ROBERT T~YLOR is a lecturer in government at Sydney University. He completed his doctoral dissertation at Cornell University on Burmese elite politics in the immediate prewar period. Much of the research for this essay was done while he was an exchange scholar at Rangoon Arts and Sciences University in 1978. He is now engaged in research on Burmese political parties in the postwar era.

MJQ1AEL V~AN l.ANGENBERG is a lecturer in modern Indonesian history at the University of Sydney. He did his doctoral research at Sydney University on the national revolution in northern Sumatra during the 1942-50 period, and has published a number of articles on that region's history. He is now engaged on a study of the political economy of the national movement in northern Sumatra from 1900 to 1942.

INDONESIA: FROM BRIEFCASE TO SAMURAI SWORD

Anthony Reid

The role of the Japanese in the creation of modern Indonesia remains an emotive question, particularly for those who were involved in the events. Since the Dutch attacked the infant Indonesian Republic in 1945 as a Japanese creation, nationalists were initially at pains to show the world that they had no debts to Tokyo. Most Western scholars have been prepared to give the nationalists the benefit of the doubt, but it has not been so easy for the Japanese, some of whom felt wounded by the "ingratitude" of Indonesians.

This debate, like many others in modern Indonesian history, has focused on the dramatic events surrounding the proclamation of Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945. It is these events which have drawn the special attention of writers of memoirs, with firsthand accounts from Hatta, Adam Malik, Sukarno and Subardjo on the Indonesian side, and Nishijima and Miyoshi on the Japanese.

Nishijima, the most prolific of the Japanese participants, explains that he began to write his version of the proclamation out of a sense of injury, when he learned in 1951 that he could not obtain a visa to revisit his Indonesian friends because of Indonesian official sensitivity on this question. In the several books he has written or inspired, Nishijima has insisted that it should not be forgotten that the independence proclamation was drafted in the house of his superior, Admiral Maeda, at a meeting in which both Maeda and Nishijima were seated at the principal conference table with Sukarno, Hatta and Subardjo. Miyoshi also represented the Japanese Army at the meeting, in the hope of implicating the Army in an effective fait accompli. In a 1959 publication, a group of Japanese scholars renewed their complaint that these facts had been suppressed by Indonesian writers, and pleaded that "a clarification of this fact now would not soil their national history." Hatta's most recent memoir accepted only a part of the Japanese version. On the occasion of Admiral Maeda's death in December 1977, the Japanese concerned were therefore understandably gratified to receive a telegram from Adam Malik, now Indonesian Vice President, but in 1945 a strenuous upholder of the view that independence should be proclaimed in complete defiance of the Japanese. Thirty-two years after the event, Malik could generously acknowledge Maeda's "great help in the preparatory stage of our independence," and proclaim that Maeda's name "will be written in the annals of Indonesia with golden letters."

The proclamation question has more to do with personal feelings and national pride than with historical causation. Here, as in the whole question of the
Japanese period, it is important to remember that the important actors continued to be Indonesian. It is they who defined the eventual shape of independent Indonesia by responding to whatever political opportunities each period offered, whatever resonances each foreign model set up in their own tradition. The argument of this essay is that the Japanese occupation brought such profound change that it is not inappropriate to regard 1942 as the beginning of the whole revolutionary upheaval which gave birth to modern Indonesia. Nevertheless, these changes were in very few cases the result of deliberate Japanese planning, but rather of Indonesian responses to a radically altered environment.

There are a number of reasons why 1942 marked a more permanent break with the past in Indonesia than in other parts of Southeast Asia. Some of them have to do with the fact that the Netherlands was not a major world power and could only have maintained its influence in Southeast Asia in conditions of great stability. A few embittered Dutch politicians complained after the war that the Anglo-Saxons had deliberately manipulated the postwar crisis to ensure that their interests prevailed in Indonesia at the expense of the Dutch. In reality, the dramatic events of the 1940s only telescoped a shift which was inevitable in the long run. The place of the Dutch language was a symptom of this shift. The Japanese officially discouraged English and French elsewhere in Southeast Asia, while in practice frequently making use of these languages for effective communication. By contrast, they had no use whatever for Dutch, and found Indonesian (or occasionally even English) much more practically useful. While the older Dutch-educated generation of Indonesians naturally found it painful to have to forego the public use of Dutch, they were themselves acutely aware that it was not internationally useful, and that there was an extra indignity in having been colonized by a second-class power. Even if Japan lost the war, Holland could not win it.

The other remarkable feature of the Indonesian case was the harmonious start given to Japanese-Indonesian relations by the almost universal Indonesian welcome to the invaders. The reasons usually given for this are the poor Dutch record in political (as opposed to social) emancipation, the exaggerated hopes of Japan dating back to the Russo-Japanese war, and the Joyo­boyo prophecy in Java which strengthened popular belief that deliverance from foreign oppression would come at the hands of another group of foreigners whose rule would be very short. If we compare the Indonesian response with the more ambivalent one in the Philippines, Burma, Malaya, or Vietnam, however, there are two other factors which assume larger proportions. Firstly, the influence of "anti-fascist" preconceptions, whether of European democratic, Marxist, or Chinese derivation, was very low. Most of Indonesia's left-wing politicians remained impotent in exile. It is significant that the attempt of the most important Marxist politician at liberty, Amir Sjarifuddin, to use Dutch money to start an anti-Japanese underground in Java, proved more of a handicap than a strength to him in his subsequent career as a nationalist leader. The other important factor was that the Japanese did not have to fight their way into Indonesia, with all the destruction and suffering that would have caused. After the fall of Singapore and the Battle of the Java Sea, the Dutch knew they were beaten and did not even attempt to defend the major cities. In some Muslim strongholds in the Outer Islands, such as Aceh (Sumatra), Gorontalo and Bone (both Sulawesi), Indonesians themselves acted to speed the Dutch departure, and could welcome the Japanese to already "liberated" areas. This relatively peaceful takeover encouraged a massive loss of
Indonesian faith in Dutch competence, while placing few initial stains on the Japanese record.

The high hopes placed in the Japanese were quickly dashed with the banning of political activity and experience of military brutality; yet the effect of this harmonious start was not entirely lost. A number of battle-scarred Japanese soldiers were surprised and relieved to find themselves at last in a friendly environment, while the civilian "experts," accustomed to the idea that the Dutch had built a "model" colonial system, were puzzled at Indonesian enthusiasm to escape from it. General Inamura Hitoshi, the conqueror of Java, was one who was very struck by his reception:

Many natives gathered round us from far and near, the way country people in Japan run to the road when soldiers are marching during manoeuvres. The natives...brought coconuts, bananas and papayas to the Japanese... Many of the natives were cheerfully raising their hands with their thumbs up. Some Japanese officers took from their pockets the Japanese-Indonesian conversation dictionaries...and began talking with the adults and children with the help of gestures. I wondered 'Is this really a battlefield?'

Spontaneously I said to Major-General Okazaki: 'Chief of Staff, we have already won the battle...'

Throughout his 1942 term as commander in Java, Inamura was to insist that the warmth of this reception made the iron-handed approach applied in other areas, particularly Malaya, inappropriate for Java. To the argument of numerous high-powered emissaries from Tokyo and Singapore that "a forceful administration like that in Singapore is the way to make the colonial people obey us," he replied that a milder policy based on pragmatism and economic incentives was the only way to restore production quickly without altogether alienating the population.

The so-called "soft" policy of Inamura was somewhat modified by his successors, and was not replicated in most of the other islands. One of Inamura's most powerful critics in Tokyo, General Muto Akira, in fact became military commander in Sumatra in 1943. In Kalimantan the Japanese committed some of the worst atrocities of the war, decimating the Indonesian political elite. Nevertheless, the model established by Inamura in Java was critical -- firstly, because he won the open admiration of Sukarno and the cooperation of most other Indonesian politicians, who found it difficult to change course subsequently; secondly, because the very lack of political opportunity under the Japanese in the outer islands made it more certain that Java would be the model for the subsequent revolution.

Economic Change

The Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia was of course intended to secure the supply of strategic raw materials to Japan -- in particular oil, rubber, tin, and other metals of Indonesia. The initial Japanese policy therefore was to continue and even accentuate the export orientation of the colonial economies and their dependence on industrial imports. The consequence of the war was the reverse of this. By the middle of 1943 the shortage of shipping was so acute that Tokyo ordered a reversal of the initial policy. All emphasis was now to be placed on the economic self-sufficiency of every region.

production was forcibly encouraged in every deficit area, and local authorities were directed to use every effort to produce cloth and other needed manufactures locally. During the last year of the war there was virtually a total breakdown of Japanese shipping movements. Somehow the Japanese war machine was kept in remarkable combat readiness, but the civilian economy was brought to its knees.

As with all the colonial economies, the suspension of exports produced a massive dislocation. In the Indonesian case the plantation economy was never able to recover from the blow. Beneficial as they would have been to independent Indonesia's balance of payments, the Dutch sugar, rubber, tobacco and tea estates were not tied to the interests of any important indigenous political force (as they were in the Philippines). Sugar-cultivation had never been popular among the Javanese peasants who were obliged to devote much of their land and labor to it, while smallholders in Sumatra were only too anxious to turn the rich plantation land over to subsistence crops. This shift of resources away from agricultural estates proved the most enduring economic result of the war, precisely because it was politically popular -- however damaging to the national budget.

The other contribution of the military administration to the Indonesian economy was still more negative, and still further at odds with Japanese official intentions. The wartime economy became increasingly a controlled economy as the war progressed. The movement of goods between residencies (shu), and even between the smaller districts now called kabupaten (bunshu), was made illegal without a government license. Larger and larger percentages of the rice crop were requisitioned by the government at derisory prices, with scarce supplies of cloth, salt, and fertilizer distributed through the government hierarchy as an inducement to produce. All of this gave enormous economic power to officials, both Japanese and Indonesian, who had little experience in exercising it. A flourishing black market in consumer goods soon appeared, and fortunes could be made in "smuggling" goods from one district to another. During 1943-44 the newspapers published numerous reports of the arrest of "smugglers" or of corrupt officials who had abetted them, though in the final year of the war the situation appeared to be too far out of hand for such methods.

Some Indonesian informants suggest that it was Japanese lower officials and civilians who first instructed Indonesians in the art of discreet "inducements" for official favors, the filling out of invoices for lesser amounts than those received, and so forth. Certainly there was unprecedented opportunity for enterprising dealers who were skillful in the ways of bending or breaking oppressive official regulations. Such skills have not lost their utility since.

If there were a few successes in growing new crops, the controlled economy had a disastrous effect on the distribution of rice. Despite all Japanese efforts to open new lands and increase food production, the harvest dropped lower with each year, until even normally "surplus" areas were in a desperate situation. There seem to have been three main reasons for this. One was the shortage of manpower as a result of the heavy Japanese demands for forced labor on roads, airfields, and defenses. According to one estimate only 60-65% of sawah (wet-rice fields) in Sumatra were planted in 1945 for this reason. Another reason was that farmers tended to hide their rice, to harvest and sell it to "smugglers" at night, or even to avoid cultivation altogether rather than to surrender it to the Japanese. In some areas where Indonesian officials
declined to implement the draconian demands for requisitioned rice, farmers appear to have had enough to eat even though there was very little to be had in the market. The third factor, which caused the greatest bitterness among Indonesians, was the determination of the Japanese to stockpile rice as a security against the time they might have to fight a defensive guerrilla war against the Allied invasion of the Indonesian islands. The official responsible for the stockpiling arrangements in Java conceded later that it was a source of much unnecessary bitterness, and that the officials concerned "interpreted the order in an exaggerated manner, trying to accumulate excessive quantities of food, labor, and munitions." The last year of the war was a time of unprecedented deprivation for most Indonesians. Many, especially in Java, were simply unable to obtain food and were seen "waiting for death" along the road. Cloth was cut as a favored minority, and many were forced to dress in sacking and rags. Yet in the midst of this hardship the Japanese were taking good care of the Indonesian political elite, whom they had very effectively drawn into government and propaganda functions. The pamong-praja administrative corps which had served the Dutch lived no less well under the Japanese, and had greater opportunities for making a profit from their office if they chose to do so. For the nationalist and Islamic leaders whom the Dutch had regarded as a nuisance, the change at Japanese hands was dramatic. They were given generous allowances, privileged access to cloth and other rations, and provided with a captive audience for their propaganda. Even though many of them increasingly saw the activities they were engaged in as a sandiwara (theater), they could not then withdraw from their exposed position as mediators between the Japanese and an embittered people. Already in 1943 people were saying, "Our leaders are now living the good life but we are as poor as ever." By the end of the war, those who had claimed to be leaders of the masses felt themselves caught, together with the older elite, under the heavy yoke of privilege. As Ki Hadjar Dewantoro put it, "The reputation of the leaders is ruined in the eyes of the people." Retribution came after the Japanese surrender, most of its victims being the pamong-praja through whom forced labor and rice deliveries had been imposed. There was no leadership to galvanize a peasant revolution in 1945, but the raw material was there to an extent which may be unique in Indonesian history.

Political Leadership

Before the war the Indonesian nationalist movement had succeeded remarkably in extending the idea of an Indonesian national identity, through an active but low-circulation Indonesian press, to urban centers throughout the whole archipelago. It suffered, however, from two major handicaps. The first was the internal bickering among the small group of Dutch-educated political leaders, which caused frequent splits in old parties and the creation of new ones; the other was the absence of any substantial contact with the "masses" in whose name the politicians professed to act. Dutch surveillance of political activity was extraordinarily complete, and the authorities allowed politicians their freedom only so long as they seemed ineffective. Any radical party which began to obtain large-scale support in the countryside was quickly shackled with impossible restrictions, and its leaders imprisoned or exiled.

The Japanese regime presented quite different opportunities: politicians lost even more of their freedom to say what they thought in print, to form parties of their choosing, and to associate with their comrades in other islands. In terms of the prewar deficiencies of the nationalist movement, however, these losses were more than counterbalanced by the gains. Unity was virtually forced on politicians: if they wanted to be public figures at all, they had to join in the single propaganda body which was allowed in each area. If they did so, as the great majority did, they had the unaccustomed experience of addressing a mass audience, often with people trucked in from surrounding villages at government expense to add to the grandeur of a public occasion. The Japanese calendar was dotted with such festivities -- the emperor's birthday, the anniversary of the Pearl Harbor, the anniversary of the Japanese arrival in each area, the "acceptance" of each Japanese concession toward independence, with appropriate speeches of gratitude, and the tours around his region by every leader who made a visit to Japan. The approved leadership of each area was built up through such means and in the controlled media.

Such exposure may not have brought the Indonesian masses to love their leaders; the earlier discussion suggests that would not be the right word. Still less did it make possible the building up of a loyal, efficient, and educated cadre structure -- the lack of which has been a feature of Indonesian politics ever since. It did at least make known to the masses who their leaders were. At each administrative level the Japanese encouraged, or even forced, the emergence of a clearly acknowledged leadership among the more charismatic political or religious figures available. Previously antagonistic political party leaders were obliged to join unitary propaganda bodies; various shades of reformed or unreformed Islamic opinion were obliged to accept a part in an overarching Islamic body; Protestants and Catholics were represented in a unitary body. Already in 1943 people had begun to campaign for religious leadership in general. Although there were times when the leaders of these organizations felt themselves to be merely captive playthings of the Japanese, the period which followed the promise of independence in September 1944 saw them gradually emerging to positions where they could take over government without serious challenge from their colleagues.

It is difficult to categorize any of these pemimpin, whether at the "national" (meaning Java) or local levels, as Quislings or puppets, in the sense of owing their position to their pro-Japanese attitudes rather than their capacity to arouse popular support. The overtly pro-Japanese figures were generally discarded within the first year, and the increasingly acute Japanese need to exhort the population to greater sacrifice led them to prefer figures who were less effective in this role. Sukarno's face, not just his name, penetrated the Archipelago. I have the Japanese to thank for that," Sukarno said. While less-prepared than many nationalists to criticize the Japanese, Sukarno was adept at using his opportunities to arouse his mass audience to nationalist fervor. Many did hold him guilty for his share in Japanese oppression, but he might well have been expected to fall rapidly from grace after the Japanese surrender. Yet even the symbol of non-cooperation with the Japanese, Sjafrir, had to concede in October 1945 that Sukarno was indispensable as President. When, three years later, Sukarno's position was put to a public test by the communist denunciation of his as "Quisling, slave of Japan, romusha dealer and heiko propagandist," he appeared to emerge stronger than ever. The point here may be that Sukarno's position rested not on specific actions he had taken or views he represented, but in
having become preeminently *penimip kita* (our leader) in a situation of confrontation with outsiders.

Under the Japanese, Indonesia was divided into three parts, with very little Indonesian contact permitted between them. The Japanese 16th Army guided Java along a relatively progressive path towards political emancipation; the 25th Army defended Sumatra against any leadership emanating from Java; while in the other islands the Japanese Navy implemented a policy designed to retain permanent Japanese control. The leadership of Sukarno and Hatta strictly extended only to Java, therefore, although after April 1945 the Navy did allow these leaders also to visit Makasar, Bali, and Banjarmasin. Since the overwhelming majority of national-level prewar politicians were based in Java, however, their acceptance of Sukarno's and Hatta's preeminence was more than half the battle. In Sumatra and the Navy area, comparable *penimip* had emerged at the local, residency level—Mohammad Sjafei in West Sumatra, Teuku Njak Arif in Padang, Dr. A.K. Gani in Palembang, Dr. Katulangie in Makasar, Pangeran Mohammad Noor in Banjarmasin, and so forth. After the proclamation of Indonesian independence these people were declared to be Residents or Governors of their respective areas, and had as little difficulty as Sukarno and Hatta nationally in having their leadership accepted by their elite peers. The contrast with the prewar factionalism is remarkable. In general, these leaders appear to have been accepted by the whole political elite because it was recognized that political leadership under the Japanese was a very dangerous and exposed game, and that those who had become proficient at it should continue to exercise responsibility, at least as long as the Japanese provided the principal potential threat to the Republic. By the time the Dutch had replaced the Japanese in this role, at the end of 1945, leadership had acquired its own momentum.

The Dutch had ruled the Indies as a centralized state, while resorting to sophisticated devices to prevent the unification of their opponents. The Japanese, by contrast, did divide Indonesia very effectively, yet the result was still further to strengthen the forces of political unity. Just because Java alone was allowed to develop an island-wide leadership, it was impossible for any other island to move in a radically different direction in 1945. In July and August of 1945, when the 25th Army saw that it could not resist Tokyo pressure for independence any longer, it made belated plans for a separate Sumatran independence, but so bungled its preparation that the effect was counterproductive. Moreover, as I have remarked elsewhere, "Almost every social and ethnic group in Sumatra was irked by the extreme isolation of the Japanese period. Only those with long memories were particularly conscious of ethnic and regional suspicions at the war's end. The enthusiasm of youth for unity above all was heightened by the fact that they had never had the opportunity to enjoy it." 23

Indonesian Identity

If colonial systems can be divided into crusading and exclusivist types, the Japanese emphatically represented the former—like the sixteenth-century Portuguese or the early Americans in the Philippines. Their most idealistic vanguard of this crusade, the young teachers sent to the south to open new schools and institutes, tended to believe that the Indonesians were essentially like the Japanese, but "spoiled and lacking in moral training as a result of insidious Dutch guidance." 24 As one headmaster who told his carefully selected students, "You were not brought here to enjoy yourselves but to learn Japanese seishin (spirit), to learn discipline and hard work... I know how lazy the westerners are, and the laziness they have taught you for hundreds of years is going to be wiped out." 25 This onslaught on the colonial value system had some important results, as will be seen below. Far more important than any "Japanization" of the Indonesian population, however, was the consolidation of a particular definition of Indonesian identity.

Language was an important part of this. Dutch was abolished and Indonesian made official in 1942, in a fashion more abrupt and complete than any independent Indonesian government could have brought about. Language commissions were established in Jakarta and in Medan to standardize the language, but more important was the practical experience of simply having to use it in areas where the Dutch had previously held sway. Moreover, the freeing of Indonesian literature from its sense of cultural inferiority towards Dutch appeared to have a profoundly stimulating effect. A. Teeuw has made a strong case for regarding 1942 rather than 1945 as the real watershed, the birthdate of modern Indonesian literature. 26

New Indonesian language textbooks were urgently required, and new historical myths to replace the overthrown mythology of Dutch imperialism. Here the Japanese made little contribution from their own national mythology, and seemed content to encourage Indonesian nationalists in the anti-colonial emphasis which was natural to them. In the twenties and thirties nationalist intellectuals had daringly attacked Dutch "heroes" and exalted anti-Dutch Indonesian "villains" in ephemeral undergraduate newspapers, but they now found their counter myths proclaimed with all the force of the mass media and mass displays.

In a lavish style they [the Japanese] encouraged the holding of mass rallies and simultaneous meetings. The statue of Jan Pieterzoon Coen which had been the symbol of Jakarta city and the symbol of colonial power was taken down with every form of ceremony which could mobilize national "sentiment." 27

In many areas the Japanese consciously encouraged the rewriting of history in an anti-colonial sense, by establishing historical commissions and launching contests for historically-oriented works. A film was made on the history of Sumatra by the Nippon Eiga Sha corporation, leading from the grandeur of the precolonial past and scenes from the Aceh war, to the climax of the Japanese landings in 1942. 29 The repertoire of the Aceh Seinendan's theater group may be indicative of the type of mythology encouraged under the Japanese. One play, perhaps a necessary concession to the Japanese, crudely adapted the famous story of Momotaro. Momotaro, who represents Japan, is on his way to fight the devil of Western imperialism when he meets three suffering figures—Indonesia, the Philippines and China. They join him and defeat the enemy. Another play told the story of two Indonesian friends, one of whom was arrested by the Dutch for his nationalistic writings. Despite the torture he undergoes in prison, he tells his captors that they will never be able to build anything to rival the grandeur of Borobodur. The Dutch have reduced Indonesian literacy from the 40 percent of Hindu times, he proudly claims, to the present 4 percent. Meanwhile, his former friend has betrayed the cause by joining the Dutch police. Both die soon after the Japanese landings of 1942, one as a traitor, the other as a hero. Two other works in the repertoire were set in the 1942 Acehnese revolt against the Dutch, and another during the 1926
The effect of all this raising of anti-colonial consciousness may have been to consolidate a new nationalist orthodoxy which has proved remarkably durable. The textbooks of national history written hurriedly by nationalists during the Japanese period have been reprinted many times since and adopted by the Republican school system. While Samuni Pane’s Sejarah Indonesia (1943)31 is the most successful in this sense, it was replicated in numerous local and regional histories.32 Moreover, it was in the last year of the occupation that Mohammad Yamin, later to be the cultural commissar of Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy,” developed his historical ideas as head of the propaganda department for Java.33

The central elements of the new orthodoxy of Pane, Yamin and their colleagues were a glorious precolonial past, followed by three and a half centuries of Dutch rule illuminated only by the sacrificial struggle of those from each region who fought the Dutch most stubbornly. Even in the large areas of the outer islands which had known less than fifty years of Dutch rule this myth seemed irresistible, encouraged no doubt by the propaganda value of contrasting three and a half years of Japanese rule with three and a half centuries of Dutch. The pantheon of approved Indonesian heroes also grew better defined as streets were named and ceremonies held in their honor.34 While the shape of this national past owed very little to the Japanese, its projection into an official orthodoxy for the new nation was greatly speeded by wartime propaganda needs.

The same appears true of the implanting of the national flag and anthem as symbols of national identity for the whole population, not simply the urban nationalists who had taken them up before the war. Following Kolo’s promise of “independence in the future,” in September 1944, the flag and anthem became obligatory on every public occasion. As Dr. Amir later observed, the Japanese-inspired propaganda “did more in one year for the idea of political unity and urge for independence than ten years of ordinary propaganda before the war.”35 In terms of these external symbols of national identity, the change between 1942 and 1945 was astonishing to outside observers. Indonesia was no longer an intellectual idea but a vital factor in popular consciousness.

The development of an Indonesian style of political behavior is far more difficult to trace. What can be stated is that the wartime environment created favorable conditions for one particular current of Indonesian political thought to find its way into the definition of this “Indonesian way.”

Examining the twenty years which followed the Japanese occupation, Herbert Feith delineated three broad characteristics of Indonesian political thought: a “diffusely moral” quality, optimism, and what he called “a tendency to see society as undifferentiated.” Even for the Islamic and Marxist parties “there was little conception of segmental groups having legitimate interests. Nor was much concern expressed for the individual.”36

Such a tendency could have been described at least among Javanese intellectuals as soon as they came into collision with European democratic ideals. In the 1920s the leading spokesman for a Javanese political model based on the natural leadership of a father within his family was Soetama Soerikoesomo, a member of the Paku Alam royal house and a great influence on the early development of the Taman Siswa educational movement. “Wise men should be at the head of the state,” he insisted, “and should be chosen by the wise, not by the people.”37 If such a current was always present, its political expression was not quite intellectually respectable among the modern-minded political activists of the nationalist movement in the 1930s.

While the Japanese appear to have contributed no political ideas of their own to the Indonesian political debate, they did create a climate in which it was good form to begin a speech with a ritual rejection of western individualism and liberalism, which “invariably gave rise to imperialism and exploitation.”38 It would be impossible to evaluate the long-term effect of such a climate were it not that the documents which have become the central symbols of “the Indonesian way” in politics were drawn up at its height—notably the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila idea. These were written and debated in the bodies appointed by the Japanese in the middle of 1945 to prepare for a Japanese-supervised “independence.” While the Indonesian delegates were remarkably successful in excluding any direct Japanese influence, “western” ideas about individual rights and political pluralism undoubtedly played a smaller role in the discussions than they would have in prewar or postwar conditions. Professor Supomo, the leading judicial official in Java under the Japanese and a great believer in a distinct Javanese model, took the lead in drafting the 1945 Constitution. As he explained the basis of this Constitution:

The inner spirit and spiritual structure of the Indonesian people is characterized by the ideal of the unity of life, the unity kawulu-gusti, that is of the outer and the inner world, of the macrocosmos and the microcosmos, of the people and their leaders. All men as individuals, every group or grouping of men in a society...is considered to have its own place and its own obligations [dharma] according to the law of nature, the whole being aimed at achieving spiritual and physical balance. ...So it is clear that if we want to establish an Indonesian state in accordance with the characteristic features of Indonesian society, it must be based on an integralist state philosophy, on the idea of a state which is united with all its people, which transcends all groups in every field.39

In keeping with these ideas, the 1945 Constitution gave very strong powers to the President, to whom the cabinet was responsible, defined no specific rights for the individual except education and the freedom of religion, and stated that “the economy shall be organized as a common endeavor based upon the principle of the family system.” In both the Constitution and Sukarno’s Pancasila speech the word kera kayaan (peopleness) tends to be preferred to demokrasi, and is defined in terms of a consensus principle—musyawarah and mufakat. The relevant clause of the preamble to the Constitution is officially translated “democracy which is guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberation among representatives.”40

In the reaction which followed the Japanese surrender these documents were put aside for a time as both impractical and undemocratic, but since 1959 they have again become the central elements of “the Indonesian way.”
Military Mobilization

The most striking contribution of the Japanese period, however, will probably be seen as the way it armed Indonesians for the revolution which followed. For those who had known the Javanese in particular as "the mildest people on earth," the transformation wrought by the war was astonishing. The mobilization of the population for military purposes was the only major change which coincided with the deliberate intentions of the Japanese rulers, although it assumed a scale and direction which they could hardly have anticipated.

I have suggested the briefcase as a metaphor for the prewar period because of the emphasis on technical and scientific superiority as the key to colonial power. Expertise was increasingly the justification for Dutchmen to remain in positions of authority. A good western education was the chief means the colonial system afforded to rise to a position of parity with the Dutch masters. The brightest stars of the Dutch East Indies were men like the Djanjadingrat brothers, Mohammad Hatta, and Dr. Soetomo, who had absorbed the best that a Dutch education had to offer and thereby mastered what seemed to be the inner mysteries of Dutch control. It was of course precisely such people who could lead the nationalist movement, who could highlight Dutch failures to live up to Dutch ideas of democracy, efficiency and justice, and who could advance the credentials of Indonesians like themselves to do the job more thoroughly.

As indicated above, the Japanese military took the view that Dutch education had been disastrously elitist, academic and impractical. They put the heaviest emphasis in their own educational efforts on physical fitness, toughness, discipline, patriotism, and a spirit of sacrificial service to the group. Many Indonesians who went through Japanese schools and institutions testified to the startling change from the Dutch pattern, the closeness of the young Japanese teachers to their pupils, and the physical and mental toughness they gained from the process. By the end of the war a very large proportion of Indonesian young men had had some exposure to Japanese methods of drilling and discipline, if not in the schools then in one of the many youth and propaganda bodies which trained with wooden rifles or bamboo spears. As Adam Malik put it:

...through the controlled wartime economy and other measures such as forced labour and systematic drilling of all social strata, ... the impact of the four-year occupation upon our national mentality and spirit was very great. We could say that during those four years our whole nation underwent a fundamental spiritual revolution, in the course of four years of Japanese oppression the economic and social condition of Indonesia was progressively turned upside-down, dissolved, and destroyed...41

No one was entirely immune from this process. Even sultans, rajas and political leaders were obliged to show a different sort of lead to the people than that to which they had been accustomed. Japanese-controlled media frequently displayed the startling sight of such worthies with their sleeves rolled up wielding a hoe before the cameras to open some new project. One Japanese agricultural training institute exhorted its graduates to work without a shirt on.

The Japanese certainly failed to break the colonial white-collar mentality, but they cannot be accused of not trying.

If Leiden graduates were the wayward favorite sons of the prewar regime, the Japanese military also spawned a favored progeny in its own image. The new elite were the Indonesian officer corps of the Peta and Givugun, bright young men who had undergone the same tough training as Japanese officers. They had drunk most deeply of Japanese seishin, the heroic spirit of the true patriot; they had learned the style of sharp command, of violent action, so much at variance with the habits of both the traditional Javanese priyayi and the Leiden graduate; they had absorbed an impatience with bureaucratic methods and aristocratic niceties; they had earned not only the cropped hair and the Japanese-style uniform but eventually also the right to wear the new badge of status in wartime Indonesia -- the sword of the samurai. They too found that Japanese practice did not match Japanese ideals, and reacted sharply when the Japanese failed to give them the equal treatment to which their rank entitled them. Experiencing the same mixture of outrage and admiration the Dutch had for their wayward sons, the Japanese military were now in turn faced with rebellion, by the Peta in Blitar and the Givugun in East Sumatra and Aceh.

The first real test of the seishin of these officers came after the surrender, when they demanded from their former patrons that Japanese arms be handed over to them.

When Indonesian independence was declared, most of this new elite were young men in their early twenties, in no position to challenge the older Dutch-educated nationalists for leadership. Four years later, however, they had tested their own claims to leadership in the violence of the revolution, while the old civilian leadership had frequently been found wanting in their eyes. Although they did not assume national leadership until 1966, they could never be ignored as an alternative source of authority in independent Indonesia.

Conclusion

This essay has attempted to show that the Japanese occupation had a major impact on the subsequent shape of Indonesia -- whether for better or worse is not for me to judge. It armed Indonesians to resist successfully the repositioning of the prewar regime, it witnessed the consolidation of Indonesian unity and identity, and it encouraged the emergence on the one hand of a new military elite, and on the other of a political leadership which was stronger on charisma and rhetoric than on political organization and cadre formation.
NOTES


4. Mohammad Hatta, Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945 (Jakarta: Tintamas, 1970), p. 58, states that Maeda withdrew upstairs while a five-man Indonesian committee drafted the proclamation, and that Miyoshi remained within earshot but said nothing.


7. The Japanese-controlled media lost no opportunity of driving this point home. The enemy powers were always listed as "Amerika, Inggeris dan belanda," the capital letter being studiously avoided for the Dutch.

8. Interviews Itagaki Yoichi and Miyamoto Shizuo.


10. Ibid., p. 148.


12. For example of smuggling see Sumatra Sinbun, 27 July 2603 [1943]; Kita-Sumatora-Sinbun, 9 Sept. 2603; and the informative article "Usaha memperbarjakkan makanan kita," in Atjeh Sinbun, 20 May 2604. A former Sumatran police officer, Abdullah Hussain, explained in his memoir Terjebak (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1965), pp. 276 and 281-83, that smuggling was the chief police preoccupation during the occupation.

followed by political reports and complaints about Japanese slapping people.


20. Notably Abu Hanifah, Tales of a Revolution (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1972), esp. pp. 125-27; and Hamka, Kenangkenangan, pp. 231-34. Sukarno himself, in An Autobiography, pp. 183-94, makes clear that it was over his record during the Japanese occupation that he was most sensitive to criticism.


24. Inoue Tetsuro, quoted in Reid, The Blood of the People, p. 129.


28. See, for example, Atjeh Sinbun, 12 Apr. 2604; and Kita-Sumatora-Sinbun, 17 Sept. 2603.


32. L. Siahaan, Ichtisar sedjarah Indonesia untuk sekolah menengah (Bandung: Poestaka Ksatrian, 2604); Raden Priyono, Sedikit tentang sedjarah Asia Timoer Raja dan Sedjarah Tanah Djaawa (Jakarta: Balai Poestaka, 2605); also published in Javanese and Sundanese; Ismail Jakub, Tengku Tjihik di Tiro: Hidup dan Perdjuanganannya (Kutaradja: 2605, 3rd ed. Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1960); Ki Agoes Mas'oed, Sedjarah Palembang, moelai sedari Seri Mjg'jaya sampai kedatangan Balatentara Dai Nippon (Palembang: 'Sinar Btahari', 1942); and Riwajat dan Perdjoangan pahlawan-pahlawan Indonesia sepintas lalu (Medan: Panitya Pasar Malam Syuu Hoo~ookai, 2605).

This historical writing is discussed in a different context in my essay in Anthony Reid and David Marr, eds., Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia (Hong Kong: Heinemann Educational Books, forthcoming).

33. Yamin's two important books of this period, both frequently reprinted, are Sedjarah Peperangan Diponegoro. Pahlawan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Jakarta: Sinbun Ksii, 2605), and Gadjah Mada: Pahlawan Persatuan Noesantara [2605?], 2nd ed. (Jakarta: Balai Poestaka, 1946).

34. Here and there the Japanese appear to have attempted deliberately to build the image of a particular anti-Dutch pahlawan (hero). For example, the head of the Japanese administration in Sumatra celebrated the 3rd anniversary of Pearl Harbor by visiting the grave of Singamangaradja XII, and honoring the widow and the son of this Batak hero. Atjeh Sinbun, 14 Dec. 2604; Kita-Sumatora Sinbun, 11 Nov. 2604.

35. Dr. Amir's notes, 14 June 1946, Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie I.C. 005964.


38. Professor Supomo's address, 31 May 1945, to the Body to Investigate Measures for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (BPKI), as translated in Feith and Castles, p. 189.

39. Ibid., p. 190.

40. The 1945 Constitution, Sukarno's speech formulating the Pancasila, and various ancillary documents of 1945 are translated in The Indonesian Revolution: Basic Documents and the Idea of Guided Democracy (Jakarta: