

THE INDONESIA - PAPUA NEW GUINEA BORDER:
IRIANESE NATIONALISM AND SMALL STATE DIPLOMACY

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PREFACE

In 1977, roughly coincident with Indonesia's national elections, a resurgence of West Papuan nationalist activity in Irian Jaya resulted in an escalating series of confrontations between OPM¹ supporters and Indonesian authorities, and a substantial movement of Irianese refugees into Papua New Guinea. It is impossible to verify the conflicting reports of what happened in Irian Jaya in this period but it seems certain that several hundred Irianese, and some Indonesian troops, were killed; many more Irianese fled their villages, seeking temporary or permanent asylum in Papua New Guinea.

Although the Papua New Guinea government stood firmly by its acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty in Irian Jaya, border incursions by Indonesian troops, Papua New Guinea's acceptance of Irianese refugees, and Indonesian suggestions that Papua New Guinea was adopting a double standard on the Irian Jaya question, all placed strains on the relations between the two countries. Also, growing popular support among Papua New Guineans for their Melanesian brothers increased the salience of West Papuan nationalism in Papua New Guinea's domestic politics; government policies with respect to Irian Jaya became a campaign issue in Papua New Guinea's national elections in 1977 and continued to be a source of contention in the early months of the second parliament.

Towards the end of 1978 there was a scaling down of Indonesian military operations and subsequent announcement of a more conciliatory policy towards the Irianese dissidents. Soon after, the Indonesian and Papua New Guinea governments successfully completed discussions preliminary to the renegotiation of the 1973 agreement on administrative border arrangements.

Against this background, a group of people with some knowledge of the Irian Jaya issue was brought together within the Australian

¹ *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (Free Papua Movement). Throughout this volume, unless otherwise stated, "OPM" is used broadly to describe the various factions of the West Papua nationalist movement.

National University to review recent events and attempt an assessment of future prospects. Seven of the eight papers presented to the two day seminar are reproduced here with only minor editorial changes. The other, on the the OPM, was not available for publication at the time this volume went to press; however we have included, as appendix II, a document on West Papua nationalism circulated by the Pacific People's Action Front (a faction of the OPM) in 1976.

We are grateful to Jan Grocott, Virginia Matheson, Hans Gunther and the Australian National University SOCPAC Printery for their contributions to the publication of this set of papers and to Mark Baker and Wantok Publications Inc. for permission to reproduce the photographs included between pages 64 and 65.

R.J. May

Abbreviations

HAD - House of Assembly Debates (Papua New Guinea)
(prior to 1975)

NPD - National Parliamentary Debates (Papua New Guinea)

OPM - *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (see footnote p.i)



Figure 1. The border area.

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Peter Hastings

With the recent deportation of OPM leader, Jacob Prai, and three other Irianese dissidents to Sweden, the successful visit of Indonesia's Foreign Minister Dr Mochtar Kusumaatmadja to Port Moresby and the more recent low keyed visit of President Suharto himself, most of the heat has gone out of the situation which existed between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia over OPM operations and Indonesian police actions along the northern border area. In fact the commitment of Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, announced in the joint communique¹ to draw up a new border treaty later this

¹ The text of the communique, as reproduced in Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra *Backgrounder* 190, 13 June 1979, is as follows:

President Soeharto of Indonesia paid his first visit to Papua New Guinea from 4-6 June. This was in response to an invitation issued by Prime Minister Somare when he had visited Indonesia in January 1977.

The two discussed a wide range of bilateral and regional issues and noted the growing nature of their bilateral relations.

Among the main points arising from the visit were the expressed intention of both sides to conclude a new border administration agreement, which it is hoped will be finalised this year, and agreement to consult in future on development programs in the common border area to improve conditions for the local population.

Another major development was agreement by Indonesia to co-operate to ensure the successful establishment and operation of the proposed OK Tedi copper mine in PNG by allowing those channels of the Fly River controlled by Indonesia to be used by PNG ore barges. President Soeharto and Mr Somare signed a Technical Cooperation Agreement and undertook to make joint efforts to obtain third party funding for it. It was also agreed that negotiations should be conducted in the near future on the closer co-operation of air services.

There was little opposition from sympathisers of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) to President Soeharto's visit.

year, as well as plans for a joint 'development programme' in the border area, clearly heralds better future relations between the two countries. The communique also contains an Indonesian promise to give what help it can in the development of the huge Ok Tedi copper project on the headwaters of the Fly. Among other things this will involve Indonesian acquiescence in the use of barges to bring copper down the Fly River from Ok Tedi to the Gulf of Papua where the concentrate will be loaded onto bulk carriers.¹

The tension in the situation was always a good deal more acute on the Papua New Guinea side where the government had to contend with a real political situation of 'pan Melanesian' or ethnic sympathy, caused by stories - some false, some true, a number simply exaggerated - of heavy handed Indonesian activities in Irian Jaya and by a sporadic flow of border crossers comprising traditional village people, political and economic refugees and illicit OPM guerilla forces. It had also to contend with a fairly widespread and increasing Indophobia in Papua New Guinea's elites, the students, police and Army. This was principally the result of a good deal of shortsighted and ultimately counter-productive Australian propagandizing in the late 1960s aimed largely at putting the brakes on the pace of political development but it took on a new dimension with Indonesia's armed intervention in East Timor, seen by many in Port Moresby as an expansionist prelude to a military attack on Papua New Guinea itself.²

Tension is probably the wrong word to use to describe Indonesian attitudes. Irritation is not. There has certainly been plenty of irritation in the policy making bodies in Jakarta, including HANKAM, DEPLU and BAKIN. The Papua New Guinea government was seen all too

¹ See Hastings (1970).

² Hastings (1977). This is fundamentally a paper on Papua New Guinea-Indonesian relations given to Papua New Guinea's Department of Foreign Affairs in Port Moresby.

frequently as being both intransigent and unneighbourly in failing to curb the use of the Papua New Guinea border area as a sanctuary for OPM guerillas and in failing to 'discipline' Australian and domestic media reporters in Port Moresby for writing and broadcasting exaggerated stories about Indonesian military activities along the border. While Jakarta clearly recognized that Papua New Guinea was a recently independent country and therefore inexperienced in the requirements of bilateral relations it also took the view that Papua New Guinea could not be excused for pursuing what in Jakarta's opinion were anti Indonesian policies simply on the grounds of ignorance. The Indonesian view during that time could be put quite simply. While Jakarta appreciated the political problems raised for Port Moresby by pro Melanesian sympathies it insisted that Port Moresby should recognize that all Irianese, whether traditional crossers or political or economic dissidents, were Indonesian citizens subject to Indonesian law.

It was always the OPM, however, which raised Indonesian temperatures, not because of its numbers but because it was able to seek refuge in another country. Jakarta could not tolerate a Papua New Guinea policy which, by design or by default, passively allowed armed enemies of the Indonesian state the right to cross the border into sanctuary whenever the going got tough and to return to Indonesian territory when the time appeared propitious. Such a policy, in conjunction with the very difficult terrain in the border area, simply invited hot pursuit by Indonesian forces. And this is precisely what happened on a number of occasions. In addition, the situation was not helped by Indonesian use of imprecise Dutch maps.¹ Despite a good deal of scare mongering in Papua New Guinea the actual number of Indonesian troops involved in actions against the OPM (or its so called military arm, the *Tentara Nasional Papua* (TNP)) has always been small, at the most about half a battalion or 500 men. But of course the OPM has also been small. At its peak it did not boast much more than 100

¹ Personal statement by Brig-General K. Santosa, Panglima, Cenderawasih XVII in Jayapura, September 1978.

hard core fighters - with supporters numbering about 300¹ - equipped with antiquated Dutch and American rifles and several Indonesian automatic weapons captured in ambush. It never captured mortars as was claimed. As every Indonesian soldier on patrol is restricted to twenty to fifty rounds of ammunition, captured weapons are in any case of dubious value. Nevertheless the 'big push' in the middle of last year, involving a battalion of Indonesian infantry, many of them Timorese veterans armed with AK 47s, and accompanied by Air Force OV 10 strafing of known, if empty, OPM villages, and the use of Bell helicopters to drop plastic bombs (these cause little damage but the noise is frightening) was seen by many including myself as a typical exercise in Indonesian overkill, the use of a sledgehammer to crack a nut. It was not till later in discussions in Jakarta that I realised the policy may have been quite deliberate in order to urge upon the Papua New Guinea government the growing seriousness of unchecked border crossings and to obtain from it a proper response. To this extent, while there were clearly other considerations involved on both sides, it was successful. It has also largely made possible, I believe, the Indonesian switch to the 'smiling policy'.

From Indonesia's standpoint certain facts are worth reiterating although some are scarcely new. There has never been the slightest doubt among Indonesia's elites that Irian Jaya was part of the Republic which from the time of the pre independence BPKI² talks in 1945 regarded itself as successor state to the Netherlands East Indies. The ethnic argument that Melanesians were different did not wash. Different from whom? The Javanese? They in turn were different from a half dozen other ethnic groups in the archipelago. And in any case Papuan features, cultural influence and language structures extend

¹ By supporters I mean literally those who carried supplies. The number of sympathizers is hard to estimate but may run into thousands along the border area. General Santosa estimated that the OPM's capacity to 'upset villagers' was totally disproportionate to its numbers. But in a Melanesian context 'sympathizer' is hard to define. My impression of Marthen Tabu, architect of the helicopter incident, was that he was a cargo cultist.

² *Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* ('investigating body for the preparation of Indonesian independence'), established by the Japanese in 1945.

not only east from Irian Jaya to the Pacific but west, as well, to Maluku, the Halmaheras, the Kei and Aru Islands and east Timor. In fact the Malay and Papuan worlds meet and mingle in the Arafura and Banda seas. Expecting Indonesia, as some do expect, to help create one Melanesian state makes as much sense in Jakarta as asking Lagos to allow Nigeria's Hausa people to form one state with those of Dahomey, or Port Moresby to acquiesce in Bougainville and the western Solomons forming an independent blackskin state. There are other elements to the equation. Papua New Guineans have never had to fight a war of independence and simply fail to realise the intense sensitivity of a people like the Indonesians, who have fought such a war, to any suggestion of fragmentation. Moreover Irian Jaya still retains a symbolic importance in terms of nationalist values because of the number of Indonesian nationalists including Hatta and Sjahrir who languished in the camps of Tanah Merah.

But having said that it is necessary to register important qualifications. Indonesia's domestic priorities lie first and foremost in the political viability of the great Javanese heartland and all other interests are subservient to that fact. Its external priorities are with its ASEAN neighbours, with Vietnam, with the US and with judging the actions of the two powers which worry it most - China and Russia. The eastern end of the archipelago, Nusatenggara, has not been a preoccupation. Nor is it now. Many Papua New Guineans have believed, and many resident whites in the past have assiduously led them to believe, that Indonesia is an expansionist power, that after Timor Papua New Guinea was next on the list of conquests. In fact, the record of official Indonesian statements on Papua New Guinea since 1945, through the West Irian takeover, Confrontation and the 'Act of Free Choice' (seen in Papua New Guinea understandably as an Act of No Choice) reveals nothing in the way of territorial ambitions although in Sukarno's day Australia as the administering colonial power was ritually castigated as *nekolim*. And in point of fact, despite Jakarta's past irritation with Port Moresby over border policies, in general, relations with its tiny neighbour have been good. Indonesia welcomed self-government. It welcomed independence. It

has refrained, publicly at all events, from characterizing Papua New Guinea as neo colonialist. It clearly regards Papua New Guinea as a sovereign country, not a colonial remnant like East Timor, but as a sovereign, independent member state of the UN, a Commonwealth country with Commonwealth and regional alliances through the South Pacific Forum and as having a special relationship with Australia. Jakarta's interest in Papua New Guinea is not in absorbing it - Papua New Guinea is not in any case easily digestible, militarily or in any other way - but in Papua New Guinea's capacity to maintain stable government, to maintain an anti communist foreign policy and to resist fragmentation which Jakarta believes would lead some in Papua New Guinea to fish in the troubled waters of Irian Jaya by stirring pan Melanesian sentiment.¹ Last but not least Jakarta hopes that future Papua New Guinea governments will understand Jakarta's nation building problems in Irian Jaya and Timor, and elsewhere in the archipelago, in the same way that Jakarta understands that Papua New Guinea faces similar problems in the Western Highlands or in the North Solomons. By way of postscript to this section it is proper, I believe, to observe that Indonesia has only intervened in unresolved colonial situations on or within its borders - West New Guinea, confrontation with Malaysia over what it regarded as a British manipulated disposal of the Borneo territories, and recently over Timor. Since 1966 it has accepted Sarawak and Sabah as states of the Malaysian Federation. It seems content to let Malaysia, Britain and Brunei work out the latter's future status. It has filled a good offices role over the Malaysia-Philippines dispute. And in determination of offshore seabed and resource boundaries it has sought to negotiate.

However the defusing of the border situation and the new era of closer Papua New Guinea-Indonesian relations symbolized by

¹ This does not preclude possible Indonesian intervention if Papua New Guinea should threaten to fragment politically and Australia refused to try by one means or another to arrest the process. However, intervention as such would be at the level of political manoeuvring, by bribery and by 'propaganda aimed at attracting the support of those groups and institutions including especially the Army, seen by Jakarta as most likely to share its aims of securing stable, effective government.' See Hastings (1977).

Suharto's visit should not obscure real future problems. The significance of the OPM and similar organizations like *Gerakan Papua Liar* (GPL) was never their numbers, which are small, but their sheer Melanesian complexity. Jayapura and Jakarta have both tended far too long to take the view that the OPM, for instance, is a purely Dutch creation, a colonial legacy, a product of the unfulfilled pledges of 1961. It has certainly been that of course, while its principal leaders have been the frustrated, betrayed generation of 1960. But it has also been symbolic of the continuing problems of Melanesians throughout the whole island in reaching accommodation with the demands of a powerful and alien civilization. This is not a new situation. The Dutch faced these problems in the late 1950s and the Australian administration over a much longer period. The Papua New Guinea administration faces them today in the Western Highlands, where thousands of Melanesians continue to resolve arguments over land, pigs and women by resorting to traditional means, and even within a stone's throw of Port Moresby where an accused man can be murdered in the presence of a Chief Justice. It is a painful, distorting process whether the alien, administering civilization is temporary and tutelary as Australia's was or permanent and acculturating as is Indonesia's.

The real point about the Irianese today is not the activities of the OPM but their future as Indonesians. Over a hundred years ago that sharp eyed English observer, Alfred Russell Wallace, wrote (Wallace 1869 vol 2: 448,458),

... if the tide of colonization should be turned to New Guinea, there can be little doubt of the early extinction of the Papuan race(for) whether we consider their physical confirmation, their moral characteristics, or their intellectual capacities, the Malay and Papuan races offer remarkable differences and striking contrasts.

In an important and unhappy sense this is true. The Melanesians of Irian Jaya will eventually be Indonesianized. It is not an entirely new process. It has in fact been going on for a long time in various parts of the Bird's Head, in the Schouten Islands, in the area around Sorong and Fak Fak and in outer islands like the Radja Ampats. But it is now a rapidly accelerating process in most parts of the island,

notably excepting the Highlands. And it will for a long time place very brutal demands on the Melanesian.

There are probably some 260,000 non Irianese Indonesians now resident in Irian Jaya (precise figures are not easy to get). This represents a quarter of the total population. Of this number about 30-50,000 are official *transmigrasi*, mainly poor Javanese rice farmers who, for the most part, have settled in farming communities, some of them mixed Javanese/Irianese communities like that at Nabire. The remainder, mainly Buginese and others from eastern Indonesia, are voluntary settlers who have moved into poor kampongs on the outskirts of the main centres where they run small shops and food and cigarette stalls to service the increasingly Indonesianized towns. They directly impinge on urban Irianese forcing them to move into increasingly depressed kampongs of their own. Although the settlers have not impinged to the same extent on rural subsistence villagers the effects are beginning to be felt through internal migration. Serious ethnic tensions are thus in the making especially as a major problem is the unprecedentedly rapid growth of towns, Indonesian style, which favours the skilled migrants at the expense of the unskilled Irianese. The government in Jakarta is aware of the problem and Dr Mochtar told me it would like to put a stop to inter provincial migration but that it presented considerable legal difficulties. The only factors likely to inhibit the flow of internal migrants to Irian Jaya, if not reverse the trend, are a downturn in economic activity or abolition of the subsidized rice prices. As the latter is tied to the former as an incentive to attract skills and as economic activity is, if anything, on the upturn, owing to increased activity in mining and logging, the outlook is for more migrants rather than fewer.¹

The Irianese in the towns are undoubtedly lowest men on the totem pole, working as garbage collectors, truck and bus drivers, market men and road gangers. Increasingly they are recruited into the civil police and a number have enlisted in the armed forces. There

¹ See the series of articles appearing in *The Sydney Morning Herald* 27 September to 5 October 1978 and 18 and 20 December 1978 dealing with two visits to Irian Jaya.

is evidence of real efforts on the part of the Indonesian administration to increase economic opportunity and there are greater numbers of Irianese in the public service than before. But economic development aimed purely at increasing the opportunities for the Irianese is still limited.

Jakarta's policy makers pin their faith in future reconciliation of the Melanesian in the twin policies of accelerated education for the Irianese aimed at bringing them into the great mainstream of Indonesian political, social and cultural values and, more recently, in the 'smiling policy' aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the people. The education effort has certainly been massive in terms of effort and expenditure and especially in comparison with that of the Dutch. It has also been aimed at the Irianese rather than the migrant. Irianese make up by far the largest proportion of students at all levels and now get the lion's share of scholarships for tertiary and training institutes in Java and overseas. The policy is paying dividends in terms of increasingly large numbers of Irianese who speak Indonesian, not only in the towns where the lingua franca has always been *pasar Melayu* but in the Highlands and elsewhere where Indonesian is the language of contact as was *pasar Melayu* under the Dutch. I thought the most hopeful sign about students to whom I talked recently in Jayapura, in Manokwari, in Merauke and in Sorong was that they saw their future in terms of Indonesian values, in terms of working the system to their own benefit.

It is too early to say for certain what effect the 'smiling policy' is having. It certainly seems genuine enough. All thirteen Irianese technicians, graduates of the Vocational Training Centre at Jayapura, arrested at the Freeport copper mine at Tembagapura for involvement in the slurry pipe attacks in July of last year have been released. Even more astonishing is the fact that the army released Marthen Tabu after he masterminded the capture of a helicopter containing Indonesian officials in January of last year, knowing that he might sooner or

later resume clandestine OPM activities, which he did. Again, one of the principal OPM sympathizers involved in the Tembagapura affair was a Dutch educated seminarian, Vicky Wamang. After he had been released from gaol, the administration supported his application to Freeport Indonesia for a job.

To recapitulate, the incorporation of Irian Jaya into the cultural norms of the Republic will take time. It will not be an easy process and there will be great tensions, but:

- . Papua New Guinea's interests, Australia's no less, and those of the Irianese will be best served by a Papua New Guinea government policy of non interference in Irian Jaya's problems. Any interference or active display of sympathy leading to a recrudescence of pan Papuanism will meet with Indonesian hostility and political action. It is very much in Papua New Guinea's interests to help as far as possible Irian Jaya's peaceful absorption into the Republic.

- . The virtual closure of the border, the OPM's lack of arms, and its very small numbers imply that it will decline in influence. Its chief achievements in the past were its surprisingly effective propaganda links with the Irianese community in Port Moresby.

- . There is no civil OPM organization to speak of and it is difficult to see how it can operate. It is true that the OPM/GPL writes and prints pamphlets, true that it has been able in the past to exploit outbreaks of a more traditional kind, such as the Waghete-Arfak uprisings and the Baliem disturbances of 1977, and to orchestrate last year's attacks on the Freeport slurry pipe by disgruntled villagers. The signs are that it is increasingly less able to manipulate situations. In part too the 'smiling policy' is possibly beginning to have some effect.

- . Nevertheless with the present rate of outer island migration the middle term outlook is not reassuring. In the long term the Irianese will be absorbed. The middle of the journey will prove difficult and painful. One of the things that Australia may expect is the possibility of boat people from the southwest. This, if it

should occur, will need very sympathetic handling.

Historical perspectives? I have mentioned some, perhaps too few. I can best give an idea of how difficult I believe it is to generalize by saying that a short while ago I was in Fak Fak where I heard that a man I had once known was in prison, pending release, for anti Indonesian activities. When I knew him nearly twenty years ago he was in the same prison, held there by the Dutch, for anti Dutch activities.

PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL BORDERS WITH PARTICULAR
REFERENCE TO THE CURRENT RE-NEGOTIATION OF THE
INDONESIA-PAPUA NEW GUINEA AGREEMENT
CONCERNING ADMINISTRATIVE BORDER ARRANGEMENTS

J.R.V. Prescott

The relations between modern states reach their most critical stage in the form of problems relating to territory. (Hill 1976:3)

There are no problems of boundaries. There are only problems of Nations. (Ancel 1938:196)

These two quotations emphasize the importance of boundary questions and the fact that they are one part of the totality of states' relationships. It would be equally true to say that there is no boundary disagreement which could not be readily solved given goodwill on both sides, and that there is no boundary which would not furnish a cause of dispute if one country wished to force a quarrel on another.

This essay is divided into three main sections. First, a short introductory passage identifies the principal types of boundary disputes. Secondly, each of these categories is examined in detail, and their occurrence in the borderland between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea is considered. Thirdly, the conclusions of the second section are listed.

Throughout this essay the terms *boundary* and *border* are used in their precise senses. A boundary is a line and a border is a zone in which a boundary is located. It would be possible to define the width of the border according to a number of different criteria; if a particular border was defined by an economist, an anthropologist, a geomorphologist and a general it would be surprising if all the limits selected coincided.

The principal types of boundary disputes.

The general term *boundary dispute* includes four distinct

kinds of disagreements between countries. *Territorial boundary disputes* occur when one country finds part of the territory of an adjoining state attractive and seeks to acquire it. Somalia's claim to the Haud and Ogaden areas of Ethiopia and Guatemala's claim to British Honduras provide examples of such disputes. *Positional boundary disputes* occur when there is a disagreement over the exact location of the boundary, probably because of a controversy over the interpretation of a phrase in a treaty or over the correct intention of parts of previous agreements. The disagreement between China and Russia over the course of their boundary in the vicinity of the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, and the quarrel between Argentina and Chile concerning the location of their common boundary in the Beagle Channel provide examples of positional boundary disputes. In territorial and positional disputes success for the claimant state will involve a change in the position of the boundary and therefore the transfer of some territory from one country to another. The amount of territory involved would usually be less in the case of a positional dispute than in the case of a territorial dispute.

Governments will normally find it most convenient to apply certain functions, relating for example to immigration and trade, as close to the international boundary as possible. Sometimes the nature of these functions or the manner in which they are applied may give a neighbouring country cause for grievance. Disagreements of this kind can be called *functional boundary disputes*. Iraq's occasional interference with Iranian shipping on the Shatt-el-Arab and Benin's closure of boundary crossing points into Togo in October 1975 typify such boundary disputes. Because boundaries are lines they will often intersect discrete resources such as rivers or an oil field which the countries on both sides of the boundary will wish to use. Conflict over the use of such features form a separate category of *resource boundary disputes*. The quarrel between India and Bangladesh over the diversion of Ganges waters at the Farraka Barrage is representative of this kind of boundary dispute. In resource and functional boundary disputes the claimant state can be successful without any alteration in the location of the boundary; in each case what is sought is an agreed set of regulations which will alleviate the administrative problem.

Territorial boundary disputes.

Territorial boundary disputes can be divided into two main classes. First there are legal disputes when the claimant country insists that the territory desired is improperly owned by its neighbour. The Philippines' abandoned claim to part of Sabah and Kampuchea's claim to the temple of Preah Vihear in Thailand, which was upheld by the International Court of Justice in 1962, were both territorial claims based on legal grounds. Secondly, there are all the other cases when a country asserts that it would be more appropriate if part of its neighbour's territory passed to its own sovereignty. Uganda's claim to Tanzania's Kagera Salient and the Argentine's claim to the Falkland Islands are typical of this large group of territorial boundary disputes. There are many grounds on which countries will make claims against the territory of neighbours; the arguments will be based in history, in geography, in economics, and in ethnology. Usually the claim will be buttressed by as many different arguments as possible. For example, Afghanistan's persistent territorial claim to parts of western Pakistan, which is thinly veiled as support for a separate state of Pushtunistan, has at least four strands. First there are the legal and moral arguments that Afghanistan was forced to sign the 1893 agreement, which produced the Durand Line, under duress. Secondly, historical arguments are deployed to demonstrate that Afghanistan once ruled over areas of west Pakistan, and it is true that the Durrani Empire controlled some of the claimed area for seventy-six years prior to 1823, when Peshawar was lost. The third set of arguments is based in the witness of ethnologists that Pathans in Afghanistan and Pakistan form a single cultural group. Finally, it is asserted on geographical grounds that the proper boundary of the Afghanistan uplands lies closer to the Indus River, along the Sulaiman Range.

Although in most cases when territorial disputes originate the claimant state genuinely hopes and expects to acquire additional territory, there are cases when territorial claims are made to serve some domestic or international policy. Presidents Nkrumah and Amin, at different times, have made claims against Togo and Tanzania respectively, when it was obviously useful to distract attention from

pressing domestic problems of an economic and political nature. When the Philippines claimed parts of northern Sabah it was suggested by some observers that the chief design was to delay the formation of Malaysia.


When the border between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea is considered there does not appear to be any likely territorial claim from either side. The agreement between Australia and Indonesia on 12 February 1973 fixed the boundary in a clear manner which does not allow any territorial claims. However, it should not be assumed that a claim could not be manufactured by either side if changed political circumstances warranted it. Once it was fashionable to classify boundaries into two major classes called artificial boundaries and natural boundaries. Artificial boundaries included those which did not correspond with any of the major divisions of the physical or cultural landscape, while natural boundaries were distinguished by their coincidence with rivers or watersheds or lines of tribal separation. The fashion was abandoned because it was recognized that it was still necessary to select a specific line within the river or the watershed or the frontier between two tribes. This realization underlines the point that in the vicinity of a boundary there will be other limits which will be more or less obvious. Some will concern the physical landscape of plants, geological structure and hydrology, while others will relate to human occupation and include differences in language, systems of land tenure, and patterns of trade. Because the present boundary formed by the two meridians and the Fly River do not correspond consistently with possible physical and human divisions in the border it would be possible for either country, by emphasizing one of these dividing zones, to call for a rectification of the boundary. It could be argued by Indonesia, for example, that the administration of the border would be simplified if more of the boundary was made to coincide with rivers, which form prominent features in the landscape. This assertion could then be extended to the suggestion that the boundary abandons the meridian 140° east when it intersects the Alice River, and that that river is then followed by the boundary to its confluence with the Fly River and then the Fly River to boundary marked MM11 (see figure 4).

The example just cited is entirely hypothetical but it does illustrate the ease with which established lines can be challenged if a country feels that there are compelling reasons to do so. Those reasons might involve the desire to provide an external focus for national sentiment or the desire to take advantage of the weakened condition of a neighbour or the desire simply to show displeasure with some policies and attitudes being adopted by a neighbour.

It must also be recognized that population distributions sometimes change, and if alien settlement occurs on a significant scale across a boundary it can later provide the ground for a demand to redraw the boundary. It was the major immigration of Chilean workers to the guano and nitrate fields of southern Bolivia which strengthened Chile's determination to acquire that area.

A wise government will prepare for all eventualities, and because it is easier to collect evidence in periods of cordial relations it would seem sensible for both Indonesia and Papua New Guinea to accumulate any evidence which they might need to rebut any territorial claim. Murty (1968) has provided a very interesting account of the problems of collecting and interpreting evidence concerning the location of traditional boundaries in the Sino-Indian border. The dispute between India and China and between the Argentine and Chile have shown the importance which the contending parties attach to maps showing the alignment they favour. A portfolio of maps derived from archives and modern sources would be a useful weapon in the armoury of any country wishing to refute territorial claims.

While there appears to be no present risk of either side making a territorial claim on land, the situation in the waters southwest of the mouth of the Bensbach River is less certain. The present position is that Papua New Guinea has inherited a seabed boundary with Indonesia which was drawn in two sections by that country and Australia. A short section of boundary measuring 22 nautical miles from the mouth of the Bensbach River was settled in the 1973 agreement (see B1-B3 in figure 2). The longer continuation, measuring 132 nautical miles, was drawn as the seabed boundary between Indonesia and Australia in May 1971. That segment



of boundary effectively became the boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea by the terms of the treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea relating to Torres Strait (Department of Foreign Affairs 1978). That treaty has not yet entered into force but there seems little doubt that it will do so. This composite seabed boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea lies very close to the line of equidistance based on Indonesian territory on one side and the territory of Australia and Papua New Guinea on the other side. A line of equidistance is a unique line which at every point is equidistant from the nearest points of the territory of the opposite or adjacent states. In effect such a line ensures that each country obtains the seabed and waters which are closer to portions of its territory than to the territory of any other country.

From the point of view of national sovereignty counter claims to maritime areas bear direct comparison to territorial boundary disputes considered earlier. There are two lines of argument which Indonesia could follow in making maritime claims against Papua New Guinea southwest of the Bensbach River. First it could be stated that the seabed boundary agreed in 1971 (see B1-A3 in figure 2), depends on Australian claims from Turu Cay, a tiny feature standing three feet above sea-level which is not inhabited. It could then be asserted that since 1971 there has been a strong development in international opinion regarding the construction of maritime boundaries, in favour of the operation of equitable principles. Such principles would prevent the isolated speck of territory which is Turu Cay from playing a decisive role in establishing the maritime boundary south of the mouth of the Bensbach River. This argument directed against Papua New Guinea would have some force because it was precisely by the operation of such principles that Papua New Guinea obtained parts of the seabed and waters of Torres Strait which could have been claimed by Australia on the ground of equidistance.

Even if Indonesia decided not to raise any questions about the alignment of the seabed boundary it could still raise another issue. The present boundary only applies to the seabed, it still remains to

draw a boundary separating the waters above the seabed. Where the seabed boundary is a line of equidistance then the boundary dividing the waters would normally coincide with it. However, in this case it would not be unreasonable for Indonesia to insist that the boundary through the waters is being drawn between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea and that therefore the presence of any Australian islands, from which Australia is only claiming 3 nautical miles of territorial waters, should be discounted. If Turu Cay is discounted the line of equidistance between the territory of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea would result in about 1500 square nautical miles of sea on the eastern side of the seabed boundary falling under Indonesian jurisdiction.

The agreement over Torres Strait already provides a precedent for one country to have rights to the economic use of waters overlying the seabed of another country, and at present Indonesia is insisting that the division between the exclusive economic zones of Australia and itself must be drawn south of the seabed boundary agreed in 1972 in the Timor Sea and the western Arafura Sea.

It is convenient at this point to observe that there is no comparable problem connected with the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea in the Pacific Ocean. The agreement in May 1971 defined a short section of seabed boundary measuring 30 nautical miles. It began where meridian 140° east intersects the coast and terminates at a point identified as C2 (see figure 3). On 30 March 1978 Papua New Guinea defined its maritime boundaries and extended the boundary northwards to the outer edge of its offshore seas, which lie 200 nautical miles from its baseline.¹ It appears that Papua New Guinea has claimed less than the equidistance principle would permit; however, part of the Offshore Seas Proclamation 1978 of 30 March 1978, stipulates that where no agreement has been reached with other states the defined line is drawn without prejudice to the ultimate location of the boundary.²

¹ *Papua New Guinea National Gazette* G24, 30 March 1978, pp 3-4.

² *Ibid* p.2.




Figure 3 Maritime boundaries north of the Indonesia-Papua New Guinea border
Source: Author's research

Positional boundary disputes.

While the basic cause of territorial boundary disputes is superimposition of the boundary on the cultural or physical landscape, which allows one or both sides to canvass the greater merit of alternative lines, positional boundary disputes arise because the evolution of the boundary is incomplete. It is a defect in the definition of the boundary, in a text, on a map or in the landscape, which is critical in the case of positional disputes. They will often arise during the process of demarcation when joint survey teams are striving to match the boundary defined in a treaty text with the features of the landscape. For example, the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1896 stipulated that the boundary between the areas now known as Iran and Pakistan would follow the Tahlab River to its junction with the Mirjawa River. Eight years later it was discovered that Tahlab and Mirjawa are two names for the same river and there is no point where usage changes from one to the other. Often the problems arise because the boundary was defined by diplomats in imperial capitals, working with inaccurate maps. Sometimes the errors arise because of the errors on the map, on other occasions confusion is created because the diplomats tried to make assurance doubly sure and defined a single point in two ways which were found later to be quite different. For example, the first boundary between Bolivia and Peru was defined as passing through the confluence of the Lanza and Tambopata Rivers *which lay north of parallel 14° south*. The surveyors had no trouble finding the confluence, but unfortunately it was south of 14° south.

Positional disputes can also arise in situations where a boundary has been demarcated through an unpopulated border which subsequently becomes more intensively used. The movement of new settlers into a border and the use of virgin land close to the boundary provide an acid test for the completeness and accuracy of the boundary definition and demarcation.

Sometimes positional boundary disputes arise because the line is made to coincide with some unstable feature in the landscape. Some rivers make very poor boundaries because they tend to change their

course in two ways. First, rivers can change their course gradually and generally imperceptibly, by accretion and erosion. The downstream migration of meanders falls into this category. Secondly, river courses can be changed suddenly by cutting through the neck of a meander. The first case does not usually call for any special arrangements because over the long term both sides will lose and gain approximately equal areas. However, in the second case the area of land enclosed by the meander is suddenly switched from one side of the river to the other. It is then a nice point to decide whether the boundary follows the new course of the river or continues to follow the abandoned course. The question of river islands can also be difficult because the deposition of silt will sometimes join islands to one of the banks. This latter problem has been particularly serious on the River Mekong where it forms the boundary between Thailand and Laos. The Franco-Thai treaty of 1893 gave France title to all the islands in the river and problems of jurisdiction arose when some of the islands became attached to the Thai bank through the deposition of alluvium. A commission was established in 1926 to rule on all future problems of this nature but the decolonization of Indo-China and the determination of Laos to own all the islands, as France did before it, has caused a fresh round of problems.

Many boundary architects have been deceived by apparently exact representation of rivers on maps and have decided that such precise features would make excellent boundaries. Unfortunately the actual rivers possess a width which makes it necessary to select some particular line within the river. Lines which can and have been used in rivers include the bank, the line of equidistance or median line, and the thalweg. If a bank is used then the entire river belongs to a single country, but an added disadvantage is that water levels change and so does the position of the bank. Further, the banks of some rivers in very flat country might merge into swamps before reaching firm ground. The median line can be easily constructed if the banks are clearly defined, but of course the line will change in location as the banks are eroded or extended by alluvial deposition. Further, the median line might intersect the navigable channel of the river and create




Figure 4 Australia-Indonesian boundary agreement of 1973.
 Source: Department of Foreign Affairs, Treaty Series 1974, No.26.

problems for commercial use. The thalweg is the line of the deepest continuous channel in the river. While this line will also change it does mean that countries on both sides will be able to claim navigation rights for their citizens.

Turning now to the boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea it seems that the only scope for a positional boundary dispute concerns the section of the Fly River used for the international boundary. The meridians north and south of the Fly River have been marked by ten and four monuments respectively. The maximum distance between any two markers is the 56 nautical miles between monuments MM11 and MM12 (see figure 4). Such a distance would mean that it would be difficult for a farmer to know exactly where the boundary lay in the intervening area, but it is understood that all major tracks have been signposted and the exact location of each adjacent village has been computed. Modern survey techniques would make it a comparatively easy matter to fix more monuments on the line if that was deemed essential. The 1973 agreement defines the boundary along the Fly River as *the waterway*, which is shown in parentheses to be the *thalweg*. The distance between monuments MM10 and MM11, which mark the termini of the section of the Fly River which forms the boundary, is 34 nautical miles, but the course of river will be much longer because it meanders widely over the flat, marshy plain (see figure 5). Maps of the region show very clearly the abandoned meanders along the river's course, and in some cases the boundary has moved as much as 3.5 kilometres when the neck of a meander was breached (see the meander marked B on figure 6). The map evidence suggests that the Fly River has an unstable course which makes it unsuitable for use as an international boundary. If the border in the vicinity of the river ever became intensively used it would prove to be a very difficult line to monitor.¹ The maps suggest that the river contains few islands which

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During discussion of Dr Prescott's paper it was observed that the Fly River could be intensively used if plans went ahead to exploit the Ok Tedi copper-gold deposit in the Star Mountains of Papua New Guinea and to transport the ore by barge down the Fly. An early feasibility study has recommended the breaching of meanders to facilitate navigation. (Ed.)




Figure 5 The Fly River (Army Map Service, 1:250,000, SB 54-10)




Figure 6 Meanders on the Fly River
(Netherlands series, 1956,
100,000)

will reduce the problems caused, but it would be necessary to examine large scale air-photographs to confirm this point.

Functional boundary disputes.

A functional boundary dispute is created when one country's authorities decide that national interests have been adversely and unfairly affected by the activities of a neighbouring country along the boundary. These activities will obviously be concerned with movement across the boundary of people, or stock, or goods, or ideas, and the complaint can take two major forms. In the first case the plaintiff state might consider that its neighbour is unreasonably interfering with trans-boundary movements. For example, Pakistan, in retaliation against Afghanistan's support for the Pathan secessionist movement, required Powinda herders to produce certificates of health for their animals before admitting them on their annual transhumance movement to the Indus plains at the beginning of winter. It proved impossible to satisfy this new regulation and the Powindas and their herds had to winter in Afghanistan. More recently Tanzania has prevented Kenyan lorries from operating between Kenya and Zambia along the roads through the west of Tanzania. Tanzania claims that this heavy traffic is damaging its unsealed roads; Kenya believes that Tanzania is unwilling to see Zambia's dependence on Dar es Salaam reduced. The imposition of tariffs is another device by which one country can hinder trans-boundary trade; while the withholding of work-permits is one method of obstructing immigration into a country.

In the second case the plaintiff country might be dissatisfied because its neighbour is not preventing illegal trans-boundary movements. For example, in the last year the export earnings of both Uganda and the Central African Empire were seriously reduced because diamonds, cotton, cocoa and coffee were smuggled out and sold in neighbouring countries. Countries might also complain if a neighbour fails to enforce health standards which result in animal or human diseases being introduced across the boundary, or fails to prevent a flood of refugees into the plaintiff's part of the border. Some of the most serious functional

boundary disputes arise when one country fails to prevent its border being used as a base for dissidents attacking the authority across the boundary. Such attacks may be launched as military campaigns in the style of the POLISARIO raids into Mauritania from Algeria, or they may simply be propaganda attacks by radio transmitters.

Functional boundary disputes have not attracted the interest of scholars to the same extent as territorial or positional disputes. This situation may be due either to the prompt settlement of most functional disputes or to the fact that serious and persistent functional disputes occur only between hostile countries which display their antagonism in more obvious and often more threatening ways. It seems likely that the chance of functional disputes developing will be greatest when the traffic across the boundary is mainly in one direction, whether it is legal or illegal. This is because in such situations there will be little or no opportunity for retaliation by the plaintiff state. If there is a flourishing traffic in both directions across the boundary any country which considers itself to be adversely affected by its neighbour's actions in the border can adopt similar measures. The introduction of new regulations or the more stringent application of existing rules which precipitate functional disputes, will often be made for sound strategic or economic reasons. However, it is also possible that they may be introduced or intensified in order to show displeasure with the policies or attitudes of a neighbouring country.

While it is possible to speculate intelligently about the possibility of territorial or positional disputes developing by studying the texts of treaties, large scale maps and air photographs, and by applying current and developing rules about the construction of maritime boundaries, there are no substitutes for rigorous fieldwork in identifying functional disputes. From conversations with people familiar with the border and from press and radio reports it appears that the problem most likely to produce functional disputes concerns the flight of dissidents from Irian Jaya into Papua New Guinea. It does not appear that the numbers involved would create serious logistic problems for the authorities of Papua New Guinea, as the movement of refugees into Thailand and into Bangladesh have for the governments of

those countries. It therefore seems possible that Indonesia would be the plaintiff state on one of two grounds. The Indonesian administration might argue that officials in Papua New Guinea should prevent dissidents from crossing into their country so that Indonesian military sweeps against such groups could be more effective. Alternatively it might be argued that the officials of Papua New Guinea should be more diligent in stopping dissidents from re-entering Indonesia after a sojourn in Papua New Guinea.

Any research programme seeking to establish the existence of functional disputes, or the likelihood of any developing, would need to collect information on the number of crossing points; the traffic across each point; the extent of trans-boundary landholdings in the border; the possibility of any part of the border experiencing rapid economic development; and the regulations governing border activities and the manner in which they are applied. The fact that Dr Mochtar has described the present agreement as 'very rudimentary' suggests that there are functional problems which Indonesia seeks to alleviate.

Resource boundary disputes.

Not all trans-boundary resources will provide possible causes of resource boundary disputes. For example, it is unlikely that a valuable, pure stand of hardwoods which straddled the boundary would cause any difficulties, providing the exact position of the boundary was known. The mining of ore bodies in the border will only call for cooperation and discussion when the construction of shafts and galleries might produce drainage or flooding problems for a mine on the other side of the boundary. The most common source of resource boundary disputes are water bodies, such as lakes or rivers, which mark or cross the boundary. Two main cases can be distinguished. First there are those situations where the boundary is drawn through the lake or along the river. In that case each state has equal access to the same stretch of the river or lake for navigation, fishing, water supplies and irrigation. It is usual for treaties producing such boundaries to stipulate that each side has equal rights to use the river or lake, but that such use must not be to the detriment of the other user. Plainly any country which allowed a breakwater to be constructed into a river without consultation with its neighbour runs the risk of fomenting

a dispute if the altered flow of the water begins to erode the neighbour's bank. Equally it would be against the terms of the general clause described above if one country allowed developments along a tributary of a boundary river to pollute that boundary river and perhaps spoil the fishing for people on both banks.

The second situation arises when the river basin is divided by the boundary and the states have successive use of the waters. In such a situation the downstream state can adversely affect the upstream country by building a dam which floods back into the neighbour's territory. Such flooding will reduce the neighbour's capacity to use that land. The construction of the Aswan High Dam resulted in flooding in the Sudanese border and the Egyptian government agreed to share the cost of resettling those villagers whose lands were inundated. The downstream country can be adversely affected if the upstream state builds a dam which alters the regime of the river or diverts large volumes for irrigation, which reduces the flow in the lower sections. When Kariba Dam was built it was necessary for what are now Zambia and Zimbabwe Rhodesia to guarantee a minimum flow along the Zambezi into Mozambique. Many international agreements have been reached to deal with the successive ownership of rivers; the Indus Waters Agreement shows that even countries which exhibit a high level of mutual suspicion, such as India and Pakistan, can reach a satisfactory solution to this kind of problem.

The other obvious resource which could create problems is a hydrocarbon deposit of natural gas or crude petroleum. Such a deposit, given the right structural conditions could be tapped from either side of the boundary. For this reason most current seabed boundary agreements require consultation between the parties if any hydrocarbon deposit is found to straddle the boundary. In some cases this consultation is required for any deposit found within a set distance of the boundary.

Once again, it would only be possible to analyse the risk of resource boundary disputes in the vicinity of the Indonesia-Papua New Guinea boundary after detailed fieldwork to establish the economic activities in the border which might damage boundary rivers or the use

of a common ore body or hydrocarbon field.¹ In pursuing this fieldwork it would be necessary to look beyond the border in some cases. For example, it is possible that a programme of extensive felling of timber in the headwaters of the Sepik River on the Indonesian side of the boundary could increase the rate of run-off to a level which would have consequences for the lower reaches of the river remote from the border.

Conclusions.

This review of the four types of boundary disputes suggests a number of conclusions regarding the Indonesia-Papua New Guinea border. First, the only possible, immediate territorial boundary dispute concerns waters and perhaps the seabed southwest of the Bensbach River. Indonesia has a fairly strong argument that Papua New Guinea should not be allowed to profit at Indonesia's expense by basing the common maritime boundary on Turu Cay, a small, isolated island belonging to Australia which that country only uses to claim a zone of territorial waters 3 nautical miles wide. Secondly, there is unlikely to be any territorial dispute on land unless there is a dramatic worsening of relations between the two countries. Such a claim would have to be based on the history and ethnography of the border, and both administrations would be wise to collect as much information as is necessary to refute any claims which might be made. Thirdly, the central course of the Fly River, which forms part of the international boundary, represents the only probable cause of a positional boundary dispute. It would only arise if that part of the valley was subject to more intensive economic development. Fourthly, the nature of any functional or resource boundary disputes will be established only by detailed fieldwork. The present apparent functional dispute is related to the flight of political dissidents from Indonesia to Papua New Guinea and their activities in the border. The only probable resource dispute is likely to concern those rivers which are shared or divided by the two countries.

¹ In the course of discussion of Dr Prescott's paper references were made to the possibility of resource boundary disputes arising from exploitation of the Ok Tedi copper-gold deposit. Possible points of contention include river pollution associated with the proposed mining operation and effects downstream of suggested breaching of meanders of the Fly River (see footnote p.24). There is also the possibility of other ore bodies in this area extending to both sides of the border. (Ed.)

Given the undeveloped nature of much of this border it is surprising that the existing agreement has not worked satisfactorily, in view of the provision which it makes for joint consultation at various levels of government. Papua New Guinea, as the smaller country, would be wise to ensure that all outstanding questions are cleared up during the present negotiations, even if this involves concessions in a number of matters.

THE 'JUSUF LINE':
BEGINNINGS OF A MORE FRUITFUL PHASE?

Rex Mortimer

Indonesia's approach to the problem of securing and defusing its border with Papua New Guinea underwent a major reappraisal in 1978, resulting in the adoption of more flexible policies towards the Irianese population and more specifically the armed dissidents of the OPM. The new policies have important implications for Indonesia's relations with Papua New Guinea, and this paper will try to unravel the rationale behind Jakarta's policy revision, examine the likely impact on Papua New Guinea, and assess the longer term prospects for the success of the new approach.

From Indonesia's point of view, the border situation and attendant problems had been deteriorating steadily for several years prior to mid 1978. The root of the problem, in Jakarta's eyes, lay across the border in Papua New Guinea. Despite the Papua New Guinea government's formal adherence to the border agreement reached with Indonesia in 1973,¹ border controls were not working effectively to limit the activities of the OPM guerillas, who were able to cross virtually at will to evade Indonesian operations against them, establish more or less permanent bases inside Papua New Guinea territory, and maintain a courier and intelligence network, all of which together contributed significantly to their ability to harass Indonesian patrols and installations. Beyond the border management issue itself, the Papua New Guinea government was unable or unwilling to respond as Indonesia wished to requests for the return of political refugees seeking sanctuary inside Papua New Guinea borders, or for firmer restraints upon the political activities of Irianese residents of Papua New Guinea.

¹ The agreement is reproduced as appendix 1 to this volume.

Largely as a result of these delinquencies on the part of Papua New Guinea, military units of the OPM were growing bolder and more successful in their attacks upon Indonesian authority. Early in 1977 they ambushed an Indonesian patrol, killing seven soldiers.¹ For several months of the same year, they provided leadership to a major uprising by tribesmen in the Baliem Valley, which required energetic measures for its suppression.² This in turn was followed by acts of sabotage against the Freeport copper mine at Tembagapura and its pipeline to the south coast of Irian Jaya.³ Finally, in May 1978, an OPM unit ambushed and kidnapped members of an Indonesian negotiating mission, killing two of them and ultimately forcing the authorities to undertake a humiliating exercise in order to gain the release of the remainder.⁴

These incidents not only indicated a new level of boldness on the part of the OPM but also gave the rebels international publicity on a scale unknown since the 'Act of Free Choice' in 1969, an opportunity which the OPM was able to capitalize upon with new and more effective propaganda outlets based in Port Moresby and regularly providing the media with its news and views. The possibility could not be dismissed in Jakarta that a continuation of this trend in rebel activity would cause Indonesia official embarrassment overseas and even attract material support for the rebel cause from revolutionary regimes in Asia or Africa. Coming so closely on top of the unhappy East Timor affair, these prospects were distinctly unwelcome to Jakarta.

Although Indonesia regarded Papua New Guinean policies as the key to the border control problem - and consequentially to the reduction

¹ Confidential information from Indonesian official source.

² Hamish McDonald, 'Looking Back at Irian Uprising', *Sydney Morning Herald* 7 December 1977.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ John Waugh, 'Irian Jaya Rebels Kill Two of their Hostages', *Sydney Morning Herald* 2 August 1977.

of OPM strength and mobility - Jakarta was aware of the difficulties faced by the Papua New Guinea government and hence of the need for restraint and patience on its part in securing the kind of cooperation required to improve the situation. It well knew that large numbers of the political public in Papua New Guinea were fearful and suspicious of Indonesia, that they resented the forcible absorption of Irian Jaya, and that they espoused a mystique of 'Melanesian unity' which made them highly sympathetic to the rebel cause across the border.¹ It was also fully aware of the fragile character of the Somare coalition governments between 1972 and 1977, the formidable problems which those governments faced in the transition to and consolidation of independence, and the manner in which internal conflicts tended repeatedly to become embroiled with the Irianese issue.

In this context, despite considerable irritation with Papua New Guinea failings, the most important factor for Jakarta was that Papua New Guinean leaders, in particular Somare and the foreign minister Sir Maori Kiki, strove to pacify anti Indonesian elements in cabinet and constantly reiterated their determination to prevent the use of the border and Papua New Guinea territory generally by OPM guerillas and their Irianese sympathizers resident in Papua New Guinea. While these efforts resulted in little positive action, they provided Indonesia with levers to keep pressure upon the Papua New Guinea government to live up to its promises. More crucially, they enabled Jakarta to adhere to a policy of supporting governmental stability in Papua New Guinea. I have no doubt that if the Papua New Guinea government had opted for open or covert hostility towards Indonesia, the latter would eventually have sought to create trouble for it by a combination of external harassment and internal disruption, but this would have been undertaken *faute de mieux*. Indonesia's best approach has always lain in consolidating governmental capacity in Papua New Guinea, since effective border management, and derivatively the pacification of Irian Jaya, demand stable

¹ For a more extensive treatment of Papua New Guinean attitudes towards Indonesia and the Irianese, see Mortimer (1976).

administrative and military presences on both sides of the border. Indonesia's commitment to this approach was demonstrated from the outset of Papua New Guinea's independence by the level and size of its diplomatic representation in Port Moresby, and has been confirmed many times since then by assurances to the Papua New Guinea government and to Australia, whose good offices Jakarta has used frequently to sort out difficulties with Papua New Guinea and have its requirements transmitted quietly but pointedly.

Indonesia's patience began to be rewarded with the return of the Somare government with an enlarged majority in July 1977. Mr Somare's authority and self-confidence had already been enhanced by the successful purge of the 'left wing' executive of the Pangu party in 1976, and the solution (for the time being at least) of the country's most volatile issue - that of regional unrest - through the introduction of provincial governments. Following the 1977 election, he began to act far more decisively as prime minister, assisted in the sphere of foreign relations by the able and ambitious Ebia Olewale. (Like most Papua New Guinean politicians, Mr Olewale has a past history of opposition to Indonesia on the Irian issue, but - again typically - once in office he has implemented government policy energetically.)

As far as we can judge without direct access to the records, the initial breakthrough leading to Jakarta's changed approach to the Irian Jaya problem appears to have come during talks held among Papua New Guinean, Australian and Indonesian officials in December 1977. Both Somare and Olewale had been convinced for some time that Papua New Guinea had to do something to stem the deteriorating border situation, with its potential for serious discord with Indonesia and escalating internal conflict in Papua New Guinea itself. They were also of the opinion, as were Australian officials whom they consulted,¹ that the position

1 The extent of Australia's role in the border issue cannot be fully known without access to Foreign Affairs and diplomatic files, but many sources (including confidential information passed to me) indicate that it has been considerable. One would like to know the considerations behind Tom Critchley's transfer from Port Moresby to Jakarta.

of the government was now strong enough to enable it to act upon its verbal undertakings to tighten up on border controls and OPM activities inside Papua New Guinea. Their disposition to act may well have been stimulated by the revelation of the lack of governmental coordination - and possibly more serious problems - disclosed by the so-called 'Diro Affair'.¹

The new level of Papua New Guinea-Indonesian cooperation on the border was vividly revealed in June 1978 when Papua New Guinea defence forces for the first time undertook large scale operations fully coordinated with an Indonesian offensive against the Irianese rebels. The joint operation resulted in a significant weakening of rebel capacity; although the guerillas narrowly avoided being trapped between the two armies, and suffered few direct casualties, their forces were dispersed and vital supplies captured or destroyed, their sanctuaries in Papua New Guinea were overrun and rendered unsafe for the future, and a number of friendly villages in Irian Jaya were savagely punished. Just as important as the operation itself was the demonstration it provided that Papua New Guinea's new hard line against the OPM was politically viable. Despite protests inside and outside parliament, the Somare government was able to carry through its policy with no more concession to its critics than an expression of concern at Indonesian violations of Papua New Guinea territory during the military operations.²

In the light of this experience, the Papua New Guinea government

¹ Brigadier-General Diro, commander-in-chief of the Papua New Guinea Defence Forces, had talks with OPM leader Seth Rumkorem in the latter part of 1977, apparently with the knowledge of the minister of defence but not that of Mr Somare or the majority of cabinet. General Diro's carpeting over the affair, and his vigorous riposte (backed up by Papua New Guinea and Australian officers under his command) created a minor crisis in Port Moresby at the time, revealing deep divisions in cabinet and the top levels of the administration. See issues of the *Post-Courier* October 1977.

² For an account of the operations and their results, see *Far Eastern Economic Review* 4 August 1978.

was able to enforce more positive sanctions against rebel activity inside Papua New Guinea. Refugees were now scrutinized more rigorously and active opponents of Indonesia among border crossers were returned to Indonesian custody. In September came the most dramatic event of all - the arrest of OPM leader Jacob Prai and two associates at Vanimo, just across the border from Jayapura. Despite a renewed wave of protests, the Papua New Guinea government again stood firm and held Prai in gaol for nearly six months until he was granted asylum in Sweden.¹ In the same period, the permissive attitude towards Irianese political agitation against Indonesia in Papua New Guinea was replaced by close surveillance and stern injunctions to the offenders. The extent of Papua New Guinea's new effectiveness against the OPM - and hence its usefulness to Indonesia - could be measured by the state of mind among OPM supporters in Port Moresby by the end of 1978. Defeatist and rent by feuding factions, their animus against the Papua New Guinea government was so intense that there was wild talk among them of terrorist attacks upon their hosts.²

By year's end, then, the Papua New Guinea government had given Indonesia substantial evidence both of the sincerity of its desire to cooperate in sanitizing the border and of its capacity to do so. It is in this light that Jakarta's new line in Irian Jaya must be appraised. The first indication of the change was contained in speeches delivered by the Indonesian defence minister, General Jusuf, on successive days in November 1978, the first one in Jayapura and the second in South Sulawesi. Jusuf announced that Indonesia would desist from its direct assaults upon Irianese culture and allow the people to adjust more slowly to the norms of Indonesian civilization. At the same time, he stated that in future the OPM rebels would be treated as the minor nuisance they constituted in fact. Indonesia would no longer engage in major operations against the rebels; instead, it would confine its military activities to routine border patrolling and security duties, leaving the guerillas either to rot in the jungle or accept in their own good time the generous clemency terms Indonesia was prepared to offer them.³

¹ For a brief summary of the Prai affair, see *Far Eastern Economic Review* 23 March 1979.

² My own sources.

³ *Far Eastern Economic Review* 24 November 1978.

Press comment on the Jusuf initiative has tended to concentrate upon the defence minister's 'new broom' and personal qualities. Without derogating from Jusuf's accomplishments, however, it is clear from the background we have surveyed that Jakarta's policy revision is the culmination of those events, and represents not merely modifications in the treatment of Irianese but a 'pay-off' to Papua New Guinea for its cooperativeness of the past year. If all goes well under the new dispensation, Papua New Guinea should not be called upon to undertake further major military operations embarrassingly associated with Indonesian offensives; there should be less border crossing by OPM effectives, and less necessity for the latter to set up bases on Papua New Guinea soil. Papua New Guinea's responsibilities will be more routine in character, concentrated upon border patrolling and the checking of Irianese activities inside Papua New Guinea. In turn, a lower Papua New Guinea profile on the Irianese issue should moderate domestic opposition in this area.

Indonesia's gains will be no less substantial if the policy works. Having abandoned its attempts to achieve total control in Irian Jaya, moderated its assaults on Irianese lifeways, and settled for a realistic assessment of its national interest and OPM marginality, it will suffer fewer manpower losses, save a good deal of unnecessary expense, and still international disquiet about its rule in Irian.

For both parties, the new policy opens up the prospect of expanded relations upon a more constructive basis and with less resistance from critics and sceptics in both camps. Already last December, foreign minister Kusumaatmadja's visit to Port Moresby, where he confirmed Jusuf's interpretation of the new line in Irian Jaya, appears to have gone off well.¹ In January this year, discussions began on a new border agreement to replace the expiring one of 1973, and preliminary reports suggest that on this occasion positive programmes for development along the border are being discussed.²

¹ *Far Eastern Economic Review* 23 March 1979.

² *Ibid.*

It still remains to be seen whether the new line will stick, however. In the long term, Indonesia can probably count upon induced demographic changes in Irian Jaya to consolidate its position in the province. On present trends, immigration into the province from other parts of Indonesia will within a decade overwhelm the indigenous inhabitants in the coastal areas and provide the central authorities with a powerful loyalist community to rely upon for the maintenance of control.¹ The hinterland will remain a source of instability, but with Indonesia able to build up a local (mixed immigrant and Irianese) civilian and military peacekeeping force and with improved logistics, trouble there can probably be contained if not eliminated. (Irian Jaya's highlands are not as crucial for Indonesia as those east of the border are for Papua New Guinea.)

In the medium term, however, trouble for the new dispensation could come from either side of the border. In Irian, the rebels are down but not out, and if they can overcome their political disabilities - always, in my opinion, their most serious weakness - they could once more capitalize upon Irianese disenchantment with Indonesian economic, cultural and demographic modes of domination. One paradox of the kind of policy now adopted by Indonesia is that the more it succeeds in the short run, the more it tends to breed laxity and complacency among those on both sides of the border who are responsible for the routine patrolling and security which the policy assumes to be a constant accompaniment of it. Another problem is that high level policies are often administered with considerable unevenness by subordinates, and as a result higher expectations are shattered by arbitrariness - a frequent recipe for revolt. In other words, an OPM revitalized by Irianese discontent and a unified national liberation front ideology could rebuild its shattered bases, communications and intelligence in an atmosphere rendered more conducive by the very approach designed to remove its sting. If that happened - and it is a real risk involved in the new line - then the pre Jusuf situation would be restored, only with conceivably greater

¹ See Garnaut and Manning (1974).

OPM guerilla potential, and Papua New Guinea-Indonesian relations would once more come under strain.

The other point of vulnerability for the new policy lies in the question marks that hang over Papua New Guinea's future stability. At the moment, systematic breakdown there does not appear to be a serious cause for concern but gradually rising graphs of anomic disorder in Port Moresby and, more crucially, the Highlands, do constitute danger signals. What makes the Highlands a particularly sensitive spot is a combination of geography and economics: if the Highlands decide they do not want to be ruled, then they cannot be ruled, and if they cannot be ruled the country faces an acute economic crisis from the loss of vital export income. In such a circumstance, Papua New Guinea's resources would be solely concentrated upon survival, and great swathes of the country - not just the border - would be wide open to dissident activities of diverse kinds, of which the Irianese variety would doubtless be well represented.

Needless to say, a combination of both sources of destabilization would represent the 'worst case' that the new Indonesian policy might confront. Indonesia has obviously weighed the first possibility in the balance before adopting its new approach, however, and the history of the OPM to date suggests that it has more than an even chance of working. That being so, and the pessimistic scenario for Papua New Guinea being more remote and in any case less amenable to policy determination, Jakarta may well feel reasonably confident that it has embarked on a fruitful new phase both in Irianese affairs and in its relations with Papua New Guinea.

DOES INDONESIA HAVE EXPANSIONIST
DESIGNS ON PAPUA NEW GUINEA?

J.A.C. Mackie

This paper had its origins in a talk I gave at the University of Papua New Guinea shortly after the September 1978 Waigani seminar, in which I attempted to answer some of the comments I had encountered there to the effect that Indonesia's foreign policies were inherently expansionist and that her strained relations with Papua New Guinea over the various border incidents of 1978 were a sign that she aspired to dominate and perhaps ultimately to annex Papua New Guinea.

Comments of this kind were usually based on three types of argument. According to one of these, the pressure the Indonesian government was then putting on Papua New Guinea to cooperate militarily with her in trying to seal the border against the Irianese dissidents seeking refuge on the eastern side of the border was to be seen as merely the first in a series of demands which, unless resisted from the outset, would culminate eventually in the complete subjugation of Papua New Guinea. My own feeling was - and still is - that Indonesia's objectives here were and are merely limited ones to do with her border problems; there was no reason to believe she had limitless and sinister designs for the ultimate annexation of Papua New Guinea as a whole. I could well understand that many people in Papua New Guinea who felt strongly that the Melanesian inhabitants of Irian Jaya were their blood brothers were unsympathetic even towards Indonesia's limited goals of closing the border against OPM elements who were taking advantage of the opportunities for easy sanctuary it provided; but that in itself was not an adequate reason for inferring that Indonesia had expansionist ambitions. To meet this objection, critics of Indonesia's policies cited one form or other of the argument that her expansionist appetites had already been amply demonstrated by the Timor episode, by the 'confrontation' of Malaysia in 1963-66 (referred to hereafter simply as *konfrontasi*)

and by the earlier campaign to gain control of Irian Jaya over the years 1950-62.

It is this second argument - about the conclusions to be drawn from the historical record regarding the supposedly 'expansionist' character of her foreign policies - which constitutes the central theme of this paper. If one looks *only* at this sequence of events, three episodes involving the use of force around Indonesia's borders, apparently directed towards the acquisition of territory, it is very easy to draw the conclusion that this is evidence of territorial expansionism. Yet when we examine the motivations and political dynamics behind each of these episodes we find that crude territorial expansionism, as defined below, has played little or no part in bringing them about. At this point, however, we must define 'expansionism' a little more precisely. I am interpreting it to mean a desire to annex additional territory either

- i for the sake of more *lebensraum* (living space) or resources (oil, copper, timber, etc.);
- ii for the sake of demonstrating the national power so as to intimidate neighbours;
- iii because of an ideology of national greatness, power and vigour, as in the case of Mussolini and Hitler;
- iv for irredentist reasons (to recover parts of the national territory which have been lost in past wars), or
- v because of a belief that the nation has a historic mission to reestablish its ancient or mythical boundaries, as in the case of Russia's pan Slavic tendencies in the late 19th Century

None of these objectives has played any significant part in motivating Indonesia's foreign policies since independence, in my opinion, with the possible exception of the last two (and I would even query that). I will later give some attention briefly to this last hypothesis, however, for several articles have been written, with titles like 'The Potential for Indonesian Expansionism' (Gordon 1963-64) to explain her foreign policy objectives in the *konfrontasi* episode and these have gained wider circulation than they deserve. They were based

on the *Indonesia Raya*, or 'Greater Indonesia', theory that the country's leaders have constantly nurtured irredentist aspirations to redraw their national boundaries in accordance with the historic boundaries of ancient Srivijaya and Majapahit. In my study of the causes of *konfrontasi*, however, I found this theory utterly erroneous and irrelevant.¹ It seems to me equally irrelevant as an explanation of the invasion of Timor, although the Timor affair revived many of the old fears that Indonesia has an ominous appetite for additional territory. And it is even less relevant, I think, to Indonesian attitudes to Papua New Guinea, for reasons I will outline at the end of the paper.

A third type of argument, which one most frequently encounters among radical critics of the Indonesian government, is one I will call the 'analogy with fascism' argument - that is, the proposition that expansionism tends to be an inherent *structural* feature of military or authoritarian or avowedly fascist regimes. Hence, since Indonesia undeniably has a highly authoritarian, army-based government, there is a *prima facie* presumption that her foreign policies are expansionist and aggressive in much the same way as were Mussolini's or Hitler's or those of pre-war Japan, either because of a militaristic and imperialist ideology or for more complex socio-political reasons. This kind of analogy is absurdly far-fetched, however. The Suharto regime may be authoritarian and in some respects even repressive, but to call it 'fascist' in any but a pejorative sense is a sheer misuse of the term. Yet this kind of hypothesis has some affinities with what might be categorized as 'diversionist' or 'instability' theories of the dynamics of Indonesian foreign policies, which also achieved quite wide currency at the time of the *konfrontasi* episode and cannot be entirely dismissed out of hand.

Closely akin to this approach is one of the more plausible (but in my opinion misleading) recent explanations of the Suharto

¹ For a fuller discussion of the *Indonesia Raya* theory and the Malaysian propaganda use of it, see Mackie (1974:21-4, 326-7 and the references cited therein).

government's foreign policies, put forward in 1976 by Rex Mortimer (Mortimer 1976) which could almost be called a 'neurosis theory' of Indonesian national self assertiveness, to which also I will return later. But before we go any further, it will be helpful to look more closely at the particular cases which are commonly held to be evidence of Indonesia's 'expansionist' appetites. From these I think it will become clear that the search for explanatory hypotheses is a good deal more complex than is implied by the word 'expansionism' in any meaningful sense.

The Irian Jaya Claim

The basis of the original Indonesian claim to Irian Jaya is so well known that it is hardly necessary to go into it at any length.¹ Indonesia maintained that as the successor state to the former Netherlands East Indies her national territory should embrace the whole of what had formerly been the Netherlands East Indies, including Irian Jaya which had previously been considered an integral part of the former colony (albeit one of the most neglected and little-developed parts). The Dutch insistence on retaining possession of what they called 'Dutch New Guinea' at the time of the 1949 Round Table Conference negotiations leading to Indonesian independence, for reasons of Dutch domestic politics and wounded *amour propre*, created a deadlock which was broken only by the unsatisfactory compromise decision to postpone further negotiations on the issue until 1950. In the course of those negotiations neither side would budge - and as the status quo favoured the Dutch, they clung on grimly to their colony until mounting Indonesian pressures, military as well as diplomatic and economic, coupled with declining international support for the Dutch, finally compelled them to surrender their hold on the colony in 1962.

¹ The best account of the early stages of the Irian Jaya campaign is Bone (1958); for the final stages, see Mackie (1974:98-103).

The rationale behind Indonesia's case was perfectly straightforward: her claim to Irian Jaya derived from the central principles of nationalism and anticolonialism upon which her revolution against the Dutch had been fought. To abandon the claim would have been to deny those principles at a time when the very unity of the fragile new state depended on maintaining the principle of nationalism as paramount in the face of potentially secessionist regional dissident movements. Indonesians believed that in pursuing their claim to Irian Jaya they were merely trying to gain control over territory that should have been recognized as rightfully theirs from the outset. The Dutch were thought to be holding on to West New Guinea for no better reason than to use it as a base from which they could subvert and fragment the new Republic of Indonesia, especially by stirring up trouble in the Moluccas and other eastern islands of the archipelago. It is worth noting, incidentally, that it was not until five or six years after 1949 that the Dutch began to talk seriously about 'self-determination' for West New Guinea and not until 1959-60 that they embarked upon their 'crash programme' to create a New Guinea elite rapidly in the hope of frustrating the Indonesians by rushing West New Guinea to independence. The Dutch put great emphasis on the racial differences between Indonesians and the Melanesian inhabitants of West New Guinea, but Indonesians regarded this as irrelevant, since they themselves were ethnically heterogeneous and they did not regard racial affinities as the determining criteria of their nationhood.

Indonesians of all political persuasions were united in support of the claim to Irian Jaya. (The strongest initial proponents of the claim were, in fact, the most pro Dutch and conservative group of leaders at the Round Table Conference negotiations, the Federalists, not the Republicans.) No one ever publicly denied the rightness of this claim, as far as I know, although there were major differences between the parties about the most effective *tactics* for pursuing the claim. As time passed the more radical parties became increasingly militant in the prominence they gave to this issue and the lengths they were willing to go to press it, whereas the more anti communist,

pro Western parties and opinion leaders clung to the belief that moderation and persuasion would induce the Dutch to make concessions. This did not happen, however, and the latter group were outmanoeuvred by the radicals in 1957 when, after several efforts to win support in the UN had failed, the radicals seized the initiative, at President Sukarno's instigation, and 'took over' all Dutch plantations, business enterprises and banks in Indonesia and nationalized them soon after. But the Dutch merely dug their toes in harder and it took the threat of military invasion of Irian Jaya in 1961-62 to force them (largely at the instigation of the US government) to abandon the struggle and negotiate a compromise settlement.

It would be inappropriate to say that 'expansionism' was a factor in the Indonesian campaign for West Irian, in my view, either in respect of the arguments used or of the basic political dynamics which impelled Indonesia into what was by 1962 an undeniably aggressive, confrontative political strategy for putting pressure on the Dutch. The style of the campaign in its final stages was certainly highly emotional, the political atmosphere almost feverish; the issue lent itself to a form of mobilization politics which President Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Party exploited very effectively for their own domestic advantage, whereas the Army leaders found themselves badly outmanoeuvred. That lesson was not lost on the Army leaders, however, for when the conflict with Malaysia loomed up a year or so later they took good care not to lose the political initiative on an issue with strong nationalist appeal and so they played an important part in getting the campaign of *konfrontasi* against Malaysia started. But by that time the political tensions and instability of the late Sukarno era were starting to exert a quite unique influence on both the foreign policies and the domestic politics of Indonesia.

Konfrontasi

Indonesia's 'confrontation' of Malaysia in the years 1963-66 provides the strongest ammunition for advocates of the expansionist theory, but an explanation given in these terms alone is seriously

misleading, in my opinion, and the real dynamics of the campaign have to be sought elsewhere.¹ Indonesia never asserted any claim to the territory of the northern Borneo states whose incorporation into the Malaysia federation she was protesting; her argument was that the project was a neocolonialist strategem, master-minded by the British to enable them to maintain their interests there, and that the people of Borneo and Singapore were being steamrollered against their will into the wider Malaysian federation. There was a good deal of evidence in favour of that proposition, although I believe that overall the pro Malaysia case was much stronger on nearly all accounts. The whole episode was a curious, half-hearted affair, a mixture of threats, propaganda, low level border raids and reconnaissance incursions into Sarawak and Malaya, attempts to ferment domestic opposition to the Malaysian government, coupled with diplomatic and economic pressures which seemed to have a variety of objectives and motivations, few of them at all clear to outside observers.

Konfrontasi was very much a personal campaign of President Sukarno's, although both the Armed Forces leaders and the PKI supported it enthusiastically in the early stages (though much less wholeheartedly later on, when the costs and risks were greater). And it undoubtedly served a variety of purposes which Sukarno found convenient - for example, maintaining an atmosphere of crisis and external threat, so that calls for national unity and solidarity with the leadership were more easily justified; simplifying the job of balancing left and right wing forces in the government and in the country; enabling him at times to divert attention from pressing domestic issues by stressing the primacy of the conflict with neocolonialist enemies at home and abroad; providing apparent justification for his ideological doctrines of inevitable conflict between the 'New Emerging Forces' and the old established forces of neocolonialism and imperialism. There is something to be said for explanations of the campaign in terms of its

¹ I have summarized the strengths and weaknesses of the various interpretations of this episode in Mackie (1974:1-11, 326-33 *et passim*).

'diversionary' value, at a time when the national economy was in decline and political tensions mounting, but they too tend to be grossly over-simplified, although in a more refined form there is something in them.¹

Konfrontasi was, in a very real sense, an extension into the foreign affairs sphere of the basic instability of Indonesian domestic politics at that time. Yet on several occasions when he had to make difficult choices in domestic politics, Sukarno *did* make them and on several occasions he scaled down the intensity of confrontation when circumstances made it prudent for him to do so. So the diversionary theory cannot be carried too far. A more fundamental element in the explanation of the whole affair, in my view, is the relevance of the ideological factor. The struggle against Malaysia served, in effect, to validate the doctrine of the New Emerging Forces and at the same time that doctrine created the imperative to engage in the struggle, for otherwise the ideology would have been hollow and meaningless. All Sukarno's speeches on the issue stressed the ideological factor, never the *Indonesian Raya* theme or the appeal to historic greatness.

In short, the whole episode was very much an outgrowth of the rather unique political and ideological climate prevailing in Indonesia in the early 1960s. The only sense in which it could be categorized as 'expansionist' was in terms of the style and methods adopted, not the objectives or motivations - for example the generally assertive, sometimes truculent claims made by Sukarno for the universality of his doctrine of the New Emerging Forces as applying to all Third World countries. It must also be admitted that if Indonesia had succeeded at that point in the decolonization process in overthrowing the Malaysian federation, she would undoubtedly have been cock of the roost in Southeast Asia. Sukarno certainly aspired to a leadership role, not only in that region but in the Third World generally (though without much success, in the final analysis). But the

¹ The best exposition of the 'diversion' theory is given by Donald Hindley (1964).

explanation for this impulse is better seen in terms of what Kahin (1964:260-1) has called 'the powerful, self-righteous thrust of Indonesian nationalism', derived from the sense of pride in their revolutionary struggle for independence, than as 'Greater Indonesia' doctrines or an ideology of territorial expansion reminiscent of Mussolini's or Hitler's demands for more land.

East Timor

Even less, in my opinion, can the campaign to incorporate East Timor be categorized or explained as simply a manifestation of expansionist appetites. Indonesian motivations in that unhappy affair are murky and complex, not at all as easy to identify with precision - or to defend on legal and moral grounds - as in the previous cases examined. But it is not difficult to discern the major factors impelling the Suharto government to become involved in the way it did. Certainly there could be no claim here, as there was in the case of Irian Jaya, on the ground that this territory had been part of the former Netherlands East Indies. Nor was it possible after April 1974, as it might have been prior to the overthrow of the Salazar-Caetano regime in Portugal, to make a case on the grounds of liberating East Timor from colonial rule of a singularly miserable, debilitating character. The Indonesian case was, instead, argued mainly on the ground that the people of East Timor wanted incorporation into Indonesia, that the Timorese party favouring incorporation, Apodeti, had substantial popular support, but was severely handicapped by the strong anti Indonesian propaganda campaign earlier maintained by the Portuguese colonial authorities and later by Fretilin. It seems highly dubious that Apodeti really did have very widespread popular support initially, but that is hardly surprising in view of the sustained anti-Indonesian propaganda to which the population had been subjected (and the inability to put a contrary case in the appropriate languages, Portuguese or Tetum or regional dialects, since Bahasa Indonesia was little understood in the colony). During the six months before Indonesian military intervention in Timor at the end of 1975, the Indonesians tried to engineer a political formula on the basis of consultations (*musjawarah*) between the Portuguese authorities and the three major Timorese parties, which

would have resulted, they hoped - with the aid of a little 'gentle pressure' - in a decision to seek incorporation in Indonesia. But the outbreak of fighting between the UDT and Fretilin factions in July wrecked any hopes of this and soon resulted in the military victory of the Fretilin forces, which were by that time the faction most strongly committed to an independent East Timor and the most uncompromisingly anti Indonesian. (UDT had by that time swung over towards a pro Indonesian stance.) This created a situation in which the Indonesian government had to decide either to acquiesce in a Fretilin victory and the establishment of an independent, strongly anti Indonesian regime in East Timor, or to intervene militarily in the civil war there. The Suharto government opted for the latter choice, sending in Indonesian troops covertly in October-November and then invading overtly in December.¹

The legal and moral rights and wrongs of these actions are a matter of controversy which it would be inappropriate to enter into here. But the question of Indonesia's underlying motivations is a question of a different order. Why did the Indonesians feel it mattered so much to them to prevent East Timor becoming independent? Their military intervention did no good to Indonesia's international reputation and appears to have been costly to her armed forces in both lives and resources. Why, then, could they not have acquiesced in a Fretilin victory?

I suspect that the basic answer boils down to the proposition that as time passed Indonesia's key policy makers simply found themselves more and more committed by their own rhetoric and their initial policies to the ultimate incorporation of East Timor; hence they either had to press on towards that goal at any cost or accept a humiliating defeat which might have been seriously damaging to their own domestic political

¹ I know of no good account of the Indonesian side of the Timor affair. A useful survey of events in Timor stressing the role of the Portuguese, is Nicol (1978). A strongly anti Indonesian, pro Fretilin version is given by Joliffe (1978).

prestige and influence. But before we look into that explanation more closely it is worth noting several predisposing factors which were certainly relevant.

The most important was the fear that East Timor might become a nest of communist influence, 'another Cuba' on her doorstep. The charges that Fretilin leaders were communists or pro Chinese were wildly exaggerated but they seem to have been widely believed in Indonesia. Even if they were not, it was clear that an independent East Timor would have had to look overseas for economic assistance and perhaps also political support from some quarter, since the economy was hardly viable and the political structure rudimentary, and China or Russia seemed likely to be the obvious candidates for such a role. Moreover, the possibility that even a non communist independent East Timor might provide a haven for Indonesian communist exiles outside Indonesian control was alarming enough, for it would be hard to prevent their infiltration from there into other parts of the archipelago.

A second consideration frequently mentioned was the fear of secessionist sentiment in other parts of eastern Indonesia if East Timor were to succeed in maintaining an independent existence. The effects on the Indonesian side of the island would have been disturbing, to say the least, and perhaps elsewhere too. Ever since the 1950s when regionalist movements threatened the territorial integrity of the young nation, Indonesia's leaders have been sensitive to the dangers of secessionist sentiments in the outlying regions of the archipelago. I doubt if there is currently as much risk of secessionism or territorial disintegration as is often suggested, for the centralizing tendencies of the last two decades have been very powerful. But it is probably true to say that Indonesia's national unity is still a rather brittle creation, which might not stand up to any serious blow to the authority of the central government. If any part of the country were able to defy central authority on a major issue and get away with it, the chain reaction elsewhere could be quite disastrous. That kind of consideration probably exerted great weight on the minds of the government's policy makers throughout the Timor affair.

Two other background considerations were also, I believe, important. One was the inclination to believe that Apodeti really did represent the true voice of the Timorese people. Indonesians referred to Fretilin, not entirely without justification, as the 'Eurasians' party', as a coterie of part-Portuguese, urban, educated leaders with no substantial following among or rapport with the bulk of the village population. They inevitably compared them with similar groups of first generation leaders of the anti colonial movements in Indonesia, most of whom later drifted away from the mainstream of Indonesian nationalism; in fact, Indonesia's Eurasians tended to be either pro Dutch or highly ambivalent towards the nationalist cause during the struggle for independence, so their nationalist credentials were suspect. In the circumstances Indonesians were highly sceptical that the Fretilin leaders really represented the true voice of East Timorese nationalism. Their suspicions of Fretilin were later exacerbated by the collusion of the radical Portuguese officers, Majors Mota and Jonatas, in advancing the Fretilin cause during 1975, which was reminiscent of Dutch patronage of the 'puppet' Federalists in 1948-49. UDT, on the other hand, had initially spoken out in favour of maintaining Portuguese rule and against immediate independence, so it was clearly a 'reactionary' rather than a 'progressive' force. So the historicist caste of mind with which Indonesians approached these matters would have inclined them towards Apodeti even though it could show little positive evidence of substantial popular support. This is not to say that they were right in that assessment; it is, however, to point out the basis of Indonesian perceptions of the matter, which is what we must be concerned with here.

The other consideration that probably played a part, although rather speculative and intangible, was the general belief that prevailed throughout the fifties and sixties that sooner or later Portuguese Timor would be liberated from colonial rule - and it was commonly assumed that this would take the form of becoming part of Indonesia, either with Indonesian help or without. Portuguese Timor was seen as an outdated anomaly, like Goa before 1961. But almost no attention was ever given (except momentarily, in a very desultory fashion, in 1963) to the question of when or how this would happen, nor were the implications of the alternative outcome (the emergence of an independent East Timor)

ever seriously considered. In short, the principle of anti colonialism, which was a central plank of Indonesia's foreign policy in the 1950s, created a presupposition that it would be 'natural' for this territory to form part of Indonesia, just as Sukarno once remarked that 'even a child can see that West Irian is part of Indonesia'. I am not saying that this is a valid, incontrovertible line of reasoning, but I think it was probably quite influential in shaping the attitudes and expectations of Indonesia's leaders prior to 1974. In fact, if the Suharto government had mounted a campaign to assist in the liberation of East Timor from Portuguese rule prior to 1974, justifying this on the ground that it was also helping to overthrow Portuguese colonial rule and help the freedom fighters of Angola and Mozambique, it would almost certainly have won widespread international support and left the Fretilin leaders no option but to side with Indonesia. Suharto must have subsequently regretted that he had been too cautious and restrained to embark on such a course, for once the revolution of April 1974 in Portugal had occurred the ball was at Fretilin's feet, not Jakarta's. To claim that Indonesia's attitude towards Timor was a grasping and covetous one seems to me, in the light of these circumstances, quite misleading.

Finally, we should notice certain aspects of the domestic political dynamics of the Timor episode which indicate, I believe, that expansionism in a crude sense was not a significant element in Indonesian motivations. The initial reaction of the Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, was, indeed, distinctly 'dove-ish'. He went so far as to assure Jose Ramos Horta, a Fretilin leader, that Indonesia made no claim to East Timor and would seek close relations with it 'after independence'. But this early view was soon modified as the 'hawks' in Jakarta began to express concern at what they saw as a drift towards the left in Timor, paralleling the course of the revolution in Portugal in its first year. Jakarta at this time still regarded the Portuguese government as the key factor determining the course of events in Timor. By the beginning of 1975 it was believed by many observers that Indonesian troops might be sent into Timor at any time. There was a flurry of

apprehension among Australian officials in February, but in the following month the Indonesian government gave clear indications that it had decided against a military invasion and was relying instead on the political negotiations between the three main parties that were to take place at Macao later in the year. The Indonesians were now beginning to woo (or buy over) the UDT leaders as the latter felt themselves increasingly under threat from Fretilin and the left Portuguese officers in control in Dilli. Suharto was clearly restraining his 'hawks' as long as he could in the hope that a political-diplomatic strategy would work towards Indonesia's ends. But after the outbreak of the 'civil war' in Timor in July-August, it must have become increasingly difficult for him to restrain the hawks and maintain any hope that a political solution would work, so the determination of policy finally swung over into the hands of the military, for by this time Indonesia was too deeply committed to achieving its goals to back away.

It should be remembered that if Suharto had failed to prevent the emergence of an independent East Timor once the Indonesian government had committed itself to incorporation, he would have been highly vulnerable to the charge that this kind of thing would never have happened in Sukarno's days. Precisely because Suharto's foreign policies were so different from Sukarno's, unassertive, low-keyed, committed to good-neighbourly relations with the ASEAN countries, there was muted criticism from the former radical-nationalist fringe of the political public in Indonesia that he was subordinating the country's interests too much to the goal of presenting an image of moderation and responsibility to the Western creditor nations. Political comment within Indonesia was distinctly muted in 1974-75, for the crackdown on dissentient opinion following the 'Malari' riots during Prime Minister Tanaka's visit in January 1974 was very severe. But precisely because the regime had been shaken by the mild expressions of criticism that occurred in late 1973, there was a good deal of nervousness about arousing fresh criticism over new issues. It is hardly surprising, in those circumstances, that there was almost no overt opposition to the government's policies on Timor, even though there seems to have

been nothing like the widespread popular support that there was over Irian Jaya. In 1975, moreover, the development of the Pertamina crisis was creating new difficulties for the government and making it even less willing to run risks of leaving its flanks exposed to critics of any hue, whether radical or nationalist. The fact, too, that the Timor crisis occurred soon after the fall of Saigon, when the generals in Jakarta were most sensitive to what they perceived as communist threats to the region, must have helped to strengthen the hands of the hardliners and undermine the advocates of moderation. By the latter part of 1975 Suharto had little choice but to go along with his hawks unless he were prepared to take very considerable risks of increasing his vulnerability to domestic critics, both within the armed forces and outside them.

Are we justified, then, in asserting that 'expansionist' elements have played no part in the shaping of Indonesia's policies towards her neighbours? I am inclined to answer: 'Yes; the primary motivating forces behind her foreign policies could not be described as expansionist in any substantial respect'. One could even go further and list a series of opportunities Indonesia has *not* taken since 1945 which, if she really had been determinedly bent upon expansion or aggrandizement of her influence over her neighbours, she could easily have exploited to her advantage - for example the situation created by the race riots of May 1969 in Malaysia, the Muslim insurgency in the southern Philippines, to mention only the most obvious.

It may be possible to define 'expansionism' according to some more complex formula and apply it to the Indonesian case, but I have not yet seen this done in any convincing fashion. The nearest approach to a carefully formulated theory is Rex Mortimer's 1976 article (Mortimer 1976) in which he put great emphasis on the country's potential instability and the inherent weaknesses or incapacity of its government, seeing various factors in that situation as 'nudging Indonesia towards a more assertive regional role'. Mortimer explicitly recognized that Indonesia was 'not an actively expansionist power', but he portrayed her leaders as bordering on the neurotic (the article is studded with words like 'hysterical', 'obsessive', 'tense', 'hypersensitive' and

'frustrated') in their preoccupation with their country's regional influence, particularly in the aftermath of the communist victories in Indochina in the previous year. Hence he regarded them as intensely concerned with the stability of Papua New Guinea also.

Mortimer's theory seems to me vulnerable on three main grounds. First, Indonesia's 'regional role' since 1965 has not been at all 'assertive' or 'obsessive', as it was under Sukarno. Quite the opposite. Secondly, the emphasis on the 'hysterical', neurotic' character of Indonesian politics is grossly exaggerated. Thirdly, in the three years that have passed since that article was written, the course of events has not borne out the predictions Mortimer then made. Instability has not significantly increased in Indonesia, her government has responded rather sensibly and coolly to the emergence of a powerful Vietnam as a potential rival for political influence in Southeast Asia, not hysterically at all, while its handling of relations with Papua New Guinea has not conformed with the pattern Mortimer adumbrated. One might justifiably ask whether the underlying theory on which Mortimer was then relying was wrong, or whether his data was erroneous - or both?

Mortimer began his article with the valid observation that we should not take it for granted that the Suharto government's economic moderation, rationality and peaceableness towards its neighbours during the years 1966-76 would continue indefinitely. Because of the Timor affair and the collapse of the Pertamina empire, Indonesia seemed in 1976 'to be facing another highly unstable period in her short and stormy history as an independent state.' It would be a mistake, he argued, to put too much stress on the Suharto government's reliance on diplomatic methods and good-neighbourly cooperation throughout the previous decade, for the Timor affair is then explicable 'only as a momentary aberration', whereas he saw it as merely one of the factors which 'tipped the scales in favour of regional interventionism' and a more assertive regional role. Both the theory and the presentation of the facts began to go astray at this point of the argument, in my view. Consider the following crucial paragraph:

Indonesian interests have been and remain primarily those of internal security and enhanced regional influence. These interests are perceived in a rather tense, and at times of crisis, hysterical manner by a political class which has been continually frustrated by the gulf between its ambitions and its capacity; hyper-sensitive to the intractable problems of national security; prone to regard obstructions to its aspirant regional hegemony as the result of malevolent plots against it; and for the past ten years obsessive about the dangers of communism both to its security and its regional ambitions.

Indonesia's concerns are not novel ones for any state to pursue, but they are concentrated upon with an unusual degree of fixity and intensity....
(Mortimer 1976:51-2)

Quite apart from the highly coloured terminology used here and the reliance on what is virtually a neurosis theory of national self-assertiveness (the assertiveness being seen as akin to Sukarno's, though 'the target of Indonesia's frustrations has changed'), I think we must query Mortimer's assumption here that an 'enhanced' regional influence is seen as a primary interest by the Suharto government or that it is 'frustrated by the gulf between its ambitions and its capacity', the ambition being 'aspirant regional hegemony'. But why is the word 'enhanced' added there? The entire sentence is slanted to convey an impression of assertiveness in her regional foreign policies which is simply not warranted by the record. Even if it is true that some Indonesians still talk about their country's regional role in a way that might justify the use of those terms (and neither President Suharto nor his two foreign ministers has been inclined to do so to any degree), Indonesia's whole policy towards the building up of ASEAN is testimony to the fact that her actions over the last twelve years have been directed largely towards calming the fears among her neighbours that President Sukarno's policies aroused. Mortimer's theory might have seemed tenable if Indonesia's generals really had been asserting a more militant role of regional leadership of the anti communist nations against Vietnam, but so far they have been very restrained on that score, far less vocal than outside commentators swayed more by their tidy theories about regional power struggles than the actual evidence of what Indonesia's leaders have said and done about the communist threat from Vietnam.

There is no doubt that Indonesia's generals are profoundly anti communist in their internal policies and it is arguable that the present political system is potentially far more unstable than it appears on the surface because of its failure to institutionalize genuinely representative institutions. But to jump from those premises to the conclusion that the present regime is bent upon the same sort of drive for regional influence as Sukarno was, or that 'setbacks will feed resentment and inclinations to assertiveness, especially if the present internal divisions in the state are intensified' seems to me simply not supportable by what we know about current Indonesian political behaviour. Only by clinging to a very mechanistic theory of expansionism as an outgrowth of instability can one justify such reasoning. The record of the Suharto government's foreign policy certainly does not justify it, despite all the hyperbole, evasiveness and worse that has characterized its handling of the Timor affair.

Mortimer's account of Indonesia's lust for regional dominance does not rely directly on the analogy-with-fascism argument, although I think both rest upon the assumption that authoritarian regimes are potentially unstable (because by definition unrepresentative - although it is questionable whether more representative political systems are significantly more stable), so there is likely to be some sort of link between the politics of domestic instability and the politics of external assertiveness, particularly if frustrations over the failure of domestic policies really are generating neurotic attitudes and irrationality. But that has not been the case of Indonesia in the 1970s. Her leaders have felt they have been achieving results, despite all the criticisms that have been directed at their policies. Their actions seem to me to betoken a good deal of confidence (within the authoritarian framework of the political system, admittedly) rather than a sense of insecurity and hysteria.

Before concluding, I want to comment briefly on the *Indonesia Raya*' theory of Indonesian expansionism and offer some guesses about the likelihood of a recurrence of that stream of foreign policy thinking.

I had to examine the influence of these doctrines closely in 1964-65 when I was trying to analyze the causes of *konfrontasi* and I have discussed the matter more fully in my book on that subject (Mackie 1974). Advocates of the '*Indonesia Raya*' theory of expansionism, like Bernard Gordon, relied mainly on two sources of evidence. One was the writing and speeches of the Indonesian politician-poet-historian, Mohammed Yamin, who was a great advocate of '*Indonesia Raya*' and inclined to wax eloquent on the theme of Indonesia's historic greatness in the days of Srivijaya and Majapahit, when Indonesian language, trade and cultural influence allegedly extended as far afield as Madagascar to the west and Cambodia to the north. Yamin was a maverick, non-party minister in several of Sukarno's cabinets and had a certain affinity of temperament and style with Sukarno, insofar as both were romantics and rhetoricians with a strong sense of Indonesia's historic destiny. He played an active part early in the campaign to recover Irian Jaya. But neither he nor his ideas played any great part in the *konfrontasi* campaign, for Yamin died shortly before it began to develop and Sukarno never made use of the historic appeal to '*Indonesia Raya*' themes in his speeches on the subject of Malaysia. Nor did any other Indonesian public figure try to step into Yamin's shoes in order to exploit the theme for its political mileage, a rather significant piece of evidence which advocates of the '*Indonesia Raya*' theory overlooked. Presumably there was not much mileage in it. Yamin was very much *sui generis* and his political influence depended more on his proximity to Sukarno than the intrinsic appeal of his doctrines.¹

The other piece of evidence used in support of the '*Indonesia Raya*' theory was the debate that took place in June 1945 in the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence on what the future boundaries of independent Indonesia should be. Yamin played a prominent part in this debate, arguing that 'the areas which should be included in Indonesian territory are those which have given birth to Indonesian people; the motherland of a people will be transformed into the territory of a State'. Thus Indonesia should consist not only of the

¹ See Mackie (1974:21-23).

the former Netherlands Indies, including West New Guinea, but also the whole of Timor and North Borneo and Malaya, including the four northern states of Malaya which the Japanese had transferred to Thailand. Sukarno supported Yamin's formulation (although on rather different grounds) against the more cautious arguments of realists like Mohammed Hatta and Haji Agus Salim; and the Yamin-Sukarno view carried the day when it came to a vote. But the debate had no practical consequences, for when the Indonesian leaders proclaimed the independence of their country in August 1945, they were so hard-pressed by events that they neglected even a commitment they had earlier given a group of Malayan revolutionaries to include Malaya in the anti colonial struggle. Twenty years later the Malaysians quoted the 1945 debates extensively for propaganda purposes as evidence of Indonesian territorial ambitions (Department of Information, Malaysia 1964) but that assertion does not really stand up to serious critical scrutiny.

It is not inconceivable, of course, that at some point in the future another Yamin or Sukarno will emerge in Indonesia and try to exploit nationalist sentiments on the basis of an appeal to historic greatness. The teaching of Indonesian history and Indonesian patriotism in the schools, military academies and indoctrination courses almost certainly continues to incorporate some elements of Yaminesque fantasy about the past which could in appropriate circumstances be nurtured as the basis for a kind of revivalist movement.¹ But one could say that of most countries in the world. Patriotism, they say, is the last refuge of scoundrels. Logically, however, the weakness of theories about expansionist tendencies which are based on predictions about how a country *might* one day react is that they can neither be confirmed nor refuted by testible evidence. That being the case, they are virtually useless.

My own guess is that Indonesia, like China and Vietnam, will continue to be concerned to ensure that developments she considers adverse to her interests will not occur around her immediate peripheries.

¹ An intriguing recent manifestation of this sort of subterranean survival of '*Indonesia Raya*' sentiment is Rahasia (1975).

She will also, no doubt, seek to play a prominent part in the politics of the ASEAN region. But these are perfectly legitimate objectives, provided they are pursued by legitimate means. They are not in themselves evidence of a desire for aggrandisement of either power or territory. There may indeed be aspects of Indonesian nationalism and of the style of Indonesian politics which outsiders find repugnant or frightening, but to infer that this is evidence of aggressive intent is to oversimplify absurdly. One could easily imagine a state of political instability developing, in which Sukarno-esque policies of militantly radical nationalism and assertive foreign policies could conceivably recur, the implications of which could be alarming for Australia and Papua New Guinea. But the dynamics of that kind of politics entail something very different from the dynamics of crude 'expansionism'.

It has been put to me that even if my rejection of the appropriateness of the term 'expansionism' is accepted, we can hardly be surprised if many people in Papua New Guinea feel apprehensive about their country's future when they contemplate Indonesia's foreign policy record. For she has on occasions had no compunction about resorting to force and pursuing policies which could be described as both interventionist and aggressive. Moreover, she has been inclined to claim that what happens in neighbouring countries is a matter of direct concern to her and she might do so yet again if there is any collapse of governmental authority in Papua New Guinea which Indonesia regarded as posing some potential threat to her. Particularly if Indonesia herself subsided back into an era of political and social instability reminiscent of the late Sukarno era, the possibility of a reversion to more assertive, interventionist foreign policies could not be ruled out of consideration.

While these points can hardly be denied, I think there are several strong reasons for believing that Papua New Guinea is most unlikely to become a target for Indonesian aggression. All the other episodes we have been considering here had to do with the process

of decolonization and the redrawing of the frontiers created by colonialism. The claims made to Irian Jaya and East Timor were to that extent *sui generis*. (*Konfrontasi* was also in part a response to the decolonization process, but in that case no claim was made to Sarawak or Sabah.) Neither in Irian Jaya nor in East Timor had the decolonization process been completed and international recognition through the UN achieved for a new and independent state; nor was there in either case, much effective international support for such an outcome, for the principle of self-determination cannot always be sustained in the course of the decolonization process, as Bougainville and Papua Besena have discovered. But once the independence of a former colony has been achieved and recognized internationally, challenges to its sovereignty are quite another matter. Moreover, as time passes, the new map of the post colonial world tends to achieve firmer acceptance. To that extent, the case of Papua New Guinea is radically different from that of Irian Jaya and East Timor. Papua New Guinea has been granted recognition as an independent, sovereign state quite explicitly by Indonesia and the rest of the world, so it would be extremely difficult and embarrassing for her to go back on that. President Suharto has visited Papua New Guinea, as well as both Indonesian foreign ministers and numerous other officials. The government has clearly come to accept the status quo there and as time passes the less likely it becomes that this will be challenged. (Conceivably, if Papua New Guinea had crumbled into anarchy or a series of secessionist movements in 1975, immediately after independence, Indonesia might have been disposed to intervene to restore order and central authority, but even that is very dubious; Mortimer is probably correct in his belief that Jakarta would have expected Australia to perform that task for her.) As anyone who has ever canvassed the matter in Jakarta will attest, Indonesian officials give very little attention to Papua New Guinea and basically just do not want to be bothered with additional problems, worry and expense in that quarter. Irian Jaya and Timor have already caused them more than enough already. They have required special financial allocations, which is a cause of

resentment in other provinces. Unless there is a reversion to quite serious instability and irrationality in Indonesian politics, as in the late Sukarno era, I see no reason for Papua New Guinea to feel vulnerable to annexationist designs in Jakarta.



Jacob Prai and West Papuan freedom fighters

(photo: Mark Baker)



Irianese refugees about to return to Indonesia.

(photo: Judy Kapaith)



Camp for Irianese refugees at Oksapmin.

(photo: Wantok Publications)

PAPUA NEW GUINEAN PERCEPTIONS ON THE BORDER;
INTERNAL PRESSURES AND POLICIES

Kwasi Nyamekye and Ralph R. Premdas

The Papua New Guinea-Indonesia border has been a source of some friction between the two countries since Papua New Guinea's independence in 1975. In June-July 1978, to demonstrate that it sincerely sought Indonesian friendship, Papua New Guinea collaborated with Indonesia in a massive military operation along the border to uproot and destroy the OPM.¹ The Papua New Guinea government was pressured by Indonesia to act against the OPM. Caught between an ethnic bond committing its emotions to support the Melanesian freedom fighters on one hand, and a clear need to promote its national security against an Indonesian menace on the other, the Papua New Guinea government had to make the extremely difficult decision whether or not to eliminate the OPM from operating in its territory. It chose to expel the OPM. The incident triggered off popular demonstrations and acts of disapproval against the Papua New Guinea government, especially since Indonesian soldiers ventured into Papua New Guinea territory in pursuit of the freedom fighters, destroyed villages, and precipitated a flood of refugees into Papua New Guinea.²

Engaging in a joint border operation with Indonesia to eliminate the OPM was a major foreign policy decision by the Papua New Guinea government. It entailed enormous risks by incurring popular disapproval and was premised on the proposition that it would win the friendship of its powerful neighbour thereby, at least temporarily, eliminating a major

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1. See Mark Baker, 'Papua New Guinea Launches Drive Against Rebels', *Sydney Morning Herald* 6 June 1978; also 'Rebel Hunt Steps up', *Post-Courier* 21 June 1978.
 2. 'Papua New Guinea Row on Rebels', *Age* 8 July 1978; also Colleen Ryan, 'Papua New Guinea Government Attacked over Indonesian Raids', *Australian Financial Review* 7 July 1978.

source of malaise between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. In reaching this crucial decision, the Papua New Guinea government made a calculated gamble that its action would promote national security, to which it had ascribed greater priority over the more elusive and dangerous course of ignoring the use of its territory by the OPM guerrillas against Indonesian presence in Irian Jaya.

The purpose of this article is to describe the sources of internal pressure exerted upon Papua New Guinea foreign policy decision makers. Of necessity, however, this must be sketched against the larger background of the conflict. Consequently, we have supplied some general preliminary observations about the OPM and its activities in Papua New Guinea, about the Irian Jaya refugees in Papua New Guinea, and about Papua New Guinea's interests in relation to the border.

The OPM

The OPM is the direct offshoot of Dutch efforts to instigate the formation of a nucleus of West Papuan dissidents to fight for the exclusion of Irian Jaya from an independent Indonesia. But when the cause of establishing a separate Dutch colony or client-state failed, and Irian Jaya was for all practical purposes turned over to Indonesia on 15 August 1962, many of the Dutch trained anti-Indonesian dissidents continued activity on their own initiative to free the territory and make it an independent sovereign state. This motif has provided continuous justification for the existence of the OPM since its formation in 1963. 'The Act of Free Choice' was so devised by the Indonesians that the outcome of the *musyawarah* was guaranteed before a ballot was cast. OPM activists call the exercise 'The Act of No Choice'.

The OPM has two segments. One segment, based outside Irian Jaya, is almost entirely engaged in political and propaganda activities. The other segment, based within Irian Jaya and areas contiguous to the Papua New Guinea-Irian Jaya border, is both military and political in purpose. The military arm is often called the Tentara Nasional Papua or TNP. However, we shall use the term OPM to refer to the rebel movement as a whole.

Since it was formed in 1963, the OPM has witnessed the gradual and effective consolidation of Indonesian control of Irian Jaya. Large numbers of non Irianese from the Moluccas, Sulawesi, and Java migrated to Irian Jaya so that by 1969, when 'the Act of Free Choice' occurred, a substantial part of the territory's urban population, concentrated in the provincial capital Jayapura, was non Melanesian. A programme of Indonesianization proceeded systematically in all government, cultural, and educational institutions. Many Irianese participated in these changes, but were alarmed by the progressive loss of their Melanesian identity as well as the subjugation of Irianese in all walks of life to Indonesian personnel. The Suharto regime added a politico-military repressive dimension to Indonesian control over Irian Jaya, limiting meaningful local participation in collective decision making.

From all of these sources, then - 'forced incorporation', 'cultural imperialism', 'loss of land', 'political repression', and so on - the OPM gathered sustenance and support from frustrated Irianese. At various times the OPM sought self-determination only for Irian Jaya, but on other occasions it envisaged its liberation efforts as part of a dream to establish an independent Melanesian Federation encompassing not only Irian Jaya and Papua New Guinea but also the Solomon Islands, New Hebrides, Fiji, and New Caledonia. Papua New Guinea's independence in September 1975 encouraged the OPM to believe that it too could achieve independence from its colonial master. Indeed, the OPM, viewing an independent Papua New Guinea as an important ally to promote Irian Jaya's independence, liberally utilized Papua New Guinea territory to establish bases from which attacks against the Indonesian presence in Irian Jaya were launched.

The OPM's active guerrilla force has never been very large. Controversy about its precise size ranges from 20,000 trained guerillas (the figure from the OPM) to 2,000. Most reliable sources accept a more modest figure of 400-600 hard core guerrillas.¹ Villages contiguous to

1. Mark Baker, 'Playing the Number Game', *Age* 26 September 1978; see also Peter Hastings, 'Indonesians Irritated at Australian Attitudes', *Sydney Morning Herald* 29 July 1978.

the border, on each side, have demonstrated steadfast support for the activities of the OPM troops most of whom are indistinguishably dressed like ordinary villagers.

The OPM in Papua New Guinea. Attacking Indonesian installations and soldiers required the OPM to secure a source of respite beyond the pursuit of the well equipped Indonesian counter-insurgency forces. This they obtained not only from their thick jungle hideouts but also by crossing the border into Papua New Guinea territory. Consequently, a substantial amount of OPM activity has tended to concentrate around the border, particularly the northern sector not far from Jayapura and Vanimo. To the guerrillas, the border, lacking clear demarcation lines and poorly guarded, is a seamless web through which a flow of men, medicines, and small weapons move. While most of the guerrillas' supplies of food and weapons appear to come from their own efforts and from supporters on both sides of the border, other kinds of support, particularly information, and morale and political direction, appear to be obtained through a network of secure contacts established partly in Papua New Guinea. About 10,000 Irianese refugees, most sympathetic to the OPM but legally pledged not to support the movement, reside in various parts of Papua New Guinea,¹ mainly in Port Moresby. From these refugees a major source of the OPM's external assistance flows to the border. For instance, the 'South Pacific News Agency' which is the propaganda mouthpiece of 'the Provincial Revolutionary Government of West Papua New Guinea', is secretly located in Port Moresby. However, it is difficult to evaluate how salient external assistance is to the survival of the movement.

Until recently, the OPM forces have limited their activities to ambushes of Indonesian patrols and use of sabotage, terrorism, and kidnapping. Some of this has already occurred. In 1977 the OPM claimed that it was responsible for sabotage that disrupted operations of the large American owned Freeport copper mine in Irian Jaya. In February 1978, nine Indonesian officials including the provincial

1. The official estimate is 2,000-3,000; cf. p. 98 below (Ed.)

governor of Irian Jaya and senior military and intelligence officers were kidnapped by the OPM. The hostages were used to demand a 'round table' conference with Indonesia to discuss the independence of Irian Jaya. Even Papua New Guinea, which has until recently turned a blind eye to OPM activities within Papua New Guinea, has been threatened with terrorist action if it does not desist from behaviour hostile to OPM activities within Papua New Guinea.

Under Indonesian pressure, the Papua New Guinea government has agreed to clean up its side of the border. The OPM leader and deputy were arrested and gaoled by the Papua New Guinea government for illegal entry in September 1978. All this attests to a new phase in the border conflict. The Indonesians do not take the OPM for granted any more. President Suharto has requested that the prime minister of Papua New Guinea demonstrate his commitment to Indonesia's territorial integrity by taking action against the OPM. The prime minister obliged him during June-July 1978 when the Papua New Guinea Defence Force launched a large anti OPM operation on the Papua New Guinea side of the border.

Papua New Guinea policy towards OPM. Jakarta's preoccupation with ensuring that Port Moresby does not adopt a pro OPM policy stems from its sensitivity towards the OPM and its belief that Port Moresby is secretly sympathetic towards the movement. A pro OPM policy would complicate Jakarta's ability to cope with the group's activists. Safe sanctuaries would become available; weapons could reach the dissidents through Papua New Guinea, and Port Moresby might provide the group with the external voice it has sought for so long. For these reasons, Jakarta has obtained Port Moresby's continuing reaffirmation that Irian Jaya is a part of the state of Indonesia.

In the communique issued after Mr Somare's 1977 state visit to Indonesia, both heads of state pledged that their respective countries would not be used to conduct activities against the other, and during his state visit in May 1978 Papua New Guinea's Foreign Affairs minister, Mr Olewale, 'assured his counterpart that the Government of Papua New Guinea will take firm and effective measures to safeguard this

pledge'.¹ After his return, Olewale even stated that Indonesia was suspicious of Papua New Guinea over the Irian Jaya issue and maintained that 'We do not want Indonesia to interpret that we condone OPM... (Therefore), we must now take decisive action against the people working against Indonesia'.² This pledge was honoured in July 1978 when, for the first time, Papua New Guinea sent military forces to patrol the border, and again in September, when Papua New Guinea arrested and gaoled the leader of OPM and his deputy. Although Port Moresby maintained that its July border action was not the joint border patrol favoured by Jakarta, it undoubtedly helped Jakarta's attempts to track down the dissidents because it denied them access to their sanctuaries on the Papua New Guinea side for some time. This is the sort of unambiguously pro Jakarta posture that the Suharto regime wants Port Moresby to adopt. It has dispelled the view that Port Moresby has a dual border policy with Jakarta.

One of Jakarta's objectives in its border relations with Port Moresby is to avoid the growth of a sizeable Irianese community in Papua New Guinea. There is fear that the Irianese community has already grown too large and might open up channels of communication for the OPM. In addition, it might be able to influence Port Moresby's border policies given the strong ethnic bond with Papua New Guinea. Consequently, Jakarta's policy has been to persuade Port Moresby to return most of the Irianese to Irian Jaya on the grounds that they are innocent villagers caught up in the border game being conducted by OPM. Jakarta believes that most of these people cannot be classified as political refugees.

There is mutual desire on both sides to resolve the refugee issue. Apart from the cost, Papua New Guinea has to weigh the humanitarian aspects of the problem. The official Papua New Guinea

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1. *Joint Statement on the Occasion of the Official Visit of his Excellency Niwia Ebia Olewale, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of Papua New Guinea to the Republic of Indonesia, 13-21 May 1978.*
 2. 'Indonesia is Suspicious', *Post-Courier* 26 May 1978.

policy has been to secure Jakarta's assurance of safe conduct before returning those Irianese who express a wish to return home. Concerning Irianese permissive residents, Jakarta's interest has been to ensure that they do not use Papua New Guinea as a base for anti Indonesian activities. At a press conference during his 1977 state visit to Indonesia, the Papua New Guinea prime minister, Mr Somare, admitted that there were about 500 OPM members living in the country. It would seem that Jakarta's policy on Irianese residency in Papua New Guinea is motivated by a desire to prevent known OPM members crossing the border and conducting activities that might harm relations between the two countries. Evidence of this policy was given by the first secretary of the Indonesian Embassy in Port Moresby, when he undiplomatically called on the Papua New Guinea government to seek reaffirmation of loyalty from ten naturalized ex-Irianese citizens named in the de facto government of West Papua in April 1978.

Jakarta is most concerned about the involvement of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in a matter it regards as an internal affair. Some senior officials in Jakarta maintain that if a strict definition of a refugee is applied, most of the people in the refugee camps would not qualify to be there. This is, of course, a legalistic approach to an unmanageable political problem.

Despite these difficulties, Jakarta remains hopeful that with goodwill on both sides the refugees can be kept under reasonable control and that relations with Papua New Guinea over the border can be stabilized. But growing economic disparities between Papua New Guinea and Irian Jaya could complicate this policy. Pressure could be expected to build up for Irianese to come to Papua New Guinea in search of better jobs. If this happened, the notion of 'Melanesian brotherhood' would face its most critical test, and the likely influx of Irianese into Papua New Guinea in search of jobs would put border relations between the two countries in a more complex environment.

Papua New Guinea's interests.

The Papua New Guinea-Irian Jaya border is more than just an irritant to Papua New Guinea. In some ways the interests around this border can be justifiably classified as vital. With over 200,000 troops, Indonesia has Asia's third largest army. Very recently this was deployed to invade and acquire East Timor in defiance of United Nations protests that the military incursion was illegal. Very sensitive to regional secessionist movements which threaten to rend asunder its fragile fabric at its ethnic seams, Indonesia could easily overreact to OPM operations if they were enlarged and made effective. Clearly, Papua New Guinea's interest in this context is at least to do nothing to aid the OPM freedom fighters lest Indonesian rage be turned against the fledgling Papua New Guinea defence forces of only 3,500 troops. A friendly Indonesia is much less costly to relate to than a hostile one.¹ Even Australia, much better prepared than Papua New Guinea militarily to confront Indonesia, has chosen a course of friendship laden with foreign aid rather than engage Indonesia in cool or hostile relations.

In opting for a policy that does not aid the OPM, the Papua New Guinea government exposes itself. Politicians who are overtly sympathetic to the OPM will probably win much popular support from a majority of the country's elite who have been brought up during the 'confrontation' period to detest and fear 'expansionist' Indonesia. There are such politicians both in the government and in the opposition. This would be a very dangerous chauvinist game since nationalist passions stirred to support 'Melanesian Brothers' across the border are likely to trigger a much larger and dangerous response from the Indonesians. This political problem points up the need for Irian Jaya border policies to be forged jointly by both.

1. For a detailed exposition of the rationale for the Papua New Guinea border policy see Somare's statement in *Draft Hansard* 7 August 1978 pages 9/1/1-3; also see Olewale's statement in *Draft Hansard* 17 August 1978 pages 21/7/2-3.

In effect, opting for a policy of neutrality to the OPM entails foregoing the temptation to mobilise domestic anti Indonesian prejudices in national politics. In turn, the Papua New Guinea citizenry may well have to accommodate itself to secret diplomacy on the border issue so as to minimise the chances of unscrupulous political outbidders seeking to use the border problem to promote personal political interests. In following this policy, there will be no escape from periodic criticisms of the Papua New Guinea government that it is permitting itself to be 'bullied' or 'blackmailed' by its militarily superior neighbour. What is lost in face is compensated for by buying hard international security, unless Papua New Guinea's compromises on the OPM cause are interpreted by the Indonesians as a sign of weakness and taken as an invitation to intervene indirectly in the political life of Papua New Guinea. In suppressing overtly its supportive linkages to the OPM, the Papua New Guinea government will take a calculated gamble that the military regime in Indonesia will not go further by demanding that political freedoms in Papua New Guinea be curtailed.

Papua New Guinea's border interests are also related to the refugee problem. Already there are over 10,000 refugees in Papua New Guinea (see p. 68). The 1,000 to 1,300 recent refugees require about K2,000 daily to maintain. This can be partly offset by subsidies from the UN, but the refugee issue goes well beyond the immediate issue of cost. The long run dangers are both economic and political. A stream of refugees would entail competition with Papua New Guinean citizens for jobs and services. Already some of this has been experienced. The Papua New Guinea government has an ongoing interest in uplifting the material well-being of its own citizens before distributing its scarce resources to its 'Melanesian Brothers'. Many of Papua New Guinea's elite who strongly espouse a policy of aiding the OPM are yet to consider seriously the economic ramifications in the event that their pro OPM sentiments led to a unification of Papua New Guinea and Irian Jaya. Papua New Guinea is much more advanced economically than Irian Jaya. Even within Papua New Guinea strong jealousies are inflamed over regional inequality in the distribution of commercial and agricultural projects. One can envisage the sort of turmoil that would engulf the

entire nation if all Papua New Guinea provinces had to sacrifice large parts of their budget to assist the Irian Jaya provinces to 'catch up'. On a much smaller scale the growth of the refugee population may eventually lead to a backlash against the present policy makers who must solve unemployment difficulties concentrated most heavily among Papua New Guinean school leavers and urban migrants.

On the political front, the growth of a refugee population could be more explosive. The Irianese refugees in Papua New Guinea today provide a major source of support to the OPM. Not only do they communicate OPM grievances to Papua New Guineans, many of whom quickly turn against the Asian menace, but they develop an uncompromising body of popular opinion which makes decision making on the border issue very difficult. Papua New Guinean decision makers may be exposed to political pressure to support the OPM from a vociferous Irianese-derived urban population, many of whom have intermarried with Papua New Guineans. If the Papua New Guinea government seeks to ignore the demands of this small group, it can face blackmail in the form of lost votes, demonstrations and even terrorist threats against Papua New Guinea government installations.

This scenario is not unrealistic. When the Papua New Guinea government announced in 1977 that it was demanding that the OPM eliminate its bases from Papua New Guinea territory, certain OPM dissidents announced that they would unleash terrorist attacks against the Papua New Guinea government. The same sort of threat was made when the Papua New Guinea government announced that it was not returning to the Irian Jaya jungles OPM leaders who were arrested and gaoled in Papua New Guinea.

Finally, Papua New Guinea, as part of a regional bloc of pro Western countries, is not likely to win friends from its powerful regional neighbours who may view the OPM as a threat to regional stability. Papua New Guinea's economy is intimately dependent on Australia for aid, trade and foreign investment. Australia provides annually about \$A225 million or 35 per cent of the Papua New Guinea

budget. Australia does not wish to engage Indonesia in an unnecessary conflict. Indeed, it has carefully evolved a workable peaceful economic and political neighbourly arrangement with Indonesia. It is extremely doubtful that Australia would assist Papua New Guinea if it should be attacked by Indonesia because Papua New Guinea refused to restrain or eliminate the OPM on its side of the border. Australia must calculate its own gains and losses from supporting Papua New Guinea in such an engagement. Papua New Guinea will face not only Indonesian hostility but powerful Australian and US economic and political pressures should it seek to inflame the border, inviting hostile foreign forces to penetrate and disturb the stability of the region.

Papua New Guinea's border policy: internal pressures.

Papua New Guinean policy on the border is a calculated consequence of complex factors, some internal others external, converging on the central decision makers, the National Security Council. Some factors support the adopted policy, others are opposed. This part of the paper tries to identify, classify and evaluate the internal pressures. As in most policy choices, an adopted position is rarely without ambiguities and contradictions.

The four main internal pressures affecting the decision makers responsible for the Papua New Guinea-Irian Jaya border are: (i) the 'Melanesian Brothers' pressure which capitalizes on ethnic bonds; (ii) the 'intellectual-ideological' groups which oppose the Indonesian regime and its alleged expansionist designs; (iii) the 'pragmatists', a variety of people and interests arguing for accommodation with Indonesia in the light of Papua New Guinea's economic and military capabilities; (iv) the parliamentary opposition which institutionally opposes the ruling government's policies.

'Melanesian Brothers'. A significant segment of those individuals and groups who oppose the Papua New Guinea government's recognition of Indonesian territorial sovereignty over Irian Jaya are motivated by subjective sentiments asserting fraternal and ethnic links between the Melanesian residents on both sides of the border. Emotional and

uncompromising, this pressure derives its support mainly from educated Papua New Guineans, villagers near to the border, University students, Irianese refugees, and a number of parliamentarians. They are not organized as a coherent group that can be readily mobilized for quick action, but they constitute a large sector of the population that influences government policy, and they express their opinions fairly effectively.

The students from the two national universities, for example, are among the most highly educated persons in Papua New Guinea. They have mounted several demonstrations on behalf of the Irianese against Indonesia's actions in Irian Jaya and East Timor. Many public servants abandoned their desks and participated in these demonstrations. Several parliamentarians, such as Tony Bais, Michael Pondros, John Noel, Roy Evara, James Mopio, from both government and opposition benches, have expressed strong views against the government's policies towards the OPM. Together, these pro OPM supporters constitute a formidable body of opinion, well placed and highly regarded, capable of structuring the collective opinion and sentiments of Papua New Guineans in regard to the border. This mass-based, emotional and influential pressure point worries the government most, lest its views be permitted to become government policy, triggering open hostility between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia.

The intellectual-ideological anti Indonesian forces. This group is anti Indonesian partly because of the repressive regime that has ruled Indonesia since Sukarno's overthrow and partly because of the Suharto regime's economic development strategy under which foreign multinational corporations are given a free hand in Indonesia. Further, it believes that Indonesia has expansionist designs on Papua New Guinea, as witnessed by the events in East Timor. Pressure from this source comes mainly from local and foreign university students, lecturers, journalists, and artists, mainly resident in Port Moresby. Composed of widely respected and exceptionally able persons such as Bernard Narakobi and John Kasaipwalova, this group is much smaller than the first but shares some of its arguments. It is articulate but only sporadic in its

outbursts against the government. Several foreign university lecturers and journalists, mostly from Australia and New Zealand, play a small supportive role in collaboration with like minded local intellectuals. This group lacks direct access to the government decision makers and depends heavily on the mass media for its impact.

The Pragmatists. These individuals weigh the economic and military costs involved, and argue that Papua New Guinea should pursue a policy of non interference in Indonesian affairs. While they are sympathetic with their 'Melanesian Brothers' across the border, they argue that colonialism was responsible for the boundary and Papua New Guinea now has no choice but to comply with the historical facts of life.¹ They urge that available time and resources be used on more pressing national issues such as rural development and unemployment, and warn that Indonesia is too powerful to antagonize. The pragmatists note with anxiety that the lack of restraint in expressions by groups opposed to Indonesia's control of Irian Jaya will probably trigger 'prophetic fulfilment' and bring about precisely what was to be avoided, Indonesia's acquisition of Papua New Guinea.

The pragmatists are very few, generally quiet, but strategically placed in the decision making system to formulate policy on the border. They are composed of high ranking members of the Papua New Guinea public service, overseas advisers to the Papua New Guinea foreign office, senior officers of Papua New Guinea's defence and intelligence organizations, and many cabinet members of the Somare government. Because of their position, they cannot agitate on the streets. They are generally privy to secret information on the border and, consequently, find themselves unable to speak out in public. They tend to advocate secret diplomacy on the border, no consultation with the parliamentary opposition, limited distribution of information to the parliament, and practically no consultation with the broad base of the Papua New Guinea citizenry.

1. This is the argument expressed by the government in 1978. See footnote 1 on p. 72.

The parliamentary opposition. The National Party, the parliamentary opposition party led by Iambakey Okuk, has endeavoured to exploit the government's handling of the border issue. In a major statement, the opposition criticized the government for its failure to inform the people about events on the border and called on it to consult with the opposition to formulate joint policies on the border.¹ The opposition has also demanded that the government invite the UN to patrol the border and settle the issue.² It has severely criticized the government for its hostility to the OPM, arguing that its foreign policy slogan 'Friends to all and enemies to none' has been contradicted by government attacks on the OPM.³

The opposition has criticized the government further for mishandling the border issue. Several opposition parliamentarians have expressed strong support for the OPM, though whether as individual sentiments or official opposition viewpoints is not clear. Part of the confusion stems from the fact that the opposition is a coalition of three separate parties. The opposition has expressed sentimental concern for the OPM, but has not expressed any concerted or systematic opposition to the specific policies adopted.

Evaluation for the future.

Papua New Guinea's relations with Indonesia over the border are replete with potentially destabilizing elements. The current equilibrium could be easily upset by a variety of internal factors in either Papua New Guinea or Indonesia. In Papua New Guinea, a new government more responsive to popular demands to support 'our Melanesian Brothers' may assist or at least tolerate OPM activities within Papua

1. See 'Re-Think on Foreign Policy', *Post-Courier* 9 June 1978.

2. 'Apologise - Guise call to Indonesians', *Post-Courier* 21 June 1978.

3. See Okuk's statement in *Draft Hansard* 7 August 1978 page 10/1/2.

New Guinea. Contradictions and ambiguities will continue to bedevil the government. In human rights, Papua New Guinea can be accused of cooperating with a repressive military regime that seeks to destroy a self-determination movement with legitimate claims to a separate homeland. Further, the prevailing policy can have grave domestic repercussions. To maintain the current posture that seeks to depoliticize the border issue by limiting the availability of information to ordinary citizens, the Papua New Guinea government will have to conduct secret diplomacy to solve ongoing problems. This could provide shelter on national security grounds for government incompetence and undermine the long run operation of Papua New Guinean democracy, under which citizens must be kept informed and must be allowed to participate in the formulation of relevant decisions.

While undertaking to expel the OPM from its territory partly to satisfy its regional neighbours' need for security and stability, Papua New Guinea has yet to bargain for an explicit quid pro quo guaranteeing that it would not be invaded or militarily harassed by Indonesia. Conceivably, the OPM, which is today treated with hostility by the Papua New Guinea government, may be needed in future if an attack by Indonesia should eventuate. In open warfare the OPM, with its popular support in Irian Jaya, could provide a buffer against Indonesian incursions or, at least, enlarge the scope of the Indonesian undertaking to militarily acquire all of the New Guinea island. Although highly unlikely, the possibility cannot be rejected.

LIVING WITH A LION. PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND
PRIVATE FEELINGS.

R.J. May

Over the years the Papua New Guinea government has made abundantly clear its unqualified acceptance of Indonesia's sovereignty in Irian Jaya and of the corollary, that Indonesia's action against dissident elements in the province is a matter of internal policy and not a concern of Papua New Guinea. At the same time, there has been widespread recognition of an underlying conflict between Papua New Guinea's official policy, dictated by the political reality of the situation, and the fundamental sympathies of Papua New Guineans for their Melanesian neighbours, sympathies which have been made explicit on occasion even by the prime minister and successive foreign ministers. There is no doubt that, without affecting its acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty in Irian Jaya, the Papua New Guinea government has, over time, exercised varying degrees of diligence in its administration of the border and Indonesia's recognition of this fact has brought tensions in the relations between the two countries.

Our object here is to describe Papua New Guinea's handling of the border issue, in a historical context, and to examine some of the domestic political forces which affect official policy, particularly in relation to the events of 1977 and 1978.

*The colonial legacy.*¹

Until well into the 1960s, within Papua New Guinea the concern over the West New Guinea issue was largely that of Australian colonial officials and an already slightly paranoid expatriate business and planter community.

¹ A more detailed account of the period up to 1969 is to be found in Verrier (1976 chapter 11), from which this section has drawn. Also see Hasluck (1976 chapter 30) for an 'inside' view of the period.

The concern of Australian officials was for the most part a reflection of the Australian government's attitude toward West New Guinea. Up till the end of the 1950s this attitude was dominated by Australia's perception of the importance of the island to Australia's security. The Australian government supported Holland in its denial of Indonesia's territorial claims to West New Guinea, it established a number of new patrol posts in the border areas, and it entered into agreements for administrative cooperation between Dutch and Australian officials in the two territories, particularly in matters of joint concern such as health and quarantine.

The announcement in 1959 that Australia would recognize any peaceful agreement between Holland and Indonesia on the West New Guinea issue gave the first indication of a change in policy in favour of Indonesia, anticipating Australia's acceptance of the transfer of sovereignty in 1962. Notwithstanding this, relations between Australia and Indonesia continued to deteriorate during the first half of the 1960s and Australian fears of a possible Indonesian invasion of Papua New Guinea resulted in a dramatic increase in defence spending in Papua New Guinea and a substantial outlay on airstrips, wharves and other infrastructure in the border areas.

The immediate impact of the transfer of sovereignty was an inflow of West Papuan nationalists into Papua New Guinea. As far as possible the Australian administration dealt with these crossings as though they were traditional movements and encouraged the border crossers to return, but a small number was granted permissive residency. With the growing resistance to Indonesian rule in West New Guinea from 1965, movement into Papua New Guinea increased sharply. There was, moreover, a number of border incidents as Indonesian patrols pursued Irianese across the border. The Australian response has been well summarized by Verrier (1976:366-7)

Along with the troubles in WNG as a whole, the Australian Government played this down [and], from 1967, to avoid embarrassing Indonesia, took a tougher line on border crossing even of the traditional kind which had been tolerated in the past.

She adds

Contrary to official public statements the majority of Irianese who crossed the border in 1968 and 1969 undoubtedly did so for political reasons, just as most of them were undoubtedly sent back for political reasons. In addition there is no doubt that Irianese dissident activity directed against Indonesia had a base in the bush camps on the Australian side of the international border. One result was a number of border incidents of potentially serious proportion, and yet another was the creation of liaison arrangements between Australia and Indonesia to resolve them.

The anxieties of the expatriate population during the 1950s and early 1960s are recorded in the pages of the *South Pacific Post* (which maintained a regular coverage of events in West Irian throughout the 1960s) and the debates of the Legislative Council. They urged support for the Dutch position until it became obvious that this was a lost cause and they used the spectre of an Indonesian invasion to gain support for a Melanesian Federation and for proposals that Papua New Guinea become a seventh state of Australia.

Paradoxically, considering the relative levels of social and economic development in the two territories, in 1962 there was not in Papua New Guinea, as there was in West New Guinea, a conspicuous nationalist elite. Hence the reaction from within Papua New Guinea to the transfer of sovereignty in that year was almost entirely an expatriate reaction. However in January 1962 delegates to a local government council conference in Port Moresby passed a resolution against an Indonesian takeover of West New Guinea; in June 1962 John Guise told Papua New Guinea's Legislative Council that his electorate had asked him to express concern over the fate of West New Guinea and that he supported an immediate referendum in West New Guinea, and in August (following a meeting of the South Pacific Commission) Guise was one of three Papua New Guinean signatories to a letter sent to the secretary-general of the United Nations criticizing the UN's handling of the question.

During the second half of the 1960s the situation changed quite profoundly; indeed Verrier (1976:369) has suggested that the West New Guinea dispute was a catalyst in the emergence of Papua New Guinean nationalism in the 1960s and has commented further (Verrier 1976:200)

that

In the unprecedented flurry of activity which took place in PNG [in the 1960s] largely because of Australia's own fears of Indonesia, those fears were firmly implanted in the minds of PNG's first elite where they were to remain when for Australia they had gone.

In a review of Australian administration in Papua New Guinea from 1951 to 1963 former Territories Minister Hasluck has written (1976:372), 'My impression was that most of the indigenous people in our Territory who were at all aware of the events were anti-Indonesian in sentiment'. In 1965, with Irianese refugees flowing into the Sepik and Western Provinces in large numbers, and Australian officials putting pressure on them to return, national members of the first House of Assembly appealed for sympathetic consideration of Irianese pleas for asylum and demanded a clear policy on the refugee issue.¹ One of the most prominent spokesmen for the Irianese was the member for Upper Sepik Open, Wegra Kenu. Kenu, from Yako village (where the Administration had recently purchased land for the resettlement of refugees), had been to school in Hollandia and had relatives on both sides of the border. Others included Paul Langro (member for West Sepik Open, who later became deputy leader of the opposition and opposition spokesman on foreign affairs) and Guise, who had become leader of the elected members of the House. In the same year, Guise and United Party leader Mathias Toliman, attending a UN meeting in New York, spoke with the UN secretary-general and demanded that the 'Act of Free Choice' be a true referendum (Verrier 1976:385).

As the 'Act of Free Choice' approached, activity along the border intensified. By the end of 1968 about 1200 refugees were reported to have crossed and over 200 were granted permissive residency. In November 1968, in response to repeated questioning of Administration policy on the border (principally by former missionary, Percy Chatterton) the secretary for law told the House that in view of the rapid build up of Irianese camps on the Papua New Guinea side of the border over the past few weeks, 'together with indications that the camps were focal points for political activity', the Administration had informed

¹ See *HAD* I(6): 924-5, 31 August 1965.

the refugees that they must return to the Irian Jaya side of the border; near Sekotchiau a shelter had been destroyed 'owing to its insanitary condition'.¹ Five days later the member for East Sepik Regional, Michael Somare, moved 'That this House expresses its sympathy with the plight of the West Irianese refugees in the Territory and urges the Administration to treat them with every consideration'. Somare was supported by Chatterton but official members attacked the motion as implying criticism of the Administration's already liberal policy and it was defeated.²

In June there was a further debate on the Irian Jaya situation, occasioned by an official statement following border violations by Indonesian troops at Wutung and Kwari.³ Chatterton successfully moved an amendment to the statement, expressing dismay that the UN was 'not prepared to insist on the holding of a genuine act of free choice' and requesting the Australian government to transmit the motion to the UN. During the debate a number of members expressed sympathy with their Melanesian brothers but, interestingly, their ire was directed not so much at Indonesia (several specifically said they had no dispute with Indonesia) as at the UN; members were quick to point out that though the UN had thought fit to criticize the conduct of the elections in Papua New Guinea in 1968 it was conspicuously silent on the denial of free choice to the Irianese.

In May 1969 about five hundred students, church leaders and others staged a march through the streets of Port Moresby, following a forum at the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG), and a petition was presented to the Administrator protesting against the Australian government's tacit support of Indonesia.

After the 'Act of Free Choice' there were numerous complaints,

¹ HAD II(3):589-90, 20 November 1968.

² See HAD II(3):671-4, 25 November 1968.

³ See HAD II(5):1131-3, 1342-6, 1436-44; 17, 26 and 27 June 1969. Also see Goode (1970).

expressed in the House of Assembly and through letters to the *Post-Courier*, that the Australian administration was putting pressure on refugees to return to Irian Jaya.

The reaction of Papua New Guineans to the West New Guinea question in this period was a complex of at least three elements. In the first place there was a genuine sympathy for the position of these fellow Melanesian people; as no lesser person than Michael Somare said in 1969, 'We are the same people ...'.¹ This sympathy increased as the evidence of Indonesian repression in Irian Jaya mounted and as a growing number of Irianese took up residence in Papua New Guinea and brought stories of repression and persecution. Secondly, the way in which not only the Dutch but also the United States, Australia and in turn the United Nations capitulated to Indonesia's display of truculence caused concern among the more thoughtful members of Papua New Guinea's elite. This was pungently expressed by Chatterton at the UPNG forum in 1969 (as recorded in *Nilaidat* 2(2)): 'If the United Nations rats in West Irian now, it may well be that in a few years time it will rat in East Irian.' It was also a recurrent theme in comments in the House of Assembly and clearly lay behind some early Papua New Guinean support for seventh statehood. Finally, expressions of support for self-determination in West New Guinea were evidence of the emerging nationalism in Papua New Guinea during the 1960s. By expressing sympathy for the Irianese - particularly when official policy was actively to discourage such expression² - and by criticizing Australia for its lack of moral fortitude, Papua New Guineans were serving notice on the Australian colonial regime of their own demands for self-determination.

Even at this stage, however, Papua New Guinean sympathy for the

¹ HAD II(5):1346, 25 June 1969.

² This was particularly evident during the June 1969 House of Assembly debate. Shortly before, Papua New Guinean MHAs visiting Australia had spoken about the coming 'act of free choice' in Irian Jaya and had been publicly rebuked by External Territories Minister Barnes (see *South Pacific Post* 23 May 1969).

plight of the Irianese was not without reservation. In 1965 Kenu (1965-66:10-12) had expressed some fears about the inflow of people from West Irian; in 1968 Somare, while expressing sympathy for them, said 'we must put them in different areas so that they cannot plan unrest',¹ and in 1970 the member for Maprik Open, Pita Lus, told the House 'We do not want these refugees to come here and make trouble.'² More significantly, at the UPNG forum in 1969 Albert Maori Kiki disappointed students by refusing to commit the Pangu Pati on the West Irian question, stressing the need, on security grounds, to see Indonesia as a friend, and in the House of Assembly Pangu member Tony Voutas spoke of the need to maintain a stable government in Indonesia even at the expense of 'the human rights of the minority in West Irian.'³

The Irian Jaya question in post independence Papua New Guinea.

Although formal responsibility for Papua New Guinea's foreign policy remained with the Australian government until Papua New Guinea's independence in September 1975, in practice the Somare government began to have a substantial say in policy formulation from its accession to office in 1972.

On the question of Irian Jaya, as foreshadowed in the comments of Kiki and Voutas the coalition government did not seek to change the broad policy of the Australian government - indeed there were strong suggestions in 1972 and again in 1973 that the Somare government was taking a much tougher line on Irianese refugees than had the colonial administration before it.⁴ Responding to questions about his government's decision in July 1972 to deport eight Irianese border crossers, Somare was quoted as saying that acceptance of Irianese refugees with OPM sympathies could affect relations with Indonesia;⁵ Australian External

¹ HAD II(3):671, 25 November 1968.

² HAD II(12):3709, 19 November 1970.

³ HAD II(5):1439, 27 June 1969.

⁴ See, for example, *Age* 21 August 1972 and 23 July 1973.

⁵ *Age* 21 August 1972; also see *Post-Courier* 17, 18 and 25 August 1972 and *Sydney Morning Herald* 18 August 1972.

Territories Minister Peacock, whose approval of the deportation was required, was reported to have commented 'It is their country and they are entitled to determine who resides there.'¹

In February 1973 Somare, on behalf of the Australian government, signed an agreement with Indonesia which defined the location of the border. There was little debate on the subsequent authorizing legislation, the sole dissenting voice being that of Langro who was pointedly reminded by Somare 'that we have a population of only 2.5 million people while Indonesia has about 100 million people. When we see such a big population in the country bordering ours we must not create any disputes with Indonesia.'² A further agreement, on administrative border arrangements, was signed in late 1973. This covered such matters as traditional land rights, traditional movement, health, quarantine and pollution, and liaison arrangements, which had been the subjects of early agreements, and an important new provision, the obligation of both parties to prevent the use of their respective territories for hostile activities against the other.³

During the early 1970s border crossings continued, though on a much reduced scale, and the number of Irianese granted permissive residency increased. However, within Papua New Guinea popular interest in the Irian Jaya situation seems to have diminished as people became more preoccupied with maintaining internal harmony and with the general business of preparing for independence. In official statements, which provided the first outlines of the country's 'universalist' foreign policy, particular reference was made to the friendship and understanding which existed between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia and it was acknowledged that 'Indonesia has shown understanding in our role of granting permissive residence to Irian Jaya refugees.'⁴

¹ *Australian Financial Review* 18 August 1972.

² See *HAD* III(15):1831-3, 1840-4, 18, 19 June 1973.

³ The agreement is reproduced below as appendix 1.

⁴ Address by the then Chief Minister (Mr Michael Somare) to the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Melbourne, June 1974 (quoted in Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1976:17).

But while in official statements the Papua New Guinea government was unreserved in its expressions of friendship towards Indonesia and its acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty over Irian Jaya, in statements outside diplomatic circles the constant reference to the relative size of populations and armed forces and to 'sleeping giants' and 'lions' and the occasional acknowledgement of Melanesian brotherhood, left little doubt that Papua New Guinea's position was dictated by expedience rather than sympathy. The situation was not improved by Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in 1975.¹

It was perhaps this conflict between expedience and sympathy that prompted Kiki, as Minister for Defence, Foreign Relations and Trade, in 1973 to initiate 'secret diplomacy' designed 'to mediate between the rebels and the Indonesian Government and bring about conditions where the two could have come together for constructive consideration of the means of peaceful reintegration of the rebel groups into the Irianese community.'² Over a period of years, with the blessing of the Indonesian government, Papua New Guinean ministers and senior officials talked with rebel leaders from overseas and from the bush but they were unable to bring the Indonesians and the Irianese to the conference table, largely, according to Kiki, because of divisions within the rebel movement.

In 1976 the position of Irianese refugees again came into prominence. In February the Dutch based Revolutionary Provisional Government of West Papua (RPG) issued a release claiming that 5,000 (later the figure became 15,000) Indonesian troops were involved in

¹ Papua New Guinea's official concern over Indonesian intervention in East Timor was elegantly stated by Kiki in a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1976 (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1976:47-8). After Somare's visit to Indonesia in January 1977, however, the government adopted a more conciliatory line, describing the Timor situation 'entirely as a domestic matter of Indonesia' (*Australian Foreign Affairs Record* January 1977:47) and in December 1978 it opposed a UN resolution supporting self-determination for East Timor. For an account of popular reaction, see Samana (1976). A demonstration organized by the Women's Action Group called on the government to take a stand against 'third world imperialistic domination' (*Post-Courier* 9 December 1975).

² See *Post-Courier* 23 February 1976. This was the first public statement on the negotiations.

an offensive near the border in which napalm had been used and 1605 villagers killed, and that Australian officers of the Pacific Islands Regiment had cooperated in sealing the border.¹ The report was promptly denied by both Kiki and Somare and by the Defence Department but Somare was clearly angered by the publicity it had received and told a press conference that the government would prosecute Papua New Guineans caught actively supporting Irian Jaya freedom fighters and deport Irianese permissive residents supporting them. 'We do not recognize rebels', he said, 'We recognize Indonesia's sovereignty'.² In response to this, a spokesman for the Irianese community in Port Moresby³ issued a statement saying that 'The threats of Government action against dissidents must not go unchallenged', that the Irianese may be forced to seek Communist aid, and that they would make representations to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. However, after Kiki had accused the group of breaching the conditions of their residency and threatened deportation the community's spokesman retracted and the subject was dropped.⁴

Later in the same year the refugee issue again became a point of contention, this time as the result of an Indonesian press report. In December, shortly before a planned visit to Indonesia by Somare, Papua New Guinea's National Broadcasting Commission relayed a report from the official Indonesian newsagency *Antara* (apparently emanating from the Indonesian embassy in Port Moresby) that talks had begun between the Papua New Guinea and Indonesian governments over the extradition of five hundred Irianese residents in Papua New Guinea. Although the report was denied by Somare, the subject was raised as a matter of public importance in the National Parliament where several speakers criticized Indonesia and the UN, recalled the invasion of

¹ See *Post-Courier* 18 February 1976.

² *Post-Courier* 20 February 1976.

³ According to the *Post-Courier* 24 February 1976 a community organization had been established earlier for proposed round table talks with the Indonesian and Papua New Guinea governments and represented about 200 people.

⁴ *Post-Courier* 26 February 1976.

East Timor, and demanded independence for Irian Jaya. The member for Maprik Open, Pita Lus, told the House

...the United Nations is not doing its job to recognize the West Irian cause. I think it is made up of lazy buggers! If only this country could send me to the United Nations ... I would tell the United Nations to give West Irian its freedom

and the member for Manus, Michael Pondros, said 'if we cannot reach any agreement, we should go to war.' Nor were Indonesians likely to have taken much comfort from the assurances of Kiki that 'The West Irianese are our neighbours and friends The Governemnt has no intention of selling our brothers.'¹

Relations between the Papua New Guinea government and the Indonesian embassy in Port Moresby were still a little uneasy when in January 1977 the head of the RPG, Brig-General Seth Runkorem, crossed into Papua New Guinea and was flown to Port Moresby for talks with the government; the Indonesian embassy 'expressed concern about the Government making available facilities to the rebels.'² And relations between the Papua New Guinea government and Irianese dissidents were not improved following reports that the liberation movement would use terrorism in the Pacific to gain recognition for its cause.³

Relations between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia over the border continued to deteriorate from around May 1977 when hundreds of Irianese began crossing into the Western and West Sepik Provinces. The movement of Irianese across the border was known to be associated with an intensification of conflict between OPM sympathisers and Indonesian military forces in the period leading up to Indonesia's national elections.⁴ But when Kiki expressed concern at the border situation

¹ See *NPD* I(18):2400-10, 9 December 1976.

² *Post-Courier* 6, 10 January 1977.

³ See *Post-Courier* 29 April 1977. The report was subsequently denied (*Post-Courier* 3 May 1977).

⁴ See, for example, *Canberra Times* 31 May 1977.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik told him, curtly, that the recent 'tribal fighting' in Irian Jaya was a domestic affair and that Indonesia would not tolerate those who attempted to exploit the tribal clashes for political purposes.¹

At the end of May 1977 there were reported to be over two hundred refugees at Suki in the Western Province and several hundred more at other points along the border. There were also reports that a Papua New Guinean villager had been shot by an Indonesian patrol on the Papua New Guinea side of the border.²

The government thus found itself in the uncomfortable position of having to reassure Indonesia that it was not providing a harbour for opponents of the Indonesian regime, while at the same time attempting to meet the considerable local pressures (including pressure from the representative of the UN High Commission for Refugees) to deal sympathetically with the border crossers and not to let itself be pushed around by Indonesia - and this at a time which the *Post-Courier* (3 June 1977) delicately referred to as 'the sensitive pre-election phase'.

In June the secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Tony Siaguru, told reporters that the refugees had returned to Irian Jaya after being told of Papua New Guinea's policy on border crossings.³ Irianese sympathizers, however, suspected that undue pressure had been put on the refugees and Langro, as deputy leader of the opposition, issued a statement accusing the Somare government of appeasement.⁴ During the ensuing elections the Somare government was frequently attacked for its handling of the Irian Jaya issue; among those who took up the issue were Langro, Pondros, Noel Levi (former Defence secretary who was a successful candidate in New Ireland) and John Jaminan (former head of the security

¹ See *Post-Courier* 8, 13, 15 June 1977.

² See *Post-Courier* 30 May 1977. The reports were subsequently denied by intelligence sources.

³ See *Post-Courier* 2 June 1977.

⁴ *Sydney Morning Herald* 1 June 1977.

intelligence branch who was a successful candidate in the East Sepik electorate of Yangoru-Saussia and became, for a while, opposition spokesman on foreign affairs).

Nor did Somare find, on his return to office in August, that the issue had gone away. During the second half of 1977 and early 1978 it became abundantly clear that what Malik had dismissed as 'tribal clashes' was in fact a series of widespread confrontations between Indonesian troops and Irianese dissidents. It was in this context that in November 1977 the Minister for Defence, Donatus Mola, informed Parliament¹ that

Recently government policy has been to take a tougher line with all border crossers. People who enter Papua New Guinea illegally can now expect to be arrested and may be put in gaol or handed over to Indonesian authorities.

During 1978 this situation became more complex and the government found itself squeezed on three sides: by the Indonesians, who sought a firm commitment against Irianese rebels; by an increasingly vocal group within the country which demanded sympathy towards Irianese freedom fighters; and by OPM leaders, who threatened militant action against Papua New Guinea if it attempted to close the border.

In April the government was embarrassed by the publication of an OPM press release naming the members of the newly appointed ministry of the de facto government of West Papua. Of the eighteen names on the list six were Papua New Guinea citizens, two were permissive residents, and two were serving gaol sentences for illegal entry but had given notice of their intentions to apply for political asylum. In a statement pending a full enquiry, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ebia Olewale, said that he viewed the matter with the 'utmost gravity' and threatened to cancel the entry permits of those named; 'we will oppose any minority which seeks to involve Papua New Guinea in the domestic affairs of Indonesia', he said.² However this did not prevent the Indonesian embassy from making

¹ *NPD* II(4):381, 10 November 1977.

² *Post-Courier* 19 April 1978.

strong representations to the government and calling on the named rebels to declare their loyalties; moreover Indonesian first secretary Siregar was reported as accusing Papua New Guinea of having double standards and saying 'If we wanted to invade Papua New Guinea we would do it now when Papua New Guinea is weak.'¹ The Indonesians also requested tighter controls over journalists. Olewale reacted sharply to these pressures and was reported to have asked the Indonesian ambassador to consider reposting Siregar.²

In the week following publication of the OPM cabinet list it was announced that Olewale, Mona and Defence Force Commander Diro had held talks in Port Moresby with OPM leaders Jacob Prai and Seth Runkorem. Prai and Runkorem were told to remove camps within the West Sepik Province or have them burnt.³ According to the *Post-Courier* (28 April 1978), 'They were told PNG did not want to act against "other Melanesians", but, at the same time, the Government could not afford a fall out with Indonesia.' Journalist Mark Baker described the ultimatum as 'the strongest stand PNG has yet taken against the guerillas' but reported that it had been firmly rejected.⁴

In May Olewale made an official visit to Indonesia. Indonesian officials succeeded in communicating their doubts about the strength of Papua New Guinea's commitment to its obligations under the 1973 border arrangements⁵ and at the conclusion of his visit Olewale told reporters that Papua New Guinea was now mounting 'constant patrols' along the border.⁶

1 *Post-Courier* 19, 26, 28 April 1978.

2 *Sydney Morning Herald* 2 May 1978.

3 See *Post-Courier* 28 April 1978, 1 May 1978 and *Age* 29 April 1978.

4 *Age* 29 April 1978.

5 See *Post-Courier* 26 May 1978 ('Indonesia is suspicious').

6 *Sydney Morning Herald* 18 May 1978.

Activity along the border further intensified in late May 1978 following the kidnapping of Indonesian officials by a rebel group south of Jayapura. At the end of the month the *Post-Courier* (31 May 1978) reported that a large scale Indonesian military operation was in progress. Shortly after, Somare announced his government's decision to deploy additional troops and police along the northern sector of the boundary in order to prevent rebels from crossing;¹ according to Olewale, any rebels encountered by Papua New Guinea border patrols would be dealt with in a 'Melanesian Way': they would be told to go back and if they refused they would be arrested.² However, although there was liaison between the two governments, Papua New Guinea firmly resisted repeated Indonesian requests for joint patrols.³

In the following weeks there was at least one major border incursion by an Indonesian patrol which was reported to have raided a Papua New Guinea village and destroyed gardens, bringing an official protest from the Papua New Guinea government.⁴ Early in July Indonesian operations escalated; villages were strafed and plastic bombs dropped in the border area. In Papua New Guinea the government expressed to the Indonesian ambassador its fears for the safety of Papua New Guinea citizens near the border but requests to Indonesia to confine bombing raids to an area not less than 8 km from the border were refused. Conscious of the possibility of an accidental clash between Indonesian and Papua New Guinean patrols, the Papua New Guinea government began withdrawing its troops from the area. Once again hundreds of Irianese villagers moved across the border into Papua New Guinea. At a meeting

¹ By mid June Papua New Guinea had about 500 army and police personnel in the border area. According to *Sydney Morning Herald* reports (14, 21 June 1978) Indonesia had four battalions (about 2800 men) plus police paramilitary units and other ancillary forces in Irian Jaya, with about 700 men patrolling the border.

² *Post-Courier* 13 June 1978.

³ See *Post-Courier* 12, 13, 21 June 1978.

⁴ See *Post-Courier* 22, 23 June 1978; *Age* 22, 25 July 1978.

of the UPNG law faculty Papua New Guinea was described as 'slowly entering a state of war with Indonesia.'¹ In September the Indonesian hostages were released and Indonesia began to scale down its military operations, but not before there had been some strain in Papua New Guinea-Indonesian relations and a considerable stimulus to anti Indonesian feeling outside the government.²

On top of this, the arrest of Prai and Otto Ondowame in the Sandaun (West Sepik) Province in late September came as a bonus to Indonesia but provided an additional headache for the Papua New Guinea government - especially when the persistent Siregar announced (incorrectly, as it turned out) that Indonesia would seek their extradition to stand trial for treason.³

In November 1978 a statement by Indonesia's Defence Minister, General Jusuf, gave notice of a shift in Indonesia's policy towards Irianese dissidents; under a new 'smiling policy' it would not be necessary for the army to pursue rebels.⁴ In December the new policy was outlined to Papua New Guinean ministers during an official visit to Papua New Guinea by Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, who praised the Papua New Guinea government for its 'restraint and good

¹ *Post-Courier* 7 July 1978.

² This account of the events of mid 1978 differs somewhat from the interpretation of Hastings (above p. 4). If in fact the Indonesian 'overkill' was intended to provoke Papua New Guinea's cooperation (as Hastings suggests), and was not simply a response to the May kidnapping, it was a dangerous ploy of dubious effect, since Papua New Guinea's eventual response was to withdraw its troops and since it considerably exacerbated anti Indonesian sentiment.

³ Circumstances surrounding the capture of Prai and Ondowame remain somewhat mysterious. Prai claims to have entered Papua New Guinea in the belief that the government wanted to talk to him. (On five previous occasions he had visited Papua New Guinea without a visa and with the government's knowledge.) Prai believes there may have been a plot to remove him from leadership (see *Age* 1 December 1978). Levi claims they were 'captured by Australian and Indonesian intelligence operatives' (*Our News* 21(4) 28 February 1979).

The two were refused permissive residency in Papua New Guinea and, with three other OPM leaders, were eventually granted asylum in Sweden in March 1979.

⁴ *Far Eastern Economic Review* 24 November 1978; *Sydney Morning Herald* 12 December 1978.

leadership' in cooperating with Indonesia.¹

With the scaling down of military operations and a certain amount of goodwill generated by Mochtar's visit, relations between the two countries at the official level seem to have improved. After Mochtar's visit the two governments commenced discussions preliminary to the renewal of the 1973 border agreement. The first round of discussions was completed in March without significant disagreement.

The atmosphere of renewed cordiality even survived the publication in February 1979 of a document purporting to be a plan for an Indonesian takeover of Papua New Guinea. Papua New Guinean security experts dismissed the document as a fake and there appears to have been virtually no public discussion of it.²

On the other hand relations between the Papua New Guinea government and both OPM leaders and the Irianese community in Papua New Guinea appear to have deteriorated markedly during 1978. In part this was the inevitable consequence of the government's tougher attitudes towards border crossings and towards visible support for the OPM within Papua New Guinea. But it also reflected the difficulties of dealing with a movement sharply divided within itself and of coming to terms with a leadership which, at least verbally, looked increasingly towards terrorism.³ After the capture of Prai and Ondowame several members of the government received threats of violence and at a cabinet meeting in Wewak, usually a very casual affair, ministers were heavily guarded by police with armalite rifles. Also, the removal of two Irianese refugees in an OPM raid on the refugee camp at Yako in April 1979 brought a very strong reaction from Somare, who said the incident could lead to a hardening of the government's attitude towards the separatists.⁴

¹ See *Sydney Morning Herald* 11, 15 December 1978.

² See *Nation Review* 1 February 1979 and *Post-Courier* 8, 12 February 1979.

³ See, for example, *Post-Courier* 29 April 1977, 2, 3 May 1977, 27 September 1977, 10 November 1977 (but see 14 November 1977), 23 October 1978 and *Age* 13 June 1978.

⁴ *Canberra Times* 4 April 1979.

In retrospect, then, the principal outcomes of the intensified activity along the border in 1977-78 seem to have been, first, the demonstration of a firm commitment by the government to preventing the use of Papua New Guinea as a base for dissident activities and to discouraging large scale movement across the border, while at the same time taking a firm stand against Indonesian pressures on matters of day to day policy; secondly, the deterioration of relations between the Papua New Guinea government and the OPM and its supporters, and, thirdly, an apparent growth of popular support for the Irianese which has increased the salience of the border issue in Papua New Guinea's domestic politics.¹ It is to the last of these that we now turn.

Domestic pressures on the Irian Jaya issue.

In recent years there has been an increasing popular awareness in Papua New Guinea of 'the Irian Jaya problem' and growing sympathy for 'our Melanesian brothers'. In some cases, including public servants and members of the government, such sympathy is influenced by personal contacts with Irianese and is often linked with antipathy towards Indonesia or with a feeling of resentment that Papua New Guinea's policy is dictated by Indonesia or Australia. But for the most part it is a vague and largely uninformed sympathy. To dismiss the support for Irianese freedom fighters simply as evidence of 'Indophobia' is to grossly oversimplify the complex of sentiments on which it draws.

Notwithstanding the widespread sympathy for the Irianese, it is unlikely that domestic pressures could bring about any radical shift in Papua New Guinea foreign policy. They could, however, affect the quality of Papua New Guinea's relations with Indonesia and they could have a considerable effect on domestic politics - especially if there is truth in the recent report² that the government

¹ A crude indicator of this is the number of times Irian Jaya or Indonesian-Papua New Guinean relations occur in the *Post-Courier* as a news item or in letters to the editor. Annual figures are as follows: 1972, 26; 1973, 40; 1974, 8; 1975, 11; 1976, 50; 1977, 71 (of which 61 were after 1 May); 1978, 220. (Source: *Post-Courier* indexes, IASER, Port Moresby.)

² *Sydney Morning Herald* 25 May 1979.

is currently preparing legislation to stop citizens actively supporting the Irian Jaya guerilla movement.

In view of this it is worth having a closer look at the composition of the 'Irian Jaya lobby'.

The Irianese community. Nobody seems to know how many Irianese-born people there are in Papua New Guinea or where they live. The usual estimate of Irianese residents is about 2,000 to 3,000,¹ of whom 217² have been granted Papua New Guinea citizenship.

Some of these migrated from West New Guinea before 1962; the rest are either refugees with the status of permissive residence (or citizenship) or people who have slipped across the border and taken up residence in villages or towns but are technically illegal immigrants. The number in the latter category (particularly in the West and East Sepik Provinces) is possibly quite large.

In broad terms the government's policy on border crossing has not changed since 1962.³ People crossing the border are required to report to one of the several patrol posts along the border and state their reason for crossing. If their purpose is 'traditional' (the most common is sago making) they are normally allowed to stay until they have finished what they came to do and are then expected to return across the border. If they apply for political asylum they are held until a decision is taken and then either granted permissive residence or told to return.⁴ In all other cases they are told to return. If

¹ Nyamekye and Premdas put the figure at 10,000 (see above p. 68).

² This figure is subject to confirmation. In December 1976, 157 Irianese were granted citizenship and in June 1977 another 60. In November 1978 it was reported that the government was imposing a freeze on citizenship to Irianese (*Post-Courier* 13 November 1978).

³ For early explanations of this policy see *HAD* II(2):359-60, 4 September 1965; II(3):589-90, 20 November 1968; II(5):1131-3, 17 June 1969. Also see van der Veur (1965-66).

⁴ The government's policy was summarized as follows in 1973: 'In general the Papua New Guinea Government will not recommend permissive residence for illegal migrants from any other country unless there is clear evidence that they would suffer extreme danger or hardship if returned to their homeland'. (*Post-Courier* 20 July 1973.)

they refuse, they are arrested and charged as illegal migrants, after which they may be deported. In practice, however, the administration of this policy has varied considerably. For most of the 1960s and early 1970s permissive residency seems to have been granted fairly readily, though border patrols were often very proficient at 'escorting' border crossers back to the border. On numerous occasions groups of people have been allowed to stay in temporary camps¹ until the conditions which caused their move have abated; while in such camps they have been given food and medical attention. In at least one instance, in 1977, the Papua New Guinea government has sought Indonesia's assurance that those returning will not be harmed. In the past it would seem that political asylum has been granted fairly readily to those who could plausibly claim that they would suffer persecution if they were returned to Indonesia, but in the recent cases of Prai, Ondowame, Maury and Indey the government was obviously reluctant to grant asylum to people whose presence could prejudice relations with Indonesia. There is no extradition treaty between the countries.

Those granted permissive residence must accept two conditions: that they will settle wherever they and their families are directed (in practice, where jobs are available away from the border), and that they will 'never directly or indirectly get involved in political activities which caused [them] seeking for asylum in Papua New Guinea' (Verrier 1976 Appendix F). The first of the conditions has had the effect of distributing the Irianese community fairly widely throughout the country and mostly in towns (particularly in Manus - where in the 1960s and 1970s large numbers of permissive residents were accommodated temporarily - and Port Moresby). The second condition has not been very strictly enforced. The circumstances of gaining permissive

¹ At present there are three holding camps, at Yako and Oksapmin in the Sandaun (West Sepik) Province and Weam in the Western Province. There has been talk of establishing another camp at Wabo in the Gulf Province. In 1977-78 the cost of maintaining refugees at these camps was quoted variously at between K800 and K2000 per day.

residency virtually ensure that the Irianese community will be antipathetic, if not actively hostile, towards Indonesia and even without engaging in formal political activity some Irianese are likely to find sympathetic voices among their Papua New Guinean neighbours (one prominent Papua New Guinean spokesman for Irian Jaya has joint business interests with Irianese). Many Irianese now hold senior positions in government, private enterprise and the church and there is no doubt that some have used their positions to publicize the grievances of the Irianese people. Moreover since 1962 the Irianese community has provided an effective underground channel for OPM propaganda and the existence of links between Irianese in Papua New Guinea and the OPM organization in Irian Jaya and overseas was evidenced, to everyone's embarrassment, by the release of the de facto West Papuan cabinet in 1977 (though some of those named disclaimed any involvement). In the mid 1970s there was an Irianese community organization within Papua New Guinea (see fn. 3 p.38) but in 1977 there were factions within the community reflecting the divisions within the international movement. In January 1978 an organization calling itself the South Pacific Group opposed an officially sanctioned visit by Jouwe.¹

However the government has prevented overt expressions of support for OPM, and for those Irianese tempted to express openly their opposition to Indonesia the threat of deportation has provided a powerful disincentive, and one which the government has not hesitated to employ. Moreover, as a result of the confrontations between the government and the Irianese community during 1977 and 1978 it is likely that in future the government will exercise even tighter control over them.

*The border villages.*² For the most part the border area is not heavily populated, but where there are concentrations of population there are usually traditional ties, social or economic, between Irianese and Papua New Guinean villages. Hence when Irianese began to cross

¹ See *Post-Courier* 12, 24, 25, 30 January 1978.

² The position of the border villages is discussed in more detail in Herlihy's paper.

into Papua New Guinea after 1962 they were generally well received - especially since many of the border villages saw themselves as standing to gain from associated border development plans. It is no coincidence that the most prominent early spokesman for the Irianese (apart from Guise) were Kenu and Langro and the expatriate member for the Madang-Sepik special electorate (all from electorates adjoining the border). It is difficult to say whether the scale of recent activity along the border and frustrated expectation of development in the border areas have diminished this sympathy. However Diro is quoted as saying in April 1978 that support among Papua New Guineans near the border is so strong that no military campaign by Papua New Guinea against the guerillas could succeed (Sharp 1977:105, quoting the ABC) and reports of operations in July 1978 tended to confirm this.¹ Among other evidence of local support for the freedom fighters, in December 1978 a letter appeared in the *Post-Courier* signed by 'the Bush People, Bewani' which asked the government to return Prai and Ondowame to the West Sepik² and on the UPNG campus the West Sepik Students' Association has maintained an active interest in the border issue.

The sense of brotherhood appears to extend into the East Sepik Province where, it seems, a number of illegal border crossers have settled over the years. In late 1978-early 1979 there was in the East Sepik a cargo cultish movement, in which 'freedom fighters' 'stripes and epaulettes were being sold to villagers for amounts ranging from K2 to K20, though the reasons for acquiring the insignia were not clear. (A similar movement had been evident in the West Sepik in the early 1970s.) East Sepik politicians Tony Bais and John Jaminan have taken up the cause of the Irianese refugees in the second parliament and in early 1979, when difficulty was being experienced in finding a home for Prai and Ondowame, Bais said over the NBC that his village would provide them with a home.

¹ See *Sydney Morning Herald* 13 July 1978.

² *Post-Courier* 20 December 1978.

The existence of such local sympathies may raise new problems for the national government as powers are progressively transferred to provincial governments. The possible significance of this is indicated by the fact that Langro, having lost his seat in the National Parliament, is now provincial secretary of the Sandaun Province.¹

The Church. The church exercises a strong influence over public opinion in Papua New Guinea. On the Irian Jaya question its concern over human rights is perhaps reinforced by sympathy for a predominantly Christian movement in a predominantly Islamic state. Having been relatively quiet on the subject since 1969, recently several church bodies have made strong statements on the Irian Jaya question. In June 1977 the National Catholic Council called on the Indonesian government 'to refrain from acts of savagery against Melanesians in Irian Jaya'.² In October 1978 the Melanesian Council of Churches (MCC) (which represents the Anglican, Baptist, Catholic, Lutheran and United Churches and the Salvation Army) established a Committee on Melanesian Refugees to protect the rights of Irianese refugees and to raise public awareness; soon after its establishment the committee criticized the government's handling of refugees in the West Sepik. In February 1979 the MCC told the government not to deport Prai and Ondowame, that such action would be unchristian.³

Also, in recent months the *Wantok* newspaper, the nation's weekly pidgin newspaper published under the direction of a board comprising representatives of the Catholic, Anglican, Lutheran and United Churches, has maintained a close and sympathetic coverage of the Irianese refugee problem.⁴

¹ This point was brought out during discussion by Bill Standish.

² *Post-Courier* 1 June 1977.

³ See report in *Wantok* 17 February 1979.

⁴ See, for example, 9 December 1978 ('Jacob Prai na Wes Irian'), 20 January 1979 ('Tarangu Prai'), 10 February 1979 ('Fridom Paitman'), and 17 February 1979 ('Mipela i no laik indai').

Students and intellectuals. In 1969 the then recently established Politics Club at UPNG became the first predominantly Papua New Guinean organization (apart from the House of Assembly) to take up the Irian Jaya cause. Participant commentator Davis (1970:295) compared Papua New Guinean student involvement over Irian Jaya at this time to Australian student involvement over Vietnam, though the former proved to be relatively short lived.

Indonesia's invasion of East Timor provided another occasion for an anti Indonesian demonstration by students and in presenting petitions to the Indonesian embassy and the Papua New Guinea government reference was made also to the demand for freedom by the Irianese.¹ During 1977 and 1978 students again identified with their Melanesian brothers and criticized the government's handling of the issue; in July 1978 there was another march on the Indonesian embassy and in November students offered assistance to Prai and Ondowame.²

Other notable expressions of support for the freedom fighters have come from John Kasaipwalova, Bernard Narakobi and Utula Samana.

Kasaipwalova, former student and village leader, poet, playwright and businessman, wrote in an article in the *Post-Courier* (28 July 1978), 'as a nation we are but dancing fools for Indonesian foreign policy' but he went on to suggest that 'we three brothers' (Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and Irian Jaya) sit down together to argue our differences. Shortly after, and almost prophetically, Kasaipwalova presented a new play, 'My Brother, My Enemy', the subject of which is the capture and incarceration of an OPM leader who has crossed into Papua New Guinea. Although the play is essentially a satire against the Papua New Guinea government, the Indonesian ambassador felt moved to walk out of the first performance.

Narakobi, lawyer (former chairman of the Law Reform Commission),

¹ For an account of the student protest (during which a replica of the Indonesian flag was trampled) see Samana (1976).

² *Post-Courier* 26 June 1978; 10,11 July 1978; 2, 10 November 1978.

writer, philosopher and prospective East Sepik politician, has on a number of recent occasions attacked the government for not supporting the Irianese freedom fighters¹ and recently presented a petition on the subject to visiting US ambassador Andrew Young. Young is reported, in a government newsletter, to have said that he 'would bring the matter to groups which are sympathetic to the West Irian cause to bring it up at the United Nations for discussion.'²

Samana, a provincial official and former student leader, who had taken an active part in the 1976 demonstration over East Timor, was arrested in December 1978 when he attempted to hand a petition to Mochtar; he was at the time he was arrested a member of the official welcoming party in Lae.

The volume of pro Irianese letters to the *Post Courier* (and according to the paper's editor those published represent only a fraction of those received) suggests that the views expressed by Churches, students and the individuals mentioned here are representative of a great mass of popular sentiment.

Parliamentary opposition. Between 1969 and 1976 Irian Jaya was not a prominent issue in domestic politics. Apart from questions by Langro, Chatterton and Pondros, the subject was seldom raised and when it was there was no systematic difference of opinion between government and opposition. As we have noted, however, the government's handling of the border situation became a significant issue during the national elections in 1977 and it has been a recurring subject for question and debate in the second parliament.

Although Langro was a casualty of the election his concern over government policy on Irian Jaya has been taken up by several new members on both sides of the House - notably Levi, Jaminan and Bais - as well as by Guise, Pondros, the present opposition leader Iambakey

¹ See, for example, *Post-Courier* 28 June 1978, 24 July 1978; *Canberra Times* 21 July 1978. Also see his warning against 'Indonesian imperialism', *Post-Courier* 9 December 1975.

² *Papua New Guinea Newsletter* 47, week ending 4 May 1979.

Okuk, and Papua Besena member James Mopio. To date opposition members do not appear to have come up with any plausible alternative policy but, especially under the new confrontationist style of opposition politics pursued by Okuk, they have been quick to make political capital out of the Irian Jaya issue, accusing the government of being weak in its dealings with Indonesia and wrong in its decision to deport Prai and his colleagues.¹

The army. Towards the end of 1977 much publicity was given to the fact that Defence Force commander-in-chief, Ted Diro, was summoned to a cabinet meeting and reprimanded for having had contact with rebel leaders. It was even reported that there were demands from within cabinet to remove Diro from the position of commander-in-chief but that these demands were overruled when it became clear that the Defence Force stood firmly behind Diro.² Then in December 1978 a senior officer of the Defence Force, Lt-Col. Tom Poang, was forced to resign because of his involvement in negotiations between the OPM and an arms dealer from Senegal for the purchase of weapons.³ In both cases personal antagonisms seem to have played some part in the government's handling of the situation but the incidents have raised questions about the extent of accord between the government and the army⁴ and lent weight to a commonly held view that there is a good deal of antipathy towards Indonesia among army officers.

¹ See especially *Draft Hansard* 7, 17 August 1978. Okuk's own position has fluctuated. Up till October 1978 he appeared mostly as a champion of Irianese refugees (e.g. see *Post-Courier* 9 June 1978, 7 July 1978, 20 October 1978) but at the end of that month he returned from Indonesia with glowing reports of Indonesia's administration of Irian Jaya and East Timor (*Post-Courier* 1 November 1978). Since then however, his position seems to have shifted again (for example see *Papua New Guinea Newsletter* 46, week ending 27 April 1979).

² See *Post-Courier* 30 September and 6, 10, 12, 14 October 1977.

³ See *Sydney Morning Herald* 19 December 1978.

⁴ It is also notable that in October 1977 Police Minister Patterson Lowa (formerly Diro's second-in-command) suggested that 'border patrols rightly belonged to the police, not the army' (*Hiri* October 1977:3).

Finally, a brief word might be said about Indonesian intelligence operations. It is generally acknowledged in Papua New Guinea that Indonesia has an efficient intelligence network within the country, some of whose members are Irianese 'refugees'. Among the country's educated elite it is widely believed that in a number of instances (some include Poang's dismissal and Prai's arrest) the Papua New Guinea government's hand has been forced by intelligence passed on to it by the Indonesians. Whether or not this is true is less important than the facts that the belief is widely held and that it has had the effect of increasing Papua New Guinea's suspicions of Indonesia's intentions. To this extent Indonesian intelligence operations within Papua New Guinea may well prove, in the long run, to be counter productive. The same might be said of attempts to buy goodwill through diplomatic hospitality and other means.

Conclusion.

Developments along the border in 1977 and 1978 not only strained relations between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia; they led to a cooling off in relations between the Papua New Guinea government and the Irianese and they created new tensions in Papua New Guinea's domestic politics. Whether, in the medium term, Indonesia's 'smiling policy' in Irian Jaya, together with the recent defection and deportation of OPM field leaders, will bring about a new cordiality in relations between the two countries, and whether Papua New Guinea's popular concern over the issue will be sustained, remain to be seen (my guesses are respectively a heavily qualified yes, and no). In the meantime, it is unlikely - even with a change of government in Papua New Guinea (which also seems unlikely in the near future) - that Papua New Guinea will initiate any change in its policy on Irian Jaya, though it might respond to domestic pressures to attempt to resume the unwelcome and probably hopeless role of mediator between the Indonesian government and the rebels.¹

¹ Cf. *Draft Hansard* 7 August 1978 p. 11/1/1.

In the short term, what may prove to be a more significant outcome of the events of 1977 and 1978 is the obvious irritation which OPM support within Papua New Guinea has caused Somare. The reconciliation of public attitudes and private feelings has always posed a delicate problem for the Papua New Guinea government, and it will continue to do so. If Somare proceeds with heavy handed measures to suppress expressions of popular support for the Irianese he may be courting political disaster.

BORDER DEVELOPMENT:
A 'POLITICAL NECESSITY' AGAIN

J.M. Herlihy

Most speakers at this seminar have been cautiously optimistic about the recent government-to-government rapport and the proposed new border agreement between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. From what has been said, especially with regard to rebel activity, it is fairly clear that the response within the border zone itself will be a crucial determinant of the success or failure of the new governmental initiatives. In this context two aspects of the proposed new approach are particularly significant: first, the 'hard line' taken by Papua New Guinea against rebel sympathizers, and secondly, the issue of border development. This paper outlines briefly, for the Papua New Guinea side of the border, some of the situational factors likely to affect village response to government initiatives and to influence governmental capacity to institute effective change within the border zone. On the basis of these factors it is suggested that achievement of government's objectives with regard to the communities in the vicinity of the border will be a complex and costly task, the difficulties of which could well outweigh the time and resources the Papua New Guinea government is able to divert to it. Previous experience and present constraints indicate a high probability that the current concern for border development will be a transient phenomenon which survives only as long as the border is a national political issue.

The relevance of a border development programme to the present politics of the border depends largely on the validity of several assumptions. These are, first, that a decline in rebel activity, which is confined to a relatively small area, will ease the international and internal tensions now associated with the border; secondly, that sympathy and support for the rebel movement among border communities will show an inverse correlation with development of the area; thirdly, that government will be able to supply the type and quantity of inputs necessary to implement an effective development programme; and fourthly, that the border communities will be able and willing to take advantage of the programme. Though this paper concentrates on the last two assumptions, each is debatable.

The border zone.

The term 'border zone' is used here to refer to the 32 km (20 mile) quarantine strip or *cordon sanitaire* which parallels the actual border across Papua New Guinea, and within which border considerations have a direct impact on the daily lives of the people - even though many have little knowledge of or interest in the political issues involved. The terrain within the *cordon sanitaire* varies from the lowland swamps of most of the Western Province, through the inaccessible central cordillera to the Sepik River lowlands, the Bewani and border ranges, the swampy alluvial reaches of the Neumeyer Plain, and across the Oenake Mountains to the coastal lowlands near Vanimo. Average population densities for the two border provinces, at an estimated 0.82 persons per km² for Western Province and 2.8 per km² for Sandaun (West Sepik) Province in 1976, are very low. Densities along the Sandaun side of the *cordon sanitaire* on a breakdown by census division range from 0 to 4 persons per km² for most of the zone with approximately 6 per km² in the Amanab area, but due to the dispersed settlement pattern and uneven distribution these figures are merely indicative. Physical and demographic characteristics are reflected in marked cultural differences between border communities, which *inter alia* inhibit across-the-board planning for the border zone. With the possible exception of the Wutung-Vanimo people, most border communities have in common their isolation from each other and from other areas of Papua New Guinea, relatively low standards of living and economic opportunity, and a history of administrative neglect and unreliability which has left deep but usually hidden resentments.

Most traditional communication and trade routes, for the border zone, such as they were, ran east-west rather than north-south, so that for a number of communities contacts across the border were more important than linkages on the same side. Though some villagers as a result still have kinship ties and land or hunting rights on both sides of the border, their range is fairly limited. Formal linkages inland on the Papua New Guinea side around the main crossing points of the Bewani-Kilimeri area rarely extend beyond a few kilometres. Far more extensive, and of far greater political significance, are the

residue of contacts established through previous exchanges and movement to and from Hollandia and a loose identification of mutual interest in the difficulties that both sides of the border have experienced as a result of the manoeuvres of their respective governments. Despite the apparent contiguity between cross-border sympathies and the 'Melanesian brotherhood' theme on which some members of the educated elite, including parliamentarians, have based their support for the Irianese cause, the latter is of little importance on the border. Many villagers in fact regard such elite articulation of border issues as political opportunism. As the 1977 election results demonstrated, the Irian Jaya situation *per se* has very little electoral pull by comparison with pragmatic parochial concerns.

A large proportion of border communities is basically hunter-gatherers. Though the majority, especially in the mountains, also cultivate small gardens, and although the swamp dwellers depend heavily on natural or cultivated stands of sago, cultivation usually is regarded as a secondary activity (see also Gell 1975:16). This means that cash cropping, the main element of Papua New Guinea development programmes, involves a double transition: first to permanent or semi permanent subsistence cultivation and secondly to production for the monetary economy. It has also resulted in a relatively high degree of individualism. As in other areas of the Sepik, village elders can advise and exhort, but cannot control (Thurnwald 1916; Huber 1977). Mobilization for a communal activity is difficult and infrequent. Especially in areas which operate on a narrow survival margin, welfare matters such as care for the sick and elderly are usually a personal or familial concern rather than a communal responsibility, and those without immediate relatives may be left to fend for themselves.

Notable among the cultural factors which reinforce isolationism and inhibit development in the border area are a multiplicity of languages, the dominance of sister exchange marital alliance, and, for Kilimeri in particular, *sanguma*, a form of assault sorcery.

The Sepik provinces contain approximately one third of Papua New Guinea's listed languages. The population to language ratio is

about half the average for the rest of the country, and drops to approximately 500 speakers per language in the border area (Laycock 1973:54-5). In 1975-76 a sample of Kilimeri people¹ had very little contact and no familiarity with neighbouring linguistic patterns, though 96 per cent of males and 75 per cent of females could communicate to some extent in pidgin. Exceptionally low levels of literacy (only 4 per cent of the Kilimeri sample could read or write even at an elementary level) meant that effective communication had to be by word of mouth, but oral information flows were severely restricted by the physical and cultural isolation and by the paucity of government patrolling and outside contact.

Sister exchange marriage is almost entirely endogamous, dissociated from the cash economy, and enforces the dependence of young people as a whole on their village elders. Under sister (or daughter) exchange a man who wishes to marry must provide a female relative as wife for a male member of the family or clan from whom he seeks his wife. Though the system traditionally was fairly flexible, the resultant social structure is one characterized by older men married to one or more young wives, young men often married to widows many years their senior, poor marital cohesiveness, and a very narrow spread of kinship ties. In the Kilimeri sample all adults had married within their own area, about fifty per cent to someone from the same village and the bulk of the remainder into a neighbouring village. As most villages contain less than 150 people, marriage-derived contacts are very closely constrained. Villagers are therefore very limited in the extent to which they can substitute kinship obligations for cash to gain access to development opportunities outside their range. When opportunistic villagers near Bewani station began to impose such charges as land rents for school children's food gardens, many Kilimeri villagers were unable to utilize the school. Similar problems arose when they wished to use land outside the *cordon sanitaire* to graze cattle, as the rent demanded was equal to fifty per cent of the beast's sale value (then equivalent to approximately \$40 *per annum* for about two hectares of unimproved pasture).

¹ The Kilimeri data quoted in this paper is drawn from fieldwork carried out by the author between 1975 and 1977.

Though warfare was a recurrent pre contact hazard, border villages on the whole do not have the tradition of endemic violence that characterized other parts of Papua New Guinea. Possibly as a result, very few have become actively involved in the OPM guerilla campaigns or exhibited significant interest in military defence of the border. On the other hand, covert violence through *sanguma* retains a strong hold, though *sanguma* practices vary along the border from the ritualized execution of the Kilimeri to the 'death threat' or magic forms familiar in other parts of Papua New Guinea. Kilimeri villagers claim that, until the suppression of warfare, *sanguma* was a 'last resort' method of social control, rarely used, but that now 'we are afraid to talk strong, we are afraid to try anything new, it is *sanguma* that holds us back'. While *sanguma* is often used as an *ex post* rationalization for inactivity, its inhibitory effect on societal cohesiveness, entrepreneurial innovation and response to external stimuli is a major problem for development of the area. Estimates of the strength of *sanguma* activity by government, mission and other observers in 1976 ranged from 'very little' to attributed responsibility for about eighty per cent of deaths in the area, a range matched only by the wildly fluctuating estimates of support for the OPM. As the village response to official discouragement of involvement in *sanguma* or OPM activities has been a marked reluctance to discuss either, articulated village opinion provides a very unreliable indicator, and the actual strength of these two important variables for the new border policy is still unknown.

For most of the border area, problems of isolation and access are compounded, and capacity for developmental responsiveness and self-help reduced, by very serious levels of malnutrition. A study in 1962 identified nutritional deficiencies in the Bewani area which were more severe than those of the Wosera and other known problem areas of Papua New Guinea (McLennan n.d.), but its findings were not followed up. A decade later other studies, based primarily on clinic records,¹ found

¹ A comparison of village data with clinic records in 1976 indicated that the latter underestimated the degree of malnutrition, largely as a result of poor or irregular clinic attendance, the lack of concern among many villagers about nutritional deficiencies, and the tendency of some mothers to hide malnourished children from health staff to avoid criticism or interference.

that malnutrition was a problem for the majority of inland border stations, with an average for the province as a whole of 63 malnourished children per 100 attending clinics, and in some areas up to eighty to ninety per cent of children under two years malnourished (Salfield 1973:25; Korte 1974; Korte and Kamkilakai 1975). In the Kilimeri area the poor nutrition and general health care was reflected in 1975-76 in a crude death rate of 3.8 per cent. One third of these deaths was among women of child bearing age.¹ Over one third of children died before they reached maturity, with 69 per cent of child deaths in the under six months age bracket and 83 per cent under two years. To some extent the high mortality was disguised by a relatively high birth rate, 6.7 per cent, which held the rate of natural increase, 2.8 per cent, at approximately average levels for the country, but the resultant age-sex structure made survival, and development, a much more arduous task than in most parts of Papua New Guinea. Though improvement of nutrition has been a perennial aim of the West Sepik administration and recently has become a nationwide development priority, for the border area it has proved very difficult to implement. Partly this has been due to the spasmodic and often inappropriate nature of official attention to the problem, partly to the major changes it has required to the existing subsistence system, and partly because malnutrition is the norm and therefore is not perceived by villagers as a problem.

Border development.

The early phase. Though border issues, including border development, have been a recurrent governmental concern for most of this century, the border is still one of the most backward and administratively neglected areas of Papua New Guinea. Ironically this can be attributed, to a large extent, to official preoccupation with the political ramifications of border administration, which has resulted in short term decision making and inattention to the problems and local idiosyncracies reported regularly by field staff. Official difficulties in reconciling observed needs with available resources

¹ DDA, Pagei, Patrol Report 2/75-76.

have created a marked gap between policy objectives and practice. In 1947 the then district officer stressed the importance of border development for amicable border politics and the need for 'continual urging to improve their living and health conditions', but felt unable to divert staff to the area.¹ In later years government officials regularly evaded the logistical difficulties of cash crop development by announcements that they would concentrate on improvement of subsistence, an even more difficult task and rarely followed through.

The inhibiting effects on border development of the government's policy probably commenced with the transfer from German to Australian control after World War I. This reduced the Sepik area from a proposed 'centre for future agricultural development' (Whittaker et al. 1975:263) to a peripheral administrative district. The westward spread of developmental demonstration effects from the only significant centre, at Aitape, was almost entirely stopped after the war by the removal of all settlers on the coast between Aitape and the border in an attempt by the district officer to prevent illicit communication, via the Dutch, between German settlers and their home country (Rowley 1958:42). Until World War II European influence on the border area came mainly from Netherlands New Guinea, though a border surveillance post, opened at Vanimo in 1918, provided (when staffed) desultory supervision of trade and contact across the border. Restrictions on border movement tightened after World War II, when a patrol officer was posted to Vanimo 'mainly to prevent Indonesians from crossing the border'. At the same time rumours that the Dutch intended to establish a city at Hollandia triggered proposals for development of the New Guinea side, 'otherwise they [border] villagers may tend to prefer the Dutch administration to ours.'² The possibility of an Indonesian takeover in the West brought further restrictions. Though the Australian government in the 1950s officially favoured 'side-by-side' development of West and East New Guinea (Hasluck 1976:362), a 1953 report of projected Indonesian activity in the Dutch territory was followed in 1954 by a directive that 'natives from across the border, or villages now regarded as under Dutch influence were not permitted to enter employment' on the Australian side.³

¹ Sub-district office (SDO), Wewak, file 30/2-23, 12 May 1947.

² *Ibid.*

³ Department of District Services and Native Affairs (DDS & NA), file NLB 31/1-1407, 6 December 1954.

After the transfer of control over Netherlands New Guinea to Indonesia in the early 1960s, the Australian administration mounted a massive development programme along the border. New patrol posts were opened, schools and health centres built, local government councils introduced, and an intensified 'political education' campaign commenced. Money was poured into the area to win the support of local people who in many cases had exhibited a preference for the material benefits of Hollandia under the Dutch. As a result, one patrol officer complained, the people afterwards expected to be paid for everything.¹ At the same time, however, an instruction to border officials that 'border surveillance is to be maintained as a priority over all other activities'² ensured that border development was effectively subordinated to political considerations. For some time official attention focussed on the small community of Sekotchiau (later Skotiaho), which was the centre of most movement across border tribal lands in the early to mid 1960s and which shrewdly played one government against the other to considerable material advantage.

In the late 1960s the peripheral border villages began to complain of their exclusion from border development and administrative attention. Direct benefits, such as education and health facilities, and flow-on benefits such as income earning opportunities from the Bewani patrol post, accrued mainly to the nineteen per cent of the administrative area in its immediate vicinity. Vanimo and the border posts were a poor substitute for Hollandia as a source of trade goods and had insufficient attractions to overcome the distance constraint. At the same time villagers became more sensitive to the inferiority of their catechist schools and unreliable health facilities vis-a-vis the new 'certificate' primary schools and government health centres, and utilization of the former declined. Resentments grew after an order that shotguns, the most coveted possession of a hunting community, were to be kept to a minimum on the border.³ They intensified when cash cropping activities, which had been encouraged in particular through

¹ Division of District Administration (DDA), Wewak, patrol report 5/69-70.

² District Commissioner (DC), Wewak, file A2-2-10/376, 6 September 1963.

³ DDA, Wewak, file 67-3-7, 5 April 1965.

the mission network and by the new councils, were discouraged by government officials. 'Be extremely wary on the introduction of crops', the district commissioner advised his staff in 1963, 'I do not want these people to get a cash-crop idea, we will never get the stuff out.'¹

Administrative problems in the area were compounded by a very rapid turnover of staff, spasmodic use of border stations as 'exile' or training posts for 'difficult' or inexperienced officers, and especially in recent years by the youth and inexperience of many indigenous officials. Delays in departmental funding, irregular availability of staff, and the burden of office obligations were reflected regularly in postponement of patrols. In addition, the simple logistics of patrolling a large, sparsely populated area meant that over a given period the client coverage which staff in the border area could achieve was less than half the national average. The subsequent lumpiness of administrative operations created a vicious cycle of diminished government effectiveness at village level and diminishing village enthusiasm for government intervention. At the same time a number of factors, including lack of political sophistication, scarcity of alternative sources of development assistance, and official discouragement of visitors to the sensitive border area, meant that power was increasingly concentrated in a narrow administrative spectrum.

The cordon sanitaire. The major government-initiated constraint on economic development of the border area, both for government officials and for villagers, undoubtedly has been the *cordon sanitaire*. The bulk of the population within the border zone live ten or more kilometres away from the actual border, and have little contact with the border patrol posts or comprehension of border issues. Due to the land tenure system, for all practical purposes these villagers are locationally bound into a situation from which they gain little if any advantage but as a result of which they subsidize development elsewhere. They bear a large part of the costs of quarantine protection for crops and herds in other areas of Papua New Guinea, and since the Indonesian side has no equivalent arrangement they also provide a buffer zone which enables Indonesia to evade responsibility for containment of its communicable

¹ DDA, Wewak, file 67-3-8, 12 July 1963.

diseases and pests. Incidentally, this has eased the border situation for the Papua New Guinea and the Indonesian governments by reducing the potential for conflict between them. In addition, maintenance of the quarantine strip has allowed agricultural and health staff on the Papua New Guinea side to avoid the expense and difficulty of regular field patrols and active quarantine supervision. It has also provided a blanket excuse for neglect of border development. Villagers have been told that in the absence of cash crop and livestock projects regular visits by agriculture staff are superfluous, but that assistance would be forthcoming when they established economically viable projects.

When the Indonesian takeover aborted moves, begun in the early 1950s, to establish uniform quarantine regulations and procedures on both sides of the border (Hasluck 1976:360), controls on the Papua New Guinea side were tightened. The effects of the *cordon sanitaire* were thus felt most severely at a time when the border development programme and the accelerated pace of cash crop and pastoral development in other parts of Papua New Guinea had aroused widespread interest in the economic aspects of development among border villages. Responsibility for the zone devolved primarily upon the Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries (DASF, later DPI), a specialist and somewhat autonomous department, singularly ill-attuned to the political needs of border management but by virtue of its control over quarantine and stock movement a powerful political force in the area. Confusion in DASF ranks for some time led to a series of conflicting directives as to what could and could not be grown or kept within the zone, as a consequence of which villagers hesitated to accept field staff guidance. Further confusion arose from policy conflicts, as when DASF proposed to allow pig and poultry projects, though in general policy and staff training it discouraged these because of their low economic returns, need for close supervision, and use of foodstuffs required for human consumption. Many villagers came to regard the zone as a 'total development ban' (West Sepik Province 1976:16).

Recognition in the 1970s of the futility of a ban on cattle and coffee, which could be controlled, when disease could be carried by

dogs, pigs, deer and people, whose border crossings could not be policed, led several officials and politicians to press for a relaxation of the policy. A number of alternatives was mooted, including establishment of sentinel herds and realignment of the perimeter, but were rejected by agriculture and health officials in Port Moresby. Quoting international precedent, DASF advised that they considered that twenty miles was the minimum acceptable for a *cordon sanitaire* and that preferably the zone should be widened.¹ This intransigence reflected adversely on village relations with other officials, in particular Division of District Administration (DDA) field staff, who were forced to justify a government stance which many personally opposed. Though there have been some indications recently that Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and Australia, for various reasons, see certain advantages in a syndicated approach to the quarantine problem, there is little evidence to date that this will result in significant improvement of the situation for border communities, or a diminution of the potential of the *cordon sanitaire* to become a major political issue in the long term.

*The Kilimeri sample.*² For the Kilimeri, as for much of the border population, regular cash earning activity in the mid 1970s was almost non-existent. Though sixteen per cent of the sample reported copra plantings (two thirds of which were immature) and three per cent had cultivars such as cocoa, chillies, coffee or spices, mostly in very small quantities and often the untended remnant of experiments many years earlier, none had received any return from their holdings. Two claimed a share in a cow or domesticated feral pig and ten in a trade-store, though in seven of the ten cases the store was temporarily or permanently closed, and the remaining three were reported as 'just starting' and at the time of the 1975-76 survey had done little if any business. Twenty-seven per cent of the sample kept chickens, which originally had filtered into the area from Hollandia,³ but these were generally regarded as the nucleus of an economic enterprise and too

¹ DASF, Port Moresby, file 1-14-103, 27 December 1972.

² See fn. 1 on p 111.

³ DDA, Aitape, patrol report 6/48-49.

valuable for domestic consumption. Villagers could not afford to purchase chickens from each other, as the standard asking price was based on DASF charges for imported breeding stock and many owners feared an official rebuke if they set their own price. Three men in 1975-76 had sold poultry to passing government patrols, which was enough to maintain the asking price and general interest. Total income for the area from all these sources in twelve months was \$34, which amounted to an average of \$5.67 for the six income earners, or approximately nine cents *per capita* for the sample.

The only other significant non-wage source of income, used by about twenty per cent of the sample, was the infrequent sale of game, sago grubs or other wild produce at the nearest station. Some border areas, such as Oksapmin, which produced European vegetables, and Green River, which at one stage started a rice project, received occasional assistance with marketing in Wewak or Vanimo from patrol officers or missionaries, but this was discontinuous, highly personalized and heavily subsidized. Though a wide variety of income earning activities have been proposed or tested along the border, in particular by concerned government officials and mission personnel, the difficulties of access, high freight costs, staff turnover and local preferences gave such attempts a relatively brief average life.

By far the most important contribution to the area's income was wages. From World War II until the end of the contract labour period in the 1960s, wage labour on plantations provided a steady trickle of goods and cash for the area, an escape from the hardships of the home environment and a much more reliable source of income than the dubious development prospects offered on the border. As this source dried up, the horizon for wage migration narrowed and employment related moves outside the West Sepik dropped from approximately 80 per cent to 50 per cent of total movement between 1965 and 1975. More men began to compete for the few job opportunities closer to home. For a few years they were able to earn enough for their basic needs from predominantly casual labour in Vanimo or at government, council or mission centres nearby, but these sources also

diminished in the 1970s. New nationalistic regulations imposed by the National Investment and Development Authority (NIDA) drove Goldore Timber Company, the West Sepik's largest private employer, out of the province. Increases in the basic wage made other employers more selective, and the localization of public service positions followed by general financial stringencies after 1974 severely reduced the amount of money released to the casual or unskilled labour force. At the same time, monetary requirements for council rates, education and purchase of trade store goods increased. Acquisition of saleable skills, either through formal education or informal channels such as job experience, had never been high and became much more difficult as the employment situation tightened across the country and the national education system was adjusted to limit the numbers of unemployed dropouts.

The post 1975 phase. In 1975-76 49 per cent of total cash income for the Kilimeri sample came from the earnings of two unskilled labourers. A further 33 per cent came from casual labour, rarely of more than two weeks' duration, and from quasi wage sources such as stipends and allowances. Since the sample had an annual median and modal *per capita* cash income of zero and an annual mean *per capita* cash income of only \$5.42, for most villagers even the lowest wage or stipend represented enormous riches. This was reflected in the very high proportion, 79 per cent, of adult males between ages 20 and 45 who in the previous year had actively, albeit unsuccessfully, sought employment. By comparison, very few were prepared to walk the same distance to receive medical treatment, and none had done so to seek advice or assistance from government officials.

Until the investigations into the Star Mountain copper deposits in the late 1960s, government officials regarded the timber stands of the Vaimo and Pual River area as the West Sepik's main hope for major economic development. Despite the policy shift to rural improvement, village participation and equalization for less developed areas, which occurred under the first Somare government, by 1976 official hopes for the West Sepik once again rested on possible timber and copper projects (Hinchcliffe 1976:11). In the course of investigations into these projects, a number of supplementary analyses was made of village agricultural

potential and capacity to benefit from the proposed large scale developments. These reported that the likelihood of significant advantage from copper mining, even for the Min people in the immediate vicinity, was very small (Rendel & Partners 1975: 11-16), and that the population of the Vanimo-Pual timber area was insufficient to develop the deforested area. For the border people, who had been inundated for a decade by consultations and official requests for cooperation, backed by promises of enormous returns at an ever-receding future date, hopes of development from timber or minerals were wearing thin. Villagers such as the Kilimeri, who had leased their timber ten years earlier when the matter was officially regarded as 'urgent', were particularly disgruntled. Under the contract timber lease land could not be cleared for commercial purposes, most of the land not leased was marginal or not suitable for cash cropping, and the purchasing power of the six-monthly interest payments, which when divided up varied between 10¢ and \$1 per recipient, had declined markedly.¹ As with the *cordon sanitaire*, inadequate explanations and weak rationalizations severely damaged the government's credibility in the area.

In 1975-76 Indonesian moves in East Timor brought a revival of governmental concern for border development. At the instigation of the secretaries of the Prime Minister's Department and the Department of Defence during a visit to the area, and with the support of Sir John Guise, a new set of 'border development proposals' was drawn up. This document, which purported to 'represent the views of all sectors of the border community' (West Sepik Province 1976:1) but which was largely the work of one expatriate administrator, concentrated mainly on upgrading the border stations and on improving administrative conditions and capacity. In essence it was a repetition and extension of the 1960s development programme. As with the earlier programme, the elements of it which were implemented over the next few years had little positive impact or spread for border villagers.

Though the dearth of adequate time series data renders any attempt to assess dynamic processes on the border largely subjective,

¹ The background of the proposed multi million dollar development of one of Papua New Guinea's largest timber resources is given in Herlihy 1976.

there are some signs that conditions for border villagers are deteriorating. The decline in employment opportunities and cash incomes, especially marked since 1974-75, brought a reduction of modern supplements to subsistence. Most Kilimeri households in 1976 were using worn utensils which had been brought back in the 1950s and 1960s by returned labourers, and were unable to replace items such as axes and saucepans which previously had been regarded as *bone* (essential). Unwilling or unable to return to arduous traditional methods of manufacture for such items as salt, many simply discontinued their use. The range of foodstuffs regularly consumed also appears for various reasons to have diminished. In Kilimeri the most common morning and evening meal consisted of boiled sago and *tulip* (the flavoursome and - for a leaf - relatively nutritious *Gnetum gnemon* tips). One village, which used to consume surplus garden produce it cultivated for sale to a nearby boarding school, ceased consumption of the introduced crops when the boarding school became a day school and its market collapsed. Another group joined the Seventh Day Adventist Church, relinquished most of its hunter-gatherer protein sources and refused to assist in communal pig hunts, which in the absence of cultivated dietary alternatives marginalized their own diet and to a lesser extent altered the communal balance. With the decline in other cash earning opportunities many villagers retained a greater proportion of saleable bush products such as game, wildfowl eggs and sago grubs for market or for the gift exchanges with town contacts whereby they obtained cloth and a few other coveted trade goods. As the costs of education and the standard required for regular wage employment rose, interest in primary and vocational education declined and schools reported a drop in attendance. In 1976 31 per cent of Kilimeri adults interviewed had received some basic education, but only 27 per cent of their children. Seventy-seven per cent of school age children at the time of the survey were not attending school and only three villagers in the sample area had completed primary education. Of those who had some schooling most children, like their parents, had dropped out by Grade 3 despite the improvement to primary facilities in the area. Adult employment histories showed a marked reduction in the range and duration of outside experience since the mid 1960s, which was matched by a decline in outside contacts and in the informal access to information and modern opportunities that they had provided.

Conclusion

The recurrent dilemma for government in development of the border area, as its past attempts have demonstrated, is that programmes which have been considered administratively feasible have been handicapped by situational constraints, while a broad attack on border underdevelopment would be a high cost, low return and long term operation. To upgrade government services and standards of living on the border merely to a standard comparable with the Papua New Guinea average would in itself be expensive in terms of monetary resources, staff quantity and calibre, and possible political repercussions from other areas. To continue to divert resources indefinitely to the maintenance of such levels, when the *per capita* costs of doing so are inflated vis-a-vis other areas by distance, low population densities and difficult terrain, is not likely to be economically or politically feasible. The provincial government experiment has already indicated that the more advanced regions are not prepared to subsidize the less developed areas to the extent that would be required, and neither the Western nor the Sandaun Provinces have the capacity to mount a campaign of such magnitude without assistance.

Nonetheless, as far as the Sandaun Province is concerned, the present Somare government is in a better position to intervene than was the first (1972-77) Somare government. In 1972 four of the five West Sepik parliamentarians, prompted by the widespread fear that Independence would be disadvantageous to the province, aligned themselves with the opposition United Party. On several occasions their parliamentary gamesmanship antagonized coalition members and reduced the government's scope for a concerted attack on development problems in their electorates. The consequent lacuna at national political level, and the *impuissance* of the local councils, left border development for five years to public servants who on the whole were professionally and locationally inexperienced and ill-equipped to tackle the problem. At the 1977 elections representative turnover was 100 per cent.¹ The three largest electorates

¹ This refers to the members who represented the West Sepik in the 1972-77 Assembly. The extent of actual change in electoral support within each electorate is difficult to assess, as electoral boundaries in the border area have been redrawn between every election to date. This has also limited the ability of border villagers to press their case consistently in the national political arena.

voted Pangu and the two border representatives crossed the floor to Pangu in the Opposition reshuffle of early 1978.¹ Though the lack of development on the border is still reflected in the relatively weak parliamentary representation which handicapped the area in earlier houses, the new political alliance gives reason to hope for the first time that national and border interests can be reconciled constructively.

¹ *Post-Courier* 21 March 1978.

APPENDIX I

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT
OF AUSTRALIA
(ACTING ON ITS OWN BEHALF AND ON
BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
PAPUA NEW GUINEA)
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA
CONCERNING ADMINISTRATIVE BORDER
ARRANGEMENTS
AS TO THE BORDER BETWEEN
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
AND INDONESIA

THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA (on its own behalf and on behalf of the GOVERNMENT OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA) and the GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA,

Recalling the Agreement between the Australian and Indonesian Governments dated the twelfth day of February 1973 which, among other things, demarcates more precisely in certain respects the land boundaries on the island of New Guinea (Irian) and delimits territorial sea boundaries off the northern and southern coasts of that island
Recognizing the need to protect the traditional rights and customs of people living in proximity to the border constituted by those boundaries

Recognising also the spirit of co-operation, understanding and goodwill that already prevails with regard to the administration of the border and border areas and the existing arrangements between Governments for liaison and other purposes in relation thereto

Recognising also the desirability of further fostering co-operation, goodwill and understanding and further strengthening and improving existing arrangements and to this end of formulating a broad framework within which the border and border areas shall be administered in the future

Having in mind Papua New Guinea becoming an independent nation
Recognising also that until independence the border arrangements in relation to the Papua New Guinea side of the border will be carried into effect by the Government of Papua New Guinea with the understanding that after independence Australia shall cease to be responsible in respect of such arrangements. As good neighbours and in a spirit of friendship and co-operation *HAVE AGREED* as follows:

Article 1

For the purpose of this Agreement the border area on each side of the border shall be those areas notified by letters and shown approximately on maps to be exchanged on or before the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Agreement. The border areas may be varied from time to time by an exchange of letters and maps after mutual consultations.

Article 2

Liaison Arrangements

The establishment of liaison on matters relating to the border is full accepted. Arrangements should be made for regulating the functions and working procedures for each level of liaison.

2. Until otherwise mutually arranged, existing liaison arrangements shall continue and liaison meetings shall be held:

- (a) by senior officials of the Government of Papua New Guinea and of the Provincial Government of Irian Jaya when requested by either Government on reasonable notice, and at least once a year, to review and develop border co-operation;
- (b) by officials of West Sepik and Western Districts and the Jayapura, Jayawijaya and Merauke Kabupatens at regular intervals but at least every two months; and
- (c) by officials of the sub-districts and kecamatans concerned at regular intervals but at least every two months, the location to be locally decided.

3. The main purposes of the liaison arrangements shall be:

- (a) to exchange information on all developments in the border areas which are of mutual interest to the Governments;
- (b) to devise, amend or establish arrangements to facilitate the practical operation, particularly at local and district

levels, of the provisions of this Agreement; and

- (c) to ensure that Governments are kept informed of developments of significance relating to the border areas and that their attention is drawn to any matters which may require consultation in accordance with this Agreement.

Article 3

Border Crossing for Traditional and Customary Purposes

1. The traditional and customary practices of the peoples, who reside in a border area and are citizens of the country concerned, of crossing the border for traditional activities such as social contacts and ceremonies including marriage, gardening and other land usage, collecting, hunting, fishing and other usage of waters, and traditional barter trade are recognised and shall continue to be respected.

2. Such border crossings based on tradition and custom shall be subject to special arrangements, and normal immigration and other requirements shall not apply.

3. The special arrangements shall be formulated on the principle that such crossings shall be only temporary in character and not for the purpose of settlement.

Article 4

Cross Border Rights to Land and Water

The traditional rights enjoyed by the citizens of one country, who reside in its border area, in relation to land in the border area of the other country and for purposes such as fishing and other usage of the seas or waters in or in the vicinity of the border area of the other country, shall be respected and the other country shall permit them to exercise those rights on the same conditions as apply to its own citizens. These rights shall be exercised by the persons concerned without settling permanently on that side of the border unless such persons obtain permission to enter the other country for residence in accordance with the immigration laws and procedures of that country.

Article 5

Settlement

It shall be an agreed objective to discourage the construction of villages or other permanent housing within a two kilometer zone on each side of the border.

Article 6

Border Crossing Other Than For Traditional and Customary Purposes

1. The crossing of the border by persons not coming within Article 3 above is to take place through designated points of entry and in accordance with the normal laws and regulations relating to entry.

2. Information shall be exchanged with respect to the migration laws and policies operating on each side of the border to maintain more effective control of the border areas.

3. Persons who cross the border other than in accordance with the practices recognised by Article 3 above or the normal laws and regulations relating to entry shall be treated as illegal immigrants.

4. In administering its laws and policies relating to the entry of persons into its territory across the border, each Government shall act in a spirit of friendship and good neighbourliness bearing in mind relevant principles of international law and established international practices and the importance of discouraging the use of border crossing for the purpose of evading justice and the use of its territory in a manner inconsistent with the preamble or any provision of this Agreement. Each Government shall also take into account, where appropriate, the desirability of exchanging information and holding consultations with the other.

Article 7

Security

1. In a spirit of goodwill and mutual understanding and so as to maintain and strengthen the good neighbourly and friendly relations already existing, the Governments on either side of the border agree to continue to co-operate with one another in order to prevent the

use of their respective territories in or in the vicinity of their respective border areas for hostile activities against the other. To this end, each Government shall maintain its own procedures of notification and control.

2. The Governments shall keep each other informed and where appropriate consult as to developments in or in the vicinity of their respective border areas, which are relevant to their security.

Article 8

Border Trade

The Governments agree to exchange information concerning cross-border trade and when appropriate to consult in relation thereto.

Article 9

Citizenship

The desirability is recognised of having a regular exchange of relevant information regarding laws and regulations on nationality and citizenship and each Government agrees, if so requested, to have consultations on any problem being encountered in relation thereto.

Article 10

Quarantine

1. The co-operation already existing in the field of health and quarantine, including mutual visits of officials and exchange of information and periodical reports, shall be continued and developed.

2. In the case of an outbreak or spread of an epidemic in a border area, quarantine and health restrictions on movement across the border may be imposed, notwithstanding Article 3 above.

Article 11

Navigational Facilities in Boundary Waters

Arrangements shall be made as appropriate in order to facilitate navigation of traffic in main waterways in boundary waters, especially the "Fly River Bulge".

Article 12

Pollution

The Governments agree that when mining, industrial, forestry, agricultural or other projects are being carried out in the respective border areas the necessary precautionary measures shall be taken to prevent serious pollution of rivers flowing across the border. There shall be consultations, if so requested, on measures to prevent pollution, arising from such activities, of rivers on the other side of the border.

Article 13

Consultations and Review

1. The Governments shall, if so requested, consult on the implementation, operation and scope of this Agreement.

2. This Agreement shall be reviewed upon the expiration of five years from the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification.

Article 14

Signature and Ratification

1. This Agreement is subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional requirements of each country, and shall enter into force on the day on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

2. It is understood that the concurrence of the Government of Papua New Guinea in this Agreement is a condition thereof and such concurrence is evidenced by the signing of this Agreement on its behalf by Maori Kiki, Minister for Defence and Foreign Relations of Papua New Guinea.

APPENDIX II

WEST PAPUA NATIONALISM: AN INSIDE VIEW

"... No right anywhere exists to hand people about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property." Woodrow Wilson, 28th President of United States of America, 11th February 1918.

1. Introduction

A number of scientists who have been fortunate or lucky enough to be allowed to enter that sacred backyard of Indonesia, a mini-siberia of the Pacific called Irian Jaya, have presented quite impressive reports on their findings. These might be the most up to date information written about West New Guinea ever-since the area was sealed off from the free world in 1963. With a bureaucratic administration and suspicious army staff in office plus secret police keeping an eye on visitors' activities, I guess the cooperation that these scientists received in Irian Jaya might go as far as looking at partly propaganda reports and observing the general life in the country. I do appreciate their reports and in this paper I prefer not to challenge their findings but to raise some more critical points in regard to the topic "Papua Nationalism" which was also mentioned in the above quoted reports.

One more point I would like to make is that the foreigners, Indonesians, Dutch, Australians and Americans alike, seem to adopt the attitude of knowing the situation better than we do. Even they tell us who we are and what we want for our future. If we disagree with them they claim that we are still primitive, we are communists or subversives. Where else in today's world would the dictum be accepted that a people were too primitive even to be free?

2. The roots of the Anti-Indonesia sentiment

There was almost nothing written in the modern literature about our relationship with Indonesia before the Europeans came to this part of the world. But from stories passed on from generation to generation we do know that our people were treated as slaves by the Asians. The general image of Indonesians, buried deep in the minds of our people

for centuries, was that they were untrustworthy people. We call them *amberi* (a Biak word). The image behind *amberi* was "foreigners who can talk extra sweet but have bad plans in mind." When the missionaries came in the 18th century and the Dutch Colonial Administration two centuries later, they brought with them Indonesian teachers, clerks, police and carpenters who again like their ancestors mistreated our people. Such punishments like forcing people to drink their own urine and bloody beatings were part of the so called education to civilize the "primitive Papuans." They were in fact the first colonialists.

3. The roots of the claim

The whole dispute over West New Guinea is based on territorial claims made by Indonesia on the one hand and the Dutch claim of legality and the rights of the Papua people on the other hand. In his book titled *Perdjjuangan Irian Barat atas dasar Proklamasi** Professor Mohamed Yamin of Indonesia tried to put forward as many arguments as possible to materialise Indonesia's claim that the whole New Guinea island was part of Modjopait's Empire since the 8th century. The name given to this island was Djangi. On page 24 he went on saying that in the years of 704, 716 and 724 Djangi girls were offered to Palaces of Kaisars in China. He was too careful to avoid mentioning that these girls were in fact part of the thousands of slaves sold to Asia by the Indonesians. The other claim made by Indonesia was that because West New Guinea was colonised by the Dutch, it should be included in the Republic of Indonesia proclaimed in 1945.

The Dutch however would not accept this. As the colonisers they knew very well that West New Guinea was never included effectively in the machinery of the East India Company. What is more, West New Guinea was excluded in the Proclamation Act announced by the Indonesian leaders in 1945 (*Naskah Persiapan Undang Dasar 1945*, page 204 by Prof. Moh. Yamin**). More convincingly, the West New Guinea people do not

* Bukittinggi and Djakarta: Nusantara. Second edition, 1956.

** Vol. 1. Djakarta: Jajasan Prapantja 1959. See also pp 191-4.

want to become part of Indonesia ("Political Awakening in West New Guinea",* page 58, by P.N. van der Veur). With the impossible demand from the Indonesian side, the Dutch proposed that the matter should be taken up with the International Court of Justice, that was in 1952, but Indonesia refused to cooperate.

The Dutch could be right in wanting to protect their Papuan interests but Indonesia regarded the colonial presence in West New Guinea as a serious threat to the newly created republic. Even some of our leaders had questioned Dutch determination to protect our rights, especially when Dutch colonists were allowed to settle in West New Guinea.

4. The political awakening

Political activities in West New Guinea could be traced as far back as 1942. Long before the Americans arrived a group of leaders in Biak, among them a lady by the name Anganetha Menufandu, proclaimed that the whole of West New Guinea should be liberated from the Japanese oppressor. This revolt ended up with hundreds of lives lost and the leaders themselves had their heads chopped off.

Immediately after the war in 1945 another group called the People's Voice Movement was founded in Biak and demanded a half independent Country, up to 25 years under USA rule. The Dutch, hoping that they would resume control over Indonesia, ignored this demand, which made the group become more radical. The *anti-amberi* campaign led by the Kaisiepo brothers in 1946 from the above group had a good response and spread quickly throughout the country. Everywhere people demanded their own local teachers, kiaps, police, carpenters etc. The Dutch did replace Indonesians with Dutch or Papuan officers and recruited more locals to be trained for these positions. The recruits from all over the country who were undergoing training in Hollandia felt strong and united and used this good opportunity to put on a bigger show. They sent Frans Kaisiepo to the Malino conference near Makasar as representative of West New Guinea people to tell Dutch and

* *Pacific Affairs* 36(1), Spring 1963.

Indonesia that the West New Guinea People would have nothing to do with the Indonesian Republic. He also requested the Dutch Government at this conference to rule West New Guinea separately from Indonesia. He was the one who also suggested the name IRYAN (not IRIAN) to replace Papua or West New Guinea.

Most leaders were satisfied with these developments and wanted to cooperate with the Dutch, but a few, understandably from the People's Voice Movement, demanded that the Dutch too should go. The Dutch would not tolerate this of course and put them in jail. Soon they found themselves isolated and forced to join Indonesia in their struggle to throw the Dutch out of West New Guinea. It was clear then, that there was two views developed among these two factions since 1946.

- (1) The first group, which didn't want anything to do with Indonesia and were willing to cooperate with Dutch, was led by N. Jouwe and M. Kaisiepo.
- (2) The second group, which rejected by the Dutch, saw Indonesia as a potential partner to get the Dutch out of West New Guinea, was led by L. Rumkorem, M. Indey and S. Papare.

Regardless of these differences, the two groups had one objective in common: "*A free Papuan State, with the same rights as any state in the world.*" Some leaders from the second group fled the country and continued on their fight together with Indonesia.

Other known organisations were the young Iryan Movement founded in Sorong in 1949, and two years later the New Guinea Unity Movement in Manokwari. About the same time the Protestant Labour Organization was formed. In 1956 the Protestant Churches, which ran most of the schools and maintained an administration network throughout the country were recognized as an independent organization known as *Geredja Kristen Indjili* or Evangelical Christian Church. The running of this national organization till today has proved that Papuan people can't be down graded from Dutch or Indonesian administrators.

The first political party, called the People's Democratic Party, was founded in 1957. The Party's platform was for greater autonomy under

Dutch supervision, leading to proposed unity with Papua New Guinea in a Melanesian Federation. During this time the Dutch and the Australian Governments were encouraging closer cooperation between the two territories. The new era of increasing political awareness started in 1960. Some more political parties were formed, all demanding development and future self-government or independence.

The climax of Papua Nationalism could be seen in 1961. The response to the elections for the West New Guinea Council was great: 22 out of 28 seats were held by Papuans. They selected national symbols, a flag and coat of arms, and a national anthem, and put to use the name of the country and the people. The entire population was proud of these national symbols. The ten years development plan proposed by the Government (the original plan was from the National Party) was accepted by all parties and the people. Everybody knew that by the year 1970 West Papua would become independent and people were prepared to work hard towards that goal. However Indonesia on the other hand was watching all these developments with discontent, and clung to her ambitious territorial claims. Thus there was no other alternative than an invasion to stop the creation of a West Papua Nation. The fighting between Dutch and the Indonesian forces erupted in January 1962 and continued on for several months until the USA persuaded the Dutch to sign a hand-over agreement, known as New York Agreement, with Indonesia in August 1962, over the heads of our people.

This sudden change didn't give much time for our leaders and parties to consider their stand. A small mission to several African countries had created a good impact but was already too late. The political leaders split into two groups, one group decided to leave the country and the other group remained. Whether staying or leaving, everybody's hope was that in 1969 with the help of U.N. we would be on our own again.

5. Can Papua Nationalism Survive?

The departing Dutch officials had asked the same question in 1962, "Can Papua Nationalism Survive?" Probably unaware of this concern,

June Verrier had dug out an answer to it. In her report ("Irian Jaya 1975: The West New Guinea Question Phase Three"*) she indicated that there was a young passionate 1969 generation, future looking and more realistic than the 1962 generation. Having experienced this process myself I would like to add that the 1969 generation was comprised of two factions mentioned earlier in this paper.

Being brainwashed by their political agitators the ordinary Indonesian men and soldiers believed that the West New Guinea people really needed Indonesia to liberate them from the Dutch colonialists. We felt sorry for them; they were being foolish to sacrifice themselves for their Generals, not for West New Guinea. They regarded themselves as liberators, they came in force so proud hoping that they would be welcomed with flowers and free hospitality. What they found was dismay, rejection and hostility. I can still recall the usual gossips: "Look at them or, here they come or, watchout for the bandits with their guns."

Angry with this situation the Indonesians conducted terror activities which were in line with Djakarta's policy to force the population to submit to their directive rules and accept their guided democracy. There was looting, intimidation, raping, stealing, beatings, torture and arbitrary arrests of the civilians. There was no law to preserve justice; even religion was a state affair. All political activity was banned, heavy press and news media censorship imposed, and prohibition of travel soon became common in the country. They made resolutions and statements one after another to condemn and ask for the withdrawal of the 1969 plebiscite and forced our leaders to agree to this. Djakarta announced to the world that the West New Guinea people had already decided to remain with Indonesia, and that therefore the plebiscite in 1969 was not necessary.

For the population who once enjoyed democratic freedom, peace and justice, this new type of government is just a "HELL". Despite all these difficulties our underground organisations and leaders secretly smuggled reports of the real situation to our leaders overseas and the United Nations in New York. The common tactic was, "let the

* *New Guinea* 10(2), August 1975.

Indonesians have the doubt, and we will come back in 1969." Previously pro-Indonesian leaders like E. Bonay (The first Governor appointed by Indonesia 1963), Moses Weror (now in PNG), Lucas Rumkorem, Martin Indey and Cem Iba (now in PNG), had turned bitterly against Indonesia. This made Indonesia come to realize that, whether Pro or Anti, all the Papuans are the same and should receive the same punishments, either exiled to other provinces, jailed or shot (from an Indonesian document in 1966, signed by Drs. Sudjoko, head of Police in Djajapura). Indonesia knew for sure, according to the above mentioned document, that a free election in 1969 would turn against Indonesia. The only solution was using force.

Believing in Human Rights, Democracy and the New York Agreement, our leaders strategy was, "not using violence", and they reported all the truth about Indonesia's misdeeds to the U.N. and the world so that in 1969, the world might accuse Indonesia and vote against her. True there was sporadic fighting in several places around the country since 1965 but this was not coordinated as a national campaign under one single command. The nationalists were primarily directed towards liberation, but hoped to achieve this by forcing Indonesia and the world to seriously consider our rights, guaranteed in the New York Agreement. Our people also strongly believed that Australia and the Dutch definitely would not let us be crushed by Indonesia. With this faith the Australian security officers placed along the border were always fed with up to date information.

Our first planned demonstration on the 24th August 1968 to welcome the United Nation's representative Dr Fernandes Ortiz Sanz, was crushed, the leader Mr Torey was eliminated, and others were jailed by the Indonesians. However we came back again armed with banners to see Dr. Fernandes Ortiz Sanz off to the U.N. in 1969. Despite the strict security measures, on the early morning of April 11th, 1969 the U.N. representative was presented with a petition at his home by a crowd of more than 2000 demonstrators. Indonesia used armored cars to crush this demonstration after it had met with the U.N. representative.

The so-called act of free choice came and ended with much publicity and criticism the world over. With all the facts reported by the U.N.

representative and many observers our people were hoping that U.N. General Assembly would condemn Indonesia. Our hopes were high that Australia, the Dutch and African Nations would lead the official protest. A number of African countries did but were beaten in the voting. Another hard blow was that Australia had not supported our delegation of two men (now living in PNG) sent to the U.N. through PNG.

The U.N. decision in favour of Indonesia was the hardest blow and one that our people will never forget. In that very moment if there were guns reaching everybody, religious leaders, men, women, young and old could have declared an open war against what they believe is SATAN. They critically questioned, the value of their religious beliefs in justice, human rights, democracy and mutual understanding. Hopefully some of our leaders overseas, enjoying more freedom than we do, would have come up with a more constructive solution, but they haven't done better either. Slowly we come back to our sense of reality. We have to sit down and evaluate everything and think of other possibilities or alternatives. An answer must be found anyhow, but one thing is clear: we will never give up.

6. A new struggle for the Liberation of West Papua.

If the reader has followed me correctly, I did mention that our people have done everything possible as faithful Christians to avoid violence and will do so with much sacrifice. Thousands of lives were lost; a very few died in fighting but the rest were murdered in cold blood by the ruling Colonialists. That was the price of honouring human rights and justice, the price of our good will and understanding to seek a peaceful solution (the same road that Sir Maori Kiki is now undertaking), but the result was too painful. I do not believe that the people are foolish enough to repeat this bitter experience all over again. Armed struggle will be more likely the choice of the people for the next start.

All is not lost. One good thing we discovered in 1969 was the strength of Papua Nationalism and deep feeling of unity. Suspicious

attitudes towards different organisations have vanished. I was moved to hear the following statement made by Mr X, a well known pro-Indonesian leader, when he addressed his group called SRIWA to give full support to the April 11, 1969 demonstration:

"For a long time we have been hated as traitors by our own brothers, just because we choose a struggle different from what they believe is right. Now the time has come for us to show them that we have been fighting for the same end."

The 1969 generation was the machine and main source of information, supplied to the groups operating overseas. The first group was known as National Liberation Council, led by Nicolas Jouwe, a known political leader since 1945. The second group, called the High Court of the Chamber of the Representative of West Papua, is led by M.W. Kaisiepo, founder of the People's Voice Movement in 1945 and of the People's Democratic Party in 1957, and also a known political leader. The 1969 generation expected the leaders of the 1962 generation to reject the unjust result of "act of free choice" by proclaiming a West Papuan state before the opening of U.N. General Assembly, but nothing happened.

Realising this failure, the 1969 generation took full responsibility by forming a Provincial Government and made Z. Rumkorem, an army officer, the President.

The official proclamation was announced on July 1, 1971, just before the Indonesian National elections. Soon after, the Provisional Government established an Information Office on the African continent in the country of Senegal, a long standing supporter of West Papua. If the Provisional Government is providing the necessary leadership to a liberation struggle, there is no doubt that everybody will follow. Take the central highlands revolt in 1969 (after the elections) for example. In very short notice, thousands of tribesmen were ready to follow their leader to battle. The people have been waiting for this moment for for a long time.

Pacific People's Action Front (PNG Section)

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