A Cross-Linguistic Study of Value-Judgment Terms

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Declaration

Except where otherwise indicated this thesis is my own work.

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to try to establish the extent to which the words *good, bad, true* and *right* can be considered lexical universals. These words have been chosen because they are value-judgment terms which, individually, have been discussed at length by philosophers. It seems to be assumed by philosophers and semanticists that these words reflect concepts which are shared by speakers of all languages. By testing whether these words are candidates for lexical universals we can then see the extent to which this assumption is true.

On the basis of information from native speakers from 15 diverse languages, we can say that *good* and *bad* reflect language independent concepts. However, in many languages, including English, the range of meaning of *bad* is narrower than the range of meaning of *good*. By looking at five of these fifteen languages we can see that the words *right* and *true* reflect concepts which are not language independent. Thus by taking a cross-linguistic approach, we can shed some light on the work done by language philosophers in the area of value-judgment terms.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

In this thesis the value-judgment terms *good, bad, right* and *true* - and the words which correspond to them in other languages - are discussed. The aim of the thesis is to try to determine the extent to which these words can be considered lexical universals. If these words are lexical universals then we have some grounds for saying that they reflect concepts which are language independent.

The words *good, bad, right* and *true* occur frequently in discussions of ethics and logic. Many philosophers, including Aristotle, have discussed these words at great length. Nevertheless, I would describe them as words about which much is assumed but little is known. This may seem a surprising statement when we consider the vast amount of literature that has been devoted to them individually. However, I hope to illustrate that something can be gained from applying a linguistic approach to their study.

As I have pointed out, Aristotle has contributed to our understanding of the word *good*, although he did not speak English. Does this mean that we assume that there is a corresponding word for *good* in every language and that each of these words reflects the same concept, GOOD? It is clear from the writings of many philosophers (in that they do not address this question) that this is indeed what is assumed, and that it is also assumed of BAD, TRUE and RIGHT. Philosophers are not alone in making such assumptions. Logicians and semanticists base much of their work on the notion that TRUE is a concept shared by speakers of all languages:

"Classical logic (whose founder was Aristotle) took it for granted that all judgments could be broken up into simple propositions, that is, statements in which something (a predicate) is asserted about something (a subject). Examples are water is wet; grass is yellow; some Greeks are rich; no animal is rational. It was also assumed that such propositions were either "true" or "false"; water is wet is a true proposition; grass is yellow is a false one." (Rapoport 1965:343)

The task of this thesis then is to establish, as far as possible, whether the assumptions made about these words are correct. Do we have shared concepts
which are reflected in words which correspond to the English words *good*, *bad*, *right*, and *true*, or do these words reflect particular cultural values of specific language groups? In order to answer this question we must first establish whether these words are lexical universals, or, given that we are not dealing with all languages, whether they are candidates for lexical universals. Clearly it is an easier task to establish that a word is not a lexical universal than to establish that it is.

1.1. Outline of Chapters

In the following chapters we look at *good* and *bad* (and, to a lesser extent, *true* and *right*) from several perspectives. In Chapter 2 we look at the contributions made by philosophers to our understanding of *good* and *bad*. In Chapter 3 we look at *good* and *bad* as a pair of antonyms. In Chapter 4 we discuss the notion of 'universal' and also discuss *good* and *bad* in relation to the concept of markedness. The discussion of these two words in relation to both antonymy and marking forms a framework from which to assess our observation that, in many languages, words corresponding to *good* have a wider range of meaning and a wider range of use than words corresponding to *bad*. In Chapter 5 restrictions of meaning and lexical restrictions are discussed. Restrictions of meaning occur when the context in which *good* or, more frequently, *bad*, is used is restricted. Lexical restrictions operate when words corresponding to *good* or *bad* can not be used in combination with a particular domain (e.g. *school* or *boat*). In other words, a discussion of restrictions of meaning is concerned with the range of meaning of a word and a discussion of lexical restrictions is concerned with the range of use of a word.

The procedure for collecting the data on *good* and *bad* from other languages, and the data, itself, is discussed in Chapter 6. Although a more thorough understanding of each of the 15 languages discussed would tell us more about the differences between the way these words are used in each language, for the purposes of this thesis, it is largely the similarities between languages that were sought and which are discussed.

Chapter 7 serves as a point of contrast. While the information we have about *good* and *bad* suggests that they reflect concepts which are language independent, the information we have about *true* and *right* suggests that these words reflect concepts which are culture specific. Thus, from a cross-linguistic perspective, the assumptions philosophers have made about *good* and *bad* appear to be accurate. This, however, does not appear to be the case with *true* and *right*. 
1.2. Viewing Semantics As An Activity

Semantics, as Wierzbicka has described it, (see Wierzbicka 1972:1) is an activity. The value of undertaking an activity lies both in the results achieved by completing the activity and the process of being involved in the activity. The results, in this case, will tell us if we can say whether these words are lexical universals and this will have implications for other related questions. For example, whether the concepts GOOD, BAD, RIGHT and TRUE are language independent concepts is dependent upon discovering whether or not they are lexical universals. In order to establish this, however, we must be clear about what we mean by lexical universal and shared concept. In terms of establishing lexical universals, presumably we have to establish that terms corresponding to good, bad, right and true exist in other languages. This is more difficult than it sounds, however, and it is necessary to do more than just ask an informant for a word which corresponds to an English word. The difficulties are particularly obvious when we look at right and true. While it is not difficult to find a word which informants say correspond to these two terms, this does not mean that the word covers the same range of meaning as the English word.

Whether or not these words are shared concepts will have a bearing upon whether or not they should be used in a semantic metalanguage. Both good and bad have been used in the semantic metalanguage proposed by Wierzbicka (1972, 1980), though they have not been proposed as semantic primitives. Clearly, if they are not lexical universals, then they can not be shared concepts, and, therefore, it would be inappropriate to use them as such, because, to be useful for cross-linguistic semantic investigations, the semantic metalanguage has to be language independent, as far as possible. That is, the metalanguage may not be absolutely language independent, because there will always be pragmatic differences in the way words are used from language to language, but the metalanguage should be as independent as possible, given that natural language is being used. Even if, however, they are both lexical universals this does not mean that their claims to be used in such a metalanguage are equally valid, as we shall see in the case of bad.

These, then, are possible implications of the results of the activity. In many ways, however, it is the process of getting to these results that is both the more interesting and informative aspect of semantics. For example, paradoxically, it is in undertaking a cross-linguistic survey that the meanings of these words in English become clearer; that the relationship between good and bad becomes clearer and that the possible meanings of the shared concepts become clearer. That is, by
looking at a range of languages we can see that while shared concepts GOOD and BAD exist, these concepts do not necessarily have exactly the same range of meaning as the words *good* and *bad*.

It is also in performing the activity that it is clear that our results are, to a large extent, a matter of interpreting the data; thus to some extent one of the tasks of this thesis is to illustrate that the results of collecting data are based as much on the way you choose to analyse the information as on the information itself. That is, the information that we collect tells us whether a particular word (e.g. *good*) can be used to describe another word (e.g. *man*). We can not, however, accept this fact at face value. We must also discover the context in which it can be used. Whether or not *good* or *bad* can be used with a set of domains tells us the range of use of these words. However, in order to determine correspondence between words across languages we must also know the range of meaning of the word, and this is determined by the context in which it can be used.

There are many approaches that can be taken in a study of value-judgment terms, as the topic relates to the inter-related but separate fields of linguistics, anthropology and philosophy. As much as possible I would like to highlight the importance of inter-relating these fields as it seems that the greatest understanding is to be gained by viewing the same question from many angles. However, in the interests of clarity, I will deal separately with these approaches. It is of interest, for example, to see how philosophers and linguists have dealt with value-judgment terms, in particular the word *good*. In terms of lexical universals it is necessary to see what has been done in this area by linguists and anthropologists, and what implications the establishment of lexical universals has on what we know about language. In the light of these two approaches we can then discuss the data and discuss the various conclusions that can be drawn from it.

1.3. Using A Cross-linguistic Approach To Test Philosophers' Assumptions

One theme that seems to recur in acquiring knowledge is the inter-relationship between insight and facts. That is, it is often possible to guess what is going on, even though we have limited information on which to base our hypothesis. We need to gather data, however, in order to confirm or reject our hypothesis. It is in looking at the data that further insights may occur to us. It is the philosophers who, in my opinion, have the greatest insights to offer in discussing value-judgment terms, although they have generally relied on information from perhaps one or two languages (e.g. Greek, English, German). However, by looking
at a larger number of languages we can see to what extent their insights and assumptions are valid. In a similar way, Katz and Vendler try to explain Moore's intuition about *good* from a linguistic perspective. Katz says:

"Moore seems to have put his finger on something quite important, and, until it is known exactly what his intuition is an intuition of, its philosophical relevance remains obscure." (Katz 1964:765)

With this in mind we can survey philosophers' views on *good*. By looking at data from other languages, however, we can perhaps see more clearly to what extent, or in what respects, their intuitions are accurate, at least from a linguistic perspective, if not a philosophical one.

On the other hand, while we need facts in order to test our assumptions, there is a danger in collecting facts but in being mistaken about what it is they represent. Randall and Hunn point to this problem in relation to the collection of data by Cecil Brown. They cast doubt, not just on

"Brown's methods but on the very idea of using glosses to test universalist ethnosemantic hypotheses. Glosses often reflect an informant's satisfaction that an anthropologist has learned an approximate meaning. Unfortunately, even this partial understanding is often further eroded when an anthropologist ignores details in an attempt to communicate with English-speaking audiences. Mnemonic glosses should not be considered evidence for semantic universals hypotheses. They may be effectively used in the early stages of theory building, but to prove a semantic universal one must use translations which are plausibly claimed to be semantically precise descriptions." (Randall and Hunn 1984:333)

Randall and Hunn's criticisms of Brown's work highlight the benefit of using native speakers as informants rather than relying too heavily on secondary sources for our information. Understandably, if we are to look at vast numbers of languages - as Brown and his colleagues have done - then one person will be unable to collect all of the necessary data. By relying on secondary sources, however, we are more likely to fall into the trap outlined by Randall and Hunn. By using native speakers and by using the method of looking at the use of words in order to establish their meaning, as has been done in this thesis, however, we are able to gain a broader understanding of these words and are therefore more adequately able to determine whether the words that are being studied reflect shared concepts.

Randall and Hunn's criticisms also implicitly suggest that we can only come to a full understanding of the meaning of a word in another language by looking at its use in a range of contexts rather than by asking for the nearest equivalent and being satisfied with that. If we want to be able to say something significant
about language in general, however, it is necessary to survey more than just a few languages - even if they are from widely differing language families - and thus, like Brown, I have found it necessary to gather some information from secondary sources. However, this information has been used only to either confirm or reject hypotheses which have been formulated on the basis of information gathered from native speakers.

The division between looking at what has been said about these value-judgment terms by language philosophers and what has been done in the area of lexical universals, then, is not one based simply on distinguishing between different branches of the humanities, but on the different emphasis placed on insight and the collection of data.

1.4. Language and Thought

First, however, let us look at the relationship between language and thought; between word and concept, and at the use of lexical universals in a semantic metalanguage.

A discussion of the concepts GOOD and BAD allows us to explore the relationship between semantic primitives and lexical universals. The words good and bad have both been used as part of a semantic metalanguage to explicate more complex concepts but have not been proposed as semantic primitives themselves. Givón, for example, would not include any adjective as a primitive (Givón 1970:835) and Wierzbicka believes they can be further defined by more simple concepts. If good and bad can be established as lexical universals and therefore as representing concepts which are language independent, then there is a case for their use in a semantic metalanguage (at least on one level). If, on the other hand, they are culture specific then the validity of assuming that these terms are basic terms that reflect concepts which all speakers have is called into question.

Presumably all languages lexically encode concepts which reflect their cultural values and moral ideals, such as courage, honesty, deceit and cowardice in English. In explicating these terms we would, I suggest, need to refer to the words good and bad, for in our culture courage and honesty are seen as something good, so much so that the value-judgment good is encoded in the very meaning of these words, and deceit and cowardice are seen as something bad. Thus the concept GOOD is encoded in words such as courage and honesty, but it is also lexically encoded in the word good.

In a cross-linguistic survey we must be aware of the potential difficulties of
dealing both with concepts and with words which reflect these concepts. There is always the possibility that a language may have a concept (for GOOD, BAD or other value-judgment terms) which is not lexically encoded (and of course individual speakers have concepts which can not be expressed in a single word), but in order to discover whether these concepts exist it is necessary to first establish whether or not lexical items exist in a language rather than to try to establish in a philosophical way whether these concepts exist in a disembodied form.

The importance of determining whether other languages have words for good and bad, therefore, lies in the fact that what we are determining is not just whether these words exist in other languages, but whether the concepts GOOD and BAD are concepts which are shared by all languages, and whether they are sufficiently salient in a given culture to have become lexically encoded, or whether these words reflect specific attitudes of particular cultures. Thus we are dealing with the relationship between language and thought. Support for the idea that there is value in looking at language in order to understand thought is not difficult to find, although, as Jackendoff says:

"[while] the idea that language mirrors thought is of great antiquity, current philosophical practice does not on the whole encourage us to explore it." (Jackendoff 1983:3)

Katz, however, maintains that there is:

"a strong relation between the form and content of language and the form and content of conceptualization"

and goes on to say that

"The special task of the philosophy of language is, therefore, to explore this relation and make whatever inferences about the structure of conceptual knowledge can be made on the basis of what is known about the structure of language." (Katz 1966:4)

Semantics, in particular, is concerned with conceptual knowledge and, as Wierzbicka has put it:

"Semantics is an activity which consists in the elucidation of the sense of human utterances. Its purpose is to reveal the structure of thought which the external form of language conceals." (Wierzbicka 1972:1)

This view is also held by Jackendoff, who says:

"To study semantics of natural language is to study cognitive psychology." (Jackendoff 1983:3)

It should be clear from these statements that in order to reach an understanding
of the concepts we are concerned with it is necessary to look beyond the existence of a word to its meaning. That is, we have to establish that when someone says a language has a word for *good* or *bad* or *right* or *true* that it corresponds to the same meaning as these words in English and is not just the nearest equivalent (as Randall and Hunn have pointed out in relation to Brown's universals).

We can also look to anthropological linguists, such as Brown and Witkowski, for confirmation of the value of looking at language in order to understand thought. In particular they are concerned with the relationship between language universals and thought:

"Language universals constitute an important focus of contemporary linguistics since their description may shed light on the nature of the human language faculty ... The study of language uniformities is one approach to fleshing out the cognitive framework innately shared by humankind upon which individual languages such as Chinese, English, Navaho and so on, are all constructed." (Brown and Witkowski 1980:359)

Language universals are also seen as of unquestionable importance by Joseph Greenberg and his colleagues:

"...since language is at once both an aspect of individual behavior and an aspect of human culture, its universals provide both the major point of contact with underlying psychological principles (psycholinguistics) and the major source of implications for human cultures in general (ethnolinguistics)." (Greenberg, Osgood and Jenkins 1966:xv)

It must be noted however that not all linguists would advise searching for such things as shared concepts. Bloomfield, for example, believed that talking about:

"'ideas' or 'concepts', such as 'the concept of a straight line' ... is merely a traditional but useless and confusing way of talking about [speech forms]; that we find in our universe (that is: require in our discourse) only (1) actual objects and (2) speech forms which serve as conventional responses to certain features that are common to a class of objects." (Bloomfield 1936:94)

Value-judgment terms, however, do not refer to 'actual objects' and, regardless of whether we agree with Bloomfield's scepticism about the existence of concepts which refer to objects, the argument cannot be extended to abstract words such as *good*, *bad*, *right* and *true*. It is a worthwhile endeavour, then, to look for the existence of words which correspond to *good* and *bad* and *right* and *true* in other languages in order to determine whether these words reflect concepts which are language independent or culture specific.
1.5. The Widespread Occurrence of Words Corresponding to *Good*

It is clear from other studies that *good* and *bad* are common to many languages; *good*, in particular, occurs frequently. For example, in a survey of seventeen languages with small adjectival classes (plus subsets of three other languages), an adjective corresponding to *good* occurred in 13 of the languages and the remaining languages had a noun *goodness*. While an adjective corresponding to *bad* occurred in 14 of the languages, not all had a unique term corresponding to *bad*. (Dixon 1982:4-7). In this study, we are concerned not just with adjectives but with lexemes (which may or may not be adjectives) which reflect the concept of GOOD and the concept of BAD - assuming, that is, that these concepts exist.

The fact that *good* so often occurs in the adjective class, no matter how small that class may be in a given language, can not, however, be overlooked. The significance of this observation becomes apparent when we compare *good* with *right* and *true* (see Chapter 7 for a discussion of this point). For the moment, however, it is important to note that the fact that *good* does not appear as an adjective in a particular language is not sufficient evidence to say that the concept GOOD is not language independent. There is, moreover, often disagreement about whether all languages have a class of adjectives, and, thus, what is significant is the way in which we so often find a word which corresponds to *good* even in languages which do not have adjectival classes.

In a study of cross-cultural universals of the affective lexicon it was found that:

"The two most common modes of qualifying right across the world are *good* and *big* (or some close synonym)." (Osgood, May and Miron, 1975:189)

The qualification - "or some close synonym" - bears noting, however, for we are looking not just for synonyms of *good*, which presumably would have a different range of use, but for words which correspond to *good* itself.

Further evidence for the widespread use of these terms across languages can be found in individual studies of cultures such as the Tahitians. We find that Tahitian is, in this respect, similar to English. Thus:

"The most general Tahitian terms for 'good', maita'i, and 'bad', ino, have a wide range of uses. They apply to good and bad fish, good and bad craftsmanship, and skillful and unskillful performance. When they are applied as a moral evaluation, they imply a dimension of good/evil." (Levy 1973:346)
1.6. Range of Use and Range of Meaning

If we find a word which informants say corresponds to *good*, how do we know that we have found a word which reflects the concept GOOD? Clearly it is insufficient to simply ask if there is a word in a particular language which corresponds to *good* in English. It is necessary to establish both the range of use of the word and its range of meaning. The range of use of a word can be established by checking if it can be used over a range of semantic domains. In this study twenty-nine semantic domains were used to test whether a lexeme could be used to describe it. Thus in English we can say *good man*, *good news*, *good weather* and *good food*. We want to know whether a word which informants say corresponds to *good* can be used with the same set of semantic domains. In order to establish the range of meaning of a word it is necessary to ask whether or not, when *good* is used with a particular domain, it can only be used in a particular context or has a restricted meaning attached to it. For example, if, in English, we say that *good food* can be used to refer to food that is both healthy and tasty, and we find that in another language it can only be used when the food is healthy, then the range of use of *good* may be the same but its range of meaning is different when used with this particular domain.

This method of collecting data, then, follows Wittgenstein's suggestion to look at the use of the word, not its meaning:

"For a *large* class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language." (Wittgenstein 1974:20)

It is only by looking at the way a word is used that we can establish its meaning, and it is only by comparing the way in which words are used across languages that we can establish whether these words reflect the same concept. This is particularly so when we are considering the meaning of value-judgment terms about which, as was suggested earlier, so much is assumed. Through looking at the way they are used, however, we can verify the assumptions made about their meanings. Thus, it is the use of a word that gives us clues to its meaning, and, therefore, it is necessary to investigate the use of a word before we can decide whether or not these terms reflect concepts which are language independent.

However, as we shall see when we compare *true* and *right* with *good*, it is not always equally simple to compare words across languages on the basis of their use. That is, while we can establish the meaning of a word on the basis of use within a language, in some cases we must be aware of the range of meaning we are comparing from language to language before we try to compare their range of use.
Not surprisingly, the different syntactic structures which languages utilise, and, in particular, the fact that comparable words do not always belong to the same part of speech in each language, gives rise to this difficulty. This apparent difficulty, however, can also illustrate the inter-relationship between syntax and semantics. Moreover, it can give us further clues to the meaning of these words, thus helping us to determine whether or not they should be viewed as shared concepts.

It has been said that the meaning of good is dependent on the context in which it is used, and indeed this point warrants further discussion (see discussion of Katz’s views in Chapter 2). But this should not deter us from isolating these words and discussing them out of any particular context. That is, while we look at the way these value-judgment terms are used in order to understand what they mean, we must then see if there is something that can be said about them that is true no matter what context they are used in.

"Although it is necessary to keep constantly in mind that a sentence can be used for different purposes and with different meanings in different situations, it is a legitimate psychological question to ask how people form and interpret the concepts that are literally expressed by the sentences they utter. The answer cannot provide a complete account of all that a psychologist would like to know about language use and acquisition, but it seems a necessary step toward such an account.” (Miller 1978:64)

This study of value-judgment terms then is but a small step towards our understanding of how languages use words which correspond to good, bad, right and true. From the knowledge that is gained about the use of these words, we can then decide whether these words are lexical universals, and, if they are, whether this indicates that these words reflect concepts which are shared by all speakers. In undertaking this activity, we can also speculate on the aspects of these words that are essential to their meaning, and, without going as far as proposing definitions, at least offer suggestions as to what the connecting threads are between, for example, good in its use in the phrases good man, good weather and good knife.

1.7. Summary of Conclusions

Some of what I have to say about the meaning of good and bad is speculative. However, it is only by offering such suggestions that we can come towards a greater understanding of such words. Before embarking on the main body of the thesis, I should outline its main conclusions. The first is that while good and bad are both candidates for lexical universals, there is more justification in proposing good as a lexical universal than bad. Secondly, the sheer difficulty of comparing true and right across languages, the fact that they overlap in meaning both in
English and in other languages, and the fact that these words do not consistently belong to the same part of speech from language to language (as good and bad tend to), suggest that these words are more likely to reflect particular cultural values and are thus not language independent concepts.

Thirdly, in English and a number of other languages, I suggest that there is a set-subset relationship between good and bad where bad corresponds to a subset of good. That is, the range of use and the range of meaning of bad is much more restricted than that of good. Good is clearly the better candidate for a lexical universal for this reason. On the other hand although bad is more restricted in its range of use and range of meaning it still reflects a concept that appears to exist in the languages that have been surveyed. Thus there is some evidence to suggest that while good and bad are not always exact opposites in English, and in many other languages, when we look at the core of shared meaning of these words across languages it appears that the concepts which they reflect are exact opposites.

Finally, I suggest that the range of meaning of good can broadly be divided into two categories which I will refer to as nature and function; whereas bad covers only the range of meaning described as nature. It is because of this restriction in its range of meaning that it is both used less frequently and in fewer contexts than good. However, from a cross-linguistic perspective, we can find an example of a language (Tagalog) where the word for good primarily covers the nature of things and thus in terms of concepts (rather than words) it seems that languages do share the concept GOOD and the concept BAD and that these antonymous concepts refer to the nature of whatever is being described.
Chapter 2
Philosophers - Their Insights and Assumptions

"If I am asked 'What is good?' my answer is that good is good and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked 'How is good to be defined?' my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it." (Moore 1952:70)

In fact Moore, as well as numerous other people, have had much more to say about good as well as about other value-judgment terms. One could speculate on why so much time has been spent on these words. It seems to be a combination of the fact that these terms are both vague and of great importance to ethical and philosophical discussions. Because so many of their discussions involve these words philosophers are clearly aware of the problem of using these terms when they are so imprecise, or when they appear to mean different things to different people. The difficulty of course is not that they mean different things to different people but that they can be used by different people to refer to different things. Thus not only can I refer to a good book and you refer to a good day but if we refer to a good man we can both refer to a different kind of person and assume that different characteristics are necessary before we can describe a man in this way.

2.1. Nature and Function

Let us look then at what has been said about good, and to some extent value-judgment terms in general, to see if there are some recurring themes in the observations and insights offered. Aristotle considers the question "But what do we mean by the good" (Aristotle Ethica Nicomachea 1925:1096b) rather than "But what do we mean by good". Assuming that these two English translations do justice to the Greek distinction, we can say that the good is not necessarily exactly the same as good although he nevertheless covers some of the same ground that it is necessary to cover in order to answer the latter question. The good seems to relate to goodness which I suggest is concerned with only one aspect of good the adjective. That is it deals with the nature of something rather than its function, but while every thing, every action, every person, can be said to have a nature, goodness seems to apply primarily to humans or things related to humans.
It is perhaps because the noun *goodness* is concerned with the *nature* aspect of the adjective *good* - that we prematurely tend to jump to the conclusion that *good* is primarily a moral concept. Thus when Wiggins says:

"Surely, it has been thought, goodness in a knife is not the same property as goodness in food? And not even the same as goodness in a lyre? And the inferential consequences of the possession of one sort of goodness will be very different from those of another." (Wiggins 1971:34)

I think he is making a mistake in assuming *goodness* and *good* to be the same. Some things which are primarily functional can’t really be said to have *goodness*, certainly not in the way they can be *good*. Thus does a knife have *goodness*? If it does it is a fairly extended usage. It can however have a *nature*. This is not necessarily the same as its *function*, for although it is generally the *nature* of knives to cut well (perform a *function*), it may be that the *nature* of a knife is that it is made of steel or has a particular shape. Thus *nature* can refer to one of several things that are integral to being a knife.

Aristotle sees *the good* as something to strive for but as something that is unattainable:

"with regard to the Idea; even if there is some one good which is universally predicatable of goods or is capable of separate or independent existence, clearly it could not be achieved or attained by man; but we are now seeking something attainable. Perhaps, however, some one might think it worth while to recognize this with a view to the goods that are attainable and achievable, for having this as a sort of pattern we shall know better the goods that are good for us, and if we know them we shall attain them." (Aristotle *Ethica Nicomachea* 1925:1096b, 1097a)

This may seem a far cry from discussing whether words corresponding to *good* can be used with a number of semantic domains in a number of languages. It does, however, suggest something about *good* which we will come across again. That is, Aristotle seems to be suggesting that *the good* is an extension of what is (i.e. is concerned with the *nature* of a thing). In other words though difficult to achieve it is related to the way things already are, e.g. the way man already behaves, but it goes beyond this. One of the main differences between *good* and *bad*, as we shall see, is that *good* is concerned with things as they are or are supposed to be whereas *bad* is concerned with the way things are not supposed to be (e.g. a good clock is one that tells the time accurately because clocks are supposed to tell the time.)

Aristotle also raises two other points which we find discussed by other writers at a later time and which are essential to the discussion here. The first of these points is that the sense of *good* differs according to what we apply it to and the
second is that *good* is concerned with the *function* that something has. For example:

"Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it can be. It seems different in different actions and arts; it is different in medicine, in strategy, and in the other arts likewise." (Aristotle *Ethica Nicomachea* 1925:1097a)

*Good*, I have suggested, encompasses the notion of the *nature* of something and the *function* of something. It seems that while everything has a *nature* not everything must have a *function*. For example, a *mountain* does not have a function. One could of course argue that in some cases the *nature* of something and its *function* are identical. Certainly they often overlap, as Aristotle appears to suggest in relation to man, and this may be one reason why the meaning of *good* seems to be so complex, but in fact the *nature* of something could be applied to other aspects rather than the *function*, even if the *function* is an essential part of the thing, as I suggested above in the case of *knife*. Nevertheless this does suggest that there will be a subjective element operating when we divide the meaning of the word *good* into *nature* and *function*.

Aristotle believes that of all the things which have a *function*, *good* will 'reside' in this *function*.

"For just as a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the function, so it would seem to be for man, if he has a function." (Aristotle *Ethica Nicomachea* 1925:1097b)

He goes on to say:

"Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say 'a so-and-so' and 'a good so-and-so' have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre-player and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of goodness being added to the name of function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player to do so well): if this is the case ... human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete." (Aristotle *Ethica Nicomachea* 1925:1098a)

Thus although we saw above that Aristotle discussed *good* in terms of an extension of the way things already are (their *nature*), he appears to see *good* as concerned primarily with *function* rather than with *nature*, describing *nature* as a type of *function*. As Aristotle has observed, *nature* and *function* are inter-related. However, I suggest that *function* should not be seen as the primary point of description. Rather, it is the *nature* of something that will be applicable to all
domains. This perspective alleviates the difficulty of trying to ascertain the function of a man, for example, and yet allows us to see the strong connection between the moral aspect of the meaning of good, which applies to man but not to other things. Thus the moral aspect can be defined as the nature of a narrow domain (man). It also allows us to say that in some cases nature and function are inseparable, or, alternatively, that in some cases the nature of a thing is its function.

Clearly the notions of nature and function are not new but it does seem that in many cases, either the functional aspect of good has been considered prior or that the meaning of good is seen as stemming from the notion of a moral good. As Beesley has pointed out:

"Both [Plato and Aristotle] concluded that 'good' and 'bad' modify relative to the functions of the arguments, and this kind of analysis continues little modified to the present day.... A problem for Plato, Aristotle, and anyone else trying to explain all uses of evaluatives in this way is that the function of man, woman, person and other such 'empty' nouns is far from obvious." (Beesley 1982:214)

However, if we think of good as referring to the nature of whatever it is modifying and note that the function is often more or less equivalent to its nature, and that some domains can not be said to have a function, then this is no longer a problem. The problem arises when we view function as primary and try to decide how to incorporate non-functional examples into this functional approach.

However, in the following quotation Aristotle seems to be alluding to the nature of things, or things being good in themselves, as well as the function of things and I suggest that this analysis is the one born out by the cross-linguistic data presented below.

"We may remark, then, that every virtue or excellence both brings into good condition the thing of which it is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well; e.g. the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its work good; for it is by the excellence of the eye that we see well. Similarly the excellence of the horse makes a horse both good in itself and good at running and at carrying its rider and at awaiting the attack of the enemy. Therefore if this is true in every case, the virtue of man also will be the state of character which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well." (Aristotle Ethica Nicomachea 1925:1106a)
2.2. Simple Ideas

Both Russell and Moore consider that when we ask what the meaning of good is, we are looking not for the sort of definition that would be appropriate in a dictionary but for the concepts or ideas that this word conjures up. This is an important distinction to draw for if we want to consider or disagree with their intuitions we must be aware of what their intuitions reflect. We can see from Russell’s discussion that he assumes that good and bad are concepts which everyone understands. He does not say of course that speakers of other languages understand them but it seems that in a study of ethics this assumption is implied.

"Good and Bad, in the sense in which the words are here intended (which is, I believe, their usual sense), are ideas which everybody, or almost everybody possesses. These ideas are apparently among those which form the simplest constituents of our more complex ideas, and are therefore incapable of being analysed or built up out of other simpler ideas." (Russell 1952:4)

The connection between ideas which are simple and ideas which everybody understands is clearly a valid one. The difficulty we have in defining good and bad suggests that these words are relatively simple ideas. It seems valid to test any words that convey simple ideas as lexical universals in order to see if these simple ideas are comparable in other languages.

Moore also believes good to be a simple idea.

"...this question, how 'good' is to be defined, is the most fundamental question in all Ethics. That which is meant by 'good' is, in fact, except its converse 'bad', the only simple object of thought which is peculiar to Ethics." (Moore 1952:69)

Clearly if a word such as this is considered to be so important to a particular branch of intellectual enquiry, it is worthy of study from a cross-linguistic perspective. In this way we can verify whether bad is in all cases the converse of good, as Moore claims, and discuss to what extent good is "a simple object of thought".

2.3. The Use of Good in Different Contexts

When good has been discussed by language philosophers it has often been discussed as a moral term. It is also often made clear that it is used in many different contexts. As Ziff says:

"A striking fact about the use of the word 'good' in English is that whether or not something is good can be and frequently is a matter of controversy and dispute in a way that whether or not something is yellow is not." (Ziff 1960:239)
However, because we disagree about whether or not something is *good*, it does not mean that we should have any difficulty in comparing whether a word corresponding to *good* in another language can be used with the same set of semantic domains as *good* in English. Thus if we accept that two speakers of English will not necessarily agree on what constitutes a good book then we must also accept that speakers of different languages will not necessarily agree about what characteristics would be used to describe a good book. The important thing is whether the same word can be used over and over again with a range of domains. We must however accept that there may be some differences in the range of meaning of a word with a particular domain. This alone does not indicate that we have different concepts reflected in corresponding words. If some core range of meaning and range of use remains then I suggest that we can claim that these words reflect shared concepts. If, on the other hand, there is little common ground, then we will be able to establish similarity of meaning but not a shared concept.

Hare makes the point that the meaning of *good* does not change simply because it can be used in a variety of contexts.

"To teach what makes a member of any class a good member of the class is indeed a new lesson for each class of objects; but nevertheless the word 'good' has a constant meaning which, once learnt can be understood no matter what class of objects is being discussed. We have, as I have already said, to make a distinction between the meaning of the word 'good' and the criteria for its application." (Hare 1961:102)

Thus in effect it is the criteria that we may dispute but we should be able to agree on the meaning, even if we find it difficult to isolate.

2.4. Vagueness

But what is the meaning of *good* and why is it so difficult to identify? It seems that the reason that *good* has engendered so much discussion is that it is often referred to as being used in different senses; this results from the fact that *good*, like other value-judgment terms, has a meaning that is vague. Thus it is not just that when we think of *good* we do not think of a dictionary definition (that is we find it difficult to divide it into component parts) but we may think of different senses of the word.

The fact that *good* can be used with a range of semantic domains, can have different ranges of meaning, and that it can be disputed whether or not something can be called *good*, suggests that the meaning of *good* must be vague. The fact that *good* is difficult to define without looking at it in terms of the noun it is
being used to describe also suggests this. However, if we view *good* as primarily concerned with the *nature* of a domain then we can see that it is not that there are innumerable senses of *good* but just that it can refer to countless domains and that its vagueness stems in part from this fact. Before saying that *good* is a vague term, however, we must be sure that we are not using vagueness as an excuse for not being able to define the word. Furthermore, we must be sure that *good* is indeed vague and does not instead have more than one meaning, that is, that it is not polysemous. The reasons for suggesting that *good* is vague rather than polysemous are discussed in Chapter 3.

There are several inter-related discussions required before we can establish that *good* is vague and, more importantly from the point of view of this study, that we can establish that the concept of GOOD is vague. Theoretically, however, until we establish whether the word *good* is vague and whether the words for *good* in other languages are vague, we can not establish whether the concept GOOD is vague. The discussions required to establish this are as follows: first we must ask what criteria we need to establish whether a word is vague or polysemous. Given that linguists have proposed criteria to distinguish these two 'concepts', this would not seem too difficult. All that is needed is to see how *good* fits in with this criteria.

Before we discuss why *good* is not polysemous, it is necessary for us to look at *good* and *bad* as a pair of adjectives and ask whether or not they are truly antonyms. One of the disadvantages of looking at *good* in the way that philosophers have done is that it is seldom discussed in terms of its relationship with *bad*. Both Moore and Russell, as we saw above, accepted or assumed that what could be said about *good* could also be said about *bad* even though their discussions were concerned almost exclusively with the word *good*. Of course when *good* is discussed in its moral sense it is generally discussed in terms of its relationship to the word *evil*. If we look to the notion of semantic field theories we find that often more is learned about a particular word by looking at it in terms of its relationships with other words rather than looking at it in isolation. In the same way more can be learned about *good* by comparing it with *bad*.

A parallel could be drawn between the advantages of looking at words which are inter-related in one language and looking at words cross-linguistically. As we shall see, we can learn something about the meanings of these words in English by looking at words which correspond to them in other languages.

Before we look at the question of antonymy, however, let us consider why it is said that *good* is vague and then what has been said about the 'different senses' in
which *good* is used. Not surprisingly, we can find reference to vagueness in Aristotle's discussion of *good*.

"And we must also remember what has been said before, and not look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords with the subject-matter and so much as is appropriate to the enquiry." (Aristotle *Ethica Nicomachea* 1925:1098a)

It is interesting to note how each of the things that can be said about *good* relate to each other or, one might say, offer clues about its true nature. For instance we could apply Zipf's principle of least effort to *good*, noting that a word that is frequently used is considered to lack concentrated meaning in order to be able to used in so many different contexts. This relates to Katz's notion of the *syncategorematicity* of *good* (see Katz 1964:739-766), which in turn suggests that if *good* is concerned with the *nature* of things then that will change from one domain to the next. Zipf also notes that such words are generally phonologically simple, short words, as both *good* and *bad* are, in English as well as in most of the other languages considered. We could also apply Russell's discussion of length to *good* and *bad*, and note that his observations may tell us something about why we use *good* more frequently than we use *bad*.

"...the more precision we give to a concept, the oftener it can be proved to be inapplicable, and the seldomer it can be proved to be applicable. When it is completely precise, it can never be proved to be applicable." (Russell 1940:106)

Thus I suggest that *bad* has a more precise meaning than *good*.

Ethical terms in general are considered to have vague meanings, as can be seen in the following quotation from Stevenson.

"Ethical terms are more than ambiguous. they are vague... An ethical term may accordingly be adapted to a broad range of uses." (Stevenson 1944:34-35)

Sweetser, who has suggested criteria for deciding whether or not a word is polysemous, also thinks it is more likely that abstract words will have a vague, rather than a polysemous meaning (see Sweetser 1986).

### 2.5. The Moral Good

We can see then that given that *good* is both an abstract term and an ethical term that we would assume that its meaning is vague. We do not know this however, for we find many examples of *good* being discussed as a word which has several senses. *Good* is often divided into a moral sense and a non-moral sense, which Ezra Talmor, for example, refers to.
"We cannot ... understand what is the most important characteristic of moral terms such as 'good', 'bad' etc., except by understanding the non-moral uses of such terms. In their non-moral uses 'good' and 'bad' behave exactly as other grading labels, the only difference being their greater generality of the criteria for their employment. If we compare the criteria of an 'extra fancy' apple with the criteria of a 'good' apple, we find that while the former are clearly fixed by the Ministry of Agriculture, the latter are much vaguer. Moreover 'good' is used as a grading label for a great variety of things (good apples, good guns, good films, etc.) which increases the lack of precision of the criteria for its use." (Talmor 1984:16)

Hare also distinguishes between a moral and a non-moral sense:

"I shall illustrate the peculiarities of value-words by examples drawn from their non-moral uses, and only later ask whether these same peculiarities are to be found in moral contexts. The procedure ... will enable me ... to show that the peculiarities of these words have nothing to do with morals as such, and that therefore theories which purport to explain them have to be applicable, not only to expressions like 'good man', but also to expressions like 'good chronometer', and to realise this is to be preserved from a number of errors." (Hare 1961:80)

As I have suggested, however, if good is seen as having the aspects of nature and function then there is no need to distinguish between a moral and non-moral sense, because the moral sense can be incorporated into the aspect of nature - in this case, specifically to the nature of man. Thus to paraphrase Beesley's comment that "the standard of 'moral excellence', however special it might be to some philosophers, is nothing exceptional grammatically", (Beesley 1982:215-216) one could say that the moral good, no matter how special it may be to some philosophers, is nothing special semantically.

2.6. Good As an Evaluative and Descriptive Term

Hare also suggests that good:

"has both descriptive and evaluative force, and these have to be learnt by different means and independently of one another." (Hare 1961:89)

Hare sees a connection between the descriptive and evaluative force of good which he illustrates in the following way:

"There are two sorts of things that we can say, for example, about strawberries; the first sort is usually called descriptive, the second sort evaluative. Examples of the first sort of remark are, 'This strawberry is sweet' and 'This strawberry is large, red, juicy'. Examples of the second sort of remark are 'This is a good strawberry' and 'This strawberry is just as strawberries ought to be'. The first sort of remark is often given as a reason for making the second sort of remark; but the first sort does not by itself entail the second sort, nor vice versa." (Hare 1961:111)
Hare's comments are worth noting because he equates a *good* strawberry with a strawberry being the way a strawberry ought to be. This is, I suggest, an accurate assessment of the meaning of *good* and again emphasises that *good* is concerned with the *nature* of a thing - the *nature* corresponding to the way something is or ought to be.

On the other hand, Ziff disagrees that *good* has an evaluative sense:

"The word 'good' is sometimes said to be an 'evaluative term' or a 'term of evaluation'. It isn't. But the suggestion is interesting. 'Evaluate' cannot be taken seriously in connection with 'good': this is indicated by such utterances as (99), (105) and (97)." (Ziff 1960: 242)

Ziff's examples are as follows:

(99) *This is a very good dish.*
(105) *We shall have good weather tomorrow.*
(97) *This is good news.*

Ziff's examples (105) and (97) are worth noting because the domains of weather and news are two which, cross-linguistically, were generally found to be acceptable with words which corresponded to both *good* and *bad*. There are some exceptions, however. For example, in French one says *beau temps*, rather than *bon temps*.

The quotations above indicate that *good* is indeed discussed in terms of which sense it is used in. Thus while I have not come across examples of writers suggesting that *good* is polysemous there are numerous examples of *good* being referred to as "in the sense of" X or Y. The importance of realising this relates to whether or not a shared concept GOOD exists in all languages, for if we find that *good* is a lexical universal the importance of this is diminished if we can not conclude that this lexical universal reflects a shared concept across languages. It could of course be the case that there is one sense in which the concept of GOOD is shared but not in another sense (and this is what appears to be the case).

In order to establish this, however, we must first decide what the different senses are and, as we have seen, given the different descriptions of moral and non-moral, evaluative and descriptive (and these examples are not exhaustive) this has not been agreed upon. However, as Wiggins has noted, although *good* is discussed in terms of different senses, there are never an indefinite number of senses; at most there are three or four.
2.7. The Relationship Between the Adjective and the Noun it Modifies

Katz believes that good differs from other words in that its meaning is dependent on the words with which it is combined (i.e. that it is syncategomatic).

"The meaning of 'good' ... does not have the kind of structure that the meanings of most other English words have. Whereas the meaning of a word such as 'bachelor', 'honest', 'hard', 'cuts', 'liquid', etc. is made up of component elements that are attributes in their own right, the meaning of 'good' is a function that operates on other meanings, not an independent attribute. Apart from combination with the conceptual content of other words and expressions, the meaning of 'good' does not make sense. Since the meaning of 'good' cannot stand alone as a complete concept, we shall say that the meaning of 'good' is syncategorematic." (Katz 1964:761)

Thus we must reconcile the apparent difference between saying that good is used in several different senses and saying that It is syncategorematic. That Is, the different senses of good could be said to be moral and non-moral, evaluative and descriptive or, from the point of view of this study, the sense of nature and of function. To say that good is syncategorematic, however, is to say that its meaning changes with each domain with which it is used (e.g. a good knife cuts well, a good teacher teaches well). If we consider that good is concerned with the nature of each domain, however, then, while the reference changes, the essence of the meaning of good does not.

Vendler attempts to illustrate why it is that good has these particular properties, properties that philosophers felt were there but had not been explained linguistically. One point that Vendler makes is that good is more remote from its subject than other adjectives such as yellow or round. He suggests that there are a number of ways in which adjectives can be tied to their subjects but that for each adjective only some of these ways are open.

"This fact affords us a principle of classification for adjectives in general and a method of discriminating between the various kinds of use a single adjective may have." (Vendler 1967:173)

The phrase good teacher can refer both to a person who teaches well and a teacher who is a good person. Vendler notes that beautiful also works in this way; thus a beautiful dancer could mean "either that the dancer is beautiful or that she (or he) dances beautifully". (Vendler 1967:176)

"The important point is that in this last case the adjective is not tied to the subject by the copula, but by another verb (to dance). This verb, of course, is recoverable from the noun (dancer) attributed to the same subject. The adjective (beautiful), therefore, is not ascribed to the subject (she) directly, but only with respect to a noun, or, rather, with respect to a verb recoverable from that noun ... Not all adjectives fit into both patterns. Compare: (Vendler 1967:177)
a. She is a blonde and beautiful dancer.
b. She is a fast and beautiful dancer.
c. "She is a blonde and fast dancer."

The relevance of this to the study of *good* and *bad* is that clearly whether you can use *good* and *bad* with certain domains depends both on the adjective you are using and on the noun that the adjective is modifying. That is, just as some adjectives, such as *fast* and *blonde*, don't allow ambiguous readings whereas *good* and *beautiful* do, it also depends on which noun follows the adjective. Thus *beautiful* is ambiguous when combined with *dancer* (as Vendler points out) but not with *girl*. In the same way *good* is ambiguous when combined with *teacher* and *doctor* but not with *man*. What we also need to ask is, is *good* potentially ambiguous when combined with words where the *function* that the person performs is remote from the *nature* of the person, such as *computer operator*. Furthermore, we must ask how *bad* fares in terms of ambiguity. Its scope for ambiguity is, I suggest, more restricted, because its range of use and range of meaning are also more restricted. That is, while *good* can be ambiguous because it can refer to either the *nature* of the person or their *function*, *bad* refers primarily to their *nature* and is thus less likely to be ambiguous.

One of the major problems that needs to be addressed in this thesis is articulated by Katz. He says:

"Difficulties in reaching a successful formulation of the meaning of philosophically significant words are often attributed to the alleged incongruities and amorphousness of natural languages. There is another explanation, however, namely that such difficulties result from relying on one or other inadequate conception of what constitutes a description of the meaning of a word." (Katz 1964:739)

Again, then, we can see the importance of looking at the meaning of a word by looking first at how it is used. For by looking at its use we can more clearly see the range of contexts in which it can be used and are therefore less likely to assume that a particular, perhaps overly contextualised, meaning of a word is prior, as I suggest has been done when philosophers have described *good* in terms of its moral and non-moral use.

Like Moore and Russell, Katz clearly assumes that *bad* is always the opposite of *good*, for he says that:

"The reading for adjectival occurrences of 'bad' should be identical with the reading for 'good' except that, where '(+)' appears in the reading for 'good', '(-)' appears in the reading for 'bad'." (Katz 1964:754)

Katz considers that Vendler's explanation of Moore's intuition is inadequate. So
while in its attributive use _good_ is furthest from the noun, in its predicative use it may be nearest the noun.

“Furthermore, it is clear on other grounds that the ordering of adjectives is a semantically irrelevant syntactic feature, on a par with the semantically irrelevant difference in ordering between the object and particle in such a pair of sentences as ‘He looked up the fact’ and ‘He looked the fact up’. The evidence that has been accumulated shows that the only syntactic properties that are semantically relevant are those which determine the grammatical relations within a sentence, i.e. subject of sentence, object of sentence, modification, etc. The ordering of adjectives in prenominal position is thus semantically irrelevant, because all the syntactic properties necessary to determine cases of adjective-noun modification are found in the source and matrix sentences where no ordering exists.” (Katz 1964:766)

Syntax and semantics, however, are closely inter-related and I suggest that Katz is mistaken when he says that the ordering of adjectives (or any other syntactic difference) is semantically irrelevant. For example, Bolinger has shown that there is a semantic difference between the predicative and attributive use of adjectives in English. (see Bolinger 1967) Although the meaning of a sentence may not change significantly when you use the word _good_ predicatively or attributively, I suggest that when used predicatively it is more likely that it will have the _nature_ interpretation whereas attributively it is more likely to be ambiguous between _function_ and _nature_ (e.g. _a good teacher_ compared with _a teacher who is good_).

The difference (discussed again Chapter 4) is subtle and with some nouns difficult to detect but this difficulty does not mean that it is semantically irrelevant.

Katz suggests that Moore’s intuition can be explained by the syncategorematicity of _good_ and not by its privilege of rank, as Vendler suggests. What Moore said was this:

“Can we imagine ‘good’ existing by itself in time, and not merely as a property of some natural object? For myself, I cannot so imagine it, whereas with the greater number of properties of objects - those which I call the natural properties - their existence does seem to me to be independent of the existence of those objects. They are, in fact, rather parts of which the object is made up than mere predicates which attach to it. If they were all taken away, no object would be left, not even a bare substance; for they are in themselves substantial and give to the object all the substance that it has. But this is not so with good.” (Moore 1959:6)

Thus while Moore feels he can not explain his intuition, Vendler and Katz agree that his intuition is right and propose alternative linguistic explanations to support it. I suggest that Vendler’s view of the ranking of adjectives does not go far enough in explaining why certain adjectives behave in a certain way - for this we must look more closely at their meaning. While Katz makes a valuable
contribution to our understanding of *good* by pointing to its syncategorematicity again I suggest that by looking more closely at the way *good* is used and not assigning it the property of an almost semantically 'empty' word we can in fact discover more about its meaning.

Philosophers and linguists then have spent considerable time discussing the word *good* and, for a simple word, it seems that if we look at what has been written about it, it appears to be very complicated. If it were in fact excessively complicated or, alternatively, semantically empty, it would seem unlikely that many languages would have a word which corresponded to *good*, which large numbers of languages do. This point and the fact that so much time has been spent on its analysis suggests that it must reflect both an important concept and, as we shall see, a shared concept.

Many insights to its meaning have been offered by Aristotle, who, while appearing to stress the importance of *function*, has also observed its vagueness, that it refers to the way things are, and to the inter-relationship between the way something is and its *function*. We have also been made aware of philosophers' assumptions that *good* and *bad* are words that almost all people understand (e.g. Russell), of the difficulty of defining it (e.g. Moore) and of the fact that we can disagree about what it can be used to refer to. We have also seen the different ways in which philosophers have chosen to view the aspects of the meaning of *good* - e.g. moral and non-moral, evaluative and descriptive.

It is now our task to look at *good* from a linguistic perspective, by comparing it with the word *bad* and by seeing how words which correspond to these two words in other languages are used. In doing this we can test the assumptions made by language philosophers and see to what extent the insights that they have had are valid. In carrying out our analysis we can attempt to determine whether there are corresponding words in other languages which are as salient to speakers of other languages as *good* is to speakers of English and whether these words therefore reflect a concept which is basic to language in general rather than to particular cultures.
Chapter 3
Antonymy of Good and Bad

In this section we want to explore the relationship between establishing good and bad as shared concepts GOOD and BAD and the antonymy of good and bad in English and in other languages. The need to verify whether good and bad are antonyms in English and whether words which correspond to these terms in other languages are antonyms stems from the fact that in two languages in our survey - Finnish and Thai - it appears that there are two words which correspond to bad (i.e. more than one opposite of good). This is significant because, on the basis of claims made about polysemy by Palmer and others, there is a possibility that good - or at least a word which corresponds to it - is polysemous in some languages rather than vague. If this is the case then, even if we were to establish that a word corresponding to good existed in all languages our claim to be establishing a shared concept would be greatly weakened.

As we will see, however, it does seem that, even in languages where there is more than one antonym for the word corresponding to good, it is more plausible to treat this word as vague rather than as polysemous. (This also has implications for analysing the data from Tagalog, where there appear to be two words which are the opposite of masama (bad).) However, in maintaining the belief that much more is assumed about value-judgment terms than is actually known about them, it is necessary to explore the possibility that good could be polysemous.

3.1. Polysemy and Antonymy

Sweetser has described polysemy as follows:

"Polysemy refers to a grouping of related but distinct senses of a single lexical item; often there is an observable direction to the relation between these senses, one being more central than, or prior to, others. Such a situation is in sharp contrast to the case of a lexical item with a single highly abstract sense, which is simply broad enough in meaning to apply to many different surface referents, or which happens to have many different pragmatically predictable uses." (Sweetser 1986:1)

What must be decided, then, is whether good has a group of related but distinct
senses or whether it has a meaning which is broad enough to apply to many different domains.

It was mentioned above that whether or not good and bad were antonyms had some bearing on whether or not good was polysemous. We do not have to look far in English to see that good and bad should not always be thought of as symmetrical opposites. For example, we can talk about our house as a good house, but one would wonder what exactly we were referring to if we described it as a bad house. We could speak of a good composer but it seems inappropriate to speak of a bad composer. There must be something about the meaning of bad that causes it to sound inappropriate in these contexts but not when we speak of bad news or bad weather or a bad man. Thus while good can be used freely as a modifier of a particular domain, there are some domains where we need to imagine a context in which to use bad. In English, as in many other languages, the most appropriate opposite of good is often not good (or no good) rather than bad. Although we seldom need to establish a context in order to use good it is often necessary to do so for bad.

Before looking more closely at the proposal that bad is not always the opposite of good we should consider the circumstances in which it is its opposite. Bad can always be the opposite of good when used in the moral sense (although note that it is often the word evil that is used instead). This is not the only time however. If we look at domains such as weather, news and habit we can see that both words can be used equally well. As we have seen from Aristotle's comments, whether or not something is good is often defined in terms of whether it performs its function well. We should remember, however, that sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between the function of something and its nature, and that in this analysis nature is deemed to be applicable to a greater number of domains than function.

Nevertheless, let us look more closely at the notion of function. The purpose of a knife (at least in our culture) is to cut well. If it cuts well (i.e. if it is sharp) it is a good knife; the function of a teacher is to teach. If he or she teaches well then he or she is a good teacher. Some things however do not have a function in the way that a knife or a teacher does - for example, news, weather, dream and man - and these words can also be modified by the word good. It seems that the words which don't refer to something that has a function to fulfil are those words which are also best used with the word bad. It follows then that words that do have a function combine less well with bad. In English this is more apparent with objects which have a function rather than with people who
have a function (e.g. *bad teacher* is acceptable, *bad knife* is less acceptable). In some languages, however, it is unacceptable to use a word corresponding to *bad* with domains which refer to people who have a function, as well as with domains which refer to objects that have a function.

If we look at the word *teacher*, which, as we have noted, has a function, we find that, in many languages, if we say *bad teacher*, the meaning changes from 'person who does not teach well' to 'teacher who is not a good person'. That is, it changes from function to person (which has no function), or from function to nature. To express the notion of a teacher who doesn’t teach well, it is more common to negate *good* (i.e. 'He is not a good teacher', rather than 'He is a bad teacher'). Thus when we speak of a continuum along which the gradable words *good* and *bad* can be placed, I suggest that we should in fact be looking at two separate continua - one of nature and one of function. Along the nature continuum we have *not good* somewhere in between *good* and *bad*. Along the function continuum only *good* and *not good* are relevant - at least this is true if we look at languages in general.

In English, we can say *bad smell* and *bad taste*. In this survey, however, it was found that, cross-linguistically, words which correspond to *bad* are seldom used with these domains. It could be argued that these domains refer to functions. However, it could also be said that the senses (*taste* and *smell*) are experiences rather than functions. Thus there are some arguments against viewing the unacceptability of *bad* with certain domains (e.g. the senses) on the basis of function.

That *bad* can be less easily used with certain semantic domains in English and across languages is enough to suggest that *bad* is not always the opposite of *good* and that, therefore, the words need to be explored as a pair of antonyms. As we have seen, *good* appears to have a greater range of meaning as well as a greater range of use. Given these differences we should not assume that *good* and *bad* are necessarily exact opposites, either in English or in other languages. For example, Bierwisch gives both *böse* and *schlecht* as opposites of the German word *gut*. He says that:

"'Polarity' plays an important role in the structure of adjectives [and that] some adjectives have more than one counterpart, corresponding to different meanings." (Bierwisch 1967:6)

The notion that more than one opposite suggests that a word is polysemous has been raised on several occasions, for example by Palmer (also quoted in Evens et. al.) and Cruse. Palmer suggests that:
"Where a word is polysemic it will, naturally have a variety of synonyms each corresponding to one of its meanings. It will also have a set of antonyms. Thus fair may be used with (1) hair, (2) skin, (3) weather, (4) sky, (5) judgment, (6) tackle. The obvious antonyms would seem to be (1) dark, (2) dark, (3) foul, (4) cloudy, (5) unfair, (6) foul." (Palmer 1976:70)

In an article on antonyms in English, Cruse follows the same line of argument:

"Although antonymy is frequently spoken of, for convenience ... as a relation between words, strictly speaking, it is a relation between senses. This means that a polysemous word may appear to have more than one antonym. For instance both sad and unhappy seem to qualify as antonyms of happy. However contexts can be found where one but not the other, seems appropriate as the opposite of happy.

a. His parents' marriage was a
   happy/unhappy/?sad one.

b. I am happy/unhappy/?sad about
   the exam arrangements.

c. The story has a happy/sad/?unhappy
   ending.

It seems a reasonable inference that differences of antonym from context to context correspond to differences in the sense in which happy occurs. Similarly, one sense of kind will have unkind as its antonym; another sense will be paired with cruel." (Cruse 1976:282)

However, while a word may have more than one antonym, it may be that the two different antonyms refer not to two different meanings but to different aspects of its meaning (which would presumably indicate that the meaning of such a word is vague). Bierwisch suggests, for example, that in German hoch (high) has two different meanings whose counterparts are niedrig and tief (of pitch); but that the counterparts of alt (old), which are neu and jung, do not correspond to two different meanings. (Bierwisch 1967:6) This is clearly also a possibility in languages, such as Thai and Finnish, where we find that there are two opposites of the words corresponding to good.

In Finnish the two opposites for the word hyvä (good) are paha and huono. In general, huono refers to function or ability. Paha is used to describe a bad person. It does not, however, correspond exactly to the English word evil as a bad habit would be translated as huono tapa, but for the bad habits of children one would use paha tapa. Paha is also used with taste, smell and dream, all things that could not be considered evil. Note, however, that earlier I suggested that senses such as taste and smell were functions. In this case it seems that paha refers to experiences, or things that we do not choose - thus, in this world view, while adults can choose to change their habits, children can not. The point is that perhaps there are some domains which can have either a function or a
nature, or where whether someone does something or experiences something, could be debated.

In Thai dii (good) also has (at least) two antonyms: leew and yae. In languages such as Thai, which have more than one word which is needed to account for all the domains that one word, bad, can account for in English (and other languages), we need to examine the possibility that there is a case for arguing for the polysemy of good. However, antonymy is only a possible clue to polysemy and is not criterial. Moreover, it is more likely that the two words which correspond to bad reflect different aspects of the meaning of dii (good), rather than that dii is polysemous. Nevertheless, if good is vague in English and in other languages, then, before we make claims about good as a lexical universal, we must know in what sense there is agreement about the concept of GOOD. In other words, to what concept do the words dii, hyvá, and good relate?

Furthermore, we find support for suggesting that dii and hyvá are vague rather than polysemous from the question posed by Sweetser:

"...how predictable is the grouping of uses cross-linguistically? If it is completely universally predictable that any word used for X will also be used for Y (as in the case of linguistic and metalinguistic negation) then we may well want to postulate an abstract meaning applicable to cases X and Y. If there is no cross-linguistic predictability at all ... then we may conclude that the two senses are separate and that their relationship is one of polysemy." (Sweetser 1986:9)

If I understand Sweetser correctly, this would mean that if good and bad apply to the same group of semantic domains cross-linguistically then we are more justified in proposing that they are vague rather than polysemous terms. Despite some variation which we can generally account for in terms of lexical restrictions (discussed in Chapter 5) this does appear to be the case when we look at good and bad over a number of languages.

3.2. Cultural Differences

If we look at the way good is used in English we may then determine that the meaning of good is vague. If we look at words which correspond to good in other languages, however, we must first overcome some arguments in favour of polysemy (i.e. that in some languages there are two opposites of good). In English, good and bad are not always exact opposites; or perhaps we should say that there is some asymmetry between the two. Thus we can say that there is asymmetry between good food and bad food, between good woman and bad woman. It should not be overlooked that some of the difficulties in using bad with a particular
domain, however, could be said to be cultural. For example some might argue that it is generally considered that men are more likely to be bad than are women. I suggest, however, that if this is so it is in part a result of the fact that women are perceived as having a function whereas men are not.

One interesting survey suggests that cross-culturally women are perceived as good - although note that the study does not compare women with men, but the 'concept' woman with a series of other 'concepts' such as horse. The survey investigated a series of such 'concepts' with respect to bipolar adjective scales. Five different language groups (Hopis, Navahos, Tewas, Zunis, Spanish-American) were compared with English speaking people. It was found that:

"the same fundamental dimensions of attitude ... were ... found in the responses of groups from the five languages." (quoted in Carroll 1963:15)

This in itself is interesting in terms of this study for it illustrates yet again that words corresponding to good are widely used cross-linguistically. The point to be made here, however, is that each of these cultures associated the 'concept' of woman with the adjective good, although there were cultural differences evident with respect to other adjective scales.

"WOMAN tends to be not heavy for Anglos and for Spanish Americans, but somewhat heavy for Navahos and Zunis ... WOMAN is soft for Anglos, Hopi-Tewas and Navahos, but tends to be hard for Hopis, Spanish Americans and Zunis. WOMAN tends to be hot for all cultures except Navahos, who think WOMAN a bit cold. WOMAN is quite clean for all cultures except Navahos and Hopi-Tewas, where it is neither clean nor dirty. Whereas Anglos tend to rate WOMAN as weak, this concept is strong for all other cultures except the Hopi-Tewas, where it is neutral. All cultures, however, agree in relating WOMAN as good." (Carroll 1963:15)

Thus societal attitudes could be influencing the use of good and bad with some domains, such as woman, but I suggest in part this is to do with the function of women. It could perhaps be said that one of the functions of women is to be good. It is also true that one of the reasons bad was less likely to be used with many domains is that it was perceived to be impolite. This, however, must have something to do with the meaning of bad and cannot simply be dismissed as being culturally unacceptable in certain societies. It could be argued that the reason that many speakers consider it impolite to use a word corresponding to bad to modify certain domains (particularly domains such as mother) is that, if the concept BAD is defined in terms of nature, then, in effect, we are saying that the essence of the person or thing is bad and not just that there is something in particular wrong with the person or thing, or that they are not adequately fulfilling their function.
3.3. Views on Antonymy

One of the difficulties of discussing *good* and *bad* as antonyms is that there are several ways in which antonymy can be defined or discussed. As Ljung has pointed out, none of the various views of antonymy really explain what it is, rather

"they merely state that adjectives with a certain kind of behavior should be called antonymous." (Ljung 1974:77)

Thus, in order to decide whether or not *good* and *bad* are antonyms, it is necessary to investigate how they behave in relation to various criteria.

Lehrer, for example, would not exclude a pair of words as antonyms on the basis of asymmetry alone. (Lehrer 1985:400) *Good* and *bad*, as we have noted, do seem to be asymmetrical in many cases. Lehrer suggests that *better* and *worse* are examples of such asymmetry of entailment and gives the following examples:

a. The chicken is worse than the steak
b. The steak is better than the chicken

However, she maintains that the reverse entailment does not hold if both the *steak* and the *chicken* are *good*, for example in the following:

a. The steak is better than the chicken, but both are bad.
b. The chicken is worse than the steak, but both are good.

On the other hand, Lehrer and Lehrer suggest that *good* and *bad* are 'perfect antonyms' because of their equidistance from the midinterval on an evaluative scale:

"Two antonyms are perfect antonyms if they are the same distance from the midinterval; otherwise they are imperfect antonyms. Thus good and bad are perfect antonyms because they are equidistant from the midinterval on the evaluative scale. Excellent is farther from the midinterval than bad is (in the opposite direction), therefore excellent and bad are imperfect antonyms." (Lehrer and Lehrer 1982:489)

If *good* refers to the way things are or ought to be (*nature*), however, then I suggest that it is more likely to be nearer the midinterval than *bad*. Furthermore, it is misleading to consider only one scale when considering whether or not two words are perfect antonyms. In order to be perfect antonyms it is reasonable to expect that the two words would cover the same ground on the horizontal scale (the range of meaning scale) as well as the vertical scale. That is, *bad* has a narrower range of meaning than *good* and therefore could not be its 'perfect antonym'.
This is more evident when it is used with some domains than with others. For example, there is little difference in the range of meaning of *good* and *bad* when used with *man*, but when used with *clock*, *bad* has a much narrower range of meaning. Thus just to look at the distance from a midinterval point is insufficient grounds on which to determine whether two words are perfect antonyms.

Another point worth discussing from Lehrer and Lehrer’s article is the use of the modifier *absolutely*. They propose that *absolutely* can be used with the endpoints of a scale. This is put forward as an illustration of the fact that *good* and *bad* are somewhere in the middle of the scale whereas *excellent* and *terrible* are at the ends of the same scale. So, one can say *absolutely excellent* and *absolutely terrible* but not *absolutely good* or *absolutely bad*.

This point is again raised by Lehrer in a later article. Here, however, she includes modifiers such as *completely*, *perfectly*, *utterly* as words which are

> “appropriate for words at the extreme end but not good for words that name a half scale or the inner part of the scale from the middle, such as *warm* and *cool*. Absolutely marvellous (spotless, filthy, awful, huge, miniscule) are much better than absolutely *good*, *bad*, *large*, *small*, *dirty*.”

(Lehrer 1985:420)

However, if we use the other modifiers that Lehrer has suggested with *good* and *bad* then I think we find that they are acceptable. This is particularly true with *good*. Thus we could have ‘a perfectly good cup of tea’ or describe a person as being ‘utterly bad’. I offer these examples not to suggest that *good* and *bad* are necessarily at extremes of the scale, but as evidence to support the view that *good* and *bad* can be seen as non-gradable words as well as gradable words. This point has also been made by Wierzbicka who says that:

> “Evaluations like 'good' and 'bad' are - from a semantic point of view - absolute.” (Wierzbicka 1971:44)

That is, like *true* and *false*, which Lehrer and Lehrer describe as contradictory (Lehrer and Lehrer 1982:483), *good* and *bad* are contradictory as well as gradable. The contradictory use of *good* and *bad* often occurs in the moral domain but, as we can see from the 'perfectly good cup of tea' example, it is by no means restricted to it.

The inappropriateness of viewing the moral *good* as gradable has been noted by Rusiecki.

> "Bartsch and Vennemann (1972) point out that the positive degree does not signal just any difference in the average, but a considerable difference. Yet 'an experienced driver' is not necessarily one who considerably exceeds
the norm; and an interpretation of the phrase 'a good man' as meaning 'one who considerably exceeds the moral decency norm of the community' would be evidence of a pretty sour view of human nature." (Rusiecki 1985:28-29)

It is interesting to note Sapir's comments on gradability in relation to good and bad which reflects, in my view, the fact that good is not always gradable. If we consider good and bad to be on a gradable continuum with better and best, worse and worst, better can be graded with reference to terms of comparison, but good is graded with reference to the norm. That is, while better is more than good, it can also be used to indicate something less than good whereas good is not subject to the same degree of relativization. It remains in the same place or maintains the same meaning; thus better can be, as Sapir says

"relatively better, not so bad' e.g. 'My pen is better than yours but I confess that both are bad'.” (Sapir 1949:126)

Another way of looking at the asymmetry of good and bad is in terms of gradability. If we think of good apples and bad apples I suggest that while you could keep showing me better and better apples it would be difficult to keep saying an apple was more and more bad (or worse and worse). That is it could be getting bad but once it had reached a certain state of rottenness there would be no point in saying this apple was worse than the last because it would come to the point where it would be no longer worth calling it an apple. This point, however, would not apply to people. Presumably a man could be infinitely bad and would still remain a man.

With reference to the discussion of whether good refers to the function or the person and to whether it is always a gradable adjective we can compare the phrases (1) the good doctor and (2) the best doctor. This example is evidence that good can have a non-gradable reading. Best can not be ambiguous but can only refer to the doctor's doctoring ability and not to his or her character, whereas good doctor could be ambiguous in this respect. This is also true of good man and best man (excluding its use in a wedding ceremony) where best man seems to imply best for something, e.g. 'best man for the job'.

When thinking about the nature of good (and bad) - its vagueness, gradability and syncategorematicity - we must accept that the extent to which these things will be true of a phrase depends both on the meaning of good (and bad) and the word which is being modified. Thus as Hare says, it depends on the class of the object.

"If I talk of 'a good egg', it is at once known to what description of
egg I am referring - namely, one that is not decomposed. Here the descriptive meaning predominates, because we have very fixed standards for assessing the goodness of eggs. On the other hand, if I say that a poem is a good one, very little information is given about what description of poem it is - for there is no accepted standard of goodness in poems ... In general, the more fixed and accepted the standard, the more information is conveyed. But it must not be thought that the evaluative force of the word varies at all exactly in inverse proportion to the descriptive. The two vary independently: where a standard is firmly established and is as firmly believed in, a judgment containing 'good' may be highly informative, without being any the less commendatory." (Hare 1961:122)

Urmson also makes the same point more succinctly when he says:

"Grading words can only be used successfully for communication where criteria are accepted." (Urmson 1950:167)

Good and bad, then, are vague terms which are gradable adjectives but which nonetheless can also be used in a non-gradable way. They are antonyms, but not perfect antonyms, because the range of use and the range of meaning of good are greater than the range of use and the range of meaning of bad. In comparing these terms with corresponding terms in other languages it can be seen that while in some languages there is more than one word to cover the range of use that bad covers in English, it also appears that the words which correspond to good in other languages are vague rather than polysemous. The concepts which these words reflect, therefore, can also be assumed to be vague.
Chapter 4
Marking and Universals

In this chapter the relevance of the concept of marking to our analysis of *good* and *bad* (and words which correspond to them in other languages) is discussed. We also examine the implications of proposing the words *good* and *bad* as lexical universals and the inter-relationship between establishing one member of the antonymous pair as unmarked and its claim to be considered a lexical universal.

4.1. Marking

As Greenberg points out, "the first use of the concept of marked and unmarked categories was in Prague school phonology". (Greenberg 1966b:63) Markedness, however, is also applicable to the syntactic and semantic levels of linguistic analysis.

One of the criteria suggested for establishing antonymous pairs is marking (e.g. see Givón 1970:817). Following this approach, in any antonymous pair one member will be the unmarked member and one will be the marked member. On the other hand, after looking at the properties of markedness which have been predicted of antonyms, Lehrer has concluded that:

"markedness is not a general structural property of antonymy; rather it consists of a number of independent properties that are imperfectly correlated. However, none of these is in fact true of all antonym pairs. Neutralization of one member of the pair in question is the commonest of the properties. Most of the statements can at best be taken as implications; if one member of a pair exhibits property P, it will be the marked (or unmarked) member." (Lehrer 1985:421)

Lehrer's conclusion, no doubt, gives a more accurate view of the relationship between markedness and antonymy in general. However, as the notion of markedness does, to some extent, apply to *good* and *bad*, it seems appropriate to discuss it.

Criteria proposed for establishing the unmarked member of a pair include the following: (1) The implied member of an implicational relationship, (2) Greater
frequency of use within language, (3) Appears in a neutralized context, (4) Less complex phonologically or morphologically, (5) Will not be overtly marked, (6) Early child acquisition, (7) Occurs in many languages, (8) Usually first added and last lost in language change. (Witkowski and Brown 1983:569)

In discussing criteria which signify the unmarked member of a pair, such as those given above, Greenberg suggests that, as not all areas of language (i.e. phonology, grammar and lexicon) fit in equally well with such criteria, it may be that if we are to apply markedness to all aspects of language then the definition needs some revision and simplification. Thus he suggests that perhaps frequency alone is sufficient to define markedness.

"There are other advantages to a frequency interpretation of marked and unmarked in grammar and semantics by which marked means definitionally less frequent and unmarked means more frequent. To begin with there is the obvious methodological advantage that frequency phenomena can be explored for every language whereas the other criteria are more limited in this respect." (Greenberg 1966a:67)

It seems more likely that frequency of occurrence will be a result of a particular item being unmarked rather than that it is a criterion for its classification but nevertheless, given its usefulness cross-linguistically, it is worth noting.

Greenberg presents evidence of greater frequency of good than bad in support of the idea that good is the unmarked member of the pair. He quotes word counts for English and Spanish and in both languages good and bueno occur over three times as often as bad and malo. (Greenberg 1966a:53) The greater frequency of use of good and bueno may result from the fact that the contexts in which bad and malo can be used are more restricted than the contexts in which good and bueno are used. The restricted contexts could in turn be a result of the narrower range of meaning of bad and malo. This is certainly born out by the data from the other languages surveyed in this study.

In terms of marking then, we can see to what extent good and bad fit in with various criteria or we can follow Greenberg's suggestion and look at something straightforward and comparable across languages like frequency of occurrence. The problem that arises from applying good and bad to a set of criteria is that there are some criteria which either do not fit (e.g. bad is no more phonologically complex than good) or we have insufficient information to know whether they do fit - for example, in terms of language change. However, whatever criteria we do adopt, what we know of good and bad does suggest that good is the unmarked member of the pair and that bad is marked.
For example, as we saw in the list above, the unmarked member of a pair tends to be acquired earlier by children than the marked member. One study, carried out on children between the ages of seven and eleven, suggests that the younger the child the more likely they are to use *good* than *bad* as a modifier for a wide range of domains. Although children of seven would have already acquired their language abilities to a large extent, it is interesting to note the differences in the use of *good* and *bad* as they get older.

The study, carried out as a word association task on English speaking children, was conducted in order to investigate the modes of qualifying used by children at these five age levels (seven, eight, nine, ten and eleven). (Di Vesta 1965:188) In each of the age groups it was found that *good* occurred more frequently than *bad* and applied to more domains. However, in the older age groups, children used a wider variety of adjectives more frequently. Therefore, as children's vocabularies increase, *good* appears proportionately less frequently, but nevertheless remains the most frequently used adjective. (It is worth noting that *good* also occurred more frequently and applied to more domains than *big*.)

Thus most available evidence suggests that *good* is the unmarked member of the pair and that *bad* is marked. It appears that this may not be the case for all languages, however. For instance, Zimmer notes that:

> "It would appear that there are languages which furnish instances of a 'positive' meaning being expressed only by the affixal negation of a 'negative' term. Thus in Maya, the only word for 'good' is ma'alob, which is derived, by means of a negative affix, from the word 'bad'." (Zimmer 1964:78)

This example, then, contradicts our assumption that *good* (and words which correspond to it in other languages) is unmarked. However, Zimmer's example does appear to be an exception rather than representative of a particular language family in that in another Mayan language, Mam, there are adjectives for both *good* and *bad* which take "no inflection or derivation" (*b'aγn* - *good*: *nach* - *bad*). (England 1983:83) This point, however, can not be overlooked.

Givón suggests that the reason that all positive members of an antonymous pair are unmarked is to do with figure/ground relations. That is, with distinguishing the normal from the unusual. He illustrates this point in the following sentences:

a. A woman with two arms came into my office and . . .
b. A woman with one arm came into my office and . . .

Givón suggests that the first of these examples is pragmatically bizarre because it fails to distinguish the figure from the ground - or in other words one would
expect a woman coming into an office to have two arms. (Givón 1978:107) If we apply the notion of figure/ground relations to the discussion of good and bad, it can be seen that good is concerned with what is normal, or what is, as Aristotle says (see Chapter 2), while bad is concerned with the unusual.

However, it is also true to say that, if we are more likely to specify what is not normal, as Givón suggests, then the unmarked member of a pair is less likely to be used more frequently than the marked member. Thus our decision to call one member of pair marked and the other unmarked can not be based on frequency alone. As Waugh notes, for example, the various attributes of markedness:

"should not be equated with its definition; and if in fact it should happen, for example, that the marked term is indeed more frequent in given texts than the unmarked, this should not be taken as evidence that the markedness values are false or uncertain, but rather that text frequency is due to the interaction of a variety of factors, only one of which is markedness. This is particularly so when dealing with lexical meaning in language." (Waugh 1982:302)

One of the relationships between antonymy and marking is that it is the unmarked member of the pair which has more than one opposite and not the other way around. This point tends to be implied by those who have written about antonymy but has not been categorically stated. It becomes significant, however, when we are deciding how to analyse the Tagalog data which, at first glance, has two words which correspond to good and one which corresponds to bad. Because one word masama (bad) has two opposites (or at least two words for good are given to cover the same range of use that good covers in English) does this mean that we want to say that in Tagalog masama is the unmarked member of the pair, whereas in other languages it is the word corresponding to good which is unmarked?

Although we do not want to decide this question only on the basis of a model of marking, it does seem that if we have a solution that fits in with this model, then this solution should be seriously considered. In this case it would mean that we would decide that there was one word which corresponded to good (mabuti) in Tagalog, but that this word has a narrower range of meaning than the word good in English. Our preference for analysing the data in this way is reinforced when we again consider defining the concept GOOD in terms of nature, and the English word good primarily in terms of nature but also of function. That is, the word mabuti is primarily concerned with nature. This is evidence for claiming that, cross-linguistically, words that correspond to good are concerned with the nature of the domain that is being modified. The importance of function to the definition of good can be seen as relevant to English but not to all languages.
Further evidence for saying that good is unmarked could come from the fact that the opposite of good can also be not good. Moreover, it should be remembered that not good is appropriate in terms of both function and nature whereas bad is less often appropriate if we are only considering function. If we say something is not bad, however, it does not mean that it is good. Rather, it implies that something is less than good but more than bad. So, if we think of a continuum with good at one end, and bad at the other, we would place not good at a point nearer to bad than to good, but we would have to place not bad nearer to not good than to good.

The same relationship between negating good and negating bad holds for the Russian words xorosii and ploxo which correspond to good and bad respectively. When negated, these words can be placed along a continuum in the following way: xorosii - neplox - nexorosii - ploxo. However, according to Zimmer:

"In the case of xorosii-ploxo it seems fairly clear that the ne-derivative of the 'positive' terms is closer to the evaluatively negative pole of the opposition than the ne-derivative of 'negative' terms is to the evaluatively positive pole of the opposition, i.e. that nexorosii is closer to 'bad' than neplox is to 'good'." (Zimmer 1964:65)

Thus in Russian and English it appears that xorosii and good are unmarked in that by negating them we get their opposite. However, by negating ploxo and bad we do not get a meaning that is opposite - rather it is somewhere in between good and bad but is nearer to bad than to good. This point further suggests the asymmetry between these words. As a result of this asymmetry, they should not be considered perfect antonyms.

In this study, then, we are investigating the existence of words whose range of use and range of meaning correspond to the words good and bad in English. We can in this way suggest whether the concepts GOOD and BAD are shared or are culture specific. However, as Burling has pointed out, there is a danger in assuming that our contributions to conceptual knowledge are greater than in fact they are:

"When a linguist makes his investigation and writes his grammar, is he discovering something about the language which is 'out there' waiting to be described and recorded or is he simply formulating a set of rules which somehow work? Similarly, when an anthropologist undertakes a semantic analysis, is he discovering some 'psychological reality' which speakers are presumed to have or is he simply working out a set of rules which somehow take account of the observed phenomena? ... It is always tempting to attribute something more important to one's work than a tinkering with a rough set of operational devices. It certainly sounds more exciting to say we are 'discovering the cognitive system of the people' than to admit that we are just fiddling with a set of rules which allow us to use terms the way others do." (Burling 1969:427)
Clearly, the aim of this study is to search for, as Burling calls it, God’s Truth. However, as there are several ways of interpreting the data (e.g. in Tagalog) it is quite possible to more or less ‘just fiddle’ with, if not a set of rules, then a set of observations about language use. In order to avoid doing only this, although this in itself, as Burling points out, has its value, the alternative ways in which the data can be interpreted should be noted. That is, we must be aware that while we can distinguish between semantic and lexical restrictions (lexical restrictions, as defined by Apresjan, are discussed in Chapter 5), for example, it is often the case that it is up to the person examining the data to decide which constraint is operating. Although one interpretation may fit the hypothesis better than the other, it is not to say that this accurately reflects the facts. Nevertheless, by being aware of alternate interpretations it should be possible to give a more valid answer to whether languages have shared concepts for these value-judgment terms.

In Chapter 3 it was noted that the range of meaning of good was wider than the range of meaning of bad. Waugh describes markedness as “the asymmetrical and hierarchical relationship between two poles of any opposition”. (Waugh 1982:299) Thus the asymmetry between good and bad is predicted by Waugh’s notion of markedness. In reference to paired grammatical categories, Waugh says that:

“the marked term necessarily conveys a more narrowly specified and delimited conceptual item than the unmarked.” (Waugh 1982:301)

This point is of particular relevance to the relationship between the words bad and good. It is this point in fact that suggests to me that it would be going too far to categorically say that bad should not be considered as a candidate for a lexical universal. What may be going on is that bad reflects a much more specific concept and for this reason it has a much more restricted range of use and range of meaning.

On the basis of the languages surveyed (excluding Tagalog) we would, then, still want to say that bad does reflect a shared concept, BAD, but that this concept is narrower than the concept of GOOD and, because of this, BAD can not always be considered an exact opposite of GOOD. On the other hand GOOD can, according to this hypothesis, always be considered as the opposite of BAD. Thus, like other marked and unmarked pairs, there is asymmetry because of the narrower range of meaning of the marked item. However this hypothesis comes under fire when we look at Tagalog.

In Tagalog we find one word for bad and two for good. We could, however, argue that what we find in Tagalog is a case of greater lexical restrictions. This is not to say we should argue for this analysis, but it is certainly one way of
dealing with the problem. The more likely explanation is that, when we consider the way words corresponding to *good* and *bad* are used across languages, there is often asymmetry between the members of each antonymous pair, but, to the extent that the words reflect shared concepts, these concepts are symmetrical opposites.

However, even if we decide that *bad* is a lexical universal, I suggest that there is less justification for using *bad* to define all domains. We have noted that there is asymmetry between words corresponding to *good* and *bad* in most languages. This asymmetry should be reflected in the use of these words in a semantic metalanguage. Because *bad* is concerned with *nature* rather than *function* it is inappropriate to use it in certain definitions, including those involved with emotions and feelings. It is best used in definitions that are concerned with things such as the moral domain. In terms of proposing *bad* as a lexical universal, however, Waugh does make the point that marked members of a pair tend to be less universal or non-universal in relation to the marked member.

Waugh's approach to markedness, then, satisfactorily deals with the pair *good* and *bad*. Although she does not deal with these particular words, in general she sees the relationship between the unmarked and marked terms as being "metaphorically characterised as a subset-set relationship where the marked category is the subset and the unmarked category is the set." (Waugh 1982:302) This then can account for the fact that while *good* is the opposite of *bad*, *bad* is not always the opposite of *good*. It does not, however, account for the data from all languages. Thus, while the notion of asymmetry and a set-subset relationship applies to *good* and *bad* in English, and to their counterparts in many other languages, there is enough evidence to suggest that perhaps the essence of the meaning of the words *good* and *bad* reflect shared concepts which are in fact symmetrical. Theoretically, then, it would not be surprising to find languages where words which correspond to *good* and *bad* are perfect antonyms.

### 4.2. Lexical Universals

The importance of testing whether *good* and *bad* are lexical universals stems from our desire to make generalizations about language in general. As we noted in Chapter 2, it has been implied by language philosophers that *good* and *bad* are words which reflect concepts that are understood by people in general, not just speakers of English or Greek, for example. It is the task of linguists, however, to test the extent to which this assumption is true. In order to do this, it is necessary to establish whether words which correspond to *good* and *bad* exist in other languages and whether they have a corresponding range of meaning and
range of use. In order to establish whether shared concepts do exist, then, we must first determine whether the words which reflect these concepts are lexical universals.

It has been noted above that we are not looking for synonyms or approximations to the words we are concerned with. We must, however, allow for differences in the structure of languages even though there is clearly a strong relationship between syntax and semantics. For example, the fact that *good* occurs so often as an adjective suggests that there is a relationship between the property of adjectives and the meaning of *good*. The distinction between the semantic basis of nouns and adjectives (see Wierzbicka 1986:353-389) has bearing on our analysis of the difference, cross-linguistically, between *good* and *true* and is discussed in Chapter 7. For now, however, we should be aware that differences in syntax, and in particular differences in parts of speech, have a bearing on the analysis of our data.

Insofar as differences in the structure of languages can not be avoided, therefore, these matters are taken into account. However, syntactic differences do not automatically rule out semantic similarities. Thus just because *good* may not be an adjective in all languages, we should not automatically assume that we do not have a shared concept GOOD.

Nevertheless, as Dixon has pointed out, the same sorts of semantic properties tend to be reflected in adjective classes and *good* and *bad* occur frequently in adjective classes.

"For languages which have the major class Adjective, the semantic content of the class is fairly constant from language to language. Thus an adjective in English will normally be translated by an adjective in the Australian language, Dyirbal, and vice versa." (Dixon 1982:3)

Furthermore, it has been noted that in Romance languages adjectives will generally be used for lexical polarization (see Malkiel 1951:485-518) and, taking *good* and *bad* as our examples of polarization, this also seems to be the case in other language families. Thus differences in the part of speech to which a word belongs can suggest differences in the meaning of words.

In addition to differences in the part of speech to which a word belongs across languages, we should also be aware of differences in syntactic frames within a language. Thus in English *good* and *bad* can be used attributively and predicatively. Bolinger has distinguished between predicative and attributive uses of adjectives in English and illustrates the differences in meaning when, for example, someone is described as a 'criminal lawyer' or a 'lawyer who is criminal'. 
(Bolinger 1967:1-34) The English adjective good does not appear to be subject to
the same degree of difference in meaning as criminal, depending on whether it is
used predicatively or attributively. However, it seems that the nature aspect of
the meaning of good is by far the more likely reading when it is used predicatively,
whereas the attributive use allows for the reading of both function and nature
(but there is a slight preference for function) of good to be implied.

Thus, although it is difficult to detect any difference between a good man and a
man who is good, because it is difficult to establish the function of man (see
Chapter 2 for a discussion of this), when we look at an example where there is an
obvious function, the difference becomes clearer; e.g. (a) a good teacher vs. (b) a
teacher who is good. Thus while (b) suggests that the teacher is a good person,
(a) is ambiguous in that it could refer to either the teacher's function or the
teacher as a person (but again, is more likely to refer to their function).

Analysing the predicative use of good in this way perhaps also allows us to
account for the following examples given by Zaitchik, the first of which he
considers to be semantically anomalous. (Zaitchik 1974:271) (Although I don't find
the first example totally unacceptable, I have starred it, following Zaitchik.)

(a) •That stone is good.
(b) That stone is good for throwing at passing camels.

If we consider the first example to be referring to the nature of a stone then it is
perhaps possible to understand that Zaitchik finds it difficult to reconcile a stone
with a nature (especially when if we replace the word stone with the word man it
has moral connotations). When a context is given in which the stone has a
function, as in the second example, then the sentence becomes acceptable.
Moreover, it would seem that to say
(c) That's a good stone.

is more acceptable than example (a) because the attributive use allows us to refer
to either nature or function and, as a result, we more readily infer from the
sentence that the stone may have a function without it needing to be specified.

When good is used predicatively it has a tendency to have moral overtones, or
given the distinction I have drawn between nature and function, it could be said
that when good is used predicatively it is less likely to be concerned with the
functional aspect of the noun. For this reason I suggest that bad can be used
predicatively more easily than attributively when it modifies a word which has a
function. The fact that we have phrases which are lexicalised where the sum of
the parts is not equal to the two parts separately seems to be a result of this.
Thus we can say good man or good fellow, but it is odd to say a fellow who is
good or a chap who is good. Furthermore good is more likely to occur in these
lexicalizations than bad.
A more accurate reflection of the range of use of *good* and *bad*, therefore, results from looking at their attributive uses. However, it does seem that speakers generally perceive no discernible difference between 'This is a good book' and 'This book is good'; 'This is a good man' and 'This man is good'; 'This is good weather' and 'This weather is good' (but this, no doubt, is because there is no overt function involved in any of these examples). So while informants were asked to translate noun phrases where *good* was used attributively, it was necessary to allow informants to make the best translation as either predicative or attributive. In Korean for example, *good* could generally be used either predicatively or attributively but with some domains it had to be used predicatively.

Katz suggests that the most basic syntactic frame is one that employs the predicative rather than the attributive use.

"Fortunately there is only one type of sentence that needs to be considered to arrive at a set of lexical readings for the adjective 'good'. These are the simple predicate-adjective sentences, i.e. sentences of the form Art-N-is good. Any syntactically compound sentence containing an occurrence of 'good' as an adjectival modifier of a noun is derived by the syntactic rules from a pair of sentences, one of which is a simple predicate-adjective sentence in which both 'good' and the noun it modifies in the compound sentence appear and the other is the compound sentence minus the occurrence of 'good' modifying the noun." (Katz 1964:749)

On the basis of the semantic considerations discussed above, however, the predicative use is considered to be more restricted in its meaning than the attributive use and thus it is not, semantically, strictly accurate to say that the attributive use is derived from the predicative use.

Bolinger is also sceptical about deriving attributive adjectival use from predicative use. As he says:

"By itself the fact that many more adjectives are restricted to attributive position than to predicative position is suspicious; if anything the reverse should be true if we want to base attribution on predication." (Bolinger 1967:3)

Furthermore, after experimenting with the format which Katz suggests, on practical grounds it was found to be more effective to use the attributive forms of *good* and *bad*. In a comparative study it is clear that many different syntactic structures will be found. Thus, as well as the existence of the copula 'to be' in only some languages, the more complex syntactic frame made translation of the sentences awkward and comparison between the languages difficult. Thus while the predicative form might be syntactically basic for English, this is not necessarily the case in other languages. Using the attributive form, however, gave a much neater
way of comparing what was going on from one language to another, as well as allowing the fullest range of meaning in English to be expressed. However, for some languages (e.g. those where 'adjectives' belong to the grammatical class 'verb') the predicative use may be easier to use, but overall, the Adj-Noun format was found to be the more satisfactory method.

Greenberg uses the term 'universal' in what he calls an extended sense and differentiates between a number of types of universals. Thus he includes unrestricted universals, which are "characteristics possessed by all languages"; universal implication: "if a language has a certain characteristic, it also has some other particular characteristic, but not vice versa"; restricted equivalence: "if a language has a particular non-universal characteristic, Q it also has U and vice versa"; statistical universals: "For any language a certain characteristic (Q) has a greater probability than some other (frequently its own negative)"; statistical correlations: "universally, if a language has a particular characteristic (Q) it has a significantly greater probability of possessing some other characteristic (U) than if it does not possess (Q)"; and finally, universal frequency distributions where: "a certain measurement, for example, redundancy in information theory ... may be applied to any language". (Greenberg, Osgood and Jenkins 1966:xix)

Thus it is not necessary for some feature to be true of all languages to be classed as universal in Greenberg's extended sense. As Greenberg notes:

"We feel that it is important to include generalizations which tend to hold true in more than a chance number of comparisons (such as symmetry of sound systems) or which state tendencies to approach statistical limits across languages or in one language over time. We are convinced that the wider use of this concept will prove to be most fruitful from the psycholinguistic viewpoint." (Greenberg, Osgood and Jenkins 1966:xvii)

Thus if we find that good or bad have a slightly different range of use in some languages or that languages exist where these terms don't seem to exist, it does not mean that we should immediately dismiss them as non-universal. Rather, we should investigate the extent to which they are universal, in Greenberg's extended sense. However, when I refer to lexical universals in this study I refer to unrestricted universals. This does not mean that there is necessarily complete overlap between the range of use and the range of meaning of these words in all languages, but it does mean that there is sufficient overlap to say that there is a shared sense in which they are used, reflecting a shared concept.

However, if we find that these terms are common to many languages but are not lexical universals this still reveals something of interest about the languages
and cultures which have been studied. Something does not have to be true of all languages for it to be significant. It would however call into question the validity of assuming that such value-judgment terms are basic to man and that we all share these concepts.

Chapter 5

Restriction of Meaning and Logical Restrictions

3.1. Restriction of Meaning

If we look at the data from the language analyzed at this stage, there is a distinct pattern which emerges. The boundaries between the range of use of words which correspond to the same word found in other languages, which seem to fall within one category, are not always clear. However, we have discussed terms that are distinguishable between the meanings of these words, which correspond to and at the same time range of vocabulary corresponding to has been attained in relation to meaning and structure. It would hence be worth to further discuss the differences between one and the other terms of the environment in which a specific meaning is sufficiently well-defined or well-undefined.
Chapter 5

Restriction of Meaning and Lexical Restrictions

5.1. Restriction of Meaning

If we look at the data from the languages surveyed in this study, the similarities between the range of use of words which correspond to *good* and to *bad* can be seen. However, we must also look at the similarities between the range of meaning of these words. In Chapters 3 and 4 the narrower range of meaning of words corresponding to *bad* was discussed in relation to antonymy and markedness. In this section we want to further discuss the differences between *good* and *bad* in terms of the restricted contexts in which, cross-linguistically, *bad* is often used.

The domains that have been used are as follows: *man, deed, woman, teacher, cook, mother, child, news, school, book, song, soil, day, weather, food, meat, rice, health, habit, smell, idea, taste, knife, clock, boat, dog, cow, dream, thing.* Semantically the word *bad* is acceptable with all of these domains. With some domains, however, some speakers would probably only use *bad* in certain contexts and/or with a different syntactic frame. It is worth noting that when *bad* can be freely used with a particular domain, because there is no semantic clash, then it will be used attributively. There is a correlation between the semantics of *bad* and the syntactic frame in which it is used.

It should be noted that while I believe *bad* to be semantically acceptable with each of these domains, I accept that they may be questioned by some speakers. This is valid for two reasons. The first is that, as difficult as it is in such a study, some effort has been made to ensure that the study is not totally biased in favour of English, thus while *bad rice* or a *bad clock* may be questionable phrases in English this is not to say that there may not be a language where these are much more common phrases than say the more acceptable *bad man* and *bad dream.* The second reason is that if we have some sort of scale of acceptability amongst these domains it should allow us some insights into the meaning of *bad.* I suggest that *bad* is less dependent than *good* on the domains with which it is used for its meaning. There is a central essence which exists regardless of what it
is modifying and for this reason it is more difficult to use with as wide a range of domains.

As each domain is considered we should not just note whether bad can be used to modify it, but think of what sort of context it would be used in and compare it to the context(s) in which good would be used. In this way we can decide to what extent bad is the opposite of good. However, for the purpose of establishing whether bad is a lexical universal, the main question is whether it can be used with a range of domains.

5.2. Bad People

Let us consider the way that bad modifies nouns referring to people. We can say bad man, bad woman, bad child, bad teacher, bad cook and bad mother. Of these six, three are describing functions: teacher, cook and mother. It is interesting to note that these three things are basically good things (nurturing things). In English bad can be used with each of these domains, but for some speakers it would be too strong a word if all we want to say is that these people are not good at performing their function.

Thus I suggest that there is a connotation of saying something about the person as such (their character or even morals) rather than simply about their function when bad is used with these domains. Note also that in our culture these are generally functions which women perform. Certainly a mother has to be a woman, although if we describe someone as ‘mothering’ someone it does not have to be a woman, but clearly that person is acting in the way a mother/woman would be expected to act when looking after children. Teachers (of school children - the terminology for those teaching tertiary students is, in any case, different) are very often women in our society and, while people who hold jobs as cooks are most often men, the people that cook are most often women. Thus perhaps these words, which refer to woman-like activities, imply something about the character of the person as well as the function.

If we compare these with functions which are either masculine, or neutral in respect of gender, the close association between function and nature seems less clear. Thus a good computer operator is someone good at their job, but a bad computer operator sounds strange; a good jockey versus a bad jockey; a good plumber versus a bad plumber - the negative of these suggest to me either (1) why are you calling them bad when all they are is not good at what they do (in other words it is too much, perhaps inaccurate, to say bad) or (2) it suggests, but only
as a last resort, that they are in some way doing something wrong. In other words, in some way they are bad people.

Thus, what I suggest is that while good can equally well refer to the function or the person, bad is much more likely to refer to the person. Where it can refer to the function - i.e. bad teacher - it is largely because there is some expectation about the person who performs that function, or in other words, where there is a close association between the person and their actions. Thus vocational jobs are more likely to be described by bad because bad refers to the person as much as to their job.

A bad doctor, therefore, is an acceptable phrase because, regardless of the reality of why people become doctors or what they are thinking when they are performing their duties, they are in fact doing something that is considered good. Therefore, paradoxically, bad is best used to modify a function when that function is considered to be done by a good person. Think for example of a priest and his functions - to say mass, hear confessions, marry and baptise people - a priest would be unlikely to be described as a bad priest if he gave poor sermons, accidentally split the communion wine or always lost his place in whatever ceremony he was performing - he could only be described as a bad priest if he was a morally bad man and did not live his life in the way considered acceptable for a priest. Thus there are certain expectations of the way that things should be. In this sense good corresponds closely with the norm or an ideal. Bad is used when this ideal is not met.

5.3. Lexical Restrictions

Before taking this discussion further it is necessary to discuss the question of lexical restrictions. It should be noted that it is generally possible to use another word, besides good or bad with any of these domains but that none of the other words can be used with all of the semantic domains, and often the meaning will change (as we would expect). Thus, in English, we would generally describe soil as poor or infertile rather than bad, but there is no semantic restriction on using the word bad with soil. This sort of restriction occurs in many languages and is called a lexical restriction (although the example above is probably better described as a lexical preference). We must, then, distinguish between lexical restrictions and semantic restrictions as well as distinguishing between semantic restrictions and restrictions of meaning (e.g. where a phrase such as good food, can refer to healthy and tasty food in some languages but only to healthy food in other languages). If we use poor or infertile with man, however, we get very different meanings both
from each other and from bad man. Apresjan distinguishes semantic and lexical restrictions as follows:

"By a semantic selectional restriction of a word in a given sense we shall mean a limitation of its use that can be formulated in terms of a particular semantic feature or features of other words with which it is syntactically combined ... By a lexical selectional restriction of a word in a given sense we shall mean a limitation in its use which cannot be formulated otherwise than by listing all the words with which it can combine syntactically. It is immaterial here whether they have common semantic features or not." (Apresjan 1973:183-184)

Apresjan notes further that:

"One would expect ... that the difference between semantically non-motivated and semantically motivated selectional restrictions may turn out to be relevant." (Apresjan 1973:183-184)

While languages differ in the extent to which they utilise lexical restrictions it will be interesting to note whether there are particular semantic domains which are more likely to employ these restrictions. This may tell us something about those domains which are most likely to be combined with either good or bad.

It should be stressed that, if there is a preference for a lexical item, other than good or bad, to be used with a particular domain, but that it is still possible to use good or bad, then when good or bad are used it is likely to be done only in a particular context. That is, it is subject to greater restrictions of meaning (the good food example again). Thus there is a strong inter-relationship between semantic restriction (e.g. *a happy lampshade), lexical restriction (e.g. poor soil) and restriction of meaning (e.g. good food as opposed to delicious food in some languages).

As was noted above, some languages tend to utilise lexical restrictions to a greater extent than others. If English is at one end of the continuum (few lexical restrictions) then Thai seems to be at the other. For example, in Thai the word leew (bad) can be used with the domains man, soil, weather and dream. However the more likely words to be used are:

a. khon chua
   man bad (evil)
   bad man

b. din leew
   soil bad
   bad soil

c. fan raay
   dream bad
   bad dream

d. aokaat yaa


When leew is used with man, dream and weather the context is marked. (Tony Diller personal communication) Furthermore it is rare to use the word for good (dii) when reporting subjective feelings. Thus to say 'I feel good' one would say:

a. chan ruusuk sabaoay
   I feel good/pleasant/comfortable
   I feel good

rather than:

b. ?chan ruusuk dii
   I feel good
   I feel good

Several things could be said about these observations. The first thing is that we can simply choose to say that Thai has greater lexical restrictions operating on the word dii than English has on good. The second thing to note is that taste, smell and sound (feel or look haven't been included in the set of domains used here) form a set of domains with which good, and more frequently bad, are seldom used, perhaps suggesting that whatever the essential meaning of GOOD is, it is not related to these domains (in other words to find the essence of the meaning of GOOD we must look at the domains with which it is most happily used cross-linguistically). The third possibility is this: the range of use of good in English is different from the range of use of dii in Thai. Is this difference in the range of use sufficient, then, to suggest that Thai speakers and English speakers do not share the same concept GOOD? This assumption would not be justified at this stage, in that there remains sufficient overlap between the use of dii and the use of good. We should, however, be aware of the differences.

5.4. Bad Food

Lexical restrictions, therefore, may tell us something about the meanings of both good and bad. In looking for the meanings, however, there are other things to take into consideration. Consider the phrases bad meat and bad rice. Good can be used with these domains when what we want to indicated is: 'I like this'. Thus good meat can be used when what we want to say is 'I like this meat' and good rice can be used when we want to say 'I like this rice'. On the other hand meat can not be described as bad if we don't like it (because, say, it's too tough or undercooked) but only if it is going off, is not fresh or is rotten. Thus bad meat has a particular meaning. Note also that it's more likely to be used predicatively than attributively and that this is one of the indications that, semantically, it combines less well with a particular domain. Bad rice on the
other hand is a less likely collocation but I think this is because rice does not go off in the way that meat does. On the other hand, in Mandarin, rice can be described as bad if it is uncooked rice, but not if it is cooked rice. In English, however, bad food is more likely to be used to refer to the sort of food that can go off, such as meat, fruit and vegetables.

However, food can also be modified predicatively by bad in the following way: 'The food at that restaurant was really bad'. This can not mean, however, that you simply did not like it. For example, if someone hates garlic and all the food had garlic in it they still could not say that it was bad. It could be described as bad if it was not properly cooked and was tasteless. In other words, if it was something other than the way food at a restaurant was meant to be. If food has garlic in it, that is an acceptable way for food to be, so it can't be described as bad.

5.5. Bad News, Habits, and Dreams

As I have suggested, words for referents that have no function, but just are or exist can easily be modified by bad. For example, bad news, bad dreams, bad weather, bad day, bad habit, bad health. It is true that potentially people have some control over habits and health, but we tend to have no control over news, dreams, weather and days. Moreover, these things are subject to change and can therefore change from good to bad or from bad to good. Thus, whereas there are certain expectations that people and food will be a certain way (conform to certain standards) and this corresponds roughly to being good, there is no expectation that the things mentioned in this list will be one way or the other. Thus both good and bad can equally describe these domains. Furthermore, they have no function in the way that cooks or teachers have a function, rather they are things which people experience and things which can be considered to have a nature.

5.6. Bad Songs, Books and Schools

The words song and book are similar in that we may be referring to one of several things or several things at once when we use the word good to modify them. The interesting difference between good and bad here is that good tends to modify them in a general sense but bad in a specific way. This reflects the fact that good is less restricted in its range of meaning than bad. It also suggests that the notion of good refers to things that are complete. On the other hand, things can become bad in many different ways. Thus if there are many parts to a thing and they all work then X is said to be good (e.g. in good health) but if any one
of them is not working (e.g. heart, lung) then X is said to be *bad* (e.g. in bad health). Note however that some things can only be *bad* in one way, for example food can only be *bad* by going off.

The other interesting and important point to note is that while things 'go bad', they always 'come good'; conversely things can not 'come bad' or 'go good'. As Eve Clark has pointed out:

"...*come* is always interpreted as having a 'positive' or known destination ... but *go* always has its destination negatively specified." (Clark 1974:316)

Clark's hypothesis indirectly supports the suggestion that *good* is concerned with the way things are and that this can best be described as *nature*.

"Since ... *come* always has as its destination the deictic center itself, the hypothesis would predict that idioms with *come* should always indicate entry into some normal state. At the same time, because the destination of ... *go* is specified as somewhere other than at the deictic center, it should also follow that idioms with *good* should occur only to indicate departure from a normal state." (Clark 1974:316-317)

If we look again at the domains of *song* and *book* we can see that a *good song*, for instance, could be one that we like, could have nice words, a pleasant tune, be innovative or have an important message, but a *bad song* refers mainly to the words. If the music of the song is not good then, I suggest, we would refer to the music itself, although it is part of the song. A *book* is obviously full of words, but a book can also be said to be *good* from several different perspectives - well written, interesting, etc. - but a *bad book* suggests more specifically that there is something objectionable about the content, perhaps it is obscene or in some way inappropriate for certain people to read.

Like *book* and *song*, a *school* which is *good* can be *good* for several reasons, or in several ways. For example the teachers are *good*, the pupils do well, there are good facilities for the pupils. A *bad school* tends to suggest that there is something wrong with the product of the school, either academically or in terms of behaviour. If something else is meant then it would be necessary to specify in exactly what way the school was bad.
5.7. Bad Knives, Clocks and Boats

If we look the words knife, clock and boat it can be seen that all three refer to things that have a function to perform. They don't just exist, but they exist for a particular purpose. In English we can have a good knife, a good clock and a good boat and while there are no semantic restrictions on using the phrases bad knife, bad clock and bad boat they are less acceptable than bad dream, bad news and bad weather.

It seems that the difference lies in whether the noun can be described as an experience (i.e. something that happens to people) or whether it is something that people do something with. There seems to be a relationship between intrinsically or morally bad and things which affect people. Perhaps it could be said that the difference is between things which people have little or no control over and things which people utilise. Thus, as we noticed above, we can draw a parallel between the fact that when bad modifies nouns referring to people it suggests something about their character rather than their function and that it is easier to modify functions that are closely associated with the nature of a person rather than those that aren't (e.g. compare a bad teacher with a bad computer operator).

Further, while things that are intrinsically bad (in the moral sense) can be modified by good they can not be modified by bad. Thus one can't really have a bad Nazi or a bad murderer as these things are already assumed to be bad. One could presumably have a good Nazi (one who wore the uniform or was a member of the party but did not do the things expected of Nazis) and even a good murderer (although this sounds a little bizarre) if the murderer was efficient at performing their task.

5.8. Bad Dogs and Cows

One final example which illustrates the difference between nature and function in the use of good and bad is to compare saying bad dog with bad cow. If we view cows only as farm animals who give milk or meat we can see that it sounds amusing to describe a cow as bad because it suggests, for example, not that they are poor milk-producers but that they are misbehaving. Dogs on the other hand are often pets; one could say that human characteristics were ascribed to them and thus, if we treat them as pets, even if they also have function (such as a guard dog) we can easily describe them as bad, referring to their nature or behaviour but not to their ability to perform a certain function. However, because good is a vaguer term and can apply to both the nature and function of animals it is appropriate to refer to both a good dog and good cow. To refer to a good dog could apply both to its nature and function.
One further point that could be made about the difference between *good* and *bad* in English is that *good* has been included in many different expressions. For example we use phrases such as good morning, Good night, Good grief, Good question and Good God. *Bad* has not been incorporated into the language to the same extent. This is partly a result of the fact that we tend to to wish people pleasant things rather than unpleasant things. On the other hand, as Abrahams has pointed out, *bad* can be used in Black American English to indicate that something is *good*.

"[There] is a set of adjectives ... which may mean one thing or its very opposite ... *Bad* itself is one of these words: in one type of usage it may mean the same as it does in Standard English - something to be despised. But more often it is used to describe something very highly valued. A really stylish person may therefore be described as a *bad* man."

(Abrahams 1976:85)

In this chapter, then, we have seen that there is asymmetry between the range of meaning of *good* and the range of meaning of *bad*. In English the range of meaning of *bad* is concerned primarily with the *nature* of something rather than its *function*. We have also noted that, while words corresponding to either *good* or *bad* in other languages may not be used with a particular domain this may be a result of a lexical restriction. This does not automatically indicate that the differences in the range of use of these words across languages reflect completely different concepts.

### 5.9. Informants and Information

One of the difficulties in such a survey is that of ensuring that the information received from informants is not just a rough equivalent but in fact reflects the same concept as *good* and *bad* in English. If it does not reflect the same concept then we must be aware of it. The difficulties of semantic versus lexical restrictions makes it even more difficult to decide exactly what is going on. This problem is no doubt exacerbated by the fact that we are dealing with abstract words but it is clearly a problem not limited to value-judgment terms as we noted earlier with Randall and Hunn's criticism of Brown's life-form universals.

While there may be some controversy about all the claims made about data in this survey it is clear that to some extent we do eliminate the problem of rough translation by testing the use of a word in order to get to its meaning. Randall and Hunn have also criticized the sorts of informants used in surveys establishing language universals and these criticisms apply to this survey. However this survey is sufficiently small that we can only claim to be making a step in that direction.
and not to have established language universals but rather candidates for lexical universals. Randall and Hunn believe that bilingual, educated informants "may be used heuristically in the manner of Berlin and Kay (1969) and Brown (1977, 1979) to develop universalist ethnosemantic hypotheses, but testing such hypotheses preferably involves both the interviewing of monolingual informants having as little formal education and European acculturation as possible and attention to lexical usage during everyday conversation. It is certainly more difficult to obtain such evidence than to consult dictionaries, ethnographic summaries, or university students. Still it seems essential to seek such data if we are to avoid confusing universals with semantic convergence." (Randall and Hunn 1984:333)

This, however, does not negate the importance of attaining the information that we have and of considering the theoretical implications that such data suggest.
Chapter 6
Good and Bad Across Languages

We have seen that there is asymmetry between the words *good* and *bad* in English, which results from *good*’s greater range of meaning as well as its greater range of use. It can be seen that all of the things that have been said about *good* and *bad* in relation to markedness, antonymy and vagueness are contributing clues which lead us to suspect that *good* and *bad* have a set-subset relationship, where the range of meaning of *bad* is only part of the range of meaning of *good*.

We should now investigate the behaviour of words which correspond to these terms in other languages. Compared with the understanding we have of *good* and *bad* in English, our information on corresponding terms is relatively sparse. Nevertheless, what we note is significant and, while the generalizations may, to some extent, be a simplification of the facts there does seem to be a correlation between what is going on in English and what is going on in other languages. This is not to say that every language works in the same way, but that the underlying themes of the meanings of these words recur.

6.1. Procedure

In order to establish whether *good* and *bad* are lexical universals, it is necessary to look at how words corresponding to *good* and *bad* are used in other languages. In this chapter we will look at the range of use of these words in 15 languages. The languages are Thai, Finnish, Spanish, Arabic, Indonesian, Turkish, Mandarin, Fijian, Russian, Kannada, Arrernte, Chichewa, Ewe, Korean and Tagalog. These languages were chosen because they represent a wide variety of language families and a variety of geographical areas. Ideally, one would want to include languages from all language families in order to form a truly representative sample of languages. However, when choosing which languages to include, it was also necessary to consider the availability of informants who were willing to participate in the study.

Between two and six informants were used to gather the data in all but three
languages. For Chichewa, Kannada and Arrerte only one informant was used. These languages were included, however, because they belonged to language families which were not represented by other languages. Ideally, we would want more informants for each language, however, once again, the number of informants was dependent upon the availability of native speakers who were willing to discuss their language.

In order to establish whether good and bad are lexical universals, it was considered necessary to concentrate on the similarities of the use of words corresponding to these terms, rather than to concentrate on the differences. Thus, in asking informants whether one word could be used over and over again, the emphasis was placed on discovering whether that word could be used (and then in what context) rather than on finding the most appropriate word.

It is at this stage that we should remind ourselves of the importance of interpreting data and of the possibilities of looking at the data in more than one way. Furthermore it will be clear from looking at the data in other languages that some of my suspicions about what is happening in English stem from observations of other languages. That is, what is covert in one language may be overt in another language. It was not initially assumed that this would be the case but eventually it became apparent that some of the more obvious things in other languages reflected what was going on in English. For example, I suspected that there was asymmetry between good and bad in English before looking at the data from other languages but it was only when there were clear parallels in other languages that this seemed to provide an explanation of what was going on in English.

It should also be remembered that, just as different informants in English can give different responses (though not widely differing responses), so we would expect that there would be some disagreements amongst speakers of other languages. It is interesting to note that informants of some languages are much more likely to disagree than informants of other languages. To some extent this can be attributed to greater lexical restrictions in some languages (e.g. Thai) than others. But it must also be made clear that to some extent this could be a result of the framework within which I am operating - that is, although the Adjective-Noun format provides us with a good framework from which to compare languages, it is not ideal. This is not surprising and so, as was mentioned above, I did not restrict myself to this format but used it as a starting point.
6.2. Overview of Results

In discussing the data I shall first give a brief overview of the results of *good* and *bad* and then discuss each language separately. The domains that were set up were those considered most relevant to most cultures. After some initial false starts the domains that were used were those which related to the daily things which affect people. However, as I mentioned earlier, it seems that it would have been wiser to include more domains that were unacceptable because it is this that probably gives us the greatest insights into the meanings of these words, just as it is the unacceptable grammatical sentences which are of most use in illustrating what is going on syntactically. The difficulty of doing this, however, is that informants were reluctant to translate something that was not acceptable in English into their own language. As it was informants often asked 'Can you say this in English?'. Clearly, one of the problems of this study is that while you can say ADJ-N (e.g. *good man*) as a phrase rather than a sentence it is often the case that people want a context. This is partly due to the nature of these words in that the other question which informants frequently asked was 'what do you mean by good/bad?' (in this context), suggesting that they wanted to translate the reference rather than the sense of the word. When investigating the words *good* and *bad* it was more important to find out whether the usage was acceptable rather than what the reference was.


Just as *good* has a greater range of use and range of meaning in English than *bad*, so words which correspond to *good* tend to have a greater range of use and range of meaning in the languages surveyed. Of the languages surveyed, the ones which accepted *good* with each of the domains with no lexical restrictions and little restriction in meaning (that is, the languages in which one could equally well say *good man*, *good cook*, *good food*, *good dog*, *good smell* etc.) were Finnish, Spanish, Turkish, Fijian, Kannada, Arabic, Russian, Chichewa. There were some lexical restrictions in Thai, Indonesian, Mandarin, Korean and Ewe, but basically there was only one word which could be used repeatedly and which, on this basis, corresponds to the word *good* in English and to the concept GOOD.

Although we can not categorically claim that a word represents a concept, it is
assumed that if speakers of different languages use particular words in the same way then they share the same concept. But what does it mean to share a concept, either with people who speak the same language or speakers of other languages? Putnam (1975), following Wittgenstein’s arguments, correlates the possession of a concept with an ability to use a word in a particular way. Thus Putnam sees a relationship between use and meaning. But note that it is a correlation that we are talking about and not an explanation. Putnam makes the point, however, that a concept is complex - there is not a one-to-one relation, between, say, an image and a concept. This seems valid as everything we have a concept for is not necessarily something that we see (e.g. *good* and *bad*). The only thing I would question, however, is how far we want to take the idea that a concept is a complex thing bound up with our ability to use this word. This may be true of words such as *good* (even though the things we call *good* may vary from one person to the next) and certainly for words such as *tiger* and *elm* (Putnam’s examples) even though, as Putnam points out, part of the ability to use the word *tiger* is to be able to distinguish it from other animals (that is, the mark of possessing this concept is that we know a tiger from a lion) whereas he suggests that for other words, such as *elm*, we may be said to possess this concept even though we may not be able to distinguish an elm tree from a beech tree. Thus the criteria for possessing a concept differ from word to word.

A word like *family* seems to have yet different criteria. What does it mean, after all, to possess the concept FAMILY? Is it an image of the people in one’s own family or of lots of similar small groups of people, or is it different sorts of groups depending on the culture to which you belong, or perhaps it suggests an idea of how a given group of people should inter-relate or depends on one’s own experience within a given group of people as to what an individual’s concept is. The possession of the concept FAMILY seems to involve more than a speaker’s ability to use the word *family* correctly and it does seem, therefore, that the possession of any concept may involve more than one’s ability to use the word which it is said to reflect. One’s ability to use the word is, of course, a necessary part of possessing a concept. There may, however, be other things involved as well.

Of the languages which have some lexical restrictions or restriction of meaning with *good* we find that Thai, Indonesian, Mandarin, Korean and Ewe have minimal restrictions which will be discussed below and which do not negate the fact that they have words which reflect the concept GOOD. On the other hand, on the basis of 'range of use', Tagalog appears to have more than one word for *good* (*mabuti* and *maganda*). Thus a lengthy discussion of these words is required. We
could, for example, say that it was a result of severe lexical restrictions and thus that Tagalog also has one word which corresponds to the concept GOOD, reflected in the English word *good*, or we could say that the Tagalog example (and I presume there are other languages like Tagalog) disproves our hypothesis. What is interesting is that the domains with which *mabuti* can not be used in Tagalog correspond to the domains with which *bad* can not be used (or are least likely to be used with) in other languages, thus suggesting that the core concept of GOOD and BAD which is shared by languages, is the same. That is, that the set-subset relationship does not hold when we look at what is common across languages. However, it does hold for most languages, including English.

Overall, then, it was found that, with the exception of Tagalog, languages did have one word which corresponded to *good* in English. On the other hand, the languages which had just one word which corresponded to *bad*, with little or no lexical restriction or restriction of meaning were fewer. They were: Turkish, Spanish, Mandarin, Arabic, Korean (thus Korean presented slightly more difficulty with *good* than with *bad*). The languages with only one word but with some lexical restrictions were: Indonesian, Mandarin, Ewe, Spanish, Fijian, Russian, Chichewa and Tagalog. Two languages, Finnish and Thai, have more than one word for *bad* and therefore will be discussed at length. Finnish has two words which it is necessary to use in order to account for the range of use of *bad* in English. Thai has two that are frequently used but there are also others that are sometimes preferred (or required) over these two.

One interesting point to raise is the status of words that are preferred over others but are not required. It was not always possible to get the most preferred word as well as to find out whether *good* or *bad* could be used, but this would be another interesting line of enquiry. The other point that should be remembered, and will be discussed as we look at the data, is the strong preference for *not good* (or, more accurately, negating the word *good*, so, for example in English we would often say *no good* rather than *not good*) over *bad* in many instances. This I think lends weight to the suggestion that *bad* isn’t necessarily a stronger word but it differs in quality as well as intensity.
Thai is an interesting language on a number of counts. One reason that it is interesting is that there were discrepancies between what was said by different informants (five informants: four female, one male). One thing which may be worth taking into consideration with some languages is whether the informant is male or female. In some languages this may influence the responses simply because those with more conservative speech patterns may insist on adhering to lexical restrictions rather than distinguishing between lexical and semantic restrictions. Thus it is possible that women, who tend to have more conservative speech patterns, would only accept the most polite lexical item. This could account to a small extent for some informants' hesitation in using words which correspond to bad rather than not good. For example, the male informant and one female informant accepted the use of leew (bad) much more freely than did the other three female informants. Of these two, the male informant accepted it as a word he himself would use, while the female informant accepted it because she felt other people used it.

While I have said that there is one word (dii), which corresponds to good, it is not the only word that is used in Thai. Another word, for example, is keeg, which applies only to skill or ability to do something. In a pilot study for this survey I used as one example in the set of domains good fisherman which was discarded because a number of informants from different languages didn't like it, but as I have since realised, it is from examples such as these that we learn most about the meanings of these words. In Thai, I was given the word keeg rather than dii to describe fisherman and cook - clearly both refer to a function or skill. For the words mother and teacher, which also refer to a function or skill, I was, however, given dii rather than keeg. Why is this? I suggest it is because the function of teacher or mother is more closely related to the person (their character or nature) than the function of fisherman or cook is related to the person.

This suggests that just as bad is least well used with words which refer to a function or to a function fairly removed from the person's qualities as a person, so the essence of GOOD, which is the concept shared across languages, is also removed from the functional aspect of things. Thus, as I have suggested, when philosophers say that the meaning of good is concerned with doing something well, from a linguistic viewpoint this isn't strictly accurate. The aspect of GOOD which is most basic, therefore, is not the moral aspect (although it is tempting to relate it to this) but the non-functional aspect - that is, the things that you have no
control over and can not do anything with - so in other words, it is to do with the nature of something. Now, if we say that GOOD is concerned with being as something should be, it is easy to see why this is confused with function - which could be defined as doing as it should do rather than being as it should be. It can also be seen why good is often considered to stem from the notion of morality. For while the moral good, it is true, is concerned with being as something should be, it is only concerned with man, whereas nature also applies to non-human things.

In the pilot study I also looked at Vietnamese. Vietnamese is similar to Tagalog in that there is more than one word for good - in fact there appear to be several. But even so, we can extract just one of them as the most basic (tót) and consider the others largely as lexical restrictions. The aim is to look at the domains in which tót fits well and see how this compares with other languages. While there are a lot of lexical restrictions in Vietnamese we find that tót does modify those domains which are non-functional - so, it modifies soil, news, health, weather and man. Unexpectedly, it also modifies clock, canoe and school. This can be accounted for by noting that tót also means beautiful and this is describing the external aspect of these things. In this respect Vietnamese is similar to Tagalog as Tagalog divides mabuti and maganda along the lines of good and beautiful - thus if you describe a school in Tagalog as maganda you are saying that it has a good appearance. There are clearly some difficulties in this analysis, therefore, which can not simply be swept aside. However, it is nevertheless necessary to make generalizations and then try to account for the exceptions we find. If we can not account for the exceptions satisfactorily then we must change our hypothesis.

In Thai, one informant (female) found dìi to be acceptable with each of the following domains: food, meat, soil, news, school, idea, book, health, weather, dream, boat, clock, mother, friend, man, child, teacher, habit, cook. However, for food dìi is used in the sense of healthy rather than in the sense of delicious, and for meat dìi refers to the fact that the meat is good for cooking and is not tough; good soil was perfectly acceptable and referred to the soil being good for crops. Thus while dìi could be used with food and with soil - that is, there was no semantic or lexical restriction on its use - there was a restriction in the range of meaning that dìi had when used with food but not with soil.

There were other domains where dìi could be used but where it required further contextualization before it was appropriate. Thus, while a knife could be described as dìi for most informants it was better to use the word kom, which means sharp. One informant, however, felt that as dìi was the more general word, it could refer
to both the quality and the sharpness of the knife. If a knife is described as dii then it usually refers to the metal which the knife is made from rather than its ability to cut well. On the one hand we could analyse this by saying that there was a restriction of meaning when dii was used with knife, but on the other hand we could also point out that the restriction is in the direction of non-functionality - that is it refers to the quality of the knife. More common than restriction of meaning, however, is lexical restriction. In the following examples dii could be used but the alternatives are strongly preferred. Thus for music, one says pro?, for taste, one says aroy (which means delicious) and for smell the word horn is used.

The opposite of dii can always be mai dii (not good) no matter what the domain. What we are interested in, however, is which word for bad can be used (leew or yae) with which domain. This will also tell us something about the sense in which dii is used. That is, dii, like good in English, is a much vaguer term than either of the words for bad, but that doesn't mean that there won't be a particular interpretation on dii, depending on the domain with which it is used. The way that we can ascertain what this interpretation is, is to look at whether leew or yae is used as its opposite. It is also worth noting that there is another word corresponding to bad (chua); chua, however, is mainly concerned with the moral sense of bad. From a cross-linguistic perspective, then, this suggests that the concept BAD does not stem from the moral domain. That is, while the moral domain refers to the nature of people, and thus words corresponding to bad are used with this domain, it is not necessarily the case that it will be the preferred word with this domain in a particular language.

However it is also true to say that as dii is vague it may refer to good generally and not to one particular aspect of good. One informant described leew as referring to something bad in nature or quality, bad as a whole and concerning morality, whereas yae refers to bad in some particular aspect. From the data it can be seen that this 'particular aspect' is often related to function.

Another word that is used for bad is raay. This refers to something out of a person's control, such as bad dream or bad news. Now, this is interesting because this is the area that I consider to be an essential part of bad (so this needs further thought). What I suggest is that the Thai word leew is the one that corresponds to the shared, cross-linguistic concept of BAD, for it refers to the nature of something. Note that this includes morality but morality is not its defining feature. But note that I could also argue that this illustrates that in fact we do not have a shared concept because one word in English (and other languages) covers the range of meaning of at least three words in Thai.
The words that are most likely to be used with *leew* are as follows (note that we could in many cases set up contexts where both *leew* and *yæe* are possible): dog, man, child, teacher (with the interpretation that the teacher is a bad person). Two informants (one female, one male) allowed the following possibilities: food, meat, soil, idea, book, taste, weather, mother, man, child, teacher, habit. Different informants found different domains acceptable. What seems sensible, therefore, is to give the information that the informant who allowed *leew* most often gave and note the examples that were still unacceptable:

1. a) phuchai dii
   man  good
   good man

   b) phuchai leew
   man  bad
   bad man

2. a) khoam-təŋ-cai dii
    will  good
    good will

   b) khoam-təŋ-cai mai dii
    will  neg good
    not good will

   c) khoam-təŋ-cai leew
    will  bad
    ill-will

3. a) phuujij dii
    woman good
    good woman

   b) phuujij leew
    woman bad
    bad woman

4. a) khruu dii
    teacher good
    good teacher

   b) khruu mai dii
    teacher neg good
    not good teacher

   c) khruu leew
    teacher bad
    bad teacher

   Note that in example (4) both *mai dii* and *leew* were said to refer to the teacher’s character and not to how well they taught.

5. a) khon khrua fii mii dii
    person cook skill good
    person who is good at cooking

   b) khon khrua fii mii leew
    person cook skill bad
    person who is bad at cooking

6. a) yæe dii
    mother good
    good mother
b) maale leew
mother bad
bad mother

7. a) dek dii
children good
good children

b) dek leew
children bad
bad children

8. a) khaaw dii
news good
good news

b) khaaw leew
news bad
bad news

9. a) rogrrien dii
school good
good school

b) rogrrien leew
school bad
bad school

c) rogrrien yaa
school bad
bad school

10. a) nansew dii
book good
good book

b) nansew leew
book bad
bad book

c) nansew yaa
book bad
bad book

11. a) phleen phro?
song good
good song

b) phleen dii
song good
good song

c) phleen mai pro?
song neg good
not good song

d) phleen mai dii
song neg good
not good song

e) phleen leew
song bad
bad song

f) phleen yaa
song bad
bad song

12. a) din dii
soil good
Note that for example (11) *dii* tends to refer to the meaning of the words of the song, whereas *pro* is more general in that it refers to both the words and the music. This is clearly a case of lexical restriction. But it is interesting to note that while we talk about *dii* as being a vague term that refers to things generally, there are examples where it is in fact more restricted in its meaning than another word will be.

In example (5) (*good cook*), if you use just *dii* this will only refer to the person and not their cooking. Further, to say *leew* is considered impolite and therefore not used often, although there are no semantic restrictions on its use. Thus we could say that in addition to everything else, we must take cultural restrictions into account. From a pragmatic point of view this is true, however from a semantic point of view I doubt that this can be the whole picture. That is, there would be no cultural restriction if there wasn’t something about the meaning of the word that caused people to feel it was impolite. It is the meaning of words that give them their taboo quality, even though it may be difficult to say exactly what it is about the meaning of the word that makes it impolite. In this case, however, we can say that the reason is because, semantically, *leew* refers to the nature of things. To use *leew*, therefore, indicates that the essence or nature of the domain is *bad*.

13. a) *wan dii*
   day good
   good day

b) *wan leew*
   day bad
   bad day

c) *wan yëna*
   day bad
   bad day

14. a) *oogaat dii*
    weather good
    good weather

b) *oogaat leew*
    weather bad
    bad weather

c) *oogaat y*
    weather bad
    bad weather

15. a) *oohaan dii*
    food good
    good food
b) aahaan leew
food bad
bad food

c) aahaan yaa
food bad
bad food

16. a) nia dii
meat good
good meat
b) nia mai dii
meat neg good
not good meat
c) nia leew
meat bad
bad meat
d) nia yaa
meat bad
bad meat

In example (15) aahaan dii means only healthy food, not good food in a more general sense and in (16) nia dii means fresh meat, not good meat generally. There appears to be a correlation between the restriction of meaning of dii and the unacceptability of leew. Whenever you can use dii, but it only has a specific meaning, e.g. healthy food, fresh meat, then leew is not used as its opposite.

17. a) khao dii
rice good
good rice
b) khao mai dii
rice neg good
not good rice
c) khao leew
rice bad
bad rice
d) khao yaa
rice bad
bad rice

18. a) sukkapah dii
health good
good health
b) sukkapah mai dii
health not good
not good health
c) sukkapah leew
health bad
bad health
d) sukkapah yaa
health bad
bad health

19. a) nisai dii
habit good
good habit
b) niso leew
habit bad
bad habit
c) niso yœœ
habit bad
bad habit

20.a) klin dii
smell good
good smell
b) klin leew
smell bad
bad smell
c) klin yœœ
smell bad
bad smell

In example (20) there is a more common word to describe a *good smell* (of perfume or food) which is *hom*. So, once again, when *dii* does not refer to the most general use, you can not use *leew* as the opposite. This also leads me to suspect, in relation to the set-subset argument about *good-bad*, that if we are going to say that there is a shared concept of both GOOD and BAD then that concept occurs in the overlapping part of the set. This is related to the line of argument that while *bad* is not always an opposite of *good*, *good* is always an opposite of *bad*, and in Thai while *leew* is not always the opposite of *dii*, *dii* is always the opposite of *leew*.

What then of the word *yœœ*? This certainly requires further investigation. However, I tend to discount *yœœ* as the word representing the concept BAD on the grounds that it is concerned with function. We could draw an analogy with phonological analyses here. When choosing an allophone to represent a phoneme we choose the allophone which occurs in the least restricted environment. This often corresponds to the allophone which occurs most frequently, but it is not necessary that it does, just as the unmarked member of an antonymous pair is likely to occur most frequently, but does not necessarily do so. Therefore, perhaps *yœœ* occurs more frequently simply because many things can have a *function* as well as a *nature* and often it is the function that is most obvious to us, but in fact, it occurs in the most restricted environment.
Note that in example (22) it is possible to use both *leew* and *yae* but, as we would expect, they do not have exactly the same meaning. *Khaamkhit leew* means that you have an idea about a bad thing, such as a crime, whereas *yae* doesn't mean that you think in a bad way. In other words, we could say, in support of our hypothesis, that *khaamkhit leew* refers to the nature of the idea being bad.

In the following examples we can see that in Thai, when an object has a particular function, then *leew* is less likely to be used.

23. a) miit kom
knife sharp
sharp knife

b) miit dii
knife good
good knife

c) miit mai kom
knife neg sharp
not sharp knife

d) ?miit yae
knife bad
bad knife

e) ?miit leew
knife bad
bad knife

24. a) nalikaa dii
clock good
good clock

b) nalikaa mai dii
clock neg good
not good clock

c) nalikaa yae
clock bad
bad clock

d) ?nalikaa leew
clock bad
bad clock

In example 24(b), *mai dii* can refer to the quality of the clock and how well it works, whereas in 24(c) *yae* usually refers only to how well it does (or doesn't) work, i.e. its function. It would be interesting if we could find an example of a
lexical restriction operating on \textit{dii} but not on its opposite. We have examples where \textit{dii} is used and there is a lexical restriction on the opposite e.g. dream - raay, as well as examples where only \textit{mai dii} can be used and not \textit{leew} or \textit{yaæ}.

Looking at the Thai data, then, we can see that \textit{leew} can be used with many but not all of the domains. It is already clear that sometimes it is heavily contextualised and that it refers primarily to the \textit{nature} of something as opposed to its \textit{function}. Thus in terms of our division of range of use and range of meaning we could say that \textit{leew} has a fairly wide range of use but a narrow range of meaning. On the one hand, we could argue that because \textit{leew} can be used with a wide range of domains, it is the word that corresponds to \textit{bad} in English. When we look at its range of meaning, however, we could ask how we could propose it as the one word for \textit{bad} because \textit{bad} in English has less need to be contextualised. However, if the essence of the meaning of BAD is the \textit{nature} of things, then, I suggest, the contextualisation of \textit{leew} in Thai always operates in this direction. We can, therefore, propose it as the word reflecting the shared concept of BAD.

Let us look at the contexts in which these words are used. For \textit{bad man} both \textit{leew} and \textit{yaæ} can be used. If a man is described as \textit{phuchai leew} this refers to the moral sense (for example a man who beat is wife would be \textit{phuchai leew}). On the other hand \textit{phuchai yaæ} refers to something specific about the man, such as that he is lazy, or to something specific that he has done (e.g. hit another car while he is driving). Thus, with the domain \textit{man}, \textit{yaæ} does not refer just to \textit{function}. As the example of laziness indicates, it can also refer to his \textit{nature}. In this case, then, the meaning of \textit{yaæ} can not be said to be totally associated with only one aspect (e.g. either \textit{function} or \textit{nature}), but is associated with both. On the other hand, \textit{leew} refers more specifically the \textit{nature} of the man and tends to encompass the moral domain.

The example of \textit{teacher} has been noted before but can be mentioned again. \textit{Khruu dii} can be used in a general way to refer to a \textit{good teacher}, although
Khruu keen refers more specifically to the person's ability to teach. Khruu leew refers to the character of the person (their nature) whereas yaae refers to their ability to teach (although there can be some overlap here with the meaning of leew). A bad mother would most commonly be referred to as maae yaae, which would refer to her ability to do the job of being a mother. Maae leew is less often used because it is very impolite, but it does refer to the character of the person. Moreover, it is because it refers to the character of the person that it is impolite.

The expression for good news, is khaaw dii and its most general opposite is khaaw raay. If you say khaaw leew it will only be in a very marked context, for example the papers are presenting distorted news, slander or lies. A good school is roqrien dii, the opposite roqrien yaae means that the school produces bad students. Once again it is marked if you use leew - this would refer to a school that encourages antisocial behaviour or violence. For a bad book, mai dii would be the unmarked opposite of dii. To use yaae you could only be referring to the style of writing, not the content. Nags leew (bad book), on the other hand, would be obscene or unsuitable for children. Like bad book, a bad song (plee yee leew) could be used in a particular context, say, for example, if you felt the sentiment expressed by a particular song was wrong. We can note, therefore, that leew is most likely to be used when it is associated with the nature of people.

The opposite of good soil (din dii) is din leew and this refers to the quality (or nature) of the soil. To refer to bad food as aahaan leew is very marked indeed - for example it would mean that antibiotics have been given to the animals and now it has gotten into the food - but again this refers to the nature of food.

We have seen that leew cannot be used with every domain. Does this mean that every domain does not have a nature? In a sense this may be true in that we don't always think about the nature of everything. Clearly, often it is the function that is more relevant. Some informants found the use of leew with the domains of day and weather to be unacceptable whereas others found it to be less acceptable than another lexeme but not impossible. To a certain extent it depends on whether an informant can think of a context in which leew could be used.

It might, therefore, seem that I am forcing things to say that leew corresponds to bad. In one way this is true, but the purpose of doing this is not to say that leew is equivalent to bad, but to try to extract the essence of the concept BAD which is shared by all cultures. We can see the importance of various ways of analysing the data when we do this. Our alternative would be to simply look only
for the ideal opposites and when we came up with four or five different words, draw the conclusion that no shared concept existed because, in order to account for all the domains that bad accounts for in English, we need to use four or five different words in Thai. It is true that no one word reflects the same concept as the English word bad does but this does not mean that there is not a shared concept BAD. Thus I think to leave the analysis at this point would be a mistake because it would not really reflect what was going on.

6.4. Finnish

We have drawn a distinction between the nature of something and its function with respect to Thai and English. How does this hold for another language which also has two words for bad? In Finnish (two female informants) there is one word for good, hyvä, which can be used with all of the domains listed. To illustrate the range of use of hyvä and its two opposites, huono and paha we have the following examples:

1. a) hyvä mies
good man

   b) paha mies
bad man

2. a) hyvä teko
good deed

   b) paha teko
bad deed

3. a) hyvä nainen
good woman

   b) paha nainen
bad woman

4. a) hyvä opettaja
good teacher

   b) huono opettaja
bad teacher

In example (3b) we could also say huono nainen, but this has the specific meaning of whore or cheap woman, whereas paha nainen has meaning similar to evil woman. Thus again we can draw the distinction between function and nature, where huono refers to function and paha to nature. In example (4b) we see the same distinction. Here huono is used in the same way as yaaë in Thai
and paha corresponds to leew. Thus a huono opettaja is a teacher who doesn’t teach well whereas a paha opettaja is a bad or evil person.

Huono is seen as referring largely to inanimate things while paha refers mainly to character and therefore to people.

5. a) hyvä kokki
   good cook
   b) huono kokki
   bad cook

6. a) hyvä äiti
   good mother
   b) huono äiti
   bad mother

Again, in example (6b), if paha were to be used, it would refer to the person’s character, whereas huono refers to the person’s function.

7. a) hyvä lapsi
   good child
   b) paha lapsi
   bad child

8. a) hyvät uutiset
   good news
   b) huonot uutiset
   bad news

9. a) hyvä koulu
   good school
   b) huono koulu
   bad school

10. a) hyvä kirja
    good book
    b) huono kirja
    bad book

In example (10b), paha kirja was considered to be unacceptable. In example (7b) the expression for bad child is paha lapsi, thus suggesting that the meaning of paha could not be similar to evil as the expression is used much like naughty child in English and is not considered to be a serious thing to say to a child. Moreover, there is a separate lexeme, ilkea, which means evil. Although bad news
(8b) is generally translated as *huonot uutiset*. *paha* can be used when the news refers to something that is evil, such as murder, rather than just to something that is bad for the individual (e.g. losing their keys). Again, then, we can see the connection between *paha* and the *nature* of things.

What is interesting is that *paha* could not be used with *book*. I would have guessed that there were some contexts in which *book* could be used with *paha*. Two points can be made about this. The first is that we can not expect exactly the same range of use of words from one language to another. At least, the fact that there is not complete correspondence will not mean that our hypothesis is wrong. The second is that speakers of each language may not view the same thing in the same way. That is, while on the one hand it is feasible to look at soil as having a *nature* (or quality), it is also feasible to look at it as having a purpose or *function* - that is, for growing things. So it is not necessarily proof that we are wrong when we find such apparent contradictions. Furthermore, it is not necessarily the case that the translation equivalents of soil will have the same meaning as the word soil itself (e.g. it may be closer to *earth* or *ground*).

11. a) *hyvä* laulu
   good song
   good song

   b) *huono* laulu
   bad song
   bad song

   c) *paho* laulu
   bad song
   bad song

In example (11), if *paha* is used instead of *huono*, it can only refer to the words of the song.

12. a) *hyvä* maaperä
   good soil
   good soil

   b) *huono* maaperä
   bad soil
   bad soil

It was mentioned above, that in English *bad soil* was a less acceptable expression than *poor soil*. In this regard we could say that neither Finnish nor English look at soil primarily in terms of its quality.

13. a) *hyvä* paivä
   good day
   good day

   b) *huono* paivä
   bad day
   bad day

   c) *paho* paivä
Paha and huono can both be used in examples (13) and (14). In example (13), one informant considered that paha was less common than huono, but that it had much the same meaning. The other informant suggested that only huono would be used. In example (14) one informant suggested that paha was used in spoken language but in not in written language. Both informants said that paha ilma suggests really bad weather and that it attributes the characteristics of a person to the weather.

For tapa (health) both paha and huono can be used. Paha tapa refers more to the habits of children or youngsters whereas huono tapa refers more to older people.
In example (20) *huono* could also be used. In this case it would refer to someone’s taste in clothes or people etc., whereas *paha maku* refers to the taste of food, which is therefore more like an experience. This fits in with the function and nature dichotomy. However, it also raises the point about things which you experience and, generally, have no control over, and things which you choose. (In this category I would also compare the habits of children with the habits of adults who, it could be said, have more control over their habits than children do.) In Thai, this group of 'no-control' things usually takes a separate lexical item (*raay*), whereas this is one group that the English word *bad* combines well with, as does *paha* in Finnish. Thus it must be said again that all these words don't have the same range of meaning. However, it should be remembered that the context is not necessarily constant because the nouns are not necessarily identical in meaning.

This is also true, but to a lesser extent, of words which correspond to *good*. However, it is masked, somewhat, by the greater similarity in the range of use of words which correspond to *good*. What we could perhaps say here is that while Wittgenstein's approach of looking at the use to determine the meaning is extremely useful and does offer many insights, it does not in itself give us the complete picture when we are looking at cross-linguistic data. In fact it can be misleading. On the other hand, perhaps we should just look more carefully at what we mean by 'use' in that the context in which a word is used is part of its 'use' but if we only look at its ability to combine with other words it does not clearly reflect its full use.
Neither idea nor veitsi (knife) can be used with paha. I would expect, on the basis of my hypothesis, that paha could be used with idea but that huono is the most natural term to use with veitsi (knife) because a knife is primarily considered to have a function. In the following two examples we also find that huono is used with functional objects.

23.a) hyvä kello
good clock

b) huono kello
bad clock

24.a) hyvä vene
good boat

b) huono vene
bad boat

Both paha and huono were given as the most common word for bad to be used with koira (dog) by different informants but informants also agreed that the other word could be used.

25.a) hyvä koira
good dog

b) huono koira
bad dog

c) paha koira
bad dog

26.a) hyvä lehmä
good cow

b) huono lehmä
bad cow

27.a) hyvä uni
good dream

b) paha uni
bad dream

28.a) hyvä asia
good thing

b) huono asia
bad thing
A dog that is described as huono is one that is not fulfilling its function, (e.g. as a hunting dog or a guard dog) or just sits around doing nothing, whereas a dog that is described as paha is one that barks and bites - that is, who has a bad nature. In example (28) asia (thing) can be described as both huono and paha. For example, if somebody had an accident, that would be a bad thing (paha). If somebody burnt a cake they were making, that would be described as huono. Although the most common opposite of hyvä lehmä (good cow) is huono lehmä, paha can be used to mean that the cow is bad tempered. In other words, if paha is used, then human characteristics are attributed to the cow (just as we are doing when we say bad cow in English). This, then, also refers to the nature rather than the function of the cow.

In general, then, the two Finnish words huono and paha seem to correspond to the notions of function and nature respectively.

6.5. Languages Like English

Most of the languages dealt with in this study do in fact use words which correspond to good and bad in much the same way as English does. That the use of these terms corresponds leads us to believe that the meanings of the words (and hence the concepts they reflect) also correspond. This suggests, then, that the concepts GOOD and BAD are common to many languages, although in most of these languages, words corresponding to good reflect a more general concept than words corresponding to bad. It is only when we find languages where a word corresponding to bad has a wider range of use than a word corresponding to good that we can suggest that the language independent concepts are exact antonyms.

Although the number of languages in this study is not large, the sample represents a wide variety of language families. Because of this, we can say something about the way good and bad are used in language in general. Let us now look at some languages that are very similar to English. Note, however, that they are not all genetically related to English. Furthermore, despite the similarities, there are some differences in the range of use and the range of meaning of these terms. I suggest that we can draw an analogy here between concepts like GOOD and BAD and Berlin and Kay's colour terms. What Berlin and Kay tested for, and found, was that the stereotypical representation of a
colour (say of red) was widely agreed upon from language to language but that the borderline cases varied from language to language (and perhaps from speaker to speaker).

One of the reasons we find discrepancies in relation to concepts of value-judgment terms is cultural. Thus the importance of, or attitude towards, things such as dreams varies from culture to culture. While two different languages may describe a dream as bad, for example, what bad refers to may differ. In one culture it may indicate that something bad is going to happen while in another it may just be that it was an unpleasant experience.

6.5.1. Spanish

Two male informants were used to collect the following information. If we look at the range of use of bueno and malo, there are very few differences between Spanish and English. Given that both languages are Indo-European and that the cultural differences may not be as wide as between English and some other cultures, this is perhaps not surprising. One informant found the use of bueno and malo with each of the domains, except knife, equally acceptable. The other informant felt that although both words could be used with each of the domains, except knife, both bueno and malo were more acceptable with the domains concerning people and animals than with the domains referring to things which have a function, unless further contextualization was given.

Thus, in Spanish greater contextualization is needed when either bueno or malo are used to describe function. In some cases, all that is needed is to use the NP in a sentence, e.g. Es un cuchillo bueno (This is a good knife). The words corresponding to good and bad in Spanish, therefore, both have a narrower range of meaning than good and bad in English. In both cases this range corresponds to nature rather than function.

1. a) hombre bueno
   man good
   good man

   b) hombre malo
   man bad
   bad man

2. a) buena gente
   good will
   good will

   b) mala gente
   bad will
   ill will

3. a) mujer buena
   woman good
good woman

b) mujer mala
don't have a direct translation

4. a) profesor bueno
teacher good
don't have a direct translation

b) profesor malo
teacher bad
don't have a direct translation

5. a) buena comida
good cook
don't have a direct translation

b) mala comida
bad cook
don't have a direct translation

6. a) buena madre
good mother
don't have a direct translation

b) mala madre
bad mother
don't have a direct translation

7. a) niño bueno
child good
don't have a direct translation

b) niño malo
child bad
don't have a direct translation

8. a) buenas noticias
good news
don't have a direct translation

b) malas noticias
bad news
don't have a direct translation

9. a) colegio bueno
school good
don't have a direct translation

b) colegio malo
school bad
don't have a direct translation

10. a) libro bueno
book good
don't have a direct translation

b) libro malo
book bad
don't have a direct translation

11. a) día bueno
day good
don't have a direct translation

b) día malo
day bad
don't have a direct translation
12. a) tiempo bueno
   weather good
   good weather

   b) tiempo malo
   weather bad
   bad weather

13. a) comida buena
   food good
   good food

   b) comida mala
   food bad
   bad food

14. a) carne buena
   meat good
   good meat

   b) carne mala
   meat bad
   bad meat

15. a) salud buena
   health good
   good health

   b) salud mala
   health bad
   bad health

16. a) hábito bueno
   habit good
   good habit

   b) hábito malo
   habit bad
   bad habit

17. a) olor bueno
   smell good
   good smell

   b) olor malo
   smell bad
   bad smell

18. a) sabor bueno
   taste good
   good taste

   b) sabor malo
   taste bad
   bad taste

19. a) idea buena
   idea good
   good idea

   b) idea mala
   idea bad
   bad idea

20. a) cuchillo bueno
    knife good
    good knife

   b) cuchillo malo
    knife bad
    bad knife
In example (20) we find that knife is not normally described attributively as good or bad. It would be more usual to say something like 'The knife is not cutting very well' (El cuchillo no esta cortando muy bien), thus emphasising the function of the knife. Of the two informants, one felt that 20(b) was less acceptable than 20(a), and the other felt that neither was worse than the other. Furthermore, one informant felt that the phrase would be acceptable if it was in a sentence such as 'I'm looking for a good knife'.

Both informants felt that bueno and malo could be used in examples (21) and (22), but one informant felt that it was not as acceptable as other domains. In English we noted that there was a difference between saying bad dog and bad cow. In Spanish, the informant who was less happy with bad boat and bad clock felt that bad dog and bad cow were equally acceptable. The informant who accepted bad clock and bad boat felt that only a farmer, or someone very familiar with cows, would say either vaca buena or vaca mala. Again, however, bueno was not considered more acceptable than malo. Familiarity with an object should, I suggest, be taken into consideration when discussing the function-nature dichotomy. It may be that familiarity with something will mean that a person sees more of the nature of a thing, whereas others see the function. This may be speculative, and of dubious significance, but it could account in some way for individual differences that may occur from speaker to speaker when asked about the acceptability of these noun phrases.
On the basis of the examples above, then, it would seem that *bueno* and *malo* are nearer to being perfect antonyms than are *good* and *bad* in English.

6.5.2. Arabic

Let us now look at the Arabic data (three male informants). One word for *good* (*jay1:d*) and one word for *bad* (*sayid*) can be used with most of the domains in Arabic. However, Arabic also has, if not a lot of lexical restrictions, then a lot of lexical preferences, which I have not spent a lot of time collecting simply because it went beyond the aims of my thesis to do so. However, what was clear, was that there were some words which applied specifically to the behaviour of people. It does seem that in many languages speakers perceive *good* as having a sense which applies primarily to people and perhaps feel that the use of *good* has spread from this use. As I have tried to illustrate, however, from a semantic viewpoint, this does not appear to be the case. Rather, the description, *nature*, is appropriate to people and can be associated with the moral domain but is not limited by it. Furthermore, it is worth noting that *jay1d* does not refer to the moral *good*. That is, the most general word corresponding to *good* is not concerned with the moral domain and is not the first word chosen to be used with *man* - though of course it can be.

1. a) *rajul mostaqim*
   
   man good
   good man

b) *rajul jayid*
   
   man good
   good man

c) *rajul qazer*
   
   man dirty
   bad man

d) *rajul sayid*
   
   man bad
   bad man

In terms of lexical preferences, it was noted by one informant that *rajul sayid* was better than *rajul jayid*, because, if the man is already *bad*, there is nothing wrong with using a word with bad connotations. However, if a man is really *good*, then a speaker would usually look for a more complimentary, generous word, than *sayid* - thus, in this domain, there are stronger lexical preferences in acting on *good* than *bad*. Example (1c) would not normally be used unless you really hated the man or wanted to say that he was evil.
One of the lexical preferences in Arabic, which is also common in other languages, such as Indonesian, is to use the word which corresponds to beautiful for many domains. In Arabic the word is \textit{jameel} (masc.) or \textit{jameelat} (fem.). This is not surprising as there has been a long association throughout history between \textit{goodness} and \textit{beauty}. (see Lakoff and Scherr 1984) Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study, it is only the one word which can be used with all domains which is being considered, and, it is worth noting, this word never seems to be the equivalent of \textit{beautiful}. That is, while things that can be described as \textit{beautiful} can therefore be described as \textit{good}, it does not follow that things that can be described as \textit{good} can therefore be described as \textit{beautiful}. Moreover, it seems that, just as the emphasis on \textit{function} does not occur in all languages, so the emphasis on \textit{beauty} does not occur in all languages. However, while words which correspond to \textit{beautiful} are sometimes lexicalised and used to modify certain domains in this way, it does not appear that languages separately lexicalise a word for the \textit{functional good}. Both \textit{jayid} and \textit{sayid} were considered to be acceptable with the following domains.

2. a) \texttt{akhbar jayidah}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{news good}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{good news}

b) \texttt{akhbar sayidat}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{news bad}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{bad news}

3. a) \texttt{madrassat jayidah}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{school good}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{good school}

b) \texttt{madrassat sayidat}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{school bad}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{bad school}

4. a) \texttt{kitob jayid}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{book good}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{good book}

b) \texttt{kitob sayid}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{book bad}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{bad book}

5. a) \texttt{taqs jayid}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{weather good}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{good weather}

b) \texttt{taqs sayid}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{weather bad}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{bad weather}

6. a) \texttt{taam jayid}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{food good}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{good food}

b) \texttt{taam sayid}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{food bad}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{bad food}

7. a) \texttt{adat jayidat}
\hspace{1cm} \texttt{habit good}
We can see from Arabic that, as well as lexical restrictions, semantic restrictions, and restrictions of meaning, it is also possible to have lexical preferences. The restriction that is most important is semantic restriction, and while lexical preferences are perhaps the least important of these, we can see that each of these limitations on the use of these words can be used to tell us something about the range of use and range of meaning of GOOD and BAD and the extent to which they can be considered shared concepts.

6.5.3. Indonesian

In Indonesian (six informants: five male, one female) the word for beautiful (bagus) can often be used instead of the word for good (baik). However, as we can see from the examples below baik can always be used. Therefore, we can say that there is one word which corresponds to the English word good in Indonesian which has a similar range of meaning and range of use.

It is also true that there is one word for bad (jelek) which can be used with all of the domains (except smell and taste - neither baik nor jelek can be used with these domains). There is another word which can be used with many of the domains, however, which means something similar to rotten (buruk).

If we look up these words in an Indonesian-English dictionary, we find that buruk is defined as old, rotten, bad, foul; jelek is defined as ugly, bad, evil. The examples of the use of buruk in the sense of bad are given as: 'He does bad things' and 'He has a bad name'. For jelek, the example given is: 'He always has bad thoughts'. It thus seems difficult to distinguish the meanings of these two words. However, on the basis of use, informants agreed that jelek could be used with each of the domains, while buruk could not. With many of the domains, however, both jelek and buruk could be used, and, in some cases (e.g. mimpi - dream), buruk was preferred. Thus, although there is clearly some overlap in their meaning, only one word (jelek) has been proposed as the word corresponding to bad.

There was some disagreement about whether buruk could be used with particular domains. Most informants agreed, however, that buruk could be used with the following domains: deed, news, habit, dog, cow, dream. Those that could not be
used with buruk are: teacher, cook, mother, child, school, book, song, soil, day, weather, food, meat, rice, health, idea, knife, clock, boat.

One informant (female) disagreed slightly with some of the above. She suggested that tidak baik (not good) would generally be used instead of jelek and buruk. The use of jelek, rather than buruk, was preferred with dog and cow. Both buruk and jelek, it was suggested, could be used with deed, news, habit and dream. Buruk could be used with man, but it was considered to be very impolite and to refer mainly to a person's physical attributes. Jelek, on the other hand, was said to refer both to behaviour and to physical attributes. It was also suggested that buruk could not be used with the domain of food.

1. a) orang baik
   man good
   good man

   b) orang jelek
   man bad
   bad man

   c) orang buruk
   man bad
   bad man

2. a) guru baik
   teacher good
   good teacher

   b) guru jelek
   teacher bad
   bad teacher

   c) guru buruk
   teacher bad
   bad teacher

Both guru jelek and guru buruk refer to the teacher as a bad person; buruk is less acceptable but could be used depending on context. To say the teacher wasn't teaching well you would use guru yang tidak baik.

3. a) perbuatan baik
   deed good
   good deed

   b) perbuatan jelek
   deed bad
   bad deed

   c) perbuatan buruk
   deed bad
   bad deed

4. a) berita baik
   news good
   good news

   b) berita jelek
   news bad
   bad news

   c) berita buruk
Three informants thought that 4(b) and (c) would be used to refer to the same thing. One informant (female), however, felt that for bad news which concerned people generally (e.g. a war), it was more common to use buruk, while either buruk or jelek could be used for news which concerned an individual.

5. a) tanah baik
   soil good
   good soil

   b) tanah jelek
   soil bad
   bad soil

   c) tanah buruk
   soil bad
   bad soil

6. a) cuaca baik
    weather good
    good weather

   b) cuaca jelek
    weather bad
    bad weather

   c) cuaca buruk
    weather bad
    bad weather

7. a) kebiasaan baik
    habit good
    good habit

   b) kebiasaan jelek
    habit bad
    bad habit

   c) kebiasaan buruk
    habit bad
    bad habit

In example 7(c), buruk was considered to be unacceptable by two informants, and acceptable by the other four.

8. a) mimpi baik
    dream good
    good dream

   b) mimpi jelek
    dream bad
    bad dream

   c) mimpi buruk
    dream bad
    bad dream

All informants considered that 8(c) was more common than 8(b).

In Indonesian, then, we have an example where more than one word is used with the same set of domains that bad can be used with in English. However, although both words are used, only one of them, jelek, is used with all of the domains.
6.5.4. Turkish

Turkish (five informants: four male, one female) is like English in its use of words which correspond to *good* and *bad* as the following examples illustrate:

1. a) iyi adam
   good man
   good man

   b) kötü adam
   bad man
   bad man

2. a) iyi öğretmen
   good teacher
   good teacher

   b) kötü öğretmen
   bad teacher
   bad teacher

3. a) iyi haber
   good news (sg.)
   good news

   b) kötü haber
   bad news (sg.)
   bad news

4. a) iyi șihhat
   good health
   good health

   b) kötü șihhat
   bad health
   bad health

5. a) iyi fikir
   good idea
   good idea

   b) kötü fikir
   bad idea
   bad idea

6. a) iyi saat
   good watch
   good watch

   b) kötü saat
   bad watch
   bad watch

7. a) iyi rüya
   good dream
   good dream

   b) kötü rüya
   bad dream
   bad dream

8. a) iyi biçak
   good knife
   good knife

   b) kötü biçak
   bad knife
   bad knife
Although both *iyi* and *kötü* can be used with saat (watch) and biçak (knife), this can only refer to the quality of the object. Thus again we see that, cross-linguistically, the concepts which these words reflect tend to be concerned with the notion of *nature* rather than *function*. Furthermore, it seems that, in terms of these notions, the range of meaning of *iyi* and *kötü* are similar.

### 6.5.5. Mandarin

Mandarin (two informants: one male, one female) is also very similar to English, as the following examples illustrate. However, the words for *good* and *bad* are stative verbs, rather than adjectives.

1. a) hao ren
good man

   b) huai ren
bad man

2. a) hao mama
good mother

   b) huai mama
bad mother

3. a) hoo xiooxi
good news

   b) huoi xiooxi
bad news

4. a) hao shu
good book

   b) huai shu
bad book

5. a) hao tu
good soil

   b) huai tu
bad soil

6. a) hoo tionqi
good weather

   b) huoi tionqi
bad weather

However, in Mandarin, *hao* and *huai* are not used with *health*. Instead, one one
would say something like: 'She is very healthy'. Thus the range of use of hao and huai is narrower than that of good and bad.

7. o) hao jian-kan
good health
good health
b) huai jian-kan
bad health
bad health

6.5.6. Fijian

Fijian also has one basic word for good and one for bad. These are vinaka and caa respectively. There are a few lexical restrictions and restrictions in meaning which apply when these words are used with certain domains. Thus perhaps we would not want to say that the range of meaning of vinaka and good, for example, corresponds exactly, but we are still able to see that the similarities are great enough so that we can say that these words reflect a shared concept GOOD. I have not discussed every restriction of meaning in Fijian but am aware that they do exist. From the examples below it can be seen that the range of use of these words is very much like English.

1. a) tomato vinaka
   person good
   good man
b) tomato caa
   person bad
   bad man

2. a) cakacako vinaka
   deed good
   good deed
b) cakacako caa
   deed bad
   bad deed

3. a) maroma vinaka
   woman good
   good woman
b) maroma caa
   woman bad
   bad woman

4. a) qasenivuli vinaka
   teacher good
   good teacher
b) qasenivuli caa
   teacher bad
   bad teacher

5. a) dauvakasaqa vinaka
   cook good
   good cook
b) E sega ni matai na vakasaqa
   not expert cook
not a good cook

6. a) tukutuku vinaka
   news good
   good news

b) tukutuku rarawa
   news sad
   bad news

c) tukutuku caa
   news bad
   bad news

It can be seen that, once again, vinaka (good) has the most general usage and meaning. In example (5), to say the opposite of good cook one must say that someone is not an expert at cooking. In example (6) to use the most general sense of bad news one must use a different lexical item - rarawa (sad). Caa is restricted in its meaning and can only be used when one refers to something like a bereavement.

7. a) qele vinaka
   soil good
   good soil

b) sego ni qele bulabula
   neg soil fertile
   infertile soil

8. a) bulabula vinaka
   health good
   good health

b) bulabula caa
   health bad
   bad health

c) sego ni bulabula vinaka
   neg health good
   not good health

Caa (bad) is not used with the domains of soil and health. Instead one must say that the soil is not fertile and that the (person’s) health is not good. Again with soil we can note that good soil can be fertile soil but that infertile soil must be specified and that bad can not be used to cover this term. There are many domains in Fijian, however, where both vinaka and caa are used.

9. a) draki vinaka
   weather good
   good weather

b) draki caa
   weather bad
   bad weather

10. a) koli vinaka
    dog good
    good dog

b) koli caa
    dog bad
6.5.7. Russian

Russian is another language where *good* (*zorošij*) and *bad* (*ploxoj*) can be used with a wide number of domains.

1. a) *zorošij čelovek*
   - good man
   - good man
   
   b) *ploxoj čelovek*
   - bad man
   - bad man

2. a) *zorošij učitel'*
   - good teacher (masc.)
   - good teacher
   
   b) *ploxoj učitel'*
   - bad teacher
   - bad teacher

3. a) *zorošij izvestija*
   - good news
   - good news
   
   b) *ploxoj izvestija*
   - bad news
   - bad news

4. a) *zorošee zdravie*
   - good health
   - good health
   
   b) *ploxoee zdravie*
   - bad health
   - bad health

5. a) *zorošij zapax*
   - good smell
   - good smell
   
   b) *ploxoj zapax*
   - bad smell
   - bad smell

6. a) *zorošij nož*
   - good knife
   - good knife
   
   b) *ploxoj nož*
   - bad knife
   - bad knife
6.5.8. Kannada

The Dravidian language Kannada (or Cannarese) (one female informant) is also a language which generally has one word for good (olleya) and one for bad (ketta), but with a few lexical restrictions operating on which domains they can be used with.

1. a) olleya manushya
   good man
   good man

   b) ketta manushya
   bad man
   bad man

2. a) olleya kelasa
   good deed
   good deed

   b) ketta kelasa
   bad deed
   bad deed

3. a) olleya gurugalu
   good teacher
   good teacher

   b) ketta gurugalu
   bad teacher
   bad teacher

4. a) olleya suddi
   good news
   good news

   b) ketta suddi
   bad news
   bad news

5. a) olleya shaile
   good school
   good school

   b) ketta shaile
   bad school
   bad school

6. a) olleya pustaka
   good book
   good book

   b) ketta pustaka
   bad book
   bad book

7. a) olleya nave
   good weather
   good weather

   b) ketta nave
   bad weather
   bad weather

8. a) olleya aragya
   good health
   good health
Aside from the restriction on bad health, the domains which can not be used with ketta (bad) are those which are primarily considered important for their function - knife, boat and clock.
In Arrernte (one female informant), an Aboriginal language spoken in Central Australia, there are a number of domains which could not be used with either *mwarre* (*good*), or *akwerne* (*bad*).¹ This could of course be for cultural reasons. Those which were unacceptable with either were deed, school, book, weather, rice, health, clock, boat, cow. However, this still leaves us with a large number of domains with which both *good* and *bad* could be used. For example:

1. a) artwe *mwarre*
   
   man good
   
   good man
   
   b) artwe *akwerne*
   
   man bad
   
   bad man

2. a) iteme *mwarre*
   
   cook good
   
   good cook
   
   b) iteme *akwerne*
   
   cook bad
   
   bad cook

3. a) ohelhe *mwarre*
   
   soil good
   
   good soil
   
   b) ohelhe *akwerne*
   
   soil bad
   
   bad soil

4. a) iterrintye *mwarre*
   
   idea good
   
   good idea
   
   b) iterrintye *akwerne*
   
   idea bad
   
   bad idea

5. a) altyerre *mwarre*
   
   dream good
   
   good dream
   
   b) altyerre *akwerne*
   
   dream bad
   
   bad dream

6. a) arne *mwarre*
   
   thing good
   
   good thing
   
   b) arne *akwerne*
   
   bad thing
   
   bad thing

Although both *good cook* and *bad cook* were acceptable in Arrernte, we find that while *good teacher* is acceptable, *bad teacher* is not. Thus, one again, we see that

¹This information was collected for me by Lea Brown.
words corresponding to bad are less likely to be used when there is a function involved.

7. a) akaltye mwarre
teacher  good
good teacher

b) akaltye akwerne
teacher  bad
bad teacher

Furthermore, although we could attribute the fact that words such as clock, boat and cow could not be used with either mwarre or akwerne to cultural reasons, it could also be said that this supports the view that, cross-linguistically, the shared concept of both GOOD and BAD is concerned with nature rather than function.

It is significant that there are a relatively large number of languages which don't allow bad with health. One reason why this may be so is, unlike other domains, you can't do anything with health - whether it's good or bad you just have it. Furthermore, with all of the other domains, they can be put in the syntactic frame 'A good X to ...' or 'A good X for ...' (this is in English of course). Thus you could say 'He's a good man to have around' or 'He's a good man for the job'; 'It's good weather to go sailing in' or 'It's good weather for sailing'; 'It's a good knife for chopping vegetables' or 'It's a good book to read'; even 'That's a good habit to acquire'. On the other hand, one can't say 'It's good health to have' or 'It's good health for exercising'. One can of course say 'She has good health for someone her age' but this is different because one is not therefore doing anything with the health. While I am not sure of its significance, it may be that this has something to do with the fact that health can be used less frequently with words which correspond to bad than other other domains.

6.5.10. Chichewa

In Chichewa, a Bantu language spoken in Malawi (one female informant), we find that -bwino (good) and -ipa (bad) (with a prefix which agrees with the class of the noun being modified) can both be used with a wide range of semantic domains.

1. a) munthu wabwino
human  good
good man

b) munthu woipa
human  bad
bad man

2. a) mphunzitsi wabwino
teacher  good
good teacher

b) mphunzitsi woipa
teacher  bad
bad teacher

3. a) moyi wabwino
    mother good
    good mother

    b) moyi woipa
    mother bad
    bad mother

4. a) nkhani yabwino
    news good
    good news

    b) nkhani yoipa
    news bad
    bad news

5. a) sukulu yabwino
    school good
    good school

    b) sukulu yoipa
    school bad
    bad school

6. a) bukhu labwino
    book good
    good book

    b) bukhu loipa
    book bad
    bad book

7. a) nyimbo yabwino
    song good
    good song

    b) nyimbo yoipa
    song bad
    bad song

8. a) nyengo yabwino
    weather good
    good weather

    b) nyengo yoipa
    weather bad
    bad weather

9. a) nthaka yabwino
    soil good
    good soil

    b) nthaka yoipa
    soil bad
    bad soil

10. a) chakudya chabwino
    food good
    good food

    b) chakudya chaipa
    food bad
    bad food

The importance of the concept of the nature of something is again seen when we
look at the phrase for bad health (moyo woipa) in Chichewa. Moyo (health) can be described as wabwino (good) or woipa (bad) but the phrase moyo woipa has suggestions or connotations of bad character as well as bad health. Thus in this example we have a different range of meaning for bad when combined with health between Chichewa and English. The difference, however, highlights the central meaning of the concept BAD across languages.

Although -ipa (bad) can be used with the domains listed, sometimes the preferred expression is: 'This is NOT an X!'.

11. a) Iyi ndi wotchi yabwino
    This is watch good
    This is a good watch.

b) Iyi ndi wotchi yoipa
    This is watch bad
    This is a bad watch.

c) Iyi si wotchi!
    This neg watch
    This is not a watch! (because it's so bad)

This fits in nicely with the semantic analysis of good proposed by Wierzbicka, who defines good as follows:

"One can say about X, what we would want to be able to say about any X." (Wierzbicka 1972:84)

Thus example (11c) suggests that if the watch is not what we want a watch to be then we won't even call it a watch. However, the syntactic frame 'This is NOT an X!' can not be used for all domains. Furthermore, it should be noted that this frame is also used literally, i.e. 'This is NOT a watch, it's a radio'. One could say 'He's not a man, because he behaves like an animal' using this frame, but it's not considered common. However, one could not say the following:

12. a) Ine si - munthu
    I neg human
    I'm not a person (because I'm so bad)

Saying that something is 'NOT an X', however, also fits in with Geach’s discussion of bad. He says:

"We can not safely predicate of a bad A what we predicate of an A, anymore than we can predicate of a forged banknote or a putative father what we would predicate of a banknote or a father. We actually call forged money 'bad'; and we cannot infer e.g. that because food supports life, bad food supports life. For 'good' the point is not so clear at first sight, since whatever holds true of an A as such holds true of a good A." (Geach 1957:33)

So in Chichewa, by denying that an object is what it purports to be, the implication is that it is something bad. Clearly, as well as not holding for the
statement 'I am not a person', it may hold for objects but can not hold for all semantic domains. For example, Geach's explanation could not apply to weather or dreams, as whatever holds for weather does not also hold for good weather, and whatever holds for dream does not also hold for good dream.

This clearly offers a clue to the meanings of good and bad. The nature of some things is meant to be a certain way. For example knives are supposed to be able to cut things. If it does this we call it a good knife. If it doesn't do this - i.e. if it is not 'complete' or is not fulfilling its function, then it is odd to describe it as bad e.g. bad knife. However the nature of some things is not to be either one way or another, e.g. weather is as likely to be sunny as it is to be cloudy and as likely to be hot as it is to be cold; dreams are as likely to be pleasant as they are to be unpleasant and news is as likely to be good as it is to be bad. Thus, for the things that aren't supposed to be a certain way by their very nature, it is as acceptable to use bad as a description as it is to use good, but for those things that are supposed to be a certain way (e.g. boats are supposed to be able to stay afloat on water, cows are supposed to give milk, clocks are supposed to tell the time), it is more likely that bad won't be used. This fits in with the nature-function dichotomy. There may, however, be some discrepancies in the argument because not all examples can be accounted for. Furthermore we must be aware that each culture doesn't view certain domains in the same way. Asian cultures such as Korean and Thai, for example, do not use knives primarily as an eating utensil. Therefore, part of the explanation for why bad is not allowed with certain domains in particular languages may be due to the way cultures perceive these things rather than that their concept of BAD differs from ours. It is not easy to establish these things, however, at least not in the sort of survey which has been undertaken here.

6.5.11. Ewe

In Ewe, a West African language spoken in Ghana (two informants: one male, one female) the word for good is nyuie and the word for bad is baqa. Here we find a number of lexical restrictions as well as certain preferences for using not good over bad. Again, however, I would suggest that there are sufficient similarities in the range of use of these words with the English words good and bad to say that there is a shared concept GOOD and BAD. Another point to note is that in some cultures the differences between the language as it is taught in schools and the language as it is spoken is greater than in other cultures. This may have some bearing on the responses. Further, in Ewe, although you can often use the ADJ-N construction there are times when it is not appropriate. One
informant felt that an ADJ-N construction was not used when what was being described involved an action, such as cooking or teaching. However it seems that it may also be used to distinguish between function and nature, the ADJ-N construction being more appropriate when we are referring to the nature of something rather than the function.

Again, not all restrictions of meaning are discussed, although those that appear to be particularly important are mentioned.

1. a) nutsu nyuie
   man  good
   good man

   b) nutsu baqa
   man  bad
   bad man

2. a) nu - nyuie
   deed  good
   good deed

   b) nu - baqa
   deed  bad
   bad deed

3. a) ny związku nyuie
   woman  good
   good woman

   b) ny związku baqa
   woman  bad
   bad woman

4. a) nufiia nyuie
   teacher  good
   good teacher

   b) ?nufiia baqa
   teacher  bad
   bad teacher

In example (4) it would be better to say 'Me fiana nu nyuie o' - 'She doesn't teach well'.

5. a) Bevi nyuie
   child  good
   good child

   b) Bevi baqa
   child  bad
   bad child

The most common way of saying bad child, however, is to use the word gbegble (spoiled).

6. a) nya nyuie
   news  good
   good news

   b) nya baqa
   news  bad
   bad news
7. a) suku nyuie
    school good
    good school

    b) suku baqa
    school bad
    bad school

8. a) agbal nyuie
    book good
    good book

    b) agbal baqa
    book bad
    bad book

9. a) eha vivi
    song sweet
    good song

    b) eha nyuie
    song good
    good song

    c) eha me - vivi o
    song neg. sweet
    not good song

    d) eha baqa
    song bad
    bad song

In example (8), although bada can be used, it was considered better to say agbal menyo o, 'the book is not good'. In example (9) the lexical restriction acts on both the positive and negative pole of the description. This appears to be less common than to have a lexical restriction for only the negative pole.

10. a) n'keke nyuie
    day good
    good day

    b) n'keke baqa
    day bad
    bad day

11. a) m'o lu nyuie
    rice good
    good rice

    b) m'o lu baqa
    rice bad
    bad rice

In example (10) baqa was unacceptable and the most appropriate opposite of n'keke nyuie was considered to be n'keke a menyo o (not a good day). In example (11) baqa is acceptable in that there is no semantic or lexical restriction on its use. However, there is a restriction of meaning when it is used. That is m'o lu baqa can only be used to refer to rice of poor quality (e.g. if it hasn't been properly refined, if there are small stones mixed in with the rice). If it was unwholesome or spoiled, however, then you must use gbegble. However both these
ideas are encoded if you say that the rice is not good - m3i u a meny o. The same distinction between poor quality and spoiled (or perhaps in this case, broken or unable to be used properly) applies when you are describing a boat. Thus once again bad does not always have the most general range of meaning.

12.a) tɔdzizù nyui e
    boat             good
    good boat

b) tɔdzizù bado
    boat             bad
    poor quality boat

c) tɔdzizù gbegble
    boat             spoiled
    spoiled boat

13.a) avu nyui e
    dog              good
    good dog

b) avu baga
    dog              bad
    bad dog

14.a) droe nyui e
    dream            good
    good dream

b) droe baga
    dream            bad
    bad dream

One further point should be made about range of meaning. While good, in the languages surveyed, has a wider range of meaning than bad, this doesn't necessarily mean that in all languages the word corresponding to good in English has the same range of meaning as good in English when combined with a particular domain. So in our earlier example of good food in English it was noted that it could refer to food that was both tasty and healthy. In Ewe, good food refers only to healthy food.

6.5.12. Korean

In Korean (five informants: four male, one female) there is one word for good (coun) and one for bad (nappuñ). These can be used with most the semantic domains tested. One difference between Korean and other languages in this study however is that these words can be used both predicatively and attributively. There is a different form if these words are used predicatively (cōtha and nappūdā respectively). Generally it is a matter of choice whether they are used attributively or predicatively, just as in English we can choose to say 'This is a good man' or 'This man is good'. One informant suggested that it was more subjective to use the attributive form; another suggested it was more informal. In several domains, however (health, boat, clock) it is obligatory to use the
predicative form. This is true for both good and bad. These are the same domains which, cross-linguistically, do not combine well with bad. We may ask, however, what this tells us about the range of meaning of 쓰움 in Korean, as opposed to good in English. It suggests that the range of meaning is slightly narrower (at least on the basis of these domains), and perhaps that it is more of a true antonym of nppun than good is of bad. That is perhaps the range of meaning centres mainly on the nature of something rather than the function.

Some examples of the use of 쓰움 and nppun in Korean follow:

1. a) 쓰움 nomja
   good man
   good man

   b) nppun nomja
   bad man
   bad man

2. a) 쓰움 haendo
   good deed
   good deed

   b) nppun haendo
   bad deed
   bad deed

3. a) 쓰움 sonsaenkim
   good teacher
   good teacher

   b) nppun sonsaenkim
   bad teacher
   bad teacher

4. a) 쓰움 soshik
   good news
   good news

   b) nppun soshik
   bad news
   bad news

5. a) 쓰움 hakkyo
   good school
   good school

   b) nppun hakkyo
   bad school
   bad school

6. a) 쓰움 chaek
   good book
   good book

   b) nppun chaek
   bad book
   bad book

7. a) 쓰움 huk
   good soil
   good soil

   b) nppun huk
   bad soil
   bad soil
One informant said that although 10 (a) and (d) are both contrastive, they indicate a different sort of contrast. 10 (a) means that this clock is good (not that one); 10 (d) means that this clock is bad (but I'm not sure about that one). 10 (b) is acceptable if you qualify it by giving more information, otherwise, it is like saying 'a clock is good' in English. 10 (e) is acceptable if, for example, the listener can identify which specific clock the speaker is referring to.

Korean is a good example of a language where different responses were given by different informants. The observations of three informants (two male and one female) are discussed in order to illustrate the fact that there are some areas of this study which are not clear cut. The fact that there is one word for good and one for bad, however, was not disputed but the disagreements suggest that the ranges of meaning of these words are difficult to capture.
Informant 1 gave the word *coûn* for *good* and *nappùn* for *bad*. These are the attributive forms of the words. Thus in almost all the examples it was acceptable to say *coûn X* or *nappùn X*. The exceptions were with the domains for child, health and clock. The word for child had a lexical restriction, so that instead of *coûn* the word *chakhan* was used (also attributively). In the case of health and clock, *good* couldn’t be used attributively at all. Its predicative use was acceptable with health but not clock (see examples (9) and (10) above).

The second informant said that using *cotha* (the predicative form) sounded more formal than using *coûn*, but that in some cases it was unacceptable to use the attributive form. In terms of the range of meaning which *cotha* and *nappùda* have, this informant suggested the following points. Food can be described as *good* if it is both tasty and healthy, and it can also be used if you want to indicate that you like the food. The most common opposite of *good food* is *not good food* (*anjòun umshik*). The phrase *umshik-i nappùda* (*bad food*) can be used but this is more restricted in the context that it can be used in. The food may, for example, be very greasy or bad for your health, or too salty. It is more common to say something like 'This food is salty, so is bad for you' rather than to say 'This food is bad', but it is possible to use *bad* with *food* without any specific context. Thus there is no semantic restriction on its use. For the domain *meat*, *good*, *bad* and *not good* are not generally used, although there appears to be no semantic restriction on their use. Here we have a case where both *good* and *bad* refer to more specific contexts than other lexical items, thus it can be seen that while these are the *basic* words, they are not always the most general words available when used with a particular domain. If you do use *good* with *meat* then it refers to good quality meat, for example, which is used for special occasions. It is less acceptable to say *bad meat* (*nappùn kogi*) as one would normally say spoiled or rotten meat. Interestingly, while *not good* can be used with *meat* (*anjòun kogi*), it does not refer to the quality of the meat (as *coûn kogi* does, but to the fact that the meat is not fresh. Thus even though *not good* tends to be used more often than *bad* as the exact opposite of *good*, there are examples where it is not the exact opposite because it refers to a different aspect of evaluation.

In Korean, one can say *good music*, and this could mean 'I like this music' or 'This music is generally liked by people'. *Not good* is used less often with *music*. It could be used in a context where the music was keeping people awake or generally disturbing others. Generally, however, it would be preferable to say *noisy* or *strange music*. One informant felt that *bad music* (*nappùn ûmak*) was unacceptable. It can’t refer to the melody or to the quality of the music but can refer to the content - that is if words went with the music. Thus one can say
bad song and it could only refer to the words of the song. This suggests that often the idea of a 'bad nature' is bound up with things to do with people. Thus while it is people that write both the words and the music, it is only words that are capable of expressing something bad. Music, on the other hand, can evoke certain feelings and images but can not be said to be morally offensive.

In addition to noting the domains which have some sort of restriction - be it lexical or semantic - operating on them, it is also revealing to list the domains which informants found to be particularly appropriate to use with good and bad. In this case the domains which were considered most appropriate were news, idea, habit and weather. These are the same domains which were suggested earlier as being neither inherently good nor inherently bad; or that are not supposed to be a certain way. That is, news is news whether it is good or bad, but a school is (in a sense) only a school when it produces children able to read and write and live in society.

Like informant one, the second informant gave another lexical item to be used with child instead of čoun - chakhan agi. This means beautiful or innocent child and also refers to good in the sense of inner goodness or purity. Thus čoun agi is less often used by most Korean speakers although the meanings of the two words with this domain are, according to this informant, similar. Bad child can be used and this refers more to the child being naughty than to anything evil about the child. This is similar to the use of paha with child in Finnish.

A third informant said that Korean speakers rarely say good food. They usually say tasty or delicious food. However, the morphemes of the word for delicious are glossed as taste + good. Although this informant sometimes used anjoûn (not good) instead of nappûn (bad), he also said that any time you can use anjoûn you can use nappûn. He agreed with the second informant that good music could be subjective but that bad music could never be used, for instance, to refer to someone like Beethoven, even if you personally don't like Beethoven's music. It can only refer to the words. A bad song can only mean there are obscene words in the song, just as a bad book refers to the content of the book.

To call a knife a good knife, one could only be referring to the shape of the knife - thus in this case it has a more restricted range of meaning than in English. Note also that it is not referring to the knife's function. Also a good boat (čoun pae) refers to its shape as well as its facilities and its ability to run well. A watch or clock could be described as good as long as it goes well. One would rarely say bad watch unless one was always having to repair it. A bad mother is
seldom used; it refers not to the woman's capabilities as a mother but to the fact that she is a 'loose woman' - anjoun (not good) also means this. As with other languages, to say that a teacher is not good usually means that he or she doesn't teach well (and is thus the opposite of good teacher), but to say the teacher is bad refers to the person's character rather than their function.

Thus one can see from these examples that there are slight disagreements amongst informants. However the main area of disagreement comes in how much contextualization is needed before coun and nappun can be used and generally not in whether they can be used. All informants agreed, for example, that there was a lexical restriction operating on child. While there are greater restrictions of meaning on coun and nappun than on good and bad, as well as some lexical restrictions and the need for different constructions (predicative rather than attributive) to be used with certain domains, it is still the case that Korean has one basic word for good and one for bad that can be used over and over and while there may be slight differences in the range of meaning of these words, they essentially reflect language independent concepts GOOD and BAD.

6.6. Tagalog

In Tagalog (four informants: two male, two female) one word, masama, can be used with a range of semantic domains. However, four words were given to cover the range of domains covered by good in English. These words are (1) mabait, (2) maganda, (3) mabuti and (4) magalang. In Tagalog-English dictionaries, we find that these words mean (1) virtuous, kind, friendly, (2) beautiful, (3) good, (4) courteous, respectful, well-mannered. Although only mabuti is said to correspond to the word good, both mabuti and maganda (beautiful) were needed to account for the same range of domains as good. (In other words all domains could be accounted for without using either mabait or magalang.)

There are, then, two words which are used as the opposite of masama (bad). However, it seems more plausible to suggest that mabuti has a more restricted range of meaning than good in English, rather than to suggest that there are two words in Tagalog which correspond to good.

Although there is only one word corresponding to bad, as in other languages, the more usual opposite of good is not good (hindi mabuti or hindi maganda) or another lexical item (but not just one other lexical item, so that has not been discussed here). Let us look first at the domains with which mabuti can be used.

1. a) mabuting laloki
good man
good man
b) masamang lalaki
bad man

2. a) mabuting titser/guro
    good teacher
b) hindi mabuting titser/guro
    neg. good teacher
    not good teacher
c) masamang titser
    bad teacher
    bad teacher

To say that a teacher is good at his or her job (i.e. performs his or her function well) however, magalang is used. Mabuting titser refers to the fact that the teacher is a good person. Masamang titser refer to the fact that the teacher is a bad person. Thus in Tagalog, it seems that there may be a three way distinction to be made: good in nature (mabuti), good in function (magalang), and beautiful (maganda). The interesting thing, however, is that all domains can be accounted for without using the word magalang (well-mannered, respectful) and on this basis I have excluded it from the discussion.

3. a) mabuting ina
    good mother
    good mother
b) masamang ina
    bad mother
    bad mother

4. a) mabuting balita
    good news
    good news
b) masamang balita
    bad news
    bad news

5. a) mabuting paaralan
    good school
    good school
b) masamang paaralan
    bad school
    bad school

6. a) mabuting panahon
    good weather
    good weather
b) masamang panahon
    bad weather
    bad weather

7. a) mabuting lupa
    good soil
    good soil
b) masamang lupa
8. a) mabuting kalagayan
   good health
   b) masamang kalagayan
   bad health

9. a) mabuting ugali
   good habit
   b) hindi mabuting ugali
   not good habit

10. a) mabuting anak
    good child
    b) masamang anak
    bad child

In example (10b), a child would have to be really bad before *masama* could be used.

There are a large number of domains where *mabuti* is not used (e.g. example 7), or at least where *maganda* is preferred (e.g. example 6).

11. a) magandang panaginip
    good dream
    b) masamang panaginip
    bad dream

12. a) magandang libro
    good book
    b) hindi magandang libro
    not good book
    c) masamang libro
    bad book

13. a) magandang awit
    beautiful song
    b) pangit awit
    ugly song
    c) masamang awit
    bad song

14. a) magandang araw
    good day
The fact that pangit (ugly) is considered to be the opposite of maganda (beautiful) also suggests that if we want to nominate one word for good then it would not be maganda. We would expect the opposite of masama (bad) to be the word for good. And this appears to be mabuti. In this case, however, we have to ask what it is about the meaning of mabuti that makes it unacceptable with the domains book, song, soil, food, meat, smell, taste, knife, clock, boat, and cow, and at best questionable with the domains day, weather, dream.

It can be seen that, of these domains, there are a number which can not be used with bad in other languages and sometimes not with good. That is, the domain of food often has lexical restrictions and words such as delicious or tasty are used instead of good - this is also the case in Tagalog. One generally describes food as delicious (masarap) and meat as fresh (sariwa). The senses of smell and taste are also frequently found with lexical restrictions for both good and bad and, as we have noted, objects that are primarily functional are seldom combined with bad, because bad tends to refer primarily to the nature of something and not its function. This suggests that mabuti also refers primarily to nature rather than function. The competing lexeme, maganda, means beautiful, and thus it seems that those domains which lend themselves to this sort of description, such as song, dream and weather, are commonly used with maganda rather than mabuti. Thus it is possible to argue that there is only one word for good in Tagalog and that that word is mabuti.

Masama is unacceptable with the following domains: mother, book, song, soil, day, meat, taste (except taste in clothes etc.), knife, clock, and boat. Thus these follow closely those domains with which mabuti can not be used. Thus it seems that mabuti and masama are antonyms. It should be noted, however, that while masama can be used with the other domains, it is often the case that hindi mabuti or another lexical item is preferred. That is, there are lexical preferences as well as lexical restrictions. For instance, the word mabait can also be used to describe the behaviour of people. Thus one can say mabait na bata (good boy) as well as mabuting bata. There is a also a particular lexical item which encodes good smell, which is mabango (therefore there would be no need to use mabuti here).

Although maganda means beautiful, its meaning is not restricted just to this and
it is this fact that makes analysing the data difficult. For example, one informant suggested that you could say:

15.a) Maganda ang relo
beautiful watch
good watch

b) Hindi maganda ang relo
neg beautiful watch
not good watch

c) Pangit ang relo
ugly watch
ugly watch

In example (15a) maganda can refer to the fact that either the watch is beautiful to look at or to the fact that it works well or to both these things. Hindi maganda can also refer to both these things. Pangit, however, only refers to the appearance of the watch. On the other hand a school could also be described with the words maganda and pangit. In this case the informant felt that maganda referred only to the physical appearance of the school and that pangit could refer both to its physical appearance and also to the students and teachers in the school.

In Tagalog, then, although there are two words needed to account for all of the semantic domains, it seems that it can be said that only one, mabuti, reflects the concept GOOD. Although only one word, masama, was proposed as the word corresponding to bad, its range of use is limited. Thus both mabuti and masama cover a similar range of meaning.

6.7. Conclusion

It can be seen from this chapter that, while we do have a number of consistent threads running throughout the data, the languages we have looked at are far from identical. While we can speculate on the extent to which good and bad can be considered lexical universals, the extent to which we have shared concepts GOOD and BAD, and the core meanings of these concepts, it can be seen that the addition of further information from other languages may well alter the perspective that has been taken here. As these words do seem to be lexical universals, however, and as they are difficult to define, it is worth bearing in mind that they may well be semantic primitives.

Thus, given the variations in the language families from which these examples are taken, it does seem that the similarities between the way these languages use words corresponding to good and bad are sufficient enough to allow us to propose that we do have shared concepts of GOOD and BAD. However, while the
concepts of GOOD and BAD may be perfect antonyms, it seems that in English, and many other languages, good has a wider range of meaning than bad which can be established by looking at its wider range of use.
Chapter 7
True and Right

The purpose of this chapter is to compare the value-judgment terms *true* and *right* with what has been said about the value-judgment term *good*. The assumption, made by language philosophers, that *good* reflects a concept that is shared by all people, appears to be born out by the data discussed in Chapter 6. However, the assumption that *true* also reflects a concept shared by all people is not born out by the data. *True* seems to be a concept which reflects specific cultural views. Like Hsu’s point that “the concept of personality is an expression of the western ideal of individualism” (Hsu 1985:24), rather than a concept which is applicable to all people, so *true* seems to be a concept that is relevant primarily to western ways of thinking.

From the five languages used in this sample (Thai, Korean, Indonesian, Finnish and Tagalog), we find that four of them do have two words which correspond roughly to *true* and *right*. In Indonesian, however, one word is used which corresponds roughly to these two English words. Even within the four languages which do have two words, however, there is some evidence to suggest that, while the concepts which these words reflect are similar to the concepts which the English words reflect, they are not the same. Furthermore, although the languages which are discussed here do have words which are at least similar to *true*, there are also some languages which do not have a word for *true*. For example, in The Australian language, Dyirbal, the word *yurjun* is used to refer to speaking truthfully in the sense of fulfilling a promise (e.g. *you* told us truly that you’d come tomorrow). It does not refer to facts, however, as *true* does. (Bob Dixon, personal communication) Unlike *good* and *bad*, then, *true* and *right* should not be considered as candidates for lexical universals.

It has been claimed by Frajzyngier that

“truth is the grammaticalized meaning of indicative sentences ... [and that] truth is the unmarked meaning of a very large category of sentences in many languages.” (Frajzyngier 1985:244)

Such a claim seems to assume that *truth* is a conceptual universal. The task here
is to ascertain the extent to which the adjectives *true* and *right* are candidates for lexical universals rather than to ascertain whether the noun *truth* reflects a conceptual universal. The difference between adjectives and nouns, however, becomes important when we look at languages where *true* occurs primarily as a noun and not as an adjective. In this section then, as well as illustrating the use of these words in English, we will compare the way *good* so often occurs in languages as an adjective with the way that words corresponding to *true* occur frequently as nouns as well as adjectives. We can then look at the use of similar words in Finnish, Tagalog, Thai, Korean and Indonesian.

### 7.1. The Use of *True* and *Right* in English

In this section we discuss the use of the value-judgment terms *true* and *right* in English. We also look at words that are related to these words, such are genuine, real and correct. These related words are not value-judgment terms, but they nevertheless help us to isolate the notions with which *true* and *right* are concerned. Hayakawa, for examples, notes that "right is largely interchangeable with correct, but often adds a hint of moral approval". (Hayakawa 1969:4) Thus *right* is a value-judgment term, while *correct* is not.

We can find examples in English where the three value-judgment terms (*good*, *right* and *true*) can all be substituted for one another in the same syntactic frame. The meaning of the sentence does vary but unless we also give examples of sentences where one lexeme can not be substituted for another it is difficult to pinpoint the exact nature of the differences in meaning. For example:

1. a) *What he said was good.*
   b) *What he said was true.*
   c) *What he said was right.*

I suggest that to say something that is *true* is necessarily thought of as a *good* thing in some respect, but to say something *good* it does not necessarily have to be *true*. There is a slight problem here, because we could say 'good for whom?' e.g. If someone tells another person that their mother is dead, this may be *true*, but it certainly isn't a *good* thing to happen, nor is it necessarily a good thing to say (at that particular time or to that particular person).

However, it is a cultural rather than an absolute thing to think of saying what is *true* as a *good* thing, or at least to think that saying what is *not true* is a *bad* thing. For example:

"The Anem [of New Britain] tell what Europeans call lies to selected groups for particular purposes; knowing not only that they are lying, but also that the people to whom they are lying know the fact of their lying
and the underlying motives. To a European, a lie is a lie; to the Anem, statements are made in context.” (see Lutz 1985:73)

The meaning of *good* is vaguer, or broader, than that of *true*. For example, what he said might have been funny and therefore *good*, but to say something funny or to make a joke it does not have to be *true*. In other words, so called, truth-conditions do not apply to all forms of speech acts, but only to statements. For example one could ask a question that was *good* because it highlighted a problem that had not been seen before but this could not be *true* or false just as jokes can not be *true* or false.

While *true* is used when we are referring to what is said, *right* is used when we are referring to what is done; that is, with actions. However as saying something is a type of doing something, *right* can also be used to refer to what is said. However, as we shall see, this is not the only difference. In English, *true* tends to be concerned with facts and beliefs, while *right* tends to be concerned with opinions and rules - social, moral and legal. Thus we can speak of *true* facts but not *right* facts, *right* opinions but not *true* opinions. If this is the case then we can see why *true* is related to speech and *right* is related to actions. That is, if *true* is related to reality (facts) then we can only say what reality is. In doing something it becomes reality, if you like, but to speak of doing *true* things suggests that we’re constantly monitoring everything we do.

These words are not always able to be used in exactly the same syntactic frame. One obvious point is that *right* can only be used with the definite article whereas *true* can be used with either the definite or indefinite article. Furthermore, *right* can not take a comparative form, as both *good* and, to a lesser extent, *true* can. That is, *true* can take the comparative in a negative sentence. The superlative seems to be acceptable in a particular context, i.e. in positive sentences about novels, indicating perhaps that they are ‘true to life’. For example Rusiecki gives the following example taken from a survey of English Usage by the University College, London: “This was one of the truest novels I’d ever read”. (Rusiecki 1985:138) Similarly, a quote from The New York Times on the inside cover of a 1956 edition of Ernest Hemingway’s novel *For Whom The Bell Tolls* says: “This is the best book Ernest Hemingway has written, the fullest, the deepest, the truest”.

The fact that *right* can only be used with a definite article suggests that there is only one *right* answer but several possible *true* or *good* answers. Given that *right* is concerned with opinions and *true* with facts, this certainly seems odd, and it is such apparent contradictions that are perhaps responsible for some overlap in the
meaning of the words. Nevertheless, I think we can speculate on why this is so and, therefore, move nearer to understanding the meaning of these words. The difference between *good* and *right* is pointed out in the following discussion of these terms:

"No one with the least familiarity with their uses could hold that 'right' and 'good', for example, mean the same in any of their contexts. To begin with, there are important differences in their grammatical behaviour. We talk of a 'a good X' but of 'the right X'; and in general we think it quite natural to speak of there being a large number of good X's, but odd (in most contexts) to speak of their being a large number of right X's - though of course we may speak of a large number of X's that are quite all right. It is not, therefore, surprising that 'right' has in modern English no comparative and superlative, whereas 'good' has. There are also many nouns which 'good' can qualify, and 'right' cannot, and vice versa. Thus we can speak of 'good art', but not of 'right art', and of 'good batting', but not of 'right batting'; and on the other hand, we can say 'You didn't play the right note', but 'good' could not be substituted." (Hare 1961:151-152)

As noted above, *true* can take the comparative in a negative sentence, thus we can say (2a) but not (2b).

2. a) A truer word was never spoken.
   b) A righter word was never spoken.

The fact that we say *a true story* or *the true story*, suggests that just as we can have a number of *good Xs*, we can have a number of *true Xs*. This seems counter intuitive at first, but I think it can be shown that it is the case because, just as people may differ about the qualities that go to make a *good X*, so *true* is related, not to individual opinion, as *good* and *right* can be, but certainly to different beliefs, which also have as strong a subjective element as opinions. Beliefs, however, tend to be held by groups of people, whereas opinions are held by individuals. The connection between *true* and beliefs is also made by Ross and by Russell, as the following quotations indicate:

"But beliefs have the characteristics ... of being true or false, of resting on knowledge or of being the product of wishes, hopes and fears." (Ross 1952:172)

"'Truth', we have agreed, is a property primarily of beliefs." (Russell 1940:236)

We have already said that *right* is related to opinions and *true* to facts. I suggest that beliefs are in fact related to reality. Facts and beliefs can therefore be grouped together, but we could say that beliefs are related to a different sort of reality. For example, in terms of religion, different groups of people believe different things; these beliefs are very strong and form part of the way they view
reality. Support for the view that true is concerned with beliefs comes from expressions such as true beliefs but not right beliefs or even good beliefs.

The reason that it strikes me, initially, as counter intuitive to say that we have only one 'right' but several alternative 'trues' is that true is related to truth, and while we can debate whether something is right or wrong on the basis of our opinions e.g. whether it is right to have nuclear power stations, and can accept that two people differ about whether they think it's right or wrong on the basis of how they feel about this subject, we would not debate whether or not something was true on the basis of how we felt, rather we would go and find out. Furthermore, when deciding on what is right and allowing for different opinions, we can often see two sides to the argument and thus can understand why other people see it the other way. However, if person A believes in God and person B does not, while it is simple enough for the two people to tolerate and even accept the other person's position, it is nearly impossible to really understand how they can hold something to be true (and real) that you do not. For this reason I think we can debate what is right but not what is true. At the same time, however, what is true for one person isn't necessarily true for another.

If we go back to examples 1(a), (b), and (c) it can be seen that if we change the syntactic frame we have more difficulty in using each of the words we are interested in, and, further, that we can interpret the grammatically acceptable sentence differently.

3. a) He said the good thing.
   b) He said the right thing.
   c) He said the true thing.

Example 3(a) would be acceptable if the good thing was changed to a good thing, suggesting, in this example, that there is more than one good thing that could be said. Of course, good thing can be used with the definite article in the following example:

3. d) The good thing about John is that he's never late.

Example (3c) is at best dubious because true can only be used attributively when it means something like real or genuine (thus clearly illustrating the relationship between true and reality). This will be discussed below. Perhaps the most interesting example is (3b), because, although it is a perfectly acceptable English sentence, it doesn't necessarily mean the same thing as example (1c).

1. c) What he said was right.

In example (1c) true could be substituted for right and it would be difficult to distinguish their meaning. However, in (3b) to say the right thing is more likely
to be interpreted as saying the appropriate thing for the occasion than saying what is true. Thus someone who always 'says the right thing' may have the reputation of flattering other people, rather than saying what is true. For example, by telling someone how nice they look, one could be saying the right thing but not necessarily being totally honest.

If we change the definite article to indefinite in example (3) we have the following:

4. a) He said a good thing.
   b) He said a right thing.
   c) He said a true thing.

We find, for the reasons put forward earlier, that (b) and (c) are less than acceptable; (b) is ungrammatical because right can not be used with an indefinite article, and (c) is dubious because true is only used attributively when it has the restricted, but related, meaning of real.

Someone who always 'says the right thing', it was noted, did not always tell the truth, thus lending weight to the idea that right is concerned with rules or appropriate behaviour. In contrast, if someone is said to always 'do the right thing' then we would accept that this is exactly what he does. In other words there is a difference between saying the right thing and doing the right thing. To say the right thing may refer to what is appropriate rather than what is morally right. In the following examples it can be seen that neither good nor true are acceptable, but the grounds on which they are unacceptable differ.

5. a) He did the good thing.
   b) He did the right thing.
   c) He did the true thing.

Note that if we change the article from definite to indefinite good is acceptable in the sentence, presumably because, just as there is more than one good thing that could be said, there is more than one good thing that could be done. True, however, remains unacceptable.

6. a) He did a good thing.
   b) He did a true thing.

If we change the syntactic frame we see that while good and right can be used with actions, true can not be. It is because true is concerned with reality and beliefs that this is the case.

7. a) What he did was good.
   b) What he did was right.
   c) What he did was true.

True is used only when referring to what has been said, as in the examples above, and in the following example.
8. a) He told us a good story.
   b) He told us a true story.

If we use a definite article in these sentences the emphasis changes from being on either the adjective or noun to being only on the adjective.

9. a) He told us the good story.
   b) He told us the true story.

In other words, in example (9a) it is only the adjective that is being contrasted (either good or bad; either true or false) whereas in (8) it could be the adjective (either good or bad) or the noun (story or song - except that you sing songs and tell stories). Example (9a) may suggest, for example, that of the stories the listeners know, they all agree that there is one that is particularly good in relation to the others. Example (9b) suggests that either it is the true story of something that the listeners have some knowledge about, e.g. He told us the true story of Florence Nightingale, or it is the truth about something that has happened which has previously been kept secret, e.g. He told us the true story of his birth. In both (a) and (b) there is the assumption that the listeners had some prior knowledge in one way or another, while in example (8) there is no such assumption.

In examples (8) and (9) true was used attributively. There appears to be no change in meaning if it is used predicatively in this context but, while (9c) sounds perfectly acceptable, (8c) sounds a little less so.

8. c) A story he told us was true.
9. c) The story he told us was true.

Example (8c) would be more acceptable if it read:

8. d) One of the stories he told us was true.

Aside from the fact that stories are told and therefore refer to what has been said, it appears that it is possible to use true attributively with story when the meaning of true is very close to genuine or real and it is when it has this meaning that true can be used attributively (remember however that one still can not speak of true actions because actions are already real).

10. a) He's a true friend.
    b) He's a real friend.
    c) He's a good friend.

Note that right can not be used in this way.

10. d) He's a right friend.

There are further constraints on the use of true.
11. a) He was the right man for the job.
   b) He was the true man for the job.

Example (11b) is unacceptable even though we can say:

12. a) He was a true man.

The reason for this seems to be because if we are saying that, when used attributively, the meaning of true is similar to that of real then something is either real or not. It does not depend on its purpose. But things may be right for a particular purpose just as they can be good for a particular purpose. This also seems to be the reason why we can debate such things as whether or not it is right to have nuclear power stations, for it may depend on what purpose they have whether someone sees them as right or wrong.

It can be seen, then, that true can only refer to what has been said when it is used predicatively. It can also have a meaning similar to real and in this case it can be used attributively and does not have to refer only to what has been said (but it can not refer to actions). This is clearly because real does not have to refer only to what has been said.

We can also note that while something can be morally right or morally good, we can not say that something is morally true. Further, while we can say that something is good for X or right for X we can not say something is true for X (note that this is different from being true of X).

One word that we often think of as a synonym for right in English is correct.

13. a) He gave the right answer.
   b) He gave the correct answer.

Correct could be substituted for right in most of the examples given so far with little or no change in their meaning. However, as we noted earlier, correct does not have a moral aspect to its meaning. This can be seen in the following example. While correct can be substituted for right the meaning is not always the same.

18. a) What he did was right.
   b) What he did was correct.

Example (18b) suggests that according to certain rules he did the right thing, but it might not have been objectively right, or morally right; it might not have been the best thing to do. For example, if a cafe displays a sign saying that only properly attired customers will be served then it may be the correct thing to turn away a weather-beaten, unkempt tramp, but it may not be morally right.
Given the complexity of the relationship between the meanings of *good*, *true* and *right* it has been necessary to try to avoid using examples with definite and indefinite articles when asking informants for words which correspond to these value-judgment terms. It has also been necessary to avoid the attributive use of these terms so that the distinction is made between their use to describe what has been said and what has been done rather than their similarity to terms such as *real* and *correct*. Thus informants were asked to translate sentences in the following syntactic frames: 'What he said was X' and 'What he did was X'. Using these frames it was possible to establish whether words which informants said corresponded to *true* and *right* were used with speech or actions or both.

### 7.2. Adjectives and Nouns

One of the difficulties of comparing *true* and *right* across languages is that they do not always occur as adjectives. This contrasts with the way that *good* generally occurs as an adjective, even in languages with a very small adjective class.

Let us look briefly at what has been said about the differences between nouns and adjectives. We noted earlier that there was a relationship between the noun *goodness* and the adjective *good*. What does this difference in the part of speech indicate? Wierzbicka has said that:

"...if one 'quality concept' acquires two designations, one nominal and one adjectival, it is not because the part-of-speech status doesn't matter, semantically, but because the concept in question splits into two, related, but not identical concepts, one of which is semantically more suited to being designated by a noun than by an adjective." (Wierzbicka 1986:355)

When we look at *goodness* and *good*, for example, it seems plausible that the notion of *nature* applies to both the noun and the adjective but that for *goodness*, *nature* is limited to things closely associated with people. Wierzbicka also makes the point that, in terms of human characteristics, an adjective indicates a description rather than something permanent and important and that:

"a description implies the presence of a number of characteristics, all on the same level of importance." (Wierzbicka 1986:358)

The notion of a description, which includes a number of characteristics, also applies to words such as *good* and *true* and *right*. *Good*, for example, can refer to both *nature* and *function* in English, and words which correspond to *good* in other languages can refer to *beauty* as well as *nature*. Several characteristics are also associated with *true* and with *right*. As we have seen, *true* is concerned both
with facts and beliefs and right is concerned with opinions and rules. Where languages employ a noun truth rather than an adjective true, then, we assume there is some difference in the concept which the word reflects in that it does not reflect a set of features.

In addition to the existence of words corresponding to good, in the languages surveyed in Chapter 6, we can find examples from secondary sources which further support the claim that words reflecting a shared concept GOOD have widespread distribution throughout the world's languages and that they generally occur as adjectives. We have already noted Dixon's point that the semantic content of adjectives is "fairly constant from language to language". He says, for example, that:

"Languages that have only a limited class of adjectives show considerable similarity in the concepts that are expressed through adjectives." (Dixon 1982:3)

GOOD is one concept which is generally expressed through adjectives. But what do we do when there doesn't appear to be an adjective which reflects this concept and what do we do about languages which do not draw a clear distinction between either nouns and adjectives or verbs and adjectives? Little was said about the fact that in some of the languages surveyed in Chapter 6 the words for good and bad were stative verbs, but, as we saw in Chinese, for example, there was no difficulty in comparing the attributive use of good from English into Chinese. In fact, as Lyons has pointed out, there are greater similarities between adjectives and stative verbs than between stative and action verbs:

"In general treatments of the 'parts of speech', 'adjectives' are frequently said to denote 'qualities', and 'verbs' are classified... as either 'stative' or 'action' (according to whether they denote a 'state' or an 'action'). From this point of view, it is clear that 'adjectives' and 'stative verbs' are more similar than are 'stative' and 'action verbs'." (Lyons 1966:221)

Wierzbicka deals with the problem posed by languages which do not have clear adjective classes as follows:

"The difference in the semantic structure between 'nouns' and 'adjectives' can be expected to be reflected somewhere in the syntactic behaviour of the two hypothetical classes, so that the difference in meaning will be reflected in some aspects of the grammatical behaviour, if not in the grammatical form." (Wierzbicka 1986:381)

This is born out by the data. That is, although differences in the part of speech are important and reflect differences in the meanings of words, if the syntactic behaviour is similar then there is some basis for saying that these words reflect shared concepts. However, if adjectives form a large class in a particular language,
and that language expresses a word which is expressed by an adjective in some languages, as a noun, then presumably there is a semantic reason for this. We would therefore hesitate to say that words which varied in the part of speech to which they belong reflected exactly the same concept if there are no grammatical grounds for this difference.

To illustrate the widespread distribution of words which correspond to good and bad throughout the world's languages let us look at some examples from language families which were not included in the survey in Chapter 6. It wasn't always clear from the sources what part of speech these words belong to, but where this information is known, it provides supporting evidence for the fact that good generally occurs as an adjective.

In Tagalog and Indonesian there are separate lexical items which correspond to beautiful which are used with a number of domains in the way that good can be used in English. In some languages, while there is only one word corresponding to good, this has aspects of nature and beauty rather than nature and function as good does in English. For example, Boas notes of the American Indian language, Takelma, that:

"A considerable number of adjectives are primitive in form, i.e. not capable of being derived from simpler nominal or verbal stems. Such are ... dû - good, beautiful." (Boas 1922:259)

On the other hand the 'word' corresponding to bad in Takelma is a suffix -ts!.

Here, then, we have an example of words which correspond to good and bad being syntactically asymmetrical.

Another Mayan language (in addition to Mam, which we looked at earlier) which has a word corresponding to good is Jacaltec. According to Day c'ul (good) is a stative verb. (Day 1973:77) Carib, a language spoken by South American Indians in Guiana, is said to have a small adjective class which includes words which correspond to good (yu?pa) and bad (ya?wa:me). (Hoff 1968:260)

On the other hand, Xhosa has an adjective corresponding to bad, but not to good.

"Xhosa has 'pretty/beautiful' and 'bad/ugly' ... but the adjective class has no term glossed simply 'good'." (Dixon 1982:7)

However, Xhosa does have a derived adjective (lungile), derived from the verb lunga which corresponds to good, right, ready. (McLaren 1963) Another source defines lungile as an adjective meaning good quality - both material and moral. (Stewart 1969)
Hausa also has an adjective for bad: mugu (masc.), mugunya (fem.) and miyagu (pl.). According to Taylor, in Hausa:

"Adjectives proper are either simple or compound. Simple Adjectives are comparatively few." (Taylor 1959:47)

In Hausa, bad is a simple adjective. However, adjectives can also be formed in several different ways. Thus the noun goodness (kyau) becomes the adjective good (da kyau). Thus the fact that good does not occur as an adjective is not, of itself, sufficient to say that there is no shared concept GOOD. The fact remains, however, that words corresponding to good occur overwhelmingly in the adjective class, even when this class is very small. But when there are no adjectives, or in the rare case when one of the few adjectives is not good there is still evidence to suggest that there is some lexicalization of a shared concept GOOD which centres on the meaning of nature.

Welmers notes that:

"In almost all Niger-Congo languages which have a class of adjectives, the class is rather small, and many concepts expressed by adjectives in European languages are expressed by other kinds of constructions using nouns or verbs or both." (Welmers 1973:250)

In Yoruba, for example,

"qualificative attributives ... are reduplicated forms derived from verbs or also used as verbs. This, however, is only one aspect of the use of reduplicated forms, and such forms cannot simply be called adjectives." (Welmers 1973:257)

The word corresponding to good (dáadáa) is reduplicated in this way. We would not, however, want to say that there was no word in Yoruba which reflected the concept GOOD.

Another Niger-Congo language, Igbo, has both good and bad as adjectives. Some Bantu languages, says Welmers, do not have adjectives but as we see in the Bantu language, LoNkundo, there are words for goodness and badness - b l’tsi and bóbé respectively.

"These ... nouns take the noun prefix of the head noun in the construction if that noun is in class 2 or 6 (for both of which the prefix is /ba-/). They nevertheless remain independent nouns, with which they must be in an associative construction, but they enter into a form of concord with the head noun. Thus:

banto ba bɔl’tsi good people
bana ba bɔbɛ bad children
yomba ya bɔl’tsi a good thing (abstract)
...
it is clear and highly important that the final words in the phrases cited above are nouns, and not adjectives as the English translations might suggest. The formula for all of them is 'a thing associated with a quality', and the words expressing quality are nouns." (Welmers 1973:274)

Thus although bsl̃tsi differs from good in that one is a noun and the other is an adjective, semantically they are similar to the extent that they can both be used to express a quality. And further, as Wierzbicka suggests, the behaviour of the noun and the adjective is similar, thus suggesting similarity of meaning.

We have seen then from these few American Indian and African languages that firstly, words corresponding to good are generally adjectives, secondly, that although it is sometimes a noun, there are arguments in favour of saying that these nouns reflect the concept GOOD.

A distinction should be drawn between languages which have small or no adjective classes (and which do not therefore include good and true) and those languages which have a large number of adjectives but where good is an adjective and true is a noun.

Unlike GOOD, which seems to be a language independent concept, TRUE seems to be culture specific. Thus while the English word true has similarities with words in other languages, it is difficult to find correspondences that have exactly the same range of meaning or a stable, core meaning. The fact that true and right overlap in English itself suggests that true is not a clearly delimited concept. If we look at evidence from American Indian languages we find interesting similarities and differences there too. Commenting on words for real, true and genuine in American Indian languages late last century, Gatschet has said:

"The terms for 'true' or 'genuine' in most of the idioms mentioned are simultaneously adjectives and adverbs and curiously enough, with a slight change in pronunciation or suffixation they also mean 'man' or 'Indian'. ...

The two words chiefly used by [the Algonquians], leni... and inini... both stand for 'man' and 'genuine' with their various synonyms... Of the Delaware dialects... lenno... is 'man, 'male', 'Indian' and lenni 'genuine', 'pure', 'real', 'original'. ...

In Mohawk... the term owe, 'true' corresponds to leni and inini of Algonquian dialects, but it also includes permanence, stability, perpetuity, immutability and is used adverbially as well. ...

[The Kiowa]... do not use a special word to express 'real', 'principal' or 'true', but they append a suffix -hi... for the purpose. ...

the Selish dialect... in British Columbia, expresses the idea of 'real' or
'genuine' by the suffix -o' and the Kwakiutl of British Columbia, by
-kyao. These terms show no affinity, however, with the word for 'man' or
'Indian'." (Gatschet 1899:159-161)

The diversity illustrated here is paralleled when we compare true and right in
English with true and right in other languages. That is, as we noted in the
previous section, there are different aspects to the meanings of these words - some
of which occur in other languages. The grouping of these aspects differ, however,
and, as in these American Indian languages, the part of speech to which they
belong also differ. Thus although there is similarity in the ideas expressed, we do
not find sufficient overlap to say that these words reflect a shared concept.

7.3. True and Right in Other Languages

The languages used to collect information on words corresponding to true and
right are Finnish, Tagalog, Thai, Korean and Indonesian. These languages were
chosen after a pilot study which tested the existence of words similar to true and
right in 10 of the 15 languages studied in Chapter 6. Finnish, Tagalog and Thai
were chosen, in part, because they were the languages which exhibited the greatest
differences from other languages in respect of good and bad. Thai and Korean
were chosen as examples of languages where true was used as a noun rather than
an adjective. Indonesian was chosen because it was the only example of a
language where the same word could be used to correspond roughly to true and
right. These languages were also chosen on the basis of the availability of
informants, and their willingness to spend time discussing their language. Two
informants were used from each language, except Indonesian, where three
informants were used.

To gather information on words corresponding to true and right in Finnish,
Tagalog, Thai, Korean and Indonesian, informants were first asked to translate four
sentences from English which tested whether a word corresponding to true could
only be used with what was said and whether a word corresponding to right could
be used both with what was said and what was done. The English sentences used
were the following.

1. What he said was true.
2. What he did was true.
3. What he said was right.
4. What he did was right.

In Finnish, the adjective totta corresponds to true and the adjective oikein
corresponds to right. Like the English word true, totta could only be used with
what was said, and, like the English word right, oikein could be used with what
was said and what was done.
In Tagalog the word corresponding to true is totoo and the word corresponding to right is tama. Thus:

1. Ang sinabi niya ang totoo.
   What he said was true.
2. Ang ginowo niya ang totoo.
   What he did was true.
3. Ang sinabi niya ang tama.
   What he said was right.
4. Ang ginowo niya ang tama.
   What he did was right.

Korean follows the same pattern. The word for true is sashil, which is a noun, and the word for right is oltha, which is a stative verb.

1. ku-go malhan ko-un sashiri-i-ot-to.
   What he said was true.
2. ku-go han ir-un sashiri-i-ot-to.
   What he did was true.
3. ku-go malhan ko-un or-at-to.
   What he said was right.
4. ku-go han ir-un or-at-to.
   What he did was right.

In addition to the fact that sashil is a noun, which suggests some difference in the range of meaning between true and sashil, there is a difference in the range of meaning of oltha and right. That is, in English, the meaning of right includes the aspects of morally right and of correct. In Korean, however, olta (or-at-ta) only has a moral sense in these sentences. To indicate the meaning of correct in example (3) one would have to use the word correct (mas-at-ta). Furthermore, in example (4) mas-at-ta would be unacceptable - indicating that one can not do something correct but only say something correct.

Thai also distinguishes between saying what is true (ciig) and doing what is right (thuuk), which can be seen in the following examples:

1. sig thiil khaw phuut pen ciig
   What he said was true.
2. ?sig thiil khaw thom pen ciig
   What he did was true.
3. khaw phuut thuuk.
   What he said was right.
4. khaw thom thuuk.
   What he did was right.

In example (3), thuuk (right) must refer to the sense of correct, rather than morally right.

Thus, in each of these languages a distinction is drawn between saying what is true and doing what is right.
In Indonesian, we find that one word, *benar*, can be used in all four sentences. Thus:

1. Apo yang telah dia katakan adalah benar.
   What he said was true.
2. Apa yang telah dia lakukan adalah benar.
   What he did was true.
3. Apa yang telah dia katakan adalah benar.
   What he said was right.
4. Apa yang telah dia lakukan adalah benar.
   What he did was right.

*Benar* is used to say something *true* and to do something *true*, to say something *right* and to do something *right*. Different informants gave different sentence constructions, but all said that *benar* would be used in each sentence. For example:

1a. Apo yang dikatakannya adalah benar.
   What he said was true/right.
2a. Apa yang dilakukannya adalah benar.
   What he did was true/right.

and

1b. Benar, apa yang telah dia katakan.
   What he said was true/right.
2b. Benar, apa yang telah dia lakukan.
   What he did was true/right.

The word *betul* can also be used in examples (1) and (3), but this means that what was said was correct.

On the basis of this evidence alone, we would not want to say that *true* and *right* reflect language independent concepts. In addition to testing whether these languages have words, corresponding to *true*, which can only be used with what is said, we can also test whether a word which is said to correspond to *true* is concerned with facts and whether a word which is said to correspond to *right* is concerned with opinions.

In order to test whether *totta*, *totoo*, *sashil*, *cig* and *benar* are concerned with facts and whether *oikein*, *tama*, *olta*, *thuuk* and *benar* are concerned with opinions, the following sentences were used.

1. It is right to give money to the poor.
2. It is not right to hit children.
3. It is not right to smoke cigarettes.
4. It is right to obey your parents.
5. It is not right to tell lies.

Each of these sentences is concerned with opinion rather than fact, and, except for sentence (3), there is a moral element involved. If we substitute *true* for *right* in each of these sentences, they become unacceptable.

1. *It is true to give money to the poor.
2. *It is not true to hit children.
3. *It is not true to smoke cigarettes.
4. *It is not true to obey your parents.
5. *It is not true to tell lies.*
What we want to see, then, is whether the words corresponding to right in Finnish, Tagalog, Korean, Thai and Indonesian are acceptable in these sentences, and whether the words corresponding to true are unacceptable.

In Finnish we find that oikein (right) would be used in all of these sentences whereas totta (true) would be unacceptable. In Finnish, then, there is a correlation between oikein and opinions and not between totta and opinions.

In Tagalog, tarna (right) is used in each of the sentences, but totoo (true) is unacceptable. In sentence (3), however, it would be better to say masama (bad), than to negate tama because smoking cigarettes does not harm other people. This suggests that tama is concerned primarily with a moral element and has a narrower range of meaning than right does in English.

In Korean, otta (right) is used in each of these sentences and sashil (true) is unacceptable. In Thai thuuk (right) is used, but cig can not be used. In Finnish, Tagalog, Korean and Thai, therefore, the word corresponding to true can not be used for opinions.

Indonesian informants, however, gave less consistent information. Three informants gave benar (true/right), betul (correct), baik (good), and tepat (exact, appropriate) as possible substitutes for right in sentences 1-5. For sentence (1) (It is right to give money to the poor.), informant 1 said benar should be used and that betul (correct) sounded odd; informant 2 said benar and baik (good) were acceptable, but that the best word was tepat (appropriate); informant 3 suggested only tepat.

For sentence 2 (It is not right to hit children), each of the informants said that benar was the right word to use, but informant 2 said that baik (good) could also be used. For sentence 3 (It is not right to smoke cigarettes), only informant 3 accepted benar; informants 1 and 2 said that baik would be used and not benar because the sentence is concerned with a person’s health and not a moral issue. In this sense, the Tagalog word tama is similar to benar.

For sentence 4 (It is right to obey your parents) informants 1 and 2 said that both baik (good), and benar (true/right) were acceptable, but that betul (correct) was unacceptable. Informant 3, on the other hand, said that betul was the appropriate word.

For sentence 5 (It is not right to tell lies), all three informants said that benar was acceptable; informants 1 and 2 said that baik was also acceptable. This
sentence has the strongest moral implication and thus it seems that benar is best used in such situations.

It can be seen, then, that there is some disagreement about using benar and betul, and that in certain cases there is a tendency to use baik as well as benar. However, for sentences 6-10, which are concerned with facts, baik was never suggested instead of benar, although betul could also be used (because it means correct).

6. It is true that the sun comes up in the morning.
7. It is true that J.F. Kennedy died in 1963.
8. It is true that people die if they never eat any food.
9. It is true that in summer it is hotter than in winter.
10. It is true that fish live in water.

If we substitute right for true in these sentences, they would not be completely acceptable. The reason that they are partially acceptable is because, in English, right can also be used to mean correct, and on this reading they are not totally wrong. However, if we changed the sentences to 'It is right to say X', they would be acceptable.

6. It is right that the sun comes up in the morning.
7. It is right that J.F. Kennedy died in 1963.
8. It is right that people die if they never eat any food.
9. It is right that in summer it is hotter than in winter.
10. It is right that fish live in water.

In this second set of sentences we find that the Finnish word totta is like true, in that totta would be used in each of them but oikein would not.

In Tagalog totoo true would be used, but not tama (unless it was used in the sense of correct).

In Korean sashil (true) would be used whereas the acceptability of olla would be doubtful. Like English, however, if the word for correct (mat-ta) was used, it would be acceptable. Furthermore, sashil is a noun, rather than an adjective, suggesting that it reflect a slightly different concept from true.

In Thai, ciŋ is also a noun. It can be used in each of these sentences. Thuuk, on the other hand, could not.

In Indonesian informants disagreed between the acceptability of benar and betul. One informant said that betul was acceptable for each of the sentences, and that benar was unacceptable. A second informant said that benar was acceptable for each of them and a third thought that benar and betul were acceptable for sentences (6) and (9) and that betul was acceptable for (7), (8) and (10).
seems that the discrepancy here results from wanting to say that these things are facts and therefore, what is being said is correct. However, the fact that benar was considered unacceptable at all suggests that this word does not relate to facts in the way that true does in English.

There does seem to be similarity of meaning between words corresponding to true and right across languages, therefore, but the similarity is insufficient to persuade us that either true or right are language universals. They therefore appear to reflect language specific rather than language independent concepts.

One can see from these examples that true and right can not be compared as easily from one language to another as good and bad and further that although there are similarities between words in other languages that could be said to correspond to these English words, in fact their range of use and meaning is sufficiently different that we would say that these words reflect concepts which are culture specific. Before we can say that words reflect a shared concept we must establish whether they have the same (or nearly the same) range of meaning by looking at the way they are used.

The point of looking at true and right has been to compare them with good. All three are value-judgment terms, worthy of discussion by linguists and philosophers. Of these three, however, it can be seen that good is by far the most basic, the most simple, because it is a word which reflects a concept that is shared by many other languages. The concepts reflected by the words true and right in English, do not seem to be shared exactly by other languages, although there are clearly aspects of the meaning of these words that are found in other languages.
Chapter 8

Conclusion

The task of this thesis has been to establish the extent to which the value-judgment terms *good*, *bad*, *right* and *true* can be considered lexical universals. We can conclude from this study that both *good* and *bad* are candidates for lexical universals. This suggests that these words reflect concepts which are language independent. However, *true* and *right* can not be considered as lexical universals. Rather, they reflect concepts which are culture specific.

In the process of establishing that *good* and *bad* were possible lexical universals, it was noted that *good*, in English, had a wider range of use and range of meaning than *bad*. This was thought to result from the fact that the meaning of *good* was concerned with the notions of *nature* and *function*, while the meaning of *bad* was concerned primarily with *nature*. This distinction is also made in many other languages. The notion of *function*, however, is not necessarily relevant to all languages.

The range of use of *good* and *bad* - established by testing whether each word could be used in conjunction with a set of different semantic domains - was not identical across languages. Words corresponding to *good*, however, exhibited less variation in their range of use than did words corresponding to *bad*. Lexical restrictions accounted for some differences in the range of use of these words. However, following Wittgenstein's suggestion to look at the use of a word in order to establish its meaning, we noted that the differences in the range of use of words corresponding to *good* and *bad*, suggested differences in the range of meaning.

Differences in the range of meaning were also established by looking at the context in which a word (e.g. *bad*) could be used with a particular domain. Some difference in the range of use and the range of meaning, however, does not automatically indicate that languages do not share the concepts GOOD and BAD. We saw, for example, that, in general, the domains with which words corresponding to *bad* could be used were those with referents which had no *function*. Thus, despite the differences, there was a core range of use and range
of meaning (related to the **nature** of the domain being modified) which existed. Thus the information from this study suggests that there are language independent concepts GOOD and BAD. Furthermore, while in many languages, including English, *good* has a wider range of meaning than *bad*, there is some evidence to suggest that the shared concepts, which these words reflect, are perfect antonyms.

We looked at five languages to see the extent to which *true* and *right*, which are also value-judgment terms, could be considered lexical universals. Although four of these languages had words which were similar to *true* and *right*, it was noted that one language, Indonesian, had only one word which corresponded roughly to these two English words. Furthermore, although we had no examples in the study of languages where no word corresponding to *true* existed, it was noted that such languages existed (e.g. the Australian language, Dyirbal).

Of the four languages which did have words similar to *true* and *right*, in two of them we found that the words corresponding to *true* were nouns rather than adjectives. Semantically, there is a difference between what is expressed by nouns and adjectives. Therefore, there are some grounds for suggesting that the concepts which these words reflect differ.

We have looked at four value-judgment terms which have, individually, been the subject of considerable discussion by language philosophers. It was suggested in the introduction that many assumptions have been made about the meanings of these words by philosophers, logicians and semanticists. By taking a cross-linguistic approach to the study of these words, I suggest that some light has been shed on their meaning and, more specifically, their use across languages.

Clearly, the approach taken here is only a beginning. A more thorough understanding of these words would result from a more detailed study of individual languages. Furthermore, although an attempt has been made to include a variety of languages in this study, before we can categorically state that *good* and *bad* are lexical universals we would want to include more languages in our study. Despite the limitations of this thesis, however, we have been able to test, and in some cases verify, the assumptions made about these words by philosophers. Therefore, we have been able to illustrate the value of a linguistic approach to the study of philosophical problems.
References


