

Political and Social Change Monograph 9

**PANGU RETURNS TO POWER: THE 1982
ELECTIONS IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA**

Peter King (editor)

**Department of Political and Social Change
Research School of Pacific Studies
Australian National University
Canberra, 1989**

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Symbols of authority. Election posters on a Maprik *haus tambaran*, East Sepik Province

(Photo: R.J. May)

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Preface

Much of the material used in this study was gathered in the course of an election research project co-ordinated through the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Papua New Guinea in 1981-2, and partly financed by that University's Research Committee, to whom thanks. The Research Committee also helped finance a two-day seminar on the 1982 elections held in the Council Room, UPNG, from 7-8 November 1982 at which 16 short papers were delivered. (Attendance at this seminar is listed in Appendix C.) The editor would like to thank the participants in the UPNG seminar who threw much light on the campaigning and the conduct of the election, particularly Reuben Kaiulo of the PNG Electoral Commission and Paul Fearman, Provincial Returning Officer, Southern Highlands.

Thanks are also due to Leila Lisi and Tetei Charlie, who gave invaluable help in keeping files and typing manuscripts in Port Moresby. The final word processing of manuscripts was speedily and cheerfully done by Sonja Waikawa, Maria Robertson and Nancy van Duuren in the Department of Government, University of Sydney. John Roberts of the Department of Geography, University of Sydney, drew the individual electorate maps.

A final word is necessary to explain the long delay in publication of this study and the sometimes awkward contrast between chapters composed soon after the heat of electoral battle and those composed or recast with the benefit of considerable hindsight. Contributor and editorial tardiness played their part - not previously unknown in the long, glorious history of Papua New Guinea election studies! But it must be noted that this study was ready for printing in early 1987. It took well over a year to establish that the University of Papua New Guinea Press would not in fact be able to proceed with its promise of publication for financial reasons. In this situation the editor was grateful that the Department of Political and Social Change, ANU, felt able to step into the breach. To Ron May in particular, for all his help, heartfelt thanks.

Peter King

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
Robin Osborne was press officer in the Task Force, Department of the Prime Minister, during the government of Sir Julius Chan. During 1982-3 he was press secretary and speechwriter for Hon. Paias Wingti, Deputy Prime Minister. Before working in Papua New Guinea he was a journalist specialising in Southeast Asian affairs, and after returning to Sydney in 1983 he worked both as a journalist and in voluntary aid organizations. His publications include *Indonesia's Secret War: the Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya*, (1986).

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
Randal Stewart lectures in political science at the University of Queensland. Recently, he completed a doctoral dissertation on the political economy of Eastern Highlands Province.



PAPUA NEW GUINEA
1982 ELECTORATES

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Kms

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**Key to National
and Highlands Open
Electorate Maps**

(The 19 provinces and the National Capital District make up 20 additional electorates.)

| <i>Map No.</i> | <i>Electorate</i> | <i>Province</i> |
|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| 1 | Abau | Central |
| 2 | Aitape-Lumi | West Sepik |
| 3 | Alotau | Milne Bay |
| 4 | Ambunti-Dreikikir | East Sepik |
| 5 | Angalimp-South Wahgi | Western Highlands |
| 6 | Angoram | East Sepik |
| 7 | Baiyer-Mul | Western Highlands |
| 8 | Bogia | Madang |
| 9 | Bulolo | Morobe |
| 10 | Central Bougainville | Bougainville |
| 11 | Chuave | Chimbu |
| 12 | Daulo | Eastern Highlands |
| 13 | Dei | Western Highlands |
| 14 | Esa'ala | Milne Bay |
| 15 | Finschhafen | Morobe |
| 16 | Gazelle | East New Britain |
| 17 | Goilala | Central |
| 18 | Goroka | Eastern Highlands |
| 19 | Gumine | Chimbu |
| 20 | Hagen | Western Highlands |
| 21 | Henganofi | Eastern Highlands |
| 22 | Huon Gulf | Morobe |
| 23 | Ialibu-Pangia | Southern Highlands |
| 24 | Ijivitari | Northern |
| 25 | Imbonggu | Southern Highlands |
| 26 | Jimi | Western Highlands |
| 27 | Kabwum | Morobe |
| 28 | Kagua-Erave | Southern Highlands |
| 29 | Kainantu | Eastern Highlands |
| 30 | Kairuku-Hiri | Central |
| 31 | Kandep | Enga |
| 32 | Kandrian-Gloucester | West New Britain |
| 33 | Karinui-Nomane | Chimbu |
| 34 | Kavieng | New Ireland |
| 35 | Kerema | Gulf |
| 36 | Kerowagi | Chimbu |
| 37 | Kikori | Gulf |
| 38 | Kiriwina-Goodenough | Milne Bay |
| 39 | Kokopo | East New Britain |
| 40 | Komo-Margarima | Southern Highlands |
| 41 | Kompiani-Ambum | Enga |
| 42 | Koroba-Lake Kopiago | Southern Highlands |

Key to National and Highlands Open Electorate Maps Contd.

| <i>Map No.</i> | <i>Electorate</i> | <i>Province</i> |
|----------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| 43 | Kundiawa | Chimbu |
| 44 | Lae | Morobe |
| 45 | Lagaip-Porgera | Enga |
| 46 | Lufa | Eastern Highlands |
| 47 | Madang | Madang |
| 48 | Manus | Manus |
| 49 | Maprik | East Sepik |
| 50 | Markham | Morobe |
| 51 | Mendi | Southern Highlands |
| 52 | Menyanya | Morobe |
| 53 | Middle Fly | Western |
| 54 | Middle Ramu | Madang |
| 55 | Moresby North-East | National Capital Dist. |
| 56 | Moresby North-West | National Capital Dist. |
| 57 | Moresby South | National Capital Dist. |
| 58 | Namatanai | New Ireland |
| 59 | Nawae | Morobe |
| 60 | Nipa-Kutubu | Southern Highlands |
| 61 | North Bougainville | Bougainville |
| 62 | North Fly | Western |
| 63 | North Wahgi | Western Highlands |
| 64 | Nuku | West Sepik |
| 65 | Obura-Wonenara | Eastern Highlands |
| 66 | Okapa | Eastern Highlands |
| 67 | Pomio | East New Britain |
| 68 | Rabaul | East New Britain |
| 69 | Rai Coast | Madang |
| 70 | Rigo | Central |
| 71 | Samarai-Murua | Milne Bay |
| 72 | Sinasina-Yonggamugi | Chimbu |
| 73 | Sohe | Northern |
| 74 | South Bougainville | Bougainville |
| 75 | South Fly | Western |
| 76 | Sumkar | Madang |
| 77 | Talasea | West New Britain |
| 78 | Tambul-Nebilyer | Western Highlands |
| 79 | Tari | Southern Highlands |
| 80 | Telefomin | West Sepik |
| 81 | Tewai-Siassi | Morobe |
| 82 | Unggai-Bena | Eastern Highlands |
| 83 | Usino-Bundi | Madang |
| 84 | Vanimo-Green River | West Sepik |
| 85 | Wabag | Enga |
| 86 | Wapenamanda | Enga |
| 87 | Wewak | East Sepik |
| 88 | Wosera-Gaui | East Sepik |
| 89 | Yangoru-Saussia | East Sepik |

PART 1: NATIONAL

Chapter 1

PARTIES AND OUTCOMES IN THE 1982 ELECTIONS

Peter King

Political parties in Papua New Guinea are commonly held to be little more than machines for ensuring the election and re-election of parliamentary leaders and their followers. Their 'grass roots' organization, their policy-making capacity, their post-electoral cohesiveness, their ideological distinctiveness and their ability to establish a hold on the popular mind are said to be negligible or non-existent. But it is also said that they are slowly improving or 'modernizing' their performance; that the Australian or Westminster type party system remains an appropriate and influential model for future development; and that from election to election parties and the party system are gathering strength in Papua New Guinea.

In June 1982, Papua New Guinea held its second post-Independence election for the unicameral National Parliament which resulted in the replacement of a five-party coalition led by Sir Julius Chan and his People's Progress Party by a two-party coalition led by Michael Somare and his Pangu Party. The three pre-Independence elections for the House of Assembly (1964, 1968 and 1972) and the National Parliament election have all been studied at length (Bettison *et al.*, 1964; Epstein *et al.*, 1971; Stone, 1976; Hegarty, 1983). Bearing in mind the record of party electoral and post-electoral performance stretching back to the 1968 election when parties came into their own, what light do the election results of 1982 and their parliamentary aftermath throw on the hopeful hypothesis sketched above - that parties are growing stronger?

First, I outline the financial and organizational gearing up of the parties for 1982. Secondly, I assess the comparative success of the parties in endorsing 'quality' candidates and the striking success of endorsed candidates as against independents in 1982. Thirdly, I assess the policy performance of the parties in the election period and estimate the significance of the 1982 election for post-election policy choices. Did the Somare government win any effective mandates for change? Fourthly, I scrutinize the election result and its parliamentary aftermath to estimate the significance of the Pangu Party's big victory in the light of developments since the election year. Has the 1982 experience permanently strengthened the role of parties in the Papua New Guinea political system? And are the bases of party strength shifting?

Eight significant parties contested the 1982 elections:

Pangu Pati. Founded in 1967 to push for self-government and independence from the Australian colonial power, Pangu under Michael Somare was the ruling party from 1972 through independence in 1975 until 1980 when it was overthrown in a vote of no confidence. Pangu is sometimes said to have a left wing of socially concerned nationalists, but they were little in evidence during the 1982 election.

People's Progress Party. Founded in 1970 by like-minded members of the House of Assembly, Sir Julius Chan's PPP has always been a tightly-knit, business-oriented party. Sir Julius was prime minister from 1980 to 1982.

National Party. Founded before the 1972 election by Thomas Kavali as a Highlands equivalent of Pangu, the National Party came into its own under the leadership of Iambakey Okuk by pushing for Highlands leadership of the country and business opportunities for Papua New Guineans.

United Party. Set up in 1970-1 by conservative Highlands politicians and expatriate businessmen to oppose Pangu, the UP under Paul Torato and Roy Evara has been interested in office above all during recent years.

Melanesian Alliance Party. Launched in 1980 by Father John Momis and John Kaputin after their break with the second Somare government, MA brought together the former secessionists of Bougainville and the former radicals who had opposed the colonial administration on the Gazelle Peninsula. Standing for economic nationalism, Christian-social ideals, the Melanesian Way and pan-Melanesianism, MA alone qualified as a radical party in the Papua New Guinea of 1982, although the business interests of Deputy Leader John Kaputin sit uneasily with the social conscience of Father Momis and party *philosophe* and deputy chairman, Bernard Narokobi. Nevertheless, MA has slowly built a national following.

Papua Party. The domesticated rump of the secessionist Papua Besena, the PP consisted in 1982 of MPs who had broken with Josephine Abaijah and her Papua Besena by entering the Chan government and working for Papuan development rather than an independent Papua.

PNG Independent Group. As the vehicle of the former Defence Force Commander, Ted Diro, for contesting the 1982 election, the IG was chiefly active in Papua.

Papua Action Party. Founded under Okuk's influence by former Pangu politicians to muster support in Papua for the NP leader's prime ministerial ambitions, the PAP failed to win a seat and collapsed after the 1982 election.

Organization and Finance

The Constitution requires that no foreign corporation or citizen shall contribute money to political parties in Papua New Guinea, but the National Parliament has failed for over a decade to pass or even draft the necessary organic law on political parties. As a result there is no effective government monitoring of party finances in Papua New Guinea because there is no requirement to reveal funding sources. The level of party spending is therefore speculative, and hard data emerged only well after the election. The hardest data concerned the biggest spender, Pangu. In 1986 it was reported that the Pangu business arm, Damai Pty. Ltd., had obtained a loan of K700,000 in two instalments from the Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation - part of which was used to pay out an existing debt to the ANZ Bank. The PNGBC loans were made on the security of a block of flats owned by Damai, but the beneficial owners of Damai were not revealed. There was criticism of this large loan made on nebulous security by the PNGBC's freewheeling expatriate manager, Peter Nicholls, who has since resigned; but a Law Reform Commission enquiry into the loan was aborted under political pressure (*The Times*, April 12, 1986).

It has since been rumoured that the PNGBC has written off over K3m of bad debts arising from the 1982 election, although Pangu's lawyer has claimed that Pangu had paid off most of its debt by 1986 (*The Times*, April 12, 1986). If the PNGBC did indeed lend over K3m to parties and leaders, it seems likely that NP leader Okuk got the second largest share. While Pangu by all accounts spent over K1m in total on the election, Okuk claims to have spent K240,000 on his own campaign in Chimbu, and K540,000 more for the National Party (Standish, 1984:62), a total not so far short of Pangu's.

Of the other parties, Robin Osborne below quotes Julius Chan as claiming that PPP spent K500,000, although perhaps this estimate includes candidates' own expenses, while UP spent perhaps K200,000, and MA managed to raise only about K20,000.

UP had the benefit of its well established business arm, Tarangu, which owned a major stake in leading Mazda dealer, PNG Motors, through Melanesian Investments Pty. Ltd and PNG Associated Industries - as indeed also did Pangu through Damai (Hegarty in Amarshi *et al.*, 1979: 201; *The Times*, May 31, 1986). The uneasy co-habitation of these two parties through their business arms eventually came to breaking point in 1986. PPP on the other hand relied more on

the personal wealth of its leading personalities than any other sources, and MA was undoubtedly more hampered by financial stringency than any other party.

Thus Pangu at one extreme was able to run a high profile campaign, including radio jingles, T-shirts and newspaper advertisements, in addition to paying the nomination fees (K100) for all its fully endorsed candidates and supplying most of them with posters, while the Melanesian Alliance at the other extreme was unable to give many of its candidates significant support at all. Pangu was also able to pay election expenses of party-swappers who gravitated to Michael Somare after the June election in hope of perks or a ministry.

Apart from bank loans and party business arms, foreign sources of funds were tapped, including donations by expatriate and white citizen businessmen and by locally established foreign firms, as well as 'offshore' money raised by leaders in their travels. These may well have accounted for most other party spending in view of some hard evidence which finally surfaced more than five years after the election, when Ted Diro admitted that his good friend the Indonesian armed forces commander, General Benny Murdani, had kicked in U.S.\$139,400 to fund the Independent Group (*The Times*, November 4, 1987; *Post-Courier*, November 12-13, 1987; *Weekend Nius*, November 14, 1987). Donations by national firms and grassroots fund-raising were probably a negligible factor. The most visible relationship was between Okuk and South Pacific Brewery, which made it possible for him to give away 96,000 bottles of beer at one extraordinary campaign meeting (Wolfers, 1982).

As for organization, party branches did revive all round the country as the elections approached. Pangu, PPP, NP and MA managed to maintain national offices, although not always separate from ministerial suites and official Opposition offices, while a few vigorous regional and provincial offices functioned as well.

As Ron May shows for East Sepik, below, Pangu from a standing start in late 1981 mounted an impressive province-wide organizational effort out of an office in Wewak. Stephen Pokawin tells a similar story for Manus, and Peter Larmour for Enga.

Given that the sums of money available to parties in 1982 seem to have been 50-100 per cent greater in real terms than for the 1977 election (cf. Hegarty, 1983), and given the unprecedented competitiveness of the election which saw almost a 40 per cent rise in the number of candidates (from 881 to 1125) - and given also, as we shall see, that parties had become more acceptable to the voters - it seems clear that the scope and intensity of party organization and campaigning eclipsed the 1977 effort.

Candidates, Party Endorsement and Party Penetration

Pangu, PPP and MA showed considerable energy in seeking out 'quality' candidates in 1982. PPP opened a national file on potential candidates, systematically conducted enquiries and interviews, and claimed great success in putting a high quality team together. There was fierce competition for Pangu endorsement and, to relieve the resulting tension, it was decided to re-endorse all Pangu sitting members. (Most other parties did the same). MA, despite its poor financial situation, endorsed over 70, as did the UP. Multiple candidacies in the Highlands electorates took the National Party's total to over 140. PPP had almost one candidate for every seat but Pangu had almost two.

As in previous elections, the party endorsement process remained quite complex in Papua New Guinea. While parties fully endorsed only one candidate per seat as a rule in 1982, they did acknowledge and assist other candidates as party supporters or as being 'pro' the party or its leader, especially Pangu. Candidates, for their part, might or might not acknowledge or stress their party affiliation; but more candidates in 1982 than ever before seemed to actively seek or claim party endorsement. Thus most candidates in 1982 ran under party labels, but only a minority carried full party endorsement. Party candidates of whatever kind did far better than independent ones, as Table 1.2 below shows, thus intensifying a trend already evident in 1977 (Hegarty, 1983:10). With 17 per cent of the candidates standing, Pangu received 34 per cent of the vote and 'owned' 46.8 per cent of the candidates elected, while Independent candidates, who were 41.2 per cent of the total, received only 20.9 per cent of the votes cast, and constituted only 3.7 per cent of MPs after June.

However, despite these rather striking statistics, it remains true that a strong candidate can win under any or no party label, and there is no opinion polling to tell us directly whether there is an authentic party vote or not. All indications still are that clan and language affiliations and personal qualities are more important, especially as any party vote is quite often split between several party candidates.

Nevertheless, observers (including this one) are wont to casually invoke a 'party effect' to explain a national political trend when they would scarcely dare do so to explain a result in a single electorate without careful enquiry. For at least one seat (Sohe Open) in 1982 we have a careful demonstration that party affiliation and party activity were just about irrelevant to the result (Saffu below), and there is little doubt that this demonstration could be widely repeated. Nevertheless, in 1982 Somare and Pangu were said to have been helped by the collapse of prices for Papua New Guinea's leading export commodities in the 'lean years' of Chan, and also by the remarkable disunity of the Chan coalition. These generalizations appeal to common sense, but no one really knows how important the party effect was.

We do know, however, from good anecdotal evidence, including most of the chapters below, that parties penetrated the electorate more than ever in 1982. As Pokawin shows for Manus, candidates were less fearful of adverse effects from bearing a party label and more avid to share in the financial and leadership strength that goes with the party label. And May shows clearly for the East Sepik that there was far more awareness of parties at the village level and that the party affiliation of candidates was less likely to be a private financial arrangement carefully concealed from the electors.

The fact is that strong parties attract strong candidates and *vice versa* (Standish, 1984:60). For the candidate a strong (or merely rich) party can provide money and support in kind (posters, leader visits and vehicles). For the party a strong candidate means a better prospect of 'getting the numbers' in the election of a prime minister. Policy and ideology are a secondary consideration on both sides - although often the candidate is grateful for a manifesto to quote, when asked a question about policy. And yet policy - even ideology - seemed to play a substantial role in the 1982 elections, as we shall now see.

Party Performance, Policy and Ideology in 1982

Party efforts in holding conferences and drafting manifestos during the run up to the 1982 election were on the whole less impressive than before the 1977 poll. Pangu held a large national convention for 400-plus delegates and thousands of Highlands supporters in Mt.Hagen in late February, but the lustre of the event was dimmed by acting Convention Chairman, John Noel, who scathingly criticised the party's organizational performance since 1977 and its propensity to use 'spivs' in the party organization and business arms (*The Times*, February 12, 1982). However, Pangu did manage to launch a new party platform, the celebrated Blue Book, in a Tok Pisin and Motu as well as an English version (*Pangu Pati Policies*, 1982.)

The National Party had already held its national convention near Kundiawa, capital of Mr. Okuk's Simbu province, in late September 1981. It was a K60,000 extravaganza (*The Times*, 25 September and 2 October, 1981). The NP's new platform was launched in the New Year (*The Papua New Guinea National Party Policies*, 1982; *Papua New Guinea Nesenel Pati as Tingting*, 1982).

The Melanesian Alliance held its first national convention in Lae with over 200 delegates during late February. (*Minutes of the National Convention of the Melanesian Alliance Party of Papua New Guinea*, 28 February, 1982). National Co-ordinator, Patterson Lowa, tabled a draft party platform of 112 pages, a PNG record (*Melanesian Alliance Party Platform*, 1982); but, unable to outline its contents in the time available, he did not press for adoption and asked delegates to forward written comments to the party (*Minutes*: p.20).

The People's Progress Party, which did hold regional conventions, failed to hold a national convention and was forced to re-issue its 1977 platform, while the UP, although it held a national convention in Mt. Hagen in January (*The Times*, January 29, 1982), barely functioned as a national body during the election period except for the purpose of distributing substantial sums of money to approved candidates. It also failed to issue a new platform.

All in all the party conventions were an impressive effort - new party executives were elected, candidates were endorsed, morale was raised, some policy was adopted and the grass roots were energised in the aftermath. But the new platforms - save for the promising MA draft, with its detailed vision of a more autonomous economy - were much less so.

Nevertheless, party leaders acted as though national policy debate was an important factor in the 1982 election. One sign of this was that most of the established political leaders and distinguished new candidates agreed to appear at a series of meetings at the University of Papua New Guinea during the election period. The taped record of their speeches and responses to questions is a very useful source, in addition to the party platforms and press and radio coverage of leaders, when we try to evaluate national debate on political issues in 1982.

At the University of Papua New Guinea eleven leaders - Michael Somare, Philip Bouraga and Tony Siaguru (Pangu), Julius Chan (PPP), Iambakey Okuk (NP), John Momis, John Kaputin and Bernard Narokobi (MA), Roy Evara (UP) and Josephine Abajjah (Papua Besena) - spoke for their parties and themselves, and they canvassed a wide range of domestic and a few foreign policy issues quite thoroughly. The transcript of proceedings (Griffin and King, 1985) is heavily drawn on below where I try to sketch the scope, content and quality of the election debate. I shall raise the question whether any mandates were effectively won and implemented by the incoming Pangu government - a conventional index of democratic party effectiveness; and I conclude with a note on the ideological implications of the party campaigns.

Chan government failures

Opponents of the five-party coalition which went to the polls in June 1982 were fully agreed on the main failures of the Chan government. The unauthorised and unnecessary K27m purchase of Dash-7 aircraft for Air Niugini by Chan's deputy prime minister, Transport and Civil Aviation minister, Okuk, was a crippling expense for the national airline. Likewise the purchase of an executive jet by the prime minister at a price tag of K6m was a needless extravagance. More importantly, the so-called sectoral programs in transport and agriculture, introduced by ministers Okuk and Evara in 1980-81, whereby project funding was transferred direct by cheque to national MPs thus by-passing provincial governments and regular planning processes, were an invitation to abuse,

and had become a scandal by early 1982 (Standish, 1984:54). Finally, the US tuna boat, *Danica*, which had been seized in early 1982 while poaching in Papua New Guinea's exclusive economic zone, was sold back to the owners by the government at a fraction of its purchase price - a decision widely criticized as a sell-out (Hegarty and King, 1982).

Beyond these specific points of criticism, there was a litany of complaints which could apply quite well to any government in independent Papua New Guinea, but which the Chan government nevertheless had to face once more. The public service is too large, said the critics, too expensive, and insufficiently productive. Corruption is a major problem in deals done by the government, especially for the timber and fishing industries, they said; and complacency and connivance in corruption at the top are a threat to the integrity of the whole public service. Above all, said the critics, especially in Pangu, the government has proved to be divided, incoherent and partly paralysed in making and carrying out policy. (The fact that the five governing parties campaigned entirely independently of each other made this criticism somewhat otiose.)

Performance claims

Sir Julius fought back against his Pangu and other critics by pointing out that he had not had to face a vote of no confidence in his two years and more of office; that fiscal responsibility had been upheld in lean times, and that the Kumul operation by the Papua New Guinea Defence force in 1980 to secure the newly independent government of Vanuatu against a secessionist threat had been a brilliant success. As for the executive jet purchase, he said at the University in April: 'If you don't invest you don't get anywhere we have to be optimistic... The US reached the moon and we buy tuna and worry about six million kina' (Meeting, University of Papua New Guinea, May 4, 1982).

In reply, Somare at the University hinted that Pangu was the natural government of Papua New Guinea and declared that the Chan government was an unpopular aberration, a quirk of parliamentary maneuver. Okuk for the NP sketched a rather inflated role for himself in the self-government struggle and claimed to be the father of localized coffee buying and Air Niugini, while Evara for the National Party pointed out that he had shown quite extraordinary tactical flair in surviving as a minister (Griffin and King, 1985).

Issues, policies and mandates

The great issue of 1982, was, of course, in Humpty Dumpty's immortal phrase, who is to be master? There was a strong presidential element in the party campaigns, with five potential prime ministers on the hustings: Somare, Chan, Okuk, Momis, and, less plausibly, Diro, who was almost as candid about his prime ministerial ambitions as that frustrated contender for the top job, Okuk. (Okuk had led two parliamentary

assaults on the second Somare government in his own name before he helped Sir Julius to power in 1980.)

The conflicting ambitions of the bigmen and their followers in Papua New Guinea's national politics produced fairly chronic political instability during most of the years after Independence. This also was an election issue in 1982. Ex-General Diro deplored dishonesty and division in the Chan government and called for firm, business-like and, by implication, military style leadership. For his part, Somare promised large Pangu numbers ('65 for '82' - a clear majority in a parliament of 109) and hence stability. A *Civil Rights and Voters' Manifesto* circulated during the campaign deplored personal and party opportunism and the resulting parliamentary volatility, and declared that a change of government should mean a new election - something the constitutional fathers had deliberately sought to avoid. During the campaign Tony Siaguru, new Pangu candidate for a Moresby seat and former secretary of Foreign Affairs, called for legislation to make party-swapping by MPs ('political prostration') an offence punishable by the ordeal of by-election (Griffin and King, 1985:34); but in the event it was Pangu which exploited political volatility to the hilt in assembling the numbers to govern after the election.

Nevertheless Pangu in office foreshadowed legislation to ban party-swapping, a proposal later endorsed by the General Constitutional Commission (*Final Report* 1983:116). But a parliament of potentially free-floating MPs was unlikely ever to pass such legislation, and did not.

Almost all leaders called for government economies. After selling off the Dash-7 and the Kumul executive jet, it was agreed (as we have seen) that the inflated and under-productive 50,000-strong public service inherited from the Australians must be cut back. Ted Diro was particularly scathing about the public service: 'Some of our Department Heads can't speak standard English', he said, and: 'The news media have given us ample evidence of government training people it cannot employ ... and employing people it does not train' (Griffin and King, 1985:21-2). Pangu promised personnel cuts and to make the public service more responsive by substituting a Board of senior bureaucrats for the recalcitrant existing Public Services Commission made up of independent appointees. In addition, Somare promised a ministry of only 20 as opposed to Chan's 27, the constitutional maximum. Pangu clearly had a mandate in these areas, and there was some action after August. The Kumul jet was sold; but selling the Dashes proved too difficult, and, when KLM was later hired to take over the management of Air Nuigini, Fokker aircraft were sold instead. Pangu Public Services minister Siaguru did try to restructure the PSC and retrench 3,000 in the public service; and while the PSC did eventually become a Department of Personnel Management, over-generous severance payments and insufficiently tight re-employment provisions turned the 'retrenchment exercise' into an expensive fiasco (King, 1984). Moreover, the promised

cuts in the ministry fell victim to the imperatives of representing 19 provinces and a coalition partner (UP) in the new government. A more determined public service - and ministerial - shake-up came under the Wingti government, led by Pangu defectors, which overthrew the Somare government late in 1985. Three departments were dissolved and ten department heads sacked at that time (*Age*, November 23, 1985).

Insofar as the state of the economy was debated in 1982, attention focused on three issues: industrial development, bank credit, and youth employment. Pangu's Blue Book promised to replace the Development Bank with a combined Agriculture, Housing and Industry Bank, which was to have expanded capital and been responsive to the little man and small business. However the Somare government's financial advisers eventually vetoed the plan. Ted Diro called eloquently for 'downstream' investment in rural industries, while Tony Siaguru expounded an imaginative multi-pronged approach to the problems of youth, and Philip Bouraga, who had been Chan's Police Commissioner and was to be Somare's Finance Minister, called for youth resettlement schemes (Griffin and King, 1985:23, 29-30, 34-7). However, in view of the deteriorating law and order situation in Papua New Guinea towns after 1982 - which led to a political crisis, the mobilizing of the Defence Force and an enforced curfew in Port Moresby for much of 1985 - we can say with hindsight that law and order, and the associated problems of under-educated and under-employed youth, were neglected issues in the 1982 campaign.

The Melanesian Alliance leaders insisted that class polarization was at the root of the law and order problem as well as many others. Here is how the deputy chairman of the MA, Bernard Narokobi, who was also the party's candidate for the East Sepik provincial electorate against Michael Somare, posed the issue: 'Did you know [he asked the Sepik villagers] that some of our leaders are sending their children to school in Australia? ...*Em [Pangu] i no pati bilong mipela kanaka man. Em bilong ol rich man hia.*' [It's no party for us primitives. It's for the rich people.] (Griffin and King, 1985:89). But no other party accepted this line of analysis.

MA pointed out that there was another potentially very serious law and order problem in Papua New Guinea apart from urban crime and tribal fighting in the Highlands: the problem of corruption in government, which, both as a reality and as a revelation, tends to exacerbate class polarization. Here the Ombudsman Commission supplied important materials for election debate with its report on the so-called Diaries Affair (*Corruption in Government: A Case Study*, 1982), which implicated nine public servants and three ministers, including the prime minister. For his part, Somare denounced the K100m Vanimo timber deal recently concluded against bureaucratic advice (Hegarty and King, 1983), referred to criminal offences (including rape) committed by Chan ministers and deplored the mishandling of public funds (Griffin and King,

1985:74-6), which had been most outrageous in the pork barrel sectoral funds for agriculture and transport. Pangu also challenged the government to introduce a tough leadership code banning the pursuit of private business interests by active political leaders; but in the event failed to do so itself. Nevertheless Pangu did terminate the Vanimo deal with the inexplicably inexperienced Filipino company, Hetura Meja, and called for new tenders; and Pangu also ended the agriculture and transport sectoral programs in their corruption-prone form: two more cases of mandates sought and implemented in 1982 (Hegarty and King, 1983: King, 1984).

Finally in foreign policy little of substance was said during the campaign except by Okuk who made a calculated attempt to stir up nationalist feeling on two highly sensitive issues - the border with West Irian and the future of Filipino ('Asian') immigration to Papua New Guinea. Okuk called for solidarity with the Melanesian brothers ('they will never be Asian') in Irian Jaya and accelerated development of the border region; and he promised defiance of Indonesia as necessary: 'A National Party-led government will never never deport fellow Melanesians to the coldest part of Europe', he said (Griffin and King, 1985: 59-61) - a reference to the deportation of *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* leader, Jacob Prai, to Sweden in 1978. (But, one wondered, would deportation to the warmer parts of Europe be acceptable?) Okuk repeatedly challenged other parties to debate these issues, but, save for the MA with its longstanding sympathy for the West Papuan cause, they were not drawn. Julius Chan affirmed impressively that he was 'very concerned about the West Irianese and about everyone on this earth' (Meeting, University of Papua New Guinea, May 4, 1982) and Michael Somare in office after 1982 continued to do as he had done before over the border problem with Indonesia - very little - until a flood of 10,000 West Papuan refugees into Papua New Guinea in 1984 forced a more activist approach on the Somare government. Okuk's attempt to shake the official consensus on West Papua - even if not fully sincere - failed. He largely failed also on the issue of Filipino immigration where he claimed that contract Filipino teachers and public servants were gravitating illegally into business and threatening local small-scale enterprise (*The Times*, January 22 and 29, 1982) - although a government committee was eventually set up under Pangu to monitor the fate of national small business.

Okuk also challenged the Chan's government's attempt at foreign affairs consensus-building as embodied in the foreign policy White Paper of November 1981 - something he had actually voted for in parliament. The controversial consultant on the White Paper was Dr Ted Wolfers of Macquarie University, Sydney. According to Okuk:

When I was in Opposition [in 1979] they selected him to write our policy and I said, look, no foreigner should write our policy ...

And I'm telling you when we come in we'll write our own foreign policy (Griffin and King 1985:61).

But the next Pangu Foreign Minister, Rabbie Namaliu, had fully accepted the White Paper by year's end (King, 1985:277), and when Okuk returned to government under Paias Wingti in 1985 no revisionist efforts in foreign policy were forthcoming from the National Party.

Ideological themes

The dominant ideological themes in the 1982 election campaign were variants of nationalism. For the MA and, to a lesser extent, the NP, Papua New Guinea must begin standing up to - or standing down - locally employed expatriates, visiting expatriate experts and foreign interests generally. Achieving the egalitarian social-Christian and communal-traditional ideals of the MA - or at least of Father Momis and Bernard Narokobi - is made difficult by the comprador leaders in Pangu and other parties with their Australian-educated children. For Okuk the big challenge in 1982 was standing up to Indonesia - conceived as the local anti-Melanesian bully; and a subsidiary challenge was to assert Melanesianism against that other form of supposed creeping Asianisation represented by an influx of skilled Filipinos into the public services and small business.

But MA remained more worried about the activities of privileged Papua New Guineans than Indonesian political leaders or Filipino *binis* pioneers. For Narokobi the established parties were indifferent to grass roots concerns and practised only 'big man' democracy. MA aspired to a party leadership controlled from below, and had begun to draft organizational rules providing for an elaborate extra-parliamentary party structure. By 1987 MA had proved itself to be quite dynamic in provincial electoral contests, where parties at first had played a negligible role. MA and close allies such as Premier Stephen Pokawin of Manus and Premier Utula Samana with his Morobe Independent Group had control of government in four provinces (the other two Premiers were Pedi Anis in New Ireland and Dr. Alexis Sarei in North Solomons) - an appropriate accomplishment for the party led by the constitutional father of decentralisation, Father Momis. For his part, in 1982 Bernard Narokobi sought to combat disillusion at the grass roots:

One day I went to campaign in one very populous area - Wosera district [East Sepik province]. I came to a village and an old man said: '*Yangpela yu painim namba na yu kam ah?*' [Young man, are you looking for numbers?'] I said, '*Sori tru - mi vot vot na olegeta namba i pinis.*' ['I'm very sorry - I have voted and voted and all the numbers are finished'.] (Griffin and King, 1985:84)

MA perhaps showed the courage of its convictions when it expelled deputy leader John Kaputin from the party in late 1985 for joining the new Wingti coalition as Minerals and Energy Minister in defiance of the party consensus (*The Times*, December 7, 1985). MA thus refused to tolerate a situation almost normal for the UP and even the NP of having party MPs in both government and opposition. But the expulsion was ironical in that Father Momis had joined Michael Somare as deputy prime minister and helped his government in the crisis brought about by Pias Wingti's defection from Pangu in February 1985, thus making a mockery of Narokobi's anti-Pangu diatribes in the 1982 campaign. (His campaign trademark was a send-up of Pangu mania: 'Pangupangupangupangupangupangu!').

If big man democracy and political opportunism were MA's bugbear, opportunism almost constituted the ruling philosophy of the United Party. In a disarmingly frank presentation at the University of Papua New Guinea, Roy Evara elevated political flexibility into a principle:

During my time in office as leader of the United Party, when there were changes of government, the United Party was always there. We never missed

It was the United Party who brought the change of government [in March 1980]

We were able to cross the floor to join this party and that party. Other people have said these people are like *pamuk meri* [prostitutes], they go here, they go there. Yes, we did that.... Having achieved these changes of government we also undertook the task of breaking every other party.... We wanted to make Julius [Chan] weak, and then we wanted to make Somare weak. So in this election we will all be saying, no party is going to be strong enough to form a one-party government (Griffin and King, 1985:53-4).

When asked with which parties he would be prepared to form a government, Evara replied: 'There are one or two I would not join with, but I will not let you know now' (Griffin and King, 1985:71).

Although not quite so candid as Evara, PNG Independent Group leader, Ted Diro, also sang the praises of opportunism. Explaining why his Group would not constitute itself as a party for the time being, he said: 'We prefer to enhance our chances of attracting the ... Independents after the election should the political winds blow in our direction we will welcome the challenge' (Griffin and King, 1985:15). In the event, after June 1982, Diro's respectable following of seven was shaken by his consenting to assume leadership of the National Party while Okuk, who had lost his Chimbu seat, sought a new one. The

Independent Group was shaken again in 1983 as Diro rather supinely conceded both party and Opposition leadership to Okuk when that force of nature returned to parliament after a by-election in Eastern Highlands. Although Diro eventually won a ministry, Forests, under Wingti in 1985, his following by then was scarcely discernible - although it did revive later. Evara, by contrast, found the United Party's parliamentary strength considerably eroded in 1982 - from 14 before to 9 after the election - but he was able to keep a ministry throughout the third Somare government despite a continuing split in his party.

Whilst the philosophy of naked opportunism could not be said with hindsight to have entirely triumphed in 1982, it remains important; and so perhaps Papua New Guinea's political parties in recent years could usefully be divided into two categories: *major parties*, being those proven capable of leading or credibly able to lead a government; and *minor or scavenger parties*. Pangu, PPP, NP, Paias Wingti's People's Democratic Movement and even MA would qualify for major party status. The UP, the Papua Party and the Independent Group would not. In Roy Evara's words:

We are and we have been a humble and working party ... We have not been greedy in the political power struggle.

The UP are the most accomplished scavengers of PNG politics.

The Election result and the basis of party strength

Election polling was carried out between June 5 and 26. In terms of voter support for party-endorsed candidates Pangu clearly outpolled every other party and, at the close of counting, had won 50 of 108 seats, up by half (see Table 1.1). (The Sumka Open seat in Madang province, contested late because of the death of a candidate before the poll, was won by Pangu). Table 1.2 reveals the extent of voter support for each of the parties. Pangu candidates were 17 percent of the total, but they received twice this proportion of the vote, whereas independents - 40 percent of candidates - received only half this share of the vote, and won only four seats. As for party regional strengths, Table 1.3 shows that Pangu candidates won more votes than any other party in three of the four regions. In the Northern region it won 24 of the 28 seats, consolidating its traditional support bases, and it later won the support of two other MPs in that region. The Melanesian Alliance outpolled Pangu in the Islands region and won eight seats overall, but lost two MPs to Pangu in the post-election lobbying. The PPP's votes were evenly spread throughout the country, but it lost significant support in the Northern region. The National Party polled surprisingly weakly, particularly in the Highlands, and Okuk lost his own Chimbu provincial seat despite extraordinary efforts. (He was later returned in a by-election in his wife's

area of Eastern Highlands province.) Diro's PNG Independent Group polled well in Papua and made inroads in other regions, winning nine seats, but losing three of these to Pangu after the count. The secessionist wing of Papua Besena disappeared, indicating the steady erosion of support for secession since independence, while Besena's non-secessionist wing, the Papua Party, managed to retain three seats. The Papua Action Party did not win a seat.

Voter turnout for the 1982 elections was approximately 60% of the eligible voting population (18 years and over), which continued the pattern of previous elections. Of the 103 incumbent MPs who contested, only 50 retained their seats, again continuing the 1977 pattern of a high turnover of incumbents. Twelve of the 27 ministers in the outgoing government were defeated. The first-past-the-post voting system, together with the unusually large number of candidates, meant that many seats were won by candidates who captured only a small percentage of the total vote. In all, 62 seats were won by candidates who received less than 30% of the votes cast in their electorates.

Table 1.1
Party Strengths - Before and After June 1982

| | Pangu | PPP | NP | MA | UP | PP | IG | Ind. | Total |
|---------------------------|-------|-----|----|----|----|----|----|------|-------|
| Parliament March 1982 | 33 | 20 | 22 | 6 | 13 | 7 | - | 8 | 109 |
| After June Election | 50 | 14 | 13 | 8 | 9 | 3 | 7 | 4 | 108* |
| Parliament, Aug.2,1982 | 61 | 13 | 19 | 6 | 6 | 3 | - | - | 108 |

Key: Pangu = Pangu Pati (Michael Somare)
 PPP = People's Progress Party (Sir Julius Chan)
 NP = National Party (Iambakey Okuk)
 MA = Melanesian Alliance (Fr. John Momis)
 UP = United Party (Roy Evara)
 PP = Papua Party (Galeva Kwarara)
 IG = PNG Independent Group (Ted Diro)
 Ind. = Independent

*The election for one seat in Madang province was postponed when a candidate died. (Pangu won the by-election.)

Source: Hegarty and King, 1982.

On Monday, 2 August the National Parliament elected Michael Somare to be prime minister of Papua New Guinea for the third time. Somare defeated the outgoing coalition's last-minute nominee, Father John Momis, by 66 votes to 40. The prime ministerial ballot (required by Section 142 of the constitution) ended a confused and debilitating month of maneuver and speculation concerning which group of parties would form the new government.

At the start of the maneuvers, the defeated Okuk successfully and sensationally nominated the newly elected leader of the Independent Group, Ted Diro, as the new leader of the National Party, effecting a merger of the two parties in the process, and effectively blocking a Diro-Somare coalition because the new grouping was too large for Somare's purposes. Somare's victory on August 2 gave him a parliamentary majority of 26 over the opposition - and in fact he had eleven more supporters than the required parliamentary majority of 55. The new government consisted of 50 Pangu MPs; 11 MPs who were either independents or who switched to Pangu from other parties immediately after the poll or just before the parliamentary ballot, and 6 United Party MPs. As it turned out, Pangu did not need the UP, but in the interests of a more secure working majority invited it 'on board'.

The Opposition, after August, was led by the new National Party leader, Ted Diro, who defeated Father Momis for that position by 18 votes to 17. The Opposition membership consisted of 19 National Party (i.e., 14 'Old' NP and 5 Diro Independent Group); 6 Melanesian Alliance; 3 Papua Besena, and 13 People's Progress Party. Sir Julius, however, did not throw in his lot fully with the official Opposition, since the PPP managed to secure minority party status with its own support staff and sat on the cross benches.

Despite earlier promises to trim the size of the ministry amidst general belt-tightening, Somare in fact announced a cabinet of 27 the week after the election, the maximum allowed by the Constitution. Four principles of appointment lay open to him - talent and experience; regional and provincial balance; partisan reward to Pangu stalwarts; and 'balance' among his coalition partners. In the event, all principles came into play, but geography - and pressures to maximise patronage - triumphed, despite Pangu's unprecedentedly large parliamentary plurality and Somare's seemingly formidable personal position. The allocation of ministries by party is shown in Table 1.5 and the full ministry is listed in Appendix B. The United Party, which helped to break up the previous Somare government by a timely defection, had been disproportionately rewarded.

Eleven of the 27 ministers were sitting in parliament for the first time, and Pangu stalwarts such as former Planning minister Tony Ila (Lae Open) felt neglected. Nevertheless, the new men included such outstanding talents as former department heads, Philip Bouraga and Tony



Casting a vote, Port Moresby

(Photo: Robin Osborne)



A symbol of things to come? The United Party campaign van comes to grief outside Gordons police barracks, Port Moresby
 (Photo: Robin Osborne)



'It is forbidden to "grease" a voter' announces a polling booth sign in Port Moresby
 (Photo: Robin Osborne)

Siaguru, and former Public Services Commission chairman, Rabbie Namaliu.

Pangu appeared formidable indeed in August 1982, not only for its victory at the polls, but because it had split and poached on the opposition to such brilliant effect. But only two-and-half years after Somare's triumph it transpired that Pangu itself was not unsplittable. When Somare's deputy, Paias Wingti, led 14 other members out of the party into Opposition in February 1985, Somare only avoided parliamentary defeat by hastily restructuring his coalition to include NP and MA representatives. Nevertheless, in November 1985 Wingti toppled Somare and formed independent Papua New Guinea's fourth coalition with PPP, NP, UP (Torato faction), Papua Party and Diro support. One maverick MA, John Kaputin, also joined Wingti. Prophets who thought in 1982 that Pangu might achieve permanent ascendancy in the political system, or might force the other parties to coalesce against the Pangu challenge, were confounded by Wingti's success, which owed something to his appeal for Highlanders across party lines - but probably more to the feeling that the Somare ascendancy in Papua New Guinea politics was passing; that the turn of the next political generation had come. This feeling was confirmed in 1986 when Tony Siaguru and four other Pangu MPs, three of them ministers (including Pangu founder, Sir Barry Holloway), also broke away from Pangu, and set up a League for National Advancement. The Chief at only 49 was felt to be holding up the leadership prospects of Namaliu and Siaguru, the other contenders for the Pangu crown (*The Times*, July 11, 1986). In retrospect, in view of the PDM and LNA revolts, Somare had perhaps been wise to insure against Pangu factionalism through his apparently superfluous coalition of convenience with the NP.

Returning to June 1982, and referring to Table 1.2, what is most striking is the poor record of independents by comparison with party-endorsed or party-supporting ('Pro Pangu', 'Pro Somare') candidates, and the glittering record of Pangu candidates compared to all others. How do we explain these two trends?

As noted above there has been an inconclusive debate among political scientists in recent years about trends in Papua New Guinea's party system and her electoral and parliamentary politics. The debate firstly concerns the relative influence of various factors supposed to explain electoral success:

- (a) the so-called primordial characteristics of candidates - clan, language, domicile, etc.;
- (b) candidates' secondary associations - in churches, community organisations and the workplace;
- (c) sentiments of provincial or regional solidarity;
- (d) class feeling, and the impact of growing social polarisation; and
- (e) party affiliation.

Table 1.2
The Party Vote, 1982

| | % Candidates Standing (no. = 1125) | % Votes Received | % Members Elected | No. Members Elected |
|------------------------------|---|-----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Pangu Pati | 17 | 34 | 47 | 51 |
| People's Progress Party | 9 | 10 | 13 | 14 |
| National Party | 13 | 10 | 12 | 13 |
| United Party | 7 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| Melanesian Alliance Party | 6 | 9 | 7 | 8 |
| PNG Independent Group | 4 | 7 | 6 | 7 |
| Papua New Guinea Party | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Papua Action Party | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Independents | 41 | 21 | 4 | 4 |

Source: Hegarty and Jackson, 1983

Table 1.3
Party Voting by Region, 1982

Percent of votes cast

| Party | North Coast | Papua | Highlands | Islands |
|-------|-------------|-------|-----------|---------|
| Pangu | 54.7 | 22.0 | 30.0 | 24.5 |
| PPP | 6.3 | 8.4 | 11.5 | 14.9 |
| NP | 10.1 | 3.2 | 13.3 | 7.6 |
| MA | 11.5 | 7.1 | 2.2 | 28.1 |
| UP | 5.1 | 6.8 | 9.3 | 4.5 |
| PP | - | 9.0 | - | - |
| IG | - | 18.3 | 6.7 | 5.2 |
| PAP | - | 4.7 | - | - |
| Ind. | 12.3 | 20.5 | 27.0 | 15.2 |
| | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Source : Hegarty and Jackson, 1983

Table 1.4
Regional Support for Somare in Key Parliamentary Votes

Percentage of Regional MPs Voting
with Somare

| Region | 1972 | 1977 | 1980 | 1982 |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|
| Papua | 78.4 | 47.8 | 29.2 | 37.5 |
| Highlands | 25.7 | 51.3 | 35.9 | 59.0 |
| North Coast | 64.3 | 89.7 | 82.8 | 92.9 |
| Islands | 76.5 | 70.6 | 23.5 | 47.1 |

Source: Hegarty and Jackson, 1983.

Table 1.5
Ratio of Ministers to Government MPs by Party

| Parties | Ministers | No. of Party MPs | Ratio |
|--------------|-----------|---------------------|-------|
| Pangu | 21 | 50 | 1:2.4 |
| Pro-Pangu | 3 | 11 | 1:3.7 |
| United Party | 3 | 6 | 1:2 |
| Total | 27 | 67 | |

Source: Hegarty and King, 1983.

Are primordial qualities and secondary associations becoming less important, and, if so, is provincialism and/or regionalism becoming the stuff of national electoral politics? Or, alternatively, is the admitted social polarisation of the period since self-government in 1973 leading to a class-based politics which will in turn see the rise of mass-based ideological parties to replace the existing caucus-based parties with their poor ideological coherence and powerful tendency to undergo die-back after elections?

These questions, which have been much agonised over (Hegarty, 1983; Hegarty and Jackson, 1983; May 1984), are not quiet satisfactory as they stand. First, there is a level of analysis problem: explanations of political outcomes at the level of the individual electorate and at the national level tend to proceed in blithe independence of each other. The same electoral analysts who can confidently show that the success of an individual candidate was almost entirely due to clan and secondary associations may nevertheless invoke low commodity prices, or Somare's charisma and Pangu mania, or divisions, extravagance and corruption in the Chan government to account for the national election result in 1982. As I have said before, strong candidates and strong parties (parties which are rich, numerous in parliament, well-organised and notably led) have a natural affinity. That is why in principle an election could be won by a party in the absence of any significant 'party effect'. In 1982 material support for candidates by Pangu and loyalty to Pangu among voters may have been decisive in only a handful of seats - and only painstaking nationwide field research of a kind not so far possible in Papua New Guinea could properly establish the facts one way or another. This is not to deny that 'party awareness' among the people and party spending set new records in 1982 - they certainly did.

The real test of party strength of course is the parliamentary vote for prime minister. Here a new game arises in which individual allegiance to a party, party allegiance to a coalition, and party stability and unity in coalition-building are all at issue. Many observers have suggested that provincial and regional loyalties continue to govern this arena of politics in Papua New Guinea, and Tables 3 and 4 remind us that there are persisting patterns of regional support for particular parties, but also that there is great volatility in regional voting patterns in parliament. Thus, although Somare has always enjoyed majority support from North Coast MPs, his support in other regions has varied from abysmal minorities to handsome or thumping majorities. Likewise, although Pangu is supposed to be the party of the North Coast above all, it has now - or at least had until the 1985-6 splits - substantial support in all regions. PPP had almost as much support in the Highlands in 1982 as in its traditional Islands base; and, if the vote of its Papuan surrogate, the PAP, is counted in, the NP is seen to have national support on a similar pattern, as does the UP. MA had a small but significant following outside its Islands base everywhere except in the Highlands, and the Independent Group's pattern of support in 1982 was similar. Only the surviving - and now domesticated - rump of the separatist Papua Besena, the Papua Party, had a purely regional base - and that record is not encouraging for would-be regional parties. Thus regional parties in the full sense of that word are a non-starter in Papua New Guinea. All major parties are national by common sense criteria, and strive to develop appeal on a nation-wide basis. They are only 'regional' parties by default. Hegarty and Jackson point out that Pangu in office has not particularly favoured its most reliable base - the under-developed North Coast, and they are right to say that MPs cross the floor more for 'perks' than 'pork', even though pork - widely spread and partly convertible to perk (the sectoral funds) - did play a key role in many incumbents' campaigns in 1982. Ron May's claim that there is a 'clear regional orientation in political party organisation' (May, 1984:184) seems to have been less true in 1982 than at any time since Independence. What of the Hegarty and Jackson claim that the 1982 election suggested 'a shift away from geographical to, if not ideological, then at least party politics'? They cite two reasons for their view - first, the remarkable success of endorsed as opposed to independent candidates; and, secondly, the fact that the election took the form of a contest between Pangu/Somare and the rest, and Pangu/Somare clearly won (Hegarty and Jackson, 1983:335). For these authors ideological or at least class politics are now not too far away: 'As class divisions ... develop ... political parties as representatives of distinct [national] interest groups will ineluctably emerge' (1983:336) - and with them, presumably, those disciplined, branch-based parties of the Anglo-Australian type which David Hegarty used to hold up as a model for Papua New Guinea during a distinguished decade of teaching politics at the University of Papua New Guinea.

Ron May is sceptical, suggesting that 'ethnic' and regional bases of party organisation will have a long and possibly permanent innings in Papua New Guinea (May, 1984:188-90). My own scepticism is of a different kind. Clearly Pangu in office was less united than anyone expected in the heady days of 1982. With party systems the proof of the pudding is ultimately in government performance. Hegarty and Jackson note that factional volatility 'has ... had a debilitating effect on responsible government in Papua New Guinea' (1983:334), and they could hardly claim that this pattern was broken in 1982. To call for or hope for ideological and/or class-based parties is perhaps reasonable, but the grass roots reality is discouraging. Strong candidates will continue to win - or be able to win - without party endorsement for a long time to come, and hence their party loyalty will continue to be questionable, while incentives to party-swap will remain high and disincentives hard to build. Ideological and policy concerns among MPs and parties alike will be hard to develop and will pay off poorly while there is a vote of no confidence in parliament on average once or twice a year. The problem is part constitutional, part educational, part organisational but also human, and will certainly take a long time to solve.

Meanwhile there are continuing intimations of serious ideological and policy debate among parties in Papua New Guinea, not least at election time, as I have tried to show. Several important policy mandates were arguably won by Pangu in 1982. Moreover, as Brett Evans has pointed out, the Melanesian Alliance at least has positioned itself ideologically to benefit from the politics of the dispossessed if that should finally take off in Papua New Guinea (Evans, 1985:16) - and the MA should be closely watched as the likely bell-wether of a shift to class politics.

Chapter 2

A GOOD ONE TO LOSE? MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE 1982 ELECTIONS

Robin Osborne

Overview

To analyse the media's role in the 1982 election one must choose a suitable time-frame. When did the campaign start and when did it end? Did it begin after the Second Parliament (1977-82) was dissolved? On the closing date for candidates' nominations? Or after the Parliamentary vote at 6.06 p.m. on 11 March, 1980 when Sir Julius Chan toppled Michael Somare? And when did the campaign stop? After the results of the count became clear? Or when the Third Parliament elected Somare to form a new Government on 2 August 1982?

Without doubt the campaign gauntlet was thrown down in that 1980 parliamentary session, but it only formalised the split between Chan and Somare which had hitherto been marked mostly by their contrasting attitudes to the proposed new Leadership Code of 1978, which takes us back almost to the 1977 election. To make the topic manageable, I have chosen a personal time-frame which begins in November 1981, when I arrived in Papua New Guinea, and extends to November 1982. My 12-month period commences when the election was beginning to be discussed as an issue, and ends with the Pangu-led government facing tough decisions in the all-important area of budgeting.

Before I came to Port Moresby the main news was about how commodity-reliant Papua New Guinea was suffering from the world recession. In an interview Sir Julius Chan said: 'It is the most difficult time in all the years I've been in politics' (*Australian* 7 September 1981). Economic problems soon emerged as the main issue of the campaign. Many journalists believed the economy was the only issue, and continued to write that none of the leaders had proposed any satisfactory solutions.

Paradoxically, the first major election story appeared outside Papua New Guinea in a November 1981 issue of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (*FEER*). The magazine's Port Moresby 'stringer', Rowan Callick, who worked full time at Word Publishing, advised readers not to bet on the result of the election: 'Only a fool - even in this nation of gamblers ready to rival the Chinese - would place odds on the result, since at the past two elections more than half the members lost their seats. Perhaps that proves that the electors are certainly not fools'

(*FEER* 6 November 1981). Callick reported that the parties were preparing slowly for the coming campaign. The most active seemed to be the National Party which had launched its campaign in

spectacular, American style with sky-diving, dancing, a beauty contest and feasting in [Deputy Prime Minister] Okuk's Simbu province. One of the country's most popular rock bands, April Sun, performed the party's theme song for the campaign, due for heavy radio plugging now that the government-owned National Broadcasting Commission has decided to accept political advertising for the first time' (*ibid.*)

My perspective was mostly Port Moresby's. For news from the campaign trail I relied on the print media and the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC). I confess that I was disappointed. In Port Moresby, with the noisy exception of polling day, it was often hard to believe that the election was on. Yet when I visited the highlands, political activity was omnipresent. The 'frontline' event that gained most coverage was Okuk's beer-fest at Kundiawa airport just before the close of polling. Kevin Ricketts of Australian Associated Press (AAP) filed a story that received wide exposure in Australia.

The women from the electoral sub-district and clan simultaneously emit high-pitched yodels and move for-ward in a line to accept in turn the 300 cartons of beer that they carry back on their heads to their menfolk. By day's end Iambakey Okuk has distributed 4,000 cartons of beer - 96,000 stubbies to the voters of his Chimbu electorate (*Canberra Times* 6 June 1982).

With pictures of an 'arse-grassed' and befeathered Okuk - 'next to him, dutifully bare-breasted in accordance with old custom, stood his wife Karina', *Time* magazine (12 June 1982) noted - it certainly brought the provinces closer to Moresby, but I felt that rural campaigning, involving 85 per cent of the electorate, was mostly happening beyond my ken.

Capital dwellers were interested in the contests between certain key personalities- Rabbie Namaliu vs. Oscar Tammur, for instance - but we received almost no news through the media. The notable exception was *The Times of Papua New Guinea* which sent Euralia Paine (a Papua New Guinean) into the field in May to file several reports. The NBC assigned journalists full-time to the leaders, yet produced no in-depth documentary programmes. By combining the recorded material that could have been sent in from the journalists (by air if phone lines were poor) the NBC could have produced a good feature programme every week. Radio is ideally suited to reporting an election because both rely on the abilities of the human voice.

Ironically, Australian audiences were better served. Using studio equipment identical to the NBC's - that old workhorse, the Rola tape recorder - Sean Dorney of the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) produced a stimulating documentary that ran for 45 minutes on the national service. This 'Background Briefing' programme included interviews with leaders as well as officials such as the Electoral Commissioner and the Ombudsman. The ABC also put a film crew on the campaign trail and, with frontman Dorney, produced news items on Chan, Okuk and Somare. By contrast the NBC's national service relied on news scripts, occasional voice reports sent in over bad phone lines, and a series of studio discussions. Some of these were stimulating. Many, alas, were loosely directed bouts of verbiage where everyone finally lost sight of the forest for the trees.

NBC's nineteen provincial stations, on the other hand aired numerous field interviews collected by their own journalists. Sir Julius Chan was only one leader who knew the importance of finding time to talk on provincial radio. But the Radio-3 service has problems with reception (due to the use of the short-wave bands) and language comprehension. These stations re-broadcasted a number of nationally (i.e. Port Moresby) produced programmes, but they were mostly intellectual, in English and thus incomprehensible to much of the audience.

To help ameliorate this problem the NBC management asked its broadcasters to remember the importance of clear writing, particularly for less educated listeners. Applauding this in one of his *Times* 'Radio' columns - delightfully titled 'Simple English *per se*' - University of Papua New Guinea journalism lecturer, Alan Chatterton, noted that the NBC now regards simple English as a professional and constitutional responsibility. News items now make fewer assumptions about listeners' awareness, especially where foreign events are concerned, he suggested. Useful indeed, but one wonders what the audience learns from items such as one which began: 'In that little European country called Beirut ...', or from the information (in a current affairs broadcast for schools) that China is inhabited by a people known as Mongoloids. NBC is a particularly important medium because of Papua New Guinea's 68 per cent illiteracy rate.

Most of the population was, fortunately, exposed to election news in a language they did understand. However the material was overwhelmingly parochial. There was little news from the other side of the fence whether one lived in a village or a town. Insularity also prevailed with regard to Papua New Guinea's view of the outside world. While the nation was contemplating its own election it virtually ignored the important, if predictable, polling next door in Indonesia, not to mention the initial Israeli advance into the Lebanon and the resignation of Alexander Haig as US Secretary of State.

Again the NBC deserves criticism. While the local papers reserve some space for world news, the NBC appeared to have no such rule. Events of global import sometimes got no mention in ten minute news bulletins which found room for some very trivial utterances by local politicians.

The electorate and the media

Lack of adequate statistics is a constant complaint of planners in Papua New Guinea. Many important figures have never been collected while others are long outdated. The results from the 1980 National Population Census were of limited value because of the structuring of the question form. During the planning of the Census there was strong disagreement among the compilers and, in the end, respondents were not asked which languages they comprehended. Instead, varying samples of urban and rural dwellers were asked what was the main language they spoke at home and the one they used in the market. For media analysts the responses, while interesting, are of little use. Instead we must look at the previous (1971) Census and speculate. In those days Tokpisin was easily the dominant language, being spoken by 44 per cent of the population. English came next, with 20 per cent, while 9 per cent spoke Motu. In the five biggest towns Tokpisin may now be understood by over half the population, while Motu and English are probably holding steady.

Another unfortunate omission from the 1980 Census was information about radio listening. In the 1971 Census 340,000 people aged ten years and over said they listened to radio at least once a day - 22 per cent of the potential audience. The NBC's researcher, Keith Jackson, noted: 'It is indicative of radio's predominance as the only significant mass medium in Papua New Guinea' (Jackson 1974). A 1978 NBC rural survey provided some general data (NBC 1978). For example, nine out of every ten villages in Papua New Guinea had at least one radio set. A different survey revealed that radio's best audience lay with people aged between ten and 19 (NBC 1975). Another investigation, by a Broadcasting Working Party in 1977, revealed that 56 per cent of the 130 families surveyed in the Highlands rural areas had no radio. The group's illiteracy rate was 68 per cent, the national average. This survey showed that:

- about one family in four listened to provincial radio, while one in twelve had listened to the NBC national service (three families had listened to Radio Australia or other overseas services);
- listening was done in groups, the number of people averaging between 5 and 6; the same in the morning as at night (*Commercial Radio Listening in Highland Rural Areas of PNG*, 1977).

At present, then, we have no clear profile of radio audiences country-wide nor details of listening habits. However the potential and actual audiences would be much increased over, say, 1971 due to population growth (3,006,799 in 1980) and a higher set ownership resulting from increased incomes.

Papua New Guinea's first radio station began broadcasting in 1934. The Australian Broadcasting Commission opened a station in 1946 and by independence 15 provincial stations were operating. In 1982 there were 19 provincial stations broadcasting in about 150 languages.

In 1982 the provincial service, Radio-3, broadcast on short-wave for 9 hours a day; Radio-1, the medium wave national service, for 18.5 hours daily from Port Moresby and various provincial capitals, with programming initiated in Port Moresby - as it was for Radio-2, the FM service which started in May that year. Radio-2 broadcast popular programmes from Port Moresby to nine larger towns (Kieta, Panguna, Mt Hagen, Goroka, Lae, Madang, Wewak and Kundiawa), again for 18.5 hours daily. The 'line of sight' nature of FM transmission and the maximum reach of 14 kms means that Radio-2 has little impact on Papua New Guinea's hinterland. However a bounce from a satellite would bring superb radio reception to even the remotest hilly areas.

Radio-2 is now the only commercial service, but during the election most of the political advertising was still on Radio-1. The former has adopted a slicker programme format, while the latter continues as a more staid station for cultural and educational programmes as well as direct broadcasts of parliamentary question time. Provincial stations take some national programmes and relay them on short-wave, but through a station manager and committee they do manage to produce most of their own programmes using local staff and facilities. Provincial stations also take development extension programmes produced by the Office of Information, including short items on nutrition, business and farming.

In the absence of statistics the NBC believes that virtually everyone in the country is reached regularly. But that did not mean that everyone was aware of the progress of the election. A select few tuned to Australian radio broadcasts which can be received clearly, particularly at night. The ABC and Radio Australia presented world and Pacific news (including regular items from Papua New Guinea) - Radio Australia in Tokpisin as well as English.

In 1982 there were two daily papers, both tabloid: the *Post-Courier* and *Niugini Nius*. The former, owned by Melbourne's Herald and Weekly Times group, held a monopoly of the daily market from 1969 until 1979, when it sold 27.8 per cent of its equity to the Papua New Guinea public. In the same year the Lae-based *Niugini Nius* began. The *Post-Courier* reported in October 1982 that it was selling 29,000 copies, with about half the circulation in Port Moresby (interview with Wayne Grant, Managing Director, *Post-Courier*, October 1982). The

Nius, and its *Weekender* edition, were then selling around 15,000 copies daily, about 10,000 going to Lae readers (interview with the then-owner of *Niugini Nius*, Raymond Thurecht, October 1982). Both papers claim a pass-on value of about five readers per copy, though the National Librarian, Sir John Yocklunn, has commented that: 'The *Post-Courier* circulates mainly to expatriates and the educated elite while the *Niugini Nius* probably reaches a less elite readership' (Yocklunn 1981). Both papers have small bureaux - usually a single staffer - in four other towns apart from their main bases.

Niugini Nius ownership passed from Raymond Thurecht, an Australian turned Papua New Guinea citizen, to Word Publishing, owned by the Melanesian Council of Churches, in 1982. However Thurecht was the paper's proprietor during the election campaign. Word Publishing's titles include the weekly *Wantok* (founded 1970), the only Tokpisin paper; the weekly (1980-82) and then bi-weekly *Times*, and other journals not relevant to the elections. *Wantok* was selling 14,500 and the *Times* 12,500 copies per issue in 1982.

The majority of editorial staff in all of these papers was Papua New Guinean, although expatriate journalists also performed an important role. While the latter are sometimes accused of dominating the print media, the editors of all papers, with the exception of *Niugini Nius*, were Papua New Guinea nationals at the time of the 1982 election. However the appearance of being 'localised' did not always tally with reality. The *Post-Courier*, notably, was using only Papua New Guinea nationals to gather news, but most of the stories were either written or heavily rewritten by expatriate 'sub-editors'.

The circulation figures of these papers may seem small, but when compared on a ratio-to-population basis with Australian national journals they compare quite favourably. In fact by this measure the *Post-Courier* has better market penetration than do the *National Times*, *The Bulletin* or *The Australian*¹ While Papua New Guinea may have a low literacy rate, those who do read are strong 'consumers' of the press. The main problem is distribution. As Word's Fr Kevin Walcott has explained, 'Air freight rates, even when discounted for publications, are so high that distribution costs to the more distant provinces must threaten the value of materials that can be sent there'. He added that newspapers and magazines are the 'most critical materials for promoting literacy in Papua New Guinea at present. A newspaper is cheap, relevant, readily available and contains information of significant current interest' (paper presented to National Book Week Seminar, Port Moresby, 4 August 1982).

¹ The *Post-Courier* reaches 0.96 per cent of Papua New Guinea's population of three million. The *National Times*, *The Bulletin* and *The Australian* reach about 0.66 per cent of Australia's fifteen million population, with a circulation of around 100,000 each.

Total weekly sales for the main Australian journals in Papua New Guinea were between 1,000 and 2,000 in 1982. The top seller was *The Australian* (especially the Weekend edition) while *The Bulletin* sold 1,300, *Time* about 2,4000 a week (including subscriptions) and *Newsweek* about 1600 (personal communication, T.B. Clarke & Co. (Sydney), distributors in Papua New Guinea for Australian papers).

I will digress to note that the fortnightly *Phantom* comic - emanating from the US - has a circulation far higher than any of the above² despite its theme of a powerful white-man lording it over 'native' tribes in the jungle. The *Phantom's* popularity prompted a group of wags, early in the campaign, to consider entering a *Phantom* election candidate. It was planned that when he appeared at the Electoral Commission to lodge his nomination - riding his white horse 'Hero' and accompanied by his dog 'Devil' - the press would record the event. The 'Friends of *Phantom*' believed, perhaps justifiably, that the Ghost Who Walks would have polled well.

Campaign posters and other leaflets should also be considered as significant printed media. So should the ubiquitous campaign T-shirts which, along with having the potential to become cult items for *aficionados*, can be expected to remain in circulation for some time.

The Office of Information received K80,000 very late in the day to make a one-hour film of the election; but the end product would not be seen for more than a year. As it transpired the film was a lack-lustre effort, making the election seem just what it never was - boring. No one used film advertising in cinemas, although there was an early suggestion that Pangu might film its campaign. This gave birth to a classic 'Grass Roots' cartoon from Bob Brown, Papua New Guinea's only regular cartoonist. On a film set Michael Somare was shown wearing cowboy gear and preparing to star in a film titled 'On the Trail with Mike'. The star's comment: 'Well, it worked well for Reagan'.

The main media for political advertising were commercial radio and the newspapers. In the vital weeks before voting the major parties, especially Pangu, mounted heavy campaigns aimed at supporting those candidates campaigning in the party's name.

The campaign

Perhaps the first sign that campaigning was seriously under way came in September 1981 when the president of the Papua New Guinea Journalists' Association called on the government 'not to intimidate the press if it wants fair reporting on the election'. He said past experience showed that government ministers had threatened the press and its

² Peter Richardson, FREW Enterprises, Australian licensee for *Phantom*, and sole distributor in Papua New Guinea, estimated sales at 'around 8,000 fortnightly' (interview, October 1982).

freedom (*Post-Courier* 19 September 1981). (Under Section 46 of the Constitution freedom of expression and publication are guaranteed.) Any fear that the election might be fought with bullets was dispelled by a story headed: 'Image builders get busy as election looms'. The story focused on a new Chan staff member,

former beauty queen Eva Arni, who, until recently, was running public relations for a Port Moresby hotel chain. The Prime Minister is said to be looking for further strength in his own public relations ... he needs it. It's not that Chan gets a bad press; it's simply that he gets very little press at all, apart from the ritual, knee-bending approval administered by the NBC...

Pangu was reportedly 'finalising its policy, to be unveiled around New Year'. Melanesian Alliance's Fr John Momis was expected to appoint a press officer shortly, while the United Party's leader, Paul Torato, was said not to need one: 'He is a glutton for media exposure who calls press conferences at every conceivable opportunity and at several inconceivable ones'. The article said that with his 'superior advice and his own natural talent for self publicity', Mr Okuk would start favourite. But the finishing post, the article warned, 'is still a long way off' (*The Bulletin* 27 October 1981).³

Indeed it was, as was the next - and only other - article which looked at the staff behind the leaders. In an article entitled 'The Backroom Mafia', the *Times's* Tarcissius Bobola examined the personalities and tactics of the image-makers and the numbers people. The report would have won the ebullient, opinionated writer few friends. He described David Gavera Giobun (nee Halliday) as 'Chan's loud-mouthed research officer' and said that Jeff Wall, an Australian advising the National Party, and his colleague, Robert Suckling, 'did not appear to be worried about what others may consider to be scruples' (*The Times* 11 June 1982). Perhaps Bobola's early experience as Mr Somare's press secretary gave him extra insight.

In the main, however, the press focused on the movements and pronouncements of the key figures. Shortly before the 1981 Christmas holiday Somare promised that Pangu's campaign would be clean and honest, adding that 'mud-throwing and belittling' would not be appreciated' (*Post-Courier* 21 December 1981). Later, apparently refreshed after the break, he predicted a Pangu landslide victory (*Post-Courier* 18 January 1982). He told a Rabaul rally that Pangu stood to win 65 seats in the 109-seat parliament. The front page article carried a picture of 'The Chief' smiling confidently, and it set the tone for Pangu's continuing dominance of the print media. I suspect it also set the other

³ The article was by Russell Hunter of Word Publishing, and stringer for overseas journals.



Paias Wingti greets supporters

(Photo: Robin Osborne)



Campaigning on election day, Port Moresby

(Photo: Robin Osborne)

parties to thinking that the *Post-Courier* was pro-Pangu, a belief that grew as Somare got more and more coverage, particularly pictorial.

I did not feel that the paper was pro-Pangu, any more than was the *Times* (4 September 1982) for running a large front-page photo of Mr and Mrs Somare and office staff celebrating the Chief's 46th birthday with champagne. 'Happy Birthday, Prime Minister' said the headline, referring to a birthday card he had received. Of course Sir Julius, the real prime minister, was somewhat upset. But he should not have been, because *Niugini Nius* was consistently pro-People's Progress Party, a bias that emanated from a leading reporter Bernard Paliau who had previously worked as Sir Julius's press secretary (and would be back with him later in 1982). I raised the issue of partisanship with Nius owner Thurecht, mentioning, *inter alia*, a report, 'Country's moment of truth' (*Niugini Nius Weekender* 30 June 1982), and was told I had made a 'fair comment'. Apparently the journalist had been asked to 'tone it down'. I agreed with Thurecht's comment that 'Bernard Paliau is a good journalist ... probing ... intelligent', but felt that readers deserved more than being told on the eve of the poll that PPP would win 36 seats (to Pangu's 30) and then learning, five days later, that 'PPP looks like ending up with 13 seats' (*Niugini Nius* 5 July 1982). Mr Thurecht added that the editor was often very busy and 'you know what it's like when your head's down and your arse up'.

In his study of the world's great newspapers, Martin Walker (1982) quotes the founder of the modern *New York Times*, Adolph Ochs, who once said: 'No reader of my newspaper should ever be surprised'. This means that a paper should cover the transition between events rather than surprising their readers with inexplicably dramatic changes. On that criterion the *Niugini Nius* certainly did not rate as a great newspaper. Nor, as I intend to show, did the *Post-Courier*.

In late January Mr Okuk made what in retrospect was an ironic boast, saying that he would spend most of the campaign touring the country and 'leave the safety of his Chimbu seat in his people's hands'. He said he was leasing his coffee factory and trade store to meet his campaign commitments. 'I do not expect other people to financially support the party if I do nothing myself' (*Post-Courier* 22 January 1982). Funding was always a key issue for the deputy prime minister (and others). Within two months he was accusing Australia's Ansett Airlines of plotting to unseat him at the polls so that it could take 40 per cent of Air Niugini - Okuk was Minister for Transport and Civil Aviation - and so gain access to international routes. He accused Ansett of guaranteeing K2m in funds for an electoral campaign against him (*The Bulletin* [Stuart Inder] 2 February 1982). He said 'a Pangu man has recently flown to Melbourne for consultations with Ansett board officials' (*Niugini Nius* 6 February 1982).

Some people considered his timing tactless: he spoke on the same day that Michael Somare was in Melbourne attending a memorial

service for his late friend, Sir Reginald Ansett. But Iambakey Okuk was not planning a campaign based on diplomacy. Evidently he was not even planning on being loyal to his leader, the prime minister. He said he would challenge any contender, including Sir Julius, for prime ministership if he were returned in June (*Post-Courier* 8 August 1982). By joining his Nationals with the new Papua Action Party (PAP) he also showed that he had little affinity with the present coalition. Party president Michael Mel called Okuk 'a definite goer' for the top job and said that PAP would win seats in every Papuan province and the National Capital District.

The extraordinary speed with which the ethnocentric highlander Okuk linked with the PAP provoked surprisingly little comment from the local media. However the Melbourne *Age's* David Broadbent was amazed by the blatant display of political opportunism. He said he had attended Mr Okuk's talk at the University of Papua New Guinea a few days earlier, and had heard him say that Papuans, unlike highlanders, were extremely lazy people.⁴ Broadbent was surprised at the lack of protest from the Papuan students present and staggered when a joint National-PAP rally was called later in the week. In a story wryly headed 'The pork barrel election', he wrote of Okuk in Port Moresby 'handing over 12 live pigs and organising a motor cavalcade headed by Highlanders and Papuan dancers bearing bamboo poles festooned with Aust. \$10,000 worth of K20 notes' (*The Age* 15 May 1982).

This ceremony echoed traditional highlands custom where relations between different groups are cemented by exchange of goods and money carried on poles. Doubtless the journalist would have been amused to learn that the notes had been borrowed over the weekend on the short-term money market. The whole rally had been a PR ruse.

One evident cynic was Susan Addison who wrote occasional media columns for the *Times*. After attending a bridge opening by Chan she was angered by the media coverage of the event: 'the press must be on its guard not to merely boost the egos of politicians and to play a game of ping-pong - action reported one day, reaction the next' (*The Times* 2 December 1982). An example of ping-pong was the claim by the national president of Pangu that the government was operating a slush fund aimed at buying community support (NBC News 14 July 1982). Sir Julius issued the standard press release saying that 'the unpleasant term "slush fund" was used during the Somare era but was dropped when the Coalition came to power. The "Minor Projects Development Fund" is neither a slush fund in name nor in function' (Chan, Press Release, 15 July 1982).

One wondered who was the winner in this sort of exchange.

⁴ Okuk's meeting, held on 20 April 1982 was one of a series on 'The Leaders', organised by the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Papua New Guinea.

The 'old' parliament ended at 7.00 p.m. on 17 February when debate on the National Intelligence Organisation Bill was adjourned due to lack of numbers. A total of 63 legislative items remained to be debated. The Speaker, Sevese Morea, now deceased, was angry that members seemed more interested in the coming election than the present Parliament. Likening Papua New Guinea politics to the game of musical chairs, the *Post-Courier's* political roundsman Susuve Laumaea wrote: 'When the parliament sits we see the Government making a show of coalition solidarity while outside the legislature they continue their pre-poll plots aimed at unseating each other' (*Post-Courier* 8 February 1982). However all parliamentarians 'joined together in a moving final tribute to veteran politician, Sir John Guise', the following week. Sir John announced he was returning to his village to grow vegetables (*Post-Courier* 17 February 1982). One hoped his garden was not as acidic as some of the comments he was making over the NBC.

By this time the government seemed to have suffered a number of public relations setbacks. Regardless of the merits, they bear listing here. A great deal of mud was flying around and much of it stuck on the government. An old political adage holds that Oppositions don't usually win elections, rather governments lose them. Amongst the issues that troubled the Coalition were the following:

- The acrimonious feud between Police Minister Warren Dutton and Commissioner Phillip Bouraga over operational control of the police. Although the government did not lose this encounter it gained nothing from it. Bouraga eventually resigned to campaign successfully as pro-Somare candidate for the National Capital District.
- The Executive Diary affair, wherein the government spent K82,500 buying 15,000 diaries for 1982. The press quickly pointed out that the Singapore-produced diary had a hopelessly out of date world map, was purchased without standard tendering procedures being observed, and was too expensive (K7.50) for most Papua New Guinean public servants. The affair was a fiasco and a year later fewer than 100 diaries had been sold. I heard of some being given away as scribbling pads to students in one Port Moresby school. The Ombudsman report of November 1982 took a more serious view, even alleging that PPP election materials, such as T-shirts, were shipped into Papua New Guinea in the same exempt-from-duty crates as the diaries (Ombudsman Commission, 1982).
- Commerce Minister Opai Kunangel's alleged misappropriation of Village Economic Development Funds by paying money to companies run by his wives. Kunangel resigned his portfolio in February 1982 and was eventually gaoled by the National Court in 1983 (*Post-Courier* 18 February 1982; 16 March 1983). The National Fiscal Commission did not help by claiming that Messrs.

Okuk and Torato had also played fast and loose with sectoral monies (see *Post-Courier* 13, 20 November 1981; Hegarty and King 1983).

- The government's decision to commission a K10,000 report in favour of introducing TV by Australian consultant, Joe Joel. This was called a 'waste of money and a farce' by *Niugini Nius*, while the *Times* totalled up the few words in the report and found that each one had cost the nation K5.00.48 Sir Julius told the *Nius* that he had not even bothered to read the Joel Report.
- The K6 million Grumman Gulfstream executive jet, known as Kumul-1 (Bird of Paradise One), was a constant thorn in the PM's side. Only briefly did it become an asset - when it helped to spot a large American tuna-boat, the *Danica*, fishing illegally in Papua New Guinea's waters. But soon the government found it had bitten off more than it could chew, and after tense negotiations with the owners and the US government it sold the boat back for what the press called a giveaway price (Hegarty and King 1983).

It often seemed as if the government was holding four aces and still managing to lose.

Perhaps the worst setback of all was the government's failed bid to increase the electoral nomination fee from K100 to K1,000. The new fee was introduced in the budget session of parliament and defended in February. But the Ombudsman challenged its validity under Section 20 of the Constitution, which guarantees every citizen the right to a reasonable opportunity to stand for election. The Chief Ombudsman, Ignatius Kilage, said: 'Wealth should not be the yardstick to determine the ordinary citizen's right to stand for executive public office' (*Post-Courier* 18 February 1982).

The Coalition portrayed a grouping for the wealthy, not for the common people. The K1,000 fee would have removed the people's access to power - albeit rather theoretical - and it was not believed that the government's main purpose was simply to limit the enormous number of nominations. The government's blunders left it open to attack and Pangu was quick on the uptake. Somare promised that he would set up a royal commission to look into the mismanagement of the Chan-Okuk coalition. He said it had 'lived up to its title of a stop-gap government' (*Post-Courier* 9 March 1982).

On 12 April the NBC began a series of unpaid political talks by leading members of the parties. Each party was allowed six original talks and six repeats. The ten minute talks were broadcast in Tokpisin, English and Motu. The NBC said that the schedule had been prepared on the principle of granting 'equal time to all 'recognized' political parties and not on the basis of size' (NBC 1982). The talks were in prime time, morning and night.

This free opportunity was passed up in some quarters. The United Party, for example, seldom found time to produce a policy talk, thus raising doubts about whether they even had a policy. However some leaders spoke strongly and convincingly. The best performers were Michael Somare, John Momis and Iambakey Okuk. Despite these first declarations of intent many observers still felt that there was little talk about real issues. The world recession and the commodity price slump loomed like black clouds that no one could make disappear. The best thing seemed to be to ignore it.

Shortly after nominations closed the *Times* (30 April 1982 *et seq.*) ran a liftout series with the names of all 1126 candidates. This useful public service was followed later by supplements about the Electoral Commission and past voting (*The Times* 4 June 1982); details on polling places and times; and, later, the full election results (*ibid.* 2 July 1982). The *Post-Courier*, despite its superior financial resources, showed far less ingenuity.

The NBC had issued a booklet of guidelines for its free broadcasts. It said that scripts must be submitted to the NBC at least one week prior to the scheduled date for recording. In a dynamic political climate this seemed very inflexible. Another guideline stressed that only one voice might be used in any talk. But immediately the Nationals broke the rule by using the multiple voices of April Sun singing the party's Tokpisin theme song:

Yu na mi na Iambakey
Yumi stretim kwiktaim PNG...
 (Yu and me and Iambakey
 We'll quickly fix up PNG)

When the People's Progress Party queried this breach it was told by the NBC chairman that the rules had now been changed. Official party songs could be included as long as NBC received a copy of the lyrics.

Pangu talks also featured the party song, 'Now we are a nation', which soon captivated the musical hearts of many people.

We've seen from the beginning,
 We've known it all along
 Somare brought us freedom
 Now we know where we belong...

Chorus: Now we are a nation, growing big and growing strong
 With Pangu and Somare helping us to grow along
 We'll have to pull together,
 It won't happen on its own
 The going's tough, but Pangu's there
 To help to lead us home...

We know what the 'Pangu' means,
 We're going to vote the Pangu team
 We need Somare and Pangu today
 Because the Pangu Pati knows the way....
 We know the way...yes we know the way ...
 PANGU!

The words were written by Pangu consultants in Port Moresby and the song was orchestrated in New Zealand. The recording was done in New Zealand using an 80-person Maori choir and Maori lead singer. As one of the producers (Bruce Dahlenburg, Dalton Electronics, Port Moresby) rightly said, it was a rousing, well-orchestrated song. Dubbed onto 3,000 audio cassettes along with Somare's speeches it was distributed to Pangu *komiti* workers throughout the country. Loud-speaker trucks played the tapes to village audiences and soon even non-English speakers were trying to sing along.

PPP's 'Come vote for us...come put your trust in the PPP' was a catchy but belated production. The background music came from a US record containing 'factory-made' jingles and was married with lyrics that paralleled the message in PPP press advertisements. These focused on promises for the future and boasts about the past record. This aspect of the campaign incensed Sir John Guise, the man parliament had revered, who took press space at his own expense to refute some of the claims made by Sir Julius. Appalled by 'political gimmickry' he warned voters not to be fooled by any one party claiming to be the originator of the kina and toea currency, or the national airline, bank, flag and broadcasting service (*Post-Courier* 28 April 1982 *et seq.*) He was clearly referring to the PPP's full page ad which claimed to have given Papua New Guinea all of these things (*Post-Courier* 26 May 1982 *et seq.*). However Sir John voiced no such objections to that part of Pangu's campaign which suggested that Somare, more or less single-handedly, had brought the nation to independence.

The Nationals' press campaign showed Okuk, again befeathered (but minus his bare-breasted wife), and presented more details than the simplistic party song. His platform favoured strong leadership and private business; he was pro-Melanesian in West Papua (Irian Jaya) but strongly anti-communist (*Post-Courier* 4 June 1982). 'Action Man - Action Party', read the tagline.

Another man-on-the-go was retired Brigadier-General Ted Diro, heading the new Independent Group and hurrying to succeed. He distributed T-shirts with the message 'Time for Change'. It was not the first time this slogan had contested an election. Gough Whitlam and the Australian Labor Party won with it in 1972. It was not even the first time a general-turned-politician had used it. In his study of political consultants Larry Sabato recalled that General Dwight D. Eisenhower's

slogan 'It's Time for a Change' was a 'perennial production' (Sabato 1981).

The Papua Action Party thought along similar lines: their T-shirts read, 'It's Time for Papua', while Diro soon got the hang of campaigning, describing the Chan government as 'a bunch of clowns' and a 'desperate group'.

Papua Besena's Josephine Abaijah campaigned once again on a Papuan separatist platform, while another Papuan woman, Fide Bale, declared her belief that 'God created woman from the rib of man, not from his head to top him, nor from his feet to be walked upon...she was made from his side to be equal'. The latter's fine sentiments did not convince the voters. Abaijah also suffered defeat at the poll.

Again to the credit of its planners, Pangu broadened its press advertising to include information ads along with image ones. A series of double-page spreads headed 'How to Vote Pangu' listed all the endorsed candidates in Papua New Guinea. The ads gave the impression of a party which considered its candidates loyal. No other party was confident enough to do this. Like the aforementioned *Times* supplements, the ads also assisted the public in this case about how to vote Pangu. 'Lift this page out and pin it on your wall', said the baseline in three languages.

Tarcissius Bobola of the *Times* remained a cynical observer. He accused Papua New Guinea of being 'a nation without a memory' which has a 'feeble, superficial press, both radio and print, and a fickle, sentimental public'. His point was that both the press and public had a tendency to quickly forget major scandals and thus to forgive the past excesses of the major parties. He was probably the only Papua New Guinean journalist to write with anger, doubtless honed by losing his job at the *Post-Courier* as a result of a vendetta by Mr Okuk.⁵

The *Times* presented good coverage of Pangu's convention at Mt Hagen and the Melanesian Alliance's in Lae where Bernard Narokobi spoke out against what he called 'Pangu's cult of Somare as saviour of this country', and the Pangu slogan, '*Pangu i save rod*' (Pangu knows the way), with its hint of blasphemy. 'I know the way, too', Narokobi quipped, 'All we Christians know that only Jesus Christ knows the way' (*The Times* 3 May 1982). Perhaps, but Michael Thomas Somare was certainly on the right path towards winning the election. To mark Red Cross Day he and Tony Siaguru gave blood at a transfusion centre at the Boroko shops. The Red Cross said that the 'political lead' was followed by a 41-pint 'flood of donations'. He also made definite campaign promises, one being a pledge about passing legislation to stop MP's switching parties 'in search of power and perks'. (This never saw

⁵ According to Mr Okuk at the University of Papua New Guinea on 20 April 1982: 'I got rid of ... I don't want to mention his name ... well, Tarcissius Bobola'.

the light of day.) A week before the polling he said there was 'no doubt his party would form a government'. Although the other leaders said the same they seemed to be equally busy arguing with their coalition 'partners'.

The *Times* took the initiative again by commissioning (at K1,000 each) two opinion polls from an independent organisation, Human Resources Development in Port Moresby. The polls were conducted on 1 and 29 May 1982. The second found that 39 per cent of the capital's voters favoured Somare and only 13 per cent Sir Julius. Mr Okuk's rating had dropped from 16 per cent to 5 per cent. The main issue that concerned voters was the lack of jobs (23 per cent of respondents), followed by law and order (20 per cent). Naturally, all parties except Pangu disparaged the polls.

Sir John Guise summed up the mood when he said that politics in Papua New Guinea had become 'rough to the point that brother would disagree with brother and father with son...it is going to be damned ruthless. There will be no Ten Commandments'. He said that in his day MP's had thought of their people but now the feeling was: 'How much can I get out of Parliament?' and 'What can I do to become a wealthy man?' (Radio Australia special on elections, by Sean Dorney). Rowan Callick went even further, writing of prospective MP's 'dreaming of awaking ... to take delivery of the new VIP car, planning the now traditional 'familiarisation visit' to Manila, collecting the unsecured loan from the bank and so on ... the parties have done little to disabuse the candidates of their vain ambitions'. He predicted that due to recession the election could be a 'good one to lose' (*Australian Financial Review* June 1982). I believe that Sir Julius rather agreed, no doubt knowing that the budgetary cutbacks necessary for the next couple of years would prove unpopular with the people.

In the weeks before polling day the leaders allowed in-depth interviews with the media. On the half-hour NBC 'Newsman' programmes each faced a panel of journalists, local and foreign, with varying degrees of success. The United Party's Roy Evara received the toughest grilling. Somewhat belatedly the *Post-Courier* discovered the interview business and ran a three-part series, 'The Leaders', on Chan, Okuk and Somare. Other leaders were said to be unavailable. Again Somare made the most of the opportunity and his remark that 'even the kids are screaming Pangu' became the headline. Okuk said that people in Papua New Guinea needed 'some instant decisions, right or wrong', while Sir Julius stood on his 'sound record of national management' (*Post-Courier*, interviews by editor Luke Sela, 1-3 June 1982).

A long *Times* editorial the day before polling, spelled out a few home truths, telling readers: 'This is how you must vote', and referring to candidates who were honest, reliable and so on. 'Your choice may well be a woman', it advised readers. In the same issue Tarcissius Bobola reminded us that: 'No political party has announced who they

will or would like to partner to form the next government' (*The Times* 4 June 1982). This would now not happen until after the results.

Emulating an Australian practice, the NBC blacked out all election stories for two days before polling. As in Australia, the ban did not apply to the press. One missed the pungent comments of the veteran observers - Cecil Abel, Percy Chatterton, John Guise - who had brightened the airwaves. One memorable remark was Abel's: 'The outcome of democracy is to dupe the electorate'.

The day before the vote a last-minute candidate declared himself. This was the *Post-Courier's* cartoon character, Grass Roots, who, calling himself 'Candidate Roots' and using the slogan 'It's Time for Me', published his own ballot paper and asked readers to post it in (*Post-Courier* 4 June 1982). Before the end of polling Roots had received some 200 postal 'votes', well in excess of the number that many candidates would ultimately get.

The poll

Voting had barely started when both Chan and Somare left for Australia where both delivered speeches designed partly for home consumption. Somare got the better of this, making a speech to a Pacific resources seminar in Sydney which showed him to be a man of regional vision. Okuk, with the field to himself back home, made the most of his opportunities. In these few days he attacked all and sundry, particularly Indonesia for its repeated crossings of the Papua New Guinea border and its treatment of the Melanesians in Irian. He even sent a strong article about Javanese domination of the Indonesian province to a leading Australian paper (*National Times* 13 June 1982).

Okuk's - and, by extension, the government's - relations with Indonesia lay in sharp contrast to Somare's. Under the heading 'Indonesia wants Somare' the *Times* reported that *Suara Karya*, the newspaper of Indonesia's ruling Golkar party, had said on June 29 that 'Mr Somare's return would mean better relations between the two countries' (*The Times* [Stephen Mandana] 9 July 1982). Somare was said to be respected by the Indonesian leadership, a claim that probably won little support inside Papua New Guinea where sympathy for the West Papuans runs high. Okuk also caused a stir by dropping election leaflets from a helicopter hovering over polling areas. Electoral officers had to warn him that the distribution of advertising material was illegal within seven metres of polling booths. 'Quick-to-react officials issued orders barring voters from polling areas while Mr Okuk's messages were cleared away' (*Post-Courier* 10 June 1982).

By polling time the overseas press contingent had arrived in town. It included Australian TV crews as well as journalists from a dozen other outlets. Most had no previous experience in Papua New Guinea and many seemed to have come rather unprepared. Local journalists

soon tired of having their brains picked. One remarked, after seeing a report in an overseas journal by a visiting journalist, 'I thought I deserved a by-line as well'.

One exception was *The Age's* David Broadbent, who covered the election in a professional way by making two preliminary visits to gain a feeling for the process. *Time's* John Dunn visited twice and produced good 'wrap-up' stories. Another visitor was Pacific-watcher Stuart Inder (*Pacific Islands Monthly, The Bulletin*), who understood the proceedings with the one notable slip of concluding that, despite all, Chan and Somare were still friends. *Newsweek's* Carl Robinson telexed an excellent report to New York, but received back a copy of a desk editor's rewrite bearing little relation to the original - or to the facts. This report, 'by Jill Smolowe with Carl Robinson in Port Moresby', using terms such as 'natives' and 'Stone Age paradise', completely ignored the Prime Minister and included errors in the spelling of proper names. Robinson's return telex to New York was ignored, while my own letter to the editor was abbreviated in such a way as to make it appear a partisan plea for my boss. This *Newsweek* experience was a prime example of how media majors can misinterpret different countries and, as a result, call down upon their heads the wrath of the developing world.

In his analysis of news-making in Southeast Asia, Dr Rod Tiffen points out that the contact of foreign correspondents with the local society is often limited and shallow (Tiffen 1979). But in Papua New Guinea the foreign press always seems able to establish good contacts. Thus it was a pity to see - as in the case of *Newsweek* - well-researched copy being misused.

On Saturday night, 26 June, the Tally Room press boxes were full. The NBC had begun a live commentary that would last until 4 a.m. (provincial stations had the count from 6.30 p.m. - 11.00 p.m.). The night wore on and the counting from the regional centres continued slowly. The commentators as distinct from analysts - began to run out of steam. Clearly the results would not be gripping until the next day. But by then the NBC seemed hardly interested at all. With the exception of a good summing up by the University of Papua New Guinea's David Hegarty, there was little analysis. I believe it would have been wiser for the NBC to concentrate its coverage on the Sunday, by which time more definite results were available. As it was, you felt left out unless you could visit the Tally Room (from which the public was excluded). Radio-2 news had stories on polling incidents such as a pro-Okuk riot in his highlands home of Kundiawa, but little on the figures.

The result

The leaders were not relying on the media for news of the count. By Sunday afternoon Somare felt confident enough to convene a press

conference at the Opposition's Boroko office and declare a Pangu victory. By how many seats he would not comment. Although he said a coalition partner would not be necessary, the *Post-Courier* speculated about whether he had talked with Chan or Diro. *Niugini Nius* said the government was 'Up for grabs'. The NBC preferred not to speculate, perhaps because their journalists ritually arrived late at press conferences. For Somare's important Sunday conference the NBC came fifteen minutes after the Chief had explained his seat count and predictions. The same applied later at Okuk's house when Okuk handed the Nationals' leadership to Ted Diro and announced that things would be 'different with me not around'. It was reminiscent of US President Nixon's demise, except that Okuk was praising the press not blaming them.

The press, in turn, said they would miss Okuk and told him that he had 'added colour to the scene'. Certainly he had provided plenty of colourful copy. Although Okuk was graceful in defeat his supporters were not. In ancient Roman times leaders would execute messengers who arrived bearing ill tidings in the hope that the bad news would disappear along with the bearer of it. The ultimate 'kill the messenger' story came from Kundiawa, where hundreds of Okuk supporters threatened to burn down the local NBC station which had announced Okuk's imminent defeat. Although management told staff to leave town and stay with friends or family, many were trapped in the building for some time. The trouble began because the NBC had broadcast some conflicting tally results from the provincial electorate office. Announcer Fabian Waim told Australian Associated Press that 'We had issued figures indicating Nilkare had 22,000 votes and Okuk 17,000. It was a mistake - the figures should have been 22,000 and 15,208. We altered the results. It was after that that we had trouble' (*Niugini Nius* [Kevin Ricketts, AAP, Port Moresby] 30 June 1982).

Other outbreaks of violence created a bad image of the Papua New Guinea election in the Australian press, although the most dramatic loss, Okuk's, was best symbolised by the National Party deputy, Thomas Kavali, in tears at Goroka airport. This was one of the rare campaign photographs that conveyed the true feeling of these emotional weeks. Mostly the daily press kept re-running the same little mug shots of the politicians. In the absence of TV the responsibility for visual coverage fell to the press photographers and travelling journalists. Yet their eyes did not seem to be looking for the picture that would be worth a thousand words.

The coalition manoeuvring raised a frenzy of speculation in the press. There was no greater contrast than between the *Post-Courier* and *The Times* of 2 July. 'Diro "All but in as PM" said the former, using Diro's own phrase, and explaining that 'minor differences among the coalition parties may be all that stands between Ted Diro and the prime ministership'. *The Times*, however, said immediately after the

count that Somare had won. 'By this stage we were in no doubt at all', acting editor Callick told me. 'We are even getting ready to publish a full-colour front cover picture of the new PM, a decision that requires some advance notice because we've not run colour before. If we're wrong we will have to pulp the whole run of the paper, but I don't think we are'. The *Times* noted that the party had made history by becoming the first ever to win more than fifty seats. Mr Somare promised that his first actions would be to cut government spending and sell the Grumman jet.

The outside world was also being told of Somare's comeback. The *Sydney Morning Herald* (30 June 1982) editorialized that Ted Diro's apparently dramatic arrival on the scene was not surprising, for 'like Somare he planned carefully and tirelessly'. However it felt he may have made his first serious mistake in joining forces with the Nationals. On the NBC Sir Percy Chatterton said that when it came to politics the retired general was only 'a raw recruit'. Another of Bob Brown's Grass Roots cartoons also commented on Diro's haste to get to the top. 'Somare here I come', yelled a determined Diro in combat gear at the charge with fixed bayonet (*Post-Courier* 7 July 1982).

By the time of Pangu's post-election convention for new members the remaining media were inclined to accept Somare's claim of a voting bloc numbering around 60 MP's. A *Post-Courier* editorial sounded the Coalition's death knell:

Without a [common ideological] base a coalition be-comes simply a matter of convenience, or worse, a means to sequester power. No one, save 109 MP's, had a chance to vote in favour or disfavour of the Chan-Okuk government until last month's election. And no amount of political rhetoric can disguise the result: when they finally got a chance to have their say, the people's verdict was a resounding 'No' (*ibid.*).

As expected there were accusations, particularly against Pangu, that parties had attempted to buy the allegiance of MP's. 'Beware of sweet-talking party hustlers', Chan warned. The Nationals' president, Michael Mel, said that a new highlands member was paid K7,500 by cheque number 850900 drawn on Pangu's Goroka account. 'Both Mr Okuk and Mr Diro supported him during the campaign. Now his name appears among the list of so-called Pangu supporters released at the weekend'. He said it was ridiculous to say that Pangu had only 'reimbursed his electoral expenses' because these had been met by the National Party (*Post-Courier* 8 July 1982). The Coalition also accused Pangu of holding the new MP's incommunicado in Goroka and, later, in Port Moresby. Pangu hotels were called 'gaols' and officials known as 'warders'. Melanesian Alliance, fond of considering itself the conscience of Papua New Guinea, was especially critical.

While Pangu might not have abducted its Members it certainly held onto its gains. The Coalition continued to chase possible partners, but even the *Niugini Nius*, which was pushing the Coalition's claim of having 58 Members (26 July 1982), could not help. Clearly the previous government was in disarray. Loser Okuk said: 'If we had started to cry the Highlands would have gone wild. I want the stupid Highlanders to suffer. I won't suffer. They'll miss me...' (*The Times* 16 July 1982). Amidst the emotion there was little analysis of the kind provided by UPNG's David Hegarty who was now calculating percentages of winning candidates and parties and concluding: 'The message is fairly clear: it no longer pays to be an independent' (*ibid.*).

When Sir Julius stepped down as leader - 'I quit, says fed up Chan', the *Post-Courier* (30 July 1982) headlined - the Coalition began working hard to find a leader to represent it in the parliamentary vote. After several cancelled press conferences Fr Momis agreed to step forward. The MA, now free of the Coalition, was waiting to be wooed by other parties. A Grass Roots cartoon showed Momis, dressed as a prostitute, standing on a street corner waiting to be picked up. But the cartoon was self-censored by the paper on the grounds of taste. Instead, artist Brown redrew Momis as a man looking for a suitable partner.

The big question remained - who would go with Pangu? The NBC, alone, announced it would be Ted Diro, who then 'categorically denied' the report that he would accept the deputy prime ministership in a Pangu-led coalition. For days Pangu had been saying that Diro was the only leader with whom it would *not* consider coalescing. But the NBC newshounds seemed not to have heard.

In the days preceding the parliamentary vote Pangu took the unprecedented step of recommencing its advertising on both radio and in the press. This time the aim was to win support from parliamentarians rather than the public, and indeed the theme song did combine with large ads of a smiling Somare to produce a positive image of a winning team. This mini-campaign helped Pangu seal its victory.

The *Post-Courier* was the only paper published on the morning of the vote (*Niugini Nius* did not appear on Mondays). '66+ say (*sic*) Somare...Home, hosed says Chief' (*Post-Courier* 2 August 1982). This contrasted with its earlier prediction - the only one it ever made - that Pangu would get only 35 seats (*Post-Courier* 25 June 1982). By the yardstick of Ochs, the *New York Times* founder, it had proven itself to be a far cry from a good newspaper. But the paper had no trouble with the final parliamentary vote: 'SOMARE TEAM...Full steam ahead after 66-40 vote'. The *Times* (3 August 1982) was more sardonic: 'The quest for power is, thank God, finally over'. It then questioned the strength of the 'renewed marriage between Somare and Evara'.

Some observers linked Somare's victory with the economic problems mentioned at the start of the campaign. Callick wrote that the father of independence's 'old political magic may be dampened by

lingering economic problems such as unemployment' (*FEER* 13 August 1982). The *National Times* ([Colleen Ryan] 8 August 1982) announced from Australia: 'Somare returns - to a grim new reality?'. During polling Callick was told by Pangu that it had spent 'more than K500,000 on the campaign - which came from fund-raising events and a small investment company with real estate' (*The Times* 3 August 1982). Some people felt that at least K1m had been spent, much of it contributed quietly by large businesses in Papua New Guinea and even Australia. But, regardless of publicity, Pangu's bubble had swelled as a result of the government's setbacks. According to Sir Julius Chan the PPP spent around K500,000 campaigning, 'of which K200,000 was useful and the rest was more or less a complete waste' (interview with Sir Julius Chan, 11 December 1982).

Like electoral victors in other democracies, Pangu had developed a better organization and successfully promoted an image of strength and vitality. However in the post-election economic climate it did not take the media long to place the new regime under the critical microscope, thus confirming that for the winners the battle had only begun.

In review

Predictably, all sections of the media felt that they covered the election well. *Niugini Nius's* Thurecht said the only room for improvement was with the candidates themselves. 'They didn't utilise the press well, although the parties were well organised and used the media well for both their ads and news coverage'. The *Post-Courier's* Wayne Grant returned from holidays in mid-campaign and remarked that he thought his own paper's coverage had been 'pretty poor'. But when it was all over he said the paper had done a 'pretty good job'. On behalf of Word Publishing, the *Times's* editor, Franzalbert Joku, said he thought they did better than any of the other papers. Like Word's Callick, he cited the liftout supplements, the opinion polls and the stories from the campaign trail. He regretted that they had not had more funds to send journalists out to the provinces. He denied suggestions that the group had favoured candidates from the Melanesian Alliance. 'It's true that we ran a few long articles by MA people, but we have a policy of encouraging contributions from interested Papua New Guineans. It so happened that the majority of unsolicited material came from MA. But our own journalists did not concentrate on that party or any other'.

The NBC said it laid great emphasis on presenting a 'fair coverage', as befitted a government-run organization. This was not always easy, as when PPP candidate and ex-chairman of NBC, Sam Piniau, called it 'the worst radio station in the world'. (The next day he withdrew his claim). I would contend that while NBC was fair to the parties it was less helpful to its audience, who often received what one writer called 'a

newsfare of undigested ministerial and bureaucratic statements'.⁶ Although the NBC disavowed such criticism it provided air-time for commentators to direct similar criticism at the print media. In a talk on Radio-2's 'Ace' programme, journalism lecturer Alan Chatterton said that 'Too often the morning election coverage in our daily newspapers has consisted of six column inches for the prime minister matched almost exactly by six for the leader of the opposition....all neatly ruled off in a big black border and marked "Election"'. He urged the media to check at least a percentage of their items and to beware of the 'image-makers'. He deserves the last word on the subject:

Image-makers come in all kinds of disguises....public relations experts, press officers [Chatterton himself once worked as press officer for Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta] ... and they can provide honest information. But they present a fundamental problem for the media in all parts of the world. It is easy for their influence to become too strong. In all areas where there is a free press, such as Papua New Guinea, that state of freedom has to be defended and worked for all the time...as is the case with most good things in life (NBC Radio-2, 30 May 1982).

As a journalist working in government at the time, I would endorse these sentiments. But one cannot expect politicians to stop making pronouncements. Thus, I believe, the responsibility of action lies with the press itself. As veteran US journalist Mort Rosenblum said in his memoirs (Rosenblum 1979), no major reforms are needed in the information system operated by free countries - just better reporting, better writing and a public more actively committed to daily affairs.

⁶ Rowan Callick, 'Letter from Port Moresby', *FEER* 11 June 1982.

Chapter 3

EARNEST EXPOSITION OR ENTERTAINING EXOTICA?

A Foreign Correspondent and the 1982 Election

Sean Dorney

'I can write about politics till I'm blue in the face but all they want down there is plane crashes and tribal fights!' That quote, from one of my former colleagues in Port Moresby,¹ points to what I might rather grandly and self-indulgently describe as the 'dilemma' facing the foreign correspondent writing about Papua New Guinea.

A constant concern of the journalist in any foreign setting is: 'What sort of a run am I getting back home?' If the journalist is on a special trip from home base and his product does not appeal to the sub-editors who decide what gets used ('gatekeepers' in Kurt Lewin's apt description), then he might not get another overseas assignment. Or if he is actually based overseas, and his material is regularly not getting used, it might be his last foreign posting. Even worse, but more than possible, the bureau might be closed down (the number of foreign correspondents based in Port Moresby was halved from four to two during 1981-2).²

Thus a few days before counting began in the elections I was having a beer with a foreign journalist sent here on assignment and we were attempting to conjure up the definitive headline that would warm the heart of even the most obstinate gate-keeper and perhaps lasso the brief attention of the casual foreign reader. What, we were trying to think, would push, say (to freshen up the example), Prince Andrew and Koo Stark off the page? One early suggestion was 'Stone Age Democrats in Bow and Arrow Election'. But we both lapsed into reverent silence when we hit on a three word headline that would sum

¹ Conversation with Michael Prain, correspondent in Port Moresby for the Herald & Weekly Times group from January 1980 until the close of the Herald & Weekly Times bureau in mid 1981.

² The *Sydney Morning Herald* closed its bureau in Port Moresby in early 1981. Paul Byrnes was the last *Sydney Morning Herald* correspondent. Before Paul's arrival in late 1979 the *Sydney Morning Herald* and the *Age* operated a joint bureau, but the *Age* pulled out of the arrangement in mid-1979. The remaining full-time correspondents in mid-1982 were Kevin Ricketts of Australian Associated Press (AAP), and the present author, for the ABC. Rowan Callick, who wrote for the *Australian Financial Review*, and Russell Hunter, who occasionally wrote for *The Bulletin*, were both employed by Word Publishing: they wrote for Australian journals on a stringer basis.

up the whole matter, guarantee splash usage and reinforce every preconceived prejudice about Papua New Guinea. There it was in huge headline type: 'POLLING TEAM EATEN'.

Thankfully, working for the ABC I have a range of more serious outlets than most journalists working for papers with rather strictly defined home audiences to aim at. However in the area of general news there is still the problem of scoring space or time against an overwhelming mass of news from the rest of the world. It has become very obvious to journalists stationed here that with independence now back in that distant decade of the 1970s the news media in Australia increasingly regard Papua New Guinea as just another overseas country. If it does fall into any special category it is one labelled 'Exotic'.

The challenge is to write what is true but interesting, serious but entertaining, undistorted but intriguing. Naturally the challenge is not always well met. The interesting, entertaining and intriguing snippets are the easy ones. Achieving balanced copy is harder; and getting it used is yet harder again.

Let me quote a line or two from some of the stories I filed on the elections that I am pretty sure were used:

'Potential voters in Papua New Guinea have been warned they could be jailed if they bet on the outcome of the coming elections' (story filed 28 January 1982).

'Papua New Guinea's Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Okuk, today gave away ninety-six thousand bottles of beer to the people of his electorate in the most lavish wealth display of the election campaign so far' (story filed 29 May 1982).

'In Papua New Guinea's New Ireland province, followers of the cargo cult that grew up around President Lyndon Johnson in the nineteen-sixties are demanding a presidential election. They've demonstrated outside a polling station with placards reading "Vote U.S.A."' (story filed 10 June 1982).

'An aircraft carrying the Australian Governor General was turned back from Goroka at the last minute today because of tribal fighting in the wake of the election' (story filed 28 June 1989).

'In the Highlands of Papua New Guinea the wife of a leading official of the National Party has sliced off her ear in a traditional show of grief at the defeat of the Party's leader, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Iambakey Okuk' (story filed 3 August 1982).

If I have given the impression that the ABC covered only the quirky side of the election, let me rush to correct it. I believe the ABC ran a

more comprehensive coverage than any other overseas media outlet. I must admit that I was surprised and delighted by the amount of detailed coverage the ABC accepted and used.³

Robin Osborne has elsewhere assessed foreign as well as domestic media coverage of the election. Let me explain some of the difficulties in reporting on a Papua New Guinea election for a foreign audience.

The most intensive period of the campaign for me was a one week trip in mid-May when I hired Chris Owen, the Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies' cinematographer, to track Somare around the Morobe Province, Okuk around the Southern Highlands and Sir Julius Chan in the Western Highlands and Simbu. We produced three television reports.

Somare was greeted by one of the largest crowds of the whole campaign when he landed in Lae from Manus on 16 May. Thousands were there and Somare was chaired from the plane to the terminal. The next day, when we flew with him into the mountains of the Huon peninsula, the story was a little different. No one at all was waiting at our first stop. Those who did wander up expressed surprise at Somare's presence. They said that according to the *Tok Save* on Radio Morobe Somare was in Wau and Bulolo that day. The night before, during a poolside party at the lavish home of Harry Pelgen, the supermarket king of Lae, a rather elated John Harangu, Somare's press secretary, had told me Pangu might win 80 seats. At Pindiu, on film, Somare was prepared to predict 60. Later in the week during a National Party rally at Kagua in the Southern Highlands, Okuk committed himself on film to 45 seats which made us wonder why we needed to bother filming Chan since there were only four seats left for the People's Progress Party! Hudson Arek, though, assured me after a particularly good Chan rally in Enga that the PPP would 'sweep the Highlands' (conversation with Hudson Arek, PPP chairman, Mt. Hagen, 18 May 1982). Everyone was shooting wild, but as it turned out Somare was much closer to the mark than I was.

Somare was the most natural campaigner of the three leading figures. He exudes confidence, is immensely popular, and that sulu-dressed swagger of his wavers between the 'happy hero' and the feudal

³ On the Sunday night after voting started (June 6) the ABC's 'Background Briefing' programme ran a 45-minute detailed look at the elections, which also surveyed the appropriateness of the present electoral process. People heard on the programme included Somare, Chan, Okuk, Momis, Diro, Siaguru, the Ombudsman (Kilage), the Electoral Commissioner (Veratau), Sir John Guise, Cecil Abel and David Hegarty. The ABC's 'World on Wednesday' used a 15-minute item, while Radio Australia's 'Four Corners' used two 16-minute items previewing the election and another after the results became known. The ABC's television current affairs programme 'Nationwide' used two lengthy items. ABC radio news used more than 30 separate stories on the PNG elections, including numerous voice reports. And Radio Australia used at least 100 election-related news items.

lord surveying what he knows is rightfully his. It is a style that I would label 'jolly monarch'.

Iambakey Okuk barked at the people who flocked to his campaign rallies. His election strategy stressed the Action Man image and the popular picture of him was one of just barely suppressed fury. Strangely he had good rapport with journalists, certainly expatriate journalists. After a few days they came away genuinely liking the man. Of course he was excellent news copy. David Broadbent of the *Age* led off his major campaign feature with a description of Okuk in the Highlands, and I ended off a 16-minute radio programme for Radio Australia on the three leaders with Okuk confidently predicting that he would become the first highlander prime minister. His cocky boast was simply very good radio.

The Okuk beerfest was the news highlight of the campaign for the foreign media. (Despite an NBC news report, there was no riot on the Kundiawa airstrip, just one brief disturbance when a few over-anxious potential voters from one of the sub-clans got fed up with waiting for the 'skeling' [calculation] of their beer share. I did not hear the NBC report and was stunned when my wife asked me the next day in Port Moresby whether I was hurt in the riot.)

I was very pleased with our television story of Sir Julius Chan campaigning in Simbu. It captured on film not so much the themes but some highly significant traces of the campaign. It opened with Sir Julius descending in a helicopter onto a dusty Chuave ridge. He and his entourage stepped out into a clearing just vacated by villagers, who had fled under the sudden onslaught of dust. Sir Julius, wearing a smart safari suit with a quarter inch of white singlet showing at his chest, smiled broadly - the smile that just fails to achieve the charismatic warmth so natural to Somare. Another significant image was Robert Yabara, the local member, dressed in his traditional finery, warmly greeting his People's Progress Party leader. Yet all around the posters declared 'Robert Yabara - National Party'. National was the party he had deserted two weeks earlier.

On the subject of campaign posters, my eye was caught by two in Mount Hagen. One was for a candidate who seemed to be deliberately modelling himself on Sir Julius Chan - you would have sworn from his poster photo that he was Sir Julius' younger brother. Apparently it did not work for him. The other was the centrepiece in a shop window jam-packed with election posters. It was the same size as the others and, underneath the face, it said 'Jesus'. How many of the others were to be crucified by the voters!

On the campaign trail I was privy to the dramatic Okuk walk-in on Sir Julius Chan and John Nilkare (successful Pangu candidate for Chimbu Provincial) having dinner together in the Chimbu Lodge. I had been with Okuk early that afternoon at Kagua in the Southern Highlands several hundred kilo-metres away. There he had been

annoyed when a message came through that former minister Yano Belo had not got home to the district to organize the rally because Sir Julius had vetoed his travel by government aircraft.⁴ We left Kagua for Kundiawa in the early afternoon to film Sir Julius's campaign in Simbu the next day. But Okuk stayed there until nightfall waiting for Kumul Two to fetch him back to Port Moresby. It never arrived, so he set off for Kundiawa with his wife and family in his Range Rover, and he claims he almost crashed three times. He had driven the whole distance the other way around dawn. Okuk reached Chimbu Lodge around 9.30 to find Sir Julius and the man who was his greatest electoral threat (and who beat him) finishing a bottle of wine. The atmosphere was highly charged. Chan and Okuk spent a good twenty minutes of 'intense private conversation' in a corner of the Chimbu Lodge lounge.

A couple of lighter moments: one, the look of absolute horror on the face of one visiting correspondent when told about the month-long beer ban; another, the problem of assuming too much when working with a visiting television team. The ABC sent a cameraman and sound recordist to PNG for TV news film on the close of voting, the count and the results. On the Saturday night that polling closed I was dashing off a voice report for ABC radio news when Chan walked in to be shown around the tally room. I directed the cameraman to get a few shots of Sir Julius looking at the figures, and from a distance I pointed out who he was. It was only after Chan finished his tour and shook hands with Somare in the observation enclosure that my cameraman realised who was who. We had some great film of the Electoral Commissioner, Henry Veratau, surveying the tally board.

Finally, let me return to that earlier exercise, trying to decide on the definitive headline. I can think of no better headline to sum up the 1982 elections for an uninformed foreign audience than the two words: 'Democracy Flourishes'.

⁴ Sir Julius had decreed that no ministers were to use government money for election trips (Prime Minister's Office Press Release, 25 March 1982).

PART II: PAPUA

Chapter 4

THE NORTH FLY REPEATS ITSELF


Richard Jackson*

The parallels between the 1977 and 1982 elections for the North Fly Open seat were striking. (For a description of the circumstances in 1977 see Jackson (1983).) In both elections a strong, well-known, local candidate failed after campaigning weakly; the question of who did not stand had a significant effect on the result; and Warren Dutton won on both occasions by collecting the largest share of votes from those parts of the electorate which did not put up a 'native son' candidate.

These parallels are made all the more striking by the radically different circumstances under which the elections were held. In 1977, the chances of the Ok Tedi project proceeding were not particularly good, very few people had jobs or cash crops, and the electorate was amongst the poorest and least developed in the country. By June 1982, project construction had been underway for a year, Kiunga township had been transformed, the road to Tabubil was well on the way to completion, three thousand jobs had been created in the area of which half or more were held by local people, successful business groups had sprung up in all census divisions except Biami, Pare, and the eastern Min areas, and villagers were flocking into the Kiunga corners and to Tabubil. In general, the 'development' for which the people of the North Fly had been crying out had arrived with a vengeance. The electorate was one of the very few in recession-wracked Papua New Guinea whose voters were economically better off - and by a very marked degree - than they had been five years earlier. The question was, had this spectacular economic development been in any way matched by more sophisticated political processes?

In view of the pattern of the election, the overall result and the details of voting, it is tempting, with hindsight, to answer this question with a resounding no! But I feel the election did not in fact truly reflect the political changes that had occurred since 1977. These changes were real; they were not forced upon the area through circumstances. Quite the reverse, it was a remarkable feature, especially of the period after 1979, that it was local leaders who made and/or grabbed political opportunities with such finesse that national leaders and the bureaucracy effectively had to follow local initiatives. It may be that the diffusion of this sense of political opportunity through the mass of the voters from

* I would like to acknowledge the kind assistance of Dominic Tan, Returning Officer, Kiunga for statistics used in this chapter.



astute leaders was slow to occur and that this is what the 1982 results show, but my own interpretation is that the unity of purpose which the North Fly was able to muster in its relations with the rest of the world merely foundered on the all-too obvious reef of ethnicity when its people were asked to choose just one of their number to represent them in Parliament.

In 1978, the Fly River Provincial Government (FRPG) shed its interim status by holding its elections, in the course of which Isidore Kaseng was elected. Kaseng had been a candidate in the 1977 elections but had performed poorly having suffered ill-health for some time until just prior to those elections and being relatively unknown outside his Moian provincial electorate. Kaseng, like many of his fellow Yonggom whose area is split in two by the international border, could as easily have claimed Indonesian citizenship as Papua New Guinean. Once elected to Daru, he rapidly organized the North Fly and Lake Murray Assembly members, assisted by Noah Daikimeng (provincial member for the Olsobip/Faiwolmin area) and Norbert Makmop, at that time a student of politics at UPNG, and previously an assistant to the regional member for Western Province in the National Parliament, Kala Swokin. It seems likely that, had Kaseng cared to do so, he could have mustered the numbers to replace Tatie Olewale as premier. Instead, he accepted the position of deputy premier and Finance minister.

Even more significant political developments followed in the North Fly. By 1980 Ok Tedi was virtually certain to proceed. There then arose the question of the division of the responsibilities between the national and the Fly River Provincial governments for the implementation of work relevant to the project. A good number of senior public servants felt very strongly that the FRPG was not capable of playing its role in such an implementation process. They did not want their strenuous efforts during negotiations wasted, and wished to see implementation remain in the national government's hands. On the other hand, Daru argued that the role was rightfully theirs and that, in any case, they should have been more thoroughly involved in the negotiations. National ministers were split on the issue: the minister for Decentralisation, Fr John Momis, was clearly on Daru's side whilst the minister for Police and member for North Fly, Warren Dutton, wanted a separate province. (Clearly, I was in error in my earlier comments on Warren Dutton's views on secession (*ibid.*, 144). Many members of Parliament did not want to see the creation of any new provinces, either because they were, generally, antagonistic towards provincial governments in any case or because they did not want precedents set in the North Fly case which might be used by potential secessionists from their own provinces. The result was that very little progress was made towards an agreed allocation of responsibility.

Into this vacuum stepped Isidore Kaseng. Whilst Moresby and Daru squabbled he established the *ad hoc* Kiunga/Lake Murray Political

Advisory Committee (KLMPAC) and demanded that all decisions on the future development of the North Fly area be made either by it or with reference to it. To cut a long and tortuous story short: Kaseng's initiative was successful. All agreed, Daru reluctantly, that the administration of the North Fly until 1986 would be vested with the Department of (what is now) Provincial Affairs under a co-ordinator, J. Desmond Fitzer, who attends all KLMPAC meetings and acts as liaison officer between KLMPAC and the national government as well as being the officer in charge of all public servants in the North Fly. (Des Fitzer led the first patrol into the western half of the Star Mountains in 1963. In July 1983 pressure was building in the North Fly for this agreement to be extended to 1991). Effectively, the KLMPAC proposes development projects through Fitzer to the national government within an annual budget of K1m. Daru has no effective say and Moresby bureaucrats and politicians pay very close attention to what KLMPAC and Isidore Kaseng say.

Aside from such formal political development, the coming of Ok Tedi itself has created innumerable opportunities for aspirant politicians to flex their muscles and to show whether they are made of stern stuff or not. Kaseng did this on several occasions in 1981 and 1982, closing project operations on one occasion and twisting both government and company arms over a wide range of issues. Whilst Kaseng clearly terrified everyone, especially in early 1981, on one occasion his will did evaporate. He threatened to secede and stop operations by mid-August 1981 unless separate status was granted. Since he had shown he could do what he threatened on previous occasions the refusal by national government to allow his demand left everyone in a state of suspense as the deadline approached. But Kaseng did nothing when the deadline came and passed; indeed he seemed to vanish from Kiunga for some time, leaving everyone tentatively relieved, if puzzled.

Several demonstrations were attempted by others in the lead-up to the election. A rowdy one (for Kiunga) featured Wyre Wobi, the National Party nominee in January 1982. The most interesting feature of that particular event was the conciliatory role played by Kala Swokin, the sitting member for Western Province, who cut a particularly cool figure, elegantly attired in suit and tie, as he flitted with his briefcase between demonstrators adorned with *bilas* and rather tired administrators and onlookers. Warren Dutton recorded the demonstration on his video camera, which not only provided a vivid record of events but also portrayed an important side of Dutton's own character: although he has particularly strong feelings on many project-related issues he tries to operate as far as possible within the system. His strong views are reflected in the number of controversies he manages to get himself involved in and the great regularity of his appearances in *Hansard*, but his position, at that time, as a minister reinforced the strength of his conviction to operate inside the rules. This applied also to

Norbert Makmop, if less forcefully. Norbert, it seemed to me, could never quite make up his mind exactly where to be in order to exploit the political potential of the Ok Tedi situation. He moved between Moresby, Daru and Kiunga almost constantly and his studies at University alternated with attempts at business, thinking about joining OTML staff and involving himself in political manoeuvres in the province. On the whole Norbert never came to prominence in any of these activities.

One last consequence of Ok Tedi's development should be noted: the project had led to rapid urbanization and considerable internal migration within the North Fly. This had two effects. First, in theory, the urban electorate should have been as high as 2000 persons - making campaigning for all candidates somewhat easier than in 1977. Secondly, however, there was a danger that migrants might disenfranchise themselves by not being present in the village of their registration on polling day or through a variety of other potentially confusing circumstances.

All in all, therefore, it did seem quite clear that by early 1982 the development of Ok Tedi had thrown up a group of North Fly people who showed that they were not only aware of the political opportunities the project provided but could be astute in manipulating such opportunities. The North Fly was no longer the ultimate boondocks and its people were no longer readily forgotten. Indeed, as the recession deepened, Papua New Guinea's hopes for the future came to depend upon Ok Tedi, and the once peripheral people of the North Fly now played a central role in national government thinking.

The Candidates (and One Non-Runner)

There were five candidates: Isidore Kaseng, Norbert Makmop, Wayre Wobi, Gen Gom, and Warren Dutton. Isidore Kaseng's activities I have already described in some detail. I would add that Kaseng is a man of small, slight physical stature who nevertheless has a commanding presence in any committee meeting. Whether or not his fellow KLMPAC or provincial government colleagues actually like him is difficult to say, but they all at times seem to be in awe of him. This is not surprising for he has used his sharp tongue with good effect on national ministers and experienced bureaucrats alike. His basic point on Ok Tedi is that he, and his people, have managed without it and lived on sago for centuries past. They can therefore continue to do without Ok Tedi, but the national government cannot. I have witnessed Kaseng completely outwit, humiliate and eventually silence National Planning Office staff up from Moresby for a day in the bush - and with great dexterity. As deputy premier of Western Province, chairman of KLMPAC, and licensee of Kiunga's only tavern (which position has certainly brought him wealth) Kaseng had all the right contacts. His greatest apparent weakness was his ethnic origin. He is a Yonggom and the Yonggom are

the smallest ethnic group in the electorate, except for the Ba. Whilst he could get to the top through the strength of his personality in small, formalised groups it remained to be seen whether that was the same as winning a popular vote in a wider, multi-ethnic situation. To most outsiders, it must have seemed that Kaseng was a formidable candidate. Certainly Naipuri Maina, Pangu organizer for Western Province, felt this was so and Kaseng ran as the official Pangu candidate.

Until April, it was not certain who would obtain Pangu backing. One outstanding possibility was Michael Namalok, who worked (and still does) as a member of OTML's public relations staff. His job as an OTML community liaison officer seemed a very suitable take-off point for a would be politician. Namalok is himself a Min; no Min had ever stood in a national election previously and any one who did so could be assured of a block ethnic vote of roughly 2000 in an electorate of not quite 10,000 votes, providing the voters could be told a Min was standing. But on top of that Namalok was widely known in Kiunga and everywhere else affected by the mine constructions - known and liked. Not only did his position show him to be powerful, but his quiet, friendly manner won him many friends. What is more, as part of his job he was seen at almost all compensation payment meetings and played a role in ensuring that locals were recruited for work in mine construction. And, if those were not sufficiently impressive qualifications, he had also shown himself to be forthright in defending North Fly people, even against OTML, his employers. In July 1981 he had publicly sided with OTML labourers in their dispute with the company. It seems to me that Namalok could have probably overcome ethnic obstacles better than any other local candidate, and would have done well in urban areas. In other words he could have won quite comfortably.

Such was the worry of Warren Dutton who felt that campaigning against Namalok would have been difficult, at best. Fortunately for the sitting member, however, Namalok did not stand and Dutton continued to sit. Precisely why this happened is not clear but two factors contributed to the situation. First, because Kala Swokin, who stood for the provincial seat as a Pangu candidate (having held it previously as a PPP member), was overruled by Naipuri Maina - the latter wanting Kaseng, the former wanting Namalok for Pangu. Secondly, and more importantly, Norbert Makmop, Namalok's cousin, also wanted to stand. With Michael already in a position to do much for his people, many Min felt that Norbert should try for parliament. The same logic seems to have also disqualified Noah Daikimeng, provincial minister of Agriculture, from Golgubip, and a vocal ally of Isidore Kaseng. Whatever the reason, Namalok eventually did not run and Makmop did.

Norbert Makmop is one of only three Min students ever to have seriously attended a university, having been a politics student at UPNG at the time of his campaign. Given that pre-eminence, he has suffered, like so many Papua New Guineans, as a result of the expectations

placed on him by his people. These are so great that he is certain to disappoint some of them. Makmop ran as a pro-Diro independent but two other points should be noted. He was very close to Kala Swokin and thus, by association, was seen as being in the same party as Kala (ex-PPP, now Pangu). Secondly, he was on very good terms indeed with Aruru Matiabe who was contesting the Koroba/Kopiago seat. No doubt, had Norbert emulated Aruru's victory their paths would have been similar.

On Gen Gom I have very little information; I was unable to see him during the election and, in Kiunga and Tabubil, very few people were clear as to who he was (other than that he was a North Awin) or what he did. In fact he was a schoolteacher little known outside his home areas who stood as an independent claiming United Party support. He seemed to be the rank outsider.

Wayre Wobi seemed equally unlikely to win, even though he was known in Kiunga and up and down the road to Tabubil as very active in demonstrations against OTML actions. Nevertheless, his candidature was of considerable interest since he stood for the National Party under what were certainly curious circumstances. The first curiosity was that when he announced his candidature in April 1981, he received front-page headline publicity in *Niugini Nius*, whose support both for Sir Julius Chan's government and Okuk's National Party was strong throughout the election. Wobi had been a policeman for nine years in Wabag and Mt Hagen. He resigned from the force some fifteen months prior to the election but gave no details of how he proposed to support himself during his campaign. He announced that he was an independent candidate, and thus, presumably, of independent means but added that he was 'going home .. to ask my people which party, if any, I should support'; clearly, he must have received unequivocal advice on the matter. But then for Wobi, as a policeman, clear cut orders were what he was used to. His views on politics were enlightening. He was reported by *Niugini Nius* as being 'confident of making the transition from policeman to politician successfully' for, he was quoted as saying, 'they do basically the same thing'. To the weak-hearted political scientist, Wobi had a reason for this chilling comparison: 'I have seen Highlands politicians operating for nine years and I know exactly what it is about'. Despite having spent nine years observing Superintendents Doa, Wingti, Okuk, Kavali and the rest of the riot squad, Wobi claimed that he had been in constant touch with the North Fly people and knew 'exactly what they want in the way of roads, and villages and development programs'. He aspired to the post of Police minister although 'he did not expect to get it immediately'.

Warren Dutton, member for the North Fly 1968-72 and again from 1977-82, ex-patrol officer, founding member of the PPP, director of Ningerum Transport (which owned the only commercial accommodation in Kiunga in 1982), and minister for Police, came to the 1982 election with a record of controversy (Jackson 1983). His ministry had had a

stormy time. Always under pressure, it was barely holding its own against the depredations of the gangs of thieves who more or less rule Port Moresby at night when a long simmering dispute between Dutton the minister and Police Commissioner Philip Bouraga effectively brought cooperation between the ministry and the force to an end. The Dutton-Bouraga dispute had fundamental repercussions for the Papua New Guinea Constitution and exercised a very large proportion of the collective legal-bureaucratic mind in Moresby for several weeks. But to Dutton's own electorate it meant nothing. Far more important to their peace of mind had been the posting by Commissioner Bouraga to Kiunga of a detachment of the police riot squad very shortly before his dismissal. This caused Dutton considerable embarrassment. The squad had nothing to do and nowhere to live. Within a short time of their arrival the crime rate at Kiunga had, in fact, increased as the bemused regular police spent much of their time arresting members of the riot squad for drunk and disorderly behaviour. The residents of Kiunga, by now quite used to the glaring floodlights and twenty-four hour din on OTML/BMKI workshops, found the riot squad's nightly revels too much to bear. But Dutton, constitutionally castrated by the decisions in the Bouraga case, could do nothing directly about the problem. He could not himself issue orders for the squad's transfer. His prayers for a surge of clan violence elsewhere were eventually answered and, hopefully, the squad was transferred to be more usefully employed elsewhere.

Dutton was a hard-working MP. Despite being embroiled in several major disputes at the national level, he worked very hard at ensuring that he knew what was going on with the Ok Tedi project (not an easy task), and at lobbying on behalf of his constituents on aspects of the project which he felt might not be in their best interests. Despite having been, in 1977, the only businessman in the North Fly worth talking of and despite his senior position in the two years preceding the election, Ok Tedi had certainly not made his fortune nor had he abused his position in any way to become wealthy by means of the project. He and the companies involved in the project were frequently at loggerheads. Nevertheless, Wobi's claims of being closer to the people (providing by 'people' Wobi meant 'Awin') than Dutton had some truth. Moreover, even if Dutton had made surprisingly little out of Ok Tedi, to almost all of his electorate he was a rich man. He, more than most candidates, had a credibility problem. But to be weighed against this was the undoubted fact that the project had gone ahead during his membership of parliament, that he had helped achieve that and that the electorate was going ahead at a remarkable rate. And, in addition, Dutton remained an approachable, friendly person, a good and patient listener.

All in all, every candidate had something to offer the electorate - a viable choice was being presented. Nevertheless, when nominations closed it was apparent that three candidates alone seemed to be in serious contention. Kaseng might have built up links through the FRPG

and the KLMPAC strong enough to carry him through; Makmop as the only Min candidate needed to campaign vigorously in the other peripheral areas; Dutton was fortunate that neither a Ningerum nor a Biami candidate had presented himself. The other two candidates were both Awin and had thus seriously and mutually undercut each other's natural support.

The campaign

Frankly, the campaign for the election was torpid at best. When I visited Kiunga during the campaign I met three of the five candidates within twenty minutes of touchdown; none was on the election trail, for even the fourth (Gom), I established, was in his home village and the fifth (Kaseng) was in Daru (people thought) not having been seen for some time. Kaseng indeed made precisely the same error in 1982 as Wingen had in 1977. He relied on his formal contacts and his record (which was impressive). He did little campaigning in person, had few posters, and seemingly felt he had the election already won. Makmop spent too much time in Kiunga and did not venture for more than a few days into Ba and Biami areas. Gom did do the latter, on foot, but had virtually no funds and, consequently, not enough time to do the job properly. Dutton was surprisingly lethargic but did get out to the only two areas in which he could expect winning votes - Biami and Ningerum. The lethargy was palpable - except in one case, that of Wayre Wobi.

It was evident that Wobi was energetic and had money. His posters outnumbered everyone else's. Iambakey Okuk's face smiled down relentlessly on the electorate and his finger pointed implacably at the ex-policeman as the only choice for the North Fly. The only election vehicles readily identifiable as such were Wobi's. Gom had none, Dutton's car remained virtually anonymous, Kaseng was hardly ever seen, and Makmop (pro-Diro independent) hitched rides in Swokin's Pangu-labelled utility. But Wobi's Land Cruiser and mini-bus, plastered with posters and megaphone-equipped, cruised Kiunga and the Kiunga-Ningerum road continually.

Whilst there could be no doubting Wobi's energy, the source of his funding was the subject of extremely serious allegations. It will be recalled that Wobi's candidature, supposedly as an independent, had received fairly unusual press coverage as well as having been announced far in advance of the election. At the time, Roy Evara was minister for Primary Industry. However, following Evara's unkind remarks about Sir Julius Chan, Paul Torato replaced him in that capacity in September 1981. Shortly after these events, Torato contacted Dutton to enquire when he, Dutton, would be taking up the remainder of his allocation from the agricultural sectoral funds. This request puzzled Dutton since he had not, at that stage, used any of the funds. Upon further investigation, Dutton established that at least K10,000 of his

original allocation had been used, prior to Torato's appointment as minister, to set up a chicken farming project in the home village of Wayre Wobi. This allocation had been made at some date between Wobi's announcement of his candidature and Evara's dismissal. Further investigation revealed that neither egg nor poultry production in the Kiunga area had climbed above previous levels of zero. Dutton was satisfied, in his own mind, that Wobi's candidature had not only been sponsored all along by Okuk but that Dutton's own sectoral allocation had been diverted to Wobi in order to fund his campaign against Dutton.

Dutton, however, was not particularly worried about the threat posed to him by Wobi and whilst he took precautions, he took no direct action, preferring instead to hold his information in reserve for more fruitful future action against either Evara or Okuk by means of the Public Accounts Committee of which Dutton was a member.

Whilst this bombshell has, at the time of writing, not yet exploded it was in fact virtually the only one that fell during the North Fly campaign. Since all candidates agreed upon the one main issue - continuance of the campaign for a separate province and since most candidates spent most of their time either in Kiunga or outside the electorate altogether there was only one remarkable feature to the campaign - its virtual non-existence.

The results

In 1977 when two Awin, two Yonggom and Warren Dutton had stood, Dutton had won very easily by picking up most of the Min, Ningerum and Biambi votes. This time he faced one Yonggom, two Awin and a Min opponent.

Because of these factors one must be very cautious in interpreting aspects of the ethnic vote. But despite them it is interesting to note that the highest two turn-outs were in areas without candidates of their own and that the lowest two were in areas with 'native son' candidates. Only Ningerum and Min areas break this pattern and, as mentioned above, there are reasons for believing that Ningerum turn-out was higher than my estimate and the Min lower. Certainly, Norbert Makmop claimed that several remoter Min villages were never polled.

Table 4.1 (below) gives a rough idea of the proportional size of the ethnic groups in the electorate. It is only 'rough' for the following reasons:

- (a) it shows figures for areas (census division) which are increasingly less coterminous with ethnicity;
- (b) given internal migration since 1980 it is very likely that total populations in Yonggom and Ningerum areas are too high;
- (c) Similarly, the Awin plus Kiunga group clearly includes quite substantial numbers of non-Awin, whilst the Min area also includes outsiders.

Table 4.1
Ethnic composition of the North Fly Electorate

| Area | Population 1982 (Estimated) ^a (A) | Eligible Voters 1982 (Estimated) ^b (B) | Votes Cast (C) | Valid Votes (D) | Turnout (C-B x 100) (E) |
|---------------------|---|---|--------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| Yonggom | 2,930 | 1,520 | 790 | 774 | 51.6 |
| Awin plus Kiunga | 11,160 | 5,800 | 3,240 | 3,215 | 55.4 |
| Min ^c | 4,400 | 2,290 | 1,840 | 1,822 | 80.4 |
| Biami | 3,840 | 2,000 | 1,902 | 1,880 | 95.1 |
| Ba | 1,045 | 545 | 524 | 504 | 96.1 |
| | 26,425 | 13,735 | 9,347 | 9,244 | 68.0 |

Notes: ^a 1980 census plus 5%, except in Kiunga's case where estimate is based on 1980 and 1983 censuses.

^b Column (A) x 0.52

^c Including Tabubil at 1980 population plus 5% only.

Also from Table 4.1 we can calculate (very roughly) how many votes each candidate might expect to get if votes were cast entirely on ethnic lines. If those who could, voted only for a member of their own group and for no one else then Makmop would just beat Gom and Wobi (assuring that the last two split the Awin vote equally). Dutton would, of course, get none. However, on top of that the Biami, Ba and Ningerum had no kinsman to vote for. If these groups refused entirely to vote for Awin, Yonggom or Min candidates and gave Dutton their votes as the least unlikeable candidate, then Dutton would win from Makmop.

Table 4.2
Votes Cast by Area and Candidate

| | Dutton | Makmop | Kaseng | Wobi | Gom | Total Valid Votes |
|--|--------|--------|--------|------|-----------------|-------------------|
| Total votes % result in each major area: | 2634 | 2426 | 1619 | 1348 | 1217 | 9244 |
| Min ^a | 4 | 89 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1512 |
| Yonggom | 19 | 13 | 58 | 10 | 0 | 774 |
| Awin | 7 | 9 | 28 | 29 | 27 ^e | 2,817 |
| Ningerum ^c | 96 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 929 |
| Biami | 40 | 15 | 8 | 16 | 21 | 1,880 |
| Ba | 67 | 23 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 504 |
| Urban Areas ^d | 29 | 40 | 17 | 12 | 2 | 828 |
| Overall percentage | 29 | 26 | 18 | 15 | 2 | 100 |

- Notes: a Excludes Tabubil
 b Excludes Kiunga
 c Excludes Ningerum
 d Kiunga (votes cast: 289), Tabubil (321), Ningerum (249)
 e In his North Awin home area Gom scored 78% of the vote

The results, shown in Table 4.2, suggest that this is, approximately, what happened. Makmop swept all the Min areas except the Star Mountains; the Wopkaimin there regarded themselves as traditional enemies of Makmop's Faiwolmin but even there he got 48 per cent of the vote. Of 1197 votes cast in other Min areas only 6 votes did not go to Makmop. Gom obtained nearly 80 per cent of the vote in North Awin. Wobi did not do particularly well in his home area (South/West Awin) where Kaseng put up a good show, but still cornered 37 per cent of the vote. Kaseng not only did not get a very good turnout in his area but also got only 58 per cent of that vote. Kaseng was the only local candidate who gathered more than half his votes (actually 72 per cent) from outside his ethnic base.

But, as in 1977, Dutton got over 95 per cent of the Ningerum vote, won two thirds of the Ba vote, and got 40 per cent of the Biامي vote. Together with a surprisingly good vote from the Yonggom, this was enough for him to win. No wonder Dutton's firm rejoices in the name Ningerum Transport.

Two points concerning the urban areas might be mentioned. Kiunga, with a population the vicinity of 2000 persons in 1982 (excluding the high school and construction camps), recorded a miserable 289 votes, probably because many of its inhabitants were enrolled in the census division of their origin; many of these probably did not vote at all. Secondly, the urban vote had nonetheless increased to over 850. By the time of the next election that should have further increased to well over 2000. All candidates except Gom did reasonably well in the urban areas. Certainly, in 1987 the candidates' exhibited predilection for urban campaigning may, at last, prove to be useful, if not crucial.

Finally, we might consider the Biامي. As explained in my 1977 election paper, the Biامي are only in the North Fly to 'make up the numbers'. Their neighbours, the Nomad, are in the Middle Fly. The Biامي have virtually nothing in common with any other group in the electorate. Yet, clearly, if a single, and only a single, Biامي had stood in this election he would have had an excellent chance of winning, especially if the Ba vote could also have been gathered. It remains something of a puzzle why none of the major parties sponsored a Biامي candidate and casts doubt on their ability to add up.

Chapter 5

THE ELECTIONS IN ORO: SOHE OPEN


Yaw Saffu

Electoral studies have encompassed a great variety of topics. From the purely administrative to the unambiguously political; from the ecological to the behavioural; from the campaign to the policy consequences; from the characteristics of the elite to the systemic and developmental import - the number of themes that books and articles on elections have brought under scrutiny has been staggering. Nevertheless, the most enduring concern of most electoral studies is with the explanation of the results. It is easy to show that the standard fare of most electoral studies - party organization; financing of campaigns; social characteristics of candidates and socio-economic profiles of constituencies; campaign issues and so on - relate to the fundamental, integrative theme. This chapter is in the mainstream. It attempts to explain the results of the 1982 Papua New Guinea elections in one constituency, Sohe Open, in the Northern (Oro) Province.

For explanatory electoral studies there has traditionally been a choice among three approaches: the descriptive; the ecological; and the sample survey. The descriptive approach is the least theoretical, and offers only a limited opportunity for comparative endeavours because a great deal of the resultant material tends to be pretty impressionistic. However, descriptive studies can usefully convey the atmosphere of politics, and describe and analyse the campaign, organizational matters, candidates, parties, and so on. All this can, in the end, lead one to feel that one understands the result.

Where election results are, or can be, disaggregated at levels below the constituency, analysis of where candidates and parties poll heaviest or lowest can suggest, more straightforwardly, linkages between ecological features such as economic activities of communities, their religious affiliation, ethnic composition, social cleavages, and electoral preferences. However, as is well-known, there is a major problem with ecological voting analysis: the problem of ecological fallacy. As Robinson (1950:351-7) pointed out over thirty years ago, in ecological analysis we are unable to say anything with confidence about the individual voter simply because the individual is not the unit of analysis. Knowledge of individual voter behaviour or preference is usually far better approached by sample survey.

Obviously a combination of all three approaches is the ideal strategy for a comprehensive explanation of electoral behaviour. However, in this study, there is a heavy reliance on what can be regarded as a watered-down ecological voting analysis, combined with some description. There are no survey data at all, unless the views of a small purposive sample,



most of the candidates, can be so regarded. I have tried to analyse the polling return in terms of who polled what and where. The objective of that is to suggest what factors influence (not to say determine) electoral choice in the constituency.

The first step in the analysis is to present the results, pointing out any geographical patterns that may be striking or discernible in these results. It is such patterns that will have to be explained in the second step by reference to ecological features. Before one embarks on these steps, however, a minimal introduction of the set and the *dramatis personae* will not be out of place.

The Province

In terms of the familiar division of the country into Papua, Highlands, Northern littoral, and islands, Oro Province is in the Papuan region. It has an area of 22,000 square kilometres and a population of 77,442, according to the 1980 census. It is thus one of the smallest provinces in the country. It is in the same league as West New Britain, New Ireland and Gulf, each with only two open constituencies. This is to be compared with Manus, the smallest, which has only one, and with Morobe, the largest, which has eleven. For electoral purposes, the province is divided into two almost equal halves. The northern half is the Sohe Open electorate with a population of 40,900, of whom 24,534 were enrolled on the electoral register. The southern half is the Ijivitari Open. Like every other province, Oro also returns one Provincial member to the national parliament.

There are three administrative districts and two sub-districts in the province. Kokoda district and Ioma sub-district lie wholly within Sohe Open. Tufi district and Afore sub-district similarly lie wholly within Ijivitari Open. But Popondetta administrative district is bisected by the electoral boundary, with urban Popondetta, the provincial capital, and its eastern rural environs belonging to the Ijivitari constituency. Similarly, the Higaturu local government council, one of six local government councils, and the largest, is divided almost equally between Sohe and Ijivitari. Two local government councils lie wholly within the constituency. These are: Ilimo local government council, catering for the Hujara (population 7050), Chirima (236), Biage (562) and Wawonga (1465) census districts, all to the west of Popondetta; and Tamata local government council, based at Ioma, and covering Binandere (3907) and Aeka (2342) census districts. Papua Waria (2033) census district at the extreme northwest of the province has been administered as part of Morobe Province. For electoral purposes, however, it is part of the Sohe constituency.

Although these administrative entities are worth noting, if only because of the observed tendency for such artificial administrative units to congeal into 'administrative district tribes', it is the major language

groups that have to be noted particularly for purposes of understanding electoral politics in Sohe. Although about thirty languages are spoken in the province, three language groups dominate electoral politics in Sohe. The Orokaiva group, spreading out in the Popondetta, Saiho, Sohe, Oro Bay and North Coast census districts is the largest. The group numbers around 42,000, but only about half of that number is in the Sohe constituency. The Hujara group, with their 'administrative district cousins' in the Wawonga, Biage and Chirima census districts, number around 9000, while the Binandere or Mambare group, together with their close allies, the Aeka, with whom they intermarry, number around 7000.

These language groups do not by any means constitute cohesive tribes. The Orokaiva, for instance, are said to be divided into about twelve 'tribes'. As Crocombe has observed 'these "tribes" are very loose units and recognise no single leader, and, before European contact, warfare within the tribe was not uncommon ... Each tribe is divided into a number of named clans ... [and] a clan is divided into a number of sub-clans ... Each sub-clan holds rights over a specific area or areas of land' (Crocombe 1963:5). With such social fragmentation, one cannot always be sure that even the smallest unit will always act together politically (Langness 1973). Yet most of the candidates sought to present themselves as representatives and spokesmen of these major language groups.

The Sohe Constituency

Table 5.1, compiled from the Papua New Guinea National Statistical Office publication, *Provincial Data System (Northern Province)*, July 1981, offers a statistical profile of the Sohe constituency.

Column 1 presents the most significant electoral fact: the heavy population concentration in the Popondetta District/Higaturu Local Government Council area/Orokaiva census districts of Saiho, Rural Popondetta and Sohe. Column 4 indicates that the predominant size of traditional settlements is small, suggesting the high probability of intensely personal, face to face community life in villages as the predominant mode of social interaction. The number of rural non-village settlements in a census district, shown in Column 2, can be used as a rough index of the degree of penetration by modernizing influences. These settlements are those that grew around government and mission facilities such as schools, DPI camps, district administration posts, or around commercial activities such as a sawmill or an oil palm project. The more such settlements there are in a district, the higher the provision of other services and amenities such as roads, air strips, wharves, telephones, etc., as Columns 8 and 9 suggest.

Table 5.1: A Statistical Profile of 'Seto'

| Census District | Resident Density (per sq.km) (1) | No. of Non-Village settlements | No. of Village Settlements (2) | Median Village Size (4) | No. of Settlements with School (3) | No. with Clinic/Airpost (5) | No. with Mission Activities (7) | Other Amenities (6) | Significant Non-Traditional Economic Activities (8) |
|-----------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|---|--|
| Chirima | 0.4 | 1 | 3 | 83 | 1 | 2 | 1 | | |
| Hujara | 4.0 | 14 | 36 | 147 | 9 | 16 | 6 | 1 Bank 1 Police station 2 Airstrips 2 DPI camps 2 Markets 1 Community centre | Kotoda Station (252): small but modern administration centre with all facilities; Escate cattle-ranching Mamba |
| Biage | 1.7 | 0 | 7 | 51 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 2 Govt rest houses | |
| Wawonga | 1.9 | 1 | 9 | 161 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 Airstrips (D) 1 Market | |
| Binandere | 1.2 | 3 | 25 | 134 | 6 | 10 | 5 | 1 Airstrip(B) 1 Govt part of cell 1 Bank 8 Markets 3 DPI camps 1 Govt rest house | Iona Station (73): small administration centre with modern amenities |
| Aeta | 1.9 | 1 | 17 | 129 | 3 | 11 | 2 | 2 DPI camps 4 Markets | |
| Sone | 6.6 | 0 | 18 | 195 | 4 | 12 | 2 | 1 Village court | |
| Saiho | 34.5 | 9 | 25 | 299 (inc. High School) | 8 | 14 | 2 | 1 Village court 1 DPI camp | Awala Plantation |
| Poponetta | 14.3 | 69 | 19 | 210 (plus Theology College) | 9 | 125 | 5 | 2 Village courts 1 Garage 1 Trade store 3 Village courts 3 Police Stations 4 DPI camps | Sawmii, oil palm plantation, coconos fermentary |

Notes: The first four census districts are in Kotoda Administrative District, Iona Local Government Council Area and are largely Hujara speaking. Binandere and Aeta census districts are in Iona Administrative Sub-District, Tamata Local Government Council Area and are largely Members of Binandere speaking. The last three census districts are in the Poponetta Administrative District, Hgata Local Government Council Area and are largely Orokaiva speaking.

One can discern a certain amount of clustering of modern services and amenities around Kokoda, Ioma and especially in the cocoa and oil palm settlement areas around Popondetta. However, overall, it is not the differentiation but the general uniformity that is the more striking. Oro is a province of small, relatively accessible, externally dependent villages under enormous Anglican Mission influence (which the figures in Column 7 can only grossly underestimate), with high migration rates for adult males (at 42.4 per cent, highest in Binandere, but with a median of 29.8 per cent for the nine census districts), and a high proportion of children in the population (over 50 per cent everywhere). Subsistence gardening and fishing are by far the most widespread economic activities. Cocoa, coffee and copra on the coast have been the traditional export crops. They are produced mostly on small traditional land holdings or on government-acquired lands. These crops grow equally well throughout the province. Oil palm, the newest cash crop and, with timber, the biggest foreign exchange earner in the province, is more geographically concentrated around Popondetta. Rubber is yet to get off the ground in the Kokoda area, while cattle ranching appears to be catching on in the Afore area. There are no sharp, distinct socio-economic or geographical differences in the constituency except for the relative inaccessibility or isolation of the peripheral census districts of Chirima, Biage, Wawonga and Papua Waria, and the heavy population concentration in the Orokaivan area of Sohe, Saiho and Popondetta.

The Candidates

Misael Jiregari: 31, attended the University of Papua New Guinea but left without completing his studies. He is from Ainsi, on the Gira River, right in the centre of the Binandere census district. He was the endorsed Melanesian Alliance candidate but he received no material help from the Alliance, because the party was too poor. In 1977, he had contested the provincial seat and had come a respectable third in a field of six, behind Wesley Embahe and the 1972-77 incumbent, Mackenzie Daudi. Apart from a wish for a political career, he hoped that his support for traditionalism, particularly ideas surrounding traditional land ownership, nationalism and the mildly socialist (communalistic?) ideas associated with the Melanesian Alliance would lead him to the national parliament.

In 1977 he had high credentials among his own Binandere and Aeka people. He had managed to convince his people of his selflessness. He was seen as having sacrificed his University education in order to lead them in a fight against what he skilfully and successfully impressed on them would be the sure beginning of a process of peasantization and pauperization. He was fighting proposals by an overseas firm, Parsons and Whitmore, to obtain a huge timber concession in the area.

By 1982, however, Jiregari's electoral attractiveness to his own people had palled. The Aeka and Binandere Development Corporation which he had helped to found in the late seventies had folded up. Further, he had ceased to live among the people after the 1977 election. He had migrated to Moresby to work for a credit institution, coming back only six months before the 1982 elections. In any case, during the three weeks I was in the province, at the highest point of the campaign period in April and May, I did not get the impression that Jiregari was campaigning vigorously. Although he acknowledged that Gegera and Beu could split the Binandere vote, he still believed that voters in his home area, and also the unionised workers around Popondetta - at the Higaturu Oil Palm Project for instance - would turn out for him.

David Beu: 35, from the north-west corner in the Binandere census district, the Ivatave-Bovera area on the Eia River, was a pro-Pangu candidate. After dropping out of High School, Grade I, he joined the Lands Department as a field assistant and went steady with the department for ten years, serving in six provinces. After resigning from the Lands Department in 1973, however, he chopped and changed jobs at the rate of about one a year, largely in the Mount Hagen area. Among others, he worked for Mobil, for Doa Motors, for the Papua New Guinea Volunteer Reserve and for Works and Supply. He resigned from Works and Supply in 1979 to go home and build a base for the 1982 elections. Once home, he tried to start a building contracting business, no doubt expecting that he could turn his stint with Works and Supply to personal advantage. Certainly he sought, and obtained, a provincial government contract to build a house.

Beu and Jiregari are related through the latter's mother who is Beu's first cousin. Beu and Steven Tago, the Sohe MP and Minister 1972-82, and a candidate for the Oro Provincial seat in the 1982 elections, are also related. They are members of the same clan. That relationship, however, did not stop Beu from denouncing Tago most vehemently for alleged neglect of his constituents. Beu perhaps took his Pangu Party affiliation and the party label more seriously than any other candidate, including the officially endorsed party candidates. Tago, on the other hand, was the National Party torchbearer in the province and, indeed, in the whole Papuan region.

Beu had gone to the Pangu convention in Mount Hagen in February 1982 under his own steam and had approached Somare personally to seek Pangu endorsement. But the Pangu executive committee in the province instead nominated Mackenzie Jovopa for Sohe. Beu, as a pro-Pangu candidate, worked closely and enthusiastically with the endorsed Pangu candidate in the Provincial electorate Cromwell Wari Burai, and benefitted from access to Pangu material and organisational support: a brand new 4-wheel drive, T-shirts, posters, handbills, and Pangu *komiti*.

Apart from the joys and rewards of elite status as an MP, Beu's very mild nationalism, encapsulated in his admiration for Somare, was probably the best explanation for his candidacy. He expected his major support to come from his area, the Tamata LGC area, where he claimed to be hand in glove with the councillors and with 'village lawyers', the 'interpreters'. These are persons in the rural areas with a reputation for understanding the workings of the bureaucracy and the modern political system and manipulating them appropriately. They are respected makers of community opinion. Beu believed he had their support sewn up in his home area.

Wescott Gegera: Much older than either Beu or Jiregari, Gegera is business manager of a bakery. Gegera also comes from Binandere census district. He is from Evore, on the upper reaches of the Gira River in the southern part of the district.

George Jambara Inga: 39, was a teacher in Anglican mission schools in the province from 1957, when he was a standard six leaver, until 1969 when he quit teaching in order to grow and buy cocoa and coffee, and also, as he hoped, provide leadership to his community. Inga comes from Sorape, about 80 kilometres southwest of Popondetta, in the Kokoda district. It was from his own people in the district, especially some six villages around his own village, that he expected his greatest support because, as he put it: 'I am a grassroots man living with my people'. His wife also comes from the area. He expected to get some 'church vote' from within the district because addressing congregations after service was his principal method of campaigning. He had no vehicle and no komitis working for him.

He claimed he was an independent candidate without any party affiliation, but from the extremely close working relationship with Steven Tago which I observed, and from the way he enthused about the National Party's 'action image', he was probably secretly affiliated to that party. It was widely believed that Inga was put up by Tago who needed an interested collaborator in the Kokoda District. After all, Wesley Embahe, the United Party strong man in the province, the sitting member for the Oro Provincial seat and thus the man Tago had to beat, comes from the Kokoda district. Thus a local 'agent' who had a personal interest in getting out to campaign was very valuable from Tago's point of view.

Although Inga appeared to be politically aware and wily, his intellectual experiences were very limited. He had, for instance, never been out of his own province. He found it difficult to articulate what parliamentarians do, beyond the blanket view of them as spokesmen for their people. By local standards, Inga was fairly well-off. He put his monetary income from his cocoa and coffee farms alone at around

K2000 p.a. However, two months before the elections, he claimed he had spent only about K300 on his campaign.

Lindsay Tofoambo: 40, from Hamara village on the Kumusi River, in the Hunjara census district, was the United Party candidate for Sohe. It was his cousin Wesley Embahe who talked him into standing. He believed Tofoambo to be eminently qualified to represent the constituency. But, above all, it would appear he urged him on because candidates for the Provincial seat sought to supplement their own efforts by putting up candidates for the Sohe seat. Apart from the Tago-Inga relationship that has already been referred to, it was widely known that Gideon Orosa was campaigning for Kipling Gombo, a candidate for the Provincial seat from Tufi, and that George Korove was Robin Safitua's Hunjara candidate. Safitua, like Gombo, was a candidate for the Provincial seat, and was also from Tufi.

If educational background and work experience counted for more in electoral choice in Papua New Guinea than they do currently, Tofoambo would have been a very strong candidate indeed. He had a grade 12 certificate from Martyrs' High School, the leading Anglican High School in the province, and a diploma in Public Administration from the Administrative College in Moresby. He had worked for seventeen years in the public service, starting as the clerk of Ilimo local government council and ending up as an acting provincial secretary. He had served in fourteen of the nineteen provinces in the country. Tofoambo claimed that, apart from the urgings of his cousin, it was the failures of politicians to whom he had been an official adviser - particularly their failure to provide policy leadership, to have the courage of their convictions and to be consistent in their decisions - that made him decide in 1980 to resign from the public service and to come back to the province to start laying the necessary foundations for his candidacy.

Like all the candidates I interviewed, Tofoambo expected his home area to turn out massively for him. Relations and friends, and those of his wife from the next village, were expected to support a '*wantok*'. He had taken the view that he would not spend time or resources in his home area, or in Biage and Wawonga, where he was sure of the people's support. Instead, he was concentrating all his energies on the Orokaiva areas of Saiho and Popondetta census districts, not only because of their heavy population concentrations, but because there were problems - land and social - caused by 'settlement schemes' that he believed he could address himself to.

As a party-sponsored candidate, Tofoambo had received only K600 from the United Party. He spoke bitterly of the mismanagement of United Party finances by the party bosses. By courtesy of Embahe, however, he had access to a 4-wheel drive pick-up bought with Agricultural Sectoral Funds for a Rubber Project in the district.

Gideon Orosa: Orosa comes from Hanjiri, near Ilimo, in the same part of the Kokoda district as Tofoambo. He lives at Ambene, not far from Ilimo. He is a coffee farmer and a businessman and runs the IJI Cooperative Society a farmers' cooperative - in the district.

Balwin Paul Javoko: 34, a graduate in Civil Engineering from the University of Technology, Lae (1969-1973), had been with the Public Works Department in Moresby. Extensive television coverage of Australian elections while he was on a short course in 1976 stirred political ambition in him. On his return to Papua New Guinea in October 1976, he sought and obtained a job on the personal staff of Steven Tago, then minister for Environment and Conservation. After mutual disenchantment, Javoko resigned in 1979, vowing to take up a challenge which Tago allegedly threw him: 'If you think you are so smart, why don't you go home and contest me?' He went back to the province to work, first for Hebou Constructions as a construction manager, and then as the works coordinator for the Provincial government.

By his own admission, Javoko started campaigning just as soon as he returned to the province. As a field engineer his job took him to the rural areas, building roads and airstrips. He never missed an opportunity to tell people of his intention to run and to make a preliminary bid for their support. But it was as an Orokaivan that he expected to win his greatest support. Javoko is from Koirata, at the foot of Mt. Lamington. His wife, a nurse, is also from Koirata. He was concentrating his campaign efforts in the Orokaiva area only, telling them that as the Orokaivans are in the majority in the province, it was time to have Orokaivans as spokesmen for the province. Presumably because he worked closely with the members of the provincial government, he believed that most of the provincial assembly members supported him and were campaigning for him.

Inconsistently with his position on which group should provide spokesmen for the province, one of the two candidates for the Provincial seat with whom Javoko had a gentleman's agreement to cooperate on campaigning matters was Robin Safitua, the then provincial secretary. Safitua is not an Orokaivan. He is from Tufi. It is true that Javoko's other collaborator, Gideon Pinoko, is an Orokaivan. But one must accept Javoko's denial that the understanding with Pinoko had anything to do with ethnic relations. After all, there were six other Orokaivans contesting the provincial seat. He insisted that their party affiliation to PPP and their personal, administrative and organizational capabilities were the sole considerations for choosing them as his collaborators.

To the public, Javoko was an independent candidate. However, unknown to one another, PPP, Papua Besena and Ted Diro's Independent Group were all supporting Javoko with funds. He maintained contact with all three of them throughout the campaign period. Not only did Javoko believe in casting his net wide, evidently he

also found something about each of the three groups that struck a responsive chord in him. He admired Chan's unabashed and forthright embrace of capitalism, as well as his reputation for efficiency. The Papuan core of Besena's concerns and the dashing, aggressive image of Diro, as well as his apparent desire at the time to promote Papuan interests, also attracted Javoko. But if elected, he said, he would seek to affiliate with a parliamentary group in this order: Ted Diro's Independent Group first, PPP second, and then Papua Besena. It was more certain that he would wish to join a winning coalition. Javoko's prospective electoral supporters were not told anything of this intricate flexibility of their candidate. But then he was not alone in concealing his true relations with the parties from the electorate.

Mackenzie Jovopa: At 58 the oldest candidate in the Sohe Open, Jovopa is from Tojemo village on the outskirts of Popondetta. His wife comes from the same Singala clan. After Standard 7 at the Martyrs' School, he joined the Administration in 1951. In 1957, he transferred to the Education Department to become a radio announcer. Apart from a short stint in the Western Province, his career as a radio announcer was pursued in his own province. Among the older voters in the constituency, therefore, Jovopa's name would be a familiar one. He resigned in 1974 with a view to standing for the Sohe Open in the 1977 general election. In 1977, he stood on the United Party ticket and came third in a field of five.

Jovopa says it was the Pangu branch in the province which approached him and offered to sponsor him as its endorsed candidate. He accepted Pangu's offer partly because of his friendship with Somare and partly because of expectations of Pangu organizational and financial support. With the approach of the election, the Pangu branch in the province had bestirred itself into action, particularly in the cocoa and oil palm settler areas on the outskirts of Popondetta, thanks to the personal dedication of three dynamic individuals: Michael Mattes, who became secretary, Sylvanus Menine, a former patrol officer who became chairman, and Napoleon Aiga, all of whom were brought together and prodded into action by the grand old man of Pangu Party in the province, Edric Eupu, MBE.

Up to the end of April 1982, Jovopa had received from Pangu K600, posters and T-shirts for his campaign. In addition, he had access to the Pangu 4-wheel drive vehicle stationed in the province. But he did not appear to have a high opinion of the other Pangu-endorsed or Pangu-affiliated candidates in the province. As far as he was concerned good men, capable men, came before party men. The ability to deliver quality service to the province was what should count most. He distanced himself somewhat from Pangu and thus largely passed up his option of access to the party campaign vehicle.

Pangu's approach to Jovopa was a shrewd move because he is simply one of the most gregarious organizers and joiners of pressure groups. As far back as 1972, KAPITS Association (K = Kokoda, A = Afore, P = Popondetta, I = Ioma, T = Tufi, S = Safia) was formed to safeguard traditional land rights and press for development. Virtually every aspiring politician in the province joins the Association. Jovopa is the president, and Akoka Doi, the sitting member for Ijivitari, is the vice-president. In 1981, a more narrowly-based pressure group, the Orokaiva - Eri Group, covering the Ilimo and the Higaturu council areas, was formed to concern itself with the development of the two districts. Wesley Embahe is the president, with Jovopa as the vice-president. In 1980, a pressure group was organised to collect signatures for a petition to be sent to the minister for Lands about compensation for the land alienated for the Higaturu Oil Palm project. Jovopa was the president of the group. For six years, from 1974-1980, he was the president of the Higaturu local government council, the largest council in the most heavily populated area.

Jovopa's claim that he is well-known in the constituency is not an idle boast. Apart from his pressure group activities, his broadcasting and his local government work, he is also the author of an autobiographical reader on the Orokaivans (Jovopa 1967). His campaign strategy was therefore simple. He would present himself to the elders of communities and would say: 'I will not make any empty promises to you. You know me. If you want my services, I am ready to represent you ably in Parliament'. He believed that the Anglican mission hierarchy in the province looked sympathetically on his candidature. And he also believed that his age was an asset over the youthfulness of the two other Orokaivans contesting the seat: Paul Javoko and Eric Tikambari.

Eric Tikambari: An energetic teacher who is an Orokaivan from the Waseta area of Saiho, Tikambari started his teaching career in Binandere. His wife, in fact, comes from the village of Manau there. He has also taught in the Kokoda district. He was standing for election because his people invited him to do so and promised him their support in the campaign. He claimed he was not affiliated to any party and was not collaborating with any candidate for the provincial seat. He was relying on young men he had taught to organize his campaign in their home areas for him.

Among candidates with visible party affiliation and party support David Beu was clearly the one who made the most of his party connection in his campaign effort. Mackenzie Jovopa also, in appropriate places such as the settlement blocks around Popondetta, quietly emphasized his Pangu connection. And especially when Somare visited the province in April, the candidates with Pangu affiliation had to come out clearly onto the stage and be counted. But Jovopa did not care particularly to push the party connection in his campaign. All the

candidates, with the exception of Beu, evidently preferred to stand or fall on their personal qualities, whether, like Javoko, Tofoambo or Jiregari, they were party-sponsored, or like the others, their party affiliation remained a confidential matter. Parties were thus, by and large, irrelevant in the elections. Candidates with party affiliation obtained some financial help but minimal organizational help, as the parties themselves hardly existed. So, parties were not completely absent from the campaign, but their profile was so low they were hardly visible, except when leaders of parties at the national level visited to give whatever boost they could to their candidates - as they all did in April or May.

There were no visible campaign or policy issues which could divide, or with which one could identify, candidates. A general blank cheque called trust is what all the candidates asked the electorate to endorse for them. In not highlighting problems such as low export prices, unemployment, and poor performance by the provincial government - and in not specifying their policies regarding these - the candidates showed greater realism than the academic commentators who lamented the absence of such issues in the election (Saffu 1983). As for resources available to candidates, Javoko, Beu and Jovopa were modestly supported by PPP or Pangu, and the amounts claimed by candidates to have been spent on campaigns may be somewhat low. However, it must be pointed out that the electoral campaign in Oro was really a very gentlemanly affair: leisurely, quiet, and low profile.

Candidates tended to concentrate their efforts on their home areas, each relying on personal, kinship or friendship ties for spreading the word about their candidacy and the personal characteristics that presumably made them trustworthy and capable spokesmen. Three glaring exceptions were Tofoambo, who said he was concentrating on the Orokaiva areas because he had no worries about his home support; Jiregari, who seemed to imagine that workers around Popondetta could be shown the Melanesian light and be attracted, not that he was particularly energetic in matching hopes with effort; and Beu, who really believed there was a party vote around Popondetta that could be picked up. It is possible that Jovopa's less than enthusiastic references to other Pangu-sponsored candidates in the province had something to do with Beu's drive to pick up some of the imagined party vote.

The Results

Table 5.2 reveals the pattern of candidate endorsement by the voters. The most striking feature of the polls shown by the table is that voters voted overwhelmingly for local candidates. Only two candidates, Eric Tikambari and Wescott Gegeera, managed to win 5 per cent or more of the votes cast in each of the three administrative districts/language

Table 5.2
Percentage of Poll: Candidates by Administrative District

| Candidate | % of Total Poll (N=10085) | % of Poll in Popondetta District (N=4711) | % in Ioma Sub-District (N=2050) | % in Kokoda District (N=3324) |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| M. Jovopa | 15.2 | 30.5 | 1.8 | 2.3 |
| G. Orosa | 12.6 | 6.0 | 4.9 | 26.7 |
| E. Tikambari | 12.1 | 19.0 | 7.8 | 5.0 |
| D. Beu | 10.7 | 9.0 | 28.0 | 2.4 |
| L. Tofoambo | 9.9 | 4.0 | 0.7 | 24.0 |
| W. Gegeera | 9.9 | 5.7 | 25.0 | 6.6 |
| B.P. Javoko | 9.7 | 15.6 | 4.9 | 4.3 |
| M. Jiregari | 8.1 | 4.6 | 23.2 | 3.7 |
| G. Inga | 7.1 | 4.1 | 2.6 | 14.2 |
| H.G. Korove | 4.5 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 11.2 |
| Total polled by local candidates | | 65.1 | 76.2 | 76.1 |

areas. Mackenzie Jovopa, who won the election, managed to poll only 2.3 per cent and 1.8 per cent in Kokoda and Ioma districts, respectively. Even the weakest candidates, H.G. Korove and George Inga, managed to poll more than their theoretical share of 10 per cent of the vote in their own districts.

Table 5.3 shows that support for candidates is even more localized than Table 5.2 suggests. For purposes of counting the votes, there were thirteen polling areas in Popondetta district, six in Ioma sub-district and eight in Kokoda district. There were thus twenty-seven polling areas altogether. Seven of the ten candidates obtained more than 50 per cent of their entire votes from just three of the polling areas within their own district. In two extreme cases, Korove and Javoko, the candidates polled 44 per cent and 40 per cent of their entire votes respectively from just one polling/counting area. In the case of Jiregari and Inga, the percentage of their total votes accounted for by two polling/counting areas were 47 per cent and 39 per cent respectively.

Table 5.3
Local Support as Percentage of Poll of Candidates

| Candidate | Votes obtained in candidate's district as percentage of candidate's total | Votes obtained by candidate in 3 counting/ polling areas in his district as percentage of candidate's total |
|--------------|--|---|
| M. Jovopa | 93.7 | 54.3 |
| G. Orosa | 69.7 | 58.5 |
| E. Tikambari | 73.2 | 57.5 |
| D. Beu | 53.1 | 47.7 |
| L. Tofoambo | 79.7 | 60.6 |
| w. Gegeera | 51.7 | 34.1 |
| B.P. Javoko | 75.2 | 53.4 ^a |
| M. Jiregari | 58.5 | 50.0 ^b |
| G. Inga | 60.3 | 46.5 ^c |
| H.G. Korove | 79.6 | 75.4 ^d |

Notes: (a) % from just one area = 40
 (b) % from two areas = 47
 (c) % from two areas = 39.2
 (d) % from one area = 44

The order in which the ballot boxes were picked up for counting at the end of the balloting followed exactly the itinerary of the polling teams sent out by the provincial electoral office. Thus, with the help of some officials and scrutineers or agents of candidates, it was possible to say almost exactly where the votes had come from. Knowing where the votes came from and where the candidates come from, live or work, one can conclude with confidence that personal factors were virtually the exclusive determinants of choice in the Sohe Open: following V.O. Key (1949:302) but adding kinship to his formula, the 'relatives, friends and neighbours effect' was in operation. The candidates appealed for a blank cheque of trust almost exclusively on the basis of personal characteristics, and also on the basis of services rendered or capable of being rendered. The voters responded appropriately on the basis of personal knowledge or lack of knowledge of the candidates, which are quite clearly not unrelated to where the candidates come from, live or work.

Conclusion

One can say that Mackenzie Jovopa won the election in Sohe Open because he was the favourite son from the most densely populated area of the constituency. True, Jovopa is an inveterate joiner. He has formed, joined or led many pressure groups. True, he has provided leadership through these and through the presidency of the biggest local government council in the province. His broadcasting career had made his name widely known in the constituency. He was the officially endorsed candidate of Pangu Pati, clearly the most vigorous in a field of admittedly very feeble parties in the constituency. Yet even he did not have constituency-wide support. His support was even more localized than most of his rivals. He did not have constituency-wide support because all the local communities in the constituency were busy endorsing their own sons.

With ten candidates for an estimated electorate of only some 20,000, in a situation of only weakly developed parties and attachment of electors to parties, and a tradition of electoral campaigning on the basis of personal qualities and trust, it is rational for the local community to endorse its own son or resident. After all, the local community can truthfully pronounce on the character only of its own son or resident. And personal virtues were definitely the primary basis on which all the candidates sought to convince the electorate that they merited its trust and, hence, its votes. But, reinforcing personal knowledge of the candidate, was the effect of the ubiquitous *wantok* system and exchange relationships in Papua New Guinea. The candidate's obligation to further the interests of *wantoks*, and their right to claim help, was manifested in the votes which entire villages and clusters of villages gave exclusively to the local candidate.

Chapter 6

THE ELECTIONS IN GULF

Prosey Koiviepomari K. Mailau

Papua New Guinea can be proud of upholding democratic values such as allowing a change of government through votes of no confidence, and having five free general elections since 1964. As in any democratic state conflict among different tribal, language, religious, social, and regional groups is expressed through political parties, which make possible a democratic management of the struggle for political power. The 1982 general election was no exception.

Geography of the Gulf Province Electorates

The Gulf Province is located in Papua and shares borders with Southern Highlands, Chimbu, Eastern Highlands, Morobe, Western, and Central provinces. It is divided into six administrative districts with Kerema as its provincial capital. Other provincial towns include Kikori, Baimuru, Ihu, Kaintiba and Malalaua. The total population of the province is 64,167 (1980 census figures). The breakdown of the population by districts is as follows:

| | |
|----------|--------|
| Kikori | 8,697 |
| Baimuru | 7,218 |
| Ihu | 8,885 |
| Kerema | 7,998 |
| Kaintiba | 14,852 |
| Malalaua | 16,517 |

The total land area of the province is 35,500 square km, including 560 km of shoreline stretching from Bell Point in the west to Cape Possession in the east. There are very few roads and these few may never be extended due to the extent of rivers and swamps in the province. Most travel is by air and river. However, many still travel today by foot along the coastline. As for climate, in the west Kikori has an average annual rainfall of 5766mm inches while Malalaua in the east has 1067mm. West from Kerema the province is continuously wet throughout the year, but the voters will go to the polls nevertheless.

Gulf Province is one of the most difficult provinces in Papua New Guinea to get around. Apart from rivers, swamps, high mountains and steep valleys, and lack of roads, airfares are very expensive for short distances, coastal shipping charges are costly, and prices of consumer

goods, petrol and kerosine are exorbitant. In addition, because of high rainfall throughout the year the province is infested with many different species of mosquito and malaria. These and other problems were faced by the 44 candidates who contested the three electorates in the province.

Candidates

Kikori Open was contested by eleven candidates of whom four had no political party affiliation; for Kerema Open there were 16 candidates, all of whom were affiliated with political parties either as 'pro' or officially endorsed candidates. Of the 17 candidates who contested the provincial seat four had no political party affiliation.

Not all candidates travelled throughout their electorates, due to geographical and financial difficulties, but some managed to use their relatives, friends and other such people as their agents to put up posters. However most of these agents, some of whom were public servants, did not appear in the public meetings in the towns and villages. Perhaps they were merely frightened to appear before the big crowds; or, if they were public servants, they did not want to be seen to be violating the public service rule which calls for their neutrality in politics.

Most candidates campaigned vigorously in their own districts. They relied heavily on party policies but occasionally referred to local district issues. These issues were sharpened by personal attacks on candidates from other districts and by stories intended to give themselves status as proven scholars and leaders in the eyes of the voters.

One candidate told a village gathering that he was the only candidate in Papua New Guinea who had graduated from the world's leading university, the Oxford University in London. Another candidate claimed to be *the* expert in developing all the natural resources that PNG has ever produced. As an expert he was capable of creating job opportunities for everybody and could turn long-neglected under-developed areas, including mangrove swamps, into bustling cities with railway lines, not only connecting major towns in the province but subsequently linking up with other provinces to create opportunities for inter-provincial trade. Two other candidates in separate public meetings told the voters that if elected to the parliament they would immediately become Finance minister.

Some voters are now confused as to why their elected members of the parliament did not finally become the first Papuan prime minister. They are still waiting for the day when their members of parliament will give them easy access to all government goods and services.

Many older candidates relied heavily on their traditional charismatic leadership qualities and condemned young candidates as having contributed nothing constructive to the development of the province. These views were also shared by the provincial government members who claimed that they knew more about social, political and economic

problems in the province than city-based 'expatriates' who only came home to show their faces during the election period.

Only seven out of 44 candidates claimed to have campaigned cleanly and honestly and avoided any criticism of individual candidates or their political parties. This group of seven further claimed that they were all exercising their constitutional freedom to compete for high public office and it was up to the voters to choose who they wanted to represent them in the parliament. They met other candidates in good faith and even helped them with transport, accommodation and other related problems, despite suffering personal attacks.

Some of the seven travelled widely, and were well received by the village people; but their openness and honesty proved to be costly in the end. They stated that they were not Father Christmas, like other candidates who had bags full of money and gifts for everybody to win votes. But giving out costly gifts such as outboard motors, generators, drums of petrol and other material at the expense of the tax paying public has set a precedent for both candidates and the voters. The less well-off candidates find it very difficult to establish committees in the villages if they cannot afford to buy or give whatever the members of the committee and influential village youth leaders and elders may ask for in return for their services.

It is equally bad for the voters to accept gifts from the candidates, because they are allowing themselves to be corrupted to vote for any fool rather than for good, reliable leaders with proven past records. The village people regard the election period as a time for them to get free handouts from the candidates, and as a result Papua New Guinea style election campaigns have produced many political prostitutes. These men present themselves to the candidates as holding traditional authority and being able to influence the village to vote for the candidates who are on good terms with them. They directly demand money or other material wealth in return for their services. Usually what happens in reality is that, as soon as one candidate has left the village for another, they immediately stop and wait for other candidates to come to their village. Not surprisingly, many of these political prostitutes became rich in the election period at the expense of the naive candidates who did not know that they were dealing with men who were not genuine village leaders.

The 44 candidates were all men and they were all married with children. In this day and age, marital status is an important element in the calculation of support. The candidates whose wives came from different villages, clans, tribes, or language groups, or from different districts within the province, were fortunate because their wives' people also voted for them. Primordial ties and sentiments based on shared origin are perceived to be politically significant.

A little over half the candidates were over forty years of age, while the rest were between twenty-five and thirty-nine years of age. The concept of age and seniority did not have much influence on the voters.

There was only one European candidate, a naturalized businessman based at Ihu, and only one candidate from one of the Highlands provinces. The rest were Papua New Guineans from the province.

Before discussing the voting pattern, I shall analyse the candidates according to district of origin, language group, and clan and tribal affiliation. All candidates expected to get majority votes from their own relatives, villages, clans and tribes - and also from their own districts. Most candidates expected not to do well in other districts.

For Kikori Open, eleven candidates came from three districts as follows:

1. **Kikori**
 1. Sarowami Wareke
 2. Allan Ebu
 3. Ivei Kurei
 4. Dodobai Wautai

2. **Baimuru**
 5. Aua Roy Evara
 6. Ivan Ivia Evara
 7. Jack John (Ako Ipai)

3. **Ihu**
 8. Mareko Mark Mauvake
 9. William Keare
 10. Pori Arialave
 11. Leo Kavaua

There were six civil servants, two sitting members of the Gulf Provincial Assembly, one former MP, and the current MP for Kikori Open (Roy Evara).

In Kerema Open electorate there were sixteen candidates from three districts:

1. **Kerema**
 1. Roseva Rovela
 2. Alex A. Miai
 3. Jerome Kevea
 4. Conrad Fox

2. **Kaintiba**
 5. Damien Pio
 6. Aron Noaio

3. **Malalaua**
 7. Jack Loho Mokoko
 8. Lari Ori Ivarapou
 9. Jack Koavea Karukuru
 10. Torea Erekofo
 11. James Haro
 12. Nelson Lari
 13. Leiloro Meakoro
 14. Raphael Eka Oraka
 15. Ben Pukori Malaifeofe
 16. Harou Orake.

The majority of the candidates in this electorate came from Malalaua district, especially from the Toaripi linguistic group, while one came from the Kaipia language group, and two from Kaintiba (formerly known as Kukukuku district). In Kerema district there was a highlander and there were three local Kerema Bay residents. Among those who contested there were eleven former civil servants and two members of the provincial assembly. The rest were businessmen.

The Gulf Provincial seat attracted 17 contestants, all but two of whom were endorsed by political parties. There were four provincial assembly members, five well-established businessmen, an academic and a former MP. The rest were former career civil servants. They came from all six districts in the province.

1. **Kikori**
 1. Ridler Kimave
 2. Kuberi Epi
2. **Baimuru**
 3. Ephraim Nanto Karara
 4. Prosey Koiviepomari Mailau
3. **Ihu**
 5. Ope Oeaka
 6. Virgil B. Council
4. **Kerema**
 7. Itaea Forova
 8. Lama Kaia
 9. Tom Koraea
5. **Kaintiba**
 10. Daniel Miko
 11. Joel Paito
 12. Lemek Kum

6. **Malalaua**
 13. Raphael Karahure
 14. Semese Ivaraoa
 15. Kauti Pikou
 16. Cletus Malaisa Morasoru
 17. Tony Haro Farapo

As stated earlier, party politics do not have strong roots in the Gulf Province and since for all three seats there were two or more candidates from each district most votes were split and many undecided voters voted carelessly.

Voting patterns

According to the rationalist conception of democracy, individuals go to the poll in a highly deliberate and informed way. In all Western democracies this assumption has been qualified by observing actual electoral behaviour, and in Papua New Guinea, too, not least in Gulf Province, voters are not very interested in voting for candidates. They feel that candidates who win a seat in the parliament will not come back to hear their grievances or fulfil campaign promises. They know that MPs live in isolation from their voters and often establish businesses so that they will have something to fall back on when they lose in the next general election.

The voters' attitudes to politics combine lack of interest with fatalistic skepticism. In general, they are not politically motivated; they are in fact politically under-developed: they do not possess ideas and opinions about politics. Politics for such people is simply a vacancy, an unused space. Politics is not much discussed in village social gatherings, or in the houses of the elders or councillors, or in the various village organizations. It is not regarded as essential to the ordinary business of life as it is in the Highlands, in North Solomons and in East New Britain.

There are only small numbers of well-informed, politically aware individuals in the Gulf Province. Most people do not read city-based newspapers (but buy them for rolling smokes), nor do they listen to local and national news although they do listen to radio messages (*Hadibaia Hereva*), traditional music and the listeners' request programmes. Nearly every household has a transistor radio made in Japan but news programmes are in foreign languages such as English, Pidgin and Motu. Though Radio Kerema news is read only in Orokolo, Kamia and Toaripi, this station does not serve the people of Baimuru and Kikori districts for some unknown reason.

As for political parties, they are only urban-based and are not organized right down to the grassroots level. Most political parties in

Papua New Guinea are hanging in the air. So what is emerging in the villages is that even if the candidate is a Pangu or United Party or a People's Progress Party member, then only his village, or only his own clan within the village, will be supporters of the party. Those who support the party are not registered members; they can withdraw their support any time when their MP relative fails to fulfil any of the traditional obligations. Political party machinery, even if established in the villages, will not last for long: the party executives in the headquarters would have to perform miracles to keep the village members happy.

Influences on the Voter

Voting was conducted in some places in the Gulf Province during the wet season. This was one reason why many eligible voters did not turn up to cast their votes. While some voters had to travel for a day or two to the nearest polling booth, others were simply not interested in voting. Those who did vote mostly supported candidates from their own clan, tribe, or district, while others were motivated to oust the sitting MPs or block candidates from other districts.

Others again had been given money or goods, or promised job opportunities, business ventures, or assistance with village projects. For many of these voters, clan, tribe, or district ceased to matter: they voted for the candidate regardless of his district, clan or tribe. It seems that many more candidates will in future elections set out to buy votes. Although such practice is illegal under the existing electoral laws, it is now well established and is here to stay.

The voters express their dissatisfaction with the candidates from their own areas or from other areas by voting for a man and not in practice for a political party. They have little confidence in party leaders or programmes. People are elected on the basis of personal influence, wealth and ability to distribute goods to genuine village leaders. Having plenty of hard cash during the election is the key to victory. As expected, candidates were strong in their own districts but weak in other districts, but candidates who did extremely well in their own districts despite splitting of votes with other candidates came out strong in other districts.

Communications

Candidates can use many different methods for getting their electoral messages across to the voters, including close personal contacts with the people on a house to house basis or through public meetings; but also through newspapers and electronic media.

Candidates must also make contact through formal organizations such as youth groups, women's fellowship groups, village sports clubs, church members' groups, clan groups, and groups of village elders. A candidate's membership in social or other village groups reinforces the

tendency to vote for him, especially if he is supported by the leaders of these groups. A case study will illustrate this. The Purari Action Group (PAG) is very influential in the Baimuru district. Among its 7,128 eligible voters PAG leaders (mostly from the elite) are very influential in their respective villages and in the towns. The MP for Kikori Open, Roy Evara, despite a strong challenge from Ivia Evan Evara (no relation) and Jack John (both anti-PAG), did very well to regain Kikori Open because he did not poll very well in Kikori or Ihu districts. With PAG support he was able to collect votes from those who did not vote for the district candidates. Many were voters he had helped with village projects while he was the minister for Primary Industry in the Chan government.

Variations in voting behaviour are very much dependent on the effectiveness of the communication methods used by the candidates rather than correlating with socio-economic class. It will take a long time before voters will be able to vote according to their social status. There is no upper class, middle class or working class in the villages. Many people vote only because they are still frightened of government officers who might put them in gaol should they refuse. They are of the opinion that by voting for a candidate they are making him rich while they suffer in their villages. Who can blame them? Many people voted under duress; they did not exercise their constitutional rights as good citizens.

Conclusion

The politicians who won the election were generally those who consistently bent the electoral rules of the game to their own advantage. Some even engaged groups of hooligans to tear up posters of other candidates and to threaten opposing candidates, their families and their relatives. Although there was prohibition of canvassing near the polling booths, many candidates did it. In addition some were seen giving gifts in the market places and stores with the intention of securing votes.

The administration of the election was poor in the Gulf Province. Many responsible government employees were not prepared. One lot of voters waited in the rain at a certain polling booth from 7 o'clock in the morning till 12.15 p.m. when the first vote was cast, but the voting was still officially closed at 6 p.m. The electoral officers should have extended the hours in the evening to make up for the hours lost in the morning.

Many voters were turned away because voting was not allowed to extend into the early hours of the night or the next day. Officials not only lacked administrative and organizational skills but failed to understand the people and their geographical surroundings. Those who were turned away refused outright to travel to the next polling booth located in the next village, which in their opinion was unnecessary. This problem

would have been solved easily had the Electoral Commission extended voting by two to three days.

Results

The final results of the 1982 elections in Gulf were as follows:

| | | |
|------------------------|-------|--------|
| Gulf Provincial | | |
| Daniel Miko | 628 | |
| Semese Ivaraoa | 573 | |
| Itaea Forova | 429 | |
| Raphael Karafure | 662 | |
| Lama Kaia | 684 | |
| Joel Paitho | 1,726 | |
| Ridler Kimave | 1,747 | |
| Ope Oeaka | 764 | |
| Kauti Pikou | 571 | |
| Ephraim Karara | 2,114 | |
| Clement Morasuru | 1,451 | |
| Virgil B. Council | 740 | |
| * Tony H. Farapo | 4,083 | |
| Kuperi Epi | 1,464 | |
| Tom Koraea | 1,489 | |
| Lemek Kum | 3,164 | |
| Prosey K. Mailau | 963 | |
| Informal: | 559 | 23,811 |
| Kerema Open | | |
| Damian Pio | 536 | |
| Roseva Rovea | 430 | |
| Jack Loko Mokoko | 636 | |
| Lari Ori Ivarapou | 163 | |
| Alex A. Miai | 641 | |
| Jack Koavea Karukuru | 1,641 | |
| Torea Erekofo | 2,514 | |
| * Aron Noaio | 4,341 | |
| James Haro | 169 | |
| Jerome Kevea | 232 | |
| Nelson Lari | 410 | |
| Leilaro Meakoro | 82 | |
| Raphael Eka Oraka | 244 | |
| Ben Pukari Malaifeope | 97 | |
| Harou Orake | 442 | |
| Conrad Fox | 1,780 | |
| Informal | 289 | 14,640 |

| | | |
|--------------------|-------|-------|
| Kikori Open | | |
| Ivia Ivan Evara | 312 | |
| Pori Arialave | 450 | |
| Mareko M. Mauvake | 420 | |
| * Aua Roy Evara | 2,611 | |
| Sarowame Warake | 978 | |
| Allan Ebu | 2,132 | |
| William Kiare | 266 | |
| John J. Ipai | 590 | |
| Ivei Kurei | 948 | |
| Leo Kavava | 508 | |
| Dodobai Wautai | 161 | |
| Informal | 230 | 9,606 |

Tony Farapo, the Provincial seat winner and a career diplomat, had been aligned with Ted Diro's Papua New Guinea Independent Group during the elections.

Aron Noaio, victorious in Kerema, had been the sitting member and was also chairman of the Kamea Rural Development Authority.

Roy Evara, the other successful sitting member, former headmaster and sometime Leader of the United Party, was minister for Primary Industry in the Chan government.

PART III: HIGHLANDS

Chapter 7

ENGA PROVINCIAL, WABAG OPEN AND WAPENAMANDA OPEN

Peter Larmour with Garry Paia and Frank Kunia

For some candidates the campaign in Enga had begun two years before the general election. By April 1982, just before nominations closed, at least 23 candidates were actively campaigning in Wabag, Wapenamanda, and up and down the road between them. The following note is based on brief interviews with these candidates during a short visit to Enga,¹ the aggregated election results, and two studies of earlier elections (Colebatch *et al.* 1971; Iangalio 1976). It deals with the Provincial constituency, and two of the five open constituencies (Wabag and Wapenamanda).

Candidates

Candidates were typically young and highly educated. The average age and level of secondary education of candidates in both the Provincial constituency and Wabag Open was 31 years and grade 10; in Wapenamanda it was 36 and grade 7) (Electoral Commission 1983: 63-64, 73-77). We asked candidates to estimate the size of the 'base' of their support among voters, how much they had spent so far on the campaign, and how much they estimated they would spend on the rest of the campaign. The results for Wapenamanda Open are shown in Table 1. Neither notion (of 'base' and 'costs') is very clear or well defined, but the questions seemed to make sense to the candidates. A candidate's 'base' is potential as well as actual, and needs protection against erosion. Costs are often not in cash, or may not fall directly or immediately on the candidate. Table 1 shows candidates typically overestimating their base compared to their final vote, though the winner, Kakarya, predicted his final vote with considerable precision. Estimates of costs varied widely, with the winner expecting to pay most. Comparing costs to final vote, Frank Taso's campaign seemed most efficient (65t per vote), while the three lowest polling candidates were spending several hundred kina for each vote they got.

¹ We are very grateful to the candidates for the time they took to speak to us, and to officials of the Electoral Commission and Office of Information in Wabag for their assistance. The visit to Enga was funded by the UPNG Research Committee.




Table 7.1
Candidates' Estimates of 'Base' and 'Costs': Wapenamanda Open*

| Candidates | Candidate's estimate of 'base' (early April) | Vote (June) | Candidate's Estimate of Cost (Kina to June) |
|---------------|--|----------------|--|
| Sai Yuguglio | 2,000 | 82 | 15,000 |
| John Tendamu | 2,000 | nil | 10-11,000 |
| Pupu Kaekin | na | 4 | 4,500 |
| Clement Kuian | 1,000 | 20 | 10,000 |
| Ronald Rimbao | 4-6,000 | 2,448 | na |
| Frank Iki | 4,500 | 2,416 | 2,500 |
| Yupele Enn | 1,800 | 2,263 | 10,000 |
| Pato Kakarya | 3,700 | 3,805 | 20,000+ |
| Frank Taso | 5,000 | 3,049 | 2,000 |
| Leo Male | 1,000 | withdrew | 2,000 |

* Information for Wabag is sketchy, but consistent with Wapenamanda information; Provincial candidates were more reluctant to talk figures.

The Electorate

The electoral roll is divided up by census division, and then into either 'rest houses' (for rural villages); rural 'non-village areas' (schools, missions, etc.); and urban areas (defined as having a population of more than 500). Electors are listed either by 'major clan' and 'subclan' in 'family order' (in Part A) or alphabetically (in Part B, Part C, rural non-village and urban areas). Table 2 shows the number of 'major clans' and 'subclans' identified in the rolls. In terms of size the category 'major clan' seems to correspond to what Talyaga calls 'tribes' (1982:60), and Meggit calls 'phratries', 'the largest patrilineal group that the people usually recognise' (1965:5). The rolls identify 162 distinct 'major clans' in the province; Talyaga identifies 131 (1982:60).

The lists by rest house in Part A of the rolls come from the 1980 census. Parts B and C cover additional people who were enrolled after 1980, or whose names had appeared in the 1977 roll but not in the census. Polling in rural areas took place over three weeks (5 to 26 June), as polling teams moved between centres (generally the rest houses used in the 1980 census). People whose names did not appear on the Table 7.2.

Table 7.2
Ratio of Major Clans to Sub-Clans: Enga Open Seats

| | 'Major Clans' | 'Subclans' | Ratio |
|----------------|---------------|------------|-------|
| Wapenamanda | 37 | 113 | 1:3 |
| Wabag | 28 | 134 | 1:5 |
| Lagaip-Porgera | 29 | 123 | 1:4 |
| Kandep | 30 | 83 | 1:3 |
| Kompiani Ambum | 38 | 156 | 1:4 |

(Source: *Principal Rolls of Electors*, 30 November, 1981)

roll might nevertheless qualify to vote under various sections of the electoral act ('section voters', whose votes, for example, comprised 8 per cent of the total for Enga Provincial in 1977). Postal voting is also possible, but only five Engans had used the opportunity in 1977. The rate of 'informal' votes, discounted because ballot papers were not properly completed, ran at less than 1 per cent in 1982. The votes were counted in Wabag, the winner being the candidate with the largest number of votes. Tables 7.5, 7.6 and 7.7 show the results.

The rolls appear to have been rather unreliable. There seems to have been both over- and under-enrolment. Table 6 compares the number of electors enrolled with population data from the Enga Rural Development Study (Lea and Gray 1983: 44-45). To qualify to vote electors should be 18 years old or over. People 18 years and over in Enga in 1979 formed 52 per cent of the total population (*ibid.*:44). Yet the number on the roll for Wapenamanda is almost exactly the same as the whole population, including children. In both the Open and the Provincial electorate the number of actual voters was considerably larger than the number of indigenous people eighteen years and over in 1979. Perhaps the difference was made up by non-indigenous people, people who had come of age since 1979, and section voters. But turnout in any case seems high, and the unreliability of the rolls must have put great pressure on the polling teams to decide, on the spot, who qualified.

The electoral roll sorts most electors into clans and subclans. A detailed study of polling would be needed to determine if people tended to vote along clan lines. Clan voting might take two forms: all clan members vote for the same candidate ('solidarity'); or a candidate can rely on the support of his clan's people ('favourite son').

If there is solidarity, votes come to candidates in 'packets' as whole clans vote one way or another (similarly, votes may come in smaller packets if wives follow the votes of their husbands). The votes of clans without favourite sons (or daughters) are presumably up for grabs by candidates from other clans.

Table 7.3
Population, Enrolment and Votes: 1979 and 1981

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|------------------------|--|----------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------|
| | Resident and Non Traditional (1979) | Indigenous (1979) | Electors Enrolled (1981) | Indigenous 18 years+ (1979) | Votes (1979) |
| Wapenamanda | | | | | |
| Open | 32,800 | 32,636 | 32,702 | 19,313 | 32,691 |
| Wabag Open | 32,123 | 33,231 | 25,319 | 16,999 | 18,249 |
| Enga Provincial | 166,691 | 159,310 | 136,820 | 89,790 | 95,856 |

(Source: *Carrad et al.* 1982: 44-45)

The National Party in particular was accused of using 'vote splitting' tactics in the Provincial constituency. Vote splitting as a tactic needs to be distinguished from the more general effects of an increased number of candidates, depressing the average vote per candidate and often the winner's vote ('vote spread'). In Wapenamanda and Wabag, for example, the number of candidates increased radically between 1977 and 1982, and the winner's vote fell in both constituencies.

The idea of 'vote splitting' assumes the electorate is 'lumpy', a kind of soup in which lumps of votes attach themselves to one candidate or another. A vote splitter aims to break these lumps up. The electorate, however, may be less 'lumpy' than some candidates think (or hope). Offered a wider range of choice of candidates, the electorate will spread its votes among them on all sorts of grounds, including - but not only - the clan or place of origin of the candidate.

While clan identification may be strong, there are several reasons for thinking that the connection between clan membership and voting preference is not simple and direct. First, clans are relatively small (even in relation to the size of open electorates) compared to the numbers needed to win. (See Table 7.4 for Wapenamanda.) At the very least, coalition and cross-clan appeals are involved in winning. Secondly several candidates described the composition of their electoral bases' in non-clan terms: contacts made during work and sport were also important. Thirdly, many candidates felt the need to campaign - some beginning two years before (Gordon and Kipalan 1983:318). They campaigned to expand out from their base, but also to defend it from splitting or from simple erosion: one provincial candidate warned, for example, 'highway votes can change all the time' (Masket Iangalio).

Votes have to be mobilized, clan or not. Fourthly, candidates talked a great deal about personalities and reputations - their own, and those of their opponents. Malipu Balakau's campaign seemed particularly intensely focused on his own personal qualities. Finally, the unit of 'clan', 'home' or ethnic identity will become broader in the wider arena of electoral competition.

Table 7.4
'Base', 'Share' and 'Clan': Wapenamanda Open

| | | |
|-----------------------------|-------|--|
| Base | 3,125 | Average of eight candidates' estimates in April |
| Share | 1,398 | Average of enrolled voters/number of candidates; indigenous population over 18/number of candidates, and final vote/number of candidates. |
| Clan | 680 | Average of enrolment votes/number of 'major clans'; indigenous population over 18/number of major clans, and final vote/number of major clans. |
| Subclan | 223 | Average of enrolled voters/number of subclans, and final vote/number of subclans |
| Winner's vote | 3,805 | Pato Kakarya |
| Winner's margin | 756 | Kakarya over Taso |
| Average voter per candidate | 1,316 | Votes cast/number of candidates |

Political Parties

Half of the candidates were endorsed by one - or, in at least one case, more than one - of the national political parties. Final party affiliations are shown in Tables 7.5-7.7. Several candidates were less than fully committed - either leaning towards a party (e.g., 'pro UP'), or to the leader rather than the party (e.g., 'pro Somare'). It is difficult to assess what these party identifications amounted to, and even more difficult to

judge their impact on the campaign. For candidates, party affiliation offered the promise of posters and refund of nomination fees. For the parties, successful candidates offered votes in the subsequent election for the prime minister. Hence parties might endorse more than one candidate for a seat to increase their chances of success, and thus the identification of parties with their leaders (who would be prime ministerial candidates). Hence also the paradox that while the use of party identification seemed to be increasing, it seemed to have little relevance to the campaign: party membership was prospective, and looked beyond the general election to the real business of electing a Prime Minister. The general election in this sense was merely a 'primary' through which parties tested and chose their delegates to the more important parliamentary election.

The National Party had set up a branch in Enga in December 1981. The executive committee consisted of the provincial premier, and two officials who worked out of a garage in Wabag and who were paid a fortnightly wage by the party. The executive had endorsed 22 candidates throughout the province: three for the provincial seat; and four each for Wabag and Wapenamanda Open. 'Endorsement' meant that the party paid the candidate's nomination fees, but the officials (Esau and Patrick) reckoned only about eight of these 22 showed 'potential'. Candidates with 'potential' would qualify for T Shirts and access to the party truck.

Pangu Parti organization seemed less formally structured, more personalised, better funded and far more effective. The Pangu effort was stimulated and coordinated by Pato Kakarya, the sitting member for Wapenamanda, MP since 1972, and of an earlier political generation than most of the candidates. Pangu had endorsed one candidate in the provincial seat (Masket Iangalio), one in Wapenamanda (Pato himself), but had hedged its bets with several 'pro Pangu' candidates in Wabag. Pato expected to spend heavily, and was getting some help from Mantons and Bromley, the Hagen company that had taken over the WASO trade store and petrol station in Wapenamanda. (See Ipatas 1976)

Campaign Themes

Few candidates proposed specific policies that they would introduce or support. Frank Iki (Wapenamanda Open) was exceptional in proposing detailed policies for rural development. Several candidates had decided to avoid, as far as possible, discussing what they would actually do in power. People voted leaders (they suggested) rather than manifestos or mandates. One candidate admitted he would 'not openly tell people what I propose to do' (Wabag Open). Another advised more tersely: 'don't promise them' (Enga Provincial). Several candidates emphasized the particular services they would push for (and Pangu benefited from memories of its government's response to a severe frost). The

distribution of VEDF and sectoral funds provided a stick with which to beat the sitting member, Paul Torato, but overall 'pork barrel' appeals seemed to be muted or made discreetly. In any case the provincial government was increasingly taking over the provision of capital works and direction of government field officers. The themes and issues most candidates identified seemed more general and emotional: law and order, restoration of traditional authority, highlands leadership, etc. There was a fairly limited number of themes that most candidates returned to. These included:

Prices: for coffee, and of imported trade store goods. It was implied, but not promised, that a restored Pangu government would restore 1970s world prices: 'When Pangu was there, we had money in the pocket' (candidate, Wapenamanda Open).

Beer: particularly as a contributor to inter-group fighting or domestic violence. This argument hit, particularly, Malipu Balakau (Enga Provincial), who had built support around his promotion of decentralized drinking in 'taverns' during his period as Liquor Licensing Commissioner.

Youth: Pangu particularly picked on the problems of Grade 10 leavers finding jobs. The theme also related to 'law and order' (youth being potential rascals) and 'authority' (the declining power of older village leaders).

Restoration of traditional authority: Peter Ipatas (Wabag Open) emphasized the theme of restoration of local, traditional, or elderly authority: 'Old guys have accepted young guys, and we are wrecking the place. I'm trying to give them back the powers they had'. Ipatas proposed a 'Leadership Act' (rather than a restraining 'Code') that would require leaders to exercise authority, and punish them if they failed to do so.

Highlands nationalism and leadership: The theme of 'matching the coastals' (candidate, Wabag Open) was often linked to criticisms of highlands leadership. The theme of the highlands being ill-served by its leaders goes back to 1972, when Tei Abal was accused of abandoning highlands interests in his equivocation about self government (Iangalio 1976: 299). In 1982 the issue was Okuk - whether he had been excessive on behalf of the highlands, and whether a cooler, more 'graduate' style would be more effective in promoting the same interests. 'Highlanders can lead - but not like Iambakey' (candidate, Wabag Open).

Law and order: particularly tribal fighting. Candidates were fairly reticent about what they would actually do.

Restoration of egalitarian values: The Melanesian Alliance candidate for the regional seat, Anton Parao, called for a return to the values of village life and personal simplicity, expressed in the 1974 report of the Constitutional Planning Committee.

Anti-communism: Sir Tei Abal introduced this old theme that had a continuing usefulness as a way of rubbishing university graduates and the Melanesian Alliance. Parao complained that Pangu also were using anti-communism by saying that, under Melanesian Alliance, 'you will need a licence to kill a pig'.

Rubbishing opponents (and voters): Candidates frequently accused each other of 'buying votes', but otherwise, especially early in the campaign, accusations seemed to be fairly indirect and made by supporters rather than the candidates themselves. Several candidates expressed some hostility towards voters. The electorate, it was said, had become more 'experienced' - demanding but fickle. Some were said to have asked for cash for their votes. There was a special admission fee for politicians at the fenced off *singsing* place at Yaramanda. A sign read: '*ol man i laik tokim politikis: K10.*' Paul Torato, the sitting member for Enga Provincial, was quoted by the NBC (10 May 1983) as complaining that candidates were paying them to the extent that some voters were 'living like public servants'.

Comparisons with Previous Elections: Tables 7.8-7.10 compare the 1982 results with the results of the 1977 election. There was a striking increase in the number of votes cast in all three electorates. The number of candidates fell in the Provincial electorate but increased several times in the two open electorates (there was a similar trend in two of the three other open electorates in Enga). The winner's vote fell in both open electorates, and winners' margins were squeezed in both the open and the Provincial electorates. Generally, the Provincial campaign seems to have become more intense and polarized, with both the winner and the runner-up increasing their vote and share, while the open campaigns seem to have become more diffuse with the winners losing votes and shares as the number of candidates increased.

In Enga Provincial Paul Torato managed to increase both his own vote, and his share of the total vote. Nevertheless he was very closely followed by Malipu Balakau, who replaced Anton Parao (previously United Party secretary, now Melanesian Alliance) as the runner up, and lost by only 215 votes.

The sitting member, Pato Kakarya, was also re-elected in Wapenamanda, but both his vote and share were severely reduced in spite of the total votes cast being increased by nearly half.

The results for Wabag Open show most clearly the effects of an increase in the number of candidates. The winner's votes fell by nearly two thirds, and Albert Kipalan won with only 13 per cent of the votes cast with a slender margin over the runner up. Sir Tei Abal's vote completely collapsed, ending a career that began with the 1964 election.

Voting figures for earlier elections cannot be directly compared with those in 1982: the system of voting (preferential) and some constituencies were different (Enga was separated from Western Highlands Province in 1974). Nevertheless some comparisons can be made. The 1968 election was very thoroughly studied by Hal and Peta Colebatch, Marie Reay and Andrew Strathern. They concentrated on the regional seat, which included what is now Enga Provincial, and on two open electorates in Western Highlands Province. The 1972 election in Wabag Open was studied by Masket Iangalio, who himself became a candidate for Enga Provincial in 1982.

Three themes of these earlier studies seem particularly relevant in 1982: the symbolic importance of Iambakey Okuk; the image of Pangu, and the role of local government councils in the elections.

In 1968 Iambakey Okuk was working as a mechanic in Wabag and stood for the regional seat. Iangalio has it that he wanted to stand for Wabag Open but 'would not do so against his friend Tei Abal' (1976:295). He was not the only indigenous candidate for the regional seat, but was unusual in being 'prepared to argue with the European candidates and stand up to cross examination'. (Colebatch *et al.* 1971:272)

The conclusion of Colebatch *et al.* that 'Iambakey's campaign affected both the course of the [1968] election and the political climate of the period' could be applied equally to 1982. Though standing in Chimbu, his style, record and future were important issues in Enga. He was an authentic, but to some disturbing, expression of Highlands nationalism. He was said to have despatched a truck from Hagen to support Malipu Balakau's campaign for the provincial seat. Balakau rejected the gift, and had the truck turned back before it got far up the valley. The story has an epic quality to it that expresses Okuk's symbolic over-the-horizon importance in the campaign.

Photo Pangu's image underwent a striking reversal between the two earlier elections and 1982. In 1968 in Western Highlands 'Pangu' was a 'smear word' (Colebatch *et al.* 1971:235), used to associate candidates with unpopular demands for self government. In 1972 Iangalio described how 'Pangu was a very bad name that nobody liked to hear in the Highlands ...[Tei] took advantage of this by calling his opponents members of the Pangu Pati' (1976:300) By 1982 'Pangu' had achieved the opposite associations of stability, high coffee prices, firm



**National Party candidate addresses a meeting at Wapenamanda
(Photo: Peter Larmour)**



**Pato Kakarya, Pangu organizer and sitting member, in his office at
Wapenamanda (Photo: Peter Larmour)**



A candidate addresses a roadside meeting near Pompabus. The stakes in the ground are used in pig exchanges.

(Photo: Peter Larmour)



Sir Tei Abal shaking hands after a meeting attended by a number of candidates at Irelya

(Photo: Peter Larmour)

leadership and so on. In both cases, Pangu represented something more than simply a party: in 1968 and 1972 it seemed to present fears for the future; in 1982 it represented a kind of nostalgia for a 'golden age' in the 1970s.

Colebatch *et al.* describe how in the 1964 election local government councils were used as means of getting campaign messages across to the electorate (1971:230). By 1968, however, while the European candidates continued to address councils in the expectation that councillors would lead public opinion, the Melanesian candidates 'did not see these [meetings] as a very effective means of communication' (*ibid.*). Local councils play little role in Iangalio's account of the 1972 election in Wabag, and Meggit has described the collapse of the local government system in the late 1970s (Meggit 1982). The Enga provincial government began to function in 1978 (Scott and Pitzz 1982: 278), and while two members of the provincial assembly stood for Wapenamanda Open, and one for Wabag, the government itself seems to have tried to keep itself aloof from the campaigns (the premier, for example, issuing a stern circular to candidates against the use of 'loud yellers' in Wabag town).

However, Peter Ipatas's interesting campaign for Wabag Open was based very clearly on the Wabag Local Government Council, of which he had become president, and from which he was seeking endorsement as a candidate. Ipatas's campaign was determinedly parochial, avoiding national and regional issues, and calling for a revival of the authority of councillors and older men (Ipatas was among the youngest candidates - just 26). He also made calculated use of tradition ('*moka* politics'), for example in a large public meeting hosted by his father outside Wabag at which several candidates spoke, followed by a careful distribution of sugar cane.

Table 7.5
Enga Provincial Results

| Candidate | Vote¹ | Party² |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| Malipu Balakau | 19,196 | PNG Independent Group |
| Lusan Lolan | 10,238 | |
| Anton Parao | 10,551 | Melanesian Alliance |
| Bill Kuala Laup | 4,173 | |
| Ruth Enda Poio | 1,637 | Pro National Party |
| Lakaia Iki Ekana | 6,788 | PNG Independent Group |
| | (Diro) | |
| Ken Kunia Manik | 3,114 | National Party |
| Herman Yongapen Kiap | 4,367 | |
| Pialu Kamambu Savwene | 189 | |
| Paul Paken Torato * | 19,411 | United Party |
| Masket Iangalio | 15,778 | Pangu Pati |
| Total | <hr/> | |
| | 95,856 | |

1. Figures from Electoral Commission

2. Figures from lists in national headquarters (David Hegarty: personal communication)

* Winner

Table 7.6
Wapenamanda Open Results

| Candidate | Vote | Party |
|-------------------------------|---------------|---|
| Kaewa Wambi | 947 | |
| Pato Kakarya * | 3,805 | Pangu Pati |
| Yupele Enn | 2,263 | |
| Mari Raiya | 148 | |
| Frank Iki Yapo | 2,416 | PNG Independent Group (Diro); Melanesian Alliance |
| Joseph Enn Komba | 1,089 | National Party |
| Roma Ponda | 1,207 | |
| Pao Karep | 793 | |
| Pupu Miokali Kaekin | 4 | Pangu Pati |
| Clement Kuian | 20 | |
| Inu Lei | 1,401 | |
| Saa Ipu Galilee | 1,594 | |
| Frank Yasima Taso | 3,049 | United Party |
| John Minakaso Tendamu | Nil | |
| Sai Yugulio | 82 | |
| Ronald Tipitape Rimbao | 2,448 | National Party; PNG Independent Group (Diro) |
| Lunga Polawa | 839 | United Party |
| Traimya Kambipi (Informal) | 1,533 53 | |
| Total | 23,691 | |

* Winner

Table 7.7
Wabag Open Results

| Candidate | Vote¹ | Party² |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| Paul Kurai | 992 | |
| Katate Yapata | 648 | |
| Robbie Lalen Samai | 1,753 | Pro Pangu Pati |
| Albert Ango Kipalan * | 2,331 | Peoples's Progress Party |
| Johnson Sikita Siki | 503 | |
| Yak Lusup | 719 | |
| Peter Kongone Kia | 79 | |
| Don John Kapi | 208 | National Party |
| Kepane Peraki | 1,605 | Pro Pangu Pati |
| Sokoli L. Warent | 785 | Pro-Somare |
| Mathew Masket | 1,002 | ? |
| Tei Abal | 731 | United Party |
| Leo Nala Igiman | 309 | National Party |
| Tsan Brian Parao Nalao | 517 | National Party |
| Saa Kia | 465 | National Party |
| Peter Ipatas | 579 | |
| Chris Kopyoto | 1,208 | Pro Pangu Pati |
| Andrew Lakau | 350 | |
| Benny Malando | 1,507 | Pangu Pati |
| Lazarus Nia | 311 | ? |
| Dep Kepori Buakao | 715 | |
| Nelson Yakan Kangun (informal) | 878 54 | |
| | 18,249 | |
| * Winner | | |

Table 7.8
Voting Statistics: Enga Provincial

| | 1977 | 1982 | %Change |
|-----------------------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|
| Voters enrolled | 109,063 | 136,820 | +25 |
| Votes cast | 71,755 | 95,856 | +34 |
| Candidates | 15 | 11 | -26 |
| Average votes/ candidate | 4,784 | 8,714 | +82 |
| Winner's vote | 12,850 | 19,411 | +51 |
| | (Torato) | (Torato) | |
| -as % votes cast | 18 | 20 | |
| Runner-up's vote | 12,361 | 19,196 | +55 |
| | (Parao) | (Balakau) | |
| -as % votes cast | 17 | 20 | |
| Winner's margin | 489 | 215 | -56 |
| -as % votes cast | 0.7 | 0.2 | |

Table 7.9
Voting Statistics: Wapenamanda Open

| | 1977 | 1982 | % Change |
|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|----------|
| Voters Enrolled | 23,901 | 32,702 | +37 |
| Votes Cast | 15,954 | 23,691 | +48 |
| Candidates | 6 | 18 | +200 |
| Av. Votes/Candidate | 659 | 1,316 | -15 |
| Winners vote | 6,391 (Kakarya) | 3,805 (Kakarya) | - 41 |
| - as % votes cast | 40 | 16 | |
| Runner-up's vote | 3,876 (Maiokali) | 3,049 (Taso) | -21 |
| - as % vote cast | 24 | 13 | |
| Winner's margin | 2,515 | 756 | -70 |
| - as % votes cast | 16 | 3 | |

Table 7.10
Voting Statistics: Wabag Open

| | 1977 | 1982 | % Change |
|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------|----------|
| Voters enrolled | 17,691 | 25,319 | +43 |
| Votes cast | 13,211 | 18,249 | +38 |
| Candidates | 5 | 22 | +340 |
| Av. votes/candidate | 2,642 | 830 | -69 |
| Winner's vote | 6,326 (Abal) | 2,331 (A. Kipalan) | -230 |
| - as % votes cast | 48 | 13 | |
| Runner-up's vote | 2,368 (L.Kipalan) | 1,753 (Samai) | -26 |
| - as % votes cast | 18 | 10 | |
| Winner's margin | 3,958 | 578 | -85 |
| - as % votes cast | 30 | 3 | |

Chapter 8

COFFEE, CANDIDATES AND CLASS STRUGGLE: GOROKA OPEN

Randal G. Stewart*

Introduction

A serious weakness of critical social science (dependency theory, Marxism) in its approach to the study of Third World development is its failure to link class power with political power - that is, state and party power. The failure is most evident in the few cases where critical social scientists have attempted to deal with political events such as competitive elections.¹ Following Samoff, it is clear that the starting point for analysis is class, understood as a

relationship, in fact two types of relationship simultaneously. On the one hand, class is defined by role in production, as production is organised at any particular moment. On the other hand, at the same time, class is defined by opposition, classes exist only in opposition to other classes. That is, class is

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1 Good and Donaldson (forthcoming) have attempted a critical electoral study of Papua New Guinea, but what Good and Donaldson call 'class' in this context is very similar to the static usage adopted by stratification theorists. Successful candidates are simply listed with their individual socio-economic characteristics, and from this information alone Good and Donaldson conclude that such and such a proportion of the total were from the rich rural classes. This example shows clearly that Good and Donaldson's method is based on the uncovering of inequalities between individuals, i.e., differences in socio-economic status; but such an approach is particularly misleading in the highlands where, due to the lateness of colonization, the delay in education, and the limits on indigenous accumulation under colonialism, most influential Eastern Highlanders will have similar life histories anyway. Good and Donaldson find similarities among influential Eastern Highlanders which blinds them to the important point that, while individuals may look and talk the same, they may have a very dissimilar location in a mode of production.

defined by both structure and process. Neither is adequate by itself (Samoff 1982: 112-113).

This chapter will concentrate mainly on class process (in opposition) rather than class structure (in production) but enough will be said in the first section to show that the competitive mobilization of the petty bourgeois and big peasant class fractions in the 1982 Goroka Open election was based simultaneously on the economic reality of a one-crop coffee economy and the social reality of a class structure whose commanding heights comprise two main fractions: 1) a coalition of petty bourgeois elements united by a network of production relations based on the appropriation of relative surplus value and increasingly removed from the point of coffee production; 2) a big peasant class fraction whose network of production relations is based on the appropriation of absolute surplus value close to the point of coffee production.

This chapter argues that, while class power in Eastern Highlands does translate into political power, the process is diverse and diffuse, for class power does not translate at all readily into party political power. It will be shown that the success of individual political candidates depends mainly upon their suitability as representatives of one or the other class fractions,² a suitability established during the dialectic of political struggle and not determined by the candidate's individual characteristics or background. The variable that seems most important during this dialectical political struggle is the candidate's strategic location, that is the strength of his rural or village base and the influence he can exercise in Goroka town. My analysis suggests that the candidate's willingness to adopt the party label most congenial to the particular class fraction is the least important factor in his pursuit of political power.

Two main contradictions affect political organization among Gorokans. The first is that while class fractions are based on accumulation at the local level, after a certain level of development this accumulation can only be maintained by recourse to state allocation and intervention, principally at the national level. The second contradiction is that while candidates aspiring to win Goroka Open seem to feel they must have a village base in the electorate, the crucial votes which must be won are those in Goroka town. The analysis which follows, if valid for Goroka Open electorate, may also apply to electorates with different material and social circumstances.

² Fractions are understood as competing segments of the dominant classes in circumstances where the subordinate classes remain unorganised at the political level. Competition between fractions is real for, as Poulantzas (1978) notes, fractions, to the extent that they become autonomous, are capable of constituting themselves as social forces.

Class Structure

Goroka Open is a good choice for class analysis of electoral struggle in Papua New Guinea. It is an electorate in which class fractions both at the level of production and in opposition can be clearly defined. This is because the political economy of the area - service industry and coffee production - is not only relatively uncomplicated but is clearly articulated through the development corporations. Development corporations have emerged out of a process of accumulation which began with big men marshalling clan resources to finance their business ventures, and has gone several stages beyond the informal process described by Finney (1973). Good and Donaldson have shown how the process was first formalised with the establishment of cooperatives and savings and loan societies by the colonial state, and then intensely commercialised with the spontaneous emergence of indigenous development corporations. Development corporations are 'the most advanced mechanism to date - far more so than the earlier cooperatives - for mobilising key resources, labour, land and capital, behind the banner of rural capitalism' (Good and Donaldson 1980:24).

The two main indigenous development corporations in the Goroka area are the Gouna Development Corporation (formed 1977) and the Eastern Highlands Development Corporation (formerly Bena Development Corporation - formed 1973). The development corporations were formed at the right time to take full advantage of two possibly unique occurrences: the Plantation Redistribution Scheme provided a setting in which the Eastern Highlands Development Corporation, drawing on the resources of some 15,500 members, could purchase four large plantations in 1975 and four more in 1977, and Gouna (approximately 2000 members) could purchase two well-established plantations, Erinvale and Roka (Mito 1981).

The coffee boom of 1976/77 further enhanced the power and wealth of the development corporations. Gouna purchased its two major plantations at the height of the boom and expanded its service activities to include a controlling interest in Goroka Sports and Book store, a Goroka soft drink company and Goroka Tyre and Battery plus a major shareholding in Pacific Helicopters. Pacific Helicopters is a particularly bold venture which began in 1975 with one helicopter and had ten helicopters in 1980 (Good and Donaldson forthcoming; Anderson 1980). Eastern Highlands Development Corporation also benefitted from the boom, spending some K200,000 on extending processing capacity at its K500,000 factory at Urona plantation. By 1977, after only two years, it was able to repay in full loans taken out to buy its plantations - a total of K350,000 (*Post-Courier* 29 March 1977).

While both Development Corporations clearly benefitted from the coffee boom, for both were ultimately dependent on an expanding coffee industry in a mono-crop local economy, the above pattern of purchases

shows that Gouna had begun to invest in activities of the service type while Eastern Highlands Development Corporation stayed close to the point of coffee production. This difference is important. It means that a potential antagonism exists at the point of production between the big peasant class fraction (Eastern Highlands Development Corporation) based on a network of production relations centred mainly on the coffee industry, and the petty bourgeois class fraction (Gouna) based on a network of production relations centred mainly on service type industries. A consequence of this fact is that appropriation of surplus value by each takes different forms, the petty bourgeoisie being engaged mainly in the production of relative surplus value while the big peasantry are engaged mainly in the production of absolute surplus value. Marx has explained theoretically the difference between the production of absolute surplus value (which is increased mainly through the lengthening of the working day) and the production of relative surplus value (which is increased by putting labour to work with newer and more efficient techniques) and more importantly how in each case the appropriation of surplus value reaches certain limits. At this point real antagonism between class fractions becomes likely. By the time of the 1982 election such a point had been reached in the Goroka Open electorate.

On the one hand, economic activity had slowed down nationally and locally, particularly as coffee prices had continued to fall despite international quotas. Goroka had fallen behind its highlands rival, Mount Hagen, as a growth centre, which brought a deterioration in Goroka's service industry to accompany its coffee worries. Gouna turned in a very modest profit before tax of K17,672 for the year 1979. Gouna's main investment since 1978 has been the construction of a K800,000 shopping and office complex in the heart of Goroka town, but Gouna was warned by its bank manager to slow down and consolidate over the next three years.³ As far as is known, Eastern Highlands Development Corporation made no major purchases between 1979 and 1982.

On the other hand, the appropriation of surplus value by each of the class fractions had reached its limit. The big peasantry are limited to the production of absolute surplus value because the care and harvesting of the coffee berry is a delicate process not susceptible to the introduction of new techniques, complex machinery or developed skill. Labour is unskilled. Little investment is made in its application and little investment is devoted to developing it, for picking is a simple procedure which cannot be made more efficient above a certain level. There seem to be few ways in which labour can be coupled with machinery or developed in skill for harvesting (or weeding) to improve productivity.

3 Gouna Raseloo purchased Marquell Press and had plans for building a cinema in Goroka (personal interview, Andes Berquiest, executive manager, Gouna Development Corporation, 10 June 1982).

In the service activities of the petty bourgeoisie, however, the only limit to the appropriation of surplus value is the present state of technological development and the cost of installing new machinery and developing new skills. In the Goroka Soft Drink Factory, for example, there is a fairly sophisticated division of labour in which workers with different levels of skill operate different stages of the production process. Clearly also the intensity of labour can be increased with faster, more efficient bottling machines, etc. However, the general decline in economic activity had by 1982 made such investments less likely.

A result of the period of rapid accumulation by the development corporations was that the focus of their activities shifted from the marshalling of clan resources at the village level to protecting their, by now, large-scale economic interests, which could only be achieved at the national level through access to the agencies of the state. It now became economically imperative for the development corporations to gain access to financial resources, to seek protection from competitors and to forestall state encroachment on their profits through 'unnecessary' taxation. But by 1982 the development corporations were forced to compete for finance as a result of declining economic circumstances exacerbated by the defeat of the Somare government.

The Somare government's replacement by a People's Progress-National Party coalition in March 1980 polarized the class fractions in Eastern Highlands. The view from Eastern Highlands after March 1980 was that a national government increasingly dominated by big peasant interests had severely curtailed the national reach of the provincial petty bourgeoisie. The big peasant fraction used the opportunity to shore up the declining fortunes of the coffee industry. World prices determine the state of the industry, so big peasant successes could not be spectacular; but in this period the industry, with the Eastern Highlands Development Corporation in the vanguard, had the export tax withdrawn from coffee, dissuaded the Coffee Industry Board from establishing its own export company, saw Development Bank lending for coffee development double (by amount) in 1980, saw the return of a system of bounty payments to producers due to low world prices,⁽¹⁶⁾ convinced almost everyone that the industry had an overcapacity of dry processing plants so that no more should be licensed, and, more sensationally, captured the national government's sectoral funds for disbursement by national (big peasant) ministers - *inter alia*, Iambakey Okuk, and Sailas Atopare - rather than through provincial governments.

Gouna, on the other hand, has not been so influential at the national political level. As coffee producers, Gouna have benefitted from assistance to the industry but, not being exporters and with only a small number of processing plants on their own plantations, the value of this assistance was limited. Gouna's service or petty bourgeois activities have suffered from the national government petrol tax, and Goroka Soft Drinks have not received the assistance which an infant industry like this

might expect from a national government. However, the sorest point with Gouna was clearly Pacific Helicopters, whose plight received little sympathy from the Chan government. Although Pacific Helicopters had expanded its fleet, Gouna believed it would be even more successful if its operations could be protected by the national government from competition by overseas operators: 'Pacific Helicopters must stay in PNG' (*Post-Courier* 29 January 1981). Gouna is now suffering from the antipathy its directors have always felt for national political involvement, (and from commitment to the quaint liberal notion of a separation of business and politics; Hari Gotaha, director of Gouna, is unusual among Eastern Highlanders - an influential man who is not at the same time a politician. In the words of a director of Gouna, 'Business is business, politics is politics' (personal interview, Auwo Ketawo, Goroko, 23 June 1982). This idea contrasts vividly with the big peasant view that politics is business by other means. By 1982, with the recession deepening and a hostile government in Moresby for the first time, the petty bourgeoisie were forced to reconsider their beliefs about business and politics.

Political Mobilization: Town and Country

There were good reasons for the class fractions in Lowa Census Division to engage in national political struggle in 1982. I will show in this section how the parameters of this political struggle were established in the period before nominations closed as fractions attempted to outmanoeuvre each other by standing candidates with competing characteristics.

As I have said, Goroka Open is split into a town population and a rural village-based population. Only candidates with sound rural bases, whose home villages are in Lowa Census Division, stand for election. Yet more than a fifth of the enrolled voters live in town and town votes can be crucial in winning. The problem is that town voters are fragmented on regional and ethnic lines, and it is difficult to determine how to win their votes. The outcome of this situation is what I call negative politics: that is, fractions mobilize candidates who can split the opponent's rural base rather than candidates who might win votes on their merits (or on issues). Vote splitting is actually encouraged by the first-past-the-post electoral system, as I will show. Political mobilization in Goroka Open in 1982 was a diffuse and diverse process, the culmination of hundreds of deals and agreements between all sorts of people, but it was not formless, for behind the backs of all these people was a basic political struggle between two class fractions.

The man to beat in Goroka Open in 1982 was the incumbent Sailas Atopare, Minister for Works and Supply. Sailas was only 25 years old when he won Goroka Open in 1977, some 680 votes ahead of runner-up Bebes Korowaro. On Hegarty's Vulnerability Index (Hegarty 1972) this was a slender victory (a 6.9 per cent margin of victory over the runner-

up), giving Sailas only a 39 per cent chance of holding the seat. But Sailas had good reason to feel he could hold the seat. His village, Goroviyufa, is well placed within Lowa CD, close to the Highlands Highway on the heavily populated Asaro side of Goroka town and, most importantly, it is solid big peasant territory.⁴ Sailas himself told me he had 15 hectares of coffee and 1000 acres of cattle land in Madang Province in 1982. He employed five permanent labourers in coffee production, processed his coffee to the wet stage and then sold it to a factory for dry processing and eventual export. Sailas ranked coffee as his number one earner in the previous year (K20,000), ahead of income from real estate and (ministerial) salary (see table 8.4). And Sailas's party affiliations show a consistent peasant pattern over the years: in 1977 he stood for the Country Party, a middle peasant party, then, after a period as an independent, he moved to the big peasant coalition party, the National Party led by Iambakey Okuk.

Sailas also seemed to benefit from the familiar big peasant trait - much loathed by the petty bourgeoisie and their academic apologists - of using political office to advance his personal political position. Sailas had access to sectoral funds and, being a National Party minister, probably had greater freedom than other MPs in spending them as he saw fit. The spending of these funds (some K13 million in 1981) by national members was pork barrelling of the most blatant kind, something never denied by the National Party. Sailas reportedly told Goroka Local Government Council that 'people expected results from their nationally elected members...the money handed out through the Transport Sectoral Programme was a positive way of showing that members were not useless' (*Post-Courier* 9 April 1981). Pork barrelling is possibly not the same as corruption, as deputy prime minister and National Party leader, Iambakey Okuk, seemed to be arguing in a roundabout way when he released figures to show that Pangu opposition members did as well as government members in the distribution of sectoral funds (*Post-Courier* 20 November 1981). But Sailas's method of pork barrelling was very dramatic. The story is told around Goroka that Sailas used his approximately K40,000 allocation to buy coffee processing machines which were loaded into a semi-trailer and, with due ceremony, given out to every village in Lowa CD with the compliments of Sailas. Sailas could also benefit from his position as minister for Works and Supply. In a

4 It is quite striking to note how different is the proportion of town voters to rural voters on the electoral rolls compared with the proportion of total urban population to total rural population of Lowa CD given in the 1980 national census. On the electoral rolls, the ratio of town to rural votes is 22.7:77.3. In the census figures the ratio of total town to rural population is about 50:50. This highlights the point that many people of voting age in Goroka town do not get on the rolls and do not vote. A large proportion of these people would be circular migrants (Skeldon 1976); others would be in institutions in Goroka and a number would be a floating population.

country where much politicking goes on over roads and bridges, this is a popular ministry. As Sailas says, 'it looks after development and you can see the immediate results' (personal interview, Sailas Atopare, Goroka 20 June 1982). Also because Works and Supply is centralised its minister can easily claim credit for his department's activities. All these factors suggest that Sailas was in a strong position to overcome Hegarty's Vulnerability Index and retain Goroka Open in 1982.

To defeat Sailas, his opponents had to win town votes.⁵ What would do this? Fragmentation on racial and regional lines has resulted from the uneven development of capitalism in Papua New Guinea. Because the highland towns were born late and grew rapidly in their early stages, they rely quite heavily on imported labour and capital (expatriate and 'other' national). In Goroka, expatriates - most of whom are now citizens - played an important role in the early growth of the town, and today they are still prominent in commercial activities,⁶ and the provincial government administration.⁷ But neither 'expatriate' citizens nor their

⁵ For example, the retail sector is divided between foreign-owned companies (Steamships, Burns Philp, Collins and Leahy) and companies owned by members of the petty bourgeoisie. However, Goroka is notable in Papua New Guinea for the extent to which the retail sector is dominated by foreign-owned companies. The weighted urban average for purchases of all goods by type of outlet and type of expenditure in the nationwide 1975-76 Household Expenditure Survey showed an average of K19.79 per fortnight per household was spent at listed (foreign) outlets, while K43.68 per fortnight per household was spent at trade stores. In Goroka the expenditure pattern was reversed: K30.79 was spent at listed (foreign) outlets and only K17.68 at trade stores. See *Household Expenditure Survey 1975-76 Bulletin No. 8. Purchases of Goods at various types of Retail Outlets*, National Statistical Office, Port Moresby.

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⁷ I was told there were more expatriates in the provincial secretariat in 1982 than a few years before. It is argued that, initially, when the provincial secretariat was staffed entirely with Eastern Highlanders, there was more conflict in the provincial government, for these officers tended to get involved politically. Expatriates on the other hand are thought to be able to remain apolitical, merely giving policy advice (personal interview,

petty bourgeois national competitors are a large town constituency, for they are significantly outnumbered by those employed in salaried government service. Most of these national public servants come from outside the province. Garnaut, Wright and Curtain noted in 1977 that only 28 per cent of those employed by the government in Goroka came from Eastern Highlands Province (Garnaut, Wright and Curtain 1977). Most of these other nationals do not own homes in Goroka and probably consider themselves temporary residents, so it is difficult to identify any basis for a stable political commitment among them.⁸ At the provincial level, state functionaries do not constitute a class or class fraction, for they are not directly engaged in the appropriation of surplus value and are not effective at the level of class process (i.e., in opposition to other classes or class fractions). For this reason their votes are up for grabs, but also for this reason and, because of the internal fragmentation of this category, no candidate is sure how to grab them.

Also floating are the votes of the less skilled wage earners, both inside and outside government employment. The workers at present do not constitute a class, for, while they share the experience of having their surplus value appropriated, the regional and ethnic differences among them diffuse class process, and working class opposition to other classes or fractions has not yet been clearly expressed at the political level.⁹ It is difficult also, then, to identify any stable political commitment among a differentiated, unrepresented working class. The same is true of the other large groups in Goroka town, women, the lumpenproletariat and the unemployed, many of whom are non-voters.

Because winning town votes is difficult, mobilization generally takes the negative form of standing second line and even third line candidates to split the rural vote of rival candidates. Negative politics - vote splitting - is actually encouraged by the first-past-by-the-post system which

Craig McConaghy, provincial projects officer, Eastern Highlands provincial government), Goroka, 18 June 1982).

- 8 According to Diana Howlett (1976:252) 'Administration employees frequently transferred to other districts after two or three years in a post ...'. However the frequency of movement may be less since the establishment of provincial government and localization of the government service.
- 9 According to Garnaut, Wright and Curtain (1977:181), 'jobs requiring little educational experience and few skills are filled by people from adjacent village areas unless the town is located in a prosperous rural region, in which case migrants are drawn from poorer, more distant areas'. Goroka is the centre of a prosperous rural area, so non-skilled wage labourers are mainly from Chimbu, while semi-skilled wage labourers generally come from the peri-urban villages near Goroka.

makes it possible for electorates to be won with a very small number of total votes.¹⁰

The obvious person to represent the petty bourgeoisie in opposition to Sailas and the big peasantry was the 1977 runner-up, Bebes Korowaro. Bebes was personally acceptable to the petty bourgeoisie; he was tertiary educated, (see table 8.3) articulate and worldly. He had been to Port Moresby. Bebes had no coffee and was not involved in coffee politics at all. Indeed, Bebes told me he had no business interests, for he did not believe in 'going in for business while in politics' (personal interview, Bebes Korowaro, Goroka, 7 June 1982). But Bebes had long been prominent in Goroka town, first as an NBC radio announcer and more recently as a member of the provincial secretariat, and he had a solid rural base on the Asaro side of town.

Bebes is also what might be called a professional politician, for his political loyalties tend to shift, partially in accordance with the state of the fractional struggle, but mainly as a consequence of the deals he has been able to negotiate for himself. This was evident in 1977 when he stood as a United Party candidate in an attempt to win both big peasant and petty bourgeois votes; and it was evident again in 1982 when he continued to flirt with both Pangu and the PPP at a very late stage. Bebes initially sought PPP endorsement (some say he was actually endorsed by PPP), for he may have had in mind that PPP, being in the government, might be in a stronger position to assist candidates financially. But Bebes is very astute and would have known that he could not win Goroka Open without petty bourgeois backing, and he must have soon discovered that the petty bourgeoisie were not backing PPP in this election. Thus, he may have sought PPP endorsement in order to put greater pressure on his petty bourgeois backers and perhaps to wring further concessions out of them (a ministry perhaps?).

Such a situation would not have bothered the petty bourgeoisie in past elections. In the past, they would probably have swung behind Koni Aize (then an alternative petty bourgeois candidate) either to frighten Bebes or because of genuine support for Koni. The fact that Koni was also a committed PPP candidate would not have worried the petty bourgeoisie in the past because until 1979 the PPP was part of a national government with obvious petty bourgeois complexion. A petty bourgeois government in Port Moresby assured the national reach of the local petty bourgeoisie, and in 1977 they could even afford the luxury of splitting support between Bebes and Koni and thus losing the seat. By 1982,

¹⁰ The problem with tracing the process of mobilization in the manner I propose is that no informant fully understands it, and most are reluctant to discuss it during the election period. Candidates themselves are cautious at this time, for they invest considerable time and personal money in campaigning and are not prepared during an election, or even later, to admit that they might have been vote-splitting rather than trying to win the seat.

however, things had changed. The PPP had joined with the big peasant National Party to form the government in Port Moresby, an act of class suicide at a time of economic crisis. The PPP was duly rejected at the polls by large sections of the petty bourgeoisie. The party has developed a dual personality which seriously impairs its ability to compete in a situation where the political struggle is polarized. Koni Aize (eventually endorsed by PPP) is himself a living example of this dualism, for his interests straddle both petty bourgeois and big peasant networks of production relations. Koni earns his living through wages as an ambulance driver but is, by association, involved in big peasant politics, for his seven acres of coffee are managed by ANGCO, a coffee export company owned by the government but staffed by people with big peasant connections, such as Ben Sabumei. Koni is an attractive candidate because his job makes him well known in the town and his village is Gama (or Kama) upon whose land Goroka town was built. Koni's village base opened up the exciting prospect that he could win town votes in the way others win rural votes. However, in 1982 his commitment to PPP and his association with ANGCO made him unacceptable to the petty bourgeoisie, even for tactical purposes.

The local petty bourgeoisie clearly had no alternative in 1982 but to have their representative for Goroka Open labelled a Pangu candidate, but it is important to emphasize that this outcome depended upon the distinctive national and local circumstances that existed at the time. By September 1981 elements within the petty bourgeoisie who wanted Bebes as their representative and needed him to wear the Pangu label were getting desperate. Pangu endorsements were to be held in mid-October but Bebes was still flirting with other parties in early September. Some further pressure on Bebes was needed and this emerged with a serious new contender for the Pangu endorsement, Sali Hurtuve. Sali resigned from his job as a carpenter with Goroka's largest construction company, Summerscales and Lambert (Hari Gotaha and Auwo Ketauwo are directors), and began actively campaigning for the Pangu endorsement. Sali is a nice man but an inexperienced politician, who seemed to find campaigning somewhat bewildering. In many ways he was an unlikely petty bourgeois candidate. He had no apparent town appeal, for he is not well educated and has few contacts in the state bureaucracy. Sali grows coffee in two fairly large gardens but seems not to have become embroiled in coffee politics. Sali's main advantage as a candidate at this stage was his rural base close to Sailas's. (His home village is Gotiyufa.) He might have been able to draw rural votes away from the big peasant incumbent and, if Bebes did stand for PPP, Sali could possibly have split Bebes' rural base by drawing on the support of his wife's relations in Sezuha village, near Bebes' home village, Masilakaiufa.

Sali's candidacy had the effect of bringing Bebes into Pangu Pati and, after a bitter fight within the organization, Pangu endorsed Bebes

(see *Post-Courier* 15 October 1981). The support of Auwo Ketauwo, a director of Gouna, was probably crucial to this outcome. Auwo later authorized Bebes' election posters and quietly campaigned for him. It is not known how the outcome was explained to Sali, although being a good natured man and a loyal Pangu supporter, he probably felt that the best man won. Sali was an asset for the petty bourgeoisie as a second line candidate, for he could still attempt to split Sailas's rural base but could be encouraged not to work against Bebes' rural base. And his Pangu loyalty was an asset to Pangu's Eastern Highlands provincial member, Barry Holloway, for Sali did not hesitate to promote Holloway and probably drew many votes to him in Lowa CD.

The support from the petty bourgeoisie for Bebes as an endorsed Pangu candidate created some worries for the big peasantry. In particular, Bebes' prominence in town and possible support from his former workmates in the provincial bureaucracy had to be countered. The second line candidate chosen for this purpose was Joe Iraiwiwi, executive officer to the Premier before his nomination. Joe was young, tertiary educated and well travelled. He was born in Lowa CD, so had a firm rural base. Joe told me he had no coffee trees, nor was he involved in any way in the coffee industry (personal interview, Joe Iraiwiwi, 8 June 1982). He was expected merely to keep town votes away from Bebes, so was not expected to join the National Party nor to endorse big peasant policies. In fact his purpose was more likely to be achieved if he appeared aloof from the big peasantry and this he did, standing as an independent. Joe probably performed this service for the big peasantry as part of the deal that gave Eastern Highlands premier, James Yanepa, the National Party endorsement for the Eastern Highlands Provincial seat. Yanepa wanted National Party endorsement because, he told me, 'You can see true and honest leadership in Iambakey (Okuk) at the national level'. But his long support for Pangu and opposition to the National Party probably meant that he had to make many promises to get the endorsement (personal interview, James Yanepa, Goroka, 14 June 1982). Joe Iraiwiwi campaigned quietly and may not have relished the assignment, although his results suggest he fulfilled his task as a second line candidate.

There were two other candidates who may have been useful to the two class fractions as third line candidates, although at this level the connections between the fractions and the candidates becomes more distant. Patrick Gehapine, university educated, holder of a commercial pilot's licence, and an auctioneer, clearly had a petty bourgeois background and was connected through Paul Ine, owner of a dress factory in Goroka and the man who authorised Gehapine's posters, into the network of petty bourgeois production relations. However, both Ine and Gehapine are known around Goroka for their outlandish behaviour and seem to have fallen out with important sections of the petty bourgeoisie. However, Gehapine and Ine were useful, as we will see in

the next section, in organizing opposition on the retail sales tax issue and putting the blame for this tax on the National Party minister for Works and Supply, may have been a third line big peasant candidate. His village location (Okiyufa) suggested he might be able to split Bebes' rural base, and he was well known in town. Hoffman was very reticent about his coffee sales and defensive about his earnings, so it is difficult to chart his place in production relations (personal interview, Hoffman Aize, 7 June 1982). The two overt Country Party candidates, Doctor Hietire and Paul Matimo, were of little interest for reasons suggested earlier, nor was the Country Party's covert candidate, Robin Saho (indeed Saho went to some length to hide his Country Party affiliation). The saddest candidate was Clancy Atuwara Piholowa, former school headmaster, who campaigned very hard but polled abysmally, probably because he never understood that the election was a competition between class fractions, a legacy perhaps of taking civics lessons a bit too seriously.

The Political Campaign National Influences and Local Issues

The campaign in Goroka Open during 1982 was essentially a local one. National influences were felt, national symbols were used and national personalities appeared but these were important only insofar as they could be fitted into a local context. Candidates raised almost all their campaign funds locally; very little was contributed by the parties' national organizations. Pangu was clearly the best organized party in Goroka Open, but my analysis sees party as among the least important variables affecting political outcomes. Hence it is understandable that most parties were not very well organised in Goroka Open. Barry Holloway's organization for the Eastern Highlands Provincial campaign was outstanding, but Holloway had little direct influence on the result in Goroka Open as he and the Pangu candidate were not very supportive of each other. The most eventful visit to the electorate by a national leader was Okuk's. He spoke at a rally on the local issue of Provincial retail sales tax.

Papua New Guinea elections are not generally noted as struggles over identifiable political issues. Much of the political competition is covert: in Goroka Open the subterranean manoeuvrings of class fractions in the process of political mobilisation. However, in 1982 the Eastern Highlands provincial government's imposition of a 3 per cent retail sales tax did emerge as a major election issue. The tax had been under preparation for some time in the provincial secretariat, and was presented to cabinet for approval in December 1981. Cabinet balked: the political implications of the introduction of such a tax were difficult for the politicians to swallow, and the tax was delayed. The tax came into effect on 1 May, less than two months before the beginning of polling in the national election, which was very bad timing, for it allowed opponents of the tax to combine with enemies of the Premier and the National Party

in protest (*Post-Courier* 13 May 1982). Huge rallies were held in Goroka town, organized by Paul Ine, Patrick Gehapine and John Kihena (pro-Pangu candidate for Henganofi electorate), who tried to blame the National Party for the tax. Gehapine told me: 'We told the shopkeepers to close up at the time of the rally or we'll ransack them. One fast food guy took ten minutes too long, so people just came in and took everything, bags of rice, etc., out of the shop. It cost him K10,000' (personal interview, Patrick Gehapine, 13 June 1982). Generally, however, traders were as much opposed to the tax as anyone and went out of their way to ensure consumers knew they were being forced to levy the tax (Goroka Book and Sports Store (a Gouna Company) charged 15.5 toea for the *Post-Courier* for weeks, despite the fact that there is no half toea coin in Papua New Guinea; customers had to pay 16 toea and in return received the newspaper and some boiled lollies.

Premier Yanepa never repudiated the tax throughout the campaign, despite the pressure on him from Okuk, among others, to drop it. Yanepa felt people would respect him because he stuck to his guns, (personal interview, James Yanepa, 14 June 1982) but Yanepa's poor showing at the polls suggests the tax did have an effect on his personal vote. It is difficult, though, to identify any other effect the tax had on voting patterns. Candidates could not agree on which section of the population in the electorate would be most affected by the tax. Yanepa said villagers were not concerned about the tax and this view was supported by Doctor Hietire, a village politician, who said he accepted it (personal interview, Doctor Hietire, 8 June 1982). However, both Sailas and Bebes said the villagers were feeling the pinch of an extra tax during a time of low coffee prices. These men were also concerned that the tax would drive business away from the province. Joe said he was keeping out of the sales tax issue.

The tax issue puzzled me, for I received very surprised reactions from all candidates when I asked the question, 'What do you say when voters ask you about your views on the retail sales tax?' Perhaps people did not ask this question of candidates because they have a clear notion of the separate levels of government and thus regarded the question of provincial retail sales tax as irrelevant for candidates in national electorates. It is more likely, however, as suggested throughout this paper, that because votes are not gathered in Papua New Guinea on the basis of candidates' positions on issues so candidates are not asked questions about them.

Few other topics arose during the campaign that could be called election issues. All candidates and voters were concerned about the decline in the economy, but this concern was not translated into any specific policy proposal. Petty bourgeois candidates talked generally about the government's mismanagement and occasionally about corruption over the sectoral funds programme. These candidates argued that Papua New Guinea was well managed under former prime minister

Somare and that a return to a Pangu-led government must lead to economic improvement. Big peasant candidates spoke less optimistically about the economy and more concretely about loosening up the conditions for Development Bank loans as a way of stimulating the economy. However, all candidates noted that Papua New Guinea's economy was subject to the vagaries of the world market and that there was little a Papua New Guinea government could do about commodity prices. All candidates relied rather heavily on party platforms to answer policy questions. This was so even in the case of independent candidates who simply lifted policies from party platforms with which they had little connection. The Pangu platform of support for youth struck a happy chord everywhere, but no-one really knew what the policy meant. The packaging of policies by national parties is useful for poorly educated candidates as a means of impressing even less well educated voters.

Campaigning is very expensive, but if candidates are to be believed almost all of the money spent was personal money with very little coming from business or the political parties. Whatever happened in 1982 it seems unlikely that personal funding of election campaigns will be adequate in the future, although many candidates seem to have almost a moralistic opposition to accepting cash donations. This moralism or naivety was evident at various times throughout the campaign period and especially during the long, three-week polling period. For example, everyone seemed to treat my suggestion that candidates might pass out how-to-vote cards as somehow subversive, and many felt such a tactic would be illegal, although I am certain it is not. Also, candidates were very hesitant to appear anywhere near a polling booth, and generally kept a fairly low profile during polling. Most candidates arrived at the polling booth very early in the morning to put up their posters but hurried off before any voters appeared. This modest physical presence of candidates during the three week polling probably had a lot to do with the form campaigning took during this period. In particular, the use of identifiable symbols helped to keep the candidate's presence in the mind of the voter. Pangu were superb at the manipulation of symbols, ranging from bright green flags and emblems on supporters' trucks to night convoys of trucks touring the area playing distinctive theme music on loudspeakers and with supporters in the back chanting 'Bebes' and 'Pangu'.

Campaigning also took the form of continued protests against officials who were manning the polling booths. The whispering vote and the question of section 141 votes caused complaints. Scrutineers were expected by candidates to supervise the procedure for whispering votes by illiterates to officials through a witness, but they themselves were kept some distance away from the whisperings, and they seemed rarely to trust the official or the witness. At many polling stations only voters who could show that their name was omitted through a printing error

(i.e., could show they had actually enrolled), or who could convince the official they had made an attempt to get on the Goroka Open rolls for a national election, were given a Section 141 vote. In other electorates I visited returning officers seemed to be more lenient with section 141 votes. The rolls themselves were a source of antagonism, for it became evident early during polling that many people were not on them. Even among the eight government employees who were the polling officials for Goroka Open, only two people were on the roll. One official was omitted through a printing mistake, but because he had proof of his application to enrol he got a section 141 vote. Another official could show he voted in 1977 and thus was also given a section 141 vote. Two other officials could not vote because they had changed their place of residence and had not bothered to enrol in Goroka Open, and two other officials had only just turned eighteen and did not know they had to enrol to vote (personal interview, Daryl Woodward, Returning Officer, Goroka Open Electorate, 5 June 1982) These were all educated people, half of whom had failed to enrol. One can only imagine how many migrant labourers, women and informally employed men from village backgrounds were also disenfranchised, although some poll officials were liberal in allowing section 141 votes.

Results

The results of the election are presented in Table 2. The total vote was below the figure on the rolls - 13,452 compared with 16,368, and the town/country proportion in the actual vote was approximately the same as on the rolls (19:81 instead of 22:78). Bebes won a slender victory over Silas, 3,250 votes to 2,993. The two leaders polled well ahead of a group of middle candidates who polled around the 1,000 vote mark. It seems likely that the candidates from the middle group who stood in order to split rural votes from the leaders (Sali from Silas, Hoffman from Bebes) not only failed but may have lost rural votes to the leader they were trying to split. Perhaps leaders can pick up rural votes in the fringe areas of the electorates where the local village candidate is not taken too seriously. However it seems likely that the other middle level candidates held their rural base intact except Clancy, who came from the same village as Sali and probably lost most of his rural votes to Sali.

Conclusion

Most accounts of electoral struggle in Papua New Guinea ignore class altogether as a basis for political mobilization. Premdas and Steeves' (1983) observations on the 1982 elections, for example, embody an unresolved contradiction: they say that in many areas party labels are significant variables, but that loyalty remains parochial, very much village and clan based. Yet without the concept of class they have no analytical

tool for linking party with ethnicity and thus exploring the contradiction. This paper has attempted to analyse the linkage between class, party and ethnicity in one electorate. It has shown that class fractions do exist and were indeed the mobilizing forces in the Goroka Open election of 1982. Class fractions selected candidates to represent the fraction in opposition to other fractions. The selection process is determined not by the candidate's individual characteristics or background, but by his potential for winning or vote splitting, which depends in turn on his strategic location in town and country. The study has also shown that the mobilisers were flexible in their choice of party label, and this should not surprise, given that parties in Papua New Guinea remain caucus parties and not mass parties.

Table 8.1
Final Results, Goroka Open Election 1977

| | |
|-----------------------|-------|
| Atau Waukavi | 1,168 |
| Buka Vitovito | 444 |
| Koni Aize | 1,981 |
| Binn Nalehupa Aravaki | 426 |
| Oreve Janis | 313 |
| Silas Atopare | 2,796 |
| P.J. Gehapine | 484 |
| Patrick Akunai Rove | 498 |
| Bebes Korowaro | 2,116 |

Source: *Post Courier*, 13 July 1977, p.5.

Table 8.2
Final Results, Goroka Open Election, 1982

| | |
|-------------------------|-------|
| Patrick Gehapine | 1,166 |
| Silas Atopare | 2,993 |
| Bebes Korowaro | 3,250 |
| Clancy Atuwara Piholowa | 548 |
| Sali Hurutuve Y.G. | 944 |
| Robin Saho | 523 |
| Joe Iraiwo Wiwiao | 1,205 |
| Doctar Hietire | 248 |
| Hoffman Ohuma Iize | 840 |
| Paul Matimo | 322 |
| Koni Aize | 1,235 |

Source: Daryl Woodward, Returning Officer, Goroka Open Electorate, 1982.

Table 8.3
Personal and Party Details

| Candidate | Age and Occupation | Party | Began Campaigning | Political Experience | Money Spent |
|------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|-------------|
| Bebes Korowaro | 36, NBC; provincial secretariat | Pangu (endorsed) | November 1981 | Stood in 1971 | K9,000 |
| Sailas Atopare | 29, national government minister | National Party | Sitting Member | Sitting Member | n.a. |
| Koni Aize | 34, ambulance driver | PPP | Early 1981 | Stood in 1972, 1977 | K4,500 |
| Joe Irairo Wiwiao | 27, executive officer | No party, pro-Pangu | November 1981 | No experience | K2,500 |
| Patrick Gehapine | 34, auctioneer | No party | September 1981 | Stood in 1977 | K7,500 |
| Sali Hurutuve | 38, carpenter | Pro-Pangu | September 1981 | No experience | K4,000 |
| Hoffman Ohuma Iize | 45, provincial minister | Pro-Pangu | March 1982 | Provincial experience | K3,400 |
| Clancy Atuwara Pholowa | 29, teacher | Liberal Party | February 1982 | No experience | K2,000 |
| Robin Saho | 26, coffee buyer | No party (CP support) | January 1982 | No experience | K5,600 |
| Paul Matimo | | Country Party | | | |
| Doctor Hietire | 42, councillor | Country Party | November 1981 | Council experience | K1,780 |

Table 8.4
Candidates' Coffee Interests

| Candidate | Coffee trees | Earnings from coffee | Ranking of earnings |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Bebes Korowato | No coffee | None | Salary only |
| Sailas Atopare | 15 hectares of coffee | K20,000 last year | coffee, real estate, salary |
| Koni Aize | 7 acres of coffee (paid labour) | K2,000 last year | salary, coffee |
| Joe Irairo Wiwiao | No coffee | None | Salary only |
| Patrick Gehapine | Has coffee (no details) | small amount from coffee | salary, coffee |
| Sali Hurutuve | 22 hectares (paid labour) | coffee not mature | salary |
| Hoffman Ohuma Iize | 2 hectares | small amount | salary, coffee |
| Clancy Atuwara Piholowa | 12,000 coffee trees | K356 last year | salary, coffee |
| Robin Saho | 5 acres | small amount | business, coffee |
| Paul Matimo | - | - | - |
| Doctor Hietire | 8 acres | K570 last year | coffee, salary |

Chapter 9

POLARIZATION OF A PROVINCE: THE 1982 ELECTION IN THE SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS*

J.A. Ballard

Introduction


The national election of 1977 in the Southern Highlands was a turning point for the province, providing the occasion both for its consolidation as a political arena and for its incorporation into national party politics (Ballard 1983). By contrast the national election of 1982 was merely one in a continuing series of contests for power within the province. The difference reflects the events of the intervening period and especially the introduction of provincial government, which marked an end to the remnants of *kiap* rule and signalled the open politicization of policy-making. The period was, effectively, one of decolonization in provincial politics and the establishment of a new political class in the province.

During the period after the 1977 election the province continued to benefit from its strong tradition of administrative teamwork, and a small core of talented expatriate public servants helped maintain a capacity for innovation. The most obvious product of this capacity was the Southern Highlands Rural Development Project, a five-year project launched with substantial World Bank funding in 1978. This encompassed not only the extension of the Highlands Highway across the province, the addition of two high schools and the development of coffee and tea plantations run by a provincial Management Authority, but also imaginative programs in non-formal education, health, nutrition and subsistence agriculture. By 1982 the roads and high schools had been completed, but the plantations and Management Authority were problematic and subject to considerable criticism, and the most innovatory portions had only begun after long delays in attracting staff (Hinchliffe 1981; Millett and Rausi 1983; French and Walter 1984; Clarke 1985; Crittenden and Lea 1989).

Further evidence of the province's substantial administrative capacity could be found in its adaptation of provincial government; its decentralized planning and administrative arrangements were taken up by the Public Services Commission and National Planning Office as models for other provinces (Ballard 1980). On a few other matters, such as health monitoring, the co-ordination of government and mission health

* This paper has benefited from comments by Rob Crittenden, Paul Fearman, Bill Standish and Mark Turner.

SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS PROVINCE
OPEN ELECTORATES 1982



— Electorate boundary
 - - - District boundary

0 20 40km

- * includes urban area of Town of Mendi
- * excludes urban area of Town of Mendi

facilities through local committees and the encouragement and application of land-use studies, the province also led the country. Although much of this innovation depended on the presence of a few remaining expatriate officials, evidence of the continuing authority of government in the province lay in the absence of serious tribal fighting during a period in which other Highlands provinces were frequently in strife. In these respects the Southern Highlands might simply be said to have lagged a few years behind the other Highlands provinces. However, despite these advantages and some preferential funding through the National Public Expenditure Program, the Southern Highlands remained last among the 19 provinces in indices of development based on the 1980 census (D'Sa 1987: 63).

In the absence of private resources available for the accumulation of individual wealth, government remained the main source of new wealth in the Southern Highlands. Much of the allocation of government funding was tied to technical formulas which reflected the strengths of the national ministry of Finance and the National Planning Office and, within the province, the strength of the provincial secretariat. But during the period after 1977 challenges to these formulas and delegation of new powers to the provinces, e.g., over liquor licensing, offered increasing scope for political patronage. This culminated in the removal of agricultural and transport sectoral grants from the National Public Expenditure Program after 1980, primarily in order to give members of parliament pre-election patronage. In the Southern Highlands the strength of the planning tradition was, however, such that most MPs collaborated with the provincial administration in planning and spending their sectoral grants.

The political geography of the province, with its informal division into three regions, East, Centre and West, was well established by 1977 (Ballard 1983:180, 194) and was reinforced by competition for resources and positions within the new provincial arena. The notion that the top three posts in the province should be divided among the three regions retained a measure of legitimacy under provincial government, and the allocation of provincial resources, particularly public works, was closely inspected for regional equity. The extension of the Highlands Highway to Tari reduced the isolation of the West, but the well-established access of the East, and especially Ialibu, to Mount Hagen and external commerce gave it a continuing competitive edge in development activities.

Politically the 'East' was Ialibu which, because of its commercial and educational advantage, saw itself as the 'natural' leader of the province in alliance with Kagua, with which it shares linguistic and cultural affinity. The Wiru of Pangia and the isolated groups in Erave, with distinct languages and limited road access through Ialibu, did not automatically share in a sense of Eastern regional identity and Pangia was often in opposition to the Ialibu-Kagua axis. The 'West' was essentially the Huli of the Tari Basin, whose leaders could only on occasion command full

unity among the Huli of Koroba, Komo and Margarima, and rarely among the non-Huli groups of isolated Kopiago and Bosavi. The 'Centre', despite a fair measure of linguistic and cultural affinity among the Anggal Heneng of Mendi and Nipa Districts, had a much less firm core identity. Among the major regional leaders, those from the East and West were from Ialibu and Tari and so had bases in the core areas of their regions, while those from the Centre had narrower bases in Mendi or Nipa and were more dependent on forging alliances with one of the other regions.

Not only was there a division within the province among the three regions, but within each of these there was a division between core and peripheral areas. The latter, occasionally referred to by those from core areas as a distinction between *hausman* and *hausmeri*, applied, for instance, between Tari and Koroba and within Kagua-Erave and Nipa-Kutubu electorates with Kagua and Nipa as cores. Just as the real or supposed neglect of the West was grounds for mobilization of the Huli, the relative isolation and lack of development in peripheral areas throughout the province served as an essential basis for the development of social and political identity (see Ballard 1987; for 1980 indices of development at district level, see de Albuquerque and D'Sa 1986: 47.) These grounds of differentiation were of critical importance in defining political groupings during the 1982 elections.

Provincial Government

During the years leading up to the 1982 election the politics of provincial government reshaped the province as a political arena. The history of this period provides vital clues to an understanding of political leadership and coalitions within the province.

The Southern Highlands adopted provincial government with conspicuous lack of enthusiasm. Its local government councils had substantial roots in the initial stages of colonial administration in the 1950s and 1960s and the provincial area authority based on the councils had developed a strong provincial identity in the 1970s. Provincial government, however, was pressed on the province from Port Moresby despite consultations by a provincial constituent assembly which attracted little public interest. Plans to declare an interim provincial government were delayed until after the parliamentary elections of mid-1977, in which area authority members contested against incumbent MPs. In December 1977 the constituent assembly adopted a provincial constitution.

Before the interim provincial government could be inaugurated, the national government unilaterally devolved powers upon all provinces as of 1 January 1978. The constituent assembly chose an administrative secretary for the province from among the few experienced Southern Highlands public servants, with its president, Andrew Andajjah of Tari,

casting the deciding vote for Roya Yaki of Ialibu over Joe Keviamé of Mendi. Yaki, a UPNG law graduate, had served as Highlands regional planner for the National Planning Office and most recently as the Highlands agent for the Department of Decentralisation in setting up provincial governments; he had also served as consultant to the constituent assembly. As administrative secretary he took over a provincial administration whose only other Southern Highlands graduate was Keviamé, executive officer to the area authority, who became provincial secretary to the new interim provincial government. As in many other provinces, the North Solomons formula enshrined in the Organic Law on Provincial Government provided a recipe for rivalry between the administrative secretary, as head of the public service, and the provincial secretary, as head of a policy secretariat under the provincial assembly and cabinet.

Andaijah, the new premier of the interim provincial government, was respected as the ablest of its members, most of whom had local government and area authority experience but limited formal education. Yaki was determined to ensure that there was no political interference in the implementation of policy. By late 1978 the premier and administrative secretary had disagreed over control of functions and were exchanging formal letters of complaint with each other and with authorities in Port Moresby. At the end of the year Yaki proposed a unified structure of provincial administration, abolishing the policy secretariat and converting the positions of administrative and provincial secretary into those of secretary and deputy secretary of the province. With the support of expatriate division heads, who had the confidence of Andaijah and his ministers, this reform was adopted and served eventually as a model for other provinces.

By March 1979 Andaijah, supported by his Western and Central ministers, was accusing Yaki, defended by Eastern ministers, of regional nepotism in appointments and allocations. In October Andaijah obtained a vote of 7-2 in the provincial cabinet in favour of Yaki's removal, but the Easterners countered with a demand for Keviamé's removal. The national Department of Decentralisation, which considered Yaki one of the ablest provincial officials, was unwilling to support a request for his transfer. In December a motion of no confidence in Andaijah obtained ten signatures from the East and Koroba, but failed to win a majority in the provincial Assembly and Andaijah thereupon removed two of his Eastern ministers.

The first provincial government elections were scheduled for May-June 1980 and the provincial constitution prescribed direct election of the premier, a feature shared only by North Solomons and Enga provinces. On 11 March the national government under Michael Somare fell and was replaced by a coalition led by Sir Julius Chan of the People's Progress Party (PPP) and the Highlands leader, Iambakey Okuk of the National Party. Yaki had been a founding and continuing member of the

National Party and he had links with the PPP through the new minister for Public Utilities, Wiwa Korowi of Ialibu. He paid an extended visit to Port Moresby in March and resigned as secretary to stand against Andaijah for election as premier.

During the period before the provincial election, Chan, Okuk and Wiwa visited the province, and both the National Party and PPP contributed resources to Yaki's campaign. Andaijah criticised the intrusion of national party politics into the provincial election, but he had help from United Party MPs and tacit support from Pangu. In addition to Yaki and Andaijah, Steven Mendepo, a businessman from Mendi, mounted a candidacy for the premiership from the Centre, and there were three minor candidates who campaigned only locally.

The results were a resounding victory for Andaijah, who captured 52 per cent of the formal vote, with solid majorities in the West and Centre and in Pangia, where Pundia Kange, MP, provided support as he had for Francis Pusal against Wiwa in 1977. Yaki, with 21 per cent, received over half his support from his three home provincial electorates in Ialibu, and beyond the East he had substantial minority support only in Koroba, Kopiago and Upper Mendi, where he was backed by provincial government members. Mendepo's support was confined to the Centre, where he carried majorities in only two provincial electorates, and the other candidates won support only in their home areas. Two of these, in Kagua and Erave, deprived Yaki of support there, while another, sponsored by Yaki in Andaijah's home territory, won only limited support in the Huli periphery. In the provincial assembly, most incumbents from the interim provincial government were re-elected, particularly in the East and Centre, but older uneducated candidates lost out.

The election served to polarize the province on partisan lines much more fully than had the 1977 national elections. The antagonism between Andaijah and Yaki within the provincial government had matured over the course of two years and all members of the Assembly were identified with one side or the other. Their rivalry focused competition not only between regions in the province, but also between generations, with Andaijah representing the older experienced local government leaders and Yaki the ambitious graduates and students. Finally, since the election followed closely on the change of government in Port Moresby, the sharpened party division there infected polarisation within the province and clarified party alignments for the 1982 national elections. Despite this the prime minister, Chan, immediately wrote to Andaijah stating that his government's support for Yaki should not affect relations between the two levels of government.

The lines of division within the province were almost immediately blurred. The new Provincial Assembly met on 14 July and confirmed its support for Andaijah by electing his candidate for deputy premier, Tegi Ebeial of Nipa, by 16 to 8. The Eastern bloc walked out when Andaijah announced that his 9 ministers included an appointed member from

Pangia and no elected member from Ialibu. Then, five days later, Andaijah was killed in an airplane crash in Tari Gap. During the stunned interval in politics which followed, Tegi succeeded as acting premier and it was agreed, despite opposition from the East, that the constitution should be amended to allow the premier to be chosen by the Assembly rather than through a fresh election.

It was initially agreed within the provincial government, out of respect for Andaijah, that the premiership belonged to the West and that Aya Dabuma of Tari, the only experienced Western member, should be chosen. However, when the Assembly met in November to elect a premier, Tegi had negotiated an alliance with the Eastern members and defeated Dabuma 17-9, appointing a cabinet with no Tari representation and with Andrew Awaisa of Erave, a firm supporter of Yaki, as deputy premier. At the next session, in February 1981, Dabuma raised a motion of no confidence which provoked a brawl before the motion failed by a vote of 15-11.

Since the provincial election, Keviamé had served as acting secretary while Yaki held senior posts in Port Moresby. In March 1981 the National Executive Council, without consulting the provincial government, appointed Yaki as secretary. The minister for Decentralisation, John Momis, was not present at the NEC meeting and objected to the failure to consult, as did the provincial government, which appointed Keviamé to the vacant post of co-ordinator of the Southern Highlands Rural Development Project. Tegi was, however, dependent as premier on Eastern support and rapidly reached accommodation with Yaki.

In November-December 1981 a further motion of no confidence almost succeeded in unseating the Tegi government. This time it was organized by Francis Pusal, who had narrowly lost the provincial MP election to Wiwa in 1977, had then become head of the province's agricultural services, and had resigned in September 1981 to contest the 1982 elections. Pusal and Dabuma agreed on the need to restore 'legitimate' regional allocation of the three top posts: Dabuma from the West would become premier and assist Pusal from the Centre to win the provincial parliamentary seat, while Yaki from the East held the post of secretary. Their attempted coup involved a refusal to pass the provincial budget, last-minute resignations by three of Tegi's ministers and the sequestering of the motion's supporters in Wabag, outside the province, to forestall any temptations offered by Tegi, Yaki, and Wiwa. In the end, however, Dabuma failed to hold unified Western support within the Assembly and the motion was lost. Thus, in the months leading up to the national elections, a provincial government and administration under Tegi and Yaki remained in alliance with the national government of Chan and Okuk.

Electoral Boundaries

Electoral boundaries for the 1977 national election in the Southern Highlands had been the result of extended bargaining between provincial politicians and the Electoral Boundaries Commission, whose initial proposals were rejected by a majority in parliament. The result was the addition of an eighth open electorate and the carving of established arenas, based on districts, into artificial electorates, particularly in the cases of the new electorates of Imbonggu, linking north Ialibu and south Mendi, and Komo-Margarima (Ballard 1983: 184-5).

The national census of 1980 gave the Southern Highlands a population of 235,647, showing only minimal growth since the 1971 census, as compared with other provinces. The provincial government was quick to point out that the census had been taken during the coffee harvest, while large numbers of migrant workers were absent on the plantations of the Western and Eastern Highlands; a provincial census in 1983 confirmed this. The provincial assembly resolved that the province should receive two additional parliamentary electorates, but the Electoral Boundaries Commission, following its legal mandate, rejected a plan for eight coherent electorates drafted by expatriate officials in the province and proposed instead a reduction to seven electorates, making the Southern Highlands the only province to lose a seat.

As in 1977 the number of members of parliament disaffected by the boundary proposals was sufficient to produce a majority against acceptance of the Commission's report. In 1982, however, there was not enough time before the scheduled elections to redesign electorates. Thus the boundaries of 1977, likely to favour the chances of incumbents, remained intact, leaving the Southern Highlands with eight open electorates in addition to its provincial electorate.

Candidates and Party Endorsements

The 1977 election had produced a strong bloc of four MPs for the PPP and the Somare coalition government, led by Wiwa Korowi as Minister for Health, and including Posu Ank of Mendi electorate, Glaimi Warena of Imbonggu and Yano Belo of Kagua-Erave. Ibne Kor of Nipa-Kutubu broke with the United Party to support the government, but the three MPs from the West of the province Matiabe Yuwi of Tari, Dambali Habe of Komo-Margarima, and Paele Elo of Koroba-Lake Kapiago as well as Pundia Kange of Ialibu-Pangia remained with the United Party in opposition.

When the coalition split late in 1978, Wiwa and Glaimi were leading members of the PPP faction favouring an alliance with Iambakey Okuk's National Party, and they and Posu moved with the PPP into opposition along with Paele. At the same time the United Party joined Pangu in a

new Somare government, and Pundia became a minister; Yuwi also later served briefly as minister.

With the fall of the Somare government in March 1980 and its replacement by a PPP-National-led coalition under Sir Julius Chan, Wiwa was first given the Public Utilities portfolio, and later Minerals and Energy, while Ibne Kor held Environment and Conservation until his removal from office after a conviction for rape. By 1982, Wiwa was leader of the government MPs from the province, who included Glaimi and Posu in the PPP and Paele, Dambali, Yano and Ibne in Okuk's National Party. Only Pundia and Matiabe remained with Somare in opposition. Wiwa and Pundia, the most effective and best educated of the Southern Highlands MPs along with Glaimi, saw themselves as potential prime ministers.

Under legislation passed by MPs protecting their own interests, public servants wishing to contest parliamentary elections were required to resign six months before the close of nominations, by 17 September 1981. Two of the province's senior officials, Pusal and Bai Waiba of the Bureau of Management Services, were both antagonistic to Yaki and resigned in September to prepare their campaigns. In addition the provincial assembly resolved in February 1982 that its members must resign before standing for Parliament, and this deterred all but one member, Anthony Temo of Mendi, from contesting.

It had been clear for some time that Wiwa and Pusal would be rematched as rivals for the provincial electorate in 1982. Wiwa was a leading PPP minister and held not only his own party's support, but also that of its coalition partner, the National Party, whose leader, Iambakey Okuk, had received a Bulolo gold-mining licence from Wiwa's ministry. Pusal had stood in 1977 for the United Party and was close to Pundia, who was in the pro-Somare faction of that party. Since Wiwa had firm support from the national coalition government, all of his opponents were likely to seek Pangu endorsement.

Somare's Pangu Pati had not been active in the province in 1977 and had no incumbent MPs, but in 1981-82 it was the best organized party at the national level. Its national secretary, Tony Siaguru, sent his former colleague in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Dominic Diya, home to Mendi in June 1981 to prepare for the party's campaign in the province. Diya was interested in the provincial electorate himself, but was particularly concerned to defeat Wiwa, a former Foreign Affairs protege whom he had helped in the 1977 election but who had failed to support Diya's career. In October Diya convened a meeting of Mendi graduates, including Pusal and Francis Awesa, to reach agreement on a single candidate from the Centre against Wiwa from the East and expected candidates from the West. The others agreed to support Pusal if he joined Pangu, though he initially preferred to campaign as an independent for fear of losing votes amongst traditional United Party voters. Pusal also dissuaded Keviamé from standing as candidate.

In the West the Huli leaders of Tari and the Hela Association did not consider themselves bound by Dabuma's agreement with Pusal and they called together potential Huli candidates to avoid a repetition of the 1977 fiasco: four Huli candidates had divided Western votes which, if combined, would easily have won the election. They settled on Martin Kajawi, who had recently left the University of Papua New Guinea for a personnel post with the Ok Tedi mine in neighbouring Western Province. Kajawi sought Pangu support at the party's Mount Hagen conference, but Pusal was already a member of the party's organizing committee in the province and readily won endorsement.

Leaders in the West and Centre had thus achieved some solidarity behind the candidacies of Kajawi and Pusal, but in the East there were others willing to stand against Wiwa. Saimon Apea, the first Roman Catholic priest from the province, based in Kagua, had considered nominating for the premiership in 1980, but his bishop opposed his entering politics. Saimon had forged links with the National Party through Yano Belo and through his former classmate, Michael Mel of Mount Hagen, and he received some National Party support from Thomas Kavali. Francis Apurel had left a brilliant record at the University of Technology to return to work with his father, a successful Ialibu businessman who had land disputes with Wiwa and encouraged his son to stand against Wiwa. In addition Paul Poto of Kagua sought Pangu support for a candidacy, visiting party headquarters in 1980 to seek endorsement. Apurel suggested to Poto and Simon that two of the three withdraw but Poto, having resigned his position with the Development Bank, refused and all three nominated. For the provincial electorate, then, there were six candidates, all with some tertiary education, all aged between 25 and 34.

The leading political figures in the province took a strong role in determining party endorsements for the open electorates. For the People's Progress Party Wiwa was provincial leader and had responsibility for determining the party's endorsements in the province. Glaimi and Posu had PPP backing for re-election in Imbonggu and Mendi, while incumbent National Party MPs were given only token opposition from the PPP. In Ialibu-Pangia Wiwa endorsed Robert Paiya, a young UPNG graduate serving as cultural co-ordinator in the province, to stand against Pundia. Yaki had hoped to recruit Paiya as a National Party candidate and gave him seven months' leave, enabling him to evade the law requiring that public servants resign in September. In Nipa-Kutubu, the PPP endorsed another graduate, Fred Malo Tomo.

As secretary of the Province Yaki could not take an open partisan role, and the National Party campaign was organized by Mendepo, the Mendi businessman who had contested the premiership against Andajjah and Yaki. Many aspiring Southern Highlanders attended the National Party's conference in Kundiawa, where they were interviewed by Okuk and his expatriate business advisers. The incumbent National Party MPs

Yano, Dambali, Paiele and Ibne were endorsed, and in each of the other electorates several candidates were given limited NP support.

Pangu's provincial committee was composed of Pusal, Dabuma, Matiabe Yuwi and Anthony Temo, a candidate for the provincial electorate in 1977 who resigned from the provincial assembly to contest Mendi Open in 1982. Pusal and Diya chose open electorate candidates in the East and Pangu's Centre, while Dabuma and Yuwi selected those for the West. The provincial committee then made recommendations for endorsement to the party's Mount Hagen conference and these were accepted in most cases. Pusal was chosen over Kajawi for the provincial electorate and the two incumbent Somare supporters were supported: Yuwi was able to defeat Dabuma's attempt to obtain a second Pangu endorsement in Tari for Halalu Mai, and Ialibu-Pangia, held by Pundia Kange of the pro-Somare wing of the United Party, was the only electorate in the country which Pangu did not contest. For Mendi Temo was endorsed and for Nipa-Kutubu Dick Peren Mune, a police officer who had won strong support there as a provincial electorate candidate in 1977. In Kagua-Erave Pangu endorsed Soso Tomu, a district non-formal education co-ordinator who had visited party headquarters with Poto and had obtained united support in his home area, Erave. In Komo-Margarima Don Mailya of Enga Province, the local government clerk in Margarima, was endorsed on Pusal's recommendation.

In two electorates the provincial committee's recommendations were challenged by the Pangu national office. For Imbonggu, the committee sought endorsement for Pila Ninigi, a UPNG law student from Glaimi's area, but Siaguru insisted that Diya be endorsed and during the campaign Pangu funds for the province were distributed through Diya. For Koroba-Lake Kopiago, Yuwi insisted that endorsement be given to Dalewa Pipigi, to prevent his standing in Tari. Belden Sevua of the Pangu national office disagreed and argued the case for his former UPNG classmate, Aruru Matiabe, who had been a strong candidate in Koroba-Lake Kopiago in 1977. The Mount Hagen conference postponed choice but the national office refused to upset the provincial committee recommendation for Dalewa. The results supported the judgment of Sevua, who had visited the province at intervals since 1980 to prospect for likely candidates.

The minor parties made little attempt to organize support within the province. The United Party endorsed its only incumbent MP, Pundia Kange, and two former MPs, Andrew Wabiria for Koroba-Lake Kopiago and Momei Pangial for Mendi. It also endorsed for Imbonggu Dus Mapun, a UPNG graduate and former president of Mendi LGC who had sought Pangu support. Aruru Matiabe, disappointed in his bid for Pangu endorsement and competing against well funded campaigns by PPP and UP candidates in Koroba-Lake Kopiago, turned to the Diro Independent Group for financial support.

Within the province there was an effort by some of the young leaders of the Evangelical Alliance, bringing together Protestant missions outside established denominations, to organize candidacies in the open electorates, particularly in opposition to uneducated older MPs. This effort coincided with a general sentiment among leaders in Tari and Kagua that it was time for a change from Yuwi and Yano, who had been MPs since 1968. Yuwi succeeded in persuading Dalewa Pipigi, literacy supervisor for the Australia-Pacific Christian Mission (APCM) to contest Koroba-Lake Kopiago rather than Tari, though this put Dalewa up against Aruru Matiabe, who had strong support from his own mission, Christian Missions in Many Lands (CMML). Tege Tandagua, APCM education secretary, was a candidate in Komo-Margarima, and the Evangelical group also supported Bai Waiba in Nipa-Kutubu and Soso Tomu in Kagua-Erave. Both of these candidates came from the outlying areas of their electorates, Kutubu and Erave, and mission support helped to persuade other potential candidates from these areas not to stand and divide the vote in their home bases.

When nominations closed there were 13 candidates for the open electorates, a total of 81, compared with 91 in 1977. Apart from the incumbents, 16 candidates had contested in 1977 (4 of them former provincial candidates who chose this time to contest open electorates) and all but 3 of these had performed well in that election. In addition 8 who had been serious candidates in 1977 were now members of the provincial assembly and would have had to resign their posts to run again; their potential rivals for the next provincial election, the presidents of the local government councils, also did not contest the parliamentary elections, but often built alliances with national candidates in their areas.

Of the 81 candidates, 71 were between the ages of 25 and 37, and of the older group of ten, aged 38 to 50, five were incumbents and two had previously been MPs. All six of the provincial candidates had tertiary qualifications and fourteen of the open candidates also had some tertiary education, while seventeen others had completed Grade 10 and only fifteen had no formal education. This represented a substantial advance in qualifications over those of 1977 open candidates. Apart from the incumbents, 32 candidates were public servants, 8 private employees, 8 local government employees and 9 pastors or church employees, while 8 were self-employed businessmen. Although 5 listed themselves as subsistence farmers, these included ex-MPs Momei Pangial and Andrew Wabiria, the latter one of the wealthiest men in the province through his United Party business directorships. Only one woman nominated, Rombame Nandi, a prominent Ialibu businesswoman and sister of a provincial minister.

The relative prominence of educated young men and absence of established businessmen, by comparison with candidates in other provinces, reflected the economic situation in the Southern Highlands, where there were limited opportunities outside paid employment, mainly

by government and church agencies, for self-advancement and enterprise. It also reflected the almost complete segregation of established local leaders in the local government and provincial government arenas, leaving Parliamentary competition to better educated and younger men.

The Campaign

Given the frenetic political activity in the province in previous years, the 1982 campaign, while giving scope to new players, was seen by many as a continuation of contests under way at least since 1977. Incumbent MPs, all of whom were candidates, had been visiting their electorates frequently during the previous year and public servants who had resigned in September 1981 were able to spend six months campaigning before voting began; in fact several public servants had used their official positions to campaign long before then.

The close of nominations on 15 April saw an unexpected break in events. Posu Ank, Andajah's predecessor as area authority president, MP for Mendi and PPP provincial leader with Wiwa, died in a road accident only hours before nominations closed. His younger brother, William Mone Ank, a teacher, was hastily recruited to replace him as PPP candidate. Posu's funeral in Mendi the following Sunday was a major event combining Christian ceremony (Posu was a United Church pastor) and traditional ritual with a political rally. Chan and national ministers attended with huge floral wreaths, money trees were flourished, and Mendepo formally transferred the mantle of Posu's leadership to William. While Pusal and others were present and offered donations, Temo, the Pangu challenger for Posu's seat, failed to attend or provide a gift and this was widely interpreted as evidence of cowardice or even complicity in Posu's death.

Chan was the only national party leader to make an extended visit to the province, flying to most electorate centres with Wiwa to speak in support of Wiwa and the PPP's open candidates. Somare cancelled a scheduled visit because of illness, and Okuk made a hasty visit to a few centres in the government's Dash 7. There is little evidence that national leaders and party affiliation had a major impact, but the financially straitened period of the previous two years led to reflection on the previous period of Somare's leadership as 'the good times', and this was a theme pushed by Pangu candidates.

As in 1977 party endorsements reinforced networks between provincial and open candidates. Wiwa and Pusal travelled with PPP and Pangu open candidates when campaigning in their electorates, and in some cases relied heavily on them to muster support. Of the other four provincial candidates, Poto confined himself to Kagua-Erave, but Fr Saimon and Kajawi toured throughout the province and Apurel visited most areas. None of these four had strong links with leading open

candidates, and they generally avoided close identification with specific open candidates so as not to lose the votes of partisans of other open candidates. The same logic applied to candidates in open electorates, who often avoided support even for their party's provincial candidate. Thus Yuwi did not provide Pusal with support in Tari for fear of losing Kajawi's voters, while Kajawi did not openly align himself with Tari or Koroba-Lake Kopiago candidates, several of whom supported him.

Financial resources varied greatly among candidates. The two substantial businessmen, Temo in Mendi and Wabiria in Koroba-Lake Kopiago, were reputed to have spent K43,000 and K50,000 respectively on their campaigns and Temo ended with considerable debt. Much of Wabiria's expenditure went to schools, churches and water supplies, while Temo gave K200 to his *komiti* (agent) in each village. Incumbent MPs had some control over the allocation of sectoral funds of up to K78,000 for transport and agriculture for 1981 and 1982, though only government supporters received funds for 1982 (thus excluding Pundia and Yuwi). These were contracted out for road and agricultural projects of maximum political benefit, but where contracts were arranged directly by the MP, as in Ibne's case, district managers withheld payment until after the election. Unlike the situation in many other provinces, district managers in the Southern Highlands were in a position to ensure that the projects were of some real benefit locally, so sectoral funds were not seen as a major political issue. All projects funded from outside the province, whether by government or international sources, were claimed by one or more candidates as the result of their personal intervention.

Wiwa, as a leading government minister, had access to further resources. Not only could he obtain helicopter transport to remote areas to open national government projects, but during the campaign he distributed 400 coffee pulpers in Upper Mendi and other strategic areas. It was widely believed that he was unable to obtain these from the minister for Primary Industry, Paul Torato of Enga, until Torato received a gold-prospecting licence in Porgera from Wiwa's ministry.

It is not known how much funding PPP and National Party candidates received and whether this came directly from party headquarters or passed through party co-ordinators based in Mendi. These were Steven Mendepo for National and Yaungtine Koromba for PPP; the latter, a mission education secretary from the largest village in Upper Mendi, later became premier. Generally, however, PPP candidates received substantial support, while National Party funds failed to reach several candidates. Pangu's funds passed through Diya, who received K7000 for the province and distributed K300 each to endorsed candidates and Apurel and K200 each to other recognized pro-Pangu candidates. The remaining K2500 went to Pusal to pay the expenses of other successful candidates after results were known. The Pangu funds arrived late in the campaign and provided a useful boost at a time when

other resources were exhausted. The United Party gave K7000 to Pundia, who used these funds primarily on his own campaign.

Independents were generally poorly funded though the more promising among them, like those endorsed by the parties, had access to PNGBC bank loans with only nominal rationale and security. In Koroba-Lake Kapiago, confronted with two well-funded rivals in Wabiria and Paiele, Aruru obtained a PNGBC loan of K5000 and also resorted to raising small amounts from friends at UPNG until provided with K1500 by Diro; while Daniel Mapiria succeeded in raising K2000 from the People's Action Party in Port Moresby, but proceeded to campaign for Wabiria.

The parties also supplied transport, with the National Party disposing of ten vehicles, PPP two, Pangu two and the United Party one. In addition Wiwa received through Okuk the first of a national fleet of red trucks mounted with four loudspeakers. All serious candidates had access to one or more vehicles; for instance, Pusal borrowed three from a friend who had built up a pool of vehicles from government auctions, while Aruru had access to fourteen borrowed from various mission and business friends. Bai made a down payment of K1500 for a National Party vehicle which never materialized.

Few provincial or open candidates campaigned off the main roads and this left the more remote areas to their own local candidates. Bai walked with a backpack throughout Kutubu District and slept overnight in most villages, and Soso and Poto had most of Erave District to themselves. In the remote southwest corner, Bosavi, one candidate visited a few villages and won support but the rest of the population followed instructions from their provincial government member.

The issues that dominated the campaign were those of local development and pride. Incumbents claimed responsibility for all new roads, bridges, schools, clinics and agricultural projects, while other candidates complained of the lack thereof and promised more. Traditional local disputes were revived and insults remembered; for instance, Wiwa's reference to the Wiru of Pangia as 'pumpkin-heads' for having refused him their votes in 1977 was widely retailed by Pundia and Apurel.

Results

The electoral administration of the province was exceptionally professional and was recognized by the national Electoral Commissioner as a model for the rest of the country. Under one of the few remaining expatriate kiaps an imaginative training program was developed, tight control was maintained, and the few crises that arose were defused (see Fearman 1982). The province was the first to report its final results, and recounts in Imbonggu and Nipa-Kutubu produced substantially the original results. Though several losing candidates made allegations of

fraud, only two, Temo and Yuwi, pursued their appeals in court and both were rejected.

Voter participation in the Southern Highlands remained among the highest in the country. With 201,802 electors enrolled, 118,520 cast votes, though of these 17,731 were not on the roll; the latter could not be explained as migrant workers who had not been available for enrolment, since a substantial majority of them were women.

In the provincial electorate Pusal, who was listed on the ballot as 'Francis Pusal Didman' to ensure recognition by those who knew him only as a *didiman*, won 34.4 per cent of the votes, while Wiwa and Kajawi took 23.5 per cent and 22.4 per cent respectively and the three minor candidates each received between 5.5 per cent and 6.5 per cent. As in 1977 Wiwa and, especially, Pusal were the only candidates to obtain substantial support outside their home areas.

Poto provided the most extreme case of localised support, winning 97 per cent of his votes in Kagua-Erave, where he captured over 40 per cent of the vote. Apurel won 85.6 per cent of his votes from Ialibu and Pangia, while Father Saimon took 80.5 per cent of his votes from Ialibu, Pangia and Kagua; his campaign to win Catholic voters throughout the province was aborted by his bishop's opposition to his candidacy. All three candidates cut heavily into Wiwa's Eastern base, where he captured only 46.3 per cent of Imbonggu, 45 per cent of Ialibu-Pangia and 12.2 per cent of Kagua-Erave.

By contrast Kajawi, 85.1 per cent of whose votes came from the three Western open electorates, and more than half the rest from adjacent areas of Nipa-Kutubu, captured 70 per cent of the vote in Tari and 62 per cent in Koroba-Lake Kopiago. Pusal, while winning 62.7 per cent of the vote in Mendi electorate and 73.6 per cent in Nipa-Kutubu, also took more votes than Kajawi in Komo-Margarima, while in Tari and the Eastern open electorates he took more votes than other outside candidates though Wiwa did better in Koroba-Lake Kopiago.

The support for Pusal and Wiwa outside their home areas can be explained in terms of party support, mustered primarily by open electorate candidates. In the East, votes in the provincial electorate were often directed to the local candidates opposed to Wiwa: thus Pundia's supporters in Pangia, who had voted for Pusal in 1977, voted for their clansman Apurel in 1982; and Soso's supporters in Erave voted for Poto, though the pro-Pangu open candidate in Kagua, Thomas Umbi, swung his voters to Pusal. In the Centre Posu Ank's PPP support in the Upper Mendi and Lai Valley areas went again to Wiwa, but in Nipa-Kutubu PPP and NP open candidates were unable to deliver support to Wiwa, while Bai Waiba in Kutubu, Dick Peren Mune on the Nembi Plateau and Don Mailya in Margarima provided solid blocs of votes for Pusal. As in 1977 Wiwa's only support in the West came from the home bases of local PPP candidates in Komo, Kopiago and north Tari, while Dabuma's campaigning in the Tari Basin gave Pusal a respectable

showing in Kajawi's home country. Since most provincial assembly members supported local candidates their influence was difficult to distinguish from other factors, and Dabuma's support provided a rare instance of identifiable influence.

The major difference between the 1977 and 1982 provincial electorate results lay in the capacity of candidates to secure unified support in their home regions and to command a network of party allies in peripheral areas of other regions. Pusal's narrow defeat in 1977 could be attributed to the presence of three other candidates from the Centre, one of whom, Peren Mune, captured populous Nipa. In 1982 Wiwa had to contend again with a strong local Kagua candidate, but also with two credible candidates from his home district taking 9000 rather than the 2300 votes lost there in 1977. Pusal's party network of ambitious young open electorate candidates proved more effective than Wiwa's, which was cluttered with less popular incumbents. As for the other provincial candidates, their lack of party networks prevented them, despite active campaigns, from attracting significant support outside their home bases.

Among the open electorate winners only two, Pundia in Ialibu-Pangia and William Ank in Mendi, had substantial margins of victory. Despite a field of thirteen candidates, the largest in the province, Pundia repeated his 1977 achievement, winning by the largest margin in the Highlands. Again the peripheral Wiru Loop area in Pangia provided a strong base of support despite an active campaign by the PPP's Robert Paia. Ank captured the same areas in the Lai Valley and Upper Mendi that had voted for his brother in 1977; these were not their home base near Mendi where Pusal had his base support, but the peripheral areas of the electorate where Posu had worked as a pastor, developed ties through marriage and pushed roads and other development.

The same solidarity in peripheral areas worked even more obviously for Bai Waiba in Nipa-Kutubu and Soso Tomu in Kagua-Erave, who were major beneficiaries of the first-past-the-post electoral system. For each, mission assistance in discouraging other candidacies in Kutubu and Erave paid off in competition with a strong field of candidates dividing the larger populations of Nipa and Kagua. Bai took 97 per cent of the votes from Kutubu, which provided 86 per cent of his total; in a field of seven candidates, he took only 18.2 per cent of the vote, but this gave him a winning margin of 172 votes over Dick Peren Mune. Soso received 97.5 per cent of the votes in Erave, excluding remote Wapasali, where he failed to campaign and where another candidate who did collected all votes. But he also won 63 per cent of the votes in adjacent East Kagua, which had mission links with Soso and no local candidate. He defeated the incumbent, Yano Belo, against whom all other candidates were ranged, and he benefited from an alliance with Kagua's provincial electorate candidate, Paul Poto.

In the Huli electorates of Tari and Koroba-Lake Kopiago the established incumbents fell to the renewed challenges of educated young

men. In Tari Halalu Mai succeeded in toppling Matiabe Yuwi in a re-run of their 1977 contest, the difference lying in the presence of seven other candidates who reduced Yuwi's 1977 support by more than half, while Halalu held his voters. In Koroba-Lake Kopiago the three-way contest among Aruru, Wabiria and Paiete, begun in 1977 and repeated in a 1978 by-election, fell this time to Aruru. The Pangu candidate, Dalewa, cut into Wabiria's base in Koroba and Philip Pakalu reduced Paiete's support among the Duna, while Aruru, who campaigned very actively, increased his support throughout Koroba.

In the two 'artificial' electorates of Imbonggu and Komo-Margarima, created in 1977 out of unrelated areas, the results were again polarised, with candidates attracting support only in their own portion of the electorate. In Imbonggu Diya split the Mendi portion with Dus while Glaimi edged out a challenge from Pila in the more populous Ialibu portion. In Komo-Margarima, Marabe Makiba, an Aid Post Orderly supervisor, defeated the Pangu candidate, Don Mailya, by 92 votes in the larger Margarima area, while the incumbent, Dambali, split the Komo vote with another candidate and five candidates divided South Tari. Candidates whose base areas were least split were the winners.

The standard pattern of bloc voting for local candidates remained largely intact, particularly in the more remote areas, and only in the less parochial areas around district stations and in the broader communities of Tari and Ialibu basins did voting on the basis of individual preferences emerge. These too were the areas where provincial and open candidates tended to avoid open alliances.

The results favoured younger and better-educated candidates, especially in competition with older uneducated MPs. Yuwi, Yano and Paiete all came second, Dambali third and Ibne last in a tight field, while ex-MPs Wabiria and Momei ran third in their electorates, but among the incumbents only Pundia and Glaimi, the two best educated, survived. Voters and their local leaders appeared to feel that educated MPs had a better chance of competing for resources for local development, but there was also considerable criticism of the lifestyle of incumbent MPs, particularly among evangelical mission voters. Fifteen candidates forfeited their deposits (compared with 17 in 1977) by receiving fewer than 10 per cent of the votes of the winning candidate in their electorates, and five of these received fewer than 100 votes; most who forfeited had not campaigned seriously.

Among the parties, Pangu was most successful in its endorsements. Pusal, Soso and Pundia (United Party, but unopposed by Pangu) won, while five other Pangu candidates ran second, three losing by fewer than 200 votes; only Dalewa in Koroba-Lake Kopiago lost badly. If Yuwi had not had his way with endorsements in the West, Pangu would have had victories with Aruru and Haralu as well. The PPP's Glaimi and Ank won and Paiya came third in Ialibu-Pangia, but other PPP-endorsed candidates did poorly. All four National Party incumbents lost, but Bai

Waiba, Marabe and Halalu were nominally National candidates. It is doubtful that party endorsement alone swayed many votes, but the evidence suggests that Pangu chose its candidates and distributed its funds more wisely than the others.

Mission-supported candidates did very well. Glaimi and Pundia were the only incumbents with strong mission support and were the only ones returned, and to this list must be added Ank, who inherited Posu's mission support. Soso, Bai and Aruru all had close links with evangelical missions and Halalu, who had worked for several years with the mission business group, Pasuwe, had APCM support in Tari. Only Pusal and Marabe among the winners lacked a strong mission vote base. While the missions eschewed links with any of the parties and did not constitute a party in themselves, despite preliminarily planning among some young mission educators, they were effective in mobilizing support for candidates who were identified with their values.

Aftermath

The rapid reporting of Southern Highlands results gave Pangu an early opportunity to implement its post-election strategy. A helicopter was made available for Pusal to fly to Kutubu, Margarima, Tari and Koroba to persuade the winners, Bai, Marabe, Halalu and Aruru, to join with him to maximize the influence of the province in negotiating a parliamentary majority. Bai, Marabe and Halalu were all nominally National Party candidates, but that party and its provincial organizer, Mendepo, had been ineffective in providing assistance for their campaigns. Bai had in fact recruited solid electoral support for Pusal in Kutubu and had helped persuade his wife's clansman, Marabe, to take down his National Party posters and support Pusal in the last weeks of the campaign. Pusal had Pangu funds with which to reimburse winning candidates for all receipted election expenses.

At the Mendi Hotel, Pusal met with Soso, Bai, Marabe, Halalu and Aruru. It was already known that Okuk, the National Party leader, was defeated in Chimbu and that he had passed the National Party leadership to Ted Diro; this further weakened any remaining ties with what had been seen as a Highlands-based party. Pusal argued for joining with Somare and Pangu as a united bloc to ensure favourable treatment for the province, and only Aruru, who had received funds from Diro, argued for keeping options open. By the time Okuk and Thomas Kavali flew into Mendi to gather the National Party winners, Pusal had led them in road convoy towards a Pangu rendezvous in Goroka.

At Minogere Lodge in Goroka Pangu assembled its elected supporters from around the country. Aruru was still attempting to persuade his fellow Westerners, Halalu and Marabe, to join him in supporting Diro, and he was challenged by Pangu leaders to declare his allegiance. Shortly after he was evicted from the meeting, a telephone

message warned that a time bomb had been planted and the Lodge was hurriedly evacuated, with some politicians diving out of windows and ending in hospital. Aruru was interviewed by police on his arrival in Port Moresby the same day and denied responsibility (*Post-Courier* 5 July 1982).

Pangu's Highlands supporters were moved to Madang and kept hidden from agents of other parties until parliament met at the start of August. At the end of July, with Pangu's majority holding firm, ministries were allocated. The Southern Highlands bloc joined with MPs from the Western Highlands and Enga to support Paias Wingti of Mount Hagen against John Nilkare of Chimbu for the post of deputy prime minister. Pusal was given the important ministry of Minerals and Energy and the other two regions of the Southern Highlands were each allocated ministries, with Pundia given Health and Halalu Environment and Conservation. Bai was offered the latter portfolio, but turned it down in favour of Halalu so that regional balance would be ensured. In the opposition Aruru was given the shadow ministry of Education, while Glaimi and Ank sat on the cross-benches with the PPP.

The results of the national elections left the three key posts of the province still in imbalance, with the Centre holding both the provincial MP and premier positions through Pusal and Tegi, and the East the post of secretary of the province through Yaki. Pusal and Bai were determined to remove both Tegi and Yaki, and provincial politics of the following year were shaped by their campaign. The 1982 elections were thus for the Southern Highlands not a major turning point, but one in a series of contests between increasingly polarized provincial elites with increasingly firm links to national political parties.

Table 9.1
Southern Highlands Results
 * = elected

Southern Highlands Provincial

| | |
|------------------------|----------------|
| Francis Apurel | 7,562 |
| Francis Pusal Didman * | 40,751 |
| Wiwa Korowi | 27,824 |
| Pata Saimon Apea | 7,654 |
| Martin Hole Kajawi | 26,537 |
| Paul Poto | 6,484 |
| Informal | 1,708 |
| Total | 118,520 |

Ialibu-Pangia Open

| | |
|---------------------|---------------|
| Rambua Kali | 2,637 |
| Karia Wanu | 70 |
| Thomas Lawa Nou | 430 |
| Pepo Tobe | 1,506 |
| Pius Piane Kuba | 1,342 |
| Manda Pumuye Hilary | 865 |
| Robert Mandi Paiya | 1,559 |
| Jim Rema Rompompea | 551 |
| Mandawe Wabe | 122 |
| Rombame Nandi | 383 |
| Nicholas Rema Ita | 851 |
| Pundia Kange * | 5,958 |
| Edwin Kumbe Yokola | 679 |
| Informal | 117 |
| Total | 17,070 |

Imbonggu Open

| | |
|-------------------|---------------|
| Dominic Diya | 2,035 |
| Gamar Iki Kirepe | 209 |
| Dominic Mendano | 653 |
| Pumbu Oso | 874 |
| Pila Ninigi Kole | 3,058 |
| George Rombo | 193 |
| Glaimi Warena * | 3,242 |
| Dus Mapun | 2,761 |
| Robin Wane Kulumi | 56 |
| Opai Daiye | 1,223 |
| Informal | 77 |
| Total | 14,381 |

Kagua-Erave Open

| | |
|-------------------|---------------|
| Akuna Wapi | 991 |
| Yano Belo | 3,295 |
| Kuna Balupa Kelly | 283 |
| Henry Ae | 546 |
| Soso Tomu * | 3,844 |
| Thomas Umbi | 1,827 |
| Mathew Yakoba | 2,563 |
| Kanga Mambi | 1,366 |
| Osa Nugi | 747 |
| Informal | 63 |
| Total | 15,525 |

Komo-Margarima Open

| | |
|-----------------------|--------|
| John Kane | 20 |
| Lape Langaio Waiya | 871 |
| Albert Taburu Waiya | 1,044 |
| Pepe Wagima | 1,160 |
| Tege Tandagua | 520 |
| Dambali Habe | 2,288 |
| Marabe Makiba * | 2,647 |
| Opena Don Jone Mailya | 2,555 |
| Ariebe Bongoli | 565 |
| J. Wandiali Dibale | 1,315 |
| Irai Pama | 598 |
| Informal | 58 |
| | <hr/> |
| Total | 13,641 |

Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open

| | |
|--------------------------|--------|
| Peter Pamburi Pambirali | 541 |
| Wabiria Andagali Andrew | 2,880 |
| Philip Kundai Pakalu | 1,345 |
| Daniel Mapiria | 10 |
| Ayu Pelepa Peter Tingapa | 77 |
| Paiele Elo | 3,830 |
| Dalewa Pipigi | 1,005 |
| Aruru Matiabe * | 4,050 |
| Informal | 61 |
| | <hr/> |
| Total | 13,799 |

Mendi Open

| | |
|----------------------|--------|
| Salei Tubei | 1,826 |
| William Mone Ank * | 5,901 |
| Kiee Kila Toap | 1,834 |
| Anthony Yarnaik Temo | 3,302 |
| Secial Sal Papol | 461 |
| Dul Mesi | 173 |
| Momei Pangial | 2,438 |
| Informal | 167 |
| | <hr/> |
| Total | 16,102 |

Nipa-Kutubu Open

| | |
|-----------------------|--------|
| Ibne Kor | 1,339 |
| Dick Peren Mune | 2,609 |
| Malo Fred Tomo | 1,961 |
| Nakone Ipe | 2,473 |
| Ungunaibe Wari Tombol | 2,376 |
| Kank Mongol Senk | 1,774 |
| Bai Yabe Eyo Waiba * | 2,781 |
| Informal | 78 |
| | <hr/> |
| Total | 15,391 |

Tari Open

| | |
|------------------------------|--------|
| Matialu Hoiari | 727 |
| Kilipa Hetabe | 540 |
| Pele Puli | 861 |
| Agali Michael Mekela Yabaria | 843 |
| Matiabe Yuwi | 3,164 |
| Iragali Harabe | 1,028 |
| Halalu Mai * | 3,695 |
| Pidiu Yari Kiwa | 951 |
| John Hako Yaguwaya | 523 |
| Agilo Kunini Victor | 186 |
| Informal | 14 |
| | <hr/> |
| Total | 12,532 |

Chapter 10

'AFTER THE BIG ONE': THE 1982 CHIMBU PROVINCIAL CAMPAIGN¹

Bill Standish

Introduction

To observe the political fate of the deputy prime minister was one good reason for studying the 1982 Chimbu² Provincial (often called 'regional') election. Iambakey Okuk, who was knighted soon before he died of cancer in 1986, was to lose his seat to John Nilkare, but whatever the outcome Okuk's role alone justified my desire to observe a third consecutive national election campaign in Simbu.

This study is part of a larger study of Simbu politics in which I as an Australian male examine the creative adaptation of Simbu people to the changes in the Papua New Guinea state and their society, and attempt to understand the rules of their political game and what the new democratic institutions mean to them. As Bailey (1969: xiv) argues, politicians have similar interests:

No statesman is effective unless he knows the rules of attack and defence in the political ring. His interest is in finding out what these rules are, both in particular cultures and cross-culturally; the moral evaluation of the participants' motives is beside the point.... Only after we understand the rules can we start evaluating the behaviour and so in the end come to a judgement on the men, if we wish to do so.

In 1982 my specific interests included the impact of the Simbu provincial government on the national electoral campaign. As new

¹ I thank again the many people around Chimbu who provided essential but warm hospitality and gave so generously of their thoughts and information to make this research possible, and Geoff Laphorne for the photographs. I am grateful to La Trobe University and to UPNG for assistance which facilitated this study, conducted over six weeks in May and August 1982. An earlier version of this paper was given at the Research Centre for South West Pacific Studies, La Trobe University, in July 1982, and I greatly appreciate the comments received on it then and those from Susan Andrews and Ron May.

² Until the Organic Law on Provincial Boundaries is amended, the Province and the Provincial electorate in the National Parliament are officially called 'Chimbu', while the provincial government has chosen the version 'Simbu', which I also use for the people.

political arenas have opened to new generations of Simbu leaders, so have new political resources become available for use within these arenas or transfer back into older spheres of competition. The term 'political resource' includes family funds and obligations, clan support and that of allied clans, and also the political skills and credit obtainable in schools, churches and business, quite apart from the support of explicitly political bodies such as political parties. One significant but unquantifiable resource is ideology, and the ability through rhetoric and action to make symbolic appeals for support within a changing political culture. The ability to manipulate such varied resources is essential for entry into and success in the Simbu political elite.

Previous experience had led me consider three resources as likely to be of particular importance in 1982, which I summarise here with the terms **parties, beer and brotherhood**.

In the 1972 election, I had wondered if there would be political party activity for the first time, as an indicator of what political scientists of the early 1960s called 'political modernization' or 'political development'. This was the increased political mobilization and participation then posited to emerge with improved infrastructure, mobility and communications, and raised levels of education and income. Political parties, it was expected, would aggregate interests and articulate them in the national arena, channelling previously local and parochial concerns into national affairs, and enable voters to make informed choices about policy matters in an effective exercise of democracy. Such theory had been largely demolished by events in recently decolonized Africa and Asia in the 1960s, which showed that with 'modernization' came stress, corruption, instability and frequently disorder and open conflict, with a heightened consciousness of ethnic or 'primordial' divisions, and often more authoritarian government. Modernization theory was based upon the expected growth of shared social values and a degree of consensus on the legitimacy of the state, and was unable to adequately analyse social change and in particular conflict and the growth of economic classes. I did not find political modernization in the 1972 election in Chimbu, nor much mobilization by individuals or political parties (Standish 1976).

In the 1977 election there was considerable mobilization, and although much political activity revolved around beer parties the elections were essentially individual contests with some personalized factions emergent (Standish 1983). Beer has long entered traditional Simbu exchange networks but although it is a luxury it is not (to use Salisbury's 1962 term) a valuable. It does not come from the labour of women, like village pigs, but rather is bought with cash, money which need imply no traditional status but which can come from one's own labour, or from friends and relatives, or commerce, or government. To distribute much beer may be a sign of access to modern wealth, but is not necessarily an indicator that the donor himself is a capitalist or even

a rich peasant; it does not imply any traditional status. Although considerable funds were spent by many candidates in the 1977 campaign - with the winner, Iambakey Okuk, saying he spent K20,000 as well as what he said he 'gave away' - this does not mean that Simbu politics had become class-based. Rather, Okuk had used resources which became available to him because of his political office. His generosity was part of a campaign to induce in people a belief that he was a good and generous man, and specifically to open friendships and even quasi-kinship relations with local leaders around the province in the hope that they could deliver their clans' votes *en bloc*. So I use 'beer' here as a shorthand way of describing the entry of money into campaigning. The source of funds used by the big players in the 1982 campaign would be a matter of great significance, especially if it came from foreign business.

Personalities and policies aside, money and beer had been important in the 1977 election, although Okuk won largely because the basic home base solidarity of his principal rival, John Nilkare, was neatly split by a political unknown (Standish 1983).

The analysis of the political expression of the social structure and the ideology of clan **brotherhood** is one of the principal contributions of social anthropology to the study of Papua New Guinea electoral politics, along with an awareness of cultural factors. Perceptions of cultural factors are important to candidates designing their political *persona* and planning their campaign strategies. Debates about the nature of traditional and modern leadership styles were integral to the 1978 Leadership Code debate (Standish 1978), which was a major factor in the unravelling of the Pangu-Peoples Progress Party (PPP) coalition in November 1978 and the fall of the Somare government in March 1980. Clan solidarity in the form of corporate voting has proven to be the essential first building block in successful electioneering. Northern Simbu clans average only about 750 people, not enough to assure election for an open seat. To garner enough votes a candidate needs the support of his own people and only with a strong home base (including his patrikin, matrikin and affines) is he respected sufficiently further afield to gain the additional votes necessary for a winning margin in an open contest. For provincial electorates the task is even harder, as voters must be mobilized on a far wider scale across several language groups and open electorates.

Previous elections have shown how older leaders have had difficulty campaigning on a scale wider than traditional tribes which number up to 5000 people (Criper 1965, Kuabaal 1976), and in the provincial contests even young, highly educated and energetic men have had trouble mobilizing support beyond their home district (Standish 1976, 1983). In 1977 as in 1972, clan solidarity was demonstrated in the voting patterns, and on the wider scale of the provincial electorate large blocks of votes were delivered to each of the ten candidates (some of whom also gained support widely throughout the province). The deliberate

manipulation of Simbu cultural values and the electoral response was likely to be an important element in the 1982 campaign, and hence to its analysis. 'Brotherhood' is used here as a shorthand symbol for the use of such mechanisms.

Context

Chimbu Province covers some 6,153 sq km, and is divided from east to west by a central mountain range which - although cut through by the Wahgi River Gorge - serves to separate the areas containing the greatest population, Kundiawa in the northern sector of the province and Gumine nearer the centre. In 1978 Chimbu's jural population was estimated at 220,000 and the resident population at about 180,000 people (SIPG 1980) who speak some thirteen languages. *Tokpisin* serves as the *lingua franca* and language of politics at district level and beyond. About 90,000 speak Kuman in the northern and western part of the province, the most settled valleys where densities reach 251 per sq km. Among other major languages are Golin (spoken around Gumine by 26,700 people), Chuave (24,000), and Siane (8000) (Howlett *et al.* 1976: 20).

The modern 'central place', Kundiawa, is the administrative, political and commercial capital and has about 5,000 residents, mainly non-Simbu. Kundiawa is sited near where precolonial trade routes met (Hughes 1975), and is in the path of the Highlands Highway and the electric power line which cross the province east-west across the northern sector. The land is most suited for cash-cropping in this area, which has by far the greatest concentration of government activities such as schools and health services, agricultural extension projects and Development Bank loans (Howlett *et al.* 1976), and long-established mission activities.

The main cash crop, coffee, is grown principally in this northern sector of the province where the infrastructure is most developed, but also in the central area of the Gumine District. Incomes from coffee are low (K50 per year per family in a normal year) for the small peasants, but potentially far higher (especially in a boom year) for the coffee buyers and processors. Although the 1982 election was held during the coffee flush, the season was nothing like the boom year of 1977 when coffee money fuelled a massive spending splurge by coffee-buyer-candidates. At the time of the election, weekly minimum wages were K14.48 (rural) and K32.76 (urban).

In the remote and therefore more marginalized parts of the province, known locally as the 'corners', there has long been resentment of the more developed people along the Highway, typified by the Kuman language speakers known to southerners as 'Chimbu'. There are more southern/central (or 'Bomai') people than Kuman speakers, if the Bomai are defined to include the Chuave and Sinasina people in the east and all

those south of the Wahgi River (such as the non-Kuman speakers in the Kup census division of Kerowagi District). Further south again are the Karimui people, who occupy that half of the province which is much lower in altitude, less fertile for traditional agriculture, and still ridden with malaria and until recently with a high incidence of leprosy, so that their population density (about 3 per sq. km.) is much sparser than the northerners (up to 280 per sq. km.). Although the Karimui people total about 10,000, their dispersed residence meant that of necessity most candidates for the National Parliament provincial seat treated them as insignificant in the election in 1982, as had occurred previously. The more densely settled northern part of their electorate, the Nomane area, was accessible by road and so witnessed much heavier campaigning.

Provincial candidates

Although thirteen men stood for the provincial seat, from before the start of the campaign period it was obvious that the main contest would be between the leader of the National Party, deputy prime minister and sitting provincial member, Iambakey Palma Okuk, and the prominent businessman and Pangu Party executive member, John Mua Nilkare, who came third in 1977 (the second placegetter, Kobale Kale, had since left active politics). Ultimately the vote for each of these two men more than doubled that for all other candidates, bar one, which helps justify my concentration upon their campaigns in this report, even though the combined role of the minor candidates was an essential factor in deciding the outcome.

John Nilkare's home base was Dirima village in Gumine District, but by 1982 he had gone far. A former magistrate and national liquor licensing commissioner, he had moved close to expatriate businesspeople and become a business lobbyist, an influential political door-opener who was on the board of both South Pacific Breweries and the Westpac Bank. A successful businessman, he had a pig and chicken farm near Port Moresby in association with the large Ilimo Farm operation, but had kept a government role as a commissioner for the Port Moresby City administration (which had replaced the suspended City Council). He had polled well in the 1977 election, despite his long absence from Chimbu, but was beaten because of the surprise nomination of a political novice from his own village, Kai Bomai, who campaigned well and took many southern Chimbu votes (Standish 1983). Nilkare has a tertiary-educated Sinasina-born wife, Anna Minga, and himself comes from a politically prominent family, his father having been Gumine Council president. He had visited Chimbu often in 1981 and - especially since he was campaigning as the only endorsed Pangu Party candidate - looked a strong prospect in 1982 to oust the incumbent provincial member, Iambakey Okuk.

Table 10.1
Chimbu Provincial Election 1982: Candidates' Details

| | <u>Name</u> | <u>Age^a</u> | <u>Party</u> | <u>Occupation</u> |
|----|----------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|---|
| A. | Iмбакей Р. Окук | 38* | National | Politician/businessman; ex-mechanic |
| B. | Петер Кумги | 36* | Pro-Pangu | Agriculture lecturer |
| C. | Вера Мори | 25 | United | Ex-soldier; ex-student (UPNG) |
| D. | Джон Т. Томбукон | 34 | Pro-Pangu | Ex-teacher (primary) |
| E. | Джерри Нинбе | 37 | Pro-PPP(?) | Finance clerk |
| F. | Риёнг Н. Яуве | 30* | Pro-Pangu | Businessman; ex-teacher (secondary) |
| G. | Джозеф Мек Теине | 26 | Ind.Ind. | Barrister/solicitor |
| H. | Миуге Петер Колкиа [Камис] | 26 | Ind.Ind. | Research Officer (B.A.) |
| I. | Джозеф Д. Кэгл | 35* | Liberal (<i>sic</i>) | Anatomist (UPNG) |
| J. | Джон М. Нилкаре | 35 | Pangu (end.) | Consultant; ex-kiap, magistrate and Chief. Liq. Licensing Comm. |
| K. | Джозеф Сил Нибобо | 35 | Pro-Pangu | Magistrate |
| L. | Филип К. Нанме | 37 | Mel.Allce | Politician; ex-soldier |
| M. | Барунке Каман | 30 | Pro-Pangu | Self-employed; ex-Provincial Secretary |

Note: a Except where marked with an asterisk (*), the information in this column is as provided to (and by) the Returning Officer.

The most publicized national politician before the election, Okuk was a 38-year old ex-mechanic who had first been elected in 1972, on his third attempt. He immediately joined the National Party in the Pangu-led government, as Minister first for Agriculture and later for Transport and Civil Aviation. A strong highlands regionalist, he had been behind a mid-1975 highlands push to replace Somare as prime minister, which was one factor in his demotion to the Education portfolio in December that year. However in 1987 Okuk admitted to me that the main issue in his sacking in January 1976 was his dealings with the Boeing Aircraft Corporation of Seattle, and his continued attempts - against an explicit cabinet directive - to buy Boeing aircraft for Air Niugini.

While an MP Okuk used his privileged access to credit lines to obtain investments in real estate and transport in Port Moresby, a small gold-mine and plantation in Morobe province, and - in partnership with his wife, Karina - an unsuccessful coffee-processing factory and thriving retail stores (including liquor sales) in Chimbu under the name Tokma, using expatriate managers. Some of the Chimbu enterprises had started life under the Kamanegu Corporation which he set up for his tribe in 1984, and then later converted into the Chimbu Yomba Corporation, but which came under his personal ownership when they became insolvent. He was notorious in business circles for not paying off his debts, yet was powerful enough to evade creditors. As described previously, Okuk retained access to sufficient resources to campaign with extravagant generosity in the 1977 election and was re-elected narrowly (Standish 1983).

In the 1977 parliament Okuk soon set himself up as Somare's principle opponent, and as leader of the small but revived National Party rose to the opposition leadership on the issue of the 1978 Leadership Code debate. Somare unsuccessfully proposed revising the Leadership Code as a mechanism to reduce politicians' business interests and hence deflect the salary demands of senior officials and as well reduce the dangers of corruption in the bureaucracy. While Somare emphasised the rapid redistribution of traditional leaders' wealth, and hence the levelling effect of Melanesian cultural values, Okuk had stressed the elements of acquisition and display of wealth and argued that the pressure to give generously required a considerable fortune (Standish 1978). The PPP leader, Julius (from January 1980, Sir Julius) Chan, argued that for politics to attract the best people entrepreneurs should not be excluded. Claiming Somare had failed to consult him over the Code, in November 1978 Chan took the PPP out of the coalition. In 1978-79 Okuk twice moved votes-of-no-confidence to replace Somare which failed or were withdrawn for lack of support, perhaps because people feared him or his highlands regionalist base, and he succeeded in ousting Somare when he nominated Chan rather than himself as prime minister on 11 March 1980.

Okuk himself was the most vulnerable target in the Chan government. He developed what might be called a 'crash through and

crash' style and his public profile was kept high by a tough-minded press secretary, Geoff Wall. Okuk was the most combative and vocal minister in Chan's government, projecting himself as a straight-talker who got things done, and was seen as *de facto* prime minister. Chan later said that working with Okuk was like 'living with a time bomb', one conspiracy after another. 'Every dirty trick performed by Mr Okuk and his men not only damaged his party, it bounced back on every coalition member' (*Post-Courier*, 21 June 1983).

Reappointed as minister for Transport, Okuk immediately sparked controversy and antagonized people across the country, not least in Chimbu itself. In what proved to be a mistake expensive both for Air Niugini and for himself, he single-handedly committed the airline to purchase (later converted to lease) three Canadian Dash-7 aircraft for K28 million, saying the deal was 'the best ever for PNG', although later he claimed a Sydney middleman had taken K3.5 million for delivery of the aircraft (*Post-Courier*, 11 February, 1984). These aircraft were able to land at intermediate-length airstrips in the Gulf and highlands, but as 40-seaters they were uneconomic because places such as Kundiawa could only generate about ten passengers a day. With four engines they were safe, but incurred heavy maintenance costs and were much slower than the Fokker F-28 jets they replaced on trunk routes.

Okuk argued the need for status symbols at the very first meeting of Chan's cabinet and pushed through the purchase of a K8 million Grumman executive jet ('Kumul 2') which incurred both annual running costs of K2 million and recurring political unpopularity. Okuk's use of these aircraft to give joyrides to local leaders only served to antagonize both elite and mass alike. 'Who benefits from this massive expenditure?' asked Pangu supporters, and answered that it was not ordinary villagers.

Okuk's greatest innovation in government was, in the absence overseas of Chan, Finance minister Kaputin and Provincial Affairs minister Momis, to persuade cabinet to hand over sectoral funds for Health, Transport and Primary Industry operations to the relevant ministers for distribution direct to individual MPs. Okuk, when moving his 1980 vote of no-confidence in Somare, had appealed to MPs' resentment at provincial governments which had taken over from the national government the power to initiate new projects, and had promised them increased access to funds. During the nine month period from September 1980 till June 1981 when the shaky Chan coalition was vulnerable to a no-confidence vote, the government thus was helped to retain power by the use of non-accountable cheques of up to K50,000, given out to MPs to be used at their discretion on projects in their electorates. Where district officers refused to certify the expenditure, the funds were drawn on cheques issued at ministerial direction by the departmental heads.

Some K6 million normally allocated to provincial governments by the departments of Transport, Primary Industry, and Public Health was

distributed in this manner, and rapidly became a major scandal. Few of the many MPs who might have been eligible for prosecution faced charges for misuse of these funds; they included one Simbu, Robert Yabara (Chuave Open). The fact that most Pangu members also accepted the funds did not reduce the anger of the thousands of political aspirants across the country, and the sectoral funds issue provided ready campaign ammunition for political aspirants.

In Chimbu the MPs' 'village projects' included campaign-related activities. A Public Accounts Committee investigation revealed Okuk's alleged misuse in 1981 of K30,000 of government warrants for helicopter travel, nominally to check out sectoral projects (*Post-Courier*, 20 June 1983) and pilots and villagers reported that the trips involved the distribution of beer. Some politicians passed the sectoral money over to provincial officials in order to avoid the backlash of hostility from provincial leaders. Okuk and Clement Poiye (Sinasin-Yonaggamugl Open) discussed with officials in Chimbu how they would like the health funds to be spent, but some other MPs were far less discreet. Some bought cars and one bought a bus for his personal business (nominally for a village project) and built a house outside his electorate. The available data indicates that there were few controls established over what was, even for a political public aware of Somare's 1979 and 1980 use of Village Economic Development Funds to shore up his parliamentary numbers, perceived as a spectacularly crude misapplication of public funds.

Aided by his national role, with the open MPs in subordinate roles, effectively as his clients, Okuk remained the giant overshadowing Chimbu politics. In the 1970s Okuk had been in conflict with many members of the interim provincial government of 1977-80 (Standish 1979). He had even brawled with its provincial secretary, Barunke Kaman - a fellow Kamanegu tribesman and former economics student who publicly accused Okuk of corruption - and in 1977 brought criminal charges against him, which were not preceded with but had the effect of quietening Kaman during the election campaign. But eventually Okuk won over many local leaders with generous use of resources from his liquor outlet and dance hall (later store) in Kundiawa, and from 1979 formed a close working relationship with the new expatriate general manager of Chimbu Coffee Co-operative Society (CCCS), Bob Kotszka. The CCCS was nominally run by the provincial government from 1979, through the provincial-government-dominated business arm Chimbu Holdings Enterprises (known as 'CHE'), but in a reverse takeover it was CCCS which effectively ran that government for a time.


In the June 1980 provincial assembly election campaign candidates used party labels, 'Pangu-UP' for the Opposition coalition with United Party, and '*lain bilong lambakey*' for Okuk's groups. In a significant if unsuccessful development a new southern (or Bomai) grouping of the 'corners' was also touted. Okuk used his access to central government

resources as Transport minister and funds donated by some prominent Simbu businessmen, including those involved in CCCS, to hire helicopters to pluck winners to safety, away from their home areas which in several instances had erupted into tribal fighting. Many winners dropped their previously proclaimed party allegiances and joined Okuk. He took them first to Minj and then to a plush Port Moresby hotel to choose a government (Standish 1980), which was widely perceived as being his puppet.

The new Simbu premier was Mathew Numambo Siune, another Kamanegu who was fond of saying that Kamanegu are 'born to rule'. Siune had bitterly opposed Okuk in the 1972 poll and afterwards (Standish 1976), but was sacked in 1974 by Chimbu Coffee for theft of \$1,643.70 of coffee-purchasing funds. Despite Siune being defended by Okuk's lawyer and saying he took the funds to pay higher prices to growers, he was found guilty. After Okuk offered to repay the funds he was not jailed, but rather placed on a one year K300 bond (*Post-Courier*, 1 March 1976). Siune became Okuk's client, and his father the nominal (but not legal) chairman of the Kamanegu Corporation. Helped by Okuk, Siune found employment with the Chimbu Area Authority and later with the interim provincial government until sacked in 1979, allegedly for non-performance of duties, when he set up a tavern near the province's western border which prospered despite the liquor ban in 1980.

Apart from these two likely front-runners, the provincial seat attracted a highly qualified field of candidates, all slightly younger and almost all better educated than Okuk himself. Nilkare aside, only Barunke Kaman was a businessman with sufficient resources to mount an effective campaign to cover the province. With perhaps one or two exceptions they were all credible candidates, however, and what was to become important was not the size of their campaign funds but the simple fact of their nomination and the locations of their home bases.

Okuk's home base was divided internally, and was ringed by serious-minded young men, determinedly opposed to him personally and hence to the National Party. Map 10.1 shows the home villages of the provincial candidates, indicated by a letter of the alphabet. As a central northerner from the Awakane clan of Kamanegu tribe, Okuk (letter A on the map) incurred the resentment of the advantages which his people had gained from their central location in the colonial era. Worse, in terms of Simbu values, he also had to overcome the shame of being opposed by two fellow Kamanegu, the MA candidate Philip Nanme (L) and the pro-Pangu (or pro-Somare) coffee buyer and former provincial secretary, Barunke Kaman (M) from Bomaikane and Orgondie clans respectively. In their home open electorate alone these two Kamanegus were to gain 3,196 votes, which - if all had gone to Okuk - hypothetically would have been enough to have reversed the ultimate result.



Also among Kuman speakers the young lawyer and Independent Independent, Joseph Mek Tiene (G), took nearby votes which otherwise Okuk or Kaman might have expected, despite earlier Kamanegu tensions with Mek Tiene's Endugwa tribe. Mek is the son of a former open member for Kundiawa and provincial government minister Joseph Tiene. His vehicle proclaimed him 'a man of the people' and perhaps to counter allegations that he had a superior manner he occasionally went barefooted during the campaign. He and some Gumine candidates thought he would do well in Nilkare's base, Gumine, after acting there as a fight mediator and defending lawyer. Still among the Kuman speakers, Okuk was opposed by the graduate research officer and Independent Independent, Miugle Peter Kolkia [Kamis] (H), from the Gembogl area of the Upper Chimbu valley, where Okuk had gained blocks of votes in 1972 and 1977. In 1982, however, Gembogl people said they were sick of the 'Highway men', and of Okuk in particular because he had failed to build the road over the Iwam Pass to Bundi in Madang Province which they said he had promised them in 1977. (They ignored the fact that Okuk had taken credit for upgrading their road to Kundiawa in the early 1970s.)

In Kerowagi District, to the West, the Kuman-speaking pro-Pangu agriculture lecturer, Peter Kumgi (B), had stood against Okuk in 1977, and was still angry at the latter's previous role as minister for Primary Industry. Again in Kerowagi District, a UPNG anatomist, Joseph D. Kagl (I), a fifth Kuman speaker, stood as a self-proclaimed Liberal (*sic*). Just south of the Wahgi River there were two other minor candidates, John Talba Kombukon (D), a pro-Pangu ex-teacher of Kup, and Joseph Sil Nibabo (K), a pro-Pangu magistrate from Neragaima in the Dom area. Okuk's base was thus ringed by at least five credible candidates.

To the east in Chuave there were three candidates, Wera Mori (C), a young former soldier and student, who had been greatly assisted by Okuk while at university in Port Moresby, but who eventually stood as one of the few endorsed candidates in Chimbu of the once dominant United Party (UP); Gerry Ninbe (E), a pro-PPP former finance clerk; and Riyong Henry [Henganike] Yauwe (F), a Morobe-born but locally raised pro-Pangu businessman and ex-secondary teacher, who had stood unsuccessfully for Chuave Open in 1977. Riyong stood to gain a very large block of Siane votes previously won by Okuk, and Mori and Ninbe smaller blocks previously directed towards Nilkare, so although the Chuave candidates effectively cancelled each other out, overall they were likely to hurt Okuk more than Nilkare.

Five of the thirteen candidates were pro-Pangu, which may not have been deliberate on Pangu's part - an issue discussed below - but merely reflected the fact that Okuk had attracted a large field of educated people who wanted to defeat him. To have the resources and confidence to tackle the provincial seat they were likely to be well-educated, and most well-educated and well-paid Simbu come from the

Table 10.3
Occupation of candidates and winners, Simbu elections
1972, 1977 and 1982^a
(rounded percentages)

| | 1972 | | 1977 | | 1982 | |
|---|-------------|------------|--------------|------------|--------------|------------|
| | C (n=71) | W (n=8) | C (n=105) | W (n=7) | C (n=132) | W (n=7) |
| Small peasant ^b | 11 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 5 | 0 |
| Big peasant ^c | 20 | 0 | 13 | 0 | 5 | 0 |
| Coffee and trade stored ^d | 10 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| (Peasant total) | (41) | (0) | (24) | (0) | (13) | (0) |
| Store owner ^e | 7 | 37 | 11 | 14 | 14 | 14 |
| Coffee Buyer ^f | 7 | 0 | 17 | 29 | 4 | 14 |
| Trucker ^g | 3 | 13 | 3 | 14 | 8 | 14 |
| (Businessmen total) | (17) | (50) | (31) | (57) | (26) | (42) |
| Public servants and clerks ^h | 15 | 13 | 22 | 14 | 33 | 29 |
| Teachers | 7 | 0 | 11 | 14 | 18 | 0 |
| Church workers ⁱ | 10 | 12 | 9 | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| (White collar total) | (32) | (25) | (42) | (28) | (55) | (29) |
| Blue-collar ^j | 10 | 13 | 3 | 14 | 6 | 29 |

Notes to Table 10.3

- (a) Source: returning officers supplemented by field data (Principal occupation).
 (b) Most rural people in northern Simbu grow coffee as smallholders, and are defined as peasants here because the economic activities are land-based and export-oriented. Some designated as 'subsistence farmers' by officials were in other occupations, such as teachers up until the election. 'Small peasant' as used here is a relative term used where no special record is kept of the size of coffee holdings or other economic activities.
 (c) These men are known to have large coffee holdings, cattle/pig projects.
 (d) Coffee sales usually support the trade stores, which are frequently seasonal.
 (e) Proprietors of viable stores and legal liquor outlets.
 (f) Coffee buyers tend to be young and relatively well educated. Young men have less access to land than their elders. They may also have coffee stores, etc.
 (g) Truckers are those hiring plant to public works, plus passenger/cargo carriers.
 (h) Includes some non-literate people such as aidpost orderlies, and interpreters, as well as clerks in private enterprise.
 (i) Includes non-literate catechists and evangelists and tertiary trained clergy.
 (j) Includes skilled tradesmen, labourers and drivers.

north of the province and so were likely to eat into Okuk's vote. Further, any opponent of Okuk's was likely to be attracted to Pangu party with its national rather than highlands regional orientation.

These other candidates might be thought to be on 'Kamikaze' missions, merely there to split Okuk's potential vote, but some campaigned very widely - especially Barunke Kaman, Mek Tiene, Wera Mori and Gerry Ninbe - and with others showed that fanatic gleam which the politically ambitious display in their mystic relationship with the electorate, and they sounded quite genuine in saying that they expected to win. They did not just 'run dead,' merely concentrating on their home areas, as would deliberate 'splitters'. Each of these four candidates, and Peter Kumgi, gained over six thousand votes, which is no mean feat. Together the eleven 'minor' candidates polled 52,220 and although every vote they gained was potentially one less for Iambakey Okuk, in some areas - such as Kaman's campaign base of Gunanggi in Sinasina district - it was also almost certainly also one less for John Nilkare.

Open candidates

Table 10.2 above summarises the background of all candidates and winners (Open and Provincial) in 1982 as well as in 1977 and 1972. It shows first of all the increasing number of Simbu attracted to the electoral lottery, with the province's average of 22 candidates per open seat again the highest in the country. The data reflect many of the changes in Simbu society and the people who were entering its political elite. The average age of candidates fell slightly to 33 years, but that of winners dropped from 36 to 29. The 1982 candidates' average level of formal education had fallen slightly from 1977, but eight were graduates and many had 11 years' schooling; the winners' average formal education rose from 7 to 11 years. Previous political office had been held by far fewer candidates (10) and winners (1) in 1982 than in 1977 (23 and 4, respectively). So these people were new to electoral politics, as were the first two Simbu women ever to stand for parliamentary election, Mun Mek and Gagum Kama both of Kerowagi district, although they had long played leading roles in various women's associations.

Table 10.3 below gives details of the occupations of candidates and winners in the three national elections, and again reflects the changing fortunes of Simbu. Compared to 1977, the proportion of 1982 candidates whose economic activities were primarily cash-cropping (who are here classified as peasants) almost halved from 24 to 13 per cent. As in 1977, they provided no winners. There was a fall in the number of coffee buyer candidates to 4 per cent in 1982 from 17 percent in 1977, and of winners to 14 from 29 per cent. In other words, those few coffee buyers who stood did relatively well in 1982, but fewer coffee buyers took the

Table 10.2
Personal data, Simbu candidates and winners 1972, 1977 and 1982 elections^a

| | 1972 | | 1977 | | 1982 | |
|--------------------------------------|------|----|------|----|------|----|
| | C | W | C | W | C | W |
| Number | 71 | 8 | 105 | 7 | 148 | 7 |
| Age (average years) | 35 | 34 | 37 | 36 | 33 | 29 |
| Formal education (av. years) | 3 | 4 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 11 |
| Previous candidacy ^b | 34 | 6 | 28 | 3 | 45 | 3 |
| Previous elected office ^c | 18 | 6 | 23 | 4 | 10 | 1 |
| Women | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Re-elected | - | 4 | - | 1 | - | 1 |

Notes to Table 10.2

- (a) The elections were for the House of Assembly (1972), the National Parliament (1977 and 1982).
 Source: returning officers supplemented by Field Data, Standish 1972-80.
- (b) This includes candidacy in local government, provincial assembly and parliamentary elections. Data may be incomplete.
- (c) This includes council, provincial assembly and parliamentary membership.

risks of standing. A larger proportion of truckers, who are more established businessmen, stood in 1982 (8 per cent, as against 3 in 1977), and again were 14 per cent of winners. Overall, the proportions fell of businesspeople standing (from 31 to 26 per cent), and winning (from 57 to 42 per cent). There was a slight rise in the proportion of teachers and clergy standing (from 20 in 1977 to 22 per cent), but a fall in their success rate (from 14 to 0 per cent). There were more public servants standing (33 as against 22 per cent) and successful (29 as against 14 per cent). There was a doubling of blue-collar wage-earning candidates (from 3 to 6 per cent) and winners (from 14 to 29 per cent).

These figures probably reflect the rising numbers of educated Simbu, of young men with confidence in themselves and the confidence of their clans to back their ambition. There were fewer business opportunities available during an economic downturn, but more Simbu public servants in clerical positions with sufficient status and salary to consider standing. They may also reflect the resentment of the better-educated at the performance of the previous group of elected leaders. As Kobale Kale, himself a former MP and minister, said, many stood to pull down or block other bigmen, or potential bigmen, or to become bigmen themselves. The sole sitting open member from Chimbu to be returned, Robert Yabara, implied before the poll that he might well lose but was satisfied because he had had 5 years and now had a business (Bill Standish [BS] field notes 17 May 1982). Given the example the sitting members showed of the material rewards available from successful candidature, it is perhaps not surprising that so many stood, especially when even losing candidature is a status-enhancing role within one's group.

My impressionistic assessment of the candidates from their career paths is that Pangu tended to attract or endorse steadier individuals with stable employment histories such as public servants, the Nationals attracted private businessmen with somewhat unstable work histories, while the MA tended to attract Christian welfarists such as church workers and teachers. PPP candidates tended to be business people and former public servants, some with slightly erratic histories.

Party endorsements were difficult to identify precisely, as were the less obvious material assistance to candidates informally committed to supporting parties. Endorsements seemed to be based upon personal relationships with party officials and leaders, such as former school or work mates, and assessments of those candidates likely to be winners which were even less accurate than in 1977. Whether or not party endorsement or association with the party leaders actually gained them votes, there was some financial inducement for candidates to seek or accept party support from the two major parties. Some candidates shopped around for support, and one (Robert Yabara) changed parties during the nomination period and finished up saying he was Independent.

National had the greatest number of open candidates endorsed, about twenty, with Okuk the sole provincial nominee, and about thirty

pro-Nationals who received party support. This was similar to Okuk's strategy of 1977, when he effectively took over the UP campaign in Chimbu. Pangu endorsed seven opens, with Nilkare the sole endorsed provincial nominee but five of his opponents also identified as being pro-Pangu. PPP had five opens, and no one nominated against Okuk (although it was alleged that two of his rivals received PPP's material support). MA had five nominees, with Philip Nanme the sole provincial nominee and organizer. The UP had two opens as well as one provincial standing. Many open candidates were independent, with about five linked with Ted Diro's Independent Group. Of the provincials, two called themselves Independent Independents, and found themselves the subject of unwelcome soliciting and accusations from other candidates.

As discussed further below, this was an election in which conspiracy theories abounded. Most of the minor candidates at some stage or another were mentioned to me as having been put up to split Okuk's vote, and one allegedly stood to split Barunke Kaman's. In the provincial seat one potential candidate was said to have dropped his idea of standing in order to become campaign manager, another to have offered to withdraw for a K3,000 fee, while a third claimed (supported by a credible witness) to have refused an endorsed intermediary's proffered bribe of a K7,000 vehicle and a business if he withdrew his nomination - a ploy hard to comprehend, because if carried out the main opponent of the alleged initiator of the move stood to benefit most. There was an air of suspicion about the 1982 election in Chimbu, with plenty of rough-and-tumble when candidates shouted out at marketplaces '_____ is a thief'. The provincial secretary, Arnold Daugl, was right when he said that the campaign was 'really hot'.

The campaign

Far more than in 1977, the election campaign in Chimbu was broadcast by national FM radio into the many village portable receivers, over-laden with commercial jingles in loud, penetrating nasal voices plugging the political parties and their leaders:

*Long bus, long nambis, ailans tu
Nesenel Pati bai emi halvim yu;
Yu na mi na Iambakey
Yumi stretim PNG;
Nesenel em i pati tru -
Votim em long '82!³*

³ In the bush, the coast and islands, too./ National Party will help you;/ You and me and Iambakey/ We'll sort out PNG;/ National is a party true -/ Vote for it in 1982!

and

We know what the Pangu means,
We're going to vote the Pangu team,
We need Somare and Pangu, today!!!⁴

The parties' high profile nationally was more than echoed at the local level, however, starting with the National Party convention in Kundiawa in March 1982, a massive feast with 180 pigs and beer provided for a huge crowd, parts of which were so rapt in the string bands and their own dancing that they barely made landing space for the (expatriate) parachutists who were among the paid entertainers. Several months later Okuk said 'We collected from business for the convention, and blew K68,000, or K86,000 on that'. National had spent K15-20,000 on conventions in seven other provinces. He considered the Chimbu convention a mistake, and he was still annoyed at 'Barunke Kaman and his mob' for having broken it up (BS 26 August 1982).

Whether or not party endorsement or association with the leader actually gained them votes, the twenty endorsed National candidates or their campaigners received about K100 cash, perhaps a beer party with several pigs and a cow, and high quality posters. National also gave about K150 worth of posters to its thirty self-proclaimed supporters. Pangu's Chimbu branch had much less funding, and K6,000 of centrally contributed campaign funds topped up by K1,000 from Nilkare was grabbed early by its main organizers. The pro-Pangu supporters received only about K50 of cheap leaflets to hand out. The other parties as such were not particularly visible or significant in the Chimbu campaigns.

Yet the importance of political parties was the dominant impression to be gained from the big public spectacles of the campaign; Pangu and National were named in almost every sentence, and speakers sought to utilize the names of their figurehead leaders. Even more than when prime minister, Michael Somare was in 1982 enormously popular in the highlands, quite overshadowing the nominal prime minister. Perhaps because people were blasé about politics and helicopters, although more likely because the few PPP candidates were not very prominent men and he did not front Okuk's heartland at Kundiawa, Chan's helicopter visit lifted the profile of PPP around the fringes but attracted little attention compared to the Pangu and National rallies.

⁴ Pangu had another song in *Hiri Motu*, as well. Perhaps because in Papua New Guinea all major parties were equally involved, the role of Australian advertising agencies and musicians in the campaigns drew no media comment, to my knowledge, in contrast to the situation in Fiji that year where foreign consultants' involvement in politics led to a royal commission.

These gatherings of several thousand were personalized into competitions between Somare and Okuk, with the crowds quite partisan, on at least one occasion to the point of foolhardiness. When Somare early in the campaign arrived by helicopter at Kerowagi to campaign for Nilkare, Okuk followed in an attempt to confront him, but the angry crowd prevented Okuk's hired helicopter from landing. Somare supporters actually grabbed the skids of the hovering machine and shook it until Okuk departed. Similar events occurred elsewhere, with Okuk chased away from Pangu meetings at Mai in Yonggamugl, in Nambaiyufa and Omkolai, and threatened with stones at Chuave. Deliberate and successful attempts were made to break up his rallies at Kundiawa and Gembogl. Former premier Siwi Kurondo, who said 'I'm Pangu, I don't change', perhaps reflected a quite widely held view as well as any personal grudge in shouting at Minggende market '*Imbakey man nogut. Em i hambag man stret*' ('Imbakey is a bad man. He is a real humbug'. BS 14 May 1982).

Although the National Party branch in Chimbu had an executive with a southerner as chairman, Timothy Yomba, and a crowded office in Kundiawa, this was very much a personal operation and as such was definitionally a political faction. Conventions had been held and policy documents printed, but in Chimbu the focus was all upon the party leader. His slogan, 'The First Highlands Prime Minister', bluntly stated his ambition to be the country's boss and also his claim to stand for the dignity of the highlanders, who would not be kicked around by coastal people, a theme he had stressed in crude anal language in the 1977 campaign. He was thereby also proclaiming himself an equal of Somare, the defeated prime minister.

Throughout the campaign in the highlands Okuk followed his strategy of the previous six years, an appeal to a pan-highlands ethnicity which bordered on highlands chauvinism. For historical reasons arising from late contact because of geographic isolation, this region had been a late-starter in colonial development, Western education and modern employment. Okuk's supporters showed films which reminded people of the famous Simbu leader, the late Kondom Agaundo, who was the first highlands representative in the Legislative Council in the 1960s. Kondom was said to have told coastal people that while they mocked his rusticity he was sharpening his spears - the educated Simbu youth. Okuk himself was one of the first highlanders to go to high school and appeared to be driven by resentment at slights received years before, as demonstrated in this paraphrased extract from a speech at a feast given by Danga Bagme at Maki near Kerowagi, which was part of his standard campaign speech.

They called us *gris pik* (pig fat), tinfish eaters, *skin diwai* (bark belt wearers), beginners. Now I want to lift up your names. There are many educated candidates; but think about it, look

closely at them, and get an orator with a good head who knows how parliament works. I am the son of a great leader, Palma, and I have taken his place. There are people from my own line, the Kamanegu, standing against me. The Prime Minister shouldn't be a Sepik or a Kavieng. We shouldn't be cargo boys. We have boundaries, setting out the positions in government. It's nothing to do with university education or lots of money. You can see that. Damn the educated young candidates! Some of them don't even have jobs. They are the children of rubbish men. The basis of work is competition. You Simbu should be happy, we didn't oust Somare with spears, but lobbied to vote him out of power. Now I'm competing to defeat them. I talk for all *gris pik* men, all *as tanget* ('breach clout' wearers, (BS 26 May 1982).

Villagers and educated people alike around Chimbu said this populist pitch appealed to highlanders, especially the rural youth, who sense injustice in their lack of success in the modern employment market and resent their better-educated and more successful agemates. Okuk said his main campaign theme was

decisive, strong, firm leadership. That is what we want. Somebody has either got to do something - lead or bloody get out of the way....If you make the wrong decisions, people will get you out I like to make some firm decisions. Good or bad.... That is the style of leadership which I am selling.... PNG people need some instant decisions, right or wrong (*Post-Courier*, 3 June 1982).

Asked if this could lead to a dictatorship, he said 'We have a tribal system here which will defuse any dictatorship movement.... Tell me who has the courage to say, "I want to become a dictator"?' (*Post-Courier*, 3 June 1982).

Okuk's Port Moresby statements reported by the national and international media focused on anti-communist and anti-union themes; some of his nationalist statements (such as those criticising Filipinos) were ethnocentric if not racist. He spoke out strongly at UPNG against Indonesia for its role in Irian Jaya, and in particular transmigration (Griffin and King: 59-61). The Indonesian Embassy took the bait and responded in a newsletter that

One has to understand the nature of international politics if one would become the leader of a certain nation, otherwise such a person will create a disaster instead of developing peace and harmony between two neighbouring countries (*The Age*, 30 April 1982).

The embassy thus appeared both to meddle in Papua New Guinea politics, for which Foreign Minister Noel Levi and Okuk condemned it, and to imply that Okuk was a possible leader. Okuk reinforced this latter impression by calling for a conference on Indonesia's armed incursions into Papua New Guinea at the time of the election. His appeal for 'Melanesian brothers and sisters' may indeed have been intended as a cheap way to place himself for the post-election prime ministerial lobbying stakes, but first he had to ensure re-election at home.

When in Chimbu Okuk virtually ignored the national and international themes he raised on the national media. The only international issue I heard raised was the unlikely allegation that Okuk had close relationships with communists. One informant said these rumours were perhaps referring to China. Perhaps this is why Okuk stressed his anti-communism in the national media, but the rumour had no basis other than maliciousness or the confusion arising from Okuk's personal business dealings with the Republic of China, Taiwan, which had led to him breaking a government ban on importing rice by bringing some Taiwanese rice in through Rabaul.

Since he was the incumbent, for the other Simbu candidates the main campaign issue was the performance in government of Okuk himself, in Chimbu. Despite having said since the 1970 by-election that he would not give promises, Okuk in 1977 had made certain campaign pledges, which were remembered in 1982 and against which he was evaluated. Pangu supporters frequently said that Okuk had done nothing in office, and - only slightly elliptically - Chan had said people should cut out the tree that bore no fruit (BS 20 May 1982). In Chuave local leaders said Okuk had not obtained the Nambaiyufa to Goroka road, the promise of which had helped swing him the winning block of votes in that remote and ethnically distinct corner of Chimbu, but ignored the massive road improvements made during 1977. Nor had he built the road to Bundi, as Upper Chimbu people recalled him pledging. These two were local issues, but were skilfully utilized against Okuk by Pangu and pro-Pangu candidates in areas where he previously had obtained large and essential blocks of votes.

In Chimbu there remained a Pangu organization following on from the provincial government election of 1980, with Barunke Kaman the secretary, but this suffered after Nilkare used his Port Moresby connections to get party endorsement for the provincial seat in 1982 ahead of Kaman. Pangu national organizer, Barry (later Sir Barry) Holloway, said, 'The party organization in Chimbu was a shambles. We tried to have it organised, but eventually left it to them.' (BS 27 August 1982). After giving K6,000 early on headquarters gave small sums (often just plane tickets back home) to Chimbu candidates, as part of a national budget which Holloway put at K630,000. Nilkare financed his own campaign caravan of three vehicles on the road for three months.

For Pangu Pati nationally Somare was the greatest asset, the man who gained self-government and independence, bringing power from Australia, and who set up the national currency. The party program emphasized three policies. First, to tighten government administration and reduce the size of the bureaucracy, which might not be expected to be popular with Pangu's traditional public service constituency. Second, to strengthen village courts, which mollify and appeal to those concerned at declining public order in rural areas, and especially appeal to the village leaders who might help sway blocs of votes. Pangu also pledged improved health services and higher levels of universal education. Third, and especially potent in Simbu, to improve the rural economy, especially rural sectors through the proposed agriculture, industry and housing bank. The Chan-Okuk government took power just as the second oil price rise shock of 1979 took effect and commodity prices - including coffee prices - plummeted 30 to 50 per cent. Overall, government revenues declined 30 per cent in real terms. While a strong government might have been able to restrain official spending, Chan's was not strong, and government debt rose in 1981-82. Chan himself later said publicly that coercive pressure to withdraw support meant that unreasonable demands by coalition members could not be refused. Pangu was able to use the Chan-Okuk government's extravagances during this economic downturn to great effect. As pro-Pangu candidate, Peter Kumgi, said, 'This is the people's money, and it is being wasted' (BS 13 May 1982).

Usually the corruption issue was raised by Pangu supporters in quiet talk around the fringes of meetings and markets, rather than in public speeches by endorsed candidates. Apart from accusations of waste such as the aircraft purchases, a libellous allegation was made by one endorsed Pangu candidate that Okuk had received a block of apartments in Sydney as a kickback for the Dash-7 purchase, which I can mention here because Okuk himself publicly denied it. Perhaps most Pangu candidates avoided overt confrontations for fear of causing a breakdown of public order, because aggressive confrontations - in the style used by Okuk in 1977 - in Simbu frequently incite violence. To gratuitously stir up conflict is bad politics. Okuk was sufficiently niggled to mention in his speeches those who had broken up his meetings, but put them down saying that they 'appeared crazy' (BS 26 May 1982).

If Pangu had a local figurehead at all it was Nilkare, but his personal campaign was low-key. He made a last-minute dash around the province by helicopter just before polling started to remind people of his candidature. As in 1977, he had spent much of the time beforehand in Port Moresby, which could have cost him the seat, but he had also kept other southerners from standing and thus kept his vote catchment safe. Nilkare had earlier used his connection with Somare in a helicopter tour of the remoter parts of Chimbu, during which Somare avoided the heated confrontational stance that marked Okuk's rallies. Despite this, Nilkare's wealth meant his campaign was an autonomous one, distanced slightly

from the Chimbu Pangu branch, although he had close links with some of the endorsed open candidates like Nua Fred in Upper Chimbu, where a large party helped win support for both (although a local informant said he had forgotten what had been said after four days of drinking). Nilkare conducted ten big rallies, at which he emphasized Pangu's economic points and condemned the Chan-Okuk government's economic mismanagement and the Dash-7 purchase. He also highlighted the falls in coffee prices and commodity rice stabilization funds, although some Okuk supporters said this was not the fault of the government.

Nilkare's northern opponents perceived that his sophistication could be turned against him, and whispered widely that he had abandoned his own kind: 'He doesn't have relatives to stay', some said - a story which is false - while a contradictory rumour said 'When Simbu visit him he breaks the dishes afterwards, because we're dirty'. Nilkare nailed the 'white man' story in a splendid Kuman language speech near Moruma, west of Kerowagi, which drew laughter and applause:

People say I am a white man but my *tokples* is Bomai and I have a black skin. It is true I have white friends, like Bill here [in the audience]. Standup! People say I give to the whites. Seventeen whites work for me and I have to talk with them. It's a trick - if I don't talk with them they'll steal from me. ...I'm a director of Westpac Bank. The staff work for me. Some Number Ten men say I talk to whites, but they are working for me: I'm a director of SP Brewery and I have accountants and lawyers. I'm Port Moresby City Commission Chairman: so when things go wrong, the whites have to come to me! (BS 23 May 1983).

There was also what he called the 'personality issue', and at Moruma he attacked Nationals as 'humbugs', making 'bullshit talk about', using government money for their helicopter trips. 'They give you money and beer and imported pigs, and rotten old cars. Why do they have to buy votes? Where have they been that they have to buy your votes?' (BS 23 May 1982). Nilkare said that Okuk was trying to stay a parliamentarian because he was looking after his own welfare, throwing money around in the way one feeds a dog and forgets it, whereas 'I've got businesses, and I'm concerned about others'. Nilkare campaign team leader and former deputy provincial commissioner, Matthew Towa, drove the message home, saying Okuk and other candidates were 'only thinking of government money, whereas John has business. He has money already in his hands, so he is not thinking of himself. So John Nilkare will look after us later' (BS 23 May 1982).

A Kamanegu councillor, Tiene Boi, who had travelled the province with Nilkare also spoke, saying Okuk had failed to deliver. Nilkare had concluded his Moruma speech by warning

Soon this country will be ruined. Okuk wants to be a dictator, one king alone, bossing the police and the army. If he says shoot someone, they'll do it - he's doing it now. Now we have a prime minister, but one without balls. True or false? Problems are like yar trees, they grow and grow....If you want a happy life like before, vote for me.

The meeting ended with reminders from a local candidate that Pangu was like the country's parents, and had opened the way to people to sit down together, with Somare supporting the good life. 'People should accept Okuk's food or pork gladly, but not be happy with the man; vote for the best man and consider a replacement' (BS 23 May 1982).

The Pangu woman candidate, Mun Mek, spoke too, expressing concern about the waste of government money which should be spent on health and educational services. Later she talked to me about how men are the wasters, and they destroy women's subsistence base in their clan warfare. Such outspoken statements, even a woman speaking up in a forum outside the clan, goes against the Simbu ethos that women are seen in public but rarely heard, and in the circumstances was immensely courageous, which may explain why Mun Mek's manner was deferential, if not her content.

Nilkare claimed he would not try to grease people with beer or money, but did present small cheques (K50-150) to youth groups and churches. Although absent from Chimbu early in the campaign period, he kept three campaign teams on the road with vehicles for months, and while his close supporters said he spent K76,000 in Chimbu (and he said it was K45,000), his campaign was less ostentatious than Okuk's. He worked on his key supporters among the older leaders, taking them *en masse* to a weekend party at Ilimo, strengthening the bonds. He had a huge party at his home base at Omkolai, but none at his wife's village this time. As in 1977 he revived traditional links with groups of voters in Kup ('My people sheltered yours when you were refugees from warfare'), and stressed the Bomai identity when in the south, although often this was left to his campaign helpers.

It was not clear that Somare's widespread personal popularity was transferred to Pangu as a whole. The pro-Pangu/pro-Somare stand of some people was not necessarily translated into a pro-Nilkare stance, as shown when the former interim premier, Siwi Kurondo, publicly supported Pangu against Okuk but then endorsed his fellow Gena tribesman, Peter Kumgi, rather than Nilkare. One Pangu supporter, Barunke Kaman, apparently could not accept Nilkare's endorsement; to Nilkare's annoyance Kaman waged energetic campaigns in areas which otherwise would be Nilkare territory in Gunanggi and Salt. With five pro-Pangu people competing for the provincial seat and party funds long spent, the Pangu campaign as such had ceased to exist in the last month

of the campaign, apart from Nilkare's links with Somare and the general use of Somare's name by many of Okuk's rivals.

Of the minor candidates, perhaps none campaigned harder than Barunke Kaman. Although his criticism of Okuk dates from his student days (Standish 1979), Kaman was widely thought to be motivated by his resentment of Okuk's hostility towards the interim provincial government. Kaman said he had received support from businessmen, including several Simbu, who were fed up with Okuk. Clearly he did not campaign just to split Okuk's vote, however, and after the election he expressed resentment at certain business deals which he alleged had benefitted Nilkare at the expense of the provincial business arm, CHE (BS 12 August 1982). He himself said he had spent K30,000 (in what was nonetheless a shoe-string operation). If Kaman's primary aim had been to enter parliament there could have been an easier way. Observers and participants thought that he might readily have won the Kundiawa Open seat, and Nilkare later said he had offered 'to support him fully' for that, but 'he was after the big one for himself' (BS 25 August 1982).

Kaman's campaign style was almost a parody of that of Okuk, whom he attacked at every opportunity, heckling him by the roadside, whereupon Okuk laughed and drove away. One Simbu graduate thought Barunke was 'uncool', and villagers said he was either very brave, or obsessed. Nilkare said that if you attack opponents directly like that in Simbu people walk away. Villagers from Kenange in late May reported Barunke arriving uninvited at their men's house at night, supporting Pangu but primarily attacking Okuk and his electoral grease as 'a trickster, a spoiler, who if elected would only think of himself and his Tokma business'. They said Kaman spoke so loudly he shook the house and frightened people, and they felt that attacking people behind their back was bad form (BS 19 May 1982). Kaman's tension was shown when he exploded at a PPP rally near Minggende at the sight of a 'mudman' who gave some contextually bizarre performance theatre, showing mock poverty and singing country songs, which he explained was designed to 'make people laugh at the bigmen' (BS 20 May 1982).

Provincial government

The actions of the Simbu Provincial Government (SPG) under Matthew Siune became a major element in the campaign. The run-down of provincial services had worsened dramatically since the 1980 election when what was identified as Okuk's team took over, and Okuk was blamed. The province had been K2.2 million over-committed at that time, but had only reluctantly followed central government advice to tighten financial controls - which later became conditions for accepting a rescue package. In 1981 the SPG had closed down the Chimbu Works and Industrial Division (WID), based at Kerowagi, thereby sacking 1600 workers, and antagonizing its dynamic executive, a former engineering

student named Camillus Dagama Bongoro, who became endorsed Pangu candidate for Kerowagi and fearlessly attacked Okuk for corruption, making quite specific allegations. Okuk had joined with the provincial government in 1982 in closing Kerowagi airstrip for urban redevelopment and to build promised factories, which further alienated many people in this mostly Kuman-speaking electorate.

The Siune government had placed millions of kina worth of WID plant under the control of the provincial-government-dominated firm, CHE, which was by now based at Chimbu Coffee. The provincial government then paid CCCS excessively to hire its own WID plant for services which in some instances were not performed. Various unprofitable enterprises had been set up using Chimbu Coffee facilities by the CCCS general manager, who was also running his own businesses in partnership with some Simbu political figures.

At the time of the campaign the Coffee Cooperative was closed, during the coffee season. Despite Okuk's attempts to gain further finance, a decision had been taken by the provincial government to permanently close it down because - even with a national government loan of some K200,000 - it was effectively bankrupt. The closure of Chimbu Coffee - with the loss by some 17,000 mostly small shareholders of over K300,000 issued capital - might have been the biggest scandal of the election, and had the potential to become a symbolic issue which could utterly discredit the provincial government. This was a step which had been avoided by colonial and post-colonial governments alike for twelve years, and Okuk had played for time by insisting that the decision remained confidential till after the election.

The Chimbu Coffee issue was an interesting test of political communication in the campaign. At a PPP rally Barunke Kaman asked the prime minister about the CCCS, and Chan not very pointedly suggested that people should look closely and see who was responsible for its problems. Danga Bagme at his feast near Kerowagi told Okuk that he had heard that Okuk had got hold of CCCS and asked about reopening the co-operative, but received no reply in Okuk's long and demagogic speech quoted above (BS 26 May 1982). The news of its permanent closure simply did not enter the Chimbu debate. I had been told in confidence of the decision; people in Port Moresby knew and it had been mentioned on national radio. The *Post-Courier* (20 May 1982) had reported Fr Momis saying Okuk had insisted that it remain open for the election period without any hope for recovery. With 550 newspapers reaching Chimbu daily one can only assume that candidates were too busy to have monitored the news: so much for theories of the great political influence of the modern media in rural areas!

Okuk was able to recall some political obligations from the provincial government during the campaign. Mathew Siune dutifully appeared at a number of National rallies, albeit in low-key roles. He also helped Okuk's cash flow problem: his cabinet insisted that the provincial

government's business arm, CHE, purchase a Port Moresby town-house from Okuk for K150,000, with an immediate deposit of K65,000. (On valuation, before purchase, the property was found to be worth K190,000.) But this was an ambiguous relationship at best. Perhaps hoping the voters had short memories as to the origin of the provincial government, Okuk tried to distance himself from some of the problems of Chimbu by patronizing Siune at Danga's feast at Paki:

Mathew is my brother, my cousin; we come from one place. Work slowly and your work is true. The Premier finds the work a bit heavy. We should be easy on him. All the Upper Chimbu and Yonggamugl representatives gave their votes to him, so he allocated the money to get businesses in their areas. But don't you worry, later on he'll help you here in Kerowagi. This year he'll help you here with money too. Right?

And Siune, who had been seated with head bowed, nodded (BS 26 May 1982).

Late in the campaign, however, rumours spread to Port Moresby of a rift between Okuk and Siune over the activities of the Chimbu Coffee management, and at a meeting on the future of CCCS Siune reportedly rejected the suggestion of a Development Bank official that Okuk attend, saying 'We don't want outsiders here'. A Simbu official observed that as Okuk's defeat grew more and more likely, so too did Siune's confidence grow: 'Maybe the premier realises he doesn't have to support a loser' (BS 2 June 1982). Other Provincial Assembly members and ministers appear mostly to have tried to keep the two arenas distinct, and played low key roles - if any - in the campaign, staying in their own areas but utilizing the generosity of provincial candidates for their own political benefit when this was possible.

The greatest issue in the campaign in Chimbu, however, was Okuk's local status: he was a Kuman speaker, a northerner and more specifically a Kamanegu tribesman, which in a bitter irony could not be separated from the actions of his fellow Kamanegu, the premier.

In campaigning in southern areas in 1982 Nilkare emphasised the 'Bomai' issue and the need to develop the southern part of Chimbu. This appeal struck a response. In the 1980 Provincial Assembly election the 'South Bomai Chimbu' slogan had been used effectively by non-Kuman speakers, who formed the majority of the assembly. The 'Bomai bloc' had lacked decisive leadership, however, after the accidental death of its main organiser, Gola Ulgan, which enabled Okuk to sway a majority of Assembly members behind Matthew Siune as premier (Standish 1980).

Siune survived a series of no-confidence motions in 1980, with Kuman Dai of Gumine the alternate candidate, but was facing another challenge in February 1981 when his Kamanegu bodyguard was killed after disturbing a suspected thief. Siune and his family proclaimed this an

attempted Bomai assassination plot, and *posses* were organized using provincial government vehicles; seventeen men were subsequently charged (*Post-Courier*, 9 April 1982; *Times of Papua New Guinea*, 10 April 1982). Siune's father was one of six convicted for the 'payback' killing of three southerners in Kundiawa that morning. A state of terror divided the province north from south, across its 'middle'. Police and government officials prevented the payback killings of several northerners working in southern villages, and with helicopters and trucks with armed escorts ferried southerners out of Kundiawa to safety, and backloaded northerners from the Gumine area, a two-way exodus which eased the trauma throughout the province.

Foreseeing an electoral backlash against himself, Okuk was furious, and attempted in cabinet to have the provincial government suspended. He helped organize K4,000 plus pigs and cattle from the Kamanegu in compensation, a fairly small amount which was reluctantly accepted by Gumine people. Years later their bitterness remained towards the Kamanegu, and specifically Okuk himself, because of the actions of his protege Siune. The candidature of Joseph Sil, a magistrate, can be directly attributed to this incident. Okuk's instantaneous assessment of this event was correct; it certainly affected his electoral chances, because early in 1981 the local leaders of Gumine including Kuman Dai got together and decided that only one southerner would nominate for the provincial seat - and that he would be John Nilkare. Thus over a third of the electorate had only one candidate, and although Nilkare used the Bomai issue in his campaign, he later said he avoided speaking directly of the killings because that only turned people away (BS, 25 August 1982). He did not need to, of course. After the election, one of Okuk's campaign managers joined other observers when he said 'the main problem was that _____ premier and his provincial government, not the economy'.

Apart from the north-south division, a Simbu educationist said that there were two competing ideas circulating among Kuman language speakers in the north. They wanted Okuk as a highlander for prime minister, he said, but were angry with him because he was campaigning all over the country and they did not see him in Chimbu. They also remembered the good life under Somare, and blamed Okuk for the economic deterioration since he took office. Okuk had done nothing during his ten years in parliament, they felt. 'They are divided on this, it is not clear at all. They are confused in their bellies, and it's up to the people now' (BS 24 May 1982).

Campaign extravagances

Although cash was given out occasionally by candidates at the roadside with the plea 'Remember me!' the use of money was far more complex in 1982 than 1977. Two elements of Okuk's 1977 campaign were

ritualized and reinforced by many candidates in the 1982 campaign. The first was the use of motor vehicles equipped with loudspeakers and cassette tapes of raucous music, which played loud and long in rural areas. Speakers were not used in towns, however, perhaps because a judge threatened contempt of court action for disturbing his proceedings, and so the loudspeakers did not, as in 1977, lead to near-riots. The second ritual was that it was virtually obligatory for candidates to give very large beer parties, to show that the candidate was a good and generous man, and to reinforce his position in his own group and beyond. Otherwise, open candidates used much the same campaign style as previously, but with very frequent mention of their political party and the name of its leader. They walked and talked their way around the men's houses at night, and the markets by day, with a fairly standard spiel that they would speak out firmly (*tok strong*) for their people, and try to get more and better roads for their electorates. They expected voting to follow clan lines, and so generally they stayed in their own clan territories and those of affiliated groups, such as affines, where they both felt comfortable and needed to maintain the solidarity of their primary support base.

By contrast to this use of real kinship, the provincial candidates placed more emphasis on pseudo-traditional fictive kinship relationships, which were essentially those of patron and client. One instance with an element of historical truth was the party given at Maki by the wealthy farmer and former perennial losing candidate, Danga Bagme, at which Okuk said that his Kamanegu tribespeople were brothers to the emigrant Kamanegu group on the Koro River some 20 kilometers to the west (BS 26 May 1982). Although Nilkare and others used similar procedures on a smaller scale, and some candidates gave money in private rather than out in the open, the clearest examples are the occasions when Okuk delivered funds for a cattle project, or a beast, to a big peasant, who would thereupon have acquired an obligation to deliver political support in return. Most probably Okuk would try to cement this by holding a party, at which the beer (worth K500-1,000) and several pigs and perhaps a cow or pig (bought from Madang, Mount Hagen or Lae) was supplied by Okuk, and towards which the local people had then made a smaller contribution in order to maintain their own dignity.

Okuk's relationships were often strongest with older men who were no longer capable of getting into national political electoral competition in their own right, but who had links with local candidates and vote-influencing attributes of their own. Under their auspices a party was given, largely supplied by Okuk, although local open candidates usually gave some beer as well, to assert his own status. 'In the electorates', Okuk later said, 'we gave out K20,000 for old leaders each to distribute as campaign expenses. K7-10,000 [sitting] went to opens. Nothing was given to individuals, so there was no bribery to vote' (BS 26 August 1982). Commenting on Okuk's campaign, Barunke Kaman said that

Okuk gained votes where he gave through local bigmen; and thrice said that 'the way to get elected is what you give and who you give it to' (BS, 12 August 1982). Thus Okuk inflated the funds needed for campaigning, and expenditures of up to K5,000 came to be regarded as the barest minimum for open candidates, and much more for provincials.

Okuk's approach inevitably caused problems. The context was a society where rural wages were K752.96 *per annum*, and where an average cash-cropping peasant family may earn only K50-100 a year. In a phenomenon noted in Tanzania (Hyden 1980), Simbu villagers almost certainly decided that they should maximize their benefits from candidates because elections were the one time when they had a chance to exert some leverage. More than any other candidate, however, Okuk's generosity was on a scale likely to be counter-productive. He often had 'party' relationships - in both senses - with five or more candidates in each open seat and was also away in other provinces during the campaign, so he simply could not keep up with the demand. He was being booked for three places at once in the run-up to the poll. One consequence was that some people expecting to see him and to consume his beer were disappointed; there are limitations to how much direct contact can be maintained by one person in a society based upon face-to-face interaction, and Okuk overreached those limits.

Okuk's spectacular generosity was to backfire, at least in some areas. He bought or guaranteed loans for nineteen new four-wheel drive motor vehicles, of which he gave five new ones to National Party campaign organizers and candidates in Simbu, and twenty seven reconditioned ones, of which twelve went to Simbu supporters who he hoped would deliver large blocks of votes. One of the latter vehicles was involved in fatal accident near Salt in Gumine District, and this death in turn led to the area's first eruption of clan warfare since pacification, during which eleven more people were killed. The bereaved people said that apart from a standard Third Party insurance payment Okuk's promised K10,000 compensation had not come, and they were angry.

As noted already, one of Okuk's innovations was his use of his ministerial position to allocate sectoral funds for transparently electoral purposes. Okuk later said he had been careful not to give out cheques; rather, Cash Fund Certificates had been used. He allocated amounts of K2,000 to each of the nine local government councils and up to K20,000 to each district (BS 26 August 1982), funds which the councillors thought were his but which were actually government money. Only four or five councils received the funds, to the irritation of the others. Okuk said he ensured that the cash was spent on roads. In several instances a combination of caution and irritation amidst officials shocked at this irregular procedure meant they kept the funds unspent in district offices. In some cases where roadwork was done the payments were ordered and made at four times the usual rates - to the annoyance of district officials and some provincial ministers who resented the waste. These



Bringing home the beer, Kundiawa, 29 May 1982

(Photo: Bill Standish)



Iambakey Okuk (centre) distributes beer at Kundiawa, 29 May 1982

(Photo: Bill Standish)

funds were widely seen as political 'gravy' to boost the names of local leaders, and Okuk's. The casualness with which resources were used and abused astonished Simbu and expatriates alike; Okuk's staff wrote off two government Range Rovers, the highlands most prestigious vehicle, and simply got others where they had come from. 'Throwaway cars', said one missionary lightly, but the fact that people were killed in one accident at Ganigle in Kerowagi District - without compensation other than insurance - once again told against the candidate.

Okuk's most spectacular innovation was on the eve of the election liquor ban to give out 4,000 cartons of beer, each with twenty-four bottles, at Kundiawa airstrip on 29 May, following an all night string band competition. In ten years I had not seen him wear traditional dress, but on this occasion Okuk did wear the traditional apron and breach clout. The story of the 'bare-bottomed MP' and the deputy prime minister's wife 'dancing bare-breasted' at the 'beer barrel election' was duly reported internationally, along with front-page photographs (*Sydney Morning Herald* [SMH] 5 June 1982; *ABC Background Briefing* 6 June 1982; *The Age* 2 June 1982), but this was not an occasion for mockery. Witnesses said that Okuk - who as at Maki spoke in *Tokpisin* - again said that he was the son of a traditional Chimbu leader and asserted a right to political power under the Simbu ideology of hereditary leadership. At least 10,000 people came to collect the beer, with Okuk as master of ceremonies distributing huge piles for supporters in each open electorate and fifty cartons each for the police, Pangu supporters and the mostly expatriate Hash House Harriers. There was some squabbling and a motorized counter-demonstration by Mek Tiene and some Pangu supporters added to the tension. Eye-witnesses told me that many accepted the beer as a natural part of campaigning, saying this was their due: 'We are only getting our own', 'We'll take the beer, but vote Pangu', or 'National today, Pangu tomorrow'.

Okuk's press secretaries spent the day assuring reporters that this was a traditional occasion. Apart from the attempted symbolism involved in this spectacular finale to the campaign, I have a hunch as to Okuk's motivation in dressing traditionally. Under the Papua New Guinea *Criminal Code* it is an offence to give beer in order to influence votes (the old English custom of 'treating'), and bribery and the exercise of undue influence may be grounds for rendering a poll null and void. In 1978, however, Okuk had read a draft report of mine on the 1977 election in which I stated that gift-exchange for prestige purposes was a customary practice, with generosity and display intrinsic to Melanesian leadership. Were any charges to be laid, I had said, this argument, backed by the Constitution's endorsement of custom, might be used as a possible defence. It was a case Okuk put frequently thereafter.

Costing these extravagances and individual campaigns as a whole is enormously difficult. Most candidates in the provincial seat inveigled businesses into providing support in kind, and probably all candidates

were assisted by their clans. Electoral expenditure became a matter of pride, and although one provincial candidate said he had spent only K550, most of the others claimed at least K10,000. Joe Sil said he was spending a minimum of K6,000 for petrol, leaflets and a speaker; the others were 'skyscrapers' (BS 17 May 1982). An SP brewery worker said Nilkare was buying 200 cartons of beer a week during the campaign worth about K2,500 at wholesale prices. Nilkare said he had spent K45,000 in Chimbu, much of that on two new vehicles at K9,000 each and four days helicopter hire (K6,000). A close campaigner said he received much 'in kind' from business supporters, such as T-shirts, free car tyres and K9,000 of fuel from one foreign company, whereas Nilkare himself denied the free fuel. All companies, he said, supported all parties. Nilkare's K45,000 total probably excludes the funds he spent on bringing close supporters to Port Moresby, but compares with an estimate by a campaign assistant of K76,000 expenditure. 'Not a *toea* of my campaign came from the party', he said; K25,000 was derived from bank overdrafts, the rest from savings (BS 25 August 1982).

Whatever Nilkare's total, the Okuk campaign extravaganza was on a different scale. Okuk said the National Party had spent K1 million in total, of which K547,000 was his own: 'I am the party business!'. National Party ministers had received K40-50,000, and backbenchers K10,000 each. He had given personal guarantees for K80,000 to four prominent National Party candidates, and several party figures had put up K80,000 each. The Papua Action Party, which he agreed was a 'fully owned National Party subsidiary', had been given K20,000 (BS 26 August 1982). He had spent, he said, K36,000 on helicopters and K48,000 on airlifting people and papers. He had bought 7,000 cartons of beer at K7.80 (based on half price at Lae, K5.00, and K2.80 transport costs, K54,600 total). Okuk said he then went to San Miguel and got the same discount, 'a good promotion for them' (BS 26 August 1982). Nilkare and Okuk each claimed the other had received free beer from different breweries. It was fortuitous that the two breweries in 1982 were in a marketing battle which matched the electoral tussle. Certainly almost all the beer distributed in Okuk's last big splurge was San Miguel. Okuk said he had bought 208 pigs at K200 (K41,600), but in a memorable phrase said 'Pigs are a hassle. There's too much work in killing and cooking them. Beer is better' (BS 26 August 1982). In total, he said, he had spent 'perhaps K120-150,000 in Chimbu', to which I said 'I'd put it at a quarter of a million', and he replied 'When it's all added up, K240-250,000' (BS 26 August 1982). Peter Kuman - his campaign manager till the last few weeks, when Okuk sacked him - said 'We wasted more money here in Chimbu than Somare all over the country' (BS 22 August 1982).

Whatever Okuk's total expenditure, how was it financed? He said that businesses told him to come back for donations after he won, whereas Peter Kuman said they had, 'like Somare', got a lot of money

from businesses (BS 22 August 1982). Astonishingly, Okuk said that much of the funding came from commercial bank loans or overdrafts against his own assets. Perhaps the assets were more than sufficient to cover the borrowings and guarantees made by Okuk, or perhaps the companies thought these funds were for normal business purposes. They cannot have been unaware of the election, so it is also possible that they were mindful that if re-elected Okuk might be able to exercise an influence over their future in the country and they accordingly felt they had no choice but to lend to him. I did not ask them.

However the banks, like Okuk, no doubt were aware that the Papua New Guinea Constitution makes provision for Organic Laws on the Integrity of Candidates and of Political Parties (which have not been passed) to control contributions to parties, and the *Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership* states that defined national 'Leaders' accepting gifts or other benefits or advantages from a person or foreign enterprise are guilty of misconduct. In guidelines which the Ombudsman Commission issued before the election⁵, it was proposed that parties should not accept any 'cash contribution or other form of financial assistance' exceeding K1,000 from citizens, and none from non-citizens or groups effectively controlled by non-citizens. Leaders were reminded of the existing Organic Law.

The guidelines stated that the constitutional provisions are designed to prevent individuals and companies, both national and foreign, gaining influence over leaders whose decision-making might thereby be compromised by conflict of interest. Pressure to provide funds for politicians, which Australian businessmen in Papua New Guinea sometimes call 'the bite', would appear to be a case where the businesspeople were compromised by the politicians, rather than the reverse, although this does not invalidate the concern properly expressed by the ombudsman.

Okuk did have his own sources of funds, but the campaign devastated his businesses. For three months Okuk said he had taken half the K140,000 monthly takings from his businesses (the Chimbu stores and the goldmine), and used advance rent from the coffee factory. He had sold a house in Port Moresby, a commercial building and five town-houses, and was trying to sell the Tokma coffee factory. He said he had borrowed K64,000 against 'my company' (IMK), K440,000 against 'this company' (Universal Brands Marketing), and K50,000 from one bank and K15,000 from another, which adds up to K569,000. The banks were chasing him for interest on the personal loans he had guaranteed, and were seeking repayment of overdrafts. He had sought more funds to

⁵ Ombudsman Commission, 'Guidelines for the Acceptance of Election Campaign Contributions and Benefits', 15 January 1982, mimeo., 'Voluntary Guidelines for Acceptance of Campaign Contributions by Political Parties', 15 January 1982, mimeo.

'pay my way on top again', which would take him three years, he said, and then he would have another crack at the prime ministership. When he got it, he would soon retire to spend the time he felt he owed his family (BS 26 August 1982).

Results

The voting period in Chimbu was fairly quiet, aided by the declaration of a 'Fighting Zone' under the *Inter-Group Fighting Act, 1977*. There were the usual logistical problems for campaign teams and many technical hitches for the officials to do with electoral rolls and non-literate voters⁶, allegations that the 'finger dye' was not indelible and so forth, but only a few disturbances when frustrated voters or scrutineers sought to intimidate officials. Okuk's bombarding of one booth with leaflets from a helicopter was counter-productive as it annoyed everyone else present, and the provincial returning officer, Trevor Downes, said Chimbu was 'one of the quietest' provinces: 'Campaigning here has been done with more decorum than in most other provinces, it would seem' (*Post-Courier*, 10 June 1982).

The most striking result indicated from Table 10.4 is an increase in political mobilization: the vote was up 30 per cent, to 96 per cent of those enrolled - although many of those who voted, especially women, were not on the rolls. Perhaps this can be largely explained by the rise in the number of open candidates, which meant that more people had a favourite for whom they had to vote, but these people also voted for the provincial candidates. The provincial informal vote was a low 0.5 per cent, a fall from 6.2 per cent in 1977.

In the open seats, the only sitting member returned was Robert Yabara, perhaps to his own surprise. Under the first-past-the-post system, with so many candidates standing, it was not surprising that most of the the open winners in Chimbu needed only about 10 per cent of valid votes to win, and in one case (Kerowagi with twenty three candidates) a mere 7.7 per cent. In Karimui-Nomane, where a mere thirteen stood, the winner's vote was 19.7 per cent.

As in previous elections the turnout of women was as high as that of men. Half the voters were women but this was not reflected in a fracturing of the solidarity of the votes from each booth, recorded by ballot box. In other words, women usually voted as did the clans they were born or married into. Half the voters were women, but this sort of public politics is a male game, and only few of the minor candidates were heard making a direct appeal to women's interests. While women may have voted for the two women candidates in Kerowagi Open, at 179 (or 0.0093 per cent of the valid vote for the twenty three candidates) their

⁶ Alexander Papenberg, *The Chimbu Experience*, mimeo [n.d.], [n.p.].

Table 10.4
Chimbu Provincial Election, 1982: Interim Count by Open Electorate*

| | (Candidate's home electorate vote underlined) | | | | | | | CHIMBU TOTAL | PROVINCIAL PERCENTAGES |
|------------------|---|--------------|--------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------------------|--------------|----------------------|---------------------------|
| | CHUAWE | GUMINE | KARIMUJ- NOMANE | KEROWAGI | KUNDIAWA | SINASINA- YONGGAMUGL | | | |
| Imbakey P. Okuk | 1929 | 1222 | 1468 | 4599 | <u>6826</u> | 3316 | 19379 | 19.3 | |
| Peter Kurugi | 10 | 30 | 36 | <u>5568</u> | 412 | 93 | 6150 | 6.1 | |
| Wera Mori | <u>4786</u> | 24 | 62 | 39 | 47 | 5995 | 10953 | 10.9 | |
| John T. Kombukon | 18 | 100 | 92 | <u>3047</u> | 34 | 60 | 3351 | 3.3 | |
| Gerry Ninbe | <u>4397</u> | 21 | 3350 | 44 | 48 | 455 | 8316 | 8.3 | |
| Riyong H. Yauwe | <u>5278</u> | 5 | 826 | 18 | 8 | 22 | 6857 | 6.8 | |
| Joseph M. Teine | 131 | 166 | 259 | 576 | <u>1941</u> | 893 | 3956 | 3.9 | |
| Miuge P. Kolkia | 8 | 13 | 3 | 96 | <u>2682</u> | 51 | 2860 | 2.8 | |
| Joseph K. Kagi | 5 | 45 | 20 | <u>1103</u> | 42 | 14 | 1229 | 1.2 | |
| John M. Nilkare | 721 | <u>11063</u> | 5057 | 2162 | 882 | 2589 | 22287 | 22.2 | |
| Joseph S. Nibabo | 11 | <u>3314</u> | 22 | 1412 | 113 | 65 | 4831 | 4.8 | |
| Philip K. Namme | 26 | 347 | 13 | 67 | <u>886</u> | 636 | 2136 | 2.1 | |
| Barunke Kaman | 456 | 116 | 1400 | 527 | <u>2310</u> | 2831 | 7581 | 7.6 | |
| INFORMAL | 36 | 54 | 94 | 128 | 134 | 78 | (524) | | |
| INFORMAL (%) | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | |
| TOTAL | 18512 | 16520 | 12702 | 19386 | 16207 | 17098 | 99886 | (valid votes) | |

Votes as % of persons
enrolled

*Source: Adapted from preliminary working figures prepared by Open Electorate Returning Officers. The 'Total' result is that published by *Times of Papua New Guinea* 2 July 1982. These figures differ slightly from those given in the Electoral Commission reports.

combined vote was so small as to be negligible, and so it can not be said they had mobilized many women voters.

When compared with the 1977 result (Standish 1983: 111), Table 10.4 shows that the leading provincial candidates raised their vote: Okuk, despite his many northern rivals, increased his 1977 total vote by 2,470 to 19,379 (19.3 per cent of the valid vote) in 1982. Nilkare almost doubled his 1977 total from 11,472 to 22,287 votes (22.2 per cent) and won by 2,908 votes. Wera Mori came third, with 10,953 votes (10.9 per cent), Gerry Ninbe fourth with 8,316 (8.3 per cent) and Barunke Kaman fifth with 7,581 (7.6 per cent). Table 10.4 shows the distribution of these votes by open electorate, and clearly shows that in 1982 Okuk's vote dropped in Chuave - the seat containing Nambaiyufa - by 2,404, and in his home seat, Kundiawa - which includes the Upper Chimbu - by 868. Okuk simply could not believe that the local candidates could have collected the votes they received there except through dishonest actions by polling officials (BS 26 August 1982). Although he gained slightly in the remaining open electorates, this was to prove insufficient.

Nilkare's vote fell in both Chuave (by 1,384) and Kerowagi (313), two seats which had several local candidates, but rose dramatically in Gumine (by 7,014 votes) and Karimui-Nomane (4,377). It also rose marginally in Kundiawa (328) and Sinasina-Yonggamugl (980), an electorate where Barunke Kaman with 2,831 votes ate into Nilkare's matrikin's vote, and where Wera Mori got 5,995 votes. Thus Wera Mori's candidature almost certainly harmed Nilkare, as did Gerry Ninbe's (he got 3,350 votes in Karimui-Nomane). But the two southern seats, Gumine and Karimui-Nomane, together provided Nilkare with an additional 11,391 votes compared to 1977, and aided by the fragmented northern vote the Bomai strategy won him the election.

Post-mortems, recriminations and appeals

There was considerable tension during the count, but compared to the 1977 and 1980 elections, when there had been violence against election officials and tribal fighting, there was very little strife in Chimbu in 1982. Contrary to a report that thousands of people had stormed Radio Chimbu in anger at some incorrect figures being broadcast, about a dozen went to the electoral office to protest. On 28 June a sombre Okuk told journalists 'I accept defeat without bitterness' (*SMH* 29 June 1982). Several women cut off finger joints in a traditional mourning gesture at Okuk's loss, which he related to me with quiet pride. 'After the election it was the time for revolution, people were so upset. I was the responsible one...the true nationalist'; he appealed for calm (BS 26 August 1982).

Okuk said simply that 'I was over-confident. I should have put somebody up, down in Gumine, to split Nilkare's vote' (BS 26 August 1982). Certainly there was no candidate in Nilkare's area, which raises

the question who Okuk was thinking of when he told journalist Sean Dorney 'my opponents are vigorously campaigning up in the highlands to split my highland vote but I'm also doing the same so I'll come out on top' (ABC, AM 31 May 1982). Okuk's campaign manager Peter Kuman - reputedly a tough former riot squad police officer, who won the Kundiawa Open seat - said that he had advised Okuk to put a 'splitter' up against Nilkare, advice Okuk rejected because 'he had worked hard there and thought he would do well ... and that's why he lost'. He said the intense electioneering by northerners had reduced Okuk's potential vote, and the huge expenditure on beer had been wasted. 'The reason why Iambakey lost was the hacking up of those three or four Gumines because of the Premier' (BS 22 August 1982).

After the election Okuk's immediate recriminations were against Chan, whom he told me he had attacked bitterly in the Opposition party room, but in his search for an explanation he also blamed others: 'John [Nilkare] is a good man, I can talk to him. But he should do it honestly. It was Barry [Holloway] who did it. He organized the whole thing and got everyone else to stand' (BS 22 August 1982). On this topic Holloway said that 'there was no definite strategy' in Chimbu. Holloway said that Henry Riyong Yauwe had approached Pangu headquarters for help, saying he was doing well in Nambaiyufa and beyond, and Peter Kumgi had also put strong pressure for help as he was taking votes from Okuk, 'These people we were forced into helping, despite our nomination of John; we couldn't turn them away totally'. Pangu had rejected Wera Mori outright, even though they recognized that he would do well. 'The overall effect of these was to pull down Okuk's vote' (BS 27 August 1982).

Perhaps it was pride that led Okuk not to seek to oppose Nilkare indirectly. Nilkare said that he had not rubbished Okuk, and they had talked. Like Peter Kuman, Nilkare considered Okuk could have won the Kundiawa Open seat. 'He knew he would lose. He even considered standing here [in Port Moresby] and in the Open', but Okuk 'stood for the provincial because he didn't want to lose face' (BS 25 August 1982).

Once the result was clear Okuk immediately set about mounting a challenge in a Court of Disputed Returns. He sent teams around collecting tape recorded allegations and documented declarations of bribery and of bias and cheating by what he called 'Pangu electoral officials', which I scanned. Many of the complaints appeared to arise from illiterate voters claiming the clerks had misrecorded their 'whispered' votes, but none of their chosen witnesses had raised complaints at the time. Legal opinion was that these statements carried little weight, although one allegation of the alleged bashing of a woman voter by a policeman - who was named - might, if verified, have influenced the case. Okuk's petition to the National Court alleged bribery by Nilkare and that he allegedly exercised undue influence on voters, and

listed twenty-five instances of electoral malpractice⁷, which were ultimately dropped from Okuk's case. It was not publicly stated why Okuk dropped these grounds from his petition, however petitions on similar grounds relating to the Chuave and Sinasina-Yonggamugl open elections⁸ were rejected by the Court.

Okuk's barrister failed in his sole remaining argument that Wera Mori was under 25 years of age and therefore ineligible to stand, and the 'total of votes he collected would have affected the end results substantially'.⁹ The petition sought a declaration that Nilkare had not been duly elected and Okuk should be declared the winner, or, alternatively, that the election of Nilkare was absolutely void. Mr Justice Andrew found that Mori was under age when he nominated, but rejected the petition on the grounds that Nilkare was not aware of or responsible for Mori's illegal practice. He said the court could not speculate as to who would have obtained Mori's votes, and it would not be just to declare Nilkare not duly elected because some other candidate was a few months under the required age and Nilkare had no knowledge of this. The judgement said that Nilkare had 'clearly obtained the will of the majority and that it would be wrong that he should be penalised for Mr Mori's behaviour in all the circumstances especially where that behaviour is less heinous than say bribery or undue influence'.¹⁰

Parties, beer and brotherhood?

Was there a party vote? In the crudest measure, that of party allegiance of winners, Chimbu voters did not follow the apparent national trend of a swing towards Pangu, in that in total they elected two National Party candidates, an Independent and a Melanesian Alliance candidate, and one each from United, Pangu and PPP. (The fact that some winners

⁷ Iambakey Palma Okuk Petitioner, in the National Court of Justice, MP No. 154 of 1982, dated 30 August 1982.

⁸ PNG, National Court of Justice, MP No. 133 of 1982, Paul Sinowai, Petitioner, 24 August 1982 ; and MP No. 143 of 1982, Dama Damien, Petitioner, 12 August 1982, respectively.

⁹ Iambakey Palma Okuk, *op.cit.* On 3 July 1982, very soon after the poll was declared, Wera Mori wrote the following letter to Okuk 'I am very sorry that my nomination helped to defeat you, our true Chimbu leader. /I must admit that I was under 25 when I nominated. At the time I was filled with hate and that is why I acted as I did. I hope you will forgive me for that and understand my feelings at the time. /If your appeal wins, I hope you will ask me to be one of your campaign managers. If not, I will work for you in the future'.

¹⁰ Andrew, J., in the National Court of Justice, 17 February 1982, MP No. 154 of 1982. See also *Post-Courier*, 8, 16, 17 and 18 February, 1983.

subsequently changed party affiliation up to twice after the post-election blandishments of Okuk and Nilkare shows how flimsy were their party allegiances, but that is another issue.) Presumably a party vote would require a spread of votes for party supporters as well as for endorsed candidates across the province, and would require detailed analysis of voting figures for Open seats which are not available to me. In the provincial poll, Okuk and Nilkare both gained votes widely, with concentrations in the north and south respectively. Nilkare's solid southern vote implies a degree of sub-provincial consciousness in the latter case, which was roughly co-terminous with the Golin and Salt-Xui language areas. Nilkare's northern spread of votes, however, was probably achieved because of the economic issues and Pangu's popularity, mobilized by well chosen and highly competent local campaign staff. The reminders of the good times under Somare appeared to strike chords, especially with older people. To verify a Pangu appeal would also require a cross check of the votes to Pangu candidates and known supporters in both open and provincial polls. One experienced expatriate observer summed up the situation before voting started by saying 'Pangu - if there is such a body as Pangu in Chimbu - seems to have a lot of support' (BS 2 June 1982).

Okuk's highlands regionalism also seemed to many Simbu observers to have wide appeal, especially to younger people, but without an 'exit poll' at booths there is no way to verify whether that was converted into votes. To check that his regionalism had appealed on a general basis there would need to have been a wide spread of votes for him, even in areas where there were local candidates. He got almost no votes in much of the southern sector, and clearly lost most votes in some areas, such as Nambaiyufa or the Upper Chimbu, where in 1982 he was being challenged by local candidates. For whatever reason, his highlands appeal did not work in such areas. A much more fine-grained analysis of voting figures is required than time and space permit.

Access to funds, whether government money or from comprador relationships with foreign capital, was clearly important in the high profile and expensive campaigns in the Chimbu elections. Most candidates spent between K5-15,000. This was not unique to Chimbu: in other provinces sitting members spent K40-50,000, and - as John Ballard notes for the Southern Highlands - the biggest spenders were not necessarily elected, although there is a perceived need for candidates to spend as much money as possible during a campaign. While some Simbu winners were businessmen, with coffee, trucks, stores, and beer sales enterprises, and could afford relatively lavish campaigns, not all were wealthy in their own right by contemporary standards. Wealth helps, but is not essential.

Cultural mechanisms of reciprocity of the type utilized by those giving out beer (or pork) at elections are widely acknowledged in Papua New Guinea. Papua New Guinea's then chief ombudsman, Ignatius

(later Sir Ignatius) Kilage, a Simbu who was defeated by Okuk in 1972, successfully moved in the Supreme Court against the attempt supported by Okuk to raise the electoral nomination fee from K100 to K1,000, using the argument that collecting the deposit money would require intending candidates to seek funds from both national and foreign sources, which would incur obligations in violation of the Leadership Code. 'Nobody gives for nothing in PNG - you have to pay it back, somehow' (ABC, *Background Briefing*, 6 June 1982).

In Okuk's case, massive expenditure on beer might not have won support, and perhaps even ultimately have gone against him. If a highlander spends so much money he may be perceived as being so big that he is beyond the normal exchange system, demonstrating such 'strength' that there is no possibility of 'equivalence', to use Read's (1959) terms. Gifts which are so large and undirected are unrepayable and hence do not incur an obligation, so that the recipient can take without feeling obliged to make a return. One provincial minister said simply 'It's all *gris*' (flattery). Certainly a number of the Kundiawa people who took Okuk's beer from his campaign swan-song expressed similar ideas to observers, but then Simbu people usually say that their votes are not influenced by gifts of beer. I asked Okuk if his beer presentations had been a mistake, and he replied elliptically 'I gave it to everyone, including Pangu.' I then suggested that if it was given on such a large scale, personal ties of reciprocal obligation would not apply; I noted his response as follows 'O. took it in and agreed silently' (BS 26 August 1982). Perhaps, to coin a new term, a 'mega bigman' is no longer a bigman.

Certainly Okuk's massive expenditure on beer, subsidized as it was by discount prices, raised some questions amongst villagers who supported him. One who had heard the allegations of corruption, and knew of the 4,000 cartons to be distributed two days later, witnessed Okuk blithely write a K1000 cheque for a truckload of a mere 80 cartons, and was stunned. Somewhat bemused myself, I asked 'Whose money is that?', and received the reply '*Nogut em moni bilong mipela*' (It's bad if it's ours). The presence of so much beer and the sight of a cheque being paid shocked my friend profoundly. Okuk was exhausted near the end of the campaign, but sounded out of character when he said that if he lost he would forget it and become a villager, because 'I've tried everything' (BS 25 May 1982).

There was a precolonial tradition that if a leader was too powerful, perhaps too violent or exploitative of his own people without bringing them sufficient return, or just causing them too much trouble, he could be killed at the behest of his own people (Rev. W. Bergmann, personal communication, 1978). The circumstances obviously differed in Chimbu in 1982, but the election was a contemporary version of highlanders manipulating clan and tribal loyalties as well as modern resources to bring down a leader.

Despite the talk of parties and beer, the parochial loyalties summarized as 'brotherhood' probably provide the best key to the 1982 election in Chimbu. Most observers and participants I talked with expected clan loyalties to continue to dominate voting behaviour in future elections¹¹. As well as boasting their government positions and modern wealth, all candidates used kinship loyalties both real and fictive, and manipulated ideologies of custom. This 'traditional' approach has a modern rationale. In 1982 the greatest number of Simbu people voted for the local man who could demonstrate he was most likely to bring benefits for them or those near him, just as they had in 1972 and 1977. This happened especially clearly in the open seats, where (unless there were two or more local candidates) once again voting was in solid blocks for the local man. 'That's our way', said Wambu John, a villager from Mintima, 'party people are strange'.

The most striking instance of this corporate solidarity writ large was Nilkare's vote in the south, a Bomai alliance which he kept together as long as the election, despite the divisive open campaign raging all around him. Nilkare had been endorsed locally in what was a modern move with a traditional rationale, arising from a peculiar set of circumstances which meant that no other local aspirant was prepared to undermine him against the northerners. His wealth and great political skills assisted him in gaining and keeping this *de facto* endorsement, and he was aided in his campaign by his Pangu Pati endorsement, Somare's personal support and the poor state of the economy. Nilkare, it seems, was elected as a result of a combination of these factors. Okuk lost because his strongest support areas were divided between better-educated young men of a later generation than he, who, even if they were unlikely to scale the political heights themselves, were determined at least to knock Okuk off his pinnacle.

Party mobilization helped some candidates, and beer helped solidify both recent party bonds and real or quasi-kinship relationships. Ideologies of brotherhood operated strongly, helping some and hindering others. The recent political history of the province had a profound impact. Nilkare's campaign could not have been so strong without the unity of purpose in the south which derived from the violence of February 1981, and that solidarity in turn arose from the operation of a belief in the transplantation of kinship loyalties and values into wider arenas. Rather than the use of party labels, or beer and money, it was - as Okuk had feared in February 1981 - the Simbu values of clan and tribal brotherhood and even of a new southern ethnicity, arising from the intrusions of provincial politics into the national elections, which ultimately ended his career as a Chimbu politician.

¹¹ For a splendid analysis of village level politics in Chuave, where clan solidarity is not necessarily shown in council elections, see Warry 1987.

PART IV: NEW GUINEA COAST

Chapter 11

THE EAST SEPIK ELECTORATES

R.J. May


In comparison with many other parts of Papua New Guinea, elections in the East Sepik Province have tended to be fairly quiet affairs - the notable exception being the successful candidature of cult leader Matias Yaliwan in 1972 (May 1975; Allen 1976). (For accounts of earlier elections in the East Sepik province see Dewdney 1965 [Maprik 1964]; Allen 1976 [Dreikikir 1972]; Wandau 1976 [Angoram 1972]; Nyamekye 1983 [East Sepik electorates 1977] and Winnett and May 1983 [Yangoru-Saussia 1977].) That is not to say, however, that electoral politics in the East Sepik have been uneventful: the province gave birth to two minor political parties - among the first in Papua New Guinea - in the late 1960s-early 1970s and has been one of the traditional strongholds of the Pangu Pati; and, of course, it has provided the country with its first, and present, prime minister, Michael Somare, and the National Parliament with its longest-serving member, Sir Pita Lus.

In the 1977 national elections Pangu candidates dominated the results in East Sepik, winning all but one of the province's seven seats. The main question in 1982 seemed to be whether, in the face of what some saw as a growing disenchantment with Pangu, the Pati could maintain this dominance in what appeared to become very much a series of 'Pangu versus the rest' contests.

The electorates

Apart from the regional electorate, East Sepik contains six open electorates (see map11.1): from east to west, with numbers of electors enrolled in 1982 in brackets, Angoram (36,093), Wewak (23,566), Yangoru Saussia (29,951), Wosera-Gau (31,326), Maprik (31,076) and Ambunti-Dreikikir (29,536).

Angoram is geographically one of the largest electorates in the country, stretching north to south from the coast to the border with Enga province. Its population, however, is concentrated along the Sepik River and its major tributaries to the south, the Keram, the Yuat (Biwat) and the Karawari. The electorate contains a number of language groups but in terms of self-identification the bulk of the population can be roughly divided into three geographical zones: the middle Sepik, which includes a number of large river villages (Iatmul speakers); the lower Sepik, including the Murik Lakes and the scattered population between the river and the coast in the eastern corner of the province; and the grass country south of the river, including the Keram and Yuat villages.



The Wewak electorate includes Wewak town, with a citizen population of 19,142 in 1980, many of whom are immigrants from the inland East and West Sepik living in squatter settlements, a number of coastal and inland villages, predominantly Boiken speaking, to the south of Wewak, and a coastal strip extending west to the border with West Sepik, containing Boiken, Arapesh and Abelam speakers.

Yangoru-Saussia contains - as its name suggests - two distinct parts: Yangoru, a fairly densely populated area north of the Sepik highway, comprising mostly Boiken speaking people with groups of Pukia (Mountain Arapesh) and Abelam speakers, and a more sparsely populated area, of mostly Plains Boiken villages, on the southern, Kubalia or Saussia, side.

Maprik, the smallest and most densely populated electorate, consists mostly of Abelam and Arapesh speakers and is the most homogeneous of the six open electorates.

The remaining two electorates, Wosera-Gai and Ambunti-Dreikikir are, even more than Yangoru-Saussia, distinguished by a pronounced bifurcation. Wosera-Gai covers, to the north the very densely populated grasslands and foothills inhabited by the southern Abelam speakers, and to the south the villages of the middle Sepik and its southern tributaries, including the Chambri Lakes, and a large but very thinly populated area stretching south to the border with the Southern Highlands and Enga provinces. Ambunti Dreikikir combines roughly what used to be the Upper Sepik and Dreikikir electorates and like Wosera-Gai comprises a densely populated area of villages in the Torricelli mountains to the north, and a vast but quite sparsely populated area which stretches up river almost to the Indonesian border in the west and south to the border with West Sepik. (The abortive electoral boundaries commission report of 1981 recommended a redrawing of boundaries inter alia to create a more homogeneous Wosera-Dreikikir electorate and a single Ambunti electorate focused on the river and incorporating most of Gai.)

Within the Wewak, Yangoru-Saussia and Maprik electorates, and to a lesser extent in the Wosera and Dreikikir segments of Wosera-Gai and Ambunti-Dreikikir there is an extensive road system of sorts, dominated by the Sepik highway, which gives at least four-wheel-drive access to the bulk of the population. In most of the Angoram electorate and the Gai and Ambunti segments of the other two southern electorates transportation depends almost entirely on canoe and (especially since the infestation of the Sepik by the aquatic weed *Salvinia molesta*) is often difficult. The Ambunti Dreikikir electorate especially presents almost insurmountable problems for even a conscientious campaigner with a finite budget (thus, obviously, favouring candidates from population dense areas).

By most socio-economic indicators the Sepik is a middle-to-low development area. Income derives mostly from smallholder cocoa,

coffee and copra, with smaller amounts from the sale of artifacts and crocodile skins. The East Sepik has long been a major source of outmigration. A small number of local businessmen, however, is emerging, mostly in Wewak, Angoram and Maprik, whose income - apart from cash crops - depends largely on trade stores, transport, construction and control of urban land.

The lead-up to the election

As in other provinces, electoral manoeuvring in East Sepik began well in advance of the official campaign, as prospective candidates began to jostle for party endorsement.

For Pangu there was a particular problem of having to preselect from an excess of good candidates. The sitting East Sepik members from 1977 were

| | | |
|-------------------|---|-----------------|
| Regional | - | Michael Somare |
| Ambunti-Dreikikir | - | Asimboro Ston |
| Angoram | - | Bill Eichorn |
| Maprik | - | Sir Pita Lus |
| Wewak | - | Tony Bais |
| Wosera-Gau | - | Matias Yambumpe |
| Yangoru-Saussia | - | John Jaminan |

with Jaminan the only non-Pangu member. In early 1981 it seemed likely that all these would stand again. In addition, following the fall of the Somare ministry in 1980 several senior civil servants who were Pangu supporters made known their intentions of standing in 1982, among them Tony Siaguru, secretary of Foreign Affairs, one of the 'Gang of Four' and a Sepik from the Boiken area in the Wewak Open electorate. Siaguru was obviously a valuable prospective candidate; on the other hand, having been away from the province for much of his life, his capacity to pull the village vote was suspect. Thus in 1981 Pangu members with whom I spoke were considering alternative electoral scenarios, including Siaguru as a candidate for the regional seat while Somare contested Angoram (where Eichorn was by no means sure of reelection), and either Siaguru or Somare contesting Wewak with Bais standing in Yangoru-Saussia, his natal area. An additional element of the situation was that well-known national figure Bernard Narokobi was rumoured to be standing against Pangu (there had been similar speculation in 1977), but whether for the regional seat or for Wewak was not known.

In the event this situation was resolved when Siaguru stood as the Pangu endorsed candidate for Moresby Northeast - which he subsequently won - and the more general question of Pangu preselection was partly dealt with by the party's decision to endorse all sitting

candidates. (The issue of preselection in Yangoru-Saussia is discussed below.) Narokobi, as we shall see, nominated for the regional seat.

The candidates¹

East Sepik Provincial: The provincial contest attracted only three candidates: Somare, Narokobi, and Jimmy Simbago.

Simbago, a man of about 54 from Magom village (Wewak Local census division), was a former policeman, soldier, teacher and public servant before returning to subsistence farming in 1968. In 1982 he listed his occupation as president of the East Sepik RSL. In the early 1970s Simbago had been secretary to cult leader Matias Yaliwan, and he was a well known character, around Wewak at least. He had contested the regional seat unsuccessfully in 1977. Simbago stood as an independent but though his poster appeared in widely separated parts of the province he did little campaigning and no one (not even Simbago) expected him to win many votes - a judgement which was borne out by the results. Somare, whose home village is Karau, in the Murik Lakes, had held the regional/provincial seat since 1972, having been member for Wewak in 1968, and the former prime minister was clearly the front runner in 1982. Narokobi, 39, from Wautogik (But Boiken CD), one of the country's first law graduates, had served variously as consultant to the Constitutional Planning Committee, chairman of the Law Reform Commission and chairman of the National Cultural Council, before returning to the province to conduct a benevolent private legal practice and serve, briefly, as provincial planner. Subsequently he was appointed professor of Melanesian Philosophy at the University of Papua New Guinea and a justice of the High Court, and at the time of the election he was chairing a committee of review into local level government while also assisting people in his home area to formulate proposals for community government. Although an early admirer of Somare, Narokobi - himself a very sincere and moral, if perhaps sometimes unworldly, person - felt that Pangu had betrayed its ideals and that its leaders (including Somare) had become corrupt. By 1982 this sense of betrayal had produced a strong personal animosity towards Somare. Having much in common personally with Fr Momis, it was inevitable that Narokobi should gravitate towards the MA. The reasons for nominating Narokobi to stand against Somare (instead of against Bais) are less clear; the decision appears to have been taken by the MA's provincial

¹ The following information is drawn partly from the data provided by candidates to the Electoral Commission, partly from personal interviews with candidates, and partly from interviews with party officials and others, supplemented by personal acquaintance with some candidates over several years. However, the information, of party attachments for nonendorsed candidates in particular, cannot be guaranteed.

branch, but almost certainly with Narokobi's concurrence. At the start of the campaign few people would have given Narokobi a chance, but as the campaign proceeded some began to see Narokobi as a significant threat to 'the chief' (see, for example, *Times of Papua New Guinea* 28 May 1982).

Ambunti-Dreikikir

The winner of the then newly formed Ambunti-Dreikikir electorate in 1977, was independent Pangu candidate Asimboro Ston: Ston, 45 in 1982, from Asiling village (Urat CD), had been a public servant and former president of Dreikikir Council before his election. Nine candidates stood against Ston in 1982:

Toromble Kabai, 40, from Bongos (Gawanga CD), former public servant, self-described as 'subsistence farmer', but having a trade store, coffee, and interests in PMVs; former village court magistrate and Dreikikir councillor; member for Dreikikir Open in the 1972-1977 house; pro Pangu.

Felix Wengisu Sowaimbau, 25, from the river village of Tongwinjamb (Waskuk Hills CD) a Roman Catholic catechist, community school teacher and youth coordinator. Said to be pro MA.

Judah Nim, 26, of Musendai (Urat CD), a local pastor and teacher; pro MA.

Nick Klapat, 30, from Maio (Upper Sepik CD), a teacher. PPP candidate.

Cain Yapi, 29, of Karkubze village, a Corrective Services officer; pro Pangu.

John Paiyep, 40, from Avatip (Upper Sepik CD), a teacher; the endorsed MA candidate.

Harry Weldon Tubugman, 36, of Bangwis village (Waskuk Hills CD), resident in Ambunti, former SDA mission worker, now prominent local businessman (chairman of Sepik Maira Motors and Sepik Investment Holdings; a director of Sepik Cocoa Producers and of SPCA) and unsuccessful candidate in 1972 and in 1977 when he was runner-up to Ston. Tubugman was the endorsed NP candidate.

Aikam Maromban, 38, of Malu (Upper Sepik CD), resigned from the PNGDF to contest the election, as a pro-Pangu candidate.

Gista Hapeli, 40, a former public servant turned local businessman, from Waringambi (Wam CD). Hapeli had been an unsuccessful candidate for the Dreikikir seat in 1972, when he stood for the PPP. In 1982 he was said to be pro Pangu (though he was also heard to support the MA).

Angoram Open

In 1977 the Angoram electorate returned the sitting Pangu member, Bill Eichorn. Eichorn, 46, mixed race, Australian-educated ex-teacher and former president of the Keram Local Government Council, ran a not-very successful crocodile farm and bought crocodile skins along the Keram River. In 1982 he was not generally regarded either as a particularly notable member of the house or as a very energetic constituency politician, and had it not been for the decision of the Pangu Pati to endorse all sitting members he might have been lucky to regain preselection.

Against Eichorn were seven candidates:

Philip Lucku Yua, 37, of Timbunke (Middle Sepik CD), a local businessman (former telephone operator) who in 1979 had been elected provincial member for Middle Sepik. Yua, a pro Pangu candidate, nominated at the last minute with the support of the Angoram Development Association, a group of influential local businessmen, but to the obvious annoyance of local Pangu officials who realized that Yua would draw votes away from another promising pro Pangu candidate, Maiben, and also perhaps from Eichorn.

Teddu Sane, 33, born at Koragopa in the Grass census division, former naval cadet officer, merchant seaman and then stevedore instructor in Lae. Sane had returned to the province in 1977 and contested the national elections in that year as a PPP candidate, coming third in an eight-way contest. In 1982 he was resident in Angoram where he operated a store and bought crocodile skins. He stood for the NP, claiming to be the founder, in 1981, of that party's East Sepik branch. Sane was a great admirer of Okuk, with whose political style he had much in common.

Jerry Sapka Moka, 35, a social worker from Marienberg mission station on the lower Sepik; the MA endorsed candidate.

Jae Maika, 42, of Moim village (Middle Sepik CD), former council clerk (1961-1977), subsistence farmer; unsuccessful candidate in 1977 and in the 1979 provincial elections; pro Pangu.

Mas Niangri, 56, from Angriman (Middle Sepik), former cook, World War II carrier, and policeman. Mas had been an unsuccessful candidate in 1964, and in the late 1960s was known around Angoram town as something of a 'wild man'. It appears that the nomination of Mas, a NP supporter, was made at the very last minute, following the late nomination of Yua, in an effort to draw votes away from Yua in the Middle Sepik.

Ludwig Schulze, 32, a mixed-race man from New Ireland, Australian-educated and with an Australian wife, had come to Angoram in 1979 as manager of a private company but had gone into business for himself, with a trade store and crocodile skin buying. Schulze was pro Pangu (though because of his New Ireland origins several villagers referred to him as 'kantri bilong Julius Chan', and felt he must be pro PPP). He was an early nominee but by the time of the election seemed to have counted himself out of the contest.

John Maiben, 32, mechanic and vocational school instructor, born in Wosera-Gai but resident in Angoram town since 1978; pro Pangu, and, before the nomination of Yua, apparently seen by local Pangu officials as the likely winner.

Benny Chimbi, 40, of Imbuando village (Lower Sepik CD), a former forestry officer and Angoram councillor; PPP candidate.

Maprik Open

The seat of Maprik had been held since 1964 by Sir Pita Lus, Lus becoming in 1982 the only member to have been returned in every general election. A foundation member of Pangu, Lus had held portfolios in successive Somare governments (for detailed biographical data on Lus see Lus 1970, Herlihy 1974). Again in 1982 he looked reasonably sure of reelection.

Seven candidates stood against Lus:

William Maniku Mimbaki 30, of Bongiora (Memblep CD), a subsistence farmer and Seventh Day Adventist church leader and one time deacon of the New Apostolic Mission; the endorsed MA candidate.

Jimmy Taol, 48, of Iahita 3 (Bumbita-Muhiang CD), a farmer, about whom little seems to have been known.

Peter Wahwal, 30, of Yalahin (Yamil CD), a trained motor mechanic and former community school teacher become businessman, and in 1982 a director of Sepik Cocoa Growers. Said to have some NP support.

David Nalas Melep, 38, of Albinama (Bumbita-Muhiang CD), a subsistence farmer and director of Sepik Producers' Co-operative Association. Unsuccessful candidate in 1977. Said to have NP support.

Tobias Kuelik Sakra, 35, of Neliqum (Wora CD) a former school headmaster, a director of the East Sepik Development Corporation and former chairman of the provincial independence celebrations committee. In 1977 Kuelik had resigned to contest the national election, coming second to Lus. Since then he had remained in the village, as a subsistence farmer. Kuelik was said to have NP support.

Redman Keni, 38, of Aupik 2 (Wora CD), a malaria control officer and subsistence farmer who had stood unsuccessfully in 1977. Pro Pangu.

Manikut Manigoli 32, of Kuminibus 2 village (Maprik CD), self-described as a subsistence farmer, but in fact a local businessman of some substance (owning a trade store, coffee and a piggery) and chairman of the Maprik District Youth Council. Said to be pro Pangu.

Wewak Open

In 1977 the Wewak electorate had been won by Tony Bais, then 33, a UPNG graduate, former social worker, assistant principal private secretary to the prime minister (Somare) and then provincial commissioner in East Sepik before resigning to contest the election as the Pangu endorsed candidate. Bais was unlucky not to receive a portfolio in the Somare ministry (which already included two East Sepiks) but was compensated with the chairmanship of the Constitutional Review Committee. A somewhat gruff personality and probably more of a national than a constituency politician, Bais was perhaps respected rather than popular around Wewak; there was also some adverse comment on Bais's 'business interests' (he owns a trade store) and several people with whom I spoke in 1981 suggested that he

might be lucky to be reelected. Nine other candidates contested the Wewak electorate:

Andrew Mungwusi, 39, of Kurupie village, self-described as 'subsistence farmer' but in fact a technical officer with Posts and Telegraphs before resigning to contest the election as a pro-PPP candidate.

William Hawarry, 39, of Magom village (Wewak Local CD), businessman, founder in 1970 of the short-lived Sepik-based National Labour Party, member of the Interim Provincial Government but unsuccessful in the 1979 provincial election), unsuccessful candidate in 1972 and 1977; NP supported.

Jenki Michael Malenki, 39, of Kremending village (Wewak Local CD). Malenki, who described himself as a subsistence farmer, was a former major in the PNGDF and had served as Somare's electoral secretary from 1977 to 1980, before falling out with Somare (and with Pangu). In 1982 he was national secretary of the MA, whose endorsement he received.

Laura Martin, 60, Australian-born, resident in Wewak since 1952, in Papua New Guinea since 1949, and company secretary of Wewak Transport, a large locally-owned company which had been established by the Martins in the early 1950s. (Mrs Martin's husband, Frank, was member for the Madang-Sepik special electorate, 1964-1968 and an early supporter of Pangu.) Mrs Martin was a well-known Wewak identity, active especially in women's sport and outspoken against excessive use of alcohol. She had stood in 1977 (coming third) and again unsuccessfully in the provincial elections of 1979, on each occasion, as in 1982, as an independent.

Nelson Kaspar Galo, 43, of Yawauoro village (But-Boiken CD), a former public servant (1962-1974) and provincial secretary of the Public Service Association, turned subsistence farmer. Galo, who had stood unsuccessfully in 1977, stood, again, as an independent (though it was said that he had UP sympathies, which were not reciprocated by the UP).

Maira Karaga (Benedict Maira), 38, of Kreer village (Wewak Local CD), subsistence farmer, former member of the Interim Provincial Government, defeated in the 1979 provincial elections. Maira was the endorsed PPP candidate (though he told me in May 1982 that he had received no help from the PPP).

Tomogel Maraf, 45, from Sirasin village on Kairiru Island (Wewak Islands, CD), ex-soldier, member for Wewak Islands and former speaker in the provincial assembly. Pro Pangu.

Magis Hautokia, 42, of Urip village (But-Boiken CD), former community school teacher (1961-1978), subsistence farmer, unsuccessful candidate in the 1979 provincial elections. Hautokia stood as the endorsed NP candidate.

Lainus Hepau Tingoan, 43, of Saure village (Wewak Local CD). Hepau, a former carpenter, who described himself in 1982 as a komiti and a church leader, had been an active figure in the Peli movement in the early 1970s and in 1983 succeeded Matias Yaliwan as the member for Yangoru-Saussia when Yaliwan resigned from the house (see May 1982); in 1977 he had been heavily defeated (Winnett and May 1983). Hepau was a pro-MA candidate, and his poster was displayed in the MA office.

Wosera-Gai

In 1977 the Wosera-Gai seat was won by a Pangu stalwart from Indingai village (Chambri Lakes CD), Matis Yambumpe. Yambumpe, 49, a subsistence farmer and former Gai Council president, lacked formal education but was a shrewd politician. Against him in 1982 stood ten candidates:

Bartley Sua, 47, of Korogo on the Sepik River (Main River CD), a former teacher and correctional institution warder, who in 1982 described himself as a subsistence farmer involved in 'community developments in Korogo - business activities etc.'. Sua was the endorsed NP candidate.

John Nigiti, 25, from Wabindumakag (North Wosera CD), former malaria control officer and *komiti* of the Wosera Council. Independent.

Jambiambo Gambaora, 35, from Weikor village (North Wosera CD), a subsistence farmer and village director of a local business group; unsuccessful candidate in 1977.

Bande Wangikia, 40, from Waigamaga (North Wosera CD), former personnel manager with a large foreign company, now subsistence farmer and businessman; the endorsed MA candidate.

Joe Yanj, 29, from Kandangei village (Main River CD), a salesman with a big local private business; PPP candidate.

Mali Adam, 33, born in the Chambri Lakes but currently employed as manager of the Sepik Producers' Co-operative Association at Hayfield, near Maprik.

Gugudimi Wabi, 33, a former broadcaster with Radio East Sepik, now self-employed, from Yenchanmangua (Main River CD). Pro Pangu.

Patrick Kamban, 30, from Isogum 2 village (North Wosera CD), president of the Wosera Local Government Council, a former teacher who had resigned in 1977 to contest the national elections, without success.

Awikia Wanjik, 30, from Wombisa village (South Wosera CD), a local businessman and coffee buyer, and Wosera councillor; pro Pangu.

Chambameri Wak'n, 39, a Sepik River man from Burui (Sepik Plains CD), who had served as a local government council officer before 'retiring' to subsistence farming in 1975. Said to be pro PPP.

Yangoru-Saussia

Yangoru-Saussia has had a peculiar political history, having returned cult leader Matias Yaliwan in 1972 and his deputy Hepau in a by-election in 1973, and being the only East Sepik electorate not to return a Pangu candidate in 1977. Between 1977 and 1982 the career of the sitting member, John Jaminan, had not been without incident. Elected as a UP candidate, Jaminan had become the opposition's shadow minister for Finance. In 1977-78 he was involved in moves to oust Sir Tei Abal (UP) as opposition leader; subsequently he left the UP to join Okuk's PUF when Okuk took over the leadership of the opposition but fell out with Okuk in late 1978 and drifted back to the UP. When the Chan government took office in 1980 Jaminan became minister for Health. Following his election to the National Parliament, however, Jaminan began drinking heavily. Early in 1980 he was summonsed to appear on what the *Post-Courier* (15 January 1980) described as three 'long adjourned charges' - two of assault and one of using offensive language. Later the same year he was convicted of driving under the influence of liquor. His aggressive behaviour also alienated him from many people within East Sepik, especially within the provincial bureaucracy. In February 1981 Jaminan was arrested for failing to appear in court to answer the earlier charges. Chan sought his resignation from cabinet and when Jaminan failed to respond he was sacked. In the midst of this, Jaminan quit the UP and rejoined Okuk. He stood in 1982 as an NP

candidate. As in 1977 Jaminan was the sole candidate from the Pukia-speaking area of the electorate.

Against Jaminan were five candidates:

Patrick Hokmori Saginginik, 28, of Toanumbu (Wewak Inland CD) a graduate (politics major) from UPNG who had been working with the provincial government as a village development coordinator, pro MA.

John Wauwia, 46, born in Waramuru (Yangoru CD) but resident on Yangoru station; a former community school teacher, broadcaster, parliamentary interpreter and ministerial services executive officer, Wauwia returned to Yangoru to contest the 1973 by-election won by Hepau and stayed on, becoming an influential local businessman (a leading figure in the Leningie Avaun Business Association Group) and councillor. Wauwia was a close runner-up to Jaminan in 1977 and an unsuccessful candidate (behind Yaliwan) in the provincial elections of 1979.

Petrus Wapigaua (Petrus Wafi), 30, of Harua village (Yangoru East CD), an Assemblies of God evangelist before being elected in 1979 to the provincial assembly where he became minister for Commerce; MA endorsed candidate. As Commerce minister Wapigaua was chairman of a provincial government fund created to assist small businesses; early in 1982 Wapigaua was charged with misappropriating money from this fund (subsequent to the election, he was convicted of misappropriating K4,500 and sentenced to a 2 year gaol term). The affair cast a substantial shadow on Wapigaua's candidature - indeed MA officials counselled him against standing.

Tom Fimaimba, 30, a former community school teacher from Haringer (Yangoru CD) and newcomer to politics. Under somewhat controversial circumstances (see below) Fimaimba received the Pangu endorsement.

Peter Rony, 32, of Numburuon village (Yangoru CD), executive officer to the Greater Maprik Local Government Council and unsuccessful candidate in 1977 and in the 1979 provincial elections; pro Pangu.

In summary, a total of fifty-seven candidates contested the seven East Sepik seats in 1982, the same number as stood in 1977 and eleven more than stood in 1972. Of this number twenty-three had been candidates in 1977 (including the seven sitting members) and another

two had been candidates in earlier elections but not in 1977. Ten had stood in the 1979 provincial elections, of whom three had been successful, resigning their provincial seats to contest the national election. Several of those who had returned to the province, or who resigned from public service positions in the province, to contest the election without success in 1977 had stayed on in the village in the hopes of gaining election but none was rewarded (except, subsequently, Wauwia - see postscript).

The mean age of candidates in 1982, at 38, was fractionally lower than in 1977 (39), a slightly higher proportion of candidates under 30 and a markedly lower number of candidates over 50 (two compared with eight in 1977) being offset by the ageing of the twenty-three candidates contesting both elections.

Educational standards were predictably somewhat higher. In 1982 about half of the fifty-seven candidates had been educated to grade 10 or beyond, including four university graduates (Narokobi, Bais, Jaminan and Hokmori), while another eleven had attained grades 8 or 9. Only five had little or no formal education, but these included three sitting members (Ston, Lus and Yambumpe) and one former member (Kabai).

As might be expected, the proportion of genuine subsistence farmers among the candidates in 1982 appears to have been lower than in previous elections, but the information given by candidates concerning 'occupation' has never been very reliable.

The campaign

As in previous years, the election campaign was a fairly quiet affair. Most candidates for the open electorates made some attempt to get around their electorates though there was a tendency, perhaps more evident in 1982 than in 1977, for candidates to rely on networks of *komiti* or friends to distribute posters and to carry the talk beyond kinship areas. A number of rallies were organized in the towns and at government and mission stations, markets and schools, and trucks with loudspeakers were used in the towns and on some rural patrols. A few small beer parties were reported. Party leaders Okuk, Chan and Momis all made brief visits to the province. Okuk appears to have planned a somewhat longer 'helicopter drop' tour but was thwarted by inability to obtain fuel; he did, however, drop in on Sane's campaign in Angoram, and in Yangoru where he received a mixed reception. Somare, busy with Pangu's national campaign, was not seen in the province as much as local Pangu officials would have liked, but was there for the last few days of the campaign.

About four weeks before voting commenced there were reports that a rally was to be held at Marambanja village, on Mount Hurun, the home in 1970-72 of the Peli movement (May 1982). There was some

confusion concerning the purpose of the rally. It appears to have been initiated by Daniel Hawina, who played a leading role in the Peli movement and had perpetuated its more cultish aspects, following the withdrawal of Yaliwan, first through the Seven Association and more recently through a fundamentalist religious organization, the New Apostolic Church. The latter operated for the most part through a network of village 'deacons' and 'bishops', nearly all of whom were former Peli *Komiti*; in 1982 a number of these New Apostolic Church officials acted as MA *komiti*. Regional candidate, and former Peli secretary, Simbago was associated with Hawina in organizing the rally. From discussions with several people involved, it seems that the main purpose of the Marambanja meeting was to elicit support for the MA - though none of the major MA personalities in East Sepik was directly involved. The officer-in-charge of Yangoru station, however, interpreted the planned event as a Peli cult revival and called for roadblocks on the Sepik highway and the road from Kubalia. In the event, officials in Wewak decided that such drastic action was not warranted but the organizers were persuaded to cancel the meeting and shortly after Radio Wewak broadcast a message through the province urging people not to get involved in what it called the 'Beibi cult'.² Some MA supporters interpreted the government's intervention in this matter as being directed against the MA. There were also complaints from the Maprik district that the charging of several villagers, who happened to be MA *komiti*, for non attendance at council workdays was politically motivated.

Apart from this, there were the usual complaints of opponents defacing, removing or 'pasting over' posters, and in a few villages some candidates were given a hostile reception. At least two incidents occurred on the Sepik highway in which candidates were threatened with physical violence, but though the election campaign may have sharpened antagonisms between the contending groups involved, the underlying causes lay beyond the politics of the election, and for the most part relations between candidates were cordial.

At first glance political parties appeared to be much more salient in 1982 than in previous elections. Of the fifty-seven candidates, fifty could be at least fairly clearly identified with a party (see footnote 1 and, on the basis of casual observation, popular knowledge of party attachments, formal or informal, seems to have been surprisingly widespread.

Four parties fielded candidates in East Sepik. Pangu, with its traditional stronghold in the Sepik, had endorsed candidates in all seven electorates while a further fifteen candidates put themselves forward - in almost all cases, it seems, without party approval or support - as either

² Before the Peli movement there had been a cult movement in the Yangoru area. A leading figure in this movement was Beibi Yembanda, a subsequent member of the national House of Assembly, who was also involved in the Peli movement.

'pro Pangu' or 'pro Somare', or were generally recognized as having Pangu sympathies. The Melanesian Alliance also endorsed seven candidates; another four identified themselves as pro MA. The National Party endorsed only five candidates not putting up contestants against Somare or Lus; but it gave limited support to at least another four (two of them in Maprik) and had another pro NP candidate without support in Maprik. PPP put forward four candidates (Ambunti Dreikikir, Angoram, Wewak and Wosera-Gai) but had another two 'pro PPP' candidates. The UP had no electoral organization in East Sepik but Galo in Wewak described himself as a 'UP supporter'. The remaining seven either stood as independents or had no known party attachment.

Of the four parties, Pangu probably ran the strongest campaign. Although as late as 1981 party organization appeared to be in little less than a shambles, by early 1982 there was a reasonably effective organization throughout the province. In Wewak, from an office next to the provincial assembly, a campaign coordinator and a deputy coordinator directed activities in the seven electorates, in which the party claimed to have a total of 'about 2000 *komiti*', mostly traditional bigmen and younger men of influence in the villages.

According to party officials, the Pangu budget for East Sepik was a modest K7,000, most of which went on a vehicle and four outboard motors. Endorsed candidates were assisted with printing and transport costs; officially 'pro-Pangu' candidates were not supported financially but 'pro-Pangu' candidates in Angoram, Wosera-Gai and Yangoru-Saussia, at least, did receive some assistance. Pangu T-shirts were available for purchase. Although precise estimates are impossible, most candidates, both endorsed and non-endorsed, appear to have outlayed sizeable amounts from their own and their supporters' savings, especially along the river where fuel is an expensive item.

With a smaller organization than Pangu, and a small budget, the MA nevertheless ran a highly effective campaign. From a small office in the Wewak-But Council building Narokobi, Malenki and a campaign manager organized the regional campaign in conjunction with those of the six open electorate candidates. An extensive network of *komiti* was organized along regional lines in a number of teams with names such as a *sak* (shark), *tarangau* (hawk), with which party organizers met regularly.

With limited funds, much of the MA's rural campaign was conducted on foot; Narokobi especially attempted to capitalize on this, describing the MA to village people as the '*kanaka pati*', '*pati bilong yumi*' and contrasting the foot patrols of the MA with the vehicles and blaring loudspeakers of Pangu. The MA organizers also carried around a census printout which listed all villages and directed *Komiti* to the areas of greatest population.


The campaign of the National Party was run on a part-time basis from the business office of the Wewak-based provincial party organizer.



Campaign posters on a house, near Yangoru, East Sepik
(Photo: R.J. May)



Campaigning in the back blocks, East Sepik
(Photo: R.J. May)




Bernard Narokobi (Melanesian Alliance) addressing a village meeting near Yangoru, East Sepik

(Photo: R.J. May)



Chewing betelnut with village *komiti*

(Photo: R.J. May)



IS SEPIK RIJENEL SIT

**VOTIM
MAN BILONG OL PIPEL**

VOTIM

BERNARD MULLU NAROKOBI

PUTIM LONG BOKIS WE

NEM BERNARD MULLU NAROKOBI ISTAP.

AS BILIP

1. Papua Niugini i mas Kristen kantri.
2. Vilis na famili laip i mas kamap strong.
3. Ol lida i mas wokboi bilong ol pipel na ol i no ken wok bisnis taun ol i memba long palamen.
4. Pleming na Development i mas stat long ples yet.
5. Edukesen i mas fri long husai i no nap long haim skul.
6. Gavman i mas givim bigpela halivim long kofi, kanikau, kopra, rans na skin bilong pukpuk taun world prais i go daun.
7. Dinau pelisi bilong benk i mas sems long halivim ol lokal bisnis man oa fama na tu long as ples man long kirapim gupela sindaun bilong em.
8. Pasa bilong politiks, faunens na pablik sevis i mas go long provinsel, lokal na silis level.
9. Wok bilong developmen bilong yu na ol meri mas kamap strong moa yet.
10. Kirapim ol kaunkain coi bilong halivim ol pipel i stat long bus, maunten, oitan na wata.
11. Kirapim liklik vilis level indastri o bisnis olem woksoy, bisnis pug, kakaruk na pukpok, sia, tebol, bet na kaving.
12. Kamapim fektori bilong wokim samcing olem kofi, matlo, pas, mekim frai fru, kakaruk na pik insai long fektori.
13. Strongim wok bilong heli, nutresen na gaden kaikai.
14. Sapoten ol wok sius i makim long sukeseim senta, yut, ol meri na heli.
15. Strongim ol gut pasin na kalja bilong melanesia, rasel daunim pasin nogut bilong ol tumbuna.
16. Sapoten wok bilong lokal maket long ol taun na rural erio bai i gat wara, Toilet, ples-slip, kuk na putim kaikai.
17. Pablik seven wok liklotu waotaim ol pipel long ples long we long taun i mas Kristen alaoens.
18. Ol wo kleria, tulval, luhai na sevis kaunsel na dokta bai i mas kisin liklik kompesesen.

BERNARD NAROKOBI EM I BIN:-

1. Wanpela nambawan loa, jas long nesenei kot na staman bilong ol rifom komisin.
2. Wanpela loa husai i wok long konstrusenei pleming komiti long raitim as o mama lo em konstrusenei bilong Papua Niugini na Vanuatu. Halivim ol narapela kamri bilong pasifik tu, long lo bilong ol.
3. Staman bilong omision na faunda memba bilong nesenei kalja kaunsel, we em i wok hai long strongim kalja bilong yumi.
4. Is Sepik Provinsal plena na statim pablik solista ofis long Is Sepik.
5. Pes staman bilong nesenei yut kaunsel na statim na pes staman bilong Is Sepik Yut Kaunsel.
6. Memba bilong melanesen kaunsel ol sius. Em kaunsel bilong halivim wok bung bilong ol sius na gavman long developmen.
7. Statim nesenei kaotik kaunsel bilong kamapim liklik sius na strongim wok bilong lo-pipel.
8. Tisa bilong lo na melanesen pasin long yunvesti.
9. Raitim buk bilong ol as tingim bilong yumi yet ol melanesen pipel long statim ol lida na gavman bilong Papua Niugini.
10. Fat hai long stretim sindaim hing ol skuata.

**“LONG OL DISPELA AS BILIP,
SENISIM LIDA, NA
SENISIM GAVMAN NAU.....”**

Authorised by Dean N. Y. Neigum, P.O. Box 123, Wewak.
Printed by Woto Press, P.O. Box 107, Wewak.

Narokobi's campaign poster

According to the party organizer the NP had only five endorsed candidates, that is, candidates it thought could win, and who had 'dedication' (i.e. who would not switch parties after the election!), but, as noted above, the party gave some assistance (K50-100 plus 'moral support') to another four or five pro-NP candidates in the other electorates. Party sources claimed that the NP had a budget in East Sepik of K2,000 in addition to being provided with a landcruiser (which was used mostly in Wosera-Gai), two speedboats and two outboard motors; candidates were also assisted in the purchase of fuel and the party distributed free T-shirts.

In Angoram, where there was an NP branch presided over by the Angoram Council vice-president, the NP appeared to have a well organized network of *komiti* systematically covering the electorate with or on behalf of Sane, many, it seems, using their own canoes and often having to buy their own fuel.

In Yangoru-Saussia Jaminan ran his own campaign with little interaction with the NP organization, but it was a pale shadow of the very extensive campaign he had conducted in 1977. In several places he presented cheques representing sectoral programme allocations; in at least one instance - in East Yangoru - this backfired, as the recipient community school headmaster publicly accused Jaminan of 'holding on' to money which should have been allocated in 1981 so that he could use it for 'political purposes'.

The PPP had a small office in Wewak, next to that of the MA; it was, however, generally deserted. According to the PPP candidate for Wosera-Gai, the PPP provided two vehicles and an electoral allowance of K300 per month for its four candidates.

With Narokobi the only serious non-Pangu candidate in the regional electorate, both the NP and PPP organizations supported his campaign regionally and there were several instances of collusion between MA, NP and PPP candidates in open electorates, notably in Angoram and Wosera-Gai.

Having commented on the apparent saliency of parties in the 1982 election it is necessary immediately to make two substantial qualifications.

The first concerns the fluidity of party attachment. The point is perhaps best made by anecdote. For one, on the only occasion I saw the PPP campaign truck in Wewak (where there was a PPP endorsed candidate and a pro-PPP candidate) it was being driven by a man (a kin of one of the candidates) who sported a T-shirt with the inscription: 'Vote 1 Laura Martin' (the independent candidate in Wewak). For another, the MA's provincial campaign manager in 1982 had in 1977 served as campaign manager for Angoram candidate Teddy Sane, then a PPP candidate; in 1982 Sane was endorsed NP candidate for Angoram, yet when the MA's team visited Angoram with Narokobi in

May they urged voters to support Sane, notwithstanding the fact that there was an endorsed MA candidate in Angoram.

Secondly, it should be noted that while the major parties provided endorsed candidates (at least) with a valuable grassroots organization, there is little evidence of parties being able to control their supporters when it came to nominations. The best illustration of this is probably the case of Pangu Pati in Yangoru-Saussia. In 1977 Yangoru-Saussia was won by UP candidate Jaminan with 3464 votes; Pangu endorsed candidate Wauwia was a close second with 3349; pro-Pangu candidate Rony, who is from more or less the same part of the electorate as Wauwia came third with 1588. Had Rony not stood Wauwia probably would have been elected. In 1982 it was generally felt that Jaminan's popularity had declined and that he was vulnerable. Late in 1981, however, the Pangu branch on the southern (Saussia or Kubalia) side of the electorate made representations to the party hierarchy in Wewak urging that, since in the previous two elections Pangu had been represented unsuccessfully by a candidate from the northern (Yangoru) side, it was Kubalia's turn to put up the endorsed candidate. Party officials (including the campaign deputy coordinator, who was a Kubalia man) eventually accepted this argument, endorsing political newcomer Fimaimba. Wauwia and Rony were annoyed by this decision and both stood in 1982 as pro-Pangu candidates, thus splitting the Pangu vote three ways. In the absence of polling place figures it is obviously difficult to disentangle party and local elements of the vote; also the position in 1982 was rendered more complex by the presence of a solid vote for the MA candidate. But it is at least possible, and indeed likely, that this lack of party discipline cost Pangu the seat for the second time. In Angoram, a Pangu victory was probably never in doubt; nevertheless the fact that four pro-Pangu candidates stood against the endorsed candidate - including one whose electoral support came largely from Eichorn's home area, and two from Middle Sepik - had no rationality as far as the party was concerned.

The general conclusion would seem to be that although party was an important element in candidates' perceptions of the elections and although voters appear to have been much more conscious of parties than they had been in 1977, party organization was still fairly rudimentary and, except perhaps in Wewak, local and kin ties and exposure to the electorate were still critically important.

Issues in the campaign were conspicuous mostly by their absence. Apart from parochial issues (roads, bridges, community schools, aid posts) Pangu candidates campaigned primarily on the record of the first and second Somare governments (which, of course, had carried the country through self-government and independence) and the extravagance and corruption which, they argued, had characterized the Chan-Okuk ministry. Some candidates (and, it seems, the Pangu coordinator) sought specifically to discredit the MA - which was

perceived as the main electoral threat in East Sepik - accusing that party generally and Narokobi particularly of being dreamers or even 'cargo cultists' (the link with the New Apostolic Church/Peli Association being exploited), having 'communist' tendencies, and risking war with Indonesia (on the basis of Narokobi's public antipathy towards Indonesian rule in Irian Jaya).

The MA defended itself against such charges, arguing that MA leader Momis had been responsible for the only significant policy innovation since independence - provincial government, and accusing Pangu of being 'the only true cargo cult party'; playing on the Pangu slogan '*Husat i save rot?*', Narokobi asked '*Wanem rot? Rot i go long Maprik? Rot i go long Wewak? Nogat. Rot bilong kago tasol*'. The MA sought to discredit Pangu by portraying its candidates as a corrupt group of rich politicians who had betrayed the ideals of the early nationalist movement. Narokobi made pointed references to 'political leaders who do not consider Papua New Guinea's schools good enough for their children' (Somare has two children at school in Australia) and to the business interests of the Pangu Pati and of individual (unnamed) Pangu candidates. MA candidates also accused the outgoing Chan government of extravagance. Narokobi's electoral poster carried an eighteen-point manifesto ('*as bilip*'), the first point of which was '*Papua Niugini i mas kristen kantri*' ('Papua New Guinea should be a Christian country'), and a letter to electors was signed 'Yours in Christ'. Many voters saw Narokobi primarily as a *christian* candidate and there is no doubt that he picked up a substantial vote from among the more religiously inclined communities, including, as noted above, the New Apostolic Church.

NP candidate Sane emphasized his party's support of local business and foreign investment but apart from this neither NP nor PPP candidates contributed much to the debate of issues.

The 1982 election was, of course, the first national election since the establishment of provincial government. As such it raised two important questions: first, what sort of interaction would there be between national and provincial politics, both issues and personalities?; secondly would there be aspirants for the national parliament among provincial politicians, and, if so, how would provincial office affect national candidature?

On the first question: in some provinces there had been considerable antipathy between national politicians and their provincial counterparts, each seeing the other as a threat to its political authority; this was perhaps especially true of some national members, one of whom (a highlander) summed up his opinion of the members who had emerged from the provincial elections of 1978-79 by describing them as the failed candidates from the 1977 national election. In 1982 the provincial politicians' time came and some provincial assemblies announced that they would give public support to those candidates whom they considered would adequately represent provincial interests.

In East Sepik, however, relations between national and provincial members had been generally cordial and the provincial assembly took no such action. (Although East Sepik was one of those provinces whose assembly had voted against party politics, in 1982 at least three quarters of the provincial members, including the premier, were known Pangu sympathizers - which undoubtedly facilitated harmonious relations.) Nor, so far as I was able to observe, did provincial members give much overt support to candidates, although Narokobi subsequently accused the provincial government of supporting Pangu (an accusation which the premier promptly denied, see *Post-Courier* 4 August 1982).

On the question of provincial members contesting the election: three provincial members stood (Maraf in Wewak, Wafi in Yangoru-Saussia, and Yua in Angoram). Nothing in the provincial constitution required them to resign before contesting the election but a resolution of the assembly early in 1982 did so. Of the three, Yua was the only one successful and my impression was that membership of the provincial assembly was a liability; in several casual discussions with rural villagers, people expressed surprise or confusion at the candidature of provincial assemblymen, and among those better informed a number said that it was not right that a person elected to serve a provincial constituency should resign his seat to contest the national election without consulting with those who voted him into the provincial assembly.

The results

The results are set out in Table 11.1. In the absence of polling place figures analysis of the voting is virtually impossible.

In the regional seat Narokobi did well to capture a sizeable 24 per cent of the vote. This was undoubtedly in part the result of an effective campaign by both the party organization and Narokobi as well as a reflection of the combined support which Narokobi received from all the non-Pangu parties.

But it would also seem to provide evidence in support of the MA's claim that there was in 1982 some fairly widespread disillusion with Pangu Pati and even with Somare, who was not seen much in the Sepik during the campaign and who was felt by some to have lost touch with village people. In Ambunti-Dreikikir, Ston won clearly (39 per cent of the vote), ahead of three pro-Pangu candidates, with pro-MA and NP candidates respectively fifth and sixth (each getting 6 per cent of the vote) and the endorsed MA candidate receiving a meagre 532 votes.

In Angoram also, though the sitting Pangu member was beaten into third place, the party swept to victory with the first three candidates (Yua and Maiben pro-Pangu, and Eichorn) collecting 73 per cent of the vote, ahead of the endorsed NP candidate (12 per cent). The MA candidate scored a negligible 187 votes.

In Maprik Lus predictably won a clear majority (56 per cent) with the MA candidate collecting a creditable second (22 per cent), probably, however, reflecting regional, as much as party, loyalty.

Bais, too, recorded a very decisive victory in Wewak for Pangu (54 per cent), streets ahead of his nearest opponents Malenki (MA, 16 per cent) and Martin (independent, 11 per cent).

In Wosera-Gai, Wanjik the pro-Pangu man from the populous Wosera area narrowly defeated the sitting member from the Sepik River (the two capturing 45 per cent of the vote) with the MA candidate a creditable third (16 per cent).

Yangoru-Saussia again proved to be the maverick. In the face of a poor electoral strategy, and an indifferent campaign by its strongest candidate, Wauwia, Pangu again lost out to Jaminan (NP), who despite the pre-election predictions of most observers scored a clear victory (29 per cent to Wauwia's 21 per cent). Notwithstanding the shadow cast over his campaign and the possible handicap of his provincial membership, MA candidate Wapigaua did well to gain third place, with 20 per cent.

Thus five of the seven sitting candidates were reelected, and in the other two electorates endorsed sitting Pangu members were defeated by younger pro-Pangu candidates.

Overall, a tentative assessment would seem to be that party vote was important in 1982, perhaps even more important in deciding the winners than locality, kin or personality. But in view of the fact that the system of single endorsement did not prevent other candidates attaching to themselves party labels it is difficult to judge just how important parties were. Certainly nearly all candidates *wanted* a party label, but as we have argued above this did not necessarily imply acceptance of an overall party strategy, nor did it preclude a considerable fluidity in party attachments. Moreover the results in Angoram, Wosera-Gai and Yangoru-Saussia, at least, provide evidence of the continued strong importance of regional/kin factors.

Postscript

In August 1982 Jaminan was charged on four counts of rape, the incidents having occurred in Mount Hagen in October 1981. In April 1983 he was convicted and sentenced to four years' gaol, thus losing his parliamentary seat. In the subsequent by-election fourteen candidates stood. A *Wantok* newspaper report (31 March to 7 April 1984) listed five candidates as MA (not including Wapigaua - who was also in gaol), four as Pangu, two as PPP, two as independent, and one undecided. Fimaimba, Wauwia and Rony all stood again, but they were the only candidates from the 1977 contest. This time Wauwia was the endorsed candidate and he won, giving Pangu, at last, a clean sweep in East Sepik.

Table 11.1
The East Sepik Results

East Sepik Provincial

| | |
|---------------------|--------|
| Bernard M. Narokobi | 21,691 |
| Michael T. Somare | 66,395 |
| Jimmy Simbago | 936 |
| Informal | 1,014 |
| Total | 90,036 |
| Turnout (%) | 49.6 |

Ambunti-Dreikikir Open

| | |
|-------------------------|--------|
| Toromble Kabai | 1,766 |
| Felix Wengisu Sowaimbau | 978 |
| Asimboro Ston | 5,970 |
| Judah Nim | 683 |
| Nick Klapat | 444 |
| Cain Yapi | 2,836 |
| John Paiyep | 532 |
| Harry Weldon Tubugman | 975 |
| Aikam Maromban | 154 |
| Gista Hapeli | 1,018 |
| Informal | 54 |
| Total | 15,410 |
| Turnout (%) | 52.2 |

Angoram Open

| | |
|------------------|--------|
| Lucky Yua | 5,312 |
| Teddy Sane | 1,890 |
| Jerry Sapka Moka | 187 |
| Jae Maika | 500 |
| Mas Niangri | 23 |
| Ludwig Schulze | 1,381 |
| John Maiben | 3,266 |
| Benny Chimbi | 125 |
| William Eichorn | 2,648 |
| Informal | 102 |
| Total | 15,434 |
| Turnout (%) | 42.8 |

Maprik Open

| | |
|------------------------|--------|
| William Maniku Mimbaki | 3,818 |
| Jimmy U. Taol | 288 |
| Peter Walwal | 659 |
| David Nalas Melep | 208 |
| Pita Lus | 9,873 |
| Tobias Kuelik Sakra | 1,190 |
| Redman Keni | 817 |
| Manikut Manigoli | 619 |
| Informal | 244 |
| Total | 17,716 |
| Turnout (%) | 57.0 |

Wewak Open

| | |
|----------------------|--------|
| Andrew Mungwusi | 399 |
| William Hawarry | 325 |
| Michael Malenki | 2,390 |
| Laura Martin | 1,566 |
| Nelson Kaspar Galo | 127 |
| Maira Karaga | 114 |
| Tomogel Maraf | 631 |
| Magis Hautokia | 683 |
| Lainus Hepau Tingoan | 117 |
| Tony Bais | 7,950 |
| Informal | 447 |
| Total | 14,749 |
| Turnout (%) | 62.6 |

Wosera-Gai Open

| | |
|--------------------|--------|
| Bartley Sua | 321 |
| John Nigiti | 1,355 |
| Jambiambo Gambauro | 524 |
| Bande Wangikia | 2,354 |
| Yambumpe Matias | 3,201 |
| Joe Yanj | 946 |
| Mali Adam | 475 |
| Gugundimi Wabi | 254 |
| Patrick Kamban | 1,383 |
| Awikia Wanjik | 3,456 |
| Chambameri Wak'n | 423 |
| Informal | 35 |
| Total | 14,727 |
| Turnout (%) | 47.0 |

Yangoru-Saussia Open

| | |
|-----------------|--------|
| John Jaminan | 3,449 |
| Patrick Hokmori | 274 |
| John Wauwia | 2,489 |
| Petrus Wapigaua | 2,337 |
| Tom Fimaimba | 1,825 |
| Peter Rony | 1,307 |
| Informal | 299 |
| Total | 11,980 |
| Turnout (%) | 40.0 |

Chapter 12

MANUS YEARNs FOR QUALITY LEADERSHIP: A QUESTIONABLE VERDICT IN 1982.

Polonhou S. Pokawin,

It is a tradition in democratic societies that the electorates speak through the ballot boxes to choose their leaders. The tradition has since 1964 been an element of Papua New Guinea's national life. In 1982 the voters of Manus spoke. At the end of it all Michael Pokayou Pondros, a member of the National Parliament since 1972, emerged the winner in the Provincial seat, and Nahau Kambuou Rooney, an MP since 1977, emerged belatedly from the chambers of the National Court as the winner of the Open seat .

Background

For the 1982 national election, Manus had a population of 25,844. The Electoral Office issued 10,366 Provincial and 10,366 Open electorate ballot papers to the seven polling teams which covered seven polling regions.

Table 12.1
Ballot Papers issued to seven regions

| Polling Region | Ballot papers (Provincial and Open Electorates) |
|--------------------|--|
| Western Islands | 335 |
| West Coast | 1,661 |
| North Coast | 1,748 |
| Highway | 1,260 |
| South Coast | 1,330 |
| East Coast | 2,634 |
| South East Islands | 1,398 |
| | 10,366 |

Of the 10,366 ballot papers issued, only 10,315 were returned for both the Provincial and Open electorates. The total of eligible voters according to the principal roll of electors was 16,546. The principal roll of electors however had a lot of errors.

Manus since 1972 has been the best represented province in the National Parliament. The creation of electorates made it a national policy that, in addition to the open electorates which are created according to the number of people, each Province should also elect a representative to the National Parliament. Each open electorate should consist of about 40,000 people, but Manus, with a population of only 25,000, nevertheless has two representatives elected by the same set of voters. This unique anomaly has been noted by politicians representing larger electorates as well as by the Law Reform Commission, whose report of early 1983 recommended the abolition of the provincial seats as being costly and lacking an effective purpose. During the 1964 and 1968 national elections, Manus had only an Open electorate. On both occasions Paliu Maloat was elected to the parliament. Manus shared the Regional electorate with New Ireland in 1964 when Jim Gross was elected and in 1968 when Wally Lussick became Regional member. But since 1972 Manus has constituted a provincial electorate on its own. In 1972, Pika Kasau was elected to the Provincial seat and Michael Pondros to the Open seat, while in 1977 Nahau Rooney became the second woman to be elected to the National Parliament in the Open seat and Michael Pondros was elected to the Provincial seat. Since the 1964 national election the issue of leadership has been an important one. Political leadership at the national level has become a goal which aspiring and ambitious personalities have sought after. It has great attractions and glamour. It is commonly said that that is where the power is, and that, if elected, leaders can bring services and achieve big things for the people. Leaders themselves often downplay the personal benefits of power, but it has become commonplace that many national leaders have risen to new heights in business, social and political circles following election success.

Manus has had experience with the politics of leadership through the Manus Local Government Council and its predecessors since 1950. The council's leadership was dominated for about 30 years by traditional personalities. This began to change towards the end of the 1970s when younger and better educated Manus men were elected as councillors. By the time the council was abolished in April 1982, the majority of the councillors were either educated or semi-educated people. Furthermore, the introduction of provincial government, and its predecessor, the area authority, added another level of leadership to the Manus political scene after 1976. In 1979, the electors went to the poll to elect their first provincial government. Since then the role of leadership and government has come closer to where the people are. The people have become more and more familiar with the art of government and the behaviour of leaders. They have over a long time developed their expectations as to what the role of the leader is and how he should conduct his own affairs as well as the affairs of government. This knowledge has increased the people's political awareness. Furthermore, their high expectation of the role of leaders and government has failed to be met by the councillors,

the National Parliament members, and the provincial government members up to 1982. Consequently, the province yearned for better leaders. Everywhere, the electors talked about the need to have better quality leaders. Younger and more ambitious people began to see in themselves the answer to the people's yearning and the province's demand. They responded by contesting the 1982 national election. They believed they had the answer to the province's search for the type of leaders it deserved. The 30-odd years of Manus' political experience since the establishment of the Baluan Council, based on historical experiences with the forces of colonialism and capitalism, has made the Manus population a politically aware one. By the 1982 national election, every decision made on Manus was a potentially political one. Increased education, involvement in business, the effect of government in the province, access by the villagers to decision makers and the experiences accumulated through years of political and or business rivalry had contributed to the politicization of the Manus populace. Consequently, political participation through attempts at influencing decisions and taking an active role in public meetings had become an 'in' thing. From youth groups to women's groups to the provincial government, the populace stands up to be counted and aspires to be heard and to be taken into account when decisions are made, money is distributed and services are provided. Politics has emerged as a popular game to play and career to pursue.

The 1982 National Election

The 1982 national election was unlike any election in the past. The campaigning was sophisticated and full of activities; the electors enjoyed a feast of political sophistry from candidates and their supporters. The high level of political consciousness contributed to the raising of expectations - that the time of change in leadership was here, and that there would actually be changes. Well before nominations, it was obvious in Manus who the candidates would be. Apart from the incumbents, the activities of others were indications that they intended to contest the elections. Some like Roy Poius Pogat had been on the campaign trail about one year in advance. Radio Manus became a medium for aspiring candidates to issue statements. Thus the list of candidates for the Provincial electorate was fully predictable, while the only surprise for the Open electorate was the Melanesian Alliance's nomination of a woman candidate, Mrs. Elizabeth Buarra, when the party had already nominated a male candidate, Charles Batapei.

Apart from individuals, political groups also prepared themselves for the election. The two most publicized ones were the Pangu Pati, which hurriedly established a branch a few weeks before the election, and the Makasol Party, which increased its public appeal as election day approached. Organizing efforts were made by the People's Progress

Party, the Melanesian Alliance, and the National Party, but did not receive as much attention. Mobilization by candidates and parties meant that Manus was well prepared for the 1982 national election. Thanks to Radio Manus and the invasion of villages by candidates, their supporters and posters every elector knew that an election was on.

The Candidates

By the time nominations closed on 15 April 1982, a total of 20 candidates had nominated for the two seats. Eleven candidates nominated for the Open Seat and nine for the Provincial seat. This was an increase of four candidates over the 1977 election - three more for the Provincial seat and one more for the Open seat. The trend in the number of candidates contesting the national elections since 1964 has been as follows:

Table 13.2

| Year | Regional/ Provincial | Seat | Total |
|------|-------------------------|------|-------|
| 1964 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 1968 | 3 | 5 | 8 |
| 1972 | 4 | 6 | 10 |
| 1977 | 6 | 10 | 16 |
| 1982 | 9 | 11 | 20 |

The increase in the number of candidates for every election is indicative of the raw interest in politics within the province. The Regional seat was not contested by a Manus person in the 1964 and 1968 elections. All candidates hailed from New Ireland. From 1972, when Manus had its own Provincial seat, the interest has been continually on the increase. Apart from the fact that the national leadership role was still a new thing in the 1960s, the qualification clause and the costs involved in campaigning in Manus and New Ireland were beyond the ability of a Manus aspirant at that time. With improved communication, and financially sound political parties and their effective machinery today, these difficulties are a thing of the past.

The 1982 national election candidates were a totally new generation of leadership aspirants. None of the 1960s candidates contested. Five candidates for the Provincial seat had contested in the 1970s, but only the incumbent for the Open seat was re-contesting the election. It was, overall, a field of fairly well educated and informed candidates.

Table 13.3
Manus Candidates

| Candidate | Age | Village and provincial electorate | Education | Party | Previous candidature in national elections | Occupation |
|------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|--|---|
| Open Candidates | | | | | | |
| Roy Pous Pogat | 38 | Karun Nali | Form 3 | Pro-Pangu | No | Health extension officer, former Lae City councillor, PMV operator |
| Mathew Tuam | 44 | Tingou Ere Kele | Grade 9 | Pro-Pangu Independent | No | Ex-teacher & councillor, member Lapan Assembly, former deputy premier |
| Joseph Koe | | Lou Babpa | Public Service Higher | Pro-Pangu Independent | No | Former executive officer to MLGC; administration officer, Manus Provincial Government |
| Hanai Popon | 36 | Derimbat Kuiti | Grade 10 | PPP | No | School inspector, appointed member for Youth, Lapan Assembly |
| Elizabeth Buana | 32 | Pihuh Lotemogh | Grade 6 | MA | No | Housewife |
| Francis Posarau | 36 | Pere-Pere | Bachelor of Surveying (UOT) | Pro-Pangu Independent | No | Former deputy surveyor general, private surveyor |

| | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|----|---------------------|--|-----------------------------|---|---|
| Nahau Rooney | 36 | Pulhan Noi | BA (UPNG) | Pangu | Successful candidate 1977 | Incumbent MP, former minister for Justice |
| Lahu Maiah | 26 | Lomui Los negros | High school | Pro-Pangu Independent | No | Vilager |
| Charles Batapei | 31 | Sori Soparben | Matriculation | MA | No | Career public servant, former administrat- ive secretary, Gulf Province and first assistant secretary, Decentralisation |
| Ksokau Pochapon | 35 | | Bachelor of Surveying (UOT) | Makasol | No | Surveyor General |
| James Pokasui | 31 | Bowat | Grade 10 | PNG Independent Group | No | Ex-soldier (captain) |
| Provincial Candidates | | | | | | |
| James Peter Sisor | 38 | Salen Kai-Bipi | Bachelor of Technology - Accounting (University of Technology) | PPP | Unsuccessful candidate in Open seat, 1977 | Accountant; former member, MLGC; former assistant secretary, Finance, Manus Provincial Government. |
| Jim Palau | 33 | Balian | Public Service/ Higher Certificate | | No | Office of Information; clerk of Lapan Assembly, Manus |

| Paul Masta | 33 | Kanun Nali | BA (UPNG) | Melanesian Alliance | No | Melanesian Council of Churches | | | |
|------------------------|----|-------------------------------|-----------|--------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|
| Michael Pondros | 41 | Powai Sopormu Makai Bay | Form 2 | Pangu | Successful candidate for open seat, 1972, and Provincial seat, 1977 | Incumbent MP and businessman | | | |
| Levi Posawan Pobmon | 43 | Sapon Lebmaich | Form 4 | Pro-Pangu Independent | Unsuccessful candidate for Provincial seat, 1977 | Private businessman | | | |
| Pakah Kasau | 34 | Worei Ene-Kele | Form 4 | Pro-Pangu | Successful candidate for Provincial seat, 1972 | Supervisor | | | |
| Barnabas Kombi | 37 | Rei Babpa | Grade 9 | National | No | Health extension officer, councillor MLGC; former premier of Manus; member, Lapan Assembly | | | |
| Paboi Palau Luikas | 33 | Moukan Rapatoma | BA (UPNG) | | No | Former national housing commissioner, director Edgells & Whiteley | | | |
| Arnold Maspal | | Nauna Rapatoma | Form 2 | | Unsuccessful in 1972 and 1977 | Private contractor | | | |

Since there is no substantive difference between the Open and Provincial electorates in Manus, I shall treat the twenty candidates together. The legislation and regulations which provide for Open and Provincial electorates makes their application in Manus an anomaly. In all respects, the boundaries of the two electorates and the number of voters are the same. With the increasing number of very well educated candidates contesting both seats, the educational qualification is becoming irrelevant and insignificant.

Educational Background

The 1982 candidates for both the Open and Provincial seats were better educated and more widely experienced in the operations of government than in 1977. The least educated, Elizabeth Buarra, had only six years of formal education. However, she has been a teacher. And six candidates, 30 per cent, had University degrees - Francis Posanau, Nahau Rooney, Kisokau Pochapon, James Sisosor, Paul Masta, and Paliau Lukas. Every candidate except for Lalau Maiah had had extensive experience in government and the private sector. Except for Buarra, all candidates were qualified to contest either of the seats in Manus. It has become obvious from experiences of the national elections since 1964 that it is the better educated people who aspire to leadership positions in government. The fact that no 'old timer' contested this election suggests that the population sees the need for better-educated and well-informed persons to take the lead at the national level. The popular expression has been that: *Nesenel Palamen i bilong ol save man, na Provensel gavman em bilong ol lapun bilong ples*. The Manus provincial parliament has provided an opportunity for village-based leaders to try their political luck, while leaving the National Parliament to the more educated candidates. It is most likely, however, that better educated persons will contest the provincial elections in future. This may push the village-based leaders back to community governments. And as younger and better educated people move to community governments the age of village-based leaders will end, and a new generation of leaders will become completely entrenched in the island province.

Is education therefore the key to leadership? Education is a necessary qualification, but the candidate must also have proven ability in the province, not necessarily the village. For a person to be considered seriously for a National Parliament seat, he or she must have a good education and be fairly well known in the province. A broad base is required to win. Locally-based support is not sufficient unless other candidates fail to win votes from outside their own base. During the campaign few references were made to the educational background of the candidates. Paul Masta, a candidate for the Provincial seat, alone continually stressed in his news releases aired by NBC that he was a university graduate in Politics and knows about the way government

works. For every other candidate, educational achievement was a non-issue. It was shown in the nomination form and that was it. It was not used to downgrade the other, less educated candidates. One's employment and experiences however were used in campaign leaflets and public speaking campaigns. For instance, Francis Posanau's work and educational experience as a surveyor enabled him to use the issue of land effectively in his platform. While in the 1982 election, educational qualifications *per se* were not an overt issue, electors were in fact well aware of the educational qualifications of candidates.

Exposure to National and Provincial Life

Out of twenty candidates seven were either incumbent or former members of the National Parliament, the Provincial Assembly, the Lae City Council or the Manus Local Government Council (MLGC) - Nahau Rooney, Michael Pondros, Barnabas Kombil, Mathew Tuam, Pika Kasau, Arnold Masipal, and Roy Pogat. Another ten had had extensive experience in the public service and statutory bodies - Joseph Kove, Hanai Popon, Francis Posanau, Charles Batapai, Kisokau Pochapon, James Pokasui, James Sisosor, Jim Paliau, Paul Masta and Paliau Lukas. One, Levi Polomon, was a promising young businessman. Two, Lalau Maiah and Elizabeth Buarra, lived mostly in the village. Some had experience in both the government and private sector (Paliau Lukas, Joe Kove, and Francis Posanau). Together, the twenty candidates had a full range of career experiences.

The experiences of the candidates featured prominently in their campaigns. Barnabas Kombil, as former premier of Manus, thought that he was the ideal representative for Manus in the National Parliament. Arnold Masipal had not only been involved with the churches, the local government council, business and community work: he was also runner-up in 1972 and 1977. He thought that his chances were good and that he had the background to represent Manus over the next five years. And Levi Polomon thought that his rising success as a businessman, his active and effective involvement with Manus communities in Port Moresby and Arawa, his very good reputation in the villages, and his links with educated Manus functionaries made him an ideal representative of Manus.

But all candidates viewed their experiences as having equipped them for the job. The incumbents Michael Pondros and Nahau Rooney had been there - one for two terms and the other as a cabinet Minister - and they thought they knew the job through and through. Their return would enable them to continue from where they left off when their terms ended. A new representative would start from scratch.

Political Party Endorsement

For the first time political parties played an important part in a Manus election. A total of six political parties fielded candidates. This involved

payment of the nomination fees and contributions to campaign expenses. Apart from the party candidates, every single candidate associated himself or herself with a political party. This was an interesting change from past elections. The Pangu Pati, People's Progress Party, Melanesian Alliance Party, National Party, PNG Independent Group and Makasol Party altogether fielded eleven candidates. Pangu Pati endorsed the incumbents Michael Pondros and Nahau Rooney for the Provincial and Open seats respectively. The PPP endorsed James Sisosor and Hanai Popon; the MA endorsed Paul Masta for the Provincial seat and Charles Batapei and Elizabeth Buarra for the Open seat; the National Party endorsed only Barnabas Kombil for the Provincial seat; the PNG Independent Group endorsed James Pokasui for the Open seat; and Makasol Party endorsed Paliau Lukas and Kisokau Pochapon.

Apart from those endorsed candidates, four provincial seat candidates were Pro Pangu Independents - Jim Paliau, Levi Polomon, Pika Kasau, and Arnold Masipal; Pangu also attracted the other five Open candidates - Roy Pogat, Mathew Tuam, Joseph Kove, Francis Posanau, and Lalau Maiaha. It was obvious that Pangu Pati was the most popular political party during the 1982 national election in Manus. Of the total twenty candidates, eleven candidates were either endorsed by the Pati or publicly associated themselves with it. One wonders whether the other candidates would have associated themselves with Pangu had they not been endorsed by the other parties. The tendency seemed to be that where a candidate was not financially supported by another Party he opted for Pangu. The fact of financial support determined the affiliation of most candidates who claimed membership of political parties apart from Pangu. There were two candidates, however, who were clearly not Pangu supporters even if they were not endorsed by other political parties. These were Paul Masta of the Melanesian Alliance, and James Pokasui of the PNG Independent Group.

For the first time, then, party politics featured significantly in Manus political life, and it tended to justify Pangu Pati's claim that Manus has been Pangu's territory.

Regional Distribution of Candidates

During the 1982 National election a candidate's effective base was his or her village or the group with which he or she had worked closely. Since the 1979 provincial government election, however, a new kind of base has come into existence, the provincial assembly electorate. Table 12.3 show where each candidate came from and from what Provincial electorate. In some cases, the candidate's continued presence in another electorate is shown.

As for villages, Kali-Bipi and Rapatona had one candidate for the Provincial seat; Soparibeu, Pere-Ribunai, Kurte and Los Negros one for the Open; Lelemasli and Nali one Provincial and two Open; Eue Kele

and Sopomu-Malai Boy one Provincial and one Open; and Balopa three Provincial and one Open. Of the fifteen regions, eleven were represented.

Lorengau is a special case. The member for Lorengau in the Provincial Assembly, Barnabas Kombil, contested the election; however, I have placed him under Balopa because he originated from Balopa. Since Lorengau is a town, and also because the majority of candidates had lived for many years in Lorengau, for all practical purposes Lorengau was open for every candidate.

As these regional identities based on Provincial electorates develop, and are nurtured in villages they could decide future elections. With effective political party machineries and membership, the present tendency to vote according to one's knowledge of the candidate could give way to either voting on the basis of political party membership or on building strongholds in a number of these regions. And since the eligible voters of the 25,000 people of Manus are only about 11,000, of whom only about 8,000 have voted consistently in past elections - and also given the increasing numbers of candidates - an effective control of three or four regions, with some votes coming in from other regions, could easily send a candidate to the National Parliament.

Open Electorate Candidates

Roy Poius Pogat. During a public gathering organized by the Provincial government in Lorengau to provide the candidates with an opportunity to present themselves to the voters, Roy Pogat began by saying: 'I have a candidate. I want to present my candidate to you. He is Mr. Roy Poius Pogat! It is time to change the Open member!' So Roy Pogat presented himself to the voters.

Roy Pogat was a loner throughout the election. His supporters were silent. Throughout the period of campaign he was accompanied by an insignificant admirer, Mr. Pokuweh Ponape, from a village other than his own. Until his resignation about a year before the election Roy Pogat was a health extension officer based in Lae and a Lae City councillor. He was an active member of the Pangu establishment in Lae. When he resigned and returned to Manus to prepare for the elections he became very active in the affairs of his village group, the Karun Business Group. He was elected chairman and he helped to acquire and run a PMV truck for the group. But internal differences created a split between himself and Paul Masta, also from Karun, and an intending candidate for the Provincial seat. Roy Pogat had had an eye on the national election from the time he set foot on Manus. He became the secretary of the PMV Association and he was often heard on Radio Manus news bulletins. He was a common sight in Lorengau - fully dressed with trousers,

long sleeved shirt and a brief case. He did all he could in one year to make up for his years of absence from the province. During the campaign period, he travelled on foot, by canoe and on trucks to visit the voters and he distributed a leaflet with his head photo on it. His major objective was to unseat the incumbent representative, Nahau Rooney. He was frank about it. Yet from the start his chance of succeeding was insignificant, although he was hopeful and strove to the end.

Mathew Tuam. Mathew Tuam has been a bright political figure in Manus. Since the early 1970s, his involvement with the Kele Planters Association helped to introduce him to the voters. He was elected a councillor in the 1970s and rose to be an interim member of the Manus Provincial Government in 1977. He became deputy speaker. In 1979 he was elected as member for Ene-Kele to the Manus Provincial Assembly. He became deputy premier and also held on different occasions the Transport and Works and Finance portfolios. At the beginning of 1982 he resigned when the premier at that time resigned. He contested the premier's position and lost. During the national election, he held his seat as a back bencher in the Lapan Assembly.

Tuam embarked on an extensive campaign throughout the province. First, before the election he got possession of a tipper truck which he utilised during the campaign. His bid was strengthened by his accompanying the incumbent Provincial member, Michael Pondros, on the campaign trail. This association between Tuam and Pondros was an anomaly. Even though Pangu Pati endorsed Rooney and Pondros, for all practical purposes, Tuam replaced Rooney as far as Pondros was concerned. It was indicative of the conflict between Pondros and Rooney. Tuam has a powerful personality. He is a forceful speaker and understands the mind of the Manus voter: he fits the stereotype that many Manus voters have about the kind of leader they should have.

In accompanying Pondros he reaped benefits from Pondros' established reputation, his video attractions, his motor canoes, and his support base. Tuam was not a serious candidate to many observers, but the result showed otherwise. An explanation was that many of his voters would have been Rooney's votes. His association with Pondros and thus the Pangu base denied Rooney a significant number of votes. Nevertheless Tuam emerged unscarred from the election. He scored well, and he continued to show his energy on the floor of the Lapan Assembly. However, he became more and more involved in his block at Salame and spent lengthy periods away from Ene-Kele.

Joseph Kove. Joseph Kove was a name associated with the Manus Local Government Council. He was its executive officer until his appointment as administration officer with the Manus provincial government in 1979. He has a quiet and unimposing personality but is a serious worker behind the scenes. He had spent many years in Lorengau.

Since Kove's resignation from the provincial government in 1981, he has been involved in dealing with trochus shells and has acted as middleman for some foreign business interests in the province. He owns a block of land in Lorengau and operates his business from there. Kove did not conduct an elaborate campaign. He produced a leaflet with his photo and statements of his dreams for Manus. He also produced T-shirts with his name and picture on it. These were widely displayed. Except for an appearance in his home region of Balopa, he never went public to push his course, although his use of family connections through his wife and his extended family was effective. As the election approached he was able to establish contacts with his long-forgotten extended family. This got him some votes.

Kove was reserved before, during and after the elections. His quiet, self-controlled personality has remained intact. He is more a private person than a public personality.

Hanai Popon. A former school inspector and incumbent appointed member for Youth and Recreation in the Lapan Assembly, Hanai Popon was considered a strong candidate from the beginning. His Kurti region constituted a large voting population and his teaming with James Sisosor further would give him votes from Kali-Bipi and Sopariben areas.

Popon in 1979 had bid for the provincial assembly seat of Kurti but lost to an older generation leader, Kuluwali Suhvau. His background and associations with the political masters in the province, however, enabled him to join the leadership as an appointed member. Popon could be a formidable opponent and a dynamic leader. He was, however, inhibited. His approach was one of presenting himself as one of the alternatives for the voters to choose from. He never pushed his candidacy to the front line and his association with PPP was perhaps a factor. PPP never had a name in the Province. Perhaps as a matter of logistics, he sought PPP's endorsement for the sake of contesting the elections. If the ceremony at Naringel during which he was endorsed by the then prime minister was any indication, he lacked the drive and enthusiasm to fight the election.

The ceremony was more an impromptu than an organized one fitting for a prime minister to attend.

Elizabeth Buarra. For all practical purposes, Elizabeth Buarra was set up to split the women's votes which it was thought would otherwise go to Rooney. She was the only woman to contest the election besides Rooney.

Elizabeth Buarra was, until she was nominated by the Melanesian Alliance Party Branch, an insignificant personality. The functionaries of the MA were determined to put up another woman against the incumbent Mrs Rooney, but their attempt to recruit prominent women leaders including Mrs Kimat and Mrs Paliu failed. In desperation the party branch put up Buarra, even though it had already endorsed Charles Batapei as the official candidate for the Open electorate. Her candidacy was a set-up; Her chance of winning was negligible, but it was assumed that her candidacy would not affect Batapei's votes. It would prevent Rooney from getting the women's votes.

Francis Posanau. Francis Posanau was one of the first graduates in Surveying from the then Institute of Higher Education, now the University of Technology. He rose within the profession to be deputy surveyor-general in Papua New Guinea. About two years before the election he left the government and became a partner in a private surveying firm based in Rabaul. Posanau moved to Manus and was involved in surveying work on a contract basis for the government. This enabled him to survey roads and land boundaries throughout a large part of the province. He was also a regular weekly commentator on a programme '*Toktok Bilong Graun*', on Radio Manus.

At Rene, his home base, Posanau had a good reputation and was highly regarded. This was substantiated through his endorsement by Pranis Pabasi, a village bigman, former councillor, and a respected old-generation provincial leader. Pranis and other leaders of Rene accompanied Posanau throughout his campaign.

Posanau printed a quality leaflet which publicized his policies and displayed a photo of himself looking through surveying equipment. He also produced a singlet with his impression on it. It was worn widely. Posanau's statements of policy highlighted the issue of land, and his ideas as to the best way to effectively resolve land problems and utilize land for the benefit of the land owners in the modern economy and, subsequently, for the government also. Posanau was bright, academically highly qualified, very experienced, and

possessed potentially good ideas. He had the basics to be a good representative. A humble person, Posanau had a quiet way of getting people to opt for his ideas. He is persistent and he is open to ideas. He recognized his limitations and was prepared to be guided by people he respects. Had Manus been true to its yearning for a quality leader, Posanau was one. He was openly pro-Pangu. His eye for political leadership made him turn down an offer to be deputy vice chancellor at the University of Technology, Lae, only a few weeks before polling began.

Nahau Rooney Mrs. Nahau Rooney was the incumbent. In 1977 she overcame all odds to be the second woman to enter the National Parliament and the first woman to do so from Manus Province. With a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Papua New Guinea and a working experience in the centre of power during the early 1970s she also had proven ability in the eyes of Manus people during her term with the Department of Manus. As an elected representative, she had tasted power as minister for Justice, minister for Liquor Licensing, and briefly as minister for Decentralisation. She has long been at the heart of power in Papua New Guinea politics and she is a pioneer in her own right as a woman and a Manus leader. Mrs. Rooney was the candidate to defeat. She was an active Pangu personality, the endorsed Pangu candidate, and was personally presented to the Manus people by 'the Chief', Michael Somare; she had widespread support.

During her term as the Open member from 1977, concern had been raised by critics and opponents in Manus about aspects of her leadership. Her central role in the 'Rooney Affair' which eventually toppled the Somare government in 1979, and her socially outward personality were points raised against her. This carried weight not so much because it had any substance but because she was a woman. It was an expressed view during the campaign that Rooney's womanliness had been used as a weapon to get what she wanted in politics. Rooney had a running conflict with her colleague in the Provincial seat, Michael Pondros. Pondros' open campaign against Rooney by teaming with Tuam was not taken easily by Rooney. Eventually, as party branch secretary, she acted to remove the party's Suzuki vehicle and 25 horse-power outboard motor from Pondros. At the same time Roy Pogat, a Pangu supporter and an opponent for the Open seat, manoeuvred to undermine Rooney's support and leadership within the party. Rooney, however, was a formidable opponent. She maintained an effective role within the Party's machine.

Her campaign involved leaflets, the party's functionaries, and teams of supporters to publicize her cause during the polling day at the legal distance from the polling booth, as well as village public meetings. Knowing that she was the target for all candidates, she campaigned extensively to maintain her lead and challenged their candidacies. She received firm support from her own base.

Lalau Maiah Lalau Maiah was the youngest candidate. Many claimed that he was under age. He claimed he was 26 years old. He had stayed home after unsuccessful completion of Grade 10. Maiah's candidacy was a surprise. It had been rumoured earlier that his father, Joel Maiah, the premier of Manus and an unsuccessful national candidate since 1964, was contesting the election. His election as premier at the beginning of 1982 when premier Kombil resigned changed the situation. Not wanting to miss the opportunity altogether Joel Maiah put up his eldest son as a candidate for the Open seat. He got the provincial minister for Economic Development, Damien Kahu, to endorse his son and authorize his campaign publicity. Maiah was not a threat to anybody. Other candidates were concerned, however, that he would split their votes. He was attacked as being under age. Some threatened to sue him.

He produced leaflets with his photo and statements of policies directed towards the youth. Clearly he aimed at getting the votes of his own age group. His smaller briefcase size leaflet was produced in red and green colours. He claimed in his leaflet 'In God I Trust'. His father, the premier, used the official premier's car to campaign for him and distribute the leaflets. A former journalist from the *Times of Papua New Guinea* newspaper, Mark Hosea, directed his campaign and accompanied him everywhere. They used a truck and a speed boat to make quick appearances in many villages.

It would seem that Maiah's candidacy was effected only to maintain the tradition of having the name Maiah on the ballot papers. Since Maiah senior was in the premier's hot seat, his son was put up to maintain the tradition and also to reap the benefit of his father's achievements and his presumably good reputation as premier for Manus. Lalau Maiah was too young even if he was 26 years old. In the eyes of the Manus people, he still had not shed the ways of the carefree youth in him. However, he scored good votes in view of his youth.

Charles Batapei. Charles Batapei was formerly Charles Brilante, but running for the Open seat was a mistake. With an eye on the national election, he resigned from the Department of

Decentralization where he had risen to be first assistant secretary and returned home to Sori Island. One of his parents came from there. The other was of white heritage. Batapei became very involved with the community and helped to establish the IROS (*Sori back to front*) Club.

Batapei was endorsed by the Melanesian Alliance Party as one of its candidates for the Open seat. The other was Buarra. With a mixed race background he had an uphill battle. The party's additional endorsement of Buarra did not help; in fact, it created doubts in the voters' minds about his candidacy. How could a party put up another candidate when they had one already? Earlier, at the beginning of 1982, the Melanesia Alliance Party branch was opened in Manus. It was launched by the party leader, Fr John Momis. The branch played its part in campaigning for the endorsed candidates, including Batapei. He accompanied Paul Masta, his colleague for the Provincial seat, everywhere. Buarra only joined them in areas near Lorengau.

Batapei did not produce any leaflet of his own, although the party did, but he made public appearances in town and in the villages. Batapei, like Buarra, was not a strong candidate. The Party, being a new one in Manus, had a long way to go before it could make its candidates significant when they were not personally so. One expression was popular during his appearances: '*Em i bilong Manus o em i bilong we?*'. His mixed-race complexion did not help his candidacy. If anything, today, unless a mixed race candidate or a naturalized white Manusian candidate is an extraordinary personality, his or her chance of being a political leader in Manus is very slim.

James Pokasui. A captain with the land element of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, James Pokasui utilized his acquired skills to launch into politics. He was able to be transferred to Lombrum as adjutant at the maritime element base in 1981, and during his short period of service there he made contact with the ex-servicemen, organized their pensions and got them involved as a group. When he resigned early in 1982 to prepare for the elections he had reliable and trusted allies among the ex-servicemen. They worked hard for him wherever they were and they provided him with a place to stay when he visited their villages.

Originally Pokasui had applied for PPP's endorsement, but failed in this. However his association with Ted Diro in the Defence Force enabled him to join forces with the former Brigadier-General, and he was endorsed as the only PNG Independent Group candidate in

Manus. Pangu supporters and campaigners worked against him because he was a PNG Independent Group candidate. They claimed that, if that Group won, Communists would run the country, and the soldiers would run the government. Pokasui was however a formidable opponent. He had determination, drive and a base to fight on. Informally, he was in league with Levi Polomon, the Provincial candidate. They both originated from Lelewasih, but only in their base did they join forces. In other areas, they went their separate ways. The party produced Pokasui's poster with a standard PNG Independent Group slogan: **IT IS TIME FOR CHANGE.** Ted Diro's endorsement was included. It was the largest poster used in the campaign. It was effectively used and so was his private utility vehicle.

Pokasui campaigned extensively in all areas except the south and south-east islands. The results proved that this cost him ultimate success. However, he emerged from the election a respected person and a potentially effective leader. His strong campaign and broad base made him a candidate to be reckoned with.

Kisokau Pochapon. Kisokau Pochapon was the first Papua New Guinean surveyor-general. He maintained his position until he resigned to prepare for the election. Since his return to Manus in 1981, he had taken an active leadership role in the Makasol Study Group or Makasol Party - the offspring of the Paliu Movement of 1946. He helped to prepare the Makasol base for the election. His island village of Mbuke was a stronghold of the Makasol Party.

Pochapon is not a public figure by nature. He is more a back room technocrat. His attempt to enter political life did not fit his personality. A policy leaflet with his photo was distributed by the Makasol functionaries, but his campaign was contained within the Makasol community; he also had personal differences with the party's candidate for the provincial seat. They were hardly ever seen campaigning as a team. He depended on the misinformation that Makasol had 10,000 members all over Manus and the reasonable assumption that ten other candidates would split the votes of non-Makasol members. Apart from his occasional visits to Lorengau and his appearances at frequent Makasol gatherings in Lorengau and various villages, he hardly appeared in non-Makasol public gatherings.

Pochapon had a good academic background, but his work experience as surveyor-general was no great asset. His attempt to broaden his experience by organizing the Makasol Party did not give

him much opportunity to broaden his base. It also did not fit with his personality. His was a case of a wasted resource.

Provincial Electorate Candidates.

James Peter Sisosor. With the establishment of the Department of Manus in 1979, James Sisosor, then finance officer with the Manus Local Government Council, was appointed assistant secretary for Finance. With an Accountancy degree from the University of Technology, work experience with bank and the local government council in Manus, he was a logical choice for this important responsibility. In 1981 he resigned to prepare for the 1982 elections. He returned to his village, Salian, in the Kail Bipi area and became involved in community activities. Not all his involvement served to establish him in a conservative village set-up. On one occasion he prevented the building of a church by the Seventh Day Adventists on a piece of land which he had rights to. The area had a substantial SDA membership, including his village.

He was the endorsed PPP candidate and campaigned jointly with Hanoi Popon, the Open PPP candidate. He printed his leaflets and distributed them widely. He and Popon were the only candidates who visited the Western Islands. They chartered the MV *Maluan Solok* for the trip. The PPP leader and then prime minister, Sir Julius Chan, and the party president, Hudson Arek, came to Manus to officially endorse Sisosor and Popon at a small gathering in Naringel. But lack of enthusiasm at the ceremony marked the occasion. Apart from the lack of preparedness on the part of the organizers, the village was a Pangu stronghold. The then village *Komiti*, Thomas Parakei, however did his best on short notice to arrange for the occasion. He put aside his Pangu affiliation and set the stage for PPP to present its candidates. But the impact of the party leader and prime minister could not equal that of Pangu's chief, the then leader of the Opposition, Michael Somare.

Sisosor counted on winning the West Coast votes. He worked at the required politics to establish his base. He did very well, but could not rely on the West Coast alone to win.

Jim Paliau. Jim Paliau left his job as the clerk of the Manus Provincial Lapan Assembly, and armed with very extensive experience in the local government system and a good educational background, he made a bid for the National Parliament. Paliau had a very pleasant personality and was accessible to everybody. He enjoys chewing betel and had around him his drinking mates and closest friends. But his campaign was feeble. In fact, he did not do

any public campaigning until the final week when he hired a utility truck on which he installed a public address system and drove through the streets of Lorengau publicizing his intentions. Between the announcements there was music.

Paliau was indifferent towards the elections. He merely nominated and left the decision to the voters. He knew from that start that his chance of success was negligible. There was, however, no reason why he should not contest the election. Paliau's resignation coincided with the launching of Admiralty Bookmakers. He went in to run the betting shop. Throughout the campaign period he was behind the counter making money for the newly established venture. Jim Paliau, a rebellious son of Paliau Maloat and the Paliau Movement, has ideas about how and where Manus should go. He can articulate them to technocrats and political allies. He can defend them against his opponents. But he had a problem communicating them to the public to win their votes in the first place. His closest aides seemed to be of no help. In actual fact, the real motive for contesting the election was not to win but to challenge and prevent a certain candidate having it all his way - Paliau Lukas.

Paul Masta. Paul Masta resigned from the Melanesian Council of Churches early in 1982 and returned home to enter the contest. He has been instrumental in organizing his Karun villagers. Among his other colleague motivators was Roy Pogat, a candidate for the Open electorate. Masta holds a BA degree in Political and Administrative Studies from the University of Papua New Guinea. He was enrolled as an honours student; was an active student leader; and during the 1978 student encounter with the police he was injured and ended up in the lock-up. Paul Masta's earlier working life as a soldier, an airline employee and a union official had introduced him to the exciting life of politics. He entered the university as a mature student. Masta was involved with the Melanesian Alliance Party when he was in Port Moresby. On his arrival in Manus he helped to establish a party branch towards the end of January 1982. The branch immediately moved to identify candidates for the election. He was instrumental in determining the fate of the branch.

Masta has a mind which when decided on something is hard to change. His perception of life or understanding of a situation would not be changed even if the hard facts proved him wrong. If he decided a line was straight, it would be difficult to get him to see that in actual fact it was crooked.

Michael Pokayou Pondros. In 1982 Michael Pondros had been in the Parliament for two terms. In 1972 he was elected to represent Manus as Open member, but in 1977 he switched to the Provincial electorate and defeated the then incumbent, Pucali Kaseu. Pondros saw that as a success story, a rise in status.

Pondros was the Pangu endorsed candidate for the Provincial electorate. Pangu had questioned his candidacy, but in view of his support for Pangu in times of hardship, the Chief insisted on his running on the Pangu ticket. Pondros, however, was bitter - not because his Pangu position had been questioned, but because during his two terms in office he was not offered any ministerial position. When Rooney got into Parliament in 1977 she was given senior ministerial positions. This made Pondros mad. His pride has been hurt. He was an ambitious man and such by-passing could not be stomached. During this election it became obvious that he did not want to see Rooney returned. His only chance of becoming a minister was to return a novice as the Open member. He therefore teamed up with Tuam. It almost cost Rooney her seat.

Pondros demonstrated during the campaign that he doubted his chance of returning. He went flat out to convince the people that Manus could not make it without him. He used leaflets, public appearances and, for the first time in Manus, he used video machines in villages to attract the crowd and at the same time to campaign. Many people flocked to his public rallies to see the white man's wonder. He covered more areas of Manus than any candidate in the 1982 election. He could not afford to lose. He had debts to repay and losing would signal his demise. When Rooney removed Pangu's car and outboard motor from him when he was away in Port Moresby, he returned with a 25-horse power outboard motor. He drifted further away from Rooney and publicly campaigned against her. Rooney eventually confronted him in Lorengau and the truth came out. He was anti-Rooney because Pangu by-passed him and gave Rooney a ministerial position. He went further to assert that the Manus people did not respect him because of this.

At the time of the campaign it was revealed that he had squandered K50,000 of government VEDF money in his own business. This revelation almost delivered a knockout blow to the man. His campaign became a way to defend himself. He resorted to Christianity. His side-kicks claimed that Pondros was a true Christian unlike other candidates. Due to his success in the two past elections and his forceful personality he had support all over the province. But a lot of concern was expressed that he had

outlived his usefulness and that Manus needed a better leader. He knew this and he went out of his way to be returned. He had a dream, he said, that the winners would be himself and Tuam. This motivated him to push on. He was the candidate to beat. He claimed publicly that no one in Manus was yet ready to replace him. This would not happen until after 1994. Until then he was the leader for Manus.

To critics and opponents, Pondros's type of leadership had outlived its usefulness. But the villagers said he was still the sort of leader they wanted. They denied that he made a fool of himself, talked nonsense and brought shame to thinking and understanding Manus people. Raised in Pokusui, he had lived in Port Moresby since he was elected to parliament and married his third wife. He became an elderly son of Thomas Posakei and built himself a house at Topi in Dungou. He considered himself as being from Dungou which was resented by a section of Dungou people. At the election he was the heavyweight that had to be done away with. He was seriously threatened and the popular view was that he had had it; but he emerged the convincing winner. Pondros won but he was hurt. The wound would be politically fatal. Manus had returned a man whom many feel could be better utilized by not being elected.

Levi Polomon. Levi Polomon came fourth in 1977. In 1982, he came out very determined to defeat the incumbent and outplay other contestants. A get-Polomon-elected committee was formed and set out to plan his strategies. The campaign was done systematically and aimed at establishing broad support. It aimed not at stating what he intended to do if elected, but presenting him as a person to know. Leaflets were printed with his head photo, and he campaigned extensively. He hired a canoe which took him to almost every village that had voters. He was accompanied by his close associates and supporters. He identified his strong points and contacts and used them to get votes. This included his membership of the SDA church, and his base at Lalaneash.

Polomon was a candidate to watch. His supporters created a situation which made other candidates worried. During polling in Lorengau, two truck loads of youth, posters and loud hailer invaded the town urging people to vote Polomon. The youth were mobilized by a functionary, Memel Pohei. In the early morning, before the polling booth opened, the town was flooded with Polomon's posters. An up and coming businessman, Polomon has some clear ideas about what is required from a Manus leader. He thinks business, and sees political leadership as central at this time

to encourage and assist individuals and groups to set up businesses. He viewed this as a must for Manus.

Polomon's greatest strength is his good relations with resourceful Manus people from all areas. He asks for advice, listens and decides. When he places trust in a person, he works with him. He is good at identifying people and involving them in his schemes. Polomon even involved the older generation in his campaign. Betelnuts were ceremonially cut and sent to groups in customary fashion. Big men were recruited to carry the message. Indications during the campaign were good. But when the voters spoke, he could only muster third place. Polomon should consider concentrating his talents into developing his business ventures.

Pikah Kasau. Of all the candidates Pikah Kasau did the least campaigning. He appeared only twice in public. His candidacy was a last minute decision. When he learned that Pondros had a record that could work against him in the polls he wrote a letter to the Pangu branch offering himself to be considered for endorsement instead of Pondros. The branch refused it. He went ahead and nominated as an independent, pro-Pangu.

Pikah Kasau was not new to Manus and national politics. He was elected in 1972 to represent Manus as Provincial member. He lost to Pondros in 1977. Since then he had attempted to go into business but was not successful. A humble man, Kasau also possessed an easy-going personality. He was not demanding but he could work behind the scenes to get what he wanted. Kasau believed that there was no need for expensive campaigns. The Manus voters knew him. He had nominated like the eight others. The voters should choose whom they wanted to lead them. This nomination was an act of offering himself to the Manus people.

Kasau did not work at influencing the voters' decisions. Every one else did. He stood alone. Kasau has good ideas. He needed however to learn how to get the voters to acknowledge his potential and rally behind him. With the new generation of leaders emerging, his attempts to return to the National Parliament will be an uphill battle.

Barnabas Kombil. Barnabas Kombil was a health extension officer by training. In the mid-1970s he was posted to Lorengau. His involvement in political leadership started when he was elected a councillor from Lorengau town to the Manus Local Government Council. When provincial government was established in 1977, he was appointed a member. But he resigned and continued as an

ordinary councillor. In 1979 he contested the provincial seat of Lorengau town and was successful. He became one of the very few better-educated elected provincial members. He immediately lobbied for the position of premier, challenging Joel Maiah, the current premier, and defeating him. He had the honour of becoming the first elected premier in 1979. After over two years he tendered his resignation following a massive demonstration to the provincial government in February 1982 after a fatal stabbing in Lorengau allegedly committed by a youth from his own island of Lou.

Kombil made history in Manus and contributed to unravelling the puzzle of decentralization in Papua New Guinea. He has a pleasant personality. But he can be forceful when situations demand it. In 1982 he was a tiger in a lambs skin. During his time as premier he impressed many people and his name became a household word. Songs were composed about his claim and he enjoyed it.

He was uneasy about the role of the public servants and politicians. He worked to make politicians the masters of the government, but often he believed that the public servants of Manus, led by the then secretary of the department, Elijah Titus, were effectively in control even of the political affairs of the province. This was a perpetual issue for him during his time as premier. At one stage in 1981 Kombil suspended the secretary for advising the cabinet that he (the secretary) refused to approve an administrative change which Kombil initiated for the Division of Finance. Kombil wished to recreate a policy secretariat and make himself minister for Finance responsible for issuing final authority for any expenditure. The after-effect of this episode was his imprisonment in 1982 for misappropriating K3,500 during that time.

Kombil had a reputation as a 'rascal premier'. When loaded with alcohol he could be a nuisance. Often he would either start fights or become involved in fights. At one stage in 1980 he fought his legal officer at a social gathering after a few drinks because the legal officer refused to draft an instrument to give him authority as minister for Finance to issue authority for spending public money. Kombil decided to contest the election because his potential was not being utilized as an ordinary member of the provincial assembly. As a former premier, being an ordinary member is an unpleasant experience. As nomination time approached he went to Port Moresby to seek support from political parties. He visited Pangu, PPP, and Melanesian Alliance but could not get an endorsement. As he stopped at the traffic lights at Murray

Barracks Mr. Okuk's wife recognized him, and while waiting for the lights to give way she learned of his purpose in Port Moresby and his failure to get an endorsement. She told him to follow her. She led him to the government building and straight to Okuk's office - the office of the deputy prime minister, minister for Transport, and leader of the National Party. She walked up to her husband with Kombil by her side and introduced him as the National Party's candidate for the Manus Provincial seat. Without any question, Okuk instantly approved and discussed strategies to win the election in Manus.

Kombil at that time was a desperate man. He would do anything. Okuk was on the Dash-7 trial flight to Manus and endorsed Kombil as the sole NP candidate. The party produced his poster and provided him with an outboard motor. During the campaign period the party president, Michael Mel, came and accompanied him to a number of villages near Lorengau. Kombil also used his supporters to campaign in their respective villages. He considered his candidacy a strong challenge to Pondros. At the polling booth he stood his supporters at the legal distance from the booth with the hope of influencing some voters' mind for him at the last minute. He was able to achieve just that.

Paliau Lukas. Paliau Lukas was endorsed by the Makasol Party, a Manus based political party of which he was the chairman. He possessed a Bachelor of Arts and a Bachelor of Economics Degree from the University of Papua New Guinea. Before he returned to Manus, he was the national housing commissioner. He became a director of Edgells and Whitely Pty Ltd and a part owner.

He became very involved with the Makasol Group which claimed to be the party of the village man and woman. It had links with the 1946 Paliau Movement. As the election drew closer the political activities of the group intensified. It became clear that they were mobilizing for the election. Paliau Lukas was the brain behind the group. Lukas is hard to understand. He is either driven by a higher ideal or is a confused simpleton. Given his academic credentials I want to think that he is driven by a higher ideal. But critics of the Makasol group call him, and others such as Kisakau Pochapon, political opportunists who use the village people for their own political gains. There is *some* substance to this view.

Lukas like Pochapon concentrated his campaign with the Makasol membership. He published a leaflet presenting himself and his

ideas to the voters. He also aimed his campaign at mobilizing the Mouk people, his hosts.

Lukas is a thinker and a schemer. He works behind the scenes while others do the publicity. Only occasionally would he personally become involved publicly. The height of his campaign was a meeting of the Makasol group at Timoanai during Easter where they vowed to take over the Manus government. He is effective when he meets with the Makasol group. Otherwise, he is resented by many who know him. He has become known by his critics as an impractical motivator. He aimed at taking the reins from Paliau Maloat, his mentor, because at the time of the election he had a strained relationship with this mentor. He uses the old man for political gain. The old man had a base and he wanted to inherit that base. But it may actually be more difficult than he assumes.

Arnold Masipal. In the 1972 national election Arnold Masipal made his first bid to represent Manus in the National Parliament. He lost to Pukah Kasau. He made another unsuccessful attempt in 1977. 1982 was his third bid. Arnold Masipal is a leader and a practical man. He was a tradesman and had been involved on and off in construction work in Lorengau. He desired, however, to be a political leader. He replaced Kombil as councillor for Lorengau, and from the chambers of the Manus Local Government Council he was elected president. In his bid to be a political leader, he had been active in church work and community work and had taken up political courses including leading the Manus people against the Lonui people when they blocked the passage way at the Lonui bridge. He joined at least four churches for brief periods. He knows what he wants and works to achieve it. When it fails, he re-assesses the situation and sets about achieving new leadership goals.

Masipal became the last council president. In March 1982, the council was abolished. As former councillor for Lorengau town, he and his *komiti* used their ward savings account to give services to the communities in Lorengau. Over K3,000 was withdrawn. A cash donation of K500 each was given to church groups in Lorengau and a number of water tanks were supplied to the squatter settlements on the fringe of Lorengau town. The abolition of Manus Local Government Council came at an opportune time for Masipal. With money available he legitimately used it to benefit his electorate. He killed two birds at the same time.

Masipal's generosity has been a key part of him and he uses it effectively to achieve political objectives. During the campaign he provided food, fish and turtles for custom work. His utility was always ready to help people and he was always the first at a situation of need. He did his part as effectively as he could, but at the end the voters decided that he was second best to Michael Pondros.

Political parties: the line-up

For the first time in an election in Manus, political parties became actively involved. As we have seen, their involvement included establishment of party branches in the province, endorsement of candidates, publication of leaflets and posters, provision of funds for other campaign purposes, appearances of party leaders campaigning for the candidates, publicizing the party's achievements or apparent achievements to convince voters, and urging voters to vote on party lines. The involvement of political parties in the election was manifested in the fact that every single candidate was either endorsed by a political party or publicly associated with a political party.

Six political parties took to the polls in Manus. Five were nationally organized political parties and one was Manus based. They were: the Pangu Pati, People's Progress Party, the National Party, the Melanesian Alliance Party, the Papua New Guinea Independent Group, and the Manus Kansol Kastam or Makasol Party. The branches of the nationally organized political parties had policies determined by the national executive of the Party and were linked with the party in origin. Information about national parties can be got elsewhere. The Manus-based party however deserves mention here.

Makasol Party

What is popularly known known as Makasol comprises the remains of the Paliau Movement of 1946. In the late 1970s what had continued as the Paliau Church since 1946 became actively involved in politics. This coincided with the return to Manus of Paliau Lukas, a candidate for the Provincial seat, and a few other well educated sons of followers of Paliau Maloat. They formed what was called the Makasol Study Group. It emphasized a group approach to the search for knowledge and understanding of the dynamics of the situation surrounding them. As the election drew near and people began forming strong opinions about politics within the province, a Makasol Party was formed with Paliau Lukas himself as chairman. He saw the party's role as one of implementing the philosophies and policies developed by the Makasol Study Group. In 1982 they came into collision with the Provincial Government when it set out to establish community government in the province.

The party's patron and leader was Paliau Maloat. It established study groups of members in villages where the followers of Paliau Maloat were. They collected money and discussed the eventuality of their taking over the provincial government. Their endorsement of two candidates for the national election was one way of achieving their underlying objective. The party claimed to have 10,000 members in all parts of the province. This represented about 40 per cent of the population. The party leaders in actual fact had inflated the party's total membership. This was based on their assumption that since they had members in a village, everyone else in the village was a member of the Study Group! Their strategy of winning the election based on this understanding therefore did not work out.

Pangu Pati

As the election got closer, political parties began to show interest in the province. The expression of this interest was the establishment of party branches. *Pangu Pati* already had a branch, but it existed only in name. In 1981, the branch was re-activated and Pangu personalities Sir Pita Lus and Michael Somare appeared in the province to boost the image of the Pati. Branch *komiti* were found from various villages and invested with *Pati Komiti* badges by the Pati leader, Mr. Somare, in 1982 just before polling began. The branch executive was elected, but no sooner had the executive settled down than internal conflict emerged. Roy Pogat, a candidate for the Open electorate, challenged the Secretary, Mrs. Rooney the incumbent representative, soon after the declaration of the result in which she was defeated by one vote. Conflict between Pondros and Rooney also had their supporters estranged. Another problem was that the Pati's branch president, George Papom, had taken no interest in the affairs of the Pati. He had not attended a number of executive meetings.

During the campaign the Pati branch did its part in promoting the Pati's image and directing the voters to vote for Pangu and its candidates. It was the most popular party in the province. Apart from the two endorsed candidates, eight other candidates openly associated with Pangu - four for each of the contests. Effectively, therefore, 50 per cent of the candidates were Pangu. Being a Pangu candidate or supporter was politically advantageous. Even though Pangu's opponents and critics claim Manus is not Pangu territory, the 1982 election tended to suggest that Manus voters were either sympathetic to or openly pro-Pangu. Even if the branch had not been re-established, the voters in Manus would have voted for Pangu candidates. Personalities, however, contributed significantly to the final outcome.

People's Progress Party

The establishment of the PPP's branch was an insignificant occasion in Manus' political life. The branch came into existence basically because of the election. PPP was not a subject in the discussions of the Manus villager. During the campaign the branch seemed to materialize only in the two candidates and the party branch's president. There was no committee to carry on the campaign. Organizations in the villages were non-existent. Overall, the branch's actual work for the cause of getting its candidates elected was a missing factor.

National Party

There was no branch of the National Party established at the time of the election. For all practical purposes, the party did not aim at contesting the election in Manus. It was not yet ready to seriously do so. According to the party's candidate, Barnabas Kombil, he was the living manifestation of the National Party. The National Party in Manus was Kombil and Kombil was the National Party for the purposes of the election. In this context, the party branch was informally set up when Kombil officially nominated to contest the provincial seat. And the Party branch disappeared when Kombil lost the election.

Melanesian Alliance Party

Like the other parties, the Melanesian Alliance was set up for the obvious reason of contesting the election. At the end of January 1982, the party leader, Father John Momis, visited Manus and launched the branch. It consisted, basically, of younger people. Like the PPP, it was new to Manus political life. The branch executive aimed at developing the party's branch from members of the Christian churches, especially the Catholic Church. The influence of Father Momis, a Catholic priest, was the determining factor. The branch was active partly due to the assistance given by a local businessman and active supporter of the West Irian fight for independence, who was a West Irianese himself, Constance Nere. But the Party has a long way to go before it can stand on its own as a political factor in Manus and not just as an election ploy.

Papua New Guinea Independent Group

Like the National Party, the PNG Independent Group was manifested in the candidate, James Pokasui. There was no party branch in the Province, and the candidate and the national leadership did not plan to establish a branch. Established parties, especially Pangu and its supporters, attacked the PNG Independent Group as authoritarian and said that a vote for its candidate would be a vote for military leadership. He seemed to be a threat to Pangu's candidates.

Endorsement of candidates

Of the twenty candidates, eleven were endorsed by political parties. Of these, two each were endorsed by Pangu, PPP and Makasol. Melanesian Alliance endorsed three candidates, one for the Provincial electorate and two for the Open. National and PNG Independent Group endorsed one each. The other nine were pro-Pangu candidates.

Almost all candidates had sought endorsement but it was not possible for all to be endorsed. Pangu had made it clear that, if any pro-Pangu candidate won, his campaign expenses would be refunded. A number of candidates had applied for PPP's endorsement. Among the unsuccessful applicants was James Pokasui, who then sought assistance from his ex-colleague, Ted Diro, and was accepted as the PNG Independent Group candidate. The endorsement of the National Party candidate was a last minute effort by Kombil to get an endorsement. And his choice of the National Party came only when he had failed to get any positive responses from Pangu, Melanesian Alliance and PPP. Melanesian Alliance endorsed a candidate for each of the two contests, and, realizing that the candidate to defeat was Rooney, the branch put up a woman candidate to split her vote. The Makasol Party had agreed well before the election on its two candidates.

The endorsement of Pangu candidates was made by the party chief, Michael Somare, at a public meeting in Lorengau. At a reception in the evening, he received and publicly acknowledge the pro-Pangu candidates. Sir Julius Chan, the PPP leader, and the party's president, Hudson Arek, made a brief visit to Manus and endorsed the party's candidates at Naringel village. And Okuk, the National Party's leader at the time of the election, entered Manus in style. He brought in the Air Niugini Dash 7 on its maiden flight to Manus, and at the airport endorsed the former premier Kombil as his candidate. In addition the party president spent a few days in Manus. The two Makasol candidates were endorsed at Timoenai where the Party held one of its major meetings just before the election. The parties' endorsement of candidates involved presentation to the public for most candidates and payment of nomination fees for all endorsed candidates. But the Melanesian Alliance and PNG Independent Group candidates were not officially presented to the voters by the leaderships of the respective parties.

Leaflets and Posters

Leaflets and posters to publicize the candidates were a common medium used by almost all candidates. The contents included statements of policies and photographs of candidates. For two first-time candidates small leaflets with a photograph and a 1982 calendar were produced. All political parties produced leaflets for either all or some of their candidates. There were two types. One consisted of the common party slogans used elsewhere in the country. This included the Pangu and

National Party leaflets. Such leaflets were authorized by the respective party leaderships. The other type was designed and authorized either by the candidate or his agents.

Posters and leaflets were widely used. However, their effectiveness is difficult to assess. Perhaps the best they could do was to remind the voters of the candidates contesting the election. Their production costs perhaps outweighed the actual effectiveness in influencing the voters. Even though they may have been cheap to produce, political parties and individuals could have utilized their limited resources better.

Campaign finance

It is difficult to estimate the funds each candidate received and from what source. It is, however, expensive to campaign in Manus, unless one walks and paddles from place to place. The use of trucks and outboard motors is very expensive. Political parties like the National Party and Pangu Pati supplied outboard motors and/or cars and additional finance for general expenses. For others, extra money to spend was either very limited or non-existent. Candidates for smaller parties like the Melanesian Alliance could not afford an expensive campaign.

A lot of political money changed hands. The Manus premier was alleged to have used his discretionary funds to contribute money to groups throughout Manus to win votes for his son - a candidate for the Open electorate. Rooney alleged this to have taken place in Mbunai when his son presented a cheque to the Evangelical Church of Manus congregation in that village. Arnold Masipal, a Provincial candidate and former councillor for Lorengau, got the approval of his *komiti* in Lorengau to use the Lorengau ward account to provide services to communities within the town boundaries, as recorded above. Such utilization of public resources was common practice. For many candidates, including party-endorsed ones, it was common to return the people's hospitality with some financial contributions. This was not necessarily done to buy votes but to acknowledge the assistance and support provided by the people.

Campaigns by the party leaders

Appearances by party leaders to campaign for their candidates were a major contribution by the party concerned. In this election Pangu, PPP and NP had their leaders over to Manus to put their respective weights behind their candidates.

Somare for Pangu came and was received in style and treated as a prime minister. The party branch did its part in preparing the province for the coming of its Chief. He was received by dancers at the airport, taken to Mokeneng village for a day of feasting, dancing and speeches; and he appeared publicly in Lorengau where he was heard by several hundred voters. Radio Manus carried the proceedings over the airwaves that week.

Chan, the then prime minister and leader of PPP, was received without much pomp. The dancers were organized at the last minute, and at Naringel, where Chan endorsed his candidates, less than 100 people were present. Many people were either not informed or decided to be unavailable. As I have said, Naringel was a Pangu stronghold. Many villagers who were there were not interested in the proceedings, especially the speeches. Even though the party chairman came, he was dwarfed by the presence of the prime minister.

However, the arrival of the deputy prime minister and leader of the National Party was an occasion to remember. He came with the newest addition to the Air Niugini fleet, the Dash 7 which he himself was instrumental in purchasing. Between 100 and 200 people turned up at the airport to see the plane, and there Okuk praised the plane, praised himself for introducing it to Papua New Guinea, and endorsed Kombil as his candidate. Kombil was there with him. Okuk's airport performance was marred by a minor misunderstanding. The premier of Manus invited the people to inspect the plane and every enthusiast flocked to the tarmac to do so. They were, however, stopped by the officials and that inspection was summarily cancelled.

Other parties left their candidates to themselves or their branch supporters. Leaders could be major vote winners but, for this election, their mere presence was insufficient. The attitudes of the electorate towards the party and the leadership were decisive. And groundwork by the branch was also required. Somare was the most effective leader. His was a household name and Pangu had similar status. Chan, in spite of being prime minister, was not effective. He came only to campaign for his party and his candidates, and for this purpose the voters were not as interested in him as they would have been had he come as prime minister for some other purpose. Okuk was even less effective than Chan. The Dash 7 was an interesting plane, but Momatee Airport could receive large planes and was already serviced by jets. The prop-driven Dash 7 was a step backward for the Manus people. Perhaps they felt that so was the National Party. Mel, the party chairman, was a non person to the Manus voters. An assessment of the party's status in the electorate would have assisted greatly in better utilizing the party leadership to promote the party and benefit the candidates. It is not enough to depend on the position of the leader unless the leader has charisma or is a national hero.

Achievements of political parties

Increasingly the voters are associating political parties with their achievements. The voters also have their views as to what party contributes to good government. At the election the major political parties took pains to outline their achievements and offer themselves as the party to form the in-coming government. A lot of deception and half-truths were involved in this approach. The ability of the party

functionaries to use words and the preparedness of the electorate to be taken for a ride determined the effectiveness of this approach.

All the political parties contesting the election in Manus except for the Papua New Guinea Independent Group and the Makasol Party had been involved in determining the policies of PNG and implementing them since 1972. Pangu, PPP, NP and MA have been in the various coalition governments and helped each other to determine and achieve government policies. It is therefore deceptive and a half truth when a single political party claims full benefit for a policy achieved by a coalition. What the parties really should have said was that they or one of their ministers had been sharing power when the government achieved or initiated a particular policy. In fact they claimed credit for the success and disclaimed any responsibility for failure. Again, the effectiveness of this approach depended on the status of the party in the electorate. The electors do want to hear good things about their favorites and refuse to acknowledge the virtues of their opponents. It is such an attitude that makes politics dirty and makes opponents enemies.

To vote party, vote candidate

Unlike previous national elections, political parties had become accepted in 1982 and could stand on their own and get support depending on their status in the electorate. So much so that in this election political parties began to campaign with the theme: 'If you want your party to win, vote so and so candidate'. In 1977 Pangu took to the polls with the slogan, 'A vote for Pangu is a vote for Somare'.

With Pangu entrenched in Manus, the slogan '*Pangu i save Rot*' became the rallying cry. Pangu must form the government, so Pangu candidates must win. Pangu was the only party which took on this campaign approach. PPP attempted but did not insist. Other parties were not in the position to use their names in this way. The trend, however, suggests that future national elections will see more campaigning on party lines and less by individual candidates.

The 1982 national election saw the beginning of party politics in the Manus electorates. The political parties have learned, the candidates and potential candidates have gained experience and in the years to 1987 the voters will become more and more politically aware and wise about political parties and elected leaders. The total experience could make the behaviour of the voters more difficult to predict, the candidates more sophisticated and the political parties more resourceful.

The campaign

For some candidates the campaign began about a year before the poll. Intending candidates who had been absent from the electorate returned and began to establish themselves. The public servants resigned and went home to prepare for the election. When the writs were issued and nominations commenced the campaign went into full swing. The level of

campaigning, however, varied from candidate to candidate depending on their attitude to voters and their objective in contesting the election.

All candidates had their basic supporters. This was the group of people who either stood side by side with their candidate or worked behind the scenes. Assistance ranged from advice to planning campaign strategies, organizing logistics, providing assessments of how the electorate was responding and keeping an eye on rival candidates. Candidates with established reputations already had a broad base of support, while new candidates, including James Pokasui, Francis Posanau, Paul Masta and Charlie Batapei, had to develop that support during the campaign period. The task was enormous and could be expensive for serious candidates, especially the logistics.

Generally the campaign was a clean one. Many candidates acknowledged that the voters would finally decide. Their personal knowledge of each other also contributed to the low level of character assassination. There, were, however, instances of straight talking and exploiting situations to gain political points. Candidates like Roy Pogat identified the candidate to defeat and said so. 'It is time to change the Open member!' The Open member being a woman, he sought arguments against her in Manus traditions and the government's attempt to revive Papua New Guinea's cultural heritage. And in taking on James Pokasui, the PNG Independent Group candidate, he spread fears about the military taking power if that party got into power. In reply the incumbent emphasized her proven leadership, and cast doubts on the leadership potential of the challengers.

Michael Pondros interpreted the challenge by other candidates as showing disrespect for him on the part of the electorate. He could not understand why any person would challenge him. He did not challenge the other Provincial candidates. Instead he worked on the emotions of the voters, forcefully re-asserting his personality. He did, however, attack the incumbent Open member for causing the overthrow of the Somare government in 1980, and he said that this could be repeated if she was elected. His chances of ascending to the heights of power depended on her defeat by a less known personality.

In their campaigns all candidates identified their respective bases which coincided with the village and the language group and also, in most cases, with provincial electoral boundaries. It turned out generally that candidates got good support from their bases except where the support was split. A further factor was religious affiliation. A number of candidates attempted to use their membership of a church to support their candidacy. The members of the Makasol Study Group voted *en bloc* for their two candidates. For other religious groups, there may have been some solidarity but generally membership of church groups was not a guarantee of support.

The factors most influential were party membership, individual reputation and membership of a traditional or customary or language

group. In this election, it paid to be endorsed by Pangu, to have individually developed a broad base and to be a member of a relatively large language or customary group. These central factors in the election tended to question the seriousness of the Manus voters' yearning for quality leadership. In so far as the voters vote according to these factors, unless the candidates are of similar type the ultimate election of the quality leader will be accidental.

The Electors

Manus in 1982 had just over 25,000 people. Only 44 per cent of the total population were eligible voters, and of these only 73 per cent cast their votes. The people of Manus said they wanted good leaders: as the election approached it became a common household demand made urgent by their experience of national and provincial government over the past five years. It was, however, difficult to reach agreement on what a good leader or quality leadership was.

The people had some ideas. They wanted a strong leader, a strong personality, one who could shout down opposition, aggressively carry the cause of his people forward and make his presence felt within the electorate even if he did not continually reside with them. The electors do not necessarily appreciate a leader who effectively represents them in a quiet manner; they want a leader who excites them and makes them feel part of his achievements.

As usual the Manus people were pleasant to the candidates who for several weeks in the first half of 1982 pestered them for their ears. It was the period when a prospective leader showed interest in visiting the villages and did not show contempt for the villagers. In fact, he stressed how much he respected them and promised that he would do what the incumbent had not done and do what he had done better. The electors would show interest in his presentation and his candidacy. The candidate would leave the village with the impression that he had been successful in winning votes from that village. Some candidates would come out fully satisfied that they had bagged all the votes. The hospitality of many Manus villagers continues today even during political campaigns, but this hospitality is deceptive. A naive candidate fails to understand that the same village will extend the same hospitality to his opponents.

By the 1982 election, the electors in Manus had come to know something about the politics of elections and the ways of the prospective leaders. National elections since 1964 with accompanying campaigns, broken promises, unachieved expectations, and increasingly wealthy elected leaders had made the electors more aware of what the exercise meant. '*Em win moni bilong ol*' became the common expression. In a way the electors took the candidates for a ride. They knew this was the only opportunity within the next five years to influence national leaders,

and these elaborate visitations would not necessarily continue after the election.

Most electors decided which candidate to vote for as soon as they knew their intentions. The campaign was really aimed at the minority who were undecided, to establish the candidate in the minds of the electors before the campaign proper. Thus the campaign could easily be costly and ineffective unless one chose to actually buy votes. Once the voters have made up their minds, they play their part in receiving every other candidate, but once such a candidate has left the village, the electors will say: 'He is a good man, but he is wasting his time!' Or: 'Had we not agreed to vote for so and so, we would vote for him!'

In the 1982 elections, therefore, the electors were politically aware of the dynamic of this leadership process; well educated in the behaviour of candidates and elected leaders they yet willingly subjected themselves to the campaign formalities. Some candidates like Kasau and Paliu were well aware of this and decided to keep campaign expenses to the bare minimum. Others like the Melanesian Alliance candidates were taken for a ride only to be properly dumped. A politically conscious electorate must be known and appreciated by the candidates well in advance before they can launch a successful campaign. Otherwise, the small businessman plus the major business houses would be the major beneficiaries of this political exercise.

Polling

The provincial electoral office, led by the returning officer, Joseph Kiluai, conducted the election. Seven teams of about five officers each covered the province from the Western Islands to Lorengau in two weeks. The province was sub-divided into seven polling areas and each polling team was given responsibility for an area. The objective was to make it easy for every voter who wanted to vote. Armed with experience from past elections the returning officer briefed the teams on the procedures as well as the polling programme. The people were informed through Radio Manus on the dates of the election, from the issue of the writ to the return of the writ. The programme of each of the polling teams was broadcast through special Radio Manus programmes as well as through the most listened to programme, 'Tok Save', which was aired twice in the evening and once early in the morning of the next day. Each team was accompanied by a policeman. Though no situation arose which would require police action during polling, their presence was required for procedural reasons.

Within two weeks, all of Manus had been given a chance to vote. Since the Open and Provincial electorates covered the same geographical and population area, the poll was easy to complete. Voters away from their villages could easily cast their votes so long as they were registered. Every area in Manus turned out to vote except for Aua and Vuvulu. The team went to the Western Island group but left with

only ten votes cast. The people of Aua and Vuvulu boycotted the election because they wanted to be part of East Sepik Province, which in practice was looking after them.

It was a well conducted election. The polling teams were led by officers of the Division of Provincial Affairs, but included officers from other Divisions within the Department of Manus. Only two incidents during counting are worth mentioning. First, as counting proceeded in Lorengau on the night of 26 June, 1982, and results began to show the actual decision of the voters, certain expectations were proven wrong and a number of candidates and their supporters thought that malpractice had occurred. This was confirmed according to them by their interpretation of certain behaviour during the counting.

Barnabas Kombil assumed that the election was between Arnold Masipal, Levi Polomen, and himself, and that Polomen and himself would get most if not all votes from the Malai Bay area. According to him the incumbent Michael Pondros was a goner. It became obvious, however, from team 3 onwards that Pondros would lead the counting. When the Malai Bay votes were counted, Kombil and Polomon did not get them all; Pondros also got good votes. As he observed the counting, Kombil witnessed communication between Pondros' scrutineer and the leader of Team 5 which covered the Malai Bay area, Chapan Lili. Lili was a relative of Michael Pondros. All this suggested to Kombil that the officer concerned had redirected votes in the Malai Bay area towards Pondros. Kombil then exploded in the counting hall and accused the officers of malpractice. The police who were present in full strength interviewed and questioned Kombil.

Soon after the result was declared in the early hours of the morning another provincial candidate, Arnold Masipal, began to collect information and lobby the other candidates to appeal the electors' decision in favour of Pondros on the basis of malpractice. This never eventuated. The returning officer supported the integrity of his officers during the incident and requested the aggrieved candidates to take action through proper channels. The other incident arose from the counting. After the first count Open incumbent Nahau Rooney and James Pokasui were equal. A recount was ordered, and in the afternoon of the 27th James Pokasui was declared the winner by 1 vote. But Mrs Rooney appealed to the National Court of Disputed Returns and she was later returned, as we shall see.

The candidates' challenges to the integrity of the electoral officers were not substantiated. It is true that a second re-count would probably have decided in favor of Rooney against Pokasui's and kept the matter out of the courts. Generally, however, the election was conducted in a manner worthy of democratic government. The returning officer and his team did a good job.

The Results

On 27 June, 1982 Michael Pondros was declared the winner in the Provincial electorate and James Pokasui, the former captain with the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, was declared the winner of the Open seat.

Table 13.4
Results

| Candidates | Votes Open | | Votes After court's decision |
|-------------------|-------------|--------------|---------------------------------|
| | First Count | Second count | |
| Roy Pogat | 424 | 424 | 429 |
| Mathew Tuam | 1,013 | 1,014 | 1,027 |
| Joseph Kove | 1,380 | 1,380 | 1,394 |
| Hanai Popon | 1,466 | 1,467 | 1,394 |
| Elizabeth Buarra | 110 | 110 | 117 |
| Francis Posanou | 977 | 977 | 983 |
| Nahau Rooney | 1,537 | 1,540 | 1,559 |
| Lalau Maiah | 380 | 368 | 305 |
| Charles Batapei | 288 | 301 | 305 |
| Kisokoiu Pochapon | 815 | 822 | 825 |
| James Pokasui | 1,537 | 1,541 | 1,548 |
| Total | | | 8,577 |

Table 13.5
Provincial

| Candidates | Votes |
|-----------------|--------|
| Paliau Lukas | 1,133 |
| James Sisosor | 873 |
| Jim Paliau | 420 |
| Paul Masta | 468 |
| Michael Pondros | 2,428 |
| Levi Polomon | 1,692 |
| Pikah Kasau | 237 |
| Barnabas Kombil | 777 |
| Arnold Masipal | 1,958 |
| Informal | 329 |
| Total | 10,315 |

In the Provincial poll Michael Pondros took over the lead from the runner-up, Arnold Masipal, from team 3 onwards and maintained his lead until he was declared the winner by nearly 500 votes. Pondros' return was a surprise to his critics and opponents. Only his supporters were convinced that Pondros was the candidate to defeat and that in fact he would be returned. The critics were of the opinion that his dismal performance during the past ten years, and more importantly his constant absence from his electorate during his second term and the allegation that he was involved in diverting K50,000 of government money to his business, would be enough to knock him out of the race. It turned out that these had little or no effect.

To the critics, the candidates to watch were Arnold Masipal and Levi Polomon. They conducted strong campaigns and the critics were certain that one of them would knock Pondros out for good, but it was not to be. Pondros' win was God's plan, according to his supporters. In his campaign Pondros repeatedly said 'I may not always attend church services, but I have Jesus in my heart!' He was often seen carrying the Bible and attending church services. In his entire campaign he went all-out, and spent a lot of money. At the end, the voters were convinced; however, the allegation that he misappropriated government money spoilt his victory. It bothered him and turned him into an incoherent personality. In fact, his success in the poll turned his life into a nightmare.

Pokasui took his seat as the new Open member for Manus without any pretensions. In preparation for his inauguration he visited the relevant government officers in Lorengau including the secretary of the Department of Manus, Elijah Titus, to get a briefing on the state of the Manus Development Plan. Later, when his nominal leader, ex-Brigadier General Ted Diro decided to take the reins of the National Party, Pokasui questioned his own continuing association with Diro and membership of the PNG Independent Group. His close friends advised him to support the Pangu Pati to form the government. He reviewed his position and ultimately when the National Parliament convened to elect the prime minister, he voted for Fr John Momis and later supported Diro. He knew of Rooney's bid to get the Court of Disputed Returns to rule on a number of issues regarding his election to the parliament. This did not deter him from taking up his new role. He performed it to the best of his ability. Among other issues, he immediately set out to clarify the status of the Western Islands.

The Court of Disputed Returns, however, ruled in October that the Electoral Commission had erred and that the actual winner of the 1982 national election for the Manus Open electorate was the Pangu candidate, Mrs Nahau Rooney. And so Rooney returned to parliament, this time being the only women parliamentarian.

The Aftermath

The 1982 National Election saw the return of the two Pangu-endorsed candidates, Michael Pondros and Mrs Nahau Rooney. Pangu's claim that Manus was its stronghold was substantiated. The story of the election, however, did not end after the declaration of the results. I shall look at Nahau Rooney's challenge to the results and her subsequent success, and Michael Pondros' obsession with the allegation that he misappropriated K50,000 of government money.

The Rooney Appeal

At the end of the first count for the Open seat Pokasui and Rooney had equal votes. After a recount, Pokasui had a majority of one vote. Mrs Rooney then began to ask questions. Basically, she wanted another count to put an end to any doubts. She did not get it. The declaration was made and Pokasui became the winning candidate. However her supporters began to produce information which suggested that several votes were invalidated by the officials because they felt they were improperly marked. The scrutineers suggested that they could be valid votes. The ball began to roll and eventually Mrs Rooney took the matter to the Court of Disputed Returns. Mrs Rooney claimed all she wanted was fair play on the part of the Electoral Commission. Since she was defeated by only one vote there could have been some mistakes.

In her petition there were three respondents: the Electoral Commission for invalidating a number of votes she claimed were valid; Pokasui for improperly influencing Defence Force personnel at Lombrum to vote for himself; and Lalau Maia for being an underaged candidate. When the Court of Disputed Returns sat to consider the petition, Mrs Rooney decided to call only the first respondent - the Electoral Commission. After the initial hearing the presiding judge ruled that the recount be held. On the court's recommendation, the judge received evidence of the recount and was presented with the doubtful votes to decide on their validity. After considering all this evidence, the judge ruled that the decision of the Electoral Commission was invalid. The final count was Pokasui 1548 and Rooney 1559.

Mrs Rooney emerged from the court room elated with success, but the Manus people received the news with indifference. To them the excitement of the political exercise had ended with the declaration of the election results. The bid by Rooney in the courts was none of their business. Rooney's closest aides and supporters of course were overjoyed.

Pokasui accepted the decision of the court. He only requested the court to rule that the Electoral Commission compensate him for its incapacity and his inconvenience.

The Pondros Dream

The approach by Michael Pondros to the 1982 election campaign was determined by the Ombudsman Commission's revelation that he was answerable under the Leadership Code for his use of certain funds. An approved sum of K50,000 from the Village Economic Development Fund was given to the Admiralty Transport Group of which he was a member. The other members were senior Manus public servants. The money was approved for the purpose of purchasing a number of barges for use in the province. The other half of the required initial finance was to be raised by the group.

As it happened, the group failed to produce the other half. Pondros then decided, apparently with the consent of the other members, to re-direct the money to purchase several buses to operate as PMVs in Port Moresby. Admiralty Transport was unregistered, and the operation of PMVs in Port Moresby was done under Pokaiou Company Ltd., of which Pondros and his wife were the directors. Pondros did not produce any report on his involvement in this venture as required under the Leadership Code, and the Ombudsman Commission revealed this well before the campaign started. It was, however, during the campaign that Iambakey Okuk, the leader of the National Party, publicized it and called upon the government to take the necessary action against such leaders. Already a few other leaders were being investigated.

Okuk's move made Pondros return to Manus to defend himself. He went on air and used every opportunity he had to explain his side of the story and win the sympathy of the Manus people. He claimed he did not steal any public money and that the K50,000 was not given to the Manus people but to him. In his campaign which took him to the villages of Manus, he had to say something about this drama. He claimed he had nothing to hide but was very concerned about the allegation. It was questionable whether he was concerned because the allegation might cost him votes or because there was some truth in it.

Since his victory at the polls, the Public Prosecutor's Office has decided to prosecute the Manus Provincial member. This has not helped his cause. Soon after the election of the prime minister, Michael Pondros was appointed minister for Public Utilities. Not long after, he was suspended as a minister because of the allegation. And in the subsequent re-shuffle his ministry was given to another minister and he remained a suspended minister without portfolio.

Pondros became obsessed with the allegation. On the floor of the parliament he often reverted to making references to the impending case before the court. His visits to Manus were short-lived and unimpressive. On one occasion, as the end of December 1982, he failed to appear at the opening of the Pobirua Community Government which was delayed especially for him to attend. He claimed that he was sick. He continually makes references to the matter and insists on his innocence.

Pondros' pride led to his downfall. He was anti-Rooney because Rooney became a minister and he was not. He achieved his goal and became a minister, but no sooner had the dust settled than he was suspended. Finally, in July 1983 a leadership tribunal found him guilty on four charges under the Leadership Code, and he was dismissed by the Governor General as a minister and as a member of parliament.

Conclusion

By 1982 Manus had had experience with political leadership at Local government council, provincial government, and national parliament level. The politically aware section of the community has demanded more and more from the leaders; in fact, the demand has tended to become insatiable. It has become a pastime to continually find fault in the leadership, and to yearn for 'quality leadership'. In 1982, for several reasons, the incumbents Pondros and Rooney did not satisfy these demands and expectations, and the camps which desired a change of leadership hoped that the election would bring it about. The public servants who were initiating new ideas in policy making wanted to work with leaders who could sit down with them and discuss programmes in order that they might jointly work to achieve them. They had not been able to work with the incumbents during their terms in office.

Quality leadership was desired, but it meant different things to different groups. Those who were implementing government decisions or formulating policy initiatives wanted leaders who could sit down and discuss matters at a high level and make firm decisions based on available information and careful analysis of options. They wanted leaders who could stand on their own and achieve set objectives. On the other hand, in popular Manus thinking a quality leader is one who is 'strong' or speaks the loudest. For a villager, a forceful leader ignites the feeling of involvement, and a leader must be seen to have his way by shutting down his opponents. Thus these two groups of voters did not see eye-to-eye, and the outcome of the election was a blow to one group and a boon to the other.

Michael Pondros' type of leadership was demanded by the villagers and resented by the implementers and the politically sophisticated voters. These two groups could not associate with such a leader, whereas the villagers would. On the other hand, Rooney's success was difficult to evaluate due to the insignificant majority. Rooney's talent was recognized from the time she was elected in 1977 and made a minister in preference to Pondros. Her style, however, was not generally liked. There was a demand even by the politically sophisticated section of the community to replace her. However this demand may have arisen because of her success in the power game and, even more, because she is a woman.

The verdict of the Manus voters in 1982 was questionable. There was demand for quality leadership, but the outcome did not seem to produce it. In the final analysis, the yearning of the Manus people for a leader they could all rally behind and identify with remains to be realized.

APPENDICES

Appendix A.**DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS
PROVINCE: PROVINCIAL RETURNING OFFICER'S
REPORT**

591255

District Services Division
Free Mail Bag
MENDI SHPMr H.T. Veratau
Electoral Commissioner
Electoral Commission
P.O. Box 5348
BOROKO
National Capital District

13 July 1982

P A FEARMAN/juk
PROV RETURNING OFFICER

Dear Sir

**SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS ELECTORAL RETURNS: EIGHT OPEN
ELECTORATES PLUS PROVINCIAL**

Because of our strong management and coordination structure the Southern Highlands has been able to coast through this general election with a minimum of problems. We have also been able to make considerable savings and pose some useful suggestions for the future.

Although our Southern Highlands team boasts of its superiority over the other less organised provinces, we do realise that our effort would not have been functional without the exceptional support that we received from yourself and your staff. We would like to particularly thank Mr. Abraham Wari whose consistent, dedicated hard work gave the basic support to our team.

Attached please find each of our eight open electorate reports and attachments. These being:-

- (i) Report body
- (ii) Returning Officers' General Return
- (iii) Counting Tally Sheets from Counting Centres
- (iv) Financial Expenditure Summaries

Pre-Electoral Campaign Headquarter Leadership

The brilliant early but timely start by the National Electoral Commission was perhaps the main contributing factor to assist us identify field problems, and other areas requiring support or training.

We managed to switch on to electoral duties in time to systematically plan our pre-electoral campaign. Because all Returning Officers were at the first Regional Conference we then had everybody switched on to electoral duties at the same time. Similarly, I feel the next conference with Provincial Returning Officers and Provincial Electoral Officers of each Highland Province cemented the relationship between the Electoral Staff and Field Staff.

Conference

From the Returning Officers' conference in Hagen, our officers felt that we had National Headquarter support and that we had been able to interact on the central planning. Although our input was perhaps small, we like to feel that the Returning Officers' Handbook on electoral offences, and the training paper for Scrutineers eventuated from this conference. We also managed to be refreshed with Polling Booth Lay Out and on general electoral duties. Thus we would support similar conferences for future elections even if other expenses were to be cut.

Radio

Mr Wari (Provincial Electoral Officer) mounted a regular twice weekly radio *toksave* program on the various electoral issues. The regular six weekly meeting of the District Managers - Returning Officers was able to identify content of these programs and offer some feedback as to how effective these were. These talks were repeated, and played over for the four months prior to polling. Although these talks did not enable people to completely understand the role of scrutineers and of literate people to witnesses, they did assist us when situations arose where we would have to talk to the people to explain these roles. I understood it was the same message as passed over the radio. Thus it was the same rule for the entire province. Nobody would like to think that their village is the only place where scrutineers can't mark ballot papers. This programs should be a regular part of our pre-election work.

Training

After being led to switch on to electoral work so early in the year, we had to keep switched on. We arranged a training workshop for all key officials four weeks or more prior to polling. To do this we divided the Province into three sections:-

East: Ialibu-Pangia, Kagua-Erave, and Imbong'gu
 West: Koroba-Kopiago, Komo-Margarima, and Tari; and
 Central: Mendi and Nipa.

We then had our training workshops at Ialibu, Tari and Nipa.

All training sessions were participatory and were highly repetitive but fun because most officers acted a role or prepared a script. During these sessions I thought some of the scripts were far fetched with possible situations; however, now that the elections are over, I believe we should have used more imagination. Who would believe that an officer would have been assaulted for not letting scrutineers mark the paper, or that the Prime Minister would make an announcement that our officials were corrupt and one had been thrown in jail, when nothing of the sort had happened? Who would have thought that one of our Presiding Officers would allow six year old school children to vote? Although we didn't act all of the possibilities our workshop trained our Presiding and Assistant Presiding Officers well. We trained extra staff in case of an emergency. This was also very useful.

The other useful aspect about this training session mean that immediately prior to departure of the electoral patrols the Returning Officer was busy. The Assistant Presiding Officers and Presiding Officers were nervous. The short course which was conducted then for Poll Clerks and to refresh everybody, although generally not so well conducted, acted as a base to give confidence to the nervous officers departing to the field. Also scrutineers were involved in this course and put in their place by the experienced Returning Officers.

Handouts of Presiding Officers' Instructions, Polling Booth Layout, Presiding Officer Return Forms, Sex Tally Sheets, Patrol Instructions to Presiding Officers and a guide to making a talk to village people were distributed at these workshops for people to read prior to departure on patrol. The course content revolved around these handouts:

- . Procedures to be followed by Presiding Officers
- . Set up of Booth
- . Use of Witnesses
- . Use of Ink
- . Control of Scrutineers
- . Liability of Presiding Officer
- . Familiarity of Electoral Act and Offences

It was stressed that when in doubt the Presiding Officer should send for his Returning Officer for advice. The situation should be kept calm and in control. If need be, close down the booth until advice arrives, but don't push the people towards being violent. Be nice to people even if they are threatening you. Ask them to understand your point of view working with the likes of them. Only experienced officers were sent to remote areas. Other areas were visited by the Returning Officers regularly.

Selection Teams

Polling teams were generally selected at the training time and were trained as a team. Each team was selected on racial grounds. Officers were asked to give their name and place of birth as well as comment on marriage or relationship to specific area. We attempted to use mainly outsiders from the Province as Presiding and Assistant Presiding Officers. We also made sure that no team was made up from people of one area. This included area of work and religion, as well as race.

By the time the teams departed we were quite sure they had all been screened and carefully selected so that no one team could be accused of being wantoks or beer buddies. Public Servants with known problems of honesty, reliability or alcohol were left off the teams. It seems that mostly Southern Highlanders and neighbouring Highlanders were held in suspicion by candidates, even though these officers were often capable officers.

Number of Teams

Each Returning Officer planned their own Polling Schedule and number of teams to be used. These were as follows:-

| | |
|-------------|---------|
| . Koroba | 7 teams |
| . Komo | 7 teams |
| . Kagua | 5 teams |
| . Nipa | 6 teams |
| . Tari | 3 teams |
| . Mendi | 5 teams |
| . Pangia | 5 teams |
| . Imbong'gu | 4 teams |

Some extra teams were added to the previously budgeted number owing to fear that time would limit the following of previous schedules. Each team had a Presiding Officer, an Assistant Presiding Officer, one or two Poll Clerks as required by population of booth catchment area, and two Police who acted as door keepers. Drivers and Interpreters were used in some areas. I believe that Kagua could have sent only one team to Waposali to walk out, owing to the shortage of people to carry. Also Komo could perhaps have been reduced by one team. I make these points now in case the Returning Officer for the next election wishes to reduce in these two districts. Neither of these Returning Officers commented on possible reductions to the amount of teams but I will suggest they do so on their Station file copy of this report to assist the next election.

Finance

Rather than send fixed amounts to each district for their electoral use, we agreed with the various District Managers that costs should be kept to a minimum so that future elections don't look too expensive. Thus each Returning Officer was given the fund's numbers and requested to spend very carefully. This was done and so great reductions were made.

Only basic equipment was purchased. Each team was issued two patrol boxes, one hurricane lamp, 2 chairs, 2 tables, 1 plastic container, 2 clipboards, 1 primus and some tent flies. We thus forwent the chance to resupply our patrol equipment and debit the Electoral Commission.

This system seems to have been reasonably effective as it stopped areas of low cost getting large allocations to spend. It seems Koroba reduced costs more than other districts and perhaps they could have made their teams a little more comfortable without being extravagant. I would like to congratulate Koroba however for their effort at saving on costs. Perhaps for the next election a zero-based budget system should be employed for patrol funding three months prior to departure. This way all districts will suffer the same financial support even though the isolated areas will receive a much larger slice of the cake.

Vehicles

Owing to our current shortage of vehicles, and the fact that PTA's present policy is to send old vehicles out to remote areas and new vehicles to Mendi NWA, we were forced to requisition extra vehicles for electoral purposes. We hired a ten seater extra to Tari, one for Mendi and a short wheel base vehicle for Ialibu. These vehicles were to be shared for the three regions within the Province. This worked well. Also the fact that our District Manager/Returning Officers control all transport within their district meant that teams could be moved by coordinating existing vehicles without any extra expense to the Electoral Commission. If there are funds surplus at the completion of our accounting period we will pay the Province for its great assistance.

Supervision

Most of the teams were visited by the Returning Officers, especially for the first few days. This of course could only be where there was easy road access; however this is getting more and more possible with each election.

Both Mr Wari and myself also visited the various districts and some teams during the polling. I found this most beneficial both for morale of the teams and because I was able to be on the spot at a few places where an unpleasant situation was in the making.

It is often known which areas are trouble spots and Returning Officers' know these and were able to guide teams through these areas

without obviously interfering. Thus a planned schedule of visits to the teams by Returning Officers' was most effective.

Law and Order

There were only minor law and order problems associated with this election. We were fortunate that beer sales were stopped and that we had such good police cooperation and control. Our Police Commander Peter Wagarando had detailed a section of the riot squad at Tari, one at Ialibu and one for Mendi. He had also allocated two policemen for each team and run briefing sessions throughout the Province.

Our policy was to make as many arrests as possible prior to serious trouble. These arrests were publicised over the NBC and Radio Mendi so that people realised that action would be taken against people who failed to respect the Electoral Act and its Regulations. We believed that an early arrest of a man who attempted to cast a second vote in Mendi was a good deterrent to the rest of the Province not to try double voting. There were, however, numerous arrests made for attempting double voting.

The biggest disturbance was in the Lai Valley where the Presiding Officer was knocked unconscious and eight ballot boxes were stolen. This was caused because the literate witness to a voter identified a mistake written on a ballot paper.

Most Presiding Officers spoilt ballot papers during the election owing to the mundane and boring nature of the exercise. When Highland men made this mistake they were accused by people of accepting bribes. The Lai Valley incident was provoked by scrutineers who felt they had been shamed by the Presiding Officer because he would not let them witness the voting. Fortunately after the incident where the patrol team was chased from Mararai village, the village court magistrate saved the day by taking the still locked ballot boxes and storing them until we could come and collect them. He also arrested two of the 32 offenders who attacked the patrol.

It was interesting to note that our recovery of these boxes and mediation with the people was done via Police Helicopter from Hagen at great expense. This could have been done by a vehicle patrol if NWA had not closed off the Lai Valley road for road works without any warning to anyone. In fact we could have retrieved the boxes by helicopter sooner if we had known NWA Mendi was closing roads. Perhaps for the next elections, we should insist NWA work within the requirement of the laws and gazette road closures and give us some idea of what they are doing.

Another sad incident is the untrue press report that one of our officers had been arrested and put in prison. I have previously requested some Electoral Commission action be taken against the person who actually furnished this report. The Returning Officer Imbong'gu has commented more fully on this incident.

Our policy for incidents where one of our officials was threatened was to change the patrol members to another area or use our emergency trained staff. Before we changed the staff from the teams, I went myself and talked with the Returning Officer and people where the incident occurred. Only the Lai Valley incident was actually serious; others were minor and trivial.

There were a few complaints about our electoral staff acting outside of their capacity or being dishonest. All of the allegations made were investigated and only one was found to be true. I'm still awaiting a report from the Returning Officer and legal advice to proceed against Mr A. Epi, Patrol Officer, for accepting votes from very young primary school children at Det and Poroma Schools. I feel that this officer risked the invalidation of his electorate result through his incompetence in his duties.

It was quite obvious that the use of ink was most useful; however it should be more carefully applied and checked to be dry prior to the voter leaving the compartment.

Also some research could be done to assist us to identify those who have scraped the ink off or in some way cancelled it.

Although our Police made many arrests for small offences we had no serious problems of law break down. There was no need for the patrols to have armed police escorting them, although the armed Riot Squad was quietly reassuring. The Southern Highlands people are growing to accept defeat in elections and to act through the correct legal channels to show any bad feeling they might have. Also the Public Service seems to have the respect and confidence of the people. Both of these two developments makes the work of electoral officers within the Province much easier.

Counting Centres

Although our counting centres managed to count their votes efficiently there could easily have been some improvement. The week prior to counting, while the polling was continuing, I visited each of the Returning Officers to make sure that his counting centre was ready. This was a worthwhile visit, but I should have checked that emergency lighting was available. Three of our counting centres, Ialibu Station, Ialibu High School and Kagua had power blackouts and Tari nearly had one. Koroba counted all night using kerosine lamps. We arranged three communication networks for each centre, Police Radio, NWA Overseer Car radio, and Posts and Telegraph. It was pleasing that Post and Telegraphs proved to be the most reliable medium for transferring information for the night. (This was a fluke.)

We had planned to have all the boxes numbered and divided into eight to ten counting tables per electorate. Where this was done counting was completed by 0200 a.m. Sunday morning. Each counting table requires only two or three counters. At the end of each table the

scrutineers may stand and witness the count. We allowed each candidate the scrutineers for about four tables.

As we placed both Provincial and Open ballot papers in each box, we could balance each box tally Open against Provincial. Sometimes there was some discrepancy as some people only voted for Provincial in some polling places. The procedure followed was to tip out the contents of the box on the table. This was done by the Returning Officer. Then the papers were sorted out into normal (common roll) and section '4' votes. The normal were sorted first for Open and Provincial and then placed in piles for each candidate. These piles were then counted into tens and stapled together. When the piles were ready scrutineers were asked to check the piles. The bundles were folded, similarly to money in a Cash Office. Once the scrutineers agreed to the count the papers were rubber banded together and placed back in the boxes. The record was recorded in duplicate. The section votes were then counted, recorded after the scrutineers agreed, and placed back in the box. The Returning Officer then came and checked that no papers were left out of the box. The duplicate of the box count was placed on top of the box and the original was taken and entered on the master tally sheet. Once this was done a new box was counted. Often the Returning Officer insisted a counting table take a coffee break between boxes. Tired people can't count. Some confusion was experienced by some Returning Officer, who tried to count the boxes in order. Following our general system the counts could all have been completed at 2 a.m. and any recounts could have been quickly and efficiently redone after a day's break. Our recounts were both very easy because of this system.

Sundries

The large ballot boxes were not a success for rural areas as they were too heavy to carry, not water proof, not strong and made so that they could not be adequately sealed - a screw driver could open any of the lids. Also they were more boring to count, a little too big.

Seals issued were found to be useless because they were too short.

We used Post Office Sealers and seals used for mailbags and replaced string with tie wire. These seals were strong, durable and cheaper than locks. Locks were generally only used for the outside of the boxes. Boxes were all sealed prior to patrol departure by the Returning Officers under scrutiny.

Ink for marking fingers should have been on hand one month prior to when it was.

Ballot papers were on hand in ample time. So were normal and supplementary rolls, as were most official forms. Some people complained about the lack of cardboard voting compartments; however, we also received complaints at Kagua when a Presiding officer fabricated one from a fish carton.

Suggestions for Future in Summary

1. We should go back to using the old ballot boxes that were made of fibreglass and were light, watertight and easy to seal.
2. Marking ink should be rechecked by the outward doorkeeper to make sure it is dry. This might require extra legislation that I believe was proposed.
3. More clear instructions should be given to control scrutineers within the polling booth: that they must not be ever closer than seven meters to the voting compartment. Our weaker Presiding Officers had some problems controlling their teams. The electoral handout on liabilities to scrutineers was most certainly very useful.
4. Bank tellers' rubber thumbs should be issued to people at each counting table.
5. Telephone should be installed in each district.

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7. Common rolls should be done away with in favour of the use of census books and village identificational tribunal. This would also mean voters could only vote at their own polling place.
8. A format should be circulated for disputed returns.
9. Funds control measures could be easily made nationally, if money was short, by only paying camping allowance and cutting out all other allowances plus weekend work. It would be relatively easy to only pay annual allowances and make this work a function of the various District Services Divisions of the Provinces. Even if allowances are paid they could be reduced. I myself along with all of our officers was very pleased to accept the extra money for electoral duty. However, if it looked like funds were going to place an obstacle in future elections I'm sure cuts could be made in this area.

We have previously sent you a copy of our proposed Southern Highlands Electoral Act Amendments. This Act is a draft of what we feel is a streamlined electoral system. We realise this act wouldn't be suitable for all Provinces, but it does suit us.

Political Observations

Dr J. Ballard from ANU accompanied me throughout the Province after the count. Although he was assisting the Province with some advice on the structure of Transport and Education, he was able to get statistics on box by box vote counts. He will be compiling this into a political paper

that will be made available to the Electoral Commission and for whoever is interested. His observations have been discussed with our field staff and will be of great interest for those interested in this aspect of the elections.

In general more money was spent for this election than for any other by the various candidates. Money was spent on vehicles, posters, gifts, parties, etc., this money being collected by varied and numerous means. At least one candidate has a warrant out for his arrest as a result of money used for electoral purposes.

It was obvious that Provincial, and, to a more limited extent, Local Government members took an active part in supporting the various candidates. Previously this role was carried out more by traditional headmen not holding government positions.

The political party system is now being used by local political factions to gain their own ends. Thus the party system is starting to strengthen even though the pressure to join is still based on land or pig problems.

Open candidates campaigned more openly than Provincial candidates; however that did not mean they campaigned more fiercely.

Various tactics were used, including Open and Provincial candidates assisting each other; people standing to cause the downfall of other candidates through breaking the vote; people being encouraged to withdraw from standing to assist each other, etc. In fact the tactics were so wide and varied it is obvious that the people are very highly politically motivated.

Conclusion

We have had several threats of disputed returns. So far I don't know if any have officially gone to the court; however, we are confident that we can survive the disputes that have come to hand so far. Our officers, particularly the Returning Officers, all worked well and as part of a team. We have a lot to be thankful for: yourself and your officers gave us whole hearted support. We hope we don't have to be working with you on by-elections in the coming months.

Yours truly

P.A. FEARMAN
Provincial Returning Officer

cc All Returning Officers - Southern Highlands Province
cc Secretary of the Southern Highlands Province

Appendix B

THE SOMARE CABINET OF AUGUST 1982

The full cabinet consisted of: Michael Somare (East Sepik) - Prime Minister; Paias Wingti (Western Highlands) - Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for National Planning and Development, and Minister for Primary Industry; Mathew Bendumb (Bulolo) - Transport and Civil Aviation; Rabbie Namaliu (Kokopo) - Foreign Affairs and Trade; John Nilkare (Chimbu) - Decentralization; Casper Angua (Bogia) - Labour and Employment; Barry Holloway (Eastern Highlands) - Education; Pato Kakarya (Wapenamanda) - Works and Supply; Pundia Kange* (Ialibu-Pangia) - Corrective Institutions and Liquor Licensing; Martin Tovadek* (Gazelle) - Health; Philip Bouraga (National Capital) - Finance; Bebes Korowaro (Goroka) - Lands; Lucas Waka (West New Britain) - Forests; John Giheno (Henganofi) - Police; Kala Swokin (Western) - Urban Development; Tony Bais (Wewak) - Justice; Epel Tito (Kavieng) - Defence; Boyamo Sali (Morobe) - Media; Roy Evara* (Kikori) - Home Affairs; Tom Awasa (Huon Gulf) - Religion, Youth and Recreation; Mackenzie Javopa (Sohe) - Culture and Tourism; Sir Pitias Lus (Maprik) - State (Parliamentary Services); Michael Pondros (Manus) - Public Utilities; Karl Stack (West Sepik) - Commerce and Industry; Halau Mai (Tari) - Environment and Conservation; Tony Siaguru (Moresby East) - State (Public Service); and Francis Didiman Pusal (Southern Highlands) - Minerals and Energy.

* United Party

Note: All non-asterisked ministers were endorsed Pangu candidates, except for Philip Bouraga (pro-Somare) and Tom Awasa (United Party turned pro-Pangu after the election).

Appendix C

THE ELECTION BY QUOTATION (gathered by the editor on the campaign trail)

Prophecy

'We [NP] will do exceptionally well in West Sepik' (Jeff Wall, Deputy PM's Staff+)

'Nobody is safe' (Jeff Wall)

The Business of Politics

'We must stop idle speculation on corruption' (Bill Rudd, Papua Action Party candidate for Moresby South)

'Business can be the name for development' (Fr John Momis)

'I'm really a businessman' (Ted Diro)

'I'm not going into government to make money' (Hugo Berghuser, independent candidate for Kairuku Hiri)

'It's no use being in Opposition' (Hugo Berghuser)

'Politics shouldn't have business'+ (Ken Tresize, PPP staff)

'Power - it's money' (Bernard Narokobi, MA candidate for East Sepik Provincial)

The Campaign Pitch

'I'm a big man - nobody will tell me what to do' (Hugo Berghuser)

'I'm a villager' (Hugo Berghuser)

'Hitler? Not a good man, not a bad man ...' (Hugo Berghuser+)

'We have not been greedy for power' (Roy Evara)

+ The National Party candidate in West Sepik lost heavily

+ i.e., political parties shouldn't have business arms

+ who explained to his village audience that Hitler was a land reformer who consolidated village plots

The Issues

'Issues in the Islands, personality in the Highlands...' (Pedi Anis, MA campaign director)

1) **West Papua:**

'They will never be Asians' (Iambakey Okuk)

'I'm very concerned about the West Irianese and about everyone on this earth' (Sir Julius Chan)

2) **Bureaucracy:**

'Some of our Department heads can't speak Standard English' (Ted Diro)

'The public service is training people it cannot employ and employing people it will not train' (Ted Diro)

3) **The Grumman Executive Jet**

'If you don't invest you don't get anywhere ... we have to be optimistic ... The US reached the moon and we buy tuna and worry about six million kina' (Sir Julius Chan)

4) **Foreign Investment**

'We are mortgaging everything we have to everybody If you don't think that's wrong there's something wrong with you' (Bernard Narokobi)

The Parties

'Papua Besena says we [Papua Action Party] are an offshoot of the National Party - we are not' (Bill Rudd)

'We started this PAP' (Iambakey Okuk)

'We've been a humble party' (Roy Evara)

'We are closely knit' (Ted Diro)

'Pangu is on the Left. The National Party is on the Right. The Independent Group is slightly left of Centre and ideologically closest to the United Party' (Ted Diro)

'Professor G.P. King is supporting the PNG Independent Group' (Candidate).

The Campaign Trail

'I travel without my wallet now' (Ted Diro)

On Coalition Formation

'I knew how to get him' (Roy Evara)

'There are one or two I won't go with, but I won't tell you now'
(Roy Evara)

The Other Candidates

'Kairuku Hiri needs a Papua New Guinean who won't sell the country for a couple of Filipino girls' (Hugo Berghuser)

'The others are rubbish candidates, they are all corrupt or have two wives' (Gina Kimi, IG candidate for Rigo Open)

Appendix D**1982 ELECTION SEMINAR: THE PARTICIPANTS**

The post-election seminar held in the University of Papua New Guinea Council Room on 7-8 November 1982 was attended by:

Peter King, David Hegarty, Richard Jackson, Nao Badu, Jim Griffin and Ngen Isana (University of Papua New Guinea); Marie Reay (Australian National University); Robin Osborne (Office of the Prime Minister); Pedi Anis and Patterson Lowa (Melanesian Alliance); Tony Siaguru, Barry Holloway, Gabriel Ramoi and Belden Sevua (Pangu Pati); Reuben Kaiulo and Morea Veri (Electoral Commission); Larry Benner (Ombudsman Commission); Paul Fearman (Southern Highlands Returning Officer); Michael Pope (Department of Transport); Prosey Mailau and Aruru Matiabe; Alfred Sasako (*Post-Courier*) and Sean Dorney (Australian Broadcasting Corporation).

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