Encountering Bureaucracy, Imaginaries, and Address: Understanding Citizenship through Lived Lives

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Abstract

The vast majority of approaches to ‘citizenship as status’ see the concept as static and often use binary modes of categorisation and analysis, such as that between citizen and non-citizen. These accounts are problematic on several fronts; firstly, they obscure the diversity of encounters that occur in the context of citizenship, and secondly, they regard the concept as relatively unchanging. By focusing on the ways that citizenship is encountered within lived lives, this thesis provides a novel approach to the study of citizenship that can better grasp the fluidity as well as the transformative capacities of the emergent encounters that make up individuals’ ongoing negotiations of citizenship.

Using fifty in-depth qualitative interviews conducted in Australia and Greece with multiple citizenship status holders, I interrogate the ways in which encounters with bureaucracy, imaginaries and acts of imagination, as well as encounters of address, create, shape, and rupture conceptions of citizenship as status. More specifically, by applying an alternative methodological approach and highlighting the role of both repetition and rupture, this thesis illustrates, in the first instance, how these transformative encounters with bureaucracy are more than just ‘gates’ that one passes through, but how they resonate far beyond their immediate contexts. Secondly, in
Abstract

building on the literature on the subject of imaginaries, I consider the diversity of ways in which citizenship comes to be imagined, and the importance of seeing these acts of imagination as both personal and collective, while retaining the possibilities of non-determinist outcomes. Finally, I interrogate the role and impact of addressing and being addressed in the context of citizenship, and the ways that these speech acts come to situate us within the world, but also how they account, at least in part, for the ceaseless transformations of citizenship itself. This thesis illustrates how it is through such ongoing and personal negotiations, that citizenship emerges within lived lives.
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We are entering, I suspect, upon a time of troubles. It is not just the terrorists, the bankers, and the climate that are going to wreak havoc with our sense of security and stability. Globalization itself – the ‘flat’ earth of so many irenic fantasies – will be a source of fear and uncertainty to billions of people who will turn to their leaders for protection. ‘Identities’ will grow to be mean and tight, as the indigent and the uprooted beat upon the ever rising walls of the gated communities from Delhi to Dallas.

Being ‘Danish’ or ‘Italian’, ‘American’ or ‘European’ won’t just be an identity; it will be a rebuff and a reproof to whom it excludes. The state, far from disappearing, may be about to come into its own: the privileges of citizenship, the protections of card holding residency rights, will be wielded as political trumps. Intolerant demagogues in established democracies will demand “tests” – of knowledge, of language, of attitude – to determine whether desperate newcomers are deserving of British or Dutch or French ‘identity’. They are already doing so. In this brave new century we shall miss the tolerant, the marginals: the edge people. My people.


It has long been a pet hate of mine to hear the far-too-common accusation that individuals are ‘studying themselves’. While I can understand the apprehension of those who perceive some studies to be too biased or author-focused, I believe that the subjects which invoke the most passion and therefore the best work are those that have often touched us personally. As such, I am using this preface as an opportunity to sketch out the birth of my fascination with this subject; the birth of my passion with it.
I am the great-granddaughter, the granddaughter, and the daughter of immigrants who came from many different countries and settled in different places; with such a diverse background, questions of citizenship, identity, and identification seem to be evoked surprisingly often. Identity is something very complex and I have always been interested in the ways in which we ‘name’ individuals both in everyday encounters and through diverse bureaucratic forms; questions often asked merely out of a source of curiosity fix us into place. This is where my interest in citizenship emerged.

Furthermore, I have spent a lot of time overseas, and through the crossing of borders I reflected on the importance of citizenship to individual freedom and opportunity. But these opportunities are not limited to simply taking the smaller queue at immigration control, or having easy access to certain labour markets; this type of bordering occurs in other places and in countless other ways.

I have mostly been fortunate enough to be a citizen of the places where I have lived, so when I found myself living somewhere where I did not have the right papers, these difficulties came as quite a shock to me. A student visa for a single year should not be hard to get, right? Especially with the correct letters and documents? I was wrong. Countless hours in queues, often waiting long before the office opened, just to be seen that day, lost days of work, and wild goose chases for elusive documents that were ‘vital’ to one official only to be told the opposite by the next. Chatting to people in these situations, and the stories that they recounted made my own stressful situations seem incredibly tame. Yet, these experiences and encounters, and their formative capacities are absent in most people’s understandings and almost non-existent in the academic literature; we criticise the ‘queue jumpers’, having never seen, heard or felt the ‘queue’ ourselves. This having been said, we must also be careful not to apply too deterministic an analysis to these encounters: they are experienced in very different ways.

Other events also stand out to me: I used to intern at a well-known Human Rights NGO. One day when I came to work, and there was a man crying in the entry surrounded by a couple of my colleagues. He had found out his father was dying back...
in West Africa; he wanted to return to say goodbye and pay his last respects. Under the conditions of his interim visa however, he was not allowed to leave the country. If he left, he would not be able to legally return and the bureaucratic process towards residency that he had been working on for the better part of the last eight or so years would be rendered void. We had no answers for him – there was no way to leave and legally return – the man had a choice; his future or his father.

What struck me at the time was not only his absolute despair, but also the clear injustice of it; on reflecting on the situation afterwards, I started to question the invisibility of these narratives and these embodied experiences of citizenship, and in many ways this thesis is my attempt at an understanding of the subject that renders these situations and practices visible.
1. Introduction

Once again I found myself late at night in a taxi. Somewhere between the public transport strikes and the questionable neighbourhood where I lived in Athens, I ended up here in the back seat of a cab at least once or twice a week. The drivers would ask me where I was going, clarify some directions, double check the turn off, and usually after a minute or so of silence, they would inquire as to where I was from. Some asked if I was from Cyprus, or from the North of Greece or from Crete, others assumed immigration. I found myself time and again having to articulate how I got ‘here’. Within the intimate space of the taxi with the middle aged man at the wheel – I used to watch their eyes flicker between the road and the rear view mirror with me in the backseat – I would give an account. This was a conversation; they often ask questions or make comments. Through every articulation the story emerged differently. There wasn’t any hostility in these questions – or at least I didn’t detect it – they were just curious, perhaps just passing the time.\footnote{This is an auto-ethnographic excerpt from some of my own writing from 2011, at which time I had been residing in Athens for almost three years.}

Citizenship is one of the most highly charged issues of our time. It can determine the opportunities available to us, where and how we move, how we are identified by others, and even how we identify ourselves: it situates us in the world. There is an underlying normative assumption that everyone is a citizen of somewhere, and the very lack of a status has been described as being ‘identical with expulsion from humanity altogether’ (Arendt [1951] 1973, 297). Questions of citizenship emerge daily at the heart of issues such as migration, racism, welfare, employment, and inequality, among others. Even something as seemingly unrelated as the sports section of the
newspaper may contain accounts of a national team or a quip about the status and residency of a player. Despite the banality suggested by the assumption that everyone is a citizen of somewhere, the frequency with which citizenship emerges as a burning issue, suggests that it occupies an unusual space between everyday and highly-contested.

After considering the impact, urgency, and centrality of citizenship, the above vignette may seem somewhat misplaced. But, it is precisely this instinct which validates the importance of the work that will follow. The neatly theorised literatures, grand national narratives, and representations of citizenship in the media, obscure the diverse and everyday ways it emerges within lived lives. As such – as in this vignette – citizenship may surface within a conversation with a taxi driver, in filling out a form, or even through escapist day-dreams at work.

However the recognition of the impact of these diverse sites and spaces of citizenship encounters is largely missing from the traditional approaches to citizenship, understood as ‘status’ (hereafter referred to as ‘citizenship as status’). Within the disciplinary diversity of citizenship studies, most approaches take a utilitarian view of the subject, conceiving of it as both static and functional, instead of realising its centrality to a vast range of social processes, power relationships, and forms of everyday labour. Scholarship on the topic of citizenship – largely due to the urge to do away with divergent and complex accounts – often presents the issue as clinical categorisations of ‘status’ and ‘practice’, ‘citizen’ and ‘non-citizen’, and ‘us’ and ‘them’. While these distinctions may satisfy our taxonomic urges, they misconstrue the complex and emergent ways in which citizenship exists and is transformed within lived lives.

While citizenship may be one of the lightning-rod issues of our time, the ways in which we conceptualise and theorise it may obscure more than they illuminate. Through the concept of encounter, this thesis will provide a vital and much needed sociological analysis of this highly charged issue, which shines a light onto all kinds of
social and cultural dimensions that are overlooked by more conventional approaches to citizenship. This thesis will address the overarching question of how citizenship is encountered and emerges through its ongoing negotiation in lived lives, and more specifically through three key sites of encounter, those with bureaucracy, through imaginaries and acts of imagination, and in encounters of address. This is done using a series of over 50 in-depth qualitative interviews undertaken with multiple citizenship holders in both Australia and Greece.

1.1 Context

Questions of citizenship have become entangled with some of the most contentious issues of our time. As such, citizenship, in its involvement with topics such as migration, employment, social cohesion, rights, public policy, and the welfare state, is a topic of fierce contestation and heated debate. Its broader existence however, as a tool for the organisation of populations, remains largely unchallenged.

More people than ever before live outside the country of their birth, and these numbers only continue to increase (International Organization for Migration 2015, 3). Regardless of their motivations for movement – be they as a result of conflict, economic, lifestyle, or other factors – the consequences, in citizenship terms, are the increasing diversity within populations and the growing numbers of people with more than one citizenship status. States are then forced to implement systems for the management of these populations. These systems of incorporation are vastly unequal: the media often highlights the ‘desperate passages’ (C. Martin 2011) of irregular migrants and asylum seekers, while at the same time we are seeing the simplification and expediting of visas and citizenship processes for the ‘neoliberal’ elite (Springer, Birch, and MacLeavy 2016, 450). Furthermore, citizenship, at a state level, relies on a ‘national’ vocabulary, and as such these issues engage with questions of what the nation should and should not look like.

The electoral upsets of the Trump election victory and Brexit, have ignited more general fears regarding populist politics and increasing racism. There is also a more
pervasive feeling of instability that is coming from a ‘new apocalyptic imagination
[that] [...] draws a parallel between diverse threats such as global warming, health
pandemics, natural catastrophes, technological risks, and international crime and
terrorism’ (Amin 2012, 138). Furthermore, the cohesion of ‘Europe’ has been
questioned following the Greek Financial Crisis and that of Brexit, bringing
European Citizenship, and the future of the European Union more generally, into
question. While Occupy Wall Street, along with other Occupy Movements, may have
had questionable success in their aims, their rhetoric of the 99% and the 1% have
engaged the popular imagination (Pickerill and Krinsky 2012) providing a clearer
metaphor for the increasing inequalities both within and between states (Anand and
Segal 2014). These internal disparities fracture traditional notions of the equality of
citizens, and have brought about interrogations regarding the ability and willingness
of states to cater to their disadvantaged populations, especially in light of the decline
of the welfare state in many contexts.

Politically we have also seen numerous changes in the policies associated with
citizenship. Whereas dual citizenship was once likened to bigamy (Spiro 2010, 114),
we are witnessing the ever increasing instances of de facto and de jure dual citizenship,
with around half of all sovereign states accepting it in one form or another (Faist
2001). Similarly, the creation of new forms of ‘partial’ or ‘light’ citizenship, such as
the Turkish Pink Card and the Indian NRI scheme, highlight the introduction of
other (sub-citizenship) categories (Caglar 2004; Dickinson and Bailey 2007). The
increasing number and complexity of these ‘citizenship constellations’ (Bauböck 2010)
in the lives of individuals generate a pressing need to comprehend the multiplicity of
ways in which citizenship is encountered.

This research is incredibly timely; not only, as alluded to earlier, is citizenship a highly
contested issue that relates to some of the key ongoing debates of our time, but it is
also a tool for the organisation and control of populations, that is so entangled in the
way we see the world, and govern it, that we can be assured of its presence and
ongoing impact well into the future.
1.2 Definition of Terms

Because of its fluidity and scope, citizenship can be notoriously difficult to define. A common distinction that is often made is that between citizenship as ‘status’ – that is the relationship with a state – and citizenship as ‘practice’ – which focuses on the role of engagement or activity, or as Kymlicka and Norman present, ‘citizenship-as-legal-status’ and ‘citizenship-as-desirable-activity’ (1994, 353). Yet in applying such binary conceptions one runs the risk of creating false dichotomies: ‘the status and practices of citizenship presuppose each other’ (Isin 2009, 369), and as such, the two are intimately entangled, and this entanglement will be highlighted in diverse aspects of this thesis.

As a point of departure, this thesis will investigate citizenship as status, where ‘status’ is used to denote a link to the membership-related conceptions of the topic – not limited to discussions of policy and institutions – as well as addressing issues of practice. At its most basic, citizenship as status is ‘a relation between individuals and territorial political entities’ (Bauböck 2010, 848) or quite simply ‘membership in a state’ (Joppke 2007, 38). This thesis considers these statuses as they emerge, transform and are conceived of, in the context of lived lives. This approach focuses not on the status per se, but on these more personal encounters: ‘the notion of life course reminds us that people do not usually navigate the ambiguous and frequently contradictory controls and policies regulating borders and statuses in a bid to make general declarations about affiliation and identity as categorical abstractions. They are more likely to be pursuing personal projects and intimate relations’ (Amit 2014, 400).

Furthermore, in investigating status, this thesis will not conceive of citizenship from the binary distinctions between ‘citizen’ and ‘non-citizen’. As illustrated by Bosniak, ‘many of citizenship’s core attributes do not depend on formal citizenship status at all but are extended to individuals based on the facts of their personhood and national territorial presence’ (2008, 3), thus individuals, such as permanent residents among others, are considered as having a variation on citizenship. In order to break away
from this binary of citizen/non-citizen, participants with multiple citizenship ‘statuses’, rather than dual or multiple citizenship, were chosen. ‘Status’ in this case is theorised as a broader term that can include citizenship, permanent residency, various forms of long term visas, such as spousal, work, and humanitarian visas. Even the status of ‘irregular migrant’ denotes a relationship to a particular state. Given the enormous diversity between states with regards to immigration and citizenship legislation, as well as the frequency and rapidity of changes to them, this approach is able to consider how, despite having different ‘statuses’ on paper, the experiences of individuals can be very similar. In the same way, individuals with the same status may encounter them very differently.

A further term which requires consideration is that of ‘encounter’, which broadly speaking may be considered a ‘distinctive event of relation’ (Wilson 2016, 2). The usefulness of this concept emerges from its ability to reflect on the interplay of diverse scales, as encounters ‘hesitate between the domain of the particular – the face-to-face encounter – and the general – the framing of the particular encounter by broader relationships of power and antagonism’ (Ahmed 2000, 9). Etymologically, the word ‘encounter’ itself hints at the adversarial qualities that are often present in interactions across space, but as a concept it also retains elements that ‘include questions of meaning, power, temporality, ethics and scale’ (Wilson 2016, 2). Further details as to the conceptualisation of ‘encounter’ will be articulated through the later stages of this thesis.

1.3 Citizenship in the Academic Literature

The academic literature on the topic of citizenship is unfathomably vast. It has a long history, and in recent years in particular, we have seen a considerable increase in publications on the subject. Any account of the academic literature on the topic of citizenship must deal with two interrelated problems – one of volume and the other of scope – and a simple and comprehensive account of ‘the literature’ is near impossible to give for these very reasons. In their substantial monograph on the topic
of citizenship, Isin and Turner emphasise the 'importance of citizenship as both legal institution and lived experience' (2007, 16), highlighting not only the existence of the institutions of citizenship, but how they are subject to processes of lived negotiation. It is broadly along these lines that the academic literature used in this thesis has emerged.

Disciplines have developed different orientations towards these more ‘legal’ or ‘lived’ approaches. As one would expect, the disciplines of law and politics are situated more exclusively within the ‘legal’ orientations towards the subject, whereas the literature orientated towards the social and ‘lived’ experiences of citizenship, has emerged largely from sociology, anthropology, and human geography. Furthermore, the subject has also been characterised by the development of a broader discipline of ‘citizenship studies’, which is considerably porous and addresses both these legal and lived elements, as well as more philosophical and theoretical questions. Despite the broad disciplinary distinctions mentioned above, much of the work done on the topic of citizenship is interdisciplinary, and may involve both these ‘legal’ and ‘lived’ considerations.

Historically, many of the earlier theorisations of citizenship focused on these on legal and policy approaches. At our current juncture, these are mainly engaged with investigating the laws regarding how citizenship is bestowed (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010; Goldstein and Piazza 1996), as well as those which are concerned with immigration legislation and its impact (Walsh 2014). Of significant interest have been the theorisations of dual citizenship within this literature (Blatter, Erdmann, and Schwanke 2010; Faist and Kivisto 2007; Bloemraad 2004; Shevchuk 1996, among many others), partially because its often de facto existence has meant that approaches have had to focus on the absence of policy rather than its presence. Furthermore, due to sending states desires to maintain connections with ‘national’ emigrants, other researchers have investigated the proliferation of various registration schemes and less than citizenship statuses (Dickinson and Bailey 2007; Caglar 2004). The diversity of these statuses, and the fact that different individuals may have varied permutations of
them, have led to the development of the notion of ‘citizenship constellations’ which are ‘structure[s] in which individuals are simultaneously linked to several such political entities, so that their legal rights and duties are determined not only by one political authority, but by several’ (Bauböck 2010, 848). Focusing on these constellations allows citizenship to be viewed from a more individual approach, which is something that is lacking within the literature in general.

One of the key issues within theorisations of citizenship has been the tendency towards static conceptions, universalism, and broad generalisations. The text often considered to be foundational within the study of citizenship, is that of Sociologist T.H. Marshall’s Citizenship and Social Class ([1949] 1950), where citizenship was theorised as the evolutionary accumulation of rights. As such, he saw particular rights as emerging from specific historical periods: ‘civil rights [can be assigned] to the eighteenth [century], political to the nineteenth [century], and social to the twentieth [century]’ (Marshall [1949] 1950, 14). This formulation has been widely criticised as only being representative of the post-World War II British context, and that the idea of an evolutionary accumulation of rights is fundamentally naïve. His narrow conception also illustrates the largely Eurocentric approach of much of the literature.

In a similar vein, in trying to conceive of the divergent orientations to citizenship legislation by different states, Rogers Brubaker suggested a historical institutionalist approach. This theorisation, which observed the historical development of orientations towards citizenship in France and Germany (Brubaker 1992), comes to the rather simplistic interpretation that France, largely as a result of its historical development, has a more civic orientation, while Germany retains a more ethnic one. In recent years, however, this static theorisation has proved to be problematic, as we have seen the convergence between these two national conceptions of citizenship (Vink and de Groot 2010).

Rights have also received considerable interest in this domain, with the most notable theorisation being Hannah Arendt’s conception of the ‘right to have rights’, which is now a common definition of citizenship and is used broadly within research on the
Chapter One

This conception emerged from her considerations regarding the number of people left stateless as a result of the events of the Second World War: ‘[w]e became aware of the existence of a right to have rights [...] and a right to belong to some kind of organized community’ (Arendt [1951] 1973, 296). This particular formulation reinforces the consequences of the spread of citizenship more globally where being a citizen of a state is considered a basic human right, and enshrined into international law. As is to be expected, conceptions of citizenship responded to broader trends in the social sciences at large, and it is in this context that in the mid to late 1990s we see a proliferation of texts focusing on post-national forms of citizenship spurred on by the introduction of European citizenship in 1992. It is in this setting that we see the work of people such as Yasmin Soysal (1994), who, in the context of immigrant workers in Europe considered the interplay between human rights demands and immigrant incorporation. She theorises, given the development of post-national citizenship rights, that rights are determined by one’s presence within the state and not necessarily by citizenship (Soysal 1994), a stance that has been questioned by more recent accounts (Shachar 2009, 2).

The academic literature on the ‘lived’ domains of citizenship has increased exponentially in the last thirty years. These theorisations often consider citizenship in relation to another topic, such as migration, identity, or belonging, and as such ‘citizenship’ may not be articulated as the primary concern of the scholarship in question. An example of this is recent work investigating the circumstances and processes of asylum claims (Darling 2014; Cabot 2012; Griffiths 2014), which, while not strictly speaking developed as part of the literature on the topic, is of significant relevance to it. These studies illustrate how these statuses ‘at the edges of citizenship’ (Hepworth 2015), come to highlight issues that are central to it.

The value of these more ‘lived’ orientations is that they account for how the ‘more informal designations of citizenship retain a dynamic of their own which demands more explicit consideration’ (Painter and Philo 1995, 115). A key investigation of this has come from the research of anthropologist Aihwa Ong, which focuses on both the
flexibility in positioning that comes with citizenship for certain individuals (1999) along with looking at the ways neoliberalism creates exceptions to citizenship (2006a). These two texts are widely cited and have made considerable contributions to the field of citizenship studies, especially as a result of their interdisciplinary approaches to the topic outside the dominant western context, and their ability to account for the inequalities within the supposedly equal statuses of citizens.

Other work has built on this, showing how despite the rhetoric of equality among citizens, the personal circumstances of individuals result in very different experiences of citizenship. This is the key topic discussed in Margaret Somers’ book *The Genealogies of Citizenship*, which illustrated the treatment of marginal populations in the context of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005. She illustrates how a 'benign view of citizenship has purchase only from the perspective of the insiders [...] it is the cold instrument of exclusion to those outside its borders, both internal borders based on race and gender exclusion, as well as nation state ones based on xenophobia and nationalism’ (Somers 2008, 5). This once again reinforces the importance of these 'lived' approaches to citizenship that are better able to contest some the broad historical and theoretical conceptions of the topic which work often render these disparate experiences invisible.

Theorisations around transnationalism (Basch, Schiller, and Blanc 1994) and diaspora (Brah 1996), have also contributed to these more lived approaches to citizenship, which focus on the different forms that questions of identity and mobility can take, especially in the context of migration. Here we also see somewhat of an unintentional division of labour with regards to the study of citizenship, with much of the scholarship that has emerged from the US being immigration focused, while works from Europe are more likely to consider citizenship and integration above all else (Favell 2000). One must also remember that citizenship lies at the intersection between multiple legal statuses and requirements, but also engages with issues of multiculturalism, human rights, gender, globalisation, and public policy, among others. As such, it may be academic work done in these vast areas that can and have
contributed to the research on citizenship more broadly, thus once again highlighting these issues of scope.

While many of these approaches to investigating ‘lived’ citizenship give us a broader understanding of this fluidity and diversity, they have done so mainly by investigating the lived experiences of groups of people. Due to the increasing value placed on individual negotiation and choice (N. Rose [1989] 1999), new approaches are needed to better conceive of the ways in which citizenship is negotiated by individuals and not just groups. Human Geography, and recent work done on ‘encounter’ provides a method with which to do so: ‘taking the ‘encounter’ as an analytic [gives] an understanding of citizenship as an emergent condition that is emplaced and embodied, rather than simply a collection of rights to be endowed’ (Hepworth 2014). As such, this thesis will expand on the notion of encounter, to examine what the ongoing negotiations of citizenship in lived lives can tell us about citizenship more broadly.

Finally, one of the failures of a significant amount of research on citizenship is that it defines and analyses the subject by straight-jacketing it into strict binaries and categorical frames. As Condor explains of the literature on citizenship: ‘a good deal of existing work recognises the complexity, and potential ambiguity of the citizenship construct. However extant approaches generally treat conceptual vagueness as [a] practical, political and analytic problem. Consequently, authors often attempt to impose conceptual order by forming tidy taxonomies of dimensions or models of citizenship. Researchers typically contribute to these reifying tendencies’ (Condor 2011, 197). This thesis seeks to fill some of these gaps in the existing literature, by investigating citizenship from the perspectives of the lived lives of individuals, and not engaging with these limiting forms of categorisation. Using the notion of encounter it will provide an approach that can deal with the diversity and ambiguity of citizenship through its ongoing transformations.
1.4 Research Questions

The main aims of this thesis are to investigate citizenship in ways that do not resort to these problematic binaries and categorical distinctions, while also considering how citizenship emerges through countless interactions and social relations. It will contribute to the emerging literature on the role of encounter within citizenship, and the ways in which this approach can better account for the diversity and fluidity of the subject. In addressing this overarching question, this thesis will carefully consider three key sites where citizenship emerges within lived lives - those of bureaucracy, imaginaries, and address. More specifically it will ask:

• What role do encounters with bureaucracy play in the lived experiences of citizenship?
• How is citizenship imagined differently by diverse individuals, and what can this tell us about citizenship more generally?
• How does the normative concept of citizenship change over time and how can we better understand it?
• Given that citizenship has strong links to identity, what role does address have with regards to individual conceptions of citizenship?

Furthermore, in breaking with the ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer and Schiller 2002b) that has plagued a great deal of literature on citizenship, this thesis will be based on a series of over fifty in-depth qualitative interviews with multiple citizenship status holders undertaken in both Australia and Greece, thereby investigating experiences and encounters in a way that does not limit them to a single national context and that does not resort to the use of limiting binaries.

1.5 Methodology

Part of the original contribution of this research is its methodology. On the occasions when empirical research is undertaken in the context of the investigation of
citizenship as status, these approaches are largely quantitative, and thus there is a noticeable lack of qualitative perspectives. Bauböck, a key scholar in the field, identifies several gaps in the current research on citizenship and migration, one of which is this lack of qualitative empirical analysis (2006, 31). Therefore, the novelty of this approach in this field, highlights part of its original contribution.

The central part of this qualitative methodology is the fifty in-depth interviews which were carried out during 2013 and 2014 in both Greece and Australia. The choice of these two locations, which differ substantially from one another, provided the necessary diversity of participants, who were obtained through snowball sampling. These interviews were semi-structured and conversational in nature, where participants largely controlled the direction and flow of this encounter; they were later transcribed, where necessary translated, and analysed. Participants were selected on the basis that they had more than one citizenship status, broadly defined, as outlined by the definition of terms section of this introduction. The three key findings chapters of this thesis will focus on the three sites of encounter that emerged from this empirical research with the most regularity and emphasis, namely those of bureaucracy, imaginaries and address.

In addition to this empirical component, this thesis includes a diversity of sources on the topic of citizenship, as well material on other subjects that will emerge within particular chapters. Sources come from areas as diverse as sociology, anthropology, politics, cultural and political geography, cultural studies, and migration studies, among others, to provide a comprehensive analysis of the topic.

1.6 Thesis Outline

The remainder of this thesis will be broken into six further chapters and a conclusion, all of which will attend to illustrating both the problematic nature of many of our current theorisations of citizenship, and the ways in which citizenship is encountered within lived lives.
In the chapter that immediately follows – Chapter Two – a genealogical account of citizenship will be provided, highlighting a history of transformation, reinvention, and rupture. This will dispel the two interlinked myths – that of citizenship’s linear development, and of its ‘naturalness’ – that have an implicit existence in much of the literature on citizenship. In addition, the chapter will map the development of citizenship within the two national case studies – those of Australia and Greece, the sites of the fieldwork for this thesis – illustrating the differential development and character of citizenship within diverse contexts.

Chapter Three furthers the investigation of citizenship as it emerges from the existing academic literature. It highlights how problems associated with defining the term have led to the development of several constraining binary and ‘categorical’ theorisations, such as that between ‘citizen’ and ‘non-citizen’. The second part of this chapter will introduce the concept of ‘encounter’ as a means to investigate citizenship away from these rigid taxonomies, and will outline some of the existing literature in this area, while highlighting the novel approach to encounter that is taken by this thesis. Finally, as encounters engage with existing institutions and power structures, a brief outline of the role of the nation-state, identity, birthright bestowal and European citizenship will be given.

Questions of methodology are this thesis’ next area of consideration, and Chapter Four will give an in-depth and reflexive account of the various methodological concerns and the process of carrying out the fieldwork for this research. Reflecting on the practical aspects of this project, this chapter will also consider how issues regarding choice of participants, translation, transcription, and ethics in cross cultural environments were addressed. It seeks to provide a more honest account of the experience of qualitative work that other studies may be missing and it closes with an examination of the value of qualitative work and provides a response to claims that it is in ‘crisis’.
The next three chapters present the substantive research of this thesis, and all draw heavily from the fieldwork encounters as well as the diverse literatures that relate to their particular themes. Chapter Five considers encounters with bureaucracy to illustrate the transformative capacities of these sites. In breaking with more traditional notions of ‘neutral’ bureaucracy simply as a ‘gate’ that one has to pass through, this chapter shows how the materiality of the bureaucratic encounter, its emotional force and the temporalities of these experiences, can have complex and ongoing implications for conceptions of citizenship.

The pervasive presence of imaginaries and imaginative acts in the fieldwork encounters is the basis for the content of Chapter Six. Building on the literature on social imaginaries, this chapter criticises the key theorists’ inability to account for the more personal acts of imagination within these social imaginaries. It considers several key imaginaries in the context of citizenship: cosmopolitan imaginaries, hereditary imaginaries, (in)secure imaginaries, as well as the impact of inertia and of rupture within these considerations. In terms of understanding the role of encounter in relation to citizenship, this chapter shows how individual acts of imagination can diverge from the predominant narratives, thus highlighting the need to integrate the possibilities of non-determinist analyses within our understandings of citizenship.

In the third discussion chapter - Chapter Seven - I consider the ways in which encounters of address make a difference, and the sizable impact that this has on the experiences of citizenship in lived lives. More specifically, drawing on the work of Judith Butler and her concept of ‘normative schemes of intelligibility’, I consider how the ‘logics’ and ‘vocabularies’ of neoliberalism and nationalism have come together to influence conceptions of citizenship. Furthermore, it will illustrate how address is determined not only by the accounts that we give of ourselves but by the at times violent address of others, highlighting the key ways in which difference is created and maintained in the context of citizenship within these encounters.
The final chapter of this thesis, Chapter Eight, will illustrate how these three key themes of encountering bureaucracy, imaginaries, and address come together to emphasise the importance of qualitative approaches to the topic of citizenship as status. Attending to citizenship from the position of encounter not only helps us conceive of its role in the everyday, but also allows an openness to fluidity and contingency. This chapter will also consider the contributions and limitations of this thesis, as well as the future possibilities of theorising the ongoing and personal negotiations through which citizenship emerges within lived lives.
Chapter Two

2. Historicising Citizenship

Compiling any comprehensive account of citizenship is a daunting task. The illusory simplicity of such a unitary term obscures citizenship’s diversity and fluidity across time, as well as both between and within places and populations. In addition to being an academic ‘buzz word’ (Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 352) and the product of a great deal of scholarship, citizenship as a concept has the added layers of its policy, political, and legal presence, not to mention its quotidian vernacular usage by diverse individuals. This chapter and the chapter that follows have the formidable task of providing a contextual account of citizenship as well as situating it within the academic literature. This particular chapter will provide a historical account, but instead of replicating the unitary history of the topic, it seeks to disrupt the dominant narratives and the commonly told story of a concept that stretches from Ancient Greece and through Rome, and eventually to the way that is used today. In doing so, it will apply what could be broadly labelled a ‘genealogical’ method, focusing more specifically on the various points of divergence and rupture. The second part of the chapter will give an in depth account of the development of Australian and Greek Citizenship – the two locations of fieldwork for this thesis – to illustrate the complexity of national contexts and to once again show the diverse and contingent ways in which citizenship has developed.
2.1 Introducing Genealogy

The accounts of citizenship which trace the development of the concept back to antiquity often provide a conception of the subject which implies that it is ‘natural’ rather than the product of a particular set of historical circumstances. As such, this chapter will use an approach that provides a ‘genealogy’ of citizenship, highlighting the specific points of change and rupture that are often taken for granted in traditional accounts of the topic.

The concept of a genealogical approach emerged in the first instance from the writings of Nietzsche ([1887] 2012), however it is the conception outlined within Foucault’s work which is the most widely cited. Foucault’s most explicit analysis of the concept of genealogy comes from his reading of Nietzsche’s work in the text Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, where he explains: ‘[t]he genealogist needs history to dispel the chimeras of origin, somewhat in the manner of the pious philosopher who needs a doctor to exorcise the shadow of his soul’ (Foucault 1977, 144). Yet even within this text there remains some ambiguity with regards to the precise form that a genealogy would take: ‘[Foucault] left us no extended methodological statement of this genealogy’ (Dean 1994, 14), and as such, there are a number of variations in the approaches to this method.

Having been described as the ‘history of the present’ a genealogical method ‘is concerned with that which is taken-for-granted, assumed to be given, or natural within contemporary social existence, a givenness or naturalness questioned in the course of contemporary struggles’ (Dean 1994, 35). In considering the topic of citizenship, genealogy becomes useful by both exposing the incredible diversity of forms that it has taken during its historical development, but also highlighting that despite its presence across the globe, it is not a ‘natural’ way to conceive of or organise populations: ‘genealogy addresses a particular kind if problem, namely, our being held captive by a particular picture, a way of thinking and acting, that is problematic in some respect such as, say, making certain exercises of power invisible’ (Owen 2005, 113). The elegant historical narratives that link citizenship to ancient societies give the false
impression that it is a ‘natural’ mode of organisation of populations, and fail to conceive of it as the result of a particular series of historical circumstances.

This is not the first attempt at producing a genealogy of citizenship (Somers 2008; Isin 2002, 1997), however the one presented here will differ somewhat to the accounts given by Somers and Isin. Both authors manage to articulate the importance of this method in this context: ‘[a]s we rethink citizenship, traditional history has nothing to teach us, by contrast, what genealogy can promise is to bring the present struggles into sharp focus and reveal the negotiations that are under way that open up new boundaries for citizenship’ (Isin 1997, 131). Thus the various articulations of citizenship consider ‘the different ways people belong to different collectivities and states’ (Yuval-Davis 2006, 198) and thus may illustrate divergent understandings and patterns of domination. In doing so ‘[g]enealogy aims to take up ‘minor’ or repressed knowledge’ (Somers 2008, 9), and by providing an account of citizenship that highlights the fact that it is historically contingent, we are also able to disrupt the ways in which citizenship is conceived today.

Thus a ‘[g]enealogy, while rooted in involvement, guards against presentist effects by locating those positivities as the historically contingent outcome of trajectories of ensembles of discursive and non-discursive practices’ (Dean 1994, 36). Conceiving of the development of citizenship in this way also reinforces the importance of encounters, a concept which will be explained and developed in greater detail in the following chapter. As such, genealogy reminds us that ‘history is not the continuous line of the emergence of a people, but a series of discontinuous encounters between nations, cultures, others and other others’ (Ahmed 2000, 11).

2.2 Citizenship and its Genealogical Development

The linear history often given of citizenship is very much a European one. This section will take apart this European narrative and instead of highlighting its historical continuity, it will point to these key periods of change and transformative events that caused ruptures in the development of citizenship. While there is great diversity in the ways in which citizenship has been enacted across the globe, this
particular analysis will focus largely on periods of rupture within its European
development. This is not a claim to the universality of the arguments that follow, but
rather an attempt to pick apart the existing dominant narrative. There is a need to
recognise both that there have been significant differences in the emergence of
citizenship within Europe, as well as the development of the concept outside Europe,
illustrating that there are many alternative ways to present a genealogy of the subject.

A majority of texts on citizenship start their historical account somewhere in Ancient
Greece, with different proponents favouring Athens (Pocock 1995) or Sparta (Heater
2004) as their point of departure; such an analysis would then often move to consider
the variations present in Ancient Rome (Shafir 1998, 36), and perhaps compare the
two. While one may contest that it was largely Aristotle’s Politics (Aristotle, Barker,
and Stalley 1998) and Ethics (Aristotle 2014) that provided the vocabulary for
citizenship, what terms such as ‘citizen’ have come to signify however, have changed
so drastically, that drawing the connection between the two is misleading. The first
indication of the failure of these linear narratives comes from the fact that these texts
were ‘lost’ for many centuries, and not rediscovered until the thirteenth century where
they started to appear in the works of philosophers and thinkers of the time. It was
not until the Renaissance that these concepts were applied to populations in any
meaningful sense (Magnette and Long 2005, 39). In this picking-up of ideas from
previous historical periods, and applying them to new contexts, there were shifts in
understandings: ‘[t]his re-emerging concept of citizenship was empirically built up over
the decades. Each city defined, on a step by step basis, according to its interests and
convictions, the rules of accession to its civic body, a panel of privileges and
obligations for members of its elite’ (Magnette and Long 2005, 44).

It is this vocabulary of ‘citizen’ and ‘state’ that can account for development of
narratives that may connect these diverse and disparate forms: ‘new society operated
not by the wholesale destruction of all that it had inherited from old society, but by
selectively adapting the heritage of the past for its own use’ (Hobsbawm 1994, 16).
Thus each place where citizenship began to remerge, defined the concept within its
own terms: ‘it is very important to recognise that the status and practice of citizenship
emerged in specific places in response to specific struggles and conflicts. It is a contested and contingent field that allowed for the mediation of conflict, redistribution of wealth and recognition of various individual and group rights throughout history’ (Isin and Wood 1999, 5, emphasis original).

Geopolitically, the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, illustrated a significant turning point in the organisation of the European state system, and caused the transition towards a model of dividing up the world within the realms of particular states (Gill 2010, 626). This would have increasingly significant implications later on, when the expectation was that not only was the world divided up into discrete partitions, but also that a similar logic was applied to individuals, and thus emerged a system that necessitated their connection with a particular state. The issues associated with this model, and especially for those who fall outside this framework, have been considered by Hannah Arendt, in her writings on the problems of post-World War II statelessness: ‘the trouble is that this calamity arose not from any lack of civilization, backwardness, or mere tyranny, but, on the contrary, that it could not be repaired, because there was no longer any ‘uncivilized’ spot on earth [...] [o]nly with a completely organized humanity could the loss of home and political status become identical with expulsion from humanity altogether’ (Arendt [1951] 1973, 296–97).

There were several other contributing factors which lead to the idea that required everyone to be a citizen of a nation-state. Eric Hobsbawm in his four part history that spans from the French Revolution to the mid-1990s (1987, 1988, 1994, 2006), highlights the role of both the French and the Industrial Revolutions as being two of the key sites for change globally in this period. These two revolutions – though considerably different in nature – resulted in transformations in society, which had similarly drastic consequences with regards to citizenship. The Industrial Revolution, essentially the emergence of modern capitalism and industrial modes of production, changed the nature of society profoundly. The impact of the French Revolution, by contrast, came from the spread of its ideas across the globe,² thus capturing the

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² This is precisely the reason for the strategic absence of the American Revolution as an event of note in this analysis, and while certainly the cries of ‘no taxation without representation’ had some impact on people's
‘modern’ imagination and inciting gradual reciprocal change in other parts of the world. In the crudest of explanations, it was the broader transformations illustrated by the Industrial Revolution which had caused the changes in society which necessitated altered forms of organisation and order, and it was the French Revolution, as an embodiment of the enlightenment thought, which became the catalyst for the development of our current understandings of citizen and state. In Turner and Hamilton’s Citizenship: Critical Concepts, they outline a similar standpoint: ‘we should regard citizenship as an essentially modern institution which reflects the profound changes which have occurred in western societies following the democratic revolutions in France and America, and as a consequence of broader more general social changes associated with the Industrial Revolution, such as urbanisation and secularisation’ (1994, 4).

The Industrial Revolution was not a singular event, but rather a gradual change in the means of production that is understood to have occurred in the latter half of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century in Britain, before slowly spreading to other parts of the globe. While ‘gradualist’ analyses suggest these changes may not have been as all-encompassing as the claims presented by scholars such as Hobsbawm (who saw ‘the Industrial Revolution [as] the most fundamental transformation of human life in the history of the world recorded in written documents’ (Hobsbawm [1968] 1999, 13)) this ‘radical change was obvious to contemporaries’ of the period (Berg and Hudson 1992, 26), and is theorised by commentators of the time. This transition to new forms of manufacturing changed the fabric of society and human relations in a number of ways, and citizenship was slowly developing to deal with these transformations.

Firstly, these changes offered greater possibilities of social mobility; they signalled the slow expansion of the middle class, and in general terms ushered in a gradual increase in the standards of living (though often in unequal ways). In addition, due to the availability of employment in urban centres, individuals were increasingly becoming conceptions, they were nowhere near as profound in other parts of the world as the French Revolution had been.
urbanised as a result of their search for work. The industrial production of goods spurred on the development of new technologies and faster more reliable means of transport (Szostak 1991, 234). As a result of the need to circulate primary materials as well as people and manufactured goods, roads and railways were being constructed. These railway systems, especially in Britain, ensured the even faster industrial development of their societies. The Industrial Revolution therefore resulted in the ‘double upheaval of the economic order and social hierarchies’ (Magnette and Long 2005, 141). The disruptions to populations both required new ways to manage increasingly mobile populations and more and more diverse communities. Furthermore, it was in this context of industrial development as well as intensifying European colonialism, where ideas of nation and citizen were being spread to other parts of the world, and would be later taken up within post-colonial nationalisms (Chatterjee 1993).

Highlighting this increasing ease of the transmission of ideas then becomes a convenient point from which to introduce the French Revolution. Unlike the Industrial Revolution, this refers to specific events, even though it is not the events themselves, but the ideas that emerged from them, which ensure its importance. The French Revolution was a period of social and political turmoil, commencing in 1789 that marked the fall of the Monarchy, and a move towards nationalism (Furet 1981). It also resulted in The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, which would become a further encouragement for the creation and legitimation of liberal democracies with a strong foundation in human rights. The events of the French Revolution were a catalyst for the spread of nationalism throughout the world. This is expressed by Theodoros Kolokotronis, one of the Revolutionary Leaders of the Greek War of Independence (1821-1829), where he states: ‘[a]ccording to my judgement, the French revolution and the doings of Napoleon opened the eyes of the world. The nations knew nothing before, and the people thought that kings were gods upon the earth and that they were bound to say whatever they did was well done. Through this more present change it is more difficult to rule the people’ (T. Kolokotronis, cited in Stavrianos and Stoianovich [1958] 2000, 212).
Through these emerging discourses of nationalism, citizenship became the primary means of the organisation of populations. Nationalism itself was an ideology that, using the basis of culture and politics, believed that all individuals belonged to a specific nation, into which the world could be divided. The French Revolution did not produce nationalism in any meaningful sense, it was rather the tool of its dispersal; the ideology itself had emerged in the works of the enlightenment thinkers well before the events themselves, which is clearly illustrated by Kedourie in his text on nationalism where he traces the origins of these ideas (1993). The French Revolution however became an inspiration for many popular movements towards independence. These ideas also played a significant role in the break-up of the multi-ethnic empires of the period such as the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Nationalism became the vocabulary with which many of the post-colonial independence movements were able to articulate themselves, where through the pervasiveness of nationalism ‘even [their] imaginations must remain forever colonised’ (Chatterjee 1993, 5).

One must not forget the role that technology played in enabling the creation of the modern nation state. Benedict Anderson’s account of the emergence of nationalism considers it as a result of ‘print capitalism’, in being able to spread ideas of the nation ([1983] 2006). The move towards democratic regimes also required better technologies for determining who was and was not a national, which occurred concurrently with the emergence of new forms of identity documents to meet these demands (J. Torpey 1999). The control and monitoring of the citizen has become increasingly important throughout history, as such ‘[t]he development of modern forms of organisation in all fields is nothing less than identical with the development and continual spread of bureaucratic administration […] [i]ts development is, to take the most striking case, at the root of the modern Western State […] The whole pattern of everyday life is cut to fit this framework’ (Weber and Roth [1925] 20, 223). The increasing ‘documentation’ of citizenship is both a cause and a consequences of the ‘total bureaucratisation’ (Graeber 2015, 18) of daily life.
The First and Second World Wars came to emphasise conceptions of citizenship that focused on the duties of the status, most notably that of conscription (Capozzola 2008, 23). It also had several further consequences with regards to the topic: ‘while legislators and political theorists discussed the fairness of conscription, drafted men and their families [...] found the state an increasing presence in their everyday lives’ (Capozzola 2008, 18), furthermore, ‘conscription created new categories of citizens: conscientious objectors, draft dodgers, veterans’ (Capozzola 2008, 22). The enormous disruptions caused by the Second World War in particular created populations whose citizenship was either contested or undetermined; many were rendered stateless. This resulted in the 1954 UN Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons, outlining the fact that all individuals had the right to a nationality (and thus citizenship, remembering that within international law, citizenship and nationality are synonymous), thus once again reinforcing both its universal application and importance (Arendt [1951] 1973, 296).

International events impacted on domestic understandings and policy. On both sides of the Iron Curtain, the Cold War had built a high level of distrust of foreign nationals (Lucas 1999, 13). The ‘hot’ conflicts of this period, most notably Vietnam, also created instances of migration and refugees that had consequences not only for the region, but also for the receiving countries (here an argument can certainly be made as to how the arrival of the Vietnamese in Australia had considerable consequences for conceptions for Australian nationhood and multiculturalism (Jupp 2002, 37)). Broadly speaking, these conflicts, both hot and cold, created fear and suspicion, which solidified both the distrust of certain foreigners and the rejection of dual citizenship. However, the end of the Cold War, and the move away from conscription opened the doors for a broader acceptance of multiple citizenship statuses (Sejersen 2008, 540).

The events of September 11, and the more general fear of terrorism has led to increasing securitisation and further use of technologies for monitoring citizens. This period has also seen more restrictive trends towards assimilation and integration (D. Kostakopoulou 2010, 837), and away from more multicultural policies. These events
were at least in part responsible for a turn away from theorisations that suggested trends towards more supranational forms of citizenship: 'despite jubilant predictions by post-nationalists of the imminent demise of citizenship, the legal distinction between member and stranger is, if anything, back with a vengeance. This distinction has gained a renewed, and at times draconian, significance in the post 9/11 years' (Shachar 2009, 2). Echoing this, others have illustrated how 'securitization contributes directly to the intensification of conventional citizenship practice, as biometric technologies are employed to conceal and advance the heightened exclusionary and restrictive practices of contemporary 'securitized citizenship’ (Muller 2004, 291).

The impact of migration on citizenship is nothing new, however the increasing 'movement of people across states revealed that citizenship is not only a set of rights, but also a mechanism of closure that sharply demarcates the boundaries of states' (Joppke 1999, 630). Furthermore, the mixity of populations and these feelings of pervasive insecurity have created a paradoxical discourse around the subject whereby ‘citizenship’ was the name of what was threatened by a 'balkanising' multiculturalism and conversely what possessed the moral capital to defeat it’ (Scobey 2001, 15). Finally, the impact of neoliberal logic on migration also created systems of mobility that often gave precedence to those with means (Sparke 2006), highlighting Ong’s claim that neoliberalism creates exceptions to citizenship (2006a), and as such moves away from the more traditional conceptions of the equality of citizens.

There is little doubt of the impact of capitalist development with regards to citizenship which is seen in both Benedict Anderson’s conceptions that were outlined earlier as well as the transformations brought about by the Industrial Revolution more broadly. This impact has continued with the increasing significance of neoliberalism that will be developed within later chapters: '[w]ithin the neoliberal form of government, the concept of the citizen is thus transformed. The so-called ‘passive' citizen of the welfare state becomes the autonomous ‘active’ citizen with rights, duties, obligations, and expectations - the citizen as active entrepreneur of the self; the citizen as morally superior. This is not simply a reactivation of liberal values of self-
reliance, autonomy and independence as the necessary conditions for self-respect, self-esteem, self-worth, and self-advancement but rather an emphasis on enterprise and the capitalization of existence itself through calculated acts and investments combined with the shrugging off of collective responsibility for the vulnerable and marginalized’ (Davies and Bansel 2007, 252). Neoliberalism is encouraging an orientation towards citizenship which focuses on individual advantages, rather than the more traditional discourses of rights and duties.

Above all, what this genealogy of citizenship has shown, is while there may be broader semantic links that suggest that the origins of citizenship lie in antiquity, citizenship itself is the product of countless transformations. Each society has reinterpreted the concept in its own way and adapted it to its own ends. These changes are not necessarily grand or dramatic, but may rather come from gradual shifts in response to changing populations or technologies. As such we must realise that despite the longevity of the term, citizenship as we know it today is not an organic formulation, but rather the product of both historical accident and our specific circumstances. Acknowledging this also highlights the constructed nature of the various articulations of citizenship, but also the possibilities available to us to promote change within it.

2.3 Citizenship Contexts

Having already traced the general historical developments and points of rupture which lead to the foundation of citizenship as the primary means of organisation of populations, it is necessary to note the individual variations that have occurred within each nation state. As the empirical elements of this thesis focus primarily on the Australian and Greek contexts, the next section of this chapter will establish the historical and cultural foundations of the respective citizenships of these two nation states. This however will not be the sort of account that seeks to form some sort of comparative approach upholding a historical institutionalist understanding (cf. Brubaker 1992), instead these two cases seek to be examples of the diverse ways in which citizenship emerges across time and in different locations.
2.3.1 Australian Citizenship

There are two striking features in the development of Australian citizenship and its translation into law. The first relates to the almost glacial pace of its development: the official legal status of ‘Australian Citizen’ has existed for a little over 65 years, and it is only in the last 30 or so years that the status has not been issued concurrently with that of ‘British subject’. Secondly, this status is essentially ‘hollow’, the legislation that surrounds it clearly outlines who has it and how it can be bestowed, but any elaboration regarding its content is conspicuously and purposefully absent. The following historical analysis will trace the major legal and political developments in the establishing of Australian citizenship, and will draw conclusions as to its origins and effects.

In light of the insights of the role of the ‘nation-state’ in our understanding of citizenship, the most obvious point of departure for this analysis is the Federation of Australia in 1901. It must not be forgotten, however, that the system that was instituted with the founding of the Constitution was strongly informed by the policies and concerns of the six self-governing British colonies which were to join together, and yet still maintain their own systems of government. The major concern of officials reticent towards federation was the possible loss of power at the state level, a fact made evident in the debates of the Australasian Federal Convention of 1897-8; this convention was one of several held to establish the foundations of the Australian Constitution. During the proceedings there was considerable debate as to the issue of citizenship, a term which was largely absent in British law at the time due to their preference for ‘subject’. Delegates argued as to the nature and definition of the citizenship, and its possible role, only to be faced with the inability to settle on an agreed upon usage. Eventually, neither the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, nor the status itself, became part of the Australian Constitution of 1901.

The relative tardiness of the emergence of citizen as a term of use has its roots in the nature of the Australian federal system; the fact that it was not included in the

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1 These were Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia.
Constitution, had as much to do with state fears regarding the loss of control over their populations, as it did with the desire to perpetuate their strong links with Britain. The reason several states were so unwilling to codify the rights and existence of Australian citizenship at a Federal level was due to concerns that this would encroach on their abilities to legislate and thus discriminate with regards to their populations. It was decided reasonably early on that they would not apply the American model, which clearly outlined the rights of citizens within their constitution (the Bill of Rights); but any written constitution was still considerably different from the 'unwritten’ British model. These decisions had significant and far-reaching consequences: ‘[t]he Australian founders eschewed putting any core positive notion of citizenship in the constitution precisely to allow the states to perpetuate their discriminatory regimes and to allow the new Commonwealth parliament to implement a national regime of discrimination’ (Chesterman 1997, 3). The power of the individual states with regard to the control of status continued for many years, and naturalisation did not become a federal power until the implementation of the Naturalisation Act in 1903.

The first official codification of a citizenship-like status, came with the Nationality Act of 1920, which did nothing more than codify the then existing de facto regime that had endured largely unchanged since Federation (Dutton 2002, 16). Members of the Australian polity were still classed as ‘British subjects’ except that now this status was codified under Australian law. This tendency towards the codification of already existing de facto regimes is something quite common internationally with regards to citizenship legislation. Where gaps in legislature are evident, it is often the case that bureaucrats function with ‘working definitions’, which may or may not later be codified into law. This de facto acceptance or acknowledgement is the reality in which many dual citizens of various countries find themselves in today. Despite having made these claims regarding the absence of the term in legislative use, it must be noted that the idea of an Australian citizen and citizenship had been cultivated publicly by some

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4 The Australian Census of 1901, the first ‘national’ census, showed that 98% of Australians had British ancestral origins, a figure that remained relatively stable up until the end of the Second World War.
5 Britain has an ‘unwritten’/’uncodified’ constitution that is made up of many rulings, statutes and policies over a considerable period of time, and does not exist in the form of a solitary document.
even prior to Federation (Dutton 2002, 17); there are certainly cases where it has been used to encourage the emergence of an Australian identity as distinct from a British one. This however was not the primary catalyst for the emergence of the term within Australian law.

The official legislative creation of Australian Citizenship came with the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948, which was implemented on Australia Day 1949. This bill, introduced by Arthur Caldwell, the then Minister for Immigration, did not present a considerable rupture with what had come before it. On the event of the introduction of the bill into the House of Representatives he commented: ‘[t]he bill is not designed to make an Australian any less a British subject, but to help him express his pride in citizenship in this great country’ (Chesterman and Galligan 1999, 30). It is not a coincidence that a bill of this nature was introduced by a Minister for Immigration, as many of the changes to the formal status of Australian ‘citizenship’ have been induced by the needs that emerged through the successive periods of immigration. Thus the official introduction of the term of ‘Australian Citizen’ in 1949 was done as a means to clarify the status as a response to the waves of post-war immigration. In short, this legislation came about from ‘the need to administer an (even more) diversifying population during a period of mass immigration [...] it was about who should belong, and not what their entitlements should be’ (Walter and MacLeod 2002, 7). Needless to say, the implementation of this status retained the aforementioned ‘hollowness’ of its predecessors. It was also during this period that we saw the introduction of the Australian citizenship ceremony, as a means to better assimilate those being naturalised. These ceremonies also illustrated Australia’s continued ties to Britain: up until 1994 ‘New Australians’, were still having to swear their oath to the queen, and at various times, the Union Jack and a portrait of the queen were present at these ceremonies.

While ‘natural-born citizens’ were often given greater stability under the law than those who had naturalised, the reality of being a natural-born citizen did not automatically predispose that individual to the whole body of rights, which is best illustrated through the situation of Australia’s Indigenous peoples. As Chesterman
and Galligan comment: “[i]n egalitarian Australia [...] subjecthood or citizenship was easily acquired – one simply had to be born here – and at the same time one’s formal status as a citizen meant very little. The crucial divide was between those citizens who had rights and privileges and those who were denied them’ (1997, 4). Both State and Commonwealth governments excluded the Aboriginal people from various entitlements such as welfare payments, pensions and benefits; most notably, in 1902, the Commonwealth Franchise Act forbade them from voting. This system was not to be remedied until the second half of the twentieth century with the changes to the Electoral Act in 1962, and the symbolic victory of the 1967 Referendum, among others.

The status of British subject would exist in parallel with that of Australian citizenship for many years following the adoption of the 1948 Act. Its dissolution was gradual, and in 1969, changes to the 1948 Act meant that individuals retained only the status of being British subjects and ceased to be them officially. This came at a time when Britain herself was undergoing a shift in focus as policies were changing to reflect ‘the disintegration of its empire and its move towards integration of the EEC [European Economic Community]’ (Dutton 2002, 17). In 1973 the Act underwent further amendments by abolishing the distinction between individuals originating from the Commonwealth and individuals from other countries who aimed to naturalise; prior to this, those who arrived from the Commonwealth received simpler conditions and preferential treatment. It was not until subsequent amendments were undertaken in 1984, over 80 years following federation, that Australians would no longer be regarded as British subjects, even in name.

Issues of race long existed as part of immigration policy even prior to the Federation of Australia in 1901. This is evidenced by the White Australia Policy, a collective name given to the various policies that limited non-European migration from the 1880s (Jupp 2002, 9). This trend continued following Federation, with the then new Australian Parliament passing the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, which, while not explicitly excluding people on the basis of race, included a 50 word dictation test. This test, which could be given in any European language of the officer’s choosing,
was used as a way to exclude ‘less desirable’ individuals (Palfreeman 1958, 43). The Immigration Restriction Act was not replaced until the Migration Act of 1958, which, subsequent to numerous amendments, still remains in place. It was not however until changes made by the Whitlam Government in the mid-1970s that one can speak of a definitive end to the White Australia Policy (Jupp 2002, 37).

Following the end of the racial constraints placed on immigration, ‘restrictiveness was being reordered rather than erased’ (Walsh 2014, 588). While in the post-war context, immigration was viewed as necessary to provide a workforce for the growth of industry, the move to more neoliberal priorities meant, policies were aimed at attracting skilled migrants. Permanent Residency Visas have long been a part of the Australian migration landscape, but these too have been subject to a periodisation. Up until 2000, the vast majority of permanent visas were given to applicants who applied and were granted their visas offshore. Since then policies moved towards a two-step migration process whereby individuals first apply for a temporary visa – usually skilled migrant or student visas – and after a period of ‘temporary’ residence may then apply for permanent residency (Gregory 2014, 8). Other forms of visas such as Working Holiday Visas are also available, however their terms are more precarious. In the Australian context this has created a ‘two-tiered system in which highly-skilled workers and students are extended opportunities for settlement and incorporation, while, for other workers [on more precarious temporary visas], restrictions on residency and the accompaniment of dependents are intended to discourage integration and induce their return’ (Walsh 2014, 596).

If further insight is needed into the fact that immigration issues were a driving force behind citizenship legislation, then one need look no further than the 1986 Amendment, which effectively abolished *ius soli*, establishing that children born in Australia will only be considered citizens by birth if their parents are either citizens or permanent residents. This amendment was made to ensure that ‘[c]itizenship was not...”

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6 *Ius soli* or right of the soil, effectively established that all those born within the nation-state were citizens by birth. This principle in the Australian context was a remnant of the British influence as it had existed there since 1608 with the Common Law legal decision widely known as Calvin's Case.
to be abused in order to gain an immigration advantage’ (Rubenstein 1995, 507) and followed several court cases in which non-citizen parents were using their children’s citizenship in order to avoid deportation. Thus the claim that has already been made holds true; the ‘[o]fficial discourse on citizenship in Australia then has much less to do with questions of civil and political rights, democracy and popular sovereignty, than with problems of incorporating immigrants’ (Dutton 2002, 18).

The most recent legislation in this area has effectively legalised dual citizenship. Since 2002 Australians who became citizens of another country by a voluntary act, no longer lost their citizenship. This was just one of several changes that were to take place during this period. In 1999 a report was handed down by the Australian Citizenship Council; with its 64 recommendations, this report would form the basis for the changes that came into effect in 2007 when The Australian Citizenship Act 2007 replaced the 1948 Act. The changes attempted to make the document more accessible, focused on a more inclusive approach to Australian citizenship and instituted a number of security measures to give the government greater control in responding to terrorist threats. Once again the legislation was largely silent on the issue of content, and so the claims regarding the hollowness of the legislation remain valid: ‘Australian citizenship [...] has no coherent substance, because the Commonwealth government has never put it there and the Australian populace has not demanded it. And, crucially, very few of the ‘rights’ identified for Australian citizens exist as foundational or constitutional rights which the government cannot infringe’ (Dutton 2002, 19).

Thus, when one speaks of Australian citizenship, it is terribly difficult to highlight a specific date of birth; it is certainly something that has been ‘incrementally defined’ (Dyrenfurth 2005, 87) and has undergone considerable changes over time. It was not present in the original Constitution and has not been added since.7 Thus the premise that is found in Hindness’ work holds true in the Australian context, that citizenship is primarily about establishing the boundaries of the national unit (Hindess 1998),

7 ‘...citizenship of Australia is not mentioned in the Australian Constitution, although citizenship of a foreign power is mentioned in s 44(i) as a disqualification for membership of the Australian parliament’ (Rubenstein 1995, 505).
which becomes increasingly obvious when one notes the fact that major changes with regard to citizenship have occurred as a response to questions of immigration and migrant incorporation.

It is also necessary to realise the extent to which Australian citizenship – in both the official legal sense and the more practical substantive sense – has been influenced by external political, historical and ideological factors. It is no coincidence that Canada’s first laws regarding citizenship (1947) emerged a few short years prior to Australia’s, or that the subsequent changes were also informed by Britain’s slow turn towards Europe and away from what was once her Empire. Ongoing international trends have continued to inform Australian legislation and approaches. Citizenship once again became a topic of note in the decade that lead up to the Centenary of Federation. Many scholars (Dutton 2002; Dyrenfurth 2005; Chesterman and Galligan 1999), suggest that this came as a result of the domestic factors such as government policies and popular interest in the topic in the lead up to the centenary. While there is some validity to these claims, this is also the period in which there were broader international academic and political trends towards discussing the issue of citizenship; debates raged around the world on issues caused by increased migration and other perceived effects of globalisation. Internationally citizenship became a subject of widespread scholarly interest, and Australia as a consequence became involved in her own debates.

This section, albeit brief, has attempted to sketch out the key trends and major changes that are associated with Australian citizenship. The following section of this chapter will now move on to a brief analysis of the origins and history of Greek citizenship, which, as will be illustrated, differs quite substantially from the Australian example.

**2.3.2 Greek Citizenship**

It must come as no surprise that the history and development of Greek citizenship is altogether different from that of the Australian case. It has however considerable similarities with other Balkan states that, following the fall of the Ottoman Empire,
had substantial difficulties staking their claim on the region’s diverse populations and shaping them into discrete nation states. This situation was made increasingly complex by the various geopolitical changes in the surrounding areas as a result of both regional conflicts and the two World Wars; Greece’s borders were not to take their current form until after the Second World War. What has remained unchanged, however, is the way the nation is perceived in strong ethno-cultural terms.

The most notable and longstanding aspect of Greek Citizenship Law is their strong (albeit selective) adherence to the principle of ius sanguinis, whereby citizenship is bestowed along ethnic hereditary lines. The basic premise of Greek Nationality law, found originally in the Civil Law on Nationality (1856), has been: ‘Greek is whomever has been born to a Greek father’ (Christopoulos 2012, 74), a principle that stood for almost 100 years before it was replaced in 1955 with the Greek Nationality Code (hereafter GNC), which adhered to similar principles. If there is any doubt as to the strong ethnic character of citizenship in the Greek context, one need only look towards the word which is its most commonly used translation, ‘ιθαγένεια’ (ithagenia), which etymologically retains these notions of birth and descent.

Many of Greece’s policy directions have been strongly influenced by its dual dilemma; in gaining independence from the Ottoman Empire, its internal population contained individuals who were not ethnically Greek, in addition to the fact that there were still a considerable number of ethnic Greeks living outside its borders. This was made all the more important by the reality that the state perceived itself ideologically as founded on a strong ethnic Greek character, based largely on the Greek Language and Orthodox Christian faith. So what constitutes someone who is ethnically Greek? While at different stages this definition has undergone alteration and amendment, according to Law 2756/1983, it is based on the existence of a ‘Greek national consciousness [...] deduced from characteristics of personality which refer to common descent, language, religion, national traditions and extensive knowledge of the historical events of the nation’ (Triandafyllidou and Veikou 2002,

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8 Literally, ‘law of the blood’, further explained in Chapter Three.
9 For a full discussion of the issues associated with translating the concept of citizenship from Greek into English, see Chapter Four.
198), a definition, like many of its other variations that is vague enough to leave the ultimate decision up to bureaucratic and state discretion.

Practically the only early exception to the *ius sanguinis* principle came from the incorporation of foreign women married to Greek men, who automatically gained Greek citizenship upon marriage, regardless of whether they wanted to or not. In addition, it was only Greek men who were able to pass their citizenship on to their children – except in the case of children born out of wedlock – and Greek women who married foreign men, lost their citizenship automatically. Through the 1980s there were gradual changes to these policies, with the introduction of stricter criteria and periods of residence for the naturalisation of foreign women. Then in 1984, as part of a broader push for greater gender equality, Greek women no longer automatically lost their citizenship when they married foreign men and were now able to pass their citizenship onto their children (Anagnostou 2011, 7).

At this point it is useful to outline two terms that are used in the Greek language and often found in legislation in this area; these are Ομογενείς (*Homogeneis*, of the same birth/descent) and Άλλογενείς (*Allogeneis*, of a different birth/descent). Within the legislature, members of the Greek nation are not necessarily the state’s citizens, but rather the *Homogeneis*, those with a Greek ethnicity. Broadly speaking, those identified as *Homogeneis* – as members of the Greek nation – have some claim to Greek citizenship, and thus for them, in most cases the process of obtaining citizenship can be relatively easy. *Allogeneis*, on the other hand have been faced with considerable hostility, and historically their chances of obtaining citizenship were almost non-existent. Even within the country there has been strong hostility to minorities by the Greek State which has continued well into recent years. There have been a number of attempts at homogenizing the Greek population which included the exchange of populations with Turkey and Bulgaria following World War I, as well as policies that attempted to stop individuals using languages other than Greek (especially in relation to the Macedonian and Albanian speaking minorities). As further evidence of these strong ethnic considerations, Greece realised remarkably early on, the benefits that came from maintaining connections with their departed *homogeneis* and diaspora
groups, and a new law 120/1914 was passed in 1914 thereby allowing all individuals born after this date to maintain their Greek Citizenship, even after being naturalised abroad (Christopoulos 2013, 4). This effectively legalised Dual Citizenship for ethnic Greeks, and even more recent policy and rhetoric shows the continued perceived value of these ‘Greek foreign nationals’.

There has certainly been a European influence in the changes made to the GNC (Greek Nationality Code). Greece joined the European Economic Community in 1981, which spurred several reforms including those aforementioned relating to gender equality. Following the Maastricht Treaty and the foundation of European Citizenship (1992), having Greek citizenship bestowed the individual with European Citizenship granting them the right to work, reside and vote in local elections in other EU nation states, along with many other advantages. This increased the perceived value of Greek citizenship in the eyes of non-citizen ethnic Greeks living abroad, and encouraged them to pursue citizenship, often motivated by the possibilities of living and working in Europe, though the compulsory military service required of Greek males was a mitigating factor.

Despite the strong adherence to the principle of *ius sanguinis*, this was not applied equally to all individuals who could claim to be ethnically Greek. Following the fall of communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Greece was faced with an influx of individuals from former communist states claiming a Greek ethnicity. The two main groups here were the Pontic Greeks from the former Soviet Union and the Greek Albanians, both of which could make substantial claims relating to their Greek ancestry. The legislative response that emerged shows the degree to which citizenship can be instrumentalised to support national interests. It was decided that citizenship would be offered to Pontic Greeks whose current country of citizenship allowed dual statuses. The decision was made not to extend this offer to the Greek Albanian population, as the Government desired to keep those populations where they were to maintain their possible claim on the southern regions of Albania. Amid increasing

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10 For the full details of the rights and responsibilities associated with European Citizenship, please see Chapter Three, and for a discussion on the ways in which European Citizenship is imagined outside Europe, see Chapter Six.
pressure, this distinction was overturned in 2001, when they were given a ‘favourable legal status, short of citizenship or ‘quasi-citizenship” (Konsta and Lazaridis 2010, 375), and then in 2008 the process of obtaining full citizenship was simplified allowing them to forgo the ten-year wait for naturalisation that is applicable in other cases, a change that came at least in part as a result of Albania’s new policy allowing dual citizenship (Konsta and Lazaridis 2010, 376–77).

Like most of the countries of Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain and Italy), from the mid-1970s, Greece went from being a country of emigration to one of immigration. This unprecedented influx of individuals from different countries – initially from Egypt and Turkey, then Albania, and later from countries such as Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan and parts of Africa – essentially caught Greece unawares. This meant, both in terms of legislation and infrastructure, Greece was ill-equipped to deal with these changes and as a result the policy was ‘reactive and piecemeal [in] character’ (Triandafyllidou 2009, 160), with the first immigration law not voted in till 2001 (Triandafyllidou 2009, 165). As Triandafyllidou and Veikou suggest: ‘[t]he reluctance of the Greek Government to accept immigration as a long term feature of society was at first partly related to the novelty and unexpected character of the phenomenon […] the continuing lack of a comprehensive policy framework […] suggest[s] that there is a relationship between this reluctance and the ethnocultural definition of Greek nationality and citizenship’ (2002, 191).

Over the past decade or more, Greece has been a key entry point for irregular migration into Europe (Triandafyllidou et al. 2014, 3), and ‘while irregular migration into the EU as a whole has dropped in recent years, entries into Greece have grown to constitute the large majority of detected illegal border crossings into the continent’ (Cheliotis 2013, 726). Furthermore, given recent conflicts in the Middle East, most notably that in Syria, the number of refugee arrivals have also increased, with ‘Greece overtaking Italy as the primary point of arrival’ (UNHCR 2015, 11). The state is once again ill-equipped to deal with such large flows having neither ‘the infrastructure [nor] services to address the basic needs of the people arriving’ (UNHCR 2015, 13). Furthermore, the failure of Greece to implement various European directives resulted
in the country being brought in front of the European Court of Justice as ‘[n]ot only were asylum applicants routinely placed in detention and when released given no assistance for housing or subsistence, but also, and most importantly, their applications were routinely rejected without a proper examination or interview’ (Triandafyllidou 2014, 420).

Finally, regarding the nationality code, there was almost no opportunity for the naturalisation of non-ethnic Greeks. This changed briefly in 2010 with the passing of the law 3838/2010 which allowed non-ethnic Greek individuals to apply for citizenship, under several very strict provisions (Christopoulos 2013, 10), however towards the end of 2012, the State Council ruled that the law was unconstitutional, and was annulled in early 2013 (Triandafyllidou 2014, 418). This annulment coincided with increasing hostility towards migrants in Greece during the ongoing financial crisis which saw falling incomes and skyrocketing unemployment, as well as cuts to welfare and services: ‘[t]he categorisation between ‘us’ Greek citizens and ‘them’ foreigners was compounded by the economic crisis’ (Triandafyllidou 2014, 417). The most discriminatory aspect of the law was that prior to 2010 the judicial and administrative bodies that made decisions with regards to residency and citizenship were not required to respond within a certain time frame (as is the case in Greece with other legal and judicial decisions) or provide any justification for their choices; without such justification, the individuals subject to these decisions had been unable to appeal them, so case law in this area is notably absent. This, along with several of the other policy decisions described above suggests once more the ‘discretionary character’ (Anagnostou 2011, 2) of Greek citizenship.

2.4 Conclusion

There is nothing ‘natural’ about citizenship. It is a status and a mode of organisation that has been reinvented in countless places and historical periods. The citizenship that most individuals today are familiar with, that of the nation state with its regimes of national documents and symbols, is the product of historical accident and its global reach is at least in part a consequence of the spread of the idea of nationalism as well
as of European imperialism. The ongoing re-imagination and re-deployment of the vocabulary of citizenship is a reminder that it is in a constant state of development and transformation, but also that it may change drastically depending on its particular context.

This fractured development and the influence of a particular set of historical circumstances can also be seen in the emergence of citizenship within the Australian and Greek contexts. It is possible to note, at least from a policy perspective, that further changes have also come as a result of responses to perceived risks, or even the writing into policy of the existing *de facto* regimes. As such, this chapter has sought to break apart conceptions of citizenship that see it as something that is either static or 'natural'. Citizenship is a tool for the management of populations, as well as membership in a community, that is contextually dependent and undergoes constant processes of change.
3. Encountering Citizenship

There is no denying the importance of citizenship within the social sciences, yet it can be argued that its significance is at least in part a consequence of its ambiguity: ‘[t]here is no notion more central in politics than citizenship, and none more variable in history, or contested in theory’ (Shklar 1991, 1). Citizenship has become part of how we belong in a community, how we identify ourselves and how we come to understand our political participation. However the expansive use of the concept of citizenship has led it to be diagnosed with an ‘analytical debility that is the simple product of the struggle to impose intellectual order through too few ideas upon too vast and heterogeneous a range of experience’ (Magnette and Long 2005, 4). As such, this chapter will perform three key functions. Firstly, it will give a general outline of why the literature on the topic of citizenship is problematic in terms of scope, and indicate how previous attempts at organising the subject along binary and categorical lines have contributed to citizenship’s obfuscation as a subject of investigation. In the second instance, this chapter will introduce the notion of encounter as it has emerged largely from the discipline of human geography. This will consider the previous uses of the concept of encounter and illustrate the ways in which this thesis will take these concepts further. Finally, given that encounters ‘hesitate between the domain of the particular – the face-to-face encounter – and the general – the framing of the particular encounter by broader relationships of power and antagonism’ (Ahmed 2000, 9), this chapter will provide a brief background to some of the existing
institutions and theories of citizenship, which will form the foundations with which we can better understand the three substantive chapters.

3.1 The Problems of Defining Citizenship

As much of the content that precedes this chapter has suggested, the unitary term ‘citizenship’ has masked considerable ambiguity and diversity. At various times it may be evoked as a policy or legal term, a theoretical concept, and may refer to both the status of belonging to a community and the practice of engaging politically within it, not to mention the various populist articulations of the term and its vernacular usage. Furthermore, the national designators, such as ‘Chinese’ or ‘French’, that come to define specific citizenships, provide us with a vocabulary for identity and being in the world. Its pervasiveness gives us the (false) impression of it being a somewhat organic formulation. But as the previous chapter has shown, citizenship is not ‘natural’, but instead, is something forged, created, articulated, theorised, and written into law and policy. Research on citizenship has emerged in diverse and surprising ways, suggesting the impossibility of giving a singular comprehensive evaluation of the literature.

Citizenship has also been characterised by an immense proliferation of texts on the subject over the last three decades: ‘[s]ince being awakened from a long dormancy at the end of the twentieth century, studies of citizenship have been making up for lost time at a breathtaking pace’ (Somers 2008, 12). As early as 1994, scholars were speaking of the ‘return of the citizen’, the ‘explosion of interest in the concept of citizenship’ and the fact that citizenship had become a ‘buzz word’ (Kymlicka and Norman 1994). This period coincides with increasing research being undertaken into migration, identity, transnationalism and diaspora and these influences can be seen within the academic literature on the topic of citizenship more broadly. This period was also characterised by the expansion of the concept of citizenship into other domains, and also the proliferation of variations on ‘citizenship with an adjective’.

Since the 1990s, when citizenship entered its current period of ‘semantic vogue’ (Magnette and Long 2005, 2), the sheer promiscuity of it as a subject has ensured that there are a wide variety of topics that it has been theorized in relation to. One may
now speak of ‘flexible citizenship’ (Ong 1999), ‘multicultural citizenship’ (Kymlicka 1996), ‘transnational citizenship’ (Fox 2005), ‘extra-territorial citizenship’ (Fitzgerald 2000), ‘citizenship light’ (Caglar 2004), ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’ (Linklater 1998), ‘cultural citizenship’ (Pakulski 1997), and ‘trans-border citizenship’ (Schiller 2005), among others. It has also become a term that has been applied to concepts that one would not traditionally consider as cognate: theorists have also developed notions of ‘digital citizenship’ (Mossberger, Tolbert, and McNeal 2007), ‘corporate citizenship’ (Matten and Crane 2005), ‘intimate citizenship’ (Plummer 2003), ‘biological citizenship’ (N. Rose and Novas 2004), ‘insurgent citizenship’ (Holston 2008), ‘sexual citizenship’ (Evans 2013), ‘ecological citizenship’ (Seyfang 2006), ‘health citizenship’ (Komporozos-Athanasiou et al. 2016), and numerous others. This sizable yet far from exhaustive list, is an indication of both the diversity of the subject, as well as its problematic ‘semantic dilution’ (Magnette and Long 2005, 3).

These diverse applications of the concept of citizenship have also ensured that it has been engaged with by numerous disciplines as diverse as demography, anthropology, sociology, cultural and political geography, political sciences, legal studies, gender studies, post-colonial studies and countless others. While sociological and anthropological approaches dominate much of the participation literature, approaches that focus on status have long been associated with legal, policy or demographic perspectives. This also suggests the diverse methodologies that have been applied to citizenship’s investigation. No truly comprehensive studies have yet occurred in relation to the scholarship on citizenship, but drawing on the literature in other fields, such as that of migration, shows how this disciplinary divide can have significant theoretical and methodological implications (Brettell and Hollifield 2000, 7).

In studies of citizenship, the literature has often developed quite differently between the various disciplines. Some of the clearest studies in relation to the understanding of the topic from a more qualitative perspective have emerged, unsurprisingly, from the field of anthropology (e.g. Ong 1999; Siu 2001; Carruthers 2002; as well as the aforementioned Hage 2000); sociological and migration studies more frequently
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consider questions of citizenship and integration (Koopmans 2009; Soysal 1994 among others), whereas the field of politics, as expected, tends to deal more directly with topics relating to citizenship policy (Howard 2010; Bauböck 2006; Escobar 2007). While I am not suggesting that all studies remain tightly within their particular discipline, this ‘division of labour’, while far from being unusual, has led to a lack of more across-the-board studies of the topic.

Thus citizenship is somewhat of a ‘dirty’ word; it has come to mean so much, that in reality the term on its own means very little. Furthermore, as the previous chapter has shown, these definitions are often contextual and change over time. Thus definitional work plays a key role in the scholarship on the subject. Citizenship is one of several complex terms that have received considerable attention within the social science literature, with other notable examples being those of ‘identity’ or ‘culture’, both of which can (and have) been theorised in relation to citizenship. It is, however, no coincidence that these terms have been some of the most widely theorised in recent decades, and it may well be their very ‘indefinability’ that make them so. As Abbot claims: this ‘explains the persistence of terms that appear to be undefinable despite their central importance to our disciplines. They survive because they are indexical terms that facilitate our discourse by their very indexicality. They give us a common if slippery language to establish relations between one another. They provide an extraordinary powerful element both for offense and defence in academic discourse’ (2001, 27). As Isin suggests, the question should not be ‘what is citizenship?’, but rather ‘what is called citizenship?’ (Isin 2009).

3.1.1 Problematic Binaries

Due to the problem, articulated above, of the complexity of citizenship as a subject, much of the current literature serves to explain the concept by straight-jacketing it into various categories and binary understandings. As such, ‘a good deal of existing work recognises the complexity, and potential ambiguity of the citizenship construct. However extant approaches generally treat conceptual vagueness as [a] practical, political and analytic problem. Consequently, authors often attempt to impose conceptual order by forming tidy taxonomies of dimensions or models of citizenship.
Researchers typically contribute to these reifying tendencies’ (Condor 2011, 197). This section will consider some of these problematic categories and binaries, as well as illustrating their consequences in terms of more general understandings of the topic. The following section will then illustrate how approaching citizenship using the concept of encounter helps us overcome these ‘reifying tendencies’.

The desire to present any concept in a clear and digestible format is a common one. In undertaking analysis, it helps to have ordered and unambiguous foundations on which to build, however, sometimes through the imposition of these categories we can obscure the very subjects that we attempt to define. This has been the case with many of the approaches to citizenship. Perhaps the clearest illustration of this has been the analytic distinction between ‘citizen’ and ‘non-citizen’. While the boundaries of who is a citizen or not, may be comparatively simple to ascertain through policy investigations or by requesting documents, this distinction often obscures more than it illuminates.

There are a number of reasons why this binary is problematic, and these issues exist regardless of whether the focus is more status or practice based. Firstly, this citizen/non-citizen distinction obscures the fact that ‘[t]ime and again we see subjects that are not citizens act as citizens’ (Isin 2009, 371). Furthermore, from a more rights based perspective, one must remember that ‘non-resident citizens are citizen non-residents elsewhere’ and that ‘status noncitizens are the subjects of what many call citizenship in a variety of contexts’ (Bosniak 2008, 8). Even those who are full citizens in legal terms may become subject to forms of exclusion which is the impetus behind Ngai’s theorisation of ‘alien citizens’ – persons who are American citizens by virtue of their birth in the United States but who are presumed to be foreign by mainstream American culture, and at times, by the state’ (2014, 2). This is similar to concerns expressed by Somers given that the existence of ‘de jure legal citizenship and formal nation-state citizenship may have been necessary, but they were not sufficient to secure the rights of the abandoned of New Orleans [after Hurricane Katrina in 2005]. The treatment inflicted on those left behind teaches us that without de facto citizenship, possessing formal nation-state citizenship alone is an inadequate foundation for being
recognised as a fully rights bearing person’ (Somers 2008, 26). All of these examples suggest that the citizen/non-citizen binary obscures these diverse relations, and can thus misrepresent them.

In highlighting the broader problematic nature of the specific terms themselves, Hepworth illustrates how our use of categorisations such as citizen, asylum seeker and illegal alien ‘imply a particular relationship to the political community, and work by effacing the multitude of subjectivities, migratory experiences, and historical contingencies of the individuals that they purport to describe’ (Hepworth 2014, 3). Therefore, new methods and approaches are required that are able to contend with these ambiguities. Even the ‘national’ distinctions of ‘French citizen’ or ‘Australian permanent resident’ also serve to obscure the diversities that exist between individuals with similar statuses.

In terms of the subject’s existence more broadly within the literature, there is often the distinction made between ‘status’ and ‘practice’ that was referred to briefly in the introduction, or similar distinctions such as Kymlicka and Norman’s ‘citizenship-as-legal-status’ and ‘citizenship-as-desirable-activity’ (1994, 353). While one may be able to ascertain whether a certain study is focused more closely on either the status or practice aspects of citizenship, care must be taken not to see this distinction as dichotomous, of which there are several examples in the literature. Another analytical distinction often cited is that between ‘national’, ‘supranational’ and ‘transnational’ conceptions of citizenship. While these distinctions may at times be useful in considering scales, these approaches often fail to take into account how these various ‘levels’ reinforce one another.

In terms of the impact of participation, citizenship has been constrained into the dichotomous differentiations between ‘liberal-individualist’ or ‘civic-republican’ conceptions (Oldfield 1990). This also has connections with ideas of ‘active’ and ‘passive’ citizenship, of ‘whether the citizen is conceptualized as merely a subject of an absolute authority or as an active political agent’ (Turner 1990, 209), which lacks awareness of the fact that ‘activeness’ or ‘passiveness’, may come as a result of a
particular context or set of circumstances. Furthermore, in the political sense, citizenship has also been considered as either ‘domination’ or ‘empowerment’, leading to conclusions that ‘citizenship is Janus-faced; it can be about empowerment or about control and domination, depending on the specific application and context’ (Robins, Cornwall, and Von Lieres 2008, 1080). A final theorisation suggests that, ‘Citizenship can then range from thin to thick: thin where it entails few transactions, rights and obligations; thick where it occupies a significant share of all transactions, rights and obligations sustained by state agents and people living under their jurisdiction’ (Tilly 1995, 8).

The argument that has been made here is not suggesting that all forms of categorisation are unhelpful, but rather, that many approaches have used these distinctions unproblematically and without considerable awareness of their consequences on the topic as a whole. This thesis by contrast, has attempted as much as possible to stay away from these more rigid and static conceptions, and embrace the ambiguity that is required in addressing such a complex topic.

3.2 Citizenship through Encounters in Lived Life

The difficulties in defining citizenship and the problems associated with constraining it to binary definitions has meant that new approaches to the topic are required to be able to address the differences in individual experiences, not only between different people, but also over time and in different contexts. Focusing on the ways in which citizenship is encountered within lived lives allows an openness to the topic of citizenship that can integrate both diversity and ambiguity within its conceptions as well as considering the impact of the material and the temporal. This section will briefly consider the advantages of this conception, as well as addressing the ways in which encounter has been used by similar approaches.

One of the issues associated with many approaches to citizenship is that they remain at a level of abstraction, and fail to consider how these statuses are experienced and understood on the ground. Suggesting that these everyday experiences of citizenship exist at a distance from the more institutional considerations, also fails to understand
the interplay between the two: ‘[w]e would suggest that these informal understandings are always linked into the more institutionalised specifications about rights and obligations usually regarded as the terrain of citizenship [...] but we would also insist that more informal designations of citizenship retain a dynamic of their own which demands more explicit consideration’ (Painter and Philo 1995, 115). It is through encounters that these more ‘informal designations’ may be investigated. In doing so, one must acknowledge the interplay between citizenship and many other aspects of everyday life, such as families and employment. This serves as a reminder, especially in considering these more lived life elements, that ‘people do not usually navigate the ambiguous and frequently contradictory controls and policies regulating borders and statuses in a bid to make general declarations about affiliation and identity as categorical abstractions. They are more likely to be pursuing personal projects and intimate relations’ (Amit 2014, 400).

One of the limitations of the current approaches to the topic of citizenship is that they have been unable to theorise the ways in which citizenship emerges within the lives of individuals, and as such the diversity of these conceptions are largely absent from research on the topic. Focusing at the level of encounter however allows a consideration not only of individuals, but also of specific encounters within the lives of these individuals, thus being able to account for changes in perceptions and understandings over time. This approach is also able to capture some of the broader aspects as well, due to the impact that power structures, and existing institutions have on these encounters, allowing the connection between what are at times very different points of order: ‘the ‘encounter’ is not a discrete spatio-temporal event; whether explicitly or implicitly, each encounter carries with it traces of broader power relations. Taking the ‘encounter’ as an analytic [provides] an understanding of citizenship as an emergent condition that is emplaced and embodied, rather than simply a collection of rights to be endowed’ (Hepworth 2014, 7).

There are several advantages to evoking notions of encounter within such investigations. Firstly, focusing on encounter allows a better understanding of the temporal that can account for change over time, but also conceives of the impact of
past encounters in the here and now: ‘[e]ncounters are meetings [...] which are not simply in the present: each encounter reopens past encounters’ (Ahmed 2000, 8), and again ‘[e]ncounters are not free from history and thus whilst the taking place of encounters might be momentary, they unfold in multiple temporalities’ (Wilson 2016, 12). As such, encounters are able to consider the ways in which past experiences impact on individual understandings, as well as how a current encounters may echo well into the future.

One may even argue that we come to be constituted through encounters, and our existence in any meaningful sense emerges and reemerges through these interactions with objects and others: ‘[t]his encounter is mediated; it presupposes other faces, other encounters of facing, other bodies, other spaces, and other times [...] in daily meetings with the other subjects are perpetually reconstituted: the work of identity formation is never over, but can be understood as the sliding across of subjects in their meetings with others’ (Ahmed 2000, 7). This point specifically will become a key consideration of Chapter Seven, which reflects on the importance of encounters of address in the context of citizenship.

Similarly, more contextual considerations may also be grasped through encounter: ‘citizenship is reinvented and reinterpreted through local contexts, understandings and experiences’ (Leuchter 2014, 786). This approach also allows us to consider the impacts of objects, such as the role of documents in the context of citizenship: ‘encounters with state materials may appear relatively ‘mundane’ for many, [but] this unremarkable quality is precisely what normalises the subjectivity of the citizen and seeks to efface the instabilities behind such normative order’ (Darling 2014, 496–97). Furthermore, encounters are the intersections through which individuals experience the state, and are therefore important as to their understandings of citizenship: ‘[b]ureaucratic encounters are part of the administration’s daily grind – a world apparently made up of routine and anonymity, but whose centre is unstable, and whose protagonists cannot always be pigeon-holed into predefined roles’ (Dubois 2012, 2). An awareness of the diverse possible outcomes of any particular encounter allows a conception of citizenship that is not embedded within static understandings,
and it will be precisely this consideration with regards to bureaucratic encounters that will be addressed in Chapter Five.

What is perhaps most important in this theorisation of encounter is that ‘encounters make difference’ (Wilson 2016, 5). As such, they are ‘both the site for the operation of power and as an occasion for the emergence of forms or ways of life that are more than an effect of power’ (Ben Anderson 2016, 2). In this way an encounter may act to reinforce existing conceptions, or even to move away from them. Repetition is also central to these notions (Dewsbury and Bissell 2015, 24) and it may be the case that ‘dispossession is a matter of non-eventful and non-catastrophic disruptions that accumulate to reshape experience’ (Ben Anderson 2016, 5). The approach to encounter outlined within this thesis emphasises the importance of both mundane and everyday encounters, as well as the more fraught one-off ‘interruptions’ (Dawney 2013), that is, encounters that create a rupture in one’s understanding and conception of the world.

This particular approach, focusing on notions of encounter can allow us to address citizenship in a way that sheds much of the theoretical baggage and binary conceptions that exist in the literature, and focus more clearly on the ways it emerges within lived lives. The hugely complex concept that is citizenship may then be understood though the everyday actions and understandings of individuals who have little or no knowledge of these broader theorisations, but largely come to understand citizenship through these very encounters.

3.3 The Institutional Foundations of Citizenship

As illustrated in the previous sections, while encounter is a consequence of these personal interactions and orientations that change across time and in space, these engage on some level with broader power structures and other considerations. Therefore, some understanding of the broader ‘shape’ of citizenship, the state, and their role in the organisation and management of society more generally, is required to provide greater depth to the analyses which will follow in the three substantive chapters. This section will outline some of the key forms and formats of citizenship as
we know it today, including the nation-state, European citizenship, as well as conceptions of birthright citizenship and identity. This brief analysis does not attempt to be exhaustive, but will rather provide a general introduction that will help frame what is to follow.

3.3.1 Citizenship and the Nation State

The historical development of citizenship has left it intimately entangled with notions of the nation-state. This is evident in the academic literature, where theorisations regarding citizenship as status tend to follow the broader trends and projections with regards to the perceived future of the nation state. As such, during the early 1990s at the same time that several accounts where claiming the decline of the nation state (for example: Miyoshi 1993; Van Deth 1995; Mann 1990), so too were other approaches suggesting at least the diminished importance of the status of citizenship (Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996; Falk 2000). When, approaches emphasising the continued importance of the nation state returned, so did those that highlighted the impact of citizenship (Shachar 2009, 2). One cannot underestimate the effect that the nation state has had, not only on understandings of citizenship, but on broader conceptions of the world in general: ‘[t]he nation-state society is the dominant societal paradigm. The mainstream considers that the concept of society is applicable only to the nation state. Accordingly, the sociological perspective or gaze [...] is geared to and organised in terms of the nation state’ (Beck 2000, 80).

Regardless of these academic trends, the state is the authority with the power to define the terms of citizenship – at least in the legal sense – as well as bestow or strip it, and as such, plays a considerable role in these conceptions. Given also that citizenship is described in 'national' terms and that this national vocabulary is central to our understandings of it, so too does this reinforce the role of the state in this conception. In many ways it is these nation state division, that form part of the ‘imaginative geography’ (Said [1978] 2003, 55) which makes up citizenship. This national vocabulary also has a significant impact on our individual identity in this context as well as the ways we are understood by others (Malkki 1992), which will be a key consideration taken up by the final chapter of this thesis.
As evoked briefly in the previous chapter, the idea that everyone should be the citizen of a nation-state is a right enshrined into international law, in both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention of Nationality, among others:

**Article 15 – The Universal Declaration of Human Rights**
(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality\(^{11}\)
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor deprived of the right to change his nationality

**Article 4 – Principles, The European Convention on Nationality**
The rules on nationality for each State Party shall be based on the following principles:
- a. everyone has the right to a nationality
- b. statelessness shall be avoided;
- c. no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality;
- d. neither marriage nor the dissolution of marriage between a national of a State Party and an alien, nor the change in nationality by one of the spouses during marriage, shall automatically affect the nationality of the other spouse.

These various pieces of international law, including the 1954 Convention regarding the Status of Stateless Persons as well as the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, all reinforce both the right and the broader normative belief that everyone is a citizen of a particular state, and those that are not, need to be. This importance of being a citizen of somewhere is also embedded in the fact that states are the authorities which produce identity documents that have become crucial not only for mobility, but everyday necessities such as employment and access to healthcare: ‘the loss of citizenship deprived people not only of protection, but also of all clearly established officially recognised identity, a fact for which their eternal feverish efforts to obtain at least a birth certificate from the country that denationalised them was a very exact symbol’ (Arendt [1951] 1973, 287).

At the opposite end of the spectrum to these stateless individuals are those with multiple citizenship statuses. Whereas once dual citizenship was seen as highly

\(^{11}\) The more observant readers may note that these two items of international law refer to ‘nationality’ and not citizenship, but as I have mentioned elsewhere, in International Law these terms are used interchangeably with a historical preference for the term nationality in such documents. If there is any doubt on the use of this term one need only consider the definitions found in these documents. For example, in the European Convention on Nationality, Article 2a, states ‘“nationality” means the legal bond between a person and a State and does not indicate the person’s ethnic origin’.

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problematic, current trends suggest that states and individuals in general see this more favourably, with one particular scholar asking: ‘How did dual citizenship evolve from traitorous to trendy?’ (Spiro 2016). The general consensus among the more politically and legally orientated scholars is that the instances of dual (or multiple) citizenship are indeed increasing (US Office of Personnel Management 2001; Boll 2007; Blatter, Erdmann, and Schwanke 2010; Federighi 2011); some go as far to illustrate that this process has emerged and continues in a pattern, much in the same way that nationalism did (Sejersen 2008, 523), suggesting a continuing increase in the number of states that accept this status (Bloemraad 2004).

Migration is a key ongoing issue in this area and can have a significant impact on the nature of these ‘national’ populations, as well as introducing non-citizens into the nation state’s territory. States have sought to control these flows, and have often dictated favourable terms for certain types of migrants, depending on perceptions of what is desirable or necessary at that time: ‘[a]s distinctions of who is worthy and deserving of permanent residence are reformulated within the market’s narrow confines the relationship between migrants and the state is denuded of its social and moral qualities and converted into a contractualised relationship in which migrants are approached as economic inputs and are constructed as resources to be mobilised and controlled for market advantage (Walsh 2014, 600). These demands of the market however, can also create an ambiguous acceptance of non-nationals, even those who occupy irregular statuses: ‘[u]ndocumented migrants are at once welcome and unwelcome: they are woven into the economic fabric of the nation, but as labour that is cheap and disposable’ (Ngai 2014, 2).

Finally, it is important to emphasise that although this section has sought to highlight some of these more general trends, there is a great deal of diversity among these states, and there are instances where these claims may not hold true. We must remember that ‘[t]he nation-state is a figment of the sociological imagination. What exists are particular nation-states, formed under particular historical circumstances bearing even today the stamp of these distinctive historical origins’ (Brubaker 1998, 138).
3.3.2 European Citizenship

When European Union Citizenship was brought into force in November 1993 by the Treaty on the European Union (also known as the Treaty of Maastricht, after the location in which it was signed), many suggested that this was a turning point in our understanding of citizenship. The emergence of this status had been considered for some time: ‘[a]lthough discussion of European citizenship began in the early 1970s, it was not until the 1980s’ renaissance of integrative pressure (coinciding with a renaissance of interest in citizenship) that serious discussion of European citizenship emerged’ (Hansen 1998, 752). Currently, European citizenship is enshrined in law through various treaties, including the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (2007):

**Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**

Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.

As is evident in the above piece of legislation, European citizenship is conceived of as additional to national conceptions, and in no way intended to replace them. It has therefore come under criticism due to ‘the rather limited material scope of European citizenship, coupled with the fact that it means very little to the vast majority of Europe’s citizens who for whatever reason cannot or do not want to cross borders’ (T. Kostakopoulou 1998, 640).

The impact of European citizenship has primarily been considered from either a rights (Maas 2007) or an identity based perspective (Jamieson 2002). The rights of EU citizenship are easier to ascertain as they are outlined within the various treaties and include things such as the right to free movement and residence, the freedom of movement to work, the right to vote in both European and Municipal elections, as well as the right to consular protection outside the European Union, among others. On the identity side however, despite initial claims to the contrary, ‘being European’ is more likely to be an abstract categorising of self and/or others rather than a strongly felt sense of common identity and belonging’ (Jamieson 2002, 506), which fits with
broader claims that ‘there is [...] little to suggest that nationality has given way to a post-national kind of [European] citizenship’ (Delanty 2007, 63).

Some have also considered the impact of EU citizenship and the rights that this entails on third-country nationals fearing that this new conception will further disadvantage the millions of people living in Europe without European citizenship. Similarly, the measures put in place for the free movement of individuals within the EU (with certain exceptions) have been diagnosed with creating a ‘Fortress Europe’, with almost absent internal boundaries, but very hard external ones: ‘[the] Schengen agreement stands as a new iron curtain, designed to protect its member countries from the world’s poor. At the same time, its other face, the removal of internal border controls, resonates powerfully with the neoliberal project of market-building and flexibilization’ (Walters 2002, 576). European citizenship therefore has implications for both those who have it and those that do not, though once again, specific impacts are dictated by individual circumstances.

### 3.3.3 Citizenship and Birthright

Notions of heredity are central within understandings of citizenship: ‘[t]he vast majority of today’s global population – 97 out of every 100 people – have acquired their political membership by virtue of birthplace or ‘pedigree’ (Shachar and Hirschl 2007, 254), with the other three per cent obtaining their status via naturalisation. In legal terms, citizenship is seen to be bestowed through either ius soli or ius sanguinis. Ius soli, literally means the ‘right of soil’, and suggests that citizenship be bestowed as a result of one’s place of birth, irrespective of the origins of the parents. This is often linked with the civic conception of citizenship or nationality. Ius sanguinis, on the other hand, means ‘right of blood’, and considers that citizenship and nationality be defined as a result of ethnicity or ancestry. While historically various regimes have been highlighted as exemplifying either of these principles, the reality is that most states will use some sort of hybrid between the two.

Both ius soli and ius sanguinis variations see citizenship as being bestowed by birth, and as such, there can be serious implications for those who happen to be born in more
disadvantaged areas. Furthermore, the intersection of these two schemes, such as being born in a country with an ius soli conception of citizenship, to parents from a country with an ius sanguinis approach, means that certain individuals will be dual citizens simply by virtue of the accident of their birth. If the opposite is the case, one may even be rendered stateless. As such, there are moral and ethical implications regarding the ways in which citizenship is bestowed: ‘[c]itizenship in the modern world is a lot like feudal status in the medieval world. It is assigned at birth; for the most part it is not subject to change by the individual’s will and efforts; and it has a major impact on the individual’s life chances’ (Carrens 1992, 26).

It has been this particular concern which has been taken up in the writings of Shachar, who considers that: ‘[t]his institution provides a state-sponsored apparatus for handing down from generation to generation the invaluable security and opportunity that attach to membership in a stable, affluent, and rule-of-law society. It also allows members of well-off polities an enclave in which to preserve their accumulated wealth and power through time. If we focus on these transfer mechanisms, we soon realize with some surprise that today’s birthright citizenship laws resemble ancient property regimes that shaped rigid and tightly regulated estate-transmission rules’ (Shachar 2009, 2).

While there are an increasing number of long terms visa statuses that may allow greater flexibility in terms of residence, the inability or difficulty of naturalising leaves non-citizen residents in a position of both precarity, and having to undertake ongoing labour to ensure that their status is up to date. This having been said, just because one is a citizen by birth does not mean that they retain full and equal citizenship in front of the law. It must be remembered that ‘[t]he dominating and hierarchising modes of citizenship can be seen clearly in the historical exclusion of women or indigenous people from full citizenship’ (Hepworth 2015, 2).

**3.3.4 Citizenship and Identity**

Identity considerations are incredibly complex and are by no means linked to citizenship alone, yet citizenship does have a considerable impact in this sphere. As
Isis and Turner suggest: ‘[c]itizenship is both a legal status that confers an identity on persons and a social status that determines how economic and social capital are redistributed and recognised within societies’ (2007, 14, emphasis original), and thus these identity elements also require consideration.

Part of the role of citizenship with regards to identity comes from the impact of how identification documents become imbricated with identity in numerous contexts: ‘Identity implies both uniqueness and sameness. An identity card, for instance, is a document showing that a particular individual is this one and no other, while it also shows that this individual belongs to one of several groups. In addition, one identity cannot be defined in isolation: the only way to circumscribe an identity is by contrasting it with other identities’ (D. Martin 1995, 6). As such identity in terms of citizenship often comes through the designations of ourselves as more or less ‘national’ than certain others: ‘this ‘dirty business of boundary maintenance’ that underlies the politics of belonging is all about potentially meeting other people and deciding whether they stand inside or outside the imaginary boundary line of the nation and/or other communities of belonging, whether they are ‘us’ or ’them’ (Yuval-Davis 2006, 204).

Furthermore, considerations of identity are by no means static, and change across time and with regards to place: ‘[a]n individual can change his identifications in the course of his life: that is, he may at a time, feel more concerned by, more attracted to one particular identity narrative and, at another time by another. The same individual can, at the same time, relate to several narratives and, to a certain extent, cope with the contradictions between them. As a matter of fact, multiple identification is the rule’ (D. Martin 1995, 14). However, these multiple forms of identification may lead to ongoing personal negotiation over identity, and in being identified in ways we do not wish to be, by others: ‘[a] complex relationship, if not irresolvable conflict exists between citizenship and identity and demands deep intellectual engagement’ (Somers 2008, 18). Identity is often a very personal process, and may thus reflect an individual’s personal orientations and changing dispositions over time.
Finally, in relation to identity, one must remember that ‘[t]he belief in the basic conflict between citizenship and identity arises from a specific conception of each: citizenship as universal and identity as particular’ (Isin and Wood 1999), and that ‘citizenship codifies and institutionalises identity, anchoring it in law’ (K. Barry 2006, 23). As such, and as will be the subject of considerable analysis in the final parts of this thesis, citizenship provides us often with the vocabularies of a particular identity, but the ways in which we position ourselves in relation to it, and the way in which we are identified by others in this context, has important ongoing implications. We are not able to define our identities in whatever way we choose.

3.4 Conclusion

There is a significant breadth to the literature on the topic of citizenship. At various times in trying to theorise a topic so broad, attempts have been made to constrain the topic into binary conceptions and other forms of categorisation. The problem with these forms of organisation is that the allow little to no room to consider the constant changes that citizenship as a topic is undergoing as well as the enormous and increasing diversity in the ways in which citizenship plays out within lived lives. One possible solution to this issue is to investigate citizenship through the lens of ‘encounter’ which allows significant diversity to be included in conceptions of citizenship, including the impact of the temporal and material, as well as notions of repetition and rupture. Given that individuals experience citizenship through these sites of encounter, investigating them gives greater understanding into how citizenship emerges and is transformed within a lived life. Finally, given that in these encounters there are already existing structures and institutions of power, this chapter has also provided a brief background into four key areas – those of the nation state, birthright citizenship, identity and European citizenship – as this context is both useful and necessary to better conceive of the encounters with bureaucracy, imaginaries, and address that will be theorised within the three substantive chapters of this thesis.
Chapter Four

4. Methodology

As the previous two chapters have already described, there has been a great deal of scholarship undertaken on the topic of citizenship, however, qualitative studies using in depth interviews and ethnographic data to investigate citizenship from the perspective of the individual and encounter are few and far between. Thus, the original contribution of this work comes in part from the novelty of applying these methodological choices to this particular subject. This of course, requires some qualification; just because something has not been done before, does not mean that it is a good idea, and the first part of this chapter will consider exactly why these methodological choices are fitting for the research questions. The next section will examine in depth the mechanics of the interview process: choice of participants, the nature of the interviews and issues regarding research ethics. As the fieldwork interviews were carried out in two different countries and in two different languages some consideration will then be given to questions of translation, transcription, and other cross-cultural concerns. This chapter will subsequently consider the way in which I have compiled this thesis, including reflections on researcher positionality, and the auto-ethnographic elements of this research, as well as the choices that were made in writing up. Finally, this chapter will address the nature and validity of qualitative work, taking into account the criticisms surrounding it.
4.1 Why This Methodology?

The complexity of the concept of citizenship has yielded many diverse approaches, as were highlighted in Chapter Two and Chapter Three of this thesis. Yet, citizenship as status, up until recently, was considered largely from legal or policy perspectives (Bauböck 2010), meaning that examples of qualitative research in this area are reasonably limited and very much required (Bauböck 2006, 31). So, what is the usefulness of a qualitative approach to the study of citizenship as status from the point of view of the individual using the concept of encounter? In the simplest terms, focusing on the individual allows us to step away from the broader macro frame which is often the starting point for research on citizenship. It reminds us that ‘[p]eople are individuals and need to be understood as such, but they cannot be understood only as individuals. They are always in relation, always in a social context.’ (Clandinin and Connelly 2004, 2). Using the individual as the site of the investigation of citizenship, we are better able to conduct empirical work which engages with a broad range of scales: by focusing on the micro, we see the emergence of the macro within the understandings of participants. Further – given that individual choice now plays a role and that ‘plural’ statuses are more common – there is a need to understand their reception and perception not solely as isolated singular citizenship statuses: a suitable method for this research must be able to capture the great diversity in individuals’ experiences of citizenship encounters which has largely gone unnoticed up until now.

By focusing on encounter, this methodology separates itself from studies that use status as a point of entry reinforcing those binaries and taxonomies that this research has pushed so hard to evade. Further to this, it allows the consideration of a diverse range of encounters from dramatic events, to the more everyday repetitive processes that are often associated with citizenship, as well as capturing the impact of other factors such as the material and the temporal (Wilson 2016, 2). The focus on encounter allows for non-determinist outcomes and the articulation of ambiguity, hopes and dreams: ‘the openness and culturally constructed nature of the social world, peppered with contradictions and complexities, needs to be embraced and not dismissed’ (England 1994, 243).
Qualitative methods are the obvious choice for this sort of investigation; the need to consider complex and multiple encounters experienced by individuals, and the necessity of in depth description, meant that interviews were well suited to engaging with these concerns. The long discussions and open-ended questions allowed for the emergence of narratives and the interrogation of how citizenship is imagined, reflecting not only what is present in policy, but also the ways that it is (mis)understood and how this effects individuals’ thoughts and actions. This thesis also draws heavily on the literature of cognate disciplines weaving together arguments that extend well belong the literature on citizenship studies.

The remainder of this chapter will be written in a more reflexive style outlining not only many of the finer details of this methodology and highlighting further its suitability to the investigation of these research question, but also providing a critical reflection of my role within the research process, as well as possible problems and limitations.

4.2 The Nature of Interviews

It is easy to miss the underlying assumption in interviews that the individual has both the authority and understanding of their own conditions to be able to express them themselves, and not require another authority to comment in their place. There is also a certain irony in acknowledging this, as it is the very belief in the validity of an individual’s insight that both necessitates this work, and makes it possible. As Gubrium and Holstein comment: ‘[i]n older societies and historical periods, agency and responsibility have been articulated in relation to a variety of other social structures, such as the tribe, the clan, the lineage, the family, the community and the monarch. The notion of the bounded unique self, more or less integrated as the centre of awareness, emotion, judgement and action, is a very recent version of the subject’ (2002, 4).

Prior to conducting fieldwork I had consulted a significant amount of material on qualitative interviewing. I considered texts on types of interviews as well as the methods used to conduct them (Warren 2002; Curtis and Curtis 2011). I had
explored the possibilities of interview protocols (Stocks, Diaz, and Halleröd 2007), and debated the advantages and disadvantages of different interview formats. In the end, I had chosen to undertake in-depth semi-structured, discussion type interviews. I entered each interview with a list of key topics, yet these conversations tended to have a life of their own, which serves as a reminder that ‘fieldwork as a dialogical process in which the research situation is structured by both the researcher and the person being researched’ (England 1994, 247). Prior to every interview I had done my best to plan my approach, consider case-specific topics, and reflect on previous interviews to develop my method, however, I never commenced an interview with a list of set questions. There are unknown possibilities that emerge from the encounter itself, and it was very clear that no amount of preparation would predict direction and content.

What was not evident in the literature, and has since been made abundantly clear to me, is the messy, awkward, and at times chaotic nature of interviewing. It became evident that no matter how well-prepared one is, there are always going to be those less-than-stellar interviews, uncomfortable situations, and misunderstandings. One of my frustrations however, is the extent to which this is absent in the literature on qualitative interviewing.\(^{12}\) There is only one example that I am aware of, that seems like an honest account of this process: that of Lareau in her appendix in Unequal Childhoods (2011), which will be discussed later in greater detail.

I had decided on semi-structured interviews (cf. Morris 2015) that resembled a discussion between researcher and participant. The interviews served a dual purpose, firstly providing me with the field research materials in the form of interview transcripts, but also acting as an opportunity for me to develop my own understanding in conversation with others. My first few questions generally established the context into both the background of the interviewee and their citizenship statuses. Later, more in-depth questions were asked, which involved many of these recounted experiences and processes, but this was often lead by the participant and their logical progression through their lives, understandings, and

\(^{12}\) Though it does exist within the literature on auto-ethnography.
histories. The diversity of the topics that emerged, did so as a result of the complex and divergent narratives and circumstances of these participants.

There are other more practical considerations that one must address when carrying out interview research. My preference for face to face interviews was a logical one: a great deal of communication is non-verbal (93% is often the figure cited, but rarely explained), and I find it easier to relate and communicate in this way. This, however, was not always available, so several interviews were also done via skype. I much preferred Skype (video) interviews over phone ones, for better interactions with these individuals, though I was forced to do one interview by phone. Lareau also comments on the occasional difficulties associated with gauging responses from phone conversations alone (2011, 324), and I am quite adamant in the advantages of being able to see one’s participants. Observing participants in person was an important part of the fieldwork encounter and had a very different affective intensity to those conversations that were mediated through technology.

There were several individuals who had mentioned that they would not be available for a face-to-face, phone or Skype interview but would be able to fill in a written survey. When this request first emerged, I had replied to these individuals that my research did not entail a pre-prepared list of questions, as much of the interview depended on their preceding responses. Out of curiosity (and perhaps naïveté), and due to the request popping up on more than one occasion, I did sit down over a period of two or three days and attempted to put the key points of interrogation from my research into some form of survey. It did not work. The sheer variety of questions and the need to interact with these individuals, meant that any form of survey could not capture the narrative and personal experiences I was after. It was however an interesting exercise; it served as a reminder of the need for congruence between the research question and the methods that are used, and helped to reinforce my choice of in-depth qualitative interviews.

‘Where’ and ‘when’ were other considerations in the interview process. I did my very best to be as flexible as possible in terms of time and location of interviewing. My
preference was to do it at their homes or places of work, both out of a scholarly ethnographic interest and to ensure their convenience and comfort. If they had issues inviting a ‘stranger’ into their homes I was more than happy for such meetings to take place in a park, library, or cafe (similar considerations of place are also discussed in Warren’s work (2002, 90) on qualitative interviewing). One particularly memorable interview was conducted in a periptero, the standalone roadside kiosks that are common across Greece. It was carried out in the cubic metre or two of space on the inside, with the regular disruptions from customers demanding their brand of cigarettes or mobile phone recharge card through the small window. For all the emphasis that this thesis places on encounter, one must not forget that the interview itself is a site of encounter for both the interviewer and the interviewee, and as such, aspects such as the material and the emotional certainly play a role.

Despite my best attempts at transparency there were several occasions where my role as a researcher seemed to be largely misunderstood. In trying to make clear my topic of research in easy to understand terms, I had settled on the explanation that I was working on the topic of ‘citizenship and migration’; in focusing on people with multiple statuses, the vast majority of participants were first or second generation migrants and this meant that I did not have to weigh them down with some of the heavier theoretical reasoning. Thus the explanation was not particularly misleading, and comprehensible to most. Nevertheless, many assumed that I was an expert in the legal aspects of citizenship and migration policy. I was often quizzed on topics relating to national and international laws on the subject; I had occasions where participants invited friends along to interviews to see if I could help them with their documentation or to ask advice on how to progress on all matters related to citizenship and residency. One particular interview that I conducted was in front of an audience of five other people waiting patiently on an adjacent couch to exploit what they perceived as my area of expertise, and so I could help them with their immigration documentation. I clarified my role as best as possible prior to the start of the interview, but nevertheless the participant wished to continue.13 It was only after

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13 For further consideration of research interviews which involve additional (unwanted) audience members see the discussion outlined by Chavez (2008, 489–90)
the interview had finished that I came to understand that there may have been a secondary reason for the audience: there was some pride associated in the idea that a researcher would be interested in one’s story and experiences. Needless to say, the reception I received, and the way I was understood, varied greatly.

As I did not know the vast majority of the participants prior to their taking part in my research, I spent the first few minutes before the start of the interview just chatting on general topics and getting to know the person better. I would also sometimes stay afterwards to continue the conversation. The time spent chatting prior to interviews could in some ways be considered the building of rapport; the time spent afterwards was more or less an act of civility. It may seem unusual, but I felt that the interview itself was an act of generosity on their part – I still feel this way – and it never felt right to simply shut off the tape recorder, to thank the person and leave. I found it fascinating how the tape recorder itself played a significant role in these encounters. Whereas others have described it as a tool of security, ‘like being in possession of a technological guardian’ (Back 2012, 251), and a symbol of their status as a researcher, in my experience, its presence on the table, and the disruption to the flow of the conversation, were palpable. It was a reminder of the unusualness of this specific encounter, and it often seemed that the interview took on a notable sense of formality once the tape was switched on.

4.2.1 Participants
Choice of participants can have quite a considerable impact on the development and direction of any research project. My main guiding principle was the idea that these individuals needed to have more than one citizenship status. This does not necessarily mean that they needed to be dual citizens, they could have been a citizen of somewhere and perhaps had a long-term visa or permanent residency in another location, or even someone who had undertaken irregular migration and thus may not have had an official legal status in the country in which they were residing. This was important for the project as those with plural statuses have a more diverse frame of reference, and have also had the opportunity, due to these circumstances, to better reflect on their citizenship.
The choice to conduct interviews in both Australia and Greece was a logical one. From the outset, while I had no desire to present any sort of comparative work, I wanted diversity among my participants, which was more readily achieved by working in more than one location, and I was very keen to have the involvement of non-English speakers as a great deal of the research on the topic of citizenship has been done within the English-speaking world. I also wanted to pick two different locations for this research that differed quite substantially from one another, which Australia and Greece most certainly do. Chapter Two of this thesis has outlined just how different these two countries are with regards to history, geography and the legal foundations of their citizenship regimes. Further to this, demographically they vary quite substantially with Australia being a country of immigration, and Greece’s long history of emigration, along with the influence if its membership of the European Union. There were also some other more practical concerns regarding this choice: I fluently speak both English and Greek; I have extensive social networks in both countries; I am familiar with their education systems, and having lived in both countries for significant periods, I considered myself both culturally aware and well integrated. There were certainly a whole range of cross cultural considerations to this decision which are discussed later on.

The choice of fifty participants was a goal that I set myself. I wanted to get as many diverse stories as possible. By the end of fifty interviews, I had reached the ‘saturation and replication’ (Morse et al. 2008, 18) at least in general terms that are required by most traditional qualitative studies, yet each interview managed to produce different narratives and perspectives. This is at least one of the reasons why this thesis has pushed for a non-determinist analysis of these encounters. Participants were recruited in both countries using snowball sampling where I initially reached out to colleagues and friends, told them about the research and asked them to spread the word. I was incredibly fortunate to have several individuals, some of which I had never met prior to these interviews, circulate my information sheet and recruit others. Participants then got into contact with me and we started organising the details of the interview.
The resulting group of participants obtained for this research was incredibly diverse in terms of citizenship status and age. Participants for these interviews had citizenship statuses from 24 different countries from around the world, of which there were 28 with an Australian citizenship status, 27 with a Greek citizenship status and 11 with a British citizenship status. Other countries included Bulgaria (5), Romania (5), Japan (4), New Zealand (3) as well as many others. In terms of age, the youngest participant was 21 years old and the oldest was 82, with the remaining participants spread relatively evenly between these two ages. There was also roughly an even spread between men (24) and women (26). In terms of education, those that participated were relatively highly educated with 28 having a tertiary degree of some description, and four having some form of a higher tertiary degree (in all cases a masters). The specifics of these particular statuses are included for each of the participants within the Appendices (p.237), which function as a reference guide. In the discussion chapters of this thesis I have decided to include only the information necessary, and therefore the appendices are available as a resource for those seeking further information.

4.2.2 Translation, Transcription and Other Cross-Cultural Considerations

When working in more than one language, it is inevitable that translation must occur at some point during the research; what one must not forget is that translation itself is a process of ‘meaning making’ and the ‘who’, ‘how’ and ‘at what stage’ of translation can all affect the outcome of the work, and ‘the processes of translation should be part of reflexive methodology’ (Bradby 2002, 852). Some even question whether there is the possibility of truly comprehensive translations (Hermans 2009). The first issue that needed to be addressed was the translation of the topic itself; ‘citizenship’, as its current meaning stands in the English language, cannot be directly translated into Greek to produce a concept of the same meaning. There are certainly words with similar meanings and others that are widely used in practice, but none that are a comfortable direct translation. So how does one investigate a concept, which even at

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14 Two of these participants were undertaking doctorates at the time, and they represent the only ones in the sample working as academics.
the most fundamental linguistic level, cannot be exactly translated? This was eventually done using a process of forward and backward translation (Edwards 1998, 199), including considerations of how relevant terms are used in common parlance and written documentation; in this context, the two nearest options are ιθαγένεια (ithagenia) and υπηκοότητα (ipikootita). The term ithagenia while broadly meaning citizenship, etymologically alludes to the status of being a native, though there is uncertainty of whether this came from the old French indigenat or the ancient Greek ιθαγενής (ithagenis), both of which have the same etymology as the English word 'indigenous'. The second term ipikootita, is, at the moment, slightly out of fashion, and is best defined in English as 'subject-ship' (the status of being a subject to someone/something more powerful). In this way, among native speakers, ithagenia is the preferred term for individuals who are ethnically Greek, while ipikootita better suits those who are naturalised. This separation was clarified by a series of Greek native speakers of various educational backgrounds that I consulted. Neither of these terms allude to the participatory aspects that can be found in the English definitions of the word citizenship. In addition to the abovementioned two terms, official documents generally seem to show a preference for the use the Greek equivalent of the word nationality – εθνικότητα (ethnikotita) – which is linked to the more ethnic conceptions of membership to the nation state in Greece. Given the vastly different contexts of the development of Australian and Greek citizenship, one must also remember that these terms carry with them not only linguistic meaning, but also cultural content (Temple and Edwards 2002, 3).

The timing of the translation of the Greek interviews was another consideration. Essentially, there were three possible stages where this could be done. Firstly, to translate and transcribe at the same time, secondly to transcribe initially into Greek, then to translate the written transcriptions, or finally to analyse the transcript data in the original Greek, and only translate the segments which would make it into the final written piece. For me, the last of these three options appealed the most initially, as I felt that it was the most likely to retain the meaning closest to the original, however, on considering the various search and coding functions that are present within NVivo (as in discussed later in this chapter), it seemed more reasonable to ensure that all the
The process of transcription itself – even when translation was not present – produced several methodological considerations. The first of these is the choice of whether to transcribe the work myself. There are certainly advantages to this; I found in my own work, that listening back through the tapes in such detail allowed me to almost relive the encounter and reflect on the answers of the participant in an environment where the intensity of the interview space was muted and my mind was not focused on understanding and formulating the next question. But this comes at a cost, both emotional and temporal. Listening back to one’s own interviews is confronting; while many people can attest to not liking the sound of their own voice, what is most frustrating is reflecting on some of the questions that were asked, and others that were missed. It must be noted that these frustrations emerge with the assistance of hindsight – having the ability to reflect on a particular interview with the knowledge and understanding of all the interviews, research, and analysis that has come after it – and having the opportunity to remove oneself emotionally from the time and space of the interview. Regrets are inevitable. As I have already mentioned in this chapter, in relation to the work of Lareau (2011), I feel that researchers, especially those who have the opportunity to do so, need to more honestly represent the ‘messiness’ and awkwardness of the interview process. Speaking in person to a whole range of researchers who have interviewed significant numbers of participants, they all attest to the uncomfortable situations, the misapprehensions, and their own distaste.
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at the way that certain interviews progressed. However, within the literature these accounts are largely sterilised. The process of doing one’s own transcribing, brings much of this messiness back to light and offers the researcher the opportunity to reflect on it.

There are a number of ways in which to transcribe a text; in the more detailed versions, not only is every word transcribed, but also the pauses and hesitations, as well as laughter and possible background noises. The initial interviews that I had transcribed, had been done in a great deal of detail; it was only after completing the first half dozen, that I decided that including all the tiniest of details, in the way that someone who was completing a discourse analysis would, was far too taxing on my time, and was in many ways unnecessary. Instead I settled on translating the text word for word, but left out some of the more minor hesitations, but laughter and longer hesitations that may have altered the meaning of the words were included. Another way to have done it would simply have been not to record the interview but to make notes while conducting them, but I feel, both now and at the time, that this would be unable to capture the detail that I desired, as well as the full intensity of the encounter.

4.2.3 Ethics

As this research was carried out through an Australian institution, it was necessary to obtain ethics clearance, which was done through the ANU Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC). This was obtained in late 2012, with protocol number 550/2012. In Australia, as well as other places around the world, the need for research to pass through human ethics board approval is now well accepted and common-place, but this is not the case in all countries. While ethics is a complex issue involving both ‘complying with institutional ethics policy and being morally and ethically responsible to [...] research participants’ (Halse and Honey 2005, 2142), the following section will focus on a key methodological dilemma, that of the unexpectedly hostile reception of these institutional components from some of my participants.
While I was aware from works such as Curran (2006) that research ethics could at times be complicated by cross-cultural settings, I had assumed that my knowledge of the society and my ‘insider status’ (along with a great deal of consideration and preparation) should largely eliminate these difficulties. From the outset I was aware research ethics boards do not exist in Greece – there are a few organisations that deal with the ethics of medical research, but that is all – which meant that I was forced to explain exactly what the information sheet and consent form were, without having a national equivalent to reference. These official documents, though created for the respondents’ benefit, aroused suspicion among many of the Greek participants which was a direct contrast to the Australian interviews where participants either welcomed or were neutral regarding the paperwork. In applying for ethics, I had decided on the use of a written consent form translated into both languages; somewhat as an afterthought, and largely as a result of the possibility of Skype interviews in exceptional cases, I had also organised an oral consent script. When they were requested to sign, a notable number of my Greek participants questioned the consent form, and expressed an unwillingness to sign it; one participant even pulled out because of it, citing the well-known Greek saying «το πουλί σου και την υπογραφή σου, πρόσεχε πού τα βάζεις» (apologies for the crudeness, but it can be roughly translated to ‘your dick and your signature, be careful where you put them’).

I made it very clear to participants that their involvement was completely voluntary; I never forced the signing of the document, and, in cases where they were unwilling, participants were told that they were under no obligation to do so, and I thanked them for their time. In later interviews, I gauged reactions to my explanations and offered them the choice of the consent form or the oral consent script. Furthermore, much like the tape recorder, the consent form also served to disrupt the initial rapport building and conversation. While my cultural and linguistic awareness of this environment may have been vast, I did not share the same suspicion that many of my participants had towards all things official and bureaucratic, and it is possible to suggest that the context (that of financial crisis Greece, with widespread distrust of both the government and the bureaucracy) may have played a role. Nonetheless it served as a clear reminder of both the unexpected events that are involved in research,
and the need not to take even the most seemingly basic ideas for granted, especially in cross cultural settings.

4.3 Putting it all Together

Throughout the undertaking of this research project I was in a constant state of learning, and many aspects of this thesis came as a result of a process of trial and error. Undertaking this research was in many ways a transformative activity and I find my conceptions of the topic – and myself – changed in many ways as a result of it. The transformations were not only due to the face to face interactions with my participants, but also through the process of thinking, reading, and putting this thesis together. This section will seek to look at the various processes that took place after transcription that were the key aspects of pulling the thesis together.

4.3.1 ‘Data’ Management and Analysis

There is a dizzying array of qualitative data management software available to researchers, and while they tend to have considerable similarities, there are also a number of differences. After investigating possible options including web-based (Dedoose), open-source (QDA lite and free versions), as well as the paid software versions (NVivo), I was forced to make a choice. I had been the good student, done courses on a couple of the varieties and was thrilled with the great diversity of functions that the various types of software could offer. In all honesty, I was somewhat in awe of the functionality of these programmes. My final decision was not based on the software best suited to my needs – I felt that they were all able to carry out what was required of them – but I settled on using NVivo as it was the most widely used in my field, and I saw it both as an opportunity to master an intricate piece of software and as a way to investigate some of its more complex search and analysis functions.

At the time I saw this programme as a means to handle my almost two days’ worth of transcripts, but also as a tool to help me make sense of them; after 50 interviews I was left with hundreds of thousands of words of interview transcripts, much more than a

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Here I object to the way in which the term ‘data’ serves to obscure what actually emerged from these fieldwork encounters, which were the in depth and personal thoughts of these individuals.
human brain could handle at any one time. The software allowed me to address the sections of multiple transcripts which dealt with certain themes all at once. I went through the process of inductive and deductive coding and then looked at the ways in which these ‘nodes’ fitted together. Yet for me this software also added a level of abstraction. The narrative character of some of these stories, and the parts that could not comfortably fit, or fitted among more than one node, tended to get lost or at least obscured. In the end I found that, while this was useful as a tool of organisation, manually going through the transcripts in paper format was the most useful in terms of in depth consideration and analysis. While I do not deny the functionality and usefulness of this software, it may at times work to highlight certain aspects while obscuring others.

### 4.3.2 Reflexivity, Positionality and Auto-Ethnographic Considerations

There is a lot of me in this thesis, whether it be through the auto-ethnographic aspects or simply my writing style(s). I was the one who was sitting opposite the participants asking the questions, reading the texts and writing and rewriting chapters, emphasising in many ways that ‘a researcher is a co-participant’ (Chavez 2008, 474). For better or for worse, my smudged fingerprints are all over this thesis which is in part why this chapter has been written so reflexively: to acknowledge that particular ‘I’ who has undertaken this research, as well as the lessons learnt, and perhaps some consideration of my own transformation during this process.

Through various stages of this thesis I emerge and disappear. The preface sets the scene using a somewhat personal account, and both the introduction and the conclusion commence with fragments of my own experience. This methodology chapter has intentionally been heavily reflexive, giving obvious voice to ‘me’ as the author, and in a far more conversational tone than the rest of the thesis. This serves as a reminder that ‘qualitative researchers [...] cannot be assured that their observations, interpretations, and representations are not affected by their various identities and positionalities’ (Chavez 2008, 475), yet caution is required as any attempt to articulate a ‘transparent positionality’ is also problematic (G. Rose 1997).
Some may have noticed that in the longer excerpts in which I ask questions, I have chosen to include my name instead of the abstract ‘interviewer’ to subtly remind the reader that it was in fact me asking the questions, and that these fieldwork encounters were largely conversations. I do at times take issue with some of the more clinical accounts of similar methodologies and the ways in which they manage to obscure both the discomfort and the euphoria of the in-depth interview process. Traces of me in the last three substantive chapters are relatively rare. I have used a few autoethnographic fragments of my own experiences – once again positioning myself with regards to this research – in the Encountering Bureaucracy chapter, simply because many of the affective intensities of these spaces had such an impact on my own narratives. Furthermore, as Ahmed reminded me, ‘these encounters were themselves shaped by my everyday dwelling (where I live) and travel (where I move)’ (2000, 14). In many ways this reinforces the idea that has been made previously of the interview being an encounter itself.

Therefore my approach towards positionality and reflexivity is one which focuses on both making myself visible as a researcher, as well as providing honest reflections and criticism of the work that we undertake. This supports the belief that ‘we need to integrate ourselves into the research process’ (England 1994, 251), and that ‘reflexivity is self-critical sympathetic introspection and the self-conscious analytical scrutiny of the self as researcher’ (England 1994, 244) which echoes the work of Kobayashi who describes it as self-critique (1994). Finally this requires that we ‘inscribe into our research practices some absences and fallibilities while recognising that the significance of this does not rest entirely in our own hands’ (G. Rose 1997, 319), further echoing the necessity of honest accounts within qualitative research. Once again I feel the need to mention how my own understanding of citizenship has been shaped by this process, and I have no doubt, that at least for some of the participants, the opportunity to articulate their own narratives – to think about them and to present them comprehensively – may have had a transformative capacity within their lives.
4.3.3 Questions of Writing and Presentation

In trying to find an analogy for my own methods as a qualitative researcher, I came across many metaphors. Some make reference to the idea of a collage or a montage, others evoke the idea of a quilt, or use the widely circulated image of the *bricoleur*. What all these analogies have in common is that they focus on how this work is the result of the accumulation of varied and diverse parts that come together to create a text that is very much the product of the researcher. As Denzin and Lincoln explain: '[t]he product of the interpretative *bricoleur*'s work is a complex, quilt-like bricolage, a reflexive collage or montage – a set of fluid, interconnected images and representations. The interactive structure is like a quilt, a performance text, a sequence of representations connecting the parts to the whole’ (2008, 8). While the patchwork of the quilt is an alluring metaphor, the analogy that sits most comfortably with the way I conceive my own practice is that of the tapestry. The ordered linear fashion in which it is woven, the ability of the weaver to introduce their choice of colours or textures to make the overall design, and the idea that the tapestry is made from the interconnection of thousands and thousands of threads, is something that sits quite nicely with me.

So what different ‘threads’ are present in this thesis/tapestry? As has been mentioned previously this thesis has given considerable weight to the fieldwork encounters that are found in the latter half of the thesis; also previously mentioned are the auto-ethnographic ‘data’ that are also peppered through the work, though less liberally than the fieldwork encounters. Furthermore, I see the contribution of this text also in uniting various disparate fields of scholarship, so I have also included a great deal of secondary sources, as well as some more theoretical texts. While the above may seem redundant to the experienced researcher, the point I am trying to make here is that we must realise that there is more to methodological considerations than simply outlining the process of undertaking fieldwork and analysing its ‘products’. All of these elements play a role in the creation of the final text and, somewhat like ingredients in a recipe, it is not only their presence, but their amounts and the way that they are combined which can colour the finished product.
In methodological terms, it is largely taken for granted just how much the ways in which we go about presenting, and compiling, research shapes the narrative that emerges from it. This is particularly of note in relation to the ways the fieldwork excerpts have been integrated within this thesis: different ways of presenting these encounters manage to draw out different intensities. Here, I have experimented with the numerous ways in which diverse aspects of the transcripts can be made to tell different stories. This included using vastly different lengths of excerpts, with some going for only a few words, others for a paragraph or several paragraphs and a couple for a few pages. I also used different colours (p.128) in order maintain the narrative account, while bringing out different concerns that emerged in an intermingled way. I also embedded some of these longer excepts with a brief introduction of my encountering them (p.188 & p.204) in order to better situate the narrative, but also to do away with the tendency towards the clinical representations of participants. This too has ethical implications.

This thesis is also very ‘heavy’ in terms of drawing on vast bodies of work outside the area of citizenship studies. Through this eclectic use of interdisciplinary literature, this thesis draws together diverse ideas and makes connections between literatures where perhaps there had been none. The later chapters of this work engage heavily in these literatures which adds to the original contribution of this thesis. Furthermore, my different presences and absences as an author are an indication of the different styles or modes of writing that have been used within the thesis. This chapter is more conversational, while the three substantive chapters that follow and that make up more than half of the word count of the thesis have a much more traditional scholarly tone. This in no way suggests that a binary exists between conversational and scholarly forms of writing, but rather that these two forms have been used here to varying degrees to bring out different intensities in the writing. In this way the writing has been changed to deal with the demands of the particular section, and one must not forget that the ways in which we address the reader is also a methodological choice.

Finally I wish to make a comment regarding the ways we assign people to specific categories. I am not denying that these individuals are in fact situated, though – as
will be explained more clearly in the latter parts of the thesis – I find the ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer and Schiller 2002a; 2002b; 2003), that is ‘the naturalisation of the state by the social sciences’ (Wimmer and Schiller 2003, 576) can obscure more than it illuminates. By including unquestioningly the nationalities of these individuals next to these encounters we may limit these encounters to something that exists within that national context instead of just focusing on the encounter itself. Also, I fear that judgements may be made about these individuals simply on the basis of their nationality. I attempt to disrupt these notions by not including these national designators where possible, unless their absence renders the extract less effective. This further reinforces the ideas outlined in the previous chapter of the failures of binary conceptions of citizenship. Their absence also serves somewhat of an ‘educational’ end, reflecting on the ways in which we seek out examples of ‘transparent positionality’ in order to understand the context, yet no attempt at positionality can be completely transparent (G. Rose 1997). I make the case in Chapter Seven regarding the ways in which we seek to understand the world in national terms. Thus, in trying to understand a specific extract that may not have a national (or age or sex for that matter) indicator speaks to the perceived importance of these categorisations in the ways we seek to understand the world. For the intensely curious among you, the national designators, age, sex, educational background, and language of interview are all outlined in the appendix.

4.4 Critiquing Qualitative Research Methods

Qualitative work has often been the topic of criticism. Denzin and Lincoln (2008) point out that it is currently suffering from a ‘triple crisis’. The first crisis concerns the fact that qualitative work is a ‘social text written by the researcher’ and which suggests that ‘qualitative researchers can no longer capture lived experience’; the second, relates to the difficulties in addressing the validity and evaluating qualitative research; and finally, they reflect on the question of whether ‘it is possible to affect change in the world if society is always and only a text’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2008, 26). I feel the need, through the strong belief in not only the validity, but the value of qualitative research, to address these three considerations.
Regarding the first point of crisis, there is no denying the researcher’s role in the creation of the text as has been alluded to previously; to once again cite Denzin and Lincoln: ‘[a]ll research is interpretative; it is guided by the researcher’s set of beliefs and feelings about the world and how it should be understood and studied’ (2008, 31). Thus, while it is less obvious, even quantitative and scientific studies interpret the world using particular technologies or lenses (Law 2004). The question is then, how do we deal with this ‘situatedness’ of the researcher? As has been made evident so far, I am not adverse to reflexive practice and have used it often to question and challenge my own position and assumptions. This too, however, is not without its criticisms (Salzman 2002); there is the possibility of overanalysing and indulging is what Bourdieu labels ‘narcissistic reflexivity’ (2003, 281). It is then, with caution that I use elements of auto-ethnographic work as a part of both my field research and reflexive practice. Its usefulness as a method comes from its ability to both to illustrate an individual case in-depth, while also allowing a critical reflexive understanding. As Leon Anderson comments: ‘[a]t a deeper level reflexivity involves an awareness of reciprocal influence between ethnographers and their settings and informants. It entails self-conscious introspection guided by a desire to better understand both self and others through examining one’s actions and perceptions in reference to, and dialogue with, those others’ (2006, 382). Thus, by at least an awareness of the position of the researcher, we do not completely overcome this idea of the research as a social text, but better understand the context in which it has emerged.

In an earlier version of this chapter draft, the next paragraph read as follows:

The second aforementioned crisis relates to the difficulty in ensuring the validity of qualitative research. It is the duty of the researcher to illustrate to the best of their ability that their study is credible, and therefore certain quality controls (for want of a better word) must be built into the research project itself. It then follows that different types of research necessitate different methods of establishing validity, and the nature of qualitative inquiry as being constructed, situated, and interpreted undoubtedly make this difficult. In my own work I have used several methods of establishing validity. The first among these is the abovementioned researcher reflexivity, in addition to ensuring that I conducted an adequate number of interviews to ensure ‘saturation and replication’ in sampling (Morse et al. 2008, 18). Readers have also been provided with a considerable amount of detail, a method labelled by Creswell and Miller as ‘thick, rich description’ (2000, 129), which is common in ethnographic accounts. Even in the presence of these attempts of establishing validity, it must be understood,
that absolute validity in qualitative research is almost impossible due to the very nature of the work, which goes some way to explain the present crisis. I no longer feel that these are the best methods of establishing validity in this context, despite having engaged in them in some form of another. It is these sorts of claims that encourage researchers to provide these more clinical accounts, which may reduce the validity of the research rather than increasing it. I am not naïve enough to think that if we throw the doors open on our practice that everyone will see how important it is and accept it with open arms, but in indicating more of these research encounters themselves – and their embeddedness in lived lives – I believe that it is one further means to assist in establishing the validity of this work.

Due to the constructed and interpretative nature of qualitative work, the idea that all research is essentially a text, further undermines the ability of this type of research to affect change (Denzin and Lincoln 2008, 26). This is quite pertinent as anyone who works in the field of citizenship studies has more than likely come across the vast inequalities that exist within our regimes of citizenship. While questions of social justice have and will be considered in greater detail in other chapters, I am not convinced that all qualitative work is unable to affect change, or precisely whether that should be its purpose. But value and purpose is often a matter of perspective; the very act of putting pen to paper and documenting and circulating these experiences gives them a life that they would not have otherwise. There is also the tendency to give too much value to the creation of texts rather than their reception. A recent article in New York Magazine (Fischer 2016) outlines how Judith Butler – whose works I draw on quite extensively in Chapter Seven – came to become one of the key public intellectuals16 of our time. It explains how ideas articulated in dense scholarly texts written over 20 years ago are now common place in the ways in which we think about gender. The article implicitly suggests that it is not only the ideas themselves, but also the ways they are received and circulate which may account for their greater influence. One can never know the precise impact of one's work.

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16 There are contested definitions of the term 'public intellectual', however with regard to this particular article it defined in terms of the influence of a particular intellectual’s ideas over society.
4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has provided a reflexive account of the many methodological choices that came about as part of this research, as well as, providing an outline of various issues that emerged during this process. The significance of this methodology is at least in part that it provides a novel approach to the investigation of citizenship as status: the focus on in depth qualitative accounts, and individual stories and experiences allows for a more nuanced approach to the subject and one that can deal with greater diversity and ambiguity, as well as escaping the universalising tendencies of other approaches. The field research for this project was undertaken in two different national contexts, and in two different languages. As such issues of translation, and cross-cultural research ethics were addressed. Furthermore due to the diversity, and central role the experiences of participants played in this research, this thesis experimented with innovative ways of presenting some of these testimonies. Finally, this chapter gives greater insight into the auto-ethnographic aspects of this research as well as some of my more personal considerations and orientations with regards to qualitative research.
5. Encountering Bureaucracy

Perceptions of modern citizenship as status are entwined with the notions and functions of state bureaucracies. This imbrication is far from surprising: it is through bureaucratic procedures that citizenship is bestowed – or denied or stripped – and it is often in bureaucratic hands where these statuses may be questioned or contested. Regardless, there has been little attention given to the importance of the bureaucratic encounter in the context of citizenship, and even then, many of these existing studies consider these experiences simply as ‘gates’ where the outcome of the encounter is either successful or not. This chapter will show the diverse and transformative capacities of these experiences; it will consider how these, at times gruelling encounters between individuals, civil servants and states are reinforced, understood, and contested in a diversity of ways, and come to have lives beyond those bureaucratic spaces. It will explore the consequences of these complex, fluid and at times messy bureaucratic encounters in the lives of these thinking and feeling subjects.

In the first instance, this chapter will highlight some general considerations regarding bureaucracy, including its historical development as an idea, and a broad examination of the relationships and techniques of power within these contexts. In seeing these encounters as sites of transformation, this chapter will examine three key elements that inform these experiences. Firstly, the impacts of spaces will be investigated through a focus on the role of the material, and more specifically, the significance of desks and paper. Secondly, more bodily concerns will be illustrated; this section will
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consider both how identification and evaluation techniques dehumanise individuals, as well as illustrating that emotion is not only present in, but central to, these encounters, countering the traditional belief of emotion having no place in bureaucracy. Finally, times are investigated, initially in a more general sense in the context of bureaucracy, and later with regards to the role of waiting, where a typology of waiting is put forth. These three sections will draw on both fieldwork encounters and auto-ethnographic work to better illustrate these complexities, and how they unfold in lived lives. This chapter will end with a more in depth focus on a single participant whose experiences will be used as an illustration of the richness within these encounters, as well as how the bodies, spaces and times of bureaucracy weave together in a multiplicity of ways. It will both illustrate and build on the emerging content within the preceding sections of this chapter.

5.1 What is Bureaucracy?

Most people are familiar with bureaucracy. We encounter it in some form on a daily basis: a document needs filling out, a tax or bill needs to be paid, a car registered, a doctor visited, a child enrolled, a permit issued, and countless others. To this we must also add the rarer and potentially more fraught one-off bureaucratic encounters, those that have the possibility of more serious consequences, and which will be the subject of this chapter. This propensity of the state to ‘document and monitor’ follows us through every stage of our life (Painter 2006, 753), and even death is accompanied by requisite bureaucratic documentary evidence: we drive with our licences, we travel with our passports, and the notion of handing over a fistful of forms, followed by a fistful of documents is far from unusual. Bureaucracy has developed gradually, we can trace its roots back to antiquity, however it is in the last 100 years or so that we have seen a ‘revolution identificatoire’ (Noiriel 1991 as cited in; John Torpey 1998, 242), with the implementation of a whole series of biopolitical practices that help governments to identify, catalogue, and thus control their citizens.

Despite acknowledging the pervasiveness of bureaucracy and the bureaucratisation of so many diverse aspects of everyday life, this chapter will deal with the specificity of
the bureaucratic encounter in the important context of citizenship. Based on my fieldwork encounters, these include the bureaucratic sites associated with getting visas, obtaining permanent residency, being naturalised, as well as the spaces where our citizenship as status is subject to checks and controls, such as at the immigration desk at an airport. While I group all these locations together as sites of bureaucratic encounter concerning citizenship as status, the reality is that these are incredibly diverse assemblages of people, spaces, policies, and practices, among others. Not only do two offices or two airports in the same country (theoretically applying the same policies and laws, and performing the same functions) often vary quite substantially from one another, but even the way the individual traveller or applicant negotiates and contests this space, can differ from encounter to encounter. As Salter reminds us: 'the 'experience' of the airport varies dramatically according to who is travelling, on what documents, in what class, and with what sociocultural baggage' (Salter 2007, 62).

### 5.1.1 Bureaucratic Encounters

What this chapter is concerned with are these bureaucratic 'encounters'. As has been outlined in earlier stages of this thesis, using the notion of encounter allows us to step away from the more policy or law orientated conceptions of what happens at these sites and come to see them as these diverse, practical assemblages of policy, people, materialities, and temporalities. The word 'encounter' itself hints at the adversarial qualities that are often present or at least perceived in these interactions, and as much of the empirical work woven through this chapter will suggest, these can be spaces of contestation. Each individual approaches them with their own capacities, constraints and understandings which are transformed by the encounter. Thus encounters are 'both the site for the operation of power and as an occasion for the emergence of forms or ways of life that are more than an effect of power' (Ben Anderson 2016, 2). There is no desire here to qualitatively classify encounters, as 'encounters are neither innately good or bad according to a predetermined logic' (Bissell 2016, 397), or to see them as 'gates' or 'stages' through which individuals must pass, but rather focus on their potentiality (Wilson 2016), and the ‘ongoing processes of transformation that take place through events and encounters’ (Bissell 2016, 395). To the external
onlooker, or to one who is more concerned with the processes laid out in policy, there may seem to be a ‘uniformity’ to such experiences, however, as the remainder of this chapter will contend, this is simply not the case: ‘[b]ureaucratic encounters are part of the administration’s daily grind – a world apparently made up of routine and anonymity, but whose centre is unstable, and whose protagonists cannot always be pigeon-holed into predefined roles’ (Dubois 2012, 2).

By focusing on encounter, this analysis steps away from much of the classical literature on bureaucracy. Bureaucratic authority, as described by Weber as an ideal type, is seen as a means of authority which deals with individuals in rational, efficient and impartial ways: ‘[p]recision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs – these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration [...] The ‘objective’ discharge of business primarily means a discharge of business according to calculable rules and ‘without regard for persons’ (Weber 1991, 214–15, emphasis original). However, even Weber himself acknowledges the constraints and abuses inherent in such a system, which is often surmised under his concept of the ‘iron cage’ which first appeared in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber and Parsons [1905] 2003). In many ways the foundations of modern states as discussed in Chapter Two are embedded in bureaucratic ways and means, and much of the evolution of bureaucratic processes are tied up with improved technologies of transport and record keeping.

Rather ironically, it is precisely this ‘without regard for persons’ – from the passage from Weber previously cited – which is problematic. Several scholars, notably Hannah Arendt (1970) and Zygmunt Bauman (1988, 1989) in exploring the Holocaust have noted the role of the bureaucratic regime in these atrocities: ‘[t]he Nazi mass murder of the European Jewry was not only the technological achievement of an industrial society, but also the organisational achievement of a bureaucratic society’ (Bauman 1989, 13). These structures, in which each individual is responsible for a small but repetitive part in the organisation, left them at once alienated from the ends yet, still a significant piece in achieving them. There is an inherent, yet largely invisible
propensity to violence within the bureaucratic construct: ‘[i]t must be kept in mind that most of the participants [of genocide] did not fire rifles at Jewish children or pour gas into gas chambers [...] Most bureaucrats composed memoranda, drew up blueprints, talked on the telephone, and participated in conferences. They could destroy a whole people by sitting at their desk’ (Bauman 1988 citing; Hilberg 1983, 3:994, emphasis added).

The myth of the neutral bureaucracy has been criticised widely and often, most notably through Lipsky’s Street-Level Bureaucracy (1983), that looks at the ways frontline civil servants and public service workers use their discretion to decide on and enact policy: '[i]n short, the reality of the work of the street level-bureaucrats could hardly be farther from the bureaucratic ideal of impersonal attachment in decision making. On the contrary, in street level bureaucracies the objects of critical decisions – people – actually change as a result of the decision’ (Lipsky 1983, 9, emphasis added). It is precisely this street-level bureaucracy and the street-level bureaucrats engaged within it that will be the focus of many of the encounters that are presented in the remainder of this chapter, yet are absent from many other approaches to this topic. The following section considers the diverse sites of power in bureaucratic encounters including a further analysis of the role of these street-level bureaucrats.

5.1.2 Power

‘The greater the bureaucratization of public life, the greater will be the attraction of violence. In a fully developed bureaucracy there is nobody left with whom one could argue, to whom one could present grievances, on whom the pressures of power could be exerted. Bureaucracy is the form of government in which everybody is deprived of political freedom, of the power to act; for the rule by nobody is not no-rule, and where all are equally powerless we have a tyranny without a tyrant.’


As Hannah Arendt articulates above, bureaucracy is a technique of power. It is both an institution of the power of the state, as well as a means to reinforce it. However, conceiving bureaucracy as all-powerful, and all those who come against it as completely disempowered, is far too simplistic a view. This section will illustrate and explore the three key sites of power and resistance within these encounters. Initially this section will consider how the power of the state is enforced and illustrated by the
very existence of the bureaucracy itself, along with the perceived right of the state as sovereign to decide in these matters. This power is also reinforced by the presence of state symbols in these encounters. Secondly, we will look at the role of the individual bureaucrats and their subjectivities within this system, and finally consider the power of the individual or claimant in their self-presentation and contestation. These three sites of power and resistance are not fixed, but are fluid and unstable, and emerge in different ways both between encounters and within them.

5.1.2.1 States

In his *Post-script on the Societies of Control*, Deleuze recounted a story: ‘Felix Guattari has imagined a city where one would be able to leave one’s apartment, one’s street, one’s neighbourhood, thanks to one’s (dividual) electronic card that raises a given barrier; but the card could just as easily be rejected on a given day or between certain hours; what counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person’s position – licit or illicit – and effects universal modulation’ (Deleuze 1992, 7). It seems that this story of the imagination may not be so far-fetched, and a reading of this fragment evokes in me our current regimes of identification and citizenship: we are all expected to carry passports to travel, that in some locations may today be accepted and tomorrow not. Yet the most important part of this story, or indeed our very system, is not the ‘barrier’, as Guattari mentions, but the system as a whole that ‘effects universal modulation’. This is evident in our own systems: '[t]he border, be it state or biopolitical, is precisely constituted through repeated decisions of inclusion and exclusion, entry and exit, and what is vital for the authority of the state is not a particular decision either in its correctness or its political import, but in the repetition of the authority to decide’ (Salter 2013, 12, emphasis added).

It is this ‘repetition of the authority to decide’ which is the ‘[...]' essence of the state’s sovereignty [...] not as the monopoly to coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to decide' (Schmitt [1922] 2010, 13). In presenting ourselves at immigration and in bureaucratic offices, and allowing them to make these decisions regarding our passage and our status we ‘reproduce national sovereignty’ (Friedman 2010, 172). This is crucial in our understanding of these sites: not only are we facing the representative of
the state, but contesting these decisions, can be perceived as contesting the very authority of the state itself. As Friedman explains: ‘[t]he interview system creates this sovereignty effect both in its role as a concrete border practice and through the ways it instantiates state power. Immigration interviews conducted at the airport literally produce the relationship of the state to citizens and noncitizens alike [...] The state is not an abstraction in this case; it is a lived experience of human contact between individuals situated very differently with respect to the privileges and power of citizenship status and bureaucratic entitlement’ (Friedman 2010, 179).

These relations are echoed by various symbolic and material aspects of these bureaucratic interactions. Michael Billig introduces the concept of ‘banal nationalism’ (1995), which argues how prosaic encounters with objects and vocabularies enforce the primacy of nationalism and the nation state. Within these bureaucratic encounters, the seemingly passive presence of the flag, the seal, as well as other symbolic, linguistic, and material markers of the national, all enforce the primacy of the state. It is also possible to go further to consider how ‘encounters with state materials may appear relatively ‘mundane’ for many, [but] this unremarkable quality is precisely what normalises the subjectivity of the citizen and seeks to efface the instabilities behind such normative order’ (Darling 2014, 496–97). Some of these more material considerations will be addressed in greater detail in the next section of this chapter.

This power of the state is often seen to have the capacity to make demands of individuals. As Salter suggests: ‘[t]he sovereign’s power to admit or exclude is manifest in the necessary anxiety of confession to produce the national subject’ (2007, 59). Through the very power to decide, these situations evoke in us the need for confession, which, as Foucault outlines, is inherent in our current regimes of power: ‘[t]he confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject of the statement; it is also a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship, for one does not confess without the presence (or virtual presence) of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority that requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console and
reconcile [...] the agency of domination does not reside in the one who speaks (for it is he who is constrained), but in the one who listens and says nothing; not in the one who knows and answers, but in the one who questions and is not supposed to know’ (Foucault [1976] 2008, 61–62). This compulsion to confess and the normalisation of the state’s ability to demand a confession further illustrates how state power is both highlighted and enforced through these encounters.

5.1.2.2 ‘Street-Level Bureaucrats’

In building on the passage mentioned above, we must emphasise that ‘the one who listens’ is not the state per se, but one of its officers. Thus these confessions are interpreted by subjective beings: ‘interview decisions are arbitrary and personal, resting on perceptions of convention, common sense and normality; gut instinct and experience [...]’ (Friedman 2010, 178–79). However, where there is space for discretion and significant power differences, there is also the possibilities for control and violence: ‘even in the most liberal national bureaucracies the bureaucratic capacity for petty tyranny remains a scandal of perception if not of fact’ (Herzfeld 1992, 6). Of this ‘petty tyranny’, the fieldwork encounters contain many examples: by forcing people to wait, by contesting minor issues with the quality of photos or documents, or by demanding documents and citing rules that may or may not exist, the public servant and their ‘arbitrary decisions’ (Graeber 2015, 66) can cause significant difficulty and distress for the individual, while reinforcing their own authority. In the following extract, one of my participants – Milena – recounts her frustrations negotiating a specific bureaucratic encounter, and the discretion that those particular bureaucrats had over her:

Despite the fact that I had collected all the necessary paperwork – from my job, from the tax office, everything I needed, even the rental contract which showed that I was renting and where I lived – I had collected everything as had been asked, based on a list which they had posted on the wall at the police station [...] when I went to submit them, after two or three attempts, I felt that they didn’t even want to give me the residency permit. That is exactly how I felt.

It is this ‘substantial discretion’ which is at the heart of Lipsky’s notion of street-level bureaucrats (1983): he illustrates how these bureaucrats are the real arbitrators of these decisions. Echoing this impact as an intermediary with regards to policy, Painter explains how ‘passing legislation has few immediate effects in itself [...] rather its
effects are produced in practice through the myriad of mundane actions of officials, clerks, police officers, inspectors, teachers, social workers, doctors and so on’ (2006, 761). Finally, Judith Butler, echoing the same point, in her work Precarious Life articulates the power in the hands of these individuals, and the ease of its abuse, labelling these the actions of ‘petty sovereigns’ (2006, 56).

5.1.2.3 Clients

Despite the sheer difference in power between the state and its officers on one hand, and the individual on the other, it would be remiss to see all clients as completely ‘powerless’ (Graeber 2015, 81) or as exhibiting ‘impotence’ (Ferme 2004, 105). Those who negotiate these bureaucratic encounters have the right to construct themselves in certain ways: as student, as traveller, as spouse, as refugee, and in the case of those with dual citizenship they can choose which documents to use, which can at times greatly affect the procedures that one is subject to. In returning to Foucault’s notion of confession evoked earlier, I argue that these confessions are constructed by the client, of course using the limited resources that are available to them. We must be careful not to overinflate the capacities of these confessors; as Salter indicates ‘a traveller is the author of one’s identity, but not the final arbiter of his/her mobility’ (2007, 53), but seeing bureaucratic interactions solely as the exercise of state sovereignty, fails to take into account the diverse evaluative elements present in these interactions and the possibilities of more subtle and emergent forms of resistance (Hynes 2013).

Resistance may be present in a diversity of forms: individuals have the choice to pursue certain ends, or even reject them, though this is not without consequence and cost. They may at times question the official, phone for information, or to check the progress of a submission prior to the date on which they were advised, appeal to them as individuals, launch a legal appeal, refuse to give certain details or lie, select which documents to show and which to hide, and perform countless other ‘acts of subversion’ (Codó 2011, 734). These individuals have the ability to create their narratives, and present themselves in certain ways; they can become dual citizens, travel using different documents, or apply elsewhere or just give up on or refuse to
Encountering Bureaucracy

engage with the process altogether. It would be a gross oversight to suggest that all individuals have equal access to such tactics. They do not. It is often those who have the financial resources or the right ‘cultural capital’ (Bourdieu 1986) – those who speak the language, know the system, or know the right people or processes of appeal – who navigate these systems more easily. Sometimes these attempts remain unsuccessful, and sometimes they are resolved through the help of others. Natalia’s account below shows how, despite ‘emphatic and categorical’ rejection on behalf of those handling her case, she was able to reverse the decision using the mother of a friend who worked at the embassy:

Natalia: I submitted my papers and they were rejected. This happens. They rejected me despite the fact that I had significant reasons to continue with my studies. So the Municipality of Athens advised me, completely incorrectly, to return to Romania and reapply for my student visa. It was something that was practically impossible. I went to the Greek Embassy in Bucharest - I remember it well. It was snowing, it was cold, and generally awful - I went there every day, and I couldn’t help myself but cry; there was no way that they would give me another student visa.

Anna: For what reason?

Natalia: Because they were under the impression that I was in receipt of a scholarship from the Greek Ministry of Education. They were saying to me, ‘They sent you… you don’t have it... the document that they gave you is classified... it can’t be bestowed... why should we give you another student visa?’ They didn’t want [to give it to me], their rejection was emphatic and categorical. I was saved by a contact.\[17\]

The power in bureaucratic encounters thus plays out differently at multiple contested sites and in multiple contested ways, thus indicating the importance of non-determinist analyses of these interactions. The remainder of this chapter will deal with three specific aspects of bureaucratic encounters – spaces, bodies, and times – and will further illustrate the complexity and fluidity of these encounters.

5.2 Spaces: the Materialities of the Bureaucratic Encounter

It would be naïve to overlook the role of spaces and materialities in these bureaucratic encounters; as Lefebvre outlined some 40 years ago: ‘(Social) space is a (social) product [...] the space thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and of action; that in

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17 Natalia later comments how a friend of her mother’s was able to call on some contacts to push through the required visa.
addition to being a means of production it is also a means of control, and hence of
domination, of power; yet that, as such, it escapes in part from those who would make
use of it’ (1992, 26, emphasis original). Materialities are central considerations with
regards to these encounters, because, as Pérez suggests, the ‘materiality and aesthetics
of bureaucratic artefacts mediate discourse and action’ (2016, 216). Furthermore, one
must also take into account the formative role materialities play, as ‘matter and
meaning are co-constitutive and mutually emergent’ (Darling 2014, 486). The section
that follows will investigate the materialities of bureaucratic encounters further by
considering the two material forms that are crucial to bureaucratic spaces - those of
decks and paper - and their transformative capacities within these encounters.

5.2.1 Desk
The desk is present in countless different forms within bureaucratic spaces. The
primacy of the desk is even present etymologically: the term bureaucracy comes from
the French bureau meaning desk, and the Greek suffix -kratia originally meaning
‘power of’ or ‘rule by’; so already in understanding this notion of a system of
government by administrative officials, the desk takes a significant role. The image of
desk is quite insightful: ‘[t]he desk represents the most perfect and evocative
illustration of the nature of these authoritative and distanced relations: the applicant,
put in the position of they who beg or demand, is dependent on the goodwill of the
civil servant, who without hope of the capacity to cross the material barriers which
isolates them not only physically, but also symbolically, from the public’18 (Chevallier
1983, 21). This capacity for division and isolation is reinforced by the presence of the
desk, yet it also reflects the dominant bureaucrat’s position of permanence and
authority.

This replicated context - that of the official behind the desk - helps reinforce our
perceptions of modern administrative rule. It has even captured the artistic imaginary:

18 In the original French, this passage reads: ‘Le guichet représente l’illustration la plus parfaite et la plus
evocatrice de ce mode de relations distancié et autoritaire: placé en position de quémandeur ou de
soliciteur, l’administré est soumis au bon-vouloir du fonctionnaire, sans espérer pouvoir franchir la barrière
matérielle qui isole physiquement, mais aussi symboliquement, celui-ci du public.’ Translation is author’s
own.
Jan Banning recently published a book of his endeavours to photographically capture bureaucracy across different regions of the world (Banning and Tinnemans 2008). Of his work he explains: ‘Each subject is posed behind his or her desk. The photos all have a square format (fitting the subject), are shot from the same height (that of the client), with the desk – its front or side photographed parallel to the horizontal edges of the frame – serving as a bulwark protecting the representative of rule and regulation against the individual citizen, the warm-blooded exception. They are full of telling details that sometimes reveal the way the state proclaims its power or the bureaucrat’s rank and function, sometimes of a more private character and are accompanied by information such as name, age, function and salary. Though there is a high degree of humour and absurdity in these photos, they also show compassion with the inhabitants of the state’s paper labyrinth’ (Banning n.d.). These photographs are insightful in both their similarity and their diversity: while the presence of the desk remains the same, the bureaucrats themselves, their stance, their expressions and the ‘technologies’ and other physical items which surround them are all very different, echoing the subjectivity evoked earlier that sees the civil servant as an evaluative individual.

These bureaucratic spaces are organised to control individuals. Some desks are positioned higher which enforces the authority of the state and the civil servant over clients. There are also numerous more subtle variations, of which the following auto-ethnographic encounter is a good example:

The desk that the official sat behind had been put on a platform and elevated in such a way that their seated position was taller than our standing one. I remember looking at my father who was raised on his toes, in order to be able to place his arms comfortably on the bench.

Here this hierarchy is evident, and the separation that the desk so clearly signifies, was made more acute by the strained standing positions. Some of these interactions may also occur through glass windows, or holes cut into walls, all of which are material variations in these alienating dividers, used to separate bureaucrat from client. These spaces therefore exhibit an unusual combination of both intimacy – in the context of being face to face with another individual – and alienation, in the form of these

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19 This is a journal excerpt from April 2012.
impenetrable barriers. Bureaucratic spaces are also places of resistance as, in relation to one particular bureaucratic office in Barcelona, Spain, where Codó explains how ‘employees strove hard to discipline clients not to wander about the office, to sit on benches until their number was called and to wait the prescribed amount of time before going back to the office for consultation’ (2011, 734).

While the desk remains a key element within the bureaucratic encounter, one cannot help but wonder whether this will remain the case. As we move towards more online forms of processing, and use newly developed forms of biometric technologies for identification, how will these interactions be affected? Salter claims that even though the technology may advance, the outcome is the same: ‘[t]he simple power of the border guard to reject a traveller at the border has equal effect on the circulation of individuals, regardless of the technological or bureaucratic infrastructure that supports the decision’ (Salter 2013, 16). This statement is correct, if the impact we seek to understand is considered in terms of circulation, however, in seeing these spaces as ones of encounter, these new technologies act to alter the experiences of these spaces, something that will be evoked in the later part of this chapter, in the section on bodies.

5.2.2 Paper

One cannot underestimate the symbolic role that paper, and other technologies of record-keeping, play in bureaucratic encounters. Not only are they the very indication of state power ‘by endlessly self-producing iconicity’ (Herzfeld 1992, 164), but they ascribe to us identities, and situate us within time and space: ‘graphic artefacts are not simply the instruments of already existing social organisations. Instead their specific discourses and material forms precipitate the formation of shifting networks and groups of official and nonofficial people and things’ (Hull 2012, 21). If there is any need to clarify the importance of paper, one need only look at the interviews which make up one of the empirical foundations of this thesis: ‘passport’ has become synonymous with citizenship as status. Furthermore, ‘[p]assports are the material markers of identity’ (Salter 2003, 3). This in itself is unsurprising; the passport is the
clearest material manifestation of citizenship, and is requested as ‘proof’ in many of these encounters.

Bureaucratic encounters involve not only passports, but a whole range of documentary artefacts in which ‘each additional document can provide more validity to a person’s case’ (Villegas 2015, 2366). Long lists of documents are also often required; for one particular process I was required to produce my Australian birth certificate and passport, my parents’ marriage licence, my baptism certificate, all of my father’s documentation including his Greek passport and identity card, as well as our family status certificate from the municipality where he was born (this was required to have been issued within the last three months). The demand for documentary evidence exists extensively within our society; modern identity and identification is situated within these very documents, as Foucault explains: ‘[t]he examination that places individuals in a field of surveillance also situates them in a network of writing; it engages them in a whole mass of documents that capture and fix them. The procedures of examination were accompanied at the same time by a system of intense registration and of documentary accumulation’ (Foucault and Rabinow 1991, 201).

Yet, the demand for evidence has extended beyond that of official documentation; personal papers too may be requested. Here Louis explains the process that he had to undergo as part of obtaining a spousal visa:

For the first two years, to prove that our relationship was genuine, we had to give photos, we had to keep evidences, friends had to write letters to say we had a true relationship. Basically, we had a pile of evidences that was quite thick demonstrating that I was setting up. That was a serious thing.

and Suzie, undertaking a similar process evokes a variation on this story:

...[Y]ou have to provide proof that you love each other and that you write to each other. You have to give examples of cards and things that you've given to each other on birthdays and Christmas and stuff like that.

The need to ‘provide proof that you love each other’ not only indicates how paper is central to these encounters, but also how these processes compel us to render tangible, things like relationships, that are not necessarily so.

Even when paper – be it in the form of documents, photographs or Christmas and birthday cards – is in evidence, it may be contested. This can occur on the grounds of both quality, not meeting technical specifications, questions as to their authenticity,
or even the claim of further not previously requested documents being required. Once again, this is often very much up to the discretion of the individual bureaucrat. Here Paheer describes the difficulties that he has been facing now that his type of residency permit has become contested:

Three times I have been in [arrested by the police]. Previously, once they saw the sticker [permit], things were fine, I was fine. But the problem is now there many duplicate [forged] papers. So they pick me up and we go there, and they put me in, and don’t tell me anything. Then one hour turns to six and they still haven’t told me anything. Then the big man came in and he put my numbers into the computer, and then they saw that everything was real, the numbers and the photo, and then they say ‘ok bye’. This last time, when the police caught me on the road, they took me to this office to do some checking. Then they took me to the big police station at Petralona, and we went there, they didn’t check anything, they asked me if I had papers, I said yes and then they let me go.

The contestation of the material trace may thus be one of these areas where the bureaucrat can wield their discretionary power over the client as illustrated in the early parts in this chapter. In these interactions, it is not only the document that becomes a site of contestation, but by contesting the document, the individual too comes into question. As such the collection, organisation, storage, and quality of documents may be a trigger for anxiety.

Returning to the significance of the passport, we must be aware of the role it plays in mediating interactions: ‘[w]ith the widespread use of a similar passport format, the examination at the border came to be centred on whether documents – rather than the traveller herself – were in order’ (Salter 2003, 28, emphasis original). The encounter then becomes as much about the documents as it does about the individual, and as such, documents, when lost or misplaced or even contested, can cause anxiety. Recent work undertaken in relation to asylum seekers has also enforced the affective capacities of paper: ‘letters took on a role as possessions critical to an individuals’ sense of self’ and ‘losing a letter was an issue of disorientation, of losing track of one’s own position, of the one thing that tied one to the state’ (Darling 2014, 491). Furthermore, Cabot in his study of the Greek asylum regime explains how ‘material techniques and tools of regulation persistently enter into new relationships and uses, open to various contradictory and collaborative ends’ (Cabot 2012, 24). The role of
paper within these encounters can have considerable ongoing transformative capacities.

Bureaucratic acts, and the need to render individual identity into restrictive paper formats, have a normalising effect. ‘Immigration controls are not neutral but productive: they produce and reinforce relationships of dependency and power’ (Bridget Anderson, Sharma, and Wright 2009, 8, emphasis original), they fit people, process them and understand them based on pre-existing static categories. ‘[P]eople are not easily classified’ (Papastergiadis 2010, 349), and yet a passport, like so many other documents of identity limit them to a name, a nationality, a sex and a date of birth. Needless to say, these designations have a way of affirming identity. As one of my participants, Susan, explains in reference to her own experiences:

> I think it is reinforced when you actually pass through gates at the airport and you go through whichever queue and you think ‘which passport will I use?’ or ‘am I going through the Australian queue or the EU queue?’, that certainly reinforces it. But I think you are always going to have the sense of the belonging, the passport is just more of a visual object that you can see. You pull it out and it is like ‘Oh yeah’...

The denial of these forms of identification can also be instrumental; in a study of the Indigenous Argentinian Chaco, Gordillo shows how these material forms of identification that had once been denied, then became fetishized as items of great reverence (Gordillo 2006). These documents have a value so far beyond the materials that they are constructed from, as markers of identity and recognition, but also as productive tools of control and categorisation.

### 5.3 Bodies in Bureaucratic Encounters

As some of the latter parts of the last section have illustrated, identity and paper find themselves intertwined with more bodily concerns, as bureaucracy tries to capture and control the body. Building on some of the ideas that have already emerged in this chapter, the following section will first explore how the body is captured and evaluated within bureaucratic encounters, and the consequences of these processes. It will also bring questions of emotion and bureaucracy back into the discussion, to illustrate, that despite indications to the contrary, emotion plays a central role within bureaucratic encounters.
5.3.1 Confessions of the Body

The increasing use of biometric forms of identification in these encounters are altering our perceptions of the body. Biometric practices are those where ‘particular use is made of individual bodily characteristics for identification purposes’ (van der Ploeg 1999, 295), and as such ‘the body [becomes] broken down precisely so that it can be correlated with the specificities of individual identity’ (Cho 2013, 342). While those in favour of these new technologies have pointed to their speed and accuracy, they have also been widely criticised for having an ‘objectifying and dehumanising effect’ (Villegas 2015, 2364). In these cases ‘the person’s body is used against him, or her, in this case as evidence of identity’ (John Torpey 1998, 249, emphasis original). As such, we lose the capacity to assert our own identities, and if we situate this with regards to Foucault’s idea of the broader confessionary complex, as outlined previously, this time, instead of the individual speaking for themselves, parts of the body are made to ‘speak’ on their behalf.

I remember recently, in one of my own bureaucratic encounters, the shock that I felt when a border guard put significant pressure on my fingers as they were being scanned by a fingerprint scanner, while passing through immigration entering the United States. The thought of having my fingerprints scanned and registered gave me a sense of anxiety in itself – as many bureaucratic encounters do – but this was heightened when I no longer controlled my digits, which were now subject to the border guard’s capture. Adey explains that ‘[t]he unity of the whole body is undone by focusing on the pieces of it’ (Adey 2009, 277) and the guard’s emphatic pressing on my fingers exemplified this. While some may argue that the introduction of these technologies are relatively minor changes to our regimes of bureaucratic encounter, one must remember that over time their capacities for transformation may build-up; as Ben Anderson suggests, ‘dispossession is a matter of non-eventful and not catastrophic disruptions that accumulate’ (2016, 5).

For many, obtaining a visa or permanent residency involves being made subject to a health check, which produces a very different encounter to those that we may be familiar with, with our regular health care professionals. Here the results are for the
state that we are applying to, and are very rarely communicated to those being examined. Returning to the notion of confession, in this case the body is made to confess, but even the person whose body it is, is not made privy to that conversation. It is therefore not surprising that these encounters can have dehumanising effects, which was mentioned explicitly in several of these fieldwork encounters. The most vocal in her distress was Emma who recounts her experience:

Emma: It's in this building in Surry Hills. You go into this dark, dimly lit lift and you come out, and it's just this nasty place with plastic chairs and people everywhere and no particular explanation of what to do and everyone looks a bit confused. Then you go and you obviously have to move around to the different sections. I remember the doctor being quite creepy and there was a lady who did the basic things like, "Can you see?" and, "Can you speak English?" And the "Can you speak English?" I come from England, so even that--
Anna: So, you had to read out a text or...?
Emma: You have to read out a paragraph, which is fine. We thought it was mildly amusing, but it was very much that I have to tick the box that we'd done it, which was quite bizarre. Largely, there are a lot of people who don't speak English and they're all in this place being shuffled around from one post to another. There's no real system and it's just gruesome.
Anna: Is it clear?
Emma: Not clear at all. Obviously a lot of people have got their families. There's no place where you could send people to sit and wait if there's one of you go through the process or whatever. Oh, it's gruesome and you're there for ages. Everyone's got to wait for their different things. Someone could look at it from a time and motion point of view. It's truly horrible. I spoke English, so at least I could find out what was going on. If I was an immigrant who didn't speak English, it would be quite the most frightening experience you could imagine... Interestingly, I have other colleagues at work who've done the same thing and they all thought the same thing from their perspective, too.20

The aforementioned dehumanisation is clear in the encounter above, illustrated by the lack of explanation and direction as these people are being ‘shuffled around’. As her verb choice attests to, there is a diminished agency of individuals within this process, as applicants become subject to the demand of whichever body part or system requires testing next. This may create all sorts of responses from fear to feelings of alienation and lack of control.

Finally the outcomes of these processes need also be highlighted as a source of anxiety, and a reminder that 'political and policy decisions are often experienced in a personal

20 Notice how, in this fragment, she makes specific reference to the material environment and the impact that it has had on her, which further emphasises the arguments made in the preceding section of this chapter.
and emotional way’ (Ho 2009, 790). Questions of health were a huge preoccupation for Suzie as she applied for Australian citizenship:

I have to admit, in the process of applying for Australian citizenship, it did make me wonder, what happens here if Australia doesn't let me in because of my health issues? I did feel very– I understand the reasoning behind it– but I just felt like it was a bit prejudicial, and it made me understand a little bit more about how other people might feel. I was very angry, and very hurt by it, because thing is this, my illness - as it stands right now - it's not in remission, but I've only ever been hospitalised twice, and that was when I was very first was being diagnosed with it. But I think, of course, the concern is way down the track, that something's wrong. But I felt like we gave a good body of evidence about how I haven’t cost anybody huge amounts of money at this stage in my life and so it made me sit back and go, ‘Well, what's going to happen to me and my husband?’ Because at that stage, could we then say, forget this and move back to America, and then we follow that track about going through American citizenship, what if I have similar issues in the US? So then I’m forced to go back to England. So, it did make me think, ‘Oh, wow.’ I’ve always thought myself as an international child, and maybe I’m not. What if no one wants me [laughter]? And it made me wonder too, privately without discussing with my husband, will our relationship survive this? If they say, ‘no sorry’, is he going to say ‘no sorry’. Because when he proposed to me, he said, ‘Don’t say yes unless at some point plan on living in Australia for the rest of your life.’

Here the process she underwent in applying for citizenship had significant emotional complications; her body, with her less-than-perfect health, stood as a potential barrier,21 not only to the status of citizenship, but possibly to her life as she knew it and to her relationship with her husband. It is evident here how bureaucratic encounters can have significant impacts well beyond the bureaucratic space, they do not happen in parallel to lived life, but as a complexly interconnected part of it. This example leads us into the next section of this chapter which looks at the role of emotion within these encounters.

5.3.2 Emotion

Earlier in this chapter, in drawing on Weber’s ideal type, we noted how the perceived absence of emotion in the bureaucratic context has been a key component in

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21 While there is simply not the space to enter into this in greater detail, the possibility of her being rejected as a permanent resident, is due to a clause in the Migration Act of 1958 (DIBP [1958] 2016). Part of this piece of legislation includes a ‘significant cost threshold’ whereby entry is denied if the ongoing cost of the individual’s illness exceeds AUD$40,000. This has meant that there have been some very public cases whereby individuals have been denied permanent residency due to the belief that their (or their children’s) future medical care will come at too great an expense. Australia is by no means alone in this legislation, and there have been several other cases discussed in the media, most notably in Canada (McQuigge 2016) and New Zealand (Roy 2016).
rationalising the value of this mode of authority: ‘sine ira et studio’ without hatred or passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm’ (Weber and Roth [1925] 20, 225, vol 1.) is described as the bureaucratic ideal. However, the experiences of clients and bureaucrats show that this could not be further from the truth. Emotions and affects are present in all bureaucratic encounters, and are sensed and evaluated differently by both the client and the public servant, and two people undertaking the same bureaucratic process with the same official may have very different emotions evoked as a result of it. For some, these encounters may even cause heightened emotions. In fact emotion is required to evaluate the client and the truthfulness of their ‘confessions’: ‘[w]ithout sufficient emotional response, civil servants found it difficult to interpret how people were thinking [...] a certain level of emotional display and exchange was considered necessary to enable civil servants to perform their duties [...] [however] if personnel are of the opinion that ‘too much’ emotion is displayed by the client, they may view it as a device to coerce the civil servant’ (M. Graham 2002, 211–12).

So not only is emotion necessary in these encounters, but as the above citation suggests, there are reasonable and expected levels of emotion. Even in the bureaucrats’ understanding of the situation, emotion and sensation are once again central: ‘gut instinct’ (Friedman 2010, 179) we are told is one of the foundations on which these decisions are made, thus highlighting the emotional intensities present on both sides of the desk. Needless to say, these situations are emotionally draining: ‘[i]n many circumstances bureaucratic indifference may be more likely to be the result of emotional exhaustion [...] or even the anticipation of emotional exhaustion’ (M. Graham 2002, 211). Furthermore, we need to acknowledge that high status and high income individuals are often able to better insulate against this: ‘for the powerful, doormen and secretaries for instance, may provide a human barrier against exposure to hostility that powerless people less often enjoy’ (Hochschild 1975, 295–96, emphasis original). By getting their paperwork processed by companies, and paying extra for faster service, these individuals experience bureaucracy very differently. This all attests to the limitations of our previous approaches to this subject where ‘the emotional
force of the experience – the one thing that matters the most to people themselves – was edited out’ (Sayer 2011, 3).

It is not only emotions at play at the exact time of these encounters, but also how these can have ongoing implications for action. These emotional responses have the ability to affect the capacities of these individuals and cause them to feel differently: ‘emotions have consequences for agency [...] emotions help propel people into alternate courses of action’ (M. Graham 2002, 220). These are what Ho describes as ‘[t]he microlevel emotional dynamics to social and political structures’ (Ho 2009, 792), all of which can change individual behaviours within them. Furthermore, the anxiety of the encounter may not even be embedded in the event itself, but rather what the encounter signifies: the transition from one’s own country, a large change or a very difficult anxiety causing decision. In the context of the encounter it is often easy to forget that this may have been the culmination of a long process or that this emotive influence may come of a result of other affective influences, thus emphasising the need for non-determinist analyses.

Finally, the processes of recordkeeping and identity documentation go some way in which to regulate emotional expression. This is clearly illustrated by one of my own encounters where I accompanied my sister to get our passports renewed. Here the official found my sister’s photo problematic, she picked it up and said to her ‘You’re smiling in this photo, the police won’t accept this!’. I picked up one of the copies of my sister’s photo and looked at her dead-pan expression in it, trying to figure out how she could even consider this a smile; her lips formed a perfectly straight line. My sister didn’t say anything, so I replied for her, ‘No, she isn’t smiling, that’s just her face’, feeling how the absurdity of the comment reflected the absurdity of the moment. Here, we see the capacity of the photograph to capture the body, but also how the requirements offer possibilities to control and dictate forms of reasonable expression: ‘[passport photographs] are not natural at all. They expose the citizen-subject caught and composed for identification purposes [...] it is doubtful that, in that fraught moment of encounter with the border patrol officer, that anyone looks as neutral or as natural as our passport photos make us out to be’ (Cho 2009, 276). Emotion,
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which has been theorised as absent in bureaucratic processes, is central to them, as illustrated in the diverse examples presented above.

5.4 Times: Waiting in Bureaucratic Encounters

Through every interview that contained a description of a bureaucratic encounter – and the vast majority of them did – issues relating to time and waiting were permanent fixtures. We do a lot of waiting within these interactions: for documents, for appointments, in queues. So much of our regimes of documentation are littered with and controlled by the temporal: our passports and identity cards have expiry dates, visas are issued for distinct periods of time, and we are subject to regimes of ‘temporal eligibility’ (Robertson 2014, 1917) where our treatment is determined by our age. Just as Ferme contends: ‘the state’s control over territory and populations is often experienced as control over space-time – the duration of passports, visas, scholarships, residence and work permits, and so forth’ (2004, 110). Yet, despite all this, bureaucracy retains a distinct ‘atemporality’ (Herzfeld 1992, 164) due to its perceived permanence of the institution, and by invoking symbols of the nation, are often represented as timeless.

To return to the previously discussed techniques of power, time and waiting are of some consequence to them; studies have shown that the lower an individual is within a power hierarchy, the longer they are likely to be made to wait (Schwartz 1974; Bishop 2013). Perhaps the clearest indication of this in the context of bureaucratic encounters can be found at airports where ‘[n]ew technologies are being adopted to allow favoured, rich and highly mobile travellers to pass seamlessly and quickly through […] while other passengers face traditional, and in many cases intensifying scrutiny’ (S. Graham and Marvin 2001, 3). As Hage reminds us ‘there is a political economy of waiting, not least because ‘time is money’ and waiting can be a waste of time’ (2009, 3). Furthermore, income and status becomes tools through which waiting may be avoided, thus exhibiting the greater ‘time sovereignty’ (Elchardus 1994, 466), or control of time of some individuals.
Time is not only an indication of the relative power of the individual, but can be used as a technique of power within bureaucratic encounters: ‘In fact, time is a tangible presence in bureaucratic interactions. What bureaucrats do is to background their own management of this contestable commodity. The timing of their ploys – what Bourdieu calls tempo – is a domain over which bureaucrat and client may tussle for control [...] [this] carries implications for unequal power that can be further accentuated by skilled temporal manipulation’ (Herzfeld 1992, 163). As such, so many of the aforementioned ‘tyrannical’ acts of street-level bureaucrats are often based in the temporal, and the ability to make wait, becomes a tool of violence: ‘Time is a crucial component in concepts of the person. By brusquely delaying action, a bureaucrat can deny the client’s humanity’ (Herzfeld 1992, 165). And as such, insisting people come again or at another time is an indication of this very power.

One participant, Lucia, was subject to one of these demands which she managed to contest:

They said I had to come at six in the morning. Then I said, ‘I cannot come then, because the doors [to the convent] are closed’. They said, ‘Okay. Then we will make them now.’ It took five or ten minutes to make them, it was only bad intentions.

These cases are present in the literature as well: ‘his feeling of powerlessness in front of the agents of the state was always expressed as a conflict of ‘spatiotemporalities’, as an excessive amount of time spent in a particular (other) state or space, rooted in immobility for a long time, his mobility disrupted because of yet another problem arising from his passport’ (Ferme 2004, 107).

It is often the case that ‘foreigners’ or people occupying certain specific categories are forced to wait in very different ways to the rest of the population, of which in my own experience, I have had a very clear and material illustration:

In our first visit to this particular building we arrived mid-morning, and studied the machine at the entry which prints out numbered tickets. There were several options, however the option for ‘foreigners’ had the blue lid of a water bottle sticky taped over the top of the button. Uncertain as to whether this was a fault of some kind or done on purpose, we asked the receptionist behind the glass at the desk by the entry. She said very rudely that all the tickets for foreigners are gone, and that in order to be seen on a given day we had to arrive before 8am. Here, on the machine that provides tickets to join the virtual queue, the ‘blue lid of a water bottle sticky taped over the top of the button’ provides a very clear both physical
and symbolic illustration of some of the barriers that certain individuals face in gaining access. In this case, those who were at these offices for other functions could obtain their numbered ticket at a time of their choosing, and be served not long after. Time in this context ‘is a social weapon’ (Herzfeld 1992, 165).

The specific length of time and the circumstances under which one is forced to wait are the result of the interplay of complex considerations, one of which are the regimes of priority applied to the categories that we inhabit. Natalia’s own observations of her experiences applying for visas in Athens reflect this:

> They asked me to go to Petrou Ralli, where there is a special police office, the General I think it is called, where they refer all of the foreigners. There are massive queues, even from early in the morning it is absolute chaos. You have to get there at 6am at the latest. Of course, those who come from European Union countries – once again this is in our interests – are allowed to enter first. They open the gates and you enter. Whereas those unfortunate people that come from Asia and the like, wait for hours with their families, pushing strollers and often surrounded by kids. It is disgusting isn’t it?

This highlights Fuller’s point that ‘[t]he queue is not just a symptom of mass distribution, it is also a diagram of how bodies and bits, peoples and structures move relationally’ (2013, 209). Countless factors can influence our waiting, it can differ between times of the year and the time of the day. It may depend on the queue that you join, and often, as indicated above, it can depend on which category you fall into. Status and wealth can be used in order to insulate the individual from the bureaucratic encounter – an idea that was developed earlier in this chapter with regards to emotion – and as such there are also possibilities temporal insulation: ‘if one has money, one pays for a lawyer’s time – carefully clocked to the minute at hourly rates – to follow through the case. Otherwise, one invests enormous amounts of one’s own time and knowledge’ (Ferme 2004, 111).

The banality of waiting is such that it often makes us overlook its significance by considering it as completely normal and expected practice. At times, however, the durations spent waiting can render some of the processes not only questionable, but absurd, as Lana explains here in relation to her own experiences:

> When you have a scholarship, and you are a student here, sometimes, well, quite a few times, you go to submit your papers and you get your permit about a month after the other one expired. It is something which is completely bizarre. In other
words, you obtain your residency permit, but you had to wait so long for it that the one that you already had had expired. One month, sometimes two or three months. So you have to submit everything, and even if you do, you will still be there illegally for a period as it will have expired.

Tied up with this absurdity, is the uncertainty that goes with it, and it is often this idea of waiting, without a clear or defined end, that can be the most difficult to cope with, and it creates anxiety and worry: ‘dead time [...] is also marked by insecurity, particularly because those waiting do not know the type of work that may go on behind closed doors to facilitate their deportation. Thus waiting produces an affective response [...] [it] enhances the worry, fear and uncertainty that are part and parcel of the border encounter’ (Villegas 2015, 2368). And in this way, bureaucratic waiting can often be vastly different from waiting elsewhere due to what is at stake; for some of these decisions may have enormous implications for the way that they live their lives and the opportunities that they perceive in their future. As Conlon suggests: ‘[...] waiting is socially produced, imbued with geopolitics, and also actively encountered, incorporated and resisted amidst everyday spaces’ (2011, 353) thus enforcing the problematic nature and ‘inadequacy of a single conception of time’ (Brown 1998, 94).

5.4.1 A Typology of Waiting

As the previous section has illustrated, waiting in bureaucracy is not singular, it’s plural. It is in trying to understand this plurality, the following section outlines a three part typology of waiting. Each will start with a description of an encounter which involved this type of waiting, before analysing the form in greater detail. The first type is queueing, that is the waiting in a line which is either physical or virtual. Secondly we will consider ‘appointed’ waiting where there has been a specific point in linear clock time where an anticipated event or outcome will occur. The final type to be considered is ‘ambient’ waiting, which is the waiting that happens when there is uncertainty regarding the timing of the desired outcome or even its eventuality. Whereas the first two examples use various technologies – the number of people that must be served before you are, or the amount of time that needs to pass before you will be seen – as indicators of eventuality, this one offers no such clarification. While there are certainly other forms of waiting and enormous diversity within these types,
this triptych gives us a starting point to better understand how and why we wait and the implications of these types.

5.4.1.1 Queueing

We had arrived at the offices around 7.45 am. We were shocked to find a queue that wrapped all the way down the disabled access ramp, the whole way down the side of the building before snaking back on itself and tailing off down the road. We could not believe it. We asked at the end of the queue if this was the queue for the foreigners and the lady nodded. It was a really cold morning, and she and her son who was in a pram were rugged up. Our breath was foggy in the cool air. At about 8.15am an official arrived with a pile of numbered tickets and a police officer. He started to hand them out and it was another half hour or so before we got our turn. We were each handed a number and told to leave and not come back till after 2pm, as there was no way our number would be called before then. 

We arrived a week later just after 6am to find the line already had some 20 people in it, so we joined it in the dark and freezing cold and waited the two or so hours for the official and the police officer to come and hand out the numbered tickets. Once we obtained out numbers, we still had to wait quite a while before those who were before us were seen. When we finally made it in over an hour later we were called in separately. It was quite daunting as you could not see into this room from the outside, and you weren’t allowed to enter it until your number had been called.

Bureaucratic offices and airports are often notorious for the lengths of their queues, and, for many, the difficulty of the task may lie less in the ‘confession’ itself, and more in the difficulty of reaching someone to hear it. As the auto-ethnographic fragment above illustrates, queueing may take hours or occur in less than ideal circumstances. This example also illustrates two types of queueing – the physical sort where people line up one after another, and ticketed queueing where one waits for one’s number to be called. Queueing gives this encounter a sense of order, that despite the length of the line or the numbers that are in front of you, you will eventually be seen to: ‘[i]t seems so simple and fair. A neat, linear structure that seems to transparently echo a tidy discursive line that says something like ‘good things come to those who wait’” (Gillian Fuller 2013, 206). No matter how slow, when the queue is moving, an end is being reached. Issues may arise when the momentum of the queue is interrupted such as with queue-jumpers: ‘where ‘to jump the queue’ is indexical with impoverished moral values and antisocial civil disobedience’ (Gillian Fuller 2013, 206–7), and complaints may be made over the length of the time spent waiting, as long queues may reflect a lack of efficiency.
Especially long queues may become problematic, as queueing requires a waiting in a certain space which can render individuals unable to engage with things outside the line or the waiting room (in the case of ticketed waiting). Often long queueing experiences may force individuals to take ‘time out’ of their usual routines, which will in itself have an impact on the intensities of the encounter; these waiting experiences are diverse, not just in terms of the length of the wait, or the expectation and anticipation that surrounds it, but also through the diverse personal, spatial, and temporal contexts in which it occurs and our responses to them. As Bissell reminds us ‘waiting as an event should be conceptualised not solely as an active achievement or a passive acquiescence, but as a variegated affective complex where experience folds through and emerges from a multitude of different planes’ (2007, 277), something that one needs to be mindful of across all three of these types of waiting.

The physicality of the queue also has an impact on the individual, especially in the cases where there is more than one queue, as Louis explains here in relation to his own experiences at the airport:

[I got my citizenship because, when [my son] was six months old we went back to France. He was born in 2003. And I remember that [my wife] and [my son] were in the Australian queue and I was in the foreigners queue. And I thought, ‘I need to get my passport.’ And that’s why I ended up getting this passport.

To clarify this idea, several further points need to be made. Firstly queueing encounters like this one, become tools of categorisation that are incredibly impactful. They provide a clear and material evocation of the different categories individuals occupy, especially when the styles of waiting – by either waiting longer or waiting differently – reinforce that categorisation. As the above example illustrates, and as the following one will also, airports are notorious for these category-enforced forms of queueing: ‘[t]here is very little in international air travel quite so unpleasant as the moment you realize that a) you don’t carry an EU passport; and b) the bureaucrats at EU airports don’t particularly care about people who don’t carry EU passports [...] I just landed in Brussels after an overnight flight from [...] Dulles and found myself, along with hundreds of others – mainly Americans – on the non-EU passport line. It was one of those tightly coiled lines that provides the appearance, though not the reality, of movement’ (Goldberg 2015). In evoking the European Union we must also
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mention the corollary; while waiting may produce an affective response, the ability to not wait, or even to wait less has an impact as well. The Schengen Agreement, which eliminated the borders between many of the EU states, has created the absence of a border, a regime of ‘not waiting’, eliminating the feeling of passing from one space to another thus minimising the awareness of difference.22

5.4.1.2 Appointed Waiting

On the day that our appointments rolled around we arrived back at the prefecture 15 minutes early and climbed the stairs to the next floor. I remember watching the girl in front of us walk up the stairs with a folding stool thinking gratefully that now that we had appointments, our wait shouldn’t be all that long. I was once again mistaken. Following the girl to the office that we had our appointments at upstairs, we were shocked to find the waiting room overflowing. There was barely any standing room, and the room was uncomfortably warm despite the chill outside. The girl that had arrived before us found a space, unfolded her stool and took a book and a thermos from her bag.

As the above encounter suggests, having an appointment sets the expectation for a specific event to happen at a specific time; appointed waiting gives us the capacity to leave the space of waiting while still being confident that our turn will come. It allows us to do the waiting elsewhere. We need to be aware of these presences and absences and the atmospheres of waiting. Whereas ambient waiting – as discussed below – is a form of waiting in absence, appointed waiting requires both absence (until the time of the appointment) and presence (waiting in the waiting room on the day of the appointment).

Here there may be several points of contestation. The first of these is in relation to how long one must wait for an appointment, and just how much power that individual has to dictate the details of this appointment. This reflects back on questions of power and waiting that were addressed earlier: often those with the least power wait the longest for their appointments and have the least ability to contest when they will be seen to. Furthermore, wealthy and high status individuals can hire services that do the waiting for them, or may receive priority or expedited treatment. Having an appointment for a specific date and time does not necessarily mean that

22 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to further investigate how the EU changed these waiting regimes for European citizens, and thus this has been addressed only in passing. For further discussion relating to the other aspects of the European context, please see Chapter Three, and Chapter Six which looks at how this regime has become embedded in imaginaries.
the individual will be seen to at that particular time. Being forced to wait beyond the
time of the appointment can create a sense of anxiety and injustice: the wrongdoing is
acutely felt because it can be measured in minutes, hours and sometimes days. The
time of the appointment sets an expectation of an end point – or at least a time at
which the individual will be served. When the appointment passes and one has not
been served – many bureaucracies are notorious for their delays – there is the sense of
having been misled, and as time progresses past the time of the appointment,
aggravation often ensues.

5.4.1.3 Ambient Waiting

Anna: Was [your residency permit] hard to get?
Mayumi: Difficult in what sense? To be honest, it needed a great amount of time.
It took more than one and a half years.
Anna: Did it need a lot of running around?
Mayumi: No, not so much running around, but it took a very long time and I just
didn’t know when I would get it. Then after, it was very inhumane. They didn’t tell
you when it was ready, you had to go to the police and see if your name is on a list
outside. There are so many people, I mean there is a list of say 1000 names and
you have to go through it all to see if yours is on it.
Anna: So they don’t give you a date? So it’s just pass by whenever you can and
check it?
Mayumi: Yup, come by and check the list. That is all they tell you.
Anna: Did you go often?
Mayumi: Once every two or three months. I wasn’t worried, because I had the
blue papers, but I was concerned... Look I didn’t really have a problem, but it was
stressful. I would go every two or three months and there were names
everywhere, and I mean everywhere.

The final type of waiting, is ‘ambient’ waiting, which described a period of indefinite
waiting: one that has uncertain timelines and sometimes uncertain ends as Mayumi,
one of my participants illustrates so clearly in her encounter above. These extended
periods of uncertain waiting leaves individuals ‘feeling outside the ‘normal’ time of
mainstream society’ (Griffiths 2014, 1992), and highlights the suffering that time can
gender (Medlicott 1999). There is a certain irony to the use of the word ‘ambient’,
as it suggests something that exists in the ‘surrounds’, which it may be for some, but
for others the anxiety and uncertainty is very much fore-grounded, like the case
exhibited in the ‘interruption’ that follows where the respondent ‘was living in that
student security check stage for five months’. His choice of words shows how pervasive
this waiting is: he is living in it. As Conlon explains: ‘waiting is not something that
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takes place in suspended time or outside of ‘doing’ things, but instead [is] an active intentional process, integral to constructions of subjectivity and ‘significantly shaping the lived life’ (2011, 357).

Finally, we once again need to acknowledge that the diversity in encounters and people’s responses to them, as Hage explains: ‘differences between the various actors, not just in what kind of waiting they engage in, but also in the intensity with which they do their waiting’ (2009, 8). ‘Ambient’ waiting can be done in both an active and a passive way: one may ring up and enquire, they may look for other options, or may engage in many of the acts of resistance that were outlined much earlier in this chapter. Or they may just wait, and even then this may be seen in more active terms as a ‘celebration of one’s capacity to stick it out’ (Hage 2009, 97). Thus we begin to see the diversity of ways in which these waiting styles are encountered. The Interruption (Interlude) below will illustrate one such case in greater detail.

5.4.2 Interruption (Interlude): Amir’s Story

After discussing the topic of time, I now wish to interrupt it, or rather interrupt the flow for this chapter to highlight how many of the ideas that we have outlined in the earlier stages of this chapter, emerge within a single narrative. Our narratives of citizenship and bureaucratic encounters are intricate experiences that involve the interplay of countless variables which are all reflected on and responded to by the individual. But by breaking up these elements, by considering them one by one, we are obscuring the seen, heard and felt narratives in all their complexity. The following interlude is taken from my interview with Amir and shows just one of countless permutations of these experiences. It evokes several ideas that are central to this chapter, and in order to maintain the intensity and richness of the narrative, I have highlighted three of these central ideas in different colours. The sections in red highlight his emphasis on the temporal and the role that time and timing play in his account. The green segments expose his repeated mentions of the lack of information, and of being kept in the dark, as well as his attempts to make sense of these delays. Finally the blue sections highlight his emotive responses to this situation. His story will be followed by a brief analysis of these three points.
**Amir:** Now, what I say is my own conditions. I don't generalize that into all [my national] community or anything... So if I compare with my friends, many of them - like, 80% of them - have not been this bad, unfortunate. But this is what happened to me now. I lodged my student visa application to Australia. I had all the documentations that they need, and I'm very organizing, making all of the documentations very, very clear. I lodged that and I waited – it's normally to take less than three months, is the average that the website also says about the student visas. I waited six months and there were no response sort of thing from the DIAC. Now, I got very anxious back then...from my own, let's say, education goals and this sort of things, I was losing opportunities... And at the same time, my own peers were getting into best US universities, so I felt very, very frustrated. DIAC was not replying anything. They were just saying – after one month of lodgement, the case officer told me to do the medical examination and everything, which essentially means that she's okay with my documents as for the immigration perspective, not the security check. But after that, I went through the security check, which– they don't mention the word security check. They said additional checks or these sorts of things. I was living in that student security check stage for five months – or – I don't know, whatever, until I got really frustrated. Now, after six months, I started to think about applying to the other countries and other universities. I tried for another TOFL exam for some of these very top universities, much higher – higher marks. I was writing to all the professors, 'Do you want a PhD student?' and this sort of thing... But anyway, I still wasn't get any answers. I randomly applied to these universities and I was – at the same time I was calling to the Embassy of Australia, asking about –

**Anna:** 'What are you doing?!

**Amir:** No clear answer. Now, longer story short, after eight months of my visa lodgement to Australia, my case officer wrote to me saying that your security check is passed, give me a new ECOE - Electronic Confirmation Of Enrolment - to issue your visa. It took me 21 days to get that issued again from –

**Anna:** Why? Just to get the [?] –

**Amir:** It was just laziness of the admin. Because I did everything. I had the new scholarship issued before that. I had the new admission before that, but just printing one thing and sending that to me – but it took so long for them to do that. The craziest thing is that when I sent that confirmation of enrolment back to the case officer, I got this automatic reply email which says that I'm on leave and contact this other case officer. I did that - didn't get any reply. Waited one week - no reply. Called the Embassy, and there were one speaker [of my language] on the phone which didn't give any sort of information. He just was saying that it's okay, wait a little bit, we will come back to you. And nothing happened. It was very, very frustrating. Now, after calling them several times, that speaker [of my language] told me that the case officer sent your profile back to the security agency again [chuckles].

**Anna:** Why?

**Amir:** I said, ‘Why?!!’ So I contacted the case officer and she said that, 'Because you have renewed your passport while you were [inaudible] security check, I had to send you back for security check again with your new passport.' Now, the interesting thing is that before I renew – because it was close to expiry date when I was waiting for visa. Before I renew that, I contacted the previous case officer and said that, ‘Look, this is the expiry date. I have been waiting for this visa. Do I renew my passport or do I not?’ and I exactly said that. Does it change the process of my visa or not? And she said that it doesn't change at all your process, and
renew it and send to me – send me the copy of the new passport as soon as you get it, which I did. I forwarded the same thing to this new case officer and she never replied. Anyway, it was passing eight months. I applied to 15 other universities and it was in different countries, because I had this very, very bad experience with Australia and I put all of my eggs in the basket of Australia, so I didn't want to do that again. I said okay, I will get three admissions from different countries and I will apply to all of them, for visa. Now, it was about eight, nine months through my visa to Australia that I got – I started to get admissions from different universities, and it was all the universities that I didn't think that I would get admitted there with a scholarship.

Amir: So anyway, after 11 months, they eventually randomly sent me an email saying that your visa has been issued, go and get it. I didn't book a flight until I went to the Embassy and they stamp that [chuckles] visa into my passport. I didn't trust the email. I waited five days to go to the Embassy and stamp that thing. The worst thing is that they do not give you any feedback. They didn't– during this whole process of the security check, eight months or so since they first came back and said that your security's passed, they never ask me that we want such and such document, or this part of your life is not clear to us - explain that to us. Or we have problem with that thing or this thing. If they were giving me feedback, I could've provided them with information. I have no idea what's– why this process is so lengthy, and why they do not contact me to ask information if they want. Either they are trying to figure out the information themselves, or not. In both cases they can contact me and ask me.

Amir: One thing that I forgot, back then for my student visa application, I told you that after eight months they came back to me and wanted new ECOE. Then I got them and they didn't say anything, and they sent my profile back to the security agency. After ten months, they got back to me and they wanted my updated CV. That is the only thing that they want for me after ten months –

Anna: That was different.

Amir: No! So I – only –

Anna: Sat at home [chuckles].

Amir: Only I guess one or two of my papers which was under review back then were accepted, so I just included those two papers and I submitted my CV back again. I immediately got a phone call from the speaker [of my language] who said that from specific date to another specific date, what were you doing? And it was from the day I lodge my visa application to that current day [chuckles].

Anna: And what had you been doing?

Amir: I said okay, I was sitting at home. He didn't say what were you doing, he said, ‘Where were you working?’ I said I didn't work anywhere. He said, ‘So what were you studying?’ I said I didn’t study [?]. ‘So what were you doing?’ I said I did blah-blah-blah. He said okay, write all of that and immediately email that to me. He said several times, immediately. I don't know, they were sitting ten months there and now they say immediately. So I sat and wrote about one page and a half, and I– in detail I said what I was doing in this ten months - sitting TOFL exam, getting admission, getting something, blah-blah-blah, reviewing that journal paper, revising that journal paper, helping other student, and all of that, in one-and-a-half page, and I sent that to them. I don't know.

[...]

Amir: Even the stuff that I'm telling you is just guesses, because there's no
information about what is this system that does the security checks, and what are the basis of that? DIAC doesn't give any answer or information, so it's just– and everybody has their own limited number of people around them, and it's just a limited number of different experiences and they want to put– And assumptions too, because I suppose you sit down and go, 'What is it about me that people might find problematic?'

[...]

Amir: .... now with the PR application here. I applied for permanent residency 11 months ago. I had all the documents and everything, and again the same as the student visa application - the immigration part went very smooth, I did all the medical checks and everything, and now I have been in this security check stage for more than nine months. No, less than nine. About nine months now. And again, the immigration doesn't– like, exactly same story, exactly same scenario. They don't tell me if they want more information and what is it that the results are not coming. At the same time, they don't accept or reject that. It's very annoying because you cannot plan for your life.

[...] Amir: I carry this feeling of insecurity with me around all the time. Part of that is because before, during that very– a few months that I was in [my country] and it was– my visa application was not coming through, and I didn't start to look into other university. I was losing my opportunities. I had a very, very bad time, feeling of insecurity, feeling of losing the future. I was very, very hardworking during all my education. I couldn't just imagine that I cannot– I am losing my goals. Now, that feeling has yet remained with me and here, I know that compared to my home country, for example, it is a safer country, it is– everything is more– what you say? There is regulations for everything, so I should naturally feel safer here. But that is not what is happening. Inside I don't feel safe because I'm asking myself why have I been treated differently? What is it? I don't get answers, and it's– this feeling of insecurity, it's a very bad feeling for me.

Throughout this text we see many references – as highlighted in red – to the counting and measurement of time. These are not only linear calendar time, as he counts down months and days, but also notions of the future (his 'education goals'), his expectations surrounding the time of the process ('less than three months') and the relative time in considering his peers ('my friends were getting into the best US universities'). His words also show just how much this waiting affects him, and in returning to our typology of waiting, most of this narrative expands on his experience of ‘ambient’ waiting. He speaks of ‘living in that security check stage’, suggesting precisely how pervasive the waiting is. The different expectations of time between bureaucrat and client are also evoked, especially in relation to demands over time: ‘they were sitting ten months and now they say immediately’. Here it also shows the changing rhythms; where waiting abruptly ends and rapid action is required – something Griffiths describes as a ‘temporal rupture’ (2014). It also shows the
importance to the bureaucracy of how one spends one’s time, as indicated by their need to account for the eleven or so months between the start of the process and their request for that document. One might also notice that the words ‘renew’ and ‘expire’ have been highlighted to emphasise that even documents have time frames within these encounters and the role that they have played in this narrative. This example shows how his waiting is both active and passive; initially he allows time to pass, but when the experience prolongs, and he is still confronted with a lack of information, he starts being more assertive, and looking for other options: he applies to other universities, he calls and sends emails to the embassy, and in one much longer part of his interview that has not been included here due to space limitations, he even recounts his attempts to speak to the ambassador in order to progress his case. All of these reflections on the temporalities of this encounter, reinforce the previous mentions of the multiple conceptions of time.

The number of the green sections speak to the frustrations that Amir had in trying to understand this process. They are reflective of the fact that while the ‘confessionary complex’ requires clients to confess, the information does not flow both ways: ‘agency of domination does not reside in the one who speaks (for it is he who is constrained), but in the one who listens and says nothing’ (Foucault [1976] 2008, 62). Here Amir tries on many occasions to find out about his application, and yet the bureaucrats are particularly closed lipped: ‘the worst thing is that they do not give you any feedback’. He tries to understand the delays in this process on his own, and relies on his own ‘assumptions’ to make sense of it, but the fact that there are no clear answers, and no explanation for these delays means that he has come to conclude that there is something about him that may be of issue: ‘I suppose you sit down and go, ‘What is it about me that people might find problematic?’’. His prolonged waiting and the lack of response from the authorities has become a source of interrogation and uncertainty that he applies to himself. This is a personal response that is not only triggered by the circumstances, but also by the individual.

Finally, the blue sections suggest his emotive responses to these situations, not only at the time at which they occurred, but also how the uncertainty and insecurity evoked
in that period extends so far beyond it. He describes being ‘frustrated’, ‘annoyed’ and ‘insecure’, and yet these feelings were so pervasive during that particular experience that they have endured: ‘I carry this feeling of insecurity around with me all the time [...] I had a very, very bad time, feeling of insecurity, feeling of losing the future [...] that feeling has yet remained with me’. This shows how the experience of the encounter can echo far beyond it.

There is so much more within this short extract than the three themes which have been highlighted above. He comments on the importance of documentation and the care that he puts in to having everything organised – ‘I had all the documentations that they need, and I'm very organizing, making all of the documentations very, very clear’ – and the fact that he did not believe that he had the visa until it was adhered to his passport, showing the value assigned to the materiality of paper within these encounters. He also speaks in his account of the different people that he spoke to, and the role they played, as individuals, highlighting the impact of specific bureaucrats. This ‘interruption’ shows exactly how several of the complex factors that have been outlined previously within this chapter emerge within the encounters of one particular individual.

5.5 Conclusion

Citizenship as status, and the countless and inherently complex and diverse bureaucratic encounters that bestow it, test it, question it, deny it, illuminate and strip it are inseparable from the identities of individuals, their emotions and perceptions, and how these interactions fit into the understanding of themselves within their own personal narratives. What this chapter has illustrated is the way in which these bureaucratic encounters are felt, sensed, rationalised and understood and the impact that they may have on our complex, fluid, and contested personal narratives. One can draw some broad global understandings from these interactions, such as the huge power differences between civil servants and their clients, how waiting can cause anxiety or be used as a tool of violence, even how the material objects of bureaucracy bestow identity. However, what this chapter most clearly illustrates is the considerable
fluidity within these processes and how the experience of a bureaucratic encounter can differ so drastically, reinforcing the need to look past the policy approaches that see these processes simply as either successful or failed applications. Here we have focused on three specific areas, the spaces of bureaucracy, as exemplified by the role of desks and paper; the centrality of the body in bureaucratic processes regardless of more traditional claims to the contrary; and finally how time and waiting are present in bureaucratic encounters. From my fieldwork encounters the ongoing effects of these experiences are evident, as exemplified by Amir’s pervasive feelings of insecurity, and thus greater attention needs to be given to the transformative capacities of these interactions rather than viewing them simply as ends in themselves.

Every day, usually unknowingly, we take part in countless acts of evaluation, calculation, and action based on social imaginaries. As such, ‘imagination permeates our decision-making, routinely enters our thoughts, is a domain in which individuals immerse themselves regularly, and in the form of collective imaginings, can inspire social change’ (Adams 2004, 277). Yet, acts of imagination and imaginings take up a relatively marginal place within the social sciences, and there are considerable advantages in developing these concepts further. This chapter will build on the existing literature on social imaginaries by providing a new approach to the subject that better integrates individual acts of imagination and considers the ways in which the concept can be used to highlight the diversity within conceptions of citizenship, and help us to theorise how citizenship is understood and acted upon in lived lives.

One of the most cited texts of the social sciences in the past three decades is that of Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* ([1983] 2006). Perhaps part of the allure of this theorisation is that imagination is a useful tool for explaining things – in his case the national community – that cannot be conceived of solely through the usual forms of interpersonal connections or objective material reality. This approach also allows
the illustration of how these imaginaries are mediated by material technologies, which help both construct this imaginary and maintain it. Citizenship – like the nation – is imagined. It is embedded within collective social imaginaries, but also comes to be articulated through individual acts of imagination, and is informed by assemblages of paperwork, policy, bureaucracy, as well as stories, conversations, and practices. Furthermore, citizenship is constantly being reimagined: ‘through the stories told, the imaginaries circulated, the rules naturalised, and the practices repeated over and over again’ (Amin 2012, 96).

The idea of imaginaries being informed by both collective and personal acts of imagination is missing from the academic literature on the subject: ‘[m]ost authors who write about imagination are, in fact, writing about collective imaginings’ (Adams 2004, 278). As such they fail to take into account the influence of individual acts of imagination. This focus on the personal is made all the more prominent by the ‘twin processes of autonomization and responsibilisation’ (N. Rose [1989] 1999, xxiii), and the more general turn towards the focus on individual choice which will be explained in greater depth later in this chapter. Furthermore, this approach to imaginaries provides us with a means to grasp how citizenship emerges initially through the imagination: ‘it is in this realm of assumptions, fears, and prejudices that citizenship in both its de jure and de facto guises is invented prior to its installation in actual practices ‘on the ground” (Painter and Philo 1995, 108). There is a pressing need to better understand how citizenship is imagined.

Citizenship also intersects with other related imaginaries. To better illustrate this, consider the example of the ‘American dream’, which extols ideals of opportunity and social mobility. This imaginary, found in countless forms through speech, literature, policy, films, and even on the Declaration of Independence, becomes a catalyst for the imagination of one’s own future circumstances. Take this quotation from Strauss’ book Emergency where he recounts the comments of a friend given over dinner: ‘I wanted to become a citizen for the opportunities’ he finally continued. ‘In the Czech Republic I had no future. In America anything is possible. Anyone can become whatever he wants. It’s all happening here. There are a million different paths and
choices and careers open to everyone who lives in America. And no matter what happens politically, they can’t take that away” (Strauss 2009, 156). This trope has come to colour general understandings, yet specific acts of imagination in this context take on a personal flavour: the ‘dream’ emerges not in an abstract form but through imagining the possibilities of a quality education of their children, or their personal business success. The American dream has also had an influence on migration narratives more generally (Barsky 1995; Pileggi et al. 2000), and its endurance speaks to its force in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Finally, despite the pervasiveness of this imaginary, one cannot assume that it emerges in the same way within personal conceptions, or even that there are not individuals that reject it entirely.

As this chapter will illustrate, while the collective focus of imaginaries is useful in understanding more general orientations, there is also insight to be garnered through individual imaginations, which serve as a reminder of the individualism that is inherent in citizenship itself (Yeatman 2007). Furthermore, notions of imagination and imaginaries are useful especially when we consider that citizenship is an ‘ongoing process of private negotiation’ (Leuchter 2014, 783). Thus, this approach will fill the gap left by many of the existing theorisations of imaginaries and imaginations that have failed to grasp these more specific personal orientations: in the academic literature there is no ‘mention of how individuals react to, think about, discuss, and act on their imaginings’ (Adams 2004, 280). All of these aspects will be considered within this chapter in relation to citizenship.

More specifically, this chapter will address this issue in five sections. Firstly it will provide context by looking at the ways in which we understand and imagine both futures and the present, and the diverse ways in which the concept of imaginaries has been theorised within the social sciences. Secondly, this chapter will address the role of cosmopolitan mobile imaginaries and the way they become embedded within individual orientations towards citizenship, but also how individual perceptions and circumstances may enforce very different orientations. It also considers the ways in which material artefacts come to inform these imaginaries. The third section deals
with inheritance imaginaries, starting with the notions of how birth and birthright have long been associated with citizenship and how this has informed parental desires for multiple statuses for their children, as well as the ways in which European Citizenship has become attractive to those dual citizens living outside Europe. The following section focuses on (in)secure imaginaries and explains how in the context of insecurity, citizenship comes to be imagined as both an opportunity and a risk, as well as how having a ‘passport in a drawer’ is seen as a tool of security. Finally, inertia and ruptured imaginaries are considered by looking at the ways in which individuals act, do not act, or react, in relation to these imaginaries. The broader narrative arc of this chapter will consider both citizenship and imaginaries, and look at how the points of intersection between these two concepts provide illumination for both.

6.1 A History of Imagination(s) and Imaginaries

Imaginaries and imagination are socially and historically situated, as such, before considering citizenship imaginaries, one must first have a general understanding of the context in which these imaginaries emerge, as this has an impact on both their form and their substance. Acts of imagination do not exist in isolation, rather they are embedded within ideas regarding the present and expectations of the future. As with the approach to citizenship outlined in the previous section, this chapter makes the novel intervention of seeing how individual acts of imagination come to inform imaginaries, and will illustrate some of these specific imaginaries in the context of citizenship. The second part of this section will consider the few examples that we have of how social imaginaries have been theorised within the social sciences.

6.1.1 Imaginaries and a History of the Future

Imagination and imaginaries are historically contingent, not simply in the sense that imaginaries are inherently contextual – which they are – but that the orientation to the future and the feeling of possibility that individuals and groups have over their lives shape the way in which they are imagined, and thus the imaginaries that emerge. Individuals may still have the capacity for imagination outside these contexts, but in understanding the orientations towards the future, the considerations of possibility,
and who may be involved in these acts of imagination, gives a more general understanding of the form. This section will provide a brief history of conceptions of ‘the future’; it is however important to note that the narrative outlined here builds very much on the development of concepts of the future within western thought, and may not be applicable in all contexts.

Notions of futurity are by no means static. At our current historical juncture, we are incredibly future-focused: we plan, calculate, and project into the future as well as perceive a rapid pace of technological advancement and change. As such ‘the future is thought of as resonant with possibilities’ (Giddens 1991, 77), yet we are also subject to a pervasive feeling of uncertainty and indeterminacy: the rapidity of change has led to feelings of instability. As Adam explains, ‘contemporary daily life [...] is conducted in the temporal domain of open and fluid pasts and futures, mindful of the lived past and projectively orientated towards the ‘not yet’” (2010, 361–62). Thus imaginaries are important not just in understanding the here and now, but also in the conception of the possibilities for future action.

Historically we have progressed through some very different orientations to the future. These orientations, which Ben Anderson describes as ‘styles’ (2010), not only dictate the ways in which we understand the future, but have implications for how we act upon it. As Adam and Groves (2007) demonstrate in several broad strokes: in ancient times, myths and legends highlighted the role of fate; tragic heroes fighting and not succeeding in escaping their destiny. Religions as well had their own variations on what the future was and how best to function with regards to it. With the scientific revolution came the notion of a form of future that was replicable: combining the same ingredients under the same conditions should create the same outcome. Then, with the rapidity of technological development and notions of progress, the future was seen as a void; to be ‘colonised’ by the individual (Giddens 1991, 112). Recently however, this model is starting to fall away in favour of another: ‘the fiction of the empty future [...] is starting to disintegrate [...] [w]e are beginning to recognise that our

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23 Not to be confused with Benedict Anderson who appeared previously. Unfortunately the work of three B. Anderson’s, and an L. Anderson have been used in this thesis so first names have been included.
Encountering Imaginaries

own present is our predecessor’s empty and open future: their dreams, desires and discoveries, their imaginations, innovations and impositions, their creations’ (Adam and Groves 2007, 13), and as such we are coming to terms not only with the fact that our future actions are limited, but more generally, there is greater awareness of the possible ongoing consequences of our actions.

Due to these current articulations of pervasive uncertainty, our visions of the future will be inherently unknown, and thus our imaginations may concurrently contain both utopic and dystopic visions: ‘disclosing the future as surprise means that one cannot then predetermine the form of the future by offering a deterministic prediction. Instead, the future as surprise can only be rendered actionable by knowing a range of possible futures that may happen, including those that are improbable’ (Ben Anderson 2010, 782). In these dystopic futures, one cannot know the shape of possible disastrous events, and so we consider the many possibilities. Massumi explains ‘threat in today’s world is not objective. It is potential’ (2007, 5), thus, our generic uncertainty and our openness to the future result in certain inclinations regarding ways to act in order to protect against various futures. Furthermore, ‘the politics of the turbulent unknown’ (Amin 2012, 148) – a consequence of the perceived threats such as terrorism and climate change – have meant that both states and individuals are increasingly likely to be involved in preparation against future threats, something that will be discussed more explicitly in the section on (in)secure imaginaries.

Whereas imagination was once the domain of the elite, whose rank gave them the authority for deciding on the futures of the masses, our present period emphasises the role of the individual creating and sustaining their own futures: ‘the imagination [...] has become part of the quotidian mental work of ordinary people [...] it is no longer a matter of specially endowed (charismatic) individuals, injecting imagination where it does not belong. Ordinary people have begun to deploy their imaginations in the practice of their everyday lives’ (Appadurai 1996, 5).24 On the subject of immigration

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24 This makes a similar point to the one that has been made in the methodology chapter with regards to the largely overlooked premise of the use and importance of the interview. It is the same broader changes that
we have also come to better recognise the agency of the ‘entrepreneurial’ migrant (Portes, Guarnizo, and Haller 2002). These notions of individuals as able to pursue their own futures has meant that ‘ordinary lives today are more often powered not by the givenness of things but by the possibilities that the media (either directly or indirectly) suggest are available’ (Appadurai 1996, 55). While the notions of ‘the good life’ that circulate through forms of media may indicate these more collective ideals, these imaginaries have become democratised, and individuals are seen and see themselves as having greater freedom to decide and strive for certain ends.

The value assigned to individualism and choice also arose through the pervasiveness of neoliberalism; Aihwa Ong, in her widely cited text Flexible Citizenship highlights the ways in which mobile individuals are subject to neoliberal influences and thus openly extol both the value and the need for flexibility (1999). This, coupled with the focus on capacity-maximising and entrepreneurship (Bröckling 2015), ensures that value is assigned to imaginative individuals. The realms of finance have instilled in us concepts of futures as being something that we are able to insure against or invest in. Furthermore, the anticipatory action that is inherent in neoliberalism, encourages individuals and organisations to labour to stay ahead of the markets, an orientation that encourages planning for the future, even if those plans do not eventuate. Thus, the ‘ordinary experience of pre-occupation and immersion in the forthcoming’ (Bourdieu 2000, 207; in Adkins 2009), is a common habit for those living in the developed world today.

The individual nature of imaginative acts is further reinforced by the ways that people are governed on the basis of greater individualism than had existed in the past: ‘[…] an enabling state […] will govern without governing ‘society’ - governing by acting on the choices and self-steering properties of individuals, families, communities, organisations. This entails a twin process of autonomization plus responsibilisation - opening free space for the choices of individual actors whilst enwrapping these

gave the authority to individuals (rather than those in power), to both think for themselves (in terms of imaginaries and acts of imagination) and speak for themselves (in the context of the value of an interview). Furthermore, this should come as no surprise, as thinking and speaking are entangled acts.

25 I deal with neoliberalism only in passing here given its in depth treatment in the next chapter.
autonomized actors within new forms of control’ (N. Rose [1989] 1999, xxiii). These ‘twin processes of autonomization and responsibilisation’ further place the possibilities of not only imagination, but acting upon it, in the hands of individuals and validates not just their individual choice, but their capacity to choose. This particular claim must be made with caution, as this capacity for choice is not available equally to all parts of a given society.

Jessamyn West is quoted as having once said that ‘the past is really almost as much a work of the imagination as the future’, and our imaginaries are as likely to shape our narratives of the past as they are to help us construct the possibilities of our future. To this however we must add the idea of circulation: these narratives are not only constructed and reconstructed, but they are shared; we often judge our own capacities and experiences through those of others. This can in part explain our increasingly global orientations: ‘few persons in the world today do not have a friend, relative, or co-worker who is not on the road to somewhere else or already coming back home, bearing stories and possibilities’ (Appadurai 1996, 4). Thus, the past experiences of another become our imagined future, and these encounters unfold through time and space. The past of others as well as our own becomes one of the key materials for imagining the future, as well as making sense of the present: ‘the future is known, not through the guesswork of the mind, but through social efforts, more or less conscious, to cast ‘jetties’ out from an established order and into the uncertainty ahead. The network of reciprocal commitments traps the future and moderates mobility’ (Jouvenel 1967, 45 in Adam and Groves 2007, 8). It is this concept of imaginaries which gives us the possibility of conceptualising how past, present, and future become enmeshed in the ways in which we understand the world in general, and, citizenship in particular.

Some consideration needs to be given to the circulation of these imaginaries. While more traditional means such as storytelling and hearsay continue to circulate, new technologies of communication can contribute to their diversity and range: ‘for the new power of the imagination in the fabrication of social lives is inescapably tied up with images, ideas, and opportunities that come from elsewhere, often moved around
by the vehicles of mass media’ (Appadurai 1996, 54). To this list of media, storytelling and hearsay; we must add stories, movies, books, news articles, and social media which has further given scope to the circulation of these imaginaries, as well as who is able to be involved in their production. Whereas once content was under the control of organisations, these new technologies have created opportunities for information to be circulated to a broader audience.

6.1.2 Imagination in the Social Sciences

The notions of imagination and imaginaries appear with regularity within the social sciences, yet concerted efforts at specific theorisations are relatively few in number: ‘the literature on imagination is incipient, leaving many areas unexplored and containing few works even on those areas that have been covered’ (Adams 2004, 280). This section will outline some of the key texts and approaches in this area, while considering how these texts fit with the concept of imaginaries that has been outlined in this thesis. Finally, it serves to mention that this section does not attempt to be exhaustive on the subject of imaginaries beyond social scientific formulations. As such, other theorisations of imaginaries, such as in the psychoanalytic theories of Lacan (Mellard 2006), as well as Sartre’s less social and more psychological account ([1936] 2012), have not been included.

Arguably the first systematic theorisation of the notion of imaginary comes from Cornelius Castoriadis’ text The Imaginary Institution of Society ([1975] 1997). In understanding both how the social world is understood and structured, he explains the extensive scope of what may be included within an imaginary: ‘[t]his element – which gives a specific orientation to every institutional system, which overdetermines the choice and the connections of symbolic networks, which is the creation of each historical period, its singular manner of living, of seeing and of conducting its own existence, its world, and its relations with this world, this originary structuring component, this central signifying-signified, the source of that which presents itself in every instance as an indisputable and undisputed meaning, the basis for articulating what does matter and what does not, the origin of the surplus of being of the objects of practical, affective and intellectual investment, whether individual or collective – is
nothing other than the imaginary of the society of the period considered’ (Castoriadis [1975] 1997, 145, emphasis original). However, while his account provided a novel theoretical contribution, it is marred by several weaknesses. Firstly, this theorisation sees social imaginaries as abstracted and largely unchanging within historical periods. Secondly, his account is dichotomous, making the common distinction between what are broadly traditional and modern societies, but giving a bare bones analysis of the diversities within these two forms, or how change is effected in this system. Thus Castoriadis’ account is based on more abstract considerations of ontology, which are difficult to engage with in non-theoretical terms.

The next text is Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities ([1983] 2006) which explores how the nation is imagined. His use of the term ‘imagined’ emerges from the idea, that since all the members of any given national community will never meet, the cohesiveness of this community comes from the fact that they are imagined as belonging together. While Anderson’s main thesis saw the importance of ‘print capitalism’ to this process of the spread of ideas of the nation and the national community, we can expand this concept to consider that citizenship and all the structures and documentation that surround it, are also in some way imagined; to his discussion of the census, the map, and the museum – technologies of imagining the nation – we may add the passport, the visa, and the identity card – technologies for imagining the citizen. Citizenship is itself an abstract concept that has emerged out of theorisations of nation states, which are themselves ideologically based, and thus will always be in some way imagined. This imagination is mobilised and materialised through countless technologies of the state, from passports to borders and government offices, and numerous things in between. And certainly, as Benedict Anderson clearly evokes in his work, just because it is imagined, or at least in part a product of the imagination, does not make it any less real: ‘it’s real because it can kill you’ (Graeber 2015). Many things in our daily lives exist, not due to their ‘givenness’ as highlighted by Appadurai (1996, 55), but rather by the countless acts of imagination from which they are constructed.
To our short list of theorisations we must also add Mill’s *Sociological Imagination* ([1959] 2000), in which ‘imagination’ in this sense is an outlook that has ‘the capacity to range from the most impersonal and remote transformations to the most intimate features of the human self and to see the relations between the two’ (Mills [1959] 2000, 7). Consequently, this is a different formulation to those of the aforementioned Castoriadis and Anderson, as it theorises imagination as a lens – a way of thinking – disciplined and disciplinary. Nevertheless, this conception has captured the imagination of other genres and disciplines who speak of Ethnographic (Atkinson 2014) or Criminological Imaginations (Young 2011). Thus within the social sciences there are several examples of the word being used in this sense.

The idea of a social imaginary has also been developed by Charles Taylor. In his conception, a social imaginary is ‘the way our contemporaries imagine the societies that they inhabit and sustain’ (Taylor 2004, 6), which can be applied to citizenship as a tool of social organisation. In considering the concept, he states that it is ‘the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations’ (Taylor 2004, 23). The usefulness of his account is that it also indicates the pervasiveness of these imaginaries: ‘[this new conception of modern social order] has now become so self-evident to us that we have trouble seeing it as one possible conception among others’ (Taylor 2004, 2), which is also applicable to the concept at hand. Furthermore, he provides an analysis of how these imaginaries can become the basis for action: ‘[social imaginaries are] a common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy’ (Taylor 2004, 23).

In addition, in building on these existing notions we have more recent work emerging in the discipline of Science and Technology Studies. Here, drawing on Actor-Network Theory, and other sources, Jasanoff and Kim among others, have developed the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries, which is the ‘collectively held and performed visions of desirable futures animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and
technology’ (2015, 4). It is this particular theorisation that will be drawn on more heavily within this chapter. In this conception, imaginaries have both empirical and epistemological implications, but in the context of this thesis it provides the grounds for a better understanding of the role of the material within these imaginaries and the impact that it has more broadly, in understanding how they are conceived of and circulated.

The deployment of imagination within this chapter, and this thesis at large, builds on various aspects of the above conceptions, but also diverges somewhat from them. As with all of the theorisations mentioned above, this approach accepts the situatedness of these particular imaginaries: ‘imagination is reflective of particular cultural and historical contexts’ (Benson 2012, 1684). However, greater emphasis will be given to our roles as agents of imagination, and the realisation that our lives themselves are ‘partly imagined’ (Appadurai 1996, 54), while still conceiving of the impact of sociality on these imaginations. Furthermore, imaginaries never exist in isolation; they intersect with other imaginaries, of family, of friendships, of what the ‘good’ life looks like. And thus imagination is concurrently social, in the sense that it exists in common among groups of people, and individuals: ‘the work of the imagination [...] is neither purely emancipatory nor entirely disciplined but is a space of contestation in which individuals and groups seek to annex the global into their own practices of the modern’ (Appadurai 1996, 4). Furthermore, it is important to reinforce that imagination is both the tool for the maintenance of certain imaginaries, but also something that causes their change – both ‘glue and solvent’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2015, 39) – something that in the domain of Sociotechnical imaginaries is known as co-production.

### 6.2 Cosmopolitan Mobile Imaginaries

The longing for a cosmopolitan lifestyle is not an uncommon one. Many of us may have the desire to travel to diverse parts of the world and to live in exotic places. Regardless of our personal incentives for change, be it for warmer climes or for more employment related reasons, the possibility of ‘[m]igration in itself comes to function
as a technology of the imagination in which envisioned migratory trajectories open up imagined worlds and possibilities’ (Vigh 2009, 105). The desire for a more cosmopolitan lifestyle produces an openness and the imagination of the possibilities of lives that could be lived elsewhere. Cosmopolitan orientations too are themselves imagined as ‘cosmopolitanism [is] a perspective, a state of mind’ (Hannerz 1990, 238).

This section will illustrate how these more global imaginaries become articulated as ‘folk expressions of metanarratives’ (Skrbis and Woodward 2007, 745) and in doing so will help us consider how ‘[i]imaginaries [...] encode not only visions of what is attainable [...] but also how life ought, or ought not, to be lived’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2015, 6). Furthermore, it will illustrate the ‘ambivalent and largely self-centred relationship to cosmopolitan experience that rest[s] upon an individual’s embracing of cosmopolitan experience in some realms and a fear or rejection of cosmopolitan ideals in others’ (Skrbis and Woodward 2007, 745). This section will address this issue in two parts, firstly looking at the ways in which these cosmopolitan imaginaries emerged in the fieldwork encounters, and how they came to circulate. The second half will provide a counter argument, showing how the stratified nature of citizenship and divergent individual perceptions and orientations suggest that we cannot assume that all individuals ascribe to these ‘shared’ visions.

6.2.1 ‘The World is Open to Me’: Status and the Possibilities of Work and Travel.

Discussions of the concept of cosmopolitanism often evoke the notion of ‘openness’ (Skrbis and Woodward 2007, 734), yet, the sense in which it is used articulates the individual’s openness towards the world. The fieldwork encounters, especially with participants who had multiple citizenships, or were aspiring to, often expressed that these statuses opened the world to them, the clearest case of which is Louis, a French, British and Australian Citizen. He comments:

Having several passports it has always given me the sense that I’m a kind of– the world’s open to me. That gives me the right potentially to go and live anywhere I want.

For many, like Louis above, having more than one citizenship has changed the way that they see themselves and their possibilities for the future. This is not to say that
having multiple statuses will mean that he will take up this opportunity to ‘live anywhere [he] wants’, but that his awareness of this multiple citizenship, leads him to imagine these possibilities, in this or other lives.

The advantages of multiple citizenship are often imagined using the language of cosmopolitan mobility: as a means of obtaining access to the world. These statuses are seen in terms of the possibilities for individuals to live and travel elsewhere. In conceiving of cosmopolitan experience as desirable, these additional citizenships become tools to facilitating these possibilities. Grant mentions this in relation to a friend, where his comment belies some envy of this ‘trifecta’:

*I think having the ability to have a European passport is massive, really. I've got a friend of mine, who's also English, and he lives in Bondi. He also married an Australian girl and he's got the trifecta. His dad was American, so he's got an American passport, obviously he's got his British passport, and he will soon become a citizen of Australia so he'll have— you've kind of covered the world there*.26

While this expresses a cosmopolitan orientation, what is also noticeable is the absence of any indication of the traditional content that one may associate with citizenship; it is articulated not as being part of any specific community, but rather in terms of the spaces that these ‘passports’ give him access to. Furthermore, his vision is a telling one in the way that the world is ‘covered’ by just three citizenships, which speaks either to the ease of movement that these passports provide, or even a reflection of his view of the primacy of these three destinations. These notions of the usefulness of multiple citizenships will be further developed in the next section of this chapter on inheritance imaginaries.

While the circulation of these imaginaries has already briefly been mentioned, it is often surprising the specific images or stories that they make reference to. One of the most unanticipated aspects of this research was the frequency with which James Bond was evoked within interviews. As Louis comments:

*You look at all those James Bond movies and things that are... it is just that having several passports [chuckle], it's like, ‘Which one will I use today?’ There's probably a little of a cool factor I suppose, not that it should be the reason why you are doing it.*

In a similar vein is a comment made by Grant:

26 In case it is not clear, the trifecta he refers to here is having US, British, and Australian Citizenship.
I've always wanted a second passport [laughter]. I mean, who doesn't? You kind of feel this slightly international man of mystery thing by having more than one passport.

Finally, Natalie, comes to a similar conclusion:

Someone told me that when you're going to any other country, you can completely choose and that they choose based on whatever's, like - if they don't need a visa for a while. But, I just find it a bit weird. I feel like James Bond [laughter].

What these comments suggest is that in having multiple passports, they either evoke Bond’s image or ‘feel’ like him. Despite the seemingly tangential link between 007 and citizenship, it is perhaps not surprising that the image of James Bond emerges within these discussions. He is par excellence an example of the unfettered individual who navigates the world without barrier; paradoxically, while being an agent of a government, he seems to be beyond the control of other states (and occasionally his own). As such, Bond seems to be a fitting allegory for the desires of current mobile individuals. Further to this, it was a diplomatic passport that became the backdrop for one of the first advertisements for Ian Fleming’s Bond books. The advertisement was headlined with ‘Diplomatic Passport 0094567 – Bond J.’, and reads: ‘Where would you find James Bond? He’s the man being hustled through US customs minutes after the plane has touched down...’ (Brittany 2014, 195). It is difficult to suggest why this particular image emerged more frequently than any other: whether there are class (all three come from higher income brackets) or national (all three are British citizens) aspects that relate to why Bond has been mentioned, or whether it springs, as Louis suggests, from the desire to feel a little ‘cooler’ than we really are, or even the appeal of subterfuge in presenting one document over another.

It may also be a result of the passport as being the material evocation of this cosmopolitan mobile imaginary. Not only do passports, as was discussed in the previous chapter, play a key role within concepts of citizenship, but they are also a continuing presence within the Bond franchise and similar genres of spy films.27 Thus it may be the role that the passport plays in these films – or even the visible presence

27 In a curious aside, the recent exhibition (opened in October 2015) of ‘Bond in Motion’ at the London Film Museum – advertised as being ‘the largest official collection of original James Bond vehicles’ – also included a cabinet containing a considerable number of the prop passports – some of which were used for their ‘real’ identities and others in the names of aliases – that had been used in the films, by Bond and other characters, thus further suggesting the impact of these documents in the franchise.
of having more than one passport, in both the films, and in the dual citizen’s hand luggage – that triggers this feeling of being James Bond. The passport becomes what Sherry Turkle describes as an ‘evocative object’ (2007), and more generally, this supports Jasanoff and Kim’s ideas regarding the material foundations of these imaginaries (2015). It is the imaginary of what the passport constitutes and the repeated acts of that passport facilitating (or not facilitating, as the next section will illustrate) travel between countries, which also evokes these imaginaries of cosmopolitan mobility outside of the image of James Bond. The passport itself is considered more generally as a symbol of mobility and opportunity: ‘[the passport] was imagined to embody other life possibilities’ (Leuchter 2014, 787). Thus ‘the ability, or at least the imagined ability, to choose between different life opportunities and scenarios becomes increasingly coveted’ (Leuchter 2014, 784). The possibilities for imagination emerge across bodies through the various images and technologies in different environments, as such, the image of James Bond, and the materiality of the passport, suggest that notions of cosmopolitan mobility have come to infuse citizenship in general, and dual citizenship in particular.

6.2.2 Tempering Cosmopolitanism: Hierarchies and Individual Difference

A common criticism of notions of cosmopolitanism is the claim that they represent elite orientations and class dynamics (Calhoun 2002) and that the cosmopolitan ‘openness’ referenced above fails to consider those who lack the capital, social or otherwise, to live these lifestyles. So the desires for, and possibilities of, ‘actually existing cosmopolitanism’ (Calhoun 2002, 869) need to be contextualised. This is also a reminder that many of these acts of imagination, and social imaginaries depend, more generally, on the context of the individual, yet cannot completely be determined by it. Part of the novelty of this approach, in comparison to some of the existing conceptions, is precisely its ability to step away from theorisations that see imaginaries as applicable to all. This section will illustrate how the presence of these cosmopolitan mobile imaginaries are not equally applicable to all individuals, either as consequence
of their status and how they imagine their place in the world, but also as a result of individual experiences and dispositions.

While the previous section highlighted how the passport is conceived of as a tool of mobility, this depends largely on where the particular passport is from. As will be discussed in greater detail in parts of the following chapter, there are companies that offer citizenship planning, and in doing so, they produce various metrics for ranking citizenships. Arton Capital produces a Passport Index which lists the number of countries that a particular passport can gain visa free entry to. According to the 2016 Passport Index, Germany is the country with the highest rating, with visa free entry into 158 states, followed by Sweden on 157, while at the other end of the scale is Afghanistan (24), Pakistan (27) and Iraq (29) (Arton Capital 2016). While these ranking systems are in themselves a crude measure, they provide a useful indication not as an objective comparison, but as a signifier of the immense inequalities between statuses.

Thus the notion of a passport as a tool of cosmopolitan mobility is predicated on the fact that it is a ‘good’ passport. This is evidenced by Kapllani in his own experiences, and the experiences of others, that he outlines in the Short Border Handbook: ‘[b]orders and walls live for the most parts inside our pockets. I become aware of this each time I stand at passport control, because at these checks, there are two categories of people: bearers of ‘cool passports’ and everyone else – people holding ‘bad passports’. If you’ve got a ‘cool passport’, you’ve got nothing to worry about. Borders are nothing more than invisible lines, a trick of the imagination, geographical lines as translucent as the light of the Mediterranean. Having a ‘bad passport’ on the other hand, changes everything. It means you have border syndrome, and every crossing you make becomes an unforgettable incident, an event in your existential calendar’ (Kapllani 2009, 155). This highlights that the conception of the passport as a tool of mobility – one that renders the world ‘open’ or ‘covered’ as described in the previous section – depends on what passport you are carrying.
Whether through indices or these more vernacular hierarchies, there are a number of ways in which the inequalities between citizenships come to be circulated. These too are linked with preconceptions of what particular nations or nationals are like, reminding us that ‘the national people is a paradigmatic case of [a] modern social imaginary’ (Gaonkar 2002, 5). These ‘nations’ exist as the result of vast networks of history and power, which are themselves represented in these conceptions. It is why people perceive a hierarchy of citizenships (Castles 2005), and it is why we speak of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ passports. In some parts of the world, individuals covert their national identification as exemplified by their passport(s): they collect them and fetishize them (Gordillo 2006). In others they, burn them. This reflects on the vast differences in the ‘opportunity structures to which individuals are entitled [as citizens which] is a blind spot, if not the ‘black hole’, of citizenship theory’ (Shachar and Hirschl 2007, 274).

Whereas so far migration has been imagined as a tool of opportunity, this too needs to be reconsidered. In focusing on the advantages of cosmopolitan movement, the assumption is that the individual will be able to improve their life. This may not necessarily be the case, and the perception of the advantages of openness and movement are not imagined in the same way among all individuals. Here Diana explains this in relation to her own experiences:

Firstly, given the fact that I don’t know how to speak English means that the very thought of travelling to another country for work verges on science fiction. Secondly, I have lived here in Greece for so many years, and because I have lived through experiences of racism [...] I don’t want to go to another country and live through that all over again. For that reason I am not even going to consider it and I believe that if I have to go to another country, it will be incredibly hard. It is only for certain young people like you who know another language, that have a Master’s Degree or a Doctorate, in other words you would be quite able to work somewhere else with what you have already done. I don’t believe that I could ever go to a place like Germany, even if I could speak the language and easily find work there and be on par with the average German, especially since I have regretted being part of all of this [migration to Greece]. There is a common proverb in Bulgarian and I consider it to be completely correct. The saying is that ‘every stone has its own resting place’, and it is so true. I don’t know. I don’t think

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28 This is an oblique reference to the Hamag, those individuals who burn their documents prior to undertaking clandestine migration, which will be discussed in the following chapter, see also (Omoniyi and Omoniyi 2016).
it is even that good. I honestly believe that if people were able to find decent work in their own countries they wouldn’t do it.

There are several points that need to be made here. Firstly, given the primacy of the English language as the closest thing that we have to an international lingua franca, the possibilities for mobility and the types of mobility one has access to, are influenced by it. In addition, it may be those who are unable to speak the language that may imagine it an insurmountable constraint. Here we also see the importance of including diverse narratives within our approaches to the subject of citizenship, including those from non-English speakers. As she says herself, given the fact that she does not speak English limits the possibilities for her. Furthermore, her reference to ‘science fiction’ is also telling, in suggesting that while she has imagined the possibility of migration, she has rejected it as being beyond the realms of possibility. Her narrative also shows how desires for mobility come against the harsh realities of experience, something that will be discussed further in the ruptured imaginaries section of this chapter. Diana’s comments also remind us that: ‘[i]t may therefore be that highly educated immigrants are better able to envisage certain applications to which dual citizenship could be put’ (Amit 2014, 398). The final comment that needs to be made regarding Diana’s insights considers the role that sayings and proverbs have in informing our own thinking. Here she mentions the Bulgarian proverb ‘every stone has its own resting place’, and one can see just how informing this is to her own understandings of this topic. Proverbs may also be a means by which imaginaries circulate.

One of the risks associated with the concept of social imaginaries, as it is theorised in the academic literature, is that it may obscure the way that personal desires and values come to shape individual imagination. For those who are lucky to have it, a (good) passport is a document of potentiality, and a possible object that we can bring into our ‘colonisation’ of the future. However, even having two ‘good’ citizenships does not dictate that the individual in question will have any desire to live a more cosmopolitan lifestyle. Here Heidi discusses her two sons, both of which are dual citizens. Within her comments the individual preferences and personal dispositions of the two young men are evoked, and the differences between the two, despite having grown up under similar circumstances are telling:
It is, sometimes you return to a specific place and you say to yourself ‘Ah, the light of the sun, the very smell of the land, and you think: this is home’ and it even goes so far as what your parents taught you, how much of a patriot you are, what sort of personality you have. To my sons I have never said anything bad about Germany [where they are also citizens], or even anything bad about any other country - nothing, nothing at all. But my youngest is so connected, so tied to this topos, for him it is the only place that matters [...] and that is a question of individual character. He says that he wouldn’t be able to live in [a neighbouring town] or anywhere else for that matter. While the other one, he wants to leave, he wants to discover the world. It is a story which is incredibly complex, and I honestly believe that every individual is different. It is obviously something which is very personal, but often these differences aren’t given enough attention.

At the very heart of our decisions made regarding citizenship, are the ways in which we perceive our life trajectories. Just because one has the option to pursue a more cosmopolitan lifestyle does not mean that it is desired and often it is these more personal orientations that are missing from theorisations of cosmopolitanism and dual citizenship. This works as a reminder that just because a particular imaginary exists does not mean that people will not think and feel differently to the circulated conventional logic. As Amit reminds us: ‘if the motivations, identifications and viewpoints of people actively choosing to immigrate and to naturalise in their adopted country are neither simple nor obvious, the orientations and viewpoints of their children who may have inherited their status are even less predictable’ (Amit 2014, 397).

Given the ‘elite’ basis of some of the cosmopolitan conceptions, it is perhaps not surprising that counter imaginaries exist in other contexts. Vigh discusses one such example in his research into urban youth from Bissau: ‘this social imaginary is related to a global awareness from below: an understanding of a world order consisting of societies with different technological capacities as well as levels of masteries over physical and social environment [sic.], as well as the spaces and social options which are open or closed to persons of different social categories within it’ (Vigh 2009, 93, emphasis added). So imaginaries can also function as a tool of restraint, where a given individual’s position may cause them to feel like they are constrained, or that they are in a situation which they are unable to overcome.

While there may be no denying the allure of the cosmopolitan imaginary for some, not all individuals ascribe to it, or imagine it in the same way: ‘[cosmopolitanism] is an
increasingly prominent, available cultural discourse – and ideal – but one that conflicts with an array of other social and personal imperatives, and thus does not always find full flowering’ (Skrbis and Woodward 2007, 735). The restrictions faced by some, as well as the role of individual dispositions and acts of imagination are all mediating factors in this context, reminding us that just because there is evidence of a circulating imaginary does not ensure that all individuals ascribe to it in equal measure, if at all.

6.3 Inheritance Imaginaries

As has been outlined in Chapter Three, historically conceptions of citizenship have had a great deal to do with birth and birthright. Whether the particular national conception be based on the principle of *ius sanguinis* – ethnic conceptions of citizenship based on blood – or *ius soli* – citizenship by virtue of being born in a particular place – both engage with the idea of citizenship being bestowed at birth. This is the standard practice for ‘97 percent of the world’s population’ (Joppke 2010, 9).\(^{29}\) Heredity has been central to notions of citizenship, and this section will look at the ways in which birthright citizenship comes to intersect with parental desires for ‘good’ lives for their children. In the first instance, it will consider just how these hereditary notions are embedded in citizenship, and how the perceived advantages of multiple citizenship have engaged the parental imaginary. Finally, the idea of European citizenship will be considered in particular to show how its perceived value for hereditary Europeans and their offspring, has created a divergent citizenship imaginary that circulates outside of Europe.

6.3.1 Inherited Multiple Citizenships and the Parental Imagination

It is perhaps a truism to suggest that the vast majority of parents want to give their children all they can to succeed in life, and it is part of this imaginary of the ‘good life’ that inherited multiple citizenships have come to play a role. Yet, the imaginative possibilities that a parent applies to the future of their child differs to the way in

\(^{29}\) I am surprised by the very small amount of research which takes this into consideration.
which they imagine their own futures. This too is embedded in the contextual concerns as outlined in the beginning of this chapter: ‘[m]ore people than ever before seem to imagine routinely the possibility that their children will live and work in places other than where they were born: this is the wellspring of increased rates of migration at every level of social, national, and global life’ (Appadurai 1996, 6). These concerns will be addressed in the section that follows, however, as was highlighted in the preceding section, this desire for hereditary dual citizenship may be mediated by the perceived value of that particular citizenship.

We live in societies where choice is highly valued. Opportunities are seen as good things that we wish to give to our children. Briefly consider this excerpt of a conversation between Mark and Amanda on the reasons why they pursued dual citizenship for their children:

**Amanda:** [Dual citizenship] is giving [our children] choices.

**Mark:** Yeah. Opportunities.

**Amanda:** Yeah. That’s the majority of the issue, is having options to be able to do more things. And certainly for them to be able to travel to Britain freely, and then to be able to travel freely throughout Europe, was the main reason why we wanted to give them British passports.

As has been mentioned previously, future possibilities are strongly culturally inscribed: this particular discussion evokes imaginings based on the ‘cosmopolitan scripts’ (Appadurai 1996, 63) that were addressed in the previous section. This invoking of the notions of ‘options’ and ‘opportunity’ also acts as a tool with which they can justify their actions, and, as Benson mentions, these more commonly held assumptions also go some way to reinforcing the imaginary: ‘action on the basis of a social imaginary both confers legitimacy on the individual and reproduces the moral order’ (2012, 1684). Given that the image of ‘the multiple-passport holder [displays] an élan for thriving in the conditions of insecurity, as well as the turbulence of global trade’ (Ong 1999, 1), it is quite natural for parents to want this for their children.

However, given the enormous differences in the conditions within states and the different levels of access and treatment of individuals, there are also moral and ethical implications: ‘scholars of citizenship have to date failed to turn their gaze to the largely analogous form of strict intergenerational transfer that still persists in the realm of
birthright transmission of membership entitlement’ (Shachar and Hirschl 2007, 274). These considerations are made all the more pertinent as hereditary citizenship can even continue beyond the second generation. Consider Grant’s comment below:

I’m very keen to pass on both my British and Australian citizenships to my children, and also their children, because I think some of it goes back to grandparents as well.

So, in this instance, not only is Grant considering the ways in which hereditary dual citizenship rights will bestow great benefits on his children (which he has not, and reinforcing the notion of the uncertain future, may not ever have), but he is also commenting on the fact that he wishes to pass on his citizenship status to potential grandchildren. While this is telling, both regarding his conceptions of the value of the status and the modes of hereditary transmission, it also says something about his projections into the future: he is planning on passing on his citizenship to his grandchildren, that is the children of the children that he is yet to conceive. But perhaps this is the point: the fact that he (currently) has neither children nor grandchildren, allows him the possibilities of imagination that may not have been available if they were already existing; their non-existence gives him the blank slate to consider them in any way he wishes. However in eventually obtaining these citizenships for his children, or even simply discussing his intentions to, he reinforces this possibility for others: ‘[i]f the understanding makes the practice possible, it is also true that it is the practice that largely carries the understanding’ (Taylor 2004, 25).

These projections into the future on behalf of one’s offspring raises the question of what it is specifically about ones’ children – or in this case one’s children’s citizenship – that not only allows, but encourages such leaps of futurity. Parent participants had the contrary perception when they spoke of their own citizenship and its possibilities. Here James considers the reasons behind obtaining Danish citizenship for his children:

Obviously, if they ever wanted to go and live in Europe for a period of time, they can do it without having to go through all the hassles of paperwork and visas and all that stuff. That’s the only reason. But I have no intention of going back myself. It’s only for the kids.

Here his use of the word ‘obviously’ is telling. As he sees it, the advantages of Danish citizenship are obvious, not just to go and live in Denmark specifically, but also in
Europe at large, which is what will be addressed in the section that follows. This desire for multiple statuses would seem ridiculous to those who may have been living in previous historical periods, where dual citizenship was seen as morally reprehensible and likened to bigamy (Spiro 2010, 114). While the parents among my participants were open to the possibilities for their children, there was a closing of the imagination with regards to the possibilities of their own lives. Thus, this suggests that depending on the situation, we may have different capacities to imagine futures.

6.3.2 European Citizenship Imaginaries

Ever since the implementation of European citizenship in 1992 under the Maastricht Treaty, it has been a topic of considerable scholarship. Some works have considered the changes that it has made to our conceptions of citizenship and rights more broadly (for example Maas 2007; Delanty 2007) and, others have focused on the ways in which European citizenship develops a broader European identity (Delanty 1997; Lehning 2001). While, as one would expect, much has been written regarding European citizenship and its impact within Europe, the literature rarely, if ever, mentions the impact it has had among hereditary Europeans who have migrated abroad. The possibilities of travel and work in the European Union have changed the conceptions of the respective national citizenships, highlighting the opportunities they engender. As Louis explains:

I look at all the Australian friends that I have and all of them will have actually one of the European citizenships, they really value that, because for them when they go backpacking or when they go to Europe, it’s easier for them to be able to work and that’s an advantage that you can gain.

Given the high numbers of migrants who arrived in Australia from Europe following the Second World War, along with the various hereditary conceptions that the particular national citizenships may have, there are a considerable number of Australians with European citizenship. While precise figures are very difficult to come by, this idea of a useful ‘European Passport’, either in regards to themselves or their children, was articulated by all participants who had both an Australian and a ‘European passport’. The frequency of these claims, and their discussions of them with friends – as seen in Louis comments above, and on Grant’s comments earlier in

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30 A notable exception to this is (Leuchter 2014).
this chapter where he mentions the ‘trifecta’ – illustrates a broader social imaginary in this context. This also links to the popularity of a European ‘gap year’ among young Australians.

Once, again, we must not underestimate the importance of personal orientations. Here Omar, a Greek-Australian who obtained Greek citizenship through hereditary means, explains how it was his father, that pushed him to apply for the status:

The first reason, and probably the most predominant reason, is that my father – who is Greek – told me I should get one. I think he’s under the impression that he wants us to – so we can go on holiday in Europe, and can stay as long as we like. Not that I ever really see myself living there.

While the value of European citizenship is highlighted for work and travel – like with the case of Omar above – several of my participants who fell into this category indicated that they had little intention of moving there or moving back as the case may be. Instead, this ‘European citizenship’ was conceived more in terms of its mobility aspects and temporary access to the labour markets. What was interesting however, is that in asking participants who had a ‘European citizenship’ and had lived in Europe for extended periods to discuss their thoughts on the topic, the same discourse of ‘access’ and ‘opportunity’ was missing. While the methodology used for this thesis can make no judgement for the applicability of this further than the participants involved in this research, this observation opens up the possibility that the imaginary of the advantages of European citizenship with regards to labour market access and opportunities for mobility, circulates more freely within the Australian context.

When Milena describes her joy in ‘having the burgundy’ with the accession of Romania into the EU (in reference to the colour that is used on all European passports) she reinforces that her particular citizenship is of greater value as a ‘European citizenship’ rather than simply a national one. This has been also understood by policy makers, and the ‘appeal’ of European citizenship has been used for geopolitical ends. Some European Union states with more ethnic conceptions of nationhood have mobilised the carrot of European citizenship to attempt to lure ‘lost’ populations living in neighbouring countries, such as in the case of Hungary with
regards to their populations in Romania prior to Romania’s own accession (Kovács 2006) and in Bulgaria in relation to their populations in Macedonia (Neofotistos 2009). This suggests the ways in which European citizenship has been imagined differently by different populations.

However, returning to the case of European citizenship in Australia, the promise with which these antipodean ‘Europeans’ hold their citizenship, has often not had the opportunity to be tested: ‘[t]he imagining of the privileges associated with these [European] citizenships does not necessarily correspond to the ability to realise them. In fact, their implementation requires, by and large, residence and command of the local language, which makes them irrelevant for most’ (Leuchter 2014, 783). The impact of coming up against a situation where one’s imaginary is questioned in the contest of citizenship will be considered within last section of this chapter on ruptured imaginaries.

6.4 Imaginaries of (In)Security

At the time that the New York Times and other American news outlets were announcing Trump’s win in the 2016 US Presidential Election, they were also broadcasting the story of the Canadian Immigration website crashing due to the enormous number of visitors (Kassam 2016). Other stories explained how individuals were seeking either to renounce their American citizenship or to obtain citizenship to another country in response to the election results (Bromwich 2016). Similarly, in both the lead up and wake of Brexit, the Guardian ran stories about the increasing number of individuals applying for citizenship in other – mostly European – locations (O’Carroll, Marsh, and readers 2016), with many applying for Irish citizenship in particular (Addley 2016). While the precise numbers of people obtaining dual citizenship and their reasons are hard to determine, what is perhaps the most telling and of the greatest interest to this thesis is the obvious articulations of an imaginary of citizenship offering security (in getting another one) and another offering insecurity (in the need to renounce it).
The reactions to the election and the referendum fit within the context of general feelings of pervasive insecurity: there is a ‘new apocalyptic imagination coursing through Anglo-American public culture. This is an imaginary that, by design or default, draws a parallel between diverse threats such as global warming, health pandemics, natural catastrophes, technological risks, and international crime and terrorism, seeing them as perturbations of a world system on the edge of breakdown or, at least, one so complex and interconnected that it continuously generates new and escalating risks.’ (Amin 2012, 138). Thus, as Giddens explains, in seeking to act or conceive of the future: the ‘assessment of risk – or the balance of risk and opportunity – becomes the core element of the personal colonising of future domains’ (Giddens 1991, 129). There is often an interplay between these utopic and dystopic visions: ‘imaginations of desirable and desired futures correlate, tacitly or explicitly, with the obverse – shared fears of harms’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2015, 6), and as such – as hinted at by the notion of (in)security – they will be dealt with together rather than separately.

While there are numerous examples of these broader imaginaries of crisis that circulate within society, the role that citizenship has to play in this is less obvious. Questions of (in)security also offer us the context with which to see how imaginaries intersect. One such example is how the perception of insecurity evokes the belief that we will be safer elsewhere (imaginaries of mobility), and thus the possibilities of the passport as a tool of security enter into this equation. Whether or not these individuals ‘use’ their citizenship as a response to the perceived threat – in this context at least – is less relevant, but rather what this section is interested in is the way in which citizenship is imagined in light of these risks. This section will consider the ways in which citizenship has become part of these social imaginaries of (in)security.

6.4.1 Neurotic Imaginaries

In theorising the importance of individual encounters within the context of citizenship, there is an underlying assumption that these are active individuals rather than simply governed passive subjects, which is further emphasised by the approach in addressing individual acts of imagination in addition to social imaginaries. It is within
this same acknowledgement that Engin Isin evokes the idea of the ‘neurotic citizen’ that acts on neuroses and fears: ‘[t]he neurotic citizen is not a passive, cynical subject but an active subject whose libidinal energies are channelled towards managing its anxieties and insecurities. The neurotic citizen actively mobilises affects and emotions and governs itself through them’ (Isin 2004, 232). In evoking this image of the neurotic, he highlights the fact ‘that people not only conduct their lives with affects and emotions but also in the absence of capacities for evaluating full and transparent information’ (Isin 2004, 220). Thus in seeking to consider how notions of (in)security come into being, we need to acknowledge these acts of interpretation: ‘the viewer after all construes what she sees; in turn the viewer’s capacity for observation is socially trained in ways that delimit what she can perceive’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2015, 19).

In theorising imaginaries as both individual and collective – as is being done in this chapter – we open up a reflection of how some of these circulating images and stories re-emerge applied to personal circumstances. What was perhaps the most telling was the role in which these narratives played in people’s minds, even when, sometimes from their own attestations, these futures were highly improbable. Take Suzie’s explanation for her reasons for naturalising:

_I would say the biggest incentive was - because we have children, we have two kids [...] not that that's really an issue, but my parents have horror stories. One of my mom’s friends was American and had come over to Australia with her husband, was unhappy, met another Australian, and decided to stay. Married him– no, she's Australian, met an American, married him, they had a child when they were physically in Australia. Because they weren't married yet, their marriage wasn't legal, because she was still waiting for a divorce from her first husband. Her American husband, because he was American, they had real issues declaring citizenship for her child that was born in Australia [...] not that anything like that is going to happen but things like that have been in the back of my head._

(Emphasis added)

While Suzie here attests to the fact that ‘not that anything like that is going to happen’ we can see from the way in which she has absorbed the narrative that she has taken it on within her own imagination of possible futures: someone else’s past circulated through storytelling, functions as trigger for the imagination of her own future. Still the narrative that left its mark is quite telling, because a brief investigation into the policies related to these concerns would have indicated that this event (as she illustrated herself) is, if not impossible, then highly improbable. This disjoint
reinforces the image of the neurotic citizen ‘whose conduct is based not merely on calculating rationalities but also arises from, and responds to, fears, anxieties and insecurities’ (Isin 2004, 217). It is wrong however to completely reject her anxiety for two reasons. The first is that we can never completely rule out the possibility, only comment on its likelihood. Secondly, this imagined situation is real in its impact on her: ‘[fear] acts just as palpably whether the threat is determinate or not. It weakens your resolve, creates stress, lowers consumer confidence, and may eventually lead to individual and/or economic paralysis’ (Massumi 2007, 6). While the situation itself may not eventuate, her emotional responses, and its role as a catalyst are both very real.

Here is another example, where David, in his early thirties, is motivated towards citizenship due to political events:

Living in Australia, the Afghan War had just started, and the parents had advised that I do [obtain dual citizenship], on the grounds that John Howard [the then Australian Prime Minister] was very much pro-conscription. The idea was that I should have a second passport, should it come to pass that mine was confiscated, and I was asked to get drafted. That way I would have a way to not have to go to war.

In David’s conception, and in this version of the narrative at least, citizenship is a means by which to overcome the (unlikely, and with regard to the intervention in question, un-eventuating) possibility of conscription. It is useful to consider this for a moment: he is reacting to the possibility of a policy that did not even exist yet. Rigid notions of policy as either in force or not, fail to consider the ways in which individuals come to take on these legal considerations: ‘[l]aws came to be remembered even if they were never enacted, with many migrants [...] citing retracted legislations – those that were proposed, debated, but never passed – as a source of their increased insecurity or as a reason for their changed habits in navigating the city or interacting with [...] citizens’ (Hepworth 2015, 8–9). Therefore, the legal framework while not unimportant, still functions to illuminate only the law itself, and fails to consider how these policies are taken on in either pre-emptive or reactionary capacities, or even how they come to present a different shape through misunderstandings. What individuals respond to more than anything is the sense of the law or their own understanding of
its probability and consequences; they rarely have a global conception of its implications. Thus, laws and policies exist at least in part through acts of imagination.

While the section that follows will consider how an additional citizenship is seen as a tool for security, Svetlana below reminds us once again that individual conceptions can create different outlooks. In this case, citizenship is not seen as an advantage, a secure status, or being part of something, instead it is seen as a risk. Svetlana comments:

*It doesn’t give me any form of security. So what can it give me anyway? Only the right to come and go as I please in Europe. I don’t care, I will go get a visa. Anyway, I travel fairly freely in Europe without it. To head to the US, I will go and get a visa. I prefer to waste my time on these sorts of things rather than having an identity card that will never give me the feeling of security [...] There are no benefits at this point in time to have a Greek identity card [...] I much prefer having a Russian passport and that is never going to change [...] I feel that [in getting it] you will be even more indebted for things that you haven’t even heard of. Somehow it will tie you down, and it will demand things from you.*

Her comment that ‘there are no benefits at this point in time to have a Greek identity card’ stands in direct contrast to the perceptions of this status as outlined by others in earlier sections of this chapter. While her context of economic crisis Greece, with the political uncertainty and the harsh new tax measures (Malkoutzis 2016), will likely have played a role, there is something that she finds troubling about the status. Her statement of ‘it will demand things from you’ also evokes more traditional ideas about the responsibilities of citizenship, which have been largely absent in other individual’s comments, apart from a few references to taxation. This is also an interesting case as it provides an almost opposite account to some of the others who saw having Greek citizenship as great personal advantage. This shows that there are subjective elements to notions of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ passports, or even how individual dispositions as well as circumstances come to shape how citizenship is imagined. While this is Greek, and thus European citizenship, the same narratives of advantage are not there. In addition, Svetlana currently lives in Greece and professes to be there for the foreseeable future. She has been married to a Greek man for many years but she has no desire to naturalise, even despite mentioning her husband’s wish for her to do so. In her imagination, Greek citizenship ‘doesn’t give [her] any form of security’, which is the complete opposite of the perceptions of many others.
6.4.2 ‘Passport in a Drawer’: Citizenship as contingency

In contrast to Svetlana, several participants saw a second citizenship as a tool of security. But in doing so, they tended to make a distinction between their two (or more) citizenship statuses: one was seen as primary to everyday life, and the other was usually imagined in other terms, such as in the context of mobility or security. In a number of cases, the passport for this ‘second’ citizenship was not renewed and others described it as simply ‘a passport in [a] drawer’. As such, this section will consider three points, firstly, how citizenship is imagined as a tool for security. Secondly, what the idea of having a ‘passport in a drawer’ says about citizenship more broadly, and finally, it will illustrate an example of what happens when this idea of a ‘backup’ citizenship comes up against the more traditional concepts of the duties of a citizen.

In the context of the insecurity of financial crisis Greece, Heidi mentions how her German citizenship fills her with ‘a sense of security’:

> I would never want to lose my German citizenship, not because I have some sort of nostalgia for it, but for me, it has always seemed to give me a strong sense of security. If, for some reason here things happen and everything goes to hell, or even something else, or even something of a more personal nature - I have the right to return to Germany and say ‘Look, here I am, do you want me? Don’t you want me? Well, you have to at least give me the basic welfare amount’ - Basically, my thinking follows along those lines.

Here she explains how her German citizenship gives her a feeling of security, especially in what she perceives as an increasingly uncertain context. Yet, the citizenship that she relies on for her security ‘if everything goes to hell’ comes from the country of her birth where she has not lived in for almost thirty years. While traditionally, citizenship is often articulated in terms of rights and responsibilities, this particular perception focuses on the rights (‘well, you have to at least give me the basic welfare amount’) with little regard to contributions, or the fact that she has not lived there for many years. Furthermore, she indicates the unquestioning certainty that she has of her German citizenship in the claim that Germany has ‘to give [her] the basic welfare amount’. Despite these perceptions, citizenship is not necessarily stable. This instability may be foretold by changing policies which strip people of their citizenship, and of this there are countless examples. Recently in the Australian context, individuals where stripped of their citizenship if they were believed to be part of a
terrorist organisation (Safi 2016), or in Germany, changes were implemented to their
dual citizenship laws, to close a loophole that was being ‘exploited’ (Caglar 2004).

The idea of citizenship as a tool of security is also articulated by Natalie:

> At the end of the day if I split up with [my partner] and I move back to the UK, it
doesn’t really matter that I’ve got two [citizenships] because so many people do. I
had a friend who grew up here, and lived here her whole [life] – and she just had
an old UK passport sitting in her drawer– because [of] her dad. I think even if I
went back, I wouldn't then revoke it. I would just think, ‘Oh, it’s just sitting in a
drawer in case it’s needed’, but I mean I don’t really– Well, hopefully we won't
split up, so it won't really matter [laughter] [...] Also I guess the thing is getting my–
is even as a PR [permanent resident], as I understand, I've got English friends that
didn’t have citizenship but were PR, and they had children and then they [the
children] automatically get citizenship if they're here, so I would just think, I would
hate it if my kids were 20 and wanted to come live in Australia and I couldn't
come back. (Emphasis added)

While this fragment speaks to some of the considerations outlined in previous
sections (as with Grant, the children that she refers to have not been born yet), she
also mentions, that given whatever circumstances that may require her to return to
the UK, she would not renounce her Australian Citizenship. In bringing up the story
of a friend with ‘an old UK passport sitting in her drawer’ – highlighting once again
the role of the circulation of imaginaries – she explains that this is where she would
keep hers.

The question is then, what exactly is ‘a passport in a drawer’ and how does it fit with
other imaginaries of citizenship. Certainly this idea alludes to a conception of the
passport as a ‘non-obliging document’ (Leuchter 2014, 781), and is one that gives very
little consideration to the identity and community elements that this status
traditionally implies. The ‘passport in a drawer’ represents a style of citizenship that is
‘actively disengaged’ from the broader national context (Leuchter 2014, 782). The
difference between this perception of citizenship, and others that conceive of it in
terms of rights and duties, suggests that ‘multiple imaginaries can coexist within
society’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2015, 5).

When two different conceptions come up against one another, we witness ‘a battle of
imaginaries’ (Amin 2012, 146). One such example occurred in 2006 where there was
widespread outrage in Canada after hereditary dual Canadian-Lebanese citizens, who
had never lived in Canada, were being evacuated at the expense of the Canadian government, during the conflict between Lebanon and Israel (Jedwab 2007). There was considerable anger towards these ‘Canadians of convenience’ (Nyers 2010, 50), who were seen as non-contributing members of society, who had never lived in Canada, and had never paid taxes. While the personal dispositions of these individuals towards their multiple statuses is not present in the academic literature, this particular case does represent an occasion in which an ‘actively disengaged’ citizenship did provide greater security. What is of more interest to this thesis however, are the clues that it gives to the coexistence of multiple citizenship imaginaries and the possible future consequences of these ‘battles of imaginaries’.

6.5 Interrupted/Ruptured Imaginaries

The possibility of the co-existence of numerous imaginaries as well as the ways in which these individual conceptions undergo continual re-evaluation and reinterpretation, requires an understanding that is non-deterministic and open to ambivalence, and can also help understand the impact of action, inaction and rupture. This, the final substantive section in this chapter, considers the ways in which individuals, given the communicated strength of their belief in these imaginaries, come to act, or not act, upon them. Initially, the following section will consider the issue of ‘inertia’: why despite indicating the value of the various statuses and their intent to obtain them, participants ‘hadn’t got around to it’. It will also address the various ‘triggers’, as outlined by participants as catalysts for obtaining an additional status. Finally, it will consider what happens when our imaginaries are ‘ruptured’, namely when a certain encounter makes us re-evaluate what we had believed to be the case.

6.5.1 Inertia and Acting on Imaginaries

What was evident in the explanations of several participants is that despite the existence of a strong desire to obtain citizenship or to live elsewhere, these individuals simply had ‘not got around to it’. This disjoint between imagination and action,
Encountering Imaginaries

highlights the need to maintain a conception of imaginaries and acts of imagination that is open to ambiguities and contradictions.

Take Louis for example, after speaking extensively of his desire to obtain dual citizenship for his son, and the value that this status has, he comments:

To be honest, [getting dual citizenship for my son] has been on the back burner probably since [my son] was born and it’s been 10 years now.

The question is then, how can we better understand this difference, between what is being said and the action (or lack thereof) that follows. Initially it is important to remember that ‘[t]he potentialities, objectives, motivations and/or plans associated with mobility are constantly being disrupted and revised over the course of people’s lives and even more so over the course of generations’ (Amit 2014, 400). However, there was nothing that emerged within this encounter with Louis which suggested that he had changed his mind recently, and he even speaks to the fact that this has been his intention for the last ten years. Instead what we have here is an instance of ‘inertia’, which does not indicate a lack of desire to undertake a particular action, but rather that for whatever reasons, it has not happened yet.

Like the different modalities of waiting that were addressed in the previous chapter, inertia itself is a mode of stillness and pause. It suggests that there is an intention to act, yet it is a contradictory space, whereby, unlike waiting where stillness is enforced by others (waiting for something or someone), inertia suggests that the capacity to undertake the desired and valued action is there, yet no attempt has been made to do so. Thus, inertia is a different ‘modality of stillness’ (Bissell and Fuller 2013, 6), and is not necessarily a result of ‘lazy’ dispositions (Becker 1995, 306), but rather that these actions and imaginations occur in other contexts, where other actions may take priority, or that there is a lack of urgency for that action to take place.

This then suggests the need to investigate its opposite. Under what circumstances are these acts of imagination translated into action? To further bring out these varying
intensities, consider another quotation from Louis,\textsuperscript{31} but this time in relation to his own citizenship:

[I got my citizenship because, when [my son] was six months old we went back to France. He was born in 2003. And I remember that [my wife] and [my son] were in the Australian queue and I was in the foreigners queue. And I thought, 'I need to get my passport.' And that's why I ended up getting this passport.]

Here in his account, he gives a clear case, of a particular moment in time which spurred him into action. This was common among the participants where a particular encounter, or life event, was highlighted as a trigger or tipping point. These catalytic moments may speak to the force of particular encounters with regards to imaginaries, but also how imaginaries evoke specific encounters as part of their explanatory capacities. Furthermore, one cannot fully understand the impact of previous encounters which led to these tipping points.

Take another example, here Agatha relates the moment, after decades of being a New Zealander living in Australia, that she decided to become an Australian Citizen:

So I'm going backwards and forwards [parking the car] just listening to the radio and there's an advertisement that says there's never been a better time for New Zealand citizens to become Australian citizens [...] I heard they're going to change the law, because I don't trust governments very much. [So I thought] They're going to change the law. They're going to make my life difficult, so I better go in and get it.

Like David, from the previous section, she is trigged by an imagined change in policy. In the full version of this encounters she spends some time relating the difficulty she was having in parking the car. She speaks of being stuck, and being forced to inch backwards and forwards, and the force with which she relays the physicality of her parking may suggest a tangential relationship, between the way in which she is constrained in her car, and the possibilities of her being constrained by not having Australian Citizenship. Furthermore, had someone not parked in her assigned spot at her workplace, she may not have had 'space' provided by the difficult parking encounter, and been listening to the radio at that time. Others may argue that this event was the trigger for a build-up of encounters that pushed her towards this point, which may be hinted at by her comments regarding her general mistrust in government. Regardless of the actual circumstances, which in this context are

\textsuperscript{31} This piece also appeared in the chapter on bureaucratic waiting in relation to the importance of queueing.
impossible to fully comprehend, what these examples suggest is the importance of specific events in the recounts of individual actions as part of citizenship narratives.

This section has illustrated that one cannot draw clear conclusions from the relationship between action and imagination. Actions may happen without engaging in extensive imaginative acts, and strong desires, embedded in repeated imaginative acts, do not necessarily result in action. Furthermore, when action does take place, often a particular moment is highlighted as catalytic, which may obscure other encounters and acts of imagination, that led to that point.

6.5.2 Ruptured Imaginaries

So what happens when those future plans and those longstanding imaginaries prove to never eventuate or turn out to be ‘wrong’? Of this there is one clear example from the fieldwork, that of Pierre. Pierre has three citizenships, and relatively recently decided to spend some time in France where he has a hereditary citizenship, but does not speak the language. Despite getting help from an Aunt, a native speaker, he came up against difficulties regarding healthcare:

He [the bureaucrat at the health office] basically said that I can’t get health insurance and I was confused as I thought that a passport was an automatic entitlement to everything [...] I’m still not sure to be honest, I’ve thought about it quite a bit lately. (P) It’s confusing, the term, to me. When I was in France, so they didn’t want to give me the healthcare just because I hadn’t paid tax, so I am not really even sure what the government thinks citizenship is. It is a bit confusing, it is a confusing word that is thrown about. Is a passport a citizenship? I am almost thinking there is a little bit of... how important is national citizenship these days, is it more to do with just border control, then it’s also this thing about rights and responsibilities, but I just don’t... so I guess I think I identify it as being about people movement mainly, otherwise I am pretty confused by the term. (Emphasis added)

As is illustrated from this testimony, his experience was quite rattling. It caused him to re-evaluate not only the way that he understood that particular encounter, or French Citizenship more generally, but rather his conception of citizenship in its entirety.

In this context, the disruption – as illustrated by his confusion – is made very clear. His situation has left him so confused that he uses the word five times in the small
extract above. We can see how ‘[t]he moment of interruption [...] marked a disruption and a calling into question of that feeling of belonging’ (Dawney 2013, 632). It is possible to argue that the embodied violence of the rupture is caused, at least in part, by the conviction with which he held the imaginary that existed prior to it. In this context it is also important to mention that it is not possible to diagnose his initial imaginary as objectively ‘wrong’, as ‘wrong’ is only a diagnosis against a particular set of circumstances, in this case his interactions with a bureaucrat in the health office. Given also the analysis that the previous chapter made regarding the role and impact of ‘street-level bureaucrats’ and bureaucratic encounters more generally, the outcome of the encounter may have been different if it has occurred under slightly different circumstances.

In the same way that disappointment increases with heightened expectations, the impact of the rupture reflects the strength of the original imaginary, as it has built up force over time. It also suggests how when these moments of rupture occur they have repercussions across diverse temporalities. They cause a re-evaluation of the past and perhaps a different orientation to the future. Finally, this approach is somewhat similar to Dawney’s work where she theorises interruptions. In this context she states ‘[w]hat is interesting in this incident is how other histories, other imaginaries, other institutional contexts are brought to presence, such that the moment of intensity – the moment when the body responds in fear and anger – can be read as the conjuncture of relations that stretch far beyond the bodies here and now’ (2013, 640). As such, when theorising the existence of these multiple citizenship imaginaries, awareness is required of just how they come to interact and react in different contexts.

### 6.6 Conclusion

Imaginaries of citizenship are a crucial component of our ongoing negotiation of the world at large. In our attempts to make our lives liveable our citizenship becomes informed, not only by collective imaginaries, but also by our own countless acts of imagination. Thus this chapter has made the novel contribution of illustrating how prior theorisations of imaginaries have fallen short by failing to conceive of the ways
in which individual acts of imagination fit into this picture. This chapter has shown how citizenship can be imagined in a diversity of ways including ones which divorce it from the national community to which it relates. It also speaks to the co-existence of numerous imaginaries, and provides some indication of the impact of what happens when they come up against each other.

Imaginaries and acts of imagination also serve as a reminder that citizenship is subject to continual and personal negotiation within lived lives: ‘[...] the notion of life course reminds us that people do not usually navigate the ambiguous and frequently contradictory controls and policies regulating borders and statuses in a bid to make general declarations about affiliation and identity as categorical abstractions. They are more likely to be pursuing personal projects and intimate relations [...] the very notion of a ‘life course’ reminds us that the workings of these intersections are not constituted as singular events. Their meanings and ramifications change over the course of people’s lives’ (Amit 2014, 400). Thus, the concept of imaginaries, in the context of citizenship provides a theorisation which can not only provide an understanding of citizenship which fits better with its ongoing negotiation as part of lived lives, but one that is open to ambiguity, re-evaluation, and change.
7. Neoliberalism, Nationalism, and Encounters of Address

Who are you?

What do you do?

Where are you from?

These are some seemingly banal questions; we ask and are asked them time and again. They are often the very first questions we ask of others; we seek to discern them, to comprehend something about them, through their response. Yet in answering – and there is an imperative to answer – one is required to provide a particular response, an account of themselves that embeds them within a ‘normative scheme of intelligibility’. The disclosure is often formulaic: my name is Masood/Cate/Jing, I am a doctor/lawyer/waiter, I am from Sydney/India/Turkey. These encounters of address fit people into the world, and how they fit will depend not only on their responses but these pre-existing normative schemes. When the answers that are given do not fit with our expectations – when this person may not sound, look, or feel to the addresser as fitting the response – a follow up question may be asked: where are you really from?

Citizenship comes into being and disappears through these and other encounters of address. One is not only called upon to give an account of oneself, but is addressed by
others and becomes subject to interpellations over which they may have little or no control; we come into being and are situated through these terms. This chapter will consider the ways in which these encounters of address and the logics and vocabularies that make them possible come to shape an individual’s being in the world, how these practices situate us and thus have significant consequences for agency. In focusing on these encounters of address and the transformations in forms of address more generally, we can better understand how citizenship is not only the subject of top down deployments, but comes into being and is transformed through situated everyday speech.

This is far larger than a simple question of terminology. These ‘vocabularies’ are imbued with values and judgements, and embedded in moral authority: ‘all individuals ground their views of the world within some conception of moral authority [...] Even average, non-activist secularists – ordinary people who maintain no religious belief, who worship no deity – live by unspoken assumptions about their world; they too are people of particular, even if implicit faith commitments’ (Hunter 1992, 119, emphasis added). It is through these modes of address that moral authority comes into being: ‘[t]he structure of address is important to understand how moral authority is introduced and sustained if we accept not just that we address others when we speak, but that in some way we come to exist as it were, in the moment of being addressed, and something about our existence that proves precarious when this address fails’ (Butler 2006, 130).

Drawing on the concept of performativity, that is the ‘reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains’ (Butler 1993, xii), this chapter will look at the way in which moral authorities, here conceived as ‘normative schemes of intelligibility’ come to shape the world and our place in it. The use of the term normative schemes, requires an explanation: these schemes are normative, because they prescribe a particular view of the world, and in doing so, they make things intelligible, situate them, and highlight their rightness – or wrongness – as the case may be. These schemes provide to us the ‘vocabularies’ and ‘logics’ through which we come to see the world and function in it. This concept of a normative
scheme first emerged in an implicit sense within several of Judith Butler’s works on gender (1993, [1990] 1999), but is more explicitly mentioned in her work *Precarious Life* (2006). In evoking the concept, it will be taken further to illustrate two clear examples of these ‘normative schemes of intelligibility’ – neoliberalism and nationalism – and how they come to be the building blocks of how we give account of ourselves as well as the accounts that we expect from, and at times impose upon, others. The consequences of this will then be considered in relation to encounters of address in the context of citizenship.

These schemes are at times difficult to identify; they sit ‘at the limits of what we can know, what we can hear, what we can see, what we can sense’ (Butler 2006, 151). They are understood differently by different people, but there is enough of a linguistic, symbolic or material cohesiveness to allow them to be maintained and to circulate. The different forms of these schemes reinforce one another: ‘[m]atter and meaning are co-constitutive and mutually emergent [...] as things are materialised in relation to discursive formations, so too are those discursive frames materialised through an entanglement with things’ (Darling 2014, 486). These schemes do not act in isolation, rather they intersect with other schemes of race, gender, ethnicity and come to form part of ones ‘categoric identity’ (Goffman 1983, 3).

In consciously or unconsciously situating individuals within these schemes, they come to influence our behaviours: ‘public feelings of empathy or aversion towards the stranger are [...] shown to be instantiations of a slew of personal and collective labelling conventions – inherited, learnt, absorbed and practised – that flow into the moment of encounter’ (Amin 2012, 5). Yet, these are also pragmatic categories of ‘everyday practice’ (Hage 2000, 31): ‘without categorisation, the complexity of the human social world might not be manageable at all’ (Jenkins 2000, 8). This chapter will show how these very labelling conventions, the normative schemes in which they fit, and the ways in which individuals are addressed in light of them can account at least in part for the diversity of encounters that individuals experience as part of citizenship.
In the first instance this chapter will consider neoliberalism, as well as its ‘vocabulary’ and ‘logic’, and their centrality to neoliberalism’s emergence as a distinctive normative scheme. This section will then address the ways in which citizenship has been transformed by neoliberal vocabularies and logics, through various examples and including the emergence of ‘citizenship planning’ providers. Nationalism is then analysed as a further example of a normative scheme, whose success is indicated by the fact that it is central to the way that we identify ourselves and others. The hierarchical and value laden nature of nationalism is then considered along with the diverse ways this scheme and others render individuals subject to border imperialism and other consequences. The final section of this chapter will look at how these schemes function when we come to give account of ourselves and in the accounts we expect or impose upon others. Repetition is shown to be paramount to these schemes, before the existence and consequences of failed address are considered. These three sections will be interwoven with two vignettes, giving two very different accounts of encounters.

7.1 The Vocabulary and Grammar of Neoliberalism

One of the very strengths of neoliberalism is the ubiquitousness of its concepts in everyday speech and understanding. We may not be aware of it, but ‘this vocabulary of customer, consumer, choice, markets and self-interest moulds both our conception of ourselves and our understanding of and relationship to the world’ (Massey 2013, 11, emphasis added). The purpose of the section that follows is to address the question of how the vocabulary of neoliberalism has come to shape, not only citizenship, but our understanding of others and the world at large. In doing so, the subject will be broken down into three parts. Initially questions of vocabulary will be shown to be at the core of what neoliberalism is, as well as foundational within its emergence: these vocabularies and logics materialise differently and change our understandings of things that we often take to be stable, in fluid and unexpected ways. The second section will address how these logics and vocabularies have altered the meanings and conceptions of citizenship through these encounters of address as well as in more general terms. The final section will focus on an extreme case of this – that of
‘citizenship planning’ providers – showing the dramatic changes to citizenship as a consequence of the ‘normative scheme of intelligibility’ that is neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism, like citizenship, is an elusive term and may refer to many things in both content and form: it is ‘an aggregation of ideas, a discursive formation, an overarching ideology, a governmental programme, the manifestation of a set of interests, a hegemonic project, an assemblage of techniques and technologies, and what Deleuze and Guattari call an ‘abstract machine’’ (Gilbert 2013, 8). Given the diversity of things to which neoliberalism relates, this linguistic and discursive congruity is central: it is the vocabulary – part of which Massey has described above – that makes the term cohesive.

This vocabulary however must be situated within a broader ‘logic’. ‘Logic’ makes reference to the subtle notions of value and hierarchy that are implicit in the use of these vocabularies: these terms are not neutral, but rather they are imbued and embedded with diverse meanings provided by these logics. According to Harvey, ‘[n]eoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade’ (2007, 2). It then follows that this logic, one that emphasises business, money, circulation, as well as the productive capacities of things, values objects and individuals that are seen to assist in these ends. It is within this logic that the associated vocabulary is understood. This is not so say however that logics and vocabularies are static; quite the opposite, they undergo transformations depending on their particular contexts and the purposes for which they are articulated, and whom they are articulated by.

The concepts of vocabulary and logic also go some way to explain the origins and spread of neoliberalism. Here in this passage, Nicholas Rose outlines neoliberalism’s materialisation across Britain: ‘They were, rather, contingent lash-ups of thought and action, in which various problems of governing were resolved through drawing upon instruments and procedures that happened to be available, in which new ways of
governing were invented in a rather *ad hoc* way, as practical attempts to think about and act upon specific problems in particular locales, and various other existing techniques and practices were merely dressed up in new clothes. But, *in the course of this process, a certain rationality, call it neo-liberalism, came to provide a way of linking up these various tactics, integrating them in thought so that they appeared to partake in a coherent logic. And once they did so, once a kind of rationality could be extracted from them, made to be translatable with them, it could be redirected towards both them and other things, which could now be thought of in the same way [...] And such rationalities were then embodied in, or came to infuse, a whole variety of practices and assemblages for regulating economic life, medical care, welfare benefits, professional activity and so forth’ (N. Rose 1999, 27, emphasis added). Rose’s ‘rationalities’ makes reference to these logics, and it is through ‘these contingent lash-ups of thought and action’, and the vocabularies in which they are embedded that neoliberalism becomes materialised. Perhaps more interestingly, this account illustrates how these notions come to infiltrate already existing processes and institutions: these logics and vocabularies build on the sites that are already occupied, but continuously reinterpret these spaces in their own terms.

In expanding on how logics and vocabularies come to shift meaning and create change, we need to not only consider how new vocabularies come to (re)inscribe that which pre-exists, but also how these normative schemes repeat and echo as they become linked to other diverse forms. To once again quote Massey, ‘these vocabularies which have reclassified roles, identities and relationships – of people, places and institutions – and the practices which enact them embody and enforce the ideology of neoliberalism’ (2013, 11). As such we must also acknowledge the role of repetition in the use of these vocabularies: the more a given action is conceived of and explained in these terms, the more it may influence subsequent actions and how they are explained and understood. Thus the greater weight that is given to ‘neoliberalism’ further obscures the countless other ideas, assumptions and small acts that brought it into being, and that continue its existence. This logic also becomes embedded in ‘affective atmospheres’ which ‘are part of the conditions of formation for neoliberal reason/objects, and, as such, are central to understanding the momentum of policies,
programmes and so on’ (Ben Anderson 2015, 16). It is through these repeated vocabularies and the logics that underlie them that brings the formidable ‘neoliberalism’ into being, and having emerged, the repeated use of this vocabulary in encounters of address and speech acts ensures the ongoing echo of neoliberalism through countless other – potentially unrelated – forms.

Just as the materiality of citizenship in the context of bureaucracy has been discussed in a prior chapter (Chapter Five), so too has the normative scheme of neoliberalism become materialised in different ways: ‘we cannot ignore the power of past discourses and their materialisation in durable technologies, infrastructures and behaviours’ (Gibson-Graham 2008, 623). Thus, caution is required; the ways these logics and vocabularies come to take material forms may veil and even misrepresent other relationships, identities and processes. In terms of economic calculations, Gibson-Graham indicate very clearly how neoliberal modes of establishing value have obscured the fact that “marginal” economic practices and forms of enterprise are actually more prevalent, and account for more hours worked and/or more value produced than the capitalist sector’ (Gibson-Graham 2008, 617). As such, these normative schemes, such as neoliberalism, can misrepresent, obscure, and even render that which does not fit into them, invisible.

The extent to which these vocabularies are used can cause their related normative scheme to seem greater and more all-encompassing than it really is: ‘critics interested in the ways structural forces materialise locally often turn the heuristic ‘neoliberalism’ into a world-homogenising sovereign with coherent intentions that produce subjects who serve its interests, such that their singular actions only seem personal, effective, and freely intentional, while really being effects of powerful forces’ (Berlant 2011, 15, emphasis original). The repetitive force and explanatory power of these vocabularies and logics as well as their circulation can make the normative scheme seem both more cogent and formidable. They also, after a time, come to feel like the ‘natural’ way of doing things: ‘Neoliberal ideas seem to have sedimented into the western imaginary and become embedded in popular ‘common sense’” (Hall, Massey, and Rustin 2013, 17). Once a logic has become embedded – becomes ‘common sense’ to echo the
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quotation above – it comes to be mobilised to describe experiences, events, actions and objects that it may not necessarily relate to, or rather may only be a small part of. Using these vocabularies obscures the sheer diversity of the forms that it is claimed to both cause and explain, and as such even variations in the scheme itself may be concealed.

These complex and overarching schemes emerge not through top down deployments – though they have their role – but rather through speech acts, encounters of address, and everyday speech. The implication is then that one must pay attention to those small repeated acts and habits that are the clearest illustration of how these logics unfold; change occurs through countless seemingly minor encounters which both come to explain and are explained away by these schemes. It is the cohesiveness of the ‘vocabulary’ and the ‘logic’ that gives the impression of a static concept to neoliberalism and other schemes that may not be static at all. The same can be said of citizenship, whose origins some trace to antiquity, yet, as the following section will show, is in a constant state of evolution and change. These functions of naming and speech acts through designation and repetition, work to bring these schemes into being, cement them, and provide the basis of a moral authority where individuals, events and even objects are judged.

7.1.1 Citizenship and Neoliberalism

In this world, shipmates, Sin that can pay its way can travel where it will and without passport; whereas Virtue, if a pauper, is stopped at all frontiers.

- Herman Melville, Moby Dick, pg. 48

Citizenship has not escaped the reach of the normative scheme which is neoliberalism. This section will make the novel intervention of considering the ways in which the vocabulary and logic of neoliberalism have come to infuse not only conceptions of citizenship, but have become central to its encounters of address. Initially, the impact of the normative scheme of neoliberalism on that of citizenship will be considered; while focusing on these changes and the links between the two, it will also make a further point regarding the intersection, evolution and mutual influence of these schemes over time. Finally, the argument will be made that despite
the focus on the linguistic, these ‘vocabularies’ and ‘logics’ move beyond the linguistic in a diversity of ways.

There is a risk when invoking the notion of vocabulary that some may think that the influence of these normative schemes may start with and end with the linguistic. Far from it: ‘[w]ords and oft-repeated phrases carry, and reinforce, understandings that go well beyond them’ (Massey 2013, 18). These vocabularies and logics that organise normative schemes have embedded within them notions of value. Words carry with them the connotations of the acceptable and the detrimental, the justified and the harmful; they carry with them implications. In relation to the intersection between citizenship and neoliberalism, the logic of the neoliberal suggests that there are certain types of people who may be desirable in the national space and others that are not. Consider these idealised types: the expat, the guest worker, the labour migrant, the refugee and the asylum seeker. In the context of neoliberalism, all of these types have inherent meaning with regards to the (productive) position that these individuals have within the state, even if some of them may predate the primacy of neoliberalism. To provide just one possible and very crude sketch: the ‘expat’ is seen as a high earner and an investor, who is heavily involved in ‘business’; the ‘migrant worker’ is only desirable for the labour that they provide and thus is interchangeable and easily replaced; finally the ‘asylum seeker’ is often portrayed as someone who does not make a contribution, and is therefore a drain on the system. These terms, whose meanings circulate between individuals and within the logic of neoliberalism, provide us with an image of their ‘value’.

These vocabularies also create expectations around what sort of individual falls into this category and of what precisely these categories constitute, and can thus intersect with notions of gender, race and ethnicity among others. These conceptions are also reinforced by a whole range of materialities from circulating media to hearsay. Explicit cases of these stereotypes are not hard to find: one such example is a recent study that has shown how women only make up 11% of the Google Image Search results for the term ‘CEO’ (Kay, Matuszak, and Munson 2015). Furthermore, expectations around race have led people to ask: ‘[w]hy are white people expats when the rest of us are
immigrants?” (Koutonin 2015). Stereotypes around gender, race, social class and ethnicity among others become embedded within these logics and vocabularies.

Within the logic of neoliberalism, the circulation of capital is desirable, thus individuals that are present in spaces with clear ‘neoliberal’ purpose are seen as having justified access to that space. This once again focuses on their productive capacities within these spaces. Those that are not there for productive reasons are seen as problematic: ‘[s]trangers are suspicious because they ‘have no purpose’, that is they have no legitimate function within the space which could justify their existence or intrusion. Strangers are hence recognisable precisely insofar as they do not enter into the exchanges of capital that transforms spaces into places [...] You can recognise a stranger through their loitering gait: strangers loiter, they do not enter the legitimate exchanges of capital that might justify their presence’ (Ahmed 2000, 31, emphasis original). Thus those that fall into categories that are considered either not to advance the circulation of capital, or even worse, to impede it, are seen as both undesirable and problematic where as those who are seen to exemplify the opposite traits are encouraged: ‘[t]he cosmopolitan, if urbane, culturally dextrous, articulate, light footed, and well connected, is largely left alone to contribute to the multicultural nation as doctor, nurse, engineer, teacher, waiter or knowledge worker.’ (Amin 2012, 103). Furthermore concessions are made by individuals and governments to allow those who exemplify these neoliberal virtues to have access to these spaces.

These perceptions of the legitimate and illegitimate access to spaces have significant consequences for our notions of citizenship. As Ong clearly articulates in her book Neoliberalism as Exception: ‘[o]n the one hand, citizenship elements such as entitlements and benefits are increasingly associated with neoliberal criteria, so that mobile individuals who possess human capital or expertise are highly valued and can exercise citizenship-like claims in diverse locations. Meanwhile, citizens who are judged not to have such tradable competence or potential become devalued and thus vulnerable to exclusionary practices’ (2006a, 6–7). Away from the more traditional ideal of the equality of all citizens, the vocabulary and logic of neoliberalism has enforced qualitatively different perceptions of certain types of citizens and non-citizens
which have become embedded within the materialities of those spaces and the policies which are used to govern them.

This is made even more explicit in the case of the airport, where we see how the corporate traveller is given priority or engaged in processes that facilitate their movement at the cost of others. Mobilities research shows the clear relationship between power and movement: ‘[i]n the airport, the corporeality of mobility – the way the body feels – interacts with categorisations of types – citizen, alien, tourist, business traveller, commuter’ (Cresswell 2006, 223). Here the ‘kinetic elite’ make use of the multiple available concessions that facilitate their movement that have emerged from the logic of these neoliberal schemes. Even the use of the term ‘business class’ with regards to air travel is telling, and it has its origins in the late 1970s (Brancatelli 2012), the same period that is cited by many scholars as the rise of neoliberalism. Perhaps even more emblematic is the fact that many airlines are doing away with the labelling of ‘first class’ altogether, but are keeping the premium option under variations of the business class title, while introducing an interim class of premium economy (Garfinkel 2008). The ‘common sense’ of business class has come to obscure its subtler (neoliberal) meanings and its (contextual and historically constituted) nature.

Yet the comparison that we need to be making here is not that between the fast and slow immigration lanes at the airport, or between business and economy class passengers. These individuals are already in an advantageous position of having made it past security and onto the plane. What this conception does not include is the passengers who fail to even make it past the check in counter; those ‘desperate passengers’ (C. Martin 2011, 1046) who may not be passengers but stowaways that ride – and die – within the landing gears of planes. These schemes come to be materialised in these diverse ways, and as such the ‘will of those whose precedence is assumed becomes embedded in the materiality of worlds [...] The modifications required for spaces to be opened to other bodies are often registered as wilful impositions on those spaces. We learn from this: when wills become wordly, we do not recognise how the world has already adjusted to those wills’ (Ahmed 2014, 146–47, emphasis original).
Many of the points made above can be clearly illustrated by Grant in the extract that is presented below. Here in recounting the process by which he became a permanent resident, he illustrates just how pervasive these neoliberal influences are at both a systemic level and through his own understanding. Some of the clearer neoliberal influences have been highlighted in bold:

> With the **working holiday visa**, you can work for a company for six months. They said, ‘Look, if it goes well and we like you and you like it, then we’ll **sponsor you on a 457**.’ So I turned up on the **working holiday visa**, started work at [my company] straight away, did three or four months, and everything was going well. So they applied to make the **457, skilled migrant visa** for four years. They did that, they sponsored me. I was probably on that for about 18 months, and after about a year or so, I think things weren’t going particularly well in terms of the **economy**, so there wasn’t much in the way of salary increases available. I negotiated that, instead of a salary increase, could we try and get through and pay for my **permanent residency instead**, because [my company] does it as a service to clients - they have an in-house team who does it - so they **sell that service to international companies who are bringing over people**. They've got an in-house team, so it's **internal costs**, so although, if I were to go and do it myself externally, it'd cost about **$7000** - it would have lawyer's fees and what have you - but because it was done in-house, they gave it to some graduate [chuckles] to practice on. They did my application, I signed a few forms, and they **paid for that**, and I got my permanent residency.

There are several points relating to the intersection of neoliberalism and citizenship that need to be highlighted that have emerged within this fragment alone. The most obvious of these is the existence of visa regimes that have developed in order to meet the ‘needs’ of businesses. The two initial visa types he mentions – those of Australia’s Working Holiday Visa Program, and the **457 Skilled Migrant Visa** – both show how occupying certain neoliberal categories allow individuals greater ease of entry. If further evidence is needed for the different ways in which these different groups are valued, one need only look at the turn-around times for the different visa statuses, such as in the Australian context where 457 visas currently have an average turnaround time of a few months (DIBP 2016b), with some visas being processed in as little as three weeks (Walsh 2014, 590), while those who are applying externally on humanitarian grounds may have to wait a year (DIBP 2016a), and often much longer.

These speeded up circuits for mobile individuals are something that has been illustrated clearly in the mobilities literature (Cresswell 2006), as well as in the context of citizenship (Ong 2006b).
Grant’s more personal considerations are also telling. His account focuses on the transactional: the relationships are highlighted in monetary terms and permanent residency in his case is something that is negotiated as part of a salary package. His explanation of the monetary equivalent – ‘it’d cost about $7000’ – reflects on just how obtaining permanent residency fits with the other calculative aspects of neoliberalism. We also see how this process – one which is largely based on speed, certainty and convenience – differs from many of those which were described in the Encountering Bureaucracy chapter; he has not had to encounter the state bureaucracy directly, but rather this whole process is done through the ‘graduate’ intermediary. The company that he works for has even taken over some of the roles of the state in processing and organising these applications, and while this is beyond the scope of this thesis, it serves to mention that this can strongly influence the nature of these encounters (Bloom 2015). Finally, a point needs to be made about what is missing: he makes no mention of the traditional notions of responsibility, of community, and of membership, which are often central to discourses around citizenship. Citizenship due to the vocabularies and logics of neoliberalism is changed, and these changes become embedded not only within these speech acts, but also as part of a whole range of situated material practices.

While Grant’s recount provides us with a specific case, we cannot underestimate how this logic plays out at other diverse sites of citizenship, and in countless quotidian encounters. A significant number of my participants saw their primary (and in some cases only) contribution to the state in terms of taxation. Taxation was also a key aspect in their decision making around citizenship: Miranda clarifies that ‘between the two countries tax is a big, big question’. Louis explained how he renewed the passport which was ‘better value for money’ and Natalie and Steve saw the downside to dual citizenship as ‘having to pay twice for things’. One participant, Mathew, even made the distinction between himself and ‘that headline grabbing couple of hundred poor people’. Thus neoliberal logic in the context of citizenship plays out in a vast range of sites, from the types of visa schemes that are on offer, to the ways in which
individuals see their contribution to the state. The pervasiveness of these logics and vocabularies in the context of citizenship cannot be in doubt.

7.1.2 Citizenship for Sale

‘[w]ealthy clients are very familiar with financial planning, with estate planning, with tax planning, but are they familiar with residency and citizenship planning? [...] Ultimately, quality of life, education, mobility, security and tax [are the reasons for citizenship planning][...] In this international and global world that we are in, these are the tools you want’.

- Eric Major, CEO of Henley and Partners, (Henley & Partners Ltd 2014)

One of the most extreme indications of the impact of neoliberalism as a normative scheme and its vocabulary and logic has had on citizenship is the existence of companies that offer ‘citizenship planning’, which is a process by which they broker the sale of citizenship. There are several businesses that offer these services, all of which have a target market of High Net Worth Individuals; they do not work with a single country, instead they offer various ‘packages’ and consult on particular needs. Henley & Partners was the first company to offer these services in a comprehensive way, but more recently we have seen the emergence of competing firms such as Arton Capital and CS Global Partners. The services offered by lawyers and others to smooth the process towards citizenship have existed in various forms in the past, however the novelty of these companies comes not from their role with regards to facilitating a specific process in a certain country, but rather their offering of a smorgasbord of diverse packages which have largely been disintermediated the cultural and geographical context of that particular citizenship. In short where pre-existing examples of ‘citizenship assistance’ helped with a particular process; ‘citizenship planning’ companies are selling a ‘lifestyle’, and providing clients with diverse packages for countries all over the world. Furthermore, these companies also offer their services to states to help them better ‘monetise’ their citizenship.

What is perhaps most fascinating about these companies is less their specific services and more the ways in which they have gone about commodifying citizenship. In doing so, they have disrupted the conventional notions of what citizenship is for and what it entails. This is done in part through their creation of fact-sheets, figures and indices: Arton Capital publishes the Passport Index, ranking the strength of various passports.
with regard to how many countries they provide visa free access to, while also allowing dual and multiple citizens the opportunity to obtain a score for their multiple statuses (Arton Capital 2016); Henley & Partners have their QNI (Quality of Nationality Index), which evaluates each country as based on various criteria, such as ease of travel or the ‘external value of the nationality’ (Henley & Partners 2016); CS Global Partners produce ‘fact-sheets’ for the various countries through which the citizenship regimes are outlined on the basis of different criteria (CS Global Partners 2016). The uses of information within these schemes – the visualisations, ranking systems, and different means of scoring – establishes citizenship as a comparative ‘product’ and creates competition between the different ‘options’ or ‘packages’ offering the buyer those very choices which are so inherent within the logic of neoliberalism. However in doing so, they have managed to strip citizenship of much of its historical and cultural specificity, which stands in direct contrast to earlier conceptions.

This elimination of the cultural contents of citizenship, is also present in visual form: CS Global Partners in a short explanatory video on their website open with an image of a non-descript passport with exotic pictures and text overlaid inside it. It comments: ‘[t]here is a little book that can make a big change to your life. Enabling you to enjoy greater freedom, increased security, mobility, and to make the most of a world of opportunities. Start a new chapter in the story of your life, with help from the experts in second citizenship’. Before finishing, this image of the black nondescript passport – without any reference to a particular state – is shown again once more (CS Global Partners 2016). The absence of identifying content in and on the document is quite telling, and is perhaps a clear indication as to this shift in conceptions of citizenship, where the cultural and community elements have lost their primacy due to more neoliberal concerns. This commodification of citizenship – stripped of its notions of equality and membership – has become something that can be materialised on a factsheet and can be presented against others using colourful diagrams and numeric ranking systems.

There is also a certain irony that these businesses are expanding at the same time that the very same states are putting up barriers to refugee settlement. One such example is
Austria which has worked hard to obstruct the arrival of refugees (Politi and Ghiglione 2016), and yet offer substantial citizenship by investment schemes (Henley & Partners Ltd 2016). It then becomes evident that the issue is not just accepting others within the nation, but being accepted depends on who that individual is and where they sit within these normative schemes. In the aforementioned promotional video for Henley & Partners, two clients, Drs Dale and Mary Chappell, express their views about these services while seated comfortably on a beach in St Barts in resort wear. They comment: '[i]t is the ability to live where you want, to travel where you want, raise your kids where you want and not subject your family to the fate of where you happen to be born; you actually get to choose’ (Henley & Partners Ltd 2014, emphasis added). However, these are not choices that are available to everyone; as Ong suggests '[n]eoliberal calculations are introduced as exceptions to the prevailing political system, separating some groups for special attention' (2007, 6). Those who occupy privileged positions within these normative schemes have the luxury of choice.

7.1.3 Interlude: Mathew and Greta

There are countless examples of the ways in which this neoliberal vocabulary plays out at a whole range of levels from institutions and their policies, right down to the ways in which individuals understand their own experiences and construct their own narratives. The following interlude is taken from Mathew and his wife Greta, who are recent Australian Citizens, and Canadian Citizens in their 50s. Here, in explaining their story we see the impact that neoliberal logics and vocabularies have made. In both this interlude and the one that follows I have included some of the more contextual elements of the encounter to better introduce the participants.

I arrived at the address that I was given, and was overwhelmed by the property’s stunning position overlooking the harbour. This was a very well-to-do neighbourhood, and I carefully parked my conspicuously old vehicle between a BMW and a Lexus. I was a few minutes late in making it inside, as the gated complex in which they lived
required three different doors be passed through before you entered their home. Having never met Mathew and Greta prior, I had no idea what to expect.

Once I arrived, Greta warmly invited me inside we sat at the kitchen bench; she apologised for the fact that her husband had yet to arrive and offered me a cup of tea. Next to me on the table sat her purse and through our short conversation across the bench I could see her glancing at it. I gathered her dilemma: to move it to a safe place, would be rude, yet, likely in her mind at least, leaving it there may be risky. She solved the dilemma by directing me to the vast dining table, and picked up her wallet and put it in a kitchen drawer as we moved places.

Shortly after we were seated across the grand dining table, her husband joined us; he had been out playing golf, and had taken longer than expected. Following more initial pleasantries we began the interview. Mathew was dominant from the start, forthright with his opinions. He lectured more than spoke, and commented expansively, and needed comparatively little prompting from the questions. While his assertive speech meant less work for me as an interviewer, the way in which he interrupted his wife, ‘corrected’ her and dominated the conversation began to raise my ire. After a more general introduction, he continued with his narrative:

**Mathew:** I was transferred from Switzerland, so I was Canadian working in that office in Switzerland. Job came up here, so I was an expat they transferred in, so it was fairly – it looked for us, it was relatively simple. Paperwork is handled by the organization so the visas and everything, you provide them with all the necessary information. [...] I can’t remember the length of time for the visa, but it was a fairly quick process compared to some places. It was maybe two months or so for the visa, and in order to get it all cleared. So it was basically paper work, doctor, but because the organization has – we employ a third-party to do that, you simply give them the papers and they provide all the 457 data.

**Greta:** We spoke to these migration people, and they gave us advice.

**Mathew:** We went to two migration companies. I went to the one that Fritz told me to go to.

**Greta:** Yes, but they didn’t give us much advice. It was the lady that NASA uses, she was the one that – our source of information frankly that we use.

**Mathew:** I got a fair amount from the other guy but you were – I went to lunch with him, we had a long discussion. But the other thing that was really obvious was that the evolution of the law was changing pretty progressively. I think it was almost like quarterly there was another announcement, so I think after the Federal Government announced that there was a significant restriction on – they
restricted the number of categories that they were considering. That I believe the locals states, said, ‘Well bugger you, this doesn’t fit our needs.’ So now they’ve created a separate series of – we need more bricklayers and we need more teachers in Perth than maybe the Federal Government thinks we need, so will then start to create opportunities for people under those particular circumstances to come down here, so the states have done their own — So a guy said you look, you can – I’ve a guy – we have a guy here from Italy, a businessman from Italy applying under the business – because I looked under also the business application when I started business and it was fairly – you had to have fair amount of money.

Greta: And plus it had to make up, you had to be a growing concern, and you had to take on take on a certain number of employees, wasn’t it?

Mathew: Yes a number of employees, so he’s going through that right now, and incidentally he’s been accepted by Queensland.

Anna: Really?

Mathew: He's been accepted by the state of Queensland and he's applying to the state of Perth?

Anna: WA [Western Australia]?

Mathew: WA, yeah, so he's applied. Queensland has accepted him, he's still waiting to see if he'll be accepted in WA. They'll sponsor.

Greta: The State will sponsor him?

Mathew: Effectively, the state says, ‘I give you permission and will sponsor you. We will give you permission to open your business here. Therefore, that qualifies you for the Federal [visa].’ So it's a fairly – basically, I think the Federal policy was – what I can see of it, was fairly ineffective for those areas of high employment needs, so you've got [Gina] Rinehart standing up, saying, ‘I need 25,000 workers here. You guys are out of touch with reality. I'm going to get on a plane, so bingo’. So, you've a got fair amount of – power [...] the Government's methodology is much more based on employment. [...] It was extremely – for the process, it was a relatively easy process for us from the standpoint of a – from the point of agreeing with the organisation to the point of getting the PR. That was a relatively simple process - expensive, but simple. The part leading into that negotiating with the company was extremely difficult. So the part - that the view the organization a major international, you would think, would be much more open. It was extremely close door. Not interested…. the consultant that I spoke to just looked at me and said, ‘Get a sponsor, it’s done and dusted.’ He was just very fair about that, he said, ‘You are in the ideal situation. You get your company to sign.’ and I kept the letter. It's a one and a half line letter. So you have to look at it, because the other overriding thing for me is that although I’m an Australian citizen from an employment standpoint, I’m an International expat. There’s a number of implications on how I’m compensated– my benefit plan, basically pension and things like that are still actually linked to my domestic country, those types of considerations would have to go on the table. Because you’d say, ‘Well, you’d give this up, don’t I give all this and this up?’ Because honestly to give up – just to give up the 457 visa was a decision as well. There was a significant financial factor. It was a fairly substantial financial impact us. I don’t know, it’s… it’s all those- it's pretty difficult to make a distinct – or make a clean-cut one way or the other because again – There are so many laws that apply under different circumstances. It’s not so clean, you know? But it’s not an emotional issue. I think that the key thing is –
Greta: For me, it'd be emotional, for you, it'd be financial.
Mathew: Well, I'm saying finance – the financial would enter into it. I'm not saying it's the only thing. I'm saying you just got to make sure that what you sign, something that says 'your bill and go boy', I didn't expect that [laughter]. I'm not 22 years old here, I've worked for 44 years.

While other aspects may be focused on, this brief analysis will consider the allusions in this fragment to the normative scheme of neoliberalism. Firstly, this text, and especially Mathew’s responses bear considerable similarities with Grant’s explanation that was presented earlier; it highlights the transactional nature of this process, which ignores notions of membership and community. Mathew explains how there was a ‘significant financial factor’ in making the decision to undertake this process. He even makes reference to his exceptionality as an ‘expat’: ‘although I’m an Australian citizen from an employment standpoint, I'm an international expat’. His adherence to this notion of expat – and it is mentioned several times over by Mathew – shows both its value more generally and the connection that he feels with the term, but also, its enormous influence. Furthermore, unlike many other participants Mathew explains that he was in no rush to become a citizen. This speaks to the fact that ‘[e]xpatriate talents constitute a form of movable entitlement without formal citizenship’ (Ong 2006a, 16). Finally, in referring to his acquaintance, Mathew feels compelled not only to clarify that he is from Italy – which will be the subject of the next section of this chapter – but also that he is not just a ‘guy’ but a ‘businessman’, further evidence of the normative scheme of neoliberalism at play.

What is keenly evident within this text is the how enabled both Greta and Mathew are with regards to this process. They face very few constraints: they see numerous consultants for assistance – even mentioning the reference to NASA, as a not so subtle reference to their standing. They are aware of the concessions that their position within these neoliberal schemes make: they explain how the threat of financial ‘flight’ can compel governments to give into individual demands (‘I’m going to get on a plane, so bingo’) and suggests the position of privilege of these individuals because of it (‘you’ve a got fair amount of power’). They are aware that they are privileged (‘You are in the ideal situation. You get your company to sign.’), and use it
to their advantage. The position that they occupy within these schemes is enabled, and there is a very active sense of agency within their account.

### 7.2 Vocabularies of Place: Nationalism as a ‘Normative Scheme of Intelligibility’

In many of the fieldwork encounters discussions of the nation and questions of nationality came up repeatedly, but it was Kaori who addressed it most explicitly. She explained:

Kaori: I mean two people can be the same, but coming from different countries changes their situation and this can even change the way that they act and the way that others act towards them. I have this feeling, I mean with the way I look now, if I went around, and just as a joke, started to declare that I was from somewhere else; that I was Japanese, or Filipino, or Korean, I feel that people would act differently when they found out where I came from. So isn’t in some ways the first judgement or assessment we have on a person based on this identity? From where they are from? Of course, this doesn’t mean that when someone finds out where you are from they treat you in the same way that they treat everyone from that country, but it certainly is informing in some form.

Anna: So it is a reason for people to treat you differently?

Kaori: I can’t explain, sometimes we are so simple its easy, other times we are so complex that we don’t have a hope of understanding things. But to make this understanding easier people tend to categorise you on the basis of where you are from. It is just one of the ways that we try to simplify things in order to understand the person in front of us. They say, ‘Oh! You are Japanese’, the Japanese are this and that, and they do this and that. They have this idea, but it is this stereotyped image, but it isn’t real. One of the first images people have of you, especially when identity cards are concerned comes from the nationality that you declare, but in some way, every individual has these stereotyped images of the country let’s say.

Here, Kaori articulates how the national vocabulary is central to the ways in which we understand people: ‘isn’t in some ways the first judgement or assessment that we have of a person based on this identity! Where they are from?’. As her comment suggests, one of the key ways in which we understand others in everyday encounters is by ‘actively territorialising our identities’ (Malkki 1992, 31) – something that Liisa Malkki calls a ‘sedenterist metaphysic’ (1992, 31) – where the reference points through which we comprehend those spaces and the people in them are embedded within a national vocabulary. We understand the world and those in it through the use of national vocabularies, and through the logic of nationalism.
Nationalism, and the vocabulary that accompanies it is incredibly pervasive: ‘notions of nationhood are deeply embedded in contemporary ways of thinking [...] nationalism has seeped into the corners of our consciousness; it is present in the very words that we may use for analysis [...] the powers of an ideology which is so familiar that it hardly seems noticeable’ (Billig 1995, 11–12). Currently the world is divided up into discrete nation states, and as a result we find ourselves subject to ‘the Westphalian ideal of a system of interlocking nation states that traverse the globe, implying that the experience of not being under any state’s authority and protection is both absurd in theory and unusual in practice’ (Gill 2010, 626). These national designators refer not only to particular places, but individuals who ‘originate’ from them and the languages that are spoken there. As a section of Chapter Five has reinforced, these terms and their symbolic likenesses are found on paperwork, identity documents and in countless material forms, and yet their ordinariness and their fluid and contrived nature often gets overlooked. As such we can see this as a ‘reflection of the success of the state to present itself as a universal political and social reality, a form of disinterested domination that is set apart from other political and social practices’ (Jeffrey 2012, 22).

There is a certain irony that as the more mobile people become and the more likely they are to be living further away from their place of birth, the more forcibly these territorialised identities are held to. In order to understand these increasingly mixed populations there is a growing ‘reliance] on the spatialisation of identities, the relationship between the territorialisation of identity, [and] the territorialisation of power’ (Bell 1999, 23). The new technologies of globalisation have further reinforced the use of this national vocabulary with which to understand the world, and these naming practices are both in part due to the ways in which states attempt to reinforce these identities as well as a result of the wider governance structures. Citizenship too, uses these national and spatial designators for its naming practices; the territorialised identity, and the convenient national vocabulary is the central means by which we seek to understand individuals.
From the earliest days of our schooling we are shown maps and atlases that illustrate clearly – often in bright colours – the national segmentation of the world: ‘[t]he world of nations is thus conceived as a discrete spatial partitioning of territory; it is territorialised in the segmentary fashion of the modern school atlas’ (Malkki 1992, 26). And while the map is only one of the many material technologies which enforce the national vocabulary, it provides a very clear image of the way individuals understand the world and those within it: divided into discrete groups. Benedict Anderson explains in his much cited text *Imagined Communities* how maps aided in the foundation of these national communities: ‘European-style maps worked on the basis of a totalizing classification’ ([1983] 2006, 173) furthermore, the ‘map and the census [...] shaped the grammar which would in due course make possible ‘Burma’ and ‘Burmese’, ‘Indonesia’ and ‘Indonesians’ (Benedict Anderson [1983] 2006, 185). We moved towards a vision of the world where “[a] man must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two ears; a deficiency in any of these particulars is not inconceivable, and does from time to time occur, but only as a result of some disaster, and it is itself a disaster of some kind’ (Gellner 2006, 6). In addition, there are countless material ways in which these vocabularies are reinforced, whether it be through sporting teams, what is written on the outside of our passports, or even articulated within our notions of multiculturalism where the foods, and costumes and music and stalls are all indicated as coming from conveniently and nationally labelled locations. However, it is the political world map – a material technology which we use to understand the world – that is most clearly indicative of the distinct borders that we assign to places and how the normative scheme of nationalism fits people and things into national spaces.

These normative schemes also go some way to obscure the incredible diversity that exists within these national spaces. As Deleuze and Guattari explain: ‘[t]he State [...] is a phenomenon of *intraco*nsistency. It makes points resonate together, points that are not necessarily already town-poles but very diverse points of order, geographic, ethnic, linguistic, moral, economic, technological particularities. It makes the town resonate with the countryside. It operates by stratification; in other words, it forms a vertical,
hierarchized aggregate that spans the horizontal lines in a dimension of depth. In retaining given elements, it necessarily cuts off their relations with other elements, which become exterior, it inhibits, slows down, or controls those relations’ (1987, 433, emphasis original). Here these forms of address render countless examples of internal diversity invisible; these hidden elements may include the differences between rural and urban populations, regional differences, differences of language or dialect, differences in customs or worldviews, and of age and generation and social class. As a result of this national vocabulary the differences between individuals within the nation-state are concealed.

National vocabularies also obscure the qualitatively different ways diverse individuals are situated within these vocabularies: ‘[o]ne of the most sociologically unhelpful aspects of the usage of the formal conception of citizenship to refer to national belonging is that the either (a national)/ or (not) logic it embodies, and which is uncritically taken on board by many analysts, does not allow us to capture the subtleties of the differential modalities of national belonging, as they are experienced within society’ (Hage 2000, 51, emphasis original). In this formulation Hage evokes the notion of cultural capital, Bourdieu’s well known concept (1986), but explains how it is interpreted within a national field. As Hage explains, this national vocabulary obscures the diverse ways in which individuals fluidly inhabit these spaces. This also further reinforces the efforts this thesis has made to step away from the binaries associated with the dichotomous ‘us’ and ‘them’ categorisations, as explained in greater depth in Chapter Three.

How can we account for the circulation of this vocabulary and logic? Just as Benedict Anderson claimed that spread of nationalism was a result of print capitalism ([1983] 2006), these vocabularies circulate in a similar ways through both material technologies and everyday speech. Finally, and perhaps most effectively, these are circulated and reinforced through modes of address: “we’ are constantly reminded that ‘we’ live in nations; ‘our’ identity is constantly being flagged’ (Billig 1995, 93). One may even make the claim that the clearest evidence of the success of a normative scheme is precisely the universality of its vocabulary as a mode of address as will be
developed in the final parts of this chapter. Even those who do not fit comfortably into one of these categories are often presented with hyphenated identities - such as Greek-Australian - which reinforce the essentialism evident in national designators, even when these individuals may differ from both the national categories that this name suggests (Tsalapatanis 2011).

Even academic research reinforces these notions of the national. It is not uncommon for studies to provide national comparisons or for research to come out of national institutions. This 'methodological nationalism' (Wimmer and Schiller 2003) ensures that economic figures are calculated based on ‘national’ expenditure and the average income of nationals are compared to the average income of nationals from other nations. It is also central to the ways in which we recognise others. People often speak of a ‘Chinese’ friend or an ‘Italian’ colleague, as if without the essentialist national identifier the individual just would not make sense: “national identity’ is short-hand for a whole series of familiar assumptions about nationhood, the world and ‘our’ place in that world’ (Billig 1995, 93). These terms also serve more practical ends even in a more everyday sense. As Ghassan Hage suggests: ‘popular racist categorisations are not out to explain ‘others’ for the sake of explaining them. They are not motivated by some academic yearning to knowledge. They are categories of everyday practice, produced to make practical sense of, and to interact with, the world’ (2000, 31).

7.2.1 Hierarchies of Nationality: Being in Place and Being Out of Place

As a guide for a reputable bus touring company, Adam has had the opportunity to meet people from all over the world, and has also seen them safely across numerous national borders. Furthermore, as someone who is a dual citizen, he has ‘put [his] citizenships to use’ over the last few years. From his experiences, he illustrates just one of the material ways in which hierarchies are both illustrated and embedded:

There’s instances where you can choose which one you want to use, depending on which one is more accessible. It’s more a question of, not only to save the cost of your visa which would influence it, but also if you think it is— I do it too sometimes when I grab everyone’s passports to hand in, say, to a border guard. Sometimes they’ll just ask you, instead of— they see it’s a tourist bus, and from a reputable company that they know. Sometimes they won’t come on the bus at all
to check. They'll just ask you where the passengers are from. You say then, ‘Australia and New Zealand’—well, Europe first, then Australia, New Zealand. Then if they go, ‘Okay, that’s fine’, you go. Just depending on the countries that you go to, you might then leave off other countries until the end. And the same, you know as well, when they’re doing the passports, you can see sometimes that certain passports, they take longer to check, to stamp, particularly if it’s from a country that is not as well-known, or maybe the diplomatic relationships are not as well established. You can sometimes see that. They’ll put the European ones—sometimes they don’t even get scanned or stamped. They get put straight away, or even handed back to you straight away. The Australian and New Zealand passports are done fairly quickly, and then the miscellaneous are checked more thoroughly.

Here, Adam explains how in presenting passports at the border he organises them in a certain order. These are not simply equivalent but different documents, rather they are situated within a hierarchy, depending on the different nationality that appears on the front of them. Adam himself works within this system of value when he presents himself and his passengers at the border, starting his account with ‘Europe first, then Australia and New Zealand’ and ‘leav[ing] off other countries to the end’. This section will build on the arguments that have been made in the previous parts of this chapter to illustrate how—just like the vocabulary of neoliberalism—national vocabularies are far from neutral. These hierarchies emerge within countless daily encounters whether they be echoes of metrics such as Gross Domestic Product or development indices, colonial legacies, or simply through the vernacular hierarchies that are imbued within daily encounters and everyday speech. Furthermore, these vocabularies are saturated with notions of qualitative difference, where being associated with a certain national designator indicates certain traits or qualities that an individual or object may have.

Nationalism is strongly intertwined with notions of the hierarchy of states which are the consequences of countless historical, geographical, and economic discernments. In addition, terms have emerged to categorise these states which further reinforces these hierarchies: ‘the common-sense sequence of ‘underdeveloped – developing – developed’ places ‘developing’ countries behind ‘developed’ ones, in some kind of historical queue, rather than just co existing in their differences’ (Massey 2013, 20) or as Hannah Arendt put it ‘[t]he third world is not a reality, but an ideology’ (1970, 21). This of course was not meant to detract from the diverse material conditions of different states, but rather to attest to the fact that that these differences come to us
full of relatively invisible ideological content, including obvious legacies of colonialism. While some states are conceived of within a negative light, others may even be unintelligible to certain individuals; the incomprehension with which many in the western world speak of ‘Africa’ as a whole while failing to understand not only the diversity within the nations, but the differences between the states themselves. So here, worse than having a bad name, is not being recognised at all: ‘sometimes these normative schemes work precisely through providing no image, no name, no narrative’ (Butler 2006, 146).

These hierarchies also exist as qualitative judgements within everyday speech; as outlined in the previous chapter, participants spoke of good and bad passports, as they became associated with the cosmopolitan opportunities for work and travel. These ‘vernacular’ hierarchies indicate how this vocabulary comes embedded with different stereotypes, ‘histories of dislike’ and patterns of domination. Take the following excerpts from Miltos, a 30-something Greek-Australian, living in Athens:

**Miltos:** I enjoy saying that I am Greek-Australian, but I think it makes a difference of where you come from and what people think about those places. I mean someone from Australia living in Greece and having a Greek passport, is more respected than... say being an Albanian and having an Albanian and Greek passport, because Greeks and Albanians have a well... you know...

**Anna:** Yeah... have a history.

**Miltos:** Yeah certainly. A history of dislike.

So, while he says he enjoys saying that he is Greek-Australian (because it is ‘respected’), he is mindful of the fact, that had his dual citizenship come from elsewhere, such as Albania – a country that neighbours Greece and became infamous for mass-migration to Greece from the late 80s through to the 90s – the reception would not be as warm. So his willingness to identify with these terms relates to the context in which he is situated, but also the broader geopolitical circumstances: ‘classifications emphasising ‘undesirability’ cannot be conceived independently of a national spatial background against which they acquire their meaning, it is equally true that they cannot be conceived without an idealised image of what this national spatial background ought to be like’ (Hage 2000, 38–39, emphasis original). This means that certain foreign ‘nationals’ are more welcome in the national space than others. In the Greek context this fits with an image of ‘Albanians’ as clandestine migrants, and
'Australians’ as either tourists or former emigrants or children of emigrants turned national returnees. The ‘appeal’ of these particular types illustrates the importance of the intersection between these and other normative schemes, such as neoliberalism.

The point is that these ‘categories’ within these normative schemes are not neutral. They are imbued with layers of meaning and expectations; they can be at times hierarchical and value laden. In addition, these modes of address are contextual – they are temporally and spatially situated. Thus, they may transform over time and we may be addressed very differently in the different spaces we inhabit. Words are never neutral, they carry with them connotations, associations and vast histories that differ between time and place. Furthermore, this vocabulary is not only one of national designators, where you name one and the interrogation ends; it is one of a world vision where certain nationalities possess certain innate skills. To illustrate this point consider the following well-known joke:

Heaven is where the police are British, the cooks are French, the mechanics German, the lovers Italian and it’s all organised by the Swiss. Hell is where the chefs are British, the mechanics French, the lovers Swiss, the police German and it’s all organised by the Italians.

While humour of all sorts is strongly based on stereotype, the national stereotypes that exist here are embedded within popular imaginaries and become central to the ways in which people understand themselves and others within this nationalist frame: ‘[s]ince belonging to an ethnic category implies being a certain kind of person, having that basic identity, it also implies a claim to be judged and to judge oneself, by those standards relative to that identity’ (Barth [1969] 1998, 14). This joke also speaks to how these ‘nationals’ are relationally constituted, but it also shows how national vocabularies do not just assign individuals to a place, but are also seen to reflect some of the capacities and traits of these individuals. Furthermore, those without these capacities or traits may have their account of belonging contested.

The pervasiveness of the national vocabulary is further emphasised by personal traits that are explained in national terms. As Hage suggests: ‘[individuals] recognise themselves as more national than some people and less national than others’ (Hage 2000, 52). This even occurs within family units, where siblings conceive of themselves
as being more or less of one nationality than the others. Take Eve’s comments below, both in relation to national stereotypes – she even admits just how much these stereotypes appeal to her – but also how she situates herself and her siblings:

Eve: I think from primary school age, I really liked the idea that I had a Swiss passport and I think that had more to do with Switzerland's role in history, the way that it's perceived to be a nation that's peaceful, neutral, and all that jazz.
Anna: Good banks [laughter].
Eve: Yeah, totally. Great cheese, great watches, full of engineers.
Anna: Swiss army knives.
Eve: Mountains, Alps [chuckles].

Eve: As I've grown up, and I've recognised elements of my identity that have come through from dad and the Swiss culture, I think identity plays more of a role. And then it becomes more balanced at the moment. [My sister] is probably more Indonesian actually than she is Swiss in her way of thinking and behaviour and so on, just by living over there for a little while. Well and Switzerland for a little while. I think it's intrinsic to her. Even though she's living in Switzerland now, she lived in Switzerland longer than she's lived in Indonesia - if you were we to count out the years of her life. I think, though, the way – and again I don't know whether or not I'm just allocating certain personality traits of hers to being more Indonesian. Out of the three of us, I'd say —[my brother’s] mind is really logically-ordered, so I'd say my mind and his mind are quite similar but it seems a bit disrespectful to say that I'd attribute that to the Swiss.

While individuals that do not fit into these expected forms may find their position within the state contested, it also creates expectations around certain predispositions and traits that an individual might have, or as Miller puts it ‘[c]ategories create assumptions’ (Miller 2013, 4).32

7.2.2 Border Imperialism and the Consequences of Categories

Through this national vocabulary there is a not so subtle built-in logic that these nationally-defined individuals belong in their corresponding nation states. The consequence of which is a far more sinister corollary: those that identify with, or are identified with, another national category do not belong in these places. Yet, once again, the consequences of these schemes are not solely linguistic, ‘[t]he powerful metaphoric practices that so commonly link people to place are also deployed to understand and act upon the categorically aberrant condition of people whose claims on, and ties to, national soils are regarded as tenuous, spurious or non-existent’ (Malkki 1992, 27). Inherent in national vocabularies and logics is the idea that those

32 Here one can perhaps make a link between the ways in which ‘national’ traits are seen as hereditary and the emphasis that is placed on the bestowal of citizenship by birth as outlined in Chapter Three.
who are not of the nation have a contested role within that national space, and thus these individuals become subject to diverse forms of exclusion, including 'border imperialism' which will be addressed in greater detail later in this chapter.

The fact that both people and place are conceived of in the same (national) terms suggests that it requires no great stretch of the imagination to come to a conclusion about who has rights to those spaces. In this way, citizenship and nationalism empower certain individuals – those who are identified as ‘belonging’ to those spaces – while disempowering others through these schemes. Thus: 'lived experiences of otherness are shaped by imaginings about who is entitled to protection from the nation-state because they represent the national identity, and who faces violence by the nation-state because their bodies are deemed not to belong' (Walia 2013, 63, emphasis original). Furthermore, the normative scheme of nationalism also allows citizens/nationals to conceive of themselves as being within a particular position of power and thus of agency: 'the person who deploys his or her hand on the scarf [of a Muslim woman to remove it] is clearly someone who believes that they have the right to manage the space of the nation in this way' (Hage 2000, 47). Nationalism is a normative scheme which not only links people to (certain) places, but also gives authoritative weight to certain individuals’ forms of address, and subsequently their actions.

The problem with some examples of research on racism, is that it often fails to give enough weight to the context of nationalism. Questions of racism are not simply about race, but rather about the conception of what national spaces should look like and who has a right to them: '[a]s soon as I begin to worry about where 'they' are located, or about the existence of ‘too many’, I am beginning to worry not just about my ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘culture’ or ‘people’, but also about what I consider a privileged relationship between my race, ethnicity and so on and a territory. My motivation becomes far more national than racial, even if I have a racial conception of the territory [...] such practices are better conceived of as nationalist practices than racist practices, even if racist modes of thinking are deployed within them' (Hage 2000, 32). While one cannot deny the racist categorisations within these actions, it is often how
these racial taxonomies fit within these national schemes, which is at least in part responsible for the presence of racist speech and acts.

As a result of these normative schemes of intelligibility, we have few opportunities to dictate the categories that we fall into and have even less power to dictate the content of those categories which exist beyond us. While one may be a citizen of a certain country, race is one of the ways in which people come to occupy a contested categorisation within that space. Of this there are countless examples, such as those from Andall’s study of black second generation youth in Milan where ‘being black and Italian were seen as mutually exclusive categories […] people encountered disbelief that [these youths] could be both black and Italian’ (2002, 400) or as expressed through Ong’s work: ‘[b]ecause there is dissonance between their personal features and their possession of cultural capital – for example, an apparently Asian subject who speaks fluent Dutch – such individuals may be judged culturally incompetent’ (1999, 91). These forms of racial coding, despite efforts to the contrary, not only exist, but maintain their othering roles as ‘coding habits from the past are deeply etched into the institutional and social unconscious’ (Amin 2012, 88). Furthermore, as Hage suggests: ‘[n]o matter how much national capital a ‘third world looking’ migrant accumulates, the fact that he or she has acquired it, rather than being born with it devalues what he or she possesses compared to the ‘essence’ possessed by the national aristocracy’ (Hage 2000, 62). Thus the exclusion of these individuals, or their assignation as not belonging, is driven more by active processes of their being identified as other instead of just simple incomprehension: ‘we recognise someone as a stranger, rather than simply failing to recognise them […] Strangers are not simply those who are not known in this dwelling, but those who are, in their very proximity, already recognised as not belonging, as being out of place’ (Ahmed 2000, 21, emphasis original).

Yet one must be careful not to apply too determinist an analysis of the role of race. There is an incredible diversity within these interactions, while the schemes may have the function of dictating who does and does not belong, this becomes operationalised differently, and these individuals are subject to diverse encounters: ‘[t]he harms of
race are never the same in time and space, and, in general, the variability has been considered the product of the situation, of the swirl of forces at any conjecture’ (Amin 2012, 87). One also needs to be aware of the ways in which certain racial categorisations may actually work as an advantage, as Cabot suggest: ‘informal classification categories [...] both enable and restrict access’ (2012, 15).

This understanding of nations and nationals creates a scheme in which certain individuals who live within the nation state are constructed in ways which make them not just out of place, but ‘undesirable’, and this often comes as a result not just of nationalism, but of the intersection of these schemes: ‘circulations of capital and labour stratifications in the global economy, narratives of empire, hierarchies of race, class, and gender within state building, all operate in tandem to lay the foundations of border imperialism’ (Walia 2013, 39). Thus regardless of whether it is a neoliberal or a national scheme ‘mobility is still framed within a moral geography of place’ (Cresswell 2006, 37), and thus the very same movement may be seen as either desirable or undesirable depending on who this movement is undertaken by and their context.

Border Imperialism is a means by which we may better understand how these forms of categorisation function in terms of allowing individuals access to spaces: ‘[w]hether through military checkpoints, gated communities in gentrified neighbourhoods, secured corporate boardrooms, or gendered bathrooms, bordering practices delineate zones of access, inclusion, and privilege from zones of invisibility, exclusion and death’ (Walia 2013, 9), but also conceives of how, even if entry into these spaces is obtained, they are encountered in very different ways: ‘[w]ithin border imperialism, migrant and undocumented workers are included in the state in a deliberately limited way creating a two-tier hierarchy of citizenship’ (Walia 2013, 72). Extending this, one can understand how these schemes come to create both internal and external exclusion: ‘[c]itizenship] is the cold instrument of exclusion to those outside its borders, both internal borders based on race and gender exclusion, as well as nation state ones base on xenophobia and nationalism’ (Somers 2008, 5)
Finally, we need to be careful in considering these normative schemes that we do not strip individuals of agency. Just because one may occupy a very difficult and marginal position within these regimes does not mean that they are incapable of action. They are constrained by their circumstances yet they also act in ways to make their lives liveable within these conditions and may defy these schemes: ‘...every time an undocumented mother walks into a school to enrol her child, it is an act of resistance and defiance’ (Walia 2013, 281). As Cabot explains: ‘individuals attempt to make tolerable lives within a set of conditions and constraints’ (2012, 24).

7.2.3 Interlude: Paheer

In Paheer’s story, we see the result of his multiple encounters – with bureaucrats (‘they don’t want to give me the papers’), with the police (‘I go in there and know that I have to wait. I try to think of it as my house’), and with the ‘Greeks’ (‘It is very difficult in the economic world, and they [the Greeks] don’t like the Indian men’) – has helped him to make sense of himself and his situation, but also of the broader schemes of governance and their vocabularies (‘I don’t plan to stay here, not at all, I want to go to Canada. One time I tried, but the police caught me so I stayed here to work, and I am waiting for my papers [...] I will try after three years or so to go to Canada). It suggests a very different vocabulary and mode of address to that of Mathew and Greta, who were featured in the previous vignette. As with Mathew and Greta’s account I will start with some context from the encounter.

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Paheer looks tired; he had asked me to come to the restaurant where he worked in the late afternoon so he could talk to me during his break between lunch and dinner shifts. We sat down on the table at the back of the restaurant which was littered with dirty coffee cups and an ashtray that was near to overflowing; this was where the staff took their breaks.

He sat down. He still had his apron on, and I could see and smell the grease that was on his cook’s uniform. Paheer speaks to me in a messy and intermingled combination of both English and Greek; he indiscriminately switches between the two languages.
He is softly spoken, and that, in addition to his accent and rapid changes between English and Greek, makes him at times, hard to understand. After several initial questions I ask him about his arrival in Greece:

Anna: When did you arrive in Greece?
Paheer: In 2003, on April 11.
Anna: How did you end up coming to Greece?
Paheer: First I went to Malaysia, then I went to Iran, and then from Iran to Turkey.
Anna: Oh ok, so it was a long trip... so how long did that trip take?
Paheer: I stayed in Turkey for five years. I stayed in Malaysia for one year. I stayed in Iran for 5 years.
Anna: So was your plan to come to Greece from the beginning?
Paheer: No, I don’t plan to stay here, not at all, I want to go to Canada. One time I tried, but the police caught me so I stayed here to work, and I am waiting for my papers.
Anna: What exactly is the process, to get papers here in Greece?
Paheer: First I get one card, that I get from the police station, and then I apply for the work permit. I then had to send it to the government in order to get the tax papers. In 2004, I got the sticker, where they check the sticker. In 2004 they gave papers to everyone. They gave paper to everyone that applied.
Anna: So between 2004 and now do you have to go every year, do you have to renew your papers at all?
Paheer: After two years you have to get new papers and then after 10 years, in 2005 or 2006, I applied for the 10 years, and after 2016 I will be able to have full papers. The sticker is for two years; I need to work for two more years to be able to get the forever sticker. I can work in Greece or Europe, wherever I like.
Anna: But you don’t get a passport?
Paheer: No, no passport.
Anna: So this card that you are about to get, do you know what it is called?
Paheer: Adeia Paramonis [Residency Permit], that’s it.
Anna: So you were saying that you have two more years to get your papers, after you get your papers do you have any plans for once you get them?
Paheer: I don’t know... I really don’t know. Maybe, I will try after three years or so to go to Canada. I have relations in Canada. I have a cousin and a sister. Maybe, I am not sure, maybe.
Anna: What about Europe?
Paheer: Europe, maybe somewhere like Switzerland. I know that it is a very beautiful country, it is also a very lucky country. In Greece some of the people are very bad. In Germany also, maybe only 80% good, but in Switzerland it is 100/100.
Anna: Can you work in Europe now?
Paheer: No, after two years... when I take my papers.
Anna: You have spent quite a few years in Greece. Do you feel that you relate to the Greeks now?
Paheer: I like the Greeks, but now is very difficult. It is very difficult in the economic world, and they don’t like the Indian men. Everything is different now, because of money.

Anna: What do you think of these papers in general?

Paheer: We have no chance. It is very difficult. No chance at all. It is crazy, after 10 years all you get is some papers, and even then it is hard to get the papers. In Paris, France, after 10 years you get the nationality, here no chance. There is no chance. The government doesn’t want to give it to me. I don’t know, I think there is a 50% chance, I have some friends that have been waiting 20 years, and he doesn’t get the paper. He has been having trouble with the documents and they still haven’t given him the paper.

Anna: Which year did you leave Sri Lanka?

Paheer: I left in 1996.

Anna: Can you tell me a bit about these experiences? How many times have they happened?

Paheer: Three times I have been in. Previously, once they saw the sticker, things were fine, I was fine. But the problem is now there many duplicate [forged] papers. So they pick me up and we go there, and they put me in, and don’t tell me anything. Then one hour turns to six and they still haven’t told me anything. Then the big man came in and he put my numbers into the computer, and then they saw that everything was real, the numbers and the photo, and then they say ‘ok bye’. This last time, when the police caught me on the road, they took me to his office to do some checking. Then they took me to the big police station at Petralona, and we went there, they didn’t check anything, they asked me if I had papers, I said yes and then they let me go.

Anna: What do you feel when this happens? Are you afraid of the police?

Paheer: No, nothing like that. I have been in three times, I go in there and know that I have to wait. I try to think of it as my house.

Anna: The first time it happened, where you worried?

Paheer: The first time it happened they kept me inside for three months.

Anna: Three months!

Paheer: Yes, three months. In 2000 I came here, I came here with a boat from Turkey and we arrived on Horse Island.

Anna: Horse Island?

Paheer: It was one or two hours from Turkey. It was Horse Island.

Anna: Was this a Greek Island?

Paheer: Yes, yes, a Greek island. It is one day from Alexander’s city.

Anna: Alexandroupolis?

Paheer: Yes yes one day away.

Anna: If I showed it to you on a map, would you be able to find it?

Paheer: Yes yes. I was there for one month and then the police said that I had my freedom and to go Athens, and then one day I caught a ferry to Piraeus, but the
boat went round and round. It went first to Alexandroupolis then Thessaloniki, but we had to get off at Alexandroupoli. They didn’t give us anything, no food, no food, we couldn’t get a round. They people didn’t know anything they didn’t understand. Then after some time the big guy came and said ‘freedom’. They didn’t give us food or anything. Then the human rights people came.

Anna: Which island was it? [presents iPad with map]

Paheer: No, no, on the Turkey side, near Ismir.

Anna: Oh Chios island.

Paheer: They put me in [detention] for three months. The lawyers came, and they wouldn’t let them in. They told us that he had to leave because they wouldn’t allow the lawyers in. But then they let us out, but there was nothing around, no houses, but we had to get food. A truck came and we got some food. It was like this for three months. Then they put us in a truck, all of us in a truck, and then they took us to the border. I then came back from Turkey in 2003. On the Turkey side there is a small river, then we crossed and all the night we were walking walking walking, for three days. It took three days and nights to get back to Alexandroupolis.

Here he makes reference to the vernacular hierarchies that had been mentioned earlier. He explains that ‘[Switzerland] is a very beautiful country, it is also a very lucky country. In Greece some of the people are very bad. In Germany also, maybe only 80% good, but in Switzerland it is 100/100’. Once again we see how these national vocabularies become responsible for significant generalisations about them.

Despite the agency suggested by Paheer’s multiple acts of clandestine migration, what is striking about this excerpt is the passivity of his tale: he waits, he treats the prison cell like home, and one gets the feeling that he has seemingly little recourse for action. There are parts of his narrative that are both shocking and sad, yet his recount of them is given without outrage or anger, but rather what could most closely be called resignation. If we are to compare it to the discussion with Mathew and Greta where they outline their possibilities of choice and opportunity, Paheer’s refrain is one of ‘no chance’, a phrase that he mentions four times in the space of a couple of lines. Even within the actions that he does undertake, there is a passivity: he does not contest the fact that he has been put in a prison cell despite having the right documentation, instead he treats it like home. This has similarities with Andall’s work where she describes how ‘[y]oung black men in Milan were frequently stopped by police and forced to undergo routine checks [and] […] for some [of these] young men, routine
checks by the police became so normalised that they did not remember to talk about it’ (2002, 399). The encounters that we are exposed to have a bearing on what we conceive of as ‘normal’ and what constitutes rupture.

While there may certainly be personality differences, comparing the two cases shows how the place which one occupies within these normative schemes of intelligibility plays a role within the capacities that individuals feel that they have. Given that in both accounts we see these repeated circumstances; Greta and Mathew are repeatedly assisted and enabled by their contexts, whereas Paheer on the other hand, despite his desire to be elsewhere is repeatedly constrained. As Sara Ahmed explains, and as is evident here in Paheer’s account, ‘[a] story of walls is a story of being worn down, of coming up against the same thing’ (Ahmed 2016).

7.3 ‘Giving an Account of Oneself’: Naming and Encounters of Address

‘Action and speech are so closely related because the primordial and specifically human act must at the same time contain the answer to the question asked of every newcomer: ‘Who are you?’’

- Hannah Arendt, the Human Condition, p. 178

There is an old adage ‘that sticks and stones may break my bones, but names will never hurt me’, but names do hurt; they situate people into categories and they may create greater difficulties (or opportunities) in navigating the world. The outcomes will depend on circumstance; on how these names are understood, and in how they are positioned within these normative schemes. Largely we might be able to shrug them off: they leave no visible scars, usually they do not send us into a panic and most of the time they are not used with any intention to cause harm; though sometimes they do. Speech acts can be damaging.

The taxonomic impulse of assigning a name and the desire to know which name to assign adds a further layer of analysis to the broader ideas of ‘confession’ that emerged within previous chapters. We are forced to confess our identities not only to the bureaucrat at the border, but to countless others who demand we situate ourselves within a vocabulary. Like with the bureaucratic encounter, these individuals have the
capacity to either accept or deny our terms of address, and doing so may have considerable repercussions. While one has some capacity to influence the terms with which they are addressed – for example one may have the opportunity to fit themselves within a neoliberal scheme rather than a national one – one is also subject to the address of others.

Rarely is enough weight given to the role of encounters of address by others in the ways in which we conceive ourselves: ‘problematising the group-category distinction – put crudely, self-determination versus domination – emphasises the centrality of power to processes of identification. External, or categorical, dimensions of identification are not only vitally important, but they have been underplayed in most theorisations of social identity. Self-identification is only part of the story (and not necessarily the most important part)’ (Jenkins 2000, 10). As such ‘[t]he daily fact of societal description ‘from the outside’ – how I’m reported by others, what’s expectantly in place, already chatting about me before I appear on stage – is integral to the dialectic of self-description. External imposition of a harsher sort – above all the force of political change, which is always a linguistic violence – may wring from me some new self-description as well as utter its own hostile naming against me’ (Riley 2000, 7–8). Like the confessions that were considered in the context of bureaucratic encounters, here too are considerations of power at play.

There is also the need to clarify that the word ‘name’ is perhaps a misnomer; this does not refer to specific names, such as first names, and surnames – though they do certainly have an effect – rather they speak of the terms by which individuals and groups are identified within a society. Specific names do play a role. Gender categorisations are frequently understood through naming practices, but in the context of the normative scheme of nationalism, names also suggest a certain nationality, and in some cases names persist long after other cultural markers have fallen away. Ages or socioeconomic backgrounds may also be implicit depending on the particular name or context. For example, in considering some of the fieldwork encounters in this thesis, readers may have come to conclusions regarding the nationality of some participants based on their names even when the nationality itself
was not explicitly referenced: ‘Pierre’ may have been ‘read’ as French and ‘Kaori’ as Japanese. Furthermore these schemes can be used in nicknames, such as in Pierre’s case where, as he explains: ‘people called me ‘Frenchie’, even though I did not speak French [laughter] just because I was born there’. This categorisation is reinforced with each use of the name, and Pierre himself hints at it being problematic with his reference to not speaking the language. Thus even though one’s name may be situated within these normative schemes, the focus of this section will be on the taxonomic naming practices that assign people to categories.

Much of this conception of giving an account of oneself is based on the work of Judith Butler, in her book *Giving an Account of Oneself* (2005). In this text she indicates the ways in which these normative schemes must be evoked when giving an account: ‘we are not mere dyads on our own, since our exchange is conditioned and mediated by external language, by conventions, by a sedimentation of norms that are social in character and that exceed the perspective of those involved in the exchange’ (2005, 28) and that ‘I will, to some degree, have to make myself substitutable in order to make myself recognizable’ (2005, 37). We must situate both ourselves and others within these schemes and their vocabularies. These categories are then subject to ethical negotiations: ‘an account of oneself is always given to another, whether conjured or existing, and this other establishes the scene of address as a more primary ethical relation than a reflexive effort to give an account of oneself. Moreover, the very terms by which we give an account, by which we make ourselves intelligible to ourselves and to others are not of our making. They are social in character, and they establish social norms, a domain of unfreedom and substitutability within which our ‘singular’ stories are told’ (Butler 2005, 21, emphasis added) thus these normative schemes which have been the subject of this chapter so far, are the resources that we must draw upon in our encounters of address.

When we do not comfortably fit into a specific category we are often asked to give a narrative account as to why this is the case, something that may be reminiscent of the mention of confession in the chapter on bureaucracy: ‘giving an account thus takes a narrative form, which not only depends upon the ability to relay a set of sequential
events with plausible transition but also draws upon narrative voice and authorship, being directed towards an audience with the aim of persuasion’ (Butler 2005, 12). For some there is also some flexibility in the way they may construct their address: in Ong’s work she evokes the Hong Kong Taipan: 'his very flexibility in geographical and social positioning is itself an effect of novel articulations between regimes of the family, the state, and capital, the kinds of practical-technical adjustments that have implications for our understanding of the late modern subject’ (Ong 1999, 3). For others, and depending on the relationships of power between individuals and the possible terms to which they can relate, this flexibility is less apparent.

Power is present in encounters of address in many ways. There is power in the ability to demand an account of someone. In being asked to give an account it may reinforce the fact that we do not ‘belong’ in this space. There is at times violence in our modes of address, and these modes can be othering even when they were not necessarily intended that way. There are also numerous modes of address that situate the individual within different fields. We come into contact with these schemes through the living exchanges that we have with others, and by having our position articulated through this national terminology. We become embedded within official and non-official forms of account, and this documentation gives an account of these particular forces. ‘I could not just ‘be’. I had to name an identity, no matter that this naming rendered invisible all the other identities – of gender, caste, religion, linguistic, group, generation [...] The discourse of the interview was not concerned with these. Nor would my interlocutor have asked this question of someone who ‘looked African’ (Brah 1996, 3). The reality is that not everyone is required to give an account, and some are subject to greater labour in situating themselves within these national vocabularies: ‘[s]ocial privilege is like an energy-saving device: less effort is required to pass through. No wonder that not to inherit privilege can be so ‘trying’” (Ahmed 2014, 148). There are however certain individuals who are not asked, and are not required to give an account: ‘[o]nly fame will eventually answer the repeated complaint of refugees of all social strata that ‘nobody here knows who I am’; and it is

33 For those unfamiliar with the term, ‘taipan’ is used in Hong Kong and China to refer to business leaders or successful entrepreneurs. It is often translated as ‘tycoon’.
true that the chances of the famous refugee are improved just as a dog with a name has a better chance to survive than a stray dog who is just a dog in general’ (Arendt [1951] 1973, 287).

In addition the cohesiveness of these ‘names’ – the terms and vocabularies in which we use to give an account – obscure the at times complex and ‘unnatural’ historical processes which brought them about:34 ‘the collectivity which appears sealed and fully rounded is the outcome of a struggle in which its articulation might have been no triumph of progressive thought but an accident, a compromise, something which has sprung up between casual cracks in the slabs of earlier monoliths, like a weed’ (Riley 2000, 6). Therefore these encounters can be as everyday as being introduced as someone’s ‘Italian’ friend, or as dramatic as in the case of Paheer where his address led him to serve a several-hour stint in a cell. We can see how address can be dangerous in a physical sense.

### 7.3.1 How Encounters of Address Make Difference

When we are asked to give an account of ourselves, we are often forced to do so in specific ways, and adhering to a specific vocabulary. Take the following recollection from Eve:

> I just remember— that’s my clearest memory of any question that I had all through my teenage years, it was more or less all reflecting on my identity and my place. Because one of the first questions, if you met someone new when I was in high school, was, ‘What’s your natio?’, was the first question. ‘Where are you from?’ ‘Oh, down the road [laughter].’ ‘I live - see that street over there [laughter]. Where are you from? What’s your natio?’ It was perfectly acceptable, for whatever reason, it was an important question to everybody that I hung around, and everybody who I happened to meet.’

This fragment of Eve’s recollection shows the extent to which this taxonomic need forces us to situate ourselves within particular normative schemes. Here it is clear that the answers that she wishes to give – ‘just down the road’ and ‘see that street over there’ – are not the responses sought. In giving her account of herself, they demand that she fits herself into national designators, which is made increasingly problematic by her mixed Eurasian heritage. As Butler explains: ‘I give an account of myself to

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34 A similar argument was made in Chapter Two where the complex historical processes behind the development of citizenship were discussed.
someone, and that the addressee of the account, real or imaginary, also functions to interrupt the sense that this account of myself is my own [...] No account takes place outside the structure of address, even if the addressee remains implicit and unnamed, anonymous and unspecified’ (Butler 2005, 36).

These normative schemes and the encounters of address that emerge out of them have enormous consequences for our being in the world; not only do these encounters come to highlight differences, but they construct them as well. In the case of Eve’s description above, we see how the demand for her to associate herself with an external identity shatters her desire to situate herself ‘here’. Thus, these ‘encounters make difference’ (Wilson 2016, 5) and can at times help construct the ways in which we understand the world. As Massumi suggests: ‘[p]ower doesn’t just force us down certain paths, it puts the paths in us, so by the time we learn to follow its constraints we’re following ourselves. The effects of power on us is our identity’. This becomes entrenched through multiple similar encounters ‘where repetition itself is productive of difference’ (Dewsbury and Bissell 2015, 24).

The lack of intense or dramatic events does not negate the impact of these encounters, and, as has been illustrated in relation to bureaucracy in Chapter Five, even waiting can cause significant distress: ‘dispossession is a matter of non-eventful and non-catastrophic disruptions that accumulate to reshape experience’ (Ben Anderson 2016, 5) and again, but slightly differently ‘the insidiousness of social suffering is that it gets under the skin. We acclimatise to it, deny it, ignore it, play it down. It is one of those slow burning accumulative types of hurt’ (Gunaratnam 2015, 1937). Thus many of these encounters may seem exceedingly unremarkable on their own, and greater attention needs to be paid to these smaller events in constructing individuals. This approach has been taken up by several scholars including Michael Billig whose concept of banal nationalism exemplifies this: ‘[b]anal nationalism operates with prosaic, routine words, which take nations for granted, and which, in so doing, inhabit [sic] them. Small words, rather than grand memorable phrases, offer constant, but barely conscious reminders of the homeland, making ‘our’ national identity unforgettable’ (Billig 1995, 93).
Through the ‘ghosts’\(^{35}\) of previous encounters, these experiences are not tied to particular movements in time or space, but rather they echo, build on one another, emerge and evolve. This may also help us understand some of these broader effects of these regimes in enforcing differences: ‘[h]abit provides precisely the suture through which we can consider how singular situated encounters draw something from the history of previous encounters and tend towards future encounters. Because of this, it is habit that provides a way of thinking how the encounters that individuate and differentiate bodies become part of their very constitution. In this sense, habit provides a powerful way of thinking how endemic forms of inequality, for instance, might be experienced in ways that progressively and incrementally change through time, leading to tipping points or breakdowns’ (Dewsbury and Bissell 2015, 23). In this way, we need to consider not only their number, but rather their frequency under certain conditions such as a specific period of time or within a particular space which exacerbates their meaningfulness. Furthermore attention needs to be given to the ways in which these encounters re-emerge over time: ‘[a] single speech event doesn’t work in isolation, but darts into the awaiting thickness of my inner speech to settle into its dense receptivity’ (Riley 2001, 49).

As a very recent campaign by the Diversity Council of Australia explains: ‘[s]peech is a form of action. Whether we like it or not, our words have consequences. They can include or exclude, even if we do not intend them to’ (2016, 3). The issue is that those who suffer from these failed forms of address, or from negative forms of address as a result of these normative schemes, usually have very little recourse for correction. In the first instance, much of their suffering goes unnoticed, and while failed address may simply be the act of another functioning within a complex world without any intention of harm, the impact can still be one of violence. These encounters of address reinforce these differences. Take this example from Hage’s White Nation: ‘[y]ou’re having fun with your friends and you see them as just that, your friends, and then suddenly you realise that they look at you and what they see is a Lebanese. Look,

\(^{35}\) This is an oblique reference to another part of Riley’s work: ‘[l]here are ghosts of the word which always haunt any present moment of enunciation, rendering that present already murmurous and populated’ (2001, 45).
it’s not that I am not proud to be Lebanese, it is just sometimes it is used to make you feel on the outside. You know... well... that’s how I felt anyway” (2000, 64). Thus, while the encounter of address above, was likely not to have intended offense, the use of that particular national designator situates the individual as other. It may also have ongoing repercussions: ‘the peculiarity of violent words, as distinct from lumps of rock, is their power to resonate within their target for decades after the occasion on which they were weapons’ (Riley 2001, 41).

7.3.2 When Address ‘Fails’

Given the previous content of this chapter, it should come as no surprise that one may be addressed in ways that they neither agree with nor enjoy. The diversity of forms of address, as well as the fluidity of these vocabularies and logics, make it likely that some become subject to ‘failed’ addresses. This notion of the failure of address is present within Butler’s original conception: ‘something about our existence proves precarious when this address fails [...] what binds us morally has to do with how we are addressed by others in ways we cannot avert or avoid; this impingement by the other’s address constitutes us first and foremost against our will or, perhaps more appropriately, prior to the formation of the will’ (Butler 2006, 130). The remainder of this section will consider types of failed address – including double alienation, incongruence and absconding from forms of address – and their consequences.

There is often very little control over the ways one is addressed: ‘there is a certain violence already in being addressed [...] [n]o one controls the terms by which one is addressed, at least not in the most fundamental way. To be addressed is to be, from the start, deprived of will’ (Butler 2006, 139). As the previous arguments have shown, both power and violence are inherent in these speech acts, and there is a lack of power in being addressed. Furthermore, these failures of address do not only relate to those forms of address which are embedded within the normative schemes. Even the use of people’s actual names can also be subject to failure by mis-naming, or renaming, denying the use of a name because it is too difficult or too foreign, enforcing a simpler name, or calling them something else. It is for the same reasons that Spivak in her text Can the Subaltern Speak? problematises the failed
representations of ‘the pathetically misspelled’ (1988, 306) and ‘grotesquely transcribed names’ of the subaltern women (1988, 297). Being deprived of one’s own name, and being subject to the naming of others speaks to the power within these encounters.

Double alienation in the context of encounters of address emerges when the forms of address that we use for ourselves are not the forms that are imposed on us by others; this can be illustrated with regard to the normative scheme of nationalism. With the increasing diversity of populations, and the growing numbers of instances of dual citizenship (Faist and Kivisto 2007; Spiro 2016), it is unsurprising to find that there are individuals who either identify themselves or are identified by others into more than one of these national categories. However, while the individual themselves might identify with both, they will be subject to different forms of address within different national contexts. Of this, Andrea is an example. She is a Greek Albanian, and explains how, despite being a citizen of both places, she has become subject to different forms of address in both locations:

Let’s just say, in Albania – here we are in the Balkans, you know, we have very strong notions of ethnicity – they always considered us as Greeks, they saw us as foreigners, and when we came here, they always saw us as Albanians. Many times, in our faculty, I have felt this way – ‘Aaaa, from Albania, yes, from Albania’. I told them that I was homogeneis [lit: of the same birth, i.e. ethnically Greek], they would reply with ‘well, it’s still Albania’ [...] There is always disrespect. ‘Ah, you got the identity card? But you are still from Albania, because that’s where you were born’. It is like you never really belong [...] you always seem to be stuck in the middle. Always a foreigner; here you are a foreigner and there you are a foreigner. You know what? It is especially with the Albanians here [in Greece], that we have these sorts of issues. Generally I don’t understand why it is so strong, why they see us in a bad light. Many times, I have felt awful. Or in the shop, many times [I have heard]: ‘Oh the Albanian has arrived to take our place [job]’

In some of my previous work, I outlined this concept of ‘double alienation’ (Tsalapatanis 2011), whereby an individual is ‘othered’ using these national markers, of which the above statement by Andrea is a perfect example. Though she identifies as both, she is seen as an ‘other’ by both groups: ‘[a]lways a foreigner; here you are a foreigner and there you are a foreigner’. Thus there is a rupture between her account of herself as ‘homogeneis’ and the denial of it by others.
The consequence of both these forms of address is that she is deemed not to belong in either category, which may even become internalised: ‘[t]here is an anxiety of interpellation, in which the subject ponders incessantly to herself, ‘Am I that name, am I really one of those?’” (Riley 2001, 45). She also speaks to the repetitiveness of these encounters, the impact of which was considered in the previous section of this chapter; in the short fragment above she uses the phrase ‘many times’ on three occasions and ‘always’ five times, as well as the words still and never, enforcing the fact that these are not one-off instances, but repetitive and reinforcing. Social Psychological approaches have also engaged with this phenomenon and they explain how ‘we experience psychological threat when we are miscategorised – that is when others fail to recognise or categorise us in terms that are consistent with how we see ourselves’ (Hopkins and Blackwood 2011, 218). Furthermore, this highlights the fact that just because she is recognised as being a citizen by the state, it does not necessarily follow that the population does as well. This is what Ngai refers to as ‘alien citizenship’ (2014, 2): the status of being a citizen in law, but otherwise not being recognised as such. In this instance however, both national groups fail to recognise Andrea: ‘[a]hh, you got the identity card? But you are still from Albania’. This shows how: ‘[i]n a representative democracy where the power to grant citizenship is delegated to the state, there is an important, and historically growing, incompatibility between the state’s formal acceptance of new citizens and the dominant community’s everyday acceptance of those people’ (Hage 2000, 50).

However, ‘double alienation’ does not only emerge from the address of others, but can also occur through forms of internalised address. For example, alienation can occur when an individual lives away from their ‘homeland’ for a long period of time, yet still identifies with it. Any differences that they have with the dominant ‘host country’ community may be explained away by both the individual themselves and the dominant national community – showing once again the interconnection of the ways we address ourselves as well as the address of others – using the home country’s

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36 Here the word ‘homeland’ is presented in inverted commas to interrupt these notions of ‘home’. It is precisely these experiences that in returning to ones ‘home’ – their country of ethnic origin – these individuals realise that it is far less of a home than they had been led to believe.
national designator. When they ‘return’ to the country that they have always conceived of as home, they find that they are once again othered: what they imagined were the cultural objects and acts of national culture that they partook in as markers of home in the host country are different to those found in the home destination on return (Tsalapatanis 2011). At its most extreme, this can cause a ruptured sense of self, and while not explicitly using this terminology, these shattered notions of nationhood are well-illustrated by Christou in her article American Dreams and European Nightmares (2006). Here once again the concepts of interruption or rupture are useful: ‘[w]here t]he moment of interruption [...] marked a disruption and a calling into question of that feeling of belonging’ (Dawney 2013, 632).

To this list of possible failures of address one needs to include the concept of incongruence. One such example is where the terms by which an individual gives an account of themselves falls outside this normative scheme of intelligibility. Of this, one participant – Bogdan – is a good example. The evidence of the failure of these normative schemes in his case is subtle: where people speak of coming from ‘France’, being ‘Australian’ or speaking ‘Greek’, Bogdan instead refers to ‘my language’, ‘my people’ and ‘my country’. The difference is made noticeable by the felt absence of the ‘anchor points’ which situate him within a certain part of the world.37 Very briefly, Bogdan, now in his 50s migrated to Australia at a time when Yugoslavia was breaking up; he lived in what now is geographically Croatia, but his Orthodox Christian faith meant to many that he should be categorised a Serb, but he himself does not identify comfortably with either. This is addressed briefly in this testimony:

This [using national descriptors] is how people understand the world today; it is the questions that they ask and the responses that they expect. [...] You have to realise that I came before all of this; I came on a Yugoslavian passport, the old passport, and it then became Croatia, and I can’t take another this way.

Here he reinforces for us both the importance of these normative schemes, and suggests the fact that he does not feel he fits comfortably within them. Bogdan’s case provides clues as to what happens when these naming conventions break down.

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37 For further discussions on the ways in which the national is informing please see the earlier parts of this chapter, methodological discussions as they relate to nationalism (p.64) as well as the discussion of nationalism in Chapters Two and Three.
Categories of all sorts are problematic due to ‘the paradoxical role categories play cognitively as containers with fixed boundaries while emphasizing the inchoateness of bounding processes’ (Jones 2009, 185).

There will always be certain individuals, ideas, and things that defy categorisation; either they do not fit comfortably within any particular category, or in the case of individuals or groups in the context of encounters of address, this may be because they contest the categories to which they become assigned. Riley experiences this problem herself due to her mixed ethnic background: ‘[a]m I to agree to be designated as ‘Black British’, or do I refuse this designation as in itself unwittingly racist because I am in fact ‘English’ and as English a citizen as everyone else, whatever my skin colour, and I don’t want that racialized difference; do I settle for ‘Afro-Caribbean’ or for ‘British of African descent’, or should I fight, tongue in cheek to introduce ‘Afro-Saxon’, or had I better specify ‘born in Holloway, London, of an Antiguan-born mother and a father from Jamaica? Or do I give up, and tick wryly that small square for all categorical residues which is marked as ‘Other’?’ (Riley 2000, 7). Thus, as she expresses, none of the available categories are really able to comfortably classify her within this scheme.

There are different ways in which individuals attempt to abscond from encounters of address. They have consequences, and the aforementioned violence from these addressing encounters may not only be linguistic: identifying and being identified with certain categories by certain individuals or ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky 1983) may lead to physical violence, imprisonment or deportation. Thus for some of these precarious individuals it may be easier to abscond from certain encounters of address. Of this there are many possible examples. One of the most dramatic is the burning of identity documents. The violent act of setting fire to one’s paperwork, is done largely to escape from official modes of address, ones which may have them deported. Among the places where this is prevalent, including Morocco and Algeria, they have a collective name for these people who burn their documents, Harrag (another mode of address), in Arabic literally meaning ‘a burner’ (Omoniyi and Omoniyi 2016, 88), but due to the commonness of the this practice it is used more generally for those who
undertake clandestine migration. By burning these documents, and thus removing the documentary traces of their identity, they limit the possibility of their identification and thus their deportation. The very existence of these acts illustrate developed states’ ‘reliance upon the passport itself [and] a certain faith in the notion that people are who their documents proclaim them to be’ (Cho 2013, 240).

Those who undertake clandestine migration also have the option to further evade encounters of address by limiting themselves to certain groups of people or living within certain communities: ‘few irregular migrants have ready access to a life lived openly and in public’ (Álvarez 2013, 148). Furthermore these limitations impact on options and life choices, whether it be questions of family or employment or simply ‘safely’ visiting certain public spaces, leading to what is described as ‘a life full of holes’ (Charhadi 1999) characterised by periods of hiding, especially from police. Paheer’s case illustrates how these forms of address can be limiting despite having all the required legal paperwork; the fact that he is ‘third world looking migrant’ (Hage 2000, 133) has led to periods of incarceration. As Riley explains ‘[t]here’s a proximity between ‘being called’ as a description and ‘being called’ as an aggression’ (2000, 10). This too has implications for citizenship, as ‘if citizenship is to mean anything in an everyday sense it should mean the ability of individuals to occupy public spaces in a manner that does not compromise their self-identity, let alone obstruct, threaten or even harm them more materially’ (Painter and Philo 1995, 115).

In being subject to failed forms of address these individuals are experiencing vastly different citizenship encounters. They may cause feelings of insecurity, anxiety about their belonging, difficulties of being understood, or simply behaviours that make hiding preferable to certain forms of address. Despite what may be only good intentions, there is a violence and a powerlessness that can emerge from forms of address: ‘[i]n its violently emotional materiality, the word is indeed made flesh and dwells among us’ (Riley 2005, 9). Thus the seemingly inconsequential act of addressing individuals and groups in certain ways, even if done with the very best of intentions can be othering and may cause exclusion. This section has shown the diverse consequences of address and how the linguistic intersects with the material,
the affective and the emotional in a myriad of ways. What it shows is that words must not be taken for granted.

7.4 Conclusion

No one today is purely one thing. Labels like Indian, or woman, or Muslim, or American are not more than starting-points, which if followed into actual experience for only a moment are quickly left behind. Imperialism consolidated the mixture of cultures and identities on a global scale. But its worst and most paradoxical gift was to allow people to believe that they were only, mainly, exclusively, white, or Black, or Western, or Oriental. Yet just as human beings make their own history, they also make their cultures and ethnic identities. No one can deny the persisting continuities of long traditions, sustained habitations, national languages, and cultural geographies, but there seems no reason except fear and prejudice to keep insisting on their separation and distinctiveness, as if that was all human life was about. Survival in fact is about the connections between things; in Eliot’s phrase, reality cannot be deprived of the ‘other echoes [that] inhabit the garden’. It is more rewarding - and more difficult - to think concretely and sympathetically, contrapuntally, about others than only about ‘us’. But this also means not trying to rule others, not trying to classify them or put them in hierarchies, above all, not constantly reiterating how ‘our’ culture or country is number one (or not number one, for that matter).

- Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, 1994, p.407-408

This chapter has introduced Butler’s notion of ‘normative schemes of intelligibility’ in order to understand how these vocabularies and logics impact on everyday encounters. They have influenced our notions of ourselves as well as the substance and understanding of citizenship. Initially it considered the ways in which logics and vocabularies were central to both the birth and the maintenance of the normative scheme of neoliberalism, as well as how this scheme has come to transform that of citizenship. Secondly, the normative scheme of nationalism was considered, along with the ways it plays a rather contradictory role of spatialising individuals at a time which they are more likely to be less restricted to a particular place. It also considered the ways in which these national designators are embedded within notions of meaning and value, and how these categories, through border imperialism, and other forms of exclusion come to dictate just who has access to certain spaces. Finally, this chapter considered the notion of encounters of address more generally considering how these forms of address come to make change and the impacts of failed forms of address.
By conceiving of the ways the vocabularies and logics of neoliberalism and nationalism have impacted on individual modes of address, we are better able to conceive of the extreme variations in the citizenship encounters of these diverse individuals. In doing so we have also come to realise the power (or powerlessness) of the individual within these ‘modes of address’ and the intensities of these impacts on a lived life, especially when these encounters of address construct certain individuals and groups as marginal. With life’s increasing uncertainty and speed (Bauman 2000; Virilio [1977] 2006), these vocabularies and logics have become even more important tools with which to understand and navigate the world, but the corollary of this is that we address others in ways that are overly simplistic and using vocabularies that are arbitrary and the result of historical accident.

What this chapter has done is to delve below the surface to see how these ‘normative schemes of intelligibility’ come to function, as well as the ways in which they enable certain individuals, and value certain things, within these schemes and yet are increasingly dismissive or critical of those that fall outside of them. Mathew and Greta have come to exemplify the able neoliberal individual for whom life is open to countless possibilities. Their very agency can be heard in the words they use and the activeness with which they describe their position. On the other hand, the encounters of address as faced by Paheer restrain him. They position him within a certain space and they limit his possibilities. Despite his agency in travelling from Sri Lanka through various parts of the world, his narrative tells a tale of passivity, of negative and constraining address, of being addressed in ways which limit his freedom. These schemes strike at the heart of who we are, and yet, from them, there is little means of escape. Through interpellation we both situate ourselves and become situated within these schemes often without realising it. However, the outcomes of these interactions are nondeterministic, and as limiting as these case may be, we need to be aware of both the fluidity and contingency that are inherent to these terms.

In returning to our topic of citizenship, the content of this chapter can also account, at least in part, for how citizenship evolves over time. Stepping away from grand notions of policy and legal transformations, these naming encounters highlight how
citizenship emerges and is shaped by these everyday practices. This occurs at the level of how an individual may have their citizenship contested, but speaks of how these can create broader shifts such as the way in which neoliberalism has altered conceptions of what citizenship entails to be more in line with neoliberal thinking and values. This further emphasises the point that was made at the very start of this thesis, that despite claims to its long and prosperous history, citizenship is in a constant process of re-articulation and re-invention.

Finally, we can see how citizenship is itself one of these normative schemes, which, as has been illustrated, intersects with the schemes of neoliberalism and nationalism. It also fits people within a hierarchy - similar to those articulated in colourful diagrams produced by the citizenship planning companies. Citizenship is based in a conception of moral authority that embeds us in the world as a subject of a particular state. What has emerged at numerous points during this chapter is the fact that as individuals these are processes over which we have very little control; these categorisations impact on how we are defined, the spaces we have access to, and the way in which we identify ourselves and others.
8. Conclusion

‘Ok! Everyone off the bus. Leave your stuff we will see you on the other side!’ It was the very early hours of a morning in the summer of 2009 and after a long journey from a small town in Brittany through St Malo, Rennes, and Paris, I had arrived at the port of Calais. We were being ushered off the bus by the driver to pass through immigration control before boarding the ferry for Dover. Somehow with my sleep-addled brain I managed to be one of the first to enter and wind through the vacant zig-zagging railings as I dug one-handedly in my bag for my passport. It was not forthcoming. Upon arriving at a desk I smiled apologetically and asked the immigration officer to ‘please wait a tick’ moments before producing my passport. He received it with a frown and then checked the document a few times over; he looked at me and looked back at it, asked me where I was going and who I was staying with. He checked each of the pages, held it up to the light, scratched at it. I was concerned; his demeanour was aggressive, his questions barking. A couple of minutes in and he shoved the passport back at me, saying harshly ‘I don’t know how you got this, but it seems real so I am letting you through’. I grasped my passport, and shuffled along to the other side. His response had disturbed me, especially this aggression; I continue to wonder what it was about me or the documentation that he found so problematic. This experience often returns to me in the moments before I come face to face with an immigration officer.  

By focusing on encounters in the context of citizenship, we can illuminate the social, material, and temporal aspects of it, while retaining the presence of ambiguity that is rendered invisible by other approaches. Take the above vignette for example. In using a political science lens, this may simply be presented as a citizen transiting from one state to another. From a binary perspective on border crossing, this vignette suggests a successful outcome to the interaction: I made it through immigration and eventually

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38 This, like the vignette that opened this thesis, is also auto-ethnographic, but this time from a few years earlier.
back onto the bus and the ferry. However, from the perspective of encounter, the richness of the specifics of this situation come to light. The power differences are felt and made evident by the border official’s demeanour. We also have some indication of the role that spaces may play, through the presence of ‘zig-zagging railings’ and the physicality of the boundary expressed by ‘passing through’. Furthermore, the impact of the encounter does not end with the return to the bus, but rather resonates when facing similar experiences in the present or perhaps in imagining like possibilities in the future. The analysis of encounters in the context of citizenship can illustrate how it is a complex social process that involves both labour demands and diverse intricate social relations. It also suggests the limits to assuming deterministic outcomes, and the importance of integrating individual difference into our understandings.

While it may seem perverse to compare this particular encounter with the ‘desperate passages’ (C. Martin 2011) of irregular migrants, that are usually in the news, when places such as ‘Calais’ are mentioned, there is a pressing need to. Considering the at times horrific circumstances of these individual migrants as something isolated from more general considerations of citizenship obscures the fact that their conditions are at least in part dictated by the same global system: the system which allows me to cross the border is the same one that leaves them constrained. Thus we require an approach to citizenship that is able to theorise not only dramatic experiences – such as that of the irregular migrant trying to cross to the UK – but also relatively banal or repetitive encounters. Studies into the treatment of irregular migrants and asylum seekers have shown how it is sometimes the most quotidian parts of these processes that have a considerable impact on the ways in which these individuals understand themselves within their new communities (Darling 2014; Cabot 2012). Furthermore, the notion of encounter also allows insight into the hidden differential modes of inclusion among citizens of the same country, an area of study that requires greater attention.

When people are asked to talk about their citizenship – as they were as part of this research – they start with the common sites and narratives: they reproduce the dominant conceptions relating to visas, passports, naturalisation ceremonies and the like. Yet, as the discussion continues, they speak of the direct points of intersection
that citizenship has had in their everyday lives; these narratives are not necessarily rational, nor linear. They are both personal and interpersonal, and are shaped by their understandings of themselves and their place in the world, as well as more complex contextual circumstances. Greater attention needs to be paid to the role of encounter in conceptions of citizenship as status in lived lives.

8.1 What this Thesis Covered

By focusing on the ways that citizenship is encountered within lived lives, this thesis has provided a novel approach to the study of citizenship that can better grasp the fluidity as well as the transformative capacities of the emergent encounters that make up individuals’ ongoing negotiations of citizenship. This being said, the various parts of the thesis have contributed to this argument in diverse ways, so this section will first consider the specific contributions of each chapter, before building on the contributions made by the thesis as a whole.

The first three chapters of this thesis set the scene for the later discussion chapters by introducing the historical development of citizenship, as well as the key literature and methodological foundations. Chapter Two – Historicising Citizenship – investigated the subject from a genealogical point of view highlighting periods of transformation, reinvention and rupture in its history, disrupting the myths of both its ‘naturalness’ and its linear development. This chapter also outlined the transformations of citizenship at the two locations where interviews were undertaken – those of Australia and Greece – once again highlighting this diversity as well as how citizenship is subject to ongoing processes of change. Chapter Three – Encountering Citizenship – further develops the concept of encounter that is so central to this thesis, as well as more broadly introducing the existing conceptions of citizenship, highlighting the subject’s two interlinked dilemmas that emerge from the current scholarship: the breadth of its application and the all-too-common reliance on binaries and strict forms of categorisation. Methodological considerations were the subject of Chapter Four which reflected on these more practical aspects. This chapter engaged with the methodological implications of using encounter as a point of investigation, as well as
some broader reflections regarding the nature of qualitative work. This discussion was underpinned by the desire to give an honest and reflexive account of the research process.

Chapters Five, Six and Seven, each drew heavily from the empirical content investigating particular sites of encounter and directly addressing this thesis’ four specific research questions. Chapter Five, the Encountering Bureaucracy chapter, answered the question of what role encounters with bureaucracy have in the lived experiences of citizenship. It problematized the existing conceptions of the neutral bureaucracy, such as those found in the work of Weber (1991), as well as the idea that these processes are simply ‘gates’ that one has to pass through. Through using considerable empirical material, and engaging with diverse but related literatures, this chapter showed how the materiality of the bureaucratic encounter, its emotional force and the temporalities of these experiences, have complex and ongoing implications for conceptions of citizenship.

Chapter Six addressed the notion of imaginaries and answered the question of how citizenship is imagined differently by diverse individuals and what this can tell us about citizenship more generally. It investigated the diverse ways in which citizenship is imagined, both collectively and individually, and the relationship this has to action. In doing so it built on existing conceptions of imaginaries (Castoriadis [1975] 1997; Taylor 2004; Jasanoff and Kim 2015; Benedict Anderson [1983] 2006, among others), and introduced the concept of ‘acts of imagination’ to better reflect these individualised encounters. These were then considered through the investigation of cosmopolitan mobile imaginaries, inheritance imaginaries and interrupted/ruptured imaginaries.

Chapter Seven addressed the two final questions of how the normative concept of citizenship changes over time and the role of encounters of address with regards to individual conceptions of citizenship. The development of citizenship was explored through the impact of ‘normative schemes of intelligibility’ and their ‘vocabularies’ and ‘logics’, concepts that emerge within the work of Judith Butler (2005, 2006,
among others), which was initially mapped out using neoliberalism as an example. The influence of neoliberalism and nationalism on the substance of citizenship were then considered further and used to account for the changes in the content of citizenship over time. The later parts of this chapter illustrated how address is determined not only by the accounts that we give of ourselves but by the at times violent address of others, highlighting the key ways difference is created and maintained in the context of citizenship through these encounters of address.

There are several ideas which transcend individual chapters and that are developed by the thesis as a whole. Linking together these three sites of encounter that are outlined in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, we gain insight into the impact of both rupture and repetitive encounters, the role of language and performative interactions, and finally, the impact of taxonomies in obscuring both diversity and ambiguity.

What this thesis has emphasised above all is the role of encounter as a site for the emergence of citizenship, and how the content of these encounters can help us better understand citizenship more generally. It has also illustrated how the common focus on grand acts and points of rupture, fails to understand the context in which most conceptions come into being. While dramatic events are telling, the scale of the impact of ‘rupture’ reflects the conviction with which the original conceptions were held. These points of rupture cannot be understood outside the flow of previous encounters (Dawney 2013), thus highlighting the impact of the banal and the everyday with regards to citizenship. Furthermore, it is within a complex landscape of fluid negotiated human perceptions that individuals use their citizenship and, as such, encounter is central to so many of the experiences in which citizenship emerges.

There are also performative aspects to citizenship – whether they be ephemeral performances of the state in the context of bureaucracy (Jeffrey 2012), or in ‘the performative dimensions of society’s self-reproduction […] the enactment and re-enactment of its imaginaries’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2015, 7) or the ways in which naming practices are performative of the power of different groups and of citizenship more generally. While each chapter has highlighted a different aspect of this performativity,
these come together to suggest the diverse ways in which citizenship comes into being. These performative aspects of citizenship have also highlighted the importance of language, and more specifically speaking encounters on individuals. To speak is an act of power, and both the speaker, and the terms that they employ, have considerable repercussions: the language and categories we use have implications on who has voice (Spivak 1988). Finally, we must remember how ‘neat’ understandings and clinical definitions come to render certain individuals invisible: ‘[i]f institutional and public spaces assume certain bodies, then history becomes concrete by enabling those bodies to flow through spaces […] [m]aybe an institution is like an old garment it acquires the shape of those who tend to wear it, and as such it becomes easier to wear if you have that shape. Privilege can be thought of in these terms: that which is wearing’ (Ahmed 2014, 147).

Another overarching topic covered by this thesis is how studies of citizenship have contributed to the concept’s abstraction through the use of rigid terms, and by ignoring individual experience. While the taxonomic desire to understand and organise is quite natural, for many there is a failure to consider how putting people and things into categories is both a powerful act on the part of the classifier, and a deprivation of sorts on the part of the classified. There is no way to do away with many of these categorisations as they are often the tools with which we navigate the world, but there are certainly methods that we can use, as individuals, and as social scientists, to move past them. This provides a much-needed openness to contingency: ‘[a]t the ground of quotidian experiences and life courses, the enactment of citizenship may appear as much, or even more, a matter of serendipity and improvisation than of formal abstractions of rights, statuses and identities’ (Amit 2014, 407). Thus this approach has allowed the consideration of the roles of material, affective, and temporal influences; it gives an understanding that moves beyond the shallowness of binary conceptions and allows us to realise the ambiguity and indeterminacy that exist in relation to citizenship.
8.2 Evaluation of Contribution

The contributions of this thesis can be seen in three key domains. Broadly speaking this thesis contributes to the qualitative literature on citizenship, further develops the concept of encounter, and provides novel approaches to the three thematic areas of bureaucracy, imaginaries, and encounters of address. The key contribution of this thesis comes from its work in understanding citizenship: in highlighting how encounter can help us step away from binary and universalising definitions and perspectives, this thesis has been able to account for fluidity and change within the various articulations of the concept. It provides a theorisation which is able to connect the experiences of the under-privileged to those who are more privileged in conceiving them as part of the same system. By ensuring that a diversity of experiences are included, this thesis has provided a more comprehensive account that is able to engage with the multiplicity of these encounters. Furthermore, the inclusion of non-English speaking participants has moved away from the English language accounts that often pervade this sphere.

Citizenship does not have and will never have an objective external referent. It is created in words, and occasionally takes material forms, but in the end, it is understood by individuals through the ways that they encounter it, how they are exposed to it, and how it is imagined. Thus qualitative research, and more specifically, the approach used in this thesis, offers a unique way of providing an account of the detail and individual circumstances that may be missed by other methodologies. This thesis has contributed by providing an account of the ambiguities as they exist, as well as better being able to theorise change. The thesis also steps away from national accounts of citizenship that are the focus of much of the academic literature. While this thesis recognised the importance of the ‘national’ frame (Malkki 1992) - citizenship is after all the relation of the individual to the nation-state - it has illustrated how citizenship ranges from small everyday experiences, to a greater ‘normative scheme of intelligibility’ which spans the globe, allowing this research to deal with this enormous range in scale. This approach allows us to see the impacts above and below the national frame, as well as beyond the context of an individual
state. Other more minor contributions involve the insights into the role that ethics, and more specifically ethics documentation, play in these interactions, which is missing from the literature. Furthermore, the experimentation with the use and presentation of fieldwork extracts, all suggests new possibilities for the ways in which we can convey the more empirically oriented aspects of our research within these contexts.

In terms of the original contributions of the three thematic areas, they have all built upon the existing literature of their respective subjects. In the case of bureaucracy, this thesis expands on some of the previous work in the field (notably Herzfeld 1992), and shows how bureaucratic processes present a misleading image of objectivity and neutrality, and how these encounters are more likely to be full of emotional and affective content, that has implications on how individuals understand themselves and their environments. This is even more important in our context where we are moving towards biometric forms of identification and population management. In the context of imaginaries, the primary contribution is the inclusion of individual acts of imagination within the conceptual framework of social imaginaries. So many of these existing accounts abstract imagination from the individual (Adams 2004), and thus fail to deal with the fluidity of these conceptions, but also the ways in which imagination may change over time.

Finally, the interrogation into encounters of address has provided a novel way to understand the influence of both neoliberalism and nationalism within citizenship. Conceiving them in terms of 'logics' and 'vocabularies' provides a means to theorise the way that citizenship changes over time. Furthermore, the illustration of how the address of others impinges on the ways in which we present ourselves has implications for scholarship in the area of identity. It also reinforces the social and socialised nature of citizenship which is often absent from other literature on the topic that focuses on these state-individual interactions.
8.3 Limitations

In acknowledging the novelty and contributions of this thesis to the field, it is also important to acknowledge its limitations. Firstly, I wish to emphasise that this process was very much a learning curve for me – steep at times – and as such I have made missteps and errors along the way. Each mistake was useful in terms of the insight that it provided me as a learning experience, but given my time again there are certainly some things that I would have done differently. This feeling, I believe, is particularly acute for those who undertake qualitative interviewing, as listening back to these interviews highlight the possibilities of what avenues could have been pursued and were not, and which questions were asked, and perhaps should not have been. I aimed to address the impact of the lack of honest accounts as to the messiness of the interview process in research more generally in my methodology chapter, and I wish to reinforce this here: the process of doing this research was complex with twists and turns, false starts, and dead ends.

While I have made it clear that the participants chosen for this research were never meant to be representative, I am still very much aware, that even though there were contributions from individuals who were more marginalised in terms of citizenship, many of those who were interviewed come from relatively advantageous positions, either by having higher levels of education or income, or simply by virtue of their European heritage or the particular official statuses that they may have. Furthermore, due to issues of length and scope, I have purposefully decided not to engage with questions regarding the citizenship of indigenous communities (except for in passing, in relation to the Australian citizenship context in Chapter Two) and some might consider this a deficiency. Applying this approach to how indigenous communities experience citizenship would be a fascinating area for further research, yet is beyond the scope of this thesis.

39 For a more comprehensive overview of the sorts of individuals who were interviewed see the appendices that follow (p.249).
8.4 Future Possibilities

It is heartening to see that in the years since this research started there have been some new contributions that are taking steps towards filling the qualitative gap in the 'citizenship as status' literature, but there is still a great deal to do in this field. While this is certainly not the first piece of work to use the notion of encounter, it will hopefully be an encouragement to others to see how these everyday interactions come to play out in individual contexts. The ways in which citizenship interacts with and 'comes up against' these aspects in lived lives are all inherently crucial to the ways in which it is understood.

While this thesis has at times been critical of other approaches in citizenship studies, this methodology is not intended to supersede them, but to rather provide an engagement with the topic that can help illuminate some of the gaps that exist within the academic literature, and this will certainly be an ongoing process. The sheer multiplicity of things that citizenship entails, and the difficulties outlined in the earlier parts of this thesis, all highlight the need for a diversity of perspectives on the topic. This thesis is not - and never intended to be - a complete and comprehensive account of citizenship in its entirety, rather it is one among many, which work together to illuminate this many faceted subject. It may however be used as a starting point to further investigation on the impact of our assumptions with regards to our research.

All this talk of doing away with binary approaches has perhaps alluded to some of the theorisations within gender studies. While there has been some consideration of performativity within this thesis, considering the ways in which analysis of gender can better help us understand the reproduction of citizenship as status in everyday life, may provide fruitful ground for further scholarship. Take these two quotations from the work of Judith Butler for example, where the word gender has been substituted for the world citizenship: '[citizenship] is, thus, a construction that regularly conceals its genesis. The tacit collective agreement to perform, produce, and sustain discrete

---

40 Here I am thinking of works such as (Benson 2012) and (Hepworth 2015), but also more generally on the work being done on encounter (Bissell 2016; Wilson 2016; Villegas 2015).
and polar [citizenship- i.e. citizen and non-citizen] as cultural fictions is obscured by the credibility of its own production. The authors of [citizenship] become entranced by their own fictions whereby the construction compels one's belief in its necessity and naturalness. The historical possibilities materialized through various corporeal styles are nothing other than those punitively regulated cultural fictions that are alternately embodied and disguised under duress’ (Butler 1988, 522). And in another example: ‘[citizenship is] a set of repeated acts within a highly regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being’ (Butler [1990] 1999, 33). These two quotations and others suggest that there is certainly ground for research into how theorisations of gender can inform the investigation of citizenship.

Finally, as this thesis has suggested more broadly in the introduction, and elsewhere, more work needs to be done around the impacts of taxonomies and categorisations within the social sciences more generally. In the context of citizenship, this means acknowledging the normative implications of these taxonomies. In trying to move beyond them we need to diversify the sort of narratives of citizenship that are available in the public, whether this be through academic, or more literary means. By stepping away from approaches to citizenship that restrict it to binary concepts, we will be better able to conceive of the diverse ways in which citizenship is encountered within lived lives. But in doing so, we require greater awareness of how the taxonomic desire for order, in research as in life, renders certain individuals and their circumstances invisible. These ‘categorical’ impulses speak to a broader sense of discomfort that comes from dealing with ambiguity, but it is only in embracing this ambiguity, that we may better come to conceive of complex topics such as citizenship.
9. Appendices

9.1 Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Citizenship Statuses</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Language of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adam</td>
<td>Australian Citizen by Birth, Dutch Hereditary Citizenship obtained in his 20s (5)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adelaide</td>
<td>UK Citizen by Birth, Australian Citizen (10)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agatha</td>
<td>New Zealand Citizenship by Birth, Australian Citizenship (10) after a long period living in Australia without it.</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amanda</td>
<td>UK Citizenship by Birth, Australian Permanent Residency (5), Australian Citizenship (25)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The bracketed numbers next to certain statuses reflect the years that particular individual had the status that precedes it.

---

41 The citizenship statuses, ages, and educational backgrounds included here is what is self-reported by the participants or inferred as best as possible from their interviews. All names indicated are pseudonyms to protect their confidentiality, however efforts have been made to select names with a similar 'style'.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Citizenship by Birth, Additional Citizenship Information</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amir</td>
<td>Iranian Citizen by Birth, Australian Permanent Resident (1), Australian Temporary Visas (4)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Higher Tertiary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrea</td>
<td>Albanian Citizenship by Birth, Greek Hereditary Citizenship (1), extended residence in Greece prior.</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Higher Tertiary</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anne</td>
<td>Australian Citizenship by Birth, French Temporary Residency Visa (2), United Kingdom Permanent Residency (5)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonis</td>
<td>Bulgarian Citizenship by Birth, Greek Hereditary Citizenship, obtained at a very young age</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arjun</td>
<td>Indian Citizen by Birth, various Australian Visas (6), Australian Permanent Resident (2)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogdan</td>
<td>Yugoslav (Croatian) Citizenship by Birth, Australian Citizen (10)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cristina</td>
<td>Romanian Citizenship by Birth, Greek Resident through Spouse (5)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel</td>
<td>South African Citizenship by Birth, Australian Citizenship (9)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David</td>
<td>Australian Citizenship by Birth, New Zealand Hereditary Citizenship (11)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diana</td>
<td>Bulgarian Citizenship by birth, Naturalised Greek Citizen due to Spouse (20)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilia</td>
<td>Greek Citizen by Birth, American Hereditary Citizenship obtained at a young age</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emma</td>
<td>British Citizenship by Birth, Australian Permanent Residency (4), Australian Citizenship (5)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Higher Tertiary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Citizenship and Residency Details</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Level of Education</td>
<td>Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eve</td>
<td>Swiss Citizenship by Birth, Australian Citizenship through Naturalisation (18), Indonesian Mother</td>
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<td>f</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fotini</td>
<td>Greek Citizenship by Birth, Bulgarian Residency (50)</td>
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<td>f</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>UK Citizenship by Birth, Australian Temporary Visas (2), Australian Permanent Residency (3), Australian Citizen</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greta</td>
<td>Canadian Citizenship by Birth, Swiss Temporary Residents Visa (under spouse), Australian Spouse of 457 Visa Holder, Permanent Resident (3), recent Australian citizen, wife of Mathew</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haris</td>
<td>Bulgarian Citizenship by Birth, Greek Hereditary Citizenship from a very young age</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Higher Tertiary</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heidi</td>
<td>German Citizen by Birth, Greek Permanent Residency through Spouse (30)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiro</td>
<td>Japanese Citizenship by Birth, Australian Permanent Resident (15)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>m</td>
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<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ioana</td>
<td>Romanian Citizen by Birth, Greek Hereditary Citizenship applied for at the age of 18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack</td>
<td>Danish Citizen by Birth, later relinquished to obtain Australian Citizenship (8)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James</td>
<td>Danish Citizen by Birth, Australian Permanent Resident for over 20 years</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joshua</td>
<td>British Citizenship by Birth, Australian Citizenship through Spouse (10)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaori</td>
<td>Japanese Citizenship by Birth, various forms of Greek Residency Permits (8)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Citizenship Details</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>Armenian Citizenship by Birth, various forms of Greek Residency Permits (7)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis</td>
<td>French Citizenship by Birth, Australian Citizenship through Spouse (12), British Hereditary Citizenship (20), qualifies for Irish Hereditary Citizenship though never obtained.</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucia</td>
<td>Romanian Citizenship by Birth, Greek Resident through EU registration (4)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark</td>
<td>British Citizenship by Birth, Australian Permanent Residency (5), Australian Citizenship (25)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathew</td>
<td>Canadian Citizenship by Birth, Swiss Temporary Residents Visa, Australian 457 Visa Holder, Permanent Resident (3) and recent Australian Citizen, husband of Greta</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayumi</td>
<td>Citizen of Japan by Birth, living in Greece using Spousal Visas (8)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michelle</td>
<td>British Citizen by Birth, Greek Permanent Residency through Spouse (20)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Greek and English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milena</td>
<td>Romanian Citizenship by Birth, Greek Resident through Spouse (7)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miltos</td>
<td>Greek Citizenship by Birth, Australian Hereditary Citizenship, obtained when young</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miranda</td>
<td>American Citizenship by Birth, Recent Australian Permanent Resident (1)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natalia</td>
<td>Romanian Citizenship by Birth, Greek Residency initially through Spouse and later through EU registration</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Citizenship Details</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Education Level</td>
<td>Language(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natalie</td>
<td>British Citizenship by Birth, Several long-term Temporary visas (457, then Spousal), Australian Citizen a month prior to interview</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omar</td>
<td>Australian Citizen by Birth, Greek Hereditary citizenship, obtained recently</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paheer</td>
<td>Citizen of Sri Lanka, Greek Temporary Visa (8) after a period of irregularity</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Greek and English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre</td>
<td>French Citizenship by Birth, New Zealand Hereditary Citizenship, and Australian Citizenship through Naturalisation (3)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sotiris</td>
<td>Greek Citizenship by Birth, Australian Citizenship through Spouse (33)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>English and Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stavros</td>
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<td>82</td>
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<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steve</td>
<td>Australian Citizenship by Birth, Hereditary Italian Citizenship (6)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susan</td>
<td>Australian Citizenship by Birth, Greek Citizenship through Spouse (35)</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suzie</td>
<td>Born in Singapore, British Hereditary Citizenship, Lived in US under Various forms of Temporary Visas (20), Australian Spousal Visa (4), Australian Citizenship (7)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svetlana</td>
<td>Russian Citizenship by Birth, Greek Permanent Residency through Spouse (8)</td>
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<td>f</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veronika</td>
<td>Russian Citizenship, Greek Residency through Spousal Visa (6)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 9.1.1 Number of Participants from Each Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>105</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Bar chart showing the number of participants from each country]
9.1.2 Age of Participants

![Age of Participants Pie Chart]

20-29: 24%
30-39: 22%
40-49: 14%
50-59: 10%
60-69: 4%
70+: 26%

9.1.3 Educational Background of Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest Attained Level of Education</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Tertiary (doctorate or masters)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.2 Map Reflecting the Origins of Statuses of Participants:

This world map represents the countries from which participants had statuses. It is not intended to suggest that the countries that are coloured have been addressed in a comprehensive manner, but rather to speak to the geographical diversity of the participants.
10. Reference List


Reference List


Morris, Alan. 2015. A Practical Introduction to In-Depth Interviewing. SAGE.


Politi, James, and Davide Ghiglione. 2016. “Renzi and Merkel Hit out at Austria’s Fence to Keep out Refugees.” Financial Times, May 6, 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/52d51f80-12e8-11e6-91da-096d89bd2173.


