THE USE AND MEANING OF
SELECTED PARTICLES IN EWE

FELIX KOFI AMEKA

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts of the Australian National University.

March 1986
Unless otherwise acknowledged
this thesis is the original
work of the author
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What more can I say than

"Ne meku la, migafa avi o sea."

(When I die do not mourn for me).

"Mawu nehe mi deke kple wuje." (God bless you).

Canberra,                          

F.K. Ameka.                       

March 1986.
### Abbreviations and Conventions

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<td>AP</td>
<td>Adverbial phrase; Adjunct phrase</td>
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<td>AUX</td>
<td>Auxiliary</td>
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<td>DEF</td>
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The number of either of the above reflects the degree of unacceptability or ungrammaticality.

Thus if we have ?A and ??B, it means that B is more bizarre than A.

If there is '*' within parentheses it means that the example is bad if the material within the parentheses is included, '*' immediately preceding parentheses means that the sentence is bad if the material within the parentheses is omitted.

'a & b' in the interlinear translations indicates that the surface form in the object language is a fused form of two morphemes "a" and "b".
This part of grammar has been perhaps as much neglected as some others over-diligently cultivated. It is easy for men to write, one after another, of cases and genders, moods and tenses, gerunds and supines: in these and the like there has been great diligence used; and particles themselves, in some languages, have been, with great show of exactness, ranked into their several orders. But though prepositions and conjunctions, &c., are names well known in grammar, and the particles contained under them carefully ranked into their distinct subdivisions; yet he who would show the right use of particles, and what significancy and force they have, must take a little more pains, enter into his own thoughts, and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in discoursing.

(Locke Vol.11: 99)

1.1 The Task Defined

Three centuries or so ago, Locke bemoaned the negligence of the study of particles in the grammars of languages in the words quoted above, meaning by this term not only prepositions and conjunctions but also - and, in fact, above all - what would now be called modal or illocutionary particles. It is regrettable that Locke's observations are still appropriate. Probably more regrettable is the situation where those who attempt to analyse particles in some languages fail to
demonstrate the use, force and significance of these important items in language.

The study which follows is a response, in a way, to Locke's challenge. It is an investigation of the use, force and significance of selected particles in one of those languages - Ewe, a language of West Africa, in which particles have indeed been meticulously grouped into various classes in various descriptions. For example, descriptive labels such as 'sentence particles' have been given to the particles examined in chapters 2 and 3. These have been further classified into "question particles" (Chapter 2) and "addressive particles" (Chapter 3). (cf Ansre 1966; Clements 1972; Duthie 1970, 1982, forthcoming; Pazzi 1977; Warburton et al 1968; Westermann 1930). One uniting feature of these particles (under investigation here) is that they structurally occur at the boundaries of syntactic units - words, phrases, clauses or sentences initially or finally.

Grammarians are quick to point out such distributional properties (though not always accurately). But, in our view, such descriptions have limited value. They do not explain the use of the particles. Nor do they provide any semantic representation (explication) for them. It is not enough to describe the distribution of and provide labels for the particles. We must go beyond descriptions and elucidate the meanings encapsulated in the particles - in a manner that would be linguistically precise and as far as permissible culturally and socially revealing and which would constitute a reliable guide to usage.

This is the task we undertake in this study. Our goal is to describe, analyse, explain and explicate the usages and meanings of selected Ewe particles.
Setting such a goal at once makes our work controversial and likely to be subject to skepticism. We are fully aware of the controversies and of the criticisms that our work might generate. Queries like the following might be raised: What are particles? Do they have any theoretical, typological or universal validity in linguistic description? Can they be explicated (= defined) given that they are commonly thought of as being semantically 'empty'? 

These are valid questions from theoretical as well as methodological perspectives. Our theory is that some items in language from psychological and semantic viewpoints can be labelled 'particles' (pace Zwicky 1985) and like all linguistic symbols, these items are meaningful. In addition, and contrary to the somewhat trendy view in linguistic semantics that no words are definable (see especially Sampson 1980, Lyons 1981b: 56-74 and Green 1983), we assume and assert that words, and in this particular instance, particles, can be defined or explicated. We shall attempt to support our claims in this chapter.

Before we do that, however, we introduce the language of the study - Ewe, outlining its genetic, areal, socio-linguistic as well as typological properties (1.2). After that, we take up the question of the controversial term 'particle' in 1.3. We propose that there seems to be an intuitively recognizable semantic or lexical class of items in many languages of the world which could be called 'particles' (more elaborately modal or illocutionary particles).

We devote 1.4 to the linguistics of particles, particularly their meaning. We survey briefly, but critically, various approaches that have been employed in the linguistic literature to account for the
meaning of particles in various languages. We show that many of the approaches, rather than throwing light on the particles tend to obscure them. Moreover, many of the approaches fail to satisfy some of the desiderata of linguistic analysis, especially those of rigour and precision. They also have very little practical value from the standpoint of language pedagogy and cross-linguistic and cross-cultural comparative studies and communication.

The approach we favour is detailed in 1.5. We describe and defend an illocutionary semantic approach to the particles. In essence, we advocate a method of analysis that decomposes the illocutionary forces of particles into their components and which are expressed in a language that is simple and intuitively intelligible. The test for our analysis is that the formulations (explications) should be substitutable for the particles in any of their possible uses. A wide range of uses will be illustrated.

In the rest of this chapter, we indicate what the state of the art of the study of Ewe particles is. And finally, we present an overview of the study as a whole outlining what we do in each of the subsequent chapters.

1.2 The Language

1.21 Its dialects, areal and genetic affinities:

The name Ewe [ɛβæ] as used in this study refers to the western-most major dialect of the language or cluster of dialects spoken in an area that extends from Lower Volta (in southern Ghana) across into Togo, Benin and as far as Western Nigeria to Lower Weme; that is, from the
Greenwich Meridian to 30°E and from the Atlantic coast to about 8°N which is now preferably called Gbe. Other major dialects of Gbe are Gen [gɛ] spoken in southern Togo along the coast and used as a lingua franca in towns; Aja [adza] spoken in central and inland parts of Togo and Benin; Xwla & Xwela [xwla xwela] spoken in parts of southern Benin and Fon [fɔ] spoken in Benin across to parts of western Nigeria, particularly in the Ogun and Lagos states. Each of the major dialects has sub-dialects (see Capo 1981, 1982, 1983a for a diachronic phonology of these dialects).

Ewe properly refers to the group of (sub) dialects spoken in the south-eastern part of the Volta region of Ghana across to parts of southern Togo as far as and just across the Togo-Benin border. For some time in the past, 'Ewe' was confusingly used both for the entire language (i.e. equivalent to Gbe) and for the major dialect (i.e. Ewe proper) which this study is about (e.g. Ellis 1890; Westermann 1930; Ansre 1961).

Some of the sub-dialects that fall under Ewe are: Ajlo (Clements 1972), Aveńa, Tojú, Waci [Watʃi], Dzodze, Kpedze, Dodome, Ho, Awudome, Teki, Ajọẹ, Sovie, Botoku, Kpando (Stahlke 1971), Gbǐ and Pó dome. A written standard was developed in the last century (Ansre 1971; Adzomada 1979). It is a hybrid of the regional variants of the various sub-dialects. With it has also emerged a standard colloquial variety (spoken usually with local accent), that is very widely used in cross-dialectal contact situations such as in schools, markets, churches etc. This is the variety on which this study is based although we indicate in places the dialectal biases of any of the specific forms we discuss.
Genetically, Gbe, and for that matter Ewe, belongs to Greenberg’s (1966) Kwa or Stewart’s (1983) Tano-Congo branch of the Congo-Kordofanian phylum.

Ewe is bordered to the west by Ga-Dangme and Akan, to the north by Togo languages, for example, Siwu, Siya, Adele and Gur languages such as Kabiye. To the east are the Gbe dialects Gbn, Aja and Xwla - all of which have degrees of intelligibility with it (see Capo 1979).

1.22 Sociological Status:

Ewe is used in Ghana as a second language in most of the Togo languages’ area. It is also one of the three most important languages in southern Ghana. It is taught in primary, secondary and tertiary (universities and diploma awarding institutions) schools. It is also used for broadcasting and in some community newspapers.

In Togo, it has been declared one of the two national languages being promoted for official use as well as use in education, mass media, etc. Ewe is thus an important language in that region of West Africa.

1.23 Salient Structural and Typological Features

1.23.1 Phonological Features

Like many other languages of Sub-Saharan Africa, Ewe is a tone language. Each syllable has a basic tone which may, in 'emic' terms be high or non-high. In 'etic' terms, the non-high may be realised as low [沮] or mid[-] while the high may be realised as high [^] or rising [/] . Contextual factors may yield the merger of some of these tones and a
falling tone [\] may also occur (for details of tone in Ewe see especially Ansre 1961; Smith 1973; Clements 1977a & b; Stahlke 1971 Nyem 1976 Sprigge 1967, Clark 1983 and Duthie (forthcoming)).

The vowel sounds that occur in Ewe are shown in Fig 1 where allophones are circled.

Diachronically, [ə] is an innovation in Ewe. It is not found in other Gbe dialects (cf Capo 1981). [e] occurs only in the environment of [+ high] sounds. For example, [eje] e\v{e} 'and' but [a\atilde;
\v{e}] e\v{e} 'his'. In some of its dialects, especially A\u{\j} \v{\j} [\j] has merged with /e/\j/.

As can be seen from Fig 2, Ewe like some other languages in the Fragmentation Belt of Africa (Dalby 1971, Welmers 1973) has double articulated plosives /kp/ and /gb/. Ewe is also famous for having both bilabial and labio-dental fricatives. The bilabial ones which many find difficult, incidentally, do not occur in the other Gbe dialects.
The inventory of Ewe consonants is shown in Fig 2 (allophones are circled).

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<th>alveolar</th>
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<th>palatal</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>approximant</td>
<td>j</td>
<td>y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>w</td>
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<tr>
<td>lateral</td>
<td>l</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Fig 2** Ewe consonants
/p/ is a borrowed phone into the language. [j] and [w] are complementary in distribution; the latter occurs before back oral vowels and the former before oral front back vowels. The two (together) are in complementary distribution with [j] which occurs before nasalised vowels. In general, the nasals occur before nasalised sounds and their oral counterparts before oral ones (cf Capo 1983b).

[m] and [ŋ] can be syllabic and when they are, they carry tone. For example 
\[\text{m} \] (morning) \[\text{d} \] (send me).

Basic syllable types that occur are \(V^I\) \(CVT\) and \(CCVT\). For example, \(\text{a} = \text{ti}^'; \text{kl}^\jmath; \text{fj}^\jmath; \text{tr}^\jmath; \text{sw}^\jmath\) 'sue' (tree) (wash) (axe) (fetish) (small)

Only the semi-vowels [j] and [w] and the liquids can occur as the second consonants in a cluster. Moreover, in this context the liquids complement each other in distribution. [l] occurs after grave sounds while [r] occurs after non-grave sounds.

Other syllable types, \(C(C)VT\) and \(C(C)VVT\), occur in borrowed words and ideophones. Where there is an arresting consonant, it is always a nasal. For instance, \(\text{kran=te}\) (cutlass).

The tone on ideophones may be varied to effect semantic differences. For example, to describe the sound of a drum 'potopoto' may be used. If it is a small drum the syllables carry high tones but if it is a big one the tone changes to low.

Similarly, the vowels of these words may be lengthened. For example, to express the intensity of 'plenty' the word \(\text{fuu}\) may be
produced as fuuuuu...... For further notes on Ewe ideophones and loan words see Geraldo (1980) and Fiagbor (1980) respectively. (See Duthie 1967 in addition to works cited earlier for further notes on Ewe phonetics and phonology).

1.23.2 Grammatical Features

Ewe has a basic SVO word order. It has post-positions showing location. For example, Kplo te (under the table)

The genitive noun precedes the governing noun. For instance

Kofi fɛ agbale.

K POSS Book

Kofi's book

Where the possessed nominal is a kinship term or a body-part term, there is no overt possessive marker that links it to the possessor. For example,

cɛvi - a ɖ dzi - lá - wo.

child DEF POSS bear er PL

the child's parents.

Modifiers generally follow the head noun in nominal phrases. For example,

cɛvi kɔkɔ atɔ mɔ - wo kató.

child tall five DEM PL all

All those five tall children.

Although indisputably a basic SVO word order language, permutations of this order occur to achieve some discourse and other communicative goals. Thus SOV structures are possible where the aspect of the verb is imperfective. For example,
Putting the object before the verb in imperfective aspect clauses whose canonical word order would require the reverse order seems to be a universal tendency (Hopper 1979). It has to do with backgrounding and foregrounding as well as transitivity in discourse. Be that as it may, OSV structures are also possible especially where an object is focus marked or questioned.

Another marked word order is OVS which occurs when there is interaction of aspect especially the imperfective, focus and transitivity in a piece of discourse. (Clements (1972: 37) denies the existence of such structures in Ewe).

Consider the following examples:
Fufu pounding to make fufu.

It is Fufu that Ama is pounding.

Is it a song that you are going to sing?

What is it that the children will eat?

Ewe pronouns have varying forms depending on their syntactic function (see Fig 3). There is one form that is non-emphatic and occurs prefixed to the verb, for example,

Me - vá.

I came.

Another form occurs before nominals or independently as emphatic forms of the pronouns, for example,

Nye, Kofí.

When pronouns are objects of verbs or prepositions, their form is also different, for example,
Kofi insulted me.

There is a logophoric pronoun ye which is generally used in dependent clauses of reported sentences when there is identity between a nominal in the dependent clause and one in the main clause.

e.g. É - be ye - a - va.

3SG say LOG SBJV come

He said he would come.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1SG</th>
<th>1PL</th>
<th>2SG</th>
<th>2PL</th>
<th>3SG</th>
<th>3PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preverbal</strong></td>
<td>me</td>
<td>mi(e)</td>
<td>(n)é</td>
<td>mi(e)</td>
<td>wó</td>
<td>wó</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prenominal</strong></td>
<td>nye</td>
<td>mia</td>
<td>wó</td>
<td>mia</td>
<td>éya</td>
<td>wó</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>independent</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>post verbal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>preposition</strong></td>
<td>-m</td>
<td>mi</td>
<td>wó</td>
<td>mi</td>
<td>-í</td>
<td>wó</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig 3 Ewe pronouns

"A peculiarity of Ewe" to use Westermann's words (1930: 126)," is that we often find a row of verbs one after the other". In modern parlance, Ewe is one of those languages that makes use of serial clauses. As in other serialising languages, a class of words functions some of the time as full verbs and at other times as 'prepositions'. Where they function as prepositions, they have been called 'verbids'.
(Ansre 1966b). Compare the following sentences, in (a) 'tó' is a full verb and can be inflected for verbal categories as in (c) while in (b) it is a verbid and it cannot take any verbal categories (see d). (e) is an example of a serial clause in which each of the verbs can be inflected as in (f).

(a) Kofí to Kpándo.
   K go through K
   Kofi went through Kpando.

(b) Kofí zo afo to Kpándo.
   K walk foot through K
   Kofi went on foot through Kpando.

(c) Kofí to a Kpándo gbesiagbe.
   K go through HAB K everyday
   Kofi goes through Kpando everyday.

(d) Kofí zo a afo to (*-a) Kpándo
   K walk HAB foot through HAB K
   everyday
   Kofi goes on foot through Kpando everyday.

(e) Kofí ku tsi kló nkúme.
   K fetch water wash face
   Kofi drew water and washed his face.

(f) Kofí ku a tsi kló a nkúme.
   K fetch HAB water wash HAB face
   Kofi draws water and washes his face.

(For further information on the grammar of Ewe see Westermann 1930; Ansre 1966a; Clements 1972; Baeta 1962; Duthie 1982, forthcoming;

1.24 Orthography

Conventional Ewe orthography as developed in the last century is phonemic in the writing of vowels but allophonic in the consonants. Thus /e/a/ are written as "e". Various rules of writing have been used, most of which are not founded on linguistic principles. For example, first and third person singular pronoun objects are the only ones written attached to the verb among the object pronoun forms (see Potakey 1936, 1937; Bajini 1964 and Nyaku (MSa) for some of these rules).

The greatest problem, from a linguistic point of view, is that tones are very sparingly marked. They are only marked on a few selected items that are otherwise homographic with another item. The reader is left to figure out others. For example, the only thing that distinguishes first person plural and second person plural pronoun is that the latter is low and the former is high in tone. Hence the first person plural form is marked, thus 'mia' (we) 'mia' (you). But a writer does not distinguish between ðè (question particle see 2.2.4); ðè (verbal focus-marker) and ðè (question particle see 2.2.5). They are all written as 'ðè'. One can imagine the difficulties that can arise in reading because of this. Several suggestions for reform have been made of many aspects of the traditional system but most of them have not yet been implemented.

However, we shall follow the suggestion that tones especially the high ones be marked throughout the writing system (Duthie 1981). We
thus indicate all high tones in our examples with an acute accent '/
whether they are conventionally marked or not. We also indicate the
tones of every item that we discuss. Except for these, we follow the
conventional orthography. Fig 4 shows the phonetic values of those
symbols that are not standard IPA symbols. All other graphics have
their IPA value.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IPA Symbol</th>
<th>Ewe Orthographic Symbol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>{e}</td>
<td>e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>{a}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φ</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β</td>
<td>y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j</td>
<td>ny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>tsy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig 4 IPA notation of some Ewe orthographic symbols

Another writing convention is to represent fused syllables in the
surface form. In our examples we maintain this practice but indicate in
the interlinear translations that there are two morphemes and link them
by &. In general, we follow the suggestions for interlinear
translations proposed by Lehman (1982). Thus words made up of more than
one morpheme are parsed into their component morphemes and separated by
hyphens. Observe carefully, the following example:

Me' - va' o.

NEG & 3SG come NEG

S/He did not come.

Here 'me' is a coalescence of me (NEG) and e (3SG). Traditionally,
me'va' is written as 'meva'.
What we have said so far about Ewe should provide enough background information to facilitate our understanding of the issues we take up in the ensuing pages. Before we turn to the more theoretical issues concerning particles, a disclaimer is in order. Some readers may find the tone and language used in the rest of this chapter hostile, aggressive or arrogant and offensive. That is not the intended message, and readers are entreated to bear with the author's over-reaction to his frustration and the sad experiences he had when he was seeking answers to questions about particles in the literature in vain.

1.3 'Particles' in language and linguistics

'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less.' 'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.'

(Lewis Carroll: Through the Looking Glass)

Terminology is one of the issues in linguistics on which agreement is lacking. This is particularly noticeable in the areas of discourse analysis and pragmatics which have been actively investigated in recent times. There is either a multiplication of the senses in which a term is applied or various names are used to describe the same or similar phenomena without making clear what the conceptual bases are. Many linguists have expressed dissatisfaction with this state of affairs and have called for standardisation and precision in the use of the terms. One would hope that these pleas would be heeded.

Unsurprisingly, one of the terms that has not escaped this problem is 'particle'. It has been made to stand for many different things in language. Because of its use for an assortment of things in specific languages and across languages, its validity has been challenged most recently by Zwicky (1985). We share some of the concerns of Zwicky but we are unable to be persuaded to abandon the term 'particle' in linguistics.
In this section, we first outline the major uses of the term 'particle' in linguistics. We then argue that in many languages of the world, there is a class of expressions which constitute a definable linguistic category which may be called particles, more appropriately 'modal' or 'illocutionary' particles. We point out that these items which form a subset of the expressions that have been labelled over the years as 'particles' are very important in many ways in human communication and should therefore have a place in an approach to linguistics that is oriented towards the study of human communication rather than 'bolts-and-nuts' (George Lakoff 1974).

Now a look at the various uses of the term particle: A very common use is that of designating the class of items that have idiosyncratic syntactic and semantic properties and which do not fit into any of the other established word classes of a language. One only needs to look, even cursorily, at various descriptive grammars to see how various grammarians of various languages lump together an extraordinary collection of items into the class of 'particles'. The items are semantically diverse and lack any syntactic unity (cf Zwicky 1985: 291; Goddard 1979: 224).

If we are faithful to the notion of a word class where its members share some syntactic as well as morphological properties and have a semantic core, (see Schacter 1985; Brown & Miller 1980; and in particular Lyons 1977) then it becomes obvious that these cannot be members of a single class. Zwicky (op cit) argues that this is tantamount to claiming that the items in this class of particle are acategorial. We agree with the view that the desideratum is that every word should be classified into a properly defined syntactic category.
Another use of the term 'particle' is for items that are unchanging in form which have grammatical meaning or function (cf Hartmann and Stork 1973; Crystal 1980). The implication of this use is that the term 'particle' belongs somewhere on the hierarchy of grammatical units, viz: morpheme, word, phrase, clause. However, all the things that have been analysed as 'particles' in language are either morphemes, words or phrasal (eg kind of) or clausal (eg you know). Here again we agree with Zwicky that if they fall together with morphemes, and words, then on the grounds of ontological parsimony there is no need to assume and posit another term on the hierarchy of syntactic units. It seems to us though that what Zwicky's criticisms point out is that the term 'particle' should be used not in relation to morphosyntactic levels but over and above it where those things that are called 'particles' can be described as various syntactic and morphological units.

The term particle is also used in a very broad sense which reflects the intuitively recognizable distinction that exists in the languages of the world between two sets of vocabulary items. Carlson (1983: 69) describes the phenomenon as follows:

"Most, if not all languages exhibit in their vocabularies two quite different types of morphemes variously referred to as lexical vs function morphemes, full words vs empty words, content words vs particles and so forth" (our underlining FA).

This distinction is very fundamental and with it the use of the term 'particle' which goes way back into centuries past. The logica moderna differentiated between categoremata and syncategoremata, a
distinction that has survived in logic (see for example, Peter of Spain's Syncategoremata). It is a distinction that reflects Aristotle's contrast between 'concepts' and 'grammatical meaning'. Locke used the term 'particle' for the syncategorematics as did Leibniz and other Port Royal grammarians. This dichotomy is pervasive enough that grammarians over the centuries have tried to accommodate it in their theories. Even those of the generative persuasion introduce explicit ways into their grammars for treating these items (Pullum 1982). Chinese classical grammarians recognised this distinction ages ago (see Tcie 1983). The nineteenth century English grammarian Henry Sweet (1891: 22) drew this distinction. Jespersen reflects it in his classification of words (Jespersen 1924 [1964]: 87 et seq). (cp also Fries' (1952) major form classes and function words; Ullman's (1962) automsemantic and synsemantic words; and Hall's (1964) contentives and functives).

As Lyons (1981b: 48) observed, there is an "intuitively evident semantic difference between typical members of one class and typical members of the other." Typically, lexical items (or contentives) are judged to "have meaning" while function items (or 'particles') are judged to be void of meaning (cf Carlson 1983; Carlson & Tanenhaus 1984, Lyons 1968; 1981a).

Although function items (or 'particles') tend to be judged to be 'meaningless' some of those "judges" characteristically try to indicate that their judgement is not entirely correct hence they say things like: "However that is not to say that particles (= function items FA) have no meaning at all" (Vasilyeva 1972: 14) or "(E)mpty word forms (i.e. particles FA) may not be entirely devoid of meaning .... But they
generally have less meaning than full words." (Lyons 1981b: 48). What is important, as we see it, is whether they are meaningful or not? We assert that these items are meaningful for they are symbols and they have psychological reality in language.

There is some psycholinguistic evidence in support of our assertion. Carlson & Tanenhaus (1984: 43) report that function items (or 'particles') occur in types of speech errors that are different from those in which contentives occur. Language defects that result from brain damage also reflect the dichotomy between contentives and functives. For instance, functives (or 'particles') do not occur in the speech of Broca's aphasics. Other studies also show differences in the recognition and recall of contentives vis-a-vis functives (or 'particles').

Carlson & Tanenhaus (1984) further advance a hypothesis which also supports the idea that there is probably a semantic core for the 'particles' and also that they are after all not meaningless. They conjecture that all the meanings that can be expressed in language seem to fall into three classes. There are those that can only be expressed lexically (i.e. by contentives) (e.g. 'horse', 'walk', 'white') and those that can only be expressed by functives (or 'particles') e.g. definite, indefinite, conjunction). Then there is the third class which could be expressed either by contentives or by functives (or 'particles') (usually modal meanings such as 'possibly' 'probably'). It is thus apparent that this traditional use of the term has some justification intuitively, semantically and psychologically.

Nevertheless, this use of the term is obviously too broad. We shall restrict the term particle (in our study) to a class of
expressions which are typically uninflected and underived items and which are indicators of illocutionary force. They have a relatively restricted position in clause structure. The core members of this class express a speaker's attitude - cognitive or social - towards a proposition or towards an addressee. They have been variously referred to in languages that they occur as "modal particles" (e.g. in German, Russian etc), "attitudinal particles", "propositional particles" (e.g. Warlpiri) 'sententials' (e.g. Yoruba (Awobuluyi 1978) or sentence or utterance (final) particles (e.g. Japanese, Chinese, Cantonese, Taiwanese and Ewe) etc.

This set of items which constitute a syntactic category on distributional and semantic grounds cross-linguistically are different from but very related to the items that belong to Zwicky's category of discourse markers which includes interjections as well as other exclamatory expressions. The discourse markers (also called "pause-fillers" or "hesitation markers", see Ostman 1981) are more like parentheticals. To the extent that they express a speaker's epistemic meaning they are related to the class of particles. However the discourse markers, unlike the particles, are typically syntactically insulated from the rest of the sentence in which they occur. That is, prosodically they are separated by pauses from the environment in which they occur (Zwicky 1985: 303).

The particles, on the other hand are more integrated into the syntax of the sentences in which they occur. They are not isolated by pauses. These are illocutionary operators on the propositions in which they occur (cf Foley & Van Valin 1984).
The particles are also different from adverbs but are related to a subclass of them, viz: those adverbs called 'modal' or 'attitudinal' or 'sentential' adverbs. The relationship is that both the particles and the 'attitudinal' adverbs are indicators of illocutionary force. However, the adverbs are usually not simple items (e.g. frankly, presumably etc in English). Furthermore, the sentential adverbs are more explicit in the indication of illocutionary force than the particles. For example, in Ewe the adverb d̥wohī (perhaps) is a more explicit indicator of a speaker's uncertainty than the particle łoż (discussed in 2.2.3).

In all the languages in which these particles occur, one can adduce intralinguistic evidence to show that they are different from adverbs. We show in Chapter 3 (see 3.1) that the Ewe particles discussed here belong to a class different from adverbs as well as interjections (or discourse markers). Arndt (1960) has also convincingly demonstrated that the class of German and Russian 'modal particles' are distinguishable from various classes of adverbs and 'modal parentheses' (i.e. discourse markers) on prosodic, syntactic and semantic grounds. He summarises his findings as follows:

Once again the Modal Particle emerges with similar characteristics as in Russian: on the morphemic level, as a minimal-stress morpheme, typically monosyllabic; on the syntactic level, as a segment of inert intonation, maximally restricted in position, neither elicitable nor responsive to non-linguistic stimuli like some of the "subjective adverbs" (naturlich, endlich) and "modal parentheses" (Gott sei Dank, Gott behute). Intonation being morphemic with regard to the modal particle, the proper grammatical niche in our scheme varies accordingly, particularly between the modal particle and the "modal
adverb." The structural features of the five classes of modifiers set up above may again be tabulated to illustrate the relative grammatical position of the modal particle:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Syllabic-</th>
<th>Stress</th>
<th>Intonation</th>
<th>Positions</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Elicit.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>icity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adverb of manner</td>
<td>1-max</td>
<td>prim.</td>
<td>dynamic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective Adverb</td>
<td>2+</td>
<td>second</td>
<td>inert</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modal Adverb</td>
<td>1+</td>
<td>prim.</td>
<td>dynamic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modal Parenthesis</td>
<td>3+</td>
<td>complex</td>
<td>inert</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modal Particle</td>
<td>1+</td>
<td>tert.</td>
<td>inert</td>
<td>1+</td>
<td>negative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(prim. = primary stress,
second = secondary stress,
tert. = tertiary stress,
pos. = positive (yes),
eg. = negative (no) FA.)

Yet Zwicky (1985: 237) asserts that: "Everything I know about the Ger(man FA) conversational particles (i.e. modal particles FA) indicates that they are adverbs with special restriction on their occurrence." All the things that we can put together from studies of these forms in the world's languages and certainly from those of German studies indicate that they are different from adverbs.

It seems that Anglo-Saxon scholars are reluctant to recognise a syntactic category of particles because of the paucity of these items in
English. König (1981: 106) observes very aptly in the opening sentence of a paper on German particles that: "One of the characteristic features of German as opposed to English or French is the existence of a large number of particles." So important are particles in German that in the last decade or so, it is said that about fifteen full-length books have been produced not to mention the numerous articles that are turned out daily (cf Hartmann (to appear)).

There is enough cross-linguistic evidence to suggest that there is a 'universal' linguistic category of what may be called "illocutionary particles" that encode various speaker attitudes. This class of particles, as we characterise them, excludes tense, aspect and negation markers (which some would refer to as particles, using the word in its broad sense) for example, but encompasses topic and focus markers as well as "little items" used to indicate notions like declarative, imperative and interrogative. All these involve speaker attitudes.

Having characterised the term particle we turn to their role and importance in language: Particles are very frequently used and are also very salient in human communication. For us, and from a humanistic linguistic point of view (a viewpoint which we share, cf G. Lakoff 1974, Yngve 1975, Haj. Ross 1982), their study should help us uncover and understand the nature of the users - socially, culturally and psychologically.

There is increasing evidence in many studies that signal that "(T)here are few aspects of any language which reflect the culture of the speech community in question better than its particles" (Wierzbicka 1976: 327). They encode various modes of communication and social
interaction as well as various shades of attitudinal meaning (see for example, Weydt 1979 (Part 1); 1983; Wilkins (to appear) de Spengler 1980; Gülich & Kotschi 1983).

Particles are known to be indispensable items in effecting conversational and discourse coherence (see for example, Locke (op cit) Halliday & Hasan 1967; Schiffrin 1985 inter alia).

Particles also serve as a means of linguistically expressing politeness in many languages. In particular, they are said to hedge the illocutionary forces of the utterances in which they occur (for example, Brown & Levinson 1978; Brend 1978).

Particles also serve to maintain co-operation between conversationalists, as it were. When one cannot keep the conversational contract, s/he may convey it to the other through the use of a particle. They are thus very important in the observance of the rules of conversation (see for example, Lakoff 1972, 1973; Ikranagara 1975).

The Oxford philosopher, Austin, decades ago pointed out that particles are one of the most "primitive" devices in language that enable speakers to make explicit illocutionary forces. Thus they are one of the illocutionary force indicating devices (Searle 1969).

Above all, the appropriate use and mastery of the particles forms an essential and necessary component of the communicative competence of the speaker of a language. For one to be successful in communication, one must be able to use particles felicitously. For a speaker (author) "to mistake in any of these, is to puzzle instead of informing the reader." (Locke op cit: 79).
Indeed, the wrong use of particles leads to miscommunication and especially where one of the interlocutors is a second language learner it results in "cross-cultural pragmatic failure" (Thomas 1983). If linguistics is to contribute not only to the understanding of the nature of human communication but also to cross-cultural communication and understanding, as many argue it should (e.g. Verschueren 1984), then insightful studies of these very important means of communication - particles - should be a sine qua non to fulfilling this role.

Looked at from this perspective, particles and their description require an approach that makes the implicit knowledge contained in them, explicit. Several approaches have emerged, all seeking to expose the use and significance of particles. Each of them is tied to a certain conception of the items as well as certain theoretical persuasions. They range from regarding them as indefinables to 'translating' them into natural or formal languages to identifying their functions as well as illocutionary forces that they have. We review these various approaches briefly in the next section as a point of departure for our own analysis.

1.4 The Linguistics of Particles

As we envisage it, particles ought to be described phonologically, grammatically and semantically (using that word in its broadest sense and thus including what many would describe as pragmatic meaning). We shall however have very little to say about the phonology of the particles under investigation in this work. We also assume that the syntactic functions of particles as well as the environments in which each of the items can occur can be described. Many studies of particles seem to focus on this aspect neglecting their semantic description.
When we come to their semantic description, what is needed is a specification of the entire content—social, attitudinal, cultural, situational—that is encoded in the particle. In other words, a good linguistic account of particles should provide adequate information about what a native speaker knows about them. At the same time, it is such information that a non-native speaker requires in order to understand and use the particles properly (cf. R. Lakoff 1972). This information (derived from rigorous analysis) should be represented in a manner that is linguistically precise and illuminating.

In general, we can say that accounting for the phonological and syntactic properties of particles has not been too much of a problem. What has been the bane of many a linguist (especially semanticists and lexicographers) is how to account for the significance, force and use that particles have in language. The problem, in our view, has various dimensions: What is the nature of the meaning of these particles? How are they to be analysed? How should they be represented? The various approaches that have emerged which we outline below react to these questions in different ways. It seems to us that each of them may have some special value but we would want to see one that is useful not only for the sake of intellectual pursuits but has practical value and relevance for the language user. This is the standard upon which our assessments are based.

First of all, we should disregard those who, because of the difficulty of characterising the content of particles (whether semantic or pragmatic), claim that it is a fruitless venture to essay a definition or explication of particles. All that we have to be content with, it is argued, is that they are indefinables. After all even the
items that are popularly thought of and felt to have more meaning than particles are also indefinable (cf Sampson 1980 Lyons 1981a; Green 1983). Besides, it is only the meanings of the contentives that we should expect to find in a dictionary, the meanings of function words and for that matter particles belong to the grammar and who wants to define grammatical meaning? (cf Palmer 1981: 32-3).

Such an attitude is not merely a traditional one it seems now to have been built into the work of 'Radical Pragmaticians'. In this view, everything is fuzzy and 'meaningless' unless interpreted within the rules of conversation and other relevant knowledge. (See for example, Sadock 1981 on 'almost' and see also Atlas 1984 for criticisms of Sadock. See also Sadock's (1985) cautionary statements to Radical Pragmaticians.) It should be evident that we do not accept such an approach. For us, particles convey meaning and this can be extracted from an examination of the various contexts in which they occur.

One strategy that many people who seek to say something about particles adopt is that of providing translation equivalents for them in another natural language. This practice has been used for a long time by lexicographers and pedagogical grammarians. However, as it is rightly widely acknowledged, idiomatic translation equivalents are not faithful representations of ideas from one language into another, not even when the languages are closely related. Leibniz (1949: 366) long ago pointed out that but in English for example, cannot be substituted for in all instances by French mais, nor is the German allein substitutable for either of these in all contexts. Yet these are some of the translation equivalents that are sometimes proffered for but. If a common particle like but in English does not have appropriate translation equivalents in its close relatives; then how can we expect
Another aspect of this strategy which is a consequence of the unavailability of suitable equivalents is that it tends to impute to a particle several 'meanings'. That is, in the search of equivalents, all the plausible equivalents are listed. This creates the impression that the one particle has 'x' number of meanings rather than presenting it as a unitary form. We shall encounter examples of this in our discussion of the Ewe particles. We are not claiming that particles could not have more than one meaning. They could and we shall see that we have ourselves posited more than one sense for some of the particles we discuss. But what we deplore is where translation equivalents in another language seem to be the guiding factor in the decision-making process of how many senses a particle may have. At best translation equivalents are hints to the analyst on the meaning of a particle and not statements of that meaning.

The inadequacies of this approach can be summed up in the words of Locke (op. cit 99). He wrote:

"Neither is it enough, for the explaining of these words, to render them, as is usual in dictionaries, by words of another tongue which come nearest to their signification: for what is meant by them is commonly as hard to be understood in one as another language. They are all marks of some action or intimation of the mind; and therefore to understand them rightly, the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations, and exceptions, and several other thoughts of the mind, for which we have either none or very deficient names, are diligently to be studied. Of these there is a great variety, much exceeding the number of particles that most languages have to express them by: and therefore it is not to be wondered that most of these
particles have diverse and sometimes almost opposite significations.'

While some choose to provide the force of particles in another natural language, which makes it more complex at times, others choose to represent the significance of particles in formal languages. The particles are either analysed in the framework of Montague's PTQ (e.g. Jacobs 1983) or in Cresswell's \(\lambda\)-categorial grammar (e.g. König 1979, 1981). In König (1981: 130-131) for example, the following is given as a description of "the meaning of erst in the 'non-accomplishment' use."

\[
a. \left(\text{erst}, a, (\lambda x (x, p))\right) \\
b. (a, P) \\
c. (\exists y)[*(y) \wedge (y < a)] \wedge (\forall y) [*(y) \wedge (y < a)] \Rightarrow \neg(y, P)
\]

It is stated that the specific contribution which erst makes to the meaning of a sentence is described by (c). The question is how many language learners (and users) can interpret this language and make use of it? We have nothing but admiration for such academic and intellectual pursuits. Nevertheless, we are unable to use such a method because such a formal language is obscure and if our aim is to expose the significance of the particles, then we need not put it into another language which is very obscure and more complex, probably, than what we are explicating. Besides, if such a representation is going to be used by the ordinary language users who know nothing about logic, it would have to be re-expressed in ordinary language. Why not express it in such a language at once? What we are discussing here calls to mind Barbara Partee's (1979) didactic question: "Semantics - Mathematics or Psychology?" Do we want our meanings to be couched in mathematical formulae or in a form that is psychologically real as well as socially
and culturally revealing? We follow Aristotle's teaching and argue that formal languages are obscure and are therefore not suitable as a means of explicating items, "for the language of a definition ought to be the very clearest possible, seeing that the whole purpose of ordering it is to make something known." (Topica VI.1: 139).

In contrast to such a formal approach but equally abstract and obscure are a number of approaches which we could label discourse-functional approaches. Generally, these attempt to identify the functions of particles in discourse. Characteristically, in these approaches thick descriptions with copious examples of use are provided. Some of the time, generalizations are extracted and talked of in terms of the basic functions and sub-functions of the particles. Thus we hear of topic-marking particles, focus particles, status-marking particles and so on. Others go a step further, especially those with ethnomethodological bias and talk of the particles as conversational coherence signals (Schiffrin 1985); evincives (Schourup 1983) compromisers (James 1983) and turn taking devices (e.g. Owen 1981) (see also Östman 1981).

Particles, we agree, do have functions in discourse and these should be noted. But to provide a catalogue of the various contexts in which a particle is used and derive an abstract basic function from it is not equal to a statement of the meaning nor a guide to the use of the particle. Some of the time too we cannot predict the whole range of the use of the particles from such basic functions. As such these methods also lack the precision, predictive power and concreteness that we desire in our analysis.
There is also a tendency for some analysts to engage in frequency counts of these particles in discourse, both spoken and written. Some comparisons are derived from such projects such as what are the differences in the frequency of occurrence between related particles (see for example, Aijmer 1984). Valuable as these statistical counts may be for validating certain aspects of the particles, they should not be substituted for nor are they descriptions of the meanings of these particles.

Some analysts choose to work within the framework of conversational logic as propounded by Grice (1975; 1978, see also Gordon & Lakoff G. 1971; Sadock 1978; Leech 1983; Levinson 1983; Sperber & Wilson (to appear)). In essence, it is claimed that there are some rules of conversation that interlocutors observe. For example, it is assumed that what a speaker is communicating is true, (Quality) that the speaker would make the communication as informative, relevant and perspicuous as required. From this viewpoint, the particles are considered as signals to the addressee that a maxim is being violated. Robin Lakoff (1972, 1973a) examines some Japanese particles in this way. She also analysed well in English along similar lines. What her findings come to are basically statements of function e.g. that well is prefaced to an answer if a respondent knows the answer is not sufficient information for the question asked. That is, it signals that the speaker is violating the postulate that one should be as informative as is required. This is a functional statement and not a formulation of meaning (see Wierzbicka 1976; 360; Svartvik 1980; for attempts at formulating the meaning of well; see also Owen 1981).

Some of the studies that have been done with this orientation suggest that it is not every particle that can be thought of in terms of
conversational maxims. When discussing particles of the kind we examine in this work in Betawi, Ikranagara (1975: 95) contends that: "The basic meanings of these particles in Betawi may be described in terms of feelings of the speaker and violations of conversational postulates."

He then divides the particles into those that express speaker feelings and those that indicate violations of conversational postulates. Why do we have to have two different models for analysing items that we feel are similar. We would prefer to have our particles analysed in a unitary semantic framework.

Apart from this, we wonder about the usefulness of this approach to a language user. How can somebody learning Betawi, for example, make use of an explanation like the following:

"The particle kan in a statement asserts that what is said is known to the addressee. It signals a violation of the postulate: what is being said is not known to other participants"

(Ikranagara 1975: 99)

Our point is that if the speaker is sure that the addressee knows what s/he is saying then what an analyst should be looking for is why the speaker should say it and moreover, why Betawi lexicalises this concept explicitly. This would be the true logic of Betawi conversation. If this can be displayed, it would be more illuminating than just saying particle X violates conversational maxim Y.

We are equally worried about the doubts that have been raised about the whole field of conversational maxims (see for example, Larkin & O'Malley 1973 and Sterelny 1982 inter alia). Elinor Keenan (1976) has challenged their universality and Sperber & Wilson (to appear) argue
that there is probably only one essential maxim; that of relevance. If this is so then what would Betawi \texttt{kan} now violate? We agree with Östman (1981: 37) when he rejects this approach for the analysis of particles because it is not always clear "what these violations are violations of."

Surely, it is instructive to think of what the conversational implicature of a particle is, but it does not provide the whole story. To say, for example, that Betawi \texttt{kan} signals that what is being said is not meant to increase the addressee's knowledge is just to indicate one component of its illocutionary force viz: "I assume you know this". Since this is an assumption, it is open to contradiction, amendment or confirmation, hence we suggest that there is another component which can be stated as:

"I assume you will agree with me"

Indeed, Ikranagara (1975: 99) points out that in one of its uses, \texttt{kan} has the force of a tag question. However, such a use cannot, in our view, be inferred from the particle's description as a violation of this or that conversational maxim. But such an aspect is deducible from our rough paraphrase. Our approach thus enables us to present a more complete and predictive account of the particle. What we want is a full representation of the significance of the particles not partial accounts.

Also common but equally inadequate is the analysis of particles as markers of various politeness phenomena in language. In fact, R. Lakoff (1972) as well as Ikranagara (1975) extend the issue of violations of
conversational maxims to principles of politeness which are said to be deducible from the violations. Brown & Levinson (1978 passim) illustrate many of their points on politeness with particles from a variety of languages. Particles are thus said to modify the illocutionary forces of utterances especially when there is a face-threatening act being performed. Such statements are also abstract and do not instruct a language user in the appropriate use of a particle.

By now, it may be wondered if there was ever a method that would not be thought of as abstract and unhelpful to the language user? Yes, there is. That method is based on illocutionary semantics. We shall discuss this approach in the next section but before that let us briefly mention a number of approaches that have recently surfaced especially in relation to Japanese particles.

A number of authors feel that the best way to deal with the troublesome sentence - final forms in Japanese is to set up a scale using a particular notion or function as a parameter and pitch the various particles on it. Thus Kamio (1979) explains the use of various Japanese final forms in terms of a notion of the "Speaker's Territory of Information". Tsuchihashi (1983) following Givon (1982) (see also Givon (1984)) argues that the particles "represent the lexicalisation of a non-discrete speech act continuum between what has traditionally been labelled 'declarative' and 'interrogative'". After arguing against Tsuchihashi's analysis, Kendall (1985) advocates another scale - a scale of speaker's commitment to what is being said and the particles are plotted on it from strong commitment to weak commitment.

These are all interesting and some of the graphs are pleasant to see but the question is do such analyses represent the significance of
the particles? Is it a linguistically precise and illuminating way of representing and interpreting symbols? We wonder! How many second language learners would make any sense of graphs? If we want to be able to use *sa* for example, felicitously in Japanese, knowing that it is the last but one towards the end on the continuum from interrogative to declarative does not tell us anything about what it means. Similarly, knowing that it is about the fifth item from the top on the scale of strength of commitment is not any better.

Thus all the approaches we have surveyed so far do not appeal to us as having practical value for language users. We reject the linguistic representation of the significance of particles through translation equivalents, formal languages, discourse functions, conversational postulates, politeness strategies and graphic scales of various notions.

Admittedly, all these viewpoints of looking at particles throw some light on aspects of the particles. The results of their application might contribute some features to the semantic representation of the illocutionary forces that the particles are exponents of. Nevertheless, to say that a particle is used to save face or is the violation of a conversational maxim is just to talk about aspects of its entire illocutionary significance. In our view, then, an approach that seeks to spell out the illocutionary force rather than politeness or discourse function is more powerful from a scientific point of view and more useful from a practical point of view. Thus although these methods may be complementary in making explicit the implicit knowledge enshrined in various particles (cf Staab 1983), one of them is more articulate than the rest and that is the illocutionary semantic framework which we describe in the next section.
Taking a cue from the observation that particles make explicit the illocutionary forces that speaker's want to convey, some linguists have adopted a speech act approach to the analysis of particles. Within this paradigm there are two main streams. One adopts a performative analysis approach (J. Ross 1970). Basically, the analysts reconstruct the particles as performative clauses in terms of a first person subject and performative verbs. Thus Uyeno (1971) postulated verbs like state, ask, order and suggest for the underlying forms of Japanese particles. That in her analysis, the particles yo and ne can have any of the four verbs depending on the context suggests one problem with this system of doing things. First, it shows that it is difficult to pinpoint the verb that underlies the particle. Second, it does not help us to see the differences between closely related particles. How do we know when to use yo and when to use ne if they have identical underlying verbs?

These shortcomings are not unique to Uyeno's work but they reflect some of the inadequacies of performative analysis in general (see Leech 1983, for example, for criticisms of the performative hypothesis). This, notwithstanding, some other linguists have used the same framework. Cheng (1977, 1980) analyses Taiwanese and Chinese particles in it. The perspective of Morton (1978) is evident from the label he gives to the items he discusses: viz, 'performative particles'. Gibbons (1980) proposes a speech-act framework for Cantonese utterance final particles. Donaldson (1980) postulates underlying structures such as: 'I assert that X' and 'I counter-assert that X' etc for Ngiyamba clitics.
Some insights can be gained from such underlying structures but to define particles in terms of performative verbs is not to define at all. It is tantamount to defining a complex sign in terms of another complex sign because the illocutionary verbs are complex in themselves and need to be decomposed (see Verschueren 1981, Leech 1983; J. Hudson (MS) and Wierzbicka (in press)).

If the purpose of analysing the particles is to bring out their essence, then using a complex sign to do so does not help. For this reason we favour the other stream of the illocutionary semantic approach to particles that breaks down the illocutionary forces into components. This is the basis of the analysis of some English particles by Goddard (1976; 1979); of Polish and English particles by Wierzbicka (1976); of Warlpiri particles by Harkins (to appear) and of Aranda particles by Wilkins (to appear).

This latter approach is founded on the view that illocutionary forces, of whatever linguistic expression, are amalgams of feelings, assumptions, thoughts intentions and purposes which a speaker conveys. Many studies of illocutionary acts support this claim, for example, Searle (1976), Norrick (1978), van Dijk (1981: 215-241) and Wierzbicka (1972, 1980, in press). (See also Ameka 1985b). Thus if particles are exponents of illocutionary forces then an analysis of their significance is synonymous with unravelling all the components of the illocutionary force which are relevant for the understanding and use of the particles. These may be situational, attitudinal, cultural, social and psychological features as well as conventions and purposes that are embodied in the particles.
What we shall do with the Ewe particles we investigate in this study is to search for the components of their illocutionary forces. The question that arises is the following: How do we ensure that we do not represent these forces in a language that is obscure and also that what we postulate as the force of a particle is not just a partial representation of the entire significance of the particle? This is a general methodological question as well as one of empirical verification whose answer can be found in the works of Aristotle and Leibniz and their followers in linguistic semantics.

First, what should be the language of the representation? That is, what should be the features of the metalanguage of the explications? We are guided by Aristotle's teaching in our choice. He taught in his Topica (VI.3) that to judge whether an analyst has defined or explicated or not, the reviewer should "see if he has failed to make the definition through terms that are prior and more intelligible. For, the reason why the definition is rendered is to make known the term stated and we make things known by taking not any random terms but such as are prior and more intelligible .... accordingly it is clear that a man (or woman F.A.) who does not define through terms of this kind has not defined at all."

Ultimately, the "prior and more intelligible" terms should be those that are indefinable, that is, semantic primitives. The search for such terms has gone on for centuries and in current linguistic semantics, the one persistent proponent of such terms, Anna Wierzbicka, has submitted that "(A)ll sentences in all natural languages can be paraphrased in terms of ... thirteen signs." These are:
"I, you, someone, something, world, this, want, not want, think of, say, imagine, be a part of, become."

(Wierzbicka 1980: 10)

These constitute a metalanguage of semantic primitives based on a natural language, English, but which to some extent at least, is culture independent.

Ideally, the various components of the forces of the particles we analyse should be expressed in these semantic primitives. However that would result in very copious formulations which would be practically unattractive. We therefore use these primitives and other near-primitives which are intuitively intelligible in our explications. We do so because we are aware that they are relatively simple and relatively language independent terms.

Several advantages accrue from using such terms: they enable us to show in fine detail the similarities and differences that exist between a number of particles that have hitherto been described in general terms, such as, question particles (Chapter 2); addressive particles (Chapter 3). Furthermore, our formulations can be more easily compared to the meanings of other particles in other languages, granting that they are analysed along these lines. Above all, and very relevant for the Ewe situation is that the explications we propose which are couched in very simple terms can be faithfully translated into other languages, for example, French, or Kabiye or German or any other language for that matter when required for lexicographic and/or pedagogic reasons. We should note here, in the light of recent criticisms by Mufwene (1985), that the translation we are talking about
is that of the sense embodied in the linguistic sign. The translation then is a translation of a paraphrase of the meaning rather than an idiomatic translation. Hence we feel any cultural component which is relevant and which has been captured in the formula can also get translated into other languages. To test this assumption and to validate the 'universality' of the terms we use, we offer in Appendix B a unilingual dictionary of the Ewe particles investigated in the study.

This brings us to the other part of the question of how to determine whether what we have come up with is the true explication that captures every instance of the particle. Here, we are guided by Leibniz. He advised grammarians in the following words:

"For a proper explanation of the particles, it is not sufficient to make an abstract explication...; but we must proceed to a paraphrase which may be substituted in its place, as the definition may be put in the place of the thing defined. When we have striven to seek and to determine these suitable paraphrases in all the particles so far as they are susceptible of them, we shall have regulated their significations."

(Leibniz 1949: 366-67)
(emphasis in original FA)

Thus to test whether we have definitional equivalence, we substitute our formulations for the particles in concrete utterances. This is the empirical test of the adequacy of our explications.

We might add here that Pulman (1983) has argued against the use of semantic primitives in the definition of words because, in his view, even though linguists strive to attain definitional equivalency they fail. He adds: "It is surely not a wholly contingent matter that even the most careful work seems to be inadequate. For example, the detailed
and systematic attempt by Wierzbicka (1972) to describe parts of English
(using primitives FA) while interesting and ingenious produces analyses
which fail the most basic test of synonymy..." (Pulman op cit: 42) He
goes on to illustrate the point with the definition of X feels afraid.
He describes a situation which to him satisfies Wierzbicka's definition
of X feels afraid but which cannot necessarily be referred to as feeling
afraid, but "more likely angry, or frustrated, or even resigned" (Pulman
ibidem). What Pulman fails to realise is that the other states of
anger, frustration etc have something in common with 'afraid'. As such
they must share some components. Besides the situation he describes is
not equivalent to that of 'feeling afraid' hence we cannot expect to
have definitional equivalence. Maybe a definition of X feels frustrated
might satisfy his situation. Be that as it may, we do not think that it
is a strong enough argument to use against semantic primitives.

We admit that it is hard to get the optimal formula but that is
what the challenge is. It is even harder to do so for particles because
of their very colloquial and pervasive nature in language. As Svartvick
(1980) found out, his attempt at a paraphrase for English well was not
substitutable for it in all contexts. Although one would have thought
that a search for a paraphrase that would suit all contexts would have
been the right thing to do, he only concedes defeat and blames it on the
nature of the particle. He writes:

"The attempts at paraphrasing well turned out to be no more
than moderately successful, which is only to be expected
since its basic function is pragmatic rather than semantic".

(Svartvik 1980: 176)
The failure, in our view, does not lie in the basic function being pragmatic. It lies in an analyst not being able to spend a little more time to find a suitable paraphrase, after all Wierzbicka (1976: 360) was able to find one for the same particle.

All in all, our concern is to make known the illocutionary strategies and modes of social interaction that are encapsulated in the selected Ewe particles. We thus follow the principles outlined by Wierzbicka (1976: 332-333) for the analysis of particles and wish to persuade linguists of whatever orientation to do the same. She sums up the method of analysis as follows:

"If the linguist describing a language wants to enable his addressee to 'feel' the force of a particle, to understand the unifying principle behind its apparently diverse uses, to comprehend the logic which controls the native speaker's use of it, he must experiment with different possible paraphrases until he hits upon one which would fit all the types of contexts in which this particle has been observed to appear. If one cannot be found, then let it be two or three - but two or three that are related that have a common core, which again can be identified in terms of an accurate paraphrase, not in terms of some vague and not fully apposite label."

This is the thrust of our methodology.

Now, a note of clarification on how we construe 'meaning'. We have all along pointed out that it is broadly used to include both semantics and pragmatics. We have even said that it is synonymous with illocutionary force (for the particles). We further outlined illocutionary force to embrace social, psychological, situational, attitudinal assumptions, conventions and purposes associated with the linguistic item in question. It means that in our analysis we consider...
irrelevant the distinction that many people make between semantics and pragmatics. Consider this characteristic statement on the meaning of particles such as well which Levinson (1983: 50) uses to argue for a pragmatic component of language: "It can be plausibly claimed that like so and many other words, well has no semantic content only pragmatic specifications for usage." It seems to us that the question is not whether it has semantic content or pragmatic specification but rather whether it has meaning or force. Moreover, because particles are explicit performatives the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is irrelevant.

We are encouraged to make this assertion because some of the people who have shown this distinction particularly strongly concede that it is irrelevant for such items. Leech (1981: 331) claims that: "In performatives (i.e. explicit performatives FA) the marriage between semantics and pragmatics is a very unequal one: the force of the utterance is explicitly given as part of its sense, so that need for a complementary model of pragmatics is not evident." This was after he had argued for a complementarist position on the two in the theory of meaning.

Similarly, Groenendijk & Stokhof (1978) who also argue for a theory of meaning that recognises the components of semantics and pragmatics admit that "the semantics of propositional connectives and propositional operators (= particles FA) can be defined in terms of the same epistemic system as the pragmatics." Thus the dichotomy between semantics and pragmatics becomes neutralised when the linguistic items are exponents of illocutionary force.
When we talk of meaning of particles we refer to their illocutionary force which entails all things semantic or pragmatic that contribute to its significance. To illustrate this point with a negative example, consider the explication of the English formulaic expression *sorry* which many would consider as having no semantic content. We would argue that the components of its illocutionary force are as spelled out in the formula. For a full justification of the formula see Ameka (1985b), but note that we have components expressing the speaker's feelings (e.g. b) and intentions (e.g. d) as well as assumptions (e.g. c), for instance. Note also that some of the components describe the situation in which the form is uttered (e.g. a) and component (d), for instance, spells out the social convention of the speech community. All these constitute the illocutionary force of the utterance and such aspects of the particles are also built into their explications where relevant.

**Sorry!**

a. I know I have done something bad to you

b. I feel something bad because of that

c. I assume you feel something bad towards me because of it

d. I want to say the kind of thing one should say to another when she does things of this kind to him/her

e. I say: I have done something bad to you

f. I say it because I want to show how I feel and to cause you to feel something good

g. I imagine that you would not want to feel *something bad* towards me because of what I say...
Having outlined our theoretical framework and methodology we shall in the next section present the state of the art in the study of Ewe particles. We shall conclude this chapter with an overview of the rest of the chapters.

1.6 Ewe Particles: The State of the Art

It will become evident that most people who describe Ewe offer notes here and there on mostly the syntactic features of various Ewe particles. However no systematic study has ever been made of these ubiquitous and salient forms in the language. Nor has anybody attempted to show the illocutionary significance of the particles.

One of the reasons for this is the preoccupation of the analysts with grammar (syntax) and not meaning. Thus one can find impressive tabulations of these elements. For example, Pazzi (1977) has a "Tableau de Particules". He lists many items such as nominalising affixes which do not fit our characterisation of the term particle.

The most comprehensive and painstaking classificatory analysis of these forms known to us is that of Duthie (1970; see also 1982 and forthcoming). His class of particles comprises the items we consider particles as well as others which do not fit any other syntactic class, for example, the possessive marker. (See Appendix A for a list of selected illocutionary particles in Ewe).

The only other thing that has been pursued in the study of Ewe which bears relevance to the particles is the investigation of linguistic items (including particles) that are used to express various
communicative functions (see Duthie 1984 and forthcoming). This has yielded a more or less functional catalogue of these particles. Thus under question function are listed all the particles discussed in Chapter 2 and so on.

The present study then is the first attempt ever to go beyond descriptive and functional labels to explain and explicate the particles. It is the start of the monumental task of adequately describing not only Ewe particles but Ewe in general. We shall now turn to how this work is organised.

1.7 Organization of the Study

Our thesis is that particles have illocutionary significance and these can be spelled out in intuitively intelligible simple terms which is socially, culturally and psychologically revealing using the theory and methodology outlined in 1.5. To support this thesis and demonstrate its validity, we have selected a number of Ewe particles for analysis.

In Chapter 2, after discussing the relationship between interrogative structures and the function of question, we describe the use of the utterance - final question particles à máhà dê and lóo and an initial particle dê and postulate semantic formulae for each of them.

In Chapter 3 we examine another set of utterance - final particles which are mutually exclusive with the question ones.

We conclude in the final chapter with a brief summary of our work and point out some of its theoretical and practical implications and applications.
Throughout, we adduce intralinguistic evidence from Ewe to support our claims. But we also substantiate our points where possible with the findings from linguistic typological studies and language universals. We try as far as possible to place our work in a typological perspective.

Our Ewe examples are drawn from plays and novels written by native speakers and which are judged to be natural in colloquial usage. We also construct our own examples.

We now invite the reader to enter the world of the Ewes as represented in part in the particles which we examine in the following pages.
"To the philosopher, the logician and the linguist, questions have a special fascination." (Hiż 1978: ix)

2.0 Introduction

It has been widely assumed that declarative, imperative and interrogative sentences are basic and near-universal sentence patterns in language. Typically, this assumption is explained and justified by claiming that human beings regularly communicate with each other through making statements, issuing commands and asking questions. Since language is a medium of expressing the salient activities of its users, then it is reasonable to expect that every language should have ways of expressing and formally marking these activities. Hence the basic sentence types which typically express the basic communicative acts are found in almost all languages. Declaratives express statements, imperatives commands and interrogatives questions. While this may be true, it must be conceded that even if these communicative functions (or speech acts) are universal, they too like many other illocutionary acts are "regulated in all societies by more or less culture-specific institutions, practices and beliefs." (Lyons 1981b:188; see also Goody 1978b; Brown & Levinson 1978; Denuth & Yanco 1979; Harris 1980; Verschueren 1981; Leech 1983; Levinson 1983; Hudson MS, among others.)

Even more widespread and quite well documented is the variation across the world's languages of the formal markers of these functions.
Interrogativity, for example, is marked variously in languages by the use of special affixes, particles or clitics, or words in addition to syntactic devices such as inversion and even phonological devices such as intonation. Needless to say, combinations of these are also employed (see Moravcsik 1971; Ultan 1978; Bolinger 1972a, 1982; Chisholm 1984; Sadock & Zwicky 1985 among others).

Ewe, like many other languages, has a number of interrogative markers which we outline in 2.2.0. In this chapter, we select for investigation those particles that are employed in forming general questions. Before we do that, we first make some observations on the phenomenon of interrogative structures. We find the attempts that have been made to characterise the notion of 'question' unsatisfactory. Consequently, we suggest a common invariant definition for it in our discussion.

2.1 Interrogative Signals vs Questions: Some Observations

"Quaestio est petitio rei ignotae ut cum petitur aliquid quod homo non intellegit et intellegere cupit."

(Lullus 1303 (1971): 11)

[A question is a request (search?) for something unknown; as when someone is searching for something that he doesn't understand and wants to understand.]

(Wierzbicka 1980: 344)

The problem that confronts anyone who attempts to describe the meaning of interrogative structures is that each occurrence of the syntactic interrogative category does not necessarily have the sense of question as outlined in the above classical definition of centuries ago. That is, there is a misfit between the interrogative form and the
question function (see Akmajian 1984). The issue is more intriguing than this. Some of the interrogative structures that have a sense of question do not always imply that the speaker seeks to understand something that s/he does not understand. That is, some structures that are interrogative in nature may have a force different from seeking information. As Hamblin (1967: 52) puts it: "Asking a question Q pragmatically implies lack of knowledge and desire to know the answer to Q and belief that the person addressed knows the answer. These "implications" are not all present in all contexts". The purpose of suspending the "implications" in various circumstances have been extensively discussed and has led to a typology of questions according to what are called pragmatic functions (cf Searle 1969; Bach & Harnish 1979, Lyons 1981b; Leech 1981, 1983; Goody 1978b, Kiefer 1981 among others).

Before looking at this typology, let us first examine another classification of questions that has been maintained traditionally in grammar. Grammarians have usually distinguished three types of supposedly universal interrogative sentences viz:

i) Yes-no questions - questions that could be answered with yes or no. For example,

(1) Are you studying here?

ii) WH-questions (also referred to as x questions (Jespersen); term or special or categorial questions (e.g. Wunderlich 1976, 1981) or open questions (e.g. Robinson & Rackstraw 1972: 3). These seek information about a specific part of a proposition. For example,

(2) Why did you come to Australia?
iii) Alternative questions - questions in which a speaker specifies a list of options from which the addressee selects the answer. For example,

(3a) Are you going or not?
(3b) Do you study or teach at the University?

In English and many other languages, for example Russian (see Comrie 1984), alternative questions are signalled by a special intonation contour. (3c) can have two readings depending on the intonation. If there is a rise on 'happy' followed by a fall on 'excited', it is an alternative question. But if it has a single rising intonation over it, it is a general question.

(3c) Are you happy or excited?

Some misgivings have been expressed about the term 'yes-no questions'. It is a misnomer because such questions need not be answered by a yes or no. (1) could be answered by any of 4a, b or c.

(4a) Yes, (I am)
(b) No, (I am not)
(c) Actually, I am on a visit.

Other terms have been proposed. These include polar questions, general questions; nexus questions (Karttunen 1978, Hintikka 1978; Wunderlich 1976; Belnap et al 1976; Bäuerle 1979; and closed questions. Aristotle referred to them as dialectical questions (Topica 58a 15; De Interpretatione 20b 22) because they involve a binary choice which makes them closely related to alternative questions.

Some linguists have used this property of these questions to argue that they have the same underlying structure as alternative questions (e.g. Katz & Postal 1964; Stockwell et al 1968; Langacker 1974; Haiman
1974, Oleksy 1979; see Bolinger 1978b for references to earlier similar treatments). This implies that the meanings of (1) and (5) are identical.

(5) Are you studying here or not?

The fallacy of this view need not delay us here because it has been exposed by other linguists (see Chafe 1970; Quirk & Greenbaum 1973; Li & Thompson 1979; Bolinger 1978; Wierzbicka 1980; Ree 1981 for various degrees of precision in contradicting the claim). In general, it is shown that (5) has a hectoric, impatient tone associated with it which (1) lacks. We therefore assume that general questions are not alternative questions. We furthermore accept for the purposes of this study the tripartite classification but would refer to them as propositional questions, categorial questions and alternative questions. Any adequate treatment of interrogatives in languages must characterise these different classes of questions.

This may not be an easy task but a more challenging one is that any adequate theory of questions must take account of the different functional types that are realised by interrogative sentences that belong to one or other of the structural classes. Some of the major functional types are outlined below.

First, some questions are asked to truly seek information. With these questions all the implications of pragmatically asking a question are present (cf Hamblin op cit).

Second, there are examination questions. In this case, the questioner may be aware of the answer but wants to find out if the
addressee also knows the answer. (6) is a good example of a Religious Studies examination question,

(6) Who betrayed Jesus?

Third, there are didactic questions (that is, "quaestio de qua quæritur" a question about which one is inquiring, Wierzbicka 1980: 315). These pose a problem for discussion. These are very commonly found in academic articles. For example,

(7a) Is language a mirror of culture?
(7b) What is language?

Fourth, there are rhetorical questions. The answer to such a question may be obvious and known to both the speaker and the addressee. The speaker does not expect an answer. For example,

(8) Can the blind lead the blind?

Fifth, some interrogatives are used to express exclamation. These express a speaker's attitude and feelings but at the same time make use of interrogative structures (see Züber 1983 and Zaefferer 1983)

e.g. (9a) Isn't she pretty?
(9b) What a nuisance?

Sixth, there are interrogative criticisms. A speaker poses a question as a criticism of what the addressee may have done.

e.g. (10) Why paint your house purple?
Seventh, a speaker may pose a question and by it instruct the addressee to do something. These are the so-called WHIMPERATIVES. A speaker may extend an invitation by (11a) or offer by (11b).

(11a) Why don't you come for dinner tomorrow?
(11b) How about a beer?
(11c) Would you like to come in?

This list could be extended but these are sufficient for our purposes. One way of looking at the problem is to treat the first type as true questions and all the other types as defective questions (see e.g. Searle 1969; Bellert 1972; Bach & Harnish 1979). This approach does not take us far because it does not help us to give a general characterisation of the notion question, to cover the whole range of uses of the term.

Lyons (1977: 755) proposes a solution which he believes is general enough and covers "not only information-seeking questions, but various kinds of rhetorical and didactic questions without obliging us to treat these as being in any respect abnormal or parasitic upon information seeking questions" (ibidem). What he suggests is that we make "... a distinction between asking a question of someone and simply posing the question (without necessarily addressing it to anyone). When we pose a question, we merely give expression to, or externalise our doubt; and we can pose questions which we do not merely expect to remain unanswered, but which we know or believe to be unanswerable. To ask a question of someone is both to pose the question and in doing so, to give some indication to one's addressee that he is expected to respond by answering the question that is posed." (ibid)
The distinction seems a reasonable one to draw but what its value is, is questionable. It seems to us that it is not very different from the true vs defective dichotomy that we mentioned earlier on. We desire to know what is invariant and common to both questions 'asked' and questions 'posed'.

A very recent attempt has been made by Rakic' (1984) to solve the problem. He proposes what he considers to be a more general notion of questions that takes account of all the various kinds. He believes that his analysis is congenial to that of Lyons (op cit) but at the same time more "specific and more radical" (p 694). To him, the definition of a question should be:

"Uttering a question, an S (= Speaker FA) expresses
a) His or her attitude toward some proposition p, and
b) The intention that some H (= Hearer FA) express his or her attitude toward p." (p 711)

Although Rakic' ostensibly claims to be defining questions he admits that he was concerned only with "yes-no questions" (in Serbo-Croatian). Clearly, this definition does not apply to categorial questions which are "defective" propositions in that they lack terms.

Granting that his definition applies only to propositional questions, we still wonder if it covers all the functional types - even those that Rakic' discusses such as rhetorical questions. We do not believe that for every question the speaker expects the addressee to express his or her attitude toward the proposition. Rakic' does not say what this word means, but if we are to understand it in its everyday sense, then there are obviously questions to which the addressee does not express his attitude. A case in point is the following:
(12) These are not good for anything, or are they?

The question is rhetorical and just emphasises the first statement. Other questions are just meant to be thought about (deliberated upon) and the addressee need not express his attitude, for example, some didactic questions.

It is also not clear whether those questions to which an addressee reacts in a non-verbal way are expected to be understood as an expression of attitude. For instance, some children in a classroom are talking and a teacher says (13) to them. They keep quiet without saying a word, is this an expression of attitude or not? Possibly, but Rakić does not make this clear.

(13) Can't you be quiet?

Rakić's proposal is indeed more specific than Lyons' and excludes many questions that one would want to characterise as such. Probably, a speaker expects an addressee to form an attitude towards all questions rather than express it.

Kiefer (1981) contends that an adequate theory of questions which encompasses the various kinds can be arrived at if we stipulate" a common semantic structure for all questions - apart from differences in propositional structure - and let pragmatics do the rest" (p 159). One wonders what he would do with those questions whose differences are syntactically encoded. For example, should we leave pragmatics to tell the difference between (14a) and (14b)?
(14a) Why paint your house purple?

(14b) Why don't you be quiet?

Although we do not agree with him entirely on leaving "pragmatics to do the rest", we share the spirit of the first part of his proposal. What is common to all questions is their interrogative nature and so if one can find a common semantic structure for it then all questions can be catered for.

Kiefer proposes that the interrogative operator be interpreted as:

"The speaker (=S) poses P (i.e. propositional content FA) that calls for solution. (In short S poses P)" (op cit: 162)

One wonders about a number of things in this interpretation. What does "call for a solution" mean? Does every question have to be solved? Can questions like (15a) and (15b) be solved?

(15a) Shouldn't we help our friends when they are in need?

(15b) What man would like a prostitute for a wife?

Above all what are we to understand by "S poses P"? What does "pose" entail?

Be that as it may, we do need a common semantic structure but Kiefer's suggestion does not satisfy all questions. Wierzbicka (1980: 316) has conjectured that "the most likely semantic invariant of all interrogative sentences, if there is one, is to be found in the dictum rather than in any other component". She does not state this categorically but a perusal of the semantic explication she offers for various interrogative sentences reveals an invariant like:

"I say: I want you to tell me"
This is certainly not common to all interrogative sentences, but it does provide a clue to what the invariant may look like. We propose that what is common to all interrogative sentences semantically and manifested in the various kinds of questions is the elicitation of a response - be it verbal or non-verbal (cf Goody 1978b: 26; Sadock & Zwicky 1985: 160). Every interrogative sentence demands a response, those used indirectly for other speech acts like ordering, suggesting, or inviting demand on action. Rhetorical questions and didactic questions may require a mental process of thinking about an issue. All these are in response, so to speak, to the question. We maintain that it is the interrogative marker that gives them this meaning.

We suggest that the invariant for interrogative sentences be formulated, tentatively, as follows:

I want you to say something because of what I say if you can.

If it is a rhetorical question, because its answer is obvious, the addressee could not say anything. Similarly, an examination question can only be answered if the addressee knows the answer. Whimperatives are usually responded to before acting upon them. We feel that our formulation is general enough to cover all the various kinds of questions.

To conclude this section, let us note other classes of questions that we may encounter. Some questions are multiple questions in that a speaker asks for more than one thing at a time (cf Bolinger 1978a; Kuno & Robinson 1972). There are also mixed questions in which a speaker poses a question and suggests an answer by posing another question. For example,
(16) How do you finance your study, by scholarship?

A further kind of question is the one referred to in the literature as "safe" questions. In these questions, the speaker presents a proposition (an existential one) and asks a question with respect to it as in (17).

(17) If something happened; what?

The way these various things operate in relation to interrogative sentences in Ewe will become evident as we proceed with our analysis. Before we embark on a detailed analysis, we outline the various markers of interrogativity that are found in Ewe.

2.2 Interrogative Signals in Ewe

2.2.0 Outline

Ewe interrogative sentences are indicated largely by lexical means. Categorial questions combine lexical as well as phonological and syntactic means. The following are the morphemes that mark interrogativity.

I ̀: It occurs at the end of utterances consisting of words (18a), phrases (18b), or sentences (18c) to mark them as propositional questions.

(18a) E-gbe-̀?

Today Q

Today?
(18b) Le kplɔ gome - ã?
At table under Q
Under the table?

(18c) Kofi klɔ jkü-me-ã?
K wash eye in Q
Has Kofi washed his face?

II máhã : This particle is used in either propositional or categorical questions. It can occur at the end of a word (19a), a phrase (19b), or a sentence (19c).

(19a) E-gbe máhã?
Today Q
Today?

(19b) Le kplɔ gome máhã?
At table under Q
Under the table?

(19c) Kofi klɔ jkü - me máhã?
K wash eye in Q
Has K washed his face?

(19d) Nú - ka di - m ne - le máhã?
Thing WH search PROG 2SG PRES Q
What (on earth) are you looking for?
cp: Núka di-m nè-le?
What are you looking for

III lóo : This particle optionally precedes another one aló to indicate disjunction in general. For example,
(20a) Kofi (lo'o) alo Ama  
K or A  
Either Kofi or Ama

But when lo'o occurs by itself at the end of a word (20b) phrase (20c) or sentence (20d) constituting an utterance, it is interrogative.

(20b) Nye loo?  
1SG Q  
I or?

(20c) Sr > - wo - e loo?  
Spouse 2SG FOC Q  
Is it your spouse or?

(20d) Fofó - wo mut - e le de wò ge' loo?  
Father 2SG self, FOC be marry 2SG INGR Q  
Is it your father himself who is going to marry you or?

IV de': This particle generally marks a word, a phrase or a sentence to which it is attached as a question.

(21a) Kofi de'  
K Q  
Where is/How is Kofi?

(21b) e-g'o me de'  
3SG under Q  
What does it mean?

(21c) e - me k'o de'  
3SG in clear Q  
Is it clear?
When I came, what could you do?

V 𓐱: Occurs at the beginning of some questions marked by 𓐱, 𓐱, and 𓐱 to introduce them, as it were:

(22a) 𓐱 2SG&NEG sleep sleep at night in NEG Q
Is it that you did not sleep in the night?

(22b) 𓐱 2SG want that LOG SBJV escape Q
Is it that you want to escape or?

(22c) 𓐱 Kofi* refuse spouse DEF Q
Is it that Kofi divorced the spouse?

VI 𓐱 : This particle has been classified as an interrogative specifier (Ansre 1966) or demonstrative (Duthie 1970, 1982) which modifies a nominal, whether a phrase or a word as a questioned element of an utterance. It may be glossed as WH.

(23a) 𓐱 Animal WH 2SG cook today
What meat did you cook today?

(23b) 𓐱 Woman beautiful WH FOC be that
Which beautiful woman is that?
This form like some other determiners in Ewe gets adjoined to superordinate nouns with general meanings viz: nú 'thing'; ame 'person'; afí 'place'; álé 'manner' to form interrogative pronominals and pro-adverbials.

(24a) ame + ka \rightarrow ameka
     person WH who

(24b) nú + ka \rightarrow núka
     thing WH what

(24c) afí + ka \rightarrow afíka
     place WH where

(24d) álé + ke \rightarrow áléke
     manner WH how

(24e) nú + ka + ta \rightarrow núkata
     thing WH because why

It may be substantivized by prefixing a third person singular pronoun to it:

(24f) é + ka \rightarrow éka
     3SG WH which

This prefix is sometimes elided.

Generic temporal nouns are repeated as if recapitulated after the particle, when they form interrogative temporal pronouns.

e.g. (24g) gbe + ka + gbe \rightarrow gbekagbe
    day WH day what day/when
VII nene : is a particle which Pazzi (1977) calls "interrogatif de quantité". It is a pronominal interrogative word which may be glossed as "how many" or "how much". It is used for categorial questions. (cp Polish ile/ilu, see Oleksy 1979; and Latin quot)

(25a) Ga nene - e fo?
Bell how many FOC strike
What time is it?

(25b) Vi nene - e le asi - wo?
Child how many FOC be at hand 2SG
How many children do you have?

(25c) Ho nene - e ne - fle avo la?
Money how many FOC 2SG buy cloth DEF
How much did you buy the cloth?

Ka (WH) and nene (how much/many) are the two morphemes used for categorial questions. These questions always terminate in a low tone on the last syllable. However, this is only recognizable if the tone on the last syllable is a high one. In that case the fusion of the two tones becomes a falling one. For example,

(26a) Tefe ka-e ne - tsɔ?
Place WH FOC 2SG come from
Where do you come from?

(26b) Ati gaa nene - e Kofi tsɔ?
Tree big how many FOC K fell
How many big trees did Kofi fell?
These questions also effect a change in the basic word order of sentences. Thus in (26b) the questioned element is the underlying object but it has been fronted yielding an OSV structure.

The summary of the question markers presented here is representative of all that one can find in Ewe grammars of an acclaimed salient communicative event in language. This situation is unsatisfactory. One would want to know more about how these interact with each other; what syntactic constraints regulate their realisations and above all what different shades of meaning each brings to bear on the articulation of the question function in Ewe? These are some of the questions that motivate our investigation. We would have loved to examine each of the items but constraints of space would not permit us. We shall therefore examine only ă, măhă, ădő, de and dę in that order. We leave out the particles for categorial questions: ka and néne. For each of the items, we survey the various syntactic and situational contexts in which it is used and extrapolate the common element which, we maintain, constitutes its basic illocutionary meaning. We begin with the - ă particle.

2.2.1 - ă

The widely acknowledged function of the particle/clitic ă is summed up by Warburton et al (1968: 2) as:

"- a (sic) at the end of a sentence marks a yes-no question (sic)."

This is just a statement of the function of the particle. It is not a description of its meaning. There has not been any serious study made of the syntactic and pragmatic contexts in which the particle is used.
Nor has any systematic relationship between it and other question particles been established. It is desirable to know what force this particle has in the language.

We want to argue that the basic meaning conveyed by \( \alpha \) when it occurs at the end of utterances can be formulated as follows:

\[
X = \alpha?
\]

(where \( X \) is otherwise a non-imperative utterance)

(a) I don't know if \( X \) is true
(b) I want to know
(c) I assume you might know
(d) I want you to say something if you can that would cause me to know it.

As we outline the syntactic and pragmatic contexts of the particle we shall verify the appropriateness of our formula.

How does \( \alpha \) behave? It is undoubtedly an utterance final particle. Thus a declarative sentence such as (26a) may be transformed into an interrogative one such as (26b) by adding an \( \alpha \) to it:

(26a) \( \text{Kofi' \( \alpha \)} - yi agble ets\( \alpha \). \)

\( K \quad \text{FUT go farm tomorrow} \)

Kofi will go to the farm tomorrow.

(26b) \( \text{Kofi' \( \alpha \)} - yi agble ets\( \alpha \) - \( \alpha \)? \)

\( K \quad \text{FUT go farm tomorrow} \ Q \)

Will Kofi go to the farm tomorrow?

Evidently the only thing that distinguishes the two sentences is the \( \alpha \) particle.
Data of this nature led Westermann (1930: 155) to comment that; "the order of words in interrogative sentences is the same as in affirmative sentences. The sentence is shown to be a question solely by the addition of an interrogative particle at the end, this is usually a low toned a." This idea is re-echoed by Ansre (1966a: 48) and Clements (1972: 35) among others.

This is true not only of simple sentences such as (26b) but also of complex sentences. Consider the following examples:

(27a) Ga le así̀-wò na-te
Money be at hand 2SG 2SG&SBJV be
jú a - kpó ame dzí le suku - `a?
able SBJV see person top at school Q
Are you wealthy enough to look after a ward in school?

(27b) Babíá lá - é nye bé nú - dze-ame - é
Question DEF FOC be that thing fit person FOC
wò-nyé bé wó - a - tsó se dé jútsu jú
3SG be that 3PL SBJV take law on man side
háfi wo - a - kpó éya júta fe' vi' si
before 3SG SBJV see 3SG self POSS child REL
Mawu nê abé yayra ené
God give & 3SG OBJ as blessing as
lá dzí-`a?
TP top
The question is; is it a good thing that a man should be brought before the law before he would look after his own child that God has given him as a blessing?
What is the significance of a in these sentences? To answer this question we have to compare (26a) and (26b) which form a minimal pair. It is obvious that (26a) is a statement while (26b) is a propositional question — a question that seeks to find out the truth-value of a proposition. The thing that gives the interrogative effect to (26b) is a. Although it is true that a marks propositional questions, it is not enough as an account of its significance. We have to spell out its illocutionary force and test its appropriateness. Using (26b), let us substitute our formula for a and see if it fits.

I don't know if "Kofi will go to the farm tomorrow" is true
(i.e. I don't know if it is true that Kofi will go to the farm tomorrow)
I want to know
I assume you know
I want you to say something if you can that would cause me to know it.

Our formula seems adequate, at least for this one example. We shall test it against other examples.

a occurs not only in simple and complex sentences but also in the so-called minor sentences. In other words, any phrase or word-fragment of sentence that can occur on its own as an utterance can take this particle (cf Ansre 1966a: 49). The syntactic category of each form in (28) is indicated against it.

(28a) Nye-a? (Pronoun)
1SG Q
Me? (Do you mean me?)
One fragment of sentences which could stand on its own but does not take à to question it is the verbal or the verbal and its adverbial modifier. This data has been completely ignored in Ewe grammar. Suppose that one were to utter sentence (29) to an interlocutor. The interlocutor mishears a part of it and therefore wants to verify the part s/he mishears. If it is a noun or an adverb that s/he wants confirmation for s/he could say (30a) or (30b). But if it is the verb that s/he wants to verify about s/he could not say (30c). One would probably have to say (30d).

(29) Kofi dzò etso.

K leave yesterday

Kofi left yesterday.
Note that verbals can constitute intelligible utterances when they stand on their own. Each of the expressions in (31) are easily understood.

(31a) Va’ fãã.
Come free
Feel free to come.

(31b) Ḟú du sésié.
run race fast
Run fast.

(31c) Va’ mí’ du nú.
Come 1PL eat thing
Come and let’s eat.

(31d) dzó.
leave.
On the contrary the forms in (32) which are identical to those in
(31) except for the final particle are unacceptable as questions. This
means that we have to qualify our generalisation about the distribution
of - à and indicate that verbals standing on their own do not take the
utterance final à interrogative particle.

(32a) * Vá fãã - à?
(32b) * ŋú du sësìè - à?
(32c) * Va mí ñu nu - à?
(32d) * dzò - à?

It is not sufficient just to qualify our statement of the
distribution of the particle to accommodate this data we also have to
explain this observable difference in behaviour of the particle. The
bare verbal with or without a modifier is the realisation of the
imperative. It seems to us that one cannot be issuing instructions to
the addressee to perform an action and simultaneously request to know if
a proposition is true or not. The interpretation of the structure (the
verbal alone) and that of the - à particle are incompatible. When one
compels another to do something one is certain of and knows what one is
doing but when you ask a question you express a lack of knowledge
therefore the two cannot be married hence the non-interpretability of
these as questions.

This is borne out when we attempt to substitute our formula for à
in these contexts. We realise that it fits (28a) "Nye-à?" In this
case, the speaker conveys a meaning which can be paraphrased as follows:
I don't know if it is true that it is me
I want to know
I assume you know
I want you to say something to cause me to know if it is me.

It also fits 28f: "to' xo-a ta-a?" which is an adjunct phrase. The message being conveyed can be rendered as follows:

I don't know if it is true that it is over the roof
I want to know
I assume you know
I want you to say something to cause me to know if it is over the roof.

These are elliptical questions whose predicates are supplied by the context. But even if we consider (32d) *dzo-a? also as elliptical whose other arguments are supplied by the context the message that comes across is contradictory. This is evident from the elaborate explication we offer for it below:

I don't know if it is true that I want you to leave
I want to know
I assume you know
I want you to say something to cause me to know it.

We have assumed in this last explication that the proposition or the dictum of 'dzo' is "I want you to leave" and a is verifying its truth value. If I want you to leave how can I not know if it is true? It is clear that on verbals a does not have an interrogative meaning.

However what complicates the issue and at the same time gives support to the explanation offered is that the forms in (32) do occur in
the language. In point of fact verbals with or without modifiers may terminate in a form identical in every respect, except probably in meaning - a low toned central open vowel which is also utterance final. All the forms in (32) are very felicitous when they are interpreted as imperatives rather than as questions.

The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that utterances could be marked as questions with a final ə except when they are made up of verbals with or without modifiers. When this surface form ə occurs with the latter it does not convey interrogativity but contributes to its interpretation as an imperative. Thus syntactically and pragmatically we should recognise two surface identical forms.

This immediately brings us face-to-face with an issue that has been much debated in linguistics. That is, do we have two homophonous forms or a polysemous one? The pros and cons of the debate need not detain us. We assume that it is a case of polysemy for two reasons. One, they somehow share some components of meaning. Two, and more importantly is that ə is not the only particle that behaves this way; another particle de (see 2.2.4) manifests similar behaviour. Perhaps there is some regularity in the polysemy.

Be that as it may, we shall focus on the uses of ə which are interpreted as questions here. The other sense of the particle will be discussed in Chapter 3 together with other particles that it occurs in the same paradigm with.

Now, a look at the social and pragmatic contexts in which questions formed by ə are used. One common situation in which they are found is that of greetings:
(33a) ḃevī - a - wọ le nyuie - à?
Child DEF PL be at well Q
Are the children well?

(33b) SrṢ - wọ dọ - à?
Spouse 2SG & POSS sleep Q
Did your spouse sleep (well)?

(33c) Ẹ - fṢ - à?
2SG wake up Q
Have you woken up?

Idiomatically, these should be translated as "How are the children?" "How is your spouse?" and "How are you?" respectively. We should hasten to point out that there is a fundamental difference between these English equivalents and the Ewe ones. There is a controversy about the status of the English forms: "Don't tell your friends about your indigestion: How are you? is a greeting not a question" so goes Arthur Guiterman's saying (quoted in Leech 1983). We take the view however that "How are you?" is a question because it satisfies our notion of question. Beyond this there is a constraint on how to answer the English form which is inoperative on the Ewe ones. Wierzbicka (1984: 108) has argued that "English How are you IS a question, ... But it is a 'Pollyana question', a question which more often than not is not expected to be answered truthfully." (emphasis in original FA).

The Ewe questions in (33) are not 'Pollyana' ones they are expected to be answered truthfully. Any of (34a), (34b), and (34c) could appropriately be the answer to (33a), (33b), and (33c) respectively.
The contribution of \( \text{\texttt{\_a}} \) to the meaning of the forms in (33) has to do with seeking information as to what the speaker assumes is the case. For example, if we ignore the components of the social meanings of (33b) "Sr\(\text{\texttt{-wo \ d\texttt{-a}}} \)?" we can informally paraphrase the meaning the speaker conveys by it as follows (that is, substituting our formula for \( \text{\texttt{\_a}} \)):

I don't know if it is true that your spouse is well
I want to know
I know you know
I want you to tell me if you can

A speaker thus assumes that a proposition to which s/he adds \( \text{\texttt{\_a}} \) to question it is either true or false. The addresssee is also assumed to know what the truth-value of the proposition is— a thing which the
speaker is ignorant about. The speaker wants to be told the truth-value of it.

 adapté questions may also be used to solicit the specification of something, should the proposition not be true. If one were not sure about when a particular market is open but surmises that it is probably on Wednesdays, one could ask (35).

(35) Kúqá - gbe - é wó - fìle - a asi - ak?
Wednesday day FOC 3PL buy HAB market Q
Is the market day on Wednesdays?

This utterance could also be explicated substituting our formula for à as follows:

I don't know if it is true that the market day is on Wednesdays
I want to know
I assume you know
I want you to say something if you can that would cause me to know if it is true.

If it is true, an addressee would confirm it by saying Ê (yes) but if it is not, a simple negative answer as Ao (No) would be inappropriate. It has to be followed by the specification of when the market is open. (36) would be quite felicitous in such a situation.

(36) Ao, blaqá - wó gbe - é.
No, Tuesday PL day FOC
No, it is on Tuesdays.

In some situations, à - questions may be triggered by an event that puzzles the questioner. A speaker may be uncertain about the
reality of what s/he perceives. A question is then posed to elicit a clarification of the doubt in the speaker’s mind. In (37), for example, a farmer (Agbledela) and the son encounter a strange figure in their farm. Agbledela wonders about its identity. At first it appears to him to be a human being, he is not sure and further wonders if it is a ghost.

(37) Agbledela: Kofi, mé - nyé

K NEG be

ame - é má nɔ anyí ñé
person FOC that sit ground at
afí - má le dzo dó - m o - a?
place that be fire set PROG NEG Q
Aló ṣolli kpo - m me - le - a?
Or ghost see PROG lSG be Q
Kofi, is it not a human being that I see sitting there and setting fire? Or is it a ghost?

Kofi: Mé - nyé ṣolli - é o,
NEG&3SG be ghost FOC NEG
ame tututu - é.
person exactly FOC

It is not a ghost, it is a real human being.

(Setsoafia 1982: 19; translations and tones mine FA)

Note that Agbledela suggests that he was seeing a ghost but frames it as a question. Both questions constitute a sort of multiple question and Kofi answers them; denying one and confirming the other.

Thus we see the use of à-questions to suggest answers to questions, in this case to an à-question. It can be used in the same
way with ka questions as well. (38) is a mixed question where the second part suggests the answer to the first.

(38) Xɔ'nye  ka? Kofi - à?
Friend my WH Kofi Q
Which of my friends, Kofi?

à-questions that demand information about a misperceived communication or an incredible situation are most evident in constructions that are otherwise words or phrases. Such questions may be contingent or echo ones. (39) is an 'adjacency pair' (to use the term of ethnomethodologists) taken from a story in which a village has been plagued by rats. A medicine man offers to eliminate them for a fee that astonishes the chief. The chief expected a higher fee than he heard because of the trouble that the rats caused him and his people. He doubts his ears and therefore seeks confirmation about the truth of what he heard. Note that his question is made up only of the relevant phrase and the question marker.

(39) Medicine man  "Né me - ðe  wó  ðá
If ISG remove them away
ná mi lá, m - a - xɔ hotú ga le mia sí.
for you TP I FUT get 50 100 at your hand
If I eradicate them, I will charge you 5000 (units of currency).
Chief  "Hotú ga ko - à?"
50 100 only
Only 5,000?
(adapted from Obianim 1954: 21)
Confirmation may also be sought by a questioner of an obvious fact, because the speaker is surprised and doubts its reality. For example, a speaker may see somebody clearly as person X but because s/he was not expecting to see that person s/he could ask if the person is really the one as in (40).

(40) Wo - e - a?
2SG FOC Q
Is it you?

Also, observe that in (41) Ama notifies Fianyo that they have arrived at the uncle's place. Fianyo is surprised and seeks confirmation from Ama.

(41) Ama: Mié - vá d̄̄ nyruĩ - nye
1PL come reach uncle 1SG&POSS
je afe - a gbɔ azɔ.
POSS house DEF side now
We have come near my uncle's house now.

Fianyo: O , mié - d̄̄ afe - a gbɔ
Oh! 1PL reach house DEF side
xoxo - a?
already Q
Oh! Have we come near the house so soon?

(Setsoafia 1982: 70; tones and translations mine FA)

-a-questions may also be specifically used to seek the opinion of an addressee about something. (42) may be addressed to someone to find out if an outfit that the speaker is trying on fits him/her. (43) also
asks for the opinion of an addressee about the maturity of a goat that the speaker wants to purchase.

(42) E - dzé - m - á?
    3SG fit 1SG Q
Does it suit me?

(43) Gbʊ - á tsi - á?
    Goat DEF old Q
Is the goat matured enough?

Substituting our formula for \( \text{\textcircled{1}} \) in (42), we find that it fits which confirms that our meaning is adequate. The message of (42) is as follows:

I don't know if it is true that it fits me
I want to know
I assume you know
I want you to say something if you can that would cause me to know that it fits me.

Information may also be passed on indirectly by asking \( \textcircled{2} \) - questions. Such questions seek superficially to know if the addressee has also heard or seen or knows that X. This is particularly common in gossip situations. Consider the following examples:

(45) E - se be wó - ga - le
    2SG hear that 3PL again be
    ga ṣọlị ge - á?
    money change INGR Q
Have you heard that there is going to be a change of currency?
You see that sibling be sleep
sleep PROG Q
Can you see that your friend is sleeping?

In all the instances enumerated so far the speaker seeks a confirmation or contradiction of a proposal. It is not surprising therefore that ` questions are commonly answered by ` (Yes) or ` (No). Sometimes however the way the content of the question is structured affects the answer desired. (37) is a case in point. In that example, the answer is not prefaced by one of these items because the questioner puts emphasis on certain parts of the questions.

Of course, the answer in (37) could have been prefaced by ` but there are situations in which an addressee in answering an ` question may not want to be definitive in the polarity value of the proposition. Other less precise answers could be given. For example, someone going on a journey could be asked (47) and not sure of the answer could reply with any of (48a) or (b) or (d).

Will you come back today?

(47) A - gbɔ egbe `?
FUT&2SG return today Q
(48a) -Dewohi.
Perhaps.
(48b) Nye me - nya' hadë'o.
I NEG know yet NEG
I don't know yet,
(48c) Nu’ - gbé - é’ tsi - a de dô.
thing purpose FOC tell HAB go sleep
It's the journey (mission) that dictates whether or not one should stay overnight.

These answers, although not definitely positive or negative have inclinations to one of them. Examples (48b) and to some extent (48c) are very pertinent to the search for the meaning of ‘a. We have in our formula the component "I assume you might know" but here we are where the addressee does not know. Is this component relevant? It is, because from the speaker's perspective the addressee might know the answer. If it turns out that s/he does not know, then it is another matter. Our formula accommodates the latter case in component (d) viz: I want you to say something if you can that would cause me to know it. It is legitimate to claim that if the addressee cannot provide an expected answer it follows that s/he cannot say the thing. Our formula in its entirety resolves the problem nicely.

There are other situations in which 'yes' and 'no' are not felicitous answers to ‘a - questions. For example, to ‘a - questions that have disjunction explicitly built into them an ̅E (yes) or ̅A (No) answer may be irrelevant. One can discern three strategies involved in the formation of disjunctive questions. The scope of ‘a may be over the list of suggested alternatives proffered by the questioner. The alternatives are linked by the form (lôo)alô (or). We shall have a lot more to say about this form in 2.2.3. Let us take an example;
(49) Agble - de - lā́ (lōo) alo'
Farm go er or
tō - fo - de - lā́ nē - nyē - ə?
river top go er 2SG be Q
Are you a farmer or a fisherman?

Obviously a yes or no answer to this question would be unhelpful to the questioner. If such an answer were given, it would be a violation presumably of some of the maxims of the Co-operative Principle in Conversation (cf. Grice 1975, 1978; Leech 1983; Wilson & Sperber (to appear)).

Nevertheless some questions that resemble (49) structurally would be answered by a 'yes' or 'no'. The reason for this is that the second alternative is usually just an elaboration on the first. Consider (50).

(50) E - kpṓ ame kōkṓ sia tɔgbe le wo
2SG see person tall this type at 2SG&POSS
agble sia me alṓ le wo agbe me hā́
farm this in or at 2SG&POSS life in too
kpṓ - ə?
ever Q
Have you ever seen such a tall person in this farm of yours or even in your life before?

The speaker in (50) is only making the point that such a tall person is rare and doubts whether the addressee would ever have seen such a person in his life.
How does our formula fit into (49) and (50)? For (49), we can obtain the following paraphrase:

(a) I don't know if it is true that you are a farmer or you are a fisherman.
(b) I want to know which (i.e. a farmer or a fisherman)
(c) I assume you know
(d) I want you to say something if you can that would cause me to know it.

Compare the foregoing with the explication for (50):

(a) I don't know if it is true that you have ever seen such a tall person in your farm or your life
(b) I want to know
(c) I assume you know
(d) I want you to say something if you can that would cause me to know it.

The two paraphrases reveal the difference we have indicated that (49) is truly alternative while (50) is no more than a propositional question. They also show that our formula represents the core of ə. Note that (49) has "I want to know which" while (50) has "I want to know". The 'which' reflects the alternative nature of (49).

Another device for the disjunctive questions is to have each alternative be governed by the ə question particle but linked by the form alo (or).
It is apparent that (51) is a co-ordination of two propositional questions. The meaning conveyed by it could be rendered as follows (in part):

I don't know if it is true that I should boil the yam
I don't know if it is true that I should roast the yam
I want to know which (is true)

Formulating the meaning as we have done reveals its alternative as well as propositional nature and shows the difference between this device and others.

A further strategy is one that does not use the alternative linker. Here the options are presented and each is marked by ə. This is usually used to suggest alternative answers to categorial questions. (52) is a lamentation of a mother at the death of her last surviving child while (53) is from a mother to a crying child.

(52) Ame - ka - wo - Ë - ə - Ë - fa avi
Person WH PL FOC FUT cry cry
le nye atá tå?
at 1SG&POSS lap top
Gbʒ - wo - é - ə? Alé - wo - é - ə?
Goat PL FOC Q Sheep PL FOC Q
Who will weep on my lap?
Is it goats? (or) Is it sheep?
(53) Nu' - xa m - a - ga - wo na wo?  
Thing WH 1SG SBJV REP do for 2SG
M - a' - ko wo kpa - a?  
1SG FUT carry 2SG on back Q
A - no no' - a?  
2SG & FUT suck breast Q
What should I do for you? Should I carry you on the back?
(or) Will you feed on my breast?

These last two examples also demonstrate how some a’-questions can have some of the assumptions suspended. (52) is uttered in soliloquy and is not expected to be answered but it has the purpose of arousing pity in an auditor. In (53), the mother does not expect the toddler to answer the question but it is meant to influence it, as it were, to stop weeping. a’-questions can thus be used to achieve other communicative ends apart from seeking information. Consider example (54) addressed to a daughter by a mother who was fed up with her debauchery and depravity.

(54) Gbô hâ dzi - a vi'  
Goat also beget HAB child
wo - di a alê hâfi - a?  
3SG resemble HAB sheep before
Does the offspring of a goat resemble a sheep?

The mother is complaining that the child does not take after the parents and at the same time rebuking and reproaching her for her behaviour. The purpose of this is not that the child should answer the question but she should feel bad because of the question and change for the better.
What we have in these instances are extended and figurative uses of questions. We maintain that these have their specific illocutionary meanings which must be spelled out independent of but related to the non-figurative meanings of question particles. It seems to us that the meaning that question particles contribute in this case is that of eliciting a response from the addressee.

The conveyed meaning of (54), for example, could be roughly paraphrased as:

(a) I know that a goat's offspring does not resemble a sheep
(b) I assume everyone would know this
(c) I want you to know that thinking of the bad things you do people cannot say you are our child (because we do not do these things)
(d) I feel something bad towards you because of that
(e) I want you to say something if you can because of what I say
(f) I say it this way because I want to cause you to feel something bad
(g) I imagine that you will stop doing the bad things because of what I say.

We can see from this formulation that the use of rhetorical questions is a distinctive strategy that nevertheless has a response-eliciting aspect common to questions (see component e). Indeed, Schmidt-Radefeldt (1977: 389) summarises the role of such questions in English, French, Portuguese and German in the following words:

"...rhetorical questions function for instance to highlight certitude as well as incertitude (they serve to communicate doubt, perplexity, uncertainty, contingency, or
deliberation) or they may contain an evaluation. In any case, rhetorical questions express a propositional attitude of the speaker (e.g. reproach, indignation, protest, wonder, perplexity or dismay or emphasis". (See also Wilkberg 1975: 44 for Quintilian's list of uses of rhetorical questions; Jones & Jones (1985) also claim that rhetorical questions in written English have the function of marking themes, and see also Orlandini (1980))

Whatever the functions of these questions may be we maintain that part of the basic meaning of the question particle is present in their total force. For a proper understanding of these questions, we need to know what the invariant meaning of the question particle is.

The invariant meaning of that emerges is that a speaker who marks an utterance by it assumes that the utterance is either true or false but it need not be in absolute terms. The speaker does not know what it is but assumes that the auditor knows. The speaker wishes to know and wants the addressee to make him know it. This is what we formulated at the beginning.

This meaning may be responsible for the restrictions that exist on the co-occurrence of and other interrogative markers. The question initial particle (see 2.2.5) can introduce an question:

e.g. (55) ṭe me - d̪̪̆ do a̱̱̱ a̱̱̱ le ż̪̪ a̱̱̱ - me o o̱? Q NEG&2SG sleep sleep at night in NEG Q Is it that you did not sleep in the night?

(56) ṭe devi̱ - a̱̱̱ - wo si̱ d̪̪̆ o̱ a̱? Q child DEF PL run leave Q Is it that the children have escaped?
cannot however collocate with any other interrogative marker.

Examine the following examples taking note of the ungrammatical ones:

(57a) *Fofó - ò - yì a - yi afi - mà màhà - à?

Father 2SG&POSS FUT go place that Q Q
c.p. Fofó - ò - yì a - yi afi - mà màhà?
Fofó - ò - yì a - yi afi - mà màhà?

Will your father go there?

(57b) *Kofi \(\text{dé} \) à?

K Q Q
c.p. Kofi \(\text{dé} \)?

Where is Kofi?

Kofi à?
Kofi?
\(\text{E} - \) me k à?
Is it clear?
\(\text{E} - \) me k à?
Is it clear?

(57c) *Si - si - m ne - le lòò à?

Run Run PROG 2SG be Q Q
c.p. Si-sì-m nèle lòò?

Are you running away or?
Sì-sì-m nèle à?
Are you running away?
This behaviour has got to be explained. Unfortunately, grammars of Ewe are rather silent on the kind of data outlined in (57). The only thing one can find is the note that Westermann makes of the alternation between \( \dot{a} \) and \( \text{máh\dot{a}} \) in propositional questions (cf 2.2.2).

In our view, we can find reasonable semantic explanations for these if we look at the meaning of \( \dot{a} \) that has emerged vis-a-vis the meanings of the other particles.

Generally speaking, it seems redundant to have two markers of interrogativity in the same utterance unless their contribution to the interrogative function of the utterance is complementary. \( \dot{a} \) can occur with \( \dot{a} \) - questions and indeed with other propositional questions marked by other terminal particles because its basic function is to introduce the question; to thematise it. It does not occur with categorial questions because these are usually thematised and the questioned
element usually occurs initially to announce that the utterance is a question.

 sécurité and a do not co-occur because they perform the same function, questioning the element that is within their domain. To have both would be redundant. Similarly à and ló share some meaning components. à has built into it a disjunction which ló explicitly expresses, it would seem to us to be unnecessary to have both since they express very similar meanings.

Another principle that can be evoked to explain some of these things is that if the essence of a linguistic sign, especially the symbol of the same sort of communicative function is embodied in another sign, that is, if the meaning of one is included in the other, it would be reasonable to assume that where the superordinate one occurs, the included term need not occur too. Because the meaning of à is somehow included in the meaning of mái they are mutually exclusive.

A further explanation for the restriction on kà and néne as well as sécurité, when it occurs at the end of a word or a phrase, not to occur with à is that à has its scope over propositions and the propositions in which these other particles occur are 'defective' because they question a constituent of a proposition. Since the propositions are not complete à cannot operate on them.

To sum up, we have demonstrated that à is used to elicit information about the truth-value of the proposition to which it is attached. The speaker takes the view that the addressee should know and therefore wants the addressee to tell him/her. We have formulated this
and verified its suitability. We have also explained some of the restrictions that operate on `a. We turn now to māhā.

2.2.2 māhā

Westermann (1930) characterises this particle in relation to the type of question in which it occurs. On its occurrence in questions marked by ḫa or nēne or ḏē he writes:

"In emphatic questions the interrogative particles māhā, ma or hā are sometimes added" (p 164).

Concerning its use in interrogative sentences formed by `a he comments that:

"In emphatic, repeated or angry questions, `a is replaced by māhā more rarely by ma or hā" (p. 165)

First let us clarify our position on the other forms that Westermann mentions. Ma and hā and even ḫī or ḏē are dialect variants of māhā (cf Pazzi 1977: 119). In the process of standardization the forms ma and hā were amalgamated into one (cf Ansre 1971, Adzomada 1979). In the koinē standard dialect described in this study māhā is very commonly used and is absolutely substitutable for hā and ma and the other variants in the dialects in which they are used.

We cannot find any evidence in support of Westermann's claim that ma and hā rarely replace `a. In the dialects in which they occur, we cannot think of any context in which they would be appropriate and māhā cannot occur. We shall focus on māhā but our findings will apply tout court to the other forms.
Although the accounts of Westermann seem to be different they at least share one thing; in both cases, that is, categorial and propositional, the questions are emphatic. But are we to understand that when categorial questions are repeated or asked angrily, mahâ is not used? What actually happens contradicts this inference as we shall show. In any case, we need to explore the various uses of this particle and try to pin down its core meaning.

We have noted that a and mahâ do not co-occur in the same utterance (see 2.2.1). Westermann's account is an indirect explanation for this. Where in an unmarked situation a question would be marked by a, it is marked by mahâ if it is repeated, emphasised or asked angrily. Some mahâ - questions are verifications. For instance, a speaker who is irritated and puzzled by something a friend might have done against him/her contrary to what one would normally expect of a friend, could ask:

(58) Wo xê - nye - é wo esia  
2SG friend 1SG&POSS FOC do this  
qê nhu - nye mahâ?  
on side 1SG&POSS Q  
Is it you my friend who has done this to me?

After persistently assuring someone of something, the person still doubts you and the speaker gets frustrated and annoyed, s/he could ask:

(59) M - a - te nhu a - xo dzî - nye se o mahâ?  
NEG FUT&2SG be able FUT receive top 1SG hear NEG Q  
Can't you believe me?
A questioner may wish to draw special attention to a propositional question by using máha instead of a. This could be prompted by one's question being ignored for the first time. This is where a question may be repeated and therefore requires máha. A father who had been away from home comes back and wants to know if anybody had called to see him. He poses (60a). He did not get any answer probably because it was not heard so he repeats it and this time a gets replaced by máha as in (60b)

(60a) Ame aché vá dó - m a?
Person INDEF come search lSG Q
Did anybody call to see me?

(60b) Ame aché vá dó - m máha?
Person INDEF come search lSG Q
Did anybody call to see me?

Sometimes the repetitive effect is brought out by prefacing (60b) with a quotative phrase: Me - bé 'I say' (see (60c))

(60c) Me - bé, aме aché vá dó - m máha?
LSG say person INDEF came search lSG Q
I say: did anybody come to look for me?

máha also occurs with words or phrases in circumstances where a could have been used. Recall the story in which a chief and a medicine-man had a conversation (cf e.g. 39). The medicine man performed his task and came back to demand his pay, and the chief asks a contingent question which terminates in máha because he felt that the amount of money demanded was too much and more than what he saw the medicine-man do (see 61).
One can sense a feeling of uneasiness and unwillingness on the part of the Chief to pay that much money.

Just as \( \wedge \) questions can be used to seek confirmation for misperceived parts of communication, if there is an urgency or anger associated with or excitement involved in the situation, \( \wedge \) questions are used. For example, (62a) is reported to somebody who is surprised about the piece of information and at the same time full of anxiety and impatience to know the truth could ask (62b):

(62a) \( \text{Wo be Kofi tr} \text{ turn back morning this sia!} \)

3PL say K turn back morning this

It is said that Kofi passed away this morning!

(62b) Kofi \( \wedge \) ?

Kofi (you mean)?

So far, we have illustrated the use of \( \wedge \) in propositional questions. It is also used in categorial questions marked by \( \wedge (\text{WH}) \) or \( \wedge (\text{how many}) \) and topic-only questions marked by \( \wedge (\text{DEP}) \) (see 2.2.4). (63) is a question asked by a farmer whose maize farm has been invaded by rodents. He wants to set traps for them but does not know where to get them. In a frustrated mood he inquires about where he could get one.
(63) Afí - ka m - a - kpó ga - mɔ - wó le á - jle máhâ?
Place WH 1SG FUT see metal trap PL at FUT buy Q
Where (on earth) can I find some traps to buy?
c.p. *Afi - ka ma - kpó ga - mɔ - wó le afle á?

(64) comes from a young lady to whom love has been proposed by a man far older than her. She is infuriated and rebukes the man.

(64) Ama: E - tsi akpá, wo ta hà fu. Nukata
2SG old too much 2SG&POSS head also white. Why
mi ame tsitsi adé - wo mie - dé - á bubu mia
2PL person old INDEF PL 2PL put HAB respect 2PL
dókui - wó jú o máhâ (* ....à?)
self PL side NEG Q Q
You are too old and you have grown grey hair too. Why is it that some old men like you do not respect themselves?
(Setsoafia 1982: 88, translations and tones ours FA)

(65) Kofi de máhâ?/(*â?)
K Q Q
Where (on earth) is Kofi?

As indicated in (63), (64) and (65) á is ungrammatical in these contexts, although máhâ is felicitous. It suggests that there is a difference between the two similar and related items.

From all this, what can we say is the meaning of máhâ? We propose the following:

X - máhâ?

(a) I don't know something about X
(b) I feel something bad because of that
(c) I want to know it now
(d) I assume you know
(e) I want you to say something if you can now to cause me to know it.

We have framed component (a) vaguely because māhā is used in different kinds of questions so what is common to all the contexts is that the speaker is ignorant about something and that thing is represented by X which may be a word, a phrase or a sentence. If it is used to ask a propositional question then the speaker does not know about the truth-value, if it is used in a topic-only question, the speaker lacks some knowledge about the topic. If it is a categorial question, the speaker is ignorant about the question. In the last two cases where we can have it on an utterance which is already marked as a question, the part that component (a) plays is to emphasise that the speaker does not know something and wants to know it urgently.

Our examples indicate that Westermann is right in indicating that māhā is used in cases of emphasis, repetition and anger. But what is common to all these? They all involve an emotive attitude - an expression of a feeling about the question. But what kind of feeling? When one emphasises something one feels something 'strong' about it. We have seen that when these questions are emphasised it is because the questioner desires to know the answer to the question urgently. In other words, associated with the emphatic questions is a petulant desire for an immediate answer. If one feels impatient, it is a feeling of something bad. One would normally not want to feel impatient hence it must be something bad to feel impatient or petulant. This is why we have our component (b).
Indeed, there is no doubt that when one is angry the person has bad feelings. Furthermore when one asks repeated questions, the one should feel something bad that s/he does not get any response to his/her questions. What else can one feel if one asks a question and is not answered and has to ask it again?

It is also true that when you ask a question angrily or repeatedly you do demand an immediate response just as you do for an emphatic question. It seems therefore that in mahâ questions the questioner feels something bad because of what s/he does not know and wants to know this thing immediately.

A piece of evidence that seems to justify such an aspect of the meaning of mahâ is its absence in questions that are used in greeting situations. Consider a situation in which (66) is uttered and the addressee does not answer. One would expect that because the question is going to be repeated (67) should be the form that one would use. But this is inappropriate as a question used in a greeting context. In such a situation (68) is more likely to ensue.

(66) A: E - f̂w - ʔa?
     2SG wake up Q
     How are you?

B: (no answer)

(67) A: ?? E - f̂w mahâ?
     2SG wake up Q

(68) A: Me - le gbe do - m na wò.
     1SG be voice send PROG to 2SG
     I am greeting you.
Why should $\text{måhå}$ not be used when you are repeating a question which is a greeting? In our view, this does not occur because in a greeting situation the speaker conveys among other things that s/he feels good feelings towards the addressee. You cannot feel good feelings towards someone and at the same time harbour some bad feelings. We think this is why $\text{måhå}$ does not get used in greeting contexts.

To account for the speaker's desire for an immediate response we have introduced the word 'now' into two of the components; (c) and (d). Let us now verify the suitability of our formula by substituting it in (60b).

$$\text{Ame ådê vá dí - m $\text{måhå}$?}$$

Person INDEF come search 1SG  Q

Did anybody call to see me?

This utterance could be paraphrased as follows:

I don't know something about whether somebody called to see me (i.e. if it is true that somebody called to see me)

I feel something bad because of it

I want to know it now

I assume you know

I want you to say something now if you can to cause me to know it.
Similarly, we could paraphrase (63) as follows:

\[\text{Afi}^{\text{- ka m - a - kp\dagger ga - m\dagger - wó le}}\]
Place WH lSG FUT see metal trap PL beat
\[\text{a\dagger - fle máhâ?} \]
FUT buy Q

Where (on earth) can I find some traps to buy?
I don't know something about some place that I can find traps to buy
I feel something bad because of that
I want to know it now
I assume you know
I want you to say something now if you can to cause me to know it.

Our formula also fits a topic-only question context of \(\text{máhâ}\) as its substitution in (65) demonstrates:

\[\text{Kofi\dagger - de máhâ?} \]
K Q Q

Where is Kofi?
I do not know something about some place that Kofi is
I feel something bad because of that
I want to know it now
I assume you know
I want you to say something now if you can to cause me to know it.

Our explication is thus appropriate and there is further evidence to show that our general conception of \(\hat{\text{máhâ}}\) is right. Usually, reported and embedded questions whether categorial or propositional end in \(\hat{\text{máhâ}}\). This may be because such questions are in a sense repeated or they occur in the part of the sentence that usually carries a lot of communicative importance in terms of the flow of information and are marked as such with the particle that marks emphatic questions. For example,
They decided to go into the forest to see if they would come across a good road.

The woman asked him why he was sad.

The woman said something to him
I want to cause you to know what she said
Imagining that I am her saying it to him
I say: I don't know the thing that happened to cause you to be sad
I feel something bad because of that
I want to know it now
I assume you know
I want you to say something now if you can to cause me to know it.

Evidently, our formula is general enough to account for all the instances of mahâ. There are some co-occurrence restrictions on mahâ with other question markers that give further support to our analysis.
Thus although maha occurs in topic-only de-questions (for example (65) repeated below as (71a)), it does not co-occur with those de'-questions that are propositional (see (71b) and also 2.2.4 on de').

(71a) Kofi de maha?
K Q Q
Where is Kofi?

(71b) *E - me ko de maha?
3SG in clear Q Q
Is it clear (at all)?
c.p. E - me ko maha?
Is it clear?

It might be added that maha and loo in propositional questions are mutually exclusive as well. For example,

(72) *Avi - e m a - fa l0o maha?
Weep FOC lSG SGJV weep or Q
Should I weep or?
c.p. Avi - e ma - fa l0o?
Is it tears that I should shed or what?
Avi - e ma - fa maha?
Is it tears that I should shed (at all)?

The non-collocability of maha with other question particles in propositional questions confirms that the particles, a, de, l0o and maha have something in common, viz: They all mark propositional questions and are utterance final. It also indicates that each of them may have distinct nuances of meaning that they bring to bear on the propositional
questions. This is all the more apparent in the case of máhâ (and probably deë as well (see 2.2.4)) since it is also used in topic-only questions.

The contribution that máhâ makes is what we have investigated in this section. We have shown that it basically conveys a speaker's ignorance about something and at the same time his/her impatience to know that thing because he/she feels something bad about not knowing the thing. We have formulated this meaning in perusable language. In the next section we examine the interrogative use of lóô.

2.2.3 lóô

There has not been any explicit mention in the literature on the interrogative use of lóô. Nor have previous descriptions of Ewe elucidated the relationship that lóô has with álô, another form usually characterised as a co-ordinative disjunctive particle. Equally unclear is what the determinants are of the co-occurrence of the two forms: lóô and álô. We shall outline the traditional accounts of the two forms and go on to argue that the use of lóô involves uncertainty and describe its interrogative nature.

One of the widespread views is that álô is the disjunctive particle which is sometimes preceded by lóô (c.f. Dutlıë 1970, 1982; Nyjmi 1977; Pazzi 1977). Westermann (1930: 111) further suggests that lóô precedes álô only in interrogative sentences - a claim which is only partially true.

Apart from this optional co-occurrence view on lóô and álô, there is another view which suggests that álô is the linker of NPs that are in
alternative relationship which "has an abbreviated form /lo/ with which it freely alternates" (Ansre 1966a: 135, see also Nyomi 1977: 308).

If these two viewpoints were accurate, one would expect lo to precede aló in all contexts but the truth of the matter is that there are environments in which lo never precedes aló. For instance, when aló occurs sentence initially lo does not come before it.

(73a) Aló ga le así - wò à?
Or money be at hand 2SG Q
Or do you have money?
c.p. *lóo aló ga le así - wò - à?
(73b) Aló me - da alakpa - à?
Or 1SG throw lie Q
Or am I telling lies?
c.p. *lóo aló meda alakpa - à?

Furthermore, if lóo and aló were free variants, we should not expect any semantic differences to be manifested when they are substituted for each other. However, at utterance final position they are not mutually substitutable. Compare the acceptability of (74a) and (74b).

(74a) Ðeví - á - wò lóo?
Child DEF PL
The children or?
(74b) ??Ðeví - a - wò aló?
Child DEF PL
The children or?
The acceptability of the utterances is reversed if there is a pause before the final forms: ́lo and ́alo. Compare (74c) and (74d):

(74c) ??Beví - a' - wó, ́lo?
    Child  DEF  PL
    The children or?

(74d) ?Beví - a' - wó, ́alo?
    Child  DEF  PL
    The children or?

We shall later on claim that this data suggests that ́lo is a disjunctive interrogative while ́alo is a disjunctive tag.

In the meantime, these observations lead us to hypothesise that the choice of ́lo or ́alo or a combination of both in particular circumstances should reflect some semantic differences. A cursory look at the use of these forms in texts revealed a number of tendencies which support our hypothesis. In general, we found that ́alo is a disjunctive form which may alternate with ́lo or combine with it when there is some uncertainty involved in the situation.

Álo tends to be used where the alternatives are a restatement, or amplification of the first unit. In (75a) and (75b) below the two nominals linked by ́alo are partially synonymous and refer to the same entity in the real world. Minimally, one of them should be appropriate but the second is added to expatiate on the first.
(75a) Megbé aló dzi - me gbadza me - kpa - a vi' eve o.
Back or chest in broad NEG carry HAB child two NEG
A broad back or chest cannot carry two children (at the same time).

(75b) Né wó' - be' dadi fe' mefí - nu aló kpe -
If 3PL say cat POSS anus mouth or buttocks
ta fo' ba hà là mé - nyé afi - wó' - e'
top beat mud too TP NEG be mouse PL FOC
á' - kpe' e d'á o.
FUT see 3SG VS NEG
If it is said that the cat's anus or buttocks is soiled with mud, it is not mice which will examine it.

Another tendency that was observed is that the use of lóó on its own or in conjunction with aló conveys a sense of doubt in the speaker's mind about the first alternative. Inherent in such constructions is a speaker's attitude which could be paraphrased as: "I am not sure" or "I don't know which". The first alternative alone seems insufficient for the speaker. In (76), for example, the speaker clearly shows that he does not know one of the things which they would have done to his addressee. It is significant that this utterance is prefaced by dewohi (perhaps) which marks the speaker's uncertainty.

(76) Dewohi, né míe - fo' wo d'á dzíehe le
Perhaps if 1PL send 2SG to north at
tógbui - a' - wo gbó lóó aló míe - blá
grandfather DEF PL side or 1PL tie
wó d'á - dzrá.
2SG PURP sell
Probably, we would have sent you to death or sold you
Where alternatives are offered within the scope of an approximator, such as *abe-ene* (as ... as), as in (77), the tendency is to use *lóo* alone or *lóo aló* but not *aló* alone.

(76)  Æó abé ḋeví ewo lóo (aló) wuiatọ ené ḋe-m.
Send as child ten or fifteen as to lSG

Send me about ten or fifteen children.

In some cases, there may not be any overt approximator but the speaker may clearly be imprecise about something, here too, *lóo* or *lóo aló* is used. In such a context, the disjunctive conveys the sense of the English "or so".

(77)  Me le apatí ḋí - mí nê wo - a -
LSG be labourer search PROG that 3SG SBJV

ɗe dru alafá ḋská lóo eve ná - m.
dig mound hundred one or two for lSG

I am looking for a labourer who would make a hundred or two mounds for me.

The difference between the minimal pair represented in (78a) and (78b) is that (78a) conveys an idea of "I don't care which", that is God or Destiny but (78b) has the component "I don't know which". Needless to say the same idea is present in (78c).

(78a)  Máwu - é aló Sé - e'.
God FOC or Destiny FOC

It is either God or Destiny.
Is it God or Destiny?

(78b) Mawú - é lóo Sé - é.
God FOC or Destiny FOC
Is it God or Destiny?

(78c) Mawú - é lóo aló Sé - é.
God FOC or Destiny FOC
Is it God or is it Destiny?

These examples portray the interrogative nature of lóo.

Languages which have more than one disjunctive marker tend to differentiate between them by associating further nuances of meaning with one (see Lyons 1981b: 126). This is what is happening in Ewe where lóo has an added interrogative sense. Take the case of Polish (see Oleksy 1979: 99 et seq) where czy is both interrogative and disjunctive and is different from albo another disjunctive marker. The following examples are due to Wierzbicka (private communication).

(79a) czy to czy tanto
this or that, it doesn't matter which

(79b) to albo tanto
this or that

Now, we turn to the interrogative use of lóo. When we discussed the strategies for the formation of alternative questions in 2.2.1, we mentioned that one of them involved the use of à having scope over each alternative and the alternatives linked by aló (see example 51). We suppressed, at that time, the possibility of rephrasing such questions by replacing the à particle with lóo on the first alternative. (80a) = (51) could thus be rephrased as (80b).
(80a) M - a' - qa te - la - a,
1SG FUT cook yam DEF Q
aló m - á - me - e' - à?
or 1SG FUT roast 3SG Q
Should I boil the yam or should I roast it?

(80b) M - a' - qa te - la lóó
1SG FUT cook yam DEF Q
aló m - á - me - e' - à?
or 1SG FUT roast 3SG Q
Should I boil the yam or should I roast it?

From this pair of sentences, we can say that lóó has an interrogative sense since it can replace a question particle. It must be conceded though that the two sentences are not entirely synonymous. There are subtle differences between them. We focus for the moment on the first parts of the sentences. In (80a), the issue is about the truth-value of the hypothesis put forward, i.e. 'I should boil the yam'. However it is left open to be confirmed, denied or amended, and in this particular case, the speaker suggests an amendment in the form of an alternative to the first part. The first part could have been sufficient minimally.

Conversely, in (80b) the issue is whether the yam should be boiled or something else. The implicit suggestion is that another alternative is possible and would probably be better than the one advanced. There is an indication of another alternative different from what has been put forward. It does not necessarily involve the truth-value of the proposition.

Let us consider another example in which lóó is used in a contingent question and followed by a suggested alternative.
(81) K: Me - yi m - a - yə fo - nye - wo' ma
1SG go 1SG SBJV call brother 1SG&POSS PL VS
né wo - a - dó gbe ná mi.
that 3PL SBJV send voice to 2PL
I am going to call my elder brothers so that they can
greet you.
A: Né wo - a - dó gbe ná mí loo,
That 3PL SBJV send voice to 1PL
aló wo - a - dó dzre ná mí?
or 3PL SBJV cause quarrel to 1PL
That they should greet us, or that they quarrel with
us?
K: Né wo - a - dó gbe ná mi.
That 3PL SBJV send voice to 2PL
That they should greet you.
(Nyaku MSb: 286; tones and translations mine FA)

K says something and A wonders about what he said and what the brothers
of K were going to do with them. He therefore asks and suggests another
alternative for what they might do. K uses loo instead of a probably
because he is not interested in the truth-value but also that he
indicates that he thinks they would come to do something else. This
example also points out another feature of the use of loo. The context
here suggests an anxious questioner wanting to know what will be done to
him and his friends. The petulant tone of such a question is reinforced
in this case by the alternative suggested, that is, whether the brothers
were coming to quarrel with them.

All these are indicative of aspects of the interrogative use of
loo which are more evident in contexts where it is not followed by an
alternative. (82) is an exchange between a girl and a potential suitor. The girl tries to dissuade the suitor from cuddling her because her father hates to see men do such things with her. The man surprised to hear that asks a question.

(82) Ama Taflatsé, me - qe kúkú
Please 1SG remove hat
me - ga - da asi qe dzi -
2SG&NEG REG put hand on top
nye o. Né fofo - nye
1SG NEG If father 1SG&POSS
kpɔ mí lá, a - vá fo wɔ. 
see IPL TP 3SG&FUT come beat 2SG
Please, I beg your pardon, do not put your hand on me. If my father sees us, he will come and beat you up.

Fianyo Fofó - wɔ ɲutʃ - e
Father 2SG&POSS self FOC
le qe wɔ ge lóo?
be marry 2SG INGR Q
Is your father going to marry you himself or?
(Setsoafia 1982: 36, tones and translations mine. FA)

The question is not so much about the truth-value of the proposition but it is an expression of how strange what the questioner has perceived is and wants to know if he has to infer that the father will marry the daughter or something else. Obviously, the questioner does not expect, indeed nobody does, that the father will marry the daughter, but the jealous attitude of the father towards the daughter makes one wonder what he would want to do with her. The questioner feels something about
the situation. Presumably, Fianyo does not frame his question with \-`a because the truth-value of the statement does not interest him nor is he just interested in a confirmation or amendment but would prefer a different alternative to what the proposition is. Probably the better idiomatic rendition of Fianyo's question into English would be: "Is your father going to marry you or what?" Note that in English there is a difference between a terminal or at the end of a question and or what in the same context. The latter is more hectoric than the former. This is a useful hint for the semantics of lo. Let us consider another example:

(83) Kponyo: Me - se bé jutsu sésè dzotsú
    1SG hear that man strong stout
ádë si yë-á é - dékúi bé fia tsatsalá
INDEF REL call HAB 3SG self that chief wander-er
lá si dzó hé - bu le ame - si - wó
TP run leave AUX lose at person REL PL
kpló - e dé le Dzodze be ye - wó - a -
follow 3SG after at D that LOG PL SBJV
lé - é 1a gbó. Wò - é nyé ame má lóó?
catch him TP side 2SG FOC be person that Q

I have heard that a certain strong and stout man who calls himself the wandering chief fled from those who were pursuing him in order to catch him. Are you that person. or?

Fianyo: É, nye - é.
yes be FOC
Yes, I am the one.

(Setsoafia 1982: 43-44 tones and translations added FA)
Note that Fianyo is the man who was trying to cuddle Ama and Kponyo is the father of Ama. Kponyo comes to meet Fianyo with the daughter and wonders about who the stranger is. We can understand that Kponyo would be very anxious to know about the identity of this man, not only because the man has been talking with the daughter but because Kponyo has heard about a certain wandering man and would prefer that this man who is with the daughter is not that man but somebody else.

From the examples so far, we recognise a close resemblance between loo questions and propositional ones. Nevertheless, loo - questions unlike the propositional ones, leave an impression that the speaker assumes the possibility of having other alternatives. We also see that in loo - questions the speaker expects a different alternative to the one that has been proffered. Because of this expectation the speaker more often than not is impatient to know what the situation is. These questions therefore carry a petulant tone. Moreover the questioner is not interested in the mere truth - value of the proposition to which loo is attached.

On the basis of these ideas, we propose the following illocutionary structure for the interrogative use of loo:

X loo? (where X is otherwise an utterance made of a word, phrase or sentence)

(a) I assume that X might be true because of what I perceive
(b) I wouldn't have expected X to be true
(c) I feel something because of that
(d) I think something else (other than X) might be true (It will be good if something else other than X was true)
(e) I don't know
(f) I assume you know

(g) I want you to say something now if you can that would cause me to know it.

To test the suitability of our explication, let us substitute it in the relevant part of (82) viz:

Fofo - wò jūm̩ e le qe wò qe lôo?

Father 2SG&POSS self FOC be marry 2SG INGR Q

Is it your father himself who is going to marry you or?

Its paraphrase would look like the following:

I assume that it might be true that your father will marry you himself because of what I perceive (i.e. you have told me)
I wouldn't have expected it to be true
I feel something because of that
I think something else might be true (and not that your father is going to marry you).
I don't know
I assume you know
I want you to say something now if you can to cause me to know it.

We have pointed out that the speaker feels impatient to know the answer hence we use the word now in component (g). These ideas are evident in example (84) as well. Mensa is visited by an old friend Fianyo in the company of a beautiful girl who appeals to Mensa. He wants to know who she is and suggests with the lôo - question that he hopes she is not Fianyo's spouse. In fact, although Fianyo informs Mensa that the woman is his spouse, Mensa later on makes advances to her. We see that Mensa would prefer that the woman was not Fianyo's spouse.
This example illustrates many things about loo - questions. It shows that loo-questions may also be used to suggest answers to other questions, in this case, a categorial question. It also shows that the scope of loo can be just over a word or phrase. Hence our characterisation in the formula of what X can be. Now, let us test our formula on the relevant loo question: "Srį - wò - é loo?" Is she your spouse or? Its explication is as follows:

I assume that it might be true that this girl is your spouse because of what I perceive (i.e. I see her with you)

I wouldn't have expected that the girl would be your spouse

I feel something because of that

I think something else might be true (i.e. that she is not your wife)

It will be good if something else (i.e. that she is not your spouse) is true

I don't know

I assume you know

I want you to say something now if you can that would cause me to know it.
Our formula is thus appropriate. The form 160 can also be used to ask questions for rhetorical effect. The example in (85) is a question posed by somebody who is disappointed about what his life has become probably through his own foolishness as he broods over what to do in the circumstances:

(85) Ao, avi' e m - a - fa lo'o?

Ouch cry FOC 1SG SBJV cry Q

Ouch, is it tears that I should shed or?

Even here, we can see the speaker sort of asking himself to say if he can whether he should weep or something else. Certainly, he would prefer not to weep but he does not know what else to do. We thus see aspects of lo'o at play here too.

Thus, we can safely conclude, lo'o is one of the utterance-final interrogative particles of Ewe which also has a disjunctive use. This is not unnatural in language (see Moravcsik 1971: 119 et seq). We have cited the case of Polish already but some close relatives of Ewe also have such forms. Akan, for example, uses ana (or) both for interrogativity and disjunction.

ene ana əkyina

today or tomorrow

u - be - ba ana?

2SG FUT come or

Will you come or?

(examples are due to K. Amoo-Appau (private communication)). Hewer (1976) notes that in Kasem (a Gur language of northern Ghana) propositional questions are marked by na (or) with the alternative deleted.
Thus it is not a mystery that Ewe should have a disjunctive interrogative particle. There is however another tendency in language, that of using disjunction markers as disjunctional tags. German is one such language, according to Moravcsik (1971: 133). For example,

Er ist krank oder?

He is sick or?

What is interesting about the Ewe case is how the language seems to divide the burden of using disjunctive markers to accomplish interrogative functions. We have loô being used to mark interrogative sentences and alô used as a disjunctional tag.

We intimated earlier on that alô is not substitutable for loô in sentence final position. Nonetheless when there is a pause before alô as the final word in the utterance it is acceptable. Consider these examples:

(86a) M - a - vá etsɔ,   alô?

1SG FUT come tomorrow or
I will come tomorrow, or?

c.p.:b?? M - a - vá etsɔ,   lôô?

1SG FUT come tomorrow or

(87a) Ðeðí - á - wó ą - ñu fufu - à?   alô

Child DEF PL FUT eat fufu Q or
Will the children eat fufu? or?

c.p.:b?? Ðeðí - á - wó a - ñu fufu à?   lôô?

Child DEF PL FUT eat fufu Q or

(88a) Mi - vá  mí - dzo!  alô?

2PL come 1PL leave or
Come and let’s go! or?
The examples indicate that \text{aló} could be tagged to statements (86), questions (87) or imperatives (88). What is happening is that a speaker says something and thinks that perhaps there is an alternative to what s/he has said. In a sense, the speaker has an after-thought about what has been said and elicits from the addressee what other alternative could be available to what s/he has said. \text{Aló} is thus used as a metatag (cf Moravcsik 1971: 140).

In Ewe then, the two forms that sometimes are used in combination to express disjunction share the interrogative function. One, \text{ło}, is an interrogative marker, which a speaker uses to elicit an immediate response from an addressee as to whether what is being perceived as true could not have been something else. The other, \text{aló}, is used as a metatag to elicit what other alternative there could be to what has been said. Our analysis shows that \text{ło} and \text{aló} are related but at the same time different. We have also displayed the illocutionary structure of \text{ło} which shows that it is related to \text{á} and \text{mahá} but at the same time different from each of them. It is only an analysis that spells out the individual components of the illocutionary forces of linguistic items that enables us to see these relationships graphically. We shall discuss in the next section the form \text{dé}.  

2.2.4 \text{dé}  
2.2.40 Preliminaries

In this section we discuss the form, \text{dé}. After a critical review of previous analyses of the form (2.2.41), we outline the syntactic
environments in which dé occurs. On the basis of the syntactic
distribution of dé, we distinguish four senses of the particle: dé₁
occurs on NPs and adjunct phrases constituting utterances. In this
context, it is used to ask what may be called topic-only questions. dé₂
occurs on declarative sentences to form propositional questions. dé₃,
closely related to dé₁, occurs medially in interrogative sentences at
the end of fronted NPs and adjunct phrases as well as initial dependent
clauses and connectives. Addressive dé occurs on directives. We
concentrate here on the use and meaning of dé₁, dé₂ and dé₃. The
addressive dé is discussed in Chapter 3.

2.2.4 Previous analyses of dé

Contrary to the absence in descriptions of Ewe of lòò as a
question particle, dé is one of the well noted interrogative markers in
Ewe. It is touched upon in many of the descriptive works on Ewe (see

In spite of this, dé remains one of the poorly understood
particles. The accounts we have are at best fragmentary and unrelated
statements about various aspects of the particle. Westermann (1930:
164), for instance, notes that: "Part of a sentence may be referred to
interrogatively by means of dé? (sic)". A few pages later, he makes the
claim that; "A question introduced by né 'if' often ends in dé (sic)"
(op cit: 166). One would have expected that given the phonological
identity between the two forms and the similar functions they perform,
Westermann would attempt to relate them. One looks in vain for any
indication of connections between the two forms. We are left to wonder
whether the two forms are separate or just manifestations of two uses of
the same form. A further inadequacy of Westermann's report is that it fails to characterise all the environments in which the particle occurs as we shall demonstrate presently.

Before we proceed any further, let us make some clarificatory comments on the apparent disparity between the tonal value that Westermann ascribes to the particle, that is, a falling tone, and the one we give to it, that is, a high tone. We recognise and take \( \hat{a} \) (more appropriately represented as \( \hat{e} \)) as a phonological variant of \( \hat{e} \). \( \hat{e} \) is usually produced at utterance final position by lengthening the vowel of \( \hat{e}, - e \), and coalescing a low tone with the high tone of the stem. This may be done to achieve a number of semantic and pragmatic effects such as emphasis, suspense or irritation. One of the commonest environments in which it occurs is at the end of truncated questions where the rest of the communication is left to be understood or interpreted and supplied by the addressee especially when \( \hat{a} \) is used on dependent clauses. For example, a speaker attempting to justify a situation in which somebody finds him/her - self through no fault of his/hers could pose the question:

\[
\text{Né } \text{mé} - \text{nyé } \text{éya } \text{puti } \hat{\text{fe}}
\]

If NEG be 3SG self POSS

\[
\text{vododa } - \text{é } \circ \hat{\text{e}}?
\]

fault FOC NEG

If it is not his own fault…. (what should he do)?

The context helps the addressee to supply the rest of the question. More often than not, \( \hat{a} \) with the falling tone carries a feeling of emphasis, suspense and desperation.

Vowel lengthening is one of the devices in Ewe for adding emphasis to particular linguistic elements (see Westermann 1930, Ansre 1961,
1966a; Stahlke 1973 Duthie (forthcoming)). As such we take `dë` rather than `dê` as the basic representation of this particle. In fact, `máhâ` (see 2.2.2) also undergoes similar modification where one can prolong the final vowel to heighten the emotive-evocative effect that the speaker wants to convey.

Another point worthy of note is that this particle `dë` is realised in the Aŋlo dialect as `ô` in certain contexts, especially at the end of declarative sentences. Because this form is homophonous with another particle `ô` used to mark focus some analysts have failed to perceive its separate functions. The point is that the other dialects have the focus marker `ô` and if this Aŋlo form were just an instance of the same particle, one would expect that those dialects would use the same form and not a different particle. More so when there is no other evidence of the alternation between `ô` and `dë` in those dialects. The following set A sentences are Aŋlo variants of set B sentences.

A. (i) Me - le dô - á me gbâ háfi wo - Vá - ô?
1SG be work DEF in first before 3SG come
I was in the job before he came, wasn't I?
(ii) Me - tré go - do - do le suku nê - a?
1SG first out go go at school to & 3SG
I finished school first before him, didn't I? (Nyomi 1980: 9).

B. (i) Me - le dô - á me gbâ háfi wò - vâ dê?
(ii) Me - tré go - do - do le suku nê dê?

We conclude that `dë` is the basic form of the particle with `dô` as a variant and `ô` - an Aŋlo dialectal variant. `dë` shall be used throughout our discussion.
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of Westermann's ideas, they have been sustained by other analysts. Pazzi (1977: 119), for example, has the following entry for the particle:

"dé interrogative avec predicat sous-entendu (Ex-Deviawo dé? Et les enfauts?). (dé interrogative with an understood predicate - e.g. Deviáwó dé? And the children?) (translation mine FA).

Probably the most fascinating exposition on this particle is that of Warburton et al. (1986). They note that:

"dé at the end of a noun phrase may be translated 'how is', 'where is', 'what is', or 'and...?' depending on the context". (p.8)

Curiously enough, none of these translation equivalents finds a place in their Dictionary entry for the item which reads:

dé how about? (used at the end of a sentence or phrase to ask a question)" (op cit: 235).

This account generates a number of questions: How helpful are the translation equivalents to us in finding the meaning of the particle? Are we to understand that the particle has several different meanings depending on the context in which it is used and no common one can be extracted? Above all, is it true that 'dé' and 'how about' are equivalents given the complexity of the English form?

What we have in these descriptions is at best a statement of the function of this particle but how it is used and what it means have been ignored. We attempt a more illuminating account of this particle by outlining the various environments in which it is used and searching for its essence in the language.
The syntax of 「de」

「de」 occurs in a number of syntactic environments. Interrogative sentences in Ewe may comprise nominal or adverbial phrases and 「de」 alone. Such questions may be called topic-only questions — questions in which a speaker indicates the constituent about which s/he wants to know something. In English such questions usually have the form "what/how about + NP" In Russian they have the form "a + NP" (Comrie 1984:27). In Ewe, such questions may be full ones as in (89) or elliptical ones as in (90). (We suspect that 「kedu」 in Igbo (Goldsmith 1981), and some of the forms in Yoruba that Awobuluyi (1978) calls interrogative verbals behave in similar fashion).

(89) a) Kofi 「de」
   K Q
   Where is/ How is Kofi?

(89) b) E - gme 「de」
   3SG under Q
   What does it mean?

(89) c) MO - a nu 「de」
   Way DEF mouth Q
   Where is the gate?

(90) A: Afì - ka - tó - wó nè-nye?
   Place WH POSSPRO PL 2SG be
   Where do you come from?

   B: Ghana- tó - wó me - nyé.
   G POSS PRO PL 1SG be
   I am a Ghanaian.

   Wo 「de」?
   You Q
   What about you?
dé also occurs at the end of adverbial phrases to question something about them. When used with adverbial expressions, the questions so formed are usually elliptical.

(91) A: Nú - ka wo - gé ñe - le egbe?
   Thing WH do INGR 2SG be today
   What will you do today?
B: M - á - yi a - qa - dí nůqudu.
   LSG FUT go FUT PURP search food.
   I will go to get some food.
A: Emegbe dé?
   Afterwards
   After that what?

Henceforth, the use of dé at the end of NPs or APs to form topic-only questions shall be referred to as dé₁.

Like à (see 2.2.1) when dé is used at the end of constructions that are bare VPs or VPs and APs which modify them, it does not have the force of question. Thus the examples in (92) are not interpreted as questions but as directives.

(92) a) Yi dé!
   Go ADD
   Go!
(92) b) Va fāa dé!
   Come Freely ADD
   Feel free to come!
This use of \( \text{dé} \) will be discussed in Chapter 3 together with other particles with which it belongs to the same paradigm.

However, when \( \text{dé} \) is tagged to a construction which is otherwise a declarative sentence, it has an interrogative sense. The question so formed is a propositional one. This use of \( \text{dé} \) has been ignored in the literature. For example,

(93) Adeladza: Mie - se kpó - do - do' - lá etso fië ... 

1PL hear bell beat beat DEF yesterday evening 
Mie - se nya adège hadèke o dé? 
2PL&NEG hear word any yet NEG Q 
We heard the beating of the gong-gong yesterday evening... 
You have not heard anything yet, have you? 
(Nyaku MSb:30, tones and translations ours FA)

Syntactically, this use of \( \text{dé} \) differs from \( \text{dé}^1 \), we shall therefore refer to it as \( \text{dé}^2 \).

A further use of \( \text{dé} \) can be distinguished on syntactic grounds. In this case it is used utterance medially at the end of fronted NPs, (94) adjuncts (95) or dependent clauses (96). When it occurs at the end of dependent clauses, the main clause is sometimes elided (97). More often than not, when the main clause is elided the particle has a falling tone, e.g.
We shall refer to this use as \( \text{dé}_3 \). Now, we examine each of \( \text{dé}_1 \), \( \text{dé}_2 \) and \( \text{dé}_3 \) in that order.

2.2.43 \( \text{dé}_1 \)

We have indicated that \( \text{dé}_1 \) questions are topic-only ones in that a speaker identifies something about which s/he wants some information. The particular kind of information desired may depend on the context. Thus in (89) (repeated below), the speaker wants to know something about Kofi. It may be about his whereabouts, it may be about his health, it may be about what should be done with him in relation to
what is being talked about. Essentially the questioner wants the addressee to supply the information which s/he is ignorant about. This is the force that dé carries. Using this particular example as a test case we propose the following illocutionary structure for dé:

\[ X \text{ dé} \] (where \( X \) is an NP or AP and the construction constitutes an utterance).

For example, Kofi dé?

a) I don't know something about \( X \)
   (I don't know something about Kofi).

b) I want to know it (I want to know something about Kofi).

c) I assume you might know

d) I want you to say something if you can about \( X \) that would cause me to know something about it.
   (I want you to say something about Kofi that would cause me to know something about him.)

We assume that the context would disambiguate what 'something' stands for. Thus if it is in a greeting context, for example, it will stand for the health of the person being asked about.

As should be evident from the discussion so far, dé questions are used in greeting contexts apart from others. (98) is a typical dialogue between two people, one of whom, (B), has just arrived home from somewhere:

(98) A: Wó - é - de!

2SG FOC arrive

Welcome
We have two instances of dé in this example all seeking information about the welfare of people. We should emphasise that although the constructions in (98) may seem to be set phrases, the use of dé in greeting phrases is very free and productive. All that one has to do is to fill the slot of X in X dé with a nominal that refers to the person or place s/he wants to ask about. Someone returning from work or church or the market or the farm could be greeted with one of the appropriate forms in (99).

(99) a)  Dó - á - me dé?
Work DEF in Q
How is/was work?

(99) b)  Soli - á - me dé?
Church DEF in Q
How is/was church?

(99) c)  Asi - á - me dé?
Market DEF in Q
How is/was the market?
Sometimes, in a greeting context, \( \text{\textit{dé}} \) may be elided. The factors for and the nature of \( \text{\textit{dé}} \) ellipsis in this context remain to be worked out. One thing we can say though is that it is more felicitous to elide the particle when the NP is plural. We cannot explain this adequately at this moment. It seems however that the plural NP is less ambiguous than the singular one when used without the particle. Consider the following examples:

\begin{align*}
(100) \text{a)} \quad & \text{দেভি} ' - \text{া} ' - \text{ও} \text{ো} \text{্দে} ? \\
& \text{Child DEF PL Q} \\
& \text{How are the children?} \\
(100) \text{b)} \quad & \text{দেভি} ' - \text{া} ' - \text{ও} ? \\
& \text{Child DEF PL} \\
& \text{How are the children?} \\
(100) \text{c)} \quad & \text{দেভি} ' - \text{া} \text{্দে} ? \\
& \text{Child DEF Q} \\
& \text{How is the child?} \\
(100) \text{d)} \quad & \text{দেভি} ' - \text{া} ? \\
& \text{Child DEF} \\
& \text{How is the child?}
\end{align*}

Note that the only difference between (100b) and (100d) is that the former is plural and the latter is singular and it seems that this is what accounts for the difference between them in appropriateness.
Be that as it may, we could paraphrase 100c as follows, substituting our formula for \( \text{d}^e \).

I don't know something about the child (i.e. I don't know something about the child's health)
I want to know it
I assume you might know
I want you to say something about the child if you can that would cause me to know something about it (i.e. I want you to tell me about its health).

Obviously, the formula is appropriate here too.

\( \text{d}^e \)-questions are used in non-greeting contexts as well. In a sense, these questions are categorial, seeking information about categories which are topical rather than propositions. This is clearly revealed by the translation equivalents quoted previously that Warburton et al (1968) offer for the particle. A speaker who wants to know the names of some people that s/he comes across could pose question (101).

(101) Mia - \( \text{j}^e \) \( \text{k}^\circ \) - wó \( \text{d}^e \)?
2PL POSS name PL Q
What are your names?

An addressee may be looking for a misplaced item, for instance, a book, and s/he may believe that the addressee might know where it is. The addressee could frame his/her request as question (102).

(102) Agbalô - a \( \text{d}^e \)?
Book DEF Q
Where is the book?
One of two people trying to fix a time for an appointment, could suggest the afternoon, for example, and would want to know what the other thinks about it, so put forward his/her proposal to the addressee as in (103).

(103) ḏō me ḍō?

Afternoon in Q

What about the afternoon?

The message in (103) can be decomposed as follows:

I don't know something about the afternoon (i.e. I don't know what you think about the afternoon)

I want to know

I assume you might know (i.e. I assume you might have something to say about it)

I want you to say something if you can that would cause me to know what you think about it.

Thus the meaning conveyed by ḏō in all contexts has to do with a speaker's ignorance and his/her desire to know that thing.

It has been suggested that ḏō could be an interrogative verbal. This claim is founded on the view that every sentence has as its nucleus, a verbal. In these sentences ḏō should be a verbal because the NPs are the subjects and ḏō must be what makes the sense complete. Furthermore, it is argued that in greeting contexts it can be shown that ḏō is truly a substitute for a verbal hence it must be a verbal. Thus it is claimed that (104a) is an abbreviation of (104b) where ḏō represents the verb and the question particle -ā.
Plausible though this may sound, it is not an analysis that provides any meaningful insight into the nature of ḍé. What is the explanation for ḍé to be so unique that among all verbals in the language it is the only one to which pre-verbal pronominals cannot be prefixed? Why can't we have (105b) while we can have (105a)? If ḍé were a true substitute for the verbal and the question particle then (105b) should not be ungrammatical. It means that ḍé is not a substitute for it and also that ḍé is not a verbal:

(105) a)  ḡ - fɔ́ - à?
    2SG wake up Q
    How are you?
(105) b)* ḡ - ḍé?
    2SG Q

Furthermore, if ḍé were a verbal we should expect that it could take a preverbal pronominal. In (106a) va takes the pronominal but (106b) is ungrammatical. Why? It only means that ḍé is not a verbal.

(106) a)  Me - va'
    I came.
Note also that when the independent pronoun forms are focus-marked they could occur with verbals as well as utterance-final interrogative markers (see (106c) and (106d)).

(106) c) Nye - é vá.
1SG FOC come

It was I who came.

(106) d) Nye - é dé́?
1SG FOC Q

It is me, what do you think?

However, a true verbal cannot co-occur with an independent pronoun form that is not focus marked. On the contrary, dé́ and indeed other interrogative markers can occur on them to mark them as questions (see (106e) and (106f)).

(106) e) * Nye vá.
1SG come

(106) f) Nye dé́?
1SG Q

What about me?

In addition, dé́ cannot be inflected for any verbal category such as the progressive. For example -

(106) g) ** Me - le - dé́ - ṃ.
1SG be Q PROG
Evidently, de is not a verbal. In principle, we prefer not to split items into various categories, if we can help it. For if we consider de as a verbal, what shall we call de, which occurs on a sentence which already has a full verb in it? de is indeed an utterance-final form that marks interrogation and it has various senses one of which we have discussed here. In the next section, we shall discuss another sense which it has when it is used to mark utterances as propositional questions.

2.2.44 de

The propositional questions that de is used to ask are biased towards the answer that the speaker expects. Such questions sometimes seek confirmation of the truth value of the proposition. But the force of de questions is different from that of `a-questions (see 2.2.1). Suppose that you have explained something to somebody and you want to find out if your message has been grasped. You may pose question (107) using `a as the question marker.

(107) E - me kɔ - `a?

3SG in clear Q

Is it clear?

In this case, the speaker expects that the addressee may answer that 'it is clear' or 'it is not clear' or 'most of it is clear, but I do not understand part X'. However if the speaker feels that all that s/he has said should be clear enough and therefore should be understood, the speaker may seek agreement from the addressee as to whether what has been said is understood. The question could be phrased with de as in (108).
Of course, the speaker leaves room for disagreement as well. What is involved in $\text{de}_2$ questions is that the speaker assumes that the proposition expressed by the declarative sentence over which $\text{de}_1$ has its scope is true but s/he is not sure and therefore elicits confirmation from the addressee. Formulating this idea more precisely, we suggest the following representation for $\text{de}_2$:

\begin{align*}
\text{X de}_2 & (\text{where X is otherwise a declarative sentence.}) \\
\text{a)} & \text{ I think that X is true} \\
\text{b)} & \text{ I am not sure} \\
\text{c)} & \text{ I assume you would say that it is true} \\
\text{d)} & \text{ I want you to say something if you can that would cause me to know that it is true.}
\end{align*}

Given this formula, we could paraphrase (108) as follows:

I think it is true that it is clear (i.e. I think I can say that it is clear)

I am not sure

I assume you would say that it is true (i.e. you would agree that it is true)

I want you to say something if you can that would cause me to know that it is true.

Let us reflect on some other examples. In (109), Bok* (a diviner) asks Tsiami (a linguist) to confirm whether all the communication that
had been going on between him and his messenger during a divination for
Tsiamí has been heard. We should note that Tsiamí confirms Boko's
supposition that all the things have been heard.

(109) Boko: Tsiamí, mia-wó nútɔ

T 2PL PL self
mie-se gbe - á ɔá xóxó dé?
2PL hear voice DEF VS already Q
Tsiamí, you yourselves have heard what has been
said, haven't you?

Tsiamí: Míe - se - é.
1PL hear 3SG
We have heard it.

(adapted from Nyaku MSb:8; translations and tones
mine FA).

Here, the polarity of the question is positive and the answer is
positive too. If we compare this with (110) in which both the question
and answer are negative, we see further the conducive nature of dé-ques-
tions. Such evidence supports our suggestion that the speaker assumes
or thinks that the proposition in the declarative sentence is true and
seeks confirmation for this assumption by marking it with dé.
(110) Adeladža Mie - se kpó - do - do
IPL hear bell beat beat
lá etso fië tso Atsyćonú nu.
DEF yesterday evening about A side
Mie se nya ađéke hadéke o aće?
2PL&NEG hear word any yet NEG Q
We heard the beating of the gong-gong last night concerning
Atsyćonu. You have not heard anything yet, have you?
Tsiamiga 0, mie se nya ađéke hadé o.
No, IPL&NEG hear word any yet NEG
No, we have not heard anything yet.
(Nyaku MSb:30 translations and tones mine PA)

The explication of (110) would look like the following:

I think it is true that you have not heard anything yet about A.
I am not sure
I assume you would say that it is true that you have not heard
anything yet
I want you to say something if you can that would cause me to know
that it is true.

It should be clear by now that aće functions in a similar manner to
English tag questions. It seeks agreement from the speaker on a
proposition.

aće-questions could be rhetorical. (111), for example, is uttered
by an admirer of a youth standing trial for brawling with an old, poor
and unrespected man in a village. The speaker is disgusted that the two
men who are unequal in status should be treated equally in the trial
She externalises this in part by posing the question in (111).
(111) Melenya m’- de Kofikuma
M NEG reach K
fé afó - ku - í nu hā o dé?
POSS foot seek DIM mouth too NEG Q
Melenya does not come anywhere near Kofikuma's toe, does he?

The effect of (111) is to assert that the two people are unequal and challenge anyone to say anything to the contrary, if s/he can.

In the foregoing we have shown that dé when used on declarative sentences elicits agreement from the addressee in respect of the truth-value of a proposition. In the next section we discuss dé3.

2.2.45 dé3

Unlike dé1 and dé2 which occur utterance finally, dé3 occurs utterance medially in interrogative utterances. Thus it occurs at the end of NPs (112a), adjunct expressions (112b), dependent and embedded clauses (112c, d) and connectors (112e) which are initial parts of utterances.

(112) a) Nya gá dé, akple gá - é wò - nyé déví ka - ná à?
Word big Q dumpling big FOC 3SG be child cut HAB Q
A big case, is it a big dumpling that a child can handle?

(112) b) Le ṣdó me dé, nú - ka wọ gé nè - le?
At afternoon in Q Thing WH do INGR 2SG be
In the afternoon, what are you going to do?
Because of this characteristic distribution of \( \text{đè} \), it has not been traditionally thought of as an instance of the interrogative final particle \( \text{đè} \).

Consider the following comment on its use in (112)c by Warburton et al. (1968: 100). They note that it is "a particle (also used as an interrogative) sometimes used with \( \text{esi} \) to indicate a subordinate clause. It is used in the same manner as \( /\text{la}/ \) (sic), except that it has a more interrogative sense. Note that it is used here in interrogative sentences. One would be equally correct in saying 'Esi ne de Lome la, ...? When you were in (visited) Lome, ...?'. This observation is impressionistically sound but it lacks adequacy descriptively and
explanatorily. First, it is a narrow characterization. \( \text{de} \) does not occur only with \( \text{esi} \) to indicate subordination. It occurs on clauses introduced by other conjunctions such as \( \text{né} \) (if) and \( \text{hafí} \) (before). Besides, the particle is not used merely to indicate subordination. Second, the authors obviously consider the particle as a homonym of, rather than as one of the sememes of the interrogative \( \text{de} \). Above all, they imply that \( \text{de} \) and \( \text{la} \) were intersubstitutable. We shall show that this can only happen if the rest of the utterance is interrogative. If it is non-interrogative, \( \text{de} \) is unacceptable. But what is \( \text{la} \)?

Typically, \( \text{la} \) is described along lines similar to that of Warburton et al (1968: 97) who note that: "a general characteristic of the Ewe language is that all dependent clauses end in /la/ if they precede the main clause." (cf Ansre 1966a: 242ff; Clements 1972: 126; Duthie 1970, 1982, forthcoming, inter alia). As the forms in (113) show, this description is true but what is worrying about such an analysis is that it fails to relate this use of \( \text{la} \) to another use in which \( \text{la} \) marks phrasal constituents (NPs and APs) as topics (see 114).

\[(113)\ a) \ \text{Mie} - f\tilde{u} \ esì \ \text{yu \ ke} \ (*\text{la}). \]

\[1\text{PL wake up when day open TP}\]

\[\text{We got up when day broke.}\]

c.p.: \( b) \ \text{Esì \ \text{yu \ ke} \ \text{la, mie} - f\tilde{u}.} \]

\[\text{When day open TP 1PL wake up}\]

\[\text{When day broke, we got up.}\]

\[(113)\ c) \ \text{Né \ tsi \ dza \ nyuie \ la, nüdu du \ a - bò.}\]

\[\text{If water fall well TP food SBJV abound}\]

\[\text{If it rains well, there would be enough food.}\]
There will be enough food, if it rains well.

(114) a) Egbe la' tsi dza.
Today TOP water fall
Today, it rained.

(114) b) Le wo' fof'o' fe kunu me la',
At 3PL&POSS father POSS funeral in TOP
3PL spend money plenty
During their father's funeral, they spent a lot of money.

(114) c) Wo' gble' ga geqe le wo' fof'o'
3PL spend money plenty at 3PL&POSS father
POSS funeral in
They spent a lot of money during their father's funeral.

What unites the two uses of la' is that la' marks the piece of discourse to which it is attached whether NP, AP or dependent or embedded clause as forming the conceptual background to the rest or part of the rest of an utterance (see Ameka 1985c for the details of the argument).

The structural relationship between la' and ge' which Warburton et al (1968) point out is very important. The same structural relation is implied in Duthie's (1982) identical label for la' and ge', viz: clause
terminal particle. Any analysis of the meanings of these particles must reflect this relationship. Above all, we must explain why Ewe has maintained a contrast between lá and dé in the marking of clauses, because as Bolinger (1972b: 1971) noted "... every contrast a language permits to survive is relevant, some time or other."

The difference between lá and dé, we would argue, is that lá marks a unit of discourse as the domain of referentiality within which the rest of the utterance should be understood or about which the rest of the utterance provides, or requests information or directs an addressee to act upon. Dé on the other hand marks a piece of discourse as the universe (of discourse) within which or about which a speaker requests some information. The two particles serve an orienting function (see Barry 1975, Chafe 1970, 1976, Kuno 1972, Gundel 1977, 1985, Noonan 1977, Dik 1978, Reinhart 1981 Davison 1984 and Prince 1981,1985 Halliday 1985 & Danes 1974 inter alia on topicality and information flow in discourse).

Now, some illustrations of the use of dé. We have already exemplified its use in NPs (see (112a)). (115a) shows dé on a conjoined NP. The speaker presents the NP and then asks a question about it:

(115a)  
Belélé ná dadi kplé belélé ná sr ŋ- wô
Caring for cat and caring for spouse 2SG
dé, ka - e nyô wu?
WH FOC good surpass
Taking care of a cat and taking care of your spouse, which is better?
(Gadzekpo 1974: 26, tones and translations mine FA)
(115b) exemplifies the use of \( \text{de} \) on an adjunct phrase where the speaker, roughly speaking, indicates that s/he is thinking about the present moment and wants to know something about it. S/he goes on to specify what information is required.

\[
(115b) \quad \text{Fi\'ia de}, \text{ nu - ka - e \ mi\'a - wo?}
\]

Now Q Thing WH FOC 1PL do

Now, what shall we do?

The unmarked position for adverbial modifiers such as fi\'ia (now) in (115b) is after the verb (and object, if there is one). That it has been fronted shows that it has been topicalised and that de marks such a topical constituent provides support for the view that it marks constituents about which a speaker wants to request some information.

The fronted nature of some of the constituents on which de occurs is most evident from NPs. In (115c), the place within the clause that the initial NP originally belongs is filled by a pronoun. Observe that if that pronoun is elided the utterance is unacceptable.

\[
(115c) \quad \text{Agbeli - a de', n\'ene - e ne - le *(e) - dzra - m?}
\]

Cassava DEF Q how much FOC 2SG be PRO sell PROG

(How about) the cassava, how much are you selling it for?

Here again we see a speaker identifying something as the thing about which s/he desires some information.
We propose the following formula illustrating it with (115c):

\[ X \text{ dé'} Y \]  
[where \( X \) is either NP, AP or a dependent clause and \( Y \) is a question]

(a) I am thinking about \( X \)
   (I am thinking about the cassava)

(b) I don't know something about \( X \)
   (I don't know something about the cassava)

(c) I want to know it

(d) I assume you know some things about \( X \)
   (I assume you know some things about the cassava)

(e) I want you to think about \( X \)
   (I want you to think about the cassava)

(f) I want you to say something if you can that would cause me to know something about \( X \)

(g) I want to say the thing about \( X \) that I don't know, \( Y \)
   (I want to say the thing about the cassava that I don't know i.e. its price).

We have argued for these components. Component (a) captures the idea that the particle marks topical elements. A topic is something that a speaker is thinking about. Components (b) and (c) are representations of a speaker's ignorance about the topic and the desire to be informed. The speaker assumes that the addressee has some knowledge about the topic and wants him/her to supply the relevant information. The last component is significant because it shows that the speaker is about to identify specifically what s/he wants to know about the topic. Herein lies the crucial difference between \( \text{dé'} \) and
(116a) ŋkɔ́ sia la, vlo - dó - ame - ŋkɔ́ - é.
Name this TOP shame put person name FOC
This name, it is a shameful name.

(116b) ŋkɔ́ sia la, vlo - dó - ame - ŋkɔ́ - é lóo?
Name this TOP shame put person name FOC Q
This name, is it a shameful name or?

(116c) ŋkɔ́ sia dé, vlo - dó - ame - ŋkɔ́ - é lóo?
Name this Q shame put person name FOC Q
This name, is it a shameful name or?

(116d) * ŋkɔ́ sia dé, vlo - dó - ame - ŋkɔ́ - é.
Name this Q shame put person name FOC

Like la, dé only occurs on initial dependent clauses (see 117).

(117a) Esi wo - le ve ná wó fífía dé, e - té
When 3SG catch neck for 2SG now Q 2SG be
jú wó náné à?
able do something Q
When he caught you by the neck now, could you do anything?
Could you do anything when he caught you by the neck now?

Before leaving the house, what were you holding in your hand?

If I don't have money, what should I do?

From the examples, it is clear that dè does not occur on the dependent clauses when they occur finally. In an SVO language like Ewe,
the unmarked order of subordinate to main clause is that of main clause followed by subordinate clause. Thus to have subordinate clause + main clause is to mark the subordinate clause as the frame of reference within which to interpret the main clause (cf Davison 1979, Townsend and Bever 1977; R. Lakoff 1984, Chafe 1984; Marchese 1977, Thompson 1985; Halliday 1985). Thus ṅe` marks the initial dependent clauses as the frame of reference within which the question which follows is asked. Characteristically, the main clauses that follow dependent clauses marked by ṅe` are questions.

Let us test if our formula is applicable to this use of ṅe`, using example (117c):

I am thinking about the time that you left the house
I don't know something about it
I want to know
I assume you know some things about the time that you left the house
I want you to think about the time that you left the house
I want you to say something that would cause me to know something about the time that you left the house
I want to say the thing about the time that you left the house that I don't know; (i.e. what were you holding in your hand?).

Our formula seems adequate.

We noted earlier on that some of the time the main clause question part of such utterances may be elided and the form becomes what may be called a truncated question. For example, instead of the full form in (117e), we may have (118).
(118) Ne'ga me - le asi'-nye o de' -- ?
If money NEG be hand 1SG NEG Q
If I don't have money -- ?

Such data poses no problem for our analysis, in its explication component (g) is not relevant because the speaker does not go on to spell out what s/he wants to know about the entity identified. It is probably worth observing that Japanese marks such truncated questions with the topic marker wa and a rising tone (see Hinds 1984: 166).

The paraphrase of (118) would be:
I am thinking about "if I don't have money"
I don't know something about it
I want to know
I assume you know some things about (the condition) "if I don't have money"
I want you to think about "if I don't have money"
I want you to say something if you can that would cause me to know something about it.

Our formula, however, does not apply to the contexts when de' occurs on embedded clauses (i.e. relative clauses) and connectors. Consider (119a) which is taken from a personal letter of the author.

(119a) xɔ - wɔ si di tsa va Ghana de',
Friend 2SG&POSS REL pay visit come G Q
e - trɔ va' gbo' mia gbɔ - a?
3SG turn come reach 2PL side Q
Your friend who visited Ghana, has he returned to your end?
Here an addresser wants to know something about an NP but wants the addressee to think of it in a particular way hence adds a relative clause and marks it with $\hat{\epsilon}$ and then specifies the question. The role of a relative clause is to restrict the domain of reference of its head. Hence relative clauses specify the domain of referentiality of their heads. They are thus background information to part of an utterance - the head (cf Schacter 1973 who calls the head of the relative clause the foreground and the relative clause the background).

The problem with the use of $\hat{\epsilon}$ here is that its scope is over the relative clause but the question that follows is not necessarily about the relative clause but rather about its head. But for the addressee to appreciate the question well, s/he must think of the head in the way stated in the relative clause. This is why our formula does not fit.

Thus in (119a), the question that follows is about "your friend" and the friend that it is about is "the one that visited Ghana". We propose the following explication for $\hat{\epsilon}$ on relative clauses:

\[ Z \hat{\epsilon} X \quad Y \]  

Where X is a relative clause, Z is the head of the relative clause and e.g. (119a) Y is a question

(a) I am speaking of Z  
   (I am speaking of your friend)

(b) I am thinking of it (Z) in this way, X  
   (I am thinking of your friend in this way, that he visited Ghana)

(c) I do not know something about it  
   (I do not know something about your friend)

(d) I want to know

(e) I assume you might know
(f) I want you to say something if you can that would cause me to know something about Z
(thinking of it in the way, X)

(g) I want to say the thing about Z that I don't know (Y)
(i.e. I want to know if he has returned to your place)

A similar paraphrase can be made of (119b).

(119b) Nyńu si bu ṣẹ́, wó – fọ – è – à?
Woman REL lose Q 3PL find 3SG Q
The woman who went missing, has she been found?

I am speaking of a woman
I am thinking of her as the one that went missing
I don't know something about her
I want to know
I assume you might know
I want you to say something if you can that would cause me to know something about her
I want to say the thing about the woman that I want to know
(I want to know if she has been found).

ṣẹ̀ is also used on connectors as the forms in (120) show:

(120a) Emegbe ṣẹ̀, nú – ka míà – wọ?
Afterwards Q thing WH 1PL do
Afterwards, what shall we do?
Discourse connectors are structurally thematic. That is, they occur initially in information unit serving as the point of departure of the information. But they are also cohesive elements in that they relate one piece of information, the one that precedes, to what follows (cf. Halliday & Hasan 1976; Halliday 1985).

Furthermore, a number of connectors create a kind of setting, a framework within which the rest of the utterance is to be understood. This is most visible with temporal ones, for instance, *emegbé* (in 120a). As such they serve as background for understanding the rest of the discourse.

It should not be surprising then that *dé* occurs on the connectives (so does *lā*, by the way) and then the speaker poses a question with reference either to the relationship that the connective stands for or with reference to the setting that it creates. We suggest the following explication, using example (120b), for the use of *dé* on connectors:

\[ Z \ X \ dé \ Y \]  
[where \( X \) is a connector, \( Z \) is a preceding discourse unit and \( Y \) a question]
(a) I am thinking of what we said before (Z)
   (I am thinking of "Ama is very beautiful")
(b) I am thinking of the way it is related to some-thing else
(c) I do not know it
   (I do not know the relationship between Ama's beauty and something else i.e. her character)
(d) I want to know
(e) I assume you might know
(f) I want you to say something if you can that would cause me to know it
(g) I want to say the thing about it that I don't know (Y)
   (I want to say the thing about the relationship that I don't know i.e. is her character also good?).

We thus see that the various contexts in which ðè is used add some nuances of meaning which are significant for the semantic representation of the forms. These explications also manifest the structural relationships that exist between lá and dé. In Ameka (1985c), we proposed formulae for lá (reproduced below) which parallel those that we have advanced for ðè here. Compare the corresponding ones to check the validity of our claim.

I X lá Y [Where X is an NP, adjunct phrase or dependent clause]
e.g. Egbe lá tsi dza nítò.
   Today TOP water fall much
   Today, it rained a lot.

(a) I am thinking about X
   (I am thinking about today)
(b) I want you to think about X
   (I want you to think about today)

(c) I want to say something about X, (Y)
   (I want to say something about today)

(d) I want you to understand Y in the way it is related to X
   (I want you to understand what I want to say as related to today)

(e) I assume you will be able to do this.

II $Z \ X \ \overset{\text{la}}{\rightarrow} \ Y$  
[Where $Z$ is the head of a relative clause and $X$ is a relative clause]

---

Wo' $d\dot{\rho}$ Semanu si $x\circ$ fe $\text{ewo ko } \overset{\text{la}}{\rightarrow} \text{fia}$.

3PL make S REL get year ten only TP chief
Semanu who is only ten was enthroned chief.

(a) I am speaking of $Z$
   (I am speaking of Semanu)

(b) I am thinking of it in this way, $X$
   (I am thinking of him as being ten years old)

(c) I want you to be able to think of it in the same way

(d) I want you to be able to understand what I am saying in the way $Z$ and $X$ are related to it (I want you to understand, 'Semanu is only ten' in relation to what I am saying, that is, he has been enthroned chief).

III $Z \ X \ \overset{\text{la}}{\rightarrow} \ Y$  
[Where $Z$ is a preceding discourse unit, and $X$ a connector]
Ama dze tugbe n'uts'gaké lâ, é - fë' nommé mé - nyo'o.

Ama is beautiful but her character is not good. (cp 120b)

(a) I am thinking of the thing we said before (Z)
   (I am thinking of 'Ama is beautiful')

(b) I want to say something more about it (Y)
   (= her character is not good)

(c) I am thinking of Y as related to Z
   (I am thinking of 'her character is not good', as related to 'Ama is beautiful')

(d) The way I think of Y as related to Z is X
   (i.e. but = contrastive relationship)

(e) I want you to think of it in the same way.

We have attempted in this section to make the point that the utterance-medial de' is interrogative and is related to the utterance-final dë as well as to another utterance-medial particle: lâ. We have found that we need three explications for its use in this context depending on the syntax and semantics of the constituent on which it occurs. Above all, we have shown that dë marks a piece of discourse as the conceptual background and domain of referentiality within which the question that follows should be understood. We summarise our account of dë in the next section.

2.2.46 Summary

We identified at the beginning of our analysis of dë, four senses of the form on syntactic grounds. We have explicated all except one here. First, that when it is used on NPs and APs to form topic-only
questions, it seeks information from the addressee about the entity in its scope. Second, that when it is used to ask propositional questions it solicits agreement from the addressee on the truth-value of the proposition. Third, that when it occurs utterance-medially, it marks the constituent within its scope as the conceptual background to the rest of the interrogative utterance. We discuss the fourth sense in Chapter 3.

It should be noted however that we consider de as a polysemous item rather than a case of homophony. It means that we expect that we can extract a common core for all the senses that have to do with interrogativity, at least. Comparing the explications we have offered in 2.2.43, 2.2.44, and 2.2.45 we could argue that the common elements of $d_1$, $d_2$ and $d_3$ are:

I don't know something about X
I want you to say something if you can that would cause me to know something about it.

The syntactic environments in which de occurs contribute further components to the force of the item. The environments are distinct enough and the significance of the particle in those contexts are also compelling enough to warrant separate but related entries for the form. The common elements cited above may be sufficient for de - the prototypical definition - but in the various syntactic environments we need other necessary components. In our view, it is more enlightening to spell these out systematically, especially when the syntactic environments are well defined. In the next section, we examine another particle which has the same segmental form as de but has a rising tone and is used to introduce propositional questions.
Researchers have accepted and perpetuated the characterisation that Westermann (1930: 165) provides for this particle. He notes that "(I)nterrogative sentences are often introduced by दे" (cf Nyomi 1977: 220; Duthie forthcoming). Admittedly, this is a sound description of a valid aspect of the particle but it is inadequate in very crucial respects. It fails to instruct us in the appropriate use of the form. The particle 'often' introduces interrogative sentences, but how often? What is the reason, the logic, behind its use as a preface to a question? What is more, to say that the particle introduces interrogative sentences does not tell us anything about its meaning. One would want to know what the illocutionary force of this particle is since there are other ways of introducing questions with different implications.

We shall show that दे is used question initially to draw and focus the attention of an addressee to the question. Furthermore, the speaker uses this particle to indicate that s/he expects the addressee to respond to the question in a particular way. That is, questions introduced by दे are conducive ones. These claims are supported from an analysis of the distribution of the particle and from its identity with a particle that introduces contrafactual conditionals.

Although it has been claimed that दे often introduces interrogative sentences, it is only propositional questions marked by अ (cf 2.2.1), माहा (2.2.2) and लो (2.2.3) which may begin with दे as the examples in (121) show.
(121) (A speaker notices an addressee dozing off in the morning at about 10 a.m. and asks:)

\[ \text{Dé me - dɔ alɔ le zɔ me o} \]

- (a) a : \( \hat{\text{a}} \) ?
- (b) maha?
- (c) loo?

Q 2SG&NEG sleep sleep at night in NEG

a/b Is it that you did not sleep in the night?

c. Is it that you did not sleep in the night or?

Questions signalled by ka 'WH' or nene 'how many/much' or dé (whether categorial or prepositional) are never introduced by dé (see (122)).

(122) a)* Dé ame - ka vá dí - m?

Q person WH come search lSG

(Who came to look for me?)

(122) b)* Dé vi nene - é nè - dzi?

Q child how many foc 2SG bear

(How many children do you have?)

(122) c)* Dé Kofi dé?

Q K Q

(Where is Kofi?)

(122) d)* Dé me - dɔ alɔ le zɔ me o dé?

2SG&NEG sleep sleep at night in NEG Q.

(You did not sleep in the night, did you?)

Why does this particle behave this way? We shall attempt to explain this behaviour and thereby uncover the significance of the particle in the language.

We contend that an explanation for the observable generalisation can be found in the meaning of the particle and to some extent the
meaning of the material to which it is attached. We have indicated that an aspect of the meaning of ɗɛ is to draw the attention of the addressee to the question. Duthie (private communication) has suggested that the particle is used to thematise (or topicalise) the question that it introduces. This is an important hint that can help in explaining the constructions in (122). (122a-c) are all otherwise categorial questions which are by their nature inherently focused. A particular constituent is singled out and highlighted for questioning. Generally speaking, every information unit has an important or salient part to which a speaker draws an addressee's attention. Needless to say, a whole information unit or cluster of information units can also be focused upon in discourse. However, in order to avoid perceptual confusion, the addressee is cued to centre attention either on one constituent of a unit or on the whole discourse unit but not simultaneously on both. A number of languages codify this psychological fact in their syntax, and Ewe is no exception (cf Boadi 1974, Epée 1975; Oomen 1978; Watters 1979; Hyman & Watters 1984).

In a language like Duala (Epée 1975) there is one focus marker which occurs only once in an utterance. In other languages such as Ewe and Rendille (Oomen 1978) there are two focus-markers, one for non-verbal constituents, ɗɛ in Ewe, and another for verbal constituents, ɗe in Ewe. Only one can occur in an information unit at a time (see 123).

(123a) Kofi vá.
K come
Kofi came.
(123b) Kofi - ṝe' va.  
K FOC came  
It is Kofi who came.

(123c) Kofi ṕe' wo - va.  
K FOC 3SG Come  
Kofi did come.

(123d) * Kofi - ṝe' ṕe' wo - va.  
K FOC FOC 3SG come  
? It is Kofi who did come.

c.p.: Kofi - ṝe', ṕe' wo - va  
K FOC FOC 3SG come  
be' mia yi agble.  
that 1PL go farm  
It is Kofi, he has come so that we go to the farm.

(123e) comprises two information units hence we can have both markers in the same sentence. It could be an answer to a question such as "Who is it?" given by someone other than Kofi.

It is for this same reason, we would argue, that the verbal focus marker - ṕe', never occurs in categorial questions (see 124). In these questions, the questioned constituent signalled by ka or nêne is focused and is very often marked by ṝe' (since the constituent is either nominal or adverbial in function).

(124a) Nu - ka - ṝe' dzɔ?  
Thing WH FOC happen  
What happened?
These pieces of evidence validate our claim that only one centre of focus can occur within an information unit. It may be on part of it or have scope over the whole unit. It would be cognitively and perceptually confusing to have an addressee concentrate on more than one thing at the same time especially in processing information.

We have seen that an addressee's attention cannot be drawn to more than one thing at a time and in categorial questions, it is drawn primarily to the questioned constituent. It follows that if \( \text{de} \) draws attention to a question, then it cannot occur in environments where focus is already present for some other reason. This explanation accounts not only for the unacceptability of the forms in (122a–c), but also gives support to the claim we made earlier on that \( \text{de} \) draws attention to a question which it introduces.

Another observation which upholds our claim is that questions that are introduced by \( \text{de} \) cannot contain any of the focus markers. Let us examine the sentences in (116).

(125a) Kofi vá – à?
         K     come Q
         Has/Did Kofi come?

(125b) Kofi – e’ vá – à?
         K       FOC come Q
         Is it Kofi who came?
(125c) Kofi dè wò – vá – à?
K FOC 3SG come Q
Did Kofi come?

(125d) ṭé Kofi vá à?
Q K come Q
Is it that Kofi came?

(125e) * ṭé Kofi – é vá – à?
K FOC come Q

(125f) * ṭé Kofi dè wò – vá – à?
K FOC 3SG come Q

(125a) is a simple propositional question that seeks information about the truth-value of the hypothesis that 'Kofi came'. In (b), however, the questioner assumes that someone came and suspects that it is Kofi who did and wants to know if s/he is right. Similarly, in (c) the addresser presupposes that Kofi did something and assumes that what he did was come but s/he is not sure. The question is posed to find out whether the assumption is true. (b) and (c) can, in fact, be paraphrased as 'mixed' questions where the WH-question poses the presupposed part of the question and the suggested answer, framed as a propositional question, is the focused part of the question. Thus (b) can be rendered as:

Who came, is it Kofi?

and (c) expressed as:

What did Kofi do, did he come?

(cf Wunderlich 1981). In (d), the speaker assumes that some event occurred. S/he is convinced that what occurred is the proposition: 'Kofi came' and seeks agreement from the addressee. It should be noted that (a) differs from (d). In (a) a questioner presents a hypothesis to
an addressee to be confirmed, denied or amended. The speaker has no assumptions about its truth-value. S/he is ignorant as far as its truth-value is concerned. In (d) a questioner presents a hypothesis which s/he believes is true and seeks agreement from the speaker.

From the exposition so far, we can formulate the illocutionary structure of ḍे as follows:

\[
\text{.isPlaying} \times \text{Question}
\]

(\text{where Question is } \text{à, mánà} \text{ or lóo and is otherwise declarative})

e.g. ḍे Kofí vá à?

Is it that Kofi came?

- a. I want you to notice the thing I say I want to know
- b. I want you to think about it
- c. I think that \text{X} is true
- d. I assume that you will think the same
- e. I want you to say something now if you can to cause me to know that you think the same.

In our specific example, the speaker wants the addressee to pay attention to the question: "Kofí vá-à?" (Did Kofi come?). If you are asked to pay attention to something you are also invited at the same time to think about it. That is why we have our component (b). We have also said that ḍे questions are biased and so in our specific example, the speaker presupposes that it is true that Kofi came and all that is needed is a confirmation of it from the addressee.
A consequence of having a focused question is that some emphasis is placed on it. It means that a speaker attaches some urgency to the response that s/he elicits. This is why we have the word now in our last component. In other words, the speaker wants the addressee to confirm his/ her judgement immediately.

Following these explanations, we can paraphrase our specific example as follows:

I want you to notice the thing I say I want to know (that is, I don't know if it is true that Kofi came, I want to know it)
I want you to think about it
I think it is true that Kofi came
I assume that you will think the same (ie you will agree that it is true that Kofi came)
I want you to say something now if you can to cause me to know that you think the same.

Our formula seems appropriate which also suggests that our analysis is along the right lines.

Other pieces of evidence confirm this. Warburton et al (1968: 235), for example, speculate that ḍe is composed of ḍe (the verbal focus-marker) and e (the non-verbal focus-marker). Whether this etymology is right or not is a moot point but it indicates that the particle has to do with focusing. It also provides a plausible clue to why the particle has its scope over a whole proposition rather than on part of it and hence cannot introduce questions that are not propositional.

For a similar reason, ḍe does not introduce elliptical propositional questions (see 126). The crucial thing about such
questions is that they focus on a specific part of what has gone before or is assumed to be shared between addressee and speaker. Such questions are thus focused and it should be redundant to put them on stage by the use of the particle. Besides, they are not fully expressed propositional questions.

(126a) Kofi 'a?
Kofi (you mean)?

(126b) * -Den Kofi 'a?

If there is any source of this particle, a plausible one which is more compelling than the one espoused by Warburton et al (1968), it is its phonetic identity with another particle that introduces contrafactual conditionals in Ewe.

(127a) -Den me - ga - de afo dęká do' dę ngö la',
1SG REP take foot one send to front TP
nė me - ge dzę do - a' me.
then 1SG drop fall hole DEF in
Had I taken another step forward, I would have fallen into the pit.

(127b) -Den wo - nyę nenęma' - e' la', nę me - gblö - e' na wọ.
3SG be such FOC TP then 1SG say 3SG to you
Were it to be so, I would have told you.

There is a crucial difference between the two forms which suggests that although they may be related they are different. We have seen that都能够 (interrogative dę) involves focus and does not co-occur with another focus marker, but dę (conditional dę) co-occurs with other focus markers (vide 127b).
The similarity between the two forms is not strange. Indeed there are several languages in which the formal markers of condition and interrogation are identical. In English, for example, the device of subject-verb inversion is used to mark counter-factual conditional clauses and propositional questions:

\[ \text{cp: } \text{Is he a student?} \]

Had he been a student ...

In German, similarly, inversion marks conditionals or propositional questions. In colloquial Turkish, the form that marks conditionals is identical to the one that marks propositional questions (cf Haiman 1974; 1978a 1978b Zuber 1983; Sadock & Zwicky 1985).

Various explanations have been offered for this typological feature. Jespersen, for example, explains the English phenomenon by saying that diachronically conditionals were questions with implied positive answers. Haiman (1978b: 24) suggests that: "One possible explanation for this coincidence is that conditionals like polar questions, are implicit disjunctions." However, he advocates a different explanation. That is, "conditionals are like polar questions because conditionals are topics".

These explanations may be correct, indeed, they provide further justification of our claims about \( \tilde{d}^c \). We have mentioned that it is used to put a question on stage, as it were. So if the reason for its similarity with \( \tilde{d}^c \) has to do with topicality, then it is independent evidence for that aspect of its meaning. We have also claimed that \( \tilde{d}^c \) elicits agreement from the addressee that the proposition is true. If the relationship between \( \tilde{d}^c \) and \( \tilde{d}^c \), from a cross-linguistic perspective, has to do with conditionals
diachronically developing from questions with implied positive answers i.e. conducive positive questions, then our claim seems to be sustained.

Furthermore, we agree totally with the explanation which has been advanced by Bolinger (1978b: 102) along the following lines:

"Both conditions and YNQs (i.e. propositional questions, FA) are hypotheses. A condition hypothesizes that something is true and draws a conclusion from it. A YNQ hypothesizes that something is true and confirmed, amended or disconfirmed by an interlocutor."

(cf Diver 1964)

The explanation suggested by Akatsuka (1985: 636) shares the spirit of Bolinger's (without the former being aware of it). She expresses the view that both conditionals and questions involve a speaker's uncertainty.

It could be that the similarity between $c^Q$ and $c^C$ is another explanation for $c^Q$ not occurring in categorial questions. Presumably the common ground of the two forms in Ewe is that they introduce hypotheses. Hypotheses are propositions but categorial questions are not complete propositions so they cannot be introduced by $c^Q$.

Another thing that the cross-linguistic evidence helps us to establish is the interrogative nature of $c^Q$. It is not just to introduce the question and draw attention to it but it also contributes an interrogative sense.

We have, up to now, not explained the unacceptability of (122d). That is, we have indicated that $c^Q$ introduces propositional questions but those that are marked by $c^Q_2$ are not introduced by $c^{\bar{V}}$. 
Recall that $d^e_2$ (2.2.44) conveys the force that the speaker seeks agreement from the addressee on the truth-value of the proposition to which it is attached. We have also noted that $d^e_Q$ also seeks agreement from the addressee on the truth of the assumed proposition. It is reasonable to surmise that the principles of language economy mitigate against the occurrence of both items with similar semantic import in the same utterance.

Besides, clauses that terminate in $d^e$ may start with $d^e$. But when they do they are interpreted as conditionals. That is, $d^e$ introduces clauses that terminate in $d^e_3$ which are interpreted as conditionals [see 2.2.45 on $d^e_3$].

\[(128) \quad d^e \quad ne \quad fle \quad e' \quad yema'yi \quad d^e\]

2SG buy it that time

ne me vo fifia o - à?

then 2SG&NEG free now NEG Q

Had you bought it then, would you not have been free now?

One aspect of the meaning of $d^e_c$ is that the speaker knows that the proposition it introduces is not a fact (a contrafactual) and assumes that the speaker thinks the same. However, the speaker wants the addressee to suppose that it is true and from this premise the conclusion follows. Indeed, we can formulate, tentatively at least, the meaning of a construction like $d^e X, Y$ as in (127a), repeated below, as follows:
Had I taken one step forward, I would have fallen into the pit.

I want you to imagine X

(I want you to imagine that I had taken one step forward)

I say: When we imagine that X is true one would expect Y to be true

(ie When we imagine that I had taken one step forward, one would expect that I should fall into the hole.)

I know X cannot be true because of what we know to be true

(I know I did not take a step forward)

I don’t want you to think that X is true

(I don’t want you to think that I took a step forward.)

The speaker has a specific view about the proposition and wants the addressee to take a similar attitude towards it. For however the questioner assumes that the proposition is true and expects the addressee to agree with that judgement, probably because of the knowledge they share about the state of affairs.

Let us now reflect on other examples involving . Consider (12Q) where K orders F to leave but F attempts to get back after K had driven him away and K poses the question.
To paraphrase (129) using our formula, we would have:

I want you to notice that I want to know if it is true that you are coming back or you are doing something else

I think it is true that you are coming back

I want you to think the same (i.e. agree with me that you are coming back)

I want you to say something now if you can to cause me to know it.

We have had to keep the force carried by lo as the other interrogative marker complex for the sake of brevity. But it is reasonable to claim that our explication of de is substitutable for it in this example as well.

Another example, in (130) 'A' and 'K' are pursuers of a criminal who disappears from them through magic during a scuffle. 'A' reports this and 'K' asks for confirmation.
Not infrequently, echo-questions which are framed in the form of 'Did you say that X?' (where X is the part of what was said before that is being questioned), are introduced by de (see 131). In that example, a diviner is having a dialogue with his agent who says "Enumake" (Immediately) but the diviner did not hear it properly and wants to be sure about what was said and asks an echo-question.

We can decompose this example too as follows - a justification of the appropriateness of our formula:

I want you to notice what I say I want to know
(I don't know if it is true that you said immediately)
I want to know
I think it is true that you said immediately
I assume that you will agree with me
I want you to say something now if you can to cause me to know it.
Also introduces rhetorical questions. One impression that needs statistical validation is that rhetorical questions which are propositional are most of the time introduced by de. We need not belabour the point that a speaker who uses a rhetorical question knows the answer and does not expect one from the addressee but assumes that it is obvious to the addressee as well. It should be hardly surprising, if we accept the formulation of the significance of de, that it should be used to introduce such questions. Rhetorical questions are in a sense biased questions (cf Sadock & Zwicky 1985) and de introduces biased questions so both are compatible. We contend that the meaning of de is what makes it possible for its use in such environments. Reflect on the examples in (132).

(132a) A couple elope, unfortunately the woman dies out of weariness, the man depressed and full of sorrow asks in the wilderness:

\[
\text{Be \ - \ le \ afi\ - \ sia \ tsi \ ge}
\]

Q 2SG be place this remain INGR

\[
m\ - \ a\ - \ dzó\ \ le\ \ gb\ - \ wo\ \ à?
\]

lSG FUT leave at side 2SG & POSS Q

Is it that you are going to remain here and I will leave you behind?

(Akotey 1974: 100, tones and translation mine FA)

(132b) After a description of a certain parent who does not rebuke the children even when they do bad things, the author asks:
It can be said that ḷ is a 'truth-value focus interrogative marker'. It encodes the speaker's belief that something is true and at the same time that attention must be placed on it and seeks confirmation from the addressee.

2.3 Summary

In this Chapter, we initially reviewed some of the proposals that have been made to solve the problem of the relationship between interrogative structures and questions. We proposed an invariant meaning for the notion of question that, to our mind, covers all the instances of the use of the term.

Detailed analysis of Ewe forms that occur initially or finally in utterances to mark them as interrogatives was undertaken. We proposed semantic explications for each of them. The value of our formulae is that they show the minute differences that occur between forms that otherwise perform the same function.

Perhaps, the best summary of this Chapter is to display the explications of propositional questions that are marked by different particles. We shall use the following example:
The reader is invited to draw out the comparisons. The explications would look like the following:

(133a): "Is it the child who is crying?"
I don't know if it is true that it is the child that is crying
I want to know
I assume you know
I want you to say something if you can to cause me to know it.

(133b): "Is it the child who is crying?"
I don't know something (i.e. I don't know if it is true that it is the child that is crying)
I feel something bad because of that
I want to know it now
I assume you know
I want you to say something now to cause me to know it.

(133c) "It is the child who is crying, isn't it?"
I think it is true that the child is crying
I am not sure
I assume you would be able to say that it is true
I want you to say something that would cause me to know that it is true.
"Is it the child that is crying or?"

I assume that it might be true that the child is crying because of what I perceive.

I wouldn't have expected that the child should be crying.

I feel something because of that.

I think it is something else (not the child).

I don't know.

I assume you might know.

I want you to say something now that would cause me to know it.

and and stand out and their relationship with these other forms are obvious enough.

In Chapter 3 we examine a class of items that occur utterance finally and which are mutually exclusive with the utterance final interrogative markers. These are the addressive utterance - final particles.
"Particles are modes of social interaction"

(Wierzbicka 1976: 365)

3.0 Introduction:

Although the interrogative particles discussed in the previous chapter encode various communicative strategies of the Ewes, the particles described in this chapter signal, more than anything else, various moods and modes of interaction between participants in various communicative events. They convey to an addressee various attitudes of a speaker towards what is being communicated or towards the scene and situation of the speech activity or towards the addressee and sometimes towards other observers.

One of the particles, for instance, has been described as an endearment particle and translated into English as 'dear' (Ansre 1966a; 49; Duthie 1982: 4) which indicates that a speaker who tags this particle, tɔɔ, to an utterance wants to convey that s/he feels good feelings towards the addressee. This particle thus encodes an attitude of a speaker towards an addressee and its use guides an addressee to be aware of the speaker's feelings. Thus these particles provide an important and easy way to speaker's to express various attitudes as modifications to the various illocutionary forces that the utterances in which they occur convey (Brown & Levinson 1978; Labov 1978; Fraser 1980; Fraser & Nølæn 1981 and Holmes 1984). This does not mean, however, that
these particles are not exponents of illocutionary forces, rather the
forces that they have either attenuate or boost the force of the
utterance to which they are attached.

Granting that this is the basic function of these particles, it
cannot be gainsaid that the grasp of their appropriate use and meaning
constitutes an essential ingredient of the communicative competence of a
speaker of Ewe. Besides, because these particles are so frequently used
understanding them and being able to interpret them is indeed a sine qua
non to effective communication. Notwithstanding these important aspects
of these particles, their treatment in Ewe grammar is rather fragmentary
and confusing. Our aim in this chapter is to clarify the status of
these particles, describe their use systematically and elucidate the
meanings that are encapsulated in them.

In the first section, we justify the label "addressive particle"
and distinguish between the addressive particles and adverbials on the
one hand and the addressive particles and interjections on the other.
In the subsequent sections we characterize the particles à, dé, là, ló,
ìêè, loo, ìëà, ìòò, tòò and (1)ëë in that order.

3.1 The Status of Addressive Particles

3.1.0 Preliminaries

In the first part of this section we argue that the particles
under discussion are not adverbials but are truly sentence final
particles. In the second part, we make the claim that addressive
particles are different from interjections and exclamatory particles.
3.1.1 Addressives vs Adverbials

The particles outlined above which form the subject matter of this chapter together with the interrogative particles ã, ã and maha discussed in Chapter 2 have been classified as "sentence particles" (Duthie 1970; 1982; forthcoming). The scope of these particles is over a whole sentence and they occur at the end of utterances (cf Ansre 1966a: 45 et seq who considers the question and addressive particles as subsidiary elements of clause structure). Clements (1972: 39) who does not mention the addressive particles but talks about the question particle ã (Q) proposes the following phrase structure rules for its generation:

1. $S \rightarrow S \ (Q)$
2. $S \rightarrow NP \ (NEG) \ PRED$

The rules of Clements are in agreement with the view that the question particle(s) and for that matter the addressive particles are sentence or utterance final particles. They also articulate the view that the particles modify the sentence as a whole in that the particle is generated as a sister to the sentence.

It is quite well known that many languages of the world have such particles that, generally speaking, codify a speaker's cognitive and/or social attitudes towards an utterance. The class of Ewe utterance-final particles both question and addressive particles parallel similar classes found in languages of Asia, for example. They are reminiscent of Japanese sentence final particles (as described in various frameworks by Uyeno (1971); Kaju (1979) and Kendall (1985) among others), Cantonese utterance particles (Gibbons 1980), Betawi lexical particles (Ikranagara 1975), Taiwanese sentence final particles (Cheng 1977),
Chinese sentence final particles (Li & Thompson 1981 and numerous papers) and Parji 'performative particles' (Morton 1978).

Analogues of these particles have been attested in some Australian languages as well. Witness the description of Warlpiri propositional particles by Laughren (1982) and Harkins (to appear) and the clitics of Ngiyamba by Donaldson (1980).

Undisputably, parallels of these particles should be found in other African languages. However, due to the paucity of systematic descriptions and the rather anecdotal and sketchy accounts of these important words in these languages, no definitive comparisons can be made. (A signal exception though is the various accounts of Somali indicator particles (see Hetzron 1965; Antinucci & Puglielli 1980; Andrzejewski 1975; and Antinucci 1980). Awobuluyi (1978: 78 et seq) describes a number of items which he calls 'sentence-final sententials' in Yoruba. This class of items encompasses question particles and others that indicate a speaker's attitude.

In descriptions of all these languages, language internal evidence is adduced to consistently distinguish the final sentence particles from adverbials. Unfortunately however, in Ewe this distinction has not always been maintained. This is particularly true of the addressive particles. Nyomi (1977), for instance, vacillates between describing the addressive particles as adjuncts of verbs (p 335) and as adverbs modifying verbs (pp 204; 363). Interestingly enough, the same author does not assign the final interrogative particles which are mutually exclusive with the addressive particles to the class of adverbs or adjuncts. He refers to them as particles. We find such an analysis inconsistent with the linguistic data.
To us, Ewe sentence final particles including addressives are not
adverbs. Ewe sentence structure has a slot for these final particles
which is different from that of adverbials (cf Ansre 1966; Duthie
1982; 4; forthcoming). This is evident from the set of phrase structure
rules that Clements (1972: 37) postulates for Ewe (two of which have
been cited earlier on but reproduced here for convenience).

1. $S \rightarrow S (Q)$
2. $S \rightarrow NP (NEG) PREM$
3. $PREM \rightarrow AUX VP (ADV)$

We shall revise rule 1 as $1'$ to cater for the addressive particles.

$$1' \quad S \rightarrow S \{Q, ADD\}$$

The combined effect of rules $1'$, 2 and 3 will be to produce the
following sequence:

4. $NP (NEG) AUX VP (ADV)\{ADD\}$

Structurally then, the sentence final particles and adverbs have
different positions in sentence structure and should therefore belong to
different classes. (See examples 1, 2 and 3 below).

Further proof of our contention can be seen in the different
behaviour of adverbs and these particles in negative sentences. In Ewe,
a discontinuous morpheme $me...o$ expresses negation. $me$ occurs
preverbally but $o$ occurs between the adverbial and the sentence final
particles or if the clause is a dependent one, before clause terminal
particles and connectives such as $la, fi\dot{i}, ta,$ or $kpa$. To simplify the
discussion we shall illustrate the point with simple sentences only.
Consider the sentences in example (1).
(la) Kofi vá.
K come
Kofi came

(lb) Kofi vá { kábá.
early
K. come { etsɔ.
yesterday

Kofi came early/yesterday

(lc) Kofi vá { tɔɔ!:
K come { là!:
ADD

Kofi came 'dear'/'certainly'

(ld) Kofi vá { kábá { tɔɔ!:
early { là!
K came { etsɔ ADD
yesterday

Kofi came { early { 'dear'
yesterday { 'certainly'

(le) * Kofi vá { tɔɔ:
kábá.
la early
K come ADD { etsɔ.
yesterday

(la) is a simple sentence made up of a subject and a verb. In (lb), adverbs are added to the form of (la) while in (lc) Addressive particles are attached. (ld) has addressives tagged onto the form in (lb). (ld) illustrates the relative order of adverbials and the addressive particles. (le) indicates that the addressive cannot precede the adverbs. Each of the acceptable sentences can be negated. Their negative counterparts are shown in (2).
In the negative sentences, we note that the second element of the discontinuous morpheme, o occurs after the adverbials (2b) but before the addressives (2c). Where there are both adverbials and addressives, it occurs between them (2d). Ungrammatical sentences are produced if o occurs after the addressives (2e) or before the adverbials (2f). These illustrate that the two sets of items have different structural positions.
The final question particles exhibit the same kind of behaviour in relation to the adverbials. Observe that in the following examples, the question particles occur after adverbials (3a) and the negative element occurs before them (3b).

(3a)  
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Kofi va} & \quad \text{ets} & \\
\text{K} & \quad \text{NEG} & \quad \text{come} & \quad \text{yesterday} & \quad \text{le } \text{gyi} \text{ me} & \quad \text{at morning in} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(i) Did Kofi come in the morning?

(ii) Did Kofi come yesterday?

(iii) Did Kofi not come early or?

(iv) Kofi came early, didn't he?

(3b)  
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Kofi me} - \text{va} & \quad \text{ets} & \\
\text{K} & \quad \text{NEG} & \quad \text{come} & \quad \text{yesterday} & \quad \text{le } \text{gyi} \text{ me} & \quad \text{at morning in} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(i) Did Kofi not come?

(ii) Did Kofi come early?

(iii) Didn't Kofi come early or?

(iv) Kofi did not come early, did he?
From the foregoing, it is evident that adverbials occur within the scope of the negative. But the final particles don't. Are we not justified in claiming that these are not adverbials?

It should be pointed out that the two sub-classes of final particles: question and addressives, are mutually exclusive. That is, they do not co-occur in the same utterance. One would expect this to be the case anyway because while the question particles generally express a lack of knowledge on the part of the speaker, the addressives convey various attitudes of the speaker towards what, broadly speaking, s/he knows or is aware of or is certain of. Thus while all the utterances in (4a) and (4b) are acceptable those in (4c) are inappropriate and ungrammatical.

(4a)  
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Sr} & \overset{\circ}{\text{le}} \text{ Ama } s^i \\
\text{Spouse be at A hand}
\end{align*}
\]
\[
\begin{align*}
(i) & \text{ a?} \\
(ii) & \text{ maha?} \\
(iii) & \text{ qe?} \\
(iv) & \text{ loo?}
\end{align*}
\]

(i)&(ii) Does Ama have a spouse?

Ama has a spouse,  
\[
\begin{align*}
(iii) & \text{ doesn't she?} \\
(iv) & \text{ or?}
\end{align*}
\]

(4b)  
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Sr} & \overset{\circ}{\text{le}} \text{ Ama } s^i \\
\text{Spouse be at A hand}
\end{align*}
\]
\[
\begin{align*}
(i) & \text{ la!} \\
(ii) & \text{ se'a!} \\
(iii) & \text{ te'!} \\
(iv) & \text{ lo'!}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{'you know'!} \\
\text{'you hear'!} \\
\text{'dear'!} \\
\text{'be warned'!}
\end{align*}
\]
Now, if these items are not adverbials, could they possibly be adjuncts? The answer to this question can be varied depending on what adjuncts are construed to be. There are those who think of adjuncts typically as sentence modifiers (for example, Quirk et al. 1972). To the extent that these items modify the sentences in which they occur, they are adjuncts. Indeed, in grammatical theories such as Tagmemics (Pike & Pike 1982), Functional Grammar (Dik 1978), Lexical Functional Grammar (LFG) (Bresnan 1982, see also Andrews 1985) and Role and Reference Grammar (RRG) (Foley & Van Valin 1984) which recognize an opposition in clause structure between a "core" and a "periphery" where adjuncts belong to the periphery, these forms could be regarded as adjuncts. For these items are illocutionary force operators on sentences and in RRG, for example, illocutionary force operators are the outermost peripheral items that take everything else within their scope (Foley & Van Valin 1984: 220). It means that they are modifiers and if sentence modifiers are adjuncts then they are adjuncts.

However, if adjunct is understood in the traditional sense (a sense in which Nyomi (op cit) uses it) then these items are not adjuncts. Traditionally, adjuncts, as Lyons (1968: 344) explains, are
modifiers attached to heads upon which they are dependent and from which they can be "detached" without any consequent syntactic changes in the sentences. That is, adjuncts are syntactically optional (Lyons 1977: 435 see also Mathews 1981: 361ff and references there). If Lyons is right, then these final particles, especially the interrogative ones, cannot be referred to as adjuncts.

This is because if we detach the interrogative particles from the interrogative sentences in (4a) we are left with a declarative sentence as in (5). Syntactically, interrogative sentences are a separate category from declarative sentences. Hence the removal of the particles has led to a syntactic change in the category of the sentences. As such they are not adjuncts.

(5) Srį le Ama sí.

Now, if there is no doubt that the interrogative particles are not adjuncts (a fact that Nyomi (op cit) implicitly concedes) and the addressives are mutually exclusive with them (see examples in 4), then it follows that the addressive particles are also not adjuncts.

Be that as it may, there is a fundamental difference between the interrogative particles and the addressives. One cannot ask a propositional question without one of the interrogative particles. They are obligatory in interrogative sentences both grammatically and functionally. On the other hand, one can choose to communicate with one's interlocutor without using the addressive particles. The difference between the sentences in (4b) and (5) is that the speaker adds some attitudinal and emotional colouring to those in (4b) which are
absent in (5). Although these extras are communicatively significant they are not required nor essential for the basic propositional meaning that a speaker wants to convey. They are thus optional, at least, grammatically.

This distinction is indicative of an aspect of the addressive particles. It shows that the addressives are more likely, than the interrogatives, at least, to reflect the living culture of the Ewes (cf Wierzbicka (MS: 4-5) who suggests that optional grammatical categories are better mirrors of the ethos of a speech community than obligatory ones). From an ethnolinguistic point of view then, the addressives are very important and should not be clouded within inconsistent descriptions. In the next section, therefore, we take up another issue of the addressives, that of distinguishing between them and interjections.

3.1.2 Addressives vs Interjections

Another somewhat understandable yet undesirable confusion that has plagued these addressive particles is that some grammarians have analysed them as interjections or exclamations. Westermann (1930: 113) lists lọ, ṣeṣe and (1)ẹ as interjections for getting attention. Warburton et al (1968: 157, 261) also describe sësà as an 'emphatic exclamation'. Addressive particles and interjections or exclamations are related but they are not identical.

The confusion between the two classes of words is symptomatic of the intricate relationship between the two classes. For one thing, they both express a speaker's emotional attitude towards an entire
communicative event or specific components of such an event. Besides they are both indicators of the culture of their users. However, there are significant differences between the two which must be recognised.

Interjections unlike addressives can stand on their own as utterances. Interjections are meaningful when they constitute an utterance on their own but addressives are not interpretable in isolation. What they do is to add further nuances of meaning to the rest of the utterance within which they occur.

For example, if one experiences pain, one can exclaim, in Ewe, Ai! This is an expression of a speaker's emotion. We can paraphrase, very roughly, the meaning being conveyed by Ai as follows (cf English Ouch!)

A farmer weeding on the farm accidentally cuts himself and exclaims ai:

a. I perceive that something bad has happened to me (i.e. I have cut myself)

b. I want to say something because of it

c. I say: I feel something bad because of what has happened

d. I say it because I want to show how I feel.

This expression alone, an interjection, is interpretable. But if one, for example, wants to signal a persuasive attitude towards the addressee uttering ṣè (an emphatic exclamation according to Warburton et al) by itself is not interpretable. It does not convey anything. Ṣè is an addressive, not an exclamation or an interjection which is defined as: "an outcry to express pain, surprise, anger, pleasure or some other emotion.", to use the words of Curme (1935: 105 in Huddleston 1984: 91).
A corollary of this difference is that an interjection could but need not have an addressee. A speaker's outcry is not specifically addressed to an interlocutor, although it may be (over)heard and acted upon. Notice that our explication of *ai* does not have a 'you' - an addressee in it. Furthermore, an interjection does not solicit a response from a hearer although its utterance may have an uptake (in the sense of Austin) (cf Sapir 1921: 6; Goffman [1978] 1984-passim). A speaker who uses an addressive particle, however, has a specific addressee and elicits a response - verbal or otherwise - from this addressee. As Ansre (1966:49), who introduced the term, put it "its (i.e. addressive particle's F.A.) presence indicates that the utterance is addressed to a party other than the speaker."

Another complication arises with what we shall call exclamatory particles. We reserve this term for interjectional particles which cannot stand on their own as utterances. For example, *bang* is described by Warburton et al (1968: 251) as "an interjection for calling someone's attention". This particle, we shall argue (see 3.5.), expresses a speaker's surprise when attached to an utterance but it does not convey anything by itself. It has to be attached to an utterance that stipulates what the surprise is.

What distinguishes such particles from addressive particles is that they do not have specific addressees (contrary to Warburton et al's characterisation). They are an expression of a speaker's emotion just like interjections but unlike the interjections, then, they cannot stand in isolation as utterances. These subtle distinctions are not trivial, because they have important consequences for the semantic representation of the forms. Note that *ai*’s formula has no 'you' in it but it has a
dictum. We shall see that \(\hat{\text{lo}}\) (3.5) exclamatory particle, has no 'you' in it and has no explicit dictum component. The explications of addressives have 'you' in them but no explicit dicta. These aspects illustrate and form a basis for the terminological 'gambling' engaged in here.

To sum up, we have attempted to clarify what the syntactic status of sentence-final particles is in Ewe with particular emphasis on the addressive particles. We have indicated that the addressives might depict the culture of the Ewes - an issue we shall take up in the last section. Above all we have argued that it is erroneous to think of the addressives as adverbs or interjections or exclamatory particles. The implications of this clarification for the analysis of the meanings of the addressives in particular was indicated. We now turn to the analysis of individual addressives with a view to extracting their illocutionary forces. We begin with \(\hat{\text{a}}\) and \(\hat{\text{d}}\).

3.2 \(\hat{\text{a}}\) and \(\hat{\text{d}}\)

3.2.0 Preliminary Observations:

Recall that in Chapter 2 we deferred the discussion of the use of two interrogative particles \(\hat{\text{a}}\) and \(\hat{\text{d}}\) after VPs because we argued that they fit more appropriately into the paradigm of addressives. That is, in this syntactic frame, their use is not interrogatively interpreted. We surmised then that there might be some regularity in the polysemy. Although this issue is open to question as well as further examination, it is of interest to note that some typological evidence seems to exist for our hypothesis.
In Taiwanese (Cheng 1977: 154), for example, the same morphemes that function as final question particles also serve as negative modal verbs. Similarly, in Chinese (Wang Li 1958 cited in Cheng 1977) final question particles tend to be etymologically related to negated modal verbs, for instance, ma. In addition, Thompson (1970) has noted various uses that have been ascribed to ba in Chinese. "We hear of the ba of polite command, ... the ba of suggestion or probability; and the interrogative ba." (p.115). He proposes that ba performs a unitary function i.e. seeks agreement from the hearer (cf Li & Thompson 1981). It is reasonable to assume from all these cases that there is a regular match between interrogative markers and emotive-expressive items (cf English interrogative exclamations: What a nice day!)

Be that as it may, when ˋ and ˋ are attached to imperative utterances, they attenuate the imperative force of the utterances. ˋ indicates a speaker's exasperation due to an addressee's failure to carry out the directive up to the time of the utterance. ˋ, on the other hand, signals that the speaker grants concession to the addressee in the execution of the instruction. The compliance with the order is left to the volition of the addressee. Let us consider some examples. First those of ˋ.

3.2.1 ˋ

(6) Kumá, fo nu - ˋ!
K, strike mouth ADD
Kuma, speak!
(adapted from Akpatsi 1974: 8; tones and translations mine FA)
In example (6), Kuma - a defendant at an arbitration has taken his turn to put his case across but could not say a word for a long time keeping the whole court in suspense. The father who cannot bear it any longer says (6) to him in exasperation. Observe that the speaker had waited for the addressee to do something that s/he was supposed to be doing but which was not being done. The speaker conveys the idea that "I cannot wait any longer, I want you to do it now."

Take another example,

(7) Taší́ - à!
Stop  ADD
Stop!

A crying child who had been consoled and comforted but continues to cry could be addressed with (7). A friend who is aware that a habit inconveniences him/her but persists in doing it could be told (7) by another friend.

In these cases also, we have a speaker expecting the addressee to have done something by the time of the utterance, but the addressee has not done it. The speaker criticises the addressee, so to speak. Here too, the idea of the speaker being fed up and not wanting to think about the matter any longer is present.

Sometimes, à utterances are followed by others which express a speaker's unwillingness to think about the consequences of the addressee's failure to carry out the directive (see(8)). Others indicate the speaker's indifference towards the outcome (sse(9)). These suggest that à implies that the speaker does not want to think any longer about the matter. Does one not feel that way when fed up and exasperated?
(8), for instance is a cliché for a kind of food made from cassava dough which was developed at a time when too much rain rendered cassava unsuitable for the preparation of the usual staple food, fufu.

(8) Gbè é du m kpọ à!
Refuse 3SG eat PROG see ADD
Do ko è lá wu wo!
Hunger only FOC FUT kill 2SG
Refuse to eat and see!
You will only die of hunger!
(= It is only hunger that will kill you).

Note the second part of the utterance which conveys the idea that: "I hate to think about what will happen to you, you will only starve"

Next, consider (9).

(9) Di nygnu bubu à!
Search woman another ADD
Nu ka é me tsọ le é me?
Thing WH FOC ISG take at 3SG in
Marry another woman!
What do I care?

(9) could be uttered by a wife to a husband who threatens to get another wife during an argument. In this context, we could expect the speaker to feel exasperated that the husband has not got another wife yet. Note the statement of indifference in the second part.
(10) is said by a friend who tries unsuccessfully to prevail upon the friend not to go somewhere. Finally he gives up and explicitly states that the outcome of the trip does not concern him.

(10) Ko yi - `a!
Take o ADD
Me ka m o.
3SG& NEG concern lSG NEG
Go! It doesn't concern me.

From these examples, we suggest that `a conveys to the addressee that s/he should have done something by the time of the utterance. The speaker is disappointed, exasperated and irritated because of that and indicates that s/he does not want to think about it any longer. The speaker wants the addressee to notice what s/he feels and do something about what is being said.

These components can be formulated more precisely using (6) as an illustration as follows:

Kuma, fo nu - `a!
K strike mouth ADD
Kuma, speak!
X - `a! (Where X is otherwise imperative)
a. I expect that you should have done/been doing X (i.e. I expect that you should have been saying something)
b. I perceive that you are not doing X (i.e. I perceive that you are not saying anything)
c. I feel something bad because of that (i.e. I feel exasperated or irritated that you are not saying anything)

d. I don't want to think any more about it (i.e. I cannot wait any longer for you to continue to say nothing)

e. I want you to notice what I feel (i.e. I want you to notice that I feel exasperated and cannot wait any longer)

f. I want you to do something because of what I am saying (i.e. I want you to say something now).

We assume that a full explication of (6) would first have some components that spell out the imperative force and then followed by the force of the particle as we have just formulated it. The dictum of that part of the explication would look like:

I say: I want you to say something (= speak)

To sum up, we give another example with its paraphrase. (11) is said by an adult to one of two children who is bullying the other by seizing something of his. All attempts by the bullied child to get the thing failed and the adult was called in as an arbiter.

(11) TscT^ - e^ ng^- a!
Take 3SG give & 3SG ADD
Give it to him!
(= Why not give it to him)
This may be explicated as follows:

I say: I want you to give it to him
I expect that you should have given it to him (by now)
I perceive that you have not given it to him
I feel something bad because of it
I don't want to think anymore about it
I want you to notice what I feel
I want you to give it to him (now) because of what I am saying.

3.2.2 \( \overline{\text{de}} \)

While \( \overline{a} \) expresses a speaker's exasperation and irritation, \( \overline{\text{de}} \) expresses a concession given to an addressee to execute a directive. In essence, a construction, \( X \overline{\text{de}} \) can be paraphrased as "I want you to do \( X \) if you want to" (where \( X \) is an imperative).

Consider the following dialogue:

(12) A: Afì - ka yi - m' ñe - le?
Place WH go PROG 2SG be
K: Me - yi asi - me.
1SG go market in
A: Nàdqù hìà - m , gaké...
Something need 1SG but
K: Nù - ka - ë? Dô - m \( \overline{\text{de}} \! \)!
Thing WH FOC Send 1SG ADD
A: Where are you going?
K: I am going to the market.
A: I need something, but....
K: What is it? Send me (if you want)!
It should be noted that \textsuperscript{a} would be infelicitous here but suppose "\textsuperscript{A}" is still undecided after "\textsuperscript{K}" had given him permission to ask him to do the thing for him then \textsuperscript{a} could be used. "\textsuperscript{A}" hesitates to ask "\textsuperscript{K}" to get what he wants and "\textsuperscript{K}" gives him the go-ahead and tags his imperative with \textsuperscript{de}. 

Let us take another example, one that is parallel to (9). (13) is a wife's reply to the husband's complaints and criticisms about her suitability. In this context, the wife conveys the message that; "if I am not suitable, then look for another woman, I permit you."

(13) \textsuperscript{Di ny\textsuperscript{nu} bubu \textsuperscript{de!}}  
Search woman another ADD  
Look for another woman (I permit you).

The idea that flows through the uses of \textsuperscript{de} is that the addressee may choose to comply with the directive to which it is attached or not. This implies that the speaker concedes that s/he will not be offended if the addressee does not want to do what s/he wants to be done. To use Leech's Tact Maxim to explain it we could say that the speaker uses \textsuperscript{de} to minimise the cost of carrying out the directive to the addressee (see Leech 1983: 104 et seq). Furthermore, the speaker wants the addressee to take note of his/her attitude and feelings.

These components of the meaning of \textsuperscript{de} can be formulated using "\textsuperscript{Ds - m de" (Send me, I permit you) from (12) to illustrate it. First the imperative part (D - m)  

I say: I want you to send me  
I say it because I want to cause you to do it.
as explicated below is tagged onto it to modify its force:

$X \text{ dé!}$ (where $X$ is otherwise imperative)

a. I want you to do $X$ if you want (i.e. I want you to do what I say I want you to do (send me) if you want to)
b. I want you to understand that I wouldn't feel anything bad if you don't (want to) do it
c. I want you to notice what I feel
d. I want you to do something because of what I am saying (i.e. I want you to notice that I would not mind if you don't do it and I want you to decide to do it or not).

The various components that we have postulated are not incompatible with the various senses of interrogative $\text{dé}$. We found in Chapter 2 that $\text{dé}$ (see 2.2.44) in particular, that is, $\text{dé}$ at the end of declarative sentences, suggests that the speaker seeks agreement with the proposition from the addressee although leaving room for disagreement. Similarly $\text{dé}$ (ADD) seeks compliance but leaves it to the volition of the addressee.

Let us substitute our formula in one example. (14) is uttered by a vendor to a customer who expresses interest in the vendor's wares.

(14) $\text{dé} \text{ dé!}$

Buy some ADD

Buy some (if you want).
The vendor, in our view, is conveying the following:

(I say: I want you to buy some)
I want you to do it (i.e. buy some) if you want
I won't feel anything bad if you don't buy some
I want you to notice what I feel
I want you to do something about what I am saying.

One is tempted to postulate a component in which the speaker expresses the idea that it will be preferable if the addressee decided to do what is expected. However, it does not seem to apply in all cases. In most cases, it does but will a wife genuinely prefer to have a rival? Some might, but in general in the case of example (13), it is inconceivable to think that the woman would prefer that the man takes another woman.

We conclude that the following represents the semantic core of \( \text{de} \):

\[ X \text{ de!} \] (where \( X \) is otherwise imperative)

a. I want you to do \( X \) if you want
b. I want you to understand that I won't feel anything bad if you don't (want to) do it
c. I want you notice what I feel about it
d. I want you to do something because of what I am saying.

3.3 \( \text{la} \)

One of the addressive particles listed by Ansre (1966a: 45) is \( \text{la} \)
(cf Duthie 1970, 1982, forthcoming). This particle is very
idiosyncratic; Duthie (1982: 4), for example, is unable to find a suitable translation equivalent for it in English. Its idiosyncrasy is also evident from its use in mixing English and Ewe codes. Utterances in (15) are not uncommon to hear from English-Ewe bilinguals.

(15a) Lets go la!
   b) Do it la!
   c) Leave me alone la!
   d) I have not seen it la!
   e) Kofi paid for it la!

This is done presumably because English does not provide such a short form which has condensed in it a complex meaning which can be so readily and vividly used. That is not to say that the English language may not be able to express such a meaning. One can use the English language to describe in a copious way the complicated assumptions and feelings that la encapsulates (cf the use of la in Singapore English as described by Richards & Tay 1977).

la conveys a speaker's bad feelings towards an addressee and his/her urgent demand for attention and change in the attitude of an addressee towards an aspect of a communicative event. la can occur with declaratives, imperatives and even vocatives but not on interrogatives.

(16) is an extract from a dialogue between a man (Fianyo) who proposes marriage to a young woman (Ama). Ama finds it difficult to accept the proposal because she cannot abandon her father her single surviving parent, although she loves Fianyo.
(16) Ama: ..........................

Nye m - a - te nju á-
I NEG FUT be able FUT
dē wɔ o le fofo - nye
marry lSG NEG be at father lSG&POSS
ta. É - ve - m ńutsɔ
since 3SG pain lSG much
gaké nye - m - á - té
but lSG NEG FUT be
ńu - i gbede o.
able PRO never NEG

Fianyo: O Ama nye lólo - tɔ
O A lSG&POSS love er
..... me - dē kúku
lSG remove hat
ná wɔ, ga - bu
for 2SG REP think
ta me vie.
head in a little

Ama: Gbede, nye - m - á - te nju - i ɔ.
Never lSG NEG FUT be able PRO NEG

Fianyo: Ao! Ao! Ama, e - gba
Ouch! Ouch! A 2SG break
nye dzi.
lSG&POSS heart

Ama: ..........................

Dzo n - a - yi afo kpoo.
Leave 2SG SBJV go home quietly.
Fianyo: Ao! Ama me - ḍe kuku
Ouch! A 1SG remove hat
ná wo ̀à! Ao! Ao! Hm!
for 2SG ADD Ouch! Ouch! Hm

Ama: I cannot marry you because of my father. It pains me but I can never do it.

Fianyo: Oh Ama, my lover.... I beg you, please think a while again about it.

Ama: Never, I cannot.

Fianyo: Ouch! Ouch! Ama, you have broken my heart

Ama: Leave, go home in peace!

Fianyo: Ouch! Ama I beg you (la)! Ouch Ouch Hm

(Setsoafia 1982: 65-66 tones and translations mine, PA)

In this example, ̀à is used in a context in which the speaker is persuading and pleading with the addressee to change her mind. It is significant that the speaker uses ̀à only on the third plea for Ama to change her mind. The speaker wants to convey to the addressee through the use of ̀à that he expects that she should have changed her mind by now because of what he has been saying for some time now. Naturally, if things don't go the way one wants, it is human to feel bad. The speaker thus registers this ill-feeling through the particle. Furthermore the speaker wants the addressee to change her mind immediately.

From example (16), it would seem that ̀à is used after a speaker has begged the addressee to do something and the addressee remains obstinate in not doing it. However in example (17) the speaker had not given any prior indication to two cousins who were fighting to stop fighting. The first thing he says to them when he realises that they are fighting ends in ̀à.
Thus something has been going on, a fight, and the speaker wants it to stop immediately because he does not expect two cousins to be fighting.

The speaker of (18) has been physically attacked by three people. In self-defence, he casts a spell on the assailants in order that they may be confused and turn on one another rather than on him. The words uttered to effect this end in \( \text{là} \).

The examples indicate the urgency that is associated with \( \text{là} \). A speaker wants something to happen immediately (a change of mind instantly; a fight to stop at once; a confusion to break out immediately). But in all cases, something that is undesirable to the speaker is what triggers the use of \( \text{là} \).
On the basis of these examples we suggest the following illocutionary structure for 'X la!' (where X is otherwise not interrogative).

a. I perceive that something has been happening for some time now (e.g. you have been fighting)
b. I expect it to have ceased by now (I expect that you should have stopped fighting)
c. I feel something bad because it has not ceased
d. I want it to cease now (I want you to stop fighting)
e. I want you to pay attention to what I feel
f. I want you to do something that will cause this thing to cease now because of what I am saying.

Informally speaking, example (16) conveys the message that: you have been rejecting my pleas for some time now; I expect you to have stopped/doing that by now; I feel something bad because you have not stopped. I want you to stop rejecting my pleas, I want you to notice what I feel and stop rejecting my pleas. Thus our formula helps us to understand the use of la in that example.

Most of the examples cited so far are imperative in structure but la also occurs on declarative sentences. In such contexts the particle seems to be used to emphasise the truth-value of the proposition. Because of this, Ansre (1966a: 45) describes it as being used "for confirmation" and glosses it as "certainly". At first sight it might seem that this use and the characterisation of Ansre are radically different and very distant from our formulation, but we shall demonstrate that our formula caters very nicely for this aspect of the particle as well. First, a look at some examples:
A speaker reports something to an addressee who doubts him s/he could indicate that it is really true by uttering (19).

(19) Nyatefe - e ` la!
   Truth   FOC ADD
   It is true (la):
   (= it is really true).

While this may be to confirm the truth of what is being said, a speaker cannot start his/her speech with a statement with `la. There must be a situation of dispute created first and `la comes in reaction to that doubt. In our view, if someone doubts what you are saying you would want that person to believe you and you do feel excited that you should be thought of as a liar. (19) could be paraphrased roughly as follows:

I perceive that you have been doubting me for some time now
I expect that you should have stopped doubting me by now
I feel something bad because you have not stopped doubting me
I want you to pay attention to what I feel
I want you to believe me now because of what I am saying.

While our formula fits example (19) we wonder if in example (16), for instance, `la is used for confirmation. It is apparent that "confirmation" is not the invariant meaning of `la. What we need is not a partial characterisation, but one which captures the core meaning of the particle. Our formula does just that.

Consider Ansre's (op cit) example for which he provides no context which is reproduced as (20).
(20) Nye afɔkpa  là!
(ISG&POSS footwear ADD, F.A.)

My shoe (certainly).

We will use this expression when, for instance, we have misplaced our footwear and have been looking for it and we are disappointed that we cannot find it. The example also shows that là can also occur only on NPs.

It is odd, for example, when someone is informing another about his/her marital status to utter (21).

(21) Sɔmε - le asi - nye o là!
Spouse NEG be at hand ISG NEG ADD

I don't have a spouse (la)!

It is however felicitous if your interlocutor (maybe someone you are interested in) continues to pester you with the question about your status. Although là may be added to give confirmation it has more to it. Basically there is a situation of doubt and uncertainty and là is a reaction to that.

We indicated initially that là can also be used on vocatives. If someone is doing something to you which you do not want to continue and you have asked that that behaviour should stop but it continues you could mention the person's name and put là on it (see (22).

(22a) Kofi là!
K ADD
Kofi!
(22b) Fo Kɔmla ła!
Title K ADD
Elder brother K mlal

Is ła used in these examples to confirm the name? Probably in a sense one could be emphasising that it is person X rather than person Y but is that all to it?

We think that "Kofi ła" conveys the following force:

Kofi, you have been doing something to me for sometime now (e.g. disbelieving me; tickling me or whatever)
I expect it to have ceased by now
But it has not
I feel something bad because of that
I would want it to cease now (i.e. you should stop what you have been doing to me now)
I want you to pay attention to me and what I feel
I want you to respond immediately.

If ła were only for confirmation or certainty, we would expect it to be used in several contexts. But, in fact, ła is not used in contexts where intrinsically there are good feelings. For example, one cannot invite another to join him/her in a meal with (23).

(23)?? Va mí Ḟu nū ła!
Come I PL eat thing ADD
Come and let's eat!

(22b) Fo Kɔmla ła!
Title K ADD
Elder brother K mlal
However one can say (24) to somebody you dine with whom you had informed that the food was ready but s/he continued to do something that was less important without coming to the table.

(24) Va’ mi’ qụ nu’ - à là!
Come 1PL eat thing DEF ADD
Come and let's eat the food (la)!

Our formula is appropriate for (24) but does not fit (23) primarily because when you invite somebody to eat with you, you cannot at the same time indicate that you feel something bad towards that person.

The analysis proposed here explains the unacceptability of the forms in (25).

(25a)?? Òdi’ là!
Morning ADD
(Good Morning)

(25b)?? Ọ̀ wọ̀ - é’ - ẹ̀ ìlà!
2SG FOC walk
(Welcome)

These are formulae expressing good feelings towards the addressee and therefore if there is a bad feeling component in ìlà, it cannot fit in. This is further proof that 'confirmation' is not the core of ìlà, because although you may feel something towards the thing you are confirming, you do not feel something bad, necessarily.
It should be evident from our data that 'l has a bad feeling component. Its use also demands an urgent change in a certain state of affairs which the speaker does not want.

3.4 lô and hêê

lô and hêê are synonymous dialect variants. The use of one or the other depends on the dialect background of the speaker. Nonetheless, some people who have both in their repertoire might use either of them depending on what dialect area they are in or they want (involuntarily) to be seen to be solidarising with. Coastal Ewes (Aŋlos) use hêê while the Inland Ewes use lô.

Typically, the two particles occur at the end of advisory statements, warnings, threats, prohibitions and permissions as well as cautions. Ansre (1966a: 45) lists only one of them, lô (not surprisingly, since he is himself an Inland Ewe). He claims that it is used for "announcement" and glosses it as 'you hear'. This may point to an aspect of the particle, but they are not enough as elucidations of the use nor the meaning of lô. Incidentally, and rather unfortunately, Ansre postulates an identical use and gloss for another addressive particle, loo, without comment. We shall show in this section and in the next that the meaning conveyed by lô and for that matter hêê is different from that of loo.

lô and hêê could be paraphrased in a performative analysis mode as 'I advise you'. This should be taken as a preliminary and unavoidably rough summary of their meaning.
Let us illustrate the use of these particles; first in some linguistic routines. A very common linguistic routine in Ewe is *agoo!* It is said at the entrance to somebody's premises before entering. In this case, it is equivalent to knocking and the addressee responds to allow the speaker in. It is also used to ask for the right of way, for instance, in a crowded street. It also solicits attention from an audience before speaking. In these latter contexts it is roughly equivalent to "excuse me" (see Ameka (in prep) for a detailed analysis and explication) Characteristically *lo* and *heę* are attached to this expression. Thus (26a) and (26b) are very often heard.

(26a) Agoo *lo!*

ADD

(26b) Agoo *heę!*

ADD

Excuse me!

(Knock, Knock)

To a certain extent, *agoo* is an announcement, an advice of what a speaker wants to do. For example, "I am about to enter, I advise you, tell me, if I can" where it is equivalent to knocking. Or, "I am about to speak, I advise you, be quiet and let me speak" where it is used to gain the stage to speak. Where it is used to gain the right of passage we could paraphrase it as: "I want to pass, you are in the way, make room for me, I advise you." These particles then are used in these utterances where a speaker gives notice of a forthcoming activity. It seems that the particles are attached to invite the speaker to consider what is going to happen and behave accordingly.
Another routine in which these particles occur is where a speaker is about to use the left hand in a situation in which s/he should not. To gain indemnity, so to speak, from social stigmatization, the speaker advises the addressee that s/he is about to use the wrong hand and uses (27) (see Ameka[1985a,b] for discussion of the cultural implications of the form).

(27) Mia \{ lò! \}
    Left \{ hèè! \}
    ADD

    The left hand!

Here again we see the use of the particles in an utterance that signifies something that is going to happen.

Contrast these examples with the unacceptability of (28)

(28) ?? Odi \{ lò! \}
     \{ hèè! \}
     ADD
     (Good Morning)

Of course, (29) is perfectly acceptable.

(29) M - á - va le ñ di \{ lò! \}
    \{ hèè! \}
    1SG FUT come at morning ADD
    I'll come in the morning (I advise you).

(28) is probably unacceptable because saying 'Good morning' is not predating anything about what is going to happen or could happen that
the speaker should be aware of but in (29) we have a piece of advice about when an event will take place and the addressee is asked to take note of it, probably for his/her good.

Another example of the use of lo from a different context is provided by the use of (30a) by a Primary Class One teacher routinely whenever he is about to introduce a flash-card to his pupils. (30b) is chorused by the pupils in response.

(30a) Nàné gbɔ - na lo!  
Something come HAB ADD  
There is something coming!

(30b) Ne va!  
3SG (IMP) come  
Let it come!

This occurs in an inland area school and the teacher is an inland dialect speaker (in fact, the school is St. Francis' College Demonstration School, Hohoe). We submit that he would equally be appropriate here and that the use of lo here is due to the dialect area and background of the teacher. Anyway, the example indicates again the use of lo where something is about to happen and note the response of the pupils.

Example (31) is a piece of advice from a girl to her colleagues. An injunction that they should learn a lesson from her life. She had refused to heed parental advice. She defied everybody and consequently indulged in immoral practices. In the end, she died miserably and disgracefully. Just before her death she uttered (31) to her friends.
My friends, take a cue from mine (i.e. my life).

(Dogoe 1964: 42 translations and tones mine PA)

lo is used here, we believe, because the author is an inland dialect speaker and the story is also set in an inland area. However, hëë would also be very appropriate in this context.

Up to now, we have seen that the two particles are used basically to make the addressee aware of something which the speaker thinks will be good for him/her to be aware of; being addressives, they also seek the attention of the addressee, as well as soliciting a response from him/her. We formulate these ideas as follows:

a. I want you to think about (consider) what I am saying
b. I think it will be good if you do it
c. I want you to do something because of what I am saying
d. I want you to notice what I think of it.

Probably, we should distinguish between lo and hëë with a component such as (e) which builds into the formula the dialectal difference between the two:

e. I say it this way (i.e. lo or hëë) because I want to be seen to be speaking dialect Y

All along we have cited examples involving lo, principally. We now demonstrate the plausibility of our formula with specific examples of hëë. (32) is an extract from an exchange between two negotiators:

(31) Novi - nye - wo, mi - srɔ - ɛ
Friend lSG&POSS PL you(PL) learn 3SG
QE to - nye yu lo!
on POSS PRO lSG side ADD

(32) is an extract from an exchange between two negotiators:
A(deladzá) is requesting from T(siamigã) the chief's stool of his clan. "T" outlines some conditions for its return and when "A" and his team were about to retire, he reminds them of the items he wants.

(32) A: Týgbuí Tsiamigã, akpê dô ̀gô!  
TITLE T applause send front  
T: Akpê me - li o. Hotsuí - a' - wo hëè!  
Applause NEG be NEG cowrie DEF PL ADD  
A: Yoo  
OK  
T: Aha la hëè!  
Drink DEF ADD  
A: Yoo  
OK  
T: -Detugbuí la hëè!  
Girl DEF ADD  
A: Týgbuí, Yoo!  
TITLE OK  
A: Honourable Tsiamigã, thanks in advance!  
T: You're welcome. The cowries, OK!  
A: OK  
T: The drink, OK!  
A: OK  
T: The girl, OK!  
A: Honourable, OK  

(Nyaku (MSb: 28a) tones and translations mine FA)

The play from which (32) is taken is based on the history of the Ajìls (coastal Ewes) and the language is therefore very much Ajìls-biased,
although the author himself comes from an inland Ewe area. (His better-half though is an A). This is a case of an author (speaker) trying to use language and particular items to reflect the dialect background of the milieu in which s/he is operating. Needless to point out that ló is a perfect substitute for héé in the above.

Let's take one of the utterances 'Aha la héé' (The drink, OK!) and substitute our formula for héé. The conveyed message is the following:

I want you to think about what I am saying (i.e. about the drink)
I think it will be good if you do it (i.e. it will be good if you do not forget it)
I want you to notice what I am saying
I want you to do something about what I am saying (i.e. you should respond).

It is worth noting that "A" responds to each of the héé utterances with yoo (OK).

A further example is provided by (33)

(33) Kpó dá, jútsuvi, fia sré me - nyé héé!

See VS boy chief spouse lSG be ADD

Look here, young man, I am the chief's spouse (wife)!

(Akpatsi (1974: 15) translations and tones mine PA)

A young man who is making advances to a lady is being cautioned by the woman that she is not only married but married to the chief of the village. Here again héé is attached to a statement that the speaker wants the addressee to consider in his own interest. ló is equally acceptable.
Consider (34), a metaphorical expression which is an instruction to addressees and which ends in hëë.

(34) Xe fũ nyuí me - wo a xe nyuí o hëë!
   Bird feather good NEG do HAB bird good NEG ADD
   A good feather does not make a good bird.

The philosophy behind this expression is that good looks do not necessarily make things to be of good stuff. A warning that one should not be deceived by outward looks. lo' could also occur on the expression.

It should be abundantly clear that lo and hëë are dialect variants with identical meanings. We have tried to formulate this meaning. We shall show in the next section that contra Ansre the meaning of lo as formulated here is different from that of loo.

3.5 loo
3.5.0 Preliminaries

There is some confusion in the literature surrounding forms that have the segmental form loo. The confusion is understandable and can be traced to the varying tonal values that the segmental structure can assume. We recognise the forms loo, lô and lôô.

Various grammarians have touched on one or the other of these forms but none has maintained the tripartite distinction we suggest here. Thus Westermann (1930: 113) describes one of the forms as:

loó (which always follows a word) urges attention; va loo come on..."
Implied in this description is the fact that loo cannot stand on its own as an utterance – an indication that it is not an interjection but an addressive particle.

Although Duthie (1982: 4) cites loo – a form identical to Westermann's, presumably – as an example of an addressive particle in sentence structure, he exemplifies the use of these forms in utterances with another form; loo ( = l̓oo by his tonal marking system). It is difficult to say if the two forms are the same or are different when he provides no comment on either of them. Later on, however, Duthie (1984) has this comment on l̓oo:

"The proposal of proposition 1 (i.e. Mī - se alobalo l̓oo!
You hear puzzle ADD
Listen to a puzzle! FA)
is specifically addressed to the Receiver by means of loo
(addressive particle) at the end". (p. 75)

We agree with his calling l̓oo an addressive particle. And we think that l̓oo is different from loo. Native speakers should be able to discern nuances of differences between the forms in (35).

(35a) Vá!
Come

(35b) Vá loo!
Come ADD

(35c) Vá lōo!
Come ADD

(35d) Vá lō!
Come ADD
We hope to bring out these differences especially between (35b) and (35c), but before that a comment on loo. Warburton et al (1968: 251) describe it in one place as "an interjection for calling someone's attention" and elsewhere refer to it as an "exclamatory particle" (p. 151). We have argued earlier on that addressives are not interjections (see 3.1.2.). They are also different from exclamatory particles. We shall show that Warburton et al are basically right in calling loo an exclamatory particle but we do not agree with the other description.

We should note furthermore, that Ansre (1966a: 45) ascribes no tone value to loo which he glosses as 'you hear' and claims that it is used for announcement. Incidentally, it is the same characterisation that he gives to lo. We have shown that lo implies advice. Conversely, we think that loo and loo are basically used to instruct the addressee to be attentive to what is being said.

3.5.1 loo and loo

The two particles loo and loo can be attached to routine greeting expressions (37) and formulae for opening some folk-events such as folktales, puzzles and riddles (38). However the normal one in these contexts is loo (cf Duthie 1984: 75 quoted above).

(37) A: ñ di loo!
   Morning ADD
   Good Morning!

   B: ñ di!
   Morning
   Good morning!
A lobalo puzzle gli story
2PL hear

Listen to a puzzle/a story!

Alobalo puzzle gli Story

Let puzzle/story come!

I oo as well as loo also occur on statements as well as imperatives. For example,

(38) Me - dz0 \`oo!
    1SG leave ADD
    I am gone!

(39) Ku tsi ve na' novi \`oo!
    Fetch water come give friend ADD
    Get some water for your friend!

(40) Xe fe - a ng na' - m \`oo!
    Pay debt DEF to & 3SG for 1SG ADD
    Pay the money to him for me!

All that I oo conveys in these utterances is that the speaker should pay attention to what is being said and respond. I oo is, indeed, the most neutral of the addressives. Although we disagree with Ansre's gloss of it as 'you hear', we think it points to the fact that he also conceives of the particle as inviting the addressee to pay attention to what is being said. We formulate the meaning as follows:
a. I want you to pay attention to what I am saying (e.g. Ọdi ọ̀ọ̀ = I want you to pay attention to what I am saying i.e. 'morning')

b. I want you to do something that will cause me to know you have heard me (i.e. I want you to respond).

We have shown in (36) and (37) how the addressee responds. Indeed, each of the examples would naturally receive a reply but this need not be verbal. For example, a mother says (41) to the child when the cassava is boiled and ready for pounding. The child does not say anything but goes to get the mortar and pestle ready. Her action is a response - a non-verbal one - to what has been said. This is why we have in our component (b) the phrase "I want you to do something..." rather than "I want you to say something...".

(41) È bi ọ̀ọ̀!
3SG cook ADD
It is cooked!

We have stated that ọ̀ọ̀ can also be used in all the contexts in which ọ̀ọ̀ has been used. What then is the difference between ọ̀ọ̀ and ọ̀ọ̀? We are of the opinion that the meaning of ọ̀ọ̀ includes the one proposed for Ọ̀ọ̀ but has in addition a feature of urgency, immediacy and haste.

To support this proposition, consider (42) which is chanted by a number of members of a bereaved family at the end of a funeral. It is an expression of gratitude to the people of the village for their co-operation during the funeral.
The performance of this routine suggests the extra component that we are advocating. The group sets off at dawn and has to go round the whole village by sun-rise. As such the people walk briskly and sing along through houses without waiting for any response. We have already seen that "lool" can be used on such routines. We think that it is not used, in fact never used, in this context because of the hurried nature in which it is performed.
Similarly, although loo is the usual addressive used on the opening formulae of folk events as shown in (37), loo may be used instead in a marked situation. Suppose that someone has been pressured by the peers to tell them a story but s/he is unwilling to do so. Finally, s/he accepts just for the sake of satisfying the colleagues. Eager to get it done with s/he begins her story with (43).

(43) Mi - se gli' loo!
2PL hear story ADD

Listen to a story!

(43) would be odd in a situation where there has not been any pressure or anxiety to get the story done. (37) is more appropriate in the relaxed normal situation.

To bring out the meaning of loo, let us attempt to differentiate between the expressions in (44).

(44a) Va!
Come
Come!

(44b) Va loo!
Come ADD
Come!

(44c) Va loo!
Come ADD
Come!

(44a) is a simple straightforward imperative and has no extra attitudes of the speaker expressed. It roughly means: "I want you to come!" (44b),
as we have suggested, signals to the addressee to pay attention to what is being said and to respond. (44c) however, has an added sense of the addressee must comply with the order immediately. Actually, Westermann glosses it as "Come on". The difference in English between "Come!" and "Come on!" is very instructive here.

We propose that ̄elo conveys the following meaning:

a. I want you to pay attention to what I am saying now
b. I feel something about it
c. I assume you will do something now because of what I say.

A comparison of the formulae for ̄elo and ̄elo reveals that the one for ̄elo contains the word 'now' in two components which ̄elo does not have. This, we believe, accounts for the urgency associated with ̄elo. Because of this same sense of urgency we have component b. A speaker is in a certain mood as s/he does something in haste it could be an impatient mood. Anyway, component (c) is framed the way it is because unlike for ̄elo where the addressee responds directly to the speaker, with ̄elo the speaker does not have to wait for a response (witness the routine expression of gratitude where the speakers do not wait for a feedback from the addressees). Surely if one is in a hurry and passing on some information, s/he does not necessarily wait to be told that it is received or not. This is not to say that some ̄elo expressions are not responded to, but the point is that the speaker need not wait for or expect such a response.

Another piece of evidence in support of this claim is that ̄elo tends to be used in situations where there is some spatial distance between the speaker and the addressee. Thus, if an addressee is in a
room somewhere in a house and a speaker is about to leave the house and s/he is not physically seeing the addressee s/he is more likely to say (45a) than (45b).

(45a) Me - yi m - á - vá lôô!
1SG go 1SG FUT com ADD
I am going to come (OK)!
(= I'll be back (OK)!

(45b) Me - yi m - á - vá lôô!
1SG go 1SG FUT come ADD
I am going to come!
(= I'll be back)

This is because s/he is on the point of leaving and need not wait for the addressee to acknowledge it.

Basically, a speaker who uses lôô conveys the idea that 'I don't have much time, I'm in a hurry, I assume you will be able to do what I want you to do'.

3.5.2 lôô

How then do lôô and lôô on the one hand differ from lôô, which we contend is not an addressive but an exclamatory particle? It is not necessarily an interjection because it cannot stand by itself as an intelligible utterance.

Let us examine Warburton et al's example of the use of this particle (1968: 151)
(46)\(Y\): Egbe \(\text{fè} \) ya ya ga- sè \(\text{loô}!\)

Today POSS wind INT REP strong EXCL
The wind of today is particularly strong!

\(A\): \(\tilde{E} \) see; kpó dzime \(qê!\)
Yes ADD see sky VS
Yes, look at the sky!
(interlinear translations mine FA)

‘\(Y\)’ remarks that the day’s wind was rather strong and ‘\(A\)’ confirms in evaluation, \(Y\)’s remark. It is significant that ‘\(A\)’s response starts with \(\tilde{E}\) (yes) rather than \(\text{yoo}\) (O.K.) Generally, \(\tilde{E}\) is used to indicate or confirm the truth of something hence it is used in answer to propositional questions. \(\text{yoo}\), on the other hand is used to indicate agreement hence it is used in response to proposals such as imperatives. Characteristically utterances that terminate in addressives are responded to with \(\text{yoo}\) and never with \(\tilde{E}\). Thus \(\text{yoo}\) is a felicitous response to \(\text{loô}\) or \(\text{lôô}\). \(\tilde{E}\) is inappropriate as a response to the addressives – another piece of evidence which supports the terminological and conceptual distinction we draw between addressive and exclamatory particles.

That aside, the example guides us to the meaning of the particle. It is tagged to a statement that notes something that is extraordinary, from the speaker’s point of view. Something that the speaker would otherwise not expect to be the case – a surprise. \(Y\)’s utterance in (46) would be unnatural if \(\text{loô}\) is deleted from it. Thus the particle conveys the surprise of a speaker.

Consider another situation: people are generally aware of the normal size of a yam. But sometimes, one can come across some that are
exceptionally huge. The reaction of such a person to what s/he perceives is to exclaim that the yam is extraordinarily big. Such an utterance can have $\widehat{\text{lo}}$ attached to it (see 47).

\[\begin{align*}
(47) & \quad \text{Te sia tri} \quad \widehat{\text{lo}}!\\
& \quad \text{Yam this thick EXCL}\\
& \quad \text{This yam is thick (I am surprised)!}
\end{align*}\]

People are also generally aware that death is a painful thing. But when one experiences its pangs directly, such as the death of a close relative for the first time, it is then that one is able to fully appreciate and feel the effect of death. Otherwise it remains a remote human event. Against this background, we should observe that (48) is part of the lamentation of someone who experiences for the first time the great damage that death can cause.

\[\begin{align*}
(48) & \quad \text{Ao! Ku wɔ-a nu} \quad \widehat{\text{lo}}!\\
& \quad \text{Ouch Death do HAB thing EXCL}\\
& \quad \text{Ouch! Death causes things! (I am surprised)!}
\end{align*}\]

Unlike the previous examples, it need not be presupposed that (48) is addressed to anybody. It is a sheer externalization of the feelings of the speaker. Of course, people could overhear it and commiserate with him/her but it is not primarily directed at them. This is another aspect, as we have intimated already, which distinguishes this particle from addressives.

We propose the following illocutionary structure for $\widehat{\text{lo}}!$:

\[X \widehat{\text{lo}}! \quad \text{(Where X is otherwise declarative)}\]
(a) I realise X has happened
   (I realise it is very windy today)
(b) I wouldn't have thought /(expected) that X could happen
   (I wouldn't have thought that the wind could be so strong today)
(c) I feel something because of that
   (I feel surprised because of that)
(d) I say it because I want to show how I feel.

The thing to which lóó is attached (i.e. X) (unlike lòò or lóó) can only be something expressed or implied in a declarative sentence. It cannot be imperative (49a) nor a vocative (49b) nor just an NP which would otherwise be meaningful as an independent utterance (49c).

(49)(a)* Va' lóó!
Come EXCL
(b)* Kofi lóó!
K EXCL
(c)* Eda - á lóó!
Snake DEF EXCL
(d) Kofi vò' - ná ná 'da lóó!
K fear HAB for snake EXCL
Kofi fears snakes (I am surprised)!

Recall that addressives such as lòò or lóó co-occur with declaratives, imperatives and even vocatives (cf. the forms in 50)

(50)(a) Va' lòò!
Come ADD
Come!
Examples (49) and (50), we believe, validate our analysis. Unacceptable utterances such as (49a) and (49b) indicate that lo does not have to have an addressee. Furthermore, the difference in acceptability between the pairs of (49a) and (50a) and (49b) and (50b) shows that lo is unlike the addressives.

In sum, it can be said that lo is tagged on to sentences whose deep structure, in a performative analysis framework, could be phrased roughly as: 'I remark/observe/note that S' to express the extraordinary nature of the predication contained in S. However, lo and lò solicit an addressee's attention. The use of one or the other depends on the degree of urgency or immediacy attached to the situation by the speaker.

3.6 se'ë

se'ë is another addressive particle which has in our view, been erroneously described as an "emphatic exclamation" by Warburton et al (1968: 157), besides spelling it differently from us (see (51)). Their example of the form is reproduced in (51).
(51) K Gblɔ - e ná mía - tɔ - wɔ
Say 3SG to 2PL POSS PRO PL
nɛ̀ wɔ̀ - a - vá nɔ ajutí
that 3PL SBJV come be & PAST orange
fle-mí le gbɔ̀ - nye sia (sic).
buy PROG at side 1SG ADD
J Yoo, me - ga - vɔ̀ o.
OK 3SG NEG Ṣẹ́p fear NEG
K Tell your friends so that they would be buying oranges from me.
J OK, Don't worry (be afraid).
(morphemic translations added FA).

K - an orange vendor, asks J to spread word about how sweet his oranges are so that the friends should be buying oranges from him. It is hard for us, however, to see what is exclamatory or even emphatic about this. We think that the speaker adds the particle to the imperative to mitigate its force. More specifically, the speaker through the particle cajoles or persuades the addressee to accept to do what s/he is being asked to do. The speaker is successful because the addressee indicates his acceptance to comply with the exhortation.

The same idea of persuasion is evident from (52). It is said by a very sick woman who had cursed a young girl, who refused to get her water when she was thirsty. The girl's mother was offended and came to rain insults on the sick woman. The sick woman was very sad because she had had a glorious past which should not be lost sight of when people are talking to her. The insults were very painful, she therefore pleads with the woman to be considerate and temper her insults with some regard for her past.
(52) Dzanka: Ne e - di' be' ye - a - bi'a nya - m la,
If 2SG want that LOG 3SG ask word 1SG TP
taflatse', bu gbeqe me na - m qa' se'a!
please think past in for 1SG VS ADD

Etowxi: Nu' ka gbeqe me - e' m - a - bu na wo qa'?
thing WH past in FOC 1SG SBJV think for 2SG VS

Dzanka: If you want to insult me, please, think about my past!

Etowxi: What past should I think about for you?

(adapted from Dogoe 1964: 39; tones and translations added FA)

This example shows the use of the particle by someone who assumes a lesser position of power in relation to the addressee and entreats her to do something.

The particle is also used when consoling or comforting someone. A crying child could be coaxed to stop crying with (53). The same expression could be said to a wailing person in order to exhort him/her to stop wailing.

(53) Me - ga - fa avio se'a!
NEG 3SG REP cry cry NEG ADD
Do not cry/wail!

In this context the particle could be translated as 'you hear' (cf y' hear in Southern American English used as a tag on imperatives Schmerling 1982: 214).

Etymologically, se'a seems to be made up of the verb se (hear, more precisely, perceive, (cf:
se gi'itie = to understand
hear under

\( \text{vé} \) se = to smell 

smell hear and

the particle \( \text{a} \) either in the interrogative sense or the addressive sense (see 2.2.1 and 3.2.1). In the interrogative sense, it could be that the form developed from the sentence

\[ \text{'\( \text{E} - \text{se} - \text{é} - \text{a}\)'} \]

2SG hear 3SG Q

Then, by the elision of the subject and object we are left with \( \text{sea} \).

This speculation, if it is right, could give us a further inkling into the significance of the particle. We have said that it is used to persuade the addressee to conform to what the speaker wants. Before an addressee can do this, it is reasonable to surmise that s/he has to weigh or consider what is being said carefully. Thus if part of the particle is probably related to perception then we could suggest that part of the meaning of this particle could be roughly represented as "I want you to consider/think about what I am saying."

Evidence that corroborates and suggests that our speculation and deductions are plausible is provided by a language that is very closely related to Ewe historically, typologically and areally viz: Akan. Writing about a diachronic phonological rule of Syllable Truncation in Akan (a Volta-Comoe language of the Tano-Congo branch of the Niger Congo family \( \text{a la} \) Stewart (1983)), Boadi (1984: 440) discusses two phonetic forms (\( \text{waï} \)) and \( \text{ai} \) which occur in the two main dialects of Akan - Twi and Fante - respectively. These two forms parallel very closely the Ewe form \( \text{sea} \). To appreciate the analogy clearly, consider the following quote from Boadi (ibidem):
"They (wai and ai FA) are always said with a question intonation at the end of a command, request, or sometimes, a statement when the speaker wants to entreat his listener or persuade him to agree to accept a point of view. The full form of these phonetic sequences is (Wu ati) literally, have you heard? In most contexts where the reduced form is heard, however, it means do you see my point? you see my point, I hope; please be agreeable. For example,

ma me bi wai.
Give me some I hope you will agree to do this.

ommira ntem, wai.
Let him come early; I hope you will agree with me he should."

The Ewe equivalents of the Akan examples are shown in (54).

(54a) Na ɖɛ - m ʂɛa!
Give some 1SG ADD
Give me some (I persuade you)!

(b) Nɛ - va' ɡabá ʂɛa!
IMP 3SG come early ADD
Let him come early (I persuade you)!

Considering these points we suggest the following components for the meaning of ʂɛa (using example 53).

X ʂɛa! (where X is otherwise not interrogative)

(a) I want you to pay attention to what I am saying
(b) I think it is right to say this
   (i.e. I think it is right to say that you should stop crying)

(c) I want you to think of it in the same way
   (i.e. I want you to think that it is right that you should stop crying)

(d) I want you to do something because of what I am saying.

Components (a) and (d) are shared with other addressives of drawing attention and eliciting a response. Component (b) entails the idea that what the speaker wants the addressee to comply with through persuading him/her is right. Normally, one would only persuade people to do things which they believe are right or correct. This component is further reinforced by the use of se\ in declarative sentences. In this context it is used to get the addressee to believe the proposition thereby indicating the commitment of the speaker to the validity of the statement. From the speaker's perspective, what I am saying is right and I want you to think of it in the same way. This leads us on to component (c), which contains the invitation to the addressee to agree with the speaker's way of viewing the situation.

A look, now, at some examples of se\ in declaratives: (55) can be said after a message has been conveyed to the speaker and s/he wants to indicate that it has been heard. Note the response:

(55) A: Me - se - e' se\!
   LSG hear 3SG ADD
   I have heard it!

   B: Yoo.
   O.K.
Here the speaker is roughly saying: I want you to pay attention to what I am saying that I have heard it; it is right that I have heard it and I want you to believe me. The addressee also acknowledges what has been said in response to a request from that encoded in the particle.

Another example: Two people could be discussing the looks of a girl. One thinks she is beautiful, the other has some reservations. The former could urge the latter to concede that she is beautiful with (56).

\[(56) \text{E}^\prime \text{ dze tugbe seà!}\]
3SG appear beauty ADD

She is beautiful!

Once more, the speaker thinks that a proposition (She is beautiful) is right and wants the addressee to think in a similar way.

A curious fact about the use of \textit{seà} which provides support for our analysis is that it is one of the few addressives which displays an ambivalent behaviour with respect to its co-occurrence with routine expressions. (57a) is odd but (57b and c) are acceptable.

\[(57) \begin{align*}
(a) & \text{ ?I di } \text{ seà!} \\
\text{Morning ADD} \\
(b) & \text{ Tsó } \text{ e ke m seà!} \\
\text{Take 3SG open 1SG ADD} \\
\text{Forgive me!} \\
(c) & \text{Agoo seà!} \\
\text{'Excuse me'}
\end{align*}\]
How can we explain this data? In our opinion, the meaning we have postulated for the particle is very instructive. One does not need to convince an addressee that the greeting being offered is genuine and to ask that s/he thinks of it in the same way hence (57a) is unacceptable. Clearly, when apologies, excuses and generally, requests for pardon are made, the speaker assumes a position of being at the mercy of the addressee. S/he therefore has to plead for these things to be accepted. No wonder a particle like se can occur on them to persuade the addressee to accept the apology or 'excuse' being tendered.

We feel that these observations give further support to our formula. We should mention that we have used the word 'right' in component (b) rather than 'true', for example, because an imperative, for instance, on which the particle can occur as well as the routine expressions do not have a truth-value. We believe that 'right' can be broadly understood as true, or felicitous depending on what construction the particle occurs in.

se then, is used by a speaker to convince an addressee to accept the point of view expressed in an utterance. Consequently, se marks the commitment of a speaker to the felicity of an utterance.

3.7 goo!

goo is an interesting addressive particle which Warburton et al (1968) give a dictionary entry for as 'respect form' (p. 242). Elsewhere they describe its use as follows:

"goo is a respect form used by a woman to a man, a commoner to a chief or in any situation where one wishes to show respect." (p. 5).
This explanation is about the only one available in the literature (apart from the mention of the particle by Westermann (1930) and Duthie (1970)). Although a bold attempt by the authors to describe this very important particle, it remains an abstract exposition. Besides, they impute to the particle the feature that it is primarily a feminine form which may be used by others when they wish to show 'respect'. We are not sure that this particle is primarily a feminine form. What we do know is that some men (such as this writer's father) use this form a lot while some women (such as this writer's mother) don't use the form at all. Is it that these men are very respectful and the women are disrespectful? What it indicates is that the particle is not necessarily a feminine form.

Furthermore, 'respect' does not seem to be an invariant feature of the particle because go may be used in situations where a speaker does not need to show respect. For example, it could be used by a chief to a commoner or by a husband to a wife. In these contexts, there is no reason to assume that the speaker is showing respect. Thus although in some usages respect might be involved, it is not present in others.

Be that as it may, there are other curious things about this particle. Unlike the other addressives we have met so far which are used in proposals as well as responses, go is used only in responses. Furthermore, it is used only in greetings. What is more, it occurs in the responses of greeting pairs which have part of or the whole of the first part repeated in the second (that is, there is some identity between the initial utterance and the response). Examine the following examples:
(58) A: Ọ́dí (*gùo)!  
Morning ADD 
B: Ọ́dí  gùo!  
Morning ADD 
Aje— a me ɗé?  
Home DEF in Q 
A: Good morning!  
B: Good morning! 
How is home? 

(59) A: Wọ́lè lèdè!  
This time ADD 
B: Wọ́lè  gùo!  
This time ADD 
A: Good day!  
B: Good day! 

(Wọ́lè is an expression used to show lack of knowledge about the precise time, between about 11.00 and 12 noon and between 3.00 pm and 5.30 pm.)

(60) A: Dza!  
Welcome 
B: Dza  gùo!  
Welcome 
A: Welcome! 
B: Thank you!

We should observe that ɗò is not used in the first part of the pair but it is felicitous in the second. We should also note that it is not every response that it gets tagged on. For instance, the pairs in (61) are greeting pairs but ɗò is infelicitous on the responses.
These aspects of the particle's behaviour have to be represented in its meaning. The particle is used in a situation where someone has said something good to another (i.e. greeted him) and s/he responds with the same kind of greeting. The similarity and in most cases identity between what the interlocutor says and what the speaker responds with also has to be reflected in the meaning. (62) illustrates that the speaker does not have to respond with something identical but there must be partial similarity.

(62) A: ḃdí ná mi!
    Morning to 2PL
B: ḃdí goô!
    Morning ADD
A: Good morning to you!
B: Good morning!
Thus far we can portray these aspects of the meaning of \textit{go} as follows:

(a) I perceive that you have said something good to me
(b) I feel something good because of that
(c) I want to say the same kind of good thing to you.

These components, we believe, cater for the use of the particle in greeting contexts and also in responses.

The point of \textit{go}, like other addressives is to draw the addressee's attention to what is being said. This particle, though does not require a response from the addressee. If an interlocutor says something to the speaker of \textit{go}, it is in all cases, in a response to a further proposal put forward by the speaker. A typical exchange involving \textit{go} is (63).

\begin{itemize}
\item [(63)]
\begin{align*}
\text{A:} & \quad \text{Fiē } \underline{\text{\textit{lo}}};! \\
& \quad \text{Evening ADD} \\
\text{B:} & \quad \text{Fiē } \underline{\text{\textit{go}}};! \\
& \quad \text{Evening ADD} \\
& \quad \text{Afé - á - me qé?} \\
& \quad \text{Home DEF in Q} \\
\text{A:} & \quad \text{É - dô! ...} \\
& \quad \text{3SG sleep} \\
\text{A:} & \quad \text{Good evening!} \\
\text{B:} & \quad \text{Good evening! How is home?} \\
\text{A:} & \quad \text{It's fine! ...} \\
\end{align*}
\end{itemize}

The second of A's utterances is a response to the question of B.

In summary, \textit{go} is a unique addressive particle which can be attached only to repetitions, as it were, of at least part of the
preceding utterance - a greeting - from other interlocutor. We have paraphrased the illocutionary force of this particle which we now substitute in example 63:

X \text{goo!} \text{ (Where X is a repetition of at least part of the preceding greeting utterance from other interlocutors).}

(a) I perceive that you have said something good to me
   (i.e. you have said 'Good evening' to me)
(b) I feel something good (towards you) because of that
(c) I want to say the same kind of good thing to you (because of that).
   (i.e. I want to say 'Good evening' to you as well).

In the next section, we discuss another particle, \text{t\text{\textacuten}}, that signals good feelings from the speaker to the addressee.

3.8 \text{t\text{\textacuten}}

\text{t\text{\textacuten}} has been described by Ansre (1966a: 49) as an addressive used for 'endearment'. It has been glossed as 'dear' (Ansre (ibidem) and Duthie 1982: 4). Ansre's (ibidem) examples are reproduced in 64.

(64a) Me - ga - fa aví o \text{t\text{\textacuten}!}
   (NEG&2SG REP cry cry NEG ADD FA)
Don't cry, dear!
(b) Mi - ga - dzó o \text{t\text{\textacuten}!}
   (NEG&2PL REP leave NEG ADD FA)
Don't leave, dears!
This characterisation of the particle is both persuasive and instructive but it is insufficient as a guide to its usage. It is equally inadequate as a description of its meaning.

We shall argue that to is used by a speaker to solidarise with an addressee. It is a signal to the addressee that the speaker is on his/her side when other people or the situation may seem to be hostile to him/her. Thus to is used to establish rapport between speaker and addressee.

Let's take an example. In (65) Yawa and Afi (women) have been insulted by some men as barren women. Yawa then asks Afi to come with her and uses to on this request. Note that Afi accedes to Yawa's request.

65 Yawa: Afì, wó-le mía dzú- m be mié-nye nyónu
A. ePL be lPL abuse PROG that lPL be woman
konó -wó ............... barren PL
Va' mí - dzó le wó gbó to!
Come lPL leave at 3PL side ADD
(Wó-te yi megbe vié)
3PL draw go back a little
Afi Míá - dzó vává ...
1PL FUT leave indeed
Yawa Afi, they are insulting us that we are barren women, ...
Come and let's go away from them
(They retreat a little)
To insult a woman as barren or childless is the most severe thing to say to a woman in Ewe society. Its impact is even worse when it comes from a man. Here Yawa is reassuring Afí that they are together and she should not bother about those men. We see a feeling of solidarity between the two people in relation to their hostile men.

When tɔɔ occurs on imperatives it could be rendered in English as 'be a dear and do X'. The conveyed meaning of such a construction could be paraphrased very roughly as:

I want you to do X
I want you to know that I feel close to you
I assume you will do it because of how I feel towards you.

One can cajole an addressee to do something by tagging tɔɔ to whatever one wants to be done. Its effect is graphically visible when somebody else tries to influence and dissuade the other not to do it, or something else is distracting the addressee from performing the action. For instance, A wants B to help her but C also wants B to go out with him at that material moment and therefore tries to prevent B from helping A. A could persuade B to help her by saying (66).

(66) Kpe qè nù - nye tɔɔ!
add to side lSG ADD
Help me (dear)!
In this context it has a colouring of: don't take notice of what C is saying or doing, pay attention to what I am saying because I feel good feelings towards you.

However,  is not used only with imperatives. When it is used in declaratives, it indicates that the speaker wants to entreat the addressee, so to speak, to believe what s/he is saying because of the way s/he feels towards him/her. In other words, the speaker expresses the idea that 'I want you to believe what I am saying, I cannot deceive you because I feel good feelings towards you'.

Two people may be quarreling and a pacifist takes sides with one of them and asks the one to forgive and forget by saying (67a). This person responds with (67b).

(67a)  zi  kpɔ -  e  tɔɔ!  
be quiet see 3SG ADD
Don't mind him/her (dear)!

(67b)  me -  se -  e  tɔɔ!  
1SG hear 3SG ADD
I hear (dear)!

To paraphrase (67b) we can say that the speaker says 'I have heard you, I'll do as you say because I feel good feelings towards you'.

Consider another example: An interlocutor has been looking for say his footwear and is quite unhappy that he can't find it. A speaker who notices where it is utters(68) to him.
It implies that the addressee should take it easy, it is under the table.

What then is invariant about the particle in all these contexts? Undoubtedly, the particle conveys to the addressee that the speaker feels good feelings towards him/her and desires that the addressee should take note of it. We formulate this meaning as follows:

(a) I feel something good towards you
(b) I want you to know it
(c) I want you to pay attention to what I feel
(d) I want you to feel something good towards me because of it.

Our formula is broad enough to cover all the situations in which \text{tòt} can occur. There has not been a specific indication of an overt request for response but rather an invitation to the addressee to form a certain attitude (to feel good) thereby reacting to whatever is being said in that spirit. There has also not been any explicit mention of other people being a distraction to the rapport between the two people. This is to emphasise the solidarity aspect of the particle. This is validated by an instance of the use of the particle. An interlocutor may proffer greetings to another but the latter has been day-dreaming, probably, and fails to respond immediately. Suddenly he comes out of his/her dream and responds and tags \text{tòt} to it (see 69).
In this case B is trying to be apologetic to A for not responding immediately and then reassuring him/her that no ill-feelings are nurtured against him/her. Indeed, to refuse to respond to another's greeting (all other things being equal) is tantamount to registering one's bitterness against the one who initiates the greeting exchange. If there is no such acrimonious feeling, then the interlocutor must convey this in some way. The use of $\text{to}$ in such a situation is one device that can be used to redress the rapture that might have been caused and renegotiate and establish whatever closeness may have existed between the speaker and the addressee.

(69) also illustrates that $\text{to}$ can be used in response which further supports our claim that $\text{to}$ does not solicit response from the addressee necessarily. In point of fact, $\text{to}$ can be said as the last word of a communication. Suppose that an announcement has gone on the air that there was going to be a change of currency (a not uncommon occurrence in recent times in Ghana) and someone communicates this to a neighbour. The neighbour becomes moody and anxious in anticipation of the unpleasant things that will be associated with such a situation (having gone through some of them with rather hazardous experiences before). He accepts the information and adds $\text{to}$ to convey to the addressee that in spite of my moody looks I feel good feelings towards you. The conversation could close there and they part.
(69) A: Ehê! Wô' - bê wo' - ga - le ga  qoli ge  lo!
Hm! 3PL say 3PL REP be money change INGR ADD
Hm! Yes! it is said that there will be another change
of currency (I advise you)!
B: Sigbe! Yoo tɔɔ! ADD
So O.K. ADD
So! O.K. (Dear)!

Thus tɔɔ need not solicit response from the addressee but it does
require that the addressee should be aware of the good feelings and feel
good too (see example (67)).

We have tried to show in this section that tɔɔ is an inexpensive
means of establishing rapport and emphasising solidarity between
interlocutors. We have spelled out the communicative strategy embodied
in this particle. To conclude our exposition, we shall discuss a fairly
unique behaviour of tɔɔ among the addressive particles.

Generally speaking, utterances have one addressive particle,
should they have any at all. But one encounters utterances in which
there are more than one and the second is usually tɔɔ. Consider the
following examples:

(70a) A: Dza!
Welcome
B: Dza  göo tɔɔ!
Welcome ADD ADD
A: Welcome
B: Thank you
(70a), (b) and (c) are felicitous utterances but (d) is odd and (e) is even more bizarre than (d). Why?

In our opinion, the semantic explications developed for these particles are indispensable clues to explaining this behaviour. *gəə*, we have argued, is an indication of response and an invitation to pay attention to what has been said. Speaking informally, the message being transmitted by the speaker in the response of (a) is something like:

You have said something nice to me (Dza!)
I have heard the good thing you have said to me
I feel something good because of that
I want to say the same kind of thing to you (Dza!)

To reinforce the whole idea and solidarise with the interlocutor, the speaker adds *tɔɔ* whose meaning can be paraphrased as:

I feel good towards you
I want you to know it
I want you to feel good because of it.
The particles *goo* and *tō* are therefore not incompatible in terms of encoding conflicting attitudes nor are the attitudes too similar to lead to redundancy. They rather complement each other neatly, hence the two can co-occur in the same utterance.

Similarly, *lō* and *lō* put across the message that the speaker wants the addressee to pay attention to what is being said and to respond to it immediately in the case of *lō*. Unsurprisingly, they can co-occur with *tō*. For one thing, to ask somebody to pay attention you would want to make the one feel that it is for his/her own good and this is what, it seems to us, *tō* is doing in (70c). As far as *lō* is concerned, it is just right that when one demands an urgent response because one does not have time, one should attenuate the ill-feeling that such a request may carry and reassure one's interlocutor that no harm is meant. *tō* is therefore very felicitous in *lō* utterances.

Conversely, *lā* and *tō* cannot co-occur because they encode irreconcilable attitudes. *lā*, as we have seen, has a component: 'I feel something bad because of it' while *tō* has 'I feel good feelings towards you'. How on earth can one feel bad and in the same breath feel good feelings towards the same situation or the same person? The two particles are semantically incompatible, therefore we cannot expect them to occur in the same utterance. No wonder (70e) is most bizarre.

Surely, one can change one's attitude in the next utterance but one cannot have conflicting attitudes in the same utterance. Thus two children could be playing and one seizes the other's toys. In the course of getting back the toys, the deprived child registers his/her bad feelings with *lā* as in (71a). Having got the toys, s/he now wants
them to play on and could exhort the other child with (71b). In this case, s/he uses the particle tă to renegotiate and bring back the rapport that existed previously.

(71a) Kɔ na - m là!
Take give 1SG ADD
Give it to me (la)!

(b) Mi' yi dzí tă!
1PL go top ADD
Let's go on (dear)!

Note that the child could not have added tă to (71a). Because tă and là are semantically incompatible they do not co-occur.

sà, however, seems not to collocate with tă for a different reason. sà is basically used to persuade an addressee. To persuade someone, one needs to adopt and establish a good relationship with that person. We suggest that sà produces such an effect implicitly. It appears that this effect together with the content of tă would be redundant in the same utterance. This may explain why (70d) is odd.

This phenomenon of the collocability or otherwise of tă with other particles provides further support of our formulations of the meanings of the various particles. We have thus shown that tă is a particle that expresses solidarity and establishes rapport. We have tried to represent this meaning in a fairly precise manner. We now turn to another particle (1)ëe which is used only on vocatives in the next section.
Another particle/clitic which could be called addressive is -ée (which has a dialect variant, lee). This particle occurs only on vocatives. In discussing his phenomenon of "calling attention" in Ewe, Westermann (1930: 113) observes that:

"When calling some one (sic) one adds a long drawn out e to his name Kofi eee!" (italics in original FA).

This is the only comment we can find in the literature on the particle. Needless to say, it is too broad to help us use the particle appropriately. For one thing it is not every time that one attaches -ée to the name of a person when calling him or her. When someone is calling to another who is in very close proximity and the caller is sure that s/he is being heard will not attach -ée to the name. Two people in two different rooms in the same house, for instance, would not under normal circumstances add -ée to the name when calling to each other. However, two people in the same room, a husband and a wife, for example, could attach -ée to the vocative should some disaster strike and the one who gets to know it first hysterically calls to the other to draw his/her attention.

A very common and more natural situation, however, in which a caller attaches -ée to his/her addressee's name is where the two people are separated by some distance but within which one can hear another's shout. The name and particle are, in point of fact, shouted out. A child may have stepped out of their house and the mother assumes that she is out in the neighbourhood playing. The mother wants her and calls out to her by uttering (72).
(72) Ama - ēé!
    A ADD
    Ama!

If the child heard it, she could reply with (73) (or just walk back home).

(73) Mamí...!
    Yes Mum!

From what we have said so far we can say that -ēé is attached to a name, more generally a vocative expression, to call to the attention of an addressee who the speaker assumes is within a reasonable distance from which s/he can be heard and expects that s/he will reply to the call. We suggest, as a preliminary hypothesis, the following explication:

X-ēé! (Where X is a vocative expression)
(a) I can't perceive you here
(b) I assume you are at a place where you can hear me
(c) I want to say something to you
(d) I want you to do something that will cause me to know you have heard me.

The particle is not attached only to names, it is also attached to address terms and in general to any noun used to name someone to whom another is speaking. Hence we have used the term "vocative expression" to describe the utterance on which the particle occurs (see 74).
(74a) Papa - éé!  
Father ADD  
(b) Na - éé!  
Mother ADD  
(c) Kwami - nô - éé!  
K mother ADD  
Kwami’s mother!  
(d) Deví - a - wô - éé!  
Child DEF PL ADD  
Children!  
(e) Wô nyónu má - éé!  
You woman that  
You, that woman ...  

In (75), however, the nouns do not refer to or address people hence -éé is inappropriate on them.  

(75a) * Blaďá - éé  
Tuesday ADD  
(b) * Egbe - éé  
Today ADD  

Where pets are personified, their names could get -éé attached to them when calling out to them. For example,  

(76a) Dódzi - éé  
D ADD  
(b) Nyasa - éé  
N ADD
These are roughly equivalent to calling out an English pet such as Fido.

We shall now cite other uses of -ée and see if they fit our formula. (77) was uttered by a naive non-Christian female student at a grotto. It was her first time of seeing the sculpture of Jesus on the Cross and so calls to the friend to come and see the strange thing. She attaches -ée because the friend was at another station.

(77) Atsufui -ée! Va kpo
A ADD Come see
nú-sia ṣá, ñeví sia
thing this VS child this
mé- le ame bu - mí o,
NEG be person respect PROG NEG
wo - klá - e dë atí juti
3PL nail 3SG on stick side
Atsufui! Come and have a look at this, this disrespectful child has been nailed to the cross!

Here, the speaker sees an unexpected thing and is surprised and so calls immediately to the addressee. This example, and indeed an earlier situation of the use of the particle by a couple, suggest that there should be a feeling component in the meaning of -ée and a temporary component as well.

We think that part of the reason for calling out a person and attaching -ée to it has to do with the speaker feeling something which is different from the normal mood when -ée is not attached. It may be because the caller wants the addressee urgently or that there is some hysteria surrounding the situation.
We have already noted that this is typically shouted out. Apart from making sure that the speaker can be heard, we believe, the speaker also shouts out the name because of the mood in which s/he is. To cater for this less directly we suggest that the speaker calls to the addressee in this way, i.e. by shouting, because of the way s/he feels. To put it in the formula format:

I say it this way because of the way I feel.

We can support this claim by the report verbs that are used. If a mother said (78a), it will be reported with yɛ́ (call) but (78b) would normally be reported with gbóli (shout out). If you shout out someone's name you have an attitude towards it and it is that attitude which makes you shout it.

(78a) Ama!

A

(b) Ama - ɛ́ɛ́!

A ADD

Obviously, someone who calls another wants a response, an acknowledgement of the call, that explains our components (c) and (d). However, -ɛ́ɛ́ is used in certain contexts in which one may not get the desired feedback. -ɛ́ɛ́ is attached to the names of supernatural beings, for example, God. (79) is an invocation by a blind man to God for help.
(79) Mawú núșé - kátã - tó - (l)ée!

God power all POSSPRO ADD
Yehowa - (l)ée! ve' nu - nye.
Yahweh ADD pardon mouth 1SG
Almighty God! Yahweh!
Have mercy on me.

But even here, if we take recourse to our cultural knowledge and beliefs about God, we see that our formula fits. God, in Christian thought, is invisible but He is near to and can hear people who speak to Him (i.e. pray to him). This takes care of our components (a) and (b). If people pray to God or call him he answers or responds to them hence our components (c) and (d) hold. Christians call God when they feel something towards him. They may be full of gratitude and praise or may be in dire need of something. All these states are reasonably describable as one of feeling something therefore our feeling component is quite appropriate. In our particular example, the blind man wants to be healed and therefore feels something and calls to God because of the way he feels.

Another context in which -ée is used which at first sight seems problematic is during lamentations. People who mourn the dead sometimes in their wailing add -ée to the address term of the deceased. The expressions in (80) are frequently heard at funerals.

(80a) Ao! Papa' - éé!
Ao! Father ADD

(b) Na - éé! Na - éé!
Mother ADD Mother ADD
Can we say that this use of the particle fits our formula? We believe that the answer is positive. But once again we have to enter the psycho-socio-cultural world of the Ewes to appreciate what game is being played.

In Ewe philosophy, the dead are believed to be very near, and especially if they were parents, to be attentive to the call of the living. The dead belong to the realm of spirits in the traditional religious system who can cause and allow things to happen to people living on earth hence ancestor veneration. So that if some one is dead, it is believed s/he can hear the call of the living and because of the belief in their power to have influence in the causation of things, it is believed that when the dead are called upon they would respond. We submit that our formulation satisfies this situation as well.

Russian, we understand, has a similar particle too. Vasilyeva (1972: 150) notes that a is used "in vocatives (when they are repeated)". Thus we have Masa!! a Masa!! (example due to Wierzbicka (private communication)). Note that in Russian a occurs before the vocative.

A translation into English of Ewe expressions with -ëe that comes to mind is hey + name! Note however the difference in the position of the two particles in relation to the name in the two languages (probably a manifestation of the different typological properties of the two languages - English is prepositional while Ewe is postpositional).

An English expression such as Hey John! is used to call out to somebody who is not in the same place as the caller. Briefly, and roughly, the meaning of this construction can be paraphrased as:
I don't know if you can hear me
I want you to say something to cause me to know you can hear me
I want to say something to you.

This is slightly different from the meaning of *hey!* on its own. Note that Ewe -ée cannot stand by itself as an utterance. Proof, we contend, that it is an addressive and not an interjection (as Westermann suggests).

To sum up, we have tried to show that while it is basically true as Westermann intimates that one attaches -ée to the name of someone when calling him/her, it is done under certain conditions. We have surveyed these circumstances and have adduced evidence to show that it is not attached only to names but to vocative expressions in general.

We propose that the illocutionary force of -ée be formulated as follows:

\[ X - éé! \] (Where \( X \) is a vocative expression used to refer to someone).

(a) I can't perceive you here
(b) I assume you are at a place where you can hear me
(c) I want to say something to you now
(d) I want you to do something (now) to cause me to know you have heard me
(e) I say it this way because of the way I feel.

In the next section we summarise our discussions of the addressive particles and relate them to Ewe culture.
3.10 Summary

In the preceding sections we have discussed a number of linguistic items that are tagged onto utterances in Ewe to indicate a speaker's attitudes and feelings towards various aspects of a communicative event.

\( \mathrm{\`a} \) and \( \mathrm{\`e} \), which are otherwise interrogative, are used on directives. The latter offers a choice to the addressee to carry out the imperative or not. The former, however, expresses a speaker's indifference with respect to whether the directive is effected or not.

\( \mathrm{\`a} \) expresses a speaker's disapproval of a situation and calls for an immediate change in the state of affairs.

\( \mathrm{\`e} \) and \( \mathrm{\`o} \) as well as \( \mathrm{\`e} \) all invite the addressee to pay attention to what is being said. \( \mathrm{\`e} \) expects an immediate response while \( \mathrm{\`e} \) exhorts the addressee to take a certain attitude towards - i.e. agree with - what is being said.

\( \mathrm{\`e} \) is used to solidarise and establish rapport between the speaker and the addressee while \( \mathrm{\`e} \) acknowledges an addressee's expression of good feelings towards the speaker. It furthermore registers the existence of similar good feelings from the speaker towards the addressee.

Finally, \( \mathrm{\`e} \) is used in hailing people.

In the course of the discussion, we intimated that these particles are very indicative of the ethos of Ewe society. Firstly because they are optional and secondly because they are items that encode
interactional attitudes between speaker and addressee (cf Wierzbicka MS). An important question that arises is the following: Can we correlate the ideas enshrined in these particles with the cultural values of the Ewes? This question deserves to be explored, but we can only offer some suggestions here.

We venture to suggest that these particles manifest, in general, a cardinal value of Ewe society, viz: communality. A value which Dzobo (1975: 87) calls "hemistic socialism" - a "'we' consciousness". Indeed, the sense of community has been thought of as the African characteristic. We do not wish to claim that the Ewes are the only ones with particles to show this. Nor are these particles the only linguistic devices that portray this characteristic in Ewe and for that matter other African languages. We do know that most African languages have linguistic means, among them particles such as those discussed for Ewe here, that reflect this celebrated characteristic of African-ness (see Ameka 1985a,b)

We are all the more persuaded to think along these lines when we reflect on the Akan forms \textit{wai} and \textit{aj} and their Ewe analogue: \textit{se\textquoteright a} which persuade the addressee to agree with the speaker. What else can this signify if not the promotion of 'we belong together so do not disagree with me but agree with me?'

We take the view that many of the other values of Ewe society revolve around the principal one of communality. Thus Dzobo (1975:92) has discussed what he calls the trans-survival values of the Ewes which include among others: human life, brotherliness, love, obedience, submissiveness, respect, mutual help and unity, harmonious human
relationships and group cohesion. He provides ample sociological and cultural evidence to support these values (see also Agblemagnon 1969).

Do these values remind us of the meanings of any of the particles discussed? Surely, it is not an easy thing to say particle X reminds one of value Y, but does the logic behind a particle not link up with one or the other of the values? Some correlations between the particles and these values, nonetheless, are apparent. tàrà reflects the values of love, of brotherliness and even of harmony and cohesion. If one expresses good feelings towards you and assures you of solidarity with you, is that not an expression of love and of fraternity?

Can it not be said that ɖò which involves the reciprocation of good feelings between speaker and addressee promotes a feeling of belongingness and of communality? Similarly, by offering an option—a choice, to the addressee to choose whether or not to carry out a directive does ɖé also not help one to show respect to the other person and above all encourage harmonious human relationship and group cohesion in which the individual is not to be seen to be seeking his/her own welfare, the promotion and satisfaction of his/her wants but must comport him/her-self in a manner that encourages the bonum commune (the good of the community)?

Just as the individual is enjoined socially and morally to work for the good of the community, s/he also has a responsibility to get other people to do the same. We are of the opinion that ǻ and ạ are indicators that a member of the community is not conforming to acceptable social norms. Although this may sound negative, they indirectly are an execution of love, brotherliness, harmony, cohesion and above all, communality.
If all these are not persuasive enough to make one think that these particles do mirror Ewe cultural values, then one should think of the sheer number of the particles that we are calling addressives. Their number, at least, should suggest that there is something about this society which is probably different from say ..., whose language, English, society does not have particles, in a number of instances, to parallel the Ewe ones. There is, for example, a sharp contrast between the communality of Ewe society and the respect for individuality, autonomy and above all privacy in English society (see Wierzbicka 1985a; Ameka 1985a,b).

The Ewe language is associated with a certain culture. Part of this culture is reflected in the language. There is no doubt that the addressive particles are one of the many areas of the language that guide us to the social reality of the speakers of Ewe. At the same time, we realise that a full documentation of this thesis requires not only research into Ewe, but also similar research into the systems of illocutionary particles in other languages and other cultures. We submit that there is an urgent need for cross-cultural investigations in this all-too-long neglected area.
"Nunya' gale nunya' go'do"

[There is knowledge (or wisdom) beyond knowledge (or wisdom)].

In this study, we have attempted to search for and display the complex ideas that the Ewes have so condensed in certain terse forms of language which we have labelled particles. We have ventured to go beyond the traditional descriptive labels to document systematically the usages of some Ewe particles and explicate their meanings in a manner that, we hope, is fairly precise and illuminating. At the same time, we recognise and acknowledge that there might be some knowledge beyond what we have attempted to capture here. Indeed, our attitude towards the study is summed up in the Ewe proverb cited above. It is our hope, however, that the material we have provided could serve as the starting point for further research both from an intralinguistic and a cross-linguistic perspective on Ewe particles.

In general, we have tried to portray the meanings conveyed by the Ewe particles we have discussed here which might aid the study of the kinds of meanings encoded in particles in languages and cultures across the world. For instance, at the Plenary Session of a recent colloquium on interrogativity (Chisholm 1984), one of the issues raised concerned what pragmatic meanings are associated with the use of question particles in diverse languages. We submit that an answer to the Ewe situation may be found in Chapter 2 of this work.
Another very relevant question raised at the same session was whether there was "any language where you can use a formal question property rather than something like 'please' with a formal imperative" (Chisholm 1984: 279 et seq). The panelists did not seem to know any such language. We have presented data in our study which suggests that Ewe is one such language: two formal markers of interrogativity - the particles à and dé - are also used on formal imperatives (see 2.2.1, 2.2.4 and 3.2). This is one area in which we would like to see further research done.

From a theoretical and methodological point of view, we believe our study has demonstrated that particles are definable. Furthermore, we hope we have demonstrated the adequacy and universality of the use of a metalanguage of semantic primitives in the description of particles, in particular, and languages in general.

At the practical level, our study might have some applications. It might serve as a reference work for pedagogical grammarians of Ewe, especially when the grammars they produce are expected to aid the teaching of the language enabling the student to acquire "the ability to appreciate the differences and nuances of meaning that certain words and expressions have" in the language (Dolphyne 1981).

Lexicographers as well as translators, we hope, will also find our study relevant to their concerns. We are aware of two on-going dictionary projects involving Ewe which are all multilingual. Perhaps the explications we have offered can serve as the starting point for rendering these particles in other languages.
For research purposes, our study may possibly inspire the investigation by linguists of particles and other illocutionary force indicators in general and in particular in some of the other languages of Africa - an area which remains virtually untouched. (cf Bakomba's remark in this respect on Bantu languages which applies tout court to other languages of Africa: "A second area where there is zero investigation is illocutionary force." in Chisholm 1984: 269). Through such an investigation, we believe linguistics would help us understand the communicative strategies and cultural pre-occupations and the nature of social interaction in different languages and thereby promote cross-cultural understanding.

Indeed, if linguistics is to be of any relevance to the languages of Africa, in particular, in their multi-lingual and exoglossic setting then serious linguistic descriptions should endeavour to provide adequate and insightful characterisations of particles - the important and pervasive forms of language - that would provide a guide to their appropriate usage. Descriptive functional labels and catalogues of linguistic items are not enough. We should show what they MEAN. The foregoing study is a modest beginning of such a task on Ewe on which we hope further research can be based, for as the Ewes say: "Xoxóá nue' wógbéa ye'yea' do." (The new is woven on the old).
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AnL Anthropological Linguistics
BLS Proceedings of the Berkley Linguistic Society
CLS Proceedings of the Chicago Linguistic Society
FL Foundations of Language
GURT Georgetown University Round Table Conference Papers
JPrag Journal of Pragmatics
JWAL The Journal of West African Languages
Lg Language
LI Linguistic Inquiry
NLLT Natural Language and Linguistic Theory
PIL Papers in Linguistics
SAL Studies in African Linguistics


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Appendix A

Ewe Particles

The following are the core members of the class of Ewe illocutionary particles:

• a  question; addressive
• ñe  verbal focus marker
• ñe  question; addressive
• ñe  question; (contrafactual conditional)
• (y)é  non-verbal focus marker
• gòò  addressive;
• hëë  addressive
• lá  topic; background information marker
• là  addressive
• lòò  addressive
• lôò  exclamatory
• lôò  or, disjunctive interrogative
• lòò  addressive
• màhà  question
• né  imperative
• sèa  addressive
• sèè  addressive
• tòò  addressive
APPENDIX B

TOWARDS A UNILINGUAL DICTIONARY OF SELECTED EWE PARTICLES

Preamble:

The following is an attempt to translate the explications we have proposed into Ewe. We have tried to render them in relatively simple Ewe; but we recognise that a more detailed investigation ought to be made in order to arrive at the optimal simple terms in Ewe. We have made some tentative decisions in this area. For example, the 'primitive' term 'say' has three equivalents in Ewe: do, be and gblɔ. We have decided to use do because it occurs in all Gbe dialects (cf Capo 1981 and other papers). We have not selected be because it is complex in that it used as a verb of saying complementizer function in quotative sentences. gblɔ is recognised as being more of a coastal Ewe form, hence its 'universality' might be restricted in some dialects. Similar decisions have been made in several places, but all we offer is a tentative rendition of the ideas encoded in the particles in Ewe.

We should also mention that we are not by any means suggesting that the entries for these items in dictionaries should be so elaborately made. As we envisage it, lexicographers should be able to summarise the explications we have offered to meet their constraints of space. At the same time, we should be able to maintain the principle of avoiding vicious circles in our dictionaries and also avoid the use of metaphorical and obscure language in dictionary entries. We offer these explications to guide and help lexicographers in their pursuits.
We arrange the items according to notional domains within which we have discussed them in the text rather than alphabetically. We also give illustrative examples and give the section in the text where the item has been discussed for easy reference.

X a:

Kp: Kofi' de agble egbea?

Nyemenya nénye bé X nyé nyatefê o
Medi bé manya'
Mensusu be anyâ (nénye bé ényé nyatefê)
Medi bé nadó nga aqé (gblô nâné) né até ñuí si aná bé manya' nénye
bé ényé nyatefê.

X mâhâ:

Kp: Kofi' de agble mâhâ?

Nûkata netsí megbé álé mâhâ?

Nyemenya nâné tsô X ñuí o
Mêsô nâm bé nyemenya' é o
Medi bé manya' e fifia
Mesusú bé anyâ'
Medi bé nadó nga aqé (gblô nâné) né até ñuí fifia si aná bé manyâ'
X loo: (2.2.3)
Kp: Sisim nele loo?

Mesusu bë x anye nyatefé le nusi mekpô/se lá ta
Nye mabuí bë x anyé nyatefé háfi o
Mese nane le nye lâme le eta
Mebu bë nú bubu anyé nyatefé
(Anyo né menyé x-é nyé nyatefé o)
Nye menyá o
Mesusú bë anyá
Medí bë nadó nya aðé (gblô nânë) fífia ne ate jûì si ana bë manyae.

X ñê₁: (2.2.43)
Kp: Kofi ñê?

Nyemenyá nânë tso x jû o
Medí bë manyá
Mesusú bë anyá
Medí bë nadó nya aðé (gblô nânë) ne' ate jûì si ana bë manyá nânë
tso eðu.

X ñê₂: (2.2.44)
Kp: Êdzém ñê?

Mebu bë x nyé nyatefé
Nyemekâ ñê ëdzi o
Mesusu bë adó bë enyé nyatefé
Medí bë nadó nya aðé ne' ate jûì si aná bë manya bë enyé nyatefé.
1. X qé3 Y [X nye ṭkonya alo dznonyadżnya alo nyagbe]

kp: Fie sia qé, núka míano?
Ési nede Lome qé, ekpó núsianú si nedí láà?

Mele tame büm tsó X njú
Nyemenyá náňé tso énjú o
Medí be manyáe
Mesusú be enyá náňé-wo tso énjú
Medí be madó núsí nyemenyá tso énjú o
Mesusú be ate njú adó nya aqé si aná be mányá núsia.

2. Z X qé3 Y [X nye nyagbe si qá a Z]

kp: Agbalé si nexlé qé, afíkaé wótae le?
Awu si nedó qé, atukpa méé nedéé lea?

Mele nu fóm tsó náňé (Z) njú
Mele énjú büm le mó sia dzí, Y
Nyemenyá náňé tso énjú o
Mesusú be anyá
Medí be nabu tame le énjú le mó si dzí mele énjú büm
Medí be madó núsí nyemenyá tso énjú o la
Mesusú be até njú adó nya aqé si aná be mányá núsia.
3. \( Z \times \frac{2}{3} X \) (X nyé nyagbe-tsyánya)  

K.p: Gawu ḋé, vi méle mia dome o?  

Mele tame büm tsó nya si miedo xoxó lā ŋú  
Mele tame büm le alési woku ḋé ŋú bubu ađé ŋú  
Nyemenyá alési woku ḋé eŋúi o  
Mesusú bé anyá  
Medí bé manyá  
Mesusú bé até ŋú adó nya ađé si aná be manyá  

\( Q \times X \):  

Kp: ḋé tsi dí bé yeadza lóo?  

Medí bé nalé tó ḋé núsi medí bé manyá lā ŋú  
Medí bé nabu tame le eŋú  
Mebu bé X nyé nyatejé  
Mesusu bé wo hā abuí nenemá  
Medí bé nadó nya ađé né até ŋuí si aná bé manyá bé nebu nenemá.  

\( X - a \) [X nyé gbeđename]  

Kp: Tási`a!  

Vuía!  

Menc mo kpém bé awɔ/ anɔ X woɔ  
Mekpó bé mele ewɔm o  
Mèsɔ nám bé mele ewɔm o  
Myemedí bé magabu tame tsó eŋú o  
Medí bé nadé dzesi núsi mese le lāme le étá  
Medí bé nawɔ náné tsó eŋú le nya si dom mele ta.
Kp: Va fāa dě!

Medi' be nāwɔ nūsi medi' be nāwɔ lā (X) ne' edzro
Medi' be nase éme be mavêm nēnye be medzro be yeawe o
Medi' be nadē dzesi nūsi mese le lāmē le ēta
Medi' be nāwɔ nānē tso ɣu le nya si dōm mele ta.

Kp: Tāsi lā!

Nyemede afima o lā!
Mekpɔ be nānē le dzɔdɔm na ɣeyiɣi aɗe fifia
Menč mə kpɔm be atɔ te fifia hāfi
Mese nānē le lānye me be me tɔ hadē o
Medi' be ne woatɔ te fifia
Medi' be nadē dzesi nūsi mese le lāmē le ēta
Medi' be nāwɔ nānē si anā be nūsia natɔ te fifia le nya si dōm mele ta.

Kp: Va lō

Medzo hēe

Medi' be nabū tame tsō nya si dōm mele ɣu
Mesusu' be anyo ne' abu tame le ɣu
Medi' be nāwɔ nānē le nya si dōm mele ta
Medi' be nadē dzesi nūsi mebu tso ɣu
[Medoê (nenêmə) alə (lɔ alɔ hēe) elabēnə medi' be amewo
nakpɔ' be gbetagbe 'Y' dólə menyə].
X lòò (3.5)

Kp Va lòò!

Akpé lòò!

Kofi xe féa lòò!

Medí bë nalé to ñé nga si doóm mele ṣù
Medí bë nawò nâné si aâ, bë manyá bë nèse nga si medó.

X lòò (3.5)

Kp Medzò lòò!

Va lòò!

Medí bë nalé to ñé nga si doóm mele ṣù
Mese nâné le lâmé le éta
Mesusù bë awò nâné fifia le nga si medó lâ ta.

X lòò (3.5)

Kp Te sia lolo lòò!

Egbevìwo nyadri lòò!

Mekpró bë nâné (X) dzô
Nyemabuí bë núsia (X) atè ṣù adʒô hafi o
Mese nâné le nye lâmé le éta
Medóé elabéñá medí bë mafía nûsi mese le lâmé le éta.
X sæa!

(Kp) Megafa aví o sæa!
Néva kábá sæa!

Medi bé nalé tó ḍé nya si dóm mele
Mesusú bé édze bé mádó nya sia
Medi bé nabuí nenema ké
Medi bé nawa náné le nya si dóm mele ta.

X goo!

(Kp) Fié goo!
Dzaa goo!

Mekpó bé edó nya nyuí adé nám
Mekpó dzidzo (le ḍú wo) le éta
Medi bé mádó nya nyuí ma tɔgbí ké ná wò.

X tɔɔ!

(Kp) Meseé tɔɔ!
Ele kpiʃa té tɔɔ!
Va tɔɔ!

Wonú le' dzi nám
Medi bé nanya
Medi bé nakpó dzidzo qé ḋunjye le éta.
X - (l)ée

Kp  Kofi - éé!
Naa - éé!
Kwamin - éé!
Kwanunc - éé!

Nyeme - kpó wò le afísia o
Mesusú bé nèle afi aqé si ate jú se nya si dóó mele
Medí bé mádó nya aqé ná wò
Medí bé nawo náñé fifía si aná bé manyá bé ese nya si dóó mele
Medóó álé le núsí mese le lámé le éta.