Maintaining Democracy:

The 1997 Elections in Papua New Guinea



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PREFACE

With staff turnover and competing commitments among staff of the University of Papua New Guinea, it looked for a while as though the 1997 election study - the latest in an unbroken series dating back to the 1964 House of Assembly election - might not materialize. At a relatively late stage, therefore, editorial input was provided from the Australian National University to complete this volume before voting began in the 2002 election.

The editors are grateful for the early assistance of Marlene Phillips; the efforts beyond the line of duty of Jill Wolf in attempting to meet impossible deadlines; James Chin in the final stages of production; and finally for the continuing support of the Electoral Commissioner Reuben Kaiulo and Deputy Commissioner Andew Trawen.

RJ May is also grateful to the Macmillian Brown Centre, University of Canterbury, which provided a respite from administration and teaching during which the volume was completed.

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October 2002

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ELECTION 1997: AN OVERVIEW[1]

R.J. May

Papua New Guinea held its fifth post-independence election in June 1997. Like all of Papua New Guinea's elections, the 1997 election was held on schedule and, although there were a number of disgruntled unsuccessful candidates and isolated instances of post-election violence, the overall result was popularly accepted. Papua New Guinea is one of the few post-colonial states which has maintained an unbroken record of democratic government, even though every government since before independence has been a coalition and no government to date has lasted for a full term. This record was maintained in 1997.

Following the previous elections, in 1992, the leader of the People's Democratic Movement (PDM), Paias Wingti, was successful in putting together a governing coalition, narrowly defeating the outgoing prime minister and Pangu Pati leader Sir Rabbie Namaliu in the vote for prime minister. Wingti's coalition included the People's Progress Party (PPP), whose leader, former prime minister Sir Julius Chan, became deputy prime minister. The provincial member for the National Capital District, Bill Skate, became speaker of the house. In late 1993, however, anticipating a vote of no confidence, Wingti resigned the prime ministership and called a quick parliamentary vote for the office, hoping to be re-elected and thus gain a further grace period in which, constitutionally, he would be exempt from a vote of no confidence. Wingti won the vote, but his actions were challenged and in August 1994 the Supreme Court nullified the re-election. Wingti's term as prime minister thus ended and in a new vote Sir Julius Chan became prime minister, defeating Bill Skate. Chan headed a coalition government in which the senior partners were PPP (which in 1992 had won only eight seats but in 1997 went to the polls with a parliamentary membership of thirty-two) and Pangu. Chris Haiveta, who had become Pangu Pati leader, was appointed deputy prime minister.[2]

In the lead-up to the 1997 election, however, Papua New Guinea experienced what was probably its most serious political crisis since independence. Frustrated at the inability of successive governments, and of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF), to resolve a long-running conflict on Bougainville, in 1996-97 the Chan government had secretly negotiated a contract with military consultants Sandline International, which involved an

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[1] I am indebted to Bill Standish for exchanges of views on electoral politics in Papua New Guinea going back almost thirty years, and for his comments on a draft of this chapter. I am also grateful to Anthony Regan for advice on the conduct of the election in Bougainville.

[2] For a review of Papua New Guinea politics on the eve of the election, see Hayashida (1997).

operation, in conjunction with the PNGDF, to attack rebel bases and capture or kill the leadership of the separatist Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). In February 1997 the existence of the Sandline contract was revealed in an Australian newspaper article by journalist Mary-Louise O'Callaghan (see *Weekend Australian* 22 February 1997), and the Chan government came under strong criticism both at home and from Australia and other international sources. Initially Prime Minister Chan dismissed criticism, saying that Sandline personnel were there to provide training for the PNGDF, consistent with a recent Defence white paper. On 17 March, however, in a public broadcast, the commander of the PNGDF, Brigadier General Jerry Singirok, announced that the PNGDF dissociated itself from the contract and had detained Sandline personnel (who were subsequently deported). The commander suggested that the government's dealings with Sandline were corrupt, and he called on the prime minister, deputy prime minister, and Defence minister to resign.[3]

Under considerable popular pressure, Prime Minister Chan, Deputy Prime Minister Haiveta, and the Defence minister, Mathias Ijape, agreed to 'step aside' pending an inquiry into the Sandline affair. A commission of inquiry was established and the report of the commissioner, Justice Warwick Andrew, was released at the end of May. Although the report was critical of the government's dealings with Sandline, and the methods used to fund the Sandline contract, Sir Julius Chan was quick to declare that it cleared him of any wrongdoing, and he resumed office as prime minister less than two weeks before voting began.

The comment is often made that issues of national significance have little place in electoral politics in Papua New Guinea, and that the outcome of elections depends almost exclusively on local, constituency-level factors – roads, bridges, aidposts and local economics—and particularly on the ability of politicians to tie down the support of their *lain* or clan.[4] In recent elections a number of candidates have challenged this wisdom, to a degree, by campaigning on a platform that emphasizes good governance and promises to attack corruption in government; but such a stance is essentially designed to demonstrate to voters the good intentions of the candidate, and there is little evidence to suggest that such anti-corruption candidates, when elected, behave much differently from those they condemn. In 1997, however, public outrage at the government's actions in contracting Sandline appeared to be widespread. Indeed, General Singirok emerged as something of a popular hero, and was urged by some to stand in the election. Singirok did not contest the election, though he did attend several election rallies in the highlands where he publicly supported a group of independent candidates associated with progressive NGO, Melanesian Solidarity (MELSOL), who had been critical of the Sandline affair. An interesting question raised in 1997, therefore, was whether the Sandline episode would have a significant impact on the election. (This is addressed in more detail by Ivarature in chapter 4 below.)

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[3] For detailed accounts of the 'Sandline affair' see Dinnen, May and Regan (1997), Dorney (1998) and O'Callaghan (1999). In March 1997 Chan dismissed Singirok, who was later charged with sedition. Subsequently, command of the PNGDF was taken over by an officer with a reputation as a hardliner on Bougainville, and a known antipathy to Singirok.

[4] See, for example, Reilly, this volume, and the case studies by Anere in this volume. The same comment is made in Commonwealth Observer Group (1997: 3, 26). For a qualification to this argument see the analysis of ballot box figures from Angoram Open electorate, in chapter 12.

Electoral administration

Preparations for the 1997 election began in February 1996 with the commencement of information and awareness-raising programs utilizing press, radio, TV, posters, and the Electoral Commission's newsletter, and with the compilation of new electoral rolls beginning in May 1996. The Commonwealth Secretariat was invited to send a group to observe the running of the election.

The electoral roll.

As in previous elections, the difficulties of compiling an accurate roll of electors in Papua New Guinea were acutely apparent in 1997. Lacking the necessary staff, the Electoral Commission relies on provincial and district officials, local government councillors, students, school leavers, and village leaders to assist in the process of enumeration: registering new voters, deleting the names of deceased or ineligible voters, and recording those who have changed their residence from one electorate to another. Preliminary rolls are then made available for public scrutiny and amendment before the rolls are finalized. Given the inherent challenges of such an exercise in Papua New Guinea – where transport to remote places is often expensive and difficult, where people are apt to change their names from time to time, and where enumerators may encounter local hostility or pressure to comply with community demands to manipulate the rolls, the compilation of rolls is fraught with problems. In 1996, for example, it was reported that in some places people refused to register and chased enumerators away.

Projections by the Electoral Commissioner in March 1996 suggested a figure of around 2.2 million eligible voters. At the end of the enrolment period, however, after the preliminary rolls had been completed and made available for public scrutiny and correction (with a number of names being consequentially deleted), there was a total of 3.4 million voters on the common roll.[5] Reports from the field suggested that in a number of instances the rolls included under-aged voters and deceased or fictitious people – even, according to some reports, pigs and dogs (see, for example, chapter 10). In some cases it was alleged that electoral officers had been intimidated by candidates or their supporters to include illegitimate entries. In at least one instance it was alleged that one of the enumerators was an intending candidate, and used his position to stack the numbers on the roll in his home area and delete legitimate names from the support base of the sitting member. Notwithstanding this, when voting began significant numbers of voters, in both rural and urban electorates, were unable to find their names on the roll, even though some claimed that their names had appeared on the preliminary roll.

The problems with the electoral roll are acknowledged and discussed in the report on the election by the Electoral Commissioner [the Electoral Commissioner's report is reproduced below]. The commissioner makes the comment, however, that the accuracy of the roll, and the elimination of cheating, depend on public cooperation and vigilance, but that 'such co-operation was not forthcoming in a lot of areas':

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[5] Legislation on provincial and local-level government passed in 1995 stipulated that a population census should be held every five years, prior to national elections. This was an impracticable requirement, and on advice from the National Statistical Office and the Electoral Commission the requirement of a census before the 1997 elections was lifted.

> Compiling an accurate register of voters in Papua New Guinea ... continues to be a seemingly impossible task, despite the best efforts of the Commission. Attitudes have to change in the country before satisfactorily accurate electoral rolls can be compiled (Electoral Commissioner 1997: 3).

The Commonwealth Observer Group also commented on problems with the electoral roll, acknowledging the logistic difficulties of enumeration, but offered the opinion that such difficulties 'appear to have been exacerbated by financial, management and organisational shortcomings, some of which arose from ineffective delegation and over-centralisation' (Commonwealth Observer Group 1997; 14, 25-26). It supported the idea of ID cards for voters.

Security

Prior to the election there was widespread concern about the difficulties of maintaining law and order, both during the election campaign, and while ballots were being collected and counted, as well as in the aftermath of the election, when there would inevitably be a large number of unhappy and angry losing candidates.

In previous elections there had been instances of violent confrontation between rival candidates or their supporters, of ballot boxes being stolen and returning officers attacked, and of post-election rampages by the supporters of losing candidates (see, for example, the chapters by Dinnen and Standish in Saffu 1996b). With increasing numbers of candidates, there appears to have been an escalation of election-related violence, especially in the highlands. Given, say, forty candidates standing in an electorate, a candidate can, arithmetically, win with just over 2.5 per cent of the vote; with around 30,000 voters in an open electorate, this means that a winning candidate would need only about 750 votes – around the number of adults in a typical large village or clan *lain*. The result of this situation has been an emerging pattern of confrontational and coercive electoral behaviour in some parts of the country as candidates seek to protect their vote, and split the vote for their rivals. Tactics include preventing 'outside' candidates from campaigning in a candidate's home area (blocking roads and throwing rocks at vehicles and helicopters containing rival candidates have become common in some areas); putting up 'dummy' candidates to split the vote in rival candidates' main support areas (one of the probable explanations of the growth in candidate numbers is the widespread and growing practice of 'vote splitting'); and bribery and coercion of voters, including organized and often coerced bloc voting. There were also reports in 1997 of candidates in the Southern Highlands printing fake ballot papers to be used to inflate their vote.

On Bougainville, where the longstanding conflict had recently entered a fragile process of peace negotiation, rebel leader Francis Ona threatened to disrupt the elections, and BRA-manned roadblocks were set up to discourage people from taking part in the election. As a result, enrolments were incomplete, there was limited campaigning, and fairly small numbers turned out to vote. In Bougainville Central Open electorate, the heartland of BRA support, only 2640 votes were recorded.

Several other areas, mostly in the highlands, were also identified as potential trouble spots.

In 1997 some 3000 police and 450 PNGDF personnel were engaged in election-related operations with the Electoral Commission (with the latter contributing to the costs of the operations). Electoral Commission officials and security forces personnel met regularly in the lead-up to, and during, the election, and were supplied with intelligence briefings by Electoral Commission officers at provincial level and by the National Intelligence Organization. When voting began, it was reported that in Wabag PNGDF personnel, warned of likely unrest, had set up mortars in fortified bunkers. Liquor bans and curfews were imposed in Port Moresby and several provinces, and in the final stages of the election there was a nationwide ban on liquor sales.

The intervention of the PNGDF was not without incident. Orlegge (chapter 7 below) records that in Goroka soldiers assigned to electoral security duties attacked supporters of the outgoing Defence minister, Ijape. Elsewhere in the highlands, while voting was in progress several soldiers were arrested in Margarima, and thirteen more in Wapenamanda, accused of assisting particular candidates. An arrest warrant was also issued for Major Walter Enuma, who had been Singirok's right hand man in the move against Sandline in March and had subsequently been seconded to the Electoral Commission to assist in electoral security; the national elections operations commander in Wabag, Superintendent John Wakon, accused Enuma of raising an unauthorized force (including the soldiers arrested earlier) to assist selected candidates. Enuma denied the allegations, claiming he had been escorting a polling official in Enga and had been asked to provide escort for some ballot boxes; he threatened to sue Wakon for defamation.[6]

During the campaign, a number of incidents was reported in the newspapers; subsequently the reports of returning officers commonly made mention of instances of coercion and intimidation of voters and election officials, and of bribery, which locally-based officials, even when supported by police, generally felt powerless to stop. Standish (1996) reported that in Chimbu in 1992 polling officials had been forced, sometimes at gunpoint, to sign hundreds of blank ballot papers and to allow multiple voting. According to Standish, in 1997 this again occurred 'widely throughout the highlands'; in Simbu alone some thirty people were killed in election-related fighting (Standish, personal communication 2002). There were widespread reports from the highlands of weapons (including automatic rifles) being carried by candidates or their supporters and of candidates moving around electorates with '*sikuriti*' or 'private armies'. During voting, some sixty ballot boxes went missing in Kagua-Erave and were excluded from the count, necessitating the voiding of the election and the holding of a by-election. Under similar circumstances, a by-election had to be held in Chimbu Provincial electorate.

Nothwithstanding all this, in the event, the election went fairly smoothly in most parts of the country; indeed the Commonwealth Observer Group was moved to comment: '...the Group was struck by the contrast, almost everywhere, between the image of a violent Papua New Guinea and the reality which we experienced' (Commonwealth Observer Group 1997: 27). Nevertheless, the Electoral Commissioner concluded, 'Even without including the special case

[6] Enuma was arrested on 26 July, but released when armed soldiers broke into the Boroko police station where he was being held. (He was subsequently acquitted of the election-related charges.)

of Bougainville, long-term observers of PNG elections would probably say that the 1997 election was the most violent ever' (Electoral Commissioner 1997: 5).

Polling

Polling took place over the two weeks from 14 to 28 June, though in all major centres and in the five highlands provinces (largely for security reasons) polling was carried out on a single day. In a number of instances the commencement of polling had to be delayed or postponed due to the non-arrival of ballot papers or other essential materials, or because of problems with transporting polling teams (particularly where helicopters were used). Such delays produced occasional local tensions. In some areas an Evangelical Alliance of Christian Volunteers assisted electoral officers and scrutineers with the conduct of polling.

At some polling places the search for names, and arguments which broke out when voters' names could not be found, resulted in long delays in the polling process, and in some instances, observers reported, people were not able to cast their vote before polling closed (even though polling hours were extended in some instances at the discretion of polling officials).

There were some criticisms, too, of the conduct of the polls. Notwithstanding the marking of voters' fingernails with indelible ink, there were again widespread allegations of double voting,[7] and the Commonwealth Observer Group (1997: 26) commented that the secrecy of the ballot was not always observed. It was also noted in the Electoral Commissioner's report that because, under the 1997 *Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections*, counting of votes must begin immediately after polling ends and the results be declared immediately after counting, results, or at least progressive totals, in some electorates were public knowledge while voting was still underway (or yet to begin) in others. As the commissioner observed, such a situation could bias voting in those electorates where voting was incomplete. That said, the overall conclusion of the Commonwealth Observer Group (*ibid.*: 27) was that 'The majority of the Presiding Officers and polling staff were efficient and diligent even when they were under great pressure'.

Candidates and campaigns

In 1992 a record 1655 candidates had nominated for the 20 provincial and 97 open seats. This was despite the parliament's decision to raise the candidate's deposit fee from K100 to K1000, slightly more than the national *per capita* GDP at the time. Already in 1992 there was concern that the large number of candidates was changing the nature of campaigning (see above) and producing winning candidates with a smaller percentage of the total vote. In 1987 41 members were elected with less than 20 per cent of the votes in their electorate, and 2 with less than 10 per cent; in 1992 the corresponding numbers were 54 and 9—that is, about half the members of the National Parliament were elected with the support of less than 20 per cent of the voters in their electorate. (In 1997 the numbers rose again, to 63 and 16.)

Before the 1997 election there were proposals to double the candidate's deposit in order to discourage a further increase in candidate numbers, but this did not eventuate, and when writs

[7] There is a persistent common belief that the ink can be removed by lemon juice or other substances, but this has not been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Electoral commissioner—or myself.

closed 2372 candidates had nominated[8] —an increase of 43 per cent over the 1992 figure. The number of candidates per electorate, which rose from 15.2 in 1992 to 21.8 in 1997, showed some regional variation, with generally larger numbers in the Highlands Region and smaller numbers in the Islands Region, though the greatest number of candidates was recorded in the Oro (Northern) Provincial electorate, where a record 61 nominated. There was a marked increase in the number of candidates in the Southern (Papuan) and Momase regions. The former includes the National capital district, where 123 candidates contested the four seats.

Expressing a widely-held concern, the Electoral Commissioner's report stated: 'The very large number of candidates increases the difficulty and the cost of election administration....But of far more consequence for our democracy is that the representativeness or otherwise of many MPs could be called into question by their own electors' (Electoral Commissioner 1997: 9). [Indeed, in 1999 Sir Michael Somare was reported as making just this point, under a headline, 'House is full of "rejects"' (*Post-Courier* 7 September 1999).]

In the fifth parliament (1992-97) there had been no women MPs. Of the 2372 candidates who nominated in 1997 there were only 55 women. Twelve of these had party endorsement.

Parties and independents

Despite some early predictions to the contrary, Papua New Guinea has not developed a strong party system. While a few parties have maintained continuity, most still tend to come and go between elections, and those which have survived generally lack a mass base, an organizational structure, a coherent ideology, and firm party discipline. As noted, all governments since independence have been coalitions, and coalition membership tends to shift during the life of the parliament. With parties not sharply differentiated ideologically, almost every party has been aligned, at some time, with every other. Individual attachment to parties is generally weak, with MPs commonly switching party allegiance in return for political rewards—a pattern of behaviour known elsewhere as 'party-hopping' but increasingly referred to in Papua New Guinea as 'yo-yo politics'.

In 1997 between fourteen and twenty parties were registered with the Electoral Commission (see Table 1.1), though several of these appeared to have only a few members, and some had a geographically limited support base. Two other established but unregistered groups, the Indigenous People's Movement (IPM) and the Black Action Party, contested the election. At least two new parties emerged just before or during polling in June: in Manus the Manus Patriotic Front was created as the political base of former Defence minister James Pokasui, and in Wabag Timothy Tima announced the formation of the 'Christian-oriented' Papua New Guinea Independent Group which, he claimed, had endorsed twenty-one candidates around the country.

A major development in 1997 was the split which took place in what has been, historically, Papua New Guinea's most prominent political party, Pangu. In 1995 the Chan government had pushed through an *Organic Law on Provincial and Local-Level Governments* (OLPLLG), which replaced the previous *Organic Law on Provincial Government*. The new organic law ostensibly reformed provincial and local-level government by abolishing elected provincial

[8] Between nomination and commencement of voting, however, three candidates died.

assemblies and decentralizing further to local-level governments (see May 1999). There was a common view, however, that the real purpose of the 'reform' was to remove the political influence of elected provincial assembly members and re-centralize power to national MPs, who became the nucleus of the provincial governments under the 1995 legislation. Although the OLPLLG was passed by a substantial majority, there were some vocal opponents of the legislation. Among these were Sir Michael Somare, one of Pangu's 'founding fathers'. Somare's opposition prompted Prime Minister Chan to drop him from cabinet; it also precipitated a split within Pangu Pati. Somare subsequently established a new political group, the National Alliance (NA), which brought together some Pangu colleagues, members of the Melanesian Alliance (MA), and several other politicians, including Manus premier and leader of the Movement for Greater Autonomy (MGA), Stephen Pokawin.[9] In August 1996 the Pangu caucus expelled its former leader. Somare's departure both weakened Pangu and created a significant new grouping. Moreover, since Pangu, led into the election by Deputy Prime Minister Chris Haiveta, had, like Chan's PPP, been tainted by the Sandline affair, the NA appeared to have substantially taken on the mantle of the country's most progressive major political grouping.

Table 1.1 Registered Political Parties and Leaders, 1997

Party	Leader
Christian Country Party (CCP)	Avusi Tanao
Christian Democratic Party (CDP)	Dilu Goma
Hausman Party	Waim Tokam
Liberal Party (LP)	Thomas Pupun
Melanesian Alliance (MA)	John Momis
Melanesian Labour Party (MLP)	Paul Mondia
Milne Bay Party (MBP)	Simon Mumurik
Movement for Greater Autonomy (MGA)	Steven Pokawin
National Alliance (NA)	Sir Michael Somare
(Papua New Guinea) National Party (NP)	Philip Kapal
Papua New Guinea First Party (PNGFP)	John Gundu
Pangu Pati	Chris Haiveta
People's Action Party (PAP)	Ted Diro
People's Democratic Movement (PDM)	Paias Wingti
People's National Congress (PNC)	Bill Skate
People's Progress Party (PPP)	Sir Julius Chan
People's Resources Awareness Party (PRAP)	Michael Uvilio
People's Solidarity Party (PSP)	Kala Swokin
People's Unity Party (PUP)	David Unagi
United Party (UP)	Rimbink Pato

Table 1.2 shows the number of candidates endorsed by each party, by region. These figures (which are based on the Electoral Commissioner's list of candidates, circulated prior to voting), however, are only very broadly indicative of party strength. For one thing, while the better organized parties usually endorse only one candidate in an electorate, it is not uncommon to have more than one candidate in a single electorate wearing the same party

[9] The MGA was established in opposition to the proposed abolition of elected provincial governments.

label, or to have candidates describing themselves as 'pro' a particular party—with or without the agreement (or even knowledge) of the party concerned. Hence large numbers of apparently endorsed candidates are not necessarily a reflection of a strong party. For example, the UP, once a major party but in 1997 substantially in demise, fielded 33 candidates, 13 of them in three electorates in Enga Province, and there were 3 or more PAP/pro-PAP candidates in several Chimbu electorates. In addition, parties which endorse a single candidate per electorate will often give covert support to other candidates, especially where they feel bound to endorse sitting candidates whose chances of re-election do not look good, and many candidates will declare themselves as independent even though they have a clear party leaning. In East Sepik, for example, the winning candidate in Yangoru-Saussia, Gabriel Dusava, stood as an independent, though he was known locally to have PPP support and in fact declared his affiliation with PPP almost as soon as he was elected; similarly, Arthur Somare, the son of Sir Michael, stood successfully as independent even though he was widely seen as the NA's candidate in Angoram (and was shown on several tabulations as NA). The fluidity of party attachments is such that not only does party identification change between elections and the first sitting of parliament, but the information provided on candidates' nomination forms seldom corresponds exactly with parties' list of endorsed candidates, and the Electoral Commissioners' own data is at times inconsistent.

Bearing in mind these qualifications, the figures in Table 1.2 show that 712 of the 2372 candidates had some party attachment. The party with the largest number of party-endorsed or pro-party candidates was the People's Action Party (PAP), a junior coalition partner in previous governments. Surprisingly, since the PAP began life as a Papuan-based group associated with former deputy prime minister Ted Diro, slightly more than half of these candidates were in Highlands electorates (mostly in Chimbu Province), where, as noted, several PAP supporters stood against one another (or possibly to split votes). Pangu endorsed 84 candidates, though there was some doubt as to how many of these were loyal to the party and its leader, Chris Haiveta, and how many would, if elected, link up with Sir Michael Somare and his NA. The NA itself nominated 70 candidates along with the endorsed candidates of its alliance partners the MA (40) and MGA (14). Again surprisingly, given the MGA's origins in the Islands Region's opposition to the 1995 abolition of elected provincial governments, 6 of the MGA's 14 candidates were in highlands electorates. PPP, with 71 candidates, and PDM, with 57, were the other major parties with a significant national base (though just over half of the PDM's candidates were in highlands electorates). In view of later developments it is notable that the PNC, whose leader Bill Skate had been a prime ministerial candidate in the outgoing parliament and a prominent critic of the Sandline contract, fielded only 10 candidates, 8 of those in the Southern Region. Some minor parties were listed as having more than 30 candidates nationwide, though mostly with some regional concentration (UP, PUP and CDP in the highlands, and IPM in Momase). Five parties had fewer than 5 candidates. A small number of candidates, either lost in the past or looking to the future, identified themselves with two apparently moribund parties, the League for National Advancement and the Papua Party.

Table 1.2 Party Status of Candidates, by Region*

Party	Southern	Momase	Highlands	Islands	Total
PPP	11	25	28	7	71
Pangu	16	35	23	10	84
PDM	10	15	29	3	57
PNC**	8	-	2	-	10
NA	9	25	30	6	70
MA	7	20	2	11	40
MGA	1	2	6	5	14
PAP	28	21	56	6	111
UP	5	4	23	1	33
NP	1***	3	5	2	11
PRAP	10	2	16	3	31
CDP	8	13	27	3	51
PUP	4	10	19	-	33
IPM	6	32	1	-	39
MLP	4	2****	12	-	18
LNA	1	3	-	-	4
CCP	1	4	13	-	18
Milne Bay P	.11	-	-	-	11
Liberal P.	1	-	-	-	1
Black Action	-	3	-	-	3
Hausman P.	-	-	1	-	1
Papua P.	1	-	-	-	1
Total party attached	**143**	**219**	**293**	**57**	**712**
Independents	485	408	643	124	1660
TOTAL	**628**	**627**	**936**	**181**	**2372**

Notes: * National Capital District is included in the Southern (Papuan) Region, and Southern Highlands in the Highlands Region.
** Includes two candidates who nominated as Papua New Guinea First Party – the Predecessor of PNC.
*** Includes one candidate who nominated as 'People's National Party'.
**** Includes one candidate who nominated as 'Labour Party'.

As against the minority of party-endorsed candidates, there was a substantial increase in the number of independents. In 1992, 1226 of the 1655 candidates (74.1 per cent) had stood as independent. In 1997 (on these figures[10]) 1660 out of 2372 (70.0 per cent) stood as independent. There are perhaps several reasons for the large number of independents. The most obvious is that, even with an increase in the number of parties, the increasing number of candidates nominating means that if all parties nominated in all electorates (an unlikely situation given that most parties have quite narrow bases), there would still not be enough prospective party endorsements to go around. However, the relation between party endorsement and number of candidates standing is not a simple one; some electorates with few candidates had a high proportion of independents (for example, of the 33 candidates standing in the five East New Britain electorates, 29 were independent), while some electorates in

[10] Although these figures are calculated from the Electoral Commissioner's list of candidates, the Commissioner's report uses a figure of 1736 independents.

which there were many candidates also had a relatively high proportion of candidates with party allegiance (in Yangoru-Saussia, for example, there were 30 candidates, of whom 14 listed a party attachment) More significantly, however, it seemed that in 1997 political parties had fewer resources to spend on candidates, and, as in previous elections, candidates often saw advantage in contesting as independents and, if elected, in effect putting themselves on the market to the highest bidder.

The large number of independent candidates was an issue of concern to the Electoral Commissioner, whose report expressed the view that,

> ...the ever increasing numbers of candidates who stand as Independents and win means that it becomes more and more difficult to know what representatives stand for, and how they expect to make the parliamentary system work well for the people they represent. For a parliamentary system to function well, one of the requirements is that representatives need to belong to well-organised, stable political parties (Electoral Commissioner 1997: 8).

Reform of the political party system became a major issue during the life of the sixth parliament.

The campaign

Campaigning began officially on 18 April 1997, when nominations closed, though it is clear that many candidates were in election campaign mode well before that. As in previous elections, extensive use was made of posters, which were much in evidence throughout the country, and candidates and their supporters travelled their electorates - or at least those parts of their electorates where it was safe to travel – in vehicles, by boat and helicopter, and in some cases on foot. In the highlands particularly, candidates organized rallies, at which food, beer and other gifts, and sometimes money, were distributed – notwithstanding the cautionary information contained in the Electoral Commission's leaflet, *Code of Conduct (Law on Campaign Bribery, Undue Influence and Illegal Practices)*. Sitting members sought to make good strategic use of the Rural Development Fund allocations to support projects that might return votes, though in many instances cynical electors were happy to receive the funds without necessarily delivering the vote. In a few cases, provincial and open electorate candidates travelled together, supporting one another's campaigns.

'Good governance' and the need to eliminate corruption featured prominently in the candidates' campaign speeches, especially in the highlands where a group of strong independent candidates was campaigning on a good governance platform. Prominent among this group were Catholic priest Fr Robert Lak, who was standing against Paias Wingti in Western Highlands Provincial, and MELSOL secretary general Peti Lafamana, who was contesting the Eastern Highlands Provincial seat. The local branch of Transparency International launched a public campaign to get political leaders to sign a 'national integrity pledge', and denounced vote-buying. A church-backed 'Operation *Brukim Skru*' ['bend the knee' (i.e. kneel in prayer)] and a 'Pray before you Vote' campaign also called for integrity and honesty among candidates. There were references, in this context, to the Sandline episode, and the role of PPP and Pangu leaders in it, though outgoing Deputy Prime Minister Haiveta expressed the view that 'Sandline has no bearing on the [Pangu] party's chances in the elections. It is a non-issue....' (*The National* 11 June 1997). The PDM's promise of free

education, if elected, also attracted some comment, much of it, however, deeply cynical. As in previous elections, substantive issues of policy did not feature prominently in the election.

Nor, it seemed, were party leaders as much in evidence as in previous elections. Somare was active in promoting NA candidates around the country, notably in the highlands where the NA was hoping to gain fifteen seats and Somare was greeted enthusiastically as 'the father of the nation'. Even before his involvement with Sandline received publicity, Haiveta, as Pangu leader, did not enjoy the popularity that Somare and Namaliu had evoked, and he was not seen much outside the Gulf and Central provinces. Some Pangu candidates, indeed, did not want to have Haiveta's picture, as party leader, on their campaign posters. Chan (PPP) and Wingti (PDM) were battling to keep their seats and did not campaign widely in 1997, and Skate (PNC) had not really achieved national status and concentrated on his support base in NCD and Central Province. Several other politicians who later came to the fore in discussions about who should become prime minister were standing as independents.

Although no free airtime was given to parties or candidates on national radio or TV, and at least five of the nineteen provincial radio station had closed down, the country's four major newspapers (*Post-Courier* and *National* dailies and the *Independent* and Tokpisin-language *Wantok* weeklies) maintained a lively coverage, and voters generally seemed to be well informed about what was happening in their electorates, if not always beyond them.

Table 1.3 Party Identification of Elected Members, by Region*

	Southern	Momase	Highlands	Islands	Total
Seats	**24**	**29**	**39**	**17**	**109**
Sitting members returned	16	13	15	11	55
(%)					(50.5)
Independent	6	14	13	5	38*
PPP	3	5	7	1	16
Pangu	6	3	1	3	13
PDM	1	1	5	2	9
PNC/PNGFP	5	-	1	-	6
NA	-	2	3	2	7
MA	-	1	-	3	4
MGA	-	-	-	1	1
PAP	2	2	2	-	6
UP	1	-	2	-	3
PRAP	-	-	3	-	3
CDP	-	-	1	-	1
PUP	-	-	1	-	1
IPM	-	1	-	-	1
TOTAL	24	29	39	17	109

* This figure includes several members who were identified in the Electoral Commissioner's pre-polling list of candidates as independent, but had known party allegiances (these include Swokin [People's Solidarity Party] in Southern, Gubag [Pangu] and Arthur Somare [NA] in Momase, and Ganarafo [Pangu], Pora [NP], and Smith [PUP] in the Highlands).

The outcome

The results of the election are detailed in Appendix 1. In sum, 55 sitting members were returned, and the balance of parties was as shown in Table 1.3. (As in Table 1.2, these figures are based on the Electoral Commissioner's pre-polling list of candidates, and do not always correspond with the figures in the Commissioner's report.) As in 1992, independents were substantially the largest group among the successful candidates, with 38 elected members, 34.9 per cent of the total membership of the house. PPP was a big loser, with half of its parliamentary membership as of 1997 (and about half its cabinet ministers) losing their seats. Pangu also lost seats.[11]

Although only 30 per cent of candidates were identified with a party, party-endorsed or pro-party candidates won 65 per cent of the seats. This is, however, probably more a reflection of the major parties' ability to identify strong candidates than an indication of a party-loyalty vote.

Of the fifty-five women who stood, only two were elected—former Papuan separatist leader, Dame Josephine Abaijah (independent) who secured 22.5 per cent of the vote in Milne Bay Provincial, and Lady Carol Kidu (independent), Australian-born widow of a distinguished Papua New Guinea chief justice, who received 21.8 per cent of the vote in Moresby South. Only one other woman received more than 10 per cent of the vote (Mary Karo [PUP] in Rigo). Womens' shares of the vote in their respective electorates averaged 2.3 per cent.

As results came in, failed and 'cheated' candidates expressed their disappointment in various ways. In the generally peaceful Sepik it was reported that two losing candidates had 'gone beserk', destroying government property and burning rival supporters' houses (*The National* 9 July 1997). Such extreme reaction was more common in the highlands, where post-election violence seemed to be following a rising trend. A more widespread response, however, was the lodging of petitions with the Court of Disputed Returns. Some 86 petitions were lodged. Although 65 of these were subsequently withdrawn, dismissed or struck out, a number was pursued successfully, and the court was still dealing with them well into the life of the sixth parliament. (This subject is dealt with in detail by Nonggorr in chapter 4.)

Formation of government[12]

As results began to filter in, party leaders began jockeying to put together a governing coalition, and successful independent candidates began assessing their options.

Sir Michael Somare (NA), former prime minister Sir Rabbie Namaliu (pro-Somare Pangu), and Bill Skate (PNC) met in Madang in late June, together with an official of the PDM. There was talk of a 'grand coalition of unity, transparency and progress' (see *Post-Courier* 30 June 1997). Skate had been one of the most outspoken of the critics of the Sandline contract and had vowed not to be associated in a post-election coalition with PPP or Pangu. Somare was counting on Skate's support, primarily to deliver a bloc of Papuan members, as well as on the

[11] Because party attachments were very fluid in the period leading up to the election, comparison of the state of the parties before and after the election has not been attempted.

[12] For a more detailed analysis of the developments leading to the formation of a governing coalition, see Ivarature's account in chapter 4. Also see Standish (1999).

personal loyalty of some Pangu members and the backing a group of progressive independents. But Skate, like Somare, had prime ministerial aspirations.

The main threat to a NA-led coalition appeared to come from a coalition led by Pangu and PPP—the senior partners in the outgoing coalition government. The prospects for a Pangu-PPP-led coalition, however, were put in doubt early on when it became clear that Sir Julius Chan might not be re-elected in Namatanai. In the event Sir Julius narrowly lost his seat to endorsed NA candidate Ephraim Apelis, becoming the first incumbent prime minister to lose his seat. With Chan's defeat, Andrew Baing (Markham Open) took over the PPP's parliamentary leadership. Pangu Party leader Haiveta was returned in Gulf, but it was not clear how many endorsed Pangu candidates might join Somare's NA.[13]

A key element in coalition formation was the PDM, led into the election by former Prime Minister Paias Wingti. Wingti, however, became another casualty of the election, having been relegated to third place in his Western Highlands Provincial electorate. The seat was won by reformist independent Fr Robert Lak, one of the group of progressive independents who had been supported in the election by MELSOL. Another important actor was the PAP, led by Ted Diro, who secured the Central Provincial seat. Like Skate, Diro had prime ministerial aspirations, and began early negotiations with various other party leaders over a possible alliance.

Apart from Somare, Skate, Diro and the new PPP leader, Baing, other re-elected members whose names were mentioned as prospective prime minister included Namaliu, and independent members Sir John Kaputin, and Sir Mekere Morauta. Namaliu had stood as an endorsed Pangu candidate, but had had differences with Haiveta. In the wake of the Sandline affair many in Pangu supported Namaliu as an alternative leader. Haiveta, however, held onto the leadership, and Namaliu threw in his lot with Somare.

In the lead-up to the opening of parliament, the situation became less and less clear. With neither Somare nor Skate prepared initially to step down from the contest for the prime ministership, Skate began to drift away from the NA towards PDM, and there were suggestions that the PNC-PDM group would put forward its own nominee for prime minister. The PNC-PDM group retreated to Tufi, Oro Province to discuss a possible coalition. Shortly before parliament met, the PNC-PDM group secured the support of the independent/MELSOL faction, plus some minor parties and other independents. The decision of Sir Mekere Morauta to join PDM appeared to strengthen that group. At this stage Somare, who had drawn his supporters together in Wewak, was still fairly confident that the PNC-PDM-independent/MELSOL group would side with the NA.

At the last moment, however, contrary to his earlier statements, Skate, and the PDM, joined the Pangu-PPP coalition. Morauta was reportedly offered the prime ministership but declined, not wanting to be associated with PPP and a Haiveta-led Pangu. The NA also offered to support Morauta as prime minister but by this time PDM, and thus most of Morauta's support for the leadership, was firmly aligned with Pangu-PPP. Reportedly, Both Chan and Wingti

[13] Before the election, Somare said he expected that about three quarters of successful Pangu candidates would support the NA.

played a prominent role in these negotiations, backing Skate (a Wingti protégé) for the prime ministership.

The contest for prime ministership thus came down to a vote between Somare and Skate, and on 22 July the latter was elected prime minister by 71 votes to 35. Skate became the first prime minister from the Southern (Papuan) Region, and, in a move which many saw as cynically opportunist, the independent/ MELSOL group had thrown in its lot with the political grouping which, as architects of the Sandline contract, had been their principal target during the election campaign.

Once again, the period of intense horse-trading between the election and the first sitting of parliament had produced a last-minute coalition of unlikely bedfellows, and, as it subsequently proved, one which would not last the life of the parliament.

Returning to the question, raised above, concerning the impact of the Sandline affair on the election, it is difficult to say just what impact Sandline had. Certainly, Chan and the Defence minister of the time, Ijape, lost their seats, and it is hard to believe that at least in Chan's case the Sandline debacle did not affect the vote. But commentators on the election in Namatanai suggest that specific local factors accounted for Chan's loss to Apelis (see Ivarature below), and Ijape was one of forty candidates in an electorate dominated by local loyalties and, as Ivarature suggests, may have done well to come third. On the other hand, Haiveta, whose role in the Sandline affair had been singled out for strong criticism in the Andews report, was comfortably re-elected. And despite Skate's strong denunciation, before and during the election, of PPP and Pangu and their respective leaders Chan and Haiveta, when it came to the contest for office, issues of principle seemingly took second place to personal ambition.

The following chapters examine aspects of the 1997 election. The studies in Part 1 look at the electoral context for 1997 (Reilly), the impact of the Sandline issue (Ivarature), and the process of legal contestation of the results (Nonggorr). The seven chapters of Part 2 provide accounts of the election from selected constituencies. Part 3 reproduces the report on the election by the Electoral Commissioner, Reuben Kaiulo.

2

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA ELECTIONS 1964-1997

Benjamin Reilly

Every one of Papua New Guinea's national elections, the first of which was held in 1964, have to date been the subject of a book-length academic study. Together, these form an invaluable and possibly unique series of election studies.[1] Most of the individual chapters contained in these election studies have concentrated on seat-by-seat descriptions and analysis of election campaigns, with less attention paid to formal election rules or the way these rules influence styles of political competition. This reflects the preoccupations of the respective authors and editors: Papua New Guinea elections are often seen as clashes between traditional culture and the modern world of representative politics, the 'counterpoint between traditional and modern bases for status-competition' in the words of one author (Strathern 1976:283). Most studies of Papua New Guinean elections to date have implicitly viewed them as an arena in which the forces of tradition and modernity can be played out, and in which the social customs and obligations of voters and candidates play a dominant role.

The formal rules of the electoral system, by contrast, have tended to be seen as being of marginal importance. In part, this reflects the traditional dominance, among the social science disciplines, of anthropology in studies of Papua New Guinea, which has long represented something of a Mecca for anthropologists due to the diversity and isolation from external influences of many of its traditional societies. A considerable amount of research and scholarship on politics in Papua New Guinea, including electoral studies, has been conducted not by political scientists but by anthropologists, who have understandably given more attention to social forces than political institutions.[2]

The comparative lack of attention to the impacts of modern political institutions has, however, also hampered a comprehensive understanding of the political process in Papua New Guinea, and has led to a tendency to ascribe the causes for political activity overwhelmingly to traditional 'cultural' factors, with insufficient attention given to the rational calculations made by Papua New Guinea's political actors as they interact with the country's political institutions. This chapter will therefore look at the way Papua New Guinea's political institutions have interacted

[1] These are: Bettison, Hughes and van der Veur (1965); Epstein, Parker and Reay (1971); Stone (1976a); Hegarty (1983a); King (1989); Oliver (1989a); and Saffu (1996a).

[2] For example Marie Reay and Andrew Strathern are both anthropologists by training.

with distinctive elements of Papua New Guinea's social structure and political culture to impact upon political outcomes.

Political institutions in Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinea has a unicameral national parliament composed of a two-tier system of 109 members elected from 89 'open' electorates of approximately equal population size, and 20 'regional' or provincial electorates based on the boundaries of the 19 provinces and the National Capital District. Parliamentary terms last for five years, and parliaments have so far run their full term, despite several changes of government on the floor of parliament. National elections have been held in 1964, 1968, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997.

Papua New Guinea's formal institutions of government are 'majoritarian', featuring a Westminster-style parliament, plurality-majority electoral laws and, in 1995, a shift from the quasi-federal structure established at independence towards a unitary state.[3] For its three pre-independence elections, Papua New Guinea used a majority electoral system—the 'optional preferential' vote, inherited from Australia. This was changed to a plurality or first-past-the-post system at independence in 1975. The National Parliament is a unicameral body, in which the executive is formed by and responsible to the legislature. There is a separate independent judiciary. The head of state is the British monarch, represented locally by a governor general. The prime ministership is determined by a vote on the floor of the parliament. Parliament is effectively sovereign: the constitution can be amended by two successive 'super-majority' votes of parliament, not by referendum. These features were all introduced in Papua New Guinea's 'autochthonous' 1975 constitution, following an exhaustive consultative tour throughout Papua New Guinea by the body charged with drawing up an independence constitution for Papua New Guinea, the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC). Between 1972 and 1974, members of the CPC engaged in widespread consultations concerning the nature of an independent government in Papua New Guinea, which involved over 100 meetings attended by an estimated 60,000 local people (CPC 1974:1/1) The constitution's autochthony was underlined by the decision of the national parliament to reconvene itself as a constituent assembly in order to debate and then formally adopt the constitution in 1975.

Papua New Guinea's political institutions are not entirely majoritarian. While the 1975 constitution provided for a unitary state, the rise of separatist sentiment in Bougainville, the Gazelle Peninsula, Papua and elsewhere around the time of independence prompted the first prime minister, Michael Somare, to agree in August 1976 to a system of provincial and local governments similar to those originally proposed by the CPC. The boundaries of the nineteen provinces thus adopted in general followed those of the nineteen administrative districts of the former Australian administration, plus the National Capital District (which is treated as a province for representational purposes). Between 1977 and 1995, each of these provinces had its own elected assembly and an executive council headed by a premier, who were constitutionally responsible for a range of specified powers.

[3] For the most influential example of this typology see Lijphart (1984). Lijphart seeks to demonstrate a basic division in established democracies between those utilizing majoritarian political institutions (such as majority electoral laws and single-party governments) and those which place constraints on majority rule via proportional representation, coalitions and other 'consensual' devices.

In 1995, however, there was a marked shift back towards centralization of power following the abolition of the previous provincial governments in all provinces save Bougainville, where special arrangements exist. The 1995 *Organic Law on Provincial and Local-Level Governments* provides for provincial assemblies, exercising a similar range of functions to their predecessors, composed of all members of the National Parliament from the province; heads of rural local-level governments; one representative of the heads of urban authorities and urban councils; up to three paramount chiefs or their appointed nominees representing local areas where the chieftaincy system is in existence and is accepted; one nominated woman representative; and up to three additional members. Regional members now act as governor of each province. The new provincial governments are subject to greater national control than their predecessors. Taken together, these reforms have introduced a number of changes in terms of representation at the provincial level, including a form of direct election to a statutory position (as the elected regional MP will automatically become the chair of the provincial assembly and head of the provincial government), functional representation for specified groups, representation of traditional interests in the form of paramount chiefs, and the statutory inclusion of a female representative.[4]

The membership of the National Parliament is determined by section 101 of the constitution, which provides for three different types of MPs. The most common form of members are those from 'open electorates'. Section 101 of the constitution provides for 'a number of members to be elected from single-member open electorates', with the precise number of these electorates to be provided in an organic law.[5] Section 34(1) of the *Organic Law on National Elections* (hereafter OLNE) states that 'in no case shall the number of open electorates be less than 81 or more than 91'. These open electorates must also be approximately equal in population, within a tolerance of plus or minus 20 per cent, and must not cut across provincial boundaries (OLNE s.35). Since the only formal post-independence boundary determination in 1977 there have been 89 open electorates. These electorates were demarcated on the basis of census figures from 1971, and have not been revised to take account of changes in population. The average population size of an open electorate at the 1997 election was around 46,000 people, or 38,360 registered voters—a number that varied considerably from the largest electorate (Lagaip-Pogera Open in the highlands, which had 84,578 registered voters) to the smallest (Rabaul Open with 15,977 registered voters).[6]

Section 101 of the constitution also provides for 'a number of members elected from single-member provincial electorates'. These provincial electorates have their origins in ten 'special electorates' reserved for expatriate candidates at the 1964 elections. After extensive consultations following the 1964 election, the Select Committee on Constitutional Development recommended the establishment of fifteen non-racial regional electorates to replace the ten

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[4] *Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Governments*, s.10(3). For more information see May (1999).

[5] 'Organic laws' have the status of constitutional law, and were introduced in Papua New Guinea in order to keep the constitution focused on basic principles and institutions. Despite this, the Papua New Guinea constitution is one of the longest in the world.

[6] Figures supplied by Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission.

existing special electorates.[7] However, *de facto* racial qualifications remained through educational qualifications for nomination.[8] In 1971, the Second Select Committee on Constitutional Development reported an 'overwhelming request for increased representation' around the country. The committee noted that there had been some call for the removal of regional electorates, although the committee itself made it clear it did not support this view. But by 1975, there had been 'a considerable shift in opinion on this matter' (CPC 1974:6/1), and the CPC unanimously recommended that regional electorates be abolished. The report argued that 'the original reasons for regional electorates has been largely invalidated by the increasing numbers of well educated people returned from open electorates' (*ibid.*). Moreover, the constitutional provisions on citizenship, and increasing standards of literacy, meant that the formal educational qualifications which were the basis of regional electorates were no longer necessary. The government, however, successfully argued for a retention of such electorates 'in order to retain greater representation in the Parliament for the less populous districts' (Goldring 1978:41-42).

Some commentators have also argued that provincial electorates serve a useful purpose by forcing candidates 'to transcend narrow, localized tribal and clan loyalties in reaching out for support in a larger territorial unit', and point out that a number of Papua New Guinea's most prominent politicians have been elected from provincial electorates (Wijeweera 1989:40). There is persuasive evidence for this latter point: of the 1992-1997 parliament, such prominent figures as Michael Somare (East Sepik), John Momis (Bougainville), Paias Wingti (Western Highlands), Chris Haiveta (Gulf) and Peter Barter (Madang) were all elected from regional, rather than open, electorates. Although it is impossible to be categorical, it seems likely that the need for candidates to appeal to a wider cross-section of voters may encourage candidature from those who have more to offer than a solid clan or tribal support base alone. The requirement to appeal to a wider political audience than one's own extended kinship network means that judgements about a candidate's suitability for public office—their intelligence, tolerance, impartiality or genuine devotion to public service—are likely to play a more important role than questions of their clan affiliations. The reality of Papua New Guinea politics means that it is almost impossible for even a genuinely outstanding candidate to be elected in many open seats without a substantial clan support base.

The constitutional provision for the third type of MP provided by the constitution has never, in fact, been utilised.[9] Under section 101, up to three members may be 'nominated' to office by a two-thirds majority of the parliament, rather than elected to it. There is a history of official and non-appointed members in Papua New Guinea legislative bodies, going back to the colonial legislative councils of the 1950s, and this provision reflects this history, being intended to give the Papua New Guinea parliament the opportunity to include expertise from outside the

[7] The fifteen electorates which were eventually demarcated followed the existing boundaries of twelve administrative districts, with three others encompassing two adjacent districts (Gulf and Western in Papua, East and West New Britain, and New Ireland and Manus).

[8] The racial qualification for candidature was replaced with an educational qualification, the Territory Intermediate Certificate 'or equivalent'. See Parker and Wolfers (1971:36-37).

[9] Nominated members have, however, been appointed to provincial assemblies.

legislature within its ranks. However, the nominated seat provision has never been used and, in the words of the General Constitutional Commission,

> there is no prospect that it ever will be used ... in our system of democracy representatives from all levels of government should be directly elected by the people. There should be no exception made for any one who is going to enjoy the same powers, rights and privileges as those whose mandate is hard-won through direct election (General Constitutional Commission 1983:113).

This view remains current. The contest for parliamentary office in Papua New Guinea is too intense, and the rewards too great, to countenance its being given away to an outsider. The closest the provision has come to being used was at the height of the Bougainville crisis in 1991, when the then Minister for the Interior, Karl Stack, urged the government to consider using the provision to appoint three Bougainvilleans to parliament, arguing that such steps were crucial to ensuring the survival of the Papua New Guinea state (*Parliamentary Debates*, 20 August 1991).

Taken together, these representative arrangements of overlapping 'open' and 'provincial' electorates reflect Papua New Guinea's geographic and ethnic diversity—a diversity which was to be emphasized after independence by a change in redistribution criteria. Prior to 1975 many of the electoral and local government boundaries reflected the sub-districts and census divisions of the colonial administration and were thus 'based on ethnic considerations' (Stone 1976b:46)—explicitly in the case of the distribution criteria used in 1964, which divided the country into 'electoral zones', made up of autonomous 'open' and 'special' electorates, 'determined on the basis of geographic isolation (as in the cases of the island districts), ethnography and communications' (Chief Electoral Officer 1964:1). The zones agreed upon were the five major island groups of Manus, New Ireland, Bougainville and New Britain, and a corresponding division of the mainland (into Milne Bay, Sepik, South, North-East and Highlands). Each zone was then divided into electorates 'on a strictly mathematical basis', following the (then) Australian practice of a maximum 20 per cent deviation from the mean size of electorates. 'Tribal and linguistic affiliations' were to be taken into account where possible, as were issues of accessibility in 'sparsely populated areas' (*ibid.*:2). While the extreme fragmentation of Papua New Guinea's ethnic groups means that this criteria was not (and could not have been) directed at forming electorates dominated by one ethnic group, it did mean that ethnic factors could at least be considered so that (for example) villages would not be divided in two by an electoral boundary.

Since independence, this situation has changed markedly. The role of recommending the number and boundaries of open electorates is in the hands of an independent Boundaries Commission, whose recommendations parliament can accept or reject but not amend. This latter provision has had a major impact on the composition of the National Parliament, as the past three Boundary Commission reports (in 1981, 1985 and 1991) were rejected by parliament for what appeared to be shamelessly self-interest reasons. As a consequence, the boundaries delimited for the first post-independence elections in 1977, utilising census data from 1971, have been used ever since. The primary criterion for the drawing of these boundaries was the requirement for equality of representation laid down in section 125(2) of the Constitution (Wijeweera 1989:38-40). This has effectively changed the dominant criterion for assessing electoral boundaries from one of

'community of interest' issues, such as language, ethnicity and geography, to numeric equality.[10] The high growth rate and mobility of Papua New Guinea's population means that most electorates are today almost certainly malapportioned, as the above-mentioned disparity between enrolments in Lagaip-Pogera and Rabaul well illustrates.

Table 2.1 outlines the changing composition of the Papua New Guinea legislature since the first national elections in 1964, consisting of a series of rapid changes in the period prior to independence followed by a period of stability and in some ways sclerosis since then.

Table 2.1: Composition of House of Assembly and National Parliament 1964-1997

Year	Open electorates	Regional electorates	Other	Total parliamentary membership
1964	44 members	10 members elected from 'Special Electorates', reserved for non-indigenous candidates	10 official members, made up of senior Administration officials	64 members in total—54 elected, 10 appointed
1968	69 members	15 members elected from 'Regional Electorates', reserved for candidates holding Intermediate Certificate or equivalent	10 official members, made up of senior Administration officials	94 members in total—84 elected, 10 appointed
1972	82 members	18 members elected from 'Regional Electorates', reserved for candidates holding Intermediate Certificate or equivalent	4 official members, made up of senior Administration officials	104 members in total—100 elected, 4 appointed
1977-1997	89 members	20 members elected from 'Provincial Electorates' demarcated on the 19 Provinces and the National Capital District	None	109 members in total—all elected

Characteristics of Papua New Guinea elections

Elections since the introduction of representative democracy to Papua New Guinea in 1964 have been marked by both change and continuity. I have argued elsewhere (Reilly 1996, 1997a, 1997b), for example, that the change of electoral system in 1975 had a marked impact on the conduct of electoral politics in Papua New Guinea. Under the optional preferential system, candidates had strong incentives to form mutual alliance and act in a cooperative and accommodatory manner in order to garner preference votes from the supporters of other candidates, particularly those from other clan or tribal groups. With the introduction of first-past-the-post in 1975, these incentives for cooperation were replaced with a new set of incentives which encouraged a much less accommodatory, 'zero sum' approach to electoral politics. Similarly, factors such as increasingly unrepresentative candidates elected on very small

[10] This factor is an almost universal aspect of uninominal district electoral boundaries drawn to maintain population parity, as it is a rare community whose natural borders coincide with electoral ones. As Steed (1985:282) has noted, 'most single-member constituencies are thoroughly artificial, ephemeral pieces of territory which have no meaning outside the electoral context'.

proportions of the vote and increasing electoral violence appear to be directly related to the introduction of first-past-the-post at independence.[11]

But there is also a number of factors which have evidenced as much continuity as change, and which appear to have been characteristic features of elections in Papua New Guinea for some time. Five of these are particularly notable by comparative standards and will be examined here: the extremely high numbers of candidates standing for election in Papua New Guinea; the marked turnover of incumbent politicians from one election to the next; the weak and fragmented party system; the instability of membership amongst parliamentary parties and governing coalitions; and the consistently high rates of voter participation and turnout in all Papua New Guinea elections to date.

Candidature rates

Papua New Guinea elections have long been characterized by remarkably high rates of candidature. Since independence, the increasing centrality of the state as a means of accessing resources and accumulating and distributing wealth has served to encourage more and more candidates to stand for election. As noted earlier, electoral victory provides the surest way of gaining access to the resources of the state itself. Some observers also argue that standing for election itself increases individual prestige regardless of the election outcome. In the Simbu region of the highlands, for example, candidature

> demonstrates local popularity, makes a 'big man', [and] shows how the candidate measures up against local rivals for clan and tribe leadership. In this competition, candidacy itself, having one's name on the ballot, posters, cars, supporters, is an indication of being a big man. Secondly, success is measured by obtaining votes of the subclan, clan and tribe. Electoral success, that is, achieving office, against thirty or forty rivals, cannot be expected. In the local contest the one who receives the largest number of votes demonstrates that he has at least a local following (Brown 1989:251).

As detailed in Table 2.2 below, rates of candidature have remained high, and increased, with every election to date.

Table 2.2: Candidates per Electorate 1964-1997

Year	No of Electorates	No. of Candidates	Average per electorate
1964	54	298	5.5
1968	84	484	5.8
1972	100	611	6.1
1977	109	879	8.1
1982	109	1125	10.3
1987	109	1513	13.9
1992	109	1654	15.2
1997	109	2372	21.8

As in so many other areas of Papua New Guinea politics, regional factors also appear to influence the distribution of this phenomenon. In regions of high contestation such as the

[11] See Reilly (1996).

highlands, where many similar-sized clans all vie to have 'their' candidate elected, high candidacy rates are always to be expected. In most elections, the record number of candidates for an electorate tends to occur in highlands seats—48 in Sinasina-Yonggamugl in 1992, 45 in Kerowagi in 1987 and 29 in Kundiawa in 1982—although the latest record of 61 candidates contesting one seat occurred in Papua's Northern Provincial electorate in 1997. The other type of seats which appear to attract high candidature are those in which a number of competing interest groups and issue dimensions are present, such as the National Capital District seats, which have consistently attracted large numbers of able candidates (Griffin 1988). By contrast, many contests in the lowlands and islands are characterized by surprisingly small numbers of candidates and a more consensual, measured style of campaigning.

This pattern corresponds to the theoretical expectations of the political science literature, which argues that the effective number of electoral candidates and parties in an election is a product of the interaction between social heterogeneity and electoral rules (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Amorim Neto and Cox 1997). Examination of the electoral impact of racial diversity in some areas of the United States, for example, has found that 'the greater the level of racial (or social) heterogeneity in an electoral district (or nation), the greater the number of effective candidates there will be in the district (or national) elections' (Jones 1997). When applied to Papua New Guinea, this theory would predict that the number of candidates per district would be higher in the more competitive and ethnically-diverse areas, such as the Port Moresby electorates and the highlands, than in the less divided islands region—which is indeed the case. At the 1997 elections, for example, the islands region had an average of 10.6 candidates per electorate, while candidature rates were twice as high in the highlands and over three times as high in the National Capital District (Electoral Commissioner 1997:15).

The 1997 election saw a record 2372 candidates standing for election—an increase of 43.4 per cent on the 1992 figure. Saffu argues that what he sees as the two 'fundamental features of Papua New Guinea elections'—the relative unimportance of political parties in the electoral process and the essentially local character of electoral politics—are both strongly related to the increasing levels of candidates standing for election (1996b:41).

Incumbent turnover

One notable feature of the electoral system in Papua New Guinea is its facility for encouraging a high degree of turnover of incumbent politicians. In all national elections since 1964, the turnover rate of incumbents has been extremely high by world standards. Roughly half of all members have been voted out after only one term of office, a rate that has held relatively constant for cabinet ministers and even party leaders. Only one member—Sir Pita Lus—has been elected to every parliament since the first elections in 1964, while one other high-profile politician—Sir Michael Somare—has been elected in seven successive national elections, and two others—John Momis and John Kaputin—in six. But most MPs are not returned to office—at the 1992 and 1997 elections, for example, over half of all sitting members were not re-elected. Table 2.3 sets out the rate of incumbent turnover for all Papua New Guinea elections to date.

Table 2.3: Turnover rates of Papua New Guinea parliamentarians 1964-1997

Year	Sitting MPs re-elected	Percentage re-elected	Sitting MPs not re-elected	Percentage not re-elected	Total no of elected MPs
1968	23	50	23	50	84
1972	38	52	35	48	100
1977	35	38	56	62	109
1982	50	48	53	52	109
1987	56	53	48	47	109
1992	44	40	65	60	109
1997	51	48	57	52	109

Source: Electoral Commission reports, 1968-1997. The table refers only to sitting MPs seeking re-election.

As Table 2.3 makes clear, the re-election rate of incumbent MPs has actually been quite consistent over six elections, hovering around the 50 per cent mark, with a trough of 38 per cent in 1977, the first post-independence elections, and a high of 53 per cent in 1987. While almost every examination of Papua New Guinea politics mentions this high turnover rate of incumbents, there have been relatively few analyses of the reasons for it. 'Social' explanations have tended to focus on voters' expectation of their MPs as a central point for 'distributive' politics. Under this explanation, members can increase their 'bank' of existing votes through increased prestige, displays of wealth, and, most importantly, direct patronage in the form of gifts, beer, pigs, petrol and increasingly cash. MPs who do not deliver are not re-elected. Government MPs should have an advantage over others by virtue of their access to government resources and opportunities to distribute patronage, and there is some evidence of a higher re-election rate for government members than those in opposition (Hegarty 1983b:15). But in general sitting MPs, despite the built-in advantages of incumbency in terms of the prestige of their position and the resources available to them, are more likely to not be re-elected than they are to gain another term in office. In political science terms they are electorally 'vulnerable', and there are sufficient cases of MPs who have distributed large amounts of gifts and patronage (e.g. Iambakey Okuk in 1982) or appear to hold positions of considerable personal prestige (e.g. party leader Tony Siaguru in 1987) losing their seats, to encourage a search for other explanations beyond these 'social' factors.

David Hegarty, who has conducted probably the most detailed examination of electoral vulnerability in Papua New Guinea, concluded that MPs with low winning margins and high numbers of opponents are more likely to be defeated than those with substantial winning margins and few potential challengers (Hegarty 1982). This is intuitively obvious: assuming an even spread of votes then the higher the number of challengers, the lower the total vote share required for victory and the smaller the likely margin between first and second. The first-past-the-post electoral system is also a factor here: by enabling candidates with very small total vote shares to be elected, the electoral system both encourages high candidate numbers and increases the likelihood that sitting MPs with a small bloc vote will fail to be re-elected. Fewer candidates would be likely to significantly reduce this factor. Moreover, the evidence of the pre-independence elections suggests that elections held under preferential voting had a lower turnover rate than elections under first-past-the-post (although the difference is not large: a 51.5

per cent re-election rate under optional preferential voting compared to a 45.4 per cent re-election rate under first-past-the-post).

Finally, what have been the effects of the high rates of incumbent turnover upon Papua New Guinea politics? There are two competing arguments. One is that the instability of support bases for most candidates and the consequent loss of continuity in parliamentary experience and continuity of government represents something of a crisis of legitimacy for Papua New Guinea politics. The opposing view is that high incumbency turnover, like the high numbers of contesting candidates or the high rates of turnout by voters, are all evidence of a highly participatory political system in which voters are aware and involved in politics, have high expectations of their elected representatives, and have every opportunity to discard politicians who have failed to impress. Perhaps the truth lies somewhere in between. Although there is no doubt that the vulnerability of many MPs creates a heightened degree of accountability towards the electorate, and is further evidence of the essential dynamism of Papua New Guinea political culture, the continued loss of experienced and able politicians at every election, particularly ministers who have proved their ability in the complex task of running a government, is a debilitating drain on Papua New Guinea's political capital.

A weak party system

Most broad indicators of party numbers and cohesion suggest a steady decline in the strength and importance of political parties in Papua New Guinea since the introduction of self-government in 1973. There is a number of ways to measure the salience of political parties in a democracy. One is to look at the internal capacity and resources of parties by examining their membership levels (which, in Papua New Guinea, are not verifiable and often not available in the first place), financial resources (*ditto*), constitutions and policy platforms, and so on. An alternative approach is to look at the number of candidates endorsed at each election—a reliable indicator of party strength in many instances, but potentially misleading in Papua New Guinea due to some parties endorsing more than one candidate in a seat, and candidates 'self-endorsing' by choosing their own party label. The difficulty in obtaining reliable information on most of these issues in Papua New Guinea is itself a telling indicator of the weakness of the current party system.

A more reliable measure of party strength in most countries is the relative success of parties in the two most important aspects of competitive politics: the results of general elections, and the formation of governments. Both of these are difficult, but not impossible, to assess in Papua New Guinea. In terms of the results of general elections, the major problem for traditional academic analysis is one of reliable data. Only since the 1987 election have the official election statistics included information on party support levels. Prior to 1987, candidates were not identified by any party affiliation on the ballot paper (although since 1972 photographs have been used on the ballot paper wherever possible to identify the particular candidate for illiterate voters). Once elected, successful members would simply align themselves with their chosen party in parliament. This makes the traditional calculation of the relationship between a party's vote share and its seat share—a mainstay of most discussions of a party's electoral support in other jurisdictions—extremely difficult in practice and largely meaningless as a measure of electoral support. Such a calculation makes sense in most Western democracies, where politics is conducted on a national level by mass parties, and media coverage concentrates on key players like the prime minister, who 'represent' their party to a national audience. To adopt a similar

approach in the case of Papua New Guinea, where election campaigns are really a series of 109 individual battles in each seat, would be to privilege aggregate data with a significance it does not deserve. National factors, while not irrelevant, are often of extremely limited importance.

Nonetheless, it is possible to look at the relationship between a party's seat and vote shares for all Papua New Guinea elections since independence. Prior to independence, the best source for such comparative information is Loveday and Wolfers' (1976) sophisticated analysis of voting patterns in the first three houses, which provides the best indicators of which elected members were associated with which parties once in parliament. As no party labels appeared on ballot papers until 1987, information on party affiliations from the 1977 and 1982 elections comes mostly from knowledgeable academics and observers making their own estimates of which candidates were 'associated' with particular parties, and using this figure to calculate a crude estimate of a party's overall vote share.

At the 1977 elections the best information available on the relationship between a party's overall vote share and its share or parliamentary seats comes from Hegarty's overview of the 1977 elections, where 'a core of party stalwarts were returned but many incumbents were dumped heavily ... of the 109 winners, 76 had been endorsed by parties or movements' (Hegarty 1983b:9). Hegarty viewed party endorsement as often more 'a question of convenience than of commitment to a philosophy, platform or leader', noting that most studies from 1977 'show that parties had very little impact at all on the voter' (*ibid.*:12). A later study by Ralph Premdas revised Hegarty's party endorsement figure upwards, claiming that 'the 1977 elections could be accurately described as a contest between the major parties ... nearly half of all candidates were either endorsed by a party or were openly or covertly affiliated to a party. Of the 108 elected parliamentarians, all but 10 had party connexions' (Premdas 1978:87). Unfortunately no statistics of a national party vote for the 1977 elections have been published, but it is possible to make some informed estimates for comparative purposes. Using the sample of fifteen studies from Hegarty's edited volume, I have attempted to estimate the overall support levels for the major parties.[12] Considering the distribution and representativeness of these results, a rough estimate of overall support levels at the 1977 election would be something like Pangu 35 per cent, PPP 15 per cent, United Party 10 per cent, Papua Besena 5 per cent, Country Party 3 per cent, National Party 2 per cent, with independents gaining the remaining 30 per cent.

By 1982, the situation had changed somewhat, with emerging signs of possible strengthening of the party system. The Pangu Pati maintained its dominance, but two new parties campaigned strongly for regional support: the National Party, which had been formed as a highlands equivalent of Pangu prior to the 1972 election but came to much greater prominence under the high-profile leadership of Iambakey Okuk; and the Melanesian Alliance, launched in 1980 by Father John Momis and John Kaputin, and which (unlike nearly all its rivals) had an ideological

[12] In the four urban seats around Port Moresby, the Papuan nationalist party, Papua Besena, won three seats with an average of 41 per cent of the vote; the Pangu Pati won one seat with an average of 28 per cent; and the United Party won no seats but gained approximately 16 per cent of the vote. Pangu won six of seven seats in the East Sepik region with an average vote share of 40 per cent; one seat went to the United Party candidate with 31 per cent. Pangu also won six of the nine Eastern Highlands seats, at a vote average of around 35 per cent. The PPP gained around 30 per cent of the vote in the Southern Highlands and in New Ireland, while the United Party maintained a strong support base in Enga and some other highlands regions.

component to its platform in the shape of economic nationalist and 'Christian-social' policies. Jackson and Hegarty estimated the total vote share for each party in 1982 as follows: Pangu 34 per cent, PPP 10 per cent, National Party 10 per cent, Melanesian Alliance 9 per cent, United Party 7 per cent, Ted Diro's Papua New Guinea Independent Group 7 per cent, others 2 per cent, independents 21 per cent (Jackson and Hegarty 1983:335).

At the 1987 election, the electoral commissioner for the first time attempted to identify candidates by their party affiliation wherever possible—a difficult task where some parties endorsed multiple candidates in a single seat or where candidates claimed a party allegiance which was not necessarily shared by the powers-that-be of the party itself. Nonetheless, for the 1987, 1992 and 1997 elections the Electoral Commission has published data on both party allegiance and overall levels of party support. When combined with the estimates of total vote share from the 1977 and 1982 elections, this enables us to compare the percentage of votes gained by each party and by independent candidates, and in most cases their raw vote totals as well, for all Papua New Guinea elections since independence. It must be emphasized, however, that this type of information can be quite deceptive when attempting to analyse Papua New Guinea electoral politics, as it can give the impression that some kind of meaningful party system exists, when in reality the data is simply the combined total of each party-endorsed candidate's vote in each seat tallied up and presented, as far as possible, as some sort of national party vote figure. National factors and candidates' party allegiance, while not necessarily irrelevant, are often of extremely limited importance. Mindful of this caveat, the following table presents an indication of party seat and vote shares for each election since independence in 1975.

Table 2.4: Party vote totals and percentages 1977-1997

PARTY	1977		1982		1987		1992		1997	
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
Pangu	na	35	na	34	408,082	14.9	294,738	9.3	237,028	5.3
PPP	na	15	na	10	168,280	6.4	90,465	2.9	288,634	6.5
NP	-	2	na	10	135,761	5.0	26,303	0.8	16,009	0.4
MA	-	-	na	9	153,611	5.6	134,903	4.3	81,303	1.8
UP	na	10	na	7	87,243	3.2	2,539	0.1	77,917	1.8
NatA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	288,965	6.5
PP	-	-	na	2	34,636	1.3	-	-	-	-
IG	-	-	na	7	-	-	-	-	-	-
Country	na	3	-	-	10,743	0.4	18,646	0.6	-	-
PB	na	5	-	-	17,122	0.6	-	-	-	-
PDM	-	-	-	-	298,715	10.9	247,379	7.8	197,331	4.4
PAP	-	-	-	-	87,836	3.2	147,538	4.7	182,845	4.1
MIG	-	-	-	-	60,922	2.2	-	-	-	-
Lna	-	-	-	-	132,001	4.8	68,188	2.2	-	-
Others	-	-	-	1	19,803	0.7	134,972	4.2	351,347	7.9
Indep.	-	30	na	21	1,117,635	40.9	1,994,132	63.1	2,738,520	61.4
TOTAL	na	100	na	100	2.732,390	100	3,159,803	100	4,459,899	100

Note: some totals add to over 100% due to rounding.
Source: 1977: author's estimates as detailed in text; 1982: Jackson and Hegarty 1983; 1987 and 1992: Saffu 1996a (note that Saffu 1996a misstates Pangu's 1992 total as 408802); 1997: Electoral Commissioner 1997.
Key: Pangu = Pangu Pati; PPP = Peoples Progress Party; NP = National Party; MA = Melanesian Alliance; NatA = National Alliance; UP = United Party; PP = Papua Party; IG = PNG Independent Group; CP = Country

Party; PB = Papua Besena; PDM = Peoples Democratic Movement; PAP = Peoples Action Party; MIG = Morobe Independent Group; LNA = League for National Advancement; Indep. = Independents.
Na = not available

The most striking conclusion from these figures is how dramatically Papua New Guinea deviates from the precepts of 'Duverger's law' that 'the plurality method tends to lead to a two-party system' (Duverger 1984), or more generalized formulations that 'the plurality rule corresponds to a low number of parties' (Taagepera and Shugart 1989:84). Even at the height of 'party strength' in Papua New Guinea in 1982, Papua New Guinea had over six 'effective' electoral parties, and their number has risen at the same time as the salience of party has decreased.[13] Not only has Papua New Guinea never had anything approaching a two-party system, but since its adoption of first-past-the-post electoral laws it seems to be heading in the other direction, towards increasing party system fragmentation and ultimately, perhaps, dissolution.

Since 1986, six parties (Pangu, PDM, PPP, MA, PAP and National) have formed the core of two opposing coalitions in parliament (Saffu 1996b:29). But their importance and influence has been steadily decreasing. In 1987, their combined vote share was 46 per cent, winning 73 seats in parliament. By 1992 their share of the vote was down to only 30 per cent, while still managing to win 64 parliamentary seats. By 1997, however, these 'core' parties of the political system had become almost irrelevant, winning just 22 per cent of the votes and less than half the seats (51) between them. At the same time, other parties have disappeared altogether and new parties arisen: between 1992 and 1997, the League for National Advancement, Papua Party, Papua Besena and others virtually disappeared, while two new parties—the National Alliance and the Peoples National Congress—emerged as potential forces. The ephemeralism of political organizations in Papua New Guinea is, according to Saffu, 'a reminder of a strong tendency to political fragmentation in Papua New Guinea, as if in imitation of the marked segmentation of Papua New Guinea social structures' (*ibid.*:31).

Executive instability

The combination of Papua New Guinea's fluid multi-party system and its majoritarian political institutions provides a dramatic illustration of a parliament which actually behaves in accordance with the oft-cited but rarely observed doctrine of 'parliamentary supremacy'. This doctrine holds that, in a system of parliamentary government, the executive is responsible to the legislature, and is dependent upon the legislature's support for its continuation in office. The rise of disciplined political parties in the first half of this century (and the widespread acceptance that functioning parties are an essential element of a functioning democracy) has seen this doctrine replaced by a more accurate 'decline of parliaments' thesis in most countries, as disciplined party voting has effectively transferred real control of the executive from the legislature to the party organization (Loewenberg 1971).

In Papua New Guinea, by contrast, the weakness of political parties and the willingness of elected members to switch from one party to another means that the executive really is beholden to the backbench. The National Parliament is elected for a five-year term, but the government may be removed by a 'constructive' vote of no-confidence and replaced without the need for an

[13] As measured by the Laakso-Taagepera index (see Laakso and Taagepera 1979).

election. While in theory early elections can be called by a majority vote of the parliament (or automatically following a successful no-confidence vote in the final year before a scheduled election), in practice Papua New Guinea parliamentary terms are rigidly fixed. The high levels of incumbent rejection noted earlier is also important here: the most recent elections in 1997 saw 52 per cent of Papua New Guinea's parliamentarians failing to be re-elected, including most of the previous cabinet. This pattern means that the National Parliament is most unlikely to ever voluntarily dissolve itself.

In 1974 the Constitutional Planning Commission recommended that 'constructive' votes of no-confidence (i.e. where an alternative prime minister is nominated) should be constitutionally guaranteed (CPC 1974:7/6). No-confidence motions have since become a feature of Papua New Guinea parliamentary politics. To date *every* elected government since independence has been deposed on the floor of parliament without reference to an election. The constitution provides that a no-confidence vote cannot, however, be used to depose a government in the final year of a parliamentary term, and a further constitutional amendment in 1991 extended from six to eighteen months the 'grace' period a new government has from no-confidence votes—effectively leaving the middle two and a half years of any parliamentary term as a potential danger time. Parliamentary sittings thus tend to be minimized in frequency and duration, and much of the legislative program paralysed, during this two and a half year danger period.

Table 2.5 details the changes of executive in Papua New Guinea since independence.

Table 2.5: Changes of prime minister in Papua New Guinea, 1975-1997

Year	*Previous prime minister*	New prime minister	Reason for change
1975	-	Michael Somare	Independence
1977	Somare retains Prime Ministership after General Election		
1980	Michael Somare	Julius Chan	No-confidence vote
1982	Julius Chan	Michael Somare	General election
1985	Michael Somare	Paias Wingti	No-confidence vote
1987	Wingti retains Prime Ministership after General Election		
1988	Paias Wingti	Rabbie Namaliu	No-confidence vote
1992	Rabbie Namaliu	Paias Wingti	General Election
1994	Paias Wingti	Julius Chan	Judicial decision
1997	Julius Chan	Bill Skate	General Election

Part of this executive instability relates to the way in which parliamentary coalitions are put together by the leading political actors after each general election. The weakness of Papua New Guinea's party system and the common ideology of almost all participants results in potential leaders engaging in frantic post-election tussles for commitments of loyalty from newly elected members, in the hope of being able to piece together a parliamentary majority. All members, not just the small parties and independents, are targeted as potential allies. Inducements are offered in return for support, and in some cases members are 'locked' in remote resorts or hotel rooms until they have given guarantees of loyalty (hence the usual reference to post-election meetings of potential coalition partners as 'lock-ups'). A 1991 reduction in the period between the return of election writs and the first meeting of parliament from twenty-one to seven days, intended to reduce tension and instability in the post-election period, has had little apparent impact. The

requirement that parliament meet within one week of the return of writs did not appear to alter the frantic bargaining for support that has always been a feature of the post-election scene in Papua New Guinea: Standish reported that following the 1992 election, a period of 'intense politicking followed the poll, in which helicopters plucked winners to 'lockups' in isolated resorts before Parliament convened' (Standish 1993:212).

Party-hopping

The extent of post-election 'party-hopping' is another example of the inherent weakness of the Papua New Guinea party system. A distinctive feature of Papua New Guinea's parliamentary politics is the willingness of members who stand for office under the endorsement of one party to join another party once elected to parliament—usually in return for a ministry or some other financial inducement. The phenomenon of party hopping, as it is known in Papua New Guinea, is not unknown elsewhere (there have been several recent examples in Australia, India, the United Kingdom and other established Westminster systems), but has reached unusually high levels in Papua New Guinea, where the incidence of MPs changing their party endorsement is so widespread as to seriously undermine executive government. Every post-independence government has been formed and reshaped by 'the numbers game' of MPs changing allegiances:

> A great part of the time of the prime minister is spent on managing the coalition, which is constantly threatened by competition for ministerial office among parliamentarians and given wide rein by the rules whereby a vote of no confidence leads to a change of government and not to the dissolution of parliament. Collective responsibility is difficult to maintain in these circumstances, especially when coalitions are based not on common policies but on an interest in the perks of power. Political stability is constantly threatened, for at the first whisper of a conspiracy towards a vote of no confidence, normal executive and legislative functions are immobilized, as the prime ministers and their rivals go about mustering parliamentary support. Corruption and patronage are the natural results, while the political system becomes discredited (Ghai 1990:329-30).

Party-hopping is also strongly connected to wider questions of Papua New Guinea's political culture. There is little opprobrium attached to party-hopping in Papua New Guinea. Part of the reason for the unusually high level of inter-party mobility is that most constituents expect their member to put local interests before national ones. Oliver has noted that if an MP can improve his chance of becoming a minister, or simply enhances his access to patronage and influence, by joining the government benches, then whatever the element of personal advantage there may be in his action, he is widely seen as acting in the interests of his electoral supporters (Oliver 1989b:3).

While party-hopping is by no means restricted to the immediate post-election period, it is usually in this period, when the most intense 'horse-trading' for support takes place, that changes of party allegiance are at their most frantic. This allows us to compare official records of pre-election party allegiance from the Electoral Commission with post-election voting patterns in parliament in order to measure the extent of movement from one party to another with more accuracy during the period from the return of election writs to the first sitting of parliament, when a new prime minister is chosen. Table 2 6 therefore gives an indication of the extent of party hopping in this period for each election since 1977.

Table 2.6: Party strength at return of election writs and first sitting of parliament 1977-1997

	Pangu	PPP	NP	MA	UP	PP	IG	PB	PDM	PAP	MIG	LNA	CP	Oth.	Indep.	Total
1977																
election	38	20	1	-	27	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	1	-	14	108*
parliament	40	20	2	-	24	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	0	5	11	108*
1982																
election	50	14	13	8	9	3	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	108*
parliament	61	13	19	6	6	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	108*
1987																
election	26	5	12	7	1	3	-	-	17	6	4	3	-	-	22	106*
parliament	27	10	10	7	2	3	-	-	26	14	4	3	-	-	-	106*
1992																
election	20	8	2	7	-	-	-	-	15	12	-	4	-	2	39	109
parliament	22	10	2	9	-	-	-	-	15	13	-	5	-	3	30	109
1997																
election	15	16	-	4	3	-	-	-	8	5	-	-	-	22	36	109
parliament	13	16	1	5	3	-	-	-	8	4	-	-	-	23	36	109

* The election for one seat in 1977 and 1982 and three seats in 1987 were postponed due to the death of candidates during the campaign period.
Source: 1977: Hegarty 1983a and Premdas 1978; 1982: King 1989; 1987: Oliver 1989a; 1992: Saffu 1996a; 1997: Electoral Commissioner 1997 and *The Independent* 25 July 1997.
Key: as for Table 2.4.

The phenomenon of party-hopping is, like many other aspects of Papua New Guinea politics, primarily an indication of the weakness of Papua New Guinea's political institutions, particularly the party system. Party discipline cannot be imposed solely from above. It needs to be representative of an authentic differentiation between opposing political forces if it is to act as a motivating force for party members and political representatives alike. A political sphere in which party-identification factors are largely irrelevant to voting choice is one in which the coherence and stability of parties will be difficult to sustain. Parties have a very specific purpose in most political systems. Like other types of social movements, they are agents for common interests to meet and provide a forum for organised social activity. But unlike social movements, political parties typically have one over-riding defining objective: to have their endorsed members elected to parliament. The prevalence of party-hopping is thus primarily a consequence of the very weakness of Papua New Guinea parties; and, in one of the frequent catch-22 situations of Papua New Guinea politics, each individual act of party-hopping works to further undermine both the influence of existing political parties, and the concept of a party system itself.

Turnout levels

Turnout levels of voters in Papua New Guinea are higher than those of many established democracies and are often cited as evidence of the health and strongly participatory nature of Papua New Guinea democracy. Lijphart has argued that 'turnout can be regarded as a measure of the quality of the democracy', and if this is the case then Papua New Guinea elections are indicative of a healthy democracy (Lijphart 1992:24). Certainly, turnout levels are a good indication of the level of interest in an election on the part of voters, and of the legitimacy they

accord to such an exercise. But they can also be evidence of other factors at work—compulsion, for example. Griffin (1997:76) claims that Papua New Guinea 'has one of the highest voting turnouts in the world' for a voluntary voting system. Examination of the comparative evidence does suggest that, if we look at the level of voter turnout in Papua New Guinea compared to its eligible population, rather than just the figures based on the electoral roll, then political participation is extremely high at recent elections.

Papua New Guinea's first mass-suffrage elections in 1964 attracted a total turnout of 72 per cent of enrolled voters, but this figure was undoubtedly boosted by the clear similarity between the mobile electoral patrols and the well-established (and compulsory) census patrols: many electors considered polling merely another prescribed exercise. A number of officials deliberately avoided disabusing electors of the widely-held belief that voting was in fact compulsory. In 1968, the official turnout dropped to 63 per cent—still a reasonable level, but again boosted by the near 100 per cent turnout field officers extracted in some villages. On the other hand, turnout in most areas fell below the 1964 levels—perhaps because of the growing understanding that voting was voluntary, perhaps also because the promises and unrealistic expectations raised by some candidates at the first elections had not been fulfilled. The official report speaks of voter 'disillusionment' and 'bewilderment', with the chief electoral officer warning that the declining turnout could be a trend:

> Whatever the reason may be the fact remains that there is a drop in voting of some 10% when comparing the 1964 to the 1968 elections. I would suggest that some serious thought be given to this problem before the 1972 General Election. If steps are not taken to alleviate the present situation I have no hesitation in prognosticating a further drop in voting percentages in 1972 (Chief Electoral Officer 1968: 31).

Despite predictions to the contrary by the chief electoral officer immediately prior to the 1972 elections (Stone 1976c: 529), this prognostication proved correct: in 1972 turnout dropped to its lowest level, officially measured at 60 per cent (Chief Electoral Officer 1973: 31). But there were considerable discrepancies: the Mt Wilhelm electorate in Chimbu province recorded a turnout of only 32 per cent; Poroma-Kutubu in the Southern Highlands achieved a 90 per cent turnout. The real differences were along regional lines, with most highlands electorates recording above-average turnout levels, perhaps reflecting 'the continued influence of district administration officials in getting voters to the polls', as well as the higher level of contestation for highlands seats (Stone 1976c: 530). Turnout in much of the rest of the country was recorded to be around the 50 per cent mark—indicative, perhaps, of the quality of the electoral rolls as much as any genuine measure of participation.

Turnout since 1972 has become increasingly difficult to measure with any confidence. Figures for the 1977 election put total turnout at between 62 and 68.9 per cent—a turnaround from the lows of 1972 (Hegarty 1983b:14; Electoral Commissioner 1987:5). No election report was ever released after the 1982 elections, which even the Electoral Commission has admitted were hampered by 'dubious' electoral rolls which contained massive duplications (Electoral Commissioner 1987:5). No turnout figures have been published by the Electoral Commission for the 1992 election, but the electoral commissioner has given a rate of 82.6 per cent (*Interview*, Reuben Kaiulo, Electoral Commissoner, 23 July 1996). The electoral commissioner's report on the 1997 elections estimates turnout at 66 per cent, but argues that this figure substantially

understates the actual rate due to problems with the electoral roll (Electoral Commissioner 1997:11-12). [The Electoral Commissioner's 1997 report is reproduced below.]

As Table 2.7 indicates, these official figures have almost certainly underestimated voter turnout in Papua New Guinea due to the widespread presence of duplications on the electoral roll. The variation between the official and 'estimated' turnout rates for the 1997 election is a case in point: while the official turnout was 66 per cent, on the basis of the estimated voting age population voter turnout was an extraordinary 98.7 per cent.[14] The table gives several estimates of turnout at all Papua New Guinea elections to date. The first column is the year each election has been held. The second column is an estimate of the total voting age population at each election (that is, the total number of persons eligible to enrol). This information was calculated from Papua New Guinea census data and from United Nations estimates of Papua New Guinea's population over eighteen years of age. The third column is the total number of enrolled voters at each election, as published in the official election reports or, in the case of the 1982 and 1987 figures, as estimated by informed commentators from official sources (Wolfers and Regan 1988: Appendix 3). The fourth column is the total number of votes cast at each election, including informal votes, section votes, absentee votes and postal votes.[15] The fifth column is the turnout percentage based on the figures in columns three and four—that is, the total number of votes cast as a straight percentage of the total number of enrolled voters. The sixth column is this same statistic as a percentage of the estimated voting age population. The final column is the official turnout figure published for each election.

If we calculate turnout as a percentage of the total voting age population, which is widely accepted as the most accurate comparative measure (IDEA 1997:10), then Papua New Guinea's average real turnout since independence, at approximately 69 per cent (or 81 per cent if the 1997 figure is included), is high by world standards. In fact, amongst comparable developing-world democracies of India, Jamaica, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Trinidad and Tobago, Papua New Guinea has easily the highest turnout rates (see Weiner 1987). If these figures are correct, they raise several interesting questions: why did participation rates dip sharply in 1968 and again in 1972 before recovering for the first post-independence elections in 1977? Why have turnout rates continued to rise since then? And why are participation rates higher in Papua New Guinea than in many similar countries?

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[14] For which there is certainly evidence from some highlands electorates. See 'Democracy without taste', *The Independent* 25 July 1997.

[15] These separate categories were copied into the OLNE directly from the Australian electoral law. Prior to its repeal in 1991, section 141 of the OLNE enabled qualified electors whose names were omitted from the electoral roll due to official error to make a declaration vote. In practice, this entailed any persons who claimed that their names had been erroneously left off the roll swearing to officials that they were over 18 and had lived in the electorate for more than six months. This provision was widely believed to have been abused, especially by under-age electors, with some electorates recording over 50 per cent of their total votes as 'section' votes.

Table 2.7: Voter turnout in Papua New Guinea elections 1964-1997

Year	Voting age population	Enrolled voters	Total number of votes cast	Turnout as % of enrolled voters	Turnout as % of voting age population	Official turnout (%)
1964	1 113 530	1 028 339	743 489	72.3	66.7	72.3
1968	1 201 200	1 151 119*	734 118[a]	63.8	61.1	63
1972	1 341 600	1 386 845*	829 963	59.8	61.8	60
1977	1 561 832	1 607 635	970 172	65.6	67.5	68.9
1982	1 757 493	2 309 621	1 194 114	52.0	68.3	66.3
1987	1 820 120	1 843 128	1 355 477	76.0	77.0	72.9
1992	2 038 910	1 987 994	1 614 251	81.2	79.2	81.2
1997	2 272 626**	3 414 072	2 244 531	66.0	98.7	66.0

Sources: Turner and Hegarty 1987; Electoral Commissioner 1992, 1997.

* The 1968 and 1972 election reports give different enrolment figures for open and regional electorates. This is the open electorate data.

** Estimate by Institute for National Affairs, Port Moresby.

One reason for the trough of turnout levels in 1972 may be a matter of electoral law: in 1971 Papua New Guinea took the progressive step of reducing the voting age from 21 to 18 years—a reform that predated similar moves in many Western countries. The chief electoral officer estimated that such a move would increase the total number of eligible voters by approximately 225,000 people (Chief Electoral Officer 1973:11). It is likely that a large number of these newly eligible electors were unaware of their entitlement to vote, hence depressing overall turnout. The 1972 election report lamented that 'young people showed very little interest in the national election' and that their votes 'therefore made little difference to the results in key electorates' (*ibid.*:12). Anecdotal evidence also suggests that enrolment (which has always been technically compulsory, even if this has never been enforced) was conducted more effectively and accurately in the early elections.

The explanation behind the increasing and continually high turnout rates since independence is more problematic, especially considering the oft-heard view that the electorate in Papua New Guinea, as elsewhere, is cynical about the political process. The key would appear to be the clan or *wantok* system which sits at the heart of Papua New Guinea politics. This social structure facilitates ease of electoral mobilization: village-based polities provide relatively discrete units of electors which can be mobilized behind chosen candidates. It also results in the phenomenon of 'block voting': most electors do not approach voting as free agents, but as members of a clan, and can thus be relied upon to act as a group when it comes to casting their vote. Moreover, the clientelist style of Papua New Guinea politics, where voters are offered financial and other inducements by candidates to turn out and vote, provides a very real motivation for electors to be, and to be seen to be, fulfilling their side of the deal. Voting in Papua New Guinea, as elsewhere in the world, is a social act with often elaborate preludes and postscripts. As in so many other areas of Papua New Guinea electoral politics, then, institutional and social forces combine to produce unusual results.

Conclusion

Young states like Papua New Guinea face many impediments to nation-building: the need to tailor introduced political systems to the reality of their indigenous political cultures; the need to come to terms with the disparities between class, ethnic and regional groupings; the realities of geography and consequent pressures towards fragmentation or secession; the conflict between traditional and modern approaches to resource distribution; and the weakness of the state apparatus itself. In many ways, Papua New Guinea is an extreme example of what Migdal (1988) called a 'strong society, weak state', in which the strength and importance of traditional social forces far outstrips the capacity of the modern state. But paradoxically, the role of the state in Papua New Guinea is often more significant than in many 'developed' countries. Traditional Western conceptualizations of the state have tended to regard it ideally as a detached or neutral agent which constructs an arena for political competition through universally accepted legitimizing devices such as concepts of democracy, freedom of speech, the rule of law and the idea of citizenship. In developing countries like Papua New Guinea, however, these concepts are relatively unimportant in terms of mobilizing the consent of the governed. By contrast, the state plays an interventionist role via its centrality in controlling access to resources and in directly mediating conflict.

In Papua New Guinea, as in many other developing countries, access to the resources of the state is thus a crucial determinant of political action, as the state, not the market, is itself the primary instrument for accumulation of resources such as foreign aid and domestic revenue. Hence, there is a tendency to view the state as the main avenue for accessing wealth. The structure of state institutions is thus of importance not just in the political arena, but also in the wider arena of competition for goods, services and other resources. This in turn means that the struggle for control of the state is a game with much higher stakes than simply access to *political* power: it also holds out the promise of access to considerable financial resources which are effectively unattainable elsewhere.

But while the state is clearly forced into playing this role in Papua New Guinea, it is equally clearly incapable of delivering satisfactory outcomes to all players. As the stakes are raised, the capacity of the state to deliver acceptable outcomes decreases, because increasing numbers of actors are competing for the same rewards. Heightened competition means heightened divisions between competing actors, with a consequently sharpened delineation of clan, ethnic, linguistic and regional cleavages. This sharpened delineation tends, if anything, to reinforce the centrality of the state as a means of accessing wealth: some of the most hard-fought conflicts, such as election campaigns, are directly concerned with access to the state, thus reinforcing the message that the state is the key to power, prestige and resources, and encouraging more and more participants in the future.

The institutional structures which provide the means of access to the state are thus of crucial importance. In Papua New Guinea, the most effective means of access to the state is by being elected as a member of parliament. Because the structure of funding for infrastructure and other projects is often more closely aligned to individual MPs than the central bureaucracy—particularly via the Electoral Development Funds scheme and its replacement, the Rural Action Program—elected parliamentarians are often the central conduit for the distribution of large

amounts of public funds, especially in rural areas. This places additional pressure on the institutions of state which determine access to these parliamentary positions.

The primary institution which determines access to the parliamentary membership and additional perquisites such as ministerial office is, of course, the electoral system. So elections in Papua New Guinea have a dual role which makes them distinctive in comparative terms. Elections are also events which have a wider meaning in Papua New Guinea than the action of voting for candidates to the National Parliament. For many areas of Papua New Guinea, elections also provide one of the few 'nationalising' events in which citizens participate. In some remote areas, for example, the five-yearly cycle of candidate selection, campaigning and polling day may be one of the only times that they have an opportunity to interact with the state.[16] This combination of factors helps to explain the highly-charged focus on and competitive nature of elections in Papua New Guinea.

[16] I am indebted to Hank Nelson for this point.

3

SANDLINE, ELECTION 1997 AND THE FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT

Henry Ivarature

On 31 January 1997, the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and Sandline International secretly signed an agreement worth $US36 million for the latter company to eliminate rebels on the island of Bougainville, recapture the Panguna Copper Mine, and return control of the island to the government. This contract was to be undertaken together with the Special Forces Unit (SFU) of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF). News of this insidious agreement was exposed in the *Weekend Australian* (22 February 1997) and several days later, on 17 March 1997, the Commander of the PNGDF, Brigadier General Jerry Singirok unilaterally and publicly announced the termination of the contract. Singirok also called for the resignation of the prime minister, Sir Julius Chan, the deputy prime and minister for finance, Chris Haiveta, and the minister for defence, Mathias Ijape, accusing them of corruption and selling the sovereignty of the state. Papua New Guinea went through a political crisis which led to the 'stepping-aside' of the key ministers and the creation of a Commission of Inquiry chaired by Judge Warwick Andrew. The inquiry found no evidence to implicate the key players, who resumed their political roles, but the affair had economic, political and military implications for the country and its institutions (see Dinnen, May and Regan 1997; Dorney 1998; Ivarature 1998, and O'Callaghan 1999 for detailed examination of the affair). Here, I explore one aspect of the Sandline affair: whether Sandline had an impact on the 1997 election and, if so, what sort of impact.

The primary question is: did the controversy over the engagement of Sandline International have an impact on the election results of the government ministers who took the decision to hire them? I attempt to answer this question by examining the election results of the three principal politicians behind the affair—Sir Julius Chan, Chris Haiveta, and Mathias Ijape—and also some other politicians who became embroiled in the controversy. The latter include the former minister for mining and petroleum and MP for Henganofi, John Giheno, and the former governor of the National Capital District (NCD), Bill Skate. Giheno became acting prime minister following the decision by Sir Julius to step-aside as prime minister pending the enquiry, and he endured extreme pressure to have the terms of reference of the inquiry widened. Bill Skate, who became prime minister after the election, was among the first politicians to criticize the government for engaging 'mercenaries'. He is remembered for unsuccessfully introducing a motion in parliament to remove the then prime minister, Sir Julius Chan, from office and for reneging on his public pledge not to align his political party with the leaders or political parties that engaged Sandline International in forming a government.

I also include in the examination candidates who featured prominently in the crisis and who successfully used the issue to contest the election. They include Fr Robert Lak and Peti Lafanama. Fr Lak, who defeated the former governor of the Western Highlands Province (and one time prime minister) Paias Wingti, was endorsed by the non-government organization (NGO), Melanesian Solidarity Incorporated (MELSOL). MELSOL members played a major role in organising public demonstrations against the government's decision to engage Sandline International. Peti Lafanama was then the general secretary of MELSOL. He was an active and vocal antagonist during the crisis and was at the forefront of the demonstrations held in Port

Moresby. He easily won the Eastern Highlands Provincial electorate by defeating the incumbent MP, Aita Ivarato, to become the governor of that province. Like Bill Skate, Lak and Lafanama are renowned for their role in forming a government which included politicians they had severely castigated during the election campaign for engaging Sandline International. Skate, Lak and Lafanama have all been accused of betraying their supporters.

In attempting to address the question of whether Sandline affected the electoral demise or return of these politicians, I also argue that national issues play a significant role in the decisions of voters, but they can become irrelevant in the competition for power, including the period of intense lobbying to form government. In other words, national issues remain significant but are weighed down during the critical stages of lobbying and negotiations to form a government. My decision to select Sandline as an example of a national issue scarcely needs explanation. The issue emerged three months before the 1997 national election; it directly involved the PNGDF through its commander, whose action bordered on a military *coup d'état*. Importantly, it led to the sidelining of the prime minister, the deputy prime minister and the minister for defence, and the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry. It drew international attention from within the region and afar. It was a national issue which in other liberal democracies would have attracted considerable debate. But unlike other developed democracies where electoral choice is influenced by the issues at hand, national issues remain, at best, insignificant in Papua New Guinea elections. The Sandline affair had limited impact on the behaviour of voters in the 1997 national election, and little impact on the outcome.

My analysis examines each candidate in three stages. The first examines the campaign undertaken by these politicians, with regard to the issues and the challenges by contenders for the seat. The second stage examines the election results, including the counting of ballot boxes, to demonstrate the importance of the issue in the vote counting. The final stage discusses the period leading to the formation of government.

Election campaign

The campaign strategies of the candidates studied varied in two ways. The incumbent politicians who had been party to the decision to engage Sandline International naturally took a defensive position on the issue and proposed various solutions to the crisis on Bougainville. The candidates challenging them generally went on the offensive to question the motives for, and logic of, engaging Sandline. For example, the deputy prime minister, Chris Haiveta, told people at a rally in West New Britain Province on 10 June 1997 that:

> A Pangu-led government would continue to push for the outright purchase of the Panguna Copper Mine for the people of Bougainville and PNG (*Post-Courier* 11 June 1997).

As leader of the Pangu Pati, he was speaking at his first election rally since resuming duties as deputy prime minister. On the subject of Sandline, he insisted that the Sandline personnel were intended only to train PNGDF soldiers and to assist the PNGDF gain an advantage over the BRA so that the government could be in a strong position to negotiate with the BRA.

Haiveta was also critical of the role played by Australia in the Sandline crisis. He accused Australia of being responsible for the problems on Bougainville, and said that:

> The Australian government and an Australian company built the mine. ... The mining agreement favoured Australia. The suffering of the people of Bougainville and PNG is because of Australia. Australia does not want PNG to become a strong country. Whatever it can do to make sure PNG stays down it will. It has used the Sandline issue as an example to make sure we are bleeding every day, so that our people are not united (*Post-Courier* 11 June 1997).

The crisis on Bougainville, he added, had cost the government K1000 million and the lives of 200 soldiers (*Post-Courier* 11 June 1997). He did not mention the lives of Bougainvilleans that had been lost too.

Meanwhile, at around the same time, Singirok, who had been sacked as commander when Chan resumed office following the release of the Andrew Report, told a large crowd of people in Mount Hagen, Western Highlands Province 'that God used people like him to reveal the wrongs' (*Post-Courier* 11 June 1997). Further, he told the crowd he stood against the government to fight corruption. About 7000 people attended the rally, where he was hailed as the 'king of PNG' and carried around on the shoulders of the crowd. He received K1252.92 collected in a wheelbarrow appeal and K200 collected at the rally (*ibid.*). The people urged him to pursue the Sandline issue and bring the leaders responsible for it before the justice system. Singirok claimed his visit had nothing to do with politics but was merely an educational visit, but according to a journalist who covered the public gathering, Singirok was using MELSOL and its extensive grassroots network in the highlands provinces to gather support for candidates endorsed by MELSOL for the national election (*The National* 11 June 1997). In a clearly provocative political statement, Singirok issued several challenges to the people:

> I challenge the people of Papua New Guinea to use the 1997 elections to change the course of the nation. The power is with you, not with the politicians. If you can't decide the future of this nation for the next 21 years now, then forget Papua New Guinea, it will go to the dogs (*The National* 11 June 1997).

Among prominent people present at the public rally was Fr Robert Lak.

Singirok also toured Chimbu Province, accompanied by MELSOL candidate for the Chimbu regional seat, Anton Goiye. In Chimbu, his legal counsel, Peter Donigi, joined him to address people on the findings of the Sandline Inquiry. Donigi was reported to have told people who gathered at Waigar village, Ganigle, Kerowagi Station, and Kundiawa that the Inquiry did not investigate all aspects of the Sandline contract. Both Donigi and Singirok were prepared to pursue the matter in court if another inquiry was not established (*The National* 11 June 1997).

From Chimbu, Singirok went on to Goroka in the Eastern Highlands Province. Goroka was then the electorate of Mathias Ijape, and home of Peti Lafamana, the general secretary of MELSOL. Lafamana had been endorsed by MELSOL to challenge the incumbent for the Eastern Highlands Provincial electorate, Robert Atiyafa. Lafamana, Goiye and Lak were considered serious contenders for the electorates they contested because of their role during the Sandline crisis. According to one observer, Singirok's support for these MELSOL candidates created immense competition for the incumbent MPs of the electorates (*The National* 11 June 1997).

Sir Julius Chan

Sir Julius was born on 29 August 1939 on Tanga Island in New Ireland. Prior to entering politics in 1968 he was a co-operatives officer. In his first term as a member of the House of Assembly he was elected deputy speaker and vice-chairman of the Public Accounts Committee. In 1970 he was elected leader of the People's Progress Party and held the position until his demise in the 1997 national election. Sir Julius was twice prime minister, once as a result of a motion of no-confidence against Sir Michael Somare (11 March 1980), and in August 1994 after the judiciary found that the then prime minister, Paias Wingti, had erred when he suddenly resigned and was re-elected as prime minister. In 1985 Chan was appointed deputy prime minister and held the position until the Pangu Pati mastered a motion of no confidence in July 1988. He served as deputy opposition leader until the election in 1992, when he became deputy prime minister under Paias Wingti. He had held several senior ministerial positions, including one as the minister of finance and another as the minister of foreign affairs. In his term as a politician he was

embroiled in two major controversies. The first was the Placer Pacific share float issue, when as the minister of finance he purchased shares in the company; a commission of inquiry subsequently cleared him of any wrongdoing. The second was the Sandline contract.

Sir Julius was in the Western Highlands Province in June 1997, at the same time as Singirok. In his opinion, Singirok was 'a little soldier' who came up through the ranks. He was the fastest rising officer [in the PNGDF]—this was our mistake' (*Post-Courier* 11 June 1997). Sir Julius claimed that 'the people were not worried about Sandline' (*ibid.*). The inquiry, he claimed had cleared him and there was nothing for his political party to be worried about. On the weekend before people began to cast their votes, Sir Julius urged them to look beyond the events of the recent months [particularly, Sandline] and judge from what else had happened in Papua New Guinea (*Post-Courier* 13 June 1997). However, while Chan was campaigning in the Enga Province, the *Post-Courier* (11 June 1997) alleged that some people stoned his chartered helicopter. The prime minister was not far away from where the helicopter was parked but was unharmed. He denied the *Post-Courier*'s report of the attack (*ibid.*). According to *The National* (12 June 1997), the prime minister was caught in the crossfire of disputing parties.

If Sir Julius considered Singirok 'a little soldier' and that people did not worry about Sandline, he nevertheless faced immediate challenge in his own electorate of Namatanai in the New Ireland Province. The Sandline controversy, and reforms to the provincial government system, according to an observer, had negatively affected the image of the PPP in the province (*The National* 11 June 1997). Challenging Sir Julius on these two issues was his own maternal cousin Ephraim Apelis, a former lecturer at the University of Papua New Guinea and director of the Islands Regional Secretariat. The National Alliance led by Sir Michael Somare endorsed Apelis. Using the word 'change' as the motto for his campaign, Apelis argued that the people of Namatanai were 'ready and willing to support a change in political leadership' (*The National* 11 June 1997). The word 'change' for Apelis meant many things: 'It [meant] change in the leadership and change in ideologies and approach to developing Namatanai' (*ibid.*). According to Apelis, in the last thirty years, the people of Namatanai had developed the mentality that development and progress were forthcoming because of their support for Chan. The people, he argued, had over time become lazy by being spoon-fed and also had developed a handout mentality. He argued that the government should introduce schemes that involved the people. Apelis was speaking from his experience and observations from residing in the village for twelve months. He believed that an upset was on the cards (*The National* 11 June 1997).

Several weeks later, the *Post-Courier,* reported that Electoral Commission officials had placed a Rabaul-based Police Mobile Squad on alert, while preparations were being made to fly a group to Kavieng following reports of threats made against Sir Julius if he won the election (*Post-Courier* 26 June 1997). Some supporters of other candidates had threatened to instigate trouble. Electoral Commission officials chose not to dismiss the matter lightly because an electoral officer was allegedly assaulted by supporters of one candidate. Some men had attacked Tamalu Manseni, a candidate contesting the Kavieng Open Electorate (*ibid.*). But the report of trouble looming in Namatanai was dismissed by the returning officer for the electorate (*Post-Courier* 27 June 1997). As the counting of votes for Namatanai Open electorate proceeded, Sir Julius trailed behind Apelis.

The margin between Sir Julius and Apelis was wide enough to cause concern for the incumbent prime minister (*Post-Courier* 30 June 1997). On the first day of counting, with 21 out of the 47 ballot boxes counted, Sir Julius trailed Apelis by a margin of 1,185. According to the *Post-Courier* (30 June 1997), this was the first time Sir Julius had trailed another candidate in all the elections contested in Namatanai. Sir Julius continued to trail for much of the vote. Eventually, Apelis collected 7,969 votes against Sir Julius's 7,859 (*Post-Courier* 1 July 1997). Sir Julius collected votes from Tanga and Anir Island, whereas Apelis polled well in his home area of Sursurunga-Tanglamet, Kandas on the southern coast of New Ireland and Lak.

Apelis was born in 1953 at Warangansau village in the Sursurunga-Tanglamet area of New Ireland about 10 kilometers from Sir Julius's village of Huris. After graduating from the University of Papua New Guinea with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Education he worked as a World Bank consultant before joining the New Ireland Provincial Government as provincial secretary. He also obtained a Master of Education from the University of Hawaii in 1981 and undertook post-graduate studies at Macquarie University, Australia (*Post-Courier* 2 July 1997). From the provincial government he moved on to become director of the Islands Regional Secretariat. He contested the 1992 elections, and was runner-up to Sir Julius. As director of the Islands Regional Secretariat he was an advocate of greater autonomy for provincial governments—a motivating factor in his decision to contest the 1997 national election was the abolition of the second tier government.

Table 3.1: Voting Results for Namatanai Open Electorate

Candidate	Party Affiliation	Number of Votes	per cent of total votes cast
Ephraim Apelis	NA	7,969	37.6
Sir Julius Chan	PPP	7,859	37.0
Benard Amnol	Independent	3,298	15.5
John Miru	Independent	88	0.4
Ben Kavi	Independent	136	0.6
Ephraim Sukbat	Independent	1,470	6.9
		20,820	**100**

Source: *1997 National Parliament General Election Results*
Note: of 30,209 registered voters, only 69 per cent voted.

Sir Julius later admitted that the defeat surprised him (*Post-Courier* 2 July 1997). He believed he had done enough for his electorate to be returned by the constituents, especially in his home area (Sursurunga), where in fact he polled poorly. Indeed, most of his votes came from parts of the electorate where he admitted to doing very little. Electoral rejection by his own people, he conceded, was painful and humiliating. He identified two major factors for his downfall. First and foremost was the Sandline contract. Although he was cleared by the committee of inquiry, Chan believed the issue had created 'fear' among voters (*Post-Courier* 2 July 1997). However, according to PPP spokesman Sir Ken Trezise, Sandline had much less impact on the election in Namatanai than thought by many people, and he attributed Sir Julius's loss to local and parochial issues (*Post-Courier* 9 July 1997). The second factor identified by Sir Julius Chan involved local issues and tribal differences, on which he failed to elaborate (*Post-Courier* 2 July 1997). His duties as prime minister also contributed to the neglect of his constituents' needs and alienated him from them (*ibid.*).

An observer, Noah Kagai also contested the attribution to Sandline of a determining influence (*Post-Courier* 3 July 1997). Kagai, who was in Namatanai when Sir Julius arrived after 'stepping aside' as prime minister, witnessed a large crowd of supporters, including people from his clan and others as far away as central New Ireland, gathered at Namatanai to welcome the prime minister. According to Kagai, Sir Julius was mobbed by his supporters as soon as he disembarked from the government aircraft. Kagai states that Sir Julius's downfall was largely his own fault because he did not support the updating the common roll through a national population census and because he received poor advice from his campaign strategists (*ibid.*). Consequently, many eligible voters were excluded from the common roll. Moreover, Sir Julius complacently and perhaps arrogantly underestimated other candidates. Kagai claimed that Sir Julius had showed him a computerised list of eligible voters who supported him.

Apelis himself was a seasoned and experienced election campaigner, a man of immense standing, personal character and charm. With his distinguished contribution in the public service, he was not a contender to be brushed aside lightly.

Chris Haiveta

The former acting prime minister and Pangu Pati deputy leader John Giheno had said that Pangu's 'chances in the election had been affected by the Sandline issue' (*The National* 11 June 1997). Haiveta denied this, describing Giheno's assessment as 'unfounded and misleading'. Haiveta claimed that:

> Pangu [was] intact and ready for the election regardless of its leaders' involvement in Sandline. Sandline ha[d] no bearing on the party's chances in the elections. It is a non-issue within the party and among our supporters and only the coming election will prove that. On the other hand, I have been cleared by the Commission of Inquiry of ... corruption and it is unfair to make any misleading assumptions. The fact remains that Sandline has no bearing on the election chances of Pangu and we are looking forward to coming home and forming the new government with or without Giheno (*The National* 11 June 1997).

Haiveta identified the National Party as a potential coalition partner with which to form the next government (*Post-Courier* 12 June 1997). Sir Julius, however, despite Pangu's disinterest and lack of obligation to continue the coalition with the PPP, maintained some hope of a continued relationship (*ibid.*). He could not visualise PPP in coalition with an alternative political group; indeed, he considered the partnership with Pangu as the 'best combination ever'.

Haiveta also indicated his intention to contest the position of prime minister. In casting his vote at his village in the Gulf Province, he was absolutely confident about retaining the Gulf Provincial, saying,

> I have done my apprenticeship since I came into Parliament and more so in my capacity as deputy prime minister and minister for Finance. With a now-defined understanding of the mechanics of governance I believe I am ready to take on the role of prime minister. However, that would depend on the wishes of the Pangu Pati caucus (*Post-Courier* 30 June 1997).

In fact, the party had already nominated him for the job. He was however critical of the different polling and counting dates, given the intense lobbying by party leaders who had been declared ahead of others (*Post-Courier* 30 June 1997). The example he cited was the National Capital District, where the leader of the Peoples' National Congress, Bill Skate, had been declared early and enjoyed an unfair advantage in lobbying to form government ahead of others who had to await their polling results.

Haiveta began poorly at the initial stage of counting, but unlike Wingti and Chan he surged ahead and maintained his lead throughout (*Post-Courier* 1 July 1997). He finished more than 3,000 votes ahead of the nearest candidate, Lesley Mark, who polled 4,623 votes (*The National* 7 July 1997). After the results were declared, Haiveta reaffirmed his intention to contest the prime ministership (*Post-Courier* 7 July 1997). Clearly confident after a resounding victory, he said:

> The Pangu Pati and I as leader are confident of playing the leading role in the new government. My members stand firm. We are intact and are consolidating our numbers, ready to form a government led by the young but learned and experienced (*Post-Courier* 7 July 1997).

Table 3.2: Voting Results for Gulf Provincial Electorate

Candidate	Party Affiliation	Number of Votes	per cent of total votes cast
Gerard A. Malaha	Independent	984	2.6
Gabriel Karahure	CDP	180	0.5
Samuel Y. Kamiaeto	PNC	4,449	11.9
Daniel K. Meara	Independent	1,409	3.8
Sarea Soi	PRAP	2,822	7.6
Marcellus T. Winaio	PAP	1,383	3.7
Jack L.M. Susu	Independent	656	1.8
Amos Toua	Independent	1,010	2.7
Ope Oeaka	PAP	1,709	4.6
Lama Haia	Independent	1,018	2.7
Jacob Kairi	NA	2,514	6.7
Lemek Kum	Independent	1,228	3.3
Albert M. Hailai	PDM	728	2.0
Donald Aiseapo	Independent	315	0.8
Soloi Hareavila	Independent	969	2.6
Akia Kairi	Independent	2,888	7.8
Christpher S. Haiveta	Pangu Pati	8,010	21.5
Dominic Evere	MA	436	1.2
Lesley Mark	Independent	4,623	12.4
		37,331	

Source: *1997 National Parliament General Election Results*
Note: of 65,312 registered voters only 57 per cent voted.

Former prime minister Sir Rabbie Namaliu dismissed speculation of a Pangu leadership challenge and the *Post-Courier*'s editorial disapproved of Haiveta's political aspirations, especially in view of Sandline, and advanced its position in an editorial:

> *Choice of PM is critical.* The people of Gulf Province have expressed confidence in their Regional Member, Chris Haiveta, by re-electing him for a second term in the National Parliament. Mr. Haiveta, the deputy prime minister and minister for Finance in the outgoing Chan/Haiveta government, has acknowledged that by saying that he is looking forward to forming a new government led by himself. Papua New Guinea needs new leaders who will ensure there is honesty and integrity in government at all levels. The Chan/Haiveta government is responsible for events of the past few months that almost brought this nation to its knees over the hiring of Sandline mercenaries. It also almost made the country bankrupt when K18 million of a K36 million fee for Sandline was paid out, nearly crippling the whole public service. The Sandline Commission of Inquiry report was highly critical of Mr. Haiveta's evidence, part of which it rejected as untruthful. This country needs an honest prime minister, a leader who can be trusted and whose words the people will accept as truthful, a person of the highest personal integrity. Mr. Haiveta has the experience in government at the highest levels, but that is not enough for him to be prime minister given his performance before the Sandline Commission of Inquiry. If Pangu is to form the next government and earn the people's trust and confidence, then it should nominate someone other than Mr. Haiveta as leader. Kokopo MP and former prime minister, Sir Rabbie Namaliu, is the best candidate among the rank and file of the Pangu MPs. Sir Rabbie possesses the finest qualities of leadership—a man of wisdom, with vast experience and enjoys wide support in all sectors of the

> community for his honesty and integrity. He is the kind of leader the nation needs at this critical time (*Post-Courier* 7 July 1997).

Haiveta responded immediately, describing the editorial as a deliberate attempt to 'hijack and pre-empt' the decisions of elected politicians in determining the formation of government (*Post-Courier* 8 July 1997). He contended that the newspaper had overstepped its role and responsibilities by publicly expressing its preference for individuals who would lead the country. The whole issue, he argued, should be forgotten (*Post-Courier* 9 July 1997). His re-election contradicted the assumption that Sandline would be a determining factor in his popularity in the Gulf Province, and in the leadership of Pangu Pati.

Bill Skate

The early likely contenders for the post of prime minister were seen to be Chan, Wingti and Sir Michael Somare. However, early results for the Western Highlands Provincial electorate suggested the imminent demise of Wingti, and saw a convincing victory for the governor of the National Capital District and leader of the PNC, Bill Skate (*Post-Courier* 23 June 1997). Before the election, Skate had proposed forming a partnership with Wingti, but this fell through when the latter lost (see below).

Having successfully defended the NCD electorate by polling 30.9 per cent of the 67,576 formal votes cast, Skate publicly announced his intention to stand for the position of prime minister:

> We cannot have the same old prime ministers trying to take the lead. We need new vision and a new dream, with new blood with new ideas. I want to work with any political party except—I cannot work with Sir Julius Chan nor can I work with Chris Haiveta. If they are still leaders of PPP and Pangu ... then I have my reservations (*Post-Courier* 23 June 1997).

Skate anticipated support from Wingti's People's Democratic Movement (PDM), and from other independent candidates, to form the next government.

Paias Wingti

Paias Wingti entered parliament in 1977 as the MP for Mount Hagen Open electorate and was returned again in the 1982 election. In 1987 he shifted to the Western Highlands Provincial electorate which he won by large margins in 1987 and 1992. He was a minister, prime minister, leader of the opposition, and leader of the PDM before his defeat in 1997.

Wingti's electoral demise, according to Frank Kolma, was of his own making (*The National* 24 June 1997). First, as leader of the opposition in 1991 Wingti played a role in initiating an Ombudsman Commission investigation of Paul Pora, then the MP for Mount Hagen Open. Wingti tabled in parliament documents which purportedly contained evidence involving Pora, as minister for finance, in a number of shady deals with a consultancy firm to bring millions of kina from Chinese sources into Papua New Guinea. The Ombudsman Commission subsequently found that Pora had failed to submit his annual returns required under the Leadership Code. Consequently, a Leadership Tribunal was convened, but after a protracted period it dropped all the major charges. However, Pora was found guilty on minor charges for failing to lodge his annual returns with the Ombudsman Commission. According to Kolma, the gruelling and humiliating experience of the Leadership Tribunal angered the people of Mount Hagen Open, who blamed Wingti for putting their MP through so much trouble (*ibid.*). Both Wingti and Pora have a substantial support base in the Mount Hagen Open electorate; Wingti's support is derived from the large Jiga and Moge tribes and Pora's from the small Yamuga tribe. Although the electorate has been Wingti's primary stronghold, the Moge and Jiga had been attracted by Pora's humble and down-to-earth character (*ibid.*).

Table 3.3: Voting results for NCD Provincial Electorate

Candidates	Party Affiliation	*Number of Votes*	per cent of total votes cast
Mary Mase Sapak	Independent	322	0.5
Philomena Kassman	Independent	1,527	2.2
Gumuna S Wari	Independent	5,090	7.4
Joseph C Polume	CDP	775	1.1
John Gundu	PNGF	722	1.1
Afuti Jonathan	Independent	1,179	1.7
Merea Sevese Navuru	Independent	682	1.0
Peter Uriligibe	Independent	711	1.0
Margaret Loko	Independent	1,970	2.9
Frank John Igo	Independent	990	1.4
Sondiong Bagago	Independent	483	0.7
Loani Ravu Henao	Independent	7,013	10.2
Paul Masta	PRAP	896	1.3
Lawrence B. Titimur	Independent	2,518	3.7
Silas James	Independent	1,684	2.5
Paul Mondia	MLP	1,995	2.9
Ronom Kopon	Independent	170	0.2
Tau Peruka	Independent	1,337	1.9
Casper K. Wollom	Independent	5,870	8.6
Camillus Narakobi	MA	1,973	2.9
Hela Tengere	Independent	2,181	3.2
Josuha Kari	Independent	419	0.6
Gary M. Paya	Independent	741	1.0
Bill Skate	PNC	21,219	30.9
Jimmy Misina Varika	PP	5,109	7.5
		67,576	

Source: *1997 National Parliament General Election Results*
Note: of 125,296 registered voters, only 54 per cent voted.

Secondly, Wingti chose Michael Mel to contest the Mount Hagen Open electorate against Pora, ahead of other candidates from the Hagen area. Mel, the founding president of the National Party (NP) and MP for Anglip-South Waghi, had fallen out with Pora in 1988 and joined Wingti's PDM as minister for finance. Pora remained with the opposition, despite the National Party having secured three ministries. During a motion-of-no-confidence vote of 4 July 1988, Pora sided with Sir Rabbie Namaliu and ousted Wingti together with Mel. Mel subsequently lost the Anglimp-South Waghi Open electorate in the 1992 election. Kolma argues that when Wingti selected Mel to contest the Mount Hagen open electorate in the 1997 election 'that was adding salt to injury for Mr. Pora and his supporters' and Wingti 'was on slippery ground from then on' (*ibid.*).

Thirdly, Wingti's single-minded determination to implement provincial government reforms in 1995 also contributed to his demise. Cost-saving measures Wingti undertook as governor included the dismissal of 800 provincial government employees, the abolition of several provincial government departments, the withdrawal of government vehicles, and the streamlining of financial procedures. Among the people Wingti's actions displaced were two former premiers and the deputy governor Lucas Roika. Roika was a key figure in the National Party and a fellow Moge tribesman. He, along with another former premier (also a member of the National Party) challenged Wingti for the Western Highlands Provincial electorate. Other

prominent challengers included David Opa, James Kond and Paulus Kunai, who split the votes from Tambul, Nelilyer and Mount Hagen respectively (*ibid.*). David Opa, from Tambul, collected over 30,000 votes while James Kond, Paulus Kunai and Lucas Roika between them collected over 43,000 votes.

Fourthly, according to Kolma, Wingti as prime minister was largely responsible for a series of financial and economic crises that nearly ruined the country during 1992 and 1993. Although deals such as the Cairns Conservatory and the Sandline contract did not directly involve Wingti, they were initiated during his leadership (*ibid.*).

Finally, Wingti's own downfall, according to Kolma, was his overconfidence. Naively assuming that his ten year programs for education and road infrastructure were in themselves sufficient to secure another term in parliament, Wingti failed to venture out and campaign. Unlike Wingti, the candidate who led for most of the count, Thomas Nolonga Amuk had begun his election campaign soon after the 1992 election. Amuk, who had contested the last four elections, was reported to have walked to every electorate in the Western Highlands Province. His ability to speak several highlands languages enabled him to talk to people of different language groups and he collected votes from all electorates. The winner, Fr Robert Lak, on the other hand, had presented a weekly program on Radio Western Highlands until the radio station was closed down, allegedly by Wingti (*Post-Courier* 25 June 1997).

At about 9.00 am on 25 June 1997, Fr Lak was declared winner of the Western Highlands Provincial electorate. The declaration, however, came two hours after Wingti convened a press conference to concede his defeat (*The National* 25 June 1997). Wingti told the press conference that his parliamentary career was over the moment the first ballot box was counted. In his own words:

> Right from the beginning—as soon as the first box was counted, I knew I was in trouble as in previous elections, if you know my history, I am always ahead and by a big margin (from the first count) ... I put this [the loss] down to not having campaigned. I thought [the] Western Highlands people knew me for 20 years so I did not go out to the villages. I think that was the backlash because people did not see my face. That's why the people have decided that a new Member should represent them (*Post-Courier* 26 June 1997).

Fr Lak polled 45,782 votes, and Thomas Amuk 41,410 votes; Wingti followed with 38,831 votes (*The National* 25 June 1997). Fr Lak, a Roman Catholic priest for seventeen years had campaigned on the rights of the people as enshrined in the constitution, and for open, honest and transparent government—key words during the Sandline crisis. Like Thomas Amuk, he had toured the entire Western Highlands Province, though unlike Amuk who travelled by passenger motor vehicles and on foot, he relied on his small Suzuki.

John Giheno

The MP for Henganofi Open electorate (and former acting prime minister and minister for mining and petroleum), John Giheno polled poorly when counting of the ballot boxes began (*Post-Courier* 26 June 1997). He later surged to the lead with 1,888 votes after 22 of the 67 ballot boxes were counted, but failed to maintain the lead and by 26 June had dropped to second place with 2174 votes. Viviso Seravo, a PDM candidate, led with 3216 votes (*Post-Courier* 27 June 1997). Seravo eventually won the election with a total of 6,154 votes. Robert Atiyafa polled second with 2,769 votes, and Giheno came third with 2,592 (*Post-Courier* 30 June 1997).

It is difficult to attribute Giheno's loss to Sandline alone. Giheno won the Henganofi Open electorate as a result of an appeal in the Court of Disputed Returns in 1992. It seems likely that competition was simply too stiff for him in 1997.

Table 3.4: Voting results for Western Highlands Provincial Electorate

Candidates	**Party Affiliation**	*Number of Votes*	**per cent of total votes cast**
Uncle Andrew Tai	Independent	752	0.3
Sandy Kagl	Independent	5,828	2.4
Paias Wingti	PDM	38,831	16.2
William Wii	Independent	2,357	1.0
Paulus K. Kunai	Independent	12,715	5.3
John Kombati	Independent	957	0.4
Kagul Koroka	Independent	6,313	2.6
Robert Enga	Independent	324	0.1
Lucas Roika	Independent	7,277	3.0
James Kond	Independent	23,350	9.8
Thomas A. Amuk	Independent	41,410	17.3
David Opa	Independent	30,123	12.6
Philip Kapal	Pangu Pati	16,257	6.8
Nicholas R. Kuman	Independent	7,390	3.0
Fr Robert Lak	Independent	45,782	19.1
		239,666	

Source: *1997 National Parliament General Election Results*
Note: of 305,844 registered voters only 78 per cent voted.

Mathias Ijape

Ijape, the member for Goroka Open since 1987 and minister for defence in 1997, was one of the three principal politicians involved in the Sandline contract. He too performed poorly in the early counting: after 39 of the 164 ballot boxes were counted, Ijape had only 88 votes (*Post-Courier* 26 June 1997). The eventual winner was Henry Iyapo Smith, a former Goroka town manager. Ijape came third with about two thirds of the winning vote, and only 67 votes behind the second-placed candidate. With forty candidates contesting, and a high turnover rate in the highlands electorates, Ijape did well, raising questions about the impact of Sandline (*Post-Courier* 1 July 1997).

Peti Lafamana

The general secretary for MELSOL, Lafanama had been at the forefront of the demonstrations against Sandline International. He used Sandline as the key election topic during his campaign for the Eastern Highlands Provincial electorate.

Lafamana polled strongly from the start, and was declared the winner on 1 July 1997 (*The National* 2 July 1997). His nearest rival Mal Smith Kela received slightly more than half the number of votes received by Lafamana. Aita Ivarato, the incumbent MP, came in third. Lafanama's victory, however, was short-lived; a losing candidate had him disqualified in a successful challenge in the Court of Disputed Returns in 1998.

Table 3.5: Voting Results for Henganofi Electorate

Candidates	**Party Affiliation**	*Number of Votes*	**per cent of total votes cast**
Viviso Seravo	PDM	6,154	9.0
Komba S. Bazamo	Independent	829	1.2
Biar P. Ragine	MGA	197	0.3
Samson Kaninku	Independent	1,124	1.6
Andrew Korarome	Independent	1,118	1.6
George T. Finkeo	Independent	298	0.4
Yankute B. Savamo	Independent	552	2.0
Marerime Forereme	Independent	1,695	2.5
Montiu N. Bepinaso	Independent	711	1.0
Tota B. Bun	CDP	1,936	2.8
George A. Baina	Independent	163	0.2
Zebby K. Marare	National Alliance	749	1.1
Moare E. Ateyam	Independent	784	1.1
John S. Savayane	Independent	179	0.3
John Giheno	Pangu Pati	2,592	3.8
Gibson A. Amao	Independent	658	1.0
Paul K. Yates	Independent	1,734	2.5
Terry Mofano	Independent	185	0.7
Joe K.B. Kegeave	Independent	414	0.6
Robert Atiyafa	Independent	2,769	4.0
Vincent H. Hatefa	Independent	1,193	1.7
Mogi Atete	CCP	909	3.3
		26,943	

Source: *1997 National Parliament General Election Results*
Note: of 46,074 registered voters, only 61 per cent voted.

Table 3.6: Voting Results for Goroka Open Electorate

Candidates	Party Affiliation	Number of Votes	per cent of total votes cast
Henry I. Smith	Independent	2,928	9.7
Joshua Soso	Independent	1,185	3.9
Musoe J. Mori	PRAP	776	2.6
Uni B.N. Toma	Independent	561	1.9
Kasup Nate	Independent	451	1.5
John Joseph	Independent	639	2.1
Gatapo Paone	Independent	1,068	3.5
Tevo Tarepe	Independent	55	0.2
Steven Pupune	CDP	785	2.6
Solomon Meuro	Independent	5	0.01
Tama H. Nipie	Independent	1,530	5.1
Samuel Kuso	Independent	1,203	4.0
Tekura Renagi	Independent	488	1.6
Uve Sabumei	Independent	261	0.9
Argo Ohue	Independent	178	0.6
Keinan G. Venapo	Independent	200	0.7
John Kuria	PAP	93	0.3
John O. Omene	Independent	199	0.7
Peter Dege	Independent	474	1.6
Opoe Soga	Independent	320	1.1
Mark B. Hook	Independent	256	0.9
John D. Nebare	Independent	211	0.7
Tony Yogiyo	Independent	1,642	5.5
Enoch Asineha	Independent	961	3.2
John S. Osa	Independent	156	0.5
Paul G. Umelisimo	Independent	569	1.9
Harry Landu	Independent	572	1.9
Lawrence P. Kera	Independent	799	2.7
Koni Aize	Independent	144	0.5
Paul Ine	Independent	1,327	4.4
Bire Kimisopa	Independent	1,601	5.3
Tim Asitore	NA	492	1.6
Mathias Ijape	Independent	2,046	6.8
Gosiho H. Mckenzie	PDM	319	1.1
John B. Tele	Independent	2,113	7.0
Apere Goso	PAP	871	2.9
Nelson O. Mikaive	Independent	737	2.4
Winnie W. Namane	Independent	14	0.1
Himony T. Lapiso	Independent	1,233	4.1
Peter Purari Ute		672	2.2
		30,134	

Source: *1997 National Parliament General Election Results*
Note: of 69,343 registered voters, only 43 per cent voted.

Table 3.7: Voting Results for Eastern Highlands Provincial Electorate

Candidate	Party Affiliation	*Number of Votes*	per cent of total votes cast
Kabian Tesasi	Independent	3,516	1.5
Kasen Nahe	Independent	5,619	2.5
Moses S. Sana	Independent	13,838	6.0
Pano K. Aura	Independent	3,072	1.3
Wato K. Avinaga	Independent	3,857	1.7
Bono A. Ovii	Independent	131	0.1
Noah Andy	Independent	675	0.3
Ricky M. Mitio	Pangu Pati	7,729	3.4
Dima W. Otoole	Independent	8,770	3.8
Sumatin W. Tima	Independent	7,835	5.9
Jeffery M. Raki	Independent	1,349	0.6
Patrick O. Taigi	Independent	1,014	0.4
Enoch. M. Mole	Independent	1,554	0.7
Opi H. Hato	Independent	2,130	0.9
Lenie Aparima	NA	8,627	3.8
Aita Ivarato	Independent	11,599	5.1
Abundi Ende	Independent	3,662	1.6
Jones Saasia	Independent	4,653	2.0
Ray R. Rasove	Independent	2,983	1.3
Peti Lafanama	Independent	35,653	15.6
David M. Garahe	PAP	5,584	2.4
James Yanepa	Independent	6,610	2.9
Soti A. Sihuwo	Independent	4,044	1.8
Steiner U. Sapu	Independent	8,622	3.8
George Pirie	CCP	4,192	1.8
Steven A. Kiari	Independent	5,560	2.4
Francis Y. Warigiso	Independent	4,464	2.0
Ambo M. Mondia	PRAP	2,379	1.0
Amos Duoff	Independent	2,531	1.1
Julie S. Akeke	Independent	11,916	5.2
Aaron Baru	Independent	1,969	0.9
Ubum Makarai	PPP	6,837	3.0
Joshua Onio	Independent	3,553	1.6
Malcom S. Kela	Independent	19,800	8.66
Kafe Kopi	Independent	9,090	4.0
Toto Taa	Independent	1,466	0.6
		226,883	

Source: *1997 National Parliament General Election Results*
Note: of 402,127 registered voters, only 53 per cent voted.

Formation of Government

Moves to form the new government were already in progress before polling had been completed. Early election winners including Bill Skate (leader of the PNC) and Sir Rabbie Namaliu (Pangu Pati rebel and speaker of parliament), and Sir Michael Somare (Leader of the NA), met in Madang Province on the night of 26 June 1997 to discuss the formation of government (*Post-Courier* 27 June 1997). At that stage only 20 seats had been declared, and Sir Michael's was not one of them. Also present at this meeting was PDM official, Lindsay Lailai.

Somare and Skate were competing for the position of prime minister. The idea of a grand coalition was discussed, but the NA maintained that if such an arrangement eventuated it was to be led by the NA (*Post-Courier* 30 June 1997). Moreover, the NA promised that if it became a member of a governing coalition, it would establish another commission of inquiry, with wide terms of reference, to re-investigate the Sandline contract (*Post-Courier* 27 June 1997).

According to Sir Michael, the people of Papua New Guinea wanted new political leadership. 'New leadership', in Sir Michael's view, meant 'people who have got good names, standing and integrity' (*Post-Courier* 30 June 1997). This definition excluded politicians like Chan and Haiveta whom the NA blamed for the country's economic problems (*Post-Courier* 8 July 1997). But 'new leaders', according to Fr Lak, also excluded the likes of Sir Michael (*Post-Courier* 9 July 1997).

Other elected MPs who entered the coalition leadership fray included Ted Diro, the new member for Central Provincial, and the new member for the Western Highlands, Fr Lak. Lak had with him four other MPs, namely Fr Louis Ambane (Chimbu Provincial), Peti Lafanama (Eastern Highlands Provincial), Lugder Mond (Sinasina-Yonggamugl Open) and Dr. Fabian Pok (North Waghi Open). The group had dissociated itself from political parties, claiming that such political concepts failed to serve the people (*Post-Courier* 9 July 1997). Diro, before he was declared MP for Central Province, had undertaken a whirlwind tour of the country holding discussions with other party leaders about forming a government (*The National* 8 July 1997). Somare (leader of the NA), Chan (leader of the PPP), Wingti (leader of the PDM) and John Momis (leader of the Melanesian Alliance and a member of the NA) met and talked with Diro.

Eleven days before the opening of the sixth parliament, three major political groups emerged as the key players likely to determine the formation of government. They were: a Pangu Pati-PPP coalition; the NA with the PNC and independent MPs; and a PNC-PDM coalition (*The National* 11 July 1997). The Pangu Pati-PPP coalition had 36 members including two from the People's United Party. The NA-PNC coalition reportedly had 30 MPs. About 10 MPs led by the member for Western Highlands Provincial sided with the NA.

The number of contenders for the position of prime minister had increased considerably. They included Sir Rabbie Namaliu (Pangu), Andrew Baing (PPP), Ted Diro (PAP), Sir John Kaputin (independent MP for Rabaul Open) and Sir Mekere Morauta (independent MP for Port Moresby-North West). Sir Rabbie's entry into the race for the prime ministership allegedly came about as the result of a split over leadership within Pangu. Haiveta's involvement in the Sandline contract had led some Pangu members to lobby Haiveta into letting Namaliu take over. But the party's policy of rotating leadership on a regional basis had already committed the leadership to a politician from the Southern Region. Namaliu came under extreme pressure from Pangu supporters in the East New Britain Province to dump the party and join other elected MPs if he did not assume leadership of Pangu (*Post-Courier* 14 July 1997). Siding with Sir Rabbie on the subject of leadership and Pangu image was Moi Avei (MP for Kairuku-Hiri).

As lobbying intensified, the PNC and PDM partnership became the crucial power broker in the formation of government (*Post-Courier* 14 July 1997). The Pangu-PPP partnership and Somare's NA both claimed they had the strength to bring the PNC-PDM partnership on board to form a government. The NA continued to push Sir Michael as their candidate for prime minister while the Pangu-PPP coalition nominated Haiveta. The NA met in Wewak, East Sepik Province to consolidate its numbers (*Post-Courier* 14 July 1997). Skate, who led the PNC-PDM coalition, continued to dissociate himself from a Pangu-PPP coalition (*Post-Courier* 14 July 1997). He told journalists:

> We do not want to be involved with their dirty politics. We have to consider the wishes of the people. They [the people] were totally against the activities and

> decisions of Pangu and PPP. We would be going against our people's wishes if we began associating with these parties (*The National* 14 July 1997).

It appeared certain for a while that the new government would be a coalition of PNC-PDM with Somare's NA. The problem was that both Skate and Somare wanted to be prime minister. Skate therefore continued to solicit support from undecided independents. One of them was Dame Josephine Abijah, the member for Milne Bay Provincial.

The PNC-PDM partnership went into camp at Tufi in the Oro Province. Among their group were Sir Mekere Morauta, Tommy Tomscoll (member for Middle Ramu Open) and two United Party members, Bevan Tambi (Jimi Open) and Gabia Gagarimabu (South Fly Open) (*The National* 15 July 1997). The Pangu-PPP partnership also gained from the alleged defection of Professor John Waiko (Sohe Open), Gabriel Dusava (Yangoru-Sausia Open) and Baki Reipa (Kainantu Open) (*ibid.*). Waiko, however, refuted the media report, claiming he was there to negotiate the PAP's future with the Pangu-PPP coalition (*The National* 17 July 1997).

On Tuesday 15 July 1997, the PNC-PDM partnership added 13 MPs led by Fr Lak to its bid to form government. The group consisted of the Melanesian Solidarity Group of Fr Lak, the PRAP and the People's Solidarity Party (Kala Swokin [Middle Fly Open], Nobert Makmop [Western Provincial] and Robert Ali [Telefomin Open]) (*The National* 16 July 1997). The arrival of Sir Mekere in the PDM camp sparked speculation that he would assume the leadership of the party from Roy Yaki, who had been acting in the position since Wingti vacated it to become governor of the Western Highlands Province.

Somare even invited his former party, Pangu, to join the NA, claiming that other political parties in the NA would not mind the partnership (*Post-Courier* 16 July 1997). He was confident the undertaking between the NA, the PNC-PDM and the group of independent MPs led by Fr Lak was cemented but awaited a scheduled meeting in Port Moresby (*Post-Courier* 16 July 1997). On 16 July 1997, Sir Rabbie disassociated himself from Pangu after failing to convince other Pangu colleagues to abandon the coalition with PPP and unite with Sir Michael (*The National* 17 July 1997). In his view, public confidence in the government had been destroyed by Sandline and the people did not wish to see the same government returned. For Somare, the departure of Namaliu from Pangu made it almost certain the position of prime minister was secured (*Post-Courier* 17 July 1997).

But political events twisted dramatically in the eleventh hour, leaving Somare and his NA with the prospect of sitting in the opposition. The PDM and PNC embraced the coalition of Pangu and PPP (*The National* 22 July 1997), and the contenders for the prime ministership were Skate (PNC) and Morauta (newly elected as leader of the PDM). Negotiations between the PNC-PDM partnership and the NA over the position had failed to gain ground. The Pangu-PPP coalition nominated Sir Mekere, however he declined on the grounds that he could not see how he could work in a governing coalition that included Pangu and PPP. In explaining his decision he said:

> It would be unwise and improper for me to be in government with them because of what I stood for in the elections. You know I spoke against them on various issues on economic, social and financial management, so I cannot work with them (*The National* 23 July 1997).

The NA had also offered Sir Mekere the position of prime minister, but his PDM colleagues had already moved in with the Pangu-PPP coalition, leaving him without a party to lead. The final tussle was thus between Skate and Somare. On Tuesday 22 July 1997, Skate resoundingly defeated Sir Michael by 71 to 35 votes to become the first prime minister from the Southern Region (*The National* 23 July 1997). Skate, and the MELSOL group of Lak and Lafanama, had opted to align themselves with political parties they severely criticized during their election

campaign. Skate had completely reneged on his public commitment never to work in a coalition that included Pangu and PPP.

Post-election developments over Sandline

Several political parties and newly-elected independent MPs publicly stated their intention of re-opening the Sandline Inquiry and widening the terms of reference. One such party was the PDM. The leader of the PDM and leader of opposition, Roy Yaki told reporters at a news conference on 31 May 1997 that he had always disagreed with the limited terms of reference set for the inquiry by Sir Julius Chan (*Post-Courier* 1 July 1997). Others wanted to include the broader issue of corruption, including the Poreporena Freeway Project, and the acquisition of the Conservatory Building in Cairns, Australia by the Public Officers Superannuation Fund and others, reported in the reports of the Auditor-General and the Ombudsman Commission (*Post-Courier* 7 July 1997). Peter Peipul, the newly elected MP for Imbonggu Open, wanted to extend the terms for such an inquiry to examine the decisions taken by previous members of the government's tenders board, including the composition of the board. He wanted to introduce legislation to give bodies such as the Leadership Tribunal and the Ombudsman Commission powers to imprison leaders who were found guilty. In expressing his determination to tackle corruption he said, 'I am furious that so many leaders are getting away with these [offences]' (*Post-Courier* 7 July 1997).

Other like-minded people included three of the members newly elected to provincial seats, Lak, Ambane and Lafanama. These men claimed that they were elected to fight corruption and they proposed to do this in parliament (*Post-Courier* 8 July 1997). In a prepared statement, they said:

> We stood as activists when we fought the issue with the people. People have now given us the mandate to represent them in Parliament and we would like to warn and remind those who were part and parcel of the Sandline decision and engagement that we will ensure the job is complete (*Post-Courier* 8 July 1997).

They assured the people that they would not form a government with those politicians who were part of the Sandline decision.

One of the principal players in the Sandline affair, Chris Haiveta, however remained undeterred. So far as he was concerned, the decision to engage Sandline International was made by the NEC; he maintained that his role as the then minister for finance was to identify the finances necessary to fund the contract (*Post-Courier* 8 July 1997). Haiveta was particularly perturbed by newly elected MPs who used Sandline to smear the image of Pangu and his aspirations for the position of prime minister. He also responded to allegations that the government was preparing to pay Sandline International the remaining $US18 million contract fee. For him, Sandline was over:

> Sandline will be here today and gone tomorrow, we have to continue to go forward. We are not going to eat and sleep Sandline for the next five years, we have to pick up the pieces and move on (*Post-Courier* 8 July 1997).

Sandline may indeed have been gone, but Papua New Guineans have had to endure the impact of the contract long after its demise.

Conclusions

Sandline had an impact on the 1997 national election on several fronts. First, several politicians implicated in the affair lost their parliamentary seats. Chan identified Sandline as a factor in his loss aside from primordial and local issues which also played a part. Ijape also lost his seat, though the high turnover rate of MPs partly explains his demise. The only one of the three main

actors to survive the election was Chris Haiveta, whose campaign for political leadership has been dogged by Sandline.

Secondly, Sandline was on the political and electoral agenda of several candidates who won seats in parliament. It had immense potential for those candidates who exploited the issue to stir up political support. While Sandline contributed to the demise of some, it also facilitated the rise of others.

Thirdly (and related to the second point), Sandline became a national issue on a scale similar to the drive for independence in 1975. Instead of being localised in one region, it extended to all sectors of society and to all parts of the country. Voters, however informed, were aware of it through the extensive media coverage it received.

Finally, Sandline became a critical issue in the formation of government. However, as the paper shows, in the quest for power and control, national issues can often be relegated to secondary levels—if not forgotten altogether until after the government has been formed. For politicians, that is the most logical and appropriate strategy even if their change of position completely contradicts the perception they created in the electorate during the campaign.

4

DISPUTED ELECTION RESULTS AFTER THE 1997 ELECTION

John Nonggorr

A record number of appeals was filed in the National Court disputing election results following the 1997 general election. Eight-six petitions altogether were filed. Whilst the majority of the election petitions were disposed of in the first twelve months, many were delayed because the resources of the National Court were stretched and numerous reviews were sought in the Supreme Court. The last one of the eighty-six petitions was still outstanding four weeks before the 2002 election.

Out of the eighty-six petitions filed, only six succeeded, resulting in elections being set aside and by-elections held. Three further petitions were filed against by-election results. Of the six originally successful candidates whose elections were declared void, four won back their seats in by-elections.

There are many possible reasons for the large number of election results disputed through petitions in 1997. One is that there were more problems with the conduct of elections, giving rise to numerous appeals to the courts. Since the grounds cited in the petitions alleged breaches of electoral laws by both candidates and officers of the administering agency - the Electoral Commission - it might be said that the conduct of candidates, and the Electoral Commission's administration of the 1997 election, were poorer than in previous elections. However, the fact that only six petitions were successful does not support the proposition that there were more problems in the 1997 general election than in previous elections.

Another possible reason is that election to the National Parliament has become highly sought after, and disputing an election result in the courts is part of the contest for a position in parliament. Given the increase in the number of candidates contesting the 109 electorates over the years, and the record 2372 candidates in the 1997 election, this is a more likely explanation for the record number of petitions filed. Ultimately, it might be argued, this demonstrates the high level of democratic participation in Papua New Guinea elections.

Petitions filed and their outcome

Following the election, challenges were made to the results declared in 69 electorates, as shown below. In some electorates, two or more petitions were filed.

Southern Region

Gulf Provincial	-	Lesley Mark v. Chris Haiveta
Kerema Open (Gulf)	-	Richard Mendani v. Tom Koraea
Kikori Open (Gulf)	-	Evara Horepa v. Riddler Kimave
Kairuku-Hiri Open (Central)	-	Charles Maino v. Moi Avei
Abau Open (Central)	-	Desmond Baira v. Kilroy Genia
Rigo Open (Central)	-	Mary Karo v. DivaraYagobo
Goilala Open (Central)	-	Camillo Esef v. Alex Bia
Northern Provincial	-	Sampson Endehipa v. Sylvanes Siembo
Ijivitari Open (Northern)	-	Hudson Arek v. Simon Kaumi
Western Provincial	-	Kayama Sinba v. Nobert Makmop
South Fly Open (Western)	-	Parry Zeipi v. Gagia Gagarimabu
Alotau Open (Milne Bay)	-	Gerald Senapali v. Iaro Lasaro
National Capital District (NCD)	-	Paul Mondia v. Bill Skate
Moresby North West Open (NCD)	-	Steven Tongia v. Mekere Morauta
	-	Miria Ikupu v. Mekere Morauta
Moresby North East Open (NCD)	-	David Unagi v. Philip Taku
	-	Norman Fernandes v. Philip Taku
Moresby South Open (NCD)	-	Albert Karo v. Carol Kidu

Momase

Lae Open (Morobe)	-	Michael Badui v. Bart Philemon
Markham Open (Morobe)	-	Benge Bon v. Andrew Baing
Kabwum Open (Morobe)	-	Tom Horik v. Ginson Saonu
Bulolo Open (Morobe)	-	John Muinginepe v. Samson Napo
Nawae Open (Morobe)	-	Bataningke Wiap v. Kennedy Wenge
Huon Gulf Open (Morobe)	-	Joseph Tetang v. Tukape Masani
Madang Open (Madang)	-	Katherine Mal v. Jacob Wama
Bogia Open (Madang)	-	Phillip Basse v. Bernard Mollok
Middle Ramu Open (Madang)	-	Godfried Oringawai v. Assik Tommy Tomscoll
Usino-Bundi Open (Madang)	-	Anton Yagama v. George Wan
Sumkar Open (Madang)	-	Peter Yama v. Mathew Gubag
Maprik Open (East Sepik)	-	Jim Kauk v. Peter Lus
Angoram Open (East Sepik)	-	Ludwig Shulze v. Arthur Somare
Yangoru-Saussia Open (East Sepik)	-	Bernard Hagoria v. Gabriel Dusava
Wosera-Gaui Open (East Sepik)	-	Paul Wanjik v. GallusYumbui

Highlands

Eastern Highlands Provincial	-	Aita Ivarato v. Peti Lafanama
	-	Malcom Kela v. Peti Lafanama
Goroka Open (EHP)	-	Bire Kimisopa v. Henry Smith
	-	Mathias Izape v. Henry Smith
Henganofi Open (EHP)	-	John Giheno v. Viviso Seravo
Kainantu Open (EHP)	-	Yuntuvi Bao v. Baki Reipa
	-	Avusi Tanao v. Baki Reipa
Lufa Open (EHP)	-	Komane Wasege v. Mathias Karani
Okapa Open (EHP)	-	Yasona v. Castan Maibawa
Unggai-Bena Open (EHP)	-	Kiatro Abisinito v. Damson Lafana
Chimbu Provincial	-	Thomas Sumuno v. Louis Ambane
	-	Andrew Porr v. Louis Ambane
Chuave Open (Chimbu)	-	Kumo Launa v. Yauwe Riyong

Gumine Open (Chimbu)	-	Joseph Sil v. Aulkupa Wamil
	-	Dennis Mipa v. Aulkupa Wamil
Karimui-Nomane Open (Chimbu)	-	John Mili v. Simeon Gaima Wai
Kundiawa Open (Chimbu)	-	Luke Apa v. Peter Waieng
Sinasina-Yonggamugl Open (Chimbu)	-	Ben Okorro v. Ludger Mondo
Daulo Open (Chimbu)	-	James Genaboro v. Ron Ganarafo
Anglimp-North Waghi Open (WHP)	-	William Wii v. Fabian Pok
Anglimp South Waghi Open (WHP)	-	Jonathan Kumba v. Kuk Kuli
Dei Open (WHP)	-	Melchior Pep v. Puri Ruing
Mul Baiyer Open (WHP)	-	Simon Korwa v. Robert Nagle
Southern Highlands Provincial	-	Dick Mune v. Anderson Agiru
Mendi Open (SHP)	-	Stephen Mendepo v. Michael Nali
Nipa-Kutubu Open (SHP)	-	Uhae Iabo v. Philemon Embel
Imbongu Open (SHP)	-	Pila Niningi v. Peter Peipul
Kagua-Erave Open (SHP)	-	Ken Nakisi v. David Basua
	-	Daniel Tulapi v. David Basua
	-	Charles Miru v. David Basua
Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open (SHP)	-	Benias Peri v. Herowa Agiwa
Enga Provincial	-	David Lambu v. Peter Ipatas
	-	Rimbink Pato v. Peter Ipatas
Wabag Open (Enga)	-	Daniel Kapi v. Takai Kapi
Wapenamanda Open (Enga)	-	Miki Kaeak v. Masket Iangalio
	-	Timmy Arete v. Masket Iangalio
	-	Wauni Reneto v. Masket Iangalio
Kandep Open (Enga)	-	Don Polye v. Jimson Sauk Papak
Lagaip-Porgera Open (Enga)	-	Anton Pakena v. Opis Papo
Kompiam Ambum Open (Enga)	-	Kelly Kalit v. John Pundari

Islands

Manus Open (Manus)	-	Memel Pohei v. Charlie Benjamin
Namatanai Open (New Ireland)	-	Julius Chan v. Ephraim Apelis
Kavieng Open (New Ireland)	-	Ben Micah v. Ian Ling-Stuckey
West New Britain Provincial	-	Greg Mongi v. Bernard Vogae
Talasea Open (WNB)	-	Gregory Seeto v. Patterson Lowa
Kadrian-Gloucester Open (WNB)	-	David Sui v. Peter Arul
Central Bougainville Open	-	Benedict Pisi v. Sam Akoitai
North Bougainville Open	-	Leo Hannett v. Michael Ogio

Of the 86 petitions filed, some were withdrawn while others were struck out or dismissed by the National and Supreme Courts: 13 were withdrawn by petitioners before the National Court considered them; the National Court heard and struck off, at the compulsory conference stage or following trial, 36 petitions; the Supreme Court heard reviews and dismissed 33 petitions; 6 petitions were successful (see below), and one petition was still pending, in the Supreme Court in May 2002, namely the second petition filed in Kagua Erave—E.P. 55/97, *Daniel Tulapi v. David Basua.*

Petitions were withdrawn for various reasons. The most common one was that parties negotiated and settled petitions out of court. In two cases, the petitioners agreed to withdraw the petitions as a result of intervention from political parties which the successful candidates had joined. In a number of others, payments were made to petitioners by the successful candidates for petitions

against them to be withdrawn. In at least one case, the grounds pleaded could not pass the competency challenge stage, thus forcing the petitioner to withdraw the petition.

The National Court struck out most petitions at the compulsory conference stage. The majority of petitions struck out at this stage were taken to the Supreme Court, by way of review (see below). The Supreme Court thus heard and disposed of a lot of the petitions, as noted above. The Supreme Court reviewed all of the six petitions that succeeded. The National Court dismissed two of the six petitions that succeeded. On review, the Supreme Court upheld the two petitions.

Common grounds pleaded in petitions

The *Organic Law on National and Local-level Government Elections* recognises four grounds which, if successfully proven, will result in an election result being overturned. The legal principles of those grounds are now fairly clear. They are:

(a) bribery and undue influence committed by candidates;
(b) illegal practices committed and errors or omissions made by electoral officials;
(c) illegal practices committed by successful candidates; and
(d) illegal practices committed by supporters of successful candidates.

The petitions challenging results declared in the 1997 general election were based on these grounds. With one exception, none of the petitions pursued after the 1997 election challenged the qualifications of successful candidates to contest elections or to be elected. These qualifications are found in the constitution. There are seven such qualifications.

The first is the age qualification. Under Section 109(1) of the constitution, in order to be qualified to be a member of the parliament, a citizen must be at least 25 years old at the time that he is declared elected. This was a ground in petitions prior to 1997. The fact that this was not a ground in petitions filed after the 1997 general election suggests that this law is now well understood by the electorate.

The second is the residential qualification under Section 109(2) of the constitution. In order to contest an election, a citizen must: (a) be born in the electorate; or (b) have resided in the electorate for a continuous period of two years preceding his/her nomination; or (c) have resided in the electorate for five years at any time. This was used as a ground for a petition by Ludwig Schulze against the election of Arthur Somare in Angoram in 1997.

The third is the requirement for a fee of K1, 000 to be paid as the nomination fee. This is a precondition of acceptance of nomination and this has not been put in issue in any of the petitions. (This is separate from challenges made against attempts to increase the nomination fee from K1, 000 to K5, 000, which attempts were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.)

The fourth is the requirement under Section 103(3) (a) of the constitution that, in order for a citizen to be qualified to be or remain a member of the parliament, he/she must be qualified to vote in elections in the parliament. There are three requirements for a person to be qualified to vote: he/she must be over 18 years old; he/she must have resided in the electorate for the preceding six months; and he/she must be enrolled on the electoral roll for the electorate. The first two requirements are covered by the age and residential requirements required under Section 103(1) and 103(2). The third requirement is new, that a candidate or member of parliament must be registered to vote. This ground was pleaded in one of the petitions that

succeeded—E.P. 75 of 1997—*Daniel Kapi v. Takai Kapi & the Electoral Commission*. The successful candidate, Takai Kapi was not on the 1997 electoral roll for the Wabag Open electorate. The Supreme Court voided the election on the basis that he was not qualified to remain a member of the parliament. The case is discussed later.

The fifth is also a Section 103 (3) requirement, under paragraph (3) (b), which states that a citizen is not qualified to be or remain a member of the parliament if he or she 'is of unsound mind within the meaning of any law relating to the protection of the persons and property of persons of unsound mind'. No challenge has ever been brought on this ground.

The sixth requirement is also found under Section 103 (3), under paragraph (c). A citizen who is under sentence of death or imprisonment for a period of more than nine months is disqualified from being a member of parliament. For election purposes, this applies to prisoners serving prison terms at the time of an election. This provision has not been in issue in litigation, as no prisoner serving a prison term of over nine months has sought to contest an election.

The seventh requirement is that, under Section 103(3)(d) of the constitution, a citizen who is 'otherwise disqualified under the Constitution' cannot become or remain a member of the parliament. This provision refers to one particular instance. It concerns citizens who have been dismissed by a Leadership Tribunal under the *Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership*. A leader who is investigated and found guilty by a Leadership Tribunal for breach of the Leadership Code (established by the constitution) may be dismissed. If dismissed such leader is not qualified to hold another leadership position for a period of three years from the date of dismissal. To date no citizen dismissed by a Leadership Tribunal has sought to contest an election during the three-year period following dismissal.

Bribery and undue influence by successful candidates

Bribery and undue influence are serious criminal offences. The *Criminal Code* makes both criminal offences under Sections 102 and 103. These provisions define what constitutes undue influence and bribery.

102. Undue influence.

A person who—

(a) uses or threatens to use any force or restraint, or does or threatens to do any temporal or spiritual injury, or causes or threatens to cause any detriment of any kind to an elector—

(i) in order to induce him to vote or refrain from voting at an election; or

(ii) on account of his having voted or refrained from voting in an election; or

(b) by force or fraud prevents or obstructs the free exercise of the franchise by an elector, or by any such means compels or induces an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election,

is guilty of a misdemeanour.

Penalty: A fine not exceeding K400.00 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.

103. Bribery.

A person who –

(*a*) gives, confers or procures, or promises or offers to give or confer or to procure or attempt to procure, to, on, or for, any person any property or benefit of any kind—

(i) on account of anything done or omitted to be done, or to be done or omitted to be done, by an elector at an election in the capacity of an elector; or

(ii) on account of any person acting or joining in a procession during an election; or

(iii) in order to induce any person to endeavour to procure the return of any person at an election, or the vote of any elector at an election; or

(*b*) being an elector, asks, receives or obtains, or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain, any property or benefit for himself or any other person on account of anything done or omitted to be done, or to be done or omitted to be done, by him at an election in the capacity of an elector; or

(*c*) asks, receives or obtains, or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain, any property or benefit for himself or any other person, on account of a promise made by him or any other person to endeavour to procure the return of any person at an election, or the vote of any person at an election; or

(*d*) advances or pays any money to or to the use of any other person with the intent that the money will be applied for any of the purposes referred to in Paragraph (*a*), (*b*) or (*c*) or in discharge or repayment of money wholly or in part applied for any such purpose; or

(*e*) corruptly transfers or pays any property or money to any person for the purpose of enabling that person to be registered as an elector, and so influencing the vote of that person at a future election; or

(*f*) is privy to the transfer or payment referred to in Paragraph (e) that is made for his benefit; or

(*g*) being a candidate at an election, convenes or holds a meeting of electors or of his committee in a house licensed for the sale of fermented or spirituous liquors,

is guilty of a misdemeanour.

Penalty: A fine not exceeding K400.00 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.

Under the *Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections* (OLNLLGE) , even one instance of bribery or undue influence or attempted bribery or undue influence committed by a successful candidate, if proven in the National Court, is sufficient to result in an election being set aside. This makes bribery and undue influence very serious grounds. This follows from the clear and mandatory terms of Section 215(1) of the *Organic Law*:

> If the National Court finds that a candidate has committed or has attempted to commit bribery or undue influence, his election, if he is a successful candidate, shall be declared void.

If a petitioner can prove in court that the successful candidate bribed or attempted to bribe one voter or the successful candidate unduly influenced or attempted to unduly influence one voter, the whole election must be set aside. This is different from a ground in a petition alleging an illegal practice where, as stated below, in addition to proving the illegal practice, it must also be proven that the illegal practice was likely to affect the result of the election and it is fair to disturb a declared result, or that the illegal practice did affect the result of the election.

Illegal practices committed by electoral officials

Illegal practice is a general phrase that covers all unlawful acts (other than bribery and undue influence committed by a successful candidate). A supporter of a successful candidate offering a bribe or attempting to offer a bribe to an eligible voter in the electorate is considered guilty of an illegal practice. So is a supporter of a successful candidate proven to have exerted undue influence or attempted to exert undue influence on an eligible voter or voters, to vote for the successful candidate.

Section 178 of the OLNLLGE lists illegal practices. These include publishing electoral advertisements without naming the person authorising such publications; printing or publishing materials without stating the name and place of business of the printer; printing, publishing or distributing a publication that looks like a ballot paper and with directions on it that might mislead voters; printing, publishing or distributing a publication that has untrue or misleading statements that would interfere with an elector in casting his/her vote; and wilfully deceiving an elector that he is not enrolled in the electorate. Part XVII of the *Organic Law*, comprising of Sections 178 to 205, creates various offences. Commission of these and other electoral offences under the *Criminal Code* is covered by illegal practices.

The *Criminal Code* specifies numerous other electoral offences, including offences that the *Criminal Code* also calls 'illegal practices'. Six different offences are defined under the heading illegal practices [Section 105(1)]. Section 106(1) lists four different offences under the heading 'other illegal practices'. These ten offences are similar to the offences found under Section 178 of the OLNLLGE. The *Criminal Code* creates numerous other electoral offences: personating a voter (s99), double voting (s100), treating (s101), interference at elections (s108), electors attempting to violate secrecy of ballot (s109), stuffing ballot-boxes (s110), offences by presiding officers (s111), false answers to questions at elections (s112), interfering with secrecy at elections (s113), breaking seal of packets used at elections (s114), offences at elections when voting is by post (s115), and false electoral claims (s116).

Two provisions of the OLNLLGE state that an election result can be set aside on account of the wrongful conduct of electoral officials. The first provision is Section 215 (3) of the *Organic Law* under the heading 'voiding election for illegal practice'. The courts have held that paragraph (b) of Section 215(3) allows the courts to set aside an election result if electoral officials have committed an illegal practice.

Section 215(3) states:

> The National Court shall not declare that a person returned as elected was not duly elected or declare an election void –
>
> (a) on the ground of an illegal practice committed by a person other than the candidate and without the candidate's knowledge or authority; or
>
> (b) on the ground of an illegal practice other than bribery or undue influence or attempted bribery or undue influence,
>
> unless the Court is satisfied that the result of the election was likely to be affected, and that it is just that the candidate should be declared not to be duly elected or that the election should be declared void.

There are several separate requirements in this provision, which will be listed below. But it should be noted that the quoted provision is phrased in the negative—'the National Court shall not' disturb an election result 'unless the Court is satisfied, etc. The courts have interpreted this to give a positive power to the National Court to disturb a declared election result in which illegal practices have been committed.

Paragraph (a) of Section 215(3) relates to illegal practices committed by supporters of successful candidates, discussed below. The constituent parts of Section 215(3)(b) are, as follows:

- the National Court can set aside a declared election result if it is satisfied with three things. First, the court must be satisfied that an illegal practice has been committed. Secondly, it must be satisfied that the illegal practice committed as found by the court, was 'likely' to affect the result of the election. Thirdly, the court must be satisfied that it is just that it disturb the declared election result.

- The illegal practice may be committed by electoral officers or by the successful candidate himself.

- If the court is satisfied that an illegal practice has been committed, and it is satisfied that the illegal practice was likely to affect the result, and it is satisfied that it is just to interfere with the election result, the court can do one of two things, depending on the circumstances of each individual case. The court can declare the whole election void, or, it can declare that the successful candidate was not elected but uphold the election, with the consequence that another candidate is declared by the court to have been elected.

The second provision under which the actions of or omissions made by electoral officials can result in an election result being set aside is Section 218 of the OLNLLGE. Again, like Section 215 (3), the provision is couched in the negative.

> 218. Immaterial errors not to vitiate election.
>
> (1) Subject to Subsection (2), an election shall not be avoided on account of a delay in the declaration of nominations, the polling, the declaration of the poll or the return of the writ, or on account of the absence or an error of, or an omission by, an officer which did not affect the result of the election.
>
> (2) Where an elector was, on account of the absence or an error of, or an omission by, an officer, prevented from voting in an election, the National Court shall not for the purpose of determining whether the absence or error of, or the omission by, the officer did or did not affect the result of the election, admit evidence of the way in which the elector intended to vote in an election.

Leaving aside subsection (2), which is concerned with a specific issue (prohibition against admission of evidence as to how a voter voted, to protect the secrecy of the vote), the courts have held that subsection (1), read in the following manner, gives the courts power to avoid an election result: 'an election shall not be avoided ... on account of the absence or an error of, or an omission by, an officer which did not affect the result of the election'. The interpretation given to it, phrased in the positive, would, in its effect, read thus - an election can be avoided on account of an error or an omission made by an electoral official which did affect the result of the election. Under this provision, if an error or omission is established to the satisfaction of the National Court, an election can be declared void. This provision does not permit a court to declare the successful candidate not elected and declare another candidate elected. The opening

words of subsection (2) make it obvious that the consequence of an established error or omission is avoiding an election result. However, it is arguable that the provisions of Section 212 of the *Organic Law*, which give the National Court extra powers, may be used to make a declaration that a candidate initially declared elected was not elected but that another candidate was elected. Paragraphs (f) and (g) of Section 212 (1) would enable the National Court to do this.

Almost one third of the grounds pleaded in the 86 petitions filed alleged illegal practices committed by electoral officials. The allegations made fall into the following categories:-

- the electoral rolls were defective, in that names were included in rolls when they should not be in the rolls or that names that should have been on the rolls were not on them;
- eligible voters names were not on the common rolls when they had applied to register;
- eligible voters names that were on the rolls created prior to 1997 were not transferred to the 1997 rolls;
- polling schedules advising voters on polling places were either unfairly distributed or that insufficient polling places were allocated in particular electorates;
- at polling, polling officials allowed under-age or other ineligible people to vote;
- at polling, polling officials allowed voters to vote more than once;
- at polling, polling officials marked ballot papers contrary to the wishes of voters;
- at polling, polling officials did not permit scrutineers of particular candidates to stand close enough to scrutinise polling properly or that polling officials allowed some scrutineers to go too close to polling booths;
- polling officials did not allow all eligible voters to vote by closing polling booths too early, by failing to poll at scheduled polling places, or by deliberately not allowing certain voters to vote;
- at polling, polling officials and the state failed to provide sufficient security, to protect polling resulting in ballot papers, ballot boxes and common rolls to be stolen or forcefully removed by supporters of candidates;
- at polling, polling and accompanying police personnel failed to lock ballot boxes properly or in not looking after them properly, thus allowing tampering of ballot boxes to occur;
- insufficient ballot paper or ballot boxes were issued to polling teams resulting in voters not being given the opportunity to cast their votes;
- at counting, electoral officials counting votes counted votes too fast, thus not reaching the correct result;
- at counting, electoral officials were guilty of tampering with cast ballot papers or whole ballot boxes;
- at counting, electoral officials wrongly refused to count ballot papers or whole ballot boxes and treating them as informal; and

- following counting, electoral officials doctored counting documents.

Illegal practices by successful candidates

As noted above, the National Court can and has set aside election results where a successful candidate is proven to have committed bribery or undue influence. If an election petition alleges, and it is proven by evidence in court, that a successful candidate has committed any other illegal practice, his or her election may be set aside for these reasons as well.

Illegal practices committed by supporters

A lot of allegations pleaded in petitions had to do with the conduct of supporters of successful candidates. Supporters were alleged to have bribed voters on behalf of successful candidates, or to have forced voters to vote for successful candidates. Supporters of successful candidates were alleged to have interfered in polling, for example by threatening or intimidating polling officials or voters supporting other candidates, or by tampering with ballot papers or electoral rolls, or being involved in other conduct prohibited by the *Organic Law* and the *Criminal Code.*

Section 215 (3) of the OLNLLGE covers actions of supporters. More particularly, Section 215(3)(a) contains four elements:

- the National Court must be satisfied that a person, not being the successful candidate, has committed an illegal practice;

- the National Court must be satisfied that a proven illegal practice was committed by such a person with the knowledge or the approval of the successful candidate. The latter are two separate parts - (1) knowledge, or (2) approval, of the successful candidate. If an illegal practice is committed by a supporter but such illegal practice was committed without the knowledge or approval of the successful candidate, even if the illegal practice is proven and it is sufficient to set aside the election, the election cannot be set aside. This is a requirement of paragraph (a) as well as the ending words of the whole of Section 215, which is that it would not be just to set aside an election if the successful candidate did not approve or was unaware of the illegal practice committed by a supporter.

- The National Court must be satisfied that an illegal practice committed by a supporter of the successful candidate, with the knowledge or authority of the successful candidate, was 'likely' to affect the result of the election.

- The National Court must be satisfied that it would not be unjust to disturb the declared result.

Successful petitions

The first of the six successful petitions was in relation to the Kagua-Erave Open electorate in the Southern Highlands Province, in E.P. No. 16 of 1997—*Charles Luta Miru v. David Basua & Others.* The allegations made in this petition were not contested. Thirteen ballot boxes were not counted because electoral officials could not verify the genuineness of the votes in the ballot boxes. At the time of polling, thirteen ballot boxes were seized by force from electoral officials. No polling took place at the places where the ballot boxes were designated for use. After polling,

the thirteen seized ballot boxes filled with marked ballot papers were brought to the counting centre by supporters of a candidate, Daniel Tulapi. Counting officials refused to count votes in the thirteen ballot boxes. After trial of the petition, conducted on 30 June 1999, the court found that no elections were conducted in a number of polling places where the thirteen ballot boxes were to have been used. The main reason was lack of transport and security risks. The court ruled that this constituted an error or an omission on the part of the Electoral Commission, as section 15 of the OLNLLGE required the Commission to administer elections. The court found that many voters in the polling areas for which the thirteen ballot boxes had been allocated were denied their right to vote. Since the number of voters denied the voting right was more than required to affect the election result, the election was set aside for that reason and a by-election was ordered by the court.

A by-election was held in early March 1999. On 28 March 1999, the petitioner who challenged the 1997 election result, Charles Miru Luta, was declared elected. This declaration was made without counting votes in three ballot boxes because of disputes at the counting centre. Two petitions were filed against the by-election result. One was filed by Daniel Tulapi (E.P. 2 of 1999—*Daniel Tulapi v. Charles Miru Luta and Electoral Commission*) and the other by the successful candidate in the 1997 election, David Basua (E.P. 1 of 1999—*David Basua v. Charles Miru Luta & the Electoral Commission*). At the trial of the latter petition, it was established that the three ballot boxes were not counted because of threats against counting officials originating from supporters of Charles Miru Luta. The court ruled that the three boxes were wrongly left out in the counting and ordered that the votes in the three ballot boxes be counted. The three boxes were subsequently counted and the figures were provided to the court. Based on these new figures, the Court upheld the petition and declared Charles Miru Luta not elected and declared David Basua elected in the by-election. Therefore, David Basua, who had been declared winner in 1997 retained the seat after the by-election.

The second petition filed by Daniel Tulapi against the by-election result was put on hold while the petition filed by David Basua was dealt with. After the declaration by the court that David Basua was elected, Daniel Tulapi sought amendment of his petition, to remove Charles Miru Luta as a respondent and replace him with David Basua and also to add further grounds to the petition. On 07 April 2000, the National Court allowed the petitioner to remove Charles Miru Luta and replace his name with the name of David Basua but refused to allow additional grounds to be added in the petition. This petition remained outstanding in May 2002.

The second petition that succeeded was in E.P. No. 40 of 1997—*Thomas Sumono v. Fr. Louis Ambane & the Electoral Commission*. This petition alleged a number of irregularities against electoral officials in the conduct of elections in the Chimbu Provincial electorate. The allegation upheld was that electoral officials in four polling places used patrol boxes to store cast ballot papers, which were later excluded from counting as the votes in the patrol boxes did not meet the requirements of the *Organic Law*. Evidence produced to the National Court established that polling teams ran out of space in ballot boxes issued to a number of polling teams. These teams used patrol boxes to store cast votes. The returning officer at the counting centre refused to count the votes in the patrol boxes.

The difference between the successful candidate and the runner up was only 22 votes. The margin to the next candidate was 833 votes. The votes in the patrol boxes that were excluded

totalled 1,300 votes. The court declared the election void on the basis that the actions of the electoral officials in not using official ballot boxes, as required by Section 122 of the *Organic Law*, was an error or an omission. Since the number of votes excluded far exceeded the difference between the declared candidate and the next two candidates, the exclusion of 1,300 votes was likely to affect the result of the election. The court ordered a by-election to be held. A by-election was held and the candidate who was declared elected in the original election was re-elected.

The third successful petition concerned the Eastern Highlands Provincial Electorate. In E.P. No. 39 of 1997—*Aita Ivarato v. Peti Lafanama & Electoral Commission* - Aita Ivarato, the sitting member prior to the 1997 general election, disputed the election of Peti Lafanama as member for Eastern Highlands Provincial. At the compulsory conference stage, the National Court struck out eight of the nine allegations in the petition on the basis that these allegations did not meet the requirements of Section 208 of the *Organic Law*. One allegation was allowed to go to trial. This ground of the petition concerned a statement allegedly made by Lafanama against Ivarato. The alleged statement was to the effect that the government of Sir Julius Chan had sold customary land to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and the government had hired a foreign private army, Sandline International, to kill people and destroy Papua New Guinea.

At the trial of this allegation, the National Court found that statements to this effect were probably made in general terms but could not form the basis for avoiding an election result. Justice Woods said:

> I find that in the circumstances of Papua New Guinea at the time the First Respondent [Lafanama] was being [no more] critical of the government in power than could have been expected. Criticism of the implications both financial and otherwise of the Sandline affair was only to be expected on the campaign platform last year. And also criticism of the Government's economic policy and the way the country was involved with the IMF and the World Bank to help [*sic*] and the implications to the people and the country generally of the Structural Adjustment Program was also to be expected. And every sitting Member of Parliament had to face this criticism whether they were part of the Government or not and note that the Petitioner was then the Regional Member in the Parliament. I find that this was no more than tough political campaigning in a country which had many economic and social problems. Of course the difference between genuine political campaigning and promises and bribery and undue influence may be very narrow at times depending on the circumstances.

The petitioner filed a review to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court upheld the application and held that the statements that the National Court had found had been made by Lafanama amounted to undue influence. The Supreme Court set aside the election and ordered a by-election. A by-election was subsequently held. Lafanama was re-elected.

In the fourth successful petition, E.P. 75 of 1997—*Daniel Kapi v. Takai Kapi*, the petitioner, Daniel Kapi, disputed the election result in the Wabag Open electorate. In the petition, a number of allegations was pleaded. At the compulsory conference stage, all the grounds except two were struck out for non-compliance with Section 208 of the *Organic Law*. The two remaining grounds related to a complaint that the name of the successful candidate, Takai Kapi, was not on the roll of electors. This challenge was based on Section 103 of the constitution (discussed above).

Following trial, the National Court found that Takai Kapi's name was not on the main roll but that he had completed a claim for enrolment form and had given it to the Returning Officer when nominating, as permitted by Section 58 of the OLNLLGE. This, the National Court held, meant that he satisfied the Section 103 requirement.

Daniel Kapi filed a review to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court heard the review on 29 April 1998 and, on 01 May 1998, declared the election void. The Supreme Court held that a candidate's name must be on the roll to satisfy Section 103 of the constitution. Takai Kapi's name not having been on the 1997 roll, he was not qualified to be a candidate or a member of parliament. The Supreme Court ordered a by-election and one was held, in which the petitioner was elected.

The fifth petition was E.P. 32 of 1997—*Yuntivi Bao v. Baki Reipa*. In this petition, the result of the election in Kainantu Open was disputed. The National Court declared the election void on the basis that votes in one ballot box were not counted because a supporter of a losing candidate (not the petitioner) burnt the ballot box with votes in it. After polling, officials took the filled ballot box to the District Office. A candidate's supporter followed the polling officers, wrestled the ballot box from them in front of police and other members of the public, and burnt it. No votes were recovered. This supporter alleged that votes were cast illegally, through double voting and ineligible voters being allowed to vote at the polling place where the ballot box was used. This person was arrested and subsequently imprisoned for six months.

The petitioner alleged that the ballot box contained votes from his support base area and that votes cast for him were destroyed. He asked for the election to be set aside. The burning of the ballot box was not disputed. It contained 466 ballot papers. The difference between the votes cast for the successful candidate and the petitioner (who was the runner up) was 411 votes. At the trial, the National Court found that the votes in the burnt ballot box came from an area in which the petitioner was likely to collect all the votes. The National Court, therefore, held that the result was likely to have been affected by the burning of the ballot box. The court found that the lack of care taken by the electoral officials in securing the ballot box contributed to the destruction of the votes in the ballot box. This, the court held, was an error or an omission on the part of the electoral officials. The court ordered a by-election. A by-election was subsequently held where the candidate returned after the 1997 election was re-elected.

Decision on the sixth and final successful petition, which was relatively short, came much later, in 2000, because at the same time as the petition was before the National Court, the successful candidate was under investigations by a Leaderhsip Tribunal. The petition is E.P. 5 of 1997—*Bernard Hagoria v. Gabriel Dusava & the Electoral Commission*. The petitioner, Bernard Hagoria, disputed the election result in the Yangoru-Saussia Open electorate. The main allegation in the petition was that electoral officials did not count votes properly. Before the petition could be heard and dealt with by the National Court, the winning candidate, Gabriel Dusava, was referred to a Leadership Tribunal established under the *Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership*. He was subsequently dismissed from office and consequently become disqualified from holding office as a member of parliament. Following this dismissal, the National Court heard the petition and ordered a recount of votes. The vote recount resulted in the petitioner being declared elected.

Compulsory conferences

Judges and lawyers recognized quite early that many petitions would be filed after the 1997 general elections even though it was not expected that the number of petitions would be as high as eighty-six. Judges and lawyers discussed rules to handle election petitions.

In a workshop held on 2-3 June 1997, judges and lawyers gathered to discuss proposals made by judges of the National and Supreme Courts on rules of court, in the form of practice directions relating to the conduct and hearing of election petition cases. The Chief Justice, Sir Arnold Amet, explained the reason for proposing new practice directions:

> The judiciary has decided to re-examine the practices and procedures of the Court in relation to this jurisdiction because of our experience in previous elections where petitions have generally taken far too long to be determined, for a variety of reasons... It is my firm view that the practices and procedures that have been invoked and applied, in election petition cases since independence, pursuant to the Organic Law on National Elections, have contributed substantially to the complexities and the lengthy delays in the determination of petitions.

Following the workshop, new practice directions were issued. The practice directions, issued on 27 June 1997, spelled out concisely places where petitions may be filed, date for filing petitions, filing fees, security deposit payments, service of petitions on winning candidates and the Electoral Commission, place of trial, production of documents before trial, amendment of petitions, compulsory conferences, and consolidation of multiple petitions filed against a single successful candidate.

The provisions of these practice directions, whilst simplifying some aspects, added to delays in others. In particular, the parts on compulsory conference, which were designed to ensure quick disposition of petitions, while achieving this result in some petitions, inhibited the quick disposal of petitions in others. Section 12 of the Practice Directions concerned compulsory conferences.

> **12. Compulsory Conferences**
>
> (1) After an election petition has been filed, the Registrar shall set a date and venue and direct the parties to appear before a judge for a conference to consider, among other things, the following:
> (a) whether pursuant to Section 222 of the Organic Law parties shall be represented by counsel;
> (b) the possibility of an amicable settlement;
> (c) the simplification of the issues;
> (d) the necessity or desirability of streamlining the pleadings;
> (e) the possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and or documents;
> (f) the limitation of the multiple of witnesses;
> (g) the necessity to direct any electoral records to be produced;
> (h) determining the number of trial days required to accommodate all parties;
> (i) the date for the hearing;
> (j) the necessity to adjourn a hearing to a Provincial Court house in or close to where the electorate is situated; and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition.
>
> (2) The date for a compulsory conference shall be at least 28 days after service of a petition.

(3) The Registrar shall give notice of the date and venue of the conference to the petitioner and the Electoral Commission. The Petitioner upon service of the Respondent with notice of the date, time and venue of the Compulsory Conference [*sic*].

(4) Any and all challenges to the competency of an election petition in respect of the formality or technical requirements of the petition shall be made at the conference and appropriate orders will be made by the judge on all matters raised at the conference.

(5) If a petitioner fails to attend a conference without satisfactory reasons, the Court may strike out the petition.

These provisions are fairly straightforward. As the rules indicate, their purpose was to sort out preliminary issues quickly, with the ultimate objective of getting petitions to trial, where a petitioner can bring evidence to prove his/her allegations. Apart from the filing of a petition that brings together the parties, their lawyers and the courts, the second most important stage in an election petition proceeding is the trial, where the allegations of improper or illegal conduct in a petition are tested. The ultimate objective, therefore, is to get to the trial and have the allegations heard and determined.

At the compulsory conference stage, however, the provisions of Section 210 of the OLNLLGE must first be dealt with. This section states: 'Proceedings shall not be heard on a petition unless the requirements of Section 208 and 209 are complied with'. This provision prevents the National Court from dealing with a petition if a petition does not meet the requirements stipulated under Sections 208 and 209 of the *Organic Law*. In other words, a petition cannot be heard in a trial until the court is first satisfied that the requirements of Sections 208 and 209 have been met. There is only one requirement under Section 209, namely that, 'at the time of filing the petition the petitioner shall deposit with the Registrar of the National Court the sum of K2,500.00 as security for costs'. This requirement has not been put in issue in any petition, because the court registry refused to accept petitions filed without payment of K2,500 in cash or bank cheque. All petitioners were forced to pay this security deposit.

The most contentious issues have arisen in relation to the requirements of Section 208:

208. Requisites of petition.
A petition shall –

(a) set out the facts relied on to invalidate the election or return; and
(b) specify the relief to which the petitioner claims to be entitled; and
(c) be signed by a candidate at the election in dispute or by a person who was qualified to vote at the election; and
(d) be attested by two witnesses whose occupations and addresses are stated; and
(e) be filed in the Registry of the National Court at Port Moresby or at the court house in any Provincial headquarters within 40 days after the declaration of the result of the election in accordance with Section 175(1)(a).

Each of these five requirements, listed under paragraphs (a)—(e), has come under extreme scrutiny from lawyers and judges. There is now an abundance of cases on what each of these five requirements means.

In relation to the requirement under paragraph (a), court decisions make it plain that when pleading any allegation in a petition, the petitioner must set out the full facts on which he/she is

challenging an election result. For instance, if an allegation is that the successful candidate bribed a voter, the allegation in the petition must specify what the bribe was; if it is cash, how much; the date when the bribe was given; the place where the bribe was given; the name of the voter or voters who received the bribe; and it must state that the bribe was offered with a request for the voter or voters to vote for the successful candidate. If a bribery allegation falls short of giving all these details, the allegation would not meet the requirement to set out facts, in which case the allegation must be struck out.

Similarly, a petition must state the relief that the petitioner seeks from the National Court. If the relief is not specified in the petition, the petition cannot be heard because the provisions of paragraph (b) of Section 208 are not met.

The Petitioner or a voter qualified to vote at the election in dispute must sign the petition. A lawyer cannot sign a petition on behalf of the petitioner. Paragraph (c) of Section 208 will not be met if a petition is signed by a person other than a candidate or a voter qualified to vote in the electorate.

Two witnesses must sign the petition as witnesses. The two witnesses must also state their occupations and addresses in the petition after signing it. Failure to witness and provide addresses of the witnesses can result in a petition being struck out at the compulsory conference stage for non-compliance with paragraph (d).

Finally, a petition must be filed in a court registry forty days from the date of declaration of the result of the election concerned. A petition filed after forty days cannot be entertained. If, in a particular electorate, the fortieth day after the declaration falls on a weekend, a petition may be filed on the next working day. But, a petition, once filed, cannot be amended after the fortieth day.

In compulsory conferences, then, lawyers for the successful candidate and the Electoral Commission, who are respondents to petitions, may raise issue and object to parts of a petition or the whole of a petition, on the basis that parts or the whole of a petition do not meet the requirements of Sections 208 and 209. The National Court must deal with these issues and decide on objections raised before the petition can go for trial. In the case of the 1997 petitions, in most instances, whichever way the National Court ruled on preliminary objections based on Section 210 of the OLNLLGE, one of the parties filed a review to the Supreme Court against this preliminary ruling. This had the effect of delaying the trial of petitions as trials had to await a ruling from the Supreme Court.

Petitioners, successful candidates and members of the public have complained about the delays in the disposition of petitions. The fact that a record number of petitions was filed is itself a major reason why petitions have not been disposed of quickly. Election petitions have provided additional work for the National and Supreme courts, whose normal civil and criminal cases have also increased over the years.

The criticisms of delay have been directed, by those familiar with the courts' procedures in election petitions, at two specific stages: the compulsory conference procedure (discussed above), and the Supreme Court's intervention in petition cases.

Supreme Court reviews

Section 220 of the OLNLLGE clearly states that a decision of the National Court in an election petition case is final:

> **220**. Decision to be final.
>
> A decision of the National Court is final and conclusive and without appeal, and shall not be questioned in any way.

To anyone who is unfamiliar with the election petition law in Papua New Guinea, the question that arises immediately is how the Supreme Court has been able to hear appeals from election petition cases in the face of this clear and unequivocal prohibition against appeal, and the clear statement that a National Court decision 'shall not be questioned in any way'.

The Supreme Court has invoked Section 155(2)(b) of the constitution to override the prohibition. Section 155(2) of the constitution states:

> The Supreme Court –
> (a) is the final court of appeal; and
> (b) has an inherent power to review all judicial acts of the National Court; and
> (c) has such other jurisdiction and powers as are conferred on it by this Constitution or any other law'".

The case that established this overriding power of the Supreme Court was a criminal case—*Avia Aihi v. The State* [1981] PNGLR 81. Avia Aihi was convicted for wilful murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. She had attacked her victim, who was a prisoner accused of killing her husband, in front of the Chief Justice and police personnel. After the life imprisonment sentence, Avia Aihi did not appeal against the conviction and sentence within 40 days given under the *Supreme Court Act*. She received legal assistance over one year after her conviction and sentence. She applied to the Supreme Court to appeal out of time. The Supreme Court held that she could not appeal out of time but she could file an application under Section 155(2)(b) of the constitution, for the Supreme Court to use its special inherent powers under that section to hear the appeal out of time.

The headnote to this case, reported in the law report, summarises the Supreme Court's majority decision on its inherent power Section 155(2)(b):

> Section 155(2)(b) of the Constitution, which gives the Supreme Court an 'inherent power to review all acts of the National Court", however, vests the Supreme Court with an unfettered discretionary jurisdiction to hear an appeal and an application for leave to appeal from the National Court, although the applicant has lost his right to appeal or to apply for leave to appeal. The discretion should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances where some substantial injustice is manifest, or the case is of special gravity, the onus being upon the applicant.

This inherent power has since been used in both criminal and civil cases. Like the decision in *Avia Aihi*, in other cases where statutory appeal periods had expired, Section 155(2) (b) has been used to allow successful applicants to review decisions of the National Court, not by way of appeal but by review - the result being the same - where no right of appeal is provided and a person has no other way of going to the Supreme Court, and where appeal is prohibited, as in election petition cases.

The first reported election petition case in which Section 155(2)(b) was invoked, is *Malipu Balakau v. Paul Paken Torato & Anor* [1983] PNGLR 242. Malipu Balakau filed an appeal against a decision of the National Court sitting as a Court of Disputed Returns dismissing an election petition he brought against Paul Paken Torato. Torato filed an objection to the competency of the appeal, contending that Section 220 of the *Organic Law* prohibited appeals from being brought against a decision of the National Court in an election petition case. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was incompetent as Section 220 of the OLNLLGE prohibited appeals from decisions of the National Court on election petition cases. The court pointed out, however, that Balakau could file an application under Section 155(2)(b) of the constitution, for the Supreme Court to review the National Court decision. Kidu CJ suggested (at page 246) that the reference in Section 220 of the *Organic Law* stating that the National Court decision shall not be 'questioned in any way' was inconsistent with Section 155(2) (b) of the constitution and therefore unconstitutional. Kapi Dep. CJ (at page 252) and Andrew J. (at page 256) also decided that the final words of Section 220 of the *Organic Law* conflicted with Section 155(2)(b) and, therefore, were invalid.

The Supreme Court decision in *Melchior Kasap v. Peter Yama* [1988-89] PNGLR 197 affirmed the inherent powers of the Supreme Court under Section 155(2)(b), to review election petition decisions of the National Court. The National Court, sitting as a Court of Disputed Returns, in considering an election petition brought by Peter Yama, an unsuccessful candidate, declared another candidate (who was not a party to the petition) elected. The petitioner and the initial winning candidate sought review of the decision in the Supreme Court, invoking Section 155(2)(b) of the constitution. Dismissing objections that the decision of the National Court was final and could not be challenged, the Supreme Court held that reviews of election petition decisions of the National Court can be brought under Section 155(2)(b). Passages from the decisions of the then chief justice and deputy chief justice have set forth the principles that have since been invoked in Supreme Court reviews of election petition decisions of the National Court.

Kidu CJ said (at p. 199):

> The first question to be determined is whether the Court should exercise its discretionary power under s.155(2)(b) of the Constitution and review the National Court's decision in question. . . .
>
> This is, of course, not the type of case in *Avia Aihi v. The State* [1981] PNGLR 81; *Avia Aihi v. The State (No 2)* [1982] PNGLR 44; *Danny Sunu v. The State* [1984] PNGLR 305 and *The Independent State of Papua New Guinea v. Colbert* [1988] PNGLR 138. Those were cases where appeals were allowed but the applicants failed to appeal in time and then applied for review under s.155(2)(b). In election cases s.220 of the *Organic Law on National Elections* specifically provides:
>
> > *"A decision of the National Court is final and conclusive and without appeal, and shall not be questioned in any way."*
>
> So the only way these applicants could come to this Court is via s.155(2)(b) of the Constitution.

In a similar case, that is, a case where the applicant had no other way to come to this Court except by way of an application under s.155(2)(b), this Court (Kidu CJ, Kapi Dep CJ and Amet J) said:

> *"In a case where a person or a party in a proceedings has no other way of coming before this Court in similar circumstances as in this case, s155(2) is available without the criteria in Avia Aihi and Danny Sunu being first established. In this case, there is an important point of law to be determined and it is not without merit." (SC Review No. 5 of 1987; Re Central Banking (Foreign Exchange and Gold) Regulations [19870 PNGLR 433 at 437.)*

It was on this basis that the applicants were allowed to proceed with their applications.

Kapi DCJ said (at p. 207):

> Section 220 of the Organic Law on National Elections (Ch No 1) was considered by the Supreme Court in *Malipu Balakau v. Paul Torato* [1983] PNGLR 242. The Court struck down the words "in any way" from the provision. The section now reads:
>
> *"A decision of the National Court is final and conclusive and without appeal."*
>
> The provision simply prohibits an appeal but does not prevent a judicial review under s.155(2)(b) of the Constitution.
>
> I agree with the Chief Justice that the criteria to be applied in this case is the same as in the case of *SC Review No. 5 of 1987; Re Central Banking (Foreign Exchange and Gold) Regulations* [1987] PNGLR 433.
>
> There is merit in the grounds of review and therefore this Court should review the decision of the National Court.

Following this decision, the Supreme Court has reviewed many election petition decisions of the National Court. Following the 1997 general election, almost 70 per cent of National Court decisions were challenged by way of review to the Supreme Court. There are at least forty-five Supreme Court published decisions.

In these cases, the Supreme Court has affirmed that its review powers under Section 155(2)(b) of the constitution are discretionary and will be exercised only where a person seeking to invoke this jurisdiction satisfies a number of criteria. In order for the Supreme Court to review a decision of the National Court in an election petition case, the person seeking the review must satisfy the Supreme Court that:

(a) it is in the interest of justice that the Supreme Court invoke its discretionary powers;
(b) there are cogent and convincing reasons or exceptional circumstances; and
(c) there are clear legal grounds meriting review of the National Court decision.

From the record number of reviews filed and decided following the 1997 elections, it may be said that these criteria have not prevented increase in the number of reviews sought in the Supreme Court.

A review under Section 155(2)(b) of the constitution has not been the end of appeals of election petition decisions. The Supreme Court has ruled that it can look again at its own decisions and correct any 'slip' or obvious errors. This has now come to be called the "slip rule". This is a

common-law-based principle under which a final court of appeal can correct its own obvious errors. This common law principle was first used in Papua New Guinea in an ordinary civil case—*Wallbank & Minife v. The State* [1994] PNGLR 78. In two election petition cases, the Supreme Court has used the slip rule to review its own decisions—*Sir Julius Chan v. Ephraim Apelis & Electoral Commission*, Unreported, 1999, SC 591 and *S.C.R. No. 08 and S.C.R. No. 13 of 1999, Charles Maino v. Moi Avei & Electoral Commission*, 2000. However, this is not a further appeal, as the same judge or judges reconsider their earlier decision and may change it only if obvious errors were made. This further procedure has come under criticism for contributing to the delays in disposing election petitions.

Conclusions

A number of observations may be made on election petitions filed following the 1997 general election. The first and most is that electoral officials, candidates and supporters committed more electoral irregularities in the 1997 general election than before, resulting in the record number of petitions being filed. Petitions were filed against 69 successful candidates. Leaving aside the 40 electorates where no petitions were filed, the incidence of irregularities must take account of the number of candidates that contested the elections. However, given that only six petitions were successful, an increasing incidence of irregularities is not an adequate explanation of the increased number of petitions.

Secondly, election to parliament has become highly sought after. Some 2,372 candidates contested the 1997 election. With this increase in the number of candidates, the chances of electoral irregularities increased, with a consequent increase in the number of challenges to the results.

Thirdly, and related, the high demand for a seat in parliament has seen the contest continuing after the elections into the court of disputed returns. In other words, some candidates treat an election petition as part of the election contest. Hence, the increase in the number of filed petitions.

Fourthly, elections have become an expensive exercise for most candidates, who spend thousands or hundreds of thousands of kina on their campaign. With such expenditure on elections, disputing an election outcome may be only a small expenditure in an attempt to set aside the election and obtain a better result from the courts. It may also be a way of saving face following a heated contest between rival candidates. In some cases there may even be personal or tribal rivalries underlying election contests, and disputing an election is a form of revenge, inconveniencing a personal or tribal rival.

Fifthly, the time taken to deal with election petitions has been raised as a major concern. This is no doubt due to the large number of petitions that were filed. If the number of petitions had been small, the courts could have disposed off them without much delay. The fact that many petitions were filed has meant that the courts' time and resources were stretched. Parties to petitions have borne the cost. Petitioners, successful candidates and the administrator of elections, the Electoral Commission, have spent considerable time and resources in attending to petitions. Court procedure, in competency challenges and Supreme Court reviews, have all contributed to the delays.

Apart from the cost in time and resources, election petitions have hindered members of parliament against whom petitions were filed in the representation of their electorates because of the uncertainties surrounding their status. Electorates have been left in suspense as well, in many cases for a number of years.

For the foreseeable future, not much will change in the behaviour of candidates and electors when it comes to observing electoral laws. Similarly, not much will change in the administration of elections. The demand for election to parliament is likely to increase rather than decrease. The cost of administering elections will also increase with the resources available to administer elections declining. Disputing election returns through petitions will thus likely remain a common feature of elections in Papua New Guinea.

Election laws exist to ensure that elections are conducted fairly. These laws must apply equally to all contestants. Elections are at the heart of democracy. No one should be allowed to hold elective office if he or she has not followed the electoral laws. Disputing returns is a way of ensuring that those who have not won an election fairly, who have won elections by breaching electoral laws, are kept out of elective office. It also acts as a deterrent to those who may want to use illegal means to seek elective office. Therefore, disputing election results through petitions must remain an essential element of elections, and of democracy, in Papua New Guinea.

The two main challenges are to ensure that electoral irregularities do not occur, or, if they do occur, that election petitions are heard and disposed of quickly. The first challenge is for candidates, political parties, the general public and Electoral Commission. All must ensure that elections are conducted in accordance with the electoral laws. But, given that elections in Papua New Guinea have become integrated into the cultural, social, political and economic life of the people, and differ in form and shape from one area to another, it will take time before elections can be conducted without the sorts of problems that are raised in election petitions. The second challenge, to ensure that petitions are dealt with and disposed of quickly, is a challenge to the legal profession and the judges of the National and Supreme courts.

5

RIGO OPEN: THE LOCAL FACTOR

Ray Anere

Rigo Open is among the 89 open constituencies throughout Papua New Guinea. It is located some 50 kilometres east of Port Moresby and is accessible by road. The electorate has a population of 36,000 of whom about 21,000 are eligible voters. Elections arouse a great deal of interest among the voters and the candidates, as is the case in other parts of the country. This is manifested in intense campaigning by some candidates and high turnouts at election rallies. What are the characteristics of voting and why did the sitting member, Dibara Yagabo, win in the 1997 election? These, and other questions will be explored in the analysis below.

The 1997 election: characteristics

The Rigo seat was contested by twenty-six candidates, including the sitting member. There were sixteen polling teams involved throughout the period of voting. Polling began on 27 June and ended on 15 July. Contestants had to campaign throughout twenty-four villages in order to secure votes. In some communities certain candidates received no votes at all. This failure to attract votes may have been the result of clan-based voting; vote splitting, to take votes away from other candidates, also occurred. According to losing candidates, money played a big part in the distribution of votes, though one losing candidate claimed that many voters expected benefits of cash and kind from candidates without the intention of voting for them. To the extent that some voters opted to choose certain candidates because of money they had received, it could be argued, their integrity as voters was put in question. Many voters acted without adequate exposure to issues or information, and were thus unable to make informed choices based on a comparison of the merits of candidates. Voters elected candidates on the basis of clan membership, geographical proximity, and money received from candidates. Accordingly, the election in Rigo was characterized by limited penetration of the political marketplace.

The vote

In the count of boxes 1 to 7, ten candidates received no votes and Madu Veratau, an independent candidate, took the lead. Candidates clearly encountered difficulties in appealing to voters in villages where their clan (or linguistic and family) ties were weak or where the handout of money was limited. Clan-based voting and the connection between money and politics are not unique to Rigo, being evident in electorates throughout Papua New Guinea (Premdas 1978; Hegarty 1983a; King 1989; Oliver 1989; Saffu 1989, 1996a).

Further analysis of the Rigo seat reveals additional variables that may help explain the outcome of the election. The counting of votes in boxes 8 to 14 revealed eight candidates receiving no votes. Nine others received one per cent each. The sitting member, Dibara Yagabo, received 23

per cent of votes while Tom Abe, a former diplomat who was endorsed by Ted Diro's People's Action Party, secured 42 per cent. These ballot boxes came from an inland village and this may partly explain why Yagabo and Abe (who was considered a 'local') did well: both are from inland areas of Rigo. Geographical distinctions as a way of narrowing the decision-making calculus of the voters was a feature of the election in Rigo. The fact that 24 of the 26 candidates each secured 7 per cent or less of the total votes in in this village is partly a reflection of the number of candidates, but also suggests limited contact between candidates and the voters. The eight candidates who did not obtain votes did not visit the village at all during the campaign period to 17 June. Others paid at least one visit, but campaigning was limited to 'talking-to-the-people' once only. Suffice it to say that many candidates did not win the hearts and minds of the voters. The lack of strong popularity and solid support for the candidates was another feature of the election in Rigo.

In boxes 15 to 19, eleven candidates did not receive any votes. The highest share was obtained by Mary Karo, with 25 per cent of the votes. She was endorsed by the People's Unity Party. Some opposing candidates claimed that Karo gained votes by the distribution of money.

Boxes 20 to 22 contained a wide distribution of votes. The candidate gaining most votes from these boxes was an independent, Leka Mou, with 35 per cent of votes. Eleven candidates received less than one per cent of votes.

The distribution from boxes 23 and 24 saw another change in the number one position: sitting member Dibara Yagabo took the lead with 31 per cent of the votes. He was endorsed by the People's National Congress (PNC), the party led by Bill Skate, who subsequently became prime minister. Sixteen candidates recorded no votes.

Tom Abe took the lead again when votes from boxes 25 to 27 were counted, receiving 43 per cent of the votes. But Dibara Yagabo again took the lead when votes were counted for boxes 28 to 43. He maintained a clear lead, with 78 per cent from boxes 28 and 29, and 17 per cent from boxes 42 and 43. Boxes 28 to 43 were mainly from the inland area. Dibara did well as he had strong clan and geographical connections among the inland people. He also used Rural Action Program funds to help secure votes in the inland areas.

Independent Willie Asigau recorded the highest number of votes from boxes 44 to 51, mustering 844 votes, 34 per cent of the total. His nearest rival, Tufi Sega, secured 746 votes. Seven candidates received no votes in the three villages covered by these ballot boxes, while another eleven candidates recorded one per cent. Overall, twenty-four candidates received less that 10 per cent of votes in these three villages.

From boxes 52 to 59, Mary Karo polled 568 votes (32 per cent of the total), and her closest rival, Dibara Yagabo, 257 votes (14 per cent). Twenty-three candidates secured less than 10 per cent of votes, with ten receiving no votes.

The final set of ballot boxes, 60 to 78, represented the coastal villages of Keapara, Alukuni, Karawa, Makerupu, Kamali, Kamali-Hula, Hula, Irupara, Alewai, Babaka and Kalo. In these, Brian Amini recorded the highest vote with 928 (22 per cent), followed by Mary Karo, who polled 635 (15 per cent). Twenty-one candidates secured less than 10 per cent of votes in these villages; of these, eleven did not record any votes. As 'coastal' candidates, Amini and Karo did

quite well. In contrast, Dibara Yagabo received a low one per cent of votes from the coastal villages: he polled only 55 votes and was ranked eleventh.

When the final tally was completed, the sitting member, Dibara Yagabo, emerged the winner with 3775 votes, 18.6 per cent of the total. This was also a victory for the People's National Congress (which later became the Papua New Guinea First Party) under the leadership of Bill Skate. Yagabo's nearest rival was Mary Karo, a PUP candidate; she polled 2570 votes, 12.7 per cent of the vote. In third place was Tom Abe with 1843 votes (9.1 per cent). Brian Amini came in fourth with 1445 votes (7.1 per cent); Willie Asigau took fifth place with 1239 votes (6.1 per cent); Veari Maha took sixth place with 1079 votes (5.3 per cent); Tufi Sega recorded 1028 votes (5.1 per cent). The rest of the candidates secured less than 1000 votes each.

The complete results of the election in the Rigo district are shown in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: 1997 General Election—Rigo District

Candidate	votes polled	Percentage of total vote	Affiliation
Dibara Yagabo	3,775	18.6	PNC
Mary Karo	2,570	12.7	PUP
Tom Abe	1,843	9.1	PAP
Brian Amini	1,445	7.1	Independent
Willie Asigau	1,239	6.1	Independent
Veari Maha	1,079	5.3	Nat. Alliance
Tufi Sega	1,028	5.1	Independent
Leka Mou	799	3.9	Independent
Frank Bomio	734	3.6	Independent
Madu Veratau	572	2.8	Independent
Kila Pat Ravu	548	2.7	Independent
Steven Vaira	522	2.6	Independent
Kwago Guria	517	2.6	Independent
Rova Maha	503	2.5	Independent
Darby Kila	397	2.0	CDP
Mari Apana	339	1.7	Independent
Gabriel Maroa	338	1.7	Independent
Laeko Bala	298	1.5	Independent
Joe Yore	297	1.5	Independent
Vaita Navuru	275	1.4	Independent
Pennie Gamoga	231	1.1	Independent
Vali Manu	227	1.1	Independent
Gobaki Dagina	198	1.0	Independent
Gabi Kemana	181	0.9	Pangu Pati
Humeu Maru	148	0.7	Independent
Kepi Naime	4	0.02	Independent

CDP—Christian Democratic Party.
PAP—People's Action Party
PNC—People's National Congress
PUP—People's Unity Party
(Source: Electoral Commission, *1997 General Election Report*, p. 6)

Yagabo polled well in Eaura, Gomore, Imuagolo, Saroakei, Tauruba and other inland villages. In all these villages he ranked first, second or third. He did well in sixteen of the twenty-four villages. In contrast, he did not do as well as he would have liked in the coastal villages of Keapara, Alukuni, Karawa, Makerupu, Kamali, Hula, Irupara and Kalo, where voters tended to vote for candidates from the coastal areas. Brian Amini, who is from the Alukuni village, on the other hand, polled better in the coastal villages.

Clan connections, and the amount of money at the disposal of a candidate, exerted a strong influence over voting behaviour. Yagabo's win may be largely attributed to the fact that clan votes in the inland areas were not split among inland candidates. His endorsement by the PNC probably counted for little.

The failure of coastal candidates was due principally to the fact that twenty of the twenty-seven candidates were from the coast. Although the population of the coastal villages is greater than that of the inland, the large number of coastal candidates substantially split the coastal vote, with the result that the leading coastal candidate, Mary Karo, could not muster enough votes to beat Yagabo.

Voting in the Rigo constituency and democracy

What does voting in the Rigo constituency say about the process of democracy? Arguably, political parties had little impact on voters' choices. PNC, PUP and PAP were either created (as in the case of the first two) or revived (in the case of PAP) in 1997 solely for the purpose of contesting the election. Much the same is true of the National Alliance and CDP. Reilly (1999:229) notes that parties in Papua New Guinea do not operate as coherent, broad-based vehicles for translating public preferences into public policy; rather they are highly personalized parliamentary factions, fragmented and unstable. As argued above, Yagabo won on the basis of clan and ethnic support and access to resources, and not on the basis of party popularity. Parties in Papua New Guinea do not have stable bases of support, suggesting that the link between the parties and democracy in the country is weak (cf. Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1990). After the election, Papua New Guinea's parties will be virtually absent from the electorate. It would seem that the interest of parties lies in mobilizing peoples' votes during the election, rather than in addressing their needs or encouraging citizen participation in the democratic process.

In other democracies where periodic elections are held, parties try to present clear choices to citizens in order to link them to the political process (Powell 1982: 76). They endeavour to cut across social groups in seeking electoral support, and in so doing engage the citizens in the democratic process. This is not the case with parties in Papua New Guinea, which lack the organizational and financial capacity to develop strong links to voters, and do not seem capable of providing alternatives to the people.

That parties and even independent candidates in Papua New Guinea do not try to cultivate strong links with voters is reflected in the very low number of votes that candidates received in some villages in Rigo. The Rigo results also show that nearly all candidates did reasonably well in some villages but not in others, pointing to limited and uneven voter mobilization on the part of the candidates. The need to maintain a spread of supporters does not seem to be strongly appreciated by parties, their candidates, or independents. In developed countries, greater weight is accorded to the widening of electoral support. This is seen in the intensity of campaigns

undertaken by parties and their candidates. There is a strong awareness on the part of the parties and candidates of the need to link citizens to the democratic process. There is, in the words of Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1990:6-7) '... inclusive participation in the selection of leaders and policies ... through free and fair elections'. The corollary is that the absence of strong ties between parties and groups leads to the exclusion of important groups from the political process (Powell 1982: 78).

In the Rigo constituency, Yagabo won with only 18.6 per cent of the vote. Small winning margins are characteristic of elections in Papua New Guinea (Premdas 1978; Hegarty 1983a; King 1989; Oliver 1989; Saffu 1996a). This is associated with the fact that Papua New Guinea has a multiparty system (in the 1997 election there were eighteen registered political parties and five unregistered parties), with the absence of meaningful connections between parties, candidates and electorates, and with large numbers of candidates, especially independent candidates. The electoral system in Papua New Guinea runs counter to Maurice Duverger's 'law' of electoral politics, that simple majority voting with single member districts is associated with two-party systems (Powell 1982:82). Papua New Guinea's electoral reality does not capture the majoritarian principle of democracy. A further consequence is the recurring formation of coalition governments, with instability and a relatively short lifespan of governments: no government since independence has survived its full term in office, due mainly to successful votes of no confidence (Anere 1998:8). It may be argued that the multiparty system in Papua New Guinea has led to unstable coalition governments. In Powell's (1982) study of twenty-seven mostly industrial countries, the average durability of government was more than 36 months. In Papua New Guinea the average durability of government has been 25 months (Anere 1998:8).

Other attributes of voting behaviour in Rigo include the absence of voting along class or occupational lines, and the relative insignificance of education, income and status of candidates. These characteristics are common throughout Papua New Guinea, and partly reflect the fact that most constituencies comprise mostly rural communities of peasant voters. Local considerations are more pronounced in such communities, and class, occupational and educational factors are less important than is the case in more modernized societies (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1990: 35). Many of the candidates contesting the Rigo seat were well-educated and had held senior government positions at various times; by implication, they were high-income earners. Yet many received as little as 1 per cent of communities' votes, and as many as ten candidates received no votes in at least one village.

Conclusion

Different levels of clan support, access to money and other resources to influence voters, and variation in the number of candidates in a given geographic area were strong determinants of the election outcome in Rigo. Parties, party candidates, and independents alike made limited contact with voters and did not present voters with clear choices. What was the case in Rigo held true for much of the rest of Papua New Guinea.

In contrast to developed democracies, where parties try to present voters with clear choices and alternatives, the intrinsic value of citizen participation in Papua New Guinea is not well appreciated by parties or candidates. Voters go to the polls but they do not have adequate opportunity to meaningfully elect their leaders.

In Rigo, as in many other constituencies throughout Papua New Guinea, the winning candidate won with a small margin. This is an outcome of the first-past-the-post voting system and the fact that large numbers of candidates compete for individual seats, often with the encouragement of their clan. The majority principle is thus not captured in elections in Papua New Guinea. Also, many election disputes occur as losing candidates challenge the validity of the outcome in the Court of Disputed Returns.

A solution to these problems might be to move away from the present first-past-the-post system to optional preferential voting. This, it could be argued, would accommodate the collective will of the electorate, and give the winning candidate legitimacy.

In addition, political parties and candidates might be required to provide the names of members and supporters on the electoral role in order to qualify for an election.

6

MILNE BAY PROVINCIAL: INDEPENDENTS VERSUS PARTIES

Ray Anere

Elections are a focal point of competition for power and thus the right to representation. As in past elections, the 1997 election generated immense political heat creating moments of excitement as well as apprehension. It produced many wild surprises as prominent political leaders were sent tumbling to the ground by the might of the pen. Papua New Guinea lived up to its reputation as 'the land of the unexpected' as political heavyweights like Sir Julius Chan, Paias Wingti, and John Giheno lost their seats to less prominent citizens in Namatanai, Western Highlands, and Henganofi.

A theme that will be explored in this chapter is the success of independent candidates, as opposed to political party candidates. First, however, a discussion of some conceptual dimensions is necessary for establishing a framework for analysis.

Conceptual framework

Political parties are associations that activate and mobilize people. They endeavour to represent interests of voters amidst competing viewpoints. Parties seek to provide political leadership for citizens. They are instruments for acquiring power and for governing. Indeed it can be said that parties are a ubiquitous phenomenon of contemporary political life (Macridis 1967:9).

Parties are associated with representative government. In order for a party to govern, a certain number of its members need to be elected as representatives of the people. Accordingly, parties are competitors for elective office. Elections embody the notion of popular representation—the idea that citizens exercise their rights to choose a candidate of a party who can best represent them in the legislature.

Lipset (1960:xxiv) has argued that, 'The power of party machines in a mass-suffrage is ... limited'. The social structure of communities plays a part in that parties are strong in heterogenous societies, and weak in those that are homogenous (*ibid.*).

In considering the representational function of parties, the question may be asked: what are the political needs of different groups in society, and how are they met? An inherent assumption is that a party exists because it has fulfilled certain constituent needs. The corollary is that a party would not assume the representational function if it did not fulfil constituent needs. This assumption suggests that party organization is essential in mobilizing votes under conditions of universal suffrage. A candidate standing for elective office has a dependent relationship with those who control the vote-getting organization. Such organizations try to mediate between private individuals and interest groups who desire something from the state. These groups can trade votes or money for favours from elected officials.

The needs of different constituents and how they are met depend in part on the political abilities of the electorate—the voters' level of knowledge, understanding, and interest in political matters. Voters are expected to make meaningful choices, and to understand the options on which they are voting. Citizens must understand the way the political system works if they are to have any significant impact on their representatives. Parties and candidates expect voters to make meaningful choices, but this can only be realized if the electorate possesses a certain basic level of political understanding.

An important implication of the electorate's political sophistication is that effective democracy requires that the citizens are equipped with political information and knowledge. Writers such as Mill, Locke, and Tocqueville believed that such traits were a *sine qua non* for an effective democratic system. Democracy also implies that citizens support the system, including its ideals such as pluralism and freedom of expression. Commitment to such ideals requires an attentive public. The citizenry, therefore, needs to be a custodian of civic virtue if they are to make well informed decisions when voting at elections. A corollary is that an uninformed public is easily susceptible to manipulation, which may lead to serious distortion of the democratic process.

An informed public should possess a strong desire for stimulating political debate as part of election campaigns. They should rally in great numbers during such campaigns, as a sign that the citizenry is concerned with political, social and economic issues. Historical experiences have strengthened the belief that a sophisticated, involved, and democratic public is a necessary requirement for democracy to succeed.

An important concern, however is whether democratic norms have developed among the public. Against the lofty images of the democratic citizen, the reality of elections suggests that the political sophistication of the voting public typically falls short of the expectations of classical democratic theory. Most citizens demonstrate political interest and participation during polling periods, but not beyond. The lack of political sophistication is associated with the claim that voting decisions are not based on rational assessments of candidates and their stand on various issues, but rather that voting is based on group loyalties and personal considerations.

A study by Berelson *et al.* revealed that certain requirements deemed necessary for a successful democracy were not evident in the behaviour of the average citizen. The study pointed out that, 'Many vote without real involvement in the election .... The citizen is not highly informed on the details of the campaign ....In any rigorous or narrow sense the voters are not highly rational' (Berelson *et al.* 1954:307-10).

These claims were supported by another study, *The American Voter* (Campbell *et al.* 1960), which found that American voters lacked understanding of ideological issues. Public opinion, it was claimed, did not carry ideological overtones. Also, there appeared to be a weak relationship between various issues, and peoples' positions on issues varied over time. The apparent lack of (ideological) structure, consistency and stability led to the conclusion that many voters lacked informed opinions (or any opinions) on longstanding political issues.

The *American Voter* revealed that the American electorate seriously lacks the capacity for understanding the rationality of government actions. Voters just do not make serious effort to understand what has led to particular policies, let alone the goals and the resources and methods

employed in achieving them. In short, most citizens in the US failed to meet the requirements of classic democratic theory.

An inherent paradox here is that although voters did not behave as good 'democratic citizens', democracy nonetheless existed for generations. Political scientists grappled with the paradox by coming up with an elitist theory of democracy (Berelson *et al.* 1954:313-23; Almond and Verba 1963: chapter 15). The theory contended that democratic politics might become unsuccessful if there were excessive citizen participation. Thus the theory attempted to popularize the notion of the 'potentially active citizen' as opposed to the 'active citizen'. It reasoned that political elites need political space and freedom to make decisions without the threat of being disrupted by dissatisfied groups of citizens. Accordingly, the political system would ensure some degree of 'democratic politics' through the active participation of those groups whose interests were at stake in certain policy or issue areas.

This analysis has relevance to the Milne Bay electorate.

The Milne Bay Provincial Electorate

The Milne Bay provincial seat was contested by ten candidates. Seven were independents while three were endorsed by parties. Table 6.1 below summarizes the electoral data.

Table 6.1: Milne Bay Provincial Electorate

Candidate	Status	Votes	%	Rank
William Tilipu	Independent	728	1.1	10
Kevin Yabara	Independent	2,239	3.3	9
John Luke Crittin	Milne Bay Party	14,247	21.2	2
Navy Aule	Independent	6,102	9.1	4
Kaidama Elliot	Independent	2,916	4.3	8
Kevin Kaidoga	Pangu Pati	3,625	5.4	7
Josephine Abaijah	**Independent**	**15,145**	**22.5**	**1**
Tovesei Toboeta	Independent	3,653	5.4	6
Tim Neville	Independent	13,160	19.6	3
Mesia Novau	PAP	4,455	6.6	5
Total		66,270		
Registered voters		114,420		

(Source: *The Independent*, 4 July 1997)

About 58 per cent of eligible voters voted in the provincial seat. Dame Josephine Abaijah won 22.9 per cent of the 66,270 votes. John Luke Crittin, a Milne Bay Party candidate, came second with 21.5 per cent of the votes. Former governor, Tim Neville finished third with 19.9 per cent.

These figures suggest that independents are more popular than parties. Why is this the case? The analysis below suggests that the popularity of independents is due not to their status as independents, but to their prominence in the community and proven record of achievements. In other words, a candidate is popular as an individual and not because of his/her independent status.

Performance of candidates

Table 6.1 shows that 66.4 per cent of the 66,270 votes were obtained by independents and 33.7 per cent were distributed among the three party-endorsed candidates. Josephine Abaijah and Tim Neville together collected 42.8 per cent of the vote.

To ascertain candidates' views on what factors they considered important, candidates were asked [before the election] to rank five factors according to how important they considered these to be in attracting electoral support. The five factors (ranked 1, most important to 5, least important) were: independent stance, issues (development problems or projects as part of a candidate's platform), work experience, status in the community, and candidate's record of achievement. The responses to this questionnaire are summarized in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2: Candidate popularity

Reasons for popularity, by rank 1-5

Candidate	Independent stance	Issues	Work experience	Status	Achievement
W. Tilipu	5	1	2	3	4
K. Yabara	5	1	2	3	4
J.L. Crittin	5	1	3	4	2
N. Aule	5	1	2	4	3
K. Elliot	5	1	3	4	2
K. Kaidoga	5	1	2	3	4
J.M. Abaijah	5	1	3	4	2
T. Toboeta	5	1	2	3	4
T.P. Neville	5	1	3	4	2
M. Novau	5	1	2	3	4

(Source: R Anere, 11 July 1997)

The table clearly shows that candidates did not regard their independent status as a factor determining their chances of winning in the election. The most important factors, as they saw it, were the issues they campaigned on, their experience, their record of achievement, and their status in the community. The top four candidates ranked achievements as the second most important factor. Navy Aule and Kaidama Elliot were former premiers, while Tim Neville was the provincial governor until his defeat in the 1997 election. John Luke was a well known businessman in Alotau, while Josephine Abaijah, a former member of the National Parliament, was prominent at the national and provincial levels and had held various official responsibilities. These candidates considered their past achievements as important factors in capturing the trust and confidence of the voters.

Tables 6.1 and 6.2 seem to confirm the findings of past election studies, that voters do not vote for parties in elections. Rather, voters choose on the basis of whom they know, to whom they are related, and on the achievements and leadership qualities of candidates.

Parties versus independents

There is a prevailing view among Papua New Guineans that independent candidates are more popular than party-endorsed candidates. I shall argue in this study that party versus independent candidacy bears little significance in the decision-making calculus of voters.

In the course of this study 500 voters in Alotau and surrounding communities, randomly selected, were asked who they voted for in the Milne Bay Provincial seat, and the reasons why they voted as they did. The results of this survey are summarized in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3: Voters and Reasons for Choice of Candidate

Reasons for Choice	Number of Voters	Percentage
Leadership ability	200	40
Development projects candidate will initiate	100	20
Family, clan or tribe member	50	10
Past achievements	50	10
Status in community	35	7
Party	35	7
Independent	30	6
Total	**500**	**100**

(Source: R. Anere, 18 July 1997)

Table 6.3 shows that party endorsement and independent candidacy were insignificant considerations in determining voter preferences and voting outcomes.

Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 contain a consistent message: the status of candidacy—party-endorsed or independent—does not influence voters' preferences or voting outcomes; party politics does not seem to count very much among the voters. Promises that 'Pangu will do this' or 'PDM will do that' do not appear to be important; rather it is 'I will do this' or 'I will do that' that people want to hear, and are used to hearing. Party-related factors seldom enter a candidate's campaign language.

Table 6.3 also indicates the limitations, among voters of Alotau, of primordial or ethnic factors in voting for provincial seats, although, as will be argued below, ethnicity may have been a significant fact in Abaijah's election. Such factors provide natural boundaries for the popularity of a candidate; beyond these boundaries a candidate has to be sufficiently prominent to acquire votes from other clans, tribes or districts. Leadership abilities and the kinds of development projects that a candidate thinks will appeal to the voters are more important than family, clan and tribal connections. For the provincial seat especially, the appeal of a candidate must go beyond such connections and include voter confidence and trust in the candidate. Thus personal qualities are more important than the independent or party status of candidacy in voters' decision-making calculus and candidate's campaign strategies.

Although contesting the Milne Bay Provincial seat as an independent candidate was not a significant determining factor, independents generally appeared more popular than party-

endorsed candidates. Among the top three candidates, two were independents and together they amassed 42.8 per cent of the total vote. Across the country, independents fared well, winning 32 of 109 seats in parliament.

While personal factors largely account for a candidate's chances of winning, independents have certain advantages over party-endorsed candidates. One advantage is that independent candidates are not bounded by party policies and are free to speak on whatever issues they feel are important to voters. All independent candidates for the Milne Bay Provincial seat considered their freedom to be an important factor in enhancing their personal attributes and thus their chances of winning.

There is a trade-off between freedom and material support in this context. Independents forego a certain amount of material support from parties, while party-endorsed candidates forego a certain amount of freedom. However, independent candidates who have sufficient material resources are able to campaign in different parts of the electorate while at the same time retaining their freedom. They are able to travel around the electorate, speaking on the issues they consider to be important to the various communities. In general, the more areas a candidate visits during a campaign, the better are his or her chances of winning.

Campaigning in different parts of the provincial electorate has several merits. First, candidates like to be seen by the voters. Voters, too, like to see the candidates in person as this helps to sharpen their decision-making focus. Secondly, candidates like to know the physical needs of specific communities, as this assists them to tailor their campaign speeches. Thirdly, a minimum level of mutual trust between the candidates and the voters must be established. The process also gives the candidates some idea of how many votes they might secure and provides a source of anticipation of the delivery of vital services on the part of the voters.

The underlying reality is the influence that geography exerts on politics. Campaign speeches need to be adjusted to the environment, and candidates see the importance of this. Their response, however, depends on their mobility, which in turn is dependent on their material resources and access to boats, trucks or helicopters for transportation. Lack of resources can severely limit a candidate's response capacity. Table 6.4 below shows the number of districts each candidate visited. It is an attempt to measure candidates' responsiveness to environmental realities.

Table 6.4: Districts and Communities Visited by Candidates

Candidate	District	Est no. of persons visited	Mode of transport
William Tiripu	C	1,000	Land (W)
Kevin Yabara	A B	15,973	Land (W)
John Luke	A B C F	30,000	Land, Sea, Air
Navy Aule	B C	10,000	Land (W), Sea
Kaidama Elliot	E	4,000	Land (W)
Kevin Kaidoga	E	5,000	Land (W)
Josephine Abaijah	A B C D	30,000	Land, Sea, Air
Tovosei Toboeta	E	5,500	Land (W)
Timothy P Neville	A B C F	30,000	Land, Air
Mesia Novau	B C	9,000	Land (W)

A, Rabaraba; B, Alotau; C, Samarai; D, Esa'ala; E, Losuia; F, Misima.
Land (W)—walking as a principal mode of transport
(Source: R. Anere, 26 July 1997)

It can be seen that no candidate visited all communities and districts, but those with material resources, or access to such resources, were able to cover wider areas of the province than those who did not. Tim Neville was able to use helicopters to visit the Rabaraba, Alotau, Samarai and Misima districts. Abaijah had resources at her disposal that allowed her to go places in Rabaraba, Alotau, Samarai and Esa'ala. John Luke, a wealthy businessman, was able to campaign in the Rabaraba, Alotau, Samarai and Misima districts. Abaijah, Luke and Neville had access to land, sea and air transportation including helicopter services. All of them would have addressed an estimated 30,000 voters. This contributed to their strong performance. The figures suggest that the greater the geographical penetration of the province, the larger the vote.

Abaijah, Luke and Neville, who all have business interests, had more resources at their disposal than did the other candidates. Table 6.5 below indicates the amount of money each candidate spent on campaigning.

Table 6.5: Amount of money spent by candidates

Candidate	Amount (K)
William Tiripu	900
Kevin Yabara	2,000
John Luke	50,000
Navy Aule	2,000
Kaidama Elliot	1,000
Kevin Kaidoga	1,000
Josephine Abaijah	12,000
Tovesei Toboeta	800
Timothy P Neville	50,000
Mesia Novau	1,000

Luke and Neville spent substantially more than Abaijah, who in turn spent considerably more than any other candidate. They were thus able to visit and talk to more voters.

The implication of tables 4 and 5 is that money, and the mobility it confers, are more important determining factors than the status of being an independent. This brings us to the question: since Abaijah had fewer material resources than Luke and Neville, what other factors were responsible for her win?

Casual interviews with voters suggest that the ethnic composition of the province was a critical factor favouring Abaijah. Table 6.6 shows that each candidate had certain geographical strongholds based on ethnic factors and popular appeal.

Table 6.6: Geographical strongholds for candidates

Geographical areas	Candidate
Rabaraba	Abaijah, Yabara
Daga	Abaijah, Yabara
Goodenough Bay Coastal	Abaijah, Yabara
Goodenough Bay Inland	Abaijah
Maramatana	Abaijah, Luke, Neville
Tavara	Abaijah, Luke, Neville
Alotau Town	Abaijah, Luke, Neville, Novau
Esa'ala	Abaijah
West & Inland Fergusson	Abaijah, Luke, Neville
East Fergusson	Abaijah, Luke, Neville
North Normanby	Abaijah, Luke, Neville
South Normanby	Abaijah, Luke, Neville
Buhutu	Aule, Novau
Ealeba	Aule, Novau
Hagita (Milne Bay Estates)	Luke, Neville
Samarai	Aule, Novau
Suau	Aule, Novau, Tiripu
Amphletts & Sanaroa	Aule, Novau
Losuia	Elliot, Kaidoga, Toboeta
Misima	Abaijah, Luke, Neville

Abaijah had strongholds in thirteen of the twenty geographical areas identified, that is, almost 65 per cent of the province. Luke's and Neville's support each covered about 45 per cent of the province; Novau's 30 per cent; Aule's about 25 per cent; Yabara's 15 per cent, and those of Toboeta, Kaidoga, Elliot, and Tilipu each 5 per cent.

Elliot, Kaidoga and Toboeta are from the Trobriands, and derived most of their respective votes from the Losuia district. Aule, Novau and Tilipu are from Suau and got most of their votes from

the Suau district. Aule resides at Samarai and this would have been an advantage in securing votes from that district. Luke and Neville are naturalized citizens who have enormous popularity throughout the province. Their strongholds appear to be Maramatana, Tavara, Alotau, West and Inland Fergusson, East Fergusson, South and North Normanby, Hagita and Misima. Abaijah is from the Rabaraba side of the province. Her stronghold appears to be the areas of Rabaraba, Goodenough, Normanby, Fergusson, Esa'ala, Alotau and Misima. Ethnically, her support would have come primarily from the Rabaraba and Alotau areas, but her leadership qualities and experience gained her support in other areas.

Table 6.7: Population by districts

District	Population
Rabaraba	21,020
Alotau	26,899
Samarai	14,149
Esa'ala	49,279
Losuia	26,628
Misima	20,805

(Source: National Statistical Office, *1990 National Population Census Final Figures Census Unit Populations Milne Bay Province*, February 1993, pp.1-11.)

Although not everybody voted in the election, it would seem that ethnicity was an important factor in Abaijah's election victory. Ethnicity is especially significant if a candidate does not face competition from rivals in the same area. In the case of the Samarai district, for example, Aule Novau, and Tilipu, who are all from Suau, split the votes amongst them such that Suau did not provide a solid base of support for any one of them. The Suau area has a population of 6,481 (1990 national population census). Although Aule may have secured more votes in Suau than either Novau or Tilipu, he could not have counted on Suau to provide a solid base of support. In contrast, Rabaraba has a larger population and had only two candidates, Abaijah and Yabara. Abaijah outclassed Yabara in terms of leadership and other qualities, and hence Rabaraba district was a solid base of ethnic support for her.

However, while Abaijah possessed the qualities that ensured her eventual victory, her chances of becoming victor would have been greatly reduced had Luke, the former governor, or Neville, the sitting member, decided not to stand. If both had not been standing, either might have won. It was a combination of ethnic and other qualities which determined Abaijah's success.

Above all else, the people wanted a change of leadership at the provincial level. While Neville, as provincial governor, had made some important contributions to the province's development, the fact that he was defeated is an indication that the people of Milne Bay wanted a change at the top. The chief executive of the province is seen as having the power to bring about changes in the direction of provincial development. A change of leadership signals a change in development emphasis, particularly for those areas that seem to have been neglected by the incumbent government. Table 6.8 below shows the reasons voters in Alotau gave for wanting a change of leadership.

Table 6.8: Reasons for wanting a change of leadership

	Order of importance	%
Rural health and social services	6	12
Rural economic development	4	15
More attention to needs of women and youth	5	11
Personal integrity	1	20
Leadership abilities	2	18
Educational qualifications	3	16
Urban development	7	8
Total		**100**

The table indicates that personal integrity, leadership abilities, educational qualifications, and rural economic development were the main considerations in voters' desires for a change of leadership. These were followed by increasing attention to the needs of women and youth, and rural health and social services. The concern for rural development and services is high on the priority list of many voters, given that about 92 per cent of Milne Bay province is rural. Out of a total provincial population of 158,780, only 11,074 live in urban areas (1990 National Population Census).

At this stage it might be useful to summarize the factors that accounted for Abaijah's success. Addressing the right issues during the campaign, professional experience and leadership abilities were important elements for both voters and candidates. Abaijah had a good command of these qualities. As seen in Table 6.3, 40 per cent of voters interviewed felt leadership qualities to be the most important element to be taken into account when voting; 20 per cent nominated development projects or issues; 10 per cent considered primordial ties as the key factor, while 10 per cent emphasized the past achievements of candidates. Party affiliation or independent status were relatively insignificant in moulding the choices that voters made. That Abaijah won the regional seat is affirmation of the peoples' appreciation of her leadership abilities. She also received strong support from female voters.

Other factors

The allocation of public resources by the political elite is of key concern to the voters throughout Milne Bay. Many voters expressed concern that politicians with business interests have, on various occasions, used their influence to give contracts to companies in which they had an interest. Prominent provincial politicians, formerly in the executive, were known to have allocated development projects to companies they owned. One alleged example is the upgrading of the Gurney international airport, a project which was given to the company of a prominent leader in the period prior to the 1997 general election.

Against this background, many voters became wary of candidates with business interests. The general concern of the people was that local businessmen and groups did not seem to be given adequate consideration when it came to the allocation of contracts for development projects, and that such practices promoted the interests of those who were already rich and powerful. The

intertwining of the interests of capital and politics, seemingly leading to a class system in the province, is generating a sense of injustice in the community. This factor may have had some negative impact on the candidature of Neville and Luke.

Putting the public interest before personal interest while in public office was an important factor in the minds of the voters. Many voters seem to have felt that Abaijah satisfied the requirement of *honesty and integrity* in leadership. Honesty, commitment to the people, fairness in the distribution of resources, and attending to the less developed areas, were some of the qualities many voters felt were strongly possessed by Abaijah.

Issues are an important element of any election: candidates inevitably need to focus on matters that are of concern to the voters, such as roads, bridges, schools, clinics and other social, economic and infrastructural needs. Voters expect candidates to talk on a variety of issues that are of relevance to them.

Table 6.2 above revealed that all candidates ranked 'issues' as the most important factor in attracting votes. What was Abaijah's winning strategy in this regard?

At least ten categories of issues could be identified in Abaijah's campaign. Table 6.9 shows how they were ranked by the 500 voters polled in Alotau and surrounding communities (see Table 6.3).

Table 6.9: Issues in order of importance

Issues	Rank
Health	6
Schools, education	5
Infrastructure (roads, airstrips, etc)	7
Family planning	4
Economic development	10
Teachers' houses, classrooms	3
Sewing, cooking	2
Agricultural extension services	9
Landowner participation in economic development	8
Women's participation in social & economic development	1

Recognizing the need for some flexibility in the campaign, Abaijah tried to adjust her discussion of campaign issues to address the particular needs of the community to which she was talking. The first six priority issues were relevant to most districts that she visited. Most rural areas in Milne Bay are lacking in women's participation; sewing or home economics skills; teacher's classrooms and houses; family planning; education, and health. Women's participation in social and economic development was seen as a high priority issue because most women are confined to domestic responsibilities. Their involvement in social and economic ventures is hardly visible. Even in the sphere of domestic duties, sewing clothes and cooking food for sale are not pursued as commercial activities. Even sewing clothes for family use is not pursued as a regular activity;

most women and their families buy clothes from the local shops. Teacher's housing and classrooms, and family planning are essential for the further decentralization of education services, and for family sizes commensurate with family income. The extension of basic health services is also a vital consideration. These require adequate infrastructural development.

On Fergusson and Misima, Abaijah stressed the importance of landowner participation in mining-related economic development, together with the extension of agricultural services to the villagers.

Social services were given emphasis in Abaijah's election campaign. This strategy was probably seen as necessary to secure women's votes, though most of the voting population are parents of pupils, patients, or in some way interested in the delivery of social services.

Conceptual Issues

The 1997 election in Milne Bay was partly a contest between independents and political parties. Various conceptual issues associated with parties as political phenomena are worth re-examining here.

Statistics of voting for the regional seat reveal that 66.4 per cent of 66,270 votes were obtained by independents. This suggests that parties mobilized only about 20 per cent of the total eligible voting population in the Milne Bay provincial seat. At least in Milne Bay, parties cannot be seen as effective instruments of mobilization of citizens on important national and provincial issues.

Several reasons can be advanced as to why this is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. First, parties are organizationally weak in Milne Bay, as elsewhere in the country. There are no regional or local branches in the province. Five of the major parties, namely, Pangu Pati, People's Progress Party, People's Democratic Movement, Melanesian Alliance, and the National Party, do not have branches in Milne Bay. Secondly, parties are not regular but *ad hoc* actors in Milne Bay politics. They interact with Milne Bay citizens only in times of intense political activity such as during national and provincial elections. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, parties lack the institutional foundations in the province to become focal points for rallying the citizens on important national and provincial issues. For example, provincial government reform is an important issue, but this is scarcely debated by political parties or citizens; the issue is left to individual citizens to comprehend in the best way they can. No political education activities are undertaken by parties. It was clear in Milne Bay during the 1997 election that parties had failed to create an informed citizenry with the ability to make choices on the issues affecting them.

Given the apparent lack of mobilizational capacity by parties, the needs of citizen groups, such as landowners and women, to have a stronger voice in decision-making are not actively taken up by political parties. For example, there is hardly any link between parties and landowner groups such as the Misima Resource Owner's Association (MROA), despite the significant political issues associated with mining activity in the province, and the fact that many women seem to be left out in the distribution of mine-related benefits. The representative function of parties is not developed in Milne Bay. The lack of a link between citizens and the political elite through party representation is a major weakness of the democratic process in the province.

The lack of an informed citizenry in Milne Bay in turn shapes the voters' knowledge, understanding and interest in political matters. To the extent that these are low, citizens do not make demands on parties to take on wider representative duties. Thus a two way process exists, in that low levels of political interest and low levels of interest articulation by parties reinforce the absence of a representative culture in the province.

Conclusion

Party politics has not been a major force among voters in Milne Bay. Parties mean very little to the voters. Consequently, the 1997 election was dominated by independent candidates, with Dame Josephine Abaijah emerging as the winner. Abaijah secured nearly 23 per cent of total eligible votes, and became the first female governor under the 1995 provincial government reform.

A feature of the election was the significance of local issues over national issues. The fact that Abaijah was voted in as provincial member, and hence as governor, had more to do with the desire for change in the provincial leadership, and for integrity and honesty, than with issues of national leadership. Management of the national economy or the elimination of corruption in national politics, important as they are, did not figure prominently in the decision calculus of the voters. Rather, issues such as the construction of teachers' houses, classrooms, and clinics, and local economic development, were among the more immediate considerations. Political socialization has not effectively penetrated the rural segments of the province. However, ironically, what the voters considered to be a local issue—integrity and honesty in leadership—was also a national desire. Fairness in the allocation of public resources and contracts and was another important concern of both Milne Bay voters and the national electorate.

Parties exerted little influence on the voters. It may be argued that parties are chiefly electoral actors rather than popular guardians of public interest in Milne Bay politics. Individuals tended to stand as independents rather than as party candidates. This was to some extent inevitable, given that many individuals were seeking political office and parties could only endorse a limited number of candidates. But in any case voters are more likely to focus on candidates as individuals, regardless of whether they stand as independents or party-endorsed candidates.

Democratic participation by Milne Bay citizens is highly visible in elections, as the 1997 election demonstrated. Between elections, the visibility diminishes. While the people of Milne Bay may not easily fit the category of democratic citizens, they are slowly adapting to Western-style democratic processes and forms of participation. The slow pace of socialization may be partly explained by the fact that the traditional functions of political parties are not actively played out in Milne Bay politics. But Milne Bay is experiencing an evolving democracy, as is, perhaps, the rest of Papua New Guinea.

7

GOROKA OPEN: FROM RURAL CAPITALIST TO TRIBES AND THEIR EDUCATED ELITES?

Wilson Orlegge

Introduction

Goroka town is the administrative centre of the Eastern Highlands Province. The Goroka Open electorate comprises urban Goroka and two rural areas, Gahuku, beyond the boundaries of the town, and Mimanalo, towards the west. The electoral boundary commences at Kamaliki, 10 kilometres east of Goroka Town and extends to Iufi Iufa, 15 kilometres west towards Kundiawa. The fact that the electorate contains an urban population has meant that a number of candidates from other provinces contested the 1992 and 1997 elections in Goroka.

The history of elections for Goroka Open has been well documented. In the first elections in 1964, ten candidates contested, of whom six were leading Gorokan entrepreneurs identified in a study by Finney (1973) as business leaders. Subsequent elections had many candidates who were identified as business leaders (Finney 1969, 1973, 1993), rural peasants (Amarshi, Good and Mortimer 1979; Hegarty 1983a) and rural capitalists (Good and Donaldson 1980; Good 1986; Donaldson and Good 1988; Stewart 1992). They were primarily rural entrepreneurs engaged in commercial primary production (coffee, cattle, vegetables) and later in trucking, trade stores and restaurants. The elected members from Goroka Open, from the first election in 1964 up to 1987, were identified as being from the rural entrepreneurial class.

Finney (1973) identified ten business leaders or entrepreneurs in his 1967/68 study. They were innovators and risk takers who introduced Western ideas, technologies and crops to a society that was little removed from the Stone Age. Amarshi, Good and Mortimer (1979:9) identified the rich peasants as those individuals who had the ability to mobilize their resources and the resources of others to establish rural enterprises, usually under the control of one or two leaders, rather than the whole group who pooled their resources and labour. Rural capitalists (Good and Donaldson 1980; Donaldson and Good 1988) were those persons who controlled and owned factors of production and produced a revenue surplus.

The first and second House of Assembly elections

The Goroka Open electorate comprises what is now the Unggai Bena, Daulo and Goroka electorates. The first member of the 1964-1968 House of Assembly was Sinake Giregire, a resident of what is now Daulo Open. He was one of the youngest included by Finney (1973) among the ten leading businessmen in the highlands of New Guinea. Sinake had work experience as an agricultural station assistant, mechanic and later an alluvial gold miner. He operated a sawmill and with the money saved later returned to his village to plant coffee. He was young, but because of his money and entrepreneurial skills his tribesmen respected him. He was provided

with a large tract of land and free labour to develop it, and established himself as a farmer and coffee planter. With the introduction of the Asaro Watabung Local Government Council (the Council for the whole of the current Daulo electorate) in 1958, Sinake was elected as councillor and eventually as the council president.

In the second House of Assembly elections in 1968, Sinake Giregire moved over to the new Daulo Open electorate and with his reputation as a young entrepreneur, former council president, business leader, and proponent of rural economic development, there was little difficulty in his winning the seat (Finney 1973). In Goroka Open, most of the candidates were from among the business leaders identified by Finney.

Sabumei Kofikai from the Bena area was elected from Goroka to the 1968-1972 House of Assembly. Kofikai was another of the leading businessmen identified by Finney. Sabumei, apart from being a business leader, earned his reputation for the service he rendered to Goroka, Daulo and Unggai-Bena area in introducing coffee, whilst employed in the Department of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries. Under the preferential voting system then in place, Kofikai capitalized on his reputation, asking those who knew him outside his Bena area to give him their second preference after giving their first preference votes to their favourite candidates (Finney 1973:121). He did well and became the member.

The third and fourth general elections (1972–1977)

For the third House of Assembly, Akepa Miakwe, a coffee farmer and president of Goroka Local Government Council, won the seat from fellow Bena rich peasant, Kofikai. With the redrawing of electoral boundaries for the 1977 national elections, Miakwe moved over to the new Unggai-Bena Open electorate and represented it from 1977-1982. Another rising rich peasant, Sailas Atopare, won the seat in 1977.

Atopare worked as a rural development officer, but resigned to manage an expatriate-owned plantation and eventually became involved in the populist business organization, the Asaro-Watabung Rural Development Corporation as its manager/secretary in the neighbouring Daulo Open electorate. By this time he had established himself as a rich peasant, organising his clansmen to pool their resources for coffee buying, investment, cattle projects, and passenger and freight business ventures. Atopare by then had 25 hectares of coffee and some cattle and vegetable gardens (Donaldson and Good 1988:104). In that election, an educated *petit bourgeois*, Bebes Korowaro, a journalist with some work experience in the provincial bureaucracy, contested and came second. He had substantial shares in one of the six business groups that owned the Gouna Development Corporation, a business organization set up by the rich peasants.

The rise of the educated elite (1982–1992)

It was not surprising when, in 1977, one of the founders of Gouna Development Corporation, Hari Gotaha, gave his personal support to Bebes Korowaro, an educated member and shareholder in the Gouna Development Corporation. In 1982 Korowaro unseated Atopare.

Arguably, this marked the start of the election of educated *petit bourgeoisie* to the Goroka Open seat. Previously, rich peasants and capitalists drew support from across tribal and language groupings. In 1987, a virtually unknown candidate, Mathias Ijape, a police cadet with a law degree, contested the election. Then employed as a prosecutor in the Police Department, Ijape

amassed enough tribal support to win from Korowaro. In his first term, Ijape paid school fees for community and high school students in the electorate through his allocation from the Electoral Development Fund. This was a welcome gesture for highlanders facing a depressed world market price for coffee. Toward the end of the 1987-1992 parliamentary term, Ijape sealed the Rothmans to Lapegu road to his village and the road to Asaroka High School. With school fee assistance and road sealing, Ijape got the majority of votes from roadside residents, as well as from his tribesmen, and was returned for a second term in 1992. Ijape was later associated with the Sandline mercenary issue and the riots of March 1997.

Background to the 1997 national election in Goroka Open

In 1997 there were candidates from almost every village in the electorate; in some instances there were more than three. Also, there were Gorokan candidates from outside the Goroka district contesting. Six candidates from the Goroka urban area contested. Each candidate contested on the basis of representing a certain clan, tribe or village, or, for the urban candidates, the town settlements or suburbs. Some candidates, such as Himony Lapiso, Kasup Nate and Steven Pupune, claimed urban support due to their employment in the Goroka Council and the Eastern Highlands Capital Authority. Samuel Kuso, though from the Mimanalo constituency, had worked in town and eventually represented the Goroka Urban constituency in the provincial government for three terms. He expected support from the town voters.

A special feature of the Goroka Open seat was that the incumbent, Mathias Ijape, had served for two terms, which no previous member had done. The Sandline mercenary issue and riots were fresh in the minds of the people—issues that were capitalized upon by Peti Lafanama, a MELSOL activist and ringleader in the riots, who had returned to his home province and campaigned actively in Goroka town for the provincial seat. Ijape was a central figure in the Sandline saga, and many people were angered by his involvement in the affair. Many candidates used that against Ijape.

The 1997 election also saw a record forty candidates contest the Goroka seat. Political party influence was minimal. Most candidates contested as independents. People were heard saying that PPP and Pangu must not be supported, and in fact no candidates contested under the banner of these parties. A detailed questionnaire was developed by the author and delivered to most candidates, but only a few completed it. A public forum was organized for all candidates at Independence Park on a busy Friday, weeks before actual polling. Further, I visited the campaign houses of most candidates. Campaign houses are normally built in a village where the candidate supposes that he will secure votes; it becomes the centre for meetings where campaign strategies are planned, and a place for accepting emissaries from other villages. Further, I travelled with some candidates on their campaign vehicles and listened to campaign speeches at various locations as part of the crowd.

The candidates, their profiles and campaign policies

The names of the candidates, their place of birth and residence, and their educational level, work experience and occupational status are shown in Table 7.1. Their campaign policies are collated from their election posters, various campaign speeches I attended, personal conversations, and, particularly, from a public forum I organized. At the forum, each candidate was requested to

answer three questions, regarding: motivation for contesting; issues facing the electorate, province and nation, and how they intended to implement their strategies in the electorate.

The Notofona tribe covers a large geographical area with different clans, but is sparsely populated. Many people from the Daulo electorate migrated and are squatting there. The Notofona villages include Asaroka, Kofika, Samoyufa and Notofana, along the Okuk Highway. There are relations with Ufeto at their southern end. In the 1992 elections, the Notofona, including the Ufeto, gave their votes to Mathias Ijape, for his good deed in sealing their roads. However, in 1997 they felt that as a big tribe, and against the background of the Sandline controversy, they could do well by contesting themselves. Excluding Ufeto, there were three candidates from the Asaroka High School area: *John Tele, Paul Guhole* and *Keinan Goinake.*

Tele is from Kofika and worked with Busu Coffee. He also bought coffee and produced vegetables for sale. He had vehicles which he occasionally used to help villagers, and expected votes from town residents because of his generosity in providing uniforms to town sporting organizations.

Guhole and Goinake are both former policemen from the Asaroka side of Notofona. Both were keen to contest. Guhole was involved with his clansmen in establishing a business group which operates a coffee plantation, the 'Eksal' live band, a beer tavern, a trade store and a PMV service. He spoke little but, like other political aspirants, wanted to deliver much-awaited goods and services and bring development, which the sitting member had not done. Goinake has been involved in coffee growing and coffee buying. He campaigned on foot, but did not talk much in public.

Table 7.1: Candidates' Biodata

Candidate	Residence	Electoral division	Place of Birth	Education-	Work Experience	Occupation
Henry Smith	Kotuni	Gahuku	Asaro, EHP	Masters	Teacher, Town Manager	on study
Joshua Soso	Kama	Gahuku	Goroka, EHP	Bachelor	Accountant	Practice
Jack Mori	lufi lufa	Mimanalo	Goroka, EHP	Diploma 1	High School Teacher	Teacher
Toma Nozu	Kimiau	Mimanalo	Morobe Prov.	Certificate	Primary School teacher	Teacher
Kasup Nate	Kama	Galluku	Goroka, EHP	Grade 10	EHCA Chairman	Entrepreneur
John Joseph	Ufeto	Mimanalo	Goroka, EHP	Certificate	High School Teacher	Assist. Secretary
Gatapo Paone	Kamus	Mimanalo	Goroka, EHP	Diploma	Plantation Supervisor	self employed
Tevo Tarape	Korniufa	Gahuku	Goroka, EHP	n/a	Commercial Farmer	Entrepreneur
Steven Pupune	Faniufa	Gahuku	Goroka, EHP	Certificate	Town Manager	Entrepreneur
Peter Purari	Nupaha	Gahuku	Goroka, EHP	Certificate	Banker	Banker
Solomon Meuro	Genoka	Urban Goroka	Okapa, EHP	n/a	n/a	self employed
Tama Hurutuve	lufi lufa	Mimanalo	Goroka, EHP	Certificate	Primary School Teacher	Factory Manager
Samuel Kuso	Kabiufa	Mimanalo	Goroka, EHP	Diploma	Council Works Manager	Entrepreneur
Tekura Renagi	W/Goroka	Urban Goroka	Central Prov.	Diploma	Agriculture Officer	Director, EHPG

Uve Sabumei	Okiufa	Gahuku	Bena, EHP	Certificate	Clerk	Entrepreneur
Ago Ohue	Kama	Gahuku	Goroka, EHP	Diploma	High School Teacher	Teacher
Keinan Goinake	Notofana	Mimanalo	Goroka, EHP	Grade 10	Policeman	self employed
John Kuria	Genoka	Urban Goroka	Simbu Prov.	Grade 10	n/a	self employed
John Oyahale	Kama	Gahuku	Goroka, EHP	Grade 10	n/a	self employed
Peter Dege	W/Goroka	Urban Goroka	Simbu Prov	Diploma	Pentecostal Pastor	Head Pastor
Opoe Soga	Faniufa	Gahuku	Goroka, EHP	Certificate	Clerk	Clerk
Mark Hook	Genoka	Urban Goroka	Simbu Prov.	n/a	ex criminal	nil
John Dable	Genoka	Urban Goroka	Simbu Prov.	n/a	n/a	nil
Tonny Yogiyo	Asaroyufa	Gahuku	Goroka, EHP	Diploma	Agriculture Officer	Entrepreneur
Enoch Asineha	Kabiufa	Mimanalo	Goroka, EHP	Grade 10	Banker, Plantation Manager	Entrepreneur
John Sikoina	Kama	Gahuku	Goroka, EHP	Grade 10	n/a	self employed
Paul Guhole	Notofana	Mimanalo	Goroka, EHP	Grade 10	Policeman	self employed
Harry Landu	Firnito	Gahuku	Goroka, EHP	Bachelor	Fisheries Officer	Public Servant
Lawrence Kera	Asaroyufa	Gahuku	Goroka, EHP	Diploma	Clerk	Entrepreneur
Koni Aize	Kama	Gahuku	Goroka, EHP	Grade 8	Driver	self employed
Paul Ine	Kami	Gahuku	Goroka, EHP	Tertiary	Manager	Entrepreneur
Bire Kimisopa	Lapegu	Mimanalo	Goroka, EHP	Bachelor	Accountant	Practice
Tim Asitore	Kamaliki	Gahuku	Goroka, EHP	Grade 10	Clerk	Entrepreneur
Mathias Ijape	Lapegu	Mimanalo	Goroka, EHP	Bachelor	Policeman	National MP
Gosihi Hunehune	Ufeto	Mimanalo	Goroka, EHP	n/a	Manager	Entrepreneur
John Tele	Kofika	Mimanalo	Goroka, EHP	Grade 10	Clerk	self employed
Apere Goso	Masi	Gahuku	Goroka, EHP	n/a	Coffee Buyer	Entrepreneur
Nelson Ovepa	Kefamo	Gahuku	Goroka, EHP	Grade 10	Policeman	self employed
Winis Omahe	Kama	Gahuku	Goroka, EHP	n/a	n/a	n/a
Himony Lapiso	lufi lufa	Mimanalo	Goroka, EHP	Bachelor	Council Manager	Entrepreneur

Henry Smith, originally from Asaro in the neighbouring Daulo electorate, is married to a Kotuni woman, and as a long-time resident is regarded as a local himself. He did his secondary schooling in Australia and trained as a teacher. After teaching in community schools, he attended the University of Papua New Guinea and was later employed as the town manager of the Eastern Highlands Capital Authority. He later went to the United States to undertake a masters degree in urban management, which he successfully completed in 1997. Smith was instrumental in getting grant funds. Through the Rural Electrification Program, Smith was able to get power connected from the Okuk Highway to Kotuni village, covering three other villages along the way. Also, he arranged for the building of an aidpost serving four villages, with support from the Australian High Commission. Smith stood as a People's Unity Party candidate and was the only candidate from Kotuni village. He also received support from Hobe, Gorohanota and Kafuku villages. He campaigned on the need for higher education, and the lack of infrastructure and social services, and argued that the problem facing all levels of society was accountability and transparency. He said that he had done work while outside of the government and could do a lot if elected.

Joshua Soso, a university graduate and an accountant in private practice in Port Moresby, also contested the Goroka Open seat. He promised better housing and living standards, through the provision of *wokabaut* sawmills to the villagers and basic social services. However, Soso faced six other candidates from his big village of Kama. Another practicing accountant operating from

Goroka, *Bire Kimisopa*, campaigned on the elimination of corruption through reform of parliamentary sittings and procedures. He argued that sitting arrangements must be rearranged, and he had a Manifesto which focused on youth, social and economic development, and the provision of goods and services to the people. Among other things, he stressed accountability and transparency. Soso is from Lapegu, the same village as the incumbent; consequently, their tribal support was split—with fiery encounters taking place amongst supporters and tribesmen.

Because of the Sandline saga, and consequent public reaction, *Ijape* was challenged from all quarters of the electorate. He could not go around openly, as in the other elections. Many local coffee plantations were resumed and sold by the banks, due to non-payment of loans. Ijape's family company purchased some of these. The landowners felt that Ijape as a member of parliament should have supported *them* to acquire the plantations. There were legal and physical fights over the purchases. Ijape was the pride of his tribe, and other neighbouring villages like Ufeto backed him during the election.

Gosiho Mackenzie Hunehune, from Ufeto, is married to an expatriate and operates her own poultry farm and food bar in Goroka town. She was the only woman candidate and contested under the PDM banner. Her campaign platform was to give women the right and opportunity to be equal with men. She wanted to bring change to Goroka, and was appalled by the lack of basic service delivery under the incumbent member, suggesting that Ijape had served for too long. Her policies were those of the PDM, the main one being the provision of free education.

John Joseph is a former high school teacher who was promoted to the position of deputy administrator in the Eastern Highlands provincial government which was suspended in 1996. His stated aim was to fight the alleged corrupt dealings of the sitting member. He questioned what Ijape had done and said he would ensure that 'real development' would occur when he was elected to office.

Apele Goso is a rich rural capitalist who owned a number of plantations in the Goroka area. However, due to coffee rust and failing prices, he defaulted on loans, which forced him out of business. He was bitter towards the local member and vowed to contest and remove him. Goso was the only candidate from Masi and stood under the PAP banner. He said little at public rallies, and met people individually. *Nelson Ovepa* was the only candidate from the neighbouring village of Kefamo. He owned and operated a PIVIV and did not campaign much.

Jack Mori is a high school teacher and Seventh Day Adventist church member. He stood as an Indigenous People's Movement candidate, and advocated a change in the physical, spiritual and social aspects of development. As a third candidate from Iufi lufa, and being regarded as a young man, he was discouraged from contesting; however, he was adamant that elections were not for old persons and expected to draw votes, on the basis of his education and campaign speeches, from Adventist church followers.

Tama Hurutuve was trained as a community school teacher but worked on coffee plantations and eventually became an assistant factory manager at Kainantu, 80 kilometres east of Goroka. Having announced his candidacy, Hurutuve was generous in assisting people in paying school fees, bride price, and so on. On several occasions before the election, truckloads of young people from Iufi lufa and the neighbouring villages of Kabiufa and Akameku would travel to Kainantu seeking his help. Hurutuve's Dyna truck provided free transportation for village youth, women,

sporting groups, and farmers travelling to other parts of the Eastern Highlands, Madang, Simbu and Lae. His policy was one of openness and generosity, and he believed that his win would be in everybody's interests. Although his posters and ballot papers revealed no party affiliation, Paias Wingti, leader of PDM, arrived in a helicopter at Iufi Iufa Community School for his campaign *mumu*. Hurutuve had been working towards his election since 1992, and was convinced that he would win support.

Himony Lapiso, also from the Iufi Iufa area, was educated in Australia and was one of the first Gorokans to enter the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG), along with prominent citizens such as Sir Rabbie Namaliu and Paul Pora. Lapiso graduated with a Bachelor of Education degree in the early 1970s. After graduation, he commenced employment with the Goroka Local Government Council and became the first national council manager in the late 1980s. He is soft spoken and widely respected, and had served on many company and statutory boards, including the UPNG Council. He left the Goroka council to run his own business in Lae. As council manager, Lapiso had ensured that roads, bridges and community schools were built and water supplied to the urban settlements. His campaign policy emphasized the creation of infrastructure and improved social services. Many people believed that Lapiso should have contested earlier, in 1977, 1982 or 1987, but he had the respect of his tribesmen.

Toma Nozu, originally from Morobe Province but married to a Kimiau woman, was another contestant. He teaches at Akameku Community School. His father had taught for a long time at Iufi Iufa Community School. He claimed the support of Akameku people and from his in-laws at Kimiau and Wande villages and from the Morobe and coastal residents of Goroka town. He stood under a PAP ticket with an emphasis on rural development and the creation of a separate ministry of religion. He asserted that as an outsider he would fear or favour no one in his duties and would ensure equal distribution of government funds and resources.

Gatopo Paone is a young man from Kamus, which is usually considered a backwater of Kabiufa and Iufi Iufa, though it is connected to the Okuk Highway about five kilometres away. He holds a diploma in tropical agriculture and has work experience on plantations. Paone asserted that no politician has looked into the social and economic needs of the Kabiufa and Iufi Iufa people for a very long time, and hence people were forced to carry cash crops to market on foot. He believed that since voting is based on tribal and clan ties, he could win. Paone is young but very fluent in the use of traditional metaphors. In all his speeches, he stressed that he was standing on behalf of the Akameku, Kimiau, Wande, Kempeni and Gehekuko (Wesan) communities. He focused his campaign on social services, and on building roads and bridges which have been neglected for too long by previous members.

Samuel Kuso resides permanently at Kabiufa village and is regarded as one of the clan leaders there. He is the son of a coastal pastor who pioneered the establishment of the Kabiufa Adventist Mission. His mother is from Kornu in the Gahuku constituency but is related through ancestry to the Namanelehuso clan of Kabiufa. Consequently, the pastor was given land and all his children were born there. Over time, Samuel Kuso has taken over as leader of his clan; he is married and his children have settled there. He studied engineering at technical college and became works manager for the Goroka Local Government Council. With the introduction of the provincial government system in 1977, Kuso won the Goroka Urban constituency in the provincial assembly and served for three terms in various senior ministries. During his term, he ensured that

settlements had electricity, and roads, water supply and urban health clinics were established in Goroka town. He is now involved in the import and marketing of thongs and shoes. He has sponsored the highlands basketball tournament, was instrumental in the touch football competition, and was the inaugural president of rugby union in Eastern Highlands Province. Kuso had worked hard to provide water supply to Kabiufa and Kornu villages, and he focused his campaign on improved social services and housing, with the introduction of a *wokabaut* sawmill where local timber could be cut.

Kuso's candidacy split Kabiufa village across clan and family lines. *Enoch Asineha* from Kabiufa came second in the 1992 elections and was hoping to win in 1997. He had taken over from Sailas Atopare at the Asaro Watabung Rural Development Corporation when the latter was elected in 1977. Asineha was managing Foinda Coffee, cultivating large tracts of land at Kabiufa and buying and processing his own coffee. He is a rich rural capitalist and has assisted people with school fees. He has also been closely associated with youth and sports (Donaldson and Good 1988). Asineha was determined to unseat Ijape, but Kuso split the vote he had received in 1977. This caused animosity among families and friends to the extent that fights occurred, and eventually this took its toll on his campaign.

Peter Puran is a young banker from Nupaha, working in Mount Hagen. He had a wide following due to his openness and popularity. He wanted to bring about changes in Goroka and was optimistic about his chances.

Another candidate from the same area was *Tavo Taropo* who counted on his twenty-three years of experience in fruit and vegetable farming and his knowledge of the hardships the people faced. He saw agriculture as the way to go in Goroka.

Uve Sabumei is the son of the member for Goroka from 1968 to 1972. Highly educated, he returned to reside at Okiufa, on the fringe of Goroka town, operating his own businesses, which include a popular disco and beer tavern, the favourite hangout for young people from both rural and urban Goroka. However, his posters did not mention policy, and I did not have the opportunity to see or hear him campaign in public.

Paul Ine is one of the highly educated persons from Kami, a village on the fringe of Goroka. He was appointed to the Eastern Highlands Interim Provincial Government and was executive director of the Eastern Highlands Provincial Government business arm, Nokondi, as well as a director of the Gouna Development Corporation (Donaldson and Good 1988). In the 1980s, Ine operated his own clothing factory and Holiday Lodge in Goroka. He became the first national president of the Goroka Chamber of Commerce and Industry. As a rich rural capitalist, his policies were to promote economic development and business.

From nearby Kamiliki was *Tim Asitore*, a coffee planter, and from Faniufa were *Opoe Soga* and *Steven Pupune*. Soga is a young man employed by the Eastern Highlands Capital Authority. Steven Pupune was the town manager; he was removed from that position, but by then he had built a large commercial complex at the end of town. The opening of the complex coincided with the election, perhaps to show what he could do in a short time. Pupune was expecting votes from the urban population.

From Kama, the large village on the southeastern fringe of the town, there were seven candidates: *Soso*, *Kasup Nate*, *Argo Ohue*, *John Oyahale*, *John Sikoina*, *Winis Omahe* and *Koni*

Aize. All claimed strong clan and family support, and expected some votes from town residents and settlers who were squatting on their land. *Kasup Nate*, former chairman of Eastern Highlands Capital Authority and an entrepreneur, was, like Kuso, Pupune and Lapiso, expecting rural tribal votes and urban votes for his work with Goroka Local Government Council and the Eastern Highlands Capital Authority.

Argo Aeno Ohue, a high school teacher, had contested under the PDM banner in the 1992 elections and come third. Like Asineha, he knew the tables could be turned in 1997, but the candidacy of so many others undermined his chances. *Omahe* was determined to show the way in what he saw as times of darkness. Quotes from the Bible were used in his campaign, and he hoped to attract the votes of Christians. *John Oyahale* and *John Sikoina* are young men who wanted to stamp their mark in Kama, whilst *Koni Aize* is an old hand who had contested Goroka Open seat continuously since 1968. Aize's policies were aimed at developing the natural resources of the area, and assisting people in times of death and natural disaster. He maintains that he will continue to contest elections until he dies.

From Fimito, *Harry Landu*, a young but established university graduate was contesting, with promises of bringing development to Goroka. From the eastern fringe village of Asaroyufa were *Lawrence Kera* and *Tonny Yogiyo*. Both are entrepreneurs competing for village votes. In the town area, there were six candidates: four from Simbu, one from Okapa, and another from Central Province. They were concerned about the lack of interest, by successive members, in the plight of urban residents, especially migrant squatters and urban youth. They all referred to rumours of eviction, and claimed that their victory would ensure better representation for the urban population and land titles for aspiring entrepreneurs; they were better versed, they claimed, to address urban problems.

A resident of Genoka settlement, *Mark Buglain Hook*, is a reformed criminal who claims to understand the problems of the urban settler community and youth. *Tekura Renagi* is a senior agricultural officer who has served in various capacities in the Division of Agriculture, the Coffee Industry Corporation and the Eastern Highlands Provincial Government. He contested the 1992 election for the Okapa Open electorate and came second. His agricultural background gave him an understanding of the problems of rural areas, and he vowed to support the marketing of fresh fruit and vegetables in other centres.

Peter Dege, national president of Pentecostal Assembly also contested. He had wide following in the town and many feared that if church members stood behind their pastor, he would win. Dege claimed that he was aware of national and international issues and if elected would ensure that the World Bank's structural adjustment reforms were rejected, that the work of the churches would be promoted, and that public spending by all members of parliament since 1975 would be investigated by a Commonwealth inquiry. He campaigned on a platform of anti-corruption, accountability and transparency.

The campaign, polling and observation of election

The 1997 election was different from other elections. The common roll was compiled by officials and submitted to the Electoral Commission. In many places, the number of people on the roll was inflated, through the use of nicknames and the names of dead people and people registered in other electorates. Further, placenames were not always those on official

government records showing clans, tribes and villages. For example, the Anego Plantation residents at Kabiufa were placed under Kimiau/Wande, which led to some confusion.

It was a relatively quiet election in that not many public rallies were organized. When queried, candidates and electors said people knew who to vote for; a candidate represented his village and may have support from other villagers through kinship, family ties and friendship. The candidate must ensure his supporters were not lured by other candidates. His presence among his supporters was vital. A public campaign is a waste of time. Thus candidates only attended political rallies at the invitation of certain supporters and fellow candidates.

As noted, each candidate had a campaign house in his village that served as meeting place for supporters in the village and for receiving other candidates, including those standing for the provincial seat. Food, betelnut, cigarettes and sometimes beer were provided as candidates talked to visitors. However, many people attended out of respect and to enjoy the hospitality, and did not necessarily vote for that candidate.

The common roll did not arrive until a week before polling and in some cases it was too late to correct anomalies, resulting in frustration and complaints that the election was rigged. Also, some candidates claimed that the incumbent member had endorsed candidates to split their votes and reduce their chance of winning.

The call-out of the Defence Force to assist in the election did little but create fear among the public. Instead of policing the election, soldiers were seen manning traffic blocks without the presence of police personnel. They also attended to civil and criminal cases and in some cases harassed people. In one incident, there was a fight between the supporters of Ijape and Soso, in which Ijape loaded his tribesmen into several trucks and drove to the Goroka police station to resolve the issue. I witnessed soldiers breaking the windscreens of the trucks while the police watched as if nothing was happening. The soldiers fired their automatic rifles indiscriminately and used the butts on the heads of Ijape's supporters. Ijape himself was hurt in the process. A number of people were admitted to hospital. The members of the disciplined forces were clearly against the government. Soldiers were openly telling people that they did not want Ijape re-elected.

On Wednesday 21 June 1997, the day set for one-day polling in Goroka, the polling officers did not attend to their polling stations. The candidates arrived in town to find that the photo of Paul Guhole appeared twice on the ballot paper—in his box and in that of fellow tribesman, John Tele. According to the provincial returning officer, the ballot papers had arrived the previous day and there was no time to print new papers. The candidates requested that polling commence, regardless. But Guhole insisted that new papers be printed. Polling was deferred till the next day. Even then, many polling teams arrived late, resulting in delayed commencement of voting.

At several polling stations I observed, some people voted six or seven times using the names of people who were not present. They used detergent to remove the indelible ink[1]. It was obvious to police and army personnel, as fingernails shone brightly and were sore. Some multiple voters changed clothes; others did it openly. The polling officers had no control, and police were

[1] Voters' fingernails were marked with indelible ink when they voted, in an attempt to prevent people voting more than once.

greatly outnumbered and could do nothing. The only way to stop multiple voting was to call all the names on the roll and cease polling as soon as all names were crossed out.

At places with two polling stations, some people voted at both stations. However, at polling stations where there were two or more candidates contesting, fights broke out over polling abuses by candidates' supporters. The supporters of Ijape and Kimisopa engaged in fights. Ijape's supporters converged on opponents' vehicles to stop them from voting, but were unsuccessful.

As polling officers arrived late, and ballot papers and ink ran out, polling commenced on Friday 13 June. At Iufi Iufa there were three candidates and three polling stations at the community school. Supporters of one candidate were voting two or even three times at the three stations, resulting in sporadic fights. As a result, many people missed out on voting by close of polling at 6 pm. They requested a special one-day poll for Iufi Iufa, but the returning officer refused. Counting was set for Saturday 14 June; village leaders organised a petition asking for an extra polling day, but this request was rejected.

Polling stations which were located in the villages of candidates were very difficult for polling officials to control, as supporters claimed that their candidates had spent substantial amounts of money to contest and therefore supporters should be free to behave as they wished, regardless of the law. At one location, polling continued for three hours after 6 o'clock, despite the presence of police. Voting finally stopped when mobile police and Defence Force personnel came to stop the polling. In another incident, as noted above, supporters of Joshua Soso and Mathias Ijape clashed and more than a dozen supporters of Ijape were hospitalized after being badly bashed in front of the police station by members of the Defence Force.

Nevertheless, polling ended on Friday 13 June with little trouble, and counting commenced at the YMCA Hall on Sunday. Counting moved at a snail's pace with little disturbance except when Defence personnel dispersed supporters who were overcrowding the designated areas where counting was to take place.

Results of the election

The results of voting, broken down into the three divisions corresponding to the former provincial constituencies of Mimanalo (14,065 votes), Gahuku (16,007 votes) and Goroka Urban (4,179 votes).

The first five candidates in Mimanalo, in rank order, were Gatopo Paone, John Tele, Mathias Ijape, Tama Hurutuve and Bire Kimisopa. Paone had about a quarter of the votes from Akameku and Kimiau, and almost all the votes of Kamus and Wande (Wesan) tribesmen. In other villages he scored less than ten votes. Similarly, Tele and Keinan Goinake received about a quarter of their votes from their Asaroka tribesmen, and Paul Guhole about half. Tele received about 90 per cent of the votes of his Kofika clansmen and a third of Notofona votes. Like Paone, he received less than ten votes from other Mimanalo polling stations, with the exception of Ufeto which is closely related to the greater Notofana tribe. Guhole and Goinake also received less than ten votes from other villages, showing clearly that votes were related to tribal affiliation. In third placing in Mimanalo was Ijape, who amassed half the votes of Lapegu, and some from his 1992 support area of Notofona, Kofika and Ufeto, also a source of support for his fellow tribesman,

Bire Kimisopa. Hurutuve scored best in Iufi Iufa, with 42 per cent of the Iufi Iufa vote, but gained less than ten votes from other villages. The significance of tribal politics and the Melanesian mentality of handouts is evident; all five top-placed candidates are from Mimanalo.

The first five candidates in Gahuku were Henry Smith, Tonny Yogiyo, Paul Ine, Joshua Soso and Apere Goso. The top five placed candidates in Mimanalo received less than 500 votes each in Gahuku. (The top five Gahuku candidates in turn received less than 200 votes each in Mimanalo.) Smith received most of the votes of his adopted Kotuni tribesmen and almost half of the votes in Kafuku, where he had provided electricity and aidpost services. In every polling station in Gahuku, Smith received some votes. Yogiyo beat Lawrence Kera to the Asaroyufa tribal votes and followed Smith in gathering votes in Gahuku. Ine gained most of Kami votes, against fellow tribesmen, and gathered a number of votes in Gahuku. Similarly, Soso gained votes in Kama, against a score of other Kama candidates.

Gahuku constituents speak the same language and are closely related. In Mimanalo, Paone and Hurutuve speak the same language but Paone is from the 'backwaters' and Hurutuve was restricted to his village. Tele speaks the same language as the Gahuku but was identified with Mimanalo. Kimisopa and Ijape are from a different language group but their proximity to Ufeto and Notofana yielded them some votes there.

The top five candidates in Goroka Urban were Mark Hook, Peter Dege, Tekura Renagi, John Dable and Kimisopa. Mark Hook received half of the votes in Genoka settlement, where he is a resident. He was followed by other urban candidates, Dege, Renagi and Dable. Kimisopa was a rural candidate but secured votes in town through his accountancy practice and support of Brothers Rugby League Club, which draws many players from the settlements. The six urban candidates (Hook, Dege, Renagi, Dable, Solomon Meuro and John Kuria) polled poorly in the rural areas. Other candidates like Lapiso, Nozu, Pupune, Smith and Nate received some urban votes but not as many as they expected.

Overall, the first five candidates in the Goroka Open electorate were Smith, Tele, Ijape, Paone and Kimisopa. Smith polled 2472 votes from Kotuni and Kafuku tribesmen, almost 400 from other Gahuku villages, and 105 and 205 from Mimanalo and Goroka Urban, to unseat Iiape. The other four were all from Mimanalo.

Conclusion

The election was basically about tribal pride. The top five candidates all received the majority of their tribal votes. In addition, all were educated and generally known in the Goroka Open electorate. Smith had worked hard to provide electricity and an aidpost. Tele, who was engaged in agricultural production, coffee buying and a PMV business, had offered his vehicle to farmers to transport their food crops to markets in Lae. Ijape, as incumbent member, had sealed the roads.

Urban candidates do not have the advantage of tribal backing, and the Goroka Open electorate has always been won by rural candidates. However, the big villages of Kama and Iufi Iufa have always been riven by conflicts between contestants, leading to splits in clan or tribal loyalty which have negated their potential voting strength.

Before concluding, it should be said that the Electoral Commission must, with the assistance of police, council and village court officers, update the Common Roll, and must consult the patrol post records to verify clan names and village names and locations. Otherwise there will be chaos. The use of Defence Force personnel is not warranted; they could be used to gain support for particular candidates. They were something of a nuisance in 1997. The police must be better equipped to provide logistical support to polling officers.

Elections are changing over the years. In the 1960s and 1970s, candidates were traditional leaders and businessmen. In the 1980s there was a shift from traditional leaders to modern business leaders. In the 1990s the focus was on traditional pride, educational level, and the generosity of candidates.

8

'IF YOU DON'T GIVE THEM MONEY THEY WON'T VOTE FOR YOU'

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN LAGAIP-PORGERA

Sean Dorney

When the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) television current affairs program, *Foreign Correspondent*, agreed to my suggestion that we should do a solid half-hour story on the 1997 Papua New Guinea election campaign, I recommended that we travel to the highlands. I promised the executive producer that I would find an electorate that would provide him with exotic pictures and a good story line. At the same time, I wanted to show an Australian audience how completely the participatory democracy that Australia had left behind in its former colony had taken hold. And also how elections had evolved into unpredictable, boisterous, lotto-like contests with unwritten rules of engagement never even imagined by the *kiaps* who, back in 1964, had introduced the ballot box to most Papua New Guinea villages. I found what I was after, and more, in Lagaip-Porgera, the electorate in Enga that takes in the Porgera gold mine.

Papua New Guinea was very much in the Australian consciousness in June of 1997. The Sandline mercenary affair had been one of those rarities—a Papua New Guinea story that grabbed the imagination of Australian news organisations. It had put Papua New Guinea back on the front page of most Australian newspapers and even, for a while, up the front of the commercial networks' TV news bulletins. Mary-Louise O'Callaghan had broken the story of the Chan government's hiring of mercenaries to crush the Bougainville Revolutionary Army in February in *The Weekend Australian* (22 February 1997). There followed weeks of intrigue, then the shock revolt by Brigadier General Jerry Singirok. His Papua New Guinea Defence Force troops captured the mercenaries and he demanded that Chan resign. Sir Julius sacked Singirok but, after ten days of civil riots and tension, during which crowds supported by the military laid siege to the National Parliament, Chan stood aside. A Commission of Inquiry kept the story alive right up to the eve of the election, when Chan resumed control as prime minister.

I suspected that there may have been a belief in Sydney (where ABC News and Current Affairs is headquartered) that, given all those events, the election would be dominated by the Sandline issue and by Singirok's allegations of corruption against Chan. One of the reasons I chose Lagaip-Porgera was to illustrate that these 'national' issues probably did not mean all that much to most Papua New Guinean voters. Another point I wanted to get across was how little belief the average Papua New Guinean voter has that he or she is voting a particular government into power, or, for that matter, voting one out. Papua New Guinea elections are about voting in members. They are not about voting in political parties. And, finally, I wanted to focus some attention upon the matter that I believed represented the biggest threat to the restoration of good governance in Papua New Guinea—and that matter was how unrepresentative Papua New

Guinea's democracy was becoming because of the huge number of candidates and the first-past-the-post voting system.

So we began our *Foreign Correspondent* item at an election rally for Opis Papo, one of the 53 candidates standing for the Lagaip-Porgera seat. 53 did not make Lagaip-Porgera electorate with the most candidates in 1997. That distinction (and record number) was taken by an electorate down on the coast in the Northern or Oro Province. There 61 candidates had nominated and paid their hefty nomination fee of K1,000 each. But 53 was the second highest number of competing candidates and more than enough for my purposes. Obviously, we could not interview all 53 in a half-hour of television. I had selected Opis Papo because he had already made a name for himself as a strident critic of the Porgera gold mine (even though the mine had put him through university) and criticism of this major resource development was central to his campaign. He and a few others had set up a new political party to push the rights of landowners. It was called PRAP—the People's Resources Action Party. The opening shots were of Opis Papo, dressed in a black suit and tie, arm in arm with traditionally-dressed, face-painted Enga warriors rhythmically stamping their way around the circular, open air, campaign rally venue. The attendant crowd was chanting, making quite a hullabaloo. 'This is electioneering Papua New Guinea style', I began, and then went on:

> Commentary: To outsiders it might seem that this election is a referendum on Sir Julius Chan's leadership following the Sandline mercenary crisis and the army's revolt. But voting in Papua New Guinea is more intricate and more local than that. This astounding passion for democracy is driven by the tantalizing rewards that go to the winner and to those who back him.

The shots of the campaign rally dissolved into a map of Papua New Guinea with the Enga Province highlighted. The camera zoomed to the marked boundaries of the seat of Lagaip-Porgera, then back to Opis Papo's impassioned supporters.

> Commentary: This electorate is at the far western end of the highlands—a rugged region opened up barely thirty years ago. Its people are renowned for their volatility. Though they've put their tribal wars on hold for this election, the system that's evolved in Papua New Guinea means most people vote for losers.

We then went to what is called in the TV trade a Piece To Camera (PTC). This one took me six or seven attempts to get right. We had to judge when there would be enough action in the background to make it lively but not too much so that my voice and message would be drowned out. I was standing in front of a line of impressively decorated, skin-glistening, *kundu*-drum-beating dancers who twice came to the end of their number before I did. Finally, it all came together.

> PTC: This is only one of scores of election rallies taking place in this most vibrant of democracies. But, ironically, that very vibrancy contains the seeds of its own undermining. Here in Lagaip-Porgera we have 53 candidates. Last time, with far fewer, the winner got in with 9 per cent of the vote. This time we could have nineteen out of twenty voters backing losers.

I'd chosen three candidates to concentrate on. Apart from Opis Papo, I had decided we should talk to the sitting member, Anton Pakena. We caught up with Anton and the first glimpse you get of him is an interior shot in a four-wheel drive vehicle, with him in the passenger seat as he is being driven along the road out of Porgera town.

Commentary: This is the man nine out of ten didn't want last time. But Anton Pakena got more votes than anyone else. He's the sitting member with money to spend. Over the past five years, Mr Pakena, like other MPs, received well over $1 million to spend as he saw fit in his electorate. Mr Pakena's biggest project? To construct a road to his home area. His re-election campaign, he says, is costing him $600,000.

Anton had agreed to an interview which we conducted in his campaign office which was located at the top of what had been the old Porgera airstrip. The airstrip had now become what passed for an extremely elongated town square with shops and buildings lining both sides and the upper end. Mr Pakena's office was hardly palatial. It was a wooden building on such a tilt that as we sat opposite each other his chair was 10 to 15 centimetres higher than mine. Mr Pakena was the endorsed candidate for Paias Wingti's Peoples Democratic Movement (PDM) but on the walls were campaign posters from 1992 when he won representing another party.

Pakena: You gotta have vehicles. At the moment I'm running 12 vehicles on the road, all new ones. And you've got to feed the people—tinned fish, packet rice, coffee, sugar and so on. And you've got to give them money and so many things.

Dorney: You've got to give them money or they won't support you?

Pakena: Right! If you don't give them the money they won't support you.

Switch location back to the road and Anton and I are travelling to an egg production factory. I had told him that I would like to film something he had helped the people build with money provided to him by the government to encourage economic development in his electorate. I was stunned when he took me to look over a major disaster. The factory had ceased production. Inside the huge shed there were rows and rows of empty chicken cages, some covered by cobwebs. Discarded bags of chicken feed were scattered across the floor and empty cardboard egg cartons were everywhere. A tarpaulin draped over one end of the building flapped in the breeze.

Commentary: I asked Mr Pakena to show me a project he'd sponsored from his Electoral Development Fund. He brought me here, where $270,000 went. On a failure! Mr Pakena put up the capital when some of his supporters fancied an egg business. But poor quality control and high prices meant the venture collapsed.

Anton Pakena was anything but ashamed. In fact, he took no responsibility for the egg business going bust. He even suggested that this failure was typical of ventures he had supported with his EDF money.

Dorney: So the K200,00 was wasted?

Pakena: Wasted! Not only this project. But other projects too in this area.

Dorney: Is it frustrating?

Pakena: It is not embarrassing for me but [it is] for the villagers.

Commentary: For Mr Pakena this business failure is actually a political success. Despite the staggering waste, the people he funded remain in his debt.

Dorney: Can this be saved now?

Pakena: It really depends on the villagers. I've done my part as a leader!

Mr Pakena blamed the Porgera gold mine for the collapse of the egg business. He claimed the mine should have bought all the eggs and paid a premium price for them because they were a local product produced by a local company. The mine management told me that they did start buying the eggs from this plant but that they had to switch back to getting supplies from Lae because by the time this much closer facility got around to delivering its output, half of the eggs in each carton were bad. We filmed at the mine and recorded an interview with the manager, Evert Van Den Brand.

Commentary: The notorious 'members' slush funds', as they're known, are not the only source of funding for projects. Mr Pakena's electorate is also home to one of the world's largest gold mines. As public services decline the mine steps in. And it proves handy when the member seeks to divert blame for everything from the egg fiasco to the government's failure to do its job.

Van Den Brand: The government retracted itself more and more. If we gave money to assist in providing a certain hospital service then the next thing you know the government is not paying any more in that area because they get money off the company anyway. So we end up being the *de facto* government here. It's a position we do not really like because the government is the government and it should function here.

The hospital at the new town of Paim was something to behold. It was in pristine condition. It was totally empty. It reminded me of the *Yes Minister* episode about the most efficient hospital in Britain being the one that had no patients. The caretaker of the premises unlocked the gates to allow us inside to film. And I recorded another Piece To Camera walking through the hospital grounds.

PTC: If there is anything that encapsulates the national government's failure to provide services here, it's the saga of this hospital. This magnificent facility—it's the best I've seen in Papua New Guinea—wouldn't be here but for the mine. Completed eighteen months ago as part of the deal that ensured the mine's opening, it's been idle ever since. The national government can't provide the money to keep it operating. It can't even provide the money to pay the nurses.

Van Den Brand: The plans to get the staff into this hospital to make it work over the years wasn't thought out.

Dorney: Are the people angry?

Van Den Brand: Rightfully so, I think.

The third candidate I had intended to work into the program was Yalipin Lucas, a local government official from the other end of the electorate to the Porgera mine. My original plan was to show that all the money was being spent up at the Porgera end because that was where Mr Pakena was from and it was also where the mine was located. In the end the interview with Mr Lucas wound up on the cutting room floor. The editors in Sydney felt it was making the story too complicated and too long. However, I did fight for us to include a segment on one of Yalipin's supporters, Timothy Tuli, a young school teacher we found in one of the dancing groups at the Lucas rally we attended. He was traditionally dressed, his face painted jet black. The producer working with me in the field was surprised, and delighted, when she discovered he could speak English. He also flashed the most engaging smile, his white teeth sparkling out of the black face paint. My commentary over the shots of this rally picked up on Mr Van Den Brand's comment about people being angry about government neglect.

Commentary: Such anger precipitated the large field of candidates, especially at this end of the electorate which has seen little of their member's publicly funded largesse. Here at Lagaim, far from the mine, the people know what it is to make do when the government doesn't seem to care.

Dorney: What's your occupation? What do you do?

Tuli: Well, I am a teacher anyway. I am a teacher. I am teaching at the Lagaim Primary School and this is my second year of teaching.

We arranged with Timothy to go to his school to film his working conditions. I knew this would provide us with good footage. So a few days later we travelled back to that end of the electorate and took shots of him walking up to his bush material classroom. He took us inside.

Commentary: This is Lagaim Primary where a less formally attired Timothy Tuli is a teacher of Grade One. 45 children cram into this tiny classroom without desks or chairs. No one is here today because classes have been suspended. There's no water and the burst pipe has yet to be fixed. Like so much in rural Papua New Guinea this school survives on the dedication of people such as Timothy.

Tuli: I need materials, basic materials like books, pencils, rulers for the children. And even I need some desks for my classroom. As you can see my floor is full of grass.

Occasionally as a TV journalist I have struck characters who appeal to the generosity of some viewers. After this program went to air, I received at least half a dozen approaches from people in Australia who wanted to send books, pencils, rulers and other teaching materials to Timothy. I provided an address and I am sure that the Education Department in Enga must have been surprised at the sudden arrival of cartons of goods from Australia destined for Grade One at the Lagaim Primary School. I asked Timothy how much support schools such as his got from the local member of parliament.

Tuli: But our members? They never look into our school problems. That's one thing. When we elect them or give them the votes they run away from us and never return with what things that we need.

Opis Papo was running on the promise that he would deliver. One day we travelled up the highway filming a convoy of his campaign vehicles. They had megaphones though which his supporters chanted his name over and over again: 'Opis Papo, Opis Papo, Opis Papo ...'.

Commentary: One candidate claiming he's not from that school is Opis Papo, a university graduate still in his twenties. With 53 candidates and no dedicated party allegiance the vote is truly a lottery. But Opis Papo knows the numbers could work in his favour. As he jolts up and down the only road, he's prepared to play the system.

Papo: If you have a bigger population in your village then you just get automatically elected just from votes from your village. That's why I'm saying it's easier for you to get elected if there are more candidates.

Commentary: Opis Papo's campaign is aggressively local—capitalizing on grievances against the government but most of all the mine. The mine put him through university but Opis Papo rages against it – selling himself as champion of the ordinary villager.

Papo: Most of the people are semi-educated and illiterates so they find it hard to understand what's going on in Moresby about corruption. What they see with their own eyes is the mine. It's the physical thing that they see. And their expectations from the mine are not delivered. So that's the only thing they see and hear and talk about.

Back to the Opis Papo rally with a burst of him speaking in the local Enga language. We provided a translation on the screen.

Papo: The mine uses your land to put up its checkpoint, it should pay you compensation. Did you get any compensation from the mine for the use of your land?

Crowd: No! We got nothing.

At the rally we had sought out one of Papo's supporters. We wanted somebody, preferably a woman with children, who could provide us with a perspective on what would motivate her voting decision. Did the Sandline Affair and the widespread allegations of government corruption have an impact? We chose Josephine Pawe. We filmed her first at the rally and then went to her village early one morning as she bathed her baby and prepared breakfast for her family.

Commentary: Opis Papo has also taken up the cause of people living downstream from the mine who claim it's polluting their river. People like Josephine Pawe who has the faith, common here, that the leader she supports will, if elected, look after her.

Dorney: Who do you think will win?

Pawe: In this election I think Opis Papo will win. And if he wins I'm going to have a good life.

Commentary: Josephine's Pawe's village, Yuyan, is not that easy to get to. She wants a new road like the one the sitting member, Anton Pakena, is building to his place. The villagers complain that their river has been ruined and they're cross with Mr Pakena.

Pawe: Me, too, I am not happy with him because he is not giving any service to me for my road. Or for my children when they get sick, [and need to go to] hospital or something like that. The man representing us in parliament for five years if he doesn't do anything the people get cross. But what are they going to do?

Commentary: The people have little say in who will lead the country. The members decide that without reference to them. So like Josephine Pawe, people across Papua New Guinea tend to focus on their homes and their villages. What is important to Josephine in this election is that the man she thinks will win is from her husband's clan.

Pawe: When we give our vote to Opis Papo [then] when he goes to parliament he'll be supporting our needs. So that's why we support him now.

Dorney: Have the people here heard of Sandline International?

Pawe: They don't know anything about that.

I was also keen to feature one of the supporters of the sitting member, Anton Pakena. We approached him at a campaign strategy meeting outside Mr Pakena's office. Sol Taro invited us back to his village, one of those relocated because of the mine. We filmed him serving behind the counter of one of his shops.

Commentary: Unlike Josephine, this man, Sol Taro, is a beneficiary of the sitting member's goodwill, even though he is hardly in need. Sol gets royalties from the mine. He has two shops and four wives. In the last election, he delivered his village to Anton Pakena and was showered with money from the public purse—$100,000 worth of vehicles, money for a church, and $10,000 in cash to start a business.

With the refreshing frankness that is so typical of people in Papua New Guinea, Sol was quite happy to tell me that the K10,000 that Mr Pakena had given him never went to the purpose it was intended for. He said he'd put up a business proposal to the mine's small business development unit but that it was rejected. So where did the money go? It appears that some of it went on cartons of SP Lager!

Taro: So, after I failed to get my proposals through, I used up this money buying drink, buying beer, buying food. I have a big family and that 10,000? I couldn't hold onto it.

Commentary: This year, six candidates from Sol's clan are standing but Sol is a Pakena man. He's promised Pakena 600 out of his people's

820 votes saying he'll direct the rest to other candidates to keep them sweet.

Dorney: You supported Anton Pakena, why?

Taro: Because he's a member. And members hold the key to the money! They guarantee our business ventures and support us. For this, I supported Anton last time. I supported him and he bought me a truck. It's over there, a big Dyna. He gave it to me.

There it was. A big Dyna truck parked outside his house. Sol thought that there was nothing irregular about asking his MP for gifts like that in exchange for directing votes his way.

Taro: Whenever we are short of money to buy a car or whatever, he will help us.

Back outside Mr Pakena's office there were always people milling around in expectation. At one stage he had to bustle his way through a group loudly demanding he look after them and provide for their needs.

Commentary: Mr Pakena hasn't time for everyone. He says the demands are endless.

Pakena: The most common is school fees and hospitals because this is a remote area and they [the people] don't understand business.

Dorney: If you don't give them the money they are after, what happens?

Pakena: They don't vote for me. I have to give [it to] them.

During the five days we were filming in Lagaip-Porgera we went to a number of other political gatherings. At one the people performed a song for us that they had written about their preferred candidate.

Commentary: These people are singing a song they've composed for a candidate. A candidate who never shows up. This isn't unusual. There's an arrogance that comes from not having to rely on majority support. In the last election only five of the 109 members won more than 50 per cent of the vote.

And the cameraman insisted on filming me joining in an impromptu dance with some of the local kids.

Commentary: And while people here are good at entertaining themselves, and even a visiting journalist, they understand politics in Papua New Guinea is a gamble. Most members last only the one term. So many MPs, suspecting they have but five years to get rich, go for it with brazen abandon.

On our last day in Porgera there were several rallies, all held on the old runway cum town square. A podium stood in the middle of the strip but there was a dispute over who would be allowed to speak from it.

Commentary: As the campaign closes, rivalries intensify. These supporters of Opis Papo break away from a rally after their man is denied access to the podium. The crowd is rowdy but relatively good

humoured. They settle down to listen to Opis Papo attack those working for the mine and the white man.

Opis Papo stood on the back of a truck some distance from the podium and, with a megaphone pressed to his lips, delivered a tirade in Engan. The translation:

Papo: You people are alone. No one cares for you. No one pities you. No one fights for you. You are losers. You collect rubbish and eat dust.

Armed police were around to try to ensure there would be no trouble. There was none while we were there.

Commentary: There's been no violence yet. The fear is that will come after the count, when there are 52 losers. Liquor is banned, there's a curfew, and extra police are on alert. But in the volatile province of Enga all that may not be enough.

Pakena: Fighting has always been here. It's part of our life. Heh, heh. Enga custom! It's a part of our life.

Dorney: Can you see it coming to an end?

Pakena: No! No, it won't end. Fighting won't end.

Dorney: Why?

Pakena: Why? Because we are born with it. And we will die with it. It's our custom.

Our *Foreign Correspondent* program ended with a shot we had taken as we left Enga of a huge crowd of supporters carrying spears marching up the highway with their candidate.

Commentary: The greater worry, though, is this newer custom of electing men with only a fraction of the vote to go to Moresby to return with riches for the lucky few. Public faith in Papua New Guinea's democratic institutions is sorely tested—but the only ones who can reform the system are those elected thanks to it.

Postscript:

Anton Pakena lost his seat to Opis Papo. Papo scored 6,304 votes winning Lagaip-Porgera with only 9.1 per cent of the vote. Pakena, who had won with 9.1 per cent in 1992, came second with 4,568 (6.6 per cent). Six of the 53 candidates did not even vote for themselves. They registered zero. Another three may have been the only ones to tick off their names. Those three got one vote each. Here are the results of the first thirteen, down to Yalipin Lucas.

Table 8.1: The 1997 Lagaip-Porgera Open Electorate Results

	votes	per cent of vote	party
Ipan Opis Papo	**6,304**	**9.10**	**PRAP**
Anton Aiala Pakena	4,568	6.6	PDM
Kandaso Napi	4,439	6.4	PP
Patrick Nasa	4,278	6.2	IND
Yanis Polopa	3,490	5.0	IND
Tia Andrew Wapalin	3,476	5.0	IND
Ipayan Kensary Lawaipa	2,934	4.2	UP
Nathan Piari	2,743	4.0	IND
Mamando Pain	2,673	3.9	IND
Nete Moses Mondowa	2,600	3.8	IND
Yalipin Lucas	2,428	3.5	IND

9

ELECTION FRAUD ON A GRAND SCALE: THE CASE OF THE KOROBA-KOPIAGO OPEN ELECTORATE

Nicole Haley

> Before Duna people were not as they are now. They were here and this was their place. But then the whites came and the Huli men went inside the government. Later they and half-caste men from between Tangi and the Tagali River [Koroba men] came here and bossed us. Now we are living like pigs in a pig's house. We don't have proper houses or a good hospital here. Because the Huli men went inside the government, we want to mark our boundaries again. I want you to make a map. The Hulis came here and made us go inside with them, and now we are nothing.... Because of this, myself and some other old men ... want to make a Duna Province.... We are not Hulis. We will not stay with them anymore. If the government won't let us form our own province then we will join with another province. We do not want to be a part of the Southern Highlands Province anymore. We don't want to stay with the Huli anymore. Some years the government throws away money to us but most years they don't throw anything, so still we are living in pig's houses. We are in the dark. We don't have power lights like the Huli.
>
> Sane Noma 12 December 1995 (Haley field notebooks 14:81-83)

This paper offers an account of and some observations concerning electioneering in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open electorate during the 1997 National Election. It examines the degree to which malpractice and electoral fraud were a feature of the election process, and will consider the extent to which cultural identity and more particularly ethnicity served to motivate such activities. Local articulations of self consciousness which were voiced during the lead up to the election, such as the one offered above, are central to this examination. They allow us to comprehend why many of the candidates and their supporters acted as they did. Robinson's paper (this volume) also provides a descriptive account of the election at Lake Kopiago, which should be read in conjunction with this paper.

It needs to be noted at the outset, that the examples of electoral fraud detailed in this paper are drawn from the entire electorate. They indicate that the election was not the least bit fair, that there was a complete lack of integrity at all stages of the process, and that all the candidates and their groups of supporters partook in electoral fraud to varying degrees and with varying degrees of success. Had there been even a hint of fairness to the process, the final outcome would, I believe, have been considerably different.

The Electorate

The Koroba-Kopiago open electorate, which for administrative purposes is the Koroba District, is the northwesternmost of eight open electorates in the Southern Highlands Province. It extends from Koroba and Mogorofugwa, two densely populated wetland basins inhabited by Huli

speakers, northwest towards the Strickland-Lagaip river junction, thereby taking in country inhabited by the Duna, Bogaia and Hewa respectively. As one moves towards the northwest, the country becomes more sparsely populated, and what little infrastructure there is in the electorate completely dissipates. The graded and reasonably well-maintained roads and iron bridges of the Koroba area give way to a 4WD track with log bridges and thence to barely defined walking tracks.

The Koroba District, or at least that portion of it north of Koroba, namely the Kopiago Sub-District, was one of the last areas in Papua New Guinea to come under administrative control, and so remains poorly developed, even by local standards. Indeed the patrol post at Lake Kopiago was established only in 1961. So, when patrol officers in other areas were busy introducing new crops and fostering participation in the cash economy, those in the Kopiago area were preoccupied with contacting, censusing and giving political education talks to the communities within their jurisdiction prior to the House of Assembly elections of 1964 and 1968. At that time the Kopiago Sub-District fell within the Lagaip Open Electorate.

> The Kopiago Sub-District forms part of the Lagaip Open Electorate, along with Porgera and Laigam. In both the 1964 and 1968 elections, the seat was won by Mr Poio Iuri, of Laigam. Generally the Tumbudu people have shown little interest in or understanding of the House of Assembly despite political education talks being given on every patrol. This seems to be due to the fact that the Kopiago candidate, Mr Aiako,[1] was defeated in the election. He gained all the Kopiago votes, but this was not sufficient, as he was not known in the Porgera and Laigam areas (Newell, Lake Kopiago Patrol Report 4-69/70:4).

None of the Bogaia or Hewa, and only some of the Duna people of the Koroba-Lake Kopiago open electorate participated in the 1964 House of Assembly elections. The Bogaia were not included in the common roll until 1965, and the Hewa not until some five years later. Accordingly the Hewa did not participate in the 1968 House of Assembly elections either.

The apparent lack of interest with which Duna people approached the initial House of Assembly elections has long since vanished. New electoral boundaries and the creation of the Koroba-Kopiago electorate prior to the 1972 House of Assembly elections, meant that for the first time the Duna were in a position to put forward a serious candidate. In that election there were five candidates, four of whom were Huli. The Duna candidate, Paiyele Elo, ran second to Andrew Wabira. Five years later, Paiyele Elo, the only Duna candidate in a field of seven, was elected to the parliament. He served only one term. This is the one and only time the Duna had a national representative. Since 1982 the Duna, Hewa and Bogaia have been represented exclusively by Huli men in the national forum, namely Aruru Matiabe and Herowa Agiwa. Both men have been elected to office twice. For those living in the non-Huli speaking areas of the electorate, the promises of development have failed to materialize time and time again, and the fragility of the infrastructure implemented by colonial administrators is now patently evident.

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[1] Aiyako Waiyape, although a Duna speaker, is not actually from Kopiago, but was originally from Aiyuguli in the Pori area. His mother Pugumi was from Waralo, near Tari. She was a Huli woman. Aiyako was employed as a government translator and moved to Kopiago in 1961 when the station was established. He later married a Kopiago woman, Linipi Mbatano.

As one moves throughout Duna country to the northwest and into the Bogaia and Hewa speaking areas of the electorate this becomes increasingly apparent. Indeed the Lagaip-Strickland corridor, a major part of the sub-district, is arguably one of the least developed in the country. The Duna, Bogaia and Hewa speaking people who live there lack even the most basic of services. They are without law enforcement, health services, schools or literacy programs. Elsewhere in the Kopiago Sub-District, a boarded up police station, empty government offices, a dilapidated hospital (without running water, louvre glass or even basic medicines), disused school buildings, and abandoned coffee trees are constant and visible reminders that successive national governments have failed to provide or even sustain existing services in rural areas of Papua New Guinea. In the last decade four community schools such that by mid 1996 the Lake Kopiago community school, itself short-staffed, was struggling to meet the needs of some 17,000 Duna, Hewa and Bogaia people.

Certainly a lack of government services is one thing that the Duna, Hewa and Bogaia communities within the Koroba-Lake Kopiago open electorate have in common. Likewise they seem to share the feeling that they have been neglected and abandoned by the national government. The following quote, taken from the official programme for Sir Michael Somare's planned visit to Lake Kopiago on 22 April 1997 reveals such sentiment.

WE THE PEOPLE OF YUNA [DUNA], HEWA AND BOGAYE [BOGAIYA]
WELCOME YOU CHIEF NA PAPA BILONG KANTRI AND YOUR
DELEGATION TO THIS LAND OF YOURS
NEGLIGENTLY FORGOTTEN BY
TIME
AND PAPUA NEW GUINEA
"EM PLES TASOL"

The feelings of neglect and abandonment expressed in this quote have been brewing for decades, and were exacerbated by the provincial government reforms of 1995, which did way with elected provincial assemblies. The replacement of the elected Southern Highlands provincial government by a body comprising national members of parliament and representatives of local government represented an effective shift of power nominally to local-level government but in fact to the national members. When the new arrangements were legislated, people at Kopiago initially expressed the view that this would provide the opportunity to strengthen local-level government, and provide greater opportunity for the provision of government services locally.

> Duna people are living in mud and sleeping in pig shit. The ministers and national members are not looking after us. They just trick people. At election time they just offer bribes to people and say, "vote for me, vote for me". But they never help the people. Maybe the councilors will put Duna people on top. After all they are Duna men.
>
> Sane Noma 19 August 1995 (Haley field notebooks 14:39-40)

Unfortunately, this has not been the case. The Lake Kopiago Local Government Council has been constrained by an acute lack of funds. In 1995, 1996 and 1997, only a fraction of the funds allocated were actually received, leading to a widely held perception that government funds are

being exhausted at the national level. Campaigning in the Lake Kopiago Sub-District for the 1997 election focused on the need for Duna unity in the political arena, and the need to secure national representation as a matter of urgency, so that the promises of 'development' might finally be brought to fruition (cf Rumsey 1999: 314). Robinson (this volume) has also reported a widely held belief that this would be the last election ever, and that the world would end before another election could be held.

Memorandum of Agreement For Duna Unity

The sense of urgency Duna people displayed in the period preceding the election is in part reflected in the *Memorandum of Agreement For Duna Unity* which was drawn up between some of the candidates contesting the 1997 election (see also Robinson's paper), and in local calls for the formation of Duna Province. In late December 1995 I met with some highly respected members of the Kopiago community, one of whom is the current district manager. These same individuals had previously been instrumental in the 1991 incorporation of the Duna People's Association. During the December 1995 meeting, however, they mapped out for me their vision for a 'Pure Duna Province'.

Some months prior to this meeting, one member of the delegation had dictated to me a letter which he entitled *Open Letter to all Duna Boys and the Prime Minister* (Haley field notebooks 14:12-49).[2] Extracts from that letter have been included in this paper. During that meeting the community leaders sought to impress upon me their view that the future for Duna people was dependent on their securing representation at a national level. They felt this could be achieved by forming their own province or electorate, or alternately by ensuring that only one Duna candidate ran in the 1997 election. Past representatives had not shared their vision.

> If the district manager, the council members, national member and provincial member had behaved in a proper manner and done their jobs, then we would be in a better position now. They are mad, they don't share the same vision for Duna people. That is why we can't work with them.
>
> Sane Noma 19 August 1995 (Haley field notebooks 14:40)

Ben Peri, the candidate they endorsed during that December 1995 meeting did in fact contest the 1997 national election, and it was in support of him that the *Memorandum of Agreement For Duna Unity* was drafted. Part of that memorandum states:

> D. All Parties realise that there has got to be only one person representing the Duna, Hewa and Bogaye people in Parliament.
>
> E. All parties realise that to do so a Duna candidate has to win. To win one candidate has to transfer his support to another candidate.
>
> F. All parties realise that for the last 23 years the people of Duna, Hewa and Bogaye have being used, manipulated and marginalised for the benefits of a few elite group from the Koroba area.
>
> (*Memorandum of Agreement For Duna Unity*, June 1997).

[2] The author of the letter did not want it sent to the prime minister at that time, but wanted it included in my PhD thesis, so that his critics might later understand his motivation for revealing his stories to me.

It was this feeling of abandonment, neglect and marginalisation which had been building for some time that seems to have motivated much of the malpractice of the Duna candidates and their Duna, Hewa and Bogaia supporters. What, in particular, motivated the Huli candidates I cannot say, but it is evident that they too sought to secure votes by fraudulent means.

The Voters

At the time of the 1997 national election the Koroba-Lake Kopiago open electorate was the home to some 40,000 people,[3] with a variety of ethnic backgrounds. There are in fact five different ethnic or linguistic groups within the electorate, namely the Huli, Duna, Hewa, Yeru/Bogaia (Bogaia) and Konai/Febi (Febi)[4], and these vary greatly in size. Indeed there are approximately 22,600 Huli speakers in the electorate (which in fact is more than half the total population of the electorate), 14,600 Duna speakers, 2,100 Hewa speakers and as few as 260 and 300 Bogaia and Febi speakers respectively.

Like other electorates in Papua New Guinea, the Koroba-Lake Kopiago open electorate was fiercely contested. In 1997 that contest centred very much on ethnicity, and who, from a Duna perspective at least, might provide or best facilitate the advancement and unity of Duna people. Excepting the period 1977-1982, when the National MP was Paiyele Elo, the elected representative for this electorate has always been Huli.

As the Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open Electorate corresponds with the Koroba District, the 1990 census figures provide a useful indicator of the ethnic mix found in the electorate. Table 1 below shows the respective population figures for each of the five linguistic groups in the Koroba District at the time of the 1990 census.

Table 9.1 The Population and Ethnic Mix of the Koroba District as at 1990

Census Division	Total Pop.	Huli	Duna	Hewa	Bogaia	Febi
01 Tumbudu	5,069	1,877	2,922			270
02 Mogorofugwa	5,340	5,340				
03 Koroba	12,607	12,607				
04 Paru	5,115	1,614	3,501			
05 North Hewa	446			446		
06 South Hewa	1,414			1,414		
07 Auwi Pori	3,486		3,486			
08 Logaiyu	597		597			
09 Kopiago Basin	2,850		2,850			
10 North Tumbudu	3,184		2,971		213	
Total	40,108	21,438	16,327	1,860	213	270
Percentage	100.0	53.5	40.7	4.6	0.5	0.7

[3] This figure has been calculated from the 1990 census figures and the 1980-1990 population growth rate of 1.9 per cent per annum.

[4] The settlements referred to here as Konai/Febi, are actually located within Western Province. When I pointed this out to the then district manager in 1995, he responded with words to the effect, 'It is probably so, but they like to vote with us, and we feel sorry for them so we look after them'.

Prior to the 1997 election, the boundaries of the Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate were revised so that the Paru [Pori] census division was removed and included in the newly formed Tari-Pori open electorate. Taking this into account, it is possible to determine, from Table 1, the Koroba-Lake Kopiago open electorate's population in 1990 and likewise arrive at projected estimates for the electorate's population at the time of the 1997 election. Table 2 presents these projected population figures, and any actual population figures that are known. Where actual figures exist, as is the case for the Hewa and Bogaia, these figures broadly correspond with the estimated figures, suggesting that the other estimates, on which I am relying, may be reasonably accurate. The Hewa and Bogaia figures are taken from household census data collected by Rebecca Robinson and myself, with the assistance of seven Duna co-workers.[5] During 1997 and 1998 we conducted a comprehensive census of the Bogaia/Yeru, Duna and Hewa speaking areas of the Lagaip-Strickland riverine corridor, as part of a social and genealogical study commissioned by the Porgera Joint Venture (see Robinson and Haley 1998a; 1998b; 1998c; Haley and Robinson 1998a; 1998b).

Table 9.2 Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open Electorate Population in 1990 and 1997

	Total Pop.	Huli	Duna	Hewa	Bogaia	Febi
1990 Census Population	34,993	19,824	12,826	1,860	213	270
1997 Estimated Population	39,921	22,616	14,632	2,121	243	308
1997 Actual Population	?	?	?	2,116	261	?
1997 Percentage	100	56.6	36	5.3	0.7	0.8

Based on these figures it is clear that the Huli have a huge electoral advantage over their Hewa, Bogaia and Febi neighbours, and a considerable, but not insurmountable, advantage over their Duna neighbours. Past campaigns and polling in this electorate have resulted in some fierce contests between Duna and Huli candidates, and in this regard the 1997 election was no different. Indeed ethnicity and cultural unity were central to many of the candidates' campaigns.

The Candidates and Their Alliances

Thirteen candidates contested the Koroba-Lake Kopiago open electorate in 1997, compared with twelve candidates in 1992 Election. Of the thirteen, seven were Huli and six Duna. All were male.[6] None of the Huli candidates, apart from the sitting member, Herowa Agiwa, had contested the last election, however five of the six Duna candidates had. Of the Duna candidates,

[5] We were assisted throughout our fieldwork by Kenny Kendoli and Richard Alo. At other times we were also assisted by Petros Kilapa, Anna Alo, Julie Aiyape, Watex Kayanda and Nancy Poke.

[6] One woman, Laipi Aiyako, the daughter of Aiyako Waiyape, the Duna candidate who had stood in the 1964 and 1968 House of Assembly election, had been keen to contest this election, but was prevented from doing so by her husband, who himself ran as an independent. She had previously nominated in the 1994 provincial elections but later withdrew at her husband's behest.

only Ruben Yandale was a first time contender. Paiele Elo had contested the seat on five previous occasions, Ben Peri and Pendepa Hera on two previous occasions each, and Warako Elo and Matthew Magaye on one previous occasion.

In the 1992 election, only two of the twelve candidates had party endorsement; in 1997 nine of the thirteen were affiliated with various parties. Interestingly the United Party endorsed both a Huli and a Duna candidate as did National Alliance and the People's Action Party. Despite the large increase in the number of candidates with party endorsement, the election was certainly not conceived of as a contest between political parties at a local level. As far as I could ascertain, party affiliation did not signal an endorsement of particular political views or positions. Rather it was viewed as one measure of the strength of the candidate's campaign. In this election it was necessary to have both the material resources to mount the campaign, and party endorsement to validate it. In some cases party endorsement resulted in access to additional campaign funds but in most cases it didn't. That party affiliation did not result in party-based policy positions is reflected in the fact that the six Duna candidates campaigned on almost identical platforms. They all promised to bring development; support church, women's and youth groups; strengthen government services; and ensure that roads and airstrips were maintained and that schools and health centres were properly funded.

From a Duna perspective, at least, none of the Huli candidates had even a chance of toppling the sitting member, who had by all accounts spent considerable amounts of money improving the Huli-speaking parts of his electorate. Amongst the voters, Herowa Agiwa was considered to have well represented his Huli constituents. Indeed this was a real source of resentment amongst the Hewa, who had supported Herowa *en masse* in the 1992 election and in the subsequent by-election that returned him to office. They felt that their support had not been repaid, and hence their votes were up for grabs.

In the lead-up to the election three Duna candidates emerged as strong contenders for the seat, namely Matthew Magaye, Ben Peri and Pendepa Hera. All had strong support in their local areas. In 1992 Pendepa had polled very well; this time he was endorsed by the United Party. He was again expected to poll well, especially in his home area, although there was a sense that 1992 had offered him his best chance of success, and that his overall support was on the wane. By contrast, Matthew Magaye's support was perceived to be steadily increasing. As well as having the support of the Auwi-Logaiyu people in his home area, Matthew had considerable support amongst the younger voters, especially those at, or who had recently graduated from, Koroba High School. Prior to the election he was principal of Koroba High School, and was instrumental in the establishment of the new high school at Paga in the Auwi area. With the opening of the new school, many of the students, especially the female students, were relieved that they no longer needed to travel through hostile territory.[7] Amongst his former students, Matthew was considered to be a fair man.

[7] In recent years, Duna children attending Koroba High School, had been attacked on the road on their way to and from school. Some of the female students had been raped, and others had had their money for fees and food stolen or extorted from them with the promise of protection. Many students, both male and female returned home without completing the school year. At the start of the school year in 1995 and 1996, I drove a number of the students to school, so as to ensure they got there safely.

Despite Matthew Magaye's obvious support, there was a strong sense that Ben Peri was the candidate most likely to mount a serious challenge to the sitting member. He had been endorsed by Sir Michael Somare's newly formed National Alliance and had considerable financial backing. Prior to nominating, he had been employed as a legal officer in Sandaun Province and had worked as Michael Somare's legal advisor. Throughout the electorate Ben was very well known and had widespread support. He certainly appeared to be the favoured candidate, especially amongst the older community leaders and amongst his contemporaries. It was widely rumored that Ben was the candidate most likely to effect real change, and that he had the support of all the surviving *luluais* and *tutuls*. Despite the fact he was educated, Ben had real grassroot appeal. On more than one occasion people outside the Kopiago area (Ben's real support base) revealed to me that they too wanted to vote for him but felt compelled to vote for their local candidate due to fear of reprisals.

The three remaining Duna candidates, Ruben Yandale, Paiele Elo and Warako Elo, were given little chance of success. Paiele and Warako, who are brothers, had little support. In their case there was considerable community discontent because they refused to decide amongst themselves which of them would stand aside. There were also suggestions floating about they had only nominated so as to be bought off at the eleventh hour. Ruben, by contrast, was generally considered to be a vote splitter, who had limited support in his home area of Aluni and amongst the Bogaia and Hewa living in the Lagaip-Strickland riverine corridor. Even those supporting him did so with some reluctance. Ruben was the self-appointed leader of the Kulini-Strickland Landowner Association, which was formed in 1996 to lobby the Porgera Joint Venture (PJV) for compensation for the pollution caused by mine tailings released into the Lagaip-Strickland river system. He had collected from the landowners over K20,000, which he said he would use to sue the company, but had failed to deliver. He had, it was widely assumed, misused the money. When he began campaigning on an anti-PJV platform, promising to engineer an amazing compensation package similar to that negotiated for the landowners living downstream of Ok Tedi, people in the riverine area felt compelled to vote for him. They had after all invested all their savings in his previous enterprise, and could not afford not to support him, on the off chance that he might actually win.

In the course of campaigning, some of the candidates entered into alliances, and/or accepted assistance from, other candidates. For instance, Ruben Yandale, who stood as an independent, closely aligned himself with Herowa Agiwa. It was widely rumored that all of his campaign funds came directly Herowa, and that Herowa was supporting him so that he might capture the Aluni Valley votes (Ruben's home area) and those of the disgruntled Hewa, instead of allowing them to flow on to Ben Peri. In his previous campaign Herowa had promised to appoint a district manager to the Hewa area, and through him inject funds into the area. Following the 1992 election he had appointed a Duna man named Alan Mone to that position, but Alan had refused to relocate to Wanakipa, in the Hewa area. As Alan was aligned with Matthew Magaye, this reflected badly on both Herowa and Matthew. In late 1995, the Hewa had committed their support to Ben Peri. Ben and Ruben are brothers-in-law, and there was the expectation amongst the Duna people at Kopiago that Ruben should stand aside and direct his supporters to vote for Ben. That he did not, and aligned himself with Herowa instead, was and continues to be a source of discontent.

Like Ruben, Matthew Magaye received campaign support from the sitting member. It was with funds largely provided by Herowa that the new Paga High School was established, thereby demonstrating Matthew as a 'can do' man. It is more than likely that Pendepa Hera also received some form of support from Herowa, if only indirectly in the form of party endorsement. Pendepa was endorsed by the United Party, and after the election Herowa was instated as the deputy leader of that party. Given the nature of PNG politics, Herowa Agiwa had nothing to lose by supporting and endorsing many of the Duna candidates who ran against him. Indeed he was never likely to secure significant numbers of Duna votes, so instead sought to strengthen the position of those candidates directly competing against Ben Peri for the Duna vote. He sought to undermine the calls of Ben and his supporters for Duna Unity, by dividing the vote.

Only days before the election, Herowa is reputed to have promised one Duna candidate K20,000 to contest the election. In the face of considerable community pressure that candidate had publicly signaled his intention to stand aside. Robinson (this volume) describes that candidate's attempts to collect his bribe, and how the bribe money was intercepted and then used to benefit another candidate. That the candidate actually contested the election leads many to believe that he did ultimately receive his promised bribe money.

In the first instance, Herowa had entrusted the bribe money to a high-ranking government official from the Kopiago area, but unbeknownst to him that official was secretly supporting one of the Duna candidates. The government official had helped meet the candidate's nomination fee, and had provided the candidate and his supporters with a PTB car, paid for with government funds. The government official was also 'bribing' the Duna candidate's supporters to vote for Herowa, knowing full well that the bribe money being given was actually being used to support the Duna candidate's campaign. This same government official was the brother-in-law of another Duna candidate who it was expected would also stand aside. That candidate contested the election, and there were suggestions that he too was bribed in the final days.

The Results

The official election results are shown below. The sitting member, Herowa Agiwa, was returned for a second term of office. His three closest rivals were all Duna men.

In the days immediately following the election, Ben Peri was declared the winner, closely followed by Matthew Magaye.[8] The Duna were jubilant, even those who had voted for other Duna candidates. Unfortunately the celebrations were short lived, because soon after the results were broadcast over Southern Highlands Radio, Herowa Agiwa was declared the true winner. With a bribe of K4000, it is rumored, he convinced the police force commander overseeing the count to have the returning officers include twelve additional ballot boxes that had originally been ruled out of the count. Ben Peri later challenged the result in the Court of Disputed Returns, but his petition was dismissed for failing to meet the requirements of section 208 of the Organic Law on National Elections, which required him to produce proof of misadventure.

[8] Like many people in the Southern Highlands, I listened intently to Southern Highlands Radio broadcasts to keep abreast of the election results, and it was certainly the case that Ben Peri was originally announced as the winner of the Koroba-Lake Kopiago open electorate.

Table 9.3 The 1997 Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open Electorate Results

Candidate	Votes Polled	Per Cent %	Affiliation	Ethnicity
Herowa Urape Agiwa	6,693	20.4	PPP(UP)	Huli
Matthew Magaye	6,582	20.0	PAP	Duna
Benias Peri	5,109	15.5	IND [NA]	Duna
Pendepa Hera Herason	4,343	13.2	UP	Duna
Albert Mokai	4,171	12.7	NA	Huli
James Pamburi	3,420	10.4	CDP	Huli
Ruben Yandale Sakuya	997	3.0	IND	Duna
Daniel Mapiria Warubaga	979	3.0	PDM	Huli
Frankie Hidaya	302	0.9	IND	Huli
Dickson Mundu Wako	38	0.1	IND	Huli
Joe Moses Muli Hapokaia	33	0.1	PAP	Huli
Duna Warako Elo	31	0.1	IND	Duna
Payale Elo	26	0.1	MLP	Duna
Total Ballots Allowed	32,724	99.5		
Informal	150	0.5		
Total	32,874	100.0		

It was despite the efforts of many well-respected Duna people and local community leaders, and because of the huge amounts of money put forward by Herowa Agiwa, that six Duna candidates had contested the seat. Amongst the wider Duna, Hewa and Bogaia community there was a hope, indeed an expectation, that at least some of the candidates would stand aside at the last moment. By early May some of the candidates had publicly signalled their intention or willingness to stand aside 'for the benefit of the Duna people', on the proviso that appropriate recompense was forthcoming. Much of the speechmaking in the period preceding the election centred on this subject, and the brokering of suitable agreements. Unfortunately, none of the candidates, apart from the sitting member, had the sort of money that would have been needed to finance such agreements. That said, it was certainly the case that there was general community agreement that only one Duna candidate should stand. But there was much debate as to which candidate that should be. Accordingly, in weeks, even months, leading up to the election there were regular dance contests at the Dilini market place, in which the supporters of each candidate, dressed in traditional dress, would compete against each other in order to demonstrate the worthiness of their candidate. These occasions also served as an opportunity for older men and women to instruct the younger ones on the true 'Duna' way to dress and conduct oneself. Individuals who were seen to be adopting or incorporating what were viewed to be Huli forms of dress were publicly chastized. Anti-Huli sentiment emerged as one thing that might unite the Duna candidates —but even that was not enough in the final analysis.

Of the six Duna candidates four, namely Ben Peri, Matthew Magaye, Pendepa Herason and Ruben Yandale polled well. Between them they managed to secure more than half the total votes in the electorate, which was a good result given that the Duna represent only 37 per cent of the electorate's total population. Each of these men had very strong and loyal followings in his own area. Ben was from Kopiago Basin, Matthew from Auwi-Logaiyu, Pendepa from the Tumbudu Valley and Ruben from the Aluni Valley, and they all managed to secure the majority of votes in their own areas. The brothers, Paiyele Elo and Warako Elo, the two remaining Duna candidates, polled poorly, both receiving fewer votes than they had received in the previous election.

Election Fraud and Malpractice

Examples of election fraud and malpractice emerging out of the 1997 election are both plentiful and diverse. They include exaggerating the numbers of eligible voters, using intimidation to influence the vote, diverting ballot boxes and ballot papers to other areas, impounding ballot boxes containing completed ballot papers, and destroying completed ballot papers. Robinson (this volume) provides some good examples. She details how three ballot boxes were kept at Kopiago instead of being sent to the outlying areas where the people were known to have signaled support for another candidate, and how groups of young men moved from one polling place to another, forcing people to vote at gunpoint for the groups' preferred candidate. These same young men also forced presiding officers to sign and hand over unused ballot papers, so they might complete them on behalf of the electors. One presiding officer told me how a group of armed men held up his polling place, after allowing about 10 per cent of the people to vote. They had, he believed, allowed some of the people to vote, so as to give the appearance of fair play and allay suspicions that a bloc vote had been occasioned by force or the threat of violence.

These were not isolated incidents. There were also instances of votes being cast on the road or in helicopters by polling officials on their way to designated polling places. In one particular case, a polling official revealed to me that he had instructed the helicopter pilot drop him and his fellow polling officials at a remote location, where they filled out the 400 or so ballot papers that had been allocated to the polling place to which they had been assigned. In other cases, the assistant returning officer gave additional ballot papers to polling places where people were known to support his favoured candidate. One presiding officer explained this practice as follows: 'In Hirane Council Ward we have about 660 people. The ballot papers that the assistant returning officers gave was about 800 ballot papers or so'. He went on to explain that the extra papers were not returned unused but were completed in favour of the presiding officers' preferred candidate. In another case the polling officials who were dropped off in the Hewa area by helicopter had to make their way back to Kopiago by foot. One presiding officer told of being pursued for a number of days through thick bush as he sought to keep his ballot box and its contents, votes for Ben Peri, away from Matthew Magaye's supporters. He had heard that Matthew's supporters had impounded and destroyed the ballot papers from another box that was also being returned from the Hewa area.

The fraudulent practice most comprehensively employed throughout the entire electorate, however, was to increase the reported numbers of eligible voters on the common roll, an exercise that wasn't particularly difficult given that the common roll was updated in each area by local school leavers (cf. Standish 1996). Those involved in updating the roll at Lake Kopiago sought

to systematically increase voter numbers. One young man involved in updating the common roll, justified his behaviour to me as follows:

> Instead of having 400 eligible voters at a particular place, they [the Huli] sort of double that one up and they get 800 votes in there. We didn't know about that. They were playing tricks on us. Last election [1992] we found out all about how they were doing that, and then now we did the same thing. That's because the Korobas were doing like that, and then they would elect the members from the Koroba side. For 23 solid years we haven't been receiving any services from the Koroba people. That is why we did that thing.

In 1992 a total of 14,264 votes were counted in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago open electorate. In 1997, 32,724 ballots were allowed. This represents a more than two-fold increase in the number of ballots cast. The updated principal roll of electors used during the 1997 election contained the names of some 40,127 individuals. Based on the projected population figures contained in Table 2, there should, however, have been no more than 22,000 eligible voters in the electorate.[9] Across the entire electorate then, population figures were inflated by over 80 per cent.

Taking the 1990 census figures by census division and comparing them with the numbers of people entered on the common roll as at April 1997, it is possible to compare the extent to which the figures have been inflated in different regions. Table 4 offers such a comparison. It was not possible to arrive at such comparison for all the census divisions which appeared in the 1990 census, as three had disappeared from the roll. The Paru (Pori) census division had been removed and included within the Tari electorate, and the North Tumbudu census division had disappeared. Although some of the North Tumbudu census units had been included in the Tumbudu census division on this occasion, direct comparison was still not possible. The true North Hewa census division had also disappeared. Whilst there was a census division listed as North Hewa, it contained what are exclusively South Hewa settlements. Accordingly I have included both the North Hewa and South Hewa, as they appear on the 1997 common roll, in the South Hewa figures, as listed below, to enable comparison.

A close examination of the common roll reveals that a variety of techniques was employed in order to exaggerate the figures. These included duplicating census units, duplicating family groups and clans by including them in two separate census units, including deceased, absent and under-aged family members on the roll, including the same individuals on more than one occasion by using different names, and including the names of children that didn't exist.

[9] Based on census data collected by Rebecca Robinson and myself approximately 55 per cent of the people in the electorate should have been eligible to vote, whereas 45 per cent were below voting age. Although the voting age is 18 years, I took the view that everyone we considered to be 16 years and over was eligible to vote. I did this as the ages we attributed to people were, in most cases, guesstimates. Accordingly I have attempted to take account of errors on our part. Very few of the people we censused had any formal schooling, so it was sometimes difficult to derive their ages. This was especially the case amongst the Hewa, where many of the women were marrying and having children before they reached voting age.

Table 9.4 Eligible Voters and Enrolled Voters—A Comparison by Census Division

Census Division or Unit	Ethnic Group Enrolment	Total Population 1990	Estimated Population 1997	Eligible Voters 1997	Enrolled Voters 1997	% Increase (estimated increase in eligible voters %)
Koroba	Huli	12,607	14,382	7,910	15,097	91
Mogorofugw	Huli	5,340	6,090	3,350	5,705	70
Auwi-Logaiyu	Duna	4,083	4,659	2,562	5,004	95
Lake Kopiago	Duna	2,850	3,250	1,788	3,597	101
South Hewa	Hewa	1,414	1,613	887	2,050	131
Yeru/Bogaia[10]	Bogaia	213	261	146	330	126

Take Bogaia as an example. In 1997 there were three Bogaia settlements in what I will refer to as the Yeru/Bogaia area, namely Ekali, Magali and Mbulago. Both Ekali and Magali are located in Yeru territory, whereas Mbulago is properly located in Bogaia country.[11] All three settlements are within what was formerly designated to be the Yeru or Pogaite[Bogaia] Census Unit of the North Tumbudu Census Division (1980 National Population Census). A total of 261 Bogaia people was living in these three settlements at the time of the election. Of them 146 people (56 per cent) were, by my reckoning, eligible to vote. More than half of these eligible voters (74 people), however, had their names on the role more than once. Indeed all three settlements were listed on the common roll twice, albeit under different names and in different census divisions. The residents of Ekali and Magali, were listed in the Lake Kopiago Basin census division under the name Agali Yeru, and again in the Tumbudu census division under the name Agali-Bulago. Likewise, the people living at Mbulago were listed twice, once in the Lake Kopiago Basin census division under the name Bulago, and once in the Tumbudu census division under the name Agali-Bulago.

Where individuals appeared on the common roll more than once, they did so under different names. Never did they appear under the exact same name twice. In a few instances they appeared under both a local name and a Christian name, but more frequently they appeared under slightly different spellings of the same name, for instance Maria/Mariya, Okayawi/Okoyawi, Kiawi/Kewi

[10] In 1980 this census unit was identified as Yeru or Pogaite (Bogaia); in 1990 it was identified as two separate census units, Yaru and Bulako. The 1997 population figure included here is an actual figure not an estimate.

[11] In pre-colonial times the Yeru area was inhabited by people who spoke their own language, namely Yeru. Today there are but a few people who speak any Yeru, and much of their territory is without permanent settlement. Over the last two to three generations many of the Yeru people migrated into the Aluni Valley, because of pre-contact and contact epidemics. The people living on Yeru land today are predominantly Bogaia speakers with Yeru connections, who have moved there to be closer to the limited government services that exist in the area.

and Sekimi/Sekime.[12]. It is my belief that many of the individuals whose names appear on the roll more than once have no idea that they are included twice and in some cases three times. I am not, then, in any way suggesting that these individuals were complicit in the fraud that took place, or that they are in any way personally responsible for their names appearing on the common roll more than once. It is more likely the case that an enterprising individual saw the advantage to be gained by 'borrowing' peoples' names, so to speak, so that extra ballot papers would be allocated to the area.

In the Agali-Mbulago census unit, for example, 74 (46 per cent) of the 161 people who appeared on the roll also appeared on rolls elsewhere. In addition to these obvious duplications, I identified the names of ten under-aged voters. These individuals were aged between twelve and fifteen years at the time of the election, and represented 6 per cent of those enrolled. At Bulago, I identified the names of fourteen people who had died prior to the election; of these, all but one had died prior to the common roll being updated, and two had actually died prior to the previous election. As there were only eighty-five people listed on the common roll for Bulago, the dead represented 16 per cent of those enrolled. In the Yeru/Bogaia area, then, the number of eligible voters was inflated by duplication and, to a lessor extent, by including the names of under-aged and deceased.

In the Aluni Valley, a Duna speaking area, some of the same techniques were employed to increase voter numbers. In 1997, just days after the election, our census (Haley and Robinson 1998a) revealed that there were 565 people living in the Aluni Valley, and that 314 (56 per cent) of these should have been eligible to vote. The common roll however contained the names of 461 people, that is 147 extra names. Unlike the Bogaia case, where most of the extra names could be accounted for by duplication, former residents and non-resident family members accounted for many of the Aluni 'surplus'. For instance, the Aluni roll listed over 30 people who had been absent for many years, as well as another 10 people who maintain houses and gardens in more than one area, and appear on the roll in each area.

In addition to the former residents, I identified the names of 39 children, who accounted for 8.5 per cent of those listed on the roll. The youngest enrolled voter was a 7-year-old girl. There were also cases of people appearing on the roll more than once. For example, Rakis Male and Ekanda Male, aged 16 and 15 years respectively, were both listed on the roll three times under different orthographies Rakasi Male/Takis Male/Takisa Malingi and Ekenda Male/Kand Male/Ekenda Malingi. Like most of the under-aged voters and the people who were duplicated on the Aluni roll, they appear at the very end, and not with their proper family units. Indeed only 12 of the last 100 people who appeared on the Aluni roll were actually eligible to vote in the 1997 election. Amongst those considered ineligible, I found the names of some people who, I suspect, never existed. Listed as children of the local councillor, for example, were two children he and his wife failed to mention in their household census. As they had listed, for us, both their living and deceased children in birth order, I consider it highly unlikely that these children, who in fact appear on the roll twice, actually exist.

Kopiago Basin provides further examples of electoral fraud. There, voter numbers were inflated using three main techniques: including family units and/or individual family members in more

[12] The examples given here are a sample of actual examples drawn from the common roll.

that one census unit; including the names of under-aged voters; and including the names of absent family members. For example, the Hirane census unit, which forms part of the Lake Kopiago census division, properly corresponds with Hirane Council Ward, which includes the Duna parishes of Hirane, Mbara and Huguni. Also included on the common roll as part of the Lake Kopiago census division is a census unit identified as Yalia-Huguni. In it are listed Huguni families who are also included on the Hirane roll. There are numerous examples of family units being included in two quite separate census units. This is in part due to the Duna practice of multilocal residence; because they operate a system of cognatic descent, Duna men and women can maintain membership in more than one clan at any particular time. Accordingly many individuals and families maintain gardens and, in some cases, houses in more than one territory. Where family units have been duplicated on the roll, it is mostly the case that they are regarded as members of both the groups with which their names appear.

A consideration of the Hirane census unit also reveals the extent to which voter numbers were inflated by including the names of children and absent family members. The names of 145 Hirane residents were included on the roll; only 109 of those listed, though, were actually eligible to vote: a quarter of those enrolled (some 36 people) were children aged between 6 and 15 years. With a few exceptions, all the children aged 9 years or older were included on the updated roll. Also included were 15 people who had moved out of the Hirane area for employment or study purposes.

Like the Duna, some Hewa groups sought to increase their numbers by including the names of young children on the common roll. This was most evident in the Waki [Waiki] census unit. When we censused the Waiki area in September 1997 (Robinson and Haley 1998b), there were only 114 residents, yet the common roll includes the names of 109 people. It would seem that being too young to walk was the only criterion on which Waiki residents were excluded from the roll. Indeed, amongst the names I identified nine children between 2 and 4 years. Children this young were also listed in the Ambi census unit, and accounted for many, although not all, of the extra names. In July 1997 the population of Ambi and Galaga combined was only 242 people, yet some 303 people appear on the common roll. Some of these people, and some of those included on the Waki roll, also appear in a census unit named Ambi Waiki. Here we have another example, like that of Bogaia, where census units appear under various names - Ambi, Waki and Ambi Waiki.

A further example is found in the North Hewa census division, with the census units of Usai, Malieli and Usai-Maliali.[13] In September 1997, just two months after the election, there were 269 people living in the Maliaeli area and 131 in the Usai area. At that same time there were 133 and 76 eligible voters living in the two areas respectively. In other words, there was a total of 400 people living in the general area of Usai-Maliaeli, of whom 209 were, by my reckoning, eligible to vote in 1997. The common roll, however, lists the names of 63 people at Malieli, 55 at Usai and 205 at Usai-Maliali—323 names in all. Duplication accounts in part for the extra names, as 32 who appear on the Malieli roll, and 17 people who appear on the Usai roll also appear on the Usai-Maliali roll. In contrast to the other Hewa areas examined, I found no

[13] As noted earlier Usai and Maliaeli are South Hewa places.

examples of under-aged children being added to the roll to boost numbers at either Usai or Maliaeli.

Many of the additional names identified at Usai and Maliaeli were those of Hewa speaking people from South Hewa places such as Papaki and Tapinam, and North Hewa places such as Waip and Tali – places that are not covered by any of the existing census units. All the North Hewa people on the common roll were included at various South Hewa locations. For example, the Waiki roll lists people from Iyali and Wasipa, two former census units, and the Wanakipa roll includes people from Tali and the area east towards the Southern Highlands/Enga border. That said, even if the 134 eligible North Hewa voters on the roll are included, this accounts for only a fraction of the 1163 extra Hewa names that appear.[14] The remainder should be considered fraudulent.

Conclusion

The Duna, Hewa and Bogaia who sought to influence the outcome of the 1997 election by fraudulent means felt they were justified in doing so, as it was their firm belief that the Huli had manipulated past election results, and could not be relied upon to contest the election fairly on this occasion. Accordingly, they felt that by cheating they were leveling the playing field so that the most deserving candidate might win. The figures presented in Table 4 reveal that each of the ethnic groups within the electorate considerably increased its overall votes. The extent to which they increased their numbers was greatest amongst the groups with the smallest populations. Yet the net effect of these increases served to increase their share of the vote only marginally. Compare for example, South Hewa and Koroba [Huli]. By adding extra names to the common roll the South Hewa increased their numbers by 126 per cent, potentially giving them an extra 1163 votes. In the Koroba case, the Huli increased their numbers by 91 per cent, thereby giving them an extra 7187 votes. Had the Hewa sought to gain for themselves an extra 7187 votes they would have had to inflate the numbers by an amazing 779 per cent. Even by cheating to a greater degree than their Huli neighbours, the smaller ethnic groups could not manufacture an electoral advantage.

Had the election been conducted fairly, and the principal roll of electors been accurately updated, the result might well have been different. All the Huli candidates together managed to secure less than the Huli 'share' of the vote (according to relative population figures), suggesting that one or more of the Duna candidates captured some of the Huli votes. In his home area, Herowa Agiwa – the declared winner, had access to an extra 7000 votes, due to inaccuracies in the common roll. His two closest rivals, Matthew Magaye and Ben Peri, had access to only an extra 2500 and 1800 votes respectively in their home areas. It is interesting to note, then, that in the final count Matthew Magaye received only 111 votes fewer than Herowa Agiwa. Had Ben Peri or Matthew Magaye petitioned the Court of Disputed Returns on the basis that the number of votes cast far exceeded the number of eligible voters, or on the basis that many of their supporters had not had the opportunity to vote by virtue of being excluded from the roll (e.g.

[14] Our census data (Robinson and Haley 1998a; Robinson and Haley 1998b) identified a total of 225 North Hewa living in Southern Highlands Province in 1997. Of these, 134 were eligible to vote; however only 34 on them actually appear on the common roll.

most of the North Hewa), and offered proof to that effect, they might have had somewhat more success.

Prior to the 1997 election Herowa Agiwa injected thousands of kina into the campaigns of Duna candidates he was competing against, operating, it would seem, on the basis that it is cheaper to fund vote splitters than buy votes (cf. Standish 1996:296). Had he invested the same sort of money in projects in the electorate during his first term of office (1992-1997), he may well have secured Duna, Hewa and Bogaia people's support at the polls, because what they desired when casting their votes in the 1997 national election was a national MP who would represent their interests. In trying to secure such a representative they engaged in electoral fraud on a grand scale.

10

KOROBA-LAKE KOPIAGO OPEN: 'THE FINAL ELECTION'

Rebecca Robinson

This paper presents an account, rather than an analysis, of the 1997 national elections at Lake Kopiago in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open electorate in the Southern Highlands Province. I have avoided using the names of candidates and their supporters whenever I discuss the illegal activities in which they were involved.

The 1997 national election was described at Kopiago as the 'Final Election'—the last opportunity for the Duna voice to be heard through parliamentary representation. It was widely prophesied, and generally accepted, that the world would end in the year 2000, thereby precluding further elections. Unlike previous national elections, in which the Duna had trusted their Huli neighbours to contest the election without recourse to unscrupulous tactics, they were no longer willing to assume that the Huli candidates from Koroba would conduct relatively honest electoral campaigns. This time they would elect a Duna representative, and in order to do so the Duna voters would employ the same techniques that they had discovered the Huli to have used in the past campaigns. With almost complete abandon, they employed techniques which they had observed, or heard of, from the rest of the highlands. This time they would wildly exaggerate the number of people on the common roll; they would divert ballot boxes from their more remote polling stations and mark the ballot papers themselves; they would use guns and intimidate voters and officials into a bloc-vote. This time the most widely supported Duna candidate from Kopiago would surely win. They were very nearly right.

Electorate

The Koroba-Kopiago electorate includes four language groups. The two largest groups are the Huli and Duna speakers. A much smaller population of Hewas (numbering perhaps 2500) make up the third group. The smallest group are the Bogaia speakers who number less than 300. By 4 July 1997, when the seat was officially declared, the total number of votes counted from the entire electorate was 32,874. Thirteen candidates competed for a share of the vote. A majority of the votes was won by Duna candidates, but the disputed electorate winner was the former member—Herowa Agiwa, a Huli man from Koroba. The figures from the final count are shown below.

Table 10.1 The 1997 Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open Electorate Results

Candidate	Votes Polled	Per cent	Affiliation
Herowa Urape Agiwa	6,693	20.4	PPP
Matthew Magaye	6,582	20.0	PAP
Benias Peri	5,109	15.5	IND
Pendepa Hera Herason	4,343	13.2	UP
Albert Mokai	4,171	12.7	NA
James Pamburi	3,420	10.4	CDP
Ruben Yandale Sakuya	997	3.0	IND
Daniel Mapiria Warubaga	979	3.0	PDM
Frankie Hidaya	302	0.9	IND
Dickson Mundu Wako	38	0.1	IND
Joe Moses Muli Hapokaia	33	0.1	PAP
Duna Warako Elo	31	0.1	IND
Payale Elo	26	0.1	MLP
Total Ballots Allowed	32,724	99.5	
Informal	150	0.5	
Total	32,874	100.00	

Pre-election preparations and campaigning

One of the first steps the Duna voters took to increase the chances of a Duna candidate winning the election was to collect and add ineligible voters' names to the common roll. As one friend, who helped update the common roll, explained:

> In the 1992 election we heard that the Koroba people wrote the names of the people ten years old and eight years old - they wrote their names in the common roll. Later they gave more ballot papers to the Koroba people where the polling places are. So then [I thought] I'll go and write all the peoples' names who died quite a long time ago. So I wrote their names inside the book. The really small ones - I wrote their names inside too.

In the past Duna people had also rigged the common roll somewhat, by including dead people's names and the names of children, but never before on such a wide and carefully thought-out scale.

Campaigning, that is the political manoeuvring, the manipulation, wheeling and dealing, began in earnest in 1996, although some of the key candidates and their core supporters had begun campaigning even earlier. It was taken for granted that the candidates' strongest support would come from their own places. To win, the votes of people from other clans, or indeed other language groups, would be needed, and to gain these would require some ingenuity.

In late 1996 Herowa Agiwa, the sitting member—a Huli man, chartered a helicopter, flew to Kopiago, and officially announced a K20,000 endorsement for a new Christian Apostolic Fellowship (CAF) church. He then had the congregation swear upon the Bible that they would vote for him in the coming election. Further, if they voted for someone else, having already sworn to vote for him, then he or God, or both, would burn the people and the church. By funding the construction of a new CAF church in what had previously been an almost exclusively Apostolic area, Herowa sought to further divide the local community. Relations in the area had been strained for some time due to ongoing conflicts between members of the

Apostolic Church, and the breakaway CAF congregation. It was probably more than a coincidence, then, that the father of one of the key Duna candidates was a well respected Apostolic minister.

While at Kopiago, Herowa Agiwa was approached by some local Kopiago men who wanted him to pay them money they were owed for acting as polling officials in the last by-election. He apparently told them that he could not pay them since the public would perceive any payments made by him as a bribe. He suggested that if they wanted their money they should approach the returning officers *he* had appointed and ask *them* for the money. At the time of writing this paper, the polling officials who presided over the 1997 national election and the previous by-election had still not been paid. This issue of unpaid wages also resulted in a delay of the local government elections. The officials who sought to conduct the election were literally chased away from Lake Kopiago. Preventing the local elections did not, of course, have the same repercussions that preventing the national elections could have had. It has, however, resulted in less than effective local representation, because some of the local government council positions were filled, it is rumoured, on an appointment basis by the sitting member without any account of whether voting had occurred or not.

In the months preceding the elections the supporters of different contenders formulated strategies to help ensure the election of the candidate of their choice. Home-made shotguns were gathered, factory made shotguns sent in, and three semi-automatics given into the care of three trusted supporters of one candidate. One man who was deeply involved told us afterwards:

> I decided [that the guns should be brought in and used]. I did it because if the Defence Force decided to shoot this person–they can shoot me on behalf of all the Duna people ... I got up and said: 'If you've got home-made guns or any stolen guns then use them in this election. If they want to kill us all then we can all die for our own place'. When you compare all the districts out in this country the only peoples suffering are the Dunas ... We don't know where to get support from—even though we went and asked these things up in Mendi, lodged these types of complaint - people started ignoring us. So we want things to change. We want these Hulis to come and bow down to us one day. So that is why we are fighting for it.

He also had the following to say:

> So that is why we, the young boys—especially I—did that on behalf of my people. I don't want my parents to suffer. *My* parents were suffering and I don't want myself to suffer in the future. So that is why I have done this—to save my people. Even if they want to send me to jail—that's okay because I have to do something for my people. Let my people be happy once. So that is how I helped the boys and I supported [a Duna candidate] and we ran these elections.

At the same time as the guns were being collected other aspects of electioneering were on the rise. Regular *singsings* were practised and performed. Teams favouring the different Duna candidates competed with each other—essentially to show who had the greatest numbers, the greatest skills, and the strongest and most influential supporters. As the weeks passed there was a steady crescendo of political talk and speech making at the local market. Much of the talk revolved around the negotiations and persuasions being offered to encourage some Duna candidates to stand aside and thus improve the chances for the remaining Duna candidates to beat their Huli competitors.

Sir Michael Somare was scheduled to visit Kopiago in late April to publicly endorse Ben Peri for the National Alliance (prior to the election Peri had worked as Somare's legal advisor). Debates between the different Duna candidates were organized, a grandstand was constructed, the station decorated with flowers, and a huge banner proclaiming 'Welcome Chief—Father of the Nation' was placed over the road leading from the airstrip to the market place. Ben Peri's supporters assembled a carefully prepared *singsing* group to dance on the airstrip, and other candidates led processions of their supporters into the station or on to the airstrip in a show of political strength. Despite the careful preparations the Duna people were to be disappointed when Somare failed to show. Nonetheless the debates that had been scheduled went ahead as planned. After an afternoon of speeches, and as a result of further private talks and promises that emerged out of meetings that carried on well into the night, it looked as if some of the Duna candidates would indeed stand aside.

The immediate pre-election period

In the days immediately before polling commenced there were three more, significant, political episodes that I am aware of. These last days leading up to the election were crucial; the tension and excitement at Kopiago was palpable—heightened by a six day delay in polling while people waited for the ballot boxes to materialize.

The first episode I am aware of occurred a week or so before voting began, when a high ranking government officer arrived from Koroba. He brought with him a briefcase containing K20,000. The money was to bribe one of the candidates so that he might split the Duna vote. It was offered as an incentive not to stand aside as he had said he would. The government officer who brought the money was a Kopiago man whose sisters and mother still live there. Using some subtle, and not so subtle, cajolery, one of his clan brothers actually persuaded him to give the bribe money to another stronger Duna candidate for use in his campaign.

The following day a helicopter, with a Huli candidate on board, was scheduled to arrive, pick up the government officer and the bribe money, and then continue on to Horaile Parish in the next big valley to the south. At Horaile the bribe was to be given to the candidate it was intended for. Knowing this, young men were 'mobilized' to rush the helicopter and throw stones as it tried to land at Kopiago. They did this, and as a result, the helicopter was forced to continue on to Horaile without picking up the government officer or the bribe. At Horaile the helicopter was also attacked and forced to leave prematurely. Meanwhile a vehicle had left Kopiago and driven to Horaile with the bribe-hungry candidate on board. The unhappily un-bribed man returned some time later and was stopped at a bridge where some young men had removed logs so that they might check for any other bribes hidden in the car. The candidate was not allowed to pass until the young men had satisfied themselves that he was not in possession of any ill-gotten gains.

Over the following days the ballot boxes began to arrive and were distributed to the more remote polling places. During this period the assistant returning officer, a Duna man named Alan Mone, appointed by the sitting member Herowa Agiwa, was sacked and then replaced after reputedly having attempted to create two additional polling places in Mathew Magaiye's census division of Auwi-Logaiyu. The sacked returning officer, who had committed his support for Matthew Magaye, was known to harbour considerable ill feeling towards Ben Peri, as Peri was married to,

but separated from, the man's sister Rona. Other illegal voting activities, however, were conducted in public and went largely unchecked.

Coinciding with these attempts to bribe one of the candidates were negotiations for the signing of a secret contract between three parties. These negotiations constituted what I consider to be the third significant episode of the immediate pre-election period. The negotiations being orchestrated were for the signing of a document entitled, the 'Memorandum of Agreement'.

Memorandum of agreement

The contents of the document referred to as the 'Memorandum of Agreement' are outlined below. I have blacked out the parties' names and any obviously identifying references to their identities.

This Memorandum of Agreement is entered this day __ of June 1997 between _____ (hereinafter referred to as the First Party on one part) and _____ (hereinafter referred to as the Second Party on the other part) and _____ (hereinafter referred to as the Third Party on the other part).

WHEREAS:

A. The First Party is a National Alliance Candidate contesting in the Koroba Lake Kopiago Open Electorate for the 1997 national elections.

B. The Second Party is an independent candidate contesting in the Koroba Lake Kopiago Open Electorate also for the 1997 national elections.

C. The Third Party is the National Alliance Candidate for the Southern Highlands Regional Seat.

C. Both the First Party and Second Party are from the Lake Kopiago Area of the Southern Highlands Province.

D. All Parties realise that there has got to be only one person representing the Duna Hewa and Bogaye people in Parliament.

E. All parties realise that to do so a Duna candidate has to win. To win one candidate has to transfer his support to another candidate.

F. All parties realise that for the last 23 years the people of Duna, Hewa and Bogaye have being used, manipulated and marginalised for the benefits of a few elite group from the Koroba area.

G. All parties to save their place from such agree to the following terms and conditions and give to themselves this Agreement.

1. REIMBURSEMENT OF ELECTION ASSOCIATED COSTS

Both parties agree that the Second party has spent an estimated K12,000.00 on election related expenses.

The First party and the Third agree that in the event the First party and Third wins the national election they will reimburse the Second Part's Election Expenses of K12,000.00

2. KULINI - STRICKLAND ASSOCIATION

The Second Party has formed an Association called the Kulini-Strickland Association to among other things, fight for the rights of the Strickland River people and a total amount of K20,000.00 have been collected from the people and used for that purpose.

The First party agrees that in the event the First Party wins the national election the said K20,000.00 will be given to the said Association and thereafter for the next four years a grant of K20,000.00 will he given to the Association to carry out its functions.

The Third Party will make available from his grants a sum of K 5,000.00 for the First year for the purposes of the Association.

3. EMPLOYMENT

The First Party and the Third Party agree that the Second Party will be recommended to the National Alliance Party for a posting in one of the overseas missions as a worker and or the Second Party will be considered for the position of Provincial Education Appointment Officer.

4. THE SECOND PARTY

The Second Party agrees that he will surrender all his support to the First Party in consideration of the conditions of the First and Third Parties.

5. SUPPORT

The Second Party will instruct his Supporters and Campaign Managers to give their support and votes to the First Party and Third Party.

In the eleventh hour, a key party to this deal, the same candidate whom the sitting MP was attempting to bribe, decided not to sign the agreement. It makes one wonder what other kinds of deals *were* actually made and effected between the candidates before the polls opened.

The Polling Period

Polling in the Kopiago sub-district was delayed for a number of days, because the ballot boxes and papers did not arrive as scheduled. When they did arrive, they were distributed to the outlying areas first, so that voting could be completed without further delay. While ballot boxes were filling up across the electorate, people in the more remote Duna, Hewa and Bogaia areas were waiting for their opportunity to vote. People in some of these places did not get the chance to vote. The following quote explains what happened to their portion of the ballot:

> We left about two ballot boxes that were supposed to go to a polling place... called Ekali [a Bogaia place], and there was another one for Yokona [a Duna place], and a third box that was supposed to go to... Idjureke [a Hewa place]. We left these three ballot boxes and then the left over ballot papers that were coming in from all of the polling places - we cast them into those three ballot boxes.

At Kopiago polling finally began on 28 June, after a six day delay. For the first time groups of young Kopiago men, faces disguised and blackened with ash, carried shotguns and moved from one polling place to another to force a bloc vote. Certainly there was a sense that they were only playing a part or acting out a role, but still it was menacing enough for the people they encountered. Two friends of ours were polling officials—one at Kopiago Station at Aiyuguni, and another at Hirane next to the Lake. They reported the following to myself and Nicole Haley:

> The guys came from Bisamu—they shot up in the air. People were surprised! They went in fear! Even the old people—they were dragging their bags up. Mothers with kids, they were dragging their kids along the street because it was their first time to see this ... We never did anything like that before.
>
> An old woman pissed herself and then went and jumped into a grave which was there, and then another person came up. There was another old man who was trying to run away, and then all the ladies jumped over him because he slipped and fell down. All the ladies jumped over him. He said that when he was lying there he looked up—he saw a young girl jumping over him and he went: 'Oh shit. I think this is the end of the world. I've never seen this kind of thing before'.
>
> [He thought that] because the people who had been in the graves before were coming out, [and] because he saw this old woman who had been in the grave. They had nowhere else to hide.

The same gunmen had planned to then go to Horaile and hold up the polling officials there but were later dissuaded from doing so. One friend relayed what happened saying:

Some guys from Hirane ran across to Horaile and said, 'These boys are coming—watch these guys'. I told [my boys] to send a spy and go to see Horaile. But they came back and said there were old people with bows and arrows ready to attack us. So they [my boys] came back and they waited for the ballot boxes on the road... The Defence Force came with a driver to pick the ballot boxes up—and they [the boys] thought somebody might have spread the news across to the Defence Force to come and shoot [them] so they ran up into the bush.

Over the next few nights, the ballot boxes were held in the district office, nominally watched over by three Defence Force personnel. These men, I am informed, spent the whole post-election period stoned on marijuana, provided by the various candidates' supporters. No police whatsoever had been sent to Kopiago to oversee the election, as it was deemed, from previous experience, that there would be few problems in the Kopiago sub-district. While they were waiting for the boxes to be collected, a contingent of Matthew Magaye's supporters, Duna men from the Auwi-Logaiyu census division, came with the intention of burning down the district office building. Learning of their plan, the local Kopiago men, and Ben Peri's supporters in particular, gathered their guns, bows and arrows and bush knives and set up guard around the district office for three days and nights until the ballot boxes were safely collected.

Once the polling had been completed, and the ballot boxes safely transported to Koroba for counting, Nicole Haley and I were able to proceed to Aluni (a valley southwest of Kopiago) to continue with some research we were undertaking. While we were there the count was completed in the Huli township of Tari, and the results aired over Radio Southern Highlands. Initially the Duna candidate, Ben Peri, was declared the Open electorate winner for Koroba-Kopiago, after a total of 68 ballot boxes had been counted. Twelve additional ballot boxes were rejected, and their papers declared informal because of disputes about their validity and origins. The provincial member Anderson Akiru was also declared at this time. Ballot papers from only 68 boxes from Koroba-Kopiago electorate were included in the provincial count.

Very soon after this, in quite a turnaround, Herowa Agiwa was declared the true Open electorate winner. Somehow the Defence Force personnel, police and the returning officers had been persuaded that the twelve additional ballot boxes should also be counted. There was, however,

no re-count for Anderson Akiru, whose votes from the Koroba-Kopiago area included only those from the 68 original boxes.

The election aftermath

In the period immediately following the announcement of the results, there was considerable election-related violence. Indeed, for many months the people from Aluni, who had voted for Ruben Yandale, their local candidate, felt that they could not venture to Kopiago, or visit the station or hospital for fear of angry reprisals from Ben Peri's supporters. At Kopiago, Herowa Agiwa's few supporters, including the CAF church members, kept a very low profile. One quite influential and generally well-respected man, who had supported Herowa, was forced to close his previously profitable trade store, until it was decided that he had lost earnings equivalent to the bribes he allegedly received. Another Herowa supporter and CAF minister had his store destroyed and its contents looted as retribution. He, his father and another family member were also attacked.

Frustrated Kopiago station residents also smashed and looted the council office, damaged the district office building, and badly damaged the local government guest-house such that it is no longer habitable. Two vacant government houses were also wrecked, and later the useable remains were slowly removed and taken away. In Kopiago and other areas of the electorate, bridges were destroyed. Indeed all of the 120 or so log bridges between Kopiago and Koroba, along the southern loop road, were removed by frustrated people living nearby. In the Kopiago area logs were removed by disgruntled and disappointed Ben Peri supporters, and closer to Koroba they were removed by Pendepa Hera's supporters.

Conclusion

The Duna people's perceptions of how the elections were run are common to much of Papua New Guinea. Duna people feel that Kopiago lacks development, and that nothing constructive has happened since independence. They also express the view that life for the sitting member's people—the Huli people of Koroba—is relatively easy; that he provides development opportunities, supports health care, provides opportunities for students to continue with their education, and gives jobs to his own people. Educated Kopiago men and women have no choice but to leave their area if they wish to secure paid employment.

Unlike the many international observers who commented on the elections, I do not endorse the view the 1997 election was conducted for the most part in a reasonably fair or just way. I am not simply referring to the fact that cheating and violence were employed. The reasons behind the cheating and the violence, at Kopiago at least, cannot simply be put down to glib statements such as, 'That's the way things are done in Papua New Guinea'. At Kopiago, violence did not beget violence. People had reached a threshold of frustration. They have been, and continue to be, neglected by the national government. They can see that there are places elsewhere in Papua New Guinea where people appear to have a greater political voice. At Kopiago it was fear for the future, fear of future neglect, and utter frustration at their lack of voice in any national political forum that begat the election-related violence. If future elections are to be peaceful at Kopiago then the reasons for the people's fears and frustrations must be addressed.

11

THE EAST SEPIK ELECTORATES: THE DEMISE OF PANGU

R.J. May

The East Sepik Province contains seven electorates: East Sepik Provincial and the open electorates of Ambunti-Dreikikir, Angoram, Maprik, Wewak, Wosera-Gaui and Yangoru-Saussia. While Maprik and Yangoru-Saussia are relatively small, fairly densely populated electorates, Ambunti-Dreikikir, Angoram and Wosera-Gaui all cover extensive, and in large parts thinly-populated, areas on both sides of the Sepik River and are amongst the country's geographically largest electorates. Wewak is somewhere in between, but includes a number of offshore islands which make campaigning difficult and expensive.

Successive elections in the East Sepik have been characterized by generally low levels of political activity (with Yangoru-Saussia an early exception), and relatively low levels of turnover amongst MPs.[1] The province has produced the National Parliament's longest serving member, Sir Pita Lus, the member for Maprik since 1964, and the country's first prime minister, Sir Michael Somare, who has held the regional/provincial seat since 1968. The province has also been a traditional stronghold of Pangu Pati. In the elections of 1992, six of the seven sitting members were returned (compared with a turnover of over 50 per cent nationally), five of them Pangu-endorsed candidates.

In 1997, however, a significant change had taken place in East Sepik's political landscape. As a result of a disagreement in 1995 between Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan and Sir Michael Somare, then leader of the Pangu Pati, Somare was dropped from cabinet and a split developed within Pangu. Chris Haiveta (the member for Gulf Provincial) subsequently became parliamentary leader of the party. Though he did not resign from Pangu, Somare subsequently established a new political group, the National Alliance (NA), which brought together some Pangu colleagues, members of the Melanesian Alliance (MA), and several other progressive politicians (see Chapter 1). In 1996 he was expelled from the party of which he had long been the figurehead.

In 1997 Somare stood under the banner of the NA. As deputy leader of the MA, Bernard Narokobi, the member for Wewak since 1987, was also identified with the NA, though he was officially listed as a MA candidate. NA candidates were endorsed in Ambunti-Dreikikir, Maprik, Wosera-Gaui and Yangoru-Saussia (where two candidates were endorsed). None was endorsed in Angoram, where, however, Sir Michael's son Arthur Somare was a candidate. For the first time, therefore, the national elections in East Sepik were not dominated by Pangu Pati, though Pangu did put up candidates in all seven electorates. Moreover, with Somare's departure from Pangu, the Sepik's identification with Pangu was diminished; this may have been exacerbated by

[1] Accounts of previous elections in the East Sepik may be found in Winnett and May 1983, May 1989a,b, 1996.

the fact that Pangu Pati leadership in 1997 was in the hands of Chris Haiveta, from Gulf Province, and Haiveta, as deputy prime minister, had been heavily implicated in the recent 'Sandline affair' (see chapter 1). In 1997 the NA's provincial coordinator was Cletus Bini, who was still the provincial president of Pangu in East Sepik; the opinion of Bini, and many others to whom I spoke in mid 1997, was that provincial loyalties to Pangu would be substantially transferred to the NA.

In fact, parties were barely visible in the province in 1997. In 1992 I recorded the impression that in the East Sepik there was little apparent interest in parties amongst either candidates or voters, especially since parties other than Pangu and MA were not well known and had little to offer materially (May 1996: 222). In 1997 this was even more the case. Pangu Pati, which over several elections had conducted its campaign in the province from an office at the back of the Provincial Assembly building, with a competent campaign manager, had no obvious presence in Wewak. The NA campaign was run quietly from Sir Michael Somare's house in Wewak town, but Somare himself spent a large part of the campaign period outside the province, supporting NA candidates elsewhere and negotiating a possible post-election coalition. Apart from the NA, MA and Pangu, ten other parties were shown on the candidates list as endorsing candidates in East Sepik (see Table 11.1). The People's Progress Party (PPP) had four candidates in the province (Anisi in Ambunti-Dreikikir, Schulze in Angoram, and Parari and Yenbari in Yangoru-Saussia) but was rumoured to be supporting several other candidates and promising to reimburse the campaign expenses of successful independents.

Table 11.1: Parties in the East Sepik electorates

	ES Prov.	Amb.-Dreik.	Angoram	Maprik	Wewak	Wos.-Gaui.	Y-S.	Total
Pangu	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**7**
NA	**1**	**1**		**1**		**1**	**2**	**6**
MA		**1**		**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**5**
PPP		**1**	**1**				**2**	**4**
IPM		**1**		**2**	**1**		**1**	**5**
PAP		**1**	**1**			**1**	**1**	**4**
PUP		**1**			**1**		**1**	**3**
PDM		**1**		**1**			**1**	**3**
CDP			**1**		**2**		**1**	**4**
CCP							**1**	**1**
PRAP							**1**	**1**
LNA		**1**						**1**
Black A.							**1**	**1**
Indep.	**6**	**9**	**6**	**5**	**13**	**17**	**16**	**72**
Total	**8**	**18**	**10**	**11**	**19**	**21**	**30**	**117**

But there was almost no evidence of party logos on vehicles or tee-shirts, as in previous elections, and indeed no evidence that I saw of their presence except for the odd party label on a candidate's poster. Voters seemed to have little knowledge of the minor parties.

The number of candidates was another feature of the election in East Sepik in 1997. Between 1977 and 1987 there had been between 52 and 57 candidates contesting the seven East Sepik seats (the number actually declining, against the national trend, to 52 in 1987). Notwithstanding

the raising of the candidate's deposit fee in 1992, the number of candidates in East Sepik rose by over 40 per cent to 74 in that year. In 1997 there was a further 60 per cent increase in the number of candidates, to 117 (see Table 11.2). Although the average number of candidates per electorate, at 17, was still below the national average (22), the large number of candidates meant that voters were less likely than in previous elections to know all the candidates, and that local factors, which are always important in Papua New Guinea elections, might be expected to exercise an even greater influence on the outcome than was the case with a smaller number of candidates.

Table 11.2: Number of candidates, East Sepik electorates

	1987	1992	1997
East Sepik Provincial	4	6	8
Ambunti-Dreikikir	9	8	18
Angoram	12	13	10
Maprik	5	10	11
Wewak	5	6	19
Wosera-Gaui	5	9	21
Yangoru-Saussia	12	22	30
Total	52	74	117

Among these 117 candidates was a number of so-called 'foreign Sepiks', who had returned to their home province, often from senior public service or private sector employment in Port Moresby or other provinces, to contest the election. These included Joseph Sukwianomb, former vice chancellor of the University of Papua New Guinea, who returned (after a less than illustrious career at UPNG) to contest in Ambunti-Dreikikir; Paul Bengo, whose career had included appointments as East Sepik provincial secretary and secretary for Defence, in Angoram; Gabriel Dusava, former Foreign Affairs secretary, and David Nelson, former managing director of the Public Officers' Superannuation Fund, in Yangoru-Saussia; Raymond Kamanabi, a former assistant secretary in the department of Finance, in Maprik; and Arthur Somare, who had fairly recently returned from education in Australia (but had been a consultant/project manager for a timber project in the electorate prior to the election), in Angoram. As in previous elections, both national and provincial, there were few women candidates: one in the provincial contest, two in Wewak and one each in Ambunti-Dreikikir and Yangoru-Saussia— a total of five. An overview of candidates' nomination forms showed a continuing increase in the average level of education, and of work experience outside the province (including a number with higher degrees), but still a significant number of poorly-educated 'grassroots' candidates.[2]

In 1997 I did not have time to travel far beyond Wewak, where campaigning was very low key, but reports from other electorates suggested that despite—or perhaps because of—the large number of candidates, apart from a few minor incidents when rival candidates, supporters confronted one another along the road, campaigning was generally rather quiet. Informants suggested that a major reason for this was lack of money to pay for transport and to reimburse *komiti* for their expenses, but many people also spoke of widespread disinterest in the elections

[2] The data on candidates' nomination forms is sometimes incomplete and often difficult to interpret since candidates who have resigned from public service jobs or returned from employment outside the province usually list their occupation as 'subsistence farmer' and often do not indicate previous experience.

(a claim, however, which seems inconsistent with the large number of candidates contesting). At the few campaign meetings I attended, candidates talked mostly about what they would do for the electorate, in terms of schools, aidposts, roads, local *raskol* activity, and agricultural production, and were asked questions about such local issues; but there were also expressions of concern about what was perceived as increasing corruption in government, and people wanted to know more about the provincial and local-level government reforms (about which most candidates appeared to be poorly informed) and about the Sandline affair. The latter did not have much direct impact for East Sepik politicians, but the Sandline mercenaries had been secretly training, with their PNGDF counterparts, in the grasslands to the southwest of Wewak, and there was a general curiosity about the events surrounding Sandline. Following one village meeting, on the outskirts of Wewak, a village leader thanked the candidate (Narokobi) and said that the village would consider what the various candidates had to say, and make their collective decision on how to vote. It appears that such uncoerced bloc voting is not uncommon.

In general, the elections in East Sepik were reported to be 'trouble free without violence', but not without 'some unbecoming incidents' (Provincial Returning Officer's *Election Report*, pp.8,2). In contrast with 1992, when the conduct of the election was hampered by recent flooding along the Sepik River, in 1997 a long dry spell had made access to many villages off the river difficult, and with only one helicopter available to service the more remote villages, and the charter company allegedly unreliable, voting, and the collection of ballots, was delayed in several villages, and some voters were unable to vote. This particularly affected Ambunti-Dreikikir and Wosera-Gaui. Problems were also experienced with the electoral roll, a number of voters in many parts of the province claiming that their names were not on the common roll, even though they had been on the preliminary rolls. This was an occasional source of angry remonstration. Problems with the common roll, rather than lack of interest or difficulties of access, probably also explain the apparently low voter turnout: of 191,935 voters enrolled, only 129,108 (67.2 per cent) votes were recorded. With regard to electoral behaviour, the provincial returning officer reported that

> ... some senior public servants of the Provincial Department were seen campaigning or supporting various candidates. Facilities such as Government vehicles were seen used by some of these officers in these activities.
>
> Others in the outstation were been pressured by some officers/teachers and current Provincial Government members to do certain things in favour of their particular candidates (*ibid.*: 2).

The provincial returning officer supported the claims of several candidates that vote splitting was common, and reported that 'in some polling places, the scrutineer intimidate or threaten the voters and polling officials. Bribery offers were not uncommon' (*ibid.*: 4).

Security for the election was provided by 242 provincially-based police, supplemented by 67 from Port Moresby, but the Defence Force was not employed in the province, as it had been in 1992.

Contests and results.

East Sepik Provincial.

Despite an increase in the number of candidates from 6 in 1992 to 8 in 1997, and rumours prior to the election that support for Sir Michael Somare was diminishing, the province's elder statesman won very comfortably, with 61.0 per cent of the vote, a considerably larger margin than he received in 1992 and almost four times the vote obtained by his nearest competitor, high school teacher and independent candidate Greg Maisen. Former provincial premier Jonathan Sengi came third, and the endorsed Pangu candidate Tobias Kuelik (who had come a reasonably close second to Somare in 1992) was fourth. The two women candidates (one of them, Maria Ibai Hayes, a former secretary to Somare) came sixth and eighth. The two other unsuccessful candidates were also linked to Somare: Joe Gawi, an ex-policeman, had been Somare's 'security' and Philip Kanora is his uncle.

After the election, it looked for a while as though Somare and the NA would succeed in putting together a winning coalition and that Somare might serve again as prime minister, but that was not to be (see chapter 1).

Ambunti-Dreikikir Open.

Between 1992 and 1997 the number of candidates in Ambunti-Dreikikir more than doubled, from 8 to 18. Like Wosera-Guai, Ambunti-Dreikikir is a bifurcated electorate which includes an essentially riverine population in the south and a culturally and geographically separate–and more populous–group of people in the foothills to the north. In 1992 sitting member Judah Akesim (Pangu), from Musendai village in the Dreikikir subdistrict, was returned with just over a third of the total vote, and in 1997 he was voted in again, receiving 16.6 per cent of the vote, ahead of former provincial deputy premier and PPP-endorsed candidate Alex Anisi, with 14.2 per cent. Akesim was said by NA sources to be pro-Somare.

Following the announcement of the result, in early July, it was reported that two unsuccessful candidates in Ambunti-Dreikikir had gone on a rampage, destroying government properties and private houses; one of these (from Dreikikir) accused a rival candidate of vote splitting (*The National* 9 July 1997, 'Two candidates go berserk in East Sepik').

Angoram Open.

In 1992 the sitting member (since 1982) and Pangu-endorsed candidate, Philip Laki was re-elected, defeating twelve other candidates. In second place was Joe Kenni, a Yangoru-born, Angoram town-based businessman who had Pangu associations, and had stood in previous elections. In third place was Ludwig Schulze, like Kenni a town-based businessman who was not originally from Angoram; Schulze was from New Ireland, was said to be a relative of Sir Julius Chan, and was believed to have PPP support. In March 1994, however, a tribunal found Laki guilty of misconduct in office and misappropriation of public monies, and he lost his seat. In the subsequent by-election, which was contested by seventeen candidates, Schulze, standing as a PPP candidate, won with 20.2 per cent of the vote; Leo Unumba, who had resigned as provincial deputy premier to contest the national election in 1987, but did not stand in 1992, came second with 17.5 per cent; Kenni came a disappointing third with 11.0 percent. Schulze subsequently became Police minister in the Chan government.

In 1997 there were ten candidates. They included the sitting member, Schulze (PPP); Kenni, who was endorsed by Pangu (but said to be pro-Somare); Luimek Pandima Johnson, a self-employed former PTC technician from Kambaramba who had stood in 1992 and in 1994, coming ninth on both occasions; and Stanley Lumbia, who had come fourth in the 1994 by-election. Also standing were two first-time candidates, Paul Bengo and Arthur Somare. As noted above, Bengo, whose home place is Korogopa, south of the river, had had a distinguished public service career, including appointments as East Sepik provincial secretary in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and secretary for Defence; Somare, the son of Sir Michael Somare, recently returned from Australia, had been working as consultant/manager of a timber project at Kaup Base Camp prior to the election.

In the lead-up to voting, there was no clear favourite. Schulze, the sitting member was said to be campaigning fairly vigorously, both personally and through a network of *komiti*, principally along the river and its tributaries the Keram and Yuat, to whom he was said to be supplying fuel, food and some outboard motors (Schulze has a small crocodile farm in Angoram and has been a buyer of skins), and was thought by many to be the likely winner. Kenni was expected to pick up votes in town and around the resettlement scheme at Gavien, and to gain something from Pangu endorsement, but many people suggested that having slipped from second in 1992 to third in the 1994 by-election, his chances of gaining election were diminishing. Johnson, who stood as endorsed PAP candidate, was also said to be running a well organized campaign, focused on the Yuat and grass Country. Arthur Somare was the unknown. A bright, well-educated young man (27 in 1997), he was carrying out an extensive campaign and might have been expected to gain from the family connection, given the widespread deference accorded his father. But many people, including villagers from the Somares' home area of Murik at the mouth of the Sepik River, expressed to me their reservations about having two members of the family contesting in the same election— a common phrase was '*nogat tupela wantaim*'. Arthur Somare stood as an independent, though he was known to be aligned with his father, and was generally perceived as NA.

In the event, the young Somare was victorious, winning 24.9 of the vote, ahead of Schulze (20.4 per cent), Johnson (16.1 per cent) and Kenni (14.4 per cent) (see the analysis of voting by ballot box, below). The Somares thus became the first father-son combination in the history of Papua New Guinea's parliament. Schulze petitioned against Somare's election, principally challenging his residential qualifications, but without success.

Maprik Open.

Sir Pita Lus is the National Parliament's—indeed according to *The National* (21 May 1997), the Commonwealth's—longest-serving member (having been elected to the House of Assembly in 1964 and re-elected in every subsequent election). He is also one of its more colourful members. In 1997 Sir Pita returned to Maprik, as the endorsed Pangu candidate, and, accompanied by three Pangu 'political strategists', undertook an effective campaign (though in the final outcome his support was heavily concentrated in his home area). He was once again re-elected, with a comfortable 20.8 per cent of the vote (compared to 33.7 per cent in 1992). Second placed was the NA candidate, Jim Kauk, with 14.5 per cent.

Wewak Open.

Bernard Narokobi, the deputy leader of the MA, has been the member for Wewak since 1987 (having stood unsuccessfully against Somare in the regional seat in 1982). In 1992 there had been pre-election talk of an agreement between coalition partners Pangu and MA not to contest against one another, but both parties did contest the Wewak (and other East Sepik) seat(s), and Narokobi had taken up the opposition slogan '*Kilim Pangu. Senisin lida nau*'. In 1997 Narokobi was again listed as MA, though the MA was part of the NA (a situation which caused some confusion among voters who were imperfectly aware of Somare's rift with Pangu and the formation of the NA, and were aware of some antagonism between Narokobi and Somare in the past). As in previous elections, Narokobi conducted a low-key, 'grassroots'-style campaign, on this occasion using his modest residence on Wewak Hill as a base, and utilized an extensive network of *komiti*, many of whom were linked through the Catholic Church. Narokobi enjoys widespread respect throughout the electorate, and in an election in which corruption and dubious dealing within the national government featured prominently in campaign rhetoric, he was acknowledged by voters as a man of integrity. Narokobi's main opponents appeared to be Kairiru doctor, Moses Manwau (independent), who had stood in 1992, and Luke Gukaine (independent, but said to be pro PPP), whose campaign was being managed by former Narokobi *komiti* Michael Mosoro. There were two women candidates, Australian-born businesswoman Laura Martin (independent), who had come fourth in the 1992 contest and was subsequently elected to the provincial assembly where she served as Finance minister, and Mary Soondrawu (PUP). Former provincial premier Bruce Samban was also an independent candidate.

Narakobi was again re-elected, with a comfortable 28.2 per cent of the vote, ahead of Manwau (14.8 per cent) and Gukaine 7.5 per cent. Pangu candidate Michael Kasi came fourth. The two women polled poorly, receiving 1.1 and 1.6 per cent respectively, as did Samban (1.9 per cent).

Wosera-Gaui Open.

In 1992, endorsed Pangu candidate Paul Wanjik, from the more populous Wosera side of the electorate, had been re-elected for a third term, with a healthy 32.7 per cent of the vote. Wanjik subsequently left Pangu and became deputy leader of the Black Action Party. In 1997 Wanjik stood again, against twenty other candidates, but as an independent. The Pangu endorsement went to William Bakamu, while the NA endorsed Cletus Cox, Wanjik's cousin, a candidate who had performed quite well in previous elections. In the event, the winner was little-known independent candidate Gallus Kipandu Yumbui, who received 12.9 per cent of the vote. Bakamu was a close second with 12.6 per cent. Cox came fourth with 9.1 per cent, about 200 votes ahead of the fifth placed Wanjik.

Yangoru-Saussia Open.

Yangoru-Saussia has been, in the context of East Sepik's Pangu-dominated political history, a maverick electorate, with an interesting record of electoral outcomes. In 1972 the seat was won by cult leader Matias Yaliwan. Yaliwan was forced to resign in 1973 but was replaced by his protégé Lainus Hepau. In 1977 competition between two Pangu candidates enabled John Jaminan, a UPNG graduate, to exploit the solidarity of his minority Pukia (Mountain Arapesh) speaking group in the western part of the electorate, and gain election. In 1982, poor electoral strategy by Pangu allowed Jaminan to win again, but he was subsequently convicted on a charge

of rape and in 1983 his vacant seat was filled by endorsed Pangu candidate, John Wauwia (Wauwia had stood unsuccessfully in 1977 and 1982). In 1987 Wauwia was re-elected, defeating, amongst others, Jaminan, who had meanwhile been pardoned. In 1992 Wauwia was again the Pangu-endosed candidate, and Jaminan was again a candidate (having meanwhile accumulated a number of further minor convictions and escaped a charge of murder); there were several other strong candidates, amongst a field of twenty-two— the largest ever, up to that point, in an election in East Sepik. To the surprise of many, Jaminan won the election in 1992, with 13.7 per cent of the vote, defeating Wauwia.

In 1997 Yangoru-Saussia set another provincial record, with thirty candidates[3], fourteen of whom claimed party attachments. Both Jaminan and Wauwia were again candidates. Wauwia stood as the endorsed NA candidate, but Somare appeared to have doubts about his capacity to win the seat and the NA also supported a second candidate, Bernard Hagoria. Hagoria, an accountant, former deputy administrator in the province and member of the East Sepik Cocoa Producers board is from the Saussia (Kubalia) side of the electorate, which had never had an elected member and had put up fewer candidates. Pangu endorsed Charley (Sali) Hakua Wafi, brother of a former provincial assembly speaker. As in 1992, Jaminan stood for the PDM and counted on winning the Pukia vote. Another notable candidate was Gabriel Dusava, of Nindipari village just above Yangoru station, who had recently resigned from the position of secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, but was facing charges over financial transactions during his term as departmental secretary. In a campaign speech in mid May Dusava said he was 'appalled at the quality of candidates and the shallowness of debate', suggested that most candidates lacked the depth, the qualifications and the experience needed to enter parliament and were aiming at splitting the votes of rival candidates rather than winning, and accused 'the few elite candidates', including the sitting member, of trying to discredit him with false accusations (reported in *The National* 19 May 1997). According to Yangoru people with whom I spoke, Dusava was conducting a vigorous campaign, with PPP backing.

In the event the vote was highly fragmented, and Dusava snatched victory with 9.4 per cent of the vote, only 15 votes ahead of Hagoria (9.3 per cent). Jaminan was placed fifth, Wafi eigth and Wauwia ninth. Of the thirty candidates, twenty-two received less than 5 per cent of the votes and eight less than 1 per cent. Hagoria challenged the outcome in the court of disputed returns. Following the election, Dusava announced that he had joined PPP, a decision which drew criticism from Sir Michael Somare and Narokobi, who urged Dusava to 'act as a proud and true Sepik and help leaders from his own province to form the new government' (*Post-Courier* 17 July 1997). Dusava subsequently became minister for Education in the new government.[4]

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[3] In the lead-up to the election *The National* newspaper reported a rumour from Wewak that Yangoru-Saussia was about to become the country's most hotly contested electorate, with 78 intending candidates (see *The National* 24 January 1997, 'Columnist', p.3).

[4] Prior to the election Dusava had been referred to a Leadership Tribunal on seventeen charges of misconduct in office, but had resigned from office, forcing the disbanding of the tribunal. In August 1997, however, a reconstituted Leadership Tribunal ruled that it had jurisdiction and would proceed to hear the charges; Dusava, was consequently suspended form office. He was later found guilty and lost his seat (see *Post-Courier* 22, 25 August 1997). Dusava was replaced by Hagoria without a by-election.

In summary, 1997 saw the end of Pangu's domination of the East Sepik electorates, with the vote count producing three NA members (including the MA's Narokobi), two Pangu sitting members returned, one PPP member and one independent. [With Dusava's demise NA increased its numbers to four.] Moreover, with Somare's departure from Pangu the Pangu Pati machine had virtually collapsed in the province. Again, however, a majority of the seven sitting members had been returned, and Sir Michael Somare's leadership in the province had been confirmed.[5]

An analysis of the Angoram vote.

The point is frequently made, in relation to Papua New Guinea, that voting overwhelmingly follows kin and clan lines, and that election issues, party affiliation, and other factors which help explain electoral outcomes in more developed political systems, have little relevance in Papua New Guinea (see, for example, Reilly 1999; also see Anere in this volume). While this is substantially true, especially for the highlands where also bloc voting is not uncommon, it does not provide a complete explanation in all electorates; specifically, while it is usually true that minor candidates win few (if any) votes outside their home area or *lain*, leading candidates often do garner support from a wider group—which is often why they win. The interesting question is, where does such extra-*lain* support come from? In some cases party support does bring votes, either directly (in East Sepik there has long been a perceived advantage in having Pangu endorsement) or indirectly through access to additional resources for more extensive campaigning. And there appears to be substantial agreement that candidates can gain votes by extensive personal campaigning to meet and talk with potential voters.

To throw more light on this question, however, in 1987 and again in 1992 I analysed ballot box figures from the Angoram electorate, where the backgrounds of candidates were known to me and where there had been interesting characteristics of party affiliation,[6] to see just how localized candidates' votes were. In very broad terms, the conclusions, in both 1987 and 1992, were that the votes of the two or three leading candidates were in fact fairly well spread, while the voting for minor candidates was highly concentrated, and that party endorsement (even Pangu endorsement) was a weak indicator of vote spread (and switching from independent to party-endorsed, and *vice versa*, did not significantly affect the vote from one election to another) (see May 1989b: 119-120; 1996: 237-238).

In 1997 I again analysed ballot box figures (in 1997 there were 75 ballot boxes), using the same fairly crude technique to measure the concentration of votes, namely the percentage of votes which each candidate received from the best four and best eight ballot box results, and the percentage of votes gained by the top, and the top two, candidates in each ballot box (see Tables 11.3, 11.4).

As In previous years, the top three candidates all had a fairly broad spread of votes: Arthur Somare ranked first in 24 boxes and second in 12— that is, he was ranked first or second in just under half the ballot boxes; Schulze was ranked first in 21 and second in 21 (actually getting

[5] As provincial member, under the provisions of the 1995 changes, Sir Michael automatically became governor of the province. When he subsequently took on the role of leader of the parliamentary opposition he had to relinquish the governorship, and Arthur Somare became governor.

[6] Several candidates had either switched parties from one election to another or had gone from independent to party-endorsed or *vice versa*.

more top two rankings than Somare); Johnson scored 10 and 16, and Kenni 6 and 11. Somare's vote was concentrated in the Lower Sepik and Angoram; he received only 68 votes in the Middle Sepik, and 41 of those came from one ballot box (he received no votes in five ballot boxes). But he also picked up significant votes in the Keram, Yuat, Banaro, Karawari, Grass Country and Ajirab census divisions. As may be seen from Table 11.3, he received only 22 per cent of his votes from four ballot boxes and 39 per cent from eight. Schulze had a somewhat broader spread, with a relatively low 17 per cent of his vote from four boxes and 31 per cent from eight. He polled well in the Lower Sepik, which however is also a Somare stronghold, and scored well in the Grass country, Kanda, and parts of the Middle Sepik andYuat. He received some votes in every ballot box. But whereas Somare received more than 240 votes in each of five ballot boxes, Schulze did not score that many in any box.

The third ranking candidate, Johnson, still had a reasonable spread of votes (29 per cent from four boxes and 43 per cent from eight), but (coming from Kambaramba) received a marked concentration of votes from the Yuat and Grass Country. Johnson stood as a PAP candidate, but there is little evidence that he gained anything from this.

Considering his past record and the fact that he was in 1997 the Pangu-endorsed candidate, Kenni's result was disappointing. He achieved a narrower spread of votes, with support concentrated in the Middle Sepik and Kanda (which includes the Gavien Resettlement Scheme); if there was a Pangu vote in Angoram in 1997 it was not obvious. Bengo's reputation and record as former provincial secretary did little for him either, with 60 per cent of his votes coming from eight ballot boxes and most of that from his home area in Banaro census division.

At the other end of the scale, Bukka and Waike, ranked eighth and ninth, received, respectively, 62 and 65 per cent of their votes from four boxes and 89 and 86 per cent from eight, though the last-ranked Koni's meagre 54 votes were spread more widely.

Overall, with a sitting member defeated and a new alignment of parties, the conclusions again have to be, first, that while all candidates rely on localized support 'banks' (usually a home village area – though in the case of the two 'outsiders', Schulze and Kenni, this was replaced by a localized concentration of 'clients') the stronger candidates achieve a spread of voter support, and, secondly, that even in a place like Angoram with its strong association with Pangu, the evidence for a party vote is slight, and reputation as a good candidate, and effective campaigning, seem to be the keys to electoral success – though in the case of the winning candidate in 1997, it is tempting to conclude that the family name, on balance, was a valuable asset.

Table 11.3: Analysis of Ballot box figures–candidate performance

	Kenni	Lumbia	Bengo	Paita	Bukka	Waike	Somare	Schulze	Johnson	Koni
Best 4 ballot box results as % of candidate's total vote	34.9	43.7	42.3	33.4	62.2	64.9	22.4	17.4	29.3	44.4
Best 8 ballot box results as % of candidate's total vote	52.1	62.2	59.7	49.1	89.2	86.0	38.6	30.6	43.2	61.1

Candidate's vote	3,314	2,009	1,515	966	767	57	5,731	4,685	3,711	54
% of total votes	14.4	8.7	6.6	4.2	3.3	0.3	24.9	20.4	16.1	0.2
Placing	4	5	6	7	8	9	1	2	3	0

Table 11.4: Analysis of ballot box figures–leading candidates by ballot box

Box	Total Votes	First and second ranked candidates in box	Candidate with most votes as percentage of total votes cast	Two candidates with most votes as percentage of total votes cast
1	205	Schulze, Bukka	47.8	68.3
2	127	Somare, Bengo	33.1	61.4
3	364	Schulze, Bukka	35.2	61.5
4	324	Bukka, Somare	48.4	86.1
5	306	Lumbia, Bukka	25.2	43.1
6	174	Lumbia, Johnson	56.9	69.0
7	481	Luhia, Johnson	29.8	49.9
8	320	Somare, Kenni	33.1	60.0
9	318	Kenni , Schulze	36.5	58.5
10	195	Schulze, Johnson	39.5	63.6
11	175	Somare, Kenni	41.1	68.6
12	112	Somare, Schulze	56.3	79.5
13	448	Somare, Johnson	39.3	67.6
13	353	Johnson, Somare	30.0	55.2
15	331	Johnson, Somare	32.6	55.9
16	362	Kenni, Schulze	59.9	82.6
17	456	Schulze, Johnson	35.3	57.7
18	380	Johnson, Paita	61.8	72.9
19	193	Johnson, Kenni	37.8	70.5
20	427	Lumbia, Paita	21.1	41.7
21	560	Bengo, Lumbia	27.5	53.0
22	584	Schulze, Kenni	40.0	66.4
23	601	Kenni, Bukka	68.7	88.7
24	196	Kenni, Bengo	94.4	96.4
25	251	Lumbia, Paita	89.6	95.2
26	294	Lumbia, Schulze	96.9	98.3
27	280	Lumbia, Schulze	80.0	89.3
28	172	Schulze, Lumbia/Bukka	48.8	68.6
29	94	Lumbia, Bukka	55.3	78.7
30	332	Kenni, Schulze	55.7	79.8
31	437	Schulze, Kenni	52.4	70.3
32	460	Kenni, Johnson	74.3	85.0
33	493	Schulze, Kenni	31.6	61.9
34	12	Paita, Schulze	41.7	75.0
35	358	Somare, Schulze	44.4	79.1
36	369	Somare, Kenni	63.1	79.7
37	399	Somare, Schulze	76.9	95.7
38	492	Somare, Schulze	82.1	94.1
39	125	Schulze, Somare	59.2	97.6
40	366	Somare, Schulze	62.3	80.1
41	404	Somare, Schulze	59.7	92.8
42	349	Schulze, Somare	42.7	73.4
43	178	Schulze, Somare	68.0	80.9
44	345	Somare, Johnson	28.4	52.2
45	391	Johnson, Schulze	38.9	60.1
46	306	Schulze, Somare	33.0	57.8
47	398	Schulze, Kenni	41.7	55.0

48	399	Schulze, Kenni	35.6	53.1
49	108	Somare, Johnson	35.2	56.5
50	171	Somare, Paita	40.9	71.9
51	330	Somare, Johnson	93.0	95.5
52	149	Schulze, Somare	55.7	79.9
53	345	Somare, Bengo	51.3	71.3
54	191	Somare, Schulze	89.0	96.3
55	151	Somare, Johnson	75.5	88.1
56	121	Somare, Schulze	94.2	99.2
57	322	Somare, Kenni	68.6	82.9
58	300	Schulze, Somare	29.7	58.3
59	366	Somare, Schulze	73.2	89.3
60	333	Bengo, Somare	29.8	51.4
61	360	Bengo, Schulze	30.0	56.1
62	490	Bengo, Johnson	57.1	77.3
63	350	Somare, Johnson	64.6	74.9
64	172	Somare, Johnson	43.6	61.6
65	207	Schulze, Johnson	36.2	65.2
66	285	Schulze, Somare	53.3	75.8
67	399	Schulze, Johnson	46.9	67.2
68	438	Johnson, Schulze	76.0	87.2
69	412	Johnson, Schulze	89.3	97.6
70	153	Johnson, Schulze	88.2	95.4
71	116	Kenni, Schulze	50.9	79.3
72	193	Somare, Johnson	75.6	83.9
73	316	Johnson, Lumbia	46.2	63.0
74	104	Johnson, Schulze	73.1	84.6
75	342	Schulze, Somare	40.6	58.8

Candidate	**Total Votes**
Somare	5731
Schulze	4685
Johnson	3711
Kenni	3314
Lumbia	2009
Bengo	1515
Paita	966
Bukka	767
Waike	57
Koni	54
Informal	205
Total	**23,014**

12

TALASEA OPEN: THE QUALITY OF CANDIDATES

Alphonse Gelu

The description of Papua New Guinea as the 'land of the unexpected' is relevant in explaining the country's political culture; uncertainty has become a prominent feature of important political processes such as elections. Anything can happen in an election. Unlike the situation in, say, US presidential elections, where American voters have an idea of which candidate will win on the basis of various opinion polls,[1] in Papua New Guinea the outcome is seldom certain until the last votes are counted.

Apart from uncertainty of outcome, cases of bribery, violence, missing ballot boxes and papers, harassment of electoral officials, and voter manipulation have all been prominent in recent Papua New Guinea elections. However, one of the outstanding features of elections in Papua New Guinea since independence has been the increasing number of candidates that have stood for the various constituencies. It is becoming widely accepted that anyone in Papua New Guinea, regardless of his/her social status, wealth, qualifications or experience, can become a political leader. This has contributed to the poor performance and leadership style, and has affected the quality of public policies formulated by the decision makers in parliament. The majority of the legislators simply do not understand what has come before them to debate. Important bills have been passed on the floor of Parliament merely on the basis of political convenience, that is, on numerical strength of the government and kickbacks received for supporting a bill.

The number of candidates seeking public office suggests individuals attempting to attain office with very little knowledge of what is expected of them by the people. This raises serious questions about the capability of elected members.

The situation in Papua New Guinea challenges two classical liberal democratic theories of representation. On the one hand, Edmund Burke (1729-1797) described representatives as delegates, who act as spokesmen, or pipelines, for their constituents. Their actions and positions on issues should at all times reflect the views and interests of their constituents. On the other hand, Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams saw representatives as independent actors, independent of their constituents, whose actions and positions are based on their individual judgement and do not necessarily reflect the views of their electorates. Representatives are thought of as experienced, qualified, wise, and well versed with the public interest, so that their judgements are sound. In Papua New Guinea, however, neither theory is directly applicable. First, representatives in Papua New Guinea cannot be described as

[1]. The cAounting of votes during a presidential election in the US traditionally begins in the east and finishes in the west. As the votes in each state are declared, western states like California already know who the likely winner is (see Salmore and Salmore 1989).

delegates of their constituents. Some do not visit their electorates until the campaign period, and there is a complete lack of consultation between the representatives and their constituents. Secondly, policies made by representatives have sometimes had damaging socio-economic and political effects. This brings into question the moral judgement of representatives, and whether they possess the capabilities to act independently. The considerations provided the context for an analysis of the 1997 national election in Talasea Open constituency.

The election in Talasea Open

In the 1997 election, twenty-eight candidates contested the Talasea Open seat. The total number of eligible voters was 34,118, and 33,168 (97.2 per cent) actually voted. About 950 votes (2.8 per cent) were declared informal.

Of the 28 candidates, 11 were affiliated to political parties, while 17 were independent candidates. The winner of the seat, Patterson Lowa, was the incumbent. He collected 4,638 votes (13.6 per cent of the total), 206 votes more than the runner-up who is Chinese by origin and an independent candidate.

Table 12.1: Results—Talasea Open

Name Of Candidate	Votes Polled	Per cent (%)	Affiliation
Patterson Balive Lowa	**4,638**	**13.59**	**MA**
Gregory Seeto Akai	4,432	12.99	IND
Andrew Talingapua	2,814	8.25	NP
Peni Ase	2,085	6.00	PRAP
Gabriel Bakani	2,084	6.11	PANGU
John Vulupindi	1,711	5.01	IND
Moses Nahia	1,581	4.63	IND
Philip Cowboy Ragi	1,406	4.12	MGA
Stanis Ian S. Tao	1,352	3.96	IND
Herman Makele	1,212	3.55	IND
Vincent Kondum	1,190	3.49	IND
Charles Mockley	1,171	3.43	IND
Petrus Mundawi	1,146	3.36	PAP
John Raka	938	2.75	MGA
Mark Hawai	936	2.74	IND
Conrad Golumu Paru	500	1.47	PPP
Herman Nonny Mirio	471	1.38	PDM
Raymond Kaitu Laupu	463	1.36	PRAP
John Tuka	436	1.28	IND
Peter Pati	406	1.19	IND
James Una	405	1.19	IND
Thomas Namui	389	1.14	IND
Elias Batari	381	1.12	IND
Leo Kalasi	373	1.09	IND
Thomas Rakas Pakilio	246	0.72	IND
Dimon Jimmy Vulolo	194	0.57	IND
Caspar Boa Lomboi	129	0.38	IND
Lukas Poka	79	0.23	PAP
Total Ballot papers allowed	**34,118**	100.00	
Informal	**950**		

Source: Election Report, Electoral Commission of Papua New Guinea, 1997, p.73.

The majority of voters I spoke to in the Hoskins and Talasea districts before the election believed that Lowa would lose his seat, on account of his non-performance, alleged marital

problems and a number of bounced cheques which he wrote just before the campaign period. Several factors may help explain the largely unexpected outcome.

First, Lowa was the incumbent, and thus had access to money, and connections in government. Lowa set up committees in all villages in the Hoskins area to assist in his campaign. Each committee was given money to pursue the task of getting him re-elected.

Secondly, Lowa was assisted by his position on the reform to the provincial and local-level government system. His party vigorously fought against the proposed reforms in 1995, and Lowa was a member of the New Guinea Islands leaders group (along with Steven Pokawin, Emphraim Apelis and Sinai Brown) who called for secession if the reforms went ahead. Lowa exploited this issue, telling voters that the reforms would lead to chaos in the country by centralizing power. His actions were highly manipulative, and a large number of people came to believe him.

A third factor that enabled Lowa to retain his seat was that a number of candidates split one another's votes in other parts of the electorate. This is not to say that Lowa, who is from the Hoskins area, was the only candidate from that area; there were seven other candidates from the Hoskins area, including one from Lowa's village and one from the village next to his. But all except one of the candidates from the Hoskins area were unknowns, and this assisted Lowa in overcoming the opposition from his challengers. The candidates that came second, third, and sixth all obtained their votes from the Bali/Vitu area (though the runner-up managed to collect some votes from Bialla, through his business interests in that district).

Leadership qualities

The election study will look at leadership qualities in relation to the Talasea Open Seat. It will argue that the majority of candidates should not have stood, because they lacked certain qualities which voters could use as criteria in assessing candidates.

This is not to challenge Section 50 of the Constitution, which specifies that an individual '... has the right, and shall be given a reasonable opportunity (a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, either directly or through freely chosen representation; and (b) to vote for; and be elected to, elective public office at genuine, periodic, free elections; and (c) to hold public office and to exercise public functions'. But Section 50(2) states that, 'the exercise of those rights may be regulated by a law that is reasonably justifiable for the purpose in a democratic society that has a proper regard for the rights and dignity of mankind'. This would seem to accommodate my general proposition, that there should be a law to limit the number of candidates according to well defined criteria. Nor does it ignore the existence and strength of traditional criteria that have been extensively used in elections since 1964.[2] Clan affiliation, *wantok* networks, traditional leadership status, and bribery/foul play have all come into play in elections, and have helped form the dominant political culture of voters throughout Papua New Guinea.

[2] In the election for the first House of Assembly there were no political parties in existence, and people therefore cast their votes primarily on the basis of clan/tribe affiliations, traditional leadership status, and so on.

The criteria identified in this study are secondary, in that they are not often used by voters in choosing candidates during elections. The study seeks to demonstrate that the application of the specified criteria would not only result in the election of the best candidates, but would also eliminate those traditional measures that have been detrimental to the electoral process and have acted as impediments to the election of quality leaders.

Further, the predominant political culture that has come to shape the political environment has swept aside the liberal norms that should govern and guide political processes such as elections, and this has created confusion among the voters. Such confusion has been compounded by candidates openly using methods that are against established norms and existing electoral laws.

The five criteria proposed in this paper are:

(a) level of education
(b) occupation
(c) experience in national decision making
(d) experience in provincial and local level government decision making
(e) affiliation with a political party

In the following, the twenty-eight candidates in Talasea Open are measured against these criteria.

(a) Level of education

Candidates	**Age**	**Highest level of education**
P. Lowa	53	First Year Law Student
G. Seeto	56	Grade 10
A. Talingapua	33	University of Papua New Guinea Degree
P. Ase	56	Grade 10
G. Bakani	49	Grade 10
J. Vulupindi	Not known	University of Papua New Guinea Degree
M. Nahia	44	Laloki Business College
P. Ragi	46	Grade 12
S. Tao	Not known	University of Technology Degree
H. Makele	34	University of Papua New Guinea
V. Kodum	Not known	Grade 10
C. Mockley	Not known	Diploma in Agriculture
P. Mondawi	37	Diploma in Theology
J. Raka	52	Diploma in Public Administration
M. Hawai	34	Grade 6
C. Paru	36	University of Technology
H. Mirio	Not known	University of Papua New Guinea Degree
R. Laulou	37	Not Known
J. Tuka	Not known	Grade 10
P. Pati	42	University of Papua New Guinea Certificate
J. Una	47	Grade 10
T. Namii	39	Grade 10
E. Batari	41	Grade 12
L. Kalasi	37	PTC Training College

T. Pakilio	37	College of Allied Health Sciences
D. Vulolo	44	Grade 10
C. Lomboi	49	Matriculation - UPNG
L. Poka	57	Diploma in Agriculture

In summary, seven candidates had at least some university training; nineteen had secondary or other tertiary qualifications; one had only primary school education; and for one candidate information was not available.

(b) Occupation

Candidates	**Occupation prior to election**
P. Lowa	Former Colonel—Papua New Guinea Defence Force—Current Sitting Member
G. Seeto	Business manager
A. Talingapua	Lawyer
P. Ase	Pastor
G. Bakani	Member, Provincial Assembly; Former national minister
J. Vulupindi	Former secretary, Finance Department
M. Nahia	Subsistence farmer
P. Ragi	Member, Provincial Assembly
S. Tao	Former general manager, PNG Harbours Board and PSA Savings and Loan Society
H. Makele	Managing Director/salesman
V. Kodum	Public relations Officer, NBPOL
C. Mockley	Plantation manager
P. Mondawi	Pastor/former policeman
J. Raka	Subsistence farmer/former patrol officer
M. Hawai	Framer, Stettin Bay Lumber Company
C. Paru	Businessman
H. Mirio	Journalist, EMTV; Staff to the Opposition Leader
R. Laulou	Church worker
J. Tuka	Subsistence farmer
P. Pati	Former public servant (Youth and Home Affairs)
J. Una	Subsistence farmer/former council clerk
T. Namii	Subsistence farmer/former policeman
E. Batari	Subsistence farmer/former high school teacher
L. Kalasi	Subsistence farmer/former radio technician, PTC
T. Pakilio	Former liquor inspector
D. Vulolo	Subsistence farmer/former policemen
C. Lomboi	Subsistence farmer/former community school teacher
L. Poka	Former plantation manager

(c) Experience in national decision making

Five candidates qualified under this category. Vulupindi, Tao and Mirio all had experience as senior public officials. Lowa, as incumbent, was involved in the national decision making, as was Bakani, a former member of the National Parliament and Minister for Primary Industries and Education.

(d) Experience in provincial and local-level decision making

Talingapua, Bakani, Nahia, Ragi, Raka and Batari were all at some time members of the Provincial Assembly. Talingapua was also a former legal officer to the provincial government.

(e) Affiliation with a political party

Eleven candidates in 1997 had a party affiliation:

Lowa	Melanesian Alliance Party (MA)
Talingapua	National Party (NP)
Ase	Peoples Resources Action Party (PRAP)
Bakani	Pangu Pati
Ragi	Movement for Greater Autonomy(MGA)
Mundawi	Peoples Action Party (PAP)
Raka	Movement for Greater Autonomy (MGA)
Paru	Peoples Progress Party (PPP)
Mirio	Peoples Democratic Movement (PDM)
Laupu	Peoples Resources Action Party (PRAP)
Poka	Peoples Action Party (PAP)

Three political parties—PRAP, PAP and MGA—each endorsed two candidates.

Analysis of the Criteria

Based on these criteria, the 'strongest' candidates to contest the Talasea Open seat were Lowa, Seeto, Talingapua, Bakani, Vulupindi, Tao and Mirio. These candidates do not all qualify under all the criteria. Lowa does not qualify under (a) but he is strong in (c), (d) and (e). Seeto is strong in (b) but not in (a), (c), (d) and (e). His association with people through his business interests added to his strength. Talingapua is strong in (a), (b), (d) and (e), and is perhaps the strongest contender in the group. Bakani qualifies under (c), (d) and (e); his experience as a former member and minister adds strength to his contention. Vulupindi has strengths in (a), (b) and (c), and his experience in the public service gives him an advantage. Tao has strength in (a), (b) and (c); like Vulupindi his experience makes him a well qualified representative. Mirio has strength in (a), (b), (c) and (e); he is young but his exposure to politics (through association with former prime minister Paias Wingti) enhances his chances. The strengths of these seven candidates may be summarised in the following table, in which each is given a score of 1 to 10 (10 being the strongest) on each criterion.

Table 12.2: Strength of candidates according to the proposed criteria

Candidates	Level of Education	Occupation	Experience in national decision making	Experience in provincial/ local-level decision making	Affiliation with a Political Party
Patterson Lowa	4	9	10	8	10
Greg Seeto	6	7	4	4	0
Andrew Talingapua	10	10	4	8	10
Gabriel Bakani	6	8	10	10	10
John Vulupindi	10	10	10	7	0
Stanis Tao	10	10	10	7	0
Herman Mirio	10	7	7	4	10

The issue of leadership is becoming a major concern in Papua New Guinea politics. The majority of leaders voted into parliament after independence, and even before, lacked certain basic qualities that would have enabled them to perform effectively in public office; these qualities included a reasonable level of formal education, experience in public life, and most importantly, exposure to governmental decision making.

The application of the proposed criteria would result in a number of important advantages. These include: better leadership qualities, in terms of experience in government and exposure to public policy; the opportunity for voters to select from a strong field of qualified candidates; and a strengthening of the bases of political parties, which would reduce the number of independent candidates, who have been identified as the major source of political instability.

If voters could eliminate those candidates who are not serious, or lack the knowledge and commitment to represent the people, this would reinvigorate political leadership in Papua New Guinea. Prior exposure to government decision-making processes would help leaders to identify good and sound policies. How can you expect a former policeman, a former army officer or a mechanic to understand the complexities of important public policies? How many members of parliament understand the mechanics of the budget? How many members of parliament understand that appointing their cronies to public office only undermines professionalism? Strict adherence to the criteria proposed would eliminate unorthodox practices by the leaders.

Having a stronger field of candidates would make the race more competitive and voters would have less reason to question the capabilities of the eventual winner. At present, any person can stand, regardless of his or her background. With a large number of candidates contesting, it is now common for experienced and capable candidates to lose, and for unknown candidates to win by a very small margin. This raises questions, first as to whether winning candidates have the mandate to represent their constituents and, secondly, whether they are capable of performing effectively as leaders.

The nature of political parties has been a major concern for political scientists both within and outside Papua New Guinea. Despite the emergence of political parties over thirty years ago, they are still struggling to become entrenched in society. They are ideologically weak with no coherent policies in areas of national interest, and most importantly they have failed in

maintaining ties with the voters and educating them on issues facing the country at large. Parties lack ideological positions on major issues facing the country. The majority are parliamentary factions, created in parliament with no formal links to the people, and face natural death when the leader loses his/her seat in parliament. Papua Besena, the National Party, and the People's Unity Party are examples of this.

Almost everyone knows something of the problems facing political parties, but there seems to be no commitment on the part of the politicians to legislate in order to make parties stronger in terms of membership, links to voters, or coherent policies that are practically enforceable.

There has also been a trend in Papua New Guinea politics since 1975 towards an increasing number of independent candidates contesting parliamentary seats. The number of winning independent candidates has increased at every election since 1975. This has become a growing concern for political parties, as the independent candidates have been seen as power-brokers when it comes to the formation of governments.[3] However, after entering parliament, independents usually become members of political parties, in return for material benefits such as money, cars or ministries.

A proposal for strengthening parties was made by the Chan-Haiveta government, and a proposed bill on the integrity on political parties was debated but never passed. The passing of the bill would have eliminated problems of loyalty and stability that are currently faced. However the application of the criteria proposed in this study would solve the problem at the local level by forcing intending candidates to join parties, enabling voters to elect the best candidate after considering party platforms.

Conclusion

There is a growing concern on the part of the voters about the qualities of representatives in parliament.

This study has proposed criteria for effective leadership, to address the leadership problems that are currently experienced in the country. Much needed good governance in Papua New Guinea politics requires knowledge on how to manage and account for public money, effectiveness and coherence in departments and statutory bodies, an understanding of basic laws, and responsibility and accountability. The criteria offered here would eliminate some of the negative practices evident in electoral politics at present.

Talasea Open is no different from other constituencies in Papua New Guinea, which have not been well served by the style of leadership that has been cultivated in the past and continues in the present.

[3] This was seen in the formation of the government after the 1997 national elections when the majority independent members formed a bloc that eventually sided with Bill Skate at the Tufi Camp to form the government.

REPORT TO THE SIXTH PARLIAMENT ON THE 1997 NATIONAL ELECTION

BY THE ELECTORAL COMMISSIONER

REUBEN T. KAIULO

JULY 1997

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Hon. William (Bill) Skate, M.P.
Prime Minister
PNG National Parliament
P 0 Parliament House
Waigani
National Capital District.

My Dear Prime Minister,

It is my pleasurable duty to forward to Parliament, through you, my Report on the 1997 national election which was held in June, and which has resulted in the convening of the Sixth National Parliament since Independence.

Section One of the Report summarises some problems that continue to plague the conduct of elections in the country, and the effort by the Electoral Commission and other state agencies, such as the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary and the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, to deal with them.

Section Two analyses the results of the elections with a view to bringing to the attention of Members of Parliament aspects of the results that do not sit well with democracy and effective representation, and which could, over time, affect the legitimacy of governments, unless measures are taken to reverse the trends.

Towards that objective of strengthening the democratic credentials of our political system and refurbishing the legitimacy of governing institutions and their actions, Section Three of the Report makes several recommendations for the consideration and appropriate legislative action by the new House. It is hoped that Parliament will move to make the necessary laws in the first year or two of its life so as to give the Electoral Commission and the general public the opportunity to digest the changes long before the next national election in 2002.

In the past, several necessary pieces of legislation to strengthen the integrity of the electoral process have either not been passed at all, or they have been done at the eleventh hour, very close to the conduct of elections and have thus contributed to the difficulties faced by the Electoral Commission and to some confusion among the public.

I would like to take this opportunity of the submission of my Report to make a few public acknowledgments of gratitude for the support I have obtained in my position as Electoral Commissioner. First, I wish to thank the Staff of the Electoral Commission, successive Returning Officers, polling officials and casual staff, who have worked so tirelessly to make it possible for the Commission to conduct elections with the rate of success that has been achieved in the very difficult Papua New Guinea environment. Successive Prime Ministers must also be thanked for having been most accommodating with our funding requests. Similarly, I must thank successive Police Commissioners and Defence Force Commanders for their cooperative attitudes.

Finally, for this year's election, I am sure the whole nation joins me in thanking the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, and the distinguished members of the Commonwealth Observer Team, for their most appreciated input into the election process. It is my sincere hope that Parliament will give the most careful consideration to the observations, which may be contained in the Report of the Commonwealth Observer Team. The people of Papua New Guinea, and good governance, can only be winners if Members of Parliament study with care and attention and act appropriately on whatever recommendations that such an experienced, disinterested and impartial team might make in its Report.

SECTION ONE: SOME PROBLEMS OF ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION

(A) The Electoral Roll

The Electoral Commission, which is charged with organising free and fair democratic elections in the country, is the first to acknowledge that an accurate register of electors is an absolutely essential foundation for such elections. Compiling an accurate register of electors in Papua New Guinea, however, continues to be a seemingly impossible task, despite the best efforts of the Commission. Attitudes have to change in the country before satisfactorily accurate roll of electors can be compiled.

In March 1996, two months before it began to compile the electoral roll for the 1997 national election, Electoral Commission's projections indicated that the enrolment population would be around 2.2 million electors. However, at the end of the enrolment period, after the new roll had been subjected to public scrutiny and corrections, there were 3.4 million electors, over one million more electors than the Commission's projections. Yet, when polling began, it became clear that names of eligible electors were missing from the roll of electors in virtually all electorates, particularly in the urban electorates.

The roll of electors can be inaccurate either because it does not list some eligible electors, or because it lists people who are not eligible to vote, or because it lists some eligible electors more than once.

The first type of inaccuracy, which effectively disenfranchises citizens, and thus attacks the very concept of democracy, is the easiest to rectify. But it does require the full cooperation of the voting public if it is to be overcome. The public has to cooperate with enumerators, not chase them away time after time, as it occurred in some urban settlements and villages. And when the draft common roll is opened for public inspection, the public has to cooperate and inspect it and report any omissions.

Unfortunately, every normal general election in PNG requires the compilation of a fresh electoral roll. The old register cannot simply be updated. A five-year cohort of newly qualified electors, people who have attained the age of 18 since the last register was compiled, have to be enrolled. Another five-year cohort of deceased persons and people who are no longer eligible to vote, on account of mental incapacity or bankruptcy or incarceration, must be eliminated from the roll. People who have moved from one locality to another in a different electorate must also be listed in the appropriate register. At the same time, their names must disappear from their former roll.

The Electoral commission, through its voter awareness campaign, through its announcements, notices, Election Updates, *tok saves*, talk-back shows, etc, on the radio, EM-TV, newspapers and the Commission's own Newsletter and other publications, sought the cooperation of the public in order to achieve a satisfactorily accurate common roll. Unfortunately, such cooperation was not forthcoming in a lot of areas.

Until 1992, electors could vote even though their names were not on the electoral roll. Since the 1991 amendments to the Electoral Law, the capacity to vote under the then Section 141 (the so-called sectional vote' provision), was abolished. Now only those on the electoral roll can vote. Those who want to be able to vote have a duty to be serious and inspect the draft common roll when it is opened for inspection. Community leaders, party leaders and prospective candidates have a leadership role here. They have to encourage citizens to make the effort to check to see that their names are on the. roll, and to ask to be listed on the roll if they are missing from it.

The other main type,of inaccuracy in electoral rolls is more difficult to eliminate when there are people who evidently see it as in their political interest to register ineligible persons. The Electoral Commission does not have its own staff to undertake the enumeration exercise throughout the country. If there are allegations of rigging of the common roll, the Commission can undertake only limited investigation of its own. It has to rely on officials of the provincial and district administrations and, sometimes, on literate local councillors and community leaders for the compilation of the roll and for most investigations.

More to the point, the Commission has to rely on the general public, which usually has the knowledge, if attempts are made at inflating the common roll. The public has to inform the Electoral Commission in good time, when the draft rolls are opened for inspection, and not at the eleventh hour, only a week or even a month before the start of polling.

Inflated common rolls, of course, introduce a high probability of cheating at the polls. This is one reason the Electoral Commission entered into an agreement with the Evangelical Alliance for Christian volunteers to assist during polling as polling officials. The use of indelible ink on electors' finger nail, vigilance by polling officials, security personnel and candidates' scrutineers, one day polling wherever it was deemed necessary, advantageous or feasible, were all aimed at countering the probability of cheating through multiple voting. But double and multiple voting, and voting by obviously underage persons, *can be checked and eliminated only if the general public can be relied upon to back the polling officials and security personnel when they take a stand against such practices during polling.*

A few. commentators in the media, following the unfortunate insistence in the Organic Law on Provincial and Local-Level Governments (passed in June 1995) that a national census be conducted before each nation-wide election, have suggested that the absence of such a census before the 1997 national election must be partly blamed for the inaccuracies in the electoral roll. However, it is the view of the Electoral Commission, and the National Statistical Office concurred, that: 'Although a census ... would have made the task of compiling a common roll for next year's election a lot easier, the timing and cost involved in conducting a census during a five year interval is just not practical' (National Statistical Office and Electoral Commission Brief on Provincial Planning and Data System and Election Roll of Electors, April 1996, p.5). The National Parliament agreed with this view when it voted in March 1997 to remove the requirement for a national census before the election.'

The Electoral Commission believes that, until comprehensive and accurate demographic, social anj economic data gathering and maintenance have become a part of the culture of Papua New Guinea, with development, continuous public awareness campaign and other educational and media campaign are ultimately the best ways of overcoming the problem of inaccurate electoral rolls. The Commission undertook such a voter education and public awareness campaign for at least one whole year before the 1997 election. Legislation on the integrity of candidates can also help, as it is argued in Section Three below.

(B) Security

Another long-standing problem that interferes with the conduct of free and fair elections in Papua New Guinea and, hence, detracts from the legitimating effect of those elections, is the incidence of election-related violence, whether before, during or after polling. The national media this year, as in past election years, has documented fully the extent of election-related violence: intimidation of electors and electoral officials, particularly through the use of weapons; murders; unauthorised road-blocks; snatching of ballot papers and ballot boxes; and so on.

Even without including the special case of Bougainville, long-term observers of PNG elections would probably say that the 1997 elections were the most violent even This was despite a thorough preparation to deal with election-related security problems. A series of Joint-Police and Electoral

Commission Workshops were held, the first in May 1996, to plan how to minimize and counter election violence. There was cooperation among intelligence gathering forces in the country, with the Electoral Commission funding the cost of such joint intelligence collection. There was a call-out of 450 Defence Force personnel to supplement the effort of over 3000 Police who would be engaged in election-related operations, with the Electoral Commission helping to fund the election-related operations of PNGDF.

As with the enumeration exercise, the Electoral Commission undertook an electoral awareness campaign aimed at reducing election-related violence. It sought to remind candidates and their supporters that they ran the risk of having their win set aside by the Court of Disputed Returns if their opponents could document instances of voter or polling official intimidation, tampering with the polling process, and so on. The Electoral Commission believes that in this area, as in the area of compiling a satisfactory common roll, the best way forward, eventually, is through sustained public education by leaders, political parties and candidates. But, as it will be argued in Section Three of this Report, appropriate legislation can also help.

(C) The Administration of Polling

The security issue affected the administration of polling, particularly in the Highlands, as the media reports at the time of the elections will have made clear to the general public. The underdeveloped transportation infrastructure and the difficulties of obtaining timely helicopter and other transport hire services also played havoc with the schedule and the efficiency with which polling could be conducted in many areas of the country. In many parts of the country, even the weather was unhelpful. The evident reluctance of some Returning Officers and Assistant Returning Officers to be thorough in their approach, for instance, in the way they distributed ballot papers and other polling materials among their polling teams, giving some teams too many and others too few, also affected efficiency.

It has to be appreciated that the Electoral Commission depends on the provincial and district administrations for nominating the personnel for appointment as Returning Officers. The Electoral Commission, of course, trains them, and provides the polling materials. There were several regional training programmes. Sessions were held in all Provincial Headquarters between January to December 1996 and then in all electorates between January and May 1997. The following materials, among others, published by the Electoral Commission, were used in the training sessions and were made available to both the polling officials and the public:

(I) National Parliament and Local-Level Government General Elections: The Returning Officers' Manual

(ii) Handbook on Electoral Offences

(iii) Candidates' Handbook to the 1997 National Parliament and Local-Level Government General Elections.

(iv) Common Electoral Offences and Penalties

(v) Code of Conduct

But, at the end of the day, the efficiency or otherwise with which polling is conducted depends to a considerable degree on the type of personnel the appropriate provincial and district administrative supremos nominate. The Electoral Commission's opinion is that the implementation of the Provincial and Local-Level Government reforms did result in a wholesale displacement of officers with considerable experience in polling matters by those who lacked such experience and skills. The

Commission accepts that its scrutiny of the ballot papers as they came off the press could have been more thorough, and that mistakes on the few ballot papers should have been picked up earlier by the Commission itself, not by others, and certainly not at the time when polling was supposed to begin. The Commission has taken these lessons on board for the future.

Since 1992, for reasons of manpower and security, staggered polling has been in place. Staggered one day polling was scheduled for several parts of the country including the National Capital District (June 16), Lae (June 17), Wewak, Kokopo, Rabaul and Gazelle (June 18), the five Highlands provinces (Western Highlands on June 16, Chimbu on June 18, Eastern Highlands on June 18, Southern Highlands on June 20, and Enga on June 23), while the rest of the country had up to two weeks' polling, from 14 to 28 June.

A new issue in the administration of elections surfaced in this year's election. The Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections, No. 3 of 1997, passed by Parliament in March and certified on 9 April 1997 requires, under Sec. 151 and Sec 175, that counting of votes begin immediately after polling ends and that the results be declared publicly immediately after the counting. Given the staggered polling, some lasting for only one-day, it was inevitable that some results in some electorates would be announced even as polling continued, or indeed even before it began, in other electorates.

Some candidates, especially those in provincial electorates, objected to the public broadcast of the progressive tally and declarations in their open electorates as prejudicial and tending to bias voting in those electorates which were either still voting or yet. to vote. If and when political parties become more influential in how electors choose their candidates, these provisions in the Organic Law will be seen more clearly to be incompatible with the practice of staggered polling, particularly if the regional or provincial seats continue to exist. In that situation the probability that the announcement of early successes or failures for a political party will influence later electors elsewhere will have to be contended with.

SECTION TWO: THE ELECTION AND OUR PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY

Democracy is about popular participation, the right of virtually every adult person not only to vote but also to offer himself or herself for election to represent the community. Thus, democracy is also about effective representation of electors. While the element of popular participation is usually not in doubt in Papua New Guinea's national elections, the concept of effective representation via elections appears to be diminishing progressively with every election.

There are essentially two inter-related reasons for this. Firstly, the ever increasing large number of candidates who stand means that it becomes easier and easier to win with fewer and fewer percentages of voter support and endorsement. Secondly, the ever increasing large numbers of candidates who stand as Independents and win means that it becomes more and more difficult to know what representatives stand for, and how they expect to make the parliamentary system work well for the people they represent. For a parliamentary system to function well, one of the requirements is that representatives need to belong to well-organised, stable political parties.

(A) Voter Turnout

Voter turnout continues to be high, at 66 per cent in this year's elections. This rate compares favourably with previous turnout rates: 72.3% in 1964; 63% in 1968; 60% in 1974; 68.9% in 1977; 63.3% in 1982; 72.9% in 1987 and 81.2% in 1992. Indeed, if by turnout rate we mean the percentage of eligible electors who actually turned up to vote, then the turnout rate of 66% understates the actual rate, for the following two reasons.

Firstly, the number of electors on the roll of electors exceeded even the Electoral Commission's own projections. Therefore, if the number of electors who turn out to vote is expressed as a percentage of the total on the Common roll the actual rate will be necessarily understated.

Secondly, it is a well-publicised fact that large numbers of otherwise eligible electors were turned away because they were not on the roll. Such electors would thus not be included in the turnout rate.

Thus, from the point of view of the level of citizen participation in national elections, our parliamentary democracy can be said to be in robust good health. Other aspects of the 1997 elections, however, were not so reassuring.

(B) The Large number of candidates

The number of persons who nominated for the 1997 election was 2371. This was 716 more than the 1655 candidates in the 1992 election, a very large increase of 43.3 per cent, compared to the increase of 9.4 per cent in 1992. This year's increase in the number of candidates was the second highest since elections began in 1964. It was second only to the 43.9 per cent increase in 1977, the first election after Papua New Guinea gained Independence.

The average number of candidates per each of the 109 electorates went up from 15.2 in 1992 to 21.8 in this year's election. The average increase in the number of candidates per electorate was thus very high, 6.6 compared with only 1.3 in 1992. The Papuan region, which has not been known in the past for its electoral exuberance in terms of the high number of persons who stand as candidates, set the record for the electorate with the highest number of candidates: 61 in the Northern Provincial electorate, compared with 1992's record of 48 in the Sinasina-Yonggamudi Open electorate in Chimbu province.

The following table puts the 1997 figures in a historical perspective.

Candidates in PNG National elections

Year	No of Cands.	% Increase in No of Cands	Av. No. Of candidates per electorate	Av. Increase in Candidates per electorate	% increase
1964	298		5.5		
1968	484	62.4	5.8	0.3	5.4
1972	611	26.2	6.1	0.3	5.2
1977	879	43.9	8.1	2.0	32.8
1982	1125	28.0	10.3	2.2	27.2
1987	1513	34.5	13.9	3.6	34.9
1992	1655	9.4	15.2	1.3	9.4
1997	2371	43.3	21.8	6.6	43.4

The very large number of candidates increases the difficulty and the cost of election administration, as the printing of ballot papers in this year's election would indicate. But of far more consequence for our democracy is that the representativeness or otherwise of many MPs could be called into question by their own electors. More and more candidates are winning with fewer and fewer percentages and with smaller and smaller margins over the runners-up. This year only 14 candidates (12.8%), compared with 22 in 1992 (20.2%), won with 30 per cent or more of the formal votes cast in their electorates. At the other end of the scale, the number of candidates winning with less than 10

per cent of the formal votes cast rose from 9 in 1992 (8.2%) to 15 this year (13.8%), with three winning candidates obtaining less than seven per cent of the votes.

This year's classification of winning percentages can be compared with those in all previous elections since Independence.

Table 1.2: Percent Votes obtained by Winning Candidates

Year	Under 10%	10-19%	20-29%	30-39%	40-49%	50% +
1977		11	37	26	16	19
1982	4	20	33	20	14	18
1987	2	39	41	13	4	7
1992	9	45	33	14	3	5
1997	15	47	31	8	2	4

As in the past, a regional variation in the winning percentages in 1997 was noticeable, as the table below shows:

Percent Votes Obtained by Winners in 1997 by Region

Region	Total Seats	Under 10%	10-19%	20-29%	30-39%	40-49%	Over 50%
Islands	17		4	5	3	2	3
Papua	20	2	12	5	1		
Momase	29	4	11	11	1		1
NCD	4	1	1	1	1		
Highlands	39	8	19	9	2		
TOTAL	**109**	**15**	**47**	**31**	**8**	**2**	**4**

The variation in winning percentages is obviously related to the regional variation in the average number of candidates per electorate. The Islands Region, as usual, had the lowest average of candidates per electorate, although at 10.6 candidates per electorate even the Islands' average was not altogether on the low side. But it was still only a third of the average in the National Capital District, for instance, and less than a half of the average in both Papua and the Highlands. The increase in the number of candidates in Papua in the 1997 election was the steepest, virtually doubling the 1992 figure.

(C) Independents Are Winning

This year, 36 out of the 109 successful candidates, or 33%, won as Independents. The rest were endorsed by as many as 14 parties. The outcome of this year's election in this respect can be compared with that in previous elections.

Percentage of Votes and Seats Won By Independents in Three Elections

1987	1992	1997

%votes	% Seats	% Votes	% Seats	% Votes	% Seats
40.9	20.8	631.1	35.8	48.4	33.03

On the one hand the large percentage of votes and seats obtained by Independents can be explained simply as the result of the increasing proportion of candidates who are Independent.

In 1992, 1226 out of the 1655 candidates, 74.1 per cent, stood as Independent. In 1997, 1736 out of the total 2371 candidates or 73.2 per cent, were Independents. But why is the proportion of Independent candidates increasing?

Although with more than fourteen parties competing in the 1997 election, there was- no shortage of political parties, there was clearly a limit to the number of candidates that could be endorsed by them. Even if every political party had endorsed a candidate in each of the 109 electorates, fourteen parties would only have accounted for 1526. Thus, it is clear that some candidates stood as Independent because they could not get any party to endorse them. But it is also clear, from the large number of Independents who won, that many of them consciously chose to avoid any public party affiliation, either because they believed that a public association with a political party would be harmful to their chances of winning, or because it would not make any difference to their chances or, even if it could help their chances of winning, they evidently wished to preserve their freedom to manoeuvre in the coalition formation stage after the election.

Whatever the reason candidates stand as Independents, however, it is a fact that they do not remain Independent for long. Successful Independents quickly join one of the many Parliamentary parties. Assuming electors notice this, the question is, do they care? Should they care?

The Electoral Commission decided to bring this aspect of PNG elections to the attention of the public and of those authorities who are charged with the task of monitoring the Leadership Code. But until an appropriate legislation is in place, party hopping, and the transformation of Independents into party men straight after elections, will most likely continue.

(D) The Results

Appendix A shows the number of seats won by Independents and fourteen parties at the end of the declarations. The status of the elected MPs shown there, whether as Independents or party affiliated, is based on the nomination forms filled in by the candidates themselves, not necessary on the basis of lists submitted by the parties. There were some inconsistencies in the two.

Appendix B provides the list of Members of Parliament elected in the 1997 election, their electorates and a detailed classification of the MPs, according to their party affiliation, if any, their region and whether they are new or sitting MPs.

There are two aspects of this year's election results about which the attentive citizen can cheer a little. This year, the failure rate among Sitting MPs declined, compared with 1992. Out of the 106 sitting MPs who sought re-election, 51 (or 48.1%) retained their seats. The failure rate of 51.9 per cent was lower than the 60 per cent in 1992, and certainly much lower than the seemingly agitated and annoyed mood in the country in the last year or two before the elections would have led many observers to predict. The rejection rate was closer to the historical average of 50 per cent, although that itself is by no means a low average, if one considers the loss of parliamentary experience that goes with that kind of average at every election.

An even more pleasing aspect of the results was the improved polling performance of female candidates. Although the election of only two female MPs out of 109 is still too low by contemporary international standards, their election broke a ten-year drought.

The strong performances of other female candidates, for instance in the Madang Open and in the Eastern Highlands Provincial, were welcome developments in Papua New Guinea's parliamentary democracy. The increase in the number of women who contested, 53, was more than three times the number that stood in 1992. It was the highest ever in PNG's electoral history.

SECTION THREE: THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION RECOMMENDS ACTION ON SEVERAL FRONTS

This Report has touched on a few areas of weakness and concern in our elections. These weaknesses have a negative impact on the performance of our democratic parliamentary system. I would like to offer the following for the serious consideration of the newly elected Parliament. I believe that the electoral process needs further reforms to strengthen our parliamentary democracy.

(A) There is a need to redraw electoral boundaries. The existing electoral boundaries were drawn in 1977, twenty years ago. Since then there have been two national censuses. It is expected that another census will precede the next national election in 2002. Parliament will have no excuse to refuse to ratify the recommendations of the Independent Electoral Boundaries Commission based on that census. The current electoral boundaries do not, in many cases, meet the democratic criterion of equality of votes, as far as the topography and the dispersion of human settlements will allow.

(B) There is a need to review the Regional/Provincial Seats. The concept of Regional or Provincial seat has been given a new political significance by the Organic Law on Provincial and Local-Level government in a way that makes its review, let alone its abolition perhaps politically unthinkable. But the question of doing either, or both, will have to be faced seriously if the need to reduce the numbers of candidates to manageable levels in our national elections is seen as crucial. The original idea of ensuring that a certain number of educated people would be in Parliament has become irrelevant. But for their new role under the Organic Law cited, Regional or Provincial MPs made no special contribution to Parliament that distinguished them from the Open members. The existence of these electorates, however, contributes to the difficulties and delays of polling and counting and, above all, contributes to the explosion of candidate numbers. Abolishing the Regional Provincial seats could allow the number of Open seats to increase substantially and, with other reforms in place, allow for better representation of the people.

(C) Try Simpler Ways of Reducing Candidate Numbers.
At the heart of many of the problems in the electoral process and what it delivers is simply the very large number of candidates. Any plan or reform that aims at drastically reducing the number of candidates is worthy of a serious attention, provided always that it does not do too much violence to the democratic ideals of equality and participation.

There have been discussions, even decisions, about re-introducing the optional preferential system of voting. The re-introduction is premised on the need to reduce the number of candidates to ensure that the MP has a wider basis of support and endorsement, and also to promote collaboration among candidates and counter the surge in violence, and so on. Whether that system will be able to achieve all these, if it were re-introduced, is a moot point. What is very clear, though, from the point of view of administering the election process, is that it will be more costly, become slower and less tidy.

A more direct route to a drastic reduction in the number of candidates is simply to require all intending candidates to furnish the names, addresser and signatures or thumbprints of say, 500 or 1000 electors on the roll in their electorates, say, six months before nominations, and to buttress that with an Organic Law on the integrity of candidates and political parties. One only has to look at the

results of the election to see how drastically the numbers of candidates can be cut by that single requirement. At least one third of the candidates failed to obtain 500 votes or more.

(D) Pass the Long-Overdue Organic Law on Political Parties and Candidates.

All the above recommendations, if they were adapted, will aid the cause of democracy and good governance. But perhaps the foremost, key reform will be the passing of a law that provides guidelines and insists on certain minimum levels of integrity and code of conduct for candidates and political parties. If stringent leadership code type rules are established for candidates and party leaders and other office bearers in the party this can significantly affect the level of electoral violence, the role of money and bribery in the electoral process, the deliberate and determined effort of some would-be candidates to tamper with the enrolment process, and so on. Certainly, one would hope that if such laws came into effect, the kind of commando-type snatching of ballot papers and ballot boxes by so-called leaders would be a thing of the past.

Appendix A

1997 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS
(Seats Won, Votes polled by Independents & Parties)

Political Party	No of seats won	Percent seats won	Votes polled	Percent votes polled
Independent	36	33.03	477,845	48.40
Peoples Progress Party Inc.	16	14.68	80,868	8.19
Pangu Pati Inc.	15	13.76	173,425	7.44
National Alliance Inc.	8	7.34	118,205	11.97
Peoples Democratic Movement Inc.	8	7.34	61,1981	6.20
Peoples National Congress Inc.	6	5.50	34,653	3.51
Peoples Action Party Inc.	5	4.59	45,488	4.61
Melanesian Alliance Party Inc.	4	3.67	32,5761	3.30
United Party Inc.	3	2.75	10,294	1.04
Peoples Resources Awareness Party Inc.	2	1.83	8,849	0.90
Peoples Unity Party Inc.	2	1.83	17,978	1.82
Christian Democratic Party Inc.	1	0.92	3,6201	0.37
Movement For Greater Autonomy Inc.	1	0.92	9,870	1.00
Peoples Solidarity Party Inc.	1	0.92	2,473	0.25
Png National Party Inc.	1	0.92	10,038	1.02
TOTAL	109	100.00	987,380	100.00

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Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared

APPENDIX: 1997 NATIONAL PARLIAMENT GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS

BOUGAINVILLE PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE

John Momis	**17,632**	**51.82**	**MAP**	**2/7/97**
Isaiah Moroko	5,005	14.71	IND	
George Lesi	3,845	11.30	IND	
Sylvester Niu	1,623	4.77	PAP	
John Siau	1,406	4.13	IND	
Joshua P. Bakirie	944	2.77	IND	
Terrie Mose	642	1.89	IND	
Nick Francis Peniai	618	1.82	PPP	
Joseph Bolata Nanei	593	1.74	IND	
Elizabeth Tangji Burain	556	1.63	IND	
Denis Sareke	415	1.22	IND	
Paul Nerau	333	0.98	PP	
Simon Kenehe	194	0.57	IND	
Henry Onsa	169	0.50	IND	
Total Ballot papers allowed	33, 975	99.85		
Informal				
TOTAL				

CENTRAL BOUGAINVILLE OPEN ELECTORATE

Sam Akoitai	**513**	**19.43**	**IND**	**1/7/97**
Ezekiel Opet	398	15.08	IND	
Benedict Pisi	311	11.78	MAP	
Joseph Steven Egilio	311	11.78	PPP	
Patrick Nianko	199	7.54	IND	
Emil Tenoa	198	7.50	PAP	
Jones Bogina	177	6.70	IND	
Raphael Bele	131	4.96	MAP	
Laurie Patrick	125	4.73	IND	
John Danmark	121	4.58	IND	
Patrick Itta Issidor	108	4.09	PP	
Thomas Kasireasi	5	0.19	MAP	
Total Ballot papers allowed	**2,597**	98.37		
Informal	**43**	1.63		
TOTAL	**2,640**	100.00		

NORTH BOUGAINVILLE OPEN ELECTORATE

Michael Ogio	**5,314**	**25.42**	**PDM**	**2/7/97**
James Togel	5,051	24.16	MAP	
Leo Hannett	4,064	19.44	IND	
Joel Latu Banam	1,573	7.52	IND	
Bart Magara	1,417	6.78	IND	
Matsi Gimis	831	3.97	IND	
Joel Hiriats	734	3.51	IND	
Joseph Gitovea	545	2.61	IND	
Donatus Mola	506	2.42	IND	
Maurice Semoso	326	1.56	IND	
Jimmie Elizah Mose	195	0.93	IND	
Total Ballot papers allowed	**20,556**	98.32		
Informal	**352**	1.68		
TOTAL	**20,908**	100.00		

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE OPEN ELECTORATE				
Michael Laimo	**4,759**	**43.31**	**MAP**	**1/7/97**
Peter Mika Bari	1,109	10.09	IND	
Albert Punghau	1,053	9.58	IND	
Moses Samboro Koiri	924	8.41	IND	
Misae Rangai	902	8.21	PAP	
Joseph Rumbali	530	4.82	IND	
Joseph Buia	424	3.86	CDP	
Patrick Leslie	378	3.44	IND	
John Pirigi	346	3.15	IND	
Peter Kungka	177	1.61	IND	
Paul Bakoi	166	1.51	IND	
Aaron Kauma Ariku	95	0.86	PP	
John Ungkong Sania	44	0.40	IND	
Total Ballot papers allowed	**10,907**	99.27		
Informal	**80**	0.73		
TOTAL	**10,987**	100.00		
CENTRAL PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE				
Edward (Ted) Diro	**29,200**	**35.86**	**PAP**	**7/7/97**
John Orea	12,501	15.35	PNC	
Galeva Kwarara	11,535	14.17	IND	
Alex Avare	5,492	6.74	IND	
Rev. Wala Tamate	3,917	4.81	NA	
Paul Bodie	3,706	4.55	IND	
Louis Mona	3,210	3.94	IND	
Michael Keko Hilake	2,853	3.50	IND	
Paul Apini	2,780	3.41	IND	
James Eki Mopio	1,752	2.15	IND	
Gorio Dobella	1,253	1.54	IND	
Paul Kipo	1,211	1.49	IND	
Joe Kassman	434	0.53	IND	
Michael Koae Sale	389	0.48	IND	
Total Ballot papers allowed	**80,233**	98.54		
Informal	**1,191**	1.46		
TOTAL	**81,424**	100.00		
ABAU OPEN ELECTORATE				
Kilroy Koiro Genia	**4,783**	**25.82**	**PP**	**2/7/97**
Desmond Tiara Baira	3,506	18.92	PAP	
Wari Iamo	3,429	18.51	PNC	
Micky Josiah Puritau	1,055	5.69	IND	
Onea Thavala	1,035	5.59	IND	
Vagi Mae	955	5.15	IND	
Waea Eckay Iamge	753	4.06	IND	
William James Reid	593	3.20	IND	
Au Aruai	569	3.07	IND	
Lamalua Makara	483	2.61	IND	
Ovo Uakai	235	1.27	IND	
Mathew Marai	217	1.17	IND	
Aron James	196	1.06	IND	
Gerega Pepena	173	0.93	IND	
Steven Berua	144	0.78	IND	
Vele Nogi	115	0.62	IND	
Jack Araua	86	0.46	IND	
Gideon Aruai Augerega	51	0.28	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Total Ballot papers allowed	**18,378**	99.20		
Informal	**149**	0.80		
TOTAL	**18,527**	**100.00**		
GOILALA OPEN ELECTORATE				
Ajax Eleli Bia	**1,167**	**10.78**	**IND**	**3/7/97**
Camillo Esef	1,096	10.12	PP	
Raiam Augustine Jerry Bauai	999	9.22	IND	
Augustine Hilo Olei	661	6.10	MAP	
Mathew Poia	659	6.08	PAP	
Henry Movi	638	5.89	IND	
Daniel Kauto	590	5.45	IND	
Sylvester Moge	524	4.84	IND	
Andrew Kaita	505	4.66	IND	
Joe Tamatai Manau	468	4.32	PRAP	
John Bulda	464	4.28	IND	
Gabriel Ivoro	393	3.63	IND	
Stephen Lamoro Katie	359	3.31	IND	
Philip Kipi Fasi	326	3.01	PAP	
Allan Koma	318	2.94	IND	
Anthony Bauwai	267	2.47	PAP	
Patrick Bawai	266	2.46	IND	
Herman Kinaram	262	2.42	IND	
Paul Keva Javu	213	1.97	IND	
John Gutoila	205	1.89	CDP	
Nicholas Kamo	193	1.78	PPP	
Venancio Ondd Mark	128	1.18	IND	
Ellison Peter Keme	110	1.02	IND	
Total Ballot papers allowed	**10,811**	99.82		
Informal	**19**	0.18		
TOTAL	**10,830**	**100.00**		
KAIRUKU-HIRI OPEN ELECTORATE				
Moi Avei	**5,112**	**16.14**	**PP**	**3/7/97**
Charles Maino	5,048	15.94	IND	
Eno Daera	4,202	13.27	IND	
Ken Fairweather	3,215	10.15	IND	
Paul A. Aisa	1,297	4.10	IND	
Peter Namea Isoaimo	1,282	4.05	PUP	
Allan Kekele	1,270	4.01	IND	
Pako Willie Peter	1,159	3.66	IND	
Tau Hota	1,125	3.55	IND	
Louis Vangeke Ido	1,092	3.45	IND	
Partrick Haino	1,018	3.21	IND	
Nanuka Beremu Marea	1,012	3.20	IND	
Dickson To'oro Pepe	916	2.89	NA	
Aihi Ovia	731	2.31	IND	
Nicholas Koae Auo	534	1.69	IND	
Theseira Charles	474	1.50	IND	
Jack Oga	371	1.17	IND	
Fred Uda Vagi	355	1.12	IND	
Heagi Isaiah	336	1.06	IND	
Dr. Topul Rali	250	0.79	IND	
David Asi	190	0.60	IND	
Barnabas Maua Oa	173	0.55	IND	
Andrew La'ava	62	0.20	IND	
Joseph Nicky	58	0.18	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Total ballot papers allowed	**31,282**	98.77		
Informal	**389**	1.23		
TOTAL	**31,671**	**100.00**		
RIGO OPEN ELECTORATE				
Dibara Yagabo	**3,775**	**18.59**	**PNC**	**7/7/97**
Mary J. Karo	2,570	12.65	PUP	
Tom Dirona Abe	1,843	9.07	PAP	
Brian Kupanarigo Amini	1,445	7.12	IND	
Willie Asigau	1,239	6.10	IND	
Vearinama Maha	1,079	5.31	NA	
Tufi K. Sega	1,028	5.06	IND	
Leka Mou	799	3.93	IND	
Frank Bomio	734	3.61	IND	
Madu Veratau	572	2.82	IND	
Kila Pat Ravu	548	2.70	IND	
Steven Vaira	522	2.57	IND	
Kwago Guria	517	2.55	IND	
Rova Maha	503	2.48	IND	
Darby G. V. Kila	397	1.95	CDP	
Dr. Mari Ernest Apana	339	1.67	IND	
Gabriel Maroa	338	1.66	IND	
Laeko Magaru Bala	298	1.47	IND	
Joe Yore	297	1.46	IND	
Vaita Navuru	275	1.35	IND	
Pennie Gamoga	231	1.14	IND	
Vali Manu	227	1.12	IND	
Gobaki Ugaia Dagina	198	0.97	IND	
Gabi Kemana	181	0.89	PP	
Humeu Maru	148	0.73	IND	
Kepi Naime	4	0.02	IND	
Total ballot papers allowed	**20,107**	99.01		
Informal	**202**	0.99		
TOTAL	**20,309**	**100.00**		
CHIMBU PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE				
Fr. Louis (Lui) Ambane	**17,589**	**7.18**	**IND**	**5/7/97**
Andrew Saki Porr	17,567	7.17	IND	
David Goro Mai	17,473	7.13	PPP	
Waguo Goiye	16,759	6.84	PUP	
Thomas Tumun Sumuno	16,222	6.62	IND	
Tangil Iambakey Okuk	12,725	5.20	PNC	
Anton Angai Goiye	12,509	5.11	MLP	
Palma Puk Embia	11,649	4.76	IND	
Mark Roy Woiwabal	10,070	4.11	IND	
John Mua Nilkare	9,305	3.80	IND	
Mathew Numabo Siune	8,782	3.59	PAP	
Brown Sinamoi	8,543	3.49	PNGNP	
Joe Mek Teine	7,978	3.26	IND	
Mogerema Sigo Wii Mogi	7,324	2.99	IND	
Bruce Gigmai	6,886	2.81	IND	
Pastor Gundu Kagl Guenu	6,317	2.58	IND	
Diri Tabi Kobla	5,984	2.44	PUP	
John Maua	5,493	2.24	IND	
Henry Tokam	5,401	2.21	IND	
Joseph Kumo	5,161	2.11	IND	
Peter Gull	3,759	1.53	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Mukale Mikail Korah	3,714	1.52	IND	
Emily Pai Paneya Dirua	3,406	1.39	IND	
Daniel Dilu Goma	3,278	1.34	CDP	
Vero (Veronica) Kawage	3,208	1.31	IND	
Steven Kelaga Kume (Kera)	3,173	1.30	IND	
Aribill Gonapa Kiap	2,115	0.86	IND	
Kobale Kale	1,745	0.71	PP	
Paul Kama Kande	1,693	0.69	IND	
Edward Bare	1,304	0.53	IND	
Rocky Nemba	1,246	0.51	IND	
Dr. Thomas V. Kubu	1,239	0.51	IND	
Kume Warren	1,134	0.46	IND	
James Maima Yopa	727	0.30	IND	
Joseph Apa Lombi	702	0.29	IND	
John Bandiagl Woka	673	0.27	IND	
Teacher Nombri Kuri	542	0.22	IND	
Bill Kuri Kamana	394	0.16	IND	
Jack Kaupa Bomai	67	0.03	IND	
Total ballot papers allowed	**243,856**	99.57		
Informal	**1,063**	0.43		
TOTAL	**244,919**	**100.00**		
CHUAVE OPEN ELECTORATE				
Yauwe Riyong	**3,076**	**10.30**	**PPP**	**29/6/97**
Kumo Peter Launa	2,488	8.33	PP	
Temai Timothy Komane	2,478	8.30	IND	
Michael Dick	2,406	8.06	IND	
Erry Ermukom Tara	2,286	7.65	IND	
John Mori	2,112	7.07	IND	
Wan Buckley Iarume	2,018	6.76	CDP	
Bob Sari Maina	1,839	6.16	IND	
Jack Tabie	1,753	5.87	IND	
Fred Nime Boi	1,608	5.38	IND	
Dr. Sali Kinawa	1,335	4.47	UP	
George Supa Muroa	1,261	4.22	IND	
Alfred Rongo	1,164	3.90	PUP	
Jack Gul Kaupa	863	2.89	IND	
Bushman Nicholas Mura	725	2.43	IND	
Jerry Wemin Kobor	670	2.24	IND	
Dama Sipa Panguna	419	1.40	IND	
Steven Morigi Wire	386	1.29	IND	
Thomas Uwau Ghiyandiwe	345	1.16	IND	
Samuel Kimbori Rumbia	321	1.07	IND	
Kiripo Mala Subba	155	0.52	IND	
Gerry Gabriel	96	0.32	IND	
Total ballot papers allowed	**29,804**	99.78		
Informal	**65**	0.22		
TOTAL	**29,869**	**100.00**		
GUMINE OPEN ELECTORATE				
Aulkupa Joseph Wamil	**2,545**	**6.65**	**PRAP**	**4/7/97**
Dennis Niripen Kas Mipa	2,530	6.61	IND	
Oltai Phile	2,356	6.15	IND	
Arol Tala Amos	2,045	5.34	NA	
Kawa Robert Bartho	1,832	4.79	PDM	
Ben Bire Delba	1,830	4.78	IND	
Kaupa Biure Vincent	1,812	4.73	CCP	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Yauro Soolyal Ignatius	1,697	4.43	IND	
Wemen David Nul	1,486	3.88	IND	
Bernadette (Bibi) Olmi	1,475	3.85	IND	
Joseph Sil Nipape	1,338	3.50	IND	
Michael Aula Kenzy	1,302	3.40	IND	
Joe Sine Wemin	1,154	3.01	CDP	
Bob Mua Yal	1,134	2.96	IND	
Fred Temai Arre	1,123	2.93	IND	
John Younma Taul Kol	1,064	2.78	IND	
Bill Ginbol Ninkama	1,025	2.68	PUP	
Silkaupa Irai	973	2.54	IND	
John Nulai	884	2.31	IND	
John Mol Dulume	873	2.28	IND	
Edward Abba Kawale	841	2.20	PPP	
Aron Wemin Kopta	763	1.99	MLP	
John Yoba Nul	732	1.91	IND	
Bernard Bol Wemin	715	1.87	PP	
Kaupa Aiwa	692	1.81	MGA	
Robert Bal Tala	668	1.75	IND	
Alai Raphael Aina	620	1.62	IND	
Pius Si Kuman	550	1.44	IND	
Joe Kuman Sipa Guai	513	1.34	IND	
Ken Kale Kumulgo Samian Yal	495	1.29	IND	
Raphael Kua Gari	329	0.86	IND	
Bob Nul Bopa	319	0.83	IND	
Peter Di Kama	289	0.76	IND	
Anthony Kaupa Kumulgo Amia	128	0.33	IND	
Paul A. K Dre	110	0.29	IND	
Bernard Kaminan Didiman	17	0.04	IND	
Tom Bomai	8	0.02	PUP	
Total ballot papers allowed	**38,267**	99.97		
Informal	**11**	0.03		
TOTAL	**38,278**	100.00		
KARIMUI-NOMANE OPEN ELECTORATE				
Simeon Philip Gaima Wai	**2,569**	**11.73**	**PNC**	**29/6/97**
John Wemin Mili	1,886	8.61	IND	
Habai Robert Hobel	1,725	7.87	IND	
Thomas Bare Yoba	1,354	6.18	IND	
Philip Biriwai Yomo	1,347	6.15	PAP	
James Kama Hore	1,222	5.58	IND	
Ben Awo	1,143	5.22	NA	
Alphonse Auri Kamo	954	4.35	IND	
Seberai Domu	875	3.99	CCP	
Elesigibiri Dapae Ben Semene	842	3.84	IND	
Martin Kunal Aiwa	800	3.65	IND	
Fr. Jack Tul	658	3.00	PPP	
Noah Berry Komere	625	2.85	CDP	
S. Seke Urago	611	2.79	PUP	
Huibe Samson	547	2.50	IND	
Jacob Ma	503	2.30	IND	
Terry Sanange Bire	490	2.24	IND	
Jimmy Kimi Teine	435	1.99	IND	
Tisa Keni Henry	426	1.94	IND	
Tony Ilimape Olape	366	1.67	PDM	
Philip Horabi Sarape	357	1.63	MGA	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
John Kuria Kia	327	1.49	MLP	
Amos Bomai Kawale	301	1.37	IND	
Weyae Hauba	289	1.32	IND	
Jack Mulake	273	1.25	IND	
Kebu Thomas Horu	269	1.23	IND	
Patrick Singapa	222	1.01	IND	
Adani Robert Soibe	168	0.77	IND	
Kusiamo Kawale	167	0.76	IND	
Jacob Tine Wie	80	0.37	IND	
Alphonse Goro Tala	45	0.21	PPP	
Total ballot papers allowed	**21,876**	99.86		
Informal	31	0.14		
TOTAL	**21,907**	100.00		
KEROWAGI OPEN ELECTORATE				
John Kamb	**8,799**	**15.39**	**PDM**	**4/7/97**
John Siune Tei	5,481	9.58	IND	
Moses Tul Dermbar	3,766	6.59	IND	
Peter Kama	3,665	6.41	IND	
Guma Wau	3,639	6.36	IND	
John Nuku	2,750	4.81	IND	
Camillus Dagima	2,317	4.05	NA	
Gunbi Kuamugl	2,298	4.02	IND	
Merawe Degemba	2,093	3.66	IND	
John Par	1,985	3.47	IND	
James Mondo	1,732	3.03	IND	
David Tau Neu	1,677	2.93	MLP	
John Wau	1,584	2.77	PP	
Bernard Goma	1,561	2.73	CDP	
William Genegiu Bomai	1,494	2.61	IND	
Mark Kono Yere	1,232	2.15	IND	
Otto Wal Victus	1,160	2.03	IND	
Bepi Yungo Timon	1,076	1.88	IND	
Michael Aglua Ande Parkua	1,047	1.83	CDP	
Toa Joe Krumba	940	1.64	IND	
Kerenga Jacob Bomai	863	1.51	IND	
David Dilu Gagma	803	1.40	IND	
Gena Gole Goison	745	1.30	IND	
Peter Mondo	728	1.27	IND	
Edward Brawa Garia	609	1.06	IND	
Bari Witne Raphael	590	1.03	IND	
Kugame Gabriel Waine	552	0.97	IND	
Alphonse Morial Willie	497	0.87	IND	
Alois Imbo Kawage	479	0.84	IND	
Peter Nere Kupo	478	0.84	IND	
Joe Gande Willie	268	0.47	IND	
Onguglo Philip Dokta	157	0.27	IND	
Cecillia Dre Kimagl	26	0.05	IND	
Joe Dilu Kagl	20	0.03	IND	
Bernad Onguglu	8	0.01	IND	
Total ballot papers allowed	**57,119**	99.88		
Informal	**68**	0.12		
TOTAL	**57,187**	**100.00**		
KUNDIAWA OPEN ELECTORATE				
Peter G Waieng	**5,199**	**9.74**	**IND**	**5/7/97**

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Joseph Bare Onguglo	3,958	7.41	IND	
Peter Yomane Kerenga	3,551	6.65	IND	
Kuglo Peter Gundu	2,959	5.54	NA	
John Kagl	2,926	5.48	PPP	
Peter Kuman Kakep	2,925	5.48	PDM	
Paul Piru	2,520	4.72	IND	
Dr. Blaise Kal Tonar	2,466	4.62	IND	
Bill Mondo	2,388	4.47	PAP	
Willy Umba	2,216	4.15	IND	
Willie Kupo	2,093	3.92	IND	
Alphonse Yer	2,039	3.82	IND	
Nicholas Umba Tagai	1,644	3.08	IND	
Dominic Daugil	1,515	2.84	IND	
Joe Simbai Arumba	1,354	2.54	PUP	
Wagi Merimba	1,243	2.33	IND	
John Koima	1,214	2.27	IND	
Joseph Kuman Kopi Baia	1,200	2.25	CDP	
John Gundu	1,142	2.14	IND	
Luke Apa (Kua Konuga)	1,135	2.13	IND	
Seka Mikhail Kukame	1,121	2.10	IND	
Palma Goka	938	1.76	IND	
John Teine Kindi	920	1.72	IND	
Waim Tokam	792	1.48	HP	
Joe Dorme Gene	688	1.29	IND	
Timon Wena	619	1.16	IND	
Sandy Wena Ulka	426	0.80	IND	
Ire Kerenga	418	0.78	MLP	
Philip Witne	401	0.75	IND	
Ruben Kuazie Tokam	245	0.46	IND	
Michael Gonguno	170	0.32	IND	
David Poka	143	0.27	IND	
Kie Krua Onguglo	121	0.23	IND	
Peter G. Baka	109	0.20	PP	
Elias Waruo	102	0.19	IND	
Jenny Gema Kimal	77	0.14	IND	
Tobby Apa Baka	19	0.04	IND	
Tobias Simon Sundu	14	0.03	IND	
Simon Komainde	4	0.01	IND	
Joe Komba	1	0.00	IND	
Total ballot papers allowed	**53,015**	99.28		
Informal	**385**	0.72		
TOTAL	**53,400**	100.00		
SINASINA-YONGGAMUGL OPEN ELECTORATE				
Ludger Luker Mondo	**4,330**	**11.01**	**PAP**	**29/6/97**
Kale Garap Konda	4,152	10.56	PDM	
Joe Kelega (Tabare)	2,052	5.22	NA	
Bagil Buckley Dama	1,750	4.45	IND	
Ben Kerenga Okorro	1,729	4.40	PPP	
Michael Mungul Mauve	1,591	4.05	IND	
David Aukamane Digal	1,403	3.57	PUP	
Robin Kiak Sikambi Gigmai	1,351	3.44	PUP	
Ware Mukale	1,346	3.42	IND	
Gena Gala Gordon	1,308	3.33	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Paul Kaupa	1,280	3.26	IND	
Urigine Kerai	1,265	3.22	IND	
Milan Kaupa Mogia	1,156	2.94	IND	
Nibson Kanen Nibabe	1,118	2.84	IND	
David Sumai	1,115	2.84	CDP	
James Kumul Dimino (Kopuldua)	1,044	2.66	PP	
Dua Kuas Kuipa	962	2.45	MLP	
Stanley Dindongo Armba	910	2.31	IND	
Lendo Waura Bal	851	2.16	IND	
Ulka Jimmy Samara	825	2.10	IND	
John M. Tangila	779	1.98	IND	
John Gigmai Tisa	706	1.80	IND	
John Wel Kalale	674	1.71	PAP	
Essy Walkaima	666	1.69	IND	
Moore Raymond Kamtai	590	1.50	IND	
Thomas More	486	1.24	IND	
Wemin Boi Ahmu	433	1.10	IND	
Galla Peter Korah	422	1.07	IND	
Mogia Wemin	376	0.96	IND	
Nime Dabire	366	0.93	IND	
George Bula Nime	334	0.85	IND	
Dege Omele Pedi	320	0.81	IND	
Gene John Tai	272	0.69	IND	
Peter Komane Gilmai	270	0.69	IND	
Bruce Mebel Maumine	222	0.56	IND	
Erik Punde	204	0.52	IND	
Tom Peni	160	0.41	IND	
Kenny Kaul Taiya	106	0.27	IND	
Talpa Peter Yure	49	0.12	IND	
Robert Kola Miamel	39	0.10	MLP	
Joe Maule Kuapege	5	0.01	PP	
Kauna Maima	2	0.01	IND	
Gigmai Kambu	2	0.01	IND	
Paul Mane Papa Wel	0	0.00	IND	
Total ballot papers allowed	**39,021**	99.25		
Informal	**295**	0.75		
TOTAL	**39,316**	100.00		
EAST NEW BRITAIN PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE				
Francis Koimanrea	**23,516**	**38.19**	**PDM**	**2/7/97**
Sinai John Brown	11,622	18.87	IND	
Allan Marat	10,616	17.24	IND	
Esorom Burege	9,889	16.06	IND	
Thomas Tobunbun	2,410	3.91	IND	
Delma Lydia Boden	1,068	1.73	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**59,121**	96.01		
Informal	**2,456**	3.99		
Total	**61,577**	100.00		
GAZELLE OPEN ELECTORATE				
Nakikus Konga	**12,815**	**48.60**	**PP**	**23/6/97**
Henry Saminga	5,523	20.94	IND	
Elias Kamu Tolulu	2,555	9.69	IND	
Esorom Toligur	2,167	8.22	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Alu Wong	1,714	6.50	IND	
Kepas Isimel Watangia	1,037	3.93	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**25,811**	97.88		
Informal	**560**	2.12		
Total	**26,371**	100.00		
KOKOPO OPEN ELECTORATE				
Sir Rabbie Namaliu	**7,667**	**53.92**	**PP**	**23/6/97**
Joe Ben Kuin	4,359	30.66	CDP	
Elias Tolam Thomas	1,613	11.34	IND	
Ereman V. Tobaining	271	1.91	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**13,910**	97.83		
Informal	**308**	2.17		
Total	**14,218**	100.00		
POMIO OPEN ELECTORATE				
Alois Koki Koimanrea	**4,147**	**27.32**	**IND**	**30/6/97**
Thomas Iakenta	2,680	17.65	IND	
Michael Komtagarea	2,289	15.08	IND	
Michael Piusparea	2,289	15.08	IND	
Hubert Konkali	1,242	8.18	IND	
Pius Kosa	1,008	6.64	IND	
Charles Kalo	480	3.16	IND	
Philip Baileonakia	368	2.42	IND	
Patrick Pagun	246	1.62	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**14,749**	97.15		
Informal	**432**	2.85		
Total	**15,181**	100.00		
RABAUL OPEN ELECTORATE				
Sir John Rumet Kaputin	**1,733**	**20.12**	**IND**	**22/6/97**
Albert Burua	1,606	18.64	IND	
Ephraim Jubilee	1,470	17.06	IND	
Nilip Nakikus Napitalai	1,063	12.34	IND	
Benson Tarara	887	10.30	IND	
Kepas Tiamon	616	7.15	IND	
Komit Kunai	543	6.30	IND	
Francis Magel	519	6.02	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**8,437**	97.93		
Informal	**178**	2.07		
Total	**8,615**	100.00		
EAST SEPIK PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE				
Sir Michael T. Somare	**78,257**	**61.02**	**NA**	**8/7/97**
Greg Mas Maisen	19,866	15.49	IND	
Jonathan Sengi	7,641	5.96	IND	
Tobias Kuelik	6,828	5.32	PP	
Joe Spencer Gawi	6,680	5.21	IND	
Maria Ibai Hayes	4,963	3.87	IND	
Philip Kanora	1,840	1.43	IND	
Bonnie Yambukia	772	0.60	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**126,847**	98.90		
Informal	**1,410**	1.10		
Total	**128,257**	100.00		

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
AMBUNTI-DREIKIKIR OPEN ELECTORATE				
Judah Akisim	**3,548**	**16.63**	**PP**	**5/7/97**
Alex Tani Anisi	3,019	14.15	PPP	
Johnson Yalowa Wapunai	2,726	12.78	IND	
Herman Massimbor	2,354	11.03	PDM	
Lucas Engime	1,632	7.65	IND	
Joseph Ouyoumb	1,225	5.74	NA	
Andrew Tolis Sapuko	1,203	5.64	IND	
Patrick Muan Halpie	922	4.32	MAP	
Joshua Akui Yandanai	766	3.59	IND	
Sukwianomb Joseph	582	2.73	IND	
Douglas Sapiyep	581	2.72	IND	
Fr. Rudolph Mongali	512	2.40	IND	
Nick Klapat	506	2.37	PUP	
Cain Yapi	451	2.11	IND	
Robyn Malange Poniou	367	1.72	IND	
Daniel Masikim Niawang	337	1.58	PAP	
Wandoi Swong Didiman	305	1.43	IND	
Peter Eniotou	231	1.08	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**21,267**	99.67		
Informal	**70**	0.33		
Total	**21,337**	100.00		
ANGORAM OPEN ELECTORATE				
Arthur T. Somare	**5,731**	**24.90**	**NA**	**8/7/97**
Ludwig Schulze	4,685	20.36	PPP	
Luimek Pandima Johnson	3,711	16.12	PAP	
Joe Kenni	3,314	14.40	PP	
Stanley Lumbia	2,009	8.73	IND	
Paul B.B.Bengo	1,515	6.58	IND	
Mathew Paita	966	4.20	IND	
Harry Bukka	767	3.33	IND	
Nickolas Waike	57	0.25	CDP	
Issac Koni	54	0.23	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**22,809**	99.11		
Informal	**205**	0.89		
Total	**23,014**	100.00		
MAPRIK OPEN ELECTORATE				
Pita Lus	**5,139**	**20.81**	**PP**	**30/6/97**
Jim G. Kauk	3,569	14.45	NA	
Gabriel Leni Kapris	3,540	14.33	IND	
Raymond Kamanabi	2,927	11.85	IND	
Leslie Wungen	2,911	11.79	IND	
Jimmy Gola Kwalo	2,003	8.11	IND	
Daniel Dopi	1,597	6.47	PDM	
John Manembi	1,082	4.38	IND	
David Sipani	779	3.15	IND	
Harry E. Manuambi	542	2.19	MAP	
Francis Wandahwan	459	1.86	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**24,548**	99.40		
Informal	**147**	0.60		
Total	**24,695**	100.00		
WEWAK OPEN ELECTORATE				
Bernard Mullu Narokobi	**5,487**	**28.21**	**MAP**	**22/6/97**
Dr Moses Manwau	2,875	14.78	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Luke Zatdu Gukaine	1,457	7.49	IND	
Michael Kasi	1,282	6.59	PP	
Michael Malenki	1,084	5.57	IND	
Anton Maigu Namuesh	1,019	5.24	IND	
Baran Sori	1,012	5.20	IND	
Anthony Naguwean	802	4.12	IND	
Petrus Sagom	727	3.74	IND	
Lawrence Horaki Komboguru	680	3.50	CDP	
Andrew Warisan	512	2.63	IND	
Norman Donigi	489	2.51	CDP	
Philip Dagun	389	2.00	IND	
Bruce Samban	359	1.85	IND	
Mary Kabaru Soondrawu	313	1.61	PU	
Joseph Wanji	249	1.28	IND	
Laura Martin	219	1.13	IND	
Melchior Javin	173	0.89	IND	
David Inau	54	0.28	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**19,182**	98.62		
Informal	**269**	1.38		
Total	**19,451**	100.00		
WOSERA-GAUI OPEN ELECTORATE				
Gallus Kipandu Yumbui	**2,636**	**12.94**	**IND**	**5/7/97**
William Bakamu	2,556	12.55	PP	
Ronald Asik	2,093	10.27	IND	
Cletus Cox	1,856	9.11	NA	
Paul Wanjik	1,668	8.19	IND	
James Walange	1,229	6.03	IND	
David Frangili	1,202	5.90	IND	
Koni Conrad Atipindu	1,006	4.94	IND	
John Yamboli	941	4.62	IND	
Joe Yanj	699	3.43	IND	
Hubert Kwangu	685	3.36	PAP	
Leo Ganja Aun	617	3.03	IND	
Joseph Sam Kemaken	572	2.81	IND	
Brian Tapi	514	2.52	IND	
Alex Panda	485	2.38	IND	
Barth Waki	417	2.05	MAP	
Noah Tonove	389	1.91	IND	
Mathew Bui	237	1.16	IND	
Stephen Gawi	156	0.77	IND	
Michael Vee	148	0.73	IND	
Luke Supro	130	0.64	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**20,236**	99.32		
Informal	**138**	0.68		
Total	**20,374**	100.00		
YANGORU-SAUSSIA OPEN ELECTORATE				
Gabriel Dusava	**1,902**	**9.40**	**IND**	**27/6/97**
Bernard Hagoria	1,887	9.32	NA	
Simon Manihia	1,771	8.75	CDP	
Johnny Kamblijambi	1,419	7.01	IND	
John Jaminan	1,266	6.25	PDM	
Arnold Ningiga	1,160	5.73	IND	
Benedict Walipai	1,134	5.60	CCP	
Charley Hakua Wafi	1,133	5.60	PP	
John Wauwia	947	4.68	NA	
Alis Liliura	933	4.61	IND	
Simontakaboy	731	3.61	MAP	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Casper Wrakonei	673	3.32	PRAP	
David Siomon Nelson	659	3.26	IND	
Augustus Wagambio	651	3.22	PUP	
Joe Bruno Hambuk	562	2.78	IND	
Jeffery Yuamiamba	514	2.54	IND	
Jimmy Parari	453	2.24	PPP	
Alois Kambori Hoandie	369	1.82	IND	
Andrew Pinge	356	1.76	IND	
Peter Jerry Jerrifia Heherewun	314	1.55	IND	
Francis Klewaki	242	1.20	IND	
Henry Sasoro Yuafoho	209	1.03	IND	
Nick Nillinkundi	181	0.89	IND	
Gilbert Niaha Yenbari	157	0.78	PAP	
Theo Ilihi	153	0.76	IND	
Peter Wararu Waranaka	138	0.68	IND	
Monica Hovehombe Hasimani	125	0.62	PPP	
Eric Magia Wangihau	120	0.59	IND	
Berry Rex Sak	40	0.20	IND	
Linus Cletus Urahori	3	0.01	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**20,202**	99.80		
Informal	**41**	0.20		
Total	**20,243**	100.00		
EASTERN HIGHLANDS PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE				
Peti Lafanama	**35,653**	**15.59**	**IND**	**3/7/97**
Malcom Smith Kela	19,800	8.66	IND	
Moses Sasakila Sana	13,838	6.05	IND	
Julie Soso Akeke	11,916	5.21	IND	
Aita Ivarato	11,599	5.07	IND	
Kafe Kopi	9,090	3.98	IND	
Dima Wauwa Otoole	8,770	3.84	IND	
Lennie Aparima	8,627	3.77	NA	
Stainer Upire Sapu	8,622	3.77	IND	
Sumatin Watson Tima	7,835	3.43	IND	
Ricky Moke Mitio	7,729	3.38	PP	
Ubum Makarai	6,837	2.99	PPP	
James Yanepa	6,610	2.89	IND	
Kasen Nahe	5,619	2.46	IND	
David Mehuwo Gahare	5,584	2.44	PAP	
Steven Aumo Kiari	5,560	2.43	IND	
Jones Saasia	4,653	2.04	IND	
Francis Yarokave Warigiso	4,464	1.95	IND	
George Pirie	4,192	1.83	CCP	
Soti Aizo Sihuwo	4,044	1.77	IND	
Wato Keoa Avinaga	3,857	1.69	IND	
Abundi Ende	3,662	1.60	IND	
Joshua Onio	3,553	1.55	IND	
Pastor Kabian Tesasi	3,516	1.54	IND	
Pano Kukusie Aura	3,072	1.34	IND	
Pastor Ray Rerepa Rasove	2,983	1.30	IND	
Amos Duoff	2,531	1.11	IND	
Ambo Makara Mondia	2,379	1.04	PRAP	
Opi Otulamo Hato	2,130	0.93	IND	
Aaron Baru	1,969	0.86	IND	
Enock Maio Mole	1,554	0.68	IND	
Toto Taa	1,466	0.64	IND	
Jeffery Masi Raki	1,349	0.59	IND	
Patrick Osborn Taigi	1,014	0.44	IND	
Noah Andy	675	0.30	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Bono Azanifa Ovii	131	0.06	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	226,883	99.23		
Informal	1,756	0.77		
Total	**228,639**	100.00		
DAULO OPEN ELECTORATE				
Ron Ganinbo Ganarafo	**2,413**	**10.63**	**PP**	**1/7/97**
James Mobien Genemboro	2,146	9.46	PAP	
Paul H. Bayango	1,871	8.25	PAP	
Dua Henry Bagme	1,861	8.20	PRAP	
Sowa Gunia	1,772	7.81	PPP	
Gorofo Horace Keruai	1,607	7.08	PUP	
Yanga Karre	1,576	6.95	NA	
Ekime Mek Gorosahu	1,189	5.24	PP	
Peter Duwe Dumba	1,126	4.96	CCP	
Levi Yuai Kurakipa	987	4.35	IND	
Nema Gorobun Mondiai	864	3.81	IND	
Benny Wally Ghabiliha	851	3.75	CDP	
Iabbie Pearce	669	2.95	MGA	
Ben Sapu Bayango	614	2.71	IND	
Gopave Harauwo Giregire	461	2.03	IND	
Noso Ohuno Tenige	407	1.79	IND	
Tim Ako Timbie	402	1.77	IND	
Philip Pata Forune	378	1.67	IND	
James Gawoyo Gahare	321	1.41	IND	
Mae Sipio	320	1.41	PDM	
Mauro Jetori Jay	257	1.13	IND	
Wisky Maniho	201	0.89	IND	
John Hove Kindiniwe	123	0.54	IND	
Sinake Giregire	91	0.40	IND	
Lucas Morofa Sefe	71	0.31	IND	
Yopa James Gahine	1	0.00	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**22,579**	99.51		
INFORMAL	**112**	0.49		
TOTAL	**22,691**	100.00		
GOROKA OPEN ELECTORATE				
Henry Iyapo Smith	**2,928**	**9.69**	**PUP**	**3/7/97**
John Blacky Tele	2,113	6.99	IND	
Mathias Izape	2,046	6.77	IND	
Tonny Yogiyo	1,642	5.43	IND	
Bire Kimisopa	1,601	5.30	IND	
Tama Hurutuve Nipie	1,530	5.06	IND	
Paul Ine	1,327	4.39	IND	
Himony Tom Lapiso	1,233	4.08	IND	
Samuel Kuso	1,203	3.98	IND	
Joshua Soso	1,185	3.92	IND	
Gatapo Paone	1,068	3.53	IND	
Enock Asineha	961	3.18	IND	
Apere Goso	871	2.88	PAP	
Lawrence Piksae Kera	799	2.64	IND	
Steven Pupune	785	2.60	CDP	
Musoe Jack Mori	776	2.57	PRAP	
Nelson Ovepa Mikaive	737	2.44	IND	
Peter Purari Ute	672	2.22	IND	
John Joseph	639	2.11	IND	
Harry Landu	572	1.89	IND	
Paul Guhole Umelisimo	569	1.88	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Uni Bayang Nozu Toma	561	1.86	IND	
Tim Asitore	492	1.63	NA	
Tekura Renagi	488	1.62	IND	
Pastor Peter Dege	474	1.57	IND	
Kasup Nate	451	1.49	IND	
Opoe Soga	320	1.06	IND	
Mrs Gosiho Hunehiune Mckenzie	319	1.06	PDM	
Uve Sabumei	261	0.86	IND	
Mark Bugglain Hook	256	0.85	IND	
John Dable Nebare	211	0.70	IND	
Keinan Goinake Venapo	200	0.66	IND	
John Oyahalae Omene	199	0.66	IND	
Argo Ohue	178	0.59	IND	
John Sikoina Osa	156	0.52	IND	
Koni Aize	144	0.48	IND	
John Kuria	93	0.31	PAP	
Tevo Tarepe	55	0.18	IND	
Winnie Winis Namane	14	0.05	IND	
Solomon Meuro	5	0.02	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**30,134**	99.73		
Informal	**82**	0.27		
Total	**30,216**	100.00		
HENGANOFI OPEN ELECTORATE				
Viviso Seravo	**6,154**	**22.57**	**PDM**	**26/6/97**
Robert Atiyafa	2,769	10.15	IND	
John Giheno	2,592	9.51	PP	Tota (Dr) Bahanare Bun
Dr. Tota Bahanare Bun	1,936	7.10	CDP	
Paul Kila Yate	1,734	6.36	IND	
Marerime Kafe Forereme	1,695	6.22	IND	
Vincent Hame Hatefa	1,193	4.37	IND	
Samson Kaninku	1,124	4.12	IND	
Andrew Korarome	1,118	4.10	IND	
Mogi Atete	909	3.33	CCP	
Komba Sbaulue Bazamo	829	3.04	IND	
Moare E'esi Ateyam	784	2.88	IND	
Zebby Kenemote Marare	749	2.75	NA	
Montiu Neofa Bepinaso	711	2.61	IND	
Gipson Nogao Amao	658	2.41	IND	
Yankute Begofa Savamo	552	2.02	IND	
Joe K. Bono Kegeave	414	1.52	IND	
George Teteva Finkeo	298	1.09	IND	
Biar Pato Ragine	197	0.72	MGA	
Terry Mofano	185	0.68	IND	
John Seva Savayane	179	0.66	IND	
George Aiwongi Baina	163	0.60	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**26,943**	98.80		
Informal	**326**	1.20		
Total	**27,269**	100.00		
KAINANTU OPEN ELECTORATE				
Baki Reipa	**3,165**	**10.10**	**IND**	**29/6/97**
Yuntuvi Bao	2,754	8.79	PP	
Avusi Elaiza Tanao	2,264	7.23	CCP	
Tau Amevo	2,048	6.54	NA	
Jerry Dodetty Mantavi	1,782	5.69	PDM	
Susan Tiyofi K. Taranka	1,735	5.54	IND	
Samuel Sili	1,681	5.37	PAP	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Joel Narako	1,475	4.71	IND	
Kapi Kokore	1,463	4.67	IND	
Schubert Zozzi Kamunda	1,424	4.55	IND	
Kops Kopito Nepher	1,346	4.30	PUP	
Simson Simi Susuke	1,324	4.23	IND	
Nevosi Yamagu	1,320	4.21	PNGNA	
Simon Forofo	1,171	3.74	IND	
Jorry Zorogeso Aejofa	1,144	3.65	IND	
Rea Rex Mavino	981	3.13	IND	
Yaunggao Uyassi	850	2.71	CDP	
Willie Piwa Neofa	693	2.21	PPP	
Sakalio Eve'e	455	1.45	IND	
Reuben Kokori Jankuno	424	1.35	IND	
Eddy Pao	371	1.18	PAP	
Lui Ani	365	1.17	IND	
Rua Banove Sarako Pesenave	359	1.15	IND	
Samuel Tukeve	290	0.93	IND	
Jerry Urifi	182	0.58	IND	
Sinakao K Fugonto Didiman	173	0.55	IND	
Masi Wilson Sikuo	67	0.21	IND	
George Nimagi Tibuka	23	0.07	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**31,329**	100.00		
Informal	**1**	0.00		
Total	**31,330**	100.00		
LUFA OPEN ELECTORATE				
Mathias Mero Karani	**3,733**	**15.02**	**PPP**	**29/6/97**
Komane Asano Wesege	2,956	11.89	IND	
Kanera Sokele Efu	2,460	9.90	IND	
Dick Iama Steven Fumi	2,295	9.23	IND	
Jawiawa John Ruli	1,881	7.57	IND	
Jerry Kavori	1,689	6.79	PDM	
Otio Akarapa	1,389	5.59	IND	
Joe Sili Jaogawah	1,336	5.37	IND	
Steven Ayete	1,313	5.28	PAP	
Aso Yawa Uvire	1,256	5.05	IND	
Timothy Koimalie Komolou	723	2.91	IND	
Neskefe B. Aigawa	614	2.47	IND	
Anton Segeyafo	468	1.88	PRAP	
James W. Oviri	459	1.85	IND	
Fred Foregao Kosu	449	1.81	IND	
William Irevu Benavepa	442	1.78	IND	
Suinavi Seni Otio	441	1.77	NA	
Nimson Nimiyasi	406	1.63	PUP	
Ted Sanive Fowa	272	1.09	CDP	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**24,582**	98.88		
Informal	**279**	1.12		
Total	**24,861**	100.00		
OBURA-WONENARA OPEN ELECTORATE				
Muki Samuel Taranupi	**3,620**	**12.41**	**CDP**	**30/6/97**
John Kauriak Koigiri	3,332	11.42	PNGNP	
John Havarika Boito	2,525	8.66	IND	
Peter Papa Gaige	2,422	8.30	PDM	
Lapa Koboi	1,883	6.46	IND	
Tupinga Kuarina	1,636	5.61	IND	
Max Ataoba Toataberi	1,409	4.83	IND	
Wesley Rau Matora	1,374	4.71	IND	
Micky Moikame Senkai	1,348	4.62	PAP	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Hea Hahamani	1,234	4.23	IND	
Pau Ikao	1,132	3.88	IND	
Popson Opeyu	855	2.93	IND	
Arabeba K. Atatai	812	2.78	IND	
Jeffrey Sanga Bavio	754	2.59	IND	
Arao Rapa	733	2.51	IND	
George Wewenim Sakaena	714	2.45	IND	
Mine Kipefa	713	2.44	IND	
Apa'a Usima	660	2.26	IND	
Juda Gura	624	2.14	CCP	
Dekot Koki	575	1.97	IND	
Jack Woweaka	393	1.35	IND	
Dr. Matopi Lorenz Apaio	346	1.19	IND	
Reuben Iniviko	73	0.25	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**29,167**	100.00		
Informal	**1**	0.00		
Total	**29,168**	100.00		
OKAPA OPEN ELECTORATE				
Castan Marbo Maibawa	**3,330**	**10.57**	**PPP**	**2/7/97**
Korak Korae Yasina	3,187	10.12	NA	
Pombre Inji Kenedy	2,049	6.51	IND	
Joe Esaki Taiwasi	1,899	6.03	IND	
Nosse Charles Nemo	1,729	5.49	IND	
Wagaro Reynolds Pinaga	1,671	5.31	IND	
Sota Kalabe Yabaimanta	1,626	5.16	CDP	
Ayorepi Sami Iserepano	1,620	5.14	PDM	
David Moses Yaigi	1,308	4.15	IND	
Reuben Yois Wanevio	1,192	3.78	IND	
Jack Hanave	1,184	3.76	PRAP	
Osova Sterly Ubimo	1,119	3.55	IND	
Terence Ofa Sigagu	1,066	3.38	IND	
Rasol Maso Kuta	885	2.81	IND	
James Ometa Kia	848	2.69	IND	
Johnson Letepa Hodimi	782	2.48	IND	
Kavara Delson Kuta	712	2.26	MLP	
Linix Anaigi Ikiwari	678	2.15	IND	
Ongka'a Vincent Sa'a	668	2.12	IND	
Vadamo Badamo Ario	534	1.70	IND	
Bayau Biyo Malie	529	1.68	IND	
Thomas Ameri	484	1.54	IND	
Esther Fakii Awasano	465	1.48	PAP	
Robert Hude Osa	430	1.37	IND	
Kaltava Tairen Asigi	384	1.22	IND	
Sori Kuroiba	288	0.91	IND	
Wingke John More	264	0.84	IND	
Joe Kamata	184	0.58	NA	
Iso Morabo Horahobu	149	0.47	IND	
Abe Wainama	140	0.44	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**31,404**	99.72		
Informal	**89**	0.28		
Total	**31,493**	100.00		
UNGGAI-BENA OPEN ELECTORATE				
Be Damson Yune Lafana	**1,731**	**6.98**	**IND**	**30/6/97**
Kiatro Ottao Abisinito	1,625	6.56	IND	
Kevin Masive	1,554	6.27	PPP	
Tom Wanga Moliki	1,460	5.89	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Iffysoe Segeyaro	1,273	5.14	IND	
Kapi Sarohafa	1,039	4.19	IND	
Emmanuel Kange	979	3.95	NA	
Makeyu Lekesavi	820	3.31	PP	
Abe Kanakoe	717	2.89	IND	
Rissa Sagifa	686	2.77	IND	
John Nukifa Mipo	644	2.60	PDM	
Peter Korimbo	639	2.58	IND	
Philip Stagg	582	2.35	IND	
Javi Kioso Yaga	576	2.32	IND	
Malo Kiniafa	565	2.28	IND	
Kemerepa Fureme Bisesea	557	2.25	CCP	
Siri Alex Kuta	546	2.20	IND	
Bibi Giko	545	2.20	PRAP	
Lombuna Ungere Umanda	529	2.13	IND	
Kohitete Kemiepa	518	2.09	IND	
Tau Tute Farokave	514	2.07	IND	
Babehue Yabi Lesa	457	1.84	IND	
Sam Jemkol Okopila	454	1.83	IND	
Allen Micklary Oiyoba	400	1.61	IND	
Gibson Thomas	396	1.60	IND	
Mineva Pohonu	392	1.58	IND	
Tebani Tisah Onopika	373	1.50	CDP	
Stanley Iroriga Anis	352	1.42	IND	
James Melegepa	346	1.40	IND	
Willy Kagubifa Tunama	310	1.25	IND	
Jim Aroven Karo	308	1.24	IND	
Bono Fiya	296	1.19	IND	
Ken Siugue Pikuli	289	1.17	IND	
Paul Monama Bebe	285	1.15	PAP	
Torosan Billy Laganaso	273	1.10	IND	
Itovo Zamzai Haki	254	1.02	PUP	
Arinaso Steven	228	0.92	IND	
Stanly Tulip Bunesito	218	0.88	IND	
Ms. Annis Jerry Malamamo	180	0.73	IND	
Akame Tunama	154	0.62	IND	
Ms. Dinare Dekay Luru	153	0.62	IND	
Fred Jogu Sese	142	0.57	IND	
Ms. Paulina Yagrowe Siop	132	0.53	IND	
Jeff Baiyer Seteme	131	0.53	IND	
Kesufa Niko Amiso	105	0.42	MGA	
Ms. Daisy Meriam Openefa	62	0.25	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**24,789**	100.00		
Informal	**1**	0.00		
Total	**24,790**	100.00		
ENGA PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE				
Peter Ipatas (Tapi)	**50,806**	**26.67**	**IND**	**6/7/97**
Mathew Parep	24,913	13.08	IND	
Enga Anderson Aipit	19,972	10.48	NA	
Stanley Sanis Kaka	19,337	10.15	IND	
Pyapin Rimbink Pato	17,931	9.41	UP	
Samson K. Amean	13,391	7.03	IND	
Malipin Joe Tomerop Tenge	11,624	6.10	IND	
George Sauwane Yapao	6,816	3.58	PRAP	
Win Wilfred Moses	5,328	2.80	IND	
Tom Amaiu	4,472	2.35	IND	
Danley Yandala Tindiwi	3,167	1.66	IND	
David Lambu	3,096	1.63	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Enda Kathy Kakarya	2,619	1.37	IND	
Smith Mara Ale Andakane	1,962	1.03	IND	
Nixon Mangape Koeka	1,721	0.90	IND	
Itokon Kela Malob	790	0.41	IND	
James Tengen	724	0.38	PAP	
Jack Wass	667	0.35	IND	
Jerry Warun	323	0.17	PPP	
Kaekin Pupu Maeokali	18	0.01	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**189,677**	99.56		
Informal	**838**	0.44		
Total	**190,515**	100.00		
KANDEP OPEN ELECTORATE				
Jimson Sauk Papak	**8,347**	**30.38**	**PPP**	**5/7/97**
Don Pomb Pullie Polye	7,155	26.04	IND	
Sam Samaro K. Lau	4,764	17.34	IND	
Daniel Kumbon	2,473	9.00	NA	
Mack Perao Pole	1,194	4.35	UP	
Robin Kurum Aipi	1,019	3.71	UP	
Kennedy Isack Kandanyato	1,006	3.66	IND	
Kambia Toli Kuni	685	2.49	UP	
James Tubin Akalyanda	632	2.30	IND	
Dennis Nenewe Kai	86	0.31	PRAP	
R. Pora Para Tigi	69	0.25	IND	
George Kupin Yamala	5	0.02	UP	
Peter Muli Kongali	2	0.01	UP	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**27,437**	99.85		
Informal	**41**	0.15		
Total	**27,478**	100.00		

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
KOMPIAM-AMBUM OPEN ELECTORATE				
John Thomas Pundari	**8,780**	**20.09**	**IND**	**5/7/97**
Kilyali Kelly Kalit	5,123	11.72	IND	
Dickson Masa Maki	4,711	10.78	UP	
Peter Komiti Wali Tabuaka	3,565	8.16	UP	
Mark Yapao	2,696	6.17	IND	
Mana Pakea	2,280	5.22	IND	
Cornelius Kakale	2,161	4.94	IND	
Timakin Rockie Nekuli	2,100	4.80	IND	
Jeffery Arlo Siki	2,011	4.60	IND	
Andrew Pepelyane	1,790	4.10	IND	
Cornelius Kunuman	1,270	2.91	IND	
Joseph Saa Timakali	1,178	2.70	IND	
Liyol Leiogaip	1,149	2.63	IND	
Jacob Luke	1,091	2.50	IND	
Kennett Alo Iki	1,078	2.47	IND	
Micheal Mangal	1,047	2.40	IND	
Yakan John Yombon	548	1.25	NA	
Pinai Paul Amaiu	409	0.94	IND	
Nicholas Nale	242	0.55	IND	
David Alowale	176	0.40	IND	
John Pyaki	138	0.32	IND	
Louis Lakaki Yoko	19	0.04	IND	
Roland Arlo	13	0.03	PAP	
Mark Mendai	1	0.00	UP	
Tit Kararo Yongapen	1	0.00	IND	
Bleekee Balakau	0	0.00	UP	
Yuanis Mairagen Yapaini	0	0.00	IND	
Yandasingi Peter Nupi	0	0.00	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**43,577**	99.70		
Informal	**132**	0.30		
Total	**43,709**	100.00		
LAGAIP-PORGERA OPEN ELECTORATE				
Ipan Opis Papo	**6,304**	**9.10**	**PRAP**	**5/7/97**
Anton Aiala Pakena	4,568	6.59	PDM	
Kandaso Napi	4,439	6.41	PP	
Patrick Nasa	4,278	6.18	IND	
Yanis Polopa	3,490	5.04	IND	
Tia Andrew Wapalin	3,476	5.02	IND	
Ipayan Kensary Lawaipa	2,934	4.24	UP	
Nathan Piari	2,743	3.96	IND	
Mamando Pain	2,673	3.86	IND	
Nete Moses Mondowa	2,600	3.75	IND	
Yalipin Lucas	2,428	3.51	UP	
Paul Kandakasi	2,422	3.50	IND	
Vincent Poropis Kala	2,385	3.44	IND	
Jonathan Mangope Paraia	2,375	3.43	IND	
Jack Kundi Amu	2,338	3.38	PAP	
Philip Kapus Kikala	2,188	3.16	IND	
Ipo Yapu	2,125	3.07	UP	
Yesu Kulina Mamuni	2,091	3.02	IND	
Tamangale Andrew Pialan	1,381	1.99	IND	
Luso Lolan	1,376	1.99	IND	
Luther Iki	1,328	1.92	IND	
Joe Kandai	1,310	1.89	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Godfrey Indiakal Waip	1,007	1.45	IND	
Kevin Tapala	944	1.36	IND	
Clement Michael	928	1.34	IND	
Paul Paken Torato	838	1.21	UP	
Kipul Yanda Miukin Yami	766	1.11	IND	
Kakas Aindakan Miukin	727	1.05	NA	
Laisen Johnson Sakate	528	0.76	IND	
Gori Paim	515	0.74	IND	
Biknas Benson Sakarao	381	0.55	IND	
Kambi Charles Tipi	297	0.43	IND	
Moses Peter Pyale	291	0.42	IND	
Peter Nakau	127	0.18	IND	
John Pess Poio	105	0.15	IND	
Kandio Ben Lemben	94	0.14	IND	
Tia Paul Pondo	57	0.08	IND	
Ben Malak Sima Putu	50	0.07	IND	
Mack Ponoso	45	0.06	IND	
Sagi Lasen	19	0.03	IND	
Nelson Ne'e Kitungu	9	0.01	IND	
Jack Itai Tokala	4	0.01	IND	
Daniel Waikali	3	0.00	IND	
Koki Saka Kaiman	2	0.00	IND	
Panda Mark Erephan	1	0.00	IND	
Menboi Enjalas Kis	1	0.00	IND	
Bilson Isai	1	0.00	IND	
Wasa Amu	0	0.00	IND	
Bill Kuro Kuala	0	0.00	IND	
Kunalin Sakis Tindipa	0	0.00	IND	
Noah Angara	0	0.00	IND	
Nome Michael Ala	0	0.00	IND	
Ned Jack Lakari	0	0.00	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**68,992**	99.60		
Informal	**276**	0.40		
Total	**69,268**	100.00		
WABAG OPEN ELECTORATE				
Takai Kapi	**7,244**	**17.91**	**PDM**	**5/7/97**
Daniel Don Kapi	4,307	10.65	IND	
Martin Yalangu Tokapae	3,821	9.45	IND	
Kelly Wak Aiyok	3,666	9.07	IND	
Albert Ango Kipalan	3,322	8.21	PPP	
Luke Kembol	3,260	8.06	CDP	
Jacob Yakali	2,640	6.53	IND	
Paul Nili	2,117	5.24	PP	
Pis Pone	1,485	3.67	PAP	
Romane Yangomina	1,444	3.57	IND	
John Mapusa	1,422	3.52	IND	
Samuel Tei Abal	1,313	3.25	IND	
Gideon Seth Timinao	1,120	2.77	IND	
Salan Ere	1,118	2.76	IND	
Maso M. Samai	711	1.76	IND	
Jemis Yapalin Kandato	612	1.51	IND	
Micheal Yuni Yalo	411	1.02	IND	
John Yali	229	0.57	IND	
Komo K. Kyangali	84	0.21	IND	
Mathew Turner	1	0.00	NA	
Jackson Pospai Keso Perano	1	0.00	UP	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**40,328**	99.73		
Informal	**111**	0.27		
Total	**40,439**	100.00		
WAPENAMANDA OPEN ELECTORATE				
Masket Gabriel Iangalio	**4,912**	**18.21**	**NA**	**5/7/97**
Yangaukin Miki Kaeok	4,629	17.16	PAP	
Gary Beto Mark	3,829	14.20	IND	
Timmy Timil Arete	2,529	9.38	IND	
Taskin Kanute Rambio	2,494	9.25	IND	
Ronald Rimbao	2,386	8.85	PDM	
John Umbu Pupu	2,197	8.14	IND	
Saka Watao Kale	1,759	6.52	IND	
Wauni Wasi Ranyeta	1,235	4.58	IND	
Pato Kakaraya	302	1.12	PP	
Arom Ponde	255	0.95	PPP	
Paul Keeting Makao	188	0.70	IND	
Kewaop Jacob Parao	185	0.69	IND	
Michael Yangao Yai Pupu	4	0.01	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**26,904**	99.74		
Informal	**70**	0.26		
Total	**26,974**	100.00		
GULF PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE				
Christopher Seseve Haiveta	**8,010**	**21.45**	**PP**	**5/7/97**
Lesley Mark	4,623	12.38	IND	
Samuel Yuwi Kamiaeto	4,449	11.91	PNC	
Akia Kairi	2,888	7.73	IND	
Sarea Soi	2,822	7.56	PRAP	
Jacob Kairi	2,514	6.73	NA	
Ope Oeaka	1,709	4.58	PAP	
Daniel Kake Meara	1,409	3.77	IND	
Marcellus Tiomdi Winaio	1,383	3.70	PAP	
Lemek Kum	1,228	3.29	IND	
Lama Haia	1,018	2.73	IND	
Amos Toua	1,010	2.70	IND	
Gerard Avea Malaha	984	2.64	IND	
Soloi Hareavila	969	2.60	IND	
Albert Mairi Hailai	728	1.95	PDM	
Jack Loho Mokoko Susu	656	1.76	IND	
Dominic Evere	436	1.17	MAP	
Donald Aiseapo	315	0.84	IND	
Gabriel Karahure	180	0.48	CDP	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**37,331**	99.98		
Informal	**9**	0.02		
Total	**37,340**	100.00		
KEREMA OPEN ELECTORATE				
Sir. Tom Koraea	**2,139**	**9.16**	**PP**	**5/7/97**
Richard Opai Mendani	1,860	7.96	IND	
Ekis Ropenu	1,579	6.76	IND	
Elizah Songavara	1,364	5.84	IND	
Dominic Paulus Barnabas	1,056	4.52	IND	
Sari Maso	985	4.22	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Vincent Eka	959	4.10	PPP	
Karava Haiveta	937	4.01	MAP	
Robert Hora Maera	850	3.64	IND	
Fred Airi	684	2.93	PPP	
Eddie Moses	669	2.86	IND	
Toape Loki Ivora	651	2.79	IND	
Richard Waive	636	2.72	IND	
Jim Mainoni	625	2.68	IND	
Samuel Miaea	580	2.48	IND	
Joe Maroa	531	2.27	IND	
Mewangi Nares	518	2.22	IND	
Ovaiasu Koete	483	2.07	IND	
Joseph Mangabi	426	1.82	IND	
George Lavari	421	1.80	IND	
Sepoe Karava	381	1.63	IND	
Poksy Pokara Orake	363	1.55	IND	
Raphael T. Banakato	345	1.48	IND	
Chris Hova	336	1.44	PAP	
Hao Keko	326	1.40	IND	
Kave Eka	321	1.37	IND	
Pou Toivita	320	1.37	IND	
Susuve Samuel Turia	314	1.34	IND	
Richard Toivita Karahure	314	1.34	IND	
Emmanuel Hela	286	1.22	IND	
Jack Kausu Aipi	277	1.19	IND	
Kure Siviri	225	0.96	MLP	
Michael Maravila	210	0.90	IND	
Koraea Kapera	199	0.85	IND	
Susuve Ikui-Akara Laumaea	191	0.82	NA	
Daniel Itu	186	0.80	PDM	
Tony Feuu Torea	152	0.65	IND	
David Lari Oaseoka	105	0.45	IND	
Phillip Susuve Hui	103	0.44	IND	
John Tipua Poha	82	0.35	IND	
Francis K. Evorea	74	0.32	IND	
Posa Malara	48	0.21	IND	
Eka Savoa	36	0.15	IND	
Jack Paito	10	0.04	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**23,157**	99.12		
Informal	**206**	0.88		
Total	**23,363**	100.00		
KIKORI OPEN ELECTORATE				
Kimave Riddler Dorobe	**2,317**	**15.76**	**PP**	**3/7/97**
Evara Horepa	1,865	12.69	PAP	
Philip Taudevin	1,764	12.00	IND	
Maipakai Mark	1,663	11.31	IND	
Hahare Harry Hulamari	1,285	8.74	IND	
Marai Allan Ebu	826	5.62	PNC	
Michael Homu Haure	639	4.35	IND	
Dennis Hulape Hauka	633	4.31	IND	
Aua Roy Evara	491	3.34	IND	
Samai Soba	452	3.08	IND	
Peter Koiviapa	442	3.01	IND	
Paul Ivape	339	2.31	PDM	
Nathan Baike	312	2.12	IND	
Aitari Huaupe	303	2.06	MAP	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Romeo Meae Haroavila	300	2.04	IND	
Kuriki Haelakore	299	2.03	IND	
Edwin Aika Hamora	174	1.18	IND	
Kiki M. Hereva	144	0.98	IND	
Peter Ove	69	0.47	IND	
Evara Rurupu	60	0.41	MLP	
Samuel Kaii	59	0.40	IND	
Tony Ila	41	0.28	IND	
Upi-A Haro Aeake	37	0.25	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	14,514	98.74		
Informal	185	1.26		
Total	**14,699**	100.00		
MADANG PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE				
Jim Kas	**44,904**	**36.36**	**IND**	**4/7/97**
Peter Barter	38,219	30.95	IND	
Zebedee Jabri Kalup	16,762	13.57	PP	
Michael Tataki	10,069	8.15	IND	
Benjamin Mathews	4,590	3.72	IND	
Peter Kaimu	3,588	2.91	IND	
Peter Jiki	2,970	2.41	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**121,102**	98.07		
Informal	**2,388**	1.93		
Total	**123,490**	100.00		
BOGIA OPEN ELECTORATE				
Bernard Mollok	**2,680**	**13.91**	**IND**	**2/7/97**
Dr Phillip Ururu Basse	1,984	10.30	NA	
Andrew Ariako	1,940	10.07	IND	
Arnold Ono Mambura	1,719	8.92	IND	
Tony Sauba	1,608	8.35	IND	
Joe Viaken	1,254	6.51	PPP	
John Tongri Hickey	1,161	6.03	IND	
Tom Kumana	1,113	5.78	IND	
Roger Raveko Meckpi	1,057	5.49	IND	
John Kirakar	945	4.90	MAP	
John Kosi Wiani	915	4.75	PP	
Clemence Silari	860	4.46	PUP	
Tim Ward (Junior)	679	3.52	PDM	
David Natikin Mullul	563	2.92	PPP	
Felix Bau	319	1.66	PP	
Pius Amani	121	0.63	IND	
Anton Dimbar	87	0.45	IND	
Anton Johanes Kapui	33	0.17	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**19,038**	98.81		
Informal	**230**	1.19		
Total	**19,268**	100.00		

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
MADANG OPEN ELECTORATE				
Jacob Wama	**2,232**	**9.66**	**IND**	**30/6/97**
Katherine Mal	2,119	9.17	IND	
Wesley Sanarup Jogamup	1,874	8.11	IND	
Stanley Pil	1,708	7.39	PDM	
Dr Salam Malagun	1,541	6.67	PAP	
Florian Sawan Bahin	1,222	5.29	IND	
Sanol Malaga	925	4.00	PUP	
John Buri	905	3.92	NA	
Peter Pabene	868	3.76	IND	
Paul Bubura	809	3.50	IND	
Paul Kamod	655	2.83	PP	
Mathew Begg Saul	654	2.83	IND	
Charlie (Sali) Kramer	652	2.82	IND	
Alos Yagas	620	2.68	IND	
John Opan	611	2.64	IND	
Amele Imalal	604	2.61	IND	
Jerry Mark	562	2.43	IND	
Robert Hosea Kalasim	513	2.22	IND	
Makusia Max Dowal	422	1.83	IND	
Henry Warawai	378	1.64	IND	
Taba Silau	338	1.46	IND	
Philip Damon	321	1.39	IND	
Simon Seeto	318	1.38	IND	
Patrick Angus	275	1.19	IND	
Johndick Gunash	270	1.17	PP	
Henry Kambuka	256	1.11	IND	
Nakun Pipoi	209	0.90	IND	
Cosmas Bigol Mahop	198	0.86	IND	
Danny Klink	184	0.80	IND	
Tom Gande	166	0.72	IND	
Rose K. Sigma	127	0.55	IND	
Sir Angmai Bilas	123	0.53	IND	
Eric Isama Olawo	111	0.48	IND	
Ben Gulaika	48	0.21	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**22,818**	98.72		
Informal	**295**	1.28		
Total	**23,113**	100.00		
MIDDLE RAMU OPEN ELECTORATE				
Assik Tommy Tomscoll	**4,258**	**18.55**	**IND**	**4/7/97**
Godfried Oringawai Andupa	2,434	10.60	MAP	
Michael Mimpi	2,290	9.98	IND	
Ben Semri	2,238	9.75	IND	
Jamure Magin Minar	1,920	8.37	IND	
Solomon Ambro	1,751	7.63	IND	
Henry Simbai Yei	1,513	6.59	IND	
Malachai Nol	1,200	5.23	IND	
Abraham Alau Tingin	858	3.74	PPP	
Isidor Nonori	751	3.27	IND	
Nick Kajpis Yari	730	3.18	PP	
Jacob W. Quininge	608	2.65	IND	
Dominic Avamor	604	2.63	IND	
James Yakip	448	1.95	IND	
Joseph Kora Sipa	329	1.43	IND	
Charles Boi Polis	291	1.27	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Peter Kaigen	289	1.26	IND	
Jerry Didi Mamuk	230	1.00	IND	
Daniel Martin	92	0.40	IND	
Stafford Mangon	48	0.21	IND	
John David Tevenuk	7	0.03	IND	
Frank Aisap	6	0.03	PAP	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**22,895**	99.75		
Informal	**57**	0.25		
Total	**22,952**	100.00		
RAI COAST OPEN ELECTORATE				
Stahl Musa	**4,229**	**20.15**	**PAP**	**2/7/97**
James Yali	3,270	15.58	NA	
Samuel Pariwa	2,164	10.31	PP	
Henry Malompi Bayema	1,825	8.70	PUP	
Hongke Ende	1,465	6.98	IND	
Niuro Toko Sapia	1,185	5.65	IND	
Peter Atat Nombo	1,014	4.83	IND	
Thomas Maito	888	4.23	MAP	
Nathan Simbungo Koti	845	4.03	IND	
Nambera Gau	781	3.72	PDM	
Marcus Kawo	708	3.37	PPP	
Gusa Mowo	624	2.97	IND	
Amili Deide Sopi	522	2.49	IND	
Mengai Kombei	362	1.72	IND	
Yeske Gendiro	362	1.72	IND	
Felix Joseph Nambeng	295	1.41	IND	
Mathias Sann Sangabu	169	0.81	IND	
John Baptist Poe	124	0.59	IND	
John Irosa	51	0.24	CDP	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**20,883**	99.49		
Informal	**106**	0.51		
Total	**20,989**	100.00		
SUMKAR OPEN ELECTORATE				
Mathew Gubag	**5,758**	**28.46**	**PP**	**2/7/97**
Peter Yama	5,015	24.79	PPP	
Henry Komin Kabug	2,357	11.65	PP	
Steven Kedo Nambon	1,898	9.38	IND	
Gileng Kambar	1,275	6.30	IND	
Michael Baduk	1,222	6.04	NA	
Mathew S. Walang	778	3.85	IND	
Awak Kavailon	542	2.68	IND	
Jerry Bugaeg Kaurab	368	1.82	IND	
Wolfram Marangui	299	1.48	IND	
Alphonse Wogem	264	1.30	IND	
Terry Sibanganei	160	0.79	PUP	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**19,936**	98.54		
Informal	**295**	1.46		
Total	**20,231**	100.00		

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
USINO BUNDI OPEN ELECTORATE				
George Wan	**1,775**	**11.43**	**PPP**	**1/7/97**
Anton Francis Yagama	1,171	7.54	IND	
Joe Yapoi Yama	1,049	6.76	IND	
Pikama Bais	988	6.36	IND	
Elijah Kass	945	6.09	MAP	
Samson Kuli Malcolm	909	5.85	PUP	
Kondy Marex Marika	888	5.72	IND	
Michael Yarap	678	4.37	MAP	
John Bare	656	4.23	CDP	
John Asse Mikauri	595	3.83	IND	
Agnes Murua Mulivoa	588	3.79	NA	
Saking Kiruak	587	3.78	IND	
Jack Tulia	540	3.48	PAP	
Yome Fred Maliupa	497	3.20	IND	
James Tiki Timbo	455	2.93	IND	
Eddy Utu Toure	426	2.74	PP	
Igurua Dorea	353	2.27	IND	
Peter Tuma	349	2.25	IND	
Indap Kuna	329	2.12	IND	
Michael Tongia	255	1.64	IND	
Laki Homate	255	1.64	IND	
Joseph Seke	206	1.33	IND	
Finto Sinok	197	1.27	PDM	
Kepas Mote	177	1.14	IND	
Kiap Greg Tuma	162	1.04	IND	
Walep H. Ibram	147	0.95	IND	
Walter Bayer Parau	129	0.83	IND	
Charlie Kolie Non	68	0.44	IND	
Homei Tinawi	66	0.43	IND	
Peter Koifu	23	0.15	IND	
Amath Sikai Wan	7	0.05	IND	
Tedor Tuya	6	0.04	PP	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**15,476**	99.68		
Informal	**50**	0.32		
Total	**15,526**	100.00		
MANUS PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE				
Stephen P. Pokawin	**9,870**	**57.68**	**MGA**	**22/6/97**
Arnold Marsipal	4,495	26.27	PP	
Lemek Kuku	1,390	8.12	IND	
John Tommy Ndrohas	615	3.59	IND	
Paliau Bernard	558	3.26	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**16,928**	98.92		
Informal	**185**	1.08		
Total	**17,113**	100.00		
MANUS OPEN ELECTORATE				
Charlie Benjamin	**3,287**	**19.83**	**IND**	**23/6/97**
Memel Pohei	2,284	13.78	IND	
Caleb Kolowan	1,856	11.20	MAP	
Danny Simeku	1,802	10.87	IND	
James Pokasui	1,101	6.64	IND	
Malai Momak	1,049	6.33	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Nahau Kambuou Rooney	1,009	6.09	IND	
Michael P. Kuweh	1,005	6.06	IND	
Paul B. Songo	764	4.61	IND	
Paliau Lukas	548	3.31	IND	
Robert Bond Keller	547	3.30	IND	
Francis Popau Posanau	456	2.75	IND	
Kisapai Kutan	343	2.07	IND	
Daniel Sijam	279	1.68	IND	
Francis Polapoi Lokes	137	0.83	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**16,467**	99.35		
Informal	**108**	0.65		
Total	**16,575**	100.00		
MILNE BAY PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE				
Josephne M. Abaijah	**15,145**	**22.53**	**IND**	**2/7/97**
John Luke Crittin	14,247	21.19	IND	
Timothy P. Neville	13,160	19.58	PDM	
Navy Aule	6,102	9.08	IND	
Mesia Novau	4,455	6.63	PAP	
Tovesei Toboeta	3,653	5.43	IND	
Kevin Kaidoga	3,625	5.39	PP	
Kaidama Elliott	2,916	4.34	IND	
Kevin Yabara	2,239	3.33	IND	
William Tilipu	728	1.08	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**66,270**	98.59		
Informal	**949**	1.41		
Total	**67,219**	100.00		
ALOTAU OPEN ELECTORATE				
Iairo Lasaro	**3,033**	**15.45**	**PDM**	**1/7/97**
Gerald Lage Senapili	2,223	11.32	IND	
David Nipuega	1,335	6.80	PAP	
Elizah Galeb Digwaleu	1,274	6.49	PP	
John Penrose	1,235	6.29	IND	
Humphrey Yabusiwa	1,215	6.19	IND	
Henry Mariota	1,210	6.16	IND	
John Kaniku	1,160	5.91	IND	
Livingston Jellico	1,073	5.47	IND	
Eleina Butuna	675	3.44	IND	
John Mogawa	655	3.34	MBP	
Moses David	512	2.61	MBP	
Watson Bernard	506	2.58	IND	
Cliff Dararugu	442	2.25	IND	
Dodoa Taylor George	430	2.19	IND	
Francis P. Diala	429	2.19	MBP	
Matilda May Pilacapio	423	2.15	UP	
Noel Simaga	374	1.91	IND	
Simeon Kibikibi	317	1.61	IND	
Andrew Kape	289	1.47	IND	
Daniel Tokabu Banige	264	1.34	IND	
Bernard Tapiedi Kuheia	251	1.28	MBP	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**19,325**	98.44		
Informal	**306**	1.56		
Total	**19,631**	100.00		

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
ESA'ALA OPEN ELECTORATE				
John Kanadi	**1,809**	**13.45**	**PPP**	**1/7/97**
Jeffrey Tolo'ube	1,676	12.46	PAP	
Rev. Oala Baru Arua	1,483	11.03	IND	
Johnson Maladina	896	6.66	MBP	
Simoto Deilala	704	5.24	PRAP	
Lindsay Iko Dawageia	690	5.13	IND	
Vincent Amole	545	4.05	PDM	
John Yareki Golom	534	3.97	IND	
Damien Bobole	528	3.93	IND	
Maiyosi Justin	471	3.50	NA	
Jones Liosi	455	3.38	MBP	
Mickey Masiana	446	3.32	IND	
Napoleon Kaemala	413	3.07	IND	
Margaret Galama Bagita	406	3.02	IND	
Pilikesa Manimua	377	2.80	IND	
Kesipik Millar	357	2.66	IND	
Sipelia Lemeki	351	2.61	IND	
Sydney Kulupi	268	1.99	IND	
Bernard Baloiloi	254	1.89	IND	
Mark Kibobona Banasi	198	1.47	IND	
Lester Mwaidoyani Simulabi	185	1.38	IND	
Stanley Donald Kisiani	161	1.20	IND	
Ephraim Wilson Iogalu	93	0.69	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**13,300**	98.91		
Informal	**146**	1.09		
Total	**13,446**	100.00		
KIRIWINA-GOODENOUGH OPEN ELECTORATE				
William Moyola Ebenosi	**2,356**	**14.64**	**PNC**	**30/6/97**
Gregory Adioufu Binoka	2,015	12.52	IND	
Steven Pilolu Misa	1,814	11.27	IND	
Beona Gerald Motawiya	1,662	10.33	PP	
Lindsay Gideon	1,434	8.91	IND	
Billy Inafala	1,407	8.75	MBP	
Henry Sikwayobu	1,165	7.24	IND	
Kaigabu Kamnanaya	1,132	7.04	PAP	
Nason Kapwarita Lepani	804	5.00	PDM	
Gerry Yowana Tokilivila	683	4.25	IND	
Mowana Mikes Ugwalubu	447	2.78	IND	
Aiden Moliola	298	1.85	PPP	
Kaliton Sali	259	1.61	IND	
Alexander Sefala	192	1.19	MBP	
Molivegai James Kilileu	156	0.97	IND	
Damien Luwaveka Modobala	100	0.62	IND	
Brian Pulayasi	10	0.06	PAP	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**15,934**	99.04		
Informal	**155**	0.96		
Total	**16,089**	100.00		

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
SAMARAI-MURUA OPEN ELECTORATE				
Titus Philemon Gwa	**3,147**	**20.18**	**PPP**	**2/7/97**
Solomon Paulisbo	1,980	12.70	IND	
Jacob Talia Lemeki	1,600	10.26	IND	
Jerry Miller	1,319	8.46	IND	
Gordon Wesley	1,232	7.90	MBP	
Israel Edoni	1,037	6.65	IND	
Hesaboda David Livingston	1,033	6.62	IND	
Manaroi Olupa	889	5.70	PAP	
Titius Ghaade Tilly	810	5.19	IND	
Vasu K. Moabi	732	4.69	MBP	
Diba Samano	731	4.69	IND	
Dominc Kasimah	414	2.65	IND	
David Morona	199	1.28	IND	
Esekaia Lakemba Ilai	149	0.96	IND	
Dr. Benjamin D. Taukuro	136	0.87	IND	
Bakaya Hedwig Leko	60	0.38	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**15,468**	99.18		
Informal	**128**	0.82		
Total	**15,596**	100.00		
MOROBE PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE				
Luther Akisawa Wenge	**45,793**	**27.58**	**IND**	**4/7/97**
Benson Saip Suwang	25,710	15.48	NA	
Mathew Bendumb	15,406	9.28	IND	
Jerry Kasip Nalau	12,078	7.27	PP	
A'aron Meya	8,964	5.40	IND	
Assaiya T. Ronald	8,941	5.38	IND	
Jonathan Kapu Soten	6,709	4.04	PPP	
Morokoi Jaotowa Gaiwata	4,997	3.01	IND	
Nangaring Micnebac Bapi	4,798	2.89	IND	
Jasper Akick Qate	3,971	2.39	IND	
James Ibras	3,736	2.25	IND	
Johnny Banzak	3,624	2.18	IND	
Jack Bukwa	3,494	2.10	CDP	
Riggo Nangan	3,294	1.98	IND	
Aliyame M. Vauri	2,760	1.66	IND	
Anton Yama	2,402	1.45	IND	
Kass Newman	2,305	1.39	MAP	
Ben Martin	2,221	1.34	IND	
Ben Garry	1,626	0.98	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**162,829**	98.07		
Informal	**3,207**	1.93		
Total	**166,036**	100.00		
BULOLO OPEN ELECTORATE				
Samson Chris Napo	**3,653**	**14.91**	**PP**	
John Muingnepe	3,094	12.63	IND	
Titi Christian	2,316	9.45	NA	
Yakam Bom	1,741	7.11	IND	
Luke Kewo	1,233	5.03	IND	
Daan Marc Jeru	1,171	4.78	IND	
Yansom Loplam	1,049	4.28	IND	
Pisau Amua	1,001	4.09	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
William Yak (Willie)	851	3.47	IND	
Lenny Tenny Yeapuo	848	3.46	IND	
Ketombing Bong	816	3.33	IND	
Sopa Mon Kiputung Steven	594	2.42	IND	
Samuel Manoah	558	2.28	PAP	
Yawing Kawalibu	509	2.08	IND	
Eric Yawing Eremugo	452	1.84	IND	
Tae Ila	384	1.57	IND	
Baroa Avi Semoi	359	1.47	IND	
Isalio Simion	358	1.46	IND	
Tiriec Whyong Nangi	328	1.34	IND	
Anonga Yakesing	310	1.27	IND	
Ananas Wanio	274	1.12	IND	
Giu Gwambek	240	0.98	IND	
Helen Yatapsa Tukwund	230	0.94	IND	
Pondros Homano	225	0.92	IND	
Meteyam Ruben	224	0.91	IND	
Polipa Titama Asaiah	205	0.84	IND	
Toby Garaba	201	0.82	IND	
Yatu Anis	180	0.73	IND	
Jeffrey Kipi Molokas	178	0.73	MGA	
Donald Dani Donasu	177	0.72	IND	
Gelimbing Yapleh	169	0.69	IND	
James Angkas	159	0.65	IND	
Kelly (Poe) Yawip	96	0.39	CDP	
Terence Kaindi	54	0.22	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**24,237**	98.93		
Informal	**263**	1.07		
Total	**24,500**	100.00		
FINSCHHAFEN OPEN ELECTORATE				
Yaip Avini	**1,367**	**7.58**	**PPP**	**30/6/97**
Alfred Pogo	1,271	7.05	PAP	
Russel Gore Theo	1,263	7.00	MAP	
Sane Gao	1,079	5.98	UP	
Jenny V. Oberong	921	5.11	IND	
Sobu Waviong	915	5.07	IND	
Huwee W. Mittie	866	4.80	NA	
Lotongia Romoke	851	4.72	IND	
Jimbango Rias Soctine	849	4.71	IND	
Daniel Hebamu Lingnoge	792	4.39	PUP	
Henry B. Dungao	723	4.01	IND	
Stephen A. Mesa Negotami	609	3.38	IND	
Kapping Isong	608	3.37	IND	
Mark Surung Riwadong	597	3.31	IND	
Musalu Geamec	510	2.83	IND	
Fungkenang Mufanuc	504	2.80	IND	
Bami Sorekeyne	497	2.76	IND	
Wotes Rodney Katiwa	483	2.68	IND	
Jeffrey Masayang	408	2.26	IND	
Manasseh Hans Hayang	387	2.15	IND	
Sam Sanangkeoc	368	2.04	PP	
Terry G. Miaka	318	1.76	IND	
Kotty Bationg Okawiong	295	1.64	IND	
Tikes Agewong Rakey	226	1.25	IND	
Yomas Dosung	224	1.24	IND	
S. Inus Lelenga	181	1.00	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Stanley S. Isome	167	0.93	IND	
Wenambi Siawong	140	0.78	IND	
Hedi Hesingut	118	0.65	PAP	
Robert Williong	99	0.55	IND	
Komawang Amo Jambunkec	87	0.48	IND	
David Etiric	87	0.48	IND	
Akesingkec Gepung Qanggengnuc	38	0.21	PDM	
Bafinu Fuseo Demo	36	0.20	IND	
Kem Henu Hesingut	21	0.12	IND	
Ken Aniong	18	0.10	IND	
Kent Paty	6	0.03	IND	
Wentey O. Qemang	DECEASED	0.00	IND	
Wentey Oraing Qemang Nominated On 12/4/97 And Died On 3/5/97.				
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**17,929**	99.44		
Informal	**101**	0.56		
Total	**18,030**	100.00		
HUON GULF OPEN ELECTORATE				
Tukape Masani	**3,783**	**18.66**	**PPP**	**2/7/97**
Joseph Tetang	2,385	11.76	IND	
Paul Kris Mantila	1,708	8.42	IND	
Peter Namus	1,596	7.87	PUP	
Jacob Sawanga	1,144	5.64	NA	
Kotoemo Tauye	921	4.54	IND	
Dr Dela Pokatou	878	4.33	IND	
Donny Gamu	749	3.69	PDM	
Kiliki Asunu	730	3.60	IND	
Maliaki Hiob	704	3.47	PP	
Levi Nasenom	546	2.69	IND	
Wally Mondo	478	2.36	MAP	
Jim Kipoi	455	2.24	IND	
John Anis	449	2.21	IND	
Kire Wapeya	439	2.16	IND	
John Gankach	330	1.63	IND	
John Gena	328	1.62	IND	
Robert Sanny	327	1.61	IND	
Greg Moias Apek	311	1.53	IND	
Kenny Sanai Gopase	284	1.40	IND	
Thomas Wanas	242	1.19	IND	
Elizah Yaling	241	1.19	IND	
Namun Nawason	197	0.97	IND	
Raunuwe Kitoria	163	0.80	PAP	
Kingsley Nime	162	0.80	IND	
Petrus Kumbang	142	0.70	IND	
Joseph Kawage	101	0.50	IND	
Eddie Maino	63	0.31	PDM	
Eric Kerengba Niwo	54	0.27	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**19,910**	98.19		
Informal	**368**	1.81		
Total	**20,278**	100.00		

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
KABWUM OPEN ELECTORATE				
Ginson Goheyu Saonu	**3,720**	**22.81**	**PPP**	**30/6/97**
Tom Horik	2,294	14.07	IND	
Patrick Basa	2,229	13.67	IND	
Bob Bofeng Dadae	1,629	9.99	UP	
Jimmy Ipmang Gosett	1,158	7.10	PP	
Mana Ginso	1,052	6.45	IND	
Hama Anga	913	5.60	NA	
Henzy Yakam	632	3.88	IND	
Mete Dongdong	604	3.70	PDM	
Zure Tudi	559	3.43	IND	
Genzie Kenza	540	3.31	CCP	
Geana Gawo	485	2.97	IND	
Joe Amungupo Wahazokac	444	2.72	IND	
Total Ballot	**16,259**	99.69		
Papers Allowed				
Informal	**50**	0.31		
Total	**16,309**	100.00		
LAE OPEN ELECTORATE				
Bart Philemon	**1,924**	**11.84**	**NA**	**22/6/97**
Mathew Minape	1,608	9.90	IND	
Paul Nayong Biram	1,507	9.28	IND	
Michael Badui	1,254	7.72	IND	
Garrett Kising	851	5.24	IND	
Seth Daniels	792	4.88	IND	
Paul Newan Nongour	739	4.55	IND	
Gabriel Eigavara	702	4.32	IND	
John Garap	664	4.09	IND	
Talas Ansua	538	3.31	CCP	
Bala Poiya	459	2.83	IND	
Kimbun Keindip	412	2.54	CDP	
Peter Davis Koringo	396	2.44	UP	
Benny Kazzai	386	2.38	IND	
Kalua Petawa	377	2.32	PP	
Russ Kaupa	375	2.31	IND	
Titus Wambun	327	2.01	PAP	
Thompson Benguma	293	1.80	IND	
Eric Neong	284	1.75	IND	
Ari Niel Baru	274	1.69	PP	
Benny Wamahasi	272	1.67	IND	
Enny Moaitz	248	1.53	PPP	
Dann (Daniel) Papoto	216	1.33	IND	
David K. Titus	203	1.25	IND	
Kevin Kasimbua	195	1.20	IND	
Ninits Elafoan	185	1.14	IND	
Miriam Yaike Songi	175	1.08	IND	
Biwa Getta	163	1.00	IND	
Milling Munziong	131	0.81	IND	
Asi Mamata Bagelo	118	0.73	IND	
Jonathan Saing	64	0.39	IND	
John Wesley	57	0.35	IND	
John Waing Banzani	36	0.22	IND	
James Popan	16	0.10	IND	
Total Ballot	**16,241**	99.97		
Papers Allowed				
Informal	**5**	0.03		
Total	**16,246**	100.00		

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
MARKHAM OPEN ELECTORATE				
Andrew Baing	**4,411**	**24.32**	**PPP**	**28/6/97**
Bange Bon	3,851	21.23	IND	
John Maran	1,600	8.82	PP	
Benjamin Gewebing	1,437	7.92	IND	
Nari Oscar Wamiang	1,010	5.57	IND	
Steven Was Fuako	953	5.25	IND	
Matap Embaku	936	5.16	IND	
James Rampugurun	890	4.91	IND	
Abraham Waiyum	688	3.79	NA	
Manuel Muga	657	3.62	IND	
Ben Jerry	577	3.18	MAP	
Peter Isan	464	2.56	IND	
Ruben Martin	442	2.44	IND	
Andrew Yafu	38	0.21	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**17,954**	98.98		
Informal	**185**	1.02		
Total	**18,139**	100.00		
MENYAMYA OPEN ELECTORATE				
Thomas N. Pelika	**5,383**	**27.13**	**IND**	**4/7/97**
Benjamin Philip	3,161	15.93	PPP	
Enoch (Yakuyakuli) Ulach	1,676	8.45	IND	
Weiyo Jora	1,401	7.06	IND	
Timothy Haki	1,004	5.06	IND	
Menos Ivango Ackrish	918	4.63	IND	
Chris Angkas	703	3.54	PAP	
Woponoko Kosamoko	656	3.31	IND	
Joram Watapai	642	3.24	MLP	
Zetro Sanis	640	3.23	IND	
Messiah K. Noia	608	3.06	IND	
Samson Kikalem	584	2.94	IND	
Bingtau Natiapango	424	2.14	IND	
Job Talau Tapapeuyo	419	2.11	IND	
Akita Enno	369	1.86	IND	
Alpias Yanikawo	307	1.55	PP	
Seth Jaru	255	1.29	IND	
Ismael Solomon	235	1.18	IND	
Saimon Maika	101	0.51	IND	
Timon Iwuko	59	0.30	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**19,545**	98.52		
Informal	**294**	1.48		
Total	**19,839**	100.00		
NAWAE OPEN ELECTORATE				
Kennedy Manziong Wenge	**1,381**	**7.29**	**IND**	**30/6/97**
Bataningke Wiap	1,203	6.35	IND	
Jackson Fontaneo Kwam	884	4.67	PP	
Mark Nanu	884	4.67	PAP	
Jack Keakop	795	4.20	IND	
Philip E. Gaman	776	4.10	IND	
Qointan Tusabi	764	4.03	IND	
Peleka Silingi	739	3.90	IND	
Mandon Timothy Idafit	726	3.83	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Peter Isaiah Tiba	714	3.77	PPP	
Jon B. Tupip	712	3.76	PAP	
Nadu Namun	645	3.41	IND	
Tim Bafenu	629	3.32	IND	
Baia Sindi	574	3.03	IND	
Lemson Lui Giransau	555	2.93	IND	
Amos Yamandi	548	2.89	PDM	
Urue Marie	542	2.86	IND	
Kabib Lamu	535	2.82	CDP	
Rex Okona	522	2.76	IND	
Paul M. Baundo	475	2.51	IND	
Sual Teine	463	2.44	IND	
Omba Poang	386	2.04	IND	
Gebob Bayu	372	1.96	IND	
Miring (Laukepe) Rumbam	364	1.92	IND	
Sissie Mona Gias	344	1.82	IND	
Yawal Ran Mazewin	334	1.76	IND	
Karl Samasam	265	1.40	IND	
William Andrew	252	1.33	IND	
Maris Beles	241	1.27	IND	
Zumbek Molong	234	1.24	IND	
Elizah Baim	223	1.18	NA	
John Butumeng	217	1.15	IND	
Ken Mahas	210	1.11	IND	
David Yandi	172	0.91	IND	
David J. Lape	129	0.68	IND	
John Narko	122	0.64	IND	
Total Ballot	**18,931**	99.95		
Papers Allowed				
Informal	**9**	0.05		
Total	**18,940**	100.00		
TEWAI-SIASSI OPEN ELECTORATE				
Mao Zeming	**3,263**	**20.06**	**IND**	**2/7/97**
Christopher Akwa	2,605	16.02	NA	
Royden Jaolase Aigal	1,970	12.11	PP	
Nickson Bomo	1,705	10.48	CCP	
Konney Arenu Kamngan	1,374	8.45	PPP	
Tofa Gavin Boto	1,070	6.58	IND	
Peter Langir Garong	1,022	6.28	MAP	
Jephthah Mera Gerinde	789	4.85	IND	
Aune Lotto	663	4.08	IND	
Denden Ruens	506	3.11	IND	
Silvanus Sari Aisi	321	1.97	IND	
Rogupe Rogue	320	1.97	PAP	
Amos Berg Wellonga	214	1.32	IND	
John Carl Karma Warra	159	0.98	IND	
Michael Dunga Livi	121	0.74	IND	
Greg Aigilo	79	0.49	IND	
Joe Hafmans	0	0.00	IND	
Joe Hafmans Nominated On 14/4/97 And Died On 12/5/97.				
Total Ballot	**16,181**	99.48		
Papers Allowed				
Informal	**85**	0.52		
Total	**16,266**	100.00		

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
NATIONAL CAPITAL DISTRICT ELECTORATE				
William (Bill) Skate	**21,219**	**30.92**	**PNC**	**22/6/97**
Loani Ravu Henao	7,013	10.22	IND	
Casper K. Wollom	5,870	8.55	IND	
Jimmy Misina Varika	5,109	7.45	PP	
Gumuna Stephen Wari	5,090	7.42	IND	
Lawrence B. Titimur	2,518	3.67	IND	
Hela Romi Romney Tengere	2,181	3.18	IND	
Dr Paul Mondia	1,995	2.91	MLP	
Camillus S. N. Narokobi	1,973	2.88	MAP	
Margaret Loko	1,970	2.87	IND	
Silas James	1,684	2.45	IND	
Philomena Kassman	1,527	2.23	IND	
Tau Peruka	1,337	1.95	IND	
Afuti Jonathan	1,179	1.72	IND	
Frank John Igo	990	1.44	IND	
Paul Masta	896	1.31	PRA	
Joseph Cholai Polume	775	1.13	CDP	
Gary Maso Paya	741	1.08	IND	
John Gundu	722	1.05	PNGFP	
Peter Uri Igibe	711	1.04	IND	
Merea Sevese Navuru	682	0.99	IND	
Sondiong Bagago	483	0.70	IND	
Joshua Ako Kari	419	0.61	IND	
Mary Mase Sapak	322	0.47	IND	
Ronom Kopon	170	0.25	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**67,576**	98.48		
Informal	**1,044**	1.52		
Total	**68,620**	100.00		
MORESBY NORTH EAST OPEN ELECTORATE				
Phillip Taku	**1,806**	8.69	**PNC**	**21/6/97**
David Unagi	1,704	8.20	PUP	
Amos Yali	1,490	7.17	IND	
John Kaupa	1,338	6.44	IND	
Norman Walter Fernandes	1,292	6.21	IND	
Hugo Berghuser	1,096	5.27	IND	
Peter Umba	1,039	5.00	IND	
John J. K. Kuman	948	4.56	IND	
Michael Teke	899	4.32	IND	
Johnson Tia	896	4.31	IND	
John Makabe Tari	873	4.20	IND	
Foxie Kaeaka	737	3.54	IND	
Elizabeth Yama	718	3.45	PPP	
Gorau Gigmai	562	2.70	CCP	
Kelly Naru	469	2.26	IND	
Philip Kaira	463	2.23	IND	
Jack Wialu	430	2.07	IND	
Barnabas Harry	400	1.92	IND	
Fred Mina Bokoi	385	1.85	IND	
Peter Yokondo	383	1.84	MLP	
Ben Tupus	375	1.80	IND	
Robert Kosuwo	288	1.39	IND	
Michael Kobor	269	1.29	IND	
Matilda Ludwig	249	1.20	IND	
Bagua Watti	217	1.04	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Huitona Tohua	206	0.99	PDM	
Dominic Bauwai	182	0.88	IND	
Joseph Nombri	171	0.82	IND	
Joe Waine	168	0.81	IND	
Tom Nenda	138	0.66	IND	
Homoka Saraga Sina	89	0.43	PRAP	
Ori Hou Kauvu	80	0.38	IND	
Francis N. K. Tanga	74	0.36	IND	
Tanoi Meuro	44	0.21	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**20,478**	98.49		
Informal	**313**	1.51		
Total	**20,791**	100.00		
MORESBY NORTH WEST OPEN ELECTORATE				
Sir Mekere Morauta	**3,217**	**15.08**	**IND**	**22/6/97**
Miria N. Ikupu	2,171	10.18	IND	
Russell Simon Wavik	1,546	7.25	IND	
Rarua Dia Loa	1,367	6.41	IND	
Laren Robbie Samai	1,337	6.27	LP	
Opao Fo'o Udia	979	4.59	NA	
Simon Ape	955	4.48	IND	
Dorothy Tekwie	941	4.41	PP	
Tin Siew Tan	812	3.81	IND	
Phillip Takori	759	3.56	IND	
John Wek	605	2.84	IND	
Laipen Wallen	568	2.66	IND	
Haraka Gabutu Gaudi	520	2.44	PAP	
Jack Talai	497	2.33	IND	
Gomane Sapovo	479	2.25	IND	
Philip Daniel Komb	454	2.13	IND	
Fred Bush Pup	434	2.03	PRA	
Leontine Avia Ovia Tamate	417	1.96	IND	
George W. Kaupa	384	1.80	IND	
Tom Amukele	380	1.78	IND	
Andrew Taupin Kandakasi	279	1.31	IND	
John Napu	240	1.13	IND	
Peterson Kila	231	1.08	IND	
Tukana Albert Toro	217	1.02	IND	
Londari Minapi	210	0.98	IND	
John Harangu	190	0.89	IND	
Johnny Mark Guina	142	0.67	IND	
Josiah Benjamin	133	0.62	IND	
Paul Tabor Timaro	126	0.59	IND	
Abba Bina	123	0.58	IND	
Steven Graham Tongia	90	0.42	IND	
John Ombu	86	0.40	IND	
Billy Opina Sarao	59	0.28	IND	
Tipson Hangu	58	0.27	IND	
Hugo Aki	58	0.27	IND	
Mathias Kawage Artist	20	0.09	IND	
Vincent George	12	0.06	IND	
Steven Dutch	5	0.02	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**21,101**	98.94		
Informal	**227**	1.06		
Total	**21,328**	100.00		

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
MORESBY SOUTH OPEN ELECTORATE				
Lady Carol Kidu	**3,906**	**21.79**	**IND**	**21/6/97**
Albert Bossround Karo	2,266	12.64	PUP	
Waburi John Leva	1,455	8.12	IND	
Raymond Agonia	1,222	6.82	PDM	
Robert Favave	1,083	6.04	IND	
Bill Dihim	817	4.56	PAP	
Daniel Hewali	806	4.50	CDP	
Jobu Joe Hora	672	3.75	IND	
Johnson A. Tolabi	587	3.28	IND	
Nicholas Manihoru	561	3.13	IND	
Paul D. Hage	559	3.12	IND	
Peter Kivori Eki	555	3.10	IND	
Manu Geno	414	2.31	IND	
Mai Makao	400	2.23	IND	
Barunke Kaman	381	2.13	IND	
Robin Michael Manman	310	1.73	IND	
Nebross Bare Duin	303	1.69	IND	
Charlie Sari Moi	280	1.56	IND	
Ben Nime	264	1.47	IND	
Wesley Amero Bire	172	0.96	IND	
Solepe Tunofi	130	0.73	IND	
Alfred Wartovo	121	0.68	IND	
Wilfred Bongali	107	0.60	IND	
Hicks Lausi-Laeka	85	0.47	IND	
John Ahwong	71	0.40	IND	
Ludwig E. Tumat	57	0.32	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**17,584**	98.11		
Informal	**339**	1.89		
Total	**17,923**	100.00		
NEW IRELAND PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE				
Paul Tohian	**10,535**	**27.38**	**PPP**	**1/7/97**
Pedi Anis	5,687	14.78	PP	
Esekiel Waisale	4,004	10.41	NA	
Steven Madana	3,156	8.20	IND	
Toligai Soka	3,051	7.93	IND	
Rore Rikis	2,692	7.00	IND	
Samson Gila	2,155	5.60	MGA	
Hedwig Yip	1,380	3.59	IND	
Gilmore Lavoro	1,246	3.24	IND	
Gabriel Nagamani	1,093	2.84	IND	
Stanis Taman	1,011	2.63	IND	
Jackson Batok	970	2.52	CDP	
Paty Horieb	236	0.61	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**37,216**	96.71		
Informal	**1,265**	3.29		
Total	**38,481**	100.00		

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
KAVIENG OPEN ELECTORATE				
Ian Ling Stuckey	**6,301**	**36.57**	**PP**	**29/6/97**
Ben Micah	3,938	22.85	PPP	
Gerard Sigulogo	2,886	16.75	MAP	
Tamalu Mansini	1,186	6.88	IND	
Wilson Kasau	946	5.49	NA	
Lapule Tamean	777	4.51	UP	
Cathy Jee Graham	647	3.75	IND	
Ezekiel Amos	240	1.39	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**16,921**	98.20		
Informal	**311**	1.80		
Total	**17,232**	100.00		
NAMATANAI OPEN ELECTORATE				
Ephraim Apelis	**7,969**	**37.55**	**NA**	**30/6/97**
Julius Chan	7,859	37.03	PPP	
Bernard Amnol	3,298	15.54	IND	
Ephraim Sukbat	1,470	6.93	IND	
Ben Kavi	136	0.64	IND	
John Miru	88	0.41	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**20,820**	98.09		
Informal	**405**	1.91		
Total	**21,225**	100.00		
NORTHERN PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE				
Sylvanes Siembo	**3,370**	**6.88**	**PP**	**8/7/97**
Sampson P.F Endehipa	3,268	6.67	IND	
Clement Kerahu	2,490	5.09	IND	
Gideon Pinoko	2,238	4.57	IND	
Akoka Doi	2,036	4.16	PAP	
Jackson Orosambo	1,847	3.77	IND	
Benson Garui	1,599	3.27	IND	
Moses Atade	1,542	3.15	IND	
Rex Embahe	1,502	3.07	PAP	
Douglas Garawa	1,406	2.87	IND	
Arthur Jawodimbari	1,309	2.67	CDP	
Wilson Wase Morove	1,294	2.64	IND	
Samuel Paul Kienzle	1,222	2.50	IND	
Champion Sorari	1,157	2.36	IND	
Henry Wariwangi	1,107	2.26	IND	
Adelbert Gangai	1,103	2.25	IND	
Wesley Joroto Aruga	964	1.97	IND	
Allan Saruwa	959	1.96	IND	
Steven Isaac Ogaji Tago	953	1.95	IND	
Peter Douglas Anayabere	831	1.70	IND	
Cecilia Iari	812	1.66	IND	
Benjamin Ijumi	808	1.65	IND	
David Clark Furifuri	785	1.60	IND	
Richard Euruba Gabuba	764	1.56	IND	
Charles K. Jasari	711	1.45	IND	
Andrew Kaiai	661	1.35	IND	
William (Bill) Samboba	625	1.28	IND	
Kipling Sanata	614	1.25	IND	
Sakimo Duigu	595	1.22	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Fr. Edison Kopada	589	1.20	IND	
Joe Sil Gala	585	1.19	IND	
Benson Ariembo	582	1.19	IND	
John Arekai	580	1.18	IND	
Willington Jojoga	576	1.18	IND	
Mendodeba Kipling Naoni	514	1.05	IND	
Ladri Kuli	513	1.05	IND	
Misael Iwaie Paine	465	0.95	IND	
Leonard Kajari	453	0.93	IND	
Cecil Wallace Kibikibi	439	0.90	IND	
Papau Mark Anthony	422	0.86	IND	
Wesley Endehipa Jaivopa	419	0.86	IND	
Arnold Koko	349	0.71	IND	
Dickson Aike Maioni	333	0.68	IND	
Lindsay Gosode	291	0.59	IND	
Eric Iewago	285	0.58	UP	
Albert Farapo Oraka	250	0.51	IND	
Samson Andoga	248	0.51	IND	
Denny Akesa	228	0.47	IND	
Nancy Jiregari	213	0.44	IND	
David Hunima	188	0.38	IND	
Judith Kuschel Penunuja	185	0.38	IND	
Cuthbert Teiane	180	0.37	IND	
Benson Toroi	169	0.35	IND	
Daisy Diro Kavo	164	0.33	IND	
James Benson Hondari	134	0.27	IND	
John Henry Pia	119	0.24	IND	
Tarua Tuta	119	0.24	IND	
Duncania Jawa	103	0.21	IND	
Jerry Kansan	94	0.19	IND	
John Lucas	88	0.18	IND	
Cecil Taimbari	82	0.17	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**48,531**	99.12		
Informal	**431**	0.88		
Total	**48,962**	100.00		
IJIVITARI OPEN ELECTORATE				
Simon Banamba Kaumi	**2,928**	**11.45**	**PNC**	**6/7/97**
Hudson Arek	1,791	7.00	IND	
Lancelot Koa	1,487	5.81	UP	
Pol Garata Toki	1,434	5.61	IND	
Solomon Kimai	1,201	4.70	IND	
Reginald Kubuni	1,192	4.66	IND	
Richard Arore	1,116	4.36	IND	
Keli Hau'ofa	871	3.41	IND	
Winterford Urami	819	3.20	IND	
Ganeba Arthur Martin Beaga	796	3.11	IND	
David Womo Amute	780	3.05	IND	
Evangill Iewago	776	3.03	PP	
Defol J. Orere	700	2.74	IND	
Michael Terina	661	2.58	IND	
Kingsley Gegeyo	630	2.46	IND	
Mckenzie Daugi	560	2.19	MAP	
Philemon Aigapa	557	2.18	IND	
Delilah Ambo	546	2.13	PAP	
Anton Kendi-Porusa	525	2.05	IND	
Ian Embora	514	2.01	IND	
James Ofare Borume	486	1.90	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Lomas Orereba	434	1.70	IND	
Philip Buruba Ogai	414	1.62	NA	
Demond Bundu	413	1.61	IND	
Muadi Augustine	378	1.48	IND	
Philemon Sabuda Bungewa	331	1.29	IND	
Stewart Pono	331	1.29	IND	
Kipling Gombo	306	1.20	IND	
Steven Yowoura	292	1.14	IND	
Caedmon Mongagi	282	1.10	MBP	
Samson Joke	271	1.06	IND	
Barnabas Orere	266	1.04	IND	
Kingsford P. Naniura	239	0.93	IND	
William Arotai	228	0.89	IND	
Alphonse Boruo Evari	164	0.64	IND	
Edrick Emota Seahaembo	150	0.59	IND	
Stan Mathias Awaita	134	0.52	PRAP	
Arthur Giriuiri Gaso	133	0.52	IND	
Hankin Hamba Emboge	119	0.47	IND	
Natheniel Safitoa	107	0.42	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**25,362**	99.17		
Informal	**212**	0.83		
Total	**25,574**	100.00		
SOHE OPEN ELECTORATE				
Prof. John Waiko	**4,768**	**20.40**	**PAP**	**4/7/97**
Stanton Haiva	1,583	6.77	IND	
Peter Atu Oresi	1,580	6.76	IND	
Nathaniel Victor	1,408	6.03	IND	
Joel Siembo	1,115	4.77	IND	
John Douglas Kivo	1,003	4.29	IND	
Ronald Kibini	875	3.74	IND	
Gibling Orovo	823	3.52	IND	
Alex Eroro Diasai	754	3.23	IND	
Claude Singar	738	3.16	IND	
John Wycliffe Jiregari	686	2.94	IND	
Laban Hauro	686	2.94	IND	
Wenceslas Aimbari	659	2.82	IND	
Gregory Bulbui	656	2.81	IND	
Mcneil Pueka	608	2.60	IND	
Rodney Wakei	591	2.53	IND	
Maclaren Jude Hiari	553	2.37	IND	
Aliet Okie Holland Kitofu	510	2.18	IND	
Ging T. Dawidi	499	2.14	IND	
Chris Waim Karogol	409	1.75	IND	
Joseph Oride Keriapa	367	1.57	IND	
Alexander Andari	348	1.49	IND	
Kingston Evari	338	1.45	IND	
Raymond Asiri	290	1.24	IND	
David Joseph Kevila	267	1.14	IND	
Reginald Homba	245	1.05	IND	
Daniel Meikopa Serere	219	0.94	IND	
Donald Joe Egimbari	207	0.89	IND	
Abraham Sorari	154	0.66	IND	
Mathew Purari	138	0.59	IND	
Dennis Embo Hoe	51	0.22	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**23,128**	98.98		
Informal	**239**	1.02		
Total	**23,367**	100.00		

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE				
Anderson Agiru Pawa	**114,476**	38.48	**IND**	**5/7/97**
Nipa Dick Mune	94,741	31.84	PPP	
Apoko Aipisa Patrick Rama	24,329	8.18	IND	
Paul Poto	15,140	5.09	IND	
Joe (So) Keviame	14,110	4.74	IND	
Francis Awesa	13,395	4.50	NA	
Yaungtine Koromba	9,453	3.18	IND	
Korowa Pokeya	4,019	1.35	CDP	
Yakopa Nalenge Nelson Waima	3,291	1.11	IND	
Paul Masa Epiam	1,822	0.61	IND	
Samson Mapi	1,363	0.46	PP	
Kapa Anda Dilini	95	0.03	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**296,234**	99.56		
Informal	**1,297**	0.44		
Total	**297,531**	100.00		
IALIBU-PANGIA OPEN ELECTORATE				
Roy Yaki	**6,941**	**23.15**	**PDM**	**27/6/97**
Yauka Aluambo Liria	3,942	13.15	MAP	
Charles Normo Turi	2,969	9.90	IND	
Pepo Brian Narali	2,698	9.00	PAP	
Robert Mandi Paia	2,129	7.10	IND	
Dick Piale Tambua	1,858	6.20	IND	
Benny Ipia	1,609	5.37	IND	
Paul Pori Benong	1,466	4.89	IND	
Uma More	1,347	4.49	IND	
Roger Kewa	1,154	3.85	IND	
Maris J. Wapa	1,143	3.81	IND	
Andele Nambi J. Rapula	914	3.05	IND	
John Tangue Keai	836	2.79	PRAP	
Mokonda Rema	536	1.79	PPP	
Kenneth Undah	204	0.68	IND	
Punda Ame Warea	12	0.04	IND	
Pundia Kange	3	0.01	PP	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**29,761**	99.28		
Informal	**217**	0.72		
Total	**29,978**	100.00		
IMBONGGU OPEN ELECTORATE				
Peter Peipul Ipu	**5,150**	**19.89**	**NA**	**25/6/97**
Philip Moya	4,374	16.89	IND	
Timothy Buka Tala	4,177	16.13	IND	
Anthony Temo	2,829	10.93	PAP	
Michael Nomi Purre	2,625	10.14	IND	
Dominic Diya	2,554	9.86	IND	
Pila Niningi	1,975	7.63	PDM	
Glaimi Warena	1,460	5.64	IND	
James Waia Mange	490	1.89	IND	
Willy Tuku Angu	85	0.33	IND	
Cletus Kelelo	11	0.04	IND	
John Mumbulu	6	0.02	PP	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**25,736**	99.40		
Informal	**156**	0.60		
Total	**25,892**	100.00		

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
KAGUA-ERAVE OPEN ELECTORATE				
David Basua	**4,551**	**19.87**	**NA**	**4/5/97**
Charles Miru Luta	4,528	19.77	PAP	
Ken Kenda Nakisi	3,262	14.25	IND	
Komeali Kapo Ropa	2,628	11.48	IND	
Robert Rambue Rami	2,356	10.29	IND	
Leslie Ope Timereke Umai	1,538	6.72	IND	
Polopa Umapi Luna	1,257	5.49	IND	
Albert A. Noriai	986	4.31	IND	
Amex Amariae Siparu	674	2.94	IND	
Akuali Pali	411	1.79	CDP	
Tamalo Steven Akesi	254	1.11	IND	
Yako Mano	159	0.69	PAP	
Daniel Bali Tulapi	125	0.55	PP	
Stephen Paglipari	58	0.25	IND	
Martha Kala	35	0.15	PPP	
Manda Daniel	24	0.10	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**22,846**	99.77		
Informal	**53**	0.23		
Total	**22,899**	100.00		
KOMO-MARGARIMA OPEN ELECTORATE				
Alfred Kaiabe	**15,050**	**28.31**	**PUP**	**3/7/97**
Komo Lemson Lemabe Mabiria	11,500	21.64	UP	
Wakinda Guluwa	9,597	18.06	NA	
Kerry Mamai Lero	5,132	9.66	IND	
Ako Lawai Kennedy	4,722	8.88	IND	
Balus Libe	4,594	8.64	PPP	
Robert Igirimene Tia	1,638	3.08	IND	
Mambo J. Lai Liwa	456	0.86	IND	
Marabe Makiba	70	0.13	IND	
James Pijabe Hale	41	0.08	IND	
Sidney Peperayja Warai	38	0.07	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**52,838**	99.41		
Informal	**315**	0.59		
Total	**53,153**	100.00		
KOROBA-LAKE KOPIAGO OPEN ELECTORATE				
Herowa Urape Agiwa	**6,693**	**20.36**	**PPP**	**4/7/97**
Mathew Magaye	6,582	20.02	PAP	
Benias Peri	5,109	15.54	IND	
Pendeba Hera Herason	4,343	13.21	UP	
Albert Mokai	4,171	12.69	NA	
James Pamburi	3,420	10.40	CDP	
Ruben Yandale Sakuya	997	3.03	IND	
Daniel Mapiria Warubaga	979	2.98	PDM	
Frankie Hidaya	302	0.92	IND	
Dickson Mundu Wako	38	0.12	IND	
Joe Moses Muli Hapokaia	33	0.10	PAP	
Duna Warako Elo	31	0.09	IND	
Payale Elo	26	0.08	MLP	
Total B/Papers Allowed	**32,724**	99.54		
Informal	**150**	0.46		
Total	**32,874**	100.00		

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
MENDI OPEN ELECTORATE				
Michael Buku Nali	**8,301**	**21.04**	**PPP**	**25/6/97**
Stephen Naik Mendepo	7,017	17.79	IND	
Philipus Maso Hapon	5,142	13.03	IND	
Harry Komba	5,132	13.01	IND	
George Apsi Wonome	4,743	12.02	IND	
Yakumb De Kewanu	2,906	7.37	NA	
Lapun Tubiri Wagep	1,550	3.93	IND	
Dick Eyoki Buruma	1,370	3.47	UP	
Andy Anda Akivi	1,083	2.75	IND	
Joseph Kobol	930	2.36	IND	
Kiee Kila Toap	437	1.11	IND	
Norman Takis	369	0.94	MGA	
Jeffrey Hurums	368	0.93	PAP	
Senen Alo Ess	6	0.02	IND	
Hun Morris	4	0.01	PDM	
Total B/Papers Allowed	**39,358**	99.76		
Informal	**95**	0.24		
Total	**39,453**	100.00		
NIPA-KUTUBU OPEN ELECTORATE				
Philemon Embel	**14,661**	**23.36**	**PPP**	**4/7/97**
Uhae Iabo	11,982	19.09	NA	
Army Peyap Danny Cooks	7,120	11.34	IND	
Poroma Tilam Andayo	6,577	10.48	IND	
Pastor Timothy Map	5,053	8.05	CDP	
Nixon Kafane Mira	4,513	7.19	IND	
Joshua Suim Mongopiri	3,640	5.80	PDM	
William Titpe Powi	3,385	5.39	UP	
Patrick Esup W. Wale	2,203	3.51	IND	
Paul Tegi	1,969	3.14	IND	
Tisa Steven Wabi Kopeap	1,394	2.22	IND	
Total B/Papers Allowed	**62,497**	99.56		
Informal	**275**	0.44		
Total	**62,772**	100.00		
TARI OPEN ELECTORATE				
Tom Tomiape Erelene	**4,971**	**16.87**	**UP**	**27/6/97**
Joseph Hungi	3,026	10.27	PPP	
Mogola Kamiali	2,893	9.82	IND	
Larry Andagali	2,415	8.20	IND	
Mathew Matiai Yago	2,290	7.77	PP	
Habia Babe	2,075	7.04	IND	
Hibson Hibilaba Ambulu	2,000	6.79	PAP	
Haralu Meria	1,977	6.71	CDP	
Ronald Kalu Kobari	1,905	6.46	IND	
Timothy Hewabe Togori	1,400	4.75	NA	
Philip Kane Keko Iya	1,051	3.57	IND	
Angoea Tadabe	942	3.20	IND	
Pius Pape	808	2.74	MAP	
Michael Yabaria	650	2.21	IND	
Haralu Mai	349	1.18	IND	
Joe Gine Muna	191	0.65	IND	
Mogola Wagi	160	0.54	IND	
Tambali Kono	136	0.46	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Egawe Mandiga Halegondo	106	0.36	IND	
Ivan Homoko	47	0.16	IND	
Henry Wangare	32	0.11	IND	
Tigi Thomas Agibe	7	0.02	PAP	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**29,431**	99.88		
Informal	**36**	0.12		
Total	**29,467**	100.00		
WEST NEW BRITAIN PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE				
Bernard Vogae	**9,711**	**17.29**	**NA**	**1/7/97**
Greg Mongi	6,521	11.61	IND	
Isikar Lazarus Matage	5,002	8.91	MAP	
Brown Bai	4,985	8.88	PP	
Joe Tauvasa	4,870	8.67	PPP	
Vincent W. Ulelio	4,556	8.11	IND	
Robert Lawrence	4,213	7.50	IND	
John Dako	3,539	6.30	PAP	
Paul M. Garai	3,231	5.75	IND	
William Padio	3,039	5.41	PRAP	
Graham Forrow	2,376	4.23	IND	
Patrick Pele	2,005	3.57	IND	
John Midan	1,016	1.81	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**55,064**	98.06		
Informal	**1,091**	1.94		
Total	**56,155**	100.00		
KANDRIAN-GLOUCESTER OPEN ELECTORATE				
Peter H. Arul	**5,506**	**25.05**	**IND**	**30/6/97**
David Sui	4,164	18.95	IND	
Luke Muta	3,359	15.28	MGA	
Peter Marme	2,892	13.16	MAP	
Issac Dau	1,561	7.10	IND	
Joseph Lehen	1,456	6.63	IND	
Thomas Akai Mecklai	1,154	5.25	IND	
Peter Mudio	1,053	4.79	IND	
Michael Palavaskit Uvilio	667	3.04	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**21,812**	99.25		
Informal	**164**	0.75		
Total	**21,976**	100.00		
TALASEA OPEN ELECTORATE				
Patterson Balive Lowa	**4,638**	**13.59**	**MAP**	**1/7/97**
Gregory Seeto Akai	4,432	12.99	IND	
Andrew Talingapua	2,814	8.25	PNGNP	
Peni Ase	2,085	6.11	PRAP	
Gabriel Bakani	2,084	6.11	PP	
John Vulupindi	1,711	5.01	IND	
Moses Nahia	1,581	4.63	IND	
Philip Cowboy Ragi	1,406	4.12	MGA	
Stanis Ian S. Tao	1,352	3.96	IND	
Herman Makele	1,212	3.55	IND	
Vincent Kondum	1,190	3.49	IND	
Charles Mockley	1,171	3.43	IND	
Petrus Mundawi	1,146	3.36	PAP	
John Raka	938	2.75	MGA	
Mark Hawai	936	2.74	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Conrad Golumu Paru	500	1.47	PPP	
Herman Nonny Mirio	471	1.38	PDM	
Raymond Kaitu Laupu	463	1.36	PRAP	
John Tuka	436	1.28	IND	
Peter Pati	406	1.19	IND	
James Una	405	1.19	IND	
Thomas Namui	389	1.14	IND	
Elias Batari	381	1.12	IND	
Leo Kalasi	373	1.09	IND	
Thomas Rakas Pakilio	246	0.72	IND	
Dimon Jimmy Vulolo	194	0.57	IND	
Caspar Boa Lomboi	129	0.38	IND	
Lukas Poka	79	0.23	PAP	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**33,168**	97.22		
Informal	**950**	2.78		
Total	**34,118**	100.00		
WEST SEPIK PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE				
John Talu Tekwie	**12,475**	**17.63**	**IND**	**10/7/97**
Rex Namah	8,442	11.93	IND	
Kalang Yuni Carilus	5,931	8.38	IND	
Arnold Lokowai	4,770	6.74	PP	
Kos Umion	4,176	5.90	CDP	
Adam Amod	4,149	5.86	IND	
Emelda Leki	3,876	5.48	IND	
Goiary Moreng	3,841	5.43	IND	
Yon (John) Uwen Wo'otong	3,513	4.96	MAP	
Thomas Kile Wakopu	2,996	4.23	IND	
James Kanaiak	2,803	3.96	IND	
Peien Aloitch	2,477	3.50	IND	
Kepeni Hohom	2,291	3.24	PDM	
Bruce Brotok Linogal	1,939	2.74	IND	
Bonny Kaiyo	1,335	1.89	PPP	
Moses Nasam	1,322	1.87	IND	
Gabriel Deckwalen	1,159	1.64	IND	
John Sairere	1,092	1.54	IND	
Tambor Wurin	733	1.04	IND	
John Ome Sanawe	724	1.02	PPP	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**70,044**	98.98		
Informal	**721**	1.02		
Total	**70,765**	100.00		
AITAPE-LUME OPEN ELECTORATE				
Eddy Saweni	**1,687**	**9.22**	**IND**	**5/7/97**
Bodee Toyaremwa	1,550	8.47	PDM	
Michael Sakelu	1,531	8.36	IND	
Paul Hugo Mambei	1,386	7.57	PPP	
Simon Tebinum Solo	1,274	6.96	PP	
Paul Aisir	1,096	5.99	IND	
Clement Anowan	904	4.94	IND	
Balthasar Tas Maketu	887	4.85	NA	
Leo Sorap	881	4.81	MAP	
Joe Amir	831	4.54	IND	
Elias Vincent Tutu	772	4.22	IND	
Jonny Osowin Tuwai	770	4.21	IND	
Benedict Endoi Akuire	706	3.86	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Mark Kowo Tuma	656	3.58	PAP	
Casper N. Onbaiye	553	3.02	PP	
Richard Koronai Nagai	485	2.65	UP	
Alex Wimolo Nonwo	477	2.61	IND	
Gabriel Ramoi	416	2.27	IND	
Luke Sowai Tepu	224	1.22	IND	
Mathew Weilobu	218	1.19	IND	
James Waisi	218	1.19	IND	
Jack Auto	217	1.19	IND	
Dominic Sumei	174	0.95	IND	
John Jalain Kaiang	174	0.95	IND	
Valentine Sume Simon	31	0.17	MAP	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**18,118**	98.97		
Informal	**189**	1.03		
Total	**18,307**	100.00		
NUKU OPEN ELECTORATE				
Andrew Kumbakor	**2,764**	**14.89**	**PDM**	**1/7/97**
Christopher Sambre	2,001	10.78	PP	
Michael Melasa Masamba	1,634	8.80	PAP	
Fabian Nasapu Muip	1,553	8.36	IND	
Simon Wama	1,123	6.05	IND	
Gabriel Weikin	936	5.04	PRAP	
Martin K. Teingo	891	4.80	IND	
Capistran Walmain	819	4.41	IND	
Patrick Muso	762	4.10	NA	
Andrew Komboni	720	3.88	IND	
Aunis Kamaso	719	3.87	IND	
Raphael Yaki Kiap	682	3.67	IND	
Eugene Tamata	658	3.54	PPP	
Freddy Sagu	417	2.25	IND	
John Mirin	417	2.25	IND	
Joe Kawa	346	1.86	IND	
Joshua Itimbien	321	1.73	IND	
Philipus Sowei	315	1.70	IND	
Sakawar Tom Kasieng	285	1.53	IND	
Leo Yimiten	215	1.16	IND	
Greg Waflou	212	1.14	MGA	
Anton Hasu Simal	201	1.08	IND	
Joseph Kaseng Barangan	186	1.00	IND	
Raphael Moiun	107	0.58	IND	
Jacob Bobahawo Hapre	96	0.52	IND	
Simon Ulae Namana	42	0.23	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**18,422**	99.21		
Informal	**147**	0.79		
Total	**18,569**	100.00		
TELEFOMIN OPEN ELECTORATE				
Robert Ali Sakias	**2,961**	**17.81**	**PAP**	**10/7/97**
Danny Lane	2,406	14.47	NA	
Nick Dap	1,799	10.82	IND	
Mike Tiki	1,528	9.19	IND	
Bob Nitin	1,402	8.43	PPP	
John Makau	1,221	7.34	MAP	
Felix Tapineng	1,149	6.91	PP	
Bill Elok	997	6.00	IND	
Youjan Kokrow	917	5.52	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Daniel Yaman	891	5.36	PDM	
James Autat Babian	770	4.63	IND	
Philip Saki	529	3.18	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**16,570**	99.66		
Informal	**56**	0.34		
Total	**16,626**	100.00		
VANIMO-GREEN RIVER OPEN ELECTORATE				
Micah W. Wes	**1,201**	7.43	**IND**	**1/7/97**
Philip Guwes Inou	1,166	7.21	IND	
Wap Yawo	1,039	6.43	IND	
Chris Anthony Vihruri	1,034	6.40	PP	
Tom Inoha	1,004	6.21	PDM	
Nappotti Gai Buru	961	5.95	NA	
Zachary Enda	955	5.91	MAP	
Francis Dau	807	4.99	IND	
Nanau Susuma	801	4.96	IND	
Gerald Gubon	672	4.16	IND	
Kevin Imba	647	4.00	IND	
Peter Apoi	570	3.53	IND	
Steven A. Kumusi	565	3.50	IND	
Jerome Tonggwi	505	3.12	IND	
Anthony Toni Nai Mawei	455	2.82	PAP	
Peter Onikre	419	2.59	IND	
Willie Mason Sinene	415	2.57	IND	
Rodney Munap Kane	403	2.49	IND	
Kapi Waisu	401	2.48	IND	
Franzalbert Joku	389	2.41	PPP	
Francis Yapa Zulu	345	2.13	IND	
Paul Langro	334	2.07	IND	
Thomson Yako	260	1.61	IND	
Willy Seriamou	251	1.55	IND	
Henry Wararu	163	1.01	IND	
Steven Samban	140	0.87	IND	
Michael Mai	57	0.35	IND	
Thomas Nianford	57	0.35	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**16,016**	99.10		
Informal	**145**	0.90		
Total	**16,161**	100.00		
WESTERN PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE				
Norbert Makmop	**6,234**	**11.90**	**IND**	**12/7/97**
Kayama Sinba	5,104	9.75	IND	
Aino Keiba	4,036	7.71	IND	
Ula Philip	3,802	7.26	IND	
Dere Wamaro	3,579	6.83	PNC	
Rex Awi Dagi	3,488	6.66	IND	
Warren Dutton	3,383	6.46	PPP	
Dair Gabara	3,208	6.13	IND	
Isidore Kaseng	2,139	4.08	PAP	
Wesley Gaba Sabiyam	2,123	4.05	PRAP	
Pius Fred	2,071	3.95	IND	
Biaguni Yoto	1,987	3.79	IND	
Tuwe Gugu Badruame Olewale	1,938	3.70	IND	
Benjes Kudi Alusi	1,837	3.51	MGA	
Barry Mapo	1,179	2.25	IND	
Alphonse S. Ruhi	1,006	1.92	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Tatie Kapio Olewale	796	1.52	PP	
Jagara Pisa	752	1.44	IND	
Miriam Maina	561	1.07	IND	
Sarisari Bazi Apelis	545	1.04	IND	
Pa'al Gurel	536	1.02	IND	
Lewis Gorimo Siware	431	0.82	IND	
Reginald Sampson	400	0.76	IND	
Mapoi Daliebo Simoi	344	0.66	IND	
Amula Bibaesi	152	0.29	IND	
Warusam G. Debege	140	0.27	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**51,771**	98.86		
Informal	**595**	1.14		
Total	**52,366**	100.00		
MIDDLE FLY OPEN ELECTORATE				
Kuok Bitan Cosmas	**2,185**	**12.38**	**PPP**	**12/7/97**
Edward Egobia	2,106	11.93	IND	
Daeki Kolesa	1,459	8.27	IND	
William Gadai Goinau	1,141	6.46	NA	
Iya Fami	1,084	6.14	IND	
Pancras Linus	1,083	6.14	IND	
Iti Didiga	918	5.20	IND	
Roger Keke Iwaneke	875	4.96	PAP	
Tom Kay	839	4.75	IND	
Damuli Wiyawa	780	4.42	IND	
Mainau Kaworo	737	4.18	IND	
Owame Ambrose Melaveka	564	3.20	IND	
Kosa Baiyae	556	3.15	IND	
Somono Ibowa	468	2.65	IND	
Kawiya Selese	414	2.35	IND	
Albert Kaupa	392	2.22	CDP	
Okou Ogawe	366	2.07	IND	
Kamelo Abaia	327	1.85	IND	
Kenakena Gologo	317	1.80	IND	
Alfred Stuart Henderson	243	1.38	IND	
Peter Sawaka Modola	214	1.21	IND	
Laole Saebi	159	0.90	IND	
Babadi Sawasi	113	0.64	IND	
Nalaba Kanupa	90	0.51	IND	
Minaemi Gaegae	14	0.08	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**17,444**	98.82		
Informal	**208**	1.18		
Total	**17,652**	100.00		
NORTH FLY OPEN ELECTORATE				
Kala Griwo Swokin	**2,473**	**14.89**	**PSP**	**8/7/97**
Max Hosepa Miyoba	1,534	9.24	IND	
Biul Kirokim	1,233	7.42	IND	
Alex Maun	1,183	7.12	IND	
Bob Bubec	1,102	6.64	PP	
Kaiomeng Bokdap	978	5.89	IND	
Kwawe Gerald Kukinai	955	5.75	PAP	
Peter Kamesiok	822	4.95	IND	
Max Rawo Ako	754	4.54	IND	
Blasius Iwik	631	3.80	IND	
Brian Psenho	604	3.64	IND	
Aro Tu'u	601	3.62	UP	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Simon Eyork	592	3.56	IND	
Menesah Kambong	565	3.40	CDP	
Frank Soma	544	3.28	PDM	
Joe Tameng	499	3.00	IND	
Gen Gom	377	2.27	IND	
Lucas Mokmok	327	1.97	IND	
Wimo Melohe	224	1.35	PRAP	
Micah Tumsok	223	1.34	IND	
Peter Amireng	213	1.28	IND	
Kim Mek	33	0.20	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**16,467**	99.16		
Informal	**140**	0.84		
Total	**16,607**	100.00		
SOUTH FLY OPEN ELECTORATE				
Gabia Gagarimabu	**3,367**	**18.62**	**UP**	**5/7/97**
Sali Subam Mawia	2,060	11.39	IND	
Parry M. Zeipi	1,130	6.25	PPP	
Martin Simaku Semnebe	1,065	5.89	IND	
Morrie Peteru	857	4.74	PAP	
Kawoi Ausa Songoro	827	4.57	IND	
Adrian Haoda'aro	761	4.21	IND	
Hardie Namoi	746	4.12	PRAP	
Odosia Sogomi	743	4.11	IND	
Gaisa Tipasa	721	3.99	IND	
Gonene Kurokuro	704	3.89	PAP	
Iowia Darika	671	3.71	IND	
Poweji Kibani Madu	577	3.19	IND	
Dewa Sureph Sabha	561	3.10	IND	
Pende Gamogab	466	2.58	IND	
Sam M. Manlel	466	2.58	IND	
Mai Anega Jubi	403	2.23	IND	
Reginald Jagu Dabad	336	1.86	IND	
Tera Siriag	321	1.77	IND	
Lalamo Goba	285	1.58	MAP	
Alua Daba	240	1.33	IND	
John Baera Gabo Aieda	199	1.10	IND	
Bob Saga	191	1.06	IND	
Ivan Gerewa Kesa Asiba	183	1.01	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**17,880**	98.87		
Informal	**205**	1.13		
Total	**18,085**	100.00		
WESTERN HIGHLANDS PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE				
Fr. Robert Lak	**45,782**	**19.05**	**IND**	**25/6/97**
Thomas Nolonga Amuk	41,410	17.23	IND	
Paias Wingti	38,831	16.16	PDM	
David Opa	30,123	12.53	IND	
James Kond	23,350	9.71	IND	
Philip Kapal	16,257	6.76	PP	
Paulus Koim Kunai	12,715	5.29	IND	
Nicholas Rop Kuman	7,390	3.07	IND	
Lucas Roika	7,277	3.03	IND	
Kagul Koroka	6,313	2.63	IND	
Sandy Kagl	5,828	2.42	IND	
William Wii	2,357	0.98	IND	
John Kombati	957	0.40	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Uncle Andrew Tai	752	0.31	IND	
Robert Enga	324	0.13	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**239,666**	99.71		
Informal	**692**	0.29		
Total	**240,358**	100.00		
ANGALIMP-SOUGH WAHGI OPEN ELECTORATE				
Kuk Kuli	**4,382**	**8.16**	**IND**	**26/6/97**
Jonathan Baret Kumba	4,155	7.74	IND	
William Roimb	3,821	7.11	IND	
William Ekip Wii	3,699	6.89	PUP	
Jamie Graham	3,237	6.03	PDM	
Patrick J. Nema	3,075	5.73	PAP	
Du Maine	3,066	5.71	IND	
Karu Kogpa Kisbik	2,583	4.81	MLP	
Philip Kaman	2,444	4.55	CCP	
Gabrial Kuma Waipek	2,092	3.90	IND	
Wagi Du Kauke	1,972	3.67	IND	
Fred Aura Konga	1,950	3.63	IND	
Roy Mian	1,871	3.48	IND	
Pius Norri Kuri	1,846	3.44	IND	
Peter Wama	1,813	3.38	IND	
Yuants Kaman	1,528	2.85	IND	
Michael Tongai Kolmal	1,480	2.76	IND	
George Koim	1,474	2.74	IND	
Pou Mai	1,388	2.58	PRAP	
Silas Kurwai Ambang	1,195	2.22	IND	
John Mark Yew	714	1.33	IND	
Nombri Konagel	636	1.18	IND	
Thomas Paraka	531	0.99	IND	
Paul Kapak Kelly	505	0.94	IND	
Dr. John Konga	504	0.94	IND	
Joe Kua Wamil	470	0.88	IND	
Tony Boma	388	0.72	IND	
Sam Kambi Imine	297	0.55	IND	
Joseph Bit	263	0.49	IND	
Sam Kaima	195	0.36	CDP	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**53,574**	99.75		
Informal	**134**	0.25		
Total	**53,708**	100.00		
BAIYER-MUL OPEN ELECTORATE				
Robert T. Nagle	**3,801**	**14.84**	**PP**	**24/6/97**
Simon Y. Korua	3,621	14.14	PDM	
Kuri Kingal	3,186	12.44	PAP	
Tom Penias Rangip	3,158	12.33	IND	
Sai Trappe	2,668	10.41	PPP	
Mokwa Mamando	2,498	9.75	PDM	
Joel. P. Paua	1,702	6.64	IND	
Richard Mel	1,285	5.02	IND	
John Rur Kunjil	1,139	4.45	IND	
Kundi Miki	658	2.57	IND	
Robert Miti Rop	578	2.26	UP	
Philip Mamando	511	1.99	UP	
John Pyawa	434	1.69	IND	
Robert Lai Tapi	287	1.12	IND	
Michael Ramdi Ekri	13	0.05	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Peter Pyawa	7	0.03	IND	
Melpa Apkas Emmanuel	6	0.02	PRAP	
Ekana Lakaia	1	0.00	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**25,553**	99.75		
Informal	**64**	0.25		
Total	**25,617**	100.00		
DEI OPEN ELECTORATE				
Puri Ruing	**6,838**	**20.06**	**PRAP**	**25/6/97**
Melchior Mack Pep	5,959	17.48	PP	
Reuben Namba Parua	5,690	16.69	PUP	
Paul Koi Nana	5,621	16.49	IND	
Willie William R. Wundaki	4,464	13.09	PAP	
William Pik Ruin	4,338	12.72	IND	
Pun Kaip	1,068	3.13	PDM	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**33,978**	99.66		
Informal	**115**	0.34		
Total	**34,093**	100.00		
HAGEN OPEN ELECTORATE				
Paul Pora	**10,038**	**28.98**	**IND**	**25/6/97**
King Kela (Stanley Nui)	8,143	23.51	IND	
Michael Mel	6,571	18.97	PDM	
David Yok	4,895	14.13	PRAP	
Marx Bu Kanamon	4,021	11.61	IND	
Andrew Konts Newman	817	2.36	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**34,485**	99.58		
Informal	**147**	0.42		
Total	**34,632**	100.00		
JIMI OPEN ELECTORATE				
Bevan Tambi	**1,956**	**10.55**	**UP**	**24/6/97**
Joseph Mill Kilinga	1,857	10.02	IND	
Johannes Yas Wapia	1,430	7.71	IND	
Sir Thomas Kavali	1,427	7.70	IND	
Bart Chicki	1,182	6.38	IND	
Wake Goi	1,006	5.43	IND	
Joseph Molomb	998	5.38	IND	
Kimb Tai	908	4.90	PPP	
James Kuru Kupul	829	4.47	PAP	
Nalan Kawa	596	3.22	IND	
William Gawa Pok	594	3.20	IND	
Robert Alua	592	3.19	PDM	
Andrew Goli	587	3.17	IND	
Teina Wut	563	3.04	IND	
John Opo Akis	555	2.99	MLP	
Goma Taima	478	2.58	IND	
Stanley Taiya Peng	478	2.58	NA	
Kennedy Thomas Edward	460	2.48	IND	
Donu Kapal	409	2.21	PUP	
Darry Tumun	374	2.02	IND	
Ulmen Kalwe	295	1.59	IND	
James Tannga Kul	254	1.37	CCP	
Luke Komai Kandike	222	1.20	PAP	
Willie Goi Zu Mukul	205	1.11	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes polled	%	Affiliation	Date declared
Peter Koike Kaul	147	0.79	IND	
Goi Ngunts	82	0.44	CDP	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**18,484**	99.71		
Informal	**54**	0.29		
Total	**18,538**	100.00		
NORTH WAHGI OPEN ELECTORATE				
Dokta Fabian Pok	**3,908**	**13.89**	**IND**	**24/6/97**
Mark Wom	3,012	10.70	PAP	
Belden Topo	2,958	10.51	IND	
James Konz	2,584	9.18	PPP	
Yimbal Aipe	2,357	8.38	IND	
Peter Ulup	2,046	7.27	IND	
Tonie Kulam Kapil	1,671	5.94	PDM	
Joe Malie Kumb	1,484	5.27	IND	
Thaddeus Paraka Tai	1,415	5.03	IND	
Peter Puk Dare	1,334	4.74	IND	
David Bal Mol	990	3.52	PRAP	
Joe Karap	805	2.86	NA	
Philip Nend Yewim	563	2.00	IND	
Apa John Edward	486	1.73	IND	
Joe Wallames	422	1.50	IND	
Joseph Bakme Dama	374	1.33	IND	
Jim Apilnga Nimbil	319	1.13	IND	
Lucas Kanjip	302	1.07	IND	
Tony Kupul Wi	299	1.06	IND	
Jack Alne	281	1.00	IND	
Pat Siwi	232	0.82	IND	
Albert Mek Bamana	157	0.56	IND	
John Nambis Kunump	58	0.21	IND	
Peter Mundi	13	0.05	MLP	
Bob Kapal Bamne	13	0.05	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**28,083**	99.80		
Informal	**55**	0.20		
Total	**28,138**	100.00		
TAMBUL-NEBILYER OPEN ELECTORATE				
Vincent Auali	**9,329**	**24.08**	**PDM**	**24/6/97**
Mark S. Anis	7,458	19.25	PAP	
Thomas Negints	6,644	17.15	IND	
Engual Philip Kerowa	6,362	16.42	CDP	
Dr. Fred Wurr Kuman	4,123	10.64	IND	
Andrew Kiapa Palme	2,892	7.47	PAP	
Peter Pilamp	902	2.33	IND	
John Lazarus Kalopa	440	1.14	IND	
David Serowa	268	0.69	IND	
Jiwa Kepo	116	0.30	IND	
David Glama	103	0.27	IND	
Spaka Wengs	15	0.04	IND	
Total Ballot Papers Allowed	**38,652**	99.78		
Informal	**85**	0.22		
Total	**38,737**	100.00		
TOTAL VOTES CASTED	**2,244,531**			
TOTAL VOTES COUNTED	**4,498,325**			

CONTRIBUTORS

Ray Anere is Senior Lecturer in the Political Science Strand, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Papua New Guinea.

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