STRATEGIC THINKING AND THE
AUSTRALIAN MILITARY
PROFESSION

BY

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I certify that this sub-thesis is my own original work and that all sources used have been acknowledged.

Michael G. Smith
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DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this sub-thesis are my own and must not be interpreted as representing the official views and policies of the Australian Army, the Australian Defence Force, or the Department of Defence.
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<td>ACDPS</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Defence Force Staff</td>
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<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
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<td>ADFCC</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force Command Centre</td>
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<td>ADG</td>
<td>Army Development Guide</td>
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<td>AJWE</td>
<td>Australian Joint Warfare Establishment</td>
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<td>ANU</td>
<td>Australian National University</td>
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<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty</td>
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<td>ASO</td>
<td>Australian Security Outlook</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>Chief of Air Staff</td>
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<td>CGS</td>
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<td>CMF</td>
<td>Citizen Military Forces</td>
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<td>CNS</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Staff</td>
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<td>COSC</td>
<td>Chiefs of Staff Committee</td>
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<td>Command and Staff College</td>
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<td>DCP</td>
<td>Defence Cooperation Program</td>
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<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>DPDC</td>
<td>Defence Force Development Committee</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defence</td>
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<td>FDA</td>
<td>Force Development and Analysis (Division)</td>
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<td>FYDP</td>
<td>Five Year Defence Program</td>
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<td>HMAS</td>
<td>Her Majesty's Australian Ship</td>
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<td>JIO</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Organisation</td>
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<td>JMOP</td>
<td>Joint Military Operations and Plans</td>
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<td>JSP</td>
<td>Joint Service Publication</td>
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<td>JSSC</td>
<td>Joint Service Staff College</td>
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<td>LCVP</td>
<td>Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel</td>
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<td>LOGEX</td>
<td>Logistics Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLW</td>
<td>Manual of Land Warfare</td>
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<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (Warfare)</td>
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<td>National Defence College</td>
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<td>NDO</td>
<td>Natural Disasters Organisation</td>
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<td>ONA</td>
<td>Office of National Assessment</td>
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<td>PMandC</td>
<td>Prime Minister and Cabinet</td>
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<td>PMF</td>
<td>Permanent Military Forces</td>
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<td>RAAF</td>
<td>Royal Australian Air Force</td>
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<td>RODC</td>
<td>Regular Officer Development Committee</td>
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<td>SDSC</td>
<td>Strategic and Defence Studies Centre</td>
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<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South East Asian Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>SIP</td>
<td>Strategic and International Policy (Division)</td>
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<td>SOSP</td>
<td>Strategic and Operational Study Period</td>
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<td>Strat Basis</td>
<td>Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy</td>
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INTRODUCTION

And is anything more important than that the work of the soldier should be well done?

Plato, The Republic

For those unfamiliar with the profession of arms, and for those acquainted with strategic thinking, the subject matter of this sub-thesis might seem at first to be unnecessary. If 'strategos' is 'the art of the general' then must it not follow logically that the Australian military profession is able to understand and help determine and implement strategy? Alas, seldom are things so simple, even if they appear so on the surface. Clausewitz recognised this when he noted that war was simple, but that in war even the simple things are difficult. As this sub-thesis endeavours to show, strategic thinking, although seemingly simple, is actually a diverse and complex discipline. It is like medicine to the doctor, or research to the academic, or mathematics to the accountant in the sense that it has many aspects, all of which are not equally important to all members of the profession.

Yet strategic thinking should be seen as a link that helps bind and largely distinguish the military profession, just as medicine, research and mathematics help distinguish doctors, academics and accountants. Often this is not realised and it is common to read or hear of other traits that distinguish the military profession. These may include its distinctive appearance, its use or potential use
of organised force, its corporate spirit, its strong allegiance to the state, its customs and traditions, or even its fighting ethic. However, in reality all of these traits form part of strategy, because ultimately they all help explain how the armed forces contribute to national security in peace and in war.

Although a number of studies concerning the Australian military profession have been conducted in recent years none have (to this author's knowledge) addressed specifically the relationship between strategy and the Australian military profession. The most thorough analysis of officer development yet conducted in Australia was the Report of the Australian Army's Regular Officer Development Committee (RODC) (1978). However, the RODC Report was concerned with examining the career progression of Army officers and was not tasked to look at the other services. Moreover, its terms of reference were so broad as to preclude any specific examination of the place of strategic thinking in the military profession.

In 1984 Major General Butler (retired) was commissioned to review the development of senior officers in the Australian Defence Force (ADF). Butler perceived that there was an absence of tradition in strategic thinking in the ADF, but he did not explain exactly what he meant by this, or why this situation existed. Moreover, his terms of reference restricted him from analysing the entire officer profession and, consequently, his recommendations were concerned only with how senior officers could be better prepared for high
This sub-thesis does not contest Butler's perception that strategic thinking within the Australian military profession is inchoate, but it goes further than either Butler or the RODC Report in examining the relationship between the Australian military profession and strategic thinking. Chapter 1 explains the meaning of strategic thinking and states why strategy is important for the Australian military profession. Chapter 2 examines one aspect of strategic thinking in detail - namely military strategy. This chapter attempts to explain the complex nature of military strategy and the contribution required by the Australian military profession. In chapter 3 the reasons for the current state of strategic thinking in the profession are explained, and the role and content of military education in strategic matters is examined. Finally, chapter 4 looks to the 'future' and suggests institutional ways in which strategic thinking in the profession may be enhanced.

Two final points of clarification need briefly to be mentioned. The first concerns the term 'the military profession', and the second relates to the role of the civilian in matters of strategy. The term 'military profession' as used throughout the sub-thesis applies specifically to the Australian military officer. This is not meant to imply that Australian servicemen and women other than officers are not part of the Australian military profession; for in numbers they form most of the profession.
and without them there would not be a profession. However, the sub-thesis is concerned with the officer group because they represent the executive branch of the profession: it is the officers who must make the decisions and who are held responsible for those decisions.

Concerning the role of the civilian in strategic matters it needs to be emphasised that it is not the intention of this sub-thesis to suggest that strategic thinking is, or should be, the sole province of the military profession. The civilian community in general, and particularly the civilian bureaucrat involved in the formulation and implementation of strategic policies, have legitimate and necessary roles to play. It could be argued that those civilians engaged in strategic assessment and force structure determination also need to analyse how civil careers in strategic matters need to be managed and developed. However, this sub-thesis is not intended to serve that purpose, although it may help to shed some light on that subject along the way.
The strategist is like a surgeon called upon to operate upon a sick person who is growing continuously and with extreme rapidity and of whose detailed anatomy he is not sure; his operating table is in a state of perpetual motion and he must have ordered the instruments he is to use five years before hand. (1)

André Beaufre, 1965

Beaufre's lucid analogy of the problems confronting the strategist indicate that strategy is a complex subject with which to grapple. Yet for anyone interested in matters of national and international security an understanding of some strategy is essential. In his seminal work, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939, E.H. Carr explained that the threat or use of military power was an essential feature in international politics. Carr realised the importance of strategy and noted that:

if every prospective writer on international affairs...had taken a compulsory course in elementary strategy, reams of nonsense would have remained unwritten. (2)

However, even a course in elementary strategy would be insufficient. Strategy needs to be studied and lived with if it is to be understood, and even then the doyens of international politics and national security are forced to operate in an atmosphere of considerable uncertainty. The
reason for this is because strategy is the product of human endeavour. It is possible (albeit increasingly difficult) to assess the potential and limitations of a country’s military power, but this assessment (though of vital importance) is only part of strategy. Of more importance and of greater difficulty is an understanding of the human motives behind these capabilities. Thus, strategy is an art more than a science because it is concerned essentially with human decisions and only uses the established rules and methodology of science to help in this process.\textsuperscript{(3)} It is for this reason that Beaufre concluded:

\begin{quote}
that in strategy, as in all human affairs, it is ideals which must be the dominant and the guiding force.\textsuperscript{(4)}
\end{quote}

This chapter attempts to answer two questions:

. What is strategic thinking?

. And in strategic thinking what role should the Australian military profession play?

What is Strategic Thinking?

An understanding of strategy is not easy to acquire. Partly this is because 'strategy' is an ambiguous word, as can be seen from the numerous definitions and descriptions in Appendix 1. Schwarz and Hadik were correct when they noted that:

\begin{quote}
There are thousands of definitions of the term strategy. They vary in time and place and according to the emphasis the author wants to give to one or other aspect.\textsuperscript{(5)}
\end{quote}
Even when related to the issue of national security the word strategy needs qualification. Do we mean by strategy the way the government intends to achieve national security; or more specifically the way in which national resources are to be marshalled; or the way the armed forces are to be structured and employed; or the way in which alliances are, or are not, to be formed; or all of these things and more? Beaufre explained that once national objectives are determined (what he called 'policy'), a national or 'total' strategy was required which embraced all the areas of national administration. He recognised at least four areas (political, economic, military and diplomatic), each of which had its own 'overall strategy' and which contributed towards national security. Diagram 1 helps explain this pyramid of strategy.

In as much as it concerns national security, strategy involves the coordination of national strategy and the 'overall strategies'. But this process is both two-way and continuous. In one direction national strategy sets the framework within which each of the overall strategies must operate, namely the goals which they seek to achieve. But in the opposite direction, and occurring simultaneously, each of the overall strategies helps national strategy to be formulated by forecasting and demonstrating what the nation realistically can achieve and how it can operate in each of these areas. Moreover, this process is continuous because by necessity coordination and liaison must continue within and between these areas both to achieve and to validate the goals.
of national strategy.

Diagram 1: The Pyramid of Strategy

POLICY................... ( National objectives providing framework within which strategy operates.

NATIONAL STRATEGY...... ( Alternatively 'total' or 'grand' strategy. The general way in which the nation is to avoid and if necessary conduct war.

OVERALL POLITICAL STRATEGY
OVERALL ECONOMIC STRATEGY
OVERALL MILITARY STRATEGY
OVERALL DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

Strategic thinking not only requires the consideration of these facets of national security but, more importantly, the derivation of a suitable course of action to be followed. As Bernard Brodie has explained:

Strategic thinking...is nothing if not pragmatic. Strategy is a "how to do it" study, a guide to accomplishing something and doing it efficiently. As in many other branches of politics, the question that matters in strategy is: Will the idea work? (7)

Beaufre was of the same opinion. He believed that:

Strategy is not a single defined doctrine; it is a method of thought, the object of which is to codify events, set them in order of priority and then choose the most effective course of action.(8)
Beaufre went further. He agreed with Ferdinand Foch's notion that 'freedom of action' was a universal rule of strategy, and in a subsequent book, *Strategy of Action* (1967), explained the various 'characteristics', 'levels' and 'modes' of action that were available to nations. Most importantly Beaufre stressed that 'action is the sword which can both strike and parry': a positive strategy 'when you wish to achieve something'.

In determining the most favourable (or at least the most rational) course of action the strategist must seek answers to three fundamental questions:

1. What is the nature of potential conflict?
2. How can such conflict be controlled?
3. How should such conflict be prepared for?

This means that at the very highest level of strategic thinking the strategist must be capable of sifting the essential elements from each of the overall strategies and melding these to form a national strategy that is both credible in the present day and relevant for the foreseeable future. At this level the strategist's task is complicated further because of the need to constantly subordinate strategy to policy - the 'means' to the 'ends'. In theory, policy should lighten the load on the strategist by providing clear guidance as to the ends required. But in
practice policy is often ambiguous, demanding from strategists an awareness of the numerous disciplines, organisations and people which combine to form it. Hedley Bull has explained:

... the concepts of contemporary strategic thinking - notions such as deterrence, crisis management, limited war, insurgency, arms control - are no more than a series of variations on Clausewitz's theme of the need to subordinate war to the political object.... Unfortunately, however, Clausewitz's does not have anything to say to us as to what the political object of war should be. This is why the strategy should not ever be allowed to become separated from study of international politics, international law and international ethics. (13)

Strategic thinking, therefore, is a multidisciplined art. In so far as strategic thinking is concerned with the consideration and solution of problems it shares also common ground with tactics. But whereas strategy is concerned with the preparation, planning, equipping and deployment of military forces, normally on a large scale and over a considerable period, tactics is concerned with the manoeuvre and employment of military units normally within a specific geographic area and/or for a specific purpose. The naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan saw the distinction between tactics and strategy in more simple terms: strategy involved getting the force to the scene of battle at the best time and in the best shape, while tactics was the conduct of the battle itself. Of course, distinctions between strategy and tactics are not always clear. It is possible to cite historical examples where essentially tactical encounters have had an enormous effect on strategy - Admiral
Halsey's decision at Leyte Gulf in 1944, and General Giap's efforts at Dien Bien Phu in 1953-54 and later during the Tet Offensive in 1968, come quickly to mind. Equally, quite small tactical forces can be controlled from the highest political level either to achieve a strategic victory or to 'signal' an adversary so as to enhance the attainment of national security objectives - the United States naval quarantine of Cuba in 1962 perhaps could be interpreted in this way.

Nevertheless, despite these grey areas between strategy and tactics, it is true that the strategist must think constantly on a much higher level than the tactician. Tactical solutions need to be found quickly, the better for innovative and original thought, but are mainly arrived at in a procedural manner: or as Brodie has noted, 'tactics are... more easily taught by precept and experience.' However, strategic solutions are more difficult, requiring the same clear headedness, but depending upon greater understanding, breadth of vision, selection of the key issues, and foresight. The military maxim 'look after the little things, and the big things will look after themselves,' has relevance in tactics, but in strategy the reverse will normally apply.

What Role Should the Military Profession Play?

The scope of strategic thinking is so vast and requires so much study that it seems at first to be beyond the
responsibility of the military profession. If the military profession is to be competent on the field of battle (or to deter battle), then little time remains for the military profession to ruminate on the complexities of strategy. Yet ruminate it must if the military is to be influential in the determination of strategy as well as in its execution. Thus, the crux of the problem for the military profession is how to fulfil these different roles - the strategic and the tactical - in a competent manner.

Huntington saw the military as having three responsibilities to the state - executive, advisory and representative (22) all of which can be related to strategic thinking. The executive role is concerned with the implementation of strategy. In conflict it is symbolised by victory or defeat, but it is a reactive role and has nothing to do with the determination of strategy. It is possible to argue that if military strategy is the means rather than the ends of policy then the military merely should be told what to do, and get about doing it: rather like a mechanic is instructed to fix a motor car, or a surgeon to remove tonsils, or an appointed historian to write an official account of an important event. But in fact nothing is quite so simple. We would consider our mechanic remiss if he was not to advise us on how the motor car could be fixed; the surgeon removing the tonsils also performs a diagnostic function, giving professional advice about what should be done; and the historian, though given the subject on which to write, inevitably will inject to some extent his/her own (23) predilections in the official account. The same is true of
strategy. Generals can hardly be told to deter, prepare for, and if necessary fight battles, about which they have not formed ideas; and it seems logical that these ideas should be considered as part of the decision-making process. This is the second of Huntington's roles, the *advisory* role. The third or *representative* role concerns the image or profile the military presents in offering advice on strategic matters. It represents the military's foray into the political arena and includes its relations with the media and various lobby groups in order to strengthen its claims.

Largely for the reasons explained in Chapter 3 the Australian military profession has tended to concentrate on its *executive* role and generally has given scant attention to its *advisory* and *representative* roles. Consequently, the Australian military profession has until recently shown only modest incentive to develop its own strategic thinking and has contributed little in the determination of national and military strategy.

The role of the military in the determination of strategy can be compared with that of the civilian. Hedley Bull succinctly explained the situation in the United States, which has relevance to Australia, when he observed that:

> The military profession today is far from having vacated the field of strategy .... But...the civilian experts have made great inroads. They have overwhelmed the military in the quality and quantity of their contributions to the literature of the subject .... They increasingly dominate the field of education and instruction in the subject .... And most prominently in the United
States, the civilian strategists have entered the citadels of power and have prevailed over military advisers on major issues of policy. (25)

The increased influence of the civilian sector relative to the military in the determination of strategy can be justified on the basis that the complex nature of strategy (already referred to) demands inputs from a variety of sources concerned with national security. This is what Brodie was referring to when he noted that

war is not only too important to be left to the generals but too important and far too complex to be handled adequately by any one profession. (26)

Brodie undoubtedly was correct and the pyramid of strategy itself implies that many sections of Australian society contribute to the formulation of strategy in some way or other - government and cabinet, the armed forces, the public service, industry, various interest groups, and ultimately the electorate. However, T.B. Millar has shown that the phrase 'civil-military relations'

is all too frequently misinterpreted as appearing to refer either to relations between the armed forces and the public, or between the armed forces and the public service. (27)

Millar states that the phrase more accurately reflects the relationship between military leaders and cabinet. Thus, if one accepts Millar's interpretation, it can be argued that in the determination of strategy the military profession has
a definite role to play - certainly not the only influence in the determination of strategy, but a distinct and direct influence none the less. However in Australia it would appear that the military (and, arguably, cabinet) has subordinated the importance of this special relationship with government to its relationship with the public service. If a criticism is to be levelled at the Australian military profession it would not be that they have obstructed the influence of the civilian bureaucracy in the formulation of strategy, but rather that the military has given too much responsibility to the bureaucrat too easily. If Brodie can complain that in the United States often too much emphasis in the determination of strategy is placed on 'military experience' and 'military judgement' then the argument that military training and experience count for nothing is equally invalid.

In Australia national strategy is based mainly on the Australian Security Outlook (ASO)(29) and military strategy on the ASO's derivative the Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy (Strat Basis).(30) Public information on these documents is sketchy. However, it would appear that although the military has an input to both documents, and that although the military has representation on the higher defence committees which consider the Strat Basis,(31) the major responsibility for their preparation rests with civilian intelligence and defence officers.
In Australia the prime interest of the military in relation to strategy has tended to rest more in the area of equipment proposals (predominantly in the way of replacement materiel), and in the area of tactics where organisational structures and operating procedures have been continually monitored and refined often using the Strat Basis as justification.

Particularly since the amalgamation of the three Service Departments into the Department of Defence (1973-76), the military profession has contributed only modestly in determining the rationale for the force structure and modus operandi of the ADF. In this respect the military generally has been reactive to the determinations of civilian defence officers and the ideas of a small group of academics, rather than developing and proposing coherent military strategies in concert with national objectives. Indeed, part of the problem faced by the military has been the apparent lack of clearly defined national objectives and priorities as guidelines within which to work, and the tendency for the three services to compete against each other for their allocation of the defence budget. Yet in spite of these problems it remains valid that strategic thinking is important for the military profession for three main reasons:

- if military advice is to have credibility as part of the strategy-making process;

- if operational concepts, force structures and materiel options are to be adopted which
truly support national strategic objectives; and if the military profession wishes to stay abreast of developments in the methods by which armed forces may be utilised, and the requirements to do this successfully.

The Australian military profession lacks a tradition in strategic thinking. It is disappointing but noteworthy that (and unlike in most other professions) Australian servicemen (and women) have contributed little to strategic thinking. Even dismissing the immortals like Clausewitz, Mahan and Liddell Hart, the Australian military profession can not boast much in the way of strategic thinkers in the vein of Fuller, or Beaufre, or Eccles, or Wylie or Sokolovskiy, or Hackett, or Zumwalt. Australia has produced its fair share of capable commanders - among these Monash, Chauvel, Blamey and Scherger - but by and large Australia's strategy has been accepted and borrowed from overseas, and implemented without much intellectual challenge as to its suitability. The reasons for this are discussed more fully in Chapter 3, but part of the explanation has to do with the intellectual character of the profession, which would seem to be a universal phenomenon and not peculiar to Australia. In considering mainly the British military profession Michael Howard has explained that it is 'difficult for the military to absorb, encourage, and nuture outstanding original thinkers in their midst.' And Rear Admiral Wylie has commented about the American military profession that
In not having a conscious and analytic appreciation of their own patterns of thought, the military minds in too many cases are restricted to the limits of their intuitive thoughts, that, after a lifetime of largely technical training, are perhaps somewhat narrower than they might be. (40)

The universal problem for the military profession is to somehow stimulate intellectual debate about the relevance of current strategic doctrine, but at the same time implement with precision the very strategy that is under question. However, by necessity performance ranks higher than thought, and normally those officers rise to the top who devote most of their attention to the application of military principles rather than to the study of strategy. The strategic thinkers within the Australian military profession are yet to emerge: their emergence will depend on the willingness of the profession to recognise the importance of strategic thinking; and the effect these officers will have on national and military strategy will depend equally on the willingness of the profession to encourage and nurture them.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to explain that strategic thinking covers a broad and complex range of topics all of which contribute to national security. The threat or use of military force is an important element of strategic thinking, and in determining the most favourable course of action (ie strategies) the profession has an important role to play. However, in Australia the military profession has tended to be reactive to strategic decisions and has not emphasised its
advisory and representative responsibilities to help formulate strategic concepts and policies. The reasons for this are explored in Chapter 3, but are also part of a universal phenomenon in which military professions seem reluctant to promote intellectual thought concerning the relevance of existing military practices.

The development of strategic thinking and its future direction within the Australian military profession are the subjects of Chapters 3 and 4 (respectively). However, before these are examined attention needs to be given to the nature of military strategy, which forms part of strategic thinking and is so important to the profession of arms.

ENDNOTES

[Throughout the sub-thesis sources are explained fully on the first occasion used, and thereafter abbreviated and referred back to where used originally. For example endnote 4 in chapter 4 reads as follows: '4. O'Neill (Chapter 1, note 3), p.30.' This means that the reference is on page 30 of O'Neill, whose full particulars are shown in endnote 3 to chapter 1 of the sub-thesis]

1. André Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy (Faber and Faber, London 1965), p.46.


3. Much has been written about the subject of strategy as art or science. Among others refer: Beaufre (note 1), p.46 et seq; Robert O'Neill 'An Introduction to Strategic Thinking', in Desmond Ball (ed), Strategy and Defence. Australian Essays (George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, London, Boston, 1982), pp.29-31; Bernard Semmell (ed), Marxism and the Science of War (Oxford Press, New York, 1981), pp. 3-12; Harriet Fast Scott (ed), Soviet Military Strategy by V.D. Sokolovskiy,


6. Beaufre (note 1), pp. 30-32. Beaufre does not include policy at the top of his pyramid, nor does he show the pyramid diagramatically.


9. ibid, p. 34. Foch actually believed in two universal principles, the other being 'economy of force'.


11. ibid, p. 27. Beaufre saw 'action' as a complete strategy which included deterrence, whereas deterrence by itself he saw as a more negative strategy having value in only certain (mainly strategic nuclear) situations.

12. These questions have been adapted from Julian Lider, Military Theory. Concepts, Structure, Problems (Gower, Aldershot, 1983), pp. 14-15. Lider contends that military thought is characterised by three, and possibly a fourth, question(s): (1) what is war? (2) How is war to be won? (3) How should war be prepared for? (4) How can war be prevented?


14. There are numerous definitions of tactics. The Australian Joint Service Glossary, (Part 1), JSP (AS) 101(A) (3 November 1981), defines tactics as

'a. The employment of units in combat.

b. The ordered arrangement and manoeuvre of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to utilize their full potentialities.' (p. 1.255)

The US Army Field Manual, Operations FM 100-5 (Washington, D.C., 20 August 1982), defines tactics as 'the specific techniques smaller units use to win
battles and engagements which support operational objectives'. (p.2.3)

15. It can be argued that ships, aircraft and missiles are not restricted to a geographic area in the sense that ground forces are. This is true, but nevertheless at the tactical level the point of contact or area of engagement is normally restricted.


17. At Leyte Gulf in October 1944 Admiral Halsey made a tactical decision to concentrate his force and move north so as to engage a 'decoy' Japanese fleet, thus leaving San Bernardino Strait and American forces in Leyte Gulf unprotected against the 'striking' Japanese fleets. Halsey's decision was tactically inept, but the eventual outcome of the battle from a strategic point of view was that 'the Japanese surface fleet was never again able to offer a serious challenge to the Allied navies' (Refer: Basil Collier, The War in the Far East 1941-1945. A Military History (Heinemann, London, 1969), p. 456.)

18. The final battle of Dien Bien Phu, May 1954, was a tactical victory for Giap. At that time the French remained strategically superior in Indo China, but the psychological impact of their defeat at Dien Bien Phu acted as a catalyst for French withdrawal, thus elevating Giap's victory to the strategic level. Similarly the Tet Offensive in January 1968 was a tactical defeat for Giap, but it's effect in dampening American willingness to continue the war effort made it a strategic victory for North Vietnam.

19. For a thorough account of the various options presented to President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 see Graham T.Allison, Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1971). Particularly noteworthy was the inability of some senior military (and civilian) advisers to appreciate the strategic consequences that some of their options (eg 'surgical air strike') would most likely have. Kennedy adopted a more moderate solution (the quarantine).


23. Despite Lord Acton's preference for anonymity and impartiality in history, E.H. Carr has shown that individual interpretation of historical events is both unavoidable and desirable. See Carr, What is History? (Penguin, 1974).

24. Essex-Clark has suggested that the decision in 1982 not to replace HMAS Melbourne with another aircraft carrier was due partly to the RAN's inability to fulfil its representative role. See Essex-Clark (note 22), p.9.


29. The ASO is prepared by the Office of National Assessments (ONA) as a result of liaison with other government agencies, in particular the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Prime Minister and Cabinet (PMandC), and within the Department of Defence (DOD) with the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO), Strategic and International Policy (SIP) Division, and Force Development and Analysis (FDA) Division.

31. The highest committees are the Council of Defence and the Defence Committee, of which the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) and the three Chiefs of Staff (RAN, Army, RAAF) are members. However, the main consideration of the Strat Basis probably occurs in the Defence Force Development Committee (DFDC) where the CDF and Chiefs are members but which (like most of the higher defence committees) is chaired by a civilian (the Secretary of DOD). The Strat Basis may also be discussed in the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), of which the CDF is chairman.

32. Prime responsibility for the preparation of the Strat Basis rests with SIP Division (under Deputy Secretary B) which liaises closely with PMandC, Treasury, ONA and DFA external to DOD, and with JIO, FDA and other areas within DOD. These organisations are all civilian managed. The services comment on the Strat Basis in the latter stages of its preparation.

33. In 1976 a senior Army officer is reported to have said that because the Strat Basis was so general it 'can be used to justify the procurement of any weapon system.' See T.P. Muggleton, 'An Evaluation of the Analytical Infrastructure of Force Structure Decision-Making in the Australian Defence Department' (B.A.[Hons] Thesis, Department of Economics, Faculty of Military Studies, Duntroon, 1976), p. 36.

34. This statement is not meant to imply that before the amalgamation of the three Departments into the Department of Defence (1973-76) the services contributed more to the determination of strategy than now. However, the services were then not subordinated to civilian bureaucrats who since the amalgamation have come to hold most responsibility in the formulation of Australia's strategy. As chapter 3 explains, little effort was given to the determination of Australia's strategy before the 1970's.

35. The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC), Research School of Pacific Studies, at the Australian National University (ANU) as been the most influential academic body in the development of Australian strategic concepts. In particular the works by T.B. Millar, Robert O'Neill, Desmond Ball and J.O. Langtry (some of which are cited in the bibliography).

36. Refer chapter 2, the 'economic dimension' pp. 47-48. For a discussion about the difficulty in defining clear national objectives (or national interests) see, among others, Brodie (note 7), chapter 8. It is possible that the Australian military has expected too much in the way of
clearly defined objectives and, because of their absence, has concerned itself more with their executive role in relation to strategy.

37. The list is illustrative and is not intended to be complete. The point is that there is no Australian counterpart to these military strategic thinkers. It is possible that strategic thinkers currently exist within the Australian military profession, but too little work has been published from which they can be identified publically.

38. Again, the list is illustrative and is not intended to be complete.


41. For an interesting account of why 'commanders' rather than 'thinkers' have risen to the highest ranks in the United States military profession see Brodie (note 7), pp. 479-496. The fact that Australia's military history reflects a prodigious list of successful commanders but no strategic thinkers would tend to support Brodie's ideas.
CHAPTER 2

MILITARY STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC THINKING

Strategy, which so clearly affects the course of society, is ... a disorganised, undisciplined activity (1) [and] some method of bringing intellectual order into strategy is long overdue. (2)


In an attempt to bring discipline and intellectual order into strategy Wylie suggested a general theory that could be applied universally. His general theory rested on (3) four assumptions: 'that there will be war'; 'that the aim of war is some measure of control'; 'that the pattern of war is not predictable'; and 'that the ultimate tool of control in war is the man on the scene with the gun'. Unfortunately Wylie's attempt carried the seeds of its own failure. Wylie's first two assumptions reflected his acceptance of the relevance of power politics in international relations - a school of thought which has attracted criticism as an incomplete explanation of the management of relations between states. His third assumption emphasised the distinctiveness of each conflict situation, thereby causing the reader to question the utility of his general theory. And of his last assumption Wylie himself expressed (5) reservations about its applicability.

However, if Wylie's solution of a general theory of strategy is suspect, his recognition for the need for discipline and intellectual thought in matters of strategy
would appear to have merit. Strategy is a complex subject — as explained in chapter 1 — and requires from those who determine and implement it a conscious intellectual effort. Wylie's contemporary, Admiral Eccles, saw this clearly when he noted that there are no easy or ubiquitous solutions to strategic problems. Eccles noted correctly that

Military theory can never be formulated or expressed with the precision that we demand of theory in the physical sciences. We cannot expect it to be perfect or permanent. It consists, rather, of a set of concepts, a group of interrelations of cause and effect. (6)

Strategic thinking is so difficult because it has no neat borders to contain it. The pyramid of strategy in chapter 1, for example, shows the various elements that combine to form national (total) strategy. But Beaufre stressed the interrelationship between all these elements and suggested the pyramid only to assist understanding and explanation. In a similar manner it is possible to analyse military strategy. For the military profession military strategy is the most vital element in strategic thinking because it is with military strategy (as distinct from political, economic or diplomatic strategies) that the profession mainly operates.

This chapter attempts to explain military strategy as an element in strategic thinking; but as Eccles once noted

Theory will never solve a military problem; it will shed light on it, and it will assist those who have responsibility and authority. (7)
The fact that so many writers have attempted to explain military strategy is evidence of the subject's complexity. Thus the explanation which follows is not so much 'right' or 'wrong' as it is an attempt to help bring some intellectual order into a very difficult subject.

What is Military Strategy?

Military strategy, or what Michael Howard once called 'organised coercion', (8) concerns the preparation and employment of the armed forces for peace and for war in concert with political objectives. (9) Although military strategy most commonly is judged by victory or defeat in war, it also plays an active role in deterring or avoiding war. Thus, Sun Tzu advised (in his chapter on 'The Attack by Strategem') that 'the supreme art is to subdue the enemy without fighting.' (10) It should therefore be emphasised that military strategy does not disappear in the normally longer periods of peace that nations like Australia have become accustomed to. As long as states continue to maintain armed forces, military strategy will be required to determine the way in which these forces are to be structured and, if necessary, used.

Perhaps because all strategy is a chosen course of action (refer chapter 1) military strategy generally has been interpreted by the Australian military profession as the means by which military force may be threatened and/or applied. This notion is reflected in the JSP definition of
military strategy (refer Appendix 1), where stress has been given to the potential or actual employment of military force rather than to the preparation of these forces for (or to deter) battle. In fact the proper handling of military forces on the battlefield is an essential part of military strategy and the Australian military profession must be proficient at it, but it is not the only part. In order that military forces may be threatened or used, considerable thought also needs to be given to their preparation, and this less glamorous area has received less attention by the Australian military profession.

Military strategy, therefore, includes both the preparation and employment of military force. However, despite this simple explanation military strategy is really quite complex and can be seen in three different ways. First, it is possible to think of military strategy in terms of the levels on which it operates. Second, military strategy can be viewed by analysing its various dimensions. And third, military strategy can be considered according to the types of military alternatives that may be considered and/or adopted.

The Levels of Military Strategy

Military strategy operates simultaneously on two levels: the higher or coordinating level, and the lower or operating level. Coordinating military strategy is concerned with broad military issues. In coordinating strategy the national resources available to support military options, and
the broad military options themselves, are examined. This is
the level at which military advice is considered as part of
defence policy-making, and also the level at which military
policies are made and disseminated downwards to guide the
preparation of the armed forces. Coordinating strategy is
concerned with questions relating to the overall organisation
and structure of the armed forces; the management and sub-
allocation of resources agreed to by government; the advice
on capability requirement given by the military to civilian
bureaucrats and to government; the military input to
mobilisation planning; the conduct of military relations
with allies; military advice about the development of the
country's defence infrastructure; and so on. At the
coordinating level of military strategy the military
profession should exercise its opportunity to contribute to
the determination of national and military strategy in
accordance with the nation's security concerns. Such
military proposals should be realistic and relevant to
Australia's 'threat environment' (11) and its 'operating
environment.' (12)

Within the Australian military profession coordinating
strategy generally has not been seen as part of military
strategy. This probably has been because the Greek word
'strategos' - the art of the general - referred originally to
manoeuvering armed forces so as to gain maximum advantage
over an enemy. 'Strategos' really refers to what may now be
called the lower level of military strategy, or operating
strategy. But without coordinating strategy operating
strategy would be stillborn: consequently the former must now also be considered an important part of military strategy.

Operating strategy is concerned with the conduct of operations on the battlefield, at sea and in the air. It involves the planning and conduct of campaigns within a specified theatre or area of operations as seen from the perspective of the theatre or area commander. This is what the Australian Army has in the last few years termed the 'operational level of war' and it represents the link between coordinating strategy and tactics, the latter which deals with 'the specific techniques smaller units use to win battles and engagements which support operational objectives.' In operating strategy the profession must have a clear understanding of how armed forces are to be prepared and used in battle. This requires from the military profession expertise in how the armed forces are to be raised, trained, deployed, manoeuvred and controlled. It is at this level of military strategy that campaigns are won or lost, where theatre or area commanders' reputations are made or broken, and where a nation's efforts at safeguarding its interests are most crudely tested. Together with tactics operating strategy is the 'bread and butter' of the military profession, and it is at this level that strategists like Jomini, Clausewitz, Fuller and Liddell-Hart mostly were concerned.

These two levels of military strategy, and their
interrelationship, are shown in diagram 2.

Diagram 2: The levels of Military Strategy

MILITARY STRATEGY

Coordinating Strategy ............ higher level

- military orders
- military advice
- policies of battle

mobilisation, budget etc
planning, management

common influence

Operating Strategy ............ lower level

force balance, manoeuvre
of forces, position

terrain, command etc
analysis and control

Tactics

From the explanation given above it is clear that a nexus exists between the coordinating and operating levels of military strategy, and that although each has a discrete purpose, they both largely influence each other. Quite clearly, military strategists at the coordinating level cannot afford to close their eyes to the military requirements of, and actual capabilities at, the operating level. To do so would be unrealistic and would serve only to
hinder, rather than help, national security. On the other hand, military commanders concerned with operating strategy cannot afford to develop operational techniques that do not utilise force capabilities in the manner intended at the coordinating level. To do so would serve only to lessen the prospects of fulfilling political objectives.

It is important that these two levels of military strategy be understood clearly by the military profession. If they are not appreciated then operating strategy runs the risk of being developed in a vacuous way, perhaps reflecting trite military principles that may be unrelated and unsuitable as part of a coherent national strategy. Moreover, if the relationship between the two levels of military strategy is not understood then the quality of military advice to government, and the influence of the military in helping determine a viable national strategy, will be limited.

In the Australian military profession the distinction between coordinating and operating strategy has become blurred somewhat because at the highest levels of military leadership these levels have been melded artificially. The CDF and the three Chiefs of Staff are undoubtedly responsible for coordinating strategy, for they (and their staffs) represent the engine room of the ADF. However, at the same time the CDF also commands the ADF, thus making operational elements responsible to him. In time of conflict, however, it is unlikely that the CDF and the Chiefs of Staff will be
able to exercise effective command. As the British found in World War 2, and more recently in Malaysia and the Falklands, commanders responsible for operating strategy need to be appointed for each theatre or area and given as much latitude as possible. This pattern is likely to be repeated in future conflicts where Australian field commanders will report to the CDF who will be concerned primarily (together with the Chiefs of Staff) in providing military advice to government and in relaying politico-military decisions back to the theatre/area commanders.

For the reasons explained in Chapter 3 a tradition in strategic thinking in the Australian military profession is not well developed. Accordingly coordinating and operating strategy are not understood well or practised properly in the Australian military. In coordinating strategy the development of military expertise has been constrained both by the competition between the services for scarce financial resources, and by the authority exercised by civilian bureaucrats in determining force structures, capabilities and operational concepts for the ADF. In operating strategy the military is yet to determine its position on how maritime and continental operations are to be conducted effectively in the defence of Australia and its interests, if necessary free from allied assistance. In addition, agreement on a credible force structure and the operational command and control apparatus required to make it work has proved difficult for the ADF.
The Dimensions of Military Strategy

Military strategy becomes more complex when consideration is given to its various dimensions, of which seven appear most important (diagram 3)\(^{(19)}\)

Diagram 3: The Dimensions of Military Strategy

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MILITARY STRATEGY

political    operational    technological    intelligence

social       administrative   economic
(logistic)
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These dimensions have relevance to strategy generally, but are considered here in relation to military strategy in particular. The political, social and operational dimensions are derived from Clausewitz's 'trinity of war' wherein he saw success in battle requiring three fundamental conditions: political motivation, operational activity, and social participation. The administrative (logistic) and technological dimensions have origins in the pre-Clausewitz era, but are most clearly expressed in the writings of Clausewitz's contemporary, Jomini, who favoured the scientific approach to warfare. The final two dimensions - economic and intelligence - have always been part of military
strategy, but the demands and effects of modern warfare have seen increased importance placed upon them.

The Political Dimension. Australian military strategy is formulated and implemented in accordance with established political custom, and its purpose is to fulfil political goals. As with all states, Australian military strategy is the manifestation of Clausewitz's aphorism that 'war is an extension of politics by other means.' However, unlike in many countries where the military controls the apparatus of government, in Australia the military is subordinated to a freely elected government and has only limited influence in the determination of government policies. As T.B. Millar has noted, within Australian society and similar 'mature' societies,

any attempt by the armed forces to intervene in government or (in the ultimate) to constitute the government would be bound to fail because of the fundamental resistance within society at virtually every level and by virtually every institution.'

Largely because of the military's subordination to government it is unlikely that Australian national or military strategy would be developed, or military action taken, simply to achieve military objectives. The threat or use of armed force can be decided only partly by the expected military outcome: of more importance is the political rationale and the long term political effects incurred from the threat or use of military force. In other words the subordination of military means to political ends always must be kept uppermost in the formulation of military strategy.
This point is so obvious as to hardly warrant mention, except that when one looks at Western history, even in just the twentieth century, one is appalled how frequently this tenet has been forgotten. For example the carnage on the Western Front in World War I illustrated the folly of subordinating political objective to military strategy. Here, commanders and politicians expended much effort and needlessly wasted lives in the obsession to satisfy military objectives which brought with them no political advantage.

In World War II the allies' demand for 'unconditional surrender' from Germany and Japan is a further illustration of the seductive power that military strategy sometimes has. It is quite probable, but of course not certain, that Germany and Japan may have capitulated much sooner had the allies moderated their demands and showed a willingness to restrain their use of military force.

On a different scale, but more relevant to Australia, was the conduct of General Blamey's mopping-up operations in New Guinea in 1944-45. By this time Japanese forces in New Guinea and the outlying islands had been totally isolated and no longer posed a serious military threat. Australian forces were given the responsibility by MacArthur to neutralise these Japanese troops while American forces continued their progress to recapture the Philippines. However Blamey, backed by the Australian government, chose to destroy the enemy when more modest operations would have sufficed. The Australian military historian E.G. Keogh was
Politically or strategically, the offensives on Bougainville and at Aitape-Wewak served no useful purpose. They achieved nothing that could not have been achieved at far less cost. (22)

A more recent example where military strategy and political objectives became dislocated was the Vietnam war. It is doubtful that the United States (and its allies) could ever have achieved a favourable political solution in Vietnam through military means. However, if this was possible, then it called for the use of massive military force (conventional or nuclear) either to fully occupy South Vietnam and politically control its population, and/or to force the North Vietnamese into total military and political submission. The military solution adopted, however, could not achieve these ends, and the allies became enmeshed in a war they were militarily too weak to win, yet militarily too strong to lose. In a situation somewhat analogous to the Western Front in World War I, allied military strategy in Vietnam came to concentrate on body counts rather than on fulfilling achievable political objectives. The military imperatives of the war superseded political realities and were justified on spurious grounds of national interest.

Thus, the political dimension of military strategy is the most fundamental dimension of all. Its importance to the Australian military is that the profession must have a clear understanding of the political ends which they strive for. And the lesson that history teaches is that the most senior
military representatives must be vigilant that they and their political masters only threaten or use military force in accordance with and in subordination to achievable political objectives.

The Social Dimension. If the political dimension is the most fundamental, then the social dimension is the largest and most complicated dimension of military strategy. In his trinity of war Clausewitz saw this dimension as the potential cause of conflict because human nature brought with it the potential for primordial violence, hatred and enmity. There is much truth in what Clausewitz had to say, but the social dimension of military strategy can be seen in at least four more specific ways.

In the first place the role of the military in Australian society needs to be understood so that military strategy can be developed in harmony with society's interests. This means that the Australian military establishment should be politically aware, attuned to the needs and concerns of Australian society, and not insulated from it by military practices that seek or encourage the existence of 'a state-within-a-state'. Traditions and rituals have a legitimate place in all professions, but they should not be allowed to become so entrenched as to separate those professions from the rest of society and, in the case of the military, to create a military strategy that is dysfunctional. In this sense, the 'constabulary' concept of armed forces, first stated by Morris Janowitz in 1960, would seem to have much relevance for the military in a Western


democracy such as Australia. This point is discussed further in chapter 3.

Secondly, and as Robert Jervis has shown, the 'perceptions' that potential or actual adversaries have of their opponent(s) are of vital importance in avoiding, precipitating and conducting armed conflict. This is the psychological aspect of the social dimension. If Australia is told constantly that it faces no discernable threat then what psychological effect does this have on the military profession? Certainly it is difficult, psychologically, to motivate a profession to create a coherent military strategy in a threatless environment. In such situations it is far easier for the profession to content itself with maintaining proficiency in military skills, and rather like the fire brigade, hope that their training and equipment can quickly extinguish the fire when it occurs and before it gets out of hand. Yet a coherent military strategy is required nonetheless, and this psychological barrier must be overcome if the military profession is to contribute more positively to maintaining national security. There are signs that efforts are being made by the military in this regard. However, largely because of the reasons explained in chapter 3, the military has expended little effort in thinking about and developing its military strategy.

Thirdly, decisions will need to be made at the coordinating level of military strategy which require from the profession an understanding of the make-up and character
of Australian society. Decisions will need to be made relating to such matters as recruitment and retention, conditions of service, education and training, personnel motivation during prolonged periods of peace, the proportion of women (and in what employment) to be included in the armed forces, the manpower mobilisation potential of the nation and society's willingness to accept partial or general (full) mobilisation.

Finally, at the operating level of military strategy consideration needs to be given to such questions as the proper selection procedures for personnel employment, how to prepare in peace for stress in battle during war, and how to develop and maintain the two most essential qualities for battle, the corporate spirit and the fighting ethic. At this level the social dimension is mainly concerned with the maintenance of morale, the importance of which convinced Montgomery that it should be included as one of the principles of war.

The Operational Dimension. The operational dimension of military strategy is the most explicit because it represents the nation's ability to defend its interests and wage war when necessary. The operational dimension is in fact the visible product of the other six dimensions of military strategy. Since the raison d'être of the military is the achievement of success in battle (should deterrence fail), the operational dimension is by necessity the most vital to the military profession.
The importance of the operational dimension has long been recognised by the Australian military profession which has earned for itself a high reputation in the conduct of military operations.

This reputation has rested largely on its combat fighting ability and particularly in its proficiency in applying sound tactical principles with discipline and expertise. However, in the conduct of military campaigns or military operations independent from larger allies, the Australian military profession has developed little expertise. Perhaps because of its small size and its historic affiliation with allies the Australian military profession has given scant attention to the problems of independent military operations. Some attention is now being given to this problem within the profession. However, generally an attitude prevails in the military that the momentous decisions concerning the operational role and required capability of the ADF are to be made primarily by civilian bureaucrats, many of whom have little or no understanding about the practical requirements for the application of military force. In this important dimension of military strategy the Australian military profession cannot afford to be too deferential to the civilian bureaucracy who in time of war will have no responsibility for the actual conduct of military operations. It could be argued that the Australian military profession needs to be more positive in identifying its operational requirements and more assertive in submitting these proposals for
ministerial and cabinet consideration.

The Administrative (logistic) Dimension. The administrative (logistic) dimension of military strategy relates to the nation's willingness and ability to provide and sustain military forces with the necessary manpower, facilities and materiel to enable them to accomplish specified military objectives. At the coordinating level of military strategy the administrative (logistic) dimension is concerned with the derivation and validation of administrative concepts which realistically reflect the nation's available resource capacity (including those resources that Australia reasonably could expect to acquire from overseas). The ability, or inability, to administratively support military operations in a variety of contingencies will largely determine Australia's military strategy. Australia's traditional reliance on allies for administrative/logistic support has meant that insufficient attention has been given to the administrative (logistic) dimension in the development of Australian military strategy. Although defence self-reliance has been stated as a prime objective of Australian defence policy for more than a decade only modest progress has been made in this area.

The administrative (logistic) dimension of military strategy is no less important at the operating level than it is at the coordinating level. Wavell considered administration to be the crux of generalship, coming even before tactics. Wavell believed that;
It takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your Army and when; it takes much knowledge and hard work to know when you can place your forces and whether you can maintain them there. A real knowledge of supply and movement factors must be the basis of every leader's plan; only then can he know how and when to take risks with these factors, and battles are won only on taking risks. (31)

The marshalling of resources on the battle field is an essential requirement of military commanders at all levels. Generally considered a less glamorous aspect of soldiering than the operational dimension, the administrative dimension of strategy has been given far less attention in Australia than it deserves. Although there is evidence to suggest that the importance of logistics has been recognised within the Australian military profession, it is probably still true that far less attention is given to preparing officers to 'support' battles than to 'fighting' them. Within the Australian military profession Eccles's comment (about the United States military in the 1960s) that

Some military men think that assignment to Logistic duty may mean the kiss of death to their professional careers, (33)

still has an element of truth today.

Jomini placed great importance on logistics. From his experience in, and analysis of, the Napoleonic wars he realised that battles and campaigns could not be won without sound logistic preparation by the General Staff. He included in logistics...
the preparation of all material of war; the drawing up of orders for alternative contingencies; the ordering of all troop movements; the collection of intelligence; the organisation of supply and transport; the establishment of camps, depots and magazines; the organisation of medical and signal services; and the provision of reinforcements to the front line. (34)

Many of these factors have since come to be considered under the more general heading of 'administration' and others such as 'intelligence' and 'contingency planning' have become so important as to merit consideration separate from Jomini's conception of logistics. However, the point is that these elements are concerned more with preparing for battle, or for sustaining the momentum of battle, and are no less important to the final outcome than the fighting aspect to which the Australian military profession traditionally has given most of its attention.

The Technological Dimension. The technological dimension of military strategy has continued to gather momentum as new inventions with military applications have proliferated and accelerated. The advent of nuclear weapons in the 1940s introduced, with a single or a few weapons, unprecedented destructive power to warfare. The ability of some powers to conduct nuclear war (the exact consequences of which remain uncertain, but the devastation of which was proven at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945) caused strategists to reconsider the utility of conventional forces. But in effect nuclear weapons only added another dimension to strategy because conventional weapons technology continued to
develop at a pace and beyond bounds imagined at the end of World War 2. The development of sophisticated precision guided munitions whose terminal destructive effects are almost guaranteed,\(^{37}\) together with enhanced information gathering and weapons platforms at sea, in the air, in space, and on land, has in some respects reduced the gap between nuclear and conventional warfare. Moreover, the availability of high technology, low cost, low maintenance, and simple to operate weapons systems, has helped foster the development of unconventional military strategies, and has helped spawn a series of asymmetric conflicts since World War \(^{38}\) 2.

The effects of technology on military strategy even for non-nuclear states such as Australia have been considerable. In the Australian military profession the emphasis on military technology has been accompanied by an increasing need for developmental systems and studies. In addition to the necessary research and development associated with all inventions, military establishments now need to be proficient in such areas as personnel management systems, project analysis, organisational structure analysis, training and simulation systems, and financial management, most of which are computerised and all of which require high levels of education and training.

In the view of Michael Howard, Western nations (particularly the US and UK) have given too much attention to the technological dimension of military strategy at the expense of the operational and social dimensions. Be this
as it may it seems certain that the technological dimension will continue to be an important determinant of military strategy in the foreseeable future, and an area in which the Australian military profession will need to devote a great deal of its attention.

Technology influences strategy in two ways simultaneously. As Beaufre has explained, strategic ideas and requirements set in train technological and developmental processes:

> Strategy must...lay down the aim which the inventions of the technicians and the research of the tacticians should strive to achieve. Only then shall we be able to direct evolution into profitable channels....(40)

But at the same time Fuller also was correct when he noted that technological inventions and tactical innovations force themselves upon strategy from the bottom-up, causing in time a change to strategic thinking as decision-makers become convinced of the utility of the new weapon or concept.

Beaufre and Fuller were both correct, and perhaps the lesson for the Australian military profession is to be aware of this, and to cultivate at all levels within the profession an innovative approach to the application of technology, while at the same time instilling in its senior officers the need to direct technological research to fulfil the aims of military strategy.
The Economic Dimension. Because nations can man, equip and sustain military forces in peacetime only in relation to their ability to finance them, economics has always been an important consideration in military strategy. However, the increased strain on military budgets, caused largely as a result of the rate and cost of technological progress and the consequent reduction in the useful lifetime of many military equipments, together with escalating manpower costs, has increased the influence of economics on military strategy. Equipment acquisition programmes and organisational structures must be scrutinised and financially managed within strict budgetary limits. The term 'resource constraint' has become a by-word for project managers, as well as for operations and training staffs, all of whom must manage carefully their financial allocations. The comment by two contemporary American strategists concerning the importance of finance in determining American peacetime military strategy applies equally to Australia. Dunn and Staudenmaier noted that:

A credible and realistic military strategy must be financially acceptable. A failure to consider the financial implications of selected military strategies or doctrines could result in the creation of a strategy which the...public will not financially support because of its expense. (42)

Probably no other factor in military strategy causes more inter-service rivalry in Australia during peacetime than that of budget allocation. Currently, each service provides financial estimates for future equipment and facilities requirements, and because aggregate expectations usually
outstrip available financial resources cuts often have to be made to one or more of the services. Bargaining occurs continually within a labyrinth of committees, and the eventual economic decisions have a direct impact on strategic capability because of the acceptance or deferment or rejection of projects and/or equipments. More recently inter-service rivalry for scarce funds attracted increased public attention over the debate as to whether or not the RAN should acquire a replacement aircraft carrier (HMS Invincibile) for the obsolescent HMAS Melbourne. The 'carrier debate' highlighted the importance of economics as part of the determination of the ADF's peacetime force structure. However, the carrier debate also showed that, when scarce financial resources were available, the three services were unable to agree on a unified military strategy within budgetary limitations. The RAN's continued insistence on the need for an aircraft carrier was in stark contrast to the RAAF's perceived requirements for Australian maritime strategy, while the Army appeared to vacillate between the two.

The economic dimension of military strategy highlights the need for close coordination between the services, as well as between the military and the civilian administration, and signals the requirement for senior military personnel to have a sound appreciation of the military options that the nation realistically can afford.
The Intelligence Dimension. Just as technology has increased the influence of economics on military strategy, so too has it improved the ability to acquire timely information and intelligence. (45) Military intelligence is an essential element of military strategy and is vital for the successful conduct of military operations and for longer term strategic assessments. Commanders and national leaders traditionally have sought information about their actual or potential adversaries, and normally have devised military strategies on their perceived understanding of their enemy's capabilities. Thus, there is nothing new in the function that intelligence performs in military strategy. What is new, however, is the increased importance now placed on intelligence, the means by which it is collected, and the consequent necessity to develop professional expertise in the intelligence field.

In time of war, or when war is imminent, the role of military intelligence is clear: all efforts are directed towards providing information about the capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions of the enemy. However, in peacetime, when no discernible threat is evident, emphasis in strategic military intelligence is given to monitoring the military capabilities of a number of countries; while in operational military intelligence a mythical enemy is used to practise the collection and utilisation of battlefield information.

It would seem, however, that military intelligence (both strategic and operational) has had little influence in the determination of Australia's peacetime military strategy.
For example, strategic intelligence seems not to have played a major role in the decisions to acquire the F/A 18 Hornet aircraft and to dispose of (and not replace) the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne. Similarly, at the operating level of military strategy the intelligence function (like logistics) is normally given less emphasis during military exercises than are other aspects such as deployment, manoeuvre, and concentration of force. (46)

Commanders at all levels (as well as national leaders) recognise the importance of surveillance and early warning. Moreover the acquisition of equipment to help provide early warning generally has been given a high priority in recent years. (47) Early warning is vital for Australia. The country maintains only small defence forces, has an undeveloped military-industrial complex, has no contingency plans for mobilisation, and has no existing or planned civil defence organisation to provide local security in the event of war. (48) In military operations for all but low level contingencies (49) Australian forces are likely to have to fight outnumbered and outgunned in the first instance. (50) Battlefield intelligence will be vital to operational commanders who may be forced to use small but mobile forces in order to achieve surprise, and continue to survive in a dispersed mode with limited logistic support.

Given these conditions it is evident that military intelligence is vital to Australia, and to the Australian military profession. Yet it is a fact that the services have given only modest attention to the development of military
intelligence. Commanders, of course, always want to know what the enemy will do and consequently are keen to acquire capabilities to help find this out. But commanders normally have not been intelligence officers, nor is it normally expected that intelligence officers will rise to be senior commanders. As a consequence only seldom will officers with aspirations to one day become generals (or equivalent) choose a career in the intelligence field. The cards are stacked against the budding officer, and invariably the keener graduates will choose, or be encouraged to choose, service in the more traditional fighting branches. There is no easy solution to this problem, but perhaps if the importance of the intelligence dimension in military strategy is recognised more clearly by the profession then enhanced career opportunities (and encouragement) for intelligence officers might ensue.

The Types of Military Strategy

Although it is important that military strategy should be understood according to its levels and dimensions, decision-makers must eventually translate these variables into actual strategies that are applicable for the situation at hand. In other words certain types of military strategies are available each of which have distinct characteristics. It is the difficult task of the strategist to choose from these various types of strategies those that are considered most appropriate for the present, and for the foreseeable future. The various types of military strategy and the more important considerations in selecting these...
are summarised in diagram 4. (These types and considerations are explained more fully in Appendix 2.)

Diagram 4 (and Appendix 2) helps explain the various types of military strategy that a state may select, but only rarely will one type of strategy be chosen in complete isolation from another. More often than not a state will structure its armed forces to implement its policies in various ways, or to protect itself from a variety of possible threats. The strategy of the Viet Minh and North Vietnamese are often cited as examples of unconventional military strategy, but this strategy remained unconventional only until they were able to muster the military strength to mount conventional operations. The battles at Dien Bien Phu (1953-4) and at Khe Sanh (1968) are illustrations of

Diagram 4: The Types of Military Strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILITARY STRATEGY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Warfare Strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlimited General Warfare Strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Conventional Warfare Strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unconventional Warfare Strategies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considerations in Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alliance and/or neutral strategy</th>
<th>deterrent and/or war fighting strategy</th>
<th>direct and/or indirect strategy</th>
<th>maritime and/or continental and/or aerospace strategy</th>
<th>offensive and/or defensive strategy</th>
<th>sequential and/or cummulative strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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conventional operations conducted as part of unconventional wars. Today, the same 'guerrilla fighters' who eventually were successful in unifying Vietnam are themselves organised as a conventional army fighting Khmer guerrillas along the Thai border. Similarly, if we look at the military strategy of the major powers we find that they maintain the military capability to conduct nuclear, general and/or limited war, and have at times also contested (with varying success) unconventional military strategies used against them.

As well, each of the four types of military strategy shown in diagram 4 have their own variants or sub-types. For example, in nuclear strategy there is debate as to whether it is possible to fight and win a nuclear war or whether any nuclear exchange will escalate to cause mutual assured destruction. For general war there is uncertainty about the extent to which nuclear and conventional operations would be linked, and as to whether the duration of conflict would be short or prolonged. For limited conventional operations there are no fixed rules about the relative advantages and disadvantages of land, air and maritime strategies - it seems always to depend on the situation. And even for unconventional military strategy (and their associated counter-strategies) there are differences in methods (eg rural or urban) which cause it to defy singular categorisation.

All of this shows that there exists an endless range of strategy types from which nations attempt to select the most appropriate for their particular circumstances. The problem
of choosing the best strategy is made more difficult because of cost and the long lead times required to introduce, and make operational, new concepts and weapons systems. In this sense strategic concepts and technology are normally ahead of operational capability, but it is the latter with which wars must be averted or fought.

When Australia's current military strategy is analysed against this backdrop of types and considerations certain trends tend to emerge. For example, in relation to the types of military strategy, the ADF concentrates its efforts on preparing to fight (if necessary) limited conventional wars, with rather less emphasis being given to unconventional warfare. In contrast, nuclear warfare and general warfare both of which would require an ongoing national commitment to prepare for (and against), have not been embraced as part of Australian national or military strategy. Australia for instance has not developed or adopted a strategy of 'total defence' similar to that in some other countries like Sweden or Switzerland. In relation to some of the considerations listed it would appear also that Australia:

- has preferred a strategy of military alliance (principally ANZUS) rather than armed neutrality; (54)
- has advocated a policy of deterrence in favour of war fighting, but has not attempted to achieve deterrence by adopting a 'total defence' posture; (55)
at least since the withdrawal of forces from Vietnam has generally preferred indirect to direct military strategy; and

has in general been unable to determine or agree on what emphasis or priority should be placed on the development of maritime, continental and aerospace strategies.

Brigadier J.S. Baker has commented that in times of peace or no obvious threat strategy will remain imprecise and flexible. Strategy will exist only as an amalgam of policies, programmes, party political platforms and social ambitions open to interpretation by those responsible for the formulation of more specific aspects within it. (57)

Baker provides an accurate explanation of the current state of Australia's national and military strategy, but the explanation can not condone this situation. There are other countries in similar circumstances to Australia that have addressed this problem more judiciously - Sweden, Switzerland and Singapore for example. The nation has a right to expect more from its defence decision-makers than Baker's explanation suggests.

In this difficult task of selecting and developing the most appropriate type of strategy for Australia the role of
the military profession needs to be considered. In Australia the military has tended to take a 'back-seat ride' in matters of strategic decision-making. That they provide advice to government there can be no doubt, but this advice often reflects single service loyalties and is most often reactive in nature.\(^{(58)}\) It would seem that many of the decisions taken in relation to Australia's military strategy are reached by an osmotic process in which proposals are filtered through an endless network of committees and sub-committees.\(^{(59)}\) Moreover, it is the civilian bureaucrats - many of whom have no professional experience in and only limited understanding about the requirements of preparing for and mounting military operations - that currently have most authority in the defence decision-making process.

The military must perform three functions if it is to be influential in determining and implementing the most appropriate military strategy for Australia. First, at the coordinating level of military strategy, the profession needs to be able to demonstrate its understanding of military strategy by assessing the suitability of each of the types (and sub-types) available. Without this knowledge the military's advice will have little influence with either senior civilian bureaucrats or with ministerial and cabinet representatives. Moreover, because military strategy is the means rather than the ends of policy, clear ministerial guidance needs to be given to the CDF, and if necessary the CDF must seek ministerial guidance before alternative military strategies can be contemplated.
Second, in its examination of alternative strategies the military needs to be mindful of resource constraints. This has been referred to already under the economic dimension of military strategy, but there is another type of constraint that requires particular attention, namely, the constraint of 'time'. In helping determine military strategy the profession should be capable of giving unequivocal advice about the 'defence preparation time' required to implement alternative military strategies. While the military can hardly be blamed should 'warning time' for a perceived threat prove to be incorrect, it justifiably may be accused of irresponsibility for failing to provide advice as to the time required to prepare different force levels at different states of readiness and (61) sustainability.

Third, in each of the types (and sub-types) of military strategy selected, the profession needs to be proficient in single service and joint operations (and possibly in combined (62) operations as well). Joint warfare has superseded single service operations, but expertise and training in the latter remains important so as to provide the necessary grounding in maritime, continental and aerospace operations. Despite the distasteful aspects of single service 'tribalism' it remains true that operations are conducted at sea, on land and in the air, and while military officers can be taught to appreciate all three, most officers will have the time and capacity to become expert only in one. However, military officers need also to practise single service expertise in a
Joint force environment. Joint force commanders and their staffs must be able to cope in this environment, using operational procedures that are appropriate and that are understood by each service. Largely because of mutual ignorance, single service tribalism continues to exist within the Australian military profession and has frustrated efforts to devise a coherent military strategy. Progress in joint warfare has been slow, perhaps partly because of the favourable strategic environment in which Australia currently resides, and partly because defence issues usually attract little public attention (or political mileage) during peacetime. Given these circumstances it is perhaps understandable that the military profession, a conservative body by nature, should seek to maintain the status quo and with it all the traditions and rivalry that distinguishes each service from the other.

Conclusion

Military strategy represents an important part of strategic thinking. For the Australian military profession it is the most essential area with which they need to be familiar if they are to be influential in the determination of Australian strategic policy. This chapter has shown that a simple definition of military strategy (refer page 27) fails to explain how military strategy is determined or what it encompasses. However an understanding of the levels, dimensions and types of military strategy goes some way towards doing this. This chapter may help bring to strategy a degree of that 'intellectual order' which Wylie correctly
assessed was so desperately required. At the very least it may help provide a kind of check list against which the military profession can assess its knowledge and expertise in military strategy. Using this conceptual approach diagram 5 illustrates the various elements of military strategy and shows how they contribute to national strategy and policy.

Brodie commented once that

military strategy, while one of the most ancient of the human sciences is at the same time one of the least developed. (65)

He went on to explain that this was because the practitioners of military strategy were by necessity men of decision and action rather than theory. This chapter is of course theoretical and perhaps justifiably may be dismissed by the military as providing little guidance for the practical problems likely to confront commanders on the battlefield. But perhaps as well as the knowledge so essential for commanders to fight successfully is the requirement for them also to understand, more fully than hitherto, the rationale for preparing for (and averting) war. Only then will the military's voice be likely to count for much in the complex peacetime process by which military and national strategy are devised. At present the efforts of the military profession in helping determine Australia's military strategy appear uncoordinated between the services and far less influential than the efforts of their civilian counterparts within the defence bureaucracy.
Diagram 5: THE CONTENT AND RELATIONSHIP OF MILITARY STRATEGY

POLICY

NATIONAL (TOTAL) STRATEGY

POLITICAL STRATEGY  ECONOMIC STRATEGY  MILITARY STRATEGY  DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

LEVELS

Coordinating ... higher
Operating ... lower
Tactics

DIMENSIONS

Political  Operational  Technological  Intelligence

Social  Administrative (logistic)  Economic

TYPES

Nuclear Warfare  Unlimited General Warfare  Limited Conventional Warfare  Unconventional Warfare

Considerations in Selection

| alliance and/or neutral strategy | deterrent and/or war fighting strategy | direct and/or indirect strategy | maritime and/or continental and/or aerospace strategy | offensive and/or defensive strategy | sequential and/or cumulative strategy |

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ENDNOTES

1. Wylie (Chapter 1, note 40), p. vi.

2. ibid, p. 111.

3. ibid, p. 87 and chapter 7.

4. For an explanation of the role of power in international politics, and particularly military power, see among others Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace (Knopf, New York, fifth edition, 1973), particularly Part 2. Two other political schools of thought which seek to explain international relations other than totally in terms of power politics are the 'dependency' and 'interdependence' schools. The dependency school seeks to show how underdeveloped countries are dependent in a predominately social and economic sense to the more advanced countries. See for example C. Leys, 'Underdevelopment and Dependency', Journal of Contemporary Asia (Vol. 7, No. 1, 1977), pp. 92-107. The interdependence school asserts that social and economic linkages exist between nations and that these linkages are complex and often more important than one country's military power in relation to another's. This school concentrates mainly on relations between developed countries. See for example Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1977).

5. Wylie (Chapter 1, note 40), p. 86.


7. ibid.


9. This definition differs from the definition in JSP (AS) 101(A) (Chapter 1, note 14), which fails to give any importance to the preparation of the armed forces. (Refer Appendix 1).


11. Australia's 'threat environment' refers to the range of threats that Australia faces now or in the foreseeable future. According to the Strat Basis paper (1982)
Australia does not face any likely military threats in the immediate future and considers Indonesia only as a potential long term military threat. The Strat Basis, however, has identified a number of possible low level threats that could arise at short notice and which would require an Australian military response. See *The National Times* (Chapter 1, note 30).

12. The 'Operating Environment' refers to the physical nature of the environment in which Australian forces are most likely to operate. This includes the Australian mainland, its offshore islands and territories, the exclusive economic zone, and the air and maritime approaches to these. The operating environment involves an analysis of such things as climate, terrain, vegetation, sea states, tides, etc.

13. In the Australian Army Manual of Land Warfare (MLW), One.1.1, *The Fundamentals of Land Force Operations* (draft, 3 November 1984), the operational level of war is explained as being 'concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns', normally at the 'army' or 'corps' level.

14. *PM 100-5* (Chapter 1, note 14), p.2.3.

15. For a fuller discussion on this, and its importance to Australia, see Millar (Chapter 1, note 27), pp. 289-290. Millar explains that Australia is inexperienced in this matter, and that Blamey's appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Military Forces in 1942 does not provide a good example for the future.

16. Within the Department of Defence FDA and SIP Divisions have the greatest influence in the determination and justification of force structures and strategic employment concepts. These Divisions are civilian managed and predominantly civilian staffed.

17. No clear position has been reached by the three services as to the extent of the contribution each service should make to national security. For example the RAN's uncertainty about the exact role it should play in the maritime defence of Australian interests has heightened since the loss (and non replacement) of HMAS Melbourne. The RAN has recently seconded a naval officer (Commander) to the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, to study this problem.

18. This was evidenced by the various positions of the services during the carrier debate (refer Chapter 2, note 45.) Considerable work has been accomplished, however, in improving the command and control procedures largely as a result of experience gained in the KANGAROO series of exercises.

19. The notion that military strategy may have certain dimensions was derived from Howard (Chapter 2, note 8), *'The Forgotten Dimensions of Military Strategy,'*
pp. 101-115.

20. Wylie (Chapter 1, note 40) points out (p. 79, fn) that Clausewitz never actually made this statement. However, there can be no doubt that this phrase — quoted so often — is an accurate distillation of Clausewitz's belief in the need for the supremacy of political thought over military action.


23. 'Political awareness' is not meant in the party political sense, but in the broader sense of awareness of the principles and foundations of democratic government. In itself this means participation and not isolation.


25. The appointment in 1984 of Major General Butler to conduct a review of senior officer development for the ADF, and the increased attention being given to strategy in the military academies and staff colleges are examples of this. These points are elaborated in Chapter 3.

26. This is evidenced by such things as: the operational settings for the KANGAROO series of exercises for which allied commitment has been important but not essential; the increased importance being placed on the operational level of war, particularly by Army; increased attention being given to the conduct and support of operations in the Australian operating environment, free from allied support; and the increased incidence of joint force exercises and training.

27. In general, many civilian bureaucrats have little understanding of military organisations: of how and why these organisations need to be structured in certain ways, and why the conduct of military operations is such a complex business. Understandably, they are inexperienced in the business of war. This would not be so bad if it was not for the fact that these same bureaucrats have so much influence in force structure development. It is not uncommon for the military to waste considerable time (and taxpayers' money) in justifying quite routine proposals. (A recent example was when Army was told to justify why it needed machine guns.) Of course, this is not to suggest that military capability proposals should not be vetted, of course they must. But it does nothing for civil-military relations.
within the Department when the military feel (and sometimes justifiably) that their civilian counterparts - who hold most of the aces in the decision-making process - are actually quite ignorant about many matters on which they deliberate. (Equally, it has been noted elsewhere in this sub-thesis that the supremacy the civilian bureaucrats have over the military is due partly to the military's poor understanding of strategy and to continued inter-service rivalry, particularly in budgetary matters.)

28. Research of public Department of Defence documents reveals that the term 'self-reliance' was first used in the Defence Report 1972 (p.4). However, similar expressions are contained in Defence Report 1970 (p.4) and Defence Report 1971 (p.3). It would appear that the need for greater self-reliance was spurred by the Nixon (Guam) Doctrine of 1969 (refer chapter 3, note 22). However, until the Whitlam Labor Government was elected in late 1972 the need for greater self-reliance remained linked to the maintenance of a forward defence policy. This is enunciated clearly in the Defence Review 1972 (pp.2,27). The linking of self-reliance to continental defence (ie not forward defence) occurred during the Whitlam Labor Government (1972-75) and was largely accepted by and explained in the Fraser Conservative Government's Defence White Paper, 1976 (pp.10-11).

29. Considerable work of a conceptual nature has been completed by the Defence Department and the ADF in relation to self-reliance, but little of this effort has been translated into actual military capabilities. It is arguable that, in terms of operational capability, the ADF was probably more self-reliant when it was involved in an alliance strategy of forward defence than it is today.


32. For example, Army runs a Logistics Exercise (LOGEX) every year or two which examines national logistic problems as well as operational support problems. And on Army tactics courses and at Command and Staff College more emphasis than hitherto is given to logistics/administration problems.

33. Eccles (Chapter 2, note 6), p.67.

35. **JSP(AS) 101(A)** (Chapter 1, note 14), administration is defined as:

'a. The management and execution of all military matters not included in tactics and strategy: primarily in the field of logistics and personnel management.

b. Internal management of units.'

It is the belief of this author that administration and logistics are part of strategy (or strategic thinking) and that it is not possible to separate them from strategy.

36. Some eminent strategists contended that nuclear weapons actually rendered large scale conventional forces obsolete. See for example Brodie (Chapter 1, note 7), p. 412.

37. A common claim in relation to these modern conventional weapons is that 'if a target can be acquired it will be hit, and if hit it will be destroyed.'

38. Asymmetric conflicts are those between unequal powers, for example as between the United States and North Vietnam. Technology has assisted the smaller power as well as the larger. In the case of Vietnam, technology (and financial assistance) helped North Vietnam to be equipped with modern, light, reliable and accurate weapons systems; as well, the United States was able to use highly advanced weaponry and intelligence gathering devices.

39. Howard (Chapter 2, note 19), p. 114. Howard noted that: 'we appear to be depending on the technological dimension of strategy to the detriment of its operational requirements, while we ignore its societal implications altogether.'

40. Beaufre (Chapter 1, note 1), p. 49.


43. The overall resource management of the defence forces (ie. manpower, money and materiel) is enshrined in the Five Year Defence Programme (FYDP). The FYDP is divided into five programming categories - manpower, Defence Cooperation Program (DCP), operating costs, capital facilities, and capital equipment. It is in the areas of non-approved facilities and equipment...
proposals that most bargaining occurs. However, even approved projects included in the FYDP are sometimes deferred or cancelled (and sometimes others are inserted) as the FYDP is reviewed annually. For example, the fourth FFG for the RAN was never part of the FYDP estimates. For an unclassified and simplified explanation of the FYDP refer 'Background Brief: The Five Year Defence Program' (Directorate General of Training and Education Policy, January 1984, unclassified).

44. The initial decision to acquire a replacement carrier was agreed in the DFDC on a split vote: the CDFS (Synnot), CNS (Willis) and CGS (Dunstan) were in favour, and only the Secretary (Pritchett) and the CAS (McNamara) were opposed. By November 1982 the situation had changed with the Secretary, CDFS (now McNamara) and CAS (Evans) all opposed, the CGS (Bennett) uncommitted, and the CNS (Leach) the only one in favour. Refer: Gary Brown, Prospects and Problems for Australian Higher Defence Organisation After the Report of the Defence Review Committee (Parliament of Commonwealth of Australia, Legislative Research Service, Discussion Paper No. 3, 1983), p. 80.

45. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) and satellite intelligence (SATINT) are the most obvious areas in which advances have been made. However, technological developments also have enhanced intelligence gathering capabilities within the area/theatre of operations. These advances include: high resolution photo reconnaissance, remotely piloted vehicles and remote sensors.

46. This is a personal opinion derived from involvement in and awareness of, a number of military exercises in Australia over the past 15 years. In most of these exercises commanders have paid lip service to the importance of intelligence. Exercise KANGAROO 81 was probably the first real attempt by military staffs to practise the intelligence function seriously at all levels of command. (The author is unaware of the importance given to intelligence in most RAN and RAAF exercises.)

47. In addition to existing capabilities, examples of this importance include: the development of JINDALEE, over-the-horizon (OTH-B) radar; and the possible future acquisition of battlefield surveillance equipment by Army.

48. The closest Australia has to a civil defence organisation is the Natural Disasters Organisation (NDO) which is an 'outrider' organisation of the Department of Defence. However, the NDO is currently concerned with natural disasters - cyclones, floods, fires etc - and is not organised, trained or equipped for civil defence tasks which normally include protective security and local defence. According to
Desmond Ball, 'in Australia, the prevailing attitude [to civil defence] can fairly be described as one of apathy.' Refer: 'Attitudes and Developments in Civil Defence Around the World,' in Desmond Ball (ed) (Chapter 1, note 3), p. 140.

Three levels of conflict applicable to Australia (low medium and high) are described in Australian Joint Operations Doctrine, JSP (AS) 1 (A). For an unclassified and comprehensive description of these levels of conflict see Brigadier J.N. Stein, 'The Administrative Support Concepts for Land Operations in Defence of Australia,' Presentation to the Conference on The Civil Infrastructure in the Defence of Australia: Asset and Vulnerabilities (ANU, Canberra, 28 November - 2 December 1983), P.8. More recently, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence categorised possible threats into 'low, intermediate, invasion, and global conflict.' See, The Australian Defence Force: Its Structure and Capabilities (Cross Report) (October 1984), chapter 1, paras 1.49 - 1.72.

The reason for this is that 'warning time' for higher level conflict is likely to be insufficient for the 'defence preparation time' required to militarily deter or combat the emerging threat. For a discussion of warning time and defence preparation time see note 61 of this chapter.

In the Australian Army the Intelligence Corps technically is one of the fighting 'arms', rather than a 'service'. However, the more traditional fighting arms from which senior commanders invariably have come are Infantry, Artillery, Armour and Engineers.

For example: Britain in Malaya/Malaysia France in Indo-China and Algeria, the United States in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

For a succinct description of various examples of total defence, including Sweden and Switzerland, refer David Martin, Armed Neutrality For Australia (Drummond, Victoria, 1984), chapters 6-8.

ibid, chapters 1,5.

Australia's present military strategy rests on the maintenance of an outline force structure (the 'core force' concept) which can be fleshed out and expanded as the need arises. This strategy is intended to defend against low level threats and deter higher level threats. The anomaly with this strategy is that for deterrence to be credible, military capabilities must be seen by a prospective enemy as being available (or potentially available) within a time period that will affect military operations. This is the basis of nuclear deterrence, as well as conventional deterrence; but it is a fundamental fact that Australian defence
policy-makers appear reluctant to acknowledge.

56. This fact was highlighted during the 'carrier debate'. (Refer Chapter 2, note 44.)


58. The author has been unable to find evidence to suggest that the military has actively sought (or seeks) to promote its views on the future direction of Australia's defence. More often than not it awaits ministerial decisions and modifies its peacetime operational policies in light of changing budgetary circumstances. The hurried decision to expand the Army Reserve as a result of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 is an illustration of the reactive nature of military strategic thought. See also chapter 4, note 6.

59. For a description of some of these committees see Jolika Tie, J. O. Langtry and Robert O'Neill, Australia's Defence Resources (ANU, Canberra, 1978), pp. 62-74. Some of the committees listed have been renamed, but the fact remains that decision-making rests on a committee-system.

60. Refer Chapter 1, notes 31-32; and Chapter 2, note 16.

61. The Australian Army has defined these terms as follows: Warning Time is 'that time which elapses from when an aggressor first conducts activities which are either hostile or which may lead to hostility in the future, to the moment when hostilities actually commence.' Defence Preparation Time is 'the time available to the Defence Force during which preparations, above normal levels, may occur. This time will commence when the Government first acknowledges the threat and directs defence preparation to commence.' Refer: Army Development Guide (Provisional), Volume 1, Terminology Section (note: these terms are unclassified). Several studies have indicated that defence preparation time is likely to be inadequate to meet emerging threats within the warning time available. See for example: I.M. Speedy, 'The Trident of Neptune', Defence Force Journal (No. 8, January/February, 1978), pp. 7-15; and J.O. Langtry and Desmond J. Ball, Controlling Australia's Threat Environment. A Methodology for Planning Australian Defence Force Development (ANU, Canberra, 1979), pp. 4-5.

62. Single-service operations are those conducted predominantly by one service. Joint operations are those involving two or more services. Combined operations are those involving military forces from two or more countries.

63. The profession has an Australian Joint Warfare Establishment (AJWE), and a Joint Military Operations
and Plans (JMOP) organisation within the Department of Defence. However, in general each of the services places more attention on its own training establishments and organisations. For example, within Army less emphasis has been given by the Military Secretary to the importance of officers working in a tri-service environment than to them holding key command and staff appointments within Army.

64. For a useful summary of why the military profession and the 'military mind' is conservative see Huntington (Chapter 1, note 22), p. 79.


66. ibid.
CHAPTER 3

THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC THINKING IN THE

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY PROFESSION

It is universally agreed upon, that no art or science is more difficult, than that of war; yet by an unaccountable contradiction of the human mind, those who embrace this profession take little or no pains to study it.\(^1\)

Henry Humphrey Evans Lloyd, 1766

Generally throughout the world military education\(^2\) has advanced and improved since Henry Lloyd's accurate, if uncharitable, observations of 1766. In Australian society today the military represents an established and highly structured profession in which military education plays an important role. Officers are no longer born but made. Most are commissioned only after completing an intensive induction period which lasts from one to four years,\(^3\) and their subsequent promotion depends largely on attendance and performance at various courses in addition to 'on-the-job' performance. It would seem that military education has become, and continues to become, more formalised and comprehensive than even Henry Lloyd would have imagined. The actual and potential horrors of war, spawned both by technological innovation and by the evolution of mankind into a volatile society of more or less independent states, has demanded that military establishments become more professional as 'managers [or potential managers] of violence'.\(^4\)
However - and as Michael Howard has explained - when Henry Lloyd spoke of the military's reluctance to study war he was not thinking only of the need to understand its 'mechanics' but also its 'application', the latter which included an understanding of the human element of warfare that could not be learnt from memorising simple principles or maxims.\(^5\) In fact, Lloyd was challenging the military (and others) to think strategically: to consider why military force might be necessary; when and how the military might be used most appropriately; and how the military should best prepare itself.

Chapter 1 explained why strategic thinking is important to the military profession. It showed that the execution ('mechanics') of military force in the field of tactics has received more attention by the profession than has the formulation ('application') of sound national and military strategy. Chapter 2 demonstrated the complex nature of military strategy and its relationship with national strategy. It highlighted the point that the Australian military profession generally has given inadequate attention to strategic thinking. This chapter examines the reasons for this situation and explains the current state of military education in strategic matters. Two related questions are addressed:

- Why has the Australian military profession hitherto given so little attention to the development of strategic thinking?
And what military education in strategic matters is currently undertaken by the Australian military profession?

Limitations to Development

Four reasons help explain why the Australian military profession has given little attention to strategic matters. The first, and by far the most important, concerns Australian history, or at least the development of the Australian military profession as part of Australia's history.

Although defence issues provided an important catalyst for Federation, and despite (or because of) Australia's involvement in a number of wars overseas, efforts to devise an independent defence strategy for Australia have been sporadic. Not until the threat of Japanese invasion in World War 2 was Australia required to consider seriously how it would handle its own security.(6) Until that time Australia had relied on Britain and the notion of imperial defence, the credibility of which, after World War 1, depended upon the survival of the Singapore Base and sufficient Empire forces being made available for the Far East in the event of war.(7) The Japanese thrust into the Pacific and into south-east Asia from December 1941 showed the inadequacy of empire defence. However, with the eventual defeat of Japan by the Allies in 1945 the urgency for national defence again waned in Australia. Demobilisation, resettlement, and post-war reconstruction became the most important national issues, and
the development of an independent defence strategy to deter or combat future possible aggression again received modest attention.(8) However, partly because of international uncertainties,(9) the Labor government approved in June 1947 the formation of the Permanent Military Forces (PMF) (19,000 strong) to be backed by the larger Citizen Military Forces (CMF) (50,000).(10) The primary roles of these forces were their potential contribution to United Nations commitments and/or to British Commonwealth defence, as well as the provision of an expansion base in the event of war.(11) The 'local defence of the Australian mainland' (12) was seen as a less likely role than that of operating abroad with allies.

In the immediate post-war era each of the services was seen by government, and saw themselves, mainly as separate identities, each concerned in some way with national defence, but administered, organised and equipped to perform different functions and requiring only loose liaison and cooperation.(13) The government and the services appreciated the need to develop and maintain military capabilities for sea, air and land warfare, but the necessity for developing coherent joint operations, so clearly demonstrated in World War 2, seemed to escape government and its defence advisers. With little thought of acquiring defence self-reliance the government looked both to Britain and the U.S. to help secure Australia's sovereignty and accordingly, in the intended protection of Australia's security, contributed forces to aid their allies.(14) The actual roles and future organisations of
the services remained uncertain, indeed as they were in Britain and the U.S., where the utility of conventional forces was still being assessed with the dawn of the nuclear age. Unable to do much else the RAN continued to sail its ships in the classic blue-water tradition of the British Navy, now extolling the virtues of aircraft carriers, maritime air, submarines and anti-submarine warfare, but assuming always that Australian sea and air power would be projected within the region as part of a larger allied force. Relatively little thought was given to Australian joint operations or to the development of a distinctive Australian military strategy. The Army concentrated its efforts in the area of minor tactics, capitalising on its World War 2 experience in jungle warfare and developing counter-insurgency skills of a high order. The Army stayed abreast of developments in conventional limited warfare and technological advances. The virtues of mechanised, parachuting and amphibious operations had all been learnt in World War 2, as had the increasing importance of aerial fire support, but generally the Army remained uncertain as to how these capabilities could be incorporated into any military strategy without allied support. Moreover, and despite the importance of these military capabilities, the types of conflict in which Australian forces became involved did not require the Australian forces to develop an independent military strategy. The RAAF, the junior and poor cousin of the services between the wars,(15) used the lessons of World War 2 to demonstrate the importance of air power for the future.(16) Within RAAF emphasis was given to the
development of strategic bombing (later called strategic strike), to long range reconnaissance, air interdiction and long range transportation. (17) Each of the services had specific requirements and priorities for aviation and this led to the establishment of the RAN Fleet Air Arm in 1947 and the first Army Light Aircraft Squadron in 1960. (18)

The disparate state of the three services can be seen as a direct reflection of Australia's national strategy in the post-war era. This strategy called for the continued reliance on more powerful allies for defence, and the willingness if necessary to assist these allies in the fight against communism as far from Australia's shores as practicable. More than anything else the emergence of Communist China in 1949, and the apparent closeness in relations between Moscow and Peking, (19) heightened the tensions of the Cold War and brought to Australia fear of a spreading monolithic communist regime. Throughout the 1950s - 1960s events in Korea, the Philippines, Malaya/Malaysia, Indonesia and Indo-China tended in Australia to be interpreted (at least publicly) in this simplistic fashion, and the Australian services were organised primarily to contribute to allied commitments. Close military ties were maintained with Britain, (20) but because of Britain's diminishing power in the Far East, Australia (and New Zealand) gravitated more and more toward the USA, now the undisputed dominant power in the Pacific. Even before the ANZUS Security Pact was signed in September 1951, an Australia - US alliance had begun to be formed from the two nations common experience during the war in the
Pacific, more recently in Korea in 1950, and also because of both countries close alliance with Britain.

The British withdrawal east of Suez (1967 - 71),(21) the Nixon (Guam) Doctrine (1969),(22) and the political defeat and withdrawal of US and allied forces from South Vietnam (1972),(23) all contributed to a reassessment of Australia's national strategy. Thus, from the early 1970s the notion of forward defence was replaced by one of continental defence(24) and this new national strategy rested on two conditions, namely maintenance of the ANZUS alliance and enhanced self-reliance.(25)

This perceived need for enhanced defence self-reliance, more than anything else, provided both the cause and the impetus for senior military officers, civilian defence analysts and academics to reconsider Australia's future strategy. What military (and non-military) options were realistically open to Australia? What could the nation provide and willingly afford in peacetime to become more self-reliant? What force structure was the most appropriate to ensure Australia's sovereignty and, simultaneously, to help maintain peace within Australia's prime region of interest? What impact was technology having on equipment acquisition and future force structure? What conflicts seemed most likely, and in what circumstances might the ANZUS alliance be found wanting? How relevant were the force structures of the three services? And how viable were the operating procedures and the command and control facilities
within the ADF? These were the sorts of problems that increased self-reliance inflicted upon Australia's defence planners.

It is important that this historical development in Australia's strategic thinking be appreciated fully. Australia is a young country whose national and military strategies are still in their formative stages. Australia resides in a relatively peaceful part of the globe; it is able to identify only a remote chance of a regional military threat to its security; (26) it has not had to fight for its freedom or its independence from an imperial power; and by and large it has never been troubled by the sort of divisive internal problems so rampant in many parts of the world. (27) Tied to Britain for so long, and then by necessity to the US in World War 2, it is understandable that the Australian military profession should concentrate its attention on the techniques of war (for which it gained and international reputation of high standing), rather than developing expertise in the less precise area of strategic thinking.

The second reason why the Australian military profession has given scant attention to strategic thinking is related to this historical issue. This reason is simply that until the late 1960s - early 1970s - at least within a few years of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam in January 1968 (28) - the Australian military profession had not been required to be experienced in matters of strategy. Australian military forces traditionally had operated as part of larger allied
contingents and for the most part had been supported logistically by, and subordinated to, their larger allies. As a result the profession had gained little experience in the preparation, planning and conduct of military operations that could be mounted and sustained independently from allies. Probably the closest Australia had come to this was from about June 1941 when the Chiefs of Staff (already preoccupied with Australian military involvement in the Mediterranean littoral and in Singapore-Malaya) began to give serious consideration to the defence of Australia. 

However, by the time the American, General Douglas MacArthur, had been appointed Commander-in-Chief South-West Pacific Area in March 1942, Australian military strategy had already begun to revert to its traditional reliance on more powerful allies.

Only since withdrawal from Vietnam has the Australian military profession considered seriously how military operations might have to be conducted within the Australian environment free from major allied support. With this has come the need for the profession to be able to produce its own theatre and area commanders and for these commanders to have a thorough understanding of joint force operations and the logistics required to make them work. But mostly the profession has been required to raise its sights: to give some thought as to how force structures should be developed to meet these challenges. The military can no longer be concerned merely with acquiring and utilising military capabilities, it must now justify the capabilities it
requires and the purposes for which they are intended. There are those in the ADF who lament this situation and see this requirement as an unnecessary obstacle to the more exhilarating job of training for war, but there can be little argument that if military strategy is to have credibility then this work needs to be done by the military profession with the same level of expertise that training requires.

The third reason why the Australian military profession has given little attention to strategic thinking relates to the military's perception of its role in society, or what is more commonly called the civil-military interface. Since the late 1950s - early 1960s military sociologists generally have belonged to one of two schools concerning the way the military profession should be structured to operate. The first school gained prominence as a result of Samuel P. Huntington's influential text, *The Soldier and the State* (1957). The Huntington model proposed a politically neutral profession, isolated from society and concerned with the achievement of military victory without regard to non-military considerations. The model saw the military as a state-within-a-state: a profession mainly pursued separately from major societal influence, apolitical in nature, but totally obedient to the elected government of the day. In the Huntington model professional expertise is best achieved because high standards can be set and attained free from external (non-military) interference.

The second school developed largely from Morris
Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier. A Social and Political Portrait* (1960). This school saw the role of the military in society quite differently. The Janowitz model proposed a politically sensitive profession integrated with society and concerned with the threat or use of force in the interests of society. This model saw the military more as a constabulary force for which the more traditional values of war fighting were supplaned in importance by the need for the military to threaten or use force to achieve limited political objectives. In a sense the Janowitz model recognised that in the nuclear age wars of attrition, or military operations designed to secure territorial objectives, had less relevance. What was required was a military profession in tune with the interests of its own society, capable when necessary of exerting military muscle in specific situations, most often for limited political purposes than for absolute military victory. Thus, in this model the military assumed the mantle of a constabulary force, in the same way that police forces partially deter crime and partially control it by limiting the prospects for its escalation. In the Janowitz model (as with Huntington's) the military was controlled by, and remained loyal to, the elected government; but as part of society it could contribute much more to the decision-making process and was less passive than the Huntington counterpart.

In Australia the role of the military in society has traditionally reflected Huntington's model although incremental change towards the Janowitz model has occurred in
recent years. (35) Separated professionally from society and remaining loyal to the government, the Australian military has had little incentive to foster expertise in complex matters of strategy. The military of course has given advice to government when requested, but overall the profession has remained passive in the formulation of strategy and has addressed most of its attention to the implementation of decisions in a reactive manner. The profession has concentrated its efforts in developing expertise in the techniques of warfare rather than in helping determine the most appropriate national and military strategy to be adopted. The feeling within the military traditionally has been that they should be told what to do, and then be allowed to get on and do it; and it is in this latter area that professional expertise has been concentrated.

The final reason which helps explain the profession's lack of attention to strategic thinking concerns the emphasis given it in formal military education. It is this question which the remainder of this chapter addresses.

Military Education and Strategic Thinking

Strategy is by nature a dynamic subject for study: on the one hand it suggests certain time-tested maxims fundamental to most military actions, (36) but on the other it must cope with technological innovations and social predilections that are in a state of constant change or flux. Chapter 1 indicated that strategic thinking covers a vast
domain which requires military action to be seen in the shadow of national strategy and not in isolation. Military capabilities are required to satisfy political ends, not to be used for their own sake or without due regard to the consequences of their use, or non use. Chapter 2 explained further that even the understanding of one area of strategic thinking - namely military strategy - is difficult because it defies simple categorisation. Together these chapters suggest that strategic thinking is a continual process that remains relevant to military professionals throughout their career. It would be unreasonable, therefore, to expect to find in the military curricula a single course that could imbue the profession with an appreciation of strategy. Rather, we must look at the officers' career in a more general way.

What education in strategic matters is conducted formally by the Australian military profession? (37) One way of examining this question is to look at the various stages of the officers' career and determine the nature of the formal education they receive in the field of strategy. Table 1 summarises this by dividing the officer's career into three stages - 'early', 'middle' and 'late' - and lists against each stage the typical officer rank and the formal education available which involves strategy. (38) A synopsis of the strategy component of the courses formally conducted is contained in Appendix 3.

In general it can be said that the study of strategy currently does not play an important part in officer
development, although there are signs that strategy is becoming increasingly important. Under the current system of single service training, officers receive little or no instruction in strategy until reaching the middle stage of their career, and then only if they are selected to attend

Table 1: Formal ADF Education in Strategic Matters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAREER STAGE</th>
<th>APPROX RANK (Army equivalent)</th>
<th>FORMAL EDUCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early</td>
<td>Cadet to Captain</td>
<td>* Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* Single Service Academies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Major to Lieutenant-Colonel</td>
<td>* Single Service Staff Colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* Joint Service Staff College (JSSC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late</td>
<td>Colonel and above</td>
<td>Overseas War Colleges and National Defence Colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* Strategic and Operational Study Period (SOSP)-(39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Army only.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* synopsis shown in Appendix 3.

their service staff college and/or JSSC.(40) By the time officers reach the late stage of their career they are expected to have developed a sound grasp of Australia's strategic circumstances, yet the opportunities available after JSSC are few,(41) and with the exception of Army's
SOSP, are conducted overseas and do not address themselves specifically to the Australian environment. Moreover, military education in strategy currently is not well coordinated either within or between the services. For example, within Army it is possible for some cadets doing Arts in the Faculty of Military Studies, Duntroon, to concentrate on subjects of strategic significance (through the History and/or Government Departments) and then to further these studies at the Army Command and Staff College (C&SC), JSSC and (in some circumstances) by post graduate work; whereas the majority of Army officers are unlikely to be exposed formally to these subjects until at least C&SC, and then only briefly. Perhaps of greater concern, however, is the fact that little effort is currently made to coordinate instruction in strategic studies between the services until JSSC, by which time officers are likely already to have served in the defence bureaucracy or in a tri-service environment where an understanding of strategy would have proved beneficial.

However, just as strategic thinking is itself subject to change, so too are the institutions in which officers are educated. It needs to be stressed that there are positive signs that the importance of strategy is being recognised and that measures are being taken to enhance the profession's understanding of strategy. These changes are evident at each of the three career stages. Overall there is a trend to commence officer education in strategy much sooner, to continue it throughout the officers' career, and for each
service to become more familiar with the others' concerns about strategy.

Probably the most significant change is intended to occur with the commencement of ADFA in 1986. ADFA will be the source of about 40 percent of the officer establishment of the Defence Force. In the History and Politics Departments at ADFA those topics related to strategy presently offered to Arts students in the Faculty of Military Studies, Duntroon, will be made available, with the possibility that these courses might be expanded in the future (refer Appendix 3.1). However, because these subjects will not be available for (or chosen by) the majority of students, a course in Defence Studies is planned and is to be completed by all cadets during the first three years as part of the Common Military Training Curriculum (refer Appendix 3.2). The intended introduction of Defence Studies at ADFA, and the high number of periods allocated to it (at 162 the next highest after Officer Development on 165), represents an imaginative attempt by the military to begin the education of officers in strategic thinking as early as possible. Although some may question the suitability of some of the topics presently listed in the planned Defence Studies syllabus, it seems clear that the military profession has recognised the need for officers to become familiar with strategy sooner rather than later in their career. This in itself is a significant departure from current practice.
There are signs also that the ADFA approach to military strategy is having repercussions on the single service academies. To date these institutions have given scant attention to promoting strategic thinking (refer Appendix 3.3), but it is noteworthy that Army, forced to revise its officer course because of the establishment of ADFA, has made tentative provision for a compulsory course in Strategic Studies (refer Appendix 3.4). Because of the importance of strategy, and in order to maintain commonality in training and equality of opportunity for non-ADFA officers, it is possible that RAN and RAAF may decide also to steer a similar course to Army on this matter.

In recent years more emphasis than hitherto in strategic thinking has occurred also in the middle career stage for officers. Each of the single service staff colleges has come to devote part of its studies to strategy (refer Appendices 3.5, 3.6, 3.7), and the creation of JSSC largely reflected the perceived need of the services for selected officers to be educated in matters such as military strategy, international politics, national infrastructure, and the formulation of defence policy (refer Appendix 3.8). Indeed, the education of the Australian military profession in strategic matters should be seen as an evolving process, and criticism of the present situation should acknowledge this. The JSSC (initially named the Joint Service Wing) was not established until 1969 and the RAN Staff College did not run its first course until 1979. The Army can claim a longer historical lineage, its first course being conducted in 1946
as the successor to the Command and Staff School founded in Sydney in 1938. However, this course was for many years an operational staff course designed to prepare Majors for operational staff appointments, and was changed to include more strategy following the recommendations of the RODC Report in 1978. The RAAF Staff College was formed in 1949, but as with Army, has broadened its scope to concentrate on strategic studies only in recent years.

Recent developments have occurred also in the late career stage for officers in relation to strategic thinking. In June 1983 Army conducted its first SOSP. In 1984 the aim of SOSP was

... to exercise and update the knowledge of senior officers in the areas of strategy, high level of operations and administration as applied to the defence of Australia.

However, an additional aim, as explained by the CGS in his Keynote Address in 1983, was to encourage the future self-development of, and study in, strategic matters of those senior officers attending. About 20 officers of colonel rank and above currently attend the SOSP which lasts for about 3-4 days. However, officers attending are expected to have completed prescribed reading beforehand, thus enabling them to contribute purposefully during the discussions. The SOSP is not intended to be a fixed syllabus, and may change its emphasis from year to year, depending on current and forseen strategic problems, and on the interests of the CGS who currently is the Exercise Director. For example, the 1984 SOSP concentrated on strategy, lower level conflict, high level conflict, and the operational level of war (refer
Appendix 3.9). The SOSP should be seen as an ambitious attempt by Army to assist in the continued education of its senior officers in matters of strategic importance. Its introduction, however, reflects also the concern held by Army that many of its senior officers presently are inadequately prepared in matters relating to defence policy, strategy, high command, and materiel acquisition.

However, of more potential significance for future senior officers of all services are the findings of the Senior Officer Development Review 1984, conducted by Major General D.M. Butler AO DSO (RL). The aim of the Review was to 'identify any significant deficiencies in the preparation of officers for senior appointments in the Defence Forces'.(54) The Review looked at Colonel equivalent and above. It concluded that within the ADF 'there is a perception of a lack of tradition in strategic thinking',(55) and recommended both that a 'National Defence College (NDC) should be established ...to conduct a twelve month full time course to prepare officers for high command',(56) and that 'all other officers of the rank of Colonel equivalent and above should undergo a twelve month part time programme...'.(57) Butler's report is still under consideration, but its findings provide prima facie evidence that current senior officers have an inadequate understanding of national and military strategy and that remedial action is required.

All these changes (actual and potential) in relation to
the development of strategic thinking indicate that the profession is aware of its own shortcomings in this field and that it is moving steadily, if slowly, to redress these problems. However, despite the positive evidence of (and for) change, it would seem that the education of the military profession in strategic matters still has far to go. It is disturbing, for example, to read Butler’s comments in relation to the study of strategy at the academies, staff colleges and JSSC. Butler noted that:

Training is conducted in strategy but... it is just another subject providing simple theory without real purpose or, in the time available, application. There is no depth. (58)

Indeed, a common theme throughout Butler’s report is that the Australian military profession has an inadequate understanding of strategy, and that greater effort needs to be made in the area if the profession is to contribute with more purpose to national security.

Conclusion

This chapter has helped explain the reasons why the development in strategic thinking in the Australian military profession has occurred slowly. Historical influences, the military’s lack of experience and tradition in strategic matters, and the military’s isolated place in Australian society, are all legitimate reasons. However, inadequate military education also has contributed to this situation and it is through education that the profession’s understanding of strategy can be, and is being, enhanced. Shelburne and
Groves (1969) noted correctly that

Contrary to popular opinion, the officer, in the beginning stages of his career, knows relatively little about the art and science of warfare, and it will be years before he can be accurately described as being truly professional in the sense that he can deal effectively with complex problems of strategy and tactics, or command and staff. (59)

There are positive signs that significant development in strategic thinking is now occurring within the Australian military profession. The swing towards the Janowitz constabulary model and the increased attention given to strategy in military institutions are proof of this. Indeed, much has occurred since Henry Lloyd made his observations in 1766. However, it would seem that General Butler's findings are evidence to the fact that more needs to be done in the future, and it is with this problem that the next chapter wrestles.

ENDNOTES


2. The term 'military education' is used throughout this sub-thesis in the broadest sense to include 'education', 'training' and 'development'. While each of these terms have specific meanings they are also related and in the general sense can be grouped under the rubric of 'education'.

3. The sub-thesis is concerned with the majority of the officer population who are commissioned after one to four years training. A lesser number of officers undergo shorter induction courses either because they have been promoted 'through the ranks' or because they have been enlisted directly to fulfil certain positions (eg. doctors, dentists, psychologists etc.).

4. The term 'manager of violence' gained prominence with H.D. Lasswell's, The Analysis of Political Behaviour (1947), p. 152. The term is often used to describe succinctly the role of the military professional in society. General Sir John Hackett, in The Profession of Arms (Sidgwick and Jackson,
London, 1983) has described this role as 'the ordered application of force in the resolution of a social problem.' (p.9). Amos Jordan has provided a more complete description: 'the management and application of military resources in deterrent, peacekeeping, advisory and combat roles in the context of rapid technological, social, and political change' - Jordan, 'Officer Education', in Roger W. Little (ed), Handbook of Military Institutions (Sage, Beverly Hills, 1971), p.212.

5. Howard (Chapter 2, note 34), p.23. For a penetrating discussion about the limited usefulness of the 'principles of war' refer Brodie (Chapter 2, note 65), pp. 21-27.

6. During the inter-war years the ALP, when in opposition, advocated a policy of home defence rather than empire defence. However not until about June 1941 did the Australian Government give serious attention to home defence, and the Chiefs of Staff were not instructed to prepare an appreciation on defence capabilities and the possible forms that an attack on Australia might take until 8 December 1941. See D.M. Horner High Command. Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945 (Australian War Memorial and George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, Canberra, London, Boston, 1982), pp. 23, 141-2.

7. The likelihood of the Empire establishing military superiority in the Far East in the event of war depended largely on the continuance of peace in other theatres, particularly in Europe the Middle East and North Africa. Moreover, the Washington Naval Treaties of 1921-22, although ensuring British and American overall naval superiority, actually had provided Japan with regional naval superiority in the Far East. As well, the construction and manning of the Singapore base was continually delayed at successive Imperial Defence Conferences throughout the 1920s and 1930s. For a good analysis of these problems see John McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence 1918-39. A Study in Air and Sea Power (University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1976).

8. In relation to Army demobilisation see J.E. Murphy, History of the Post War Army 1945-1953 (1955, unpublished, copy held Defence Regional Library, N.S.W. This history was written at the direction of the Military Board - agenda number 34/1953.) Murphy states that, 'In the sixteen months between the 1st October 1945 commencement of General demobilization and its completion of 15th February 1947 a total of 349,964 members of the Army were discharged - an average of one every two minutes over the whole period.' (p.17). In relation to the RAN see George Odgers, The Royal Australian Navy. An Illustrated History (Child and Henry, Hornsby, 1982). Odgers explains that demobilisation occurred more slowly in the RAN than the other services, RAN being reduced from 35,592 in 1945
to 10,188 in June 1949 (p.157).

9. The main factors contributing to this uncertainty included: the future role Britain would play in the Far East; the outcome of various independence and/or communist movements within European colonies throughout the world, but particularly in south and south-east Asia; the future relationship between Australia, the US and Japan; and the uncertain effects of atomic weapons and missiles on the utility of conventional military forces.

10. Murphy (Chapter 3, note 8), p.28. The Cabinet approved the following on 3 June 1947:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PMF</th>
<th>4,470</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>one independent brigade group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(comprising three infantry battalions, one armoured unit, plus support units)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fixed establishments (administrative and training purposes)</td>
<td>13,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres for CMF</td>
<td>1,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CMF</th>
<th>48,850</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>field force of two infantry divisions, one armoured brigade group, plus selected Corps units</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fixed defences</td>
<td>1,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. ibid.

12. ibid.

13. For example, from the outbreak of World War 2 each of the services continued to function under separate ministerial and departmental control until reorganisation into the Department of Defence 1973-76. For a succinct history of the Department of Defence refer Brown (Chapter 2, note 44), pp. 2-11.

14. For example, Australia's military involvement in Asia since World War 2, whilst often substantial, has been as part of larger allied forces. In Japan, Korea and Malaya/Malaysia, Australia participated as part of British Commonwealth Forces; its participation in SEATO was contingent upon an allied military response to which Australia would, numerically, be a minor partner; and in South Vietnam Australian forces (though operating largely independently for much of the time in Phuc Tuy Province) were under operational control of senior US commanders and remained dependent upon the US for logistic support, air support, and strategic intelligence.

15. The RAAF was not formed until 1921 and its size and aircraft acquisitions were retarded partly because of
RAN and Army objections. When World War 2 started, the development of the RAAF was restricted also by the emphasis given to the Empire Air Training Scheme. For a thorough discussion of these matters see McCarthy (Chapter 3, note 7.)

16. The point was not so much that air power was the most important strategy for modern warfare (as the Italian, Douhet, had been advocating between the wars), but that World War 2 had demonstrated conclusively that air power could play an important, if not always decisive, role.

17. The term 'long range' is used in the layman's sense to denote long distance, and not in the more technical sense of aircraft capabilities, where short, medium and long range represents specific distances. For example, Australia's longest range transport aircraft, the Hercules C130, is in military terms a medium range aircraft.

18. Approval for organic air support for the RAN was given on 3 July 1947 by the Prime Minister, and approved later by Cabinet: refer Odgers (Chapter 3, note 8), p.158. In relation to Army, an Aviation Corps was not established until 1 July 1968: refer Australian Army Aviation Corps Presentation, 'Early History' (December 1984). It should be noted, however, that RAN and Army aviation had their origins before the establishment of RAAF in 1921, and that RAAF developed from the Army Flying Corps which had been established formally in 1914. The Army used aircraft for observation posts and for artillery spotting before and during World War 1, and the RAN used float and wheeled bi-planes for the first time during that war. However, once formed, the RAAF assumed responsibility for most flying tasks within the three services. The need for a Fleet Air Arm was justified by RAN from the lessons learnt about maritime air power in World War 2, particularly the battles of Taranto, Coral Sea and Midway. Army justified its claim for organic air assets principally on the need for guaranteed battlefield reconnaissance which, because of other priorities, the RAAF was finding increasingly difficult to provide.

19. Although relations between PRC and USSR were far closer in the late 1940's than they are today, there were already important historical, geopolitical and ideological differences between the two countries. See, for example, Geoffrey Jukes, The Soviet Union in Asia (Angus & Robertson, Sydney. 1973), pp.4-29, 214-217. For an examination of the differences between and the development of Soviet and Chinese military strategy, see Semmell (Chapter 1, note 3), pp. 24 et seq.

20. After the war Australia's three services continued to be trained and organised along traditional British lines and continued to look toward Britain for most of
their operational doctrine and administrative procedures. Australia participated as part of a Commonwealth Force in Japan and Korea, and assisted Britain in Malaya/Malaysia and Borneo. Australia joined SEATO, as did Britain, and together with Britain (and New Zealand) continues to provide air defence assistance to Singapore and Malaysia under the Five Powers Defence Arrangements.

21. The withdrawal of British forces from the Far East occurred gradually after World War 2 and was delayed principally by the Malayan Emergency. According to T.B. Millar '...the timetable for Britain's final withdrawal from her bases in Malaysia and Singapore was announced in July 1967.' See T.B. Millar (ed), Britain's Withdrawal From Asia. Its Implications for Australia, seminar proceedings, SDSC, ANU, 29-30 September, 1967 (ANU, Canberra, 1967), p.3. The withdrawal of most British forces from the area was completed in 1971.


23. Australia's combat role in Vietnam came to an end in December 1971, and by March 1972 the Australian Task force and its supporting units had been withdrawn. An Australian Army Assistance Group Vietnam, of some 140, remained in Vietnam and were withdrawn in 1973. Associated with these developments was the gradual realisation by Australia that the 'domino theory' of Communist expansion had little credibility. Communist movements throughout south-east Asia (and the world) came to be seen more as nationalistic movements, each separate in themselves and often at odds with Moscow and/or Peking, from where previously it had been assumed they had been largely orchestrated.

24. Continental defence has not been defined officially, but in general it is accepted to mean the security of Australia's sovereign territory, including its offshore islands and territories, its exclusive economic zone, and the immediate sea and air approaches to these. Continental defence is the antithesis of forward defence, the latter which sought to protect Australia's territory by deterring or combating perceived hostile forces as far 'forward' in south-east Asia as possible. Vestiges of the forward defence strategy remain under the Five Powers Defence Arrangements, the Manila Pact, and conceivably in some circumstances under the ANZUS Security Treaty. Refer also chapter 2, note 28.

25. Although a case can be made that alliance strategy and self-reliance are opposite in meaning, it is true also that greater self-reliance may enhance the military potential of an alliance. This latter case is presented in Major M.G. Smith et al, The ANZUS
Alliance. A Military Perspective (A Research Project of the Australian Army Command and Staff College, Fort Queenscliff, September 1983), particularly chapters 2 and 6.

26. This country is Indonesia. Refer Brian Toohey, 'Where is ANZUS When We Really Need It? The Strat Basis Papers', The National Times (March 30 - April 5, 1984), p.4.

27. Australia, for example, has not experienced the racial problems of South Africa or Malaysia; or the religious problems of Ireland or the Middle East; or the social problems of the Indian sub-continent, or Latin America, or Africa; or the ideological problems of China, or Vietnam, or Indonesia.

28. The suggestion is not that the Tet offensive caused Australia's change from forward to continental defence. Rather the Tet offensive provided a milestone in helping change the attitudes of the Australian (and US) Government as to the viability of achieving a military solution in South Vietnam. As withdrawal became more likely, so, too, more consideration was given as to what Australia's national and military strategies would be.


30. Ibid. Horner does not state this, but it is possible to draw this conclusion from the facts he presents.

31. Huntington (Chapter 1, note 22).


33. These include the 'fighting ethic' of the military profession, and the 'heroic commander motif', both essential for victory on the battlefield.

34. For a discussion on the diminished value of territorial conquest see Klaus Knorr On The Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1966), pp. 21 et seq. In the same vein Professor J.A.C. Mackie more recently commented that: 'International politics is about the application of pressure in a multitude of ways, not about seizing lands or invading other countries ... Rarely does the ultimate sanction of applying overt military force come into play'. 'Australia Without ANZUS; White Trash?', Sydney Morning Herald, 5 February 1985, p.9.

35. Examples of this incremental change include: the increased interest being given by the military as to its role in society; the increasing literature by
Australian military officers on the role of military managers in a bureaucratic (non-military) environment; the increased integration of service families within the community in respect to housing; and the increased involvement by service personnel in civil education courses, in civilian institutions, and in non-service recreational and sporting activities. For more details on these issues see: Air Commandore R.G. Funnell, 'The Professional Military Officer in Australia', Defence Force Journal, (No. 23, July-August 1980); Australian Army Regular Officer Development Committee (RODC) Report (May 1978); M.G. Smith, 'Institutional Inertia and the Army Officer Corps', Submission to the RODC (August, 1977); and Paul Mench (ed), Armed Forces in Australian Society. The Next Decade (USI of the ACT, June 1974).

36. The 'principles of war', for example, come into this category.

37. Of course, what officers read and learn about military strategy from private research is also significant, but there is no way of judging this. As well, some officers undertake tertiary studies in subjects related to strategy, but this education is not offered formally by the profession, effects only a small group of officers, and is difficult to assess in a study of this type.

38. Naturally not all officers will end their careers in the rank of Colonel (equivalent) or above and thus the late career stage for some officers will equate to the early or middle stages for others. However, assuming that an officer remains in the service and is promoted with his peer group the table is sufficiently accurate. It should be noted, however, that this analysis applies only to Regular (and not Reserve) officers.

39. In 1983 the title of SOSP was Senior Officer Study Period. This was changed to its current title for the 1984 meeting.

40. Selection for staff college and JSSC is competitive. For example, in the Army only 42 percent (plus or minus five percent) from each cohort of eligible Majors are selected for C&SC (information provided by Army Office, Personnel Branch, 7 February 1985). And for JSSC the Army fills 20 Lieutenant-Colonel vacancies twice each year (plus about three Lieutenant-Colonels every two years to the US equivalent, the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk) from a current (1985) Lieutenant-Colonel population of 482. (Information provided by Army Office, Office of Military Secretary, 7 February 1985).

41. In the case of Army, for example, a maximum of four senior officers (Colonel or above) currently can attend overseas NDCs (or equivalent) in any one year. However, normally this number is less because these
postings are rotated between the Services. The current (1985) population of senior Army Officers is 182 (including 120 Colonels). (Information provided by Army Office, Office of Military Secretary, 7 February 1985).

42. This is not meant to suggest that overseas courses for senior officers are not useful in enhancing the officer's knowledge of strategy. But it is a fact that these courses are not designed to address Australia's strategic circumstances (other than by elective research).

43. In recent years the single service staff colleges have combined to conduct a short joint operations exercise. Although this exercise is beneficial it is concerned mainly with strategic deployment and tactics and is hampered because each service has little understanding of the other's basic strategy: for example, most Army Officers have an inadequate understanding of air and sea power (and the same situation applies to the other services).

44. Funnell (Chapter 3, note 35), p. 27. The author shows that over one fifth of the effective officer population works in the Department of Defence at any one time. For officers of Major rank (equivalent) and above the figure is much higher, in the case of RAAF, over 50 per cent.

45. Elsewhere this author has argued that institutional change in the military occurs slowly. Refer Smith (Chapter 3, note 35).


47. For example, it is intended that a Master of Arts in Defence/Australian Studies be offered in the near future, perhaps as early as 1986. (Discussion with W.H. Smith, Head of Government Department, Faculty of Military Studies, Duntroon, 8 February 1985).

48. It is estimated that by 1989 the ADFA undergraduate student population will be 1259 (RAN 329, Army 424, RAAF 465, Overseas 41), of which 422 Australian cadets will be Arts students (RAN 83, Army 208, RAAF 131). Not all of these Arts students will elect to major in History or Politics. Source: ACDFS Minute 666/84, 2 April 1984, 'ADFA Student Population Working Party Report'.


50. RODC Report (Chapter 3, note 35), pp.4.21-4.22, para 453; and RODC Study Two, Education and Training, Chapter 9, p.9-12,para 929.
51. The RAAF Staff College was the successor to the RAAF War Staff Course which was a short course commenced during World War 2, on 28 September 1943. During postwar demobilisation the course was suspended and RAAF Staff College opened on 15 February 1949. Refer: RAAF Staff College Advanced Staff Course Handbook 1985, (7 January 1985), chapter I, para 104.


53. CGS Keynote Address, SOSP, June 1983, p.3.


55. ibid, p. viii, para 1.

56. ibid, p. viii, para 3.

57. ibid, p. viii, para 4.

58. ibid, chapter 3, p. 16, para 5.

we have not as yet... provided them the means of acquiring a theoretical and practical knowledge of the higher duties of their profession. (1)

Emory Upton, 1878

When Emory Upton made these comments about the American military profession more than a century ago he was not advocating that military officers should become strategic thinkers in the broadest sense suggested in this sub-thesis. Upton was concerned principally with the preparation of army officers for competent service on the battlefield. His desire that officers should be able to 'study strategy, grand tactics, and all the sciences connected with modern war' (2) has been realised by the institutional nature of military training that has since evolved - no less in Australia than America or many other countries.

Nevertheless, Upton's comment has equal relevance today if one considers the requirements of the senior military officer. Donald Bletz explained this well when he offered his profile of 'The Modern Major General' (1980). Bletz concluded:

I am asking a great deal of my modern major general. I expect him to understand the society which he serves, to be knowledgeable of the world in which he lives and to have a firm grip on the very complex concept of the utility, or disutility, of military
force within the context of the assumed domestic and international environment. At the same time, I expect him to be a true expert in the conduct of military operations so that he has credibility in the deterrent role and the ability to "win" - to achieve the political objective - if force is eventually brought to bear.'(3)

In essence this is what strategic thinking for the modern military profession is all about - a far wider vision than the one Upton had in mind.

Robert O'Neill has suggested that five characteristics are required for the modern strategic thinker: intelligence, experience, intuition, knowledge of your own and the enemy's available resources, and a high level of morale.(4) In addition O'Neill contends that these characteristics need to be developed over time, requiring from the strategic thinker constant involvement in reading, thinking, writing and discussion.(5) O'Neill provides helpful advice for budding individual strategists, but it is unlikely that the profession's image and capability in strategic matters will be enhanced by following this advice alone. Like Upton, the profession also needs to examine the institutional imperatives that largely will determine the degree of competence and influence exercised by the military in strategic matters in the future. Three of these imperatives are:

. a more active role by the military in strategic thinking,
. improved inter-service relations to enhance strategic
thinking, and better military education to improve strategic thinking.

These imperatives are the underlying themes of this sub­thesis, and they are examined further in this final chapter.

The Role of the Military

In Australian society the military is subordinate to the democratically elected government. This is the proper place of the military in a democracy: a place that the Australian military profession has filled well in the past and will undoubtedly do so for the foreseeable future. However, it would seem that the ability of the military to think strategically has been constrained because the profession has interpreted its subordinate role in two rather negative ways. First, in respect to its position in society, the military has tended to adopt a Huntington model (refer chapter 3), generally keeping the profession somewhat separate from society by fostering standards and customs in a quasi-autonomous manner. Second, in exposing the virtues of civilian control in the use of force, the military has allowed itself to become subordinated not so much to ministerial control as to the control of civilian bureaucrats in the Department of Defence.

Both of these conditions are related, and both need to be redressed by the military if the profession is to play a
more positive role in the formulation of strategy as well as in its execution. In relation to the role of the military in society it would seem that the Australian profession should move more rapidly to embrace Janowitz's constabulary model (refer chapter 3). This would not alter the military's subordination to government. However, by integrating the military more with society, and thus making it more aware of and accountable to society's concerns, the profession would be required to assume more responsibility for its actions (and non-actions). As an integral part of Australian society the Australian military profession would have the responsibility not only to enforce (when necessary) the will of government, but equally to proffer advice to government with clarity and thoughtfulness. This would mean that the profession would be required to think more strategically than hitherto: to be aware of the likely consequences of using or threatening military force, and not concerned solely with the mechanics of using force should the government so decide. It is noteworthy that in relation to the Vietnam War the public record can be searched without memorable trace of concern by the Australian military as to the strategic sensibility of becoming involved in that tragic episode. In the Huntington model such action might be acclaimed in terms of loyalty, or patriotism, or impartiality. But in today's society this interpretation somehow seems anachronistic, and in the Janowitz model might be interpreted more correctly as ignorance or (worse still) irresponsibility on the part of the military. (6)
As concerns the role of the military profession vis-a-vis the civilian bureaucrat in the determination of strategy, much has been said already.\(^7\) It needs to be stressed, however, that the field of strategy is now so broad, and the requirements for national strategy so complex, that there is a role for each to play (just as there is for the interested academic and citizen). However, it would seem that the military profession neither has been given nor has been keen to accept much responsibility in this matter. Particularly in the field of military strategy the influence and authority of the civilian bureaucrat over the military is apparent. The debate as to whether this has occurred by civilian design or military default is largely irrelevant. The fact that this situation exists is evidence enough to show that the military profession has been found lacking, or at least unconvincing, in matters of strategic thinking. Particularly at the level of coordinating strategy (refer chapter 2) the military will need to 'lift its game' if it wishes to carry more weight in helping determine a viable and coherent strategy for Australia. To this end the words of Funnell are prophetic:

The military profession in Australia must make a quite fundamental adjustment. A combat orientation is primary and predominant but it is not an end in itself and it must not be allowed to dominate practices and procedures as it has to date. The profession must accommodate to political and organisational realities. If professional military advice is to receive due weight in defence decision-making at the highest levels military professionals must be developed who possess the political managerial and bureaucratic skills
needed to operate effectively in the organisational environment of the 1980s. (8)

If the Australian military profession wishes to enhance its strategic thinking and have a greater impact in the determination of strategy then it needs to give more attention to its advisory and representative responsibilities, as well as maintaining its executive responsibility in which it has established a proud record (refer chapter 1).

Inter-Service Relations

The shallowness of strategic thinking within the military profession becomes clear when inter-service relations are examined. Ignorance of and rivalry between the services are unfortunate features of the ADF, but they are features also which indicate a lack of strategic thinking within the profession. In an age of joint operations nothing could be clearer than the need for the services to provide a united front in finally determining defence priorities and strategic concepts to enhance Australia's national security. However, the findings of the Utz Committee suggests that inter-service rivalry is a far greater problem than even the question of civilian-military relations within the Department. (9) Indeed, there is a strong case for arguing that civilian authority is so pronounced only because of inter-service rivalry. There is constant competition between the services for the allocation of scarce resources. Given the historic and separate development of the three services (or four, if one includes the Public Service) this situation
perhaps is understandable, but it is hardly appropriate for the development of national and military strategy.

It is probable that inter-service rivalry will continue and strategic thinking in the profession remain stifled as long as the services remain ignorant of and isolated from each other, and as long as they perceive the need to compete with each other for the allocation of scarce resources. That ignorance and isolation exist there can be little doubt. Incidents such as the failure of Navy Office to use the weight of an armed soldier to determine accurate weight requirements for the construction of the Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel (LCVP) for HMAS Tobruk,\(^{(10)}\) and more recently the RAN's failure to consult with the other services for the acquisition of low level air defence weapons for the Freman-tle-class patrol boats,\(^{(11)}\) tend to confirm this view.

Another example of isolationism within the services was demonstrated by Army in its writing of the Army Development Guide (ADG). Preparation of the ADG began in earnest in 1981 and as the name implies its purpose was to establish how the Army should be structured and employed in the future. The ADG was an ambitious task undertaken because senior Army officers felt there was insufficient guidance (both from within Army and from existing higher level documents on strategic assessment and force structure development \(^{(12)}\)) concerning the way in which the Army should be structured and equipped. The force structure derived in the ADG rested heavily on Army's perception of the strategic environment in which
Australian land forces are likely to operate. However, this assessment was derived by Army without consultation with the other services, SIP, FDA or JIO. The ADG was very much an 'in house' document whose authors worked under instructions not to discuss its contents with the other services or with civilian bureaucrats within the Department.

This should not be interpreted as a case for the unification of the services along (say) Canadian lines. As explained in chapter 2 the complexity of war suggests that three distinct services are required. However, there is a case for improved coordination between the services and for an end to the attitude that each service's gain is another's loss. Each service should see itself as one part of the ADF and the force structure and capability of each should be justified always in terms of the overall strategic posture of the ADF.

In recent years steps have been taken to reduce inter-service rivalry and improve strategic thinking within the ADF. These steps have included: the establishment of the position of CDF and progressively the increased importance given him and his staff; the establishment of JSSC, AJWE and ADFA; and the enhanced attention given to joint operations by each of the services. Overall, however, progress in strategic thinking has been slow, with each service giving higher priority to the preservation of its own image and identity than to the development and requirements of the ADF as a whole. As a consequence strategic thinking has
become subordinated to vested interests, perhaps no more clearly exposed than in some of 'the byzantine machinations surrounding the justifications advanced for acquisition of an aircraft carrier'.

If strategic thinking within the services is to be enhanced in the future then it would seem that inter-service relations need to be improved. As with the question concerning the role of the military in strategic thinking, inter-service relations also seem destined to improve only given proper education within the military profession. It is to this vital area that most attention needs to be given by the profession for its future development in strategic thinking.

**Military Education and Strategic Thinking**

In chapter 3 it was explained that efforts are being made by the military profession to further the study of strategic matters, but that overall progress has been slow and not particularly well coordinated between the services. What, then, is the way for the military to proceed if it is to enhance strategic thinking in the profession? Dunn and Staudenmaier have commented that 'choices require knowledge and knowledge should improve strategy', but when and how should the military set about acquiring this knowledge?

This question instantly raises another - how many strategic thinkers does the profession want or need? It is sometimes argued with conviction that although there may be a
requirement for senior officers to be strategic thinkers, most officers will in fact not rise to the senior ranks. Thus, it is argued, the military predominantly needs men and women of Sparta and only few of Athens. In this light strategy is often seen as a 'could know' subject, far less important in the day to day business of military service than matters of tactics, man management and technical knowhow. Commanding officers need to know how to command troops and their junior officers need to know how to sail ships, fight on the battlefield and fly aeroplanes. In essence the heads of young officers do not need to be filled with grand theories of strategy that have little relevance to their actual employment.

This is a seductive argument but it seems to miss the crucial point that strategists, like generals, are made and not born. Because strategy remains (at least partly) the art of the general, it is important that the study of strategy should start sooner rather than later in the officer's career. It is a fact that as essential as Spartans are to every nation and its defence forces, many of the Spartan skills are procedural in nature and are learnt effectively only by practice. This is what in common parlance is referred to as on-the-job training, and there seems to be no suitable alternative to it.

The approach to be taken at ADFA and RMC of A (refer chapter 3) towards developing strategic thinking in cadets is Athenian in nature and is an attempt by the military profes-
sion to develop an appreciation of strategy at a formative stage in an officer's career. This approach is laudable but it carries with it the danger, so frequently reinforced in many military courses, that complex matters either can be simplified into a short list of fundamental principles, or covered adequately by an endless sequence of disparate lectures. Such an approach will do little to develop strategic thinking in the profession and could well have the opposite effect. Somehow a course needs to be developed and presented that provides cadets with some basic knowledge, but which also encourages and requires them individually to assess the relevance and importance of strategy now and for the future.

There is a tendency in the military to design and provide courses in order to help prepare officers for subsequent promotion or job. There is much sense in this approach, but it is probable that strategy cannot be understood or covered adequately in this way. In his review of senior officer development Butler concluded that there exists a lack of strategic thinking in the Australian military profession and that partly because of this many senior officers are ill prepared for high office.\(^{(16)}\) Butler recommended that an NDC be established in Australia to help redress this problem.\(^{(17)}\) Certainly there is merit in Butler's proposal, but equally it might be argued that other alternatives exist at this time that also need to be explored. One wonders if attendance at an NDC may occur too late in an officer's career to have him/her think strategically: or whether instruction and problem consideration on strategic matters at an NDC would be any
less shallow than that which Butler observed occurring at the single service Staff Colleges and JSSC.\textsuperscript{(18)} The value of an NDC in enhancing strategic thinking in the military profession is tempered by Brodie's assessment that although it visibly raises the horizons of the officers who pass through it; ... the training is too brief, too casual, comes too late in life, and keeps the military consorting with each other.\textsuperscript{(19)}

There are other avenues open to the military to promote strategic thinking which require examination as well as the NDC proposal. These include such things as defence fellowships, sabbatical or study leave, civil schooling, and research secondments to industry, foreign defence forces and defence-related establishments. Furthermore, it may be more important for officers to undertake such training in the middle stage of their careers (refer chapter 3) instead of in the late stage which the NDC option requires.

Yet another alternative which would require serious consideration is the establishment of a School of Strategy which could help coordinate inter-service requirements and promote strategic thinking within the profession. Several options exist each of which would need to be examined carefully: for example the School could be an offshoot of JSSC, or AJWE or the NDC (if the latter was established). However, perhaps a more practical option would be to establish a Chair of Strategy (or Strategic Studies or similar) at ADFA by combining those courses already offered in the Politics and History Departments, and expanding them to...
include such topics as military technology, military economics, defence infrastructure, military geography and military sociology. In Chapter 1 it was shown that strategy is a practical subject that demands, eventually, a course of action to be chosen. However, strategy is also a complex subject that is best learnt and pondered in an academic environment, free from routine military constraints and given time for analysis and reflection. These are attributes not easily reproduced in the more rigid structure of formal military courses.

A Chair of Strategy at ADFA could help promote strategic thinking within the military in several ways. First, because of its academic status ADFA would help legitimise study in such matters, and quite likely the products of its research may attract significant credibility. Second, being non-partisan to any particular service and by including civilian scholars and students, a Chair of Strategy would be able to look at strategic matters in a more practical and impartial manner than is likely within a closed service environment (such as JSSC, etc.). Third, by offering undergraduate and postgraduate programmes (perhaps even by correspondence) such a Chair would help introduce strategic thinking to young officers and provide the opportunity for selected officers to continue their studies throughout their career. Not all of these studies necessarily need be linked to the gathering of degrees (masters, doctorates, etc.); such a Chair would provide also a suitable venue for the conduct of many research projects and defence fellowships. Fourth, a Chair of Strategy
would help distinguish ADFA from other universities in Australia. A legitimate concern of many in the military is that too much of the ADFA academic curriculum is a mere duplication of that existing in other Australian tertiary institutions, and because of this it may be more appropriate (both socially and economically) to have military officers educated in existing civilian universities. However, a Chair of Strategy would help provide an education more relevant to the needs of the military profession than that offered currently in many courses at Australian universities and at ADFA. Finally, a Chair of Strategy at ADFA could help guide and coordinate the development of strategic thinking at the more formal military institutions, such as the single service Staff Colleges and JSSC where greater depth of analysis and understanding in strategic matters is (according to Butler) required.

Conclusion

In chapters 1 and 2 it was explained that strategic thinking is a complex area of study, particularly in the area of military strategy where an understanding is vital if the profession wishes to contribute purposefully to the determination of strategy. Overall the sub-thesis agrees with Butler's recent analysis of senior officer development in which he concluded that the Australian military profession has little ability to think strategically, but that this ability is vital for the profession both now and in the future.
In chapter 3 it was explained why the Australian military profession has failed to develop the art of strategic thinking. However, it was acknowledged also that the military is aware of its shortcomings and that it is moving towards redressing this inadequacy, albeit in a ponderous and uncoordinated (between the services) fashion.

Finally, this chapter has suggested that if the military seriously wishes to improve its ability to think strategically then it must look to three particular areas: to the actual role that the profession should play in strategic decision-making in Australia; to a better understanding of inter-service requirements and joint operations; and to the manner in which the profession can best be educated in matters of strategic importance. These issues are all important and require rigorous analysis by the profession. Because of their complexity it is possible to become despondent about the prospects for change occurring in these matters, at least in the short term. However, one can take also a more optimistic view. The ADF - like the nation it serves - is young, and its reputation remains high internationally. Its officers are generally well educated and trained, and for the most part are capable and articulate. Given these favourable circumstances it is probable that strategic thinking within the profession will continue to be developed, even though the strategic perceptions of a 'no threat' environment may tend to dampen the urgency that this author believes the matter deserves.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid.


5. Ibid, p.39. (O'Neill's emphasis.)

6. This is not to suggest that the military should have refused to go to Vietnam or to perform any other task deemed necessary by the elected government. The military must always remain the servant of government (and the people). However, a more active involvement by the military in providing advice to government on matters such as Vietnam may help in more prudent decision-making. Perhaps a more recent example of the Australian military's reluctance to become involved (at least publically) in matters of strategic importance occurred during the deliberations of the Cross Committee into the state of Australia's defence capability (refer Chapter 2, note 49). Although not reflected in the Cross Report it is the understanding of this author that the CDF was a reluctant witness, and was not eager to contribute to the debate as to the ADF's current and future structure and capabilities. It is noteworthy also that of the 26 written submissions presented to the Committee only one came from a senior serving officer.


9. Utz Report (Chapter 1, note 30), p.xii, para 5; and Brown (Chapter 2, note 44), pp. 57-58, 75-87.


12. These higher level documents principally are the Strat Basis and the 'Defence Force Capabilities Paper'.

13. The CDF now commands the defence force rather than the defence force 'staff', and may do so either through the Chiefs of Staff of each service or direct to appointed joint force commanders. The staff of the CDF has been progressively enlarged, and an ADF Command Centre (ADFC) established to allow the CDF to command the ADF.
more appropriately.


17. ibid

18. ibid p. 89.

The following is only a selection of definitions and descriptions of the word 'strategy', listed under one of three headings: 'strategy-general', 'national strategy' and 'military strategy'. The determination of under what heading each definition/description should occur is arbitrary, largely reflecting this author's interpretation of the original author's intention. As can be seen, the division between these groupings is not always clear.

STRATEGY-GENERAL

(1) André Beaufre
I. Strategy is not a single defined doctrine; it is a method of thought, the object of which is to codify events, set them in order of priority and then choose the most effective course of action.

2. Strategy can in fact be reduced to universal Einstein-type formula as follows:

$$ S = KFut $$

K is any specific factor applicable to the case concerned; F stands for material force; u for the psychological factor and t for time. In direct strategy the predominant factor is F, the factor u of considerably less importance and the factor t comparatively small. In indirect strategy the exact reverse is the case, the dominant factor being u.

(2) Bernard Brodie
Strategy is a field where truth is sought in pursuit of viable solutions.

(3) Henry E. Eccles
Strategy is the comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas to attain broad objectives.

(4) Hanrieder and Buel
The art of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war to afford maximum support to policies and in order in war to increase the probabilities and favourable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat.

(5) Woodford A. Heflin
The art or science of using such factors as time, space, geography, politics, and trends of events, together with available or potential power, to achieve a previously conceived objective; or the use of these factors to create advantageous conditions for meeting the enemy in combat, either to compel surrender or to achieve some other objective.
JSP (AS) 101 (A) - Glossary (6)

The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favourable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat.

Robert O'Neill (7)

Strategy is an art rather than a science: it involves intuition, judgements of imprecise data and comprehension of a multitude of factors bearing on any situation.

Schwarz and Hadik (8)

There are thousands of definitions of the term strategy. They vary in time and place and according to the emphasis the author wants to give to one or other aspect.

Shelburne and Groves (9)

Ultimately, the end of strategy is to influence the opponent's decisions.

Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie (10)

Strategy is a plan of action designed in order to achieve some end; a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment.

NATIONAL (TOTAL/GRAND) STRATEGY

André Beaufre (11)

1. The art of applying force so that it makes the most effective contribution towards achieving the ends set by political policy.

2. The art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve this dispute.

Edward Mead Earle (12)

Strategy is the art of controlling and utilising the resources of a nation - or a coalition of nations - including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential or merely presumed.

Hanrieder and Buel (13)

The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.

Jane's Dictionary of Military Terms (14)

Strategy: The plans for conducting a war in the widest sense including diplomatic, political and economic considerations as well as those of a purely military nature.
JSP (AS) 101 (A) - Glossary

The art and science of developing and using political, economic and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.

General Albert C. Wedemeyer

Grand strategy is the art and science of employing all of a nation's resources to accomplish objectives defined by national policy.

MILITARY STRATEGY

Atkeson

Military strategy is the art of generals, national strategy is the art of statesmen.

Joseph M. Califf

Strategy is the planning of a campaign and the determining of the character, direction, and object to be attained by military operations, and embraces all operations prior to actual tactical collision.

Karl Von Clausewitz

The art of the employment of battles as a means to gain the object of war. In other words strategy forms the plan of the war, maps out the proposed course of the different campaigns which compose the war, and regulates the battles to be fought in each.

Concise Oxford Dictionary

Generalship, the art of war; management of an army or armies in a campaign; art of so moving or disposing troops or ships as to impose upon the enemy the place and time and conditions for fighting preferred by oneself.

John Garnett

... examines the way in which military power is used by governments in pursuit of their interests.

Hanrieder and Buel

The art and science of employing military power under all circumstances to attain national security objectives by applying force or the threat of force.

Antoine Henri Jomini

The art of directing the greater part of the forces of an army on to the most important point of a theatre of war, or a zone of operations.
JSP (AS) 101 (A) Glossary

The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force.

B.H. Liddell-Hart

The art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy.

Robert E. Osgood

Military strategy must now be understood as nothing less than the overall plan for utilizing the capacity for armed coercion - in conjunction with the economic, diplomatic, and psychological instruments of power - to support foreign policy most effectively by overt, covert and tacit means.

Soviet Military Encyclopaedia

Military strategy is defined as 'the component part of military art, its highest field, which encompasses the theory and practice of the preparation of a country and its armed forces for war, the planning and conduct of war and the strategic operations'.

ENDNOTES

1. Beaufre (Chapter 1, note 1), pp.13,129.
3. Eccles (Chapter 2, note 6), p.70.
8. Schwarz and Hadik (Chapter 1, note 5), p.94.
10. Wylie (Chapter 1, note 40), p.17.
13. Hanrieder and Buel (Appendix 1, note 4), p.79.
15. JSP (AS) 101 (A) (Chapter 1, note 14), p.1.173.
Nuclear Warfare  
Nuclear warfare involves the procurement, deployment, threat and possible use of strategic nuclear weapons (as distinct from tactical/battlefield nuclear weapons). Nuclear strategy at present is concerned principally with the relationship between the superpowers (USA and USSR) in what is often called the 'central balance'. Other major powers, principally PRC, UK and France, are also capable of threatening and fighting a nuclear war. The basic distinction between nuclear warfare strategies and other military strategies is the degree of importance placed on 'deterrence.' Although deterrence has validity in all types of military strategy the effects of nuclear war are potentially so horrific as to increase the importance placed upon deterrence or war avoidance. The USSR officially has not embraced a strategy of deterrence (claiming instead that nuclear warfare is an extension of conventional war), but in actuality it has been party to the maintenance of a deterrent strategy. Perhaps ironically, the credibility of deterrence has rested on the continued advance in nuclear weapon capabilities and the continuous revision of war fighting strategies on both sides. For an explanation of the development of nuclear warfare and discussion about the various strategies see (among others) Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (Macmillan, London, 1981).

Unlimited General Warfare  
This type of strategy involves 'armed conflict between major powers in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed and the national survival of the belligerents is in jeopardy.' (1) Such wars are unlimited in the sense that they may include nuclear weapons (strategic and tactical) and they involve and/or effect nations other than the principal belligerents. World Wars 1 and 2 are examples of unlimited general warfare, albeit without greatly being effected by nuclear weapons.

Limited Conventional Warfare  
The features of limited conventional warfare are that the conflict is confined or limited to a local geographical area, involving only two or a small number of nations, and where strategic nuclear weapons are not used. Some writers believe also that biological and chemical weapons cannot be used in limited conventional warfare, (2) but this would seem to be too narrow an interpretation. Examples of
limited conventional warfare include the Korean War, the Indo-Pakistani Wars, the Middle East Wars (Israel-Egypt etc.), and the Iran-Iraq War. The current definition of 'limited war' in JSP (AS) 101 (A) is imprecise and conveys little meaning. Hanrieder and Buel have described limited war as:

armed encounters, exclusive of incidents, in which one or more major powers or their proxies voluntarily exercise various types and degrees of restraint to prevent unmanageable escalation. This accords with the definition offered by Osgood. Both these interpretations, however, fail to recognise that limited wars may occur other than between (one or more) major powers; and they fail to acknowledge that non-major powers so involved may not exercise restraint at all, but with the resources available to them are unable (and often don't wish) to escalate the conflict beyond the conventional limited threshold.

Unconventional Warfare

Unconventional warfare is a broad category encompassing all strategies not included in the other three types. JSP (AS) 101 (A) defines unconventional warfare as a:

General term used to describe operations conducted for military, political or economic purposes within an area occupied by the enemy and making use of the local inhabitants and resources.

Hanrieder and Buel provide a more comprehensive description of unconventional warfare:

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held, enemy denied or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, direct action missions, and other operations of a low visibility, covert, or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by external sources during all conditions of war and peace.

In addition, unconventional warfare includes such activities as terrorism and partisan operations. It also involves the derivation of strategies to counteract all the activities mentioned above, for example 'counter-insurgency operations' and 'counter terrorist operations'. The concept of unconventional warfare also may be extended to include methods of non-military defence.
CONSIDERATIONS IN SELECTING TYPES OF STRATEGY

In selecting one or more of the above strategy-types nations need to consider the following six questions.

Alliance and/or Neutrality
To what extent does the nation want or need to be allied? Is the alliance designed principally to protect the nation's vital interests or to help provide protection for the other partner(s)? Is the nation capable of being neutral? Is it capable of maintaining a strong alliance? To what extent does the adoption of one of these alternatives (alliance or neutrality) affect the size, shape and readiness of the defence forces?

Deterrent and/or War Fighting
Does the nation wish to deter conflict or to further its interests by military threat or aggression? Against whom or what are deterrence and/or war fighting strategies designed? Can military deterrence be achieved without proper war fighting preparations? Are nuclear and conventional deterrence similar and plausible strategies? What are the force structures required to achieve them?

Direct and/or Indirect
Is military force the principal means by which the nation wishes to maintain security (ie direct strategy)? Or, is security to be maintained primarily by less direct methods, for example political and economic strategies (ie indirect strategy)? If indirect strategy is chosen then what types of military strategy and what force structures are required? Does provision need to be made in the force structure to change from indirect to direct strategy? If so, how long will this take?

Maritime and/or Continental and/or Aerospace
What are the maritime, continental and aerospace capabilities required by a nation to maintain national security? Which if any is to be predominant and why? How can they be coordinated to provide a viable military strategy in concert with national objectives?

Offensive and/or Defensive
Should the military be structured and strategies be chosen that are essentially offensive or defensive? To what extent is it possible to devise offensive and defensive strategies? What emphasis should be placed on strategic strike and preemptive strike capabilities? In what ways can the three services be structured and coordinated for these strategies? To what extent should the services be integrated with or offset by civil defence measures?
Sequential and/or Cumulative (9)

To what extent should strategic contingency planning be sequential and/or cumulative? Is it possible to devise sequential and cumulative strategies that are realistic before actual military situations develop? Given resolution of the previous five considerations, should the nation adopt a predominantly sequential or cumulative strategy?

ENDNOTES

1. JSP(AS) 101 (A) (Chapter 1, note 14), p.1.110; and Hanrieder and Buel (Appendix 1, note 4), p. 51.

2. For example, Hayward (Appendix 1, note 14) defines limited war as 'a conflict of greater intensity than guerilla war but one in which NBC weapons are not used.' (p. 97).

3. JSP (AS) 101 (A) (Chapter 1, note 14), defines limited war as 'armed conflict short of general war, exclusive of incidents, involving the overt engagement of the military forces of two or more nations.' (p.1.147)


6. JSP (AS) 101 (A) (Chapter 1, note 14), p.1.270.


9. The distinction between sequential and cumulative strategy is explained in Wylie (Chapter 1, note 40), pp. 23-29. Basically, sequential strategy is progressive with each successive step being determined by the outcome of the previous step. Sequential strategy needs to be planned, but its implementation depends on the success or failure of each phase of the campaign. Examples of sequential strategy include MacArthur's campaign in the south-west Pacific, the allied drive towards Germany from the Normandy landings, and the German drive into Russia. Cumulative strategy is the collection of lesser or individual actions which are largely independent of previous actions. Examples of this strategy include the German submarine campaign during World War 2, or perhaps the air battle over Britain. Cumulative strategy is suitable particularly for maritime and air (including missiles) operations, for commando-type...
operations, guerrilla and partisan warfare, and terrorism. Cumulative strategy requires fastidious planning (as does sequential) but generally can be implemented free from the constraints that sequential strategy may suffer. Wylie suggests that one of the problems in devising the most suitable military and national strategy is to combine sequential and cumulative options in the best way.

Appendix 2

This appendix contains information about the strategy component of major military courses conducted currently or planned, within the ADFA. These courses are subject to change (usually marginally) depending on the availability of instructors, the direction of the respective Commandants or other changing situations (eg. world events largely dictate topics for consideration). For this reason the year of each course is indicated, and those wishing to update this would need to refer to the relevant handbook and/or liaise with the relevant establishment. Other courses such as the Industrial Mobilisation Course, which are of strategic importance have not been mentioned because they generally affect only a few officers, are not currently deemed important in an officer's career progression, and would not be assessed by the author in the time available. Such courses also may require scrutiny.

Appendix 3 contains the following:

a. Appendix 3.1 - Intended ADFA Academic Courses of Strategic Importance, 1986

b. Appendix 3.2 - ADFA Common Military Curriculum. Proposed Courses in Defence Studies, 1986

c. Appendix 3.3 - Strategy Component of ADFA Military Curricula: RAN, RNZAF, RAAF Academy

d. Appendix 3.4 - Proposed Course in Strategic Studies, RNZAF, Dunrobin, 1986

e. Appendix 3.5 - Strategy Component, RAN Staff College, HMAS Stirling, 1984

f. Appendix 3.6 - Strategy Component, Army CSSC, Fort Queanbeyan, 1984

g. Appendix 3.7 - Strategy Component, RAAF Staff College, Fairbairn, 1985

h. Appendix 3.8 - JDC Course, 1984 (Course 29/84)

i. Appendix 3.9 - Army Strategic and Operational Study Period (SCAP), 1984.
MILITARY COURSES CONCERNED
WITH STRATEGIC MATTERS

This appendix contains information about the strategy component of major military courses conducted currently, or planned, within the ADF. These courses are subject to change (usually marginally) depending on the availability of instructors, the direction of the respective Commandants or other changing situations (eg. world events largely dictates topics for consideration). For this reason the year of each course is indicated, and those wishing to update this would need to refer to the relevant handbook and/or liaise with the relevant establishment. Other courses, such as the Industrial Mobilisation Course, which are of strategic importance have not been mentioned because they generally affect only a few officers, are not currently considered important in an officer's career progression, and could not be assessed by the author in the time available. Such courses also may require scrutiny.

Appendix 3 contains the following:

a. Appendix 3.1 - Intended ADFA Academic Courses of Strategic Importance, 1986
c. Appendix 3.3 - Strategy Component of Military Curricula: RANC, RMCoFA, RAAF Academy
d. Appendix 3.4 - Proposed Course in Strategic Studies, RMCoFA, Duntroon, 1986
e. Appendix 3.5 - Strategy Component, RAN Staff College, Balmoral, 1984
f. Appendix 3.6 - Strategy Component, Army C&SC, Fort Queenscliff, 1984
g. Appendix 3.7 - Strategy Component, RAAF Staff College, Fairbairn, 1985
h. Appendix 3.8 - JSSC Course, 1984 (Course 29/84)
i. Appendix 3.9 - Army Strategic and Operational Study Period (SOSP), 1984.

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INTENDED ADFA ACADEMIC COURSES OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE 1986

The courses listed are those that are related directly to the study of strategy. Of course many aspects of science, engineering and the humanities ultimately may have a bearing on strategic capability, but they are not concerned specifically with the study of strategy.

Department of History
b. The Evolution of Modern War.
c. War and Society in Australia.
d. Revolts and Counter-Insurgency in South-East Asia.
e. War and Revolution in East Asia.
f. (Additional subjects for honours students, to be determined).

department of Politics
a. Civil-Military Relations.
b. The International System.
c. International Relations of South-East Asia.
d. Strategic Studies.
e. International Relations of North-East Asia.
f. Law and War.
g. Maritime Law.

Source: 'University College - ADFA. Draft Calendar for 1986', dated 22 May 1984
## ADFA COMMON MILITARY CURRICULUM
### PROPOSED COURSE IN DEFENCE STUDIES, 1986

<table>
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<th>SUBJECT AREA</th>
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| **1. Military History** | Explain the importance of military history to the 'Profession of Arms'.
| | Outline the character and style of selected commanders that have been involved in military conflict.
| | Assess the aspects of character and style of nominated military commanders that influenced the outcome of battle.
| | Outline Australia's military role in the following wars:
| | a. Boer War.
| | b. First World War.
| | c. Second World War.
| | d. Korean War.
| | e. Vietnam War.
| | Outline the development of the Australian Services and Defence Forces. |
| **2. Strategy** | Outline the concept of 'strategy'.
| | Explain how military strategy is derived from national policy.
| | Outline the factors that determine a country's strategic situation.
| | Outline the theories of the great strategists.
| | Outline the evolution of strategy and warfare (with emphasis on the 20th Century). |
Discuss the contemporary relevance of the Principles of War to the application of military power.

Explain the meaning of tactics, logistics, strategy, national policy and military strategy.

Outline some of the effects that politics, society and economics have had on the conduct of some recent military conflicts.

Analyse selected military campaigns and operations on the basis of applied military strategy.

Analyse the conduct of operations using the following elements of a systems model: environment, information, weapon's power logistics and control.

Describe the influence of technology on the conduct of operations.

Describe the effect of selected new weapons systems on the conduct of operations.

Outline the development of joint operations.

Outline the planning process associated with the development and implementation of small scale joint exercises.

Describe the effects of the fire support available to the ADF.

Produce an outline plan for a small scale joint operation in a limited war.
4. International Politics

Discuss the background to current world events of significance to Australia.

Explain the implication for Australia of selected aspects of the foreign policies of:

a. USA,
b. USSR,
c. PRC, and
d. Japan.

Explain the influence of the major powers on world stability.

Discuss the relations between the above major powers.

Outline the possible implications for Australia of:

a. the political influences in the SW Pacific area;

b. the military balance in:
   (1) SE Asia, and
   (2) The Indian Ocean and its littoral States; and

c. instability in the Middle East.

Outline the role of ASEAN and its potential for assisting stability in the region.

Outline Australia's role in the Five Powers Defence Arrangements.

Outline the purpose and broad operation of the Defence Co-operation Program.

Discuss the relationships between Australia and New Zealand.

5. Australia's Strategic Situation

Discuss the aims of Australia's current defence policy.

Outline the functions and roles of the ADF and its Services.
Appendix 3.2

Outline the higher command and control of the ADF.

Explain the significance of Australia’s defence treaties and agreements.

Discuss Australia's strategic situation.

Discuss the concepts of the 'Fortress Australia' and 'Forward Defence' policies.

Discuss areas which highlight aspects of the Defence Studies programme.

Explain some of the difficulties involved in defending areas of Australia.

Assess the national significance of nominated industries.

Appendix 3.3

STRATEGY COMPONENT OF MILITARY CURRICULA: RANC, RMCoF, RAAF ACADEMY

RANC, Jervis Bay, 1984
1. Professional naval training includes instruction/study in naval history and maritime aviation, depending on officer category.

2. The Humanities Department also offers courses on:
   a. War and Society in the 20th Century, and
   b. Conflict and Order in World Politics.

Source: 'Royal Australian Naval College, Jervis Bay, Calendar 1984'.

RMCoF, Duntroon, 1985
1. The Military Studies course includes the following:
   a. Military History. Central instruction is based on teaching cadets how to use history to complement their professional studies. Cadets study a specific aspect of military history on an elective basis and prepare both a paper and a presentation on their chosen subject.

   b. Strategic Studies. This subject introduces cadets to strategy and provides an understanding of the military, political and geographical considerations relevant to the defence of Australia. It assists cadets to understand significant events in Australia's areas of interest and encourages cadets to discuss these events in both formal and informal groups.

2. Academic courses relevant to strategy are almost the same as those listed in Appendix 3.1 for ADFA.

Source: 'The Royal Military College and Faculty of Military Studies Handbook, 1985'.

RAAF Academy, Point Cook, 1982
1. Professional training includes a short course on Military Studies. The scope of the course is as follows: 'An introduction to the nature and principles of war and their application to the Australian Defence environment. Particular emphasis is placed on the employment of Air Power at squadron level and the role of Air Power in Joint Operations and in national defence planning.'

Source: 'Royal Australian Air Force Academy, Point Cook, Handbook 1982'.

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The details of this course are yet to be finalised. However, it is currently planned that this course will be compulsory for all cadets, covering approximately 60 periods of instruction. The proposed course has three seminars/components as follows:

a. **The Development of Strategic Thinking**

(1) Scope of Strategic Studies  
(2) Milestones in Strategic Thinking  
(3) Armed Forces and the State  
(4) Warrior Caste Versus Constabulary Force  
(5) Direct and Indirect Strategy  
(6) Total War and Limited War  
(7) Nuclear Strategy and the Central Balance  
(8) Conventional Strategy and the Operational Level of War  
(9) Unconventional Warfare and Non-Conventional Strategies  
(10) Terrorism, Transnational and Sub-national Violence  
(11) Peacekeeping  
(12) Peace Research and Arms Control  
(13) Defence Decision-Making

b. **Regional Strategic Balances**

(1) Europe  
(2) Middle East/Gulf  
(3) North-East Asia  
(4) South and South-East Asia  
(5) South-West Pacific

c. **Australia's Strategic Environment**

(1) Australia's Strategic Environment  
(2) Rationale and Determinants for Australia's Defence Policy  
(3) Australia's Defence Infrastructure  
(4) Force Expansion and Mobilisation  
(5) Civil-Military Relationship  
(6) Preparation of Army for Australia's Defence

Source: '(DRAFT) Strategic Studies Course, RMCofA, 1986'.  
(Provided by RMCofA Writing Team.)
Aim

The aim of the strategy component is to develop students' knowledge and understanding of the world, regional and national environments and the factors which determine and influence the formulation of Australia's national and maritime strategies.

Programme

The strategy component is comprised of the following elements:

a. The World Environment

   (1) World Economic Trends
   (2) World Resources
   (3) World Order and the Strategic Nuclear Balance
   (4) Superpower Perspective - USA
   (5) Superpower Perspective - USSR
   (6) Significant World Ideologies

b. The Regional Environment

   (1) North Asian Region
   (2) Indian Ocean Region
   (3) South-East Asian Region
   (4) South-West Pacific and New Zealand
   (5) Near Northern Region

c. The National Environment

   (1) Australia's National Aims and Interests
   (2) Maritime Aspects of Australia's Foreign Policy
   (3) Contemporary Australian Society
   (4) Development of Australian Politics
   (5) Development and Structure of the Australian Economy
   (6) Australia's Economic Prospects
   (7) Trade Unionism
   (8) Australian Government
   (9) Australia's World and Regional Defence Roles and Responsibilities

d. Development of a Maritime Strategy

   (1) Exercise: Developing a Suitable Surface Combatant Fleet
   (2) Classical Maritime Strategists
   (3) Current Maritime Strategic Concepts
   (4) Maritime Environment and Marine Research
   (5) International Law
   (6) Naval Law: Peace and War
   (7) Maritime Surveillance Agencies
(8) Australia's Maritime Infrastructure
(9) Regional Maritime Forces
(10) Naval Control of Shipping
(11) Australia's Maritime Interests
(12) Cockatoo Island Dockyard (Visit)
(13) Maritime Research
(14) The Roles of the Reserves
(15) Concepts of Naval Warfare
(16) Naval Warfare
(17) Need for a Navy
(18) A Maritime Strategy for Australia

Source: 'RAN Staff College, Study Three Handbook, Australia's Strategic Interests, Course 12/84'
Aim

The aim of the strategy segment is to develop students' knowledge of the nature of war and to introduce procedures that lead to Australian security policy decisions and selected factors which affect them.

Programme

The strategy component consists of three segments as follows:

a. Strategy Segment

(1) The Armed Forces - Government and Opposition Views
(2) Australia's Political Process
(3) Historical Development of Defence Policy
(4) The Government Role in War
(5) The Government Framework for Australian Defence Policy
(6) The Nature of War
(7) Introduction to Strategic Thinking
(8) The Classical Strategists
(9) The Elements of Power
(10) A Strategic Assessment for Australia
(11) Understanding Intelligence
(12) The Intelligence Community
(13) The Threat Assessment
(14) Australia's Areas of Interest
(15) Technical Intelligence
(16) Nuclear Deterrence
(17) A Nuclear and Special Weapons Option for Australia
(18) Conventional Deterrence

b. Exercise Full Circle Segment

The exercise consists of two 10 day study tours of Northern and Western Australia to enhance students' knowledge of:

(1) the influence of Australia's geography on operations and logistics;
(2) the capability of Australia's transportation and telecommunications infrastructure to support military operations;
(3) the influence of demographic and sociological trends on military planning;
(4) Australia's economic and industrial potential in peace and war; and
(5) the location, facilities, equipment and operation of RAN and RAAF Bases in Eastern, Northern and Western Australia.
Appendix 3.6

c. Force Structure Segment

(1) Australian Military Strategy
(2) The Operational Level of War
(3) National Objectives
(4) Australian Human Resources
(5) Australia's Economic Status
(6) National and Defence Industrial Capacity
(7) Defence Research and Development
(8) Australia's Communications
(9) National Transport Resources
(10) Government Finance
(11) Financial Programming and Estimates
(12) Development of Defence Capabilities
(13) Development of Army Capabilities
(14) National Mapping
(15) Army Manpower Planning
(16) The Army Development Guide
(17) Army Works Policy
(18) Army Personnel Policy
(19) Army Materiel Policy
(20) Army Logistics Policy
(21) Army Operations Policy
(22) Visit to Local Defence Industry
(23) Strategic and International Policy
(24) CINCPAC Presentation
(25) Exercise on Procedures Required to Procure Army Equipment
(26) Exercise on Preparation, Deployment and Maintenance of Joint Force for Operations.

Appendix 3.7

STRATEGY COMPONENT, RAAF STAFF
COLLEGE, FAIRBAIRN, 1985

International Politics and World Events Segment

a. The Strength of a Nation
b. International Organisations
c. International System of States
d. International Law
e. Ideologies
f. World Trade
g. The World Economy
h. Government Policy Formulation - UK and USA
i. Major Power Relations: USSR, PRC, USA
j. Major Power Foreign Policies
   (1) USA
   (2) USSR
   (3) PRC
   (4) Japan
k. Foreign Policies of:
   (1) Vietnam
   (2) Indonesia
   (3) PNG
l. Regional Relations and Strategic Significance:
   (1) Indian Ocean
   (2) South-East Asia
   (3) South-West Pacific
   (4) North-East and East Asia
   (5) ASEAN

Strategy Segment

a. Security Needs
b. The Reasons for War
c. The Nature of Strategy
d. Evolution of Strategy
e. Land Strategy
f. Maritime Strategy
g. Air Strategy
h. Guerrilla Strategy
i. Influence of Technology on Strategy
j. Conventional Warfare - Future Trends

Australian Segment

a. Australia's Machinery of Government
b. Australia in International Organisations
c. Australia's Foreign Policy
d. Development of Australia's Foreign Policy
e. Australia's Trade Relations
f. Australian Government Policy Formulation
g. Australia's Aims and Interests
h. Australian Society and National Power
i. The Constitutional Basis of Australian Government
j. Roles of Constituent Parts of Australian Government
Appendix 3.7

k. Influences on Government
   (1) The Media
   (2) Employer Groups
   (3) Trade Unions

l. Australia's Defence Policy
m. Alternative Defence Policies
n. ALP Foreign and Defence Policies
o. Liberal Party Foreign and Defence Policies
p. Australia's Strategic Situation
q. Strategic Guidance
r. Capabilities Guidance
s. National Intelligence Community
t. The Australian Economy
u. Economic Factors - Australia's Industrial Structure
v. Australia's Industrial Relations and Industrial Structure
w. Mobilisation
x. Wartime Industrial Capacity
y. Defence Research and Defence Related Industry
z. Australia's Internal Threats

Exercises
a. Exercise STRATEGIST - an evaluation of a selected Australian policy for national security.

b. Exercise ATLAS - an evaluation of selected world issues and their significance to Australia. Students are formed into sub-syndicates to study and give a presentation on the following:
   (1) East Timor - past, present and future
   (2) Kampuchea - can it survive
   (3) Vietnam - nature and consequences of expansion
   (4) Burma - isolationism and survivability
   (5) US-Philippines Connection
   (6) Japan - rearmament
   (7) Northern Ireland - the future
   (8) China and USSR - future relations
   (9) Iran versus Iraq - likely outcome and consequences
   (10) Saudi Arabia - influence on stability
   (11) Afghanistan - Soviet long term interests
   (12) India - can it remain a democracy
   (13) Nuclear Free Indian Ocean - prospects and consequences
   (14) South Africa - future of white society
   (15) Africa - Soviet Influence
   (16) Central America - threat to USA

Visits
a. Industrial Visit - Sydney - 5 days
b. National Study - Australia Trip - 2 weeks

Source: Adapted from 'RAAF Staff College, Strategic Studies Component, 1985'
Appendix 3.8

JSSC COURSE, 1984 (Course 29/84)

Government, Defence and Strategy
The aim of this part of the course is to further members' knowledge of Government, the Department of Defence, the Defence Force and strategic theory. The duration of this part of the course is about seven weeks, and the following topics of a strategic nature are covered:

a. The Department of Defence
   (1) Australia's Defence
   (2) The Higher Defence Organisation
   (3) The Department of Defence
   (4) Introduction to Joint Operations Doctrine
   (5) The Joint Staff in Support of CDF
   (6) The Officer in Policy Making

b. The Process of Government
   (1) Government Policy Formulation
   (2) The Structure of Government
   (3) Civil-Military Relations
   (4) Contemporary Australian Politics

c. The Services
   (1) The RAN
   (2) The Australian Army
   (3) The RAAP
   (4) The Public Service

d. Strategy and Modern Theories of Warfare
   (1) Introduction to Strategic Thinking
   (2) Causes of War
   (3) Crisis Management
   (4) Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence
   (5) Terrorism
   (6) Enduring Strategic Factors
   (7) Strategies of Warfare
   (8) Trends in Warfare

Influences on National Security Policy
The aim of this part of the course is to further members' understanding and knowledge of the major factors influencing Australia's national security policy. The duration of this part of the course is about seven weeks, which includes a three day industrial tour and about a two week overseas tour. The following topics of a strategic nature are covered:

a. International Influences
   (1) World Order and Superpower Relations
   (2) World Economic Trends and International Trade
   (3) World Food, Mineral and Energy Resources
   (4) International Monetary System
   (5) Laws of War
   (6) Laws of the Sea
b. Regional Influence
   (1) Africa
   (2) Central and South America
   (3) Europe
   (4) Middle East
   (5) South-East Asia
   (6) South-West Asia and Indian Ocean
   (7) South-West Pacific
   (8) Soviet Union

c. Domestic Influences
   (1) Australian Security
   (2) Aspects of Social and Economic Change
   (3) Australia's National Objectives
   (4) Factors Affecting Government Policy
   (5) Strategic Assessment
   (6) Australia's Foreign Policy
   (7) Future Influences on Australia's Security Policy
   (8) Security Arrangements Involving Australia (Treaties etc)
   (9) Australia's Economy
   (10) Australia's Manufacturing Industry
   (11) Australia's Industrial Relations
   (12) Defence Industry Policy
   (13) Internal Threat
   (14) The Media

Australian Defence Policy
   The aim of this part of the course is for members to study the formulation and administration of Australia's defence policy. The duration of this part of the course is about five weeks and the following main topics are covered:

a. Defence Policy Formulation and Decision-Making
   (1) Defence Policy-Making
   (2) Planning in Uncertainty
   (3) Derivation and Consideration of Alternative Military Strategies for Australia
   (4) National Intelligence
   (5) Leadership Styles and Case Studies in Decision-Making
   (6) Strategic Guidance
   (7) Role of Analysis in Department of Defence
   (8) Scientific Support for Defence Programmes
   (9) Mobilisation
   (10) Organisational Theory
   (11) Budgets and the FYDP
   (12) Development of Defence Force Capabilities
   (13) Computers and Management
   (14) Manpower Planning
   (15) Supply and Support
   (16) Defence Facilities

b. Defence Policy Review
   (1) Government and Opposition Defence Policies
   (2) Alternative View(s) to Defence Policy
Joint and Combined Operations

The aim of this part of the course is for members to examine the employment of Australian forces in joint and combined operations. The duration of this part of the course is about three weeks and the following main topics are covered:

a. Command and Control
   (1) National Command and Control
   (2) Joint Service Doctrine and Procedures
   (3) Command and Control of Joint and Combined Operations
   (4) NATO Command and Control

b. Planning and Operations
   (1) Contingency Planning
   (2) Exercises Involving Australian Forces in Operational Scenarios
   (3) US Operational Interests in Asia/Pacific
   (4) Australian Involvement in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and the Sinai
   (5) The Falklands Conflict - A British Perspective

Source: Adapted from 'JSSC Course 29/84 Study Guides'.
### Programme

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<tr>
<th>DAY</th>
<th>TOPIC</th>
<th>AIM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td>To develop an understanding of the fundamentals of Australian military strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- military strategy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- naval/maritime and air strategies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Low Level Conflict</td>
<td>To develop an awareness of the political and military considerations involved in the effective employment of military force in situations short of high level conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Factors influencing military involvement in...</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Use of military power in...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Controlling Australia's threat environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Level Conflict</td>
<td>To give an understanding of national considerations involved in developing a directive to a force commander in a high level conflict situation, especially command and control, intelligence and logistic aspects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Command and Control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Intelligence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Logistics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Higher level responsibilities for strategic and operational intelligence at international, national and departmental levels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Problem: consideration/discussion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Operational Level of War</td>
<td>To expose participants to the high level considerations involved in the conduct of a campaign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Explanation/discussion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Consideration of and presentation of following case studies:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- American Civil War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Palestine 1918</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Russia 1942-43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Bangladesh 1971</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Fulda Gap</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Preparation of concept of operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 'Strategic and Operational Study Period Exercise Instruction' (Headquarters Training Command, 13 March 1984)
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