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Unless otherwise indicated, this thesis is my own work.

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ABSTRACT.

The present study investigates how the abstract meanings of prepositional phrases, often treated as metaphorically motivated, can be accurately described. The semantics of a number of Russian constructions with the preposition \( \text{V} \) [in/into] is considered. The constructions fall into the following categories:

1. constructions where a noun after \( \text{V} \) refers to a person's internal state or an emotion;
2. constructions where a noun after \( \text{V} \) refers to a category of property transfer (such as gift or reward);
3. constructions where a noun after \( \text{V} \) refers to a social role (such as teacher).

For each construction, a number of semantic constraints (additional to the general semantic categories of emotions, transfers and roles) on nouns which can be used after \( \text{V} \) [in/into] are described, and a semantic formula in the Natural Semantic Metalanguage corresponding to the meaning of the given construction is proposed. A possible metaphorical motivation for the described semantic constraints is discussed.

Chapters 1 and 2 are introductory in character. Chapter 1 contains an overview of the literature on metaphor in grammar and prepositional polysemy, as well as an outline of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage used as a descriptive tool in the present study. Chapter 2 surveys the literature on the constructions studied and introduces the notion of semantic constraint. Chapter 3 describes the meanings of a few Russian constructions which present emotions and some other internal states as containers and places where those experiencing them can immerse, come and fall. Chapter 4 deals with a causative use of \( \text{V} \) [in/into] with nouns referring to emotions and internal states and contrasts it with the meaning of another causative construction with a different preposition.

Chapters 5 and 6 treat the use of nouns referring to property transfer after \( \text{V} \) [in/into].
Chapter 5 prepares the ground for the discussion in chapter 6: it describes in detail the meanings of some nouns referring to property transfers (such as gift and reward). Chapter 6 investigates which nouns referring to property transfers can and cannot be used in a Russian construction with Y [in/into].

Chapters 7 and 8 describe the use of nouns referring to social roles in a number of constructions with Y [in/into]. Chapter 7 focuses on constructions with the accusative case of nouns referring to roles, whereas chapter 8 deals with the locative case. The difference in case implies different temporal perspectives.

Chapter 9 investigates the relationship between semantic constraints associated with the abstract meanings of prepositional phrases and some spatial situations. In many cases, standard inferences associated with a spatial sense of a prepositional phrase can be viewed as metaphorical motivations of semantic constraints characteristic for abstract meanings.

Chapter 10 is a study in the semantics of several Russian constructions used to phrase new metaphors in Russian.
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Chapter I.

Introduction: Theoretical issues.

1. Scope of the study.

The present thesis represents a study in the semantics of several Russian constructions that have the following feature in common. The constructions that I will consider are instances of the so-called conventional metaphors: they include words and word combinations which have a meaning of location or motion in space. All constructions include a verb (referring either to motion or location), the preposition \( V \) \( [\text{in/into}] \) and a variable for a noun used after the preposition \( V \) \( [\text{in/into}] \). In the constructions that I will consider nouns after the preposition \( V \) \( [\text{in/into}] \) fall into the following three categories:

(1) nouns referring to property transfers; examples:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{devočka} & \quad \text{polučila} & \quad \text{kuklu} & \quad \text{v} & \quad \text{podarok} \\
\text{girl} & \quad \text{received} & \quad \text{doll} & \quad \text{ACC in/into} & \quad \text{present} \\
\text{'the girl received a doll as a present'} ;
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{emu} & \quad \text{dali} & \quad \text{medal′} & \quad \text{v} & \quad \text{nagradu} \\
\text{him} & \quad \text{DAT} & \quad \text{gave} & \quad \text{medal ACC in/into} & \quad \text{reward ACC} \\
\text{'he was rewarded with a medal'} ;
\end{align*}
\]

(2) nouns referring to social roles; examples:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Ivan} & \quad \text{vzjal} & \quad \text{Petju} & \quad \text{v} & \quad \text{pomožniki} \\
\text{Ivan took} & \quad \text{Petja ACC in/into} & \quad \text{assistants ACC} \\
\text{'Ivan made Petja one of his assistants'} ;
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Ivan} & \quad \text{pošel} & \quad \text{učitelja} \\
\text{Ivan went} & \quad \text{in/into} & \quad \text{teachers ACC}
\end{align*}
\]
'Ivan became a teacher';

Petja byl u Ivana v pomoshnikax

Petja was to Ivan GEN in assistants LOC

'Petja was one of the assistants to Ivan';

(3) nouns referring to emotions and internal states; examples:

Ivan pogruzilsja v pechal'

Ivan sank/plunged in/into sadness ACC

'Ivan became sad';

on prisel v jarost'

he came in fury ACC

'he became furious';

ona byla v gneve

she was in anger LOC.

One could think along the lines proposed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), that whatever is referred to by a noun after the preposition V [in/into] (be it a name for a transfer frame like 'gift', a social role, or an emotion), it is metaphorically conceptualized as a container (or a place). The problem is that this description turns out to be oversimplified, because for each construction not all nouns of the corresponding class are able to occur after V [in/into]. To give just one example, the mere existence of "conceptual metaphors" like 'internal states are containers for people' (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 31-32) leaves unexplained why one cannot say in Russian *on byl v ljubvi [he was in love] whereas on byl v gneve [he was in anger, that is, he was angry] is possible.

In this thesis I will consider several prepositional constructions (of the kind which are often spoken of in terms of "conceptual metaphors") in order to determine exactly what their combinatorial potential is. That is, what restrictions exist on the occurrence of
nouns from a particular category (like roles and emotions) in a given construction. This task is, in fact, much more difficult than it seems at first because metaphorical conceptualizations such as 'social role is a container' are restricted in many surprisingly elaborate ways.

The meaning of each construction can be described on different levels. Firstly, one can describe the semantic restrictions on words that can occur in slots of each construction. Secondly, one can try to identify which part of a particular construction (the verb or the preposition) is responsible for certain semantic restrictions on words occurring in slots of this construction. Finally, in a number of cases one can give a rather precise account of the metaphoricality involved, that is, to indicate what restrictions associated with an abstract use of a verb of motion (location) with \( V \) [in/into] correspond to those associated with its spatial usage.

In this introductory chapter I will consider some basic assumptions behind the present study, such as the assumption that grammatical constructions have meanings that can be investigated and described, as well as some relevant linguistic literature. The scope of linguistic research related to the topic of this thesis is very wide. It includes literature on metaphor in grammar and that on the polysemy of prepositional phrases. As it is not possible to survey all literature concerning these problems, I will try to focus on studies which are either very influential or directly relevant for what follows (or both). I will also discuss the theory behind the descriptive tool used in this work - the Natural Semantic Metalanguage developed by Anna Wierzbicka and her colleagues. A few studies concerning the constructions that I will describe and the gathering of data are discussed in the next chapter.

One of the basic assumptions behind the present study is that grammatical constructions, like words, have meanings. It is assumed that if two constructions $C_1$ and $C_2$ have different ranges of use then the meaning of $C_1$ is different from that of $C_2$. During the last decade this view was advocated, among others, most prominently by Langacker (1987; 1990) and Wierzbicka (1988).

In his *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar* (1987) Langacker defines the grammar of a language as "those aspects of cognitive organization in which resides a speaker's grasp of established linguistic convention. It can be characterized as a structured inventory of conventional linguistic units" (1987:57). Both lexical and grammatical structures are represented in cognitive grammar via the construct of a "symbolic unit". A symbolic unit is formed by a (symbolic) association between a phonological and a semantic structure; the simplest kind of symbolic unit is a morpheme. Basic symbolic units combine to form progressively larger symbolic structures which are themselves often mastered as units which constitute for the speaker a "prepackaged" assembly and are used automatically. (Langacker 1987:57-58).

Grammar patterns are based on "schematic" symbolic units which, according to Langacker, differ from other symbolic units not in kind, but only in degree of specificity. The grammar of a language is taken to be an inventory of linguistic units. Such an inventory is seen as structured in the sense that some units function as components of others. Three basic kinds of relations are recognized between the components: (1) symbolization, which establishes a correspondence between a semantic structure and a phonological structure; (2) categorization, based on schematicity, which allows the speakers of a language to recognize, for example, a particular apple as a member of the category 'apple'; (3) syntagmatic relations which allow to combine units into a composite structure of greater size (op.cit: 73).
Of these relations the first two have an overtly semantic (cognitive) basis. As for the third, it is not purely formal either, because, as Langacker explains, the integration of two symbolic structures involves their integration at both the semantic and the phonological poles: "For two semantic structures to combine syntagmatically, they must have some point of overlap; more precisely, a substructure of one is placed in correspondence with the substructure of another" (op.cit: 94). Thus, grammatical structure is considered in cognitive grammar as inherently symbolic: it consists of the conventional symbolization of semantic structure and forms a continuum with the lexicon.

As the present study deals with the semantics of grammatical constructions, it is worth mentioning too that grammatical constructions, according to Langacker, are combinations of morphemes and larger expressions into progressively more elaborate structures. These are therefore symbolically complex, in the sense that they contain two or more symbolic structures as components (Langacker 1987: 82).

A view of the semantics of grammar which has much in common with Langacker's position, yet is clearly distinct, has been advocated by Anna Wierzbicka in her *Semantics of Grammar* (1988). As language is a tool for expressing meaning, any linguistic form has meaning, and therefore, according to Wierzbicka, linguistics falls naturally into three parts which could be called lexical semantics, grammatical semantics and illocutionary semantics. The main assumption behind the notion of grammatical semantics is that grammar is not semantically arbitrary: every grammatical structure is used to convey a certain semantic structure which determines the range of use of the given grammatical structure (Wierzbicka 1988:3). Therefore, presumably, one can reconstruct the semantic structure underlying a certain grammatical structure by analyzing its range of use, and conversely, predict the use of a given construction from its meaning.
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Wierzbicka’s approach to the semantics of grammar differs from Langacker’s in that she advocates explaining grammatical meaning via a set of conceptual primitives (Wierzbicka 1988), whereas Langacker neither accepts nor rejects the existence of such conceptual atoms (Langacker 1988).
The main purport of Wierzbicka's book is to show that one can explicate meanings of grammatical constructions in a clear and intuitively satisfactory way using a metalanguage based on a set of semantic primitives - words conveying universal meanings which cannot be explicated any further. In other words, one can define meanings of grammatical constructions in the same way as one defines meanings of words. To quote Wierzbicka,

"there is no such thing as 'grammatical meaning' or 'lexical meaning'. There are only lexical and grammatical means of conveying meaning - and even here no sharp line can be drawn between the two." (Wierzbicka 1988: 8).

As this is the approach to grammatical meaning adopted in the present thesis, I will describe in a separate section the theory and practice of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (see section 5 of this chapter). However, before turning to the descriptive tool used in this study I will consider works concerning the main subject of this thesis, that is, metaphor in grammar and prepositional polysemy.


Although there have been a number of different attempts to define metaphor (see, for example, Ortony 1979 (ed.); Sacks 1979 (ed.); Ortony 1990 (ed.)), most definitions have a common core: metaphor is understanding and experiencing one thing in terms of another. Cognitive grammar describes metaphorical processes in terms of "mapping" of one domain into another (Langacker 1988).

Most examples of metaphorical processes in meaning change have been discussed with respect to the lexicon. However, during the last decade an important role of metaphor in the development of grammatical categories has been acknowledged and explored within the framework of the theory of grammaticalization (see, for example,
A number of linguistic studies relying on "image schemata" for structuring and explanation of data has been conducted within the framework of cognitive linguistics (Langacker 1987; 1988; 1990). Although "image schema" is a theoretical construct which differs from metaphor, most "imagery" involved in linguistic studies is spatial (topological or sensory) in nature (see, for example, Talmy 1988; cf. Talmy 1983).

The emergence of the recent interest in metaphor and imagery was, in a sense, prepared by linguistic theories of the past. According to Heine et al. (1991: 113), one of the most well known and relevant theoretical positions in this connection is localism (Hjelmslev 1935; Anderson 1971, 1973; Lyons 1967, 1975, 1977; Pottier 1974). The central thesis of localism is that spatial expressions are linguistically basic and are used for structuring other kinds of expressions. Research within this framework provided evidence that grammatical expressions for temporal and aspectual categories, possession, causal and conditional notions in many languages are derived from expressions for locative categories. According to a stronger form of localism, even linguistic expressions of truth, modality and negation can be traced back to locative categories (Anderson 1973:10).

As both cognitive linguistics and the modern theory of grammaticalization pay special attention to meaning and meaning transfers of locative expressions, spatial metaphor plays an especially significant role within these two theoretical frameworks.

3.1. Metaphor and grammaticalization.

3.1.1. Metaphor and the motivation of grammaticalization.

The term grammaticalization has been introduced to refer to the process of "emerging" of grammatical categories (it seems that the word was first used by Meillet in
According to Hopper and Traugott (1993:1-2), this term has two meanings:

"it refers to that part of the study of language that focuses on how grammatical forms and constructions arise. It therefore highlights the tension between relatively strained lexical structure and more constrained syntactic, morphosyntactic and morphological structure. The term "grammaticalization" also refers to the actual phenomena of language that the framework of grammaticalization seeks to address, most especially the processes whereby items become more grammatical through time."

Heine and Reh (1984:15) characterize grammaticalization as "an evolution whereby linguistic units lose in semantic complexity, pragmatic significance, syntactic freedom, and phonetic substance."

A classical example of grammaticalization is the development of verbs of motion, such as go and come, into aspectual auxiliaries. Bybee and Dahl (1989) have analyzed the development of aspect and tense in a wide range of typologically different languages. They have shown that spatial terms develop into temporal ones along similar paths, which suggests that the development may be caused by common cognitive "needs" and processes. The three major paths of development of aspectual auxiliaries, according to Bybee and Dahl, are:

a. expressions with a copula or possession verb plus a past participle, or verbs meaning 'finish', 'come from', or 'throw away' develop into grams marking anterior or perfect, which in turn develop into perfectives or pasts;

b. expressions with a copula, locative or movement verb develop into progressives which in turn develop into imperfectives;

c. expressions with a verb meaning 'desire', 'movement towards a goal' or 'obligation' develop into grams expressing intention and future. (Bybee and Dahl 1989: 57).
Modals have been found by Bybee and Pagliuca (1985) to develop along, by and large, similar paths: from a concrete, often spatial meaning to a more abstract sense.

In discussing the problem of motivation of such changes, Bybee and Pagliuca (1985) propose that semantic change and grammaticalization processes are motivated by the fact that "human language users have a natural propensity for making metaphorical extensions that lead to the increased use of certain items. The metaphorical extensions are cognitively based and are similar across languages".

These studies of grammaticalization prompted extensive discussions of the motivation of grammaticalization, the role of metaphor and other semantic changes involved in this process. (For later work on the development of auxiliaries see Heine (1993)). According to Heine et al. (1991:27), grammaticalization is motivated by extralinguistic factors, generally speaking, human cognitive abilities and creativity, and can be regarded, as Traugott (1988:413) points out, as an instance of problem solving. Thus, when people face the need to express new concepts, for which no labels exist so far, one possible strategy is to extend the use of existing forms for the expression of new concepts. This claim implies a few basic assumptions, mainly that (a) concept formation is independent of concept naming and (b) the use of a given linguistic form for a new concept involves a process whereby two different concepts are metaphorically equated.

The result of this problem solving activity is that lexical structures are used to express grammatical meanings, and grammatical structures serve to express even more abstract grammatical meanings. This is an unidirectional process "leading from concrete to abstract concepts and from lexical to grammatical expressions" (Heine et al. 1991:31).

As the output of grammaticalization is more abstract than its input, it normally lacks some of the source's concrete meaning. On the other hand, some meaning, initially absent in the input, may be present in a grammaticalized form. In other words,
grammaticalization is connected both with semantic loss and semantic gain. The first is often referred to as "abstraction" or "bleaching", the second as "pragmatic strengthening" or "enrichment". As we will see further on, semantic relations between concrete spatial and abstract meanings of locative expressions also involve some semantic gains and losses and therefore the notions of "semantic bleaching" and "pragmatic strengthening" are of relevance here.

3.1.2. "Bleaching" and abstraction vs. pragmatic strengthening.

3.1.2.1. "Bleaching".

Studying how words and expressions are grammaticalized, some linguists express the view that the meaning of grammatical categories is "contained" in the meaning of their lexical sources and is the result of "desemanticization" (Heine and Reh 1984) and "fleshing out" of meaning (Sweetser 1988). This implies, however, that grammaticalization does not bring anything new to the meaning of expressions undergoing semantic change and, what is more, that linguistic expressions which form part of the same line of grammaticalization share some common semantic core. However, it is known that the source meaning may completely disappear in the process of semantic change and be replaced by a meaning which is synchronically unrelated (for example, the negative meaning of the French negative marker *pas* is not related to its initial meaning 'step'). In fact, as shown by Traugott (1988) and Sweetser (1988), "semantic bleaching" is characteristic for later stages of grammaticalization rather than for earlier stages. Other processes of semantic change may occur at early stages of grammaticalization, among which the most clearly described is "pragmatic strengthening". Besides, "bleaching" (in the sense of the inclusion of more abstract grammatical meanings into those which served as their source), does not coincide with
what Heine et al. call "abstraction".

3.1.2.2. Abstraction.

According to Heine et al. (1991:43), describing the processes of meaning change one can distinguish between "generalizing" abstraction, "isolating" abstraction and "metaphorical" abstraction. Generalizing abstraction refers to reducing the intension of a word or expression to its semantic core that leads to increasing its extension. Isolating abstraction is similar to generalizing abstraction, the only difference being that the feature preserved through the processes of semantic change does not necessarily have to be the semantic core of the initial concept. Both types of abstraction are involved in processes referred to as "desemanticization" or "semantic bleaching". Metaphorical abstraction relates "more abstract" meanings to concrete meanings across conceptual domains and, according to Heine et al. (1991), it is the metaphorical abstraction, rather than any other, that underlies the processes of grammaticalization. From this perspective, metaphor is understood to be a cognitive mechanism which allows the linking of categories belonging to different domains. Heine et al. speak of "categorial metaphors" and present them as chains of categorial transfers such as, for example:

SPACE > TIME or
SPACE > OBJECT.

Metaphorical abstraction is a shift along such a path of categorial metaphors. For example, spatial terms such as behind can be derived metaphorically from a body part (an example of a shift described by categorial metaphor OBJECT > SPACE), and after this, temporal terms can be derived metaphorically from the spatial terms (via SPACE > TIME shift) which makes it possible to say in English something like:

We are behind in paying our bills.
Needless to say, synchronically metaphors corresponding to grammaticalization processes are "frozen" or dead, that is, presumably, no conceptual transfer is perceived by the speakers.

3.1.2.3. Pragmatic strengthening.

The early stages of grammaticalization, according to Hopper and Traugott (1993), involve a shift of meaning and "pragmatic strengthening" of the initial meaning rather than its loss, but over time the initial concrete meaning tends to "bleach" or "weaken". An idea of "pragmatic strengthening" in meaning change has been introduced by Traugott (1988). To take her widely known example, causal since has developed out of the temporal since on the basis of strengthening of informativeness, based on a proverbial inference rule: after this, therefore because of this. Other examples of semantic change, arrived at by pragmatic enrichment based on inferencing, include the development of epistemic will from volitional will (as in predictions like Bill will be late again. I suppose); concessives from temporals (while); conditionals from temporals (as long as).

Along similar lines, Traugott and König (1991) argue that strengthening of informativeness based on conversational inferences, may result in conventionalized new meanings, or polysemy, as in general, according to Grice (1975:58), it is possible "for what starts life ... as a conversational implicature to become conventional". They give an example of the development of a preference marker out of the temporal adverb sooner, through this process:

Bill died sooner than John (temporal);
I'd sooner die than marry you (preference).

3.2. Langacker on metaphor.
An approach to metaphor in grammar which is both close to that of the theory of grammaticalization and clearly distinct from it, has been developed within the framework of cognitive linguistics, above all, in the writings of Ronald Langacker. Metaphor in the proper sense of the word, according to Langacker, is understanding of one domain in terms of another and the so-called "mapping between them" (Langacker 1990:155).

"The metaphorical expressions are instances of semantic extension. The primary role of metaphor is to extend lexical meanings. When these expressions are used idiomatically the extended or "figurative" sense functions as the active node - it represents the actual notion to be conveyed - while the basic or "literal" sense is activated secondarily. This two-level semantic representation accounts for the special quality of metaphorical expressions, but the enhancement of meaning by the activation of subsidiary nodes is present to some degree in virtually every expression. The metaphorical use of novel expressions has the same fundamental character, the only difference being that the extended variant and categorizing judgment have not yet achieved the status of conventional units" (Langacker 1988:69).

When used repeatedly, however, metaphors tend to "fade" and become conventional. Speakers stop being aware of the fact that they are actually comparing one domain to another, conceptualizing a class of phenomena in terms of other phenomena.

3.2.1. An example: "abstract motion".

Interesting examples of "faded" metaphors are provided in a number of languages by tense auxiliaries derived from verbs of motion. Langacker introduced the notion of "abstract motion" (Langacker 1987: 168ff, Langacker 1990:149 ff.) to describe how a meaningful verb like go changes into a future tense auxiliary, as in the French
construction 

va finir/coucher (this change is normally accounted for as "grammaticalization of go", see above). Langacker also proposes to analyze in terms of abstract motion sentences like:

Roger went through the alphabet in 73 seconds;

This milk is about to go sour;

The concert went from midnight to 4 AM.

(Langacker 1990:155).

Langacker observes that "though one's first thought is to treat such sentences as instances of spatial metaphor, it is not obvious how strongly and persistently speakers perceive them as such (1990:155). Accepting the basic validity of this analysis, Langacker states that "as it stands it is insufficiently precise". To make the "metaphor" or "transfer" involved in such cases as those above precise, the following cognitive formula, corresponding to physical movement in physical space, is introduced:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{[}[m] L1] & \quad [T1] & > & & [][m] L2] & \quad [T2] & > & & [][m] Ln] & \quad [Tn] \\
& & & & C & \quad & & & & C \\
& & & & T1 & \quad & T2 & \quad & Tn
\end{align*}
\]

In this formula, ([m] Li] Ti indicates that the mover occupies location Li at moment Ti (as the formula shows it, different locations at different times), whereas the bottom line corresponds to the observer's conceptualizations of the mover's location at different times. Langacker observes that in order to interpret the examples where go is used in an abstract sense we need only interpret the notations in the formula above in a suitably abstract manner. Under this generalized interpretation, [L1, L2, L3, ...Ln] is not to be construed as a spatial path in particular, but simply as an ordered sequence of entities within the relevant domain, such that the mover m is capable of "making contact" with each of these entities individually; [m]Li then indicates the momentary contact of m with Li in this domain. This schematic concept of motion, as Langacker observes, is so
general that any change can be viewed as an instance.

3.2.2. Langacker on case meaning extensions.

Another fragment of Langacker’s theory which is directly relevant for this study is his view on grammatical case. According to Langacker, although case markings are traditionally regarded as elements devoid of semantic content, from the perspective of cognitive grammar this is quite wrong:

"the assumption that a governed morpheme is ipso facto semantically empty is erroneous: being obligatory is not the same as being meaningless, and the conventions of a language often specify the co-occurrence of particular meaningful elements" (Langacker 1990:235).

The idea that morphological cases have meaning is also advocated by Wierzbicka (who traces it back to Jakobson): "it must be acknowledged that case markers often have a positive semantic function: they encode certain specific and precisely stateable meanings" (Wierzbicka 1988: 437).

Getting back to Langacker’s discussion of the category of case it is worth mentioning one more point of importance. Langacker explicitly mentions the fact that case meanings, like other kinds of meanings, above all lexical ones, can have semantic extensions:

"A case category is generally complex, comprising a network of alternate senses connected by relationships of schematicity and semantic extension. The specific array of senses associated with a particular case is a matter of linguistic convention and reflects the interaction of numerous factors. For one thing, the senses of a case tend to cluster around a particular role archetype, which provides its prototypical value" (Langacker 1990:249-50).

The idea of possible metaphoric extensions of case semantics will be continually
employed in the present study. I will show that temporal perspectives associated with grammatical constructions including the preposition \( \text{in/into} \) differ depending on the case of the noun used after the preposition (the accusative vs. locative).

4. Modern studies of prepositional polysemy.

As all grammatical constructions that I will consider include the preposition \( \text{in/into} \), with the semantic content of the "containment" relationship different for each construction, existing approaches to prepositional polysemy, especially to abstract meanings of prepositions, will be overviewed in this section.

According to Taylor (1988), there are two major approaches to prepositional polysemy: the "core sense" approach (applied mainly by Bennet (1975)) and the "meaning chain" approach first developed by Brugman (1983).

4.1. The "core sense" approach (Bennet 1975).

A clear concise account of the "core sense" approach used by Bennett (1975) can be found in Hawkins (1984). Bennet's system can be summarized briefly as follows. The descriptive inventory includes five "cases" (LOCATIVE, SOURCE, PATH, GOAL AND EXTENT) and a number of "parts" (such as "interior", "exterior", "surface", "inferior", "anterior" and "posterior") - spatial areas contiguous with a physical object. Neither cases, nor parts are given definitions; some labels, such as "interior", are considered to be self-explanatory; others are illustrated by means of examples. Thus, Bennet's explanation of LOCATIVE is based on a comparison of two structures:

\[ \text{I saw Gwyneth at the supermarket} \]

and

\[ \text{I saw Gwyneth at 10 o'clock}. \]
employed in the present study. I will show that temporal perspectives associated with grammatical constructions including the preposition \(V\) [in/into] differ depending on the case of the noun used after the preposition (the accusative vs. locative).

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and

I saw Gwyneth at 10 o'clock.

It may not be easy to distinguish between the polysemy of a preposition (\(V\) [in/into], in what follows) and that of constructions including this preposition. Thus, prepositional constructions are normally "centred" around a preposition and the polysemy of a construction is "carried", so to speak, be the preposition.
Bennet notes that the first sentence locates the event of 'seeing Gwyneth' in space, whereas the second sentence locates it in time. According to Bennet, "LOCATE IN SPACE" and "LOCATE IN TIME" imply that there is a general notion of location which is neither specifically spatial nor temporal ... This general notion is designated by the element "locative" (Bennet 1975:15-16).

The cases SOURCE, PATH and GOAL are illustrated by the sentence We went from Waterloo Bridge along the Embankment to Westminster, where from Waterloo Bridge specifies the SOURCE, to Westminster corresponds to GOAL and along the Embankment provides information about the route taken and, therefore, corresponds to the PATH (op.cit: 18). Finally, EXTENT is introduced to analyze semantic structures such as those corresponing to the sentence

How long is the Mall?

In terms of these five "cases" and "parts", semantic structures of prepositions are decomposed like this, for example:

INSIDE: LOCATIVE interior of side;
IN FRONT OF: LOCATIVE anterior;
DOWN: GOAL LOCATIVE lower;
OVER: LOCATIVE superior.

Bennet rejects prepositional polysemy and attributes the semantic differences between various uses of a given preposition to other factors within the structures in which the preposition occurs. In the end he proposes a single semantic representation for each preposition. In many cases, however, he considers several componential representations corresponding to different uses of a preposition before arriving at a uniform semantic description of these uses. However, no rules which allow us to infer the meaning of a preposition in a given context from the "core sense" and the context have been proposed
by Bennet. In the absence of such rules it is hardly possible to decide whether the sense of a preposition in a single use is compatible with the "core sense". Thus, according to Hawkins (1984:195-196), it is very questionable whether the meaning of the preposition over in the sentence They hung a curtain over the picture is compatible with Bennet's claim that the core sense of over is LOCATIVE superior. As long as there is no precise way to verify whether the "core sense" is present or absent in a particular example no argument seems conclusive. Bennet's notation, being based on notions which are too abstract, on the one hand, and not formally defined, on the other, does not provide an opportunity for such verification.

4.2. The "meaning chain" approach.

The "meaning chain", (or semantic networks) approach to prepositional polysemy was started by Brugman's (1983) analysis of over and then implemented in a number of works, such as, for example, Lakoff 1987; Norvig and Lakoff 1987; Rice 1992; Rudzka-Ostyn 1985; Taylor 1988; Schultze 1991; Cuyckens 1991; Vandeloise 1991; Kuteva and Sinha 1994).

Semantic theory which both underlies this approach and at the same time builds on it, has been most clearly formulated by Lakoff and Brugman (1987), and illustrated by the semantic analysis of over in English. The network representation of related senses is proposed as a "cognitively real" alternative to the traditional approach to polysemy characterized by listing all senses of an ambiguous word (with the assumption that examples which fall into a particular type (sense) meet a list of necessary and sufficient conditions). Brugman and Lakoff propose instead that (a) different senses of a polysemous word are related "radially" to its central sense (which does not have to be a "core sense" shared by all other senses) and/or to some other senses; (b) the category
corresponding to each sense has an internal structure with some members being more exemplary than others; therefore the boundaries of the category are not clear-cut.

To illustrate how different senses of a word can be related, Brugman and Lakoff analyze the meaning of the preposition *over*. Different senses of *over* are presented in this work both by pictures and notation based on a number of distinctive features such as: landmark is extended (X); landmark is vertical (V); landmark is both extended and vertical (VX); there is a contact between trajectory and landmark (C); there is no contact (NC). For example, the situation referred to as *the plane flew over the hill* will be denoted as "VX.NC"; the situation referred to by *Sam drove over the bridge* is presented as "X.C". Apart from the use of notation based on distinctive features, Brugman and Lakoff present each non-metaphorical sense by a picture (or "schema").

Each non-central sense is linked to another sense: it is presented as a minimal (that is, differing in respect to only one feature) variant of the central sense or as a variant on a variant. For example, the sense of *over* in the sentence *the bird flew over the yard* (X.NC) is linked to the sense of *over* exemplified by *the plane flew over the hill* (VX.NC), which, in its own turn, is linked to *the bird flew over the wall* (V.NC), and so on.

Most of the links between senses are the so-called "image schema transformations". The "image schema transformations", according to Brugman and Lakoff, are natural and non-arbitrary because they reflect everyday visual experiences.

This approach, however, attractive as it seems, has some important deficiencies and shortcomings, many of which have been pointed out by Sandra and Rice (1995). Thus, no clear-cut methodology for making distinctions between prepositional senses is offered by the lexical networks approach: network descriptions of prepositional usage have been based, so far, entirely on the authors' introspection, with no formal polysemy tests being
proposed. The general trend within the networks approach is to make very fine-grained distinctions, something, which is, according to Sandra and Rice, especially appealing about this approach. However, one can always make more distinctions. For example, as pointed out by Sandra and Rice, along with distinctions based on the shape and orientation of the landmark (extended vs. non-extended, vertical vs. non-vertical), one can distinguish two usages of over in the sentences:

**The plane flew over the ditch**

**The boy jumped over the ditch**

on the basis of the shape of the trajectory of the moving trajectors (linear vs. curvilinear, respectively), although Brugman and Lakoff do not do this. Therefore one needs some clearly formulated criteria for distinguishing prepositional usages, corresponding to different nodes of a network, to rely on.

Furthermore, the linguistic status of networks representing prepositional polysemy is unclear. For instance, it remains unexplained whether different nodes correspond to major senses or to possible variations of just one sense which can be distinguished by the context. Some networks, at least, where nodes correspond to usages with a common semantic "core", may be compatible with this monosemy view (cf. Ruhl (1989)).

The cognitive status of the networks is even more unclear. There is no evidence so far, that all kinds of fine-grained descriptions, like those presented by the networks approach, are psychologically real. In fact, according to Williams (1992), there is evidence against the psychological reality of prepositional networks. Williams argues that if the mental representation of polysemous words is organized according to meaning chains, the only factor determining the amount of priming (that is, decreasing the time needed for an experimental task such as discriminating words from non-words) between related meanings should be the extent to which they overlap. However, the experiments
provide evidence of an asymmetry in the amount of priming between central and noncentral meanings and this is, according to Williams, inconsistent with the "meaning chain" approach (op.cit.: 208). On the other hand, however, Gibbs and Colston (1995), for example, argue in favour of psychological reality of image schemas and their transformations.

When dealing with metaphorical meanings, Brugman and Lakoff rely on the notion of conceptual metaphors proposed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). For example, the sentence *She has a strange power over me*, according to Brugman and Lakoff, "is an instance of a very common metaphor: CONTROL IS UP; LACK OF CONTROL IS DOWN... *Over* in this sense is an extension of schema 2, where the *trajector* is simply above the landmark" (the corresponding sentence is *the bird flew over the yard* - A.M.; op.cit: 498).

The sentence *Sam was passed over for promotion* is explained as an instance of the image schema corresponding to the spatial sentence *The plane flew over*. According to Brugman and Lakoff, two metaphorical meanings apply to the former sentence. The first is, again, CONTROL IS UP which entails that the person who passed over Sam was in control of his situation; the second metaphor which applies to this schema is CHOOSING IS TOUCHING. However, as Brugman and Lakoff admit themselves, an analysis like that quoted above does not explain why metaphorically used prepositions (and prefixes in the words *overlook, oversee*) mean what they mean (op.cit: 499-500). What is being explained is what Brugman and Lakoff call "motivation": it is, in a sense, natural for *over* to have some metaphorical extensions and the proposed analysis in terms of conceptual metaphors explains why some extensions are intuitively perceived as natural. As Rauh (1993: 143) emphasizes, these conceptual cognitive principles explain no more (and no less) than the prerequisites for lexicalization.
Apart from the fact that the proposed analysis does not actually explain what metaphorically used prepositions mean, another feature characteristic of this approach to metaphorical meaning (see also, for example, Lakoff and Turner 1989; Lakoff 1990; Johnson 1993) leaves the reader somewhat dissatisfied. Although the idea that the metaphorical usage of prepositions is related to conceptualization of one thing in terms of another is undoubtedly an important insight, it leaves unexplained what transfers actually occur and what do not and why (cf. Taylor 1988: 323).

In other words, the "meaning chain" approach does not tell us what kinds of constraints are involved in the functioning of conceptual metaphors. Obviously there are constraints: thus, for example, it remains totally unclear why in English one normally says *Sam was passed over for promotion* but not *Sam was selected over for promotion*? Why is it so if CONTROL IS UP and CHOOSING IS TOUCHING? The most obvious hypothesis in cases like this is that, perhaps, either not any kind of control is "up" or not any choosing can be conceptualized as touching. Conceptual metaphors like CONTROL IS UP obviously do not provide a descriptive tool which could capture subtle differences between *pass* and *select* which are, perhaps, responsible for these differences in metaphorical conceptualizations, and, consequently, usage.

Constraints of this kind are clearly language-specific: they may happen to be the same for two languages in respect of a particular conceptual metaphor but this does not have to be so. For example, one can say in English *to be in love* but the exact equivalent of this phrase does not exist in Russian (*byt' v ljubvi* is not a correct expression). It seems that the semantic analysis in cases like the above could start only with usage: facts concerning distribution and selection restrictions provide important clues to metaphorical conceptualizations underlying the abstract use of prepositions.

It should be mentioned that in later works Lakoff, in order to account for
constraints on metaphorical conceptualizations, formulated the "Invariance Hypothesis".

According to the "Invariance Hypothesis",

"metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (this is, the image schema structure) of the source domain. It will follow from this that all source domain inferences due to cognitive topology will be preserved in the mapping." (Lakoff 1990:54).

This would account, according to Lakoff, for what has been observed empirically in metaphor studies: that abstract inferences are actually metaphorical versions of spatial inferences (for a different approach to constraints on metaphorical conceptualizations see Kövecses (1995)).

The "Invariance Hypothesis", important and appealing as it seems, should be taken somewhat metaphorically: obviously metaphors do not preserve all inferences associated with the corresponding spatial expressions, which simply would not be possible because of differences between concrete and abstract domains. Metaphors, indeed, preserve and strengthen some inferences (cf. Traugott and König 1991). It seems, however, that so far it has not been possible to identify beforehand what inferences will be preserved by a metaphor.

4.3. Herskovits' system.

According to Herskovits (1988), the simple relations model of prepositional usage (as outlined by Leech (1969), for example) has a number of shortcomings. One of the most important of these is that the simple relations model does not account for "added constraints" such as, for example, the fact that for the phrase

The man at the desk

to be appropriate, the man should be working, or at least, in a position which allows him
to work at the desk and not, say, dancing on the top of the desk (Herskovits 1988:273). Similarly, one normally would say the potato under the bowl and not *the potato in the bowl when the potato is covered by an upturned bowl, although the space area occupied by the potato is "included" in that of the bowl. Furthermore, the simple relations model is not able to predict the possibility of a sentence like

**Ulysses is on the desk**

when "Ulysses" is the top one of a few books stacked on the desk. Thus, the simple relations meaning is often "almost true" (cf. the example above) and sometimes shifted to another, closely related meaning, which suggests, according to Herskovits, a prototypical meaning structure for the prepositions. Herskovits' account of prepositional meaning can be sketched as follows:

1. The prepositional category as a whole in Herskovits' model is organized around the ideal meaning. The whole set of uses of the preposition is subcategorized into use types (corresponding roughly to different senses), each manifesting the ideal meaning, but usually to some extent transformed or distorted.

2. A level of "geometric conceptualization" mediates between speakers' naive conceptualization of the physical world and the use of locative expressions; prepositional meaning applies to schematic images (geometric descriptions) mapped onto the objects.

3. There are pragmatic "near-principles" (referred to by Herskovits as relevance, salience, tolerance and typicality) which explain many characteristics of prepositional usage. (Herskovits 1988: 273).

**4.3.1. Use types.**

The notion of use types is directly intended to describe prepositional polysemy and therefore has to be surveyed in more detail. First of all, it should be noted that the "core
sense" position is, in fact, abandoned by Herskovits. Thus, describing the processes by which a use type can be derived from the ideal meaning, she indicates, along with some others, the following possibility. When the ideal meaning is a conjunction of defining conditions A and B, two transformed meanings, which do not share a common core, can be derived from it: one by dropping condition A and another by dropping condition B. (Herskovits 1986:94). For instance, this is the case with some uses of on: the ideal meaning formed by the conditions of contiguity and support may be transformed either into the idea of contiguity (as in the sentence on the left wall, there is a chest of drawers) or support (as in the sentence Ulysses is on the desk above).

Use types are established entirely on introspective grounds:

"there are no strict theoretical criteria for distinguishing use types. Two use types are distinguished by means of one or several "significant" distinctions: while this might seem subjective, there is a good degree of agreement to what is significant."

(Herskovits 1986:93).

A use type consists of two parts: a phrase pattern centered around a preposition, and the interpretation associated with the pattern, that is, a set of conditions defining the appropriate use of this pattern (Herskovits 1986: 89-90). The phrase pattern is a preposition with selection restrictions for the subject and object of the preposition (Herskovits 1988:291). For example, the usage of the preposition in in English is described by Herskovits as centered around the ideal meaning "inclusion of a geometric construct in a one-, two-, or three-dimensional geometric construct" and is subcategorized into the following use types:

- Spatial entity in container
- Gap/object "embedded" in physical object
- Physical object "in the air"
Physical object in outline of another, or of a group of objects
Spatial entity in part of space or environment
Accident/object part of physical or geometric object
Person in clothing
Spatial entity in area
Physical object in a roadway
Person in institution
Participant in institution.

A use type corresponds to complex knowledge, which includes anything that holds true for any phrase generated by the use type pattern. These constraints can be divided into those which apply to the "scene" and those concerning the context (although the two kinds of constraints interact) (Herskovits 1986:91). Constraints on the scene include

(a) selection restrictions, that is, specifications of categories to which the subject and object noun-phrases of a preposition belong (for example, a use type of on illustrated by expressions like the children on the bus is described by Herskovits as 'physical object transported by a large vehicle' whereas 'physical object transported by a vehicle' would be inadequate as one cannot say *children on the car);

(b) specifications of allowed spatial relation between the objects (these constraints are represented in the system by the ideal meaning, allowed sense shifts and descriptions of allowed deviations which do not fall within a sense shift);

(c) constraints on indexicals which correspond to

location and viewing direction of the viewer implied by some prepositions;

(d) constraints on geometric description functions (such as, for some uses of in, the geometric description function applying to the reference object must be OUTLINE (Herskovits 1986:92).
Constraints on the context include all kinds of pragmatic conditions that should be met for a locative expression to be normal. Among them the most important is the constraint on purpose (normally locative expressions are uttered with the purpose of constraining the location of the object referred to in subject position).

According to Herskovits, one cannot list the necessary and sufficient conditions that would apply to all appropriate uses of a locative expression and exclude all inappropriate ones, and, therefore, constraints on the use of locative expressions formulated in her work (1986) are simply characteristic, canonical constraints; a set of such constraints associated with a use type defines the corresponding normal situation type (Herskovits 1986:20).

4.3.2. Pragmatic "near-principles".

Pragmatic "near-principles" formulated by Herskovits deserve to be looked at. These principles state necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the appropriateness of a certain use. Although these principles are aimed to predict applicable geometric descriptions and to account for acceptable shifts, Herskovits admits that "it is actually very hard to formulate rigorous principles and to find rigorous inferential paths from them (Herskovits 1988:284). Therefore one can speak only of "near-principles" which include (a) salience; (b) relevance; (c) tolerance and (d) typicality.

Salience explains the direction of metonymic shifts. Thus, in the sentence the cat under the table the word table refers to the table top, a functionally salient part of the table (Herskovits 1988: 285). Relevance helps to explain why it sounds very odd to say *the milk on the bowl although there is a relation of contiguity and support between the milk and the bowl. As Herskovits points out (1988:287), one uses in or on according to whether containment or contact is most relevant. Since with milk in a bowl one does not
usually focus on contact, the use of on sounds odd. The notion of tolerance is introduced to explain the fact that real spatial settings referred to by a locative expression may differ to some extent from the corresponding ideal geometric image (in terms of angle or a distance).

For the purpose of this study the most interesting among Herskovits' pragmatic "near-principles" is typicality. Typicality corresponds to normal expectations associated with a locative expression and motivates inferences. For example, hearing the sentence

The fountain is behind the city wall,

one would assume, normally, that the fountain is next to the city wall, although this is not a part of the meaning of "behind" (Herskovits 1988:290).

In what follows we will see that selection restrictions characteristic of a particular (abstract) use type of a preposition may often be explained as a transformation of typical inferences associated with the spatial use of the preposition. The process whereby a typicality inference characteristic of a spatial sense is converted into a full-fledged selection restriction associated with some abstract uses of the same preposition, can also be viewed as an instance of "pragmatic strengthening".

4.3.3. Idiomaticity.

Idioms in Herskovits' system are treated in the same way as regular uses. Thus, comparing expressions like the book on the desk with those like the man on the bus Herskovits observes that the difference between the two is only the matter of generality: one can substitute a number of noun-phrases for book, desk, man and bus, but the selection restrictions for the second pattern are tighter than for the first. However, speakers use both structures as productive, which indicates that idiomaticity is a matter of degree (determined, according to Herskovits, by such factors as the distance from the
ideal meaning, the scope of selection restrictions, and the deviation from the geometrical restrictions normally expected). Therefore both less and more idiomatic patterns should have a uniform representation (Herskovits 1986: 89).

This view of idiomaticity is adopted in the present study: all grammatical patterns that I will consider are to a certain extent idiomatic. In what follows, my task will be, first of all, for each construction to describe selection restrictions on noun phrases able to occur in it, and further, wherever possible, to indicate by what kind of metaphorical transfer the selection restrictions, associated with an abstract use type, are related to the usage conditions of the corresponding locative expression. However, as the constructions studied in what follows are centered around the preposition \( Y \) [in/into] used in abstract meanings, a geometric representation of semantics of the constructions in question does not seem conceivable and, therefore, another metalanguage, based on verbal non-geometric meaning, is needed. As for the underlying spatial (non-metaphorical) expressions, their meaning can, perhaps, be adequately described as a geometric image with possible deviations from it. However, this solution, although it generally seems attractive, will not serve for the present study: if one has to formulate explicitly the relation (corresponding to a sense shift) between a spatial and an abstract sense of a locative expression, one has to use the same metalanguage for representing both. As the only viable metalanguage for abstract senses seems to be necessarily based on words, one has to represent the spatial senses in words as well, in order to be able to compare the two.

5. The Natural Semantic Metalanguage.

The descriptive tool used in this study is the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (henceforth - NSM) as developed in the works of Anna Wierzbicka (1972, 1980, 1985,
1988; 1996) and her colleagues (see especially Wierzbicka and Goddard (eds.; 1994)). There are several basic assumptions behind the NSM approach to the semantics of natural language which can be outlined as follows.

Firstly, it is assumed that the words and expressions of a language have meanings that speakers of the language know (unconsciously) and "have in their mind". It is also assumed that meanings are conceptual in nature, that is, that a meaning can be adequately presented via other meanings, but not via a description of physical events, such as neuron transactions, nor via a notation based on some kind of formal logic. As Wierzbicka herself formulates it:

"In order to be semisubstitutable [in the natural language expressions - A.M.] (and, consequently, verifiable) semantic representations have to be formulated in a metalanguage based on natural language." (Wierzbicka 1980: 21).

As meaning is something speakers of a language know, it can be "dragged" out of a speaker's mind by means of methodical introspection, that is, internal observation and analysis.

Secondly, linguistic meaning is considered to be compositional in nature, that is, meanings of words (and other expressions) can be decomposed into conceptually simple elements and presented as combinations of those. The crucial point of the NSM theory is that these conceptually simple units can and should be

a. minimal, that is, impossible to decompose any further and indefinable via other conceptually simple units:

"This list of indefinables must be as small as possible; it should contain only those elements which are really absolutely essential while being at the same time adequate to explicate all utterances. The minimalization postulate provided a valuable criterion in choosing between different "candidates" thought to be..."
possible indefinables: only those semantic units are truly indefinable, whose
selection as such is compatible with the list being as short as possible.
Minimalization also makes it possible to account fully for all the semantic relations
which exist between different expressions." (Wierzbicka 1972: 13);
b. conceptual indefinables should be represented by words of the natural language which
makes definitions based on these elements understandable to all language speakers and
intuitively verifiable;
c. indefinables should be universal, that is, manifest meanings present in all natural
languages, which makes it possible to use definitions based on such elements to compare
meanings across languages.

Using the NSM set of conceptual primitives, one can explicate all kinds of meanings,
lexical, grammatical and illocutionary. In other words, the NSM approach to language
allows to describe not only the meanings of words, but also those of grammatical
constructions and pragmatic routines.

The program outlined above, as pointed out by Wierzbicka (1972 and 1980), can be
traced back to Plato, Descartes and Leibniz. Along with Wierzbicka and her
collaborators, Andrzej Boguslawki in Warsaw has been working on the development of
the NSM for the last three decades (see, for example, Boguslawski 1965; 1970 and
1989). In Moscow a group of semanticists, especially during the 60's and the beginning
of the 70's, worked on the construction of a semantic metalanguage based on
"elementary senses" ("elementarnye značenija"). Elementary senses are conceptually
simple indefinable entities which can be combined, according to the grammar of the
semantic metalanguage, to form meanings of the natural language words (see, for
example, Zolkovskij, Leont'eva and Martem'janov (1961); Melčuk (1974); Apresjan
(1974)). The metalanguage was expected to provide a basis for automatic translation
across languages. In later years, however, the goals of the Moscow semanticists significantly diverged from those of Wierzbicka and her collaborators.

Although the NSM approach to language outlined above remained basically the same throughout the years of Wierzbicka's research, some developments and changes concerning important issues of the theory should be noted.

5.1. Set of primitives.

The set of primitives included in the proposed universal "alphabet of human thought" has varied throughout the years of Wierzbicka's work. In her "Semantic primitives", Wierzbicka proposed for further testing the following set of fourteen indefinables:

- SOMETHING,
- SOMEONE,
- I,
- YOU,
- THIS,
- WORLD,
- WANT,
- DON'T WANT,
- FEEL,
- THINK OF,
- IMAGINE,
- SAY,
- BECOME,
- BE A PART OF.

In 1980, the set of primitives was slightly modified: KNOW and BE IN A PLACE were added and FEEL was temporarily discarded (to reappear in later sets). In Wierzbicka's later works this set underwent more changes. The set of semantic primitives, tested across a number of languages in Wierzbicka and Goddard (eds.; 1994) included the following components:

- Substantives: I, YOU, SOMEONE, SOMETHING, PEOPLE;
- Mental predicates: THINK, SAY, KNOW, FEEL WANT;
- Determiners and Quantifiers: THIS, THE SAME, OTHER, ONE, TWO, MANY, ALL;
- Actions and Events: DO, HAPPEN TO;
- Meta-Predicates: NO, IF, CAN/COULD, LIKE, BECAUSE, VERY;
- Time and Place: WHEN, WHERE, AFTER, BEFORE, UNDER, ABOVE;
Taxonomy and Partonomy: KIND OF, PART OF;
Evaluators and Descriptors: GOOD, BAD, BIG, SMALL.

The latest set proposed in Wierzbicka's *Semantics: Primes and Universals* (1996) has expanded to 55 elements. It includes the following new elements:

"Determiner"  SOME
"Augmentor"  MORE
"Mental predicates"  SEE, HEAR
"Non-mental predicates": MOVE, THERE IS, (BE) ALIVE
"Space"  SIDE; INSIDE; HERE, FAR and NEAR
"Time"  A LONG TIME, A SHORT TIME, NOW
"Imagination and possibility"  IF... WOULD, MAYBE

Modifications of this kind are legitimate because as pointed out by Wierzbicka (1972), one can arrive at the right set only by trial and error, that is, by putting forward a specific hypothesis concerning a set of conceptual indefinables and testing it. According to Ockham's principle of eliminating unnecessary entities (the so-called "Ockham's razor"), all words (that is, their meanings) which are shown to be explicable via other meanings should be excluded from the list of potential primitives, and vice versa, if the meaning of a word cannot be explicated via other meanings, it should be included in the list of semantic primitives. Therefore, it is natural that going through different problems of semantic analysis one can discover new primitives and dismiss those which appeared to be indefinable at a particular stage, but afterwards have been shown to be explicable.
5.2. The grammar of the NSM.

It is not enough to establish a number of universal non-decomposable atoms of thought. One should also describe in what ways these atoms can be combined with each other in order to make the process of explicating linguistic meanings in the NSM really free of language specific features. In other words, the grammar of the NSM explications should be universal too.

A number of "canonical contexts" in which the proposed primitives could be expected to be found in any language is listed in a paper by Goddard and Wierzbicka (1994); a chapter in Wierzbicka's latest book Semantics: Primes and Universals (1996) also deals with this problem. As Wierzbicka points out, "the universal syntax of the NSM can be characterized as analogous in some respects to, but much simpler than, the syntax of natural languages." (1996: 144). The main features of the proposed NSM syntax can be outlined as follows.

The elementary unit of the NSM grammar is a "clause" which consists of a "substantive" and a "predicate" (and some additional elements determined by the nature of the predicate). Apart from this type of clause, there is one minor type, namely, "existential" sentences, centred on the predicate THERE IS/ARE. "Substantives" SOMEONE, SOMETHING and PEOPLE can be combined into a unit with "determiners" (THIS, THE SAME, MUCH/MANY, LITTLE/FEW, ONE, TWO and ALL) and "attributes" (GOOD, BAD, BIG and SMALL).

Different "predicates" take different types of "complements" and "objects". Some of the predicates can be combined with the "metapredicate" CAN. In addition to predicate complements, some types of clauses (depending on the nature of the predicate) can take temporal, spatial and causal adjuncts (for example, THIS HAPPENED can be combined with AT THIS TIME/IN THIS PLACE/BECAUSE OF THIS). All types of clauses can
combine with two universal operators: negation and possibility (MAYBE). Clauses can be combined into sentences by means of the following elements: IF; IF...WOULD; BECAUSE; AFTER; BEFORE; WHEN and LIKE.

The NSM grammar as outlined above amounts to a hypothesis about the universal core of all human languages or the "grammar of human cognition". However, as pointed out by Wierzbicka herself (1996:112; 147) the NSM grammar proposed so far is neither complete nor final and should be seen as a starting point for testing across languages.

Since the syntax of the NSM is still in the process of development some conventions concerning syntax have been accepted for the practice of writing explications, above all, avoiding syntactic configurations which are known not to be universal. For example, instead of saying 'I thought that you wanted something' NSM explications phrase this as 'I thought: you want something', because the former pattern is known not to be universal. Similarly, since the grammatical pattern 'I want you to do something' is not universal (it does not exist in Russian, for example), in the NSM one should say something like 'I want: you do something'.

Personally I believe that among the most obvious and at the same time, important strengths of the NSM as a system of semantic notation are: (1) the fact that meaning is explained via very simple words; and (2) the ability to account for a wide range of subtle semantic phenomena which seem to be unaccounted for in more formal semantic theories. The viability and versatility of the NSM as a tool of semantic and pragmatic notation has been demonstrated in Wierzbicka's work - in a way which does not leave any doubts about the efficiency of the tool.
Chapter II.

The literature on the constructions with V [in/into] and data.

1. The literature on the Russian constructions with V [in/into].

Russian constructions with the preposition V [in/into] used in an abstract (non-spatial) sense are normally ignored by grammars and studies in syntax, although constructions referring to the role status of a person (such as pojti v soldaty [to go into soldiers, i.e. to become a soldier]) are something of an exception. I will discuss the literature focused specifically on role constructions in chapter seven which is aimed at describing this particular "use type"; all other studies concerning the abstract use of the preposition V [in/into], because of their scarcity, are dealt with in this chapter.

1.1. The Academy Grammar (1960) and (1980).

The Academy Grammar (1960) lists constructions with "non-spatial" V [in/into] among other constructions with a nominal predicate. Predicates constituted by nouns in the accusative and locative case are considered separately.

The only thing the Academy Grammar (1960) says on the use of the accusative after V [in/into] is that it can be used to denote certain internal and external states, similarity, assessment, measure and some other meanings. The information given on the use of the locative after V [in/into] is that a noun in the locative case after V [in/into] can be used as a predicate with the following meanings:

1) external and internal state (of the subject). Example:

Elagin, s kotorym Rostovy byli v ssore

Elagin with whom Rostovs were in quarrel LOC

'Elagin who was not on speaking terms with the Rostovs' (Tolstoy);

2) rank, occupation (the noun should be used in the plural in this case). Example:
I was in deans LOC faculty GEN

'I occupied the position of dean of the faculty' (Chekhov);

(3) inner content ("vnutrennee soderzanie"). Example:

\[ ne \ v \ razume \ sila \]

not in mind LOC power

'the power is not a quality of mind' (Krylov).

This latter type has been considered in detail by Zolotova (1964).

An edition of the Academy Grammar (1980) published twenty years later does not add much. A number of constructions with \( V [\text{in/into}] \) and nouns referring to roles are listed among cases of "sil'noe predložnoe upravlenie vinitel'nym padežom" [strong prepositional government of the accusative] (Academy Grammar 1980:30). This list includes the construction \( iđti \ v \ učeniki \) [to go into assistants ACC] which is described as an instance of "vospolnjaju~še" [filling up] meaning of \( V [\text{in/into}] \). Further, a number of constructions with \( V [\text{in/into}] \) is listed under a somewhat obscure heading "obstojate'stvenny determinanty" [circumstantial determinants] (1980:160-162). A number of semantic possibilities is distinguished here (only examples including \( V [\text{in/into}] \) are quoted below):

(1) temporal meaning:

\[ v \ metel' \ vse \ predmety \ uveličivajutsja \]

in snow-storm ACC all things get bigger

'all things seem bigger during a snow-storm';

(2) space:

\[ v \ storone \ ot \ dorogi \ - \ storozka \]

in side LOC from road GEN - hut
'beside the road there is a hut';

(3) cause:

\[ \text{vvidu \text{ iznosa}}; \]

in view ACC wear out GEN

'because of the wearing out';

(4) goal:

\[ \text{v poiskax staryx rukopisej} \]

in search old GEN manuscripts GEN

'in search of old manuscripts',

\[ \text{v raz'jasnenie svoego tezisa} \]

in explanation his GEN point GEN

'in explanation of his point';

(5) condition:

\[ \text{v slu'caе neobxodimosti sdelat' cto-libo} \]

in case necessity GEN do INF something

'in case of the necessity to do something';

(6) restricting/contrastive meaning:

\[ \text{v oblasti vne'snej politiki} \]

in area international GEN politics GEN

'in the area of international politics',

\[ \text{v smysle vybora professii} \]

in sense choice GEN profession GEN

'in the sense of the choice of a profession';

(7) qualitative characteristic:

\[ \text{v spe'snom porjadke gruppa dvinulas' v gory} \]
These semantic types are meant to describe possible meanings of all circumstantial phrases and are naturally, therefore, very wide. The constructions that will be considered are not listed under any category. It could seem, however, that the Academy Grammar as "vospolnjačee" [filling up] has something to do with the "goal" category (the goal is to fill) whereas with nouns referring to roles is close in meaning to the examples listed within the category "qualitative characteristic". On the whole, however, the Academy Grammar (1980) does not give any in-depth description of prepositional usage, in particular, the use of with abstract nouns.


A paper by Zolotova (1964) devoted to an abstract sense of the preposition is of some interest, although none of the constructions included in the present study is discussed. She considers sentences of the type

\[ A \text{ sostoi} / \text{zaklučaetsja} v B \]

A consists/is contained in B.

For example,

\[ \text{zadača kinoiskusstva sostoi} / \text{zaklučaetsja v sozdanii} \]

task cinema GEN consists/is contained in creating bright images GEN contemporaries GEN

'the task of cinema is to create bright images of contemporary people'.

Zolotova observes that sentences of this structure can be paraphrased in a few ways: (a)
the word in slot B can be, instead of the locative, in the nominative case; (b) instead of a
nomen agentis in slot B one can use an infinitive. Further, there are restrictions on lexical
classes of nouns which can occur in slot A. Although Zolotova formulates these
restrictions in a somewhat vague way (a word in slot A, according to Zolotova, should
be "essential" [essencial'noe] in meaning, that is, thought of as something limited and
bounded and therefore possible to fill). This vague description is complemented by a list
of possibilities; thus, words that can be used in this construction include, among others,
the following: soderžanie [content], smysl [meaning], sut [essence], osnova [basis];
príčina [cause], sekret [secret], tajna [mystery]; itog [total], rezul'tat [result], vyigryš
[gain]; oščedričie [difference], sходство [similarity].

The most important part of Zolotova's argument is her idea that sentences of the type
A sostoit/ zaključaetsja v B [A consists/ is contained in B] establish a connection
between a concept referred to by the subject (A) and its concrete instance (B), the
function (A) and its value (B). In other words, the purport of sentences of this type is
that the content of A is B, which is one of A's possible "embodiments". As we will see
further on, this is characteristic of several constructions with the preposition V [in/into]
used in a non-spatial sense.


Kilby in his book on Russian cases (1977) considers, along with spatial locatives, a
number of so-called "locative realizations". Starting with Zolotova's (1964) analysis of
locative sentences with "pivot" words such as soderžanie [content] which can be
paraphrased with the nominative (as "equative" sentences) and the instrumental, Kilby
claims that there are other sentences which appear "to point to the predicative member of
the equative sentence being a locative" (Kilby 1977: 55). These are, according to Kilby:
A. Sentences with sostojanie ("state") or a hyponym of it:
   a. On byl v sostojanii rasstrojstva. "He was in a state of confusion";
   b. On byl v rasstrojstve. "He was in confusion".

   On prišel v jarost'. "He came into fury (i.e. he became furious)"
   Ona v vostorge ot poezdkii "She is in ecstasy over the journey"

B. Sentences with hyponym of dolžnost' ("job"). These are more common with the
   inchoative form:

   On byl (služil) v sekretarjax (Loc). "He was (served as) a secretary"
   Pereveli ego iz načal'nikov (Gen) v zamestiteli (Acc) načal'nika. "They transferred
   him from chief to deputy chief";

C. Sentences with prevraščat'sja [change]:

   Ekologija prevraščaetsja v razdel (acc) social'noj nauki. "Ecology is turning into a
   branch of social science"

D. Other miscellaneous examples:

   On privel v primer (acc) vladel'ca (acc) avtomobilja. "He brought the car driver up
   as an example";
   Emu dali v nagradu (acc) medal' (acc). "They gave him a medal
   as a reward" . (Kilby 1977: 57-58).

Kilby mentions that the last "inchoative locative constructions" ("inchoativeness" here is
indicated by the use of the accusative case) would correspond to unacceptable in Russian

Kilby proposed a transformation for sentences of the sostojanie [state] class which
"subjoins a sentence such as Ivan rasstroen [Ivan is confused] with a locative empty
pronoun, which later may or may not be realized as a word sostojanie [state]." (op.cit:
58-59). Similar treatment is outlined for role sentences. However, although the idea that abstract nouns are often used in the locative when the meaning is equative is on the whole convincing, this account of abstract locatives leaves too much data unexplained: not all hyponyms of the word sostojanie [state] can be used in the locative as not all nouns referring to jobs can be used both in the inchoative locative (that is, in the accusative) and static locative sentences. One cannot say, for example,

* on byl v sostojanii spokoystvija

he was in state LOC peace GEN

'he was in a state of peace',

nor

* on byl v spokoystvii

'he was in peace LOC',

although both

on byl v sostojanii bespokoystva

he was in state LOC anxiety GEN

'he was in a state of anxiety'

and

on byl v bespokoystve

he was in anxiety

'he was anxious'

are possible. Moreover, byt' v sostojanii čego-to [to be in a state of something] and prijti v sostojanie čego-to [to come into (=to) a state of something] are used, in fact, with different nouns referring to internal states, although they are discussed by Kilby as if these two constructions were one. Similarly, one normally would not say

*/? on byl v učiteljax
he was in teachers LOC,

although

\textit{on togda ešče byl v podmaster'jax}

he then still was in apprentices

is possible. These data clearly show that there is more to abstract locatives than the idea of equativeness or metaphorical filling one abstract entity with another (although this may be an important insight).


Toporov in his book on the locative in Slavic languages provides only a brief description of the use of the locative after \textit{V} [in/into] in Old Russian (1961: 67-75). He points out that when an abstract noun is used in the locative after \textit{V} [in/into], the locative construction is used to refer to a state (mostly emotional in his examples) accompanying an action. He also mentions that already in the 13th century a noun in the locative plural could be used to refer to a person's occupation or social rank.

1.5. Leont'eva and Nikitina (1974).

Leont'eva and Nikitina (1974) seek to describe all semantic relations expressed by twenty three Russian prepositions. Naturally, the description of semantic relations is very succinct. Each preposition is described by a table with various contexts which determine its various meanings. A particular meaning is formed by one or several elementary semantic relations which are taken to be fundamental. The basic meanings differ in the composition or number of such relations within them.

The paper examines two of the constructions considered in the present study: \textit{dat' den'gi v zadatok} [to give money in a deposit, i.e. as a deposit] and \textit{pojti v soldaty} [to go
into soldiers, i.e. to become a soldier.

The construction *dat' (A) v zadatok (B) den'gi (C)* [to give (A) in (=as) a deposit (B) money (C)] is described as follows. The word in slot A (*dat'* [give] in the example above) is characterized by directedness; the word in slot B (*zadatok* [deposit] in the example above) belongs to the semantic class "function"; and the word in slot C (*den'gi* [money] in the example above) is the passive actant of A (*dat'* [give]). The meaning of the preposition *Y* [in/into] in this construction is described like this: (1) C is in the function of B; (2) the fact that C is in the function of B is the goal of giving (Leont'eva and Nikitina 1974: 350). This description is, however, by no means sufficient: it does not explain, for example, why one cannot say *dat' den'gi v čaevye* [to give money in (=as) a tip]; *dat' den'gi v podačku* [to give money in (=as) a sop] (see chapter six for an explanation).

The construction *on (C) pošel (A) v soldaty (B)* [he (C) went (A) into soldiers (B), i.e. he became a soldier] is described in a similar way. Thus, a word in slot B should be an animate noun, in plural, referring to a member of the semantic class described as "function"; a word in slot C should refer to an animate noun. The semantic description of the preposition *Y* [in/into] also consists of two components, of which the second is rather difficult to interpret: (1) C is part of B; (2) (1) (that is, that C is part of B) is the terminal point of B. Whatever the meaning of the second component, this description is insufficient, because it leaves unpredicted and unexplained the fact that one cannot say *pojti v špiony* [to go into spies, i.e. to become a spy] (see chapter seven for a discussion and explanation).

1.6. Rozental (1986)

Rosental in his dictionary of syntactic government in Russian mentions a difference
between the expressions v volnenii [in excitement] and s volneniem [with excitement]: v volnenii [in excitement] refers to one being fully "gripped" ("polnyj oхvat") by one's emotion whereas s volneniem [with excitement] does not (Rosental 1986: 20). This observation may be used as a starting working hypothesis about selection restrictions involved in the use of nouns referring to emotions after V [in/into]. However, this hypothesis needs elaboration because each construction with V [in/into] and nouns referring to emotions imposes its own interpretation of what being "gripped" or overwhelmed by an emotion means. Thus, for example, the selection restrictions on a noun referring to an emotion used after V [in/into] in the construction on pogruzilsja v X [he plunged/sank into X] do not coincide with the selection restrictions on nouns used after V in the construction on prišel v X [he came into X]: one can say

on prišel v bešenstvo

he came into rage

'he became enraged',

but not

*on pogruzilsja v bešenstvo

he plunged/sank into rage.

(see chapters three and four for a detailed discussion of the use of emotional terms after V [in/into]).


A dissertation on the semantics of spatial prepositions in Polish, Russian and English (1988) by Alan Cienki deals only with spatial meanings of prepositions and does not discuss abstract use types.
2. The notion of semantic constraint.

The notion of semantic constraint that will be widely used in what follows also needs some explanation. A constraint 'P' on a term 1 should be understood in the sense of the compatibility of the referents of the term with the property formulated in the constraint. That is, it is required that 1 in the context of a given construction (for which the constraint 'P' is relevant) could be interpreted as corresponding to a referent with the property 'p', but it is not necessary that all possible referents of the term 1 have the property 'p'. For example, if a constraint requires that X refers to an intense emotion, it means that for an emotional term to be able to occur in slot X, the term should refer to an emotion that may be intense, but not that all emotions, which can possibly be denoted by this term, must be intense.

The notion of semantic constraint formulated above is related to Weinreich's (1980) idea of transfer features. Weinreich's transfer features (1980:139) were introduced for analyzing selection restrictions. Commenting on the fact that the English word pretty is not normally applicable to men, Weinreich notes that this could be stated as part of the dictionary entry for pretty. However, it is obvious that when the context is unspecified as to [+/- Male], the word pretty itself specifies it as [-Male]. Weinreich calls the meaning component [-Male] associated with pretty a "transfer feature". Thus, the notion of transfer feature accounts for the fact that selection restrictions are restrictions based on semantic compatibility: the expression a pretty person is normally understood to refer to a woman although the word person itself does not convey this.

3. Data.

Most data for the present study come from literature and oral speech of native Russian speakers in Canberra and its surroundings. My major literary sources include (1)
Bulgakov's *Master and Margarita* (1973); (2) Doestoevsky's *Idiot* and *Netočka Nezvanova* (1956); (3) Babel's short stories (1979). Some examples in chapter seven are borrowed from a paper by Prokopovich (1969). I have also devised a few examples myself. The acceptability of all invented examples has been checked with other native speakers.

Since this study investigates the combinatorial potential of several Russian prepositional constructions, I had to rely, apart from literary examples, on negative linguistic material. In other words, many of my conclusions are based on the unacceptability of some sentences in Russian. Unacceptable sentences are, naturally, invented ones. All judgements of unacceptability are based on my own intuition but also checked with at least two other native speakers.

4. Glosses and transliteration.

In most cases, Russian sentences and phrases have two glosses: a kind of interlinear word-by-word gloss and a gloss in single quotes which is a translation into standard English. Grammatical cases are marked in interlinear glosses in those cases when they are relevant. Sometimes, however, when a Russian structure is much the same as its English translation equivalent, compromise decisions have been made in order to avoid lengthy double glosses. For example, articles absent in the Russian sentence are added in brackets to the interlinear translation. Thus, the Russian sentence

*он был в панике*

may be glossed as:

he was in [a] panic.

Similarly, in those cases when the English structure happens to be the same I use only one-level gloss, for example:
he was in rage LOC.

When an example is cited in the context of another phrase or sentence, only the example itself will have double gloss, whereas the surrounding context will be translated into standard English.

The following abbreviations are used to refer to grammatical cases: NOM stands for the nominative; GEN - genitive; DAT - dative; ACC - accusative; INSTR - instrumental; LOC - locative.

All examples are spelt in the Roman script according to standard system of transliteration used in linguistic works; as for Russian names, I tried to follow usual Roman spelling in those cases where it exists.

Chapters III - VIII fall into three parts: those describing the use of (a) emotional terms with \textit{v} \textit{[in/into]} (chapters three and four); (b) nouns referring to property transfers with \textit{v} \textit{[in/into]} (chapters five and six); (c) nouns referring to social roles with \textit{v} \textit{[in/into]} (chapters seven and eight). Chapter nine contains a general discussion of combinatorial constraints characteristic of abstract use types of the preposition \textit{v} \textit{[in/into]} and underlying spatial images. Chapter ten, unlike the previous chapters, treats the grammar of new unconventionalized metaphors in Russian.
Chapter III.

The preposition V [in/into] with nouns referring to emotions.

0. Introduction.

This chapter examines the projection of a few spatial relations such as 'an object being immersed in a deep container', 'a person coming to a place' and 'an object located in a place' into the domain of emotions. It has often been noted in the linguistic literature that persons can be spoken of as containers for emotions and ideas, and that emotions are sometimes treated by the language as if they were containers for people experiencing them (see, for example, Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Rudzka-Ostyn (1985), Radden (1985); Kovecses (1989)). The use of spatial prepositions like in has often been discussed in terms of "conceptual metaphors" (in the sense of Lakoff and Johnson (1980)). The notion of "conceptual metaphor" may explain why one can speak of emotions in many languages as if they were containers (that is, why one can say something like she is in despair). However, the existence of "conceptual metaphors" like "emotions are containers for those experiencing them" does not explain why not all emotional terms can be spoken of as containers, nor do all kinds of contexts allow this (and similar facts concerning the use of "spatial" prepositions other than in, cf. Wierzbicka 1986).

Besides, if "conceptual metaphors" like "emotions are containers" are part of a language speaker's competence, they obviously operate in a way which is specific for any given language. For example, one can say in English to be in love but no exact equivalent of this phrase exists in Russian, although in both languages some emotions, indeed, are spoken of as if they were containers. A possible solution is to say that prepositional phrases like to be in love are idiomatic and speakers of a language simply remember each of them. However, given a large number of such phrases, this does not
seem a sufficient explanation.

Another way to approach the same problem is to provide a more detailed description of constraints on the use of spatial prepositions with nouns referring to non-physical objects and the underlying imagery. That is, it would be an interesting task to find out what kinds of emotional terms in what contexts can be viewed as containers and how (if at all) this is related to locating objects in real containers. Besides, this problem seems interesting from the perspective of semantic description of words referring to emotions (cf. Apresjan and Apresjan (1993)).

In this chapter I will attempt to describe what kinds of words referring to emotions and inner states can be treated as containers for those experiencing them in a few Russian constructions with the preposition \( V \) [in/into]. I will consider the following four constructions:

1. **on pogruzilsja v X**
   - he plunged/sank into X ACC;
   - example:
     - **on pogruzilsja v skorb’**
       - he plunged/sank into sorrow;

2. **on prišel v X**
   - he came into X
   - ‘he reached a state of X’;
   - example:
     - **on prišel v jarost’**
       - he came into fury
       - ‘he became furious’;

3. **on byl v X-e**
he was in X LOC

'he was in a state of X';

example:

on byl v užase
he was in terror

'he was terrified''

(4) on vpal v X

he fell into X ACC;

example:

on vpal v paniku
he fell into panic

'he started panicking'.

The table below illustrates differences in combinatorial possibilities between the constructions. To indicate the ability/inability of a word (X) to be used in a construction (C), the symbols "+" and "*" are used (respectively) on the intersection of the line corresponding to X and the row corresponding to C. In borderline cases I use "?".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>X</th>
<th>pogruzilsja v X</th>
<th>prišel v X</th>
<th>byl v X-e</th>
<th>vpal v X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>ispug [fright]</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>strax [fear]</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trevoga [anxiety]</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>užas [terror]</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>panika [panic]</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bojazn' [caution]</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotion</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surprise</td>
<td>недоумение [bewilderment]</td>
<td>удивление [surprise]</td>
<td>изумление [astonishment]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disgust/contempt</td>
<td>возмущение [indigation]</td>
<td>отвращение [disgust]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotion (noun)</td>
<td>Constraints</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prezrenie</strong> [contempt]</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>nenavist'</strong> [hate]</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiration/love/respect</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>vosxishchenie</strong> [admiration]</td>
<td>+ + + *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ljubov'</strong> [love]</td>
<td>+ * * *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>uvazenie</strong> [respect]</td>
<td>* * * *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One can see that the four constructions have very different combinatorial possibilities. In the following sections of this chapter I will attempt to describe these differences as distinct systems of semantic constraints on nouns which can occur in slot X of each construction. Although the semantic constraints on X are presented below as if they were discrete and independent from each other, in fact they are not independent, because, as it is well known, all features of an emotion (such as intensity, duration, the way it is expressed etc.) are related to each other. Therefore, some of the constraints discussed below may be seen as one constraint for reasons of simplicity decomposed in a few components.

It is also important to remember that semantic constraints are understood as "compatibility constraints" (see chapter two for more detail). Thus, a word may occur in slot X in two different constructions C1 and C2 with different constraints on X if the word can be reinterpreted within each construction in a way implied by the semantic constraints corresponding to the given construction (it is also possible, of course, that X is always understood so as to meet the constraints corresponding to the two constructions).

1. The construction on pogruzilsja v X [he plunged/sank into X].
The verb *pogruzit'sja*, which is a part of the construction in question, for the lack of an adequate gloss is glossed below as *plunge/sink*, but *pogruzit'sja* does not actually coincide in meaning with either of them. The verb *pogruzit'sja* refers to gradually getting deeper and deeper into a substance until an object is fully covered with this substance (normally a liquid). The subject of the verb *pogruzit'sja* can refer to both animate and inanimate objects. Semantic constraints on words referring to a person's inner states which can be used in slot X in the construction on *pogruzilsja v X* [he plunged/sank into X] are, as we will see, connected with the spatial sense of the verb *pogruzit'sja*.

1.1. Examples.

Words able to occur in slot X in the construction on *pogruzilsja v X* [he plunged/sank into X] fall into three distinct categories: nouns referring to (a) emotions; (b) intellectual processes; (c) inner states other than (a) and (b) such as sleep, unconsciousness. The examples below illustrate the three possibilities.

Emotions:

(1) *ja pogruzil'sja v bezdnu užasa*

    I plunged/sank into abyss ACC terror GEN

    'I was absorbed in my terror' (Dostoevsky);

(2) *babuška pogruzilas' v unynie*

    grandma plunged/sank into dismay ACC (Dostoevsky).

Thinking processes:

(3) *on pogruzil'sja v vyčislenija*

    he plunged/sank into calculations ACC (Nabokov);

(4) *on pogruzil'sja v šaxmatnye bezdny*

    he plunged/sank into chess abyss ACC
'he plunged into an abyss of chess thoughts' (Nabokov);

(5)  Markelov snova pogruzilsja v dumu

Markelov again plunged/sank into thought ACC

'Markelov plunged into thought again' (Turgenev: BAS).

Other inner states:

(6)  on pogruzilsja v dremotu/son/bespamjatstvo

he plunged/sank into doze/sleep/unconsciousness ACC

'he plunged into a doze/sleep/unconsciousness'.

I will consider only the semantic constraints on words denoting emotions and thinking processes and leave out nouns like son [sleep]. Emotions and thinking processes will be treated separately, because semantic constraints on X seem to differ a little, depending on which of the two categories the word in slot X belongs to.

1.2. Semantic constraints on X.

1.2.1. Temporal constraint.

A word in slot X in the construction on pogruzilsja v X [he plunged/sank into X] normally refers to a state which lasts for a long time. The following example is characteristic in this respect:

(7)  on pogruzilsja v bezmernoe ožidanie

he plunged/sank in endless expectation ACC

on żdal terpelivo

'he waited patiently'

prodremal dva časa

'dozed for two hours' (Babel).
A. Emotional terms.

Emotional terms which cannot be interpreted as referring to long-lasting emotions do not occur in slot X in the construction on pogruzilsja v X [he plunged/sank into X]. Thus, ispug [fright] and strax [fear] in Russian differ in the implied duration, strax being an emotion which can last for a long or short time, whereas ispug refers to a person's short-term state (caused by such things as a thunderstorm, a car accident etc.). One can say

(8) vsju svoju žizn’ on prožil v straxe

'all his life he has been living in fear',

but hardly

(9) *vsju svoju žizn’ on prožil v ispuge

'all his life he has been living in scare'.

As a consequence, one can say

(10) on pogruzilsja v strax

he plunged/sank into fear ACC,

but not

(11) *on pogruzilsja v ispug

he plunged/sank into fright ACC.

The words grust’ and pečal’, both being rough equivalents of the English sadness, differ in intensity (pečal’ being thought of as more intense) and in time: grust’ more readily, than pečal’, is modified by words like korotkaja [short], mimoletnaja [quickly passing], which indicates that pečal’ is thought of as lasting longer. Therefore one can say pogruzit’sja v pečal’ [plunge/sink into pečal’], but *pogruzit’sja v grust’ [plunge/sink into grust’], although possible, sounds worse.

The claim that one can only pogruzitsja [plunge/sink] into an emotion for a long time
can be supported by the fact that modifiers like *nenadolgo* [for a short time] cannot be inserted in this construction if X is an emotional term:

(12) ? on nenadolgo pogruzilsja v strax
   he for a short time plunged/sank into fear ACC
   'he sank into fear for a short time';

(13) ? on na minutu pogruzilsja v pečal'
   he for [a] minute plunged/sank into sadness ACC
   'he sank into sadness for a minute'.

B. Words referring to thinking processes.

However, if X is not an emotional term, it is possible to say something like

(14) on nenadolgo pogruzilsja v razdum'e
   he for a short time plunged/sank into reflection ACC
   'he plunged into reflection for a short time';

(15) on na minutu pogruzilsja v svoi mysli
   he for [a] minute plunged/sank into his thoughts ACC
   'he plunged into his thoughts for a minute'.

One can also say something like *nenadolgo pogruzit'sja v dremotu/ bespamjatstvo* [to plunge/sink in a dream/unconsciousness ACC for a short time]. However, with nouns referring to emotions, as we have seen, *pogruzils'ja* [he plunged/sank] is not used in the context of time modifiers such as *nenadolgo* [for a short time], *na minutu* [for a minute].

It seems that what we are dealing with here is not a system of discrete and independent restrictions, but rather a somewhat fuzzy idea of a "deep emotion". One can only *pogruzit'sja* [to plunge/sink] into something deep and it seems plausible that, from the "naive" point of view, the longer the emotion lasts, the "deeper" it is. On the other
hand, emotions which pass quickly are not "deep" at all. This is why sentences like (12) and (13) sound rather odd. As for thoughts and reflection, and perhaps also dream and unconsciousness, they can be thought of as "deep" even when lasting only a minute. What the speaker of a language means when calling them "deep" is, perhaps, the inability of the experiencer of a "deep" state to notice the outer world, his/her being confined to his own state. This brings up another constraint.

1.2.2. **X should be an "introvertive" state.**

The construction on pogrusilsja v X [he plunged/sank into X] seems to imply that X is, to use the widespread psychological jargon, an "introvertive" state. The following examples with the noun pogružennost' [absorption] derived from the verb pogruzit'sja and referring to one's being absorbed into one's own self illustrate this point:

(16) legkost' i razmetannost' Axilly smenilis'
'easiness and distraction of Axilla were replaced by'

tjaželovesnost'ju neotvjaživoj mysli
'heaviness of constant thought'

i glubokoj pogružennost'ju v sebj a
and deep absorption into himself (Leskov: BAS);

(17) rassejannost', pogružennost' v sebj a
distraction absorption into himself

men'še vsego mogli prigodit'sja emu na fronte
'could not be useful to him at the front' (Kaverin: BAS).

However, if one tries to analyze what "introvertive" actually means, it seems that it may be decomposed in at least two distinct ways: it may refer, roughly, either to the absence of outward manifestations of a feeling or to one's being concentrated on one's inner
world and not paying much attention to what is going on outside (the connection between distraction and one's being absorbed into himself implied by the examples above seems characteristic in this respect). Let us test the two hypotheses against words referring to emotions. (Both "no outward manifestations" and "not noticing the outer world" conditions are met by words referring to thinking processes like razdum'le [reflection] and therefore will not be tested for this group of words).

1.2.2.1. No outward manifestations hypothesis.

Words referring to emotions which are expected to be manifested in an active way do not occur in slot $X$ in the construction $\text{on pogruzilsja v } X$ [he plunged/sank into $X$]. For example, one cannot say

(18) *$\text{on pogruzilsja v } \text{jarost'}$

he plunged/sank into fury ACC;

(19) *$\text{on pogruzilsja v } \text{vozmušćenie}$

he plunged/sank into indignation ACC;

(20) *$\text{on pogruzilsja v } \text{neterpenie}$

he plunged/sank into impatience ACC;

(21) *$\text{on pogruzilsja v } \text{volnenie}$

he plunged/sank into agitation ACC,

although jarost' [fury], vozmušćenie [indignation], neterpenie [impatience] and volnenie [agitation] can last a long while. Therefore another constraint on $X$ should be postulated: to be able to occur in slot $X$ in the construction $\text{on pogruzilsja v } X$ [he plunged/sank into $X$] a word should denote a state that one does not show by drastic outward reactions, and often would keep to oneself. This explains why the sentences above are infelicitous: one cannot experience jarost' [fury] without showing it. As for vozmušćenie
[indignation], neterpenie [impatience] and volnenie [emotion/agitation], they can be hidden, but typically one would rather expect the emotions referred to by these Russian words to be overtly manifested. By contrast, words able to occur in slot X in the construction on pogruiystalsja v X [he plunged/sank into X] refer to emotional states which are not manifested in an active way. For example, one can say

(22) on pogruiystalsja v mečty
he plunged/sank into dreams ACC;

(23) on pogruiystalsja v raskajanie
he plunged/sank into repentance ACC;

(24) on pogruiystalsja v sožalenija
he plunged/sank into regrets ACC;

(25) ty bespokojnoju dušoj
you restless soul INSTR

už pogruižalsja v razmyšlenje
already plunged/sank into reflection ACC

'(you are already immersed in a reflection with all your restless soul' (Pushkin);

(26) v dremotu xladnju nevol'no pogruižalsja
in drowsiness ACC cold unwillingly plunged/sank

'(he) unwillingly sank into a cold drowsiness' (Pushkin);

(27) pogružen byl dušoj v zabvenie
plunged was soul INSTR in oblivion ACC

'[he] plunged with all his soul into oblivion' (Pushkin).

The inner states referred to in the sentences above are either quiet and do not imply outward manifestations by nature, or should be understood as such in the context of
pogruzilsja [plunged/sank]. For example, razmyšlenie [reflection], mečty [dreams], dremota [drowsiness] and zabvenie [oblivion] are always understood to be states that one confines to oneself, whereas raskajanie [repentance] does not have to be a self-contained state (one can say for example, burnoe raskajanie [wild repentance]). But in the context of pogruzil'sja [plunge/sink] raskajanie [repentance] cannot be understood as burnoe [wild] and has to refer to a state that one confines to oneself. As for words like jarost' [fury], whatever the context, they cannot be understood to refer to a state without outward manifestations and therefore cannot occur in slot X of the construction on pogruzilsja v X [he plunged/sank into X]

In terms of the primitives, the absence of outward manifestations constraint can be phrased as 'Y did not do many things because of this' (i.e. because Y felt an emotion (X)).

1.2.2.2. Not noticing the outside world hypothesis.

Some instances of the construction on pogruzilsja v X [he plunged/sank into X] refer to the idea of a person's own feelings and thoughts "screening" for the person what's happening in the outer world (rather than "screening" the person who does not express his feelings in overt reactions). For example:

(28) v kakuju burju oščuščennij
    in what storm ACC sensations GEN
    teper' on serdcem pogružen
    now he heart INSTR plunged PARTCP

    'in what a storm of sensations he was immersed now' (Pushkin).

Furthermore, some emotional terms which refer to emotions that one is not necessarily expected to show in outward reactions, and which can be understood as denoting long-

Presumably, when a person is "immersed" in one's sensations, especially in a storm of sensations, this person can hardly concentrate on things other than these feelings.
lasting emotions, still cannot be used in slot X in the pogruzit'sja [plunge/sink] construction. For example:

(29) *pogruzit'sja v otvraščenie
plunge/sink into disgust ACC;

(30) *pogruzit'sja v udivlenie
plunge/sink into surprise ACC;

(31) * pogruzit'sja v vozmuščenie
plunge/sink into indignation ACC.

In order to explain these data, one can rely on the "not noticing the outside world" hypothesis. That is, it seems to be relevant that the "focus" of these emotions is outside the person experiencing them. These emotions have, so to speak, an outward target. It seems natural that one cannot plunge/sink into an emotion which is focused on an outside object (event). In terms of the primitives, this constraint can be phrased as 'Y did not think about many other things because Y felt something (X)'.

1.3. Spatial prototype.

The "introvertiveness" constraint discussed in the previous section may be connected with the use of the preposition Y [in/into] with nouns referring to places and containers. Among other factors relevant for the ability of a word (X) to be used after Y [in/into] is the visibility of objects located within the limits of the object (or place) referred to by X. The less visible the objects at X are, the more likely it is that the word X can be used after Y [in/into]. For example, one can say

v kresle
in armchair LOC

'in an armchair',
but not

\*v divane

in sofa LOC

'in a sofa';

one says

v lesu

in forest LOC

'in a forest',

but not

\*v poljane

in clearing LOC

'in a clearing'.

(one should say na poljane [on a clearing]). A person can plunge into a soft kreslo
[armchair], so as to be partly covered from view, but it is not possible with a divan
[sofa]. Similarly, the reason why poljana [clearing] cannot be used after V [in/into]
whereas les [forest] can, is that in a poljana [clearing] there is more open space and it is
easier to see things than in an often dark les [forest].

One can then try to interpret the fact that a word in slot X in the construction on
pogruzilsja v X [he plunged/sank into X] should refer to an "introvertive" state as a
metaphoric projection of this visibility restriction. One can think that a person who
pogruzilsja [plunged/sank] into a state (X) is thought of as if this person could not be
seen outside of X. "Introvertive" states which are not expressed in any conspicuous way
can be viewed as such containers: if a person in a state does not manifest an inner state

\[4\]

The fact that in English one says in a clearing indicates that the English in is
characterized by a somewhat different system of constraints.
by any actions or reactions it is as if one could not see this person inside his or her state (an analogy in English is provided, for example, by Lindner’s (1982: 311) analysis of the preposition out, according to which out in phrases like find out and throw out a few ideas is associated with a change of information status from private, "hidden" to public, known, "visible").

On the other hand, if one plunges into a container, one cannot see things outside this container. This may suggest an easier way to interpret the link between plunging into a container and plunging into a state: plunging into a state like dreams or reflection one is focused on one's own feelings and thoughts and does not notice much of what is going on outside.

1.4. Explication.

The construction Y pogruzilsja v X [Y plunged/sank into X] can be explicated as follows.

A. Y pogruzilsja v X-emot [Y plunged/sank into X emot], where X refers to an emotion; example: Ivan pogruzilsja v otcajanie [Ivan plunged/sank into his despair] =

(a) a person (Y) felt something (X) for some time
(b) because of this, Y could not think about other things at this time
(c) because of this, Y did not do much at this time
(d) at this time, people could think something like this:

Y will feel this (X) for a long time

In the explication above, component (a) refers to the fact that Y was experiencing an emotion (X). Component (c) refers to the fact that X is not an emotion manifested in an active way. When plunging/sinking into an emotion, a person is not expected to think

5 Actually, one plunges into a substance (such as water) rather than into a thing and, hence, one could argue that plunging implies in a "medium" rather than a container (cf. Hawkins 1984). However, this distinction does not seem to bear any relevance to my task.
much about other things (component (b)) and, finally, the emotion is expected to last a long time (component (d)).

B. \textit{Y pogruzilsja v X-think} [Y plunged/sank into X-think], where \( X \) refers to a thinking process; example: \textit{Ivan pogruzilsja v razdum'e} [Ivan plunged/sank into reflection] =

(a) a person (Y) thought about something (X) for some time 
(b) because of this, Y could not think about other things at this time 
(c) because of this, Y did not do much at this time

In the B variant of the explication, component (a) refers to the fact that Y was thinking; components (b) and (c) are the same as in the (A) variant of the explication (corresponding to plunging into an emotion); no component referring to the duration time of the state (X) is needed, because, as we have seen, with states which are not emotions, one can \textit{pogruzit'sja} [plunge/sink] even in a short-time state.

2. The construction on prisel v X [he came into X].

The construction \textit{on prisel v X} includes the verb \textit{prisel} (the infinitive is \textit{prijti}) which, although it is glossed throughout this chapter as "came", does not have an exact equivalent in English. The verb \textit{prijti} is more specific in meaning than \textit{come} and means 'to come by foot'. The idea of coming to a place by foot and normally staying there only a short while is important, as it will be shown, for the meaning of the construction \textit{on prisel v X} when applied to a person's emotional state. Words referring to a person's inner state which are able to occur in slot X of this construction are confined to emotional terms.

2.1. Examples.
(32) *ja prišla v isstuplenie
I came into [a] frenzy ACC

'she said that I do not want to live with grandma' (Dostoevsky);

(33) knjažna prišla v užas
princess came into terror ACC (Dostoevsky).

(34) esli by ja privel svežega človeka na repeticiju
'if I brought [a] fresh person to a rehearsal',

'on prišel by v veličajšee izumlenie
he would come into [a] great astonishment ACC (Bulgakov);

(35) on vsegda prišodil v beženstvo ot stepennosti
he always came into rage ACC from respectfulness GEN

'his father's respectfulness always drove his into a rage' (Gladkov: BAS);

(36) ona prodolžala prišoditi v vostorg ot pokupok
she continued come INF into ecstasy ACC from purchases

'she continued to enter a state of ecstasy over her purchases' (Chernyshevskij: BAS).

2.2. Semantic constraints on X.

2.2.1. X refers to an intense emotion.

Russian has a few sets of words referring to similar emotions differing in intensity. In each set, only words referring to more intense emotions can occur in slot X in the construction on prišel v X [he came into X]. For example, one cannot say

(37) *on prišel v grust'
he came into sadness ACC,

but

(38) on prišel v otčajanie
he came into despair ACC

is quite possible.

Similarly, one cannot say

(39) *on prišel v ispușk strax
he came into fright/fear ACC,

but one can say

(40) on prišel v užas
he came into terror ACC.

One cannot say

(41) *on prišel v neodobrenie
he came into disapproval ACC,

but one can say

(42) on prišel v vozmučenie
he came into indignation ACC.

One cannot say

(43) *on prišel v radost'
he came into joy ACC,

but it is quite felicitous to say

(44) gost' on prišel v vostorg
the guest came into ecstasy ACC (Bulgakov).

One cannot say

(45) *on prišel v odobrenie
he came into approval ACC,

but one can say

(46) \textit{on prišel v vosxiščenie}

he came into admiration ACC;

similarly,

(47) \textit{? on prišel v udivlenie}

he came into surprise ACC

sounds worse than the fully felicitous

(48) \textit{prijti v izumlenie}

to come into astonishment ACC.

The major difference between words in each pair (though not the only one) is that the first word refers to an emotion which is thought of as not very intense (such as \textit{grust' [light sadness]}), whereas the second word in each pair includes in its meaning the idea that an emotion denoted by the word is very intense.

However, it is not clear what 'intense' means in terms of semantic primitives. Moreover, it seems that 'intense' may refer to different features when applied to different inner states. For example, some native speakers of Russian are inclined to think that the inner states that one can \textit{pogruzit'sja [immerse]} into also are intense, although their 'intensity' is in fact different from the 'intensity' implied by the construction \textit{on prišel v X} [he came into X], and means concentration on one's internal life (cf. section 1.2.2). I will assume that the intensity of emotion implied by the construction \textit{on prišel v X} [he came into X] is decomposable into the following two features: (a) the emotional state referred to by this construction is, in a sense, abnormal and therefore can last only a short while; (b) the emotion is expected to be overtly manifested because of its intensity and vice versa, to be intense because it is overtly expressed (cf. Bain 1888). These two constraints
are discussed in the following two sections.

2.2.2. \(X\) refers to a short-term emotion.

Unlike the construction \(\text{on pogruzilsja v } X\) [he plunged/sank into \(X\)], discussed in the previous section, the construction \(\text{on prišel v } X\) [he came into \(X\)] does not imply that \(X\) is an emotion which lasts for a long time. In fact, \(\text{on prišel v } X\) [he came into \(X\)] implies the contrary: to be able to occur in slot \(X\), a word should be able to be interpreted as referring to a short-term emotion. The fact that one cannot combine the adverbs \(\text{nadolgo}\) [for a long time] and \(\text{navsegda}\) [forever] with the construction in question makes it obvious. Thus, one cannot say

\[
\begin{align*}
(49) \text{*on nadolgo/navsegda prišel v bespokojstvo} \\
\text{he for a long time/forever came into worry ACC;}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
(50) \text{*on nadolgo/navsegda prišel v užas} \\
\text{he for a long time/forever came into terror ACC;}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
(51) \text{* on nadolgo/navsegda prišel v otčajanie} \\
\text{he for a long time/forever came into despair ACC,}
\end{align*}
\]

whereas without the adverbs \(\text{nadolgo}\) [for a long time] and \(\text{navsegda}\) [forever] these sentences are quite normal. (By contrast, the construction \(\text{on pogruzilsja v } X\) [he plunged/sank into \(X\)] with a word in slot \(X\) referring to an emotion, as we have seen (section 1.2.1.), is readily modified by \(\text{nadolgo}\) [for a long time.]). Consequently, words which refer to long-lasting attitudes, rather than just temporary states, cannot occur in the construction \(\text{on prišel v } X\) [he came into \(X\)]. One cannot say, for example,

\[
\begin{align*}
(52) \text{* on prišel v interes} \\
\text{he came into interest ACC,}
\end{align*}
\]

whereas
(53) on prišel v uvlečenie

he came into passion/involvement ACC

is possible, which can be explained by the fact that only uvlečenie [passion/involvement], but not interes [interest] can be spoken of in Russian as short: korotkoe uvlečenie [short passion/involvement], but not *korotkij interes [short interest]. One can also say

(54) prijti v vostorg

to come into ecstasy ACC;

but not

(55) *prijti v ščast'e

to come into happiness ACC;

(56) prijti v otcijanie

to come into despair ACC;

but not

(57) *prijti v skorb'

to come into grief ACC,

because vostorg [ecstasy] and užas [terror], but not ščast'e [happiness] and skorb' [grief], are readily conceptualized as temporary in Russian. Similarly, one can say

(58) on prišel v užas

he came into terror ACC;

but not

(59) *on prišel v bojazn'

he came into cautiousness ACC,

because užas but not bojazn' can be understood as referring to a short intense emotional state.
2.2.3. X is an actively manifested state.

Very few words can occur in slot X in both on pogruzilsja v X [he plunged/sank into X] and on prišel v X [he came into X]. These are, for example, otčajanie [despair], užas [terror] and vosxiščenie [admiration].

However, the word otčajanie [despair] in sentence (60)

(60) on prišel v otčajanie
    he came into despair ACC

'he became desparate';

would be understood as referring to a state quite different from otčajanie [despair] in sentence (61):

(61) on pogruzilsja v otčajanie
    he plunged into despair ACC.

First of all, otčajanie [despair] referred to in (60) is expected to be experienced during a rather short time, such as a few minutes (cf. section 2.2), whereas otčajanie [despair] in (61) can last for years. As a consequence it is possible to say something like

(62) posle smerti ženy on pogruzilsja v otčajanie
    after death wife GEN he plunged into despair ACC

'after the death of his wife he sank into despair',

but sentence (63)

(63) posle smerti ženy on prišel v otčajanie
    after death wife GEN he came into despair ACC

'he is in despair after the death of his wife'

sounds rather strange. The construction prijti v otčajanie [to come into despair] is more appropriate in a context like (64):

(64) opozday na avtobus, on prišel v otčajanie.
having missed on bus  he came  in despair ACC

'having missed the bus he is in despair'.

It should be noted, however, that the reason why one can be expected pogruzit'sja v otčajanie [to plunge into despair], but hardly prijti v otčajanie [to come into despair] after a serious loss, is not limited to the differences in expected time duration of emotions referred to by X in the two constructions. Otčajanie [despair] referred to in (65)

(65)  on prišel v  otčajanie

he came  into despair ACC
would be manifested by some action such as pulling one's hair, dramatic gesticulation, cursing, screaming and so on. Otčajanie [despair] referred to in (66)

(66)  on pogruzilsja v  otčajanie

he plunged/sank into despair ACC

is expected to be "deeper". The same kind of differences in meaning can be found between the phrases prijti v užas [to come into terror] and pogruzit'sja v užas [to plunge/sink into terror]: the first terror would be expressed by an exclamation, by rounding one's eyes etc., whereas the second would paralyze the person experiencing it, in other words, it would be "deeper". To be able to occur in slot X in the construction on prišel v X [he came into X ], an emotional term should refer to an emotion which is expected to be manifested by some visible outward reactions. Therefore one cannot say

(67)  *on prišel v  grust'/pečal'

he came  into light sadness/sadness ACC;

(68)  *on prišel v  strax

he came  into fear ACC;

(69)  *on prišel v  ugryzenija sovesti
he came into remorse ACC.

These emotional states can pass quickly, or last a long time, be more or less intense, but normally they are not manifested in actions. In the following two examples the construction on prišel v X is clearly associated with drastic outward manifestations of feeling:

(70) oglušennyj raek prišodit v isstuplenie.
[the] deafened upper gallery comes into ecstasy ACC

theatre rattles from applause

'the upper gallery, deafened with noise, is in ecstasy;
the theatre is rattling from the applause' (Pushkin);

(71) aziatskie banščiki prišodjat inogda v

ecstasy, jump you on shoulders

'in asian baths, attendants sometimes reach such ecstasy that they jump on visitors' shoulders' (Pushkin).

The claim that the existence of clear externally observable expressions of an emotion (X) is crucial for the use of the construction on prišel v X [he came into X] can be supported by the fact that it would be rather strange to continue a sentence which is an instance of the construction on prišel v X [he came into X] with the words etogo ne pokazyval [did not show it]:

(72) ?on prišel v vostorg, no ne pokazyval etogo.

he came into ecstasy ACC but NEG show this

'he was delighted but did not show it'.
Besides, some words referring to states which are not emotional at all, but physical, can occur in \textit{on prišel v X} [he came into X], for example:

\begin{align*}
(73) & \quad \text{\textit{on prišel v dviženie}} \\
& \quad \text{he came into movement ACC} ;
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
(74) & \quad \text{\textit{on prišel v naprjaženie}} \\
& \quad \text{he came into tension ACC} \\
& \quad \text{'he became tense'.}
\end{align*}

2.3. Spatial prototype.

One can attempt to reconstruct the spatial "prototype" of the construction \textit{on prišel v X} [he came into X] as follows. Sentences of the structure \textit{on prišel v X} [he came into X], where X refers to a place, can be uttered if the speaker is observing somebody moving (that is, striding by foot as the verb \textit{prišel} indicates), and then coming to a place (X). The speaker, of course, can be the same person as the striding person. The important thing is that the speaker should be located so as to be able to see the movement. This spatial image may underlie the fact that words in slot X in the construction \textit{on prišel v X} [he came into X] should refer to emotions which are expected to overtly manifested in physical actions.

Further, it has to be explained why X in \textit{on prišel v X} [he came into X] should refer to emotions which are expected to last a short time. One can try to deduce this constraint from the same spatial image of coming to a place by foot. Thus, the sentence \textit{on prišel v X} [he came [by foot] to X] would be used in its spatial sense when the speaker follows somebody's path through a lot of different places of which X normally is not the last. Besides, these days, if a person comes somewhere by foot, the person is normally expected to leave soon. One can, in fact, say something like
(75) on prišel v naš gorod i ostalsja tut žiti'

he came into our city and remained here live INF

'he came to our city and remained here to live',

but it sounds slightly odd and is unlikely.

2.4. Explication.

Y prišel v X [Y came into X]; example: Ivan prišel v užas [Ivan came into terror, i.e. became terrified] =

(a1) a person (Y) felt something (X) for a short time

(a2) people could not feel like this for a long time

(b) because of this, Y did something at this time

(c) people could see this

(d) at this time, people could think something like this:

(d1) Y will feel this for a short time

(d2) Y will do this for a short time

In the explication above, components (a1) and (a2) refer to the fact that Y was experiencing an inherently short intense emotion (X); components (b) and (c) state that Y’s emotion was overtly manifested; (d1) and (d2) state that, according to normal expectations, a state like this will last only a short while.

3. The construction on byl v X-e [he was in [a state of] X].

3.1. Examples.

(76) francuz byl v udivlenii

[the] frenchman was in surprise LOC (Dostoevsky);

(77) ja byla v užasnom ispuge
I was in [an] awful fright LOC (Dostoevsky);

(78) ja byla v bolšom smuščenii

I was in [a] great confusion LOC (Dostoevsky);

(79) mgnovenie bulldog byl v nerešitel'nosti

moment bulldog was in indecisiveness LOC

'for a moment the bulldog was indecisive' (Dostoevsky).

3.2. On byl v X-e [he was in [a state of] X] vs. on prisel v X [he came into X].

Words which can occupy slot X in the construction on prisel v X [he came into X], always can occur in slot X of the construction on byl v X-e [he was in [a state of] X].

This seems rather natural: when an event referred to by on prisel v X [he came into X] has happened, one can say on byl v X-e [he was in X]. The reverse is often true as well.

For example a sentence like

(80) Griša byl v vostorge

Grisha was in ecstasy LOC

'Grisha was ecstatic' (Bulgakov),

implies that at a time Grisha was driven by something to this state (because one cannot always be in a state of ecstasy), which would be normally referred to by the sentence

(81) Griša prisel v vostorg

Grisha came into ecstasy ACC

'Grisha became ecstatic'.

However, some words which cannot occur in on prisel v X [he came into X], can occupy slot X in the construction on byl v X-e [he was in X]. For example, it is possible to say

(82) on byl v razdum'e
he was in reflection LOC;

(83) on byl v nerešitel'nosti

he was in indecisiveness LOC

'he was indecisive' ;

(84) on byl v pečali

he was in sadness LOC

'he was sad' ,

but not

(85) *on prišel v razdumu

he came into reflection ACC;

(86) *on prišel v nerešitel'nosti

he came into indecisiveness ACC;

(87) *on prišel v pečal

he came into sadness ACC.

These data can be explained as follows. As I have claimed above, to say on prišel v X [he came into X], one has to actually see (or hear) the experiencer of a feeling to "move into" a state of X. As for the construction on byl v X-e [he was in [a state of] X] , the speaker does not have to see that the person is in a state of X. It is enough if the speaker knows from any source that this is so, and may, for example, even deduce his knowledge from some other information. Therefore X in the construction on byl v X-e [he was in [a state of] X] does not have to have as tangible and conspicuous physical expression as in on prišel v X [he came into X]. It is worth mentioning that the same distinction applies to moving and staying in real places. Saying

M v X-e

M in X LOC
'M is in X'

means only that the speaker believes, for some reason, that M is located at a place (X), whereas saying

\[ M \text{ пришел в } X \]

'M came into X ACC'

implies that the speaker can see M moving with his own eyes (or perhaps follow M's movements in some other way).

3.3. Semantic constraint on X: X is a "temporary" state.

The semantic constraint on X in the construction \[ \text{он был в } X \text{-e} \] [he was in [a state of] X] is related to time: to be able to occur in slot X, a word should refer to an inner state which is conceived of as temporary, non-permanent. This explains why one cannot say in Russian

(88) * on byl v ljubvi

he was in love LOC;

(89) * on byl v nenavisti

he was in hate LOC.

For the same reason, one can say

(90) on byl v vostorze

he was in ecstasy LOC,

but not

(91) *on byl v ščast'ě

he was in happiness LOC;

it is possible to say

(92) on byl v otčajnii
he was in despair LOC,

but not

(93) * on byl v skorbi

he was in grief LOC.

This "temporariness" constraint on X is characteristic of many constructions with the preposition Y [in/into] and a noun in the locative. A general spatial basis underlying this constraint is related to the fact that for a spatial sentence of the structure Y v X-e [Y is in X LOC] to be informative, it is necessary that one could think of some possible locations of Y other than X, in other words, that X be a temporary location for Y (cf. the discussion of the locative with nouns referring to transfer (chapter six) and social roles (chapter eight)).

3.4. Explication.

on byl v X-e-emot [he was in [a state of] X-emot]; example on byl v ispuge [he was in [a state of] fright] =

(a) a person (Y) felt something (X) for some time

(b) at this time, people could think something like this:

at other time Y will not feel like this

4. The construction on vpal v X [he fell into X].

The construction on vpal v X [he fell into X] is another Russian construction which refers a person's "transfer" into an inner state. This construction treats the state as if it were a container (or a place which has a hollow into which one can fall).

4.1. Examples.
I fell into a frightening long sadness ACC (Dostoevsky);

I fell into indifference, into apathy ACC (Dostoevsky);

Aleksandra Mixajlovna fell into terrible anguish ACC (Dostoevsky);

Tatiana fell into very limitless dreaminess ACC

'I fell into endless dreams' (Dostoevsky).

4.2. No constraint on extro/introvertive nature of a state.

The construction on vpal v X [he fell into X] allows the state referred to by a word in slot X to be both "introvertive" and "extrovertive". For example, along with

'I plunged into reflection, as before' (Pushkin)

it is possible to say

Ivan became worried, pushing people around him and swinging his candle ' (Bulgakov),

where Ivan's bespokojstvo [anxiety], as the context shows, was of a rather active nature.

Similarly, the word jarost' [fury] can be used in this construction:
4.3. No constraint on duration.

The state referred to by a word in slot X is not restricted in its time of duration (as it is with the constructions on pogruzilsja v X [he plunged/sank into X] and on prišel v X [he came into X], cf. sections 1.2 and 2.2). Thus, along with words referring to short-term emotional states, words referring to long-lasting attitudes can be used in slot X of the construction on vpal v X [he fell into X]. For example, jarost' [fury] in the last example is clearly a short-term state; the same applies to bespokoistvo [anxiety] from sentence (99). However, in the sentence below, slot X is occupied by the word samonadejannost' [exaggerated self-confidence] which refers to an attitude rather than a short-term state:

(101) ne byvaet nikakix teorij!

NEG there is none theories GEN

vpadaja v samonadejannost' vskrikival ja

falling into arrogance ACC exclaimed I

'there can't be any theories! - I exclaimed slipping

into arrogance' (Bulgakov).

There is also a set-phrase vpast' v gordynju [to fall into pride], where gordynja [pride] refers to an attitude rather than to a short-term state. As we will see, the verb vpal [fell] imposes its own constraints on a word in slot X.
4.4. Semantic constraint on X: X is "bad".

Since real falling into something which happens in physical space is normally an undesirable event, it makes it easy to understand why words referring to positive emotions cannot occur in slot X in the construction on vpal v X [he fell into X]:

(102) *on vpal v vostorg

he fell into ecstasy ACC;

(103) *on vpal v likovanie

he fell into exultation ACC etc.

Words occurring in slot X in the construction on vpal v X [he fell into X] always denote inner states which are thought of as bad for the experiencer, for example:

(104) ljudi vpadali v tupoe, ravnodušnoe otčajanie

people fell into dumb indifferent despair ACC

'people were driven to dumb and indifferent despair' (Gor’kij: BAS);

(105) ona vpal v glubokoe unynie

she fell into deep melancholy ACC

'she became immersed in deep melancholy' (Pushkin);

(106) on vpal v bespamjatstvo

he fell into unconsciousness ACC

'he sank into unconsciousness' (Dmitriev: BAS).

However, although the words vozmuščenie [indignation], razočarovanie [disappointment] and pečal' [sadness] refer to negative emotions, one cannot say *on vpal v vozmuščenie [he fell into indignation], *on vpal v razočarovanie [he fell into disappointment], *on vpal v pečal' [he fell into deep sadness]. One can only say vpast’ v X if the speaker believes that the experiencer of an emotion (X) is in the wrong letting him/herself feel X (cf. the set phrase vpast’ v grex [to fall into a sin]). This explains why
one can say

(107)  on vpal v  paniku

he fell into panic ACC,

but not

(108)  * on vpal v  strax

he fell into fear ACC.

The word panika [panic], but not strax [fear], refers to an emotion which is generally
disapproved of. Along the same lines it should be explained that one cannot say

(109)  * on vpal v  spravedlivyyj  gnev

he fell into justified/righteous anger ACC

whereas

(110)  on vpal v  neobosnovannyj  gnev

he fell into unjustified anger ACC

is perfectly felicitous. Similarly, one can say vpast’ v otčajanie [to fall into despair], but
not *vpast’ v skorb’ [to fall into grief]: the word skorb’ [grief] includes in its meaning the
idea of being caused by a serious loss (and therefore skorb’ [grief] cannot be unjustified,
cf. *neobosnovannaja skorb’ [unjustified grief]), whereas otčajanie [despair], on the
contrary, may be thought of as unjustified.

4.5. Explication.

Y vpal v X-emot [Y fell into X-emot], where X refers to an emotion; examples: Ivan

vpal v jarost’ [Ivan fell into a rage]; Ivan vpal v gordynju [Ivan fell into pride] =

(a) a person (Y) felt something (X) for some time

(b) when a person feels something like this people think something like this:

if a person feels this it is bad
In the explication above, (a) refers to Y's emotion (X); (b) means that the past' [fall] construction implies that the emotion is disapproved of.

5. Conclusion.

We have considered four Russian constructions including the preposition Y [in/into] and different verbs. We have seen that although all of these constructions present an emotion experienced by a person as if it were a container or a place, semantic constraints on X are different for each of the four constructions. Differences in semantic constraints associated with the constructions are caused by differences in meaning between verbs used in the constructions.

The verb pogruzit'sja [plunge/sink] referring to gradually getting deeper and deeper into a container of liquid, when applied to emotions, refers to experiencing a long-lasting emotion which makes one, roughly speaking, concentrate on one's own feelings and ignore the rest of the world: naturally, having plunged into something, one cannot see what is outside. One would not be able to make many movements either, which, in the case of emotions, corresponds to the lack of outward manifestation of an emotion.

The construction on prijel v X [he came into X], by contrast, is used to refer to overtly manifested short-term emotional states. Both ideas (short duration time and overt manifestation) can be traced back to spatial situations that the verb prijti [come by foot] refers to. Thus, prijti [come by foot] is used to refer to somebody's movement observable to the speaker, and also in situations where the person who has come is expected to depart soon.

Finally, the construction on vpal v X [he fell into X] is used when the speaker believes that it is bad if somebody experiences a particular emotion (X) which corresponds to falling being an undesirable event.
Chapter IV.

The causative meanings of the prepositions V [in/into] and OT [from] with nouns referring to emotions.

0. Introduction.

This chapter is aimed at describing and comparing the meanings of two Russian constructions which convey, roughly speaking, the following idea: something happening to a person is caused by this person's emotional state. The constructions that will be discussed are:

1. v X-e + on + VP [in [a state of] X + he + VP], for example,

   v vozmuščenii on stuknul kulakom po stolu

   in indignation he hit fist INSTR on table

   'he hit the table with his fist in indignation';

2. ot X-a + on + VP [from X + he + VP], for example,

   on onemel ot straxa

   he became mute from fear

   'he was so scared that he could not speak'.

In both constructions, X is a noun referring to an emotional state, on [he] denotes a person experiencing this state and VP is a verbal phrase. Each construction includes a spatial preposition: in the first construction it is V [in/into] and in the second it is OT [from].

Russian has a few causative constructions with spatial prepositions other than V [in/into] which refer to different types of causation (see Iordanskaja and Mel'čuk 1996). This chapter is focused on causation of an event (VP) by an emotion. I will try to show that differences in meaning between the V [in/into] and the OT [from] construction are related to a particular time perspective associated with each construction.
1. The construction v X-e + on + Verbal Phrase [in [a state of] X + he + Verbal Phrase].

   This construction is used when the speaker believes that there is a causal link between a person's emotional state and the content of Verbal Phrase (henceforth - the predicate): on [he] did something referred to by the predicate because he was in a state of X.

1.1. Examples.

(1) "Ne možet ona igrat" -

   'She can't play'

   v zlobnom isstuplenii xripel ja

   in angry frenzy spoke hoarsely I

   'She cannot play - I said in hoarse anger' (Bulgakov);

(2) Stepa v trevoge poglubže zagljanul v perednjuju

   Stepa in anxiety deeper looked into hall

   'Stepa anxiously peeped deeper into the hall' (Bulgakov);

   It should be noted that a different word order does not imply a causative link between a person's state (X) and the predicate, for example:

(3) oni nenavideli po nocam, zasypaja v smutnoj trevoge

   they hated on nights falling asleep in vague anxiety

   'hated during the night, when going to sleep in a vague anxiety' (Bulgakov).

   In sentence (3), the emotional state (a vague anxiety) did not cause what the predicate refers to (going to sleep).
1.2. The spatial prototype.

The causal link between a state (X) and an action referred to by the predicate (in sentences (1-2) above) has a clear spatial prototype. Thus, a sentence like

(4) \( v \text{ Arktike slony } \text{ umirajut} \)

in Arctic elephants die

'elephants die in the Arctic regions'

means not only that elephants die (sometimes) and it may happen in the Arctic regions, but rather that when placed there elephants die, and die because they have been placed there.

The presence of a causal link between being in a place (X) and the content of the predicate is not necessary for spatial sentences to be felicitous. For example, one can say something like

(5) \( v \text{ Moskve ne } \text{ nosjat } \text{ percatok} \)

in Moscow NEG wear PL gloves

'people don't wear gloves in Moscow'

and it would not mean that the speaker sees or expects the hearer to see any link between being in Moscow and not wearing gloves. The only meaning which is invariably present in sentences of this structure is restrictive: the event referred to by the predicate occurs in a place (X) but not everywhere. Otherwise, if the event denoted by the predicate had nothing specific for X, saying that this event occurs in X would not be informative (in Grice's sense). In spatial sentences this restrictive meaning is sometimes strengthened (in the sense of Traugott and König (1991)) into a causal link (something happens to some people in a place (X) and not in many other places because these people are in that place) and sometimes it is not.

However, sentences where X refers to a person's emotional state differ from spatial
sentences in this respect. If one cannot work out how the action denoted by the predicate can be causally related to a state (X) the sentence is perceived as infelicitous. For example, the following sounds rather odd and even comical:

(6) * v otčajani ona pudrila nos

in despair she powdered nose

'In despair she powdered her nose',
because it is difficult to find a connection between being in despair and powdering one's nose.

1.3. Semantic constraints on the construction v X-e + on + VP [in [a state of] X + he + VP].

The ability of an emotion to cause a particular event is not a sufficient condition for a noun referring to the emotion and a predicate referring to the event to be able to be used in slots X and VP (respectively) of the construction v X-e + on + VP. It turns out that there are other constraints on emotional terms in slot X and predicates in slot VP.

1.3.1. Semantic constraints on the emotional term (X).

To find out what the constraints on emotional terms in slot X are, it seems useful to look at sets of semantically close emotional terms which differ in respect of a few relatively simple features (such as intensity). A few sets of emotional terms, close in meaning within each set, are analyzed below. All words in a set are tested with the same predicate occurring in a real example with one of the words (the top one for each set). To indicate the ability/inability of other words in a set to be used in the same context, I will use "+" and "*" respectively. In order to provide a better illustration, the sign "+" sometimes is followed by a real (literary) example.
Fear

ispug [fright] +

ja v ispuhe brosilas' dogonitat' ego

I in fright threw myself catch INF him

' in a state of fright I tried to catch him' (Dostoevsky);

strax [fear] +

he in fear closed his eyes

trevoga [anxiety] +

Stepa v trevoge pogublje zagljanul v peredneju

Stepa in anxiety deeper peeped into [the] hall (Bulgakov);

užas [terror] +

in terror held church services

' in terror they held church services' (Dostoevsky);

panika [panic] +

in panic put on INF gas-mask

't to put a gas-mask on in a panic' (Bulgakov);

bojazn' [caution] *

Surprise

nedoumenie [bewilderment] +

he in bewilderment turned back

'in bewilderment he turned back' (Dostoevsky)

udivlenie [surprise] +
izumlenie [astonishment] +

Anger

razdraženije [irritation] +

kot v razdraženii udaril lapoj po stolu

cat in irritation struck paw INSTR on table

'in irritation the cat struck the table with its paw' (Bulgakov)

dosada [annoyance] +

knjažna v dosade topala nožkoj

princess in annoyance stamped foot INSTR

'the annoyed princess stamped her foot' (Dostoevsky)

gnev [anger] +

Lizaveta Prokofievna v gneve vyšla iz-za stola

Lizaveta Prokofievna in anger left from table

'Lizaveta Prokofievna left the table in anger' (Dostoevsky)

beženstvo [rage] +

ona v beženstve skosila glaza

she in rage squinted [her] eyes (Bulgakov)

jarost' [fury] +

Sadness

pečal: [sadness] ?/*
grust' [light sadness]?

ogorčenie [distress]?
otčajanie [despair]

+ on v otčajanii zaprokinul golovu

he in despair threw back [his] head

gore [grief]?
skorb' [sorrow] *

Joy

vostorg [ecstasy / delight] +

on v vostorge brosilsja mne na šeju

he in ecstasy threw himself me on neck

'he threw himself on my neck in ecstasy ' (Bulgakov)

radost' [joy] *

vesel'e [merryment] *

sčast'e [happiness] *

blaženstvo [bliss] *

Disgust/contempt/disapproval

vozmuščenie [indignation] +

v vozmuščenii ja voročalsja po nočam

in indignation I used to toss at night (Bulgakov);

otvraščenie [disgust] *

prezrenie [contempt] *

nenavist' [hate] *
Admiration/love/respect

v osxisiščenie [admiration] +

v vosxisiščenii on sledil za ee dvizhenijami

in admiration he followed for her movements

'in admiration he followed her movements'

ljubov' [love] *

uvaženie [respect] *

In each of the sets of emotional terms given above, words differ in several respects. The most obvious differences concern (a) intensity of the emotion referred to (for example, izumlenie [astonishment] is more intense than udivlenie [surprise]); (b) its expected duration (for example, gore [grief] is expected to last longer than grust' [light sadness] and otčajanie [despair]). Therefore it seems logical to test whether the ability of an emotional term to occur in the construction $v \ X-e + on + VP$ [in [a state of] X + he + VP] depends on intensity of the emotion referred to and its expected duration.

1.3.1.1. First hypothesis: X is an intense emotion.

The examples above show that emotional terms referring both to very intense emotions and less intense emotions can be used in the $V [\text{into}]$ construction. Thus, one can say

(7) $v užase brosilja bežat'$

in terror started to run,

but also

(8) $v straxe/ispuge brosilja bežat'$

in fear/ fright started to run;

similarly, not only
(9)  v jarosti topnul nogo
in fury stamped foot
'in fury stamped his foot',
but also
(10)  v dosade topnula nogo
in annoyance stamped [her] foot (Dostoevsky);
and
(11)  v razdraženii stuknul lapoj po stolu
in irritation struck paw on table
'[he] struck the table with his paw in irritation' (Bulgakov)
are possible.

Besides, the words ljubov' [love], nenavist' [hate] and prezrenie [contempt], all referring to intense emotions, cannot be used in this construction. Therefore, the "intensity" hypothesis has to be rejected: the ability of an emotional term to be used in slot X of the V [in/into] causative construction does not depend on the intensity of the emotion. In fact, I will show in the next section that the inability of an emotional term to be used in slot X of the V [in/into] causative construction can always be explained in terms of time.

1.3.1.2. Second hypothesis: X is a "short-term" emotion.

For an emotional term to be able to occur in slot X it is necessary that it could be understood as referring to a short-term state. This claim can be supported by the following contrasts: one can say
(12)  ja v ispuge brosilas' dogonjat' ego
I in fright started catch INF him
'in fear, I tried to catch him' (Dostoevsky),

but not

(13) *ja v bojazni brosilas' dogonjat' ego.

I in caution started catch INF him,

the main difference between ispug [fright] and bojazn' [caution] being that ispug refers to a temporary state, whereas bojazn' [caution] - to a general attitude (as for the word strax [fear], it can refer to both, but in the context of the V [in/into] construction is understood as temporary). Similarly, one can say

(14) v vostorge on brosilsja mne na šeju

in ecstasy he threw REFL me on neck

'he threw himself on my neck in ecstasy';

but not

(15) *v radosti on brosilsja mne na šeju

in joy he threw REFL me on neck

'in joy, he threw himself in my arms',

nor

(16) * v scast'e on brosilsja mne na šeju.

in happiness he threw me on neck.

One can say

(17) v otčajanii ona lomala ruki

in despair she wrung [her] hands (Dostoevsky),

but the sentence with gore [grief] sounds definitely worse:

(18) */ v gore ona lomala ruki

in grief she wrung [her] hands.

This difference, too, may be explained by the fact that gore [grief], rather than otčanje
[despair], is expected to be a long-term state. For the same reason, one cannot say

(19) *v skorbi ona lomala ruki

in sorrow she wrung [her] hands

(the word *skorb' means, roughly, 'sorrow caused by a serious loss' and cannot be interpreted as referring to a short-time state, cf. *korotkaja skorb' [short sorrow], *mimoletnaja skorb' [momentary sorrow]). There is a sentence from a novel by Bulgakov, however, where the word *pečal' [deep sadness] which normally would not be understood as referring to a short-term state is used in slot X, but it is followed by another emotional term - *vosmuščenie [indignation]:

(20) v pečali. v vozmuščenii ja voročalsja s boku na bok po nočam

'in sadness in indignation I tossed in my bed at night (Bulgakov).

Without the word vozmuščenie [indignation] the sentence would be on the verge of being odd. On the other hand, the "short term" interpretation, although not very likely, is still compatible with the word pečal' [deep sadness]: one can say, for example, korotkaja pečal' [short sadness].

All emotional terms marked "*" in the list above fall into two categories:

(a) long-lasting emotional states: sčast'e [happiness]; blaženstvo [bliss]; gore [grief]; skorb' [sorrow];
(b) attitudes: bojazn' [caution]; prezrenie [contempt]; otrvaščenie [disgust]; uvaženie [respect]; ljubov' [love]; nenavist' [hate].

These data show that the idea of "short-term" duration is always present in the meaning of emotional terms able to occur in slot X of this construction. In terms of the primitives, this constraint should be phrased as 'he felt something (X) for a short time'.

1.3.2. Semantic constraints on the predicate (VP).
Examples found in the literature suggest that a predicate (VP) in the construction \( y X-e + \text{on} + \text{VP} \) [in [a state of] X + he + VP] normally refers to an unplanned spontaneous action, to which the subject is driven by his/her emotional state. Therefore the action (VP) is performed by the subject while experiencing the state (X), "within" its time limits, so to speak. These are, in fact, a few constraints that should be tested separately. Besides, it seems that there are different constraints for predicates which are preceded by a negation and for those which are not. Therefore constraints on negated predicates will be considered separately (see section 1.5).

1.3.2.1. The predicate refers to an action.

Within the \( V \) [in/into] construction, a noun referring to the experiencer of an emotion should be in the nominative and the predicate should include a verb in the active voice.

Thus, a widely used construction including a noun denoting the experiencer of a feeling (or thought) in the dative and the predicate which is a reflexive verb cannot be inserted in this construction:

\begin{enumerate}
\item (21) * \( v \) straxe emu kazalos' cto v komnate kto-to est'
\end{enumerate}

\[ \text{in fear him DAT seemed that in room somebody is} \]

'\text{in his fear, it seemed to him that there was somebody in the room}';

\begin{enumerate}
\item (22) * \( v \) vostorge emu vse navrivos' v nej
\end{enumerate}

\[ \text{in ecstasy him DAT all liked in her} \]

'\text{in his ecstasy he liked everything in her}';

\begin{enumerate}
\item (23) * \( v \) vozmuščenii emu ne xotelos' s nej govorit'
\end{enumerate}

\[ \text{in indignation him DAT NEG want with her speak INF} \]

'\text{in indignation he did not want to speak with her}'.

Another "experiencer" construction, constituted by the preposition \( L \) [to], the genitive
of the subject (experiencer) and a reflexive verb, cannot be incorporated in the \textit{V [in/into]} construction either:

(24) *v \textit{volnenii} u nego drožali ruki

in excitement to him trembled hands

'his hands trembled with excitement';

(25) *v \textit{neterpenii} u nego goreli uši

in impatience to him burned ears

'in impatience his ears burned'.

The predicates \textit{flushed, blushed, turned pale, trembled} etc. which refer to states that can be caused by an emotion but have nothing to do with either performing or not performing an action cannot occur in slot \textit{VP} of the construction in question:

(26) *v \textit{volnenii} on poblednel /pokrasnel

in excitement he turned pale/flushed;

(27) *v \textit{neterpenii} on drožal/trjassja

in impatience he trembled.

What is more, the word \textit{dumat' [think]} cannot be used in this construction either:

(28) *v \textit{straxe} on dumal, \textit{čto umiraej}

in fear he thought, that is dying.

However, when thinking is presented as an active process rather than something that the thinking subject passively endures, the \textit{V [in/into]} construction can be used. For example, if \textit{dumal [thought]} in sentence (28) above is substituted for \textit{voobražal [imagined]} it makes the sentence sound better:

(29) v \textit{straxe} on voobražal \textit{čto umiraej}

in fear he imagined that is dying.

Similarly, the words \textit{videl [saw]} and \textit{slyšal [heard]} can never be used in the \textit{V [in/into]}
construction:

(30) *v straxe on videl prividenija

in fear he saw ghosts;

(31) *v užase on slyšal č'i-to šagi

in terror he heard somebody's steps,

presumably because hearing and seeing are thought of as "passive" processes which happen to an experiencer, rather than as something done by an agent. However, the words osmatrivat'sja [examine/scrutinize/ look around] and vsluşivat'sja [listen attentively] referring to deliberate attempts to hear and see better and more (respectively) readily occur in slot X:

(32) ja v smuščenii osmatrival'sja krugom, priiskivaja kuda ujti

'I in confusion looked around seeking where to escape' (Dostoevsky);

(33) v neistoščimoj toske ja vsluşivalas' v eti zvuki

'in endless anguish I listened to these sounds' (Dostoevsky).

These data indicate that within this construction the subject is thought of as an agent (not an experiencer), and the predicate (VP) refers to a subject's action. Very often it is a bodily action (a sudden movement, such as hitting or breaking something caused by an emotion).

1.3.2.2. The action is performed within the time limits of the emotion.

The "time limits" constraint can be illustrated by the following contrasts. One can say

(34) v užase on pones kakuju-to okolesinu

'in terror he was saying absurd things' (Bulgakov),
but not

(35) \(v \ užase \ on \ izmenil \ svoju \ vnešnost'\)

in terror he changed his appearance.

Similarly, one can say

(36) \(v \ otčajanii \ on \ rval \ na \ sebe \ volosy\)

in despair he tore on self hair

'he was pulling his hair in despair',

but it sounds rather strange to say

(37) \(v \ otčajanii \ on \ emigriroval\)

in despair he emigrated

'in despair he emigrated';

it is possible to say

(38) \(knjažna \ v \ dosade \ topnula \ nožkoj\)

the princess in annoyance stamped her foot (Dostoevsky),

but hardly

(39) \(knjažna \ v \ dosade \ porvala \ s \ podrugoj\)

the princess in annoyance broke with her friend;

one can say

(40) \(on \ v \ razočarovanii \ oternulsja\)

he in disappointment turned away

'in disappointment he turned away',

but not

(41) \(*on \ v \ razočarovanii \ razvelsja \ s \ ženoj\)

he in disappointment divorced with wife

'in disappointment he divorced his wife';
finally, it is possible to say

(42)  on v vostorge obnjal menja

he in ecstasy embraced me

'in ecstasy he embraced me',

but not

(43)  *on v vostorge zaveščal mne svojo sostojanie

he in ecstasy bequeathed me his property

'in ecstasy he bequeathed me his property'.

These contrasts illustrate the transformation of the "being in a container" idea into doing something within certain time limits. The V [in/into] construction includes as part of its meaning the idea that the action is performed while an emotion is experienced. This is why sentences (35), (37), (39), (41) and (43) are infelicitous: the results of actions like changing one's appearance, emigrating, breaking up with a friend etc. last much longer than the emotions which have caused them may last. That is, these actions cannot be viewed as performed "within" the time duration of an emotion. This constraint seems to be responsible for the fact that a predicate in the V [in/into] construction in most cases is constituted by a perfective verb (not always, however, cf. sentence (36) where the predicate rval [pulled] is an imperfective verb). Perfective verbs differ from imperfective ones in how they present "the internal structure" of the event they refer to. Roughly speaking, a perfective verb refers to an event as a single completed whole, whereas an imperfective verb corresponds to an event in its development (cf., for example, Comrie 1976). It seems clear, then, why sentences of the structure v X-e + on + VP [in [a state of] X + he + VP] often, although not always, have perfective verbs in slot VP. It is easier, indeed, to confine within the time limits of an emotion an action corresponding to a point (in time) than one corresponding to a period, but the latter, too, can develop
within the same time limits.

This constraint may be phrased in the explication as follows:

(b) *Y did something at some time during this time* ,

where *this time* refers to the time when an emotion (*X*) was experienced by the subject.

The word *during* which is not one of the NSM primitives (although it is considered as a possible new primitive, according to Anna Wierzbicka (p.c.)), is necessary to account for the "time limits" constraint.

1.3.2.3. The predicate refers to a spontaneous unpreplanned action.

An action that the predicate refers to cannot be a preplanned act for the predicate to be able to occur in the construction in question. Thus, one can say

(44)  
\[ v \text{ vosxišćenii on poceloval } ej \text{ ruku} \]

in admiration he kissed her hand,

but not

(45)  
\[ *v \text{ vosxišćenii on sdelal } ej \text{ podarok} \]

in admiration he made her a present.

The difference between the two situations concerns the fact that presenting a gift, even though it can be done while experiencing an emotion, unlike kissing one's hand, requires a planning (such as buying the present beforehand).

Similarly, one cannot say

(46)  
\[ *v \text{ toske on soveršil krugosvetnoe putešestvie} \]

in anguish he made [a] round-the-world tour;

(47)  
\[ *on \text{ v straxe/ispuge zastraxoval žizn' svoix detej} \]

he in fear/fright insured life his children

'in fear, he bought life insurance for his children';
although actions referred to by predicates in these sentences can be performed by the subject while the emotions are experienced. The same emotional terms combined with predicates which can be understood as referring to "impulsive", unpremeditated actions sound fully felicitous:

(49) on v toske brodil po ulicam

he in anguish wandered on streets

'in anguish he wandered in the streets' (Dostoevsky);

(50) ja v straxe/ispuge brosilas' doponjat' ego

I in fear/fright started to run after him;

(51) on v uvlečenii načal ob'jasnijat' svoju mysč

he in enthusiasm started explain his thought.

Therefore, another constraint on predicates in the V [in/into] construction should be postulated. To be able to occur in slot VP, the predicate should refer to an impulsive, unpreplanned action. In terms of the primitives, the "spontaneous action" constraint can be phrased as 'he did this (VP) not because he thought before: I want to do this'.

The existence of this constraint can be proved by the fact that if one adds to a V [in/into] sentence something in the sense "he was going to do this anyway", it makes the sentence sound comical. For example:

(52) *on v panike napjalil protivogaz, kotoryj

he in panic struggled into gas-mask which

kak raz sobiralsja odet'

just was going to put on
'in panic he struggled into a gask-mask that he was
just going to put on'.

The "spontaneity" constraint is obviously related to the "short-time duration" and the
"time limits" constraints: since the emotion referred to by X lasts only a short time, it is
unlikely that the subject could plan an action and perform it within a short time.

Sometimes it may be even impossible to tell which of these constraints is responsible for
the infelicity of a sentence. For example, let us consider why the following sentence
sounds rather odd:

(53)  on v uvelchenii napisal knigu

he in enthusiasm wrote [a] book.

Given that normally it takes a lot of time and planning to write a book, there are two
posibilities: either the author's enthusiasm lasted quite a long while and in this case the
"short-time" constraint on emotional terms is violated, or, if the enthusiasm was short and
just has served as a trigger for the author, then the "time limits" constraint on the
predicate is violated. Indeed, if a book is substituted for a paper, the sentence sounds
better:

(54)  on v uvelchenii napisal stat'ju

he in enthusiasm wrote [a] paper

'he wrote a paper driven by his enthusiasm'.

It should be noted, however, that even intellectual activities like writing a paper within
this construction are presented as unpremeditated and spontaneous. Thus, one cannot
say:

(55)  * v uvelchenii on napisal stat'ju, kak davno xotel

in enthusiasm he wrote a paper as long wanted

'he wrote a paper driven by his enthusiasm as he had
wanted for a long time'

1.3.2.4. The predicate refers to uncontrollable manifestations of an emotion.

"Spontaneous and unpreplanned" may be not a sufficient description of actions referred to by sentences of the structure $vX-e+on+VP$ [in [a state of] $X+he+VP$]. The predicate in these sentences often refers to socially unacceptable actions like breaking furniture, slamming doors and screaming, which means, it seems, that the $V$ [in/into] construction presents the subject as unable to control his/her actions because of an emotion.

This claim may be supported by the fact that when a modifier like bujnyj [wild] and neuderžimyj [irrepressible], indicating that the emotion was overtly manifested, is inserted in sentences with emotional terms like radost' [joy] and gore [grief], otherwise unacceptable, it makes them sound better. Thus, both

(56) $v$ bujnoj radosti on brosilsja mne na šeju

'in wild joy he threw me on neck

'in wild joy he threw himself on my neck';

and

(57) $v$ neuderžimom gore ona lomala ruki

'in irrepressible grief she wrung [her] hands

are considerably better than the corresponding sentences without the modifiers bujnyj [wild] and neuderžimyj [irrepressible]. This does not mean, however, that the "short-time" constraint (that we relied on in order to explain the unacceptability of the corresponding sentences without the modifiers) is optional or interchangeable with the "uncontrollable manifestation" constraint. In fact, intensity markers like wild and irrepressible are expected to imply a shorter duration of an emotion: wild joy is likely to
last for a shorter time than normal joy.

Similarly, sentences with poryv radosti [a fit/burst of joy] and poryv gorja [a fit/burst of grief] in slot X are quite felicitous:

(58) v poryve radosti on brosilsja mne na šeju
in [a] burst [of] joy he threw me on neck
'in a burst of joy he threw himself on my neck';

(59) v poryve gorja ona lomala ruki

The word poryv [burst/fit] refers, roughly, to a short overt manifestation of a feeling.

In terms of the primitives the "irrepressible manifestation" constraint can be formulated as 'if he wanted not to do this, he could not'.

1.4. Explication.

The causative meaning of the Y [in/into] construction can be explicated as follows.

\[ v \ X-e + \, on + \, VP- \, act \]

\[ [\text{in [a state of] X} + \, \text{he} + \, \text{VP-} \, \text{act}] \]

example: v razdraženiji on stuknul kulakom po stolu [in his irritation he struck the table with his fist] =

(a) a person (Y) felt something (X) for a short time

(b) because of this, Y did something (VP) at some time during this time

(c) Y did it not because he thought before this time: I want to do this

(d) if Y wanted not to do this, he could not

In the explication above, component (a) refers to the fact that a person (Y) was experiencing an emotion (X) for a short time; component (b) means that this emotional state caused the person to do something while experiencing the emotion; (c) refers to the fact that when the person acted, it was not a preplanned action; and, finally, (d) means
that the person could not control his/her actions.

1.5. Negated predicates.

The semantic constraints on emotional terms in slot X and predicates in slot VP are different for the negated variant of the construction (instantiated by sentences where the predicate is a negated verb or a verb incorporating a negation in its lexical meaning). In this section I will briefly outline the differences with the affirmative variant of the V [in/into] construction described above and propose a tentative explication.

First of all, consider the examples:

(60) *v svoem volnenii ona ne zametila čto na nej teper'*

in her excitement she NEG notice that on her now

byl černýj plášč

was black cloak

'in her excitement, she did not notice that she had a black cloak on her now' (Bulgakov);

(61) *Iuda pridumyyal kakju-to lož'*

Iuda was making up some lie

no v volnenii ničego kak sleduet ne obdumal

but in excitement nothing properly NEG thought over

'Iuda was making up a lie but in his excitement did not think it over properly' (Bulgakov);

(62) *on pomolčal nekotoroe vremja v smjatenii*

he was silent some time in confusion

'in his confusion, he kept silence for a while' (Bulgakov);

(63) *ja v somneniax promedlil v Peterburge tri nedeli*
I in hesitation lingered in Petersbourg three weeks (Dostoevsky);

(64) _v smuščenii on ne mog vydavit' iz sebj ni slova_

'in his confusion, he could not squeeze out of himself a single word';

(65) _v svoej bezmernoj gordosti oni ne dopuskajut_

'in their endless pride they do not admit their imperfections' (Dostoevsky).

These examples show that in the negative variant of the _Y [in/into] construction_ constraints on emotional terms are different: in sentence (65) by Dostoevsky the word _gordost' [pride] refers to a long-lasting attitude rather than to a short-time emotional state. What is more, this is not a creative deviation (in which Dostoevsky is so rich), because one can construe sentences of the same kind:

(66) _v svoej beskonečnoj predannosti on ne zamečal_

'in his endless devotion he did not notice that he has been betrayed';

(67) _v toske po domu on ne mog ni na čem_

'he was so homesick that he could not concentrate'.
Furthermore, the predicate does not have to refer to an action: cf., for example, sentence (60). It seems that the predicates in the negative variant of the \textit{Y} construction have the following feature in common: they either overtly include in their structure a reference to the subject's inability to do something (sometimes to see/hear something, cf. sentence (60)) because of an emotion or can be understood in this sense. An emotion is viewed as an obstacle: if it was not for the emotion, the subject would be able to do (see, hear) something. Thus, for example, the words \textit{ne mog} [could not] can be inserted in sentence (61) so that the sense does not seem to be distorted:

(68) \textit{v volnenii Iuda nič ego kak sleduet ne mog obdumati'}

in excitement Iuda nothing properly \textit{NEG} could think over

'\textit{in his excitement, Iuda could not think anything over}'.

Similarly, instead of (65) one can say

(69) \textit{v svoej bezmernoj gordosti oni ne mogut zametit svoi nedostatki}

in their endless pride they \textit{NEG} can notice their imperfections

'\textit{in their endless pride they cannot notice their imperfections}'.

Along these lines, (60) may be interpreted in the sense that Margarita could not notice things because of her excitement; (63) and (64) mean, respectively, that the subject could not find what to say and make a decision to leave.

The "inability" interpretation of the negative variant of the \textit{Y} [in/into] construction can be supported by the following consideration. Russian has another causative construction with the preposition \textit{IZ} [out] and nouns referring to emotions, for example:

(70) \textit{iz uvaženija k dedu on soglasilsja brat'}

out respect GEN to grandfather he agreed to take
The causative IZ [out] construction is used, roughly speaking, when the speaker means that the subject could not do in a particular situation what other people perhaps would do (in the example above - to charge more for a lesson), because of his feelings; otherwise (if the subject did not feel like this), the subject would have done what other people do. It seems natural that there may be a link between situations corresponding to IZ [out], on the one hand, and V [in/into] plus negation, on the other hand, and therefore this fact can be considered as supporting the “inability” understanding of the negative variant of the V [in/into] construction.

To sum up these observations, the negative variant of the V [in/into] construction can be explicated as follows:

\[ V \ X\!-\!e + \ he + \ NEG + \ VP \ [\text{in [a state of]} \ X + \ he + \ VP]; \]

example: on pomolčal nekotoro vremja v smjatenji [in his confusion, he kept silence for a while] =

(a) a person (Y) felt something (X)

(b) because of this Y could not do/see/hear something

(c) if Y did not feel like this, he would have done/seen/heard this

2. The construction of X-a + on + Verbal Phrase [from X + he + Verbal Phrase].

To make the remaining discussion clearer, it is worth pointing out, at the outset, a major contrast between this construction and the construction v \ X\!-\!e + on + VP [in [a state of] X + he + VP]. One can say using the construction with OT [from]:
(71) \textit{vy porjadočno postareli ot gorja}

you fairly got older from grief

'grief made you [looking] much older' (Bulgakov).

However, it is impossible to substitute \textit{ot gorja} [from grief] for \textit{v gore} [in grief] in this sentence:

(72) * \textit{vy porjadočno postareli v gore}

you fairly got older in grief

'you got much older in grief'.

Sentence (72) is impossible because \textit{postaret'} [to get older] is a permanent change which cannot possibly be confined to the time limits of an emotion which has triggered it (grief, in this case). Thus, the construction with \textit{OT} [from], unlike the construction with \textit{V} [in/into] discussed above, allows predicates (VP) referring to events which last longer than the triggering emotion (X).

2.1. Examples.

(73) \textit{vse videli kak plačet ot oskorblennoj gordosti}

all saw how cries from injured pride

ix \textit{korol'}

their king

'everybody saw their king crying from injured pride' (Babel);

(74) \textit{ot radosti vse pomutilos' v golove u Varenuxi}

from joy all turned vague in head to Varenuxa

'everything got confused in Varenuxas' head from joy' (Bulgakov);

(75) \textit{Dvojra sidela rjadom s mal'čikom onernyšim}

Dvojra sat close with boy having become mute
ot toski
from anguish

'Dvojra sat close to a boy who from anguish could not speak' (Babel).

2.2. The spatial prototype.

The spatial idea underlying the time perspective associated with the construction \( \text{ot X-a + on + VP} \) \([\text{from X + he + VP}]\) is the following. When the preposition \( \text{OT} \) \([\text{from}]\), in its spatial sense, precedes a noun referring to a physical object, \( \text{OT} \) \([\text{from}]\) refers to moving away from the object denoted by the noun. When a noun preceded by \( \text{OT} \) \([\text{from}]\) denotes an emotion, the emotion is viewed as a point of departure, or rather, origin of something referred to by the predicate \( \text{VP} \) \(\text{(cf. Radden (1985) on the causative meaning of from in English).}\)

This imagery suggests that what the predicate refers to takes place after the emotion. However, this image is a simplification of the actual facts and may be misleading: in some sentences, for example, (74) and (75) above, the most plausible understanding would be that the emotion and the event referred to by the predicate took place simultaneously.

2.3. Semantic constraints on the construction \( \text{OT X-a + on + VP} \) \([\text{from X + he + VP}]\).

2.3.1. No constraints on the emotional term \((X)\).

The \( \text{OT} \) \([\text{from}]\) construction, unlike the construction with \( \text{V} \) \([\text{in/into}]\), allows nouns referring to long-lasting emotional states. For example, there are two set phrases, both including the word \( \text{ščast’e} \) [happiness] in slot \(X\):

(76) \text{poxororošjet’ ot ščast’ja}
to get prettier from happiness;

(77) poglupet' ot sčas'ja

to get stupid from happiness;

Even the words ljupopytsvo [curiosity] and interes [interest], both referring to "intellectual" emotional attitudes, so to speak, can be used in the OT [from] construction:

(78) Nikolka, vzerošennyj ot interes

Nikolka dishevelled from interest (Bulgakov);

(79) vytaščennyj ot ljubotstva glaz

staring from curiosity eye

'an eye staring with curiosity' (Bulgakov).

2.3.2. Semantic constraints on the predicate (VP).

The predicate in the construction ot X-a + on + VP [from X+ he + VP] most often refers to an event that the subject (on [he]) passively endures (cf. the examples in section 2.1). In some cases, however, the predicate in this construction may refer to a subject's action, for example:

(80) [Skazal kot], žmurjas' ot udomol'stvija

[said cat] closing eyes from pleasure

'the cat said it, closing his eyes from pleasure' (Bulgakov);

(81) ja ot vostorga prygaJU

I from ecstasy/delight jump

'I am jumping from delight' (Vysockij).

The OT [from] construction states the fact that either an event happening to the subject or his/her action has been caused by an emotion. The choice between the two
types of the OT [from] construction (causing an event vs. causing an action) is conditioned by the semantic type of the predicate (VP). Thus, if VP is an action verb, the appropriate understanding is 'he did something (VP) because he felt something'. On the other hand, if VP is not an action verb, the reading is 'something (VP) happened to him because he felt something'. In what follows, I will discuss the "action" type and the "happen" type of the construction separately, because, as it will be shown, the two types have different constraints on VP.

2.3.2.1. The "action" subtype of the OT [from] construction.

2.3.2.1.1. The predicate (VP) refers to an involuntary action.

A predicate in the OT [from] construction can refer either to an event happening to the subject or to a subject's involuntary action. This can be proven by the fact that the words narocno [deliberately] and staralsja [tried] cannot be inserted in the OT [from] construction:

(82) ?ot obidy on staralsja ne zamečat' menja

from offense he tried NEG notice me

'he tried not to notice me because he was offended';

(83) ?ot vozmuščenija on narocno ne govoril so mnoj

from indignation he deliberately NEG speak with me

'he deliberately did not speak with me from indignation'.

As a consequence of the "involuntariness" constraint it is rather odd to say, for example,

(84) ?ot straxa on pozvonil v policiju

from fear he called in police

'out of fear, he called the police';

(85) *ot gneva učitel' nakazal menja
The reason why (80) and (81), but not (84), (85) and (86) are fully felicitous is that one can involuntarily close one's eyes and even jump but not call the police, punish somebody and refuse to come to a party. In terms of the primitives, the "involuntariness" constraint can be phrased as 'he did this (VP) not because he wanted to do it'.

2.3.2.1.2. The predicate (VP) refers to a bodily action.

The "action" subtype of the OT [from] construction is limited to bodily actions. The following examples are characteristic in this respect:

(87) **Margarita vzvizgnula ot vostorga**
Margarita screamed from ecstasy/delight (Bulgakov);

(88) **on potiral ruki ot neterpenija**
he rubbed [his] hands from impatience (Dostoevsky);

(89) **madam Leotar vskriknula ot užasa**
madame Leotar screamed from terror (Dostoevsky);

(90) **ja zarydala ot vostorga**
I sobbed from ecstasy/delight (Dostoevsky);

(91) **Nataša xoxotala ot radosti.**
Nataša laughed from joy (Bulgakov).

One could say that the OT [from] construction presents actions caused by an emotion as something the subject's body does independently of his/her will. Predicates referring to
non-bodily actions cannot occur in slot VP in this construction. For example,

(92)  * ot izumlenija on zadal mnogo voprosov

from astonishment he asked a lot of questions

sounds odd, although asking questions can be involuntary, in a sense. On the other hand, it is hard to think of other involuntary actions than bodily actions and therefore this constraint seems to be logically implied by the previous one.

2.3.2.2. The "happen" subtype of the OT [from] construction.

The predicates (VP) in this subtype of the OT [from] construction are often constituted by verbs referring to bodily symptoms such as getting red or pale, trembling or getting older in appearance etc. However, this is not always the case as is illustrated by the following sentences:

(93)  ot gorja ona vpadala v kakoe-to bessmyslie

from grief she fell in some senselessness

'she lost her sense from grief' (Dostoevsky);

(94)  ja stradala ot etogo novogo cuvstva

I suffered from this new feeling (Dostoevsky);

(95)  Foma, ot izli~nega ~ara, zaraportovalsja

Foma from too much enthusiasm, talked nonsense (Dostoevsky);

(96)  ja kak-to vse ne pro to govorju ot smu~cenija

I somehow all NEG about that speak from confusion (Dostoevsky).

Therefore one has to conclude that when the predicate refers to an event (and not an action), it does not have to be a bodily event.

2.3.2.3. Temporal constraints on the predicate (VP).
Let us now turn to the question of whether there are any restrictions on time associated with the predicate. As we have seen (section 3.2), the predicate in the construction in question refers to an event which can start happening only after an emotion (X) is first felt. However, further development in time of the event (VP) caused by an emotion (X) allows variation. Thus, an event can last for the rest of the subject's life (as in the case of postare' ot gorja [to get older in appearance from grief]).

Sometimes, an event can actually be confined to the time of experiencing the emotion. For example, in the sentence

(97) ruki ee trijaslis' ot neterpenija

hands her trembled from impatience

'her hands trembled from impatience' (Bulgakov)

it would be natural to assume that as soon as the subject stops feeling impatient her hands will stop trembling.

Finally, an event referred to by the predicate in this construction can even be momentary. For example, in the sentence

(98) on vzdrognul ot 1spuga

he started from fright,

the verb vzdrognul [started] belongs to a group of the so-called momentary verbs and has the suffix -nu- characteristic of these verbs.

The temporal invariant in all of these cases is that an event (VP) happened to the subject, or that he/she did something after he started to experience an emotion (X). In terms of primitives this sequence corresponds to two components: 'before some time he did not feel X' and 'after this time something happened to him/he did something'.

It should be noted that the idea of continuity of the event referred to by VP (suggested by the spatial sense of OT [from]) seems to influence the aspeccual form of predicates.
Thus, in most cases predicates in the QI [from] construction are constituted by imperfective verbs or inchoative perfective verbs (cf. Paduicheva 1993).

2.4. Explication.

To sum up, the meaning of the QI [from] construction can be explicated as follows.

A. \text{ot X-a + on + VP- non-act [from X + he + VP- non-act];}

example: \text{Myšlaevskij poburel ot obidy [Myšlaevskij got brown from hurt/offense].}

(a) a person (Y) felt something (X)

(b) before some time, Y did not feel this

(c) after this time, something (VP) happened to Y

(d) this happened because Y felt something

(e) it did not happen because he wanted it to happen

In this explication, component (a) refers to the fact that the subject (Y) was experiencing an emotion (X); (b) and (c) mean that something happened to the subject after he started to feel the emotion; (e) means this event happened independently of the person's will.

B. \text{ot X-a + on + VP- act [from X + he + VP- act];}

example: \text{on rassmejalsja ot sčas'ja [he laughed from happiness] =}

(a) a person (Y) felt something (X)

(b) before some time, Y did not feel this

(c) after this time, Y was doing something (VP) with his body

(d) Y was doing this not because he wanted to do it

(e) Y was doing it because he felt something (X)

The component (c) in the explication above refers to the fact that the subject of a sentence (Y) was performing a bodily action after he/she started to feel an emotion.
(referred to by components (a) and (b)); (d) and (e) mean that this action was caused not by the subject's will but by an emotion (X).

3. Conclusion.

The constructions \( \text{v}_X \cdot \text{e} + \text{on} + \text{VP} \) [in [a state of] \( X + \text{he} + \text{VP} \)] and \( \text{qt}_X \cdot \text{a} + \text{on} + \text{VP} \) [from \( X + \text{he} + \text{VP} \)] differ, as we have seen, in temporal frames associated with each of them and in the content of the verbal phrase (VP).

The \( \text{v} \) [in/into] construction implies that VP denotes a spontaneous action performed by the subject while experiencing an emotion (X), "within" its time limits. The \( \text{QT} \) [from] construction implies that VP is an event or a process rather than an intentional action which happened after ("from") the time an emotion (X) was first felt by the subject.

Both constructions display a kind of semantic agreement between the time perspective (determined by the spatial image) and aspect of verbs in the predicate's slot (VP). Thus, although momentary verbs are possible in the \( \text{QT} \) [from] construction, in most cases predicates in this construction are constituted by an imperfective verb or a perfective verb with an inchoative meaning. By contrast, predicates in \( \text{v} \) [in/into] sentences most often consist of perfective verbs referring to an action viewed as a single completed whole (which does not have long-lasting results or consequences).

In a sense, even the difference in the content of predicates (action vs. event) which can occur in slot VP in the two constructions is connected with the underlying spatial images (see Dirven (1993) for similar views in connection with the causative use of prepositions in English). Thus, if the duration of something caused by an emotion is confined to the time limits of the emotion, then this is likely to be an action deliberately performed by the person (because as soon as the emotion stops, there is no will for the action). On the other hand, if something caused by an emotion may last longer than the
emotion itself, it does not have to be a subject's deliberate action and therefore it is an event or a process.

This chapter focuses on the concept of some verb involving the idea of 'giving' and 'receiving'. The purely situational and consequently temporary nature of generalizations corresponding to these words is crucial for their semantic: a piece of jewellery, for example, can be categorized as a present or a gift depending on the situation; it is involved in similarly because can be categorized as a present as well as a token in different situations. Nouns of this kind refer not only to a particular situation, but also to the speaker's point of view on the situation. For example, by denoting something as a gift, one is assuming the following point of view: it was given purposefully to achieve someone's goal and the person who gave and received it considered it as illegal, but the gift thing (like a piece of jewellery, a blanket) can be involved in many different situations, 'emotional generalizations'. The things can change many different kinds of things, more 'decontextualized' than hypocorisms like 'little' and 'baby'.

Nouns including the idea of 'giving' and 'receiving', such as gift, present, presents, make up a large and interesting variety of the 'emotional generalizations'. Almost all material things can be given and got, and may be personified in different ways, depending on the particular kind of present and giving.

This chapter aims at supporting the classification of some personification of the system of Russian nouns referring to transfers in the conative aspect. In order to make the arguments in phase, I will describe the meanings of basic verbs of giving and the meanings of the corresponding personalizations such as dachnye for charity, benefactions.

A paper by Dixon (1970) investigates the semantics of English verbs of 'giving' such as donate, present, present, give, gift, hand over by individuals with their own approach.
Chapter V.

The semantics of nouns referring to transfer.

0. Introduction.

This chapter focuses on the semantics of some words including the ideas of 'giving' and 'getting'. The purely situational and consequently temporary nature of generalizations corresponding to these words is crucial for their semantics: a piece of jewellery, for example, can be categorized as a present or a bribe depending on the situation it is involved in; similarly, biscuits can be categorized as a dessert as well as a snack in different situations. Nouns of this kind refer not only to a particular situation, but also to the speaker's point of view on the situation. For example, by denoting something as a bribe, one is assuming the following point of view: it was given purposefully to achieve someone's goal and the persons who gave and accepted it committed an illegal act. As one thing (like a piece of jewellery or a biscuit) can be involved in many different situations, "situational generalizations" like present can denote many different kinds of things, more "divergent" than hyperonyms like flower and bird.

Nouns including the ideas of 'giving' and 'getting', such as gift, reward, bribe, donation make up a large and interesting variety of the "situational generalizations". Almost all material things can be given and got, and may be conceptualized in different ways, depending on the particular kind of 'giving' and 'getting'.

This chapter aims at supporting the discussion of some peculiarities of the syntax of Russian nouns referring to transfer in the next chapter. In order to make the argument in chapter six clearer, I will describe the meanings of some verbs of giving and the meanings of the corresponding nominalizations (such as donation for donate) in Russian.

A paper by Dixon (1970) investigates the semantics of English verbs of 'giving' (such as donate, present, award, pay, lend and sell) in connection with their syntax. Two
distinct senses of 'give' are postulated. 'Give 1' in return for some service or object (to which pay and sell are hyponyms) and 'give 2' referring to 'spontaneous giving' (Dixon 1970: 211). Pay "is semantically defined as 'give 1' with the direct object specified as a sum of money (or institutionalised money equivalent)". Lend is defined as 'give' plus specification of limited duration and rent is defined as 'give 1', for a limited period, for money. As for the verbs present, donate and award, the author's conclusion is that "definitions of these verbs must refer to extralinguistic, cultural phenomena; the exact form which such definitions should take is unclear." And further: " donate, award and present are each defined as 'give 2' plus some as yet not fully understood semantically-cultural specification." (op. cit: 219).

In this chapter I will discuss the meanings of the Russian equivalents of the words present, gift, reward, award, sop and purchase and provide some definitions. However, all definitions are considerably simplified so that they focus on matters relevant for explanation of syntactic behaviour of the words discussed in the next chapter (the ability of some of them to be used after V [in/into] and the inability of the others).

As all words discussed refer to a particular situation of giving and getting, involving a set of "situation members", or actants, such as persons who are giving and receiving something, what is given and what for, words referring to "situational generalizations" will be defined as included in a sentence. When a noun to be defined is derived from a verb, which is very close in meaning to the noun (for example, nagrada [reward (n)] - nagradit' [reward (v)]), the verb will be defined first and then the corresponding noun. However, nouns derived from verbs can change considerably the initial verbal meaning (for example, the noun present is semantically rather far from the verb present; in Russian from the same verb darit' [give] are derived two different nouns: podarok and dar). In these cases nouns are described separately from the corresponding verbs.
Two non-primitive meanings will be used in the definitions: ‘give’ and ‘belong’. According to Bendix (1966), ‘give’ means ‘cause to have’. However, it seems that this definition does not reduce the meaning of ‘give’ to simpler components. Since both ‘give’ and ‘have’ are semantically very complex, for the reasons of simplicity of definitions they will be treated as semantic wholes.

1. Podarok [present] vs. dar [gift].

1.1. Podarok: examples.

(1) *Semen Antonovič rešil zakatit’ grandioznyj*

*Semen Antonovič decided organize INF enormous festival with distribution presents GEN.*

'Semen Antonovič decided to organize an enormous festival for the distribution of presents' (P'ecukh);

(2) *Mama ob'javila, čto skopila 200 rublej kotorye mne i darit s sovetom s'ezdit' za granicu*

'Mother announced that she had saved 200 roubles' which she gave me advising me to spend them for going abroad'.

*Ne izobrazit' ni radosti, ni polnoj neozidannosti podarka*

'one cannot describe my happiness nor the full unexpectedness of the present' (Pasternak).

(3) *Berlin pokazalsja mne gorodom podrostkov.*
Berlin seemed to me to be a town of teenagers

who yesterday had got walking sticks as presents' (Pasternak);

(4) *Tjaželaja golova. - šepnula ona.*

'Heavy head - she whispered'

*i vyšla iz komnaty. unosja neudačnyj svoj podarok*

'and walked out of the room taking her unsuccessful present' (Nabokov).

1.2. Dar: examples.

(5) *Ne prazdnik, ne priemnyj dar*

NEG festival NEG welcome gift

*ona gotovila požar neterpelivomu geroju...*

she prepared fire impatient DAT hero DAT

'It wasn't the festival or the welcome gift that she [Moscow] had prepared for the impatient hero.

She had prepared fire.' (Pushkin);

(6) *Volxvy ne bojatsja mogućix vladyk,*

'The magi are not afraid of powerful sovereigns',

*a knjažeskij dar im ne nužen.*

and prince ADJ gift them DAT NEG need

'and they do not need princes' gifts'(Pushkin);

(7) *Tri dni, tri noći s kunakami/ Ego on xočet ugoščat'*

'He wants to honour him three days and three nights'

*I posle čestno provožat'*
and then honestly let go

S blagosloven'em i darami

with blessings and gifts

'and then bless him and let him go with gifts' (Pushkin).

1.3. Podarok vs. dar: discussion.

A distinction similar to that between the words gift and present, but not quite the same, can be drawn between Russian words podarok and dar. In modern usage the word dar [gift] is used mainly to describe a rather formal situation, when something is given to an institution (a museum, school, library etc.) or, more rarely, when something is given to somebody by an institution or a person of high status (like a queen, for example). In other words, either one or both actants of the word dar in the modern usage should be institutions, authorities or people of high official status. Unlike gift, dar cannot be used to refer to informal interpersonal relations. Therefore, something referred to as a dar is not necessarily aimed to be pleasant (it is hardly possible that something can be pleasant to an institution).

A podarok is something meant to give pleasure. Thus, in sentence (4) a podarok is called "neudačnyj" [unsuccessful] because it did not give pleasure to the person to whom it was given. By contrast, one cannot say *neudačnyj [unsuccessful] dar.

Dar, similarly to English gift, is thought of as something good to have, valuable, which makes it possible to use dar figuratively in the sense of "talent" or "ability", for example:

(8) Umenie vlezať v čužnu škuru - grustnyj dar, kotorym nagraždaet čeloveka žizn'.'

'The ability to imagine oneself being somebody else is a sad gift that one is given by life' (I.Greko).


In accordance with its conceptualization as 'something good to have' and unlike gift, the Russian dar cannot be described as useless: one cannot say *bespoleznyi dar [useless gift] even though it is actually useless. In fact, something which is thought of as useless would not be referred to as a dar. By contrast, one can say bespoleznyi podarok [useless present].

Finally, it is important that the purpose of giving a podarok sometimes is not just to give a particular thing but rather to show one's warm feelings to the receiver (especially on occasions like birthdays when one is expected to give presents). In this sense, giving a podarok may have a purpose other than a simple property transfer, namely, to fill a particular transfer frame with something given as a podarok (see chapter 6 for more detail).

1.4. Podarok vs. dar: definitions.

To summarize, the following definitions are proposed:

podarok X-a Y-y
present X GEN Y DAT =
(a) something given to Y by X
(b) because X wanted:
   (b1) this thing belongs to Y
   (b2) Y feels something good because of it
(c) X did this because X feels good things to Y and wants Y to know it

In the definition of podarok components (a) and (b1) refer to the fact that giving a podarok is a volitional property transfer; (b2) accounts for the fact that presents are intended to be pleasant for the receiver; (c) means that a podarok is a possible means to show one's good feelings to the receiver.
dar X-a Y-y

gift X GEN Y DAT

(a) something given to Y by X
(b) because X wanted: this thing belongs to Y
(c) people can think something like this:

   it is good for Y to have it

In the definition of dar components (a) and (b) refer to a volitional property transfer; (c) means that a thing referred to as a dar is conceived of as something valuable. The fact that either one or both actants can be institutions, for reasons of simplicity, is not accounted for.

2. Nagrada [reward/award] vs. voznagraždenie [reward].

2.1. Nagrada: examples.

(9) Nikakoj nagrady za vse ee uslugi na balu nikto

   None reward for all her services on ball nobody

   po-vidimomu, ej ne sobiralsja predlagat'.

   apparently her NEG was going offer INF

   'It seemed that nobody was going to propose a reward for

   all that she had done during the ball' (Bulgakov);

(10) U drugix mužčin ejo okruženija dosug byl

   to other GEN men GEN her circle leisure was

   rasskazyvat' o svoix zaslugax, nagradax

   tell INF about their achievements rewards

   'The other men of her circle spent their leisure hours
talking about their achievements and rewards.' (Solzhenicyn)

(11) Nagrady designate authority NOM
talking about their achievements and rewards.' (Solzhenicyn)

Rewards are designated by the authorities' (Pasternak);

(12) Tak esli gostsom emu ja ugožu, byt' možet.
So if voice INSTR him DAT I please be may

tem sebe nagradu zaslužu
this INSTR self reward ACC deserve FUT

'If he likes my voice maybe I will deserve a reward' (Krylov).

2.2. Voznagrazdenie: examples.

(13) Za knigu mističeskim sposobom uničtožennuju
for book mysterious INSTR way INSTR destroyed

ja polučil 100 % avtorskogo voznagrazdenija
I got 100% author ADJ reward.

'I got the 100% reward for the book which has been
mysteriously destroyed.' (Dovlatov);

(14) Počka ego. Ja otdaju emu v voznagrazdenie.
stack his. I give him in reward ACC.

'This money is his. I give it as a reward to him.' (Dostoevsky).

2.3. Nagrada vs. voznagrazdenie: discussion.

The differences between the two words are partly analogous to those between the
words award and reward, but not the same. The word voznagrazdenie can be used only
to denote something valuable, like a sum of money, unlike nagrada, which can refer to
things of symbolic value (such as a medal) and even a situation (for example, the possibility to travel somewhere). Further, the word voznagraždenie cannot denote something given for a socially recognized achievement: it would be odd to say

(15) *voznagraždenie za učastie v konkurse

voznagraždenie for taking part in [a] competition;

(16) *voznagraždenie za lučšij proekt

voznagraždenie for [the] best project;

(17) *voznagraždenie za pobedu v sorevnovanii

voznagraždenie for [the] victory in [a] competition.

In the phrases above and in all cases where the speaker refers to something given for a socially recognized achievement the word nagrada has to be used.

Voznagraždenie, unlike nagrada, does not imply that it is given for something good: it is possible to say, for example,

(18) voznagraždenie za ubijstvo

voznagraždenie for [a] murder

but nagrada is hardly acceptable in this context:

(19) ? nagrada za ubijstvo

nagrada for [a] murder.

Consequently, only a nagrada but not a voznagraždenie can be used, so to speak, as a sign of social approval and recognition. A voznagraždenie, by contrast, is a means not to show approval but to pay for something which was good for the giver.

The word nagrada implies a higher social status of the person who is giving a nagrada.

Thus, it's impossible to say

(20) *nagrada direktoru ot služaščix

nagrada director DAT from employees GEN
'a reward given by the employees to their director',

but the reverse is quite normal; one can say:

(21) nagrada služaščim of direktora

nagrada employees DAT from director GEN

'a reward given by a director to his employees'.

Finally, it may be worth mentioning that neither voznagráždение nor nagrada can denote something given to somebody who can do something good in the future; the Russian word poooščenie shares this idea of "encouragement to do good things in the future" with the word award.

2.4. Nagrada vs. voznagráždение: definitions.

Let us first define the verbs nagraždat' and voznagráždat' that nagrada and voznagráždение are derived from.

X nagradil Y-a W-om za Z

X NOM rewarded Y ACC W INSTR for Z ACC

(a) X gave something (W) to Y
(b) because before that time Y did something (Z)
(c) X thought: Z is good
(d) X could do things for Y that Y could not do for X
(e) X wanted: Y knows that X thought Z was good
(f) X thought: Y could feel something good because of W

X voznagradil Y-a W-om za Z

X NOM rewarded Y ACC W INSTR for Z ACC

(a) X gave something (W) to Y
(b) because before that time Y did something (Z)

(c) Z was good for X

(d) people can think that it is good for anyone to have Z

In each of the two definitions above component (a) means that each verb is a verb of giving; component (b) refers to the fact that each verb denotes giving something to a person for something this person has done. Further, component (c) in the definition of nagradil means that this verb includes the idea that the receiver has done something which, in the opinion of the giver, is generally good; by contrast, component (c) in the definition of voznagradil means that the verb may be used when the receiver's action is good only for the giver. Component (d) in the definition of voznagradil refers to the fact that one can to voznagradit' [to reward/award] only with a thing which has a commonly accepted value; by contrast, it is possible nagradit' with something of only symbolic value (such as a certificate of merit etc.). Finally, component (d) in the definition of nagradil means that the giver has to have a higher social status than the receiver (not necessary for voznagradil); components (e) and (f) in the definition of nagradil mean that the purpose of the action referred to by the verb nagradil is not only to transfer a particular thing but also to show one's approval and, presumably, by this to make the receiver feel good.

Accordingly, the nouns nagrada and voznagraždenie can be defined as follows:

nagrada X-a Y-y za Z

(a) something (W) given to Y by X

(b) because before that time Y did something (Z)
(c) X thought: Z is good

(d) X could do things for Y that Y could not do for X

(e) X wanted: Y knows that X thought Z was good

(f) X thought: Y could feel something good because of W

voznagrazdenie X-a _Y-y_ za Z

reward X GEN Y DAT for Z

(a) something (W) given to Y by X

(b) because before that time Y did something (Z)

(c) Z was good for X

(d) people can think that it is good for anyone to have W

3. Podacka [sop].

3.1. Podacka: examples.

(22) Sobaka kljančila podacki.

dog asked sops ACC

'the dog was asking for sops' (Dovlatov);

(23) Inogda on pod antidit k general’še i celuet ejo ruki

'sometimes he approaches the general’s wife and kisses her hands'

So stola emu dajut podacku.

from table him give sop ACC

'they give him a sop from the table'. (Dostoevsky).

3.2. Podacka: discussion.

The following features seem to be crucial for the meaning of the word podacka. First, it
is something small and insignificant, not really valuable from the speaker's point of view. Second, it is always given by somebody who has a higher social status than the person to whom it is given. The person who is giving a podačka can decide whether to give it or not to the receiver. Third, a podačka is not thought of as something deserved, that has fairly to be given to a person; for example, money paid for work, however small it is, can hardly be called a podačka. Finally, a podačka is thought of as something given to a person in need, often in response to this person's urgent request and, therefore, humiliating for the receiver.

3.3. Podačka: definition.

\[\text{podačka } \text{X-a Y-y} \]

\[\text{sop X GEN Y DAT} \]

(a) something given to Y by X

(b) this thing is small

(c) X can do things for Y that Y cannot do for X

(d) if X did not want to give it X would not give it to Y

(e) if X did not give this thing to Y something bad could happen to Y

(f) people can think: Y feels something bad because X gave this thing to Y

4. Pokupka [purchase].

Another interesting situation of getting and giving is connected with buying something.

4.1. Pokupka: examples.

(24) Vsjakuju pokupku vam prinesut na dom.

every purchase ACC you DAT bring on home
'every purchase will be delivered home.' (Goncharov: BAS);

(25) Vdova, pridja s bazara razložila pokupki na stole.

The widow came back home from the market and put her purchases on the table' (Gor’kij: BAS).

4.2. Pokupka: discussion.

Dictionaries usually define the word pokupka as 'something which has been bought'. However, although most things around us were once bought, not all of them can be referred to as pokupki [purchases] recently. For example, a dress that was bought two years ago is by no means a pokupka two years later, and neither is an exercise book bought several weeks ago and since then filled with exercises a pokupka. At the same time, a country house bought several years ago can still be recognized as a pokupka. It seems plausible that something remains pokupka until it ceases to be recognized as 'new', 'just bought'. Naturally, for different things this period varies.

4.3. Pokupka: definition.

pokupka X-a

purchase X GEN

something bought by X

The semantically complex verb sell is defined by (Dixon 1970) as 'give 1 for money' and buy as its converse. It means that the semantics of buy includes the idea of the 'transfer of ownership'. It seems also important that this transfer should be social, that is, recognized by other people. In terms of semantic primitives and the meanings 'give' and 'belong' buy can be defined as follows:

X bought Z from Y:
before now Z belonged to Y
X wanted: Z belongs to me
people can think something like this:

\[ X \text{ bought it not a long time ago} \]

The possible construction is referring to transfer.

0. Introduction.

Words referring to different alternatives of 'giving' (such as: transmit, present, transfer, [reward/award], promulgate, [merit/punishment]) can be used in the following construction with the preposition \( \text{to} \) [version]

\[ \text{N NOM \quad \text{to} \quad M \quad \text{NOM} \quad \text{Y ACC} \quad X \quad \text{SO ACC}} \]

\[ \text{N received \quad Y as \quad an \quad X \quad from \quad M} \]

For example:

\[ (1) \text{drumka, \quad polinika, or \quad relisina:} \]

\[ \text{the girl NOM \quad received from parents GUN doll ACC in present ACC} \]

\[ \text{the girl received a doll as a present from her parents} \]

In this construction, \( \text{N} \) and \( \text{M} \) denote persons or groups of people and \( \text{Y} \) is an object transferred from \( \text{M} \) to \( \text{N} \). Nouns which are able to occur in slot \( \text{X} \) in the construction polinika \( Y \quad \text{to} \quad X \) (to receive \( Y \) in \( X \), i.e., to \( X \), to the man) refer to material things which have been transferred. On the other hand, these nouns are derived from verbs referring to different kinds of giving and therefore they also refer to a particular situation of giving, such as those corresponding to pension (pension, subsistence, allowance) and dole (dole).

The preposition \( \text{to} \) [version] is used in the construction above to a basic different from its spatial sense. I will try to answer the following question: how is the use of \( \text{Y} \) [version] analogous with the spatial sense of \( \text{X} \) [version]? In other words, the situation in the construction of a spatial relation attempted in some of the previous:

\[ \text{X gave something to Y} \]
\[ \text{Y gave Z to X} \]

because of this people think now:

\[ \text{Z belongs to X} \]
Chapter VI.

The preposition V [in/into] with nouns referring to transfer.

0. Introduction.

Words referring to different situations of 'giving' (such as podarok [present], nagrada [reward/award], pouščenje [encouragement]) can be used in the following construction with the preposition V [in/into]:

\[ N \text{ polučil } \textit{ot M-a } Y \text{ v } X \]

\( N \text{ NOM } \text{received } \text{from } M \text{ GEN } Y \text{ ACC in } X \text{ SG ACC} \)

'N received Y as an X from M'.

For example:

(1) devočka polučila ot roditelej kuklu v podarok

'girl NOM received from parents GEN doll ACC in present ACC'

'the girl received a doll as a present from her parents'.

In this construction, N and M denote persons or groups of people and Y is an object transferred from M to N. Nouns which are able to occur in slot X in the construction polučit' Y v X [to receive Y in X, i.e. as an X], on the one hand, refer to material things which have been transferred. On the other hand, these nouns are derived from verbs referring to different kinds of giving and therefore they also refer to a particular situation of giving, such as those corresponding to podarok [gift], nasledstvo [inheritance] and dolg [loan].

The preposition V [in/into] is used in the construction above in a sense different from its spatial sense. I will try to answer the following question: how is the use of V [in/into] in this construction connected with the spatial sense of V [in/into]? In other words, this chapter investigates the projection of a spatial relation examined in some of the previous chapters - " moving an object into a container" - into the domain of different transfer
situations.

Many authors believe that spatial relations underlie some possessive and existential constructions (Clark 1978) and verbs of buying and selling in particular (Gruber 1976; Jackendoff 1983). For example, Clark argues that the possessor in the possessive constructions "Tom has a book" and "The book is Tom's" is "simply an animate place" (1978:89). To support this view, different kinds of data are used. For example, in English a locative existential sentence like

There is a book on the table

can be transformed into

The table has a book on it

which "seems to be closely allied to possessive constructions in English." (op. cit.:109).

Many languages use a locative marker of some sort (such as case endings, prepositions and postpositions) to indicate the possessor in possessive constructions. Outside these constructions, the locative markers are normally used only with locative nominals. Thus, Clark concludes that "the evidence from these languages suggest that in many instances the possessor in possessive constructions is treated explicitly as a locative nominal." (op. cit.: 116).

According to Gruber (1976), the verbs give and obtain, sell and buy, loan and borrow, lease, all express "abstract motion". Gruber also observes that the prepositions from and to both refer to transition in physical space from one place to another as well as to possessional transition, for example,

John obtained a book from Mary;

John gave a book to Bill. (Gruber 1976: 38).

Some verbs of ownership, such as have and belong, can be described as both possessional and positional, but not all of them. For example, own is only possessional,
which is why a question-answer pair like

*Where is the book? John owns it.

is impossible. By contrast,

Where is the book? John has it.

is normal, which means that have has a locative basis and is both possessional and positional. (Gruber 1976: 59). Considering prepositional expressions of possession, Gruber mentions that in most cases the preposition is associated with the possessor, but "there are some little used expressions of transition of possession in which the preposition is associated with the possessed object." These are, for instance,

John came into money;

John came into possession of the cattle;

John ran out of books;

John is in the money. (op. cit.: 56).

According to Jackendoff (1983:192), the semantic structure of a sentence like Beth lost the doll can be described as an event (losing the doll) which starts/goes from Beth (the possessor) and proceeds via some unspecified path to some unspecified goal. Similarly, Amy gave the doll to Beth involves a causative event (transfer of the doll) in which Amy causes the doll to go from her (the possessor) and proceed via an unspecified path to Beth (the goal and ultimate possessor).

Langacker (1990: 227) expresses similar views describing the verbs give and receive as referring to a motion (physical or abstract) from one sphere of control to another, involving a mixture of physical, perceptual and emotive components. However, he goes even further, hypothesizing that possession and part-whole relation are, in fact, the same: "the linguistic category of possession has an abstract basis .... with respect to which ownership, part/whole and kinship relations constitute special, prototypical cases. What
all possessives share ... is that one entity (the "possessor") is used as a reference point (R) for purposes of establishing mental contact with another, the target (T). ...People are far more likely to be known individually than their possessions and are thus more readily construed as reference points than as targets (the beggar has a cup; ?? the cup has a beggar). Similarly, a part is characterized in relation to a larger whole which usually has greater cognitive salience and is quite naturally chosen as a reference part (the woman has long legs; ?? the long legs have a woman)." (Langacker 1990: 338).

As we have seen, the description of ownership transfer in terms of motion has a rather long history. It was also observed that considering the process of transfer of ownership as a motion of an object in space does not exhaust the spatial basis underlying different situations of transfer (such as giving, donating, rewarding, borrowing etc.). That is, if transfer is viewed by language as moving an object from one place to another, then it seems clear why the state of the possessed object before and/or after the movement is also viewed (conceptualized) as a change of position in space (cf. Clark's and Gruber's work cited above). Gruber also mentions that the state of the possessor before and after the transfer is sometimes presented as a change of position in space.

I will show in this chapter that transfer of an object which falls into the scope of a particular socially recognized transfer frame (such as gift, reward etc.) in some cases is presented in Russian as filling a container with something. Such a view is associated with the use of the construction polučit' Y v X [to receive Y in (as an) X]. In what follows my task will be to answer the question under which conditions this construction can be used.

Section 1 contains some preliminary observations on the meaning and use of the construction in question; section 2 describes the semantic constraints on X in the construction polučit' Y v X [to receive Y in X (as an X)]; section 3 illustrates the constraints discussed in the previous section by means of some negative material; section
4 sums up the semantic constraints revealed in an explication. Section 5 treats the question why nouns like podarok [present] and nagrada [reward] cannot be used after Y [in/into] in the locative case.

Two technical points should be made about the construction that I will examine. First, this construction is converse, on the semantic level, to those including the verb dat' [give]: N receives Y from M when M gives Y to N. However, on the surface level, some nouns referring to transfer (for example, the words dar [gift] and podarok [present]), being morphologically derived from dat', cannot be combined with it: one cannot say

(2) *roditeli dali rebenku kuklu v podarok

parents NOM gave child DAT doll ACC in present ACC

'the parents gave the child a doll as a present'.

Nouns referring to indirectly transferred things, such as nasledstvo [inheritance], being compatible with polučit' [receive], cannot be used with dat' either. Therefore, for reasons of uniformity, I will consider the construction with polučit' [receive], compatible with all the words of the class in question.

The second point concerns the form of the examples cited. Most of the examples will include just the infinitive of the verb polučit' [receive], a noun referring to the given object (Y) and a noun that occupies slot X (and no indication of the giver M and the receiver N), because the discussion will focus on the interaction between the given object and its role in a particular frame of transfer.

1. Preliminary observations on the construction polučit' Y v X [to receive Y in (as an) X].

This section contains some preliminary observations on the semantics of the nouns
which can occur in slot X in the construction \textit{polučit' Y v X}. Nouns referring to things given as presents and rewards, borrowed and inherited can be used in this construction:

(3) \textit{polučit' orden v nagradu;}

receive INF order SG ACC in reward SG ACC

'to be rewarded with an order';

(4) \textit{polučit' cvety v podarok}

receive INF flower PL ACC in present SG ACC

'to receive flowers as a present';

(5) \textit{polučit' dom v pridanoe}

receive INF house SG ACC in dowry ACC

'to receive a house as dowry';

(6) \textit{polučit' kartinu v dar (ot kogo-to)}

receive INF picture ACC in gift ACC (from somebody)

'to receive a picture as a gift (from somebody)';

(7) \textit{polučit' dom v nasledstvo}

receive INF house ACC in inheritance ACC

'to inherit a house from somebody';

(8) \textit{polučit' den'gi v voznagraždenie}

receive money ACC in reward ACC

'to get money in reward for something';

(9) \textit{polučit' den'gi v dolg (u kogo-to)}

receive INF money ACC in loan ACC (from somebody)

'to get money as a loan (from somebody)';

(10) \textit{polučit' zemlju v arendu}

to receive INF land ACC in rent ACC
'to rent the land' ;

(11) polučit' den'gi v kredit
receive INF money ACC in credit ACC
'to get a money loan'.

However, borrowed words referring to things which were given in reward or borrowed often are unable to be used in this construction. Thus, one cannot say

(12) *polučit' tysjaču v premiju
receive INF thousand ACC in bonus ACC
'to receive a thousand roubles as a bonus';

(13) *polučit' televizor v priz
receive INF TV-set ACC in prize ACC
'to receive TV-set as a prize'
(cf. sentence (3) above with the word nagrada [reward], the superordinate of premija [premium] and priz [prize] that can be used in the construction polučit' Y v X [to receive Y in X (as an X)]).

Similarly, it is odd to say

(14) *polučit' knigu v suvenir
receive INF book ACC in souvenir ACC
'to receive a book as a souvenir',

whereas the word pamjat' [memory] can be used in the construction discussed; nor can one say

(15) *polučit' cvety v prezent
receive INF flowers ACC in present ACC
'to receive flowers as a present',

although the word podarok [present] which is a native close synonym of the borrowed
prezent can be used in the construction in question too. Apart from the formal constraint on borrowed words, there are several semantic constraints on nouns which can occupy slot X in the construction polućit' Y v X [to receive Y in (as an) X]. These constraints are examined in section 2.

2. Semantic constraints on X.

2.1. The first constraint.

2.1.1. The first constraint hypothesis: something (Y) is given in order to activate a particular transfer frame.

In what follows I will speak of different "frames" of giving and transfer. The notion of "frame", introduced by Minsky (1975), is often illustrated by means of the concept of a restaurant. Thus, knowing what a restaurant is means that the person has some information concerning the sequence of actions expected from a customer: when you come to a restaurant you have to take a table; then order food from a waiter; then eat it; then pay the bill; after that you may go (more details can be added, naturally). Someone who would not know that, would not know what a restaurant is.

"Frames" can have "slots" in their structure, that is, variables which can take different values. For example, the role of waiter in the restaurant's frame can be performed by different people, of course, but it does not change the frame itself. Similarly, food can be different, but the frame remains the same. Moreover, clearly one can think of "activating" the frame of restaurant - dining out- without even thinking of who would be the waiter.

Different situations of giving and transfer, like many others, can be viewed and structured in a similar way. For example, the concept of award implies the following sequence of events: someone achieved some good result or promises such an achievement; for that, somebody of a higher status gives this person something; it is
believed that it can help the recipient to achieve more good things in future. In this case, too, the roles of recipient and the person awarding him/her can be performed by different people, as well as very different things being awarded. Nevertheless, the general "frame" of award remains the same.

People possess some informal knowledge of different everyday frames, in particular, frames of transfer. Presumably, people know the succession of events corresponding to frames because, first, they frequently occur in their lives and, second and most important, because there are words naming these frames. (In fact, frames are just another attempt to represent our lexical knowledge).

It seems plausible that in some situations of transfer the corresponding frame plays the major role, whereas material objects which actually fill in the "slots" of this frame are not that important (as one can wish to go to a restaurant without thinking about who the waiter would be). It seems also possible that for some frames one can first think of the frame that has to be "activated", so to speak, and only then of what to fill its slots with. Only nouns referring to this kind of transfer frame can occur in slot X in the construction polučit' Y v X [to receive Y in (as an) X]. This hypothesis is investigated in detail below.

Consider the following data that need to be explained. The nouns pokupka [purchase], naxodka [find], dobyča [loot] cannot occur in slot X in the construction polučit' Y v X [to receive Y in (as an) X]:

(16) *polučit' kol'co v pokupku  
receive INF ring ACC in purchase ACC  
'to receive a ring as a purchase';

(17) *polučit' kol'co v naxodku  
receive INF ring ACC in find ACC
'to receive a ring as a find';

(18) *polučit' kol'co v dobyču
receive INF ring ACC in loot ACC

'to receive a ring as loot'.

The words podačka, vzjatka [bribe], milostynja [alms], požertvovanje [donation], all referring to something given by one person to another, cannot be used in the construction polučit' Y v X either:

(19) *polučit' rubl' v podačku
receive INF rouble ACC in sop ACC

'to receive a rouble as a sop';

(20) *polučit' rubl' v vzjatku
receive INF rouble ACC in bribe ACC

'to receive a rouble as a bribe';

(21) *polučit' rubl' v milostynju;
receive INF rouble ACC in alms ACC

'to receive a rouble as alms';

(22) *polučit' rubl' v požertvovanje
receive INF rouble ACC in donation ACC

'to receive a rouble as a donation'.

The same applies to the words peredača [things sent to somebody who is away from home] and posylka [parcel], also referring to things transferred:

(23) *polučit' pečen'e v peredaču;
to receive biscuits ACC in things sent to somebody who is away from home ACC

'to receive biscuits as things sent to somebody who is away from home';

(24) *polučit' knigu v posylku
to receive book ACC in parcel ACC

'to receive a book in a parcel'.

The reason why the words pokupka [purchase], dobyća [loot], podačka [sop], milostynja [alms], požertvovanie [donation], peredača [things sent to somebody who is away from home] and posylka [parcel] cannot occupy slot X in the construction polučit' Y v X [to receive Y in X (as an X)] lies in the structure of situations corresponding to these nouns.

It is important that there are some socially recognized transfer situations, such as rewarding or making presents, which occur frequently and can be planned beforehand. What happens when such a transfer is planned? Presumably, when the giver plans to reward somebody or to make a present, the main thing for him/her is to give something that will be considered as a reward or a present. What exactly this thing is in the case of rewards and presents is less important. To put it in a different way, some things (such as rewards) are given not because the giver wants to give something specific, but in order to activate a transfer frame which is familiar to the receiver. Hypothetically, only nouns referring to transfer situations of this kind can occur in slot X in the construction polučit' Y v X [to receive Y in (as an) X].

This hypothesis makes clear why the words pokupka [purchase], peredača [things sent to somebody who is away from home], posylka [parcel], milostynja [alms], požertvovanie [donation], podačka [sop] and dobyća [loot] cannot occur in slot X in the construction polučit' Y v X: none of them can be conceived of as a transfer frame which is necessary to fill with some concrete thing. Thus, in the case of the word pokupka [purchase], first comes a thing, needed by someone, which is necessary to buy, and then after it has been bought it becomes a pokupka [purchase]. A posylka [parcel] is also sent to someone not in order to send a parcel but to send the things that somebody needs.
The same applies to the words *peredača* [things sent to somebody who is away from home], *podačka* [sop], *milostynja* [alms] and *požertvovanie* [donation]: they are given to a person (or a group of people) who needs something concrete to satisfy this need (and not to activate and fill with just something the corresponding frame). As for *dobyča* [loot], it refers to something taken illegitimately and often by violence. Clearly, the motivation for getting *dobyča* [loot] is to obtain the things referred to by this word and not to get something illegitimately, that is, this is not the case when the activating of the corresponding frame is planned.

Why would a person want to create a link between an object and a slot of a particular transfer frame? There can be several different reasons for this. One of them is that when an object falls within the scope of a transfer frame which is familiar to the receiver, it causes in the receiver certain thoughts and feelings. Thus, for example, when something is given as a reward, it is meant to make the receiver feel good and understand that the giver approves of him. Similarly, presents are signs of the giver's good feelings towards the receiver (cf. the previous chapter).

Sometimes (in the case of *dolg* [loan], for example), the transfer frame that the giver and receiver have in mind causes certain behaviour: if something is given as a loan, the receiver is expected to return it. Since this is not the case with presents, one can say that there is always a connection between the receiver's behaviour and the transfer frame to which the given object is "assigned".

In what way can a link between the given object and the slot of a particular transfer frame be established? Clearly, the most common way to do this is to say that the object transferred should be considered within a certain transfer frame. In oral speech, people often inform each other like that: *ne dumaj, eto podarok* [do not think anything, it's a gift] or *ja v dolg beru* [I get it as a loan].
Thus, in some cases transfer is thought of and planned as an interaction between people by means of some socially recognized frequent frames activated by words. In these cases a thing which is actually transferred may be conceived of only as a tool to fill a slot in a frame.

2.1.2. Testing the first constraint hypothesis.

Let us test against examples the first semantic constraint on nouns able to occur in slot X in the construction polučit' Y v X. The hypothesis tested is that nouns able to occupy slot X refer to transfer situations of a particular kind: those which can be viewed as filling a preconceived transfer frame with something.

1. podarok [present].

When something is given as a podarok the giver does it because he wants to show his 'good feelings' towards the person receiving the podarok (cf. the previous chapter) and in this way to make the receiver feel good. That is why the important thing is to give something that would be thought of as a podarok (and therefore to make the receiver feel good) rather than to transfer a concrete thing.

2. dar [gift].

Dar is a close synonym of podarok [present] and also a sign of the giver's good feelings towards the recipient. Therefore in this case, too, the giver wants to transfer something that would be thought of as a dar, that is, to activate a particular transfer frame.

3. nagrada [reward/award].

The main purpose of a nagrada is to show one's approval of an action performed by the
person receiving the *nagrada* and to make the person receiving the *nagrada* feel something good. The value of the *nagrada*, therefore, may be just symbolic. It means that in the case of *nagrada* the most important thing is to fulfill the frame of *nagrada* rather than to give something concrete.

(4) *voznagráždenie* [reward]

*Voznagráždenie* is a close synonym of *nagrada*, the main difference between them being that it does not have to be a sign of approval and can be given for something that is good for the giver but not necessarily generally good (cf. the previous chapter). However, a *voznagráždenie* is given to give something in return, to pay back and therefore in this case, too, the idea of filling a slot in a particular transfer frame dominates the need to transfer a particular thing.

(5) *pridanoe* [dowry]

An old custom (which has been out of fashion for a long time now) required that parents should give their daughter who is getting married some money (or real estate or things like clothes or furniture) as so-called *pridanoe*. Since the *pridanoe* was given, according to the custom, only on the occasion of a daughter’s marriage, this transfer was undertaken in order to fulfill the corresponding frame, not to give something specific.

(6) *nasledstvo* [inheritance]

*Nasledstvo* [inheritance] is rather an out of date concept which originated in times when "passing property on" was expected and carefully planned. In this sense *nasledstvo* can be thought of as a pre-existing frame that has to be fulfilled.

(7) *zadatok* [deposit/caution]
The word *zadatok*, like the English word *deposit*, can refer to something, normally money, given to the owner who is hiring a thing (a house or a car, for example) as a guarantee that he will be able to repair a possible damage to this thing. A *zadatok* can be also given when something is being bought and gradually paid for as a guarantee of the buyer's intention to go on paying (*zadatok* is used, then, as an equivalent for the English *caution*). In both cases, clearly, a *zadatok* is given to fulfill the function of a guarantee, to secure the relations like those between a seller and a buyer or a landlord and a resident, rather than just to give some money.

(8) *kompensacijā* [compensation]

The word *kompensacijā* refers (as its form suggests) to something given in order to compensate for something bad that has happened to the receiver (normally the word is used in this sense in the expression *v kompensaciju ubytkov* [as a compensation for damage]). So, the main reason to give a *kompensacijā* is to fulfill a particular transfer and interaction frame by something and not to give something specific.

(9) *dolg* [loan]

It is difficult to see in what sense lending something can be seen as dominated by the will to fulfill the frame of loan rather than to transfer a particular thing needed by the borrower. A possible way to solve this difficulty is connected with the different perspectives of the participants. Thus, from the borrower's point of view, something is given to him because he/she needs this particular thing. But on the other hand, from the giver's perspective, even the situations of lending can be seen, perhaps, as filling a frame that has to be filled.
(10) **kredit** [credit]

The word **kredit** [credit] in Russian refers to money loan that can be returned gradually and is a hyponym of **dolg** [loan]. Therefore everything said about **dolg** can be applied to **kredit**.

2.2. The second constraint.

2.2.1. The second constraint hypothesis: the transfer is favourable and pleasant for the receiver.

As we have seen in the previous section, nouns which can occur in slot X of the construction **polučit’ Y v X** [to receive Y in (as an) X] refer to things given because the giver wants to activate and fulfill a particular transfer frame rather than in order to transfer a particular thing (Y). In this section I will consider another constraint on the semantics of nouns which can occur in slot X of **polučit’ Y v X**. My hypothesis is that only nouns referring to transfer situations which are favourable for the receiver and make the receiver feel good can occur in slot X.

Indeed, why activate and fulfill a socially recognized transfer frame such as "present" or "reward"? A possible reason (along with other reasons mentioned in the previous section) to do it is that fulfilling these "transfer frames" alone means doing something good for the receiver (cf. the discussion in the previous chapter). Naturally, getting the thing transferred may be also to the receiver's benefit.

In order to explain why the words like **milostynja** [alms], **podačka** [sop] and **požertvovanie** [donation] cannot be used in slot X, one can postulate as a part of the "favourability" constraint that words able to occur in slot X should refer not only to a transfer which is to the receiver's benefit, but also to a transfer which makes the receiver feel good. Thus, receiving a **podarok** [present] and a **dar** [gift] as well as **pridaniec**
[dowry] and a nasledstvo [inheritance] is obviously to the benefit of the receiver. It is also expected that the receiver feels good on all these occasions. The same, with slight modifications, holds true for the nouns dolg [loan], arenda [lease], kredit [credit] or prokat [hire], all of them able to be used in the construction polučit' Y v X. Giving loans, lending and hiring things is meant, in brief, to satisfy the receiver's needs, that is, they serve to benefit the receiver. It is also easy to imagine how getting loans, lending and hiring things can cause the receiver good feelings, that is, the semantics of the corresponding words is compatible with the 'make feel good' part of the constraint.

As for the words nagrada [reward] and poosćrenie [encouragement], the real value of what is given in some cases may be very small or just symbolic. Nevertheless, receiving rewards and encouragements is also good for the receiver because it makes him/her feel another's approval and through this makes him feel good.

Another argument in favour of the connection between the use of v [in/into] and the "receiver's benefit" is the existence of similar constraints on other constructions within other lexical groups. Thus, words referring to different types of utterances, such as šutka [joke], ob"jasnenie [explanation], dopolnenie [addition] can be used after skazat' v [to say in], for example:

(25) skazat' čto-to v ob"jasnenie / šutku/dopolnenie

'say INF something ACC in explanation/joke/addition ACC

'to say something in explanation/jocularly/in addition'.

However, one can say

(26) skazat' čto-to v podtverždenie (slov Peti)

'say INF something ACC in confirmation ACC (of Petja's words)

'to say something to confirm Petja's words'.

but not
(27) *skazat’ čto-to v oproverženie slov Peti

'say INF something ACC in refutation ACC of Petja’s words

'to say something to refute Petja’s words';

similarly, one can say

(28) skazat’ čto-to v utešenie Petja
day INF something ACC in consolation ACC Petja DAT

'to say something to comfort Petja',

but not

(29) *skazat’ čto-to v oskorblenie Petja

'say INF something ACC in insult ACC Petja DAT

'to say something to insult Petja';

one can say

(30) skazat’ čto-to v opravdanie Petja

'say INF something ACC in justification ACC Petja GEN

'to say something in Petja’s justification',

but not

(31) *skazat’ čto-to v obvinenie Petja

'say INF something ACC in accusation ACC Petja GEN

'to say something to accuse Petja'.

These examples show that words referring to different types of utterances have a constraint on the use of V [in/into] with the verb skazat’ [say] similar to that on the use of V [in/into] with polučit’ [receive]. In both cases, the use of V [in/into] is restricted to words denoting actions (or, rather, interactions) which are favourable for the person affected by the action. Now let us test the condition of "receiver’s benefit" against all nouns that can occur in slot X in the construction polučit' Y v X.
2.2.2. Testing the second constraint hypothesis.

(1) podarok [present]

A podarok [present] is given in order to do something that would please the receiver and make him feel good (cf. the previous chapter), which means, clearly, that the transfer corresponding to podarok is good and pleasant for the receiver.

(2) dar [gift]

Dar [gift] is a close synonym of podarok [present], the main difference between them being that dar is conceived of as referring to something valuable, which is good for the receiver to have, whereas podarok [present] may refer to a thing which is enjoyable but useless. Therefore, in the case of dar [gift], too, the transfer is good for the receiver and makes him/her feel good.

(3) nagrada [reward/award]

Nagrada [reward] is a sign of approval from somebody of a higher status than the recipient's. This approval is meant to make the recipient feel good.

(4) voznagraždenie [reward]

Voznagraždenie refers to money or something valuable which is given in return for some receiver's action. So, getting a voznagraždenie is also to the benefit of the receiver and, therefore, presumably, causes good feelings.

(5) pridanoe [dowry]

Pridanoe refers to property or money given by parents to the daughter on the occasion of her marriage. Such a transfer is, naturally, to the benefit of the latter and, because of
this, is expected to cause good feelings.

(6) *nasledstvo* [inheritance]

*Nasledstvo*, like *pridanie* [dowry], refers to property transfer which is always to the receiver's benefit.

(7) *zadatok* [deposit]

*Zadatok* [deposit] is money paid to the owner of something to make him able to repair a possible damage to the thing hired and therefore it serves to the receiver's benefit.

(8) *kompensacija* [compensation]

*Kompensacija* [compensation] is paid to compensate the receiver some damage to his property, which is, of course, good for him.

(9) *dolg* [loan]

*Dolg* [loan] is given to someone who lacks something that he needs, which is, clearly, to the receiver's benefit.

(10) *kredit* [credit]

Since the word *kredit* [credit] is a hyponym of *dolg* [loan], everything said about the latter can be applied to *kredit* [credit].

2.3. The third constraint.

2.3.1. The third constraint hypothesis: the transferred should not be used up.

Another constraint on nouns which can occur in slot X in the construction *polučit’ Y v X*
is the following: the meaning of X should not imply that Y is used up or spent while fulfilling its role in a given transfer frame. This constraint is postulated to explain why it is impossible to say

(32) *polučit' kašu v zavtrak;

receive INF porridge ACC in breakfast ACC

'to receive porridge for breakfast';

(33) *polučit' rubl' v karmannye

receive INF rouble ACC in pocket money ACC

'to receive a rouble for pocket money',

although we deal with fulfilling of preconceived frames here. The meaning of the word zavtrak [breakfast] implies that food given as zavtrak is meant to be eaten, otherwise it could not be named zavtrak. Therefore zavtrak cannot occupy slot X in the construction polučit' Y v X. Nouns referring to other meals or stages of a meal (such as entree, dessert etc.) cannot occur in slot X for the same reason. Similarly, money given as karmannye [pocket money] is meant to be spent: the idea of spending on small purchases is part of the concept of karmannye (as well as that of 'pocket money'). This is why this word cannot occur in slot X of the construction polučit' Y v X [to receive Y in (as an) X]. In such cases the preposition na [on] is used. In the next section I will test this constraint against all nouns which can occur in slot X in the construction polučit' Y v X.

2.3.2. Testing the third constraint hypothesis.

(1) podarok [present]

When something is given as a podarok, normally the thing transferred is not used up after having been transferred. Although in some cases, when, for example, a cake is given as a podarok, the thing functioning as a podarok is eaten, it is implied by the
function of the thing transferred (that is, the cake), not by the notion of podarok. Eating (or any other kind of using up) may be a consequence of the ownership transfer, but it is not a part of the frame corresponding to podarok. Besides, even in the case when a cake is given as a podarok, one would not expect the cake to be eaten immediately, which can be proven by the fact that a plate with a cake (instead of a box) or a glass of wine (instead of a bottle) cannot be given in the function of a podarok. However, in the vast majority of situations corresponding to the word podarok, a thing given as a podarok remains unchanged for a long time.

(2) dar [gift]
Dar [gift], similarly to podarok [present], refers to things which are not expected to be used up after the transfer. Since dar [gift] is a word of a higher register, and its meaning includes the idea that the thing transferred is valuable (cf. the previous chapter), it is even less likely to be affected after the transfer than it is in the case of podarok [present].

Sometimes money donated for charity etc. could be referred to as a dar but this use of the word would be clearly marginal. What is more important, the word dar [gift] does not presuppose that the thing given would be changed after the transfer, although in some cases the nature of the thing itself may imply it.

(3) nagrada [reward]
Nagrada is not supposed to be used up or changed while being used by the person who has been given it, unless it is something like money which implies spending by its own nature. However, a sequence of simple events corresponding to the word nagrada (i.e., the so-called frame of nagrada) does not contain the idea of using up the object that constitutes nagrada as its part.
(4) *voznagraždenie* [reward]

At first, it seems that the constraint of 'not using up the transferred thing' does not actually apply in this case because normally what is given in the function of *voznagraždenie* is money. However, the giver does not have to use up this money for it could be referred to as a *voznagraždenie*. In other words, since the frame of *voznagraždenie* includes the transfer of ownership as its part, the receiver can do anything he wants with the thing he has received as a *voznagraždenie*. In particular, if this thing is money, the receiver can spend it, but this would not be part of the frame corresponding to the word *voznagraždenie*, being just a consequence of the ownership transfer.

(5) *pridanoe* [dowry].

Ideally, the *pridanoe* was not supposed to be spent. Even in the case when it was money (let alone property) people disapproved of "wasting *pridanoe*-money".

(6) *nasledstvo* [inheritance]

The word *nasledstvo* does not imply that the thing transferred is used up after it has been transferred. Furthermore, as in the case of *pridanoe* [dowry], people traditionally disapproved of spending inherited money or wasting inherited property, that is, it is not what was supposed to happen to *nasledstvo*.

(7) *zadatok* [deposit]

A *zadatok* given to the owner of the thing that the giver is hiring is not part of the hiring cost and should be returned to this person when he stops hiring.
(8) **kompensacija** [compensation]

A **kompensacija** can be spent, when it is constituted by money, but its meaning and purpose do not imply it. The thing that constitutes **kompensacija** can be spent (because an ownership transfer has occurred and its owner can do with it anything he likes), but this is not one of the simple events which are part of the frame corresponding to **kompensacija**. Besides, the expectation concerning a **kompensacija** always is that it will not be spent immediately.

(9) **dolg** [loan]

Something given as a **dolg** [loan] is expected to be returned and in this sense is unaffected by the transfer.

(10) **kredit** [credit]

The word **kredit** in Russian refers to a particular kind of loan (one which can be paid back gradually) and therefore everything said about **dolg** [loan] can be applied to **kredit** [credit].

### 2.3.3. An elaboration on the third constraint.

The examples considered show that the second constraint on the construction **polućit' Y v X** [to receive Y in (as an) X] - "Y is expected not to be used up" - needs some elaboration. It is more exact to say that Y can be used up after it has been transferred, but the frame corresponding to the word X does not require or imply it. In other words, the receiver can do anything with the object transferred (Y), including using it up, but this is not a part of the relevant transfer frame, that is, not one of the events that constitute it.
For example, the frame of obed [dinner] includes the idea that food should be eaten as its part. If food is not meant to be eaten, then it cannot be referred to as obed. Similarly, if money is not meant to be spent on small purchases, it cannot be referred to as karmannye [pocket money]. The idea of 'using up' is part of the concepts encoded by the words like obed and karmannye. By contrast, the sequence of simple events corresponding to the word podarok [present], does not include using up the thing transferred, although it could be, if it is a cake or money, for instance. It is important, however, that it happens because money or cakes have to be used in a certain way, not because it is a part of the concept of podarok [present]. Similarly, even though a voznagraždenie or a kompensacija are normally constituted by money, one can have money transferred as a voznagraždenie or a kompensacija for a very long time, never using it nor never thinking of using it, and the money still could be referred to as a voznagraždenie or a kompensacija. This indicates, I believe, that 'using the transferred thing up' is not a part of the concepts corresponding to these words. Besides, in each case when the transferred thing can be used up (because of its nature, so to speak), it is not expected to be used up immediately.

3. Negative material: discussion.

In order to illustrate how the three constraints formulated above work, some negative material will be examined in this section. For each word which cannot occur in slot X in the construction polučit’ Y v X I will indicate a semantic constraint which is responsible for that.

1. obed [dinner]

The word obed [dinner] cannot be used in the construction polučit’ Y v X [to receive Y in (as an) X] because it violates the third semantic constraint: Y should not be used up
while fulfilling its role in the frame X. Food given as obed, of course, would be used up, that is, eaten.

2. sladkoe [dessert]

Sladkoe [dessert], similarly to obed [dinner], refers to food which is supposed to be eaten and therefore violates the third constraint. This explains why sladkoe [dessert] cannot occur in slot X in the construction polučit' Y v X [to receive Y in (as an) X].

3. dobavka [second serving].

The word dobavka [second serving] also refers to food to be eaten and thus violates the same constraint on X.

4. čaj [tip]

The word čaj [tip] in sentences like

(34) on dal emu rubl' na čaj

he gave him rouble ACC on tip ACC

‘he gave him a rouble as a tip'

refers to money given as a tip and therefore intended to be spent by the receiver. Besides, this sense of the word čaj is derived, its basic sense being ‘tea’, which means that initially money given na čaj [as a tip] was thought of as given for buying tea. So, čaj violates the constraint “Y should not be used up while fulfilling its role in the frame X” and therefore cannot occur in slot X in the construction polučit' Y v X [to receive Y in (as an) X].

5. karmannye [pocket money]

The word karmannye [pocket money] refers to pocket money which is meant to be spent
on small purchases. Therefore karmannye violates the constraint "Y should not be used
up while fulfilling its role in the frame X". This is why the word karmannye cannot occur
in slot X in the construction polučit' Y v X.

6. vzjatka [bribe].

The word vzjatka [bribe] presents a rather difficult case. First, it is not quite clear
whether bribes are given to activate the corresponding frame. In some situations, one can
think that one has to give a bribe, that is, think of it as a frame that has to be fulfilled to
influence the person whom one depends on. On the other hand, it is quite possible to
think of a situation when a bribe is camouflaged as a present and is actually thought to be
a present by one side, but still remains a bribe. In this case a bribe is not conceived of as
a frame to fulfill, one just gives something as a means to please the influential person. (If
a bribe is thought to be a present by both sides, the question arises whether it is a bribe at
all). In fact, it seems possible that the word vzjatka cannot occur in slot X in the
construction polučit' Y v X for simple phonetic reasons: since vzjatka begins with two
consonants it would be difficult to say and to understand the phrase v vzjatku [as a
bribe].

7. podačka [sop].

Podačka is something given to a person in need or difficult situation out of pity. The
speaker thinks of what has been given as small and insignificant (cf. the previous
chapter). The thing transferred has been given not in order to fill a slot in a particular
frame, but rather because it would make the receiver feel better. It is also possible that
the receiver needed this particular thing. Thus, podačka violates the first constraint on
words which can occur in slot X in the construction polučit' Y v X [to receive Y in (as

On the other hand, the phonetic difficulty can be overcome by shifting from v to its phonetic
variant v' o. lt

It is important, perhaps, that a bribe is not something socially approved of.
an) X]: they refer to things which are given not because the giver wants to give this particular thing.

8. milostynja [alms] and požertvovanie [donation].

The words milostynja [alms] and požertvovanie [donation] are related to expenses (for the giver), but Y is not actually spent or consumed while filling the slot in the frame of alms or donation. Since the 'no using up' constraint does not explain anything in this case, another way to explain why these words cannot be used in the construction polučit' Y v X [to receive Y in (as an) X] should be found. Donations and alms are given because they are needed and asked for by somebody and normally are unplanned, which means that the first constraint on X (the thing transferred is given in order to fulfill a preconceived frame) is violated in this case.

Furthermore, the situations corresponding to the words milostynja and požertvovanie are thought of as humiliating for the receiver and cannot be conceived of as 'making the receiver feel good', and, therefore, the second constraint is violated here, too.

9. peredaća [things sent to somebody who is away from home].

The word peredaća is used to denote things like food or clothes (sometimes books or tobacco), transferred by different ways to a person who is away from home, normally in a place like a prison or hospital where there is not enough of what is in the peredaća. Thus, the main function of peredaća is to transfer the things the person needs and not to fulfill the frame of peredaća. That is, this word violates the first constraint on X and therefore cannot occur in slot X in the construction polučit' Y v X.

10. posylka [parcel].
**Posyłka** [parcel], as well as the word *peredača*, refers to things which are sent to somebody, normally not because the sender wants to send a parcel (that is, to fulfill the frame of *posyłka* [parcel]), but because he wants the receiver to get something in particular. So, it is not true for the word *posyłka* either that the will to fulfill the frame dominates the need to transfer some concrete things. This explains why *posyłka* cannot occur in the construction *polučit’ Y v X* [to receive Y in (as an) X].

4. Explication.

To summarize, the following explication is proposed:

\[ N \text{polučil} \text{ ot } M \text{-a } Y \text{ v } X \]

N received from M GEN Y in (as an) X =

(a) \( M \) gave \( Y \) to \( N \)

(b) \( M \) did it not because \( M \) wanted: \( N \) has this thing \( (Y) \)

(c) \( M \) did it because \( M \) thought something like this:

\( c1 \) people often give things to other people

\( c2 \) they say to these other people: it is \( X \)

\( c3 \) they do it because they want: something good happens to these other people

\( c4 \) I want to do something like this to \( N \)

\( c5 \) it will be good for this person if I do this

(d) \( N \) can have this thing \( (Y) \) for a long time

In the explication above, component (b) refers to the fact that the giver (M) gave something (Y) to the receiver (N) not because M wanted N to have this particular thing but rather because he/she wanted to initiate a particular transfer frame (cf. section 2.1). A preconceived frame should be, presumably, socially recognized, that is, frequent (component (c1)) and lexically encoded (component (c2)). Further, activating a socially
recognized transfer frame is a means of interaction between people, that is, transferring Y the giver (M) makes something happen to the receiver (N). As we have seen in section 2.2, the construction in question is used when the interaction is favourable for the receiver (N); components (c3) and (c5) account for this constraint. Finally, component (d) refers to the third semantic constraint on the construction polučit Y v X [to receive Y in (as an) X]: the transfer frame corresponding to the word X does not imply that Y has to be used up; an object is expected to stay unchanged for a long time.

5. Why nouns referring to transfer are rarely used in the locative case after V [in/into].

After an object has been moved into a container, the situation would be described in Russian by means of the same preposition V [in/into] and the noun referring to the container in the locative case, for example:

čaška v škafu

cup in cupboard LOC
'the cup is in the cupboard';

kniga v jaščike

book in box LOC
'the book is in the box'.

However, most nouns referring to transfer frames which can occur in slot X in the construction polučit' Y v X cannot be used after V [in/into] in the locative case. Thus, one cannot say

(35) *imet' medal' v nagrade

to have[a] medal in [as] reward LOC;

(36) *imet' kuklu v podarke
to have [a] doll in [as a] present LOC;

(37) *imet’_den’gi_ v _kompensacii_

*to have money in [as] compensation LOC;

(38) *imet’_den’gi_ v _dolge_

to have money in [on] loan LOC.

Nevertheless, a few nouns referring to transfer frames can be used in the locative case after _V_ [in/into] in the construction imet’ _Y_ v _X-e_ [to have _Y_ in _X_, i.e. as an _X_ ] referring to the state of affairs which is a result of transfer described by the construction polučit’ _Y_ v _X_ [to receive _Y_ in [as an] _X_]. Thus, it is perfectly normal to say

(39) imet’_dom_ v _pol’zovanii_

to have [a] house in use LOC;

(40) imet’_dom_ v _rasporjaženii_

to have [a] house in disposal LOC;

(41) dom v arende

[the] house in [on] lease LOC.

To explain these data, one has to consider the meaning and usage conditions of the construction referring to physical location of an object in space. A sentence like

kniga v jaščike

book in box

‘the book is in the box’

is informative and pragmatically normal, if the book could be somewhere else. The idea of the ‘possibility of other locations’ is part of the meaning of phrases with nouns referring to transfer in the locative case after _V_ [in/into]. Thus, if something is given as a present, it cannot be transferred somewhere else, that is, it cannot change its location, so to speak. The same with gifts, rewards, compensations. However, when something is
hired or leased, it is transferred to the receiver temporarily, that is, the thing transferred can and should change its location and therefore the nouns arenda [lease] and naem [hire] can be used in the locative case after Y [in/into]. The possibility of using the words vladenie [ownership], pol'zovanie [using], rasporjaženie [disposal] in the locative case after Y [in/into] can be explained in the same way.

6. Conclusion.

We have seen that a spatial relation - 'moving an object into a container' underlies a Russian transfer construction used to refer to giving presents and rewards as well as borrowing something. In these cases a particular transfer frame dominates, so to speak, the object transferred: what is important for the giver is to fill the frame with something (rather than to give a concrete thing). The object transferred is viewed as if it were placed inside the transfer frame. Other conditions for viewing a situation of transfer in terms of 'moving an object into a container' are, first, that the transfer should be favourable and not unpleasant for the receiver and, second, that the thing transferred could stay unchanged for a long time and should not be used up within the scope of the relevant transfer frame. One can see here a certain similarity with the situation of moving an object into a container for the purpose of storage: the object is not supposed to be used up for a long time, and its being stored normally serves to the benefit of the person who placed it there.
Chapter VII.

The preposition \( V \) [in/into] with nouns referring to roles in the accusative.

0. Introduction.

This chapter describes the meaning of the following two Russian constructions:

- \( M \text{ vzjals } Y-a \ v \ X-y \)
- \( M \text{ took } Y\text{ACC into } X\text{s ACC} \)

"M made Y one of his Xs';

for example,

- \( \text{Petja vzjals Vanja v uceniki} \)

"Petja took Vanja into apprentices"

and

- \( Y \text{ posels v } X-y \)
- \( Y \text{ went into } X\text{s ACC} \)

"Y became an X';

for example,

- \( \text{Vanja posels v ucitelja} \)

"Vanja became a teacher'.

One can see that in each construction there is a noun (in slot \( X \)) which refers to a person's (Y's) role such as 'friend', 'assistant' or 'teacher'.

Although the notion of role is very popular in psychological and sociological literature, it is not a well defined concept. Some authors define 'role' as a set of norms about the behaviour in a particular social position (Biddle and Thomas 1966). Emmerich
(1961) defines role as the behaviours of the incumbent of one position toward the incumbent of another position in a social structure. Foa and Foa (1974) define a role as "a set of behaviours and norms, pertaining to a specific "actor" in the context of his relationship to a given "object". It follows that for designating a given role, both participants should be specified. For example, the role of Father - Daughter "consists of behaviours directed by the father toward his daughter and towards himself, as a father of his daughter. In our terminology this role contains the giving to - and taking away from - himself and his daughter certain resources, both on ideal (norms) and actual levels." (Foa and Foa: 93).

For the purpose of this study, I shall use the word 'role' in a slightly wider sense. Roles in this sense are all words referring to people who are considered as participants of a particular recognizable situation. Further, a role in the sense of this study can be based on a relation between more than two people. For example, a 'champion' is a role which refers to the relation between the participants of a competition, presumably, more than two. 'Middleman', too, is a role which presupposes the existence of at least two other participants. Further, professional roles are based on a relation between a person and the society, that is, an indefinite number of other participants of which none is particularly important.

In what follows it will be relevant that roles can be "located" in time in different ways. In this connection, the sharpest distinction can be drawn between momentary roles, such as passenger, pedestrian or interlocutor and long-term roles, so to speak. A role is considered to be momentary if a person can be referred to by the corresponding word only in a particular situation, whereas in other situations this person is not conceived of as a performer of this role. Thus, a person can be referred to as a passenger only when going somewhere by transport, but when staying at home, for example, or at work, this
person obviously is not a passenger any more. Long-term roles differ from momentary in this respect: somebody who has children can be referred to as a father or a mother of his or her children in all situations. The same applies to professions: a person remains a teacher or a hairdresser even when not at work.

Among the long-term roles are, for example, roles referring to interpersonal relations such as friend, enemy, rival; family roles like father and brother; professional roles such as teacher and painter. Some roles can be interpreted either as momentary or as 'long-term' roles (cf. Wierzbicka 1969). For example, driver may be understood, first, in the sense 'a person who is driving a vehicle at the moment of speech' or in the sense 'a person who always drives, whose profession is driving'.

The constructions with the proposition V [in/into] that I will discuss have been attracting the attention of grammarians for a long time. Thus, Peshkovskij (1956) observed that among non-spatial uses of V [in/into] there are constructions such as

(1) postupit' v dvorniki

enter INF into janitors ACC

'to become a janitor';

(2) služit' v dvornikax

serve INF in janitors LOC

'to serve as a janitor'.

He briefly mentions that nouns after the preposition V [in/into] normally refer to professions and have, according to Peshkovskij, the archaic form of the accusative - dvorniki instead of dvornikov (1956:306). Indeed, animate nouns like dvornik [janitor] after "a verb of motion" like postupit' [enter] or pojti [go] and the preposition V [in/into] should be used in the accusative which is dvornikov. The form dvorniki in which the word is actually used corresponds to the nominative case of the plural. However, the
nominative would coincide with the accusative if dvornik was an inanimate noun. It is also an archaic form of the accusative of animate nouns like dvornik: in Old Russian, the accusative of animate nouns coincided with their nominative (which in Modern Russian applies only to inanimate nouns).

The question of case and animacy of nouns used after the preposition Y in constructions like pojiti v soldaty [to go into soldiers (to become a soldier)] is the major point of interest for most other authors who have considered this problem. Zaliznjak (1967:50-52) states that the case of nouns in phrases like pojiti v soldaty [to go into soldiers, i.e. to become a soldier] can be considered as (a) nominative; (b) accusative and (c) a separate "inclusive" case. He also listed a number of verbs able to occur in phrases of the structure pojiti v soldaty: pojiti [go], projiti [pass], perejiti [move], vyjiti [come out], prolez't [climb in], probrat'sja [get in], proskočit' [slip in], vyvdvinut'sja [step out], vyskočit' [jump out], zapisat'sja [enrol], zaverbovat'sja [to be hired], perekvalificirovat'sja [to get a new qualification], prosiť'sja [apply], gotovit'sja [to get trained].

Melčuk (1979) also considered the question of case and animacy of nouns in slot X in the construction Y v X-y (where Y is a verb like pojiti [go], postupit' [enter]). He concluded that nouns in slot X should be described as having the accusative case. As for their animacy, it changes within the construction in question: nouns in slot X are morphologically inanimate, but syntactically "partially inanimate" (op. cit: 20). Nouns in slot X are considered to be "partially animate" because adjectives which agree with them within a sentence in some cases behave as if they agreed with animate nouns, whereas in others - they take case endings characteristic of those which agree with inanimate nouns. Thus, one says

(3) On postupil v staršie inženery

he entered into senior ACC engineers ACC
'he became a senior engineer',

where *staršie* [senior] agrees with *inženery* [engineers] and behaves as if *inženery* was inanimate (otherwise the accusative of *staršie* would be *staršix*). However, in a sentence like

(4) **On postupil v *staršie* inženery.**

  he entered into senior ACC engineers ACC

'he became a senior engineer'

  **kakovyx u nas ne ljubjav**

which ACC to we GEN NEG like

'which we do not like'

the word *kakovyx* [which] depending on *inženery* [engineers] has the accusative inflection -*yx* which means that it agrees with an animate noun.

Apart from studies focused on case and animacy of nouns in slot X in the constructions such as *pojiti v X-yx* [to go into Xs], there were a few discussions of the semantics of these constructions. Prokopovich (1969: 192-199) vaguely says that the grammatically plural nouns in slot X in the constructions *postupit' v X-yy* [to enter into Xs] and *byt'/sluzit' v X-ax* [to be/serve in Xs] may be used to refer to a social position of just one person, but sometimes denote a real, physically existing group or class of people as it is, for example, in the sentence

(5) **Mužiki-to nashi v partizany podalis'**

Men NOM our into guerrillas ACC went

'our men became guerrillas'.

Rothstein (1977), following Vinogradov (1947:165), claims that the case-inflection of nouns in the constructions like *pojiti v X-xy* [to go into Xs] cannot be seen as just a relic of the older system but should be explained in terms of productive metonymy. "The
wide-spread character of this construction in modern Russian and its productivity" suggest, according to Rothstein, a metonymic or metaphoric process. "The mechanism of the metonymy here involves changing a single lexical feature specification from [+animate] to [-animate]. The noun object of Y, newly specified, will properly occur in an accusative plural form identical to its nominative plural" (Rothstein 1977:98).

It appears, then, that there are two large "families" of constructions, each of them being constituted by two subclasses. Firstly, there is a "family" of constructions consisting of one or two names denoting concrete people, a verb, Y [in/into] and a noun referring to a role in the accusative case. These constructions refer to the change of a person's role, the "transfer" to a new role.

This change of a role can be accomplished by the person him/herself or caused by somebody else. If the change is not thought of as caused by another person, then only one name is present in the construction and the verb is intransitive. Examples of this subclass are constructions Y pošel v X-y [Y went into Xs], Y vyšel v X-y [Y came out into Xs], Y vydvynysja v X-y [Y moved forward into Xs], Y postupil v X-y [Y entered into Xs], Y gotovilsja v X-y [Y got trained into Xs].

When the change of a role is conceived of as caused by some other person, there are two slots for names in the construction and the verb is transitive, for example: M vzjat Y-a v X-y [M took Y into Xs, that is, M made Y one of his Xs], M vydvynul Y-a v X-y [M moved Y into Xs, that is, M promoted Y into Xs].

The constructions within each of these subclasses seem to be closely semantically related and therefore I will consider below only one "representative" of each subclass: Y pošel v X-y [Y went into Xs, that is, Y became an X] and M vzjat Y-a v X-y [M took Y
Secondly, there is a family of constructions consisting of one or two names of concrete persons, \( Y \) [in/into], and a noun referring to a role in the locative case. These constructions refer to being in a role without reference to any transfer into a new role and are sometimes described as meaning 'to continue performing a role' (Prokopovich 1969). If there are two names of persons present in a construction, then they are linked by the preposition \( \text{t} \) [at/to]. One name, then, refers to a participant of a higher status, whereas another one denotes a participant performing a particular role in respect to the first participant, for example: \( Y \text{ byl u M-a v X-ax} \) [Y was in Xs to M, that is, Y was one of M's Xs], \( Y \text{ služil u M-a v X-ax} \) [Y served in Xs to M, that is, Y served as one of M's Xs]. Sometimes, a similar structure is possible with only one name of a person present: \( Y \text{ togda služil v X-ax} \) [Y served in Xs then, that is, Y served as an X then], \( Y \text{ byl ešće v X-ax} \) [Y still was in Xs, that is, Y still was an X]. In this case, however, an adverb referring to the time when a person (Y) performed a role (X), should be present.

Most studies, as we have seen, are concerned with the first family of constructions (those with nouns referring to roles in the accusative), briefly mentioning the second (those with nouns referring to roles in the locative) as closely parallel. The only difference between the two families of constructions is viewed within an "aspectual" perspective: the constructions with the accusative refer to the beginning of a situation, whereas those with the locative refer to its continuing (cf. Prokopovich 1969).

I will show below that nouns referring to roles are used in the accusative case after \( Y \)

\[ \text{The clause "M made Y one of his Xs" is used here and below as a gloss for the Russian M vzjhal Y-a v X-y, although it does not quite adequately convey its meaning. The problem is that whereas English "M made Y one of his Xs" states explicitly that M had many Xs, the Russian construction only allows this possibility, but does not require it (see in detail below). However, since no English gloss that would completely render this meaning seems available, I will gloss v X-y as "one of his Xs".} \]
[in/into] when a person is expected to remain "within" a role for a long time. The locative case of nouns referring to roles does not convey this meaning. It will also be shown that the differences between the constructions with the accusative and those with the locative are caused by the underlying spatial images.

It has often been noted that the distinction between the accusative and the locative after $V$ [in/into] corresponds to "the well-documented semantic distinction of "motion toward" vs. "location" in Slavic." (Brecht and Levine 1986: 25). The function of nouns in the accusative after $V$ [in/into] is to refer to moving something from outside into a container or a place. Nouns in the locative after $V$ [in/into] are used to refer to something being somewhere. For example,

- **On xodil v park**
  - he walked in park ACC
  - 'He walked to the park'
  
  and
- **On xodil v parke**
  - he walked in park LOC
  - 'He walked in the park'.

As Brecht and Levine point out, "the only difference in form between these sentences [those above - A.M.] seems to be in the morphological case endings of the object NP's and it is therefore tempting to attribute these differences in meaning to the cases themselves." (Brecht and Levine 1986: 25).

Standard inferences on duration of the events described by the two constructions are different. When an object is said to be moved into a container from outside, the object is expected to remain in the container for some time, presumably because otherwise this event would not be worth mentioning. On the other hand, when we say that an object is
in a place, a normal inference is that the object is not always there, otherwise this utterance would not be informative (in Grice's (1975) sense). These standard expectations or inferences drawn from sentences including \textit{Y} [in/into] in its spatial sense, as will be shown, become part of the meaning of sentences with \textit{Y} and nouns referring to roles. The aspectual-like differences mentioned above are "projected" inferences associated with the underlying spatial sentences.

The meaning of the constructions that I will discuss can be described on different "levels", so to speak. Firstly, one can describe the semantic constraints on words that can occur in slots of each construction (only constraints on words occupying slot X in the constructions discussed in this chapter are non-trivial).

Secondly, one can try to identify which part of a particular construction (that is, the verb or the preposition) is responsible for certain semantic constraints on words occurring in slots of this construction. In this connection it is important that most of the constructions considered in this and following chapters can be paraphrased without the preposition \textit{Y} [in/into] with a noun referring to a role (X) in the instrumental (cf., for example, Zolotova (1964) and Kilby (1977) on paraphrasing different types of sentences with \textit{Y} [in/into] via sentences with the instrumental). Thus, instead of \textit{Vanja byl v učiteljax} [Vanja was in teachers LOC, i.e. Vanja was a teacher] one can say \textit{Vanja byl učitelem} [Vanja was teacher INSTR, i.e. Vanja was a teacher]. Therefore, by comparing restrictions on constructions with \textit{Y} [in/into] and those with the instrumental, one can distinguish semantic restrictions on nouns in slot X which are caused by \textit{Y} [in/into] from semantic restrictions which all constructions have in common. Of all the constructions discussed in this and the following chapter only \textit{Y pošel v X-y} [Y went into Xs, that is, Y became an X] and \textit{X v lice Y-a + Verbal Phrase} [X in the person of Y + Verbal Phrase] cannot be paraphrased with the instrumental.
1. Semantic constraints on X in the construction \( M \text{ vzjal Y - a v X-y} \) [M took Y into Xs, i.e. M made Y one of his Xs].

This section investigates the semantic constraints on the following construction:

\[ \text{M vzjal Y-a v X-y} \]

\( M \text{ NOM took Y ACC into X PL ACC} \)

'M took Y into his Xs', that is,

'M made Y one of his Xs';

eample:

(6) \( \text{Vanja vzjal Petju v pomoščniki} \)

\( \text{Vanja NOM took Petja ACC into assistants ACC} \)

'Vanja made Petja one of his assistants'.

In this construction, M and Y refer to specific persons and are, usually, proper names; X is a role. Semantic constraints on nouns able to occur in slot X in this construction are considered below.

1.1. The first constraint: a word in slot X should refer to a conventional role.

First of all, the relevant constraint can be formulated in formal terms: only a word or a set phrase can occupy slot X in the construction in question. Nouns with adjectival attributes and nominal complements can occur in slot X only if a noun with an adjective or a complement form a phrase such as \( \text{staršij inžener} \) [senior engineer] or \( \text{pomoščnik konstruktor} \) [assistant to designer] which refers as a whole to an occupation or position.

On the level of semantics, this formal constraint corresponds to the conventional character of a role in slot X. Indeed, a word in slot X in the construction \( M \text{ vzjal Y-a v X-y} \) [M made Y one of his Xs] refers to a role viewed as a container which has to be
filled with a person. Only a word corresponding to a socially recognized role frame which occurs frequently in everyday life can be conceived of as such a container. A frequent, socially recognized frame normally corresponds to a verbally encoded concept. Indeed, no word combinations referring to roles, apart from some set ones, can occur in slot X. Thus, one cannot say

(7) * Vanja vzjal Petju v kritiki ego zabluždenij

Vanja took Petja into critics ACC his mistakes GEN

'Vanja made Petja one of the critics of his mistakes';

(8) * Vanja vzjal Petju v ieneratory kkti

Vanja took Petja into generators ACC ideas GEN

'Vanja made Petja one of his ideas generators'.

Similarly, one can say vzjat' v korrektory [to take into proofreaders, i.e. to make a proof reader], but not * vzjat' v ispraviteli ošibok [to take into correctors of mistakes, i.e. to make a corrector of mistakes], vzjat' v suflery [to take into prompters, i.e. to make a prompter], but not vzjat' v podskazčiki [to take into those prompting, i.e. to make a person who is prompting].

These data show that to be able to occur in slot X a word should refer to a conventional role. Presumably, the construction in question indicates that the speaker views a situation of transfer into a new role along the following lines: a person (M) has a preconceived role frame which has to be filled with a person or persons; Y is going to be this person or one of these persons.

This constraint holds for the instrumental paraphrase of the construction in question as well. One can say

(9) Vanja vzjal Petju pomoščnikom

Vanja took Petja ACC assistant INSTR
'Vanja made Petja his assistant', whereas

(10) *Vanja vzjal Petju tem kto pomaga et

Vanja took Petja that INSTR who helps

'Vanja made Petja the one who helps'

is impossible.

1.2. The second constraint: Y performs a role (X) because M wants it.

Family roles which refer to "blood relations" such as brat [brother], sestra [sister], otec [father], syn [son] cannot occupy slot X in the construction M vzjal Y-a y X-y [M made Y one of his Xs]. Thus, one cannot say

(11) *Vanja vzjal Petju v brat'ja

Vanja took Petja ACC into brothers ACC

'Vanja made Petja one of his brothers';

(12) *Glafira vzjala Tanju v dočeri

Glafira took Tanja ACC into daughters ACC

'Glafira made Tanja one of her daughters'.

It is possible to say, however

(13) Vanja vzjal Tanju v ženy

Vanja NOM took Tanja ACC into wives ACC

'Vanja made Tanja one of his wives'.

The word žena [wife] can occur in slot X in the construction M vzjal Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs], whereas the words brat [brother], otec [father], doč [daughter] etc. cannot because the construction M vzj al Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs] refers to volitional actions of a person (M) who caused another person (Y) to fulfill a role (X).
Therefore words referring to relations which do not depend on people's will, such as brother and father, cannot occupy slot X.

It seems plausible that the construction in question refers to situations volitionally caused by M because the predicate *vzjal* [took] refers to an action controlled by its subject, which is, within the scope of this construction, M. Thus, \( M \textit{vzjal Y-a v X-y} \) [M made Y one of his Xs] can often be paraphrased as \( Y \textit{pošel v X-y k M-u} \) [Y went into Xs to M, i.e. Y became one of M's Xs]. However, in situations when an event (Y becoming one of M's Xs) can be caused by the will of only one participant of the situation (M), such a paraphrase is impossible. For example, one can say

(14) \( \text{babuška } vzjala \text{ Vanju v nasledniki} \)

'grandmother made Vanja one of her heirs',

but not

(15) \*\( \text{Vanja } \textit{pošel k babuške v nasledniki} \)

Vanja went to grandmother DAT into heirs ACC.

This paraphrase is impossible because the construction \( Y \textit{pošel v X-y k M-u} \) [Y went into Xs to M] implies that something happened because Y wanted it. As for the construction \( M \textit{vzjal Y-a v X-y} \) [M made Y one of his Xs], it implies that the event 'Y became one of M's Xs' was caused by M's will. When Vanja became his grandmother's heir, it could only be caused by her will, not by his, and that is why sentence (15), which is an instance of the construction \( Y \textit{pošel v X-y} \) and implies the opposite, is odd.

This constraint holds for the instrumental paraphrase as well: one cannot say

(16) \*\( \text{Vanja } \textit{vzjal Petju bratom/otcom} \)

'Vanja made Petja his brother/father'.
In this case, too, a role (X) that Y performs in respect to M is conditioned by M's will.

1.3. The third constraint: the status of M is higher than that of Y.

If a relation between two people implies that the status of one participant is higher than that of another, then the word referring to the role of the second participant can occupy slot X in the construction M vzjal Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs]. One can say, for example

(17) Petja vzjal Vanju v pomoščniki

Petja took Vanja ACC into assistants ACC

'Petja made Vanja one of his assistants';

(18) Petja vzjal Vanju v zamestniki

Petja took Vanja ACC into deputies ACC

'Petja made Vanja one of his deputies'.

If the role of a person determines his/her status as lower than that of the other participant of the relation corresponding to the role, then the word referring to this role cannot occur in slot X. Thus, one cannot say

(19) * Petja vzjal Vanju v načelniki

Petja NOM took Vanja ACC into bosses ACC

'Petja made Vanja one of his bosses';

(20) * Petja vzjal Vanju v nastavniki (cenzory)

Petja took Vanja ACC into mentors ACC (censors ACC)

'Petja made Vanja one of his mentors (censors)'.

A possible elaboration on the restriction of status is that what we are dealing with here is not a matter of status but rather of relative power. Indeed, since the transfer of Y
into a new role (X) is caused by M's will, then, obviously, M should have power or some means of control over Y to do it. Normally, power and control over another person's position is associated with a higher social status, although it does not have to be so (for example, one could imagine two persons of formally equal statuses one of whom has much more power than another because of some informal connections). However, since the relation between status and power is clearly far beyond the scope of this study, I will continue using the word 'status' to refer to this complex of ideas.

Sometimes the relation between the statuses of two people (M and Y) corresponding to a particular role (X) is not strictly defined. For example, two colleagues or coauthors of a work can have equal statuses or one can have a higher status than the other. To take another example, marriage does not completely lack status differences, but they are not clearly defined in modern life. If a word refers to a role which does not imply any clear differences in status between M and Y, then the relationship between M and Y sometimes can be interpreted as "M dominates Y". In such cases the word referring to the role of Y can occur in slot X in the construction M vzjal Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs]. For example,

(21) Vanja vzjal Tanju v ženy

Vanja took Tanja ACC into wives ACC

'Vanja made Tanja his wife or one of his wives';

(22) Vanja vzjal Petju v soavtory

Vanja took Petja ACC into coauthors ACC

'Vanja made Petja his coauthor or one of his coauthors'.

In other words, a role can occur in slot X when it either includes the idea of a lower status of the person who performs it (as in the case of pomoščnik [assistant]) or is compatible with this inference made by the hearer on the basis of the use of the
construction M vzjat Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs] (as it is in the case of soavtor [coauthor]). For instance, in the following example coming from Pushkin the word napersnik [confidant] does not include the idea of a lower status of the performer of this role, but is compatible with this idea:

(23) O sebe govorit' ja tebe ne xoču, potomu čto
'I do not want to speak of myself because'

ne nameren v napersniki brat' moskovskuju počtu.
'I'm not going into confidants ACC take Moscow ADJ post

'I do not want to speak of myself because I'm not going to make

Moscow post clerks my confidants' (Pushkin).

Moscow post clerks were, of course, people of lower status than Pushkin, but they may have had some influence on the lives of those people whose letters they opened and read. Using the construction vzjat' v X-y [make one of one's Xs] here the author, presumably, is trying to stress that it is he who is controlling the situation. However, if a relation between two people (M and Y) is clearly incompatible with the idea that "M dominates Y" then the role performed by Y cannot occur in slot X in the construction M vzjal Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs]. For example, one cannot say

(24) *Petja vzjal Vanju v pervye avtory

Petja took Vanja ACC into first authors ACC their

sovmestnoj stat'i

joint GEN paper GEN

'Petja made Vanja one of the first authors of their joint paper'.

For similar reasons, the sentence

(25) ? Tanja vzjala Vanju v muž'ja

Tanja took Vanja ACC into husbands ACC
'Tanja made Vanja one of her husbands' sounds worse than

(26) **Vanja vzjal Tanju v ženy**

Vanja took Tanja ACC into wives ACC

'Vanja made Tanja one of his wives'.

The constraint on relative statuses of participants (M and Y) may be related with the grammatical number of a noun in slot X. A word in slot X in the construction **M vzjal Y-a v X-y** should be plural, that is, this construction presents the relation between M and Y as if M along with Y had many other performers of the same role (X). This is not necessarily true in reality, that is,

(27) **Vanja vzjal Petju v kompanony**

Vanja took Petja ACC into companions ACC

'Vanja made Petja one of his companions'

does not actually mean that Vanja has other companions apart from Petja (the latter can be the only one). It is important, however, that the construction in question means that Vanja (M) could have several people performing in respect to him the same role as Petja (Y) does. The requirement imposed on the relative statuses of M and Y (the status of Y should not be obviously higher than that of M) may be a consequence of this potential plurality of people performing the same role as Y towards M.

This does not exactly apply, however, to the phrase **vzjat' v ženy** [to take into wives, that is, as a wife]: a man cannot have several wives in the Russian society. Therefore it may be more precise to say that M contemplates several "candidates" for a role (X) before making one or several of them perform the role.

The restriction on respective statuses of M and Y, discussed in this section, holds true for the instrumental paraphrase as well. Thus, one can say
(28) Vanja vzjal Petju zamestitelem/soavtorom

Vanja took Petja deputy INSTR/coauthor INSTR

‘Vanja made Petja his deputy/his coauthor’;

but not

(29) *Vanja vzjal Petju nacal’nikom

Vanja took Petja ACC boss INSTR

‘Vanja made Petja his boss’.

These data indicate that the constraint "the status of Y should not be higher than that of M" is connected not only with the fact that the noun in slot X is grammatically plural, but also with the use of the verb vzjal [took].

1.4. The fourth constraint: the relation between M and Y should be favourable for M.

Consider the following contrasts. One can say

(30) Vanja vzjal Petju v sojuzniki

Vanja took Petja ACC into allies ACC

‘Vanja made Petja an ally or one of his allies’;

but not

(31) *Vanja vzjal Petju v sopernik.i

Vanja took Petja ACC into rivals ACC

‘Vanja made Petja one of his rivals’;

one can say

(32) Vanja vz jal Petju v kompan’ony

Vanja took Petja ACC into companions ACC

‘Vanja made Petja his companion or one of his companions’,
but not

(33) *Vanja vzjal Petju v konkurenty

Vanja took Petja ACC into competitors ACC

'Vanja made Petja ACC one of his competitors'.

These data can be quite easily explained. As we have seen in section 1.2., the construction $M$ vzjal $Y$-a v $X$-y [M made Y one of his Xs] includes as a part of its meaning the idea that a person (M) volitionally did something to make another person (Y) fulfill a new role (X) towards M. It is quite clear then why one cannot say *vzjat' v soperniki (konkurenty) [to make somebody one's rival (competitor)], whereas vzjat' v sojuzniki (kompaniony) [to make somebody one's ally (companion)] is possible: a person can volitionally make allies and companions, but it is hardly possible that someone could volitionally fulfill for oneself such roles as a rival and competitor. Therefore a role can occur in slot X in the construction $M$ vzjal $Y$-a v $X$-y [M made Y one of his Xs] if it corresponds to the relation between two persons (M and Y) which is not unfavourable for M.

To be more exact, it is possible theoretically that one could complain, for instance, of the lack of competitors and wish that there were more of them. This is the reason why the restriction of "favourability for M" is independent of that of volition (see section 1.2.). However, normally one would not be expected to wish oneself to have enemies and rivals, and therefore the fact that the role (X) performed by a person (Y) should not be detrimental to the person in respect to whom it is performed (M) is connected with the fact that it is M who makes Y perform this role.

However, it is not enough to say that to be able to occur in slot X a role should correspond to a relation between M and Y which is not unfavourable for M (because it
was M him/herself who volitionally caused this relation). It seems that the core meaning of the construction in question includes the idea that the relation corresponding to the role of one of two participants (Y) is definitely beneficial for another participant (M), rather than just not unfavourable. Prototypically, if Y does something to favour M, this normally helps M in some way. In fully felicitous instances of the construction \textit{M vzjal Y-a v X-y} [M made Y one of his Xs] the word in slot X refers to some kind of assistantship or cooperation: one says \textit{vzjat' v assistentny, dubljory, sekretari, illustratory, prod'jusery} [to make somebody one’s assistant, understudy, secretary, illustrator, producer]. In fact, it is rather difficult to find instances of the construction \textit{M vzjal Y-a v X-y} [M made Y one of his Xs], where X does not refer to a kind of help offered by Y to M. It is not impossible to say:

\begin{itemize}
\item[(34)] \textit{Ivan vzjal menja v postojal'cy}
\item[(35)] \textit{Ivan vzjal menja v dacniki}
\item[(36)] \textit{Ivan vzjal menja v klienty}
\end{itemize}

However, the sentences above are not fully felicitous. Why is it so, given that roles referred to by the words \textit{postojalec} [tenant], \textit{dacnik} [country house tenant] and \textit{klient} [customer] determine a relation between M and Y which is favourable for M (since in all these cases Y pays M for a service of some kind)? The explanation lies in the fact that prototypically, on the level of expectations, the construction \textit{M vzjal Y-a v X-y} [M made
Y one of his Xs] refers to situations when Y does something good for M, thus helping him/her in an active way.

It holds true for the instrumental paraphrase also that a role (X) performed by a person (Y) in respect to another person (M) who has caused this situation, should be favourable for M. Thus, one cannot say, naturally,

(37) *Petja vzjal Vanju sopernikom

Petja took Vanja ACC competitor INSTR

'Petja made Vanja his competitor'.

1.5. The fifth constraint: the relation between M and Y should not be unfavorable for Y.

One can say, for example

(38) Ja tebja i v lakei vzjat' ne zaxoču

I you and into lackeys take NEG want

'I would not hire you even as a lackey' (Dostoevsky);

(39) Vanja vzjal Tanju v kuxarki

Vanja took Tanja ACC into cooks ACC

'Vanja made Tanja one of his cooks';

(40) Vanja vzjal Petju v sadovniki

Vanja took Petja ACC into garderners ACC

'Vanja made Petja one of his gardeners';

whereas the following sentence is unacceptable:

(41) *Vanja vzjal Petju v raby

Vanja took Petja ACC into slaves ACC

'Vanja made Petja one of his slaves'.

.......

.......

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In fact, no word referring to a person forced to work for somebody against this person’s will can occupy slot X in this construction: one could never say *vzjat’ y rabyni [to make someone a female slave], *vzjat’ y plenniki [to make someone a captive], *vzjat’ y krepostnye [to make someone a serf].

The following sentence sounds better, although according to the judgment of some speakers, it is not quite smooth either:

(42) ?Vanja vzjal Petju v slugi

Vanja took Petja ACC into servants ACC

‘Vanja made Petja one of his servants’.

In these examples the words rab [slave], rabyntja [female slave], sluga [servant] refer to role activities determined by the other side’s (M’s) benefit. Since these words still cannot occupy slot X in the construction in question, another constraint on words occurring in slot X should be postulated.

To explain why one can say vzjat’ v sadovniki (gorničnye) [to make somebody one of one’s cooks (gardener, maids)], but not *vzjat’ v raby [to make somebody one of one’s slaves] the idea of a ‘favourable situation’ is going to be used once again. Thus, modern Russian speakers think of being a slave (servant) as being in a situation which is definitely unfavourable for the person who is a slave (servant). This is why the word rab [slave] cannot occupy slot X in the construction M vzjat Y-a v X-y. The sentence with the word sluga [servant] is not quite felicitous for the same reason (it can be perceived as fully felicitous if the informant thinks of someone’s sluga [servant] in the positive light, as in staryj vernyi sluga [an old faithful servant]).

As for being a cook (gardener, maid), it is a kind of a professional service and therefore the words kuxarka [cook], sadovnik [gardener], gorničnaja [maid] do not have any negative connotations as rab [slave] and sluga [servant] do. Being a cook or a
The gardener or a maid is not conceived of as being in an unfavourable situation. This makes the words sadovnik [gardener] and gorničnaja [housemaid] able to occur in slot X in the construction M vzjal Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs].

The phrase vzjat' v založniki [to take into hostages, i.e. as a hostage] looks as if it had the same structure and seems to be a counterexample. However, it is not. Since in the expression vzjat' v založniki [to take as a hostage] the word vzjat' [take] refers to the physical action, it can always be replaced with zaxvatit' [seize]. However, vzjat' [take] can never be replaced with zaxvatit' [seize] in phrases which are instances of the construction M vzjal Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs] (in particular, in none of those cited above). I conclude from this that vzjat' v založniki [to take into hostages, i.e. as a hostage] is a phrase which despite the appearance is not an instance of the construction under discussion.

What parts of the construction M vzjal Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs] are "responsible" for the favourability restrictions? It seems that the relationship between M and Y should not be unfavourable for Y for a reason different from that underlying the requirement that the relation between M and Y should not be unfavourable for M. Thus, M vzjal Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs] requires that the relation corresponding to a role (X) be favourable for M simply because M volitionally does something to fulfill this role (see the previous section). This does not explain why the same relation should not be unfavourable for M's counterpart Y: it is quite possible that M would want to make Y fulfill a role which is good for M, but bad for Y. There can be a few different explanations of this fact, some of them compatible with each other.

First, it can be that it is the combination of the preposition Y [in/into] with the accusative which brings in the requirement that the role performed by Y should not be unfavourable for him/her. It is worth mentioning that analogous restrictions on the
constructions \textit{polučit' Y v X} [to receive Y in (as an) X] and \textit{skazat' Y v X} [to say Y in (as an) X] have been found (cf. the previous chapter). Thus, one can say

(43) \textit{polučit' kuklu v podarok}

receive INF doll ACC into present ACC

'to receive a doll as a present',

but not

(44) \textit{polučit' den'gi v milostynju}

receive INF money ACC into alms ACC

'to receive money as alms',

because in the latter situation the transfer is conceived of as unfavourable (that is, unpleasant) for the receiver. It seems that for the same reason one can say

(45) \textit{skazat' čto-to opravdanie Petja}

say INF something ACC into justification ACC Petja DAT

'to say something in Petja's justification',

whereas it is not possible to say

(46) *\textit{skazat' čto-to obvinenie Petja}

say INF something ACC into accusation ACC Petja DAT

'to say something in Petja's accusation'.

Since the only coinciding part in these constructions is the preposition \textit{v} [in/into] with a noun in the accusative case, it is possible that there is a link between the use of \textit{v} [in/into] with the accusative case and the notion of 'favourable' or, to put it in simple words, 'good for'. This is not to say that the accusative after \textit{v} [in/into] is always associated with the idea of favourability. In such a general form this statement would obviously be false; thus, one can say, for example, \textit{sdelat' v otmesku} [to do in (as a) revenge ACC], using the accusative of the word \textit{otmeska} [revenge] after \textit{v} [in/into].
What is being claimed here is that for some classes of words (which include among them words referring to transfer and roles) there is a link between the notion of 'favourable' and the use of the accusative after Y [in/into].

One can try to interpret this link along the following lines. The primary function of Y [in/into] with a noun in the accusative case is to refer to moving something into a container denoted by the noun in the accusative (cf., for example, Peterson (1923: 55)). As for moving into a container, it is often done for storage, which is definitely favourable for the owner of the stored object. It is also not unfavourable for the object stored, because nothing bad is expected to happen to that which is stored.

This may be an explanation why the construction M vzjal Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs] requires that the relation corresponding to a role (X) should not be unfavourable for the person fulfilling this role (Y): Y is in place of a stored object to which nothing bad is supposed to happen. As for M, the relation corresponding to a role denoted by X should be favourable for M, as it turns out, for two reasons. First, because M is in place of an owner who put something in a container for storage, and second, because as we have seen already, the situation referred to by the construction M vzjal Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs] is volitionally caused by M.

On the other hand, the words rab [slave], krepostnoj [serf] and even sluga [servant] are not quite felicitous in slot X of the instrumental paraphrase either:

(47) ?Ona vzjala ego rabom/ krepostnym/ slugoj

'she made him her slave/serf/servant'.

This could mean that the constraint "the role (X) should not be unfavourable for the person who performs it (Y)" has nothing to do, in fact, with the use of Y [in/into] and the accusative case of the noun in slot X. This constraint can thus be interpreted in quite
a different way: a person (M) caused another person (Y) to perform a role (X), not only because M wanted it, but also because it was in agreement with what this Y, performing the role, wished (cf. Mel'čuk (1979)). It turns out, however, that the construction with a noun in slot X in the instrumental and that with the accusative after Y [in/into] differ with respect to how unfavourable for Y his/her role (X) can be. Thus, it is not quite felicitous if at all possible to say

(48)*/? načal'nik ekspedicii vzjal Petju

director expedition GEN took Petja ACC

v nosil'ščiki/šernorabocie

into porters ACC/unqualified workers ACC

'the director of the expedition made Petja one of the porters/unqualified workers',

but the instrumental paraphrase sounds much better:

(49) načal'nik ekspedicii vzjal Petju nosil'ščikom/šernorabocim

director expedition GEN took Petja porter INSTR/unqualified worker INSTR

'the director of the expedition made Petja a porter/an unqualified worker'.

It seems, therefore, that the preposition V [in/into] and the accusative case of a noun in slot X cause some of the "favourability" restriction. It is also possible that we are dealing here with a confusion between "favourable" and "socially approved". That is, it can be that what Y [in/into] is really responsible for is the perception of a role in slot X as socially approved of (since it is a role that has to be filled). At the same time, socially approved of roles are normally rather favourable for those performing them.

1.6. The sixth constraint: X should not be a momentary role.

The following example from Dostoevsky, according to my informants and my own
intuition, sounds rather odd nowadays:

(50) ? Rogožin vzjal knjazja v svoi sobesedniki

Rogožin took prince ACC into his interlocutors

'Rogožin made the prince one of his interlocutors' (Dostoevsky).

In modern Russian momentary roles cannot occur in slot X in the construction M vzjal Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs]. Thus, one cannot say, for example

(51) *Vanja vzjal Petju v passaziry

Vanja took Petja ACC into passengers ACC

'Vanja made Petja one of his passengers';

(52) *Vanja vzjal Petju v partnery po kartam

Vanja took Petja ACC into partners ACC on cards

'Vanja made Petja his partner in cards'.

One can say, however,

(53) Vanja vzjal Petju v provozatye

Vanja took Petja ACC into travelling companions ACC

'Vanja made Petja one of his travelling companions'.

A possible explanation for this apparent counterexample is that the role of provozatyj [escort] may not be momentary at all, because it refers to accompanying somebody in a journey which may be long.

Some roles which are polysemous between momentary and permanent meaning can occur in slot X, the only possible interpretation being 'permanent'. For example:

(54) Vanja vzjal Petju v pacienty

Vanja took Petja ACC into patients ACC

'Vanja made Petja one of his patients';

(55) Vanja vz jal Petju v sobutyl'niki
Vanja took Petja ACC into drinking companions

'Vanja made Petja one of his drinking companions';

(55)   Vanja vzjal Petju v voditeli
Vanja took Petja ACC into drivers ACC

'Vanja made Petja one of his drivers'.

In the sentences above, the words pacient [patient], sobutyl'nik [drinking companion], and voditel' [driver] can only be interpreted as 'permanent patient', 'permanent drinking companion' and 'a person who always drives Vanja' (respectively).

The constraint "no momentary roles in slot X" is specific for the construction with Y [in/into] and X in the accusative. Thus, momentary roles can occupy slot X in the instrumental construction:

(56)   Vanja vzjal Petju passazirom
Vanja took Petja ACC passenger INSTR

'Vanja made Petja his passenger';

(57)   Vanja vzjal Petju partnerom po kartam
Vanja took Petja partner INSTR on cards

'Vanja made Petja his partner in cards'.

1.7. Explication.

M vzjal Y-a v X-y [M took Y into Xs, i.e. M made Y one of his Xs];

example: Ivan vzjal Petju v pomočniki [Ivan made Petja one of his assistants] =

(a) people know:

   (a1) many people can do something with one person for some time

   (a2) this person can do some things to all these people

   (a3) these people cannot do the same to this person
(a4) other people can think something like this about these people:

these people are people of some kind

if some people do this for a person it is good for this person

it is not bad for these people

(b) M thought: I want Y to do something like this for me

(c) because of this, after this, M did something to Y

(d) because of this, after this, Y was doing something with M

(e) before this, Y was not doing this

(f) because of this, at this time, people could think something like this:

(f1) Y is a person of some kind (X) now

(f2) people can think: Y will do this for a long time

In the explication above, the set of components (a1)-(a4) refers to a frame of a role (X) that a person (M) has before he/she fills it with another person. Component (a1) refers to the potential plurality of people fulfilling the same role with respect to M. Components (a2) and (a3) refer to the fact that M's status is higher than that of a person, or people, performing a role (X) with respect to M, that is, M has power over Y, that Y does not have over M. Component (a4) refers to the fact that X is a conventional socially recognized role, which means that its performers are categorized as people of a particular kind, and states the favourability constraints on the role: it is expected to determine a relation which is good for M and not bad for Y. Components (b) and (c) state that M did something volitionally to fulfill the role in question. Component (d) refers to the process of performing a role by Y. Component (e) is needed because the construction in question refers to a transfer into a new role which Y did not perform before. Component (f1) indicates that a person (Y) who has started to do some things for another person (M), is categorized by other people as a person of a particular kind
Finally, (f2) refers to the fact that a person (Y) is expected to perform the role (X) for a long time.

2. Semantic constraints on X in the construction Y pošel v X-y [Y went into Xs, i.e. became an X].

The instrumental paraphrase is impossible for this construction, and therefore the constraints revealed will not be compared with those on the corresponding sentences with the instrumental.

2.1. The first constraint: X is a conventional role.

The formal constraint discussed in section 1.1. for the construction M vzjal Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs] applies to the construction Y pošel v X-y [Y became an X] as well: only a single noun or a set phrase can occur in slot X. On the level of semantics it means that a role in slot X should be conventional and socially recognized. Thus, one can say pojti v korrektory [to go into proofreaders, that is, to become a proofreader], but not *pojti v ispraviteli ošibok [to go into correctors of mistakes, that is, to become a corrector of mistakes]. Similarly, one can never say *pojti v konstruktivnye kritiki čužix zabluždenij [to become a constructive critic of other people's mistakes ], nor *pojti v generatory idej [to become a generator of ideas ], because the word combinations after Y [in/into] correspond to roles which are not quite conventional or rather, socially recognized.

2.2. The second constraint: Y volitionally becomes an X.

The following examples illustrate the second constraint:

(58) Vanja pošel v soldaty
Vanja went into soldiers ACC

'Vanja became a soldier';

(59) Operiroval vsju vojnu.

'He was a surgeon throughout the war.'

Posle vojny v terapevty pošel.

after war into general practitioners ACC went.

'after the war he became a general practitioner'.

(Newsapers 1965; as cited by Prokopovich (1969));

(60) Otec moj - upravljačiji zavodom v Vjatke, a

'my father is a manager in a factory in Vjatka, and'

ja pošel v učitelja

I went into teachers ACC

'I became a teacher' (Gorkij: BAS);

(61) Egorka pošel v mjasniki

Egorka went into butchers ACC

'Egorka became a butcher,'

emu povezo v etom dele

'he was lucky in this enterprise'. (V. Ivanov; as cited by Prokopovich (1969)).

Words referring to family and interpersonal roles cannot occur in slot X in this construction:

(62) *Vanja pošel v otci

Vanja went into fathers ACC

'Vanja became a father';

(63) *Vanja pošel v brat'ja

Vanja went into brothers ACC
'Vanja became a brother';

(64) *Vanja pošel v muž'ja
Vanja went into husbands ACC

'Vanja became a husband';

(65) *Vanja pošel v druz'ja
Vanja went into friends ACC

'Vanja became a friend'.

The explanation of these data lies in the distinction between roles that can be performed by a person volitionally and those which are performed because something happens to a person. The words otec [father], brat [brother], muž [husband] and drug [friend] belong to the latter group and therefore cannot occupy slot X in the construction Y pošel v X-y [Y went into Xs, i.e. became an X]. Similarly, one cannot say

(66) *Vanja pošel v otličniki
Vanja went into excellent students ACC

'Vanja became an excellent student',

because Vanja's being a student with excellent marks would depend not only on his own will, but on his teacher's too.

2.3. The third constraint: X should not be a momentary role.

Momentary roles could not occur in slot X in the construction Y pošel v X-y. One cannot say

(67) *Vanja pošel v sobesedniki
Vanja went into interlocutors ACC

'Vanja became an interlocutor';

(68) *Vanja pošel v sobutyl'niki
Vanja went into drinking companions ACC
'Vanja became a drinking companion';

(69) \*Vanja pošel v passażiry
Vanja went into passengers ACC
'Vanja became a passenger';

(70) \*Vanja pošel v pacienty
Vanja went into patients ACC
'Vanja became a patient'.

2.4. The fourth constraint: Y became a member of a class.

As it was mentioned earlier, the noun in slot X in the construction Y pošel v X-y [Y became an X] has the case ending of the nominative case, whereas the verb pošel [went] with the preposition Y [in/into] requires the accusative. However, the accusative would coincide with the nominative, if X was referring to an inanimate noun. One can explain this fact along the following lines: a class of people (X) joined by a person (Y) is viewed as if it were an inanimate object into which Y is put. Consequently, X should refer to an activity which is thought of as performed by many people, which actually means a profession in this case.

A question arises: why are nouns in slot X in the construction Y pošel v X-y [Y went into Xs, i.e. became an X] confined to those denoting professions, whereas it is not the case for nouns in slot X in the construction M vzjal Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs]? What makes the range of words able to occur in slot X in the construction M vzjal Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs] wider is the fact that in this construction X refers to a role that Y performs with respect to M. Therefore words referring to socially recognized interpersonal relations, such as assistance and cooperation, can occupy slot X.
in **M vzjal Y-a v X-y** [M made Y one of his Xs]. As for **Y pošel v X-y** [Y became an X], it implies that X is a socially recognized role of a person without reference to any other people. This means a profession, because other conventional roles involve explicit reference to the other participant(s) of a role relationship.

2.5. The fifth constraint: X is expected to be a "good" role.

Roles which are perceived as corresponding to some socially recognized and respected positions most readily occupy slot X in the construction **Y pošel v X-y** [Y became an X]. The following are typical examples:

(71)  
čelovek vozmožnost' v sebe počuvstvoval.

'a man felt what he was capable of.'

xot' v komandarmy pojdet

even into army commanders ACC will go

'he would become an army commander'

i ne srobeet.

'and won't be intimidated.' (Kataev; as cited by Prokopovich (1969));

(72)  
Eto go nedostavalo!

'Isn't it too much!'

Foma prizival'sčik, v pomeščikil

Foma paid companion into estate owners ACC

'Foma, a paid companion, becomes an estate owner!' (Dostoevsky).

Normally, words occupying slot X in the construction **Y pošel v X-y** [Y went into Xs, i.e. became an X] refer to classes of people of a relatively high status, respectable and respected by other people. Consequently, **pojti v učitelja** [to go into teachers, i.e. to become a teacher] sounds better than **pojti v nočne storoža** [to go into night watchmen,
i.e. to become a night watchman]. Words referring to roles which are perceived as 'bad' cannot occupy slot X. Thus, one cannot say

(73) *Vanja pošel v prestupniki

Vanja went into criminals ACC

'Vanja became a criminal';

(74) *Vanja pošel v vory

Vanja went into thieves ACC

'Vanja became a thief';

(75) *Vanja pošel v falšivomonetčiki

Vanja went into money forgers ACC

'Vanja became a money forger'.

It also seems rather odd to say

(76) ?Vanja pošel v tjuremsčiki

Vanja went into warders ACC

'Vanja became a warder';

(77) ?Vanja pošel v palači

Vanja went into executioners ACC

'Vanja became an executioner',

although both tjuremsčik [warder] and palač [executioner] refer to professional roles. Further, consider the words razvedčik [reconnaissance officer] and špion [spy]. They refer, in fact, to the same or nearly the same activity, but reflect different attitudes towards it: the word razvedčik [reconnaissance officer] is conceived of as corresponding to a good and noble activity, while špion [spy] in Russian has nearly the opposite assessment included in its meaning. As a consequence, the sentence

(78) Vanja pošel v razvedčiki
Vanja went into reconnaissance officers ACC

'Vanja became a reconnaissance officer'

sounds much better than

(79) \textit{?Vanja pošel v špiony}

Vanja went into spies ACC

'Vanja became a spy'.

One can say, however, according to Mel'čuk (1979),

(80) \textit{pojit\textit{i} v farcovščiki}

go into smugglers ACC

'to become a smuggler'.

but this phrase is perceived by native speakers as less felicitous than \textit{pojit\textit{i} v razvedčiki} [to become a reconnaissance officer]. Even \textit{pojit\textit{i} v čistil\textit{ščiki}} [to become a shoe-cleaner] in the following example, where the speaker obviously presupposes that to be a shoe-cleaner is not a very favourable position, sounds better:

(81) \textit{baranina podorozala, klientura ploxaja.}

'lamb has become more expensive, there are not many customers',

\textit{idit\textit{i} v čistil\textit{ščiki} i to\textit{l'ko}}

go IMP into shoe-cleaners ACC and only

'the only thing left is to become a shoe-cleaner'

(Panova; as cited by Prokopovich (1969)).

The following two examples, where the speaker clearly presupposes that the positions of a governess and a village teacher are not particularly favourable, are also quite natural:

(82) \textit{Ja ne mogu žit\textit{i} s vami!}

'I can't live with you!'
I will go into governesses ACC into country teachers ACC
'I will become a governess, a country teacher'

no zdes' žit' ne ostanus'.
'but I won't stay here.' (Ostrovskij: BAS);

(83) idti v guvernantki opjet'
go INF into governesses ACC again

s rebjonkom na rukax bylo trudno
with child on hands was difficult

'with a child on her hands, it was difficult
to become a governess again' (Dostoevsky).

These examples suggest that a possible constraint on words in slot X in the construction in question is connected to the quality of the role itself (whether it is considered as 'good'), but not with its favourability to the performer. It seems that the unacceptability of words like prestupnik [criminal] and fal'sivomonetčik [money forger] in slot X may be caused by the fact that X is thought of as a role which is often performed by many people. In other words, it is a conventional social role (see section 2.1). It may be difficult to think of something 'really bad' like a palač [executioner] (a pejorative word in Russian) or a fal'sivomonetčik [money forger] as of conventional roles: such things are normally thought of as deviations.

A slightly different reason why pojti v farcovščiki [to become a smuggler] is not quite felicitous and pojti v prestupniki [to become a criminal] is unacceptable may be the following. The construction in question is used when the speaker views a person's starting to perform a role as if this person was moving into a container; the class of people performing the same role is in place of the container. However, occupations such as tjuremščik [warder], vor [thief], prestupnik [criminal] and palač [executioner] are
solitary by nature: people performing these roles do not manifest themselves as classes. This peculiarity may make it hard to think of a person who starts performing one of these roles as somebody joining a class of people doing the same thing. One can see that the constraint on roles in slot X requiring that they should be socially approved of, or, to put it in simple words, 'thought by people to be good' may be caused by the previous constraint: a word in slot X should refer to a large class of people performing conventional roles.

On the other hand, other constructions with the preposition \( Y \) [in/into] have constraints on nouns in the accusative case occurring after \( Y \) formulated in terms of 'good for' (see this and the previous chapters).

Finally, in this connection it seems interesting to go through the list of verbs in (Zaliznjak 1967:50) which are able to occur in similar constructions, that is, to precede \( Y \) [in/into] and a noun referring to a role. This list includes the following verbs: \( \text{pojti} \) [go], \( \text{projti} \) [pass], \( \text{perejti} \) [move], \( \text{vyjti} \) [come out], \( \text{prolezt'} \) [climb in], \( \text{probrat'sja} \) [clamber], \( \text{proskocit'} \) [slip in], \( \text{vydvinut'sja} \) [step out], \( \text{zapisat'sja} \) [enrol], \( \text{zaverbovat'sja} \) [to be hired], \( \text{perekvalificirovat'sja} \) [to get a new qualification], \( \text{gotovit'sja} \) [prepare oneself]. Many verbs on the list (such as \( \text{prolezt'} \) [climb in], \( \text{proskocit'} \) [slip in] and some other) refer to role changes metaphorically as moving into a place which is difficult to access. Role changes referred to by these verbs are always favourable for the person and at the same time socially approved of. As for some other verbs referring to motion, such as \( \text{projti} \) [pass], \( \text{perejti} \) [move] and \( \text{vyjti} \) [come out], they are rather general in meaning, but they too can hardly be used to refer to unfavourable role changes, or those which are generally disapproved of.

For the reasons mentioned above, and in order to maintain further parallelism with the constructions \( \text{polučit'} Y v X \) [to receive \( Y \) in \( (as \ an) \ X \) ], \( \text{skazat'} Y v X \) [say \( Y \) in \( (as \ an) \ X \)]
an) X] and vzjet’ Y-a v X-y [to make Y one of someone’s Xs], the constraint on
‘goodness’ of roles occupying slot X in the construction Y pošel v X-y [Y became an X]
can be formulated in terms of expectations: X is expected to be not a ‘bad’ role.

2.6. Explication.

To summarize the foregoing discussion, the following explication of the meaning of
the construction Y pošel v X-y [Y went into Xs, i.e. Y became an X] is proposed.

Y pošel v X-y [Y went into Xs, i.e. Y became an X]; example: Ivan pošel v učitelja
[Ivan went into teachers, i.e. Ivan became a teacher] =

(a) people know:

(a1) many people can do something for a long time

(a2) other people can think something like this about these people:

these people are people of some kind

it is good if some people do this

(b) Y wanted to do something like this

(c) because of this, after this, Y was doing this

(d) before this, Y was not doing this

(e) because of this, at this time, people could think something like this:

(e1) Y is a person of some kind (X) now

(e2) Y will do this for a long time

In the explication above, the component (a) refers to the preconceived frame of a
professional activity (X). Component (a1) states that an activity (X) is viewed as a
conventional professional role; (a2) indicates that people performing such a role are
categorized as a particular kind of people and refers to the fact that only activities which are generally approved of can readily occupy slot X in the construction in question. Component (b) states that a person (Y) was performing this activity as a result of this person’s volitional act; (c) in combination with (d) describes the fact that the construction in question refers to ‘moving into’ a role, that is, is used when a person (Y) started performing a new role (X); Component (e1) states that after “having moved into a new role” its performer is thought of as a person of a particular kind. Component (e2) means that the construction includes a reference to the speaker’s expectations that a person (Y) will be performing the role (X) for a long time.
Chapter VIII.

The preposition \textit{V} [in/into] with nouns referring to roles in the locative.

0. Introduction.

This chapter contains a description of a few more constructions including the preposition \textit{V} [in/into] and a noun referring to a role. I will discuss the following three constructions:

(1) \( Y \text{ byl} v \ X-\text{ax} \ u \ M-\text{a} \)

\( Y \) was in \( X \)'s LOC to \( M \)

'\( Y \) was one of \( M \)'s \( X \)';

(2) \( Y \text{ togda byl} v \ X-\text{ax} \)

\( Y \) then was in \( X \)

'\( Y \) was an \( X \) then';

(3) \( X \ v \ \text{lince} \ Y-\text{a} \ + \ \text{Verbal Phrase} \)

\( X \) in person \( Y \) GEN+ Verbal Phrase

'\( X \) in the person of \( Y \)'.

In order to make the technical part of the discussion simpler, I may consider sentences with zero copula \textit{byť} [be] and some other verbs (such as \textit{žít} [live], \textit{služit'} [serve]) as instances of the constructions \( Y \text{ byl} v \ X-\text{ax} \ u \ M-\text{a} \) [\( Y \) was one of \( M \)'s \( X \)s] and \( Y \text{ togda byl} v \ X-\text{ax} \) [\( Y \) was an \( X \) then].

The main difference between the constructions \( Y \text{ togda byl} v \ X-\text{ax} \) [\( Y \) was an \( X \) then] and \( Y \text{ byl} v \ X-\text{ax} \ u \ M-\text{a} \) [\( Y \) was one of \( M \)'s \( X \)s] on the one hand, and the constructions \( Y \text{ pošel} v \ X-y \ k \ M-u \) [\( Y \) became one of \( M \)'s \( X \)s] and \( M \text{ vzjal} Y-a v \ X-y \) [\( M \) made \( Y \) one of his \( X \)s], on the other, is that the former two constructions include a word referring to a role (in slot \( X \)) in the locative case, whereas the latter two constructions
have words referring to roles (in slot X) in the accusative.

The constructions with nouns referring to roles in the locative are often considered (see, for example, Prokopovich (1969), Mel’čuk (1979)) as closely parallel to the constructions which consist of a verb of motion, V [in/into] and a noun referring to a role in the accusative (see the previous chapter). Thus, according to Mel’čuk (1979), the main difference between the constructions with the accusative and those with the locative is that the former refer to the beginning of a situation (someone starts performing a role) whereas the latter refer to continuation of such situations. However, the aim of this chapter is to show that apart from these aspectual-like differences between the constructions with the accusative, and those with the locative, a number of other differences in meaning are caused by the difference in case. I will try to show that the differences in meaning between the constructions with roles in the accusative and those with roles in the locative can be considered as a projection of inferences normally associated with the use of the accusative vs. locative case after V [in/into] in sentences referring to location of objects in space.

With nouns referring to containers and places, the preposition V [in/into] with the accusative is used to refer to moving into a container or a place, while V [in/into] with the locative is used to refer to being in a container or in a place (and possibly to moving within the limits of this container, but not from outside into it).

The primary meaning of the locative case (in particular, with V [in/into]) is to refer to the location of an object. To indicate the location of an object, say a rabbit or a book, one would say something like

zajac v lesu

rabbit in forest LOC

'the rabbit is in the forest';
kniga v jascike

book in box LOC

'the book is in the box',

using after the preposition V [in/into] the locative case of nouns referring to what is sometimes called a "landmark" (cf. Miller and Johnson-Laird 1983). After V [in/into], such a landmark is normally constituted by a word referring to a container (or a place), or something viewed as if it were a container. Naturally, it is worth saying that an object is somewhere only if it can also be somewhere else (this follows from Grice's postulate of informativeness (cf. Grice (1975)). Similarly, it is worth saying that an object is inside, or within, or covered with something, only if it is informative, that is, it is possible for the object be in a different position. Therefore one can say, for example:

lico v vesnuškax

face NOM in freckles LOC

'a freckled face',

but not

*lico v kože.

face in skin LOC

'a skinned face';

similarly, one can say

derevo v cvetax

tree NOM in flowers LOC

'a tree in flowers, i.e. a tree in blossom',

but it is hardly possible to say

*?derevo v kore

tree NOM in bark LOC
'a tree in bark'.

This fact, which is a pragmatic inference for \( Y \) [in/into] with words referring to physical objects and places in the locative case, is part of the meaning when such a "landmark" is constituted by a role.

1. The construction \( Y \) byl v X-ax u M-a \( [Y \) was one of M's Xs].

1.1. Examples.

In the examples below the locative of a noun referring to a role is used to describe a situation which has changed:

(1) On ženilsja na moloden'koj francuženke.

'he married a young Frenchwoman'

živšej v guvernantkax u ego soseda.

living in governesses LOC to his neighbour

'who was a governess of his neighbour's children'

(Pisemskij; as cited by Prokopovich (1969)).

In this example, the young Frenchwoman has changed her position in life and is not a governess any more.

(2) Nedavno ego nikto i po imeni-to ne nazyval.

'not long ago nobody called him by his name'.

U xozjainа v učenikax žil

to patron GEN in pupils LOC lived

'he was one of the patron's pupils' (Shmelev; as cited by Prokopovich (1969)).

In this case, too, it is clear from the context that the person in question has now (by the time of speaking) become somebody more important than a patron's pupil.

(3) Prišlos' Malan'e uiti ot Perevozčikova
Malan'ja had to leave Perevozčikov
u kotorogo ona služila v njan'kax
to whom she served in nurses LOC
'where she served as a nurse' (Golubeva; as cited by Prokopovich (1969)).

The examples above suggest that the construction Y byl v X-ax u M-a [Y was one of M's Xs] is used when the speaker means that a person who used to perform a role (X) does not do it any more.

1.2. M vzjal Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs] vs. Y byl v X-ax u M-a [Y was one of M's Xs].

Most constraints on the construction M vzjal Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs] do not apply to the construction Y byl v X-ax u M-a [M was one of M's Xs]. First of all, in the latter construction the relation between two persons (M and Y) that a role (X) refers to does not have to be favourable for either of them. Thus, one can say referring to a sports competition

(4) v protivnikax u Peti byl Vanja

in competitors LOC to Petja was Vanja

'Petja's competitor was Vanja';

it is also possible to say about a school boy who gets bad marks:

(5) Ivanov byl u Marii Ivanovny v dvoečnikax.

Ivanov was to Marija Ivanovna in bad students LOC

'Ivanov was one of Maria Ivanovna's bad students'.

Similarly, if Petja was investigating a crime, it is possible to say

(6) Ivanov byl u Peti v podozrevaemyx

Ivanov was to Petja in suspects LOC
'Ivanov was one of Petja's suspects'.

As we have seen in the previous chapter (sections 1.4 and 1.5), the words protivnik [competitor] and dvoečnik [bad student] cannot occupy slot X in the construction M vzjala Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs].

Further, there is no constraint on time: momentary roles can occur in slot X in this construction if the word order is the following: y X-ax u M-a byl Y [Y was one of M's Xs]. For example, one can say

(7)  U Petja v partnerax po kartam byl Vanja

to Petja in partners LOC on cards was Vanja

'Petja's partner or one of Petja's partners in cards was Vanja';

(8)  U Petja v sosedjash po vagonu byl Vanja

to Petja in neighbours LOC on carriage was Vanja

'Petja's neighbour or one of Petja's neighbours in the carriage was Vanja'.

The phrases partner po kartam [partner in cards] and sosed po vagonu [neighbour in the carriage] cannot occur in slot X in the construction M vzjala Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs].

Word order can sometimes be relevant for the use of the construction Y byl y X-ax u M-a [Y was one of M's Xs]. Let us consider first what differences in meaning are caused by differences in word order in sentences with Y [in/into] and the locative case used in its spatial sense. One can say both

kniga v jaščike

book NOM in box LOC

' the book is in the box'

and

v jaščike kniga
In box LOC book NOM
'there is a book in the box'.

In the first sentence the word *kniga* [book] represents a given information, and is topical (that is, it is a sentence about some book, the hearer is supposed to know which), whereas the words *v jačike* [in the box] convey a new information. The second sentence has the reverse word order and, consequently, *v jačike* [in the box] is a given information and is topical (it is a sentence about what is in the box), while the new information is contained in the word *kniga* [book].

In sentences which are instances of the construction *Y byl v X-ax u M-a* [Y was one of M's Xs] differences in meaning caused by word order are quite analogous to those in spatial sentences. Thus, the word order *Y byl v X-ax u M-a* [Y was one of M's Xs] implies that a person (Y) is a topic of the sentence (it is a sentence about Y), whereas his role is a new information conveyed by the sentence. The word order can be reverse: *v X-ax u M-a byl Y* [it was Y who was one of M's Xs]. In this case a role (X) is topical and the name of the person performing this role (Y) conveys a new information (it is a sentence about who performs a particular role).

Sometimes the range of roles that can occur in slot X depends on differences in word order. For example, it is rather odd to say

(9) *?Petja v načal'nikax u Vani*

Petja in superiors LOC to Vanja

'Petja is a Vanja's superior'

probably, because it is strange to characterize Petja by saying whose superior he is. However, the sentence with the reverse word order sounds better:

(10) *u Vani v načal'nikax Petja*

to Vanja in superiors LOC Petja
'Vanja's superior is Petja'.

This sentence is about a role (Vanja's superior) and the information conveyed is that this is a particular person (Petja), which makes it less odd than sentence (9). Similarly, the sentence

(11) Vanja byl v protivnikax u Peti

Vanja was in competitors LOC to Petja

'Vanja was one of Petja's competitors'

is not quite felicitous, whereas the reverse word order makes it sound better:

(12) u Peti v protivnikax byl Vanja

to Petja in competitors LOC was Vanja

'Petja's competitor is Vanja'.

1.3. Semantic constraints on X.

1.3.1 The first constraint: X is a conventional role.

To be able to occur in slot X in the construction Y byl v X-ax u M-a [Y was one of M's Xs], a word should refer to a conventional, verbally encoded role (cf. the same constraint on words occurring in slot X in the constructions Y pošel v X-y [Y became an X] and M vzjal Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs]). In formal terms, a role which cannot be referred to by a single word or a set phrase, but only by a non-set word combination, including a noun and an adjective, cannot occupy slot X in the construction Y byl v X-ax u M-a [Y was one of M's Xs]. For example, one cannot say:

(13) *Vanja byl v vospriimčivyx učenikax u Petra

Vanja was in receptive LOC pupils LOC to Peter GEN

'Vanja was one of Peter's receptive pupils',

but without the attribute vospriimčivýj [receptive] the sentence is quite normal:
(14) *Vanja byl v učenikax u Petra

Vanja was in pupils LOC to Peter GEN

'Vanja was one of Peter's pupils'.

A role can be referred to by a phrase of the following structure: tot+kto+Verb [that+who+Verb], for example,

tot kto pomogaet

that who helps

'the person who helps';

tot kto ubiraet

that who cleans

'the person who cleans'.

No phrase which includes the words tot kto [that who] can occur in slot X in the construction Y byl v X=ax u M-a [Y was one of M's Xs]:

(15) *Vanja byl u Petra v tex kto pomogaet

Vanja was to Peter GEN in those LOC who help;

(16) *Vanja byl u Petra v tex kto ubiraet

Vanja was to Peter GEN in those LOC who clean.

However, the corresponding nominalizations pomoščnik [helper] and uborčik [cleaner] can occupy slot X in this construction:

(17) *Vanja byl u Petra v pomoščnikax

Vanja was to Peter GEN in helpers LOC

'Vanja was one of Peter's assistants';

(18) *Vanja byl u Petra v uborčikax

Vanja was to Peter GEN in cleaners LOC

'Vanja was one of Peter's cleaners'.

...
This constraint applies to some extent to the instrumental paraphrase as well. Thus, one cannot say

(19) *Vanja byl u Petra temp kto pomogaet

Vanja was to Peter that INSTR who helps

'Vanja was the one who helps Peter'.

However, some phrases that cannot occur in slot X in the construction Y byl v X-ax u M-a can occur in the instrumental paraphrase. For instance,

(20) Vanja byl u Petra vospriimecivym ucenikom

Vanja was to Peter receptive INSTR pupil INSTR

'Vanja was one of Peter's receptive pupils',

even though the phrase vospriimecivyj ucenik [perceptive pupil] cannot occur in the construction with the locative.

1.3.2. The second constraint: Y could not be an X.

As it has been already said, it is very important for the meaning of the construction in question that a word referring to a role (X) is used in the locative case (in contrast to the accusative). The locative indicates that the speaker means that Y can change his/her role (X). Therefore one cannot say

(21) *Vanja byl u Peti v brat'jax

Vanja was to Petja in brothers LOC

'Vanja was one of Petja's brothers';

(22) *Vanja byl u Peti v synov'jax

Vanja was to Petja in sons LOC

'Vanja was one of Petja's sons'.

One cannot say

(23) *Vanja byl u Peti synom/bratom

Vanja was to Petja son INSTR/brother INSTR

either. However, if u Peti [to Petja GEN], is substituted for the dative Pete [to Petja GEN], the instrumental paraphrase becomes possible:

(24) Vanja byl Pete synom/bratom

Vanja was Petja DAT son INSTR/brother INSTR

'Vanja was Petja's son/brother'.

Therefore, the idea of an unstable, temporary link between a person (Y) and his/her role (X) is conditioned by the locative case of the word referring to the role. The examples in section 1.1. refer to the change of role which happened in the past. However, consider the following infelicitous sentence:

(25) ?Ivan prodvigalsja po sluzbe i vySel na pensiju v zamestiteljax u direktora

'Ivan was well promoted and retired in deputy directors, i.e. as a deputy director'.

The infelicity of (25) is caused, presumably, by the fact that any further change in Ivan's position is impossible because he has retired. Similarly, one cannot say

(26) * Petja navsegda ostalsja v pomoščnikax u Ivana

Petja forever remained in assistants to Ivan

'Petja always remained Ivan's assistant',

because navsegda [forever] excludes any possibility of future change. Along the same lines one can explain the fact that

(27) mnogie iz nas končili službu staršinami

many from us finished service first sergeants INSTR

'many of us finished our service in the rank of first sergeant' (Krupin)

cannot be paraphrased with the locative:
(28) * mnogie iz nas končili službu v staršinax

many from us finished service in first sergeants.

In (28) the speaker's friends finished their military service in the rank of first sergeant and therefore it was the last of those possible to achieve, which makes infelicitous the sentence with the locative. Therefore, one has to conclude that the use of the locative implies a possibility of future change of role (from the point of view of an observer who can be located in the past).

1.3.3. The third constraint: M can have many Xs.

This constraint is reflected in the grammatical number of words in slot X: the construction Y byl v X-ax u M-a [Y was one of M's Xs] (as well as the construction M vzjał Y-a v X-y [M made Y one of his Xs]) presents a person (M) as a potential counterpart of many persons performing the same role (X) with respect to him/her.

1.3.4. The fourth constraint: the status of M is not lower than that of Y.

One can say

(29) Vanja byl u Peti v pomoščnikax

Vanja was to Petja in assistants LOC

'Vanja was one of Petja's assistants';

(30) Vanja byl u Peti v podmaster'jax

Vanja was to Petja in apprentices LOC

'Vanja was one of Petja's apprentices';

(31) Vanja byl u Peti v podčinennyx

Vanja was to Petja in subordinates LOC

'Vanja was one of Petja's subordinates'.


whereas the following phrases are on the verge of acceptable:

(32) \( \text{Vanja byl u Peti v načal'nikax} \)

Vanja was to Petja in bosses LOC

'Vanja was one of Petja's bosses';

(33) \( \text{Vanja byl u Peti v nastavnikax} \)

Vanja was to Petja in mentors LOC

'Vanja was one of Petja's mentors'.

One can say something like

(34) \( \text{Vanja byl u Peti v učiteljax} \)

Vanja was to Petja in teachers LOC

'Vanja was one of Petja's teachers',

but this would inevitably mean that Petja is a person of a higher status who hired Vanja to teach. The constraint on relative statuses of participants is a consequence of "number asymmetry" discussed in the previous section. This can be proven by the fact that the corresponding construction with the instrumental does not have this constraint. It is quite possible to say

(35) \( \text{Vanja byl u Peti načal'nikom} \)

Vanja was to Petja boss INSTR

'Vanja was Petja's boss';

(36) \( \text{Vanja byl u Peti nastavnikom} \)

Vanja was to Petja mentor INSTR

'Vanja was Petja's mentor'.

1.4. Explication.

\( Y \text{ byl v } X\text{-ax u } M-a \) [Y was in Xs to M, i.e. Y was one of M's Xs];
example: *Ivan byl v učenicax u Petra* [Ivan was one of Peter’s apprentices].

(a) *people know:*

(a1) *many people can do something with one person for some time*

(a2) *this person can do some things to all these people*

(a3) *these people cannot do the same to this person*

(a4) *other people can think something like this about these people:*

*these people are people of some kind*

(b) *Y was doing something like this with M for some time*

(c) *at this time, other people could think something like this:*

(c1) *Y is a person of some kind (X) now*

(c2) *at other time, Y will not do this*

(c3) *at other time, Y will be not a person of this kind*

In the explication above, components (a1) - (a4) refer to a role (X) corresponding to the construction. Component (a1) refers to the potential plurality of those performing a role (X) with respect to somebody (M): it can be a person as well as many people. Components (a2) and (a3) indicate that the performer's (or performers') status is lower than that of M. Component (a4) refers to the conventional, socially recognized character of the role (X): its performers are thought of as people of a particular kind. Component (b) indicates that a concrete person (Y) was performing such a role in respect to another person (M). Component (c1) means that a person (Y) performing a role (X) is seen as belonging to the corresponding kind of people. Finally, and most importantly, (c2) and (c3) describe the time perspective conveyed by this construction: by using it, the speaker expresses his opinion that Y’s position will change.

2. The construction *Y togda byl v X-ax* [Y then was in Xs, i.e. Y was an X then].
In this construction, \( X \) refers to a role and \( Y \) to a person performing this role, as before. Normally sentences of this type include an adverb referring to time, such as \textit{today}, \textit{yesterday}, \textit{during this month} (year) and so on. In order to make the technical part of the discussion simpler, I will consider only the variant of the construction where the copula \textit{byt'} [be] is in the past tense and the adverb is \textit{togda} [then]. However, there may be sentences with predicates other than \textit{byt'} [be] (for example, \textit{sluzit'} [serve], \textit{cislit'} [count]) among the examples.

2.1. Examples.

(37) \textit{Kazdyj možet menja sprosit'}:

'everybody can ask me:'

počemu ja ne v bol'ševikax ešče s toj pory

why I NEG in bolsheviks LOC still from that time

'why I haven't been a bolshevik all this time'

kogda ogon' zagorelsja

'since the fire lighted up'. (Ostrovskij; as cited by Prokopovich (1969)).

In this example, the speaker is questioning the existing situation and suggesting that it could be different in respect to his role (he could be a bolshevik, although he is not).

(38) \textit{Sluzit'} v razvedčikax

serve INF in reconnaissance officers LOC

'to serve as a reconnaissance officer'

byla davnišnjaja mečta Juzika

'was a long-cherished dream of Juzik' (Beljaev; as cited by Prokopovich (1969)).

In this case, too, the speaker is contemplating a possibility, a role that Juzik could have been performing, but is not.
In the last two examples a word in the locative referring to a role (\textit{v nevestax} [in brides, that is, as a bride] and \textit{v devuškax} [in girls, that is, as a girl]) is used along with another word referring to a role which is not in the locative (\textit{vдовица} [widow] in the first case and \textit{фрейлина} [courtier] in the second). In both cases, the idea is that two roles were performed by a person simultaneously and one of them is considered as a temporal reference point: to inform the hearer when another role was performed, the speaker refers to the first one. The words referring to roles considered as temporal reference points are used in the locative after \textit{V} [in/into].

\textit{čelovekа čisлят v molodyx - godami...}

'a person is counted among young ones for years'

\textit{čisлят, poka eto stanovitsja fiziologičeski nevozmožnym}

'until it becomes physiologically impossible to consider a person young' (Ginzburg).

Finally, there is a set expression \textit{ne bylo v živyx} [there was not in those living LOC, that is, not among the living] which has the same structure as the construction in question and is applied to people who have died. For example:
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(42) *Grafa otca uže ne bylo v živyx

count GEN father GEN already NEG was in living LOC

‘the count, father, was already not among the living’ (Kuz'minskaja).

2.2. Discussion.

As the examples above show, the construction in question is used when the speaker
wants to indicate that a person (Y) was performing a role (X) temporarily and could be
doing different things at other times (or be considered to be performing a different role).
Consequently, words referring to momentary roles that could be performed by different
people can occur in slot X in the construction \( Y \ togda byl v X-ax \) [Y was in Xs then],
for example:

(43) segodja v dežurnyx Vanja

today in those on duty LOC Vanja

‘Vanja is on duty today’;

(44) segodnj a v veduščix Vanja

Vanja today in commentators LOC Vanja

‘Vanja is commenting today’,

whereas they cannot occupy slot X in the construction \( Y \ pošel v X- y \) [Y went in Xs, i.e.
Y became an X] (see the previous chapter).

Words referring to family roles which cannot be performed by different people in turn
cannot be used in slot X in the construction \( Y \ togda byl v X-ax \) [Y was in Xs then]:

(45) *Maša byla togda v materjax

Masha was then in mothers;

(46) *Ivan byl togda v otcax

Ivan was then in fathers LOC;
(47) *Ivan byl togda v mužjax
    Ivan was then in husbands LOC;

(48) *Ivan byl togda v bratjax.
    Ivan was then in brothers LOC.

Words referring to professional roles like teacher or painter can occupy slot X in the construction \( Y \text{ pošel v } X\text{-y} \) [Y went into Xs, i.e., Y became an X] (cf. the previous chapter), but sentences like the following ones sound rather odd unless it is clear what could have made or actually caused a change in the situation:

(49) *Vanja togda byl v uciteljax
    Vanja then was in teachers
    'Vanja was a teacher then';

(50) *Vanja togda byl v xudožnikax
    Vanja then was in painters LOC
    'Vanja was a painter then';

(51) *Vanja togda byl v učenyx
    Vanja then was in scientists LOC
    'Vanja was a scientist then'.

It is better to say

(52) Vanja togda ešće byl v učiteljax
    Vanja then still was in teachers LOC
    'Vanja was still a teacher then',

because the words togda ešće byl [then still was] indicate explicitly that later Vanja was doing something different. This construction can also be used to refer to a role change in the future:

(53) Ja kak vzgljanul na nego, tak i predrjok:
I like looked on him thus and predicted

be INF you DAT in concierges LOC

'as I looked at him I predicted: one day you will be a concierge.' (Dostoevsky).

This temporary, non-permanent character of a role (X) performed by a person (Y) is specific for the construction with the locative, which can be proven by the fact that unacceptable sentences (45-51) become quite felicitous if one paraphrases them via the instrumental:

(54) **ona byla mater'ju**

'she was a mother';

(55) **Vanja byl učitelem/xudožnikom/ucenym**

'Vanja was a teacher/a painter/a scientist.

Some words can occupy slot X in the construction **Y byl v X-ax u M-a** [Y was in Xs to M, i.e. Y was one of M's Xs] more readily than that in the construction **Y togda byl v X-ax** [Y was in Xs then, i.e. Y was an X then]. For example,

(56) **Vanja byl v učiteljax u Peti**

'Vanja was one of Petja's teachers'

sounds better than just

(57) **?Vanja togda byl v učiteljax**

'Vanja was a teacher then';

similarly,
(58) Vanja byl v podčinennyx u Peti
Vanja was in subordinates LOC to Petja
'Vanja was one of Petja’s subordinates'
is better than

(59) Vanja togda byl v podčinennyx.
Vanja then was in subordinates LOC
'Vanja was a subordinate then';
it is possible to say

(60) general budet u nego v njan’kax
general will be to him in nurses LOC
'the general will be his nurse' (Dostoevsky),
but

(61) *general togda budet v njan’kax
general then will be in nurses LOC
is hardly intelligible at all.

An explanation of this fact can be found in the same idea of possible change in the role presupposed by the use of the locative case after the preposition Y [in/into]. The construction Y byl v X-ax u M-a [Y was one of M’s Xs] leaves more room for imagining a possible change (a person denoted by M could be replaced by somebody else) than the construction Y togda byl v X-ax [Y was an X then] does.

2.3. Explication.

To summarize, the following explication is proposed.

Y togda byl v X-ax [Y then was in Xs, i.e. Y was an X then]; example: Nataša togda byla v devicax [Natasha then was in unmarried girls LOC, i.e. Natasha was unmarried
then) =

(a) people know:

(a1) many people can do something for some time

(a2) other people can think something like this about these people:

these people are people of some kind

(b) Y was doing something like this for some time

(c) because of this, at this time, other people could think something like this:

(c1) Y is a person of some kind (X) now

(c2) at other time, Y will not do this

(c3) at other time, Y will be not a person of this kind

In the explication above, components (a1) and (a2) refer to X being a conventional role;
(b) refers to the fact that at the time referred to by the adverb toga [then] a person (Y)
was performing this role; (c1) refers to the fact that Y belonged to a class of people
performing the same role; (c2) and (c3) describe the time perspective associated with the
construction: it is used when the speaker believes that a person (Y) performing a role (X)
at a time (toga [then]) will not perform it at some other time.

3. The construction X v lice Y-a + VP [X in the person of Y + VP].

This construction can be used in two related ways, of which only one involves a
person performing a role. Therefore, I will briefly mention the first one, but will
concentrate on the second.

A noun in slot X can refer to a group of people to which a person (Y) belongs. For
example, one can say something like this:

(62) na den’ roždenija prišla naša sem’ja v lice.
on birthday ACC came our family in person LOC

papy i menja

father GEN and me GEN

'from our family, father and I attended the birthday party';

(63) otdel ximikov prinjal učastie v konferencii

section chemists GEN took part in conference LOC

v lice Petja.

in person LOC Petja GEN

'the chemists' division took part in the conference in the person of Petja'.

In these cases a noun referring to a group of people occupies slot X, while a noun or several nouns in slot Y refer to some member(s) of this group. In most cases, a noun or nouns in slot Y name some but not all members of the group denoted by a noun in slot X. Thus, for example,

(64) moi sosedvi v lice Vani i Peti

my PL neighbours in person LOC Vanja GEN and Petja GEN

'my neighbours in the person of Vanja and Petja'

can be said if there were only two of them, but it is more likely that there were other neighbours. In all cases, sentence (64) implies that people other than Vanja and Petja could be the speaker's neighbours. Similarly, it is rather odd to say

(65) naša sem'ja v lice mamy, papy i menja

our family in person LOC mum GEN dad GEN and me GEN

'our family as represented by mum, dad and me'

if there is nobody else in the family. The word in slot X can refer not only to a concrete group of people who are together somewhere at some time, but also to an abstract class.

For example:
(66) žurnalistika, v lice svoix darovitejších

journalism in person LOC its GEN most gifted GEN

predstavitelej

representatives GEN

vsegda služila samym dobrosovestnym obrazom umstvennym

potrebностей общества

'always honestly served the intellectual needs of the society'

'the most gifted representatives of journalism always honestly tried to serve the intellectual needs of the society' (Pisarev: BAS).

Needless to say, when a word in slot X refers to a class of people, such as journalists, the word in slot Y denotes some, but by no means all, members of this class.

Now consider some examples where X refers to a role performed by a person (Y):

(67) veduščij v lice Aljoša vernulsja v studiju

commentator in person LOC Aljosha GEN came back in studio

'the commentator in the person of Aljosha came back to the studio';

(68) predstavitel' instituta v lice Ivana sdelal doklad

representative institute GEN in person LOC Ivan GEN did talk

'a representative of the institute in the person of Ivan gave a talk';

(69) dežurnyj v lice Petja ubral klass

a man on duty in person LOC Petja GEN cleaned classroom

'a man on duty in the person of Petja cleaned the classroom'.

These sentences refer to the fact that a role (of veduščij [commentator], predstavitel' [representative], dežurnyj [a man on duty]) was performed by a particular person (Aljoša, Ivan, Petja respectively), emphasizing, at the same time, that it could be performed by somebody else and perhaps will be some other time. This variant of the
construction \(X \text{ v lice } Y-a + VP\) \(X\) in the person of \(Y + VP\) will be considered in more
detail.

3.1. Spatial prototype.

The construction \(X \text{ v lice } Y + VP\) \(X\) in the person of \(Y + VP\) means that an entity
denoted by \(X\) (either a group of people or a role) is represented by some of the different
objects that could possibly represent it (either by some members of a group or by one
person of all the people who could perform a role). It seems that this fact is related to the
meaning and use of the locative case after the preposition \(Y\) [in/into], when it is used to
refer to purely spatial relations. Consider the following sentences:

\[
\text{ozero v etom meste glubokoe}
\]

lake in this place deep

'the lake is deep in this place';

\[
\text{les v seredine sgorel}
\]

forest in middle burned

'the forest has burned in the middle';

\[
\text{reka v verxov'jax teczet bystro}
\]

river in upper part runs quickly

'the river in its upper parts runs quickly'.

The sentences above have the structure \(X\) \(\text{NOM} + V[\text{in/into}] + Y\) \(\text{LOC} + \text{Verbal Phrase}\),
where \(Y\) refers to a place (or an object) inside a bigger place (object), denoted by \(X\). The
predicate refers to something that directly applies to \(Y\), but since \(Y\) is a part of \(X\), it
applies to \(X\) as well. At the same time, there are other parts of \(X\), to which the predicate
might not apply. Thus, in the examples above, if a lake is deep in one place, it does not
mean that it is as deep in another. If the river runs quickly in its upper parts, it does not
mean that the same holds true for its lower parts. Spatial sentences of this structure have some features in common with the construction \textit{X v lice Y-a + VP} [X in the person of Y + VP]. Thus, the word referring to a person (Y) performing a role is linked to the word referring to the role (X) by \textit{v lice} [in the person], where \textit{lice} is the locative of \textit{lico} [person]. In this case, too, the locative is used to refer to an instable link between a person and a role.

3.2. Semantic constraints on X.

3.2.1. The first constraint: \textit{X} is a conventional role.

This constraint is closely parallel to the corresponding constraints on the other constructions with the preposition \textit{Y [in/into]} and nouns referring to roles. A role in slot \textit{X} should be referred to by a single word or a set phrase. For example, it is extremely odd to say

\begin{verbatim}
(70) *tot kto pobedil v lice Ivana polucil medal'
\end{verbatim}

that who won in person LOC Ivan GEN received medal

'the one who won in the person of Ivan received a medal',

whereas the same phrase sounds acceptable when the description \textit{tot kto pobedil} [the one who won] is replaced by the corresponding nominalization \textit{pobeditel'} [winner]:

\begin{verbatim}
(71) pobeditel' v lice Ivana polucil medal'
\end{verbatim}

winner in person LOC Ivan GEN received medal

'the winner in the person of Ivan received a medal'.

3.2.2. The second constraint: \textit{X} is a momentary role.

Words occurring in slot \textit{X} in the construction \textit{X v lice Y + VP} [X in the person of Y + VP] should refer to momentary roles, that is, to roles which are performed by a number
of different people in turn. Thus, one can say, for example,

(72) *võšel sledujuščij pacient v lice malen'kogo mal'čika

entered next patient in person LOC little GEN boy GEN

'then there entered the next patient in the person of a little boy',

if one takes the doctor's point of view. Similarly, the driver of a bus or a person remaining in it for a long time and watching other people coming in could say something like

(73) passažiry v lice dvux starušek zanjali

passengers in person LOC two GEN old women GEN took

perednie mesta

front seats

'passengers in the person of two old women took the front seats'.

By contrast, one cannot say

(74) *otec v lice Ivan

father NOM in person LOC Ivan GEN;

(75) *žena v lice Marii

wife NOM in person LOC Maria GEN;

(76) *sestra v lice Ol'gi

sister in person LOC Olga GEN,

because roles such as father, wife and sister are not supposed to be performed with respect to a person by different people. It seems also rather odd to say

(77) *načal'nik v lice Ivana

supervisor in person LOC Ivan GEN

'a supervisor in the person of Ivan';

(78) *vrać v lice Petra

'supervisor in the person of Petra';
Iشن "a doctor in the person of Peter," unless the speaker means that these roles can be performed by other people and the hearer would understand how this is relevant to the discourse.

3.3. Explication.

To summarize, the following definition is proposed.

\[ X \text{ v lice } Y - a + VP \text{ [X in the person of } Y + VP]\]; example: veduščiji v lice Aljoši zadaval gostju voprosy [the commentator in the person of Aljosha interviewed the guest] =

(a) people know:

(a1) sometimes a person does something for a short time

(a2) because of this, during this time, people can think about this person:

\[ \text{this person is a person of some kind } (X) \]

(a3) at other times, another person can do the same

(b) at this time, Y did something like this (VP)

(c) people could think something like this at this time:

(c1) Y does this because Y is a person of some kind (X) now

(c2) at other time, Y can be not a person of this kind

In the explication above, components (a1)-(a3) state that words occurring in slot X in the construction \( X \text{ v lice } Y + VP \) [X in the person of Y + VP] refer to momentary roles. Components (b) and (c1) refer to the fact that a person (Y) was performing a momentary role; (c2) states that the construction in question indicates that the speaker thinks that the role (X) can be performed by someone else at some other time.

4. Conclusion.
The preposition *y* [in/into] with nouns referring to roles conveys the idea that a role functions as if it were a container. Nouns in the accusative referring to roles are used to refer to somebody "moving into" a role, that is, beginning to perform it (as it is in the constructions *M vzjál y-a v X-y* [M made Y one of his Xs] and *Y pošel v X-y* [Y became an X]). In these cases "being inside a role" is expected to last for a long time and to be favourable for the person performing it.

Nouns in the locative referring to roles are used to convey a different meaning. The use of the locative emphasizes the unstable, temporary nature of the link between a person and the role performed: either the role can be performed by somebody else (as it is in the case of the construction *X v lice y-a + VP* [X in the person of Y + VP]) or the person can perform other roles (as it is in the case of the construction *Y toda byl v X-ax* [Y was in Xs then]).

The meaning of the constructions with the preposition *y* [in/into] and nouns referring to roles can be considered as a metaphorical projection of spatial relations corresponding to the use of *y* [in/into] with nouns referring to containers and places into the domain of people's roles. However, the spatial relations are not simply projected, but also somehow developed or "strengthened" (cf. Traugott and König 1991). Indeed, with real containers an object which has been moved into a container from outside does not necessarily have to be there for a long time. However, the object moved from outside into a container is likely to be expected to remain there for some time. Furthermore, with real containers, moving into a container does not have to be to somebody's benefit, although it is likely to be so, if the container is meant for storage. These likely inferences become part of the meaning of the Russian constructions with nouns referring to roles in the accusative. These constructions present someone's beginning to perform a role, as if this person had been moved into a container and stored there.
Similarly, if an object is said to be in a container or in a place, it does not mean that it will soon be somewhere else. Normally, however, saying so implies that the object could be somewhere else. This standard inference becomes part of the meaning of the Russian constructions including nouns referring to roles in the locative.
Chapter IX.

Semantic constraints and spatial images: discussion.

So far we have dealt with selection restrictions on nouns used after \( Y \) [in/into] in several Russian constructions. The corresponding spatial ideas (or images) were discussed insofar as they helped to clarify what selection restrictions exist in a given case. In this chapter I will consider what it means to claim that there is a metaphorical relation between the meanings of the constructions discussed in the previous chapters and the corresponding spatial images. The problem is the nature of the precise relation between spatial and abstract meaning, and how it can be accounted for.

First of all, it is worth mentioning that although the meaning extensions of prepositions like at, in, on, along, over are often referred to as spatial metaphors this view has its opponents. For instance, Jackendoff responds in the negative to the question of whether the transfer of spatial relations in the case of prepositions is metaphorical, because spatial parallels in this case "are not used for artistic or picturesque effect" (Jackendoff 1983:209-10). Another argument against the metaphoricity is that relations like these cannot be conceived in any but spatial terms (Traugott 1985:46).

It seems that there are a few distinct, though equally legitimate, ways to approach the question of whether the use of spatial prepositions with abstract nouns is metaphorical. Firstly, one can say that the use of \( Y \) [in/into] in grammatical constructions like those considered in the previous chapters, for example, in the construction polučit' \( Y \) v \( X \) [to receive \( Y \) in (as an) \( X \)] should be considered metaphorical if the mental representation corresponding to this construction includes any images connected to the spatial sense of \( Y \) [in/into]. This is a psychological question which does not have a clear answer so far. In fact, the very nature of mental representations corresponding to
metaphors seems unclear (for different views on this subject see Sternberg 1977; Ortony 1979; Paivio 1979; Honeck and Kibler 1985).

Secondly, the answer may depend on whether contemporary speakers are aware of the "likeness" between some kinds of transfer and the spatial relation 'moving an object into a container'. Thus, a word or an utterance is metaphorical in this sense if its semantics is most plausibly represented via the component "like" and the meaning of another word or utterance (there should be some kind of linguistic evidence for such a representation). Therefore, a word or an utterance can fall within the scope of a "conceptual metaphor" in the sense of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) (or a "categorial metaphor" in the sense of Heine et al. (1991)), without being a metaphor in this sense (this view has been advocated by Wierzbicka (1986)). According to this view, whether \textit{Y [in/into]} in the constructions discussed is metaphorical depends on whether a contemporary speaker of Russian saying something like \textit{Masha polučila kuklu v podarok} \textit{[Masha received a doll in (as a) present]} would mean that \textit{podarok} \textit{[present]} is actually like a container, say a box, and \textit{kukla} \textit{[doll]} is like inside this box. The author's intuitions for this case are that anything like that clearly cannot be the speaker's meaning. However, with some of the constructions discussed it is not so obvious that speakers do not perceive any similarity between the spatial and the abstract sense: for example, it seems possible, unless experiments prove otherwise, that a contemporary Russian speaker may think, although perhaps only faintly, of a liquid of some kind when saying something like \textit{on pogruzilsja v pečal'} \textit{[he plunged/sank into sadness]}.

Whatever is in a contemporary speaker's mind, it seems plausible that "the extension of prepositions to thematic relations was presumably metaphorical when it first occurred" (Traugott 1985:46). According to Wierzbicka (1986), "Given that the meaning of the locational \textit{in} is very simple, and the meaning of the "\textit{in} of emotion" is very complex, one
I can speculate that the latter is in some sense derived from the former... Possibly, some metaphorical transfer does occur somewhere along the way." (1986: 304).

Let us consider the consequences of the view that the preposition Y [in/into] in the constructions discussed in the previous chapters was used metaphorically, when it first appeared, but is not so used any more (in fact, one does not know if it is; see, for example, Williams (1992) for an experimental approach to this problem). There should be, then, a similarity between the semantic representations corresponding to sentences with spatial Y [in/into] and the meaning of Y in the constructions with nouns referring to property transfers, roles and emotions discussed in the previous chapters. Speakers may not be aware of this similarity and may not rely on it when using these constructions. Still, it must be possible to tell what this similarity is, that is, what are the coinciding components in the semantic representations of sentences with spatial Y [in/into] and those with abstract Y [in/into].

Bearing in mind that spatial Y [in/into] is semantically very simple, what could these coinciding components be, if not the meaning of spatial Y [in/into]? However, no semantic component corresponding to spatial Y [in/into] is included in the semantic explication of the constructions with abstract Y [in/into]. It seems that one can find a better answer to the question where the similarity between the spatial sense of the preposition Y [in/into] and its abstract senses lies, if one stops trying to locate this similarity within the different senses of a single word like Y [in/into]. Instead, a similarity between constructions including spatial and abstract Y [in/into] can be examined and identified.

In the remainder of this chapter I will reproduce all explications of the constructions described in the previous chapters and compare them with the explications of the corresponding spatial sentences. When no obvious spatial prototype seems accessible, I
will speculate on what it might be and, again, look for semantic links with an abstract sense.

1. Emotions as containers and places.

1.1. Immersion into an emotion.

Y pogruzilsja v X [plunged/sank into X]; example: on pogruzilsja v pečal [he plunged/sank into sadness] =

(a) a person (Y) felt something (X) for some time

(b) because of this, Y could not think about other things at this time

(c) because of this, Y did not do much at this time

(d) at this time, people could think something like this:

Y will feel this (X) for a long time

The corresponding sentence where both pogruzit'sja [plunge/sink] and Y [in/into] are used in their spatial sense can be, roughly, explicated as follows:

čelovek (Y) pogruzilsja v vodu [a person (Y) immersed into water] =

(a) Y did something for some time

(b) because of this, after some time, all parts of Y's body were in water

This explication simplifies the actual facts to some extent: the fact that pogruzit'sja [to plunge/sink] may be applied to situations when most but not all parts of a person are in water is ignored. However, for the purpose of identifying similarities with the emotional sense this is not relevant. Comparing the two explications as they are one cannot find a single coinciding (or partly coinciding) component.

However, it is rather clear what constitutes the link between the two senses. The result of the action referred to by spatial pogruzit'sja [to plunge/sink] normally is that one
cannot see as clearly as before one has sunk into something (as well, outside observers normally cannot see the person/object which has sunk into something); besides, normally one cannot move freely when having sunk into a liquid. Both points have the status of typical expectations: the verb *pogruzit'sja* can be applied to an ideally transparent and very light liquid which does not constrain one's vision nor movements. If these optional components referring to expectations are incorporated into the explication of the spatial sense the link between the two senses becomes clear:

**Y pogruzilsja v vodu** [Y immersed into water] =

(a) *Y did something for some time*

(b) *because of this, after some time, all parts of Y's body were in water*

(c) *because of this, Y could not move*

(d) *because of this, Y could not see other things*

In this explication, the components (c) and (d) are similar to (b) and (c) in the explication of the emotional *pogruzit'sja* [immerse]. Namely, one can think that

(b) *because of this, Y could not think about other things at this time*

of the emotional sense, corresponds to

(d) *because of this, Y could not see other things*

in the explication of the spatial sense. Similarly, component (c) of the emotional sense

(c) *because of this, Y did not do much at this time*

corresponds to

(c) *because of this, Y could not move*

in the spatial sense.

1.2. "Coming into" an emotion.

Y prišel v X [Y came into [a state of] X]; example: on prišel v užas [he came into terror,
that is, he became terrified] =

(a1) a person (Y) felt something (X) for a short time

(a2) people could not feel like this for a long time

(b) because of this, Y did something at this time

(c) people could see this

(d) at this time, people could think something like this:

(d1) Y will feel this for a short time

(d2) Y will do this for a short time

A spatial sentence with prijti [come by foot] and Y [in/into] can be explicated as follows:

(yesterday) he came into (=to) this place =

(a) he was not at this place before some time

(b) he was doing something with his body for some time

(c) people could see this

(d) because of this, after this, he was at this place

The two senses have in common component (c):

(c) people could see this

which refers to the fact that in Russian both prijti v kakoe-to mesto [to come to a place] and prijti v kakoe-to sostojanie [to come to an emotional state] are used, normally, when the change is visible.

1.3. Y was in [a state of] X.

Now let us turn to the static situations when somebody is spoken of as a person "in [a state of] X".

Y byl v X-e [Y was in [a state of] X]; example: on byl v ispuge [he was in fright, i.e. he
was frightened] =

(a) a person (Y) felt something (X) for some time
(b) at this time, people could think something like this:

\[\text{at other time } Y \text{ will not feel like this}\]

The meaning of the corresponding spatial expression belongs to the set of the NSM's elementary sentences which cannot be explicated any further:

\[Y \text{ byl v etom meste (X)} [Y \text{ was at this place (X)}] =\]

(a) at some time, \(Y\) was at this place (X)

However, a typical expectation associated with spatial sentences of this structure is that \(Y\) will not (or did not) always stay at the place in question. Otherwise, that is, if the speaker expects \(Y\) always to be there a sentence of this structure is not informative, in Grice's (1975) terms. If a component concerning this normally expected state of things is introduced, one can see how the two senses are connected:

\[Y \text{ byl v etom meste (X)} [Y \text{ was at this place (X)}] =\]

(a) at some time, \(Y\) was at this place (X)

(b) at this time, people could think something like this:

\[\text{at other time } Y \text{ will not be at this place}\]

Components (b) in the two explications refer to the idea of expected change.

2. Property transfers: motion into a container.

It seems plausible that there is a spatial basis underlying the meaning of the construction \(\text{polučit' } Y \text{ v } X\) [to receive \(Y\) in (= as an) \(X\)]. This construction refers to the filling of a transfer frame with an object transferred as if the transfer frame was a container and the object was moved inside it. This claim can be supported by the fact that the preposition \(V \text{ [in/into]}\) between two nouns in the accusative, apart from the
construction *polučit' Y v X*, is also used with verbs of motion in sentences referring to one object moving inside another. For example,

postavit' čašku v škaf

put INF cup ACC in cupboard ACC

'to put a cup in a cupboard';

položit' knigu v ješčik

put INF book ACC in box ACC

'to put a book in a box'.

I will show that there is a similarity between the meaning of the spatial Y [in/into] with verbs like *položit'* [to put] and *pomestit'* [to place] referring to the motion of an object inside another object and the meaning of the construction *polučit' Y v X* [to receive Y in (=as an) X]. The meaning of the construction *M pomestil Y v X* [M placed Y into X] can be explicated as follows:

\[
M \text{položil } Y \text{ v } X \text{ [M placed } Y \text{ inside } X]\]

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explication of the latter from chapter six:

\textbf{N polučil ot M-a Y v X =}

(a) \textit{M gave Y to N}

(b) \textit{M did it not because M wanted:}

\texttt{N has this thing (Y)}

(c) \textit{M did it because M thought something like this:}

\begin{itemize}
  \item (c1) people often give things to other people
  \item (c2) they say to these other people: it is \textit{X}
  \item (c3) they do it because they want: something good happens to these other people
  \item (c4) I want to do something like this to N
  \item (c5) it will be good for this person if I do this
  \item (d) \textit{N can have this thing (Y) for a long time}
\end{itemize}

Comparing this with the explication of \textbf{M pomeštil Y v X [M placed Y inside X]} given above one can find that the component (d) of the first explication partly coincides with (d) of the second one:

\begin{itemize}
  \item (d) \textit{Y can be inside X for a long time;}
  \item (d) \textit{N can have Y for a long time.}
\end{itemize}

Further, one can notice comparing these explications that both constructions refer to events which happen because somebody (M) wanted them (cf. Brugman 1983a on the idea of "deliberateness" in the meaning of the constructions like 'to be in the know' in English). For the construction \textbf{M pomeštil Y v X [M placed Y inside X]} what M wanted is:

\begin{itemize}
  \item (c) \textit{M wanted: Y is inside X.}
\end{itemize}
In the construction *polučit*’ *Y* v *X*, the component referring to volitional causation of the transfer is (c4):

\[(c4) \text{I want to do something like this to N}\]

The transfer frames corresponding to words able to occur in slot *X* in the construction *polučit*’ *Y* v *X* [to receive *Y* in (as an) *X*] include the idea that people do such things because they want something to happen to the recipient:

\[(c3) \text{they (people) do it because they want:}\]

\[\text{something good happens to these other people}\]

Thus, in both cases, *M* wanted to change the relationship between an object (*Y*) and something else.

3. Social roles as containers.

3.1. Nouns referring to roles in the accusative: motion into a container.

The selection restrictions on role constructions with a noun in the accusative referring to a person’s new role, as we have seen in chapter seven, have much in common with those characteristic of the transfer construction *polučit*’ *Y* v *X* [to receive *Y* in (=as) an *X*]. Therefore, for the constructions *M vzjali* *Y* v *X*-y [M took *Y* in his *Xs*, i.e. M made *Y* one of his *Xs*] and *Y pošel* v *X*-y [Y went into *Xs*, i.e. Y became an *X*] one can reconstruct the same spatial prototype as for the transfer construction. Compare the explications of the role constructions with two accusatives, and that of a spatial expression with *Y* [in/into] and two accusatives (for example, *položit*’ *Y* v *X* [to put *Y* into *X*]):

*M vzjali *Y*-a v *X*-y [M took *Y* in his *Xs*, i.e. M made *Y* one of his *Xs*]; example: *Ivan vzjali Petju v pomožniki* [Ivan took Petja in his assistants, i.e. made one of his assitants]
(a) people know:

(a1) many people can do something with one person for some time
(a2) this person can do some things to all these people
(a3) these people cannot do the same to this person
(a4) other people can think something like this about these people:
these people are people of some kind
if some people do this for a person it is good for this person
it is not bad for these people

(b) M thought: I want Y to do something like this for me

(c) because of this, after this, M did something to Y

(d) because of this, after this, Y was doing something with M

(e) before this, Y was not doing this

(f) because of this, at this time, people could think something like this:

(f1) Y is a person of some kind (X) now

(f2) Y will be a person of this kind for a long time

Y pošel v X-y [Y went into Xs, i.e. Y became an X]; example: Ivan pošel v učitelja [Ivan went into teachers, i.e. Ivan became a teacher] =

(a) people know:

(a1) many people can do something for a long time
(a2) other people can think something like this about these people:
these people are people of some kind
it is good if some people do this

(b) Y wanted to do something like this

(c) because of this, after this, Y was doing this
(d) before this, Y was not doing this

(e) because of this, at this time, people could think something like this:

(e1) Y is a person of some kind (X) now

(e2) Y will do this for a long time

\[ M \text{ položil} \ Y \ v \ X \ [M \text{ put} \ Y \ \text{into} \ X] = \]

(a) at one time, M did something to Y

(b) because of this, after this, Y was inside X

(c) M did this because M wanted:

(c1) Y is inside X

(d) at this time, people could think something like this:

\[ Y \text{ can be inside X for a long time} \]

One can see which components the accusative role constructions have in common with the spatial sentence above. These are, firstly, the components referring to time: a person (Y) is expected to perform a role (X) for a long time (components (f2) and (e2) in the role constructions and (d) in the formula above). Secondly, a new situation (either a new role status or a new position of a physical object) is volitionally caused by somebody (either M or Y), which is referred to by components (b) in the two role formulae and (c) in the formula corresponding to the sentence \[ M \text{ položil} \ Y \ v \ X \ [M \text{ put} \ Y \ \text{into} \ X] \].

3.2. Nouns referring to roles in the locative: staying in a place for some time.

The role constructions with a noun referring to a person’s role in the locative, as we have seen in chapter eight, differ in meaning from those with role-nouns in the accusative. The major difference between the accusative and locative role constructions is related to the implied time perspectives: an accusative role construction includes, as
part of its meaning, the idea that a person will perform the role in question for a long time. By contrast, the use of the noun referring to a role in the locative implies that the speaker thinks of a possible change of role. This point can be illustrated by the following example:

\[ \text{mnogie iz nas končili službu staršinami} \]

many from us finished service first sergeants INSTR

'many of us finished our service in the rank of first sergeant' (Krupin).

This sentence includes neither the accusative nor the locative: the role noun staršinami [first sergeants] is used in the instrumental case. What is important, however, is that the speaker's friends finished their military service, as he says, in this rank and therefore it was the last of those possible to achieve. As a consequence one can paraphrase the sentence using the noun staršiny [first sergeants] in the accusative:

\[ \text{mnogie iz nas byli proizvedeny v staršiny} \]

many from us were promoted in first sergeants ACC

'many of us were promoted to the rank of first sergeant'

v konce služby

'in the end of service',

but not in the locative:

\[ \text{*mnogie iz nas končili službu v staršinax} \]

many from us finished [the] service in first sergeants LOC

Therefore the explications of the locative role constructions include semantic components referring to the idea of possible change.

\[ Y byl v X-ax u M-a \] [Y was in Xs to M]; example: Maša byla v pomoščnicax u Ivana

[Masha was in assistants to Ivan, i.e. Masha was an assistant to Ivan] =

\((a)\) people know:
I'll many people can do something with one person for some time

(a2) this person can do some things to all these people

(a3) these people cannot do the same to this person

(a4) other people can think something like this about these people:

these people are people of some kind

(b) Y was doing something like this with M for some time

(c) at this time, people could think something like this:

(c1) Y is a person of some kind (X) now

(c2) at other time, Y will not do this

(c3) at other time, Y will be not a person of this kind

Components (c2) and (c3) in the explication above refer to the temporary character of a role (X). In the next explication possible changes of role are accounted for by components (c2) and (c3):

Y byl v X-ax [Y was in Xs then, i.e. Y was an X]; example: Ivan byl togda v podmaster'jax [Ivan was in apprentices then, that is, was an apprentice then] =

(a) people know:

(a1) many people can do something for some time

(a2) other people can think something like this about these people:

these people are people of some kind

(b) Y was doing something like this for some time

(c) because of this, at this time other people could think something like this:

(c1) Y is a person of some kind (X) now

(c2) at other time, Y will not do this

(c3) at other time, Y will be not a person of this kind
Components (c2) and (c3) from the two explications above have much in common with the component (b) referring to the typical expectation of change of location in the following semantic formula:

\[ Y \text{ byl v etom meste (}X) \] [Y was at this place] =

\( (a) \text{ at some time, } Y \text{ was at this place} \)
\( (b) \text{ people could think something like this:} \)
\[ \text{at other time } Y \text{ will be not at this place} \]

4. Causative constructions with nouns referring to emotions.

Finally, I will look at a causative construction which has a variable for a noun referring to an emotion (see chapter four for details). Russian has a large family of causative constructions which have the following feature in common: an emotion is viewed as a cause of another event. Emotional causatives with different prepositions differ mainly in how they present the temporal relation between a cause and its consequence; they may also differ in the range of emotional terms and predicates that they are compatible with. Thus, the causative construction with the preposition \( Y \) [in/into] is used with nouns referring to a short-term uncontrollable emotions which caused someone to do something unplanned while experiencing the emotion (such as hitting something in anger etc.).

\[ Y \text{ X- } e \text{ on } + \text{ VP-act [in [a state of] }X + \text{ he } + \text{ VP-act];} \]

example: \( y \text{ razdraženii on stuknul kulakom po stolu [in irritation he struck the table with his fist]} \) =

\( (a) \text{ a person (}Y\text{) felt something (}X\text{) for a short time} \)
\( (b) \text{ because of this, } Y \text{ did something (VP) at some time during this time} \)
\( (c) Y \text{ did it not because he thought before this time:} \)
(d) if Y wanted not to do this, he could not

The spatial situation underlying the causative use of Y [in/into] can be reconstructed as follows: if something happens to an object/person in a particular place and not in other places, one can think that it happens because an object/person is in this place. The use of Y [in/into] strongly implying such an inference can be illustrated by a sentence like y Arktike slony umirajut [in the Arctic elephants die]. This spatial sentence, including the inference concerning the location of objects (elephants) being a cause of an event (death) happening to the objects can be explicated as follows:

\[ Y \text{ X-e + Y + VP} \ [\text{in X + Y + VP}]; \text{example: y Arktike slony umirajut [in the Arctic elephants die]} = \]

(a) when Ys are in a place (X) for some time

(b) something happens to these Ys at some time during this time

(c) people can think something like this:

\[ \text{this happened because these Ys were in this place} \]

The formula corresponding to the causative Y [in/into] construction with nouns referring to emotions and the explication of the spatial causative above have in common (1) the idea of something happening to Y (Y’s action in the first case) because Y was in X: in a state of X, in the case of emotions or in a place called X; (2) the idea that this happened during the time that Y was in X.

5. Conclusion.

One can see that some components of meaning associated with the abstract usage of Y [in/into] with verbs of motion and location recur in several explications, whereas
I others do not. Naturally, the recurring components are the most interesting ones.

First of all, one can identify temporal meaning associated with the use of \( V \) \([\text{in/into}]\) with the accusative vs. locative case. Within the range of the constructions considered the use of a noun referring to an "abstract container" in the locative implies expectations of change of the relation between "the container" and "the contained" (see chapters three, six and eight). By contrast, the accusative often implies the expectation of long-lasting location of an object within an "abstract container", as we have seen in chapters six and seven. This is not the case, however, in the construction \( \text{on prišel v X} \) [he came to [a state of] \( X \)], where \( X \) refers to an emotion (chapter three).

Further, the use of a noun in the accusative after \( V \) \([\text{in/into}]\) with some constructions (not all, however) is restricted to cases when moving an object into an "abstract container" is conceived of as favourable for somebody. This is why one cannot say *vzjat' v raby \([\text{to take into slaves} \text{ ACC, i.e. to make one's slave}]\), whereas vzjat' v pomožniki \([\text{to take into assistants, i.e. to make one's assistant}]\) is possible (chapter seven); a similar constraint is responsible for the fact that polučiti v podarok \([\text{to receive in present} \text{ ACC, i.e. as a present}]\) is possible, whereas *polučiti v požertvovanie \([\text{to receive in donation} \text{ ACC, i.e. as a donation}]\) is not (chapter six); along the same lines one can explain why one can say skazat' čto-to v opravdanie komu-to \([\text{to say something in justification} \text{ ACC of somebody}]\), but not *skazat' čto-to v obvinenie komu-to \([\text{to say something in accusation} \text{ ACC of somebody}]\).

The idea of visibility, or, rather, invisibility of an object located in a container, be it a real or an "abstract container" is also important. Thus, the preposition \( V \) \([\text{in/into}]\) in a spatial sense in Russian is more readily used to refer to situations when seeing one object is made difficult by another object (this is why, for example, one says \( v \text{ lesu} \) \([\text{in a forest}]\) but \( na \text{ poljane} \) \([\text{on a clearing, i.e. in a clearing}]\)). This fact seems to be reflected in
the abstract use of Y [in/into]: it is used when an object is conceptualized as hidden from view, covered on all sides by an "abstract container". Thus, with emotions we have seen that the construction on pogruzilsja v X [he plunged/sank into X] is used when the emotion is thought of as deep, that is, the person experiencing it does not notice (see) what is going on outside and, on the other hand, does not express his/her emotion in an overt way and therefore is as if invisible to observers (chapter three). The same can be applied to the use of Y [in/into] with nouns referring to roles, perhaps, on a more abstract level. As we have seen in chapter seven, only conventional roles (mostly those which can be referred to by one word) can be used after Y [in/into], whereas descriptions cannot. Thus, one can use after Y [in/into] the word учитель [teacher] but not a phrase like тот кто учит [the one who teaches]. This fact can be interpreted as a transformation of the visibility idea: one might not see a person behind the person's role, so to speak, but this is far less likely behind an action.
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which can be referred to by one word) can be used after \textit{V} [in/into], whereas descriptions
cannot. Thus, one can use after \textit{V} [in/into] the word \textit{uchitel'} [teacher] but not a phrase like
\textit{tot kto ucit} [the one who teaches]. This fact can be interpreted as a transformation of the
visibility idea: one might not see a person behind the person's role, so to speak, but this is
far less likely behind an action.

Thus, the combinatorial constraints characteristic of abstract usage of the preposition
\textit{V} [in/into] with verbs of motion and location are related to the spatial usage of \textit{V} [in/into] with these verbs via typical expectations: one can interpret many of the
constraints revealed as metaphors of the expectations associated with spatial meanings.

An interesting question, of course, is what typical expectations are preserved as combinatorial
constraints associated with abstract meanings, and what are not. In general, it seems that much
more careful empirical work has to be done before we can answer this question. The analyses
presented in this work are too limited in number to provide us with a well-grounded elaboration
of Lakoff's "Invariance Hypothesis" concerning metaphors which says that "metaphorical mappings
preserve the cognitive topology [...] of the source domain" (Lakoff 1990: 54).

However, on the basis of the present limited body of research, and therefore, highly tentatively,
I could speculate that expectations connected with duration of events and their evaluation in terms
of being "good" or "bad" are likely to be preserved. It seems generally plausible that preserved
expectations are "conceptually simple", so to speak, and liable to rendering in terms of semantic
primitives.

I believe that in order to come closer to an understanding of how metaphor works it is crucial
to use descriptive tools which are fit for the task and enable one to elaborate on overgeneralized
claims like "emotions can be conceived of as containers". My own attempts to analyze
metaphorically motivated prepositional meanings, once again, prove the value of Natural Semantic
Metalanguage as a heuristic tool which helps one find and formulate clear and precise solutions.
Chapter X.
The semantics of new noun-focused metaphors.

0. Introduction.

The aim of this chapter is to investigate the interpretation of new (that is, not fully conventionalized) "noun-focused" metaphorical expressions in connection with their syntax. By "noun-focused" metaphors I mean those where a non-literally used word which has to be reinterpreted is a noun. I will describe the linguistic devices used to express new "noun-focused" metaphors in Russian and show how the syntax of a metaphor serves as a rough guide for its understanding.

Although this task is clearly distinct from the problems we were concerned with in the previous chapters, one can see them as cognate: in this chapter, as before, I seek to describe the meaning of some grammatical constructions which are used to convey semantic transfers. The main difference between the constructions considered in the previous chapters and in this last chapter is that the former were metaphorically motivated, but they were not new metaphors, whereas the latter are constructions used to phrase new metaphors.

It is important to emphasize from the very beginning that new metaphors are considered here as comparisons, that is, it is assumed that the meaning of any new metaphor M includes the component 'A is like B'. (By contrast, conventionalized metaphorically motivated expressions like those considered in the previous chapters need not include 'like' in their meaning).

The most detailed and well-known criticism of the comparison theory of metaphor is an essay by Max Black (Black 1962). According to Black, "when we have a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction." (Black 1962: 38). For
example, uttering and understanding the metaphor 'Man is a wolf' one thinks of a man as similar to a wolf, but one also thinks of a wolf as more human than it actually is.

Further, Black continually emphasizes the importance of 'the system of associated commonplaces' for understanding metaphors (i.e. "commonplaces" associated with metaphorically used words). Thus, using the metaphor 'Man is a wolf', "a speaker who says "wolf" is normally taken to be implying in some sense of that word that he is referring to something fierce, carnivorous, treacherous, and so on" (Black 1962: 39). Explaining what he means by "commonplaces", Black says that "the system of commonplaces may include half-truths or downright mistakes (as when a whale is classified as a fish); but the important thing for the metaphor's effectiveness is not that the commonplaces shall be true, but that they should be readily and freely evoked" (Black 1962: 40). Thus, "commonplaces" are what is normally described as a word's connotations.

Finally, according to Black, the literal meaning of words has nothing to do with their connotations: "what is needed is not so much that the reader shall know the standard dictionary meaning of "wolf" - or be able to use that word in literal senses - as that he shall know ...the system of associated commonplaces" (Black 1962: 40).

However, it is unclear why the importance of 'commonplaces associated with a word' or, in more widely accepted terms, connotations, justifies the main conclusion of Black's argument: metaphors do not have literal meaning which can be explained and paraphrased. To quote Black once again: "Suppose we try to state the cognitive content of an interaction-metaphor in "plain language". ...The set of literal statements so obtained will not have the same power to inform and enlighten as the original. ...The literal paraphrase inevitably says too much - and with the wrong emphasis." (Black 1962: 46).

The importance of 'commonplaces associated with a word', however, does not
necessarily prove that the comparison theory of metaphor is false.

Clearly, to understand such metaphors as 'man is a wolf', one has to apply the comparison to the entire meaning of the word wolf, i.e. including its connotations (such as 'cruelty', 'ferocity' etc.). Therefore if we want a definition of 'wolf' to account for this possibility of metaphorical transfer, then these connotations should be included in the definition.

It is worth saying that similar views were expressed within the framework of pragmatics: for example, Morgan claims that "the metaphor is calculated from a complete understanding, an enriched sort of meaning with all the pragmatic gaps filled in" (1979:139). Sperber and Wilson also mention that metaphors are based on stereotypical expectations associated with a concept which constitute what they call "encyclopaedic entries" (1986:86; 236).

However, connotations or stereotypical expectations associated with a word like wolf, probably differ in status. Thus, some expectations (like, for example, 'elephants never forget' for the word elephant) represent a piece of conventionalized language and therefore are likely candidates for including in the lexical meaning of the word (on the basis of "linguistic evidence" test as proposed by Wierzbicka (1985); for similar views see also Kovecses (1993)). Some other information (such as that elephants are endangered species), since it does not form part of any conventionalized expression (in English), should be left out.

From the point of view of formation of new metaphors, however, the situation seems more complicated. Some connotations are much more likely to be used as a basis of a metaphor, than others. On the other hand, no connotation of a word can be excluded as a possible basis of a metaphor.

However, even if some information normally considered to be a word's connotations
could and should be included in the dictionary entry, it is hardly possible to include in a word's definition all properties which can possibly be used as a basis for a new metaphor, however unexpected they can be. Therefore at least some connotations of a term which can be used as a basis for a metaphor should be left out of the definition and, probably, do not form part of the word's lexical meaning. To answer the question whether this would be a normal case or a rare one, one would have to undertake a separate study.

Getting back to Black's argument, it seems, indeed, that many metaphors leave some sense of uncertainty about the ground of comparison of A to B and can be understood in several more or less distinct ways. However, if a metaphor has a limited number of distinct interpretations, there is no reason why its meaning cannot be adequately conveyed in several distinct paraphrases. The feeling of inadequacy of any paraphrase might be caused by the inadequacy of any single paraphrase when we need a number of them to capture the meaning and not by the absence of a paraphrasable meaning of the metaphor.

A point of view which seems distantly similar to this hypothesis was discussed by Davidson (1979:44) and clearly expressed by Searle: "...there may be an indefinite range of paraphrases. For example, when Romeo says:

Juliet is the sun,

there may be a range of things he might mean." (Searle 1979: 83).

Presumably, what Searle meant when speaking of indeterminacy in the meaning of metaphors, is the feature of new metaphors rather than conventional ones. Metaphors underlying polysemy relationships in the lexicon seem to differ in this respect from new ones. Thus, the conventional metaphor 'a table's legs' does not allow, in fact, any indeterminacy of interpretation (unless it is reinterpreted as new).

It may be true and it has been emphasized a great many times that no new metaphor
can be paraphrased without an important loss in its effect on the hearer. But there is still a question of how the hearer reaches an understanding and what it is.

Little work has been dedicated so far to investigating in what way the meaning of a metaphoric expression is calculated on the basis of the corresponding literal meaning in the case of new metaphors. A book by Brook-Rose (1958) and an article by C.J. Cohen (1979) are some of a few examples.

If metaphorical meaning is somehow derived or calculated on the basis of the literal meaning, there should be something in the linguistic form of a metaphor which prompts the right interpretation (or a number of them). I will show that, in fact, the range of possible paraphrases of a metaphor is guided and limited by its syntax.

1. The metaphorical constructions in Russian.

Claiming that metaphorical constructions have a meaning, we accept as a working hypothesis, like before, the idea that grammatical constructions in general have a meaning which can be explicitly formulated (Langacker 1987; Wierzbicka 1988). The meaning of the five metaphorical constructions as listed below will be described and compared:

1. **A like B P**

   A like B P,

   where A is a noun denoting an object A' which is compared to something; B is a noun denoting B' to which A' is compared; P is a predicate (either a verb or an adjective);

   example:

   kogda širokaja ladon', kak rakovina, plameneja

   'when a wide palm is flaming like a shell' (Mandelštam).
Clauses of this structure are normally considered as similes, since they refer explicitly to comparison (by means of the word kak [like] and the predicate P1). In this study they are included under the general rubric of metaphor. This is not to say that there is no difference between similes and other metaphors. In fact, in what follows I will try to describe what exactly these differences are.

2. A nom B instr P2, where A nom is the nominative case of A and B instr is the instrumental case of B; example:

    ogon' podnimalsja stolbom
    fire NOM SG rise PAST column INSTR SG

'the fire was rising like a column';

3. A adj B, where A adj is an adjective derived from the noun A; example:

    sneznoe pokryvalo
    snow ADJ NOM SG cover NOM SG

'snow cover';

4. B adj A, where B adj is an adjective derived from the noun B; example:

    bronzovoe lico
    bronze ADJ NOM SG face NOM SG

'bronze face' ;

5. B nom A gen, where B nom is the nominative case of the noun B and A gen is the genitive case of the noun A; example:

    zoloto solnca
gold NOM SG sun GEN SG

'the gold of the sun'.

The actual order of the components in a metaphor is not important for our task. Therefore, a metaphor M is considered to belong to one of the five types listed above if M includes the same components as one of these metaphorical constructions, but the actual word order in M can be different from that indicated above. For example, the metaphor

(1) sny naplyvajut volnoj

dreams NOM PL drift PRES PL wave INSTR SG

'the dreams come like a wave' (Tolstaja)

in these terms, belongs to the type A nom B instr P2.

In what follows the hypotheses on meaning of constructions used to phrase metaphors will be based on restrictions on their mutual paraphrases. That is, the unacceptability of certain paraphrases of a metaphor will be particularly informative for our purpose. In a sense any phrase, perhaps, can be accepted as a new metaphor, especially if the hearer is forced to interpret it. When a paraphrase of a metaphor is claimed to be unacceptable below, it means that (a) according to the author's intuitions checked with other native speakers, a phrase sounds odd; (b) if it had to be accepted, it would have no "core interpretation" - a range of isolated understandings which do not overlap is possible.

1.1. The instrumental: the meaning of the construction A nom B instr P.

Different accounts of the Russian case system often agree that the instrumental is a complex case in terms of the range of meanings it can express (see, for example, Lomtev 1956). However, according to Kilby (1986), most approaches consider the instrumental
of instrument and the instrumental of agent among the most basic functions of the instrumental. As we will see, this can help understand the metaphorical usage of the instrumental.

1.1.1. Paraphrasing A kak B P1 via A nom B instr P2.

['the wind is as sharp as a knife' via 'the wind cuts with a knife'].

Transforming metaphors of the type A kak B P1 into those of the type A nom B instr P2 is possible when P1 is an active verb. In these cases, P1 coincides with P2, for example, instead of

(2) pes, kak zmeja, popolz na brjuxe

dog NOM SG like snake NOM SG crawl PST SG on belly LOC SG

'the dog like a snake crawled on his belly' (Bulgakov)

one can say

(3) pes zmeej popolz na brjuxe

dog NOM SG snake INSTR SG crawled PST SG on belly LOC SG

'the dog like a snake crawled on his belly'.

Instead of

(4) tramvaj gudel kak žmel'

tram NOM SG buzz PST SG like bee NOM SG

'the tram was buzzing like a bee' (Kaverin)

one can say

(5) tramvaj gudel Žmelem

The English examples in brackets here and below are meant to give a very general idea of the meaning and structure of the Russian construction and do not exactly correspond to the Russian metaphorical expressions.
Metaphors of the type $A \textit{kak} B \textit{P}1$, where $P1$ is an adjective, can be paraphrased via $A \textit{nom} B \textit{instr} P2$ if one can find an "appropriate" verb $P2$. For example, the metaphor

(6) $\textit{koljaska. legkaja.} \textit{kak motylek}$

cart NOM SG light NOM SG like moth NOM SG

'the cart is as light as a moth' (Mandelstam)

by adding a new meaning 'fly' can be changed into a metaphor of the type $A \textit{nom} B \textit{instr} P2$:

(7) $\textit{koljaska. proletela legkim motyl'kom}$

cart NOM SG flew PST SG light INSTR SG moth INSTR SG

'the cart flew like a light moth'.

Of course, introducing an additional verb into a metaphor of the type $A \textit{kak} B \textit{P}1$, one inevitably changes its meaning and the 'like' relation between $A$ and $B$ is interpreted as a similarity in action.

Interestingly, one cannot find an "appropriate" verb $P2$ when the comparison of $A$ to $B$ is not based on a similarity in action. For example, the metaphor

(8) $\textit{kvartira tixa kak bumaga}$

flat NOM quiet like paper NOM

'the flat is as quiet as the paper' (Mandelstam)

cannot be paraphrased via the construction $A \textit{nom} B \textit{instr} P2$. One cannot say, for example,

(9) $\textit{*kvartira mol'cit bumagoj}$

flat NOM SG keeps silence PRES SG paper INSTR SG

For the same reason it is impossible to paraphrase the metaphor
(10) _potom pojavilas' lysaja, kak tarelka._

then appear PST SG bald NOM SG like plate NOM SG

golova

head NOM SG

'then a head appeared, as bald as a plate' (Bulgakov)

as

(11) *_potom pojavilas' lysaja golova tarelkoj._

then appear PST SG bald NOM SG head NOM SG plate INSTR SG.

The comparison of a bald head to a plate is based, probably, on the appearance and has nothing to do with the action that the verb pojavit'sja [appear] refers to. So we can see again that a similarity in action between A and B is necessary for phrasing a metaphor via the construction _A nom B instr P2._

Metaphors of the type _A kak B P1_, where P1 is a passive participle, cannot be paraphrased via the construction _A nom B instr P2_ either. For example, instead of

(12) _lošad', raskormlennaja kak nosorog._

horse NOM SG overfed NOM SG like rhinoceros NOM SG

'a horse overfed as a rhinoceros' (Bulgakov)

one cannot say

(13) *_lošad' raskormili nosorogom._

horse NOM SG overfed PST PL rhinoceros INSTR SG.

Similarly, one cannot paraphrase

(14) _faetonščik, propečennyj kak izjum._

coachman NOM SG baked NOM SG like raisin NOM SG

'a coachman as baked as raisins' (Mandelštam)

as
coachman NOM SG baked PST SG raisin INSTR SG

These facts can be explained in the same way as before: the metaphorical construction A nom B instr P2 can be used only when the comparison of A to B is based on a "likeness" (from the speaker's point of view) in what they do.

1.1.2. Paraphrasing B nom A gen via A nom B instr P.

['the knife of the wind' via 'the wind cuts with a knife']

Metaphors of the type B nom A gen can be paraphrased via the construction A nom B instr P2 only if one can find an 'appropriate verb' P2 which always changes the sense of a metaphor to some extent (cf. the previous section). For example, if instead of

(16) past' rakoviny

mouth NOM SG shell GEN SG

'the mouth of a shell' (Tolstaja)

one says (using the construction A nom B instr P)

(17) rakovina raskrylas' past'ju

shell NOM SG opened PST SG mouth INSTR SG

'the shell opened its mouth'

the sense of the initial metaphor seems to be considerably distorted. Thus, in all the cases where metaphors of the type B nom A gen are paraphrased via those of the type A nom B instr P2, one has to add a verb P2, which would "fit in", that is, in fact, one has to interpret the comparison of A to B as similarity in action.

1.1.3. Paraphrasing A nom B instr P2 via B nom A gen.

['the wind cuts with a knife' via 'the knife of the wind']
Metaphors of the type A nom B instr P2 often cannot be paraphrased via the construction B nom A gen. This paraphrase is impossible when the basis of comparison of A to B is not obvious. In these cases, if the predicate P2 referring to the basis of comparison were omitted, a hearer would not be able to reconstruct P2 himself and therefore the metaphor phrased in the form B nom A gen would not be understood. For example, one cannot paraphrase

(18) dikoj utkoj vzovjotsja uprjok

wild INSTR SG duck INSTR SG fly up FUT SG reproach NOM SG

'the reproach will fly up like a wild duck' (Mandel štam).

as

(19) *dikaja utka uprjoka

wild NOM SG duck NOM SG reproach GEN SG

'the wild duck of reproach';

similarly, the metaphor

(20) solov'jom načinaet strekotat'

nightingale INSTR SG starts PRES SG chirp INF

sluxovoj apparat

acoustic NOM SG apparatus NOM SG

'the acoustic apparatus starts chirping like a nightingale'

cannot be paraphrased as

(21) *solovej sluxovogo apparata

nightingale NOM SG acoustic GEN SG apparatus GEN SG

'the nightingale of the acoustic apparatus'.

The clauses dikaja utka uprjoka [the wild duck of reproach] and solovej sluxovogo apparata [the nightingale of the acoustic apparatus] are perceived as unacceptable
because the hearer would never understand why uprijk [reproach] is compared to dikaja utka [wild duck] and sluxovoj apparat [acoustic apparatus] is compared to solovej [nightingale] until he is told what the speaker sees as a similarity. This is what the predicates vzov'jotsja [will fly up] and strekotat' [chirp] are needed for. Each of these predicates could be substituted with some other word referring to what is thought by the speaker to be a similarity between the two things compared, but these metaphors can hardly work without a predicate.

Metaphors of the type A nom B instr P2 can be transformed into the form B nom A gen if the omitted verb P2 can be easily reconstructed. For example, instead of

(22) volnami xodit trava
    waves INSTR PL go PRES SG grass NOM SG

'be grass moves in waves' (Tolstaja)

one can say

(23) volny travy
    waves NOM PL grass GEN SG

'waves of grass'

It seems that no meaning is lost through this paraphrase: one can think of volny travy [waves of grass] only in the situation when the grass xodit [goes/moves].

1.2. The genitive: the meaning of the metaphorical construction B nom A gen.

The genitive, according to some traditional accounts (see, for example, Peterson 1923) can express any semantic relation between two nouns. According to Mel'čuk (1986) the genitive in Russian does not have a meaning. When used metaphorically, the genitive does the least semantic narrowing of the type of the construction.
1.2.1. Paraphrasing A kak B P1 via B nom A gen.

['the wind is as sharp as a knife' via 'the knife of the wind']

Many metaphors of the type A kak B P1 cannot be paraphrased via the construction B nom A gen. For example, the metaphor

\[(24) \ kvartira \ tixa \ kak \ bumaga\]

flat NOM SG quiet like paper NOM SG

'a flat is as quiet as paper' (Mandel'stam)

cannot be paraphrased via the construction of the type B nom A gen: the expression

\[(25) \ *\ bumaga \ kvartiry\]

paper NOM SG flat GEN SG

'the paper of a flat'

can be hardly interpreted at all. Similarly,

\[(26) \ lysaja, \ kak \ tarelka, \ golova\]

bald NOM SG like plate NOM SG head NOM SG

'a head bald as a plate' (Bulgakov)

cannot be replaced with

\[(27) \ *\ tarelka \ golovy\]

plate NOM head GEN

'(his) plate of a head'.

Sometimes, however, metaphors of the type A kak B P1 can be paraphrased via the metaphorical construction B nom A gen. For example, the metaphor

\[(28) \ gladkoe, \ kak \ zerkalo, \ ozero\]

smooth NOM SG like mirror NOM SG lake NOM SG

'the lake smooth as a mirror'

can be readily paraphrased as
The genitive construction does the least semantic narrowing of the type of comparison, and therefore metaphors of the type \textbf{B nom A gen} are limited to more obvious similarities, where the hearer can reconstruct the basis of comparison on his/her own. If, however, one cannot expect the hearer to guess why A is like B without an explanation, metaphors of the type \textbf{A kak B Pl} cannot be paraphrased via the construction \textbf{B nom A gen} (cf. the examples above). Consequently, once a more explicit comparison including \textit{kak} [like] has been made, the corresponding metaphors of the type \textbf{B nom A gen} would be possible as long as the hearer can be expected to remember the simile. For example, once the metaphor

(30) \textbf{lysaja kak tarelka ego golovy}

'bald NOM SG like plate NOM SG head NOM SG'

appeared, the head could be referred to, perhaps, as

(31) \textbf{tarelka ego golovy}

'plate NOM SG his head GEN SG'

while the hearer can be expected to bear in mind the previous explicit comparison.

1.2.2. Paraphrasing \textbf{B nom A gen} via \textbf{A kak B Pl}.

['the wind of the knife' via 'the wind is as sharp as a knife']

Unexpectedly, metaphors of the type \textbf{B nom A gen} cannot always be paraphrased via those of the type \textbf{A kak B Pl}. For example, the metaphor

(29) \textbf{zerkalo ozera}

'mirror NOM SG lake GEN SG'

'\textit{the mirror of the lake}'
cannot be paraphrased as

(33) *bas ______ kak kloč'ja ______ (doletal do menja)

bass NOM SG like scraps NOM PL reached me

'the bass reached me like scraps'

Similarly, the metaphor

(34) advokatov ______ žalo

lawyers GEN PL sting NOM SG

'the sting of lawyers' (Mandelštam)

cannot be paraphrased as

(35) *advokaty ______ kak žalo

lawyers NOM PL like sting NOM SG

'lawyers are like a sting'.

These data can plausibly be accounted for if we admit that in the examples above the genitive case of the noun B is used to convey two semantic relations. First, there is a 'like' relation between A and B and, second, a 'part-whole' relation between A and B. In other words, not the whole A is like B, but some part of A. Thus, not Agapenov's low voice as a whole is compared to kloč'ja [scraps], but some part of what was said by Agapenov in his low voice is thought of as scraps. Obviously, not advokaty [lawyers] are compared to žalo [stings], but parts of lawyers' bodies, perhaps, hands or tongues or both, which can be thought of as poisonous, committing subversive actions and so on.
Even in cases when it is not quite clear what part of A is compared to B, a 'part-whole' relation might still be present in the meaning of a metaphor. When these metaphors are paraphrased in the form A kak B Pl the meaning 'part of A is like B' is replaced by a quite different meaning 'A is like B'. This is why the paraphrase via the construction A kak B Pl is either impossible or completely changes the meaning of a metaphor of the type B nom A gen.

1.2.3. The hearer's hypotheses about the meaning of the metaphors of the type B nom A gen.

Metaphors of the type B nom A gen are the most indeterminate from the point of view of possible interpretations. The only meaning that the speaker conveys explicitly when uttering metaphors of this type is: 'I say: A is like B'. The speaker does not say anything about the ground of comparison of A to B, when uttering metaphors of the type B nom A gen. To understand a metaphor of this type, the hearer has to guess why A is like B for the speaker, that is, to reconstruct the basis of comparison of A to B or, at least, to put forward some hypothesis about it. What is the structure of this hypothesis, what does it look like?

It appears that when the hearer is interpreting metaphors of the type B nom A gen he/she often makes up several hypotheses about the ground of comparison of A to B. Some of the possible hypotheses are more detailed than others.

For example, consider the metaphor

(36) želoba ulic

gutter NOM PL street GEN PL

'the gutters of streets' (Tolstaja)
(37) **Veter rečnoj, veter sadovyj... nesutsja v pustyx želobax ulic**

'The river wind and the garden wind rush in the empty gutters of streets'.

To understand what the metaphor želoba ulic [gutters of streets] means, the hearer has to make up a hypothesis as to why streets are like gutters for the speaker. Generally, the speaker's idea seems to be that the wind rushes in streets like water does in gutters. What do these streets look like? One can think that (a) streets are like gutters because they are narrow; (b) it might be that streets are like gutters because they are dark; and (c) one can combine the previous two hypotheses and think that streets are like gutters because they are narrow and dark.

Similarly, the interpretation of the metaphor

(38) **klena zubčataja lapa**

maple SG GEN angular NOM SG paw NOM SG

'the angular paw of a maple leaf' (Mandel'štam)

also seems indeterminate to some extent. First, one can think that a leaf of maple is compared to a paw because the leaf is zubčatyj [angular] and resembles a paw by its shape. Second, it is possible that the ground of comparison is not only shape, but also colour: the leaf is reddish and this makes it (along with its shape) similar to a paw.

The possible hypotheses that a hearer makes up when trying to understand metaphors of the type **B nom A gen** may vary in detail. It seems that the hearer could think something like the following: (the speaker says that) A is like B, because A has the feature P1 and B has the feature P1 or because A has the features P1 and P2 and B has the features P1 and P2 or because A has the features P1, P2 and P3 and B has the features P1, P2 and P3 etc.

1.3. The adjectival constructions A adj B and B adj A.
The semantics of Russian adjectival phrases consisting of a noun and an adjective derived from another noun present nearly the same problems as noun compounds do in English. As it has been shown by many authors, noun compounds can be based, it seems, on an indefinite range of semantic relations between two nouns, although one can try to pinpoint a limited number of the most important (that is, most frequent) possibilities (Levi 1976; Shoben 1991), such as: N1 causes N2 (heat rash); N2 uses N1 (gas stove); N2 is located at N1 (city riots); N2 for N1 (eye drops); N1 has N2 (lemon peel) and N2 made of N1 (sugar cube).

The same applies to adjectival phrases consisting of a noun and an adjective derived from another noun. Thus, the examples above, when translated into Russian, will be turned into adjectival phrases of the structure N1 adj N2 (where N1 adj is an adjective derived from a noun). As with noun compounds in English, it seems that when interpreting Russian adjectival phrases of the structure N1 adj N2 the hearer often reconstructs the relation between N1 and N2 specifically for each single adjectival construction. The only thing known to the hearer beforehand is that 'there is a relation between N1 and N2' and he/she has to guess what it is (cf. Downing 1977).

However, it seems that only a few of the semantic relations which can possibly be expressed by adjectival phrases in Russian can be turned into metaphors. Indeed, a phrase can be understood as a metaphor after it has become obvious that its literal interpretation is not compatible with the context. The interpretation of an adjectival construction as general as 'there is a relation between N1 and N2' can hardly be clearly incompatible with a context. Actually, we do not know what really happens when an adjectival phrase is interpereted as metaphorical (as we do not know what happens when noun compounds in English are interpreted as metaphorical). Hypothetically, the important thing is that adjectives derived from some nouns in phrases of the type N1 adj
N2 have a much narrower sense than 'related to N1' and therefore their meaning can be found to be incompatible with a context, thus signalling the need for non-literal interpretation. For example, the adjectives золотой [golden], серебряный [silver], железный [iron] normally modify nouns referring to material things and should be understood in the sense 'made of the material denoted by the corresponding noun'. Therefore when applied to something that cannot be made of these materials, the adjectives have to be reinterpreted.

Among all of the semantic relations possible between N1 and N2 in adjectival phrases of the type N1 adj N2 only a few have been found to be actually used as a basis for metaphors: 'is made of' (either N1 made of N2 or N2 made of N1 ) and 'body-part' (N2 is a part of the body of the creature denoted by N1, for example, crocodile skin). This does not mean, of course, that metaphors can never be based on other semantic relations of these underlying adjectival phrases.

Other relations underlying adjectival phrases, such as 'N2 is located at N1' can be used as a basis for metaphors, though, it seems, only rarely (one can say, for example, комната была заплита каким-то марсианским светом [the room was flooded with a martian light]).

Some adjectival phrases, such as based on the relation 'N1 causes N2', probably are not used metaphorically because it seems hardly possible that the relation 'N1 causes N2' could be obviously falsified in a context. Another reason why adjectival phrases of this type do not function as metaphors may be that only relations which can be perceived by human senses, can be turned into metaphors.

The discussion of metaphorical usage of adjectival phrases below aims at describing only the most frequent and important possibilities.
1.3.1. The construction B adj A.

The metaphorical construction B adj A can be used to convey two distinct meanings. First, metaphors of the type B adj A can convey the idea that A is "perceptually" similar to B:

(39) mednaja luna

copper ADJ NOM SG moon NOM SG

'a copper moon';

(40) atlasnaja koža

satin ADJ NOM SG skin NOM SG

'satiny skin';

(41) svirel'nyj golos

pipe ADJ voice

'a voice as tender as a pipe'.

"Perceptual similarity" of A to B means that A either looks like B (as in the case of mednaja luna [a copper moon]) or sounds like B (as in the case of svirel'nyj golos [a voice as tender as a pipe]) or feels like B to the touch (as in the case of atlasnaja koža [satiny skin]). Sometimes metaphors of the type B adj A refer to "perceptual similarity" which is, perhaps, based on several different senses. Thus, barxatnye lapy [velvety paws] means that lapy [paws] feel to the touch like velvet, but it can also mean that they look like velvet.

A metaphorically-used adjective can be interpreted in different ways when used in different metaphors. For example,

(42) kamennoe lico

stone ADJ NOM SG face NOM SG
'stone face'

means, roughly, that a face is as expressionless as stone. However, the same adjective kamennyj used in the metaphor

(43) kamennyj xleb

stone ADJ NOM SG bread NOM SG

'stone hard bread'

will certainly be understood in a different way: in the sense that bread is as hard as stone.

Similarly, the metaphor

(44) vatnye oblaka

cottonwool ADJ PL NOM cloud NOM PL

'cottonwool-like clouds'

would be interpreted in the sense that clouds look like cottonwool, whereas the same adjective vatnye in the metaphor

(45) vatnye nogi

cottonwool ADJ PL NOM foot NOM PL

'feet as numb as cottonwool'

would mean that somebody's feet did not feel anything as if they were made from cottonwool.

Metaphors of the type B adj A can also convey the idea of similarity of body parts: for example,

(46) obez'jan'i guby

monkey ADJ NOM SG lips NOM PL

'lips of a monkey';

(47) jastrebinj nos

hawk ADJ NOM SG nose NOM SG
I

'hawkish nose'

A slightly different type can be illustrated by the metaphors medvežij bas [bear ADJ bass], košač'ja poxodka [cat ADJ gait], lis'i povadki [fox ADJ manners], bul'dož'ja xvatka [bulldog ADJ grip]. In these cases the nouns refer not to actual body-parts, but rather to something which is characteristic of an animal's body (such as bas [bass], poxodka [gait] etc.).

1.3.2. The construction A adj B.

The construction A adj B is used more rarely than B adj A and conveys, roughly, the following idea: A is "perceptually similar" to B. For example, the metaphor

(48) pletka ruč'evaja

lash NOM SG stream ADJ NOM SG

'the lash of streams' (Mandelštam)

in the context

(49) 'I rasxaživaet liven' s dlínnoj pletkoj ruč'evoj' *and the rain walks with a long lash of streams' (Mandelštam)

means, perhaps, that the streams of rain hurt like a lash and may be also that they look like a lash. Similarly, the phrase

(50) cvetočnyj kovjor

flower ADJ NOM SG rug NOM SG

'the rug of flowers'

means that flowers look to someone (the speaker, presumably) like a rug and may be also that they feel as soft as a rug, say, when sitting on them. Similarly, the metaphor

(51) snežnyj ulej

snow ADJ NOM SG beehive NOM SG
'snow beehive'

can be understood in several different ways: first, one can think that (1) flying snowflakes look like bees; (2) the sound of a howling snow-storm is similar to that of bees buzzing; (3) snowflakes falling on someone's skin hurt like stinging bees. Any combination of these three possibilities also seems to be a possible interpretation of the metaphor snežnyj ulej.

1.3.3. Paraphrasing metaphors of the type A adj B and B adj A via each other.

['gold banana' via 'banana gold']

Metaphors of the type A adj B and B adj A can seldom be paraphrased via each other. It is possible to do so when (1) there are adjectives derived from both nouns A and B, and (2) the material that A consists of is compared to that of B. For example, instead of

(52) zolotye banany
    golden NOM PL bananas NOM PL
    'golden bananas'

one can say

(53) bananovoe zoloto
    banana ADJ NOM SG gold NOM SG
    'banana gold';

instead of

(54) mednaja luna
    copper ADJ NOM SG moon NOM SG
    'copper moon'

one can say

(55) lunnaja med'
    moon ADJ NOM SG copper NOM SG
    'copper moon'
moon ADJ NOM SG copper NOM SG

'moon copper'.

Paraphrases of this kind always shift the focus of the construction to another word and, consequently, change to some extent the meaning of a metaphor. Thus, in the metaphor zolotye banany [gold ADJ bananas] the comparison starts from banany [bananas] and the purpose of the phrase is to tell that they look as if they were of zoloto [gold]. As for bananovoe zoloto [banana ADJ gold], the comparison is reversed and more complicated. On the one hand, something is told about zoloto [gold] - it is not real gold but banana gold. On the other hand, the hearer has to guess in the end that it is all not about gold but again about bananas - they look like gold.

A possible explanation of the fact that metaphors of the type A adj B are rare is connected with the normal topic/focus structure of a metaphor and that of an adjectival phrase. Thus, according to C.J. Cohen (1979), in a metaphor normally the word A referring to an object compared to something is topical, whereas B referring to what A is compared to, corresponds to the comment. As for adjectival phrases, here the noun is topical and the adjective contains the comment. Therefore, in metaphors of the type B adj A, both the comparison of A to B and the adjectival structure indicate that A is topical and B is the comment. On the other hand, metaphors of the type A adj B correspond to two conflicting topic/focus structures: in a metaphor A should be topical and B should be the comment, but the structure of the adjectival phrase signals the opposite.

2. The meanings of the metaphorical constructions: explications.

Let us sum up briefly the analysis of mutual paraphrases between the metaphorical constructions discussed.
Metaphors of the type **B nom A gen** (e.g. *zoloto solnca* [the gold of the sun]) are the most indeterminate from the point of view of possible understandings. To understand metaphors of this type the hearer has to reconstruct on his own the ground of comparison of A to B, that is, the reason why A is like B for the speaker.

Metaphors of the type **B adj A** have two distinct meanings: (1) A is compared to an animal B's body-part, e.g. *ryb'i glaza* [fish-like eyes]; (2) A is compared to the material B, e.g. *xrustal'nye glaza* [crystalline eyes]. Metaphors of this latter type refer to perceptual similarity between A and B, most often visual, but not always (cf. for example, *atlasnaja koža* [satiny skin]).

Metaphors of the type **A adj B** convey the idea that A is "perceptually similar" to B. The "perceptual similarity" referred to is most often visual, but not always: cf., for example, the metaphor *snežnoe pokryvalo* [snow cover] where the comparison of snow to cover is based, perhaps, (apart from the fact that snow actually covers earth) on snow being as soft as a cover. Sometimes metaphors of this type can be interpreted as referring simultaneously to different sources of perception (i.e. senses). Some metaphors of this type can be understood in several different ways corresponding to different combinations of possible sources of perceptual information (cf. the discussion of the meaning of *snežnyj ulej* [snow beehive ] in the previous section). On the other hand, in many cases one's own experience allows the hearer to exclude all kinds of possible perceptual similarity between A and B except one.

The constructions **A kak B P1** and **A nom B instr P2** are less indeterminate from the point of view of possible interpretations. **A kak B P1** means that A is like B because they share a common feature **P1** (from the speaker's point of view, which is, of course, not necessarily "objective"). **A nom B instr P2** conveys the same idea with one elaboration: **P2** cannot be just any feature, but must be a similarity in action.
The possible interpretations of the metaphorical constructions (1) *A kak B Pl*; (2) *A nom B instr P2*; (3) *B adj A*; (4) *A adj B* are explicated below. To account for the possibility of combination of different sources of perception the component 'see/hear/feel' (which violates, strictly speaking, the limits allowed by the syntax of NSM) will be used.

Two points should be made in connection with the explications below. First, as has been emphasized by many authors (see, for example, (Beardsley 1962)) metaphors are not necessarily based on a similarity between A and B existing in the real world. Often metaphors refer only to the speaker's impression of similarity between A and B and therefore the component 'I say' precedes the component 'A is like B' in the explications given below. In other words, the message 'A is like B', in the case of non-conventional metaphors, is the speaker's point of view, which has nothing to do with objective truth.

Second, including the counterfactual component 'if I did not know...I could think' in the explications (3) and (4a) we assume that uttering a new metaphor (that is, saying something literally false), the speaker by this very fact confirms that he himself does not actually think that 'A is B' (for (3)) nor that 'A is made of B' (for 4 (a)). In other words, the metaphorical usage seems to imply a certain level of mental reflection about what one could think if one did not know what an object really is.

Explications.

(1) *A kak B Pl* : tramvaj žužžal kak šmel' [the tram was buzzing like a bee]; kvartira tixa kak bumaga [the flat is quiet like paper].

(a) *I say: A does/is something (P1)*

(b) *B does/is something (P1)*

(c) *because of this I say:*

\[ A \text{ is like } B \]
(2) A nom B instr P2: son naplyvaet prozračnoj volnoj [the dream floats [comes] like a transparent wave].

(a) I say: A does something (P2)
(b) B does something (P2)
(c) because of this I say:

A is like B

(3) A adj B: moxovaja poduška [moss pillow].

(a) when I see/hear/feel A I think:

if I did not know that A is not B

I could think that A is B

(b) because of this I say:

A is like B

(4a) B adj A: bronzovoe lico [bronze face]

(a) when I see/hear/feel A I think:

if I did not know that A is not made of B

I could think that A is made of B

(b) because of this I say:

A is like B

(4b) B adj A: jastrebinyj nos [hawkish nose]

A semantically complex expression 'A is made of B' can be explicated, in its own turn, as follows:

A is made of B = (a) someone did something to B (before now)
(b) because of this there is A (now)
(a) when I see/hear/feel A I think: 

    if I did not know that A is not a part of the body of the animal B

    I could think that A is a part of the animal's B body

(b) because of this I say:

    A is like a part of the B's body

The definitions above do not cover, of course, everything that one can think of when hearing a metaphor. They focus on just one aspect of the interpretation of metaphors: the role of a particular syntactic construction used to phrase a given metaphor.

3. Conclusion.

The restrictions on mutual paraphrases between the metaphorical constructions in Russian are determined by differences in meaning between the constructions. Paraphrasing a metaphor phrased in a certain way via another metaphorical construction, one changes a range of acceptable interpretations of the metaphor.

Although many metaphors allow several different interpretations, the range of possible understandings is always constrained by the syntax of the metaphorical constructions.
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