaries in the Chinese *neibu* [internal] and public newspapers and journals which emphasised the emergence of "multipolarisation" in world politics⁹¹, in other words, the transformation from a world with "two poles" (the Soviet Union and the United States) into one with "multipoles" (such as Western Europe, Japan and China) due to the weakening of Soviet and American control and influence on world affairs. This was seen as a positive development which would prevent or delay the outbreak of a third world war and strengthen the forces of peace. This projection of Western Europe as an "independent pole" contrasted sharply with the view espoused by a Chinese analyst less than two years before, in January 1981, when he said:

Western Europe cannot develop enough military clout to do without the United States...[in order to] meet the Soviet global menace...it is manifestly unrealistic, in the foreseeable future, for Western Europe to become completely independent of the US and a third force standing between the two superpowers.⁹²

Why did the Chinese suddenly become advocates of Western Europe as an independent pole? The most plausible explanation could be that they saw their own position as analogous to that of the Western Europe - in political, military and economic terms as subordinate to that of the United States. Therefore, by propounding the theory of multipolarisation - Western Europe as an independent pole *along with* China and Japan - China was indirectly asserting its own independence in foreign affairs and supporting West European, particularly the British and French, position of refusing to let their nuclear forces become the bargaining chip in the superpower arms control talks. The multipolarisation theory also negated the premise on which the Soviets based their argument for lumping the Anglo-French and US nuclear forces together to demand compensation for third-party threats. Finally, China was emphasising the right of these countries to maintain their nuclear deterrent capabilities as a means of breaking the superpower monopoly of nuclear weapons and bringing to an end the era of bipolar international system. Beijing snubbed the Soviets' proposal in mid-1983 for a simultaneous nuclear freeze by Britain, France, China, the US and Soviet Union, on the grounds that it was aimed at perpetuating the superpower bipolarity.⁹³ The *Xinhua* commentator argued that "compared with theirs [the US and the Soviet Union], the *nuclear arsenals of Britain, France and China are no more than odds and ends.*"⁹⁴ Thus, the theory of multipolarisation provided a common shield with which to protect their nuclear deterrent capability from being undermined by the arms reduction process. This theme of multipolarisation has since then become an important component of the Chinese national security framework. In short, the breakdown of the superpower dialogue on INF and the escalation of the US-Soviet arms race brought the Chinese into closer contact with the different aspects of Western security issues.

By the end of 1983 and early 1984, there were indications that Moscow was becoming less and less tolerant of Beijing's sharp attacks on the Soviet INF posture. From the Soviet perspective, China's stand on the INF problem had been consistently negative, stridently anti-Soviet and pro-West. The Chinese had, by supporting the French and British position on the modernisation and exclusion of their nuclear forces from the US-Soviet arms reduction talks, not only undercut the Soviets' ability to achieve an arms control accord on terms favourable to the Soviet Union, but had also made the negotiations more complicated by persistently raising the issue of Soviet SS-20s deployed in the Far East, and thereby provided a basis for cooperation and convergence of West European and Chinese security interests.

In a manner reminiscent of the Sino-Soviet polemics of the 1960s, the Soviet and Chinese communist parties' leading organs began attacking each other's position on the INF issue in December 1983. *Izvestiya* took strong exception to an article published in the *Beijing Review* on 5 December which accused Moscow of having started the deployment of its SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23 missiles *even before* the breakdown of INF talks in November 1983.⁹⁵ A *Xinhua* commentary on 16 December accused the Soviet Union of "taking an intransigent attitude towards both the resumption of the Geneva talks and the escalation of the arms race."⁹⁶ It cited two reasons for this. The first was the balance of forces in the Soviet Union's favour: "Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe have surpassed those of NATO both in quantity and quality." The second was the Soviet strategy of splitting NATO, and encouraging and exploiting frictions among the Western countries and the United States through the anti-war peace movements in those countries.⁹⁷ Soon after this commentary was broadcast, *Red Star* and *Xinhua* exchanged sharp recriminations.⁹⁸ This round of polemics between Beijing and Moscow reached its peak in January 1984 and Sino-Soviet relations registered a downward slump. On 8 January, *Renmin Ribao* reacted angrily in a front-page editorial to an article in the Soviet armed forces newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* which accused the Chinese media of taking a "baffling position" on the superpower arms control talks, "misrepresenting the true facts", "not being objective" and acting "in the interests of those [the United States] who...endanger peace and security of the peoples."⁹⁹ In mid-1984, a *Renmin Ribao* article entitled "The 'Truth' in Pravda" questioned the logic of *Pravda's* editorial on cruise missiles in Europe.¹⁰⁰

However, this exchange of verbal warfare with the Soviets was not only harming Beijing's relations with Moscow, but also had the effect of damaging China's projected image of equidistance from the two superpowers. Besides, an unremitting US-Soviet nuclear missile race engulfing the Asian region would have seriously undermined the credibility of China's minimum nuclear deterrent capability and forced Beijing to divert scarce financial resources from domestic economic development to the defence sector. Beijing was not oblivious to the growing threat to its security from the increasing US-Soviet military confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region. Although China maintained a discreet silence on the arrival in June 1984 of the nuclear-armed US Tomahawk cruise missiles on the platforms of the American Pacific fleet, and viewed them as counterbalancing the Soviet Asian SS-20s, it was well aware of an increase in the threat to its security if the Soviets took countermeasures in the Far East.¹⁰¹ As *Renmin Ribao* warned:

The Soviets have stepped up the deployment of medium-range missiles in the region. Eighteen more SS-20 missiles were added to the 108 in place a year ago. It is expected that the number will increase to 144 this spring and exceed 200 by the late 1980s.¹⁰²

These considerations made Beijing rethink its approach towards the INF question. One Western analyst has suggested that China favoured only a limited deployment of US missiles in Europe to redress the balance of forces and that, to the Chinese, "the act of deployment was far more important than the actual numbers of missiles."¹⁰³ From the Chinese viewpoint, a limited deployment of US missiles in Europe fulfilled the military as well as the political objectives China was pursuing. An unrestrained arms race would only serve to encourage the pacifist movement, seriously erode NATO's cohesion and unity, and possibly boomerang to the disadvantage of Western Europe. In a damage-limitation exercise, Chinese leaders and analysts started urging both the superpowers to resume their talks and reach an INF agreement. In his bilateral talks with the leaders of West European countries in early and late 1984, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang stressed the need to evolve a common Eurasian strategy to resolve the deadlock over the INF issue.¹⁰⁴ Reiterating China's support for a "strong, unified, and peaceful Europe" and opposition to the "superpowers' interference in European affairs," Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian observed in April 1984:

We are disturbed by the tension in Europe as a result of the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles. We will join Europe in pressing the two superpowers to end their arms race and negotiate in good faith...¹⁰⁵

He also expressed concern about the deployment in the Far East of Soviet SS-20s, which constituted a serious threat to China, and asked the Soviets to drastically reduce their troops and the SS-20 missiles along the Sino-Soviet border.¹⁰⁶

Meanwhile, in a reappraisal of the US-Soviet military balance in Europe after the deployment of US missiles since late 1983, some Chinese analysts now concluded that unlike the late 1970s and early 1980s, NATO had gained superiority over the Warsaw Pact countries in overall INF strength.¹⁰⁷ As *Liaowang* put it, "with the deployment of 118 US-made Pershing-II and Tomahawk cruise missiles, including the independent nuclear power of Britain and France, NATO predominates over the Warsaw Treaty Organisation to a certain extent."¹⁰⁸

In addition, there was another reason for China to urge the superpowers to come back to the negotiating table and to follow an even-handed policy towards them. During the INF negotiations in 1983, a new and more critical factor - the United States' launching of its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or the "Star Wars" programme - had further aggravated the superpowers' arms race and heightened international tensions.

It was not until 1984 that Beijing began to understand fully the SDI's implications for Chinese national security. The "Star Wars" programme or the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems posed a worrisome dilemma for the Chinese: in the longer term, the SDI programme and its Soviet counterpart, as well as a budding anti-satellite arms race, could conceivably neutralise or undermine the independent nuclear deterrent capabilities possessed by China, France and Britain, leaving them vulnerable to blackmail or coercion by one or both of the superpowers. Hence, the Chinese representative in the United Nations, Qian Jiadong, called on the two superpowers to halt their arms race in outer space, and reaffirmed China's support for a ban on all outer space weaponry.¹⁰⁹ In short, the prospects of an extension of the superpower arms race into outer space made it all the more urgent and imperative to place some restraints on US and Soviet nuclear weapons.

Obviously, Beijing was very pleased when the Soviets and Americans finally returned to Geneva for arms control talks in March 1985, shortly before Gorbachev's accession to power. The Soviet side insisted on a blanket settlement of such issues as strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, including British and French nuclear forces, and the United States' SDI programme. With the exception of SDI, the Soviet position had not changed at all from what it was in November 1983 when the Soviet delegation had walked out of the Geneva talks.

However, there was a change in the Kremlin leadership in 1985. The new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, demonstrated his determination to take dramatic foreign policy initiatives and unveiled a radical domestic socio-economic agenda. Commenting on Moscow's decision to resume arms control negotiations, even though its precondition - the abolition of all American missiles deployed in Europe since November 1983 - for such talks had not yet been met, *Liaowang* argued that the Soviet objective was to "force the United States to give up its programme for developing space weapons so that the ground strategic nuclear balance of both sides can be retained."¹¹⁰ Evidently, Chinese commentators began to believe that the focus of the Soviet arms control strategy had now shifted from the inclusion of Anglo-French nuclear weapons to the seeking of restraints on the American SDI project.¹¹¹

The softening of the Soviet attitude on the British and French forces was apparent in late 1985. During a visit to France in October 1985, Gorbachev suggested that the issue of Anglo-French nuclear missiles be negotiated directly between the two countries and the Soviet Union. But the offer was rejected in Paris and London. Later, on 15 January 1986, Gorbachev put forward a series of radical arms control proposals on the

"stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons," wherein he offered to eliminate all Soviet and US INF systems, *dropped his demand for reductions in the level of British and French nuclear forces but asked for a freeze at their current levels.*¹¹² China welcomed the "constructive proposals," but supported the British and French opposition to the Soviet demand for a freeze and the proposal for a five-power ban on nuclear tests.

However, much to the consternation of the Chinese, while the Soviets appeared willing to compromise their original stand on the Anglo-French nuclear forces, they remained adamantly opposed to any reduction or elimination of their Asian-based long-range intermediate nuclear forces (LRINF). Beijing expressed its strong disapproval of what it now termed the "decoupling of European and Asian security concerns"¹¹³ to President Reagan's special advisor on arms control affairs, Edward L. Rowny, who called on the Chinese leaders in February 1986 to explain the US position on the INF talks. The Chinese leaders urged the US and its NATO allies not to enter into any agreement with Moscow that would deal with the European-based SS-20s in isolation, as proposed by Gorbachev in the previous month. Ambassador Rowny promised that "the US would not bend to Soviet efforts to divide us from our Asian friends and allies by Soviet insistence on no LRINF cuts in SS-20s in Asia while agreeing to such cuts in Europe."¹¹⁴

Apparently not satisfied with the American assurances, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang, addressing a rally in Beijing to mark the International Year of Peace on 21 March 1986, demanded "*simultaneous and balanced reduction* and on-the spot destruction of the medium-range missiles deployed in Europe and Asia by the Soviet Union and the United States."¹¹⁵ Much like America's Asian allies - Japan, South Korea and ASEAN - China interpreted the Soviet move as a calculated attempt to split Europe and Asia over a sensitive security issue and create doubts in the minds of America's allies in the region about the value of Washington's defence guarantees. Some Chinese commentaries compared it with the earlier Soviet attempts to cause a split between the US and its Western European allies in the early stages of INF talks. The Americans were also concerned that their failure to incorporate Chinese security concerns regarding Soviet Asian INF deployments might adversely affect Sino-US relations and force Beijing to seek an accommodation with Moscow.¹¹⁶ To relieve the anxieties and fears of China and its other Asian allies, Reagan cautiously welcomed Gorbachev's "zero option" for Europe but added that it would have to be global, one which took into account the SS-20 threat to Asian nations.¹¹⁷ In June 1986 this demand met with opposition from the Soviet negotiators, who were willing to freeze but not reduce the Soviet missiles in Asia. Alternatively, the Soviets proposed that the INF talks should first

involve the European theatre and leave the Asia problem to be settled separately at a later date. However, the Chinese made their opposition to both such proposals very clear to the Americans as well as the Soviets. It was obvious that the Soviets' insistence on their right to keep INF weapons in Asia had now become the biggest impediment to superpower agreement on INF missile reductions.

The Soviet Security Concerns About China and the "China Factor" in INF Talks

Moscow's security concerns about China's growing nuclear capability made the Soviets reluctant to agree to any reductions in their INF systems deployed in the Asian theatre. According to a Rand Corporation study, the Soviet high command viewed the SS-20 as a deep strike weapon for the Asian theatre with potential use against China.¹¹⁸ The strategic situation in Asia was much more fluid and complicated than that in the European theatre. As Gerald Segal points out, from Moscow's viewpoint, the Soviet conventional and nuclear forces in the Far East had far less "fat" than those deployed in the European theatre and therefore the scope for unilateral cuts remained small.¹¹⁹ (According to NATO estimates, there were 171 mobile SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles deployed in Soviet Asia). In fact, some Soviet military strategists drew attention to the superiority of Chinese conventional forces over those of the Soviets.¹²⁰ In other words, they drew an analogy between the Soviet position in Asia and that of NATO in Europe. Just as the US and Western Europe rely on nuclear weapons in Europe to counterbalance NATO's inferiority to the Warsaw Pact conventional forces, so the Soviets relied on nuclear weapons in the Asian theatre to counterbalance China's superiority in conventional forces. In late 1983, Soviet leader Andropov had drawn attention to the fact that China "has its own nuclear potential, [which] is gradually growing," and expressed the hope that "China could make a considerable contribution to the solution of problems relating to the prevention of nuclear war."¹²¹ The US side was also initially reluctant to press the Soviets for a "global" INF pact because it believed that Moscow would not sign a deal which required it to cut its Asian missiles to levels that would enhance the relative deterrent capability of China *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union. A Soviet newsagency *Novosti* commentary, published in early 1986, vowed that

Washington will never make the USSR dismantle the SS-20 missiles in eastern regions of the country in return for the elimination of the American medium-range missiles in Europe.¹²²

Recently it has been acknowledged by Soviet officials that "the decision to deploy SS-20s in the Far East was motivated in part by the perceived need to counter Chinese nuclear weapons,"¹²³ and in part by the need to counterbalance US nuclear forces and

bases in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and the Pacific Ocean. In the famous Vladivostok speech of July 1986, Gorbachev had also expressed concern at the emergence of a "militarized triangle of Washington, Tokyo and Seoul [where] the US has deployed nuclear weapons."¹²⁴ According to Bonnie Glaser, the Soviet forces deployed in the Asian theatre to meet the Chinese and American nuclear threat included battlefield tactical nuclear weapons, short-range and long-range intermediate nuclear missiles, including about 171 SS-20s, and Backfire bombers.¹²⁵ Apparently, the Soviet security concerns about China, as well as the perceived threat posed by the US and its allies in the region, considerably restricted Moscow's room for manoeuvre and flexibility in INF negotiations relating to the Asian region. The various arms control proposals put forward by Moscow also reflected the lingering concern with the potential threat to its security from Chinese nuclear weapons in the East and Anglo-French arsenals in the West. Asked by a Hungarian reporter in February 1986 if an agreement with China would meet Soviet conditions for dismantling all SS-20s in Asia, an *Izvestiya* correspondent replied: "Why not?...We will be pleased to remove them from there provided, of course, that the US forces leave Asia and that agreement is reached with China."¹²⁶

However, China on its part was equally determined to avoid entering into a bilateral or multilateral arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union because Beijing, much like Paris and London, regarded its nuclear weapons as vastly inferior to those of the superpowers in quality as well as in quantity, and saw the restraints as undermining its nuclear deterrent. As a matter of fact, its whole arms control strategy was based on the non-negotiability precept, and was designed to frustrate Soviet efforts to bring the Chinese nuclear forces onto the negotiating table. Fortunately for the Chinese, they had the support of their American and West European friends in this endeavour.

In October 1986, shortly before the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Reykjavik, a Chinese official repeated China's demand for the inclusion of Asian-based Soviet SS-20s in the talks. The Chinese position was also supported by the visiting US Secretary of Defence Casper Weinberger, who assured Chinese leaders that President Reagan was well aware of the "very justified Asian worries" about the number of Soviet missiles carrying more than 500 nuclear warheads in Asia.¹²⁷ According to some reports, the issue of Asia-based Soviet SS-20s had also been on the agenda of the Sino-Soviet normalisation talks since 1983, which were aimed at improving relations between Moscow and Beijing.¹²⁸ To add weight to their argument for "simultaneous and balanced reductions" in both theatres, the Chinese media highlighted the fact that

Soviet SS-20s were highly mobile and could be moved from east to west of the Urals within a day or two, thereby posing a threat to Western Europe.

The Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik failed to produce an INF agreement because of Soviet insistence on "linking" the INF issue with that of SDI and the American refusal to scuttle it. Nonetheless, the Soviet side, according to *Liaowang*, made "unprecedented, great concessions" at the Iceland summit.¹²⁹ The draft agreement on INF that emerged from the summit contained the following important features:

1. elimination of all Soviet and American INF systems in Europe, i.e., acceptance of the "zero option" proposal in Europe;
2. exclusion of British and French nuclear forces and forward-based weapons from the INF talks; and
3. agreement on the reduction of 513 SS-20 warheads in Soviet Asia to about 100. The Soviet Union to retain 100 INF warheads in its Asian region and the United States to keep 100 warheads within its own territory, excluding US nuclear weapons deployed in the Asia-Pacific region.

Thus, at the Reykjavik summit in 1986, the Soviet Union finally dropped its demand for the inclusion of Anglo-French nuclear forces in the INF talks, indicating a significant departure from the previous Soviet position on the issue. Chinese commentators sought to explain it away as a result of (i) the consistent and principled stand taken by Western Europe and China, which foiled the Soviet strategy to create divisions in the ranks of its opponents; (ii) the new Soviet strategy to scuttle the United States' SDI programme; (iii) Gorbachev's domestic political-economic agenda which required greater economic and technological cooperation with the West; and (iv) the Soviet desire to enlist West European support for Soviet arms control proposals, particularly on SDI.¹³⁰

Though the draft agreement went a long way towards meeting Chinese security concerns, the Chinese government was not happy with its terms. Beijing's strong objection to it was based on the fact that it provided for the elimination of all INF weapons in Europe but the retention of 100 INF warheads by the Soviets in Asia and by the Americans in Alaska. This "discrimination" against Asia was interpreted in Beijing as the "delinking" of European and Asian security, and underpinned Chinese apprehensions that Washington might reach an agreement with Moscow which was detrimental to Chinese security. Even though it represented an 80 per cent reduction in Soviet Asian-based INF warheads, from China's perspective it provided the Soviets with an excuse and an opportunity to justify their Asian deployments in terms of China's

nuclear capability and to reserve the right to put pressure on Beijing to enter into bilateral Sino-Soviet nuclear arms reductions at an appropriate time in the future. The worst thing, from the Chinese viewpoint, was that it indirectly legitimised the Soviet "equal security" principle as the basis of superpower arms control talks. Such an outcome was, then, unacceptable to the Chinese even if it meant a significant reduction in the actual number of missiles whose target was China.

"We are concerned that Asia may be left behind or sacrificed in favour of a solution to the INF problem in Europe," said an arms control expert at the Institute for International Studies in Beijing. "More importantly," he added, "there is also an emotional element involved for us [the Chinese], and that is, equal treatment of Europe and Asia by the two superpowers."¹³¹

Moscow's unwillingness to completely eliminate its Asian SS-20s together with the European ones led Chinese analysts to question Gorbachev's sincerity about reducing tension in the Asia-Pacific region and improving relations with Beijing, a central theme of Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech delivered in July 1986. An article in *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu* in late 1986 concluded that the Vladivostok speech was intended to "shift the people's attention from the Soviet deployment of SS-20 medium-range missiles in Asia and the Afghan and Kampuchean problems."¹³²

Meanwhile, the post-Reykjavik summit tone of Chinese commentaries and analyses also indicated a distinct change in Chinese support for the original US "zero option" which was now being advocated by the Soviet Union, though confined only to Europe. While downplaying the Soviet concession on the Anglo-French nuclear weapons, the Chinese media sought to highlight "the security concerns of West European countries which were neglected by President Reagan" when he reached an agreement on the "lopsided zero point settlement" with Gorbachev in Iceland.¹³³ Interestingly, Beijing now lent its support to the arguments of those - mostly right-wing parties and leaders - in Western Europe who argued that acceptance of the "zero option" in Europe, or the dismantling of all medium-range missiles, would decouple defence of the United States from that of Western Europe, weaken the US nuclear umbrella over Western Europe, perpetuate the superiority of the Soviet Union in conventional forces, short-range missiles and chemical weapons, and undermine the unity of the Western alliance and its "flexible response" defence strategy.¹³⁴ The Chinese leaders left no opportunity unexploited to stress that China and Western European countries shared similar views on safeguarding the security and stability in Asia and Europe.¹³⁵ The rationale of the US missiles was explained by a Chinese analyst in these words:

Western Europe looks upon the US medium-range missiles deployed there not just as a force resisting the Soviet SS-20 missiles, but also as a deterrent force and a commitment to the security of West European allies, leaving West Europe in doubt about the [logic of] "zero option" scheme.¹³⁶

One article in *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu* in early 1987 even expressed sympathy with the hopes of some West Europeans for preservation of some of the US missiles but sounded a note of caution that since medium-range missiles have ceased to be a "critical factor" in the US-Soviet military balance, "the United States is unlikely to make too much of a retreat from the existing programme [i.e., the zero option] just because of some West European countries' opposition."¹³⁷ Criticising Reagan's "rash promise" to withdraw all medium-range missiles without consulting his allies, a *Renmin Ribao* commentator, Fang Qiu, endorsed the West European position that "in its armament talks with the Soviet Union, the United States should not go too far, too fast."¹³⁸

By lending its support to the apprehensions and misgivings of conservative forces in Europe, China was in fact trying to win over their support for its demand for the simultaneous reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons in Europe and Asia. Apparently, it did not matter much to the policymakers in Beijing if this demand contradicted China's own previous policy on the issue. The most dominant policy consideration was the enhancement of Chinese national security. It could also be said that by making an issue of the Soviet SS-20s in Asia and championing the cause of conservative forces in the West opposed to an INF pact, Beijing was expressing its strong disapproval of the Soviet position, and signalling to Moscow to make a positive gesture in the interests of Sino-Soviet *rapprochement* - an important component in Gorbachev's foreign policy framework - and entice China into a position on arms control issues closer to that of Moscow. After all, there was little substantive disagreement between China and the Soviet Union in their general positions on arms control and disarmament, particularly on the SDI question.¹³⁹

In spite of that, the Soviets appeared unyielding in the face of persistent Chinese demands for the reduction and elimination of their nuclear missiles in Asia, "proportionally" or otherwise without a trade-off. Asked by American negotiators why they wanted to keep 100 SS-20s in Asia, "they replied that 33 were for targeting China, 33 for Japan, and 33 for South Korea."¹⁴⁰

By the end of 1986 and early 1987, some Chinese analysts were predicting the conclusion of a US-Soviet INF agreement which would allow each side to retain 100 INF warheads on its territory. On 28 February 1987, Gorbachev called for the signing of an INF treaty on the basis of the Reykjavik draft agreement, without linking it to the

controversial SDI programme. To the Chinese, this represented a change in Soviet tactics rather than strategy. They pointed out that Moscow intended to constrain the US SDI programme by making a breakthrough in the INF talks, thereby distancing the West European allies from the US by turning the tide of world opinion against it on the SDI issue.¹⁴¹ An article in *Liaowang* published after Gorbachev's "new suggestion" in mid-March 1987 tried to elicit Europe's support for the Chinese stand by pointing out that "synchronous and proportionate" reduction and destruction of INF missiles in Europe and Asia would in fact serve European security interests in the sense that it would facilitate the resolution of "some specific problems associated with on-site verification of the destruction of medium-range missiles."¹⁴² Addressing the Regional Conference on Disarmament in Beijing in late March 1987, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Qian Qichen once again stressed the identity of security interests between China and Europe:

The question of the intermediate-range missiles has a direct bearing on the security of countries in Europe as well as in Asia. International security is indivisible...We insist that in accordance with the same principle, there should be a *simultaneous and balanced reduction* of the missiles deployed in both Europe and Asia until their complete destruction.¹⁴³

The formulation of "simultaneous and balanced reduction" had now come to mean that a total elimination of all Soviet INF systems in Europe should be accompanied by total elimination of similar Soviet weapons in Asia as well. Thus, unlike the early 1980s, the Chinese were no longer demanding "a significant reduction", but "total destruction" of all Soviet INF missiles in the Asian theatre.

The period between February and July 1987 witnessed an unprecedented increase in the volume of Chinese comment on the INF issue. This was a manifestation of China's concerns that its security interests were being ignored and compromised in the US-Soviet INF talks. Sometimes, it appeared that Beijing would prefer no agreement at all to one which allowed the Soviets to retain 100 INF warheads in Asia whilst eliminating all nuclear missiles from Europe. This was evident from the manner in which the Chinese media tried to play up the threat to Western Europe's security from the removal of American INF weapons, the Soviet superiority in short-range missiles and conventional forces and the possible "denuclearisation" of Europe if the "zero option" were accepted. A *Xinhua* commentator, Ren Zhengde, argued that the zero option would only benefit the Soviets because "the Soviet SS-20 missiles cannot reach the US territory, while the US cruise and Pershing-II missiles are targeted right at the heartland of the Soviet Union."¹⁴⁴ Supporting some West Europeans' demands for the

inclusion of Soviet short-range missiles in an INF pact, the Chinese army paper *Jiefangjun Bao* "exposed" Soviet motives which endangered the Western security:

One is to use the short-range missiles as a "hidden restrictive factor" to bargain with the two nuclear powers, Britain and France; the other is to turn the talks on short-range missiles into a forum to discuss all short-range nuclear weapons in Eastern and Western Europe, and use this forum to demand the establishment of a Nuclear Free Zone in Central Europe.¹⁴⁵

In addition to harping on the theme of "denuclearisation" of Europe which would sooner or later involve British and French nuclear forces as well, China also warned Western Europe against the dangerous implications of the US SDI and its Soviet counterpart. As Wu Jin observed:

The establishment of separate US and Soviet space defence systems will render ineffective the strategy of nuclear deterrence of the West on which West European countries have so much relied...Britain and France will no longer be able to boast of their nuclear forces as a symbol of their world power status.¹⁴⁶

The solution suggested by the Chinese to prevent the strategic situation from getting worse was to (i) maintain vigilance against the US-Soviet attempts to reach an agreement detrimental to West Europe's security; (ii) strengthen the nuclear forces of Britain and France; (iii) explore the possibilities of West European defence cooperation, including nuclear defence cooperation; and (iv) forge West European political unity. In short, Beijing called upon the Western Europe to "rely more on its own strength" (*ziligengsheng*).¹⁴⁷

On 14 April 1987, in order to dispel West European suspicions, Gorbachev announced his decision to dismantle all short-range INF missiles of 500 to 1,000km range along with long-range INF missiles, but said nothing about the 100 INF warheads in Asia. Welcoming Gorbachev's new concession as "useful", Beijing asked the Soviet leader to address himself to the last obstacle in the conclusion of an INF treaty by renouncing the right to keep 100 INF warheads in Asia.¹⁴⁸ However, it was becoming increasingly obvious to the American arms control negotiators involved in talks with the Soviets that that was the farthest the Soviets were willing to go to conclude an INF agreement with the United States. The US Secretary of State George Shultz gave expression to this assessment when he observed:

The US side has long referred to destroying all intermediate-range nuclear forces worldwide instead of removing only Euromissiles. *But this time if the Soviets insist that each side retain 100 warheads outside Europe, the United States might have to keep the Soviets company.*¹⁴⁹

In an attempt to cool tempers in the Asian capitals and assuage anxieties about a 'betrayal' by Washington, President Reagan once again dispatched his arms control

trouble-shooter Edward Rowny to Beijing, Tokyo and other capitals to explain the US stand and try to win over their support for an INF pact which would allow each side to maintain 100 INF warheads outside Europe. During his talks with Rowny, the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Zhu Qizhen strongly disapproved of the US arms control strategy which had failed to get the Soviets to agree to simultaneous and balanced reductions of INF weapons in Europe and Asia.¹⁵⁰ The Chinese were apparently not satisfied with the pleas that Washington was now left with no other option but to go along with it. Faced with a barrage of criticism, Rowny repeatedly assured the Chinese and other Asian leaders that "it is an interim step...We don't see that as the end of the line" and reiterated "[w]e [the United States] don't have second-class allies."¹⁵¹ To elicit China's support, he even told Beijing that once the INF agreement was signed, "the US hoped to begin within six months negotiations on the remaining 100 warheads for each side."¹⁵²

Still, the Chinese remained unimpressed. Arguing that just as the Soviet Union had "changed its attitude from refusing to discuss the issue to being willing to maintain the *status quo* and further agreed to reduce the number of its warheads to 100," a Chinese Soviet expert, Jia Bei, implied that the Soviet side could be persuaded to abandon its demand for 100 INF warheads in Asia only if the correct strategy were adopted by the West.¹⁵³ A Chinese Foreign Ministry arms control expert described the Soviet Asian-based SS-20 missiles as the "trump card" which was being used by Moscow in Asia as a political weapon to put pressure on China, the USA and its allies in the region, and to raise doubts about the credibility of their protective relationships with Washington.¹⁵⁴ In an interview with *Liaowang* in late April 1987, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Qian Qichen warned that Sino-Soviet relations would suffer if

the Soviet Union agrees to reduce its medium-range missiles in Europe to zero while retaining 100 medium-range warheads in Asia [which] will not only arouse unease among the countries of Asia but *may not necessarily be beneficial for the Soviet Union itself*.¹⁵⁵

At the same time, Beijing continued to express sympathy with the apprehensions and concerns of some West Europeans about the emergence of a "non-nuclear" process, and sought to expose the Soviet motives for accepting the "double zero option" plan in Europe. As a *Liaowang* article put it in May 1987:

The Soviet Union had a deeper thought in proposing the second "zero option" plan. Through the double "zero option" plan, the Soviet Union tried to realise the target of..."denuclearisation of all of Europe," with the aim of better utilising the strategic role of its conventional forces in Europe...The plan is trying hard to bring about strategic disconnection between the US and Europe through the elimination of all the American nuclear weapons in Europe.¹⁵⁶

Such a posture evidently brought out several contradictions in Chinese commentary on the INF issue. To begin with, the Chinese criticised the Soviet Union for not eliminating short-range missiles together with long-range INF missiles; and later, when the Soviets agreed to do so, Beijing attributed this to Moscow's ulterior strategic motives. Why was Beijing playing such a negative role? The most plausible explanation might be that China wanted to delay the conclusion of an INF agreement unless and until its own security concerns were met by the two superpowers. In fact, one can argue that Beijing was exploiting the West Europeans' fears of "denuclearisation" to its own advantage. It gave Beijing an opportunity to put additional pressure on Moscow to concede its demand for the elimination of its Asian-based 100 INF warheads.

Realising that the Soviet Asian deployments were harming the Sino-Soviet normalisation process, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze now tried to justify the 100 INF warheads in anti-American rather than anti-Chinese terms. Addressing a press conference in Australia in early May, he said that "they are there because the region adjacent to the Soviet Far East is an area of American sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles", and expressed his optimism that "if nuclear missiles are eliminated in Europe, in Asia they would not last long."¹⁵⁷ A few days later, in reply to the NATO defence ministers' call to the Soviet Union to scrap all its INF missiles in Europe and Asia, Gorbachev publicly linked the global elimination of SS-20s to the removal of US nuclear weapons deployed in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines and to the withdrawal of US aircraft carriers beyond agreed-upon lines.¹⁵⁸ The Chinese were, however, happy to see the US nuclear weapons remain where they were, and were apparently relieved when the US State Department rejected the Soviet demand.¹⁵⁹

The five-year long Chinese campaign for removal of INF weapons from the Sino-Soviet border, without a trade-off involving Chinese nuclear weapons, finally brought success on 22 July 1987, when Gorbachev announced the Soviet acceptance of "Global Double Zero", i.e., elimination of SRINF and LRINF missiles in Europe as well as in Asia. He also dropped his earlier demand for the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons and aircraft carriers deployed in the Asia-Pacific region. The Soviet move could be interpreted as a positive Soviet gesture towards China, indicating Moscow's resolve to mend its relations with Beijing, and to break the deadlock over arms control with the US, and it could be seen as organically linked with the changes in the economic and foreign policy agendas of the new Soviet leadership. The Chinese government welcomed the Soviet offer, calling it "a first step towards nuclear arms reduction," while pointing out that "even with the LRINF and SRINF dismantled, the nuclear weaponry of the

United States and the Soviet Union would be reduced only by less than 5 percent."¹⁶⁰ When the INF Treaty was signed in Washington on 8 December 1987, Beijing cautioned against over-optimism, saying that the accord should not be regarded as a sign of a major reduction of the danger of nuclear war, nor of fundamental relaxation of tensions, and that the threat of nuclear war still remained.¹⁶¹

Chinese Commentaries on Arms Control Since the INF Pact:

An analysis of Chinese attitudes towards arms control in the post-INF period will help us to derive conclusions about the directions of Chinese arms control policy and the prospects of possible Chinese participation in the ACD process in the future. Several themes can be identified from a survey of Chinese writings since the conclusion of the INF Treaty. The most important are: (i) implications of the space-based defence weapons for the US-Soviet military balance and Chinese security; (ii) China's concern about the impact of arms control process on West European and Chinese security; and (iii) the Sino-Soviet military balance in the wake of an INF Treaty.¹⁶²

Ever since the Soviet Union replaced its demand for the inclusion of Anglo-French nuclear forces in INF talks with the demand that SDI be included, Chinese analysts have been writing that "the issue of space weapons is the real focus of the US-Soviet disarmament talks" because it has a direct bearing on each side's quest for military superiority.¹⁶³ Hence, the argument goes that, with the focus of the superpower arms race shifting from quantity to quality, that is, development of hi-tech, precision and state-of-the-art strategic defence systems, the two sides could easily agree to reduce their armaments by 50 percent because (i) there has long been over-saturation in the number of nuclear weapons deployed by Moscow and Washington and (ii) the reduction of huge quantities of obsolete weapons would save scarce financial and technical resources for better use elsewhere.¹⁶⁴

The Chinese have their own security interests at heart when they oppose the extension of the arms race into outer space. The prospect of Soviet strategic defence and space-based weapons systems which would completely neutralise their limited nuclear deterrent capability worries the Chinese. Hence they have deliberately sought to downplay the significance of the INF Treaty, and singled out progress on limiting strategic weapons as a test of superpower commitment to arms control. As one analyst put it, "unless a breakthrough on this key question is achieved, the INF Treaty will lose what limited significance it has."¹⁶⁵ The United States' SDI and its Soviet counterpart reinforce Chinese and West European apprehensions regarding the "decoupling" of

European defence from that of the US, and serve to emphasise the need to maintain and develop the nuclear capabilities possessed by China, France and Britain. The majority of Chinese analysts sees the INF Treaty neither as a beginning of arms control nor as an indication of a slowdown in the arms race, but as a change in US-Soviet tactics to gain the upper hand in their rivalry. Therefore, they tend to be very pessimistic about the efficacy of arms control to check the arms race and reduce tensions.

Besides, post-INF Chinese commentaries have held that the serious economic problems of Washington and Moscow and consequently the need to cut military expenditure were important factors in the superpowers' desire to reach an arms control agreement. Accordingly, both superpowers might seek deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals so long as these do not jeopardise the strategic balance between the two sides. The INF Treaty is thus seen as a part of this strategy.¹⁶⁶ The Chinese believe that it is difficult to tilt the general balance in military strength between the Soviet Union and the US before the end of the century. Some secondary military forces could be eliminated, but it would be difficult to reach any arms control agreement on strategic defence and space weapons.

There is an undercurrent of anxiety in China that after the two sides eliminate 50 percent of their nuclear weapons - a demand originally put forward by Beijing - the Soviet Union will press Britain, France and China to join the process of nuclear disarmament. Therefore, the Chinese have now stopped asking for 50 percent cuts and started demanding "substantial cuts," without defining them. Some Chinese strategists have suggested that China will not discuss reductions to its arsenal until the superpowers agree to reduce nuclear weapons well below the levels currently being discussed (i.e., 80 to 90 per cent)¹⁶⁷, and commit not to test, produce or deploy nuclear weapons. This formula of "three cessations and one reduction" means that China's position is now stricter than that of France.¹⁶⁸ Following in the footsteps of the Chinese, the British have recently stated that "US and Soviet reductions would have to go much further than 50% before we could consider including the British deterrent in arms control negotiations."¹⁶⁹ The Chinese are particularly resistant to superpower ACD overtures. Inducing China to participate in the nuclear arms control talks of the future will therefore not be easy.

Second, the Chinese continue to be concerned that the INF Treaty could undermine NATO's flexible response defence strategy, reduce the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee, and lead to the denuclearisation of Europe. Beijing has voiced its opposition to the idea of European and even global denuclearisation, although this stand

contradicts its declaratory posture on the desirability of complete and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons. China also rejected the Soviet offer in mid-December 1987, a few days after the signing of the INF Treaty, to hold talks with the Soviet Union to achieve the objective of a nuclear-free world by the end of the century.¹⁷⁰ It noted with satisfaction the setting up of a "European Security Platform", which emphasised the need for allied interests to be *immune to any arms control move*, and argued that the nuclear forces of Britain and France become the foundation of a European nuclear umbrella.¹⁷¹ Thus, Beijing has in general welcomed the plans of the West European nations to carry out conventional and nuclear modernisation after the withdrawal of US INF weapons to bolster their military strength *vis-à-vis* the Warsaw Pact countries, and has been stressing the need for the emergence of a militarily strong and powerful Europe in the wake of an INF Treaty - a Europe less dependent upon the United States for its security needs.

Finally, one notices a deliberate attempt by the Chinese to minimise the significance of the INF Treaty. This can be attributed partly to Beijing's continuing preoccupation with the Soviet threat to its security, in spite of a thaw in its relations with Moscow. For example, some Chinese commentators ascribed Gorbachev's acceptance of the "Global Double Zero" to the United States' decision to deploy its 100 INF warheads in Alaska, closer to the Soviet border.¹⁷² It has also been pointed out that the removal of SS-20s would reduce Soviets' nuclear options against China and complicate their nuclear strategy in Asia more than in Europe. For example, as Dennis M. Gormley observes, "China possesses great strategic depth and a comparatively hard military infrastructure. Losing the deep targeting capability of the SS-20 against such a hard and diffuse target set must be viewed dimly by Soviet military planners."¹⁷³ The Chinese rebut such arguments by pointing out that the nuclear threat to China does not end with the elimination of SS-20s. They mention the ongoing deployment of Soviet SS-25 mobile missiles plus SS-N-21 cruise missiles both of which can hit the same Asian targets as the SS-20s to be destroyed under the INF Treaty.

Beijing's cautious response could also be related to future implications of the INF Treaty. After its implementation, China would remain the only NWS to retain intermediate-range missiles in Asia. The nuclear balance in post-INF Asia will include, at the intermediate forces level, the Soviet Union's medium-range bombers; US nuclear-armed SLCMs; and China's intermediate-range missiles, SLBMs, and medium bombers (approximately 170, 300, and 250-300 delivery vehicles, respectively).¹⁷⁴ While it is true that "the growing Chinese emphasis on a limited nuclear warfighting policy...will get a

boost from the departure of the most threatening theatre-devoted Soviet nuclear weapons system"¹⁷⁵, it is also true that, as a consequence, China's nuclear capabilities will become the focus of increased attention. The Soviets have already said that they would like third nuclear powers, notably the PRC, to join the nuclear arms negotiations.¹⁷⁶ Chinese analysts believe that future US-Soviet talks on conventional arms may include tactical nuclear weapons, and might require Britain and France to reduce or eliminate their tactical nuclear weapons which, in turn, would set a bad precedent for China.

Under its nuclear force modernisation programme, China is engaged in developing and deploying tactical and theatre nuclear weapons and short-range missiles such as M-9 and M-11, and advanced medium-range ballistic missile systems with MIRV capability, similar to ones which are to be eliminated under the superpower INF Treaty.¹⁷⁷ Like the French and British theatre and strategic nuclear forces, China's nuclear strike potential in the 1990s will confront the Soviet high command with an increasingly acute contingency planning dilemma. But there is little doubt that Beijing would resist any outside pressures in the guise of arms control to derail its nuclear development. The second option available to China, as suggested by Johnston, if faced with continuing Soviet pressure to involve Beijing in the nuclear arms reduction process, is to develop a larger arsenal, some of which could be traded away without a significant degradation of its nuclear deterrent.¹⁷⁸

Besides, the steady proliferation of ballistic missiles in countries such as Israel, India, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Taiwan, could pose additional problems for the Chinese if the demand for transforming the current bilateral INF Treaty into a global agreement on the lines of PTBT/NPT gains momentum.¹⁷⁹ For example, India has offered to eliminate its Agni IRBM missile subject to the elimination of all land-based IRBMs worldwide.¹⁸⁰ This would present China with a dilemma of sorts, not only because it would be asked to destroy an important part of its nuclear deterrent force as part of a global arms control agreement, but also because, having supported a bilateral INF Treaty, it could not afford to oppose a global INF Treaty. Yet supporting a multilateral INF agreement would seriously undermine China's nuclear deterrent capability.

Conclusions

The Chinese perspectives on arms control outlined in this chapter were influential in shaping the official Chinese position on the INF issue. These perspectives were the

views of Chinese policymakers and experts on arms control, the superpower military balance and Chinese national security, and arms control policies, and are an expression of the specialised opinion which informs Chinese policy decisions on arms control issues. The concerns expressed by the Chinese analysts about the US-Soviet arms race and arms control, SDI, INF weapons in Europe and Asia, the relationship between the Chinese and Anglo-French nuclear forces, and the impact of all these on Chinese national security had been widely debated and shared within the Chinese policymaking organs throughout the 1980s, and subsequently shaped China's response to the INF talks.

It is obvious that the perceived impact of Soviet INF systems on China's national security shaped Beijing's response to the INF talks in the 1980s. Initially, Beijing did not pin much hope on arms control talks as a means of restoring the superpower military balance, which had been upset by the Soviet deployment of SS-20s in the 1970s. Beijing instead advocated a strong military response by the Western countries and actively supported NATO's December 1979 decision to deploy American Pershing-II and cruise missiles on European soil. Beijing also opposed Soviet arms control proposals which called for the inclusion of Anglo-French nuclear forces. Until mid-1982 there was little indication that the Chinese were aware of the correlation between Chinese and British and French nuclear forces, though they omitted no opportunity to highlight the threat to China posed by the Soviet SS-20s in the Far East. During this period the Chinese were also critical of the growing peace movement in the Western countries, and did not envisage the possibility of emergence of Western Europe as an independent power centre.

Signs of change in China's attitudes towards arms control appeared concomitantly with a shift in Chinese foreign policy towards a more balanced relationship with the two superpowers in early 1983. In February 1983, Beijing made its official position on the INF talks known to the international community, and called for global ceilings on the INF weapons. China actually made the removal of SS-20s from Asia a precondition for an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, which underlined the linkage between its national security and arms control policies. Beijing apparently concluded that it could not afford to remain indifferent to the arms control process if US-Soviet arms control agreements undermined Chinese security. Hence it argued that it was flawed reasoning to believe that transferring nuclear weapons from Europe to Asia would lessen the nuclear threat to Europe. In order to win over West European support for its position, China presented itself as a "natural ally" of Western Europe in its struggle to preserve

the independent nuclear forces of Britain and France. Behind this posture lay Beijing's anxiety about the perceived impact on its own nuclear forces once the Anglo-French nuclear weapons became the subject of superpower arms control negotiations. Thus INF talks helped to bring about a convergence of Chinese and West European security interests. Beijing's newly-discovered support for the European peace movements and its theory of multipolarisation - an outgrowth of its "independent foreign policy" and arms control strategy - was also aimed at stressing the identity of political-strategic interests between China and Western Europe, as distinct from those of the USA and the Soviet Union. In contrast with the past, Beijing now started urging both superpowers to carry out arms control negotiations in earnest, without jeopardising the security interests of third countries.

After the Soviets dropped their demand for the inclusion of Anglo-French nuclear weapons in late 1986, and agreed to reduce their Asian-based SS-20s to 100, Beijing stepped up its campaign to demand simultaneous and balanced reductions in both Asian and European theatres. China was thus demanding not "significant" or "drastic" cuts in the Soviet Asian missiles, but the complete elimination of all Soviet INF weapons in Asia. Beijing believed that, just as Moscow employed "linkage" tactics first with Anglo-French nuclear arms and later with SDI to realise its objective of maintaining military superiority, it could use its remaining 100 INF warheads in Asia as a bargaining chip to force the Chinese to start bilateral Sino-Soviet nuclear arms reduction talks in the future.

During the various stages of the INF talks, Beijing strenuously lobbied American arms controllers to persuade them to fashion the US negotiating position in a manner consistent with Chinese security interests. However, after the Reykjavik summit the Chinese started expressing doubts about America's will and capability to protect Chinese security interests. They concluded that the stakes involved in the game were too high to be left to the care of their American friends alone. The arms control strategy required astute diplomacy, lobbying, cajoling and even enticing in order to safeguard Chinese security interests without becoming entangled in the arms control talks. Hence the Chinese adopted a carrot and stick policy. On the one hand, they signalled their intention to improve Sino-Soviet relations significantly if Moscow reduced the level of its nuclear and conventional deployments on the Sino-Soviet border. On the other hand, they turned towards Western Europe to get its support by sympathising with its concerns regarding the implications of the Soviet "zero option", which might lead to denuclearisation of Europe. Ironically, China's support for the demand by some West

European countries for a general reduction of Soviet short-range nuclear missiles, conventional arms and chemical weapons to go along with Euromissile cuts - in other words, "linkage" of an INF agreement with other arms control issues - contradicted its own opposition to the Soviet demand for linking an INF agreement to the control of the Anglo-French or space-based defence weapons. After the Soviets proposed a "double zero" in Europe (the first zero covering missiles of ranges between 1,000 and 5,500 kms, and the second those with ranges between 500 and 1,000 kms), the Chinese media accused the Soviets of isolating nuclear weapons as the major threat to peace, and seeking to achieve complete denuclearisation of Europe. It called on Western Europe to develop a more independent and powerful conventional and nuclear deterrent capability.

Through such tactics the Chinese maintained pressure not only on the Soviet Union but also on the USA to give due consideration to the security interests of third countries in their arms control negotiations. Beijing's insistence on this principle ultimately paid dividends when Moscow agreed to the global elimination of INF missiles. However, after the INF agreement was reached, the Chinese sought to explain it by reference to the domestic constraints of the two superpowers, to problems inherent in their competition, and above all to the pressure of peaceloving countries like China, and warned that the elimination of land-based missiles must not lead towards militarisation of outer space.

If post-INF Chinese commentaries are any indication, then, the Chinese are likely to remain as unwilling in the future as in the past to the conclusion of an arms control agreement which places restraints on their nuclear force levels and modernisation, unless and until the two superpowers drastically reduce their nuclear and strategic weapons. As regards the superpowers ever agreeing to such a course, Chinese analysts and policymakers remain fairly pessimistic. The conditions they have defined for China's participation in the ACD process are so general and broad that even follow-on superpower accords on offensive and defensive systems may not satisfy Beijing. Even after deep cuts, the superpowers' offensive totals might still be considered insufficient when related to Chinese and Anglo-French totals. In short, the Chinese would prefer to increase their own nuclear forces rather than rely on international arms control accords for their security. Thus future negotiations on limiting short-range nuclear forces or achieving a global INF accord are likely to meet with opposition from China. It is also safe to assume that China would like Britain and France to resist any external pressure, either from the USA or from the Soviet Union, to place limits on their nuclear forces' expansion or modernisation plans.

NOTES

- 1 Johnston, *China and Arms Control*, op. cit., pp. 56-60.
- 2 Reinhard Drifte, "Arms Control and the Superpower Balance in East Asia," in Gerald Segal (ed.), *Arms Control in Asia* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.), 1987, pp. 18-42; and Bonnie S. Glaser, *Soviet, Chinese and American Perspectives on Arms Control in the Northeast Asia* (Working Paper No. 28, Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra).
- 3 See Herbert Y. Schandler, "Arms Control in Northeast Asia", *The Washington Quarterly*, (Winter 1987), pp. 70-71; Lawrence Freedman, "The Military Dimension" in Gerald Segal (ed.), *The Soviet Union in East Asia* (London, Heinemann, 1983); and Segal (ed.), *Arms Control in Asia*, op. cit., p. 46.
- 4 Wang Chongjie, "Parity or Superiority?" *Beijing Review*, No. 17, 27 April 1981, p. 14. Also see Zhang Zhen and Rong Zhi, "Some Observations on Soviet Detente," *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu*, Beijing, No. 4, (1982).
- 5 Qi Ya and Zhou Jirong, "Expansionist Soviet Global Strategy," *Beijing Review*, No. 25, 22 June 1981, p. 24.
- 6 Ibid., p. 25.
- 7 "Brezhnev's Diplomatic Offensive," *Xinhua*, 22 March 1981; and "Soviet Threat and NATO Meeting," *Beijing Review*, No. 21, 25 May 1981, p. 12.
- 8 Li Zhongfa, "Behind the Soviet 'Peace' Offensive in Western Europe," *Beijing Review*, No. 36, 7 September 1981, pp. 11-12; *Beijing Review*, No. 40, 5 October 1981, pp. 25-27; *Xinhua*, 19 November 1981; Fang Min, "On the Eve of the US-Soviet Nuclear Talks," *Renmin Ribao*, 30 November 1981, p. 7; and *FBIS-China*, 1 December 1981, p. A2-A4.
- 9 Zhang Fan, "Western Europe's Independent Role," *Beijing Review*, No. 2, 12 January 1981, pp. 14-15.
- 10 Johnston, p. 56; and Segal (ed.) *Arms Control in Asia*, p. 46.
- 11 In 1981 alone there were at least eleven references to the threat to Chinese security from the Soviet SS-20s in the Far East.
- 12 Jiang Yuanchun, "Soviet Strategy for East Asia," *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu*, No. 3, (1981); and *Beijing Review*, No. 12, 23 March 1981, p. 20.
- 13 Tang Tianri, "Whither Soviet Global Strategy," *Xinhua*, 6 February 1982, in *FBIS-China*, 8 February 1982, pp. C1-C2; and "The Recent Soviet Strategic Trend," *Beijing Review*, No. 8, 22 February 82, p. 10.
- 14 *Beijing Review*, No. 13, 29 March 82, pp. 11-12.
- 15 *Renmin Ribao*, 28 November 1981, p. 6; and *FBIS-China*, 1 December 1981, p. A3.
- 16 Huang Tianying, "Can a Tune Be Played? - On the Soviet-US European Theatre Nuclear Weapons Talks," *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* [*China Youth*], 28 November 1981, p. 3, in *FBIS-China*, 4 December 1981, p. A3; and "Behind the Soviet 'Peace' Offensive in Western Europe," *Beijing Review*, No. 36, 7 September 1981, pp. 11-12.
- 17 *Beijing Review*, No. 10, 8 March 1982, p. 3; *Beijing Review*, No. 13, 29 March 1982, p. 12; and *Renmin Ribao*, 7 January 1982, p. 7, in *FBIS-China*, 12 January 1982, p. C2.
- 18 "A Year of Worries for Moscow," *Xinhua*, 30 December 1981 in *FBIS-China*, 4 January 82, p. C1; Chen Weibin, "US-Soviet Nuclear Weapons Talks Resume," *Beijing Review*, No. 4, 25 January 1982, p. 10; and *FBIS-China*, 12 January 1982, pp. A1-2 and 4 January 1982, p. C1.
- 19 *Renmin Ribao*, 1 December 1981, cited in Johnston, p. 57.

- 20 Ibid. Gong Weixin, "A Look at US-USSR Nuclear Negotiation," *Beijing Review*, No. 45, 9 November 1981, pp. 10-12, and Fang Ming, "Soviet-US Disarmament Talks Lead Nowhere," *Beijing Review*, No. 48, 29 November 1982, pp. 11-12.
- 21 Huang Tianying, "Can a Tune Be Played?" op. cit., pp. A1-A4; Li Shipu, "Superpowers' Arms Race," *Beijing Review*, No. 24, 14 June 1982, pp. 10-11; *Beijing Review*, No. 21, 24 May 1982, p. 11; and *Renmin Ribao*, 30 November 1981, p. 7.
- 22 "Ball Game at the Conference Table," *Xinhua*, 23 February 1982, in *FBIS-China*, 24 February 1982, pp. A1-A2.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Te An, "Kicking the Ball," *Renmin Ribao*, 6 February 1982, p. 6.
- 25 Tong Chang, "Daydreaming," *Renmin Ribao*, 4 February 1982, p. 6, in *FBIS-China*, 8 February 1982, p. C2.
- 26 *FBIS-China*, 12 January 1982, p. A1; and *FBIS-China*, 8 February 1982, p. C2.
- 27 See Huan Xiang, "Adhere to Independent Foreign Policy," *Beijing Review*, No. 46, 15 November 1982, pp. 21-23; and "China's Independent Diplomacy," *Beijing Review*, No. 4, 24 January 1983, p. 4.
- 28 On the East-West Military Balance, see Xing Shugang, Li Yunhua, and Liu Yingna, "Soviet-US Balance of Power and Its Impact on World Situation in the 1980s," and Li Ning, "A Year With Greater Tension and Tumult," *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu*, No. 1, (1983).
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- 30 Chen Weibin, "Anti-Nuclear Movement Gaining Momentum," *Beijing Review*, No. 19, 10 May 1982, p. 9.
- 31 Fang Min, "A New US-Soviet Controversy Arises," *Renmin Ribao*, 31 December 1982, p. 7, in *FBIS-China*, 5 January 1983, p. A4.
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 *International Herald Tribune*, 18 January 1983. Also cited in Drifte, op. cit., p. 26.
- 34 Jiang Jianguo, "Gromyko's 'peace offensive' visit," *Beijing Review*, No. 5, 31 January 1983, p. 11; Chen Tean, "Geneva Talks on Nuclear Missiles," *Beijing Review*, No. 6, 7 February 1983, p. 11; *Renmin Ribao*, 5 February 1983, p. 7; Mei Zhenming, "Beginning of 'Year of Euromissiles,'" *Xinhua*, 5 February 1983, in *FBIS-China*, 8 February 1983, pp. A2-A3. Chinese foreign minister Wu Xueqian also expressed concern at the Soviet decision to move SS-20 missiles from Soviet Europe to Asia, see BBC, *Summary of World Broadcasts - Far East*/7263.
- 35 *Xinhua*, 14 April 1983.
- 36 Interviews with arms control experts at the Foreign Ministry's Institute for International Studies, April 1987. Johnston's and Bonnie Glaser's writings also support this view.
- 37 For details see Chapter II.
- 38 *Xinhua*, 8 February 1983; and *News From Xinhua News Agency Weekly Issue* 730, 10 February 1983, p. 14.
- 39 "Soviet military buildup in Far East arouses public concern," *Xinhua*, 15 March 1983; and "Soviet planned deployment of nuclear missiles in Far East arouses anxiety in Asia," *Xinhua*, 5 April 1983, in *News From Xinhua News Agency Weekly Issue* 735 and 738, pp. 20, 29.
- 40 *Xinhua*, 5 April 1983.
- 41 Cited from James Nathan, "The Maritime Strategy and the US Alliances: Prospects and Forebodings," *International Relations* (London), Vol. 9, No. 2, (November 1987), p. 169; also see US Pacific Command, *Pacific Area Update*, P4048.1, p. 1-4, 17 February 1984, p. 5.

- 42 Pei Monong, "China's Future Position in Asia," *Beijing Review*, No. 16, 18 April 1983, p. 19.
- 43 Xing Shugang, Li Yunhua and Liu Yingna, "Changing Balance of Soviet-US Power," *Beijing Review*, No. 19, 9 May 1983, p. 16.
- 44 *Beijing Review*, No. 6, 7 February 1983, p. 12.
- 45 *Xinhua*, 5 February 1983.
- 46 *Xinhua*, 26 April 1983.
- 47 Commentator, "The US-Soviet Nuclear Arms Race Threatens World Peace," *Renmin Ribao*, 7 May 1983, p. 7, in *FBIS-China*, 9 May 1983, pp. A1-A2. Italics mine.
- 48 Drifte, p. 26.
- 49 *News From Xinhua News Agency Weekly Issue 759*, 1 September 1983, p. 17; Fang Min, "The Mutually Confrontational Disarmament Proposals," *Renmin Ribao*, 7 May 1983, p. 7, in *FBIS-China*, 9 May 1983, pp. A3-A4; and Mei Zhengmin, "A new round on Euromissiles," *Beijing Review*, No. 16, 18 April 1983, pp. 12-13.
- 50 According to Gerald Segal, "the Andropov offer seemed to be far more aimed at China, presumably in the hope of improving Sino-Soviet relations and winning over China's support for the Soviet position on the superpower arms control talks." See Segal (ed.), *Arms Control in Asia*, p. 62.
- 51 *Renmin Ribao*, 17 September 1983; *Beijing Review*, No. 39, 26 September 1983, p. 13. Italics mine. Asked whether the deployment of SS-20 missiles along the China-Soviet border constitutes a fourth obstacle, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Qi Huaiyuan, said that it should be included in the three obstacles. "China hopes that the Soviet Union would reduce its troops along the China-Soviet border, including conventional and nuclear weapons," he added. See *SWB FE/7457/A2/1*, 6 October 1983. A noteworthy point is that at this stage Chinese officials did not go so far as to suggest completely eliminating the SS-20s in the Asian part of the USSR.
- 52 "China's Position at UN on Disarmament," *Beijing Review*, No. 44, 31 October 1983, p. 13. Emphasis added.
- 53 Robert E. Johnson, "China's Nuclear Forces and Policies," in Larry M. Wortzel (ed.), *China's Military Modernization: International Implications* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 83.
- 54 On the Anglo-French nuclear forces and INF talks, see John Prados, Joel S. Wit and Michael J. Zagurek, "The Strategic Nuclear Forces of Britain and France," *Scientific American*, Vol. 255, No. 2, (August 1986), pp. 33-41.
- 55 On the earlier Soviet attempts to drag in the Chinese nuclear forces in arms control talks, see Dan L. Strode, "Arms Control and Sino-Soviet Relations," *Orbis*, Vol. 28, No. 1, (Spring 1984), pp. 163-188; Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston, Little Brown & Co., 1982), pp. 1168 and 1173; and Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York, Bantam Books, 1982), pp. 252, 258.
- 56 Andropov said the most important thing was to conduct arms control negotiations based on the principle of equality and equal security, see *Xinhua*, 31 December 1987, in *FBIS-China*, 5 January 1983, p. A3. A detailed study on the impact of the Anglo-French nuclear weapons on the INF talks has been done by Eric J. Grove. See his monograph entitled *Where and When? The Integration of British and French Nuclear Forces with the Arms Control Process* (London: Faraday Discussion Paper No. 5, The Council for Arms Control, September 1985), p. 15.
- 57 Alastair I. Johnston, "China and Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region," (Paper presented at the Conference on Maritime Security and Arms Control in the Pacific Region, Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, May 1988), p. 13.

- 58 Gong Weixin, "New Round of Euromissile Talks," *Beijing Review*, No. 22, 30 May 1983, pp. 11-12; and *News From Xinhua News Agency Weekly Issue 736*, 24 March 1983, p. 13.
- 59 *New York Times*, 3 April 1983.
- 60 *China Daily*, 2 February 1983, p. 4.
- 61 Zheng Yuanyuan, "Britain and France: Why they reject Soviet Proposal," *Beijing Review*, 28 February 1983, pp. 10-11.
- 62 Fang Min, "USSR-US: Quarrels over Disarmament," *Beijing Review*, No. 3, 17 January 1983, pp. 28-29.
- 63 Wang Chongjie, "Contradictions between Soviet Union, France Sharpen," *Xinhua*, 22 April April 1983, in *News From Xinhua News Agency Weekly Issue 741*, 28 April 1983, p. 14.
- 64 See note 49.
- 65 Charles-Antoine de Nerciat, "Leaders 'secretly' Favour Missiles," *South China Morning Post [SCMP]*, Hong Kong, 9 November 1983; *Guangming Ribao*, 21 March 1983, p. 4; and *News From Xinhua News Agency Weekly Issue 764*, 6 October 1983, p. 20.
- 66 *Renmin Ribao*, 7 May 1983, p. 7.
- 67 *News From Xinhua News Agency Weekly Issue 729*, 3 February 1983, pp. 13-14. Yet another article expressed concern that "under the pressure of the anti-nuclear peace movement, most of the five West European countries which originally planned to deploy the new US missiles face difficulty in earnestly carrying out this resolution," see Sun Wenfang and Wang Xianhua, "The Controversy over Missiles in Western Europe's 'Missile Year,'" *Guangming Ribao*, 21 March 1983, p. 4, in *FBIS-China*, 1 April 1983, pp. A1-A2.
- 68 Zhang Zhen and Rong Zhi, "Brief Discourse on the Soviet Detente Policy," *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu*, No. 4, (October 1982), pp. 18-23, in *FBIS-China*, 9 February 1983, p. C8.
- 69 *Beijing Review*, No. 22, 30 May 1983, pp. 11-12.
- 70 Chen Tean, "Another Round of US-Soviet Nuclear Talks," *Renmin Ribao*, 7 August 1983, p. 6, in *FBIS-China*, 9 August 1983, pp. A10-A11.
- 71 Ibid.
- 72 Grove, op. cit., p. 18.
- 73 Note 65 and note 68.
- 74 Johnston, *China and Arms Control*, op. cit., p. 59.
- 75 Grove, pp. 12-13; and Robin F. Laird, *France, the Soviet Union, and the Nuclear Weapons Issue* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), p. 19.
- 76 Zheng Yuan, "A Debate Over British and French Nuclear Strength," *Renmin Ribao*, 28 September 1983, p.7, in *FBIS-China*, 30 September 1983, pp. A8-A9.
- 77 Ibid.
- 78 Johnston, *China and Arms Control*, p. 59.
- 79 Ibid.
- 80 *News From Xinhua News Agency Weekly Issue 770*, 17 November 1983, pp. 14-15.
- 81 Ibid.
- 82 *Peking Review*, No. 24, 16 June 1979, p. 23. The leader of the Chinese delegation stated in September 1983 that "...after the Soviet Union and the United States have taken practical efforts to stop testing, improving and manufacturing nuclear weapons and agreed on reducing by *half* their nuclear weapons and means of delivery of all types, a widely representative international conference should be

- covenanted to negotiate the general reduction of nuclear weapons by all nuclear weapon states." See *Foreign Affairs China*, December 1983.
- 83 Note 75. Also see Eric J. Grove, "Allied nuclear forces complicate negotiations," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, (June/July 1986), p. 18. Emphasis added.
 - 84 Cited from Edward A. Kolodziej, "British-French Nuclearization and European Denuclearization: Implications for US Policy," in Philippe G. Le Prestre (ed.), *French Security Policy in a Disarming World* (Boulder & London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1989), pp. 116-7. Italics mine.
 - 85 "China urges superpowers to take action first in nuclear disarmament," *News From Xinhua News Agency Weekly Issue 766*, 20 October 1983, p. 17.
 - 86 Ibid.
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- 116 See Robert G. Sutter, *Chinese Nuclear Weapons and American Interests - Conflicting Policy Choices* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report No. 83-187F, 27 September 1983), pp. 35-6.
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- 120 *Far Eastern Affairs*, Moscow, No. 4, 1985.
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- 122 *The Christian Science Monitor*, 27 February 1986.
- 123 Glaser, *Soviet, Chinese and American Perspectives*, op. cit.; and for a detailed account of Moscow's security concerns about Beijing, see Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, *War and Peace: The Views from Moscow and Beijing* (Institute of International Studies, Policy Paper No. 20, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984). The primacy of the anti-China mission for the SS-20s, although denied by the Soviets today, has been acknowledged by some Soviet writers in the past and by some Chinese spokesmen fairly recently. See Harry Gelman, *The Soviet Union, East Asia and the West: The Kremlin's Calculus of Opportunities and Risks* (London: IISS, Adelphi Papers, No. 217), p. 19, also cited in *Korea and World Affairs*, Vol. 13, No. 1, (Spring 1989), pp. 113. However, to the Chinese, Soviet handling of the SS-20

deployment in the Asian theatre had demonstrated a total disregard, perhaps a deliberate one, of Sino-Japanese security concerns.

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- 125 Glaser, op. cit.
- 126 Magyar Hirlap, 21 February 1986, *FBIS-The USSR*, 25 February 1986, cited in Glaser.
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- 154 Interview, April 1987.
- 155 *Liaowang*, No. 17, 27 April 1987. Emphasis added.
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- 163 Xiang Kuiguan, "What Is the Real Focus of Superpower Disarmament Talks?" *Xinhua*, 2 August 1987, in *FBIS-China*, 4 August 1987, p. A3.
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- 167 Johnston, "China and Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region," (note 57) p. 30; and Hua Di, *Nuclear Strategy and Arms Control From A Chinese Point of View* (Paper

- presented at the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Annual Conference, February 1988), p. 13.
- 168 Kevin Clements, "Peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 14, No. 1, (January/February 1989), pp. 14-15.
 - 169 See *Statement on the Defence Estimates*, Vol. 1, (London: HMSO, May 1989), p. 12; also cited in Francois Heisbourg, "The British and French nuclear forces," *Survival*, Vol. 31, No. 4, (July/August 1989), pp. 301-320.
 - 170 The offer was made by a Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, V. Petrovskiy, in New Delhi on 18 December 1987, see *SWB FE/0030/i*, 19 December 1987.
 - 171 *Xinhua*, 18 December 1987, in *SWB FE/0033/A1/2*, 23 December 1987. Emphasis added.
 - 172 For example, see Zhang Yunwen, "Gorbachev Keeps the Ball Rolling," *Beijing Review*, No. 32, 10 August 1987, p. 13.
 - 173 Dennis M. Gormley, "'Triple Zero' and Soviet Military Strategy," *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 18, No. 1, (January/February 1988), pp. 18-19; and *Double Zero and Soviet Military Strategy: Implications for Western Security* (London: Jane's Publishing Co. Ltd., 1988), pp. 142-3. This view apparently ignores the fact that by redirecting less than 10 per cent of their strategic nuclear warheads, the Soviets could attack the Chinese targets that had once been covered by their SS-20s.
 - 174 USSR Academy of Sciences, *Disarmament and Security 1987 Yearbook* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1988), p. 427.
 - 175 Michael J. Mazarr, "'A Very Good Thing': The INF Treaty and Asian-Pacific Security," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 1, No. 3, (1988), p. 254.
 - 176 *Disarmament and Security 1987 Yearbook*, op. cit., p. 428.
 - 177 Wendt and Wilson, *Post-INF: Toward Multipolar Deterrence*, p. 21; Johnston; and *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 44, No. 2, (March 1988), p. 55.
 - 178 Alastair I. Johnston, "China Enters the Arms Control Arena," *Arms Control Today*, (July/August) 1987.
 - 179 This point is illustrated in Heisbourg, "The British and French nuclear forces," op. cit., p. 312.
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Chapter VII

CONCLUSION: CHINESE APPROACH TO NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

Since the early 1980s China has been unusually active in the arms control field.* The post-Mao leadership has acceded to a number of arms control agreements, supported the superpower arms control process, and put forward a number of ACD proposals. Admittedly, many of these actions or proposals are, or appear to be, contrary both to past Chinese behavioural patterns and declarations. Consequently, increased attention in the West has been devoted to re-examining China's ACD posture, in order to ascertain whether any basic change has occurred. Several interpretations have been offered. While some observers, such as Tai Ming Cheung and John Prados, see elements of "new thinking" in Beijing's arms control activism¹ and attribute this to China's Four Modernisations strategy, and anticipate a more positive Chinese role in the arms reduction process, other analysts like Alastair Johnston and Gerald Segal see little or no change in Chinese arms control policy.²

From an across-the-board condemnation of arms control and disarmament during the 1960s and 1970s, the People's Republic of China has moved to professing faith in the ^{nuclear} value of the ACD process in the 1980s. Apparently this shift in the Chinese policy lies at the root of the common perception that a significant change in the Chinese approach to arms control is in the offing, if it has not already taken place. This study argues that such a judgment, however, may be premature and unwarranted. It demonstrates that **there has been little substantive change in the PRC's operational policy.** China's arms control posture is still aimed at keeping the Chinese nuclear deterrent out of arms control negotiations. What is more, there are signs of a hardening of Beijing's stance on Chinese participation in the nuclear arms reduction talks, and signs that China can be expected to hinder any arms control measure which is seen as damaging to Chinese national security interests.

However, this is not to say that no changes have taken place in the Chinese attitude. For one thing, ^{nuclear} arms control has come to play an important role in the formulation of that country's national security policy in the 1980s. This study demonstrates that the Chinese leadership has always recognised the fundamental link between national security and arms control. But it was only in the 1980s that it decided to use ACD as a means to enhance Chinese national security. In the past, it did not do so simply because it could not, given its adversary relationship with both the superpowers,

* nuclear as well as non-nuclear arms control measures.

its weak military capability and the nature of arms control issues involved in US-Soviet talks. Moreover, official rhetoric has also been different from that which characterised China's past attitude towards arms control. Nonetheless, the point is that **the Chinese remain especially reluctant to do anything that would imply subjecting China's nuclear weapons to negotiated restrictions.**

The objective of this study, as outlined in Chapter I, has been to examine the relationship between Chinese national security and nuclear arms control in order to gain a better understanding of China's arms control policy between 1978 and 1988. A detailed analysis of China's response to three nuclear arms control issues has been undertaken here to demonstrate how China's national security strategy has determined its arms control policy, and in turn, has been influenced by the latter. Hence it is submitted that national security should be the sole barometer to analyse, measure and predict China's response to nuclear arms control.

In this concluding chapter, I will attempt to infer a Chinese approach to nuclear arms control by (i) identifying the key objectives of Chinese nuclear arms control strategy; (ii) summarising the factors that motivate Chinese policy; and (iii) discussing change and continuity in China's arms control posture and Beijing's likely response to the nuclear arms control issues of the near future.

I

Objectives

Chinese nuclear arms control strategy has been devoted to the promotion of four specific objectives:

The first and foremost objective has been to **maintain and enhance the credibility and potency of China's nuclear deterrent capability *vis-à-vis* its rivals.** To this end, Beijing has followed a two-track policy. On the one hand, China has supported those nuclear arms reduction agreements which place restraints on the US-Soviet nuclear weapons and opposed those which require similar curbs on Chinese nuclear weapon programmes. On the other hand, Beijing has shown a determination not to let its nuclear deterrent face any threat of obsolescence by undertaking a nuclear modernisation and diversification programme which includes the development of SSBNs, SLBMs, MIRVs, TNWs, neutron bombs, and modern short-range and long-range ballistic missiles. Since this programme requires continued nuclear testing, China has

been reluctant to endorse a Comprehensive Test Ban or Nuclear Test Ban treaty which could disrupt the ongoing nuclear modernisation programme.

The second objective has been to **keep China's nuclear forces out of bilateral and/or multilateral nuclear arms reduction talks**. This has been accomplished by emphasising the primary responsibility of the two superpowers to make significant reductions in their huge nuclear stocks which far outnumber those of China. By focusing on the need to reduce the size of the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers, particularly that of the Soviet Union, and maintaining an exclusionist stance on its own nuclear weapons, Beijing apparently seeks to enhance the relative capability of the Chinese nuclear deterrent. Such a posture also helps Beijing to divert world attention from China's nuclear weapons to those of the two superpowers.

Third, China's nuclear arms control strategy has sought to **influence the outcome of superpower arms control talks in a way beneficial to its own security interests and have its views given due consideration in the superpower arms control negotiations**. As shown in the case study on the INF talks, the Chinese have attempted to achieve this, with varying degrees of success, through their periodic bilateral exchanges with the Americans and the Soviets. The Chinese can be expected to continue to try to persuade US and Soviet arms control negotiators to take into account Chinese security interests, and not the Chinese nuclear weapons, in their nuclear arms reduction deliberations.

Fourth, its aim has been to **project China's image as a peaceloving and responsible nuclear power**, which is in accordance with Third World aspirations, China's global status as a NWS and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and to beat the Soviets at their own favourite game.

It may be noted that these four objectives have not received equal priority. The maintenance of China's nuclear deterrent capability and the exclusion of Chinese nuclear forces from the arms reductions process are the most important, followed by, in order of importance, the third and fourth objectives. As illustrated in the cases of Beijing's response to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear free zones and intermediate-range nuclear forces talks, the primacy of the first two objectives overruled the considerations of the last one.

In accordance with these objectives, Beijing has enunciated the key principles of Chinese nuclear arms control policy, which are, in effect, three pre-conditions for China's participation in future five-power nuclear arms reduction talks.³ These are:

1. The United States and the Soviet Union must take the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons, and drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals;
2. vigorous measures must be taken to avert an arms race in outer space, check new tendencies in the arms race such as qualitative improvements in weapons, and the extension of weapons technology to new fields; and
3. no bilateral agreements on disarmament should jeopardise the interests of other states.

These three principles or pre-conditions are expected to help Beijing achieve the four objectives of its nuclear arms control strategy and guide the formulation of Chinese responses to various arms control issues of the future.

II

Factors

Like the Soviet Union, China also appears to be treating ^{nuclear} arms control in a comprehensive manner, integrating it within the overall context of Chinese national security policy. Chinese commentators have also propounded this view, noting that any US-Soviet arms control process cannot be viewed in isolation from the evolving international situation. When seen in this context, it is hardly surprising that Chinese ^{nuclear} arms control positions have undergone some alterations. Such alterations have been prompted by a combination of internal and external factors - security, domestic and diplomatic - which also determine the arms control policies of other NWSs. These factors have induced various responses, less in substance and more in form, in Chinese ^{nuclear} arms control policy. We shall now summarise how the interplay of internal and external factors combined to make Chinese policy what it has been, what it is, and what it is likely to be.

The Security Factor in China's Nuclear Arms Control Policy:

First of all, Beijing's arms control strategy of the 1980s is a product of changes in the country's threat perceptions *vis-à-vis* the military capabilities, defence strategies of the two superpowers, and the role of arms control in their security equations. The Chinese assessments of the global balance of power and perceived threat to Chinese security have played an important role in shaping China's attitude towards arms control. In the 1960s and 1970s, Chinese writings were replete with criticisms of arms

control, discussions of the inevitability of a third world war, of the superiority of men over weapons, and of socialism over imperialism/hegemonism etc. The Chinese critique of ACD was, in effect, motivated by Beijing's suspicion of a potential superpower condominium to check its nuclear weapons development programme. This was also the period of strategic vulnerability, and as such, arms control had no place in the Chinese national security agenda. The Sino-Soviet armed clashes in 1969, coupled with indirect threats of a Soviet nuclear strike against Chinese nuclear installations, made the Chinese leadership rethink the wisdom of pursuing a "dual-adversary" foreign policy at a time when their own military capabilities were weak.

The rapprochement with the US that began in the early 1970s was apparently an effort, on the part of the Chinese, to offset the palpable and threatening increase in Soviet power - a trend that, in conjunction with ^{and} the invasion of Afghanistan, the troop deployments in Mongolia, ~~and~~ the alliance with Vietnam, suggested a grand strategy of encirclement of China. It also provided Beijing with an opportunity to thwart repeated Soviet attempts to draw the United States into a joint anti-Chinese alliance through the arms control agreements of the 1970s. The establishment of close Sino-US ties coincided with a reappraisal of the international situation in the late 1970s which portrayed the Soviet Union as an ascendent power and the United States as a declining power. Until the early 1980s, virtually all Chinese writings contained highly critical references to the Soviet Union, accusing it of trying to hoodwink the world by talking peace and gaining military superiority through arms control pacts. According to the Chinese, military buildup, not arms control treaties, could restrain aggressive Soviet foreign policy behaviour. Besides, given its past experience with the Soviet Union, China could not afford to rely indefinitely on the United States for its security needs. Hence China's immediate goal was to acquire a credible nuclear retaliatory capability against the Soviets as soon as possible, which would not only lessen the threat from the north but also reduce Chinese strategic dependence on the United States.

By the early 1980s, China had acquired sufficient nuclear deterrence capability to render a successful preemptive strike uncertain and hence unlikely. The achievement of a second-strike capability imparted a sense of security and confidence to deal with any external threat to Chinese security on its own and was instrumental in the adoption of an "independent foreign policy" line in 1982. These two developments, in turn, made it possible for Beijing to take a closer look at ACD issues and revise its perceptions about the role of arms control in Chinese national security and the contemporary international system.

Beijing's desire to follow a balanced relationship with Washington and Moscow was welcomed by the Soviet leadership which had always been wary of close Sino-US ties. China now tended to see the main thrust of Soviet power as directed against the US and Japan, not against itself. Gorbachev's initiatives in Asia, the INF Treaty, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the unilateral reduction of Soviet forces on Sino-Soviet border, and the potential resolution of the thorny Cambodian issue, led to a considerable warming in Sino-Soviet relations. An improvement in Sino-Soviet ties was expected to provide the Chinese more flexibility in their foreign policy options and considerable leverage in their dealings with the Americans.

Nevertheless, a majority of Chinese defence planners still believes that the Soviet Union is and will remain China's most threatening long-term geopolitical rival.⁴ This perception continues to shape China's response to the ACD process, particularly to Soviet-sponsored arms control measures. Current Chinese analyses hold that both superpowers are increasingly constrained by economic, political and military factors in their contest for supremacy. Chinese analysts continue to warn against lowering their armed guard at a time when the focus of arms race is shifting from nuclear weapons to space weapons.⁵ They would like China to strengthen its national defence rather than rely on arms control to mitigate threats to its security. Thus, security remains a powerful dynamic in the Chinese response to ACD issues.

While there may be disagreements among Chinese policymakers and commentators over how much arms control can achieve, there are no claims that, on balance, US-Soviet arms control negotiations should not continue. Rather, Beijing believes that conducting an arms control process is even more imperative today than it was in the past to check the qualitative arms race. The Chinese are apparently concerned that another round of the US-Soviet arms race might consolidate the bipolar pattern of world politics and thus prevent China from emerging as an independent power centre at par with the superpowers. Therefore, there are now a number of Chinese analysts who admit that some arms control activities do benefit Chinese security insofar as they seek to cap or reduce US-Soviet nuclear weapons. Moreover, some Chinese commentators also advocate taking advantage of the improvement in Sino-Soviet relations to ease the Soviet pressure on Beijing to join formal multilateral nuclear arms control talks.⁶ Beijing apparently would prefer to resolve bilateral problems through unilateral, unstated, informal arms control and CBMs.

(i) *Evolving Chinese Military Thinking*

As illustrated in Chapter III, Chinese military thinking seems to be undergoing major revisions which could have serious implications for China's policy towards nuclear arms control. There is considerable disagreement over the extent of change in the international situation, the permanence of the current phase of US-Soviet detente, the degree of threat these pose to Chinese security, and the type of nuclear weapons China should develop to meet external threats to its security.⁷ The emerging global strategic trends indicate to Chinese planners that the security environment is becoming more complex, with the gradual diffusion of power and the proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities in their immediate neighbourhood. Chinese defence planners are also concerned at the prospect of an extension of the arms race into new frontiers such as outer space and the oceans. Assessments of emerging strategic trends presented in Chinese writings manifest Beijing's growing interest in the diversification of its strategic nuclear forces, and stress the need to deploy more accurate and long-range SLBMs, mobile ICBMs, modern bombers, tactical and cruise missiles and enhanced radiation devices. Some sections in the Chinese military establishment also appear to be interested in developing ballistic-missile defences (BMD) to meet the challenge of superpower space-based defences.⁸ Contending that nuclear deterrence and nuclear rivalry will still be an important part of the defence strategies of the superpowers in the 21st century, a majority of Chinese analysts is pessimistic about the complete abolition of all nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. And as long as nuclear weapons still exist on the earth, they do not want to rule out the possibility of fighting a nuclear war.⁹ The evidence shows that between the conventional and nuclear components of China's war planning, the role assigned to the latter has relatively increased. Some Chinese strategists have begun to propose deterrence as a major national defence strategy while others are beginning to envision the possibility of protracted nuclear war. The potential implications of TNWs, neutron bombs, space weapons, and BMD for Chinese arms control policy have been discussed in Chapter III. It is suffice to say here that **emerging trends in Chinese military strategy do not bode well for the ACD process.** China continues to invest significant resources in bolstering the survivability and reliability of its nuclear forces, as well as the training of its armed forces to fight under atomic, biological and chemical (ABC) conditions and the ability to wage more flexible nuclear operations.

In short, nuclear weapons as deterrents and as political means are still considered indispensable by the Chinese national security planners. In the 1990s and beyond,

China is mainly concerned with ending the qualitative aspect of the superpower arms race, not merely the quantitative aspect, because it does not want the technological gap separating it from the superpowers to grow even wider. China's arms control diplomacy reflects this concern. It is no coincidence that China's leaders have reiterated on several occasions China's opposition to the militarisation of outer space. The modernisation of Chinese nuclear forces is apparently aimed at preserving the reliability and credibility of its nuclear deterrent for the next thirty to fifty years, even if the US and USSR go ahead with their plans to develop and deploy ABM systems with space-based weapons systems.

Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s, China had trodden the nuclear path gradually and cautiously so as not to frighten and antagonise the two superpowers, the improvement in Sino-Soviet and Sino-American relations means that Beijing is no longer constrained to adopt a "go-slow" policy with regard to the development of its nuclear forces for fear of adverse impact on its relations with the two superpowers. In a period of detente with Washington and Moscow, China can justify its nuclear force modernisation and diversification programmes in terms of a threat to its security from regional proliferation of nuclear and missile capabilities in countries such as India, Pakistan, Taiwan, Japan and North Korea. As the number of near and potential NWSs grows around China's borders, Beijing might be tempted to increase its nuclear arsenal to meet complex, uncertain contingencies. It may also further strengthen the resolve of those elements within the PLA who favour the development of ground-based BMD. Thus, in the short- and long-terms, Beijing's nuclear capability and strategic doctrine for the use of that capability will remain the most critical factor in the formulation of Chinese arms control policy.

(ii) Anglo-French Nuclear Forces and Chinese Strategy

China's security interests, and its strategy to protect its nuclear weapons while seeking benefits from the superpower arms control process, have also led it to look towards the other two medium-sized NWSs, France and Britain, and to forge a more or less similar nuclear arms control strategy. Repeated Soviet attempts to bring Chinese nuclear weapons in the East and Anglo-French nuclear forces in the West onto the negotiating table, as evidenced in the SALT I and II, INF negotiations and several other recent Soviet arms control proposals, have incidentally helped identify the areas of common interest among Beijing, Paris and London. This convergence of security interests and the need to insulate their nuclear weapons from the superpower-negotiated constraints led the three countries to adopt strikingly similar postures on

their participation in multilateral nuclear arms reduction talks. For its part, Beijing has strongly condemned every Soviet attempt to place Anglo-French or Chinese forces on the negotiating table as a thinly veiled attempt to legitimise Soviet strategic superiority over the United States.

All three medium-sized NWSs - China, France and Britain - have active plans to expand and modernise their nuclear forces over the next ten to fifteen years.¹⁰ The increasing capability of the Chinese nuclear forces to inflict severe damage on the Soviet Union, not to mention the problems they present for Soviet security planners, is almost certain to result in continued Soviet pressure to include the Chinese nuclear forces in future arms control deliberations. The Soviets have already made it clear that they expect the issue of nuclear forces of third countries to "mature" for consideration after 50 per cent cuts in the Soviet and American strategic nuclear forces.¹¹

However, it is likely that the Chinese will not agree to limit their nuclear modernisation programmes or accept restraints on their operational use.

The three conditions defined by China, France and Britain for their participation in strategic arms reductions talks are meant to widen their options and enhance bargaining leverage. To resist the Soviet pressure to join the nuclear arms reduction process, the Chinese have initiated a two-track policy. On the one hand, they have come out with the theory of multipolarisation which envisages five independent strategic poles in the world - with China and Western Europe emerging as two major power centres apart from the US, USSR and Japan. This theory justifies and legitimises the possession of nuclear weapons by Beijing, London and Paris in their own right, irrespective of what the superpowers may do. It also provides a common shield with which to protect their nuclear deterrent capabilities from being cut below the level of credibility. On the other hand, they have come out strongly in defence of an independent West European nuclear deterrent to meet what they describe as "the growing challenge" to European security from the "decoupling" of European and American defences following the INF Treaty.¹² The Chinese would like to see increased defence cooperation among West European countries and an upgrading of the Anglo-French nuclear deterrent. Chinese commentators reject the idea of European and even global denuclearisation because "nothing can substitute for nuclear deterrence."¹³ This contrasts sharply with Beijing's official declaratory policy on the thorough and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. The Chinese also appreciate the fact that neither France nor Britain has been willing to offer its nuclear forces as a bargaining chip in any nuclear arms control negotiations.

It should be noted that the success of what might be called the Sino-Anglo-French strategy to keep their nuclear forces out of the US-Soviet arms control talks until now owes a great deal to the support extended to it by the United States. But the US negotiators may find it increasingly difficult to stick to this position after the 50 per cent reduction in US-Soviet strategic arms. Given the nature of Beijing's relationships with Washington and Moscow, it is possible that, in the long run, China's arms control policy might differ or come into conflict with the arms control policies not only of the superpowers but also those of other medium-sized NWSs - Britain and France. However, this may not happen if both European countries move towards greater strategic independence from the United States. In that case, the arms control strategies of China, France and Britain may begin to complement each other. In the short and medium terms, one can say that China, much like France and Britain, also regards ACD measures as being for other states rather than for itself, and believes that such measures must not affect its own security interests or strategic doctrine. Evidently, the security factor is the most dominant one in the making of Chinese arms control policy.

The Domestic Factors in Chinese Nuclear Arms Control Policy:

A country's leadership, in devising its arms control policy, has to take into account that country's capability of economic, technological and industrial infrastructure to support a defence sector independently. China is no exception in this regard. The changes in domestic development priorities, particularly the Four Modernisations strategy aimed at enhancing this capability, made it necessary to establish a tension-free strategic environment around China's borders to facilitate economic development. Deng Xiaoping's Four Modernisations strategy necessitated China's integration with the world economic and political system. The resulting interaction with and dependence on the international system also made China amenable to the notion of international cooperation on security issues. And the Chinese argued, insofar as ACD ensures a peaceful environment, and restrains a superpower arms race detrimental to Chinese interests, it should not only be welcomed but also encouraged.

However, the impact of the domestic situation on Chinese arms control strategy has resulted in two developments, one positive and the other negative from the nuclear arms control point of view. On the positive side, there has emerged a lobby in China's decision-making organs which favours adopting a flexible response to ACD to facilitate greater cooperation with the West on economic and security issues, and to reduce defence spending and the size of the armed forces. This tendency is reflected in Chinese

approach to nuclear nonproliferation issues. Thus, China's need for external aid and cooperation in its domestic economic development brought about some change in Chinese policy. On the negative side, emphasis on economic modernisation has led to discontent within the military establishment which feels that dramatic changes in military technology require enhanced Chinese defence spending. Deng, while not intending to ignore the military's needs, could not satisfy all of their resource demands without derailing his ambitious economic plans. The substitute solution to resolve the differences over the allocation of resources within the Chinese leadership was to spend more on cost-effective nuclear weapons. Thus, strategic nuclear forces and space technology have been exempted from cuts in military spending. According to CIA estimates, military R & D expenditure between 1978 and 1987 increased by 25 per cent whereas the overall defence budget was reduced from 17.5 per cent of total governmental expenditure in 1979 to 8.2 per cent in 1988.¹⁴ In addition, since the early 1980s, the PLA has promoted the sale of military hardware, including missiles, to Third World countries as a way to fund China's military modernisation. The increased emphasis on nuclear weapons is likely to create problems for those who favour using non-military instruments to reduce the external threats to Chinese security.

In short, domestic factors such as economic planning, bureaucratic turf battles, the views of the military establishment, and the differences among China's civilian and military experts over defence and arms control issues, will continue to affect the general thrust of Chinese arms control diplomacy. However, it should also be remembered that whatever differences they may have over other issues, there seems to be a remarkable political consensus among the rival political factions within the CCP in support of the nuclear weapons programme itself. Any discussion of the Chinese approach to nuclear arms control must also take into account the vital fact that Chinese nuclear weapons strongly reinforce China's claim to equality with the United States and the Soviet Union. Chinese disclaimers notwithstanding, superpower or at least major power status is the ultimate goal of Chinese national security strategy. And to become a major power, China needs to have a credible military capability across the spectrum of war. Thus, China's unwillingness to undertake any nuclear arms reduction obligations has part of its root in domestic politics.

The Diplomatic Factor in China's Nuclear Arms Control Policy:

Finally, China's arms control diplomacy is aimed at winning friends and influencing people in the Third World by pointing to the arms race between the superpowers as the

major threat to world peace, while putting Beijing at the forefront of the international disarmament and anti-nuclear forces. In order to resist external pressure on China to join the ACD process, Beijing has deliberately and thoughtfully sought to play down the significance of its nuclear weapons capability by claiming that it exists only for self-defence and to break the superpower nuclear duopoly, and by emphasising its no-first-use pledge. China's interest in fostering an image of a peace-loving and responsible nuclear power has led it to abandon its erstwhile hostile and sceptical approach to ACD.

However, considerations of image and prestige remain subordinate to security considerations in the making of Chinese nuclear arms control policy. There have been instances when China has stubbornly refused to endorse those ACD proposals which are seen as damaging to Chinese security, even if they have been widely supported by the nonaligned and Third World nations.¹⁵ The Chinese are aware that the nuclear weapon is also a political weapon which has given China a status in world affairs disproportionate to its actual economic and military capabilities. Beijing needs nuclear weapons to make the political point that it is on a par with other great powers. And if nuclear weapons are replaced by space weapons in the future as the new status symbols in international politics, China is likely to wish to acquire space weapons, if it can afford to do so, again to make the point that it is an equal of major powers.

This overview of the factors which determine China's nuclear arms control policy serves to highlight the way in which security concerns, domestic-economic and diplomatic factors interact with each other to produce shifts in this policy. The examination of the relationship between Chinese national security and nuclear arms control in the three case studies undertaken in this thesis further validates the significance of these factors in the making of Beijing's arms control strategy. It is argued that security, economic and diplomatic considerations led China to acquire nuclear weapons in the 1960s; determined and shaped Beijing's opposition to a non-proliferation regime in the 1960s and 1970s; propelled China to undermine the regime in the 1980s; and that they could cause it either to erode or to support and strengthen the global non-proliferation regime now and in the future. Beijing's response to the diffusion of power in the international system, and the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile proliferation in China's neighbourhood, which will create new uncertainties and threats to Chinese security in the coming years, will be influenced by the above-mentioned considerations. It is still difficult to say whether stemming proliferation has become an integral part of the Chinese nuclear arms control policy. The case study on NWFZs/NFZs challenges the popular assumption that with the possible exception of the

Soviet Union, China has been the most consistent and fervent supporter of NWFZ proposals. This study contends that China's policy pronouncements or voting behaviour in the UN disarmament fora give an incomplete picture of China's arms control diplomacy. China's support for NFZs has never been unconditional or unequivocal, as the Chinese would have us believe, but has always been determined by strategic and diplomatic considerations. Each NWFZ/NFZ (both those already established, and those proposed) has unique features, and at one level, it is the specifics of the NWFZ and their implications for Chinese national security that determine China's policy. Therefore, one must not underestimate the degree to which Chinese thinking on the NFZs reflects important elements of its strategic perceptions. Similarly, the perceived impact of INF talks on Chinese security not only brought about a community of interests among Beijing, Paris and London, but also forced China to take a closer look at ACD issues and adopt an arms control strategy. The three case studies show that the prospects of Chinese participation in bilateral or multilateral nuclear arms reduction process in the foreseeable future do not look promising.

III

Change and Continuity

In many respects, the present Chinese positions on nuclear arms control are reminiscent of the 1960s and 1970s, when Beijing used to look at ACD either as a luxury which China could not afford or as a tool used by external forces to limit China's nuclear weapons programme. China's main concern, then as now, has been to avoid becoming the odd man out in the US-Soviet-PRC triangle but at the same time keeping out of the US-Soviet ACD process. Beijing's quest for independence and its endeavour to maximise its own security interests also place limits on its rapprochement with either the US or the USSR. China's ACD strategy is still oriented towards enhancing its nuclear capabilities rather than reducing its nuclear arsenal. This could be construed as something which goes against the spirit of ACD as it is commonly understood but it is certainly in accord with the Chinese conception of national security. The Chinese apparently prefer to use the arms control process as a means to reduce and weaken superpower forces, especially those of the Soviet Union, while protecting their own. From Beijing's perspective, behind the recent Soviet peace offensive there lies a strategy to use arms control as a means to block American technological advances and to restrict

the growth in the nuclear forces of China, France and Britain at a time when Moscow is increasingly constrained by economic and political factors to devote fewer resources to its defence sector. This explains the Soviet readiness to accept previously unthinkable reductions in its own forces as the price. Chinese analysts believe that Moscow might make some arms cuts that are deeper than those of its rival if it can do so without letting Washington gain the military advantage. The signing of the INF Treaty is cited as one example of this tendency.¹⁶ This strategy, according to the Chinese, is no different from the earlier Soviet attempts to achieve these objectives by different tactics. Beijing is also wary of Moscow's attempts to exploit identical, but coincidentally so, Chinese-Soviet arms control positions on no-first-use of nuclear weapons, ratification of the South Pacific NFZ Treaty, and opposition to SDI "to serve its global interests" which go against China's "independent stand on disarmament."¹⁷

Thus, the conceptual underpinnings of Chinese arms control policy remain basically unchanged. That ACD for China is just one of the means to counter the external threat to its security is evident from the Chinese support to those arms control proposals which restrict or limit the nuclear arsenals of its adversaries and opposition to those arms control issues which adversely affect Chinese military programmes and deployments. In order to shield its nuclear deterrent from being undermined by global arms control activities, Beijing will continue to keep a close watch on all aspects of the superpower arms race - space, nuclear and conventional as well as on the ups and downs in US-Soviet relations, to assess how China's national security could be affected by these developments.

Nonetheless, there have also been some noticeable changes in Chinese approach to ACD. First, despite their distrust of superpower intentions, the Chinese have accepted the central value that ACD activities can help to promote international peace and stability. Second, China has abandoned its erstwhile preference for the "general and complete disarmament" approach in favour of a "limited" arms control approach. Third, while in the past China used to question the sincerity of the superpowers' attempts to reduce their nuclear arsenals, now it believes that reduction is possible but tends to differ on how deep the cuts should be and what types of weapons should be restricted. Moreover, whereas in the 1960s and 1970s China did not have an articulated arms control strategy and simply ignored or condemned the ACD process, in the 1980s China does have a well conceived and calculated ACD strategy which could be termed more appropriately perhaps as an "anti-ACD" strategy. Whereas in the past, Chinese policy was largely reactive to US-Soviet arms control agenda, now it is much more perceptive

and imaginative. Besides, the eighties have seen the emergence of a small "arms control community"¹⁸ within Chinese policymaking organs which is favourably disposed to evaluating arms control issues. Finally, there has been a greater recognition of the fact that China's national security cannot be divorced from international security.¹⁹

Chinese National Security and Nuclear Arms Control Policies: Implications For The Future:

Needless to say that any attempt to project the future is subject to the hazards of unforeseeable events and change. Nevertheless, if past and present Chinese behaviour is any guide to future action, then it is safe to assume that the Chinese response to various nuclear arms control issues in the near future will be determined by the four objectives and three principles of Chinese nuclear arms control strategy outlined above. As stated earlier, the maintenance and enhancement of China's nuclear capability will remain the single most important consideration to guide Chinese arms control behaviour, followed by the considerations of insulating Chinese nuclear weapons from negotiated constraints, injecting Chinese security concerns into US-Soviet arms control dialogues and projecting the image of China as a peaceloving and responsible nuclear power. In addition, China ^{be} can be expected to insist on its demand for "three stops and one reduction" and an end to qualitative arms race before Beijing could contemplate joining the multilateral nuclear arms reduction process.²⁰ What follows below is a discussion of possible Chinese response to five major issues of nuclear arms control - a comprehensive test ban, the strategic defense initiative, strategic nuclear weapons, tactical and theatre nuclear systems and naval arms control.

(a) Comprehensive Test Ban/Nuclear Test Ban:

China's position on CTB/NTB is ambiguous. Chinese analysts argue that a comprehensive test ban or nuclear test ban is a luxury that China cannot presently afford. Moreover, they cleverly downplay China's testing programme by describing it as being of "insignificant scale."²¹ Cessation of all nuclear testing by China also goes against the first and second objectives of Chinese nuclear arms control strategy. Nuclear testing is seen as essential to ensure the continued viability of Chinese nuclear deterrent. As in other areas of arms control, China wants the superpowers to take the lead before China stops all nuclear testing. China's position on the CTB issue is also similar to the French stance. Chinese and French postures derive from scepticism regarding CTB prospects and the US-Soviet plans to deploy space-based weapons systems which require extensive testing, and fear that this may seriously undermine the potency of lesser nuclear deterrents possessed by medium-sized NWSs.²²

Recently, China has reluctantly, for political and diplomatic reasons, tried to soften its opposition to NTB issue, knowing full well that the goal of an NTB is an impossible one to achieve. Analysing the contradictory motives of Washington and Moscow over the NTB issue, a Chinese arms control expert has concluded that "it is very difficult for them to reach a substantial agreement on 'overall and thorough prohibition' of nuclear tests" in the foreseeable future.²³ In 1986, China modified its stand and said that if an ad-hoc CTB committee is established, "the Chinese delegation will participate in its work."²⁴ Yet participation does not imply China's willingness to accede to the treaty. As the case study on NWFZs demonstrates, China sometimes seems willing to extend verbal support to even those arms control proposals which are seen as detrimental to its security interests, but which are unlikely to materialise. By doing so, Beijing can achieve its objective of garnering Third World support for its disarmament position.

(b) *Strategic Defense Initiative:*

The extension of the superpower arms race into outer space, as exemplified in the United States' SDI project and possible Soviet countermeasures, threatens to emasculate the potency of China's nuclear deterrent, and thus undermines the very basis of China's nuclear arms control strategy. No wonder, then, that the Chinese have stated in unequivocal terms their opposition to Reagan's "Star Wars" project, which is an attempt to build a multi-layer anti-ballistic missile defence system with space-based kinetic energy weaponry as its backbone. From Beijing's perspective, SDI is an important step in seizing military superiority by building a new strategic weapon system which is as offensive as it is defensive.²⁵ The Chinese government considers strategic defences to be potentially destabilising and detrimental to the ACD process. Since the early 1980s, China has supported that process as a means of enhancing strategic stability. Despite recent changes in the Soviet Union, Chinese analysts believe that the Soviet Union cannot afford to lag behind, and would invest whatever resources are necessary in the development of new military technologies. This, in turn, would lead to an unpredictable and unrestrained offence-defence arms race and further perpetuate the bipolar structure of the international system.

The US-Soviet space-based defence systems have the potential to pose a much greater threat to China than any quantitative increase in their offensive arsenals so far. Given the nature of Anglo-French relations with the United States, the Chinese feel that, in the final analysis, they have most to lose by progress in superpower antimissile development. Beijing's domestic development priorities indicate that China has neither the resources nor the technological capability to keep pace in an offensive-defensive

superpower nuclear arms race. China advocates, much like France and Britain, restraining US-Soviet anti-ABM efforts by preserving as much of the ABM Treaty as possible and using SDI as a bargaining chip to force the Soviets to cut their nuclear arsenals drastically. Mindful of the proliferation of nuclear and space technologies in Asia, China proposed in 1985 that "*all countries with space capability* undertake not to develop, test or deploy space weapons."²⁶ The Chinese proposal to include "all countries with space capability" was presumably aimed at curbing the potential military use of space technologies by its potential Asian rivals, especially the Japanese and the Indians in the near future, in addition to the two superpowers.

At the same time, emerging trends in current Chinese military thinking also indicate that many Chinese strategists appear to see the development of space-based weapons systems as inexorable and favour the deployment of BMD systems by China.²⁷ China is reportedly taking "steps to try to guard against the spectre of emasculation; cruise-missile technology has received increased developmental priority, presumably because of its potential promise as a vehicle with which to underfly and hence circumvent anti-ballistic-missile installations."²⁸ According to Johnston, the possible development of ASATs to protect China's nuclear deterrent has already been discussed by senior Chinese strategists.²⁹ Thus China's efforts to ensure the viability of its nuclear deterrent have the potential to further complicate the superpower arms control negotiations.

(c) *Strategic Nuclear Weapons:*

Publicly, China supports the concluding of an agreement by the two superpowers as soon as possible to reduce by 50 per cent the number of their strategic arsenals.³⁰ A significant decrease in the US-Soviet nuclear arsenals automatically enhances Chinese nuclear capability relative to that of the superpowers. But privately, the Chinese are concerned that cuts in the superpower arsenals by 50 per cent would soon focus world attention on the Chinese and Anglo-French nuclear deterrents, and that the three NWSs would be subjected to increasing pressure to bring their nuclear forces onto the negotiating table for reductions. Thus, the reduction of superpower strategic nuclear weapons by 50 per cent - a demand originally put forward by China - has come to haunt Chinese leaders and arms control policymakers. Not surprisingly, then, as soon as Gorbachev proposed 50 per cent reduction as the basis of START negotiations, Deng Xiaoping dismissed his call as not reflecting "any substantial change."³¹

To resolve this policy dilemma, Beijing has recently staged a significant retreat by fudging the explicit figure of 50 per cent to one of "substantial reductions" in superpower

arsenals.³² In what might be an indication of a hardening of China's stance on its participation in multilateral nuclear arms control talks, Beijing has set forth new pre-conditions such as a halt to the qualitative arms race and complete cessation of testing, production or deployment of nuclear weapons in addition to reductions much deeper than currently being negotiated. If it seems surprising that, during a period when the superpowers are closer to drastic nuclear reductions than at any time since the advent of nuclear weapons, China's position on its involvement in the process is hardening, then one needs to understand the role of nuclear weapons in China's national security policy. While in theory China claims to stand for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, in reality Chinese policy sees little likelihood of this happening in the short or long term. Besides, there are grave doubts as to whether a return to the pre-nuclear age would usher in an era of stability, peace and tranquility.³³

Thus the case of strategic nuclear arms control reveals tension between the first and second objectives of Chinese nuclear arms control strategy. Much as Beijing would like to see deep cuts in US-Soviet nuclear weapons to enhance the potency of its nuclear deterrent, it would not like them to cross a threshold beyond which it is difficult for Beijing to keep Chinese nuclear weapons out of the arms reduction process. What causes most concern is the fear that the implementation of superpower deep cuts and the continuation of that process would place the Chinese government in a very difficult position. The Chinese can be expected to take the line that as long as the Soviet Union possesses the capability to threaten China, the Chinese government will want to maintain its nuclear deterrent. It is safe to conclude that the implications of deep cuts in superpower arsenals are against Chinese political-diplomatic interests if China's bluff in the arms control arena is called.

(d) *Tactical and Theatre Nuclear Forces:*

Since the signing of the INF Treaty, the Soviets have repeatedly said that the problem of reducing and eliminating tactical nuclear weapons (tactical missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft and artillery) needs to be addressed and that "the participation of the third nuclear powers in solving this problem is not merely possible but indispensable."³⁴ Beijing is likely to oppose any progress in disarmament in this category unless its pre-conditions are met. Though the Chinese military has carried out several exercises using tactical nuclear weapons, Beijing has never officially acknowledged the existence of TNWs in the Chinese armoury.^{*} It is unlikely that the Chinese will either acknowledge their possession of TNWs or easily abandon their attachment to them.

*Chinese military exercises are discussed in Ch.III, pp.71-72.

(e) *Naval Arms Control:*

Like the French and the British, the Chinese have come to regard a fleet of ballistic-missile submarines as the cornerstone of their strategic nuclear forces and war planning because China's geographical proximity to the Soviet Union makes China's land-based missiles vulnerable. Unfortunately for Beijing, the focus of arms control is shifting to naval arms control at a time when China is committed to pursuing its sea-based deterrent.

In a number of speeches, especially those in Vladivostok in July 1986 and Krasnoyarsk in September 1988, Gorbachev has suggested steps to curb the naval dispositions and movements of the superpowers and regional powers in the Asia-Pacific region.³⁵ So far the dominant reaction in Beijing to Gorbachev's initiatives has been one of scepticism. The acceptance of the Soviet maritime arms control proposals, argue the Chinese strategists, would result in severe limitations upon US-Japanese and Chinese naval forces.³⁶ For example, freezing naval and air deployments in the region would not only put brakes on China's naval buildup plans, which include developing an aircraft carrier and a sizeable SSBN fleet, but also benefit the Soviet Union. Nor will China or Japan have any interest in freezing naval deployments, since they both perceive themselves to be at a great disadvantage compared to the Soviet Union. As the chapter on NWFZs demonstrates, Chinese policy on port calls by nuclear-armed ships, naval exercises in international waters, foreign military bases, nuclear and missile testing in the Asia-Pacific region is, at best, opportunistic and self-serving. In short, Chinese strategic and arms control objectives rule out Beijing's support for those arms control proposals which seek to curb Chinese naval activities in its vicinity.

It is apparent that these nuclear arms control issues are likely to generate friction and tension not only between China and the Soviet Union but also between China and the United States. So far there have been no arms control negotiations that have included the Chinese (or Anglo-French) nuclear forces. It can be said that the nuclear arms control process has served China's interests quite well until now and that Beijing would therefore certainly prefer this *status-quo* to continue. But the current trends in superpower arms control process indicate that this process may cease to work to China's advantage sooner than expected. For example, since the mid-1980s, China has had the backing of the United States in excluding Chinese nuclear forces from negotiated constraints. Whether Beijing will continue to receive this backing in the future depends on the balance of nuclear forces and the state of US-Soviet-Chinese relations. The projected growth in Chinese nuclear forces combined with Sino-Soviet detente and the

relative decline in US-Soviet military capabilities in the region might make Washington less willing to incorporate Chinese security concerns in its negotiating strategy with Moscow.

Still, there is no evidence to suggest that the Chinese are prepared to scale down their nuclear force modernisation and diversification plans or get involved in arms reductions or forego nuclear weapons. In basic terms, Chinese nuclear arms control policy has always been dedicated to helping Beijing accomplish the four key objectives mentioned above. At the same time, China's increasing involvement in the ACD process has revealed that there are many uncertainties about future Chinese nuclear weapons and arms control policies. China is uncertain about the consequences of arms control, which could be desirable as well as undesirable. The undesirable consequences include accepting external restraints on its military programmes and deployments. The ongoing changes in the international strategic environment further complicate Chinese arms control planning. This uncertainty prevents China from taking a clear-cut attitude on many arms control issues. It is, in fact, caught in a dilemma. It is unable to oppose disarmament for political and diplomatic reasons; at the same time, it is afraid that it may lose militarily or at least gain some military advantages only at the cost of swallowing some other losses. As long as this uncertainty remains in the Chinese arms control posture, there is no reason to be too optimistic about the chances of involving Beijing in any sort of direct, formal nuclear arms reduction talks in the foreseeable future.

It is also likely that persuading China to come to the negotiating table will be even more difficult than persuading France or Britain, for that matter. The conditions Beijing has defined for participation in the arms reduction process are so general and vague that even follow-on superpower agreements on offensive and defensive strategic systems are unlikely to satisfy the Chinese leadership and military. For historical and geopolitical reasons, the Chinese are particularly resistant to Soviet-proposed arms control initiatives, seeing them as a ploy to weaken Chinese defence posture. Even after deep cuts in Soviet and US strategic arsenals, their totals might still be considered too large to constitute what the Chinese describe as "drastic reductions". Given a choice, the Chinese would prefer to increase their own nuclear forces rather than rely on international arms control accords for their security. In short, the essence of Chinese nuclear arms control policy has been and remains to avoid, at all costs, accepting external constraints on its own nuclear forces.

To sum up, China's nuclear arms control strategy is derived from a rational calculation of costs and benefits. Recent changes in China's ACD policy can only be explained with reference to China's national security and the interplay of the three factors which also determine the formulation of the arms control policies of other NWSs. This study not only demonstrates the uncertain nature of China's ACD posture but also focuses on the dilemmas and problems facing the Chinese arms control policymakers, and their French and British counterparts, in formulating an appropriate response which is consistent with their countries' national security objectives. This study has established the linkage between Chinese national security and nuclear arms control. It also shows that an excellent perspective on China's national security concerns can be gained from an analysis of its arms control policy. China continues to attach great importance to nuclear weapons in its calculus of deterrence. In spite of Beijing's seemingly high profile ACD diplomacy of the 1980s, the prospects of China's participation in the bilateral and/or multilateral nuclear arms reduction talks of the foreseeable future do not look promising.

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NOTES

- 1 Tai Ming Cheung, "Disarmament and Development in China: The Relationship Between National Defense and Economic Development," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 28, No. 7, (July 1988), pp. 757-774; and John Prados, "China's 'new thinking' on nuclear arms," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, (June 1989), pp. 32-35.
- 2 Johnston, *China and Arms Control*, op. cit.; Alastair I. Johnston, "China and Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region." (Paper presented at the Conference on Maritime Security and Arms Control in the Pacific Region, Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, May 1988); and Gerald Segal, "China and arms control," *The World Today*, Vol. 41, Nos. 8-9, (August/September 1985), pp. 162-166.
- 3 *Beijing Review*, 30 March 1987, pp. 13-16; *FBIS-China*, 23 March 1987, pp. A1-A2; and "PRC Submits Working Paper to UN on Disarmament," *FBIS-China*, 12 May 1989, p. 2.
- 4 Robert Delfs, "Sino-Soviet Summit," *FEER*, 25 May 1989, pp. 12-14.
- 5 See, for example, Ji Yin, "A Rest and Reorganisation Period Before a Further US-Soviet Contest in the 21st Century," *Shijie Zhishi*, No. 21, 1 November 1988, pp. 2-4, in *FBIS-China*, 23 November 1988, pp. 4-6; and *Jiefangjun Bao*, 15 July 1988, p. 3, in *FBIS-China*, 29 July 1988, pp. 28-32.
- 6 Interviews with Chinese arms control experts at IIS, Beijing, April 1987.
- 7 See Chapter III. Also Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "Chinese Assessments of Global Trends and The Emerging Era of International Relations," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 28, No. 4, (April 1989), pp. 347-362. Gorbachev's peace initiatives and domestic reforms have been the subject of intense debate among China's policymakers and analysts. A minority viewpoint is that the Soviet Union, under Gorbachev's leadership, has largely abandoned territorial expansion in order to concentrate on domestic economic development and that Soviet foreign policy as a result has changed for the better. The second view, and one which is more widely shared, holds that Soviet arms control diplomacy offensive and peace professions are part of a wider Soviet strategy to gain breathing space in order to catch up and hence these changes are tactical and cosmetic.
- 8 Cai Xiaohong, Wang Subo, Wang Dong, and Qing Chaoying, "Strategic Competition Has Been Extended to Outer Space and the Oceans," *Jiefangjun Bao*, 2 January 1987, p. 3, in *FBIS-China*, 2 February 1987, pp. A1-A6; Johnston, *China and Arms Control*, op. cit., pp. 60-67 and 75-77; and Bonnie S. Glaser and Banning N. Garrett, "Chinese Perspectives on the Strategic Defense Initiative," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 35, (March-April 1986), pp. 28-44.
- 9 Noting that nuclear weapons have always been an important factor for the US and the Soviet Union in formulating their nuclear security strategies, Chinese analysts Chen and Zhai believe that talk of a "post-nuclear era" notwithstanding, "in the 20th century at least, the nuclear deterrent systems of the United States and the Soviet Union with nuclear offensive as the main aspect will be maintained," see Chen Feng and Zhai Zihai, "Readjustments of the US, Soviet Nuclear Strategies, and Their Backgrounds," *Renmin Ribao*, 29 July 1988, p. 6, in *FBIS-China*, 1 August 1988, p.1; and Zhang Jian, "It Is Still Necessary to Base Our Plans on Fighting a Major War," *Jiefangjun Bao*, 24 April 1987, p. 3, in *FBIS-China*, 4 May 1987, pp. A2-A3.
- 10 Each of the three medium-sized NWSs has a strategic nuclear force about one-fifteenth as powerful as that of a superpower. Over the next decade, China is expected to have about 1,000 nuclear warheads. The capability of Chinese nuclear forces to inflict damage on the Soviet Union and United States will increase considerably after 50 per cent decrease in superpower nuclear arsenals.

- 11 USSR Academy of Sciences, *Disarmament and Security 1987 Yearbook* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1988), p. 61.
- 12 Chinese concerns over the decoupling of European and American defences in the wake of the INF Treaty are discussed in Chapter VI.
- 13 Xing Hua, "Europe After the INF Treaty," *Beijing Review*, No. 13, 28 March-3 April 1988, pp. 14-18. Also see Zhu Chun, "The Strategic Situation in Europe After the Signing of US-Soviet INF Treaty," *Guoji Zhanlue Yanjiu [International Strategic Studies]*, No. 1, (March 1988), pp. 14-16.
- 14 CIA Report, "China: Economic Policy and Performance in 1987." Presented to the Subcommittee on National Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, 21 April 1987, cited in Prados, "China's 'new thinking'," p. 35.
- 15 Nuclear Test Ban is one such proposal. It is widely supported by the nonaligned and Third World countries. The other is freezing of nuclear forces by the medium-sized NWSs at their current levels.
- 16 *Beijing Review*, 2-8 May 1988, pp. 24-28.
- 17 *Disarmament and Security 1987 Yearbook*, op. cit., pp. 148-150. For Chinese reaction see *Zhongguo Tongxun She* (Hong Kong), 13 December 1986, in *FBIS-China*, 15 December 1986, pp. C1-C3; and *Wen Wei Po* (Hong Kong), 22 January 1986, in *FBIS-China*, 22 January 1986, pp. W1-2. The Sino-Soviet convergence of interests also extends to a shared concern over new tendencies in Japanese military policy. The Soviets are keen to enlist the support of the Chinese in their opposition to the revival of militarism in Japan and the abolition of ceiling on military spending set at one per cent of the GNP.
- 18 Johnston, *China and Arms Control*, pp. 38-44.
- 19 See Song Yimin, *On China's Concept of Security* (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, April 1986).
- 20 This formula of 'three stops and one reduction' means an end to testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and drastic or substantial reductions in superpower nuclear arsenals. See *China Daily*, 18 February 1986, p. 1.
- 21 Cited from Dan L. Strode, "Soviet China policy in flux," *Survival*, (July/August 1988), p. 344.
- 22 Carl G. Jacobsen, "The attitudes of the nuclear weapon states to a comprehensive test ban," in Jozef Goldblat and David Cox (eds.), *Nuclear Weapon Tests: Prohibition or Limitation* (SIPRI: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 306-7.
- 23 Ren Zhengde, "The Core of the Three US-Soviet Talks," *Liaowang*, No. 47, 24 November 1986, pp. 31-32, in *FBIS-China*, 1 December 1986, p. A1.
- 24 *Survey of Current Affairs*, March 1986, p. 85.
- 25 Chen and Zhai, "Readjustments of the US, Soviet Nuclear Strategies," op. cit., pp. 1-3.
- 26 Working Paper submitted by the Chinese delegate to the Conference on Disarmament, CD/579, 19 March 1985.
- 27 Note 8.
- 28 Jacobsen, op. cit.
- 29 Johnston, "China and Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region," op. cit.
- 30 "PRC Submits Working Paper to UN on Disarmament," *FBIS-China*, 12 May 1989, p. 2.
- 31 *International Herald Tribune*, 6 October 1985.
- 32 Note 20. Also see *Pacific Research* (Canberra), November 1988, p. 19; and Johnston, *China and Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region*, op. cit.

- 33 Chinese analysts, generally speaking, are very pessimistic about the achievement of the goal of a nuclear weapons free world. For example, see Zhang Jianzhi, "Views on Medium-Sized Nuclear Powers' Nuclear Strategy," *Jiefangjun Bao*, 20 March 1987, p. 3, in *FBIS-China*, 1 April 1987, pp. K29-33.
- 34 *Disarmament and Security 1987 Yearbook*, p. 144.
- 35 *Renmin Ribao*, 17 September 1988, p. 6.
- 36 Dongfang Tie, "Using Small Bait to Catch a Big Fish," *Jiefangjun Bao*, 30 September 1988, p. 4, in *FBIS-China*, 17 October 1988, pp. 2-3.

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