The prewar origins of Japanese popular pacifism, and the influence of pacifism on Japan’s postwar defence policy

by

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JAPANESE DEFENCE POLICY

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This sub-thesis is my own work, and all the sources used have been acknowledged.

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Note on the text:
Throughout this paper Japanese names are rendered in the Japanese fashion, with the family name first and the personal name second.
Decisions made by ... governments ... reflect the overall balance of internal forces ... They also reflect the gravitational pull of what might be termed loosely the 'accumulated legacy of history'...

...By and large, historical traditions emerge through a process of natural selection. Those which have produced satisfactory results are remembered. Those which have proved disastrous, or which seem irrelevant to contemporary problems, are gradually, but not entirely forgotten.

In 1960, hundreds of thousands of Japanese took to the streets of their major cities to protest against the signing and ratification of a revised security treaty between Japan and the United States. The revised treaty was intended to guarantee Japan protection under the American "nuclear umbrella", assistance from U.S. forces in the event of an armed attack on Japan, and removal of provisions in the earlier version of the treaty which were considered to compromise the independence of the Japanese nation. Despite the intention of the new treaty to afford greater security and sovereignty to Japan, the public disturbances its ratification caused were of such magnitude, and parliamentary and press opposition so vociferous, that the Prime Minister of the day was forced to resign, and a visit to Japan by the President of the United States was cancelled.

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1. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, preface.
In 1981, a Japanese Prime Minister, during a visit to Washington, referred to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as an "alliance" rather than the customary "partnership". The public outcry in Japan was sufficient to force the Prime Minister to deny that his use of the term imbued the treaty with any special or augmented military significance, and, when that failed to mollify the press and public, the Foreign Minister took responsibility for the affair and resigned.

In the mid-1980s, a Cabinet-imposed upper limit on Japanese defence spending of one percent of GNP was officially broached. Even though the increase still left Japan's defence budget the smallest, in proportion to its GNP, of any major Western power and, indeed, one of the smallest in the world, the Cabinet decision to authorise the increase came only after months of political manoeuvring, and was made in defiance of the wishes of some seventy percent of the Japanese people, supported by the parliamentary opposition and the newsmedia.

In 1991, Japan pledged several billions dollars in economic aid as its contribution to the United Nations-sponsored operation to remove Iraqi military occupation forces from Kuwait: when this failed to silence condemnation of its response by sections of the U.S. Congress and the Western media, and less strident but insistent pressure from the U.S. government, the Japanese government dispatched Maritime Self Defence Force minesweepers and crews to the Persian Gulf, again in defiance of the wishes of a majority of the Japanese civilian population and Self Defence Force personnel.

More than four decades after its defeat in the Pacific War,
Japanese public opinion is still preventing revision of the "alien" postwar Constitution, which includes, in Article IX, the renunciation of war, non-possession of war potential and the rejection of the right of belligerency of the state; and, members of the Japanese Self Defence Force are still discouraged from appearing in public in uniform.

Whence comes this powerful aversion to all things military which characterises the Japanese people today? They are, after all, a people most frequently perceived in other nations as heirs to the feudalistic legacy of the famous, or infamous, warrior code of bushido; a people who, little more than a one hundred ago, emerged from eight centuries of largely isolationist military rule only to embark on a half century of largely expansionist military rule, the legacy of which for many of Japan's neighbours is continued suspicion and dislike of the now economically powerful state on the mountainous archipelago northeast of the Eurasian landmass.

This paper seeks to explain the strength and durability of Japanese popular resistance to full re-armament 1, domestic

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1. The term "re-armament" as used in this paper means an updated version of Japan's prewar military capability, which included a substantial force projection capacity, and a large standing Army and Navy. The Japanese public has accepted their country's present need to defend itself, but with a comparatively small Self Defence Force, which is without an independent force projection capability, thereby emphasising its purely "defensive" role.

"Pacifism" is used primarily to indicate opposition to acts of aggression against other states, and, domestically, to indicate an aversion to perceived
militarism and the deployment of defence personnel abroad, and fears about the implications of the American alliance, which together constitute a pervasive pacifism which has been one the major influences on the evolution of post-war Japanese defence policy. For most of the postwar period, this strong pacifist influence has coincided with pressure, most notably from Japan’s ally, the United States, for Japan to rearm and acquire a significantly increased military capability, one more in keeping with Japan’s status as an economic "superpower". It is evident that these are contradictory influences and therefore liable to produce conflict, in particular in a relationship already

...Continued...

signs of "militarism". The popular rejection of things which are, or seem to be obviously of a military nature stems in part from outright "pacifism" or "civilian-ism", but also from Japanese not wanting to be reminded that the SDF exists, rather than opposition to the SDF per se, because although the public has come to accept that the SDF may play a constructive role in society, principally through disaster relief work, there are still doubts about its legality and constitutionality. Although the subject of this paper is "popular" pacifism, this should not be taken to mean that the pacifist views of the ordinary people of Japan are not shared by many of its political, bureaucratic, or industrial leaders, nor by members of the SDF itself; quite often, they are, and for the same reasons — including the legacy of Japanese history.

"Militarism" as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, means "undue prevalence of military spirit or ideals". In this paper, it means in particular a policy or ideology which promotes territorial expansionism as the primary means of advancing the national interest, as opposed to diplomacy or trade. Internally, "militarism" signifies extreme or ultra-nationalism, xenophobia, the glorification of war, the prevalence of a military-industrial complex, and a tendency to blur the distinction between the functions of the armed forces and the police. It further signifies military dominance of those areas of national life which in democracies are usually under civilian control, such as Cabinet ministries, including, of course, the defence ministry. There is, however, no defence minister in postwar Japan; the head of the SDF is a civilian, the Director General of the Defense Agency, which is part of the Prime Minister’s Office.

In the domestic context the opposite of "militarism" is, strictly speaking, "civilian-ism", but "pacifism" is more commonly used, and therefore appears more frequently as the antonym, in theory and in practice, of "militarism" in this paper.
rendered difficult to manage because of popular and Congressional resentment in the U.S. over Japan's massive surplus in bilateral trade, and its increasing ownership of American companies and property.

This is not to say that there has been an absence of calls from within Japan for an augmented national defence effort, nor that American demands for a Japanese military buildup have been unremitting or unquestioned within the United States. However, given the very different historical experience of both nations, including Japan's defeat by the U.S. in the Pacific War, it becomes evident why misunderstandings and disputes have arisen between the two nations in recent decades, in particular over the American perception that Japan is taking a "free ride" at the expense of its ally.

It is argued in this paper that the reluctance of a majority of Japanese to have their nation assume a larger military role at the behest of domestic military proponents or of the United States cannot be solely attributed to Japan's devastating defeat in 1945 and subsequent sheltering under the American security umbrella, or to an aversion to increased defence expenditure simply for economic reasons. It can also be attributed to Japan's long prewar history, which ill-prepared the nation for the role of a traditional "Great Power". For, despite its centuries of civil war and rule by military dictators, and the popular foreign perception of it as a belligerent nation, Japan exhibited no real aptitude for external armed aggression until less than a century ago. Nor, until some two decades ago, did it possess sufficient
economic power to exert a strong influence on developments overseas by the disposition of its foreign trade, investment or aid.

Japan has been cautious in its post-war approach to the game of power politics, a game from which it has customarily been somewhat aloof, but which, when it has played, it has for the most part played ineptly and even disastrously. Since the end of the allied occupation, Japan has instead been diligent in utilising its long-proven assets, principally its ability to adapt foreign ideas and technologies and the industry of its people, to become a trading state par excellence.

It is the contention of this paper that Japan's continuing slowness in rebuilding its military strength and its parallel reluctance to assert itself in international political and economic regimes are an appropriate and unsurprising continuation of several of the dominant features and trends of the country's long pre-war history, which have been reinforced by its defeat in the Second World War and the strategic realities of the postwar era.

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1. The term "power politics", *Machtpolitik*, is used frequently in this paper in preference to its synonym, "international politics", because the connotations of the former are more appropriate in the context of a paper dealing mainly with the threatened or actual use of force in Japan's relations with other states.
CHAPTER I
THE LEGACY OF HISTORY

Synopsis

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that while both Japan and the United States wanted and duly acquired Pacific empires in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, their experience of power politics prior to this time and the initial impetus for expansion differed between the two nations. For most of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, Japan was a closed, homogeneous and feudalistic society which maintained a defensive posture vis a vis other states, whereas the United States was the product of mass migration, revolution and seemingly unstoppable territorial expansion. Most significantly for the purposes of this paper, the Japanese and American experience of external aggression prior to the twentieth century was widely divergent, for whereas the United States was itself the product of westward territorial expansion from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans, and had emerged triumphant from war with some of the Great Powers of the day, Japan's attempts to extend its political influence and territory overseas by force of arms had largely been failures. Even the Japanese victories over China and Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were deceptively sound, and fateful, in that they encouraged Japan to adopt a program of
empire-building, which represented a marked departure from the country's customarily peaceful relations with neighbouring states, and the sustainment of which was eventually to prove beyond Japan's military or industrial capabilities. The contest for Pacific hegemony brought the U.S. and Japan into armed conflict during the first half of the twentieth century, and resulted in Japan's devastating defeat. This experience served to induce and maintain a Tokugawa-like aversion to involvement in postwar power politics, though not to trade, on the part of a majority of Japanese. The unprecedented level of political liberalism, domestic prosperity and international prestige which has accompanied Japan's adherence to the role of a peaceful trading state has reinforced the high level of popular resistance to an augmented Japanese military capability.
Unlike the United States, with its belief in "manifest destiny" and long record of successful territorial conflicts, Japan seemed destined until the mid-nineteenth century to be frequently uninterested in the outside world and doomed to failure whenever it attempted to expand its political power overseas by armed force. It also seemed destined to experience internal political and social upheaval during those times when it opened itself up to external influence.

It is important to examine in detail the long-established patterns associated with Japanese external aggression, overseas trade and internal instability because they are still discernible today, and help render the strength of Japanese pacifism and the peculiarities of Japan's defence posture as both appropriate to the nation and comprehensible to non-Japanese.

One of the earliest major engagements of a Japanese military force in what would now be termed an international war was a failure of such magnitude that no similar enterprise was attempted by Japan for almost one-thousand years. In 663 A.D., the Japanese state of Yamato sent a great naval force to assist its ally, the powerful Northeast Asian state of Koguryo, against the forces of T'ang Dynasty China and its Silla allies. The crushing defeat suffered by the Japanese at Paekchongang "served only to reinforce the deeply isolationist sentiments of the
Japanese ruling classes. 1

However, if complete isolation from involvement in power politics was untenable, the ruling classes evidently decided that it would be better henceforth to be involved on the side of the dominant power; apart from any other considerations, this would give Japan access to the superior military technology and techniques of the T'ang and Silla. Thus, the Chinese triumph over Japan did not result in any loss of contact between Yamato and the rich, powerful and culturally brilliant T'ang state. Japan aligned itself with its stronger neighbour and Chinese influence in Japan was encouraged and duly increased, resulting, among other things, in the spread of Buddhism and associated arts and crafts, the creation of an official written history, the development of centralised government and the modelling of Yamato's first "capital city", Nara, on the T'ang capital, Ch'ang-an. Yet, despite these benefits flowing to Japan, Japanese leaders remained wary of supplying any reciprocal benefit to the T'ang in the form of troops or functional weaponry:

The high point of medieval Sino-Japanese military co-operation was reached when the Emperor Junnin, hearing of An Lu-shan's rebellion against the T'ang, and alarmed at this threat to his fellow Buddhist-Confucian monarch, decided to dispatch military aid to the Chinese court in the form of vast quantities of bullocks' horns (used in the manufacturing of bows). 2

This is an early example of a gesture which was to be often repeated in later Japanese history, most recently by the Japanese

1. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.3
2. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.3
government's initial offer of financial aid rather than defence force personnel and equipment as its contribution to the multilateral military operation to end Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in late 1990.¹

Five important and enduring threads in the cloth of Japanese history are discernible in the battle of Paekchongang and its aftermath: one is the defeat of Japanese military forces when sent abroad; a second is the failure of the states which vanquished those Japanese forces to subsequently attack Japan; a third is a form of "one-sided" alignment of Japan with the dominant regional power; a fourth is Japan's interest in adopting and adapting ideas, institutions and technology from a more advanced society; and a fifth is Japan's propensity to internal turmoil and (unsuccessful) external aggression when "open" to the outside world.

Accordingly, from the fourth to the sixth century, the introduction of Chinese culture from Kyushu to the court of Yamato had produced serious and prolonged strife at court:² from the seventh to the ninth century, the period in which Japan's acquisition of Chinese culture and religion was accelerated, and during which it was vanquished at Paekchongang, Japan's internal strife widened and became more bloody as Yamato and other Japanese states sought to transform themselves according to the T'ang model and to expand, frequently making "violence...the

¹. See: "A dogs-of-war house for Japan", The Economist, 19.1.91, pp.27-28
². Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, p. 194
order of the day". Eventually, a form of backlash occurred, and Japanese insularity reasserted itself.

From the ninth to the twelfth century, during the so-called Heian Age, Japan eschewed foreign military adventures, and retreated into isolationism, terminating its contact with China and henceforth showing "no interest in foreigners". It was a period of Japanese history notable for its large measure of domestic calm and stability, and for its brilliant cultural achievements, including Lady Murusaki’s *Tale of Genji*. This era of peace and accomplishment was notable also in that, although the imperial family was preserved and the Emperor's throne never usurped, control of the court was actually in the hands of another family, the Fujiwara. They set "a lasting Japanese pattern of control from behind the scenes through a figurehead...This fact has often helped to conceal the realities of Japanese life and confuse the casual observer". The Fujiwara effectively ruled Japan from 670 until 1165, and continued to heavily influence court politics until 1945.

With the passing of the Heian Age, Japan again established contact with the outside world and suffered frequent bouts of

1. Leonard, *Early Japan*, p. 16

2. Leonard, *Early Japan*, p. 39. In accordance with the strong continuity of many Japanese mores over its nearly 2000 years of recorded history, such xenophobia was to manifest itself again strongly during the more than two hundred years of Tokugawa isolation which began in the seventeenth century; and, in a public opinion poll held by the Prime Minister's Office in 1980, 64% of Japanese wanted "nothing whatsoever to do with foreigners". (Harries, *Sheathing the Sword*, p.269).

3. Reischauer, *Japan*, p.43

4. Bergamini, *Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy*, pp. 196-197
internal conflict, most notably between the rival Taira and Minamoto families. When Minamoto Yoritomo eventually gained the upper hand, he retained the Emperor in Kyoto, as the Fujiwara had done, but effectively ruled from his military command post at Kamakura, thereby creating the country's first "tent government", bakufu, and becoming its first shogun. Yoritomo's bakufu was to evolve into the feudalistic form of government which saw warrior aristocrats either governing or, at least, holding the military balance of power in Japan for the next eight centuries.

There were similarities between Japanese and European feudalism, but instructive differences as well. One such difference was the Japanese concept of feudal relationships being primarily based on moral obligations as opposed to the Romanised European concept of their being based on legal obligations. Of more importance to an understanding of Japanese pacifism today is the difference in longevity between feudalism in Japan and Europe. The Japanese variety far outlasted its European relative, surviving intact until the Meiji Restoration, and maintaining a powerful influence, especially in its emphasis on militarist values, on Japanese politics and society until the end of the Pacific War.

Elements of feudalism may still be noticed in many areas of life in modern Japan, ¹ but equally, if not more noticeable, is 

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¹. see Reischauer, Japan, pp.52-55. However, it should be noted that "feudalism" is to a great extent in the eye of the beholder: most Australians would not consider their country feudalistic, yet its head of state is a queen. The political, legal, religious and cultural practices of all Western societies are to a great extent derived from the European feudal period, and
the Japanese public's continued aversion to anything that hints at a resurgence of militarism. Given Japan's present, comparatively democratic mode of government, its technological prowess and its success as a trading state, it is significant that in Europe, the more politically and socially constraining aspects of feudalism were abandoned with the rebirth of humanism and its attendant advances in science and technology, and the rise of an internationally competitive society. One of the more salient features of the modern world is that the seven major economic powers¹, while together disposing of great military strength, are not individually feudalistic or militaristic states: it is the least successful economies which are most commonly under military or other forms of totalitarian rule.

It was during Japan's first period of military rule that it experienced a threat of foreign invasion greater than any until the twentieth century. Mongol warriors had swept out of Central Asia in the early thirteenth century, to conquer within a few generations a great swathe of the Eurasian landmass, from Korea... Continued...

all retain many feudalistic elements. So does everyday life: whenever a man opens a door for a woman, or stands when a woman enters the room, he is obeying a feudal (twelfth century) code of courtesy. The "feudalism" of Japan is not unique, and can be overstated.

1. The so-called "Group of Seven (Major Industrialised Nations)" comprises Japan, the United States, Canada, Britain, France, Germany and Italy. A further salient feature of this group is that three of its members, Japan, Germany and Italy, were defeated by an alliance of the other five states in W.W.II., and divested of their empires. Japan and Germany have nevertheless enjoyed extraordinary economic success since then, with Japan now being the world's second largest economy and Germany the world's largest exporter. The implications of this for Japanese defence policy are presented in Chapter III, pp.85-86; and Conclusion, p. 144.
and China to the Middle East and Muscovy. Under the leadership of Kublai Khan, the Mongols attempted to extend the eastern boundary of their empire to Japan.

The first invasion was mounted from Korea in 1274, and after an inclusive battle with Japanese forces on the coast of Kyushu, the Mongol troops, who had reboarded their ships for the night, were drowned or blown back towards Korea by a storm. In 1281, the Mongols attempted another invasion, this time mustering an army which was probably larger than any other sea-borne invasion force that had ever been assembled. The Mongol armada again crossed the Straits of Tsushima from Korea and made for the coast of Kyushu. However, before the full, overwhelming force of Mongol and allied warriors had come ashore, a typhoon bore down on the fleet, destroying it and Kublai Khan’s designs on Japan.

The typhoon was believed by the Japanese to be the product of divine intervention; it was the "god wind", kamikaze, and yet another sign of Japan’s uniqueness and inviolability. They did not, however, presume on that divine protection to the extent of mounting any retaliatory assault on the Mongols.

This brutal intrusion into Japanese affairs by the outside world and a subsequent increase in economic contact between Japan and neighbouring states was characteristically accompanied by an era of violent political upheaval in Japan. The Kamakura period was succeeded by the Ashikaga bakufu, or Muromachi period, which

1. see Reischauer, Japan, p.81; and Leonard, Early Japan, pp.61-64
2. see, Reischauer, Japan, pp. 64-65, and The Japanese, p.55; Leonard, Early Japan, pp. 61-64
was characterised for the most part by increasing political
disruption and confusion, and, towards its end, by almost
incessant warfare.

During the fourteenth century, trade with China expanded and
brought considerable prosperity to Western Japan. The Ashikaga
shoguns tried to monopolise it, by permitting their country to
become a Chinese tributary state in return for the Ming Emperor's
recognition of them as "kings" of Japan", to the lasting shame of
Japanese nationalists. 1

The Muromachi period also saw Japanese influence extend for the
first time far beyond its shores, as Japanese traders and
pirates, who were usually masterless samurai, sought by barter or
the sword to obtain goods from as far away as the Philippines,
Java and Thailand. They plundered their way into China as far as
Nanking, an expedition with unfortunate modern resonances.
Although these pirates amounted to a serious scourge of the
coasts of China and the seas of Southeast Asia, and brought
prosperity and exotic products to their baronial patrons, the
daimyo of western Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku, their activities
did not represent a concerted effort by Japan to conquer foreign
lands. They would rather have served as evidence to Japan's
nobility and burgeoning merchant class that foreign trade was
generally a more profitable and safer enterprise than overseas
territorial expansionism.

The recurring pattern in Japanese history of increased foreign
contact coinciding with increased civil strife was again evident

in the fifteenth century, which brought the Onin War, and in the even more violent sixteenth century, the "Age of the Country at War, sengoku jidai. Trade with China and other lands was furnishing Japan with new ideas and technologies, and a redistribution of wealth in favour of western and southern Japanese. The demise of the Ashikaga bakufu was accompanied by growing disorder and there occurred "something of an age of freedom for Japan's lower classes"¹. While rising discontent and acts of civil disobedience on the part of the peasantry did not amount to a revolution, had the new wealth, goods and ideas been permitted to continue to flow into Japan, there might eventually have been a movement away from feudalism and military rule. However, when faced with evidence that Japan was not an effective external aggressor, and that it was being encroached upon by nations possibly more powerful even than China, the military leaders who succeeded the Ashikaga chose to react to threats to Japanese sovereignty and its socio-political status quo by strengthening the feudal system and ensuring its preservation by sealing off Japan from the outside world.

This was not, however, the initial reaction of Japan's leaders when confronted with the superior technology of Europe. When the first Europeans known to have visited Japan landed on an island near Kyushu in 1542/3, the local lord welcomed the three Portuguese adventurers, and showed particular interest in a demonstration of their arquebuses. The Japanese bought them, and

¹. Leonard, *Early Japan*, p. 104
set about making copies of this new and powerful weapon. The first Japanese leader to restore a measure of order to the central region of the anarchic "Country at War", Oda Nobunaga, made good use of this new weapons technology in his battles with rival daimyo and militant Buddhist monks. His successor, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, further consolidated centralised control over the country, and, almost one-thousand years after the last disastrous foreign military adventure by the Japanese, he decided to utilise Japan's new-found wealth, advanced weapons technology and abundance of unemployed soldiers in the conquest of China.

In 1592, Hideyoshi's very large, well-trained and well-equipped expeditionary force landed in Korea, then a Chinese tributary state, and swiftly overran the peninsula, until the force arrived, overextended, at the Yalu River. Although the Ming Dynasty was by now in decline and would shortly be overthrown by the northern Manchu tribe, the massive army it dispatched to assist Korea pushed Hideyoshi's forces, their supply lines cut, back to the south of the peninsula. A further Japanese effort to conquer Korea was made five years after the first invasion, but after again sweeping the southern half of the peninsula, it too was stalemated in the face of China's seemingly unending supply of reinforcements, and once again Hideyoshi's soldiers had their supply lines severed by Korea's superior naval vessels and strategy. Peace negotiations began, but, in 1598 "the death of Hideyoshi...gave the Japanese a welcome excuse for abandoning the whole venture, and their armies streamed home".1 Despite its

1. Reischauer, Japan, pp.80-81
advanced weaponry, Japan's first attempt since Paekchongang to prevail by force of arms in continental power politics had, like its previous attempt, been unsuccessful. And costly, for in terms of "sheer carnage, it had surpassed anything that Europe would see until the campaigns of Napoleon more than two hundred years later." ¹

Under Nobunaga, Japan had further expanded its overseas trade, and European influence, especially in the form of new technologies and Christianity, made a significant impression on Japanese society. However, Hideyoshi proved less welcoming to the Christian missionaries than his predecessor, and he welcomed not at all the unprecedented degree of freedom and prosperity, and access to firearms, being enjoyed by the common people. During the civil wars, armed peasants and small landowners had taken to banding together to defy their feudal masters and to chase tax collectors out of their villages. Firearms had encouraged such rebelliousness, because they afforded peasants a hitherto impossible degree of "armed parity" with their overlords, and militant commoners "who had good weapons were too dangerous to molest without the support of a large army." ² Although Hideyoshi was himself a commoner by birth, he sought to restrain other would-be parvenus and prevent any major, concerted peasant uprising by introducing repressive laws and practices even before he had consolidated his rule, thereby creating the framework for

1. Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, p.211
2. Leonard, Early Japan, p.144
a more conservative and rigid form of feudalism.

Hideyoshi was succeeded by Tokugawa Ieyasu, and under him and his descendants many of the familiar threads in Japanese history were woven into a new and enduring prominence.

The failure of Hideyoshi's armies to conquer the region's customary hegemon, China, and even to maintain control over its much smaller neighbour, Korea, had demonstrated that despite their advanced weaponry, new-found wealth and large population, the Japanese were no more able to prevail in war against foreigners, and especially against an alliance of foreigners, than they had been a millennium earlier. Moreover, the hostile alliances Japan might now face, comprising European powers and, possibly, their agents within Japan, were an unprecedented and therefore more alarming threat. The outside world, for a period perceived by Japan's ruling class as a cornucopia of riches and beneficial inventions, and seemingly ripe for Japanese conquest, began now to assume a different guise, that of unpredictable and intractable menace.

Japan's centuries of isolation under the Tokugawa bakufu was heralded by the expulsion of Christian missionaries and the suppression of Christianity. The threat posed by Japanese Christians was that, like militant Buddhists, they could become powerful enough to challenge the Tokugawa shogun; the missionaries were seen as liable to encourage such a development, and as liable also to embroil Japan in the terrible wars of religion then being waged in Europe.

Just as dangerous were the new secular concepts of statecraft being developed in Europe, which, if allowed into Japan could
undermine the political and social status quo, recreating the sengoku jidai and destroying the Tokugawas' dynastic aspirations. The obvious means by which such concepts could enter Japan was via foreign trade, and this, together with the shogun's concern that trade could enable the western daimyos to acquire wealth and new technologies sufficient to challenge the central administration, resulted in the limiting of trade to only one or two visits per year by Dutch ships to Nagasaki. Foreigners in Japan were all expelled, save for a few Dutch merchants confined to an island in Nagasaki harbour.

One difference between Japan's experience after Paekchongang and after Hideyoshi's abortive assaults on China, was that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Japan failed to align itself with a hegemonic power as a means of guaranteeing its security. Nobunaga's association with European missionaries and his use of them and European weapons technology in his feuds with rival daimyos and militant Buddhist monks could be interpreted as a form of very loose alliance resulting from a fairly brief convergence of interests. Hideyoshi entertained the idea of turning Japan itself into a hegemonic power, but in the end Japan's military rulers proved hostile to foreign contact. Yet, this does not mean that Hideyoshi or Ieyasu and his descendants would not have chosen to align themselves with a power able to afford Japan protection and more tangible benefits, from a safe distance and at little cost to themselves, had such a power been available. However, the region's customary hegemonic power was failing and hence unreliable. In 1658, when the half-Japanese
Ming resistance leader Zheng Cheng-gong (Coxinja), whose navy controlled the China seas, appealed to the Tokugawa shogunate for assistance against invading Manchus, "the Japanese leadership, after careful consideration, decided not to intervene. The outcome of the conflict was uncertain. Discretion, therefore, seemed the better part of valour."¹ There was similar uncertainty as to which of the European nations would emerge strongest from their wars on the other side of the world, or from their contest for imperial possessions in Asia. It was likely, moreover, that a European ally would seek to interfere in Japan's internal affairs. Therefore, in the absence of any acceptable alternative, the Tokugawas "retreated into watchful isolationism".²

In terms of understanding the strength of pacifism in Japan after 1945, and its influence on Japanese defence policy, the above outline of Japanese history prior to the Meiji Restoration reveals certain recurring themes, or modes of political and social behaviour, which have powerful resonances in modern Japan.

**Japanese isolationism and American expansionism: a study in contrast.**

As described above, for almost two-thousand years, the Japanese maintained a singularly defensive posture, with a marked tendency towards isolationism when the external world appeared to threaten the safety and prosperity of their island nation. This belief in the uniqueness and divine protection of their island home extended to invade and conquer any prosperous neighbour across the Taisho line.

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1. Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p.3
2. Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p.5
threaten the security and stability of their nation. From the third century A.D. to the end of the nineteenth century, Japan’s contact with the outside world was restricted for the most part to economic and cultural activity, with few attempts made to intervene militarily or otherwise in the affairs of its neighbours. On those rare occasions when Japan did attempt foreign military adventures, they failed.

For most of its existence, Japan was protected from the vicissitudes of continental politics by the sea, by alignment with the prevailing dominant power, and, it was believed, by the help of the gods. Remarkably, neither Korea, nor East Asia’s customarily dominant power, China, has ever attempted to invade their populous and prosperous neighbour across the Tsushima Straits. Perhaps more surprisingly, neither did the aggressively imperialistic European nations at the height of their power, although they, and the United States, imposed unequal treaties on Japan in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Overall, Japan has enjoyed a singularly benign geopolitical environment for most of its history, and this makes the Japanese people’s belief in the uniqueness and divine protection of their island-nation until the end of the Pacific War understandable.

There were several obvious conclusions which the Japanese could draw from the recurring pattern of their nation’s opening to the outside world, followed by its attempted territorial expansionism, and then its withdrawal into isolation, in the pre-industrial era. These included the high probability that:

* overseas military aggression by Japan would fail;
* overseas military aggression against Japan would not occur, and if it did, it would fail;
* alignment with a non-intrusive dominant power would enhance national security but also increase the risk of entanglement in overseas conflicts;
* a foreign presence on Japanese soil would challenge the status quo, and draw Japan into international wars in which it wanted no part;
* isolation, except for carefully managed foreign trade, would produce stability and security; and
* contact with the outside world would produce mixed blessings, with trade bringing prosperity but new technologies and ideas bringing baronial and popular challenges to centralised government and the existing political and social system.

As Japan approached the middle of the nineteenth century and the end of its more than two-hundred years of seclusion under the Tokugawas, it was a society which, given no reason to question the lessons of the past, had remained essentially introspective, defensive, homogeneous, and pre-industrial. Yet, while the Tokugawa may have considered the exercise a success in terms of keeping external threat and internal change at bay, nearly complete seclusion under rigid feudalism did very little to benefit the majority of Japanese, except to reduce the power of the daimyo and encourage a form of self-government to arise in its place in most provincial villages. For most people outside Edo, the two centuries of Japan’s isolation meant a stable but bleak existence: the Japanese population, which had risen dramatically in pre-Tokugawa times, increased under the Tokugawa bakufu only from twenty-six million to thirty-three million. “The farmers were so well taxed and policed they exposed and abandoned
all infants who could not be fitted into the national budget."  

However, Japan would shortly be forced to open up to the outside world, and contest for power in the Asia-Pacific region with a nation whose historical experience, and hence its values and practices, appeared diametrically opposed to Japan's.

The American experience during the period which coincided in Japan with the latter stages of the *sengoku jidai* and the Tokugawa era was notably expansionist and, in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, marked by success in wars against contemporary Great Powers such as Britain and Spain. While Japan was turning isolationist and more intensely feudal in response to its third failed attempt to defeat China and Korea and perceived vulnerability to European expansionism, the United States was being born of a trans-oceanic migration from Europe, and growing prodigiously through the westward conquest and occupation of vast territories, from the Atlantic to the Pacific seaboard.

This expansion of America's physical horizons was matched by an expansion of scientific, technological and political horizons. It had began in Europe with the Renaissance and proceeded with the Reformation, a period which coincided with the advent of Japan's period of enforced isolation and internal political and social rigidity. Towards the end of Japan's era of seclusion, the United States was already reaping the technological and economic benefits of the industrial revolution, and experiencing the social dynamism which flowed from the attainment of national sovereignty and popular representative government, the industrial

1. Bergamini, *Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy*, p.218
revolution and an unprecedented degree of mass immigration.

By the time of the Meiji Restoration, the United States had weathered a civil war, emerging with a strengthened industrial base and a self-confident, heterogeneous society set, with Britain and Germany, to initiate and to exploit the second phase of the industrial revolution, the era of steel, oil and electricity.

Even though, unlike Japan, the United States possessed within its own borders large quantities of the natural resources needed for this phase of industrialisation, it was also the era of American imperialism overseas, and in this, as they had done ever since the landing at Plymouth Rock, Americans looked westward. By the end of the nineteenth century, the U.S. had acquired North Pacific territories and the Philippines, the latter conferring on its possessor the status of an imperial power in Asia. The goal of this territorial expansion was plainly hegemonic: President Theodore Roosevelt stated that the Pacific era, "destined to be the greatest of all", was at its dawn; moreover, as another contemporary American politician claimed, the "power that rules the Pacific is the power that rules the world". 1

The United States at the same time acquired, or at least articulated, a moral justification for its expansionist behaviour. In 1850, an American journalist had written that his countrymen had, "...a destiny to perform, a 'manifest destiny'...the haughty Japanese tramplers upon the cross [must]

1. Roosevelt and Senator A.J. Beveridge quoted in Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary History, p.76
be enlightened in the doctrines of republicanism and the ballot box...and a successor of Washington ascend the chair of universal empire." 1 The Americans had, as it were, picked up "the white man's burden", as Arthur Conan Doyle had noted when visiting the U.S. in 1894: "The centre of gravity of race is over here, and we have to readjust ourselves." 2

The Japanese at this time were readjusting to being part of international society once more. However, it was a society far removed from that which had existed when Japan's era of seclusion begun, when "few Japanese questioned the assumption that East Asia was coeval with the civilized world". 3 And, the "centre of gravity of race" in that world had always been China. Yet, by the mid-nineteenth century, it was possible for the Russian general, Dragomirov, to assert that "Far Eastern affairs are decided in Europe"; 4 and in America, it could be added with respect to Japan.

The United States demand that Japan open up to trade, delivered by Commodore Perry and about one quarter of the American navy to the Tokugawa government in Edo in 1853, was a

1. De Bow, J.D.B, quoted in Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary History, p.102

2. Quoted in Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary History, p.75

3. Welfield, John, An Empire in Eclipses, p.2

4. Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary History, p.93
reflection of America's economic and territorial expansionism. There has long been a strong current of isolationist sentiment in the United States, many of whose settlers had fled the bitter wars, prejudices and injustices of European society. Yet, although the U.S. experienced strong bouts of isolationism during the first half of the twentieth century, it did not forgo its North Pacific territories such as Hawaii and Guam, nor the Philippines, and its isolationist periods may thus, in contrast to Japan's, be seen more as an exercise in post-industrial self-sufficiency than a defence against a serious threat to its sovereignty. Although the U.S. has been wary of entanglement in major armed conflicts outside the western hemisphere, and accordingly entered the First and Second World Wars long after the other major combatants, it prevailed in both wars and emerged from the latter as the most militarily and economically powerful nation in the world.

Commodore Perry's mission to Japan was an early indication of where American expansionism would ultimately lead, for it was "in the Pacific that the United States first trod the path to world power",¹ and that path would end, as it had begun, in conflict with Japan. The outcome of that conflict, if it should lead to outright war between the two nations, was also strongly indicated by the contrasting experience of the two nations in territorial expansion and international warfare up to that point, as well as the enormous, and more tangible, disparity in their capacity for industrial self-sufficiency.

¹. Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary History, p.102
CHAPTER II
IGNORING THE LEGACY OF HISTORY

Synopsis

This period in the history of Japan, from the Meiji Restoration of 1868 to the end of the Second World War, and in particular the Pacific War between Japan and the United States, reveals how, in its haste and determination from the mid-nineteenth century to abandon its strict isolationism and pre-industrial economy, Japan, in effect, went too far: it also, hastily and determinedly, abandoned its customary discreet approach to power politics and its aversion to external aggression. The result of Japan's modern half-century of graduated territorial expansion was to bring it into armed conflict with other Pacific powers, including, finally, the United States, and hence to a military defeat far more crushing than Paekchongang and far more costly to human life than the carnage of Hideyoshi's war with China. This program of empire-building was embarked upon by Japanese militarists, despite consistent warnings about the folly of their ambitions from eminent political and military figures, including such luminaries as the statesman Prince Saionji Kinmochi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Navy, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, and Japan's Ambassador to Britain and later first elected postwar Prime Minister, Yoshida Shigeru; and despite early disillusion and
opposition, which was widespread and on occasion even violent, on the part of the ordinary people of Japan. Indeed, the economic burden of dramatic military build-ups and external warfare was realised, and strongly and widely protested against, by the Japanese masses long before the advent of the final and disastrous phase of Japan's imperialistic aggression; such protests, in the streets and in the form of majority votes for parliamentary parties with anti-fascistic platforms, continued even after the Japanese people were subjected to an intense and pervasive program of militaristic indoctrination in the 1930s. However, because the prewar Japanese Constitution failed to place sufficient power over national policy in the hands of elected representatives of the people; because it failed to bring about universal adult suffrage; and because, in particular, it failed to explicitly entrench control of the Army and Navy in civilian hands, the document failed also to prevent Japan from gradually adopting the militaristic, externally aggressive policies also adopted, to their eventual detriment, by the fascist powers of Europe.

Yet, this fateful half-century was also, and more encouragingly, marked by further evidence of Japan's extraordinary capacity for the adaption of foreign technology, and for rapid economic development, the benefits of which were felt in a raised standard of living for ordinary Japanese, except, significantly, at those times when this new-found national wealth was diverted to fund a series of wars abroad. The Meiji, Taisho and early Showa eras, coinciding with the last phase of territorial expansion by the old European powers,
thus produced two distinct and largely contradictory theories as to how Japan should best conduct its domestic and international affairs: one, was to submit the nation to military rule at home and military expansionism abroad; the other, was to encourage democracy and a more pacifist, trade-oriented foreign policy. By August 1945, the former theory had been discredited; since 1945, Japan has revived and, for the most part, abided by the latter theory, which is essentially a modernised version of the politically and militarily isolationist, but economically expansionary foreign policies which have been evident during those periods of Japanese history in which the nation has prospered. Chapter II of this paper therefore furnishes further historical evidence that Japan's current defence policy represents a continuance or development of beliefs and practices which have recurrent throughout the nation's long history. In particular, the paper argues that the strength and persistence of modern Japanese pacifism is to a significant extent a product of this historical continuum.
From the Meiji era to the Taisho era: a study in contradictions

Tokugawa Ieyasu’s belief that it was in Japan’s best interest to hold itself aloof from power politics was seemingly validated by the early stages of the nation’s forced return to international society in the mid-nineteenth century. It was virtually powerless before Commodore Perry’s cannon, and before those of the British fleet, which destroyed the southern Japanese city of Kagoshima in 1863. One year later, the Chosu forts on the Straits of Shimonoseki were razed by a Western fleet. No typhoon materialised to disperse the foreign intruders, and Japanese weapons technology had fallen far behind that of the West, so the Edo government, already weakened and facing revolt by discontented noblemen from southern Japan, had no choice but to admit defeat in the face of such force majeure and "the full unequal treaty system developed in China was applied to Japan." 1

During those periods when it had been open to outside influence in the past, such as in the sixth, seventh and eighth centuries and in the sengoku jidai, Japan had experienced social and political upheaval and had exhibited unusual interest, but little talent, in playing power politics and attempting the conquest of neighbouring states. The course of Japan’s history during the century which followed the arrival of Perry’s ships was to follow the same pattern. Thus, initially, the shogun’s

1. Reischauer, The Japanese, p. 79
accession to America's demands further undermined the authority of the government in Edo, caused a widening of the rift between the Tokugawas and the court in Kyoto, and produced a civil war, although one which proved shorter and less destructive than the sengoku jidai. The result was the fall of the Tokugawa bakufu system and its replacement by a form of oligarchy, comprised largely of noblemen and samurai from the Chosu and Satsuma clans of southern Japan, which operated in the name of the Meiji Emperor, much as the Fujiwara and the various bakufu had done. Nevertheless, despite the ascendancy of the Chosu and Satsuma clique and the continued machinations of the ever-present Fujiwara, the young Meiji Emperor was one of the few of his kind who had both the opportunity and the talent to exercise real power during his reign.

True to its established pattern, Japan's exposure to the outside world and its ensuing political perturbations in the latter half of the nineteenth century were accompanied by a burgeoning foreign trade and a thirst for foreign knowledge. Just as it had done in the great Taika Reforms which preceded Paekchongang and during the latter days of the sengoku jidai before Hideyoshi's assault on China, Meiji Japan now sought to improve its position in international society by utilising suitable foreign innovations, including advances in military technology, derived from the region's prevailing hegemonic power,
which in the post-industrial world meant Europe. The Japanese would thus be able to "expel the barbarians" in the modified sense of achieving security from the West and political equality with it."

This process would be the most exacting attempt at national transformation undertaken by Japan since its assimilation of Chinese culture which had begun in earnest in the sixth century. Yet, whereas the Sinification of Japan took several centuries, the process of Westernisation was to be achieved in decades. This in itself was sufficient to ensure some rough passages in the process, especially as Japan had shown a propensity to civil strife when exposed to novel foreign influences, and a need to prove at least the equal of its foreign exemplars in the game of power politics. The dislocation would be further accentuated during the Meiji, Taisho and early Showa era, because having come to the end of the long straight track of Tokugawa rule, Japan's leadership was now faced with choosing from a multiplicity of untried roads which promised to lead to potentially very different versions of a modern, industrialised Japan. For example, Japan's more ardent "Westernisers" believed the best way to progress would be by:

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1. One other notable parallel between the Taika Reforms, Hideyoshi's bakufu and the Meiji Restoration was that each introduced a program whereby the state assumed sole responsibility for the waging of war: in the first two instances by the forcible collection of weaponry, and in the third, by the more subtle but similarly effective expedients of making samurai subject to the same laws prohibiting murder and violence as all other citizens, and establishing universal manhood conscription for a national army and navy. In all cases, the external aggression subsequently attempted by the Japanese state ended in failure.

2. Reischauer, The Japanese, p.80
uprooting the nefarious influence of Chinese civilization, with its...pessimistic view of war, its emphasis on stability, hierarchy and order in international society, and substituting more robust and assertive Western models in its place. This required abandoning Japan's deeply rooted sense of community with China and Korea.

Another school of thought, not incompatible with the above, emphasised the desirability of Japan using Western military means to oust Western influence, in particular in the form of imperial Britain and Russia, from Asia, creating instead a Pan-Asian community centred on Japan, with the divine emperor at its heart. The notion of incorporating "liberated" Asian states into an Asian confederation was one means of avoiding or ameliorating the daunting and discomforting task of rejecting Chinese and Korean values and replacing them with Western ones. As John Welfield has noted, this Pan-Asianist vision represented, in many respects, a return to the "ideals of Prince Shotoku, the sixth-century Buddhist aristocrat who presided over the Sinification of the original Japanese state." 

Opinion on the way in which China and Korea and other states were to be incorporated ranged from advocacy of armed force to allowing a peaceful process of unification, already perceived by some as underway, to run its course. The pacifist vision of Japan's potential as the "centre of gravity of race" also proposed a future role for Japan as a bridge of understanding.

1. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp.5-6
2. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.9
between East and West.¹

The one outstanding difference between all these theories of how Japan might best protect itself and usurp the Western role in Asia, and the theories of Japan's place in international society which had prevailed for the best part of two thousand years was that never before had the Japanese seriously postulated that their nation, rather than China, was the centre of the East Asian world. Ultimately, the short-lived empire which Japan created in the Asia-Pacific region would include elements of Western-style imperialism, Japanese nationalism and Pan-Asianism.²

The Meiji Constitution was promulgated in 1889 as a gift of the Emperor to the people. It was a debatable gift, for the people would continue to be "reigned over and governed" by the Emperor, and the document's ambiguities would facilitate the eventual erosion of civil administration. These ambiguities enabled the Meiji Constitution to be all thing to all men. Thus, for those among the Japanese leadership who were genuine liberals, the document was "an opening wedge for their plan to rationalise the mystical relationship between people and Throne and make the Emperor as being under law."³ For those Japanese whose prime objective was to make their country an

¹ Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp.10-11
² However, it is salutary to compare the term, "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere", with its connotations of egalitarianism and munificence, with the more brutally frank "Third Empire" of Nazi Germany. Even at the height of its imperial power, the Japanese island-nation seems to have had difficulty in escaping its Sinocentric heritage and accepting the proposition that it was no longer on the periphery of things.
³ Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, p.260
internationally-recognised Great Power, the document would serve as evidence that Japan possessed a legally binding and explicit social contract, which would obviate the need for foreign jurisdiction over foreign residents and business interests in Japan, and hence necessitate the renegotiation of unequal treaties.

By 1894, Britain was sufficiently impressed by Japan's modernisation to agree to relinquish its extra-territorial privileges by 1899, and other nations followed its example. 1894 was also the year in which Japan eschewed the "pessimistic view of war" and the legacy of past defeats by China, by sending an army to Korea, where it easily defeated Chinese forces, much to the surprise of the Western powers. 1 In 1895, the war concluded with China's agreeing to an independent Korea and Japan's acquisition of Taiwan and the tip of southern Manchuria, the Liaotung Peninsula. Japan was also accorded the "same unequal diplomatic and commercial privileges the Westerners had extorted." 2 Even at this very early stage, the idealistic Pan-Asianist vision of a form of "Pax Japonica" was proving elusive:

1. This was not, strictly speaking, the first engagement by Japanese forces abroad since Hideyoshi's campaigns: after the Meiji oligarchy was dissuaded from launching an invasion of Korea in the 1870s, it gave approval for a number of unemployed samurai to fight "a few aborigines in Taiwan (Formosa) who had killed some Okinawan mariners". (Reischauer, Japan, p.146) However, the skirmish did not constitute a war against another state, having more in common with the exploits of the wako pirate-traders than the progressively more ambitious Japanese wars of expansion fought after 1894. It did, however, have a significant if fortuitous result for Japan: the indemnity paid by China to Japan for the incident unwittingly confirmed Japan's claim to sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands.

2. Reischauer, Japan, p.147
being new entrants in the game of power politics, the inexperienced Japanese were closely following the example of its accomplished Western practitioners.

Yet, at an even earlier stage, in the 1870s, there were Japanese leaders who harboured doubts that overseas aggression by Japan would be successful, or, if successful, worth the effort.¹ There were those who pointed out with great prescience that a Japanese invasion of the East Asian mainland could result in Japan's exhaustion and a further increase in Western military power and territorial possessions in the region. After five years of argument, the anti-war faction triumphed, but only for a time.²

The victory over China in 1895 henceforth strengthened the argument of those men who saw Japan's future as a secure and prosperous Great Power being principally guaranteed not by trade and diplomacy, but by military strength and economic autonomy achieved by the forceful acquisition of land and resources. This was, of course, the prevailing view in international society in the late nineteenth century. And, as Richard Rosecrance has pointed out, it remained largely thus until recent decades, when weapons of mass destruction, global economic interdependence and the remarkable rise to prosperity of a militarily weak and empire-less Japan (and Germany), have combined to mitigate what he has termed the "worst aspects of the Westphalian system with

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1. See: Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, p. 257
2. See: Blainey, The Causes of War, pp. 59-60; and, Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, p. 256
its emphasis on territoriality, sovereignty and a spurious independence”. Yet, it is reasonable to question the wisdom of those who advocated Japanese territorial expansionism at the turn of the century, for while they could not see into the future, they could look back on the past, and reflect on Japan’s poor performance as an external aggressor and aspiring hegemonic power.

Soon after Japan’s victory over China, the pitfalls awaiting the inexpert player of late nineteenth century power politics became evident to the Japanese when they were forced by Russia, France, and Germany to surrender control of the Liaotung Peninsula of southern Manchuria back to China. This “lesson in power politics was made all the more bitter for the Japanese when the Russians appropriated the area for themselves three years later.”

In 1904-5 Japan fought Russia, again over control of Korea. The world was even more surprised by Japan’s victory in this war than it had been by its victory in the war against China. In particular, Japan’s defeat of the Czar’s Baltic Fleet in the Straits of Tsushima was a compelling sign that Japan was becoming a major naval power. Even more compelling, and to the Western powers, more alarming was evidence that an Asian nation could vanquish a European one.

Mindful of what it saw as Russia’s duplicity over the Liaotung Peninsula, and to help ensure the outcome of the war, Japan "set

1. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State, p.211
2. Reischauer, The Japanese, p.90
a new pattern for modern warfare by first crippling Russian naval strength in East Asia and then declaring war." \(^1\)

The ploy worked to the extent that Russia acknowledged Korea as being within Japan's sphere of influence, transferred to Japan its lease of the Liaotung Peninsula and its railways in southern Manchuria, and ceded to Japan the southern half of the island of Sakhalin. Another expedient which held great promise was Japan's new alliance with Britain \(^2\), the first ever equal alliance between a Western and non-Western power. It was based on the old Japanese principle of aligning with the stronger against the weaker and was specifically intended to prevent other Western powers, including in particular Russia, from again "ganging up" on Japan.

However, despite its apparently sound victories over China and Russia, there were signs that Japan's resources would be severely taxed were it to attempt further expansion of its empire, and that the Japanese people were not in any case convinced that aggressive empire-building was an efficient way of advancing the national interest. Before the Sino-Japanese War, China had already been weakened by internal political disorder and the inroads of Western imperialism. Russia had also to cope with revolutionary movements during its war with Japan, which was moreover fought on the extreme eastern boundary of the Russian empire, at the end of a single-track railway several thousand miles long; the Russian Baltic Fleet had had to travel more than

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1. Reischauer, Japan, p.148

2. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed in 1902, lapsed in 1921 and was terminated two years later.
halfway around the world before it was set upon by the entire Japanese navy operating in its home waters. Despite its pre-emptive launch of the war, and its geo-strategic advantages, a year-and-a-half of fighting left Japan "so exhausted that she welcomed the peace arranged by President Theodore Roosevelt, who greatly admired Japanese efficiency and pluck".¹

Such admiration was only possible for as long as Japan was content to control parts of Northeast Asia far from American territories and interests. Admiration for Japan's expansionist program on the part of the Japanese public had already waned as a result of the damage done to the economy by the war against Russia. So desperate for a settlement was the Japanese government that, while it gained territory, it had to accept the loss of an expected cash indemnity, and this so infuriated the public that massive riots broke out in every major Japanese city.

The violence reached such a pitch that the government proclaimed martial law and the war Cabinet of General Katsura Taro had to resign. The new government was headed by Prince Saionji...[and being] known as an opponent of the war, he successfully soothed the angry people, but he also shouldered for his Constitutionalist party the grievous financial problems and unpopular austerity created by the war.²

This profound resentment on the part of the Japanese public at being falsely persuaded by militarists that war was the path to prosperity, rather than a sure road to pointless carnage and

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1. Reischauer, Japan, p.148
2. Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, p.282

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poverty, would find its fullest and most durable expression
during the second half of the twentieth century in popular
resistance to Japan's postwar military build-up.

Opposition to expansionism was still strong among the Japanese
populace even after Japan annexed Korea in 1910, at no cost to
itself. Britain accepted the move as the quid pro quo for Japan's
support: the Anglo-Japanese alliance also ensured that there was
no resistance offered by any of the other Great Powers. Yet, only
two years after such a painless example of empire building, when
it became known that a militarist faction had engineered an
effective coup d'état, popular resentment at this affront to
constitutional government and fear of an impending return to
territorial expansionism produced a repetition of the
disturbances which followed the Russo-Japanese peace treaty.
Again, there were massive riots in Tokyo, Kobe, and Osaka,
newspaper offices were burned, and mobs waged pitched battles
with the police. The nation had been brought to the verge of
civil war, when a new, popularly acceptable Cabinet was installed
and promptly cancelled most of the expensive military expansion
program which had been ordered by its predecessor.¹

During the course of the crisis, an event had occurred which
underscored the growing independence of democratic forces in the
Japanese political system: the Constitutionalist party had voted
not to comply with a request made in the name of the Taisho
Emperor that it cease its opposition in the Diet to the
militarists' new political arrangements. It is highly probable

¹ See: Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, pp.292-296
that, as David Bergamini has stated, "Never before in the history of Japan had an express imperial order been rejected outright."¹

The outbreak of the First World War provided an opportunity for those Japanese in favour of territorial expansionism to satisfy their ambitions with relative ease and at no great cost to the nation. While the European powers fought on the other side of the globe between 1914 and 1918, Japan, as an ally of Britain, assumed control of German territories in East Asia and the North Pacific, and took the opportunity of exacting more concessions from China, the subsequently infamous "Twenty-One Demands".² It appeared at the Versailles Peace Conference as one of the victorious Great Powers.

The Meiji leaders, who had set out in 1868 to create a Japan that would be militarily secure from the West and fully equal to it, had, within the very lifetimes of their more long-lived members, done exactly that. Few generations of political leaders anywhere have proved as successful within the limits of their own goals.³

To a considerable extent, however, that success was fragile or even illusory. Japan had done very little in the war, and yet what little it had done proved unpopular with the Japanese

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1. Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, p.294
2. This was a particularly notable example of Japan's lack of finesse when attempting to play power politics, and of what extensive damage to its wider and longer-term interests such an "ill-conceived and clumsily handled diplomatic offensive" could do: the offensive, planned by Japan's military attache in Beijing and an official of the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo, was so repugnant to Chinese nationalists and Americans, that after "1915 Japan never recovered, in the eyes of the American people, the moral prestige -- so high in 1905 -- that was lost at that time...[henceforth, in] terms of propaganda the Chinese, who of course often had a good case, swept the field." (Storry, A History of Modern Japan, pp.151, 123-154)
3. Reischauer, Japan, p.150
public, whose analysis of the cost benefits of warfare for their nation was evidently more sober and, in the long term, more accurate than that of many of their leaders.

Between 1915 and 1917, Britain had been pressing its Japanese ally to shore up the eastern front by moving troops westwards from Vladivostok, but because Japan could not be certain of the outcome of the conflict, discretion, once again, seemed the better part of valour. Japan also ignored repeated British requests for it to send troops to the western front, and instead sent destroyers to the Mediterranean and troops to help quell unrest in Singapore and protect British interests in Hong Kong and Shanghai. This Japanese unwillingness to involve its troops in other people's wars was fully in accordance with its behaviour since its stunning defeat at Paekchongang in the seventh century, and had thus far served Japan comparatively well, even if it had disappointed or annoyed those embattled foreign leaders who had hoped to elicit more substantial Japanese assistance than bullocks' horns. In order to help preserve its amicable relations with Britain, however, Japan would have been well advised to have moved with less speed and apparent opportunism in seizing German mandates and leaseholds in the Asia-Pacific region. And, to at least maintain the appearance of consistency in its policy on affording minimal assistance to allies, and to again avoid the appearance of opportunism, Japan should have offered only token participation in, or refrained altogether from, an allied intervention in Siberia in 1918.

However, after the United States joined the allies against
Germany in 1917, Japan felt more confidence in the allied cause, and, when America sought allied assistance in July, 1918, not to fight Germany but to fight Bolshevism in Siberia on behalf of the White Russians, the Japanese Cabinet, which was dominated by Army interests, agreed to dispatch thirty-thousand troops. The size of the Japanese contingent and the speed of its deployment, and the alacrity with which the Japanese Cabinet responded to this chance of achieving a further extension of an already strong Japanese military presence in and around Manchuria, surprised and disturbed the United States government and even sections of opinion in Japan’s ally, Britain.¹

Japanese troops remained in Siberia until 1922, but as an intended force of leverage in international politics rather than as a serious bulwark against Bolshevism, because the White Russian cause had quickly proven hopeless. Overall, the exercise not only failed to secure Japan’s short-term objective of installing a White Russian regime and a lasting Japanese presence in Siberia, but it, and other Japanese wartime operations, also failed to obtain for Japan the complete equality it sought with the Western Great Powers at either the Versailles Conference of 1919, or the Washington Naval Conference of 1921. The intervention was also detrimental to long-term Japanese interests, because of the hostility engendered in Japan’s big Soviet neighbour by its championing of anti-revolutionary forces, the massacres of Russian civilians carried out, under orders, by

¹ Bergamini, Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy, p.305; and, Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.15
its troops and its four years of military rule over the eastern sector of the Trans-Siberian Railway and Vladivostok. 1

As had happened before Paekchongang and Hideyoshi's war on China, those among Japan's leadership who favoured overseas aggression had again demonstrated their propensity to misjudgment.

The intervention was highly unpopular with the Japanese people. Throughout August, 1918, after the decision for it was made:

Japanese housewives staged riots in the major cities, burning warehouses in protest against the high price of rice. Soldiers complained that no one would come to see them off when they left for the front, and many of them wore civilian clothes so that they would not be recognised as Army men. 2 As a result of the popular protest, the [Army dominated] government resigned in late September, and Emperor Taisho mollified the mobs by appointing in its place Japan's first true party government, presided over by a commoner... 3

In 1905, the Japanese public had protested against what it deemed the meagre rewards of a costly and bloody war against Russia; in 1912, it had protested even more vehemently against the installation of a Cabinet dominated by militaristic

1. See: Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, pp.302-305; and, Blainey, The Causes of War, p.47. Blainey points out that "one of the rosary beads of U.S. nationalism during the Vietnam war was the belief that [the] U.S.A. had never lost a war. The war of intervention in Russia had been forgotten". Nevertheless, this does not detract from the argument put forward in this paper that Japan has been a singularly inept foreign aggressor, because such a loss for U.S. forces fighting abroad was an exception, whereas for Japanese forces fighting abroad, it was more often the rule.

2. It is interesting to note that in postwar Japan, members of the Self Defence Force are similarly rarely seen in uniform outside SDF bases, because of the public's disenchchantment with militarism.

3. Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, p.304. For a post-W.W.II analysis of the frequency of popular disturbances in Japan, their severity, and political and social implications, see Chapter III, pp. 80-82, of this paper.

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interests; in 1918, it had protested once more against the cost of a military intervention, creating what has been described as the greatest social upheaval in modern Japanese history.¹ As a result of popular pressure, militaristic Cabinets had been forced out of office in 1912 and 1918. In 1912, the Diet had sided with the public in opposing the militarists' coup, and its Constitutionalist party members had, in an unprecedented instance of lese-majeste, refused to comply with a direct request from the Emperor that they cease criticism of a planned military build up.

It was evident that a deep division of opinion had opened between militaristic interests and the public and parliamentary parties over Japan's internal political arrangements and the course it should pursue to secure its sovereignty and prosperity in international society. From the point of view of those who believed the best course was to permit less democratic latitude internally, and to promote armed expansionism externally, the public and Diet would need to be taken in hand and re-educated.

Undaunted by the lessons of history or by considerations of cost-effectiveness and just where empire building might eventually lead their nation, Japan's militarists saw victories over China, Russia and Germany as an encouraging sign that Japan, too, might aspire to fulfilling a "manifest destiny". It was also becoming obvious that Japan would have to fulfil that destiny on its own, proving beyond doubt that it was equal, indeed, superior, to the Western powers. For, despite Japan's prominence

¹. Sugimoto, Popular Disturbance in Postwar Japan, p.68
at Versailles, it became apparent shortly after that, when it came to the equality of Great Powers, some were more equal than others.

The Washington Naval Conference of 1921 set the ratio of capital ships possessed by Japan, the United States and Britain at 3:5:5. American concern about Japan's territorial expansionism had emerged shortly after the Russo-Japanese War, and the world tour of Roosevelt's "Great White Fleet" at that time was "primarily designed to impress the Japanese with the awesome potentialities of American power." Such concern had been increased by Japan's seizure of German assets in the Pacific in 1914, and its large-scale intervention in Siberia.

While its invitation to the Washington conference in 1921 seemed a confirmation of Japan's parity with the West, and agreements on China and military bases in Asia and the Pacific seemed to lessen friction between Japan and the U.S. and Britain, the lower number of capital ships allowed the Japanese navy offended militarist and nationalist groups in Japan. In private, the military strategists of both Japan and the United States were preparing for inevitable conflict between their two nations. Britain, too, was growing weary of its alliance with Japan, under which "it had given too much and gotten too little in return", and wary of Japanese territorial ambitions in the Far East. The alliance was terminated in 1923, the British having belatedly

1. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p. 14
2. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp. 14-15
3. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p. 15
realised that Japan had not been playing balance of power politics in East Asia, but had taken the necessary first steps towards the creation of an Asian empire, with Britain's encouragement.

Some postwar Japanese commentators have nevertheless claimed that the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese alliance made Japan's next phase of rapid and much more ambitious territorial expansionism almost inevitable. Their argument is that, while Japan felt itself protected by Britain, it was to a significant extent able to divert its energy and resources away from military programs and into the development of democratic institutions and a raised standard of living for all its citizens. ¹ The combination of Japan being bereft of Great Power protection and the increasing hostility of the international political and economic environment in the wake of the Wall Street Crash of 1929 served, it is argued, to strengthen the hand of those misguided individuals who favoured the securing of Japan's national sovereignty by the build-up of a more powerful autonomous military capability and the securing of lebensraum and vital resources by force of arms.² Japan was, in effect, reacting with the over-compensative bravado of a frightened child suddenly bereft of its parents in an unfriendly world. This variation on ¹. See: Okazaki, "The Restructuring of the U.S.-Japan Alliance", pp.135 & 141

². According to Fujii Hiroaki, the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance meant that "Japanese foreign policy was in effect cut adrift from the moorings that had steadied it ever since the Meiji Restoration"; see, "Japan's Foreign Policy in an Interdependent World", p.122
the oyabun/kobun theme may be part of the explanation for the phenomenon of Japanese militarism and expansionism in the 1930s and 1940s. Another part, and probably the greater, was the wilful disregard of Japan's exhaustion at the end of its war with Russia, of its earlier outright failures in territorial expansionism and of the limitations of its current military and industrial capabilities. The impulse for this, as Barbara Tuchman has stated, came not from a patriotic desire to protect Japan, but "from the compelling lure of dominion, from pretensions of grandeur, from greed." ¹

In Japan in the early 1920s, however, militaristic interests were forced to play a diminished role in national affairs because of the comparatively peaceful international environment and because this state of affairs reflected the will of the Japanese public and its representatives in the Diet. The economic and social changes of the Meiji and the Taisho eras had gradually produced a parliament and electorate which exercised a greater degree of independence and influence over national affairs than Japan's nineteenth century reformers had foreseen. Even the initially small body of male voters "proved to be far more politically conscious and cantankerous than expected." ²

The politicians in the Diet used their control over the budget

1. Tuchman, The March of Folly, p.32. Japan's empire also foundered on its disregard of rising Asian nationalism, especially in China. However, Japan was certainly not alone in this miscalculation, which was also made, at great cost, by various European powers and the United States in the postwar era. However, as the Japanese are themselves Asian, the failure of their leaders to appreciate the nationalist aspirations of their neighbours may be accounted a greater folly than that of Western governments.

2. Reischauer, The Japanese, p.91
to prise a share of real political power from the military, the court and other unelected policy makers. Ever since the Russo-Japanese war, it had been apparent that the dramatic economic growth of the country would not result in a commensurate improvement in living standards for the majority of Japanese, if the government's first priority was to build up Japan's military power and finance its wars. In consideration of this, and of the violent popular protests it had caused, and given that Japan and its foreign territories seemed secure in the early 1920s, the Diet decided to cut the size of the standing army and drastically reduce the military share of the budget. According to Edwin Reischauer, this was one of several developments which "showed the tendency of the party governments to rely for Japan's economic security on trade with the outside world rather than on military expansion."¹ In 1925, an unprecedentedly large proportion of Japan's population gained considerable influence over national affairs by the granting of universal manhood suffrage.

However, the Meiji Constitution, under which such democratic changes could take place, also provided for changes of a different and contradictory sort, for although the Diet had to vote both the military and civilian budgets, the Constitution assigned direct control of the Imperial Army and Navy to the Emperor. This meant that, in effect, the armed forces were not less, the effective fraction from civilian control of the

¹ Reischauer, The Japanese, p.94
completely free of civilian control,¹ and this freedom would eventually prove useful to those militaristic elements who felt the surest way to commit their nation to a course of further territorial expansionism was to present the Cabinet, Diet and people of Japan with a *fait accompli*.

**The early Showa era: a study in conflict**

Japan's need for imported raw materials and overseas markets may have continued to have been satisfied, both in fact and in the perception of its leaders, by its existing empire and political, diplomatic and trading arrangements, had the Great Depression not intervened. However, this could have served merely to hasten the onset of empire-building, because Japan's foreign policy may indeed have already been "adrift" after the loss of its mooring in the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and its militarists already seduced by "the compelling lure of dominion" by the time commodity prices fell and the Wall Street Crash occurred. The latter event was both shocking and frightening, and was but one in a series of disasters which undermined confidence in the Western capitalistic and individualistic ethos. The constriction of world trade, the collapse of the international financial system and mass unemployment; the accentuation of chauvinism in international relations, the advent of fascism in Europe; and, not least, the effective freedom from civilian control of the

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Japanese Army in Manchuria, all no doubt contributed to Japan's return to military rule and expansionism. A further significant contribution to this, and to Japan's eventual decision to ally itself with Germany and Italy, was made by the consolidation of communist rule in Russia, the support being given to Chinese communists and Korean nationalists by Josef Stalin, and the activities of the Japanese underground left.¹

Nevertheless, despite its previous centuries of government by bakufu, the lingering authoritarian and elitist elements in private and public life, and its victories over China and Russia, Japan's passage from democracy to military rule was neither especially swift, nor smooth, nor, unlike in Germany, the result of a popular mass movement. Much of the Japanese electorate and the parliamentary parties continued to resist the encroachment of militarism in the 1920s, although most Dietmen remained conservative enough to approve the Peace Preservation Law of 1925, which would prove to be an important instrument of state repression, in particular from the early 1930s to 1945.² Yet, even during the 1930s, when Japan's education system and mass media were being used with increasing vigour to indoctrinate the Japanese people with extremely chauvinistic and militaristic views and ideals,³ the parliamentary parties continued to gain impressive electoral victories, and a new leftist vote was increasing.

¹ Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp.17-18
² See: Reischauer, Japan, pp.173 & 198-199
³ See: Reischauer, Japan, pp.199-201
However, this took place during a period marked not only by mass indoctrination, but also by rightist political assassinations, including that of the Prime Minister by young Navy officers, an attempted military coup d'état, and the gradual replacement of civilians in the Cabinet by military men. Japanese chauvinism had been strengthened at the start of the decade by Japan's seizure of all Manchuria.

In 1930, the Cabinet had forced the Navy to accept a treaty, agreed to at the London Naval Conference, which extended to heavy cruisers the ratio of three to five with the United States and Britain that had been established in 1921. This was achieved only at the cost of almost open insubordination by the Navy. The following year, Army commanders in Manchuria and Tokyo gave their tacit approval for a group of officers to stage an incident on a railway near Mukden, which gave the Japanese Army an excuse to take control of all Manchuria, and turn it into the puppet state of Manchukuo. When the League of Nations condemned Japan's action, Japan abandoned the League. The civil government in Tokyo had no choice but to accept the new stage of imperialism instituted by the Army, and to endure the mounting hostility of the Navy. Civil government was under mounting pressure from the military and civilian rightists, who feared the perceived growth

1. It was not only the treaty provisions, but the manner in which they were ratified which angered the Imperial Navy. The Emperor, the Cabinet and the Privy Council were persuaded to accept the treaty by an acting Navy Minister who was a civilian: this was considered irregular by the Navy. Moreover, "everybody recognised that a blow had been struck for the principle of cabinet supremacy in a debatable field where considerations of foreign policy, national defence and strategy overlapped." See: Storry, A History of Modern Japan, pp.178-179
of the communist threat, and leftists, who feared Japan's adoption of fascism. The ascendancy of the anti-communists was manifested in the signing by Japan and Germany of the anti-Comintern Pact in 1936. ¹

The triumph of the military over Japanese political life came effectively in 1937, when all party collaboration in the Cabinet was eliminated under a prime minister who was an Army general; and when the Japanese Army refused to accede to Chiang Kai-Shek's demand that it stop its gradual extension of control over northern China and Mongolia. Although few people outside China or Japan realised it, the Second World War had begun.

It might still have been possible for Japan to avoid outright war with the United States, but indications thus far were that it would not. Mao Tse-tung pointed out at the time that Japan's Chinese campaign was most likely part of a grander plan: Japan was set on a course aimed not just at control of East Asia, but of Southeast Asia as well, and as a corollary of this, at control of the China seas and the southern part of the Pacific. Such a course would inevitably bring Japan into conflict with other Pacific powers, including the United States.²

Japan, having judged that Germany and Italy were destined to


². Mao's remarks were reported by Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, London, 1937, pp.94, 102; quoted in Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary History, p.28. The US government, under pressure from isolationists and the more powerful elements in the business community, and deeply worried about the threat of war in Europe, continued to try and avoid opening a conflict in the Pacific: see Costello, The Pacific War, p.61.
emerge from the war dominant in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, had according to its customary practice aligned itself with the perceived rising fortunes of the fascist powers under the Tripartite Pact of 1940. This alliance, and Japan’s provocation of the U.S., were to prove far more disastrous than its similar miscalculations of the relative strengths of other powers prior to the battle of Paekchongang and Hideyoshi’s campaign against China.

By 1941, American economic and oil sanctions had left Japan with three choices: to desist from further aggression in China; to reach a compromise settlement with the U.S.; or to strike south and seize the oil-producing Dutch East Indies. The Japanese government was "unwilling to do the first and unable to achieve the second and therefore settled on the third choice". 1

The Commander in Chief of the Imperial Navy, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, sought to convince his colleagues that Japan could not vanquish the United States and therefore should not fight the United States. When this view was condemned, he argued that to avoid disaster, Japan should cripple American naval power in the Pacific and seize what resource-rich territories it could swiftly and then, within a year, make a concerted effort to reach a compromise with America. This view was more acceptable to Yamamoto’s colleagues. 2

The attack on Pearl Harbour was to prove the most profoundly

2. see: Costello, The Pacific War, p.606; Craig, The Fall of Japan, p.xxi; Taylor, The Second World War, p.121
mistaken move in the game of power politics, and the most 
disastrous act of aggression yet undertaken by a country with a 
long and fairly satisfactory record of aloofness from power 
politics, and a short and unimpressive record of involvement in 
external aggression. It would seem as though, in its 
determination to ignore the warning inherent in the defeats of 
Paekchongang and Hideyoshi’s China campaigns, the excessive and 
debilitating cost of the war with Russia and even the 
counterproductive intervention in Siberia, Japan’s militaristic 
leadership had, as it were, been blinded also to the realities of 
the present. This led to the miscalculation which was not only 
disastrous, but strange: 

At a time when at least half the United States was strongly 
isolationist, the Japanese did the one thing that could have 
united the American people and motivated the whole nation for 
war...The fact is that Japan could have seized the Indies without 
any risk of American belligerency; no attack on Dutch, British or 
French colonial territory would have brought the United States 
into the war. Attack on American territory was just the thing --
and the only thing -- that could.1

It may be that, once a nation has embarked on a program of 
conquest which required the level of determination and energy 
that Japan’s did, it is virtually impossible to counter such 
psychological and physical momentum: discretion can no longer be 
the better part of valour. Certainly, those Japanese who 
supported the attack on Pearl Harbour were not only ignoring 
their own nation’s past history and present capabilities, but

1. Tuchman, The March of Folly, p.31
those of their adversary. The United States, with its unbroken record of success in major international wars, was highly unlikely to be so dismayed by the crippling of its Pacific fleet that it would not seek to retaliate, nor seek to contest for supremacy in the Pacific. The Japanese militarists' blindness is even more remarkable given that it was a similar action by Germany (the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare) which had brought the United States into the First World War, and which had brought about Germany's defeat.

By December, 1941, when it was poised to carry out Yamamoto's planned attack on the United States' naval base at Pearl Harbour, Japan, by virtue of the militarists' incremental rejection over five decades of the political and strategic lessons of the past two-thousand years, was not being propelled forward into regional hegemony, but backwards into a corner.

The principle means of so doing was to have Japan adopt, in 1947, a Constitution which was intended to entrench and extend the liberal provisions of the Meiji Constitution, and to excise those provisions which explicitly or implicitly facilitated the militarisation of Japanese political life. Many Western observers in Japan during the early postwar period predicted the precipitate revision or rejection of the new Constitution once the occupation ended, and while it is true that many reforms were
CHAPTER III
REMEMBERING THE PAST

Synopsis

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the consequences of Japan's eschewal of peaceful means of national advancement, and thereby the lessons of two-thousand years of largely non-aggressive and beneficial relations with the outside world, which brought upon it the very thing it had always feared and yet had avoided in the past: conquest and occupation by foreign military forces. In order to render Japan incapable of again threatening world or regional peace, the Allied Powers, led by the United States, embarked on a program of dis-arming and de-militarising Japan. They also sought to reform Japan's political, economic and social institutions in such a way as the eventually enable Japan to re-enter international society as a democratic member of the Free World.

The principle means of so doing was to have Japan adopt, in 1947, a Constitution which was intended to entrench and extend the liberal provisions of the Meiji Constitution, and to excise those provisions which explicitly or implicitly facilitated the militarisation of Japanese political life. Many Western observers in Japan during the early postwar period predicted the precipitate revision or rejection of the new Constitution once the occupation ended, and while it is true that many reforms were
to prove ineffective, or were discarded by the occupation itself, the postwar Constitution has not been revised or rejected, principally because of the strong and continued resistance to any alteration to it by the Japanese people. This is based in part on popular support for the "non-aggression and other constitutional provisions per se, and in part on the assumption that once the precedent of constitutional revision had been set, further alterations and a possible diminution or rescission of electoral and other constitutionally guaranteed popular rights and freedoms might follow.

The "non-aggression" provisions of Article IX have been circumvented to the extent that Japan now possesses what are, in effect, an Army, Navy and Air Force, but they are limited in purpose and capability to the defence of Japanese territory, and the Japanese people have consistently opposed both internal and external pressure for increases in the capacity and budget of the Self Defence Force. The Japanese government has been constrained from acting too far or too openly in defiance of public opinion when formulating defence policy, because the Japanese people enjoy an unprecedented level of political power under the postwar Constitution, and because they have long demonstrated their ability, when politically thwarted, to take their protest onto the streets, on occasion to the extent of threatening Japan with civil war. The Japanese postwar Constitution has overall proved more robust than expected, principally because a majority of the highly literate, historically aware and practical Japanese public has found it to be an efficacious means of ensuring that their nation's present defence and foreign policies more closely
resemble those of the comparatively secure and prosperous semi-isolationist periods which characterise the greater part of Japanese history, rather than the short but very costly and ultimately disastrous periods when the nation forsook diplomacy and trade and adopted militarism and territorial expansion as the primary means of advancing the national interest.

which, by mid-1942, had pushed the bounds of the empire south from Manchuria and eastern China through Southeast Asia to New Guinea, north to the Aleutians and west, across the Pacific, to beyond Wake and the Gilbert Islands. But, the Japanese Cabinet had underestimated or chosen to ignore the potential strength of the United States' war economy and its determination to destroy the Japanese military and its empire, as well as the efficiency of America's intelligence gathering, and, in particular, its ability to break and decipher Japanese codes. Thus, Yamamoto's other prediction, the Japan could not vanquish the United States, proved accurate. After the battle of Midway in June 1942, Japanese naval forces in the Pacific were gradually pushed back towards Japan, and its land forces in South East Asia and New Guinea were either defeated or isolated. American forces had already captured Okinawa and were ready to invade the main Japanese islands when atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, principally in the expectation that a demonstration of this terrible new weapon would obviate the need for an invasion of Japan in order to secure its complete and unconditional surrender. The A-bombs did succeed in persuading half of the Japanese War Cabinet and the Emperor, who held the decisive vote.
Peace and the allied occupation: a study in renewal

Japan surrendered unconditionally on August 15th, 1945. As Admiral Yamamoto had predicted, the Imperial Army and Navy had won a series of victories after the attack on Pearl Harbour, which, by mid-1942, had pushed the bounds of the empire south from Manchuria and eastern China through Southeast Asia to New Guinea, north to the Aleutians and west, across the Pacific, to beyond Wake and the Gilbert Islands. But, the Japanese Cabinet had underestimated or chosen to ignore the potential strength of the United States' war economy and its determination to destroy the Japanese military and its empire, as well as the efficiency of America's intelligence gathering, and, in particular, its ability to break and decipher Japanese codes. Thus, Yamamoto's other prediction, the Japan could not vanquish the United States, proved accurate. After the battle of Midway in June, 1942, Japanese naval forces in the Pacific were gradually pushed back towards Japan, and its land forces in South East Asia and New Guinea were either defeated or isolated. American forces had already captured Okinawa and were ready to invade the main Japanese islands when atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, principally in the expectation that a demonstration of this terrible new weapon would obviate the need for an invasion of Japan in order to secure its complete and unconditional surrender. The A-bombs did succeed in persuading half of the Japanese War Cabinet and the Emperor, who held the deciding vote,
that now was the time to publicly accept what had been apparent for some time: Japan must surrender unconditionally, or be destroyed.

Less than one-hundred years had passed since Commodore Perry's arrival in Edo Bay. Since then, Japan's interaction with the outside world had, as always, produced turmoil within the country. In 1945, however, it was not just the existing political and social system that was affected, for great tracts of the country were in ruins: precious arable land lay fallow, factories were reduced to rubble and matchsticks, cities and towns had become wastelands, razed by explosions and firestorms, and two million Japanese soldiers and civilians were dead; burned, blasted and irradiated.

Japan's modern march of folly had begun with its deceptively sound defeat of China and overly-taxing defeat of Russia at the turn of the century. Most significantly, the economic problems and the widespread popular resentment of militaristic policies which followed the Russian war was an ominous foretaste of what would happen when Japan ultimately pitted its military and industrial capacity against that of the United States. This was to be a disaster far in excess of Hideyoshi's Korean campaigns and even of Paekchongang. Japan's half century of overseas military aggression, undertaken on the pretext of protecting its sovereignty and establishing access to vital resources and markets, would succeed only in bringing about the very thing Japan had most feared and yet successfully avoided for more than a millennium: conquest and occupation by a foreign power. The kamikaze had turned on Japan.
This aggression was undertaken despite widespread and violent protest by the Japanese public, and warnings from some of the nation's most senior and well-informed public figures ever since the first mooted invasion of Korea in the 1870s. The greatest Japanese statesman of the Meiji, Taisho and early Showa period, Prince Saionji Kinmochi, had opposed the Siberian intervention, war with China, and war with the United States; a government leader and senior imperial adviser, Prince Konoye Fumimaro, had also opposed war with the United States; the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Nagano Osami, had expressed doubt that Japan could defeat the U.S.; and in 1940, the Lord Privy Seal, Marquis Kido Koichi, had predicted that:

After this world war, the United States and the U.S.S.R. may unquestionably emerge unhurt when all other nations are devastated. I can imagine, therefore, that our country, which is placed between these two giants, may face great hardships.¹

Also in 1940, Admiral Yamamoto had with great prescience told Prince Saionji's political secretary, Baron Harada Kumao, that:

It is my opinion that in order to fight the United States we must be ready to challenge the entire world... In those evil days you will see Tokyo burnt to the ground at least three times. The result will be prolonged suffering for the people. And you and Konoye and the others, pitiful as it may be to contemplate, we will probably be torn limb from limb by the masses.²

¹. Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, p.733
². Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, p.734
The masses, however, did not need to tear their wartime leaders apart, because the need for vengeance was to be satisfied by acts of seppuku on the part of various militarists and by allied war crimes tribunals. Instead, the masses did something much more constructive: they supported early postwar constitutional reforms intended to entrench and further develop the liberal political structures of the prewar era. Both the masses and the occupation authorities were aware that, as late as 1936, the Minseito party had won a strong plurality in Diet elections under the slogan, "Will it be parliamentary government or fascism?" Particularly appealing to the Japanese public were those provisions of the postwar constitution that were specifically intended to prevent re-armament, re-militarisation and renewed external aggression by Japan, and a majority has continued ever since to resist pressure for a Japanese defence build-up, whether it has come from within Japan or from the United States. For, by the start of the 1950s, Japan's conqueror

1. Reischauer, The Japanese, p.99. The Minseito Party, revived after the war as the Liberal Party, later combined with the Democratic Party to form the Liberal Democratic Party, which has since dominated Japanese politics.

2. POLL

Defense system
Appropriate Defense Efforts
Q: ...do you think defense expenditures should be increased in order to defend the peace and security of Japan? Or do you think that defense expenditures are adequate at the present levels, or should they be lower than the present levels?

Defense expenditures had better be increased...............14.2%
Defense expenditures are adequate at the present levels...54.1%
Defense expenditures may be lower than the present levels..17.7%
Don't know..................................................14.0%
and champion of Japanese pacifism had performed a *volte-face* on
Japanese re-armament.

In August, 1945, however, the United States showed no
equivocalness in establishing a constitutional framework for its
"ultimate objectives" in regard to Japan, which were:

(a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the
United States or to the peace and security of the world...
(b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and
responsible government...

These objectives will be achieved by the following principal
means...

(b) Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The
authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will
be totally eliminated from her political, economic and social
life. Institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and
aggression will be vigorously suppressed.

The principal means of achieving these objectives, and
perpetuating them, would be Article IX of the Japanese
Constitution, which sets forth Japan's "renunciation of war, non-
possession of war potential and rejection of the right of
belligerency of the state". 2

Japanese constitutional pacifism: a study in resilience

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...Continued...

(Public opinion survey conducted by the Prime Minister's Office in November


2. *Defense of Japan 1986*, p.72
It has been observed that the manner in which their postwar constitution was presented to the Japanese people "paralleled the promulgation of the Meiji constitution in 1889. Then, as in 1946, the constitution was presented as an act of good will on the part of the emperor."¹ There were other similarities too, such as in the largely unchanged operations of the Diet and the electoral system. Even the seemingly radical and highly contentious definition of the Emperor as a powerless symbol of national unity was not entirely novel. Although it had never before been stated in a public document, this had, in practice, largely been the imperial role from the rise of the Fujiwara to the Meiji Restoration: the Meiji Emperor's exercise of real political power was the exception rather than the rule, and the degree to which the Showa Emperor exercised real power before August, 1945, remains the subject of often heated debate.²

But there were significant changes as well, most of them having the objective of transferring a much greater measure of real power from the hands of the nation's largely discredited conservative political, economic and military elite to the hands of the millions of ordinary Japanese people. Their widespread and strong outbursts of resistance to authoritarian rule in pre-Tokugawa times,³ their hard-headed appraisal of the cost-

¹ Livingston et al., The Japan Reader, p.17
² see Reischauer, The Japanese, pp.106-107
³ See Chapter I, and Conclusion, of this paper for details regarding uprisings by peasants and small landowners against, in particular, the economic burden placed on them by their local lords and the rigorous centralised tax system.
benefits of war and massive anti-militarist protests in the early part of the twentieth century, and their electoral support for incipient democracy had been recognised by the occupation authorities as more in keeping with, and likely to preserve, the customary non-interventionist and pacifist tenor of Japan's foreign relations.

The mainly American drafters of Japan's postwar Constitution "wisely made their work not a new creation based on the American political system but a perfection of the British parliamentary form of government that the Japanese had been moving toward in the 1920s." 1 The Diet was assigned supreme political power, and all competing sources of power were eliminated or made clearly subordinate to it. The House of Peers was replaced by an elected House of Councillors, and cabinets were made responsible to the Diet by having the prime minister elected by the lower house. The Constitution also featured popular rights which existed in the American Constitution and others more recently formulated, including the enfranchisement of women and equality of the sexes. Whereas the Meiji Constitution emphasised duties, its successor stressed rights, such as the right to freedom of thought, the right to a good standard of living and the right to education. 2

As is always the case with such human endeavours, not all the provisions of the new Constitution came to function in quite the way the occupation authorities had intended. Since 1946, there

2. Storry, A History of Modern Japan, pp.250-253
has been "erosion" of some provisions, perhaps none more obviously, or controversially, than the "non-aggression" provisions of Article IX.

The Japanese Self Defence Force, comprising Ground, Maritime and Air arms, was created in March, 1954, in the aftermath of the Communist victory in China's civil war, and the stalemated war against Communist North Korea. In 1950, after most of the American ground forces in occupied Japan were dispatched to the Korean peninsula, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, ordered the establishment of a Japanese Police Reserve Force of 75,000 men, and the strengthening, by 8,000 men, of the Maritime Safety Force, which had been established in 1948. The Police Reserve Force was succeeded by the National Security Force in 1952; two years later, it was converted into the Ground Self Defence Force, the Maritime Safety Force was converted into the Maritime Self Defence Force, and a new arm, the Air Defence Force, was created. The authorised number of SDF personnel under the Mid-Term Defence Program (1986-1990) was 272,162: however, the actual number of SDF personnel has consistently fallen short of the target, and in the case of the Mid-Term Program, by some 10 percent. The authorised number is much lower than the 350,000 personnel envisaged by John Foster Dulles in 1952. ¹

A perhaps more significant figure is provided by comparing the percentage of regular armed forces to men of military age in Japan with the percentage in several NATO and other Western

¹ Harries, Sheathing the Sword, p.213.
states: the Japanese percentage dropped from 1.0 in 1969-70 to 0.9 in 1977-78; in 1977-78, the percentage was 3.2 in Britain, 4.8 in France, and, in Japan's erstwhile Axis partners, it was 3.8 in West Germany and 3.0 in Italy. In another U.S. Pacific region ally, Australia, the percentage was 2.5, and in non-aligned Sweden, the percentage was 4.3.¹

As employment in the Japan's civil sector affords the opportunity of both higher pay and higher status, and, for those at the top, more power, it is perhaps not surprising that Japanese who have the option seem in general to eschew a career in the SDF, which as a consequence has fallen short of the desired level, not only in quantitative, but in qualitative terms:

They are not quite reduced to accepting anyone and everyone who applies: automatically ineligible are ex-convicts, those judged mentally incompetent, and members of the Japanese Communist Party. But they have had to make the physical requirements for entry less stringent than they would like. In the mid-1970s there was, for instance, no absolute ban on soldiers who were colour-blind; and a considerable proportion of SDF members are older than is the ideal.²

Opinion polls conducted in Japan reveal a profound disenchantment with warfare, to the point of only just over half those polled by the Prime Minister's Office in 1984 stating that they were prepared to fight to defend their country: of these, 36 percent were "rather willing" to defend Japan, and only 17.6

1. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp.357-359
2. Harries, Sheathing the Sword, p.294
percent were "highly willing". In a poll conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun in 1968, 37.0 percent of respondents thought the SDF should devote its attention to disaster relief work, 24 percent thought it should devote its attention to national defence, and 19 percent thought it should devote itself to the preservation of public order.

Article IX of the Japanese Constitution has, by government interpretation, come to mean that Japan should possess the "minimum level of armed strength necessary to exercise the right of self-defense". This is, strictly speaking, an abrogation of "the renunciation of war, non-possession of war potential, and rejection of right of belligerency of the state". It is not, however, a breach of the renunciation of aggression, the act of beginning a war or mounting an unprovoked attack, for Japanese policy remains that Japan "will initiate defensive operations only when she herself is attacked by a foreign power or powers". Throughout the centuries, it has not been Japan's possession of "war potential" which has occasioned the country's military defeats, the suffering of millions of people in neighbouring countries and the devastation of Japan itself: it has been the combination of militaristic policies and the possession of war potential with a strong long-range projection capability, be it

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2. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.424
in the form of the ships sent to assist Koguryo, or the Pearl Harbour Strike Force, which has proven to be perilous.

This is why the Japanese public reacted strongly to Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko's statement in Washington in 1981 that Japan would assume responsibility for the defence of sea-lanes up to 1,000 nautical miles from the home archipelago. However, despite this agreement in theory, Japan's power projection capacity remains limited, in that neither the Maritime nor Air Self Defence Force has an independent capability to transport and sustain large expeditionary forces overseas;¹ the SDF possesses no aircraft carriers, no powerful long-range bombers, and no strategic missiles.²

The potential for Japan's acquisition of such weaponry would be significantly augmented should militaristic elements again come to prominence in government. Although civilians may espouse militaristic policies, it has been the experience of the United States and Britain, and other Western democracies, that the removal of ultimate control over the armed forces from serving military officers to civilian members of government, has assisted in preventing the domination of national political life by militaristic elements, and in avoiding the precipitation of war by military forces acting in collusion with such elements. Indeed, the opposite of militarism is, according to strict theoretical definition, "civilian-ism" rather than pacifism, and

1. For an analysis of SDF capabilities, see: Welfield, pp.356-357, 446
2. In 1995 it will, however, be deploying its own potentially offensive and very effective surface-to-surface cruise missile, the SSM-1; see Chapter IV, pp.105-106, of this paper.
to a great extent this is the case in practice as well, especially in the context of Japanese prewar politics.

For eight hundred years, from the time of Minamoto Yoritomo to the last of the Tokugawas, Japan had been subject to direct military rule. One of the means by which Japan was returned, within the framework of the Constitution, to military rule and militaristic domestic and foreign policies in the 1930s was by the gradual assumption of Cabinet control by military men. The drafters of Japan's postwar Constitution fully appreciated this and sought to prevent any recurrence by stipulating in the new document that the prime minister and a majority of his Cabinet ministers must be members of the Diet, and, most significantly, that the premier and all ministers must be civilians. ¹ This novel and very important interdiction has been neither legally abrogated or modified, nor, in practice, eroded since 1946. Similarly resilient has been the Constitution's severe curtailment of the imperial prerogative, in the name of which a number of militaristic or illiberal policies and practices were instituted in the Meiji, Taisho and early Showa era. Neither Emperor Hirohito, nor his successor, Akihito, has been restored to divine status: sovereignty still resides with the Japanese people, and Japanese governments must still be popularly elected.

¹. Storry, A History of Modern Japan, p. 252
Given that the postwar Japanese constitution has lasted for almost fifty years without amendment, it is interesting that so many observers of Japanese affairs at the time of its promulgation predicted that it would not last long without major revision or even rejection. They seemed in particular to doubt that the Japanese people would grasp and retain the spirit of democracy and pacifism embodied in the constitution. 2

1. A clear majority of Japanese have consistently expressed the view in public opinion surveys that the Constitution should not be revised. There have been studies made of the SDF's "constitutionality" and an LDP revisionist movement, headed at one stage by the former war criminal and later Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, but, apart from most Japanese not wanting to change Article IX per se, the biggest obstacle faced by revisionists is that this article is seen as a "test case for the durability of the Constitution as a whole, and too much else is at stake". (Harries, Sheathing the Sword, p.290)

The Asahi Shimbun has regularly conducted polls on amendment of Article IX:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Should Amend (%)</th>
<th>Should Not (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>61.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1969: Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.421
1978: Asahi Shimbun, 1.11.78
1981: Asahi Shimbun, 25.3.81)

2. The evidence is, however, that they did grasp what was at stake in the Constitution, in so far as rejecting or revising it could lead to a return to militarism: "loss of liberty" was the most common response as to the impact of such an eventuality; it was followed by "conscription" and "danger of war".

POLL

What would be the impact of a revival of militarism on your life?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austerity</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of liberty</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful coexistence impossible</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscription</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Accordingly, T.A. Bisson noted that there "is no background of a popular struggle to limit monarchical power" in Japan, and that the "democratization" of the emperor bids fair to make him an even greater symbol of Japanese nationalism than ever before".¹ Yet, Bisson's opinion does not take into account the fact that monarchical power in Japan had been severely limited since before the time of Minamoto Yoritomo. Under the bakufu system, and in particular during the Tokugawa period, the majority of emperors disposed of no political or military power, and frequently suffered economic hardships and social indignities: the imperial lot under military rule was more akin to the lot of the common folk of Japan than to that of a shogun or daimyo. Furthermore, it was a shogun, Hideyoshi, who launched the unsuccessful wars against China in the sixteenth century, and a samurai oligarchy, the Army in Manchuria and a coterie of presumptuous militarists in Tokyo which could be held responsible for Japan's most recent, ultimately ruinous military adventures.² This may assist in explaining how a majority of Japanese have

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Danger of war......................31
Good for business................3
Other answers.....................1
No effects........................3
No answers......................7

(AsahiShimbun poll of January, 1972; see: Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.428)

1. Bisson, Prospects for Democracy in Japan: on the constitution and retention of the emperor, see pp.20-25

2. Debate continues over Hirohito's "guilty" or "innocent" role in W.W. II: in 1946, when the constitution was promulgated, SCAP's decision not to try the emperor as a war criminal was understandably construed by Japanese as evidence of his innocence.
coped with the apparent contradictions of maintaining their emperor system and their "Western" Constitution, as well as their opposition to Japan's rearmament and remilitarisation.

John Maki, writing in late 1947, stated that "there are few good officials in the occupation who can ride themselves of the feeling that much of what they now hope will be permanent in the reform of Japan may vanish as soon as the occupation ends." 1

Similarly, Mark Gayn asserted: "What is wrong - disastrously wrong - is that this constitution does not come from the Japanese grass roots...And nothing in the constitution is more wrong than General MacArthur's own provision for the renunciation of war." 2

Yet, it has been claimed that although this provision accorded well with the aims of the occupation, it was not proposed initially by MacArthur but by the then Japanese Prime Minister, Shidehara Kijuro. 3

Since the seventh century, every attempt by the Japanese

1. Maki, "The Role of the Bureaucracy in Japan", Pacific Affairs, XX:4, p.400
2. Gayn, Japan Diary: on drafting the constitution, see pp.125-131
3. see: Storry, A History of Modern Japan, pp.251-252. Although Baron Shidehara was a member of the conservative elite, he was more aware of the strong pacifist and isolationist traditions of Japan than many of the Western observers in Japan at the time, and appeared in a comment to MacArthur to appreciate that the Japanese people would wish to retain the "non-aggression" provision of the constitution; he also appeared to assume at least shared responsibility for it with SCAP: see, Manchester, American Caesar, p.695. However, there is no direct evidence to support this contention and some well-informed people, including Shidehara's son, have denied it, claiming his father was a "realistic idealist" who had no patience with "illusory idealism"; see: Harries, Sheathing the Sword, p.215. One obvious reason why no Japanese politician would want to be associated with Article IX is that it would alienate him from the remaining militaristic or chauvinistic elements in the political, bureaucratic and business community; it would be far more expedient to attribute Article IX to SCAP or the more vague and ever serviceable gaiatsu.
state at overseas military aggression had ultimately resulted in defeat, and in the case of its most recent and most audacious attempt, in progressively more ambitious stages from 1894 to 1945, the defeat had been proportionately the most catastrophic. It is therefore reasonable to assume that over the centuries, the Japanese people would have acquired a fairly strong aversion to warfare and its practitioners. This aversion would be reinforced by the fact that Japan, unlike most other nations, had never been subjected to attempted invasion by its nearest and, at various times, more powerful neighbours; and by the observation that the only occasion on which Japan's "divine protection" had failed and the nation been conquered by a foreign power, was at the conclusion of a half-century marked by Japanese involvement in foreign conflicts, the last of which was precipitated by Admiral Yamamoto's assault on Pearl Harbour.

That a majority of Japanese are opposed to their nation's again resorting to militarism and foreign aggression is not only important to Japanese politicians because they must be elected, but because, over the centuries, the Japanese masses have frequently revolted against unpopular government policies, especially those affecting their economic wellbeing and the waging of war.

Sugimoto Yoshio has presented evidence that in the first decade of the Meiji Restoration, there were many more incidents of public disturbance in Japan than in France and Germany during approximately the same period. The recorded incidents in Japan, between 1868 and 1877, comprised 449 peasant uprisings (hyakusho
ikki) and 24 urban mass disturbances (toshi sojo), a total of 523 cases in which Japanese protested "against the power establishment of the time." 1

The scale of the rioting precipitated by the economic consequences of Japan's intervention in Siberia in 1918 is especially noteworthy:

The immediate condition that precipitated this turmoil was the sharp upswing of food prices, especially rice prices. The series of incidents which followed began in a town in Toyama Prefecture, with the wives of fishermen forming a picket line to obstruct the shipment of rice to other areas. They attributed the skyrocketing rice prices to the scarcity of rice in their own prefecture. 2

Riots spread across the country, with some 570 cases of disorder being recorded between July 23rd and October 15th, 1918. The riots involved forty-two prefectures, leaving only five "intact". Among the incidents, there "is clear evidence of human injury or property damage for 248 cases", and during the turmoil:

the police forces were temporarily paralyzed and the army was mobilized in seventy locations. Riots involving military intervention numbered thirty-three in cities, twenty-three in towns, and fourteen in villages... There is strong evidence, then, to suggest that the notion of Japan as a cohesive and tightly knit society based on a singular value system requires reassessment... macro-studies have often confused governmental stability with mass contentment. 3

The import of this is clearly that, when politically frustrated, the Japanese people were capable of attempting to

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1. Sugimoto, Popular Disturbance in Postwar Japan, pp.67-68
2. Sugimoto, Popular Disturbance in Postwar Japan, p.68
3. Sugimoto, Popular Disturbance in Postwar Japan, pp.68-69
take matters into their own hands, including by violence. The postwar Constitution, however, put matters in the hands of the people to an unprecedented degree, and in this, it was probably more reflective of "grass root" aspirations of the Japanese than was realised by American commentators on the occupation reforms.

In consideration of their postwar political power, and their capacity, when thwarted, to riot, it is not surprising that, as a majority of Japanese have consistently indicated a lack of "mass contentment" with erosions of Article IX of that document, their elected representatives have found in such opposition a good reason to be slow and cautious in their approach to rearmament, increasing Japan's defence capability and in clarifying the military implications of Japan's alliance with the United States.

It was certainly the case that most Japanese were eager to participate in the new postwar political system by exercising their right to vote a year before the new Constitution had even came into effect: in April, 1946, three out of four Japanese entitled to vote, did so, including for the first time fourteen million women. The result, although it featured a strong performance by independents (20.4 percent), minor parties (14.9 percent) and the Socialists (9.1 percent), who almost doubled their 1937 vote, nevertheless provided an early sign of the conservatives' domination of postwar Japanese politics. Even though their numbers had been reduced by a purge of members of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Liberals and Progressives (later re-named Democrats) obtained 43 percent of the vote. The Socialists were able to form a shaky coalition
government after the lower house elections of 1947, but by the
time the occupation ended, the Liberals had obtained the first
one-party majority under the new constitution, and the pattern of
conservative ascendancy in the postwar Diet was established. 1

That the Japanese people could accept many radical changes in
their political, social and economic life, and yet maintain a
preference for conservative leadership, may be explained by
observing that this remainder from pre-occupation days may have
provided a necessary symbol of continuity amid such dramatic
change. The leftist parties had, in any case, been discredited in
government by their inability to settle their differences, and
the communists, in particular, lost support "in the eyes of the
public during the summer of 1949 by several acts of violence
generally attributed to them. Ever since the war, the Japanese
public has reacted sharply against any violence that took human
lives."2

Moreover, while Yoshida Shigeru, the man who led Japan's
earliest postwar conservative governments, was a member of
Japan's prewar elite, and deeply conservative and anti-communist,
he was not a militarist, nor had he ever been one. He
consistently condemned the Pacific War as an "unwinnable blunder"
and the military leaders as "dangerous socialist radicals"; and
he demonstrated "a significant feature of Japanese politics [this
being] that one did not have to be a liberal to oppose the

1. Manchester, American Caesar, p.502; and, Reischauer, Japan, pp.264-268
2. Reischauer, Japan, pp.268-269
Yoshida’s premiership undoubtedly made the return of conservative rule palatable for many Japanese, because under his guidance it did not threaten a return to militarism.

The points made above, that Yoshida was anti-militarist but no liberal, and that he saw the militarists as "radicals", are extremely significant. They support the contention of this paper that resistance on the part of a majority of Japanese to an augmented postwar Japanese defence effort and increases in the defence budget are not just a reaction to the defeat and horrors of the Pacific War, but are a continuation of a much older, traditional view of Japan’s proper place and role in the world. Central to this view is the notion that to commit Japan to involvement in foreign wars is to commit an "unwinnable blunder".

When, under the subsequent leadership of Kishi Nobusuke, the LDP Cabinet attempted to have the Diet pass legislation, the "Police Duties Performance Law", which was intended to expand police power, there was widespread concern, including among LDP members, that the new bill might herald a return of prewar "thought control" and "police suppression", and pave the way for a more aggressive military alliance with the U.S., constitutional revision and, eventually, overseas service for Japanese troops. This alarming prospect succeeded in rousing the Opposition parties, trade unions, the mass media, and "an impressive array of citizens groups" to a determined resistance to the proposed legislation: throughout "October and November 1958 the Diet was paralysed, the country torn by strife and emonstrations", and the

1. Harries, Sheathing The Sword, xxviii-xxix
Police Bill was, as a result, dropped. 1

Another reason the conservative Liberal Democratic Party has enjoyed fairly consistent success at the polls, has been its having presided over the economic growth of Japan, which has seen the nation rise to the position of the world's second largest economy, and which has brought the Japanese an unprecedentedly high standard of living and their country an unprecedentedly high status in the society of nations. Economic growth has been largely fuelled by foreign trade, which has been a prime source of increased prosperity for Japanese since Japan's early associations with the T'ang, Sung and Ming dynasties and the rewarding exploits of its trader-pirates before the Tokugawa bakufu cut Japan off from the outside world. While it may be true that the more than two centuries of isolation which followed created an era of relative peace and stability and cultural integrity, it left the nation seriously disadvantaged when confronted with the scientific, technological and industrial developments of the West: indeed, having no advanced military technology, Japan was effectively helpless.

It was the consequent rush to reach industrial parity with the West that, together with Japan's uncharacteristic subscription to the prevailing doctrine of territorial expansionism, eventually

1. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp. 152-153. For further details on popular opposition to the Police Bill, see Chapter IV, p.109, of this paper.

Pacifism, and more particularly, concern about the Japan-U.S. security treaty, is, to varying extents, a component of the platforms of all major Opposition parties, including the Socialists, the Democratic Socialists, the Communists and Komeito, the parliamentary party of the ten-million member Buddhist organisation, Soka Gakkai. See: Harries, Sheathing the Sword, p.286-292; and, Reischauer, The Japanese, pp. 312-313
saw Japanese troops fighting overseas for the first time since Hideyoshi’s abortive assault on China. Postwar Japanese, mindful of the wealth and technological prowess developed by their country under LDP rule, without resort to foreign aggression, have overall seen no reason to possibly risk their prosperity by removing it from office, despite evidence of widespread corruption. The LDP in its turn is mindful of the expectations of continued prosperity on the part of voters, and the importance of satisfying those expectations in order to retain power was demonstrated by the LDP’s loss of its majority through upper house elections in 1989, principally because of popular dissatisfaction with a new 3 percent consumption tax and the level of corruption among party leaders.

Japanese voters are also well aware that their nation’s economic success has been due in large measure to its proportionately small defence budget. Related to this, is the realisation that being divested of militarism and an empire has helped, rather than hindered Japan’s economic growth:

One of the differences between successful and unsuccessful growth seems to lie in countries’ assumptions about the feasibility of economic self-sufficiency. Cartels flourish where autarchy appears attainable. In such conditions coalitions do not have to worry about being challenged by a wide international market or foreign competitors. If countries must export to live because they are too small to be self-sufficient, narrow special interest groups are an expensive luxury. As one observer remarks:

1. see Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State, pp.130,172-176

2. See: Asahi Shimbum Poll, Note 1, page 77, this paper. The poll found that a revivial of militarism would not be advantageous for either business or individual prosperity. See also: Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp.419,428.
"Postwar Germany, Italy and Japan succeed economically not because of totalitarian episodes or foreign occupation, or integration into a larger unit but because losses of territory or empire, or the hope of empire left them with factor endowments that indisputably forced them to trade."  

The postwar Japanese constitution has confounded many predictions at the time of its promulgation by surviving intact for the best part of half a century. It has not, however, survived untouched by politically expedient "interpretation" or a considerable degree of circumvention, especially in relation to its renunciation of aggression and the sovereign right to possess war potential. Yet, overall, Japan's currently "defensive" defence policy and capability, and its greater dependence for security and prosperity on trade and the economic and strategic benefits of foreign aid and investment, has more in common with the non-interventionary strategies of the millennium that followed Paekchongang and the two centuries of the isolationist Tokugawa bakufu than it has with Hideyoshi's short-lived plans for regional dominance and the increasingly grandiose schemes of Japanese militarists during the half century after 1894.

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CHAPTER IV
THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE: A LEGACY OF DIFFERENT HISTORIES

Synopsis

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that Japan's security treaty with the United States evokes contradictory responses among Japanese, the relative strength of these being influenced by such external factors as the perceived capability of the U.S. to come to the aid of Japan should it be attacked; the level of threat posed by the Soviet Union; and the extent to which American bases in Japan are seen to increase or diminish the likelihood of an armed assault on Japan or more general warfare in the Asia-Pacific region. The record of Japanese history lends weight to the view that Japan will not be attacked if it abstains from provocative action, or if it is under the protection of a hegemonic power which respects Japanese sovereignty and does not risk attracting an attack on Japan by maintaining a significant military presence in Japanese territory, such as was the case with the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

Of great concern to those Japanese who see the treaty with America as a military alliance, rather than an agreement by which the U.S. is able to maintain a trans-oceanic forward deployment of troops and equipment, is that it could involve Japan in conflicts in which it wants no part. Although more than a millennium has passed since the crushing defeat of forces from Japan and its ally, Koguryo, a large majority of the Japanese public, and the Self Defence Force personnel, remain wary of being prevailed upon by an ally to commit Japanese armed forces to a foreign war. This
has resulted in the contradiction of Japan supporting United Nations peace-keeping operations while resisting the commitment of troops to assist such operations. The argument that the American alliance could result in Japan's direct or indirect involvement in foreign military operations contrary to its perceived best interests was lent credibility by what Japanese critics saw as intervention by U.S. forces based in Japan in China's internal affairs in 1950.

The Japanese government and people and, in recent years, U.S. administrations, have supported an alternative means of maintaining Japan's security, prosperity and stability by a program known as "Comprehensive Security". This attempts to compensate for Japan's lack of military power by utilising its great economic power to prevent, rather than combat, threats to Japanese and wider Western interests by fostering economic development and political stability in less wealthy and industrially advanced nations, in particular those which contain vital resources or which lie in, or adjacent to, strategically important parts of the world, including readily obstructed portions of sea lanes of communication. This approach to the advancement of Japan's national interest represents a return to the mainly non-aggressive, trade-dominated and mutually beneficial relations Japan enjoyed in past centuries with the rest of the (then) known world, comprising Korea and China and other Asian states, and during which it was in the main exempt from foreign threats to its security, and did not succumb to foreign conquest.
The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty: a study in misunderstanding

The postwar Japanese constitution and Japan's subsequent alliance with the United States were to be the cornerstones of its postwar defence policy. They were created, however, under very different conditions. By 1952, when the alliance came into effect, the United States was no longer the only nuclear power in the world, for the Soviet Union had demonstrated its first atomic device in 1949 and the W.W. II partnership between the two "superpowers" had degenerated into the Cold War. The U.S. had, moreover, "lost" China to communism and was intent on fighting communist troops in Korea and communist sympathisers at home, through the activities of Senator Joseph McCarthy. It had become important to America to preserve Japan as a member of the "free world" and as a secure base for the forward deployment of American forces in Asia.

Within Japan, this accentuated tensions which had been building between those Japanese attempting to exercise some of their revived or new political freedoms, such as the right to withdraw labour, and the occupation authorities who, as early as 1947, had stopped a proposed general strike and who, a year later, prohibited strikes by public servants. By 1949, the occupation was generally more tolerant of rightist than leftist elements in Japan, and inclined to acquiesce in behaviour which, strictly speaking, was in contravention of the rights and liberties enshrined in the postwar Constitution. An example of
this was the so-called "Red Purge" of leftist activists from the payrolls of Japanese industries, under the pretext of compliance with a government program of severe fiscal austerity.\textsuperscript{1} It was becoming rapidly evident that the strengthening and development of democracy in Japan and the continuation of what was, in effect, foreign military rule were inimical to each other.

This is the central problem of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty from the perspective of its Japanese critics, because it places American armed forces in Japanese territory, and this is seen as perpetuating a form of \textit{de facto} foreign military occupation of Japan.\textsuperscript{2} The bases are also seen as increasing the risk of attack on Japan by a country hostile to the U.S., and, because of the increasing level of cooperation between the SDF and U.S. forces, such as joint military exercises, and improvements to the interoperability of SDF and American weaponry, there is also a perceived risk of Japan being drawn into a conflict even if the Japanese government decided against such involvement.\textsuperscript{3} In consideration of such fears, it is understandable that:

An \textit{Asahi Shimbun} survey of 27 September 1971 found 30 per cent of

\textsuperscript{1} See: Reischauer, \textit{Japan}, p.235; and, Storry, \textit{A History of Modern Japan}, p.255


respondents declaring that the alliance made a positive contribution to the security of Japan and the peace of Asia, 33 per cent asserting that it was a dangerous arrangement, increasing international tensions and the risk of involvement in war...A Newsweek survey published on 11 July 1983 found 52 percent of Japanese respondents declaring that a strong American military presence around the world increased the chances of war. Only 27 per cent thought that the stationing of United States forces abroad enhanced the prospects for peace...Popular Japanese suspicions of the United States...were considerably deeper than those to be found in Washington's European allies.1

Unlike Japan, Washington's continental European allies are all nations well used to the marching of foreign armies across their soil, and the marching of their armies across the soil of others. Britain, although not successfully invaded since 1066, had enjoyed one of the most prolonged periods of successful empire-building, and one of the largest empires, the world has seen. European powers, and especially Britain, are also well used to alliances formed to ensure a regional balance of power, and have long subscribed to the concept and practice of collective defence.2

Prior to the Second World War, Japan's concept of the best form of bilateral security arrangements was to be found in the early twentieth century Anglo-Japanese alliance; and the worst, in its seventh century alignment with Koguryo. In the first instance, Japan was obliged only to reach naval parity with Russia, and was otherwise left alone to pursue its domestic affairs and external territorial expansion under British protection: Britain's repeated requests for Japan to dispatch

1. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.415
2. For a fairly comprehensive catalogue and analysis of European balances of power, see: Wight, Power Politics, pp.168-185

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Army divisions to the western front in the First World War were ignored by the Japanese Government. ¹ In the second instance, Japan dispatched a large force to assist its ally against the T’ang and Silla, and was crushingly defeated. ²

The 1940 Tripartite Pact represented a similarly damaging miscalculation, for although the pact did not involve Japan in any conflicts against its will on behalf of its allies, this alignment with what they perceived to be the globally ascendant fascist powers afforded Japanese militarists a sense of security and of destiny, in the absence of which they may have behaved with greater prudence, particularly in respect of the United States. ² The alliance with Germany and Italy could thus be seen as the instrument whereby Japan brought upon itself the conquest and occupation by a foreign power which it had until then avoided with singular success for almost two millennia.

The furore occasioned in 1981 by Prime Minister Suzuki’s use of the term “alliance” to describe Japan’s security arrangements with the U.S. is therefore explicable in terms of the long-established Japanese view that military pacts may encourage or require the dispatch of Japanese troops abroad, to fight in wars in which Japan wants no part, and in which its ally might in any case be defeated. Japan’s record of failure as a foreign

¹. See: Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp.12-13; and Okazaki, "The Restructuring of the U.S.-Japan Alliance", p.141. Bergamini describes the Anglo-Japanese alliance thus: “For her pittance of co-operation Japan expected a mountain of reciprocity”, Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy, p.298

². As Tsuchiyama points out, Japan’s preferred form of alliance is one which affords protection by compensating for "the perceived weakness of the [Japanese] state"; see, "Why Japan Enters Into Alliances", p.5
aggressor underlies this fear. Nor is opposition to the deployment abroad of Japanese defence personnel limited to civilians, for a study undertaken in 1965 revealed that of eighty-eight SDF and Defence Academy members whose opinions were sought on a range of political and strategic issues, only two hoped "for overseas service as part of the Free World". ¹

The view that Japan’s security would be enhanced by the removal from its territory of armed forces which have a powerful forward deployment capability and long-range weapons systems (such as the U.S. 7th Fleet and strategic missiles), is based on the premise that Japan would not be subjected to attack unless its own, or allied troops based on its soil, precipitated that attack. As Japan has only once been subjected to attempted invasion without having initiated hostilities², and as this attempt (by the Mongols) failed, this point of view is not unreasonable.³

That the presence on Japanese soil of foreign agents and

1. The study was undertaken by the Japanese military critic, Yoshiwara Koichiro, and involved Defence Force personnel from the elite First Airborne Group, the Eighth Guards Unit, the Defence Agency and students at the National Defence Academy. See: Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.388.

2. It should be noted however that prior to the invasion, the Japanese "militarists" of the day, the warriors of Kamakura, beheaded some of the Khan’s emissaries, thereby markedly increasing the likelihood of war with a more powerful adversary — a gamble not unlike the assault on Pearl Harbour, but with a more fortuitously beneficial result.

3. A Mainishi Shimbun poll of 3.5.72 found that a total of 47 percent of respondents believed an external attack on Japan was unlikely or totally impossible, and exactly the same percentage believed an attack was possible or likely. See: Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp. 417-418

A Yomiuri Shimbun poll of 17.4.78 found that in response to any American pull-out of troops from South Korea and force reductions elsewhere in Asia, 31% of Japanese respondents said Japan should strengthen its autonomous defence system; 22.3% said it should not; and 46.6% were undecided or had no response. See: Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.429
property might in a number of ways precipitate an attack on Japan had been evident to both Hideyoshi and Ieyasu and later Tokugawas: such an attack did occur in 1863, when the murder of an Englishman by Satsuma samurai resulted in the retaliatory bombardment of Kagoshima by a British fleet. The initial helplessness of Japan in the face of nineteenth century Western military power, and the humiliating unequal treaties imposed on it by that power, have disquieting resonances for many Japanese of the late twentieth century, who consider the presence of American military bases inside their supposedly sovereign and customarily isolationist nation a very high, if not excessive price to pay for putative U.S. protection.

Only 21.2 percent of Japanese questioned by the Yomiuri Shimbun in April 1978 thought that the United States would really come to Japan’s assistance in time of crisis. Some 38 per cent, including 34 per cent of Conservative voters, declared that the United States could not be relied upon.1

The value placed by Japanese on their security treaty with the United States tends to reflect their disposition to alignment with a clearly hegemonic power, in the absence of which autonomy is preferable.2 This was the course adopted by Nobunaga,

1. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.415

2. According to Tsuchiyama, the Japanese disposition to being most comfortable when it is, in effect, playing a subsidiary role in an alliance seems to be a reflection of Japan’s geographic location near China, for “its surrounding areas were colored by Sinocentrism and the assumption of Chinese superiority”. During the time when Ch’ing Dynasty (1644-1912) power and influence was at its height, this Sinocentrism was formalised into an East Asian tribute system that included Korea, Vietnam, the Ryukyus and Japan, and their suzurain, China; see: Why Japan Enters Into Alliances, pp.6-7.

There are numerous examples of former dominant powers (as Japan was briefly
Hideyoshi and Ieyasu. Alignment with states whose dominance is less certain, such as Koguryo or the Axis powers, has proven detrimental to Japanese interests: in these cases, discretion should have been the better part of valour. In accordance with such observations, Japanese support for the security treaty with America waned during the Carter administration, which initially favoured decreased defence spending and a U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea, and increased during the early years of the Reagan administration, which favoured a strong military build-up by the U.S. in response to the Soviet build-up and its invasion of Afghanistan. Popular support for the treaty and the SDF reached a postwar high point after the Soviet Air Force shot down a South Korean civilian jumbo jet which had entered restricted Soviet air space: the jet was downed in what the Japanese consider their territory, between Hokkaido and the disputed southern part of Sakhalin, and Japanese nationals were among the 269 people on board who were killed.¹

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during the first year of the Pacific war) which have settled into a dependence upon their supplanters, as Japan has upon the United States; see: Wight, Power Politics, p.127. Japanese dependency is not, per se, unique, although the marked and prolonged asymmetry between Japan’s military weakness and economic strength vis a vis its American supplanter probably is.

¹ In 1945, the USSR took control of what had been Japanese territory on Sakhalin island, northwest of Hokkaido, and in the Kuril island chain, which forms the eastern boundary of the Sea of Okhotsk, north of Hokkaido. Japan has not relinquished its claim to the islands, which are considered to be of strategic importance to the USSR.

**POLLS**

**Necessity of SDF**

Q: Do you think Japan needs or does not need the SDF?
The Japanese public and political leaders do not always share the same threat perceptions as Americans, nor do they always agree on how to counter those threats. There is, however, a convergence of opinion on the Soviet Union. Opinion polls reveal that Japanese consider the U.S.S.R. as posing the greatest external threat to their nation, although this perception is not based upon the same considerations as those which underlie American concern about the U.S.S.R. \(^1\) The United States and the Soviet Union have spent the best part of the postwar era

---Continued---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>It's better to have SDF</th>
<th>82.6%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It's better not to have SDF</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Defense System

Q: ...Japan has concluded a security treaty with the U.S. Do you think the Japan-U.S. security treaty is conducive or not conducive to the peace and security of Japan? Indicate you answer from the items listed below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>It is useful</th>
<th>33.9%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is moderately useful</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is not particularly useful</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is not useful</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Public opinion surveys conducted by the Prime Minister's Office in November 1984. Source: Defense of Japan: 1986, p.338)


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What Country Poses the Greatest Threat?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USSR %</th>
<th>United States %</th>
<th>North Korea %</th>
<th>PRC %</th>
<th>South Korea %</th>
<th>Others %</th>
<th>Don't Know %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
contesting for ideological and military supremacy on a global scale, and hence, America has been concerned to maintain its own nuclear deterrent capability and overall armed parity with the U.S.S.R, and to maintain collective Western security. However, according to the terms of the U.S.-Japan Treaty, the postwar Japanese Constitution, and its traditional inclination, Japan has not been concerned with the defence of any nation but itself.1

Thus, while glasnost and perestroika, the demise of communist governments in much of Eastern Europe, actual or proposed force reductions in Europe, and Soviet support for the American-initiated military operation to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991 have markedly improved relations and reduced the prospect of war between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, they have done little to improve relations between the U.S.S.R and Japan.

Apart from its inclusion in the global INF reductions, Northeast Asia has been largely exempt from international agreements or even negotiations on limiting troops and weapons, or other confidence-building measures. Moreover, Japan and the U.S.S.R./Russia have a long history of animosity stemming from rivalry over control of territory in Northeast Asia, and which produced armed conflict between them in 1904-5 (over Korea and


   The view of successive Japanese governments has been that "the right of collective self-defense...is constitutionally not permissible", see: Defense of Japan: 1986, p.73. Tsuchiyama points out that this is another example of postwar Japanese policies reflecting long-established practices, because "Japanese alliances...have customarily excluded collective action", see: Why Japan Enters Into Alliances, p.9
Manchuria), 1918-22 (over Siberia), 1939 (over Outer Mongolia),
and 1945 (over Manchuria). They have remained technically at war
since the end of W.W. II, principally as the result of their rival
claims to sovereignty over Sakhalin and the Kurils. Japanese
critics of the American alliance believe this history of
animosity would increase the likelihood of, for example, a Soviet
missile attack on American and SDF facilities in Japan should
superpower rivalry escalate to war, because such an attack would
amount, in effect, to "killing two birds with one stone". This is
the reasoning which has contributed to the Japanese nomination of
the United States as the second greatest external threat to their
security.¹

The need for forward deployment of American forces in Japan
was further undermined in the opinion of many Japanese by their
not concurring with the United States' security concerns about
China in the 1950s and 1960s: moreover, the threat from North
Korea was felt by Japanese to be adequately contained by United
States and indigenous forces in South Korea. The historical basis
for Japan's low threat perception vis a vis China and North Korea
is obvious, for although Japan invaded Korea in the sixteenth
century, and annexed it in the twentieth; and although Japan
attacked China in the sixth, sixteenth, nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, neither China nor Korea has retaliated by attempting
to invade Japan, despite possessing at various times the means to

¹ The other major contributing factor has been bilateral trade friction.
This millennia-old Japanese perception of East Asia's traditional hegemonic power, major source of trade and cultural fountainhead as being of no danger to Japan, as being, indeed, more of a benignant than a malignant force in the region, was not altered by China's acquisition of a Communist government, nor has it been limited to leftists or the postwar generation. In 1951, it was made clear to Prime Minister Yoshida that unless he agreed to abandon plans for Japan to recognise the People's Republic of China after the conclusion of the allied occupation, the U.S. Congress would not ratify the San Francisco peace treaty, and hence deny Japan its formal independence. Japan duly recognised the Kuomintang regime as the only legitimate government of China, but that "so virulent an anti-communist as Yoshida had to pressured into taking this position indicates how widely divergent the two counties were".  

Events in China have furnished Japanese with a concrete example of how American bases in Japan (and on Okinawa) could be used in ways potentially detrimental to Japan's interests or even contrary to its wishes. In 1950, President Harry Truman responded to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea by assigning the Seventh Fleet to the Straits of Taiwan, "effectively preventing a communist invasion of Taiwan, and having the fleet operate out of

1. Chinese and Koreans participated in the thirteenth century attempt to invade Japan, but this was at the direction of their overlord, the Mongol Kublai Khan.
Sasebo -- thus making Japan, in the words of one Japanese commentator, "a forward military base for intervention in the Chinese communist revolution". 1 The independence of U.S. forces in Japan from Japanese government control was modified in the revised Security Treaty of 1960: an associated agreement states that a build-up of U.S. forces in Japan, or the use of such forces and U.S. facilities in Japan for combat operations other than in the defence of Japan must be preceded by consultation between the two governments. 2 Doubts about the efficacy of such arrangements were aggravated by a series of major United States policy changes on Asia in the 1970s, which were announced without prior consultation with Japan. 3

Japan is a nation which has shown a strong preference for isolationism during almost two-millennia, which has a history of failed external aggression, and which, when aligned with other states, has done the least damage to its own interests by offering them token military assistance or none at all. For many of the people of such a nation, the presence on their soil of foreign military bases and ultimately irresistible pressure to

3. U.S. rapprochement with the PRC under President Nixon and a withdrawal of US forces from South Korea under President Carter; the latter was not undertaken. Both the Japanese government and the Japanese people were dismayed by the Nixon and Carter volte-face: see Lee & Sato, U.S. Policy Towards Korea and Japan, p.110; and Solomon, "The Role for Japan in United States Strategic Policy for Northeast Asia", p.99.
send military personnel to a foreign war zone has been a very heavy burden to bear.

This is not the United States' estimation of Japan's burden, nor that of many Japanese allies prior to W.W.II. It is certainly the case that American pressure on Japan to increase its defence expenditure and its defence capability, and its commitment to military operations undertaken to protect Western interests, has coincided with the increase in America's trade deficit with Japan and its inability to play the role of global hegemon. However, as has been the case with Japanese popular pacifism and other concepts and practices that impact on Japanese foreign and defence policy, Japan's perceived enjoyment of a "free ride" at its an ally's expense is not a recent phenomenon; indeed, it is very old.

In 1980, when the U.S. Defence Secretary, Harold Brown, was quoted as saying of Japan's defence expenditure that it fell seriously short of what was expected, and was "so modest that it conveys a sense of complacency", he was voicing the frustrations

1. The Japanese Prime Minister, Nakasone Yasuhiro, first proposed sending MSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in 1987 (The Age, 5.4.88). Domestic debate about the proposal eventually subsided, and was not revived until after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August, 1990. Then, after intense US Congressional criticism and months of debate in the Diet and public fora, Japan agreed in April, 1991, to send minesweepers to the Persian Gulf to help a United Nations effort to clear it of Iraqi mines and other debris of war. Because the vessels and their crews would not be involved in fighting, the decision could be seen as a token gesture, not unlike that of the Emperor Junnin's dispatch of bullocks' horns to the T'ang. As could have been expected, some of Japan's neighbours did not see it this way: the former Singaporean Prime Minister, Lee Kwan Yew, said this initial breach of the ban on JSDF personnel serving abroad was like "giving liqueur chocolates to an alcoholic". (The Japan Times, 3.5.91)

2. Lee & Sato, US Policy Toward Korea and Japan, p.136
of Japanese "allies" at various times over a period of some two-
thousand years:

The Japanese, while eager to participate in trade and obtain
access to the most advanced technology of the age, were generally
careful to avoid too intimate a strategic association with their
mentors and allies. The Wei emperor's hopes that Yamatai,
populous, wealthy and disposing of considerable naval power,
might prove a useful ally in his protracted struggles with Wu,
Shu Han and the governors of Yen for continental hegemony,
proved, in the end, illusory. Japan's military assistance to
Paekche was insufficient to alter the military balance on the
Korean peninsula.¹

After Wei and Paekche came Koguryo: Japan broke with tradition
to dispatch a great naval force to assist this ally, and was so
 crushingly defeated at Paekchongang in 663 that it consequently
refused to send military forces abroad for almost one thousand
years. During their alliances with mainland powers, Japanese
states had, however, acquired advanced technology, and in
particular, advanced military weaponry and techniques with which
to fight domestic (and potential foreign) rivals,² and Japan had
not, even after Paekchongang, fallen victim to the wars of
conquest waged by various mainland states, including the mighty
and highly expansionist T'ang.

It was only when Japan's isolationist tendencies were carried
to the extreme under the Tokugawas, and when it was consequently
denied access to new technology over a period coinciding with the
industrial revolution in the West, that its sovereignty came to
be seriously imperilled. Until the seventeenth century, Japan's
primary preoccupation with its domestic affairs, its discreet

1. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.3
2. See: Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.4
approach to power politics, its eschewal of external aggression and its undemanding alliances had, with the assistance of the Straits of Tsushima, served it well, and it is understandable that the Japanese saw no reason not to revive this rewarding strategy in the late nineteenth century. Unfortunately, the beneficial affect of the strategy as a whole was eroded and eventually destroyed by Japan's not reviving two of its key elements: discreet diplomacy and non-aggression.

By the 1920s, Britain had grown weary of its alliance with Japan, having given too much and received too little in return. This state of affairs must also have been apparent to the other victorious Great Powers at the Versailles peace conference: Japan's seat among them, and its possession of former German territories, had been secured by the barest minimum of war effort in the East, and no effort whatsoever in the bloody trenches of the Western front. Thus, "Japanese alliances are apt to be one-sided from the standpoint of the ally", because:

...nations that place high value on the [collective] good -- usually the larger power -- bear a 'disproportionate' share of the alliance burden...

The Japanese concept of alliance was not exactly alliance per se, but could be described as issue-specific coalitions formed for the attainment of limited and issue specific objectives. Japan won the 'carte blanche' in a key issue area, its allies basically gained only the global strategic implications of an alliance with Japan, with the exception of U.S. military bases in the U.S.-Japanese case...

It is this "exception" which has persuaded many Japanese that

they, and not the Americans, are bearing an unprecedentedly heavy share of the alliance burden, a burden which is not only strategic but now economic, as the Japanese financial contribution towards maintaining American forces on its territory has steadily increased since 1978. The United States has, moreover, demanded of Japan that it increase spending on its own defence force, and increase the capability of that force to the extent that it is capable of providing early warning of an impending enemy attack on Japanese territory and, until U.S. forces in Japan and possible reinforcements from America can engage that enemy, to deny air superiority to enemy aircraft and landfall to enemy vessels, and to contain an invasion force on Japanese soil.

The United States in addition sought and gained Japanese government agreement to acquire an Air and Maritime SDF forward deployment capability such as to protect the sea lanes out to one-thousand nautical miles from Japan, and a strategically significant augmented capacity to blockade the Tsugaru, Soya and Tsushima Straits. The latter task has provided the rationale for Japanese development of the SDF's new surface-to-surface missile, the SSM-1.

It is obvious that the security of a nation is increased in direct proportion to the increase in the distance from its territory at which it can efficiently destroy or contain enemy forces. However, while long-range weaponry obviously affords a significant defensive advantage, increases in its range and accuracy also increase its potential to afford a significant offensive advantage. Thus, as John O'Connell has observed, the
SSM-1 project may, by 1995:

...give Japan the capability of interdicting surface ship traffic to and from the Sea of Japan. That capability, combined with mining the straits to interdict submarine passage, can drastically alter the balance of power in the Far East...As cruise missiles go, it may not necessarily be the most advanced when it enters service. Its potential for significant strategic impact lies in the roles which it may be assigned by the Japanese government. There is no doubt in my mind that the only intended role is entirely defensive at present, and that it is solely intended for anti-invasion efforts. But things have a way of changing, and so do policies.¹

Each increase in the sophistication, range and efficacy of Japanese military technology brings with it an increase in actual or potential erosion of Article IX of the Japanese Constitution, and a consequent increase in the responsibility of the Japanese government and people to ensure that such technology is not deployed in a fashion contrary to their best interests. It also brings Japan a step closer towards acquiring the capacity for armed autonomous defence, which is not what a majority of Japanese want.² For, although hosting American forces is seen as

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2. POLL: Defense System
Q: What steps do you think must be taken to defend the security of Japan? Indicate your answer from the items listed below.

Abolish the Japan-U.S. security treaty, and upgrade, instead, the country’s self-defense capability so as to enable Japan to maintain its security on its own..................5.0%
and defend the security of Japan under the Japan-U.S. security and with SDF as at present..................69.2%
Abolish the Japan-U.S. security treaty and scale down or disband SDF..........................6.8%
Others.........................................................1.1%
Don’t know...................................................17.9%
a potential risk to Japanese security because of their ability to invite or initiate attack, and although American pressure on Japan to increase its defence effort is seen as increasing the risk of revived Japanese militarism, the alliance per se nevertheless acts as a counterbalance to these risks, in that it limits the possibility of a drastic Japanese defence build-up and re-militarisation on the pretext of its being necessary in the absence of a friendly and protective hegemonic power.

There is no reason to suppose that Japan will not continue in its current and customary role of subsidiary military ally for as long as the American alliance, and in particular its provision for the basing of U.S. forces in Japan, does not significantly increase the risk of attack on Japan, or Japan's involvement in overseas aggression; nor, from the public's perspective, increase the risk of revived domestic militarism or of a much augmented

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...Continued...

(Public opinion survey conducted by the Prime Minister's Office in November 1984, Defense of Japan: 1986, p.338)

According to public opinion polls undertaken in 1971-1973 by the Yomiuri, Asahi and Mainichi Shimbun, there was "widespread anxiety about a possible revival of Japanese militarism, especially in the context of American reassurance for an accelerated arms build-up. Many appeared uneasy about the adequacy of the civilian control system. There was little confidence that Japan's re-emergence as a great military power would be advantageous either to the nation or its people"; see: Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.419.

American pressure may work in favour of remilitarisation in two possible ways: (1) by simply forcing Japan into a defence build-up which could precipitate drastic changes to the Constitution, political system and defence policy; or (2) by the more subtle and more likely means of providing militaristic elements in Japan with the pretext for a drastic defence build-up and a means of absolving themselves of responsibility for it. Japanese opponents, and others, could find themselves hard pressed to identify whether militaristic developments were the result of indigenous initiatives or gaiatsu. However, at time of writing, neither of these scenarios appears probable.
defence budget and capability. In the absence of any other serious external threat to Japan’s security, should gaiatsu emanating, or popularly perceived as emanating, from the United States government seem to threaten to seriously undermine Japan’s sovereignty, unprecedentedly liberal political arrangements and prosperity, the popular resistance which may be expected to such a development could find its expression in a repetition of the popular disturbances which occurred in the 1950s. The most notable of these were the demonstrations by hundreds of thousands of protesters which accompanied the "undemocratic" ratification by the Diet of the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and which occasioned the resignation of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke and the last-minute cancellation of a visit to Japan by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Similarly, if the Japanese government or other powerful domestic interests should appear to be returning the nation to policies and practices significantly more in accordance with the Meiji Constitution than the "civilian-ist" and pacifist postwar Constitution, popular opposition, if constrained from expression through the ballot box, could spill onto the streets and revive the destabilising and violent confrontations which brought Japan to the brink of internal warfare in 1912 and 1918, and which were echoed in the less destabilising, but still serious mass

demonstrations of the early post-occupation period. While it is the case that militaristic or chauvinistic elements might welcome serious popular disturbances as a pretext for the reimposition of authoritarian rule, such as occurred under Hideyoshi and the Tokugawa bakufu, it is doubtful whether the damage that would inevitably accrue to parliamentary government and the Japanese economy would be welcome to the government or other powerful groups with a major interest in Japan's continued prosperity. It was to a significant extent recognition of the danger posed to political stability by the far right which enabled compromise to be reached over the 1960 and 1970 crises, and which informed

1. Sugimoto has found the frequency and magnitude of violent popular disturbances in Japan in the decade following the end of the postwar allied occupation to be greater than those of similar disturbances in the decade after the Meiji Restoration, another period of Japanese history marked by great change and "openness to the outside world": the frequency of popular disturbances in Japan from 1952 to 1960 was more than eight times that of similar disturbances during the same period in France. (See Sugimoto, Popular Disturbance in Postwar Japan, Table 4.1, p.67, & pp.66-92)

From 1952 to 1960, Japanese mass demonstrations, often involving several thousand people, injury and damage to property, occurred in response to perceived challenges to political and social reforms and to pacifism. Popular grievances included: infringements of employees' rights; loss of farming land to military bases; industrial accidents; visits to Japanese ports by nuclear-powered American vessels; the transportation of fuel or oil tanks for use in Vietnam; and the erosion of "democratic education" and the reintroduction of portions of the prewar education system. Leaders and participants in these disturbances ranged from the left to the right of the political spectrum: some protests featured leftists from student and labour organisations; some featured members of anti-union and pro-government organisations such as PTAs and Shinto groups; whereas others comprised coalitions of left and right. (Ibid.)

When the Kishi government attempted to expand police power through a "Police Duties Law Amendment Bill", it was defeated by pressure from an unexpected coalition which included groups which as a rule eschewed politics: among them were the YMCA, the Federation of Women's Organisations and several religious organisations. (See: Sissons, "The Dispute Over Japan's Police Law", pp.36-37, 43-45)
government decisions not to mobilise the SDF against anti-alliance demonstrations, thereby averting the likelihood of civil war and an "appalling tragedy" for Japan.1

As they approach the twenty-first century, the preference of a majority of Japanese people, in consideration of their current geopolitical situation and their two-thousand years of accumulated experience in such matters, is in essence for an updated form of the military arrangements they enjoyed in the third to ninth centuries, minus the naval assistance to Koguryo. This would comprise an indigenous "defensive" defence capability such as to deter limited aggression, supplemented by an alliance with a hegemonic power able to maintain regional stability and participate in mutually beneficial trade, and to come to Japan's defence in the face of large-scale aggression, but which would otherwise desist from interference in Japanese internal affairs.

Such a preference may appear unrealistic and selfish, yet the evidence of history suggests that the further the Japanese stray from such arrangements, and in particular from a purely "defensive" military capability, the greater is the harm done to themselves and to millions of others.

Comprehensive Security: a study in discretion

Japan is not a great military power, yet it is a great economic power, with global economic interests which depend for their security on the preservation of international trading and

1. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.137-141, 180-182
financial regimes and institutions, and the maintenance of peace not only in regions close to Japan, but as far away as the Middle East and Europe. Japan is a prime example of the "interdependent" state, for the maintenance of its domestic prosperity and stability is heavily dependent on its continued access to foreign resources, especially energy resources, and foreign markets for its manufactured goods and investment.

For a time, most notably immediately after the end of the Second World War, the United States was able to assume a large part of the burden of defending not only Japan itself, but the sea lanes and foreign markets and resources on which Japan's economic reconstruction would increasingly come to rely. This, however, became an increasingly onerous task for the United States, for the postwar world rapidly became the post-colonial world, which brought with it a multitude of conflicts which in themselves often imperilled access to resources and the passage of vessels through "choke points" on sea lanes of communication, and which also proved an almost irresistible lure to foreign intervention. As hostility between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. increased, so too did the number of their "wars-by-proxy" and the size of their nuclear and conventional forces.

The combination of manifold actual and perceived threats to U.S. and general Western security, coinciding with the decline of the American economy, in particular at the time of the Vietnam War, led the U.S. to the decision that it must reduce its overseas military commitments, and encourage its allies and friendly states to take up more of the burden of their own defence:
America's Asian allies were informed of this new, and for many, worrisome arrangement in a speech by President Richard Nixon in Guam, in 1969.

Japan's ability to contribute more to its own defence and to that of other non-Communist states by a military build-up was constrained by both public opinion and Article IX of its Constitution, and by Cabinet decisions banning the possession of nuclear weapons and the export of armaments and military technology,¹ both of which policies also had strong popular support. Japan was also constrained by international concern about any sign of resurgent Japanese militarism, a sentiment particularly strong among those states which had been, or seemed about to be, unwillingly incorporated into the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. In consideration of these inhibiting factors, the course which Japan adopted in order to enhance its security was to largely eschew an augmented military effort² in

1. The United States, concerned that the flow of technology between it and Japan was largely one-way, sought not only to obtain access to Japanese military technology (to which earlier bilateral agreements had in any case already entitled it), but to also obtain easier access to even more attractive dual-use Japanese technology, by obtaining the Japanese government's consent to a new agreement, which permitted the broaching of the ban on exports of Japanese military technology and goods in respect of the US. (See: "Exchange of Notes on the Transfer of Japanese Military Technologies", 1983, and, "Detailed Arrangements for the Transfer of Military Technologies", 1985) Some observers have expressed the view that the US-Japan military technologies agreement will eventually facilitate the easing or lifting of Japan's arms export restrictions; see: Drifte, Arms Production in Japan, p.6

2. One gesture, which was largely symbolic, was the Nakasone Cabinet's decision in 1986 to permit the defence budget to exceed one percent of GNP, which it had not done, according to Japanese reckoning, since 1967. The decision took considerable time to reach, principally because domestic public opinion, and opposition parties in the Diet were against a breaching of the one percent limit (see: Katahara, The Politics of Japanese Defence Policy Making, p.35): so, too, were neighbouring states.
favour of utilising its great wealth to establish what has become the world's largest foreign aid program. Owing to its inclusion of significant economic and diplomatic components, as well as the more customary military component, this form of national defence was named "Comprehensive Security".

The reasoning behind this approach is twofold: firstly, as economic problems such as trade deficits, overseas debt, and endemic poverty contribute to political instability, in particular in the more fragile post-colonial societies, assistance in overcoming those problems should also assist in maintaining stability. This is, of course, a good thing in itself, yet it may in addition further the security interests of the Western world as a whole. The absence of war or civil unrest in a developing country obviously facilitates access by other nations, such as Japan, to its natural resources and cheap labour, and to its domestic market, which, with increased prosperity, should expand and be capable of absorbing manufactured goods from the industrialised nations. In other words, Japanese economic aid to developing countries is intended to foster mutually beneficial economic interdependence and political stability. This is more important to Japan than most other nations because of its heavier than usual dependence on trade and imported raw materials and energy for its continued prosperity. And, the importance of continued prosperity to Japan's continued domestic stability may, among other things, be gauged by the serious popular disturbances which resulted from unfulfilled economic expectations in 1905 and 1918. One of the
major underpinnings of Japanese popular pacifism is the very early realisation that the risks and costs inherent in external aggression are generally in excess of its benefits.

The second major reason for Japan's making a singularly large contribution to the economic stability of other nations, for example, in Southeast Asia, is that it is not thereby helping only to ensure its access to the resources and markets of Southeast Asian nations, but also to those of nations beyond the region. Most of Japan's oil imports come from the Middle East through the Straits of Malacca, between Singapore and Indonesia, and the narrow channels that permit egress from the South China Sea to waters adjacent to the Ryukyus and the western reaches of the Pacific Ocean. The maintenance of stability within and between states bordering such maritime "choke points" is of prime importance in keeping them safe and open to the passage of vessels bearing Japan's vital oil and other energy imports, and the exports of its manufacturing sector. Moreover, security of access to resources and markets, and sea lanes of communication, is important to the continued prosperity and stability of all trading states, and thus Japan's economic contribution to maintaining such access may be considered a constitutionally permissible contribution to the "collective defence" of the economically interdependent world.

Japanese appreciation of the benefits of economic interdependence is not a postwar phenomenon: Japan had enjoyed "centuries of harmonious and mutually beneficial" intercourse

1. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p. 1
with neighbouring states, and, in particular, with China and Korea from as early, perhaps, as the Han Dynasty. Certainly by the time of the T'ang, there was a sizable trade in raw materials, manufactured goods, medicinal herbs and objets d'art. The Japanese were especially quick to understand the strategic benefits of imported technologies, as attested to by the Korean weaponry in the tumuli of Yamato's earliest rulers.\(^1\) By the sixteenth century, Japanese traders-cum-pirates were venturing as far afield as the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, and the daimyo of western and southern Japan were growing rich and, to the displeasure of the shogun, more powerful, notably so after their acquisition of fire-arms from the Portuguese. More than anything else, it was the virtual elimination of Japan's trade with the outside world under the Tokugawa bakufu which ensured its helplessness in the face of Commodore Perry's guns.

There is a third reason for Japan's subscription to the pacifistic approach to defence manifest in "Comprehensive Security", and this is that by example and by economic ties, it assists in drawing other nations into the trading system, and:

If every factor favoring the military-political and territorial system is itself an augury against the trading system, the reverse is also true. The greater the attractiveness of the trading system, the less likely the military-political world is to be chosen by nations...

...if trading strategies hold out the prospects of rapid new growth, the latter will likely be selected as the primary means

\(^{1}\) Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, pp.2.4.

The U.S. has sought access to Japanese military technology, and, through this, its dual-use technology, which is of interest not only to the US DoD, but US industry.
of national advancement...

...There are fateful consequences involved in choosing one primary means over the other. In an open economy greater production and trade by one nation does not prevent another from achieving similar goals. The forceful seizure of additional territory by one nation, however, diminishes the possibilities of others.

The Japanese people have learned over the centuries, and particularly this century, that territorial expansion is a zero-sum affair. Their eschewal of the military-political and territorial system in favour of the trading system has gained them the prosperity and prestige, and global influence, such as they had sought, but failed to obtain, by means of aggression in the past. And, these benefits have been won in the main without loss of territory, independence or prosperity to others. Japan has, as it were, set a very good example, albeit one which has been followed with varying degrees of difficulty and success by others.

Overall, the United States has not been displeased with Japan’s approach to increased defence burden-sharing, although in consideration of Japan’s great wealth, it may fall short of what is desired. In 1980, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William Colby, claimed that if Japan

1. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State, pp.39,43

2. It is beyond the scope of this paper to argue whether or not, or to what extent Japan’s economic success has been at the expense of the US: it is worth noting, however, that while U.S. exports to Japan increased in 1981, its exports to Europe decreased, and the U.S. merchandise trade deficit world-wide was almost 28 billion dollars (Okita, “Japanese American Economic Troubles”, p.201). Moreover, numerous Japanese and American studies have shown that if Japan concede to every Congressional demand designed to end its “free ride”, the US deficit would be reduced by no more than about 16 percent. (See: The Economist, 9.1.88; and, Okita, “Japanese American Economic Troubles”, p.202)
increased its defence budget by four to five percent, putting most of it into foreign economic assistance and thereby far exceeding American ODA:

... then I think there would be general understanding that the Japanese have made a major effort in the area appropriate for Japan to contribute. This is the way alliance should work: that we do not necessarily do the same thing, but we each do the thing that is appropriate to a good relationship between us. 1

However, when American troops are called upon to fight in the perceived defence of Western interests, including Japan's Middle Eastern oil supplies, money is not enough: allies must be seen to be doing "the same thing". When allied assistance was requested for the United Nations-sponsored and American-led military operation to end Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, the Japanese government's response, (which was, in effect, to again permit discretion to be the better part of valour), proved unacceptable to many Congressmen and disappointing to the Bush administration. The latter had to maintain a delicate balance between, on the one hand, being seen very publicly to care about the possible "unfair" burden of blood to be shed by American troops and about American economic problems, and, on the other hand, being concerned less publicly to reduce bilateral trade friction and preserve good relations with Japan: the dispatch of JSDF personnel to the Middle East, not just Japanese money and high technology products, would have been considered of great

assistance.\textsuperscript{1} Despite a compensatory increase in the several thousand-million dollars pledged by Japan to the war effort and in strategic aid to countries such as Egypt and Turkey, pressure from America and other Western powers and recognition by the Japanese government that it could now invoke such \textit{gaiatsu} to facilitate a contribution "not only in finance but also in personnel",\textsuperscript{2} led to the eventual dispatch of MSDF minesweepers to the Gulf, after agreement to a ceasefire had been reached.

The Japanese public opposed the decision. For several months before it was made, the Diet had been discussing a U.N. Peace Cooperation Bill, which was proving to be highly unpopular, in part because it revived memories of the ambiguities of the Meiji Constitution, which had proved valuable to militaristic interests:

The bill has major flaws, particularly in its wording, the vague nature of which inspires fears of inadequate civilian control over the military. Moreover, it became clear as the debate continued that the Japanese public did not support the bill; various opinion polls indicated that only 20% to 30% were in favor of its passage.\textsuperscript{3}

However, some observers believed the debate was efficacious in that it "brought Japan's role in international activities relating to peace and security to the attention of the general public for the first time."\textsuperscript{4} The reluctance of the Japanese

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{The Economist}, 19.1.91, pp.27-28
\item \textit{The Japan Times}, 3.5.91
\item Ogata, "The United Nations and Japanese Diplomacy", p.163
\item Ogata, "The United Nations and Japanese Diplomacy", p.162
\end{enumerate}
people and government to assert their views in international fora, be they such institutions and regimes such as the World Bank and the GATT, or meetings such as those of the "Group of Seven", is not surprising, given Japan's customary aloofness from involvement in international politics. The period of some two decades, during which Japan has acquired politically significant global economic interests, is a very short space of time in which to overturn, not only the Japanese feeling of "separateness", but the very real lessens of the centuries during which the military and political isolation of Japan from outside events, unless carried to the extreme, was generally beneficial, and certainly preferable to the risks and costs of involvement in power politics. Japanese considering the overseas deployment of SDF personnel have not only the legacy of the recent half-century of mainly poor diplomacy and failed aggression to contend with, but also the legacy of profound strategic misjudgements on the

1. The triumph of Japanese diplomacy early this century was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, although, in the longer term, it may be accounted disadvantageous in that it helped lay the foundations of Japan's half-century of empire-building. Otherwise, as we have seen, Japan's forays into the world of diplomacy-cum-power politics were singularly unimpressive. Japanese leaders, notably those of militaristic inclinations, misconstrued victories over China and Russia as indicating that further expansionism would be possible and beneficial. The "Twenty-One Demands" and Japanese intervention in Siberia which followed soon after were both counter-productive. The Axis Pact proved of little assistance to Japan, and, by December 1941, it proved a liability, by serving to abet those Japanese who had so seriously underestimated America's will and capacity to fight, that they failed to appreciate its ability to conduct successful warfare in Europe as well as the Pacific. On the other hand, the efforts of those Japanese who wished by diplomatic means to contain their nation's expansionism and prevent or curtail its war with the U.S. came to nothing. Prominent Japanese participation in international fora also entails the possibility of prominent loss of face, as happened at the Washington and London naval conferences, not least because of the American perception that a increase of Japanese power meant a diminution of American power, a perception that persists in some quarters to this day. (See Appendix, this paper)
part of Hideyoshi and the court which dispatched the Japanese contingent to Paekchongang. Moreover, as bombing raids and the allied occupation of Japan cast serious doubt on the efficacy of its divine protection, the wisdom of the members of the Kamakura bakufu who so provocatively beheaded Kublai Khan's emissaries is open to question.

There is good reason to argue that the Japanese should be permitted to slowly and cautiously strengthen and expand their political role in international society in the concluding years of the twentieth century, rather than attempt to emulate their remarkably speedy and frequently ill-advised assertions of the military and political prerogatives of Great Power status which characterised their re-entry to international society in the concluding years of the nineteenth century. Japanese reticence in assuming a more prominent role in power politics may be difficult for a majority of Americans to understand, given their nation's far different and long-standing record of generally successful political assertiveness and belligerency on the international stage. It would seem, however, that in recent years, the Reagan and Bush administrations have come to terms with the peculiarities of Japan's defence policy. Apart from American

1. Despite Congressional and popular American annoyance at Japan's initial, purely financial contribution to the Persian Gulf war, informed opinion in Washington has for some years accepted that Japanese and overall Western interests would best be served by Japan continuing, "its steady defense build-up in order to attain its desired defense capabilities...Additionally, Japan can and should do more to increase the level of host nation support...within the limits of the U.S./Japan status of forces agreement, and continue to increase both the amount and quality of its ODA." (Wright, before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 28.2.89)
concern not to provoke the kind of domestic Japanese unrest which marked the years leading up to the signing of the revised security treaty, and which eventually erupted into massive and potentially de-stabilising protest demonstrations, Japan's espousal of purely "defensive" defence capabilities, "Comprehensive Security" and a cautious approach to asserting itself in international fora and regimes:

...spare American citizens the hard truth that burden sharing also means power sharing, and that the world would look a lot different if the U.S. were effectively beholden to collective security arrangements in which major strategic decisions were conceived in foreign capitals. ¹

Through their customary insular preoccupation with domestic affairs, and corresponding lack of cumulative experience in playing power politics, it may well be that the Japanese are simply not good at international politics. ² Given Japan's existing capacity to influence global affairs by virtue of its wealth and wide economic interests, and its potential capacity to exert much greater influence through a more assertive utilisation of its large population, industrial prowess and technological sophistication, it is reasonable to argue that the best course for Japanese and foreign governments is to respect the wishes of


2. This is the opinion of a former Japanese diplomatic, Kawasaki Ichiro, who criticised Japanese leaders in his book, Japan Unmasked, as better party-political "operators" than diplomatic or strategic "independent thinkers" (pp.200-201), and Japanese domestic politics as a block to a greater role in foreign affairs, even to such tentative moves as Japan's initial participation in the Asian Development Bank (pp.206-207). Yet, even this critic of Japanese insularity and introspection at one point described any Japanese aspirations to regional leadership as "grandiose" (p.231).
the bulk of the Japanese people as to their nation's foreign and
defence policies. In accordance with this, it should be noted
that because of its popularly-supported constitutional and
governmental bans on the dispatch of military personnel and the
sale of weaponry abroad, Japan, unlike both the U.S. and
U.S.S.R., and several European NATO members, did not
substantially assist the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, in the
augmentation of his military power and hence the realisation of
his territorial ambitions regarding Kuwait. As Meirion and Susie
Harries have noted, when the United States decided to continue
promising prewar trends and make postwar Japan a democracy, the
Americans "made the will of the Japanese people paramount -- and
the will of the Japanese people, generally speaking, is firmly
against military escalation".2

1. The nature of these wishes, and their divergence from those of Americans on
the same subject are indicated by a public opinion survey conducted by the
Yomiuri Shimbun in 1981:

**POLL**

Choose two items from the following regarding Japan's effort to strengthen its
national security.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Americans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen the free economic system in the west</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen military-alliance system in the West</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen Japan's defense capability</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase aid to developing countries</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen the United Nations</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen disarmament negotiation with the USSR</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase economic and cultural intercourse with the East</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Harries, *Sheathing the Sword*, p.286
CONCLUSION

There was a great recoil,
The blood was bitter to the bone
The trigger to the soul...1

...it is according to the dictate of time and fate that we have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable. 2

There can be no doubt that the result of Japan's participation in the Second World War -- the death of two million Japanese, the razing of their homes, farms, schools and temples, and the humiliation of the conquest and occupation of their land by a foreign power -- has greatly impressed upon the Japanese people the fact that international war in the twentieth century can cause suffering and destruction on a scale unmatched by even the worst of their internal conflicts and the natural catastrophes which so frequently visit mayhem upon the Japanese islands. They, more than any other people, have good reason to know that warfare today can mean, not just humiliation, but annihilation, by the ever more numerous and terrible descendants of Robert


2. Emperor Hirohito's broadcast to the Japanese people on their nation's surrender to the allied forces, in Craig, The Fall of Japan, p.210-212
Oppenheimer's first atomic "Shatterer of Worlds".  

Yet, this alone cannot explain the persistence of Japanese pacifism, for almost half a century -- two generations -- has passed since the firebombing of Tokyo and the mushroom clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki: countries have lost terrible wars before, only to launch new ones soon after, as Germany did this century. Indeed, nuclear weapons may not deter, but facilitate aggression by a nation which wields such power. The United States and Soviet Union have most visibly demonstrated that one thus far successful means of averting direct nuclear or conventional attack is to possess the capacity to launch a nuclear counter-attack: a nation may indulge in all sorts of direct and indirect aggression against other less powerful non-nuclear states when it is in possession of such a fearsome arsenal, provided it does not overstep the boundary of what other nuclear-armed states will tolerate. Japan has no nuclear weapons of its own, but it has spent most of the past half century in alliance with the United States, one of the two greatest military powers in the world, and sheltering under the U.S. "nuclear umbrella". Yet Japan has not since 1945 attempted by force of arms to acquire territory or political influence in neighbouring states, even though its postwar political leadership, which included a prime minister who was a convicted war criminal,² its quasi-military forces, and powerful bureaucratic and industrial sectors were not wholly

1. J. Robert Oppenheimer, quoting the "Bhagavad Gita"; in, Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, p.552
2. Kishi Nobusuke

124
purged of militarists.

Indeed, Japan has been so reluctant and slow to assume even part of the burden of its own defence that it has been criticised by the U.S. Congress and even, publicly, by U.S. administrations, as being an "unfair" ally which has taken a "free ride" at the expense of its powerful and generous, but increasingly hard-pressed former foe. That Japan should have chosen to stay so long on the pacifist path it began to follow in the early days of the allied occupation, despite pressure from within and from without the country to diverge, implies a stronger commitment to non-aggression than the loss of one war might be expected to elicit.

There has, of course, been considerable pressure from other Asian nations for Japan to refrain from acquiring a much larger or offensive military capability. However, while the countries which were the victims of Japan's recent aggression have ever since protested vociferously at perceived signs of a resurgence of militarism or precipitate re-armament on the part of Japan, this has arguably been a comparatively minor constraint on Japan's military capability. In deciding national policies, the governments and, in democracies, the people of a state primarily follow the dictates of their domestic political, social and economic aspirations and standards, because these are generally more constant, reliable and comprehensible than the fluid, self-interested and alien policies of other states in what is, after
all, an "anarchical society". In the absence of a persuasively high level of duress on the part of other states, a nation's preferred policies have usually originated internally, and have evolved over, and stood the test of, time: "What states do is influenced by what they believe they must do, and that in turn is the product of social learning".

Japanese pacifism has stood the test of time, not just since 1945, but since the days of Himiko, Queen of Yamatai, in the third century A.D. Japanese external aggression, on the other hand, has not. This is known to the Japanese people who have, since the days of the Tokugawa bakufu, enjoyed a higher literacy rate than most other peoples, and who are keenly interested in, and knowledgeable about their history, especially their comparatively uncontroversial prewar history.

In Chapter One of this paper, it was stated that the Japanese could draw certain conclusions from the recurring patterns of their more than one thousand years of recorded history prior to the Meiji Restoration: it is appropriate to examine these conclusions again to ascertain whether they have stood the test of later times, and to discern their influence on postwar Japanese defence policy.

1. The term chosen by Hedley Bull to describe international society, by which he did not mean that it was necessarily always disorderly or violent, but that it was not subject to government; see: The Anarchical Society, pp.46-51

2. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State, p.43

3. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.2

4. See: Chapter I, pp. 26-27 of this paper
* Overseas military aggression by Japan would fail.

After their defeat in the battle of Paekchongang and in Hideyoshi's attempt to conquer Korea and China, a Japanese army next went abroad in 1894 to again fight China, principally over control of Korea. Japan won this war against a nation which had been weakened by poor government, internal political unrest and partial subjection to Western imperialism, but Japan nevertheless promptly lost one of its most important territorial gains, the southernmost tip of Manchuria, in a clever playing of power politics by Russia.

The Russo-Japanese war which followed a decade later resulted in another deceptive Japanese victory, for Japan launched an unexpected pre-emptive strike, and the Czar's far eastern naval and land forces and his Baltic Fleet were hampered by profound logistical problems. The war so exhausted Japan, and caused so many casualties and so much economic hardship to the Japanese people, that when its outcome failed to compensate them for their privation, the rioting that consequently erupted was of such magnitude that martial law was declared and the war Cabinet had to resign.

The First World War resulted in Japan acquiring territory and assets, though more by German default than Japanese prowess. Japan's intervention in Siberia in 1918 failed in establishing a long-term friendly buffer state there, but succeeded in establishing long-term animosity towards Japan on the part of successive Soviet governments, and its perceived economic cost to the Japanese people caused even worse rioting than in 1905. Thus,
even before the Pacific War, the Japanese public had good cause to rue the loss of Japanese life in foreign conflicts, and again question the militarists' apparent reckoning that the benefits of war outweighed its cost.

The aversion of the Japanese public to overseas aggression thus has emotional and practical underpinnings. Its emotional basis is to be found in the fact that few Japanese were personally untouched by the losses and horrors of wars fought by their nation this century, and most notably, the Pacific War. If the millions of Japanese war dead were not to have died in vain, then it was reasonable to construe that it was their lot to have demonstrated the error of militarism and overseas aggression, and ensured Japan's future adherence to civil government and non-aggressive foreign policies.

The Meiji Emperor's grandson, Hirohito, seemed to appreciate this point when, on August 15th, 1945, he sought to make Japan's defeat and surrender palatable for his millions of subjects by telling them that their suffering had a point, in that he had now decided that they should fulfil their destiny to work towards a peaceful future: in so doing, he exhibited good judgment and considerable prescience.

The practical basis of Japanese aversion to overseas aggression is simple and tangible and therefore probably the stronger and more durable of the two: it is that Japan's territorial gains from aggression have been transitory and their economic cost too high. At the end of the Pacific War, the frontiers of the Japanese empire were the same as they had been at the time of the
Meiji Restoration, and the country was in ruins:

Profits and death grow marginal,
Only the mourning and the mourned recall
The wars we lose, the wars we win;
And the world is -- what it has been. 1

It was obvious that an alternative, more reliable and productive means of advancing the national interest should be pursued: since the early 1950s it has been, and the results have been spectacular. It is this conviction, validated by the empirical evidence of Japan's present wealth and prestige, which is reflected in the largely negative responses in public opinion surveys to questions concerning the desirability of increases in Self Defence Force capabilities and budgets, constitutional revision, the possession of nuclear weapons and the deployment of SDF personnel abroad. 2

* Overseas military aggression against Japan would not occur, and if it did, it would fail.

Warriors from mainland Asia, such as Jurchen forces from eastern Siberia, have occasionally landed on Japanese soil, but they have not constituted a serious threat to Japanese states. One of the most significant and singular features of Japanese history has been the nation's exemption from invasion, or even danger of invasion, during almost two millennia. The exception to this, the


2. It is not just the civilian public which is resistant to a Japanese nuclear weapons capability: according to a survey of attitudes of Self Defence Force members, the aversion to nuclear weaponry extends to the SDF; see: Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.388
great Mongol campaign to conquer Japan in the thirteenth century, was thwarted, and the Christian churches and European powers failed to establish a presence in Japan beyond the sixteenth century, save for a few Dutch traders confined to an island in Nagasaki harbour.

Despite their military superiority, the European powers which encroached on Japanese sovereignty in the nineteenth century did not attempt to conquer Japan, as neither China nor Korea had ever done, despite their periodically possessing the military capability to do so, and, most notably under the T’ang dynasty, an expansionist policy to complement that capability.

The two greatest threats to Japanese sovereignty, the invasion forces assembled by Kublai Khan and the United States some seven hundred years later, were in part the product of expansionary processes in those societies which operated independently of any Japanese influence, but they were also in part, and in the latter case, for the greater part, the result of provocative action by Japan. The defiant and very risky gesture of the Kamakura warriors’ beheading of Kublai Khan’s emissaries was echoed in the Mukden incident and attack on the U.S. Pacific fleet in Pearl Harbour: the scale and folly of the latter gesture was matched by the overwhelming nature of the hostile power it unleashed.

It is thus reasonable to conclude on the basis of past experience that Japan is unlikely to fall victim to serious aggression or invasion if it refrains from inciting such behaviour, or if its troops are not deployed where they may
become involved, willing or not, in provocative incidents: this reasoning underlies the Japanese public's aversion to the deployment of SDF personnel abroad and to the SDF's possession of an offensive capability, such as could appear to threaten, or actually attack, other states.

* Alignment with a non-intrusive dominant power would enhance national security but also increase the risk of entanglement in overseas conflicts

The reasoning which supports a non-offensive Japanese military capability is also the source of popular concern and opposition to American military bases in Japanese territory, because they do possess a powerful offensive and long-range forward deployment capability.

Although the protection it afforded may have served as an inducement to Japanese militarists to raise their territorial ambitions, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was less intrusive and to this extent less dangerous than the present American alliance in the eyes of its Japanese critics. The British alliance did not increase the chance of attack on Japan by a third country (except by Russia, which was unlikely after its defeat in 1905 and its subsequent internal revolutionary ferment and war against Germany), and did not produce irresistible pressure on Japan to commit troops to the killing fields of World War I on the other side of the world. Britain thus proved a more satisfactory ally than Koguryo and, in some ways, than the United States.

President Truman's dispatch of the Seventh Fleet to the Straits of Taiwan at the start of the Korean War in 1950, the
subsequent use of U.S. forces in Japan in combat on the Korean peninsula, and the later use of U.S. facilities in Japan for the Vietnam War effort only served to reinforce the view that the American alliance could prove a liability, as has pressure on Japan to deploy SDF personnel abroad in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It is for historical reasons difficult for Japanese to conceive of their nation being attacked in the absence of provocative action by their own military forces, or, as some may see it, the inadvertent involvement of Japanese military forces in a clash with foreign troops, and thus the defensive rationale for the deployment of U.S. forces outside American territory is not a convincing one for many Japanese.

Such conclusions about the American military presence in Japan are the source of concern expressed in opinion polls, and in the massive demonstrations of 1960, and at the time of its automatic extension in 1970, about the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the likelihood of U.S. overseas forces precipitating, rather than preventing, warfare.

1. These demonstrations were larger even than those of 1960, with police estimating the number of participants to be in excess of 700,000: the organisers of the protests put the figure at more than 2 million. The size of the disturbance reflected Japanese public concern about the American military presence in Asia contributing to warfare there, in the wake of the large-scale U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, which began to escalate in 1965, and its more recent invasion and massively destructive strategic bombing of neutral Cambodia. In 1971, local elections resulted in overwhelming victories for anti-alliance, Socialist and Communist backed candidates in Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka and other urban centres; and elections for the Upper House of the Diet shortly after resulted in losses for the LDP, and significant gains for Socialist and Communist parties. (See: Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp.280-285)
* A foreign presence on Japanese soil would challenge the status quo and draw Japan into international wars in which it wanted no part.

The concept of a foreign presence in Japan producing political and social instability may have its roots in the prehistoric migrations of people from the Asian mainland which gradually displaced the Ainu and other long established inhabitants of the islands. In particular, it may reflect memories of aggressive migrants who arrived in Kyushu from across the Straits of Tsushima in the third century. They expanded northeast to Honshu and there established the state of Yamato and the imperial family, and a warlike, patriarchal society whose values came eventually to displace those of the Yayoi, the milder, matriarchal societies of southern Japan.

However, express concern about the dangers of a foreign presence in Japan first came to prominence in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, when the presence of traders and missionaries, first from Portugal and then other Western countries, raised the prospect of sectarian strife being imported into Japan with the new religions and the goods which European ships brought from China. The foreigners also brought with them alien ideas about government and, more threatening, the Christian notion of ultimate loyalty to faith and God, not the Emperor of shogun. It was also appreciated by Hideyoshi and Ieyasu that religious and economic rivalries between the various churches and countries which supported them might not only produce conflict within Japan, but could result in one or more of the Western states attacking or even attempting to colonise Japan.
Japan embarked on its program of territorial expansionism after the Meiji Restoration largely by its own volition, at the insistence of militaristic elements among its leadership and despite advice against such a course by many eminent and well-informed figures, whose views, while far from being liberal, were realistic.

However, it is not unreasonable to ascribe some validity to the view that, were it not for the violations of Japanese sovereignty by the European-American presence on Japanese soil under the unequal treaty system, and the seeming encirclement of Japan by expansionist Western states, there would have been much less reason for Japan to try to regain its national pride and defend itself by, as it were, beating the Western powers at their own imperialist game.

The period during which the foreign presence on Japanese soil was greatest was during the postwar allied occupation, and as was noted above, events surrounding the Korean War furnished Japanese with evidence that their country would through American forces be involved, at the least indirectly, in foreign conflicts. The occupation presented the greatest challenge to the political and social status quo in the nation's history, directly by imposing unprecedented foreign military rule, and indirectly, but more lastingly, by introducing constitutional and other reforms.

It is this concern which contributes to opposition to American military forces remaining in Japan and, especially from the chauvinists' point of view, the alien cultural impact of those forces and, compared with prewar times, the extraordinarily large number of civilian foreigners now living in or visiting Japan.
Isolationism has a powerful attraction to Japanese, and this is reflected in results of public opinion polls ranging from the high number of people who want nothing to do with foreigners to an even higher number who oppose the overseas deployment of the Self Defence Force.

* Isolation, except for carefully managed foreign trade, would produce stability and security.

The Tokugawa period of Japan's isolation from the outside world was characterised by stability and, in the short term, security. However, it was also characterised by political and social rigidity and oppression and, especially in rural areas, extreme hardship for a majority of people. Moreover, severely restricted foreign trade tends to benefit only those who are directly engaged in it. Heian and Tokugawa introspectiveness may be seen as a form of over-reaction, a retreat to policies the extreme opposite of the adventurism apparent in the provision of significant military aid to Koguryo, the expansionism of Hideyoshi, and the overseas exploits of the wako, the pirate-traders of the pre-Tokugawa era whose exploits enriched the shogun's political and military rivals and provoked potentially dangerous Chinese antagonism to Japan.

The conclusion that isolation and restricted trade produce stability and security is reflected in the Japanese public's aversion to foreign military bases on their soil and the overseas deployment of SDF personnel. It is also reflected in resistance to the opening of domestic Japanese markets to outside competition, one of the allegedly "unfair" practices which
complicates the management of Japan's alliance with the United States and its relations with other countries, and contributes to Japan's lack of assertiveness in international regimes such as the GATT.

Some Japanese so resent the charge that their country is taking a "free ride" at its ally's expense that they have suggested that the U.S. should recognise that in some ways it now needs Japan more than Japan needs it. An outspoken politician, Ishihara Shintaro, provoked controversy in the U.S. following publication of a booklet, The Japan that can say No: Japan's new card in its relations with America, in which he, and the Chairman of the Sony Corporation, Morita Akio, strongly criticised America's economic performance and its perceived attitude towards Japan. He argued that:

Japan holds very strong cards -- its high technology capabilities which are indispensable to weapons development in both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. .

Some of Japan's business leaders ... are of the opinion that Japan could go neutral, revoking the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, if the Soviets will return our northern islands, and allow Japan the right to develop Siberian resources.

Although Japanese people may harbour reservations about the perceived dangers attendant on having U.S. military forces in their country, and would rather have a non-intrusive and

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1. Ishihara, The Japan that can say No: Japan's new card in its relations with America: excerpts reprinted in The Independent Monthly, March 1990, pp. 27,29

A further indication of the lack of appeal of Ishihara's comments to the Japanese public may be gained by noting his failure to win the elections in 1991 for mayor of Tokyo, despite his having official LDP endorsement.
undemanding alliance such as Japan enjoyed with Britain early this century, it is evident from public opinion polls that a majority do not want the security treaty with America revoked, nor the acquisition by Japan of the autonomous defence capability implied by such action. What they do appear to want is greater recognition by Americans that, given Japan's history of "one-sided" alliances, and its concern about foreign entanglements, the Japanese, in their own estimation, are bearing a heavy burden in maintaining an alliance which places foreign military forces in their territory.  

* Contact with the outside world would produce mixed blessings, with trade bringing prosperity but new technologies and ideas bringing baronial and popular challenges to centralised government and the existing political and social systems.

While no one may doubt the bravery of individual Japanese soldiers over the centuries, the often superior quality of their training, weaponry and battlefield tactics, or, on one of their rare deployments overseas, their determination to acquire the glittering prizes afforded by dominion over foreign lands, it is nevertheless the case that their military efforts to carve out an empire in Asia and the Pacific, or even merely to sway the outcome of conflicts on the mainland, have been singularly

1. Homma Nagoyo replied to Ishihara thus:

"The arrogant nationalism of Ishihara, who exaggerates Japan's technological power, does not represent mainstream thinking in Japan, nor does his unilateralist view that from now on, Japan can go it alone without America's assistance". ("The Peril of Revisionism", p.19)
unsuccessful and ultimately catastrophic. By contrast, Japanese economic and cultural contacts with other states have been beneficial and lucrative, although, on occasion, the foreign ideas and technologies imported with foreign goods have given rise to domestic political and social instability. This, however, has customarily been more of a threat to Japanese rulers than those they ruled.

Contact with China in the seventh century was accompanied by a particularly bloody interval of civil warfare between rival aristocratic clans, but it also introduced Confucianism to Japan, and with it the concept of good government, and instruction in the means by which to implement it. 1 During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, revived trade with China and novel trade with South East Asia brought in exotic goods, technologies and coinage which flowed into the hands of daimyos, merchants, small landowners and other ordinary people, and removed the monopoly on wealth and power enjoyed by the Ashikaga bakufu. Guilds of merchants fortified their towns and enlisted soldiers to protect their shipments; peasants revolted, assaulted tax collectors, plundered granaries, drove the shogun’s officers out of whole provinces and deposed local daimyos and ruled in their stead: it was, according to a popular contemporary saying, a time of “the low oppressing the high”. 2

1. The clans were the Soga and what became the Fujiwara; a document prescribing proper behaviour for officials, which has been attributed to Prince Shotoku, has been described as the first constitution of Japan; see: Leonard, Early Japan, p.15

2. Leonard, Early Japan, p.100
Hideyoshi and Ieyasu largely put a stop to such assertions of plebeian political independence and power, which in the sixteenth century had been further encouraged by the introduction of Christianity, with its notions of spiritual egalitarianism and the individual's ultimate allegiance to a deity or his high priest in Rome.  

After more than two centuries of isolation and feudalism, it was the arrival of foreign gunboats and the subsequent revival of foreign trade under unequal treaties which precipitated the demise of the repressive Tokugawa bakufu and the eventual promulgation of the Meiji Constitution which, whatever its faults, gave an increasing number of ordinary Japanese an increasing degree of legitimate power over national affairs: those who were neither content with government policy nor enfranchised, like the fishwives of Toyama in 1918, understood and practised the exercise of political power by the more time-honoured means of rioting. Finally, the postwar period of Japan's close interaction with the United States and other countries, which has seen it rise to the position of the world's pre-eminent trading state and, on the basis of its assets, the world's richest state, has also been the period during which all Japanese have enjoyed unprecedented political power and prosperity. It has also brought the power to influence the affairs of other states.

1. The Tokugawa shoguns were not, however, entirely successful in quashing popular disturbances or quenching the spirit of independence among the masses, as is shown by popular revolts which continued throughout the era, in particular in remote rural and mountainous areas where the authority of the bakufu was relatively difficult to enforce. (See: Sugimoto, Popular Disturbance in Postwar Japan, pp.172-176)
by economic means, and by example to persuade others to forgo the costly and risky business of war: "Trading states are beginning to emerge once again in world politics, and the erstwhile low politics of trade and growth is becoming high politics once again."¹

The peaceful, primarily economic relations with the outside world, a comparatively liberal internal political system and a generally high standard of living which characterise Japanese society today are not conditions that merely co-exist: they are, and their less developed but recognisable manifestations in earlier times were also, to a great extent, dependent on each other. The Japanese people are aware of this, as is demonstrated by their opposition to constitutional revision and their persistent aversion to potentially militaristic domestic policies and aggressive foreign policies, and by the reasons to which they ascribe this aversion, including the prospect of conscription, the time-honoured means of co-opting civilians to the implementation of militaristic policies.²

This does not necessarily mean that some further circumvention, or adaption, of the democratic rights and principles embodied in the postwar Constitution, or entrenchment of governmental practices which may not accord with the Western ideal of good political leadership, necessarily herald a return to Japanese militarism and aggressive foreign and defence

2. See, for example: POLL, Note 2, page 77, of this paper.
policies. One of the greatest of modern Japanese statesmen, Yoshida Shigeru, was not a liberal, but he was opposed to militarism and expansionism. In the prewar era, the leader of the Meiji oligarchy, Iwakura Tomomi, opposed war with Korea in the 1870s, as did another oligarch, who is credited with being the main architect of Japan’s modernisation, Okubo Toshimichi. These men pointed out that the economic cost of war would be greater than any potential rewards, and would thus hinder Japan’s economic and political development and its the ultimate objective of obtaining diplomatic recognition of its equality with the Western powers; and, they predicted that severe economic problems would also hinder Japan’s ability to repay its debts to Britain, affording the British a pretext to intervene in Japanese internal affairs. Saionji Kinmochi, originally a member of the Meiji oligarchy and a Fujiwara, opposed the attempt by militarists to dominate the Cabinet and finance a big Army build-up in 1912, and persistently argued against every war fought by Japan this century.  

1. As the case of Article IX shows, a constitution which can bend somewhat may be less inclined to break. However, to avoid a repeat of past errors, such as the Meiji Constitution’s allowance of the gradual displacement of civil government by military rule, and foreign policy being decided by armies in the field, some principles of the postwar Japanese Constitution must remain inviolate: these include; the sovereignty of the people, and the requirement for civilian cabinets comprised only of Diet members, civilian control of the Self Defence Force, and popular elections for both houses of the Diet. Given that civilian Cabinet members may sometimes be among the most ardent of militarists (and not just in Japan), it is also important that budgetary control remain as far as possible with the Diet as a whole, rather than being permitted to shift further within the exclusive province of the LDP and Ministry of Finance.  

2. See: Reischauer, Japan, p.164; Blainey, The Causes of War, pp.59-60,90-91; Bergamini, Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy, pp.255-256
Japan's experience of warfare up to and including the last war it fought attest to the validity of the view of some Meiji oligarchs that foreign aggression is a very risky and costly business. Moreover, the longer it lasts, the costlier it becomes, and short wars, in particular those against bigger states, show a propensity for turning into long ones, as did Hideyoshi's initially quick advance to the Yalu River, and Admiral Yamamoto's year of victories after Pearl Harbour. As one historian observed of the miscalculations which preceded World War I: "Quick, decisive victory was the German orthodoxy; the economic impossibility of a long war was everybody's orthodoxy." 1

As Geoffrey Blainey has found, the expectation of a fast and comparatively inexpensive war is not only a mistake often associated with war, it is, in itself, a cause of war, which afflicts both sides and which is obviously attributable to "differing calculations of the rival forces and rival equipment." 2 It is notable that those Meiji era leaders who were opposed to foreign aggression, Okuba, Iwakura and Saionji, had all travelled abroad and had made realistic calculations the forces and equipment of potential rivals: similarly, Yamamoto, who warned against fighting the United States had been a student there, and the anti-war Yoshida was a well-travelled diplomatic and former Ambassador to Britain.

2. Blainey, The Causes of War, p.56
Postwar Japanese political leaders may still be more concerned with domestic affairs than is warranted or desirable, as Kawasaki Ichiro has claimed, but many more of them, and bureaucrats, business people, journalists, students and ordinary tourists are going abroad than in the prewar era, and are being made aware of the military and industrial resources, and the comparative self-sufficiency of other nations. This, the outcome of the Pacific War, and the respect now accorded Japan because of its economic power and technological sophistication, must undoubtedly reinforce the evidence gathered over two-millennia that Japanese external aggression fails and peaceful co-existence and trade succeeds in advancing the interest, not just of a ruling clique, but all Japanese.

The importance of the legacy of history should not be underestimated, and in the case of Japan's relations with the United States, it has undoubtedly caused misunderstandings and antagonism, given that the American historical experience justifies optimism over the outcome of political assertiveness and belligerency in international affairs; whereas Japan's justifies a fair degree of pessimism. This has led Japan to adopt foreign and defence policies which may be better suited to the coming century than will be those which have worked well for other states in and prior to this century. Thus, as the Gulf War of 1991 demonstrated:

...it is becoming cheaper to destroy the opposition's main

1. Kawasaki, Japan Unmasked
weapons of invasion and occupation, such as battle tanks, long-range combat aircraft and large warships -- than to deploy them oneself. The result is to increase the attractiveness of non-offensive (or non-provocative) defence strategies, based on the principle that all the activities of the military forces -- ranging from their size, structure, weapons and logistics to their training, manoeuvres and war games -- can be designed to provide an effective defence, but with virtually no offensive capability...

The Gulf War has demonstrated that the negotiation of mutual non-provocative defence strategies (including adequate verification) would be in tune with the technological possibilities.

Japan's pursuit of a strictly non-offensive defence policy would be in keeping with the legacy of the nation's long history, and would therefore be agreeable to a majority of Japanese. It would not, perhaps, prove so agreeable or comprehensible to many Americans and others, as Richard Rosecrance suggests:

Many have misunderstood the differences between Japan and America, believing that Japan is a youthful, smaller edition of the United States, a still not fully developed major power with political and economic interests that have yet to be defined on a world stage. Sooner or later, many feel, Japan too will become a world power with commensurate political and military interests. This is a misconception of the Japanese role in world affairs and a mistaken assimilation of a trading state to the military-political realm. Even if, at some distant future time, Japan increased her defense expenditure to 2 percent of gross national product, she would not follow the United States and Soviet strategy in international politics or try to become the world's leading naval or military power. As a trading state it would not be in her interest to dominate the world, control the sea lanes to the Persian Gulf, or guarantee military access to markets in Europe of the western hemisphere. She depends upon open trading and commercial routes to produce entry for her goods. It is not the American model that Japan will ultimately follow. Rather, it is the Japanese model that America may ultimately follow.

1. Barnaby, "A lesson in defence from the Gulf", in The New Scientist, 16.2.91
2. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State, xi
Unlike their Meiji era predecessors at the turn of the last century, the Japanese of today have over one hundred years of their nation’s interaction with the world to reflect upon and thereby gain insight into what path should be followed to advance the national interest into the twenty-first century. Universal literacy, a plethora of historical works and much enthusiasm for learning about themselves have now given Japanese the capacity, as never before, to examine how their nation fared during the almost two millennia that separated Queen Himiko of Yamatai and the Meiji Emperor, and during which it adopted various policies intended to address much the same issues as Japanese face today: how to preserve the sovereignty of the state, how best to govern it, how best to ensure economic growth and the livelihood of its people.

For what was by far the greater part of those two millennia, Japan lived in peace with its neighbours, trading with them and growing in wealth. Very occasionally, in 663, 1592, and 1597, it sent armies abroad, but they all failed to secure their objectives, and those warriors who were not killed, returned in haste to Japan. Overall, the recent wars against China, Russia, Germany and Western powers in the Asia-Pacific region cost Japan dearly in lives and money, and served only to prove that, when the modern Japan that emerged after 1868 chose to ignore the legacy of history and to progressively move further down the path of territorial expansionism, it chose the wrong path. After 1945, Japan evidently chose to remain on the right path, to judge by its remarkable rise from humiliation, destruction and poverty to security, prosperity and prestige.
The path on which the allied occupation left Japan, and which has since been adhered to by the Japanese people, was that of civilian government and pacifism: specifically, to maintain a non-aggressive and, as far as possible, omni-directional foreign policy with primary emphasis on the establishment and maintenance of a flourishing overseas trade; and, a defence policy which, while allowing for re-armament, did not threaten other states by its inclusion of plainly offensive and long-range weaponry, or an independent forward deployment capability.

The strong support of pacifism by the Japanese people today is not a postwar novelty, but a continuation and enhancement of prewar modes of thought and behaviour derived from, and sustained by, the legacy of history; theirs is a communal wisdom gained not only from events of this century, but from all the centuries stretching back to the Japanese military force dispatched abroad to suffer death and defeat at Paekchongang.
APPENDIX

COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY: PROS AND CONS

There is no doubt that most Japanese, and most of their neighbours in the Asia-Pacific region, prefer to see Japan securing its prosperity, stability and sovereignty by way of trade, investment and aid rather than by external aggression and expansionism. Despite rioting over "Japanese economic imperialism" in some South East Asian nations in the early 1970s, and official complaints over such things as Japan's failure to transfer technology and, most notably, its unfair trade practices, the nations of Japan's own region which are recipients of Japanese economic aid have enjoyed economic growth rates in excess of those of most other nations, including in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the world economy was in recession.

This does not, however, mean that "Comprehensive Security" has been immune from criticism, some at least of which is justified. Implementation of the concept has led to Japan being, in absolute terms, the world's largest aid donor. In relative terms, its performance is less impressive: as a share of GNP, Japan's aid expenditure in 1988 ranked fourteenth among the eighteen members of the Development Assistance Committee. ¹ The quality of Japanese aid is subject to greater criticism than that

¹. Far Eastern Economic Review, 10.3.88, p.64
of many other nations, including that it "gives away less while lending more to developing countries than most donors, and makes loans on tougher terms ... Japan's aid is still heavily weighted in favour of infrastructure developments which often benefit the better-off at the expense of the very poor." 1 Moreover, even Japan's "soft" loans can become very "hard" when debtor nations are faced with an appreciating yen.

A further complicating factor in Japan's pursuit of comprehensive security is negative reaction in the United States to Japan's economic ascendancy, and America's relative decline, in particular in the Asia-Pacific region: "many congressmen and others think that more aid from Japan simply extends that country's trade". 2 This opinion is frequently shared by recipients of Japanese assistance, including members of the Association of South East Asian Nations. 3

Nevertheless, Muthiah Alagappa is of the opinion that Japanese support for economic development in the member-states of the Association of South East Asian Nations enhances regional security, not only because it is perceived by the ASEANs as less threatening than a military role for Japan in the region, but because the importance of economic development in maintaining their internal stability would be difficult to overestimate:

In the Philippines, the stability of the Aquino government and

1. The Far Eastern Economic Review, 18.3.88, p.64
2. Far Eastern Economic Review, 10.3.88, p.69
3. Alagappa, Japan’s Political and Security Role in the Asia-Pacific, p.32
success in combating the serious communist insurgency threat will, to a considerable extent, be a function of economic reform, growth and development. In Malaysia, harmonious inter-ethnic relations, so vital to political stability, become much more difficult to achieve during periods of slow or negative economic growth. In Indonesia the legitimacy of the Suharto government and the dominance of the military in Indonesian politics are predicated upon promises of economic development and political stability. A prolonged downturn in its economy will raise serious questions about the viability of an island city state like Singapore. Vietnam’s economy is in dire need of reform and external assistance. As many of these states can directly or indirectly affect the naval balance of power and safety of navigation in the region, it behooves Japan to adopt a positive approach to Asean in particular.

It is fair to say that Japan’s overseas trade, investment and aid, and the example its economic growth has set, have overall helped, rather than hindered, the global ascendancy of the free enterprise system, and “Comprehensive Security” has accordingly gained adherents among officials in the United States. Japan’s foreign economic assistance may therefore also be considered as a form of political assistance in the management of its relations with the United States. However, an appreciation of the efficacy of Japan’s comprehensive approach to security may be less evident during international crises which are perceived to threaten Western interests, for then Americans are apt to see Japan as shirking its duty as a military ally (rather than a “partner”, as Japanese would have it) by not contributing military personnel to serve, and possibly die, beside U.S. troops.

Yet, in less emotionally heightened times, it is evident that “Comprehensive Security" per se is considered overall to be beneficial by American administrations, although no substitute

1. Alagappa, Japan’s Political and Security Role in the Asia-Pacific, pp.28-29
for what they regard as the minimal requirement for Japan to be capable of protecting sea lanes of communication up to 1,000 nautical miles from the home islands, blockading the Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima Straits and defending the home islands against limited aggression.

It is significant in terms of its future prospects that "Comprehensive Security" is an acceptable form of "long-range" national defence for the pacifist Japanese public, who would much rather see the country attempting to secure the passage of vital commodities through, for example, the Malacca Straits by way of peaceful economic and developmental assistance to Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, rather than the deployment of Ground SDF personnel, or the dispatch of a Japanese aircraft carrier, to Southeast Asia.
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