THE JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY AND DEFENCE POLICY
IN THE 1980s

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I certify that this sub-thesis is my own original work and that all sources used have been acknowledged.

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INTRODUCTION

Japan's past defence policy has basically been framed by the tension between the US-Japan Security Treaty and the pacifist Constitution of Japan. Article 9 of the Constitution stipulates that,

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised.

The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) has always regarded itself as the sentinel guarding the Constitution, ensuring that the Constitution will not be revised by the party in power, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Even though the JSP, as the largest opposition party in Japan, has been unable to keep the LDP to a strict interpretation of Article 9 - the non-maintenance of military forces - the JSP, by playing an inhibitive role, has made it difficult for the LDP to go beyond the loose interpretation of Article 9 - the right of defensive defence for Japan without the capability to project military power abroad.

1. The JSP has not been in power at the national level except for a brief period as one component in a coalition government between 1947 and 1948.
Why study the JSP and Defence Policy in the 1980's?

One reason why the JSP has been considered to be relatively insignificant as a factor in the formulation of Japan's defence policy and in the ongoing national debate on defence is because the JSP has been a perennial opposition party. Moreover, it has been suffering from long term electoral decline. The party is unlikely to hold power in the foreseeable future, at least in its own right. Thus, the argument goes, the JSP never had and never will have any important input to Japan's defence policy.

The party's adherence to "unarmed neutrality" is based on a strict reading of Article 9. It has often been pointed out that such an interpretation is too "idealistic" and naive for any states to adopt.

"Unarmed Neutrality" has also been criticised as a slogan rather than a policy. It has often been perceived as a notion with no concrete or feasible proposals as to how such a scheme could be put into effect. Moreover, unarmed neutrality has been seen as the object of an "intra-party game" and is designed for internal party consumption rather than for a feasible policy for the security of Japan.

Given the consistently strong American pressure on Japan to increase its contribution to the alliance, "there is a tendency to overestimate the effect of US influence on Japanese policy and underestimate the
constraints arising from the domestic political process".  

The major variables within the domestic setting which have influenced the formulation of defence policy and the national debate on defence are: the factionalised LDP; the Japanese bureaucracy; the defence community; public opinion, the press and the opposition parties. Even though the JSP is but one variable amidst a host of others, it is still an important and complex variable, being influenced and also influencing some of the other variables in turn.

Even if the JSP is to remain in permanent opposition, it can deny the LDP the Diet consensus it seeks on certain defence related issues. One example is provided by Prime Minister Nakasone's attempt to breach the 1% GNP ceiling on defence spending in 1985. The JSP scored a symbolic victory when Nakasone promised to adhere to the 1% GNP barrier for the time being in the face of the JSP's threat to boycott the Diet's Budget proceeding. If the LDP attempts to ram its policy through the Diet, the JSP can adopt obstructionist tactics causing a rupture in the smooth running of parliamentary proceedings. A JSP boycott would undermine the LDP's Diet programme including other legislation on other important matters of government.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom that the JSP plays only a "negative" or restrictive role in the formulation of defence policy, the party has exercised its initiative in defence policy formulation through interpellations in the Diet. Takuya Kubo, the one-time Secretary General of the National Defence Council, pointed out that one important way whereby Japan's defence policy is determined and clarified is by the "items on which opposition parties present opinions during Diet deliberations with decisions reached through government administrative replies to the opposition".\(^3\) Kubo further elaborated,

There are a considerable number of defence policy measures which have been adopted through the government's replies to opposition party questions and opinions during the course of Diet deliberations; for example, the limits of war potential and self-defence strength in relation to Article 9 of the Constitution, prohibition of conscription and dispatch of forces overseas, the three non-nuclear principles, whether or not possession of nuclear submarines is possible, the scope of the "Far East" referred to in Article 6 of the US-Japan Security Treaty, the substance of prior consultation in relation to that same treaty, the three principles on the export of weaponry, removal of the bombing equipment and mid-air refuelling capability of the F-4 fighter aircraft, etc. \(^4\)

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3. Takuya Kubo, "Japanese Defence Policy: Decision-Making Process and Background", June 1978, p.4. (The source of this article is not known. The article is kept at the library of the Australia-Japan Centre, Australian National University.)

4. ibid.
By asking leading questions, trying to pin the LDP down to specific defence issues, and attempting to force the LDP to clarify and to make a commitment to a particular position on defence, the JSP is actually making an indirect contribution to the formulation of Japan's defence policy.

The JSP's unarmed neutrality policy has often been dismissed for being "unrealistic". It has, however, often been misunderstood. The current dominant view within the JSP considers that unarmed neutrality is achievable only at the end of a long, indeterminable process. Moreover, the JSP affirms that it is not so impractical to abrogate the Security Treaty or to disband the Self Defence Forces (SDF) immediately upon obtaining power through a coalition government.

Interviews with the Chairman of the party, Masahi Ishibashi, and various key factional leaders within the JSP, revealed that the dominant, though not unanimous, view is that when the socialists come into power, Japan will at the first stage remain temporarily within the alliance. During the second stage, Japan will leave the alliance and go through a process of Armed Neutrality. At this stage of armed neutrality, the JSP will attempt to decrease its armaments. The ideal goal of unarmed neutrality at the final stage will be attempted only if international and domestic conditions are favourable.
Thus, the operational policy of the JSP is to remain temporarily within the Security Treaty arrangement and then at some later stage, adopt the position of armed neutrality for Japan. It is hoped that it will be armed neutrality with only limited military capability. The declaratory policy is that unarmed neutrality will be sought at the final stage of the process. Since the conditions for unarmed neutrality are extremely difficult to fulfill, what the JSP's defence thinking amounts to is actually armed neutrality for Japan.

Why has the JSP not made explicit their real intentions of armed neutrality for Japan? This question will be dealt with in this thesis.

It is true that unarmed neutrality has been used as a slogan for election purposes. In addition, the JSP has sought to contrast itself from the LDP, to attack the LDP for "militaristic" tendencies in mass mobilisation protests against the presence of American military bases in Japan, and to instil a sense of ideological purpose and commitment among the party's rank and file. Yet it cannot be said that the JSP lacks a defence policy. For, at another level, the JSP has well elaborated views on five interlocking sets of issues. They are:

5. To make the analysis of defence policy more manageable, the focus will be on these five interrelated areas. This framework will subsequently also be applied to the individual JSP factions' defence policies. The last four categories have been adopted from Mike Mochizuki, "Japan's Search
(1) The party's official world view and conception of international relations;
(2) The question of threat to Japan;
(3) The desirability of the US-Japan Alliance and its alternatives;
(4) The constitutional, legal and treaty framework of defence policy;
(5) The appropriate military force and posture.

Since unarmed neutrality is the hallmark of the party, the JSP has always maintained a special interest in defence policy. The JSP also maintains a Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee within its Policy Board. The JSP has oftentimes set up special project teams to study defence issues and also to re-evaluate its own defence policies.

Why study the 1980's in relation to JSP's Defence Policy?

The 1980's is an interesting period to study because the JSP has come under increasing pressure from the factions on the right wing of the party, the


Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the Komeito, the JSP's potential coalition parties; and from the trade unions supportive of the JSP to shift towards more "realistic" policies.

Internationally, the JSP's hope for the evolution of a peaceful environment, a crucial condition for the pursuit of unarmed neutrality, was further shaken by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. This event contributed to the demise of detente between the superpowers. The steady Soviet military buildup in North East Asia has lent credence to the view, for many Japanese, that there is a potential Soviet threat to Japan. The US has continued to apply pressure on Japan to increase its contributions to the alliance and for greater joint collaboration within the US global strategic framework.

Domestically, the LDP has been testing the constraints on Japan's defence posture. The DSP and

7. The 1954 Self Defence Force Law outlaws conscription, prevents the SDF from undertaking military operations overseas and restricts the Japanese air, naval and ground forces to defensive operations, and then only in the event of an attack on the nation. The legally non-binding Principles that have been established by policy decision include: Japan's Three Principles on Armed Export (1967); the Government Policy Guideline on Arms Export (1976); the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (1967) banning the production, possession and the introduction into Japan of nuclear weapons; and the 1% GNP ceiling on annual military spending (1976). For a summary of the various constraints, see Aurelia George, op.cit, p.4.
Komeito have continued to shift closer to the LDP's position on defence. Public opinion has increasingly grown to accept the Security Treaty and the SDF.

It is in this difficult milieu that the JSP's defence policy and its changes or inability to change is studied.

The Key Concerns of the Thesis

The focus of this study is how factional politics within the JSP, the quest for a coalition government with other parties, and the symbiotic relationship with Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions) have had an impact on the JSP's defence policy. It will analyse the extent to which the JSP's defence policy has changed over the years.

In 1983, the JSP, in order to revamp its moribund image, adopted the slogan of a "New JSP". In 1985, at the December Party Convention, an attempt was made to drop the party's Marxist baggage and to adopt the

8. Nevertheless, 30% of Japanese public opinion still prefers the policy of unarmed neutrality for Japan at the turn of the decade. See Asahi, March 25, 1981. Moreover, Ishibashi's book On Unarmed Neutrality published in 1980, has become a bestseller in Japan. Even though not everyone who buys his book will necessarily subscribe to his reasoning, it still indicates a substantial interest in unarmed neutrality as a defence option for Japan. The English edition was titled Unarmed Neutrality: A Path to World Peace. (Organ newspaper Bureau, Socialist Party of Japan, Tokyo, 1985.) The author told me that 300,000 copies of his book had already been sold.
"New Declaration", an ideological platform which subscribes to social democracy. Have these moves made any impact on the JSP's defence policy? Has the JSP's defence policy in the 1980's been different from its policy of the past? In short, how and when did changes occur in its defence policy and what is the significance of these changes? This study will attempt to answer these questions and will conclude by canvassing the problems and prospects of the JSP's operational policy of armed neutrality and its declaratory policy of unarmed neutrality.
CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND : THE JSP AND DEFENCE POLICY (1949-80)

This chapter will examine landmarks in the JSP's defence policy between 1949 and 1980. It will examine the changes, the failed attempts to change, the compromises and the consequences of not compromising on the party's defence policy.

The important landmarks are:

(i) Party Schisms of 1951 and 1959;
(ii) Proposed Ishibashi Plan of 1966;
(iii) Adoption of the Ishibashi Plan in 1969;

Party Schisms and Defence: 1951 and 1959

Defence policy has always been a contentious and a divisive issue for the JSP. It has threatened, on two occasions, the very stability of the party. This has been the result of ideological incompatibilities between the left and right factions of the JSP.¹

In brief, the marxist-oriented Suzuki faction perceived international relations as a contradiction

between capitalism and socialism. It distrusted the US as the archetypal capitalist state and conversely did not see socialist Russia as a threat. The capitalist states were seen to be warmongers while the socialist states, by definition, were peace-loving. Thus, they did not see any need for the Security Treaty because the USSR was not seen to be a threat to Japan. Such a treaty, they feared, could drag Japan into a war of the US's making. The alliance would also push Japan into rearmament with such a course serving US interests rather than the interests of Japan. Rearmament was also seen to be provocative and upsetting not only to Japan's immediate neighbours but also to the other Asian countries that had fallen under the yoke of Japanese militarism during the Second World War. Rearmament would be economically wasteful and could be politically and socially destabilising given the pre-war propensity of military interference in politics. The Suzuki faction sought a strict observation of Article 9 of the Constitution. It felt that unarmed neutrality was consistent with both the spirit and the letter of the Constitution. Hence, unarmed neutrality was considered to be the most appropriate policy for the JSP and Japan. To fulfill

2. The lineage of the Suzuki faction can be traced back to the pre-war Labour-Farmer faction (Ronoha) which in the late 1920's began propagating a one stage revolutionary strategy for Japan. Cole, Totten and Uyehara, ibid., pp.6-7, pp.278-279 and Stockwin, ibid., pp.20-23.
this, Japan should immediately both revoke the Security Treaty and disband the SDF.

In contrast, the right wing Nishio faction subscribed to democratic socialism. It perceived international relations as a struggle between democracy and communism. Its members were sympathetic towards the West; they feared communist Russia. While they had reservations about the unequal aspects of the Security Treaty, the Nishio faction nevertheless saw the utility of the alliance as a deterrence against the USSR. The Nishio faction subsequently even contemplated the amendment of Article 9 of the Constitution in order to legitimise the right of self defence by military means. Thus, they did not believe in unarmed neutrality.

The Party Congress of January 1951 was preoccupied with the question of rearmament. The Nishio faction advocated the right of self-defence within the western camp against the perceived communist threat. The Suzuki faction countered with a resolution that endorsed the "three peace principles": a peace treaty with all the belligerent powers; permanent neutrality; no foreign military bases in Japan. A fourth "peace principle" - "opposition to rearmament" - was added by the left.

3. The lineage of the Nishio faction can be traced back to the more conservative Social Democratic Party which was formed in 1926. This group known as the Socio-democratic Clique (Shamin-kei) advocated reforms rather than revolution. Cole, Totten and Uyehara, ibid., pp.6-7, 295.
Thus, unarmed neutrality was affirmed as the official party policy as the Suzuki faction succeeded in obtaining a majority support at the Party Congress. The opposition of the Nishio faction to unarmed neutrality was to no avail as the factional balance of power had shifted against them since 1949.

The JSP was split asunder in October 1951 when the party could not agree on the stance to be taken towards the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Mutual Security Treaty signed with the US in September 1951. At opposite ends of the spectrum within the party, the Nishio faction supported the two treaties while the Suzuki faction opposed them. It took four years before a remarriage of convenience was effected. Security issues, once again, proved to be the most intractable problem for the reunion.

The "Locarno" concept of 1925, whereby the frontiers of France and Belgium were guaranteed by Germany, Belgium, France, Britain and Italy, became the basis for the eventual reunification of the left and right socialists. It was hoped that non-aggression treaties between Japan, the USSR, China and the US could be signed

4. This was partly a reaction against the right wing of the JSP which had participated in the unstable Katayama and Ashida coalition governments. The JSP suffered its worst ever defeat at the polls as the party was considered to be inept by the electorate. Stockwin, op. cit., p.35.

5. ibid., p.71.
so that neutrality for Japan would be tenable.

Two aspects of the Security Treaty were shrouded in ambiguity so that both sides could interpret them to their own satisfaction. Firstly, the time frame for the abolition of the Security Treaty was not mentioned. The left could emphasise the abolition of the Security Treaty while the right could make this dependent on the prior establishment of the four power non-aggression treaty.

Another ambiguity was whether the Treaty should be revised or abolished. The right wanted a revision and to retain it while the left wanted to abolish it. The compromise solution was to juxtapose the two contradictory terms "revise" and "abolish" together in order to read: The JSP would "revise-abolish" the Security Treaty!

As for the SDF, the left made a tactical concession by not insisting, as they had previously, on an immediate demobilisation of the SDF. It was agreed that any reduction in the SDF would have to be done gradually. To be logically consistent, either option (to do away with the Security Treaty before or after the establishment of a Locarno-type system in North East Asia) would mean that Japan would have to go through a process of armed neutrality, since the SDF was not to be abolished immediately.

If armed neutrality could be deduced from the party's official defence policy of 1955, why was it not

6. ibid., pp.75-78.
mentioned? Could it be that the JSP's policy was logically inconsistent? One crucial reason why the JSP could not be explicit about armed neutrality was because the left factions would be vehemently against the policy of armed neutrality even if it was part of a process towards the ideal of unarmed neutrality. The pacifist sentiments of the Japanese people were very strong and it would be electorally disadvantageous to advocate such a position especially if armed neutrality could be perceived as leading Japan into increased rearmament. It would be confusing to the party's rank and file and party supporters. A position of armed neutrality would also be unacceptable to the JSP's key supporter, Sohyo, which has advocated "unarmed neutrality" for Japan. The party might be open to attacks from LDP members who supported the Security Treaty claiming that armed neutrality would be costlier - economically, politically and strategically - than the Security Treaty arrangement with the US. On the other hand, the JSP might unwittingly aid those LDP members who desired Japan to be strongly armed and neutral in the future rather than to be tied to the US security system. An open adoption of armed neutrality by the JSP could possibly weaken the party's ability to check the LDP's attempts at rearmament. The JSP's moral and constitutional arguments against the alleged "militaristic" tendencies of the LDP would also be weaker, for "armed neutrality" would contradict the JSP's strict
interpretation of Article 9. An explicit adoption of armed neutrality could also undermine, in the long run, the pacifist domestic environment of Japan. If the JSP were to make clear its operational policy of armed neutrality, it could be criticized both within and outside the Party as an act of folly that would play into the hands of the LDP.

The Party Schism of 1959

Despite the compromises between the left and the right factions, the contradictions between them over defence policy could not really be repressed. The conflicting outlook towards the revision of the Security Treaty contributed to the breakaway of the Nishio faction from the JSP in October 1959, together with some members of the Kawakami faction, to form the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). The Nishio faction was critical of the militant struggles of the political left against the US military presence. It felt that it was beneficial for Japan to possess a revised treaty as a "shield against communist power until relaxation of international tensions, effective collective security, or greater Japanese economic and military strength could develop". The left, on the other hand, was prepared for extra-parliamentary opposition - mass demonstrations - to oppose the revision of the Security Treaty.

The secession of 1959 and the formation of the DSP removed the previous need to compromise on defence for both the Suzuki and the Nishio factions. The Suzuki faction, now dominant within the JSP, could reintroduce their preference for an immediate abrogation of the Security Treaty and the SDF. Thus, the breakaway of the right removed a brake on the leftward bent of the JSP.

The Ishibashi Plan of 1966

In May 1966, Ishibashi Masashi, then the head of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Policy Board, made public a draft of the JSP's defence policy. It was an attempt to formulate a credible and concrete defence policy as an alternative to the other political parties' defence policies that were being presented around about the same time. China's hydrogen bomb tests and the approaching expiration of the Security Treaty in 1970 gave impetus to the various parties to reconsider the question of national defence.

When the draft of the Ishibashi Plan was unveiled, it was seen by the Japanese press as both new and the most concrete JSP defence policy to date. However Ishibashi remarked that it was merely a systematic packaging of various policies that had been adopted

before by the party. It was probable that such a denial was aimed at avoiding antagonising those factions that had committed themselves to defence positions that were dissimilar to Ishibashi's draft. Thus it was likely that Ishibashi downplayed his draft as merely presenting policies which had been agreed to by the Party in the past in order to gain acceptance from the factionalised party.

What were Ishibashi's proposals? With regard to the SDF, Ishibashi insisted that a socialist government should not dismantle the armed forces immediately. Ishibashi set four conditions to be met before the SDF could gradually be reduced. Firstly, he emphasised that the international environment had to be favourable to Japan's disarmament. His position was that a gradual dissolution of the SDF would not be possible prior to the establishment of non-aggression pacts between Japan, USSR, China and the US; the reunification and the neutralisation of Vietnam and Korea; and the settlement of the Taiwan problem. Secondly, the position of the JSP-led coalition government had to be stable. Thirdly, the JSP had to be able to establish its control over the SDF. Fourthly, the people's attitude towards the SDF would also be considered. Thus, given the difficulty of

12. ibid., p.22.
fulfilling the above conditions, unarmed neutrality was, in effect, relegated to a distant ideal by the Ishibashi Plan. Ishibashi pointed out that the timing of the SDF's gradual dissolution should be flexible and not predetermined. As for the Security Treaty, Ishibashi proposed that non-aggression pacts with China and the USSR could be signed even during the term of the Security Treaty. Such a move, Ishibashi argued, would render the Security Treaty redundant in substance. Since the premise of the Security Treaty was that the two communist regimes were potential threats to Japan, the multilateral non-aggression pacts would make the Security Treaty superfluous.

How original were Ishibashi's proposals? The main thrust of his proposals was that it was not possible immediately to do away with either the Security Treaty or the SDF. This policy was agreed to by the Suzuki faction as a tactical compromise with the Nishio faction when the party was reunified back in 1955. Ishibashi's stress on the importance of a peaceful international environment before Japan could begin its disarmament process was closer to the hitherto Nishio faction's official position than that of the Suzuki faction. What was new was the explicit way in which Ishibashi qualified the attainment of unarmed neutrality by articulating the four conditions and thus postponing it indefinitely. Yet Ishibashi differed from the Nishio position by not supporting the
Security Treaty at all. Moreover Ishibashi, unlike Nishio, did not perceive any external threat to Japan and was against any tampering with the Constitution.

Ishibashi was ambiguous about when a JSP government would give a one-year notice to the US to abrogate the Treaty. However, it could be argued that if the Security Treaty were as undesirable and dangerous as Ishibashi had claimed, the JSP should have sought its abrogation as soon as possible. Thus the abolition of the Security Treaty would be in the immediate agenda of a JSP led coalition government while there would be no timetable to achieve unarmed neutrality. The logical conclusion of the Ishibashi Plan was that a socialist government, upon leaving the alliance, would actually adopt a position of armed neutrality without a schedule to achieve the ideal of unarmed neutrality.

The Ishibashi Plan came unstuck when it was swallowed up by factional politics. Ishibashi belonged to the Katsumata faction,\(^\text{13}\) which was then an anti-mainstream faction. Any attempt to revise the defence policy supported by the mainstream Sasaki (ex Suzuki) faction would be regarded as a challenge, a criticism and an attempt to undermine the preferences and the leading

\(^{13}\) Katsumata Seiichi was the heir of the Wada faction which was of post war origin. It had a left-leaning reputation but has occupied a centrist position in the JSP today. Ishibashi is the heir apparent of the Katsumata faction.
position of the Sasaki faction. This led the Asahi Shimbun to comment: "There have appeared increasing probabilities of the intra-party controversy over the security problem becoming serious, partly in connection with the main-current and anti-main current faction's strive for leadership, with the Party convention stated to be held in November".  \(^{14}\)

The controversy took on a main-stream and anti-mainstream cleavage when the Eda faction, which was antipathetic towards the Sasaki faction, joined in the fray by supporting the Katsumata faction in reconsidering the party's defence policy.  \(^{15}\) The Eda faction supported immediate abrogation of the Security Treaty and rejected the state of the international environment as a condition to be met before the SDF could be gradually reduced. Thus, the Eda faction's position differed from Ishibashi's position in that the external environment had to be considered before the SDF could be gradually dissolved. Nevertheless the Eda faction seized the opportunity to put down the Sasaki faction by commenting that the mainstream faction's defence policy was "backward".  \(^{16}\) Thus, defence policy had been conveniently used by the Eda faction as a factional weapon against its rival, the Sasaki faction.

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The Sasaki faction condemned the Ishibashi Plan as giving the impression that the Security Treaty would be maintained even after the non-aggression treaties had been signed under a JSP-led regime. This was unacceptable to the Sasaki faction which stressed the abrogation of the Security Treaty. Its hostility towards the Ishibashi Plan was also due to the fact that the plan was drafted by the Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs which, at that time, was dominated by the anti-mainstream factions.17

The Sasaki's faction rejected the Ishibashi Plan on the grounds that it would undermine the party's policy of unarmed neutrality. It also rejected the inclusion of the international situation as a criterion to be met before unarmed neutrality could be attempted. The faction insisted that "if a Socialist Party Government were to withhold retrenchment and reduction of war potential because of the trends of [sic] the international situation, and were to retain war potential as an endorsement for its security, it would mean in practice, the upsetting of our party's position for unarmed peace."18 As for the proposal that the Security Treaty could be temporarily retained even when non-aggression

pacts had been made, the Sasaki faction stated: "This argument is nonsense ... Is there not a contradiction in adopting the two security frameworks? The Security Treaty would oblige Japan to be involved in a US initiated conflict with China and the USSR. Yet such an action could not be permissible upon the signing of the non-aggression pacts". 19

Another concern of the Sasaki faction was the danger of giving an impression that the JSP's defence policy was shifting towards the right. Such a trend would be to the LDP's advantage because the LDP would welcome a national consensus on defence. Toleration of the Security Treaty would also undermine the JSP's argument in favour of abrogating the Security Treaty in 1970. The anti-mainstream counter-argument was that the mainstream Sasaki faction was too doctrinaire and unrealistic. This had the effect of depriving the JSP of the ability to take the reins of power. 20

Despite the intra-party acrimony over the party's defence policy, a compromise was reached between the opposing factions. The final draft of the defence policy stressed that "in order to secure peace, Japan must abrogate the Japan-US Security Treaty, let the United

19. ibid.
States withdraw its forces from Japan and stick firmly to a policy of positive neutrality".  

The emphasis was on abrogating the treaty and no mention was made of keeping the treaty even when the Locarno-type system had been introduced. In this way, the Sasaki faction was placated. The abrogation of the Security Treaty, however, would be in accordance with "normal diplomatic procedures" and a demand for an immediate, unilateral abrogation of the Security Treaty was not included in the final draft. Thus the Katsumata faction could derive partial satisfaction from the omission. Ishibashi also won agreement that the SDF would gradually be reduced, with proper consideration given to the stability of the JSP-led coalition government; control over the SDF; and the people's support for such a move. However, the condition that a favourable international environment should exist prior to the gradual dissolution of the SDF, which the Sasaki faction had vehemently opposed, was removed.

As a result of these factional compromises, no factions emerged as clear-cut winners or losers. Perhaps the only loser was the JSP, whose oscillating defence policy was shown to be mainly a consequence of factional considerations. Nevertheless, such a compromise was necessary to defuse the defence policy conflict amongst the factions which could have divided the JSP even further.

The Ishibashi Plan Resurrected: 1969

By 1968, both the Eda faction and the Katsumata faction had become mainstream factions. The change in the factional balance of power facilitated a reconsideration of the party's defence policy.22 The Sasaki faction at that time was experiencing internal problems, which eventually resulted in the breakaway by some leaders of the Sasaki faction.23 It was possible that the Sasaki faction was distracted by its factional problems and so was in a weaker position to challenge the readoption of the Ishibashi Plan in March 1969.

Moreover, Sohyo had applied pressure on the JSP to rejuvenate itself after the JSP's poor performance in the 1968 Upper House election. One of Sohyo's demands was for the JSP to consider the "need for concrete substance to the argument for non-armament neutrality".24

Not surprisingly, the reconsideration of defence policy opened up differing views on the subject. Former Policy Deliberation Committee Chairman Isei Ide was reported as supporting an "armed neutrality type" option.25 At the other end of the spectrum, the former

22. The Sasaki faction suffered a setback when their foe, Eda Saburo, became the new Secretary General of the party. Upon gaining office, Eda signalled his intention to review the JSP's defence policy. See Tokyo Shimbun, October 5, 1968.
members of the defunct Peace Comrade Society and a part of the Sasaki faction formed a small militant group called the "Comrades Society for Crushing the Japan-US Security Treaty" in January 1969. Despite the militants within the party, the Ishibashi Plan was finally revived. Nevertheless, certain policies were adopted to appease the militants. The party policy asserted that in a hypothetical invasion of Japan, armed resistance would not be resorted to. Other arguments within the party in favour of voluntary armed resistance by a militia and resistance by the national police force (a euphemistic title for the SDF) were rejected.

The emphasis in the defence policy was on abrogating the Security Treaty: "the first diplomatic step (of a JSP government) will be (to) give notice to the United States Government of Japan's intention to terminate the Japan-US Security Treaty and it will be eventually abolished through diplomatic negotiation".

Since 1969, the Ishibashi Plan has gained the status of the official policy of the JSP. Subsequent treatises officially released by the JSP on defence have been a restatement or elaboration of the Ishibishi Plan.

In 1973, the overthrow of the democratically elected Socialist Allende government in Chile had a

salutary effect on Katsumata Seiichi, the then Chairman of the Socialist Theory Committee. He remarked: "(It) cannot be said that the SDF will not carry out a coup de'tat after the establishment of a people's coalition government in Japan".28

His committee then recommended measures to reinforce civilian control of the SDF. Hence there was a growing awareness within the JSP that it would be difficult to dismantle a large, armed organisation. There was increasing acceptance within the party of the official Ishibashi line of a long-term, gradual dissolution of the SDF. Such a line, as argued earlier, amounted to the adoption of a policy of armed neutrality for Japan, given the JSP's rejection of the Security Treaty and the difficulties of disbanding the SDF.

The New Current Group and Armed Neutrality : 1976

In December 1975, three Diet members from the New Current Association,29 Hideo Den, Yanosuke Narazaki and Yutaka Hata, presented a draft defence policy to the


29. The New Current Association (Atarashi Nagare no Kai) was formed in 1973. It is inclined towards the right. It is favourably disposed towards the West and China. It stands in direct confrontation with the Socialist Association which is ultra left and pro USSR.
party and the general public. It gave a very detailed breakdown of the equipment, personnel and expenses of the SDF at different stages of the process leading to a reduction, but not the negation, of the SDF. Their plan envisaged a three-stage process for the abrogation of the Security Treaty and the reduction of the SDF. The first stage would involve the measures adopted by a "provisional coalition government" (possibly including even elements from the LDP); at the second stage would be policies taken during the term of a "Middle of the Road Coalition Government" (JSP-Komeito-DSP coalition government); at the third stage would be policies conducted by a "Renovationist Unified Government" (JSP government). At the last stage, the SDF would be abolished. However a smaller People's Guard Corp would still be maintained equipped with tanks, artillery, missiles, fighter planes and naval crafts. As for the Security Treaty, the JSP would seek to limit its functions. It would insist on the strict observation of prior consultation; the scope of the Far East would be redefined more narrowly; US reconnaissances using Japan as a base would be suspended; and the movements of US forces using bases in Japan would also be restricted. At the second stage, negotiations

30. Yomiuri, December 21, 1975. See also the ten part series featured in Yomiuri (January 11, 1976 to January 20, 1976) where the three New Current Diet members debated three top Japan Defence Agency officials on defence policy.
would be carried out to replace the Security Treaty with a Friendship Treaty. At the third stage, the Security Treaty would be abolished. Even at the final stage, when Japan had left the alliance, an armed organisation, euphemistically labelled as the People's Guard Corps, would still be retained. As for diplomatic measures to facilitate the reduction of the SDF, bilateral peace treaties would be signed with China and the USSR. Given the Sino-Soviet conflict, a Locarno-type system would not be feasible. The New Current group also avoided any suggestion of a Locarno system to disassociate its idea from the Asian Collective Security System promoted by the USSR at that time.

The New Current group presented their defence concept as a "development of the Ishibashi Plan of 1966". This could have been an attempt to camouflage their programme and make it acceptable to the party. While armed neutrality could be inferred from Ishibashi's position, the New Current group's defence policy was much more explicit about armed neutrality. Hideo Den commented: "There is a problem in the point that non-militarization and neutrality are put together. Therefore, although neutrality would be attained, the time when a situation of non-militarization could be attained globally would be much later. In the case of Japan, too,

it is increasingly possible that it will be delayed.\textsuperscript{32} Yutaka Hata also pointed out that if Japan were to "go through the stages as mentioned in our tentative draft, there will be \textit{lightly-armed neutrality} at a certain time ..."\textsuperscript{33} (emphasis mine).

The New Current group's proposal, just like the Ishibashi's proposals back in 1966, ran aground because of factional politics. At the time the proposal was floated, the New Current Association had forged an alignment with the Eda faction and the Sasaki faction to oppose the doctrinaire Marxist Socialist Association (Shakaishugi Kyokai) that was threatening to dominate the JSP.\textsuperscript{34} Since the New Current Association was part of the anti-Kyokai alignment, its defence proposals were not only disagreeable to the Socialist Association but also took the form of a provocative challenge to it.

The Socialist Association rejected the New Current group's proposals on two counts: "the first point is that even at the final stage of the three stages, the presence of an armed group - armaments - is being recognised, under the name of the people's guard corps.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Yomiuri}, January 11, 1976.
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{ibid}.
\textsuperscript{34} The Socialist Association was first set up as a theoretical group in 1950. By the mid 70's it had developed strong grassroots support even though its Diet representation was negligible. It became a threat to the established factions. The Socialist Association wanted the JSP to be turned into a class-based, revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party.
Will this not run contrary to the JSP's principle for Unarmed Neutrality?" Secondly, the Socialist Association rejected any notion that, at the first stage of the provisional coalition government, any alignment with LDP elements would be permissible.

No criticisms from the Sasaki faction were reported by the press. This might seem surprising as the Sasaki faction had traditionally exhibited hostility to any suggestions of prolonging the existence of the Security Treaty and the SDF. It was plausible that it withheld criticisms of the New Current group as a result of its anti-Kyokai alignment with the New Current faction and its resentment towards the Socialist Association that had encroached on its hitherto dominant position in the JSP. Moreover, the Sasaki faction that had been staunchly pro-China, became more muted in its criticism of the Security Treaty and the SDF after China had adopted a positive attitude towards the US-Japan alliance as a counterbalance against the Soviet Union.

Because the New Current group's defence proposals were caught up in factional politics within the JSP and given the powerful influence of the Socialist Association on the JSP at that time, its proposals simply floundered and were not adopted by the party.

The confrontation between the anti-Kyokai and Kyokai forces in 1977 led first to the defection of Eda Saburo and then the defection of Hideo Den and a number of Socialist Dietmen in October. Eda, in forming the Socialist Citizen League, adopted a less idealistic outlook towards defence: "I do not abandon the idea of non-armament as the ideal of the nation. However, as to the reality, we cannot do that". Hideo Den also adopted a different policy upon leaving the JSP. He asserted that the Security Treaty and the SDF should be maintained while the "USSR is pursuing hegemonism actively". While not denying the ideal of leaving the US-Japan Alliance and changing the SDF into a land construction corps, Den felt that the "Soviet threat" would not permit Japan to leave the alliance in the immediate future. The difference between Hideo Den's new official outlook and the defence policy that he had espoused earlier as a member of the New Current Association, was that he now publicly acknowledged the benefits of the alliance as a deterrence against potential threats. Prior to that, both Den and Ishibashi, despite their differences, claimed that there was no threat to Japan. Hence, they did not view the Security Treaty as necessary or desirable for Japan. Their formulation of defence policies had less to do with potential foreign

threats to Japan than the obstacles to be met within Japan before the SDF could be gradually dissolved.

The change in outlook by both Eda Saburo and Hideo Den suggested that both Eda and Den might not have subscribed to unarmed neutrality beyond giving lip-service while they were in the JSP. It would have been difficult to articulate such views given the sensitivities and the probable resistance from rival factions within the party.

The Official Ishibashi Line: The 1980's

Ishibashi's treatise, On Unarmed Neutrality, first published in 1980 has been regarded as the official party policy since that time. However, at the factional level, there has been a diversity of views on defence. Some of the views of the various factions do not necessarily mirror the party's official defence policy. The differences between the factions extend to divergent world views; dissimilar emphasis on threats to Japan; attitudes towards the Security Treaty; disagreement over the legality of the SDF; whether passive resistance or armed resistance is to be adopted in a hypothetical invasion of Japan; and whether Japan would have to pass through a process of armed neutrality. The following chapter will analyse the individual faction's attitudes, responses and influence on JSP's defence policy amidst the changes both internal and external of the party in the 1980's.
CHAPTER TWO

INTRA-PARTY DYNAMICS: FACTIONAL POLITICS AND DEFENCE

In this chapter, the following questions will be considered:

(i) What are the individual defence policies of the JSP factions in the 1980's?
(ii) What is the nature of factionalism in relation to defence?

The JSP factions and their defence policies in the 1980's

The factions, ranging from right to left of the political spectrum, are: Seikoken, Shaken, Katsumata faction, New Birth Research Association and the Socialist Association.

Seikoken (Seiken Koso kenkyukai [Political Power Concept Research Council])

Seikoken was formed in 1979 with the declared aim of promoting social democracy and establishing a JSP led government. It is an amalgamation of the New Current Association, the Tanabe group, the Kawakami group and the Hori group.

In 1982, Asukata, supported by the left factions, picked Noburo Baba, a leader from the New Birth Association, as the party's Secretary General. Seikoken, supported by Sohyo, demonstrated its clout by forcing the
party to reshuffle its leadership.\textsuperscript{1} Baba lost his post while Asukata's reputation was irrevocably damaged. He was succeeded by Ishibashi in 1983. Makoto Tanabe from Seikoken subsequently became the Secretary General. Since 1983, the balance of power has shifted towards Seikoken. It has been consistently successful in increasing its share of the CEC posts.\textsuperscript{2} Seikoken's influence is augmented by its alignment with Shaken and the Katsumata faction. It has benefited from the decline in the JSP left.

Seikoken supports a coalition with the DSP and Komeito and even with segments of the LDP. Sanji Muto, a top Seikoken leader, believes that "if the elections result in creating a state of equality (between the strengths of the ruling party and the opposition parties in the Diet) we will probably be able to form a coalition with Toshio Komoto or Kiichi Miyazawa of the LDP".\textsuperscript{3} Both LDP leaders are acceptable to Muto possibly because they are less "hawkish" on defence.

Seikoken's defence policy is influenced by the

\textsuperscript{1} See Asahi, February 7, 1982; Nihon Keizai, March 16, 1982; Nihon Keizai, December 9, 1982.

\textsuperscript{2} The success in obtaining positions in the CEC is a good barometer of the rising fortunes of the right. See Tokyo Shimbun, Evening, December 15, 1982; Sankei, December 1982; Asahi, December 18, 1982; Mainichi, September 1, 1983; Sankei, February 20, 1986; Mainichi, Evening, January 22, 1986.

\textsuperscript{3} Asahi, July 29, 1984.
considerations of a possible coalition with the DSP and Komeito. To make the JSP an acceptable partner, it entails "realistic" changes to the JSP's defence policy. Seikoken's dilemma is that if it tries to change the party's defence policy, it may further complicate the difficult tasks of promoting a "New JSP" and adoption of the New Declaration. The Socialist Association was extremely sensitive to the DSP's remark that the adoption of the New Declaration would lead to discarding the policy of unarmed neutrality. Such a move, the DSP claimed, would bring the JSP, at long last, more closely in line with the DSP's defence policy.

Thus, one possible reason why Seikoken has kept a low profile on defence is to decouple the issue of defence from controversy over the New Declaration. If a link is formed by its opponents between the reviews of JSP's defence policy and the New Declaration, it will make the tasks of changing its defence policy and the affirmation of the New Declaration doubly hard. Given the controversial nature of defence issues, any premature moves to change the party's defence policy might be intertwined with the immediate task of adopting the New Declaration. If there had been a convergence of attempted changes to both defence and the New Declaration,

it would have given the New Declaration's opponents the opportunity to rally those who supported unarmed neutrality and the New Declaration to reject the latter on the grounds that it would open the floodgates of change to party principles including unarmed neutrality.

Even though Seikoken is the JSP's largest faction, it has encountered enormous difficulties even in attempting limited changes to the party's defence policy. Only if Seikoken continues to increase its strength and retains its cohesion will it have a greater capacity to attempt further changes to the party's defence policy.

Seikoken's world view

Unlike the Nishio faction, Seikoken does not possess a Cold War mentality of communism versus democracy. Its conception of international relations is that of a "community of nations" where there is detente between East and West and co-operation between North and South. Seikoken's vision is that of an international...

5. Yokomichi Takahiro (New Current Association) is an articulate exponent of this position. He was a member of the Diet's Special Committee on Defence and is presently the governor of Hokkaido. Yokomichi has been tipped by the press (Asahi, October 27, 1985) and a number of party members to be a possible future Chairman of the JSP. See Yokomichi's "Security and Disarmament" in Trialogue 30/1, Summer/Fall 1982; "Japan Socialist Party" in Rei Shiratori (ed.), Japan in the 1980s (Kodansha International, Tokyo : 1982). See also Yokomichi, "Soren Kyoiron o doo miruka" (How to regard the theory of Soviet threat", Gekkan Shakaito, No. 305, December 1981.
society where international tensions are reduced; arms control, disarmament and nuclear free zones established; the United Nations strengthened; and untied aid and technology transferred to the South. It is felt that Japan can only thrive in a stable and prosperous world given its dependence on external trade. Thus Japan has the greatest stake in promoting a peaceful international environment. While Seikoken is critical of both the US and the USSR for not curtailing their arms race, it does not view either with hostility. It has been suggested that the international outlook of Seikoken's four groupings is as follows:  

(i) New Current Association pro West  
(ii) Tanabe group pro West and pro China  
(iii) Kawakami group pro West, pro China and pro Soviet  
(iv) Hori group pro West and pro USSR  

Thus all four components' common denominator is a lack of hostility towards the West.

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6. Interview with Mr. Minoru Uezumi (Tanabe group) on February 20, 1986. To be pro West does not mean that Seikoken's groupings are in the western camp. It means that they are friendly towards the US. Likewise, to be pro China or pro Soviet in Seikoken's context means a friendly disposition towards these countries too.
Seikoken's threat perception

The USSR is not perceived by Seikoken to be a threat to Japan. Even though the USSR is recognised to be a great military power, Yokomichi believes that Soviet might is not directly targeted against Japan but against the US and China. He argues that it is misleading to view Soviet capability exclusively in military terms. The USSR is beset by economic problems which can only be eased if there is detente and economic cooperation with the West and Japan. Greater economic interdependence should be promoted between the USSR and Japan - "it is possible through an increase in economic interchange based on mutual interest to create a state of affairs in which no military threat can be made without considerable sacrifice". Yokomichi prescribes that "if threat indeed derives from intent and military capability, we must devote our efforts to a diplomacy that fosters peaceful intent and a stable international environment; and to creating the conditions for relations of mutual trust that will help make disarmament and arms control a reality".

The potential threat, according to Yokomichi, is actually from within. The SDF poses a threat against a socialist regime and democracy. Yokomichi pointed out

that "the strength of democracy in this country (Japan) has yet to be tested. Can democracy in Japan control the military as it does in the US and Western Europe? Here, it has a history of only some forty years." 9

Seikoken's view of the alliance

Seikoken supported the 1980 JSP-Komeito agreement which stated that the Security Treaty should be retained for "the time being". Dietman Ichiro Hino, a leader and Chief of Secretariat of Seikoken, believes that the Security Treaty serves as a deterrent and is recognised by international law. 10

Seikoken's view: Constitutional and legal framework for defence

Unlike the right-wing Nishio faction of the 1950's, Seikoken supports the pacifist Constitution of Japan. It regards the SDF as "unconstitutional but legal" because it was established by legislation duly passed in the Diet. In 1984, Secretary General Tanabe (Seikoken) defined the SDF as "unconstitutional but legal" in the party's draft Action Policy. 11 As a result of stiff opposition from the left factions, which regard the SDF as illegal, the phrase was deleted. The compromise

9. ibid.
10. Asahi, October 29, 1985.
was that the SDF is "unconstitutional but has a legal existence". This semantic hair-splitting has certain differences in nuance. To say that the SDF is "legal" conveys a positive outlook but to label it as having a "legal existence" does not imply any positive value judgement.12 The right could interpret the compromise as half a step better than the traditional position, while the left side could interpret it as "illegal".

Consequently Ishibashi was forced by the left not to use the expression "unconstitutional but legal". Seikoken's response was that "the unconstitutional but legal argument is to our assertions, and we welcome it, and if this argument on the legality of the SDF takes root within the party in actual fact, we will not be insistent about the expression to be used".13

Seikoken's view: The appropriate military force and posture

Yokomichi criticizes the pursuit of military strength as an insurance for security because it would lead to a vicious cycle of military expansionism, arms races and increase in international tension. He prefers the concept of a military force designed exclusively for defence. Yokomichi thinks that it is good for Japan to

12. I would like to thank Professor Ikuro Takaqi for explaining to me the nuances of the phraseologies.

choose "the path of asymmetry with its neighbours in terms of military capability". 14

An examination of the available writings on defence by Yokomichi reveals that unarmed neutrality was neither propagated nor criticized. While extolling the pacifist sentiments of Article 9, Yokomichi makes no mention of unarmed neutrality at all. Perhaps this omission suggests that he does not take unarmed neutrality seriously as an operational policy despite his pacifist leanings.

Hino accepts armed neutrality as a viable option for Japan. 15 Even if Japan were to leave the alliance, Hino argues, the present SDF is strong enough to make any invasion very costly. If Japan is invaded, the SDF should resist with the backing of the people. Thus, Hino believes that if Japan were to opt for armed neutrality with a limited conventional posture, it would still be a sufficient deterrent to any potential aggressors.

It is possible that some members of the New Current Association and the Tanabe group may privately share the defence views of their former faction leaders who broke away from the JSP in 1977. If this is so, it indicates a recognition that armed neutrality with a


15. Interview with Mr. Ichiro Hino (Kawakami group) on March 4, 1986.
moderate capability is desirable, not because it is difficult to dismantle the SDF upon leaving the alliance, but because it is difficult to shape the real world in Japan's pacifist image.

Since Seikoken, unlike the left factions, does not view the US with suspicion, and given their interest in maintaining an accord with Komeito and DSP, the faction could possibly push for the party's acceptance of the SDF as legal and for a more explicit recognition of the Security Treaty "for the time being". It is unlikely that the declaratory policy of unarmed neutrality would be challenged by Seikoken. Although Seikoken is on the right of the JSP its attitudes towards defence are different from those of the Nishio faction of the 1950's. Its reluctance to tamper further with the party's defence policy is also because the faction does not think that any major change is necessary.

Shaken (Shakaishugi Kenkyukai [Socialism Research Council])

Shaken, the ex-Sasaki faction, has changed its ideology from Marxism to social democracy. It used to be the dominant faction within the JSP. While it is not as influential as before, it augments its influence by aligning itself with Seikoken and the Katsumata faction. It supports a more "realistic" JSP, the New Declaration and a coalition with Komeito and the DSP.
Shaken has the reputation of being a pro China faction. This puts it at odds on foreign policy and defence with the pro Soviet factions: the Katsumata faction and the Socialist Association.

Shaken's world view

Shaken's international outlook is influenced by its pro China leanings. When China adopted the Three Worlds Theory in 1974 as its declaratory framework for analysing international relations, Shaken followed suit. China proposed a United Front with the US (classified as the less dangerous component of the First World); the Second World (Western Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand) and the Third World against the "hegemonic" power on the rise - the USSR. Shaken, unlike the Chinese, placed Japan in the Third World! Despite discarding its Marxist trappings, Shaken is reputedly close to the Deng Xiaoping leadership. Shaken's pro China policy may also be influenced by non-ideological reasons: it has been alleged that Shaken obtained funds from China via Chinese trade channelled through some factional members.


17. ibid.

Shaken's threat perception

Shaken has regarded the USSR as a threat to world peace and Japan.\(^\text{19}\) This outlook leads Shaken to the mutually contradictory policy of supporting both China and unarmed neutrality. If the USSR is indeed a threat, then it should follow China's exhortation to view the Security Treaty as an indispensable deterrent against the USSR. Shaken has avoided answering the question of how unarmed neutrality can be feasible if the USSR is a threat. Shaken was greatly embarrassed by China's criticism of the JSP's policy of unarmed neutrality as unrealistic. Nevertheless, Shaken did not abandon the policy of unarmed neutrality even though it regarded the USSR as a threat. China today no longer emphasises a United Front against the USSR. Shaken, on its part, has also been subdued in its criticism of the USSR.

Shaken's view of the alliance

While it had once called for the immediate abrogation of the Security Treaty and the SDF, Shaken, in recent years, has not taken a strong line against the Security Treaty nor pushed for the dissolution of the SDF. Yugi Soga, the party's Vice Secretary General and a leader of Shaken, said that the faction does not insist on a

\(^{19}\) Tokyo Shimbun, May 14, 1975.
speedy abrogation of the Security Treaty. As a result of its pro China leanings, Shaken has been more tolerant of the Security Treaty. Shaken's support for the maintenance of the Security Treaty "for the time being" is also because of its desire for the JSP's defence policy to be more acceptable to the centrist parties.

Shaken's view: Constitutional and legal framework for defence

Shaken views the SDF to be "unconstitutional but legal".

Shaken's view: The appropriate military force and posture

While keeping the ideal of unarmed neutrality, Soga suggested an "Austrian formula" for Japan. Such a proposition would imply a neutral Japan with limited conventional capability, guaranteed by the great powers. When asked about the appropriate response to a hypothetical invasion, Soga felt that the SDF should resist the aggressors. This view differs from the official Ishibashi line of passive resistance.

Since Shaken is pro China and is supportive of a JSP-Komeito-DSP coalition, it is likely that it would, together with Seikoken, seek the party's recognition of

20. Interview with Mr. Yoji Soga (Shaken) on March 3, 1986.

21. ibid.
the SDF's legality and a more positive acceptance of the Security Treaty "for the time being". It is unlikely that Shaken will challenge the JSP's declaratory policy of unarmed neutrality.

**Katsumata faction (Seisaku Kenkyukai: [Policy Research Association])**

Although the Katsumata faction is a small, centrist grouping, it has benefited from the rivalry between left and right in the party. Since a candidate for the Chairmanship from either the left or right may be unacceptable to either wing, the compromise solution of having a centrist Chairman is more tolerable to all. The Katsumata faction has played a pivotal role by siding with both left and right at different times. This has been a contributory factor to Ishibashi's political longevity. By occupying the top posts of the party since 1970, Ishibashi has been able to promote his defence plan of 1966 as the party orthodoxy on defence.

The Katsumata faction has officially adopted social democracy. Unlike the social democrats of Western Europe, it is rather cool towards the US and is very friendly towards the USSR.

**Katsumata Faction's world view**

The Katsumata faction sees international relations in terms of tension between imperialism and socialism. Ishibashi wrote: "The socialist camp is
certainly in a shambles. To our surprise the traditional image of socialist countries as peaceloving has been mercilessly shattered ... (However) the day will surely come when the Soviet Union and China again have amicable relations. Reconciliation between the USSR and PRC implies a unification of all the socialist forces on the globe. The significance of this for Japan needs little explanation."\(^{22}\) As for the western alliance, Ishibashi remarked: "It is completely natural for the imperialist camp to combine efforts in the U.S., Europe and Japan so as to become superior to the Soviet Union".\(^{23}\) Ishibashi continued: "If the U.S. were to take retaliatory measures (after Japan has left the alliance), Japan could be drawn into another camp perhaps contrary to our wishes".\(^{24}\)

Despite Ishibashi's proclivity towards the USSR, he visited the US in 1984 to demonstrate the "realism" of the "New JSP".\(^{25}\)

While the Katsumata faction is pro Soviet, it is unlike the Socialist Association whose support of the USSR is almost total. The Katsumata faction criticized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the Soviet's participation in the arms race and the Soviet one party-

\(^{22}\) Masaki Ishibashi, *op. cit.*, p.113.
\(^{23}\) *ibid.*, p.67.
\(^{24}\) *ibid.*, p.73.
\(^{25}\) *Tokyo Shimbun*, April 7, 1984.
bureaucratic state. Nevertheless it remains very friendly towards the USSR because of ideology and close personal ties with the USSR. Mr. Chisato Tatebayashi, a CEC member from the Katsumata faction, feels that good economic relations with the USSR would redress some of Japan's trade imbalance which, he considers, is skewed towards the west.

It is also rumoured that the faction benefits from trade relations with the USSR. Such an activity, which provides a source of income to the faction, is said to predispose the faction to be pro Soviet.

Katsumata faction's threat perception

The Katsumata faction obviously does not see the USSR as a threat to Japan. Ishibashi wrote: "As an island nation, Japan need not worry about being invaded as long as it does not cause the dispute ... Even today, with the exception of the Japan-US Security Treaty under which Socialist Countries are regarded as enemies and the US

26. Interview with Mr. Chisato Tatebayashi, Head of International Bureau and CEC member of JSP, on March 6, 1986.

27. ibid.

28. Faction members from both left and right of the Katsumata faction mentioned its alleged trading activities. Such rumours of financial connections with foreign powers are not peculiar to the Katsumata faction alone. These allegations are floated by rival factions as a result of factional suspicions and attempts to discredit their opponents.
armed forces are provided with military bases, there is no reason for other countries to invade Japan." Moreover, the USSR has little to gain by the invasion of Japan. The faction's view is that: "If the Soviet Union should attack Japan without any reason, not only Japan-Soviet trade would be suspended, but also the Soviet Union would be isolated from international public opinion and east-west trade would be disrupted, and the Soviet Union would invite strong reaction from the Third World with the result that it would be put in a very difficult position. Further, the Soviet economy would suffer very much."30

Katsumata faction's view of the alliance

The faction argues that the Security Treaty is unnecessary as the USSR is not a threat to Japan. It is an entangling alliance which would drag Japan to war. Ishibashi also rejects the Security Treaty because he "cannot believe that the US would come to help Japan at the risk of entry into a war which might devastate its own territory."31 Even if it does, it would still be unable to help Japan in time to prevent an invasion of Japan. Ishibashi is not confident that the US nuclear deterrent


30. Japan Socialist Review, No.419-420, October/November 1983, p.5. The whole issue was devoted to the Ishibashi policy of unarmed neutrality.

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would work in the future. He commented: "the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons must be admitted. But not for a moment will I believe the nonsensical claim that they will never be used." 32

Given the Katsumata faction's scepticism about the alliance, why is the faction willing to tolerate the Security Treaty for the time being when a socialist coalition government is formed? Such a position is merely an expedient move to make the JSP an acceptable partner to the centrist parties. If the alliance is really dangerous to Japan, the Katsumata faction should logically support the speedy abrogation of the Security Treaty.

Katsumata Faction: Constitutional and legal framework for defence

The faction supports the expression "The SDF is unconstitutional but legal". Ishibashi explained:

"There are two meanings to the word legal in that the SDF satisfies all legal procedures and that the SDF is in line with the spirit of the Constitution. I used the expression that they are legal only in terms of the procedure." 33

32. Ibid., p.48.

Katsumata Faction: The appropriate military force and posture

Ishibashi claims that Japan is indefensible. He believes that a war fought on Japanese soil may annihilate the Japanese people. If Japan is invaded, passive resistance may be adopted. Ishibashi wrote: "Depending on how the adversary acts, we need to attempt various kinds of resistance that do not rely on military force. This resistance could take a wide range of forms including demonstrations, hunger strikes, boycotts, non-cooperation and general strike."34 Ishibashi also recommends surrender as an option if Japan is invaded. He wrote: "Without worrying about being misunderstood, I make it a rule to tell people that, yes, there are times when it is actually wiser to surrender."35

Ishibashi's view of defence is based more on domestic conditions than the international situation. He remarked that if force structure is shaped by international considerations, "this implies that the range of military defence can be infinitely enlarged in accordance with international affairs and technological development. This is the same as saying that the scale of the military has no limits or restriction."36 Ishibashi further expressed his fear that a "threat

34. Masahi Ishibashi, op. cit., p.42.
35. ibid.
36. ibid., p.21.
mentality" may lead to the introduction of emergency legislation, secrecy protection legislation and a system of national mobilisation. These measures, he felt, could lead to the erosion of democracy in Japan.37

If military defence is undesirable, how is the SDF to be dissolved? Ishibashi maintains that the Four Conditions which he had first proposed in 1966 have to be met. When asked whether Japan will adopt armed neutrality upon leaving the Security Treaty, Ishibashi said that it would be the logical position for Japan.38 This is because the SDF will not be demobilised immediately upon the abrogation of the Security Treaty. Since the SDF could only gradually be dissolved, it is inevitable that Japan would pass through a process of armed neutrality. While unarmed neutrality is just a vision, armed neutrality is an operational policy for Ishibashi. To him, armed neutrality for Japan is more attractive than an "entangling" alliance with the US.

Shinsei Kenkyukai (New Birth Research Council)

The New Birth Research Council, formed in 1977, comprises younger Dietmen previously from Shaken, the New Current Association, the Katsumata faction and

37. ibid., p.85.

38. The question was raised at Ishibashi's seminar at the Peace Research Centre, Australian National University on April 18, 1986.
Thus, its members came from ideologically diverse backgrounds. The major consideration among the younger Diet members was the desire to have a factional base to obtain party posts and to exert greater influence on the JSP. Although the faction has been identified as generally left leaning, it does not have consistent or well articulated views on party policies with a character of its own. Even though the faction is the second largest in the JSP, it is not as formidable as its numbers suggest because it is not cohesive.

The faction is divided in its support for a "New JSP" and the "New Declaration". It is also unable to present a unified view on the controversy over the SDF's legality. The faction is relatively different from other JSP factions in that it is not ideologically oriented. Even though the raison d'être of other JSP factions is to attain power, they are not solely concerned with power for its own end but also as a means to achieve a faction's policy goals. However the New Birth Research Council does not have any obvious ideological goals beyond an amorphous left-leaning orientation.

New Birth Research Association: The lack of a world view

The faction does not share a common outlook towards the great powers. However, the faction supports North Korea. It is rumoured that the faction receives financial assistance from that country.40 The faction's pro North Korea orientation disposes it to see the US presence in North East Asia in a negative light.

New Birth Research Council: The lack of a defence policy

The faction does not possess a defence policy with its own character. However, some members of the faction participate in a supra factional organisation, The Comprehensive Strategy for Peace Research Council, set up in 1983 with the declared task of preserving unarmed neutrality as party policy.41 While the Council also includes Socialist Association members, most of the Diet members in this supra factional organisation are from the New Birth Research Council.

When the controversy over the SDF's legality erupted, the Comprehensive Strategy for Peace Research Council succeeded in checking Ishibashi's attempt to recognise the SDF as legal.42

40. Not surprisingly, allegations were made by the right wing of the JSP.
41. Asahi, March 26, 1983; Tokyo Shimbun, April 1, 1983.
Noboru Baba, the JSP ex-Secretary General and a leader of the faction, was very critical of Ishibashi's position that the SPF was legal. Baba and his group are said to be bitter about Ishibashi having profited from toppling the Asukata-Baba leadership. Since the "SDF is legal" controversy is a symbol of Ishibashi's determination for a more "realistic" JSP, Baba and others in the faction did not hesitate to challenge Ishibashi on both policy and personal grounds.

Socialist Association (Shakaishugi Kyokai)

The Socialist Association advocates Marxist-Leninism; the JSP as a class party; the Socialist transformation of Japan through revolution and a United Front with the JCP. Even though its Diet arm, the Sagatsukai (March Association), is small in numbers, the Socialist Association has won over many local party activists. These Socialist Association activists were influential at the important annual Party Convention while JSP Dietmen did not have the automatic right to vote at the Convention. By 1977, it was at the peak of its power.

Alarmed by the Socialist Association's growing influence, an anti-Kyokai alignment was forged between the

43. Asahi, October 15, 1984.
Eda faction, the New Current Association and Shaken. The policy of unarmed neutrality was also used against the Socialist Association. The anti-Kyokai factions attacked the Socialist Association for its alleged intentions of revising the "bourgeois" peace Constitution and also for its supposed studies on rearmament.45

The limited changes to the JSP's defence policy in the 1980's are related to the decline of the Socialist Association. Its decline is a necessary condition before changes in the JSP's defence policy can be made. If the Socialist Association had not declined after 1977, it would have been extremely difficult even to make limited changes to the party's defence policy.

Why has the Socialist Association declined? The combination of anti-Kyokai and Sohyo succeeded in giving all Dietmembers the automatic right to vote at party conventions.46 Since the Socialist Association has only a small Diet representation, its influence at party conventions has diminished.

The declining attraction of Marxism works to the disadvantage of the Socialist Association. In addition, the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, the Sino-Soviet conflict, the warring socialist states of Kampuchea, Vietnam and China,

and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan have cumulatively damaged the image of socialist states.

With the rise of affluence in Japan, the general environment has become less conducive to radicalism. The classical Marxist doctrine of the "impoverishment of the workers", revolution, and the "dictatorship of the proletariat" has little relevance and appeal to the overwhelming majority of Japanese who consider themselves to be middle class. In Marxist terms, there has been a process of "embourgeoisement" of the masses and a decline in the "consciousness" of the workers.

Many JSP members now consider Marxism to be obsolete. The social democrats within the JSP perceive that the fortunes of the party will continue to sink unless Marxist dogmas are scuttled by the party. This trend towards social democracy has posed a threat to the long term existence of the Socialist Association.

The Socialist Association's cohesion has been rocked by secessions and divisions. Yutaka Fukuda, a Hosei University professor, together with some Socialist Association members, left the organisation in 1984 as a result of ideological disputes.47 Fukuda leans towards Eurocommunism and feels that Marxist-Leninism is no longer appropriate to Japan. Moreover Fukuda opposed the faction's support for the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

The faction suffered yet another blow when their doyen, Professor Itsuro Sakisaka, died in 1985. The faction has since been divided into two groups: the right-wing Yamamoto group which prefers Eurocommunism and extends expedient support to the New Declaration; and the Yamaguchi group which adheres to the Sakisaka line of Marxist orthodoxy. 48

Although the Socialist Association has been split, the Sakisaka group, fortified by Marxist ideology, is single-minded, disciplined and dedicated to its cause. This group has shrewdly augmented its limited strength with larger numbers from the New Birth Research Council to form the supra factional Comprehensive Strategy for Peace Research Council. The supra factional organisation has the avowed aim of resisting any tampering with the JSP's policy of unarmed neutrality. 49

The Socialist Association still retains the support of a third of the party secretariat. 50 Their supporters in the party bureaucracy can hinder the implementation of policies opposed by the Socialist Association. It can also count on the grassroots support that the Socialist Association has built up over the years. Thus, it can still fight a stubborn rearguard action against changes to the JSP's defence policy.

Socialist Association's World View

The Sakisaka group sees international relations as a contradiction between socialism and imperialism. It is very hostile to the US "imperialists". It gives almost total support to the USSR. When the USSR intervened in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Socialist Association claimed that "the military intervention in Czechoslovakia does not mean hegemony. It was nothing but the revolutionary side's attitude against counter-revolutionaries".\(^{51}\) As for the Kurile islands, they maintain that this territory should be retained by the USSR and not returned to "bourgeois" Japan.\(^{52}\) While the official policy of the JSP was to condemn the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan, the faction unfailingly extended its support to the USSR.\(^{53}\)

The Socialist Association in the 1980's has been less cohesive in its international outlook especially after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.\(^{54}\) Fukuda criticized the Sakisaka group for echoing the Soviet line. The Yamamoto group, attracted by Eurocommunism, also does not see the world in bi-polar terms. Toshio Otsuka, the

\(^{51}\) Tokyo Shimbun, May 14, 1975.

\(^{52}\) Ibid.

\(^{53}\) Nihon Keizai, February 11, 1980.

\(^{54}\) Interview with Professor Yutaka Fukuda, ex-Socialist Association member, on March 1, 1986.
CEC member from the Socialist Association, also pointed out the inadequacy of the Marxist framework in analysing international relations especially when socialist countries are, by definition, peaceloving.55

Besides ideology, it is rumoured that the Socialist Association has received funds from the USSR.56 Since the faction is close to the USSR and is extremely hostile to the US, it deviates from the party's ideal of neutralism.

Socialist Association's threat perceptions

The Socialist Association believes that there is no Soviet threat because there is no cause for conflict between Japan and the USSR. The real threat is perceived to come from the SDF since it props up the capitalist order. The SDF is "bound up with American imperialism against Soviet (socialist) military forces and is the imperialistic army of the Japanese capitalist monopoly".57

55. Interview with Mr. Toshio Otsuka (Socialist Association), Director of Press Bureau and CEC member of JSP on March 3, 1986.

56. Professor Fukuda mentioned that the Soviets did approach the Socialist Association in 1975 to offer financial assistance to it. According to Fukuda, the offer was declined. Subsequently, the Soviets offered a more subtle way of funding. They offered to buy the faction's magazines. Fukuda was insistent that the Soviet offer was rejected.

57. Tamatsu Sato, ("The fight for unarmed neutrality, which is difficult but promising"). Shakaishugi (Socialism). May 1984, No. 5, p.16.
It is believed that the SDF is always prepared to act against the opposition parties and mass movements.

Socialist Association's perception of the alliance

It sees the alliance as undesirable because it serves the narrow interests of the ruling class. The faction asserts that "Japanese capital monopoly and the LDP have the SDF and the Japan-US Security Treaty for the purpose of maintaining capitalism and their own security". Since the Socialist Association is extremely hostile to the alliance, it would welcome the speedy abrogation of the Security Treaty.

Socialist Association: The Constitution and the legal framework for defence

The faction claims to have a "perfect" understanding of the Constitution. The policy of unarmed neutrality is consistent with Article 9. It opposes the view that the "SDF is unconstitutional but legal". Such a view contradicts Article 98 which stipulates that "this Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation, and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force

58. ibid., p.15.
59. Interview with Mr. Tamatsu Sato, Secretary General of Socialist Association, on February 26, 1986.
or validity". Since the SDF is unconstitutional, it cannot be legal.

Socialist Association: The appropriate military force and posture

Unarmed neutrality is proclaimed as a "peace promoting security policy with which to fight the alliance and the expansionist intentions of the LDP government". Since there are no external threats to Japan, the SDF should be dismantled. However, the faction is sceptical about whether Ishibashi's Four Conditions would be sufficient to ensure the smooth dissolution of the SDF. It commented: "These Four Conditions do not include the treatment of possible resistance from the SDF". Therefore it is necessary to mobilise the masses against the SDF. It implicitly criticized the Ishibashi Plan as inadequate by insisting that "the Four Conditions will be meaningless unless the SDF is paralysed by a series of mass struggle". It believes that it is not possible to

61. ibid., p.8.
62. ibid., p.27.
63. ibid., p.32.
dissolve the SDF unless the capitalist system is replaced by the socialist system. It said: "The dissolution of the army does not necessarily go well even if the process is given time. On the contrary, delay may work to the advantage of the old establishment. Taking this into consideration, the coalition government and the National Front must achieve a socialist revolution as early as possible, because the dissolution is not completed until the stage of socialism is reached." 64

How can the masses be mobilised and can a "reactionary" army be resisted? The faction claims that it is a "historical truth" that the army would collapse in a social revolution if it is directed against its own people. 65 There had been disagreement within the Socialist Association before about whether Japan should adopt passive resistance or establish a revolutionary people's militia. Sakisaka "doubted that the Japanese working class could maintain or even keep control of an effective armed force which would be only too likely to become an instrument of capitalist oppression." 65 However it would be ideologically consistent to argue that a socialist army is desirable when capitalism has been replaced by socialism.

64. ibid.

65. ibid. Curiously, Iran was given as an example where the army could not resist the mobilised populace. The Bolshevik Revolution and the refusal of the Tsarist army to act against the people, would have been, ideologically, more appropriate.
What policy should Japan adopt when leaving the alliance? Otsuka believes that it has to pass through a long process of armed neutrality. On the other hand, both Fukuda and Yoshio Ishizawa thought that armed neutrality should not be adopted as part of the process towards the ideal of unarmed neutrality. Such a position is logically impossible unless Japan simultaneously disbands the SDF upon leaving the alliance.

Maruyama, the head of the JSP's Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, believes that the Socialist Association's support for "unarmed neutrality" is just a charade. Maruyama claimed that "there is within my party the growing infiltration of alien elements which have been manipulated from the outside and is determined to make use of the 'unarmed neutrality policy' to weaken Japan. A prominent advocate of these elements has recently by his writings advised the public to capitulate to the Soviets in time of hostilities and to make a socialistic transformation in Japan. After this transformation, the other representatives of these elements have insisted that Japan should abandon the 'unarmed neutrality policy' and join actively the military alliance with the Soviet Union.

66. Stockwin, op. cit., p.133.
67. Interview with Otsuka, op. cit.
68. Interviews with Fukuda and with Mr. Yoshio Ishizuka (Sangatsukai), Director of Planning Department, JSP.
for the cause of joint struggle against imperialism." In short, Maruyama believes that the real position of the Socialist Association is to adopt unarmed neutrality as a deceitful scheme to leave Japan vulnerable to the USSR. Subsequently, socialist Japan would become part of the Soviet alliance. Such a view, however, is not the official declaratory policy of the Socialist Association.

Unarmed Neutrality as a policy has also been used by the Socialist Association to achieve other ends. One objection to the JSP's coalition with the centrist parties is that it threatens the party principle of unarmed neutrality. In fact, the converse is also true. The Socialist Association clings to unarmed neutrality to check a possible coalition between the JSP, Komeito and the DSP. Since the changing of the JSP's defence policy is often claimed to be a prerequisite to a coalition, the successful opposition to changes in the JSP's defence policy by the Socialist Association could make a coalition between the three parties less tenable. The opportunism of the Socialist Association can be seen by its preference for a United Front with the JCP. Even though armed neutrality is the defence policy of the JCP, the Socialist Association prefers a coalition with the JCP. Although the Socialist Association claims to be a staunch advocate

69. Mr. Hiroyuki Maruyama's unpublished memorandum which was sent to the Christian Science Monitor. This paper was made available to me by Maruyama.
of unarmed neutrality, it does not prescribe unarmed neutrality as a condition to be met by the JCP before a United Front is acceptable. It ignores the JCP's non adherence to unarmed neutrality. Yet it opposes the JSP-Komeito and DSP coalition on the grounds that party principles, especially unarmed neutrality, might be sacrificed for the sake of political expediency. However, both the Socialist Association and the JCP could agree to the abrogation of the Security Treaty without any delay.

The Heretic: Hiroyuki Maruyama on Defence

Factionalism is paradoxically both an advantage and a disadvantage to Maruyama, the Chairman of the JSP's Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. He does not belong to any faction. He would have been more influential if he had the backing of a faction or an alignment of factions. On the other hand, the left factions have been unable to get rid of him. Ishibashi called him an "eccentric" but is powerless to remove him from his post even though Maruyama's views contradict the official Ishibashi line on defence.

The left factions are unable to get the other factions to move in concert to censure Maruyama. Thus, he is tacitly tolerated by the right factions. By

70. Short interview with Mr. Masahi Ishibashi on April 18, 1986.
turning a blind eye to Maruyama, the right factions have avoided reopening the divisive issue of defence. Moreover, the right factions are committed to the promotion of a coalition government and the creation of an image of a more "realistic" JSP. Had Maruyama been axed from his post, a bad impression would have been given to the centrist parties that the JSP is intransigent on defence and that the left is calling the tune. Moreover, the removal of Maruyama could possibly generate negative publicity for the party's new image of "realism". That no one is able to remove Maruyama has less to do with the "democratic nature" of the JSP than the factional nature of the JSP. There is the anomalous situation in which the Chairman of the party's Committee of Foreign Affairs and Defence publicly disagreed with the party's official defence policy and is still able to retain his post. Ishibashi is unable to remove Maruyama while Maruyama is unable to obtain any approval for his proposals on defence.

Maruyama's Threat Perception

Maruyama is acutely suspicious of the USSR. When he was a student in Yugoslavia, the Soviet invaded

71. Maruyama's views on defence can be found in The Japan Times, October 23, 1985; Shokun, November 1985; Sankei, October 2, 1985. The subsequent discussion of Maruyama's views is drawn from an interview conducted on March 4, 1986.
Czechoslovakia. Ever since, Maruyama has been convinced that the USSR has no compunction against using military power to achieve its ends. He was also impressed by Yugoslavia's ability to maintain its independence by the adoption of armed neutrality.

Through his reading of Soviet military doctrine, he is convinced that it is basically offensive, seeking the advantage of military superiority and pre-emptive attack. He felt that "by fully utilizing the power projection potential of its naval forces, the Soviet Union intends to apply enormous pressure both politically and militarily in order to ultimately 'neutralise' Japan and secure the 'free use' of Japan's three international straits - Ōshima, Tsugaru and Soya ...". Maruyama argued that "in the event of an armed conflict between the US and the Soviet Union, a localised invasion against Hokkaido that faces the three strategic straits may not be completely ruled out".

Maruyama's perception of the alliance

To Maruyama, the alliance is the best option for Japan today and also in the immediate future. Beyond that, Japan should judge whether the alliance or armed neutrality is best for Japan. Maruyama criticised the party's unarmed neutrality policy as unrealistic and

72. ibid., Shokun,
73. ibid.
working to serve the interests of the USSR.

Maruyama's View: Constitutional and legal framework for defence

Maruyama argued that Article 9 was framed on the assumption that Japan could depend on the proposed UN Collective Security System for its safety. The lack of unanimity among the "Big Five" powers in the UN and the advent of the Cold War rendered the scheme unworkable. Thus, Article 9 should be "creatively" interpreted as permitting defensive defence for Japan.

Maruyama held the view that the SDF is constitutional and legal. Nevertheless, he supported the attempts to consider the SDF as "unconstitutional but legal" as a tactical move because it is still an improvement over the traditional JSP position that the SDF is illegal.

Maruyama is by no means alone in the JSP in considering the SDF as constitutional and legal. Some medium ranking and young secretaries of the JSP Secretariat believe that to attain power, the JSP must be more "realistic" in its defence policy. They criticise the "view that the SDF is unconstitutional but to exist legally is not sufficient. Arguments in the party must be brought even to the view that (the SDF) is constitutional and legal".74

Maruyama's view: The appropriate military force and posture

He argued that Japan today needs to strengthen the SDF, even if it were to breach the 1% GNP ceiling. If Japan were to opt for armed neutrality in the future, it should not acquire offensive capability such as aircraft carriers and attack submarines.

What if the USSR were to threaten a neutral Japan? Maruyama believes that the possession of nuclear weapons by Japan is an option in the last resort. A neutral Japan retains the option of seeking alignments with other powers if the international situation demands a different policy. In short, Maruyama rejects the policy of unarmed neutrality.

The nature of JSP factionalism and defence

JSP factions, unlike LDP factions, are not simply composed of "personal cliques". Ideology and policy issues, especially defence, are important. The defence policy of the respective factions are invariably influenced by their ideological orientation. The exception is the New Birth Research Council. Beyond an amorphous left-leaning orientation, it lacks a well-defined ideology and defence policy. Nevertheless, its individual members' attitudes lean towards the left on defence.

Within the LDP, the Nakasone faction has a reputation of being "hawkish" while the Komoto faction
(ex-Miki) has been considered to be relatively "dovish". It is not possible to classify the other LDP factions because members within a particular faction may hold contrasting views on defence. The holding of a similar policy outlook by members of the same faction is not necessarily important for the LDP factions. What really matters is patronage and opportunities for advancement through factional support.

While JSP factions are ideologically oriented, socialist factions are also vehicles for obtaining party and parliamentary positions. The New Birth Research Council is an extreme example where a factional base to obtain party posts and influence is the prime motive rather than a shared ideology among its members.

JSP factions are not free from personalistic leader-follower relationships. The most ideologically motivated faction, the Socialist Association, had for its head Professor Sakisaka whose leadership stemmed from his charisma, intellect and moral prestige. It is argued that "very few Socialist Dietmen who take the meaning of personalistic factors (e.g. in terms of patron-clientele relationships) to be that literally found in the case of conservative factionalism. Rather, they see it as

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75. Professor Sakisaka was purged from Kyushu University in 1928 and was imprisoned in 1937 for two years. He wrote numerous books on Marxism and had translated a 27-volume complete works of Marx and Engels into Japanese. See The Japan Times Weekly, February 9, 1985.
something like a leader-follower relationship in the philosophical dimension." 76

Defence policy has also been used as a factional weapon to undermine the policy preferences and the power position of rival factions. In the struggle against the Socialist Association in 1977, the anti-Kyokai factions accused the Socialist Association of not maintaining the pacifist Constitution and of conducting studies on "rearmament". Such anti-party behaviour, the anti-Kyokai factions implied, ran counter to the policy of unarmed neutrality. The Socialist Association has resisted attempts to regard the SDF as legal, a policy which has the advantage of maintaining an obstacle to the JSP's coalition with the centrist parties.

Opportunism for factional power is often intertwined with ideological preferences. The attainment of power will make the adoption of a favoured policy alternative or ideological orientation more likely. To be able to obtain ideological leadership would lead to political leadership of the JSP. Thus, ideological and policy issues have been keenly contested by the various factions. Defence policy is no exception to this pattern of socialist factional behaviour. Defence policies of the various JSP factions have been both a means to an end and an end in itself.

The defence policy of the JSP is shaped by compromises between factions with competing viewpoints. The contention between the centre and right factions (which argued that the SDF was legal) and the left factions (which insisted that the SDF was illegal) resulted in the compromise solution that the SDF has a "legal existence". The official defence policy often settles for the lowest common denominator and is often ambiguous and ambivalent.

All the factions can agree on ideals like disarmament, arms control, establishment of nuclear free zones, peace diplomacy with all countries and the declaratory policy of unarmed neutrality. However with differing world views, the factions have different perceptions and levels of hostility towards the US and the Japan-US Security Treaty. Seikoken (friendly towards the US) and Shaken (pro China) are more tolerant of the Security Treaty "for the time being". The Katsumata faction and Socialist Association (pro Soviet factions) are more eager for a speedy abrogation of the Security Treaty. Given the dissimilar factional outlook on when and how the Security Treaty should be abrogated, the ambiguous official policy states only that negotiations will be needed with the US without any mention whether the alliance will be abrogated as soon as possible or will be maintained in the foreseeable future.
The party's defence policy is also influenced by the relative strength of the factions and factional ability to align with other factions so as to shift the balance of power to its advantage. If either the factions on the left or right are dominant, it is likely that the official defence policy will be closer to their preferred position. The ability of the Katsumata faction to be in the mainstream since 1970 has contributed to the recognition of the Ishibashi Plan as the official party policy.

A faction's power can be increased by its success in placing its candidates in the two top party posts, the Chairmanship and the Secretary Generalship; the CEC; the party secretariat; the level of support at the annual national party convention; faction members elected to public office and trade union support. Seikoken's increasing power can be attributed to its success in meeting the above criteria of party influence.

A faction's influence is also dependent on the faction's cohesion; the level of commitment and interests to a particular policy area; the faction's skill in forging alignment; political manoeuvring and factional in-fighting. The Sakisaka group is committed to resist any further shift to the right by the JSP on defence. It

77. For a summary of the variables of factional power, see Stockwin, op. cit., p.158.
has also aligned itself with larger numbers from the New Birth Research Council to check further changes to the party's defence policy. Despite its relative decline since 1977, the Socialist Association still poses a formidable obstacle to further changes to the JSP's defence policy.

The decision making process of the JSP is not conducive to policy change especially when the subject is a contentious issue like defence. Former JSP Chairman Asukata lamented: "When the leadership determines to do something new or resolve to change policies that are already in force, it must be very careful and expand enormous effort on creating a consensus. When I was in office, I sweated blood over this task ... this is not true of all political parties. Indeed I believe that it is particularly marked in the case of the JSP."78

However, failure by the mainstream factions to compromise on defence will alienate the anti-mainstream factions resulting in factional strife that may spill over to other policy areas being pursued by mainstream factions. (The three salient policy areas of the JSP in the 1980's involve debate about: a coalition with the centrist parties; rejuvenation of the JSP; and adoption of the New Declaration). If the dominant factions are

perceived to pursue a "zero-sum game", it may even lead to a party schism.

Given the factional nature of the JSP, changes in its defence policy are extremely difficult, acrimonious and if they do take place, are generally incremental and forged by compromises between factions of conflicting outlook and interest.
CHAPTER THREE

INTER-PARTY DYNAMICS : COALITION POLITICS AND DEFENCE

The following questions will be addressed in this chapter:

(i) What is "coalition politics?"

(ii) What is the impact of "coalition politics" on the JSP's defence policy?

(iii) What is the consequence for "coalition politics" if the JSP changes or fails to change its defence policy?

Coalition Politics

By the mid 1970's, the opposition parties anticipated that the LDP could lose its narrow majority in the Diet. It was hoped that an emerging parity of strength in the Diet between the LDP on the one hand, and the opposition parties on the other, would present opportunities for the opposition parties to share power by forging a coalition among themselves or with the LDP. A coalition with other parties is the only avenue to power for an opposition party because none has sufficient seats in the Diet to form a government by itself in the foreseeable future.

"Coalition politics" refers to the manoeuvres by various political parties to keep their options open and to build bridges with potential coalition partners in the hope of forming a coalition government in the event of the
LDP losing its slim majority or of a split within the factionalised LDP. It also entails the reconsideration of their defence policies in order to enhance their acceptability to other potential coalition partners.

The impact of "Coalition Politics" on JSP's defence policy

The "coalition" dilemma

The dilemma faced by the JSP leadership is how a coalition strategy could be pursued without disrupting the internal cohesion of the party. The JSP's potential partners, the DSP and Komeito, have both insisted that the adoption of "realistic" policies by the JSP is a prior condition of coalition with the JSP. The DSP's position is that "it is not possible to form a government together with the JSP with its irresponsible diplomatic and defence policy". Komeito's policy is that the party "will not adopt diplomatic and defence policies, which are contrary to the common sense of the people and if the JSP is impossible, with regards to those points, we will (have to) consider new responses".


3. Ibid.
The left faction of the JSP, the Socialist Association, is hostile to a coalition involving the JSP, Komeito and DSP. Its preference is for a United Front with the JCP. An all opposition party coalition that includes the JCP is unacceptable not only to the DSP and Komeito but also to the right factions within the JSP. There is a fear within the party that the pursuit of a coalition strategy might be at the expense of party principles, especially unarmed neutrality. The view that compromises with other parties are unacceptable if they are to lead to the further rearmament of Japan, is not confined only to the Socialist Association.4

The right factions within the JSP are prepared to make limited changes to the party's defence policy. However they are dismayed at the centrist parties increasing movement towards the LDP's position on defence.5 Even if the defence policy preferences of the right factions could be implemented, the policy gap on defence between the JSP and the centrist parties would still be wide. Though the right factions are keen to forge a coalition with the centrist parties, they are hesitant to make the sweeping changes to the party's

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4. Chisato Tatebayashi (Katsumata faction), Director General of the International Bureau and CEC member, strongly emphasised this point. Interview on March 6, 1986.

5. Interview with Mr. Ichiro Hino (Kawakami group, Seikoken) on March 4, 1986.
defence policy demanded by both DSP and Komeito. Not only would a rightward shift of the party's defence policy lead to destructive factional strife, but it would also weaken its role of checking the LDP on defence.

The contradictions between the JSP and the centrist parties' defence policies

Another dilemma for the JSP is the growing gap between the defence policies of the JSP and the centrist parties. If Komeito and DSP were to continue moving closer to the LDP's position on defence, the resulting isolation of the JSP on defence would also weaken its inhibitive role against the LDP. Moreover, the widening policy gap could also complicate the JSP's hopes of forming a coalition government with the centrist parties.

By 1975, the DSP had adopted a positive attitude towards the Security Treaty. Prior to that, the DSP called for the gradual dissolution of the Security Treaty, the non-stationing of US forces in Japan, and the introduction of US forces only in the event of an emergency. Thus, the previous DSP's defence policy envisaged armed neutrality for Japan in the long term.

The DSP's defence policy in the 1980's differ little from the LDP's. In October 1980, the LDP and DSP had a consensus on defence policy. It is noted that

"... the DSP is supportive of the LDP on most defence issues. Indeed, at times, the DSP has appeared more hawkish on defence matters than the right of the LDP".  

Komeito had initially preferred to abrogate the Security Treaty and to adopt lightly armed neutrality for Japan. It had earlier considered the SDF to be unconstitutional. By the end of 1981, Komeito had decided that the USSR was a threat to Japan, that it wished to maintain the Security Treaty, and that the SDF was constitutional. Komeito has continued to insist that defence spending should be limited to 1% GNP ceiling and that Japan should only have sufficient equipment to repel an enemy "at the water's edge".

Both the DSP and Komeito are prepared to discuss appropriate military equipment for Japan. The JSP, in contrast, has avoided such discussions because to suggest a better choice of weapons would be to concede to the LDP the principle of armaments for Japan.

The DSP and Komeito, by shifting their defence policies closer to the LDP, hope to enhance their chances of forming a coalition government with the LDP. By criticizing the JSP's defence policy, they can portray


themselves as "realistic" and responsible while also impressing the LDP that they are suitable coalition partners.

Faced with long-term electoral decline and pressure from the centrist parties, the JSP in the 1980's attempted to adopt "realistic policies" in order to demonstrate its credibility as a responsible party capable of holding power. In January 1980, the JSP and the Komeito made a pact with the aim of future co-operation. The JCP was excluded as a suitable coalition partner. The two parties also agreed that the Security Treaty would be dissolved through negotiation and that Japan should opt for disarmament and neutrality.\(^{11}\) Such a defence posture was consistent with the Ishibashi Plan of 1966.

Komeito had earlier signed an agreement with the DSP in December 1979.\(^{12}\) Both parties agreed to maintain the Security Treaty for the time being. The long term aim would be abrogation of the Security Treaty. The SDF would also be maintained but its "re-organization" might be "studied" in the future. Thus the DSP conceded to Komeito the possibility of reducing the SDF. All three parties were eager to patch together agreements on defence policies in anticipation of the June 1980 Elections. This led to the comment that "the opposition parties are

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apt to debate defence matters in connection with the concept of a coalition government".13

The Asukata leadership nevertheless expressed its reservations with the DSP: "If the DSP is to take its present direction of militarization, there cannot be a JSP-Komeito-DSP line".14 Asukata believed that "if the time ripens, the Security Treaty and the SDF will be abolished even during the time of the coalition government".15 This aspiration of Asukata was conveniently left out of the JSP-Komeito agreement on defence.

Just before the 1980 National elections, Asukata expediently said: "It is absolutely clear that such assertions as non-armament, non-alignment and positive neutrality, which are matters on the plane of the party platform, will not be an obstacle to forming a coalition with other parties and that they must also not be permitted to become obstacles".16 Yet Asukata also mentioned that "the spirit of the basic party policies of non-armament, non-alignment and positive neutrality will be maintained firmly, under whatever circumstances ... (and) ... we cannot go back on them".17 Thus,

17. ibid.
contradictory statements were made just prior to the National elections which could hardly enhance the credibility of the JSP.

Contrary to the hopes of the opposition, the LDP won convincingly the 1980 General Elections. The differences between the three opposition parties' defence policies which had been papered over just prior to the elections resurfaced as the anticipated defeat of the LDP did not materialize. By September 1981, Komeito threatened to review the JSP-Komeito pact "if the JSP does not make realistic responses on the three major policies for security, defence and energy".\textsuperscript{18} The gap between the JSP and Komeito widened at the end of 1981 as Komeito re-evaluated the Security Treaty more favourably and considered the SDF to be constitutional. In November 1981, Asukata decided to shelve the JSP-Komeito pact. He insisted that "the JSP-Komeito Agreement means that we will decrease and re-organize the SDF, will abrogate the Security Treaty in future, will hold firm to disarmament in an overall scale and to (an) anti-nuclear weapons policy. We abide by it. I want them (Komeito) to abide by it as well."\textsuperscript{19} Predictably, the Socialist Association also criticised the JSP-Komeito pact as meaningless since

\textsuperscript{18} Mainichi, Evening, September 3, 1981.

\textsuperscript{19} Sankei, November 27, 1981.
Komeito had shifted towards the right on defence.\textsuperscript{20} The JSP, in January 1982, criticised the DSP for considering a coalition with the LDP: "(The DSP) is aiming at a conservative-middle of the road government and recently, it is falling in line with the LDP on defence ... forgetting its position as an opposition party'.\textsuperscript{21} Thus the JSP-Komeito-DSP line-up for a coalition government did not look promising as a result of their disparate characters and policies.

Changes in the JSP's defence policy

Despite the hesitation of the JSP to adopt more "realistic" policies, certain policy changes were attempted in the 1980's. These changes were made to impress the electorate and the centrist parties that the JSP was a "realistic" and a "responsible" party. In foreign policy, the JSP tried to portray itself as no longer hostile to the US.\textsuperscript{22} It also broke the taboo of limiting its contacts with North Korea but not with South

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Yomiuri, March 1, 1982.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Asahi, January 15, 1982.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} A "Council to Consider Japan-US Relations" was set up by the JSP in 1982. See Yomiuri, Evening, April 26, 1984. The Japan-US Exchange Committee was also established in 1984. See Nihon Keizai, April 15, 1984. Ishibashi went to the US in April 1984. See Nihon Keizai, April 13, 1984. A branch bureau of the party's organ paper Shakai Shimpo was also opened in Washington. See Asahi, July 8, 1984.
\end{itemize}
The party also attempted a facelift by selling itself as the "New JSP" in 1983. Some JSP Dietmen also challenged the party's rejection of atomic power for Japan. In January 1986, the JSP officially discarded Marxism and adopted social democracy as its ideology. Amidst all these policy changes, defence policy has proven to be the most intractable to change. Where changes to the party's defence policy did occur, they were rather incremental and limited in scope.

The Diet Special Committee on Security

In 1980, a Special Committee on Security was established in each House of the Diet. The Special Committee on Security even includes representatives from the JSP and the JCP. The Special Committee on Security is, at present, not empowered to take up legislative measures. Thus it is not in a position to affect defence policy already decided. The Committee is said to have "the potential to affect future defence policy ... Still ... it is too early to tell whether it will be effective or merely at best a talking-shop or, at worst, an institutionalised arena for ritual combat between the

23. The Japan Times Weekly, June 8, 1985. However, the JSP's contacts in South Korea are limited to the South Korean opposition party, the New Korea Democratic Party.

government and the opposition on defence."  

The Special Committees on Security were not set up before 1980 as there was no inter-party consensus for their establishment. Yet, it should not be assumed that the setting up of this committee indicates an emerging consensus on defence. From the JSP's viewpoint, it is another means to strengthen civilian control of defence policy. The JSP considers the Committee to be a forum to highlight the differences between the JSP and the LDP's defence policy. Many JSP members do not attach much importance to this committee. The consent of the JSP to the establishment of the Special Committees on Security is not a departure from the JSP's defence policy. Back in 1965, Ishibashi had already recommended the establishment of a Committee on Defence in the Diet to strengthen civilian control.


26. Interview with Vice Secretary General Yogi Soga on March 3, 1986.

27. Interviews with various party officials revealed that the party attaches much greater importance to the Diet's Budget Committee and the Cabinet Affairs Committee for discussion on defence issues.

Budget allocation for defence

Prior to 1983, the JSP had adopted a policy of reducing the military budget. By the budget compilation of 1983, it had switched to a policy of "freezing" rather than "reducing" the defence budget. Thus the JSP tacitly accepted the status quo of 1% GNP ceiling on defence spending rather than its reduction. The Japan Defence Agency (JDA), not surprisingly, was gratified by the JSP's new position. It thanked the JSP for not demanding the reduction of its defence expenditure. However, the DSP criticized the JSP's decision to "freeze" the defence budget as not going far enough. The JSP's new position on the defence budget is considered by the DSP to be an "irresponsible" policy. Despite the readjustment by the JSP to its policy on defence spending, it is possible that a gap between the JSP's policy and the actual defence spending of Japan might emerge from 1987 onwards. It is likely that defence spending in 1987 might exceed the 1% GNP ceiling.

The SDF as "unconstitutional but legal" proposal

One important attempt to change the party's position towards the SDF was the "unconstitutional but legal" controversy. It failed to be officially adopted by the JSP as a result of the strong resistance from the left factions of the party. However this attempt at change should not be dismissed as insignificant even though its objectives have not yet been fulfilled. The JDA Director General publicly expressed his appreciation to the JSP's "realistic line" for accepting the legality of the SDF.\(^{33}\) The legitimacy of the SDF has always been in question as a result of Article 9. Its ambiguous constitutional status has affected the morale and the recruitment of the armed forces.\(^ {34}\) The JSP has been responsible, to a large extent, for casting a cloud over the legitimacy of the SDF through a strict interpretation of Article 9. Thus, the JSP's attempt to recognise the legality, if not the constitutionality of the SDF, is obviously welcomed by the armed forces.\(^ {35}\)

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35. That the SDF was considered legal by the JSP was regarded by the JDA as a significant date in the domestic calendar of defence policy changes. See Japan Defence Agency, *Defence White Paper 1985* translated by The Japan Times Ltd, p.331.
The JSP's defence policy, change and the consequence for "coalition politics"

Is the JSP's defence policy really a serious stumbling block to a coalition with the centrist parties? By early 1980, all three parties had hastily patched together two contradictory agreements: the Komeito-JSP pact and the Komeito-DSP agreement. Tempted by the possibility of forming a government, the differences between the three parties were conveniently side-stepped. It was pointed out that "despite the differences in their ways of thinking about the nation's basic policies (Security Treaty and defence), the three opposition parties compromised and completed these two coalition plans for the sole purpose of setting up an opposition administration as soon as possible".36

In 1984, both DSP and Komeito sought to take advantage of the LDP's factional infighting by supporting Susumu Nikaido (Tanaka faction) as the LDP's party president.37 They hoped to form a coalition with at least a segment of the LDP. In 1985, Komeito was prepared to participate in any "anti-Nakasone" LDP government at "any time".38 Thus Komeito showed itself

willing to participate in a coalition with the LDP despite the differences over defence.

Ishibashi has also rationalised the possibility of forming a coalition even with the LDP in spite of the JSP's disapproval of the LDP's defence policy. Ishibashi claimed that "... there is ... a sense of weariness even within the ruling party against (Nakasone's militaristic) statements. If he continues in the present direction, there is a possibility of even closer links between members of the ruling and opposition parties in the future". By the end of 1985, Ishibashi declared that "there will be a possibility that the LDP will split, if we are able to decrease the number of its seats to half of the total or less, and that we should then give thought to forming a coalition with it".

In the same month, the JSP's draft of the New Declaration stated that the JSP will "face political power relations with any political parties in a positive way". Subsequently, the draft was revised because of strong opposition from the left. The final draft proposed that the JSP should seek the replacement of the LDP as the

party in power. Thus, it showed that the right factions contemplate a coalition even with the LDP. If the right factions could continue their ascendancy over the left factions, they would be in a better position to push for a coalition even with the LDP. However, it was left unclear how a coalition with the LDP could be reconciled with the party principle of unarmed neutrality.

Even if the JSP were to shift to a more positive attitude towards the Security Treaty, it would not be a sufficient condition to secure the acceptance of the party by the DSP. The DSP is interested not only in the policy changes of the JSP but also in changes to the JSP's personnel. The DSP is still extremely suspicious of the left factions within the JSP. The DSP would be more amenable to a coalition with the right factions of the party, or with a JSP where the left is no longer influential, or a JSP with the left excluded from the party.

In January 1986, the DSP criticized the JSP's New Declaration for not discarding the policy of unarmed neutrality. The DSP has continued to insist that "there can be no coalition with the JSP, unless it changes its attitude of 'unarmed neutrality' and opposition to the

42. ibid.
Japan-US Security Treaty". 44 An advantage obtained by the DSP leadership by criticizing the JSP's defence policy as "unrealistic" is that it serves as a useful excuse to avoid committing itself to a coalition arrangement with the JSP and to keep its preferred coalition option with the LDP. The left wing members of the DSP want to form a coalition with the other opposition parties (except the JCP) in order to replace the LDP government. In contrast, the DSP's party elders prefer a coalition with the LDP. Thus, the party elders find it convenient to point out to the party's rank and file that major policy differences between the DSP and JSP make a coalition arrangement between the two parties difficult. 45 By emphasising the differences in the defence policies of the two parties, the DSP can rationalise to the party members their preference for a coalition with the LDP.

Even if the JSP were to attempt further changes in its defence policy, it is less attractive to the DSP and Komeito as a coalition partner. The likelihood of gaining power is far better through a coalition with the LDP than with the JSP. A JSP-Komeito-DSP coalition is not yet in a position to muster sufficient numbers to form a coalition government, as shown in the following

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The centrist parties are unwilling to align themselves with the JCP as part of an all opposition strategy. The DSP stated that "even if the opposition parties were to obtain a majority in the general election, we will not be able to secure a majority unless we have the JCP, which is a political party with a different quality, join us. We cannot but approve a government centred on the LDP".47

The Socialist Association pointed out that there are only two plausible coalition strategies that could possibly muster the numbers to form the government. They are either a JSP-Komeito-DSP-LDP lineup or an all


opposition parties strategy. The Socialist Association's conclusion is that a coalition with the LDP is an anathema and that a JSP-Komeito-DSP lineup which excludes the JCP would not have the numbers to form a coalition government. Therefore the JSP should not be preoccupied with the quest for a coalition government but should concentrate on "struggles" against the LDP. The right factions drew a different conclusion: it is necessary to be prepared to form a coalition even with a segment of the LDP in the event of a split within the ruling party.

Even if the JSP were to adopt a more "realistic" defence policy, there is no assurance that it will be able to secure a place in a coalition comprising the LDP, Komeito and the DSP. "Coalition politics" does not hinge on the defence issue alone. However, if future elections see the LDP losing its majority (even when aligned with the New Liberal Club), coalition manoeuvres will be fluid. The key consideration would be the coalition line-up which could facilitate the attainment of power, rather than a preoccupation with the defence policies of the prospective coalition partners. Thus the parties have behaved in contradictory ways. On certain occasions, they attach importance to defence policy as the crucial criteria for a party's suitability to be a coalition partner. In practice, opportunism prevails. It is conceivable that

differences over defence could be conveniently papered over in the pursuit of a coalition path to power.

Even though no parties (with the exception of the JSP) subscribe to the ideal of unarmed neutrality, the opportunism of coalition politics might lead other parties to find the JSP's present defence policy to be tolerable enough. That policy presents no demand for the reduction of the defence budget; an effort to recognise the legality of the SDF; and the tacit acceptance of the Security Treaty "for the time being" without a declared timetable for abrogation. An expedient toleration of the JSP's defence policy is not impossible given the wider consideration of a coalition government. Likewise, the JSP leadership is even prepared to form a coalition with a segment of the LDP despite the differences in their defence policies.
CHAPTER FOUR

LABOUR UNIONS, THE JSP AND DEFENCE

In this chapter, the following questions will be considered:

(i) What is the relationship between Sohyo and the JSP?
(ii) Why has Sohyo shifted away from radicalism?
(iii) What is Sohyo's defence policy?
(iv) What is the impact of labour unions on the JSP's defence policy?

The symbiotic relationship between the JSP and Sohyo

Sohyo is Japan's largest trade union federation with a 4.5 million membership. It provides organisational, electoral and financial support to the JSP. Sohyo is the JSP's primary pressure group. As a result of the party's dependence on Sohyo, it is amenable to Sohyo's policy inputs which are not restricted to socio-economic issues but include foreign policy and defence proposals as well. The relationship between the JSP and Sohyo is also cemented by personal ties. 62% of the

1. Sohyo's formal organisational support includes a nationwide network of Councils of JSP members of Sohyo which was established in 1961; a Committee for Strengthening the JSP was established by Sohyo-affiliated unions in 1980. See Asahi, September 28, 1975; Ninon Keizai, November 3, 1980.
incumbent Lower House and 67% of the Upper House JSP Diet-members are of trade union origins.  

While Sohyo is the primary trade union federation supporting the JSP, the party also enjoys some support from Churitsuroren (Federation of Independent Unions) and Shinsambetsu (National Federation of Industrial Organisations).  

Sohyo, since 1979, has not given support only to the JSP. As the Sohyo leadership favours a JSP-Komeito-DSP coalition government, it has also extended some support to Komeito's candidates too. Since Sohyo comprises 18 public sector union federations and 32 private sector union federations, it is not a monolithic organisation. While Sohyo's leadership may pursue a set of policy goals, its affiliated unions may also pursue their own independent policy goals inclusive of defence policy. While Sohyo does not officially discriminate against any particular JSP factions, certain Sohyo-affiliated unions only extend selective support towards

3. Churitsu Roren's mainstay member union, Denki Roren (All Japan Federation of Electric Machine Workers Union) also acts as a pressure group to push the JSP to adopt more "realistic" policies. Sankei, July 19, 1985. On Churitsuroren and Shinsambetsu's support for the JSP, see Nihon Keizai, November 3, 1980.
5. Sohyo, This is Sohyo: Japanese Workers and Their Struggle (Sohyo, Tokyo: 1985), pp.118-127.
specific JSP factions. For example, Zendentsu (Japan Telecommunications Workers' Union), Tekko Roren (National Federation of Iron and Steel Workers Union) and Zensei (Japan Postal Workers Union) support the JSP right factions while denying electoral support to the Socialist Association. The extreme left faction, Socialist Association, receives support from elements within Nikkyoso (Japan Teachers Union), Kokuro (National Railway Workers Union) and Jichiro (All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union).

The JSP, as a result of its dependence on Sohyo, has been labelled the "political bureau of Sohyo." Moreover, Sohyo has often intervened in party affairs. Sohyo claimed that "it is difficult to fix the limit on such intervention. However, if it is entrusted to the party alone, then nothing can be done. The present situation in the JSP is such that even if we are not asked to step in, we cannot but step in ... If the JSP does not accept what (Sohyo) says, then we will change our stand of supporting the JSP alone."

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7. Interview on February 19, 1986 with Mr. Yoichi Yamada, Director of International Bureau, Sohyo.


9. This statement was made by Sohyo's Secretary General Mitsuo Tomizuka when Sohyo intervened against the Socialist Association in 1977. Such an attitude by Sohyo was also exhibited in its subsequent interventions when the party has been immobilised by factional fighting. See Tokyo Shimbun, July 20, 1977.
Nevertheless Sohyo has continued to support the JSP. The official reason why the JSP has been supported by Sohyo is because the JSP is the preferential party of its members. Even though there has been declining support for the JSP especially among younger workers, the JSP is still supported by the majority of younger workers who have party preferences. The main reason for Sohyo's support of the JSP is because the party represents the interests of Sohyo through the parliamentary process. By supporting the JSP, the party is able to deny the LDP the opportunity to revise the Constitution and dilute post-war reforms that have included labour rights. Thus both the JSP and Sohyo need each other.

Yet, mutual dependence also has its drawbacks. One reason for the JSP's electoral decline is its image of representing the narrow, sectoral interests of its trade union supporters. The long term decline of the JSP has been alarming to Sohyo because if the trend were to continue, its ally would be less able to represent its interests from within the Diet. Ishibashi sums up the symbiotic relationship well: "In this alliance, we share

10. Interview with Mr. Yoichi Yamada.

11. In a poll conducted by Sohyo on its younger members from 29 major member unions aged 31 and below, 45.6% did not support any particular political party. For those who did support a party, the majority preference is still the JSP. The support pattern is as follows: JSP:36%; LDP:8.1%; JCP:4%; Komeito:1.8%; DSP:0.8%. The Japan Times, February 19, 1986.
each other's fortunes; we look at ourselves through our partner's eyes. If Sohyo declines, we decline; and vice versa". 12

In the hope of arresting the decline of the "JSP-Sohyo bloc", Sohyo has adopted more "realistic policies". It has in turn pressured the JSP to pursue more "realistic policies" inclusive of defence. In order to understand why Sohyo's rightward trend has had a ripple effect on the JSP's defence policy, it is pertinent to know, in brief, why Sohyo has shifted away from Marxist militancy to a position that exercises a moderating influence on the JSP.

Sohyo: The shift from radicalism

Even today, Sohyo believes that "given the reactionary nature of the Japanese employers and the conservative government, trade unions should act vigorously in the political arena if only to defend the economic life of workers". 13

Although Sohyo's activism still extends beyond the economic realm, it has become less militant for a number of reasons. 14 By the 1970's, Sohyo's new

14. For a succinct summary of the reasons for Sohyo's militancy, see Bradley M. Richardson and Scott C. Flanagan, op. cit., pp.81-84. See also Stockwin, op. cit., p.92.
leadership had become less radical.\textsuperscript{15} The automatic extension of the Security Treaty, the American withdrawal from Vietnam, and the reversion of Okinawa to Japan removed some of the grounds for radicalism. Increasing affluence, and an occupational structure shifting to white collar employment, have made Marxism less attractive to workers.\textsuperscript{16} Sohyo has a new set of problems and has become relatively less preoccupied with foreign policy and defence issues. The relative slowdown of Japan's economic growth has also made it difficult for Sohyo to secure substantial annual wage hikes for its workers. Sohyo has also identified a number of problem areas caused by Japan's structural transformation in the 1980's. These are: the problems of middle and old-aged workers; the problems of unemployment that would be aggravated by robotization and office automation; the influx of women

\textsuperscript{15} Sohyo was led for the larger part of the 1950's and 1960's by Chairman Ota Kaoru (1955-67) and General Secretary Iwai Akira (1955-68), both of whom subscribed to Marxism. See Cole, Totten and Uyehara op. cit., p.341. Sohyo leaders also accepted Professor Sakisaka's revolutionary thesis that workers must be prepared to use force, if necessary, to seize power from the capitalists. See Stockwin, ibid., p.92. Mr. Yoichi Yamada believed that the shift of Sohyo away from militancy is not merely a result of the different personalities of Sohyo's new leadership. According to Mr. Yamada a new environment faced by Sohyo called for a new type of leaders and new leaders did appear. Thus Sohyo's radical leaders were phased out.

workers into the economy; and the need to rectify Sohyo's failure to organise workers in the growing tertiary sector of the economy. Moreover, the existence of Sohyo is threatened by the proposal to establish a national unified labour front, Zenminrokyo (The National Council of Private Enterprise Workers Unions). If Sohyo's private unions were to join Zenminrokyo, there is the danger that Sohyo would split and be weakened. Faced with a new set of problems and a threat to its survival, Sohyo has responded with more "pragmatic" policies. This "realism" has also been extended to Sohyo's defence policy.

Sohyo's defence policy

In 1951, at the Second Congress of Sohyo, the left wing unions of Sohyo mustered enough strength to incorporate the Four Peace Principles into its political programme. They are: the settlement of a universal peace treaty; the neutrality of Japan; and the rejection of all military bases and the refusal to rearm. The policy of "unarmed neutrality" was disagreeable to Sodomei, the right-wing trade union federation then affiliated with Sohyo and also to Zenro, the breakaway federation from

17. Sohyo, op. cit., pp.70-75.

Sohyo comprising moderate and conservative unions. 19 Zenro and Sodomei, opposed to Sohyo's radicalism, formed a rival trade union federation, Domei (Japanese Workers Confederation) in November 1964. Subsequently, Domei has extended its support to DSP, a party which has always rejected the policy of unarmed neutrality.

Sohyo, in the early days, was responsible for pushing the JSP's defence policy to the left. After the party schism of 1951, Sohyo extended its support primarily to the Left JSP. It was noted that: "the Left Socialists at first tempered their policies, calling for a revision of the peace treaty and abrogation of the security pact; but supporting unions obliged these leaders to adopt a stronger stand against the two treaties and to champion the four principles of peace". 20

In the 1960's, Sohyo was in the vanguard of the mass movements against the revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty, US involvement in Vietnam and the US occupation of Okinawa. Even in the early 1970's, Sohyo's defence policy seemed to be more radical than the JSP's official defence policy. Sohyo advocated the abrogation of the Security Treaty as soon as possible. 21 JSP's defence policy at that time was more ambiguous on the timing of the treaty's abrogation. By the late 1970's,

19. ibid., p.451; See also Stockwin, op. cit., pp.40-48.
Sohyo's general orientation was to move away from the left. While it had once supported the defence policy of JSP's left, Sohyo has changed its position to one of support for the defence policy of the JSP's right.

Sohyo's world view

Sohyo has shifted from Marxism to social democracy. It had previously declined to join the non-communist ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions). Until the mid 1970's, Sohyo had been closer to the eastern bloc even though it was supposed to maintain the policy of "positive neutrality". Conversely, it was hostile to the US.

In the mid 1970's, Sohyo launched its "labour diplomacy" towards the west. Sohyo had a rapprochement with its American counterpart, AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organisation). Both trade union federations broke off relations in 1965 because of security-related issues. Sohyo had accused the US of being imperialist aggressors in Vietnam. AFL-CIO, which was staunchly anti-communist, saw Hanoi as the aggressor. It was also hostile towards Sohyo because AFL-CIO perceived Sohyo to be a pro-communist organisation which opposed the Japan-US Security Treaty.


23. ibid.
Sohyo's shift towards the West was also prompted by the fear of increasing protectionism in the West. Sohyo's worry was that trade restrictions would be detrimental to the livelihood of its workers. Moreover, Sohyo was concerned that the trade union federations in the West would support protectionism. Thus, it was hoped that Sohyo's reorientation towards the West would open channels of communication and understanding with the trade union federations of the West. Sohyo's labour diplomacy was, interestingly, supported by the Ministry of Labour and the Foreign Ministry.

Sohyo also exchanged relations with the General Confederation of Labour (West Germany), the Trade Union Congress (Britain); applied to join the OECD's Trade Union Advisory Committee and established an office in Paris, the OECD headquarters.

While Sohyo has moved towards the West, its relations with the USSR have been more restrained. Sohyo, to the annoyance of the Soviets, held a rally for the first time in 1978, demanding the return of all the Kurile Islands. It also supports the Polish trade union

27. Ibid., Yomiuri.
Solidarity's struggle for autonomy. Sohyo also suspended an exchange with the USSR for some time in protest at the Soviet shooting of the Korean Airline in 1983. Thus, by the 1980's, Sohyo had weaned itself away from the Socialist bloc and changed its hostile outlook towards the US as a result of ideological reorientation, pragmatism and its general shift away from the left.

Sohyo's threat perception

Sohyo perceives that the real threat to Japan is the danger of Japanese militarism. Sohyo's hostility toward any revival of militarism has its roots in the labour movement's history of repression by Japan's pre-war militaristic regime. To Sohyo, militarism is the antithesis of peace and democracy. It believes that "democracy is a necessary prerequisite for the defence of peace and the protection of the living of workers". Sohyo disagrees that the USSR is a threat to Japan. It supports the view that the creation of tension between the USSR and Japan is the danger and not the USSR itself.

30. Sohyo, op. cit., p.52.
31. Kyodo Desk, No. 2, October 1, 1983, p.5. This periodical is published by Sohyo's Association for Supporting and Strengthening the JSP.
Sohyo's view of the alliance

Sohyo had once vehemently opposed the Security Treaty. It led the massive demonstrations against the revision of the Security treaty in 1960. While Sohyo still advocates the abrogation of the Security Treaty, it no longer calls for the speedy abrogation of the Treaty. While the Sohyo leadership has tacitly accepted the Security Treaty for the time being, some of its affiliated unions have divergent views on the Security Treaty. For instance, Tekko Roren (Japan Federation of Iron and Steel Workers Union) on the right, supports the maintenance of the Security Treaty, the right of self-defence and has rejected unarmed neutrality as unrealistic. Goka Roren (Federation of Synthetic Chemical Workers Union), on the left, calls for the abrogation of the Security Treaty as a major task for "struggle". Thus the Sohyo leadership in its consideration of defence policy has to take into account the differing views of its affiliated unions and where the centre of gravity lies along the ideological spectrum of its member unions.

Sohyo's view: Constitutional and legal framework for defence

Sohyo opposes the revision of Article 9. Such a position also has the added advantage of preventing the LDP


from revising the labour rights guaranteed by the Constitution. This is because if the LDP succeeds in revising Article 9, it may open the floodgates of revision resulting in the loss of constitutionally guaranteed labour rights. Sohyo has always suspected that an LDP government would collude with big business to introduce anti-labour measures.

Sohyo does not object to Ishibashi's position that the SDF is unconstitutional but legal.

Sohyo's view: The appropriate military force and posture

Sohyo has adopted the operational policy of armed neutrality while retaining the declaratory policy of unarmed neutrality. Sohyo's position in the 1980's is that: "it is impossible to realize, at one stroke, the ideal of unarmed neutrality, including the immediate dissolution of the SDF and the immediate abrogation of the Security Treaty". Sohyo envisages a three stage process towards the ideal of unarmed neutrality. At the first stage, a JSP-led coalition government would still stay within the alliance. At the second stage, the coalition government would abolish the Security Treaty and declare Japan's neutrality. At the third stage, the SDF would be gradually reduced in accordance with Ishibashi's Four

34. Nihon Keizai, Evening, December 1, 1980.
Conditions. The declaratory goal is to "ultimately realise unarmed neutrality and external peace in the world". Armed neutrality is not stated explicitly as Sohyo's preferable defence policy. Such a policy, however, is implied as the SDF is not to be abolished when Japan leaves the alliance. This position is similar to Ishibashi's operational policy of armed neutrality for Japan.

The labour unions' impact on JSP's defence policy

In October 1979, the JSP and Sohyo made a pact that the JSP should reorientate itself towards social democracy; to exclude the JCP from a coalition framework; and to form a coalition with Komeito and to review its policy on the Security Treaty. By nudging the JSP towards support for a coalition with the two centrist parties, Sohyo has also tacitly accepted that the JSP should narrow the defence policy gap between the JSP and the centrist parties.

Sohyo has kept up the pressure on the JSP to adopt more "realistic" policies. It asserted that "concerning various problems, including defence, foreign policy, nuclear-power generation, administrative reform, etc., the JSP has come to disclose its weak points, to the effect that it cannot announce ideas as a political party

36. ibid.
or realistic policies. Also, it lacks efforts to overcome that ... the JSP ... should announce new policy goals ...

Sohyo's affiliated union, Zentai, insisted that in order to establish a JSP-led coalition government, "the JSP must establish a realistic policy line in the fields of diplomatic, security and energy policies. With regard to the SDF, unarmed neutrality is an ideal. (However) we should not mix it with reality". Another Sohyo's affiliated union, Zendentsu, also believed that "it is difficult to form a coalition without a policy-based agreement. The JSP will have to give its answer in concrete terms about the Security Treaty, the SDF, atomic power generation and the ROK. Otherwise it will probably be difficult to obtain the people's understanding and support as a responsible political party". Given the JSP's dependence on the trade unions, the party is susceptible to their pressure to review its defence policy. As a result of the convergence between Sohyo, its right-wing affiliated unions and the JSP's centre and right factions on defence, the JSP's defence policy has shifted, in a limited way, to the right. One reason why the JSP has made only limited changes to its defence policy is because there has been no real pressure from Sohyo on the

38. Mainichi, November 14, 1981.
JSP to make more than limited changes. This is because Sohyo's defence policy is fairly similar to the JSP's defence policy. Sohyo has not demanded publicly that the JSP should show a more positive attitude towards the Security Treaty even if it is to be maintained for the time being.

However, the right-wing Sohyo-affiliated trade unions would probably appreciate a JSP that accepts the Security Treaty more explicitly and positively "for the time being", while retaining its option of armed neutrality and declaratory ideal of unarmed neutrality.

Besides direct pressure from the labour unions on the JSP to change its defence policy, other actions by the labour unions have indirectly affected the JSP's defence policy. The support of Sohyo for the right and centre factions had a decisive impact on the decline of the left factions. Since the left factions have been weakened, in part, by the repeated intervention of Sohyo against them, the shift of the balance of power towards the right factions has also meant that the left has been less able to pursue their preferable defence policy.

In July 1977, Sohyo intervened in the party's factional struggle and forced the Socialist Association to limit itself to just a theoretical group to study Marxism. It also proposed the change in the composition of the delegates at the important annual party convention.

Sohyo successfully sponsored the automatic right of Dietmembers to vote at the convention. This was a blow to the Socialist Association because it had few Dietmembers in its ranks. From then on, the power of the Socialist Association has waned. Denki Roren and Zendentsu have also refused to support candidates from the Socialist Association in elections.\textsuperscript{42}

In February 1982, Sohyo boycotted the JSP left Asukata-Baba leadership by castigating it as a "one-lung" executive which excludes the right factions.\textsuperscript{43} Asukata had to give in to Sohyo's pressure. In subsequent party elections, the right factions have continued their ascendancy over the left factions. In January 1986, the centre and right factions, with Sohyo's backing, succeeded in adopting the New Declaration as the party's ideology.\textsuperscript{44} All these interventions by Sohyo have contributed to the decline of the left factions.

As a result of Sohyo's rightward shift and its switch of support away from the left factions, it has given impetus to the JSP leadership to move towards the right too. The changes to the JSP's defence policy was, in part, a

\textsuperscript{42} Yomiuri, August 20 , 1977; Yomiuri, Evening, July 5 , 1978.

\textsuperscript{43} See Yomiuri, February 7, 1982; Asahi, Evening, February 17, 1982; Asahi, February 18, 1982; Nihon Keizai, Evening, March 1, 1982; Yomiuri, April 13, 1982.

\textsuperscript{44} Sankei, January 9, 1986.
consequence of Sohyo's movement towards the right, its subsequent support to the centre and right factions of the JSP, and its direct pressure on the JSP to be "more realistic" on defence.
CHAPTER FIVE

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

The final chapter will ask the following questions:

(i) What are the conceivable changes to the JSP's defence policy?

(ii) Does the JSP have the capacity to change its defence policy?

(iii) The thesis will conclude by canvassing the merits and the possible problems of armed neutrality as the JSP's official defence policy.

The possible changes in the JSP's defence policy

They are:

(i) to regard to SDF as "unconstitutional but legal".

(ii) to recognise the SDF as "constitutional and legal".

(iii) a more "positive" acceptance of the Security Treaty "for the time being", without discarding the declaratory ideal of unarmed neutrality.

(iv) to explicitly adopt armed neutrality as the party's operational and declaratory policy while retaining "unarmed neutrality" as a distant ideal.
The party's capacity to change its defence policy

The JSP's capacity to change its defence policy will depend on how far-ranging the proposed changes are. Even though JSP supporters have increasingly grown to accept the Security Treaty and the SDF, the party has retained its declaratory policy of unarmed neutrality. Despite the sustained pressure on the JSP by the centrist parties to discard its "unarmed neutrality" policy, the JSP has refrained from doing so. The left factions would resist any moves to drop the party's hallmark of "unarmed neutrality". Even the right factions are reluctant to do so because of their pacifist leanings. Maruyama and some other JSP secretaries who reject the "unarmed neutrality" policy are an isolated minority within the party. Sohyo, which maintains the declaratory policy of "unarmed neutrality" would veto any attempts to discard the policy of unarmed neutrality.

Efforts to adopt the SDF as "constitutional and legal" would also meet the same fate, in the foreseeable future, for the same reasons. However, it is only a matter of time before Seikoken, Shaken and the Katsumata faction move again to adopt the SDF as "unconstitutional but legal" because of the decline of the Socialist Association and the disunity of the New Birth Research Council.

1. Yomiuri, June 8, 1980.
Is it possible for the JSP to adopt a more "positive" attitude toward the Security Treaty while retaining its ideal of unarmed neutrality? If Seikoken continues to increase its factional power, it could, in alignment with Shaken, support such a position especially if it could enhance the party's prospects for a coalition with the centrist parties. Since both Seikoken and Shaken are not hostile to the US, it is easier for them to adopt a more "positive" attitude towards the alliance. However, the pro Soviet factions (the Katsumata faction and the Socialist Association) and the pro North Korea faction (New Birth Research Council) would be reluctant to adopt a similar position.

What might possibly change a factional stalemate to a more "positive" acceptance of the Security Treaty is intervention from Sohyo. Sohyo has continued shifting toward the right since the 1970's. It has also discarded its hostility toward the US. If Sohyo is convinced that a more explicit acceptance of the Security Treaty by the JSP is necessary for a coalition with the centrist parties, it might apply further pressure on the JSP to change. If the party continues its long term decline, Sohyo might also pressure the JSP to adopt more "realistic" policies inclusive of defence.

If the LDP were to perform badly at future national elections, it is conceivable that the JSP would expediently adopt a more "positive" outlook towards the
Security Treaty if it had a real opportunity to form a coalition government with the centrist parties.

If the LDP were to lose its majority, an LDP-DSP coalition or even an LDP-DSP-Komeito coalition is more attractive to the centrist parties than a coalition with the JSP which still has a vocal Marxist component. An LDP-Centrist party coalition would destroy the hopes of the JSP of forming a coalition government. It would result in the loss of an important incentive for the JSP to change its defence policy.

Yet, it is not impossible that the LDP would be split resulting in the formation of a coalition government comprising the JSP, Komeito, DSP and an LDP segment. Even if the JSP were to form the largest component in such a coalition, its hands would be tied by its coalition partners from abrogating the Security Treaty.

It is conceivable that the JSP, entrusted with power and responsibility, would continue to retain the alliance given the political and economic costs Japan could possibly suffer if it leaves the alliance. Takuya Kubo believes that "should the JSP take over the reins of government administration, principle will remain principle, but more realistic security policies will actually be adopted". 2

Would the JSP change its defence policy if international conditions deteriorated? Even if the USSR

were to continue its military buildup, the pro Soviet factions would oppose any moves to regard the USSR as a threat to Japan. If there is a conflict in the Korean peninsula or if either of the Koreas were to acquire nuclear weapons, it would result in factional disputes over the question of threat to Japan. Given the different factional outlook, turbulence in North East Asia could lead to a polarization of the JSP's defence policy rather than a consensus about the need to change its defence policy in response to a common threat perception. Any outbreak of regional conflict would heighten the fear within the JSP that Japan's alliance with the US would drag Japan into a war where US interests are involved.

Given the strong belief within the party that the alliance is potentially dangerous to Japan, could armed neutrality be made both an operational and declaratory policy of the JSP?

Armed neutrality as JSP's official defence policy

One important factor that has led to the long term decline of the JSP is its image of being an "unrealistic" and "irresponsible" party incapable of holding power. The policy of unarmed neutrality has often been criticised as the epitome of irresponsible idealism. An explicit adoption of armed neutrality for Japan while retaining the ultimate ideal of unarmed neutrality would help to make the JSP's defence policy more credible.
The JSP could point out that the final ideal of unarmed neutrality would not be abandoned. It would have to argue that armed neutrality for Japan is preferable to an entangling alliance with the US; that Japan could cope with possible US economic retaliation; that the present level of military spending is sufficient to act as a deterrent against any aggressors.

Armed neutrality for Japan would not really be a major change to the JSP's defence policy. Since the Ishibashi Plan of 1966, armed neutrality has always been the implicit, operational policy of the JSP. The only change is to make it explicit both the declaratory and operational policy of the JSP. Such a position could be rationalised as the second stage of the JSP's defence policy upon leaving the alliance. The rhetoric of unarmed neutrality as the final stage of a long, indeterminable process could still be kept as before.

By adopting armed neutrality explicitly as its defence policy, the JSP need not follow the tails of Komeito and DSP in shifting toward the LDP's position on defence. A failure to adopt armed neutrality openly, coupled with a greater toleration of the Security Treaty, would place the JSP in a crowded field already occupied by the centrist parties. The JSP would then be unable to present an alternate perspective on defence for Japan. By making its preference for armed neutrality explicit, the JSP would retain its distinctive policy; present
itself as a credible party with a viable, alternate
defence policy which is potentially appealing to the
Japanese people. 3

The problems of adopting armed neutrality as
party policy

There is the risk that armed neutrality as the
party's policy would ignite factionalism which could even
result in the breakaway of the left. Squabbling over
defence policy would reinforce the image of the JSP as an
ineffectual, faction-ridden party. However, if the left
were to split from the party, they would be even more
isolated politically. The party could rebuild itself,
despite what might possibly be just a temporary setback,
minus the doctrinaire attitudes of the left. Such a
choice could still be rewarding in the long run.

To adopt armed neutrality as the JSP's defence
policy, the party must win Sohyo's support. Sohyo's
implicit, operational defence policy is also armed

3. See John Welfield, "Some Diplomatic and Strategic
Aspects Of Japan's Present And Future Foreign
Policies", Research Paper No. 84, May 1981,
Australia-Japan Research Centre, pp.56-57. See also
Radha Sinha, Japan's Options for the 1980s (Croom
present persuasive arguments that armed neutrality is
indeed a viable and preferable strategic option for
Japan. One question which both authors did not
address is: Does armed neutrality for Japan
necessitate more defence spendings than it would need
if it has remained within the alliance framework?
The onus is on the JSP to present a persuasive case
that armed neutrality for Japan does not necessitate
a stronger defence posture for Japan.
neutrality for Japan. Thus, if Sohyo were to adopt the policy of armed neutrality explicitly, it would not be a drastic change from its previous policy.

What would be the consequence for "coalition politics" if the JSP were to openly adopt the policy of "armed neutrality?"

Historically, both Komeito and the DSP have preferred armed neutrality for Japan though they have come to accept the alliance. This shift toward the LDP's position has the advantage of presenting themselves as acceptable coalition partners to the LDP.

The JSP could reassure the centrist parties that it would accept the alliance "for the time being" while keeping armed neutrality as the option for the future. What is more important is the JSP's future electoral performance. If the JSP continues to diminish in numbers, it would be a less attractive partner in a coalition. On the other hand, if the JSP is able to increase its parliamentary numbers, it would be more attractive to the centrist parties which would prefer to keep their coalition options open. Both the DSP and Komeito have made compromises on defence before, and would do so again if it facilitated the attainment of power through a coalition.

Would the JSP's open adoption of armed neutrality lead to the erosion of its inhibitive role on LDP defence policy? The LDP could argue that increased
defence spending within the ambit of the Security Treaty would still be less than that demanded by the JSP's policy of armed neutrality. Moreover the JSP's position of armed neutrality could be interpreted by its opponents as a recognition of the need for armaments and thus a shift by the JSP to the right.

Hence, one argument which could be used by LDP "doves" against the "hawks" within their party would be weakened: namely, that to increase defence spending would be politically disruptive given the absolutist position of unarmed neutrality by the JSP. The LDP government could also lose an excuse to convince the US that the pacifist sentiments of the main opposition party, being in tune with a large segment of Japanese public opinion, are against US attempts to pressure Japan to increase its defence posture.

Regardless of whether the JSP adopts an explicit policy of unarmed or armed neutrality, the US would maintain its pressure on Japan to upgrade its defence posture. While the US welcomes a shift to the right on defence by the JSP, it does not consider the JSP to be really important given its record as a party in perennial opposition. Even if the JSP were to cling to its present...
declaratory policy of unarmed neutrality, it would be increasingly ineffective in checking the LDP unless it improved its electoral performance.

Hitherto elections have not been won or lost by changes in defence policy. However, if armed neutrality were adopted, and if other policy changes could also be made - including the JSP distancing itself from the socialist bloc so as to appear really neutral; discarding Marxist dogmas; lessening its dependence on the trade unions; and building up its grassroot support - the cumulative effect might change the moribund image of the JSP. These are indeed formidable tasks. Yet, the failure of the JSP to adjust to a new milieu can only lead to the party's increasing isolation and ineffectiveness in checking the LDP on defence issues. The result would be a greater inability to affect the formulation of Japan's defence policy.
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