HARIAN RAKJAT, DAILY NEWSPAPER OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA -
ITS HISTORY AND ROLE.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My thanks are due to many persons for helping me in the preparation of this thesis.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Reflecting the power which the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Communist Party of Indonesia or PKI) gained between 1950 and 1965, much has been written on the political and ideological position of the party. The period of Guided Democracy (1959-1965) was particularly important for the PKI, and has been well treated. During this time the party adjusted to the many aspects of the new regime which initially threatened to dramatically downgrade all political parties, and required allegiance to an undemocratic, authoritarian political order. The PKI successfully trod a path which brought to it the protection of the head of Guided Democracy, President Sukarno. He increasingly seemed to adopt a radicalism similar to that of the PKI, while never permitting the party to have real power. All this ended after an unsuccessful coup attempt by leftist military officers on 1 October, 1965. While the precise role of the PKI in the coup is unknown, it was sufficiently involved for the army to act forcefully to ban the party and execute or imprison many of its members. Even Sukarno did not escape the army's wrath. He was forced to relinquish his position during 1966, and was replaced by General Suharto.

Lesser concern has been given to the various institutions
which went to make up the party. By institutions is meant the
organizations of the party which dealt with discrete matters or areas
of policy. For example, Lekra was the PKI institution concerned
with culture, Soksi was the PKI affiliated labour union, the
Barisan Tani Indonesia, the peasants union, was dominated by the
PKI, and was generally seen as being an affiliate of the party. One
major exception to this was Donald Hindley's *The Communist Party of
Indonesia 1951-1963*. Among other matters this dealt with many of
the institutions of the PKI. These dealings were not however full
studies of those institutions because of the wider demands of his more
prominent political study. Also the study does not deal with the last
three years of Guided Democracy.

*Njoto*, a deputy of the party, was the chief editor of the newspaper.
He was extremely active and influential in this role. The seniority
of this appointment alone would attest to the importance of the paper
to the party.

**Survey of the Literature**

Besides the importance of examining the paper in its
relationship with the party, it is also necessary to examine HR in relationship to the wider press world. The communist and left-nationalist press early established their concern with the state of the Indonesian press and speculated about its future. Their contribution to press debate, in terms of ideological formulations of newsgathering and presentation was influential. Yet this aspect of Indonesian press history has received scant attention. Possibly reflecting the resolution of the political conflicts of the 1950s and 1960s in favour of the right-wing, anti-communist forces, post-1965 Indonesian writing on the press has predictably sought to discredit the PKI's position. Broadly speaking the PKI is depicted as having a policy of ruthlessly suppressing press freedom and betraying the integrity of Indonesian journalism. Their conclusion quite often seems to be based on a contemporary political need to continue to discredit the PKI, especially amongst young Indonesian journalists who have had no direct experience of the PKI. This type of approach has also been taken up by some Western commentators.

Not all works are of this type. Several have provided us with more considered accounts of various aspects of the press. Oey Hong Lee's Indonesian Government and Press During Guided Democracy is an examination of the press system as it evolved under the direction of the Guided Democracy government. His major focus is the relationship between the government and the press. Looking at the broad nature of the political conflicts of the time, he successfully accounts for the nature and development of the government's policy towards the press. Smith attempts a similar analysis, but being
limited to Indonesian English-language newspaper sources, and constrained by a consistently *laissez-faire* view of the role of the press and press freedom, he becomes ensnared by the notion that both the Guided Democracy government and the PKI successfully emasculated the press. Crawford brings together much good material on the development of the Indonesian press this century. He also deals with the effect of individual newspapers and journalists on press history. Having used Indonesian language material, and having spent several years in Indonesia during Guided Democracy, he achieves a greater insight into the functioning of the press than does Smith. An Indonesian text of some merit is *Beberapa Segi Perkembangan Sejarah Pers di Indonesia*, edited by Abdurrachman Surjomihardjo. Apart from chapters on the press before 1945, and on the local and regional press, it deals with past and present government policy towards the press. One chapter covers the history of Mochtar Lubis' newspaper *Indonesia Raya* and successfully shows the problems encountered by a single newspaper in dealing with government laws designed to restrict the press.

In all these works the reaction of communist and left-wing newspapers to the developments of the periods of constitutional democracy and Guided Democracy are either not relevant to the scope of the studies or where they might be, are ignored.
Part One of the present study aims to rectify these shortcomings. It comprises two chapters. The first chapter considers *Harian Rakjat'*s role and philosophy in the protracted press debates about the role of the press which occurred during the period of constitutional democracy from 1949 until 1959. During this period *Harian Rakjat* (HR) countered claims by independent, non-politically affiliated newspapers that the party press, because of its political affiliation, was not able to give its readers unbiased reporting. HR was not alone in these rebuttals, the newspapers of other political parties being just as enthusiastic in putting them forward. The result was a clear delineation of the positions of the party and non-party press. This is important because it reveals that in the history of the Indonesian press there have been formulations of press theory in addition to those advanced by the independent press and various governments. Indeed as the second deputy of the PKI and chief editor of HR, Njoto's statements of position suggest that the party believed in freedom of the press, at least in the context of constitutional democracy. Moreover, as will be shown in chapter III, Njoto continued to call for press freedom during Guided Democracy when the army and government acted to limit these freedoms. The
maintenance of this stance can be understood in terms of the PKI's wider political strategy of accommodation with the political forces of Guided Democracy and its fears that the army intended to intervene to restrict the operations of the party.

Chapters II and III argue that the authoritarianism apparent in the press during Guided Democracy was not the result of PKI policy. Probably for tactical reasons, rather than belief in a wide and varied press, the PKI opposed many of the controls placed on the newspapers by the government and the army.

It is true that Njoto's concern with press freedom was more evident during the constitutional democracy period. However, particularly after 1963, when radical nationalist journalists encouraged the sacking of journalists holding different views, and the banning of associated newspapers, the evidence shows that this was against the wishes of the PKI, or of Njoto at least. Njoto held that harsh retaliatory action against all the BPS newspapers was tactically unwise. This was because it only served to sharpen the conflicts among journalists, and would lead to other more aggressively anti-PKI newspapers replacing the banned papers. Through their control of the Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (Indonesian Journalists Association or PWI) radical nationalists were able to override the PKI position and push ahead with their plans.
In Chapter IV some managerial aspects of HR are examined. These include the purchase of the paper, its staffing policy, circulation, readership and finances. It also looks at party efforts to have readers take out collective subscriptions and to undertake collective readings of HR. From a management point of view HR was not a great success. Although its circulation was comparable with other newspapers, it never reached more than a small percentage of party members. Partly as a result of this and partly as a result of difficulties in collecting money from its agents and subscribers it was not a financially sound venture. From the aspect of ideological propagation it was equally unsuccessful. Although the economic plight of many party members hindered the circulation from rising greatly, party efforts to have collective readings of the paper also failed. Despite its large membership and organizational networks HR only achieved a per copy readership which was equal to newspapers which were not affiliated with political parties and therefore did not possess a wide organizational base to encourage patronage.

Several aspects of HR content are examined in Part Three. In the first chapter of this section, chapter V, the focus is press polemics, and in particular a polemic which occurred in mid-1964 between Merdeka and HR. The intention here is to show how lively, political debate was allowed at certain times during Guided Democracy. It becomes clear, especially after martial law was ended in 1963, that claims of a total repression of the press under Guided Democracy are ill-informed.
The following chapter deals primarily with short stories which were carried in HR. By examining several stories the chapter builds up a picture of the type of characterization which was made of the 'ordinary' Indonesian (usually a peasant). Inspired by the thirst for justice, by honesty, by hard work, by camaraderie, and an acute awareness of social classes and exploitation perpetrated against the masses - this is the characterization of the masses.

Importantly this is not conveyed to the masses as a form of propaganda, but to the generally middle class reader of HR. The paper sought to have its readers view the mass of the party's members and the country's wider population as conscious actors in an ongoing class struggle. This presents an interesting contradiction. Party policy downgraded class struggle, yet party literature highlighted it. But the contradiction is resolved by the educative role of the short stories for the reader - many of whom were party cadres. Before class struggle could manifest itself, it was necessary for the party to have become aware of its own strengths and limitations. The short stories told cadres of the hypothetical strengths of those people whom they would one day be called upon to lead in actions against the exploiting classes. The short stories were ammunition for the future.

In chapter II brief mention is made of efforts by Njoto to establish a network of amateur journalists to contribute to HR. This
is expanded upon in chapter VII. The evidence suggests, although it is slight, that this movement was successful while possibly politically bothersome for the PKI. The problems arose when these amateur journalists sent in political commentary and criticism, some of which was directed against the party. The movements were successful in that they encouraged a form of popular participation in a party activity.

Much of the following chapter is conjectural. It deals with the depiction of Sukarno and the PKI leaders in HR. For tactical reasons Sukarno's coverage increased after the mass mobilization around the West Irian campaign after 1961—a mobilization enthusiastically supported by the PKI. This is to be expected. What is less sure is why the coverage of Aidit increased during 1964 and 1965, while that of Njoto decreased during 1965. Discussion of this involves reports of a split between Aidit and Njoto, which lead to Njoto being dismissed from his party positions. If the reports of this are true the HR coverage of the two is understandable. Njoto's influence and prestige in the party needed to be replaced by an increased stature for his primary opponent in the party, according to one explanation. But the reports may not be true. If this is so the emphasis could be explained by Aidit's position being elevated in order that the HR coverage of Sukarno did not allow him (Sukarno) a continuing personal predominance of the HR readers. Aidit was to become equal with Sukarno, rather than coverage of Sukarno being
downgraded. To lessen coverage of Sukarno would have been obvious to all, and could have been used by the PKI's enemies to discredit the party in the eyes of Sukarno, and to further discredit the party in the view of its enemies.

The problems of leadership are not resolved here. The evidence is too limited. But that evidence does point the way for further research.

Sources

Original source material used in the study comes mainly from Indonesian language newspapers and Indonesian language texts written about the role of the press and journalism during the period covered by the research. The amount of material is abundant and this confirms the great interest in the development of the press in the early days of independence and during Guided Democracy.

A short period of fieldwork in Indonesia provided many insights into the operations of the media prior to the present New Order government. Most of this involved interviews with journalists who were actively involved in the press in either one or both of the political periods embraced by the study. Obviously the major problem
with this type of information is that it is reflection over some twenty or thirty years. The mind often forgets details, and reappraises events in the light of other experiences. For many of the interviewees their experience of the period since 1965/66 has included imprisonment. As communists, suspected communists or radical nationalists they were imprisoned by the present regime, only to have been released relatively recently. The research attempts, I hope successfully, to take account of these conflicts.
Newspaper proprietors and journalists enthusiastically debated the role of the press in Indonesian society during the period of constitutional democracy, 1949-1959. They were concerned with press freedom, the legitimacy of the party press, with journalistic objectivity, and with the interpretation of factual information. In discussing these matters the ideological beliefs of the participants affected their responses.

Njoto, the second deputy of the PKI, and the chief-editor of Harian Rakjat, represented his party in the debate. His primary concern was to ensure that his newspaper be allowed to operate freely. He rejected the suggestion of journalists who adhered to an ideology of liberal pluralism, that the party press, particularly that of the leftist parties, did not carry out their journalistic tasks in a responsible way.
Some of the ideas and strategies Njoto developed during this time were carried over to the more restrictive period of Guided Democracy.

The Political Context

Indonesian independence was proclaimed by Sukarno and Hatta on August 17, 1945; the Dutch colonists did not accede to that independence until four years later on December 27, 1949. In the interim period, which was marked by a bloody revolutionary struggle between Indonesian forces and forces of the Dutch colonists returning after the conclusion of the Pacific War, the political momentum had swept Hatta to a position of greater eminence than Sukarno. Both had been nationalist leaders prior to and including World War II. Hatta was, however, more in control of governmental power by 1949 than was Sukarno. Sukarno was not to regain the power he seemed to hold on Independence day 1945, until his political philosophy embodied in Guided Democracy was triumphant in 1959. In the intervening years a system of constitutional democracy, which was upheld by Hatta and those of his political persuasion, was the type of governmental system followed.

After the conclusion of the Round Table Conference, which was held in The Hague from August to November 1949, the Republic of the United States of Indonesia was formed with Sukarno as President and Hatta as Prime Minister. The potential power of the presidency was
denied to Sukarno as Hatta strengthened the standing of his prime ministership.

That Hatta was able to emerge in such a strong position has been attributed by Feith, to a number of factors.¹ These are: Hatta's influence with the army in the wake of his overseeing the crushing of the 1948 Communist uprising at Madiun; his role in pushing for a diplomatic solution to the revolutionary struggle against the Dutch; and his pursuit of policies aimed at gaining the support of the West. Hatta, according to Feith, was the republican leader who was most trusted by the Dutch, the Americans, and the Indonesians of the Dutch established states which were to form parts of the United States of Indonesia.²

In addition, Hatta was a proponent of a constitutional democracy for Indonesia and an avid anti-communist, encouraging credentials in the view of the United States of America, which was by 1950 caught up in the Cold War. Indonesia came to be seen as a bastion against the Communist growth developing in South-East Asia. Also following Hatta's participation in the Round Table Conference, Dutch capital and enterprises in Indonesia were given legal protection. Those were further encouraging indications to the capitalist West, of the political and philosophical intent of post-revolutionary Indonesian governments.

The legacy of Hatta's revolutionary posture was preponderant during the early years of the 1950s. The federal state of Indonesia
was transformed into a unitary state during 1950. Hatta relinquished his prime ministerial position for the role of vice-president. The role of prime minister was subsequently filled by appointees of similar philosophical leanings to those of Hatta. Feith says of Hatta and the prime ministers and cabinets which governed Indonesia from 1949 to 1953:

They gave a high priority to establishing security, creating a more unified army, rehabilitating former fighters, and making the machinery of government more efficient. All of them devoted themselves to restoring and increasing production, stimulating development, and maintaining financial stability - and they offered no major challenge to the preponderant power of Westerners and Chinese in the economy.

These aims were pursued with reasonable successes although the dramatic transformation of the material condition of the Indonesian people, a promise many equated with independence, did not eventuate. These cabinets governed in a way which devalued revolutionary fervour. This fervour, which had been displayed in previous years, was thought by many to be able to make a major contribution to national development. When it was not utilized some judged the political system inadequate to the nations' demands and needs. This continuing revolutionary fervour elicited ideas of a more populist style of government than the cabinets of the early 1950s had desired. A radicalism based on nationalism increasingly began to jostle for supremacy over the position of the early cabinets.

This change in perceptions was evident in the Partai Nasional
Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Partai) (PNI) nominated cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo (July 1953–July 1955). Dutch and Chinese business interests now became less secure as the cabinet worked towards greater Indonesian participation in the economy. Foreign policy moved towards stronger ties with Asian and African countries than had previously existed. Continuing Dutch control of West New Guinea began to be questioned.5

As this debate developed, electioneering and planning for general elections for a parliament and a constituent assembly were under way. The elections were due in late 1955. Many saw these as a chance to resolve, by democratic means, the policy conflicts which had led to a number of cabinet crises in the previous years.

In terms of providing a decisive resolution to these problems the elections were unsuccessful. The PNI received 22.3 per cent of the vote, Masjumi 20.9 per cent, Nahdatul Ulama (NU) got 18.4 per cent and the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) polled 16.4 per cent.6

Certainly the elections did not provide the stability desired by the adherents of constitutional democracy - a stability necessary for their forms of economic development, foreign policy and internal security to be advanced. In those terms the elections were indecisive.
But from another perspective they were decisive. Firstly with PNI, NU and PKI obtaining about 85 per cent of their total vote from Java, the political spectrum was split in terms of Java and the outer islands, with the Masjumi being the major representative of the latter. Secondly, the vote recorded by the PKI was substantial. From its near annihilation after the Madiun uprising of 1948, it was in 1955 one of the four largest political parties. And thirdly, the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI), (which together with Masjumi was a firm supporter of constitutional democracy), received just under 2% of the vote.  

The elections highlighted the low level of support for policies associated with the liberal pluralism of Masjumi and PSI; they underlined the substantial support for a more nationalist tone in political policy as seen in the PNI and to some extent in NU; and they highlighted the electoral support for the PKI. This last development was anathema to the Masjumi, the PSI and a number of other smaller parties. Their anti-communism was deep-seated. The PNI and NU were also not enthusiastic about the developments. The PKI, by drawing much of its support from the peasantry, was intruding upon a social group to which the PNI and NU believed they had a prior claim for support.  

After the elections the continuing failure of the constitutional system to provide stable government deepened the
disenchantment with the system evident prior to 1955. Many outer islanders became more concerned with the influence of the Java-based parties. They believed they were financing, through their large export earnings and higher level of economic activity, the corruption and ineptness of the Javanese political leaders when these happened to dominate the cabinet of the day. The success of the PKI in the local election of 1956, when it increased its vote by 37.2 per cent over the September 1955 election vote,\textsuperscript{8} reinforced the concern of those individuals and groups which feared communism. Successful PKI campaigns to increase its membership accompanied this electoral success.\textsuperscript{9}

Sukarno and the army leadership, during a number of political crises which beset the government after the election, were both concerned to resolve the instability in government and to increase their own influence.\textsuperscript{10}

Sukarno devised what he called his "konsepsi", which was to be the basis of a new political system. It was based on a representation of all major political parties in a cabinet, and a National Council made up of functional groups representing, amongst others, workers, farmers, traders and women. This system was subsequently called Guided Democracy. He offered this solution in February 1957.
In the year prior to Sukarno's launching of his new political conception, elements of the army had attempted to force the establishment of a cabinet under Hatta. As we have seen, the army leadership had strongly supported the anti-communist Hatta at least since the Madiun uprising in 1948. The "October 17 Affair" of 1952 was an attempt by pro-Hatta elements of the army to force Sukarno to intervene to remedy what they saw as an unmanageable parliamentary system. Their efforts were not successful. Army elements again made Hatta their champion during 1956. At a time when cabinet government went from crisis to crisis and the PKI gained increasing support, an unsuccessful military coup was staged in Jakarta by Colonel Zulkifli Lubis. In December 1956, coups in Central Sumatra, Northern Sumatra and Southern Sumatra led by military commanders took over control from central government administrators. The coup leaders demanded that Hatta lead a new cabinet, and Masjumi was sympathetic to their demands. In February 1958, after about a year had passed and the central government had failed to restore its authority in these areas, a Revolutionary Government (PRRI) was established in Central Sumatra by the rebels. Demands by Lieutenant-Colonel Husein in Padang that a new cabinet be led by Hatta or the similarly right-wing Sultan of Jogjakarta were refused by the central government, thus triggering the advent of PRRI which was led by the Masjumi leader Sjafruddin Prawiranegara.
Support for the PRRI movement was by no means universal among the army and Masjumi members, however. In fact, the central leadership of the army under Chief of Staff Nasution directed army efforts to put down the various rebellions. Nevertheless this was an attempt to give the army a greater role. By acting in defence of the unity of the state, and supporting Sukarno's moves for a change in the political system, the central army leadership was manoeuvering to a position where it could provide the strong counterbalance to the PKI which Hatta and his supporters had sought through the continuation of a Masjumi dominated cabinet.

The army gained increased power when martial law was established in March 1957 to deal with the regional threat. In its efforts to maintain the unity of the state, the central army had amassed increased respect from those civilians who believed in that unity. Its support of the state unity meshed in well with that of Sukarno.

These developments helped to produce the atmosphere in which the ground-swell for the promised unity and stability of Guided Democracy grew rapidly, with Sukarno continuing to argue forcefully for his proposals. Against the background only sketchily depicted
here, the era of Guided Democracy was ushered in during 1959.

Guided Democracy underwent many changes during the period 1959 until 1965. These changes, however, were premised upon the strengthening of the position of the Presidency, which was made possible when the Constitution of 1945 was reintroduced as part of the Guided Democracy package. The conflict seemingly inherent in the party system was to be eliminated. Sukarno and the army devised systems whereby functional groups were to gradually replace the continuing, if already lessened, power of the parties. Guided Democracy was intended to usher in a regime of stability and unity.

The period of constitutional democracy was one in which the ideology and political philosophy of Masjumi, PSI and others of similar inclinations were progressively weakened. Their attempts to maintain their economic, political and social programs as the dominant ones in Indonesia were thwarted. Radical nationalism began to be seen by many as an improvement upon the divisiveness of constitutional democracy's political forms. At the same time, the PKI grew in strength as it gave support to the cause of national unity, and also as it offered long term prospects of radical economic, social and political reform. The contradiction between a nationalism which sought no major changes in social and
economic relationships and a communism which did was to dominate the period of Guided Democracy.

The Press and Government

Developments within the Indonesian national press during the period of Constitutional Democracy reflect the enthusiasm of Western oriented individuals and groups for the development of an independent press based on a philosophy akin to that of the Western press. At the same time, weak at first but gradually becoming more pervasive, newspapers owned by or with a close affiliation to political parties began to develop. The party press openly espoused particular political ideologies. The attention given the press and its role in post independence society was in many respects as wide spread and increasingly acrimonious as the more prominent parliamentary debate over political and economic policy.

That the press was a matter for debate is not surprising. The influence of newspapers had been substantial in aiding the development of nationalist consciousness among literate Indonesians during the colonial and post-war revolutionary period. It is understandable that this experience should have made Indonesians aware of the importance of the press after independence. But while the pre-war press had been dominated by the call to national unity, there was a multiplication of conflicting political ideologies, which caused the press to divide along partisan political lines, in the
post-independence era.

In 1950 the relevance of nationalist calls for unity had diminished. Indonesians had won their independence from the Dutch. What was needed now was to achieve the social justice and prosperity that was seen as synonymous with that independence. Ideas about this 'just and prosperous society' were many. Reflecting this diversity the press no longer gave expression to the common purpose of earlier times.

In the early 1950s, the proponents of an independent press were vociferous in their espousal of their total independence from political ideologies and their total objectivity. By the time Sukarno began to launch his concept of Guided Democracy a much more partisan approach was evident. The party newspapers had no inhibitions about communicating their political affiliation in the build-up to the elections of 1955 and in the following years before Guided Democracy.

In 1965 Sukarno was able to say that he did not believe in freedom of the press.12 No public condemnations of this statement were heard. In contrast Njoto, second secretary of the PKI and nominal chief editor of Harian Rakjat had earlier supported full freedom of the press.13 He did this in early 1956. To not a small extent it was a response to the successes of the PKI under the system of constitutional democracy. That system had served the party well, allowing it freedom to organize and expand. The party press had also operated freely without much government intervention. As we will
see in the next chapter Njoto continued his call for freedom of the press once martial law and Guided Democracy had been introduced. At that stage however his main reason for calling for press freedom was to attempt to offset the restrictions on the press instigated by the army and the government. Mochtar Lubis, editor of the independent Indonesia Raya, and Rosihan Anwar, editor of Pedoman, both seemed confident in the early 1950s of the evolution of a purely independent press. Sukarno’s statement would have been scarcely credible in 1950. The years between 1950 and the beginning of Guided Democracy were characterized by a debate about the press which was always intense and often bitter.

Harian Rakjat, through its editors and journalists, contributed to this debate in a way which reveals PKI ideas of the relationship of the press to society and politics.

In broad terms, the debate centred on three topics; firstly, the role of the press in society, secondly, the legitimacy of the party press; and lastly, the position of journalism and journalists. Each of these topics will be discussed fully below, but before doing so governmental laws regulating the press and government assistance to the press need to be noted because these had major effects on newspapers during the period.
Regulation of the Press

After martial law was introduced on March 14, 1957 in response to the regional rebellions, the Peperti (Penguasa Perang Tertinggi) (Supreme War Authority) created within its own ranks the position of 'press liason-officer'. The occupant of this position had a number of army regulations regarding the press to implement. Firstly, there was a regulation of 14 September 1956, introduced by the Army prior to martial law being proclaimed. Among other things this regulation prohibited the...

...printing, publishing, circulation and ownership of writings, pictures, prints or drawings which carry or contain criticisms, insinuations or insults towards the President or Vice President, a public authority or committee or "a civil servant at the time of or because of his performing his official tasks".

In addition, the martial law regulations gave the press liason-officer the right to stop the publication, circulation and transport of, trade in, and wall-posting of any newspaper. Further, the military authorities prohibited newspapers from reporting any events involving the armed forces which did not originate from the army.

These restrictions were generally ill received by all newspapers.

This is not surprising. Only three years earlier, in 1954, the right of freedom of the press to publish unencumbered by government regulations had seemed assured. This was the result of the revocation of an old Dutch press regulation, the Persbreidel Ordonnantie. This regulation enabled the government to prohibit the publication of a newspaper when it was considered that its continued
publication would disturb the public order. The vagueness of the concept of 'public order' allowed the regulation to be used by the colonial government to silence even the most minor criticism.

The Indonesian Journalists Association (PWI) led the move to persuade the government to revoke the *Persbreidel Ordonnantie*. It argued that the regulation was in conflict with the Indonesian constitution which guaranteed citizens the right and the freedom to hold and to express their opinions. At the same time it sought to have proclaimed a press law which specifically incorporated the provision of freedom of the press.

The PWI achieved its first demand in August 1954 when the *Persbeidel Ordonnantie* was recinded. A formal press law was not drawn up however. By 1957 press regulations introduced by the army made the efforts of the PWI all but useless. After Guided Democracy was introduced, new regulations were formulated which required newspapers to support the policies of the government.

Although after 1957 regulations affecting the press were to become as stringent as in the old colonial laws, the vigour with which the PWI and newspaper people opposed the *Persbreidel Ordonnantie* reflected a desire by those concerned to have the widest possible freedom. In a period of increasing instability in the fortunes of government cabinets, the greater the formal guarantees of press freedom the less likely were newspapers of political factions opposed to the current government to be banned merely because of their
opposition status. *Harian Rakjat*, for instance, had been banned by the *Masjumi* government of Sukiman in August 1951. At that time the government, in a crackdown on the PKI, arrested 15,000 communists for fear that they were planning to overthrow the government.\(^{21}\) Feith relates that government action of this type was generally directed against communist, Dutch and Chinese publications.\(^{22}\)

Nevertheless, the power conveyed by the *Persbreidel Ordonnantie* was only sparingly used. Lee suggests that the "rules of parliamentary democracy" assured this,\(^{23}\) and there was a general belief in as great a degree of freedom as possible.

Thus the press world, composed of various groups often holding diverse views on politics and the press, formed an unlikely coalition which pressed for and succeeded in obtaining a high level of press freedom.

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**Government Assistance to the Press**

After Independence the Indonesian government and the press concluded that government assistance should be given to enable the growth of the national press.\(^{24}\) This assistance rose from Rupiah 11,526,201 in 1950 to Rupiah 26,882,790 in 1954.\(^{25}\) It had peaked at Rupiah 32,202,710 in 1951, falling dramatically to Rupiah 12,068,145 in 1952, and then rising again in 1953 and 1954. The
assistance was intended to be of a short duration only, and indeed amidst press criticism some assistance was withdrawn in 1955.\(^{26}\)

Dutch language and Chinese language newspapers had re-emerged after the Round Table Conference. They generally had large, modern printing houses. By comparison, the Indonesian press was economically and materially weak. However, Indonesian publishing houses such as Merdeka, Pedoman and Indonesia Raya did emerge by 1953 with modern printing facilities\(^{27}\) and they benefitted from the government assistance.

Initially, government assistance to the Indonesian language press involved the supply of newsprint at subsidized prices, the granting of credit facilities for the purchase of new machinery, and assistance with travel to enable journalists to experience press developments in other countries.\(^{28}\) Assistance was also given to the development of the newsagency Antara, the publishers' association and journalists' association, as well as the Indonesian Press Institute.

One result of this assistance to newspapers was the proliferation of newspapers, especially after 1952 when political parties tried to publish a large number of papers with only small circulations, which were nevertheless able to continue publication, in part, because of government assistance. Another development was abuse in the allocation of the assistance. A minor polemic developed in early 1953 about the distribution of government advertising,\(^{29}\) in
which *Merdeka*, *Pedoman*, *Mimbar Indonesia* and *Abadi* engaged in a debate about allegedly unfair distribution. Somewhat later, *Harian Rakjat* accused *Pedoman* of having received a disproportionately large amount of government assistance. Just how widespread such abuses in the distribution of assistance actually were is difficult to determine.

Possible abuse aside, the main result of government assistance was the already mentioned growth of the party press. As we shall see later this development was opposed by adherents of the view that newspapers should be divorced from political parties. Secondly, by allowing an Indonesian press to develop, the assistance contributed to a decline in the Dutch press, as readers turned to the national media, though the Chinese language press had a remarkable growth until repressive government action was taken against it in the late 1950s.

The Role of the Press

Before 1950 the development and reinforcement of public opinion in support of the nationalist ideal of independence was given great prominence by the Indonesian press, and a similar posture was adopted by the press after the revolution. The press continued to see itself primarily as a shaper of public opinion. But in comparison with the pre-independence period, nationalism was increasingly subsumed by ideological positions which reflected the new political life of the country.

Lenin's discussion of the role of the press in *Where to Begin?* was used by Njoto as the basis for defining the role of *Harian Rakjat* and all other PKI newspapers and publications. In pre-revolutionary Russia Lenin had formulated the idea that a publication should be a "collective propagandist", "collective agitator" and a "collective organizer". By adopting these tasks, publications were said to aid the working class struggle for the establishment of a
Njoto used these principles to develop a consciousness of the necessity for class struggle amongst the readership of H.R. and other PKI works.

Conquest's examination of Lenin's theory of the press and propaganda in the USSR are instructive for an understanding of the ideas Njoto adopted. In its propaganda work a publication theoretically would present a wide range of ideologically correct concepts to a limited number of people, most of whom would be party members. These people would then pick out one or two elements at a time from their pool of ideologically sound knowledge in order to explain topical events or to generally inform a broad spectrum of people. This selection of a narrow range of ideas and their regular repetition is the basis of agitation. Although it is usually carried out by party cadres and members, mass communications can also agitate, by emphasising in a direct, uncomplicated way, concepts which are aimed at altering a person's consciousness. This is usually achieved through newspapers which are aimed at a wide audience, and not specifically at party members. The PKI did not start a popular newspaper of this type until 1965, when it established Gelora Indonesia. Propaganda and agitation in publications are forms of ideological organization upon which party groups can then be based.

Also following Lenin, Njoto emphasised that all literary work must form part of the general proletarian struggle. He stressed
that HR had a central role in that struggle. Lukman, also a deputy of the party, called attention to this several years later. He spoke of how HR was an educative device by which the workers and peasants would gradually recognize the other classes 'in all their political forms and ideologies. From this point on the class consciousness of the workers and peasants comes into being'.

The most important factor in bringing about this class consciousness was to be party ideology. The engendering of a belief in the PKI's ideology within the mass of workers and peasants was part of the class struggle. The party anticipated that, as ideological commitment grew amongst these groups, the tempo of class struggle would also increase. In 1958, on the seventh anniversary of the establishment of HR, Aidit also stressed its role in opposing the ideological pressures of the 'enemies of the people', and its role in raising the ideological level of communists, party members and the people.

The primary function of HR therefore was to shape public opinion in terms of a belief in and practice of revolutionary change based on class struggle.

While the revolutionary purpose of HR was associated with desired fundamental changes in the distribution of economic power, the social responsibility thesis was, by and large, premised upon a maintenance of the existing social and economic relationships in Indonesia. The social responsibility thesis nevertheless sought to
improve the material plight of the vast mass of poor Indonesians. But that mass was not to be an instigator of the improvements. Rather, those sectors of society properly equipped with the prerequisite modern vision and training, would lead the majority through gradual progress to modernity.

Adi Negoro was a prodigious non-PKI commentator on the function of the press and he subscribed to the western model of a newspaper's role. He wrote in 1949 that the press could have a profound effect on public opinion and went on to say that this influence should be directed towards serving the good of society and of the state. He argued that this 'good' was above party politics. Political parties and newspapers based on these parties had too narrow a perspective on society, he reasoned, and this could jeopardize its best interests. Adi Negoro and similar writers stressed the duty or role of the independent, non-political newspaper. Divorced from narrow partisan political interests, the independent press was viewed as well endowed to operate in a socially responsible manner.

A similar theme was developed by the Jakarta daily Pedoman. This paper was edited by Rosihan Anwar, and although it subscribed to many of the views of the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI), was not formally affiliated to, nor financed by that party. Pedoman regularly proclaimed its independence and defended its right to support political policies of different origins. Because of this independence Anwar believed that his newspaper was immune from the insidious influence of the political parties and was therefore able
to provide readers with reasoned evaluations of situations and events. 'Political balance' was thought to be the hallmark of independent newspapers. With this detachment Pedoman suggested its aim was to represent the oppressed and the poor so that they might have the opportunity to live dignified lives.42

The obvious problem with these claims of independence from political parties is to determine the extent of that separation. Were the independent newspapers any less political than the political party newspapers? Those who adhered to social responsibility in the press clearly were supporters of the political system of liberal pluralism. They generally supported the PSI and Masjumi. Just as a journalist needed to be a PKI member or supporter to work for HR, so too did journalists need to be Masjumi or PSI sympathizers to be employed with Indonesia Raya or Pedoman.

The thread which seemed to run through the notion of social responsibility was the demand that the government of the day should recognize the materially depressed condition of the bulk of the Indonesian population and that it should remedy that situation. The role of social responsibility for the press required that it act as one of a number of social intermediaries to inform the government of the objective situation of the masses. As a corollary it required the press to convey to the people an understanding of government programs designed to raise the general standard of living of the people. The belief that the independent press could perform this task adequately was based on its perception that the political party press
would distort an objective situation for political reasons, resulting in government becoming involved in political manoeuvring with the non-government parties, rather than paying attention to the fundamental problems of the society. The social responsibility theorists believed that the press should act as a channel for communications between the government and the people.

Roshihan Anwar, the editor of *Pedoman*, and Mochtar Lubis, the editor of *Indonesia Raya*, were the major journalists who expressed the social responsibility theme. Both were sympathetic to constitutional democracy as the most acceptable political system for Indonesia. They also had sympathy with the PSI, which was a supporter of that political system. Anwar and Lubis supported the stability and economic development policies of the various Masjumi cabinets. Understandably then, they adhered to the Western liberal tradition of social pluralism which gave rise to the idea that political ideologies were somewhat anachronistic in a society grappling with the transition from a traditional to a modern state.43

While Anwar and Lubis eschewed political ideologies, another independent editor called for an upgrading of nationalism as a means of enhancing the social responsibility contract between the people and the government. This was B.M. Diah, who was editor and owner of *Merdeka* (Freedom), an independent Jakarta daily. Diah sought to recapture the lost unity he believed to have existed during the Revolution. He was not a believer in liberal democracy with its continually feuding parties, nor was he interested in radical social
revolution. For him the unity of the state was paramount. This was his version of press responsibility:

On this 12th birthday (of Merdeka) we promise to continue working to determinedly give to the nation and people a press that highly respects the importance of the people and nation, and resolutely to make Merdeka a newspaper that is the same as its name, to defend the importance of the nation and people above that of the groups and individuals, to be able to serve the society that needs information that is truthful and that can be valued.44

A year later during anniversary celebrations for Merdeka in October 1958, Merdeka called upon Marbangun, the director of Lembaga Pers dan Pendapat Umum (Press and Public Opinion Institute) (LPPU) to give an interview dealing with the Press in Indonesia. Answering a question about the less pleasing aspects of the post revolutionary Indonesian press, Marbangun replied that the lack of social responsibility displayed by the party press was a cause for regret.45 Here Diah was allowing his paper to propound a thesis held also by Lubis and Anwar. The primary difference was his belief in a nationalist ideology rather than the liberal pluralism of Lubis and Anwar, as the means for enabling government and people to work together for a more prosperous state. The three editors agreed on the nexus between the government, the press and the people. Basic to this
nexus was the insistence that the press, as one element of a generally urban, literate middle class culture, had the duty to act as an intermediary between the government and the masses. Mass interests, concerns and expectations were seen as being most logically and beneficially channelled to the government through a middle group of politically independent and modern institutions, of which the non-party press was one.

That this view of social responsibility grew among social pluralists and right-wing nationalists is instructive for the analysis of social groups which it carries. The Indonesian society was seen to be underdeveloped economically, politically and culturally. At the same time the demands of modernity needed to be faced in the post-independence period. To fulfill these demands all available expertise in modern economic management needed to be harnessed in order to achieve the development of the state. The position of the underdeveloped and traditional masses would change as economic development progressed, but this was to be a lengthy process. Penetration of the benefits of economic development, including increased literacy rates, expanded educational opportunities, modern institutional networks, government efficiency, was the vision of these groups. Set against this vision was the underdeveloped society of the majority who were unable to comprehend modern concepts and were open to political manipulation. The independent press took upon itself the task of giving 'non-political', 'objective information' to the masses in the movement towards modernity. Social responsibility was an essentially
conservative philosophy not envisaging radical changes in the relationship between the various groups and classes of Indonesian society.

Party Representation

After 1952 newspapers affiliated to or directly owned by political parties prepared for the general elections scheduled for 1955. Newspapers were a convenient and efficient method of communicating party programs and policies to the literate middle class. In addition, the assistance provided by the government was an added incentive to party organizers to undertake such ventures, insofar as it lessened the financial burden on the party which would have otherwise arisen. The political parties, by and large, saw the development of the party press as a healthy sign in a democratic society. Duta Masjarakat believed that it was the right of all political parties to operate newspapers. Indonesia agreed. In 1956 it suggested that the airing of different views by political parties in affiliated newspapers was indeed basic to the democratic process.

Such developments were anathema to the independent newspapers. For instance, Pedoman disparaged the idea that democracy was well served by party newspapers. In an editorial it argued that the views of party newspapers were merely the formulations of political party heads obtained from political text books.
continued that such a basis for newspaper content could not achieve the level of reasoned thought and reasoned interpretation of a situation that the independent press could achieve.

However much the argument that democracy was enhanced by the presence of party newspapers was put forward, those newspapers which professed the idea of social responsibility were not to be convinced of its validity. They saw their government/mass dichotomy being destroyed when party newspapers mirrored the growing political divisiveness apparent in the society. Consequently the independent press continued to lambast the party press, while the latter newspapers continued to represent their affiliated party, and indeed to the chagrin of the independents some of them achieved high circulation figures.

Apart from denying the claim by the party press that it served to entrench democracy, the independents attacked them on two other main grounds. Firstly, the party papers were accused of lacking social responsibility and secondly they were said to be lacking in objectivity.

As we have seen the idea of social responsibility, as expressed by Indonesian press commentators, had as one of its tenets the belief that a newspaper should be separated from the influence of political parties if it was to satisfactorily carry out its role as public
opinion maker in a socially responsible manner. The major contradiction in the actions of the social pluralists becomes obvious here. While professing social pluralism, an aspect of constitutional democracy which in the Western tradition held that a diverse range of views was legitimate and necessary in a democratic society, they manifestly rejected the implicit notions of freedom in that philosophy. Their belief in freedom did not include freedom for the PKI. They espoused ideas about controlling the PKI in much the same way as did the Masjumi, PSI and right-wing groups. It is not idle conjecture to suggest that the social pluralists in the press would have been able to accept a national press composed of political party newspapers if those papers did not include PKI and radical nationalist newspapers. Masjumi for example financed the national daily Harian Abadi whose editor, Tasrif, was committed to constitutional democracy. He was close to Rosihan Anwar and Mochtar Lubis and they together worked towards establishing professional journalism in Indonesia. Harian Abadi did not receive the direct condemnation from Lubis or Anwar that radical newspapers did. Nevertheless social responsibility became the lynchpin upon which the independent press scorned the party press.

Marbangun of the LPPU was strident in his criticism. He argued that the press generally had not reached a consciousness of social responsibility. The exaggerated and long-term influence of the political parties was the reason behind this. At a time when
martial law directives were severely restricting the freedom of the press to operate as it had in earlier years Marbangun urged that the press rediscover its role as a shaper of public opinion in terms of the social responsibility thesis. Adi Negoro, in the late 1940s argued that journalists who represented a group or a party in the society ran the risk of undermining the good of the whole society. H. Firdaus, the secretary of the Badan Kongres Musliman Indonesia (The Congress of Indonesian Muslims), writing in Indonesia Raya in 1957, continued this theme by suggesting that party or group newspapers by their very nature departed from the pure aim of the press (i.e. social responsibility) and as a result did not care about justice or ethics.

Having suggested that partisan interests were not compatible with performing a task in a socially responsible manner the independents then argued that the party press had discarded objectivity in its reporting. They were accused of mixing fact with opinion so that objectivity was lost. By comparison, the independent editors were presented as willing to let the facts stand alone in order that the reader could independently form an opinion.

However, this was not to say that the independents did not have opinions. They held that they like all others in a free society had the right to profess them. To overcome the possible contradiction between the necessity to provide factual information in performing
the 'social responsibility' function, while also having a democratic right to hold opinions, the independents argued that they only conveyed their opinions through editorials and *podjok* (corner columns). They both these columns were recognized by readers as being specifically assigned to opinion.

Objectivity was defined by the right-wing independents as being basically the reporting of factual information in a newspaper without the mixing of opinion with that fact. They claimed that their newspapers rigidly adhered to such objectivity. As an extension of this, independent newspapers were considered to project a neutralist approach to information, an approach not tainted by ideology. Thus we discover another foundation upon which social responsibility was built. Objectivity and neutralism suggested a non-biased, scientific approach to newspaper reporting. By extension every factual report was necessarily responsible because it depicted 'reality' as it really was, unencumbered by partisan ideology.

However, the liberal philosophy did allow that the facts could be open to interpretation in the news columns. Roshian Anwar believed it was possible to provide an honest interpretation of facts. It appears from this delineation between
"interpretation" and "opinion" that the primary element, that is the "fact", is a most crucial element in the whole philosophy of the independents. As suggested above, the "fact" had a positive relationship to rationality and to science. Facts were truths. The approach of the right-wing independents stressed their freedom from ideology and their neutral approach to reality based on factual information. Consequently, because of this perceived value-free objectivity their interpretation was by extension a scientific, value-free exercise. It became an elaboration of facts, but never an opinion which had an unscientific, tendentious aspect to it.

The connection between objective fact and objective interpretation was not always seen to be value-free or ideology-free. Elements of the party press suggested that objectivity had a basis in ideology.

Njoto joined the dispute when he defined objectivity in a newspaper as a mirroring of events within a society as they really were. But he elaborated on this:

But don't get it wrong, objectivity is not the same as being neutral. This society is full of conflict between one class and another, this society is full of class struggle. Because of this, objectivity itself contains an aspect which sides with the class which oppresses or the class which is oppressed, an attitude which sides with the class which is rising or towards the class that is declining.
Suluh Indonesia proclaimed a similar view. An editorial stated that the paper's role was to spread its spirit and ideology into society. It went on to conclude:

If in journalism objectivity is always desired, then the objectivity of Suluh Indonesia is always based on the view and standpoint that is followed by the paper.

Essentially the argument behind the view of Njoto and Suluh Indonesia is that the progression from fact to interpretation is not value free. Rather, interpretation seeks to make sense of factual information. This endeavour is dependent upon a preconceived method of analysis. Thus Njoto can say that 'objectivity' is not contradictory to 'sides with' because he would certainly feel that his notion of objectivity (undoubtedly for him the only correct one) was based on the objective truth contained in the dialectic of historical materialism. Thus it is possible that all ideologies contain a method of analysis upon which the interpretation of facts is premised.

Based on this view of objectivity a critique of the right-wing independents centres around their use of the term interpretation. Their step from objective fact to objective interpretation denies the above observation that no single method of analysis can claim universal agreement to its objectivity. Using this approach the ideological perspective of the right-wing independents comes into focus.
The concept of social responsibility adhered to by journalists who supported the social pluralism of liberal democracy was part of a discrete political ideology. This ideology supported a system of economic, social and cultural relationships. The formal detachment of the social pluralists from political allegiances could not successfully prove their detachment from the ideology of liberal democracy. This professed detachment was in fact an integral part of that political ideology. That is, the ideology required that they be seen to be apolitical, while nevertheless supporting the political system and ideology which necessitated that response.

It was difficult for the right-wing independents to maintain their claim to objectivity and neutralism as political turmoil ushered in Guided Democracy with its promise of stability in government. They became openly anti-communist and proclaimed 'The Defeat of Communism' as their new role. The latter stages of constitutional democracy were full of tension as the political and economic plans of the Masjumi and PSI were quickly being defeated. As a result the objectivity linked with social responsibility was abandoned as political proselytizing became increasingly important.

However, the exponents of social responsibility were able to justify their actions by warning that the continued development of the
democratic state for which they believed the revolution had been fought was being lost, in the late 1950s, to the Moscow dominated PKI. Thus their partisan approach could be judged as being an objective interpretation of fact and therefore, socially responsible.

Another view of the actions of the independent press has its roots in the notion of vested interest and is closely connected to the previously mentioned ideological position of the social pluralists. Djawoto, a member of the PKI who was to become a chairman of PWI in 1961, pointed out as early as 1949 the possible contradictions to be faced by a general press. Djawoto noted how in the West the general press was increasingly controlled by those who possessed access to large amounts of capital. He recorded that this development was not always seen by citizens of the Western countries to be compatible with the needs of the society. He told how the concern with the manipulation of information by those capital interests had led consumer groups in the West to seek to democratize the press through opening it to greater public access.

Written near the end of the revolution, Djawoto’s text was a veiled warning of the potentially non-democratic function of the capital based general press. He traced the increased monopolization of public opinion in the West by a decreasing number of large
newspaper conglomerates. These newspaper giants progressively developed a vested interest in supporting viewpoints which were similar to the points made above by the Indonesian independent press about the party press. That is, the press monopolies were merely mouthpieces for a given ideology. This was so because the ideological position of newspaper monopolies, based as they were on the investment of large amounts of capital, was intended by the monopoly owners to maintain the social environment in which that capital was not put at risk. This position also threatened the democratic free flow of information. Djawoto was pointing out that in the West there was an awareness that the conflict of interest between the owners of capital based newspapers, and the majority of readers, who did not own large amounts of capital, led to newspapers serving only the interests of their owners, rather than the democratic right to information. His words carried an implied warning for the Indonesian press.

As we have already seen, the period just after the Round Table Conference was a time when the concept of an independent press was enthusiastically pursued. Its development and domination in the early 1950s seemed almost assured. Government policy gave financial assistance to the Indonesian press which was almost totally
Independently owned. Chinese and Dutch newspapers missed out on this assistance. As literacy spread, newspaper proprietors realised newspaper circulation would grow; and as economic development advanced the level of advertising directed towards newspapers would increase. Growth in literacy and advertising were assumed to be the mainstays of an economically viable independent press.

Unfortunately for the vision of the independent proprietors, the system of liberal democracy encouraged the airing of a wide range of opinions and ideas and an increase in party owned and party affiliated newspapers. These newspapers benefitted from government assistance and, to an extent, drained advertising revenue from the independents.

Although the Indonesian independents did not achieve the monopoly which Djawoto described, they certainly attempted to create a situation in which the dominant press of Indonesia was one based on a press policy which stressed the investment of capital for the purpose of achieving economic profitability. They did realize that any economic system could only support a limited number of newspapers where the profit motive was the dominant reason for a newspaper's existence. However to counter any accusations of financially based vested interests influencing content they then emphasized the ideas of social responsibility and objectivity.
Journalism

One of the most ambitious press strategies of those who subscribed to the ideals of social responsibility during the 1950s was their work towards placing journalism on a more professional and theoretical level than had previously existed. While this was happening, however, the party press subscribed to journalistic standards which reflected their own ideologies.

Indonesian journalism prior to 1950 had been based on the prerequisite qualification of experience in the nationalist struggle. Journalists were those who could stir the nationalist fervour and spirit amongst newspaper readers. But after the Dutch had recognised Indonesian independence, the proponents of the independent press no longer believed that politics and nationalism should be the dominant concern of the newspaper-reading public. Rather, independent Indonesia was to concern itself with social and economic development. Concomitantly, economics and social responsibility were to replace politics and nationalism as the foci of journalistic concern. Entertainment columns, which included women’s fashion, cooking, western comics, sport, films and film stars, were to supplement the more serious developmental aspects of newspapers.

To replace the journalist nurtured during the nationalist period the independents sought a new professionalism. This stressed the liberal pluralist view of social responsibility and objectivity.
Various government agencies encouraged the spread of the theory. Particularly the Department of Information and the LPPU were to the forefront in these efforts. Travel grants to journalists have been mentioned previously and these were intended to help raise journalistic standards.

The LPPU, established in September 1952, had a major part to play. Nieuwenhuis says that "...The objective of the Institute is to afford the opportunity to study press science in the widest possible sense by providing personal and material assistance". With a western educated staff, headed by Marbangun, the LPPU organized upgrading sessions for journalists which often involved lectures by, and seminars with, visiting overseas, especially American mass communications experts. The Institute was also involved with the appointment of Dr. Schneider of the University of Leyden to the press science faculty at Gadjah Mada University.

Non-government efforts to inculcate professionalism into journalism were also developing. Journalism courses were expanded in the universities. The PWI and Parada Harahap's Jajasan Akademi Wartawan also participated in the upgrading of journalistic standards.
As has been suggested earlier, the momentum for the development of an independent press decreased somewhat as the party press came on to the scene after 1952. The journalistic ethic based on professionalism was also threatened, since for the party press the crucial qualification for its journalists was not so much professionalism, as sympathy for the newspaper's ideological and political position.

The most radical departure from the professionalism of the independent press was the PKI's journalists' credo. Harian Rakjat had a core group of journalists and staff correspondents, but in the mid-fifties the newspaper instituted a major journalistic innovation.

This innovation was the *Korbu* (Koresponden Buruh - Worker correspondent) and *Korta* (Koresponden Tani - Peasant correspondent) movements. These movements were designed to encourage worker and peasant readers of Harian Rakjat to contribute to the newspaper by establishing them as non-staff correspondents. The types of contributions which were solicited by *HR* dealt with...

problems associated with personal experience, about every-day life, about every-day difficulties and every-day struggles ... The letters should relate experiences in the regions which the editor himself cannot arrange.
Within HR two new editorial positions were set up, one dealing with the KORBU contributions and one dealing with the KORTA efforts. 70

Although this movement appears to have met with a good response, many of the KORTA and KORBU reports apparently were not journalistically acceptable, their news being outdated, badly composed or otherwise unacceptable. 71 Consequently, the PKI press occasionally carried articles which were directed towards providing guidelines for improving the presentation of news items submitted by the members of the movement. 72 This was a type of simple journalistic training.

Njoto's policy of encouraging contributions from its readers contrasts markedly with the professionalism of the independent press. The initiative was based on the belief that social institutions such as the press should encourage the participation of the ordinary members of the society in those institutions. But this participation was not encouraged merely for its own sake; rather it had a purpose. It was based on Lenin's dictum that progress towards the isolation of reactionary forces in society could only succeed if the relationship between the communist party and the masses was strengthened, and one way of achieving this was by the masses contributing to the party press.

Also apparent in the Korbu and Korta movement was the
suggestion that the economic, political and cultural reality of the people could be most objectively portrayed by the people themselves. The *HR* readership was seen as having a legitimate contribution to make to the overall development of the country. By contrast, the press theory of the independent press held that a professionally trained corps of journalists could best represent the needs of the masses to the government, and as a result of this mediated representation, the development of the society would be advanced.

Possibly the gap in perceptions about journalism between the communist press and the independent press represented the extremes of the ideas current at the time. It is difficult to discover any sources which deal with the specific characteristics of party press journalism outside of the communist and independent groups. Nevertheless, in the light of the party press' general determination to project its own political ideas, it is not unlikely that its journalists were required to be supporters of the associated political party. To that extent journalistic practice which downgraded the role of the party press and lauded the independent press, would not have been favoured by these journalists.

The press debate examined here was carried on during the ten years up to 1959. In that year Guided Democracy was declared and a series of regulations were promulgated which restricted the
freedom of all newspapers and indeed forced the closure of many newspapers, including those which supported the Masjumi and the PSI.

In the debate the independent social-pluralists made most of the running as they tried to forestall the advance of the party press - an advance which jeopardized the possibility for the growth of the independent press on one level and threatened, in their eyes, the success of the system of constitutional democracy to which the social pluralists adhered, on another level.

The debate was not really resolved by any of the parties to it. The co-operation between the army and Sukarno to implement Guided Democracy ended the debate as press laws based around Guided Democracy concepts were introduced. These complemented the martial law press regulations which had governed the press since 1956

Nevertheless the debate is instructive for several reasons. Firstly it shows that the idea of social responsibility, which in a slightly altered way, governs the Indonesian press today, had its Indonesian roots in an attempt by the literate middle class to represent the illiterate mass of Indonesians in a move towards economic prosperity and justice. The masses were to be gradually led to the desired goal. Secondly, the debate points out that there has existed in Indonesia a history of communications theory which did not rely on the formulations of liberal social pluralists. Rather a tradition which radically defined the meaning of social
responsibility, of objectivity, of democracy in the media, of the basis for communications between the masses and the government, developed out of Indonesian society in the 1950s. Importantly these formulations were not the private preserve of the PKI, although it made a major contribution. Rather the many components of the Indonesian political spectrum contributed to them. Thirdly, it suggests that the contradiction between the basic social pluralist belief in the legitimacy of diverse views and their efforts to forestall the growth of the party press, was primarily aimed at stopping PKI and radical nationalist participation in the press. Fourth, it shows how the PKI, represented by Njoto, argued that its journalistic theories were legitimate under a constitutional democracy which was theoretically committed to press freedom. The PKI had grown dramatically under constitutional democracy and the party projected that it would continue to do so. This confidence lead it to support press freedom at that time. After martial law was introduced the party felt less secure as an increasing number of army regulations restricted the operations of all political parties. As we will see in the next chapter the policy of supporting press freedom remained with the PKI during Guided Democracy, although the party did seek to have select newspapers banned at times. Fifth, HR was a debating tool. It did not merely carry party propaganda, but contributed to the development of ideas regarding the role of the press. Njoto and other members of the PKI were not reluctant to put their point of view. They believed it to be logical and capable of winning non-committed observers to their viewpoint. Undoubtedly the longterm projection was that the entire Indonesian press would operate as the PKI press
operated. But then, this was no different to social pluralist ideas that the press should mirror its media model. For the moment PKI strategy was to enter debates, support a diverse press, and continue to grow under constitutional democracy. PKI debate on the press declined during Guided Democracy however. Yet on other subjects debate was not totally discarded. Njoto's willingness to project PKI views, as seen during the 1950s, continued in the 1960s and resulted in several lively polemics. These will be treated in chapter V.

Sixth, the concept of peasant and worker correspondents was an important mid-1950s initiative by Njoto. In chapter VII these movements will be examined. As we will see the movements posed some political problems for the PKI. Despite these later problems, its inception at a time when professionalism in journalism was being propagated by the liberal pluralists, highlights a form of PKI internal democracy and party participation which was based on the view that the masses could contribute to the political, economic and social advancement of the party and nation - a position opposed to the belief of the social pluralists.
During Guided Democracy Njoto continued his concern of the precious decade that freedom of the press be allowed. He called on the government to bring down press laws to ensure that freedom. Rather than this being done primarily to support the continuation of the political system in which the PKI was flourishing, as was the case in the period of constitutional democracy, Njoto now demanded press freedom to ensure the continuation of the PKI's publications against the threat of army action to permanently suspend them.

While working to protect its own position by calling for press freedom the PKI also was increasingly bringing its influence to bear on other newspapers and journalists. Until mid-1963 the PKI was confident of its control of the nation's press, having gained support from other newspapers because of its continuing calls for press freedom and laws to guarantee the rights of the press.
Infiltration of newspapers and press institutions by leftist journalists assisted this control.

But PKI control was broken in 1963. The party saw the sacking of editor Jusuf from the nationalist daily *Merdeka* as the beginning of its loss of influence. Some evidence suggests that the army precipitated Jusuf's sacking, as it did the later and more well-known *Badan Pendukung Sukarnoisme* (Body for the Support of Sukarnoism or BPS). The BPS was an attempt by political groupings and journalists to arrest PKI influence on Sukarno. However after some hesitation, Sukarno banned the BPS and the newspapers upon which its support was based. The left-nationalist journalists applauded this action, but there is some suggestion that the PKI only agreed with the banning of the movement, seeing the banning of the newspapers as being possibly premature. During 1965 there appears to have developed at least the beginnings of a split between the leaders of the PKI press and some of the left-nationalist journalists. This resulted from the vigour with which some sections of the left-nationalists handled the newspaper aspect of the BPS, and the subsequent fast decline in PKI influence.

The early rewards for PKI concern with the press which were seen by 1963, were increasingly lost as broader political tensions resulted in divisions within the press. To some extent the PKI had also lost control of some of its erstwhile left-nationalist press friends by 1965.
The Political Context

By 1959 the widespread disillusionment of many sections of the Indonesian political public with Constitutional Democracy allowed Sukarno to decree a return to the Constitution of 1945 and thereby commenced the period known as Guided Democracy. Initially Sukarno and the army leaders were keen to lessen the role of political parties. They planned that functional groups, which were to be formed on the basis of similar tasks or functions in society, would usurp them. Before very long, however, Sukarno realized that the army intended to dominate these groups. Now aware of the potential threat to his domination, he revived the parties. This was happening by 1962 and the parties relished their resurrection. The PKI particularly improved its influence at this time. While it sought an increasing radicalization of Indonesian society, the army wanted the opposite. Bitter disputes ensued and were only resolved with the coup events around October 1, 1965. Soon after, the army was in control, the PKI destroyed, and Sukarno powerless.

In July 1959 Indonesia reverted to the Constitution of 1945, which gave Sukarno as chief executive wider powers than he had under the previous constitution. The return had been opposed to varying degrees by some of the existing political parties - the PSI and Masjumi were trenchantly opposed and the NU insisted on greater guarantees for the position of Islam. After some initial hesitation the PKI and PNI supported the move. As the constitution of the
Constitutional Democracy period was still in force, to legally reintroduce the 1945 Constitution required the consent of the Constituent Assembly. Despite the efforts of Sukarno and the army, and the support of the PKI and PNI, the Constituent Assembly refused to adopt the new constitution. Sukarno reacted by dissolving the Assembly and decreed the 1945 Constitution into law.

Over the next year the President decisively cut much of the constitutional power from the parties. The Masjumi and PSI were declared illegal, as they failed to support the new constitution. No longer were the parties dominant. According to Feith, by August 1960...

...there were no more serious attempts by the President to weaken the parties as such, and no major acts of open resistance by the parties - at least not until March 1962, when electoral legislation was discussed again. This halt in the contest occurred partly because there were no more liberal pieces of constitutional machinery for the President to destroy or the parties to defend. And indeed the formal institutions of Guided Democracy had virtually all come into existence by that time.¹

While the initial impetus of Guided Democracy had severely limited the scope of the parties by this time they were soon to gain a more prominent profile as Sukarno and the army vied for real, if not formal control, of the country's political institutions.

The beginnings of this were seen several years earlier in the agreement between Sukarno and the army about the benefits of replacing the parties with functional groups.² These were groupings of
individuals based on non-political criteria. Journalists were a group, as were workers; youth and women were also. Each of a myriad of groups would choose its leaders who would then participate in the various parliamentary and non-parliamentary bodies of Guided Democracy. The parties were to have no influence on the selection of those representatives. It was an ideal way of usurping the influence of the parties. It also fitted in with the concept of the state as a family - an idea keenly espoused by the army and Sukarno. Because each group performed a function necessary to the society, theoretically at least, no dispute should have arisen which could not have been resolved on the basis of consensus and consultation. For to jeopardize the society through disputes would harm all groups. Clearly this was very different from the rationale of the parties which vied for control of government over the interests of other parties.

The army from mid-1957 enthusiastically set up institutions to formalize these ideas. These were Badan Kerja-sama (Cooperation Bodies or BKS). The first such group was the BKS-Pemuda-Militer (Youth-Military Cooperation Body) "consisting of Army personnel working directly with the youth ormas (mass organizations) of the four major parties". The army extended this strategy to other groups and party mass organizations. In January 1958 the army established an umbrella body for the many BKS. This was the Front Nasional Pembasaran Irian Barat (National Front for the Liberation of West Irian). Reeve suggests that this Front, while ostensibly a
"coordinating body for the West Irian campaign", was "actually a bid to control Sukarno's proposals for the Front Nasional".\(^5\)

Sukarno was not keen to have the Front controlled by the army. He wanted it to be based on the Konggres Rakjat (People's Congress), which would be partly made up of individuals from functional groups.\(^6\) The advantage to Sukarno of this strategy was that the components of the Front were likely to show greater allegiance to him than if the Front members were from army supported BKS.

A primary promise of the development of functional groups for the army and a fear for Sukarno was the legitimacy of the army as a political force. As the army encouraged the development of BKS it was only a matter of time before it could claim that same status. By late 1958 this was achieved.\(^7\)

The dilemma for Sukarno was that he needed the army support to assist him with the transition to Guided Democracy, but he did not need an army which was in control of sufficient political institutions to make him merely an army puppet. It must have been obvious to Sukarno that without an organized mass base of support, especially after the early success of the BKS, he was, to no small extent, dependent on the army for his position. It is of course unlikely that the army would have moved against him at that time, but Sukarno wanted
to be in control rather than be controlled. To achieve this required a change of tactics.

The major impediment to the success of the National Front, both in terms of the BKS and Sukarno's control of them, had been the stipulation that political parties could not join the front. It was after all supposed to have been a front of functional groups and government appointees. In practice the political parties did influence the BKS and functional groups by nominating those members of the mass organizations who would represent the organizations in the various Guided Democracy governmental bodies. The resolution of the National Front problem took notice of the reality of the functional groups.

Sukarno, realizing the advantages held over him by the army in the BKS and FNPIB, dramatically changed the rules of membership of the National Front on December 27, 1961. Now the focus on functional groups was discarded as parties, mass organizations and other organizations could join the Front as discrete entities. This effectively stopped the policy of the previous five years which sought to isolate and downgrade the political parties. Henceforth they could maintain their identity in one of the most prominent movements in the country. In the old tradition they could also be expected to vie with each other for prominence, although this was not necessarily intended by Sukarno.
Sukarno fared well from all this. Not only was the National Front now "his", as the mass organizations and parties applauded his recent decision, but also the Front was used to mobilize the masses behind his plans to bring West New Guinea into the Republic of Indonesia. The parties, and especially the PKI, participated in this mobilization with much enthusiasm. For the first time under Guided Democracy the PKI could display its organizational and numerical strength in support of the President, and implicitly against the power of the army. No other party could call upon so many people to attend a government demonstration or meeting, at such short notice, as could the PKI. Sukarno could not but be impressed, as he now was establishing, if only by proxy of the PKI, a formal mass organization.

While the mass mobilization of the National Front was encouraging for the PKI, another pro-party formulation was equally important, if slow in reaching fruition. This was NASAKOM (an acronym implying unity of Nationalists, Religious people and Communists). It was a concept popularized by Sukarno after 1960 as he sought to bring the PKI into the cabinet. Feith speculates that Sukarno wanted the communists to take the Finance ministry, "presumably in order to have them share blame for economic deterioration". But the army opposed this and the PKI never obtained a ministry, although Aidit and Lukman were given ministeries...
without portfolios in 1962, as was Njoto in 1964.

The idea of *NASAKOM* was crucial for the parties. It legitimized their existence after the previous efforts to destroy them. Although the PKI did not achieve a *NASAKOM* cabinet it did achieve increasing influence in all areas as government instructions to ensure nationalist, religious and communist representation on a wide range of government and non-government bodies progressed.

In 1963 Indonesia acquired West New Guinea and Martial law was lifted. The former event, while fulfilling a long held aspiration of Sukarno, left him without a reason for radically asserting Indonesian identity internationally, and without a reason for mass mobilization. The lifting of Martial law meant that much of the day to day control previously exercised on all levels of politics by the army was ended.

Two developments during 1963 continued the radical nationalism which had been swelling during the previous four or so years. Somewhat timidly, Sukarno early in the year voiced Indonesia's opposition to the formation of the Federation of Malaysia. Vacillating between acceptance of the new state and the threat of armed intervention to stop it, Sukarno by the end of the year had decided that Malaysia was indeed a "neo-colonialist plot", and set up the mechanics for Indonesia's confrontation against it. The second
development showed similar indecision. It had to do with an economic stabilization program to be supported by the United States. The Americans were considering assistance of around $200 million in addition to multinational assistance of around $125 million. In exchange for this assistance Indonesia was to undertake an International Monetary Fund economic assistance program. After some procrastination the government promulgated the May 26 regulations which established the program.

The economic measures were unmistakably liberal in intent and effect, providing for sharp increases in many prices and charges, a de facto devaluation of the currency, and heavily reduced government expenditures. They were accompanied by other indications on Indonesia's part of a desire to propitiate the United States, notably a decision to admit the Peace Corps and the successful negotiation of new agreements with the foreign oil companies operating in Indonesia.

The stabilization plan commenced as protracted negotiations on the Malaysian dispute were being held. It seems that Sukarno thought that he could build up his international and domestic stature through confrontation, while receiving the assistance of the United States and the International Monetary Fund. Mindful of United States help in bringing the West New Guinea dispute to a favourable conclusion for Indonesia, it seems that Sukarno thought similar support would be forthcoming for the Malaysian Confrontation. For the United States, however, the Malaysian problem was not one of wrestling control from a former colonial power. As long as the negotiations between the colonial power, Britain, and the colonized
peoples were progressing towards an acceptable independence, the United States was unlikely to intervene to thwart them, but rather, would most certainly support that independence. As the negotiations between the Indonesians, British and the representatives of the proposed new state became more intractable, economic and diplomatic moves by Indonesia removed any hope of an amicable settlement of the dispute. By late September 1963 the International Monetary Fund suspended standby credits to Indonesia. The stabilization plan was soon forgotten as Indonesia's mid-year appeasement of the West was lost.

Generally the PKI and the army were happy with the outcome. Indeed they had to some extent been instrumental in it. The PKI reasoned that one of the stipulations for the international aid would be a curtailment of the party's influence on the government and its continued exclusion from the cabinet. Overall the plan was judged to be a reactionary step, after several years of reasonably radical government actions. Inspired by their judgement, the PKI fanned Sukarno's fears of the imperialist inspired Malaysia. The army was also fearful of the stabilization program. It rightly reasoned that resources available to it would be greatly reduced by the plan's austerity. Its prominence and power and in particular its ability to oppose the communists in hardware and manpower terms would be lessened. Confrontation with Malaysia offered the opposite. Resources for the military aspect of confrontation would obviously
increase if the policy was to be carried through. This self interest, together with a real fear of encirclement by British imperialism, obliged the army to accept military adventure and forego the possibility of economic reform.

Returning to the purely domestic front, the enmity between the army and the PKI increased, especially as elements of the PNI were displaying a radicalism not far removed from that of the PKI. As we have seen NASAKOM gave the parties the legitimacy that the emphasis on functional groups threatened to take away. The parties and especially the PKI capitalized on this as Reeve suggests...

From 1960 to 1962 Sukarno and his colleagues continued to speak of both Nasakom and golkar (functional groups) as if the two were somehow complementary - but the two formulations began to be used by opposed political forces for their own needs. The parties began to use Nasakom as a justification for more assertive political activity, while the army inherited exclusive use of the golkar concept.15

Two areas of major conflict between the PKI and the army and other non-radical groups arose largely as a result of the scope allowed the parties by NASAKOM. These were about enterprise councils and land reform.

Legislation of the late 1950s planned an increased role for workers and peasants in the economic fabric of the state. These laws were enacted at a time when Sukarno and the army saw functional groups being the vehicles for the workers' and peasants' political participation. In so far as Sukarno and the army were to control the
functional groups, the implementation of the legislation would have been under their control.

For the workers the legislation sought to establish enterprise councils in all state enterprises. That is, worker representatives were to jointly manage the enterprises with the established managements, through the councils. As it happened, the majority of state enterprises had come under army control as a result of the takeover of Dutch enterprises in 1957. The army managers were not enthusiastic about losing their control of these enterprises to workers by implementing the laws, as the PKI increasingly pressed for the laws to be implemented.

For the peasants, legislation was enacted to set a legal minimum for the division of crops between landowner and tenant farmer, and to limit the maximum and minimum areas of landholding. This struck at many NU and PNI members who were landlords and landowners. Their influence did much to frustrate the laws being implemented in the early 1960s.

Here then were two areas in which the PKI could utilize its two largest mass organizations - the peasants union, Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI) and Sobsi, its proletarian workers union. Although enterprise councils were set up Sobsi and BTI were not able to dominate these. Rather, an army inspired organization, Soksi, utilizing the presence of the army management, established considerable influence in the state enterprises. Reeve highlights
the strength of Soksi:

Within the 636 enterprise councils set up by the end of 1963, SOKSI and management representatives held 39% of the positions, compared to 30% held by the PKI ormas SOBSI and BTI, while civilian allies of SOKSI accounted for another 18%.\textsuperscript{16}

Greater success was achieved by the PKI in its efforts to have land reform and crop sharing laws implemented. After the economic stabilization plan had been discarded and the confrontation with Malaysia was stepped up, the PKI began to call for the agrarian laws to be implemented. Its mass organization BTI pressed the claims. Experiencing a landowning class reluctant to accept the likely loss of land and crops, the BTI organized \textit{aksi-sepihak} or unilateral actions whereby peasants carried out the laws themselves. Tension rose in the rural areas. Violence increased. The unilateral actions became a matter of national controversy. So volatile was the situation, that Sukarno in December 1964 called a conference of all ten political parties at which the \textit{aksi-sepihak}, among other matters, were to be discussed. After a long session, the conference, in respect of land reform agreed...

To carry out the above matters and solve national problems, for example the agrarian law and crop-sharing law, the system of consultation and consensus... will be given priority...Particularly with regard to land questions, officials and peasants are obliged to consult without using insinuations, intimidation, and arms.\textsuperscript{17}

Although both sides claimed victory the PKI had had its boldness reigned in. With future moves for land reform and crop
sharing dependent on "consultation and consensus" it was inevitable that the same delays and frustrations experienced prior to the aksi-sepihak would be experienced again.

Nevertheless the PKI was basically satisfied with its handling of the unilateral actions. The party had shown its strength in the countryside and Sukarno's intervention was timely in so far as it stifled any possible precipitate action by the army and its friends, against the PKI and BTI. While not as successful in the enterprise councils the PKI did at least assert a radicalism not prominent in its policy in the earlier years of Guided Democracy.

Following the decision to continue with the confrontation against Malaysia, Sukarno displayed a greater radicalism than he had done previously, despite his calling a halt to aksi-sepihak. In late 1964 he banned the army and Murba party backed Badan Pendukung Sukarnoisme (Body for the Support of Sukarnoism - BPS), which gave a non-Marxist interpretation of Sukarno's thought. In January 1965 he banned the Murba party. In February he banned 30 BPS newspapers. Reflecting a progressively closer relationship with the People's Republic of China, Sukarno gave tacit support to the idea of a Fifth Force, whereby workers and peasants would be armed with Chinese weapons, although he did not go so far as to order the force to be formed. One report holds that Sukarno offered the PKI the portfolios of Labour and of Information in late 1964 in response to the party's longtime demand to be included in the cabinet. This was rejected by the PKI as tactically precipitate, despite the loud calls for
inclusion. Again suggesting Sukarno's increasing radicalism, a recent PKI paper states that Njoto was to have become foreign minister in December 1965, after Subandrio had been elevated to a more senior position in the government.\textsuperscript{19}

The events of September 30, 1965, with an attempted leftist coup and successful military counter coup, meant that all the conflicts between left and right forces were resolved in favour of the rightist forces as the army strengthened its grip on the country. For scholars, however, the nature of the relationship between Sukarno and the army and Sukarno and the PKI has remained a contentious issue.\textsuperscript{20} Whatever Sukarno's ultimate intentions - whether he was balancing the army and the PKI, encouraging the PKI as his heir, domesticating the PKI, or one of several other combinations - it is clear that the PKI saw him embarking on actions and policies which were suitably radical for it to support, and which would strengthen its own claim to a prominent role in government in the future. The PKI was enthusiastic about mass mobilization around the liberation of West Irian. It encouraged confrontation against Malaysia and ridiculed the 1963 economic stabilization plan. \textit{Aksi-sepihak} again demonstrated to Sukarno the party's mass support and organizational ability. The PKI applauded his radicalism of 1965. Possibly Sukarno was not going to hand power to the PKI, but nor was he a keen supporter of army moves to disband the parties.
The Guided Press

As we have seen, for the greater part of the 1950s the proprietors and journalists of newspapers who wanted the Indonesian press to develop along lines similar to the press of Western Europe and the United States dominated the press debate. They forced the party press to debate theories of objectivity and responsibility; they greatly influenced the various government departments and bodies established to help develop the press; they were loudest in their support of press freedom; internationally people like Mochtar Lubis, Rosihan Anwar and Tasrif, were to the fore. All of this changed with the introduction of Guided Democracy. No longer were press standards judged through the standards of the adherents of the PSI and Masjumi, but rather through the measurements of support for the political and ideological formulations of Guided Democracy.

All newspapers which were prepared to adjust to the new climate and which were not considered treasonous by the government were permitted to continue. Some, either voluntarily or forcibly, were closed. In theory, the press was, like so many other areas, to be adjusted to Guided Democracy.

In practice Guided Democracy was never all-embracing in its didacticism. The political conflicts of the period suggest this, as do developments in the press. Certainly new press regulations curtailed much press activity, but beneath this newspapers attempted
to highlight many contradictory aspects of the political order. During 1963 to 1965 the many press polemics stress the vitally important political role of the press and its lack of political and ideological uniformity.

Politically the PKI, while initially suspicious of the move towards Guided Democracy, quickly threw its support behind Sukarno. It welcomed the culling of its long-standing and trenchant press opponents. It cultivated journalists from all sectors of society. By 1963 the media was substantially under its influence. But its fortunes quickly changed. The "Jusuf Affair", which will be examined shortly, redrew the lines of PKI influence. When editor Jusuf was sacked from the daily newspaper *Merdeka* the hitherto widespread PKI influence in the press ended. This rift was a forerunner to the BPS movement in late 1964. Here anti-PKI newspapers and journalists openly opposed the PKI influence on the Indonesian society. Although these BPS newspapers were suspended in February 1965 they were, amidst PKI disapproval, replaced by other army and pro-army newspapers.

During 1965, reflecting the wider political forment, the battle lines in the press were essentially formed by the army on the one side and the PKI and left nationalists on the other.

*Harian Rakjat* fulfilled important roles during this period. From June 1960 it was the only major PKI publication. After it carried a critical review of the first year of Guided Democracy, party activity was temporarily prohibited, while HR and all other PKI
publications were suspended. While party activity and HR were reinstated in September 1960, all the other publications remained suspended until martial law was revoked in May 1963. HR was the only publication coming from the party centre to the regions. Its continuation was crucial for party development.

Regulation Of The Press

During the first eighteen months of Guided Democracy the government and the martial law authorities introduced laws, additional to those ruling since martial law began in 1956, to direct press activities. The government laws, while undoubtedly authoritarian as characterized by Lee, were generally readily accepted by the newspapers. This was not the case with the military regulations, which were often judged to encourage the unwarranted interference of the Peperti martial law authorities in the working of the press. This contradiction in the selective support of some Guided Democracy regulations precipitated a continued call for press freedom during the years of Sukarno's authority, although that freedom was clearly different from the freedom of the mid-fifties.

In his analysis of the Indonesian press system Lee examined these regulations in detail. What follows highlights the more important regulations with which he dealt.
After Guided Democracy was proclaimed in July 1959 Depernas (National Planning Council) was instructed by the government to devise an outline of the function of the press as part of its planning for an Eight Year Plan. This it did and an MPRS (People's Consultative Council) edict proclaimed the Plan. The functions of the press were: political, social, economic, educational and cultural; it was to be an instrument for the implementation of over-all planning; it was to aid in the completion of the revolution, by criticizing and correcting; it should be a collective instrument based on Indonesian Socialism; it should act as a barometer, as an indicator and a controller; it was to assist in the implementation of MANIPOL (the political manifesto which outlined the functioning of the state under Guided Democracy) and especially in the implementation of the Plan for National Construction. The equivocalness of these directions assured their ready acceptance by the press. They did not weaken, nor did they abrogate the power of Peperti over the press, but neither did they affect the daily running of newspapers. Peperti still held ultimate power.

Using its continuing powers under martial Law and the changed political climate, the Peperti moved to reform the press in actuality. It prohibited newspapers not printed in Latin or Arabic script or in the script of a regional language. This was aimed at the Chinese press and effectively closed it. Then in October 1960 it instructed all newspapers and magazines to apply for new publishing permits. Newspaper proprietors were required to adhere to a number of conditions which premised the granting of a new license on support and defence of Manipol and the program of the government. Newspapers
associated with the Masjumi or PSI were not granted licenses and thus were forced to close. Essentially these regulations ridded the press of those newspapers supportive of, or sympathetic to the regional rebellions of 1956/1957, and opposed to Sukarno's Guided Democracy. The newspapers which remained, ranged from keen supporters of Guided Democracy to those which were willing to defer to political reality.

As the government press regulations were not always specific in their intentions, primary control of the press remained with the martial Law authorities, who reacted to what they saw as press misdemeanours by using the Peperti regulations which had been proclaimed previously.

**Freedom of the Press**

After the debate around press freedom in the mid-1950s, amidst essentially unrestricted press behaviour, the continuation of the debate after martial law and Guided Democracy were introduced is somewhat paradoxical. From 1956 that freedom was increasingly curtailed and after 1960 it was again limited. Yet, discussion of freedom of the press did continue amidst the restrictions, although the foundations of the new theory were very different from those prevailing during the ascendency of the PSI and Masjumi. Essentially this freedom sought to protect the press from the, as it
was seen, heavy handed control of the *Peperti*, and to define the scope of freedom permitted those newspapers which supported the new regime.

Utilizing its power under martial law the *Peperti* was neither selective nor restrained in its treatment of the press. As we have seen the army acquired the right to act against any newspaper it judged to be disturbing or having the potential to disturb public order. So ill defined was the concept of public order that many newspapers unwittingly ran foul of the authorities. It took several years and the introduction of Guided Democracy for the press to become sufficiently aware of the limits of press reporting. Smith in his study of newspaper suppression in Indonesia provides some useful information about military and government action against newspapers. Using a broad range of criteria, including newspaper suspensions, journalist jailings, press plant confiscations, license revocations, he detailed annual actions against the press. In 1957, there were 125, in 1958 ninety-five; they fell to 73 in 1959, rose again in 1960 to 93 and in 1961 fell to 52; by 1962, the limits were obvious as only 16 actions occurred, and this pattern continued until the mass banning of BPS newspapers in 1965.

What is particularly noteworthy about these actions is that they were not solely directed against communist and left wing newspapers. Rather, they hit the broad spectrum. Those of the right suffered, as did those of the left. After the unrestrained freedom prior to martial law, it was difficult for journalists and
editors to adjust to the Peperti directions, especially as the dramatic changes in the nation's political system were increasingly projected to the politically concerned middle-class.

Developments in the press at this time reflected the wider political machinations. When Pedoman, Harian Abadi and Indonesia Raya were closed or voluntarily closed, because of the requirement to declare allegiance to Guided Democracy, many surviving newspapers greeted the government action with understanding ranging through to jubilation. Because for many journalists and members of the middle class the PRRI Pemesta rebellions had so jeopardized the future of the fledgling state of Indonesia, and because any sign of support for the rebels was tantamount to treason, the loss of PSI and Masjumi supporting newspapers was substantially welcomed.24

Obviously, for newspapers to encourage and applaud this action of the Peperti meant that they were condoning it, and consequently opening themselves to possible similar action in the future, as such actions were given legitimacy. Consequently, while happy that the pro-rebellion press had been removed, the remaining press continued its demands for freedom of the press and for press laws to embody that freedom as a right.

From the proclamation of martial law until the declaration of Guided Democracy, appeals for press freedom from the anti-rebellions press lacked a pretext for their call being sympathetically received.
by the _Peperti_. For freedom of the press was one of those notions of Western liberalism that Sukarno and the army saw as being at the root of the political and social divisiveness of the period of Constitutional Democracy.

In those years the threat of press freedom being curtailed by the _Peperti_ was a continuing problem for the PKI. The party was proud of the rational, unsensational criticisms and reviews of government business that HR frequently carried. It was keen that it be allowed to propagate its own ideological and political ideas to its members and others. And it judged that its influence amongst other newspapers and journalists was gradually increasing. It reasoned that if the authoritarian intent of the _Peperti_ was to prevail, HR and the party's other publications would be the first to suffer.

For HR and many other newspapers Sukarno's Guided Democracy provided an argument for freedom of the press which was more acceptable to _Peperti_ and Sukarno. Rather than a commitment to a plural society with a multitude of opinions on various issues, the new commitment was to the continuing revolution which was stressed by Sukarno. If Guided Democracy eschewed liberalism then a newspaper which supported Guided Democracy was, in theory, axiomatically anti-liberalism and opposed to the liberal ideas of freedom of the press. Thus when newspaper owners signed the declaration of allegiance to the revolution in 1960, they then should have acquired freedom to act as they wished as long as the concepts of Guided Democracy were not
jeopardized. Commonly journalists reasoned this way. Writing just after Guided Democracy was introduced, Njoto foreshadowed how he thought a newspaper which supported the new political arrangements should act. According to him a newspaper should support without reserve all progressive actions, criticize all actions which were less than good, and oppose all actions which did not benefit the people. In the hypnotic political language of the day his words were just what journalists who were sympathetic to Guided Democracy, but weary of its authoritarian aspects, agreed with in order to assert their independence.

Editorial staff of prominent national dailies like *Bintang Timur, Suluh Indonesia, Warta Bakti, Duta Masjarakat, Trompet Masjarakat* (Surabaya) and *Harian Rakjat* saw the limitations on the press because of the Peperti, but also welcomed the changed direction of the state and sought to take an active part in aiding the progress of Sukarno's revolution. They believed that newspapers could retain an independence from government and act responsibly, but if necessary, critically towards that government in order to safeguard the ideals of Guided Democracy. Occasionally this high-minded attitude received rebukes, not only from the Peperti, but also from affiliated political parties. Editors of *Suluh Indonesia*, a PNI publication, received in the early years of Guided Democracy, criticism from the party hierarchy because of what were said to be articles which were unnecessarily critical of the performance of the government. *Nahdatul Ulama* officials
threatened, during 1960, to withdraw funding from *Data Masjarakat* if its editors continued with its occasional restrained criticism of government policy. Although this pressure was accepted to some degree, concerned editorial staff insist that a critical attitude was maintained.

All these concerns and pressures to adjust the press to the dictates of Guided Democracy were initiated in an atmosphere where the press had no rights in law. Indeed many regulations governed newspapers, but no laws or statutes defined their rights. Thus all the talk about freedom of the press under Guided Democracy was merely a lot of conjecture.

This was a vexing predicament for much of the press. What they saw was the inability or unwillingness of the various governments since 1954 to prepare an acceptable press law. Their frustration was intensified because, at the time of the revocation of the *Persbreidel Ordonnantie* in 1954, the Department of Information had promised to speedily draft a press law.

Pressure for these laws and guarantees of freedom of the press increased after 1959 as journalists, who represented their functional group in the parliament, called for adequate laws to be drafted. When a draft was presented to the parliament in early 1961, it was ill received by many. Short on detail, and long on
rhetoric, it did little to define the role of the press, or to ensure freedom of the press.

The PKI was singularly unimpressed with what the parliament had formulated. Njoto in an article in July 1961 entitled *Menudju UU Pokok Pers jang Demokratis* (Towards Democratic Press Laws), highlighted several of the anomalies in the draft. He complained that only one paragraph of the draft regulations mentioned the rights of the press. That section supported government aid to newspapers, but did not examine what types of assistance should be given. The proposal that an additional press permit, an izin perusahaan suratkabar (newspaper company license), be required before a newspaper be published, was also rejected. By requiring companies concerned with supplying information to the public to seek licenses with instrumentalities which examined applications for licenses by companies engaged in industrial, manufacturing and other economic development ventures, was not only inappropriate, but would involve unnecessary delays and doubts for the applicants about whether a license would finally be approved. A third complaint concerned the proposal that where there existed a newspaper which was judged to be deviating from MANIPOL, the government should be permitted to step in and set up its own newspaper in competition. Njoto strongly opposed this, arguing that any recalcitrant newspaper should be advised to follow MANIPOL, and if it was unwilling to do so, should be banned. Here was a fear of government newspapers being widely established and creating a precedent by which other non-government newspapers could be ursurped.
The criticisms directed at the draft laws necessitated further work on them. However this work was not pursued with any enthusiasm by the government, as the regulations of Peperti and of the President proved sufficient to control the press. It was not until 1966 that a press law was legislated.

While the bureaucratic procedures for redrafting the laws dragged on, newspapers and the PWI continued to press for their early tabling in the parliament. Njoto also kept up the pressure, especially after the slashing by Peperti of PKI publications in June 1960. A speech on the tenth anniversary of the founding of HR epitomized the party's position well. Among other things, Njoto said...

It is my opinion that what are very necessary today are, on the one hand, guarantees for the part of the press which supports the Manipol, and on the other, a clear-cut policy, such as a law on the freedom of the press, which regulates the freedom and the responsibility of the press...It is obvious, however, that as long as the press abides by such regulations, and as long as it does not violate the law of the land, it is reasonable to expect that freedom of the press is guaranteed...The parties which have passed the process of retooling are guaranteed certain rights to continue their activities and representations. The press should be granted the same treatment. After those of the press have passed the process of retooling, they should be given the right to continue their activities and the right of voicing their opinion.

Few in the press world of the early 1960s wanted to return to the almost unrestricted press freedom of the mid-1950s. They did nevertheless want a freedom adjusted to the political reality of Guided Democracy. Primarily this freedom encompassed the right of a
newspaper to criticize the government if it was judged to be not fulfilling the promises of a just and prosperous socialism as portrayed in the political formulations of Guided Democracy. The right to represent the views of any affiliated political party or social group was pertinent to this freedom. Importantly, this right held that a newspaper which was loyal to Guided Democracy should not have its position threatened by the whimsical enactment of vague martial law regulations.

Njoto and other PKI journalists avidly used the term freedom of the press. While it was certainly a tactical device to ensure the safety of HR and other newspapers sympathetic to the PKI, and to impress the middle-class with its projected democratic demeanour, it also had a basis in the belief in the value of a limited degree of free expression in a society still composed of groups and individuals variously committed to political, social and economic change. This last aspect will become evident in the following pages.

The Jusuf Affair

The banning of the PSI and Masjumi press in 1960 heralded an increased PKI influence on the press, an influence which was dealt a stunning blow in August 1963 when the editor of the daily Merdeka, Jusuf, was sacked. Jusuf, in the several years of his editorship, firmly allied the editorial policy of Merdeka with the radical nationalism of Sukarno, which was also encouraged by the PKI. Until
his sacking, the PKI felt confident of its hold on the national press. With Jusuf gone, that confidence was sapped, and a major realignment of newspapers into pro-PKI and anti-PKI resulted.

Not surprisingly the HR senior staff had for many years been busy in cultivating the friendship and respect of journalists from other progressive newspapers. As the influence of Tasrif, Rosihan Anwar and Mochtar Lubis waned, the prominence of Njoto, Naibaho and other senior HR journalists like Dahono, was apparent at journalist gatherings, press excursions abroad and so on. Influence through personal relationships and professional prominence was HR policy. Indeed, Njoto, the personable and affable chief editor of HR, gained great respect amongst sympathetic and hostile journalists alike. His intelligence and joviality undermined many suspicions amongst some journalists and impelled them to varying degrees of sympathy, not so much for PKI ideology, but to the right of the PKI to take a prominent role in Indonesian affairs. These non-PKI journalists, already favouring the new road of Sukarno's Guided Democracy, became important patrons of the PKI position. Not all journalists became so enamoured of the PKI right to exist, of course, but many did, and the party felt gratified with its work in these areas.

While this type of support was sought, more concrete influences were achieved also. Capitalizing on the increasing radicalism of the period, PKI members and radical nationalists from the press were able to gain powerful positions in two important press organizations - the PWI and Antara, the national newsagency. The
influential Jakarta branch of the PWI reflected this radicalism, when in 1961 Hasjim Rachman, a director of the radical nationalist newspaper *Bintang Timur*, was elected chairman of the branch and Jusuf Isak, the *Merdeka* editor, became its secretary. In 1961 the PWI national body came under direct PKI influence when party member Djawoto became the chairman, and remained under its influence after 1963 when Karim D.P., editor of the progressive *Warta Bakti*, took over this position. Charged with compiling news from the regions as well as national and international news, the role of Antara in determining the news selection for the Indonesian press was crucial. The PKI recognized early the political value of affecting the news content of papers through the national newsagency. Djawoto had been on the editorial staff of Antara since 1945. During Guided Democracy other PKI journalists including Sukrisno, Suroto, and Waluyo, joined Djawoto on the editorial board. They dominated Antara news policy until October 1965.

This activity, coupled with the inclination of many newspaper owners and journalists to accept Guided Democracy, encouraged the PKI leaders to assert their conviction about the revolutionary posture of the press. In 1961 Njoto claimed that there were only two newspapers in the country which were opposing MANIPOL. These were *Suara Rakjat* in Bandung and *Pikiran Rakjat* in Surabaya. With a confidence bordering on bravado Aidit is reported by Crawford to have said in 1963:

> We have had essential control over the mass media in this country for the past five years. When the day comes for us to finally take power, you will see that this has been more effective than anyone today.
realizes. The ground is being thoroughly prepared for acceptance of our world view.36

Aidit could not have foreseen how swiftly and dramatically his picture of the press would change. But change it did, and change because a progressive journalist who had been influenced by the PKI stance, was removed from what was probably the country's best known and respected nationalist newspaper.

Merdeka had been established by B.M. Diah during the revolution against the Dutch. Amongst many members of Jakarta's middle class it symbolized the importance of the press in the birth of the country, and the continuity of the ideals of the revolutionary days with the new ideals of Guided Democracy. When B.M. Diah became Indonesian ambassador to Moscow in 1961, it was easy for people to show an enhanced respect towards Merdeka as a consequence of the honour bestowed on its proprietor. The PKI took advantage of all of this. With Jusuf as editor, Merdeka entered the progressive press forces. Indeed an HR editorial grouped Merdeka with Bintang Timur, Warta Bakti, Warta Berita, Harian Ekonomi Nasional and Suluh Indonesia as prominent and progressive adherents of MANIPOL.37

On 17 August 1963 Jusuf was removed as editor of Merdeka.38 The reaction from HR and other progressive papers was bitter. With Jusuf's replacement by conservative editor Hiswara Darmaputera, the PKI and radical nationalists knew that the political
unity of the nation's prominent newspapers was broken.

Jusuf's removal occurred while Diah was briefly in Indonesia. Rather than being summarily dismissed he was promoted to the Dewan Pimpinan Merdeka, a body set up at the time of the removal of Jusuf and said by Merdeka to have been created as a result of a MANIPOL instruction to allow greater employee participation in management. The left and PKI press scorned this move. Clearly for them Jusuf had been sacked from the most important position in Merdeka. When Merdeka printed reasons for Jusuf's removal it became obvious to all that the 'promotion' was merely a sop against the anticipated adverse reaction of the left.

Jusuf was removed for three reasons. Firstly, he was accused of consciously or unconsciously assisting the PKI by his sympathetic coverage of the party. Then it was claimed that because of his editorship, Merdeka staff were afraid to write anything that could be considered critical of MANIPOL. And lastly, Jusuf and Diah disagreed about how Sukarno's political writings and thought should be interpreted.

Basically these three reasons highlight the radical nationalism of Jusuf, which was sympathetic to the PKI. Each reason is suitably vague or contradictory. Nasakom was current at the time and the PKI, because of this, had a public profile which demanded press coverage. Hence, from Jusuf's and the PKI's viewpoint, the first accusation, if valid at all, was in line with Sukarno's
political stance. Secondly, as it was incumbent upon all newspapers to support MANIPOL, the next accusation if true, should be commended. Lastly, Sukarno's works and position could be open to many interpretations depending upon one's ideological and political approach. Jusuf approached these problems radically, but with a radicalism that arguably was in line with the dominant political thinking of the day.

Anticipating the wider schism that could result if less prominent newspapers sided with Merdeka, the radical nationalist and PKI press moved to discredit it. Warta Bakti suggested that all journalists were at the whim of management and that press laws should be drawn up to protect press staff. The previous day it assured its readers that Jusuf had undeniably followed the Sukarno line, and concluded that for Merdeka to have sacked him implied that it wanted to develop a contrary, and therefore, incorrect interpretation of Sukarno's thinking. Bintang Timur claimed that under Jusuf's editorship Merdeka had always benefited all revolutionary groups, and sought to damn counter-revolutionaries. Consequently he was obeying the intent of MANIPOL. The PKI-dominated PWI declared that in his journalistic work Jusuf was certainly in line with MANIPOL and implemented the policy outlines given by Sukarno. HR believed that although the dismissal was contrary to labor laws, the worst aspect was its connection with political matters.

Despite the protestations from the left forces, Jusuf was not reinstated as editor, nor did he take up his position on the
Merdeka employee-management management board.

The PKI's worst fears were soon confirmed. Merdeka turned from pro-communist to anti-communist. No longer would Merdeka declare, as it had earlier in an editorial, that it condemned the 'kaum komunisto-phobie', (a group with a phobia against the communists); rather it turned to condemning the PKI. It took an early opportunity. It repudiated remarks by Aidit suggesting that Jugoslavia was revisionist and acted against the people. Merdeka reminded Aidit that Jugoslavia was a socialist state and a member of the emerging nations. In these aspects it was like Indonesia and this was highlighted by the friendship between Tito and Sukarno. Further chiding Aidit, Merdeka suggested that Aidit should remember that he was not only the leader of the PKI, but also minister representing the chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) and a presidential assistant. He should therefore adhere to Sukarno's policies.

What prompted B.M. Diah to remove Jusuf is not clear. The reasons Merdeka gave are in themselves sufficient, and certainly contain some truth. However, some speculation, while not in any way negating the stated reasons, does point to a broader intrigue at work. It concerns the army and its support for Soksi, the trade union alternative to the PKI dominated Sobsi. The editorial policy towards Soksi under Jusuf was such as to give the organization only minimum coverage, and definitely not to allow any Soksi report to reach page one of Merdeka. For the army and Soksi leaders
this policy was not acceptable. As we have seen Merdeka was a prominent and prestigious nationalist paper. Its influence in setting the news agenda for many of the middle class was substantial. Yet the primary labor union alternative to the Soksi was rarely mentioned in it. The success of Soksi, to not a small degree would depend on its prominence, and this was missing in Merdeka.

It is at this point that the realm of speculation is reached. One theory has it that the army leaders, particularly Nasution, encouraged Diah to move against Jusuf in order that its radical position and sympathy towards the PKI would be curtailed and in particular that Soksi be given greater prominence. As an inducement the army leaders are said to have promised to arrange a loan, through Soksi, for Merdeka to purchase new printing equipment. Whether because of a Soksi loan, or otherwise, new equipment was installed during the following year.

The truth here is difficult to attest. It does however complement other moves by the military to influence the functioning of individual newspapers through non-regulatory means. Several examples highlight the point. Firstly, research sponsored by the Indonesian Department of Information and LEKNAS-LIPI, asserts that the army funded Mochtar Lubis' newspaper Indonesia Raya in the late 1940s. Secondly, during 1957 the army moved to close down the already radicalized Bintang Timur. This newspaper had in the
early 1950s been owned by a group of Jakarta businessmen. They had obtained substantial government loans to expand the enterprise. In the mid-1950s they sold Bintang Timur to a group of nationalist journalists which included editor Tom Anwar and director Hasjim Rachman. The earlier loans remained unacquitted. In 1957 the army sought to have the new management repay the loans. It refused, arguing that the debt still lay with the former owners. The army was about to confiscate the newspaper as repayment of the loan, when the new owners of Bintang Timur were successful in convincing Sukarno to order the Poperti press authority to stop its actions against the newspaper. While the army leaders saw the newspaper as excessively radical, Sukarno saw it as a major supporter of his moves towards Guided Democracy. And lastly, after Sukarno had banned the BPS newspapers in February 1965, the army immediately filled the void itself. It opened the new newspapers Berita Yudha and Angkatan Bersendjata, the former using presses owned by Diah. While these developments do not add any evidence to the claim of a Soksi loan to Merdeka, they do highlight the preparedness of the army to attempt to support or restrict newspapers on the basis of political alignment.

The PKI realized that the sharpening of the contradiction between its increasing influence on Sukarno and the anti-communism of other powerful groups, had manifested itself in the press. The army realized that Merdeka would now encourage and join with other newspapers, which until then had been generally obsequious to leftist radicalism, in the fight to overcome communist influence.
This army-encouraged press vanguard now had the task of controlling the radicalism of the press, a task less easy for the army after it lost its wide powers when martial law was rescinded in May 1963.

This change in circumstances from army regulation to press factionalism gave rise to a press more willing and able to engage in debate, than had existed in the previous three years. These debates were pitched in the 1950s journalist style. The circumspection of the martial law period was lost. As this happened the number of newspapers willing to openly agree with the trenchant anti-communism of Merdeka increased. It was only a matter of time before they developed a formal opposition. The BPS was this opposition.

_Badan Pendukung Sukarnoisme (BPS)_

The BPS was a short lived political alignment of newspapers opposed to the PKI and keen to assert the non-Marxist aspects of Sukarno's thinking as the basis of the Indonesian state. The response of the radical nationalists was to condemn the movement as an illegitimate threat to the political viability of the PKI, while the PKI journalists focused primarily on its wider political backing and
implications. This difference in approach is one which has been overlooked by commentators and scholars alike. A willingness to see the left nationalist and PKI political movement as monolithic, has jeopardized a closer examination of the left press. It has treated press history at this time as undisputedly BPS versus the left nationalists and the PKI.

The BPS received its inspiration from members of the Trotskyist Murba party, in particular from Adam Malik, from top army leaders, and from B.M. Diah. They coalesced with many journalists who were concerned with the growth of PKI influence. Some thirty newspapers supported the movement whose public appearance was seen in the daily newspaper column Beladjar Memahami Sukarno-isme (Studying to Understand Sukarnoism). This column was written by an ex-editor of Suluh Indonesia, Sajuti Melik. It was initially carried in Diah's Berita Indonesia, but was soon taken up by newspapers throughout the archipelago.

The newspaper column was in most respects merely a means by which anti-PKI newspapers could show their common cause. It emphasized the non-Marxist aspects of Sukarno's writings and speeches. According to Sajuti Melik, Sukarno encouraged him to continue with his work only weeks before banning the BPS movement. Substantially innocuous in their appraisal of Sukarno's thought, the columns were nevertheless extremely dangerous for the PKI, because of the scope of
The radical nationalist and PKI press took up the challenge. *Bintang Timur* led the field. It carried front page articles examining the journalistic worth of the BPS newspapers. It condemned their 'reactionary' stance. *Warta Bakti* reacted similarly, though not devoting as much space to the problem. *HR* responded differently. During November and December it carried a series of twenty seven articles entitled *Tentang Tulisan2 Juti* (Concerning the Writings of Juti). These were written by Njoto and sought to argue against the non-Marxist interpretation of Sukarno's thought which was given by Sajuti Melik.

The difference in approach between the communist and radical nationalist press points to differences in the way they thought the problem of the BPS should be resolved. For Njoto the problem was a political one. Manipulating the BPS was the *Murba* party and some army leaders, and this element was central for him. He saw the threat not so much as one where the PWI was jeopardized, but one where the enemies of the PKI were using newspapers with no formal political association, to weaken the PKI and the PKI influence on the PWI. *HR* overwhelmingly called for the banning of the BPS movement, but showed little concern with banning the BPS newspapers. The movement was eventually banned by Sukarno on December 15, 1964. While Njoto had debated with the BPS through the pages of *HR*, the party had been putting pressure on Sukarno to ban it. Once successful in this matter, the PKI pressed to have the *Murba* party banned also. Sukarno
did this in January 1965.

The radical nationalists among the PWI leaders, and especially its Jakarta branch leaders, viewed the primary threat of the BPS as being against the PWI as the representative organization of all Indonesian journalists. They thought that the BPS would evolve as a formal journalists association. Of course they had good reason for viewing the movement in this way, it was after all primarily composed of journalists, despite the influence of the Murba party and the army. By seeing the BPS as a threat to the PWI, and probably to their own positions as leaders of the association, they focused their condemnations on the journalistic aspects of the movement. As a result the most appropriate resolution of the controversy was for the BPS, as a journalistic movement, to be banned, along with newspapers which supported it. Obviously if the threat was seen as coming from the journalists and newspapers, their removal from the Indonesian media would, in the first instance at least, secure the position of the PWI and its officials.

The day after the BPS was banned by Sukarno the Jakarta branch of the PWI expelled twelve of its members, who were accused of supporting the movement. These expulsions were temporary, requiring national PWI approval for them to be made permanent. This approval was secured at a PWI working conference held soon after in Malang. But it was only secured after PKI delegates had opposed it. In the PWI political committee, the PKI delegates argued that the expulsions were too harsh and most importantly, would not benefit the progressive press. Again they reasoned that the BPS was a
movement manipulated by outside political groups rather than predominately a journalists movement. Outnumbered in the committee by non-PKI people, and unable to convince sufficient of these to take up the PKI line, the PKI journalists were overruled and the expulsions confirmed. With this resolved the PWI then carried a motion calling on the government to ban the BPS newspapers. This call was echoed by other organizations including Sobsi, the PKI affiliated labor union, and the BTI, the peasants' union.

That these PKI affiliated mass organizations supported the call for newspaper bannings raises a further question. Why was Njoto against the bans while PKI organizations supported them? The most logical answer seems to be that once the PWI had publicly decided to do so, the PKI had no alternative but to support that action. Obviously for a split between the PKI and the PWI to become general knowledge would have been more politically embarrassing than to support the bans. Indeed Njoto did in the end write an editorial supporting the call of the PWI for the bans, and once Sukarno announced them he wrote an enthusiastic editorial congratulating him for his revolutionary act. He was by now, however, reacting to what others had pushed upon him, rather than dictating what should happen. Another possible answer to the question is less precise because of a lack of concrete information. It focuses on a split between Aidit and Njoto, rather than between the PKI and the PWI. According to this scenario Njoto had a fairly liberal approach to the press. He believed that the cause of Indonesia's progressive forces
was best served by allowing fairly open debate in the press about major political issues. He was confident of the rationale and public appeal of the arguments of the PKI in any debate. At the end of a hearty polemic between HR and Merdeka in mid-1964, which was stopped through the intervention of the attorney-general, Njoto reminded the government of the need to allow debate. Njoto's supporters suggest that he earnestly believed that a policy of continual debate was a more efficient way of isolating reactionary newspapers and winning over the uncommitted, than was regulating them out of existence. Aidit, on the other hand, was dogmatic. When the opportunity arose to put down an enemy, he believed it should be taken, say Njoto supporters about Aidit. Deviation from central principles, if only for strategic purposes, was not to be permitted at that stage. Here the Sobsi and BTI calls are seen as reflecting Aidit's attitude.

If such a split occurred it is difficult to prove, and a number of other reasons for the PKI's opposition to the press bannings seem to fit in with the logic of the suggestion that the PKI was forced to adhere to the PWI position. Firstly, what was said above about Njoto's view of press debate can be reiterated, but allow that Aidit may have agreed with it. Secondly, with the BPS banned as a political movement, the press which had supported it would probably engage in further debate with the radical nationalist and leftist press on different subjects. According to Njoto the progressive press could not but win these debates, because of the obvious truth of its position. Thirdly, Aidit and Njoto must have realized
that the banning of the thirty or so BPS newspapers would not be readily accepted by their opponents and realized that replacement newspapers would soon take their place. And indeed this did happen, with the army opening newspapers and some of the banned newspapers reopening under different names.66 Possibly the banning of several prominent BPS newspapers would have been acceptable to the PKI, in much the same way as it had earlier applauded the closure of Pedoman, Harian Abadi and Indonesia Raya. But the total banning of the BPS press only served to encourage the entry of the army to the direct publication of newspapers which would be outside the directives of the PWI, the Department of Information and possibly also of Sukarno. We should also recall here how Njoto was opposed to the section of the 1960 draft Press Laws which envisaged government newspapers being established. The army newspapers presented a similar, but more threatening problem.

Lastly, it can be tentatively posited that the PWI was taking on itself a political prominence which was considered inappropriate by the PKI. For not only was the PWI in disagreement with the PKI about the newspaper bannings, but it was also opposed by the Department of Information under Minister Achmadi. During the period of the BPS debate and especially once demands for the banning of the BPS press became more strident, Achmadi vied with the PWI to influence Sukarno's thinking on the subject.67 The minister pointed to a small but influential number of newspapers in the BPS which were, in his and his department's opinion, vehemently opposed to Sukarno. He
suggested that these were merely using the BPS to cause dissension within the revolutionary ranks. He advised Sukarno that only these newspapers be banned. Now although Achmadi was a radical nationalist who supported Sukarno, he was not a PKI supporter. He believed that the best way to ensure that the PKI did not dominate the press, was by protecting the pro-Sukarno newspapers of the BPS. He consequently argued for a limited banning of newspapers. Njoto agreed with this. Tactically it was best to have the pro-Sukarno, if not pro-PKI press, survive for the time being, especially after the movement which had sustained their unity was banned. It was also tactically wise for the PKI to support Achmadi as minister. The PKI had a vested interest in bolstering his position. When he was appointed Minister of Information in September 1964, many observers were surprised at the choice - he was not a prominent person in government circles; he did not have a background interest in the press or in the supply of information. He was an army major who strongly supported the radicalism of Sukarno; he was not frenetically anti-communist; and he was acceptable to the PNI, an important consideration in making an appointment to the Department of Information, which had traditionally been under the control of a PNI member or supporter. Most importantly, Achmadi had been suggested to Sukarno as a suitable Minister of Information by Aidit and Njoto. In the period leading up to the appointment, Sukarno offered the position to the PKI. He implied that Djawato of Antara, or Supeno of HR and the MPRS would be acceptable. The PKI leaders rejected this seemingly golden opportunity to enter the cabinet. After some deliberation Aidit and
Njoto apparently decided that the PNI's loss of the Department could have undesirable consequences for the PKI. They agreed that the anti-PKI faction of the PNI could use the decision to further increase the allegiences to their position. And further, although the PKI was vocal in calling for a cabinet which included PKI members, it was really not anxious to have these demands met just yet. These calls were intended to alert the political public to their intent at some time in the future to enter the cabinet, and to show up the injustice of their not then being included in it. However, they were not in fact anxious to have portfolios in a cabinet which presided over an economy in disarray. Nor were they prepared at that time to risk repressive action by the army if they became influential in the cabinet. They were satisfied with holding several ministries without portfolio.

Overall, Achmadi was in some ways a PKI man. To have him humiliated because his advice was not accepted by Sukarno was not desirable. Such circumstances could lead to his removal by Sukarno with an unknown person replacing him. There was a fear that such a replacement could in the circumstances come from the PWI, and although this person would most likely have been close to the PKI, the PKI feared repercussions from the army and the PNI if this important department fell to what would universally be seen as a PKI supporter.

Regardless of these manoeuvreings and strategies, the BPS newspapers were banned by Sukarno. He announced the decision at a PWI
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Regardless of these manoeuvrings and strategies, the BPS newspapers were banned by Sukarno. He announced the decision at a PWI
mass meeting on February 23, 1965. It seems that no one knew that Sukarno would announce the ban - Achmadi did not know, nor did Karim D.P., Jusuf or Hasjim Rachman of the PWI; Naibaho and Njoto also did not know. Hasjim Rachman had pressed the PWI resolution for the bans onto Sukarno for several weeks prior to the meeting. Despite this it seems that the views of Achmadi had been accepted by Sukarno until the night of the meeting. Because Sukarno had refused to confirm a ban prior to the night, journalists at the time concluded that, encouraged by the huge crowd present which called for a total ban, he had been swept away by the atmosphere. How could he refuse the call of so many of his people? He must obey them, and so he did. The crowd, provided with anti-BPS placards by the PWI and lead in shouting anti-BPS slogans by PWI organizors, tilted the balance towards the bans.

The PKI and the Department of Information subsequently publicly applauded the President's decision.

Having precipitated the bans the PWI acquired an enhanced status. It even sought to be recognized as a formal political group by replacing the banned Murba party. While the leadership of the PWI was trying to entrench the gains they believed they had made during the BPS events, there is some evidence that dissent was spreading within the organization as a result of it having precipitated the bans. A report in Warta Bakti hints at this.

A. Karim D. P. in a message directed to all members
of the PWI, stated that there were rumors put out by a small body of people to the effect that: "the PWI was increasingly weak and was not the pride of all people as it had been previously. Here and there rumours are beginning to arise that people want to establish a new journalists organization, because the PWI is considered to not be able to give them satisfaction. The PWI reached this point because it was excessive in its treatment of the BPS." These words, according to A. Karim D. P. were perfectly understood by PWI members who supported MANIPOL, because people who previously were supporters of the PWI, but now are not because of the 'excessive stubbornness' in opposing the BPS, are, if not actually BPS people, at least pro-BPS.  

How extensive this split was is difficult to determine. It does seem that the army was aware of it. In a confidential report to Generals Nasution and Yani, Wiratmo Soekito, formerly a prominent supporter of the Manifesto Kebudajaan (Cultural Manifesto - a non-Marxist formulation of the nature and use of art), noted it. While the events of September 30, 1965 overtook the progress of the split, it is not idle conjecture to suggest that moves were in train by right wing groups and the army to fuel the dispute. It was of course this type of development that Njoto had feared when the PWI had insisted on the banning of the BPS newspapers. His policy had the wider interests of the party in mind, while the PWI leaders, seemingly, were more interested in their own organization.

By mid-1965 the PKI influence on the press, which was
apparent in 1962, had been greatly reduced as a result of the 'Jusuf Affair' and the BPS. These had been used by the anti-PKI groups to encourage anti-communist journalists and newspapers to join in opposition to the PKI. Some evidence also suggested that the decline in PKI influence resulted from disagreement among some radical nationalists and the PKI over the banning of BPS newspapers. While the PKI saw the bannings as tactically precipitate in broad political terms, some leaders of the PWI encouraged the bannings in order to maintain the immediate influence of their own organization. The major press debate during the period of constitutional democracy declined during Guided Democracy. However the PKI continued to demand freedom of the press. With Peperti and Guided Democracy regulations restricting the press, it became paramount that as great a degree of press freedom as possible be obtained to forestall possible harsh army or government moves against PKI and radical nationalist newspapers.
Soon after Aidit achieved the leadership of the PKI in 1951, he and his fellow politbureau members set about consolidating their position and expanding the party. One aspect of this activity was to establish a daily newspaper to help propagate the party's ideas. *Harian Rakjat* was purchased to fulfil this need. From the beginning the party leaders were concerned with the role of HR within the party's program. Aidit and Njoto regularly stressed that it was essential for party members to read the paper. Alongside this the paper faced continuing financial problems which were never satisfactorily resolved.

The Purchase

Rather than set up a totally new newspaper the leaders decided to purchase an established daily. It was expedient to obtain a paper with existing printing arrangements, distribution outlets and staff, rather than establish a completely new paper. Therefore in July
1951 the party purchased a majority shareholding in the company *P.T. Persatuan*, which published the existing newspaper called *Harian Rakjat*.\(^1\)

When the revolution against the Dutch finished, *P.T. Persatuan* had begun to publish a daily newspaper called *Min Pao*, which during 1950 came under the editorial direction of Siauw Giok Tjhan.\(^2\) He had been a minister of state in the cabinet of Amir Sjariffudin during 1947 until 1948 and his influence on *Min Pao* continued the paper's previous leftist and nationalist tone. Soon after Siauw became editor he changed the paper's name to *Harian Rakjat*, the name retained by the PKI.

**Staffing**

After the PKI purchased *P.T. Persatuan*, Siouw was no longer required as editor and so he resigned to continue his work in the DPR and several government departments. Njoto became chairman and chief editor of the paper and Naibaho, a party member and editor of *Zaman Baru* in Surabaya was brought to Jakarta as editor.\(^3\)

That a prominent person in the party was given charge of HR attests to the important role the daily had in communicating between the party leaders and party members. Njoto retained this position until about April or May 1965 when he was replaced by
Hutapea, who was a central committee member and director of the party's theoretical school, the Aliarcham Academy.4

Although Njoto's responsibilities as a member of the central committee were many, he was always active in the day to day running of HR. As chairman he was also chief editorial writer. He regularly wrote the daily podjok or corner column, the headline for the major daily news stories, and from time to time he prepared feature articles. Generally, the editorials, podjok, and headlines were only prepared by Naibaho or other staff members if Njoto was absent from Jakarta.

Naibaho was responsible for implementing the party's press policies on a day to day basis. He was an experienced journalist who had received his training in journalism and law at the University of Indonesia during the Dutch period.5 During the latter half of 1965 he was progressively being relieved of many of his responsibilities because, as a strong and longtime supporter of Njoto, he was suspected of being critical of Hutapea's chairmanship.6

Although HR obviously propagated the PKI line it was not entirely staffed by party members. As its circulation grew the additional staff required were predominantly drawn from outside the party. In 1951 the central staff of the paper numbered 4 editorial personnel and 5 administrative staff.7 By 1961 there were 17 journalists on the editorial staff and 43 administrative workers8 and this had risen to about 25 and 50 respectively by 1965.9 Only
about 25% of the journalists were party members in 1965, the remainder being leftist journalists willing to work within the PKI's guidelines for the press. Reports about PKI affiliated mass organizations were arranged by representatives of the various organizations who became members of the HR editorial staff.

By recruiting non-party people as journalists, the party faced an important dilemma. Although these journalists were efficient in their technical grasp of journalism and were sympathetic to the basic tenets of the party program, they were however negligent of party ideology. The contradiction between the paper's role as a propagator of party policy and ideology, and a staff composed of a majority of the ideologically uninitiated, prejudiced the utility of HR. Aidit pointed to this problem and suggested:

"Education in ideology for all editors, correspondents, and staff members of Harian Rakjat must be intensified and be conducted continually. The task of opposing ideological pressures from the enemies of the people and the task of raising the ideological standards of the Communists and the mass of the people cannot be fulfilled if Harian Rakjat does not have an editorial staff and a string of correspondents who are constantly being trained in ideology."

For staff journalists ideological training sessions were organized. Aidit mentioned seminars held in Jakarta, Medan, Surabaja and Jogyakarta to celebrate HR's seventh anniversary in 1958, as venues for improving HR in "order to increase its contribution to the people's struggle". Seminars such as these became annual events and enabled the role and ideological effectiveness of the paper to be
debated. Journalists became familiar with the problems and living conditions of the workers and peasants by visits to various areas. For instance, Naibaho made a working visit to a Javanese village in 1958 by which he was, according to him, able to gain first hand knowledge of the lives of the peasants.  

I discussed in chapter II the KORBU and KORTA movements which were radical innovations in the Indonesian journalism of the time. The movements sought contributions from workers and peasants which focused on their daily lives. These journalists augmented the formal HR staffing.

**Circulation**

The circulation of HR grew as the PKI grew. When the party purchased the paper in 1951 daily circulation was 2000 copies. By March 1956 it had jumped to 58,000 following successful membership drives in the previous three years. Then in 1956 the party introduced its "First Three Year Plan of Organization and Education, 1956-1959". This plan intended, amongst other things, to increase the volume of party publishing in general and to increase the circulation of HR in particular. A second plan from 1960-1963 once again sought to extend the use of HR. The increase in circulation after 1956 was, however, less than satisfying although the circulation
projections in the second plan were substantially fulfilled. Although HR claimed as late as 1964 that circulation had reached 110,000 during 1957\(^1\) this seems to have been an exaggeration. The official figure based on a government newsprint allocation in 1963 was still only 59,000.\(^2\) The circulation for 1964 was increased from the official figure of 59,000 to 70,000 by using newsprint purchased on the black market.\(^3\) The circulation also reached about 85,000 copies by use of blackmarket newsprint during 1965.\(^4\)

An article in 1963 suggested that all requests for subscriptions to HR could not be filled because of the shortage of newsprint at the low prices applicable to the government sponsored allocation.\(^5\) HR, together with most other newspapers, regularly complained about the supply of newsprint, which was restricted by the government in order to conserve the country's foreign exchange. Although the MPRS decided in 1960 to increase the total average daily newspaper circulation from the 1960 level of about 800,000 to five million by 1968, Njoto was unhappy with the expansion of print supplies that was evident by 1963.\(^6\) He called for the government to give serious attention to the problem, for without doing so the aims of the revolution would be hindered by the inability of the progressive forces to communicate with the masses.
Readership

From the circulation that HR did achieve it is clear that it was not a mass circulation paper. Indeed with a total 1961 circulation for all the country's 61 daily newspapers of 692,500, no single newspaper could legitimately claim to have a mass readership in an Indonesia with a population of about 97 million. Indonesian society was precluded from having a mass newspaper readership for several reasons. Firstly, it remained a largely illiterate society despite the emphasis placed on eliminating illiteracy by post-independence governments. Secondly, most Indonesians, including many of the newly literate, were too poor to purchase newspapers. This was exacerbated during Guided Democracy by the deteriorating economy. Thirdly, the governments' need to conserve foreign exchange resulted in insufficient supplies of newsprint being imported.

Nevertheless the management of HR often depicted its readership as being composed of the proletarians and peasants. It suggested that these groups, which it described as having the greatest revolutionary potential, were somehow automatically regular readers of the party daily. However much this type of analysis was made, it was of course far from reality. For the reasons given above the Indonesian press was not a mass press. Rather than drawing its audience from a broad spectrum of the society, HR's readership consisted of party members, candidate members and members of the literate urban society.
The repeated insistence that the workers and peasants were the paper's audience was intended to alert the middle class readers to the importance of these groups to the party's political theories for social change.

By far the largest readership was drawn from the party members and candidate members. HR carried party thinking and directives to members and introduced candidate members to party orthodoxy.

Apart from these groups HR was read by a small number of non-party people in the cities, and especially by civil servants. During the 1960s as Sukarno became more obviously politically radical, the pressure for some civil servants to be seen to be in conformity with his revolution grew. This was especially so in government departments which were controlled by radically oriented ministers. This gave an impetus to the circulations of leftist papers. Similarly the obvious increase in the power and prestige of the PKI, especially in its relations with Sukarno, suggested to some the utility of at least being cognizant of broad PKI thinking, if only for purely pragmatic purposes connected with a civil servants career prospects under a department or government possibly controlled by the PKI in the future.

HR also achieved a small readership amongst the members of the armed forces, at least in the period prior to the 1955 elections.
At these elections the PKI estimated that about 30% of military personnel voted for it. If this was correct it is not unlikely that HR was read at least occasionally by some of that number. This was confirmed when, after the PKI's success in those elections, the army leaders prohibited all army members from reading HR. This may also have reflected a fear by the army of an increased readership among the ranks as the success of the PKI gave the party increased legitimacy in the eyes of many. Despite this ban the HR management still believed it had a regular army readership after 1955.

A smaller, but potentially more powerful military audience was cultivated by Aidit and his Biro Chusus (Special Bureau) during 1965. The Biro Chusus was established in November 1964 to develop a sympathy for the PKI among officers in the armed forces. Its efforts were many, and included providing HR for those officers being cultivated as part of the indoctrination work.

At about the same time that the Biro Chusus was set up, Aidit delivered a speech which developed an emphasis on the revolutionary potential of the pradjurit (soldier). In response to the speech HR introduced a special regular column entitled Ruangan Pradjurit (Soldiers' Column), which contained articles especially directed to depicting a suggested close connection, past and present, between the soldiers and other revolutionary groups.

Whereas the readers of HR were drawn from the above groups,
many other people were averse to reading it. Obviously many were strongly opposed to the PKI, but others who were variously attracted to the party's ideas were loath, for security reasons, to read the daily. Although the PKI was becoming progressively more powerful many people thought that open sympathy for the party, by way of reading HR, could possibly compromise them in the eyes of others. To avoid the dilemma many turned to other radical leftist newspapers such as *Bintang Timur* or *Warta Bakti.* To be seen reading newspapers such as these did not usually provoke the same antipathy as was possible from being seen to read HR. This probably resulted from these newspapers promoting radical nationalism in the name of Sukarno, a position manifestly acceptable to many Indonesians at the time. Mindful of such fears many people, undoubtedly including some civil servants, purchased and read HR surreptitiously.

Though HR did obtain a readership among non PKI people this was always small and the main source of readers remained the party members and candidate members.

**Collective Subscriptions And Collective Readership**

Against the modest increase in HR's circulation after 1959 was the burgeoning of the party membership which the PKI claimed had reached three million by 1963. Keen that ideological, political and
organizational education should expand amongst the new members, aware that the party daily was appropriate for fulfilling this function, and also realizing the limitations for increasing dramatically the paper's circulation, the party began to stress the collective use of HR. This became particularly important after July 1960, when as a result of HR having carried a critique of the first year of Guided Democracy, party activity was severely curtailed by the military authorities.

When collective readership was stressed it had two main emphases. Firstly, it sought to encourage groups of readers to band together and take out a collective subscription to HR. Secondly, the party advocated that the number of people who read a single copy of the paper should be increased and also that discussion groups should be formed so that the contents of the daily could be examined.

As the economic decline of the Guided Democracy period affected the population, the ability of the subscribers to HR to continue to pay for their individual subscriptions likewise declined. Because HR's aim was not profit making, but propagation of the party line, it was not willing to discontinue subscriptions to such people. While it continued to provide the newspaper, the party encouraged groups of people to take out a group subscription. The increasing circulation of HR during the period was partly due to the success of the collective subscription campaign.
As a corollary to the subscription campaign was an expected increase in the total readership as those who had not previously purchased HR now became joint subscribers. Njoto wrote in 1956 that each copy of HR was read by, on average, five people, and he encouraged party members to increase the number to between 10 and 15 or more. Several years later, in 1963, Naibaho spoke of a village he had visited where all members of the village jointly subscribed to one copy of HR, and where practically all members of the village read the paper. By joint subscriptions the party hoped to increase the readership markedly, even if the harangueing of Njoto was somewhat over-optimistic and the account of Naibaho somewhat improbable. However, it seems that the increase was not as large as had been hoped. Indeed in 1963 Naibaho estimated that the paper had a total readership of about 242,000. Working on that figure, and with a circulation of between 70,000 and 80,000 in that year, HR consequently only had a per copy readership of about three persons. Undoubtedly this was rather disheartening for the HR management because a readership of three persons per copy was what was believed to have been achieved by other prominent Jakarta dailies of the time. They did not have the organizational back-up available to the PKI to help promote their papers, but nevertheless achieved a similar per copy readership.

In order to extend the HR audience, collective discussion groups were encouraged. Theoretically these would draw together those who regularly read HR and other party material, and those who because of illiteracy, time constraints or a basic lack of political
sophistication were unable to read or fully assimilate the contents of the daily. Such groups had been encouraged by the party even before the advent of Guided Democracy. Optimally groups of about seven party members, candidate members and sympathizers were expected to regularly meet and discuss the party literature that at least one of them had read. The group leader was essentially required to agitate around one or two aspects of the reading and encourage discussion of these subjects.

The success achieved in this area is difficult to determine, although it does seem that the results were not as encouraging as the party had hoped for. One interviewee complained that group members often did not attend these discussion sessions. Another complained that copies of HR provided freely to many party branches and sub-branches were merely read by the party officials and then filed away out of reach of ordinary members or interested persons. Nevertheless one interviewee, who was an employee of a motor assembly plant in Jakarta during 1964 and 1965 did relate that regular discussion groups did take place at that factory and these were often based on HR. Despite being an active member of the union at the plant, he rarely attended such meetings, although he was a member of a group which held a collective subscription to HR.

Party members suggested to this author that collective
discussion was reasonably widespread. However, from the evidence available, it seems unlikely that it ever became a successful party activity.

Finance

On at least one occasion during Guided Democracy PKI officials suggested that HR might be closed because of its increasingly unfavourable financial position. Although it is unthinkable that the suggestion would have been implemented, because of the paper's crucial role as a propagator of the party line, it does however highlight just how tenuous was the daily's economic viability.

Kahin has suggested that the PKI was Indonesia's wealthiest political party. He attributed this to financial assistance received from other communist parties and from sympathetic Chinese within Indonesia. Hindley also mentions these sources as possible financiers, while also stressing the wealth generated by membership fees from party and mass organization members. Predictably party officials with whom this author spoke denied Kahin's suggestion. The party held that its finances were generated from membership dues, small donations, sale of party literature and similar activities.
Regardless of the possible wealth of the party it expected the expenditure involved in the publication of HR to be recouped from sales revenue.

In the early years of its existence HR's finances were far from satisfactory. The initial purchase of P.T. Persatuan (which shortly afterwards had its name changed to P.T. Rakjat by the PKI) and HR's very small circulation meant that the paper operated at a deficit with the party financing its continuation. The increasing circulation from the mid-fifties on improved the finances of P.T. Rakjat, although it was accompanied by several related problems.

From the beginning, HR was distributed through commercial agencies and by direct subscription. Rather than try to establish its own distribution network, existing commercial facilities were considered adequate for the distribution of non-subscription copies. Certainly the distribution arrangements were satisfactory, but the high percentage of sales receipts taken by agents and the often irregular remittance of sales money by the local agents back to the HR central office were continuing problems. These agents were not party members and were usually remote from the supervision of the party. Apparently the amounts being withheld were quite substantial and continued to jeopardize the financial position of P.T. Rakjat.

Not only these commercial agents but also individuals and
groups who took out direct subscriptions to HR were negligent in the payment of their subscriptions.\textsuperscript{49} Despite criticism of this indiscipline it seems the problem persisted.

Notwithstanding the continuing financial default by some agents and subscribers \textit{P.T. Rakjat} continued to despatch copies of HR, apparently deciding that the propagation of party ideology was more important than risking a loss in its audience through insisting upon payments.

A more insidious burden on the financial position of HR was the suspensions of the newspaper by the martial law authorities which occurred after 1957. HR was temporarily banned on five occasions between early 1957 and January 1961. Usually these suspensions were for short periods of several weeks but a suspension of several months in 1960 severely affected the financial well-being of \textit{P.T. Rakjat}.

The daily lost several hundred thousand Rupiah as a consequence of the suspensions.\textsuperscript{50} Receipts from sales stopped, wages and rents and other expenses continued to be paid, while representations were made to the military authorities to have the paper reinstated. Concerned by the magnitude of the financial problem, Aidit launched the "\textit{Harian Rakjat Assistance Fund}" in October 1959, pointing to the serious problems being experienced even before the prolonged suspension of the following year.\textsuperscript{51} By June 1960, Rupiah 132,707.46 had been donated by readers. A more
substantial contribution to the liquidity of P.T. Rakjat resulted from the floating of a bond issue which attracted Rupiah 900,000 in 1960. While the former donations probably genuinely represented individual contributions as claimed by the party, the amount attracted by the bond issue suggests an investment by individuals, groups or organizations of substantial economic ability. Unfortunately details of subscribers to the bonds are not available.

The fund raising efforts of 1959 and 1960 kept P.T. Rakjat solvent. After 1960 the incidence of suspensions, particularly long suspensions, declined, as newspapers adjusted to the military press regulations and the Guided Democracy press laws.

Advertising was never a big revenue earner for HR. While the independent newspapers attracted a small but consistent level of advertising especially before Guided Democracy was introduced, HR fared badly. The only consistent source of advertising was from several trading companies of the People's Republic of China, which advertised a range of manufactured goods. Party officials have suggested that a conspiracy existed amongst most advertisers to direct advertising away from HR because it was the PKI daily. It is not unlikely that this was true to an extent. Advertisers who identified with the rather liberal economic structure of the 1950s arguably would not have been very enamoured of PKI economic theory and policy. Most major newspaper advertising prior to Guided Democracy was provided by large foreign companies operating in Indonesia. Such advertisers
would not readily have given support to an ideological opponent. But rather than see this conspiracy as the sole reason for a lack of advertising, the actual audience of HR must be also considered. Although it is possible that a small number of readers of HR were reasonably affluent, the average reader was, according to the party, economically weak. Consequently his ability to purchase the consumer goods which were usually the focus of advertising, was small, and thus advertisers were not encouraged to spend money when it was obvious to them that the advertising would not result in increased sales.

Although the financial position of P.T. Rakjat was of continuing concern for the PKI, it was, as has already been suggested, of less importance than the propaganda value of HR. One party decision reaffirms this. During 1964, as inflation increased, the government gave all newspapers permission to set the subscription price of a newspaper at Rupiah 600 per month.\textsuperscript{54} HR writers stressed that in economic terms the price rise was perfectly justifiable. However, the HR management decided to raise its subscription price from Rupiah Rupiah 207 to Rupiah 500 because most readers were unable to meet the higher official price.

Torn between economic soundness and a sustained audience for HR, the PKI chose to develop its audience. Of course this was not surprising. P.T. Rakjat was essentially a political outlet of the PKI, not a profit-making enterprise. However the party did strive to place the company on as firm an economic foundation as possible. Despite this most of the evidence suggests that P.T. Rakjat was not
financially self sufficient. The losses incurred from agents and subscribers failing to pay continued, even though suspensions decreased.

Other PKI Publications

Apart from HR, the PKI and its affiliated mass organisations published other newspapers and periodicals, as well as being prodigious publishers of pamphlets and books.

Prior to June 1960 a number of specialized periodicals were available. *Bintang Merah* was the party's theoretical journal; *Kehidupan Partai* was devoted to activity of the party in the parliament; *Review of Indonesia* gave a coverage of PKI policy in English. Regional committees published their own periodicals and newspapers; *P.T. Rakjat* also published *HR Sport dan Film*. The party's mass organizations also published periodicals.

This range of publications was dramatically ended in June 1960 following the publication in HR of the PKI review of the first year of Guided Democracy. The review had been unusually critical of the government's performance.

When martial law was revoked those publications previously
suspended were only slowly recommenced. Indeed some did not start up at all. However, in 1965 two new daily PKI publications became available. These were Gelora Indonesia, a newspaper which tried to provide more general entertainment items than those available in HR, and Kebudajaan Baru, a paper devoted solely to cultural material and which was an expanded version of the weekly cultural edition of HR, HR Minggu.

As a political party newspaper, the financial instability of HR was not of primary concern. But more seriously its low circulation, and especially the failure of its collective subscription and collective readership campaigns to achieve their targets seriously limited the ability of the daily to propagate party ideology widely. It always remained primarily a paper for the educated members of the party.
First and foremost HR conveyed the thoughts of the PKI to party members. It was primarily a party organ and as such concentrated much of its available space on party policy. Lengthy speeches of the party leaders carried these policies to the cadres through the pages of HR. Similarly as party policy was directed towards increased participation in national politics after 1959, that participation was heavily covered. This was a major part of HR content.

While always a party organ, HR was not always dull, lifeless and predictable, as political party press organs are often characterized as being. Rather it was often lively, entertaining and concerned with literary portrayals of the lives of the masses. These attributes are seen in the chapters which deal with press polemics (Chapter V) and short stories (Chapter VI). The remaining two chapters conversely highlight the rigidity of party control as criticism from party cadres is dismissed and leadership imperatives are ensured.

These chapters do not attempt a full analysis of the content of HR. To do so would merely reproduce what has been dealt with in
political and ideological studies of the period. Rather they focus on areas of content which have hitherto received little treatment.
CHAPTER V

PRESS POLEMICS: PLATFORMS FOR POLITICAL
AND IDEOLOGICAL DEBATE

Polemics were a feature of the Guided Democracy press, just
as they were of the press during the 1950s. Debates over a multitude
of matters, some trivial, some centering on the ideological
foundations of the nation, were carried on. Sometimes protracted,
sometimes ephemeral, but always lively, the polemics of the Indonesian
press fulfilled the function of representing the current thinking of
the various political and social groups to the middle class reader.
So intense were many of the debates and so wide-ranging were the
topics pursued, that it is arguable that the press, to a not
inconsiderable extent, usurped the parliamentary institutions as the
forum where discussion of state policy normally was pursued. Early in
the Guided Democracy period the parliament had largely become a rubber
stamp for the executive and cabinet; here consensus to assure the
continuation of the revolution was ensured. A lively press, in not a
small way, filled the vacuum left by the truncated formal political
processes.

A time of flowering for press polemics was after martial law
had been rescinded in May 1963. No longer inhibited by the threat of
intervention by the military press authorities, newspapers debated
feverishly. As martial law came to an end debates raged about the
Manifesto Kebudayaan which centered on the interpretation of the nature and role of art, music and literature. A protracted debate centered on the acceptability of American and other Western film, music and dance in Indonesia; the Badan Pendukung Sukarnoism, a grouping of ostensibly pro-Sukarno and aggressively anti-communist journalists referred to in chapter III, triggered a lively polemic which centered on the interpretation of Sukarno's writings, and a short but bitter debate about several contentious political issues was the basis of a polemic between Harian Rakjat and Merdeka in mid-1964.

The last polemic will be examined here. It dealt with several major aspects of Guided Democracy's political philosophy. Initially the debate centered on the proposal to form a one-party state. This led to the matter of leadership of the revolution, and then to aksi-sepihak, or unilateral actions, whereby peasants and peasant organizations affiliated to the PKI sought to have implemented, laws already proclaimed concerning land reform and the percentage of a crop which could lawfully be retained by peasant workers. It is also interesting in that Merdeka focused on a split which it suggested existed between Njoto and Aidit about the strategy of the aksi-sepihak. All these issues highlight the extent of debate among newspapers at the time.

The polemic began in early June 1964 and continued for almost a month until it ceased on 9 July 1964 when the Attorney-General stopped the barrage of editorials and feature articles in which the polemic was carried on. He stated that polemics were useful as long
as they did not split the revolutionary zeal of the nation, or cause the unity of thought of the people about the revolution to be broken, or disturb the political peace. He then went on to say that the polemic had violated these three conditions.

Shortly after the polemic started, Merdeka implied that HR was consciously misinterpreting the teachings of Sukarno about the revolution. This was essentially what the more prominent political and ideological disagreements of the polemic revolved around. Both antagonists held that they were faithful to the president and produced snippets of his past writings or speeches to support their position. In many ways, this polemic was a precursor to the longer lasting Badan Pendukung Sukarnoisme polemic which was directly concerned with interpreting Sukarno's ideas.

The polemic opened when Merdeka suggested that the current multi-party political system be replaced by one state party. This was to bring about a return of the nationalist fervour which had been the great inspiration for the independence struggle. Also, it would bring Pancasila, a Sukarnoist ideology, to its rightful prominence. The Merdeka article argued that the strength of the nationalist movement had been sapped since 1949, and particularly since the advent of Guided Democracy, because Pancasila and Manipol-Usdek had not been fully embraced. Consequently, because the nationalist groups had lost their ideological cohesiveness, the communists had been able to exacerbate differences within the movement to their own advantage.
Diah's strategy was to depict Indonesian society as composed of two groups which he saw as incompatible - the nationalists and the communists. Essentially he saw that all Indonesians, save for the communists, and others who had been associated with the rebellions of the 1950s, were joined together by nationalism. He included in this unity the various religious and socialist groups. His emphasis on Pancasila sought to position that ideology as the only legitimate precept upon which Sukarno's continuing revolution could be based. He thereby dismissed Marxism and Leninism as legitimate revolutionary ideologies in Indonesia. The one party state, Diah reasoned, was a logical extension of nationalism and Pancasila.

Merdeka did not rest its case there. It reflected upon the development of the National Front. Whereas initially Merdeka had high hopes for the National Front becoming the centre of "the struggle of the Indonesian people", by 1964 it was claiming that various groups and parties had used it for their own ends, an obvious criticism of the PKI which had become increasingly influential in the Front. For Diah the history of the National Front must have been very disappointing. Formed in 1959 it was initially viewed by the political parties as being intended to bring about their end. Indeed Aidit had in 1960 looked on the Front as an institution by which army officers and Murba party people hoped to establish a state party. Diah supported the idea of the National Front giving rise to a state party, but witnessed this prospect recede as Guided Democracy progressed.
Diah's one state party was therefore proposed to replace the National Front. Because all legal political groups, even the PKI, viewed Pancasila as the ideology of the nation and the embodiment of the living philosophy of the people, and supported Manipol-Usdek as the political, economic and social program which sprang from Pancasila, the unity promised by one party needed to be accepted, argued Merdeka.

For the PKI, talk of the creation of one single national party was dangerous. It would not willingly lose its identity through amalgamation with the country's political groups. And though its tactics did require it to pledge loyalty to Pancasila for the time being, the PKI was not willing to discard its Marxist ideology. Indeed, the PKI gave greater emphasis to Manipol-Usdek than to Pancasila, because it provided for radical programs and policies from which the PKI could pursue its plans for a socialist state. Pancasila on the other hand, was merely a conservative political philosophy without practical prescriptions for action.

Thus the groundwork for a lively debate had been prepared.

So radical was Merdeka's proposal for one party that Njoto was able to rebuke it with the tenor of one supporting the political status-quo. How could one state party be set up when Nasakom was a basic political concept of Guided Democracy?, asked Njoto. 9 Nasakom, which included nationalism, religion and communism, guaranteed the right of the legal political parties to function
separately, while simultaneously implying the loyalty of the component
groups to Sukarno and his revolution. Njoto pointed out that Diah's
proposal would mean the end of all political parties, not merely of
the PKI. Hinting at a violation of Manipol he accused Diah of
inciting the PNI and NU, the largest nationalist and religious party
respectively, against the PKI.

Njoto continued to focus on Manipol. He reminded his
readers that Indonesia was in the national-democratic stage - a stage
where anti-revolutionary groups still existed - of the two-stage
revolution. The subsequent socialist stage, where counter-
revolutionaries would have been eliminated, was yet to be reached.
He argued that as Sukarno had instigated a campaign to have false
revolutionists retooled or replaced from their government, party and
other positions, it was axiomatic that contradictory groups still
existed. Therefore for anyone to call for a single party was
conceptually inconsistent. One party consisting of all groups in the
society would obviously include reactionaries and other false
Manipolists. This was a dangerous deviation from Sukarno's efforts to
isolate false revolutionaries from true revolutionaries, that is to
isolate the landlords from the peasants, and the capitalist
bureaucrats from the workers.

The leaders of other political parties did not need Njoto to
tell them of the possible abolition of their parties which was implied
in the one party idea. This was obvious, and ensured Diah's proposal
was ill received.
Having failed on this issue, Merdeka then turned the debate to the question of leadership of the revolution. It held that the leadership should be focused on Sukarno, but in reality was falling to the hands of the PKI. The PKI, Merdeka claimed, was attempting to take over the revolution, thereby disregarding Manipol, which directed that everything must be done on Sukarno's order.

Specifically, Diah referred to remarks by Aidit in Peking in September 1963. According to the article Aidit had said that the leadership of the revolution should be in the hands of the working class, and the PKI leader continued "we don't want the leadership of the working class to be written into the Manipol". The PKI saw itself as the leader of the working class. For Diah this was tantamount to treason. Firstly, Sukarno's position as sole leader was disputed, and secondly Manipol was being abused when a source of leadership outside of Manipol was proclaimed.

Using the essential vagueness of Guided Democracy's ideological formulations, Njoto used Manipol to support Aidit's statements. He recalled that Sukarno had encouraged competition within Manipol. Within these terms, the PKI sought to gain the leadership of the workers and peasants.

Diah enthusiastically disputed the idea of this type of leadership. Sukarno was the only leader and all other claims were treasonous. Diah suggested that the logical progression of PKI leadership of the workers and the peasants was a dictatorship of the
proletariat leading to a communist state. He goaded Njoto by pointing out that Marxist-Leninist theory taught that only the leadership of a proletarian party could direct the dictatorship of the proletariat. Clearly then, the PKI was implicated in a plan to oppose Manipol and the leadership of the revolution by Sukarno.

Not to be outdone in nebulous interpretations of state ideology, Njoto retorted that the PKI supported Sukarno as leader. In fact, he continued, Aidit's remarks in Peking were not about individual leadership but about class leadership. With a dexterity not hitherto seen in the polemic, Njoto reasoned that class leadership could not be formulated in Manipol because it was based on a joint program which amalgamated various classes. However, basic PKI philosophy saw society in class terms. Now rather than this admission being treasonous under a non class-based Manipol, Njoto called on Sukarno's essay Marhaen dan Proletarian for support. He claimed that in this Sukarno had said that in the Marhaen struggle for a just society, the proletariat had a major role to play. Consequently, by seeking to lead the proletariat, the PKI was adhering to Sukarno's teachings. Njoto did not suggest that this essay, written in 1933, may have been somewhat anachronistic in the Indonesia of 1964. Though, with the myriad interpretations of the period's ideology that were possible, it was not easy to resolve the contradictory ideas about leadership brought forward in the polemic.
Intertwined in the dispute over one state party and leadership was the debate about the *aksi-sepihak* or unilateral actions which have been mentioned in chapter III.

Reflecting its concern to develop national unity, *Merdeka* argued that rebellious actions such as *aksi-sepihak* should be stopped. Somewhat in contradiction to this it suggested that the national democratic first stage of the revolution was nearing completion and consequently land-reform based on the collectivization of agriculture should be planned. However, it warned that such a policy was a major undertaking and would be slow and difficult to implement. Undoubtedly the result, if this suggestion were to be accepted, would have been a return to the previous slow and cumbersome implementation of the laws. But to escape being labelled reactionary *Merdeka* proposed the collectivization plan. With the first stage of the revolution almost over and the second or socialist stage about to begin, the collectivization program was the most beneficial and appropriate policy for the peasantry, it reasoned. Essentially *Merdeka* was calling for a halt to the *aksi-sepihak*, while proposing a program of land reform which would be slowly implemented.

*Merdeka* had premised its call for collectivization on an interpretation of projections for agricultural development in *Manipol/Usdek*. *Njoto*, however, interpreted the idea differently.
For him collectivization similar to that suggested in the Merdeka proposal would certainly be implemented in the socialist stage of the revolution but the PKI did not acknowledge that the first stage of the revolution was near an end. Not to be outdone by the use by Merdeka of the radical slogan of collectivization, Njoto gave it an entirely different meaning in the national-democratic stage of the revolution. He said that it meant ‘collective actions’, and in the context of the current debate, it implied collective actions by peasants to implement just laws.22

The aksi-sepihak were undoubtedly collective and spontaneous actions undertaken by peasants, according to the PKI. Merdeka, however, refuted the PKI claim of peasant spontaneity claiming that the poor socio-economic situation of peasants was merely being used by the PKI for its own political purposes.23 Rather than being revolutionary according to the Merdeka view of Manipol, the aksi-sepihak were attempts by the PKI to instigate class struggle, which was contrary to the inherent unity of the revolution. To insinuate PKI hypocrisy about the conduct of the campaign, Merdeka at one point accused the PKI and BTI of shielding sympathetic landlords from the implementation of the laws.24 Njoto responded by asserting that the laws should by applied to all equally.25

Whatever the case about PKI instigation of the aksi-sepihak and its assistance to sympathetic landlords, HR blamed landlords and pro-landlord officials for the necessity to wage these actions.
Dismissing a call by Diah that peasants should seek further consultation with landlords, Njoto questioned how these consultations could take place when the landlords were demonstrably unwilling to participate. Consultations could only take place if the landlords acknowledged the land reform laws and division of crop laws to be legitimate. Here was the essential problem according to HR - legitimate laws were being flouted by landlords and pro-landlord officials.

The argument continued that it was incumbent upon all true revolutionaries who believed in Manipol to ensure the passage of the laws. The recalcitrance of the landlords highlighted their feudal nature, and because feudalism was undeniably against the basic philosophy of the Indonesian revolution, it should be eliminated. Turning full circle from the viewpoint of Merdeka, HR saw the actions as legitimate, and a reflection of, and in accordance with Nasakom unity or collectivity. Preempting possible criticism that the aksi-sepihak was contrary to the unity implicit in Nasakom, Njoto reported that the individual programs or campaigns of any Nasakom faction were allowable and encouraged as long as these were demonstrably revolutionary. It was not necessary for other factions to agree with the programs or campaigns, and Nasakom unity was not endangered when this occurred.

Not unexpectedly Diah found much to disagree with in Njoto's conception of aksi-sepihak. His desire for unity was again
the starting point. He questioned how any individual or group could support aksi-sepihak when it was obviously causing rifts in the national unity. Furthermore aksi-sepihak jeopardized the success of the campaign to crush Malaysia. Divisiveness within the ranks of the Indonesian revolutionaries, Merdeka reasoned, would severely detract from the ability of Indonesia to crush the British imperialists. Njoto retorted that the campaign was not in jeopardy as the landlords and pro-landlord officials against whom the aksi-sepihak was directed, were not part of the revolutionary forces, but were actually reactionary. Consequently the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal actions meshed together as revolutionary necessities.

Interestingly, Diah's newspaper attempted to suggest that a split between Aidit and Njoto had occurred over the validity of the aksi-sepihak being pursued by the PKI at that time. Diah pointed to remarks by Njoto at Klaten in April 1964. He suggested that Njoto saw aksi-sepihak as an inappropriate program for the PKI to support at that stage of the revolution. According to Diah, Njoto was intimating that Aidit was being adventurist in supporting the actions, and that he had condemned Aidit's insistence on continuing the campaign. Njoto quickly countered that for all members of the PKI land-reform and crop-sharing, not excluding their implementation through aksi-sepihak, were legitimate at that stage of the revolution because they were obviously anti-feudal.
Later Merdeka insisted again that disagreement within the party did exist, and it ventured that differenties of opinion between leaders of whatever group were indeed usual. But, it continued, HR was afraid that the PKI should be seen not to be a monolithic structure based on a unified body of opinion. The possibility of these differences becoming public knowledge was, Diah reasoned, feared by the PKI to such an extent that Aidit reminded the PKI members to oppose modern revisionism – modern revisionism being an empty concept used to stifle, in a Stalinist manner, any disagreement in the party.

Whatever the truth or otherwise of the accusations from Merdeka, Njoto certainly fully supported the aksi-sepihak as the polemic progressed. It ended on July 9 1964, as a result of a decision of the Attorney-General. Although couched in such a way as to make it sound not an act of repression, the order nevertheless was mandatory. To have disobeyed it almost certainly would have resulted in the suspension of the offending newspaper. Merdeka and HR heeded the order. Soon a more protracted polemic, encompassing a wider range of newspapers, sprang up: this was the debate about the BPS. Obviously newspapers were not fearful of retaliatory action from the government if a polemic was commenced, but they were judicious enough to finish particular debates, if told to do so.

The Merdeka – HR debate is instructive for several reasons. Firstly, where Guided Democracy has been widely depicted as nurturing
a press which overwhelmingly adhered to its unitary philosophy, prominent newspapers of the period engaged in a detailed debate over a range of ideologically important matters. These polemics, while based on contradictory viewpoints were permitted by the government, which only stepped in to stop them after lengthy debate had occurred. Polemics were less common while martial law was in force, but they blossomed in the less restricted climate after it was revoked in 1963. Secondly, although some of the contentious issues were related to areas which were acceptable under the press provisions, others disagreed over important aspects of the ideological and philosophical basis of the nation. The debate over a state party and over various aspects of the leadership of the revolution go to the foundations of Guided Democracy. Yet they were freely debated. Certainly those tenets were sometimes vague enough to allow myriad interpretations, but the salient point is that such interpretations were permitted at all.

The polemic did also reflect the wider political schisms in the society and undoubtedly it would not have been possible if those differences were not widely held. It is likely if Guided Democracy was all pervasive in its ideological and punitive abilities that the press would have been as controlled as many have thought it was. The reality is that for several years of Guided Democracy the press regaled its readers with comment not generally found in a politically repressed newspaper world.
While falsely portraying its readership as being the workers and peasants, so too did HR idealize these groups to its real middle class readers. Short stories and regular columns devoted to broad occupational and other categories revealed what the ideal member of the toiling class was like. The enemies of the people were also presented, in this case stereotyped in totally negative ways. A basic antagonism between the masses, the righteous force, and the enemies of the people, the ignoble force, conditioned the stereotypings.

Those parts of HR which presented these portrayals were generally short stories in the Kebudajaan (cultural) columns, and the columns specifically for women (Ruangan Wanita, and later Ruangan Gerakan Wanita), peasants (Ruangan Gerakan Petani), and proletarian workers (Ruangan Gerakan Buruh). Usually these columns appeared once weekly.

The Kebudajaan column consistently focused on fictitious descriptions of daily life which illustrated the inherent conflict between classes. The columns for women, peasants and workers combined short fictional passages with reports of events, meetings and political actions in affiliated organizations. For example,
the *Ruangan Gerakan Petani* gave much space to reports of meetings, resolutions, demonstrations and other procedural matters organized by the peasant organization, *Barisan Tani Indonesia*. The fictitious descriptions of daily life reveal the idealized concept of the peasant or worker more readily than the other organizational reports.

These columns were not the work of ordinary HR journalists, but of specialized writers. The mass organization columns were written either by the full-time representatives of the organizations, who were attached to HR, or by other officials of the organization. Members of the PKI affiliated cultural organization, *Lekra*, provided material for the *Kebudajaan* column. This was occasionally augmented by contributions from the worker and peasant contributors (*Korbu* and *Korta*). These contributions were few, and because they were usually badly composed, often needed to be rewritten by *Lekra* members.

What was written about daily life was modelled on the principles of social realism. Much discussion in the party tried to isolate what 'social realism' was and how it could best be represented in art. Broadly it encompassed the requirement of simplicity and clarity; the requirement of ideological adhesion to Marxism-Leninism and to party philosophy; the requirement to represent that which is typical of the progression to socialism, that is, the representation not of the numerous experiences of everyday life, but
the representation of those experiences which typically are progressive in the Marxist-Leninist terms of class struggle and of those experiences which highlight the contradictions within pre-socialist society. With simplicity and clarity, and with ideological integrity, that which was said to be typical of the peasants' and workers' predicament became the focus of the HR columns.

The main device used to portray the typical was characterization. Individuals were given a range of attributes or personalities by which they, as peasants, workers or fishermen who were exploited in the semi-feudal, semi-colonial class society of Indonesia, could change their economic plight. They would take control of their own lives and banish exploitative landlords, imperialists, capitalist bureaucrats and other reactionaries forever.

It is not surprising that the PKI tried to create a new characterization for the Indonesian masses. Basic to any social system is the socialization of individuals in that society. Marxists argue that in all pre-socialist societies this socialization falsely represents the reality of an individual's existence. This is so because those who control the economic power, the means of production, only continue to do so by perpetuating within individuals a false consciousness or dominant ideology by which their real or objective position in class society is hidden. Thus, the characterization of workers and employers working to their mutual
benefit, represents a false analysis of the situation. Only once a socialist state has been achieved would the characterization of individuals actually agree with the reality of existence. Having to contend with a society dominated by what they saw as an exploitative ideology or ideologies, the PKI set out to provide an alternative ideology, and in terms of literature, an alternative social characterization of the individual.

According to the PKI view society was dominated by exploitation: the Indonesian toiling class was constantly exploited - exploited by landlords, corrupt capitalist bureaucrats, imperialists and corrupt government officials. This theme was very common. It was found for example in the short stories *Panen* (Harvest) in 1959, *Senjari Bumi* (Twilight of the Earth) in 1962 and *Togap Purba* (a person's name) in 1965.\(^2\) In *Panen* a government appointed village lurah (village chief) displays his exploitative nature as he attempts to give less than the customary percentage of the harvest (*bawon*) to one of his seasonal laborers, a young woman named Umi. Unilaterally he cuts Umi's *bawon* because he thinks his son intends to marry her, although we are told that Umi does not want to marry him. In a discussion Umi and her other peasant friends agree that changes in the *bawon*, such as that ordered by the landowner, are
unjust and exploitative. In Senjari Bumi squatters are portrayed as being exploited. On the instruction of Mas Mantri, a government official, the peasant squatters are told to leave what he claims is government land. But having worked the land since the revolution, the squatters claim the land as rightfully theirs. No account is taken of their claim as a number of the squatters are arrested, their houses burnt and their property confiscated. Their efforts to open new land come to nought as they are herded off to become labourers for others. In Togap Purba, the hero of the same name and his fellow peasants pay exorbitant rent on the land they farm and which is owned by P. T. Bentang Rakjat. As if this is not burdensome enough the factory owner, who turns out to be a bupati (government appointed head of an administrative area), with the assistance of a local wedana (district chief), has some of the company's land levelled by bulldozers and the occupying peasants evicted. All the peasants and squatters are at the whim of landlords or government officials.

Though generally illiterate and not politically sophisticated in terms of Jakarta politics, the idealized member of the peasantry is conscious of social classes. Experience of exploitation assists this consciousness. Indeed it is so strong a consciousness, and so strong a bond for the exploited peoples, that it outweighs family ties. Togap Purba, disgusted that his son could remain in the employ of the bupati owner of P. T. Bentang Rakjat after the action against the squatters, disowns his son when he concludes "...A blood connection is not the tie that determines that
people will become revolutionaries, but rather it is sharing the same fate, the same class." He had earlier advocated revolutionary action to avenge the grievances of the squatters. The stress on class ties pervades much of the writing under consideration here during the period of Guided Democracy. This is remarkable considering that class antagonisms were downgraded by the PKI at this time, as it accommodated itself with the National Front and Nasakom, both of which did not accept class conflict as being basic to society. But while that accommodation was a political strategy and hence class struggle was not encouraged, at least until the aksi-sepihak, efforts to bring about class consciousness were always evident. The party always saw itself as the leader of the toiling classes and its activities worked to entrench that consciousness.³

By these activities it is easy to see how peasants could become more aware of class. However some of the short stories and column articles depict peasants becoming class conscious, if not by magic, at least by the workings of some innate human awareness. In Panen for instance, quite apart from any political agitation by outside agents, Umi and her friends decide to confront the lurah about the amounts given as bawon. What triggers this is simply the act of cutting Umi's bawon. This precipitated the peasants' holding several meetings which decide that all present should confront the lurah and demand a just settlement of their grievances. The contradiction here seems to be one between apparent prior acceptance of a feudal relationship and a sudden awareness of class
and its exploitative nature. The transformation does not provide a credible model to inspire peasant agitation.

A more convincing realization of class is related by Sri Supartini in *Jang Mendorong Saja Masuk Gerwani*. She relates that while still at high school in 1958, she was self-centered and generally not aware of class distinctions or the masses. Soon a major change took place. Through an initial fleeting involvement with a PKI sponsored anti-literacy campaign she witnessed the distressing economic and social condition of the people. Experience in this work made her receptive to analyses of the injustices of the society, and after involvement with *Gerwani*, she seems to have developed an acute perception of class. This method of attaining class realization, involving both practical experience and formal education from *Gerwani*, is more believable than the intuitive class consciousness of *Panen*. Clearly though, writers did increasingly get over this contradiction. Possibly this reflects the party's increasing emphasis on organizing and educating its mass membership. Consequently the works under consideration here represented the mass organization and its officials as a catalyst to transform the feudally-minded peasantry into a class-conscious and politicized peasantry. Just as Sri Supartini became aware of the contradictions within society by her association with *Gerwani*, so too did peasants in *Senjari Bumi* and *Togap Purba* by their involvement with BTI.

While the emphasis on class is pervasive, the lack of concern
with other categories of association is correspondingly noteworthy. Ethnic groups are not considered important sources for the social identification of an individual, nor are villages seen as harmonious social units. Religious affiliation is not important, nor is the nation seen as a single unit devoid of class contradictions. Family relationships as we have seen are considered less meaningful than class relationships.

The last main element is the historical link between the present and the past. Treatment of the past focused on the revolutionary period which influenced the present in practical, as well as political ways. The many stories centering on squatters and their rights to retain land use revolutionary experience as the basis for legal claims to the land. Peasants may have cultivated deserted plantations or virgin land during the war years and through continued occupation considered they had a legal claim to the land. Others claim government land was distributed to them during the revolution by the Indonesian army, and so, for the government to attempt now to confiscate the land is illegal, as well as immoral. Moral expectations of the revolution ushering in a just society free from the exploitation apparent during the period of constitutional democracy were revived during Guided Democracy.

Harking back to the revolution which had been waged to bring about a just society free from exploitation by the Dutch, gave a moral force to demands to have exploitation stopped - a moral force outside of the claim of class contradictions which were logically political;
a moral claim inherent in the sacrifice of the people to bring their land from the clutches of the Dutch colonialists.

It also focussed readers attention on the idea of continuing revolution, which was a slogan often espoused by Sukarno during Guided Democracy.

Although members of the toiling classes were depicted as conscious of class and of the exploitation stemming from their class-based society, these changes from feudal and colonial levels of consciousness were not in themselves sufficient to form active members of a class struggle. For a person to become active, he or she needed to lose that thinking which for centuries had subjected them to the exploiting classes.

The stories therefore convey the message that pride in labor is good, idleness is bad. Labor is the means of survival. It proves that people controlled their own fate; life or death is dependent on labor. The toiling classes love labor. Idleness is the work of exploiters. The rich are rich and idle because they exploit others. They can only survive as long as they continue to exploit labor. The exploiting classes never work.
While labor is seen in this way, it becomes far from satisfying when the worker does not receive a just reward. When those of the exploiting classes force peasants and labourers to work for less than fair wages, in money or in kind, the integrity of labor is sacrificed. A feeling of despair at the futility of becoming a paid labourer afflicts Pak Hardjo's wife in *Bumi Sangar* (Cursed Land). Pak Harjo had been arrested for squatting on government land, resulting in his wife being forced to work for a local landlord in order to provide for her family. Spurred by responsibility for her children, she persists with this work in order to gain a small income, but it lacks the satisfaction of her former work with her husband on their own land.

For the peasant and farm labourer, work is only satisfying if they own the land which they work. The opening paragraphs of *Panen* show this well. Here is a comparison of the almost instinctual happiness peasants feel for the land and the harvest, with the injustice, for those who do not own but only work the land, of receiving an unfair share of the harvest. Through being made aware of their dependence on the rich because of the feudal traditions and laws, we can sense that they aspire to work and own their own land. This atmosphere establishes the basis of conflict in many of HR's short stories.

Land is the essence of a further characteristic of the members of the toiling class. This characteristic is patriotism. But a worker or a peasant is not patriotic towards Indonesia as epitomized by the concept of the Indonesian state or nation, or
towards the institutions, or the government of the nation. They love the physical earth that is Indonesia. And they love the rakjat, the toiling people of Indonesia. A patriotism inclusive of state, government, the non-toiling classes, the land, the rakjat, is contradictory to the rationale of class struggle. In contradistinction to this the exploiters are traitors - traitors to the essence of Indonesia, the land and the people. The owners of P. T. Bentang Rakjat betray the land as they bulldoze the fields and houses of the peasants. When a progressive pamong (civil servant) sides with the people in Gugurnja Seorang Pamong (The Fall of an Official), he is killed by rebels as a consequence. The state and the government are unwilling to provide the pamong and the people with sufficient protection from the rebels. The effect is a betrayal of the pamong and the people by the state and the government. Before dying the pamong says "...If I die tell Sukarno and Hatta and all the leaders who consider that they have some responsibility towards the people that I did not die to obey their orders. I died because I had to die with the people......". Essentially this idea of patriotism is only an adjunct to class. The toiling class, the rakjat, according to the PKI, legitimately owned all that was Indonesia. Class consciousness implied love of land and of the people. It also implied that a member of the toiling class should not show allegiance to anyone or anything that was antagonistic towards their class.6

Although the people loved labour, and ownership of the land and patriotism were considered good, these attributes alone could not
change Indonesia. The ideal member of the toiling class needed, in addition, to embody other good characteristics. That person was to be politicized, to be an activist and to be self-disciplined and unspontaneous. Once these characteristics were achieved, and only then, would changes begin to occur.

Membership of the PKI or one of its affiliated mass organizations was an essential first step towards being politicized. The radicalism of Togap Purba's family is due in no small measure to participation in PKI organizations. Togap Purba himself sometimes chairs meetings of the local BTI branch. His daughter attends a night school run by the party. There she hears explanations about the enemies of the people, of the revolution, and of the wickedness of P. T. Bentang Rakjat. This training equips her well to confront her brother who seems to be siding with the bupati in the controversy over the ownership of the land. She accuses her brother of not knowing MANIPOL and of not having a revolutionary spirit. Already politicized she becomes an activist against her brother. What the party considered objective knowledge was used to destroy traditional roles. The young peasant sister, once armed with political knowledge, could easily conquer the limitations ordinarily imposed by her relationship to an older brother, who had a better formal education than her, and as a clerk in the office of the bupati had a higher social status.
What could be done on this personal level could also be accomplished by groupings of people. When Mas Mantri instructed the peasants to leave the government land in Senjari Bumi, San, the leader of the group, knew immediately to call upon the BTI to assist them in their efforts to retain the land. The BTI officials advised them to stay on the land and ask Mas Mantri to meet with the organization. This he refused to do and promised to return with others to arrest the squatters, who were determined to remain. Many were eventually arrested, but they remained united as the organization tried to resolve the matter.

This type of agitation was not taken lightly by the Peperti. Although only carried once weekly, short story material was examined by the authorities. So objectionable to the Peperti was the decision of the peasants in Senjari Bumi to remain on the land against the order of Mas Mantri, that HR was suspended for five days. The suspension was ordered because...

the said short story contained provocative aspects which could influence the public to undertake and defend actions which were against the law, especially in regard to the use of tanah liar (jungle or land upon which private title had not been granted).

Activism was not to give rise to rash or spontaneous acts however. Even though the actions of the exploiters, as wicked as they often were, may have seemed to warrant some immediate, violent, retaliatory action, this was to be avoided. Deliberation was the essential prerequisite to activism. Meetings, however informal, needed to be held to decide upon the correct action to be taken. People in local communities were idealized as being inspired by
collectivism and able to reach decisions, which were vital to their futures, through consultation.

A number of less overtly political ideals were also ascribed to the toiling class. While its members may be in many ways unsophisticated, they are always virtuous, honest, modest and just.

The mutability of class relationships rested with the actions which were undertaken and their results. Interestingly much of the change was to be directed by actions which brought a conflict before government instrumentalities. This is not surprising in view of the PKI's unwillingness before 1964 to precipitate physical antagonism between the classes. But it also points out the limited success that could be obtained by using existing laws and the government's court system. Although the PKI embarked on *aksi-sepihak* during 1964, laws ensuring crop-sharing and land-reform had been in force since 1959. The overall delays and frustrations with these reforms may have precipitated *aksi-sepihak*, but some successes were achieved through the implementation of the laws. Similarly the courts were used to resolve conflicts between peasant squatters and those who claimed their land. In *Senjari Bumi* the action of the peasants in refusing to vacate the land claimed by the government caused the arrest of peasants by the police. However the peasants' organization fought for justice through the local courts, and won. Not only were those who had been arrested released, but they were also permitted to
return to their land and rebuild their houses and replant their crops. Although the principal peasant character, Pak Hardjo, was still in jail at the conclusion of the short story, his case was still to be heard by the court and the mood of the story is that the system of law would eventually legitimize his rights as a squatter. This trust in the courts was not pure fiction. Some successes by squatters were in fact achieved after they took their complaints to the courts.10

Political feelings had changed by 1965. The aksi-sepihak discarded the consensus approach which had led to reliance on laws and courts to achieve the party’s aims. Although it was stopped in late 1964, the radicalism which aksi-sepihak cultivated amongst the peasantry was continued in HR’s short stories.

Compare the court-based approaches described above with Togap Purba’s view of change in May 1965. Speaking of the land owned by P. T. Bentang Rakjat he vows "...This land not only will not be rented from anybody, but will be owned, and made legal by the laws of struggle, the laws of strength", and further "...What determines the ownership (of land) my son is power and strength. This land, which we now rent, can become ours if we are strong and revolutionary." We later learn what this revolutionary power and strength will bring about - the abolition of the bupati, and of landlordism. This is a far cry from the conciliated decisions of the courts. It recalls a similar attitude in the story Panen, which was written prior to the introduction of Guided Democracy and the introduction of land reform and crop-sharing laws. Here the peasant
labourers decide to stage a mass demonstration in front of the house of the lurah and demand that the bawon level be raised for all the farm labourers. Strength of numbers and resolve, not the practice of law, are the catalysts which will force the lurah to give them justice. The outcome of the demonstration is not depicted.

The theme of bringing about change because of the politicized and activated toiling class was an important aspect of the HR stereotyping of the peasants and workers.

While the characterizations examined here are not the totality of the features of the toiling class conveyed through HR, they are undoubtedly the most common. They work to place the individual within a context of change. The individual is a member of a class, the lines of demarcation between that class and other classes are well defined and cannot be crossed without betraying one's original class. Membership of other social worlds, such as family, clan, and country must be relegated to a lesser importance. By focusing on class as the main element of ideological discourse, not only does the individual become an ascribed member of that class, but he also acquires responsibilities commensurate with that membership. The overriding duty is to act in such a way that would resolve the basic contradictions between the classes, that is, give members of the toiling class control of the means of production. To do this one needs to be politicized and be an activist. One needs to be loyal to
the toiling class. One needs to realize one's capabilities in conjunction with other members of that class. The proposal of these aspects of HR contents can be readily understood: before changes in a society can take place a major change in perceptions by the members of the society is needed.

The limited readership of HR among the mass of Indonesians has already been mentioned. Obviously then, the material presented here was not read widely by the type of person depicted in the stories and articles. Party members made up the bulk of the audience and these were predominantly middle class. Consequently rather than the material being presented to directly aid in altering the consciousness of members of the toiling classes, it had a purpose amongst the middle class. Primarily the middle class was expected to change its perceptions of the toiling class. Being essentially based in urban areas, the middle class reader had little direct knowledge of the peasants and workers. This was recognized by the PKI after 1960 when the party leaders exhorted its members to join in the "go-down" movement. The movement proposed that its members should increase their direct knowledge of the peasantry by living with them. The emphasis of the short stories augmented this. They related some of the problems experienced by the toiling class, the positive characteristics of members of that class, and the methods of organization to be used to begin to overcome the exploitation in the society. With this knowledge the middle class party member could approach party work with correct perceptions and attitudes.
During 1963 the audience for the characterization of the short stories was further limited. When the Sunday edition of HR was set up during 1963 specifically as a cultural edition, the Kebudajaan column which had contained most of the short stories and had appeared mid-weekly, was transferred to it. *HR Minggu* was essentially a newspaper for party intellectuals. Devoting space to poetry, short stories, literary criticisms and cultural theorising, the paper did not attain the circulation levels of HR, often failing to achieve a circulation of 30,000, which was less than half the circulation of the daily edition of the paper. Thus many middle class readers of HR did not now read the short stories which were the main means by which the stereotyping of the workers and peasants was carried. Literary concern with the worker and peasant primarily became the prerogative of the party intellectuals.
CHAPTER VII

HIGHLIGHTING THE DISTANT, DOWNGRADING THE LOCAL – INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL NEWS

IN HARIAN RAKJAT

The avid reader of HR obtained a broader knowledge of foreign lands than of the many regions of Indonesia. After about 1956 the paper devoted an increasing percentage of its available space to foreign news, while coverage of local issues declined. At the same time it enthusiastically solicited reports of regional news from its members. But these policies were not in opposition to each other. While international news was important for the education of readers, the local news contributions were essential for the awareness of local developments by party leaders. The local correspondents took their role seriously, and although the evidence is not conclusive, they appear to have developed a critical independence of the HR central editorial staff. Conversely, the selection of international news was firmly in the hands of HR staff members and supported party policy thoroughly.
Local News

Although local and regional news was an important aspect of the content of HR in the mid-1950s, its prominence had declined during much of the Guided Democracy period. This type of news was listed in the small Berita Daerah (Regional News) column, although important news from the regions was carried in other parts of the paper and it did increase greatly during aksi-sepihak.

Regional and local news reports were provided by a small number of staff correspondents in the regions, by the national newsagency Antara, and by KORBU (Worker correspondents) and KORTA (peasant correspondents).¹

The KORBU and KORTA correspondent movements were newsgathering operations based on reports despatched by peasants and worker correspondents. Reflecting the numerically small Indonesian proletariat and the PKI emphasis on the peasantry, the Korta movement achieved greater support from readers than did the Korbu movement. While the movements always remained informal and loosely supervised aspects of the newspaper's operations, they did achieve participation levels which were gratifying to the daily's editors. Writing in 1958 Njoto claimed that about 65 letters or reports were received daily.² In 1961 he stated that the number had risen to 135 per day,³ and during 1963 it had reached between 175 and 200 daily.⁴ These contributions comprised regional news, "letters to the editor", organizational reports, writings, poetry, resolutions and
petitions. A dramatic increase in letters resulted when the PKI instigated the aksi-sepihak. Reports of violations of the land reform and share-cropping regulations, of physical conflicts, and local experiences of the unilateral actions, were sent to HR in Jakarta. Two HR editorial staff dealt with the material received.

These types of contributions were encouraged for several reasons. The first and most obvious one was for their news value. Only a very small number of the items received were printed however, and these were purposely selected. A primary factor in the selection was that an item should be an exchange of experiences between the regions. Essentially if one region undertook an action which was considered to be an advancement over actions of other regions, then a report of it would be considered for publication. But routine actions would not generally be considered. Anwar Dharma gives an example. He says that demands for a Lebaran (fasting month) wage bonus were routine party practice, and were not newsworthy. What was newsworthy were those actions which succeeded and the form the successful struggle took. These struggles then would become examples for other groups and regions. Fundamental to this selection was that immediacy was not an important criterion, but rather the educational value for party members was paramount. Reports which were dated, could be selected over more recent material if the educational benefit from doing so was considered to be greater. For example, HR devoted about half of one column to a report that the PKI committee in Timor had protested to Sukarno about the arrest of PKI members in North
While the arrests had taken place in August 1957, and the Timor committee had sent its protest on September 2, HR did not carry the report until September 26, 1957. But the selection of the report had a purpose. It emphasised that the party was widely represented and politically active. A similar report from an area of long-standing PKI representation, would most likely have been passed over because it would not have had the same effect of stressing the expansion of the party.

A second reason for the party leaders encouraging the worker and peasant correspondent movements was so that they would receive a regular and diverse representation of the views of party members and sympathizerers about topics which were important to them. While regional committees regularly reported to the central headquarters, these reports were of a bureaucratic or organizational nature and lacked the spontaneity that the short and informal KORBU and KORTA submissions had. In appointing an editor to handle each movement it was assured that all letters would be read. These editors determined those reports which would be published, those which would not be, and those which would be passed on to Njoto or Naibaho. The published letters were few, and those not to be published were many. Those seen by Njoto or Naibaho were not generally abundant, but were nevertheless important as intelligence to be used by the party leaders. Njoto regularly read those letters which were connected with current party programs or which suggested that new demands or concerns were being formulated by the local groups, outside of the instigation of the party central bodies. These reports were a direct link
with local party groups. Provincial and regional committees and sub-committees which were becoming increasingly 'bureaucratized', were to some degree by-passed as local groups and individuals communicated with the centre.

This aspect of communication with the leaders is also related to the idea of internal democracy and collective decision making. Njoto stressed the need for popular participation in the party press in his compilation of articles published in *Pers dan Massa*, and the continuing emphasis on reader contributions was part of this.¹²

While consistently successful in maintaining the level of contributions to HR, the *KORBU* and *KORTA* movements did present the party with some difficulties. Primarily these were of two types - technical and political. The technical problems received regular coverage in HR. This was in marked contrast to the political problems, which were only fleetingly touched upon.

The technical problems were several. Firstly, *KORBU* and *KORTA* contributors complained about their material not being carried in HR.¹³ Indeed only a very small amount was carried as a result of HR only having a news print allocation which enabled it to print four pages daily. The party stressed this and sought the understanding of its contributors.¹⁴

The enthusiasm of readers for becoming contributors was also a problem. Many items were journalistically unacceptable and could
not be published without major rewriting. To help overcome this problem party journals and newspapers began to carry articles indicating how to write a news report. Unlike the professional journalism of the time which was increasingly taught in academic institutions, the journalism of the KORBU and KORTA movements was simply constructed. It sought to have party members relate their experiences to others. Because of party instruction members were becoming increasingly aware of the class contradictions in the society, and as a result would have had experiences which highlighted these contradictions. Experience of an exploitative landlord, a corrupt official or of workers or peasants cooperating to their mutual benefit were all experiences worthy of a news report. What the party stressed was that these experiences were important and should be reported. It also realized that guidelines for news presentation should be given to the correspondents. This was done and it was stressed that news items should be short, clear, descriptive and factual. By stressing brevity, consideration was given to the space constraints of HR and to the journalistic capabilities of the correspondents.

In contrast to the regular articles about technical aspects of the movements, reports of the political difficulties were few. Returning briefly to the correspondents' journalistic practice it is clear that HR was not soliciting political texts, but rather short descriptive reports. Although the evidence is sparse it does seem that some of the correspondents took advantage of the system to send political analyses. Njoto brought attention to this as early as 1958.
in *Pers dan Massa*. He wrote of contributions from people in the regions:

What is most wanted in letters are details of personal experiences, of everyday life, of everyday difficulties, everyday struggles. It is very necessary that this be remembered because the editor (of HR) not infrequently receives letters that contain political comment. It is not that political comment is not important to the editor, but that sufficient of it is arranged by him or can be obtained by him through interviews. The type of letters which are wanted are those which tell of experiences in the regions, and which can not possibly be arranged by the editor himself.  

It was however difficult for this type of political comment to be curtailed. As the party grew from the mid-1950s, it also was keen to develop the ideological sophistication of its members. The party’s organizational and educational plans of 1956 and 1959 were devoted to raising the standards of its cadres. These efforts gave some success, but in the process the more sophisticated cadres became increasingly confident about holding and expressing political opinions. Thus party policy encouraged a confidence to express the type of political comments which Njoto sought to discourage, at least in the pages of HR.

The intent of many correspondents to deal with these political or policy matters, was countered to some extent when HR solicited criticisms of its operations. During 1957 Aidit criticized the short comings of the party editors and journalists in their knowledge of Indonesian society, the Indonesian revolution and party
organization and he stressed that these problems should be overcome. However he did not encourage readers to make criticisms of this type. He merely asked the members and local committees to criticize technical and managerial aspects of HR, such as circulation, subscriptions and control of agents commissions. In the same year Njoto called for criticisms on these aspects also. Criticisms on this technical level were later said to have resulted in HR carrying short stories from abroad, instigating an annual literary award for non-professional writers and an anti-illiteracy column.

Political comment, being unacceptable, was withheld from publication. The type of political comment Njoto was speaking about in 1957 is difficult to access. Having no examples of it in HR it is impossible to say whether it was directed at the party itself or at other political groupings. However from the early 1960s some of the political comment or criticism from correspondents in the regions was directed against the party. One interviewee recalls that with the deteriorating economic situation during 1962/1963 letters were increasingly critical of the party's inability or unwillingness to use its organizational and political strength to create circumstances which would alleviate the problems. Some material in HR at the time tends to confirm this suggestion, if only in a circumspect way. For instance, Lukman conceded that criticism has arisen accusing HR of not working "to arouse the people to take action against injustice" nor to "erase all forms of injustice and suffering of the workers". Despite this he maintained that HR was implementing party policy and suggested that any shortcomings were the result of
technical problems such as those discussed above. Several years after Njoto made his comments in 1957 Dahono was similarly defensive. He allowed that HR gave primary emphasis to the various political matters which the party determined were important at particular times. Continuing in a manner which could be seen to be allaying criticisms of party unconcern with real exploitation in the regions, he wrote:

Of course if we decide at a certain time to emphasize an important matter, it does not mean that other problems are left unfinished. Of course not.23

Some peasant correspondents may have found this statement clearly untrue. During 1961 HR carried many articles demanding the implementation of land reform and crop-sharing laws.24 During the following year the campaign was virtually stopped in the press, not to be resurrected again until late 1963. In political terms the campaign may have been a means of displaying PKI concern for the peasants to the political elite for tactical purposes, but on the local level increasingly aware party cadres may have looked at it in terms of practical action, rather than politicking from the centre. For the campaign to have been curtly called off by the party leaders, conceiveably could have instigated the types of criticisms which Lukman and Dahono were trying to temper.

Political accommodation with other political forces by the
PKI was an important strategy for ensuring its protection against its enemies, especially the army. Indeed, the PKI took no actions apart from those sanctioned by the National Front during Guided Democracy, except for the aksi-sepihak. The aksi-sepihak stepped outside of this strategy. Why the PKI was willing to undertake a campaign which the party leaders anticipated would arouse strong opposition from its political opponents is unsure. Mortimer sees it as a conscious decision:

...the Communist leaders soberly and judiciously embraced the "aksi" in their plans for a political offensive set within the framework of confrontation and aimed at decisively strengthening their hand with their government allies.

Wertheim sees the impetus coming from the lower level cadres of the PKI and BTI. He suggests that they were experiencing the deteriorating national economic circumstances and poor rural production in 1963. This experience led them to demand that the land reform and crop-sharing laws be implemented.

While the evidence presented here about Korta correspondents criticizing party tactics is inconclusive it does tend to support Wertheim's thesis that radical developments at the local level were being impressed on the party leadership. In any event, once the party undertook the aksi-sepihak campaign many letters and reports of the local actions flowed in, and many were published. When the aksi-sepihak was curtailed by Sukarno in December 1964, and the PKI agreed to his action, some letters criticizing both decisions were
despatched by the correspondents to HR.

The Korbu and Korta movements successfully encouraged low level cadres to communicate with the centre. That these correspondents touched upon political policy, some at least which was critical of party actions, points to the contradiction seen by some members between their party's preaching socialist revolution on a theoretical level while accommodating itself to the conservative national political structure.

For an understanding of the role of HR it is necessary to take account of the news it did not print. Though much of the local and regional news submitted to HR may not have been carried on the reasonable grounds that it was not journalistically newsworthy, evidence does show that some of the reports were not carried because they were critical of the policies of the party.

International News

Unlike the Korbu and Korta movements, the selection of international news did not pose any problems for the staff of HR. The party policies in international relations were clear, and these policies dictated the guidelines for international news selection.
An early indication of the influence of the policy can be seen in the substantial increase in foreign content between 1956 and 1964. The LPPU publication *Warta dan Massa* surveyed major dailies in 1956 for their coverage of national, local and foreign news. Its research showed that HR gave about 42% of its available space to national news, about the same to local news and only 14.32% to foreign news. Using slightly different categories Crawford showed that 41.33% of HR content in 1964 was devoted to international relations and foreign news, and 35.2% of editorials were related to international relations. He did not provide a local news figure. Because these studies used different parameters and categories for quantifying news content, it is not possible to infer with precision changes in the level of foreign news carried. It is however evident that HR increased its coverage of international affairs.

Changes in domestic Indonesian politics during the period tend to support the trend of the figures. Firstly, in 1956 the PKI was still expanding its membership and the party daily, by devoting substantial coverage to local issues was assisting the members to gain a greater understanding of party activity. Government policy was also dominated by domestic considerations at that time. By 1964 the PKI had become the largest communist party in a non-communist country, and its emphasis over the previous six years had changed somewhat to one of consolidation of its unwieldy membership. Not that this should necessarily have caused an increase in foreign news, while regional news appeared to decrease. Arguably the party daily could have assisted the consolidation. But by that time the party had become a major component of national politics, unlike it had been in 1956. As
such it was incumbent upon the PKI to support the nationalist emphasis of Sukarno— an emphasis which he used to assist his claim to continuing leadership during Guided Democracy. One aspect of this nationalism was an increase in international concerns. Sukarno developed the concept of conflict between 'The Old Established Forces' (the Western industrialized countries) and 'The New Emerging Forces' (the countries of Asia, Africa, and South America) as a major part of his political posture. His campaign to incorporate West Irian into Indonesia, and his efforts to 'crush Malaysia', further fueled the foreign aspects of national politics. The PKI itself gave increasing emphasis to United States imperialism and to relations with China. These political considerations and the party's national standing, influenced its daily newspaper to give substantial coverage of these nationally important matters and the foreign countries which were associated with them.

To assist the collection of news material from abroad in those years of increasing interest in foreign matters, the HR management established its own staff correspondents in Moscow, Peking and Amsterdam. It also established news gathering arrangements with 'progressive' forces in 'imperialist' countries. For example, as HR concern with Australia increased when that country became involved in supporting the British position in Malaysia, the communist Guardian newspaper in Australia contributed news and articles to HR on developments in Australia. These forms of foreign news collection were however limited. To establish staff members in many of the countries with which the PKI was interested was beyond the financial capacity of HR, and reliance on sources like the Guardian could not
provide the breadth of foreign intelligence required by the party. The bulk of foreign news came from foreign news agencies. While ideological considerations ensured that socialist newsagencies dominated, by-lines show that the major western agencies were also used. Of course the Indonesian national newsagency was used as it expanded its foreign network of correspondents.

The foreign news policy of HR was essentially quite simple. Substantial coverage was to be given to socialist countries and to the 'progressive' countries of the 'New Emerging Forces'. Conversely the imperialist countries were to be well covered also. But there was an important, and not subtle, difference in the coverage of these groups. The positive aspects of the first category, especially of the socialist countries were to be stressed. For the imperialist countries both positive and negative aspects were highlighted. Broadly, those classes of the imperialist and capitalist countries which were, in Marxist terms, exploiting the toiling classes, were depicted negatively, while the toiling classes were depicted positively.

The positive portrayal of communist states sought to educate PKI members about the benefits of socialism. The unity of purpose of government and citizens in those countries was prominent. Industrial and agricultural development was assured under socialism, although some problems could be encountered as that development progressed. However, socialist planning and cooperation would resolve any such problems. Prosperity and social justice awaited the socialist state.
It was not difficult for HR to suggest the negative aspects of the imperialist and capitalist states. Exploitative capitalists impoverished the members of the toiling classes in the capitalist countries. But these countries did have positive aspects. These were the honesty, righteousness and spirit of struggle of the working people.

The foreign news coverage of HR was generally very predictable. It established for readers parameters by which they could judge what was able to be achieved under socialism and what the imperialist countries were doing to prevent the move to socialism. It placed the PKI's struggle in Indonesia in an international context, whereby the aspirations and problems of the party were those of many other nations.
A major change in HR between the mid-1950s and the early to mid-1960s is the increasing emphasis on individuals rather than institutions, whether party or governmental. By 1965 Aidit was routinely given front page prominence, a distinction only rarely given to him in earlier years. Similarly Sukarno’s coverage increased after Guided Democracy was introduced, and again grew dramatically after he emphasized the mass mobilization around the West Irian campaign. While the emphasis on Sukarno is understandable in terms of the PKI seeking his political protection, the change in Aidit’s status is not so easily explained. The change will be examined in relation to two hypotheses—firstly, that the domination of national politics by Sukarno since 1959 gave him a level of public prominence which was not in the long term best interests of the PKI and to counter this, HR and the PKI emphasized Aidit as the main party leader, and as a major national leader; and secondly, that there was a split within the upper ranks of the party.
After Sukarno allowed the political parties and mass organizations to enter the National Front as discrete entities in 1961, wide-ranging support was given by the parties and mass organizations for the West Irian campaign. Sukarno's action protected the parties against an army intent on their destruction. The response of HR was to give full coverage to the campaign and to its instigator, Sukarno. The PKI enthusiastically accepted the opportunity to become publicly politically active, and repaid the policy turnabout by Sukarno with frequent reports of developments in the campaign. Sukarno was elevated to a prominent position for all readers of HR to see.

Despite this there are some indications that the HR editors were keen not to portray Sukarno as the infallible leader of the revolution. Hindley talks of the "enforced servile praise of Sukarno (by the PKI) - who in private is heartily disliked by the cadres". Enforced and servile much of the coverage of Sukarno in HR certainly was. This is to be seen in a series of reports during 1959. In August of that year a devaluation of the Rupiah was implemented by the new Guided Democracy government. Sukarno, as head of the government, announced the decision and in a message to the people regretted that the action was necessary. The decision was widely acknowledged as likely to have ill-effects on the population. In the reporting of HR from this point a separation is apparent between Sukarno and his cabinet. The latter is charged with implementing the instructions of Sukarno so that as little as possible harm was done to the masses. HR put forward detailed proposals to ensure that this
would be the case. But Sukarno is set aside from the implementation of his decision and the potential distress it could cause to the population. Instead he is praised. HR proclaimed that his 'acknowledgement (that the people would suffer) is honest, and that it is proof of his great spirit. Because of this the people understand and feel that Sukarno is not far from them'.

The differentiation between Sukarno as president and as head of a cabinet which was charged with making decisions, some of which were not welcomed by the PKI, is a major aspect of HR reporting. This theme is seen in the PKI survey of the first year of Guided Democracy. This was very critical of the government and its policies. However while the government was severely criticized, Sukarno did not attract any reprimands. In fact, he worked to protect the party from army action against it for making the criticisms. Again, in 1963 when the government was making plans to accept the IMF economic stabilization plan, ministers were criticized for this plan, but Sukarno, who momentarily supported it, escaped any reprimands.

The general impact of this policy was to depict Sukarno as the guiding force of the revolution, but encumbered by corrupt, reactionary ministers. This position was dangerous for the party for several reasons. Firstly, if as Hindley says, Sukarno was unpopular with some cadres, the representation of him by the party daily as an important element in the revolution, could possibly have caused those elements to criticize the party. Conversely, the
prominence of Sukarno could have caused some to downgrade the role of the PKI, while accepting him as the sole legitimate leader. This leads to a second possibility. If dissension arose, the leadership of Aidit and his supporters could at the very least have been questioned because of what was seen as the inappropriate policy they were pursuing.

Within HR these developments were intended to be arrested by several editorial policies. Unlike all other national dailies, including the left-nationalist Bintang Timur and Warta Bakti, HR almost never referred to Sukarno by the many grandiose titles he attracted during Guided Democracy. It was HR policy not to refer to him as *Pemimpin Besar Revolusi Indonesia* (Great Leader of the Indonesian Revolution), *Presiden Seumur Hidup* (President for Life), *Wartawan Agung* (The Great Journalist), or with any of the other honourific titles which he attracted. He was generally referred to as President Sukarno or *Bung* (Brother) Karno, and occasionally as leader of the armed forces. This policy was introduced by Njoto in order that Sukarno would never achieve a preemminence that would allow him to replace the PKI as the vehicle through which social change could be obtained. If the PKI agreed to Sukarno being the leader of the revolution, or President for life, it would surely have been abrogating its own position as leader of the revolutionary classes. This was of course only a slight concession to the dominance that Sukarno had over politics and in HR after 1961, but it stands in marked contrast to the other newspapers. *Merdeka*, for example, saw the non-use of the titles as proof of PKI treason towards Sukarno.
Radical nationalist newspapers did see Sukarno as the only leader of the revolution, and not merely as someone to be momentarily used for wider political purposes.

The second way in which the prominence given to Sukarno was countered was by an increasing emphasis on Aidit as leader of the PKI. Whereas before 1961/1962 many routine reports or decisions of the Central Committee of the party were reported in the name of that body, later similar reports were increasingly attributed to Aidit, with the wider organization only being given a brief mention. This change was not dramatic, but rather slow to evolve.

During 1965 this trend became more obvious. Aidit received substantial coverage. He and Sukarno received almost equal front page prominence. Rather than downgrade Sukarno's coverage, Aidit's was raised to a similar level. But by this time the development was not merely a HR policy to counter Sukarno's position, according to some sources, but rather it reflected a wider schism within the party.

These developments can be seen in HR's coverage of the Konfernas Sastra dan Seni Revolusioner (KSSR) (National Conference of Revolutionary Literature and Art). Apart from being an example of the coverage given to Aidit, this conference also is important for the possible insights it provides into a split which is said by some sources to have developed between Aidit and Njoto. The split is believed to have resulted in Njoto being dismissed from the Central
Committee of the party and from all his other party positions during 1965.

The KSSR was the first national conference of progressive (that is, PKI and leftist) artists and literary workers to be organized by the PKI. It opened its doors to a wider range of people than were generally attracted to Lekra, the party's cultural organization. Held in Jakarta and opened by Sukarno, the conference commenced on 28 August 1964, and continued for one week.

It was Aidit's conference. He gave the main address of the opening session. His talk lasted for about five hours, and covered many old and some new concepts in PKI cultural thinking.

It is not surprising that HR covered the conference in full. This was to be expected. What was interesting however, was the role taken by Aidit in the conference, some of the propositions he put forward there, and the subsequent domination of HR's Sunday cultural edition, HR Minggu, by the KSSR.

With the conference Aidit took to himself a new and demanding role - he became *de facto* leader of PKI cultural activity. For KSSR was not merely a once-off conference, but it was to become an annual event. During August and September 1965 a second conference of similar grandeur to the first, was held. In the intervening period the resolutions and policies of the first conference dominated PKI cultural activity.
In all of this the foremost question involves the role of Njoto and Lekra. Lekra had been established in the early days of the reorganization of the PKI under Aidit. With Njoto as its principal leader it fared well, gaining a membership of about 500,000 by 1965, and increasingly attracting non-communist artists to its ranks. Annual Lekra conferences were held, and coverage of Lekra in HR Minggu was considerable until late 1964. Few in 1964 would have questioned the pivotal position of Lekra in PKI cultural activity. But just a week after Lekra held its 1964 annual conference, the KSSR was held with great fanfare and Aidit as its sage.

Why was Njoto apparently usurped by Aidit as leader of PKI cultural activity and why was Lekra seemingly to be replaced by KSSR? The difficulty of answering these questions is immense. Two streams of thought do arise however. The first treats these developments as legitimate personnel changes in the party. The second sees them as the result of a profound split in the party leadership.

Njoto, according to the first scenario, had been increasingly burdened by his tasks during 1964. Not only did he have his party responsibilities, but he was also to become a minister of state in the government in September 1964. This state position merely recognized his increasing role as advisor to Sukarno which had been developing during the past year. He was thus hard-pressed in all his tasks. A rationalization of these was necessary. Because of his being highly thought of by Sukarno, and having excellent access to him, the party
judged that Njoto should relinquish many of his party responsibilities to concentrate on his governmental responsibilities.

Indeed when Njoto did move from control of *Lekra* in late 1964, Sudisman (a senior politbureau member) informed top *Lekra* members that he (Njoto) had been removed to concentrate more on keeping close ties with Sukarno and Subandrio. In an interview Njoto gave similar reasons. His departure from HR in April/May 1965 can be seen as the result of these circumstances also.

In the event it was necessary that a person of high stature step in to replace Njoto in *Lekra*. Initially he was replaced by Hutapea, a central committee member. However, being considered unsuitable as a cultural leader he was soon replaced by Rewang, who was party secretary for Java Tengah. But he was not a substantial enough figure on the national scene, so Aidit stepped in. The KSSR can consequently be seen as an event to legitimate Aidit's takeover in the eyes of the progressive cultural workers.

The second version believes that Njoto was sacked from his party positions. The reasons are difficult to determine but include—central committee displeasure with a romantic affair Njoto was having with a KGB agent; Njoto's criticism of a speech Aidit made in which he publicly stated that *Panca Sila* (an ideology founded by Sukarno), would not be necessary in the socialist stage of the Indonesian Revolution; Aidit's fears that Sukarno and Njoto together would form a radical nationalist party and thereby bring
about the decline of the PKI. There was also a suggestion that Aidit's leadership group was increasingly making party policy without reference to the party members with the result that internal party democracy was being jeopardized. Njoto is said to have been disturbed by this trend. A number of other suggestions circulate, and are less credible as reasons for dismissing one of the party's most competent leaders. Nevertheless the last suggestion concerning internal party democracy, being of a broad ideological nature and having real effects on the determination of party policy and the administration of the party, conceivably is the type of conflict upon which a major dispute could be premised.

The coverage of the KSSR by HR not just as a one week conference, but as a new expression of PKI cultural activity throughout late 1964 and 1965, provides some evidence to support the contention of declining internal democracy.

The main evidence concerns the pradjurit (soldier). In his address to the opening session of the conference Aidit instructed the cultural workers that they should direct their activity towards serving the workers, peasants and the soldiers. While the need for cultural activity amongst the workers and peasants could be accepted by all those present, the emphasis on soldiers caused consternation among some. It appears that Aidit anticipated that some Lekra people would scorn his suggestion. He countered what he perceived they were thinking, in two ways. Firstly, he elaborated upon why the soldiers should be a matter of concern, and secondly, he
attacked the *Lekra* leadership.

Aidit argued that in general the soldiers were *rakjat pekerdja* who happened to be armed.\(^{15}\) In addition the Indonesian armed forces were born from the August Revolution of 1945 which led to freedom from Dutch colonialism. Consequently, according to Aidit, the forces had the following characteristics\(^{16}\): they were anti-fascist, democratic, anti-imperialist, and held socialist ideals; the forces were an instrument for serving in the struggle of the *NEFO* (New emerging forces) against the *OLDEFO* (old established forces); and they were an instrument for maintaining the integrity and unity of the nation.

He continued that the reason the soldiers had not until that time become a focus of revolutionary art and literature was because of the anti-people and pro-people analysis of Indonesian society.\(^{17}\) Aidit had first announced his analysis of Indonesian state power in these terms in 1963.\(^{18}\) The analysis was not class based but grouped social forces in respect of their congruence with what the PKI saw as beneficial for the revolutionary development of the people.

Aidit was saying that PKI cultural workers had not until then directed their attention to the soldiers because they had generally seen the armed forces as part of the anti-people component of state power. It seems he was right. In the annual confernece of *Lekra* held only a week previously, none of the statements or resolutions
carried in HR suggested Aidit's strategy. His words were an attempt to change this. Emphasis on not only the workers and peasants, but also the soldiers was prominent in the HR reports of KSSR throughout the following year. Notably HR introduced a special weekly column, *Ruangan Pradjurit* (Soldier's Column), directed towards the soldiers.

Although the evidence is very slight there seems to have been criticism from Lekra members of Aidit's concern with the soldiers. During a number of interviews this author conducted with PKI members, it became apparent that some sections of the party disagreed with his strategy. The main focus was the pro-people categorization of the army from which the *pradjurit* cultural work sprang. It seems that some Lekra members saw the categorization as inappropriate, suggesting rather that the army was demonstrably anti-people, and thus the call to work amongst the soldiers was inappropriate. Such opinions did however fail to make a distinction between the ordinary soldier and the army command. As has been mentioned previously HR management believed that they had a small readership amongst the soldiers, which certainly suggested to them the possibility of at least recruiting these people to sympathy for the party. The emphasis of the criticism of Aidit was, that as long as the army command was demonstrably anti-people it would direct its commands to act against the best interests of the people, and would be obeyed by the ordinary soldiers.

A further major problem was that the PKI cultural
organization Lekra was not involved in formulating or debating the new policy. Party democracy was therefore circumvented. The only evidence from the period to support this appeared in HR. Joebaar Ajoeb, a Lekra official wrote in an article dealing specifically with cultural work amongst the workers, peasants and soldiers, that the focus on the soldiers had created suspicion amongst some people. He did not elaborate further, but merely went on to suggest how the new policy could be implemented. The tone of the article certainly suggested that such debate was not desired by the party.

Against this background Aidit's criticism of Lekra can be examined. In his opening KSSR speech he criticized those party or mass organization leaders who felt that the party had grown because of them. He stressed that no party or organization leader should consider that he could not be replaced. He then focused on Lekra, stating that its growth to a current membership of half a million was not the result of its leaders efforts, but of millions of people, presumably implying the wider party organization.

This type of criticism could normally be quickly dismissed. The party leaders often gave perfunctory criticism like this. But on this occasion it was possibly more serious. That this is so springs from the factional disagreements with Aidit's formulations in the KSSR, and from information that he and his colleagues suspected that Lekra, as a party institution, had greater allegiance to Njoto than to the party. His fear here was that Njoto could use Lekra
as a vanguard for a potential new party. Thus in his criticism, Aidit was warning Lekra leaders of possible dismissal if they questioned party policy.

With these conflicts and contradictions we must look at the coverage of Aidit in HR. There is little doubt that KSSR was prominent in HR during 1965. Aidit's speeches gave plenty of scope for commentary. Lekra conversely was seemingly increasingly neglected. Throughout the coverage we are reassured that Aidit was the guiding force behind this new cultural movement, if only by the very ubiquity of his name in relation to the movement.

In dealing with the coverage of Njoto during 1965, we face some of the same problems associated with understanding the coverage of Aidit. That is, was the decrease in his coverage after about April/May, the time when Hutapea replaced him as HR's chief editor, merely the result of his changed activities or was it a conscious editorial policy to downgrade his prominence.

What is clear is that Njoto was not portrayed as the party philosopher after mid-1965. Prior to this he often wrote on ideological matters. For example during January and February 1965 a number of his lengthy articles were carried. These were: Antara Teori dan Praktek Revolusioner (12 January) (Between Revolutionary Theory and Practice), Marxism - Dajahidup dan Dajadjuangnja (19 January and 21 January) (Marxism - Its Lifeforce and and Struggle), Jang Dikandung Djangan Bertjetjeran, jang Dikedjar Djangan
Tak Dapat (9 February) (What is Carried Should not be Dropped, What is Being Pursued Must be Obtained), *Marxisme dan Keharusan Rituling* (11 February) (Marxism and the Need for Retooling), *Njoto: Mendjawab Beberapa Salah Faham Atas Marxisme* (15 February) (Njoto: Answering Several Misunderstandings about Marxism), *Njoto: Bagaimana Mister Jones Tjoba2 Melawan Karl Marx* (18 February) (How Mr. Jones Tries to Oppose Karl Marx), *Njoto: 'Kapital' jang Menggontjangkan Kapitalisme* (22 February) (The Capital Which Shakes the Foundations of Capitalism). By August/September his coverage was concerned mainly with his position as ministerial advisor and with his continuing association with Lekra. These were generally only small items. Clearly he was no longer a commentator on ideological and philosophical aspects of Communism.

An additional problem can be seen in his later coverage. Why, when he had either been dismissed or moved from Lekra in late 1964, was he still being connected with that organization in August/September 1965. One interviewee believed that the party leadership was afraid of the consequences of revealing Njoto's dismissal. Thus he was allowed to maintain his public association with the organization, although he had nothing to do with its formal operations. The party feared that those loyal to Njoto in Lekra would widen the breach between the party and Lekra, and possibly more importantly, that the party's enemies, particularly the army, would be encouraged to move against it. This latter consideration also prevented Njoto from publicising his position. He was after all still a committed communist.
A similar position arose with HR. Although Njoto had moved from the daily in April/May, after a period of sometimes bitter conflict between HR journalists loyal to or opposed to him, his name remained on the HR masthead until the daily was banned in October 1965.

Leaving aside for the moment the possibility of a split between Aidit and Njoto, it is clear that HR was used to focus the attention of its readers on different personalities at different times. For several years it was politically expedient to give prominence to Sukarno. This was little to pay for the reward of his political protection. Similarly, as the PKI became more confident in its own power, and not as dependent upon Sukarno, it attempted to assert Aidit's dominance of the party.

How then should the slight evidence of a split between Aidit and Njoto be treated? Firstly we need to look at the sources of this information. The evidence from HR presented here is consistent with such a split, rather than directly speaking of it. Also as I have suggested this evidence can be used to support other interpretations. But we should not expect necessarily clear-cut evidence from the period. If there was a split between Aidit and Njoto it is unlikely that they would have been so foolish as to bring it to public notice, thereby encouraging the party's enemies to strike against it. It is quite credible that it should have remained an internal party matter.
Indeed several PKI interviewees with whom this author spoke, rebuffed my questions by claiming the privilege of the subject, even now, being an internal party matter.26 Several others were more forthcoming. But clearly many PKI ex-political prisoners believe that a split did occur. The article Berbagai Catatan Dari Berbagai Macam Cerita yg. Dikumpulkan Dalam Cakapan2 Dengan Berbagai Teman Tahanan di Salemba... recounts much speculative evidence in support of it. How should we treat this evidence? That it comes nearly twenty years after the event suggests caution. If the conflict within the party was so well known among such a wide range of party officials, we could reasonably have expected some "leaks", which would undoubtedly have been eagerly taken up by the party's enemies. But none seems to have occurred. B. M. Diah's attempts at proving such a split during the Merdeka-HR polemic appear to be aimed at inciting confusion in the party, rather than being based on factual information. Then if the knowledge of these developments in the party were confined to a small circle in the leadership at the time, it is likely that obvious changes in Njoto's responsibilities could have been explained away by his elevation to a ministerial position, as seems to have happened. If this is so we must then question how information which was secret prior to October 1965, became general knowledge among party officials who were imprisoned in the New Order government's prison camps after 1965.

Two main considerations are relevant here. They concern firstly the privileged group who knew of the split prior to October 1965, and secondly army tactics against the PKI under the New Order.
The simplest explanation for many PKI people knowing of the split now is that they had been told of it whilst in prison. Party officials who knew of the split could have told all. Secrecy no longer needed, they may have sought to encourage discussion of why the party failed, or merely to chide the actions of their leaders – actions which resulted in party members languishing in prison, some for many years.

The second explanation possibly says just as much about post-1965 politics as it does about pre-1965 politics. McVey says the army used propaganda to spread "disunity and disillusionment among the surviving PKI adherents." It stressed the differences between Njoto and Aidit "usually to discredit Aidit as having impetuously sparked off the coup by himself and having rejected the more cautious opinion of Nyoto and others, but sometimes...stressing Nyoto's lack of morals." On another tack, the army made Huteapea appear to be the power behind the PKI in the pre-coup period and in the post-coup period. In this position he is said to have worked to push Nyoto aside, to allow his own rise to power.

Amidst the numerous contradictions concerning the PKI's leadership during 1965 it is clearly impossible to use HR as a strong source of evidence for any split. The newspaper did however report on the political leaders in different ways at different times. The question of why Aidit's coverage rose during 1964 and 1965 still remains to be answered. Further research needs to be done on the KSSR and Lekra. A full study may throw more light on the suggested conflict between Aidit and Njoto.
Marian Rakjat succeeded well in propagating the ideology and political policies of the PKI. The daily's chief editor, Njoto, not only diligently supervised its operations, but brought his authority as a deputy of the party to his position. This assured the paper's commitment to party orthodoxy, at least until the latter stages of Guided Democracy, when the maintenance of party solidarity fell to Hutapea as the new editor.

Specific party policy for HR fell into two distinct areas - its relationship with other newspapers and journalists, and its internal operations. Firstly the policy saw HR as one newspaper amongst many in the turbulent circumstances of the periods of constitutional democracy and Guided Democracy. In this broad area PKI policy never permitted the paper to become excessively radical, in the eyes of the party and radical nationalists at least. The newspaper sought to have its position and the positions of other newspapers sympathetic to it secured during both periods by acknowledging that a diverse press should exist. This was particularly so during the 1950s when independent newspapers with no
political affiliation were suggesting that political party newspapers were not adequately able to fulfil the role of a responsible press. This policy of tempering HR's potential radicalism reflected the wider PKI tactical accommodation with President Sukarno during Guided Democracy. Aware of Sukarno's role as protector, the PKI rarely deviated from his general political policies. It followed this course for fear of arousing retaliation from its enemies, principally the army, if it deviated greatly from Sukarno's policies.

Using this strategy the PKI, through HR and its staff, gained substantial influence amongst journalists and newspaper proprietors. By 1963 the PKI believed it held wide influence over the Indonesian press. However this control was increasingly eroded after the editor of *Merdeka*, Jusuf Isak, was sacked from that newspaper for allegedly implementing pro PKI policies. This incident placed *Merdeka* with the anti PKI forces, and encouraged the grouping known as the BPS.

The BPS was the most prominent press movement to oppose the PKI. It propagated a non-Marxist interpretation of Sukarno's thought. Within the PKI and radical nationalist press this movement was interpreted differently. The PWI vigourously opposed the BPS and saw it as a direct threat to its control of Indonesian journalism. Holding this view the PWI officials believed that repressive action needed to be taken against BPS journalists and newspapers.
The PKI saw the situation differently. It held that the BPS was primarily a political movement manipulated by people outside press circles, and especially by the army. In the PKI view most BPS journalists and newspapers were being used by the PKI's enemies to attack the party. Thus the focus for the PKI became the BPS as a political movement. The party successfully campaigned to have the BPS movement banned. When Sukarno did this in December 1964 the PKI felt satisfied that in the eyes of the political public the BPS movement of political opposition to the PKI had been repudiated and the PKI's position vindicated. Further action against BPS journalists or newspapers was not considered to be warranted by the PKI at that stage. For tactical reasons it did not want to be seen as being excessively repressive. The radical nationalists in the PWI were not as inhibited. They launched a campaign to have BPS journalists expelled from the journalists association and to have BPS newspapers banned. By mid-February 1965 they were successful. Some evidence shows that the PKI opposed these moves. Evidence also suggests that disputes were apparent in the PWI after February 1965 as a result of the action taken by the PWI leadership.

The PKI influence over the press which was apparent in 1963 was greatly reduced by 1965. The party's enemies, and to some extent its friends in the PWI, had precipitated this.

The second aspect of the PKI's policy for HR concerned the paper's internal operations.
The party attempted to expand the paper's circulation and readership as a way of increasing party propaganda. Although the circulation did increase significantly after the PKI purchased it in 1951, HR never became a mass circulation daily. Its readers always remained essentially middle class party members. Widespread illiteracy and the poor economic position of most Indonesians at the time prohibited HR's expansion.

The policy which directed HR's content was somewhat contradictory. Njoto believed that HR should be used to encourage debate with its sworn enemies as well as those who had minor differences with PKI policies. This came to fruition after martial law was lifted in 1963. Lengthy debates were carried in the national press. Yet, this acceptance of debate and dissension, if it concerned internal PKI policy, was not permitted to be carried in the pages of HR. In Chapter VII it was seen how political criticisms apparently directed at the party were sent to HR, but these were not printed. Similarly in Chapter VIII debate within Lekra about a new cultural direction instigated by Aidit was not carried in HR. The daily did not carry its liberal approach to debate with its adversaries through to internal party debate. Certainly tactical reasons played some part in this. The party's enemies would have fuelled the slightest hint of friction in an effort to discredit and crush the communists. However some account of the nature of the party leadership should also be taken. Was it committed to a democratic party? In chapter VIII
evidence of a split between Aidit and Njoto was put forward. This is still inconclusive and requires further research. Yet it suggests that some party cadres were unhappy with the level of leadership consultation with the membership. Internal party democracy was increasingly lost as the party became more powerful. This dilemma is placed in the context of the leadership split. As has been suggested the story of this split may have been concocted since the events of October 1965 actually occurred. Still the basic theme of dissatisfaction with the degree of party democracy remains important to surviving party members. It should be examined further in an attempt to elaborate upon the PKI as an organization composed of different institutions and many individuals, rather than as a monolithic party of singular purpose.
NOTES

I. INTRODUCTION

1 An excellent bibliography of material relating to the PKI is:


3 See for example:


II. THE RESPONSE OF HARIAN RAKJAT TO DEBATES ON THE ROLE OF THE PRESS DURING THE PERIOD OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY


2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., p. 312, 313.

4 Ibid., p. 313.

5 Ibid., p. 315.


7 The PSI received 753,191 votes in the 1955 elections, slightly less than 2% of the vote: George McT Kahin, "Indonesia", in G. Mc.T. Kahin, editor, Major Governments of Asia, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1958, p. 551.


9 Ibid., pp. 73-100. Here Hindley surveys several PKI membership drives.

Discussions of the pre-independence press and the influence of nationalism upon it can be found in the following texts:


Interview with Rosihan Anwar, Jakarta, 2 February, 1983.


Ibid., p. 151.


HR., editorial, 23 April, 1957.

Swantoro and Atmakusumah, op. cit., p. 150.

Oey Hong Lee, Indonesian Government and Press During Guided Democracy, Hull, The University of Hull, 1971, pp. 117-132. Here Lee details the many regulations which were introduced to direct the press during Guided Democracy.
21 Ibid., p. 51.


23 Lee, op. cit., p. 51.


26 Ibid., p. 20.


28 See for example the report of a government financed European tour by S. Tasrif of *Harian Abadi*, Mochtar Lubis of *Indonesia Raya* and Rosihan Anwar of *Pedoman in:


30 HR., 7 May, 1957.

31 Lee, op. cit., p. 49. The circulation figures mentioned by Lee show these trends.


33 Ibid., p. 23.


These ideas are especially put forward in:


Ibid., p. 62.


*Pedoman*, editorial, 29 November, 1954.

See for example, *Pedoman*, editorial, 29 November, 1954.


47 Mahbub Djunaedi, "Personalalita Koran", in Duta Masjarakat, 2 January, 1959. Djuanaedi was the editor of Duta Masjarakat at the time he wrote this article.

48 "Menindjak Tahun Ke IV", editorial, Suluh Indonesia, 1 October, 1956.


50 "Pers Indonesia Telah Alami", op. cit.

51 Adi Negoro, op. cit., p. 43.


53 "Perdjuangan Kami: 8 Tahun Indonesia Raya", in Indonesia Raya, 31 December, 1958.


56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

Pedoman, editorial, 29 November, 1954.


Ibid., p. 22.

Njoto, Pers dan Massa, op. cit., p. 12.

"Menginjak Tahun Ke IV", editorial, Suluh Indonesia, 1 October, 1956.

See for example, "Perdjuangan Kami: 8 Tahun Indonesia Raya", in Indonesia Raya, 31 December, 1958.


Sanjoto, "Penjelenggaran Berita Ekonomi", in Pedoman, 29 November, 1954.


The breadth of these activities can be judged by the many reports in the magazine Warta dan Massa, which was published by the L.P.P.U.


This idea is similar to the Rabselkor (worker-peasant correspondents) movement in the Soviet Union which was established in 1918 by the Communist Party newspaper, Pravda.

Njoto, Pers dan Massa, op. cit., p. 19.
Lee, op. cit., p. 176.

See pp. 164, 165.

See p. 165.
NOTES

III. HARIAN RAKJAT DURING GUIDED DEMOCRACY


3 Ibid., pp. 62, 63.

4 Ibid., p. 59.

5 Ibid., p. 59.

6 Ibid., p. 65, 66.

7 Ibid., pp. 65, 70, 71.

8 Ibid., p. 83

9 Ibid., p. 83

10 Feith, op. cit., p. 339.


12 Ibid., p. 214.

13 Ibid., p. 212, 213.
14 Ibid., p. 207, 208.

15 Reeve, op. cit., p. 78, 79.

16 Ibid., p. 94.


18 Interview with H. (In conducting research for this thesis I interviewed persons who requested that I not reference them openly. Consequently interviewees included in the List of Confidential Interviewees are designated by alphabetic symbols in the body of the research.) See also pages


22 Ibid., pp. 111-131.


24 Interviews with B, D, F, H, I, J.

25 Interviews with B,F,I.

26 Njoto, "Pers Reaksioner dan PKI Revolusioner", in HR., 7 September, 1959.
Interview with K.

Interview with Mahmub Junaedi.

For example, the call of HR journalist, Supeno, in a parliamentary session on 15 January 1960, for the government to give attention to the matter of press freedom, was part of these pressures. See, Kronik Pers, 1956 s/d 1960. Djakarta, Lembaga pers dan Pendapat Umum, 1961 (?), p. 61. The pressure increased after Information Minister Maladi had promised on 19 August, 1959, that a press law would be decided upon immediately. See, Ibid., p. 49.


For example see the article, "Banjak Suka-Dukanja dan Banjak Harapan2 Dinantikan dari Ta\'jun2 Mendatang", in Suluh Indonesia, 1 October 1962.

HR., 3 July, 1961.


Ibid.


45 *Bintang Timur*, 18 September, 1963.


50 Interview with H.

51 Interview with H.


53 Interview with F.

55 See for example Bintang Timur (BT), 11 November, 1964, where an editorial argued that the BPS was established as a counter organization to the PWI. BT had held this view from the time the existence of the BPS became known.

Interview with F.

56 BT., 21 December, 1964.

57 BT., ibid.

58 In an interview with F. he recounted how he and like-minded delegates argued forcefully to have the committee approve the expulsions. That the conflict occurred was confirmed in an interview with J.

59 BT., 30 December, 1964.


63 See pp. 175 ff.


65 Journalists interviewed by this author stressed that Njoto firmly believed in allowing press debates during the then current national stage of the revolution. He also held that, in the climate of Indonesian politics at the time, newspaper readers were
increasingly becoming radicalized and therefore were more likely to accept the arguments of the left than of the right. Njoto held that in these circumstances 'wavering' newspapers would be forced by public opinion to be more progressive, or be forced to close down as their readership declined.


67 Interview with A.

68 Interviews with H. and J. There is no substantial alternative evidence to support their claim.

69. In PKI circles this fear centered on Karim D. P., the editor of Warta Bakti and the secretary general of PWI Pusat. It was common knowledge at the time among journalists that Karim had strong ambitions to become Minister for Information.

70 Sukarno was not seriously considering a ban at this time. Interview with A.

71 Interview with F. According to this source PWI officials pressed Sukarno, albeit unsuccessfully, to have the PWI declared an official political grouping.


73 Wiratmo Soekito, Perpetjahan Dalam PWI?, mimeograph, 6 July, 1965. (Copy held by author).
IV. THE ADMINISTRATION OF HARIAN RAKJAT


2 Ibid.


4 Interviews with C. and H.

5 *Petundjuk Pers*, op. cit., p. 21.

6 Interviews with C. and H.


8 Ibid.

9 Interviews with C. and J.

10 Ibid.


12 Ibid., p. 254.


14 See chapter II, *Journalism*.


17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., p. 93.

19 "HR Menagih Djandji Kenaikan Djatah Kertas 30% Tiap Tahun", in HR., 3 February, 1964.
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<td>&quot;14 Mendjurubitjarai Kepentingan Buruh, Tani dan Pradjurit&quot;, in HR., 6 February, 1963.</td>
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<td>&quot;14 Mendjurubitjarai&quot;, op. cit.</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>See for example, <em>Role of Harian Rakjat in Indonesian Society</em>, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, Washington, 1961. Here are collected articles dealing with HR and workers, HR and peasants, HR and women, and HR and fishermen.</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>Naibaho, &quot;Berlangganan Kolektif&quot;, op. cit.</td>
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<td>36</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>Interviews with B. H. and I.</td>
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See for example:

Lukman, "Harian Rakjat is a Powerful Weapon", op. cit., p. 31.

Naibaho, "Berlangganan Kolektif", op. cit.


Interview with G.

Interview with J.

Interview with L.

Interview with J.


Hindley, op. cit., p. 118.

Interviews with E, G, and J.


"The Distribution of Harian Rakjat and its Expansion", op. cit., p. 28.

Ibid.,

"Speech on Harian Rakjat's Tenth Anniversary by Njoto", op. cit., p. 52.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 53.

Interview with J.

"14 Mendjurubitjarai", op. cit.
NOTES

V. PRESS POLEMICS: PLATFORMS FOR POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL DEBATES

1 All references to the Merdeka and HR polemical material are taken from: Polemik H.R. dan Merdeka, Djakarta, Merdeka Press, 1965. At the end of the polemic Njoto and Diah agreed that each would publish a full transcript of the debate.


5 Ibid., p. 10.


7 Ibid., p. 100.

8 Ibid., p. 101.

9 “Gotongjoyong” a La "BI" dan "Persatuan" a La Merdeka”, HR., 4 June 1964, in Polemik, pp. 10-12.


11 Ibid.

12 “Gotongrojong”, op. cit.

13 Since the parties and mass organizations had been permitted to enter the National Front as discrete entities in 1961, they had rigorously attempted to maintain their individual identities.


16 Ibid., p. 33.

17 Ibid.
25 "8 Expresi Merdeka Membela Susunan Lama", HR., 1 July, 1964, in Polemik, pp. 139-146.
30 Ibid.
VI. IDEALIZING THE MYTHICAL READER

1

Interview with E, Jakarta,

2

The following short stories and articles from HR will be examined in detail in this chapter. Additional material to be referenced will be noted when cited.

S. Tugi, Bumi Sangar, HR., 29 August, 1959.
Sri Supartini, Jang Mendorong Saja Masuk Gerwani, HR., 8 October, 1964.
Ananta Pinola, Togap Purba, HR Minggu, 16 May, 1965.

3

This leadership was not a recent development. HR material highlighted what the PKI saw as its longtime concern with the toiling class, a concern dating back to the 1920s. See for example:


4

In "Memprogresifkan Koperasi", by Imam Sardju (HR., 3 July 1965) participation in peasant cooperatives and witnessing of the benefits for the peasants from the cooperatives which were under the direction of the BTI, shows the participants how they can succeed without the intermediary of exploitative landlords. Experience of progressive actions gives them a sound political education. See also:

Frustrated by her monotonous household tasks the central female character decides to become involved in Gerwani. Upon doing so she begins to feel useful and politically knowledgeable.

5

See for example:

Puto Oka, "Bibi Kerti", HR., 22 November, 1964. In this story the government authorities try to evict Bibi Kerti from land she and her husband have worked since the Second World War. Believing her claim to the land to be legitimate she decided to appeal to the court of law to have her ownership acknowledged. While the outcome of this is unknown her determination and sense of justice are put forward as
attributes worthy of emulation.

6 Affinity of peasants with the land is seen as a natural human characteristic. Not only Indonesian peasants feel this way. In a short story by Wilfred Burchett entitled "Petani2 Vietnam Menuntut Kekiadaban Tuantanah" (HR., 5 September, 1959) exploited Vietnamese peasants show the same emotional ties with the land as do the Indonesian peasants.

7 Women become similarly motivated after attending a Gerwani training centre. They obtain knowledge and thus become politicized. See:

Tity Wawarintu, "Dibadjakan Training Centre", HR., 10 October, 1964.


"Bibi Kirti", op. cit.

8 HR., May 7, 1962.

9 A short story about the 1926 Communist revolt in Indonesia has a similar theme. In "Guruh", HR., 29 November, 1964, the author A. Kobar Ibrahim writes that 'victory is on the side of those who oppose.' Published in late 1964, the aggressive approach to the resolution of society's contradictions, as attempted in the revolt of 1926, now becomes the example for PKI members to follow.

10 Interviews with B, F, G, J.
NOTES

VII. HIGHLIGHTING THE DISTANT, DOWNGRADING THE LOCAL-INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL NEWS IN HARIAN RAKJAT

1 See pp. 50-52.


5 Ibid.

6 Interview with J.

7 See pp. 51-52.

8 Anwar Dharma, "Berita Daerah", op. cit.

9 Ibid.


11 Interview with J. Jakarta,


See also, Njoto, "Soal Pendidikan dan Kaum Inteligensis", HR., 5 July, 1957.

13 Anwar Dharma, "Berita Daerah", op. cit.


15 See p. 51.

16 See for examples:


Anwar Dharma, "Berita Daerah", op. cit.


19 Nioto, "Soal Pendidikan", op. cit.


21 Interview with J.


25 Ibid., p. 277.

26 Ibid., p. 302.

27 W. F. Wertheim, "Indonesia Before and after the Untung Coup", *Pacific Affairs*, XXXIX, nos. 1 and 2, pp 115-127.


NOTES

VIII. ESTABLISHING THE LEADERS

1 See pp. 62, 63.

2 Donald Hindley, 'President Sukarno and the Communists: the Politics of Domestication', in American Political Science Review, LVI, No. 4, 1962, pp. 923, 924.

3 HR., 27 August, 1959.

4 HR., 26 August, 1959.

5 Ibid.

6 See p. 33.

7 Interview with J.


9 Aidit's speeches were published in bookform as:


10 Response by Basuki Resobowo (Member Central Committee of PKI and Board Member of Lekra, 1965) to my questions conveyed to him by Carmel Budiardjo, 19 April, 1983.

11 Communication from Ruth McVey, 23 April, 1983.

12 Basuki Resobowo, op. cit.

13 These reasons come from:


and

Interviews with C, H, and K.


15 Ibid., p. 30.
16 Ibid.,
17 Ibid., p. 31.
18 For a full discussion of this concept see:
19 In the months prior to KSSR Lekra was still stressing the need for work amongst the workers and peasants only. See for example:
20 See pp. 113, 114.
22 D.N. Aidit, 'Kibarkan Tinggi2 Pantji Pertempuran Dibidang Sastra dan Seni Revolusioner', in D.N. Aidit, Tentang Sastra dan Seni, op. cit., p. 82.
23 Interview with H. Although not speaking in the context of the possible split G. confirmed this impression.
24 Interviews with H and C.
25 Interview with H.
26 Interviews with E, G and J.
27 Communication from Ruth McVey, 23 April, 1983.
Abdulgani, Ruslan, *Funksi Penerangan Di Indonesia*, Djakarta, Kementerian Penerangan, 1953(?).


Berbagai Catatan Dari Berbagai Macam Cerita Yg. Dikumpulkan Dalam Cakapan2 Dengan Berbagai Teman Tahanan Di Salemba, Mimeograph, 1979(?). (Copy held by author. These notes have circulated amongst ex-PKI political prisoners since 1979.)


Nieuwenhuis, J., "The Indonesian Press Institute", in Gazette, V. 1, No. 1, 1955, pp. 48-49.


Soetopo Soetanto, "Biro Khusus Partai Komunis Indonesia", in Persepsi, 1, No. 3, October-December, 1979, Jakarta, Yayasan Pancasila Sakti, pp. 108-142.


Wertheim, W. F., "Indonesia Before and After the Untung Coup", *Pacific Affairs*, XXXIX, Nos. 1 and 2, pp. 115-127.


Newspapers and Periodicals


LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

All the interviews listed below were conducted in Jakarta on the dates shown. An additional “Confidential List of Interviewees” listing the names of interviewees who requested that their names not be openly referenced has been presented to the examiners of this thesis.

Rosihan Anwar, editor Pedoman.
2 February, 1983.

Assegaff, journalist with Indonesia Raya 1958-1959; currently secretary of PWI Pusat.

Sjamsul Basri, journalist associated with the B.P.S. currently editor of Suara Karya.
11 February. 1983.

Mohammad Chudori, journalist with Antara 1960-present.
13 January, 1983.

12 January, 1983.

Mahmud Junaidi; editor Duta Masjarakat.
6 February, 1983.

Muaya, journalist with Antara 1958-present.
13 January, 1983.

Wiratmo Soekito, member Manifesto Kebudajaan group.

Tasrif, editor, Abadi.
11 January, 1983.