Migration and development in the South Pacific

John Connell editor
Migration
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Abstract

For the past quarter of a century migration has been the most important demographic variable in large parts of the South Pacific region. Within the region there is extensive rural-urban migration and beyond the region international migration to the metropolitan states of USA, Australia and New Zealand. The scale of this movement has changed perceptions of development, posed problems for national development (and especially for agricultural development) and contributed to rapid social and economic change, as island states and islanders have increasingly focused their social and economic aspirations outwards. Pressures for migration continue to increase at the same time as the opportunities for satisfying such pressures are declining, and as international migration becomes an increasingly overt political issue.

This collection of recent papers examines the changing context and impact of migration in eight different states in the region, reviewing such issues as the brain or skill drain, remittances and investment, employment strategies of migrants, the impact of migration on inequality and uneven development and the overall relationship between migration and development. Migration is more closely linked to social issues, including education and suicide, than in many earlier discussions and there is also a strong emphasis on the historical evolution of structures of migration. The various papers demonstrate the great variety in the structure and impact of migration and recognize the tasks involved in incorporating such diversity into appropriate policy formation.

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In the present decade there has been surprisingly little work on contemporary migration, and the relationship between population movement and development in the South Pacific (including Micronesia), despite the significance of internal and international migration in the region. The last volume which put together some relevant pieces was based on a conference held at the Australian National University in the late 1970s (Jones and Richter 1981) and recent work (Connell 1987a; Walsh 1982) has reviewed a series of dated migration studies, but included no new data or theoretical considerations, being solely concerned with a limited range of practical issues. Two book-length studies have appeared more recently (Chapman and Prothero 1985; Chapman 1985b), the first of which collected 1978 conference papers on mobility in Melanesia while the second examined issues of mobility and identity with development implications. There are consequently a series of important issues that have received minimal attention yet are crucial to economic and social development, class formation and the generation and maintenance of inequality. Such issues include the role of substantial emigration on social change and on the supply of labour (skilled or otherwise), the role of remittances (in consolidating or removing inequality, catalysing social change or contributing to business development), the utility of skill acquisition amongst migrants and the welfare of those who remain 'at home' (Morauta 1984), many of whom are women. Similarly, migration is often only loosely related to other social issues, is rarely situated in a political context and only occasionally linked to other social changes such as education. This book seeks to fill some of these gaps.

It is abundantly clear that migration, and especially international migration, is of great and increasing significance for the development of Pacific island states. Excluding Papua New Guinea, more than one in ten Pacific islanders now live outside their 'home' countries, and there are great pressures from within the region for more migration opportunities in nearby metropolitan states. Such pressures reflect declining prices for most South Pacific export commodities, and hence problems of agricultural development, stable or declining government expenditure (partly following only slowly increasing aid levels) and growing demands for more 'modern' education and material goods. Pacific island states have thus increasingly focused their social and economic aspirations outwards, not only in terms of migration, but also in terms of aid, trade and foreign investment. This focus has largely caused the remnants of more self-reliant development strategies to disappear, and the structure of migration and development in the island Pacific has become much more like that in other island
micro-states. Most of the chapters in this book reflect on these transformations but also on the considerable geographical variations within the region.

The orientation of the volume, then, is not solely towards sending societies and countries, since the potential for continued migration to metropolitan countries (mainly New Zealand, USA and Australia) and the experiences of migrants in those countries is crucial to the significance of migration. In many respects, as several chapters demonstrate, conditions are worsening in the destinations. Though coincidentally the only four countries in the world that can still be said to accept permanent immigrants — Australia, Canada, New Zealand and United States — are the principal destinations of Pacific Island emigrants, there are considerable doubts that this situation will continue indefinitely, or even at the present, in some cases, reduced, levels. In the case of Australia, for example, although some recent reports have recommended increased migration opportunities for Pacific Islanders (see Connell 1988a), the most recent national report to have considered this possibility has bluntly rejected it: ‘it was decided that special immigration policies were not an appropriate strategy in Australia’s relation with the region’ (Fitzgerald 1988:8). Other than in colonial territories the situation is becoming bleak for those who seek emigration from the Pacific, and this will in turn put pressure on island governments for economic restructuring.

Whilst the central theme is the relationship between population movement and development, the volume is not primarily oriented towards policy formation, nor does each chapter focus exclusively on migration (rather than, for example, issues of population growth, cash cropping or education), though there has been a more obvious attempt to consider the historical evolution of societies with the appropriate analytical depth to assess genuinely the role of migration in the development process. This book seeks partially to rectify this problem and complement those that have preceded it.

Edited collections of essays are notorious for their pretensions, often derived from conference or seminar proceedings (and the first hint of this collection emerged from the annual conference of the Institute of Australian Geographers in May 1985) and thus are often diffuse sets of contributions with an optimistic preface that claims the result is a comprehensive survey of the field in question.

Of course this book is not comprehensive, but it does draw on the work of individuals from eight countries, all of whom have worked on migration-related issues in the Pacific in the past few years and in most cases are continuing to do so. Their perspectives vary, although most are geographers or anthropologists, a variation that is appropriate for examining a complex phenomenon. There is no discrete group of questions appropriate to migration, no single epistemology and thus no single method of enquiry; there is strength and also weakness in this diversity, as the chapters range throughout most of the island Pacific (apart from the French territories), but the collection nonetheless makes some contribution to a topic of continuing interest and concern.

In any collaborative work of this kind a variety of secretaries in different continents have played important roles. Maps and diagrams were drawn by John Roberts and Val Lyon. To them, to Louise Morauta, who carefully read and commented on first drafts of all the chapters, and to very many Pacific islanders, the authors are collectively grateful.
CHAPTER 1

Modernity and its discontents

Migration and change in the South Pacific*

JOHN CONNELL

Strictly speaking there are no concrete phenomena arising exclusively from outmigration (Davis 1977:161).

The South Pacific region as conventionally defined (Figure 1.1) includes some twenty-two states and almost a thousand language groups; it is an area of exceptional geographical, cultural and economic diversity, which is exaggerated by fragmentation, restricted land areas, and the isolation of small islands and island states. The region includes only 550,000 sq. km of land amidst 30 million sq. km of ocean. There are three indigenous population groups: Melanesians, Polynesians and Micronesians. There has been immigration of Europeans, Indians, Chinese and others. Although in historic times there was a movement into the Pacific, there has increasingly been a movement away, especially from the smaller states (Connell 1987a). Crudely, the Polynesian states are characterized by international emigration (mainly to New Zealand and USA), the Melanesian states are characterized by internal migration (although across significant language and cultural boundaries), and the Micronesian states are experiencing both patterns of migration alongside the intake of migrant workers. Contemporary variations in the structure of migration are substantially a function of colonial history, and throughout the South Pacific islanders have mobilized colonial ties to emigrate to the metropolitan countries. In small states like the Cook Islands, Niue and American Samoa there are more islanders overseas than in their own countries, and that overseas proportion is gradually increasing. In larger Polynesian states the same trend exists and the signing of the Compact of Free Association suggests that the Micronesian states will also move towards a situation

* The title of this chapter is derived from that of one chapter in The Homeless Mind (Berger et al, 1973), a slim volume of some significance to any discussion of social change and modernization. I am indeed indebted to Trevor Matheson and Grant McCall for their comments on an earlier version of this chapter and to Murray Chapman for his help and encouragement over the years.
where Micronesian residents of the United States may outnumber ‘the folks back home’ (Marshall 1979:10-11; see also the contribution by Henzel and Levin in this volume). Only in Melanesia have colonial ties not been utilized, hence internal migration continues to dominate population movement there. Enormous diversity restricts the possibility of reviewing more than some components of the relationship between migration and social and economic change. Moreover, the changes that result from migration cannot necessarily be distinguished from other parallel changes. Put simply in one South Pacific context, ‘Samoan migration can be explained more fundamentally as a social process within the migrant society, a process in fact taking place whether or not there is migration’ (Pitt 1977:2). Similarly migration is both catalyst and consequence of economic change. This introductory chapter reviews some recent research on issues related to migration in the region, and especially those that concern social and economic change, puts subsequent chapters in context, but is wary of over-ambitious generalizations (cf. Chapman 1987). Here, and throughout the book, diversity is usually the keynote, and qualitative judgments prevail over quantitative assessment.

There are four elements of migration in the region: a movement away from small, remote islands, a movement down mountains to more accessible coastal locations, urbanization, and international migration, especially to the cities of America and New Zealand. Opposing trends of resettlement and decentralization are more rhetoric than reality. These elements of migration are interrelated, resulting in growing ecological pressures in some coastal areas and hastening social change through social and economic contact with, and incorporation into, westernized societies and economies. Migration in the region has been characterized as circular mobility (Chapman and Prothero 1985), but is increasingly becoming more permanent in the growing towns of the region and especially in
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the metropolitan cities on the fringe of the region, as both Bryant and Franco show in this volume. However, only retrospectively can migration be considered permanent (see chapter by Haberkorn), and it is rarely possible to distinguish contract workers, temporary migrants and permanent emigrants, though their impact on social and economic change is quite different. This chapter to some extent conflates international migration with internal migration across major island groups and language boundaries, arguing that their significance is often broadly similar, though their results may differ.

The variety of reasons put forward to explain migration in the South Pacific sometimes seems interminable and the problems of generalization considerable. Apart from migration or as a result of natural hazards, the major influences are economic even where social changes are also significant. Migration is primarily a response to real and perceived inequalities in socio-economic opportunities that are themselves a result of dependent and/or uneven sectoral and regional development, a function of the penetration of capitalism into this global periphery. Social influences on migration are important, especially in terms of access to education and health services, but also as one element of the transition to adulthood; such social influences are in turn often a function of economic issues. Just as economic and social influences on migration cannot be separately distinguished, neither can the economic and social impacts of migration in the small states of the region, most of which might best be described as socio-economic (Howlett 1982). Migration remains, in different forms, a time-honoured strategy of moving from a poor area to a richer one in the search for social and economic mobility abroad or at home.

A major influence on migration has been radical changes in expectations over what constitutes a satisfactory standard of living, a desirable occupation and a suitable mix of accessible services and amenities. Aspirations are now almost always likely to involve some imported food and other goods (such as clothes and vehicles) and access to schools, hospitals and, sometimes, modern entertainment, all of which demand some cash income (Bedford 1980a). Overwhelmingly aspirations include a combination of economic and social objectives; for rural Melanesians, and for many others, ‘the ideal life-style to be sought after is that of their leaders - urban, materialistic, consumer-oriented’ (Bedford 1980b:63). In parallel with changing aspirations and the increased necessity to earn cash, agricultural work throughout the Pacific has been losing prestige and the relatively limited and declining participation of young men in the agricultural economy is ubiquitous. Changing aspirations are not only the province of young men. In Tonga, ‘one often hears parents expressing the wish that their children “work at something better than agriculture” even though they themselves are farmers. This “something better” invariably refers to white collar jobs which carry with them a lot of prestige’ (Sevele 1973:16). In Fiji, young people ‘are taught to value white-collar occupations and detest farming’ (Naidu 1981:8). In Kukipi in Papua ‘the devaluation of subsistence production and heavy manual labour is closely linked to peer experience in town. These urban attitudes have reinforced the tendency ... for village status to be closely related to modern achievements’ (Morauta 1985:238). Where migration opportunities are blocked (and remittances decline), as in Western Samoa, agriculture becomes more crucial to development yet is largely unattractive to frustrated youth, as Macpherson shows in his chapter. With or without migration the growing disdain for agriculture is everywhere.
Changes in values, following educational growth, reflecting and influencing the expansion of bureaucratic (largely urban) employment within the region in the 1970s, have been associated with an expansion of employment in the post-independence era as education increasingly becomes crucial to employment (see White in this volume). This has also assisted in orienting migration streams away from the region, as new employment opportunities have not kept pace with population growth, but contributed to the increased gap between expectations and the reality of domestic employment and incomes. Nonetheless there has been movement back into village life, and the chapter by Hezel and Levin notes the extraordinary manner in which educated youths have often managed to come to terms with the rural environment. Unlike the situation in Western Samoa, the absence of a tradition of overseas employment in Micronesia may have assisted in this reappraisal.

In the Pacific as elsewhere it is the most educated who migrate first; furthermore migrants have left many rural areas to take advantage of superior urban or international education facilities. These separate facets of education and migration tend to reinforce each other. In a real sense, 'ironic as it may seem these migrants seek in the west the very things that modern day Gauguins want to leave behind - access to material goods, jobs in the industrial sector, better education for their young, and social mobility in a society they have believed free of the traditional barriers of rank and family status that made such mobility difficult at home' (Shore 1978:xiii). The universality of the education bias, despite the relatively short history of formal education in parts of the Pacific, suggests that it is likely to continue while simultaneously the 'diploma disease' worsens, as the chapters by Hezel and Levin and by White indicate. However, in some contexts the rewards to education have been disappointing (see Macpherson, this volume), hence, though education is the key to contemporary success, attitudes to it are ambivalent, in view of both the limited rewards that may accrue, especially to those other than the educated, and the manner in which it distances children from parents and from society. In West New Britain 'a classic love-hate relationship wrenches the fabric of village social order; ... although the school may facilitate the gradual process of modernization, it does so at considerable cost in individual frustration and social discontent' (Zelenietz and Grant 1986:47-8; cf. Carrier 1984:50). Neither curriculum changes to make education more 'relevant' nor the graduation of students have resulted in material improvements. Only in a few areas, like the Rai Coast of Madang (White, this volume), have educated youths not made a greater contribution to village development than their less educated brothers and sisters. Though the individual gains may be substantial (as Bryant shows), the collective rewards are less certain, a situation symptomatic of the whole structure of migration. Whatever the discontents, education and modern media more firmly direct the perspectives of small societies outwards; in Guam 'not only does it [the media] make us feel homesick for places we have never been, it gives us the necessary feeling that what we experience every day is abnormal' (Underwood 1981:69). The combination of changing aspirations with the migration of the more educated has contributed to a brain or skill drain from national peripheries, and from small states, perhaps ultimately worsening the welfare and bargaining position of those places.

It is, however, apparent that the upward social and economic mobility gained by many migrants is rarely if ever discouraged. In the Mount Hagen area of
Papua New Guinea there is even a general disapproval of migration except for the well-educated (Strathern 1972), and in many areas, especially those areas of Papua New Guinea where labour migration is relatively recent, success in an alien world is highly prized by migrants and kin alike. Amongst the relatively recently contacted Baruya of the Eastern Highlands, a man jailed for a 'modern' offence, 'returned with redoubled prestige for having both followed the customs of his tribe and taken a further step into the white man's world' (Godelier 1986:197). Now there is 'a new kind of "big man", those with new skills in prestigious employment outside, who are gradually becoming folk heroes... Prestige now goes to the young men who like the aoulatta [great warriors] before them have conquered in the outside world' (ibid.:205-18). Though many old values and practices remain vibrant, villagers are extremely proud of those people who have gained new values and rewards from migration.

Implicitly underlying the structure of migration is the constant dialectical interplay between individual human actions and institutions or, more generally, between everyday life and structure. Although the notion of structuring is rarely made explicit in discussions of migration, most of the following chapters tend to highlight human agency rather than a prunestian structuralist bed. People not only respond to circumstances, they act upon them, and although structures exist they are not as firm and deterministic as is often thought. The revival of tradition suggests that people are more aware of how their world works, and more capable of modifying it, than is often generally allowed. Broadly, the internal dynamics of change within societies are as crucial as the relationship between those societies and the world economy. Crude notions of closed societies, as uniform and inert victims of international capitalism, and hence of a pattern of dependency imposing a prescribed linear transformation, have no place here. The greater emphasis on ethnography and history in this collection enables a clearer focus on the active role of rural people in their own history and a reduction in the mechanistic function of external forces.

Demographic change

In Melanesia migration has been characterized by a male dominance, a maintained legacy of the plantation economy, but elsewhere, and increasingly also in Melanesia, family migration (if often initiated by the male) now predominates, and sex ratios in most areas are balanced. As elsewhere migration is generally characterized by the movement of young men and women, a situation which has contributed to high dependency rates in some areas, as Macpherson shows in his chapter. Sex selectivity in migration also has implications for demographic change. When migration was primarily of men there is much evidence that this slowed the birth rate and, in some areas, such as Rotuma, migration was regarded as one means of family planning (Howard 1961). Migration (alongside education) has tended to delay the age of marriage; this is further likely to reduce fertility. However, the correlation is rarely straightforward. In the Outer Reef Islands (Solomon Islands) the total fertility rate rose among remaining females as the total number of females decreased through migration (Davenport 1975:112). In the case of very small islands such as Eauripik (Yap), migration may so reduce the number of eligible spouses that fertility is reduced as marriage rates fall (Levin 1976:225). However, the change towards more balanced sex structures of migration, though far from apparent in many parts of Melanesia (Jolly 1987:136), and the demise of
long-term labour contracts, have limited the impact of migration on the reduction of fertility. Other trends in the region may have resulted in increases in fertility (and reductions in infant mortality) that counteract any decline following migration. Indeed, in large parts of Polynesia, natural increase is very high, and international migration has proved to be a 'safety-valve', albeit one that has not resulted in other 'safety measures' being instigated. Migration, in this regard, is widely seen as a crucial 'strategy for economic and political survival' (chapter by Hezel and Levin). Although migrants returning to Tokelau have at least introduced modern family planning techniques, the general argument that return migrants, through their contact with 'modern' values of small family sizes, induce lower fertility, thus reducing population growth in rural areas (e.g. Standing 1982:23; Simmons et al. 1977), is not validated in the South Pacific. The extent of emigration, limited return migration and the strong influence of Christianity are other factors. Contemporary family planning techniques are conspicuous by their absence, even in countries like Fiji where fertility was previously declining, and the population size of most island states is now as large as it has ever been.

In a number of areas, migration is linked or sponsored, with households or extended kinship units planning for and encouraging the migration of particular individuals (Connell 1980a:7-8), to the extent that in the smallest states Bertram and Watters (1985:499) have suggested the emergence of a new institution, the 'transnational corporation of kin', allowing kin groups to colonize and exploit economic opportunities across a wide range of environments. On Nanumea atoll in Tuvalu, at the household level, 'parents actively hope to produce remittance earners and most feel that this necessitates having more than one son [one of whom] will be our road to money and imported goods' (Chambers 1986:283-4). There, and in remote areas like Awa in Papua New Guinea, labour may be almost the sole resource that can be 'converted into the required cash and commercial goods' (Boyd 1981:75). On the small island of Ponam (Manus, Papua New Guinea), control of migration and population growth is also consciously economically rational, with ideology equating an economic return (remittances) with an economic investment (child-rearing for migration) so that it is appropriate to speak of labour export rather than merely migration: Tonam is not a society passively allowing or suffering the migration of its members. Rather it is a society which actively regulates this migration, and it does so in a way which helps secure a substantial remittance income [hence] children are our garden and we survive by eating the fruit' (Carrier 1984:42, 49; cf. Grant 1987:256). Where migration exists to spread, and minimize, risks, the argument that the loss of rural security resulting from more permanent emigration and declining remittance flows results in increased birth rate (Meillassoux 1983) may also have considerable validity. Family sizes in Nanumea, Ponam and elsewhere have not significantly declined, since maintaining high fertility levels is logical in a low-skill wage labour system where the costs of education and reproduction are not high. Overall the direct impact of migration on the level of fertility in the region is now limited, but it may be positive in a number of places.

The major impact of migration on fertility in the region is through the transfer of fertility from one part of the country to another, usually from rural areas to urban areas, or outside that country. For example, on Namoluk atoll (Truk), some 90 per cent of the de jure population in the age group 15-29 had left the atoll (Marshall 1979:10) so that a very high proportion of children born to Namoluk
people are born off-island. The same is true for some national situations, such as Wallisians and Futunans in New Caledonia (Rallu 1982). One result of this is that migrants, and especially those children born outside the home village or country, increasingly lose their village, island or national identity, experience problems of ethnicity and, perhaps most important, find that they have only minimal residual claims to land and hence development opportunities in their 'home' areas. This is exacerbated where marriages are increasingly across language boundaries and ethnic and cultural groups (Macpherson 1985), posing social problems for the next generation.

Increasingly women have become migrants both with their husbands (or to join their husbands) and, more importantly, as individuals for reasons of their own. Much of the scanty literature on the social and economic impact of the migration of women and the impact of male migration on women has been reviewed elsewhere (Connell 1984). Under-employment (or formal unemployment) is usually higher for women than men in Melanesian towns, and probably elsewhere in the South Pacific and metropolitan destination countries. Women migrants, as dependants, are more likely to lose any real opportunity to be economically productive whilst simultaneously losing contact with rural culture, becoming dependent on and peripheral to males and to urban society and economy (Franco in this volume). Where women migrate as individuals marriages are more likely to occur across language groups, resulting in more complex land tenure situations, convergence and westernization of traditional social organization, more permanent urban residence, more marital disharmony and children having minimal contact with rural societies.

Where, as in Melanesia (and best documented in Papua New Guinea), migration has tended to be of males, there has been a changing sexual division of labour, as some traditional male jobs become partly female jobs. Women sometimes gained prestige, status and income through greater control of cash crops. Invariably women, and children and older people, carry out extra work. In the Solomon Islands the extra burdens on women, alongside very high population growth rates, have contributed to female life expectancies being less than those of males. In several parts of the Highlands of Papua New Guinea women have not always been able to maintain the agricultural system, resulting in child malnutrition; in parts of the Southern Highlands, where this was occurring, women appeared 'to be working themselves to the point of exhaustion' (Allen et al. 1980:132). Women are marginalized not by being allocated the more labour-intensive or poorly-paid activities but by receiving extra tasks which not only restrict their ability to participate in non-productive activities but place heavy demands on them.

The impact of migration on women's lives is complex and variable. In many regions oral history suppresses the significance of female migration, despite its significance in restructuring gender relations (Jolly 1987), hence information is invariably incomplete. On the one hand women may gain independence, autonomy, competence in new skills and status, where they are themselves migrants or remain in villages as household heads when male relatives leave. On the other hand they may lose independence and status (especially as 'passive' migrants to towns or through over-dependence on remittances), experience poorer health and welfare, be excluded from relevant policy discussions and decisions and become subjugated to men. These changes parallel other socio-
economic changes, especially in education, as Zimmer discusses in her chapter. Overall relatively little is known about the changing distribution of power, status and authority between the sexes in South Pacific societies, or even changes in more tangible variables such as the distribution of resources, nutrition or health status between sexes. Nevertheless in more traditional South Pacific societies women and men generally perceived themselves and each other as living in complementarity and interdependence, not in competition, in societies that lacked many of the sharp divisions, for example, between public and private spheres, secular and sacred, that characterize more industrialized nations (Rohrlich-Leavitt 1975:625). The establishment of capitalism, and with it the emergence of cash cropping, wage labour, migration and greater individualism within nuclear families, has tended to separate families from the community and women from men. The migration of men physically emphasizes their emerging isolation and occasionally brings with it conflict and tension.

Economic change

The impact of migration on economic activity is complex, and dependent on the structure of both migration and agriculture. Output is most likely to fall where family migration is more common, as in large parts of Polynesia, such as Tonga, the Cook Islands and Niue. Migration has generally resulted in stabilized (or declining) agricultural production, relative to population growth, especially since the possibilities for land tenure reform and mechanization are few. Simultaneously cooperative work groups have lost importance, affecting house-building and road maintenance alongside agricultural production. The cultivation of food crops has conspicuously failed to benefit from migration so that one of the most significant trends in the region is that of declining or stagnating food production per capita and, consequently, the growing dependence on food imports from metropolitan countries. Status and prestige have long been gained through the consumption of imported food, often at some nutritional and economic cost (Connell 1987a). Earlier wants have become needs and their purchase must partially be financed by migration to wage employment (see chapters by Boyd and Munro in this volume). Economic history cannot, however, merely be reduced to a transition from subsistence to cash cropping. More broadly there has been a dramatic expansion in the service sector, especially in the urban public services, a development of tourism, and even the emergence of manufacturing and offshore financial centres. This has evolved alongside increased migration and agricultural decline, to the extent that the smaller island states have economies where the combined effect of migration, remittances, aid and the bureaucracy 'now determine the evolution of the system' (Bertram and Watters 1985:497). Such economies, where migration and remittances are so crucial, have thus been designated MIRAB economies although the heavy urban bias of the new bureaucratic and commercial sectors suggests that MURAB would be a better acronym (see chapter by Munro for an explanation of these terms). Though such trends are less apparent in the larger states, especially the independent states of Melanesia, they exist in the more remote areas.

The absence of migrants is usually, but not always, balanced (if not necessarily compensated) by some form of resource transfer from migrants to kin in the areas of origin. Such remittances, which maintain social ties and act as insurance premiums for migrants, fuelling an ideology of return migration, are principally
used to repay debts, finance migration moves for kin, and purchase consumer goods, including housing. Their use reinforces a traditional set of values and, since migration emerges out of inequality, this tends to reinforce, rather than conflict with, the social hierarchy, as Zimmer shows in her chapter. The general economic role of remittances has been discussed elsewhere (Connell 1980a, 1987a); in most areas this has contributed to a greater aura of prosperity, what has been described crudely as 'dependency modernization' and not development (Schneider et al. 1972). In the Polynesian states especially remittances have become crucial to welfare, have significantly raised and maintained living standards and eased national balance of payments problems, despite their contribution to inflation, whilst also contributing to employment, mainly in the construction and service sectors. However, increased demand for imported consumer goods can usually only be met by further migration and little of the remittances has been invested in economic growth, since in many areas a history of failed projects has discouraged new investment, marketing facilities are poor and the more educated and highly skilled have moved away (Turner 1984:143). Existing rural economic strategies, of cash cropping, trade store construction and investment in education and renewed migration are thus conserved. Although, as Boyd shows in his chapter, there is a transition in remittance use in the Pacific, such factors as few investment opportunities have operated to reduce the significance of this transition. For the moment remittances, alongside the elitist and consumer-oriented ideas of return migrants, contribute to increased demands for high consumption (and welfare levels), though neither remittances nor return migrants may make significant contributions to increased production. Nonetheless it is most important to note that many islanders, and specifically Tongans, regard 'productive investment' as 'the well-being of kin and advancing to a sound social status' (Fuka 1985:93; cf. Tongamoa 1987), so that increased production cannot be viewed in a narrow economic or materialistic perspective.

The role of remittances and, more widely, the contribution of migration to inequality have been controversial topics. The overall impact of migration on equality differs greatly according to the particular mode of production and the model used to describe it. Two substantial global reviews of the relationship concluded, on the basis of scattered and inconclusive data, that the more common outcome seems to be for migration to reduce overall inequality (mainly by reducing differences between origin and destination areas) but that migration may also help to perpetuate inequalitarian production systems (Hugo 1983; Rodgers 1983). By contrast Lipton has stated unequivocally that 'migrant streams are so structured that - contrary to the expectations of marginal analysis - their movement worsens overall distribution among remaining rural persons, among remaining rural persons plus migrants and between village and town' (Lipton 1980:3; cf. Rubenstein 1983). Much of the evidence presented in this collection and elsewhere (Connell 1980a) supports this latter conclusion. A strong case has been made by Turner, for areas where remittances are a critical source of income, as in parts of the Oro Province of Papua New Guinea, that they 'not only contribute to substantial inequalities between rural families and their households but also subvert the local community by focusing its social life on areas from which it is far removed' (Turner 1984:154). However, at least one other study in Papua New Guinea has stressed that remittances are usually not large enough to contribute to
inequality, and instead rather tend to reduce it (Clunies Ross 1984). Consequently generalizations are necessarily tentative.

Allocation of the genesis of inequality to migration would be inaccurate since uneven development has broadly followed the peripheral and parallel incorporation of the South Pacific region not only as a reserve of labour and of commodities (and hence capital) but also as a market for the purchase and consumption of new commodities (Munro, this volume; McInnes and Connell 1988). In turn this unevenness has accentuated migration. However, although incorporation into the new spatial order of the global economy has created some forms of uneven development, it may have opened up more egalitarian alternatives for single or non-chiefly men and sometimes for women. Education and labour migration opened the door to new skills and incomes, enabling the gaining of respect and a more fulfilling life away from or within the village (Newton 1985:202), and in the South Pacific migration has almost always benefited the migrants. South Pacific island-states have experienced a collective inequality on the margins of the global economy, but within states, villages, islands and even households, new equalities and inequalities have emerged.

Access to land is not surprisingly often a source of inequality, as the best land becomes permanently occupied by cash crops, and latecomers are significantly disadvantaged. Consequently, where population densities are higher, such inequalities are likely to be greater (Zimmer, this volume), whereas where they are relatively low, or where cash cropping is only in its infancy (see both Boyd and White in this volume), access to land remains of slight importance in socio-economic differentiation. Even within relatively localized areas cultural values (and individual initiatives) are quite different; in Highlands societies in Papua New Guinea, for example, commitments to the ‘social production’ of pigs may be the greatest source of inequality (Feil 1985; Modjeska 1980). Yet these kinds of inequalities are quite different from the ‘potentially permanent, large-scale and hidden forms of inequality which can be brought about by capitalist enterprise’ (Strathern 1980:157) that are much more pervasive throughout the Pacific. Whether new inequalities are worse than old inequalities, or merely different, will never be resolved.

There is little doubt that international migration has been of benefit to the destination countries, but for the countries of origin the conclusions are always less apparent (Connell 1977). Nevertheless international migration is often viewed as a ‘safety-valve’ which reduces pressure on national governments to provide employment opportunities and welfare services, a view which is justified as a means of satisfying rising aspirations whilst simultaneously generating scarce foreign exchange. Concern is related to specific issues, such as the brain or skill drain or, in the case of Niue, Pitcairn and the Cook Islands, the overall population decline. The ‘safety-valve’ effect, limited economic growth plus concern over individual freedom of movement, have combined to result in steady and imposed migration from many countries. Constraints to international migration are posed by the destination countries rather than the source countries. Migration has thus been viewed rather as a substitute for development, or even the aim of development, than as a short-term support for increasing the effectiveness of national development efforts.

There is a widespread assumption that the level of individual remittances declines over time (Connell 1980:23; see also the chapters by Macpherson and
Haberkorn in this volume) though evidence from the Cook Islands (discussed by Loomis in this book) and from Tongans in Sydney (Tongan 1987) suggests that remittances may be maintained at high levels over surprisingly long periods of time. Nonetheless, if this assumption is ultimately correct, then migration must also be maintained to counter such a decline. However, if the economies of metropolitan countries are restructured to reduce employment opportunities for unskilled labour, if unemployment increases or there is political opposition to increased migration levels, the tasks of sustaining migration and remittances will be extremely difficult.

Given the role and extent of remittances, sometimes the single most important component of national incomes, it is not surprising either that countries have not restructured their economies towards greater self-reliance or that migration is, with exceptions (see chapter by White), usually regarded as an important economic strategy, though only rarely is it a preferred strategy. In Siwai, Papua New Guinea, workers were initially forced to work on plantations in the interwar years (though others chose to sell their labour). They returned to their villages with the successful advent of cash cropping in the post-war years but began to leave again when land became inadequate (Connell 1985a). Where there are real rural income-earning opportunities, mobility for education becomes more important than labour migration (as White shows) since local economic development is invariably preferred. In remote areas where income-earning options are perceived to be inadequate, labour migration and education often function as dual strategies (e.g. Turner 1984), nowhere more than in relatively remote islands (Bedford 1985; Carrier 1984; and Bryant in this volume). In the smallest island states, Kiribati and Tuvalu, potential migrants are trained to become a more acceptable international workforce (Connell 1985b). In larger states where domestic options are better and more diverse, international migration, in good times, may still be regarded as the best possible choice, as in Western Samoa where ‘migration was a far more lucrative investment than anything available in the village’ (Shankman 1976:71). Where migration opportunities decline, social and economic expectations are shattered, resulting in Franco’s ‘broken dreams’ or Macpherson’s ‘stolen dreams’ (see their chapters below) as one strand in the diversity that is development is removed.

As they have done for decades Pacific islanders have seen migration, and especially overseas employment, as a means of escaping limited domestic economic opportunities and diversifying or transferring their human resources into more productive areas. Even where, as in the highlands of Papua New Guinea, virtually the only jobs for uneducated, unskilled migrants are poorly paid jobs on coastal plantations, demand has been substantial (as both Boyd and Zimmer show), depleting villages of young men, and contributing to new inequalities. Inflated brideprices have made young women more inaccessible to Wovan men in highlands Papua New Guinea, and the absence of men on coastal plantations encourages women to marry outside. In the absence of cash crops Wovan men must remain away for increasingly longer times to earn adequate sums to marry, and the migration pattern has become ‘a vicious circle which becomes increasingly difficult to break’ (Flanagan 1983:46). The Wovan may earn little but their distant earnings are better than anything possible at home. When even limited migration options are cut off, problems necessarily follow. In the pre-war years I-Kiribati were resettled from the more densely populated southern
islands of Kiribati, eventually as far as the Solomon Islands; this settlement has been viewed quite differently at different times:

In earlier days, they were called the land-hungry people; they were the unfortunate ones who did not have sufficient land. Now our values have changed. Settling overseas, beyond the oceans of our islands is something to be sought after. Why? Because our population is still growing. So many consider them, the resettled ones, as the fortunate ones and they consider us to be the unfortunate ones (Schultz and Ten ten 1979:127).

Emigration, temporary or even permanent, may thus be a means of maximizing both individual and household development options:

Those that remain behind in societies of the extreme periphery may never become better off without connecting with migrant dispersion, but internationalisation itself eventually offers possibilities for at least a more broad-based economic mobility than would be possible in island states such as Tonga (Marcus 1981:63).

It is these wider economic opportunities that provide the strongest case for migration where Pacific island economies have become more vulnerable.

As the case of resettlement from Kiribati dramatically illustrates, expectations have risen in the wake of independence (for many states in the 1970s), the extension of education (especially secondary education, with its particularly 'modern' content), and following migration itself which has given so many people overseas relatives. Increased expectations have emphasized the shift from production to consumption, the decline of exchange and an increase in social tensions. The spreading taste for commodities has influenced work habits. In rural society additional tasks and new perceptions of social life have suggested that time is scarce; yet those with experience of migrant labour and urban life may 'still find the village a paradise of temporal freedom' (Smith 1982:514). But this temporal freedom is double-edged; its other contemporary construction is boredom (cf. McGrath 1971:135; Kiste 1968:320). The 'allure of modernity is strongly linked to city life ... The mystique, however, tends to be stronger than the rational expectations. It survives the disappointment of the latter. Whatever its frustrations and degradations, the city continues to be the place where things are happening, where there is movement and a sense of the future' (Berger et al. 1973:128-9). For many in the South Pacific, the largest cities (cf. Peet 1980) and the metropolitan countries exercise the same allure, offer the same sense of future, and apparently validate migration. After all, migrants elucidate their reasons for migration within commonly understood rules of human behaviour; it is rational to have moved to improve one's position in life (Kubat and Hoffman-Nowotny 1981:318) even if such expectations are not satisfied.

Where rising expectations are combined with increased pressure on rural resources and also, seemingly paradoxically, by declining formal sector job opportunities, then migration from rural areas is more likely to be permanent. This permanence may be urban (and there are now third generation urban residents in the South Pacific), international or both (see the contributions of Haberkorn, Bryant and Franco to this volume). In town children grow up with limited, if any, contacts with 'home areas', sometimes with minimal local language-speaking ability and little understanding of culture and hence with tenuous claims on rural
areas; 'upon returning many discover that they do not fit in, that although they
"look Polynesian" they "act western" (Ritterbush 1988:5) despite their often
romanticized view of 'home'. These children are almost inevitably destined for
an urban or international future. In many cases, their unemployment levels are
high, both within the region (e.g. Morauta and Ryan 1982) and in the destination
countries, and serious social problems (notably crime and alcoholism) and more
general 'anomie' are apparent; significantly these problems appear to be more
clearly correlated not with migrants but with more longstanding urban residents.
Less clearly, health and nutrition problems may also worsen following migration.
Characteristically the problems and disadvantages of more permanent migration
are experienced, not by the migrants, but by the next generation, whose effective
choices are diminished.

Tradition

Most studies of the social impact of migration point to a limited range of unidirec-
tional changes, along the lines of greater individuality and conformity, the decline
of the extended family, reciprocity and exchange relationships, the disappearance
of cooperation, language shifts towards English and lingua francas etc., all of
which are subsumed as evidence of westernization, modernization and the
decline of tradition. Many such studies neglect to note that 'traditional' societies
have rarely been static and have always been both mobile and open to innovation.
In some pre-colonial societies there was extensive mobility with significant socio-
economic and political impacts (e.g. Watson 1985; Alkire 1978). Detailed analyses
of early post-colonial societies have now effectively overturned two deep-rooted
misconceptions, first, that there was a static, traditional, unchanging society and
second, that pre-colonial society was egalitarian and communal (Connell
1982:508). However, a number of studies, especially in Melanesia, have
demonstrated that socio-economic change is not unilineal, embracing ideas of
unending growth and greater rationality, but that there are also traditionalist
enclaves which appear to have 'kept their commitment to their ancestors and the
past, in the face of Christianity, copra and cash, and nowadays, tourists, transistors
and Toyotas' (Keesing 1982:39), not because these enclaves have not experienced
these options but because they have chosen this alternative.

In a number of areas, especially of coastal Melanesia, elements of 'customs'
have been revitalized, often as a political symbol in the rhetoric of nationalists
and secessionists (Connell 1977, 1988c). In part this has been a 'counterreaction
against the subversion of Melanesian values of kinship and community in the
process of capitalist development' (Keesing 1982:41), though the 'encapsulation'
of certain practices as 'tradition' undermines the greatest value of tradition, that
is how things were, are and should be done, by placing it alongside other modes
of legitimizing established practices (Giddens 1979:200). This reaction against the
results, if not necessarily the values, inherent in capitalist development must be
regarded as of lesser importance than the revaluation of tradition in response to
the difficulties of achieving capitalist development in the extreme periphery. Thus
the Kwaoi of Malaita (Solomon Islands) would actually welcome more
money (Keesing 1982:48), but in their mountain fastnesses cash cropping was
virtually impossible and migrant Kwaio workers have found that the Solomon
Islands has developed an indigenous class system and the Kwaio and other
Malaita pagans are on the very bottom of it' (Keesing 1978:186-7). Without modern education and skills the Kwaio obtain only unskilled employment and low wages. In somewhat similar terms, Kilenge villagers of West New Britain (Papua New Guinea), 'at a subconscious level at least have managed to minimise their dependence by limiting their cash needs. Despite their verbal declarations of dedication to the idea of development via cash cropping and business, they find excuses to restrict their involvement in the global economy' (Grant 1980:17). In much the same way many Kwaio have become convinced that, if the rewards and strengths of traditional life can be preserved, and augmented with a new earning power, it will have to be through progressive disengagement from traditional migratory wage labour ... so that young men will not have to go in such numbers, for so long, at such cost. That cost from the standpoint of Kwaio adults - both men who have seen the outside world of plantations and trade stores, and women, who have not - is an erosion of traditional values, moral standards and knowledge; a succumbing to the temptations of bright lights, town girls and money (Keesing 1978:188-9).

Yet out-migration has become increasingly the chosen option for the Kwaio. Elsewhere there have also been partial withdrawals from the capitalist economy through unrealistic and naive expectations (Townsend 1980a:14). More exceptionally there has been disengagement because of 'perceived unfairness of distribution of rewards' (ibid.:15); this has resulted in conflict for many potential cash croppers, notably in coastal Papua and Madang. In Oro Province returned migrants, who attempted to establish rice as a cash crop, found their plots destroyed by non-migrants, whereas the establishment of tradestores was not thwarted since the rewards were believed to be equitably distributed (Turner 1984). Conflicts between generations over the spoils of migration are widespread, even leading directly to some reconstruction of the social order, as Boyd shows in his chapter.

In some areas this reversion to tradition is represented in the establishment of cultism. Cargo cults must be seen not only as mystical millennial events but also as a response 'to the crisis of indigenous society provoked by the disruptive effect of foreign capitalist penetration' (Barnett 1979:776). There is widespread evidence that cult movements have had a significant economic influence, with cult members in areas as far apart as East Sepik and South Bougainville (Papua New Guinea) being poorer than non-members in the same area (Connell 1979:127). Not only is this so but the name of the cult itself reflects one consistent theme, the demand for modern consumer goods; this content denies the view of cargo cults as wholly traditional and ideological responses to modernization. 'The traditionalist defending himself cognitively against modernity almost invariably incorporates elements of the latter within his own defence' (Berger et al. 1973:148). To enact custom is at once to follow the rules of everyday life and to assert political autonomy in opposition to anonymity and abstraction.

Ultimately, and most conventionally, withdrawal, disengagement and the revitalization of tradition appear to have occurred principally in those areas most remote from the centres of capitalism, where long attempts to engage in the cash economy (through cash cropping or migration) have been largely unsuccessful. In the contemporary world, where services are localized but increasingly necessary, population decline and even depopulation are almost always a correlate of
remoteness. The Kwaio and other similar groups are no more, and no less, than the societies that have experienced the greatest frustrations with inadequate and insufficient capitalism as with capitalism itself. For the Hube of Morobe Province (Papua New Guinea), after decades of incorporation, 'the people generally are groping around trying to find some autonomy and self-esteem, which were shattered by the capitalist system's forerunners about eighty years ago' (Townsend 1980b:293). Elsewhere Townsend suggests, surely correctly, that 'some Papuans nowadays lament the relative lack of development in their region, and echo Kay's conclusion about inadequate capitalism' (Townsend 1980c:409). Kay's now famous statement was simply that 'capital created underdevelopment not because it exploited the underdeveloped world but because it did not exploit it enough' (Kay 1975:x); reality, however, is certainly more complex. Essentially arguments on reversions to tradition and disengagement are merely new versions of the early idea of 'limited good' as a cultural barrier to development. In this theory rural folk perceived their social world in terms of a competitive game in which gains were at the expense of others' losses; consequently they would tend to withdraw and not wish to avail themselves of new opportunities since these would lead to increasing socio-economic inequalities and internal conflict (Foster 1965). This idea was rejected by those who considered that individuals constantly allocated resources to alternative ends, that societies could not be regarded as 'closed communities' uninfluenced by historical processes in wider national and international systems, that not all members of a society shared similar views, and that security was more important than risk. Indeed, in Kwaio at least, and certainly more generally, not everyone has recognized the virtues of tradition; those who have sought to revitalize tradition, and effectively maintain the status quo, are those who have vested interests in the maintenance of an immutable order.

External influences and internal conditions are extremely variable, yet some degree of opposition to colonialism and its social and economic consequences has been widespread, taking a variety of forms, violent and passive, sometimes creating something of a 'culture of resistance' directed against transformation 'that would destroy indigenous culture, the basis of survival and integrity' (cf. Petersen 1979; Connell 1983a). This opposition to some forms of development has been concentrated more obviously in coastal areas of Melanesia, although somewhat earlier,

consciousness of the changes in so many spheres may lead, as in Polynesian societies, to a renewed emphasis on traditional or modified (pseudo-) traditional forms, which are, as it were, obtruded as evidence of a social solidarity which may in fact be threatened or lost in other fields (Firth 1953:88). That the bulk of this section focuses on Melanesia is a perhaps surprising reflection of the greater emergence of post-colonial inequalities in the Melanesian states rather than in the smaller Polynesian states with their long period of post-colonial evolution and more obviously maintained historic inequalities. Indeed, Firth's comment is based on the experience of Tikopia, a Polynesian outlier in a distant Melanesian nation. The government of Western Samoa, perhaps pondering the possibilities for a more autonomous or self-reliant structure of development, has stated:
there are few, if any, small societies which having had access to industrial civilization have rejected it and gone back peacefully to the traditional ways of their ancestors (Western Samoa Economic Development Department 1980, cited by Howlett 1982:79).

Whilst differences within Melanesia may have explanations within variable coastal and highlands social structures, and in some coastal societies egalitarianism is particularly pronounced (Chowning 1979:68) so that these differences are sometimes considerable, they also reflect the experiences and durations of post-colonial history. Discontent is apparent in the highlands, as both Boyd and Zimmer show in this volume, and is evident even in the emergence of cultism (e.g. Walter 1981). Current economic trends suggest that such discontents will increase.

There are enormous and critical variations in the manner in which local societies have become incorporated into the global economy, and hence equally enormous variations in response and reaction to that incorporation. Islands and island-states are not merely uniform and inert victims of international capitalism, but play a vital role in their own history; though they may be ‘actively engaged in contributing to their own dependency’ (Munro, this volume), the invariable existence of a ‘culture of resistance’ and the dialogue between disengagement and incorporation suggest that the structure of dependence is ultimately, at least in part, negotiated. Crude notions of dependency and underdevelopment are not helpful; whilst the extension of the capitalist economy drew out labour and commodities from the periphery, simultaneously creating a new market there, the colonial and post-colonial states’ modifications of the process of incorporations, as in Fiji, spared Fijians the ‘journey through Hell’ experienced in some other regions (Knapman 1985:83). Despite widespread opposition to, and withdrawal from, some aspects of contact, the destruction of tradition and the consolidation of capitalism may have been more benign than in many other parts of the Third World.

While these issues may seem remote from those of international migration they are not, both because migration from Kwaio to Honiara displays almost every similarity with international migration, and because these responses to migration are also valid at an international level. Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent at a national level than in American Samoa where it was noted that, as a result of emigration, ‘the gradual erosion of the traditional Samoan culture and customs has accelerated, change has been institutionalised and the demise of American Samoan culture appears to be unavoidable’ (Leibowitz 1980:271; cf. Shankman 1976:90-2). In American Samoa the response to this statement was that it constituted a misrepresentation and a misunderstanding of a vital and important social structure. Elsewhere, especially in the smaller states of Polynesia, such as Niue and the Cook Islands, such feelings are maintained, in the face of similar perceptions to those of Leibowitz, but are masked by the enormity of change, and its accompanying dependency, despondency and demoralization in the wake of what is more obviously, and seemingly inevitably, a unidirectional trend. Yet paradoxically it is often the more distant long-term migrants who, out of nostalgia, lack of familiarity with changes and discontent with the often alien world around them, most strongly retain an image of a more traditional social, economic and political environment than actually exists. This is well expressed for French Polynesian migrants in New Caledonia, ‘who have conserved an
extremely idealised view of an historic Polynesia where they grew up. They are conscious of having retained the values of their home country and freely state that they do not understand young Tahitians’ (Gages 1976:686). Yet they too have been changed by the experience of migration, and modernity has embraced them at least as much as it has done those who have remained at home. The dichotomy of ‘traditional/modern’ is emphatically a false one.

Return migration

The impact of migration on the migrants themselves is wide-ranging, especially in terms of changes in personal values, ideologies and attitudes, but also in the potential for gaining high wages, education, experience and new skills. Though there are social and psychological costs in the course of this acquisition, the conclusions suggest that many migrants benefit both in economic and social terms: for Polynesians in the United States ‘economic change has created social distinctions that have undercut traditional lines of prestige and authority’ (Shore 1980:766). Freedom of movement is consequently highly valued. Not all these individual gains become gains for the sending areas because of limited return migration, the marginal value of many acquired skills in the sending areas and social, political and economic conflicts between migrant and home societies. Return migration, within countries, because it is so much a continuation of the traditional structure of circular mobility, is less disruptive and more likely to contribute to economic development, even at the cost of some social discord. In the Sa’a district of Malaita in the Solomon Islands,

the back-migration characteristic of the Solomons is mainly transformative insofar as those returning have a new vision of where the society should be going ... By the same token, the wage labour experience transforms men’s values regarding consumption. They return home with new expectations, consumer preferences, and a deeply seated commitment to continue in the modern vein. One result ... has been a general swing away from part-time fishing, which earns no cash, over to copra production the leading cash crop (Meltzoff and Lipuma 1986:56).

The visions of the young are in conflict with the values of the old; there are tensions and contradictions between the indigenous and industrial worlds and great stress is placed on the maintenance of the social economy.

Most migrants from the South Pacific, including some of those with skills, are in the ‘secondary segment’ of the labour force of the metropolitan destination countries (New Zealand and USA), that is a sector where social, institutional and economic barriers prevent movement into the ‘primary segment’, so that they remain in unskilled jobs with low wages, insecure tenure, poor working conditions, few benefits, high unemployment and low unionization (Franco, this volume). Many migrants from the region, other than those with American or New Zealand citizenship, whether temporary or effectively permanent, thus continue to function essentially as ‘guestworkers’. As metropolitan economies are restructured and rationalized the ‘secondary sector’ declines and labour demand also declines (Gibson 1982); immigration policies of the metropolitan countries are therefore tending towards both greater severity and a skill bias so that the prospects for continuing migration from the region are uncertain. Recent evidence from New Zealand suggests that some Polynesian migrants there are no
longer able to support extended families and have begun to discourage further migration and encourage return migration, even to the extent of reporting 'oversayers' (P. Shankman, pers. comm., 1984; see also Loomis in this volume). These changes are likely to place increasing pressure on South Pacific states to restructure economies and establish population policies, especially if return migration ensues, though the more obvious immediate results are discontent (as Macpherson shows in his chapter) and increased pressure on metropolitan countries to relax migration legislation.

Since migrants can be generally characterized as younger, more adaptable and better educated than non-migrants, it is apparent that they have a considerable potential for economic (and social) development in their villages and countries of origin. There is, however, much evidence that many overseas migrants have conservative attitudes to development in their home areas. Migrants from the Cook Islands, for example, specifically remitted money to their home islands not for business development but for the construction of churches and village halls so that rural life would remain relatively 'traditional'. Similarly many Palauans in distant Hawaii argued that it was important to 'limit outside influence and hold on to traditional ways' (Vitarelli 1981:22), which would also enable migrants to retain their land rights more easily, thus emphasizing the ideology of return. Especially where return migrants are elderly they are unlikely to be interested in development opportunities; in Wallis and Futuna where, by the mid-1970s, the islands could be described as 'holiday islands and havens for the retired' (Roux 1980:174), return migrants have contributed little to development. More significantly, and rather more generally, migrants have returned because of limited success abroad; this is best documented in the case of American Samoa where those who returned valued their family ties and the customary social organization of Samoa but have also been unsuccessful in some respect (usually in gaining long-term employment) in their adjustment to the American economy and society (Lyons 1980). Both nostalgia and reaction to discrimination also play some part; 'the most restive group in Palau are the recent returnees from college. They have serious identity problems ... In college they absorbed a sort of American romantic image of Palau, and they go back filled with a utopian image of the land' (McKnight 1978:36). Return migrants not only have little to contribute to economic (if not, perhaps, social) development in the region but their expectations of superior social services place pressure on the national economy. They are often therefore a 'source of dissatisfaction with village life and the predominantly subsistence economy' (Meleisea and Meleisea 1980:37). They introduce new discontents, values and aspirations, do not settle long themselves and induce others to follow their lead. The available evidence suggests, however, that return migration is limited in comparison with situations elsewhere. Nonetheless return migration follows exactly the pattern that exists in southern Europe, though its volume is smaller. The principal employment effects are in the service sector (rather than in production), savings are devoted to family consumption rather than productive investment, and many returnees remain in urban areas (Hudson and Lewis 1985:24-35), so much so that Cerase (1974) described the return movement in southern Italy as a 'return of conservatism'. Indeed,
it is probably unrealistic to expect more than a tiny fraction of those who have already escaped from the rural areas to ever go back. Many will want to go back but only provided that ‘want’ is never put to the task (Crocombe 1978:52; my emphasis).

There is a sharp contrast between public and private views of ‘home’, between public affection and private concern, between the rhetoric of return and the reality of emigration, so that even land purchases and extended periods of substantial remittances cannot be regarded as a commitment to return (Macpherson 1985). In many areas, just as one reason for migration is its significance as a ‘rite of passage’, a means of gaining status and prestige in the transition to adulthood, so return migration is often an admission of failure.

It is, however, a far cry from the mid-nineteenth century when returning Cook Islanders were reported by missionaries to have ‘an unsettling influence on island life and formed a “depraved and vicious element” advocating such sins as prostitution and the consumption of fermented liquors’ (Gill 1846, cited by Curson 1973a:107). More than a century later broadly similar views have been held:

The social effects of wage labour are more significant. It has undoubtedly contributed to a moral decline. The young men are away from home for so long that they forget the precepts inculcated in childhood; moreover they learn no others during their absence with which these might have been replaced. Their sense of obligation to their fellows is in consequence dulled, and petty crimes such as thieving become more common (Hogbin 1958:173).

By contrast others have demonstrated the vitality of societies to withstand these changes; in Awa (Papua New Guinea) returning labour migrants ‘strut about the village in their urban dress playing transistor radios at full volume’ (to quote Boyd in his chapter); though they are very cocky and may take the opportunity to show disrespect for the elders and to punish them for assumed slights in the past, within a few weeks village life returns to a more usual pace. Migration in Sa’a in southern Malaita, in apparent contrast to nearby Kwaio,

is the social relation to change. It has moved Sa’a and other groups from the trajectory of their own internal evolution onto a course of accelerated development. This change tips the balance of power in new directions. It removes power from the hands of the older generation whose dispositions and practices now confront a new environment, distant from the social world which originally instilled them and to which they are objectively tailored (Meltzoff and Lipuma 1986:55).

For Sa’a there has been no going back. Social life is never the same; social and political change proceeds from disrespect and challenge to the prestige and power of traditional authority. Nevertheless, in more recent decades of this century, return migrants to the countries of the South Pacific have included very many of the principal leaders in the region, including most of those who took a significant part in negotiating independence for their states. Thus return migrants to the Cook Islands included the first three premiers, and elsewhere in the region most current political leaders have experienced overseas education. In the moulding of an elite, with significant influence on the politics of the South Pacific, the overseas experience has been critical.
Despite the return migration of those who achieve political power, a critical constraint to development virtually throughout the region is the serious shortage of skilled workers, a shortage exacerbated by emigration, especially in the smallest countries. Indirectly, this may also result in the creation of a planning elite who may become alienated from the development aspirations of the local people (Sevele 1975). At the same time as a 'diploma disease' becomes consolidated in the region, with school leavers needing increasingly higher qualifications for any kind of formal sector employment, the demand for individuals with genuine tertiary skills shows little sign of diminishing. Yet for many potential return migrants, especially to the smaller islands, there are few economic incentives to return migration (and not necessarily even the security of subsistence), and there may be competition for the limited resources available (e.g. Pitt and Macpherson 1974:15). Loyalty by stability is highly prized, though returnees may be well treated. Only the Rapanui, of all those Pacific islanders overseas, seem to 'take any opportunity with the slightest change of success to make their homecoming' (McCall 1981:138); yet there are many Rapanui in Chile and Tahiti so perhaps their experience of return to their tiny, isolated homeland may not be exceptional. Despite the important role of emigration as a population safety-valve, only in exceptional cases, such as Niue and Pitcairn, is the contemporary population not at its highest level ever; thus significant return migration may be a cause for some concern. This is apparent in islands like Wallis and Futuna, where it is feared that political changes in New Caledonia could lead to substantial flows and genuine social disruption.1 The retired can actually take their place as return migrants more easily than the economically productive young.

Social change

Migration has contributed to greater individualism in terms of the declining significance of wider social groups (such as clans), extended families and even nuclear households. This may not always have been so; in some circumstances extended families have become more important following migration as they cooperate to undertake the work previously carried out by the migrants (Connell et al. 1976:149). The impact of migration cannot be differentiated from other social changes, also directed towards greater individualism, the decline in reciprocity and exchange relationship and the greater extent of monetization. A greater emphasis on material possessions has in itself necessarily transformed social relationships; in a village only recently having experienced the start of labour migration, 'returnees feel exploited by those who remain in the village and older people feel neglected and abused by their "children"' (D. Boyd, pers. comm., 1984; cf. his chapter in this volume). Societies and cultures have become more homogeneous and more internationalized; the 'exotic' in traditional life - clothes (or lack of them), polygamy, body adornment, shamanism, shell currency, cremations, cannibalism etc. - has slowly disappeared as its presence is found to conflict with the norms of larger, more modernized societies and to suggest a no longer welcome situation of 'backwardness' that opposes 'progress'. Other phenomena, such as art, have also declined as interests have shifted, different priorities have

1 'Wallis se préoccupe du retour de ses expatriés', Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes, 8 February 1988:2.
governed the allocation of time, and the elaborate cultural organization, of which these were inextricably a part, has also begun to disintegrate. In earlier times opposition, dispossession and suppression all played their part.

Whilst observed changes are often readily apparent and the social implications of migration are evidently similar to many experienced in other small, modernizing countries, clear correlations can rarely be made. This is particularly apparent for psychological changes where subjectivity is rife. For the Cook Islands one study has been titled 'The impact of modernization on the personality of the Polynesian people: or, how to make an uptight, rivalrous westerner out of an easy-going generous Pacific islander' (Graves and Graves 1978). The views of many I-Kiribati about returning seamen are not noticeably different; for one local writer at least they 'dehumanise themselves, destroy local customs and cause envy and resentment in the rest of the local population' (Toatu 1980:31, my emphasis). One Melanesian perception of similar changes was made by the Bougainville writer and former politician Leo Hannett in reference to migrant workers and change at the Panguna copper mine:

Where we once walked with our heads high, now we move around with our heads hanging low ... never quite knowing what to expect from these outsiders, heartless outsiders with their heartless machines slowly eating out like a cancerous growth the soul of our community, degenerating, humiliating and dehumanising us with their 'development' at our expense. We are now made strangers in our own land (Hannett 1975:288-9).

Emotions are stirred by modernization and migration. It is so often concluded that modernization may be too rapid, even as in Kwaio, where its impact is slight (but critical). In areas of Bougainville where mining operations were most disruptive, residents were compensated, seemingly ironically, for the 'hardship which will follow the enforced change from a traditional village environment to a European way of life and provide for the additional cost of maintaining the European-style residence in an urbanised community' (Bedford and Mamak 1977:40). Despite withdrawals and the revitalization of tradition in some remote areas, more societies in the South Pacific broadly accept European culture and technology. In Tuvalu, for example, there is now a pouliuli myth [which] assumes that traditional Tuvalu culture is inferior to western, that local customs belong to "days of darkness" (pouliuli) and must be replaced by enlightened ones from European culture' (Chambers 1984:272). If there is an appropriate pace for modernization no societies have been fortunate enough to have achieved it, hence the persistent themes of incorporation and disengagement.

Crude contrasts between tradition and modern, and between disengagement and incorporation, point to the manner in which migration simultaneously acts as a force of conservation and dissolution. Amongst the Baruya, for example, migration and male initiation now work in two directions: towards the interior, where they are still directed against women, to create and reproduce male dominance, and towards the exterior, where dangers may befall emigrants. 'As this process moves both ways, it preserves, while at the same time amputating, the principles which used to underpin the thought and workings of a society in order to withstand the march of history' (Godelier 1986:206). Migration removes the discontented and the upwardly mobile, whilst older conservatives remain. Those who have moved 'maximise their options by successfully exploiting the
ambiguity of being temporary sojourners who are in fact long-term absentee or migrants' (Tonkinson 1985:141) though the balancing act is not without strains and some may stay away too long. Remittances both conserve societies through emphasizing historic structures of land tenure and dissolve social economies by stimulating economic change and the transformation in tastes. Collective goals are maintained (in the construction of village halls and churches) but individualism prevails. Remittances safeguard yet erode the vitality of the home region, sustaining and improving welfare yet undermining production. This is scarcely surprising. A desire to conserve is an inevitable reaction against the anxieties generated by modernization 'because the pace of change and development has attenuated a legacy integral to identity and wellbeing' (Lowenthal 1985:xxiv). If migration and employment opportunities worsen internationally and in the growing cities and towns of the Pacific islands, the mirage of easy money will be dissipated and more security will come from village and ethnic values and identity (Bonnemaison 1985b:58). This kind of duality is reflected in the state itself, where national rhetoric is oriented to greater autonomy and self-reliance, whilst the reality is one of greater dependence. In such a context, as elsewhere, migration 'calls for people to leave, though often to return again, in order to maintain and improve what they have left behind' (Richardson 1983:6); migrants are 'leaving in order to stay' (Nietschmann 1979:20; Lucardie 1985:65) as migration has become 'a way of maintaining the family by leaving the family; and it is also a means of going without leaving' (Nietschmann 1979:22). Ultimately more is changed and dissolved than is conserved.

In a number of countries education is oriented to the needs of migrants in their destinations. In American Samoa there is concern that migrants do not have adequate education and training to compete for employment in America. In Tonga, where there is semi-skilled employment in manufacturing industry, most workers view this as useful training for eventual overseas employment (R. Norton, pers. comm., 1987). Attempts to introduce vocational education in Kiribati community high schools have been strongly opposed by parents concerned that their children will then be unable to obtain bureaucratic employment. Moreover, many educational systems, notably those in American territories, inevitably result in disdain for rural life, 'for the exclusion of traditional skills and knowledge from westernised school curricula in many developing countries amounts to a constant tacit assumption that such things are not worth learning' (Johannes 1981:148). Not only does contemporary education emphasize, and make more familiar, the values and expectations of distant societies, which conflict with more local values and expectations, but it reduces the time available for socialization in local cultures, at the same time reducing the legitimacy of those who undertake this socialization. Migration and educational change reinforce each other.

In the smaller states in the region there are no national daily newspapers or even regular radio programs; in others these are rare, intermittent and often with a substantial overseas syndicated component. In most countries communications (transport, literary or radio) are much easier with metropolitan centres elsewhere than with many parts of the country. The contacts of the elite are more likely to be with each other or with similar groups overseas; their language of communication is often English and almost all official documents in the region (such as Development Plans) and most newspapers are in English (or French). The 'na-
tional core relays to the national periphery ideologies, tastes and fashions im-
ported from abroad' (Seers 1979:xix), whereas the more diverse ideologies, tastes
and fashions of the periphery do not travel in the reverse direction. Those at the
core are consequently better informed on some international issues than on some
national issues. At the extreme of this kind of influence is Niue, and there is even
a periphery in the 'back villages' of Niue:

Niueans have responded without resistance to the permeation into their
life-style of New Zealand's own ways and values. In fact they have come to
accept and desire as an integral part of their modern life-style, practically
everything with which New Zealand is associated ... The evolution of Niuean
society, as a consequence of New Zealand's imperial aspirations, has reached
the point of no return (Chapman 1982:138).

In short, Niueans are no different from most other Pacific islanders: they seek to
have the best of both worlds. A non-Niuean perspective might be less blunt but
also less accurate.

Social impacts at a national level are difficult to assess and few studies in the
South Pacific region have attempted to do this. In Tonga Marcus suggests that
temporary migration has been a source of a broader-based middle class yet,
despite this growth, the 'conventional nation-state model of development is
challenged by the possibility of more elite families who exercise considerable
power, decisively switching abroad their tentative and relative commitments
among options in the present general trend of migration' (Marcus 1981:61). In
Tonga the first overseas university degree was obtained by the present king;
subsequently noble and elite commoner families have been the major source of
those who have obtained overseas education. Consequently Tongan national
elite families now have an international dimension and thus see their fields of
activity as a strategic mix of options in the framework of dispersed family net-
works which span different places' (ibid.). This is exactly the situation in other
Polynesian states, where emigration has been common particularly amongst the
elite. Emigration is consequently viewed by such groups, who are more easily
able to overcome the disadvantages of migration and who also have the greatest
control over development policy, as a means of maximizing household develop-
ment options.

International migration has taken away many of those who might have been
dissidents and aspiring political leaders in opposition to more conservative con-
temporary leaders. Apparent in Tonga and elsewhere in Polynesia, it is now most
obvious in the migration of Indians from Fiji. In the political sphere too emigra-
tion is now a safety-valve, channelling the ambitious and frustrated away from
inflexible systems of social and political stratification.

Conclusion: beyond the banal?

Social changes are inseparable from all other changes in the nations and societies
of the South Pacific: Although, in some areas, especially rural Melanesia, changes
have been stimulated more by other influences, such as education, missionization,
cash cropping and entrepreneurial activity, migration has accentuated the speed
of change and contributed to ushering in the revolution of rising expectations.
There are obviously social and economic costs and benefits to development
throughout the Pacific, and few of these are wholly or even partially attributable
to migration, yet migration often plays a significant role in the restructuring of societies and economies. Moreover it is much the most important demographic variable in the region. Early migration in the region could be characterized as ‘dual dependency’, but in more recent years has become more obviously a function of ‘dependency’, especially in areas of high population pressure on resources, as rural communities have been unable to generate perceived needs. Consequently migration has slowly shifted from circularity towards permanence and, as job opportunities decline, this has worsened rural-urban inequalities, themselves often emphasized by ‘urban bias’ in government policy. Increased material rewards, which may be transient, cannot be balanced against the disruption of traditional production and exchange relations (even with their often implicit inequalities) and the emergence of class differentiation, characteristic of the various transitions to capitalist production and proletarianization. Opposition to these trends through the revaluation of tradition has generally been sporadic, although widespread, and not at all revolutionary. In the international context, the reaction has been one of acquiescence, with increasing migration subject to constraints in the destinations (the latent desire for migration being particularly apparent in Western Samoa in 1982 at a time of revaluation of Western Samoan citizenship). Ultimately migration has remained a safety-valve; that it cannot always be so is equally apparent. In extremis, ‘no community can function as a giant incubator for male workers who once they reach maturity are exported’ (Yusuf and Peters 1985:22), though many function partially in this manner.

Social and economic changes are generally logical; they occur in many areas of the world in similar form, they are often banal and obvious. To go beyond the banal demands explanation of the variable rates of social change in South Pacific societies (and of those beyond which are themselves changing) and the revaluation of tradition in a number of societies. Thus some societies in Papua New Guinea have been described in a manner which is suggestive of ‘proto-capitalism’ rather than ‘pre-capitalism’ to the extent that such societies were pre-adapted to change by virtue of their pre-colonial values and institutions. Several societies in Melanesia have sought through cargoism the economic progress that has eluded them in other ways, although cargoism too is deeply rooted in pre-colonial intellectual systems (Connell 1979:107-20). Underlying important aspects of social and economic change are pre-colonial economic, cultural and intellectual systems. Only systematic comparative analyses of changes in those societies, for which there are adequate analyses of pre-colonial structures, enable substantial analytical progress. At the same time the task of achieving consensus over the critical components of social change - as wide-reaching debates over Margaret Mead’s work in Samoa and reinterpretations of major work by Malinowski, Rappaport and Pospisil abundantly demonstrate - will not be simple. Not only are there few studies in some areas and wide differences in findings but there are equally wide, if not wider, differences in interpretation. This introductory chapter also presents idealized models and over-simplifications, ignoring much of the particularity and idiosyncrasy of change that is crucial to each society; such generalization derives partly from reviewing only a fragment of the literature on migration and social change in the South Pacific, a literature from which many elements required for correlation and interpretation are often missing. The chapters that follow take these arguments further.
Change occurs when traditional strategies, which assume traditional patterns of relations (e.g. between leaders and followers, or between men and women) are deployed in relation to novel phenomena which do not respond to those strategies in traditional ways. The complex of changes (following international migration and other related phenomena) has brought societies into conditions of internal conflict and contradiction as new relationships have defeated both intention and convention. This perspective on change, which largely results from (abortive) attempts to apply traditional interpretations and practices, unites mechanisms of reproduction and transformation; change is failed reproduction (cf. Sahlins 1981). The incorporation of the societies of the South Pacific into a global economy, and their participation in a modern society have enabled them also to participate in ‘a world of mistakes, frustrations, disappointments, anxiety and conflict’ (Bailey 1966:409). This world presents multiple, often conflicting choices; taking choices inevitably leads to diversity and to errors, distortions and problems. Choices, for example of alternative careers (rather than jobs), result in relative deprivation and frustration but also in social, occupational and geographical mobility. Small societies have problems coping with diversity so that institutional fabrics become disunited, fragmented and progressively deprived of plausibility (cf. Berger et al. 1973:85); for example, supernatural sanctions are no longer overwhelming and choices (of religions, medicines etc.) can be individually made within wider (if still limited) parameters of choice. The structures of modernization that initially appear as alien, powerful and coercive can slowly be accommodated; eventually ‘rationality and impersonality come to be experienced not simply as alien impositions but as necessary and perhaps even beneficial criteria dominating at least the economic sphere’ (ibid.:114). Eventually cycles of history no longer repeat themselves.

The prospects of long-term indigenous economic development in the South Pacific region are poor, a function of such factors as limited domestic resources, smallness and isolation, and the constraints of the global economy, hence development options are severely limited, especially in the atoll states (Connell 1985b, 1988a). Rising expectations, that cannot be met within small states, have resulted in an increasing orientation outwards, the demise of some small societies and the depopulation of outer islands. As long ago as 1967 it seemed ‘that many of the smaller islands will cease to be viable socio-economic units as present trends in culture change continue’ (Ward 1967:96). A decade later such islands were regarded as ‘beautiful but not places to live’ (Bedford 1980b:57), where social and economic life was being maintained by a skeleton crew. The final phases of life on the outer Palauan island of Merir were vividly recorded in 1954: ‘the island is dying, at least as far as the present generations are concerned ... The women are too old to cultivate taro in any quantity and the men cannot keep the coconut groves cleared’ (Osborne 1966:49). Yet many small islands have not died; some, like Pitcairn, have retained their population long after confident predictions of its imminent departure (Connell 1988c).

Few societies or states have voluntarily opted out of the migration circuit; indeed in the South Pacific region a number of countries (most obviously Kiribati and Tuvalu) are actively seeking new overseas employment (and settlement) opportunities and providing training for emigration. Other states also maintain overseas labour contracts in New Zealand. Nevertheless, there are those who, like the Kwaio, having experienced the frustrations of migration and the ensuing
social costs, have attempted partial withdrawal from the periphery of the global capitalist economy. For them Keesing (1978:194) queries:

Might the Kwaio pagans, still virtually self-sufficient, have preserved their independence long enough to survive better than most people in a precarious future? ... there is a chance for the Kwaio themselves to rebuild their customs so as to combine the virtues and self-sufficiency of the old ways with new strengths and new ways opened up by westernisation - in effect to renegotiate the terms on which they live with their ancestors ... there may be a chance for the Kwaio to exploit selectively the opportunities opened [up] by Western education and medicine, without sacrificing their ties to tradition and self-sufficiency.

Yet Keesing is too optimistic; the remote Kwaio are modernizing and abandoning a tradition which had its own inequalities. As Scott (1976:5) argues, 'it is all too easy, and a serious mistake, to romanticize the social arrangements that distinguish much of peasant society'. This was true of the Marquesas, where traditional society was 'integrated it is true, but largely by sorcery and human sacrifices; filled with fear and with an ordinary violence to one another which seems extraordinary' (Dening 1980:234), and this in Polynesia, the supposed haunt of the 'noble savage'. The contemporary visible effects of disruption have assisted in the romanticization and generation of utopias in the historic Pacific (see, for example, Valentine 1979:98-9). Incorporation of the Kwaio into a global economy has drawn attention to unsatisfied needs. Respect for the diversity of human cultures and human preferences should not provide a trap in the acceptance of each culture's self-justification at its face value. A transformation towards tradition would be a revolutionary re-direction of social change in the rural areas or states of the South Pacific, and most societies are well beyond the Kwaio in the extent of their incorporation into a national and international economy. But who is to say that those Kwaio who prefer disengagement and traditional values are not right?

The values expressed by groups like the Kwaio have found some favour with others who stress the virtues of a more self-reliant approach to development, whether in small communities or nation-states. The economics of this have been considered elsewhere (Connell 1987a). Self-reliance entails a more selective approach to external influences of all kinds. In keeping with this orientation is the idea that factors that were previously regarded as 'obstacles' to development, such as nationalism, a separate language, traditional customs and so on, appear now rather as shields against the expense and inappropriateness of modern consumption styles and technologies (Seers 1977). So the Kwaio and some academics may sometimes be seen as expressing the phrases that reflect appropriate aspirations if growth cannot easily be achieved; in a Nigerian context self-reliance was 'little more than a ritual for exorcising the devil of dependence' (Joseph 1978:223), where that social and economic dependence could not directly be challenged. Attempts to revalue tradition have largely failed, especially in the smallest states, and further emigration from the South Pacific to neighbouring countries appears inevitable.

Two decades ago in the most remote islands of Ireland,
Migrant labour takes and returns people each year - the same people - and they return changed and the culture changes with them. New ideas, needs, values and artifacts are fed back into the culture yearly, and yearly it changes. The very factor that preserves the island as a social unit, the desire of the young to return, is the factor that will probably destroy it as the last stronghold of Gaelic life in these islands (Fox 1962:19).

In the South Pacific too there is a uniformity of cultural transformation which a wide review of the social consequences of international migration in sending countries has simply summarized as ‘a sorry tale of unrelenting societal disintegration’ (Finkle and McIntosh 1982:178). Yet small island societies are preserved as social units, because return migration can never be discounted, and many have gained from new health and education systems. Even on Pitcairn Island, where few emigrants will ever return, land reform has been impossible because of their concerns and pressures. Social changes in the areas of origin of migration (whether internal or international) reflect the discontents experienced in some of the transformations of modernity, a discontent summarized by Berger et al. (1973) as ‘homelessness’, a reflection on shifting emotions and emergent social constructions of reality. Migration is thus both reality and metaphor.

Invariably binary oppositions persist in the literature; conservation is impossible without dissolution and the ‘love-hate’ relationship in Kilenge education recurs in attitudes to migration, urbanization, industrialization and modernization. The erroneous presumptions of a radical dichotomy between small-scale systems and the capitalist world, a dichotomy based on unfortunate binarisms (traditional and modern, open and closed, etc.), reduce social and economic change to impoverished concepts such as ‘modernization’ and limit the utility of generalization. Dichotomous contrasts between the traditional and modern have characterized models of social change, often transforming a contrast based on characteristics of nineteenth-century European development into a supposedly universal feature of all evolving human societies (Giddens 1979:229). Absent from such contrasts is often the sense of ethnography, and the recognition that local people selectively incorporate new knowledge, not merely responding to outside forces, but reinterpreting them and imbuing them with significance for their own social practice (Meltzoff and Lipuma 1986). Critics of dichotomous contrasts have thus directed attention to the various ‘mixes’ of tradition and modernity in specific societies, usefully directing attention away from unfolding models, towards notions of dependency and uneven development (Giddens 1979:229), and to the crucial roles of history and the sense of place. Mobility is embedded in culture, geography and history and drawn out in new forms by global capitalism.

The subject of development ... is never homo economicus but real people living in the image of their own culture ... People’s attitude to modernization is less a measure of their conservatism than of their search to innovate in the face of great uncertainty (Meltzoff and Lipuma 1986:61).

Uncertainty has contributed to one of the most substantial phases of emigration recorded anywhere in the twentieth century. That uncertainty is mirrored in the various academic interpretations of migration and development in the varied societies of the Pacific region; there is no consensus in this collection. Migration, as these chapters demonstrate, is a highly variable process, yet although the
authors generally attribute this to disparities between regions and nations, few argue that it reduces, or can reduce, these regional and national imbalances, or even that it significantly contributes to rural development. Most, especially those who have written about the small island states, are pessimistic about the future and few offer real solutions. The authors too are often poised between the dual options of disengagement and incorporation. After decades of research on migration in the Pacific it is clear that there are few remaining secure generalizations and no shared paradigm. For all that knowledge of the history, structure and impact of migration has increased in both degree and in kind, and in particular towards a greater understanding of the history and internal dialectics of small societies and the comparative analysis of systems and their transformations, through their spatial and temporal articulation with external structure and agencies, there is much more yet to be said on the complex relationship between migration and development, and even on how they are both defined.
Economic dependence in Third World countries is not simply the product of the recent incursions of capitalism, colonialism and independence. Rather, events in earlier centuries have had long-term repercussions that have laid the foundations for subsequent change, hence a historical perspective casts important light on the current migration situation. Tuvalu is no exception, hence the present chapter surveys the accumulated pressures over time that have resulted in deepening dependence\(^1\) and incorporation into the world economy. Labour migration has played an increasingly important role in this process.

The Pacific micro-state of Tuvalu comprises nine small coral atolls and reef islands (Figure 2.1). With an aggregate surface area of 25 square kilometres, Tuvalu is one of the world's smallest nations. Formerly known as the Ellice Islands, and part of Britain's Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony (GEIC), Tuvalu separated from the Colony in 1975 and achieved independence three years later. The individual islands are small even by atoll standards and typically have limited potential for supporting human populations. Nevertheless the population of the group has increased dramatically from approximately 2800 in 1860 (Bedford et al. 1980:238) to 7349 at the latest census in 1979 (which translates into a crude density of 287 persons per square kilometre), with another 1400 or so Tuvalu citizens living abroad (Iosia and Macrae 1980:177). With its lack of industrial potential and its meagre agricultural exports, combined with

\(^1\) The word 'dependence' has been used in preference to 'dependency'. It should be understood to mean the reverse of self-sufficiency, though neither condition when taken to the logical extreme occurs in practice. 'Dependence' also takes into account incorporation into the world economy but does not imply any notions of dependency theory.
environmental restrictions and the highest population density of any Pacific archipelago, Tuvalu is heavily dependent on foreign aid, remittances and imported foodstuffs, and will remain so for the foreseeable future (Connell 1980b; Fisk 1982). The degree of dependence in Tuvalu is great precisely because the alternatives are so few.

Figure 2.1 Tuvalu

Yet in traditional times, before European contact, the individual islands were not only politically autonomous but economically self-contained, without being self-sufficient in the strict sense of the word. Each possessed the same narrow range of resources so there was no scope for inter-island trading links; and while institutionalized visits (maalaga) between islands involved in part the reciprocal exchange of goods, they were essentially ceremonial and social and in no way comparable in scale or function to the complex trading cycles found elsewhere in the Pacific. By and large, Tuvaluans in traditional times interacted infrequently
with other Pacific islanders (cf. Alkire 1978). Inter-island canoe voyagers seldom ventured beyond the archipelago, except by accident. Contacts with islanders from other groups, moreover, were sporadic, though Tongan marauders and Gilbertese invaders made their presence felt at various stages. There is an element of sad irony that a people once so self-contained should now be dependent to such a degree.

Nevertheless, Tuvaluans should not be seen as merely passive victims of wider economic forces. Dependence was embraced rather than imposed. Islanders adopted new ways and artifacts in a conscious attempt to raise their standard of living and enhance their well-being. Given the alternatives, Tuvaluans are now overwhelmingly satisfied with the nature and content of their dependence, although there is a recognition by some of its disturbing implications. The optimist might say that Tuvaluans contributed actively to their own status and that the traders, missionaries and government men in their midst deliberately set out to achieve these effects as well; the cynic may well marvel at the spectacle of a people actively engaged in contributing to their own dependence while at the same time averring their commitment to self-reliance.

Tuvalu's self-sufficiency was gradually eroded as a consequence of European contacts. The first significant contacts began in the early 1820s with the arrival of whaleships. These initial encounters were casual and irregular. Most commonly Tuvaluans initiated proceedings, chasing passing vessels in their canoes. Coconuts and mats would then be exchanged for iron hoop, fish-hooks, bottles and knives. Pigs were occasionally left behind and their offspring in turn were in high demand among visiting whalers. But this occasional and small-scale barter between ship and shore meant that the impact of the whalemen and other earlier visitors was necessarily limited. Unlike Rarotongans, for example, Tuvaluans never became economically dependent on whaleship visits to the extent that they suffered vicariously when these shipping contacts ceased. Nor were large numbers of young men recruited by whaling captains, leaving a demographic imbalance and associated problems which some of the Cook Islands experienced (Beaglehole 1957:92; Crocombe 1964:69-70). Nevertheless the first signs of dependence in Tuvalu can be traced to the whaling era, in the form of a nascent reliance on an outside facility.

By the 1950s the passing whalers were being superseded by resident traders, sometimes trading on their own account but more usually as company agents. The passing trade in provisions and mats gave way to one based on coconut oil and, later, copra. But Tuvaluans still sought the same products of Western technology as before, namely items of utilitarian value such as glass bottles, hoop iron and knives, which saved hours of time in the construction of dwellings and canoes when compared with tools made from sea-shell or turtle carapace. Indeed, Tuvaluans were anxious to improve but not replace existing technology.

Tuvalu's links with and dependence upon the industrial world remained slight and easily reversible, but pressures were already there to tighten these links. From a trader's point of view, the coconut crop on each island was drastically under-utilized because the 'indolent' Tuvaluans left nuts to rot on the ground rather than converting them into copra. The matter was put into perspective by a visiting naval captain who remarked that this 'constant complaint on the part of
Europeans, that they are lazy and will not work, merely means that the natives are not much inclined to work for them' (Maxwell 1881:2). Nevertheless, there was ample scope for increased copra production once Tuvaluans acquired a greater range and volume of consumer demands, which came about largely as a result of missionary activity.

The London Missionary Society (LMS) entered Tuvalu in 1865, gradually placing Samoan pastors on each island, and within ten years the entire archipelago had been won over to the Protestant cause. The pastors wrought profound social change which had far-reaching economic repercussions in that a new range of imported consumer goods necessary to Tuvaluans' participation in the Christian order became incorporated into Tuvaluan life. Thus the bilateral trade between Tuvaluans and traders was transformed into a three-cornered relationship to include the LMS (see Figure 2.2). In a single decade the shift to dependence had occurred irrevocably; a once self-sufficient resource base became unable to service the full range of Tuvaluan needs.

Figure 2.2 The trading relationship

Mission-inspired consumer demands fell into three broad categories, of which building materials were one. A wave of competitive church building occurred throughout the group, with the size of each church being seen as an indication of an island's religious commitment. In this headlong pursuit of prestige, local

2 New technology, and later money, were not simply grafted on to old values. Rather, the use of new technological items followed the adoption of a new epistemology (cf. Martin 1974). In a Tuvaluan context the disintegration of the traditional religion was a precondition to the acceptance of a range of European artifacts, which were then often put to novel uses. This development is different in kind to the acceptance of a few incidental items, such as metal fish-hooks, similar in form and function to the ones they replaced.
building materials were discarded in favour of costly imported building material. Clothing was the second new area of consumer demand, since the Samoan pastors insisted that Tuvaluans be clothed in accordance with prevailing Christian notions of morality. The third line of mission-inspired imports was books and stationery. Literacy was necessary to one's participation in the new religion which in turn gave rise to the need for writing materials.

In Tuvalu these new 'luxuries' did not become 'necessities' (cf. Shineberg 1967:162). Nor did what began as purely 'discretionary' material requirements come to be regarded as 'necessary' (cf. Knapman 1976:169). Rather, these church-inspired imports were necessities from the moment Tuvaluans became Christians. At the same time, non-church-inspired consumer demands, such as tobacco, reinforced the Tuvalu islands' incorporation into the world economy (cf. Black 1984:476, 495). In 1897, for example, the people of Nukufetau were anxious to receive another resident trader as this would break the tobacco famine they had endured since the departure of his predecessor (Campbell 1897:397).

To compound the initial trend to dependence the LMS generated a demand for cash within Tuvalu which only the traders could satisfy. Tuvaluans did not need the money for themselves so much as for their various church donations. Again, a spirit of competitiveness between and within islands prevailed, with prestige accruing to islands and individuals in direct proportion to the size of their donations. As a means of mobilizing resources these rivalries were extraordinarily successful, as testified by the sudden appearance throughout the group of churches built from expensive European materials and paid for in copra. Trading and missionary activity thus combined to increase Tuvaluans' dependence on the outside world. Traders provided Tuvaluans with cash, which could then be given to missionary funds, thus removing the need for the LMS to engage in direct trading relations with Tuvaluans. At the same time the Tuvaluans, as newly converted Christians, demanded clothing, stationery, building materials and cash to a degree which significantly stimulated copra production. Tuvaluans first made copra to obtain the iron implements necessary to release time to make yet more copra to purchase a new range of trade imports and obtain the cash necessary for their participation in the new religious order.

At the same time missionary activity, from around 1865 to the early years of this century, resulted in the Tuvaluans of the five southern islands experiencing a degree of subsistence affluence never before encountered and never repeated. The three northern islands were not blessed to such a degree: they did not accept missionary teaching until the mid-1870s and suffered the effects of a severe drought during the early 1890s. It was not therefore the pre-contact period but the missionary and early colonial periods which saw the heyday of subsistence affluence in southern Tuvalu (cf. Grossman 1984:149-57). Metal-tipped tools lightened the round of daily work while the introduction of new plant species, such as the breadfruit tree, expanded the resource base. At another level, the missionaries offered an escape from the sanctions and repressiveness of the traditional religion, as well as putting an end to fighting, infanticide and abortion. Missionary activity, in short, ushered in a brief period of security and abundance which, in turn, sustained the rapidly growing population that resulted from their policies. When the veteran missionary S.H. Davies called at Tuvalu in 1905 he was struck by the changes since his last visit in 1882: the population had doubled
on some islands and on all islands there was 'a more varied and larger food supply' (Davies 1905).

By the turn of the century, however, a once self-sufficient resource base was no longer able to service the full range of Tuvaluan needs. Nevertheless Tuvaluans continued to gain their livelihood overwhelmingly by traditional subsistence means with imports being firmly tied to copra production, and involvement in the cash economy being limited to the gathering of mission contributions. In the long term, however, trading and missionary activity in Tuvalu facilitated new pressures which resulted in Tuvaluan resources being far outstripped by a steadily increasing reliance on the outside world. These new pressures were a consequence of formal imperial control being extended over the archipelago which, in turn, smoothed the way to a sustained program of labour migration.

In 1892 Britain declared a Protectorate over the then Ellice Islands as it had four months earlier in the neighbouring Gilberts. Although technically separate Protectorates the two groups were, for convenience, treated as a single entity and shared a common administrative centre located in the northern Gilberts; this 'legal fiction' was formalized in 1916 with the transition to a consolidated de jure colony. Accordingly the history of the Ellice Islands under colonial rule was intertwined with developments in the Gilberts until the parting of the ways in 1975, when the Ellice Islands became a separate British dependency.

From the start the new Protectorate was run cheaply; it had to pay its way and raise its own revenue. To that end a Queen's Tax, payable in copra, was imposed on each island and collected on the administration's behalf by the vessels of one or other of the trading companies operating in the area. Any surplus copra was converted into cash and left to accumulate in respective Island Funds (Macdonald 1982:81). The Queen's Tax provided another stimulus to copra production and increased Tuvaluan involvement in a cash economy. But the decisive event, from the standpoint of deepening dependence, was the start in 1901 of return labour migration to Ocean Island (Banaba), the site of a newly-opened phosphate extraction enterprise operated by the Pacific Islands Company.

Overseas labour migration was not previously an important theme in Tuvalu history. Recruiting had been strongly opposed by the powerful Samoan pastors and this opposition, coupled with the small resident populations, made the archipelago an unpromising recruiting ground. However, that population was increasing and by the late 1890s 'overpopulation' was concerning missionaries and colonial administrators alike, especially in the drought-prone north. However, the rate of population growth varied markedly between islands, and once it was realized that the populations of the three southern atolls of Nukulaelae, Funafuti and Nukufetau had barely risen over the previous thirty years, a ban on any labour recruiting at these places was imposed. There were no such qualms about the northern islands, however, which were considered to be overcrowded, and the first contingent of Tuvalu workers for Ocean Island were recruited from these islands in 1901. Over the next decade the numbers employed at Ocean Island varied from 60 to 120 in any given year (Chambers 1984:88, 170). The period of employment was generally for two years, and the great majority of the migrants were young men. On completion of their contracts they were returned
to their home islands and a new batch of recruits replaced them at Ocean Island. In addition Tuvaluans, particularly those from Nanuméa, obtained other avenues of overseas employment, especially on ships (Mahaffy 1911:2).

Circular migration had two immediate effects in the communities of origin. First, a new wave of church building in the early years of the twentieth century was a function of the cash earned by migrant labour. Second, Tuvaluans purchased European manufactured goods in unprecedented quantities now that large sums of money were being brought into the group by repatriated workers from Ocean Island. In 1909 alone the Australian firm of Burns Philp sold £4000 worth of goods, and Burns Philp's competitors sold goods of perhaps a comparable value (Buckley and Klugman 1981:267). A touring colonial official summed up the situation, and although referring to the Gilbert Islands his description applies equally to Tuvalu:

The establishment of so great a labour centre as is Ocean Island, so close to their homes, is of course a feature of the greatest importance in their lives and in their whole economy. The old and spartan simplicity of the standard of living, which was maintained upon the almost exclusive diets of cocoanuts [sic], pandanus, and fish has vanished before the cultivated taste which demands rice, meat, sugar, and biscuits, and which is inclined to scorn the simple food of a former generation. Clothes of shocking shape and atrocious colour have almost replaced the picturesque Kilt of leaves or fine woven mat ... The rapid decline of the simple arts and crafts among the natives is very much to be regretted (Mahaffy 1909a:12).

Such comments were destined to be repeated in many forms throughout the Pacific.

Within ten years of recruiting for Ocean Island, Tuvalu was significantly further down the road to dependence. The cash brought back by returned labourers assumed increasing importance both for individual households and for islands as a whole. At Nanuméa, for example, the accumulated contributions of labourers were used to finance the construction of their new church during the 1930s. That the church was wholly constructed by Nanumeans indicates that labour migration was the vehicle by which skills as well as a rising tide of consumer demands were imported to Tuvalu (Chambers 1984:90). Nevertheless a qualitative break had been made with the past in that consumer demands were no longer tied to local copra production, as was the case throughout the nineteenth century, but now had to be met by outside sources of cash.3

Return labour migration brought with it parallel demographic and medical effects. Migrants brought back from Banaba a variety of infectious diseases which contributed significantly to a decline in population between 1901 and 1913. This 'shocking mortality' was only reversed by the appointment of a Medical Officer on Funafuti and the subsequent extension of medical facilities throughout the group.

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3 Bertram and Waiters (1985, 1986) have developed the notion that the effects of migration, remittances, aid and bureaucracy (hence the acronym MIRAB) have combined to produce a distinctive class of economies in several South Pacific micro-states, including Tuvalu. The migration-remittances nexus at least was entrenched in Tuvalu as long ago as the early years of this century.
The provision of medical services and personnel highlights a recurring theme in twentieth-century Tuvalu history and that is the entrenched Tuvaluan expectation that governments, whether colonial or post-independence, provide services. This tendency to see government in instrumental terms rested easily with the evolving nature of colonial rule itself, which had moved away from its original guiding principles of indirect rule to one that was paternalistic and authoritarian (Macdonald 1982:75-94, 125-42). Initially the form of dependence this produced was qualified, in that Tuvaluans were not yet receiving substantial grant aid. On the contrary, the colonial administration ‘was not a charitable organisation’ (Macdonald 1982:112), with the result that Tuvaluans provided the money and labour for administration-initiated projects. Money to establish new medical facilities, and to purchase a vessel for the Protectorates, was only found by raiding the individual Island Funds, which the colonial government absorbed in 1916 (Macdonald 1982:85, 125-6). Education, such as it was, remained a missionary responsibility and thus a source of continued expense to the people. Tuvaluans, moreover, were required to spend a number of days a week on public works (Smith-Rewse 1913:6). Thus the colonial government took a directive role by deciding what was to be done, utilizing forced labour to accomplish these ends, and leaving the individual communities to foot the bill. This arrangement endured until the 1950s when the scale of social services and development far outstripped locally-raised revenue. After that, governments, perforce, assumed the role of benefactors as well as initiators, thus reinforcing the instrumental image that Tuvaluans had of them.

The migration patterns established during the early years of the century also carried over into the inter-war period, when at least 250 people were living outside their island of usual residence each year. In some years (e.g. 1922, 1933) the total exceeded 600, and while some of these would have been visiting other islands within the group, a significant proportion of absentees were working on Ocean Island or, after 1921, on the other nearby phosphate island, Nauru (Munro and Bedford 1980:8). Continued labour migration had the dual effects of reducing population pressure and providing households with a source of cash income through remittances from relatives working abroad. On their return the workers brought otherwise unobtainable capital items such as sewing machines and tools. The extent to which the wall of self-sufficiency had been irreparably breached was highlighted during the late 1920s and early 1930s when the British Phosphate Commission (BPC) refused to employ Tuvaluans at the phosphate islands rather than accede to the wages being demanded. The BPC was unmoved when Tuvaluans eventually pleaded for a resumption of employment. A reluctant change of mind was forced in 1936 following an influenza epidemic which placed the entire Gilbert archipelago in quarantine; because of a limit on the number of Chinese labourers on Ocean Island, the BPC had no alternative but to re-engage Tuvaluans (Faaniu 1983:124; Williams and Macdonald 1985:279).

The occupation of Ocean Island and Nauru by Japanese forces during World War II disrupted both phosphate production and labour migration from Tuvalu. However, the presence of thousands of American troops on Nanumea, Nukufetau and Funafuti provided Tuvaluans with an alternative source of goods and savings. The people of Vaitupu even purchased the island of Kioa in Fiji from their accumulated wartime savings. The American occupation gave to Tuvaluans their own version of 'riches beyond the dreams of avarice', to quote the description of Ocean
Island and Nauru when phosphate wealth was confirmed. The wealth and largesse of the Americans, moreover, led to expectations, both political and economic, and contributed to the post-war winds of change reaching Tuvalu. In the words of Macdonald (1982:143):

While it remained, the American military presence dominated lifestyles, offered new opportunities to make money, to travel, and led to a reordering of Islanders’ perceptions of the world and of their own place in it. Beside the self-confident might of the American presence, British officialdom faded into insignificance and, for some, Uncle Sam became the new Messiah.

Tuvalu’s growing dependence after 1945 consequently took place not only in the context of population growth and widening opportunities for overseas wage employment, but also of decolonization (cf. Macdonald 1976).

The employment of Tuvaluans at the phosphate islands resumed once wartime damage had been repaired. In the light of mounting disquiet over their Chinese labour force (Williams and Macdonald 1985:378-9), the BPC increasingly preferred I-Kiribati (Gilbertese) and Tuvaluan labourers. Tuvaluans readily enlisted, and no less than in previous years ‘one of the primary motives for Islanders working at the phosphate islands was the accumulation of items - a canoe, or timber to make one; bicycles, sewing machines, lamps and stoves - which were usually beyond the reach of a village copra grower’ (Williams and Macdonald 1985:453). A combination of reasons enabled returnees to bring enormous quantities of these goods into Tuvalu from Ocean Island and Nauru: their wages had risen dramatically in real terms; there were no customs duties to erode these earnings; and, not least, the goods that accompanied them on the voyage home were not subject to freight charges. Freight-free shipping also encouraged Tuvaluan workers to hoard their surplus rations and to take these home as well. From the early 1960s, however, returnees were increasingly repatriated by aircraft which drastically reduced their luggage (and, incidentally, resulted in the once-hoarded rations being fed to their pigs).4 By then the capital items brought from the phosphate islands were an essential part of every household’s inventory (Chambers 1984:181). At the same time the need back home for the labourers’ remittances was undiminished, whether to buy imported foods and goods from the village stores, to pay children’s education fees, or to contribute to the pastor. Store purchases were variable, but nonetheless substantial, forming an indispensible adjunct to the subsistence sector. Flour, rice, sugar and cabin crackers had become staples and demand was limited only by a lack of ready cash or by periodic shortages in consequence of the vagaries of shipping (Chambers 1984:241-2). In other words, ‘traditional’ village life was incomplete without these influxes of cash and goods from overseas. Moreover, standards of living

4 Tito Isala (pers. comm., 1986). Isala also pointed out that the selection of labour migrants was used by local authorities as a means of social control. While the GEI government set quotas for each island, it was left to the respective Island Councils to decide which individuals would go to the phosphate islands as workers. Recalcitrant persons, and especially those who had neglected to involve themselves significantly in communal works, were ruled out, and thus they and their families were effectively denied access to the material benefits of labour migration. Given the seriousness of being excluded from labour migration, Island Councils had a powerful lever with which to enforce obedience to their directives.
tended to be equated with the extent of purchases from the store. To some degree these developments were unavoidable given that the rising population imposed increased demands on local resources to the extent that shortages of imported foods brought about definite hardship. Tuvaluans were now further removed than ever from the self-sufficiency of old.

The existence of a further major migration outlet compounded these developments, which in themselves were simply the acceleration of a trend evident since the arrival of missionaries in 1865. In 1946 it was decided to develop South Tarawa as the Colony capital (Macdonald 1982:163) and increasing numbers of Tuvaluans moved north to Tarawa to take up offered jobs, seek wage labour in the evolving urban centre, and later to attend the Colony secondary school or the marine training centre. By 1963, over 700 Tuvaluans were living at Tarawa, which was equal to the number then working at Ocean Island (Munro and Bedford 1980:11). Unlike Ocean Island, the Tuvaluans at South Tarawa were employed predominantly in administrative and clerical capacities, a class of bureaucrats engaged in servicing government rather than being occupied in what might be described as directly productive activities.

The decision by Tuvaluans in 1975 to separate from the Colony, and the mass repatriation from Tarawa of Tuvaluan civil servants, represent the latest phase in the archipelago’s drift to dependence. By that time the Tuvalu islands were migration-oriented communities which depended on remittances and imports to supplement their basically subsistence livelihoods. With separation Tuvalu became aid dependent as well; the MIRAB economy was securely established. The latest Development Plan frankly concedes that ‘without aid the economy would be unable to sustain itself’ (Tuvalu 1984:26).

Post-separation pressures have altered the extent and nature of Tuvalu’s dependence, yet these changes are not divorced from the past but are part of it. Secession and independence are not a watershed but rather the latest stage in a historical continuum that can be traced back to the early decades of the nineteenth century.

The very act of separation was in itself a commitment by Tuvaluans to a deepening level of dependence. Secession has most commonly been viewed as the will of a minority group who, in defence of their cultural identity, were prepared to face the economic uncertainties of going it alone (Isala 1983:30-6; Macdonald 1975; Wilson 1978). Whilst preservation of identity was the overriding motive, separation also had a solid economic basis which some Tuvaluans fully appreciated and set out to exploit. The role of economics as well as identity has been obscured by the financial disincentives to separate, because as a condition of secession Britain deprived the newly independent state of income from Ocean Island or any GEIC assets, apart from what were already in Tuvalu, except for a single vessel from the existing fleet. The terms of separation were harsh indeed but their corollary was that Britain would have little option other than to provide substantial grant aid. This was then perceived in Tuvalu as infinitely preferable to a future as a deprived and oppressed minority should their association with the Gilbertese continue after eventual independence (Brady 1978:273).

The circumstances surrounding the birth of Tuvalu as a separate political entity inevitably accentuated dependence. Because Tuvalu had to start from scratch much initial aid was ploughed into developing the infrastructure of government. This has clearly been advantageous in terms of capital development but there are
associated difficulties. Most stem from the heavy concentration of government services and facilities at Funafuti, the seat of government, with only the agricultural station and secondary school at Vaitupu. The most visible effect is the preponderance of structures, whether houses or offices, churches or community meeting houses, that have been constructed from imported building materials. Also, the immediate need to create the infrastructure of government led to an initial neglect of economic development. The government, moreover, has concentrated on social services with high recurrent costs rather than development projects to generate money. Even when these followed, for example the tuna fishing operation (Fairbairn and Tisdell 1985:384-5), they tended to be costly to establish and maintain, and with little prospect of immediate or even any economic return.

The development of the capital has also resulted in urban migration and an upsurge of wage employment on Funafuti, fuelled largely by an influx of civil servants from outer islands, suggesting the appropriateness of a new acronym, MURAB. The government dominates the economy and is much the largest employer. In consequence the atoll's population rose by 143 per cent between 1973 and 1979, (Tuvalu 1984:36, 56) and in 1979, 67 per cent of the Funafuti population comprised in-migrants (Wit 1980:52), usually without lands and therefore effectively divorced from the subsistence economy. This inevitably contributed to a heavy dependence on imported food which, in 1983, accounted for 27 per cent of total imports of $2.9 million (Tuvalu 1984:255). Migrants to Funafuti must cope with high food and other commodity prices but also with requests for money and goods for outer island relatives. The obvious alternative, that the outer islands supply the capital with significant quantities of traditional foods, is hampered by infrequent and expensive shipping services and the lack of a market infrastructure. Other repercussions of urban migration are housing shortages and mounting unemployment. In 1979 the government, in a deliberate act to create employment, dramatically increased the public service establishment (Isala 1988). This variant of 'social security' or 'welfare' temporarily stemmed the tide, but employment opportunities are again lagging behind the number of school leavers and university graduates seeking wage labour in the capital (Tuvalu Echoes, July 1986, p.9). The government has also encouraged the development of small business enterprises on Funafuti, both to provide employment and to 'offer fiscal incentives, assist in market development, and promote the entrepreneurial and managerial skills of indigenous businessmen' (Hailey 1982:20). But such contributions are only palliatives to the exigencies of separate political status and nationhood, which have deepened rather than diminished the extent of aid-, food-, and remittance-dependence in Tuvalu.

Even in the outer islands, where the subsistence sector predominates, imported goods and foodstuffs are indispensable adjuncts to household production. A telling portent of outer island food-dependence was provided shortly before separation when the members of a touring United Nations mission received constant enquiries on the matter of continued food supplies.5 Imported food is taken for granted in the outer islands. The question of dependence is irrelevant except when supplies run out, and considerable hardship follows. Even in the outer islands goods and money, or a great deal of them, are not internally

5 Tito Isala (pers. comm., 12 Oct. 1988). Isala was then the UN mission's liaison officer and interpreter. On a later occasion acute food shortages were experienced on the outer islands after the breakdown of the sole inter-island ship.
generated but are brought from the outside. The pattern since 1820 has been to look gradually but increasingly beyond the horizon for things which have become necessary to daily life. The contemporary situation, even in the outer islands, highlights the long-standing role of external supplies in Tuvalu history.

Yet Tuvalu proclaims its desire to be self-reliant. It is an impossible dream given the small size and fragmentation of the group, its isolation, the inherent poverty of the atoll environment, the pressure of population on resources, the tiny domestic market, and the limited potential for economic development. Locally generated earnings include modest copra exports, income tax, customs duties and philatelic sales. But these are insufficient and Tuvalu's budget has only been balanced by direct contributions from Britain. Another major source of national income is the remittances from overseas workers. The current Development Plan stresses 'the importance of external employment opportunities to the Tuvalu economy' (Tuvalu 1985:37). The reasoning behind this statement is that labour migration relieves population pressure and also reduces unemployment. Nevertheless, labour migration is, as it always has been, integral to Tuvalu's dependence. Remittances sustain standards of living and raise expectations, while at the same time they depress copra production, discourage import substitution and thus contribute to continued dependence. In other words Tuvalu is experiencing the common enough paradox of deepening 'incorporation' into the world economy in order to 'disengage' from it (cf. Townsend 1980a). Labour migration and dependence are in no way alternatives but complementary. Far from solving or alleviating dependence, labour migration contributes to it; the even more unpleasant alternative would be to face intolerable pressure on resources should migration cease and overseas workers all return.

In short, labour migration is necessary not only to maintain the flow of remittances but to blunt the edge of population pressure. Yet Tuvalu's resident population is increasing. Tuvaluans have no permanent migration outlet as do many other islanders. Tuvaluan labour migration remains circulatory and Tuvaluans are confined to their archipelago except for relatively short periods abroad in education, at Nauru or on merchant vessels. With the return of Tuvaluans from the Gilberts in 1975, and from Ocean Island in 1979 following the exhaustion of phosphate, migration outlets have actually contracted and the resident population has risen from 7349 in 1979 to 8269 in 1983 (Tuvalu 1985:253).

In other ways, too, labour migration has contributed to population pressure: the family planning program is having limited success partly because 'in looking ahead to the future, parents actively hope to produce remittance earners and most feel that this necessitates having more than one son' (Chambers 1986:283). Labour migration is rarely given such prominence in people's strategies for livelihood.

Tuvalu's prospects are grim, though not as bad as they might be. The small population and the relatively small amounts involved in overseas aid mean that the group's economic problems are not so seemingly infinite as those of much larger states. A political solution is possible, perhaps through Australia or New Zealand granting immigration quotas (Connell 1985b:469). The sea bed may produce exploitable riches and the archipelago could assume greater strategic significance for which the government can demand payment. Much more important is the innovative Tuvalu Trust Fund, whereby aid donors contribute several years' financial aid to a permanent fund. With Britain's eventual agreement to
participate in 1987, a fund of A$26 million has been established and will be managed by a subsidiary of Westpac; if it is successful Tuvalu may be able to live off the interest, thus dispensing with further aid (Tuvalu Echoes, 31 Aug. 1987, p.1). Another indication that Tuvalu's stated objective of self-sufficiency may be more than rhetoric was provided in 1983 when an American, in a private capacity, offered to finance the construction of a new wing to the Princess Margaret Hospital, but the government refused the offer in view of the recurrent expenditure that would be involved (Tito Isala, pers. comm., 1986). Perhaps this is merely to put the best face on a basically bad situation for 'By any standards ... Tuvalu is in a situation of extreme dependency ... mitigated only by a remoteness that has ... imposed a degree of self-reliance and an almost involuntary maintenance of identity' (Connell 1983g:38). Thus virtue is made out of necessity, and appropriately so, given that Tuvaluans separated from the Gilbert Islands in order to preserve that identity.

There is a sense of the inevitable about Tuvalu's drift to its present level of dependence. The first real breach in the wall, so to speak, was made by missionaries who inspired a range of consumer demands necessary to Tuvaluan participation in the new religious order. Even if local resources could no longer satisfy the full range of Tuvaluan needs, at least imports and participation in the nascent cash economy were tied to domestic copra production. The breach widened after 1900 with the commencement of return labour migration to Ocean Island. Consumer demands gradually escalated, and rather than being tied to local resources were now met by cash earned elsewhere. As the century progressed historical circumstances, especially the increasing opportunities for overseas employment and the colonial government's domestic policies, deepened Tuvalu's dependence and linkages with the world economic system. Decolonization and independence brought another set of pressures which opened the floodgates and threaten to reduce Tuvalu to the standing of a 'permanent pensioner' (Macdonald 1982:267). An element of sad irony overshadows this. Tuvalu's environmental limitations and poverty of resources had the effect of mitigating the potentially damaging effects of culture contacts with the West during the nineteenth century. Smallness of scale and fragmentation also played a part, but essentially Tuvaluans were not exploited because their islands lacked exploitable resources. The environmental limitations which served Tuvaluans so well in the nineteenth century are now the major limiting factor in their belated quest for some movement towards the restoration of the self-sufficiency of old.
Over the past two decades, periodic warnings have been issued about the inevitability of a brain drain in Micronesia, namely the three new island nations that until recently have been part of the United States Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands: the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia embracing the states of Yap, Truk, Pohnpei and Kosrae (see Figure 1.1). These warnings are usually accompanied by illustrative examples of what has occurred in other Pacific islands such as Niue, the Cook Islands, American Samoa and Micronesia’s closest neighbour, Guam. These dire predictions have not only been heard by government planners in the three emerging island states but have been incorporated into their development planning. Substantial emigration is anticipated by the island governments and was deliberately provided for in their negotiations with the US government over the political status that will take effect at the conclusion of the present UN trusteeship. Emigration to the United States is seen as a necessary provision to permit run-off of excess population, which in most places is still growing at more than 3 per cent yearly, and a safety-valve in the event that plans to develop the island economically fail. Future emigration, then, far from being seen as a menace that threatens to deplete the islands’ human resources, is counted upon as an essential element in the Micronesian states’ strategy for economic and political survival.

The three island nations that, together with the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, once comprised the US-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, have opted for a status that grants them internal political autonomy while guaranteeing annual subsidies from the United States in exchange for defence rights during the initial 15-year period of Free Association with the United States. Each of the three new island nations is small, lacks resources, and has a 40-year history of living off US government subsidies. For years Micronesia’s main export has been copra, with handicraft and fish bringing in a little more money; only in the past decade has a limited tourist industry pointed to a possible alternative source of income. Overall, however, the islands’ economy remains heavily dependent on government salaries bankrolled by US
annual subsidies, and the single greatest source of income remains the 'school industry' in the form of teachers' salaries. Despite the avid talk of development of primary industries, the unspoken consensus seems to be that the new island nations will have to depend on US aid, currently scheduled to decline over the next 15-year period, to buttress their economies for the indefinite future (Connell 1987b). Even with this aid the three island nations cannot hope to provide enough employment to keep up with the demands of a rapidly increasing population. It is for this reason that Micronesian negotiators insisted on a provision in the Compact of Free Association (Title I, Article 6) that would allow Micronesians free access to the United States to live and work there indefinitely.

Emigration is no easier for Micronesians than it is for any other people. Despite their well-known fondness for travel - a trait that was documented as far back as the mid-nineteenth century when islanders signed on whaleships as deckhands much as they sign on as crew members of freighters today - they always left home with the anticipation of returning. Like other Pacific islanders, Micronesians have always had a strong 'homing instinct' due to their strong attachments to land and family. Only in very recent years have other forces begun to operate as an effective counterweight to these ties. In this chapter we review the rise of these forces since 1970, especially those relating to education and employment, through a period that has been something of a turning point in the development of the islands. We also attempt to document the beginnings of emigration from the three island nations of Micronesia. However, even more than in other parts of the Pacific, there are enormous gaps in the Micronesian population data, and we have thus been compelled to devise alternative means for estimating the numbers we lack. Although this necessarily involves some speculation the result provides a reasonable estimate of the magnitude of past and present-day emigration as well as a survey of the major factors that have contributed to it.

**Early emigration from Palau**

The first signs of emigration from Palau were apparent long before the burgeoning budgets and rapid educational expansion of the Kennedy administration. Already by 1953, only two years after the Trust Territory had been transferred from US Naval to civilian rule, there were 100 Palauans on Guam 'in quest of education, high wages and bright lights' with their own Palau Association (Solenberger 1953:7-8). Others were already beginning to move out to occupy some of the handful of government jobs available in other districts of the Trust Territory or to continue their schooling beyond intermediate school, the highest level available in Palau at that time. Emigration from Palau, beginning long before any similar movement out of other parts of the Trust Territory with the possible exception of the Northern Marianas, continued unabated until about 1972. Thereafter, the extent of emigration showed an enormous increase almost overnight as new pressures and the educational avenues to escape them began to appear (Johanek 1984).

A simple gate-count tally of figures for out-migration culled from the Trust Territory (TT) annual reports shows 1232 Palauans emigrating between 1956 and 1972 (Johanek 1984; Hezel and Levin 1987). Slightly more than 70 per cent of these had moved to other parts of the TT. Among the principal destinations were Yap, an island group close to Palau that offered opportunities for private entrepreneur-
### Table 3.1 Palauan population, 1955-72, with births, deaths, and net growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Reported births</th>
<th>Reported deaths</th>
<th>Net growth</th>
<th>Net growth + 10%</th>
<th>Net growth + 15%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>7,656</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>7,999</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
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<td>307</td>
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<td>375</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>356</td>
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<td>385</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>353</td>
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<td>334</td>
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<td>69</td>
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<td>375</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>297</td>
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<td>1970</td>
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<td>336</td>
<td>77</td>
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<td>285</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>12,686</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>66</td>
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<td>394</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The number of births minus deaths does not necessarily tally with yearly population gains, since they are from different sources. Source: Johanek (1984).

ship, and Saipan, the capital of the TT after 1960 and the site of many new government jobs. The records showed another 361 Palauans as having moved beyond the TT, presumably to Guam and the United States, with the yearly rate dropping sharply during the later 1960s as government budgets expanded and new jobs opened up in the TT. Addition of the unrecorded numbers of Palauans who left their home island before 1956, when TT gate-count figures first became available, would boost the total emigration beyond 1232. On the other hand, because of the likelihood that some of these early migrants returned to Palau for a few years before leaving again, there is a strong possibility that the 1232 figure represents a partial double count.

As a check on the gate-count figures, we can compare the data on births and deaths during the period 1956-72. The difference between the total number of births and deaths for the period should represent the natural population increase. This figure can then be compared with the recorded difference in population between 1956 and 1972 to show the net loss of population through emigration (Table 3.1). Such a computation without any adjustment yields a net loss of 416 persons, most of whom left during the final years of this period. This is clearly an undercount compared with the gate-count records and the estimated size of the Palauan community in Guam and the United States, hence some adjustment...
must be made for under-reporting of births and deaths, particularly since 55 per cent of the population of Palau were living outside Koror, the port town and district centre, even as late as 1970. An adjustment of 10 to 15 per cent for under-reporting, while low by TT standards, would keep birth and death rates within acceptable limits, and yield an average migration of between 37 and 52 persons yearly with a total of between 960 and 1231 for the entire period. The higher figure is more consistent with the results derived from the gate-count method. If we extrapolated similar rates for the earlier years 1946-56, a period during which we can be sure at least some emigration occurred, we could add another 300 migrants to give us a total of as many as 1200 ethnic Palauans who moved out of their island group.

The available data suggest that about 1000 Palauans emigrated before 1972. Allowing for intermarriage and the usual affinal additions to the Paluan households, and assuming a rather high birth rate of around 3.3 per cent per annum, the size of the Paluan overseas community could easily have doubled by the early 1970s, putting it within reach of the 2500 total estimated by McGrath (1972) as well as figures given by Kay (1974) and others. Not all these Palauans would have taken up residence in the United States; several hundred were in Guam, 500 in the Northern Marianas, and perhaps another 350 distributed throughout the rest of the Trust Territory (Connell 1983f:17).

Palauans, more than any other group in Micronesia, have always had the reputation of striving to excel and outdo others. Their society places a strong value on achievement in whatever form this may take. Hence, Palauans have from the first sought jobs with a special nomadic zeal, searching not just for work but for higher paying and more prestigious employment. Indeed, the explanations given by Palauans for leaving their island, as tabulated in the TT annual reports, indicate that the overwhelming majority left Palau for economic reasons. Most of the remainder reportedly left to join their families abroad (Johanek 1984). Evidently the ‘homing instinct’ that binds Micronesians to kin and land was offset by other considerations in the case of these early Palauan emigrants. It must not be imagined, however, that their decision to leave Palau represented the simple triumph of Western values and lifestyle over the traditional, for the competitiveness that is so deeply embedded in Paluan society was undoubtedly itself an inducement to emigration. But herein also lies the difference between Palau and the other island groups of Micronesia, for nowhere else is there the same emphasis on competitiveness and personal achievement (Alkire 1977:29ff.). If emigration can be seen as a strategy through which Palauans can pursue traditional values, the same cannot be said for the rest of Micronesia. This is probably why no other island group in the area shows evidence of emigration on anything like the Palauan scale.

Since 1972 the outflow of Palauan emigrants has become a virtual torrent. Although there are no gate-count records cited in TT annual reports for this period, the other methods that have been used above give a reasonably accurate estimate of the magnitude of this emigration. As Table 3.2 shows, the difference between all the recorded births and deaths in Palau during the years 1973-84 is a net gain of 2903 despite the fact that Palau’s resident population had only grown by 250 at the end of this period. Hence, even without making adjustments for under-reporting, there are about 2650 missing Palauans from this period: presumably emigrants to the United States, Guam and other places. This figure assumes a natural growth
Table 3.2 Palauan population, 1972-84, with births, deaths and net growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Reported births</th>
<th>Reported deaths</th>
<th>Net growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>12,673</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>..</td>
<td>396</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>285</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>321</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>12,911</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>288</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>228</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>12,172</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>12,313</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>12,514</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>12,718</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>12,925</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3735</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>2903</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- = no data available.

Source: Johanek (1964). Figures on births and deaths are corrected with recent data from the Republic of Palau Planning Office.

rate of slightly less than 2 per cent a year, much lower than the recent rates for the rest of Micronesia. Even with allowance made for the decrease in percentage of women of child-bearing age that was a consequence of emigration during previous years, this growth rate is a conservative one. It should also be noted that the population figures between 1981 and 1984, the only years showing a growth in resident population, are merely estimates. If the upward swing in population that these figures show during the past few years is unfounded - and recent estimates issued by the Palau government assume that this is so - then the number of missing Palauans would stand at well over 3000.

The recent outflow of Palauans, then, has grown to great proportions: about 240 emigrants each year. This estimate seems to be confirmed by airline travel records showing an average yearly net departure of 254 people from Palau (Johanek 1984). Hence the pattern of migration that was established in Palau as early as the 1940s has intensified greatly in recent years. Whereas there were once about fifty to sixty emigrants from Palau each year, there are now four to five times that number.

The Micronesian education explosion

It has been only since the early 1970s that large numbers of other Micronesians have begun moving back and forth across the Pacific. This movement has been triggered by the education explosion whose reverberations are still being felt throughout Micronesia. Its impact in Truk has been well documented (Hezel 1979, 1985), although no studies have been done of its effect on other parts of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) or the Marshalls.
The educational build-up throughout Micronesia began in the early 1960s with the construction of new elementary and secondary school buildings, the recruitment of American teachers, and the commitment of a much larger share of the TT's growing budgets to education and health services. By the end of that decade high school enrollments everywhere in Micronesia had soared. In Truk, perhaps the most striking example of educational expansion, the high school enrollment doubled in a single year. During the four years between 1970 and 1974 the Truk school system produced more high school graduates than were turned out during the twenty-five years of American administration up to that time, and the number of graduates began doubling every four years thereafter (Hezel 1979). The expansion in other parts of Micronesia was not nearly so dramatic, but it was nonetheless real. By the mid-1960s each of the states (then called districts) had its own public high school, and some had private high schools besides. In 1970 Palau was turning out 180 high school graduates yearly, the Marshalls about 160, and the FSM another 360 (Table 3.3). In all, roughly 700 high school graduates were being fed into the labour force each year. Some further expansion on the high school level occurred during the 1970s: Pohnpei's yearly output almost tripled, Kosrae's and Truk's doubled, and the other places showed more moderate increases. By the end of the last decade there were slightly more than 1000 high school students finishing school each year, a figure that remains about the same today.

Table 3.3 Graduating Micronesian high school students, by year of graduation, 1970-82

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Truk</th>
<th>Pohnpei</th>
<th>Kosrae</th>
<th>Yap</th>
<th>Palau</th>
<th>Marshalls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Except for 1976, these figures represent an estimate of graduates on the basis of the number of 12th grade students at the beginning of the school year.


Secondary school expansion had obvious effects on the composition of the labour force, but its greater significance may have been to precipitate the massive surge into college that began during the early 1970s. As the number of high school graduates multiplied everywhere in Micronesia, there was a growing interest in continuing studies in college abroad - partly for the adventure of being away from home and partly for the well-paid jobs that degrees would surely bring. During the 1960s no more than a handful of high school graduates went on to college, usually through scholarships or other forms of government financial assistance. By 1970 the number of Micronesians away in college had grown to over 400 (Table 3.4). Although this figure was double that of 1966, it still meant that only one out of every seven high school graduates was able to go to college.
Moreover, Palauans were disproportionately represented among Micronesian college students; they made up 40 per cent of the number of college-bound in Micronesia, even though Palau comprised only 14 per cent of the total population of Micronesia. The TT government and the local district legislatures had just about exhausted their ability to provide increasing amounts of scholarship and college loan funds to accommodate the growing number of students who wished to attend college when the US Federal government came to the rescue. As of late 1972 Micronesians were formally declared eligible for US Federal education grants aimed at enabling the economically and socially ‘disadvantaged’ to attend college. Within a year of this ruling, large numbers of those in the expanding 12th grade classrooms throughout Micronesia were filling out forms for educational grants, writing away to a plethora of small community colleges more than happy to fill empty classroom seats, and trying to scrape together enough money for their plane fare to the college of their choice. The main destination of those few Micronesians who had been fortunate enough to get to college before that time was Guam, where most lived in a ramshackle dormitory known as ‘TT Scholarship Hall’ while attending the college a few hundred metres away. Micronesians now began heading in large numbers for the nooks and crannies of Middle America to begin their college studies. The pursuit of a college education was suddenly no longer contingent on whether a young person received a scholarship, or on the academic ability shown in high school. A college education was no longer the privilege of the intellectually gifted; it had suddenly become a universal right.

Table 3.4 Micronesians studying in college, by years, 1962-85

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Truk</th>
<th>Pohnpei</th>
<th>Kosrae</th>
<th>Yap</th>
<th>Palau</th>
<th>Marshalls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>309</td>
<td></td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>159</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
(i) Figures do not include Micronesians enrolled in College of Micronesia extension program and other extension programs.
(ii) Figures for Pohnpei during early years include Kosraeans as well, since Kosrae was a part of Pohnpei District until 1977.
Sources: TT Annual Reports for 1962-74; TT Education Department list of Micronesians in college for 1979 and 1985.

After 1972 there was an escalation in the number of college students, nowhere more dramatically felt than in Truk, where the number of young people in college jumped from 49 in 1970 to over 600 in 1979. Elsewhere the patterns of growth varied from place to place. The number of Pohnpeians in college doubled between 1970 and 1974, and it has doubled again since 1979. The number of Kosraeans and Yapese attending college also doubled before 1979, but the growth rate has been much slower since then. College attendance in the Marshalls grew...
five-fold in the past decade, although it has dropped considerably since (at least if government records are accurate). In Palau, understandably enough, the rate of increase in the college student population was more modest, largely because of the relatively high rate of college attendance among Palauans during the 1960s. Notwithstanding the fact that they were well ahead of other places in educational attainment before the college boom in the 1970s, the number of college students from Palau doubled during the decade.

The surge to college reached its height in 1977 and 1978 when about 2400 Micronesians were away studying, most of them on the US mainland or in Hawaii (Harlan 1977:49). By that time about 35 per cent of all high school graduates from the Marshalls, 50 per cent of those from the FSM, and 75 per cent of Palau graduates were attending college. Overall, about half of the young men and women graduating from high school - and their number had grown greatly by this time - were continuing their studies in college. Needless to say, this posed considerable problems for economic planners and the politicians for whom they worked. What could be done to enable the new nations, then just beginning to exercise self-government, to meet the growing expectations of the college educated, who were only then starting to return to their home islands in real numbers?

New demands on a limited economy

Ironically, just as the large early waves of college-bound Micronesians were being washed upon the shores of the United States, yearly US allocations to the Trust Territory for operational expenses were close to reaching a plateau (Table 3.5). At the height of the 'diploma disease' that had infected the islands, a cut-back in the growth of jobs first appeared on the horizon. Micronesian leaders were sitting down with UN advisers to work out a development plan that would reduce the size and cost of the TT government, redirect the economy towards the private sector, and take some initial steps towards the self-reliance that has always been the avowed goal of Micronesian political leaders. Although the plans were drawn up and approved, very little was done to implement them, partly because of the fear of the social upheaval that a cutback in government employment would bring on. Continual expansion of the TT government had been the norm since the Kennedy years, and a reversal of this expansion would have been an unpalatable move just as the education explosion, itself a product of these development policies, had reached its peak. While the regular US subsidy was approaching its upper limit, other sources of US funds guaranteed further expansion of government during the 1970s. Capital improvement funds were earmarked for the construction of roads, airports, docks and other infrastructural development projects; and US Federal programs were bringing millions of dollars and hundreds of new jobs to Micronesia during this period (Table 3.5).

Thanks to these supplementary sources of funding, the TT government was able to expand the number of jobs in the public sector - and thus induce a rise in employment in the private service sector, which is almost totally dependent on government spending - right to the very end of the decade. While Palau, the Marshall Islands and two of the states of the FSM (Pohnpei and Kosrae) showed the greatest increase in jobs between 1973 and 1976, Yap and Truk marked an even greater increase during the three-year period following 1976 as a result of the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual subsidy</th>
<th>Capital improvement</th>
<th>Federal programs</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
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<td>1955</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>1956</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>115.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>124.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


proliferation of Federal Program-funded positions. Truk and Yap both experienced a sharp decline in the number of jobs immediately afterwards when most of the Federal programs were withdrawn from Micronesia. Something similar probably happened elsewhere, although there are no data available for other islands since 1979. In all, the total number of jobs in FSM more than doubled from 1970 to 1979, while in Palau and the Marshalls employment grew by an additional half to two-thirds. However, the percentage of the total labour force employed at the end of the decade was almost unchanged (Connell 1983b:10; Hezel and Levin 1987:25). The Marshalls registered virtually no
difference, while Palau's rate grew by 7 per cent only because its population remained stable throughout this period owing to heavy emigration. The FSM, which showed the greatest growth in the number of jobs, registered an increase of 7 per cent. This was the best the island nations could do, even under rather favourable economic conditions, in their race against expanding populations and educational upheaval.

Statistics on the percentage of employment among the labour force, however, are of limited usefulness in dealing with a society that has a large semi-subsistence economy. There are obvious difficulties in determining how many of the labour force are actually looking for salaried employment. One measure, although admittedly an inadequate one, is the extent to which urbanization is occurring. As Table 3.6 indicates, the rate of in-migration into town during the 1970s was pronounced in Palau, where villagers are still streaming into Koror, its port town, at a rate only slightly slower than the rate of emigration from Palau. In other words, the villagers are emptying into Koror, which in turn is sending its excess population abroad. In its proportion of urban population, the Marshalls, with its two towns of Ebeye and Majuro, approaches that of Palau, although the rate of increase has slowed down considerably in the last decade. Truk and Pohnpei, the only states in the FSM where there are clearly defined urban areas, show an intermediate rate of growth. The overwhelming migration trend throughout Micronesia has been the increasing concentration of population in the central islands, the high islands of Palau and FSM and the two atolls of Majuro and Ebeye. (Ebeye is entirely urban, Majuro almost all urban.) No country in the Pacific has a higher urban population proportion than Palau. Moreover, in most cases (except, perhaps, Yap state in FSM, and Majuro and Kwajalein), population growth rates still appear to be higher at the centre, both through natural increase and through migration, leading to high urban population densities, especially in the Marshall Islands.

Although it is not easy to translate this migration into hard data on employment and unemployment, the demand for salaried jobs is probably in direct correlation with the degree of urbanization in an island group. Hence, we must assume that during the 1970s a significantly greater part of the labour force was eager to enter the wage economy.

Table 3.6 Urbanization (percentage of population living in towns) in Micronesia, 1955-80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truk</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pohnpei</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshalls</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>59.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Micronesian Seminar (1984:8); data taken from TT Annual Reports.
Another indicator of the percentage of the labour force that is actively looking for jobs is the educational attainments of those entering the labour force. We can assume that almost all males and a fair number of females among high school graduates are hoping to find a paying full-time job. Naturally, this is even more true of those who have gone away to college. Although these young people could in theory return to the semi-subsistence rural economy to live off the bounty of land and sea, while obtaining whatever relatively small amounts of cash they might need from copra production and the like, very few of them show any preference for this sort of life. In Palau about 1800 high school graduates were produced between 1970 and 1979, while the same period saw the addition of about 1200 jobs. The numbers of both new jobs and new graduates in the Marshalls are nearly identical with those in Palau during this time. The high degree of urbanization in both places indicates that the majority of graduates remained in town and became more than just nominal members of the labour force. According to the 1980 Trust Territory Census, 33.9 per cent of all persons over the age of 25 in Palau had a high school diploma. This in itself put enormous pressure on the government to produce jobs for the recent graduates entering the labour market despite the avowed intention of leaders to cut back the size of government, as the former President of Palau once admitted in an interview (Connell 1983f:12). Only in the FSM did the number of new jobs during the 1970s exceed the number of young people who graduated from high school during the same years. Statistics show the addition of 6900 jobs, while about 2500 new graduates were turned out. The surplus of jobs left FSM in a better position to absorb these additions to its labour force, while FSM's relatively low urbanization rate made it easier for those who did not find salaried employment to accept the alternative of life in the village semi-subsistence economy.

Graduates of an earlier era had the luxury of returning to their village and finding employment as teachers in the elementary school. According to a study of Truk high school graduates (Elimo et al. 1977), 70 per cent of the graduates of 1966 were both living in their village and working for a salary, an optimal arrangement in the minds of most Trukese. Of the Truk high school graduates six years later, however, only 45 per cent were back on their home islands after completion of school. The few jobs that were available in the villages had long since been filled, and graduates were forced to move to Moen, the state capital, to find full-time employment. The inevitable result was a drift of graduates into the urban centres where jobs might be found.

The woefully stagnant state of the village economy and its consequences for residence patterns can be illustrated by a look at two small communities in different parts of the FSM. The first is the island of Paata, a municipality at the extreme western side of Truk lagoon with a population of about 700. In 1973 there were only twelve high school graduates from Paata, all of them employed and ten of them living on or near their home island (Hezel 1985:8). By 1978 the number of graduates had tripled to thirty-six, with thirteen of them employed, all but two of them working either in the village school or as health aides. Another eight lived on their island and were unemployed. In 1984 the number of Paata graduates had risen to seventy, with thirty-nine of them living on their own island. Only seventeen of these were employed, and the modest increase of four jobs was due to the opening of a school annexe and the funding of a new pre-elementary school program. Overall, then, the number of Paata high school graduates had multiplied...
from twelve to seventy, while the number of these working for a salary on that island rose only from ten to seventeen, with all but two employed in education. The spill-over of Paata youth to Moen totalled thirteen by 1984; it would no doubt have been much higher but for the fact that no jobs were to be found on Moen either by this time.

Eauripik, a tiny coral island in Yap State far from the commercial centre and capital, furnishes another example of the economic limits of the rural economy in Micronesia. Although the male population has a remarkable success rate in education - fifty-two out of sixty young men have graduated from high school - the only salaried positions on the island are those of two teachers and a health aide (Levin 1976). Since 1950 the graduates have begun leaving their island to take up residence where job opportunities are more abundant; only fourteen of the high school graduates now live on Eauripik. All but a few of the remainder were dispersed throughout the FSM, most of them employed as nurses or health aids, mechanics, sailors or radio operators. Only three had left the area altogether, one to work on Tinian in the Northern Marianas as a cowboy and another two to join the US Navy in California.

The search for employment consequently underlies migration moves. The possibilities of employment underlie more apparently casual motivations whilst movement for education is a precursor to employment. Moreover many migrants are the relatives of those who have found work, but are not themselves working. In FSM, as elsewhere in Micronesia:

as people come to the district centers, they come hoping for a government job — if not for themselves, then for their newly half-educated children. For here government is not the employer of last resort, but of first resort ... working in business ... is considered demeaning, while working for government is seen as prestigious. The salary scale reinforces this attitude. Government salaries are pegged at U.S. levels (Nevin 1977:32).

It is not, however, just a movement of workers and the most fertile group of the population (who may then reproduce overseas) but it is also an internal brain drain of the skilled and talented (Marshall 1979:10). Out-migration has increased the dependency ratio of atolls and has resulted in a labour shortage for some activities, including fishing. Atolls are increasingly becoming places of 'vacation homes' so that, for example, the atoll of Namoluk 'may be described quite accurately as a combination “old folk’s home” and “day care centre”' (Marshall 1979:3). The burdens of dependency for the remaining workers are thus very great.

Given the economic sluggishness of the villages, whether on high islands or coral atolls, graduates throughout the 1970s were faced with the choice of either returning to the bosom of their family and friends, where they could utilize local resources to help support themselves, or of striking out for the town in search of a job. Everywhere in the FSM there is strong evidence that, confronted with such a choice, most graduates would willingly move to town and take a job. These circumstances, of course, were responsible for much of the internal migration within the islands and the growing urbanization during the past decade. As jobs became unavailable to graduates even in the towns, from the late 1970s, however, Trukese showed a tendency to return to their villages to fish and work on the land rather than remain in town unemployed (Hezel 1979). While this may have been largely true also of Pohnpei, Kosrae and at least Yap proper (in contrast to the
outer islands), this was certainly not the case in Palau where there has been no perceptible back-migration to the villages. Instead, the young who could not find jobs appear to have left Palau altogether. In the Marshalls, on the other hand, high school graduates who cannot find employment in the towns seem to return to their home island. Such at least may be inferred from population data in the 1980 Census, which shows no more than normal growth rates for the towns of Ebeye and Majuro.

**After the boom years**

By the end of the 1970s, with the island economies groaning under the weight of the great influx of educated young Micronesians in the job market, the period of retrenchment began in earnest. Following self-government in the three Micronesian entities in 1978, strict budget ceilings were imposed on annual US grants and several Federal Programs that had formerly employed hundreds of Micronesians were terminated in order to prepare the new nations for the budgetary constraints of Free Association. Although funding for Capital Improvement Projects actually increased, this money was spent on new construction and there were relatively few Micronesians who were direct beneficiaries, least of all the high school graduates and returning college students who aspired to white-collar employment.

Employment figures for 1982 reflect the cutback in US funding. Of the states in the FSM, Truk and Yap suffered the severest drops in employment with a loss of 32 and 27 per cent respectively of their 1979 level jobs. Only in Pohnpei was there a continuing growth in employment, largely due to the transfer of the FSM capital to that island in the late 1970s. Overall, the FSM experienced a loss of more than 1700 jobs during the period 1979-82, while about 1800 recent graduates, half of them with some college education, entered the labour force. This was very bad news for the latest crop of school finishers, who had expected that their diploma would entitle them to a salary as it had for so many before them. In fact, however, only 35 per cent of the most recent Trukese graduates had managed to find steady employment by the time that a 1984 survey was conducted (Hezel 1985). This was in sharp contrast to the 51 per cent employment rate among the 1972-77 graduates recorded in a 1978 survey (Hezel 1979).

Although the Marshalls registered a slight increase (by twenty-five) in jobs in 1982, it faced much the same problem as the FSM. Figures cited by Connell (1983e:9) show a gain of 300 jobs between 1979 and 1982 for an increase of 100 jobs each year. Even granted the limited accuracy of these figures, the situation was still little better than in the FSM, for entering the labour force each year were 500 young Marshallese, 200 of them with a high school diploma and half of these with two or more years of college. There are no data available on the 1982 employment level in Palau, but the number of jobs could only have risen slightly, if at all. The answer to this impasse may have once been to pad the government payrolls and create new jobs, but such measures were now impossible with the reduced budgets.

The new crop of graduates and their parents were quick to grasp the situation. The euphoria that was everywhere during the 1970s began to dissipate as students and their parents came to realize that employment was no longer the sure reward of twelve years of schooling. It was bad enough that so many of the high school graduates were unemployed, but even worse when some of the returnees
from college could not find jobs and had to retreat to their villages to fish and pound breadfruit. For most Micronesian parents schooling had represented an investment that would pay generous dividends when their children qualified for a salaried job and provided security for them. Although there were other gains to be had from education, of course, this was seen as the dominant one, particularly by those people who themselves had never gone to school. The result was a fall-off in high school enrolments, the first decline of any real duration since the inception of the American education system in Micronesia in the late 1940s. Almost everywhere in Micronesia the numbers of young people graduating from high school dropped, as Table 3.3 indicates. By 1982 a 12 per cent fall-off in the number of graduates had occurred.

The tide of young Micronesians going off to college was also beginning to ebb at about this time. In Truk, where a few years earlier roughly 65 per cent of the newest crop of high school graduates were leaving for college, only 44 per cent were now college-bound (Hezel 1985). A recent survey of Micronesians studying in college abroad shows that their number has dropped considerably from the peak of 2400 in college in 1978. The number of college-bound in the Marshalls fell most sharply, by about half, between 1979 and 1985. Palau also showed a

Table 3.7 Destinations of Micronesian students in college, 1974 and 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Truk</th>
<th>Pohnpei</th>
<th>Kosrae</th>
<th>Yap</th>
<th>Palau</th>
<th>Marshalls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1974</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>100 (42)</td>
<td>110 (50)</td>
<td>57 (40)</td>
<td>144 (47)</td>
<td>57 (36)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>62 (26)</td>
<td>51 (23)</td>
<td>32 (23)</td>
<td>116 (37)</td>
<td>22 (14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM-MOC</td>
<td>56 (24)</td>
<td>45 (21)</td>
<td>46 (33)</td>
<td>28 (9)</td>
<td>71 (45)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>19 (8)</td>
<td>12 (6)</td>
<td>6 (4)</td>
<td>21 (7)</td>
<td>7 (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>157</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **1985** |      |         |        |       |       |           |
| US     | 199 (38) | 183 (35) | 33 (20) | 60 (33) | 205 (46) | 91 (51)   |
| Guam   | 249 (47) | 117 (23) | 9* (5)  | 48 (27) | 127 (29) | 2(1)      |
| CCM-MOC | 79 (15) | 219 (42) | 123 (75) | 71 (40) | 109 (25) | 85 (48)   |
| Total  | 527     | 519      | 165     | 179     | 441     | 178       |

* This figure does not include Kosraeans attending University of Guam.

Notes: (i) Numbers in parentheses indicate percentage of students in each location; (ii) figures for Pohnpei in 1974 include Kosraeans as well.

decrease, as did Truk and Kosrae. Only in Pohnpei and Yap did college attendance continue to rise. The reason for the fall-off in numbers may be partly the growing disillusionment - some would say a growing sense of realism - about future job prospects, but there are more immediate financial concerns that help to explain it. Rising costs of air travel and college tuition are putting college beyond the means of many young people, even with the Federal assistance that Micronesian students now receive and will be eligible to receive through the first three years of the implementation of the Compact of Free Association. If college is seen by many as an investment, then the rising premiums together with the growing uncertainty about the dividends have discouraged many from risking their money on a college venture.

There are other indications that the escalating expense of a college education is having an impact on the education picture in Micronesia. Just as the early 1970s saw a shift of young Micronesians away from Guam towards Hawaiian and mainland US schools, the early 1980s have witnessed a swing back to colleges closer at hand. Table 3.7 compares the destination of college-bound Micronesians in 1974 with the location of students who were abroad in 1985. It shows a pronounced movement in recent years away from more distant sites in the United States, with an increasing percentage of college students enrolled at either the Community College of Micronesia (CCM) on Pohnpei or the Micronesian Occupational College (MOC) in Palau. Almost 700 students are now enrolled at MOC and CCM, nearly as many as the number of Micronesians studying in the United States. The percentage of Micronesian college students in the United States has dropped from 44 to 38 per cent, despite the large increase in absolute numbers. Only Palau and the Marshalls fail to show a significant shift away from US colleges, although each probably for a different reason. The Marshalls is almost as close to Hawaii in terms of travel costs as it is to Pohnpei, and a flight to Hawaii is much cheaper than the airfare to Guam. Hence, the Marshalls' strongest links are with Hawaii, in education as in everything else. As for Palau, its youth continue to use colleges in the United States as staging areas for long-term or permanent emigration. Although travel is expensive, there are well-established Palauan enclaves in many parts of the United States as a result of earlier emigration and these afford Palauan college students moral support and sometimes lodging and financial help.

With the expansion of CCM and MOC, separate facilities that, together with a small nursing school, comprise the College of Micronesia, an extension program has been established in each of the states of the FSM and Palau and the Marshalls. Several hundred Micronesians are also enrolled in the College of Micronesia extension programs, with still more registered in additional programs run by such institutions as the University of Guam, East Oregon State College, and San Jose State College. Although the extension programs are becoming an increasingly prominent part of the educational landscape in all of the islands, they are excluded here because they serve an altogether different clientele. Those enrolled in the extension programs are not recent high school graduates on the verge of entering the labour force, but almost entirely government employees, largely teachers, who are working for a diploma to upgrade their credentials. Thus, the extension programs do not serve as a conduit for students into the ranks of the employed, but rather as a device for permitting veteran employees to retain their positions.
Emigration today and tomorrow

One of the most celebrated side-effects of schooling may be to engender the hope for a regular income and the other things that go to make up the 'good life', yet the state of the economy in Micronesia guarantees that these hopes will be dashed for the majority of school-leavers today. Although over 600 young graduates, to say nothing of the others without a high school education, are entering the labour force in the FSM each year, there are a mere handful of jobs to be shared out to the newcomers. The Marshall Islands is in no better shape. Over 200 graduates are counted among the 500 who enter the job market yearly to compete for fewer than 100 salaried jobs - and these jobs include such marginal occupations as driving a taxi or doing yard work. Palau has solved the problem of the job shortage by the emigration of more than 200 people each year to make their fortunes elsewhere. Micronesians are quick to adapt to new situations and they have made adjustments to cope better with the scarcity of jobs in recent years. The decline in school enrolments and in the numbers of college-bound can be seen as one response to this situation. Another is the relative ease and grace with which most of the unemployed school-leavers have settled back into their rural communities and taken up the customary routine. Clearly there are other important motivating forces in their lives besides a place on the payroll.

Nonetheless, employment is bound to be a continuing concern for young Micronesians, particularly those who advance through high school or college, and there is little reason to expect any radical changes in the extent or nature of the educational system that inevitably nurtures such expectations. At present, a small but significant number of young men and women have begun looking beyond their islands for employment, even at the cost of leaving land and kin. In a recent survey of all Trukese high school graduates, 242 were found to be settled outside Truk (Hezel 1985). This represents 9 per cent of the 2835 graduates not in studies, double the percentage living abroad identified in a similar study six years earlier (Hezel 1979). Nearly half of these are living in Pohnpei or elsewhere in the FSM, most of them either employed by the FSM government or with spouses who work for the government. They cannot be considered a part of the brain drain in any sense, for they remain with the government employment system that binds Truk to other parts of Micronesia. The others include 38 living on Saipan, many of them working in the private sector, 22 on Guam, 69 in the United States, and 8 others living in such distant places as Canada, Japan, Fiji, Nauru and Switzerland. If we subtract those working in government or other official positions, we are left with 115 Trukese who can be regarded as genuine emigrants, many of whom originally left to attend college and have lived abroad for as long as ten or twelve years. In the last year or two a number of others have left for Tinian or Saipan in the Northern Marianas to look for work in the garment factories, the tourist industry or on the fishing boats. If we take these into account and add in those who are not high school graduates, we could have a total of 200-250 Trukese emigrants. That estimate would represent merely 0.5 per cent of the total Trukese population, hardly a cause for alarm if it were not for the fact that this trickle has begun only within the last six to eight years.

Although we lack the data to make any but the wildest guesses about the extent of overall emigration from the other states of the FSM, 1980 US Census statistics furnish us with the means of estimating the number of Micronesians
who are living in the United States (Levin 1984). The census tables on Pacific islanders in the United States, based on sample tabulations, give a count of Micronesians on the basis of general ethnicity, birthplace and language spoken at home (Table 3.8). According to the breakdown by birthplace and the number of languages spoken, the number of Trukese living in the United States is put at a little more than 500, including the 400 studying in college at the time. The number of Pohnpeians enumerated under these two headings averaged roughly 400, with perhaps half of these still students. Kosrae had about 100 persons residing in the United States at the time of the census (if we discount the impossibly high figure of 1239 Kosraean language speakers as an error), and all but a handful of these would have been attending college. The count of Yapese residing in the United States is more problematic, since there are 371 listed by birthplace and 687 by language spoken. Subtracting the 100 or so students among them, we are left with a group of residents that may number between 250 and 550. The great majority of these would seem to be outer island Yapese, according to the language sub-classification given in the census data. In summary, then, the US Census figures suggest a total FSM emigration (whether short-term or permanent) of approximately 600-900 non-students: 100 Trukese, 200 Pohnpeians, no more than 50 Kosraeans, and 250-550 Yapese.

At first sight the Marshallese figures are more confusing because of the discrepancy between the large number listed by birthplace (1197) and the more plausible figure assigned by language spoken (511). The high figure for birthplace is probably due to the number of Caucasian dependants born on Kwajalein to American families employed there, hence the number of Marshallese living in the United States is probably about 500. Allowing for a student population of about 300 at that time, we can estimate the size of the emigrant population in the United States at perhaps 200. There is already a medium-sized Marshallese community in Costa Mesa, California, and one or two smaller settlements in the making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Number by birthplace</th>
<th>Number by language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truk</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pohnpei</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosrae</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>1239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yap</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yapese</td>
<td></td>
<td>(161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer islands</td>
<td></td>
<td>(526)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshalls</td>
<td>1197</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>1003</td>
<td>1027</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Palauan population in the United States is enumerated at slightly more than 1000, according to the figures on birthplace and language spoken. Nearly 300 of these were college students. The remaining 700 may be an undercount, perhaps representing only half the actual size of the Palauan population in the United States, if we judge from the heavy emigration during the 1970s. Extrapolations from voter counts during a 1983 plebiscite put the Palauan population in the United States at between 1000 and 1500 (Schwalbenberg 1984). In addition to the Palauans living in the United States, there are at least 1500 and probably closer to 2000 residing on Guam, with another 1000 distributed throughout Micronesia.

However imprecise our estimates of the magnitude of emigration may be, one conclusion is inescapable: the brain drain has begun. Aside from the 4000-5000 Palauans who have left their island home over the course of the last forty years, relatively small numbers of Micronesians from other island groups have begun in recent years to take up residence in the United States, Guam and the Marianas. Their number is uncertain: perhaps as many as 1500 from all parts of the FSM and another 200 from the Marshalls. In all likelihood, few of these packed their bags and departed with the intention of remaining away until death or disaster befall them. If the Truk emigrants described in the survey are typical, most originally left to attend school or possibly for some other reason, remaining afterwards when a steady job was found or when they could not get together the money for their return plane ticket. Many simply drifted into a prolonged stay abroad. Many do claim they will return to their home island some time in the future, but for a good number this will be a relatively short visit to see friends and family before returning to the United States.

There is every reason to believe that the trickle of emigrants will increase considerably in the near future. With free migration into the United States and its territories permitted under the Compact of Free Association, Micronesians who are out of college will no longer be obliged to dodge US Immigration officials as they must today. Unless the island nations of Micronesia are somehow able to turn around their economies and create hundreds of new jobs without the assistance of higher levels of US aid, there is a good chance that more young people will elect to leave home and pursue jobs, wherever they are to be found. That possibility is envisaged and welcomed by Micronesian leaders, who can find no workable solution for the chronic lack of employment in their islands. It was also foreseen by the authors of the Solomon Report in 1963 when they predicted that 'in the long run ... certain inflexible economic limitations of the area and the increasing population pressure must eventually compel substantial emigration of Micronesians' (Solomon 1963, cited in Schwalbenberg 1981). It does not seem that they will be proved wrong.

It is most unlikely, because of the structure of the Micronesian economies, that these new states will be able to generate economic growth of such an order that they will be able to compensate for the declining levels of funding outlined in the Compact of Free Association. Indeed it is very doubtful if there will be any significant economic growth, and certainly not of the necessary order of 10 per cent per year over a lengthy period. There is therefore likely to be a crisis of some kind during the Compact period, which is likely to lead to either increased US aid, more diversified aid or more extensive out-migration. Development is shaped in the context of an American free enterprise system (without guidance or
direction) and an overdeveloped legal system, that combine to remove local initiative and responsibility, within a democratic system, where decisions are made by a few in terms of short-term goals, with a largely uninformed public. Economic development and employment creation in Micronesia face gloomy prospects. Marshall (1979:10-11) has suggested that eventually Micronesian residents of the United States may outnumber 'the folks back home', a situation that already exists in Niue and the Cook Islands. Moreover, even to attempt to retain skilled Micronesians in Micronesia may necessitate providing salaries at close to US levels, for a small number, and hence enormous disparities between their incomes and those of other Micronesians (Schwalbenberg 1982:31). The alternative is to enable returning migrants, like the Trukese graduates, to find an environment in their home islands where a satisfactory economic and social development is possible. This will not be easy, especially at prevailing population growth rates, and policies contemplated to reduce the brain and skill drain (Connell 1983b:48) and increase self-reliance appear unlikely to be successful.
CHAPTER 4

Cook Island remittances

*Volumes, determinants and uses*

TERRY LOOMIS

Where contacts between migrants and homelands continue over time, remittances have long been an important focus of social scientific research (cf. Manners 1965; Philpott 1968, 1973). The reasons for these continuing contacts, and their effects on homeland economic development are, however, seldom obvious or simple. In a review of research on migration and remittances in the Pacific, Connell (1980a) identified three issues of interest to academics and policy makers alike: the extent and scale of remittances, the determinants of these flows, and the use made of remittances. Connell found major data limitations to the study of remittances; remittance figures were often no more than crude estimates, and important aspects of remitting were ignored. Findings of different studies were often contradictory, and general conclusions difficult to make.

Cook Islanders have been migrating to New Zealand in increasing numbers since World War II. Unlike many Pacific migrants, they are citizens of New Zealand and thus have unrestricted right of entry. There are now more Cook Islanders resident in New Zealand (25,000) than in the islands (19,500), a function of limited social and economic opportunities, particularly in the smaller islands. The Cook Islands are one of the few Pacific nations where several studies have included some investigation of remittances, hence there is now sufficient information to address the issues raised by Connell, and to identify trends in remittance volumes and their use. The following discussion is based on fieldwork in New Zealand and the Cook Islands during 1985 and early 1986. Among other issues, treating remittances as 'value transfers' permitted reassessment of analyses by Hayes (1982) and Bertram and Watters (1984) of the volume and significance of remittances for the Cook Islands. Several general conclusions

* Research for this chapter and other studies was made possible by grants from the New Zealand Social Sciences Research Fund Committee and the Department of Foreign Affairs. Fieldwork included a stratified sample survey of 111 respondents in New Zealand; comparisons with a similar survey of 208 individuals in 1981; structured interviews in villages on Rarotonga, Aitutaki and Mauke islands; a series of three interviews each with fifteen case study households in New Zealand and the islands; and participant observation. Details are available in Appendix A of Loomis (1986).
are suggested which invite further comparative research among other Pacific migrant groups.

The volume of Cook Islands remittances

Estimating total remittance values. Problems in measuring the volume and value of remittances can arise from particular definitions of remittances. In the following discussion remittances are broadly considered to be any form of value transfer by migrant individuals or groups back to kin, friends, or organizations in their self-identified land of origin. Such a definition avoids prejudging questions of motivation and purpose, or structural factors underlying these value transfers. Among Cook Islanders, remittances are comprised of postal money orders, cash sent or taken, goods and gifts sent or brought back during a holiday, services (e.g. equipment repairs, airfares, education costs, costs of kin visits, telephone calls), investment in small business or housing, donations to tere parties (fund-raising cultural troupes), and organized donations in New Zealand for projects in the islands (e.g. churches, community halls).

Hayes (1982) and Bertram and Watters (1984) have attempted to estimate total remittance flows in relation to issues of Cook Islands development. Both studies are based essentially on secondary data. Hayes used the annual value of New Zealand postal money orders cashed in the islands as his starting point. He then estimated cash transfers other than postal orders, and the value of goods and services, using as the basis of his calculation a New Zealand Labour Department survey (Research and Planning Division 1979) of Pacific island migrants in the Wellington area. Since his subsequent estimates and those of Bertram and Watters rely heavily on the Labour Department survey, it bears closer scrutiny. The survey included 353 Pacific islanders, all born overseas and all over the age of 18. Respondents were selected from among Council housing lists, church and association memberships, and individuals known personally to ethnic community leaders. This is one of the few ways of generating a reasonably large listing of Pacific island migrants, but it does not result in a completely random sample. The inbuilt biases must be borne in mind in subsequent analysis. For example, the survey excluded persons born and raised in New Zealand, was biased towards those who were active either in formal ethnic organizations or in the personal networks of community leaders, and ‘adults’ were defined as anyone 18 and over. Findings were based on respondents’ own estimates as reported to ‘respected community members’ (Research and Planning Division 1979:124). In the status and reciprocity system in which most migrants participate there may be a tendency to inflate estimates of assistance, particularly if the interviewer is a community leader. The cumulative effect of these inbuilt biases probably led to an over-estimation of remittances.

By accepting at face value a study possibly biased towards high levels of remitting, Hayes and Bertram and Watters began their calculations of total remittances on shaky ground, although both studies were aware of the data limitations. Calculations of Cook Islands remittances by the present author took account of a number of obvious biases in sample population selection (Loomis 1986: Appendix A), included a 25 per cent reduction ratio for informant over-estimation, and compared findings with three previous surveys (Hooper 1961; Curson 1973b; and Loomis 1984). Hayes proceeded to multiply per capita cash
remittances of Cook Islanders in the Wellington survey by the number of economically active islands-born adults in New Zealand to arrive at total cash remitted. He found that cash transfers were 48 per cent above the official postal order receipts, and estimated that non-postal order cash flows increased incrementally from zero to around 48 per cent between 1971 and 1979. Hooper (1961) found that Cook Islanders remitted an average of NZ$50.79 per person. Curson (1973b) estimated, in a 1966 survey, that remittances averaged NZ$179.40 per person. On the basis of postal money orders at the time, 28 per cent of this amount was actual cash transferred by mail or person. Cash remittances recorded in my 1985 survey averaged NZ$337 per person, 5 per cent greater than the amount in postal orders. Respondents had visited the islands less than once per person, and only 10.5 per cent of remitters stated that they had taken cash back to give to someone the previous year.

From these findings, it appears that Hayes's calculation of non-postal order cash between 1971 and 1979 overstates the amount of unrecorded cash sent or taken back, and understates the amount sent before that period. Hence, by retaining Hayes's estimate of 48 per cent after 1981, Bertram and Watters may have compounded the problem of over-estimating unofficial cash transfers. An alternative, based on previous research, was to assume that since 1966 there had been an average of 10 per cent non-money order cash remittances.

The value of gifts, goods and services in the Wellington Labour Department survey was 60 per cent of the total cash remitted. My 1985 survey resulted in a figure close to 30 per cent. Unlike the Wellington survey, my questionnaire allowed respondents time to recall the details of their remittance practices during the previous year. I also had access to corroborating evidence from fifteen case study households and my previous 1981 survey. The 30 per cent figure seems to be more accurate, and has been used in recalculating the Hayes and Bertram and Watters remittance estimates (see Table 4.1).

The practice of churches and community associations raising funds for projects in the islands was noted by Hooper in the 1950s and Curson in the 1960s. Hayes and Bertram and Watters mention that similar projects still occur in the 1980s, along with fund raising by visiting tere parties. Neither quantify the contribution which these sources make to annual remittances. Respondents in my 1985 survey contributed an average 35 per cent more than the value of their cash and in-kind remittances to islands projects and visiting tere parties. This proportion is probably higher than in earlier years. There has been a substantial influx of migrants over the past decade, and the ethnic community in New Zealand has increased in organizational complexity. Inter-group competition in fund raising has become more intense. I have estimated, therefore, that organized donations to islands projects and to visiting tere parties have increased incrementally since the mid-1960s. As a test, I checked the 1981 fieldwork records of contributions of visiting tere parties and islands projects and found the total to have been about NZ$500,000. This figure corresponds quite closely with what one might expect, based on a 30 per cent incremental ratio of organized donations to cash remittances for that year (Table 4.1).

As a check for accuracy, I used the same 1981 Development Plan estimate as Bertram and Watters (1984:167). The Plan anticipated cash remittances in 1981 of NZ$2344 million, compared with the Bertram and Watters figure of NZ$2699 million (adjusted to 1982 dollars) and my NZ$1828 million. The Development
Table 4.1  **Total value remitted by Cook Islanders in New Zealand, 1966-84 (NZ$'000)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar year</th>
<th>Money order transfers</th>
<th>Hayes cash transfers</th>
<th>Revised cash transfers</th>
<th>Hayes cash + in-kind</th>
<th>Revised cash + in-kind</th>
<th>Hayes remittances + donations</th>
<th>Revised total remittances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>584</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>1218</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>1462</td>
<td>1145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
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<td>936</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>1497</td>
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<td>1796</td>
<td>1398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>1331</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>1664</td>
<td>1199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>1122</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>1796</td>
<td>1243</td>
<td>2245</td>
<td>1554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>1239</td>
<td>1010</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1313</td>
<td>2478</td>
<td>1641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>1285</td>
<td>1002</td>
<td>2056</td>
<td>1303</td>
<td>2570</td>
<td>1629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1106</td>
<td>1632</td>
<td>1217</td>
<td>2636</td>
<td>1582</td>
<td>3295</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1120</td>
<td>1658</td>
<td>1232</td>
<td>2653</td>
<td>1602</td>
<td>3449</td>
<td>2083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1662</td>
<td>2459</td>
<td>1828</td>
<td>3947</td>
<td>2377</td>
<td>5114</td>
<td>3090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1782</td>
<td>2637</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4219</td>
<td>2548</td>
<td>5485</td>
<td>3312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1955</td>
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<td>4629</td>
<td>2796</td>
<td>6018</td>
<td>3635</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1784</td>
<td>2640</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>4224</td>
<td>2551</td>
<td>5702</td>
<td>3444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**


Col. 3: Re-calculation of col. 2 based on estimates of constant non-money order cash ratio annually of 1.10, rather than Hayes's figure of 0 prior to 1971, then incremental increases to 1.48 in 1979.

Col. 4: 1966-83 from Bertram and Watters (1984: Table 6.12, p.168) using Hayes's procedure. 1984 calculated using Hayes's ratio of 1.60 for in-kind remittances above total cash sent.

Col. 5: Re-calculation of col. 4 based on estimate of half the level of in-kind remittances (130) of Hayes and Bertram and Watters.


Col. 7: Computation of total remittances based on col. 5, using same procedure as for col. 6.

Plan figure was based on a survey of money orders, cheque transfers through the National Bank, and cash sent through the mail. The Bertram and Watters figure does not include donations for tere parties and village projects, some of which would also have been overlooked in the Development Plan survey. Adding 30 per cent for 1981 donations to the Bertram and Watters figure (NZ$3509 million) puts it considerably above the Development Plan estimate. When the 30 per cent ratio of donations from the 1985 survey is applied to the revised cash estimate for 1981 and adjusted to 1982 dollars, the result (NZ$2614 million) is much closer to
the Development Plan, since the Plan used net rather than gross money-order transfers. Bertram and Watters also fail to take into account erosion in the value of remittances due to inflation. Since 1975, when overseas migrants remitted NZ$1199 million, inflation in the Cook Islands has averaged close to 140 per cent (Cook Islands Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, September 1984:ii). Remittances are now worth some 140 per cent less in constant dollar terms than a decade ago. In other words Cook Islanders in New Zealand would have had to send back NZ$8571 million in 1983 instead of the NZ$3635 million they actually sent in order to make the same relative contribution to the islands economy that they did in 1975.

When total remittances are broken down into primary components - cash transfers, in-kind goods and services, and organized donations to projects and tere parties - the pattern becomes even clearer (Figure 4.1). Cash transfers have consistently been the largest component of remittances. As a proportion of total remittances, they grew substantially during the early 1980s but more recently (until at least 1987) they have shown a downturn. Goods in kind have risen gradually, but organized donations only 'took off' during the late 1970s. The fact that this trend continued when cash transfers declined deserves comment. First, financial records of tere parties to New Zealand between 1976 and 1984 indicate that this form of organized remitting became increasingly important over the decade, transferring close to half a million dollars back in 1983 (Loomis 1986:90). Then in 1984, the Kumiti Akaare Tere (Tere Party Enablement Committee), comprised of New Zealand church elders, responded to complaints that contributions were becoming a burden by declaring a five-year moratorium on tere parties to New Zealand. The results were immediately noticeable in 1984, with tere party donations declining by two-thirds in 1984 alone. This drop was partially offset by more fund-raising events in New Zealand for islands projects, as well as an increase in the number of groups travelling to the islands to make donations, for such projects as new village halls. At the end of 1987 the moratorium was lifted at least temporarily, when a group from Penrhyn came with the intention of raising NZ$70,000 and left with NZ$130,000 plus some goods. Organized remittances also appear to have remained constant in Figure 4.1 because of the greater percentage of survey respondents who were active in community organizations, and whose donations to islands projects tended to be higher than average. It seems likely that organized remittances actually declined in a similar fashion to cash and goods.

The calculation of total Cook Islands remittances above does not include the value of transfers from Australia. Several hundred Cook Islanders now reside permanently in Sydney and Melbourne. Nevertheless, total postal orders from Australia in 1985 were worth around A$50,000, an average of only $116 per money order. Cook Islanders interviewed in both countries suggested that people often went to Australia to escape the burden of the reciprocal obligations operative in the migrant community in New Zealand.

Another input not included in my estimate of total remittances was gifts and donations brought by migrants holidaying in the islands. Milne (1985) found that overseas Cook Islanders stayed an average of twenty-three days and brought a total of NZ$289.30 per person to the Cook Islands economy in 1985. However, since 'value transfers' as defined by economists do not include visitor spending, only gifts of cash and goods can technically be classified as remittances. The
average returning Cook Islander brought gifts of NZ$47 in cash and NZ$25 worth of goods. If the level of visiting by Cook Islanders has remained constant since 1983, as it appears to have done (Cook Islands Statistics Bulletin), then visiting Cook Islanders contributed NZ$87,120 to the economy in 1985. In the 1981 and 1985 surveys, slightly more than half the respondents stated they had visited the islands the previous year. The number of people who had made several visits since emigrating actually increased in the 1985 survey, although there was a similarly low rate of islands visiting by young people. Reciprocal visiting, in other words, is being maintained by older persons who have been in New Zealand longer. While levels of circular or reciprocal visiting for the moment remain high, they will undoubtedly decline as the emerging generation of New Zealand-born Cook Islanders matures.

Determinants of remittances

Migrants are influenced in their choices about returning or remitting by a variety of factors, including their position in the social order, ethnic community sanctions, and personal preferences. The following discussion examines whether Cook Islanders send remittances as an 'investment', and the influence of wider structural determinants on remittance behaviour.

Remittances as an investment. Macpherson (1985:242) criticizes the idea of homeland 'sociopolitical investment' as erroneously imputing self-interest to migrant motives. But the notion of investment does not necessarily imply selfishness or rational calculation for personal gain. Stark (1978; cf. Connell 1980a) proposes an investment model which links the remittances an individual sends,
his home ‘commitment’ and the length of time away. According to Stark, remittances will initially be high but decline over time, increasing occasionally in response to specific needs in the home district. Eventually they will cease unless the migrant decides to return permanently, in which case they will again increase.

The 1981 and 1985 Cook Islands surveys permit a practical test of the Stark commitment/investment model. Considering the incidence of remitting by length of residence in New Zealand (Table 4.2), there is no evidence that the frequency of remitting declines over time. However, the two surveys do confirm high levels of remitting by recent arrivals. These individuals are more likely to have current debts and obligations to meet, and the need for closer homeland communication for a period. The 1985 survey also found that recent migrants sent higher amounts on average than other respondents. Over 70 per cent of those who had arrived in New Zealand during the previous four years had sent back NZ$100 or more, versus 46 per cent for arrivals between 1970 and 1979, 48 per cent for arrivals between 1960 and 1969 and 67 per cent for arrivals before 1960. In fact, the proportion of those remitting large cash amounts was similar for earliest and most recent migrant cohorts. In contrast, those born and raised in New Zealand remitted the lowest amounts.

Table 4.2 Remittances by length of residence in New Zealand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of Residence</th>
<th>1981 Survey</th>
<th>1985 Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remitted</td>
<td>No remittance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-59</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-69</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-79</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>63.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980+</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ-born</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Stark hypothesized that the amount of remittances would suddenly increase if a migrant anticipated a permanent return. However, the 1985 survey findings show that a larger proportion (65 per cent) of those who were not planning to return remitted NZ$500, or more than those who were planning a permanent return (35 per cent). The $500 cut-off point was chosen to rule out the many ‘symbolic’ $100 contributions sent annually by individuals. If these are included in the calculation, there is still an equivalent level of cash remitted by those returning and not returning. The Cook Islands findings do not therefore confirm Stark’s prediction that remittances decline the longer a migrant is away. Survey results also challenge Stark’s hypothesis that those planning a permanent return will ‘invest’ high levels of remittances before their trip.

Data were not gathered on remittance histories, so it is impossible to determine whether individual respondents had changed the extent of their remittances over time. However, the correlation between strength of material interests in the islands, length of time in New Zealand and amount of remittances was examined. Information on an individual’s knowledge and use of land rights, as well as
number of visits back to the islands, were combined. Affirmative responses to a series of questions (e.g. knowledge of land rights, name registered with the Cook Islands Land Court, frequency of home visits) were taken to mean an individual had a strong islands commitment. One or two positive responses were classified as 'weak' and no affirmative responses meant a 'non-existent' commitment.

The results demonstrated no necessary connection between strength of land rights commitment and the length of time a person had lived in New Zealand. Those who had arrived between 1945 and 1959 evidenced a similar level of 'strong' land rights ties (25 per cent) to that of the most recent arrivals. Cook Islanders migrating between 1960 and 1979 had the weakest commitment. Remembering that the earliest and latest arrivals remitted the largest amounts, there does seem to be a correlation between level of demonstrated commitment to the islands and value of remittances. Since the elderly generation reporting high remittances was from different islands, and only some were responding to a special family event or planning a return, there must be other reasons for their persisting commitment. Stark's model predicting that remittances will decline steadily the longer a person is away and rise when a return is planned is, in light of the Cook Islands evidence, in need of considerable modification.

Economic circumstances of migrants in New Zealand. Analysis of the political economy of Cook Islands labour migration and remitting is beyond the scope of this discussion (cf. Loomis 1984). Nevertheless, it is not always appreciated that whatever the strength of migrant beliefs and cultural values, material conditions and position in the social formation are bound to structure remittance practices in a fundamental way. Inadequate attention has been paid in Pacific research to conditions in the metropolitan centres and also in the islands which make it necessary or valuable for migrants to continue remitting over time. I want to look briefly at the relationship between the class position(s) of Cook Islanders in New Zealand, unequal development in the islands and remitting.

Social classes are more appropriately conceived in terms of relations of production rather than 'strata'. It is from this perspective that the class structure of New Zealand society can best be understood (Loomis 1985). Contrary to popular ideology, Polynesians do not as a total population make up an exploited underclass. While a majority constitute a fraction of the working class, a minority have entered the 'middle class' (Poulantzas 1978), largely through being co-opted as state bureaucrats or community advisers. Still, surveys in 1981 and 1985 found that over 90 per cent of Cook Islands respondents were proletarians in the neo-Marxist sense.

Class position should have some bearing on remittance practices, though it should not necessarily be assumed that poor persons will automatically remit less than wealthy people. Half the working-class Cook Islanders surveyed had sent between NZ$100 and $499 the previous year, while another 23 per cent had remitted between NZ$500 and $999. But the working class also accounted for almost all of the large amounts of over NZ$1000 sent, including four who sent over NZ$2000. The real economic effects of one's class position, in particular one's level of income, might be expected to have a more direct bearing on the amount and frequency of remitting. The average annual income of respondents in the 1985 survey was NZ$12,016, compared with the average national income of NZ$17,466. In other words Cook Islander incomes are about a third below that of the average New Zealander.
In fact there is a clear correlation between a migrant's individual income and level of remitting (Table 4.3). With regard to frequency, those in the lowest income category were least likely to have remitted anything, while those with the highest incomes were most likely to have sent remittances. The majority remitted between NZ$100 and $500. At face value, those on lower incomes tend to remit less, though younger New Zealand-born adults are more often found in this category. Remitters on low incomes usually send back amounts of about NZ$100, while those on incomes of NZ$14,000-24,999 tend to send the larger amounts. The few cash remittances of over NZ$2000 reported were not sent by the most affluent individuals, but by those in the 'middle income' brackets, albeit still proletarians.

Table 4.3 Remittances by individual income levels, 1985 (NZ dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>No remittances</th>
<th>Less than $100</th>
<th>$100-499</th>
<th>$500-999</th>
<th>$1000-1999</th>
<th>$2000+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0-4999</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.5%)</td>
<td>(0.9%)</td>
<td>(10.8%)</td>
<td>(2.7%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5,000-13,999</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15.3%)</td>
<td>(2.7%)</td>
<td>(11.7%)</td>
<td>(5.4%)</td>
<td>(1.8%)</td>
<td>(1.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$14,000-24,999</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.8%)</td>
<td>(5.4%)</td>
<td>(5.4%)</td>
<td>(4.5%)</td>
<td>(2.7%)</td>
<td>(2.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25,000+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.9%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(1.8%)</td>
<td>(0.9%)</td>
<td>(0.9%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(37.8%)</td>
<td>(9.0%)</td>
<td>(29.7%)</td>
<td>(13.5%)</td>
<td>(5.4%)</td>
<td>(4.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


When remittances are correlated with combined household income (Table 4.4), a slightly different picture emerges. Cook Islanders tend to live in extended families for economic as well as cultural reasons. Pooling incomes is one means of coping with a lack of opportunities and low incomes. Households in the 1985 survey earned an annual average of NZ$27,563, once again below the New Zealand average. Cook Island households tend to be larger than the national average and combined incomes must support more people. It is not the lowest income households that are least likely to remit, but households in the NZ$5000-13,999 range. Only 19 per cent of this category sent back cash the previous year. In the main there appears to be a significant gap between low-income, destitute households (e.g. single parents, pensioners) and the remainder of households with their modest incomes attained through combining several workers' wages. This means that there is a basic differentiation in remittance practices within the working class itself.
Table 4.4 Amount of remittances by household income, 1985 (NZ dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>No remittances</th>
<th>Less than $100</th>
<th>$100-$499</th>
<th>$500-$999</th>
<th>$1000-$1999</th>
<th>$2000+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None-$499</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.5%)</td>
<td>(2.7%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5000-13,999</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.2%)</td>
<td>(0.9%)</td>
<td>(0.9%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$14,000-24,999</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.6%)</td>
<td>(0.9%)</td>
<td>(7.3%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25,000+</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(20.0%)</td>
<td>(8.2%)</td>
<td>(19.1%)</td>
<td>(12.7%)</td>
<td>(5.5%)</td>
<td>(3.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(37.3%)</td>
<td>(9.1%)</td>
<td>(30.0%)</td>
<td>(13.6%)</td>
<td>(5.5%)</td>
<td>(4.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In New Zealand the recent consequences of the Labour government’s economic restructuring policies, especially rising unemployment in sectors where Cook Islanders have been concentrated, and persisting high inflation, have placed severe pressure on the migrant community to reassess their remittance practices. If anything these developments are accelerating trends for individual households and young people to distance themselves from the reciprocity system. This seems increasingly to be resulting in the hiving off of the very poor and the affluent from the core community. Moreover, many New Zealand-born young people now talk disparagingly about FOBs (fresh off the boat) - unsophisticated recent arrivals - and avoid the embarrassment of ritual involvement with their parents.

Economic conditions in the Cook Islands. The three islands in the Southern Group on which this study is based - Rarotonga, Aitutaki and Mauke - form a broad continuum of economic development. Rarotonga, the largest island, is the main administrative and commercial centre. Aitutaki, with its idyllic lagoon and World War II runways, has experienced rapid economic and social change in recent years due primarily to a growth in tourism. Mauke, an outer island, is of a similar size to Aitutaki but with fewer natural resources and attractions, and is less developed.

Rarotonga is the most monetized of all the Cook Islands. It has the highest proportion of full-time wage and salary earners and the highest incomes. Admittedly, many Rarotongans still plant small family taro plots and keep a few pigs for ceremonial occasions, but reliance is increasingly placed upon wages and
salaries, supplemented by an occasional gamble on planting a quick cash crop for the New Zealand market. On Aitutaki, planting for domestic use and lagoon fishing are as important to the family livelihood as wage work. On Mauke, most families still plant for domestic use, though the best land is far from the two villages and there is no lagoon. Public service jobs are less plentiful, and there are fewer private sector jobs. The shift out of agricultural production has been most pronounced on Rarotonga, where employment in the service and commercial sectors has expanded rapidly. The public service still dominates the local economy, though the situation is changing. For example, of the new companies registered in the Cook Islands during the past fifteen years, a quarter were
established on Rarotonga in 1984 and 1985 alone. Aitutaki has seen a surge of new ventures, mostly related to tourism. On Mauke, where paid employment opportunities are fewer, casual labour with the Department of Works is used by the government to disguise unemployment.

Tourist spending is greatest on Rarotonga, where new motels and hotels are springing up everywhere. Increasing affluence is evident in the number of new cars and motorbikes plying the roads, and the construction of new housing around the island. On Aitutaki, tourism and an established banana exporting industry have ensured an expanding local economy. There are few cars, but the number of motorbikes is increasing and the main road is being sealed. New houses are being built by local residents and returning islanders alike. On Mauke, tourist numbers are low and there is only one four-unit motel. A handful of new government utility trucks and several ageing motorbikes ply the dirt roads. There is virtually no new housing. Many dwellings stand empty or in derelict condition as mute testimony to the steady outflow of migrants over the years.

Population trends in the three islands reflect the same pattern of unequal development (Table 4.5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rarotonga</th>
<th>Aitutaki</th>
<th>Mauke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Per cent change</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>9,971</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>11,478</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>2855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>9,811</td>
<td>-14.5</td>
<td>2414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>9,530</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>2335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% change
1966-81 -4.4 -9.5 +1.5

Source: Cook Islands Census, 1981.

In 1981 the population of Rarotonga was 9530, compared with 2335 for Aitutaki and 681 for Mauke. All three islands experienced losses of population during the 1970s when emigration to New Zealand was at its peak. Indicative of the imbalance in development is the dramatic slowing of the population decline on Rarotonga and Aitutaki as the economy and new employment opportunities picked up. The rate of population decline in Mauke from 1976 to 1981 remained considerably higher. The effect of fertility and migration on these figures needs to be taken into account. The relationship between increases in living standards, educational levels and declining fertility has been well documented. In conjunction with the accelerating pace of economic development, the fertility rate on Rarotonga declined by 39.8 per cent between 1966 and 1976 (Hayes 1982:189). The fertility rate on the remainder of the southern islands as a group declined by 22.6 per cent,
but in the northern islands by only 11.4 per cent, hence emigration made a greater contribution to population decline on Mauke and Aitutaki than on Rarotonga.

The general pattern of migration in the Cook Islands involves a number of migration streams from the outer islands converging on Rarotonga and subsequently overseas. Flows in the opposite direction in the form of return migration are much smaller. Crude migration rates vary in direct relation to the level of economic development in each area. Between 1966 and 1976 the rate of emigration from the less-developed Northern Group was 49.2 per 1000, for the Southern Group other than Rarotonga 39.1 per 1000 and for Rarotonga 32.9 per 1000 (Hayes 1982:142).

The real impact of unequal development can be seen in the changing distribution of the working-age population and differential dependency ratios. Between 1966 and 1976 there was a marked shift of working-age population to Rarotonga, which had 56.4 per cent of the working-age population in 1966 and 60 per cent a decade later. Aitutaki went from a 12.1 per cent share to 12.4 per cent, and Mauke remained virtually static at 3.2 per cent to 3.3 per cent.

Changes in dependency ratios (Table 4.6) among the three case-study islands show the true plight of Mauke economically and socially. The trend of the Rarotonga dependency ratio has been steadily downward, at least since internal self-government in 1965, and in Aitutaki the ratio declined sharply and then levelled off. The dependency ratio on Mauke, however, has increased alarmingly. Rarotonga has been gaining workers relative to dependants, while on Aitutaki the proportions of young and elderly people leaving has been similar. On Mauke, the trend has been for working-age people to leave and the proportion of very young and elderly remaining behind to increase. Viewed another way, by 1976 on Rarotonga there were 0.95 workers for every dependant, while on Aitutaki there were 0.76 and only 0.64 on Mauke.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Island</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1976</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rarotonga</td>
<td>105.3</td>
<td>103.6</td>
<td>94.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aitutaki</td>
<td>140.6</td>
<td>132.1</td>
<td>132.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauke</td>
<td>142.2</td>
<td>153.5</td>
<td>156.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Unequal development and differential amounts of remittances. Having established a crude three-island scale of unequal development, we can test expectations that the size of cash remittances will vary inversely with the level of development. The distribution of money orders per capita (Table 4.7) confirms the expected pattern. Rarotongans receive the lowest amount per capita and Maukeans are the most dependent on money orders. The number of money orders received is much lower on Rarotonga, but the average amount for each money order is the highest there. Thus more Rarotongans are likely to receive little or nothing in the way of money orders, while fewer individuals receive large
amounts. When 1985 survey findings are divided by island, the pattern of cash remittances follows the pattern of unequal development among the three islands (Table 4.8), indicating that there is an inverse correlation between remittances and conventional measures of development.

Table 4.7 Comparison of New Zealand money orders paid during 1985 on Rarotonga, Aitutaki and Mauke

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rarotonga</th>
<th>Aitutaki</th>
<th>Mauke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number paid</td>
<td>8103</td>
<td>2438</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount paid</td>
<td>$1,260,012.00</td>
<td>$336,673.00</td>
<td>$117,015.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average per order</td>
<td>$155.50</td>
<td>$137.90</td>
<td>$146.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number per person</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount per person</td>
<td>$132.22</td>
<td>$143.98</td>
<td>$171.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Postmaster General, Main Post Office, Rarotonga.

Table 4.8 Distribution of total cash remittances among three islands, Auckland survey, 1985 (NZ dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rarotonga</th>
<th>Aitutaki</th>
<th>Mauke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money orders per person</td>
<td>$89.05</td>
<td>$197.78</td>
<td>$143.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash sent per person</td>
<td>79.05</td>
<td>52.78</td>
<td>300.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations per person</td>
<td>48.58</td>
<td>219.59</td>
<td>276.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total per person</td>
<td>$216.68</td>
<td>$470.15</td>
<td>$720.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Unequal development and remittances: village survey. Further evidence for the link between unequal development and remittances emerges from a survey of thirty households, one-third each in villages on Rarotonga, Aitutaki and Mauke. The Rarotongan interviews were carried out entirely within the village of Ngatangia, some distance from the urban centre of Avarua. The sample included public servants and private sector employees who commuted daily to Avarua, though several of these were also part-time growers. The Aitutaki sample was divided between Amuri village, where several new houses are being built and tourist ventures are beginning, and the more remote village of Tautu. On Mauke, the sample was divided between the two villages of Kimiangatau and Oire Tumu.

The Rarotonga sample of household heads comprised three women and seven men, all between 20 and 59 years of age and most in their forties. The Aitutaki sample comprised two women and eight men, mostly in their thirties and forties. The Mauke sample comprised four female and six male household heads, all but one over 45 and three over 60 years old.
Occupationally, the Rarotonga sample included seven public servants, two commercial planters and a baker. Two individuals reported that they had a second income and eight said they did some domestic planting and/or fishing. The Aitutaki sample contained six public servants, a contractor, a commercial grower and two housewives. Eight of the ten had another important source of income: three worked in shops, three planted commercially, one hired out his truck and one rented out videos and tapes. Six of the ten also did domestic planting and fishing. In Mauke four household heads were in the public service, three were pensioners, two were housewives living on benefit payments and one was a shopkeeper. Only one person reported a second source of income, a video hire business. Nine out of the ten planted and/or fished for much of their food requirements.

The variations among the three village samples were remarkably consistent with the differences in economic development among the three islands. For instance, the average Rarotongan household income from all sources (excluding remittances) was NZ$13,475, compared with about NZ$8650 for the average Aitutaki household sampled and NZ$4891 for the average Mauke household. Remittances received by the village samples were similarly consistent with the unequal development hypothesis. The Rarotongans received an average of NZ$265 in cash in 1985; Aitutakians received an average of NZ$379, while Maukeans received NZ$565 to augment their low annual incomes. Two women reported receiving approximately NZ$100 a month from husbands working in New Zealand. Unlike people on the other two islands, Maukeans were also more reliant on a local system of store credit (with its antecedents in nineteenth-century European ‘company stores’) to sustain their spending.

Special events and remittances. Besides unequal development, remittance flows will be influenced by family rites, village ceremonials and natural events. At a family level, for instance, death is an important regulator of remittances. As members of the first generation of migrants in New Zealand die, many kopu tangata (extended kin groups) decide to have the body flown back to the islands for burial. This is followed a year or so later by a group of kin bringing back a headstone to mark the grave. In so doing, it should be noted, they also reinforce their claims to land rights. These events result in a momentary and substantial inflow of overseas capital in the form of monetary donations, food for feasts, and visitor spending.

At the village level, ceremonial events contribute to further inflows. The fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Cook Islands Congregational Church in Ngatangiia was an example of how ceremonials can act as a catalyst to remittances. The project received support from Ngatangiia people all over New Zealand. They contributed over NZ$20,000 and travelled in a tere party for the opening of the renovated church at Christmas 1985. More than half the funds were sent beforehand to help local people pay for materials and skilled labour. The group sent a large quantity of tinned and crated food by ship, which the local hosts prepared for the main feasts when the New Zealand group arrived.

Climatic conditions such as droughts and natural disasters can also cause remittances to increase. On Mauke, a cyclone in 1967 devastated many houses, forcing the migration of many able-bodied men to earn money in New Zealand for rebuilding. Many of these migrants never returned, eventually sending fares
for their wives and children to join them. Most continued to send remittances, however, to assist remaining relatives with the task of reconstruction.

Remittances are not simply an automatic response to customary obligations, material circumstances or ceremonial requirements. Remitters consciously weigh their own financial situation against ongoing (and new) obligations, life crisis events and the changing circumstances of their relatives in the islands. Overseas migrants often maintain contact by letter, telephone and visiting friends, and are knowledgeable enough about the material circumstances of islands kin to change their remitting practices in conformity with their perceptions of their kinsmen’s needs.

The use of remittances

The use of remittances also varies with the pattern of unequal development. Those living on less developed islands with lower incomes, fewer wage jobs and high import costs will tend to use remittances for consumption. Those on more developed islands with higher incomes and more opportunities for income and investment are more likely to receive smaller symbolic gifts of cash, and often use larger sums for savings or for business and production opportunities which may present themselves.

The village survey data (Table 4.9) indicate that purchases of food used up the largest share of cash remittances.

Table 4.9 Use made of cash remittances on three islands: combined responses of thirty respondents (NZ dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use</th>
<th>Total spent</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>$5051</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>$168.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household expenses</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>62.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drink, entertainment</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>30.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceremony/gift</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project/tere</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/planting</td>
<td>3150</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>105.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>24.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>21.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>$12,549</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>$418.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cook Islands village survey, 1985-86.

Expenditure on drinks and entertainment was also high. Contrary to expectations, however, 25 per cent of remittance spending went into ‘productive’ activities, that is costs associated with small business, planting and fishing. An additional 6 per cent of remittances went directly into savings. This contrasts with the impression from many previous Pacific migrant studies that remittance recipients primarily spend their cash on ‘conspicuous consumption’ (Connell 1980a:25). At the same time, the amounts of remittance cash allocated to ceremonies, gifts and donations was low. There is a clear differential pattern of
remittance use between the three islands (Table 4.10). Cash is used entirely for consumption among the Maukeans sampled, corresponding with the island's lower level of economic development, high cost of store goods and low wages. On the other hand, cash remittances on Rarotonga and Aitutaki were more evenly allocated between consumption and production uses.

Table 4.10 Comparisons of per capita remittance use among samples on three islands (NZ dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rarotonga</th>
<th>Aitutaki</th>
<th>Mauke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>$68</td>
<td>$48</td>
<td>$390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family expenses</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drink and entertainments</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceremonials and gifts</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects and tere donations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/planting</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (car purchase)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cook Islands village survey, 1985-86.

Overseas entrepreneurs and return migrants. Since coming to power in 1978, the Cook Islands Democratic Party government has established a number of policies and tax regulations designed to encourage small business and tourism. A considerable amount of new commercial activity has occurred in these sectors, particularly on Rarotonga and Aitutaki. The high per capita figures for business and planting investment and savings on Aitutaki in Table 4.10 reflect new opportunities for small entrepreneurs generated by an expanding tourist industry and reasonable returns from the export of bananas.

The increase in entrepreneurial activity, 'reflected in the rapid increases in local businesses, particularly shops, and also private companies' (Taylor 1980:41), occurred just before 1980. The following five years saw an even more rapid expansion (Table 4.11).

The majority of new firms continue to be owned by Cook Islanders. Most operate in the service and tourist sectors on Rarotonga and increasingly on Aitutaki. Many of these companies include permanent residents or naturalized papa'as (Europeans) as partners often through interracial marriages. They also include 'numerous partnerships with people domiciled overseas' (Taylor 1980:41), though of the 636 firms currently registered, only 30 (4.7 per cent) have partners who are overseas Cook Islanders. Apart from nominal holdings, one of the companies is partnered by a political leader, fourteen by private individuals and four by persons who have recently returned to the Cooks to begin a business. On the basis of these figures, we must conclude that there may be scope for investment, but overseas Cook Islanders are not availing themselves of the opportunities.

Writers on Pacific remittances have treated new house construction by overseas or returning islanders as a form of consumption. However, under the right economic circumstances, a house can be a money-making investment. This is
certainly the case where tourism is flourishing, and expatriate Europeans in
public and private employment require accommodation. A number of Cook
Islands families interviewed in 1985 used their island house for Christmas
holidays, and then rented the property for the remainder of the year. Twenty-one
families (19.4 per cent) owned their own house in the islands, either one that they
had built before they emigrated, or one constructed with remitted funds during
their stay in New Zealand.

Table 4.11 Trends in company registrations in the Cook Islands, 1971-85

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Companies registered</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971-76</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-79</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-83</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>100.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Companies Registration Files, Cook Islands Department of Justice.

During recent Cook Islands fieldwork, newly-constructed domestic dwellings
were surveyed, primarily along the main roads of each island. The majority of
new houses on Rarotonga and Aitutaki were built by Cook Islands Maori resi-
dents (Table 4.12) who had resided in the islands for several years before building,
and had acquired their capital locally. This reflects the greater availability of cash
and employment on both islands.

Table 4.12 Ownership of new housing on Rarotonga and Aitutaki, 1985-86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rarotonga</th>
<th>Aitutaki</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook Islands Maori</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local owner/capital</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some NZ remittance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned NZ migrant</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in NZ</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renting</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leasing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cook Islands fieldwork housing survey, 1985-86.
Houses being built with the assistance of remittances are few on both Rarotonga and Aitutaki. As Table 4.12 indicates, more than a quarter of newly-constructed dwellings were erected by migrants who had returned permanently, or who had built holiday homes which they usually rented to relatives or tourists when they were in New Zealand. On Mauke, however, there were only two new houses. Existing houses were of poorer quality and condition. The proportion of abandoned dwellings in each village (12 per cent of all housing) clearly indicates the marginal economic position of the island (Table 4.13).

Remittances have been more important for housing construction on Mauke than the other islands, even though this has not been recent construction. There have been two major cyclones over the past quarter century, and the devastation has forced many individuals to migrate in search of funds to rebuild.

In contrast to Rarotonga and Aitutaki, there is little evidence that expatriate Cook Islanders from Mauke are investing in holiday homes and/or tourism, nor are they returning to stay.

Table 4.13 Ownership and source of funds for all housing on Mauke, 1985-86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Existing occupied</th>
<th>Existing unoccupied</th>
<th>New housing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local owner</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local/some remitt.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in Rarotonga/N.Z.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned NZ migrant</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expatriate/empty</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown/other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The survey was carried out with the assistance of a local informant, and covered all but a handful of scattered dwellings.
Source: Cook Islands fieldwork housing survey, 1985-86.

Conclusions
Remittances have often been conceived too narrowly. An accurate assessment of their actual volume and impact on the home district requires a more comprehensive definition of migrant value transfers, one which does not prejudice questions of the motives or determinants of remittances. Since little research in the Pacific has focused on migrant remittances (Connell 1980a), there are few accurate data on volumes of remittances, their uses, and their significance for islands economies. The Cook Islands are one of the few instances where longitudinal
data allow a closer examination of certain commonly-held expectations and assumptions about remittance practices. Even here, care must be taken in calculating the volume and impact of remittances.

Many factors bear on whether a migrant will continue to remit, assist, visit and generally maintain contact with his or her natal land. Some scholars (e.g. Chapman 1985b) have pressed with renewed vigour for the primacy of personal choice and cultural values in explaining patterns of migrant behaviour. While social actors are neither the automatons of culture nor of material conditions (cf. Bourdieu 1977), such arguments too often divert energies away from a rigorous analysis of structural relations in the political economy of the South Pacific, along with the class position, legal status and ideological treatment of migrants in the metropolitan centres. It is against this background that personal choices and cultural norms must be understood. Furthermore, without implying rational economic calculation on the part of participants in a reciprocity system, remittances always constitute an ‘investment* ineffect if not by design. This applies with regard to symbolic capital as much as to economic interests.

As a means of understanding the basic dynamics of remittance behaviour, Stark (1978) proposed a model suggesting that individual remittances are likely to decline the longer a migrant is absent from his or her ‘home’ district. The only exceptions are special events or needs, to which the migrant responds with declining enthusiasm. However, should he or she decide to return permanently, his or her remittances will suddenly increase again.

Though research on individual Cook Islander life histories is still required, comparative survey findings offer mixed conclusions with respect to Stark’s model. Among Cook Island migrants interviewed in New Zealand in 1981 and again in 1985, there does not appear to be any clear evidence that the longer an individual has lived away from the islands, the less often he or she will remit. There is some confirmation that recent arrivals will show the highest incidence of remitting, but the amounts remitted by both the earliest and most recent migrant cohorts were equally high. An age factor is noticeable in both surveys, with older migrants tending to remit more often than younger. The most significant predictor of remitting was whether the person was born in the islands or in New Zealand. The incidence of remitting among young adults born in New Zealand was half that of persons born in the islands. A similar dividing line exists with respect to the retention of land rights and ‘islands commitment’. A fundamental distinction seems to exist within the working class itself between the situation of poor migrant households (tangata veve as Cook Islanders call them) and those on combined, more moderate incomes. It is quite likely that further analysis will show that the majority of the latter households are located in what has been termed the ‘supervisory fraction’ of the working class. The distinction is certainly mirrored in amounts of cash sent, regardless of whether the family planned to return or not, and regardless of how long they had been in New Zealand.

Contrary to what has been stated by Stark, plans to return permanently to the islands were not correlated with either an increased frequency or increased volume of remittances. This suggests that, if there is any correlation, it is a more complex one than Stark anticipated. The Cook Islands data suggest a firm connection between the strength of an individual’s commitment to and material interests in the islands, regardless of length of absence. In other words the notion
of ‘investment’ itself rather than time should form the central axis of a revised model. The focus would then be upon economic conditions in the islands and the metropolis, structural relations between the two, the political (e.g. citizenship status), economic and ideological position of migrants in the metropolitan centre, cultural resources and social relations between migrants and home district population and changes in these circumstances and relationships over time as they affect remittances. This might reveal, for instance, that the high level of remitting by older migrants, which would be puzzling on Stark’s linear timescale model, could be explained by a combination of low elderly migrant incomes and the lack of portability of New Zealand superannuation payments.

Regarding the use of remittances, Connell concluded that they are typically used to finance migration, household needs and ‘conspicuous consumption’ for prestige (including building a new house), and queried why few of the Pacific studies to date mention remittances contributing to savings or other forms of financial investment (Connell 1980a:27ff.) The evidence presented here suggests that the use of remittances among Cook Islanders is more complicated than simple models suggest. A significant proportion of Cook Islands remittances is used for small business investment, agricultural production and savings, especially on the more developed islands of Rarotonga and Aitutaki. It is a mistake to assume that building a new house with remittances is only a matter of security or conspicuous consumption. More must be known about the individual motives and economic circumstances behind such construction. Where money is to be made providing accommodation for tourists and European public servants, there are often profit motives involved in building. There is more of a possibility that house construction should be placed on the ‘production and investment’ side of the ledger.

The pattern of unequal development among the three islands studied is obvious and predictable, given the nature of capitalist penetration and administrative centralization on the main island of Rarotonga. What is striking is the clear-cut correlation between remittance volumes and uses, and the differential pattern of development. One problem with many Pacific migration and remittance studies seems to have been in assuming that in each island society the volume and uses (and therefore effects) of remittances are the same on each island and district in the group. The determinants and uses of remittances, and their socio-economic consequences, vary from island to island. The wider structural factors accounting for this state of affairs (e.g. the efficiency and profit motives of centralizing bureaucracy and capitalist enterprises on the ‘main island’) need to be included in any analysis of remittance patterns, as well as the way in which remittances themselves help reproduce a situation of unequal development. There is much here for further investigation.
A vital issue in the literature on migration in Papua New Guinea is the relationship between rural development and population movements. While it is generally accepted that an imbalance in rural and urban economic opportunities is a factor in the decisions of migrants from less developed rural areas to migrate to towns on the coast or in the central highlands (cf. Garnaut 1977; Skeldon 1979:77-110), there is disagreement over the potential for rural development to do more than temporarily arrest out-migration, particularly in cash cropping areas where inequalities in the availability and distribution of land and other resources (cash and labour) may promote the migration of younger and/or poorer individuals and households.

Proponents of the view that rural development can stem the tide of out-migration have suggested that commercial agriculture offers uneducated youths and unemployed migrants a chance of earning a reasonable income and building a secure position for themselves in village society (Conroy 1973; Harris 1972) and that once cash cropping becomes established in an area most migrants are likely to be young men satisfying an urge for adventure and ‘educated or skilled men going to urban centres on a more permanent basis, taking their wives and families with them’ (Harris 1972:246). Opponents have argued that, although rural development may provide villagers with alternative sources of income, it also provides migrants with the means to travel to distant urban centres as well as insurance (in the form of cash crops looked after by relatives) against their eventual return to the village (May and Skeldon 1977; Ward 1971; Young 1977).

More importantly, a change from subsistence gardening to cash cropping may increase the area of land needed to support a family, thereby resulting in even higher levels of out-migration from more densely settled regions (Ward 1971:95).

The current picture of migration in Papua New Guinea and elsewhere in Melanesia does not provide clear support for either point of view and hints at a more complex set of factors at work in the migration and development decisions.
of rural peoples. For example, although many migrants do return home to participate in rural developments, many others must first leave the village for sometimes lengthy periods of wage labour in order to earn money to be invested in rural enterprises or in the purchase or securing of rural land rights (e.g. Bastin 1985; Bathgate 1985; Connell 1985a; Finney 1973; Ogan 1972; Salisbury and Salisbury 1972). On the other hand, while out-migration is increasing from areas where cash-earning opportunities have declined as a result of land pressure (Connell and Curtain 1982a; Curtain 1980; Garnaut, et al. Wright and Curtain 1977), there are instances where villagers have cut back on cash crop production to make way for more food crops (Mitchell 1982:65).

Figure 5.1 The Island of New Guinea

In the following case study on the Gende - a group of shifting cultivators living in the highlands of Papua New Guinea (Figure 5.1) - I seek to demonstrate that economic factors such as underdevelopment have been only partly responsible for the Gende’s high rate of out-migration (25 per cent) and that in looking at the relationship between migration and development one must also take into account the possibility of various historical, social and cultural factors that can set into motion a process of social differentiation and inequality that will very likely only intensify, and result in even higher rates of out-migration if development is limited to cash cropping or other land-intensive projects. Furthermore, the entire process may occur long before there is any objective land shortage. Some of the factors pertinent to this argument follow. First, in most Melanesian societies individuals commonly gain access to important resources through the fulfilment (or promise of fulfilment) of a range of reciprocal obligations to kinsmen and affines. Since exchange networks overlap and a failure to fulfil obligations to one’s partners may jeopardize their other exchange relations, frequent or prolonged non-payment of debts often results in the withdrawal of their support (i.e. help with large exchange payments, land rights and so on) in favour of more reliable exchange partners.
Second, given the competitive nature of most Melanesian exchange systems, individuals are under more or less constant pressure to increase the scale of their exchange payments. One factor in the competition is that individual exchange performances are judged relative to competitors' accomplishments and rarely by any absolute standards. As I hope to show in this chapter, the increasing gap between individual Gende in terms of their access to cash has produced a situation in which even the more industrious villager may fall behind in the competition for prestige and a secure position in the village exchange community.

Third, anything which inhibits an individual's ability to participate in the local exchange system tends to have cumulative effects on their exchange performance, widening the social distance between that individual and other members of the community and increasing the likelihood that he or she may be forced to migrate or, in the case of an absentee, to remain in town indefinitely (Morauta and Ryan 1982; Zimmer 1985). Such factors include: (i) differences in education and income-earning capacity among migrants; (ii) an inequitable distribution of urban remittances and local income-earning opportunities among villagers; (iii) inflation (e.g. brideprice inflation); (iv) uncertain incomes; and (v) the accumulation of indebtedness during periods of unemployment or through the failure of exchange partners to honour their commitments. Furthermore, in areas where cash cropping is an important source of income or is expected to become so, land may be a source of keen investment and competition as a hedge against future inflation and uncertainty, apart from any objective requirements individual investors may have. Under such circumstances younger or less wealthy individuals may experience greater difficulties in obtaining or holding on to land and, should they elect to remain in the village, suffer a loss of status by having to work for other villagers.

In the case of the Gende, full-scale rural development has been long in coming and is even now only in its infancy with the opening of a cardamom project in 1986 and the completion, in 1987, of a road linking the Gende to both highlands and coastal markets. It is too early to do more than speculate on the outcome of these developments. Nevertheless, an investigation of Gende investment and migration patterns up to and including the time of my principal research (1982-83) is instructive both for what they reveal about the relationship between rural underdevelopment, migration and urban unemployment, and for what they tell us about the process of social differentiation going on in both rural and urban contexts. For the Gende, the prospect of development has long been a source of worry that when it comes not everyone will be in a position to profit from it. This remains true today, in spite of the upsurge of hope that recent developments have brought. As I hope to show, this worry, which has coloured much that the Gende have done, is well founded.

Migration, underdevelopment and inequality

The Gende's homeland is in the Bismarck Mountains in southern Madang Province (Figure 5.2). There, some 6000 Gende rely on the cultivation of sweet potatoes and taro, the herding of pigs, and the collection of wild forest products for the bulk of their subsistence and exchange needs. Another 2000 or so Gende live and work outside the region, the majority residing in or near several highlands towns to the south of the Gende's territory.
Traditionally, the Gende were divided into a number of exogamous clans and sub-clans. Membership in these groups was based on an idiom of patrilineal descent and on the fulfilment of an array of exchange obligations among clan members and between affinal and cognatic kin in different clans. Although Gende clans were associated with specific territories, garden land was individually owned and passed on from one individual to another on the basis of reciprocal exchange.

In the past, status distinctions among the Gende were largely based on differences in age, sex, personal industry and skill in managing extensive networks of exchange relationships, and, in the case of aspiring traditional leaders (Big Men), the ability to attract more than one wife. Renowned for their generosity and ability to organize large-scale feasts at which pork and other valuables were given to exchange partners in other clans, Big Men (and sometimes women) were influential in the religious and social life of their communities, in addition to being an important force in the formation and continuity of local kin groups.

While the above description is as true today as it was fifty years ago, there have been changes which threaten to alter the basic structure and values of Gende society. One force for change has been the Gende’s involvement in labour migration since they were first contacted by Europeans in 1932. In the early years of contact, men worked as mission helpers, native police, plantation labourers, and miners in places as far removed from their home villages as the island of New Britain and the Bulolo goldfields in Morobe Province. During World War II, others served as carriers for Allied forces in the nearby Ramu Valley and on New Guinea’s north coast. After the war, many of these men headed south to the new towns of Kundiawa, Goroka and Mount Hagen, where they found work as hotel...
cooks, domestic help and construction labourers. In the 1950s, hundreds of Gende (including some women and children) left their homes to work on coffee plantations in the central highlands.

Underlying this migration was a desire to share in the greater wealth and power of the Australian colonial 'masters' and, among younger migrants and men of low esteem, the possibility of enhancing their social position in the village by investing wages in the exchange activities of their clan. When migrants returned home with suitcases filled with Western clothing and trinkets, they were greeted as the forerunners of a new generation of Big Men (Zimmer 1984; cf. Salisbury 1962). Cash, steel axes and metal cooking pots soon became familiar currency in traditional exchange payments.

Not infrequently, however, migrants returned home empty-handed, having lost their earnings in card games or given them to other migrants in return for various favours and promises of support. One enterprising couple, who worked as domestics in the home of an Australian, became the focus of a migrant exchange network by providing new arrivals from the husband's village with a home-away-from-home where they could find solace in the company of other Gende and be taken care of when they were sick. In the seven years they were away from the village, the couple accepted the gifts of grateful houseguests and invested small amounts of cash and trade goods in the marriages of other young men. This extension of their personal network formed one of the foundations of the husband's eventual status as an influential and widely acclaimed Big Man among the Gende.

In the villages, the 1960s ushered in the widespread planting of coffee as a cash crop and the beginning of work on a road to link the Gende to the north coast and central highlands. In 1964 copper was discovered near Yandera village and local men were hired to build a base camp and to assist foreign geologists and other mining personnel working for Kennecott. Migrants who returned home to participate in these developments received an unexpected bonus. Because the absence of so many able-bodied men and women and their frequent failure to send remittances home was disrupting the flow of exchange which held the rural community together, villagers were often eager to provide returning migrants with garden land (and in some cases brides) in return for the pigs the women would raise and the money young men might earn at the mining camp.

While the Gende hoped that local development might solve the problems of unbalanced exchange (see below) by enabling income to be generated in Gende itself, circumstances prevented this hope from being realized. When I first visited the Gende in 1982 and 1983, although they had carved miles of unsurfaced road into the mountainsides with picks and shovels, the road was useless for vehicular traffic because of the absence of connecting bridges and frequent landslides. Without a road to transport coffee to distant markets, the local coffee industry was in a depressed state and in 1982 few households had earned more than K50 (in 1982 K1 was approximately A$1.50) from coffee sales (Table 5.2). Similarly, although over the years different mining companies have poured large sums of cash into the local economy in attempts to discover profitable deposits of copper and gold, wages have been unevenly distributed among members of only those villages closest to the main sites of exploration (located near Yandera village). Furthermore, periods of full employment have been intermittent and work at the mining camp has been an unpredictable and unreliable source of income.
The problems of inequality and uncertainty

Throughout the sixties and seventies, men and women continued to leave their villages. In the early 1970s, the first Gende to earn high school or college diplomas entered the urban labour market as professionals and white-collar workers. By 1982 close to 1000 men and over 400 women between the ages of 18 and 45 were living in non-village urban settings (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1  Distribution of Gende population by location, age and sex, 1982  
(figures are percentages of total population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Rural Males / Females</th>
<th>Urban Males / Females</th>
<th>Rural and urban Males / Females</th>
<th>Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>7.1 / 6.5</td>
<td>1.6 / 1.3</td>
<td>8.7 / 7.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-17</td>
<td>10.7 / 9.2</td>
<td>3.3 / 2.6</td>
<td>14.0 / 11.8</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-45</td>
<td>15.1 / 16.1</td>
<td>12.5 / 5.2</td>
<td>27.6 / 21.3</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46+</td>
<td>3.9 / 3.1</td>
<td>1.2 / 0.5</td>
<td>5.1 / 3.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All ages</td>
<td>36.8 / 34.9</td>
<td>18.6 / 9.6</td>
<td>55.4 / 44.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes migrants working on plantations or employed at mine sites outside the Gende's territory.

Source: Author's fieldwork, 1982.

Unfortunately, not everyone who looked for work was successful in finding or keeping a job which would pay enough to allow them to fulfil obligations to village exchange partners. In 1982 few women and less than half of the adult male migrants were earning regular wages. While many jobless migrants eke out an existence in town by relying on the generosity of employed migrants, their failure to repay their debts to villagers has resulted in extreme income differences among village households as well as differences in villagers' ability to participate effectively in the exchange system and to gain access to important resources such as land and marriage partners. The degree of income variation among a sample of 41 of the 100 households in Yandera village (Table 5.2), the primary location of fieldwork in 1982 and 1983, is indicative of the broad pattern of income differences.

Some of the more serious consequences of inequality have been the expulsion of indigent persons from the rural community by means of harassment, accusations of theft or sorcery, and in some cases the use of physical force, and also the emergence of a class of absentee landlords, as villagers compensate for the loss of exchange payments from unemployed or poorly-paid relatives by giving away land rights to more prosperous migrants who help them honour their exchange commitments (Zimmer 1985). For dispossessed migrants and villagers who have been driven off the land by angry creditors, the loss of a viable rural option tends to be permanent. Although many of these migrants hope eventually to redeem alienated land rights or to restore their credit-worthiness in the village, few possess the education or skills to improve their economic situation significantly and even fewer are willing to suffer the shame of working on land belonging to their more fortunate peers. While the new cardamom project near Bundi offers migrants the possibility of returning home, wages are unattractively low (K33.80 a fortnight) and initial interviews indicate that most money is spent on tradestore
### Table 5.2  Annual household incomes in Yandera village, 1982 (in kina)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Households&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>No. of members</th>
<th>Total income</th>
<th>Income&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Income source</th>
<th>Urban remittances&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cash</td>
<td>Mining camp</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2094</td>
<td>1741</td>
<td>1208</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>1000</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
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</table>
Table 5.2  Annual household incomes in Yandra village, 1982 (in kina)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Households</th>
<th>No. of members</th>
<th>Total income</th>
<th>Income&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Mining camp</th>
<th>Income source</th>
<th>Gambling&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Urban remittances Kind</th>
<th>Cash</th>
<th>Other&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<td>110</td>
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<td>154</td>
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<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
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<td>97</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(-2)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(-2)</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>42</td>
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<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Two households are headed by widowers (18, 40), one by a widow (35), two by women whose husbands are working in town (20, 31), and one by a divorced man (41). The remaining households consist of married couples, their unmarried children, and in households 1, 38, 9 and 11, the husband's elderly mother and/or father. Four households (1, 2, 4, 14) are headed by men with three wives.

<sup>b</sup>The figures listed under 'Total income' are the combined values of cash income (including urban remittances in cash) and urban remittances in kind (e.g. food, clothing, beer). These totals do not include the value of pigs and garden produce raised by household members for the purpose of consumption or exchange, or received by household members in exchange payments from other villagers.

<sup>c</sup>Gambling losses (in parentheses) are included in this table for the sake of comparison with gambling wins.

<sup>d</sup>The category 'Other' includes cash earned by the sale of tradestore items and garden vegetables, and gifts of cash or store-bought items received from other villagers.

Source: Author's fieldwork, 1982.
foods (particularly for persons without gardens or whose gardens are far away) and card games.

Spiralling inflation even further reduces the ability of poorer households to balance their exchanges and to compete for valuable resources. Brideprices, which had risen to an average of ten pigs and K1000 in 1983, were by 1987 ranging between 10 to 15 pigs and K2000 or more. Unless a young man is earning a large salary, his chances of marrying are slim. Rather than face the prospect of permanent bachelorhood, some village youths and returned migrants settle into tenant farmer relationships with wealthier clan members in return for the use of land and brideprice support. Many young men, however, prefer taking their chances in the urban job market, hoping they will earn enough money to become independent landowners and more desirable mates. Marriage patterns (Table 5.3) demonstrate how few young men from Yandera village had achieved that goal in 1982. Out of fifty-two males between the ages of 18 and 24, only one was married. Among males aged 25 to 34, only thirty-seven out of sixty-seven were married. The current marital status of younger men contrasts sharply with older generations of Gende males, most of whom were married by their mid-twenties.

Table 5.3 Marriage and residence patterns among Yandera males 18 years and older (Yandera village census 1982)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Resident (alone)</th>
<th>Absent Married</th>
<th>Married Married (alone)</th>
<th>Totals Single</th>
<th>Totals Married</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All ages</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Column code:
(1) Single male residents of Yandera village. Includes two widowers and one divorced man who have no children.
(2) Married male residents of Yandera village. Includes five widowers with children.
(3) Married men living in town (or on plantations) without their wives.
(4) Married couples living in town with their unmarried children.
(5) Single absentees.
(6) Total number of unmarried males.
(7) Total number of married and unmarried males.
Source: Author's fieldwork, 1982.

Through repeated adjustments in the rate of exchange, the value of women's production remains fairly high. In 1982, for example, the value of a large pig was commonly quoted as K1000. In spite of this, women have suffered as much from inflation and inequality as men have. Since most women are unable to feed more than four or five pigs at a time and it takes four or five years to raise a pig to
maturity, inflated brideprices and childwealth payments (made at the birth of each child) have lengthened the period of time a woman must work to repay her in-laws for their investments in her brideprice and any children she bears her husband.

Not surprisingly, young women are eager to marry men who will share more of the burden of expensive exchange payments. Extended visits to relatives in town are now the common experience of young (and not so young) women in search of eligible bachelors. One outcome of this search is that a fair number of Gende women marry non-Gende men. A corresponding movement of non-Gende women into the Gende region is absent, however, since few Gende can pay the higher brideprices of women from more developed areas of Papua New Guinea. For example, the Gende’s neighbours and former trade partners in the Upper Chimbu Valley enjoy access to markets and higher profits from the sale of coffee and garden produce. As a result, the Chimbu receive more wives from the Gende than they give, a reversal of the situation which existed in pre-contact times. This drain on potential marriage partners for Gende males is reflected in Table 5.4 which indicates that, although sex ratios among rural Gende are near normal, the urban segment of the Gende community is decidedly masculine.

Table 5.4  Sex ratios according to age and location, 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age groups</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-17</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-45</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46+</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All ages</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The sex ratio (the number of males per 100 females) is based on census data which do not include women who are married to non-Gende men, except in cases where the women and their husbands are living in the wives' villages.

Source: Author's fieldwork, 1982.

In the realm of personal status and prestige, income differences have produced a number of upsets and contradictions in Gende society. Being wealthy in both pigs and cash has aided a number of village men to achieve the status of Very Big Men (wana nambaio yonua) at the same time as their equally industrious competitors have been reduced to near Rubbish Men (korumbu-wana) when their migrant supporters default on exchange payments and they are unable to maintain previous (or hoped for) levels of exchange. In some cases, individuals who possess few of the characteristics of traditional Big Men (e.g. ambition, energy, oratorical skill, charisma), have acquired high status through the agency of a wealthy son or daughter. Through sending home generous remittances for their parents to invest in village social relations, children both enhance their own prestige and gain access to village resources through their parents. That some young men and women are able to exert such influence over village affairs is a
cause of envy and resentment among less fortunate Gende. It is also a source of confusion among elderly men and women, many of whom must struggle to keep abreast of inflated exchange obligations at a time in their lives when they ought to be enjoying the fruits of past labour and years of having invested their wealth in others (Zimmer 1987).

One consequence of this social upheaval is a rise in sorcery accusations and court cases in which the claimants are seeking compensation for alleged sorcery attacks. Although many of the accused sorcerers are relatively wealthy, others are poor and are the victims of wealthier individuals’ fear of sorcery attack by jealous neighbours. Unable to pay compensation or to rely on the support of other villagers, members of poor households are sometimes driven from their homes or forced to live in isolation in their garden houses. Likewise, not a few migrants have fled their villages or remained in town indefinitely because of the threat of sorcery attack by disgruntled exchange partners (cf. Koroma 1977).

Coping with inequality and uncertainty

Investment patterns among the Gende are the result of a combination of factors. When planning their investments, individuals must take into consideration (i) an economic environment characterized by extreme inequality (see Table 5.2) and uncertain prospects, (ii) the effects of inequality upon their social relations and personal aspirations, (iii) the necessity to rely on others for support at various times or stages in their lives and social development, and (iv) the fact that they are judged worthy of others’ continued support or respect on the basis of their demonstrated capacity to reciprocate the care and generosity of others and, in the case of persons with political ambitions, to promote the welfare or well-being of their followers.

The two most common patterns of investment are characterized by what I call a ‘broad investment policy’ and a ‘narrow investment policy’ (Zimmer 1983 and 1985). The first is aimed at reducing uncertainty and risk, while the second involves taking risks in the hope of maximizing future profits. Although individual strategies reflect the use of both policies in varying degrees, a broad investment policy is the predominant form of investment among wealthier members of the Gende community and persons whose incomes are subject to unpredictable fluctuations, whereas a narrow investment policy is common among the poorest members of the community and persons with steady, but moderate to low income.

Broad investment pattern

A broad investment pattern is one in which an individual invests his or her wealth in a large number of persons representing a wide range of social relations and economic circumstances. For example, the personal network of one successful Big Man in Yandera includes his mother, his three wives and their fourteen children, two married sisters and their families, all the members of his own clan, and numerous cognatic and affinal relations in other Gende clans as well as a number of ‘friends’, or non-relatives. Having invested over the years in the marriages and/or formal education of his own and others’ children, and being ever ready to help his exchange partners fulfil their exchange commitments, this man has amassed a large fund of support and social credit which is at the base of his current
influence and high status. Diversifying his investments among a large number of migrants and villagers, and among young men and women who seemed likely to succeed in finding lucrative employment in town and those who failed at school but were willing to work hard at more traditional pursuits, he has ensured for himself a steady supply of both pigs and cash. By the same means, he has reduced the impact that any one or several of his exchange partners could have on his social and political aspirations should they default on their exchange obligations to him.

For individuals whose incomes fluctuate from year to year, investing small amounts of wealth in a broad range of persons allows them to widen their network of supporters at the same time as the level of their commitment to any one exchange partner is reduced, and therefore easier to maintain during periods of low income. Not a few of the men who once earned high salaries at the mining camp made the mistake of investing their wages in only one or two highly competitive exchange relationships or in marriages involving large brideprices. Counting on their incomes remaining constant and failing to use their wages to build a broad base of support for themselves, they have since been embarrassed by their inability to maintain their former level of exchange. In 1982, for example, the wife of an unemployed mine worker left him for another man. Her relatives took custody of the couple’s only child, an act which was justified by her ex-husband’s failure to complete payment of her brideprice and the large childwealth payment which was expected after the birth of the couple’s first child.

Persons whose incomes are irregular because their migrant children are intermittently employed or otherwise unable to send home regular remittances face similar problems. In order to counter the effects of uncertainty upon their other exchange relations, many such persons automatically invest small amounts of whatever income they do receive in as many individuals as possible. Thus, when major exchange payments are due, it is relatively easy for them to cash in on such minimal investments, since all but the poorest members of the Gende community can, at short notice, come up with K10 or K20.

A corollary of the investment pattern described above is the involvement of many Gende in card playing (Zimmer 1986). By promoting a flow of cash throughout Gende society (see Table 5.2), card playing gives less wealthy players both the means and the opportunity to extend their range of daily social contacts. At the same time, by giving other players a chance to increase their income, wealthier men and women are able to defuse resentment over their greater wealth and to restore social relations with exchange partners who have been avoiding them out of a sense of shame over unpaid exchange debts.

For persons who cannot depend upon their incomes remaining constant, card playing is seen as an almost risk-free investment opportunity, since putting money into the gambling pool for others to use does not commit a card player to any long-term, formal social obligations. Although card players face the possibility that they may not be able to win their money back when they have need of it, having financed the game network they enjoy the support of other card players, who lend them money or extend their credit by ignoring overdue exchange payments.
Narrow investment pattern

A narrow investment pattern is one in which individuals invest wealth in a small number of persons, usually their own children and closest kin and in-laws. For example, one man in Yandera, who earns a small but steady income from his work as a mission helper, invests most of his money in his older children’s secondary education. The remaining income is spent on rice and tinned fish to supplement his family’s daily diet of sweet potatoes and other vegetables in order to, as he put it, raise ‘bigger and healthier children’. Most of the pigs he and his wife have raised have gone to pay back formal debts to his wife’s relatives, a sister’s husband, his mother’s brothers, and his father’s mother’s brothers (following the death of his father). Very few have been invested in the marriages or other exchange activities of his fellow clan members.

Like many narrow investors, this man hopes that, by delaying his involvement in clan activities and investing in his children’s education and physical well-being, he will be the primary beneficiary of his children’s future success in the urban job market. When that time comes, he expects to switch from a narrow investment policy to a broader one, thereby achieving greater prestige and a more secure position in village society. The risks involved in such a policy, however, are several: children may fail to complete their education or to find lucrative employment, and thus be unable to reciprocate their parents’ investment; and narrow investors cannot rely on other villagers to support them in times of crisis, such as when sorcery accusations are levelled against them or they are in danger of losing land rights.

For individuals with little or no income, a narrow investment policy is often a matter of necessity rather than choice. Unable to pay back their debts or to invest in a large network of supporters, most such individuals invest what little income they receive, in addition to their labour and/or pigs, in the exchange activities of one or several influential men and women. By doing so, they gain some protection from the ill-will of other community members and may retain their rural option. Their children, however, face the prospect of permanent migration, since poorer village households are often the first to alienate their children’s land rights by granting such rights to more prosperous villagers or migrants.

Although some narrow investors stubbornly avoid playing cards, others invest small amounts of cash in the gambling pool as a means of bettering both their financial situation and relations with other villagers. Indeed, a significant portion of some of the poorer households’ income in Yandera comes from gambling (see Table 5.2).

Investing in tomorrow

Although Gende investment patterns are played out in the context of present social and economic realities, they are oriented towards the future. For some villagers and migrants, the future holds the promise of untold riches and increased options. Two such individuals are leading men in the Gende community, the fathers of many children, and the centres of large networks of exchange partners and supporters. They are also the owners or proprietors of large parcels of land.

One of the two men has, in recent years, been involved in a scheme to acquire rights to land in the vicinity of his oldest wife’s home village. The land in...
question is the site of a proposed cobalt, chromite and nickel mine, which is expected to be one of the largest such mines in the world. Transferring his land rights in Yandera to his sons and brothers' children in return for large sums of cash and numerous pigs, by 1982 he had invested sufficient 'capital' in members of his wife's clan to be able to move his three wives and younger children to his oldest wife's village and to begin planting gardens on his new land. Although several of his older sons and nephews were employed migrants who had little use for their newly acquired land in Yandera, they have benefited from the 'rent' they are receiving from land-poor tenants. Furthermore, now that the road is completed, they are planning to plant cardamom on the land and to install their wives and younger brothers as the caretakers of their 'plantations'.

The second of the two men often claims he has no land, though his mother and three wives make gardens on land to which he has unquestioned rights on the basis of his past investments in the former owners' exchange activities. In 1982, when one of Sam's (a fictitious name) clan brothers returned to Yandera after being in town for thirteen years, he (the clan brother) discovered that the land he and his wife expected to make gardens on - land which had long before been set aside for him by one of his father's brothers - was being used by one of Sam's three wives. In the ensuing conflict, Sam's rights to the land were validated by public opinion, and the younger man was informed by his father's brothers that he had lost any rights he may have had in the land when he failed to contribute money to his deceased father's brother's mortuary ceremony (which was largely financed by Sam) or to reciprocate the past investments of his kinsmen.

According to Sam, one of his primary reasons for practising a broad investment policy is so his children will be free to choose between a prosperous existence in town or an equally prosperous life in the village. By investing wealth received from past investments in an ever-expanding network of relations, Sam has created a fund of credit which his sons will be able to capitalize on long after his death. Should his sons show scholastic ability, their school fees will be paid for by their father's creditors. On the other hand, should they fail at school or have an interest in becoming farmers and cash croppers, they will have easy access to land.

There have been a number of factors involved in the high rate of out-migration among the Gende, not least of which has been an inequitable distribution of income among Gende households and the inability of many Gende to fulfil their exchange obligations and to retain land rights and the support of village exchange partners. While the Gende hoped that development would change this situation by providing new sources of cash income and employment, there are some indications that it may very well increase existing inequality and lead to even greater rates of out-migration in the future.

Although both broad and narrow investors have attempted to manage the effects of inequality on their lives in ways which they had hoped would bring them the greatest opportunities and benefits, only those with large land reserves seem likely to profit from development. Pinning their hopes on their children some day doing well in town, many narrow investors have mortgaged their rights in all but a few parcels of land in order to finance their children's education. Like villagers whose land holdings have been eroded by inflation and the loss of
exchange payments from unemployed migrants, they are not in a position to take full advantage of the opening of the road and improved opportunities for marketing cash crops. By contrast, land-rich villagers and absentee landlords have the added advantage of both cash-cropping incomes and rent monies with which to defend their prerogatives and to invest in even greater acquisition of land and prestige.

Furthermore, although I have yet to carry out a full-scale survey of current migration patterns, there does not appear to be any significant reversal in the flow of out-migration from the Gende region. Although a few land-rich migrants have chosen to return home to participate in developing their land, others have delegated that task to relatives, preferring to hold on to their jobs and continue enjoying the benefits of town (e.g. better health care and educational opportunities for their children, and a more varied social life). Even among less wealthy migrants, for whom town is a daily struggle to find money to live on, there appear to be few who are overly anxious to return home. While some of these migrants fear the retribution of angry creditors, others have expressed the opinion that there is not enough money to be made by returning home and that they prefer living in town to helping others get rich from their labours.

Although the Gende situation is unusual for the high degree of inequality which occurred before rural development, the general process of alienation and increasing stratification is not unique. In other areas of Melanesia, where cash cropping has long been established and land is increasingly expensive in terms of the rising costs of related exchange payments, there is evidence of a growing class of proletarians, either rural or urban. Writing of the Weasisi in Vanuatu, Bastin (1985:176) noted that there was a ‘growing class of rural proletarians who retain their village base only through periodic wage labour in town’. Owing to the Weasisi’s strong attachment to their village and their belief that there is no advantage in urban settlement, many Weasisi men (unlike the Gende) are employed by fellow villagers, resulting in an emerging ‘system of stratification based on cash-oriented relationships’ (Bastin 1985:177, 190). For the Siwai people of Bougainville, Connell also suggested that, although there is as yet no committed urban-industrial proletariat among the Siwai, as conditions of employment worsen (at the Bougainville copper mine and elsewhere in Papua New Guinea), and young men and other Siwai no longer have access to high mine earnings which now enable them to develop local cocoa plantations or to finance such village social obligations as mourning feasts, such a proletariat will emerge (Connell 1985a:147; cf. Connell 1988e).

In the light of such findings, it would seem that as much attention should be given to factors which promote economic and social differentiation in Melanesian societies as is being given to factors which, at least for the time being, permit circular mobility rather than permanent migration (e.g. Chapman and Prothero 1985a). As I have tried to show with the Gende, in societies where competition is an integral part of the social system and land rights are achieved and not given, external conditions (e.g. an inequitable distribution of urban remittances) that give advantage to some and not others set in motion a process that results in more permanent kinds of inequality, which in turn contributes to further migration.
Circular labour migration is a significant means by which rural Pacific peoples have become involved in the modern world (Chapman and Prothero 1985b; New Zealand Coalition for Trade and Development 1982). Rural residents, encouraged by structural forces and motivated by various personal desires, migrate to work sites, usually in or near urban areas. There they exchange their labour power for wages, and eventually, after periods of absence that vary in duration, return home. Some portion of the income earned usually is remitted to the village of origin, being either sent by post or messenger or carried home by returning workers. It is common for migrants to 'circulate' between home and job several times during their wage-earning careers.

The influence of rural-urban migration, and the corresponding urban-rural remittance flow, on rural development is the focus of much debate. Some observers view the net flow of benefits as favouring the rural areas: urban wage employment is seen as an opportunity for 'surplus' or 'under-employed' rural labour to earn money that can be used to finance agricultural improvements and new economic ventures (e.g. Berg 1965; Byres 1979; Stark 1980). Other investigators argue that remittance income more often supports participation in regional exchange systems and consumption of imported commercial goods, and rarely stimulates the economic transformations necessary for local development (e.g. Connell et al. 1976; Lipton 1980; Rempel and Lobdell 1978; Shankman 1978).

* The research reported here was conducted on three separate field trips in 1970 (3 months), 1971-72 (16 months), and 1981 (1 month). Sponsorship of the Cora Black Foundation (1970), the US National Institute of Mental Health (1971-72), and the Government of Papua New Guinea (1981) is gratefully acknowledged. I am obviously indebted to the people of Irakia village who spent many hours with me discussing the issues and providing the data presented in this chapter.

1 This usage of 'remittance' corresponds to that proposed by Connell et al. (1976:30) which extends the usual scope of the term to include not only income sent home by migrant workers during their absence, but also 'savings brought back by returning migrants, and any reverse flows of either remittances or savings in cash or kind'.

CIRCULATION, REMITTANCES, AND THE CONTROL OF INEQUALITY IN AN EASTERN HIGHLANDS COMMUNITY, PAPUA NEW GUINEA

DAVID J. BOYD
It is difficult to assess the net effect of labour circulation on donor communities. Transfers between rural and urban areas, as Connell (1981:230-1) reminds us, involve more than simply quantifiable monetary flows. Individual migrants may acquire skills, status and experience, but the community may lose potential leaders and suffer various social disruptions. Moreover, opportunities to sell their labour are not likely to be available to all members of the community. Such unequal access to the rewards of labour can undermine local authority structures and increase the extent of socio-economic inequality. While those stressing the beneficial effects of labour migration may view such changes as necessary concomitants of rural 'modernization', opponents hold that erosion of authority and increase of inequality thwart the aims of enlightened development efforts by destroying community cohesion and weakening the ability of rural residents to represent their own interests collectively.

This academic and policy debate is mirrored in confrontations occurring within many rural communities. The topics of contention are similar: structural constraints on participation in new economic opportunities, challenges to traditional village authority, and the threat of growing household inequality. In many areas, the debate is well advanced, as evidenced by the overwhelming influence of governmental authority and rising inequality fostered by the success of a few talented entrepreneurs. In other areas, such as the one to be discussed below, the debate is just commencing.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore an aspect of this debate among the Irakia Awa people of Papua New Guinea concerning the control and distribution of wage earnings remitted by circular labour migrants. In this relatively remote rural area, the demand for cash is increasing, but opportunities to earn money locally remain few. As a result, remittances are an important source of income. Those migrants who return to the village are strongly urged to distribute their accumulated savings among the local population - social pressures which migrants attempt to resist. The desire of returnees to be the chief beneficiaries of the product of their own labour puts them in direct conflict with the intentions of the established community leadership to control the actions and resources of all village members for the perceived benefit of the entire group. When new forms of wealth challenge old structures of power, social disharmony results.

The context of limited opportunity

Since first contact with an Australian exploratory patrol in 1947, Irakians have received few benefits from the capitalist economy expanding around them. Living in a mountainous region of Okapa District, Eastern Highlands Province (Figures 5.1 and 6.1), the roughly 270 members of this community remain relatively isolated, subsistence-oriented cultivators on the periphery of the encroaching capitalist system. They do grow small amounts of coffee, but marketing this cash crop entails a five-hour walk to the nearest vehicular road. There are no traders in the vicinity. Access to all government services is intermittent and no Irakian has ever been to school. In essence, there is little likelihood that local economic activity will alter the existing structure of inequality in this community.

Village life, although little improved by recent changes, has not been unaffected (cf. Clarke 1980). Colonial pacification efforts and the more recent expansion of a national political system have diminished local autonomy and
altered the nature of inter-community relations. Involvement in the monetary economy has produced even more pervasive changes. Since at least the time of contact, there has been an intense demand for commercially manufactured goods, especially steel tools, blankets, clothing, food and cooking utensils. These new consumer demands, along with the founding of small regional market centres, rapidly led to the distortion and disintegration of traditional inter-village trade systems. By the late 1960s, cash had become a major medium of exchange and a required item in all Irakian bridewealth payments.

Opportunities to earn sufficient amounts of cash while residing in Irakia have not kept pace with demand. Coffee trees were first planted about 1963, and are now the most important source of locally-earned cash. Nonetheless, Irakian involvement in coffee production remains modest. In 1972 the total community income from coffee sales was less than K440 with an average household tending only sixty trees, a fraction of the average holding of 359 trees estimated for Eastern Highlands households in 1973 (Wilson and Evans 1975:11). The boom in
coffee prices in the mid-1970s stimulated planting of new trees but, by 1981, coffee prices had again dropped to relatively low levels, confirming the Irakian view that coffee is an unreliable source of income. A generous estimate is that coffee earnings by Irakians in the early 1980s were perhaps twice the level of 1972, an amount insufficient to meet the needs of most households. Without significant improvements in local processing and transportation facilities, income from coffee production is unlikely to cause marked inequality between households in this community.

Most other means of earning cash locally appear even more limited. The demand for high-quality black palm bows and carved arrows produced by Irakians has declined drastically with the reduction of inter-village warfare. Also, trade in bird-of-paradise plumes has all but ceased in Irakia. The birds are rarely seen on village lands and traditional trade routes from more southerly forests have diverted to regional market centres. One such market, located in Okapa, provides an outlet for the occasional sale of Irakian garden produce, especially peanuts. Such a marketing venture, however, involves a twenty-hour round-trip walk and seems, therefore, an unlikely option for significant expansion of cash earning opportunities.

Commercial singing, begun in the late 1970s (Boyd 1985), are thought by Irakians to hold great promise for increasing local incomes. Singsing bisnis, as it is known, involves participating as a community in a series of coordinated dance festivals that move from village to village on successive weekly, or fortnightly, occasions during the coffee harvesting flush. A sponsor in each community builds a dance ground enclosure and collects an admission fee from each person who attends. Other members of the host village sell their own cooked pork, garden produce and other items to the dancers and assorted revellers who attend from neighbouring communities. With good weather and a reasonably strong coffee market, a sponsor can expect to exceed K1000 (A$1250) in gate receipts from a single event. Most men will never have the opportunity to sponsor such a lucrative gathering, so singing bisnis does have the potential to increase local income inequality.

Constraints and patterns of participation in labour migration

The demand for money and commercial goods in Irakia, combined with the dearth of opportunities to earn cash locally has made the sale of labour an important source of income. Participation in labour migration, however, is constrained by the accessibility and structure of employment opportunities and by the demands of maintaining a viable home community. To date, only Irakian men have sought employment and they usually go in small groups to minimum wage, unskilled jobs. Earnings usually are not sufficient to support a worker and his family at the job site, so most migrants retain an economic as well as an emotional stake in the village and periodically ‘circulate’ between job and home (cf. Salisbury and Salisbury 1972; Strathern 1977). In fact, repatriation of such agreement workers is explicit government policy (Fitzpatrick 1978). With wages

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2 See Connell (1981:236-41) for a good comparative summary of available data on the contributions of remittances to community and household incomes in the South Pacific.
set below the cost of social reproduction, women and other non-migrants who remain in the village must maintain a local socio-economic system capable of meeting basic subsistence needs (see Connell 1984). By so doing, they indirectly contribute a 'subsistence subsidy' to wage employers. The labour requirements of the village-based system also constrain participation in wage employment. A substantial amount of male labour is essential for subsistence production and this requires some control of the number of men allowed to leave the village at any given time. To avoid serious problems, rural residents must carefully integrate the flow of labour to wage employment and the requirements of local production activities (Boyd 1981). The rural household, then, 'straddles the village economy and the urban/plantation sectors' (Curtain 1981:203) in a condition Burawoy (1976) calls 'dual dependency'.

The pattern of wage labour participation by Irakian men over nearly three decades to 1981 exhibits a general form characteristic of highlands Papua New Guinea (cf. May and Skeldon 1977; Ward 1971). Their initial experience of work was as carriers and interpreters on government exploratory patrols in the 1950s. By the late 1950s Irakian men were venturing further from home to seek employment as pick-and-shovel labourers at regional government stations in Kainantu and Wonenara and as seasonal harvesters on coffee plantations near Kainantu. More recently, they have worked at coffee and tobacco processing enterprises in the main valleys of the Eastern Highlands. The duration of such casual employment ranges from a few hours to several months, but normal village production activities are not much affected by these short-term absences. Earnings are low, but all able-bodied Irakian men participate in this type of employment at some point in their lives.

In mid-1963, Irakian men began their participation in the government-sponsored Highlands Labour Scheme (HLS) contract labour program. Workers initially were recruited in the village for a two-year term of employment served, in most instances, on coastal plantations. Irakian participation in this form of employment peaked in the late 1960s, and declined sharply in the early 1970s. Most young Irakian men, however, still sign on for at least one contract tour. Although wage rates for contract labour are low, deferred earnings paid to workers on completion of contracts have provided the largest source of externally earned cash to enter the Irakian economy.

As their enthusiasm for contract labour declined, Irakian men increased their efforts to secure casual employment as independent migrants. Indeed, by mid-1981, all men absent from Irakia were engaged in or searching for this type of work. While offering higher prestige and earning potential, success in this labour market requires considerable work experience and knowledge of job opportunities. Some ready cash also is essential as search costs, especially transportation and living expenses, must be borne by the migrants. Once hired, independent workers are often responsible for procuring their own food, clothing and housing. With such requirements, individuals from distant rural communities, like Irakia, find it difficult to succeed in this labour market. Nonetheless, Irakian men have turned increasingly to this type of employment (see Table 6.1). Earnings are relatively high for those who obtain long-term employment and a few Irakians have held such jobs for more than a decade. Little of these earnings, however, is remitted to the village. As Strathern (1975) has pointed out for urban-based Hageners, transportation costs to the job sites,
urban living expenses, and relatives visiting from home are a considerable drain on casual workers' incomes. Indeed, increasingly, many hopeful Iraqi job-seekers return home having spent more money searching for work than they were able to earn, a source of embarrassment and disappointment for themselves and their families.

Table 6.1  Contract and casual labour migration of Iraqi men, 1963-81

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mid-1963 to mid-1972</th>
<th>Mid-1972 to mid-1981</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contract labour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of participants</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total man-years</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casual labour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of participants</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total man-years</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's fieldwork.

Remittances and the control of inequality

A major problem posed by a high degree of reliance on remitted earnings is that the ability to exploit this earning option is largely limited to one segment of the population, namely able-bodied men. Within this group, young single men predominate as migrants: of the 138 labour contracts entered by Iraqi men from 1963 to 1981, 98 (71 per cent) were signed by never-married men, all of whom are under 30 years of age. The skewed opportunity structure and participation pattern afford a possible means for the unequal accumulation of wealth by young men. To avoid this, non-migrants must get the remitted earnings out of the pockets of returnees and into the village economy. With this accomplished, the established inequalities of the existing social order are reinforced. Not surprisingly for a highlands community (cf. Strathern 1979), the ideology of social exchange is readily expanded to encompass the new circumstances.

Non-migrants view the returning migrants as arriving home in a state of indebtedness which requires the distribution of some portion of their remitted earnings. Since young never-married men formerly did not participate in exchange activities, the new strategy requires that some relationships and events which previously would not have established specific payment obligations now be accepted as grounds for reciprocal reimbursement claims. Parents and older siblings stake their claims on the responsibility they shouldered in rearing a future migrant to adulthood. Although there is no tradition of formal payment for such acts of guardianship, there is a sense of sharing and mutual support

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3 This percentage is identical for the 1963-72 (74 of 104) and 1972-81 (24 of 34) periods. The data also show that never-married men account for the bulk of casual employment by independent migrants, but this pattern may result from delays in marriage due to long-term absences from Iraq or from unreported marriages to 'foreign' women at their work sites.
among this group of close relatives that most young men accept and wisely respect. A youth’s relationship to his mother’s brothers is of special significance. Mother’s brothers provide for the child and his mother for a short period following birth (Boyd and Ito 1986), preside over the infant’s naming ceremony, and protect the young man from serious harm during painful male initiation rituals (Newman and Boyd 1982). When a migrant returns home, his mother’s brothers again protect his person by performing rituals of reintegration. Throughout a man’s life, mother’s brothers ideally are major benefactors on whose support he can count, especially during disputes with his own patrikin. Traditional payments involving this relationship flow between the boy’s father and the boy’s mother’s brothers, but at present men who have responsibly performed their avuncular duties expect to receive some remuneration from the earnings of a sister’s son (cf. Lewis 1980:187-90).

A means used to remind migrants of their obligations just before their leaving the village is to mourn their departure and give them presents for the journey. Such gifts typically include favoured foods and various items thought to magically protect the bearer from disease and misfortune. With enough advance notice of departure, someone may kill and cook a pig to honour the men soon to leave the village. All of these acts of grief and kindness will burden the future remitted earnings of these men.

During a migrant’s absence from the community, he may also incur certain debts. For example, a thoughtful relative may choose a wife for an absent migrant and make a betrothal payment on his behalf; or a close relative may die and those who help perform a proper burial will expect a mortuary payment when the migrant returns. A married migrant also commonly asks one of his wife’s close kinsmen to look after his wife, children, pigs and coffee trees during his absence; assuming this caretaking responsibility is fulfilled to the satisfaction of the migrant, the guardian of his household can expect a small payment.

On re-entering the village following an extended absence, returnees are the subjects of much attention and hospitality (cf. Hayano 1979). Friends and relatives from other villages come to visit and admire them. Everyone brings them food, enquires as to their general health, and advises them to take it easy until they have regained their strength and readjusted to village life. Occasionally, a pig or some chickens are killed for a welcoming feast. The returnees strut about the village in their urban dress playing transistor radios at full volume and regaling listeners with stories of their adventures. At the same time, they gradually distribute goods and money to those they favour.

During this re-entry period, which may last up to one month, returnees also must observe certain activity restrictions. They are not allowed to enter subsistence gardens for fear that local crops may be harmed by ‘foreign spirits’ adhering to their bodies. They also may not spend time with their wives since their absence is thought to have made them physically weak and vulnerable to the dangers associated with sexual intercourse. The end of the re-entry period is marked by older non-migrants who take returnees to a ceremonial site and perform a ritual very similar to male initiation. Harmful spirits are washed from their skin and the common practices of nose bleeding, cane swallowing, and penis laceration are performed to promote strength and continued well-being. Returnees are then pronounced fit to resume daily routines appropriate to their
sex and age. Matrilateral kinsmen who conduct these rituals of reintegration can expect compensation from the returnees.

With the above array of social pressures and demands aimed at the newly acquired wealth of the returned migrants, the ability to retain earnings for personal use is limited. The impulse to accumulate savings in anticipation of future needs is eventually weakened by social pressures couched in the idiom of exchange. To ignore the expectation of presenting 'gifts' or to refuse the payment of assumed obligations is to risk losing future support of friends and relatives in such crucial activities as exchange, bridewealth poolings, subsistence production and personal altercations. The authority of older community leaders, though challenged on many fronts, is still sufficient to make continued residence in Irakia impossible for those who earn their eminy.

Circular migrants, nonetheless, do attempt in several ways to reduce the drain on their remitted earnings. Often a group of young men secretly plan to depart unannounced from the village in search of work. On the appointed day, they quietly slip away before dawn, hoping thereby to avoid the obligating gifts and mourning rituals that assuredly would accompany a public announcement. Smaller groups may use a different tactic: they openly walk to town for a variety of announced intentions, such as going to the store or visiting friends; once there, they sign a labour contract. Older non-migrants may foil such spontaneous departures by sending along younger children with any suspected group of young men making a trip to town. Community leaders may also physically intervene to stop young men from leaving the village when many men are already absent. Such actions by non-migrants are not intended, as Strathern (1972) noted for Hageners, to discourage labour migration, but to control it (cf. Lewis 1980:209-11).

Solicited opinions of non-migrants concerning the validity of their claims to some portion of migrants' remitted earnings always stress the responsibilities younger men have to help their elders. The older residents point out that they worked hard raising these young people to adulthood and now these wage earners have a chance to return this assistance by distributing a generous portion of their earnings. They stress the fact that non-migrants alone maintain and protect the village and its members while workers are away: when migrants return, their houses are still standing, their families, pigs and coffee are generally in good shape, and there is plenty of food to eat. 'Without our help,' one informant emphatically stated, 'there would be no village to which they could return.'

The opinion of returned migrants concerning their obligations is somewhat different. They agree that friends and relatives who made gifts in their honour should be reimbursed for their generosity. Similarly, people who looked after their families and property during their absence should be paid for this assistance. They also accept the notion that they are obliged to help those close relatives who nurtured and raised the to adulthood. In the last case, however, returnees generally do not agree that this obligation, incurred during childhood, requires periodic compensation: once a wage earner has shared his earnings with these individuals, the debt should be considered paid. One returnee summarized the view commonly shared by returned agreement workers: 'The first time I come back, I give some of my money to everyone who was good to me while I was growing up. The second time, I use the money to buy my wife. The third time, the money is mine.'
Few returned migrants are able even to approximate this idealized plan of earnings allocation. Average remittance distributions recalled by Irakian men who had completed sixty-five labour contracts show that 30 per cent of remitted earnings was distributed as gifts to village residents within a few days of returning to the community (Table 6.2). This cash was quite widely spread among residents with the average returnee sharing his earnings with nine people. Another 13 per cent was given as contributions to various ceremonial payments and bridewealth accumulations. An additional 10 per cent was spent on personal items and council taxes. The average balance of 46 per cent retained as savings by these Irakian returnees is nearly equal to that of the ‘typical’ Siane returnees in an earlier period (Salisbury 1962:128-9). This broad situation has continued into the 1980s.

Table 6.2  Irakian contract labour remittances allocation, 1963-72 (N = 65)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remittance allocations</th>
<th>Amount (kina)</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local distributions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gifts and obligations</td>
<td>1,075</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceremonial contributions</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant’s bridewealth</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total local distributions</td>
<td>1,562</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal consumption</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council taxes</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditures</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total retained earnings</td>
<td>1,756</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total remitted income</td>
<td>31,760(^a)</td>
<td>57(^a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)These totals do not sum accurately owing to rounding
Source: Author’s fieldwork.

Conclusion

The Irakia Awa, like members of many remote societies in the developing world, have few options for participation in the development process unfolding around them. Their marginal incorporation within the global economy is based largely on the sale of the labour of young men who periodically migrate out of the village for wage employment. Since wage rates generally are below the cost of social reproduction, participation in this labour circulation is sustained by exploiting the efforts of women and other non-migrants who maintain a viable village economy to which most workers eventually return. This dual dependency causes social conflict between the migrants, who wish to retain control of their remitted earnings, and the non-migrants, who invoke the prevailing exchange ideology to declare much of the remitted wages as an obligation to others. Returnees resist the asserted indebtedness, but cannot ignore the social pressures to share their earnings.
Remittance income has yet to produce any semblance of development in Irakia. None of these earnings has been invested in productive activities capable of generating sustained cash incomes, so no economic transformation has occurred. Neither have remittances fostered greater income inequalities among community members since much of this wealth is channelled into the local exchange economy controlled by village leaders. Rather, this particular source of wealth has caused an elaboration of the local ideology of social exchange that serves to maintain the existing structure of social inequality.
Recent theoretical developments have led to significant improvements in the quality of analysis and comprehension of causes and patterns of international economic and political inequality. Analysis moved beyond 'modernization' theory as dependency models and their intellectual descendants focused on the economic linkages which tie Third World nations into the world system. The earliest of these models over-stated the importance of economic dependence and under-stated the significance of local response to incorporation into the world capitalist system. Early attempts to demonstrate that capitalism caused under-development focused on the devices by which developed nations at the core exploited hapless developing nations at the periphery and led to fairly crude typifications of capital, core and periphery.

Critiques of dependency theory pointed to the general neglect of socio-cultural factors which mediated the impact of capitalist penetration on pre-capitalist states. Of specific concern was the theory's treatment, or rather neglect, of modes of production and of class structure within these states. As Higgott (1983:65) notes:

For dependency theory and world systems theory, with their emphasis on unequal exchange relations between a core and periphery, social classes became synonymous with geographical entities and problems of inequality and deprivation, thus making the prospect of any useful class analysis extremely unlikely.

Attention focused increasingly on the role of internal socio-political factors in defining the pattern of their development, and the elaboration of these factors has produced increasingly sophisticated formulations of class formation and the articulation of modes of production.

*I am indebted to La'ava Macpherson for thoughtful comments and perceptive critique at every stage of this paper: Malo le ona'i, ua so'o le fau.
The scrutiny of the classes that form as a consequence of the penetration of capitalism and of associated social, political and economic inequalities, while beneficial, has at times diverted attention from inequalities which develop in pre-capitalist sectors of these social formations as an indirect consequence of their exposure to the world capitalist system. These inequalities can disrupt social relations within these sectors and prevent them from responding to the very initiatives which might transform patterns of inequality. There is, however, much to be gained from a study of the process of class formation in Pacific states; the ways in which it has shaped, and been shaped by, capitalist penetration; and the extent to which it resembles processes elsewhere. Yet it is crucial that there also be parallel consideration of patterns of inequality that are developing in subsistence and mixed-subsistence sectors which might be overlooked in such an analysis because of their apparently tangential connection with the world capitalist system. This chapter seeks to establish the importance of this parallel analysis by examining the case of Western Samoa.

Western Samoa is an independent Pacific state, with a predominantly Polynesian population estimated at 158,130 in 1981 (Connell 1983i:16), living on two large islands (Upolu and Savai'i) of recent volcanic origin and three smaller islands, which, with one other uninhabited islet, have an area of 2935 sq. km. Some 81 per cent of this land is held in customary title, and controlled by the heads of extended families (matai). An estimated 21 per cent of the population resides in and around the port town of Apia, and the remaining population in some 300 villages, ranging in size from 200 to 500 people, on the coastal regions (Walsh 1982). In the foothills behind these villages, taro, copra, cocoa, coffee and bananas are cultivated and cattle grazed (Ward and Proctor 1980:395ff.). Agriculture dominates the domestic economy. Fifty per cent of the GDP is generated by agriculture and of this 70 per cent comes from the subsistence sector in which 70 per cent of the total workforce is involved (Fairbairn 1985:303-4). The absence of significant natural resources, a very limited industrial base and a rapid decline in the prospects for emigration mean that a considerable part of the Western Samoan population, with declining economic growth rates and restructuring elsewhere, will remain within this rural sector and will therefore come under the control of those whose power derives from traditional principles of gerontocracy and traditional criteria of competence. This sector has had little direct exposure to the world capitalist system and yet that contact has had quite profound effects on the distribution of the opportunities and perception of those opportunities in that sector. Inequality in this sector have become consolidated and have in the process blocked opportunities for mobility of young Samoans in that sector. Analysis of the articulation of modes of production can sharpen our understanding of the consequences of dependency in the Pacific by allowing us to identify sectors within sectors.

In Western Samoa dependency has had very different consequences for groups within a single sector. The distribution of power in the traditionally organized rural, agricultural sector seems to have been consolidated and even enhanced by dependency. But these gains may have created tensions which will lead eventually to challenges to that power and widespread social change. Specifically, the concentration of power in the hands of older, and more traditional, people has occurred in this sector as an indirect consequence of its contact with the world capitalist system. Furthermore, the same process has disadvantaged younger
rural Western Samoans by reducing their opportunities for access to power. The argument derives from a study of the causes of a rapid increase in the rate of adolescent suicide in Western Samoa (Macpherson and Macpherson 1985, 1987) which emphasized that the contraction of the New Zealand economy, the main destination of Samoan migrants, has had a marked impact on village life, as one would expect in a small dependent country. It has transformed the lifestyle and life chances of younger people and their perception of their future, but has had much less impact on the lifestyles and life chances of older people and on their perceptions of their future. While the young, who believed that wage employment and emigration would permit them greater social and economic freedom, see their life chances deteriorating, they may become pessimistic. Older people, for whom wage employment and migration hold little attraction, have less reason to do so. The differential impact results from the fact that continued acceptance of the legitimacy of gerontocracy ensured its continued control of resources which has in turn enabled its own persistence. The gerontocracy control resource flows and revenues within the village economy which can be divided crudely into two categories: those that originate inside the village and those that originate outside the village.

During expansionary phases in the world economy, labour from the village migrated and remitted funds to the village. This led to an increase in the sources and volume of the resources controlled by the elders, and an increased number and range of elders benefited from migration and remittances (Shankman 1976), as migrants typically remit most to those to whom they consider they have the greatest debt, those whose 'sweat they have eaten', who tend to be their parents. These resources were invested, in many cases, in activities intended to maintain and enhance parents' social and political status within the village, either directly or indirectly (Macpherson 1974, 1981). Thus while migration generated considerable resource flows in the village, decisions about their use were largely controlled by older people. Declining migration opportunities for young Samoans have emphasized the gap between expectations and opportunities, have increased frustrations and led to a declining commitment to 'traditional' social values and structures. In gerontocratic societies such as Western Samoa, where youth are not entitled to challenge the existing distribution of power, conflict resolution procedures are either ill-defined or non-existent and conflicts tend to remain unresolved. This heightens youthful disillusionment with their society and young people's place in it, hence the society will be less able to respond to the sorts of development initiatives which might result in reduced dependence, even if this were a goal at either national or local level. This chapter focuses on the factors which have transformed both chances and the perception of those chances.

Demographic factors

Population density. Population growth may place increased pressure on resources where it occurs in a stagnant economy (Western Samoa, Government 1982:2) and is associated with decreases in available per capita resource levels. Increased population density leads to a reduction in the available per capita land resource when all other things are equal. This is significant in understanding the situation of youth in Western Samoa for reasons set out below.
In the period from 1971 to 1981 population density rose slightly, during a period of emigration, from 52.7 to 54 persons/square kilometre, but the national figure masks significant regional variations. Between 1971 and 1976 urban population densities increased from 501 to 531 persons/square kilometre, and in Northwest Upolu from 141 to 146 persons/square kilometre (6 and 3.5 per cent respectively). Population density is now at its highest level ever and looks set to grow further as a consequence of reduced emigration.

Population density influences the life chances of youth, who are primarily dependent on village agriculture, by placing constraints on available land and other resources. Continued growth of the order recorded in the pre-migration era of the early 1960s would have resulted in severe pressure on resources in this sector. The growth of the New Zealand and US economies produced opportunities for emigration which eased the rate of growth and the pressure on resources. Recession in both economies has indirectly resulted in increased pressure on Samoan land resources. This has been made more serious by the fact that slow growth in the wage and salary sector of the Western Samoan economy in the recent past has meant that more school leavers have been unable to find jobs in that sector and have had to remain on the land. The Western Samoan government's own estimates of growth in this area, which assumed continuing emigration, forecast a growth in formal unemployment from 1350 to a minimum of 2400 in the period 1980-84 (Western Samoa, Economic Development Department 1980:14-15). In fact, a reduction in the rate of permanent emigration has pushed this figure upwards significantly. Those who cannot find wage employment can, and do, return to village agriculture, thus those who moved to Apia in search of wage work and failed to find it may add to pressure on resources if and when they choose to return to the rural sector. In some villages around Apia, and in Northwest Upolu, the situation would appear to have deteriorated as pressure on arable land resources has increased in those areas. In villages elsewhere the situation of youth solely dependent on agriculture may in fact have improved slightly, but possibly temporarily, as people have left the more remote regions.

In villages where there is pressure on resources, and particularly land, the opportunities to improve income through increasing production have been limited. This is acknowledged by the Western Samoan government which has pointed to the difficulties facing all who seek to improve their lifestyle in plantation agriculture:

the consumer goods to which the farmer aspires are not within reach without a quantum leap in income, something which he rarely sees as possible in agriculture ... A major constraint is thus that village agriculture as practiced [sic] now is not economically competitive with the wage sector (Western Samoa, Government 1982:32).

Thus young people, who might once have expected to emigrate, are both denied that opportunity and confronted with increasing pressure on available resources at home. This situation is made worse because, as land becomes more scarce, land disputes tend to increase and insecurity of tenure becomes a disincentive to participation in agriculture. Population density alone reveals only part of the picture. A more complete picture emerges when it is coupled with another demographic indicator, the dependency ratio.
Dependency ratio. A clearer impression of the situation of Western Samoan youth may be gained by considering their role in economic activity over time. Changes in dependency ratio, which relates the productive and non-productive sectors of a population, give an indication of the shifts in the load on economically productive members of a society. Growth in the dependency ratio in a stagnant economy typically leads to a decline in the living standards of the economically productive population. This is significant in Western Samoa because rural youth play a significant part in the production of food and capital assets, typically taking the heaviest and most monotonous parts in both plantation agriculture and capital projects. As the 'aumaga' (the body of untitled men) they are at the 'bottom end' of the one-way chain of command (Lockwood 1971). Thus increases in the dependency ratio do not fall equally on all of the 'economically active' population: increases in the ratio tend to fall most heavily on youth.

Western Samoa has one of the highest dependency ratios in the South Pacific, behind only the Cook Islands and Niue. Moreover, the national dependency ratio actually declined in the ten years between 1971 and 1981 which means that, on the surface at least, the situation of the economically active seems to have improved over the period. But economically active Samoans face more difficulties because most work is in village agriculture with fluctuating returns on effort, whereas Cook Island and Niuean economies have proportionately more extensive wage sectors. National figures mask the very considerable range of regional variations (Table 7.1) and even these figures are misleading because they mask significant variations within the regions. Moreover, even dependency ratios are of limited value because responsibility for production does not fall equally on all in the 15-59 year age group. In the village economy, production falls more heavily on younger people and on young untitled men in particular. If one accepts that most food production and heavy work falls on those between 15 and 39 years of age the dependency ratios, while varying regionally, will be very much higher than the official figure. The lot of those in the Apia urban area, who support 2.3 persons, would seem easier than the lot of those in rural villages in the rest of Upolu where each person supports 3.1 persons (Macpherson and Macpherson 1985:72).

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.1</th>
<th>Dependency ratios by region, Western Samoa, 1976</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15 years + 60 years/100-59 years)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apia urban area</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest Upolu</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Upolu</td>
<td>125</td>
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<tr>
<td>Savai’i</td>
<td>122</td>
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Several points follow from this analysis. Samoa has experienced a high birth rate for some time but the rate of population growth was artificially depressed by the high rate of emigration in the late 1960s and the 1970s. The imposition of limits on emigration to American Samoa and New Zealand has almost certainly led to an increased population growth rate in Western Samoa. The Western
Samoan government forecast an actual population growth rate of 1.97 per cent per annum by 1984, which assumed a net emigration of 2000 per annum (Western Samoa, Economic Development Department 1980:13). In fact net emigration has probably been significantly lower and the actual rate of growth probably closer to the forecast 'natural' growth rate of 3.11 per cent per annum (ibid.). In many villages already high dependency ratios, following substantial out-migration, will be forced higher still as the economically inactive component grows faster than the productive one.

Villages which experienced high levels of out-migration may have gained in terms of the potential resources available to them through migrants who settled overseas. But it is not clear that these gains are offset against the effort required of the untitled who remain. In fact, increases in potential resources available through migration seem often to be regarded as net increases and do not necessarily lead to significant reductions in the effort required of those who remain.

Villages often collect and use remittances to create, extend or renew capital assets such as pastors' houses, women's committee meeting houses, village guest houses, churches, school buildings and access roads. Young people are usually called on to provide the labour component of these projects, and to provide additional food for the workforce and gifts to specialist builders and carpenters as contributions in kind. Where extended kin groups use remittances to build or to extend houses and plantations, much of the additional required labour is again provided by young people and particularly the untitled men. In both cases these are over and above their daily contributions to the village economy and the kin group's maintenance. Remittances have generated a new set of projects which have placed additional burdens on young untitled people.

Increases in the dependency ratio thus signal more work for those who remain as the number of persons whom they must maintain increases. Their situation is made worse by the unstable prices for all agricultural commodities except taro (Western Samoa, Government 1982:102); and the increased cost of imports following inflation in countries of origin and the devaluation of the Western Samoan currency. Furthermore, a significant part of the servicing of debts on capital projects has fallen on the working population in a period during which the prices for agricultural products have fallen and the terms of trade index has fallen significantly (Fairbairn 1985:57). Thus, repayment of debts incurred five years ago now consumes considerably more production than might have been foreseen at the time. One young man complained, for instance, that where each member of the 'aumaga' was supposed to provide one basket of copra per week to meet a village debt, each had now to provide four baskets per week to meet it.

New projects are likely to be even more 'expensive' for this group. A decline in real levels of remittances from migrants in New Zealand has set in over the past five years (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, pers. comm., 1987) and the devaluation of the Western Samoan tala has reduced the value of remittances still further. This was inevitable as the New Zealand economy contracted and young migrants married and assumed debts which reduced their disposable income and their ability and willingness to remit. Without young single replacement migrants, who tend to be the most able and reliable remitters (Shankman 1976; Macpherson 1981), the value of remittances was bound to decline. But the period of extended dependence has generated high expectations which do not accommodate new economic realities easily or quickly. If villages and families seek to make up
shortfalls in the domestic economy the task will inevitably fall heavily on the young. Their labour will be required and these calls on their time and energy may well frustrate even limited personal plans and aspirations.

In villages where high out-migration during the 1970s produced high dependency ratios, resentment of the increased effort required by those who remain may be most acute, as those who remain experience a rather stronger sense of relative deprivation than those in villages from which fewer people migrated. Of course, not all who remain are disillusioned or dissatisfied with their lot. The impact of these trends on older people is much less marked because many did not expect to increase their standard of living by emigrating and are therefore largely unaffected by restrictions on emigration; because they are insulated from the impact of increases in dependency ratio by the traditional division of labour; and because they retain control of both traditional resources and those generated by their migrant children.

However, as Graves and Graves (1976) have shown in the Cook Islands, it is not the actual demographic facts which are significant but the perception of those facts. Just as in the Cook Islands, even where demographic facts had not changed, the young believed that they had and judged their situation as less satisfying because of the increased amount of work they believed was required of them. It is likely that the publicity given to the population growth in the media and in birth control programs over the past few years has heightened the impression of a growth rate that is more rapid than the actual rate. The rate of growth may appear most significant to those young literate Samoans who, in growing numbers, seek jobs which do not appear to exist.

The media

Various development plans have attempted to improve Western Samoa's communication infrastructure. Government initiatives resulted in dramatic growth in the number of radios in Samoan homes. Because government retained control of program content, these initiatives have not been a major source of information on alternative lifestyles as analyses of programming show (Western Samoa, Economic Development Department 1980:174). Government studies estimate that although 100 per cent of the population has access to radio, reception of local radio programs is poor for some 45 per cent of the population (ibid.). The unforeseen consequence is that many people tune in to radio transmissions from Pago Pago in American Samoa in which a pseudo-American lifestyle, with a marked emphasis on conspicuous consumption, is presented as normal (Macpherson and Macpherson 1984; Thomas 1984). Increases in both the number of newspapers (from three to six) and in circulation (from 15,000 to 32,000) have occurred from 1971 and 1979 respectively, and Samoana, a weekly Samoan-language paper published in New Zealand and Western Samoa, regularly provides telling comparisons of lifestyles outside, while the situations vacant column contains advertisements for comparable positions in the two countries which graphically illustrate salary differences. Throughout the past two decades the population have been exposed, through formal education, the media, and the return visits of emigrants (Kallen 1983:110), to visions of lifestyles in which economic prosperity is associated with high degrees of personal freedom. For many young rural Samoans expectations of the lifestyles portrayed in the media,
and made possible by educational success, seemed realistic while economic growth at the core generated opportunities for both temporary and permanent emigration.

The growth in numbers of television sets in Western Samoa reflects the availability of television transmission from Pago Pago in American Samoa. More and more Samoans are able to watch a world peopled by the stars of ‘Days of Our Lives’ and ‘Falcon Crest’, interspersed with advertisements depicting an affluent, liberated lifestyle supplied by KRON4 San Francisco. A similar growth in the numbers of fixed and mobile cinemas and in attendances is harder to chart accurately but they are significant because commercial films contain some of the most explicit and visually persuasive alternatives to life in Samoa. The images in films offer alternative visions of specific relationships, some of which explicitly challenge Samoan conceptions of those relationships. Australia and New Zealand are currently competing for the right to supply satellite television transmission to Western Samoa and neither proposal contains significant proportions of locally produced programs. The introduction of home video systems further threatens to overtake even television broadcasts and take control of viewing diets and habits away from the government in the way it has in Fiji.

The impact of growth of media-born alternatives is easy to underestimate yet difficult to establish, but as a source of dissatisfaction with life in rural Samoan society and a source of challenge to traditional distribution of power it deserves closer scrutiny. A situation has emerged in which the aspirations of young Samoans are being raised by the media as their opportunities are eroded. But if the media has portrayed the alternative lifestyles, formal education has been portrayed as the vehicle to their attainment.

Education

Education has been stressed in successive development plans and has received significant shares of government revenue over a long period of time. The investment in education has seen substantial increases in the 1970s, hence the numbers receiving secondary education more than doubled in the decade while the number in tertiary education went from 152 to 497. These people are increasingly exposed to alternatives to rural Samoan society and lifestyle through education, and so develop high expectations of wage employment, and of a way of life that wage employment makes possible. Both government and popular support for and faith in education have led many to believe that it is the key to social mobility, and during the expansionary phase many who succeeded in formal education enjoyed a wider range of opportunities both within and outside Western Samoa.

The contraction of labour demand outside Western Samoa, particularly in New Zealand, and the slow growth of the Samoan economy (Western Samoa, Economic Development Department 1980:2), means that the high expectations of formally educated Samoans are unlikely to be met. It is not even certain that the same range of educational opportunities will in future be available.

If, as a result of reduced emigration, Western Samoa’s population growth results in a larger pre-school population than anticipated and resources cannot be increased to cope with this trend, two courses are available. The simple options are to give more education to fewer people by limiting entry; or to give less education to more people by concentrating available resources at levels of
greatest demand. The importance attributed to education in Samoan society is such that the first option is likely to be unacceptable while the second is likely to have unforeseen consequences. If fewer opportunities for advanced education are available to those who have come to believe that education is the key to social and economic mobility, and to rural communities which have invested heavily in education (Western Samoa, Economic Development Department 1980:164), disillusionment with rural life may be heightened at a time when the only realistic solution to rural stagnation is a sustained attempt to increase and diversify agricultural production. Recent reductions in opportunities for advanced studies overseas, especially in New Zealand, as a result of budgetary constraints in Samoa and immigration regulations in New Zealand, have intensified competition for those places, and produced disappointment among those who might have expected to study overseas. This situation is unlikely to improve. Although the numbers actually affected by these changes in policy are small, the number who believe that their prospects have been reduced is somewhat larger.

Migration

High rates of out-migration over a long period have led to a widespread expectation that many Samoans would leave Western Samoa for varying periods, and reasons, at some time in their lives. It has become, in effect, part of the Samoan life cycle. Even those who expected to spend most of their lives in Samoa often left to put together financial and/or socio-political capital which could set them up at ‘home’. The high rates of movement between Samoa and New Zealand and American Samoa which occurred through the 1960s and 1970s were evidence of this expectation. Kallen noted that 81 per cent of her respondents had one or more relatives overseas; that 63 per cent had been encouraged to migrate by emigrants; that 72 per cent had been visited by emigrants; and that 92 per cent of the emigrants had seemed to be happy with life in their new country (1983:109-11). Over a period of more than twenty years this trend became established as a rite of passage (Bedford and Lloyd 1982). The rapid decline in opportunities for this movement occurred as the world recession set in and demand for unskilled labour declined. As the New Zealand economy slowed, labour demand slackened and immigration became a politically ‘sensitive’ issue; American Samoa moved to limit illegal movements from Western Samoa to American Samoa and the USA; and new immigration regulations limited movements to Australia via New Zealand.1 For those who had come to consider that a period outside Samoa was a reasonable expectation this decline was a blow.

In 1982 Western Samoan hopes were raised briefly when the Privy Council ruled that persons born in Western Samoa during the period in which it was administered by New Zealand were in fact New Zealand citizens and entitled to

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1 It was possible to travel to New Zealand on a holiday permit and then, posing as a New Zealand Maori, to travel to Australia taking advantage of the fact that New Zealanders did not at that time require passports to enter Australia. The imposition of passport requirements for New Zealand citizens entering Australia closed this increasingly popular route. A similar route to the United States via American Samoa was closed at about the same time. Western Samoans had travelled to American Samoa and worked until ‘obtaining’ documentation before moving illegally to Hawaii or the mainland USA. A change in immigration control procedure in American Samoa effectively closed this route. New Zealand procedures were also tightened by issuing permits to people who could provide an accommodation guarantee at an address at which travellers had not previously resided beyond permit expiry dates. This dramatically reduced the numbers of eligible sponsoring households.
the same privileges as other New Zealanders. This ruling had the effect of conferring New Zealand citizenship on some 100,000 Western Samoans or approximately 66 per cent of the Western Samoan population. With the New Zealand economy in recession the New Zealand government moved, with the 'cooperation' of the government of Western Samoa, to block this loophole with a Protocol to the Treaty of Friendship of 1962, and the passage of the Citizenship [Western Samoa] Act of 1982 (Macdonald 1986).

The realization that opportunities for migration have declined significantly focuses attention on local opportunities for mobility and the structures which control these. The prospects for both increased upward mobility and personal freedom seem limited by a series of factors to which we now turn.

Social mobility: the blockages

Several routes have traditionally been available to youth who aspired to power in Samoa: becoming a chief (matai), a pastor (faife'au) or a wage earner/entrepreneur. These remain but, for reasons set out below, are less available and, where before those who aspired to power could reasonably expect to attain it, it is increasingly clear to many that these routes are now blocked.

In Samoa there are some 14,000 matai or chiefs who are normally selected by members of the extended kin group which they head. The matai control access to both house sites and agricultural land vested in their matai title and derive considerable power from this fact. Those who require access to land for subsistence or cash cropping must accept the matai's power over their activities and indeed over some of their income. Succession to matai titles is competitive and open to all who demonstrate competence in certain prescribed activities. Only a very small number of Samoans have the resources necessary to live without access to land and some 96.8 per cent of the population live, according to the census, 'under a matai'. A matai's power is limited by the necessity of retaining the kin group's support and the possibility of their removal from that group where the kin group considers their performance unsatisfactory.

Shortly after independence, a large number of new titles were created in an attempt to alter the balance of power within districts, since only matai are enfranchised (Meleisea and Schoeffel 1983:100). The prospect of access to power seemed for the young to expand very rapidly but the government quickly moved to limit the creation of new titles. The number of titles available is now more or less fixed and, while more than one person may hold a given title at the same time, holders have vested interest in discouraging this trend. Thus, young men have unlimited opportunities to demonstrate competence, but limited opportunities for access to power. These are further limited by the steadily increasing life expectancy of incumbents which means that for many young people the period during which they will serve (tautua) the matai is increasing and that during which they can expect to exercise power is decreasing.

2 This stems from the belief that beyond a certain point splitting of titles weakens their status and authority and increases probability of dissension within the family over succession and ranking (Meleisea and Schoeffel 1983:105).
Even a symbolic gesture, the enfranchisement of persons over 21 years of age, failed to win the necessary support when it was put to parliament in 1981, though the same recommendation would have restricted electoral candidacy to registered matai titleholders (Meleisea and Schoeffel 1983:110). The extension of suffrage might not have had a huge effect on the daily lives of those who continued to live under matai in villages but it might have been symbolic recognition of their contribution to the Western Samoan political economy.

Pastors also enjoy power and a privileged lifestyle and derive authority from their religious office. They too can be removed for unsatisfactory performance and can be controlled in certain subtle ways by the village in which they work. This group is small and, while entry is technically open to all, in fact the prospects of entry to theological college, and to the lifestyle beyond, is limited by a stable demand, the steadily increasing life expectancy of incumbents, and the absence of a compulsory retirement age.

For those committed to mobility within the traditional sector, avenues are closing off at a time when there is pressure for their opening up. Furthermore, the opportunities to enter the clergy are limited largely to males, and although women hold titles they constitute only a very small proportion of all titleholders. These ‘traditional’ avenues are not, however, the only avenues for social mobility. Wage employment and entrepreneurial activity have always been avenues to power for the young within the village. Opportunities have existed for people to leave, enter the wage economy for a period, return and invest their stake in business ventures. The preferred destinations for accumulating capital were the United States and New Zealand, but a period of employment in Apia was considered better than nothing and many looked to wage employment in Western Samoa as an opportunity to accumulate some money and enjoy a measure of independence.

The Western Samoan economy has grown slowly and new jobs are not being created in sufficient numbers to absorb school leavers. Moreover, existing jobs are not being vacated by incumbents, who might earlier have gone to New Zealand after a period of employment in Apia. Rural youth, whose material aspirations might, in other circumstances, have been satisfied by a period of wage employment, no longer have such ready access to these opportunities. Furthermore, the over-supply of labour has resulted in a depressed wage structure so that even those who do secure employment find that the gap between income and expectations is continually widening.

The other avenue to acquiring the capital needed to enter entrepreneurial activities is by a loan, but the agencies empowered to make loans tend, because of the cost of administration and requirements of collateral security, to make these to larger commercial ventures (Macpherson 1981). The only other alternative is borrowing through the village development schemes but these are cooperative ventures, typically controlled by those elders whose authority is recognized by the government, which offer little opportunity for mobility for untitled adolescents.

This combination of raised expectations among rural youth and the blocked opportunities for both emigration and local social mobility generates considerable pressure on social structures for changes which will lead to improved economic prospects and increased personal freedom. Had the international and local economies not contracted, rural youth might not have become so conscious
of their economic situation and of their limited prospects. The consequences of dependency have become more serious for this group's life chances than for those of their elders, and it is not surprising that the latter tend to regard the frustration of the former as evidence of their immaturity (Macpherson and Macpherson 1985). Though other Pacific states have been similarly dependent on other core economies and have also experienced the same evidence of youth's frustration, yet it is primarily in Western Samoa that high levels of frustration have been reflected in adolescent suicide (Macpherson and Macpherson 1987). The explanation seems to lie in the Samoan social structure.

Youth in Samoan society

Western Samoa is a gerontocracy and power is formally concentrated in the hands of the chiefs and pastors. Both groups claim to exercise legitimate authority and each group tends to support the other in what might seem to outsiders a powerful and conservative alliance. The alliance's power, derived from secular and religious traditions, is not widely challenged. Village secular activities tend to be controlled by a council of chiefs (fono matai); their sacred affairs by a pastor and a group of senior male villagers who constitute the session (fono o tiakono); and women's affairs by the wives of titled men (faletua ma tausi). Various bodies of untitled men and women exist but their primary role is to provide labour and to perform tasks for those who make decisions on their behalf. While those who control village activity cannot act without the consent of those who will provide labour and thus must be sensitive to the limits of their power, there is no formal process in which conflicts between the controllers and controlled can be raised and resolved in public. Both religious and customary opinion believe that challenges are illegitimate.

Samoan culture prescribes for adolescents a period in which they are expected to serve, not challenge, those who hold power over them. Adolescents are told that service is the path to power: o le ala ile pule ole tautua. Since this has almost invariably been true for those who presently hold power over adolescents, they frequently have some difficulty in understanding challenges. Their responses to challenges to their authority as chiefs (matai), pastors (faife'au), and parents (matua), are often therefore severe and punitive. Adolescent frustration over the opportunities for mobility, made more acute by the limited effective opportunities which their culture provides to challenge the existing distribution of power, is a strong influence on high suicide levels (Macpherson and Macpherson 1985, 1987).

Conclusion

During economic expansion the opportunities for Western Samoan youth expanded and social and economic mobility became possible, primarily through migration. Many reasonably pinned their hopes on wage employment and/or emigration, as a more probable option than either the transformation of the traditional division of labour or the power structures which flow from it. The contraction of the international economy has left the young, and particularly the rural young, with limited prospects of social and economic mobility both within and outside Western Samoa. If this group are, as a consequence of this erosion, pessimistic about their life chances, they are unlikely to be highly motivated to
invest heavily in agricultural activity which now represents the only realistic opportunity for upward mobility.

Young and untitled Samoans have been offered progressively more education and visions of alternative, usually Western, lifestyles. Western Samoan society, dominated by older people and a durable tradition (fa’a Samoa), appears unable and unwilling to accept some of these expectations or to move to make these attainable (Meleisea and Schoeffel 1983:108-12). The young thus become alienated from central values but are forced to continue to live by them, but become dissatisfied with society and seek opportunities to leave. In the past, some found it possible to demonstrate commitment to traditional values and persuade their families that they were the sorts of people whose migration should be sponsored: they were committed to Samoan custom and would contribute to the family and village. These opportunities are no longer readily available and youthful frustration has increased. This frustration would be less serious if there were opportunities for attaining at least some of their aspirations within Samoan society. But, confronted with an apparently immovable tradition reflected in councils dominated by those committed to fa’a Samoa, attaining those aspirations seems increasingly unlikely. Under these circumstances the growing alienation and disaffection of many young Samoans are widely revealed.

The prospects for redistribution of power within Samoa seem remote, and the alternative of increased emigration, which is related to the state of the international economy, now seems equally remote. Dependence on the economies of New Zealand, the United States and Australia for both opportunities for emigration and remittances has been shown to have high risks. Economic recessions in the nations on which Western Samoa became dependent caused short-term reductions in labour demands which were reflected in declines in the levels of remittances and the rate at which these grew. Restructuring in the New Zealand economy and the movement towards the capital-intensive industrial technology considered necessary to compete with other industrial powers is likely to turn this temporary reduction into a permanent one. The prospect of a return to the levels of migration of the 1960s and 1970s, on which many an adolescent dream was built, is very slim. And yet at the point at which the alternative, increased and diversified agricultural production, has become most obvious it may be seen by many young people, whose commitment is essential to its success, as the least attractive alternative to their stolen dream.
There are a number of reasons why parents in the Third World send children to school. They may send their children to school because they are instructed to do so (by government officials or missionaries), because it is the ‘done thing’ and everyone else does (see Carrier 1981b) or - and this appears to be most important - for economic reasons. Many studies have shown that parents in the Third World see schooling in terms of an investment for the future (Schultz 1963; Blaug 1970; Foster 1965; Conroy 1976), where education is necessary for wage employment and parents benefit by receiving remittances from their children in due course.

In his study of rural households in Maragoli, Kenya, Martin (1982) contends that the demand for conventional schooling is a response to household consumption needs, not investment motives. Consumption levels are not fixed and unchanging but are subject to economic and social development. What were once luxuries become essentials. Where rural households depend less and less upon consumption from household production, they depend more and more upon commodities purchased by cash, and hence upon cash incomes. For the majority, the means to obtain cash is wage employment and the means to wage employment is schooling. In this situation, there is no alternative to expenditure on education. ‘Far from Western education and labour migration subtracting from local needs, they provide the only means under present agricultural and demographic conditions of reproducing Maragoli households, providing for their subsistence’ (Martin 1982:152). In areas of Papua New Guinea where local opportunities for cash income are very poor, as in Ponam Island (Carrier 1981a) and Kukipi (Morauta 1985) remittances are crucial to meet consumption needs and the demand for education as a means to migration is also very great. However, since remittances in most parts of Papua New Guinea represent less than
5 per cent of rural incomes (Connell 1987a), those areas that are currently extremely dependent upon remittances are exceptions.

Education will be in demand for as long as it is necessary to gain access to wage employment. More importantly, increasing school leaver unemployment usually leads to a greater demand for education. 'The paradox of the situation is that the worse the educated unemployment situation gets and the more useless educational certificates become, the stronger grows the pressure for an expansion of educational facilities' (Dore 1976:4). The resultant 'diploma disease' has become widespread.

In Papua New Guinea, education provision has grown beyond the absorptive capacity of the economy (Bacchus 1984). Projections by the National Manpower Assessment for the 1980s were that the total labour force would grow by roughly 40,000 persons per year but that only 4000 new jobs each year would be available (Papua New Guinea 1981). In fact 'Events so far in the 1980s indicate that the position is considerably worse as, far from 4,000 jobs being created each year, the formal sector employment has in fact decreased at a rate of about 12,000 per annum between September 1980 and June 1982' (Papua New Guinea 1983). Between 1971 and 1980 employment of citizens increased by only 0.4 per cent per annum (Connell and Curtain 1982b:466). However, despite increasing school leaver unemployment in the Rai Coast district of Papua New Guinea, there has been a decline in demand for schooling (White 1986). It has been suggested that as time progresses the links between schooling and employment may weaken as parents become disillusioned with schooling, become less convinced by its economic value and eventually withdraw their children (Bray 1984:17). However, in Papua New Guinea (as elsewhere) education still remains the means of access to wage employment and those with higher levels of education are less likely to be unemployed than those with little or no education. It is the view in this chapter that the decline in demand for schooling in Papua New Guinea can only be explained in relation to the wider socio-economic situation and the changes that have occurred in the rural economy. In other words, this chapter sets out to discover what it is in the rural society of the Rai Coast of Papua New Guinea that makes conventional education relatively unimportant.

In Papua New Guinea, subsistence and monetized activities go on side by side. The need for cash to meet household consumption and traditional obligations has increased. Through an examination of the contribution that remittances and local monetized activities make to household income in two villages (Galeg and Sibog) on the Rai Coast of Madang Province (Figure 5.1), this chapter will show that by extending the relations of production that pertain in the traditional mode to commodity production and by using the technical knowledge of their educated children, local monetized activities provide parents and elders with greater access to wealth accumulation, status and power. By focusing on an analysis of inter-generational inequality in terms of the forces and relations of production, this chapter will show that it is not disillusionment with the role of schooling in providing access to wage employment that is responsible for a decline in demand, but disillusionment with the ability of distant wage employment to provide access to wealth, power and prestige.
The traditional mode of production

Land and labour in subsistence production. Kinship as an organizing principle directly affects access to, control over and distribution of economic resources, which in subsistence production are land and labour. On the Rai Coast, production is organized on the basis of membership of patrilineages. Land rights are inherited within the maximal patrilineage (that is to say the kindred of recognition), each having a land leader, the senior active member, who allocates land to each adult male member. Maximal patrilineages (known in Papua New Guinea as 'clans') are distinguished from one another by their totems, legends and by the belief that certain traits of character as well as mutual duties are inherited within the clan.

The total land area of Galeg, a coastal village, is approximately 5 square kilometres (500 hectares); it is lowland divided into bush (forest) and *kunai* (*Imperata ciliandra*), stable grassland that has been permanent in living memory. Land is inequitably divided between eleven clans. Although there is no overall shortage of land, with almost half the population aged 15 or below, some clans are very concerned about future land shortage. People say that 'the size of the land remains the same but the number of children is increasing'. Sibog, a village situated 15 kilometres inland, has approximately three times the area of land of Galeg, about 15 square kilometres. It is mountainous, approximately 1000 metres above sea level and mainly bush. The village and most of the gardens lie along the ridges. As with Galeg, land is inequitably distributed between clans.

Land is used for subsistence gardening, hunting and small-scale commodity production, which in Galeg is of coconuts and cocoa and in Sibog mainly coffee. The use of land for cash crops has put pressure on land for gardens and fallow periods are getting shorter. Where land is short, a man may sometimes be allowed to use land which does not belong to his clan, but only for gardening and not for cash cropping. Such rights do not allow ownership.

Land in Galeg and Sibog is valuable and important. It is referred to by the people there as 'our treasure' and none has ever been sold. No one in Galeg or Sibog has lost his land rights. Those who migrate rely on their brothers or cousins to look after their interests till they return. Migrants sometimes return to plant cash crops or send money to their brothers to do this for them. Two men who left Galeg in the 1940s have neither returned nor exercised their rights to land. They have married women from Sia village near Madang and now live there. Similarly, one man from Sibog also left in the 1940s and now has a business in Goroka. Their children are now adults with children of their own. In view of the fear of land shortages, it is unlikely that the third generation of migrants would be allowed to exercise their land rights should they wish to do so, unless a sizeable compensation payment were made to the members of the clan concerned. It is important for migrants to maintain contact with the village, by returning periodically to work and by sending money, if they eventually wish to return and live there.

In subsistence production the producer interposes only simple hand tools, such as hoes, forks and axes, between himself or herself and the object of labour, the land. The labour force is qualitatively and quantitatively dominant in the production process and participates in this process either as individual or as collective workers. Subsistence production is carried out by domestic units,
referred to here as 'households'. There are, however, seasonal cultivation cycles which have a technical requirement for larger labour forces at particular times of the year. Some production processes are major operations, for example cutting down the bush or forking the kunai grassland in preparation for planting yams, which have to be completed within a limited period. These operations require extended cooperation and all members of a clan work together on a reciprocal basis. Other processes require only the simple cooperation of members of individual households.

In Galeg, gardens are made both in newly cleared bush, where taro varieties, bananas, tapioca and green vegetables (such as aibika) are planted and in the kunai where yams, mami yams, bananas and pitpit are planted. The average area gardened per household is approximately 1500 square metres, which includes both kunai and bush gardens. Household garden sizes are similar but the amount produced from them varies considerably and is determined by how many and how hard-working are the members of the household. Since the clearing and forking of land is done by extended cooperation, the size of individual households in relation to garden size is immaterial. However, planting, maintenance and harvesting, which determine yields, are carried out by individual households. The greatest source of variation in productivity of the garden is the investment of labour and not the area planted (cf. Ross 1984). In other words, labour can be substituted for land as the latter becomes more scarce. All sons and unmarried daughters, from the age of about 15, are expected to contribute labour to their parents' gardens. These gardens are cropped for two to three years, then the kunai is allowed to regenerate for six to eight years, whereas the bush gardens are subsequently planted with cash crops.

The seasonality of indigenous agriculture has dictated a distinct dichotomy between the wet and dry seasons in the traditional patterns of labour utilization. In July of each year, during the dry season, households in Galeg mark out an area for kunai gardens. Members of one clan will help others that have ties with them and there is some cooperative work on all gardens. In Sibog, subsistence production is also carried out by domestic units in simple cooperation, except for certain activities which require a larger input of labour at certain times. Men work together in clans to clear the bush in preparation for making gardens; widowed women or men who are ill will have their land cleared, and they will give food to those who have helped.

Agricultural activities are complemented by domestic tasks. Domestic activities, such as cooking and collecting firewood, are the sole province of women and women also look after pigs, which are produced for exchange rather than immediate consumption and are an important source of wealth and prestige. Pigs, however, are not a necessity of life and some households have none. Essentially in the organization of subsistence production 'the household is charged with production, with the deployment and use of labour power, with the determination of economic objectives. Its own inner relations, as between husband and wife, parent and child, are the principal relations of production in society' (Sahlins 1972:76-7).

Distribution, consumption and the structures of power. The relations of production determine the distribution of the product, thus the structure of production units also determines that of the consumption units. On a day-to-day
basis, the consumption unit is the household, composed of a man, his wife and children and, in some cases, his elderly parents. However, if production and consumption are organized only at household level there is no mechanism for the redistribution of surplus among domestic units.

The mechanism for redistribution in Galeg and Sibog is through feasts. In Galeg there are two major feasts each year: opening the yam garden and opening the yam storehouse. Apart from these, feasts are held on the occasion of marriage, death, initiation, dispute settlement, for visitors, and to pay back traditional obligations. All members of a clan will contribute to the preparation for a feast. Clan elders distribute food to individuals according to their status and position. Status in village society is gained through seniority, by possessing traditional knowledge and observing traditional customs. This knowledge can only be acquired over a long period of time. In Sibog, biing means both Big Man and knowledge. The possession of highly regarded skills, such as hunting, fighting, sorcery, oratory, or the ability to settle disputes, carries status. Today, church leaders and local politicians are also respected. Leadership and authority in Galeg and Sibog is in the hands of the elders, the senior active males of the clans. It is they who allocate and distribute land, organize cooperation of labour in production and distribution of the product and possess traditional technical and social knowledge. They are the dispute settlement authority of the village.

Formal initiation for boys in Galeg and Sibog occurs in their mid to late teens; for those at high school it occurs after they leave. Nowadays this lasts for about six weeks, though in the past it was for a year or more. For girls initiation is less intensive and formal. Social knowledge, knowledge of genealogy, alliances and so on, do not play a direct part in production but in the reproduction of the social structure and it is in this sphere that the power of the elders becomes apparent.

The process of reproduction and the relations between elders and juniors. The dominant element in the reproductive process is labour power. ‘Human beings ... are the sole agents of the economy, the only source of energy, the only means of production and reproduction and, therefore, the axis of all economic relations’ (Meillassoux 1964:223). In other words, reproduction of the social and economic structure depends upon the physical reproduction of the production units, and it is the circulation of the labour force which ensures renewal of the production units. This circulation is generally brought about by matrimonial exchanges. In Galeg and Sibog, these exchanges are subject to the law of ‘general exchange’ applied through the system of bridewealth. It is this mechanism which ensures the physical and social reproduction of the group. Bridewealth is linked to a number of key forces in the rural political economy, particularly the relations between elders and juniors. There are certain objects which do not enter into the production process and which are not consumption goods, the possession of which marks the rank of the owner. These are inherited items, generally not made locally and obtained through exchange and alliances between trading partners in other villages. In both Galeg and Sibog, wooden bowls and clay cooking pots are highly prized. Wooden bowls are made at Sibog and clay pots are made at Bilbil near Madang. Wealth derived from the social organization of the economy makes marriage possible and possession of such wealth is used by the elders to perpetuate that organization.
In Galeg and Sibog the main restriction on marriage is the prohibition within three generations of blood kin. Violations of marriage prescriptions, however, are not uncommon, given the size of the clans, the frequency of adoption between clans, the relative rapidity of assimilation of such adoptees and the shallowness of accurate genealogical recall. Parents prefer their daughters to marry locally because they expect their children to help them when they are older. Married couples usually help to provide both sets of parents with food. It is also more difficult for the bride's parents to obtain bridewealth from her husband's patrilineage if they are far away since there is no established affinity between clans. Unwillingness to let their daughters marry 'strangers' is one reason why parents often do not send their daughters to school. Out of forty-three marriages in Galeg, twenty-two brides were from within the village, eleven were from neighbouring villages in the same language group, four were from villages with a related language and five from villages with non-related languages. In Sibog out of thirty-seven marriages, sixteen brides were from within the village, eighteen were from neighbouring villages in the same language group, and three were from villages with non-related languages. The same situation was observed elsewhere in Madang Province: 'the greatest likelihood of marriage occurs between villages which are within three miles of each other, share a common language, and have adjacent territory' (Morauta 1974:60). However, marriage between partners from the same village is becoming difficult. Because of inter-clan marriage almost everyone is related. Young men are now looking for wives outside the village which means that bridewealth will be higher, reflecting the opportunity cost of the wife's lost labour. Men who marry within the village have a greater obligation to help their wife's family with labour and food.

The material transactions that accompany marriage symbolize the establishment of a friendly alliance between two patrilineages. Marriage involves a series of negotiable and obligatory payments from the groom's to the bride's family, which begin with marriage and extend well beyond the birth of a couple's first child and are often transferred to subsequent generations. There is a generally accepted level of bridewealth within an area. In Galeg and Sibog in 1983 it was K150 (A$225) plus one large pig, items of traditional wealth (such as dogs' teeth, pigs' tusks, shells and armbands, food and betelnuts. Young men in Galeg and Sibog are still largely dependent upon their parents, older brothers and the elders of their clan for bridewealth. Cash has recently entered into bridewealth and has been substituted mainly for pigs. Access to and control over cash for bridewealth may result in contradictory influences on inter-generational authority relations. A son's access to independent cash income through wage employment is likely to diminish his dependence on his father in meeting bridewealth payments and so diminish the father's authority, hence domestic relations have changed since the introduction of cash into the traditional economy, as the next section shows.

**The introduction of cash into the rural economy**

The main change in the rural economy of Papua New Guinea has been the introduction of cash. In the first instance, villagers' need for cash was enforced by the imposition of tax in colonial times. However, as household consumption levels changed, so did their need for cash. Today, in Galeg and Sibog, all households are involved in the cash economy. Cash is used for the purchase of
consumption items as well as for meeting traditional obligations and maintaining status and prestige.

Apart from the need to meet household consumption items such as school fees, cash has also entered the 'gift economy'. Money has added to, or in some cases replaced, items that meet traditional obligations. The demise of the traditional sector has not occurred with the rise of the modern sector but both commodity production and gift production have expanded. The indigenous economy has not died out with the advent of political and economic development but has 'effloresced' (Strathern 1979). For Gregory this means we must abandon the notion of the 'dual economy', that is of distinct traditional and modern sectors, since 'the fact of the matter is that the whole economy is modern' (Gregory 1982:115).

Cash has entered the rural economy in two ways, first, through remittances and, second, through local monetized activities. Since schooling is necessary to gain salaried employment, the contribution made by wages to rural household income can be seen from a study of school leaver employment.

Wage employment and the contribution of remittances to rural household income. School leavers fall into one of three groups, grade 6 leavers, grade 8 leavers and grade 10 leavers, with the majority leaving at the end of grade 6. Following the grade 6 examination, selections are made for high school. In 1983 there were four high schools in Madang Province, none located in the Rai Coast district, and pupils from the Rai Coast could be sent to any of the high schools. At the end of grade 8, approximately one-third, the weakest students academically, are 'pushed out'. The proportion of grade 6, grade 8 and grade 10 leavers in the Rai Coast between 1973 and 1982 can be seen from Figure 8.1. Of the 448 school-age children in 1973, 287 entered grade 1 and 45 of these completed grade 10 in 1982.

School leavers with no more than primary education have had difficulty for some years in finding jobs other than low paid general labouring or unskilled work. More recently, the problem of unemployment amongst secondary school leavers has begun to emerge. In 1982 only thirteen (29 per cent) of the grade 10 leavers in the Rai Coast were offered Central Selection Unit (CSU) placements for education and training beyond grade 10; in themselves they do not represent employment figures. Furthermore the number of grade 10 leavers gaining direct entry to employment without further training is relatively few and not all those who receive CSU placements complete their training or find employment.

Little is known of what happens to grade 6 and grade 8 leavers after they leave school. It is assumed that many return to their village but at least some go to the towns in the hope of finding work. Most, however, are unsuccessful and eventually either return to the village or live with wantoks (persons speaking the same language, often relatives or people from the same or nearby village) in the numerous squatter settlements that have sprung up around the major towns.

If one is to assess the contribution that remittances from school leavers make to household incomes it is necessary to establish what has happened over a period of time. An analysis of grade 6, grade 8 and grade 10 school leavers from Galeg and Sibog over a twenty-year period (1963-83) is shown in Table 8.1. Out of a total of 111 school leavers (seventy-six grade 6, twelve grade 8 and twenty-three grade 10) between 1963 and 1983 in Galeg and Sibog, twenty-seven found some kind of wage employment. Of those eleven are still employed, three from Sibog.
and eight from Galeg, and the rest have returned to live in the village. No one in Galeg and Sibog who has not been to school is presently working outside their village. The contribution that these twenty-seven school leavers have made in the past to household income, by sending home remittances, is difficult to assess but it is likely to have been quite small. The majority of those who have returned to the village worked for relatively short periods of time in semi-skilled low-paid jobs. A significant reason for returning to the village was that living in town was

**Figure 8.1 School leavers in Rai Coast, 1973-82**

- **1973 Grade 1 enrolments**
  - Dropouts: 66
  - 64% of age group

- **1978 Grade 6 examination**
  - 221
  - 49.3% of age group

- **1978 Grade 6 leavers**
  - 161

- **1979 Grade 7 enrolments**
  - 60
  - 13.4% of age group

- **1980 Grade 8 leavers**
  - 15

- **1982 Grade 10 examinations & Grade 10 leavers**
  - 48
  - 10% of age group

- **No. CSU placements**
  - 32

- **CSU placements for 1983 courses**
  - 13
  - 3% of age group

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a Based on 1978 grade 6 enrolments allowing for a dropout rate of 23 per cent.
b Total 7-year-old population in Rai Coast in 1973 was 448 (1980 census).
 Sources: Enrolment records for high schools and community schools; 1980 census; Central Selection Unit (1982), school leaver selection.
expensive. A number said they could make more money in the village 'where everything is free'.

From household surveys conducted in 1983 five out of forty households in Galeg and two out of forty households in Sibog said they received remittances occasionally from children or relatives who were working away. However, they usually only received remittances if they asked their children to send money and this was usually for specific purposes. On the basis of this analysis, it has to be concluded that, in Galeg and Sibog, the contribution that school leavers who find wage employment make to household income, though not insignificant, is extremely small. Do school leavers who return to the village then subsequently contribute to household income?

Table 8.1 School leavers in Galeg and Sibog, 1963-83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade 6</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The contribution of local monetized activities to rural household income. Local monetized activities take on a variety of forms, most of which are referred to by the people of Galeg and Sibog as bisnis, in the sense of 'em i wokim bisnis' (he makes business) and not 'em i gat wampela bisnis' (he has a business). This usage of the word categorises bisnis as a kind of human activity, rather than something that exists apart from the person doing it (Birkins and Krause 1982). In Galeg and Sibog the term bisnis is associated with obtaining and maintaining status and prestige. Bisnis covers all monetized activities except the sale of surplus garden crops, which is controlled by women. Bisnis is controlled by males and women participate mainly as labourers. The term covers small-scale commodity production of copra, cocoa and coffee, as well as livestock projects, such as cattle, poultry, pigs and fishing, running a tradestore, and operating a public motor vehicle (PMV) or boat.

The contribution that the sale of surplus garden crops makes to household income in Galeg should not be underestimated. Because of the distance and the mountainous terrain it is difficult for women in Sibog to carry garden produce to the market at Saidor. Women from Galeg go to the market at Saidor at least once a week, where they sell taro, kaukau, green vegetables, coconuts, muli (bush oranges), bananas and betelnuts. The money from this, which is kept by the women, is used to buy small household consumption items such as soap, kerosene, imported food and occasionally clothes. Households in Galeg can earn between K50 and K100 per year in this way. The sale of garden crops also provides one of the few opportunities for young people in the village, especially girls, to earn a little money for themselves. Young men, especially in Sibog,
occasionally take a copra bag of betelnuts to Madang town to sell. In the dry season they can obtain high prices, up to 10 toea (15 cents) for three nuts, making a full copra bag worth K200 to K250.

The main concern here, however, is with bisnis, the way in which it is organized, the role of school leavers and the contribution it makes to household income. Although commodity production is regarded by villagers as bisnis, it will here be considered separately from other kinds of bisnis activity because the level of technology is different and, in the context of the present study, it is bisnis which determines the value of children and the use of education.

Commodity production in Galeg and Sibog. Land in Galeg and Sibog is allocated to adult males on the basis of their clan membership, though an individual decides how to use his own land. Most land in Galeg and Sibog is currently either bush or is used for gardens. Much of this was planted in the 1960s when villagers were encouraged by the Australian Administration to plant and produce cash crops jointly on communal village plots. However, within a relatively short time, people split up into their traditional land holding groups and each clan planted coconuts on its own land. In Galeg and Sibog, the second generation planting of cash crops is only just beginning and the effects of these crops on traditional land tenure systems is yet to be realized. Traditionally a man passes on most of his rights over land to his eldest son and if he has more than one son land is obtained for them from his clan. The implications are that, if a man plants cash crops, his eldest son will inherit them whereas younger sons must plant their own. Since even tree crops have a limited life span, providing there is sufficient land for all the sons, a permanent effect on economic differentiation is unlikely. The situation, however, will change with increasing population pressure and land shortages.

All households in Galeg have coconuts and earn income from copra. The areas planted vary from household to household, but this does not in itself determine individual household income. This is determined by the age and condition of the trees, and the amount of labour available for maintenance and harvesting. Since there is no hired labour in Galeg and Sibog this is dependent upon the number of active adult workers in the production unit. For social and prestige reasons there is a tendency to plant more than can be properly managed by the available labour, in Sibog, for example, there are large areas of coffee planted, much of it neglected. Cocoa has recently been introduced into both villages as a cash crop, and people are now planting cocoa, believing that it gives a higher cash return for less labour than either copra or coffee. Cash crops are owned by mature men who are married and who have land rights and a house of their own. Until then young men, whether school leavers or not, work with their fathers or eldest brothers. The characteristic relations of production in subsistence activities persist in commodity production, where much labour is given on a reciprocal basis. In commodity production the product is exchanged for cash. Where production is organized on a household basis the income is held by the male head of the household who uses it to meet the cost of larger immediate consumption items such as clothes and school fees and to ensure the satisfaction of future consumption needs by meeting traditional obligations. A considerable proportion is used to buy food and drink for feasts which is then redistributed according to custom.
This is what Strathern (1979) refers to as the ‘efflorescence’ of the gift economy. Very little of what is earned is saved or reinvested into commodity production, an exception being that presently, in both Galeg and Sibog, most households are planting cocoa and buying new seedlings from the Department of Primary Industry at the cost of K5 per 100. When labour is ‘pooled’, and when members of a clan or related clans work together, income is also pooled. It belongs to the clan and not to individual households. This money is put into a bank deposit account and the pasbuk (savings book) is held by the elder of the clan, so that no individual can withdraw money. Some is used to meet traditional obligations (feasts, bridewealth etc.) but most will be used to finance future bisnis development in Galeg. Certain kinds of bisnis give more status and prestige than other kinds. For example, running a tradestore or PMV has more prestige than growing cash crops, but by the same token those kinds of bisnis require more money to establish.

Copra is the main cash crop for the people of Galeg and when households worked independently, each produced between six and twelve bags of copra per year. The average annual income per household from copra would have been between K100 and K250 in 1983. By contrast, when several clans work together they produce, on average, four bags of copra per week, worth between K50 and K100. Working on a rota basis, it means each clan would earn this amount once every three or four weeks. Most households in Galeg are now planting cocoa, some of it underneath established coconuts. Cocoa is sold as wet bean (straight from the tree) to a nearby plantation (Nom) which collects once a fortnight and pays 35 toea (25 cents) per kilogram, and the income generated from cocoa production is likely to pass that of copra before long.

In Sibog, the main cash crop is arabica coffee and the unit of production is again the household. Sons, even when married with land of their own, will continue to work together with their father on his cash crops until he dies. The income is held by the father and mainly used for traditional obligations. Redistribution is in the form of food for feasts, although occasionally some cash is distributed between the sons. Younger unmarried sons and daughters work with their fathers or elder brothers and are sometimes given clothes or ‘pocket money’. As in Galeg, the income from coffee produced by individual households in Sibog is at the disposal of that household.

Production varies according to labour availability and price fluctuations, but on average a household with four active adult members could manage approximately 1000 trees, or half a hectare of coffee. The average yield of village coffee is around 700 kilograms per hectare per year, giving an income before costs of K560 per hectare. Marketing of coffee is not usually done by individual households. Bisnis groups are set up within a village, or group of villages, and marketing is through the bisnis group. The organization of bisnis groups is discussed below.

Two households in Sibog are presently cropping cocoa and, as in Galeg, many others are planting it. Cocoa is preferred to coffee because it is less labour intensive and is productive throughout the year, whereas coffee has two main flushes. Village cocoa will yield approximately one tonne of wet bean per hectare (700 trees) per year, bringing in an income of approximately K50 per year for every 100 trees. The problem to be overcome for the people of Sibog is transport.
At present everything has to be carried 12 kilometres down the mountain from the village to Saidor.

It is difficult to assess accurately what income individual households derive from commodity production because of the variety of ways in which production and distribution are organized. However, there are considerable differences in income between households derived from differing combinations of remittances, selling surplus garden and cash crops, and depending on the number of workers in a household and on price fluctuations. A survey of fifty households in Galeg and Sibog in 1983 showed that ten households received annual incomes of K400 to K800, twenty-nine households received from K200 to K400 and eleven households from K50 to K100. An important point in the context of household numbers and the role of education is that school leavers who return to the village make a valuable contribution to the labour force of the household, both in subsistence and in commodity production. There is little difference between the work done by grade 10, grade 8 and grade 6 leavers and those who have not been to school, although numeracy skills are useful in marking out ground for planting and in the marketing of produce. There is also little difference in income between households with high school leavers and those without. However, as will be seen, this is not the case with other forms of bisnis.

Bisnis in Galeg and Sibog. Today, new definitions of success in village society imply bisnis and ultimately money as the central factors. Introduced bisnis activities have been integrated into traditional social and economic structures. Organization of production and distribution of the cash product is still done in much the same way and for much the same reasons as traditional activities, that is for the attainment and maintenance of status and prestige through accumulation and redistribution of wealth. There is, however, one fundamental difference between bisnis and traditional production activities, and it concerns 'knowledge'. Unlike traditional production activities where elders possessed and allocated access to technical knowledge and juniors provided the labour power, in bisnis it is those who have been to high school who possess the technical knowledge required in production. Previously schooling was seen as useful in getting a formal sector job and perhaps the only way of acquiring money. Now, with changes in rural household production activities, bisnis is seen as another and often preferred form of wealth accumulation, status and prestige. It is in the sphere of bisnis that high school leavers in the villages are seen as most useful in contributing to household income.

Bisnis in Galeg is organized at the level of clans, since individual households usually lack the necessary capital and knowledge for bisnis development. In 1983 there were three tradestores in operation in Galeg, and two chicken projects. All of these projects required capital (between K100 and K250) to establish, and depended upon contributions from resident and non-resident members of the kinship group. Two clans financed their bisnis partly through remittances received from relations working away and partly from money saved from commodity production. Urban migrants appear more willing to send money to help finance bisnis projects in the village from which they themselves hope to benefit in the future, than to contribute to the immediate consumption needs of their relatives. However, since remittances in Galeg are somewhat limited, financing
of *bispens* is mainly through local commodity production: copra production organized on the basis of extended cooperation between members of a clan.

A number of clans have plans to start new *bispens* projects. For example, Palafot clan are saving for the purchase of a vehicle for carrying people and produce to Saidor and Madang town. Apart from copra and cocoa growing, this clan also runs a tradestore, a chicken project with fifty laying hens, a copra drier, and they own a buffalo and cart which is used for carrying copra at a hire charge of K2 per load. They have a small labour force and three of their members have been to high school. The elder of this clan is the most respected man in the village. He is an ex-councillor and was the first man in Galeg to run a tradestore. Masai is the largest clan in Galeg, and the most 'successful' at *wining skul* (going to high school). Out of a total of seventeen people who went to high school from Galeg, ten are members of this clan. Five are living in the village and five are working away. Masai clan runs a tradestore and plans to use the money made from this and commodity production to finance further *bispens*. Bron clan was running a tradestore during 1982 but it lost money and closed. In 1983 it started a poultry project (with fifty broilers) which it hopes to expand so that the money can be used to reopen their tradestore. Three members of Bron clan have been to high school, all grade 10 leavers, but none found work outside the village. Kotai is unusual in that it is the only clan in the village to have started a *bispens* project yet not to have any members who have been to high school. It has a tradestore which is run by a grade 6 leaver; he admits to having little knowledge of how to run a *bispens* and relies on advice from a non-resident high school leaver who is a member of his wife's clan. No other clan in Galeg has started a *bispens*, apart from commodity production, and no other clan has grade 10 high school leavers.

*Bispens* in Galeg is controlled by elders, in as much as it is they who, through their network of relationships, raise the capital and they who distribute the profit. No high school leavers who have returned to the village after leaving school have started *bispens* on their own behalf. However, the day-to-day management of their clans' *bispens* is by the high school leavers. The skills required are a certain level of literacy, numeracy and basic accountancy. Those with only grade 6 education are thought to have only *liklik save* (little knowledge) which is insufficient to do *bispens*.

The importance of English in the village, where it is hardly spoken, is initially hard to understand. However, the people consider it important for contact with outsiders, especially government officials, and for gaining further knowledge. Even school leavers who have been back in the village for a number of years retain literacy and numeracy skills and value them very highly, especially relevant skills for simple business accounting and management. All school leavers working in *bispens* in Galeg village expressed a wish to learn more about basic accountancy and book-keeping.

Modern technical knowledge does not have much use or value in traditional activities, but it does in *bispens*, and success in *bispens* also gives status in traditional society. To the older people success in *bispens*, in the sense of making a profit, is not so important as the status that doing *bispens* brings. Many *bispens* projects fail to provide wealth accumulation, however this can be seen as a form of redistribution. Money which is made from *bispens* is often not reinvested but is redistributed by feasts. Many tradestores close through a loss of capital caused in this way. Since there are three tradestores operating in Galeg, with a total resident population of approximately 200, little profit is likely to be made. Buying a truck, when no
one in the village has the skills to repair and maintain it, is surely the road to economic disaster since there are no breakdown or garage services available on the Rai Coast. Fear of sorcery is not so much a constraint to bisnis development, as suggested by Vulliamy and Carrier (1985), as it is a determinant of how production and distribution are organized. It ensures that bisnis is organized in groups and that the profits are redistributed.

Apart from a little pocket money, high school leavers in Galeg receive little direct financial benefit from working in bisnis. High school leavers appear to have a great sense of obligation towards their parents. They feel they must repay their parents for the costs incurred in sending them to school. They see bisnis as a way in which they can help their parents and ensure that obligations for bridewealth will be met. As one school leaver put it, 'If I want money I must first work with my family. Later some money will be given back.'

In Sibog, there is no bisnis organized by a single clan. There is one bisnis group called Halalowang, consisting mainly of members from five different clans; almost all village households were therefore members of the bisnis group. The bisnis group runs a tradestore in the village and markets coffee. It buys coffee at 60 toea per kilogram and sells it in Madang at 80 toea per kilogram. The profits are normally redistributed among members in the form of dividends. The village is saving for the purchase of a truck, an item too costly for one household or one clan to undertake, so the profits from the bisnis group are saved towards this. Although controlled by the elders and by one in particular, the bisnis group is managed by two grade 8 high school leavers.

Bisnis groups are a regular feature of contemporary village life on the Rai Coast. They are organized along traditional lines, members being from traditional groups within a village or from closely related villages. Bisnis organized in groups reduces jealousy and the threat of sorcery by one individual or another and the pooling of money allows the purchase of more expensive items such as a truck, which will benefit the whole village or group of villages. The government has encouraged the formation of bisnis groups by the way it allocates loans. For example, loans from the Village Development Economic Fund are only given to registered bisnis groups that have a certificate of incorporation, and not to individuals.

The forerunner to contemporary bisnis groups on the Rai Coast was the Native Cooperative Society, established in the 1950s by the Australian Administration and involving many villages. It undertook the marketing of copra, coffee and rice, and ran a tradestore. Profits were redistributed to members in the form of yearly dividends which were allocated to the headman in each village and not to individuals. A large feast would be held and the profit redistributed according to custom. The Native Cooperative Society ceased trading in 1975 because of poor management, jealousy and disagreements between members and transport difficulties. Until recently, the people of Galeg were involved in the Gasuyama bisnis group, whose members were from five closely related villages including Galeg. It started in 1972 and its main function was marketing copra. It was formed by a consortium of Big Men and elders, and managed by younger educated men. It collapsed in 1981, apparently through inefficient management, price fluctuations, transport problems (a secondhand vehicle was bought but it broke down and no one had the skills to repair it) and wantok problems (loans were given to members which were not repaid). Similarly, until 1981, the people of Sibog were involved
with nearby villages in the Kabali bisnis group. Its main function was the marketing of coffee. It was organized and run exactly like Gasuyama, and similarly collapsed for the same reasons.

The people of Sibog are presently involved with seven other villages in a new cocoa fermentary which is being built near Saidor. Once the fermentary is built villagers will be able to dry their own cocoa rather than sell it as wet bean, since dry bean fetches almost three times the price of wet bean. In this bisnis group too the same organizational structure exists. Cooperation of members, the raising of capital and the distribution of profits are in the hands of the elders, whilst day-to-day management is in the hands of high school leavers.

Conclusion

Through an analysis of the ways in which rural households obtain cash, this chapter has demonstrated that, in the Rai Coast district of Papua New Guinea, remittances from household members who are working in wage employment contribute very little to household income. Villagers see local monetized activities as an alternative and preferred means of wealth accumulation, status and power, hence there is no great demand for education that will give access to wage employment. In order to gain access to these new sources of revenue, parents and elders have appropriated the technical knowledge and skills of their educated children. Through schooling, children acquire the technical knowledge necessary for modern production activities. They learn literacy, numeracy and basic business skills. An analysis of modes of production has shown that elders appropriate the knowledge of their educated children. They are able to do so because it is the elders in the lineage-based societies in Papua New Guinea who hold power. They control access to land, traditional knowledge (including magic and sorcery) and, by controlling the elite goods necessary for bridewealth, they control access to wives. This ensures the reproduction of the traditional social relations of production, the dependency of juniors on elders and the appropriation of the labour power of the juniors by the elders. Inter-generational inequality was used as the basis and justification for the maintenance and the strengthening of traditional inequalities and the reproduction of traditional relations of production in the modern bisnis arena.

It is possible from this analysis to discern the impact of education in rural areas of Papua New Guinea. The body of knowledge introduced by school leavers into rural communities was an improvement on existing technical knowledge. It has resulted in economic development through increased monetized activities becoming established, but it has not resulted in a reallocation of productive resources, a redistribution of the product or a change in the relationships of production. In other words, it has not yet resulted in social change. Parents and elders wishing to exploit new agricultural and bisnis opportunities have done so by extending traditional relationships of production to new economic activities. Traditional relationships of production have not hampered economic development and the increase of income earning opportunities. They have, however, led to increased inequality; those who traditionally held the power in society are those who have benefited most from economic development.

Social change, the transformation of the traditional mode of production, has essentially not occurred in Papua New Guinea, despite a development of the
forces of production via education, because, so far, there has not been the development of an oppositional ideology which would give rise to opposing social forces. This is a view shared by others: 'On Karkar, considerable economic, political and educational change has occurred over a relatively long period, yet the traditional intellectual system remains' (McSwain 1977). More generally, and similarly in Madang Province, 'the villager is still enmeshed in a network of traditional relationships because ... his traditional ideological system has survived the impact of western development' (Lawrence 1982:66). In the context of this study, this means that either 'class' antagonism between elders and juniors does not exist or (and this is more likely) there is not yet an awareness of class antagonism or class consciousness, which would give rise to class struggle and the overthrow of the traditional relationships of production. It is likely, however, that it will, in part, be through schooling and educated children that a new ideology and class consciousness will emerge.

The extent to which these conclusions apply elsewhere will no doubt depend on local resources (land and labour) and opportunities (markets and infrastructure) for local development. It was pointed out earlier that areas where local opportunities for cash income are very poor, for example Misima (Milne Bay), Ponam Island (Manus Province) and Kukipi (Gulf Province), the demand for education is very great (Carrier 1981a; Morauta 1985). In these areas schooling is seen as providing access to wage employment, the only means under present conditions of meeting household consumption needs. However, remittances in most mainland parts of Papua New Guinea represent a very small part of rural incomes and those areas that are primarily dependent upon remittances are rare exceptions. Migration, therefore, is likely to be present in areas that are very remote, close to town or with relatively poor resource bases, as in parts of Papua and on some small islands, but in Papua New Guinea these conditions still remain relatively unusual.
Rotuma is a group of fertile volcanic islands lying approximately 400 kilometres north-north-west of the main islands of Fiji (Figure 2.1). The single small inhabited island is about 13 kilometres long and 4 kilometres wide. Of the 8078 Rotumans in the whole of Fiji in 1981, only 2578 or 32 per cent lived on the island of Rotuma, compared with 56 per cent in 1966. About 40 per cent lived in Suva, the capital of Fiji. Although Rotumans are Polynesians, with a Polynesian chiefly structure, they have been politically a part of Fiji since annexation in 1880, though they constitute only 1.2 per cent of the national population. Recently there has been some discussion of secession from Fiji. Despite its geographical isolation from the main islands of Fiji, Rotuma has had long contact by sea with peoples of other islands, and with European missionaries and traders. Today the island is less isolated with a twice weekly air service and regular visits from government supply ships, and the economy is more closely integrated into the mainstream Fijian economy. While copra is still the major cash crop and export earner, there are a number of projects underway to market oranges and fish on a larger scale.

Rotuma, with its long history of contact with other island groups, presents an unusual case in migration behaviour. The reasons why almost 70 per cent of Rotumans now live on the main islands of Fiji are partly historical, partly to do with land availability, and partly for the same kinds of reasons that motivate other migrant groups - education, employment and, eventually, the chain migration pattern of family members. What is unusual about Rotuman migration is their situation in Fiji proper. Rotumans obtain proportionately more senior positions in government and other high-status occupations than the two main ethnic groups in Fiji. The reasons for this success can be examined through a longitudinal study of Rotumans living in Suva.

In contrast to other groups, very few Rotumans demonstrate circular migration behaviour and, despite the declared intention to return home eventually, few do. In addition, even fewer Rotumans migrate internationally. In this chapter it is suggested that the rates of both international permanent migration and circular migration may change as the continuing 'success' of Rotumans and the pressures
of development on Rotuma become possible sources of conflict, both in Fiji society and on the island. It is likely then that 'risk-aversion' migration patterns will continue in response to economic necessities.

Migration in Fiji

Population mobility is of particular significance in countries with small populations and areas, and in many isolated parts of the Pacific whole villages have been deserted as people leave voluntarily for a new life in town which will bring benefits unknown at home (Pirie 1982:27). The out-migration of skilled and able-bodied people has had detrimental effects on small island economies which are only partly eased by remittances. In a detailed study of internal migration in the eastern islands of Fiji, Bedford (1980a:45) has stated that there 'is nothing particularly unique about Fijian mobility', and moreover, the migration of Rotumans from their isolated island reflects a pattern found in other outlying areas such as the Lau group and Kadavu (Walsh 1982:25). Fiji has examples of all the types of South Pacific migration: 'from outer islands to inner islands, from small islands to large islands, from mountains to coasts and from rural areas to urban areas' (Connell 1983b:60). Generally circulation remains prevalent in Fiji, where people visit towns for short periods and then return to their villages. There is now considerable debate over the extent of circulation with Ward suggesting that, with increasing urbanization, circulation is becoming less common (Ward 1987); fewer economic opportunities on outer islands are also likely to reduce circulation (Connell 1983b:82). Chandra and Chandra (forthcoming), however, believe that although there is still a 'high degree of urban to rural migration, the "circular" component of the movements is difficult to quantify'. This study of Rotuman migration will examine the likelihood of circulation in declining economic circumstances.

Connell attributes migration from the small islands of Fiji to the commencement of colonization, Christianity, 'the decline in indigenous warfare and the establishment of trade' (1983b:53-4), although Pacific islanders had obviously been long-distance voyagers for centuries. Rotuman islanders have continued to migrate from their isolated Polynesian island in the Fijian group since the arrival of the first Europeans in the Pacific. They are known to have worked as sailors, pearl fishermen, miners and plantation hands throughout the Pacific and even in South America since early in the nineteenth century (see Howard 1961; Bryant 1974; Connell 1983b).

Rotuman population and migration

With a population density of 62 persons per square kilometre in 1976, Rotuma has the highest population density in the Fiji group and it is claimed that, along with Lau, this is high relative to the resource base of the island (Walsh 1982:20). The relationship between people and resources on Rotuma may account for the considerable out-migration of the population to the main islands of Fiji. Indeed, total out-migration figures recorded in 1976 showed that 50 per cent of the population born there had migrated to other provinces, the highest recorded for any of the Fiji provinces, and between 1970 and 1976, out-migration was 28 per cent of the resident population, also the highest recorded (Chandra and Chandra, forthcoming).
While it could be maintained that this movement of Rotumans away from their island is a way of maintaining a balance between resources and population, particularly since the number living on the island today is only 300 more than it was in 1891, there are many other possible reasons for migration such as isolation and the lack of employment opportunities.

Of all groups moving between the provinces and districts in Fiji, Rotumans are the least likely to undertake return migration to their island. Only 4.3 per cent of 1970 migrants had returned to Rotuma by 1976 (Walsh 1982:29; cf. Chandra and Chandra, forthcoming). The very high out-migration and low return migration of Rotuman islanders may not add up to particularly unusual migration behaviour, since it is only slightly more exaggerated than for other migrant groups within Fiji, but the occupational results of Rotuman migration are also more extreme.

The continued success of Rotumans in achieving high status occupations in Fiji has been examined in some detail (Howard 1961; Bryant 1974; Kaurasi 1977). The movement and subsequent success of Rotumans is not simply the result of risk-aversion migration, but has far more to do with the history of capitalist penetration, reflected in the high rate of labour migration and desire for education. The close ties between Rotumans and their home island, demonstrated by remittances and the concern amongst Rotumans living abroad and in Fiji about the impacts of development on their island, ensure that contacts are strongly maintained.

Between 1881, when census records were first compiled for Fiji, and 1921, there is no numerical record of Rotumans living in Fiji proper, though some were undoubtedly there. The early censuses also recorded which other Pacific island groups were living on Rotuma and the 1921 records show that apart from 'Rotumans' there were a number of Fijians, Europeans, and other Polynesians, variously from Niue, Futuna, Wallis, Tonga and elsewhere. Rotuma has clearly not existed in isolation. The widespread contact with other races bringing an exchange of ideas and sharing of knowledge may perhaps be partly responsible for the movement of Rotumans. Constant striving for a better environment, whether social or economic, characterizes the Rotuman people and may partly account for the high degree of out-migration. The size and isolation of Rotuma, however, and the dependence on a single cash crop (copra) are undoubtedly other major factors which influence the will and need of Rotumans to migrate. Historical factors, such as temporary voyages on whaling and pearling vessels and the turning of those journeys into a type of initiation rite (Irava 1977:153) have also contributed to migration as a way of life.

The Rotuman population has undergone a number of fluctuations in recorded history (Table 9.1). Between 1901 and 1911 the population declined, largely as a result of 246 deaths in a measles epidemic. A slight increase from 1911 until 1921 stabilized the population once more and there has been a steady subsequent increase with natural increases being as high as 2.9 per cent (1946 to 1956), and remaining over 2 per cent into the 1970s, rates which are higher than average for Fiji. A decline in infant mortality after 1936 was largely responsible for the increase in population but the population of the island itself has increased only marginally with the 'surplus' migrating to Fiji proper.
Table 9.1 Population of Rotuma, 1881-1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>1126</td>
<td>1326</td>
<td>2452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1056</td>
<td>1163</td>
<td>2219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>1036</td>
<td>1194</td>
<td>2230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1043</td>
<td>1133</td>
<td>2176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1129</td>
<td>1106</td>
<td>2235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1413</td>
<td>1403</td>
<td>2816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1696</td>
<td>1617</td>
<td>3313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>2232</td>
<td>2190</td>
<td>4422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2939</td>
<td>2858</td>
<td>5797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>3666</td>
<td>3625</td>
<td>7291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>4028</td>
<td>3933</td>
<td>7961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>4095</td>
<td>3983</td>
<td>8078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>4164</td>
<td>4033</td>
<td>8197</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Censuses of Fiji, 1881-1976; Fiji Bureau of Statistics (1984). Data from 1980 on are estimates.

Since 1976, Bureau of Statistics projections based on declining fertility, mortality and emigration for the Fiji population (Chandra and Booth, forthcoming:12) have shown a continuing and steady increase in the Rotuman population, although the rates of natural increase have declined (Table 9.1). Of major significance in the past twenty years has been the increasing proportion of the population living on the main islands of Fiji, particularly in urban areas (Table 9.2). The Rotuman population in the main Fiji islands is very much an urban population with 55.2 per cent living in urban areas compared with 30.5 per cent of Fijians and 39.5 per cent of Indians. The much smaller Chinese and European populations are the most heavily urbanized at over 80 per cent. The movement of Rotumans to urban areas from their home island is analogous to that of many other migrant groups in other countries and is reflected in the occupational structure and status of the Rotuman community in Fiji.

Rotuman international migration is difficult to assess. Although Rotumans live in New Zealand, Australia and elsewhere, figures are difficult to obtain since the host countries list Rotumans with other Fijians or ‘other Pacific islanders’. Connell (1983j) notes that there were about 3500 Fijians in Australia and about 3880 in New Zealand in 1981 and these figures undoubtedly include Rotumans. Figures on international migration from Fiji have been recorded for ethnic groups other than Fijians or Indians only since 1981, hence they give little indication of the total number of Rotumans living overseas. Since 1981 the numbers of Rotumans emigrating have averaged twenty-five a year or around 1 per cent of total emigration (Fiji Bureau of Statistics 1981-85).

The Rotuman population is becoming increasingly urbanized (Table 9.2), although the absence of birthplace data for Rotumans in the 1976 census makes increasing urban permanence difficult to verify. Since 1966 the population has tended to concentrate in Suva, as employment opportunities in the mining town
of Vatukoula diminish. This necessity for labour to shift location is simply part of changing employment patterns, and for Rotuma itself is indicative of the response to capitalist penetration of outlying islands which makes wage-earning employment a necessity.

Table 9.2 Distribution of Rotuman population in Fiji, 1921-76

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1966*</th>
<th>1976b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rotuma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1052.0</td>
<td>1264.0</td>
<td>1352.0</td>
<td>1474.0</td>
<td>1625.0</td>
<td>1380.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1060.0</td>
<td>1279.0</td>
<td>1392.0</td>
<td>1519.0</td>
<td>1610.0</td>
<td>1327.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2112.0</td>
<td>2543.0</td>
<td>2744.0</td>
<td>2993.0</td>
<td>3235.0</td>
<td>2707.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suva</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>148.0</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>183.0</td>
<td>495.0</td>
<td>1357.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>189.0</td>
<td>491.0</td>
<td>1377.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>210.0</td>
<td>177.0</td>
<td>372.0</td>
<td>986.0</td>
<td>2734.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other urban</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>192.0</td>
<td>694.0</td>
<td>1246.0</td>
<td>1290.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total urban</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>126.0</td>
<td>369.0</td>
<td>1066.0</td>
<td>2232.0</td>
<td>4024.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total non-urban in Fiji</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>147.0</td>
<td>200.0</td>
<td>363.0</td>
<td>330.0</td>
<td>560.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in Fiji</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>123.0</td>
<td>273.0</td>
<td>569.0</td>
<td>1429.0</td>
<td>2562.0</td>
<td>4584.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Rotumans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2235.0</td>
<td>2816.0</td>
<td>3313.0</td>
<td>4422.0</td>
<td>5797.0</td>
<td>7291.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a 1966 figures are for 'towns only'.
b 1976 figures are for 'towns and peri-urban areas'. If the peri-urban areas were not included the percentages would be slightly less (e.g. 33.3 per cent of the Rotuman population is found within the city of Suva and 37.5 per cent is in the city and peri-urban area).
Source: Censuses of Fiji, 1921-76.

The relocation of the Rotuman population from the island is also reflected in the changing demographic situation of that population. The situation is very similar to the impact of migration on other outlying (or periphery) islands throughout the Pacific and indeed throughout the world (Fuller 1979:29). For example, the dependency ratio of the island population is high, with a ratio of 118 dependants to 100 adults of working age, compared with 63 per 100 for the Rotuman population living in Suva in 1976 and 84 per 100 for the total Rotuman
population. The high dependency ratio for the island itself is partly accounted for by the tendency of Fiji-based families to send small children to Rotuma to be cared for by grandparents and other relatives. This does not only occur with the orphans but is quite common within large families and is reflected in the high child-woman ratio of 70 for the island compared with 41 in Suva. The dependency ratio cannot be taken even as a crude measure of fertility, however, because of the movement of children, and, in any case, fertility on the island is declining (Naroba, forthcoming). Family separation, either between one spouse and the rest of the family, or between parents and children, is common in most Third World countries, although it is becoming less so with improved employment opportunities for women (Gilbert and Gugler 1982:63). Whether or not this is the case for Rotumans cannot at present be demonstrated, but the indications are that the practice remains strong and shows the intricate links which Rotumans retain with their home island, even long after they have migrated.

The fertility of Rotumans living in Suva is low, although detailed statistics for the urban centre are unavailable. Fertility on the island and for the total Rotuman population shows declining crude birth rates (CBR) from 42.2 in the period 1937-60 to 30.8 in the period 1961-80 until in 1981 the CBR was around 21.7 (Fiji Bureau of Statistics 1984:37). The most recent CBR figures are lower than for Fijians and Indians, and no doubt reflect the high proportion of Rotumans living in urban areas and the move towards a later age of marriage and a desire for more educational qualifications among women. While the CBR figures appear lower than for other groups, the rates of natural increase in population for Rotumans in 1982 were 3 per cent compared with 2.3 per cent for Fijians and 2.7 per cent for Indians. The difficulties of obtaining up-to-date registration figures for births on the island of Rotuma could distort the figures (Fiji Bureau of Statistics 1984:13). The isolation of Rotuma and the difficulties involved with obtaining wholly accurate data are problems faced in studies of many migrant groups.

Rotuman occupational characteristics

What is particularly interesting about the situation of Rotumans in Fiji proper is how they fare in Fijian society, despite the difficulties they could face in a society in which they are a minority. It could be argued, from an examination of demographic characteristics and by comparisons with migrants from similarly isolated areas in Fiji, such as the eastern islands and the Lau group, that Rotumans display characteristics very similar to other migrants. Bedford discusses the relocation of Fijians from the eastern islands to the urban centres of Viti Levu in order to obtain employment; he claims that there is a ‘quite disproportionate number of eastern islanders occupying senior positions in the public as well as the private sectors in Fiji’s main towns’ (Bedford 1980a:50). Unfortunately Bedford gives no figures to back up this claim though casual evidence suggests it has validity relative to other parts of Fiji.

An analysis of the 1976 census for Rotuma, as well as Howard’s work in the 1960s, demonstrates that the number of Rotumans involved in high-status occupations is proportionately higher than for Fijians and Indians, particularly in the professions (Tables 9.3 and 9.4). A more recent sample survey in Suva demonstrated that this trend is still continuing (Table 9.5). Howard and Howard (1972:22) commented on the extent to which Rotumans are to be found in a wide variety of occupations in Fiji, but are concentrated in particular fields. They also
noted that, in the 1956 census, the proportion of the male population in professional and allied roles was 84 per 1000 for Rotumans, compared with 48 per 1000 for Fijians in the 30-44 age group, and 102 and 36 per 1000 for the 45-49 ages. In the 1966 census, these figures were 79 per 1000 and 61 per 1000 in the 30-44 age group, and 97 per 1000 and 45 per 1000 in the 45-49 age group for Rotumans and Fijians respectively. At this time, Rotumans were second only to Europeans in professional and allied roles, although by 1976 the Chinese were represented in almost equal numbers to Rotumans in professional occupations.

Table 9.3 Economically active population of Rotuma, 1976 (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Fijian</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Rotuman</th>
<th>European</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional/technical</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative/managerial</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and related</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production/transport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>workers/labourers</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not classifiable</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total economically active</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census of Fiji, 1976.

In the 1930s and later, when the Vatukoula (Emperor) gold mine was at the peak of its operations, a large number of Rotuman labourers migrated to Fiji in search of wage employment. In 1956 there were 519 Rotumans working in the mines; by 1974 they constituted 25 per cent of the employees on the staff of the Emperor Mine. This also represented a rise in status for Rotuman employees of the mine from being workers paid by the hour to a situation where they occupied a quarter of the salaried positions at the mine (Emperor Mines, pers. comm., 15 March 1974). Apart from this case of chain migration, it is in the professions and throughout the public service where Rotumans appear to hold a number of high-status positions disproportionate to their total numbers.

If females and males are separated according to their occupational status some more obvious differences are apparent. For instance, 19.5 per cent of Rotuman women in 1976 worked in clerical and related occupations, largely as bookkeepers, cashiers and stenographers. For Indian women the figure was 19.6 per cent and for Fijians 9.9 per cent. In the agricultural sector, 46.2 per cent of Rotuman women claimed to be agricultural workers, compared with 15.7 per cent of Indian and 27.7 per cent of Fijian women, perhaps indicating the numbers of women remaining on the island, or else their willingness to be classed as employed rather than as not working.
Table 9.4  Rotuman and Fijian males aged 15 and over engaged in selected professional and administrative occupations, Rotuma, 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Rotuman</th>
<th></th>
<th>Fijian</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical/dental</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountants</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government executive officials</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total males over 15</td>
<td>1791</td>
<td></td>
<td>65,123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census of Fiji, 1976.

Table 9.5  Occupations of Rotumans in Raiwaqa, 1973, 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1973</th>
<th></th>
<th>1983</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary industry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary industry</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and comms</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainment</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration/gov</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Bryant (1974) and author's survey, 1983-84.

Of particular note is the role which Rotuman men play in the civil service. Kaurasi reports that the 1974 Civil List shows that they hold more than their relative proportion (in terms of population) of top civil jobs. 'Rotuman male doctors constitute 6.9 per cent of the total, or 6 doctors out of 86' (Kaurasi 1977:168). Of even greater significance is the fact that Rotuman men are far more likely to be involved in certain professional and government occupations than Fijian men; as Table 9.4 shows, the proportion of Rotuman males who are dentists, doctors, accountants or government officials is more than twice the figure for Fijians.
The changes which have taken place in Rotuman employment since 1966 are difficult to specify because of major changes in census classifications. It would appear, however, that Rotumans have retained their generally high profile in the occupational structure, and indeed where there were no qualified accountants in 1966 there are now seventeen (Censuses of Fiji, 1966 and 1976). The reasons for the continuing high status are complex and are not only to do with motivations. Linked with that are such important reasons as the level of education (and formal education does not proceed beyond form four on the island) and the very fact that they are migrants. Migrants tend to be better educated, and it appears that once they reach Fiji, and as a motivation for going there, Rotumans undertake a significant amount of secondary and tertiary education and training. Another possible explanation for Rotuman success may be that Rotumans as a group are more cohesive or more conscious of their ethnicity than other groups. In support of this, the Howards claim that the high amount of Rotuman in-migration into Vatukoula, ‘increases ethnic consciousness because of the continual need to socialise newcomers’ (Howard and Howard 1972:51). Miles and Spoonley find such an analysis too simplistic, however, and, in reference to the status of migrant groups in New Zealand, feel that ‘ethnic consciousness’ is only one factor in determining the location of people in society. The modes of production, history, and the structure of a society are likely to have a much more significant impact (Miles and Spoonley 1985:22). Certainly the labour migration of Rotuman islanders to Vatukoula should be viewed in the light of all of these factors. They were responding to uneven development, and were presumably in demand at a time when semi-skilled labourers were required by the developing economy of Fiji. These motivations for leaving do not, however, provide an adequate explanation for Rotuman success.

It has been suggested by several authors that the impetus provided by leaving the island, in order to escape traditional kinship obligations for example, might force people to succeed in Fiji (Howard and Howard 1972:22; Bryant 1974:14; Irava 1977:154) but there is no reason to suppose that traditional obligations are greater in Rotuma than elsewhere. It is more likely, therefore, that the inadequate resource base of outer islands such as Rotuma encourages permanent migration in search of adequate living standards. Migration and the desire for permanent, high-status jobs are encouraged by the need to obtain income in order to build a new house, to help relatives, or to provide children with education. All of these factors are important motivations both for leaving the island and for achieving success. If financial success can be measured by the value of remittances to the island by Rotumans living elsewhere, then they are contributing a substantial proportion of the island’s income. In 1976-77 remittances contributed $66,000 or 12 per cent of the total cash income of the island including government wages and salaries (Plant 1977:181). This does not include gifts of food and cargo which are regularly shipped by relatives to the island from the main islands of Fiji and overseas.

Howard has advanced a number of theses on the reasons for the apparent ability of Rotumans to succeed in Fiji society. Not all of the reasons concern the motivations for migration listed above, although they may explain the apparent bias shown by certain employers towards Rotumans (Howard 1961, 1963, 1964, 1966; Howard and Howard 1972). The Howards claim that it was not until there was a significant number of Rotumans living in Fiji itself that a sense of Rotuman
identity evolved (Howard and Howard 1972:14) and this emerging identity provides part of the answer to the impetus for Rotuman success:

Rotumans coming to Fiji stepped into a social structure that sought to classify them by ‘race’ from the very beginning. The process was fostered by their distinctiveness from Fijians in racial type (closer to Polynesian) and language; it was probably furthered even more by European favoritism for Polynesians with whom Rotumans are generally classified by Europeans, over the darker Melanesians (including Fijians). Thus Rotumans tended to be placed above Fijians in the European derived hierarchy, and it was to their advantage to accept if not nurture the distinction (Howard and Howard 1972:52).

Difficulties in interpreting such generalizations are apparent when contrasted with Alan Howard’s earlier comment in a paper on Rotuman achievement that racial discrimination did not seem to account for Rotuman superiority in a number of fields because the ‘Europeans regard the country as belonging to the Fijians, and their major prejudices are directed toward the Indian segment of the population’ (Howard 1966:267). At that time Howard viewed the isolation of Rotumans as an explanation for their subsequent success, as well as their determination not to be overwhelmed by Europeans.

The Howards illustrated their 1972 argument with reference to the position of Rotumans in the gold mines at Vatukoula where they pointed out that in Fiji ‘ethnicity has been the major criteria [sic] for allocating privilege’ (Howard and Howard 1972:51). The degree to which Rotumans in Fiji proper regard themselves as ‘Rotuman’, rather than being from a particular district of the island, is also important in developing this sense of ethnicity. As with the migration of any minority ethnic group into a larger society the sense of identity takes on a broader form for protection. The Howards argued that the ‘birth’ of Rotuman identity took place in Vatukoula because it was only there that there were enough Rotumans for the critical mass required for the crystallization of identity (Howard and Howard:57-8) in an obvious distinction from other ethnic groups. Although Rotumans are regarded as Fijian in terms of national identity, they do not call themselves Fijian and retain distinct social and cultural patterns of behaviour. Intermarriage with other ethnic groups does occur, but the partners are most likely to be European, Indian or Chinese and very rarely Fijian (Kaurasi 1977:163). Since 1972 the migration of Rotumans to Fiji has increased and the destination changed from a small company town to the larger urban centres. The gold mines at Vatukoula are still in operation, after brief periods of closure, but at reduced capacity. It is therefore important to examine changes in Rotuman identity and movement in the 1980s and to ask if Rotumans as a community still maintain a strong sense of identity, whether, and if so, for what reasons they continue to achieve high-status occupations, and if this fact is causing Rotumans to be viewed as a separate, powerful group in competition for high-status jobs in modern Fiji.

Rotumans in Raiwaqa, 1974-84

In 1973-74, a survey was undertaken of urban Rotuman households which provided a valuable baseline study of the Rotuman enclave in the Suva suburbs of Raiwaqa, Raiwasa, and Raiwai (collectively known as Raiwaqa). Ninety-eight Rotuman households living there (a 93 per cent sample) were surveyed and basic
socio-economic data gathered (Bryant 1974). The study was repeated and continued a decade later, with the aim of tracing the original households, to note changes in residential status, and to examine alterations in socio-economic status. It was impossible to find all ninety-eight families but enough have now been found to comment on the changing situation and destiny of Rotumans in the past ten to twenty years.

The first survey generally found that the sense of ‘Rotumanness’ which Howard had described was being reinforced rather than broken down in the urban setting. It was also suggested that the Rotuman ‘community’ would continue to make a strong impression on Fijian life (Bryant 1974:45). The different Rotuman enclaves from the island living in Suva were becoming unimportant, partly because of difficulties in visiting the island, and there was thus a reduced level of awareness of the existence of significant feelings of separate identities which occur in Rotuma. Moreover, Rotumans living in Fiji proper appeared at that time, at least to outsiders, as a unified and single group. What was however then obvious were the differences between the Wesleyan and Catholic groups which, in Rotuma, live in two clearly defined areas, partly as the result of the efforts of the nineteenth-century French and English missionaries who were somewhat ‘intolerant towards one another’s labours’, so that religious factionalism developed (Howard 1961:273).

The existence of the United Rotuma Convention and the Rotuman Methodist Choir, as well as youth and sporting clubs which are open to all Rotumans, reinforced the impression that Rotumans living in Fiji were very much a ‘community’ and not likely to be readily absorbed into the mainstream of Fijian life. The Combined Seven Co-operative, named after the seven districts in Rotuma and established in 1972, was an obvious attempt to advance all Rotumans. The fact that among 32 per cent of Rotumans living in Suva in the 1970s were in Raiwaqa was taken as further evidence of their unity as a group. While 32 per cent is not a high concentration compared to ‘ghetto’ and enclave situations elsewhere, this did remain the main centre for Rotumans, with other smaller enclaves existing in Toorak, close to the centre of Suva city, and Samabula. The remainder of the population was scattered but visited Raiwaqa regularly for community meetings, church and social occasions.

A decade later, by contacting informants and field assistants involved in the earlier survey, and examining maps and household lists, information was obtained for 62 per cent of the original households. Of the sixty-one households ‘found’ in the second survey, more than half were still living in the same house in the suburb of Raiwaqa, and only 12 per cent had migrated internationally or returned to Rotuma (Table 9.6). Even where people had moved from their earlier home, more than 50 per cent of those homes continued to be occupied by Rotuman families, indicating a secondary process of chain migration for, as one Rotuman household leaves, another takes its place. Although the impression gained in conversation with some informants was that those who have moved from Raiwaqa (a low-cost Housing Authority suburb) had gone ‘upmarket’ to the wealthy suburbs of Tamavua and Namadi Heights, this was not borne out by the 1983-84 survey, unless those who were not found have in fact done that (Table 9.7). If all those who migrated overseas and who moved because of a job transfer, however, are included, a further 27 per cent could be classed as having moved ‘upmarket’, suggesting that 54 per cent of the Rotumans interviewed earlier have
substantially improved their economic circumstances. This is demonstrated in Table 9.8 which shows that of those who did move from their earlier home, 44 per cent purchased a home elsewhere. While these same people initially rented their homes in Raiwaqa, they eventually purchased them from the Housing Authority only to sell them later to other Rotumans. The houses then purchased in higher status suburbs were of better quality and higher value, and thus the first home in Raiwaqa provided the investment basis from which to improve their economic circumstances. While it might appear that the Rotuman population is scattering as economic circumstances improve, the Raiwaqa enclave is being maintained, and it appears that a Rotuman enclave will continue to exist for one reason or another for the indefinite future.

Table 9.6 Rotuman families in Raiwaqa: movement of household head, 1973-83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In same house</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved, same suburb</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved, elsewhere Suva</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved, elsewhere Fiji</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrated overseas</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned to Rotuma</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>61</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Household head was taken to be the person who was responsible for renting or purchasing the house. A number of family groups generally live in each house and their movement is much more flexible than that of the head.

Sources: Bryant (1974) and author's survey, 1983-84.

The data gathered in 1983-84 demonstrate a number of points concerning Rotuman mobility in the previous ten years. While the community may not appear to have been particularly mobile in that the majority of those who moved to Raiwaqa remain there (Table 9.6) some have significantly improved their circumstances. In the 1973 survey it was clear that Raiwaqa was a stepping stone towards higher status (Bryant 1974:5), but in the past few years steps have been taken not only towards achieving higher education and occupational status within Fiji, but also towards developing the home island and providing a strong base for retiring householders. In this situation Rotuman migrants are behaving in the manner of Hugo's working-life migrants where they are highly committed to the city but retain contacts with the village and may eventually return there (Hugo 1983), as demonstrated by the three households which returned to retire.
Table 9.7 Movement of Rotuman householders in Fiji, 1973-83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Similar area</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealthier area</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job transfer - suburb unknown</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrated overseas</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned to Rotuma</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total moved</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's survey, 1983-84.

Table 9.8 Rotuman housing status after moving

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purchased</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned to Rotuma</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's survey, 1983-84.

Remittances are still common and a proportion of these are not used for immediate consumption (Kaurasi 1977:171) but for investment purposes in the manner of international migrants (Fuller 1979:32-3). On Rotuma such investments include yaqona, or kava (Piper methysticum) plantations which can be worth several million dollars at maturity, video shows, fishing ventures, and other cooperative enterprises funded by Rotumans living in Suva, Lautoka and even Sydney. In addition to ventures on the island itself, Rotumans are consolidating their position in Fiji proper by becoming home owners. Of the sixty-one households for which data are available, thirty are known to have purchased their Raiwaqa home, despite the fact that the majority of those householders remain in the same occupation, or one similar to, the one they held ten years ago.

While Rotuman islanders may in general appear to hold more high-status posts than many other groups, it is difficult to demonstrate from the census figures and the 1973 survey that they had ‘taken over’ the higher echelons of the public service or elsewhere, despite the early signs of disproportionate representation (Table 9.5). On the other hand, a survey of forty-four Rotumans of working age interviewed in Raiwaqa ten years later demonstrated that there is a movement towards professional and administrative occupations in recent years.
Despite this there are also several known cases of senior Rotuman civil servants being denied promotion in the civil service ranks. This is perhaps an indication of the 'over-achievement' of Rotumans and attempts by government to avoid the disproportionate representation of a minority group, although the depressed state of Fiji's economy and high unemployment of the 1980s also minimize possibilities for a flexible job market.

Rotumans do not tend to return to the island in large numbers, although there are many who, because of their easy access to land there, use the island for investment purposes. Despite the fact that many do not live on the island or even visit it, the sense of Rotuman identity is strong. The territorial base still exists even if the territory itself is not seen for many decades. Although the population is now highly urbanized, the strong sense of identity is maintained through organizations such as Rotuman Methodist and Catholic churches and sports clubs. The fact that the population generally achieves higher levels of education and occupations than the two main ethnic groups in Fiji (Table 9.9) also helps emphasize a strong sense of identity.

Table 9.9 Education of Fiji population 15 years and over, 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No education / primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Post secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fijian</td>
<td>118,061</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>30,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>125,758</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>42,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotuman</td>
<td>2,765</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1,482</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-European</td>
<td>3,185</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3,232</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>255,079</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>81,278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census of Fiji, 1976.

Rotuman islanders are high achievers with clear educational and occupational goals. Such disproportionate achievement may not, however, be welcome in a multi-racial society where the two major races face far greater problems of unemployment and poverty and where they are constantly vying with one another for the power to correct the ills facing Fiji today. Since Rotumans are a minority group, theoretically with the same rights as everyone else in the country, but who have 'succeeded' to an extent even where some other groups have not, it is possible that their success and resultant pressures could actually stimulate further international migration rather than a return to island life and idealistic self-reliance which can no longer provide security. On the other hand, recent statistics demonstrate that few Rotumans are migrating overseas, and that the population is increasingly investing in development projects on the island.
In the 1980s Rotumans have become a split population in several senses. Not only does the majority of the population live away from the island, but there are divisions within the community over the type of future development suitable for the island and the population. Those who live on the main islands of Fiji and overseas continue to maintain strong links with the island and like to play some part in what is happening on the island. Those who remain want to control their own future and there has been some public resentment of involvement by Rotumans living in Australia or New Zealand in new projects such as an alternative cooperative movement or the visit of tourist liners (Fiji Times, 13 June 1986:1). The reality is that Rotuma is a small and isolated island with a limited resource base. The people have for generations provided a labour force for major projects in Fiji and elsewhere in the Pacific, in response to uneven development between the 'centre' of urban Fiji, and the 'periphery' of the outer islands. Idealistic self-reliance in the form of small-scale development projects, and even occasional visits by tourist liners, may not provide security for the population and the majority will continue to migrate, never to return permanently, in search of greater security and independence.

The theme of self-determination may explain the motivation for Rotumans to migrate and be successful in whatever they do. The very fact that they are of a different ethnic origin from other major groups in Fiji allows Rotumans to be scrutinized, and sometimes criticized, within Fiji, where inequalities are frequently viewed in ethnic terms. A more plausible explanation of their success is that Rotumans migrate in order to avoid the risks and constraints inherent in uneven development, and must either succeed or become a minority group in the wider society with little chance of economic and social success. That they undertake very little circular migration is an indication that they do not see their future on the island as assured and that, despite rural investments, most see their future away from Rotuma.
Chapter 10

Paamese in Port Vila
Peasants on leave or a wage-dependent proletariat?

GERALD HABERKORN

This chapter examines to what extent rural-urban migration in Vanuatu has undergone a change from short-term mobility to longer-term, and even permanent relocations, and discusses some of its implications for source and destination areas.

Vanuatu, formerly known as the New Hebrides, is an archipelago of some eighty islands lying 2250 kilometres northeast of Sydney, Australia and 400 kilometres north of New Caledonia (Figure 10.1). The vast majority (about 94 per cent) of its population of approximately 130,000 is of Melanesian origin living in rural areas, with Port Vila and Santo, Vanuatu's only two towns, accounting for just 18 per cent of the country's population. Agriculture represents the most important economic sector accounting for 80 per cent of total exports and 81 per cent of the country's labour force (Haberkorn 1985). Copra and cocoa produced on commercial plantations rather than on smallholdings have provided the bulk of domestic exports throughout this century, and, with commercial plantations primarily located on the islands of Efate, Santo and Malakula, point to a long history of ni-Vanuatu wage-labour migration. While such forms of population mobility, mainly from resource-poor islands like Paama in central Vanuatu, for example, were predominantly rural-oriented throughout the first half of this century, and expanding and diversifying urban economy from the early 1970s onwards has led to a considerable mobility change (Haberkorn 1985). To what extent such a spatial reorientation has also been accompanied by a change from temporary circulation to long-term and even permanent rural absenteeism, will be discussed via an examination of recent Paamese mobility.

The contemporary significance of this issue for a country such as Vanuatu has serious implications for development planning, particularly in the context of views expressed in its first National Development Plan, that

Vanuatu has a pattern of circular migration typical of Pacific Islands. People from the outer islands, particularly the young from the densely populated islands, migrate to Port Vila or Luganville (or in the past to New Caledonia) to stay with a group from their island of origin and find work. After a period of
time, which could be several years, these temporary migrants return home, and are replaced by others (Vanuatu 1982:103).

Figure 10.1 Vanuatu
The contemporary validity of such assertions, however, has to be seriously questioned. For one thing, they are largely based on empirical work carried out by Bedford and Bonnemaison between the late 1960s and early 1970s, when economic, social and political conditions in migration destination (towns, plantation) and source areas may well have favoured such forms of population mobility over more permanent relocations. Bedford’s (1971) assessment, that temporary mobility was likely to persist in Vanuatu for many years to come, and that rural-urban migrants cannot be considered a wage-dependent proletariat given that their home villages remain ‘an important source of income as well as of social security’ (1971:288), has to be interpreted in the context of the social, political and economic climate of the late 1960s.1 The importance of acknowledging changes in the setting of mobility over time is implicit in Bonnemaison’s (1976) suggestion that temporary circulation, particularly to urban areas, may well decline given the considerable economic and social change during the early 1970s, as is discussed below, creating new conditions for mobility which are more conducive to long-term and even permanent forms of movement from some islands. The view that contemporary ni-Vanuatu mobility remains predominantly temporary and circular furthermore fails to acknowledge, first, the implications of intercensal population growth rates on several islands, which cannot solely be explained in terms of fertility and mortality differentials; second, the growing importance of urban areas over rural destinations between 1967 and 1979; and third, the substantial increase in female mobility in recent years, all of which are clear indications of changing ni-Vanuatu mobility patterns (Haberkorn 1985, 1987).

This issue of temporariness versus permanence, of whether or not urban migrants have become a wage-dependent proletariat or merely represent peasants on temporary leave, has been the predominant one in Melanesian mobility research for some time (e.g. Ward 1980). Despite early references to an emerging urban permanence amongst certain migrant groups in Papua New Guinea (Ryan 1964; Oram 1968; Ward 1971), Fiji (Nayacakalou 1963) and Vanuatu (Tonkinson 1968), and more recent census evidence from these countries pointing in a similar direction,2 the general consensus emerging from the literature emphasizes temporary movements, or circular migration, as the predominant form of Melanesian population mobility (see, for example, Bedford 1973, 1981; Chapman 1969, 1975, 1985a; Connell and Curtain 1982a). Such assertions are principally substantiated by migrants’ perceptions of rural areas as ‘home’, even after long absences (Young 1977:173), as places to which they eventually intend to return permanently at some unspecified time in the future.

1 Bastin’s (1985) more recent suggestion along similar lines that, despite longer periods spent in urban wage employment, Tannese villagers are not oriented towards permanent urban residence, and rather wish to secure an income in their home village, may also reflect conditions in Weesi village on Tanna during the early 1970s, when Bastin carried out his empirical work there, rather than more recent conditions.

2 This is implicit in much higher urban than rural population growth rates. In Papua New Guinea, intercensal urban and rural population growth amounted to 4.04 per cent versus 1.86 per cent respectively between 1971 and 1980. The corresponding figures for Fiji between 1966 and 1976 amounted to 3.21 per cent and 1.53 per cent, and for Vanuatu between 1967 and 1979 to 5.09 per cent and 2.66 per cent. The Solomon Islands, however, reveal no such explicit contrast, as evident in figures of 3.66 per cent and 3.02 per cent between 1970 and 1976 (Haberkorn 1984:40).
Conflicting empirical evidence concerning the continued significance of temporary circulation results primarily from three methodological inadequacies. Empirical 'proof' of permanence relying on static measures\(^3\) of urban stability is contradicted by evidence based primarily on dynamic indices, such as loosely constructed cognitive measures of intended future residence or attitude to town and rural life. Yet irrespective of the type of empirical data referred to, both approaches often fail to recognize the structural context of mobility. The second analytical shortcoming emerges from studies which, in their overemphasis on structural features, acknowledge that individual behaviour (mobility) cannot be predicted without due recognition of 'those structural constraints influencing it' (Fahey 1979:310), yet by doing so fail altogether to consider a behavioural component. Despite highlighting certain parameters underlying mobility differences between particular migrant groups (e.g. Fahey 1979; Curtain 1980), this approach still permits no assessment of the likelihood that certain migrants remain absent from their rural 'home' areas for longer periods than others. A third problem relates to the operationalization of urban permanence. Since urban migrants could, theoretically, always return to their 'home' areas irrespective of how long they have resided in town, permanence can only be established post facto, that is either after the ultimate return 'home', or after the death of these migrants (Fahey 1979; Morauta 1979; Connell 1988a).

From a policy point of view, however, the reliance on post facto evidence to differentiate between temporary and permanent migrants is as irrelevant as the emphasis on either future residential intentions or on structural criteria is conceptually inadequate, since these migrants, and particularly those accompanied by their families, require and utilize an infrastructure (of housing, health care and so on) similar to that of their non-migrant counterparts. Adhering to the view that the present is part of the past (cf. Thompson 1982:290), an examination of recent mobility change, via the analysis of life-time migration histories in the context of structural change in source and destination areas, is proposed as the most reliable means of assessing the question of temporariness versus permanence underlying contemporary ni-Vanuatu population mobility. An examination of the life-time mobility experience of Paamese migrants in Port Vila and of their rural counterparts resident on the island of Paama, in central Vanuatu, forms the basis of the following analysis.

Structural change in migration destination and source areas

Bedford (1971:37) emphasized a 'sequential change' in ni-Vanuatu population mobility from pre-contact days until World War II, from traditional oscillation, associated with the acquisition of pigs for social rank-taking ceremonies (Allen 1968; Bonnemaison 1985a) and inter-island trade (Bedford 1971, 1973), through periods of lengthy absenteeism in contract employment overseas, to Fiji, Queensland, Samoa and New Caledonia between 1863 and 1904 (Price and Baker 1976), and to more short-term plantation mobility within Vanuatu.\(^4\)

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\(^3\) For example, demographic indices such as the age and sex structure of urban migrants fall in this category, as well as the length of residence in town (see Mitchell 1968).

\(^4\) Between 1912 and 1939, 32,000 contract moves, primarily to French plantations (75 per cent) were recorded throughout the country (Bedford 1971: Appendix IX).
He estimated that by the time of World War II, most ni-Vanuatu men had come into contact with labour migration. This was largely the result of a compulsory conscription of all men over 18 years of age for three-month labour stints initiated by the two colonial powers to satisfy the US military’s demands for labour, to construct military bases, airstrips and dry-docks in and around Port Vila, Santo (Luganville) and Havannah Harbour on north Efate.

As far as the impact of World War II on subsequent ni-Vanuatu mobility is concerned, the fact that most ni-Vanuatu men gained their first experience in rural-urban migration during this period, is of equal, if not greater importance than the sheer number of people involved. Although Port Vila, unlike Santo, was already established as a town before the arrival of the US military in 1942, being the commercial and administrative centre of the New Hebrides, population mobility until then had been primarily of a rural nature. Even in cases of rural-urban mobility, employment was primarily on urban and peri-urban coconut plantations.

Whereas the expansion of Port Vila during the US military presence was greatly aided by an existing, though very underdeveloped urban infrastructure, it was in Santo that the US military practically built a town overnight. Construction, with military and island labour, went ahead at a phenomenal speed, building a major military and supply base the ‘size of a small western city’, accommodating over 100,000 servicemen who were permanently stationed there and about half a million who passed through during the years of the American presence (MacClancy 1980:107). Following World War II, Port Vila and Santo experienced a remarkable population growth. The population of both towns nearly doubled between 1955 and 1967, and the ni-Vanuatu population alone grew by 556 per cent and 802 per cent respectively. Suffice to say that, given the small base population of resident urban ni-Vanuatu in 1955 in both towns, 200 in Port Vila and 170 in Santo (Bennett 1957:123), these growth rates were the direct result of an increase in rural-urban migration.

The 1960s and early 1970s saw the beginning of an expanding and diversifying urban economy, providing growing employment opportunities for ni-Vanuatu, and in sectors previously unknown to them when both colonial powers decided to step up the development of educational, medical and agricultural services (Bedford 1971:116). The destruction by the 1959 hurricane of many of the wooden and corrugated iron buildings erected during World War II, and the repatriation in 1963 of Vietnamese workers who constituted the main labour supply in the construction industry, illustrate how suddenly previously unknown employment opportunities became available for ni-Vanuatu. The decline of the Vietnamese population from around 1600 in 1956 to 397 in 1967 (McArthur and Yaxley 1968:24) not only affected the urban construction industry, but also the

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5 The war-time population of 1000 was largely made up of European settlers and administrators, and about 200 Japanese and Chinese farmers and artisans and newly arrived Tonkinese labour (MacClancy 1980). During these years, few ni-Vanuatu lived in town. If they were unemployed or not from nearby villages, they could not remain in town beyond fifteen days, after which they faced deportation to their home islands. But even for those from Port Vila’s four surrounding villages (Erakor, Pango, Ifira, Mele) and the employed ni-Vanuatu, their urban presence was severely regulated in the form of nightly curfews after 9 p.m. (MacClancy 1980:65). Santo, in contrast, by then consisted merely of the Catholic Mission established in 1907, a small hospital, some tradestores which opened during the 1920s and a Condominium Government District Agency.
peri-urban plantation sector, opening new positions for unskilled ni-Vanuatu labour. The opening of the manganese mine in Forari, 20 kilometres northeast of Port Vila, provided further positions in the mining sector, in construction, and in associated retail and service sectors.

Port Vila's rapid growth between 1967 and 1972 (Haberkorn 1987) resulted primarily from the gradual expansion of administrative services business, involving Europeans and Asians, requiring a steady labour supply provided mainly by ni-Vanuatu and other Pacific islanders. In 1971 British legislation turned Vanuatu into a tax haven modelled after the Cayman Islands.

The result was electrifying. Between 1972 and 1974 Port Vila became a boom town. Thirteen overseas banks opened their doors, the expatriate population tripled, subdivisions sprouted in what had been previously virgin bush and, as a side effect, tourism took off. Two large new hotels were built to international standards, air services increased rapidly and cruise ships tied up at regular intervals alongside a newly built wharf capable of berthing vessels up to 40,000 tons. Suddenly Port Vila was on the map (Forster 1980:371).

Although the overall economic impact of this development was rather limited since the British government cut its aid by the exact amount which the tax haven generated in annual revenue, it did create substantial employment for ni-Vanuatu, first in the construction industry and subsequently in banks, tourism related industries and the domestic service sector (Connell 1983h:10).

Data from a national manpower and employment survey conducted in 1973 show an increase in the non-agricultural monetary sector of the economy and workforce from 5692 to 8749 jobs between 1967 and 1973. This increase by 54 per cent in only six years was primarily due to an expansion in the construction industry and the wholesale/retail business accounting for 60 per cent of the total change, and would have been even more substantial had the peri-urban plantation sector and the urban domestic services labour force been included in that survey (Connell 1983h:18). Ni-Vanuatu participation in the formal sector had by then increased to 5700 and made up 67 per cent of the labour force from a previous 3726 in comparable occupations during 1967, representing a massive increase in the employment of ni-Vanuatu (ibid.). Yet by examining the wider context of urbanization during this period, particularly as it affected ni-Vanuatu, it is apparent that a growing participation in an expanding domestic economy is only a partial explanation of this phenomenon. By the late 1960s, Port Vila and Santo were not only attracting rural-urban migrants responding to a diversifying and increasingly urban domestic labour market, but as the 'termini for overseas shipping and air services were being used as a place of temporary residence by New Hebrideans in transit for another urban area - Noumea' (Bedford 1971:124).

As much as the departure of Vietnamese labour from Vanuatu in the early 1960s had affected the domestic construction industry and plantation sector, their departure had even more serious implications for the labour market in neighbouring New Caledonia (Bedford 1971). The resulting labour shortage became most problematical with the ensuing nickel boom in the late 1960s which prompted 'large expansion plans for the New Caledonian mining and metallurgical industry placing great strain on available accommodation in Noumea, and by mid 1971 considerable new construction was going on in and around the town' (Bedford 1971:127). Bedford gives the number of ni-Vanuatu employed in
Paamese in Port Vila 157

Noumea towards the end of 1968 as 500, and puts this figure at about 1500 by the end of 1969 and 3500 in 1971. Connell (1983h:32) suggests that during the entire period of the nickel boom more than 10,000 ni-Vanuatu worked at some time in New Caledonia.

A further explanation for the great urban growth between 1967 and 1972 relates to the 'rural crisis' of the early 1970s (Bonnemaison 1976). Extensive cyclone damage to coconut groves in the highly populated Banks and Shepherd islands in 1971 and a drastic fall in copra prices in the same year released parts of the rural labour force effectively made redundant as a result of these outside changes. While short-term circular mobility in the past could have been easily combined with subsistence and small-scale cash crop activities at home, these external pressures facilitated more long-term urban mobility. Furthermore, during these years, the initial effects of a more intensive education reaching ni-Vanuatu became apparent ‘when a considerable number of educated people headed for Port Vila and Luganville joined by planters driven away from the islands by the copra slump’ (Bonnemaison 1976:11). This combined result of ‘structural and cyclical factors triggered off a new wave of urban migration’, which Bonnemaison (ibid.) refers to as ‘wild’ or ‘uncontrolled’ in the sense that this movement no longer reflected ‘structures, means of control and links with the home environment’. Bonnemaison considered that more than half of all urban residents in Port Vila and Santo during the early and mid-1970s were migrants of this type.

Despite the considerable expansion and diversification of Vanuatu’s urban economy, it was associated developments that ultimately provided the basis for a change from temporary to more permanent urban mobility. A steady growth in urban wages (Haberkorn 1987), formerly geared towards the urban sustenance of single workers, facilitated family residence in town, hence permitting longer periods of urban residence. The increased incidence of female and family mobility, however, was further aided by two parallel developments: first, a rapid expansion in female formal sector employment during the 1970s (Tonkinson 1985; Connell 1985b), which is reflected in census data pointing to a growth in female labour force participation of 80 per cent between 1967 and 1979, and an even higher increase in female urban employment outside of agriculture of 168 per cent (Haberkorn 1987). The second aspect refers to a gradual decline in employment-tied accommodation which formerly provided sleeping quarters for single workers only (cf. Bedford and Marnak 1976; Fahey 1979; Curtain 1980; Connell and Curtain 1982a). The availability of retirement benefits for ni-Vanuatu public servants, and for many private sector employees, notably those of the two main commercial traders Burns Philp and Ballande who had over twenty years of service, also made urban permanence more attractive in recent years. Equally important, such retirement benefits also implied a relative decline in rural subsidization of the urban economy, considering that in the context of short-term circulation, rural Vanuatu bore the double cost of reproducing the urban labour force and providing security in old age.

While such developments made a change from temporary circulation to more permanent urban relocation easier, the growing demand for skilled manpower requiring a stable labour force necessitated such a change. Furthermore, declining urban opportunities for unskilled labour caused the latter to hold on to such positions for much longer periods than in the past. The biggest change resulted
from the abolition of a tripartite colonial administration, which, amongst other idiosyncrasies, ran three Public Works departments. In the private sector, the two largest trading firms, Burns Philp and Ballande, also considerably reduced their labour force during the mid-1970s, affecting primarily dock workers and other unskilled occupations. The development over the past decade has been towards hiring day-labour, whenever labour demands cannot be met by their small contingent of permanent 'wharfies'. Given these changes in the urban economy, rural-based temporary circulation to urban areas has become something of a luxury that few labourers can afford, as illustrated in the words of a 38-year-old former wharf labourer now employed by Ballande as general labourer, and a 47-year-old road maintenance man in the Public Works Department:

(1) Some time ago, three of us shared a position [working in the docks] with Ballande. When it was my turn, I worked for three, or six months, then took a rest on the island [Paama]. Then, another friend took the job...and so it went until it was my turn again. But the last time [about 1978], a friend held on to the job. I talked to the manager, who told me 'sorry, but I can't do anything about that because that's your people's business'.

(2) It's quite a hard job, and the pay is bad. If I had had this job in earlier years, I would have taken a break from it [and returned to Paama]. But now, if I were to do that, another man would take my position straight away which then would be lost for good. (Translations made by the author.)

The significance of such a dramatic change in mobility practices lies well beyond a mere temporal issue, as is implicit in the first example. Although this form of labour rotation was of greater economic benefit to urban employers than to their labour force, for example in allowing the maintenance of low urban wages, the above quotation, however, also underlines this system's appeal to many rural ni-Vanuatu, particularly to those no longer able to participate periodically in the urban economy.

Apart from these changes in the urban economy, structural transformations of Paamese society have also created an environment more conducive to permanent than temporary out-migration. The most important changes relate to an increase in landlessness resulting from the individualization of land tenure and economic production around the turn of the century, an increased monetization of marriage transactions, and the resurgence of communal work-groups (kampanis) during the 1950s.

The individualization of land tenure and agricultural production, and subsequent forms of economic stratification, date back to the late nineteenth century, when large numbers of Paamese men returned from three or more years of plantation labour in Queensland (Haberkorn 1987). Older Paamese informants recall stories of their fathers and grandfathers clearing large areas of virgin bush with newly acquired metal tools, to plant coconuts and cotton. The Presbyterian church, present on Paama since 1887, resident European traders, and the colonial government fully supported (or even initiated) such activities to utilize previously unproductive bushland, as evident in the provision of seedlings (Frater 1928). As these developments did not affect communal garden areas, and had the active participation of chiefs, there was little known resistance to this massive land exploitation. Land demarcations originating from these days are still recognized today as valid boundaries despite ongoing quarrels over ownership.
Landholdings gradually changed from lineage to individual control, passed down from father to sons, ideally on equal terms at the time of their marriages.

Despite Paamese insistence that contemporary inequalities concerning access to land date back to this period, rather than being caused by differential fertility and mortality, demographic processes played a significant role in the gradual fragmentation of land, since at the turn of the century around 1000 Paamese were living on only 36 square kilometres of land (Haberkorn 1987). Although few Paamese household heads are actually landless, ‘functional landlessness’ (Howlett 1980) poses a major problem. For those who are unable to secure a year-round supply of subsistence crops on their smallholdings, who are without land to cultivate cash crops, and given the impossibility of purchasing land locally, mobility has always played an integral part in the household’s survival.

A second major change in Paamese society concerns the declining importance of the production of ceremonial wealth, such as the cultivation of giant yams and the rearing of large pig herds, and the ensuing monetization of the traditional economy. This change is due primarily to large-scale labour migration by Paamese men to Queensland and, in the early twentieth century, to plantations throughout Vanuatu, since the production of ceremonial wealth was the sole domain of men. The use of much land for newly established coconut plantations, and the time spent in such activities, further facilitated this development.

As pigs became scarcer for bridewealth payments, and unmarried men generally had no access to coconuts to earn locally the required cash to purchase pigs elsewhere, plantation migration became a compulsory ritual for Paamese men to earn their bridewealth. Although cash earnings were still being used during the 1920s to procure pigs for bridewealth payments on the neighbouring islands of Epi and Ambrym, cash (five Australian pounds) and the payment of just one pig became the generally accepted standard for years to come. Following a rapid inflation of bridewealth over the years, the Presbyterian Church once again intervened, during the 1950s, to limit payment to ten Australian pounds, a sum to be paid to the officiating churchman who was to pass it on to the bride’s parents (Tonkinson 1968:64). Despite such official ceiling figures, payments of up to seventy Australian pounds were not unknown during these years, and payments between A$600 and A$1000 represent the norm today (Haberkorn 1987). This substantial inflation in bridewealth cannot be dissociated from mobility, since the lack of domestic resources led to a growing need for young men to seek employment elsewhere. This relationship, however, is by no means one-directional, but reflects a process of political control exercised by Paamese chiefs and parents (cf. Wilson 1973:58). With a growing number of young men participating in wage-labour migration the highest jump in bridewealth occurred at the time of massive Paamese labour migration to New Caledonia, when wages were

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6 People with little land ascribe this situation either to the laziness of their father or grandfather in not clearing enough bush, or to their absence in Queensland at the time this happened.

7 Land can be borrowed on a seasonal basis from lineage members for the cultivation of subsistence crops, but not for the planting of cash crops. This situation led many Paamese to purchase land on the neighbouring island of Epi during the late 1960s. It was often bought from expatriate plantation owners, who alienated it from customary Epi landowners during the colonial period. Many Paamese either lost this land after independence, when customary landowners repossessed their land, or are presently engaged in negotiations with these customary owners over future arrangements.
substantially higher than anywhere in Vanuatu. A gradual increase in bridewealth ensures that migrant earnings represent no threat to the local social, political and economic status quo. It nullifies any potential investment in rural business ventures, for example, thus ensuring what would otherwise be declining control over young men. This form of political control, preserving the traditional authority of chiefs and elders, is instrumental in creating an environment for permanent out-migration of young Paamese, by not providing enough room for economic and social innovation.

Another, less subtle form of political control conducive to permanent Paamese out-migration, involves the omnipresence of kampani work in contemporary Paama. Though dating back to pre-colonial times of more communal agricultural activities, such communal work-groups were reintroduced during the 1950s to assist the sick and old with gardening activities and house maintenance. In recent times, however, kampani work has gradually become a village enterprise, involving cash payments, to generate money for a village fund providing a cash reserve for local festivities or other matters of communal concern. Anyone in need of extra manpower specifies the work required to the local chief and negotiates with him a fee payable for work provided by the kampani. Payment is dependent on the type of work and manpower required, and usually ranges between A$5 and A$20; it may further entail the provision of food for the kampani. Generally, all adult household members are expected to participate, with only the elderly and sick excused from these activities. Those who do not appear may be fined $1 each.

Two days each week are set aside to provide free communal labour for the local pastor and church elders, and for weekly village clean-up operations. Furthermore, the local Presbyterian Women and Mothers' Union and the Youth Fellowship each have one day set aside per week for fund-raising activities, where any interested party can hire their services on the same basis as the local kampani. With four days each week taken up by these activities, most villagers may find only one or two days when they are able to look after their own affairs. In practice, this means only Saturday for most, a day reserved for each family to work in its own gardens.

Kampani work, like bridewealth developments in recent years, not only ensures the continuous authority of chiefs and village elders, but also ensures that all residents remain on a fairly equal, if low, socio-economic level. A rural Paamese household head in his late thirties, married with three children, summarized this situation as follows:

Local communal labour implies three problems. Such activities prevent people from locally earning some money because they have no time whatsoever to look after their own affairs; there are ways to make money here, but people cannot do so because of too much communal labour and the endemic jealousy here. Additionally, local chiefs undermine progress [development] on the island, by occupying people all the time and preventing them from looking after their own affairs. Another very important problem lies in the fact that such activities have led to the out-migration of many people.

(Translation made by the author.)

The reference to these activities as an important structural cause behind Paamese out-migration is only one link in a continuous feedback chain, exemplifying the
dialectic nature of mobility. Not only does an increasingly long-term absence of young men, women and entire families increase the demand for communal labour, but those remaining have to work even harder. This in turn leaves little or no (regular) time for those remaining to engage in local cash-earning activities, which may lead to more out-migration, and thereby endlessly perpetuate a vicious circle.

**Paamese in Port Vila: temporary city-dwellers or permanent urbanites?**

The fact that Paamese residents in Port Vila, as of February 1983, had averaged 10.5 years of continuous urban residence, is a clear indication of a long-term, or even permanent urban orientation of this migrant group. This figure underlines a certain stabilization of rural-urban mobility, considering that, in 1972, 52 per cent of all migrant household heads interviewed by Vienne and Vienne (1972) had resided in Port Vila for less than one year, a proportion similar to that found by Bonnemaison (1977:64) one year later. Although older Paamese migrants account for the longest continuous residence in Port Vila (Table 10.1), the overall average of 10.5 years points to the late 1960s and early 1970s as the time most Paamese arrived in town, which corroborates earlier comments that social and economic change at that time may give rise to an increased urban permanence.

**Table 10.1 Years of residence in Port Vila**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current age</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Females</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Median</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>(5.7)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>(5.9)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>(6.6)</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>(5.6)</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>(4.3)</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>(5.8)</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>(7.4)</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>(9.1)</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55+</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>(10.1)</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>(12.0)</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(67)</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>(7.1)</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>(58)</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>(7.7)</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s fieldwork.

The fact that most Paamese men in town who are employed as unskilled labourers (51 per cent) have continuously resided in Port Vila for nine years, while others engaged in professional and technical occupations (18 per cent) or in the sales and service sector (27 per cent) have lived there only marginally longer, thirteen and ten years respectively, underlines that long-term or permanent urban relocations are by no means the prerogative of those engaged in the ‘white-collar’ sector of the urban economy (Haberkorn 1987). This situation also emerges in female labour force participation. Forty five per cent of urban Paamese women work as domestic servants and 36 per cent are housewives, averaging a continuous urban residence of thirteen and nine years respectively. These figures are only marginally different from the fifteen years of continuous urban residence amongst the 14 per cent of Paamese women in skilled and semi-skilled employ-
ment. Except for one man, who owns a small tradestore on Paama, no urban household receives any additional income from their home island. Although some receive occasional supplies of island-grown foodstuffs, this cannot be regarded as rural subsidization of urban living, since these food shipments are reciprocated by urban-to-rural remittances in cash, food or goods (see below).

Despite the apparent plausibility of the assumption that with longer urban residence urban migrants are less likely to return to their rural 'homes' (Morauta and Ryan 1982:49), years of urban residence, per se, should not be mistaken for an indication that these people are likely to stay on in town forever. It can be argued as convincingly in the context of circular migration, that long-term absentees are more likely to return than those who only recently moved to town, as illustrated by the contrasting views of two 50-year-old Paamese men in Port Vila:

(1) I have been in Vila for twenty years. Why should I return to Paama? Life on Paama is very hard, and I have forgotten how to manage the hard work involved.

(2) Young people will remain in town for many years to come. But I will return home next year, because I have been away for a long time already.

(Translation made by the author.)

To what extent the ten and eleven years of continuous urban residence by Paamese men and women respectively are indicative of a growing urban permanence, or merely represent longer periods of rural absence in an otherwise unchanged circulation context, can be assessed on the basis of lifetime mobility developments amongst current urban and rural Paamese residents, and based on the extent of contacts between Paamese residents in Port Vila and their 'home' areas. A substantial divergence in mobility processes over time, as reflected in increasing period-mobility ratios (see below) amongst urban Paamese, and in consistently low or declining period-mobility ratios amongst rural Paamese, would indicate a growing permanence amongst urban migrants. Such a trend would also be indicated by a low incidence of urban-rural contacts, considering Bedford's (1971:228) emphasis on the importance of villages as a source of income and social security, and given the significance of remittances as indicators of a continued involvement and commitment to one's home village (Chapman 1985a).

Changes in Paamese mobility, 1953-82. Period analysis (Shryock and Siegel 1976), a widely used method in the study of demographic change, provides a useful tool in the analysis of recent Paamese mobility developments. Derived from adult lifetime mobility histories, period-mobility ratios are calculated in the following way:

\[
\text{PMRC}_j = \frac{\Sigma \text{ME}_{ij}(P_t)}{\Sigma \text{EXP}_{ij}(P_t)}
\]

Period-mobility ratios represent a simple ratio of different events (duration of moves from Paama throughout the life of individuals) over specified periods of time, to a measure of total exposure over that time period. 'ME;' refers to the cumulated mobility experience (in person-months) of all individuals belonging to
birth-cohort ‘C’ during reference period ‘T’ divided by the total time of exposure (person-months lived) of all individuals ‘EXPi’ belonging to the same birth-cohort ‘C’ during reference period ‘T’.

Developments in the adult lifetime mobility of Paamese men and women between 1953 and 1982 illustrate the operation of two distinct mobility processes: the continued existence of periodic, short-term and rural-based circulation alongside a more permanent urban orientation amongst Paamese residents in Port Vila (Figure 10.2).

Between urban and rural Paamese residents, few notable discrepancies appear in their period mobility ratios (PMR) before 1960, although current urban residents experienced a somewhat higher mobility than their rural counterparts. Disaggregating these totals by sex, however, underlines a striking contrast in the past mobility of men and women. While a divergence in PMRs between urban and rural men did not eventuate until 1963, with rural men revealing slightly higher PMRs in earlier years compared to those currently residing in Port Vila, such a diverging pattern amongst women dates back considerably earlier. While the early 1960s saw a sharp increase in the mobility of current urban residents, particularly amongst men, a concurrent stagnation followed by only a mild increase characterizes the mobility of rural Paamese during these years. These overall trends stabilized during the second half of the 1960s. But, contrary to the steady mobility increase amongst urban Paamese from around 1969 onwards, the time of an expanding economy in both Vanuatu and in neighbouring New Caledonia, a parallel downward trend emerges in the mobility of rural residents, leading to a gradual divergence in the PMRs of urban and rural residents.

Changes in the importance of different migration destinations, and implicitly in wage employment, offer some explanations regarding the development of different mobility patterns between urban and rural residents from the mid- to late 1960s onwards. Notwithstanding their similar period mobility ratios between 1953 and 1962, urban and rural Paamese men engaged in different forms of mobility during this period (Figure 10.3); whereas urban areas were the major destination for current town-based men, employment on domestic and international cargo ships played a greater role in the mobility of rural men during these years. Contrary to the predominance of urban destinationsthroughout the past thirty years in the mobility of men currently residing in Port Vila, a greater variety in destinations characterizes the mobility of their rural counterparts over the same timespan. The predominance of employment on cargo boats was followed by a greater balance in mobility destinations during the mid-1960s, and urban

8 If, in 1975, for example, 50 out of 67 Paamese men currently in town were over 15 years of age, their combined exposure to mobility, that is the total time these people could have been absent from Paama during that year, amounts to 600 person-months (50 x 12 months). In case 25 of these men would each have been absent from Paama for 6 months during this year, the period-mobility ratio for 1975 would amount to 0.25 (25 x 6 months absent/50 x 12 months of exposure).

9 Given that social and economic transformations previously associated with mobility change took place throughout the past two decades, and since any retrospective mobility analysis has to be temporarily restricted to minimize the interference of stochastic processes, the following analysis will be limited to the period 1953-82. The risk of random phenomena distorting a reliable diachronic evaluation of mobility developments increases with the length of the reference period and a concomitant gradual decrease in the sample size resulting from mortality and permanent out-migration in the past. This analysis is based on 258 men and women from whom complete migration histories could be obtained, of whom 125 (67 men, 58 women) live in Port Vila, and 133 (67 men, 66 women) live on Paama.
Figure 10.2  Developments in Paamese life-time mobility, 1953-82
destinations emerged as the principal ones during the years of an expanding domestic urban economy at the time of the New Caledonian nickel boom (1968-72). Although Port Vila- and Santo-bound movement was still prominent in the years thereafter, rural destinations and employment on boats have assumed, once again, a relatively greater importance in recent years (1978-82).

Figure 10.3 Changes in migration destinations, 1953-82

The prevalence of different destinations, amidst similar PMRs, in the mobility of urban and rural Paamese men between 1953 and 1962 may well explain the diverging mobility patterns from the mid-1960s onwards. Although many new employment opportunities became available during the mid- to late 1960s, many of these positions, and particularly jobs conducive to long-term employment, favoured people with previous work experience, qualifications and contacts (to employers). Such criteria were more readily met by migrants with previous urban work experience than by those men previously employed primarily on boats and in the plantation sector. The importance of such contrasting past mobility experiences between urban and rural Paamese men in explaining the subsequent development of different mobility processes resembles Young's (1982) concept of 'critical moves', which 'predispose towards a particular kind of wage work and increasingly channel the subsequent choices made from a range of mobility options' (quoted in Chapman 1985a:440). While the matter of volition
is debatable, such a link between subsequent employment patterns has been recently illustrated by Friesen (1983) in his analysis of Choiseul labour mobility in the Solomon Islands.

The mobility of Paamese women, however, has been more urban- than rural-oriented throughout the past thirty years, except during the late 1950s and during the past five years or so. Much lower female than male PMRs reflect the interference of mobility norms with rural-based circulation of women, and also indicate a more belated process of urban stabilization, with a gradual convergence in PMRs of urban men and women only emerging during the past ten years.

The extent of urban-rural contacts. While only 22 per cent of all Paamese men and women in town have never returned to Paama since their arrival in Port Vila, 51 per cent have only visited their home island once or twice (Haberkorn 1987). Given an average length of urban residence of 10.5 years, this feature seems hardly an indication of the close urban-rural contact one would expect to find amongst circular migrants.

Maintaining close contacts with family members on Paama, however, does not necessarily imply a need for periodic return visits amongst urban Paamese. The availability of regular shipping services between Port Vila and Paama makes town readily accessible for island visitors. This situation is emphasized by the fact that about half of all rural men and women had visited Port Vila at least once during the year preceding this study, and that a similar proportion of urban households hosted at least one visiting relative between January and March of 1983. The importance of hosting visitors for the maintenance of contact will events on Paama resembles Bedford’s (1985:344) analysis of Lau migrants in Suva, whose expression of interest in events in eastern Fiji were predominantly manifested in the provision of accommodation for visiting kin and in urban-to-rural remittances of cash and goods.

Most urban Paamese claim to remit cash, foodstuffs and other consumer goods at least occasionally to their areas of origin (Table 10.2). The fact that most men and women, seven of ten Liro area men, and nine of thirteen Liro area women, who never remitted anything no longer have any close family members living on Paama merely indicates the universality of remittances amongst Port Vila migrants. However, urban-rural contacts are intermittent and urban-rural cash flows are insignificant relative to a much greater incidence of food shipments, predominantly in the form of tinned meats, rice and bread (Table 10.2). This greater incidence of food rather than cash remittances results from a general reluctance amongst urban migrants to remit cash other than for specific and ‘sensible’ purposes. They explain their unwillingness to remit money in terms of much higher prices for consumer goods in rural stores and on trading ships, for

10 This was emphasized by several men and women in town who stressed that they only send money *tseni we hemi strei, tseni we olgeta oli midim from stam samting strei* [Only when it is proper, only when they (recipients) need it for something proper]. This pattern clearly differs from that reported by Conroy and Curtain (1985:301). Drawing on data from the 1974-75 Papua New Guinea Rural Household Survey, they show that with the exception of Malalaua and Gollala absentee, a much greater proportion of migrants from other districts remitted cash rather than consumer goods. Cash figures most prominently amongst remittances of more recently arrived Paamese in town; controlling for occupational differences and urban income does not yield any consistent relationship (Haberkorn 1987).
the purchase of which most of this cash would be destined anyway. This predominant use of cash remittances for everyday household needs and conspicuous consumption, rather than for productive economic ventures, has been widely reported throughout Melanesia and other Pacific islands (Connell 1980a), as well as in other developing areas (Connell et al. 1976). Although this relatively low incidence of urban-to-rural cash flows and remittance of consumer goods could be indicative of a gradual loosening of urban-rural contacts, it needs to be stressed that the increased urban presence of spouses and children, the prime beneficiaries of such assistance, no longer requires such regular urban-to-rural remittances. While the provision of economic support for one’s immediate family remains unaltered, this change in directional flows of support deprives other rural kin of potential spin-offs, thereby contributing to a further loosening of urban-rural ties.

Table 10.2 The incidence of urban-to-rural remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cash</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Food</th>
<th>Goods</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Cash</th>
<th>Food</th>
<th>Goods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regularly(^a)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasionally(^b)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely, when asked(^c)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures are percentages based on people who at least sometimes send remittances (57 out of 67 men, and 45 out of 58 women):
\(^a\) Regularly every 2-3 months.
\(^b\) Only about once or twice every year.
\(^c\) Not every year, and also predominantly when asked.

Note: An individual, rather than household perspective has been taken, since husbands and wives, for example, send remittances independently from each other, and since several households consist of co-resident kin, rather than family members in the nuclear family sense.
Source: Author’s fieldwork.

Apart from the strong urban presence of nuclear family units, as indicated by the fact that 95 per cent of all ever-married Paamese men and women in town are accompanied by their spouses and children, another indicator of urban permanence, the low frequency of contemporary urban-to-rural remittance flows can also be attributed to an increased significance of indirect remittances. The accommodation of younger lineage members attending school in Port Vila, the payment of urban school fees for other kin, covering urban hospital expenses for rural relations and providing them with a place for convalescing, means that fewer economic resources are available for more direct forms of urban-to-rural remittances.

The most prevalent amongst such forms of indirect economic assistance in contemporary urban Vanuatu relates to the periodic accommodation of rural visitors, as occurs in other Melanesian towns (e.g. Conroy and Curtain 1985; Bedford 1985; Frazer 1985). Such visits can turn into stays over several months, during which time most costs incurred for food, entertainment and ‘proper
clothing for town' are covered by the host, who often needs to rely on the financial contribution of other urban kin and friends (see also Strathern 1977). While such visits may appear selfish, and exploitative of their urban hosts, such actions reflect in many instances a deliberate coping mechanism with declining direct forms of urban-to-rural assistance. This attitude that 'if money no longer comes to us, we go towards it' is clear in the following statement:

The last time I went to Santo was to see my son, from whom I hadn't received any news for quite some time. I took a bag of yams, and some kava to him, and he in turn gave me a small amount of money and paid for my return trip. This is our custom, I give something to him, and he in turn gives something to me.
(Translation made by the author.)

This reference to a customary exchange of gifts reflects a change in the nature of urban-rural exchange networks, and yet emphasizes rural residents' continued adherence to its basic underlying principle. While urban and rural residents alike stress that, in the past, villagers acknowledged the receipt of gifts from town-based relatives with an urban-bound shipment of island foodstuffs, many Paamese residents in Port Vila claim to feel manipulated by contemporary rural-urban food shipments, which they regard as explicit inducements to send remittances. Some migrants claim to avoid sending direct remittances altogether, so as to get out of a cycle of continuous indebtedness, only to find themselves facing greater financial burdens implicit in having to meet expenses of rural visitors. This, and the fact that others state their preference for periodically sending something to rural kin, to prevent them coming to town too often, casts some doubt on the reliance on remittances as indicators of urban and rural commitment.

Conclusion

The long continuous residence of Paamese men and women in Port Vila, their different mobility histories compared with their rural counterparts, the sole economic dependence on urban wages and salaries, and the low frequency of direct urban-rural contacts, indicate that this group of Paamese migrants cannot be regarded as 'peasants on temporary leave'. Concerning the likely implications of this growing urban permanence amongst Paamese migrants in Port Vila for source and destination areas, the scenario of a widening economic gap between source and destination areas, perpetuating more permanent relocations from some islands such as Paama, appears the most obvious danger. With past migration primarily the domain of men and of a short-term and circular nature, women played a significant and much the most important role in rural subsistence production. Besides the more obvious function of securing a year-round supply of food for their families, female subsistence production then also subsidized absent male wage labour. Increased female mobility then not only affects rural subsistence production and food supply of those remaining as well as absent wage labour, but with a growing absence of entire families, more earnings will be consumed and invested in town, with increasingly less money to be remitted to rural areas.

Despite the decline in rural period-mobility ratios throughout the past ten years (Figures 10.2 and 10.3), rural Paamese men continued to engage periodically in wage-labour circulation. The fact, however, that this form of mobility
does not represent the first choice amongst Paamese men is clearly evident in statements by about two-thirds of all rural men under the age of 45, that given the opportunity of obtaining long-term urban employment they would leave *wantaem*, meaning, today rather than tomorrow (Haberkorn 1987). Such statements are in line with sentiments shared by many Paamese that temporary circulation was hardly ever a matter of their own free choice, as illustrated in the words of a 58-year-old male resident on Paama:

This type of movement was initiated by Europeans. They wanted us to work for them for short periods only; they asked us for three or six months only. Once they [labour recruiters] arrived at the beach [came to the island], they immediately took down our contract periods. Once your time was finished, they took you back home again. Today things are better. If I want to go for three months, I am free to do so, and if someone wants to go for long periods, Europeans can no longer prevent this. (Translation made by the author.)

Although such statements contradict the known difficulties faced by most expatriate planters throughout this century to secure and retain a stable plantation labour force (Wilson 1966), living and working conditions on many of these plantations were not conducive to long-term employment stints. While a much needed improvement of these conditions and recent downward trends in the urban economy, and also in employment opportunities on inter-island trading vessels, may well increase the attractiveness of rural-based plantation circulation in the future, the recent movement of many young Paamese to Port Vila, despite their facing likely unemployment on one hand, and the general unwillingness of young unemployed urban Paamese to work on peri-urban plantations on the other, raises some doubt concerning such prospects.

Trends towards an increased incidence in rural-urban mobility and towards a greater urban permanence have considerable implications for Vanuatu’s economy, given that 73 per cent of all planned capital expenditure is aimed at the agricultural sector (Vanuatu 1984:23). Such mobility developments point towards greater pressures on urban infrastructure planning to provide adequate housing, education, health facilities and employment for a growing urban population. Growth rates much higher in urban than in rural areas throughout Melanesia in the 1970s should remind planners and politicians in the region that assumptions about the eventual return of rural-urban migrants, if they cannot find adequate employment or proper housing, reflect wishful thinking more often than reality. Although it is hard at this stage to conceive of social and economic problems in Vanuatu similar to those associated with urban poverty in towns and cities in larger less developed countries, Port Moresby’s development in recent years should serve as a timely reminder that social problems associated with urban unemployment and poverty are by no means the prerogative of cities in Asia and Latin America.
In the systems of the past we do not find simple exchange of goods, wealth, and produce through markets established among individuals. For it is groups, and not individuals, which carry on exchange, make contracts, and are bound by obligations... The system of contractual gifts in Samoa is not confined to marriage; it is present also in respect of childbirth, circumcision, sickness, girls' puberty, funeral ceremonies, and trade (Mauss 1970:3, 6).

Recent research on immigrant adaptation to urban centres in the United States has emphasized the positive economic outcomes associated with immigrant 'enclaving' (Portes 1984; Bonacich 1976; Light 1980). Korean, Chinese, Japanese, and Cuban immigrants arrive in the United States with 'traditions of enterprise' and entrepreneurship. They adapt aspects of their traditional system of economic exchange, including entrepreneurship, and establish self-sufficient enclaves, supported by small businesses employing their labour.

In the past Samoan patterns of economic exchange centred on tautua (service to chiefs and families) and fa'afālavelave (mutual support during crucial life cycle events). Today, Samoans still serve and support their chiefs and families, and the concepts of tautua and fa'afālavelave have gained additional meaning within the context of urban centres in Samoa, New Zealand and the United States. Tautua and fa'afālavelave remain important social transactions between leaders, supporters and kinsmen, and these transactions provide the economic basis for what is now an international kinship system. In Hawaii, however, these patterns of exchange have not resulted in self-sufficient Samoan enclaves. Samoans go to Hawaii largely without a tradition of entrepreneurship, so the small business, ‘Samoatown’, adaptive strategy is unavailable to them.

In 1980, for the first time, Samoans were identified as a distinct ethnic group in the United States census. This identification resulted in a more complete enumeration of Samoan urban communities in the 'fifty states' (hereafter, the 'United States proper', exclusive of American Samoa), and as census results have
become increasingly available a clearer demographic picture of the Samoan community in Hawaii is emerging. This chapter relies heavily on the 1980 census results, and the author’s decade-long fieldwork with Samoan community organizations in California and Hawaii. Throughout the chapter comparisons are made between the total Hawaii state population, the Samoan population in Hawaii, and other selected, mostly Asian, populations in Hawaii.

Modern Samoan movement and urban adaptation is a complex process that introduces, along with other related processes in Samoa, the potential for major cultural change. This chapter emphasizes, however, the cultural continuities associated with modern Samoan movement and adaptation. Samoans still feel that their system of economic exchange involving tautua and fa’alavelave has served them well over the 150 years of European contact and economic expansion.

The cultural response to modern mobility patterns

Samoan culture is resilient, and numerous statements about Samoan conservatism have appeared in the anthropological literature from 1930 to the present. For example, Sir Peter Buck (Te Rangi Hiroa), one of the most highly respected of early Polynesian ethnographers, stated:

The Samoans are more conservative than other branches of their race and their satisfaction with themselves and their own institutions makes them less inclined to accept the change that foreign governments consider to be of benefit to them (Buck 1930:5).

In a more recent work Bradd Shore (1977) states that although the Samoan islands have been politically separated for eighty years ‘the entire Samoan archipelago reveals a remarkably unified identity and striking homogeneity ... There is a shared commitment to a large number of kinship and political institutions’.

The Samoan international movement network is also largely based on traditional concepts and values. Samoan population movement is a combination of undirectional, permanent migration, and circular, temporary movements encompassing a wide geographic expanse from New Zealand, through Samoa to
Hawaii and the United States mainland. Samoans often conceptualize the more circular, temporary movements as malaga, the traditional practice of inter-village and inter-island visiting and resource sharing. But today the movements are international, with the visits being to kinsmen ('aiga) residing more permanently in New Zealand, Samoa, and the United States proper, and the resources, in addition to taro, breadfruit and mats, now include American and New Zealand dollars. The resources involved in these malaga movements are still, to a large extent, directed towards family and village chiefs (matai) who often make decisions about how to use them best for the overall benefit of the entire family.

Large-scale movements of American Samoans to Hawaii and the United States mainland, and of Western Samoans to New Zealand, began in the early 1950s. During World War II American and Western Samoans developed transportation, communication, and supply skills at the Tutuila Naval Station, and with the end of the war many of these skilled workers were eager to succeed in overseas labour markets. In addition, hundreds of American Samoans joined the United States military during the war, and when the Naval Station was closed in 1951 they were taken to Hawaii. The first major movements of American Samoans to Hawaii were thus partly voluntary, for economic reasons, and partly a result of military relocation. From 1951 to the present, movement from American Samoa has been, and continues to be, stimulated by economic motives and military enlistment. In addition, the Samoan perception of better educational opportunities in Hawaii has also motivated American Samoan migration. American Samoans are American 'nationals' and as such their movement into the United States proper is unencumbered by immigration restrictions. For this reason, they often 'visit' American Samoa while maintaining employment and schooling in Hawaii and the United States mainland.

From 1951 to the mid-1970s, the primary flow of Western Samoans was to New Zealand. However, since the slowing of the New Zealand economy in 1975, and concomitant tightening of immigration control, the major Western Samoan movement has been into American Samoa, and then on to Hawaii and/or the United States mainland. Today, many Western Samoans move temporarily on short-term visas into New Zealand and the United States to pursue employment opportunities. Others find long-term success and stay in these overseas labour markets.

Samoans in the United States proper

The 1980 census enumerated 41,948 Samoans in the United States proper. Nearly half (47.9 per cent) of the Samoan population was residing in California, while more than a third (33.4 per cent) was in Hawaii. The Samoan population in the United States proper was greater than the population of American Samoa by approximately 10,000, but was only one-fourth the size of the Western Samoan population (see Table 11.1).

Samoan movement into the United States proper is largely an island-rural to urban migration. Approximately 96 per cent of the Samoans living within the fifty states resided in urban areas, with the largest concentrations being in Honolulu (13,811), Los Angeles-Long Beach (8049), and San Francisco-Oakland (4329). There were more Western Samoa-born individuals (13,238) than American Samoa-born individuals (9361) residing in the United States proper in
1980. Approximately 57 per cent of these Western Samoans immigrated in the period 1970-80, 20 per cent in the period 1970-74, and 37 per cent in the period 1975-80. Because American Samoans can move freely into the United States proper it is more difficult to determine their year of in-migration. However, in 1980, Samoan-born individuals (22,599) marginally outnumbered Samoans born in the United States proper, indicating the growing significance of the American-born Samoan population.

Table 11.1 The Samoan population of the United States, selected states, American Samoa, 1980, and Western Samoa, 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>California</th>
<th>Hawaii</th>
<th>All other states</th>
<th>American Samoa</th>
<th>Western Samoa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total persons</td>
<td>41,948</td>
<td>20,089</td>
<td>14,073</td>
<td>7,786</td>
<td>32,297</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source*: US Bureau of Census (1980); Western Samoa, Department of Statistics (1983).

In comparison with the United States proper, California, and all other states, the Samoan population of Hawaii contained the highest percentage of American Samoa-born individuals, and the lowest percentage of Samoans born in the United States proper. Census sample data indicate that exactly a third (33.1 per cent) of Hawaii's Samoan population was born in Hawaii; almost all the remainder were born outside the United States proper. With respect to length of residence, 22 per cent of Hawaii's Samoan population in 1980 had migrated to Hawaii in the five years preceding the 1980 census, compared to 14 per cent of California's Samoans. In absolute numbers, recent Samoan migrants to Hawaii outnumbered recent Samoan migrants to California in 1980. Thus, Samoans in Hawaii have had less time to adjust to their new environment. Further, Honolulu represents the first major urban experience for Samoans, so their adaptive problems are often more severe than those of Samoans elsewhere, or most migrants into the United States.

Geographic distribution of Samoans in Hawaii

Fully 97 per cent of Samoans in Hawaii live in the Honolulu urban area on Oahu island, and then in particular residential areas. In January 1982 the Hawaii State Department of Planning and Economic Development released figures that showed the census tracts where Samoans comprised a high percentage of the total 1980 population. These census tracts were:

- Kuhio Park Terrace, where the 1428 Samoans comprised 53.6 per cent of the total tract population.
- Kalihi Valley Homes, where the 1285 Samoans comprised 43.6 per cent of the total tract population.
- Mayor Wright Housing, where the 519 Samoans comprised 30.2 per cent of the total tract population.
These are extremely high concentrations for a recent migrant group and quite different from the more dispersed residential pattern of other relatively large migrant groups from the Pacific, such as Tongans and Guamanians. Approximately 28 per cent of the Samoan population in Hawaii resided in the relatively poor Kalihi-Palama area of the inner urban area of Honolulu. Other major areas of concentration on the island of Oahu include Laie/Hauula, and Pearl City, Waipahu, Makaha/Waianae, and Palolo in Honolulu itself. In general, the larger Samoan communities in Hawaii are centred around public housing areas in Kalihi and Palolo, military housing areas near Pearl City, and the Mormon religious centre and university at Laie. The exceptionally high residential concentration of Samoans has enabled most Samoans in the United States, and especially in Hawaii, to 'live in a virtual Samoan world' (Ablon 1971:78), easing the process of incorporation into American society and limiting the extent of assimilation.

There are historical and cultural factors that partly explain the geographic distribution of Samoans on Oahu. Samoan Mormons moved into Laie when their temple was completed in 1919, and by 1950 about 500 Samoans were living in the Laie area. The Samoan community at Laie has continued to grow around the Temple, the University and the Polynesian Cultural Center. The University and the Cultural Center are important sources of employment for Laie Samoans.

The first major wave of Samoans came to Hawaii after World War II, and most of these individuals had close ties to the United States military, hence they moved into the military housing areas near Pearl Harbor, and later often dispersed into surrounding communities. Samoans still join the military in large numbers so the military housing continues to provide an effective and active community base. Culturally, Samoans have no concept of rent, so in the first move to Hawaii it made a great deal of sense to them that they should receive housing at little or no cost. Their more recent movement into public housing may thus represent continuities in the Samoan perception that housing should not entail large financial expenditures. Conversely, the idea of paying considerable sums for housing in the open market, even if substantial incomes were available, is difficult for Samoans to accept. Only 29 per cent of all Samoan housing units are owner-occupied, compared with 64 per cent for the national population, a rate higher only than that of Vietnamese. Samoan enclaves in Hawaii are centred around military bases and public housing projects, and not around small business enterprises like those of the Chinese, Japanese and Koreans.

Employment and occupations cross-culturally

The census data from 1980 reveal that the Samoan unemployment rate in Hawaii was 10.2 per cent, and this was more than twice the overall rate for the state of Hawaii of 4.7 per cent. Samoan unemployment was much higher than that of any selected ethnic group in Hawaii (Table 11.2) and young Samoans, first entering the labour force, were particularly likely to be unemployed. The Samoan female labour force participation rate was more than twenty percentage points below the Hawaii state female figure, while the Hawaii Samoan male labour force participation rate was ten percentage points below the Hawaii state male figure. Cross-culturally, Samoan females had the lowest labour force participation rate, while the Samoan male rate only exceeded that of Vietnamese males (Table 11.3).
Table 11.2 Percentage of Hawaii civilian labour force unemployed, by selected ethnicity, 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Per cent unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoan</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 11.3 Percentage in the Hawaii labour force, by selected ethnicity and sex, 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>76.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>73.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoan</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1980 there were major differences between the occupational structures of Samoan males in Hawaii and of all males in Hawaii. Approximately 44 per cent of all Hawaii males were in white collar occupations within professional, managerial, technical, sales and clerical fields, compared to only 20 per cent of Samoan males. Nearly 60 per cent of all Samoan males were in blue collar work, as transport operators, labourers and service occupations, while just over 30 per cent of all Hawaii males were in these jobs. Compared to all Hawaii women, Hawaii Samoan women were over-represented in the service sector, and under-represented in the white collar occupations. Consistently the data reveal that Samoans are in less prestigious and lower status jobs than the Hawaii population as a whole.

Within white collar occupations Samoan men are often found in executive, administrative and managerial positions. Some of these gained administrative skills while serving as 'twenty-year men' in the US military. Samoan women are found as professionals in social service and nursing positions, especially on the mainland and particularly with the elderly in convalescent homes, a function of traditional Samoan values of caring for the elderly. However, most Samoans are in blue collar jobs, with men working as security guards, building, maintenance and construction workers and women working as entertainers, food service
workers, maids and cleaners. Language problems have tended to make it difficult for Samoans to pass licensing exams and upward occupational mobility has thus been blocked. Samoans have everywhere gained a reputation as effective factory workers, not least in both Western Samoa and American Samoa. However, Hawaii has only a small manufacturing sector, hence this employment option is largely unavailable.

For women especially their traditional economic role is of minimal significance in the new urban arena. In rural Samoa women performed the extremely important social and economic task of producing fine mats ('ie toga) that were crucial ceremonial gifts. In the US such a task no longer exists. Not only can women not gain the respect and satisfaction that they once earned from mat-making, but it appears that there has been a de-skilling of Samoan women, as their economic role is reduced. Women have more difficulty finding jobs and increasing their educational status, especially since many play significant roles within the household.

Of all employed Japanese and Chinese in Hawaii, roughly one in five was working in the retail trade. For more recent Korean and Vietnamese immigrants more than one in three workers was involved in retail trade, since these immigrants clearly see small business as a major adaptive strategy in the Hawaii economy. For the Samoan population only one worker in seven was employed in the retail trade. Cross-cultural comparison of California's retail trade labour force also shows Samoans as under-represented in entrepreneurial activity. Thus, despite differences in the structures of the Hawaii and California economies, Samoans have not turned to entrepreneurship as an adaptive strategy.

It is also interesting to note similarities between Samoans and Hawaiians in both states, as both Polynesian groups seem to be under-represented in small business relative to Asian groups. Culturally, Samoans and Hawaiians share very similar patterns of resource exchange, while the Asian groups take stronger traditions of entrepreneurship into American urban environments. Relatively recent American military activity in Korea and Vietnam may also have stimulated small business development in these two countries and hence in these two immigrant communities (see Table 11.4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Employed in retail trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoan</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most Samoans are thus employed in 'entry-level' occupations in the labour market, where few skills are required, often working initially for earlier migrants. The structure of employment is similar in both Hawaii and California where a recent study found that most employed Samoans in San Francisco in 1983 were in clerical occupations or in unskilled employment in the service industry, where lay-offs contributed to high unemployment levels. The concentration in blue collar occupations was a function of limited skills and English language ability, while these jobs offered little on-the-job training and hence provided little socio-economic mobility (Roblin 1984). Concentration may also be a result of the need to earn money quickly to pay off loans (to cover migration expenses) rather than obtain the education and training necessary for high-skill occupations; in any case employment in low-income jobs inhibited self-financing of formal education. In general:

many migrants, including those enjoying high rank and prestige in their own societies, find employment only in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs in construction, assembly lines, as janitors or maintenance workers. Many work as night watchmen or security guards. Some never get far from the point of entry and find maintenance jobs at airports or shipyards. Faced with generally low wages, expenses swollen by large families, and constant financial obligations to the church and a large group of relatives both in America and abroad, the men often are forced to hold two jobs. Many women work, too, commonly as hotel maids, aides in hospitals and nursing homes and in fish canneries ... No matter how difficult economic conditions are they are generally brighter than in the islands (Shore 1980:765).

Although most general socio-economic surveys of this kind have focused on 'average' workers, rather than emphasizing social and economic mobility, they do point to Pacific islands migrants in the United States, especially Samoans, being concentrated in jobs demanding few skills and commanding low wages, and rarely achieving more prestigious, better-paid employment.

**Income**

In 1979 the Samoan per capita income of US$2729 was the lowest of any Asian or Pacific islander group in Hawaii. Further, this per capita income level was only 35 per cent of the Hawaii State average. Of the 2481 Samoan families enumerated in the census, 931 (37.5 per cent) were living below the poverty level as adjusted for family size. This percentage is nearly five times the rate for all Hawaii families (7.8 per cent), and only the Vietnamese population had a higher percentage of families living below the poverty level. Roughly one Hawaii Samoan family in three (32.7 per cent) received public assistance while the rate for all Hawaii families was one in ten. The average annual income for Samoan families in Hawaii was US$14,107, while half of all these families were making less than US$10,662 a year. Comparing these income levels with those of other selected ethnic populations reveals that only the recently migrant Vietnamese had lower income levels than Samoans. Apparently the Vietnamese small business adaptation is in an establishment phase, and has not yet resulted in significant income gains. On balance, at an individual level, Samoans in Hawaii had almost double the incidence of poverty of the United States population as a whole, and were more likely to be very poor.
Education

The main difference between Samoans in the United States and the US population as a whole was the relatively low proportion of Samoans, especially females, who had completed four or more years of college education. The disparity between the proportions completing high school, especially in Hawaii and again especially for females, was much greater than that for college education and this gap, with its implications for the successful acquisition of some basic skills, may be an important factor in low socio-economic attainment. Although there is a steady increase in the educational status of Samoans in Hawaii this may not be faster than that of the population as a whole or at a rate sufficient to improve employment prospects. Thus, despite the great significance seemingly attached to education in the United States, it is apparent that few migrants, or their children, are particularly successful in the American education system. Parents have high aspirations for their children but are able to do relatively little to achieve these aspirations; in Los Angeles, 'education, the traditional avenue of mobility in American society, does not seem to be pursued by many young Samoan people' (Emery 1976:15). Again, most American Samoans

are seriously undereducated by the standards of American employers. Thus many find they are not qualified for the jobs they desire and, furthermore, have no other training to qualify for employment. The result is a high unemployment rate and many broken dreams among the emigrants (Levin and Wright 1976:166).

Despite education systems in source areas like American Samoa that are similar to those of the United States itself, success in the education system is limited and 'many of the social and economic problems confronting migrant groups in Hawaii and the US mainland stem from inadequate education preparation in American Samoa' (Pirie 1970:498). Although improved education was seen as a major reason for leaving American Samoa, both by migrants in Hawaii and return migrants in Tutuila, very few migrants actually utilized educational opportunities in the United States. Whilst Lyons (1980:89) suggests that Samoans generally have 'hollow ambition', in that they desire educational improvement but were often unable to work sufficiently hard to achieve it, it is equally probable both that an educational rationale for migration disguised another reason for migration (perhaps an unrealized desire for better employment) or that the opportunities for education, alongside employment, were more limited than had been anticipated.

A measure of social change and educational achievement is language speaking ability. At least among Samoans, language problems are of less concern to recent migrants than more immediate issues of accommodation, employment and transport but, nevertheless, the standard of English proficiency of recent migrants often turns out to be inadequate for access to employment in the USA (Levin 1984). Nevertheless linguistic ability is likely to be a real constraint to employment and educational achievement. A study of Samoans in Kalihi, one of the poorest parts of Honolulu, found that not only were these 'urban' migrants much poorer English speakers than migrants to the more rural and predominantly Mormon settlement of Laie, but they were even less capable of speaking English than the inhabitants of four villages of Tutuila, the main island of American Samoa (Lyons 1980). Education and linguistic ability are thus likely to have hindered education, employment and income-earning capacity.
Peripheral capitalism and modern Samoan mobility

There are three identifiable periods where developments in peripheral capitalism clearly influenced the Samoan movement pattern. First, in the 1940s, the introduction of numerous wage labour opportunities attracted Western Samoans into American Samoa, and began to create social, demographic, economic and political imbalances which partially account for later Samoan movements. Second, in the 1960s, with a large infusion of capital, and the development of the tuna cannery complex and the airport in American Samoa, American Samoans began to experience the significantly higher wages that attract Western Samoans today. Third, in the mid-1970s, as a recession gripped New Zealand, immigration and employment opportunities for Western Samoans declined and they began their eastward movements into American Samoa at a more accelerated pace.

Since the 1850s, and the expansion of peripheral capitalism into Samoa, there has emerged a dominant pattern of Samoan participation in the commercial sector. Samoans generally stayed active in village subsistence and cash agriculture, while an entrepreneurial class comprised of non-Samoans and part-Samoans conducted business in town. Samoan economic activity remained largely founded on rural economic values of service and support for ‘aiga and matai. Few Samoans could participate successfully in the commercial-entrepreneurial sector, and, at the same time, participate in the ‘aiga-matai system of resource sharing and political manoeuvring. Samoans remained committed to this latter economic and political activity, primarily in rural areas, and viewed small business entrepreneurship with ambivalence. The small village store (faleoloa) was a means of purchasing large quantities of goods, usually canned foods, at a discounted, near-to-wholesale price. These foods could be used for daily consumption, or to meet ceremonial requirements. On the other hand, ‘aiga members could see the food wealth displayed in the faleoloa, and request a loan of so many cans of fish or corned beef. This ‘loan’ or ‘food credit’ was, and is, difficult for Samoans to reject. Thus, when Samoans tried small business in the village they transformed invisible cash resources into visible food resources, and these visible resources, like the traditional food resources of taro, breadfruit, coconut, pigs and chickens, had to be shared. As financial debt to suppliers increased, as gifts exceeded purchases, the faleoloa collapsed, or was taken up by another villager with surplus tala (dollars). The Samoan entrepreneur has been encumbered by his own preferences to share food resources with ‘aiga and matai, and thus there are clearly cultural constraints on Samoan small business development.

Conclusion: entrepreneurship cross-culturally in Hawaii

The Samoans who moved to Honolulu in the 1980s are unlikely to find a family business where they can contribute unskilled labour. This is a major contrast to what immigrants from China, Japan, Republic of Korea, and now Vietnam, find when they arrive in Hawaii. The history of these Asian groups in Hawaii shows a strong and clear pattern - entrepreneurship has been, and continues to be, perceived as the route to upward economic and social mobility (Fawcett and Carino 1987). According to Lind (1980:88):

The advantage of the Chinese as early arrivals was not as fully shared by later immigrant groups, but the pattern of turning to trade after graduating from
plantation labor, was followed to a considerable degree by Japanese and Koreans.

More recent immigrant flows from Asia demonstrate the continued trend of participation in Hawaii's small business sector. Again, Lind comments on Korean adaptation to the Hawaiian urban environment:

Koreans particularly have found the city to be a suitable area of settlement. Considering relatively late arrival, the proportion of their population in Honolulu is almost as high as that of Chinese ... Koreans have manifested similar desires to create separate communities of their own within the city ... The Koreans responded vigorously to the competitive atmosphere of the city. As did the Chinese and Japanese, they managed to establish themselves in middle- and upper-class residential districts, to a considerable degree within a single generation (Lind 1980:59, 67).

The Vietnamese immigrants in Hawaii have also turned largely to entrepreneurship as an initial adaptive strategy. Nearly 42 per cent of all employed Vietnamese were working in retail trade, and whether entrepreneurship will result in major upward social and economic mobility for Vietnamese 'within a single generation' remains to be seen.

Clearly, Samoans have not established themselves in middle- and upper-class neighbourhoods within a single generation, and have not developed self-sufficient entrepreneurial enclaves. Local Hawaiian social and welfare organizations having recently recognized the low level of entrepreneurial activity in the communities they represent, have initiated small business training programs. The short-term impact of these programs has yet to be determined, but representatives from these organizations have begun a dialogue with local Samoan community leaders about developing Samoan entrepreneurial capabilities. These programs, and entrepreneurship generally, may prove beneficial to Samoans in Hawaii, but they may also ultimately prove detrimental to the Samoan international system of kinship support and service, as Samoan small-businessmen, and small-businesswomen, begin directing surplus money into necessary inventory development rather than into the 'aiga, the churches, or the matai system.

For the moment Samoans continue to function much as 'guestworkers'. Studies of Samoans in the United States differentiate those in California who are generally in employment but in the lower echelons of the labour market and those in Hawaii who are often unemployed and can be regarded as an 'underclass' (Hayes and Levin 1983). Unemployment levels of Samoans and other Pacific islanders are lower in California than in Hawaii and this suggests that step migration may have been self-selective. The evidence from the census and various surveys of Samoans (and also Tongans) in Hawaii and California suggests that, in a sense, the 'migration frontier' has moved onwards from Hawaii to the mainland and, in addition, is accentuated by step migration from Hawaii. This process has tended to result in differences between islander populations in the two states, with an older and poorer islander population in Hawaii and a younger, more economically successful, better educated population in California. Levin concludes that:
It seems there is a continuum of labour force participation and general adaptability among Pacific Islanders; that is the farther from the Pacific Islands in time, space and orientation, the more integrated into American Society (Levin 1984:15-16).

Islanders in the US mainland are, in an American context, more economically successful.

As for so many other migrant groups Samoans have reached Hawaii with social and economic values predisposed to a predominantly rural form of economic organization and are, at best, marginally adapted to American economic life. By contrast most Asian migrants have often previously been successful in entrepreneurial activity and are able to transfer and adapt those skills. In addition the poor educational and linguistic abilities of Samoan migrants, alongside residential concentration, have also discouraged assimilation and resulted in a concentration in ‘entry-level’ jobs, with low incomes and high probabilities of unemployment. Retention of cultural values, though easing adaptation to urban America, has been at considerable economic cost. Conversely, where there have been economic gains, this has been offset by a decline in social and political status; the status and prestige accorded to chiefly status in Samoa, or to the upper hereditary classes in Tonga, does not exist in the United States and ‘economic change has created social distinctions that have undercut traditional lines of prestige and authority and transformed both migrant and island societies’ (Shore 1980:766). The transition to new forms of social organization, the decline of the extended kinship network and a familiar social system, have resulted in some problems of social adjustment. Few migrants have really succeeded in the American education system, and health status has sometimes deteriorated. The unequal status of Samoans in the United States emphasizes the manner in which peripheral capitalism has been no more than a thin veneer in Samoa itself, and has led not to the modernization of the economy but to the marginalization of Samoans within the global economy, whether they remain in Samoa or move to the United States.
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