THE PURPOSES AND COHERENCE OF UNIVERSITIES

KEVIN JAMES BATT

This work is a thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the Australian National University
1970
Every institution in society must serve society. Otherwise it will not last long. But the question is what is the special, peculiar, unique service a university can render? How many different kinds of service can a university render without ceasing to be one, or without becoming incapable of restating the special, peculiar, unique service it could offer? If a university is expected to meet every need, respond to every demand, and yield to every pressure, how does it avoid becoming totally other-directed? What then is its claim to that freedom traditionally called academic? If it may properly respond to some demands and reject others, what is the standard of acceptance or rejection it should apply? Obviously the ordinary test of action, the test of purpose, is meaningless if the university's purpose is to do whatever the society wants. We all have a vague feeling, even yet, that there are some things a university ought not to do and some things it cannot do without ceasing to be a university. A.H. Hutchinson, 'Reclotthe Us in Our Rightful Mind', Educational Record, Spring 1949.

This thesis is my own original work.

Kevin J. Batt

Kevin J. Batt
Every institution in society must serve society. Otherwise it will not last long. But the question is what is the special, peculiar, unique service a university can render? How many different kinds of service can a university render without ceasing to be one, or without becoming incapable of rendering the special, peculiar, unique service it could offer? If a university is expected to meet every need, respond to every demand, and yield to every pressure, how does it avoid becoming totally other directed? What then is its claim to that freedom traditionally called academic? If it may properly respond to some demands and reject others, what is the standard of acceptance or rejection it should apply? Obviously the ordinary test of action, the test of purpose, is meaningless if the university's purpose is to do whatever the society wants. We all have a vague feeling, even yet, that there are some things a university ought not to do and some things it cannot do without ceasing to be a university. R.M. Hutchins, 'Reclothe Us In Our Rightful Mind', Educational Record, Spring 1969.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Preface**

**Introduction**

**Chapter 1: The Purposes of Universities - A Confusion of Ideas**
- Introduction, 1; Purposes Ascribed to Universities Since the Early Nineteenth Century, 2; Issues of the Last Thirty Years, 33; Conclusion, 65.

**Chapter 2: The Role of the University in Three Patterns of Higher Education and Learning**
- Introduction, 72; Universities in the California Master Plan, 75; Universities in the United Kingdom, 80; Universities in Australia, 87; Conclusion, 97.

**Chapter 3: The Systematization of Higher Education and Learning**
- Introduction, 102; Concepts of Higher Education, 103; Systematizing Higher Education and Learning, 113; Academic Reactions, 127; Conclusion, 142.

**Chapter 4: The Centrality of the University in Higher Education and Learning**
- Introduction, 146; The Centrality of the University, 154; Conclusion, 168.

**Chapter 5: Liberal Education as a Purpose of the University**
- Introduction, 174; Interpretations and Justifications of Liberal Education, 178; The Placement of Liberal Education, 187.

**Chapter 6: Problems of Academic Responsibility**
- Introduction, 202; Recent Proposals on the Responsibilities of Universities and Academics, 207; Academic Responsibility, 218.

**Chapter 7: Institutional Coherence**
- Introduction, 226; Instruments and Principles of Coherence and Unity, 240; Conclusion, 253.

**Chapter 8: Ideas of the University**

**Conclusion**

**Appendix: Extracts From a Master Plan for Higher Education in California 1960-1975**

**Bibliography**
Today, it seems, everyone is ready to discuss the purposes of universities. My intentions, in this study, are to provide an account from the viewpoint of intellectual history of the purposes ascribed to universities during this and the previous century and to explore the implications and ramifications of these statements of purposes.

There is a vast literature on this subject. My discussion, therefore, concentrates on universities in the British Isles, the United States of America and Australia, and at times on California rather than the United States in general.

My account shows that a great range of purposes has been ascribed to universities in this period. It is suggested that there is a confusion of ideas on the purposes of universities and that no way presents itself as uniquely appropriate for establishing what are proper purposes for universities.

Official ascription of purposes to universities in three patterns of higher education and learning are shown to differ in scope but reflect similar attitudes. But even the most detailed ascription affords little positive direction. Nonetheless, many academics fear that the planning and systematization of higher education and learning threaten some of the traditional purposes of universities. I argue, however, that traditional purposes are not necessarily threatened, that planning and systematization can guard specified values, although academics would need to ensure that the necessary conditions are planned for and built into the systems. Academics may also need to point out that as
things are at present constituted the welfare of universities is central to the welfare of the systems, a fact which would seem to have implications for the financing of higher education and learning.

Closer consideration of liberal education as one purpose traditionally ascribed to universities confirms that there is uncertainty on how the purposes of universities should be ascertained. This is one of a number of reasons why there are difficulties involved in stating the responsibilities of universities and academics. Many and various factors make for incoherence in modern universities, and there are many proposals for achieving greater unity. But opinions differ on how coherent universities must be, and it is concluded that different degrees of coherence suit different university purposes.

Many pleas are being made for the diversification of higher education. I take the view that there are good reasons for conceiving of universities more broadly than is common at present. In the eighth chapter I urge that rather than seeking for a single principle common to all universities it makes good sense to consider universities as belonging to a family whose family characteristics - the various activities of learning which universities have shown themselves to perform well - are represented to different degrees in the members, some members properly engaging in many, some in a limited, number of these customary activities. However, I subscribe to the principle of gradual innovation, and my proposals are not meant to suggest that there should be a radical transformation of higher education and learning.
Unlike the biologist, the university administrator cannot eschew teleology; he must face squarely the fact that universities do not exist simply for their own sakes, as daffodils and sparrows and mice do: they have a purpose.

Eric Ashby, Technology and the Academics.

Richard Peters writes of "aims", "ideals", "intentions", and "purposes" as comprising a "comparatively uncharted region". I shall not attempt to draw an accurate contour map of "purposes", but some scrutiny of the terrain is necessary before beginning to explore "the purposes of universities".

The third simple sense of "purpose" given in the Oxford English Dictionary is: 'The object for which anything is done or made, or for which it exists; the result or effect intended or sought; end, aim.' And it is in these related ways that "purpose" is principally used in this thesis. Thus, we shall be concerned with the objects for which universities exist, the results which it is intended they should achieve, the ends which they serve, and the direction in which they are aimed.

The primary source material of this thesis is substantially drawn from the statements of individual people. We are not, however, concerned so much with the purposes of

3 The 1933 edition of the Oxford English Dictionary is used throughout this thesis.
individuals but with the purposes which individuals ascribe to universities as institutions. "Purposes" here is related more closely to the function of institutions than to the intention of people, even though universities as institutions operate through the action of individuals. But "function" too is capable of diverse usage. I use the word here not in the sense of the end actually brought about by an institution within a wider social system, but to indicate an end which the institution ought to bring about. Sometimes writers speak of the "essential" or "vital" functions of universities, meaning functions which universities must perform if they are to warrant the title "university"; such statements I take to be about "the purposes of universities" as I am using that expression.

It may be thought naive to concentrate attention on "the purposes of universities" in this sense of the ends which universities ought to bring about, especially in view of the precision of techniques for establishing what social systems such as universities actually do bring about, and I would agree that it is not yet clear what part "purpose" plays in organizational structure and social processes.

2 There are two levels of difficulty here concerning "purposes". Cf.: 'The interrelationship between purpose and organizational structure has not been easy to define. That there is a vital connection seems apparent. How one influences the other has not been carefully explored. Here it seems to me is one of the important gaps in our organizational theory.' J.D. Millett, The Academic Community, New York: McGraw-Hill 1962, p. 14. There is also the philosophical problem of how men can be influenced or controlled by such things as aims and purposes. See K.R. Popper, Of Clouds and Clocks, St. Louis, Missouri: Washington University 1966, p. 14f.
But there is much to be said in defence of the consideration of "purposes". The objectives or purposes of universities are sometimes formally laid down in university acts and regulations and handbooks and other literature, and it would be absurd to suggest that individuals do not attempt to direct the institutions of which they are members towards these ends. Sometimes the purposes of universities are nowhere formally set down, and this is especially so in the case of ancient foundations. Oxford, Paris and Bologna were originally customary societies rather than legal corporations — they were not made but grew. In such cases there may be only a general notion of what the purposes of the institution have come to be down through its history. But whether ideas of the purposes of universities have been formulated or exist only in general notions of what it is proper for such an institution to do, it is useful to compare them with what it can be shown that universities actually do. Functional analysis alone (in the sense of function of what the institution actually accomplishes) cannot evaluate the performance of an institution, but its results must be compared with and measured against institutional objectives. And the planning and systematization of higher education and learning and increasingly refined methods of systems analysis require precise statements of objectives, even if in institutional terms the objective is an open one such as free and independent learning.

The present state of higher education also provides

good reason to scrutinize the purposes of universities. Not only are "the traditional purposes of universities" being questioned, but new institutions of higher education and research are being established with specific purposes - and the problem arises of their relationship to universities and whether in fact they themselves should be regarded as universities. Then in a number of countries, governments are moving towards the position of formulating the role which they require universities to perform within their systems of higher education and learning.

Moreover, throughout the world, students are demanding stridently to be informed on the purposes of universities. Uncertainty of the role of the university was given by the fact-finding commission as one of the causes of unrest among students leading to the disturbances at Columbia University during April and May 1968. Thus it has become widely urged that a university must make a clear and simple statement of its purposes in language that everyone can understand. But the call for a re-statement of the purposes of the university is not only a contemporary phenomenon.

The need was seen in the 'thirties by Ortega y Gasset who attempted a general re-formulation in his Mission of the University. And one persistent stream of thought in the

3 Originally, lectures delivered and published in 1930. Translated into English and published at Princeton as The Mission of the University by Princeton University Press in 1944.
discussions on universities in the post-war world has been that the proper purposes of the university can be re-discovered and that their re-formulation represents the first step in university reform. 'How can the university be the university?' is stated as a fundamental question in one of the most important books on the post-war university.¹

My intention in this thesis is to clarify personal and official statements which ascribe purposes to universities and to indicate some of the ramifications and implications of these views. Unlike Gross and Grambsch, I am not attempting an empirical study of what university administrators hold the goals of the university to be.² My thesis is an exercise in intellectual history, presenting - as it were - to policy-makers important movements in the history of thought on the purposes of universities and dependent issues.³ My period extends from the end of the eighteenth century to the present and beyond as I consider accounts of what universities should do in the future. The greatest concentration will be on the last thirty years. And my attention will be concentrated on statements relating to universities in Australia, the British Isles and the United States of America. In some chapters my attention will be focussed on public universities in those countries.

Sociologists sometimes categorize objectives into high level stated goals - objectives which may perhaps be

1 Sir Walter Moberly, The Crisis in the University, p. 106.
3 These movements in thought would need to be considered carefully by experts in philosophy, sociology, economics, etc., before the policy-makers were really well-informed.
described as ideals - and operational goals to which particular activities are directed. While objectives in both of these categories answer what ends universities ought to bring about and may be said to be purposes of universities, my emphasis will be on the former, although specific operational objectives will sometimes be considered.

Finally, in this introduction, something needs to be said on terminology and usage. At times "university" will be used for an entity with more or less global characteristics. This is not in ignorance of national and regional differences. The editors of the *Year Book of Education 1959* on 'Higher Education' found that they were unable to provide an international definition of "university" and elected to provide a comparative account of institutions of higher learning in different countries using the definitions provided in those countries.¹ As will emerge in my second chapter, however, in the limited number of societies which we are considering in detail, official views of the role of universities are rather similar. But apart from regional and national differences, "university" can be used in at least three ways - as has been pointed out by Kenneth Keniston.² Like "higher education", it can be used for a social institution like the family, the law and industry; it can be used for the university community of students and staff; and to designate a specific institution.

It is appropriate to speak of purposes in each of these senses of "university" but where a particular use is important it will be indicated. Where the word represents a specific institution, it will be written "University" as it would be normally in the full title of that institution.

I have attempted to use the nouns "academic", "student" and "scholar" consistently throughout the thesis. By an "academic" I mean a member of the teaching or research staff of a university and those university administrators who were formerly members of the academic staff of a university.

While I agree that in a sense all members of a university should be regarded as students,¹ I use "student" to mean a junior member of a university or a graduate working towards another or higher degree. My "scholar" may refer either to an academic or to a student, and in the plural very often includes both academics and students.

One expression which I have used frequently is "higher education and learning". Different meanings that have been given to "higher education" are discussed below.² My purpose in coupling "learning" with "higher education" is specifically to include research which may not easily be included within "higher education". In Australia, for example, the research work of the C.S.I.R.O. must often be considered together with the work of universities and other institutions of higher education, but it would be misleading simply to include such work in the category of "higher education".

One word must be said about the use of quotation marks. Single quotation marks are used for titles and to designate

² See below, p. 103 f.
accurate quotations. Double quotation marks are used as cautionary marks and to indicate words and phrases taken from other sources but for which it does not appear necessary to reproduce carefully the original contextual form.


Introduction

1.1 This chapter is intended to illustrate the confusing multiplicity of ideas which exists on the purposes of universities. To do this I want first to give a historical account of the purposes assigned to universities. But there is a vast literature in which purposes are ascribed to universities, and any account of them must be selective within the material available. I have limited my account in this chapter to the most significant views of scholars and administrators relating to universities in Australia, the British Isles and the United States of America since the early nineteenth century, with greatest concentration on the issues of the last thirty years.

1.2 Obviously, the issues of the last thirty years must be considered; but let me say at once why I propose to consider at some length views expressed in the nineteenth century. In my experience it appears easier to observe from a distance the ways in which conceptions of institutions change and how concepts are communicated over time and space. And it was in the nineteenth century that certain important patterns of thought were established which persist in the
CHAPTER ONE

THE PURPOSES OF UNIVERSITIES - A CONFUSION OF IDEAS

When we turn to the primary questions, concerning the things that really make or mar a university, and ask - 'What are universities for? What effect should they have on their alumni? What are their responsibilities to the outside world?', we are asking questions to which a minority of university teachers return discordant answers and the majority return no clear answers at all.

Sir Walter Moberly, The Crisis in the University.

Introduction

I:1 This chapter is intended to illustrate the confusing multiplicity of ideas which exists on the purposes of universities. To do this I want first to give an historical account of the purposes assigned to universities. But there is a vast literature in which purposes are ascribed to universities, and any account of them must be selective within the material available. I have limited my account in this chapter to the most significant views of scholars and administrators relating to universities in Australia, the British Isles and the United States of America since the early nineteenth century, with greatest concentration on the issues of the last thirty years.

I:2 Obviously, the issues of the last thirty years must be considered; but let me say at once why I propose to consider at some length views expressed in the nineteenth century. In my experience it appears easier to observe from a distance the ways in which conceptions of institutions change and how concepts are communicated over time and space. And it was in the nineteenth century that certain important patterns of thought were established which persist in the

minds of individuals and which are still embodied in institutional structures. Not only are the views of some of the giants of the nineteenth century still quoted, but in recommendations that universities should revert to their state in an earlier age the early nineteenth century is sometimes referred to with approval. A substantial part, therefore, of this chapter is given to the consideration of nineteenth century views.

I:3 In the second section of the chapter I have tried to identify the biggest issues of the last thirty years on the purposes proper to universities. The final section represents an attempt to establish that a confusion of ideas on the purposes of universities exists, at least to the extent that anyone looking into the history of universities would discover a confusion of ideas and no sure way to ascertain what would count as the criteria of a proper purpose of universities and that in any university there would be likely to exist simultaneously a variety of ideas on the purposes proper to universities.

Purposes Ascribed to Universities Since the Early Nineteenth Century

I:4 At no time since the end of the eighteenth century has there been a global or even national consensus on the purposes of universities. This can be illustrated from early in our period by the dispute on the state of the University of Oxford between the Scottish reviewers and Edward Copleston, then fellow of Oriel College. Scottish universities were traditionally democratic institutions taking students from all social groups and they afforded an education which while
not strictly utilitarian was more general and philosophical than that given by the ancient English Universities of Oxford and Cambridge.¹ The reviewers asserted that Oxford was not justifying itself as a national institution, that it was religiously exclusive and educationally inefficient - its studies resulting in no useful knowledge.² Copleston replied that the University should not be regarded as a national institution, that it was proper to assert the higher importance of the individual over the national welfare. And he argued that traditional studies were useful, although of a higher type of utility, affording an all-round competence for any profession and the business of life and in cultivating the nobler aspects of personality.³

At this time there were no universities in the Australian colonies. In America, a multiplication of views of the purposes of universities had begun long before the start of our period.⁴ Harvard had been established in 1636

² Edinburgh Review, 14:28, Article 10, July 1809; 15:29 Article 3, October 1809; 16:31, Article 1, April 1810.
⁴ I acknowledge that it is often urged that it is more correct to speak of Harvard and the Philadelphia institutions in their early years as colleges rather than as universities. But they were officially designated as Harvard University and the University of Pennsylvania in 1780 and 1779 respectively without there being any fundamental alteration of their original purposes. See G.W. Pierson, 'American Universities in the Nineteenth Century: the Formative Period' in M. Clapp (ed.), The Modern University, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1950, p. 61.
more or less on the traditional pattern of a college of one of the ancient English Universities for the purpose of affording a general literary education for the colonial clergy. Influence emanating from the Scottish universities had affected the form of William and Mary College in its internal arrangements and the creation of a governing body on which members of the non-academic community were represented. But the really radical view of the purposes of a university was expressed in the foundation in 1755 of the College, Academy and Charity School of Philadelphia which was later to develop into the University of Pennsylvania. Under the influence of Benjamin Franklin this institution served no religious purpose, and useful studies which were designed to fit students for a range of occupations were provided along with those studies which were


2 Cf. the statement of purposes from New England's First Fruits: 'After God had carried us safe to New England, and wee had builted our houses, provided necessaries for our livelihood, rear'd convenient places for God's worship, and settled the Civill Government: One of the next things we longed for, and looked after was to advance learning and perpetuate it to posterity; dreading to leave an illiterate Ministry to the Churches, when our present Ministers shall lie in the Dust.' Cited by S.E. Morison, The Founding of Harvard College, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1935, p. 160. And the first printed set of rules of Harvard stated that the institution's chief aim was that 'Every one shall consider the Mayne End of his life and studyes, to know God and Jesus Christ, which is Eternall life.' Cited in Brubacher and Rudy, op. cit., p. 8. But perhaps the original purposes of Harvard were more complex: Nathan Pusey cites an historical account which proposes that the founders wanted to establish the university to be a third force beside church and state. See The Age of the Scholar, New York: Harper and Row, 1964, p. 44.

3 Brubacher and Rudy, op. cit., p. 5.
more "ornamental".1 Thus at the start of our period different conceptions of the purposes of a university were extant in America as well as in the British Isles.

I:6 A foreign observer characterized the aim of Oxford and Cambridge early in the nineteenth century to be the same for all their students: '... not to form Divines, Jurists, Physicians, Chemists, Mechanics, Political Economists: but to form GENTLEMEN, and next, SCHOOLMASTERS who may educate the rising generation of Gentlemen.'2 At best, traditional classical studies, with the addition of mathematics in the case of Cambridge, were employed to discipline the intellect of students and enrich their minds by making them familiar with their Graeco-Roman-Hebrew-Christian heritage and thus to fit them for a more or less public life in the church, society and the state. Little attention was given to training for strictly professional competence. Copleston accepted that professional and miscellaneous knowledge had a rightful place in the University, but he felt that they should be very much subordinated to liberal education. Liberal education afforded a general competence in any profession, and there was plenty of time in later life to study informative subjects.3 On this Sir William Hamilton was quite specific:

The Idea of a University is two-fold: it is first what its name imports, a school of liberal and general knowledge, and secondly a collection of special schools devoted to the learned professions. Of these, the former is the University, properly so called; the second is complementary and ministerial. ¹

But there was nowhere formally laid down what the purposes of the Universities should be. ²

I:7 In the absence of any official formulation, many people have regarded statements in Newman's Dublin lectures as the best - if idealized - account of the purposes generally ascribed to the ancient English Universities in the early nineteenth century. For Newman the university was essentially a place of teaching, and not of teaching professional skills but "universal knowledge". 'This implies' he wrote in the preface to The Idea of a University that its object is, on the one hand, intellectual, not moral; and, on the other, that it is the diffusion and extension of knowledge rather than the advancement. If its object were scientific and philosophical discovery, I do not see why a University should have students; if religious training, I do not see how it can be the seat of literature and science. ³

On historical and psychological grounds he asserted that the distinction between academies and universities should be preserved. To discover and to teach he considered not only distinct functions but distinct gifts and seldom found in the one person. And with few exceptions, he continued, history

---


² Cf. 'So far as Oxford and Cambridge were dedicated to anything, it was to the perpetuation of themselves and of the type of graduate formed by their peculiar social environment - though this was simply what they in fact did rather than a consciously formulated aim.' C.C. Gillispie, 'English Ideas of the University in the Nineteenth Century' in M. Clapp (ed.), op. cit., p. 29.

showed that the greatest thinkers have avoided interruption, being "men of absent minds and idiosyncratic habits", shunning the lecture room and public school.¹

Thus confirming that a university (and not a particular university) should be a place of education, he emphasized that the education should not be in professional knowledge but in "liberal" or "philosophical" knowledge. If asked further what should be the end of a university education and that liberal or philosophical knowledge, he said that he would answer:

... it has a very tangible, real, and sufficient end, though the end cannot be divided from that knowledge itself. Knowledge is capable of being its own end. Such is the constitution of the human mind, that any knowledge, if it really be such, is its own reward. And if this is true of all knowledge, it is true also of that special Philosophy, which I have made to consist in a comprehensive view of truth in all its branches, of the relations of science to science, of their mutual bearings, and their respective values.²

Such a view, he contended, was not paradoxical, but '... both intelligible in itself, and has ever been the common judgment of philosophers and the ordinary feelings of mankind.'³ I cannot comment on Newman's reading of history and philosophy, but his view contrasts sharply with the insistence of the modern age that knowledge be pre-eminently useful. But in saying that knowledge is its own end, Newman did not want to deny that this "gentleman's knowledge" ⁴

¹ Ibid., pp. xxx-xxxi.
² Ibid., p. 91.
³ Ibid., p. 92.
⁴ Ibid., p. 98.
impacted useful by-products. If this philosophical or liberal education ('... which is the proper function of a University ...') were not directed towards professional interests, it merely postponed these while it accomplished "the formation of the citizen." And if he were required to assign a practical end to a university course he would say that it was '... that of training good members of society.'

... a University training [he concluded] is the great ordinary means to a great but ordinary end; it aims at raising the intellectual tone of society, at cultivating the public mind, at purifying the national taste, at supplying true principles to popular enthusiasm and fixed aims to popular aspiration, at giving enlargement and sobriety to the ideas of the age, at facilitating the exercise of political power, and refining the intercourse of private life.

How typical Newman's view was of early nineteenth century conceptions of the purposes of universities need not be determined here. But it is certain that in practice many English academics thought of the Universities as properly serving a social rather than strictly intellectual purpose. This can be illustrated by reference to the views of Edward Pusey. Pusey saw the object of universities as being to '... discipline and train the whole moral and intelligent being.' But this did not mean for him that a university should stretch the student to the limit of his capacity. The type of English intellectual character, he observed, was '... sound, solid, steady, thoughtful, well-disciplined judgement.' This meant for him that 'It

1 Ibid., p. 148.
2 Ibid., p. 156.
3 Ibid., p. 157.
wanted it to operate at a higher intellectual level than any of the American colleges of the time. His idea of the purposes of the University were set out in a letter to Joseph C. Cabell:

To form the statesmen, legislators and judges, on whom public prosperity and individual happiness are so much to depend;

To expound the principles and structure of government, the laws which regulate the intercourse of nations, those formed municipally for our own government, and a sound spirit of legislation, which banishing all arbitrary and unnecessary restraint on individual action, shall leave us free to do whatever does not violate the equal rights of another;

To harmonize and promote the interests of agriculture, manufactures and commerce, and by well informed views of political economy to give a free scope to the public industry;

To develop the reasoning faculties of our youth, enlarge their minds, cultivate their morals, and instil into them the precepts of virtue and order;

To enlighten them with mathematical and physical sciences, which advance the arts, and administer to the health, the subsistence, and comforts of human life;

And, generally, to form them to habits of reflection and correct action, rendering them examples of virtue to others, and of happiness within themselves.

This account of the purposes of a university is important in the history of universities and higher education. Not only does it record the intention that a particular university should serve ends which previously had been considered improper for universities, but in depicting the university as a multi-functional institution it was prophetic of what universities were to become. It represents a very different conception of what a university should do from those which are revealed in the functioning of Harvard, Oxford and Cambridge at this time.

1 Brubacher and Rudy, op. cit., p. 148.
In England, the foundation of London University in 1826 was not accompanied by any authoritative statement of the ends it was meant to achieve. The founders referred only to its secular nature which would permit dissenters to obtain a university education and to its cheapness designed to attract the commercial classes of the metropolis. But from its original structure it can be seen that it was neither intended to be an ancient university-type institution for dissenters nor an institution affording only a strictly utilitarian type education for those who were engaged in the business of the city. The original course in Arts remained based on the classical languages and mathematics, but there was a wide range of additional subjects which suggests that the founders considered that a university graduate should have a knowledge of modern languages and literature (including English), philosophy, science and the studies of society. Apart from the Arts course there were courses in professional studies, the institution's emphasis being placed on legal and medical education. Two other innovations, its secular nature and non-residential character, indicate how great a change London University represented from the traditional purposes of universities as seen in the structure of Oxford and Cambridge. It was significant of the emphasis commonly

placed on the religious purpose of the ancient universities that it was the new institution's secular nature which drew the greatest contemporary criticism.

1.13 London University did not gain a charter, nor did the Anglican King's College which had been founded in the hope of frustrating "the godless institution in Gower Street". But in 1836 a charter incorporating the two institutions was sealed; London University became University College, and the new University of London was empowered to grant degrees to candidates nominated by the colleges and who satisfied the examiners. In a sense, the idea of a university with only examining and degree-granting functions for candidates from affiliated colleges was not greatly removed from the role that the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge were then playing within the total activities of those Universities and their constituent colleges. The same principle was followed by the government in the establishment in 1845 of three colleges of university status in Ireland and the incorporation of the Queen's University of Ireland in 1850 as their examining body. But London and the Queen's University examined only candidates from their affiliated colleges, and although certification was undoubtedly an important purpose of the Universities it was not implied that the purpose of a university education was simply the attainment of a qualification. As in the Ancient English Universities and in Trinity College Dublin, it was

still assumed that within their colleges undergraduates would take on a way of life. In 1858, however, non-collegiate students were permitted to sit for the examinations of the University of London and if successful take their degree. This move represented, in the words of H.C. Dent, a 'breathtaking contraction of the meaning of the term "university"; it is indicative not only of the increased emphasis which some people must have been placing on certification as a purpose of a university but of the equation of a university education with the absorption of examinable book-learning.

I:14 To return briefly to the first half of the nineteenth century: those fifty years saw the rise and triumph in England of the idea that universities are national institutions. With reference to Oxford, this proposition had been put forward by the Scottish reviewers and rejected by Edward Copleston. The debate arose over whether the state should step in and reform Oxford and Cambridge. James Heywood, the great advocate in parliament of university reform by the state, had W.C. Perry write an account of German University Education which stressed the role of the state in the reform of universities in the German states. The principle of state intervention

2 See above p. 3 and cf. 'The University of Oxford is not a National Institution. It is a congeries of foundations, originating some in royal munificence, but more in private piety and bounty.' E. Copleston, op. cit., p. 183.
3 W.C. Perry, German University Education; or, the Professors and Students of Germany, London: 1845.
had already been admitted as regards the Scottish universities, a Royal Commission having inquired into them over the period 1826-1831.\(^1\) But south of the border the Scottish universities were not considered venerable institutions like Oxford and Cambridge. And in spite of an increasing insistence in the literature that Oxford and Cambridge must be considered national institutions, parliament waited on the Universities to reform themselves. It was not until August 1850 that the Royal Commissions were finally issued for inquiries into the state of Oxford, Cambridge and Trinity College Dublin. In their reports, however, the Royal Commissioners showed that they had no doubts that these ancient foundations had become national institutions. The Oxford report was based on its first section, 'The University a National Institution', and its main assumption was that:

*Such an Institution cannot be regarded as a mere aggregation of private interests; it is eminently national. It would seem, therefore, to be a matter of public policy that inquiry should be made, from time to time, in order to ascertain whether the purposes of its existence are fulfilled; and that*

\(^1\) 'Report Made to His Majesty by a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the State of the Universities of Scotland', Reports from Commissioners, 1831, Volume 22.

\(^2\) Cf. 'We cannot close this article, without, in a few words, urging the absolute necessity of a systematic Government control of the Universities ... The state pays them, charters them, and gives them an honourable standing, but makes no inquiry what they are about ... the nation ought to know how its money is used and whether the pretensions on which it is received are answered by the corresponding deeds ...' B.A.,' Of a Liberal Education in General and with Particular Reference to the Leading Studies of the University of Cambridge, London: 1848, p. 23.
such measures should be taken as may serve to raise its efficiency to the highest point, and to diffuse its benefits most widely.¹

And the Cambridge Royal Commissioners were of similar mind:

The University is a great National institution, invested with important privileges by the favour of the Crown on the authority of the Legislature... But the practice of exercising this high prerogative fully and completely must depend on its keeping pace with the progress of enlightened opinion and moving in sympathy and unison with the spirit of the age.²

I:15 The idea that universities should adapt themselves to the needs of succeeding ages had not been generally admitted at the start of our period but had become more generally accepted contemporaneously with the development of the idea that universities are more national than private concerns.³ In the early nineteenth century Oxford and Cambridge looked almost exclusively to the past, and then the distant classical past, for the literature of university learning. In 1818 James Mill blamed clerical domination for the Universities' inability to progress.⁴

But I think it can also be argued that a classical education gained in an appropriate social environment still appeared

1 'Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the State, Discipline, Studies, and Revenues of the University and Colleges of Oxford', Reports from Commissioners, 1852, Volume 22, p. 3.
2 'Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the State, Discipline, Studies and Revenues of the University and Colleges of Cambridge', Reports from Commissioners, 1852-1853, Volume 44, p. 44.
3 Cf a view of 1832: 'Founded for national objects, and invested with a character of accommodation to the wants of former times, they ought, by every rule and principle of justice to receive an adaptation to the wants of successive generations as they arise, with the change of times and circumstances.' Anon., 'Physical Studies in Oxford', Quarterly Journal of Education, 8:15, 1832, p. 63.
to the social classes who were able to obtain it to meet their needs, and that this was a cogent reason for the conservatism of the Universities. The real problem was that the needs of the upper classes were not co-extensive with the needs of the nation; in addition to a traditional education for the upper classes, the nation now required modern knowledge and skills to be more generally diffused in society. With the recognition of the need, people began to argue that universities should be agents in the diffusion of modern knowledge and skills. Thus in 1826 a Scottish reviewer asserted that as changes occurred in the state of knowledge so the instruction in the universities should change. 'We abhor intellectual perpetuities...', he concluded, and suggested that one day it might be the case that the Burmese language would contain the most valuable writings.  

Scottish universities had kept in touch with university developments on the Continent and generally were vitally interested in comparatively recent philosophy.  

London University, too, set out to offer undergraduate courses whose content was more obviously relevant to the age. Increasingly, the literature demanding reform of Oxford and Cambridge pointed to the new purposes assigned to universities on the Continent and particularly in the German States. It was in this manner that the idea was

---


2 Eric Ashby says that Scottish universities were able to keep in touch with Continental developments because unlike Oxford and Cambridge they were open to dissenters. Technology and the Academics, op. cit., p. 15.
advanced that universities should be concerned with increasing knowledge as well as with handing on a store of knowledge that had been inherited. Thus "A Graduate of Cambridge" wrote in 1836 that universities had three purposes: to be seminaries of education for the nobility and gentry; to be nurseries for the established church and the learned professions; and '... as schools for the advancement and development of science, and the deeper researches of literature.'\(^1\) It was this additional purpose of the advancement of knowledge which Newman was to reject categorically in his Dublin lectures.

1:16 In America ideas on the purposes of universities continued to multiply throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. Similar ideas to those which underlay the original structure of the University of Virginia were spread in New England by Jefferson's friend George Ticknor. After a period of study in Europe he returned to Harvard and succeeded in 1825 in getting the University to give greater attention to modern languages and science.\(^2\) A more radical suggestion came in 1850 from Francis Wayland, president of Brown University. A committee of which he was chairman proposed to the Corporation of the University that Brown's curriculum of studies be enlarged so that '... in so far as

---

2 R. Hofstadter and C. DeWitt Hardy, *The Development and Scope of Higher Education in the United States*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1952, p. 23. Cf. the Yale Report of 1828, which claimed that it was misleading to compare German universities with American colleges as the former had greater financial resources and catered for a more mature, better prepared student body. Brubacher and Rudy, *op. cit.*, p. 102f.
it is practicable, every student might study what he chose, all that he chose, and nothing but what he chose.' It was proposed that the University offer traditional subjects, modern languages and sciences including sciences of society, and such professional or rather vocational subjects as:

"the Science of Teaching", "the Principles of Agriculture",
"the Application of Chemistry to the Arts" and "the Application of Science to the Arts". 'The object of the change' Wayland reported,

would be to adapt the institution to the wants, not of a class, but of the whole community. It by no means is to be taken for granted, in a country like our own, that every college is to teach the same studies, and to the same extent. It would be far better that each should consult the wants of its own locality, and do that best, for which it possessed the greatest facilities. Here would arise opportunity for diversified forms of excellence; the knowledge most wanted would receive an important impulse from every institution of learning in our land.4

Here Wayland's report might almost be taken for one of the twentieth century pleas for the diversification of institutions of higher education, but the changes which were made at Brown were not generally taken up by other institutions.

I:17 In 1851, however, Henry P. Tappan, who was to become president of the University of Michigan in 1852, advanced on Wayland's ideas in a book entitled University Education.2


Principally, Tappan wanted to see the development in America of universities which, being established on the model of German universities and working at a higher level than other American institutions, would form the apexes of state systems of education. 'By the Universities [he wrote] we mean'

Cyclopædias of education: where in libraries, cabinets, apparatus, and professors, provision is made for studying every branch of knowledge in full, for carrying forward all scientific investigation; where study may be extended without limit, where the mind may be cultivated according to its wants, and where, in the lofty enthusiasm of growing knowledge and ripening scholarship, the bauble of an academical diploma is forgotten.1

Tappan noted the changes proposed by the Corporation of Brown University and observed that some of them had '... very much the air of a University.' But he observed further that as the Corporation intended only to modify, not dissolve, the collegial nature of their institution, '... we do not discern the legitimate idea of a University.' And, in fact, he considered that no true university then existed in America.2 Brown, he thought, was about to attempt in the one institution three different grades of education - those appropriate to a university, a college, and schools of commerce, manufacturing and agriculture.3 In the university he proposed there would be four faculties, of philosophy and science; letters and arts; law; and medicine. Students would normally be graduates from existing colleges. Degrees would be awarded in two grades, the lower after three or four years study, the higher to mark "a high and honourable advance" in medicine, philosophy, science, letters or art.4

1 Ibid., p. 493.
2 Ibid., pp. 494-495.
3 Ibid., pp. 496-497.
4 Ibid., p. 505.
Thus, by early in the second half of the nineteenth century, German and other radical ideas of the purposes of universities were well-represented in the American literature on universities and were beginning to be reflected in the form of some university institutions.

1:18 The first universities in the Australian colonies were founded in the 'fifties, Sydney in 1850 and Melbourne in 1852. David Macmillan found no evidence of either the founders or the first professors of the University of Sydney referring to German universities of the time. In the case of Melbourne, the only direct reference to German ideas or practice which I have noted was Governor Hotham's remark at the laying of the foundation stone in 1854 that he hoped the new University would incline to the German pattern of modern languages and science rather than classical studies. It seems that there was no question that the Universities were for teaching, but there was much dispute on what should be taught. As was to be expected, some spokesmen simply voiced the traditional opinions which they had formed at Oxford and Cambridge early in the century. But the Universities were

1 D.S. Macmillan, 'The University of Sydney - the Pattern and the Public Reaction, 1850-1870', The Australian University, 1:1, July 1963, p. 35. There was however, some reference to German university practice in the press. E.g., 'Mental Philosophy for General Education', The Empire, 30 April 1855.
2 The Argus, 4 July 1854.
3 Although it was believed for some time that Sydney University should only examine and award degrees, affiliated colleges doing the teaching. When the colleges did not materialize the University opened as a teaching institution as well. J.M. Ward, 'Foundation of the University of Sydney', Journal and Proceedings of the Royal Australian Historical Society, 37: Part 5, 1951, pp. 303-304.
established as state and secular institutions in which a limited number of modern studies were offered in the single faculties of Arts in addition to the traditional studies of classics and mathematics. It seems, therefore, that the founders looked most closely for models to the University of London and the reformed Oxford and Cambridge. As J.J. Auchmuty points out, there was surprisingly little indication of Scottish influence in the foundations, but in the colonial press many references were made to Scottish principles of university education to suggest limitations in the antipodean institutions. References were also made in the press to the views on university education of men like William Whewell, Sir John Herschel, Thomas Arnold and Sir James Stephen. And the professors of the infant Universities were likely to quote the views of Sir William Hamilton, or to refer to the innovations at the University of Virginia and Brown University or the Report of the Royal Commission on Oxford University, to support their own views on what the Universities should do, what ends they should serve.

A number of issues can be seen in an interesting light in the colonial situation. As in England over London University, there was debate in the press on the secular nature of the Universities. For example, the Anglican Bishop of Newcastle proposed in one newspaper that degrees should be awarded by Sydney University only after an affiliated denominational college had certified

that the candidate had attended and received religious
instruction, thus taking the view usual in Oxford and
Cambridge early in the century that religious training
was an essential part of a university education.¹ To this
a leader-writer in a rival paper replied, 'It is not the
province of a University to impart a religious character
...² The official attitude of the University on this
matter is significant of the fact that institutions must
adapt themselves to the conditions in their supporting
society; it was not that the University was secular on any
academic ground, but simply that with the admixture of
sects in the Colony no other solution was practicable for
an institution established and maintained from public
funds.³ Sydney's professor of classics, the Reverend John
Woolley, justified the University's position in part by
reference to other universities which had given up religious
tests and training.⁴

The extent to which the Universities should be
adapted to the needs of the age and more particularly the
needs of the colonial situation was probably the issue
given most attention in the early years of the Universities.
Without any well-defined upper and leisured class in the
colonies, it had always been intended that the Universities
should prepare men for service to the state and in the

¹ Sydney Morning Herald, 8 November 1852.
² Empire, 10 November 1852.
³ Calendar of the University of Sydney 1852-1853, pp.
   33-34.
⁴ J. Woolley, Lectures Delivered in Australia, Cambridge
professions rather than be enclaves of quasi-aristocratic leisure and privilege. Even so, the Universities were much criticized for upholding the standards and values of the old world and neglecting the demands of the new. In 1859 the provost of the languishing Sydney University summed up what he saw as the fundamental problem of his institution:

There is every desire on the part of the Senate to render the Institution one of good practical benefit to the community, whilst there is an equal determination to maintain the high standard of learning required by its statutes for the attainment of honours and degrees.

Out of this dilemma of the colonial Universities one proposal merits particular mention, because while it was not an original idea its adoption in a British university would have represented a radical innovation. In a pamphlet of 1855, the professors of Melbourne University suggested that classical studies should not be compulsory for the degree as retention of the classical requirements would soon result in there being few applicants for higher

1 E.g., Redmond Barry, who was instrumental in the founding of the University of Melbourne spoke at its opening of the University producing '... accomplished scholars, honourable practitioners in the learned professions, respected magistrates, able leaders in the Senate, enlightened legislators and trustworthy guides in the councils of the country.' Proceedings on the Occasion of the Inauguration of the University of Melbourne, Melbourne: 1855, p. 22.


3 'Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Select Committee on the Sydney University', New South Wales, Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly 1859, Question 101.
education. Reference was made to the programmes of the University of Virginia and Brown University as precedents. And, importantly, they showed that their aim was to produce an educated man of the standard of the older English Universities, the replacement of classical studies by the natural and social sciences ensuring that the educated man would still be produced.1

I.21 In the tension created by the apparent conflict of traditional university studies and values with the demands of the colonial situation, it was still generally accepted that a university education should result in character formation, including moral uplift. Thus the parliamentary committee on the University of Melbourne reported in 1853 that it hoped that:

"...the institution of a University for the education of her youth, will, under Divine Providence, go far to redeem their adopted country from the social and moral evils with which she is threatened; to improve the character of her people; to raise her in the respect and admiration of civilized nations."

And in the letter sent to England in 1854 to the select committee appointed to secure professors for the new University, character formation was emphasized in the purposes of the institution, which were stated as being to '...reclaim the intellect, create the taste, form the manners, and confirm the loyalty...' of the colonial youth.3

1 W.E. Hearn and W.P. Wilson, On the Proposed Course for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts in the University of Melbourne, Melbourne: 1855, especially pp. 2, 6, 7, 8.
3 Minutes of the Proceedings of the Council of the University of Melbourne, Appendix to April 10, 1854. Letter no. 2, p. 4.
One other statement on the purposes ascribed to the colonial Universities must be recorded. In 1857 the vice-provost of Sydney University asserted that the University had been established to provide an educational standard for the Colony:

... when the State admitted that it was its duty to give encouragement to liberal education by public endowment, its first business was to obtain the standard by which liberal education should be tested, and to which all teaching should be adjusted. To provide this standard, the University was called into existence ...¹

The historical accuracy of the assertion need not concern us here; what is important is the idea of the state university at the apex of the state system of education, setting standards of scholarship relevant to the other educational institutions. Here it is recognized that it is a proper function of a university to act as an accrediting agency. Although seldom stated as one, this purpose of universities must be regarded as of great importance to a society, and has even been described in retrospect as the main role of universities and colleges.²

In the period extending roughly between 1860 and 1940 the universities of the British Isles, the United States and Australia were transformed, but most statements on the purposes of universities were in effect modifications or developments of ideas which had been expressed in the

first sixty years of the nineteenth century. Many of these statements reflected German ideas of what universities existed for. These German ideas have been summed up by Paul Farmer in three propositions:

(1) the university is properly subordinate to the state
(2) the university serves properly as the voice of the national spirit or mind of the nation
(3) the university is properly dedicated to the increase of knowledge as its principal task rather than to the mere perpetuation of an inherited store of knowledge.¹

These ideas first came to fruition in the University of Berlin, not so much in the ideal of liberal education propounded there at its foundation by Wilhelm von Humboldt,² as in the ideals of learning and scholarship which ousted von Humboldt's ideal of liberal humanism. In the University of Berlin such men as von Ranke and August Böckh laboured first as research workers, secondly as teachers. For von Ranke history was the empirical investigation of the past rather than a means to a liberal education; Böckh's concern was the empirical reconstruction of antiquity, not its educational value.³ As Abraham Flexner observed, this was new wine in old bottles and the old bottles burst.⁴ The medieval and reformation universities of Germany quickly copied the Berlin model, and from 1840 intense specialization, rigid objectivity and careful documentation became the hallmark of German university scholarship. By

mid-century the same ideal of scholarship had captivated the scientists as well as the humanists with whom it had originated, and in the second half of the nineteenth century the German university became a general exemplar.

I:24 We have already noticed the importation into America by Henry Tappan of German ideals of scholarship and the idea that the pursuit of such learning was the proper end of a university in contradistinction to a college. But it was not until 1874 that a book written by an American and giving a full account of German university life appeared, and the establishment of Johns Hopkins University in 1876 as a graduate institution is usually seen as the first successful attempt to transplant the German ideal into American soil.¹

I:25 In England the most important attempt to re-state the purposes of universities along German lines was made by Mark Pattison. In 1855 Pattison saw the production of the liberally educated man as the proper purpose of the university. 'The products of a University [he wrote] are not inventions, improvements, discoveries, novel speculations, books, but the fully educated man.'² In 1868, however, he published a blueprint for the reform of Oxford University which was much influenced by his experience of German institutions.³ He proposed that college endowments should be made over to the University


which would be the agency of both research and education. Students should have one year of general education in classics and mathematics and then be permitted to study in any of nine faculties which would cover the whole range of knowledge. This they would do from a love of learning, and incidentally they would get an advanced, specialized education. 'The object of these Suggestions', Pattison concluded,
is that the University shall no longer be a class-school, nor mainly a school for youth at all. It is a national institute for the preservation and tradition of useful knowledge. It is the common interest of the whole community that such knowledge should exist, should be guarded, treasured, cultivated, disseminated, expounded.¹

In 1873 the Devonshire Commission described research as a primary duty of the university,² and the idea continually gained ground, although it is still a matter of dispute whether research or teaching should be designated the first task of universities.

Well before it had become a commonplace that universities should engage in research, it had become widely accepted that they should concern themselves with teaching a broad conspectus of human knowledge. Modern science was an obvious omission in the early nineteenth century, Eric Ashby suggesting that it was only with the founding of London University that the scientific revolution implanted itself in English higher education.³ But as modern scientific studies became established in German

¹ Suggestions on Academical Organisation, cited by J. Sparrow, Ibid., p. 123.
³ E. Ashby, Technology and the Academics, op. cit., p. 29.
universities the demand for scientific education and research to be made purposes of English universities grew rapidly. In the United States the popularity of science grew only gradually until around 1880 it became coupled with a sudden increase of interest in research.\(^1\) Scientific studies had always been possible in the Australian universities, but it was only in the 'eighties that the demand for them required great change in the universities' arrangements.\(^2\)

I:27 Contrary to what happened in Continental Europe, the science that was taken up in the later nineteenth century in the universities of the British Isles, the United States and Australia included applied as well as pure studies, and once again questions were asked of the degree to which universities should aim to meet the immediate and material needs of their supporting societies. But now the issues were complicated by the development of new types of institutions - the land grant colleges in the United States and civic universities in England. The United States Morrill Act of 1862 provided funds for faculty salaries in institutions which while not abandoning classical and scientific studies would teach military tactics and - more importantly - '... such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts ...'.\(^3\) Some states set up new, specialized institutions, but others expanded existing institutions or developed

---

\(^1\) L.R. Veysey, *op. cit.*, pp 174-175.

\(^2\) See, e.g., G. Blainey, *A Centenary History of the University of Melbourne*, *op. cit.*, Chapter 10.

\(^3\) Hofstadter and Smith, (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 568.
state universities to make use of the available funds. Thus in some universities very useful, technological studies were conducted beside more traditional university studies. A typical effect on the aims of one of these institutions can be seen in the first feature set out in 'Features of the University' in Cornell University's First General Announcement of 1867:

> Every effort will be made that the education given be practically useful. The idea of doing a student's mind some vague general good by studies which do not interest him, will not control. The constant policy will be to give mental discipline to every student by studies which take practical hold upon the tastes, aspirations and work of his life.

The general acceptance of the principle that useful studies could be vehicles of the mental enlargement which a university education had traditionally been expected to confer cleared the way for a massive concentration by some American universities on narrowly vocational courses. This trend was decried by theorists who subscribed to less mundane conceptions of the purposes proper to universities. Thorstein Veblen complained in 1916 that the intrusion of "business principles" - by which he principally meant the notion of undertaking only what would return a pecuniary profit - into the universities '... goes to weaken and retard the pursuit of learning, and therefore to defeat the ends for which a university is maintained.' Abraham Flexner rejected most vocational and professional courses as worthy of study in a proper

university. A "genuine university", he argued, should be '
... an organism, characterized by highness and
definiteness of aim, unity of spirit and purpose.' This
led him to deny that Columbia, Harvard, John Hopkins,
Chicago or Wisconsin were really universities. 1 A modern
university, as he used the term "university", would '
address itself whole-heartedly and unreservedly to the
advancement of knowledge, the study of problems, from
whatever source they come, and the training of men - all
at the highest level of possible effort.' A university
should study problems, but it was not its business to do
anything about them. 2 Flexner believed that a university
should not be concerned whether or not the truth about
problems would be welcome or unwelcome outside the
university. Somewhat similarly, R.M. Hutchins argued
that "vocationalism" led to triviality and debased the
courses of study. 'It deprives the university [he wrote
in 1936] of its only excuse for existence, which is to
provide a haven where the search for truth may go on
unhampered by utility or pressure for "results".' Hutchins
also considered that with the increasingly rapid
development of professional knowledge and the consequent
changes in professional practice a university should only
educate in '
... the general principles, the fundamental
propositions, the theory of any discipline.' And believing
that the scholar should seek a unified view of truth, his
ideal university would be composed of three faculties only -

2 Ibid., p. 24.
metaphysics, social science and natural science - and factual research and professional training should be carried on in institutes connected to, though not part of, the university.\(^1\) Standing out against vocationalism - which was probably the most powerful stream in university practice in America early in this century - these three theorists nonetheless formed rather different concepts of the ideal university; for instance, while Flexner considered that a university should primarily be engaged in the advancement of knowledge, Hutchins held that foremost a university should be an agent of liberal education.

I:29 In England, civic universities developed in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries - usually from colleges or other institutions with specialist technological or professional purposes - primarily to act as scientific, technological, commercial and generally cultural service stations to a provincial city and the surrounding industrial and commercial complex, each institution mirroring the specialist techniques of its area.\(^2\) From the foundation of London University, which was intended to serve the needs of dissenters and the commercial classes of London, each new university or university college was founded to meet the needs of people with specialist interests. Early in the nineteenth

---

century, Oxford and Cambridge had in practice largely served the needs of a particular class; but the purpose of that type of university education was ideally to serve the needs of man as man.\footnote{1}{In large part the civic universities unashamedly served those needs of man which arose out of his being employed in the professions and commercial and technological occupations. In time the interests of the civic universities widened, but the established pattern became that of a "scientific and cultural service station".} In large part the civic universities unashamedly served those needs of man which arose out of his being employed in the professions and commercial and technological occupations. In time the interests of the civic universities widened, but the established pattern became that of a "scientific and cultural service station".\footnote{2}{W.H.G. Armytage, Civic Universities, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 244.}

**Issues of the Last Thirty Years**

Universities have always been in a state of transition, but the world war of 1939-1945 marked the beginning of a period of rapid change. Not only have the institutions themselves undergone rapid change, but the changes have been accompanied by increased discussion and debate of what should be the purposes of universities. Most of the issues had been discussed before; but they have been argued in this period with great urgency and seriousness of purpose. On one hand, theorists have tried to show that changes in society require radical re-formation of universities; on the other, traditionalists have denounced the fundamental alterations to the nature of universities which they say are being advocated and are

\footnote{1}{Cf. J.H. Newman: 'Professions differ, and what is an education for one youth is not the education for another; but there is one kind of education which all should have in common, and which is distinct from the education which is given to fit each for his profession... And this is the education for which you especially come to the University - it is to be made men.' \textit{My Campaign in Ireland}, Aberdeen: King and Co., 1896, p. 315.}

\footnote{2}{W.H.G. Armytage, Civic Universities, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 244.}
actually occurring. Some writers have predicted the demise of universities and "the idea of a university". And it has been in this period that confusion, or at least uncertainty, on the purposes of universities has been most apparent and can be seen to be widespread.

Oxford and Cambridge had been little concerned with the Napoleonic wars; universities generally in the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia were very much involved in the war effort of 1939-1945. Their efforts to solve the scientific and technical problems of the war indicated that universities everywhere were prepared to involve themselves in the immediate and practical problems of their supporting societies. Not only did their war effort win universities the praise of governments, but it revealed that universities were indispensable to the progress of highly developed technological societies. Since the war, governments have continued to pour money into universities for research on defence and similar matters of vital national importance. And with the expansion of knowledge in the war years it became generally accepted that professional men needed expert training at a very high level. Charles Morris has given his impression that in his youth in the early twentieth century Oxford was concerned with "education" rather than professional training. This was reasonable, he suggests, because even doctors then required very little science and professional training could safely be left to other institutions - such as the London hospitals and the Inns of Court. But with

the development of science it became inevitable that universities should cease to be colleges of arts and sciences and become "a consortium of professional schools". While Morris's view of the inevitability of the location of this newly-conceived professional training in universities may be questioned - the expansion of professional training institutes offering a reasonable alternative - it can hardly be doubted that universities were eager to develop in this direction. Of course research and professional training had long been generally accepted as proper functions of universities; what was new was the pressure on universities to devote themselves more fully to them.

During the war, it seems, the social expectations of Western nations rose sharply, and this was to have profound implications for universities. Not only was it recognized that professional training must proceed at a very high level, but it became the most common assumption that complex highly developed societies require a high level of both technical skill and general education diffused through the community. The assertion that every child has a right to a secondary education was now accepted in the United Kingdom and Australia as well as in the United States. With increasing frequency it was also accepted that people have a right to education as far as their ability permits them to go. As the numbers

completing secondary school grew, so did the numbers demanding access to higher education; and secondary schools tending to be academic in nature, the demand was especially great for access to universities. Expansion was not a new phenomenon, and theorists who held the education of a comparatively small élite to be the major purpose of a university had long been troubled by rising numbers in the universities. The expansion of the years since the war, however, has been so large as to lead some theorists to warn of the possible devastation of the university.

I:32 The universities' re-orientation towards meeting more directly through useful research and professional training the demands made of the knowledge industry and the post-war expansion in the size and number of institutions occasioned lively discussion and debate on the purposes proper to universities. That the purposes of universities were so evidently up for discussion may have been partly responsible for the readiness of students in the 'sixties to question the role and nature of society's institutions and the university in particular. What is certain is that student attitudes have stimulated discussion and declamation both in the community at large and in the universities of what universities should be and do.

1 Cf. Sir Ernest Barker, writing in 1931: 'The nation may, as it were, over-value its Universities: it may run away with the idea that it is impossible to have too much of a good thing. Those who know our Universities best are haunted by the fear that a democratic enthusiasm, as genuine as it is ill-informed, may result in an attempt to increase the quantity of University education at the expense of its quality.' Universities in Great Britain, London: SCM Press, 1931, p. 79.
One central issue which has engaged many minds of distinction is whether the modern university should primarily be concerned with the pursuit and advancement of knowledge through research and reflection or with the dissemination of knowledge through teaching and more broadly through the provision of education facilities. A now classic statement of the latter view was made by Ortega y Gasset who between the wars had declared that European man was in pieces and that the university should be the agent of his reconstruction.

Ortega was particularly concerned with the state of the Spanish university, but he accepted that his arguments had wider application, all European universities having general characteristics in common; and after the translation of his *Mission of the University* was published in 1944, his views on the university were much quoted in the English-speaking world. His basic belief was that the university had departed from its original and proper purpose. 'An institution is a machine [he wrote] in that its whole structure and functioning must be devised in view of the service it is expected to perform. In other

1 'Professionalism and specialism, through insufficient counterbalancing, have smashed the European man in pieces. ... We have to reassemble out of scattered pieces a complete living organism, the European man. What we must achieve is that every individual, or (not to be Utopian) many individuals, should each succeed in constituting the type of the whole man in its entirety. What force can bring this about, if it is not the university?' *The Mission of the University*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944, pp. 61-62.

words, the root of university reform is a complete formulation of its purpose.1 As with many other would-be reformers of the university, Ortega looked back to its medieval origins for a precedent: 'Compared with the medieval university, the contemporary university has developed the mere seed of professional instruction into an enormous activity; it has added the function of research; and it has abandoned almost entirely the teaching or transmission of culture.'2 His great complaint was that the European professional man was uncultured, a new barbarian. 'Hence it is imperative to set up once more, in the university the teaching of the culture, the system of vital ideas, which the age has attained. This is the basic function of the university. This is what the university must be above all else.'3 In addition, he conceded that a university should train for the professions, but only '... by the most economical, direct and efficacious procedures intellect can devise ...'4 But in accepting general and professional education as proper purposes of the university Ortega rejected the function of research, and here his reasoning needs examination. Earlier he had argued that only ordinary men need institutions, that extraordinary creatures probably need neither educational nor political institutions, and that therefore the university's primary concern was with ordinary men.5 He reasoned further that there being no cogent reason why the ordinary man needs to be a

1 Ibid., p. 47.
2 Ibid., p. 57.
3 Ibid., p. 59.
4 Ibid., p. 73.
5 Ibid., p. 63.
scientist (in the sense of one who advances knowledge) research does not belong among the primary functions of the university. Perhaps it is necessary to recall here that Ortega was writing in 1930 and could not have appreciated how research would become so much a part of our civilization that it would need to be performed by people who could hardly be considered extraordinary and how demanding of skill and intellect professional training would become. It must be recorded, however, that while Ortega was not prepared to allow that a university should be anything like a research institute, he accepted that a university, to be a university, must be suffused with science (in its broadest sense).¹

I:34 The opposite view - that the modern university should be primarily concerned with the pursuit and advancement of knowledge through research and reflection - was expressed by the writer who wrote under the name "Bruce Truscot". Truscot claimed that it was true historically that the advancement of knowledge constituted the university's essential function, the earliest universities being established by men to advance knowledge, '... indeed to possess all knowledge for themselves ...', and not to diffuse it abroad. Also he claimed that his view was logically sound, for if only existing knowledge were to be diffused it would only be necessary to found a superior type of secondary school and staff it with a superior type of school teacher - of which there were plenty, as any scholastic agency would acknowledge. He believed that researchers want to share

¹ Ibid., p. 96.
their knowledge with others, especially the young, and thus held the teaching function to be a natural development from the essential idea of the university.

But to the idea of a university only the "Fellows", the researchers, are essential. There could perfectly well be a university which, like All Souls' College, Oxford, had no undergraduates at all; and, instead of teaching, replenished its ranks by the choice of scholars who had been taught elsewhere, devoting itself entirely to the pursuit of knowledge.

For Truscot, all this was not idle toying with classification but justification for action. For example, by emphasizing that research must be put first in consideration of the university's nature and role, he argued that the "continuation-school" idea of the university must be fought from the outset.1

I:35 Debate on whether universities should be primarily concerned with research or education has continued throughout the last thirty years.2 Both Ortega and Truscot supported their positions with historical and philosophical argument. A more rigorous philosophical argument on this question has been constructed by A.P. Griffiths who argues that the essential function of a university is the disinterested pursuit of universal objects because the other activities of a university are dependent on it and are, comparatively speaking, accidents.3

1 B. Truscot, Red Brick University, London: Faber and Faber, 1943, pp. 47-49 and 55.
This view of the university will be considered in a later chapter, but here it is appropriate to notice that Richard Peters notes that Griffith's view "... is certainly a possible concept of a university, but it is neither the British nor American concept. "University" [he goes on] suggests to us not only the disinterested pursuit of truth in its various forms but education as well - at least in the minimal sense of the initiation of others into this pursuit."¹

I:36 Ortega, Truscot, Griffiths and Peters all seem to accept the idea that although there is an activity which is essential in a university, a modern university may properly engage in other activities. They therefore address themselves to establishing priorities and considering the balance which should be struck of different activities.

Some theorists have more positively advocated that the modern university is necessarily a multi-functional institution with complementary functions. To quote Karl Jaspers, whose work The Idea of the University has been much cited in the past decade since its translation into English from the German of 1946:

Three things are required at a university: professional training, education of the whole man, research. For the university is simultaneously a professional school, a cultural center and a research institute. People have tried to force the university to choose between these three possibilities. They have asked what it is that we really expect the university to do. Since, so they say, it cannot do everything it ought to decide upon one of these three alternatives. It was even suggested that the university as such be dissolved, to be replaced by three special types of school: institutes for professional training, institutes for general education possibly involving a special staff, and research

institutes. In the idea of the university, however, these three are indissolubly united. One cannot be cut off from the others without destroying the intellectual substance of the university, and without at the same time crippling itself. All three factors are factors of a living whole. By isolating them, the spirit of the university perishes.

To this important statement we shall return; here it should be noted that Jaspers sees the interaction of general and professional education and research as making the university. But some of the theorists who advocate that the modern university is necessarily a multi-functional institution with complementary functions seem not to restrict these functions to the three Jaspers cites. Charles Frankel, for instance, sets out a single function with a number of different aspects as the mission of scholars in universities, but his statement might well be construed to authorize a great range of learning activities as appropriate to universities:

That mission is to keep the tradition of disinterested learning alive; to add to the knowledge possessed by the race; to keep some solid, just, and circumspect record of the past; and to use what knowledge, skill, and critical intelligence exists for the improvement of the human estate. That is the function of universities wherever they are permitted to attend to their own proper business.

The generality of Frankel's recommendation that it is proper for universities to apply knowledge, skill and critical intelligence to the improvement of the human estate would seem to authorize a wide range of the service activities in which universities have engaged.

social needs - even if they were the immediate needs of only part of the population. But from the early nineteenth century it became more clearly recognized that universities could function as instruments of public purpose. We have already referred to the debate on whether Oxford and Cambridge should be regarded as national institutions in this sense; the extent to which universities should address themselves to solving the problems of the local community, state and nation has continued to be a lively issue. Public service in this sense has probably been taken to greater lengths in American than in British or Australian universities, the land-grant institutions and state universities particularly seeing it as a very serious responsibility. The Universities of Wisconsin and Nebraska have described their whole state as their campus, and many institutions have set up research and service bureaus.

1 Cf. 'From their primeval beginnings, universities were recognized as institutions necessary to satisfy certain important social needs. These needs, and hence the role of the universities, were, of course, conceived within the cultural context of their times. Thus in the 13th century theology, law and medicine comprised the superior faculties of universities and reflected the views of governing classes regarding the principal contribution of higher learning to the satisfaction of existing social needs.' L.K. Caldwell, 'The Response of the University to Changing Concepts and Conditions' in Papers of the International Association of Universities, No. 4, University Education and Public Service, Paris: International Universities Bureau, 1959, p. 46.

2 See above, pp. 3 and 13-16.


4 Ibid., pp. 110-111.
can be taken to include advising governments, solving the practical problems of society through applied research and acting as an agency for the storage and dissemination of information as well as by engaging in pure research and providing general and professional education. Recently in America the purpose of community service has been given a new emphasis; as American society has become more aware of the seriousness of social problems like poverty, distinctions made on a racial basis, and various struggles for rights, so people have looked to the universities for guidance, and theorists have argued that universities cannot ignore their requests. Universities must face the problems of the cities, says J.W. Gardner, for these constitute '... the gravest problem of our generation.'¹ One of the acknowledged sources of student unrest has been the feeling that in spite of the tradition of public service American universities have been too little involved in the social problems which students consider to be crucial.

university could, if it wished, retire into a modest and unassuming backwater away from the arena of social and public life. If it did, it would be necessary to invent a new model university to replace it.1

At the same time there has existed an insistent demand that British universities should not totally immerse themselves in society, that a university needs to be somewhat removed from society if it is to perform its role successfully. Eric Ashby, for instance, has emphasized on a number of occasions that while the university should no longer be an ivory tower:

... there must still be ivory towers on the campus, places where scholars can do work which may seem irrelevant and even pedantic, without having to feel apologetic about it. And they must be free to do it at their own pace and style, even if this does not produce a flow of published work each year. A university which does not offer its faculty and students opportunities for this kind of solitude and detachment is failing in one of its duties to society. And it is the best students who must be initiated into this commitment to solitude .... Whatever happens to universities in tomorrow's world, they must make some arrangement which ruthlessly selects the few students of high intelligence and ensures that their minds are sharpened by constant exposure to mature excellence. Unless this thin stream of excellence is kept crystal-clear, there will be no one trained to make innovations in tomorrow's world. This is the university's prime function.2

This quotation is given at length because it is characteristic of the attitude that universities preserve something of inestimable value which would be lost if they were to give themselves up to serving the immediate needs of society. But Ashby lays great stress on the idea that this detachment is not simply in the interests of the university but also in the best interests of the larger society. Bryan Wilson maintains

1 Charles Morris, 'The University and the Modern Age' in T.B. Stroup (ed.), op. cit., p. 75.
that a university must be detached from society, not only to afford the solitude which scholarship demands, but to provide a suitable environment for the transmission of the distinctive university values. He believes that if universities are to maintain their mission, they must insulate young people '... from influences which not only distract them from education, but create conflicts about the values which they should accept.' This means that the university needs to take young worldlings out of the world into the ivory tower. For Wilson, the university has its best impact on society when students return to the world committed to the distinctive values of university life.

I:39 Most modern universities are complex institutions serving many functions, and to many theorists this is as it should be. The multiplication of functions, however, necessitates large institutions, as H.S. Commager points out of American universities:

the pattern of the American university - a pattern now spreading back to the Old World - is that of an institution large enough to serve all the traditional functions of the university - teaching and character training and professional training; serve the needs of society and of government; engage in far-reaching academic ventures across national boundaries; and initiate, sponsor and carry out research in every field that calls for investigation.

2 'My premise is that as an educative agency the university is an organization with certain distinctive value-commitments, its primary responsibility being to produce the educated man in the wide sense of the word.' Ibid., p. 46.
3 Ibid., p. 66.
Certainly, this pattern is not confined to the United States, and Ashby has attempted to depict the way in which functions have multiplied in British universities:

There has been an accretion of functions over the centuries. From Bologna and Salerno comes the function of the university to train students for certain professions, like the church, medicine, and law. From Oxford and Cambridge comes the university's function as a nursery for gentlemen, statesmen, and administrators. From Göttingen and Berlin comes the function of the university as a centre for scholarship and research. From Charlottenburg and Zurich and Massachusetts comes the function of the university to be a staff college for technological experts and specialists... The universities have responded to all of them and repudiated none; but adaption is by no means complete. Form is not everywhere fitted to function. Indeed the cardinal problem facing universities today is how to reconcile these four different functions in one and the same institution.1

Ashby is not suggesting that universities take on additional functions whenever precedents can be found, but that precedents are important not only in revealing how society's needs may be met but in revealing that it is universities which have been applied to these purposes. Ashby indicates the difficulty of containing these different functions within the one institution. But in the United States it has been suggested that the largest and most multi-functional of universities - the "multiversity" - is not to be thought of as the "organism" that Flexner thought a university should be, but as a mechanism - '... a series of processes producing a series of results - a mechanism held together by administrative rules and powered by money.'2 Clark Kerr suggests that the multiversity actually represents an unlikely consensus and "a remarkably effective educational

institution", but he admits that the parts aim in different directions and that the multiversity is not a perfectly stable structure:

A university anywhere can aim no higher than to be as British as possible for the sake of the under-graduates, as German as possible for the sake of the graduates and research personnel, as American as possible for the sake of the public at large - and as confused as possible for the sake of the preservation of the whole uneasy balance.1

I:40 As might be expected there are theorists who reject the accretion of functions as proper to a university and who seek a simpler form of institution. Frequently these theorists assert that the university should be regarded as "a centre of learning" and that universities should be divested of their grosser public service activities such as applied research, vocational education, and acting as community information centres. Antecedents of their thought can often be found in Newman and Pattison, Tappan and Flexner, and much reference is made to "the idea of the university". In general their aim might be said to be to reveal the unique function of the university, "unique" not so much in the sense of a single activity which a university should perform but as the best way in which this institution may serve society.

I:41 An early representative of this sort of thinking was A.N. Whithead. He argued that universities are not primarily schools of education or schools of research as these functions could be performed at a cheaper rate outside the university. 'The justification for a university', he wrote in the early 'thirties,

1 Ibid., p. 18.
is that it preserves the connection between knowledge and the zest of life, by uniting the young and the old in the imaginative consideration of learning... At least, this is the function which it should perform for society. A university which fails in this respect has no reason for existence.¹

At about the same time Ernest Barker was writing that the university like the church is a spiritual institution and should be judged '... by the degree to which it performs its own intimate and essential purpose.' This purpose, he considered, was then best preserved in Oxford and Cambridge:

... it is a great mistake, as some American universities have found, to blur the distinction between the university and the technical college. It is here that Oxford and Cambridge can be of peculiar service, because they have a peculiar power, from their very position, of keeping the true and pure 'idea of a University'. The other universities are exposed to a far greater pressure: the older universities, just because they are less exposed, have a great and bounden duty of defending, for the sake of the rest, the stronghold of pure learning and long-time values against the demands of material progress and the zest for immediate values and quick returns.

... Philosophy and universality remain the alpha and omega of British universities; it was in this that they began, and it will be to this that they will always necessarily return.²

For Barker, the unum necessarium was "the study and advancement of the higher branches of learning"; he seemed to equate this with the idea of a university, but offered no justification for the conflation.³

1:42 Over the last thirty years, the theorists who have emphasized the role of the university as a centre of learning have tended to accept that modern universities must serve more than one function, but they have asserted that the propriety

---

² E. Barker, Universities in Great Britain, pp. 80-83.
³ Ibid., pp. 81-82.
of functions must be assessed in terms of the university's true nature as a centre of learning. In an early work, Ashby tried to bring out with reference to professional training this dual nature of universities:

Always the universities have trained men for the professions and they will continue to train them; this is one of their main duties to society. But apart from this, universities have been the nurseries for intellectual progress. They bring men together. They give them access to books and opportunity for talk. They encourage a ferment of thought. They tolerate and nourish ideas, however feeble and embryonic they are. For the thoughtful man the university opens two doors: the one to a profession, the other to the man's own intellect. Although professional training is still the university's business, cultivation of the intellect has become its vocation.¹

In the United States Jacques Barzun is critical of the multi-functional university which with the accretion of functions has had to abandon singleness of purpose and the criterion of what is fitting in a university:

Let us recall the provinces from which it has abdicated: the unity of knowledge: the desire and power to teach; the authority and skill to pass judgment on what claims to be knowledge, to be a university, to be a scholar, to be a basic scientist; finally, the consciousness of what is properly academic - a consciousness which implies the right to decline alike: commercial opportunities, service assignments for industry, the administering of social welfare, and the bribes, flattery, or dictation of any self-seeking group.²

Barzun sees a functional role for the idea of the university as a centre of learning of understanding; it is to be '... a principle of discrimination within the flood of concrete events, a continuous practical choice between what fits and what does not fit the purpose of higher education.'³ And he

¹ E. Ashby, Challenge to Education, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1946, p. 76.
³ Ibid., p. 234.
sets out at some length a number of such choices which he believes must be made if the university is to survive in America.¹

I:43 The fullest recent account of the university considered as a centre of learning does not restrict the university to a social role which is not complex or specify that universities should engage only in a particular type of learning.² In this essay, 'The Academic Community', R.W. Heyns rejects as inadequate certain of the currently popular conceptions of the university:

1. The university is simply part of a larger political entity.¹
2. The university is divided into three power blocks. [administration, faculty and students]
3. The university is an instrument of direct, social action.
4. The university is a public utility.
5. The university is an extension of the family.³

Heyns maintains that if any of these were to be given a dominant role in the definition of a university, it would damage academic institutions. His proposition is that to consider the university (or college) as a "Center of Learning" '... would permit a ready derivation as to what a university should do with its issues of conflict resolution, style and manner of academic discourse and debate, student participation, and the social role of the university.'⁴ Some of the outcomes of the process of derivation which he cites are:

¹ Ibide, pp. 245 and 247-286.
³ Ibide., pp. 13-14.
What does the Center of Learning say about the relationship to society? Several derivations are possible. The university is not an instrument of direct social action. Its task is to prepare men and women for intelligent and responsible social activity through sharpening their skills of data acquisition, analysis, and evaluation.¹

What about values and manners? The academic community ideally shares a reverence for the individual, a belief in his great worth, and a moral commitment to maximize the likelihood that each member will realize his potential. We join in the protection of the institution from those outside, as well as inside, who would make it less attractive as a place to learn, or who would limit its effectiveness as a place of learning. The community embraces and exalts the reasoned, examined life. It encourages the life of the mind, not because it rejects emotion and concern, but because it knows that only disciplined sympathy and interest are truly effective.²

Heyns specifies that in a Center of Learning emphasis is placed on the activity of learning, that faculty and students are partners in the process of learning but that the teacher is the expert - not only in the content of the discipline but also in the conditions of learning.³ Like Barzun, then, Heyns suggests criteria by which universities should remove themselves somewhat from society and adjudge the propriety of the various demands made upon them.

It cannot be suggested that the ideas of theorists who claim that a university must be a centre of learning form a coherent body of theory. For example, when Truscot and A.P. Griffiths are included in the category, we have theorists who see the university as a centre of learning being concerned mainly with the advancement of knowledge, compared with the theorists cited who think of it foremost as a place of education. But two themes on the purposes of

1 Ibid., p. 16.
2 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
3 Ibid., p. 15.
universities recur again and again: that the university must act as the guardian of knowledge or truth, and that it is of the nature of the university that scholars from different fields should meet and work together with the aim of achieving a unity of knowledge.

Until recently, with widespread concern for the rapid obsolescence of information and emphasis being placed in higher education on the acquisition of skills, the old idea that one of the purposes of the university is to be the guardian of knowledge tended to be neglected in the literature. Recently, however, there have been a number of attempts to clarify this traditional idea and show its relevance in the modern world. For example, Michael Oakeshott observes that universities do not tend to arise in pioneering societies, but that in our notion of a civilized society something will be lacking until a university appears.

And when it appears it will be recognized to be an association of persons engaged in caring for and attending to this inheritance of enterprises of understanding. It will be concerned, not merely to keep this intellectual inheritance intact, but to be continuously recovering what has been lost, restoring what has been neglected, collecting together what has been dissipated, repairing what has been corrupted, reconsidering, reshaping and reorganizing these advantages of human understanding.¹

Oakeshott goes on to emphasize that the guardianship of knowledge must be considered a creative task for the university, whose scholars '... will live at what is called "the frontiers of knowledge"; and they will recognize themselves as engaged in intellectual pursuits rather than as gatherers or custodians of a store of information.'²

² Ibid.
But this presentation of the idea seems immediately to involve only established scholars, whereas Bryan Wilson shows that it is implied in the provision of undergraduate education:

In England the universities themselves have regarded their distinctive mission as the dissemination of human, liberal, civilizing values. They have sought to introduce students to the richness of our cultural inheritance, to provide access to the cumulative aesthetic, literary, philosophic and scientific resources of mankind, and to stimulate intellectual discussion and critical assessment in a context in which young people have leisure and opportunity to savour all the best that our culture has to offer. Thus information alone has never been the concern of English universities - it has been merely the basis on which an educated understanding and a cultivated attitude could be developed.¹

Wilson points out that this is a description of an ideal which has often outstripped the reality,² and Oakeshott recognizes that learning and universities as he has described them are threatened and may only survive by becoming minority retreats.³ In America Jacques Barzun sees little evidence of the guardianship of learning being regarded as the vital purpose of universities:

Next comes the raison d'être of the university as guardian of learning. In the miscalled knowledge explosion the university has only tried mechanical organization - putting the stuff into bales. A few journals occasionally commission an article reviewing a decade of scholarly work. Otherwise, there is no conspectus of any science or subscience, any field or backyard. If the public knew this it might shut down the universities.⁴

To a theorist who sees the university as ideally a centre of

² Ibid.
³ M.J. Oakeshott, 'The Definition of a University', loc. cit., p. 142.
learning, this represents a grave failure of the universities. Barzun therefore proposes that scholars should periodically review their fields, a measure which would facilitate their working towards the achievement of a unity of knowledge.¹

I:47 Newman had held that it was the proper function of a university to afford the means to liberal or philosophic knowledge, by which he meant the capacity to see things in their mutual relations and respective values.² The idea persists today that the structure of the university renders it ideally suited to working towards the achievement from every branch of learning of a unity of knowledge. Writing of 'The Purpose of the University', R.M. Hutchins claims:

All formulations of that ideal have involved one proposition in common, and that is that the object of the university is to see knowledge, life, the world, or truth whole. The aim of the university is to tame the pretensions and excesses of experts and specialists by drawing them into the academic circle and subjecting them to the criticism of other disciplines. Everything in the university is to be seen in the light of everything else. This is not merely for the sake of society or to preserve the unity of the university. It is also for the sake of the specialists and experts, who, without the light shed by others, may find their own studies going down blind alleys.³

This idea of a community of scholars working with the aim of developing a unity of knowledge is usually central to the theories of those who regard the university primarily as a centre of learning. It is often referred to, approvingly, by other theorists. But the demands of specialization and the development of the multi-functional university, together with scepticism on the likelihood of its attainment, appear

¹ Ibid.
² See above, p. 7.
largely to have forestalled its implementation in modern universities.

I:48 Boris Ford is right, I think, in saying that the idea that it is the university's purpose to be a centre of learning '... is one that acquired its validity with the rise of the science faculties of the last 80 years, with their ideal of the pursuit of dedicated and disinterested scholarship, and of knowledge communicated to rigorous and critical minds.' The ideal student in a centre of learning would seem to be one with the ambition and ability to become an academic. But it is evident that modern universities take in students who are not in this way ideal, and it has been argued that universities today cannot be structured simply on the principle that a university should be a centre of learning. Lord Robbins, for instance, does not start with some one normative idea of the university but takes the expanded state of universities as "a given". From this point he argues that universities must accept that they are bi-functional and organize themselves so that they can provide training for "life in the outside world" for those students who will never advance knowledge and do not plan to be dons or school teachers.  

I:49 Another fundamental issue which has been raised many times over the last thirty years concerns the extent to which universities should make value judgements. In earlier times it was generally accepted that universities

1 B. Ford, 'What is a University?', New Statesman, 24 October 1969, p. 562.
should stand for, and transmit, a system of values, but recently there has been much uncertainty on what universities stand for and what values they could pass on. J.S. Ackerman indicates the extent of this uncertainty:

Since the age of Objective Analysis has defined its functions in terms of techniques rather than principles, the aim of higher education has been simply to train students to perform effectively. What they should perform and why have not been discussed seriously; each individual is expected to decide this for himself. So the growing adolescent is assigned the most crucial decision at all: to determine the purpose of the whole educational enterprise - and without the encouragement of his teachers. No matter how effectively techniques are taught, they cannot help students to make this decision wisely.

Ackerman goes on to suggest that this situation has arisen because in earlier times universities were not expected to define the goals of education: '... figuratively, they contracted to produce graduates equipped to perform the tasks and to reflect the principles defined by the dominant class.' With the greater emphasis now placed on the importance of pluralism to a democratic community many academics consider that universities must confine themselves to intellectual tasks and maintain a neutrality on value judgements.

A university, they say, is not an institution for moral training. It is not even a place dedicated to wisdom, only to knowledge. A university will ... teach students how to make bombs or cathedrals, but it will not teach them which of these objects they ought to make. The typical nineteenth century don believed that what he taught should be not only accurate but edifying; today some of his successors believe that all that is required of their teaching is disinterested accuracy.

1 Cf. the early statements of the purposes of Harvard College, p. 4 above and Bryan Wilson's account of the "distinctive mission" of English universities, p. 54. above.
3 Ibid.
The only rules these teachers would enforce on the academic community are those essential to preserve it as a place of learning and research. Over the social implications of knowledge, even more over manners, ethics, and styles of life, they adopt a policy of non-intervention.¹

And there are those who would urge that real neutrality is impossible, scholarly neutrality necessarily implying a value judgement on the social implications of scholarship.² They urge that universities should hold fast to some standards and values. Sydney Caine speaks for many people concerned about the relationship between universities and society when he says:

There can be no expectation, and it could not be regarded as a desirable objective that universities should revert to Church domination, but they would be in the most general sense more useful institutions if they could once more feel a real sense of moral purpose.³

Some theorists go so far as to say that in a society which is losing contact with the religious and metaphysical sources of its values the university is the best institution to be the ethical as well as intellectual form of lay society.⁴ Others are certain that in these circumstances universities have a special responsibility to their students at least, a responsibility that is more important than their intellectual obligations. 'In the past', writes R.M. Ogilvie,

2 J.S. Ackerman, loc. cit., p. 862.
a majority of people who passed through the universities already came up with a framework of values and standards, often Christian, inherited from their family. The New Student is entirely lacking in these and it is the function of the university not to make him into a historian or a physicist but to supply him with some compensating standards, something to which he can anchor his life.1

I:50 As might be expected, there is a range of opinion among those who have recently been urging that universities re-assert their moral purposes on just what values universities may properly espouse. Ashby is one of those who claim that the discipline of scholarship carries its own ethical values which are valuable not only in the university but in the world outside:

... reverence for truth, with the recognition, which generates humility, that all truth may be contaminated by error; equality, for any scholar, however junior, who advances knowledge has his place in the guild of learning; internationalism, for it is immaterial whether a scholar's theory is upset by one of his own countrymen or by an enemy, but by a black man or a yellow man, by a Christian or a Muslim - the theory is upset all the same. Moral authority in universities, therefore, can be an authority which avoids dogma and which lays down the pragmatic conditions under which scholarship can be pursued. And what is valid for scholarship is valid for all rational decision-making. Arrogance, insincerity, prejudice, intolerance, failure to ascertain the facts: these are incompatible with intellectual health, whether in research, or politics, or commerce.2

The reasons Ashby gives why these values are implicit in the discipline of scholarship are not beyond question; that a junior scholar who has advanced knowledge has a place in the guild of learning, for example, does not appear to be an argument conclusively in favour of equality. But this is not to doubt the importance of the values Ashby lists. He

appears to be describing an ideal rather than the reality. In the United States Merrimon Cuninggim argues that '... the university by nature is a valuing institution', and sets out five central values in which the university believes - briefly, truth, universality, freedom, relevance, and a belief in human worth. For Cuninggim, these values are necessarily implied by the idea of a university; for an institution to deny any one of them, he considers, would be to prohibit naming it a university.¹

Some theorists have gone further and asserted that universities may properly transmit other sets of values. J.U. Nef has attempted to show how students should be brought to understand the comparative value of different studies.² Sir Walter Moberly claimed that the doctrine that the universities' only task is to turn out specialists should be branded a heresy and that it is still a primary duty for them to educate for cultural leadership and social responsibility. 'During their years at the university most graduates', he said,

will have received some vocational training more intensive than of old. But, over and above this, all graduates should have improved their equipment for the major decisions they must make; and that is, how to align themselves on the chief issues which divide our distracted world and by what standard they are to judge them. Ultimately the most important attribute of any man is his 'world-outlook' and the values to which he gives his allegiance.³

In the same tradition W.R. Niblett asks: 'Have our universities a large enough concept of their job? Though they must produce scholars, scientists and technologists in greater and greater numbers, the country is looking to them also to turn out a governing class. For if they do not, who will?'¹ By "governing class" Niblett means one which educates and changes public opinion, and he is well aware of the difficulties in the way of forming one:

A university's wide receptiveness will make it likely that it will contain a number of differently structured value systems. But can a university train a governing class adequately if it does not itself stand for more than the particular truths and value systems with which any one of its parts is especially concerned?²

Niblett is insistent that the university should not indoctrinate.³ But he considers that a university should do more than create "a healthy scepticism and critical acuteness"; it should challenge students to find out what they stand for on fundamental issues: '... it should make it exceedingly difficult for any of them to be inside its doors even for a year without seeing and feeling the importance of the questions to which religious faith is the seeking of an answer.'⁴ Then some would go even further than Moberly and Niblett by claiming that the values which the university must re-assert are Christian.⁵

¹ W.R. Niblett, The Expanding University, p. 123.
² Ibid., p. 125.
³ 'It is not the function of a university as such to try to convert any of its students to one particular religion or one particular philosophy of life.' Ibid., p. 130.
⁴ Ibid., pp. 130-131.
A university might communicate values more positively than is now usual if it were operated as a religious institution. A more common view is that this purpose would be achieved if greater emphasis were placed on the study of subjects with emotional as well as intellectual content. Thus F.R. Leavis, writing especially but not exclusively of Cambridge University, spoke of:

... the raison d'être of a university to be, amid the material pressures and dehumanizing complications of the modern world, a focus of humane consciousness, a centre where, faced with the specializations and distractions in which human ends lose themselves, intelligence, bringing to bear a mature sense of values, should apply itself to the problems of civilization.¹

For Leavis, the idea of the university might be represented within a university by, pre-eminently, a School of English or a lively school of the humanities. In fact he considered that '... without such a centre, a university, whatever essential functions it performs and whatever improvements are attempted, will remain calamitously remote from the Idea.'²

But "the idea of the university" has been variously interpreted, as can be seen in the debate on whether it is properly a purpose of a university to include training in the visual arts in its curriculum.³ Some theorists seem to ascribe to the university responsibility for almost the whole of a student's personality. It has been suggested, for example, that academics really want to have students leaving the university not only with an academic degree,

² Ibid., p. 31.
³ See below, chapter 4.
... but as men and women of good character, with sound moral or religious values, with some appreciation of good music, literature, and the arts, able to distinguish between genuine public expressions of the stirrings of social conscience and mere mass hysteria, eager and ready to lead good and useful lives in the service of the world community.¹

I:53 Other seemingly important views of the purposes of universities could be noted,² but perhaps enough have been cited to support the argument of the conclusion of this chapter that a confusion of ideas now exists on the purposes of universities. This account would not be complete, however, without reference to a principle which is occasionally expounded in the literature and which may be thought to add to the confusion.

I:54 From time to time theorists assert that no limit must be placed on the purposes of universities or that at least their purpose of education must be regarded as unlimited and capable of infinite extension.³ I think this is what Lord Bowden means when he says of universities: 'Their interests cannot be restricted; their role cannot be defined.'⁴ This seems to be an extraordinary claim to make in an age when the pressures are very strong from many directions for universities to state their purposes as precisely as possible. Its justification, however, would seem to lie in the logic of a role which is very generally

assigned to universities. Bronowski and Mazlish concluded in *The Western Intellectual Tradition*¹ that a tradition does emerge from the history of Western thought since the Renaissance. This they described as '... a tradition of dissent - that is, a tradition of questioning what is traditional.'² The validity of this judgement need not concern us here; what seems quite evident is that in this century universities have come to be regarded very generally as properly the critics of society. Ashby has recently put on record his belief that it is the distinctive role of universities in systems of higher education '... to teach the discipline of constructive dissent which changes ideas and advances knowledge.'³ Those who allow that universities properly are the critics of society would seem logically bound to permit universities to undertake any inquiry and educate as they see fit. This would not prevent universities from making formulations of their purposes, but any formulation would have to be regarded as tentative. The reality of the situation is that this role of critic is not the only function required by a society of its universities, and normally some parts of a formula of the purposes of a university could be stated precisely while others were left open.

² Ibid., p. 502.
Conclusion

I:55 Many ideas on the purposes of universities have been propagated since the start of the nineteenth century; in this conclusion I shall give the reasons why I consider that they constitute a confusion of ideas. In brief, I shall suggest that the history of thought on universities in these two centuries reveals a confusion of ideas because the criteria of what would constitute a proper purpose of a university are unsettled. And for various reasons it seems likely that in any complex university institution today many different ideas will be held on the purposes proper to universities.

I:56 However, it is first necessary to recognize that the situation is more confused than has so far emerged in this chapter. Members of the public as well as academics, students and administrators now hold more or less definite views on the purposes of universities and frequently express them in public. And in an age in which universities are very commonly regarded as important instruments of national purpose and many institutions are almost totally dependent on public finance, the views of the public matter more than in times past when the university was thought to be more of a private concern. But this chapter has been confined almost entirely to the personal views of those professionally involved in the processes of higher education and learning. It is for the confusion in these (loosely) "academic" views that I shall now try to account, but it should be recognized that this confusion is part of an even larger area of uncertainty.

I:57 Some views of the purposes of universities are taken from a particular philosophical standpoint, and because
grounds and types of argument differ, a variety of views results. A.P. Griffiths and Karl Jaspers, for instance, start with different premises and reach rather different conclusions on what universities should be and do. But most views of the university are not the result of a conscious philosophic stance. Of these, some are taken with regard first to understanding the traditions of universities; others, like that of Robbins, appear to result from prior consideration being given to the needs of society and the existing system of institutions of higher education and learning. 'Round every Senate table', Eric Ashby observes, sit met for whom the university stands for something unique and precious in European society: a leisurely and urbane attitude to scholarship, exemption from the obligation to use knowledge for practical ends, a sense of perspective which accompanies the broad horizon and the distant view, an opportunity to give undivided loyalty to the kingdom of the mind. At the same Senate table sit men for whom the university is an institution with urgent and essential obligations to modern society; a place to which society entrusts its most intelligent young people and from which it expects to receive its most highly trained citizens; a place which society regards as the pace-maker for scientific research and technological progress.

But the debate is not between two simple groups - one of traditionalists, the other of progressives. We have seen, for instance, that different traditions have been appealed to, and that various conceptions have been dignified by the title "the idea of the university". As for the "progressives", there is difference of opinion whether a university should

2 Above, pp. 40-42.
3 Above, p. 56.
4 E. Ashby, Technology and the Academics, op. cit., pp. 69-70.
serve first the local, national or international society. Because it is thus controversial how the criteria of what constitutes a purpose proper to a university should be determined, it seems inevitable that a confusing number and variety of ideas will be put forward as purposes for universities.

Ideas may be borrowed over time and space. Obviously, the colonists in America, New South Wales and Victoria had at first to look overseas for inspiration; but international exchange of ideas has continued and become increasingly complex. Often, the latest overseas theory or practice has been taken as the model, but many academics have looked back to earlier concepts of the university and the institutions themselves in former times as models of what universities should be like today. Various explanations of the phenomenon are possible. Very often today, people are aware of only an idealized version of what institutions were like in former times. 'In all eras of rapid transition and cultural transformation, there is an aching need for an institution that will project the image of "things as they used to be" in all their (imagined) simplicity, security, and dependability.'

What is said there of the church may well be true of one attitude to the university. Another possibility: J.K. Galbraith suggests that science scholars have welcomed or at least accepted close relations with the industrial system, whereas scholars in classical studies, the humanities and some of the social sciences have been largely unaffected by the technostructure and 'They will retain and

... avow with increasing vehemence the older goals of the academy.  

Reference to the past may simply represent an appeal to the authority which venerable masters and institutions may be supposed to have possessed. Sometimes the appeal is made to an authority in the same philosophical or religious tradition as the appellant. Whatever the reasons, there can be no doubt that academics and administrators have looked much to other societies and other ages for guidance in the ascription of purposes to universities, and this in itself adds to the confusion of ideas.

Apart from this practice of borrowing ideas over time, it seems almost certain that the disciplines in which academics work are reflected in the views they take of the purposes of universities. I say "almost certainly", for I am implying that a statistical trend could be observed, and that is more properly a matter for a sociologist to decide. One would think, nonetheless, that a nuclear physicist would be likely to take a different view of the purposes of universities from, say, a medieval historian. This supposition cannot be substantiated from the historical material of this chapter, for in the very great literature of recent years on the nature and purposes of universities there is comparatively little written by natural scientists. But perhaps the case may go by default. Historians and philosophers very frequently refer to the university as a

guardian of knowledge, but I know of no sustained account ascribing this purpose to universities written by a physical scientist. And I think it may be agreed that academics working in applied studies are likely to hold a different view of a university - for example, with regard to the propriety of considering the university to be a centre of learning - from those engaged in studies which are not immediately "useful", even if the difference involves only a different order of priorities.

I:60 I conclude, then, that history reveals a confusion of ideas on the purposes of universities. Because the criteria of determining what would count as a proper purpose of a university are not settled, a proliferation of purposes has been proposed, and the contemporary observer seems kept uncertain as well. In any university today there is likely to exist a considerable variety of opinion on what universities should be and do. This is not to deny that trends of thought and practice can be distinguished. I think Edmund King may be correct when he distinguishes four phases of the role of universities, the fourth and present phase implying "a social and political reinterpretation of the university's responsibility".¹ This may well sum up the trend of current thought on universities. The confusion which I have been describing is that which faces the theorist when attempting to determine whether this trend should be supported or opposed.

I:61 Modern universities encourage the propagation of ideas, and this is undoubtedly one reason why there is a

voluminous literature on purposes. Until recently, however, it was never doubted that with all the discussion and debate universities would still be able to operate without becoming quite chaotic. Healey and Holloway have observed that in discussions about university education in England a Newman-type view seems to prevail, while a frankly utilitarian view is accepted as a basis for action. The relationships between stated purposes and action are not always clear. In suggesting that a confusion of ideas exists on the purposes of universities, I am not suggesting that universities are likely to become impossible to operate. As I will suggest in a later chapter, academics generally seem to hold the view that a wide range of purposes are proper for universities. They tend to write about purposes when they fear that one or more of this range is in danger of neglect. As universities are always in transition there is a constant stream of literature on purposes. What Eric Ashby says of the relations of universities with their societies, then, may be generally true of statements on the purposes of universities.

... I wonder whether this very rhythm of recurrent enthusiasms, now for utilitarianism and now for the esoteric training of an élite, now with emphasis on the highly trained professional and now on the broad humanist, may not itself be the nearest to a solution we can ever hope to get. For the university, if it is not completely submerged in it, must reach some sort of equilibrium with it. There will be what the scientists call a dynamic equilibrium; always drifting this way and that, always adjusting itself. Physical equilibria of this sort are subject to what is called Le Chatelier's Principle ... at the risk of being rash.

I do wonder whether the response of a university to pressure from society should not bear some resemblance to Le Chatelier's Principle.¹

Some theorists fear that universities are becoming submerged in society, that with the greater interest of governments in universities certain purposes will dominate and others be swept away. This is one reason for looking carefully at official as opposed to personal views of what universities are for and how they should fit into systems of higher education and learning. And this is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ROLE OF THE UNIVERSITY IN THREE PATTERNS OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND LEARNING

... the universities can do no more than reflect a purpose which is instilled by the government. R.A. Butler, The Responsibilities of Education.¹

Introduction

II:1 Since the early nineteenth century governments have taken an increasingly lively interest in the universities. Of course emperors, monarchs, popes, princes and parliaments had often founded universities and intervened in university affairs, but from the early nineteenth century there can be traced a growing governmental concern that universities should serve their societies well. State universities were founded in America and in the Australian colonies.² And the appointment of Royal Commissions to inquire into the state of the universities of Scotland and, though belatedly, Oxford and Cambridge and Trinity College Dublin established precedents which have been followed repeatedly.³

II:2 It is only comparatively recently, however, that governments have seen a need to sort out what universities should do in relation to other sectors and institutions of higher education and learning. Important here has been the recognition that the progress of highly developed technological societies is largely dependent on the

² Above, pp. 9f and 20f.
liveliness of higher education and research. Subsequent involvement in educational planning, development of non-university sectors in higher education and the funding of higher education and research has made many governments aware that they need to be clear on, and possibly to regulate, the functions of the different institutions. Governments seek to ensure that the needs of the community are being catered for, and require information about institutions so that they can apportion funds correctly to accord with governmental policy. At least, therefore, they must ascertain institutional and sectorial objectives.

In California, the United Kingdom and Australia - the three governmental areas with which this chapter is concerned - governments have gone to different lengths to regulate higher education and learning. Since the second world war the pattern has been to appoint commissions of inquiry to determine the nature of existing institutions and community needs, and then for governments to take action on the basis of the reports by founding new institutions, providing additional funds, setting up continuing boards of inquiry and the like. From these proceedings an observer is able to learn something of what purposes a government sees as appropriate to different institutions and sectors. Sometimes these purposes are explicitly set out in government regulations, especially the purposes which governments ascribe to non-university institutions. But government spokesmen tend

1 J.K. Galbraith claims that it is because education has replaced financial capital as the decisive factor of production in the industrial system that it owes its power and prestige. The New Industrial State, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1967, p. 283 f.
to be loath to lay down strict criteria for activities appropriate to universities - probably because this could be seen as a direct challenge to the autonomy of universities, particularly their right to name their own objectives. It is customary, however, to illustrate the purposes ascribed to non-university institutions by reference to what it is thought universities have done well in the past and, by implication at least, what it is thought they should continue to do.

II:4 This chapter is concerned with the purposes officially ascribed to universities in the three governmental areas just named. By official ascription I mean statements of purposes in governmental regulations, statements by government officials, and accounts of purposes made by commissions of inquiry which seem to have met with governmental approval. An examination of these official ascriptions of purpose is justified because it is anyway important for universities to know what influential governments would have them do and because those academics and administrators who fear governmental influence need to be supplied with accurate information on the intentions of governments. In terms of the plan of this thesis: it is necessary to inquire whether governmental views could resolve the confusion of ideas in the purposes which academics ascribe to universities. This could be important in respect of institutional coherence and the responsibilities of academics and universities. And the next chapter requires information on the degree to which governments have attempted to direct universities.
Universities in the California Master Plan

II:5  Greater detail than was given in chapter one on the development of the American university can now be found in several substantial volumes. Here it is necessary to recall only that following the development of land grant institutions after the Land Grant College Act of 1862, and the rise of scientific or empirical investigation in the eighteen-seventies, the American university was engaging in a great variety of activities by the early years of the twentieth century. Thus, when junior colleges were first developed in California in the years before the first world war, they were conceived by educational theorists of the time not as providing something quite different in education from the universities but as extending secondary schooling along the lines worked out in universities and four year colleges, and the first legislation enabling the establishment of junior colleges in California specified that their courses should approximate those in the first two years of university courses. It was not until the middle 'twenties and early 'thirties that terminal courses were begun for students who would not later transfer to four year institutions. Then, during and after the second world war, the junior colleges involved themselves in adult education, and it was from this time that they began to be called "community colleges". The junior or community college is

1 E.G., L.R. Veysey, The Emergence of the American University, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965; Brubacher and Rudy, op. cit.
4 Ibid., p. 5.
5 Ibid.
II:6 The expansion of junior colleges coupled with the development of the old Californian normal schools into state colleges produced a crisis in the years immediately after the second world war in the division of labour between the various institutions of higher education, and a committee of inquiry was set up by the Liaison Committee of the Regents of the University of California and the State Board of Education. Its report — "the Strayer Report" — examined the functions which the junior colleges, state colleges and the University of California were then performing and cited legislation relevant to the then current division of labour. There was a special examination of what the University should be doing in the interests of the State and nation. The committee recommended that all institutions do some university-type undergraduate teaching, but that the junior colleges should take special responsibility for technical curricula, the state colleges for occupational curricula (which was defined as the level between the technical training of the junior colleges and the work of professional and research departments of the University) and the University for graduate and professional education and research. A second survey accepted this principle of differentiation; but it

3 Ibid., pp. 4-45.
4 Ibid., pp. 36-45.
was found that while some courses could easily be assigned - medicine was to be offered only in the University - it was difficult to make distinctions in courses like business administration, in which the differences between types of institution would need to be "mainly those of emphasis", and in liberal studies, in which overlapping between the institutions would be justified.  

II:7 In the late 'fifties projections of the proportion of high school graduates who would wish to proceed to higher education revealed that a very great burden would fall in the next decade on the State's public colleges - the proportion of students in private colleges being much lower in California than in the eastern states. At the same time a number of Californian colleges were putting forward ambitious proposals to extend their activities; some junior colleges were anxious to offer four year courses leading to bachelors' degrees, and the state colleges wanted "the efficiency of freedom" to manage their own affairs, engage in research and award doctorates. As a result, in June 1959, a new team was appointed to survey the State's needs in higher education for the period 1960-1975 and to make recommendations "so that unnecessary duplication will be avoided". The inquiry was confined to the University of California and the public colleges, no recommendations being made about the private institutions such as Stanford University and the California Institute of Technology.

2 Master Plan Survey Team, op. cit., p. 27.
3 Ibid., p. xi.
The Master Plan Survey Team accepted the differentiation of institutional function principle adopted by the earlier committees but formulated a new statement of functions which it recommended should be written in as an amendment to the State Constitution, so that the differentiation would have the force of law and that '... the difficulty of amendment will give a new era of stability to public higher education.' The recommendations were incorporated in State legislation, and those which are relevant to the purposes of this thesis are recorded in the Appendix. Very briefly, these recommendations were that each institution should strive for excellence in its sphere as defined. Junior colleges: the standard courses leading to transfer to higher institutions, vocational-technical courses leading straight to employment and general or liberal arts courses. State colleges would provide instruction in the liberal arts and sciences, the professions, and applied fields, at undergraduate level; teacher education to the master's degree; and in certain circumstances offer the doctoral degree in conjunction with the University. The University would provide instruction in the liberal arts and sciences and the professions including teacher education, and would have sole responsibility for training in the professions of dentistry, law, medicine, veterinary medicine, and graduate architecture. It could award the doctor's degree in all fields of learning and would be "the primary state-supported academic agency for research". The establishment was proposed of the Co-ordinating Council for Higher

1 Ibid., p. 37.
Education, an advisory body whose functions were to make recommendations on the financial support of the institutions, to interpret the regulations on functional differentiation and plan the "orderly growth" of higher education in the State. 

To see these recommendations and the subsequent legislation in proper perspective, it must be noted that entry to the different segments of higher education was regulated. The University recruited from the top 12½% of high school graduates; state colleges from the top third.

By state legislation, any high school graduate or person over the age of eighteen "who is capable of profiting from the instruction offered" must be admitted to a junior college, although there are limitations concerning the actual college to which an applicant must be admitted.

The University of California, then, was designated to be at the peak of the state system of higher education concerning its curriculum, degree of general autonomy and right of making degree awards. Nevertheless, in comparison with the non-public colleges and universities of the State, its freedom was somewhat restricted in these areas. And this is to be contrasted with that of the universities of the United Kingdom.

2 Committee on Higher Education (the Robbins Committee), Higher Education, Appendix Five, Annexe S, p. 284.
Universities in the United Kingdom

II:11 In the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge the United Kingdom has a long history of higher education, but technical and technological institutions are of comparatively recent origin. In the nineteenth century a variety of institutions was established to cater for people who had received little formal schooling and could attend evening classes. By the end of the century, some colleges had been developed to offer training to degree or professional qualification level. And in the years before the first world war a number of trade schools were established. But it was only after the second world war that large-scale development of day and full-time courses in these various institutions was generally effected.¹

Ex-servicemen discharged at the end of the second world war were permitted to take up student grants for university study in appropriate technical colleges, and this consolidated the degree work which had been developing in a number of these institutions.²

II:12 In 1945 the Percy Committee on Higher Technical Education³ reported that post-war expansion of higher education should take place in technical colleges as well as in universities, but the recommendation was ignored and the position of technical colleges in higher education became uncertain during the early 'fifties. Then in 1952 the government began to make special grants to local education

authorities for technical colleges doing work at more or less university level. It was during these years that the need was recognized for improving education in order to modernize British industry and increase productivity, and a government white paper announced in 1956 that some technical institutions were to be expanded and advanced technical studies concentrated in them. In the event, ten of the many technical institutions doing advanced work were developed into colleges of advanced technology. Previously, technical institutions had prepared students for external and occasionally internal degrees of the University of London. But with the establishment of the National Council for Technological Awards in 1955, the Diploma in Technology was created and it was for this award that students in the colleges of advanced technology prepared - a qualification which was held to be of university honours degree standard.

II:13 Thus there was at the time of the Robbins Committee investigations a variety of institutions preparing students for university degrees or qualifications of a similar standard. When the Committee surveyed the United Kingdom institutions of higher education it concluded that '... it would be a misnomer to speak of a system of higher education in this country, if by system is meant a consciously co-ordinated organization.' Noticing that higher education was "so obviously and rightly of great public concern" and so largely financed from public funds, the Committee felt that it was '... difficult to defend the continued absence of co-ordinating principles and a general conception of

2 Robbins Report, p. 4.
Assuming, then, that there should be a system, the Committee addressed itself to rationalizing the activities of the different institutions and sectors. Four aims of higher education, considered to be fundamental, were set out, and - importantly - it was suggested that ideally each of these should have some representation in every institution of higher education. The Committee also assumed that differentiation of institutional function was necessary with different institutions having different functions and emphases. It was argued that as the nation needed different functions to be performed, different kinds of institution were equally important and valuable. In this spirit the Committee was unequivocal that equal academic awards must be given for equal performance, and recommended that the colleges of advanced technology be granted charters to become universities. But convinced of the rightness of the differentiation of function, it suggested that the

1 Ibid., p. 5.
2 In abbreviated form, these were:
   We begin with instruction in skills suitable to play a part in the general division of labour.
   But, secondly, while emphasising that there is no betrayal of values when institutions of higher education teach what will be of some practical use, we must postulate that what is taught should be taught in such a way as to promote the general powers of the mind. The aim should be to produce not mere specialists but rather cultivated men and women.
   Thirdly, we must name the advancement of learning.
   Finally there is a function that is more difficult to describe concisely, but that is none the less fundamental: the transmission of a common culture and common standards of citizenship.

   Our contention is that, although the extent to which each principle is realised in the various types of institution will vary, yet, ideally, there is room for at least a speck of each in all. The system as a whole must be judged deficient unless it provides adequately for all of them. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
3 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
institutions might wish to call themselves "technological universities" to publicize the special approach to learning which they had developed as colleges of advanced technology.\footnote{Ibid., p. 131.}

It was also in this spirit that the Committee recommended the establishment of a Council for National Academic Awards to regulate the award of qualifications outside the universities and make possible the awarding of degrees for work of university standard done in other institutions. Both the development of colleges of advanced technology into full universities and the establishment of the Council for National Academic Awards were accepted by the government.

\footnote{This was suggested by Lord Robbins to Professor B. Ford in an interview, 'Report on Robbins', Universities Quarterly, 20:1, December 1965, p. 7.}

Later evidence suggests that the Robbins Committee envisaged that when other technical institutions doing university standard work expanded sufficiently they too should become universities,\footnote{Department of Education and Science, 'The Role in Higher Education of Regional and Other Technical Colleges Engaged in Advanced Work' (Administrative Memorandum 7/65), Circulars and Administrative Memoranda 1st January 1965-31st December'1965, London: HMSO 1966, (abbreviated below to Administrative Memorandum 7/65) p. 3.}

but the government of the day decided in 1965 that there would be no new universities or accessions to university status for ten years.\footnote{For an account of the government's motivation in this, see J.R. Lukes, 'The Binary Policy: a Critical Study', Universities Quarterly, 22:1, December 1967, pp. 6-46.} It was also decided that there should be strict differentiation made between universities and technical institutions doing advanced work.\footnote{\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\unthesections\untheses
"the Woolwich Speech" and which was later issued in abridged form by the Department of Education and Science as an administrative memorandum.\(^1\) In this address and a subsequent speech at Lancaster University on 20th January 1967,\(^2\) an attempt was made to distinguish the roles in higher education of universities and non-university technological institutions doing advanced work.\(^3\)

II:15 In his Woolwich speech Crosland indicated that the government endorsed the view of the Robbins Committee that there should be a system of higher education in the United Kingdom. But whereas the Committee had held that differentiation should be '... based on the nature of the work done and the organisation appropriate to it ...',\(^4\) Crosland seemed to imply that the organizational structure should determine the nature of the work done. Pointing to twin traditions of autonomous and public institutions of higher education in the United Kingdom, he asserted that they must form the base of the system, '... with each sector making its own distinctive contribution to the whole.'\(^5\) Technical colleges would rightly continue to work in higher education in part at a lower standard than degree level courses. But in the courses in which the colleges complement the work of the universities they should '... exploit their own traditions and standards of excellence, and develop the fields in which they can make their own distinctive contribution to meeting

\(^1\) Administrative Memorandum 7/65, op. cit.
\(^3\) Reviews of later speeches by ministers of the Labour Government suggest that nothing new was added to the bases of distinction set out in these early speeches. See Times Educational Supplement, 16th May 1969, p. 1623 and 6 June 1969, p. 1866.
\(^4\) Robbins Report, p. 9.
\(^5\) Administrative Memorandum 7/65, p. 1.
society's needs.\(^1\) Concerning the technical college traditions, the only components listed by Crosland were service to industry, business and the professions.\(^2\) The modest implication of this would seem to be that universities do (if not properly do) stand further removed from the application of knowledge than technical colleges, concerning themselves more, presumably, with the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. This idea is again implicit in Crosland's speech at Lancaster in 1967. While he denied that he wanted a rigid dividing line between the sectors (having, at Woolwich, merely accepted the existing "strikingly varied, plural and diverse system") he nevertheless wanted polytechnics to be distinctive from universities. Polytechnics would be more comprehensive, offering in addition to degree courses studies which would be of higher education, but not degree, standard. Polytechnics would emphasize teaching, although research to serve the needs of local industry or to enlarge the understanding of staff of their own disciplines would be allowed. And degrees from the Council for National Academic Awards would be comparable in standard to university degrees but not slavish copies of them.\(^3\)

II:16 While it was made explicit that the universities of the United Kingdom were officially expected to perform a distinctive role in higher education, these speeches reveal only by implication what that role should be. Their right

1 \textit{Ibid.}, p. 5.
2 \textit{Ibid.}, p. 4.
3 E. Robinson, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 252-255.
to autonomy appears to be assumed. They are expected to take responsibility for the greater part of the research - especially fundamental research - that is assigned to higher education institutions. They are expected to engage in the pursuit and dissemination of knowledge without it necessarily being tied to immediately useful purposes. And it is implied that they should not be comprehensive institutions taking in all levels of higher education students, but should work at the highest levels of scholarship, catering for students who have the same interests as designated for the institution.

In 1957 a national committee of inquiry on Australian universities, under the chairmanship of Sir Keith Murray, recommended an expansion of Australian universities to include all education for the professions and support of the universities with federal government finance. The establishment was also recommended of a permanent commission to act as a liaison body between the universities and the state and federal governments and to report every three years on the needs and desirable development of the universities.¹

The Australian Universities Commission was subsequently set up, and it was a committee of the Commission which was appointed, under the chairmanship of Sir Leslie Martin, in August 1961, to consider the future development of tertiary education "in relation to the needs and resources of Australia".² The Martin Committee was made aware of the very great expansion which Australian society would require of higher education. But noting the unreal demands made on universities in the past, it recommended that the expansion take place in the non-university sectors as well as in the universities, and particularly that technical education institutions be expanded and modernized.³

With the existing universities, technical and teachers' colleges and the findings of Robbins before it, the

³ Ibid., pp. 172-175.
Martin Committee readily accepted the case for maintaining and increasing the diversity of Australian higher education. It saw a particular danger in higher education becoming identified in the mind of the community with university education. 'Ability is a many-sided quality.', the report reads; and again: young people display '... a varying range of ability and a broad array of educational objectives.' The prestige of the universities and the comparative weakness of technical institutions was seen to result in a wastage of talent:

The objective of the education provided by a technical college is to equip men and women for the practical world of industry and commerce, teaching them the way in which manufacturing and business are carried on and the fundamental rules which govern their successful operation. The university course, on the other hand, tends to emphasize the development of knowledge and the importance of research; in doing so it imparts much information which is valuable to the practical man but which is often incidental to the main objective. Both types of education are required by the community, and in increasing amounts, but it is important that students receive the kind of education best suited to their innate abilities and purposes in life. At present, certain pressures tend to overtax the academic ability of a considerable segment of the student population which could be better provided for in institutions offering courses of different orientation and less exacting academically.

Accordingly, the Committee recommended the development of the technical sector of higher education through the establishment of state institutes of colleges which would co-ordinate existing technical colleges offering tertiary courses, agricultural colleges and colleges of specialist technologies, and such new institutions as might be approved by the state institutes. By providing for students with different interests, this sector would relieve pressure on

1 Martin Report, p. 175.
2 Ibid., p. 36.
3 Ibid., p. 165.
the universities, the proportion of university enrolments being calculated to fall from 58% of the total tertiary enrolment in 1963 to about 50% by 1975. The colleges in this non-university sector should not simply provide technical education; liberal courses should support the technical, although the colleges should resist the temptation to copy the universities. 2

II:20 The Commonwealth Government accepted these recommendations in principle, but the development of the non-university sectors did not perfectly follow the Committee's recommendations. The Committee had seen tertiary education as a whole, had recommended that there be one continuing Australian Tertiary Education Commission to extend the operation of the Australian Universities Commission to the other sectors, 3 and had pointed out the need for ease of transfer between sectors. 4 What actually happened was that the technical education sector was developed with great emphasis on the way technical institutions differed from universities and with little attention to the positive relationships between the sectors. The Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Advanced Education was set up as something of a counterpart to the Australian Universities Commission instead of the latter being expanded into a Tertiary Education Commission. Where the Martin Committee had been clear that the new technical institutions should provide courses which were academically less exacting, spokesman in the colleges and the government suggested that

1 Martin Report, p. 15.
2 Ibid., pp. 183-184.
3 Ibid., pp. 195-197.
4 Ibid., p. 175.
as the colleges were aiming at a different type of excellence they would become "equal but different" from the universities.

II:21 Controversy on the respective roles in higher education and learning of universities and colleges of advanced education has prompted a number of official statements. In its first report in 1966 the Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Advanced Education set out its understanding of how the colleges were to differ from universities.\(^1\) Perhaps most importantly it considered that college students would tend to be interested in the application more than the development of knowledge and less concerned with a subject as a body of discipline. By contrast with the universities, the colleges should have (in summary form):

(a) Students with somewhat different types of interests;
(b) A greater concentration upon part-time studies associated with employment, especially in scientific fields;
(c) A more applied emphasis;
(d) A more direct and intimate relationship with industry and other relevant organizations;
(e) Far less attention to post-graduate training and research;
(f) A primary emphasis on teaching.\(^2\)

The distinctions indicated here were not perfectly clear to everyone, and the discussion continued. Much was made of the colleges' vocational emphasis, but universities in Australia had often been criticized for having been too vocationally orientated.\(^3\)

2 Ibid., p. 23.
of the Advanced Education Branch of the Commonwealth Department of Education and Science wrote that the term "advanced education" was meant to indicate that the colleges '... are educational institutions teaching at the post secondary level with a vocational bias and offering courses leading to professional competence in a range of disciplines', his description could be taken to apply to Australian universities.

In its second report, the Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Advanced Education was less rigid in its remarks on the criteria for advanced education:

Since our First Report we have considered further the part which the colleges play in tertiary education and we have had the opportunity to visit them again to discuss their aims with both councils and staff, and are now able to see more clearly their future role. We emphasise, however, that we are dealing with an evolving concept not susceptible to close definition.

One development in thinking has been a new idea of the importance of research in the colleges, a matter which relates significantly to the role which universities are officially expected to play. The original Wark Report did not see research as an important aspect of the colleges' programme, but the 1969 Report welcomes the idea:

We would welcome an increase in demand for the services of the colleges in professional consulting or in investigational work for industry. Through the normal grants system we are prepared to encourage colleges gradually to acquire facilities for research clearly related to industrial problems and of significance to the teaching programme.

3 Ibid., p. 3.
The chairman of the Committee, while remaining opposed to the ideas that the colleges develop "the scholastic outlook of the universities" or engage in basic research, suggests that short-term research closely related to the needs of industry should be developed in the colleges to the relief of the universities which would be freed to concentrate on longer-term fundamental research.1

II:23 A number of statements on the proper distinctions between universities and colleges of advanced education were made by the Minister who was then in charge of Education and Science. In an address of March 1969, the Minister paid deference to the autonomy of universities, saying on the question of the propriety of external studies in universities that 'Neither the Commonwealth nor the State Government ought to have or in fact has any wish to bring pressure on a university to do something it does not wish to do.'2 And he accepted that strict differentiation between the universities and colleges was impossible:

Let me say at the outset that neither institution fits neatly into a compartment. We are not going to be able to make a neat division of areas of activity and say that those matters are the responsibility of a university and those the responsibility of the colleges. In some areas their responsibilities will be overlapping, although they will need to try and avoid this as much as possible.3

In addition he seemed to accept that a university's prime responsibility is '... to train those with an analytical mind,

2 M. Fraser, 'External Study Facilities and the Relationship of Advanced Colleges to Universities', (Unpublished address to the annual meeting of Convocation at the University of Melbourne on Friday, 28th March, 1969) p. 2.
3 Ibid., p. 6.
and to train them to reason rationally and without emotion.\(^1\)

He admitted that students with "a good measure of analytical and imaginative capacity" would be found in the colleges as well, but he considered that college students would tend to be differently inclined and particularly "more vocationally minded".\(^2\) While liberal studies in the colleges should be closely related to vocations, it was proper for universities to engage largely in activities such as education and research purely for their own sake.\(^3\) The colleges should aim for close relationship with industry and commerce, but there are significant areas of university activity where this would not be appropriate.\(^4\)

II:24 In this March address the Minister continually emphasized the difficulty of strictly differentiating the work of the two sectors. But in a paper prepared for the Conference on Planning in Higher Education held at Armidale in August 1969 he was more definite that there are two main groups of young people - the practically minded and the analytically minded - and that the advanced colleges and universities correspond to these main groups.

The universities offer an analytical, theoretical kind of education supported by practical work. That is obvious in university teaching of the sciences, but is just as true of much of their teaching of the Arts. If you major in French or Japanese, you are expected to study the language and the literature and culture of the country analytically and, in addition, to become proficient in the practical use of the language. But the emphasis is on the analytical. Not all school-leavers are well served by the kind of analytical education which universities offer. On one or both of two grounds, they may be ill-served by that kind of education. They may not have the kind of mind which comfortably and naturally adopts the analytical approach,

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 9.  
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 7.  
\(^3\) Ibid., p. 8.  
\(^4\) Ibid., pp. 8-9.
or they may be quite capable of tackling it, but wholly lacking interest in it. We ought to provide higher education for both types of mind and that, in the case of the most able of both types, is why we need the advanced colleges as well as the universities.¹

The Minister gave his opinion that it was not necessary for the colleges to do what universities do to win esteem. When they successfully serve human needs in their own particular way they are accorded esteem - '... not the esteem given to the universities, but esteem equally high, given for the good performance of their own proper function.'² He also declared that the colleges should not enter into the field of training for research degrees such as the Ph.D., as this would lead to adaptation of their normal courses to fit students for starting research degrees and would lead eventually to the failure of the colleges as alternatives to the universities.³

II:25 To summarize official attitudes on the role of universities in the context of higher education and learning between 1966 and 1969: universities were expected to cater for a different type of student, the student with an analytical mind whose aim was disinterested learning. Studies would be made primarily for their own sake and research in universities would be fundamental in nature rather than serving the immediate needs of industry. Only the university should offer the Ph.D. degree. It is to be admitted that official spokesmen often spoke descriptively rather than prescriptively; but their intention was to indicate gaps which the colleges should fill, and by implication where it

² Ibid., p. 3.
³ Ibid., p. 4.
was not explicit they accepted that universities should continue to perform the functions to which allusion has been made.

II:26 In order to round off the account of views on the respective roles of colleges and universities which has been given in this section, three additional statements should be recorded. In its 1969 report the Australian Universities Commission used the same words as the Minister had used - "students with analytical ability and a measure of imaginative power" - to describe the students which universities try to select. ¹ It agreed that these abilities would be valuable to students in the advanced colleges, but for the purposes of the colleges not the most essential. The colleges should emphasize practical qualities, "such as are required in certain managerial positions", and they should not engage in teaching for research degrees. ² But the Conference on Planning in Higher Education held in the University of New England unanimously rejected the Minister's account of the main grouping of young people:

The conference considered that Australia needs a co-ordinated system of higher education. This will best be served by the development of a diversity of institutions offering a multiplicity of courses to cater for a wide range of individual needs and preferences. The system should not be constructed on the basis of two or three narrowly specified types of institutions since students do not fall into simply defined groups such as those with analytical minds and those with practical minds, or those with vocational and those with non-vocational interests. ³

² Ibid., pp. 4-5.
And the present Minister for Education and Science has stated that he is reluctant to define the role of universities:

I am reluctant to enlarge on the place of the university in society, because society is organic and dynamic and so are universities. It follows that the relations of the two are constantly changing and to try to define a particular place for the university in society is to suggest a static situation which seldom prevails.¹

¹ Unpublished address By the Honourable Nigel H. Bowen, Q.C., M.P., Minister for Education and Science, At the Ceremony for the Conferring of Degrees of the Australian National University on Thursday, 7th May 1970, p. 1.
Conclusion

II:27 In each of the patterns of higher education and learning considered in this chapter there has been a similar series of events. Projections of the expansion of higher education have led to the appointment of an official committee of inquiry which has recommended that the expansion be spread over different sectors or segments of the system, the different sectors maintaining distinctive functions. Governments have largely accepted these recommendations and tried to maintain separate identities for the sectors. From this point the similarities become less marked. In California the different roles of institutions were written into the State Constitution; in the United Kingdom and Australia preservation of the distinctions between sectors has been attempted by exerting influence on the less autonomous non-university sectors. The need for continuous consideration of these distinctions is everywhere apparent. In Australia, for instance, the Australian Universities Commission has announced that it will no longer support new courses that would be more appropriate in a college of advanced education.\(^1\) This suggests the need for some central body to make regulations or at least advise on them. In California one of the functions of the Co-ordinating Council for Higher Education is to interpret the legislation on functional differentiation between the sectors. There is no comparable body in Australia or the United Kingdom. And in these two countries official statements regarding the distinctive role of universities have tended to be very general, probably in

deference to the universities' traditions of autonomy.

II:28 In California, too, the regulations concerning the distinctive role of the University are rather general. As in the cases of Australia and the United Kingdom, official attitudes would seem to allow that a range of activities is appropriate of a university. Something of a global view of what is appropriate to a university emerges. Universities are to be distinctive in working at the highest levels of scholarship; in concentrating on theoretical rather than vocational studies; in being the home of research; and in possessing the greatest autonomy of the institutions under consideration. This view of the purposes of universities does not do much towards resolving the confusion of ideas on the purposes of universities which we saw in the first chapter. It does not settle whether education or the advancement of knowledge should be put first, or whether a university must concern itself only with cognitive rationality. No reference to "the idea of a university" was noted in official statements, but the view which emerges would seem to allow that a university should be a centre of learning and the institution through which society is criticized and advances in civilization principally made.¹

II:29 It will be recalled that the Robbins Committee recommended that all institutions of higher education take part in "the transmission of a common culture and common standards of citizenship".² There is nothing, however, in official statements on the necessity of a common learning in higher education. In each of these societies in the

¹ See above, pp. 48f and 63-64.
² See above, p. 82.
'sixties, the prevalent attitude was that diversity must be furthered. The case for diversity was summed up thus by T.R. McConnell:

Everything we know about human variability, not only in aptitude and achievement but also in interests, motivations, attitudes, values and intellectual dispositions, emphasizes the need for a highly diversified educational system. Likewise, the more we learn about the highly differentiated manpower required by a complicated industrial, technological society, the more we appreciate the importance of differential educational opportunities. Furthermore, our growing perception of the almost infinite nuances of human sensibilities dictates a preference for variety rather than uniformity in educational arrangements.1

But theorists on education have been prone to taking holistic views and referring approvingly to conceptions like "the unity of knowledge" and "the unity of education", and opposition developed to strict separation of the segments of higher education.

II:30 It had been recognized in the official reports that the work of universities and other institutions would overlap. In California it was accepted that each of the sectors would offer courses in the liberal arts and sciences,2 and details of how the University of California was to co-operate with other institutions was incorporated in the legislation.3 In the United Kingdom, the Robbins Committee pointed out that the same sort of study was to be found in different institutions and recommended a single Grants Commission for the whole of Great Britain.4 This proved unacceptable to the government, and diversity continued to be emphasized by the succeeding Labour Government. In the 1965 Woolwich

2 Master Plan Survey Team, op. cit., p. 36.
3 Ibid., p. 37.
speech of the Secretary of State for Education and Science it was stated that there should be "mutual understanding and healthy rivalry" where the work of the sectors overlapped. In the 1969 speech at Woolwich by Edward Short - the new Secretary of State for Education and Science - much greater emphasis was laid on co-operation between the sectors, the Secretary hoping '... that the sharing of facilities and of specially qualified staff, the conjoint provision of specialist courses, especially designed to update professional and managerial personnel within industry, will all grow apace.' Short also predicted that higher education would rapidly evolve because of its close connection with a changing economy, that universities and polytechnics would inevitably change, and the barriers between them be reduced because of their influence on each other. In Australia the Martin Committee was clear that the work of the sectors would overlap, and like Robbins recommended a single Tertiary Education Commission, a proposal which met the same fate as the Robbins recommendation. Early in 1969 the Minister for Education and Science stated that colleges of advanced education and universities should try and avoid "as much as possible" the overlapping of areas of responsibility. But as we have seen, there is now a considerable body of opinion that higher education and learning should not be strictly segmented but should be made up of widely diversified institutions.

2 E.g., p. 165 of Martin Report.
3 Ibid., pp. 195-197.
4 N. Fraser, 'External Study Facilities and the Relationship of Advanced Colleges to Universities' (Unpublished address to the annual meeting of Convocation at the University of Melbourne on Friday, 28 March, 1969), p. 6.
5 See above, p. 95.
It would be interesting to speculate on the factors in these societies which have led to the different degrees of official specification of the role of universities. The numbers entering higher education, comparative traditions of university independence, and the existence of non-state institutions would probably prove important. What is certain is that the development of new institutions and attempts to settle distinctive features on the sectors represent moves to make the provision of higher education and learning more systematic. Generally, universities seem to have welcomed the development of planning and systematization in higher education and learning. But some academics have taken the view that these processes threaten some of the purposes ascribed to universities. The effects on universities of the systematization of higher education is the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER THREE

THE SYSTEMATIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND LEARNING

It does not matter that universities depend on patronage. They always have. What matters is that the patrons should be enlightened by those who enjoy their patronage. Eric Ashby, 'The British Universities - I: Patronage'.

Everybody's children in Everybody's university...

The professor had to decide whether he would endeavour to make the university a school of higher education or merely a higher school of education. Carl Becker, 'On Being a Professor'.

Introduction

III:1 In the previous chapters it has been shown that many different personal views are taken on the purposes proper to universities and that, at least in the societies studied, official statements allow universities to engage in a wide range of activities. But universities are no longer completely free to do as they wish. For a variety of reasons there is everywhere steady movement towards greater systematization of higher education and learning.

III:2 This chapter is concerned with the question of how well universities lend themselves to this systematization. Examination of concepts of "higher education" and the nature of the planning and systematization of higher education and learning indicates that conflict is likely to arise between academics holding certain views of the university and the planners. My conclusions, however, are that the conflict is not a necessary one, and that planning and systematization may in fact afford the means by which minority views of

---

1 E. Ashby, 'The British Universities - I: Patronage', The Listener, 10 March 1955, p. 422.
higher education and the purposes of universities may be preserved and put into practice.

**Concepts of Higher Education**

**III:2** So far in this thesis "higher education" has been used to mean simply courses of study provided in universities and colleges which continue above the level of courses at the upper limits of secondary education and, relatedly, as a generic name for the different institutions which collectively provide such courses. "Higher Education", however, has been much used with other than these structural meanings to stand for a highly normative concept of the matter appropriate to education at this level. In this sense it has often been used to refer to one of the sorts of education traditionally afforded in universities.

**III:3** I cannot recall if Newman ever used the term "higher education", but the "philosophy" he saw as the most appropriate outcome of university studies, the intellectual enlargement which permits the seeing of things in their mutual relations, is roughly the end in view in this highly normative concept of "higher education". Pattison, however, did use the term, and his conception of the outcome of a liberal education is almost identical with Newman's "philosophy". In his essay 'Oxford Studies' which was originally published in 1855, Pattison agreed that university studies should culminate in the "philosophical spirit": '... it is not knowledge, but a discipline, that is required; not science, but the scientific habit; not erudition, but scholarship.' He urged that this spirit could not be

1 Above, p. 7.
developed by the elementary studies then customary in the University: 'When the elementary, which can be taught as rule and dogmatically, has been passed, we arrive at those parts of the subject where experiment and discovery in the physical, and speculation in the moral sciences begin. This is the very vital sphere of the higher education.'

He recognized that civilization required increasing subdivision of professional training, but he considered that universities should aim at developing this philosophical spirit, the resultant "commanding superiority", the "enlargement of mind", the "grasp of things as they are", "clearsightedness", "sagacity" and "philosophical reach of the mind" remedying the fragmentation of the professions.

For Pattison, then, "higher" in "higher education" referred not only to a level in the structure of educational studies but to the matter and methods of studies as well. He saw the culmination of higher education in a person's ability to test his own beliefs.

III:4 Such normative concepts of higher education which go beyond narrow professional preparation to include the development of powers of synthesis and even wisdom may, perhaps, be designated as "elemental" concepts of higher education. This will serve to distinguish them from "structural" concepts of higher education, which are structural in the sense that they refer to levels at which institutions operate, such as post-secondary. Of course, in historical context, Newman and Pattison were thinking only

1 Ibid., p. 421.
2 Ibid., p. 460.
3 Ibid., p. 422.
of universities as affording this sort of higher education, and "higher education" came to be used frequently for the sort of education which it was thought universities provided or ought to provide. The result was that in some places "higher education" was officially used as the equivalent of university education or universities collectively. The clearest example of this is Canada, where - at least until recently - it was possible to refer to universities as the only instance of higher education in that country, teachers' colleges, for instance, being officially placed in another category entitled "post-secondary education". It should be noted, however, that with the passage of time "elemental" conceptions of higher education have been described to indicate the sort of education which is appropriate to any institution of higher education in the structural sense.

Marjorie Reeves, for instance, has attempted to set out what should be the characteristics of any full course in higher education, and she has emphasized that this prescription should apply widely and not just to university education.

(a) The purpose of every course should be to introduce the student to an organized body of theoretical knowledge at a level where he can grasp something of the principles on which that subject is built, its scope, methods and assumptions. The approach may be through a practical or applied interest, but unless the course moves beyond mere practical applications, the student does not achieve that "freedom of the subject" which is the mark of higher education.

2 M. Reeves (ed.), Eighteen Plus, Unity and Diversity in Higher Education, London: Faber and Faber, 1965, p. 152f. Because this statement makes a plea for unity rather than diversity in higher education, and because it will be referred to below, it is given here in full.
(b) Every course should contain some opportunity for work in depth, so that the student has an opportunity of receiving one of the essential experiences of higher education, namely, learning how to master material for oneself: how to acquire, arrange, criticize and interpret a body of knowledge.

(c) Higher education should embody a new concept of authority. The student who is beginning to gain the 'freedom of the subject' may listen to authoritative expositions with respect, but yet is entitled to question assumptions and apply techniques of criticism to the very masters from whom he learnt them.

(d) Knowledge should no longer be conceived as a fixed body of material to be handed on, but as an ever-expanding territory in which the landscape frequently changes. The assumption should be that teachers as well as students are always learning, and therefore the experience of listening to an expert changing his mind in the light of fresh evidence or thinking fresh thoughts aloud should be another essential experience of higher education.

(e) The end to which this intellectual activity is directed is not only the creation of a healthy scepticism and critical acuteness, but also the power to make judgements, to commit oneself experimentally to a viewpoint and to form convictions without closing the mind.¹

Her list of necessary characteristics of a full course of higher education thus looks beyond minimal preparation for the professions to outcomes which are not unlike the "philosophy" and "philosophical spirit" which Newman and Pattison saw as the desirable outcome of university studies, and in Pattison's case as the proper outcome of "higher education".

III:5 Some modern theorists have placed considerable emphasis on commitment as the culmination of higher education. B.E. Meland, for instance, in his Higher Education and the Human Spirit,² proposes that there is a goodness "beyond the moral measure" which is the proper object of inquiry in

¹ Ibid., pp. 152-153.
higher education and which can be achieved by a scholar through various imaginative and spiritual experiences.

It is this higher goodness, pre-eminently the qualitative fruition of the sensitively informed imagination and of perceptive awareness, that is the proper preoccupation of the higher learning. All areas of human existence have access to it. Every institution of society can benefit by its presence and operation. Every community, of whatever cultural status, must draw upon its resources. Yet, it is the community of higher education which fixes upon it as an object of inquiry and which assumes its nurture as a sober obligation. In stating the matter in this way, I mean to bring into as sharp a focus as my words can convey, the dedicatory aspect of higher education. I mean to designate that which makes of the higher learning an act of devotion.

Substantially, the rest of Meland's book is a discussion of the ways in which what he conceives as the proper object of higher education may be achieved.

III:6 A second example of "higher education" being given a character beyond intellectual preparation for professional and academic practice is to be found in N. Fehl's The Idea of the University in East and West. Fehl is not concerned with institutions of higher education other than the university, but he is interested in the concept of higher education as he regards it as "the elemental pre-supposition of a university". The first critical distinction between ordinary and higher education, he notes, is found by some people in Plato's Meno. There, the highest knowledge is held to be intuitive, a virtue which is a model for the other virtues, a virtue which Jaeger interprets in the Paideia as "the view of the Good as a whole". In Fehl's view, Western education developed on a pattern with three levels:

1 Ibid., p. 6.
2 N. Fehl, The Idea of the University in East and West, Hong Kong: Chung Chi College, 1962.
3 Ibid., p. 18.
elementary, including the basic skills of communication; intermediate, historically the appropriate studies being literature and history; and at the highest level, the study of philosophy, being critical, interpretive, and creative.  

Fehl asserts that higher education properly deals with principles, is critical and interpretive and not catechetical or mechanical, and is characterized by both a depth of competence and a breadth of perspective. He concludes that higher education is structured "with a view toward ultimate concern", and this he believes has been true of universities in their periods of highest excellence. He fails, however, to specify what he means by "ultimate concern", and he does not offer any criteria independent of his own assumptions and argument by which the universities' periods of highest excellence can be judged.

From these "elemental" accounts of higher education a composite picture can be built up of the sort of university required to institutionalize this sort of higher education. It would be primarily a centre of learning where scholars worked together towards the achievement of a unity of knowledge, but an institution perhaps devoted more to liberal education than the advancement of knowledge. An institutional emphasis on the importance of commitment would result from the principle expressed by Niblett as 'The process of higher education should contain a serious and powerful challenge to finding out what one stands for and also what one does not.'

1 Ibid., p. 20.
2 Ibid., p. 29.
3 Ibid., p. 30.
Today, however, "higher education" is more generally given a "structural" rather than an "elemental" connotation. The situation is complicated because vestiges of the "elemental" usage remain in official formulations, and because in its structural sense "higher education" is considered to start at different stages in different societies. When the editors of The Year Book of Education 1959 attempted to clarify terms like "university", "higher education" and "higher learning", they found that on a global scale the standards of the relevant institutions and the meanings of the terms themselves varied so much that they were forced to use a comparative approach, accepting the usage of the particular country under examination at the time. But even within a particular country it can be difficult to ascertain the precise meaning being given to "higher education". In England, for instance, universities were long deemed to offer "higher education", with the work of technical and teachers' colleges being officially located in "further education". Such simple designations, however, are no longer realistic, the academic nature of studies no longer fitting neatly the organizational structure. As a result of the McNair and Robbins recommendations, teacher training colleges have become "colleges of education" and academically associated with the universities and "higher education", but have remained administratively and financially part of the further education sector. With the development of polytechnics, the Department of Education and

Science has attempted to redefine "higher education", but in terms of standard of entry rather than type of curriculum.  

III:9 Fritz Machlup has suggested that if we did not have to deal with the world as we find it but with an ideal world, it would be well to use a "persuasive" definition of higher education and restrict the designation to institutions which impose intellectually high standards of admission.  

In an ideal world, I take it, he would use "higher" in a structural sense with reference to the intellectual levels of applicants as measured (presumably) by the standard tests of intelligence. But we must deal with the world as it is, and this is the point of departure of W.H. Cowley and D.T. Williams in their article entitled 'The Meaning of "Higher Education"'.  

They argue that as in the United States clear cut structural distinctions have never been made in the classification of educational institutions (they cite the case of junior colleges being legally regarded as part of secondary education in California and higher education in other states), common usage must supply the criteria of "higher education". And they note that the latest edition of Webster's unabridged dictionary reports this common usage as "education beyond the secondary school: education provided by a college or university".  

III:10 The positions on "higher education" assumed by

4 Ibid., p. 507.
Machlup and Cowley and Williams are very far removed from those taken by the exponents of "elemental" concepts of "higher education" which J.S. Brubacher shows are based on philosophical understanding of the nature of man and knowledge and are therefore developed from a reference point independent of history. But it cannot be denied that "higher education" is now used very generally in a structural sense. That is the way it was used in the official reports examined in the preceding chapter. The proposal of Cowley and Williams would seem therefore to be the most satisfactory basis for using "higher education" in future situations. And in the rest of this thesis I shall use "higher education" unqualified as synonymous with "tertiary education" to stand for education provided in universities and colleges which continues above the level of education at the upper limits of secondary schooling and, relatedly, as a generic name for the different institutions which collectively provide such education.

Cowley and Williams emphasize that "higher" in "higher education" means structurally higher and not higher in the social values taught. "Social values" could be interpreted in many ways. But if the term is used by them generally to indicate values which are esteemed over other values by some part of society, then it can be pointed out that historically "higher education" has been used in precisely this way. Some academics believe that "elemental"

2 In the Martin Report tertiary education is defined as "the highest stage of the established educational system", p. 4.
views of higher education are threatened with extinction in the planning and systematization of higher education. of higher education, it is useful to think in terms of formal and informal systems. The expression "system of higher education" has often been used when nothing more was meant than the aggregate of institutions of higher education within a particular social or governmental area. At the other end of the scale, "system of higher education" may be used to refer to a complex of consciously interrelated institutions of higher education such as exists in the state of California or in totalitarian countries. Such usage would seem to be justified. The Oxford English Dictionary gives as its first meaning of "system": "A set or assemblage of things connected, associated, or interdependent, so as to form a complex unity; a whole composed of parts in orderly arrangement according to some scheme or plan..." The very fact that a number of universities and colleges constitute the institutions of higher education in a particular social or governmental area would allow them to be described as a system in the sense of the first definition, and when they are actually organised to interrelate they would obviously qualify as a "system" in the second sense. But even where there is no centrally planned effort to interrelate the functioning of institutions of higher education, the institutions themselves tend to interrelate in an informal manner. Non-university colleges, for example, often prepare students for advanced placement in universities, and drop-outs from universities frequently transfer to institutions that offer other programmes to which they expect
Concerning the notion of "the systematization of higher education", it is useful to think in terms of formal and informal systems. The expression "system of higher education" has often been used when nothing more was meant than the aggregate of institutions of higher education within a particular social or governmental area. At the other end of the scale, "system of higher education" may be used to refer to a complex of consciously interrelated institutions of higher education such as exists in the State of California or in totalitarian countries. Both usages would seem to be justified. The Oxford English Dictionary\(^1\) gives as its first meaning of "system": 'A set or assemblage of things connected, associated, or interdependent, so as to form a complex unity; a whole composed of parts in orderly arrangement according to some scheme or plan ...' The mere fact that a number of universities and colleges constitute the institutions of higher education in a particular social or governmental area would allow them to be described as a system in the sense of the first definition; and when they are actually organized to interrelate they would obviously qualify as a "system" in the second sense. But even where there is no centrally planned effort to interrelate the functioning of institutions of higher education, the institutions themselves tend to interrelate in an informal manner. Non-university colleges, for example, often prepare students for advanced placement in universities, and drop-outs from universities frequently transfer to institutions that offer other programmes to which they expect

\(^1\) 1933 edition.
they will be better suited. Where there is only this limited interrelation, the institutions may be described as forming an "informal" system of higher education. Greater formality occurs with the efforts of institutions to co-operate with each other. By "formal" system of higher education, I mean a system in which the institutions have formulated regulations to control their ventures in co-operation and co-ordination or where this has been performed by a government or governmental agency.

Within most "systems of higher education" there are complicating factors which must be noticed. One complication is that within a loosely constituted system of higher education there may exist different degrees of systematization. For instance, in a system in which there is little co-operation or co-ordination between institutions of different types, the institutions of a particular sector may be highly co-ordinated; the co-ordination of technical or teachers' colleges by a state department of education affords a ready example. Another difficulty is that the use of "system of higher education" may conceal the fact that within a governmental area there are independent or private institutions which are not purposefully related to the public or state sectors. In California, private institutions are represented on the Coordinating Council for Higher Education but are not integrated into a single system for the State. In California, therefore, and in other states, the expression "the system of public higher education" is much used to gain greater precision. In the rest of this chapter I shall be thinking principally of more or less public universities like the University of California and the universities of the
United Kingdom and Australia. For convenience, however, I shall write simply of "the systematization of higher education and learning"; but it must be borne in mind that what is said will not always be applicable to really independent institutions.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine how well universities lend themselves to the planning and systematization of higher education and learning. In the rest of this section, therefore, I shall attempt to determine what is the scope of these practices in non-totalitarian countries, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia.

In each of these countries the need for co-operation between universities in the interests of economy and efficiency seems to be generally accepted. The largest co-operative ventures are to be found in the United States. There, extensive schemes of co-operation between universities and colleges have been developed to facilitate the sharing of equipment and facilities, one grand scheme in particular enabling students to take subjects offered in any of a large number of co-operating institutions towards their qualification for a degree from their own institution.¹

Large associations of institutions include the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges with one hundred member institutions, and the Council of Graduate Schools in the United States with 248 members in

1968. None of the schemes of co-operation in the United Kingdom or Australia would seem to have the scope of the most extensive of these ventures in the United States. A statement on the extent of co-operation between universities in the United Kingdom is given in the report on the Nottingham Conference on University Co-ordination held in 1967. At that Conference Alan Prichard distinguished four main grades of co-ordination: the exchange and collation of information; consultation between institutions; construction of policy, involving at times a self-denying limitation on the autonomy of each body; executive co-ordination, involving the setting up of machinery to carry out the policies decided by consultation, even against the wills of some of the individual constituents. Present co-operation between universities in the United Kingdom seems to fall within the first three of these grades, but an enlarged role has been envisaged for the Committee of Vice-chancellors and Principals which would include the executive function in the fourth grade. A similar situation pertains in Australia, and it has been suggested that university councils may now need to delegate certain defined responsibilities to the Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee.

2 'University Coordination - the Nottingham Conference', Universities Quarterly, 22:3, June 1968, p. 310f.
3 Ibid., p. 309.
4 Ibid., p. 317.
Close co-operation is also possible between universities and other institutions of higher education and learning, and this can be extended to comprehend the co-ordination that is more usually provided by state-appointed bodies. Voluntary bodies co-ordinate higher education in some states in the United States of America, but it is a minority movement. Some academics claim that it is through voluntary bodies such as these that the roles of the different institutions and sectors should be determined. This task would seem to involve determination of the needs of society and of individuals and assessment of the capacity of different institutions and sectors to meet those needs. In neither the United Kingdom nor Australia, however, does machinery exist to produce self-determination of institutional roles out of consultation throughout higher education. The Conference on Planning in Higher Education held in the University of New England at Armidale in August 1969 was able to produce a list of unanimous recommendations; but although members of the Conference were in many cases delegates of institutions of higher education, the recommendations were advisory only and in no way binding on the institutions represented.

Many theorists are sceptical of the ability of voluntary bodies to carry out these tasks of determination of need and allocation of function. Perhaps the major critic of systematization through voluntary bodies has been T.R. McConnell. He was, he recalls, for long an advocate of the

1 See e.g., K.J. Batt, 'The Universities and Co-operation in Higher Education', The Australian University, 7:2, August 1969, pp. 92-109.
voluntary co-ordination of higher education, but recanted this view in 1964 as the result of periodic observation of co-ordination in both Britain and the United States. 'I have come to the conclusion', he wrote in 1965,

that purely voluntary methods are almost certain to be ineffective in the long run. First of all, they are unlikely to produce the continuing and impartial planning on which a comprehensive and diversified system of higher education must be built. Second, they are unlikely to produce the efficient allocation of resources for educational expenditures and capital outlay that an adequately financed system of higher education requires.\(^1\)

McConnell was closely associated with the Californian surveys of higher education noticed in chapter two and the resulting Master Plan. In his consideration, that is the sort of organization of higher education that any modern, highly developed, technological society requires:

Modern democratic industrial societies make almost insatiable demands on their institutions of higher education. These societies look to their colleges and universities to supply the means of greater productivity; to find new uses for raw materials; to create new products and services; to develop new technologies; to supply more technicians, as well as more scientists, engineers, and other professionals; and to stimulate civic competence.

It is increasingly apparent that we can no longer depend on the initiative of individual institutions to serve these varied and complex needs by educating a great body of students characterized by enormous diversity in ability, aptitude, achievement, interest and motivation. Nothing less than a differentiated, articulated, and co-ordinated system of public higher education geared to a master plan for educational development is required.\(^2\)

It is evident, I think, that advanced societies require universities to produce more than the technical skills and

---

2 T.R. McConnell, 'Governments and the University - A Comparative Analysis' in W.M. Cooper et al., Governments and the University, Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada 1966, p. 81.
civic competence that McConnell lists. At least they sanction
and support cultural studies and fundamental learning. As
will be shown, opposition to the planning and systematization
of higher education and learning often comes from academics
engaged in cultural studies and fundamental learning. But
the great demand for such studies perhaps provides an
additional reason for planning and systematization.

III:18 Educational planning and the systematization of
higher education and learning are closely related notions.
All institutions of higher education and learning engage
more or less in planning, but when reference is made to "the
planning of higher education", centralized planning is
usually meant. Normally the term comprehends assessment of
the needs of the society and individuals in higher education,
perhaps estimation of the relevant available resources, and
theoretical determination of the most effective utilization
of resources towards satisfying the assessed needs.
"Planning" may be short- or long-term, but is normally used
to include the widest objectives where "programme" implies a
more detailed determination of specific objectives to be
achieved within a specified time, and "projects" is used for
distinct units of larger "programmes". "The systematization
of higher education and learning" stands for theoretical but
especially practical attempts to order higher education as a
whole, especially in the interests of economy and efficiency.

1 Cf. 'The Two Poles of Educational Planning: Long-term
Prospecting and Short-term Programming', UNESCO Chronicle,
2 R. Diez-Hochleitner, 'The Role of Educational Planning in
Developing Countries' in G.Z.F. Bereday and J.A. Lauwerys
(eds), The World Year Book of Education 1965, London:
Evans Brothers 1965, p. 163.
Efforts at systematization are likely to suggest the need for planning, while planning increasingly precedes greater formal systematization.

It was awareness of the forthcoming numbers requiring higher education coupled with recognition that the economic and social welfare of nations is dependent on adequate provision of higher education that prompted the inquiries into the state and future of higher education in California, the United Kingdom and Australia in the early 'sixties, and which led in each case to increased systematization. Rising enrolments in the institutions, mounting costs and institutional rivalries, recognition of the investment aspects of higher education, and wide acceptance of the idea that people have a right to education as far as their ability can take them dictated that there be greater systematization so that adequate provision might be made for all fields of higher education and so that there would be no further unnecessary duplication of activities or proliferation of departments and institutions. Each of the reports can be regarded as examples of educational planning. None of them was the first attempt at planning higher education in its governmental area, but each was the first to rely heavily on the analytical tools of modern educational planning, such as demographic analysis. Their recommendations represent "undoctrinaire planning". That is not to say that the reports did not make ideological assumptions; but they are undoctrinaire in the sense that Alexander King uses the term of educational planning - in not purporting to be part of a cosmic outlook but simply attempting to make the economy,
social policy and higher education articulate with each other.¹

III:20 King's concept of undoctrinaire planning is indicative of the extent to which the planning of higher education can be taken. L.A. Glenny has shown that master plans are more comprehensive and penetrating than mere state surveys of educational needs.² And because what can be achieved in higher education is conditioned by what is done in lower grades of education,³ it can be argued that the planning of higher education must be done as part of planning the whole of a society's system of education. Of course, the size of the society for which it is appropriate to plan will depend on the host of factors - geographic, economic, social and especially political - which pertains in each case. But because higher education and learning are now important instruments of social and economic policy, and because of the vast sums now needed for their support, it would seem that planning and systematization must be integrated with the planning of society as a whole. In these circumstances there appears to be an international trend towards national planning and systematization of higher education and learning.

III:21 The wisdom of planning higher education on a massive scale has been questioned on many occasions. For instance,


² There is a list of emphases common in master plans in L.A. Glenny, 'State Systems and Plans for Higher Education', loc. cit., pp. 97-98.

while P.H. Coombs has urged that there should be national planning in the United States, Clark Kerr has concluded that considering the Nation's pluralist traditions planning on this scale would not be appropriate and is unlikely to emerge in the foreseeable future. But Australia has a population smaller than that of California, and it might be thought that here is a clear case where national planning is unquestionable. The Fourth Report of the Australian Universities Commission reveals situations which seem to demand thinking on a national scale, such as the best location of a new school of veterinary science. This need has long been recognized. As already mentioned, the Australian Universities Commission was established in 1958 on the recommendation of the Murray Committee. Then in 1964 the Martin Committee recommended that the Australian Universities Commission be expanded into the Australian Tertiary Education Commission, but the Commonwealth Government chose instead to establish another national body counterpart to the Australian Universities Commission - the Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Advanced Education. More recently the Conference on Planning in Higher Education held in the University of New England at Armidale has called for a single planning and grant authority for the whole of higher education. But with the major part of higher education finance coming from the states it has been widely thought

4 See above, p. 95.
that planning and systematization cannot be done adequately at the national level alone, and a number of states have set up their own bodies to plan and co-ordinate higher education.¹ The result is a most complex situation, the relationships which pertain between these various bodies and between them and the Commonwealth Department of Education and Science urgently needing clarification. Not only does this situation reveal diversity of opinion on the area for which it is best to plan, but it is suggestive of the difficulties which may arise when there is more than one planning authority.

III:22 The Master Plan Survey Team in California and the Robbins Committee in the United Kingdom made rather different recommendations on the bodies they considered should co-ordinate higher education. The Coordinating Council for Higher Education included representation from private institutions but was to co-ordinate all public institutions in the State of California, although only in an advisory capacity to the governing boards of the various institutions and segments and appropriate state officials.² By comparison the Robbins proposals were very involved. It was proposed that the autonomous institutions (including the old colleges of applied technology and teacher training colleges for which the Committee advocated new status) be co-ordinated by one Grants Commission to be developed from, and as far as possible modelled on, the University Grants Committee. Non-autonomous institutions were to be co-ordinated by a Minister of Arts and Science who would ultimately be responsible for all higher education, and who was to be advised by:

¹ Chronicle of Australian Education, 1:8, March 1969, pp. 6-8, and 1:10, May 1969, pp. 5-7.
² Master Plan Survey Team, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
i) a Consultative Council which would advise the government on matters covering the whole field of education

ii) the Council for National Academic Awards which would also have powers to approve courses and promote uniformity in non-autonomous institutions

iii) the National Advisory Council on Education for Industry and Commerce and the various bodies which at that time advised the Minister of Education on specific issues in the field of further education

iv) a Schools Council on the articulation of secondary and higher education

v) the National Advisory Council on the Training and Supply of Teachers.

That this represented a very complicated scheme of co-ordination is attested to by the Committee's warning that these various agencies would have to work together to develop research into education and ensure that there was no unavoidable duplication of effort in it. A further complication to the scheme was that additional arrangements would have to be made to suit the independent status of Scottish education. These plans have proved unacceptable to successive governments, and this substantiates Clark Kerr's estimate of the difficulty of implementing a national system of higher education in a society with a history of pluralist traditions. Nevertheless, the idea appears to be increasingly accepted in the United Kingdom that there should be a permanent Robbins-type commission to oversee higher education and eventually to extend the operation of

1 Robbins Report, pp. 253-255.
2 Ibid., p. 255.
3 Ibid.
the University Grants Committee to the whole of higher education.¹

These proposals have been listed to show the extent to which co-ordination and systematization might be taken in non-totalitarian countries. The reports themselves can be regarded as examples of sophisticated educational planning. But in no case were the planners able to start from scratch; in each case they had to take account of the systems as they then existed. This is of course the usual situation in educational planning, but it needs to be recognized that this is almost certain to mean that the theoretically most effective utilization of resources cannot be achieved. A second limitation on the extent of the planning was the committees' decisions on ideological grounds to use the numbers thought to require higher education in the future as the basis of planning rather than manpower prediction. Then, concerning the ideological bases of the reports, no committee was able to draw on a substantial and coherent body of social philosophy specifically relevant to its society, and each was forced to determine its own guiding principles. The committees accepted this as normal, but recent theory on educational planning suggests that the formulation of educational aims is not within the competence of planners as such, and that planners need simple statements of

objectives on which to base their studies.¹ Had these circumstances been different, even more intensive planning might have resulted. The increasing refinement of operations research, input-output and cost-benefit analysis, mathematical and scientific models and systems planning offers the possibility of close control over systems of higher education.

Academic Reactions

III:24 Some academics welcomed the Royal Commissions into the state of Oxford and Cambridge in the eighteen-fifties and co-operated with the Commissioners; others regarded the inquiries as unwarrantable intrusions into the private concerns of the universities. And this has become the stock pattern of reaction to government intervention in university affairs, although the situation has been altered by many factors - the most notable probably being the modern universities' dependence on public funds.

III:25 This section of the chapter deals with the reasons underlying unfavourable reactions by academics to the planning and systematization of higher education and learning. I do not account for the favourable reaction from academics. Having examined the goals and methods of planning and systematization, it is enough to observe here that many academics have welcomed these innovations and the participation of governments in them because of the security and order that have been made possible. I am not suggesting that the reactions of individuals have been perfectly clear cut for and against, and I shall not attempt to give accounts of the total reaction of individuals.

III:26 Concerning the hostile reaction, it must first be recognized that the hostility can reflect personal or psychological disaffection. Planning and systematization is likely to remove decision-making from some of those who previously exercised it, and powerful institutions and individual academics and administrators may fear that formal systematization would lead to a levelling down of institutions. Then there are those who would oppose
bureaucracy or large-scale organized endeavour on intuitive rather than rational grounds; they would almost certainly oppose the development of supra-university planning and co-ordinating institutions.

III:27 Secondly, opposition to planning and systematization is often bound up with criticism of expansion, but it should be possible to consider planning and systematization apart from expansionist programmes. Planning and systematization have often been preceded by foreknowledge of expansion of demand and concern that growing demand be met by increased systematization. But to anticipate a later conclusion, planning and systematization do not necessarily entail expansion. And here I am concerned with hostility towards planning and systematization as such. This hostility appears to rest on two basic attitudes: that planning and formal systematization emphasize one sort of education over another; and that they are likely to lead to politicization of the university.

III:28 At first sight, the planning and formal systematization appear to cater better for professional training than for the development of the philosophic outlook which is an important goal of "elemental" higher education. They seem to require clear statements of goals if they are to function satisfactorily, and the clearest objectives seem to be those of professional education. Professional societies normally make clear statements of the minimum standards of entry to the professions, and estimates of manpower requirements for particular professions can be made with increasing accuracy. The standard of work to be achieved and the number of professional workers who must be
produced represent reasonably straight-forward objectives for professional training. But it is a task of great philosophical complexity to determine what constitutes the educated man and how much and what sort of education each individual requires and is necessary in the individual for the good of society. The philosophical outlook and "ultimate concern" and similar notions which some academics hold to represent the proper ends of higher education would seem to present difficulties of a different order from those of professional competence in the determination of objectives and relevant programmes of training. In part the difficulties are those of statement. Theorists often take recourse in speaking about the "imponderables" and "intangibles" of education. And many processes of education are held to depend on abstractions such as "truth", "value", "obligation" and "reverence", which seem to defy exact analysis and of which it is difficult to give any empirical account.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty, however, arises from the views still taken by many academics that learning is its own end and that education should not be distorted by forcing it to serve extrinsic ends. This is not the place to embark upon an historical account of the justification of an idea that would take us back to the debates between the Sophists and the School of Socrates. But it is important to see clearly the complications that these ideas raise for the planning and systematization of higher education. John Anderson set out the crucial distinction on which the case for the intrinsic value of knowledge, learning and education must rest:
... it may be pointed out that the classical and utilitarian views of education are distinguished as employing intrinsic and extrinsic criteria, the one considering education in its own character, as the development of thinking or criticism, the other considering it in its contribution to something else, subordinating it in this way to the non-educational and running the greatest risk of distorting its character. For clearly there can be no subject or field of study which is utilitarian in itself, whose character resides in what it produces or helps to produce, and this applies as much to science as to any other study; its intrinsic character, taken as the search for laws, the study of the ways of working of actual things, has no reference to the turning of its findings to 'practical' account.¹

In evidence of the continuing acceptability of the distinction, A.C. McIntyre cites these lines from Anderson in his essay entitled 'Against Utilitarianism'.² McIntyre goes on to argue that it is the production of critical capacity that saves education, especially education in universities, from becoming a utilitarian practice - 'The critical ability which ought to be the fruit of education serves nothing directly except itself, no one except those who exercise it.'³ For these theorists, then, it would be proper for a university education to result in "the development of thinking or criticism" or critical ability that "serves nothing directly but itself"; but I suspect that they would agree that this should arise naturally in the study of a discipline and that undue emphasis on the development of critical ability would amount to a distortion reflecting the intrusion of an extrinsic criterion. To use a discipline like history or literature, Richard Peters warns, is to debase and distort it; critical thinking

³ Ibid., p. 19.
properly develops when people enter imaginatively into the traditional disciplines and learn to appreciate them "from the inside." And it is relevant to notice here the argument of A.P. Griffiths that while studies like physics, history and philosophy require imagination, wisdom and intelligence, their pursuit does not generally develop these particular qualities but only allows the scholar to become better at the discipline in question, qualities such as logical power and imagination being manifested only in the way some things are done.

III:30 A unit of one graduate qualified to enter a particular profession would be an item on which those involved in the planning and systematization of higher education might well base their calculations. There would be far less precision in designating "the educated man" or critical ability as an objective of a programme or project in higher education. And it would seem at least a little odd to set down education as an end in itself as the output in a plan or system of education. Planners talk much of "investment in education", and even when this takes the form of "investment in individuals" it may be thought that education is being planned to serve ends outside itself. The possibility that planning may require that education be bent to serve extrinsic ends greatly disturbs some theorists. Peters, for instance, strongly objects to mental health being designated as an aim of education as it represents:

1 R. Peters, 'Mental Health as an Educational Aim' in Ibid., p. 88.
... the obnoxious view that education must have some aim beyond itself, that it must have some practical use in 'the outside world' or that it must be some sort of 'investment' which it is worthwhile for a community to spend money on ... Now though activities such as science may contribute to practical ends it is treason to civilization to see them only under such an aspect. For education is not just a preparation for 'living' in this sense; it is an initiation into a distinctive form of life.

In another place, Peters says that when economists or politicians ascribe instrumental aims to schools and systems of education, they are not really speaking of the aims of education but are making suggestions as to how things should be taught or schools used for purposes which are not strictly educational.

III:31 It will be obvious that many people would reject as precious (in the perjorative sense) the view of education taken by these philosophers. But some theorists who claim to be in sympathy with it argue that liberal education and pure learning can be justified and comprehended within the systematization of education only in other terms. Fritz Machlup, for instance, has observed that exponents of intrinsic value acknowledge that education and learning pursued for their own sakes incidentally produce instrumentally valuable results. He therefore advocates (but only under protest, he says,) that some "ultimate productivity standard" must be accepted if ideas of intrinsic value are to prove operational concepts:

The advocate of liberal education and humanistic learning for whom learning and intellectual curiosity

1 R.S. Peters, 'Mental Health as an Educational Aim', loc. cit., p. 87.
are absolute values will rate purely intellectual noninstrumental knowledge above useful knowledge even if he is told what remarkable increase in material welfare can be had from the latter. However, there is also the position of those who defend liberal education not for any absolute value attached to intellectual pursuits but rather for the contribution it makes indirectly, as a sharpener of intellect and a builder of character, to the eventual social and productive performance of the educated ones, and ultimately to the material welfare of society. Personally I do not like this position, but I admit that it provides a basis for a compromise. If the ultimate results could be measured in terms of material products - goods and services which have market prices - all knowledge would become comparable and measurable in terms of economic productivity. I state this under protest, because I dislike the attitude so very much, but where compromises are needed intransigence is wicked. Moreover, the believer in learning for the sake of learning and knowledge for the sake of knowledge usually has such a high opinion also of what learning can do for the learner and what pure knowledge can do for the development of applicable knowledge, that he may without guilt feelings accept the "ultimate-productivity standard" as a compromise in the valuation of knowledge of different types and kinds.¹

Now it must be agreed that some of the most important exponents of "elemental" concepts of higher education and of the pursuit of learning for its own sake have emphasized the incidental benefits which may accrue from such studies. Newman, for instance, held that a liberal education would confer benefits in professional practice.² And Pattison, it seems, at one stage would have found Machlup's compromise acceptable, as he urged that 'Mental enlargement we know to be self-valuable, not useful; but if it can be introduced to notice under cover of being useful in life, so be it, so only that it is introduced.'³ But some academics would regard this compromise as really a major abdication. Peters points out that there is a logical incompleteness in questions about "use":

² The Idea, pp. 146-147.
As they raise questions of instrumentality, of means to ends, anyone asking them must make explicit the end he has in view in relation to which something is useful. Once this form of questioning begins it cannot end until something is arrived at which is to be regarded as valuable in itself and not just as a means to something else that is thought valuable. Philosophy, art, and science are forms of activity which are worthwhile in themselves; they are part and parcel of a form of life which we think desirable. It is absurd, therefore, to expect the same sort of justification of them as is to be given for activities like boarding buses or building banks.\(^1\)

Presumably, theorists like Peters would reject the compromise because it ignores a type of value that may not be easily assessed but which is thought to indicate great individual and social benefit, and because it posits criteria which may lead to the distortion and debasement of education. It needs to be pointed out that Machlup proposes the compromise because he considers that the conflict between "the humanist in spirit" and "the pragmatist in spirit" cannot be resolved.\(^2\)

III:32 Expositions of "elemental" concepts of higher educations and of education for its own sake make use of concepts of value that cannot be analysed exactly and which are not comparable with other sorts of value, such as that used in the measurement of national economic productivity. Blaug and Woodhall observe that as yet there are no quantitative data on such important aspects of education and learning as intellectual insight, curiosity, social maturity and personal and cultural awareness;\(^3\) and many academics


fear that because of the difficulties and inappropriateness of their quantification these aspects of education and learning are likely to be ignored in planning and systematization that are aimed principally at improving national productivity. David Riesman's immediate reaction to Philip H. Coombs's lecture, 'Educational Planning - its Goals and its Dangers' was to reject the proposal that American education be more closely geared to the Nation's economic needs and to suggest a way by which planners might gain a fuller understanding of the disposition of the American people.  

It is true that official statements on education often refer to ideas such as "the return to the person" and "investment in persons" which are not construed only in economic terms, and tables of aspects of consumption education can be set beside those of aspects of investment education. But it is certainly true that the reports of the official inquiries into higher education in California, the United Kingdom and Australia which were noticed in the preceding chapter laid stress on economic productivity and efficiency.

III:33 Veblen was an early critic of the intrusion of business principles into universities, objecting in particular to "bureaucratic officialism and accountancy" and the predilection for "practical efficiency". But with the development of supra-university co-ordinating agencies,


the bureaucratic organization of higher education and learning has been greatly enlarged. And as the costs of higher education and learning have become a major expenditure of governments, it can be expected that economy and efficiency will be increasingly emphasized in the planning and systematization of higher education and learning. Increased attention is being given to refinement of the techniques of cost-benefit analysis, but in view of the non-comparability of intrinsic value it might be thought that Machlup's compromise represents the most sympathetic treatment that planners are likely to give to pure learning and "elemental" concepts of higher education. Some academics who hold these ideas to be vital to university learning argue for their support on the grounds that history shows that society often benefits in great measure from learning and research whose ultimate value cannot possibly be estimated at the time at which they are done.\(^1\) Other academics openly admit that the university must be considered a luxury; Michael Oakeshott, for instance, says that a university is a luxury because what is sought there '... belongs to the world of human wants rather than to the world of human needs.'\(^2\) Oakeshott then goes on to sum up the case against the strict costing of university learning:


\(^2\) M.J. Oakeshott, 'The Definition of a University', *loc. cit.*, p. 139.
Not being comparable to a light-industry (having no product, in the strict sense), nor to a store (having no sales-list of items for disposal), a university is apt to confound the accountants. Profit and loss, cost and return on capital are not easily calculable; indeed, there is something inappropriate in making the calculations. It illustrates the truth that there is nothing great in the world that does not involve waste, and that the human propensity to avoid waste (which has itself been erected into a science) is, perhaps, one of our greatest intellectual vanities.¹

III:34 Many academics continue to assert that universities are the mentors as well as the agents of society and know what is ultimately best for society, what is really in the public interest. On these grounds it is still occasionally asserted that syndicalism is the first obligation of academics, that the first function of universities is to provide the best circumstances for the work of the individual academic.² More widely acceptable terms are: that if academics have responsibilities to truth, to the individual and to society, devotion to truth must be placed first or else they can only act irresponsibly toward the individual and society. Academics who hold these views tend to consider that the emphases in planning and systematization on instrumental objectives, quantification, costing, economy and efficiency seriously threaten to lead to the neglect of imponderables and intangibles in education, to the neglect, that is, of what they consider to be vital elements of higher education.

III:35 The other major reason why academics might oppose the planning and formal systematization of higher education lies in the fear that the increasing governmentalization of higher education and learning must lead to the politicization

1 Ibid., pp. 139-140.
2 See 'University Coordination - the Nottingham Conference', Universities Quarterly, 22:3, June 1968, p. 322.
of the university. There is a vast literature on the subject of relations between universities and the state and a number of works on this particular aspect. Here, therefore, I shall offer only some general observations. What should be recognized is that the fear of academics that universities are being politicized is closely related to their distrust of the emphases on instrumental objectives and quantification in the planning and systematization of higher education. Through the disbursement of public funds and the operation of co-ordinating agencies governments have at least potential power to control higher education in the interests of political groups. And as higher education and learning now have so much bearing on national economies, it can hardly be doubted that there is an at least potential power to control higher education in the interests of political groups and ideologies. Where academics have traditionally asserted that they know what is in the public interest, what are the real needs of society, it is now widely held that the government or at least parliament can best interpret the interests of a nation as a whole. The feeling, which Brubacher says can be traced back to Alexander von Humboldt, the founder of the University of Berlin, that universities are too important to leave exclusively in the control of academics, is now very general. And as the bearing of higher education and learning on the economies and welfare of nations increases, it can hardly be doubted that there is a

constant danger of politicization. In these circumstances, educational theorists and policy-makers have attempted to distinguish matters which are properly academic from those which can be dealt with by outside bodies and quantified without threatening academic independence. And there is some measure of agreement on the areas that may be regarded as properly the responsibility of governments or governmental agencies. Referring to current issues in the United Kingdom, R.M. Titmuss asserts that somewhere the limits to institutional freedom and institutional inefficiency (in terms of serving the demands made by society of the institution) must be drawn:

Every individual member of the university must be completely free to teach and to express his views according to his own intellectual conscience. In institutional terms, however, there are and must be limits to freedom. No university can be free to establish, say, a faculty of veterinary medicine; to buy as many computers as it thinks fit; to concentrate its resources on teaching students from other countries; or to ignore completely the needs of society.

In Australia, A.K. Stout says that as in many areas like the establishment of new universities and the provision of new subjects resources are limited, rationalization is inevitable, and that while ideally this rationalization should arise from consultation between universities, failure on their part must lead to governmental directives. But he sees no objection to governments laying down standards of accommodation in university halls of residence.

United States, Glenny has drawn a distinction between "substantive" and "procedural" autonomy. The former is that institutional freedom which is "essential to the advancement of knowledge, the exploration of ideas, and the critical assessment of society itself"; procedural autonomy is independence from rules and laws which supercede the authority of the institution itself and which are imposed for the welfare of all institutions in a system. Procedural rules necessarily limit independence, but procedural autonomy is not to be thought of as substantive to the central purpose of the institution.¹ This distinction would seem to allow that procedural rules might be made by a governmental agency without disturbance to properly academic freedom. And Algo Henderson distinguishes between issues of a political nature and those of an educational cast. As political issues he cites:

Questions as to who should be encouraged to go to college, what broad program of higher education should be provided by the state, where institutions are needed, the functions of individual institutions within the public system, what portion of the state income should be devoted to higher education, and how the appropriations of public funds should be distributed ...²

And educational issues are considered to be: '... what is to be studied or researched and how, and how to maintain an environment conducive to freedom of thought, discussion, and reporting.'³

³ Ibid., p. 9.
III:37 In each of these "political" lists there are items that would have great bearing on the conduct of admitted academic affairs. Many academics would surely object to the notion that the subjects to be offered by a university was not an academic matter in view of its influence on matters like the integration of knowledge, and the adequacy of programmes of liberal education and professional training. Those academics who hold that a university's purposes include the nurture of a cultural as well as a strictly intellectual élite might well oppose the view that governments should lay down standards of residential accommodation, as might those who hold life in residence to be a vital aspect of a university education considered even in purely intellectual terms. And where Henderson designates the allocation of functions of institutions within a public system to be a political matter, Stout observes that this should develop out of consultation between institutions, and some academics hold that the determination of functions must be arrived at in this way.¹

¹ E.g., F.C. Ward believes that universities should formulate a self-definition of what each should do and apply for aid on that basis. 'University Initiative in Response to Change' in W.R. Niblett (ed.), Higher Education: Demand and Response, op. cit., p. 214.
Conclusion

III:38 In Australia it has been publicly expressed that no conflict exists between the government and universities' views of the area in which university autonomy is essential. In the United Kingdom, however, there exists a substantial body of thought that vital elements in university independence have already been lost. Max Beloff has given examples of the "subordination of academic values to political advantage". But where Oakeshott wishes that universities were less costly affairs and perhaps poorer, Beloff accepts the dependence of universities on public funds. He urges that they should have private funds which they would be completely free to use and with which the University Grants Committee, the Department of Education and Science and the Comptroller and Auditor General could not interfere. In another place, Beloff asserts that it has been dissatisfaction with the planning and systematization of higher education which has led to plans to found an independent university in the United Kingdom. And there are theorists who argue that both for efficiency and the welfare of the National economy, higher education in the United Kingdom should again be placed on a market.

2 M. Beloff, (Correspondence) 'Hands Off the Universities?', Minerva, 6:4, Summer 1968, p. 601.
3 M.J. Oakeshott, 'The Definition of a University', loc. cit., p. 140.
4 M. Beloff, 'Hands Off the Universities?', loc. cit., p. 602.
basis and institutions compete with each other on market conditions. In the United States where truly independent universities have continued to exist alongside more public institutions, it has been suggested that a university which desires to be a "liberal university" must remain free, as governments favour the "big, useful, and impersonal" multiversities as agents of their purposes. In this view, the "liberal university" is contrasted with both the multiversity and '... complex state systems of higher education held together largely by the control of funds and the veto power which such control affords.' Unless the "liberal university" maintains its independence through securing sufficient funds from its alumni and friends, it is argued, it must gradually develop into another multiversity.

It can also be argued, however, that while the programmes and projects and systems of higher education and learning have been such as to lead academics to think that vital elements in university learning may be preserved only by completely independent universities, planning and systematization as such do not necessarily threaten these vital elements. Philip Coombs has stated that educational planning is not a goal in itself but '... a body of concepts, principles and analytical tools which can be flexibly and usefully applied in any nation to fit its own aims and circumstances, at any level of development and whatever the nature of its institutions, national goals and

1 E.g., E.J. Mishan, 'Some Heretical Thoughts on University Reform', Encounter, 32:3, March 1969, pp. 3-15.
ideology.\textsuperscript{1} I think that this can be regarded not merely as an authoritative opinion but as a statement of a principle on which planning could be based. On this basis there could be planning which allowed considerable freedom for sectors, institutions or departments to pursue the goals they themselves elected. In fact this sort of planning would seem to underlie the development of junior and state colleges, polytechnics and colleges of advanced education to allow universities to devote themselves more exclusively to pure and fundamental learning. Such "planning for freedom"\textsuperscript{2} might well make provision for the elitist universities described by Bryan Wilson\textsuperscript{3} and for Ashby's ivory towers.\textsuperscript{4}

Because sophisticated tools of quantification and analysis have been much used in planning, it does not follow that they must be used in every planning exercise. What would be necessary is that those who are engaged in the planning and systematization should be convinced of the value of the work in question.

III:40 Niblett has observed that:

Some kind of philosophy of higher education, in the sense of concern about fundamental issues of its purpose and desirable scope, ought to be in the minds of those with power to deploy state or federal or provincial funds to serve it - whether they are members of the British UGC, the Ontario Committee on University Affairs, among the Regents of the University of California, or civil servants in any country whose influence and power behind the scenes may be very great.\textsuperscript{5}


\textsuperscript{2} Karl Mannheim's expression, cited by W. Moberly, The Crisis in the University, p. 154.

\textsuperscript{3} Above, 54.

\textsuperscript{4} Above, 45.

\textsuperscript{5} W.R. Niblett, Higher Education: Demand and Response, p. 120.
My view is that academics should seek to inform the planners on what they consider to be the fundamental issues of the purpose and scope of higher education. Lionel Elvin says that 'The universities must organise themselves for a dialogue on more nearly equal terms.',\(^1\) and I would agree that some sort of organization here seems inevitable.\(^2\) But I do not think that an organized lobby would be as satisfactory as the planners seeking to familiarize themselves with the main bodies of academic opinion. If direct faculty participation is unusual on co-ordinating agencies in the United States,\(^3\) academics are members of the University Grants Committee and the Australian Universities Commission, and it might be thought adequate to leave the representation of academic views to them. Beloff firmly rejects this proposition, claiming that the academics who gravitate to such bodies are of a distinctive type and not good representatives of academic opinion.\(^4\) I am myself uncertain whether it is possible to lay down a single best means for informing the planners. But it can hardly be doubted that the situation is likely to give rise to conflict if it is considered that planning and systematization are goals in themselves.

1 L. Elvin, (Correspondence) 'Hands Off the Universities?' Minerva, 6:4, Summer 1968, p. 605.
4 M. Beloff, (Correspondence) 'Hands Off the Universities?', Minerva, 6:4, pp. 601-602.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE CENTRALITY OF THE UNIVERSITY IN
HIGHER EDUCATION AND LEARNING

Because modern man in his search for truth has turned away from kings, priests, commissars, and bureaucrats, he is left, for better or worse, with the professors. Walter Lippmann, 'The University and the Human Condition'.

'If from the institutional point of view, the kingdom of higher education is divisible into separate and even independent domains, the commonwealth of the mind is not. Boris Ford, 'The Universities' Role in Higher Education'.

Introduction

In the preceding chapter it became apparent that academics need to keep before the minds of those involved in the planning and systematization of higher education and learning the ideas that there are intangibles, unmeasurables and imponderables in education and that the products of higher education at least in part are of a different kind from the products of industrial processes. In this chapter I shall argue that the university as it is at present constituted in California, the United Kingdom and Australia is not simply one institution among the many in higher education and learning but central in the systems, the other institutions depending on them, if indirectly for validation of their programmes of education. If this argument is sound, academics need also to expound this notion of the centrality


of the university to the officials involved in the planning and systematization of higher education and learning.

IV:2 The implication of this centrality of the university that is uppermost in my mind is its bearing on the comparison of costs in universities and non-university institutions and the principles on which resources are allocated to them. But I shall not attempt to specify here all the reasons why universities may be more costly than other institutions. And it is not my intention to inquire carefully into the comparative social status of institutions. Because I am not going deeply into these matters, I avoid using expressions like "the pre-eminence of the university" or "the primacy of the university", and use instead what I trust is the less antagonizing expression, "the centrality of the university"; but this should not be taken to indicate that those involved in the planning and systematization of higher education and learning should not give first consideration to the welfare of universities.

IV:3 Universities have always provided training for élites and usually their clientele have come from the more socially privileged sections of society. Generally, they have been accepted as the pinnacles of the range of educational institutions. But the development of the new polytechnics in the United Kingdom and colleges of advanced education in Australia has been accompanied by official declarations that the new institutions are not to be considered inferior to the universities, and "equal but different" has become a cant description of them. Equality, however, can have many applications, and even when used with reference to institutions many possible interpretations present themselves; but not all these need concern us.
IV:4 From official statements and from the reports of official inquiries, three main ideas of how the new institutions should equal universities emerge. In the first "Woolwich Speech", the Secretary of State for Education and Science in the United Kingdom made clear the importance that the Government ascribed to the non-university sector of higher education. With '... opportunities for learning comparable with those of the Universities, and giving a first-class professional training ...', the public sector should make its own "equally distinguished but separate contribution" alongside the university sector's "own unique and marvellous contribution".¹ Then in his speech at Lancaster University in January 1967 Crosland referred to the part-time and non-degree students in technical colleges and polytechnics as students whose '... importance to the Nation can hardly be overestimated.'²

IV:5 In Australia, the Martin Committee recommended great expansion of the existing technical colleges, urging that the importance of their work to Australia could not be overemphasized. 'At this stage [it observed] in Australia's development from a primary-producing country to one which is becoming industrialized rapidly, it is important to develop to the maximum all institutions which provide education in the technologies.'³ The Wark Committee's Report echoed this opinion: 'At present Australia is perhaps pressed more for leaders with industrial initiative than for those dedicated to fundamental research.'⁴ But whereas the Martin

¹ Administrative Memorandum 7/65, p. 2.
³ Martin Report, p. 129.
⁴ Wark Report, p. 31.
Committee had seen courses in the expanded non-university sector as being not only of "different orientation" but also as "less exacting academically", the Wark Committee held that at least in part advanced education courses would in a sense equal those of the universities: "We consider [the Committee reported] the application of knowledge to specific problems, while it may call for different qualities of mind, is no less exacting." In the interests of raising their status in the public mind, the Committee thought, the colleges should strive for excellence, aiming

... to provide a range of education of a standard of excellence and richness of content at least equal to that of any sector of tertiary education in the country, so that students and staff will be attracted to them on their merits for the special opportunities they offer. We hope that in due course some of the colleges will in their own specialized fields, achieve international standing.

This idea that the colleges should win a distinctive reputation was taken up by the Minister for Education and Science:

It is important that the Colleges be properly understood and have a proper status. The Colleges must not be thought of as a poor relation of the university - as something inferior. I believe they will in time develop their own ethos and establish a prestige and standing in their own right, but it might take some time before the true worth of the advanced colleges is recognized as widely as it should be.

And on another occasion he observed that the colleges had no need to copy universities to win esteem, for when they serve human needs in their own particular way they are accorded esteem - not the esteem given to universities,

1 Martin Report, p. 165.
2 Wark Report, p. 31.
3 Ibid., p. 24.
'... but esteem equally high, given for the good performance of their own proper function.'¹ (My emphasis).

IV:6 What emerges, then, from official observations on the structure of higher education in both the United Kingdom and Australia is that non-university institutions of higher education may be put on a par with the universities as regards their standards of work (although striving for a different excellence), in their importance to the community, and thus in the eyes of students and the public. Perhaps it is necessary to point out that, with the possible exception of the last extract, these are observations on what should be the case, rather than factual accounts of what now pertains.

IV:7 It would be possible to use these observations as premises from which to argue that, if other things – such as numbers of students and size of institutions – were also equal, non-university institutions have an equal claim with universities on the resources available for higher education and learning. Presented with this argument, governments and agencies responsible for the co-ordination of systems of higher education and learning would need to make a policy decision involving assessment of a multiplicity of factors. One important consideration would be determination of what are the basic material and economic needs of the society and assessment of what contribution the different types of institution might make towards meeting them. But as has been shown in earlier chapters, many academics believe that universities should serve other ends besides economic and material welfare, and this has been officially sanctioned

¹ See above, p. 94.
in the patterns of higher education and learning which we have considered in detail. The multiplicity of factors that would need to be considered cannot be adequately considered here. My purpose in this chapter is to point out one set of factors which I consider must not be ignored.

IV:8 The matter of differential costs among the institutions was touched on by the Robbins Committee. Observing that it is unavoidable that there should be differences in achievement and reputation between institutions, the Committee suggested that the criteria for making different allocations of resources to different institutions should not be social status but should "... rest clearly on differences of function on the one hand, and on acknowledged excellence in the discharge of functions on the other."¹ But such criteria are not very helpful when it is claimed that one sector, although having a different role to perform, is as valuable to the community, works at an equivalent level, and should be held as high in public esteem as another sector. It is not possible, then, to go to the Robbins Report for a clear ruling on what special factors pertain in universities which call for prior consideration.

IV:9 Witnesses to the Committee of Public Accounts inquiry in the United Kingdom into Parliament and the control of university expenditure were asked on a number of occasions on what grounds the greater comparative costs of the universities could be justified. Perhaps the clearest answer was given by Lord James when he replied:

¹ Robbins Report, p. 9.
... one has got to realise the cost of research, that included in these overall figures there are research items which may be expensive, which may lead to great variations from university to university, for example, but that while we expect the universities as we do in this country to do great chunks of our pure research, then some of them will look pretty expensive. I do think that it would re-assure the other sectors of what is now called the binary system, as it were, if they realised that we had not got this fantastically different standard of life from them, and I do not honestly believe that we have, except as regards the fact that more money is spent, as it must be, on research in universities and on a number of individual projects. The essential thing is to look at a university in the totality of its obligations as a research institution and as a focus in some ways for the cultural life of the community as it ought to be.

To this he added the corollary, that if the universities wanted to obtain more funds from Parliament it would be necessary for them to make the public understand what universities are for and that 'Some of the problems they are concerned with will be very remote from life and ought to be superficially very remote from life ...' If he is right that special consideration must be taken of the circumstances of the universities, I think it will be agreed that his reference to the need to inform "the public" on this must be taken to include those who are more immediately concerned with the planning, financing and systematization of higher education and learning. In itself the reply is not perfectly clear and would need to be greatly expanded if it were to count for anything more than an expression of opinion. But I suspect that Lord James has ignored what I consider to be vital factors in the case that universities as they are now constituted are in a special situation among

2 Ibid., p. 96.
the institutions of higher education and learning. I emphasize "as they are now constituted" because it is conceivable that the structure of higher education could be so altered that this factor might hold more generally throughout the institutions of higher education and learning.

IV:10 Niblett has drawn attention to the fact that it has become easier in some governmental areas to obtain public finance for specific projects in non-university institutions than in the universities. There are many ways of explaining this - such as the comparative stage of development of institutions - and I cannot here consider the whole matter of the differential allocation of public funds to the various institutions of higher education and learning. That this situation has arisen, however, would seem to point to the need for a public re-appraisal of the bases on which allocations are made. My argument is that universities are in a position of centrality among the various institutions of higher education and learning, and this would seem to have implications for the financing of the institutions.

1 W.R. Niblett (ed.), Higher Education: Demand and Response, p. 5.
The Centrality of the University

IV:11 The centrality of universities as they are at present constituted rests on the related ideas that it is the university above other institutions which should preserve and advance knowledge and be the critic of society.

'The universities,' writes P.H. Coombs, being at the apex of the educational system, are expected by tradition and common consent to provide the system with its leadership. In addition, they are intended to be the guardians of truth, the seekers of new truths, and the upsetters of old dogmas, the conservators of society's heritage, the moulders of its youth, and the pathfinders of its future.¹

Expressions have been noticed in earlier chapters of the ideas that it is properly a purpose of the university to preserve knowledge, advance knowledge and to be the critic of society. I think it can also be shown that in the United Kingdom and Australia at least universities are not only given the freedom to pursue these objectives but are officially expected to engage in their pursuit.

IV:12 It needs to be recognized, however, that while it is now very generally expected that universities should advance knowledge, the idea that the university should be the "guardian" of knowledge, the conservator of society's heritage, is now seldom stated so explicitly. This doubtless reflects changes within the institutions themselves. In Logan Wilson's words, 'Preserving and transmitting man's cultural heritage ... is still an important function of higher education. But contemporary colleges and universities are becoming more and more oriented toward the present

Throughout much of their history universities have been preoccupied with handing on a body of knowledge; only since about the end of the eighteenth century with the development of faculty psychology have graduates been expected to be creative thinkers rather than simply the possessors of well-stocked minds; and the acceptance of research as a proper function of universities is more recent again. But with the now rapid obsolescence of knowledge it is understandable that there should be widespread caution about subscribing to ideas like the university as the "guardian of knowledge". Today, when views of the primary task of the university are being expressed, the preservation of knowledge is at best likely only to be coupled with research, as in A.K. Stout's view that the primary duty of a university is "... the preservation of knowledge from generation to generation and its continual advancement by original inquiry and research ...".

To say that the university should be the "guardian of knowledge", however, is not to say that it is to be blindly devoted to society's current knowledge and culture. If fear that "guardian of knowledge" implies that the university would be blind partly contributes to abandonment of the idea, the difficulty might be removed by substitution of the term "guardian of truth". Of course the distinctions made between "knowledge", "truth" and "belief" continue to be the subject of much philosophical inquiry. But I think it is the case that those who have maintained that the

university must be the guardian of knowledge have assumed the philosophical tradition that "knowledge" implies truth. The substitution of the term "guardian of truth" does away with any suspicion that the implication is that the university must be devoted to tradition and knowledge that is not developing. The substitution therefore may remove a prejudice and permit more objective examination of the realities of academic activities. Such an examination reveals, I think, that the guarding or preservation of truth is a necessary academic activity. Any inquiry, including creative and critical thinking, would seem to need to take into account the existing ideas and bodies of information which would appear to be relevant to the inquiry. At the very least these will be the elements of logical thought and the bodies of language or symbols necessary to formulate new ideas, but for most academic inquiries there will exist a considerable body of relevant theory and information. And this applies to both original inquiry and the learning activities of students. At any level of scholarship, the scholar needs to care for the truths on which his own learning is constructed. Noting in his analysis of the concept of education that the aspect of education as transmission of knowledge is unfashionable today, Richard Peters points out that it is absurd to think that procedures can be handed on without content; rather, the procedures of a discipline can only be "... mastered by an exploration of its established content under the guidance of one who has already been initiated." ¹

IV:14 It may be that with the greater emphasis now placed in universities on research and original inquiry and the advancement of knowledge, the foregoing argument is generally assumed, and that the preservation of knowledge is usually taken to be included in the advancement of knowledge. Not only are the two closely related as has been suggested, but it might be claimed further that it is only the worker engaged in the advancement of knowledge who can adequately test old knowledge and be confident of what is of such value that it must be preserved. This claim cannot be used as further persuasion that the academic who is advancing knowledge is also consciously involved in its preservation, but it may be a valid reason why in an age of rapid change it has been less common to specify the preservation of knowledge as a distinct purpose of the university.

IV:15 The advancement of knowledge seems always to have been included among the purposes assigned to universities in recent official statements. The preservation of knowledge or of a society's cultural heritage has also received some official recognition as a proper purpose of institutions of higher education. Thus the Robbins Committee listed "the transmission of a common culture and common standards of citizenship" among the purposes that should be served by every institution of higher education.\(^1\) In Australia, the Martin Committee was not so forthright on this matter. But in a section headed 'Tertiary Education as an Aspect of a Wider Problem' it suggested that at all levels of education general education is of basic importance, creating '... the whole educational climate of a modern nation, which no

\(^1\) Robbins Report, pp. 6 and 7.
amount of highly specialized training can replace.' A little later in the section, the Committee appears to concern itself more specifically with the nature of higher education:

... Men and women who are capable of benefitting [sic] from higher education are also citizens. They share with their fellows the responsibility of making judgements on issues of all kinds, including apparently humble and private matters. Yet these decisions are ultimately to be made in terms of values, values which can be discerned only in the light of a sound general education.¹

The Committee thus saw the transmission of values as properly a part of general education, but this is not the equivalent of "the transmission of a common culture and common standards of citizenship" in the Robbins Report. And neither can be said to be the exact equivalent of "the preservation of knowledge" or of "the preservation of culture". But I think it may be allowed that each report implies that the preservation of the society's knowledge and culture are fitting objectives of institutions of higher education.

IV:16 These statements from official inquiries refer to institutions of higher education generally; but while they are meant to apply to universities as institutions of higher education, I think that it can be argued that the reports' other recommendations point to situations in which the university is the institution of higher education and learning best-fitted to be the guardian of knowledge and of at least the larger part of the society's culture. In each of the patterns of higher education that we have considered carefully, it has been emphasized that universities should be the homes of research and the advancement of knowledge and

¹ Martin Report, pp. 4-8.
that they should enjoy the greatest degree of autonomy. It is in its possession of autonomy and its engagement in the advancement of knowledge that the university is the best-fitted of institutions of higher education to act as the preserver of knowledge, the guardian of truth, and as the critic of society. This was perhaps brought out most clearly in the Murray Report:

Finally, in addition to the two aims of education and research, universities have a third function. They are, or they should be, the guardians of intellectual standards, and intellectual integrity in the community ... Here is one of the most valuable services which a university, as an independent community of scholars and inquirers, can perform for its country and the world ... No nation in its senses wishes to make itself prone to self-delusion, or to deceive by other nations; and a good university is the best guarantee that mankind can have, that somebody, whatever the circumstances, will continue to seek the truth and to make it known. Any free country welcomes this and expects this service of its universities.¹

IV:17 It has already been suggested that it is only the worker engaged in the advancement of knowledge who can adequately test old knowledge and be confident of what is of such value that it must be preserved. This is not to say that the staff of a technical or teachers' college cannot take part in the preservation of knowledge by transmitting received knowledge to their students; but if they have not the time, facilities and skill to test this knowledge by examination of alternative hypotheses they will be bound to rely on other persons or institutions which can offer some guarantee of the authenticity of the knowledge in question. It may be objected that the staff of non-university institutions are likely themselves to be graduates and

¹ Report of the Committee on Australian Universities, September 1957, p. 11.
should therefore be capable of authenticating knowledge for themselves. Doubtless many could - given time and facilities. It remains true that staff in non-university institutions are seldom accorded these conditions and must remain heavily dependent on workers in the universities. IV:18 Closely related here is the principle that it is only the institution which is both autonomous and able to support its members in the activity of investigation which is likely to act effectively as a critic of society. As has been suggested,¹ there is a tradition in Western society of questioning what is traditional, and it would certainly seem in those patterns of higher education and learning which we have studied closely that universities have been allotted the conditions necessary for following in that tradition. In the United States, Kenneth Keniston has looked carefully at this notion of the university as critic and come to the conclusion that:

In this critical examination of modern society, American universities have quietly but nonetheless decisively assumed the leading role. Higher education has become the chief source of analyses, evaluations, and judgements of our society: our proposals for reform, our critiques and defenses of the status quo, our prophecies of doom and our utopias almost invariably originate from the academy. With but few exceptions, our modern vocabulary of social analysis, our rhetoric of social criticism and reform, are the products of higher education. The university has given us our most powerful understandings of American social character, of the economy, of our psychology as a nation.²

Keniston appears here to be thinking principally of forms of social organization. But my conception of the university

¹ Above, p. 64.
as critic - or critic of society - includes criticism of any pattern of thought or value held by a society or any of its members, and not simply those which relate to social organization. And writing of the complicated structure of higher education in the United States, Keniston refers without discrimination it seems to "higher education" and "universities". What I want to suggest is that because of the differential allocation of conditions to different institutions of higher education and learning, non-university institutions must be reliant on the universities, not only for the authentication of knowledge but also in large part, for the stream of new ideas on which any course in higher education is dependent. It is often claimed that if teaching at tertiary level is to be kept lively and relevant the teacher - no matter in which institution of higher education he is working - must be himself engaged in research or at least engaged in keeping up with developments in his subject. If this view is correct, the teacher in non-university institutions who is unable to do his own research will be dependent on research emanating from universities; but so will the teacher who is able to carry out investigations of his own, for it is unlikely that anyone will be able to teach only on the subject of his own original work.

IV:19 An additional argument may be advanced in support of the claim that the role officially ascribed to universities gives them a central place in systems of higher education and learning. Again we must recall that universities are officially expected to be the home of fundamental research and learning; and non-university
sectors to concern themselves rather more with applied studies. Now it can be argued that pure and applied studies depend upon each other. If it is assumed that to be really valuable knowledge must be put to use, then it is clear that in this sense pure knowledge is dependent upon applied. But this is not a necessary dependence, whereas by definition applied knowledge is necessarily dependent on pure. It could perhaps be replied that it is incorrect to imply that the work of the non-university sectors is simply constituted of applied studies. Michael Polanyi has suggested that technology is composed not only of applied science but also of '... the older crafts which still form the majority of modern industries and which have been invented without the aid of science, by mere trial and error.' This being so, technology might expand without recourse to pure studies, and non-university institutions (including perhaps teachers' colleges if they concentrated on teaching the tricks of the trade) function without reference to university learning.

But the validity of this argument can be admitted without accepting it as a proper objection to the dependence of other institutions on the universities as the home of pure studies and fundamental research. Today, at least in the societies particularly relevant to this thesis, all sectors of higher education are expected to be both excellent and efficient, and these they could not be if they were cut off

1 Sir Charles Morris has argued that today the pure sciences are quite dependent on technology. 'The University and the Modern Age' in T.B. Stroup (ed.), The University in the American Future, Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press 1965, p. 59.

from the new knowledge, skills and stimulation afforded by
pure and fundamental studies. Again it seems clear that
denied the opportunity for research and the conduct of
fundamental studies, the other institutions of higher
education must be dependent on the universities.
IV:20 One problem which arises from the notion of the
centrality of the university in higher education and learning
is that of the extent to which the university is competent
to validate or even comment upon the studies of other
institutions; at first sight customary university studies
seem irrelevant to some of the subjects studied in
non-university institutions. Of course, those who subscribe
to the view that all tertiary institutions should be engaged
in "elemental" higher education would see it as an activity
for which universities might properly be concerned no matter
in which institutions it took place; and there are many
subjects which are studied, perhaps with differing emphasis,
in both the universities and other institutions. But can
the concern of universities be justified for subjects which
are not part of the universities' curricula or fields of
research and investigation? An affirmative answer may be
given by pointing out that the traditional university
disciplines underlie the way we think about any problem,¹
and at the very least there will always be questions that
may be asked about the validity of the language or symbols
and logic used. In commenting on the idea of a unity of
knowledge, Maxwell H. Goldberg suggests that models
employing the concept of the complete circle (as in "the
circle of sciences", I presume) need the corrective of

¹ Cf. R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 158f.
elevation to indicate the different depths at which knowledge may be sought, and that the image of a cylinder might be more apt.\textsuperscript{1} For our purposes I would want to alter the image again to that of a cone. For, without becoming involved in the science of conics, it seems useful to conceive that no matter what topic is studied at a low level in the cone, there will be segments related to it at a higher level, and at the peak of the cone logic and the laws of language and symbol on which every topic of knowledge must depend. If the fundamental university studies are representative of the upper levels of the cone then there is no item of knowledge to which they are unrelated. And use of "unity of knowledge" recalls to mind that some theorists still hold to the traditional view that it is the proper purpose of a university to engage in the pursuit of a unity of knowledge.\textsuperscript{2} For them the university will be all the more justified in concerning itself with the studies made in the non-university institutions. If, then, the university is held to be the "guardian of truth" for its society, it would seem reasonable that universities should concern themselves with the validation of knowledge throughout society and including the treatment of knowledge in other institutions of higher education.

IV:21 So far in this consideration of the problem of the extent to which the university is competent to validate or comment upon the studies of other institutions we have been concerned with the notions of "truth" and "knowledge"


\textsuperscript{2} See above, p. 55.
and their authentication. The problem assumes rather different form when it involves those studies which are normally undertaken at tertiary level only in non-university institutions and which involve practical work rather than the pursuit of knowledge and the criterion of beauty rather than truth. Concerned with the validation by universities of B. Ed. studies in the United Kingdom colleges of education, Niblett lists craft, fine art, drama, household economics, dance, physical education and music as "borderline academic subjects" where difficulty has arisen over their acceptance by universities for the degree.¹ In the United States, the fine arts, including their practice, have been widely accepted as appropriate studies in universities, and Niblett points out that in the United Kingdom some universities already count drama towards a degree and offer degrees in physical education and household economics and that in many long-established university studies such as surgery, engineering, laboratory work in science, and music, training in skills is important.² But to say that a study has been accepted by a university as fitting or even by a number of universities is not to be all-persuasive. The real question, in Niblett's view, is whether it is possible to prepare syllabuses and examinations in these fields which '... will encourage both a proper recognition of the rational and spontaneous mental activity at a level that is profound?'³

IV:22  Niblett's answer really applies only to the creative

² Ibid., p. 340.
³ Ibid.
arts. He asserts that some people express their intelligence better through creative work in the arts or more practical subjects than through traditional academic studies, and he urges that '... the disciplined practice of a creative art involves the exercise of rational intelligence at a high level.' His implication is, I think, that such subjects can be pursued in a way which makes them appropriate in a university, but he is forced to note that it may be necessary for us to enlarge our "recognition of the nature of the rational". ¹

IV:23 Proper evaluation of Niblett's position and his concepts of rationality and intelligence would take us deep into disputed territory in psychology and philosophy and cannot be attempted here, but some general observations can be made. The inclusion of fine arts in a university's curriculum has sometimes been opposed on the ground that the university should concern itself only with things of the rational intellect. ² This view seems to imply that distinctions can be drawn with confidence between the capacities of man which we may roughly term rationality and artistic sensibility. But it would not appear certain that a fine distinction can be drawn here. It is common experience that a person does not give total allegiance to either one. And others besides Niblett have held that these two capacities are really aspects of the one capacity - intelligence. ³ If a fine distinction cannot be made here it would be less easy to maintain that some subjects are

¹ Ibid.
² E.g., J. Barzun, The American University, pp. 235-238.
³ Cf. Howard Nemerov's "practical intelligence of art". See F. MacShane, 'Arts in the University', Columbia Forum, 12:1, Spring 1969, p. 43.
appropriate in a university and that some studies must be made in other institutions. Then the history of fine arts and aesthetics are generally accepted as proper parts of the academic study of history and philosophy. For both these reasons it would seem justifiable for academics in universities, if not actually to teach fine arts themselves, at least to comment on work in fine arts in other institutions. It cannot be doubted that academics who accept that the university should be the guardian of truth would maintain that it is the right, indeed duty, of academics to comment on the elements of cognitive rationality at least in the study of the fine arts and more practical studies wherever they are pursued.
Conclusion

IV:24 My main concern in this chapter has been to suggest that there are factors which place universities as they are at present constituted in a special situation in systems of higher education and learning, factors which also make the other institutions in certain senses dependent for their vitality and standards on the university. The clearest implication of this that I can see is that institutions of higher education and learning cannot be considered to have the same financial needs. But it is now frequently asserted that the institutions of higher education are in some usually undefined sense equal. And as in many governmental areas it has become easier to get finance for specific projects in non-university institutions than in the universities, it would appear that it is now urgent that the bases on which resources are allocated to different sectors and institutions be re-examined. I am particularly concerned that those who are involved in the planning, financing and systematization of higher education and learning should appreciate the position of centrality in which universities have been placed in patterns of higher education and learning and should make allowance for this in the allocation of resources.

IV:25 Although I have been suggesting that the interests of all institutions of higher education and learning are in some respects closer than is often supposed, I have not simply been advocating that unitary systems of higher education should replace binary systems where they exist. The settlement of that matter would require consideration of many additional factors. In order to make this chapter
more complete, however, I propose to move momentarily further into the field of systematization and indicate some of the ways in which the responsibilities arising from the centrality of universities as I have described it might be exercised.

IV:26 The organizational forms by which the responsibilities arising from the centrality of the university can be exercised vary from informal activities on the part of individual academics, through formal arrangements by universities and other institutions and the development of universities so that in some way they comprehend the other institutions of higher education, to that situation in which all institutions of higher education are constituted as universities. I shall look first at the extreme forms and then at those which fall between.

IV:27 Many academics have entered into discussion of arguments published by members of non-university institutions. On publication, points of view become in a sense public property, and their origin is no longer a vital matter outside the history of ideas. Some academics more positively evince a feeling of responsibility for the welfare of higher education in other institutions by becoming external examiners and members of subject committees, academic boards and governing bodies of the other institutions. While it is obvious that many academics prefer to work in personal and informal ways, it may be wondered whether the responsibilities of the university for other institutions arising from its role of guardian of truth could ever be fulfilled without a greater degree of organization.
IV:28 At the other extreme there are proposals that the form of universities be altered and new universities created to meet the extensive demands now being made on systems of higher education. Such a proposal is put forward by J.R. Lukes. Her "comprehensive" or "regional" university would be "... something different and broader than our present concept of what a university is and should be ...", would link up institutions "as they now exist", and in the future would also include community centres and adult education centres. The plan is not perfectly clear, however, it not being specified - for instance - whether existing universities would be reformed or the linking up effected by new institutions. A somewhat similar proposal but one more carefully worked out is that made by John Vaizey for "quniversities" - so called to distinguish them from present universities. Vaizey would group all the existing non-university institutions of higher education in the United Kingdom into quniversities, the newly-created institutions being composed of county or regional groupings of formerly separate institutions. Through a Higher Education Board the quniversities would organize their own finance, administration, degree and diploma awarding, and so on. Whether these proposals would result in viable institutions cannot be determined here. They are cited as examples of extreme ways in which the influence of the university as "guardian of truth" might permeate higher education. If the new institutions were able to engage in

research and the advancement of knowledge and had a sufficient degree of independence that their staff might be free to engage in any issue, then the way would be open for a greater sharing of the guardianship of truth and culture than now appears to pertain.

IV:29 A middle course is represented by the extension of the university institute of education principle to other non-university institutions. With others in a letter to The Times, Boris Ford has suggested that the idea of linking academically the colleges of education to the universities could be extended to institutes of technology and commerce,¹ and if the above argument that universities may properly comment on the work of fine arts institutions is valid, then the idea might perhaps be capable of extension generally throughout higher education. The formal sharing of responsibility for standards by the university and the institution through an academic board allows the university's peculiar competence to act as guardian of truth to be exercised in institutions without their becoming administratively wholly part of a university. It should perhaps be noted that it is as yet unclear whether such a "university umbrella" would be permitted in Australia by the Australian Universities Commission,² and in the United Kingdom - at least until recently - the University Grants Committee has allowed only one or two exceptions to a rule that universities should not enter into such formal

¹ B. Ford and others, (Correspondence) 'Professional Education' The Times, 22 December 1965, p. 9. For Ford's account of the institute of education principle, see 'The Universities' Role in Higher Education', loc. cit. pp. 171-184.
² Cf. J.J. Auchmuty, 'Co-operation Among Universities and with Other Organizations', loc. cit., p. 64.
arrangements with institutions of higher education other than colleges of education.¹

IV:30 If the comprehensive universities described by Lukes or Vaizey's universities actually came into being, or if the university institute of education principle were extended more generally throughout higher education, the way would be opened for a more general sharing of the responsibility for the guardianship of truth and criticism of society than in fact exists at present. This changed situation might also obtain if non-university institutions were accorded greater independence and increased opportunities for investigation. It is for these reasons that I stress that it is as universities are at present constituted that the centralising factors which I have described pertain.

IV:31 Lord Annan has described the recommendations of the Robbins Committee that colleges of education enter into closer relationships with universities, that colleges of advanced technology become universities and that the Council for National Academic Awards provide the means by which other institutions prepare for university status as a "takeover bid" by the universities for higher education,² and doubtless there would be much opposition to an extension of the universities' influence over higher education. Probably there would be many advocates of greater freedom and increased opportunities for investigation for non-university institutions. What seems certain is that

official views of the role of universities allow universities to act as guardians of truth and critics of society more easily than other institutions. Academics who accept that this is as it should be should not only engage in these activities but should make this special situation of universities known to those who are responsible for the organization, especially the funding, of higher education and learning.

Both these functions could be performed at a cheaper rate, apart from these very expensive institutions... Thus the proper function of a university is the imaginative acquisition of knowledge. A.R. Whitehead, 'Universities and their Function'.

Introduction

V:1. Newman held that the nurturing of liberal education was the proper and primary function of a university. In this century, Whitehead, Octago and Hutchins have assumed similar positions. But today there is a confusion of ideas on the purposes proper to universities, and individuals who uphold the primary of liberal education are now confronted with assertions that other ends should determine the functioning of universities. The resulting uncertainty cannot be settled autonomously within the walls of a university. Governments and their agencies hold certain expectations of universities, and it now appears necessary for an institution to determine its major functions at least in consultation with public officials and coordinating agencies.

1 Akes Amurao Lim in the record of discussion in R. Gurjar and Rafa-ur-Rahman (eds), The University Today: its Role and Place in Society, p. 49.

2 A.R. Whitehead, The Aims of Education and Other Essays, pp. 120-129.
CHAPTER FIVE

LIBERAL EDUCATION AS A PURPOSE OF THE UNIVERSITY

The development of the whole man is the essential aim of a university education. Professional preparation in a true university, from the point of view of educational values, is always a secondary aim, although it can be made the primary objective. Alceu Amoroso Lima in The University Today: Its Role and Place in Society.¹

The universities are schools of education, and schools of research .... Both these functions could be performed at a cheaper rate, apart from these very expensive institutions .... Thus the proper function of a university is the imaginative acquisition of knowledge. A.N. Whitehead, 'Universities and their Function'.²

Introduction

V:1 Newman held that the nurturing of liberal education was the proper and primary function of a university. In this century, Whitehead, Ortega and Hutchins have assumed similar positions. But today there is a confusion of ideas on the purposes proper to universities, and individuals who uphold the primacy of liberal education are now confronted with assertions that other ends should determine the functioning of universities. The resulting uncertainty cannot be settled autonomously within the walls of a university. Governments and their agencies hold certain expectations of universities, and it now appears necessary for an institution to determine its major functions at least in consultation with public officials and co-ordinating agencies.

¹ Alceu Amoroso Lima in the record of discussion in B. Ducret and Rafe-uz-Zaman (eds), The University Today: Its Role and Place in Society, p. 49.
² A.N. Whitehead, The Aims of Education and Other Essays, pp. 138-139.
At present in the three patterns of higher education and learning with which this thesis is particularly concerned, universities are officially expected to make provision for liberal education. The Californian Master Plan acknowledged that liberal education should proceed in higher education institutions throughout that system.¹ In the United Kingdom, the Robbins Committee did not concern itself with matters of curricula. However, in the section entitled 'The Aims of Higher Education', the Committee pointed to the function of transmission of a common culture and common standards of citizenship and postulated that one aim should be to produce cultivated men and women rather than mere specialists. The Committee suggested that there was room for at least "a speck" of these principles in every institution of higher education, and that the system as a whole would need to provide adequately for them.² In Australia, the Martin Committee stressed the need for "general education" at all educational levels,³ and it has been generally emphasized in official statements that Australian universities should put analysis and theory before vocational training.⁴

These almost casual statements do not reflect the very great seriousness with which many theorists have regarded the situation of liberal education in the modern university. Charles Frankel, for instance, has pointed to a persistent tension in higher education in the United States which continuously tests the resilience of higher

¹ Above, p. 78.
² Robbins Report, pp. 6-7.
³ Martin Report, pp. 7-8.
⁴ Above, p. 88f.
education: 'On one side, a vigorous, skeptical technological society demands that learning come to grips with living problems; on the other side, scholarly traditions demand that disinterested inquiry for ideal ends not be submerged under the pressures of the present.' He goes on to suggest that the tension would not be unhealthy if something of a balance could be struck between the demands of society and those of scholarship.¹ In England, Ashby has pointed out that extreme solutions to the problem would bring with them serious consequences and are therefore unacceptable: '... if the university repudiates the call to train technologists, it will not survive; if it repudiates the cultivation of non-practical values, it will cease to merit the title of university.'² The pressures on liberal education in the universities have been such that theorists have taken to talking about the demise of liberal education at tertiary level. Jacques Barzun has observed that in the United States there has been a tendency to seize the young scholar and train him in a "tangible salable skill", with the result that '... the liberal arts tradition is dead or dying.'³ And in a popular article Irving Kristol raised something of a storm by claiming that "to all intents and purposes" liberal education no longer survives on American campuses.⁴ J.S. Brubacher, therefore, is perhaps justified in considering that the long-continuing tendency for professional

1 C. Frankel, Issues in University Education, p. 171.
2 E. Ashby, Technology and the Academics, p. 78.
and technological training to encroach on liberal education poses one of the chief - if not the chief - need for theoretical or philosophical study of higher education. A detailed "theoretical or philosophical study of higher education" is not attempted in this chapter. My intention here is to indicate briefly the range of meanings given to "liberal education" and some of its consequences in the discussion on the purposes of universities, and to outline some of the other considerations which would seem to be involved in assigning liberal education as a proper purpose of universities. As "liberal education" stands for a congeries of ideas rather than a coherent doctrine, and as there is no settled way of determining how universities best serve society, my conclusion is that while liberal education as defined can be regarded as a fitting purpose of a university it remains possible to conceive of a university which does not aim at affording liberal education.

1 J.S. Brubacher, Bases for Policy in Higher Education, p. 21-22.
"Liberal education" is a term much used without careful consideration of the exact meaning it is intended to convey. This can considerably hamper discussion and examination of points of view because the term has in fact been used to stand for a wide range of ideas. Something of the extent of this range can be ascertained by consideration of the views of Hutchins and C.D. Hardie. Hutchins implies that the means to a liberal education are not only settled but everywhere the same: 'Education implies teaching. Teaching implies knowledge. Knowledge is truth. Truth is everywhere the same. Hence education should be everywhere the same.' At the other extreme, Hardie argues that as the term "liberal" took its meaning in a slave-owning society and a liberal education was originally one appropriate to a free man, the distinction between liberal and illiberal depends on the extent to which one's own free choice operates throughout the process of education. For Hardie, humanistic studies prescribed in an engineering course are no more liberal than engineering studies, but the result of an engineer freely electing to study medieval history in the leisure time from his engineering studies would be to liberalize his education. In passing it can be noticed that P.H. Hirst observes that the Greeks attained the concept of an education that was liberal in two senses: in that it was appropriate to free men rather than slaves and in that they saw it as freeing the mind to function according

1 R.M. Hutchins, The Higher Learning in America, p. 66.
to its true nature - free from illusion and error.\textsuperscript{1} It has been because theorists have held certain studies to be the most appropriate for freeing the mind in this way that it has been widely held that the means to a liberal education were fixed.\textsuperscript{2}

V:6 Today the beliefs are widely held that there are various means to a liberal education and that the matter by which a liberal education is acquired is less important than the method by which the learning proceeds. Henry Winthrop can be cited as one who holds that liberal studies assume new forms over the passage of time. He holds that liberal education today should be sought in modern interdisciplinary studies rather than in the traditional studies which were thought to afford intellectual and social well-roundedness. For Winthrop, modern interdisciplinary studies offer the possibility of intellectual integration, although in a context of understanding rather than original discovery, and it is this sort of integration that is now demanded by the liberal tradition of education.\textsuperscript{3} And Richard Peters

\textsuperscript{1} P.H. Hirst, 'Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge' in R.D. Archambault (ed.), Philosophical Analysis and Education, p. 115.

\textsuperscript{2} Cf. R.M. Hutchins, 'Liberal education aimed at the continuation of the dialogue that was the heart of western civilization. Western civilization is the civilization of the dialogue. It is the civilization of the Logos. Liberal education made the student a participant in the Great Conversation that began with the dawn of history and continues to the present day.' (The Conflict in Education, New York: Harper and Brothers 1953, pp. 81-82.) To take part in this conversation and to know what dialogue has gone before, a person needs, in Hutchins's view, a course of study consisting of the greatest books of the western world, the arts of reading, writing, thinking and speaking, and mathematics - "the best exemplar of the processes of human reason". The Higher Learning in America, p. 85.

represents the view that subject content does not guarantee liberality:

... both science and arts subjects can be passed on by liberal or illiberal procedures. Literature and science can both be treated as 'subjects' and, as it were, stamped in to a student. Or they can be treated as living disciplines of critical thought and of the imagination, in which the student can be trained on an apprenticeship system. "Liberal" is a term used of certain types of principles and procedures such as respect for persons and facts, toleration, and deciding matters by discussion rather than by dictat. Its association with the content of courses is derivative from the belief that some subjects foster such principles more than others. But this is a naïve view - rather like the strange belief that technical colleges can be made more "liberal" if a certain amount of time is devoted to teaching 'the humanities' to supplement science subjects. For it is surely the manner in which any course is presented rather than its matter which is crucial in developing a liberal attitude of mind.¹

V:7 There exists, then, a great range of opinion on what should be the content and method of liberal studies. Two further sources of confusion concerning liberal education must be noted. In the past it has been traditional to distinguish liberal education from professional and vocational education, but in many recent views this distinction is by no means clear. Newman himself admitted that a person might cultivate knowledge as useful and liberal at the one time.² In this century it has frequently been maintained that it is quite proper to pursue a liberal education through the media of professional and vocational studies. M.V.C. Jeffreys, for instance, maintains:

At its worst vocational education is the acquisition of mere tricks of the trade. At its best it is the consecration of service, and can be as generous and philosophical as the apostles of the liberal tradition could wish, while possessing the added urgency of meaning that comes from direct reference to social utility.³

² The Idea, p. 99.
Not only does Jeffreys blur the distinction between the liberal and vocational, but his use of quasi-religious language recalls to mind that it has frequently been maintained that liberal education should culminate in wisdom rather than knowledge. The matter is highly controversial. Apologists like Hutchins emphasize the development of rationality, while others emphasize the "poetic-metaphoric-intuitive-artistic and the moral and spiritual".¹ Inclining more to the latter position, Jacques Maritain has suggested that liberal education should not culminate in narrow intellectual expertise but should evince a response from the whole being of the student:

We grasp the meaning of a science or an art when we understand its object, nature, and scope, and the particular species of truth or beauty it discloses to us. The objective of basic liberal education is to see to it that the young person grasps this truth or beauty through the natural powers and gifts of his mind and the natural intuitive energy of his reason backed up by his whole sensuous, imaginative, and emotional dynamism.²

As the goals, matter and methods of liberal education are thus disputed, it is only to be expected that different justifications are offered for liberal education. Three main types of justification can be distinguished; two depend on what we may call intrinsic values, the other on the value of liberal education for extrinsic purposes.

Newman justified liberal education by reference to knowledge being its own end and to the possibility or

ideal of the intellectual perfection of a man. 1 Traditionally, liberal education has been held to develop the distinctively human characteristics. 2 But this tradition has very often been interpreted to refer simply to man's intellect, his cognitive rationality. But to justify liberal education by reference to the development of characteristics that are said to distinguish him from the inferior creatures gives rise to a number of difficulties. First there is the problem of justifying the selection of certain characteristics over others, and there are logical difficulties in arguing from a state of affairs which is to one which ought to be. 3

Perhaps as a result of these difficulties, a number of philosophers have recently attempted to provide an autonomous justification of liberal education, "autonomous" being used to indicate that the justification is provided in terms of the nature of knowledge and without reference to what is thought desirable on social or similar grounds.

In his essay, 'Liberal Education and the Nature of

1 Cf. 'Things animate, inanimate, visible, invisible, all are good in their kind, and have a best of themselves, which is an object of pursuit... There is a physical beauty and a moral: there is a beauty of person, there is a beauty of our moral being, which is natural virtue; and in like manner there is a beauty, there is a perfection of the intellect. There is an ideal perfection in these various subject-matters, towards which individual instances are seen to rise, and which are the standards for all instances whatever.' The Idea, pp. 107-108.

2 Cf. John Woolley; 'A liberal education is one which cultivates and develops in their due and harmonious proportion what the Romans called "humanitas", all those faculties and powers which distinguish man from the inferior creatures.' Lectures Delivered in Australia, Cambridge and London: Macmillan 1862, p. 339.

3 It was largely on these grounds that Sidney Hook attacked the views of liberal education of Hutchins and Mortimer Adler with their emphasis on the rational intellect. Brubacher and Rudy, op. cit., pp. 301-302.
Knowledge', Paul Hirst argues that 'To ask for the justification of any form of activity is significant only if one is in fact committed already to seeking rational knowledge. To ask for a justification of the pursuit of rational knowledge itself presupposes some form of commitment to what one is seeking to justify.'\(^1\) He cannot see any way in which the pursuit of rational knowledge can be justified except in terms of rationality which would have to be excluded on logical grounds. But this does not mean for Hirst that finally rational pursuits lack justification, '... for they could equally well be said to have their justification written into them .... The situation is that we have here reached the ultimate point where the question of justification ceases to be significantly applicable.'\(^2\)

V:11 Other theorists have attempted to justify liberal education not as an end in itself but for its development of useful qualities. Newman emphasized that liberal knowledge is its own end, but he was also emphatic that it was useful as a pre-professional education. The person who possessed general culture of mind would be able to take up his professional calling '... with an ease, a grace, a versatility, and a success, to which another is a stranger.


2 Ibid., pp. 126-127. R.S. Peters makes the similar point that if a person seriously asks the question 'Why do this rather than that?' he will be forced to answer in terms of traditional university disciplines such as science, history, literature and philosophy '... which are concerned with the description, explanation, and assessment of different forms of human activity... This is presumably one of the basic arguments for a "liberal education".' Ethics and Education, pp. 162-163.
In this sense, then, ... mental culture is emphatically useful.¹

This view - that liberal education, pursued as an end in itself, has generally useful by-products - has persisted through the attacks made on transfer of training.² Thus, in a comparatively recent statement, A.K. Stout claims that:

'... the liberally educated man will tend to be broader-minded, less liable to prejudice, less open to the impact of high-pressure salesmanship and propaganda and better able to weigh evidence and see other people's points of view, and so is likely to do better whatever he does just because of his education.'³

This elevated or higher utility has generally been regarded as being valuable to the society at large rather than only to the individual. Ultimately, Newman recognized, a practical end could be assigned to university education:

'... that training of the intellect, which is best for the individual himself, best enables him to discharge his duties to society ... If then a practical end must be assigned to a University course, I say it is that of training good members of society.'⁴

In the words of John Dewey: 'Society is strong, forceful, stable only when all its members can function to the limit of their capacity.'⁵ if this principle is accepted as a premise, Stout's statement on the liberally educated man also points to the higher social utility of liberal education. But where Newman and Stout acknowledge the higher personal and social utility of a liberal education, theorists like

1 The Idea, pp. 146-147.
2 Cf. W.B. Kolesnik, Mental Discipline in Modern Education, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1962, chaps 6, 7, and 8.
4 The Idea, p. 156.
Machlup would be prepared to justify liberal studies in terms of these useful results only. Machlup explains that he is forced to apply his "ultimate productivity standard" to liberal studies because of the need to compromise with those who are attempting to organize higher education in quantitative terms. But if the argument of my third chapter is sound, planning and systematization are not in themselves opposed to any particular form of higher education, including liberal education. Nonetheless, the major official reports on higher education seem to justify liberal and general education in terms of their higher personal and social utility.

V:12 This brief consideration of different views that are taken of the goals, matter, methods and justification of liberal education reveals something of the involved nature of clarifying purposes assigned to universities. If it is suggested that education is a main purpose of the university it is manifestly necessary to inquire further whether "education" refers here specifically to professional or vocational education or to liberal education or to a concept in which these forms are not strictly differentiated. But even to specify liberal education as a purpose of the university is to use a term which requires explication. And it can perhaps be assumed that other purposes assigned to universities - such as the advancement of knowledge, research and public service need similar explication before they can be fruitfully discussed. I have argued in earlier chapters that academics need to inform the planners and those involved

1 See above, pp. 132-133.
2 Cf., e.g., the section 'Education as an Investment' in the Martin Report, pp. 4-9.
in systematization about the special purposes and requirements of their subjects and university and higher education in general. Given the variety of views that are taken of liberal education and the possibility that similar complexities exist concerning other university activities, it is possible that a confusion of ideas might be propagated and little clarification of purposes and requirements result. But all academics need not, in the first instance, communicate their views to those doing the planning and systematizing. It would seem wise that there be more discussion of viewpoints on the purposes and nature of university activities within the universities themselves.

Certainly decisions on whether universities should engage in liberal education programmes are not ones that can be given over entirely to super-university organizations.
The Placement of Liberal Education

V:13 This section is concerned with some of the considerations which need to be taken into account in attempts to determine whether liberal education should be a purpose of a university. Such attempts might be made by theorists on higher education speculating on ideas of the university, planners of systems of higher education and learning, university officials - such as members of an interim council laying the foundations of the new institution - and members of a university trying to order the institution's priorities.

V:14 Now we have seen in the three patterns of higher education which we have studied closely that it has been accepted that universities should continue to offer programmes of liberal education. It may therefore be questioned whether there is a real issue in determining if liberal education should be a purpose of a university. My answer to this query would be that if it has not already proved questionable whether universities should engage in programmes of liberal education the matter is likely to be increasingly debated in the near future. Ashby has stated that the task of reconciling four major functions in the one institution represents the biggest problem facing the British universities, and in America Gross and Grambsch found that clear distinctions emerged between institutions with élitist and those with "service" goals. When, therefore, observers point to an apparently decreasing interest in liberal studies in the United States it may be

1 Above, p. 47.
that in some universities and systems of higher education and learning liberal education is already generally thought of as something which may accrue from the studies for which there is provision in the university but that in itself it does not constitute a primary purpose of the university. ¹ This attitude may have resulted from careful consideration of ideas of the purposes of universities and the nature of liberal education or it may be the almost inevitable result of external pressures on universities. Martin Trow believes that pressures on the university are now so great that the expansion demanded in some areas threatens the continuation of some of the university's traditional activities. ² Trow divides the functions of universities into two categories, "popular" and "autonomous". In the first he includes the provision of places for those who want to continue their education beyond high school and the provision of useful knowledge for any who want it. As autonomous functions he designates the transmission of high culture (Newman and Hutchins's purpose for the university), the creation of new knowledge through pure scholarship and basic scientific research, and the selection, formation and certification of elite groups. Trow considers that the central question which universities must now ask themselves is whether these popular functions are compatible with the survival of the autonomous functions of disinterested inquiry in the classroom and in scientific research. ³ Of course, from the

1 This seems to be the view of Jacques Barzun in his address 'College to University - and After', in J.D. Margolis (ed.), The Campus in the Modern World, pp. 151-154.
3 Ibid., p. 7.
replies of Edward Copleston to the attacks on Oxford University by the Edinburgh Reviewers early in the nineteenth century, more or less constant expression has been given to the idea that liberal education in the universities is being threatened. But if Trow is right it would appear that it is now critical for universities and co-ordinating agencies to consider carefully whether the university should be devoted to the pursuit of liberal education. The extent to which a university should devote itself to the pursuit of liberal education, the advancement of knowledge and the servicing of the knowledge industry would seem to be a very real issue in highly developed societies.

V:15 It has been confirmed in this chapter that many interpretations can be put upon the term "liberal education". Obviously, different interpretations will affect the outcome of considerations of the place of liberal education in higher education. For example, Hardie's view that liberal education is that which is freely and autonomously chosen by the student must be considered in a different way from the ideas that liberal education is afforded by a prescribed course of study or that liberal education is a by-product of professional and specialist studies. If, therefore, this is to prove a useful study of some of the considerations that must be taken into account in determining the placement of liberal education, it is necessary to be specific about the meaning given here to "liberal education".

V:16 The meaning given to "liberal education" for our immediate purposes in this section is a common one: education for which the motivation of student and teacher stems more
from concern with personal human development and valuing learning for its own sake than with professional or vocational expertise. As such, liberal education would be broad rather than narrow in scope, but would include some study in such depth that the successful student would achieve some mastery of at least one of the scholarly disciplines. Described in this way, the area of liberal education is not perfectly demarcated. It blends into professional education, particularly into "academic" or "professorial" education (the education appropriate to those who will later teach a particular subject at tertiary or upper-secondary level), into research and the advancement of knowledge and into the guardianship of knowledge. It can be sufficiently distinguished from these, however, to permit of separate programmes of study and to give rise to the question of whether it should be treated as a separate category of learning or a by-product of other learning.

V:17 It would be most unusual for a theorist to regard the pursuit of liberal education as a worthwhile activity and the other university activities are worthless or the other activities as worthwhile and liberal education as worthless. All the purposes traditionally ascribed to universities refer to activities which are very generally accepted as valuable in terms of individual and social well-being. The problems which must be faced are whether among a number of worthwhile activities liberal education

1 R.M. Titmuss refers to "professorial degrees" in Commitment to Welfare, p. 35, and "professorial education" was evidently a term much used by Alexander Carr-Saunders—see S. Caine, British Universities: Purpose and Prospects, p. 30. Sir Charles Morris distinguishes between "academic" and "educational" studies in 'The Functions of Universities Today' in W.R. Niblett (ed.), The Expanding University, pp. 24-25.
has any prior claim to be included in the activities of a university and whether, perhaps, there is reason why liberal education must be one of the university's activities. Supporters of the idea of the multiversity may not consider that these are serious problems for the university at all, their institution being conceived as one which can accommodate the continuing accretion of functions. Those, however, who regard the multiversity as the abnegation of the idea of a university are likely to regard these problems very seriously indeed.

V:18 The need for a university to choose between the functions which have accumulated in the course of the years is usually said to be in the cause of the efficient discharge of responsibilities. In the words of Jacques Barzun:

"The baroque university that we have built is causing more and more people disquiet and discomfort... The suspicion grows that diversity, generally deemed a sign of corporate strength, has for this institution become a means of escaping responsibilities, a means which all alike employ - students, faculties, and administrators."  

The solution that is commonly put forward is that the university should be a specialist rather than a multi-functional institution. This is a proposition which Hutchins has consistently advocated:

"What we want is specialized institutions and unspecialized men.... We want institutions constructed and managed to do a specific job. The more clearly that job is defined, the more likely it is to get done. The political party in a totalitarian state, the church in Spain, the American educational system and university, are examples of underspecialized institutions. Because these institutions undertake to do more than they are equipped to do, they fail in everything."

1 J. Barzun, The American University, p. 242.
Hutchins would have the university engage in those activities for which it is "the best and indispensable instrument", doing nothing that another agency could do as well.\(^1\) This principle has long been applied by theorists and it was partly on this basis that Newman was opposed to the development of research in universities.\(^2\) The principle has been thought to have wide application;\(^3\) Wayland would have had it applied to every institution of higher education;\(^4\) and it appears to have been applied in recent attempts to differentiate the functions of institutions and sectors in systems of higher education and learning. While in practice multiversities proliferate, theorists on higher education and learning tend to argue that the university (and possibly each other institution) should concentrate its attention on a limited range of purposes. It is in this situation that the case for liberal education as a proper purpose of the university must be put alongside the cases for other functions. The question now becomes one of deciding what is a proper purpose of a university.

It may seem a small point, but it must be recognized that there may be legal imperatives on this matter for a university or a number of universities. For instance, a university might, by its statutes, be required

---

2 Above, pp. 6-7.
3 Cf. A.K. Stout: 'To define the primary function of any human institution we have to ask what distinctive contribution it makes to human welfare and progress which cannot be made, or at least cannot be as successfully made by any other institution, and which is of such importance that humanity will be the poorer for its loss.' *The Functions of a University*, The Australian Quarterly, 18:2, June 1946, p. 6.
4 Above, p. 18.
to offer liberal education programmes, or a number of universities within a governmental area be collectively required to provide programmes of liberal education or some other activity for the youth of that area. The existence of such regulations would seem to indicate clearly enough that the universities had certain responsibilities in the area, although it may be noted that official statements are usually so general as to allow of many interpretations.

But the application of the "best and indispensable instrument" should go further than the determination of how the institution might efficiently discharge its stated responsibilities; it should be used to determine what are properly the responsibilities of the institution.

Application of the "best and indispensable instrument" principle involves having regard for the various institutions existent in the society in question and comparative assessment of the role each institution performs best. However, when theorists attempt to determine in what ways the university is the best and indispensable instrument they tend to pay little attention to the other social institutions but simply make assertions about which role they believe universities to have performed best. And as is to be expected, opinions differ on what universities have shown themselves best fitted to do.

Hutchins has suggested that 'If the university can be an intellectual community, it can fulfill its historic function.' He would set up vocational training

---

1 One of the statutory purposes of the University of London, for instance, is to hold forth to all people "an encouragement for pursuing a regular and liberal course of education". *University of London Calendar 1969-1970*, p. 205.
schools and research institutes to cater for the knowledge industry so that the university might be reduced in size and able to concentrate its attention more effectively as a community devoted to intellectual endeavour as such.¹ In England Ernest Barker seems to have taken a similar view of the historic purpose of the university and dignified this notion with the title "the true and pure 'idea of a university'".² But the range of opinion is very wide. In Australia W.M. O'Neil urges that when James Perkins speaks of the obligation of the university to serve the community many people think only of economic benefits while he would rate equally "the relief of human puzzlement and the reduction of human ignorance and superstition". He continues:

"Though the universities may make substantial contributions to the first set, I believe that they are especially well equipped to make substantial contributions to my set. Further, though there are many other institutions able to make substantial, perhaps more substantial, contributions to the former, the universities are almost unique in modern society in their ability to make substantial contributions to the latter."³

Walter Lippmann proposes that the university's unique function is to act when the truth is at issue as the "court of last resort":

The proposition with which I am starting is that as men become modern men, they are emancipated and thus deprived of the guidance and support of traditional and customary authority. Because of this, there has fallen to the universities a unique, indispensable and capital

² Above, p. 49.
function in the intellectual and spiritual life of modern society.¹

And with reference to the tradition of universality which originated with the medieval universities and to "the greatest single public problem of our times", L.K. Caldwell ascribes to universities a unique and indispensable function in the building of a sense of community on a world or universal scale.²

V:22 Individuals differ, then, on what the universities have shown themselves best able to achieve, and no common method emerges on the way this should be determined. The great complication is that in global terms universities have shown themselves to do many things well. S.B. Gould claims that the American university has a fundamental responsibility to concern itself with the attainment of broad social goals. But what I particularly want to notice is his reason for this claim:

Because the university is an impartial agent drawing on the greatest collection of intelligence, ability, and creativity we have in this country, it is the only instrument I know of that can do this job, and do it without political ramifications.³

This concentration of talent in the universities is common in most societies, and it is this which permits the universities to do many things well and better than other social institutions. A further complication is that it is widely believed that universities in different countries

have distinguished themselves for performing best different intellectual tasks - English universities, liberal education; German universities, fundamental research; and American universities, public service. If the best and indispensable instrument principle is applied to ascertain the purposes or responsibilities proper to universities it would seem necessary to confine it to a single national tradition or governmental area. And in an age of internationalism in higher education and learning the application of the principle would seem to fail to select a particular activity and point only to the various successes of the multi-functional global institution. One is left with the feeling that if a particular activity must be selected from among the functions which universities have performed well a more rigorous method must be adopted to determine a satisfactory basis of selection.

V:23 A.P. Griffiths attempts such a rigorous investigation, using the techniques of philosophical analysis, in his essay entitled 'A Deduction of Universities'. Griffiths argues that the disinterested pursuit of universal objects (philosophy, physics, literary criticism, history, etc.) represents the essential function of the university, other activities such as teaching and education being dependent on it and thus, comparatively speaking, accidents - although some accidental activities such as teaching he recognizes to be particularly compatible with the pursuit of universal objects. ¹ But even if we assume with Griffiths

the value and importance of the pursuit of universal
objects and the dependence of teaching and education upon
it, it does not seem inevitable that it should be seen as
the essential purpose of the university. Griffiths
attempts to show '... that there is a region in the firmament
of values that must be filled; and that, in general, it is
the institution which people tend to call a university that
serves to fill it.'¹ This may be accurate as an historical
observation, but does not seem to constitute a statement of
what must be the case. If the pursuit of universal objects
were to be located in special institutes, the institutions
now known as universities might be able to devote themselves
to their historic function of education. Of course
education would still be dependent on the pursuit of
universal objects but this activity would be largely centred
on other institutions. Logically, I suppose, Griffiths
would be required to designate the new institutions as
universities rather than the reformed institutions. But
someone engaged in the planning and systematization of
higher education and learning might well conclude after
studying Griffiths's essay that in the interests of
efficiency education and the disinterested pursuit of
universal objects should be conducted in distinct although
interrelating institutions, and that there was at least as
much reason to call the educational institutions
"universities". And I do not see that Griffiths has shown
why one of these institutions should be regarded as a
university rather than the other.

¹ Ibid., p. 189.
not vitally important, that what is important for a society is that the various activities of higher education and learning can continue in appropriate institutions. Certainly, in view of all the uncertainty about what are proper and essential activities of universities and what is the proper method for ascertaining them, one is left with the feeling that a society would deem it acceptable for a university to concentrate on any limited range of activities drawn from the functions which universities have shown themselves to perform well. A proviso here would be that the society would probably want to be assured that this concentration of activities was in the interests of efficiency and that excellence in the selected activities might still be attained. In such a situation different universities would do different things, although each would rely on other institutions to complete the whole spectrum of higher education and learning. It would be unlikely that an institution would easily pursue a single activity, a research university, for instance, would probably need to train its research workers and might be obliged to act as a guardian of knowledge. But concentration on related activities would seem feasible so that institutions might become technological universities, teaching universities concentrating on liberal and general education, perhaps even public service universities which would confine their attention to solving the immediate problems of their supporting society. Moves in these directions might seem to be a reasonable outcome of the difficulties inherent in attempting to determine what purposes are proper to universities. But there are theorists who might agree that
universities should concentrate their attention but who would strongly oppose the extension of the name "university" to a wide range of institutions.

V:25 Such theorists hold that the title "university" should be restricted to institutions which conform to an historical model. Henry C. Johnson Jr, for instance, argues in his article 'Are Our Universities Schools?' that much of the confusion on the purposes and nature of the modern university results from a failure to recognize that during the last century a "New Institution" has come into being within the university. This new institution resembles a "school", but is devoted primarily to research, analysis and to some extent to specialized training. Johnson argues that the modern multi-functional institution cannot properly be called a "university" and that it cannot be salvaged by rhetorical devices such as naming it a "multiversity". It can readily be seen that Johnson considers that an institution may be called a "university" only when it is primarily a "school", but the latter term is not defined, and the precise grounds on which he rejects the title "multiversity" are not apparent. But Johnson's general position is clear enough; he proposes that public centres of research and development be established and effective educational institutions be re-established each in their own right. In effect he is maintaining that within the modern institution which is popularly called the "university", the real university continues to exist but without due recognition. 2 And along somewhat similar lines, J. Douglas

2 Ibid., passim, especially pp. 165-169 and 176.
Brown proposes that in order to recognize a university of "the kind which has made the term meaningful over the centuries" it may be necessary to call such institutions "liberal universities".¹ For both Brown and Johnson liberal education will be an appropriate, if not the essential, activity of an institution which strictly deserves to be called a university. But their views depend upon the maintenance of an historical conception of the proper purpose of the university. The questions of whether and to what degree the traditions and "idea" of an institution should determine what it should do in the present will be taken up in a later chapter.

V:26 For the present, it can be seen that different methods of determination lead to different accounts of what are proper activities in the university and that it is not self-evident whether an historical or philosophical or some other method should be employed. In the patterns of higher education and learning with which we are particularly concerned, liberal education is accepted as a proper purpose of the universities and in such general terms as would admit of a great range of interpretation. It may be concluded that at least in the rather traditional way that I have interpreted it, liberal education can be considered to be a fitting purpose of a university. It must also be noticed that some theorists would claim that liberal education is an essential activity of the university but that this view has also been rejected by one theorist on philosophical grounds. In the uncertainty about which method should be

used to determine the purposes proper to universities, I take the view that society would be likely to sanction universities concentrating their attention on a limited range of the activities which universities have shown themselves to perform well and might designate such an institution to be a "university", even if it did not consciously attempt to provide a programme of liberal education.

... when the practice of comparable departments differs, as it quite often does, this may be because the departments hold quite opposing views about the responsibilities of university teachers and so allocate their intellectual resources differently. Any such allocation of resources can be judged only in terms of a particular conception of the university's task, a matter on which, with accustomed confidants, we predict that views will differ so long as there are universities.

Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committees, Teaching Methods in Australian Universities,

VI:1 Increasingly, universities and academics are being told that they must be "responsible" and, although less frequently, what their responsibilities are. Students in particular have been vocal in suggesting that academics are irresponsible, and the student who wrote in a college paper that "What most ... experts lack is a discernible sense of responsibility ...." might well have been writing on behalf of a very considerable number of university students in Western society. But as well as students and members of the public, governments and governmental and co-ordinating agencies have taken to enunciating responsibilities to the
CHAPTER SIX

PROBLEMS OF ACADEMIC RESPONSIBILITY

If you want a bomb the chemistry department will teach you how to make it, if you want a cathedral the department of architecture will teach you how to build it, if you want a healthy body the departments of physiology and medicine will teach you how to tend it. But when you ask whether and why you should want bombs or cathedrals or healthy bodies, the university, on this view, must be content to be dumb and impotent. Sir Walter Moberly, *The Crisis in the University*.1

... when the practice of comparable departments differs, as it quite often does, this may be because the departments hold quite opposing views about the responsibilities of university teachers and so allocate their intellectual resources differently. Any such allocation of resources can be judged only in terms of a particular conception of the university's task, a matter on which, with unaccustomed confidence, we predict that views will differ so long as there are universities. Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee, *Teaching Methods in Australian Universities*.2

VI:1 Increasingly, universities and academics are being told that they must be "responsible" and, although less frequently, what their responsibilities are. Students in particular have been vocal in suggesting that academics are irresponsible, and the student who wrote in a college paper that 'What most ... experts lack is a discernible sense of responsibility ....'3 might well have been writing on behalf of a very considerable number of university students in Western society. But as well as students and members of the public, governments and governmental and co-ordinating agencies have taken to ascribing responsibilities to the

---

1 W. Moberly, *The Crisis in the University*, p. 52.
universities. And within universities themselves increasing emphasis on the objectives and methods of teaching and examining is one of a number of ways in which the individual teacher is called upon to reconsider his responsibilities and act responsibly.

VI:2 It is by no means certain, however, that this new situation has enabled the academic to see his responsibilities more clearly. "Responsibility" and "responsible" and related words like "obligation", "duty", "answerability" and "accountability" are bandied about with little attention being given to the ways in which they are used. And as yet there does not appear to be any substantial work in which notions of responsibility in the context of higher education and learning are examined rigorously and systematically.¹

VI:3 In this chapter I shall show something of this difficulty which the academic must face in attempting to ascertain his responsibilities. I shall also examine three of the most important proposals that are now being put forward in this general area. And I shall then consider some of the implications of these proposals in the light of my understanding of "academic responsibility".

VI:4 As has been suggested, many individuals and organizations have taken it upon themselves to ascribe responsibilities to academics and their universities. Sometimes these ascriptions can be seen to have been made by people who are grossly ill-informed on the sorts of institutions that universities are. But when ascriptions of responsibility are made by spokesmen of governments, co-ordinating agencies, other institutions of higher

education and learning, professional organizations and student bodies, they need to be considered very seriously. Having made an ascription of responsibility, these spokesmen may proceed to judge whether the academic or university in question is behaving responsibly or irresponsibly, and they or their organizations, might punish behaviour which they considered to be irresponsible. Responsibility can be allocated after an event, but it would seem to be most useful for the ascription to be made before the event so that the interested parties would have the chance to regulate their behaviour to accord with the formulation of responsibility. Very often a responsibility is formulated and allocated, ascribed or assigned by one party and accepted or assumed by another. However, it is probably even more common for the one party to identify and formulate a responsibility and then assume it. This description makes the procedures sound superbly rational, but very many people act responsibly without consciously formulating and assuming a particular responsibility. But in general it may perhaps be said that it is most useful when clear formulation, allocation and assumption of responsibility takes place before the event in question in order that the responsibility may be properly discharged.

VI:5 I want to suggest that it may be very hard for an academic who intends to behave responsibly to ascertain what his responsibilities are. A large part of the difficulty is that there are many activities in which he could engage in the university and off the campus - too many to engage successfully in them all - and he must therefore ascertain

1 Cf. Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee, Teaching Methods in Australian Universities, pp. 11-12.
those in which he should be engaged. But universities are
not like the armed services in which traditionally at least
almost every aspect of service life is governed by orders and
regulations. By contrast there is great freedom in academic
life, orders are seldom given, and regulations on what
academics should do are likely to be quite general and able
to be interpreted in very different ways. If the academic is
unable to ascertain in his department in what his
responsibilities consist, he may look at the university
regulations. But here again he is likely to find only great
generalities. And statements of the objects of the
university and institutional functions are quite likely to
contain a sentence or paragraph which virtually permits the
university to do anything that is appropriate to a university
and the higher learning.¹ Should the academic seek further
and try to discover what universities are expected to do in
systems of higher education and learning he will find that
the evidence is inconclusive. Even in California - which is
unique in the systems we have looked at closely in having
the functions of the segments written into the State
Constitution - it is laid down only that the University
should provide instruction in the liberal arts and sciences
and teacher and other professional education and that it

¹ E.g., one of the "Objects of the University" of the
University of New South Wales is '... to provide
instruction and carry out research in the disciplines of
humane studies and medicine and in such other disciplines
as the Council may from time to time determine.'
Calendar of the University of New South Wales 1969,
volume 1, Kensington, N.S.W.: Published by the University,
p. A33. Cf. also the "Power" of the University of Reading:
'To do all such other acts and things whether incidental
to the powers aforesaid or not as may be requisite in
order to further the objects of the University as a place
of education and learning.' University of Reading,
should be the State's foremost public agency for research.¹ Should, finally, the academic seek the personal opinion of others on his responsibilities he would be likely to encounter something like the range of opinion which we have noted exists on the purposes of universities.²

VI:6 It is likely, therefore, that the academic who seriously attempts to ascertain what responsibilities have been allocated to him and to his university in general will be largely thrown back on his own resources and scale of values. From this point he will be engaged not only in identifying ascriptions of responsibility but in determining which responsibilities he should assume and what order of priorities he should establish. This, of course, is likely to prove a formidable task. As has often been pointed out, the responsibilities of the academic are almost certainly bound to conflict,³ the rival claims of research and teaching at different levels being mentioned perhaps most frequently in the literature. And almost inevitably he will find that he cannot assume the responsibilities ascribed to him by others and that his order of priorities is not the same as that of some other person.

¹ Above, p. 78.
² In Chapter One, above.
³ Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee, Teaching Methods in Australian Universities, pp. 11-12.
In recent literature on universities and the academic profession a trend of thought has become apparent which has been hailed by some as new thinking. Fundamentally the attitude could be described as a belief that academic detachment should give way to concern, involvement and commitment. Of course this attitude cannot be considered really new in academic thought. As Ashby points out, in earlier times university dons generally believed that what they taught should not only be accurate from the point of view of scholarship but edifying as well.\textsuperscript{1} And Samuel Gould concedes in his essay 'A New Objective' that the idea that universities should be concerned with solving the problems which afflict society was that which inspired the development of land-grant institutions in the United States.\textsuperscript{2} What is new is recognition of the size and complexity of the problems of society and that only the universities have the expertise to solve them. The new attitude can also be seen to be a reaction to the insistence on scholarly detachment which was one aspect of the German ideal of scholarship imported into British, American and Australian universities in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thus while Flexner emphasized that it was essential for the university to study problems no matter from which source they came but not to do anything about them,\textsuperscript{3} many theorists are

\textsuperscript{1} Above, pp. 57-58.
\textsuperscript{3} A. Flexner, Universities: American, English, German, p. 24.
now asserting that such an attitude reflects both social
and academic irresponsibility. As an example of the new
attitude, the concluding lines of Theodore Roszak's essay
'On Academic Delinquency'¹ may be cited. Roszak has been
deploiring what he regards as the fact that American
politics are not intellectually respectable because the
learned professions have not insisted "that intellect
embrace a dimension of citizenship" and have opted out of
politics. He concludes:

So long as our politics retains this character,
there is little that academics - whether they are
humanists or scientists, specialists or generalists,
scholars or technicians - have any right to be proud
of. They may indeed be cultivating a luxuriant garden
of knowledge and theory, and cultivating it with
fastidious skill and exquisite taste. But the obscene
shadows of misguided power and thermonuclear extinction
brood over that garden and all the world surrounding it.
And any conception of intellect that leads men to ignore
that fact is ultimately futile and cowardly.²

Within this trend of thought various proposals have
been made concerning the different functions of the
university. Concerning the teaching function, H.H. Janssen
is translated as saying:

To the ancient Greeks, theoria and praxis were
opposite notions; to us, the distance between the two
has been greatly reduced....
Society and the university have come much closer
together; this contact has added new features to
university life, while the university is increasingly
aware of its responsibilities towards society; it is
no longer merely responsible for the truth of what it
teaches, but also, in some measure, for the use that
will be made of its teaching.³

There would seem to be two principal ways in which

1 'On Academic Delinquency' in T. Roszak (ed.), The
Dissenting Academy, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1969,
pp. 11-44.
2 Ibid., p. 41.
3 H.H. Janssen, 'The Responsibility of the University
Toward Itself, the Student and Society' in University
Education and Public Service, Paris: International
Universities Bureau 1959, p. 76.
universities could discharge this responsibility for the use to which their teaching might be put: firstly by treating with their students of the moral issues to which the topics studied give rise; secondly by commenting publicly on the use to which knowledge is actually put. Also concerning teaching, Samuel Gould argues that American universities must become more closely involved in "domestic social problems" such as illiteracy, poverty and disease. Universities, he considers, have special resources for solving these problems, such as '... the knowledge and experience of the faculty, the idealism and social zeal of students, and the traditional power of colleges and universities to make their presence felt within the community.' These resources should enable colleges and universities to move toward "the objective of a new educational pattern" designed especially to develop the talents of disadvantaged young people. Concerning research, the Lurias propose that universities themselves (rather than outside research agencies) should accept a responsibility to experiment in the process of social change, such as by '... organizing economic or political structures directed at the solution of specific community problems.'

VI:9 At first sight these proposals would seem to be absolutely beyond reconciliation with the belief in the necessity of academic detachment held by Flexner and the dons whom Ashby cites as adopting a policy of strict non-intervention. But attempts have been made to show that there is no unbridgeable gulf between these views. Northrop

1 S.B. Gould, 'A New Objective', loc. cit., p. 228.
2 S.E. and Z. Luria, 'The Role of the University: Ivory Tower, Service Station or Frontier Post?', Daedalus, 99:1 Winter 1970, pp. 81-82.
3 Above, pp. 57-58.
Frye, for instance, urges that social concern is not the negation of a properly academic approach but that the two should be complementary in the individual:

The scholarly virtue of detachment ... is a moral virtue and not merely an intellectual one: what is intellectual about it is its context. It turns into the vice of indifference as soon as its context becomes social instead of intellectual. Indifference to what? Indifference, let us say, to what we may call, with the existentialists, concern. By concern I mean something which includes the sense of the importance of preserving the integrity of the total human community. Detachment becomes indifference when the scholar ceases to think of himself as participating in the life of society, and of his scholarship as possessing a social context. We see this clearly when we turn from the subject itself to the social use made of it. Psychology is a science, and must be studied with detachment, but it is not a matter of indifference whether it is used for a healing art, or for "motivational research" designed to force people to buy what they neither want nor need, or for propaganda in a police state.¹

And the Lurias specify that the social engagement of the universities would be different from that of partisan action groups or political parties. 'The university [they continue] may use critical experimentation in social situations in order to find out what approaches are effective in altering such situations and what results are to be expected from such actions.'² The great advantage they see in having the university rather than an agency committed to a particular social theory engage in this social experimentation is that '... it could be carried out in a spirit of intellectual integrity and mutual criticism, with awareness of the underlying assumptions, willingness to accept results that contradict the assumptions, and commitment to full disclosure

² S.E. and Z. Luria, 'The Role of the University: Ivory Tower, Service Station of Frontier Post?', loc. cit. p. 81.
of findings and conclusions.¹ These theorists do not suggest that there is no gulf between the views, and do not throw a bridge from one side to the other; they seem simply to suggest that the scholar himself can span it, one foot on either side.

VI:10 The academic who is informed that it is his responsibility to be committed, not neutral, might well seek for an authoritative statement on the responsibilities of academics. The need for such a code was well-stated in the editors' introduction to the Year Book of Education 1959. They pointed out that while members of the legal and medical professions and of the church lay down codes of proper professional behaviour and have power to punish those who offend the code, the ethical conduct of academics had not been codified. The sorts of questions which such a code would need to answer if it were to be authoritative were: what should be the social responsibility of academics? How should it be discharged? Who is to be its judge? Has the public through its spokesmen necessarily to accept a profession's own assessment of its services to humanity or could this be challenged?² And to this list, which made no claim to be exhaustive, might well be added questions relating to the matter of priorities in cases of divided loyalties, between, for example, institution and profession or between various academic functions.

VI:11 The 1966 Statement on Professional Ethics which was adopted by the American Association of University Professors cannot be considered to have answered all these questions or

¹ Ibid., p. 80.
² G. Z. F. Bereday and J. A. Lauwerys (eds), The Year Book of Education 1959, p. 12.
provided the principles from which answers might be deduced:

THE STATEMENT

I  The professor, guided by a deep conviction of the worth and dignity of the advancement of knowledge, recognizes the special responsibilities placed upon him. His primary responsibility to his subject is to seek and to state the truth as he sees it. To this end he devotes his energies to developing and improving his scholarly competence. He accepts the obligation to exercise critical self-discipline and judgment in using, extending, and transmitting knowledge. He practices intellectual honesty. Although he may follow subsidiary interests, these interests must never seriously hamper or compromise his freedom of inquiry.

II  As a teacher, the professor encourages the free pursuit of learning in his students. He holds before them the best scholarly standards of his discipline. He demonstrates respect for the student as an individual, and adheres to his proper role as intellectual guide and counselor. He makes every reasonable effort to foster honest academic conduct and to assure that his evaluation of students reflects their true merit. He respects the confidential nature of the relationship between professor and student. He avoids any exploitation of students for his private advantage and acknowledges significant assistance from them. He protects their academic freedom.

III  As a colleague, the professor has obligations that derive from common membership in the community of scholars. He respects and defends the free inquiry of his associates. In the exchange of criticism and ideas he shows due respect for the opinions of others. He acknowledges his academic debts and strives to be objective in his professional judgment of colleagues. He accepts his share of faculty responsibilities for the governance of his institution.

IV  As a member of his institution, the professor seeks above all to be an effective teacher and scholar. Although he observes the stated regulations of the institution, provided they do not contravene academic freedom, he maintains his right to criticize and seek revision. He determines the amount and character of the work he does outside his institution with due regard to his paramount responsibilities within it. When considering the interruption or termination of his service, he recognizes the effect of his decision upon the program of the institution and gives due notice of his intentions.

V  As a member of his community, the professor has the rights and obligations of any citizen. He measures the urgency of these obligations in the light of his responsibilities to his subject, to his students, to his profession, and to his institution. When he speaks or acts

1 I am not implying that the Statement was a response to the editors' observations on the need for professional controls.
as a private person he avoids creating the impression that he speaks or acts for his college or university. As a citizen engaged in a profession that depends upon freedom for its health and integrity, the professor has a particular obligation to promote conditions of free inquiry and to further further public understanding of academic freedom.  

The Statement does not really consider the question of the social responsibility of academics. It is not just that this terminology is not used; there is no consideration of what mankind might require of the academic as opposed to the requirements of his subject, students, institution and colleagues, and community. ("Community", I take it, refers to the local or national community in which the professor resides, and not mankind). And there is little said of a positive nature which would offer guidance in cases of conflicting loyalties. It is said that as a member of an institution the professor should first seek to be an effective teacher and scholar, and that community obligations must be measured against his more obviously academic responsibilities. But nothing is said of a prime responsibility except in the case of seeking and stating the truth as "His primary responsibility to his subject..."

[My emphasis.]

VI:12 Recently, the matter of an academic code of ethics has been raised again by Sir Eric Ashby. Ashby considers that it is right for university teachers to regard themselves as belonging to a profession but points to the need of an ethical code analogous to those by which the legal and medical professions regulate the lawyer's duty to his client and the doctor's to his patient. His suggestion is that the institution of the university should create an academic

---

analogue of the Hippocratic oath of doctors which would set out for acceptance a code of responsibility to students.  

The first thing which must be noticed about this proposal is that the code would regulate the academic's responsibility to his students, not the academic's total professional responsibilities. On another occasion Ashby has made it clear that he considers professional standards already to have been established concerning the discovery and publication of new ideas and discoveries. Ashby's proposal would seem to draw the responsibility of academics from the realm of moral obligation more into that of quasi legal responsibility, although he has not drawn up such a code himself or worked out details of how such a code of ethics would be administered. He does not consider, for instance, what organization should enforce conformity to the code or whether and what sanctions should be imposed on offenders. Ashby hopes that such a code would stabilize "a schizophrenic and disintegrating profession", but in making this proposal he has not adequately taken into account that responsibilities are considerably dependent on the purposes of institutions and that these are so much in debate. His statement that 'It should be a code which lays down the teacher's duty to his pupils as the main feature which distinguishes a university from a research institute.' is inadequate to dismiss academics' conflicts of responsibility arising from the confusion of purposes which the demands of society engender in the university. In Higher Education: Demand and Response,

3 E. Ashby, 'A Hippocratic Oath for the Academic Profession', loc. cit., p. 66.
W.R. Niblett points out the sort of difficulty which can arise when loyalties appear to conflict. Universities now need to convince the community that academics are responsible in the use of public funds, but they also need to convince students that they are responsible in other ways, for instance by showing that university criticism makes for the renewing of society and by engaging in social issues. To be soundly based, an academic code of professional ethics would need to have resolved the most serious conflicts of responsibility. Ashby's assumption that an academic's major responsibility is to his students avoids discussion of these basic issues.

VI:13 In the face of the difficulties inherent in attempting to lay down a code of ethics for a whole profession, and given the widespread demand for greater clarity about the responsibilities of universities and the academics, it is important to notice that individual institutions can be more precise on the principles by which they operate and their requirements of their members. Academics who elect to work in institutions with limited purposes should more easily be able to determine their responsibilities.

VI:14 A third trend of thought which has become apparent in recent years places increased emphasis on the public accountability of universities. After much discussion and

2 There have been attempts to formulate a set of aims, purposes and principles which would be appropriate to a single university. E.g., see H.L. Case, 'A Declaration of Aims and Policies of University X', Educational Record, 50:4, Fall 1969, pp. 450-452. And J. Barzun suggests that collectively universities should draw up an ethical code, "a charter of their rights and duties". The American University, p. 268.
debate and a public inquiry, the accounts of universities in England and Wales have been made open for investigation by the Comptroller and Auditor General and ultimately by the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons. This situation has always pertained in Australia but a new emphasis on public accountability is evident here too, the universities being advised that if their autonomy is to be retained they '... need to accept the responsibility of regarding themselves as accountable.'

VI:15 It is easy to give reasons why there should be increasing insistence on the public accountability of universities. As it becomes increasingly clear that the development of advanced societies is dependent on institutions of higher education and learning, so public interest in them grows. And as higher education and learning expand and become more complex under the impacts of new knowledge and the new public interest, larger subventions must be made from public funds. For both these reasons it would seem likely that the public will continue to require that universities are efficient institutions making good use of public funds.

VI:16 It is not my intention here to attempt to determine grounds on which universities should be made accountable. What I consider must be made clear is that there is little point in insisting on public accountability unless the criteria by which the account will be adjudged are settled

---

2 M. Fraser, 'Governments, Universities and the Community', loc. cit., p. 103.
before the event. It is possible to refer to accountability in much the same way that people call on the universities and academics "to be responsible". Such sermonizing does not allow the members of an institution the opportunity of ascertaining the effects which accountability would have on the work of the institution and of discussing the propriety of the demand. What many academics fear is that strict accountability threatens some of the traditional values and responsibilities of universities. As was shown in an earlier chapter, there is much in the processes of higher education and learning that cannot be strictly quantified or analysed exactly, and there are likely to be difficulties concerning what is really in the public interest. As some aspects of higher education and learning are obviously of immediate benefit to the community and some are readily quantifiable, it is not unreasonable to believe that these aspects would be emphasized in public accountability.

2 Ibid., p. 18.
VI:17 The notion of academic responsibility has not been much studied although allusions to it are quite common. The qualification of "responsibility" by "academic" points to a specific type of responsibility, and it would clearly be improper to equate "academic responsibility" with "the responsibilities of academics" (which would seem to include responsibilities not of an academic nature) and, although less clearly, with "the responsibility of academics" which seems to require reference to a particular situation. "Academic responsibility" seems to stand for a specific category of responsibility, as does "political responsibility".

VI:18 So far it has been left indefinite who might appropriately exercise this power. In his essay, 'Toward a Definition of Academic Responsibility', C.B. Neff distinguishes between individual responsibility and academic responsibility. Academic responsibility, he defines as 'common responsiveness within a university to institutional and professional norms and values, and the collective voluntary assumption of the obligation of furthering those norms and values.'¹ Neff carefully points out that he considers that the responsiveness of individuals to professional and institutional values cannot be categorized as "academic responsibility"; purely individual responses to questions raised by morality and scholarship he lists as "individual responsibility".² In terms of the understanding of academic responsibility which I advanced in the preceding paragraph, however, I would want to urge that "academic

² Ibid., p. 19.
responsibility" may properly and advantageously be used to designate situations in which individuals as well as groups are placed in relation to academic matters. I would urge, in fact, that the notion may be usefully applied to a wide variety of situations. The individual scholar considering the particular direction in which an academic study on which he is engaged should proceed would seem to be justified in thinking that he had not only power to act in this matter but also a responsibility to act in such a way that the pursuit of truth would be most furthered, this particular responsibility quite appropriately being designated as "academic responsibility". Concerning groups: there would seem to be no logical difficulty in the way of applying the notion of academic responsibility to the situation of a number of academics collectively considering a similar matter. This seems to remain true when the group is considered as an institution. It appears to make good sense to speak of a university's responsibility to provide suitable conditions for the exercise of scholarship as an aspect of its "academic responsibility". And it would not, I think, be absurd to speak of the academic responsibility of a supra-university body whose function was to co-ordinate the work of a number of institutions. When, in the interests of academic excellence, such a body attempts to rationalize the situation in which a number of small and consequently inefficient departments compete for students and funds, its situation is not unlike that of an individual academic who recognizes and is prepared to accept as part of his academic responsibility the problem of deciding whether to concentrate his intellectual endeavour on a particular subject or more
VI:19 There would appear to be two sources of academic responsibility. One is external in that a department, school, university, co-ordinating agency or government allocates responsibility for an academic matter to an individual, group or institution. The other is internal in that an individual, group or institution determines what its responsibility is in an academic matter. The external allocation might be an assignment of a particular duty with the role of the agent fully specified, or allocation of an area in which the agent may act as he or it sees fit. Although in the second case the agent may decline to accept any responsibility in the area, conflicts are more likely to arise where the duty is fully specified externally. Where an agent's estimate of his responsibility conflicts with that specified by a legitimate external authority, the agent can work for a change of attitude by the external authority and in normal circumstances could resign. By way of an example of such a conflict we may cite one in which a university teacher and the governing body of his university take different attitudes concerning the amount of time he should spend away from the campus on study leave. In Neff's terms this might be a conflict between institutional and professional norms and values.

VI:20 Academics and their universities have traditionally maintained that there are areas of academic affairs where it is legitimate only to make internal determinations of academic responsibility. Intermittently throughout this thesis reference has been made to the idea that there are aspects of higher education and learning that are not easily appreciable by outsiders. On this view only the academics
actually engaged in these aspects of scholarship can be responsible for them. This is not to say that no one can be held responsible for these aspects of higher education and learning, but that the academics or academic institutions which accept responsibility for them must do so in their terms and not in terms dictated by external authorities. We have already noticed accounts of what are properly the responsibilities of governments and what are properly academic, and I have voiced some doubts on these divisions.¹ It is inevitable that opinion will differ on this subject, and in the final analysis academics and their universities can do little other than society allows. My attitude is that ideally each conflict should be resolved through the powers of rational persuasion rather than by power politics.

VI:21 Within my understanding of the term, then, academic responsibility may be assumed by the individual academic or a group of academics, by a university, and by co-ordinating agencies of higher education and learning. These individuals and institutions may be considered the agents of academic responsibility. Their assumption of academic responsibility will follow on external allocation and internal determination of their responsibilities in academic affairs. The actual balance to be struck between these sources cannot be universally determined, but it is of the nature of academic responsibility that there must be large areas of academic affairs in which the agent’s responsibility will not be for the completing of a duty in a closely specified manner but for exercising the responsibility to do what the agent considers fit within his or its professional competence.

¹ Above, pp. 139-142.
It remains for me to consider how the three recent proposals which we have already noticed on the responsibilities of universities and academics should be considered in the light of this understanding of academic responsibility.

VI:22 The first proposal noticed was that academic detachment should give way somewhat to social concern and that universities should involve themselves more in working towards the solution of the most pressing problems of society.

Now this proposal has been taken beyond the recommendation that universities should pay more attention to the world's social and political problems to the prescription that this is the peculiar responsibility of the academic, the responsibility being inherent in the professional occupation of the academic. In view of the undoubted urgency of many social and political problems it is easy to believe that governments, co-ordinating agencies and universities might believe that academics should involve themselves in their solution and might even designate this to be part of their academic responsibility. On the evidence of Frye and the Lurias and general observation it would seem likely that many academics would be prepared to accept such a responsibility. Ultimately, each academic would have to make up his own mind whether he could assume this obligation as part of his academic responsibility, and it is likely that

1 As has often be recommended, e.g. by Morton White who suggests that if only a tiny part of the skill and energy of philosophers which has gone into logic had been expended on the clarification of the issues surrounding social and political questions we should now be much closer to the solution of our most pressing problems. 'The Social Role of Philosophy' in Religion, Politics and the Higher Learning, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1959, pp. 4-5.

many would feel unable to do so. Then the further question must be asked of whether this is an area in which external authorities may properly legislate. My own opinion would be that this should be an area of academic responsibility in which each academic should be free to determine his responsibility within his understanding of his own competence. VI:23 These sorts of difficulties make it impossible to lay down a code of academic responsibility with universal application, and it would seem that codes of professional ethics which are meant to apply to the whole profession cannot simply be regarded as final statements of academic responsibility. They may, of course, be acceptable to individual institutions which would then assume the responsibilities of an academic nature set out in them, or at least an interpretation of them, as part of their academic responsibility. Neff seems to think that each university should draw up such a code.¹ Such codes would function for the individual academic as a most authoritative external allocation of academic responsibility. Each individual academic would still have to determine whether or not to assume these responsibilities. The different views which academics take concerning their academic responsibility is an important cause of the incoherence of modern universities. VI:24 It is only reasonable that where governments and governmental agencies allocate specific responsibilities to universities, or even where they hold certain expectations of universities, and provide public finance on these bases, that they should hold the universities accountable for the manner in which these responsibilities have been discharged and

these expectations met. As an academic is normally able to resign if he cannot assume the responsibilities which the university assigns to him, so it would be usual for universities to be able to refuse funds for responsibilities which it could not discharge, for expectations that it could not meet. But this is not to say that universities must be accountable in any terms. As I have reiterated, there is much in higher education and learning that cannot be strictly quantified or analysed exactly. Thus the terms in which accountability will be required should be settled before any external allocation of responsibility is assumed. This easy answer avoids making any recommendation in that very complicated area where a responsibility has been assumed, perhaps over many years, before the matter of accountability is raised.

VI:25 But what should be said about accountability in those areas of responsibility where the university is allowed to act on its own responsibility, as is seen to be fit within the professional competence of its academics? Here the logic of the situation would seem to be that it would be absurd for a non-expert body to judge the actions of a professional body in an area which had been given over to the professional body as one in which it alone had the competence to judge what should be done. Here we are brought back again to the issues of what responsibility should be allocated by external authority and what should be determined by the agent. One would expect that governments and governmental agencies would want the area in which agents were delegated responsibility to act on their own initiative to be very small while academics and universities would want it to be
extensive. At present, however, governments seem prepared to accept the academic claim that universities and academics are most productive when they work in freedom. This claim is palpably true of some university functions, such as acting as the critic of society, but its justification in other areas needs careful explanation. But given that such areas exist and that governments and governmental agencies are themselves accountable for the use of public funds to the people, the logical conclusion referred to—that responsible agents should not be called on to account for their actions in areas in which it is agreed that only they have the competence to judge—perhaps cannot be applied. For this among other reasons it would seem to make good sense that academics in public universities should attempt to draw up rational accounts of the justification of their activities. But creative scholarship cannot always be accounted for rationally and it will not always be recognized to be within the immediate public interest. In these circumstances, academics should work for the preservation of bodies like the University Grants Committee and Australian Universities Commission which endeavour to limit academic accountability and confine appraisal of accounts of academic activities to those who are professionally competent to judge and those who recognize the limits of their competence. Academics who decide that their own determination of their academic responsibility has been overruled may feel that they should resign in order to be able to work in wholly independent universities or as independent scholars.
CHAPTER SEVEN

INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE

The university is so many things to so many different people that it must, of necessity, be partially at war with itself. Clark Kerr, *The Uses of the University*, 1963.1

A university bears a name which embodies its purpose of resolving diversity into a unity centred in enduring values. J.D. Brown, 'The Squeeze on the Liberal University', 1964.2

Introduction

VII:1 One of the reasons most often given for the demand that universities reconsider their purposes is that the modern university lacks coherence as an institution. Reconsideration of purpose is one proposal for the removal of disunity within the university; another is that given the many functions of a modern university some means should be found to integrate them. Whichever method is favoured, theorists tend to stress the importance of coherence in the university. And as we found concerning the apparent decline of liberal education and questions concerning the responsibilities of universities, there are theorists who see this task of achieving unity as the central problem facing universities today.3

VII:2 Proposals differ on what sort of coherence should be achieved. My own use of "coherence" in this chapter is a wide one to include agreement on specific courses of action,

1 Clark Kerr, *The Uses of the University*, pp. 8-9.
agreement on values and the ends of the institution, what is common to different university activities, and the coherence of knowledge which can be achieved through academic endeavour.

VII:3 It is soon apparent in reading the literature on university coherence that coherence is not only a word with various meanings but one which is often used quite vaguely so that it is not clear which meaning the writer is intending. One common difficulty, for instance, is that institutional coherence and coherency of academic knowledge are often discussed simultaneously. Towards the end of the chapter it will emerge how the two are inter-related.

VII:4 My main concern in this chapter is to indicate how questions concerning the coherence of universities must be answered in the context of statements concerning the purposes and nature of the institutions in question. It is suggested that there are two rather different reasons for desiring university coherence: institutional efficiency and the belief that a university must be a coherent intellectual community because this is the sort of institution which a university must be if it is really to qualify as a university. Some of the ways in which universities can be made coherent or are thought to cohere are described and related to consideration of the purposes of universities.

VII:5 It seems to be widely accepted that the university is in a state of disintegration, or at least that forces exist today which if left unchecked would result in disintegration. Student unrest is only one aspect of this situation; many issues may be regarded as of very great importance because they are closely related to the basic problem of the identity of the university. As was suggested
in my first chapter, because different individuals ascribe different purposes and different priorities of purpose to the university, any university institution is likely to be a house divided against itself. Some theorists maintain that liberal education is the reason for the existence of the university; others argue that universities should first set about solving the problems of society; and others again hold that a university must be foremost an independent centre of research and criticism. In any institution each of these views is likely to be represented among the academics, and among the students, and among the members of the council, senate or board of regents. The questions might then be raised of who should determine the purposes of a university? and what would count as a proper purpose for the university? And it is likely that no longer may these questions be considered only within the university. Co-ordinating bodies of systems of higher education and learning and governments have expectations of universities even where they do not positively allocate purposes to them.

VII:6 Some of the purposes ascribed to universities seem in themselves to make for a lack of institutional coherence. The purpose of solving the problems of the supporting community, for instance, would seem to require academics to work for authorities outside the university rather than work autonomously selecting their own projects and pursuing them to their own satisfaction. Not only would this lead to a great variety of masters the academics of an institution were serving, but to the danger of presenting results which the sponsoring body required rather than the results afforded
by disinterested inquiry. The existence of very different standards of scholarship in the one institution could only make for incoherence. Furthermore, research which is initiated from outside is likely to bring into the university research workers whose concern is with the particular project in hand and not in the university except as host of that project and who are likely to leave the institution once the original project is complete. Much that is relevant to the question of the coherence of universities has been written about government-sponsored research in universities in the United States.

VII:7 In the modern, multi-purpose university the feeling is likely to exist that some of the institution's purposes are at odds if not positively incompatible with others. Much has been written about the relationships between research and teaching to the effect that these activities are complementary and discordant in the life of an academic and consequently in the life of an institution, and the answer must surely be that they can be either, depending on the will and circumstances of the individual. This would seem to suggest that these activities may well be discordant unless there is a deliberate attempt to interweave them in the life of the institution. Certainly each of them can be all-consuming of the effort and time of an individual, and this supports the proposition that unless they are deliberately organized to complement each other each is likely to be disruptive of a multi-purpose institution. In at least one respect, research is the more likely of the two

to make for institutional incoherence. Teaching is by definition a shared activity and its results tend to spread themselves throughout the institution. By contrast research results may be intended for a public outside the worker's own institution. When in a multi-purpose institution a particular purpose is emphasized over others the way is left open for the complaint that activities which are important, even vital, to a university qua university are being neglected. In the last twenty years, for instance, governments have required a great expansion in the number of undergraduate students in state universities but without requiring that the universities confine their purposes to this function. And this has led to the complaint that scholarship - the most important function of the university - must suffer.  

Such conflicts over purposes makes for dissension in a university.

VII:8 Even when the purposes of an institution are set out officially and in apparently precise terms the possibility of dissension remains. Not only may some members of the institution wish to debate that these constitute a proper set of purposes for a university, but this sort of statement may be variously interpreted by different members. As was apparent in the study made of notions of liberal education in an earlier chapter, "liberal education" has stood for many ideas involving various grounds, ends and methods, and in that chapter it was suggested that the same is probably true of the other purposes normally assigned to universities. Liberal

---

1 See e.g. B. Wilson, 'The Needs of Students' in M. Reeves (ed.), Eighteen Plus, pp. 46-53.
2 Above, p. 78.
education, however, is a good example to use here of the uncertainties which follow on statements of institutional purpose. By being normally related to the idea that knowledge is intrinsically valuable in being its own end, liberal education is representative of the notion that much in education and learning is incapable of exact analysis, cannot be quantified and is dependent on "imponderables" and thus must be left to the discretion of the individual academic concerned in a particular project. The freedom of individual academics to make personal decisions on academic matters is a potential source of institutional disunion. And in these circumstances, the fact that certain clear purposes have been officially ascribed to an institution is not a guarantee that members will achieve them or even engage in their pursuit. There is a considerable literature on conflict between administration and academic staff.

VII:9 It is very often the case that the purposes of a particular institution are not clearly defined, a matter which complicates any ordering of priorities and encourages institutional discord. And the number of academic activities in which academics now customarily engage within and outside their institution makes for incoherence. The dispersal of attention to teaching, pastoral care, research - perhaps both private and sponsored - consulting, membership of professional associations, and the like would seem to make for a lack of cohesion throughout the institution. Some demands from outside, such as those made by professional associations and accrediting bodies, may be so great as to inhibit institutional loyalty and concern. But even the demands upon the individual academic and the university
which emanate from within the institution are so various as to pose serious organizational problems if they are not to be disruptive.

VII:10 Take the case of undergraduate education. As is often pointed out, students no longer come from a particular segment of society but come up with diverse social backgrounds and respond differently to the university's values and expectations. Some come up with no clear idea of what the university offers; others have been prepared for years at home and school for undergraduate life. Those undergraduates who come up with clear expectations of their own may be seeking a general education or professional competence and qualification or wish to engage in scholarship for its own sake. Some will be strongly motivated but not by academic goals. It is likely that some will enroll as undergraduates even though they consciously reject the universities' intellectual approach to problem-solving. Thus the interests of undergraduates may well differ from those of an academic with whom they must work and from the objectives of the institution. Where previously much was written on the relationships between administrators and faculty, it is recognized today that the interests of administrative staff and faculty and students must be investigated. Thus even in the area of undergraduate education the university must serve a multiplicity of objectives where early in the last century there was in the promotion of a common learning the possibility of a single objective.

VII:11 Although academics seem increasingly to advocate that universities should involve themselves in the whole life
of the student, few universities today claim to offer students a particular view of life. In this century the collapse of a common learning has been almost complete although it could perhaps be argued that universities still present a common although minimal offering of intellectual standards and values. But belief in a set of basic cultural studies has been generally suspended and it is most unusual to find theology or philosophy offered by a university as a unifying study rather than as one discipline among many. The multiplication of disciplines and their sub-division proceeds apace. In itself, specialization permits a coherent view of a small area of knowledge, but within the university increased specialization makes for greater incoherence, presenting formidable problems of communication and organization. Much has been written on the two or three or myriad cultures and in refutation that such divisions exist. But to presuppose a later argument, if there is some underlying factor which unites the disciplines and cultural categories, its power of unification is not so readily apparent that academics can easily use it to make the work of a university cohere. And institutional incoherence is accentuated by the statuses accorded to the various studies. Comparatively new studies like sociology and education have frequently been accorded a low status by workers in other fields. If one criterion of low status is newness, the continuing proliferation of subjects may make for greater institutional incoherence on that ground as well as on its unfamiliarity. In the modern university students are socialized in a field of study, or a department or a professional school rather than in the institution as a
whole. Narrow specialists are likely to have difficulty in acting as agents of institutional socialization.

VII: 12 'Who is to make the university and its missions a coherent whole?' asks Perkins in *The University in Transition*, and his question is indicative of a growing concern that the planning of modern universities as coherent wholes is being neglected. The structuring of universities on departments has been much criticized. Asa Briggs holds departmentalism as responsible for 'Duplication and dispersal of effort, lack of planning and co-ordination, rivalry and occasionally friction, boundary disputes and far from splendid isolation ...' As a remedy for these ills of departmentalism the organization of a university into schools of studies is often suggested, but of itself this measure cannot prevent all forms of institutional incoherence. 

VII: 13 Without going into the educational effects of the size of institutions, it can hardly be doubted that great size militates against the coherence of the institution. Consider, for instance, the difficulty in arranging meetings of interested parties to an issue in the large university. It is not just that buildings and facilities may not be available for mass meetings, or that timing difficulties are likely to be acute, or that university men and women seem to tend to be non-joiners of large gatherings; there is also the very real difficulty of making communications where large numbers of people are involved. Another factor relating to size which would seem to make for institutional incoherence

2 See e.g. W.R. Niblett (ed.), *Higher Education: Demand and Response*, pp. 245-246.
is a high rate of expansion. When an institution grows quickly the processes of socialization are likely to be less effective. Once the process of socialization is weakened the effect is likely to be cumulative, new members of the institution being increasingly less able to carry on the socialization of new students. Rapid expansion throughout a university sector makes for a high turnover of academic staff, and in this situation loyalty to a particular university is likely to be low. It would seem reasonable to predict that members who had little institutional loyalty would be little inclined to study the institution's values and adjust their conduct to the achievement of its purposes.

VII:14 No university is likely to allow such forces to go completely unchecked. But my concern here has not been to describe the state of coherence in the modern university but to indicate some of the principal agencies of institutional incoherence. Collectively, these forces would seem to make for universities to become multiversities - institutions serving a number of masters, with many purposes and activities. The multiversity form has its advocates, but as we have seen the prospect of the multiplication of multiversities has led some theorists to propose that universities should divest themselves of some of their functions and strive for coherence, an increasingly popular view being that universities should revert to being centres of learning, to being liberal universities rather than multiversities. The fact that the Commission on the

1 See e.g. C. Kerr, "Toward the More Perfect University" in J.D. Margolis, (ed.), The Campus in the Modern World, pp. 299-300.
2 See above, p. 48 f.
Government of the University of Toronto principally addressed itself to the questions: 'University or multiversity - Which do we have? Which do we want? Which can we have?' may perhaps be regarded as evidence of the reality of this issue and of the importance ascribed to it.

VII:15 At this point it is necessary to ask why universities strive for coherence or more precisely why it is felt that academics should strive to make universities more coherent institutions. The easy answer would be to say that in some sense of "natural" it is natural for man to strive for coherence, that this urge represents an aspect of reality which is suffused throughout nature. In the present work, however, it seems more profitable to consider the question in the light of what has been said on the problem of unity with direct reference to the institution of the university. And here two patterns of thought emerge. First, it is frequently argued that in terms of efficiency as an organization a university needs to be coherent. Secondly, it is widely believed that the possibility of unity in the university exists, that traditionally universities have been structured to this end, and that they should continue to be so because this is the sort of institution which the university must be if it is to be a university. For convenience of reference we may refer to these respectively as the "efficiency" and "community" arguments for university coherence. The two are not mutually

exclusive. Those who take the second view are prone to say that it is only when a university acts as a community that it can be really efficient. The community type of argument may therefore comprehend the efficiency argument, but it is always more comprehensive.

VII:16 Universities have been thought of in organizational terms for many years,¹ but it is only comparatively recently that they have been seen as systems in themselves and as components of systems of higher education and learning and studied as systems as such.² Simply to conceive of men's values and activities as forming an institution or system is to presuppose a degree of orderliness, but rigorous and systematic analysis concentrates attention on matters like the intended outcomes of an organization and its observable outcomes and can indicate the degree of efficiency of the institution in these terms.³ In this way systematic analysis can prompt or support the arguments that universities are inefficient because they serve many ends, because university officials are uncertain which goals they should pursue, and because some of the goals if not incompatible at least make for an inefficient dispersal of effort. Then, in the interests of efficiency, it is sometimes recommended that universities leave some of their present functions to other institutions and concentrate on those activities which they do best and which society most requires of them.

¹ See e.g. the categories of universities as organizational structures in T. Caplow, Principles of Organization, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964, pp. 36-49.
³ Cf. Ibid., p. 173.
The community approach to the idea of the necessity of university coherence comprises many related arguments. A very common presupposition is that man naturally attempts to obtain a coherent view of things. 'Every thinking person [states Lionel Elvin] tries to organize his experience and life so that it is coherent, and in this sense every university man or woman seeks unity of knowledge. Then it is usually assumed that coherence in the university is ultimately possible. The expression "unity of knowledge" is used to stand for various notions concerning the existence of a oneness of truth which it is possible for men to apprehend at least in part. This is held to imply that by scholarly effort men can produce approximations of different aspects of truth which to the degree that they are valid approximations cannot finally conflict with each other. Many examples of the assumption that a unity of knowledge does exist can be found underlying activities and processes in universities, and many theorists maintain that the university has been structured on this belief. And some would go further and contend that today the university must be a unity for this is the most distinctive generic characteristic of universities. Thus reference is often

1 In the record of discussion in B. Ducret and Rafe-uz-Zaman (eds), *The University Today: Its Role and Place in Society*, p. 291.
2 H. Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, (F.M. Powicke and A.B. Emden - eds), London: Oxford University Press 1936, p. 464 and note from p. 463: 'The two most essential functions which a true university has to perform, and which all universities have more or less discharged amid the widest possible variety of system and method and organization, hardly excepting even the periods of their lowest degradation, are to make possible the life of study, whether for a few years or during a whole career, and to bring together during that period, face to face in living intercourse, teacher and teacher, teacher and student, student and student.'
made to the fact that the etymology of "university" points to a unity, as if this were proof that today universities should be communities of people engaged on a common task. ¹

The person, then, who advocates that a university must be a community of scholars or a community of masters and scholars may not simply be harking back to an agreeable vision of what life in universities was like in the past; he may be putting forward the criterion which he believes is appropriate for determining whether a particular institution warrants being called a university or in some other sense qualifies as a university. In view of the discussion of the next chapter, it should be noted here that some theorists would emphasize that by being such a community a university is not detached from society but serves society most efficiently, the synoptic quest for the unity of knowledge being part of a university's responsibility to society. ²

1 J.D. Brown, 'The Squeeze on the Liberal University' in J.D. Margolis (ed.), The Campus in the Modern World, p. 198 - the second epigraph to this chapter. J. Barzun adds some worthwhile comments on this idea in The American University, p. 244.

2 E.g. M.H. Goldberg, 'Quest for a Unity of Knowledge', in B. Ducret and Rafe-uz-Zaman (eds), The University Today: Its Role and Place in Society, p. 278.
Instruments and Principles of Coherence and Unity

VII:18 As there are different reasons for people desiring that a university be a coherent institution so different degrees of coherence are desired. It seems obvious that those who insist that the university should be some form of community would advocate a high degree of coherence, but I shall not attempt to establish whether there are positive relationships between type of motivation and type and degree of coherence advocated. What I shall attempt in this section is to indicate three more or less distinct theories of how institutional coherence might be achieved in the university. I do not mean to suggest that there are three established theories which people acknowledge and act upon in their efforts to achieve coherence. It is just that from people's actions and the principles they enunciate an observer is able to distinguish three rather different approaches. Certainly an agent would not have to assent to any one of my categories before working for coherence in a university. With "theory" qualified in this way, it might be possible to speak of the "piecemeal", "integrity" and "holistic" theories of university coherence.

VII:19 I have reiterated in this thesis that many different conceptions are held and expounded of the purposes of universities and that people holding these different views are likely to be found in any institution. It is easy to envisage an institution in which there are to be found individuals who maintain different views of the purposes of universities and different views of the ends which their own institution should serve but who, perhaps for various reasons, desire greater coherence in the life of their
university. Such individuals might well agree to moves to obtain greater institutional coherence or to give students a more cohesive pattern of studies. More concretely, they might well support interdisciplinary seminars, administration through schools of studies rather than departments, greater regulation of the pattern of undergraduate courses, the development within the university of a college system and the like. What they would be doing would be agreeing on certain means of action without having had to agree about final ends. It is true that these measures would be intended to make for greater coherence; but coherence would not constitute a final or ultimate end, it being rather a short-term end thought to be in turn instrumental in the achievement of more final ends such as more far-reaching research, or the truly liberally educated graduate, or concerted action in solving the problems of the supporting society. Without settling which of these should be the foremost goal of the institution, or what sort of research should be undertaken, or what is a truly liberally educated person, agreement on the desirability of greater coherence and appropriate action might be obtainable. Another example, in which academics might agree about means rather than ends, is when consensus is reached on what machinery should be used for settling matters on which there is likely to be difference of opinion about the ends in question.

VII:20 In his essay, 'The Role of Objectives in Higher Education', Ordway Tead cites the example of a faculty.

committee chairman who observed that if his committee had to agree about ends it would simply split into warring groups and achieve nothing of importance. The chairman continued:

The only way we can proceed in a democratic society to achieve more community is to start with whatever community of interest happens to exist and to try and find and put into effect ways of utilizing that community of interest more effectively ... Such piecemeal social engineering appears to be the way in which universities tend to be organized, settlement of final objectives being generally avoided. Indeed it would seem that most multi-functional social institutions operate in this way. Presumably the method may be employed at all levels of university organization, whether control is centralized or devolved throughout the institution. At any rate, it would appear to be an appropriate method of keeping operational the multi-functional modern university. There is, however, much dissatisfaction with the degree of coherence which this piecemeal approach offers. And the criticism centres around the disunity of purpose in modern universities. Thus Jacques Barzun sets out his impression of the value of unity of purpose, saying that the university is not merely a cross-roads or a convenience:

The restrooms of large terminals are also visited by a great crowd from all over the world, but they are nothing except conveniences. The danger of the multi-university is that it will be a terminal and not even a restroom, because those who will come, and are already coming in large numbers, are not people of like purpose. Given the like purpose, the results are not to be thought of as added together but as multiplied and enhanced. Contact and collision strike fire from the individual mind and bring out of the total effort an achievement greater than could have seemed possible.

1 Ibid., p. 419.
When this happens steadily, it is a great age of the university and of the nation too. Barzun stresses the importance of like purpose, but he does not give here any evidence for his belief in its power to stimulate more than the contrasts and conflicts of interest to be found in the multiversity. But he has no doubts that the piecemeal coherence of the multiversity is insufficient. As we have seen he holds a normative idea of the university, and to this he makes frequent reference. Thus, on the coherence of the university he is able to conclude in the introduction to his programme of reform for the universities: 'I begin, therefore, by saying yet again that a university should be and remain One, not Many, singular not plural, a republic, not an empire ...'

Before turning to the ways in which it is suggested that the university can and should be a strict unity, I propose to consider an idea which seems to fall between the piecemeal and holistic approaches although none is perfectly clear-cut. Today it is often suggested that academics must look to the "integrity" of their institutions. "Integrity" has been used in this context in various ways, but the basic conception seems to be that a university should first determine its ends and then organize its activities strictly to serve those specified ends. Attention to the ends of the institution and the apparent need for some agreement on them would seem to remove this idea some distance from that in which a sufficient degree of institutional coherence can, it is thought, be obtained through piecemeal social engineering.

1 J. Barzun, The American University, p. 244.
2 Above, p. 50.
3 J. Barzun, The American University, pp. 242, 238, etc.
4 Ibid., p. 246.
At the other extreme, the integrity approach does not require that there is any single focus around which the university can and should cohere. Minimally, university integrity could mean that if a university specified its ends from among the purposes normally ascribed to universities and strictly organized its activities to fit those specified ends, sufficient cohesion would be achieved. But those who write of the integrity of the university usually mean more than this.

VII:22 James Perkins sees university integrity as the maintenance of coherence and harmony in the pursuit of the university's aims. Having specified research, instruction and public service as proper purposes of a university, he adds that each of these must support the others and that the integrity of the university is violated when large decisions in one area do not consider the impact in the other two.

This idea of mutually supportive activities puts Perkins's version beyond what I consider to be the minimal view of university integrity, but he does not go so far as to say that there are elements common to all activities engaged in the pursuit of these three purposes. Nevertheless, Perkins has been criticized by Clark Kerr who asks how certain activities conducted by Cornell - the university of which Perkins is president - support its other activities.

Of course a general principle is not shaken by the failure of a single institution to make use of it, but perhaps Kerr is implying that it is unreasonable to expect all activities in a modern university to be mutually supportive. Yet

2 Ibid.
without severely limiting the purposes thought proper to a university, it has been argued that certain values do underlie a university's varied activities.

VII:23 In 'The Integrity of the University', Merrimon Cuninggim accepts teaching, research and public service (or "public service or social responsibility" as he puts it in one place\(^2\)) as proper functions of a university because they reflect a common devotion to knowledge and rest on the values that are implicit in the very being of the university.\(^3\) He lists five basic values in which a university must believe and which "constitute the dimensions of its integrity" - truth, universality, freedom, relevance and human worth. Short accounts are given of the particular aspects of these catholic categories which Cuninggim has in mind. What is perhaps more germane to our purposes is to try to get clear in what ways these values are related to university activities. Cuninggim asks if it would be possible for a university to deny any of these values and replies that this would be nonsense, 'For the integrity of the university lies in its adherence to these values.' The values are expected to permeate the whole institution, being 'implicit in the university's functions and integral to all its efforts.' In a sense Cuninggim has formulated for the university a set of purposes into each of which is built a value system and is advocating that the university should not only be coherent but integrated in that all its activities should evince this system of values. In this way Cuninggim is in effect suggesting how Perkins's three purposes of the university

2 Ibid., p. 40.
3 Ibid., pp. 40-41.
may support each other. But Cuninggim's emphasis is not on coherent purposes as such but on common values, and it is these which give institutional coherence: 'The integrity of the university consists in its moral conviction about these five articles of faith.'

Throughout the article Cuninggim seems to imply that if this conviction is weak or non-existent the institution is not properly a university.

VII:24 The third approach to the problem of institutional coherence is to posit an idea or principle by which all the university's activities can be governed. In the history of universities many principles have been proclaimed by which the institution has been thought to form a coherent whole. Such principles of unity and the instruments by which these principles might be enacted may perhaps be described as forming examples of a holistic approach to university coherence. Probably the clearest example of such a principle is the idea of the university as a Christian institution. Those who regard Christianity as a universal principle of truth with universal application would seem to be bound to seeing Christian faith and doctrine as a principle of unity. This unity has often been supported by reference to the origins of the university. The first universities were established within the medieval synthesis, and although it has been argued that they were attempts to form autonomous corporations free especially from the church

1 Ibid., p. 46.
2 Cf. 'An idea enables you to tell what is appropriate and what not, what is to be included and what left out. The idea shapes the constitution, the external and internal relationships, and the activities of the university. It holds the place together and defines and protects it.' R.M. Hutchins, 'The Issues' in Clark Kerr et al., The University in America, Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions 1967, p. 5.
it seems clear that by the fourteenth century the studia were regarded as ecclesiatical foundations. That was Rashdall's finding, but it is imperative to append here F.M. Powicke's note that 'this is to be interpreted in the light of the medieval conception that the Christian ecclesia was synonymous with Christian society.'

What is certain is that for a long but indefinite period theology was generally regarded as the queen of the sciences and at least until late in the nineteenth century Christian belief was generally regarded as an integrating factor of knowledge. And sectarian colleges and universities have continued to look to their religious character as a unifying force, although in this century the idea seems increasingly to have lost support. From time to time, however, the idea is revived, and forms a good example of what might be termed an extrinsic ideology by whose principles it is proposed universities might cohere.

VII:25 The other main group of ideas which afford holistic principles and instruments of university coherence is that dependent on a conception of the unity of knowledge. Some

1 H. Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, (F.M. Powicke and A.B. Emden - eds), volume 1, pp. 22-33.
4 Cf. : '... the term unity of knowledge is but a short-hand or semaphore sign, a synedoché for a whole cluster of notions concerning the state or the process of achieving oneness within that major institution or remembering, discovering, and teaching which we call the "university". And Maxwell Goldberg goes on to list the ways it may be sought in a university. 'Quest for a Unity of Knowledge' loc. cit., p. 262.
Christian apologists may want to claim that the unity of knowledge must ultimately be justified on religious grounds, but many people will agree that the idea of a unity of knowledge seems more intrinsic to the normal activities of a university.

VII:26 In the past, philosophy like theology has been regarded as an important if not the vital means of integration in the university. The view has not infrequently been advanced that all university subjects should be treated philosophically, the question why? being held to be more important than how? But those who advocate philosophy as an integrating study tend to go beyond this and require that philosophy be a central study allocating other subjects to appropriate subordinate places in an hierarchy of the curriculum. J.U. Nef for instance, advocated that philosophy departments should attempt to bring all other subjects into communion with philosophy. It is perhaps obvious that Nef is not thinking of modern analytical philosophy which tends to disclaim special competence in this role, and indeed he refers approvingly to the great classical, medieval and early modern philosophers who 'were concerned with the whole universe and the whole of knowledge'. Other subjects have been put forward from time to time as forces which might integrate institutions. Herbert Read seemed to accord this role to art, as F.R. Leavis does for the study of

3 Ibid., p. 30.
At any rate Leavis certainly believed that a lively school of humanities could provide a centre for a university to enable it to approach the idea of a university.  

The acquisition of a synoptic or connected view of things has long been one aim in pursuing liberal education. From this ideal it would seem to follow that the individual scholar should be able to gain a coherent view of a university's values and activities at least to the extent that his liberal education attained the ideal. On this basis R.M. Hutchins argued that unless students and professors had a "common intellectual training" a university must remain a series of disparate schools and departments united only by having one head and one board of trustees. In a later work, The Conflict in Education, he presents a picture of a university which would operate in some ways as a unity, not by agreement on common basic principles so much as by dedication to a communal approach to ideas. As a communal approach to ideas is often presented as vital to the idea of a university but is seldom described at any length, Hutchins's account is given in full.

A university should be an intellectual community in which specialists, discoverers, and experimenters, in addition to their obligations to their specialties, recognize an obligation to talk with and understand one another. If they can restore the conditions of conversation among themselves, they can become a

---

1 F.R. Leavis advocates the study of literary criticism rather than philosophy for obtaining the integration which is often thought to be necessary in a university. Education and the University, chapter 2, especially pp. 37, 39 and 65.

2 Ibid., pp. 30-31.

3 R.M. Hutchins, The Higher Learning in America, p. 59. By "common intellectual training" Hutchins meant: "This means more than having the same language and the same general interest in advancing knowledge. It means having a common stock of fundamental ideas."
university, a corporate body of thinkers, that can exert intellectual leadership and hope to make some modest efforts to fashion the mind of its time. They could hope to achieve a *Summa Dialectica*, a summation of the possibilities of thought, of the methods of analyzing, relating, and understanding ideas, with an indication of real agreements and disagreements.¹

But Hutchins himself doubts whether such communion may now be achieved in the modern university.² It is important to recognize that for Hutchins it is this communal approach to knowledge which is the proper characteristic of a university, and to the extent that this communal approach is not realized Hutchins would presumably want to say that the modern university is not really a university.

VII:28 If it is doubted whether the intellectual co-operation between scholars described by Hutchins can now be achieved it may also be considered doubtful whether programmes of liberal education surely afford a synoptic view of knowledge and in this way make for university coherence. Yet it is still frequently asserted that the existence of a college of liberal arts and sciences makes for coherence throughout a university. Thinking of ideas rather than a particular college, G.R. Waggoner writes of this pervasive influence for coherence:

> The college serves as a unifying force, because its courses touch every student and faculty member in the university. By the nature of its goals and processes the college requires a network of communication that tends to unify the total institution in a manner that is not possible in the loose clustering of professional schools, common in most of the world.³

Here Waggoner is rather vague concerning the degree of coherence which a college might produce. And considering

² Ibid., p. 104.
the forces making for disunity listed earlier in this chapter and the evidence in an earlier chapter on the variety of ways in which liberal education has been conceived and put into practice, it may well be concluded that in itself the existence of a college of liberal arts and sciences in a university might not serve as a very effective instrument of unity. The situation would be different, however, if the college were consciously used as an instrument of coherence. And here it becomes significant that when Waggoner writes of his own University of Kansas it is revealed that a particular ideal of liberal education has been followed— that of Ralph Barton Perry.¹ Waggoner is convinced by his experience in the University of Kansas that the pursuit of this ideal in decentralized colleges offers students the chance 'to live in unschizophrenic contact with all of the university.'² In this view are represented the two main strands of university coherence; the connected view of knowledge which is often thought that scholars can achieve and institutional coherence.

VII:29 There have been many attempts to describe and justify ideas of the unity of knowledge and relate them to the institution of the university. Thus Jaspers argues that 'By definition knowledge aims at unification. ... The university is articulated in such a way as to represent the unity of knowledge.' At the same time he is forced to recognize that universities fail to live up to his ideal and he points out that 'The institution is simultaneously indispensable and a standing threat to the idea of the

¹ Ibid., p. 97.
² Ibid., pp. 99–100.
university.'

Others have argued that ideally two or more cultures do not exist but that there is a unity in scholarship - in its assumptions, procedures and products - and that ideally there is the possibility of intellectual and thus institutional coherence in a university. To examine these ideas in depth is beyond the scope of this thesis as they raise great philosophical problems. It must be recognized, however, that this sort of idea is often assumed by those who advocate "ideas" of the university and those who write on university coherence. What can be said with certainty is that scholars usually find that they can co-operate with scholars in other fields on many projects but that the fields of interest of some scholars are so removed from a specified project that co-operation would seem to be unfruitful. This is not to deny that ultimately knowledge may be in some way capable of unification; it is merely to suggest that while faith in some unity of knowledge may prompt some academics to seek and work for university coherence many academics would regard the principle of the unity of knowledge and such instruments of its achievement as have been described in this section as incapable of securing a high degree of coherence throughout a university. To put the matter briefly: even if the unity of knowledge is a valid principle, its operational value in respect of institutional coherence seems limited.

Conclusion

VII:30 Stated broadly, the main problem which arises from the discussion of the chapter concerns the degree of coherence which the university requires. And in the literature on university coherence referred to in this chapter, virtually nothing precise has been said on this subject. But of course that is too broad a statement. To speak of "the university" here is to beg the issue; it must first be acknowledged that different purposes are ascribed to universities and that institutions with different purposes seem to require different degrees of coherence. It becomes important, then, to try to get clear how we should regard different "ideas" of the university, and this is the subject of the next chapter. The other great problem which arises concerns the relationships between university coherence and academic and other types of freedom. This also relates to the purposes of institutions, but as the principle of academic freedom is upheld in all university-type institutions some general comments are possible.

VII:31 If I am right that the piecemeal approach to university coherence has become the norm in the multi-functional modern university, it might be further advanced that the degree of coherence that it affords is that which is required by the multiversity as a whole. The critics of the multiversity claim that it is largely incoherent, but it must be observed that because the organization of the institution as a whole proceeds on a piecemeal basis, greater coherence is not precluded in parts of the institution. Where specific purposes can be allocated to parts of the institution the opportunity is
presented for greater integrity in the sense that activities are strictly directed towards the agreed on ends of the part. But the question of academic freedom becomes important here. Should different sections of an institution enjoy different degrees of academic freedom, the degree being related in some way to the purposes of that section of the institution? Probably parts of the answer would involve further questions of efficiency and the public interest. And here the literature seems to offer no real guidance as to whether academic productivity (broadly conceived) is furthered more in an institution by community of purpose or by great freedom and the stimulation afforded by contact with workers with somewhat different purposes and fields of interest.

VII:32 I have already voiced doubts on the practical unifying effects of various holistic approaches to the problem of university coherence. While it may be possible to found new institutions with limited purposes which may be pursued with great integrity or new institutions cohering around some principle of unity and for these to continue as viable institutions, the problems of obtaining coherence in institutions which are already established and which to some degree are already in the sway of the forces making for incoherence described earlier in this chapter must be considered formidable indeed. There is, for instance, the problem of who should continue as members of the institution and on what criteria new members should be admitted. Theorists who subscribe to the idea of the university as a tightly-knit community seem bound to say that intellectual considerations are not enough and that members must be in
harmony with the idea of the institution. 1 Quite obviously many academics would not be content to have existing institutions re-organized around any of the holistic principles described. 2

VII:33 There can be little doubt that there is widespread desire for greater coherence in existing universities. But the problems of obtaining a high degree of coherence in institutions that are already multi-functional are formidable, Ashby claiming that reconciling four major functions in the one institution is the cardinal problem facing universities today. 3 Of course this is a problem of all multi-functional institutions, and the usual strategies of institutions seeking greater coherence, of concentrating on common interests and obtaining a high degree of coherence in parts of the institution, can be adopted in the university. But these measures are unlikely to satisfy those who believe that to be a university a university must be tightly coherent overall. Such theorists may be partly satisfied if new institutions were established on their principles, but probably they would continue to advocate the reform of

1 Sir Walter Moberly, for instance, maintains that a university should be sure in making key appointments that the appointee subscribes to a common moral outlook. 'He may belong to any one of a large variety of schools of thought; but his basic values and outlook should be congruous with those of the university.' The Crisis in the University, pp. 159 and 161. And cf. Jaspers, The Idea of the University, pp. xi-xii.


3 See above, p. 47.
existing institutions or at least to recommend that they no
longer be misleadingly called "universities". The status
of the claim that the form of a university must be governed
by an idea with universal application will be examined in
the next chapter.

As society changes, the institution of
higher education changes. It does not
lead, it follows. But In following the
leader, it changes. W.B. Martin in
W.K. Niblett (ed.), Higher Education:
Demand and Response.

Introduction
VIII:1 Intermitently throughout this thesis reference
has been made to the expressions "the idea of a university"
and "the idea of the university". Early in the nineteenth
century Sir William Hamilton laid it down that the idea of
the university was two-fold, a school of liberal and general
knowledge constituting the university proper and being
complemented by a collection of professional schools. At
mid-century Bevan claimed in The Idea of a University that
essentially the university should be a place of teaching
universal knowledge. But even then universities everywhere
did not conform to these ideals, and in this century we find
Ernest Barker feeling it necessary to refer more pointedly
to "the true and pure 'idea of a university'."

VIII:2 What was happening was that with the progression of
time men were taking to dignifying other ideas of the
university with the title "the idea of a university".

1 W. McRae, The Crisis in the University, 2 1977.
2 W.B. Martin, Response to Marjorie Bevan in W.K. Niblett
(ed.), Higher Education: Demand and Response, p. 69.
3 Above, p. 9.
4 Above, 2.
5 Above, p. 49.
CHAPTER EIGHT

IDEAS OF THE UNIVERSITY

The actuality of the university to-day flagrantly contradicts its 'idea'; the university is failing to be the university. Sir Walter Moberly, 'The Crisis in the University'.

As society changes, the institution of higher education changes. It does not lead, it follows. But in following the leader, it changes. W.B. Martin in W.R. Niblett (ed.), Higher Education: Demand and Response.

Introduction

VIII:1 Intermittently throughout this thesis reference has been made to the expressions "the idea of a university" and "the idea of the university". Early in the nineteenth century Sir William Hamilton laid it down that the idea of the university was two-fold, a school of liberal and general knowledge constituting the university proper and being complemented by a collection of professional schools. At mid-century Newman claimed in The Idea of a University that essentially the university should be a place of teaching universal knowledge. But even then universities everywhere did not conform to these ideals; and in this century we find Ernest Barker feeling it necessary to refer more pointedly to "the true and pure 'idea of a university' ".

VIII:2 What was happening was that with the progression of time men were taking to dignifying other ideas of the university with the title "the idea of a university".

1 W. Moberly, The Crisis in the University, p. 177.
3 Above, p. 6.
4 Above, p. 7.
5 Above, p. 49.
German model especially was held out as the ideal. Thus in America Henry Tappan referred to the German idea as "the legitimate idea of a University." \(^1\) Truscot is at the other extreme from Newman in suggesting that to the idea of a university only the researchers are essential. \(^2\) Truscot allowed that teaching was a "natural development" from the essential idea of the university, and by the time that he was writing many people held that more than one function should be represented in the idea of a university. Thus Jaspers held that professional training, education of the whole man and research were indissolubly united in the idea of the university. \(^3\)

VIII:3 These ideas were considered to have practical consequences. By reference to his version of "the idea" Newman was able to justify his opposition to research, which was becoming a feature of continental universities, and to the emphasis on professional studies at London University. Truscot argued that officers and teachers of a university who were true to the idea must not only hold the idea intellectually but illustrate it by their own example, inculcating ideals of scholarship by practice rather than precept, and by fighting the "continuation-school" idea of a university from the outset. Jaspers was concerned to resist proposals that universities should be dissolved and replaced by separate institutes for professional training, general education, and research.

Leavis's belief - that a lively centre of the humanities must be formed in a university if the institution is to

\(^1\) Above, p. 19.
\(^2\) Above, p. 40.
\(^3\) Above, p. 41.
approach the idea of a university - affords another example of a version of the idea of a university which is held to have practical consequences.\(^1\) And with the recent rise in the amount of discussion on the theory of universities much reference has again been made to "the idea of the university". Barzun, for instance, sees the idea of a university as a principle of discrimination in deciding what fits the purpose of higher education.\(^2\) And Hutchins designates how the idea should shape all the activities of a university and all its internal and external relationships.\(^3\)

VIII:4 My purpose in this chapter is to ascertain what value should be placed on this way of determining what modern universities should be and do by reference to the idea of the institution. I shall also set out what I consider to be the best method of proceeding in such a determination.

VIII:5 It can be assumed that any rational adult person might form ideas on the purposes and nature of universities. Ideas of what universities should be and do are certainly formed and propagated by people other than theorists professionally involved in speculation on higher education and learning. Potential university students must develop some ideas on what universities are about; it is likely that their parents and teachers will do so as well. And with universities being increasingly in the news and available to a growing proportion of the population, members of the public are more likely than ever before to consider the role of universities. Those who employ graduates are

---

1 Above, p. 62.
2 Above, p. 50.
3 Above, p. 246.
likely to have quite definite ideas on what universities should do. Today, such ideas cannot be considered irrelevant to the task of determining university matters. Not only should it be considered that these people have a just claim to say what they think universities should do, but indirectly as voters (and more directly should they become members of parliament or members of a university council, senate or board of regents) they have potentially a certain amount of power to require universities to do certain things. Because of their origins many of these ideas are likely to be quite heterodox in terms of the usual theories of higher education and learning. Without prejudice concerning their value, such ideas as are not representative of one of the bodies of theory of higher education and learning I shall call naive ideas of universities. It is hard to envisage any serious objection being made to their being described as "ideas of universities"; but in spite of what I have suggested of the potential power of the holders of naive ideas of universities to alter university institutions, it is almost certain that objections would be raised if any of these naive ideas were described as "the idea of a university" or "the idea of the university".

VIII:6 Some ideas seem to have more status, to be more authoritative, because they arise more positively out of the history of universities. These ideas can be illustrated by reference to the structure and practices of universities at definite times. Thus it is possible to refer to ideas of universities which can be seen to have been influential in medieval Europe or eighteenth century England or Germany
in the nineteenth century. Sometimes ideas on the purposes and nature of universities are specified as being those that underlay the establishment of the first universities. Because these "traditional" ideas seem to have determined the nature of universities at particular times, some theorists seem to regard them as more important than a naive idea of a university could ever be. Some theorists have gone further and confirmed the status of one or other of these traditional ideas by dignifying it with a title like "the idea of the university".

I should want to argue, however, that it seems imprudent to dignify any naive or traditional idea of the purposes and nature of universities by the title "the idea of a university" or "the idea of the university". My opposition to this practice is on two grounds - one historical, the other that it implies a misconception of how social institutions function.

Those who make use of expressions like "the idea of the university" seem to assume that the idea under consideration is formative of the institution rather than being merely a categorization of institutional activities. The idea is usually distinguished, however, in an investigation of some aspects of the history of universities. But even a casual reading of university histories reveals that in the course of their existence universities have done many different things. It therefore appears that if one wishes to speak of "the idea" one must either put forward some fundamental idea on which the various activities of universities have been based or posit some normative idea from which individual institutions may have departed. It
is my belief that the former method can be productive of only the most general ideas, such as that universities have always been places of education or institutions devoted to the pursuit of truth. Rashdall was able to conclude only that universities had always existed to make possible "the life of study" and to bring scholars face to face. \(^1\) Such ideas have little operational value, and theorists have often turned to the earliest universities to ascertain a pure idea by which universities originally functioned. It is possible, however, to derive different principles in this way, the question of the degree to which medieval universities were oriented towards professional training being a case in point. And Rashdall listed a number of features of medieval universities which had been appealed to as binding precedents but which were not universal even in medieval times. \(^2\) No medievalist, I have come to believe that there was no single idea which determined the nature of such diverse foundations as Salerno, Bologna and Paris, excepting of course such vague principles as that they were places of education where worked scholars devoted to the pursuit of truth, which seem to be merely generalizations made from observation rather than guiding principles of the founders. One can imagine a theorist claiming to have intuited the idea of the university without recourse to the history of universities, but I have never actually read of such a claim.

**VIII:9** The expressions "the idea of a university" and "the idea of the university" could be used to refer to an

---

idea governing a single university institution, and it might be possible to determine an idea which ordained the nature of a specified institution at its foundation or at another particular point in its history. But the expressions are normally used to prescribe what universities should be and do at any time and in any place. Now even if it were possible, which I doubt, to designate a single seminal idea which governed the origins or history of the earliest universities, it would seem more appropriate to name it "the original idea of the university" rather than "the idea of the university" or "the idea of a university". The expression "the original idea of the university" does not seem to imply a prescription for universities at all times and places. References to "the original idea of the university" in discussion of what should be the purposes and nature of universities seem to function as indicating an idea which can be shown historically to have had important practical consequences and which by virtue of this historical importance merits consideration in the discussion. By contrast, "the idea of the university" and "the idea of a university" are absolutist. Although these expressions designate naive or traditional ideas of the university conceived in the minds of men, they are given increased status so that they function like archetypes with universal application or like ideas in the mind of God. What I want to argue is that no idea of what universities should be and do should be allowed to rest on status supposedly conferred by its ascription as the archetypal idea of the university.
the university for all time seems to me to misconceive the functioning of social institutions. To lay down some version of the idea of the university as an archetype with universal application seems to be the extreme example of the practice of seeing the university as "inheriting" characteristics. I do not object to the image of a university being left the inheritance of university traditions; my objection is to biological analogues which suggest that a university has a biological heredity which it cannot escape. Here I am in agreement with Dorothy Emmet when she states that 'An institution is a functional organization which makes possible the pursuit of a number of purposes by a succession of people.' It would be generally accepted that institutions evolve, whether one were thinking of a single instance of an institution (such as a particular university) or a number of institutes collectively forming an institutional pattern (the largest number forming that global institution "the university"). But the Lurias are correct in pointing out that the evolution of social institutions is Lamarckian, treasuring acquired characteristics. It needs to be specified that no biological process is involved in this evolution, and it is misleading for Ashby to say that a university undergoes evolution "as plants and animals do." Ashby is attempting here to identify elements in the heredity of the American university, and he points to detachment and freedom, responsibility for the moral welfare of students,

disengagement from the marketplace and political forum, and a unique social structure as hereditary characters inherited from British, European and American institutions. ¹

What I want to urge is that such characteristics should be regarded not as genetic imperatives but as a cultural inheritance which the members of an institution and the planners of systems of higher education and learning can accept whole or in part or discard according to their needs.

If "the idea of the university" is intended as a prescription for universities universally, it functions like a genetic imperative. Universities have always been

VIII:11 I must now face the objection that in saying that members of an institution and the planners of systems of higher education and learning can accept or discard the inheritance of the institution, I have depicted an anarchic situation. But the model which is usually offered of the non-anarchic situation that is supposed to pertain in the determination of the purposes and nature of universities is unsatisfactory. It opposes requirements which are in some way inherent in the traditions of universities to the demands made by society on the institution. Reference has already been made to Ashby's conception of the university in dynamic equilibrium with the demands of society analogous to Le Chatelier's Principle for physical equilibria. ² But it seems clear that there is much uncertainty on the precise nature of these inherited requirements of universities. Many theorists refer to the disinterested advancement of pure learning as the sine qua

² Above, pp. 70-71.
non of all universities, while others see it as an innovation in universities in the nineteenth century.\(^1\) As we have seen, the most important attempt to show that teaching and service are essentially dependent on the advancement of knowledge and that research (broadly conceived) is essential in the university while the other functions are accidents, seems to show that the advancement of knowledge is necessary to society but not that it is necessarily located in universities as opposed to other institutions.\(^2\)

Other observations on the traditions of universities, such as that universities have always been places of education and that they have always been devoted to the pursuit of truth, do not seem to offer much specific guidance on the determination of the purposes and nature of modern universities; at least it can be said that they represent demands made by society on the institution as much as traditions to which universities hold fast against the pressures of society. And it is in this lack of clarity concerning the distinction between the requirements of universities and the demands of society that the model proves to be unsatisfactory. In the opening chapter of this thesis it was shown how during the nineteenth century it came to be widely accepted that universities should be responsive to the needs of society and its changing circumstances. But Marjorie Reeves has argued that Western institutions of higher studies have always been the direct products of social needs and pressures, not merely because they were social institutions but because they have always

---

1 Cf. pp. 40 and 56 above.
2 A.P. Griffiths's account, pp. 196-197 above.
trained people to fit into some other social organization. ¹

If she is right, the distinction between the traditions of universities and the demands made by society is considerably blurred because the important traditions originated and have survived because they met social needs. My first reply, then, to the objection that concerning the determination of the nature and purposes of universities I have depicted an anarchic situation would be to suggest that it is difficult to conceive of a non-anarchic model, the possibility of an anarchic situation being ever-present with social institutions.

VIII:12 The second point I would make here is that while there is always the possibility of anarchy, anarchy seldom prevails because societies tend to recognize that there are ways in which they have been served well by institutions in the past and that it is to their advantage to promote these traditional purposes of the institutions. This is not, however, to assert that a society must recognize certain genetic imperatives for social institutions. Attempts are sometimes made to ascertain from the traditions of universities the ways in which universities best serve society, but it is obvious that universities have served societies well as teaching and research and service institutions, and as is often pointed out these terms cover almost every activity of learning and its dissemination.²

¹ M. Reeves, 'The European University from Medieval Times with Special Reference to Oxford and Cambridge' in W.R. Niblett (ed.), Higher Education: Demand and Response, p. 61f.
Universities have proved that they can serve a society well in many ways; and this conditions not only the way in which societies tend to regard the purposes and nature of universities, but the way in which they should be regarded. Rather than to seek for a single principle which should be common to all universities, it seems to me preferable to consider universities as belonging to a family, the family characteristics of which occur unevenly in members. Having examined the variety of activities which we call "games", Wittgenstein wrote: '... we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.' Wittgenstein characterized these similarities as "family resemblances" and concluded that games form a family. My suggestion is that it is quite proper to consider universities in this way, that the word "university" and the institution should not be regarded as being capable of a simple definition but should be regarded as constituting a family of usages and a family of institutions. If the various activities of learning and its dissemination which universities have shown themselves able to perform well are each taken as sufficient characteristics of the family of universities, any institution might be adjudged a member of the family if it were characteristically performing well any one or more of these activities. This would seem to allow that multi-functional institutions and institutions with limited purposes might appropriately be regarded as universities. To the extent that a society worked on this

principle in the determination of the purposes and nature of universities, I should judge the situation not to be anarchic. From observation of institutions of higher education and learning I would suspect that institutions would tend to carry on a number of traditional university activities rather than one.

VIII:13 Practical considerations will loom large in any official determination of the purposes and nature of universities, such as the condition of existing institutions of higher education and learning within the relevant area and the resources which can be made available to institutions. But certain theoretical observations can be made. It would certainly seem to be crucial that the members of institutions and planners of systems of higher education and learning be well-informed on what universities have shown themselves to be able to do well in the past. But the propriety of universities continuing to perform these functions should finally be justified in terms of the needs of contemporary society rather than by reference to their fitting "the idea of a university" or being within the university tradition. It must be emphasized that this conclusion does not imply anything about the value of any idea which has been described as "the idea of a university" or the value of any university tradition. By reference to "the idea of a university" or to university tradition, it has often been maintained that universities must be closely-knit intellectual communities, and this idea would be widely accepted as a highly valuable ideal. But the importance of such an idea lies in its personal and social value at a particular time and not in its status as
"the idea" or its authenticity as a tradition of the university. Some naive ideas of universities may come to be regarded - even within universities - to be as important as any traditional idea.

VIII:14 Certain more practical considerations, however, must be included in theorizing of this type on the determination of the purposes and nature of universities. Whether one is concerned with the founding of new institutions or the altering of old, any innovation must be evaluated in terms of old structures and ideas to determine whether they are likely to prove worthwhile. In the case of an existing institution it must be assessed whether the innovation would so disrupt the institution that it would seem preferable to preserve things as they are. And any university must fit into the world family of universities by having acceptable standards and by being capable of attracting suitable staff. Then, radical innovations are likely to upset community expectations of what universities are for and what they should do; for without having recourse to the difficult notion of public concepts, it is clear that patterns of community expectations on the purposes and nature of universities seem to be related to the traditions of universities in the community.¹ All this seems to suggest that institutions should be altered only slowly, and I am in accord with Rashdall when he suggests that historical continuity should be preserved, historical solecism avoided.² And I have considerable sympathy with

1 H. Philp et al., 'Community Expectations of the University', The University and Its Community, Sydney: Ian Novak 1964, pp. 79-81.
Hutchins when in the passage which is quoted as the epigraph of this thesis he observes that "we all" have a vague feeling that an institution cannot do some things without ceasing to be a university. But my version of what it is proper for a university to do, being based on what universities have shown themselves able to do well in the past and allowing for gradual innovation, would be more comprehensive than that of Hutchins which seems to be based on the principle that there is one "special, peculiar, unique service" which a university can offer. Ultimately, universities would have to do what the society wants, but at any one time the purposes of a university can be stated more precisely than that. These purposes should be found within university tradition, but gradual innovation should always be possible. As the needs of society change and old needs are viewed differently, different balances may need to be struck between the traditional purposes of universities and new purposes may need to be assigned on the acceptance of the long-term value of naive ideas. Reference to the traditions of universities provides a shorthand method of suggesting that universities would serve society well in this or that regard. Finally, however, consideration of the ultimate value to society of different programmes cannot be avoided, although it would seem necessary to use general categorization rather than strict quantification for much of this study. Without compromising pluralist traditions there could well be more concerted effort along these lines than is at present the case in Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom.

1 Above, iii.
CONCLUSION

The perennially unresolved problem of universities is one of purpose... The reconciliation of these purposes is the recurrent theme of graduation addresses, memorial orations, and academic pamphleteering. If anyone could survive the ordeal of reading all that has been written about these conflicting functions he would, I am sure, reach the modest but undeniable conclusion that the problem has no formal solution and that the teleology of the modern university has yet to be written. Sir Eric Ashby, 'The British Universities -II: Purpose', ¹

IX:1 The demand is now very frequently made that the purpose of the university be ascertained. My intention in making the present study has not been to provide a simple statement of the purpose of the university, but to explore some of the most important personal and official statements which ascribe purposes to universities and indicate their ramifications and implications. In the course of the study, however, it has become necessary to consider what sort of response the theorist on higher education and learning whose interest is in the history of educational thought should make to this demand. In this conclusion I shall first give a summary of the main conclusions of the thesis. I shall then make some observations on this whole question of what the purposes of universities should be.

IX:2 When the range of purposes ascribed to universities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is set out, some confirmation is provided of the common notion that a confusion now exists on the purposes of universities. At least it can be said that anyone who looks into the

The ascription of purposes in these centuries to the universities of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America will find a great range of purposes each one of which has been justified at one time or another as a proper purpose of a university. And in this survey no one method presents itself as self-evidently the legitimate way in which to ascertain what is a proper purpose of a university.

IX:3 In these circumstances, many people have looked to governments to provide the answer to what universities ought to be and do. For their own part, it might be expected that governments would be anxious to be clear on the role universities should play in patterns of higher education and learning. Not only are governments in the three societies just mentioned dependent on institutions of higher education and learning for the material and social well-being of their peoples, but they now make large subventions of public funds for the support of these institutions and it would seem to be increasingly important for them to know the role of each institution, or sector at least, so that they might apportion public money appropriately and ensure that it is well spent. A study of three societies - California, the United Kingdom and Australia - shows that governments have gone to different lengths to lay down roles which they expect universities to play, but that so far the practice has not afforded a great deal of detailed positive direction.

IX:4 With their social importance now universally recognized, it seems certain that institutions of higher education and learning will be increasingly expected to fit into formal systems. But some of the purposes assigned to
universities are concerned with values, states and processes which cannot be analysed exactly or strictly quantified. Because the planning and systematization of higher education and learning deal much in measurement and seem to require precise and detailed statements of objectives, there is apprehension that some of the traditional purposes of universities are threatened with extinction. But it is argued that this is not necessarily the case, that planning and systematization can be used to preserve the less determinate of university values, although academics - as those who appreciate these values best - need to ensure that the correct conditions in which these values can be attained are planned for and built into the systems.

IX:5 Academics who are concerned with the guardianship of knowledge or truth and criticism of society as purposes of universities may need to bring these purposes to the attention of officials involved in the planning and systematization of higher education and learning. Recognition and acceptance of these purposes seems to be implied in the systems of higher education and learning which were studied in detail. But it may still have to be pointed out that if these purposes are assigned to universities it entails that the welfare of universities is central to the well-being of the whole system.

IX:6 Close consideration of liberal education as one purpose which has received continuing support as being proper to universities reveals that "liberal education" cannot be regarded simply, as standing for a single purpose of universities, but that it stands for a complex of notions, being variously defined and justified and employing different
methods. Consideration of the ways in which different activities have been justified as proper in universities suggests that liberal education - in a rather traditional interpretation - can be seen to be a fitting purpose of universities. But in the uncertainty over how a proper purpose would be ascertained a society might well designate an institution as a university if it were engaging in a number of the activities which universities have shown themselves to perform well, even if it were not consciously attempting to provide a programme of such liberal education.

IX:7 I have attempted to show why, although academics are being told increasingly that they must be responsible, it is difficult for them to see their responsibilities clearly. Recent proposals on the responsibilities of universities and academics were considered in the light of my understanding of academic responsibility. From this consideration I conclude that responsibility for the social implications of knowledge may well be assumed by some academics as part of their academic responsibility, but that this responsibility should not be allocated by external authorities to every academic. And while academic codes of professional ethics may be accepted by individual academics and institutions, they should not be regarded as final statements of academic responsibility. I also suggest ways in which the increasing demands that universities be accountable may conflict with the individual's own determination of his academic responsibility.

IX:8 The frequent calls for the university to be a more coherent institution are seen to be motivated by desires for greater efficiency and for university institutions to revert
to being closely-knit intellectual communities as required by certain ideas of the university's essential nature. The question is raised of how coherent a university must be, and it is shown that different university purposes seem to require different degrees of coherence. The piecemeal institutional engineering which seems to prevail in the modern university cannot satisfy those who see uni"ties, or the possibility of uni"ties, present in the life of universities. The unifying effects of some principles and instruments of unity, however, are not perfectly clear. Those theorists who believe that a university must be a tightly coherent institution may be partly satisfied if institutions were established on their principles, but they would probably still want to criticize existing institutions as inadequate universities.

IX:9 In the course of their existence universities have performed well many different activities. Different theorists have dignified conceptions which seem to underlie university activities by the titles "the idea of a university" or "the idea of the university". Without commenting on the value of any of these conceptions, one must question the practice itself. Not only is it difficult to see how any one operationally significant conception has underlain all university activities, but the practice is suspect for attempting to establish a single idea to govern a social institution universally and for all time. It is argued that rather than seeking for a single principle which should be common to all universities, it is preferable to consider universities as belonging to a family whose family characteristics are represented to different degrees in individual members. Such a conception permits conceiving
of a variety of university institutions, but there must be limits to what is to count as belonging to the university family. It is suggested that if the various activities of learning and its dissemination which universities have performed well are taken as the basis on which to draw up an account of the family characteristics of universities and the principle of only gradual innovation of purposes is accepted, the nature of universities will be reasonably well safeguarded. Ultimately, the criterion of a proper purpose of a university must be its value to individuals and to society.

IX:10 It has been argued that there is a confusion of ideas on the purposes of universities at least to the extent that ideas of what universities should be and do abound and there seems to be no general agreement on the method of determining what are proper purposes for universities. Whether or not the confusion is greater than this, there can be no doubt that there is a great demand that the purposes of universities be clarified and clear statements of them made. Clear statements of the purposes of universities are required for systems analyses and to distinguish universities from other institutions. Governments in particular would seem increasingly obliged to know what role universities perform in the total system of higher education and learning. Within the universities, academics, students and administrators need to understand the purposes of their institution so that they might accurately identify their various responsibilities. And in terms of institutional coherence many calls are made for universities to review their purposes in the interests of efficiency and their integrity.
There would seem to be disadvantages, however, in attempting to state the purposes of universities minutely. Because there are intangibles in education and the pursuit of learning, and because academic activities can frequently be properly assessed only by specialists working in relevant fields, the determination of what is appropriate to academic enterprises must often be left to the academic freedom and responsibility of the individuals working in a particular area.

With these limitations noted it seems to remain true that much greater attention should be paid to the purposes of institutions to ascertain how acceptable they are to members and for the acceptable purposes to be pursued with greater concentration of attention. But as was shown in the chapter on the internal coherence of universities, the great difficulty in this programme is that ultimate ends are precisely the matters on which it is seemingly impossible to get agreement in a university, and the various ways of obtaining unity within an institution are unlikely to be generally acceptable.

For these reasons it seems that while greater emphasis should be placed on the achievement of stated purposes in universities, there must be a variety of purposes which are proper to universities. Here it should be recalled that I am using "purposes" in a number of related ways to include the objects for which universities exist, the results which it is intended they should achieve, the ends which they serve, and the direction in which they are aimed. My conclusion is that we should not seek a single purpose in some simple "idea of the university" but may regard any of...
the activities which universities have traditionally performed well as appropriate purposes for modern universities. Theoretically, those who are planning a university should effect a balance between a number of purposes selected from university tradition, but because universities are social institutions and exist to serve individuals and the society provision must be made for gradual innovation as the needs of individuals and society change.

IX:14 In any attempt to determine proper purposes for a university, a great range of practical considerations must be taken into account. Some of these - such as consideration of the educational and economic aspects of the size of institutions - have only been touched on in the thesis. Some - such as consideration of the nature of existing institutions in the relevant area or system - change from place to place and have not been discussed. The following proposals must therefore be seen as arising out of the main themes of this study and cannot be regarded as the result of an attempt to take all the relevant considerations into account.

IX:15 By freeing ourselves from the principle that any university must adhere to some simple idea of the university and by accepting that any of the activities of learning and its dissemination that universities have traditionally done well represent appropriate purposes for modern universities (as far as the nature of university institutions is concerned), it becomes possible to conceive both of universities with limited purposes and universities with a great variety of purposes. The general notion of the
multiversity may be taken as representative of the latter type of institution. Of the former type, there might be teaching universities which concentrated their attention on, for example, liberal education at both the undergraduate and graduate levels, universities which concentrated their attention on research and post-graduate and "academic" or "professorial" education, universities which might be termed "public-service universities" because they would interest themselves in solving the problems of society and the dissemination of applied ideas and knowledge, and universities with other orientations.

IX:16 I do not mean to suggest that these purposes would represent the exclusive interest of the institutions. In chapter four I attempted to show how activities throughout higher education and learning interrelate, and I would want to advocate close co-operation and a degree of articulation and integration between institutions and suggest that in the nature of things the academics in these universities with limited purposes would want to pursue a number of interests. Each of these types of universities would be concerned with education. But in these institutions a greater degree of concentration would be possible than is now the case in most universities. Theorists could be found who would accept that one or other of these universities with limited purposes constituted a university according to criteria now in use, such as versions of "the idea of the university". But it is evident that theorists like Jaspers who claim that the spirit of a university vanishes if functions are separated in different institutions would not regard these conceptions as

1 Cf. above, p. 190.
being representative of a true university. Because I would not accept Jaspers' reference to "the idea of a university" as a satisfactory premise, I would reject the form of this objection. Concerning the value of the interrelation of functions I would suggest that its necessary nature has never been demonstrated and that modern communications make possible close inter-relations between institutions. And of course the sort of university depicted by Jaspers would certainly qualify as a university under my proposal.

IX:17 My proposal is not meant to suggest that a radical transformation of higher education and learning should take place. Clearly my proposal suggests that the purposes to which universities now work are usually appropriate purposes for universities. I intend to suggest rather that present purposes should be pursued more intently and with greater confidence, but that in re-organizations and the establishment of new institutions there are some grounds on which the limitation of purposes should be considered. Not only would this offer the chance of greater institutional coherence, greater ease in ascertaining the responsibilities of scholars and administrators, and institutional integrity, but there would be increased opportunity to form tightly-knit communities of scholars. We have encountered many proposals that there should be greater diversification in higher education and learning; I should want to urge that greater diversity among universities is not unreasonable. Many people refer today to "the end of the university". Here "the university" refers to universities established upon a particular "idea of the university". My view is that universities will survive, although often, perhaps, in more
specialized forms than are at present common. Of course, I can speak with any authority at all only of universities and higher education and learning in the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia.

IX:18 Having now ventured to speak of the future of universities, I may perhaps add a number of further observations. I suspect that the purpose of the guardianship of knowledge may receive greater emphasis in the near future. There seems to be great dissatisfaction in society with such outcomes of scientific development as the population explosion, pollution and nuclear and bio-chemical warefare. I consider it likely that universities will be increasingly expected to keep society informed of what has proved valuable in the past and should be preserved. Relatedly, I expect greater emphasis will be placed on the function of criticism of society. Ashby says that ivory towers must be preserved on every campus.¹ I would go further and suggest the need for publicly-supported institutions quite free to engage in any aspect of learning of an advanced nature which its members considered vital to society but which was neglected elsewhere.

IX:19 One factor would seem to make it especially hazardous to speculate on universities in the future. In this study I have had occasion to refer directly only twice to the views of the purposes of universities taken by women, these being the views of Dorothy Emmet and Zella Luria. I would consider it to be inevitable that women will increasingly express their views on the purposes and nature of universities, and universities may be radically altered.

¹ Above, pp. 45.
as a result.

IX:20 Fifteen years ago Eric Ashby observed that purpose was "the perennially unresolved problem of universities".¹ This study has not finally resolved any of the larger issues of the purposes of universities. In particular I await criticism that the specialized universities which I have suggested would represent a not unreasonable development in thinking on the purposes of universities would not be real universities, as Flexner denied that Columbia, Harvard, Chicago or Wisconsin were real universities.² It is my hope, however, that this study may have brought the most important issues into focus, and with greater resolution than was previously obtainable.

¹ Cf. above, p. 272.
² Above, p. 31.
APPENDIX

EXTRACTS FROM A MASTER PLAN FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN CALIFORNIA 1960-1975

1 An amendment be proposed to add a new section to Article IX of the State Constitution providing that public higher education shall consist of the junior colleges, the State College System, and the University of California. Each shall strive for excellence in its sphere, as assigned in this section.

2 The junior colleges shall be governed by local boards selected for the purpose from each district maintaining one or more junior colleges. The State Board of Education shall prescribe minimum standards for the formation and operation of junior colleges and shall exercise general supervision over said junior colleges, as prescribed by law. Said public junior colleges shall offer instruction through but not beyond the fourteenth grade level including, but not limited to, one or more of the following: (a) standard collegiate courses for transfer to higher institutions, (b) vocational-technical fields leading to employment, and (c) general, or liberal arts courses. Studies in these fields may lead to the Associate in Arts or Associate in Science degree. Nothing in this section shall be construed as altering the status of the junior college as part of the Public School System as defined elsewhere in the Constitution.

3 The State College System:
   (a) Shall constitute a public trust, to be administered by a body corporate known as "The Trustees of the State College System of California" with number, term of appointment, and powers closely paralleling those of The Regents.
   (c) The state colleges shall have as their primary function the provision of instruction in the liberal arts and sciences and in professions and applied fields which require more than two years of collegiate education and teacher education, both for undergraduate students and graduate students through the master's degree. The doctoral degree may be awarded jointly with the University of California, as hereinafter provided. Faculty research, using facilities provided for and consistent with the primary function of the state colleges, is authorized.

4 The University of California shall be governed by The Regents as provided in Section 9 of Article IX, of the Constitution. The University shall provide instruction in the liberal arts and sciences and in the professions, including teacher education, and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over training for the professions ..., dentistry, law, medicine, veterinary medicine, and graduate architecture. The University shall have the sole authority to public higher education to award the doctor's
degree in all fields of learning, except that it may agree with the state colleges to award joint doctoral degrees in selected fields. The University shall be the primary state-supported academic agency for research, and The Regents shall make reasonable provision for the use of its library and research facilities by qualified members of the faculties of other higher educational institutions, public and private.

5 An advisory body, the Co-ordinating Council for Higher Education:

(a) Shall consist of 12 members, three representatives each from the University, the State College System, the junior colleges, and the independent colleges and universities...

(c) The Co-ordinating Council shall have the following functions, advisory to the governing boards and appropriate state officials:

(1) Review of the annual budget and capital outlay requests of the University and the State College System and presentation to the Governor of comments on the general level of support sought.

(2) Interpretation of the functional differentiation among the publicly supported institutions provided in this section; and in accordance with the primary functions for each system as set forth above, advise The Regents and The Trustees on programs appropriate to each system.

(3) Development of plans for the orderly growth of higher education and making of recommendations to the governing boards on the need for and location of new facilities and programs.

(d) The Council shall have power to require the public institutions of higher education to submit data on costs, selection and retention of students, enrollments, capacities, and other matters pertinent to effective planning and co-ordination.¹

BIBLIOGRAPHY
(Works cited in the text)

I UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

A University Theses


B General


CONFERENCE ON PLANNING IN HIGHER EDUCATION, 'Draft Recommendations', Conference on Planning in Higher Education held in the University of New England, Armidale, 10th - 16th August 1969.

FRASER, M., 'External Study Facilities and the Relationship of Advanced Colleges to Universities', Address to the Annual Meeting of Convocation at the University of Melbourne on Friday, 28th March, 1969.


WOODS, S.W., 'A Concept for Educational Planning', Australian National Advisory Committee for UNESCO, National Seminar on Educational Planning, Canberra 1968, (Background Papers, Group D).
II PUBLISHED MATERIAL

A Official Publications

i Great Britain

'Report Made to His Majesty by a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the State of the Universities of Scotland', Reports from Commissioners, 1831, Volume 22.

'Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the State, Discipline, Studies and Revenues of the University and Colleges of Oxford', Reports from Commissioners, 1852, Volume 22.

'Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the State, Discipline, Studies and Revenues of the University and Colleges of Cambridge', Reports from Commissioners, 1852-1853, Volume 44.


ii Commonwealth of Australia


iii Colonial and State Parliaments

New South Wales: 'Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Select Committee on the Sydney University', New South Wales, Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly 1859.

Victoria: 'Report of the Select Committee on the University of Melbourne', Legislative Council Parliamentary Papers of Victoria 1852-1853, Volume II.

iv United States of America

UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE, Universities from the Land, n.p.: n.d.


v University Publications


Calendar of the University of New South Wales 1969, Kensington, N.S.W.: Published by the University, Volume I.


Calendar of the University of Sydney 1852-1853.


B Books, Chapters and Pamphlets


ANONYMOUS, Proceedings on the Occasion of the Inauguration of the University of Melbourne, Melbourne: 1855.


ASHBY, E., Challenge to Education, Sydney: Angus and Robertson 1946.


AUSTRALIAN VICE-CHANCELLORS' COMMITTEE, Teaching Methods in Australian Universities, November 1965.
'B.A.', Of a Liberal Education in General and with Particular Reference to the Leading Studies of the University of Cambridge, London: 1848.


BLAINEY, G., A Centenary History of the University of Melbourne, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press 1957.


COPLESTON, E., A Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review Against Oxford Containing an Account of Studies Pursued in that University, Oxford: 1810.


DEUTSCH, M.E. ET AL., see under Official Publications - California, above.


HAMILTON, W., Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform, London: 1852.


HOLY, T. C. ET AL, see under Official Publications - California, above.


-----------, 'The Issues' in Clark Kerr et. al., The University in America, Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions 1967, pp. 4-8.


---------, The Uses of the University, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1963.


KOLESNIK, W.B., Mental Discipline in Modern Education, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1962.


----------------, 'Governments and the University - A Comparative Analysis' in W.M. Cooper et al., Governments and the University, Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada 1966.


MASTER PLAN SURVEY TEAM, see under Official Publications - California, above.


ORTEGA Y GASSET, The Mission of the University, Princeton University Press 1944.


PERRY, W.C., German University Education: or, the Professors and Students of Germany, London: 1845.


-------, Of Clouds and Clocks, St Louis, Missouri: Washington University 1966.


RASHDALL, H., (F.M. Powicke and A.B. Emden -eds-), The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, London: Oxford University Press 1942 (f.e. 1936), Volumes 1 and 3.


Truscot, B., Red Brick University, London: Faber and Faber 1943.


ANONYMOUS, Articles in the Edinburgh Review, 14:28, Article 10, July 1809; 15:29, Article 3, October 1809; 16:31, Article 1, April 1810; 43:86, Article 3, February 1826.


--------, Editorial, The Empire, 10 November 1852.


--------, 'Mental Philosophy for General Education', The Empire, 30 April 1855.


--------, Articles in the Chronicle of Australian Education, 1:8, March 1969, pp. 6-8 and 1:10, May 1969, pp. 5-7.


-----, 'The Universities, the Government and the Public Accounts Committee', Minerva, 6:1, Autumn 1967, pp. 28-42.


BROWN, R.S., 'Rights and Responsibilities of Faculty', AAUP Bulletin, 52:2, Summer 1966, pp. 131-140.


MACSHANE, F., 'Arts in the University', Columbia Forum, 12:1, Spring 1969, pp. 41-43.


---------, 'Government Stand by Binary Policy Mrs. Williams Restates Case', The Times Educational Supplement, 6 June 1969, p. 1866.


D Published Correspondence


NEWCASTLE, W., Letter to the Editor from the Bishop of Newcastle, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 November 1852.